alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Employment Agreement dated December 3, 2007- Star Gas and Steven J. Goldman



 Exhibit 10.24 
 

 
 December 3, 2007 
 Mr. Steven J. Goldman 
 Dear Steve: 
 This letter confirms your promotion to the position of Senior Vice President of Operations of Star Gas Partners, L.P. and its subsidiaries (the “Partnership”), effective as of May 31, 2007. We are
pleased to offer you the following compensation package and other terms, the levels and conditions of which will be in effect during your employment, unless otherwise modified by agreement between you and the Partnership. 
 Base Salary: Your base annual salary will be $275,000 per year. You will be paid $11,458.33 semi-monthly subject to withholding of all
applicable taxes and benefit deductions. 
 Benefit Coverage: You will be eligible to participate in the Partnership’s
benefits plans in accordance with their terms and conditions. 
 Terms: It is understood that your employment is at will and
that either party can terminate the relationship at any time. If the Partnership terminates your employment for reasons other than for cause, or you terminate your employment for good reason, you will be entitled to one year’s salary as
severance. In consideration of this offer you agree that while you are an employee of the Partnership and for twelve months thereafter, you will not compete with the Partnership nor become involved either as an employee, as a consultant or in any
other capacity, in the sale of heating oil or propane on a retail basis. You agree that you will not reveal any confidential information concerning the Partnership and that you will not solicit, nor seek to hire, employees of the Partnership during
that time. 
 Please indicate your acceptance of this offer by signing and dating this letter below. 
 Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call me. 
  

	
	Sincerely,
	
	  
	Daniel P. Donovan
	President and Chief Executive Officer

  

			
	Accepted:	 	
		
	  	 	  
	Steven J. Goldman	 	Date
## I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S O F T E X A S NO. WR-82,489-02

EX P ARTE ANDRE AM ERSON, App licant

ON AP P LICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORP US CAUSE NO. D-1-D C-10-204966 IN THE 147 DISTRICT COURT T H F ROM TRAVIS COUNTY

Per curiam . O R D E R Pursuant to the provisi o n s o f Ar t icle 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e, the cler k of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habea s corpus. Ex parte Y oung , 418 S.W .2d 824, 826 (Te x . C ri m . App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of ag g rava ted robber y and sente nced to thirty

y ear s’ imprisonment. Applicant contends that his counsel render ed ineffec tive assistance beca use counsel failed to timely file a notice of appe al. Applicant has alleg ed fac ts that, if true, might entitle him to relief

. Strickland v. W

ashington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Ex parte Patterson , 993 S.W .2d 114, 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Ex parte Axe l , 757 S.W .2d 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). I n these circ umstances, additional fac ts are neede d.2

As we held in Ex parte Rodriguez , 334 S.W .2d 294, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960), the trial cour t is the appropr iate forum for finding s of fac t. The trial cou rt s h al l order counsel to respond to Applicant’s claim of ineffe ctive assistance of counsel. The trial court may use any means set out in T E X . C O D E C R I M . P R O C . art. 11.07, § 3(d)

. I f the trial c ourt elec ts to hold a hearing , it sha ll de termine whether Applicant is indige nt. I f Applicant is indige nt and wishes to be repr es en t ed by counsel, the trial court shall appoint an attorney to repre sent Applicant a t the hear ing. T E X . C O D E C R I M . P R O C . art. 26.04. The trial court shall make findings as to whether Applicant informed counsel of his desire to appea l. The trial court shall make finding s of fac t and conclusions of law as to whether Applicant

was denied his rig ht to a meaning ful appea l beca use Applicant’s counsel failed to timely file a notice of appeal. The trial court shall also make any other findings of fact a nd conclusions of law that it deems re levant and a

ppropriate to the dispositi on of Applica nt’s claim for ha

beas c orpus re lief. This application will be held in abey ance until the trial court has resolved the fac t issues. The issues shall be resolved within 90 day s of this order

. A supplemental t ra n s cr i p t containing all aff idavits and int err og atories or the t ransc ription of t he court repor ter’s notes from any hear ing or deposition, along with the trial court’ s supplemental finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law, shall be for war ded to this Court withi n 120 day s of t he date of t his order

. Any extensions of ti me shall be obtained f

rom this Court.

Filed: January

14, 2015 Do not publish
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<PAGE>

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<CGS>                                          319,021
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                86,779
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 1,509
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               7,481
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 21,444
<INCOME-TAX>                                     7,690
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             13,754
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<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    13,033
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.09
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.09
        

</TABLE>
#### Magdalene Tikun TEBA, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, U.S. Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 04-60881

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 22, 2006.

*514Uche Mgbaraho, Houston, TX, for Petitioner.

Thomas Ward Hussey, Director, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Andrew Cunningham MacLachlan, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Caryl G. Thompson, U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Service, District Directors Office, New Orleans, LA, Sharon A. Hudson, U.S. Citizenship *&*Immigration Services, Houston, TX, for Respondent.

Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, pro se.

Before BARKSDALE, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Magdalene Tikun Teba petitions for review of an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying her motion to reopen. Teba contends that her right to due process was violated because the immigration judge (IJ) failed to fully inform her of her right to seek an adjustment of status based on her marriage to a United States citizen in accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2) and that the BIA improperly relied on facts not supported by the record. Teba also argues that she failed to comply with the order to voluntarily depart due to ineffective assistance of counsel. She contends that this constitutes exceptional circumstances excusing her failure to comply such that she should not be barred from seeking an adjustment of status.

We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. *Manzano-Garda v. Gonzales,*413 F.3d 462, 469 (5th Cir.2005). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Teba’s motion to reopen because the BIA determined that Teba was advised of her right to seek an adjustment of status based on her marriage but that she elected to forgo this application until after her asylum hearing. Given this fact, Teba’s reliance on 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2) to establish a due process violation based on the alleged failure to inform her of the availability of such relief is misplaced. *See Ahmed v. Gonzales,*447 F.3d 433, 440 (5th Cir.2006) (holding that because an application for adjustment of status is a request for discretionary relief, it does not create a liberty or property interest that is protected by due process). Likewise, Teba’s assertions of ineffective assistance do not excuse her failure to *515comply with the order to voluntarily depart because the exceptional circumstances excuse that she relies on was repealed by Congress and is no longer provided for by statute. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1229c. Additionally, any failure to preserve the ability to pursue discretionary relief does not implicate due process. *See Ahmed,*447 F.3d at 440; *Assaad v. Ashcroft,*378 F.3d 471, 475 (5th Cir.2004).

The petition *for review is*DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Consent
of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm











We hereby
consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on Form S-8
(No.  333-154708), of Arabian American Development Company’s Stock
Option Plan for Key Employees and Arabian American Development Company
Non-Employee Director Stock Option Plan of our report dated March
13, 2009 (which reports an unqualified opinion), with respect to the
consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedules of Arabian
American Development Company for the years
ended December  31, 2008, 2007, and 2006, and
the  effectiveness  of  internal  control  over  financial  reporting  as
of December 31, 2008,  included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K)
for the year ended December 31, 2008.








/s/Travis,Wolff
& Company, L.L.P. (also known as Moore Stephens TravisWolff,
L.L.P.)







Dallas,
Texas


March 13,
2009
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Lee BOYD, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-6879.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Oct. 31, 2006.

Decided: Nov. 6, 2006.

John Lee Boyd, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Frank DeArmon Whitney, United States *319Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

John Lee Boyd, Jr., seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his Fed. R. CivJP. 60(b) motion for reconsideration of the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000); *Reid v. Angelone,*369 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir.2004). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. *Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir.2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Boyd has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
96-1627.

#### State v. Tucker.

Shelby App. No. 17-95-10. On motion for appointment of counsel Thomas A. Ballato. *Sua sponte,*motion remanded to the court of appeals for appointment of counsel.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2846 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2846

To authorize the issuance of United States War Bonds to aid in funding 
               of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            December 8, 2009

 Mr. Nelson of Nebraska introduced the following bill; which was read 
  twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
                                Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To authorize the issuance of United States War Bonds to aid in funding 
               of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``United States War Bonds Act of 
2009''.

SEC. 2. PURPOSE.

    The purpose of this Act is to authorize the issuance of United 
States War Bonds to aid in the funding of the operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.

SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF UNITED STATES WAR BONDS.

    Section 3102 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding 
at the end the following:
    ``(f) Issuance of United States War Bonds.--
            ``(1) In general.--The Secretary is authorized to issue 
        bonds under this section, to be known as `United States War 
        Bonds', to aid in the funding of the operations in Iraq and 
        Afghanistan.
            ``(2) Form.--The bonds authorized by paragraph (1) shall be 
        in such form and denominations, and shall be subject to such 
        terms and conditions of issue, conversion, redemption, 
        maturation, payment, and rate of interest as the Secretary may 
        prescribe.''.
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
0 MEANS NOT APPLICABLE OR NOT SEPARATELY DISCLOSED. THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS
SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE COMPANY'S AUDITED CONSOLIDATED
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1996 AND THE YEAR THEN ENDED AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
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<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                             278
<SECURITIES>                                     1,044
<RECEIVABLES>                                   41,779
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,371
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  42,598
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                         36,531
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           147
<OTHER-SE>                                       4,939
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    42,598
<SALES>                                          6,221
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 6,221
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    4,916
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 1,746
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   963
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,207
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,305
<INCOME-TAX>                                       482
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                823
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       823
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES L. THOMPSON,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

F. REYNOSO; et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 09-17274

D.C. No. 1:04-cv-06755-LJO-SMS

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 10, 2010** 

Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.

James L. Thompson, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the

district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the

FILED

AUG 25 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 09-17274

district court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust, and its factual determinations for

clear error, Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003), and we affirm.

The district court’s finding that Thompson refused to be interviewed was not

clearly erroneous. Even if a petitioner is entitled to be excused from the

exhaustion requirement where the prison officials prevent the petitioner from

pursuing administrative remedies, see Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th

Cir. 2010), the district court’s finding that prison officials did not obstruct

Thompson in this manner was not clearly erroneous, see Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119-

20 (“In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies,

the court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact.”). 

Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed the action because Thompson

failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit. See Woodford v. Ngo,

548 U.S. 81, 93-95 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is

mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.4(d) (2010) (“An appellant’s refusal to be interviewed or

cooperate with the reviewer shall result in cancellation of the appeal.”). 

We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal or in the

reply brief. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999). 

AFFIRMED.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Lamonte Johnson, Appellant.

[976 NYS2d 895]

Appeal by the defendant from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Lewis, J.), dated March 26, 2010, as denied, without a hearing, his motion pursuant to CPL 440.30 (1-a) for DNA testing of certain evidence.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from.

The Supreme Court properly denied, without a hearing, the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPL 440.30 (1-a) for DNA test*970ing of certain evidence since the defendant failed to show that there was a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to him had DNA tests been performed *(see*CPL 440.30 [1-a]; *People v*Perry, 89 AD3d 1114, 1115 [2011]; *People v Bolling,*65 AD3d 1054, 1054 [2009]; *People v Weay,*54 AD3d 695, 695 [2008]).

Although the defendant also moved to vacate the judgment oí conviction pursuant to CPL 440.10, the issues raised in that’ motion are not properly before this Court, as he was denied leave to appeal from so much of the order as denied that motion by decision and order on application of this Court dated August 12, 2010 *(see People v Jean,*74 AD3d 1234, 1234 [2010]; *People v DeLuca,*45 AD3d 777, 778 [2007]; *People v Rivas,*206 AD2d 549, 550 [1994]). Mastro, J.E, Roman, Miller and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.
§ 542.30 What is a Tier B gaming operation? 

A Tier B gaming operation is one with gross gaming revenues of more than $5 $8 

million but not more than $15 million. 

7-8-10 Version 

Page 1 of 1
Order entered February 28, 2020

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-19-00542-CV

QADREE CAMPBELL, Appellant

V.

ANGELA MARIE PECINA A/K/A ANGELA HOWELL 

AND GREGORY OLIVAREZ PECINA, Appellees

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 004-01649-2018

ORDER

Before the Court is appellant’s February 26, 2020 motion for an extension of 

time to file his brief on the merits. We GRANT the motion. We ORDER the 

brief tendered to this Court by appellant on February 26, 2020 filed as of the date 

of this order.

/s/ BILL WHITEHILL

JUSTICE