Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CT-1582 | December 6, 2019 Page 1 of 13

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Martin H. Kinney, Jr.

Dolt, Thompson, Shepherd

& Conway, PSC

Louisville, Kentucky

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

Norris Cunningham

Christina L. Essex

Kathryn E. Cordell

Katz Korin Cunningham PC

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Hazel M. Sendelweck,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

Greene County General Hospital 

d/b/a Good Samaritan SocietyNorthwood Retirement 

Community; and The 

Evangelical Lutheran Good 

Samaritan Society d/b/a Good 

Samaritan Society-Northwood 

Retirement Community,

Appellees-Defendants

December 6, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CT-1582

Appeal from the Dubois Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Nathan A. 

Verkamp, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

19C01-1807-CT-452

Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CT-1582 | December 6, 2019 Page 2 of 13

[1] Hazel Sendelweck appeals the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in 

favor of Greene County General Hospital, d/b/a Good Samaritan Society—

Northwood Retirement Community (Greene County Hospital), and The 

Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society, d/b/a Good Samaritan 

Society—Northwood Retirement Community (Evangelical Lutheran)

(collectively, Defendants). Finding that Sendelweck failed to timely file her 

claim before the running of the statute of limitations and that there was no due 

process violation, we affirm. 

Facts

[2] Sendelweck received skilled nursing care from Defendants from March 15, 

2016, through May 13, 2016. On May 9, 2016, Sendelweck allegedly received 

an injury to her shoulder while in the care of Defendants. 

[3] On April 10, 2018, Sendelweck filed a Proposed Complaint for damages with 

the Indiana Department of Insurance (IDOI) for alleged medical malpractice 

surrounding the injury to her shoulder, naming both Greene County Hospital 

and Evangelical Lutheran, both operating as “Good Samaritan Society—

Northwood Retirement Community,” as Defendants. At the time the Proposed 

Complaint was filed, there were twenty-nine days remaining before the 

applicable statute of limitations barred Sendelweck’s claim; the filing of the 

complaint temporarily tolled the running of the statute of limitations while the 

IDOI reviewed the complaint.
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[4] In a letter dated April 19, 2018, and received on or around April 23, 2018, the 

IDOI notified Sendelweck that neither Greene County Hospital nor Evangelical 

Lutheran had filed proof of financial responsibility or paid the required 

surcharge and therefore were not qualified providers under the Indiana Medical 

Malpractice Act (MMA). In the letter, the IDOI mislabeled Greene County 

Hospital as Greene County General Hospital, d/b/a Good Samaritan 

Society—Northwood Retirement County, rather than Community. Appellees’ 

App. Vol. II p. 20.

[5] Due to this mislabeling, Sendelweck believed the IDOI had made an error in its 

determination, and she followed up with the IDOI in an attempt to clarify

whether the correctly named party was, in fact, a qualified provider under the 

MMA. The IDOI again informed Sendelweck that the letter was a preliminary 

indication that Defendants were not qualified, but that the case could continue 

with the IDOI upon a showing by Sendelweck that they were qualified.

1

[6] Sendelweck filed a complaint with the trial court on July 11, 2018, alleging 

medical malpractice against Greene County Hospital and Evangelical 

Lutheran. On July 26, 2018, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss alleging the 

claim was barred by the statute of limitations, which they contended expired on 

 

1

Sendelweck claimed that she discovered by her own independent research that the Indiana Patient 

Compensation Fund Database website lists Greene County General Hospital as a qualified provider. This 

prompted Sendelweck to contact Defendants’ counsel via email on June 11, 2018, to “ask[] if they were going 

to respond to the Complaint,” to which Defendants’ counsel replied the same day that Defendants had “not 

received notice of any state court filing.” Appellees’ App. Vol. II p. 41, 49. Only after this interaction did 

Sendelweck finally file the suit in state court a month later. 
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May 22, 2018, twenty-nine days after Sendelweck received the IDOI’s letter. 

On August 14, 2018, Defendants’ pleading was converted to a motion for 

summary judgment. 

[7] Sendelweck filed a Proposed Amended Complaint with the IDOI on October 

25, 2018, against the two original Defendants as well as Greene County 

Hospital in its individual capacity. The malpractice allegations in the amended 

complaint were identical to those in the original Proposed Complaint and in the 

complaint filed with the trial court. The IDOI notified Sendelweck on October 

31, 2018, that the two original Defendants still were not qualified providers 

under the MMA, but that Greene County Hospital was a qualified provider in 

its individual capacity only. 

[8] The trial court heard oral argument on the motion for summary judgment on 

May 30, 2019. On June 12, 2019, the trial court granted summary judgment in 

favor of Defendants and dismissed Sendelweck’s claims. Sendelweck now 

appeals. 

Discussion and Decision

[9] Sendelweck argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to 

Defendants for two reasons: first, that the trial court improperly found that the 

statute of limitations barred Sendelweck’s claims; and second, that the MMA’s 

procedure for determining the qualified status of health care providers, as 

applied to Sendelweck, violates due process of law under the Indiana 

Constitution. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CT-1582 | December 6, 2019 Page 5 of 13

[10] Our standard of review for summary judgment is well established:

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no 

genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). In reviewing 

a trial court’s ruling on summary judgment, this court stands in 

the shoes of the trial court and applies the same standard in 

determining whether to affirm or reverse the grant of summary 

judgment. We must therefore determine whether there is a 

genuine issue of material fact and whether the trial court has 

correctly applied the law.

Relying on specifically designated evidence, the moving party 

bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that there are 

no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. If the moving party meets this 

burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to set forth 

specifically designated facts showing that there is a genuine issue 

for trial. 

A genuine issue of material fact exists where facts concerning an 

issue that would dispose of the issue are in dispute or where the 

undisputed material facts are capable of supporting conflicting 

inferences on such an issue. In our review, we consider all of the 

designated evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party. 

Robbins v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., 45 N.E.3d 1, 5-6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (internal

quotations and some internal citations omitted). 

I. Statute of Limitations

[11] Sendelweck first argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment 

to Defendants because the April 18, 2018, letter from the IDOI did not provide 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CT-1582 | December 6, 2019 Page 6 of 13

proper notice to Sendelweck to effectively recommence the running of the 

statute of limitations. More specifically, Sendelweck contends that because the 

letter misnamed the Greene County Hospital as “Green County General 

Hospital, d/b/a Good Samaritan Society Northwood Retirement County,” 

rather than Northwood Retirement Community, this was not a proper 

notification from the IDOI regarding whether Defendants were qualified 

providers and it therefore did not cause the statute of limitations to 

recommence. 

[12] The statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims is two years from the 

date of the alleged injury. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4; id. § 34-18-7-1(b). The MMA 

governs medical malpractice claims against “qualified” health care providers, 

meaning those providers who file proof of financial responsibility with the IDOI

and pay a required surcharge. Id. § 34-18-3-1, -2. Before an action against a 

qualified health care provider may be commenced in state court, the claimant 

must first file a proposed complaint with the IDOI. Id. § 34-18-8-4. Once a 

proposed complaint is filed, the statute of limitations is tolled until the claimant 

receives from the IDOI either an opinion or until a notification that the named 

health care provider is not qualified under the MMA, at which point the statute 

of limitations begins to run again. Id. § 34-18-7-3; Guinn v. Light, 558 N.E.2d 

821, 824 (Ind. 1990). The claimant then has the remainder of the statutory 

period to file a complaint in court before being time-barred. Id.

[13] Because Sendelweck’s alleged injury occurred on May 9, 2016, the two-year 

statute of limitations would ordinarily run until May 9, 2018. Once Sendelweck 
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filed the Proposed Complaint with the IDOI on April 10, 2018, the statute of 

limitations was tolled, with twenty-nine days remaining, until the IDOI either 

issued an opinion on the matter or notified Sendelweck that the health care 

providers named in the Proposed Complaint were not qualified under the 

MMA. Sendelweck argues that, because the Greene County Hospital was 

misnamed as d/b/a Good Samaritan Society—Northwood Retirement County, 

she never received proper notice and therefore nothing triggered the re-running 

of the remaining twenty-nine-day statutory period. 

[14] We have addressed the sufficiency of IDOI notice to recommence the running 

of the applicable statute of limitations in multiple prior cases. See, e.g., Rumell v. 

Osolo Emergency Med. Servs., Inc., 88 N.E.3d 1111, 1114-20 (Ind. Ct. Appt. 2017), 

trans. denied; Burns v. Hatchett, 786 N.E.2d 1178, 1181-83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); 

Lusk v. Swanson, 753 N.E.2d 748, 751-52 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Shenefield v. 

Barrette, 716 N.E. 2d 1, 3-5 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). In each of these cases, this

Court upheld the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants

because the plaintiffs failed to file in state court before the statute of limitations 

expired. In each case, this Court in each found that the IDOI’s letter containing 

a preliminary determination of a provider’s qualified status was sufficient, even 

if containing some ambiguity or lacking total conclusiveness, to re-trigger the 

running of the statute of limitations. In the event conflicting or unclear 

information regarding a provider’s qualified status is provided to a claimant, the 

claimant bears an affirmative obligation to inquire further into whether the 

provider is qualified or not. Lusk, 753 N.E.2d at 752. 
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[15] The facts surrounding this case are most analogous to those in Rumell. The 

plaintiff in that case received a notice letter from the IDOI stating the provider 

was not qualified under the MMA. Like Sendelweck, Rumell then followed up 

with the IDOI and was told, just as Sendelweck was here, that the information 

in the letter was a preliminary determination of the provider’s status. Rumell 

argued that the post-letter action of following up with the IDOI showed that the 

letter was not conclusive enough to trigger the running of the statute of 

limitations. Rumell, 88 N.E.3d at 1118. This Court disagreed: “As the trial court 

properly determined, [n]owhere in [prior case law] is there any indication that 

the IDOI’s determination needs to be conclusive, definitive, or otherwise 

beyond all possibility of subsequent modification for its receipt to recommence 

the statute of limitations.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Further, the 

information received when Rumell followed up with the IDOI, “although 

indicating that the status of the [providers] could be changed, did not in any 

way contradict the information concerning the [providers’] status provided in 

the [initial] letter.” Id. at 1119. 

[16] We see no meaningful distinction between the facts in Rumell and those in the 

instant case. Sendelweck appropriately filed a proposed complaint with the 

IDOI, correctly naming as defendants Greene County Hospital and Evangelical 

Lutheran, both d/b/a Good Samaritan Society—Northwood Retirement 

Community. The filing of the proposed complaint tolled the statute of 

limitations until the IDOI reviewed the complaint and informed Sendelweck, 

via the April 19, 2018, letter, that neither of the Defendants had filed proof of 
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financial responsibility or paid the required surcharge and thus were not 

qualified providers under the MMA. Once received, the letter provided 

sufficient notice to Sendelweck to trigger the running of the remaining statutory 

period, which meant Sendelweck had until May 22, 2019, to file her complaint 

with the trial court.

[17] Although the IDOI mislabeled the d/b/a designation for one of the parties, the 

burden was nonetheless on Sendelweck to follow up and clarify the issue with 

the IDOI and to show that the misnamed provider was actually qualified, if that 

were the case. And interestingly, although Sendelweck claims to have seen 

Greene County Hospital listed as a qualified provider on the Indiana Patient 

Compensation Fund Database website, she never presented that information to 

the IDOI to prove its qualified provider status. Instead, she only contacted 

Defendants to ask if they were going to respond to the Proposed Complaint, to 

which they replied they were waiting for her to file in the trial court. Appellees’ 

App. Vol. II. p. 41, 49.

[18] Furthermore, Sendelweck knew the correct identities of the named Defendants 

and was equipped with the proper business names to conduct her own 

independent research. Therefore, this was not a case of the IDOI or the 

providers misleading a claimant with incomplete information; it was merely a 

typographical error, and not a significant or misleading one at that. Compare 

Schriber v. Anonymous, 848 N.E.2d 1061, 1064-65 (Ind. 2006) (noting that 

continued tolling of the statute of limitations was appropriate remedy where 

defendants attempted to obfuscate plaintiff’s ability to determine provider’s 
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proper business name, and thus there was reason to doubt the accuracy of the 

IDOI’s determination), with Rumell, 88 N.E.3d at 1119-20 (distinguishing 

Schriber where “[h]ere, on the other hand, [plaintiff] knew the identities of the 

Defendants, so there was little reason to view the IDOI’s indication that the 

Defendants were not qualified as suspect” (emphasis added)). 

[19] Sendelweck waited until a full fifty days after the statute of limitations expired 

to file the complaint in court, and made no attempt to show to the IDOI that 

the Defendants’ qualification status may have been incorrect. Nor did she make 

any effort to protect herself from being time-barred by filing in court to preserve 

her claim while she continued to clarify the providers’ status with the IDOI. See 

I.C. § 34-18-8-7 (authorizing claimants to “commence an action in court for 

malpractice at the same time the claimant’s proposed complaint is being 

considered by [the IDOI],” so long as anonymity is preserved for the defendants 

until the IDOI issues an opinion or makes a qualification determination); 

Shenefield, 716 N.E.2d at 6 (“The [plaintiffs] could have avoided a limitations 

problem by filing their complaint with both the [IDOI] and the court.”). And 

Sendelweck even outright conceded to the trial court that the claim was filed 

after the statute of limitations had expired: “I think that when we filed with this 

Court it was outside the window. . . . I mean, I don’t know what else to say to 

the Court. I mean, I apologize to the Court that I wasn’t—didn’t have the 

foresight to file the anonymous complaint with the Court . . . .” Tr. Vol. II p. 

13.
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[20] In light of the evidence designated for the summary judgment motion, we find 

no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Sendelweck’s medical 

malpractice claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The IDOI letter 

provided sufficient notice to recommence the running of the statute of 

limitations, which still gave Sendelweck nearly another month to take 

appropriate action. And to the extent that there was conflicting information 

found during her independent research of the Defendants’ qualified status, 

Sendelweck nonetheless failed to act timely by neither making the proper 

showing for the IDOI nor preserving her claim in court. 

II. Due Process

[21] Sendelweck next argues that, regardless of whether the IDOI provided sufficient 

notice or her claim was barred by the statute of limitations, the MMA as 

applied to her case violates the due process guarantee under Article 1, Section 

12 of the Indiana Constitution because the MMA “fails to provide a reasonable 

means for [Sendelweck] to prospectively determine the qualified status of health 

care providers. Thus, improperly denying her access to justice.” Appellant’s Br. 

p. 10. 

[22] Article 1, Section 12 provides that “[a]ll courts shall be open; and every person, 

for injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy 

by due course of law. Justice shall be administered freely, and without 

purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily, and without delay.” The 

“due course of law” language has been interpreted by this Court to require “a 
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fair proceeding in which the fundamental requirements of due process are 

notice and an opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” 

Lake Cent. Sch. Corp. v. Scartozzi, 759 N.E.2d 1185, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). 

[23] Sendelweck argues that the MMA and caselaw essentially require her to file a 

complaint with the IDOI to determine whether a provider is qualified as well as 

file a complaint in court, but that since the filing with the IDOI is mandated 

before she is allowed to exercise her right to seek redress in court, this dualfiling requirement amounts to an “unreasonable impediment” on pursuing a 

valid claim under McIntosh v. Melroe Co., 729 N.E.2d 972, 980 (Ind. 2000). 

[24] Sendelweck’s reliance on McIntosh is misplaced. In McIntosh, our Supreme

Court was reviewing the constitutionality under Article 1, Section 12 of a 

statute of repose for products liability that barred all claims outright for injuries 

occurring after ten years following an event (the delivery of a product to a 

consumer) unrelated to any injury suffered, thereby eliminating any remedy for 

any injuries sustained after the passage of a set amount of time. The Court held 

that with such limitations on available remedies, “the limitation must not be an 

unreasonable impediment to the exercise of an otherwise valid claim,” id. at 

980, and it is this language that Sendelweck relies on to contend that the dualfiling system under the MMA violates due process. 

[25] Here, in contrast to McIntosh, the statute at issue is a statute of limitations, not a 

statute of repose—rather than having no remedy whatsoever for an otherwise 

valid claim for her alleged injury, Sendelweck had a remedy available, but 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CT-1582 | December 6, 2019 Page 13 of 13

simply failed to timely seek that remedy, a fact which she conceded at oral 

argument. As such, we simply cannot find that, as applied to Sendelweck, the 

MMA procedure for bringing her claim violated due process under McIntosh. 

[26] In regards to the nature of the dual-filing system itself, we reiterate the 

sentiment expressed by this Court in previous cases and “decline to require, or 

even endorse, the ‘double filing’ . . . due to the potential strategic disadvantages 

it entails and the duplication of effort and additional expense inherent in the 

double filing procedure.” Shenefield, 716 N.E.2d at 6 n.4. But the fact remains 

that this is the current system under which medical malpractice suits operate, 

and even as applied to Sendelweck, there was no deprivation of notice or an 

opportunity to be heard, and therefore no due process violation. Sendelweck 

filed a proposed complaint with the IDOI believing the named providers were 

qualified and, upon notification that they were not, she did not take advantage 

of the opportunity presented to her to present any additional evidence of 

qualified status to the IDOI. Though the current MMA procedure undoubtedly 

risks “encourag[ing] obstreperous legal gamesmanship on the part of defendants 

to medical malpractice claims,” Rumell, 88 N.E.3d at 1121 (Baker, J., 

concurring), that is simply not what happened here, and no unreasonable 

burden was in place to prevent Sendelweck from pursuing her claim aside from 

her own failure to timely act.

[27] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Riley, J., and Brown, J., concur.