i i i i i i



### OPIN ION No
. 04 -0 9- 00 54 6- CV SAN ANTONIO EXTE NDED MEDICA L CARE, INC . D/B/A Me d Mart Appellant
v . Ruben VA SQU EZ , I ndividually , and as A dminist rator of the Estate of

Ruben Vasque z, J r., Dec ease d and Or alia Va squez, J oe Ji menez, and Rosa Ward, Appellee s Fr om the 150th J udicial District Court, Be x ar County , Texas

Trial Court No. 2008-CI -20411 Honora ble Andy Mireles, Judge Pre siding Opinion by : Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Sitt ing: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Kar en Ang elini, J ustice Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: Febr uary 3, 2010 REVERSED AND RENDERED I n this int erloc utory

appe a l, San Antonio Ex tended Me dical Care , I nc. d/b/a Med Ma rt (“Me d Mart”) challeng es the trial co u rt ’s o rd er denying its motion to dism iss filed pursuant to section 7 4
. 3 5 1 ( a ) o f

th e T e xa s Ci v il Pr a c ti c e an d Re me d ies Code. T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 74.351(a) (Ve rnon Supp. 2009). We reve rse the judg ment of t he trial court and rende r judg ment dismiss ing the cause .04
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- 2- B ACKG ROUND O nA p r i l 7 , 2 0 0 8 , R

u b e n V a s qu e z , J r . ( “ M r . V a s qu e z ” ) u n d e r w e n ta t r a c h e o s t o m y. T e nd a ys afte r t he surge ry , he was discharg ed from the hos pital under doctor’s orders t o rec eive home oxy g en the ra py and tr a c he a c are . Me d Mart de liv e re d tw o o xy g e n ta nk s to Mr . V a sq

ue z’s ho me on

Ap ri l 17, 2008. The followingday , Mr. Vasque z ’s wife called Me d Mart and inf ormed them that he r husband wa s running low on ox y g en. She ag ain informed Med Mart that the ox y g en supply was low on April 19, but another delivery was not made. L ater that day , Mr. Vasque z became unc onscious and wa s transported to the hospital by EMS. He died the ne x t day
. There afte r, on Dec ember

9, 2008, Ruben Vasque z, indi vidually , and as a dminist rator of the Estate of Ruben V asquez, J r., dec ease d, and Or alia Va squez, J o e J i m enez, and Rosa Ward (c oll e c tiv e ly , “ Va sq

ue z”) su e d M e d M art

a lle g ing , amon g oth e r cla ims, th a t Mr . V a sq ue z’s de a th
wa s p ro xima te ly

c a us e d b y the ne g lig e nt a c ts a

nd /or omi ssi on s o f M e d M art , in c lud ing : f a ili ngto pr ov ide a de qu a te oxy g e n ta nk s a s o rd e re d; f

a ili ngto r e sp on d to re qu e sts by Mr . V a sq

ue z’s fa mil y for a n adequa te oxy g en s u p ply ; failing to insti tute safe g uards to insure that patients such as Mr. Vasque z would alway s have a n adequ ate supply

of the medic al supplies, including oxy g en; and failing to provide ade quate oxy g en supply as orde red by

his treating doctors. On May 14 , 200 9, Me d M art fi le d a mot ion to d ism iss c la imi ngVa sq ue z fa ile d to se rv e his 120-day expert repor

t as requir ed by

section 74.351(a ) of t h e T ex as C ivil P rac tice and Re medies Code. See T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 74.351(a) (Ve rnon Supp. 2009). Vasque z filed
a mot ion to s tr ike the mot ion

to d ism iss and a re sp on se to the mot ion to dis mis s cla imi ngthat he is
no t su bje c t to the re qu ir e me nts of se c tio n 7 4. 35 1 bec a

us e he did

no t a sse rt

a he a lthc are lia

bil ity claim ag ainst Med Mart and beca use Med Mart is not a

health ca re pr ovider. Alter

natively , Vasque z04
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- 3- argue d in the mot ion s th a t he c omp lie d wi th se c tio n 74 .3 51 by fi lin g an a uto ps y re po rt a tta c he d to
a Sto we rs demand letter wi t h i n t h e 120-day expert repor

t deadline a

nd that the re port was not objected to by

Med Mar t. The trial court denied the m otion to dis miss without making finding s of fac t or conclusions of law, but or ally stated that the evidenc e did not demonstrate Me d Mart to be a hea lth care provider. S TA N D A R D O F R E VI E W AND A PP LI C A BLE L AW We g e ne ra lly

re vie w a tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r g ra

nti ng a mot ion to dis mis s f or fa ilure to t ime ly file a section 74.351(a) expert repor t under an abuse of

discretion standa

rd. Pedroza v. Toscano , 293 S.W. 3d 66 5, 66 6 ( Te x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 20 09 , n o p e t.) ; Holguin v. Laredo R eg ’lMed. Centr., L.P. , 256 S.W .3d 349, 352 (T ex . App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.). Howeve r, whe n the issue prese nted re quires a statutory interpre tation or a de termination of whe ther Chapter 74 applies to a claim, i.e. , questions of l aw, we us e a de novo standard of revie w. Brown v. Villegas , 202 S.W .3d 80 3, 80 5 ( Te x. Ap p. —Sa

n A nto nio 20 06 , no pe t.) . Whet he r a c la im i s a

he a lthc are lia

bil ity c la im is a question of law. Inst. for W omen’ s Health, P.L.L.C . v. Im ad , N o . 0 4
- 0 5
- 0 0 5 5 5
- CV , 2 0 0 6 WL 33 40 13 , at *1 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio F e b. 15 , 2 00 6, no pe t.) (m e m. o p. ); Lee v. B oothe , 235 S.W .3d 448, 451 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pe t. denied). Section 74.351(a) provides that a health ca re liability

claimant must file an e x pert re port for
eac h phy sician or hea lth care provider de fenda nt within 120 day s after

filing the claim. T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 74.351(a)
. I f t h e re q u i red report ha s not been ser ved by the 120-da

y deadline, on pr oper motion by a defenda nt, the t rial cour

t must di smiss t he ac tion with prejudice a nd
awa rd reasonable attorney ’s fees and court costs incurred by the def endant. Id. § 74.351(b) ( Ver non Supp. 2009).04
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- 4- A “ he a lthc are lia

bil ity c la im” is d e fi ne d a s: [A] cause of ac tion ag ainst a hea lth care provider or phy sician for

treatment, lack of treatment, or other c laimed depa rture f rom ac cepted s t an d ards of medical c are , or he a lthc are , o r s a fe ty

or pr of e ssi on a l or

a dmi nis tr a tiv e se rv ic es di rect ly re la te d to health ca re, w hich proxim ately

results in injury

to or death of a claimant, whether the c la ima nt’ s c la im o r c a

us e of a c tio n s ound s in

tor t or c on tr a c t. T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 74 .0 01 (a )( 13 ) ( Ve rn on 20 05 ). Whe the r a c la im f a lls wi thi n the def inition of a health ca

re liability

claim requires an examination of the “ essenc e” or “under ly ing nature ” of the claim. Di v e rsi c ar e Ge n. Pa rtn e r, In c . v . R ub io , 185 S.W .3d 842, 851 (Tex. 2005); Ho lgu in , 256 S.W .3d at 3 5 2
. “A ca use of a ction ag ainst a hea lth care provider is a health ca re liability claim . . . if it is based on a claimed depar ture from an acce pted s tandar d of medica l car e, health care , or safety of the patient, whether the ac tion sounds in t ort or contr act.” Di v e rsi c ar e , 185 S.W .3d at 848. “A cause of ac tion alleg es a de parture from ac cepte d standards of medical c are or health ca re if the act or

omission comp l ai ned of is an inse para ble par t of the re ndition of medical service s.” Id. The ne cessity of expert testimony

from a medical or health care profe ssional may be
a fa c tor in d e te rm ini ngwh e the r a c la im is an ins e pa

ra ble pa rt of the re nd iti on

of me dic a l or

he a lth
car e ser vices. Id. Ho we ve r, the fa c t th a t e xpe rt te stimo ny may no t ul tim a te ly be ne c e ssa

ry to
su pp or t a ve rd ic t a t tr ia l do e s n ot n e c e ssari ly me a n th e c la im i s n ot a

he a lthc are lia

bil ity c la im. Mu rp hy v . R us se ll , 167 S.W .3d 835, 838 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam). D I S CUS S I ON On a pp e a l, M e d M art

a rgue s th e tr ia l c ou

rt a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

de nyingits mot ion

to dismiss beca

use Vasque z asse rted a health car e liability claim and wa s theref

ore r equire d to serve an expert re port. I n support, Med Mart asser ts that Vasque z’s claims for neg lige nce ba sed on Med Mart ’s a lle g e d fa ilure to furn ish a de qu a te oxy g e n to Mr. Va sq ue z me e t a ll thr e e pr on g s o f a he a lth04
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1 ... T h e term “ heal t h care pro vi d er” al so i ncl ud es: (i ) an of f i cer, dir ect o r, s hareho l d er, m em b er, pa rt ner, m anager, ow ner, or af

f i l i at e o f a he al t h c are p rovider o r p hy si ci an; a nd (i i ) an em p l o y ee, indep end ent c o nt ract o r, or agent o f a h e a lth c a re p ro v id e r o r p h ysic ia n a c ting in the c o u rs e a n d sc o p e o f t h e e m p lo ym e n t o r co n tra c tua l re la tio n sh ip . T EX . C IV . P RAC . & R EM . C O D E A NN . § 7 4 .0 0 1 (a )( 1 2 )( B ) (V e rn o n 2 0 0 5 ).

- 5- c are lia bil ity c la im. I t is un dis pu te d th a t V a sq ue z al le g e d th a t Me d M art c a us e d M r. Va sq

ue z’s de a th by fa ili n g t o d e l i v e r

o xyg e n ; t h u s , t h e t h i r d

e l e m e n tn e c e s s ar

y t o e s t a b l i s h a h e a l t h c ar e l i a

b i lit y cla im —t hat th e pl ain ti ff m us t al lege t hat th e def end ant ’s a cti on pro x im ate ly caus ed i nj ury

to or dea th of a c laimant—has bee n satisfied. T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 74.001(a) (13). Acc ording ly , we must deter mine whether Med Mart is a he alth car e provide r, and, if so, w hether the claims asser

ted by Vasque z cla imed a depar ture from the acc epted standards of health ca re. See id. 1. Health C

are Provide r A hea lth care liability

claim is a ca

use of a ction ag ainst a hea lth care provider or phy sician. Id. A “ he a lthc are pr ov ide r” is d e fi ne d a s: [A] ny person, pa

rtnership, pro fe s s ional association, cor poration, fa cility , or ins tit uti on du ly lic e ns e d, c e rt if

ie d, re g is ter ed, or

c ha rt e re d b y the State of

Te xas t o pr ov ide he a lth c are , inc lud ing : (i ) a re g ist e re d nur se ; ( ii) a

de nti st; (i ii) a

po diatr ist ; (iv) a pha

rmac is t ; (v ) a chir oprac tor; (vi) an optometrist; or (vii) a health ca

re instit ution. T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 74.001(a) (12)( A) (V ernon 2005)
. 1 The li st is not ex clusive. See Christus Health v. Be al , 240 S.W .3d 282, 286 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (c i t i n g T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE A NN . § 31 1. 00 5( 13 ) ( Ve rn on 20 05 ), wh ic h p ro vid e s th a t “ inc lud ing ” is a ter m o f en l ar gem en t and not of limitation). The statute def ines “he alth car e” a s “any act or tr e a tme nt p e rf

or me d o r f ur nis he d, or that sh ou ld h a ve be e n p e rf or me d o r f ur nis he d, by

any he a lth
car e provide r for , to, or on beha lf of a pa tient during the patient’s medic al ca re, t re at m en t , or confine ment.” T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 74.001(a) (10) ( Ver non 2005).04
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- 6- At the hea ring on the motion to dismiss , Carlos Ba rre ra, Med Mart’s vice president, testified that Me d M art

is a c omp any

lic e ns e d b y

the Tex as Departme nt o f H e a lthand lic e ns e d a s a presc ription drug firm. B arr era fu rther stated that oxy g en is a drugwhich re quires a doc tor’s presc ription. I t is undisputed that Mr. Vasquez was pre scribed oxy g en by his treating phy sician, Dr. Mark W. Hatch, w ho order ed that he be rele ased from the hospital a nd treated at home with oxy g en thera py . I t is li kewise undisputed that Med Mart was the entity selec ted to provide home he alth car e service s for Mr. V asquez. Phy sicians’ orders were faxed to Med Mar t by the hospital. Med Mart contends that these attributes make it a he alth car e provider. V asquez counter s that Med Mart c annot be a he a lthc are pr ov ide r be c a us e it is no t sp e c if

ic a lly lis te d a s su c h in t

he statut e and

be c a us e it i s
mere ly licensed by

the State as a

distributor or manufa cture r, not as a he alth car e provide r. We ag ree that Med Mart qualifies as a health car e provider. T he re cord c ontains evidenc e that Med Mar

t is li cense d by

the Texas Depa

rtment of State Hea lth Ser vices as a presc ription drug firm (manuf

actur er) and as a

licensed de vice f

irm (distributor and manufa cture r). F urther, the rec ord
c on ta ins te sti mony

fr om M e d M art ’s vic e pr e sid e nt, wh o s ta te d th a t a pr e sc ri pti on

dr ugfi rm lic e ns e is the same lice nse held by pharma cies. Unlike in Brown v. Villegas , wher e we held that the alleg ed health ca re pr ovider fa iled to prove its status as s u ch b y n o t i n cludi ng proof that it was “ licensed,
c e rt if ie d, re g ist e re d, or

c ha rt e re d b y the State of

Te xas t o p ro vid e he a lthc are ,” Me d M art me t it s burden of establishing lice nsure by the State. Se e Br own , 202 S.W .3d at 806. Althoug h Vasque z
c o n te n d s th a t th e e v id e n c e me r e ly d e mo n s tr a te s M e d M art h e ld a li c e n s e to d istribute a nd manufa cture drug s—not to provide health ca re—our rea ding of the statute lea ds us to conclude that such license s meet the de finition of a hea lth care provider. See Pe dr oz a , 293 S.W .3d at 668 (noting t h at to asce rtain the leg islative intent of a statute, we beg in with its plain languag e); M a rk s v . St.04
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- 7- Luke’s Episcopal Hosp. , No. 07-0783, 2009 WL 2667801, at *3 (Te x . Aug. 2 8 , 2009) (“ When interpre ting a statute, we rea d words and phrase s in c ontext and construe them acc ording to the rules of g ra mma r a nd c omm on us a g e .” ). Th e statut e me re ly re qu ir e s th a t th e pr ov id er be lice ns e d to “provide health ca

re.” T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 74.001(a) (12)( A). “ ‘He alth car e’
means a ny act or treatment pe rfor

med or furnished, or

that should have be en per formed or furnished, by any health ca

re pr o v i d er fo r, t o, or on beha lf of a patient during the patient’s medic al ca re, t re at m en t , or conf

inement.” T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 7 4
. 0 0 1 ( a ) ( 1 0 )
. A s w il l be dis c us se d b e low , M e d M art su pp lie d p re sc ri pti on -o rd e re d o xy g e n th e ra py to M r. V a sq

ue z. A t a minimum , the deliver

y of the ox y g en constituted an “ac t” per formed by Med Mar t for Mr. Va squez during his treatment. See id. Even thoug h the oxy g en wa s delivere d to Mr. Vasque z’s home, he was rele ased f rom the hospital under doc tor’s orde rs to rec eive home oxy g en ther apy , without which he was inca pable of breathing. See, e.g., Tesoro v. Alvare z , 281 S.W .3d 654, 660 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2009, no pet.) (location at w hich hea lth care is perfor med or fur

nished is not determinative of whether claim constitutes a health ca re liability

claim). Ac cording ly , we hold that on this rec ord, there was suff

icient evidenc e to prove Med Mart’s status a s a hea lth care provider. We ne x t examine whether Vasque z’s claims alleg ed a c laimed depa rture f rom the acc epted standards of health ca re.

2. Cla imed

De pa rturefrom Ac c e

pte d St and ards of He alt h Care To establish a he alth car e liability claim, the ac t or omission complained of m u s t be an in s e p ar a b le p art o f th e r e n d it io n o f h e a lt h c ar e s e r

v ic es. See D ive rsi c ar e , 185 S.W .3d at 848; Ga rla nd Cm ty
. Ho sp . v . R os e , 156 S.W .3d 541, 544 (Tex. 2004). A fa ctor in consider ing w hether
a ca use of a ction is an insepar able pa rt of the r endition of hea lth care service s i s wh et h er ex pert04
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- 8- testimony from a me dical or health car e profe ssional is nece ssary to pr ove a c laim. Di v e rsi c ar e , 185 S.W. 3d a t 84 8; Espinosa v. Baptist Health Sys ., No. 04-05-00131- CV, 2006 WL 2 8 7 1 2 6 2 , at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 11, 2006, pet. denie d) (mem. op.) . Her e, Va squez a lleg ed that Mr. Va sq ue z’s deat h wa s p ro xima te ly c a us e d b y the ne g lig e nt a c ts a

nd /or omi ssi on s o f M e d M a rt , including: f

ailing to pr ovide ade quate ox y g en tanks as order ed; failing to r espond to reque sts by Mr. Va sq ue z’s fa mil y fo r a n a de qu a te oxy g e n s up ply ; f a ili ngto i ns tit

ute sa fe g ua

rd s to ins ur e that patie nts such as Mr. V asquez would alwa y s have a n adequa te supply o f t he medica l supplies, including oxy g e n; a nd fa ili ngto p ro vid e a de qu a te oxy g e n s up ply a s or de re d by

his tr e a tin g do c tor s. On

a pp e a l, Med Mar t contends that Vasque z’s c laims a re insepara

bly and inextricably

linked to the rendition of Mr. Va squez’s healt h ca re b ec au s e his death is alleg ed to have been c aused, at least in part, by Med Mar t’s failure to provide hi m with ox y g en which was prescribe d by his doctor as post-ope rative treatment. I n response , Vasque z maintains t hat Med Mar t was mere ly

deliveringox y g en to Mr. Vasque z and was not requir ed to re main at his bedside as the o x y g en wa s used; there fore , the delivery of oxy g en tanks c annot be a n insepara

ble par t of the re ndi t i o n o f medica l or hea lth care
se rv ic e s. The fa cts of this case are simil ar to those in V a ld e z v . Lo p e z H e a lt h S y stems , wher e the plaintiff’s daug hter died a fter a home hea lth care service worke r re m o v ed t h e porta ble suction machine r equire d for he r survival. Valdez v. Lopez He alth S ys., Inc. , No. 04-04-00023- CV, 2005 WL 1629803, at *1 (Te x . App.—San Antonio J uly 13, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.). The plaintiff
a lle g e d th a t th e ho me he a lthse rv ic e wa s n e g lig e nt i n f a ili ngto p ro vid e ne c e ssa

ry me di c a l e q

u i p m e nt. Id. Th is c ourt

he ld t hat th e pla int if

f’ s cla ims we re g ov e rn e d b y se c tio n 7 4. 35 1 b e c a

us e in o rd e r t o
e sta bli shlia bil ity , th e pla int if

f w ou ld have to pr ov e the sta nd ard of c are a

pp lic a ble to h ome he a lth04
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- 9- car e provide rs and the n show that the standar d was bre ache d. Id. a t *2 . Si mil arl y , in or de r t o establ i s h t h at Med Mar

t was neg lige nt in failing to provide nece ssary medical e quipment to Mr. Vasque z, Vasquez would have to prove that the standar d of care applicable to a health ca re pr ovider require d Med Mar

t to deliver oxy g en and that Med Mart brea ched that standard. T hus, Vasquez has
c o mp la in e d o f a c ts o r o mi s s io n s th a t o c c u r r e d d ur in g M r . V a s qu e z’ s tr e a tm e n t b y Med Mar t. See Ro se , 156 S.W .3d at 544. Acc ording ly , we conclude Va squez’s claims ag ainst Med Mart a sserted an alleg ed depa

rture f rom the ac cepte d standards of health ca re. This conclusion is further

bolstered by

the fa ct that expert testimony will be require d to prove Vasque z’s claims. S

e e id. (n o t ing that one consider ation in determining whether alleg ed ac t or omission is insepara

ble part of health ca

re is provingclaim would re quire spec ialized knowledg e of
an e xpe rt ). As Me d Mart no te s, Va sq ue z a lle g e d mor e tha

n a me re fa ilure to d e liv e r o xy g e n. I t is undisputed that Med Mart de livered two ox y g en tanks to Mr
. Vasque z. One was ha lf full and the other wa s a quar

ter full. The Med Ma rt t ec h n i ci an s et t he flow r ate of the tanks at two liters pe r minute. The question, there fore , is w hether an adequate supply of ox y g en was de livered. Me d Mart argues that i t is not within the common knowledg e of the g ener al public to know whethe r the c orre ct flow rate was se t or whethe r there was a n adequate supply

of oxy g en deliver ed in the first instance
. Se e Di v e rsi c ar e , 1 85 S.W. 3d a t 84 8, 85 1. We a g re e . E xpe rt te sti mony

is r e qu ir e d to e sta

bli sh whether the oxy g en tanks we re se t at the correc t flow l evel or whether an adequate supply of oxy g en was de livered to Mr. Vasquez. Such information i s not within the common knowledge of the g ener al public. Se e Ro se , 156 S.W .3d at 544; Imad , 2006 WL 334013, at *3. Acc ording ly , we c onclude that Vasque z ’s cl ai ms meet all three prong s of a he alth car e liability claim: Med Mar

t is a health ca

re pr ov ide r w ho se a c tio ns a lle g e dly c a us e d M r. Va sq

ue z’s de a th and the e sse nc e of Va sq ue z’s c la ims04
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- 10- is inext rica

bly intertwined with the re ndition of heath ca re se rvice s. Se e Ro se , 156 S.W .3d at 546; Ho lgu in , 256 S.W .32d at 353. Ha vin g c on c lud e d th a t V a sq

ue z br ou g ht s uit

a sse rt ing a he a lthc are lia bil ity c la im s ub je c t to section 74.351, the trial c ourt was r equire d to dismi ss the cause pursuant to Med Mar t’s motion unless an expert re port was timely serve d b y Va s q u ez . See T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 74.351(a ). Vasquez contends he satisfied the statutory require ments by

tender ing D r. L evy ’s autopsy repor

t a nd curr iculum vitae
. Med Mart responds that the “re port” filed by Vasque z is not an expert re port at all, but instead an a utopsy repor t attache d to a Sto we rs de mand le tte r t hat f a ils to
n a me M e d

M art, mu c h le s s c o n n e c t M e d M art’ s c o n d

u c t t o M r . V a s qu e z’ s d e a th
. We ag ree . As s u m i n g arguendo th a t a p la in ti f f c ans e r v e ane xp e rt r e p o rt i nth e ma n n e r u s e d h e r e , th e r eport
c omp le te ly

fa ils to n a me Me d M art , othe r tha n to sta te , “Me dma

rt wa s to pr ov ide the loc a l su pp lie s, some of which [Mr. Va squez] alre ady had.” See G arcia v. Maric halar , 1 8 5 S. W. 3 d 7 0 , 7 1
- 7 2 ( T e x. App.—San Antonio 2005, no pet.) (holdingrepor t that failed to na

me defe ndant health car e provide r
wa s n ot a n e xpe rt re po rt a s def

ine d b y se c tio n 7 4. 35 1) ; Bo ga r v . E sp ar za , 2 5 7 S. W. 3 d

3 5 4 , 3 6 0 ( T e x. Ap p. —A us tin

20 08 , n o p e t.) (h old ingre po rt se rv e d w ith in 1 20 -day dead li ne that f a ils e nti re ly

to implicate the conduc t of a de fenda nt is not m ere ly d eficient, but is in effec t no report a s to that de fe nd ant) . We c ann ot c on c lud e that th e a lle g e d r e port here re pr e se nts “ an o bje c tiv e g oo d f a ith eff ort to comply

with the definition of an e x pert re port.” Jones v . King , 255 S.W .3d 156, 159-160 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa

n A nto nio 20 08 , p e t. d e nie d) ; T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 74.351(r) (6) (V e rn on Sup p. 20 09 ) ( de fi ning an “expe rt re po rt ” ). Ac c or din g ly , w e ho ld t he tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in fa ili ng to di sm is s V a sq

ue z’s c la ims a g a ins t Me d M art fo r f a ilure to t ime ly

se rv e an e xpe rt

re po rt . See T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 74.351(b).04
- 09
- 00 54 6- CV

2 ... W e do not re man d t h e c au s e t o t h e t r i al cou r t f or det er mi n at i on of

re as on abl e a t t or n ey ’ s f ee s a n d c os t s of c o u rt inc u rr e d b y M e d M a rt b e c a u se M e d M a rt d id no t r e q u e st s a m e in its m o tio n to d ism iss. See T EX . C IV . P RAC . & R EM . C O D E A NN . § 7 4 .3 5 1 (b )( 1 ) (V e rn o n S u p p . 2 0 0 9 ).

- 11- C ONCL US I ON Ba s ed o n t he re asons stated a bove, we reve rse the tr ial court’s or der de ny ing Me d Mart’s mot ion to dismi ss, and re nd e r j ud g me nt dis mis sin g Va sq ue z’s c la ims a g a ins t Me d M art wi th prejudice
. 2 See T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 74 .3 51 (b ); T EX . R. A PP . P. 43.3.
Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice