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241 

Matter of L-L-P-, Respondent 

Decided February 24, 2021

U.S. Department of Justice 

Executive Office for Immigration Review 

Board of Immigration Appeals 

An applicant for special rule cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(2) of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2) (2018), based on spousal abuse 

must demonstrate both that the abuser was his or her lawful spouse and possessed either 

United States citizenship or lawful permanent resident status at the time of the abuse. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Laura L. Lichter, Esquire, Denver, Colorado 

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Kalin Ivany, Assistant Chief 

Counsel 

BEFORE: Board Panel: GREER and GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judges; 

PEPPER, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge. 

GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judge: 

 In a decision dated September 17, 2019, an Immigration Judge denied the 

respondent’s application for special rule cancellation of removal under 

section 240A(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229b(b)(2) (2018), a form of relief reserved for certain victims of 

domestic violence in accordance with the provisions of the Violence of 

Against Women Act, enacted as Title IV of the Violent Crime Control and 

Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902 

(“VAWA”). The respondent has appealed from this decision. During the 

pendency of his appeal, he filed a motion to remand so that he may apply for 

cancellation of removal for certain nonpermanent residents pursuant to 

section 240A(b)(1) of the Act, based on intervening case law. The 

Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) opposes the respondent’s appeal 

and motion. The appeal will be dismissed, the motion will be granted, and 

the record will be remanded. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 The respondent is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United 

States without being admitted or paroled. The following facts are undisputed. 

In 2001, an Immigration Judge denied his application for cancellation of 
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242 

removal under section 240A(b)(1) of the Act because he had not 

demonstrated the requisite hardship to a qualifying relative and granted his 

request for voluntary departure. The respondent departed from the United 

States but then reentered this country without admission or parole. 

 In 2006, the respondent was again placed in removal proceedings through 

the service of a notice to appear that failed to specify the time and date of his 

removal hearing. Based on his common law marriage, which lasted from 

1995 to 2011, he filed an application for adjustment of status as a battered 

spouse self-petitioner. In 2012, the United States Citizenship and 

Immigration Service denied his Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er), or 

Special Immigrant (Form I-360) because he had not established that his 

former spouse possessed lawful immigration status in the United States 

during their marriage. 

 Before the Immigration Judge, the respondent sought special rule 

cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(2) of the Act. The 

Immigration Judge denied this application because the respondent had not 

met his burden of proof to show that, during his marriage, his former spouse 

held the necessary status either as a United States citizen or lawful permanent 

resident when she abused him. Sections 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I), (II) of the Act. 

II. ANALYSIS 

A. Special Rule Cancellation of Removal 

 Section 240A(b)(2)(A) of the Act provides, in relevant part, that 

The Attorney General may cancel removal of, and adjust to the status of an alien 

lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an alien who is inadmissible or 

deportable from the United States if the alien demonstrates that— 

(i)(I) the alien has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a spouse or 

parent who is or was a United States citizen (or is the parent of a child of a United 

States citizen and the child has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by 

such citizen parent); [or] 

(II) the alien has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a spouse or 

parent who is or was a lawful permanent resident (or is the parent of a child of an 

alien who is or was a lawful permanent resident and the child has been battered or 

subjected to extreme cruelty by such permanent resident parent) . . . . 

 These provisions plainly state that an abusive spouse must be either a 

United States citizen or a lawful permanent resident at some point in time. 

This case presents a matter of first impression, namely, whether an applicant 

for special rule cancellation of removal must demonstrate that his or her 

spouse possessed United States citizenship or lawful permanent resident 

status at the time that the applicant was abused by and married to this spouse. 
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243 

This is a legal question, which we review de novo. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) 

(2020). 

1. Statutory Construction 

 We begin by considering whether sections 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) and (II) 

clearly and unambiguously specify the point in time at which the abusive 

spouse must possess either United States citizenship or lawful permanent 

resident status. See Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 139 S. Ct. 1048, 1056 

(2019) (“[W]e begin ‘where all such inquiries begin: with the language of 

the statute itself.’” (citation omitted)); see also Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 

S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020) (stating that a court should “interpret[] a statute in 

accord with the ordinary public meaning of its terms at the time of its 

enactment”). “To determine whether Congress has directly spoken on [an] 

issue, we use ‘traditional tools of statutory construction.’” Banuelos v. Barr, 

953 F.3d 1176, 1180 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. 

Res. Def. Council, Inc. (“Chevron”), 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)). Where 

the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ends, 

because we “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 

Congress.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 

 Sections 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) and (II) of the Act require an alien to have 

been “battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a spouse . . . who is or was” 

either a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident. We perceive, 

from the plain language of the statute, more than one possible time frame for 

the spouse to hold United States citizen or lawful permanent resident status. 

The word “is” in these provisions could be interpreted to mean that the 

spouse held United States citizenship or permanent resident status at the time 

of the marriage and abuse, or, as the respondent argues, at the time the 

application for cancellation of removal was filed. As the statute is 

susceptible to more than one interpretation, we conclude that sections 

240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) and (II) are ambiguous. We must therefore determine 

which interpretation reasonably reflects Congress’ intentions for these 

provisions. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 

545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005) (stating that “ambiguities in statutes within an 

agency’s jurisdiction to administer are delegations of authority to the agency 

to fill the statutory gap in reasonable fashion”); Martinez-Perez v. Barr, 947 

F.3d 1273, 1280 (10th Cir. 2020) (same). 

2. Overall Statutory Context 

 “The broader context . . . of the statute provides considerable assistance” 

in construing an ambiguous term or phrase. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 
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244 

U.S. 337, 345 (1997). An analysis of the overall statutory context may not 

resolve an ambiguity, but it will assist in determining which meaning applies 

when considering the statute’s purpose. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. 

v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 94–95 (1993); see also Payless 

Shoesource, Inc. v. Travelers Cos., Inc., 585 F.3d 1366, 1374 (10th Cir. 

2009) (“[W]e must ask whether the word is used ambiguously within the 

actual . . . context in which it appears. After all, when interpreting a . . . 

statute, we derive meaning not just from abstract words in isolation, but from 

their context . . . as a whole.”). 

 Here, the parentheticals in sections 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) and (II) provide 

context in determining the overall meaning of those provisions. For instance, 

the parenthetical at section 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) provides that an applicant 

may be “( . . . the parent of a child of a United States citizen and the child has 

been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by such citizen parent).”1

 We 

find it significant that the phrase “has been battered or subjected to extreme 

cruelty by such citizen parent” in this parenthetical is in the present perfect 

tense. Section 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act (emphasis added). Congress 

uses this tense to “denot[e] an act that has been completed.” Barrett v. United 

States, 423 U.S. 212, 216 (1976); see also Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 

448 (2010) (looking to “Congress’ choice of verb tense to ascertain 

a statute’s temporal reach”). The parenthetical specifies that this past harm 

must have been committed “by [a] citizen parent.” Thus, the ordinary 

meaning of this parenthetical is that the child must have been abused by 

a parent who was a citizen at the time the abuse took place. See Bostock, 140 

S. Ct. at 1738. 

 Notably, removing the final phrase “by such citizen parent” from this 

parenthetical would not change our understanding of the statute except with 

regard to the abuser’s status at the time the abuse occurred. In this way, 

Congress used the phrase “by such citizen parent” to explicitly tie the abusive 

parent’s citizenship status to the past abuse, indicating that the abusive parent 

must have possessed United States citizenship status at the time the abuse 

took place. Based on our examination of sections 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) and 

(II) as a whole, including their parentheticals, we conclude that the abusive 

spouse (or parent) must be a United States citizen or lawful permanent 

resident at the time of the abuse. Moreover, because the spousal portion of 

these provisions requires the abuser to be a “spouse,” this abuse must have 

occurred during the course of the marriage. Section 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) of 

the Act (emphasis added); see also section 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Act. 

 

1

 The parenthetical is identical in both sections, except as to the status of the parent as 

either a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident. We examine only the first 

parenthetical, but our reasoning applies to both sections. 
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 With the context of the statute as a whole in mind, we interpret the term 

“is” in sections 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) and (II) as requiring that the abusive 

spouse (or parent) be a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at 

the time the battery or extreme cruelty occurred. We interpret the expanded 

phrase, “is or was” in the statute to mean that the spouse (or parent) may later 

lose his or her citizenship or lawful permanent resident status. Yet the 

applicant does not lose the opportunity to apply for special rule cancellation 

of removal so long as that spouse (or parent) was a citizen or permanent 

resident at the time the abuse occurred, and, in the spousal context, the 

applicant was married to the abuser during this abuse. To sum up our 

interpretation of the statute in the marriage context, the spouse must be a 

spouse during the abuse—that is, the abuse occurs during the marriage—and 

that, at the time of the abuse, the spouse is either a United States citizen or 

lawful permanent resident. We next consider whether our interpretation is 

reasonable given Congress’ intent in designing the VAWA. 

3. Legislative Intent 

 Because the plain language of the statute is ambiguous, we may consider 

whether the relevant legislative history of the VAWA provisions in the Act 

confirms our interpretation of sections 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) and (II). See 

Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516, 518 (BIA 2015); see also United States 

v. Manning, 526 F.3d 611, 614 (10th Cir. 2008) (“If the statute’s plain 

language is ambiguous as to [c]ongressional intent, ‘we look to the legislative 

history and the underlying public policy of the statute.’” (citation omitted)). 

Although legislative statements have less force than the plain language of the 

statute, such statements are helpful to corroborate and underscore 

a reasonable interpretation of the statute. See generally, e.g., Weinberger 

v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982). A review of the relevant legislative history 

confirms that our interpretation of these provisions is consistent with the 

underlying purpose of the VAWA. 

 In Matter of Pangan-Sis, 27 I&N Dec. 130, 133–34 (BIA 2017), we 

discussed the legislative history of the VAWA in the context of an exception 

to inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(a)(6)(A) (2012), for certain battered women and children. 2 We 

observed that Congress intended to reduce marriage fraud by requiring a 

conditional permanent resident to file a joint petition with his or her United 

States citizen or permanent resident spouse to remove the conditions on 

residence. However, this requirement “created a situation in which abused 

alien spouses were reluctant to leave their United States citizen or lawful 

 

2

 We recognize that Pagnan-Sis discussed a separate provision of the Act. We rely upon 

this case solely for its discussion of legislative intent with regards to the VAWA. 
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permanent resident abusers for fear of losing their potential to adjust their 

status.” Id. at 133. We discussed how the House Judiciary Committee 

Report accompanying the VAWA recognized that 

[d]omestic battery problems can become terribly exacerbated in marriages where one 

spouse is not a citizen, and the non-citizen[’]s legal status depends on his or her 

marriage to the abuser. Current law fosters domestic violence in such situations by 

placing full and complete control of the alien’s spouse’s ability to gain permanent 

legal status in the hands of the citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse. 

Id. at 134 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 103-395, at 26, 37 (1993), 1993 WL 

484760). 

 This concern of Congress—that an alien spouse would be subject to 

a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse’s control over his 

or her immigration status—motivated the VAWA legislation to ensure that 

aliens do not remain in abusive relationships because of immigration 

consequences. See H.R. Rep. No. 106-939, at 111 (2000) (Conf. Rep.) (Joint 

Explanatory Statement), 2000 WL 1479163, at *111 (stating that the VAWA 

was “designed . . . to prevent immigration law from being used by an abusive 

citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse as a tool to prevent an abused 

immigrant spouse from reporting abuse or leaving the abusive relationship”); 

see also 140 Cong. Rec. H10,693, H10,693 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) 

(statement of Rep. Schumer), 1994 WL 545675, at *H10,693-01 (stating that 

the VAWA “permits immigrant spouses of United States citizens to escape 

from their abusive spouses without risking deportation”). 

 This Board and the circuit courts have recognized that Congress intended 

the VAWA to prevent abusive citizens and residents from using immigration 

benefits as a means to control their alien spouses. See, e.g., 

Perales-Cumpean v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 977, 983 (10th Cir. 2005) 

(recognizing that Congress enacted the VAWA to protect victims of abuse); 

see also Da Silva v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 948 F.3d 629, 636 (3d Cir. 2020) 

(“VAWA cancellation of removal is ‘intended to ameliorate the impact of 

harsh provisions of immigration law on abused women.’” (citation omitted)); 

Toro v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t Homeland of Sec., 707 F.3d 1224, 1230 (11th Cir. 

2013) (stating that the purpose of the VAWA’s self-petitioning provisions 

“is to prevent the citizen or resident from using the petitioning process as a 

means to control or abuse an alien spouse” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 103-395, 

at 37)); Matter of Pangan-Sis, 27 I&N Dec. at 134 (quoting same); Matter of 

M-L-M-A-, 26 I&N Dec. 360, 364 (BIA 2014) (“[A] purpose of VAWA relief 

is to empower aliens to leave abusive relationships.”); Matter of A-M-, 

25 I&N Dec. 66, 77 (BIA 2009) (stating that “the underlying purpose of the 

battered spouse provisions of the Act . . . is to enable aliens to leave their 

abusive citizen or lawful permanent resident spouses who may use the threat 
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of deportation or sponsorship for an immigration benefit to maintain control 

over them”). 

 Although the VAWA has been amended several times to include 

a self-petitioning visa provision, special rule cancellation of removal for 

battered aliens, and an exception to inadmissibility, we recognize that, in 

enacting all these benefits, one of Congress’ goals was to free abused spouses, 

who are married to United States citizens or lawful permanent residents, from 

the fear that remaining in an abusive marriage is the only way to obtain lawful 

immigration status. This goal clearly contemplates that the abusive United 

States citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse is actually able to use that 

status to benefit—or punish—his or her alien spouse. We made this 

particularly clear in Matter of Pangan-Sis, 27 I&N Dec. at 135, where we 

stated that the VAWA exception to inadmissibility in that case covers 

“a spouse of a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident who suffers 

abuse . . . . However, coverage is not extended to aliens who are married to 

non-United States citizens and non-lawful permanent residents, because such 

persons lack ‘immigration leverage’ over their spouses.” 

 In light of this discussion from Pangan-Sis, we conclude that our 

interpretation of sections 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) and (II) is reasonable and 

consistent with congressional intent. Where the abuser is the spouse of an 

applicant seeking special rule cancellation of removal based on spousal abuse, 

the applicant must demonstrate that the abuser held both legal status as the 

applicant’s legally recognized spouse and United States citizenship or lawful 

permanent resident status at the time of the abuse. 

 We have recognized that special rule cancellation of removal is 

a continuing application since an applicant continues to accrue physical 

presence and good moral character until the final administrative order is 

entered. See Matter of M-L-M-A-, 26 I&N Dec. at 363. However, the 

continuing nature of this form of relief does not relieve an applicant of the 

burden to demonstrate that, at the time of abuse occurring during the 

marriage, the abuser was his or her lawful spouse and either a United States 

citizen or lawful permanent resident. Our decision in M-L-M-A- supports 

this conclusion. There, we granted special rule cancellation of removal to an 

applicant who had divorced her abuser, after the abuse had taken place. Since 

her abuser was her lawful spouse and either a citizen or permanent resident 

at the time of the abuse, her divorce was irrelevant to her statutory eligibility 

for this form of relief. 

 Our interpretation of sections 240A(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) and (II) gives full 

effect to the language enacted by Congress and is consistent with 

congressional intent. We therefore hold that an applicant for special rule 

cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(2) based on spousal abuse 

must demonstrate both that the abuser was his or her lawful spouse and 
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possessed either United States citizenship or lawful permanent resident status 

at the time of the abuse, even if the abuser’s spousal status, citizenship, or 

lawful permanent resident status was later terminated or revoked, or the 

abuser can no longer use an immigration benefit to control the applicant. 

4. Application to the Respondent’s Case 

 The respondent has not demonstrated that his former spouse was a United 

States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time they were married and 

when she abused him. The parties agreed below, and do not otherwise 

dispute on appeal, that the respondent’s former spouse was not a United 

States citizen or permanent resident during the marriage and abuse. The 

parties further agreed below, and do not dispute on appeal, that she had likely 

obtained permanent residence some years after the marriage and abuse ended. 

Because the respondent has not shown that his former spouse was a citizen 

or permanent resident during the marriage and abuse, he is ineligible for 

special rule cancellation of removal pursuant to section 240A(b)(2) of the 

Act.3

 We are not persuaded by the respondent’s argument that his former wife 

used the fact that she had applied for, but had not yet obtained, immigration 

status during their marriage as “leverage” to keep him in the abusive marriage. 

An abusive spouse must have the actual ability to affect an alien’s 

immigration status in order to threaten the alien in the manner contemplated 

by the VAWA. Thus, the Immigration Judge correctly denied the 

respondent’s application for special rule cancellation of removal. 

B. Motion to Remand 

 The respondent argues that remand is warranted so that he can apply for 

cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1) of the Act because he may 

be able to establish the requisite 10 years of continuous physical presence for 

this form of relief under intervening case law from the United States Court 

of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in whose jurisdiction this case arises. See 

 

3

 On appeal, the respondent renews his argument that the DHS has access to the 

respondent’s former spouse’s immigration records, and it refuses to share them, despite 

formal requests that it do so. The Immigration Judge properly determined that the 

respondent was responsible for demonstrating eligibility for relief. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) 

(2020). The DHS is not required to provide documentation of immigration status for 

persons not a party to these matters. Moreover, the refusal to share information about the 

ex-wife’s current lawful immigration status is not a due process violation, as it would not 

affect the outcome in the respondent’s case. See Matumona v. Barr, 945 F.3d 1294, 1308 

(10th Cir. 2019) (“To prevail on a due-process challenge, the petitioner must show 

prejudicial error.”). 
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Banuelos, 953 F.3d at 1184 (holding that the “stop-time” rule ending the 

period of continuous physical presence for cancellation of removal is not 

triggered by the combination of two documents containing the date and time 

of the removal hearing). Because the relevant notice to appear failed to 

specify the time and date of the respondent’s hearing, it was incomplete, and 

we agree with the respondent that he may now be able to establish the 

requisite period of physical presence under section 240A(b)(1)(A). 

Accordingly, the respondent’s appeal is dismissed and his motion to remand 

is granted so that he may pursue cancellation of removal under section 

240A(b)(1) of the Act. 

ORDER: The respondent’s appeal is dismissed. 

FURTHER ORDER: The respondent’s motion to remand is granted, 

and the record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings 

consistent with the foregoing opinion and the entry of a new decision.