Third District Court of Appeal 

State of Florida 

Opinion filed July 17, 2024. 

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. 

________________ 

No. 3D22-2180 

Lower Tribunal No. F22-15012 

________________ 

The State of Florida, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

Ronald Lee Miller, 

Appellee. 

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Laura Anne 

Stuzin, Judge. 

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor 

General, Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and Alison 

E. Preston, Deputy Solicitor General (Tallahassee), for appellant.

Robert I. Barrar, P.A., and Robert I. Barrar, for appellee. 

Reed Smith LLP, and M. Patrick Yingling (Chicago, IL) and Wesley A. 

Butensky, for the Niskanen Center and former Florida State Senator Jeff 

Brandes, as amici curiae. 
2

American Civil Liberties Union, and Julie A. Ebenstein and Casey 

Smith (New York, NY); Proskauer Rose LLP, and Matthew Triggs (Boca 

Raton); Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, and Patrick Berry 

(New York, NY); ACLU Foundation of Florida, and Nicholas L.V. Warren 

(Tallahassee), Caroline A. McNamara and Daniel B. Tilley; NAACP Legal 

Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., and Leah C. Aden (New York, NY), for 

the American Civil Liberties Union, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU 

School of Law, American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, and NAACP Legal 

Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as amici curiae. 

Dianne Carames; Daniel Tibbitt, for the Florida Association of 

Criminal Defense Lawyers-Miami Chapter, as amicus curiae. 

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, and Sascha N. Rand (New 

York, NY), Samuel G. Williamson and Thomas S.P. Geeker, for the 

Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, as amicus curiae. 

Reid Levin, PLLC, and Reid Levin (Boca Raton); Akin Gump Strauss 

Hauer & Feld LLP, and James E. Tysse (Washington, D.C.), and David Giller 

and Caitlin E. Olwell and Andrew A. McWhorter (New York, NY), for Former 

Members of the Commission on the Statewide Prosecution Function, as 

amici curiae. 

Toth Funes PA, and Freddy Funes; Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, and 

James C. Dugan and Ferdinand G. Suba, Jr., (New York, NY), and 

Noorjahan Rahman (San Francisco, CA); Quinn Yeargain (Harrisburg, PA), 

for State Constitutional Law Scholars Robert F. Williams and Quinn 

Yeargain, as amici curiae. 

Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, and David Gossett and Matthew R. 

Tuchman (Washington, D.C.) and MaryAnn Almeida (Seattle, WA) and 

Rachel R. Goldberg (Los Angeles, CA), for the Due Process Institute, as 

amicus curiae. 

Before SCALES, GORDO and BOKOR, JJ. 

BOKOR, J. 
3

The State, through information filed in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit by 

the Office of Statewide Prosecution, charged Ronald Lee Miller with voter 

fraud based on both Miller’s allegedly false affirmation on his voter 

registration that he was eligible to vote and his subsequent voting as an 

unqualified elector. Miller moved to dismiss, claiming the Statewide 

Prosecutor lacked authority to bring the charges because the alleged acts 

don’t trigger the statutory prerequisite that the offense “occurred[] in two or 

more judicial circuits as part of a related transaction.” § 16.56(1)(a), Fla. Stat. 

(2020). The trial court agreed with Miller and granted the motion to dismiss, 

which the State appeals. So, does the act of filling out a voter registration in 

one jurisdiction, and voting in that same jurisdiction, constitute an offense 

occurring in two or more judicial circuits as part of a related transaction? 

Based upon the plain reading of the statutory language and relying on the 

jurisdictional stipulation of facts agreed to by the parties and ratified by the 

trial court, we answer the question in the affirmative and conclude that the 

Statewide Prosecutor possessed the authority to charge Miller.1 

1 The relevant statute was subsequently amended to grant the Statewide 

Prosecutor clearer and broader authority. See Ch. 2023-2, § 1, Laws of Fla. 

The State argues that such grant of authority applies retroactively. However, 

because we conclude that the operative statute at both the time of the 

offense and the filing of the information permitted prosecution by the 

Statewide Prosecutor, we decline to address the issues of retroactivity and 

application of the amended statute.
4

BACKGROUND

The Office of Statewide Prosecution charged Miller by information with 

one count of making false affirmations in connection with an election and one 

count of voter fraud, pursuant to sections 104.011 and 104.15, Florida 

Statutes (2020). The information alleged that Miller registered to vote and 

voted in Miami-Dade County in October 2020, despite knowing he was not 

an eligible elector. The information also alleged that the charges stemmed 

from related acts occurring in both Miami-Dade County and Leon County. 

Miller moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant 

to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190, contending that the Office of 

Statewide Prosecution lacked jurisdiction to prosecute the claims under 

section 16.56(1) because the charged acts occurred solely in Miami-Dade 

County (Eleventh Judicial Circuit). The parties stipulated to a joint statement 

of facts for use in the jurisdictional hearing before the trial court. The parties 

stipulated that the charges related to Miller having registered to vote and 

voted in Miami-Dade County in 2020. Further, the parties stipulated that 

Miller’s voter registration was submitted by a third-party organization to the 

Broward County Supervisor of Elections (Seventeenth Judicial Circuit), 

which in turn forwarded the information to the Florida Secretary of State in 

Leon County (Second Judicial Circuit) to process Miller’s registration. The 
5

parties agree that Miller never physically entered or personally transferred 

anything into the Second or Seventeenth judicial circuits. The State also 

acknowledged that the charges do not allege a criminal conspiracy, but 

instead argued that the transmission of the voter registration to Broward and 

Leon Counties and the subsequent transmission of approval from the 

Secretary of State in Leon County to the Supervisor of Elections in MiamiDade County (and Miller ultimately voting in Miami-Dade County, which vote 

was forwarded back to the Department of State’s Division of Elections in 

Leon County) constituted acts and related transactions occurring in multiple 

jurisdictions. 

On December 7, 2022, the trial court granted dismissal of both 

charges, finding that the Office of Statewide Prosecution lacked jurisdiction 

to bring the charges because the charged acts occurred only in Miami-Dade 

County and did not allege either a multijurisdictional criminal conspiracy or 

any acts committed by Miller in multiple jurisdictions. The State timely

appealed the dismissal.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

The sole issue for review is whether Miller’s registering to vote in 

Miami-Dade County, and subsequent voting in Miami-Dade County, invoke 
6

the jurisdiction of the Office of Statewide Prosecution.

2 To do so, we examine 

whether the processing of the voter registration in another jurisdiction, Leon 

County, with approval conveyed back from Leon County to Miami-Dade 

County, and the subsequent voting in Miami-Dade County and conveying of 

the votes to Leon County constituted offenses which “occurred[] in two or 

more judicial circuits as part of a related transaction.” § 16.56(1)(a), Fla. Stat. 

(2020). 

While we review the plain meaning of the words in the statute, we do 

so not in isolation, but rather in the context of the entire statutory provision. 

As explained recently by the Florida Supreme Court:

Before explaining our answer to the certified question, we 

address a threshold issue about Florida's law of statutory 

interpretation. The United States encourages us to use an 

approach that is often linked to a passage from our Court's 

decision in Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) 

(quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 

157, 159 (1931)). There we said that “[w]hen the language of the 

statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and 

definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules 

of statutory interpretation and construction.” In practice, following 

this maxim often leads the interpreter to focus on a disputed word 

or phrase in isolation; the maxim also leaves the interpreter in 

2 We review de novo the trial court’s order granting the motion to dismiss

based on the Statewide Prosecutor’s authority. See State v. Espinoza, 264 

So. 3d 1055, 1062 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (“The standard of review for a trial 

court's order based on statutory interpretation is de novo. Further, the 

standard of review for a trial court's order regarding a Rule 3.190(c)(4) 

motion to dismiss is de novo.” (citation and italics omitted)).
7

the dark about how to determine whether a particular word or 

phrase has a clear meaning.

We believe that the Holly principle is misleading and outdated. 

More recently our Court has said that judges must “exhaust ‘all 

the textual and structural clues’” that bear on the meaning of a 

disputed text. Alachua County v. Watson, 333 So. 3d 162, 169 

(Fla. 2022) (quoting Niz-Chavez v. Garland, ––– U.S. ––––, 141 

S. Ct. 1474, 1480, 209 L.Ed.2d 433 (2021)). That is because 

“[t]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined 

by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which 

that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as 

a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 

843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997).

Viewed properly as rules of thumb or guides to interpretation, 

rather than as inflexible rules, the traditional canons of statutory 

interpretation can aid the interpretive process from beginning to 

end (recognizing that some canons, like the rule of lenity, by their 

own terms come into play only after other interpretive tools have 

been exhausted).

Conage v. United States, 346 So. 3d 594, 598 (Fla. 2022). In performing 

such an analysis, we review the plain meaning of the words at issue and 

read the relevant provision (i.e., whether “any such offense. . . occurred[] in 

two or more judicial circuits a part of a related transaction”) in context with 

the entire statutory provision. The statute includes language in section 

16.56(1)(a)(12) that the office may “[i]nvestigate and prosecute the offenses 

of . . . [a]ny crime involving voter registration, voting, or candidate or issue 

petition activities.” We therefore conclude, based on the plain language of 

the jurisdictional charge, read in the entire statutory context, that the statute 
8

confers jurisdiction on the Office of Statewide Prosecution to prosecute the 

crimes as alleged.

To show our work in carrying out the understanding of statutory 

construction set forth in Conage, we look at the plain language of the entire 

statute and the common understanding of the terms at issue. The term 

“transaction” generally refers to some reciprocal action or exchange 

involving multiple parties. See Transaction, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 

2019) (“1. The act or an instance of conducting business or other dealings; 

esp., the formation, performance, or discharge of a contract. 2. Something 

performed or carried out; a business agreement or exchange. 3. Any activity 

involving two or more persons.”). The term “transaction” here is also modified 

by the terms “related” and “part of,” both of which also connote the 

involvement of multiple acts or actors. See Related, Black’s Law Dictionary 

(11th ed. 2019) (“Connected in some way; having relationship to or with 

something else. . . .”); Part, Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, 

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/part (last visited May 30, 2024) 

(“[O]ne of the often indefinite or unequal subdivisions into which something 

is or is regarded as divided and which together constitute the whole . . . an 

essential portion or integral element . . . one of several or many equal units 
9

of which something is composed or into which it is divisible . . . an amount 

equal to another amount.”).

Miller would not have been able to register to vote, and ultimately vote,

without his filling out the form in Miami-Dade County, the processing and 

approval of his voter registration in Leon County, and the conveyance of such 

approval back to Miami-Dade County.3 It makes no difference based on the 

statutory language whether Miller himself communicated or affirmatively 

acted in concert with anyone outside of Miami-Dade County. Indeed, the 

parties stipulated that he did no such thing. The important part, however, is 

that these transactions that occurred in multiple jurisdictions were not only 

related, but they were also required acts before Miller got his voter 

registration and proceeded to vote.4

3 Additionally, and as stipulated by the parties, Miller’s voter registration was 

originally erroneously forwarded by a third-party voter registration 

organization in Miami-Dade County to Broward County’s Supervisor of 

Elections, which forwarded the information to the Secretary of State in Leon 

County, which forwarded the approval back to Miami-Dade County’s 

Supervisor of Elections. The analysis would be the same if the original 

organization had properly submitted the registration to the Miami-Dade 

County Supervisor of Elections as it would still involve processing, 

communication, and transmission to and from the Secretary of State in Leon 

County.

4 The dissent takes issue with our analysis of the related transaction

language in the statute. See Dissent at 2–3. No one disputes that Miller acted 

only in one county. But the dissent doesn’t explain why a related transaction

in another county in another circuit in the context of the commission of a 

criminal act fails to convey jurisdiction on the Statewide Prosecutor. Instead, 
10

It doesn’t matter that Miller may not have intended to set off a chain of 

related events in other jurisdictions in order to vote. As explained by the 

United States Supreme Court, “[w]here one does an act with knowledge” that 

a chain of events to complete the aim of the act “will follow in the ordinary 

course of business, or where such . . . can reasonably be foreseen, even 

though not actually intended, then he ‘causes’” the related chain of events.

Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1954).5 For example, when a party 

requests that a financial institution wire funds from one bank account to 

the dissent concludes that because Miller’s affirmative acts occurred in one 

jurisdiction, “[s]ection 16.56(1)(a)’s ‘as part of a related transaction’ language 

is not implicated.” Dissent at 4. Here, the transmission to, and processing of, 

the voting form in Tallahassee, Leon County, constituted a related 

transaction, in this case a necessary act, but for which the crime as alleged 

wouldn’t have occurred. In other words, while Miller himself acted only in one 

jurisdiction, the chain of events that led to the consummation of the crime 

necessarily occurred in two or more jurisdictions. See State v. Tacher, 84 

So. 3d 1131, 1135 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (noting that “the crimes did not take 

place only in Miami-Dade County”). Indeed, the dissent’s analysis suffers 

from a rigid parsing of the statutory language divorced from “the specific 

context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute 

as a whole.” Conage, 346 So. 3d at 598 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 

519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)). 5 The dissent argues that the majority improperly “imports tort concepts into 

its analysis” of a criminal statute. Dissent at 5. We note, however, that 

Pereira is a criminal case discussing foreseeability and causation.

Additionally, we don’t examine foreseeability or causation in the context of 

tort liability, nor to suggest that foreseeability is a requirement here, but 

rather as a vehicle to explain the relatedness of the transactions at issue 

here. As explained, the transactions occurring in other jurisdictions were not 

only related to Miller’s acts; they were necessary predicates to his 

registration, voting, and, ultimately, the tabulation and counting of his vote. 
11

another person’s account at a different bank, it would be reasonably 

foreseeable that requesting the wire transfer could trigger a series of related 

transactions across multiple servers and multiple jurisdictions. Indeed, such 

related acts would be required to realize the sender’s request, even if the 

sender didn’t know the specific processes or technicalities involved. See id.

at 9 (explaining that where a defendant delivered a check drawn on an outof-state bank to a local bank for collection, “he ‘caused’ it to be transported 

in interstate commerce” because “[i]t is common knowledge that such checks 

must be sent to the drawee bank for collection and it follows that [the 

defendant] intended the [local] bank to send this check across state lines”). 

Similarly, here, it is not only reasonably foreseeable that a voter 

registration submitted to a third-party organization would be processed by 

local and state officials, including the appropriate office in the state capital, 

but it is a required part of the transaction to allow Miller to register to vote. 

See § 97.053(2), Fla. Stat. (“A voter registration application is complete and 

becomes the official voter registration record of that applicant when all 

information necessary to establish the applicant’s eligibility . . . is received 

by a voter registration official and verified pursuant to subsection (6).”); id.

(6) (explaining that a voter registration application “may be accepted as valid 

only after the [Florida Department of State] has verified the authenticity” of 
12

identifying information provided by the applicant).6 Such a chain of events

from filling out the forms to the voting and processing of votes as stipulated 

here meets the definition for an offense or offenses which “occurred[] in two 

or more judicial circuits as part of a related transaction.” § 16.56(1)(a), Fla. 

Stat.

Our conclusion finds further support in the analysis provided by State 

v. Tacher, 84 So. 3d 1131 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012). Tacher held that the Office 

of Statewide Prosecution properly exercised jurisdiction to prosecute a 

single-circuit drug deal under the theory that offense occurred in two or more 

judicial circuits as part of a related transaction. See id. at 1134. The court 

concluded that the co-defendants served as “an integral part of the overall 

criminal enterprise that included the purchase of contraband pharmaceutical 

drugs . . . transported by bus through various Florida judicial circuits by a co6The same logic applies to the act of illegally voting (Count II of the 

indictment), which necessarily involves the vote being counted. A vote is first

tabulated in Miami-Dade County with such tabulation transmitted to the 

Department of State and ultimately the Elections Canvassing Commission in 

Leon County. See, e.g., Fla. Admin. Code R. 1S-2.053 (explaining process 

by which the supervisor of the county canvasing board transmits the 

summary election results to the Department of State Division of Elections); 

see also § 102.111, Fla. Stat. (setting forth the duties of the Elections 

Canvassing Commission which meets to certify returns in Leon County). 

Therefore, a related (and inexorably intertwined) transaction to the act of 

Miller’s voting in Miami-Dade County occurred in Leon County.
13

perpetrator, and delivered in Miami–Dade County to the co-defendants, who 

sold the drugs to others and laundered the money.” Id. Here, unlike Tacher, 

we don’t have co-defendants, but we do have a party who himself only 

committed an act or acts in one jurisdiction but relied on related transactions 

in multiple jurisdictions to complete the illegal act or acts. In other words, the 

related transactions in Leon County were necessary for Miller to receive his 

voter registration and vote in Miami-Dade County. Accordingly, as in Tacher, 

“we conclude there is sufficient evidence to establish the [Office of Statewide 

Prosecution’s] authority under the first theory provided in section 

16.56(1)(a).” Id.

Reversed and remanded with instructions to reinstate the information. 

GORDO, J., concurs.
14

The State of Florida v. Ronald Lee Miller,

3D22-2180

SCALES, J. (dissenting)

I respectfully dissent. While I agree with the majority that this case 

comes down to, and the authority of the Office of Statewide Prosecution 

(“OSP”) to prosecute Ronald Lee Miller rests upon, a statutory construction 

of section 16.56(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes, I would construe the plain 

language of the statute consistent with the trial court’s construction and I 

would affirm the trial court’s dismissal of both counts of the information.

I. Section 16.56(1)(a) and its two bases authorizing OSP’s 

authority

Section 16.56(1) creates the OSP within Florida’s Department of Legal 

Affairs. Subsection (a) of the statute contains a schedule of fifteen 

enumerated offenses that the OSP may investigate and prosecute. 

Subsection (a) then goes on to specifically and significantly limit the OSP’s 

authority over those enumerated offenses:

The office shall have such power only when any such offense is 

occurring, or has occurred, in two or more judicial circuits as part 

of a related transaction, or when any such offense is connected 

with an organized criminal conspiracy affecting two or more 

judicial circuits. Informations or indictments charging such 

offenses shall contain general allegations stating the judicial 

circuits and counties in which crimes are alleged to have 

occurred or the judicial circuits and counties in which crimes 

affecting such circuits or counties are alleged to have been 

connected with an organized criminal conspiracy. 
15

§ 16.56(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2020).

Hence, the statute sets forth two separate bases upon which OSP 

authority may be exercised. The enumerated crime either (i) must have 

occurred in two or more judicial circuits, as part of a related transaction (in 

which event the information must specify the judicial circuits and counties in 

which the crime occurred), or (ii) must be connected with an organized 

conspiracy affecting two or more judicial circuits (in which event the 

information must specify the judicial circuits and counties affected by the 

crime). Id. In this case, only the first premise of OSP’s statutory authority is 

implicated because there is no assertion of any conspiracy under the second 

premise.

II. Construction of the plain text of Section 16.56(1)(a)

Thus, we are called upon to construe the following portion of the 

statute: “The office may . . . prosecute . . . [a]ny crime involving voter 

registration [or] voting . . . only when . . . such offense . . . has occurred[] in 

two or more judicial circuits as part of a related transaction[.]” §

16.56(1)(a)12., Fla. Stat. (2020) (emphasis added). 

In my view, based on the statute’s plain text, for the OSP to have 

statutory prosecutorial authority, the voting offense must both “occur in two 

or more judicial circuits” and the occurrences must be “part of a related 
16

transaction.” Put another way, unless the “offense” has “occurred in two or 

more judicial circuits,” the OSP has no authority, and we do not reach the 

issue of whether the occurrences in multiple judicial circuits were a part of a 

related transaction. Further buttressing this construction is the subsequent 

sentence in section 16.56(1)(a): “Informations or indictments charging such 

offenses shall contain allegations stating the judicial circuits and counties in 

which crimes are alleged to have occurred[.]” § 16.56(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2020) 

(emphasis added). Read in pari materia, these two unambiguous statutory 

provisions authorize OSP involvement only when elements of the charged 

offenses are alleged to have occurred in more than one judicial circuit. 

III. Construction of Section 16.56(1)(a) in conjunction with the 

charged offenses 

Miller was charged with violating sections 104.011(1) and 104.15 of 

the Florida Statutes. Section 104.011(1) reads in relevant part as follows: “A 

person who willfully swears or affirms falsely to any oath . . . in connection 

with or arising out of voting or elections commits a felony . . . .” § 104.011(1), 

Fla. Stat. (2020) (emphasis added). Section 104.15 reads in relevant part as 

follows: “Whoever, knowing he or she is not a qualified elector, willfully votes

at any election is guilty of a felony . . . .” § 104.15, Fla. Stat. (2020) (emphasis 

added). 
17

Miller did not “swear or affirm” his oath, nor did he “vote,” anywhere 

other than in Miami-Dade County. As the State rightfully concedes, no 

portion of either alleged offense “occurred” anywhere other than in MiamiDade County. In my view, because no portion of either charged “offense”

was alleged to have “occurred” in any judicial circuit other than the 11th

(Miami-Dade County), that is where the inquiry ends. Section 

16.56(1)(a)’s “as part of a related transaction” language is not implicated, 

and the OSP lacks prosecutorial authority.

III. Majority’s construction of Section 16.56(1)(a)

The majority takes a far more expansive interpretive approach. The 

majority seems unconcerned that Miller’s alleged offenses occurred in a 

single judicial circuit. Rather, the majority puts its focus on whether Miller’s 

single-county actions occasioned “reasonably foreseeable” activity by other 

actors in other judicial circuits. (See majority opinion at 11). Seizing on the 

statute’s “related transaction” language, the majority concludes that, despite 

the alleged offenses occurring in a single judicial circuit, the statute

nevertheless authorizes OSP involvement because the Leon County 

transactions triggered by Miller’s Miami-Dade County acts “were not only 

related, but they were also required acts before Miller got his voter 

registration and proceeded to vote. . . . . It doesn’t matter that Miller may not 
18

have intended to set off a chain of related events in other jurisdictions in 

order to vote.” (Id. at 9-10). The majority then imports tort concepts into its 

analysis of whether the charged offenses authorize OSP prosecution: “[I]t is 

not only reasonably foreseeable that a voter registration . . . would be 

processed by . . . local and state officials . . . in the state capital . . . , but it is 

a required part of the transaction to allow Miller to register to vote.” (Id. at 

11).7

7 The majority relies on two cases to support its conclusion that a court can 

look at activities other than those undertaken by the defendant to determine 

whether an offense has occurred as part of a related transaction: Pereira v. 

United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954), and State v. Tacher, 84 So. 3d 1131 (Fla. 

3d DCA 2012). (See majority opinion at 10-12). I do not see how either case 

is instructive to the statutory construction issue presented in this case or 

supportive of the majority’s reading of section 16.56(1)(a). 

In Pereira, the defendants, who had concocted and carried out a multi-state 

scheme to dupe a wealthy widow, were convicted of mail fraud, 

transportation of stolen property across state lines, and a conspiracy to 

commit those crimes. Pereira, 347 U.S. at 3. The defendants challenged their 

convictions suggesting “there was no evidence of any mailing or of 

transporting stolen property interstate[.]” Id. at 7. The Pereira court affirmed 

the convictions, concluding, among other things, that the evidence showed 

the defendants’ scheme occurred when they caused stolen funds to be 

mailed from a bank in one state and deposited in a bank in another state. Id.

at 8-9. The Pereira case does not construe a statute relating to prosecutorial 

authority. Pereira merely comes to the conclusion that the defendants 

committed crimes at both ends of a transaction. 

While Tacher is a case involving OSP authority, it is inapposite to this case. 

In Tacher, the defendants received delivery of illegal pharmaceutical drugs 

after their transport through multiple Florida judicial circuits, and then sold 

the drugs in Miami-Dade County. Tacher, 84 So. 3d at 1132-33. Tacher is 
19

I agree with the majority’s discussion as to what constitutes a 

“transaction” (Id. at 8-9), that Miller’s actions “set off a chain of related events 

in other jurisdictions” (Id. at 10), and I also agree that those events were 

“reasonably foreseeable” (Id. at 11). But I do not view these as relevant 

considerations in this case because, pursuant to section 16.56(1)(a)’s plain 

language, OSP has prosecutorial authority “only” when the charged “offense

. . . has occurred in two or more judicial circuits,” and no portion of either 

charged offense is alleged to have occurred in any circuit other than the 

Eleventh Judicial Circuit. 

The statute narrowly authorizes OSP involvement, and the statute’s 

plain text does not contain any of the broad relatedness concepts relied upon 

by the majority to assert OSP’s authority. For example, nowhere does the 

statute suggest authority where it is “reasonably foreseeable” that the 

charges implicate third-party actions in other jurisdictions (Id. at 11), or where 

the charges “set off a chain of related events” in other jurisdictions (Id. at 

not instructive because the defendants in Tacher were cogs in a crime that 

occurred in more than one judicial circuit. In fact, in Tacher, the defendants 

did not dispute that the information contained “sufficient allegations of multicounty criminal activity.” Id. at 1133. Their participation in the trafficking of 

the drugs was not confined to one judicial circuit, hence OSP involvement 

was authorized by the statute. Here, the State has stipulated, and at oral 

argument conceded, that Miller’s alleged crimes occurred entirely in MiamiDade County.
20

10). In my view, had the legislature intended so broadly to authorize OSP’s

involvement when alleged charges implicated, related to, triggered actions 

in, or affected other jurisdictions, it certainly could have employed such broad

language in the statute. It did not. Instead, the legislature prescribed OSP’s

prosecutorial authority “only” when alleged offenses “occurred” in multiple 

jurisdictions. 

I think the trial court correctly concluded that the OSP lacked the 

prosecutorial authority to pursue the charged offenses, and I would affirm the 

trial court’s dismissal of both counts of the information.