IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of:

DIANE KAY EANS-SNODERLY, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL CHARLES SNODERLY, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 18-0447 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC 2005-070898

The Honorable Lisa Ann VandenBerg, Judge

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF GRANTED IN PART

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Pangerl Law Firm PLLC, Phoenix

By Regina M. Pangerl

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Owens & Perkins PC, Scottsdale

By Max Nicholas Hanson

Counsel for Respondent/Appellee

FILED 8-18-2020
EANS-SNODERLY v. SNODERLY

Opinion of the Court

2

OPINION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop 

joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Diane Kay Eans-Snoderly (“Wife”) appeals the superior 

court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Michael Charles 

Snoderly (“Husband”) on her petition for contempt and motion to enforce 

matters relating to a consent decree of dissolution. The issues we address 

are (1) whether the court had jurisdiction to consider Wife’s petition insofar 

as it sought contempt remedies for Husband’s failure to pay the balance of 

his equalization debt, and (2) whether her petition and motion were barred 

by Arizona’s judgment renewal statute or by laches. Because we conclude 

the court erred in granting summary judgment, we vacate the court’s order 

and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

¶2 After Wife petitioned for divorce, the parties mediated their 

disputes, resulting in an agreement addressing their “community and 

separate property and obligations.” Under the agreement, which was 

incorporated into a consent decree of dissolution entered in 2006, the 

community business, Snoderly Distributing, Inc., was awarded to 

Husband, and Wife was awarded a $300,000 equalization payment. The 

decree ordered Husband to maintain the business as a going concern and 

keep a life insurance policy in place until the equalization debt was fully 

paid.1 The decree further stated that Husband would pay Wife his share of 

the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence, less $50,000, and then

make monthly installment payments on the remaining balance. The

agreement, however, left the amount and duration of the monthly 

installment payments blank, along with the date when interest would start 

1 The agreement states that the requirement for Husband to maintain 

insurance applies “[i]f necessary.” While it is not entirely clear what this 

contingency means in context, Husband has not argued it has any effect on 

this appeal. 
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Opinion of the Court

3

accruing. If Husband failed to pay the debt, the decree stated that Wife 

could file a contempt action. 

¶3 In January 2007, the parties signed a handwritten agreement 

addressing, among other things, additional payment terms for the $300,000 

equalization debt. Husband agreed (1) he would pay $5,000 per month to 

Wife beginning 30 days after closing on the sale of the marital residence, 

and (2) by February 2, 2007, he would name Wife as the beneficiary on his 

life insurance policy up to the amount still owing on the equalization debt. 

Husband paid Wife $70,000 from the sale of the marital residence in June 

2007 and $5,000 per month from July 2007 through November 2009. He 

then made two more partial payments in December 2009 and January 2010, 

according to Wife’s calculations. In May 2015, Husband filed for personal 

bankruptcy, and a discharge was entered a few months later; according to 

Wife, however, the equalization debt was not discharged. 

¶4 Wife took no further court action to collect the remaining debt 

until October 2015, when she filed the 2007 agreement with the superior 

court under Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure (“Rule”) 69.2 In 

December 2016, Wife filed a “post-decree petition for contempt and motion 

to enforce Rule 69 agreement,” later amended in August 2017 (referred to 

hereinafter as the “Petition” unless otherwise noted). Wife asked the court 

to find Husband in contempt for (1) failing to pay the balance of the

equalization debt, and (2) failing to maintain the business as a going 

concern by transferring it to a third party without her knowledge. She 

alleged Husband owed her $81,250 plus interest, for a total of $136,161.35, 

as of October 31, 2016. Wife also sought an order compelling Husband to 

fund the life insurance policy as he previously agreed, or alternatively, to 

provide other equitable relief to remedy his failure to comply with that 

agreement. 

¶5 Husband moved for summary judgment, asserting the 

judgment renewal limitations period in A.R.S. § 12-1551 barred Wife’s

Petition because his last installment payment was due on April 30, 2011, 

and Wife filed the Petition after the five-year period for renewing or 

enforcing judgments. Husband also raised a laches defense. 

2 Although Rule 69 has been amended since the parties’ 2007 agreement, 

the Rule has consistently stated that an agreement is binding if it is in 

writing.
EANS-SNODERLY v. SNODERLY

Opinion of the Court

4

¶6 The superior court granted Husband’s motion, concluding 

the judgment renewal statute barred Wife’s Petition on the outstanding 

debt. In denying Wife’s subsequent motion to amend the judgment, the 

court (1) clarified that § 12-1551 applied because the $300,000 award was 

not for spousal maintenance, and (2) found that laches also barred the 

Petition. The court awarded attorneys’ fees and costs to Husband and 

entered a final judgment. Wife filed a timely notice of appeal. We later 

issued an order directing the parties to provide supplemental briefing on 

whether the superior court had jurisdiction to consider Wife’s petition for 

contempt based on Husband’s failure to pay the full amount of his 

equalization debt. 

DISCUSSION

¶7 Summary judgment is appropriate only if no genuine dispute 

of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 79(a). We review the grant of summary 

judgment de novo, considering the facts and any inferences drawn from 

those facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. 

Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 199, ¶ 15 (App. 

2007). We also review the interpretation of a statute de novo. Jensen v. 

Beirne, 241 Ariz. 225, 228, ¶ 9 (App. 2016). We review the superior court’s 

decision on laches for an abuse of discretion. Rash v. Town of Mammoth, 233 

Ariz. 577, 583, ¶ 17 (App. 2013).

A. Jurisdiction—Petition for Contempt 

¶8 In seeking to enforce the terms of the consent decree and the 

Rule 69 agreement, Wife’s Petition requested, inter alia, that the court find 

Husband in contempt for failing to finish paying the equalization debt and 

failing to maintain the business as a going concern. The law is clear that 

this court lacks jurisdiction “over an appeal from a civil contempt 

adjudication.” Danielson v. Evans, 201 Ariz. 401, 411, ¶ 35 (App. 2001). Thus, 

we do not have jurisdiction to consider Wife’s appeal of the superior court’s 

ruling denying her petition for contempt. In our discretion, however, we 

will treat Wife’s appeal from the court’s ruling as a petition for special 

action and accept jurisdiction. See id.

¶9 We next decide whether the superior court had jurisdiction to 

enter the order from which this appeal was taken. See Bates & Springer of 

Ariz., Inc. v. Friermood, 109 Ariz. 203, 204 (1973). “In Arizona, dissolution of 

marriage proceedings are creatures of statute, and jurisdiction to decide 

such cases is conferred on the courts by the legislature.” In re Marriage of 
EANS-SNODERLY v. SNODERLY

Opinion of the Court

5

Waldren, 217 Ariz. 173, 175, ¶ 8 (2007); accord Weaver v. Weaver, 131 Ariz. 586, 

587 (1982) (“Title 25 defines the boundaries of a dissolution court’s 

jurisdiction, and the court may not exceed its jurisdiction even when 

exercising its equitable powers.”). Thus, the issue here is whether Wife’s 

petition for contempt falls within the jurisdictional boundaries of Title 25. 

¶10 In 1973, our legislature adopted A.R.S. § 25-317, which 

provides in relevant part: 

A. To promote amicable settlement of disputes between 

parties to a marriage, the parties may enter into a written 

separation agreement containing provisions for disposition of 

any property owned by either of them, maintenance of either 

of them, and support, custody and parenting time of their 

children. 

. . . .

D. If the court finds that the separation agreement is not 

unfair as to disposition of property . . . , the separation 

agreement shall be set forth or incorporated by reference in 

the decree of dissolution or legal separation and the parties 

shall be ordered to perform them.

. . . . 

E. Terms of the agreement set forth or incorporated by 

reference in the decree are enforceable by all remedies available for 

enforcement of a judgment, including contempt.

(Emphasis added.)

3 To our knowledge, the meaning of § 25-317(E) has not 

been previously interpreted in any reported decision, except to recognize

the constitutional prohibition of ordering imprisonment for nonpayment of 

property settlement payments. See infra ¶¶ 11–13. But the statute’s 

language yields only one reasonable meaning; it unambiguously provides 

that the terms of a written separation agreement are enforceable by all 

remedies available to enforce judgments, including contempt. See Glazer v. 

State, 237 Ariz. 160, 163, ¶ 12 (2015) (“If the statute is subject to only one 

reasonable interpretation, we apply it without further analysis.”). The 

legislature could have qualified that language by creating exceptions or 

3 The parties do not dispute that their negotiated consent decree 

constitutes a written separation agreement within the scope of A.R.S. § 25-

317.
EANS-SNODERLY v. SNODERLY

Opinion of the Court

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otherwise limiting the scope of this provision such that terms related to 

property settlements would not be included, but it did not do so. See State 

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. White, 231 Ariz. 337, 341, ¶ 14 (App. 2013) (“We 

‘will not read into a statute something which is not within the manifest 

intent of the legislature as indicated by the statute itself.’” (citation 

omitted)).

¶11 We recognize that both our supreme court and this court have 

held that property settlement payments cannot be enforced by contempt 

proceedings. See, e.g., Proffit v. Proffit, 105 Ariz. 222, 224–25 (1969); Masta v. 

Lurie ex rel. Superior Court, 22 Ariz. App. 170, 171 (1974); Danielson, 201 Ariz. 

at 411, ¶ 37. In Proffit, the superior court found the defendant wife in 

contempt because she failed to pay her husband money she owed him 

under the divorce decree. 105 Ariz. at 223–24. The court’s contempt order

stated that wife was “subject to such punishment as the court may impose, 

including incarceration in the County Jail for such period of time as the 

court may deem equitable and just in the premises.” Id. at 224. Our 

supreme court held that the contempt order violated Article 2, Section 18 of 

the Arizona Constitution, which prohibits imprisonment for failure to pay 

a debt. Id. at 224–25. Comparing wife’s situation to an earlier case, the court 

commented that unlike alimony and support payments, property

settlement payments “may not be enforced by contempt proceedings.” Id.

(citing Stone v. Stidham, 96 Ariz. 235, 237–38 (1964)). The court added that 

the decree’s provision directing wife to pay husband a sum of money 

“should be treated like any other judgment.” Id. at 225. Our supreme court 

has not opined on the effect of the later-adopted § 25-317(E) on its analysis 

or holding in Proffit.

¶12 In Masta, we considered whether the superior court had the 

power to incarcerate the husband after finding him in contempt for failing 

to pay certain community debts. 22 Ariz. App. at 170. Noting the recent 

adoption of § 25-317(E), we stated that the legislature “intended to allow a 

property settlement agreement incorporated into a decree of dissolution to 

be enforced by all former[ly] available remedies, including contempt as it 

has been used and interpreted in this State” but that the legislature did not 

intend to “invalidate the provisions of Article 2, Section 18 of the Arizona 

Constitution and all of the prior Arizona case law.” Id. at 171. We therefore

concluded the superior court could not incarcerate the husband for 

contempt. Id. We did not address whether the superior court lacked 

jurisdiction to consider husband’s failure to pay as part of a contempt 

proceeding or whether the court could utilize other remedies to compel 

payment. See id. In Danielson, citing Proffit and Masta, we held that the 

superior court lacked jurisdiction to hold the husband in contempt for 
EANS-SNODERLY v. SNODERLY

Opinion of the Court

7

failure to pay military retirement benefits to his wife. 201 Ariz. at 411–12, 

¶¶ 37–38. 

¶13 These cases are distinguishable from the present case. Proffit

was decided in 1969, four years before the legislature adopted § 25-317(E). 

And neither Masta nor Danielson addressed whether the superior court had 

jurisdiction, under the plain language of § 25-317(E), to consider a petition 

for contempt relating to nonpayment of an obligation incurred under a 

separation agreement. 

¶14 If we agreed with Husband’s position that the superior court 

lacked jurisdiction over Wife’s petition for contempt, we would have to 

conclude that when the legislature adopted § 25-317(E), it merely codified 

the existing common law—a law already binding upon the courts. See 

A.R.S. § 1-201 (“The common law only so far as it is consistent with and 

adapted to the natural and physical conditions of this state and the 

necessities of the people thereof, and not repugnant to or inconsistent with 

the Constitution of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state, 

or established customs of the people of this state, is adopted and shall be 

the rule of decision in all courts of this state.”). We cannot presume the 

legislature only intended to maintain the status quo when it adopted § 25-

317(E); instead, we presume that all words in a statute have a substantive, 

meaningful purpose. See Nicaise v. Sundaram, 245 Ariz. 566, 568, ¶ 11 (2019) 

(“A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if 

possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is 

rendered superfluous.”). Here, that purpose was to provide the superior 

court with broad authority to enforce separation agreements, as evidenced 

by the phrase “all remedies available for enforcement of a judgment, 

including contempt.” A.R.S. § 25-317(E); cf. Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 92(a)(1) 

(authorizing courts to use civil contempt sanctions “for compelling 

compliance with a court order or for compensating a party for losses 

because of a contemnor’s failure to comply with a court order”).

¶15 As directed by the legislature, the superior court has 

jurisdiction over petitions for contempt that seek to enforce the terms of a 

settlement agreement. But because statutes must be read in a manner to 

avoid constitutional conflicts, Lagerman v. Ariz. State Ret. Sys., 248 Ariz. 504, 

507, ¶ 13 (2020), the remedy of contempt provided by § 25-317(E) is subject 

to the narrow exception that incarcerating a party for his or her 

nonpayment of a debt would violate our constitution. See Proffit, 105 Ariz. 

at 224. Accordingly, we hold that § 25-317(E) gives the court jurisdiction to 

consider a petition for contempt for a spouse’s failure to comply with the 

terms of a separation agreement, including an obligation for payment of 
EANS-SNODERLY v. SNODERLY

Opinion of the Court

8

money, except the court cannot order incarceration for such nonpayment. 

See Waldren, 217 Ariz. at 178, ¶ 24 (recognizing that in the context of 

dissolution actions, “the legislature has the power to circumscribe the 

courts’ jurisdiction”); cf. Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 92(e) (authorizing a court to 

impose appropriate sanctions for obtaining compliance, including “seizure 

of property, attorney fees, costs, compensatory or coercive fines,”

incarceration, and other coercive sanctions “permitted by law,” as long as 

the order includes a purge provision).

B. Judgment Renewal Statute 

¶16 We next consider whether A.R.S. § 12-1551 barred Wife’s 

Petition (1) seeking to hold Husband in contempt for his failure to pay the 

remaining equalization debt and maintain the business as a going concern, 

and (2) requesting enforcement of the Rule 69 agreement, which required

Husband to list her as a beneficiary on a life insurance policy with a value 

equal to the amount of the remaining debt. The superior court concluded 

that § 12-1551 barred Wife’s Petition because more than five years had 

passed since entry of the decree and the Rule 69 agreement. At the time of 

Wife’s Petition, § 12-1551(B) stated: 

An execution or other process shall not be issued on a 

judgment after the expiration of five years from the date of its 

entry unless the judgment is renewed by affidavit or process 

pursuant to § 12-1612 or an action is brought on it within five 

years from the date of the entry of the judgment or of its 

renewal.4

By definition, this statute applies only to a judgment “upon which 

execution or like process may be sought.” Jensen, 241 Ariz. at 229, ¶ 13. In 

Jensen, we distinguished between a decree ordering “payment of a specific 

amount of money due at a certain time” and a decree mandating equitable 

real property distributions. Id. at 228, ¶¶ 11–12. The judgment renewal 

statute applies to the former but not the latter, because equitable real 

property distributions “are not judgments for payments of sums certain or 

judgments enforcing property liens.” Id. at ¶ 10. 

¶17 Husband contends the $300,000 equalization debt was a 

specific, enforceable money judgment subject to the five-year renewal 

period in § 12-1551. But even though the decree specified the amount of the 

4 Effective August 3, 2018, the renewal period is now ten years. See 

2018 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 36, § 1 (2d Reg. Sess.).
EANS-SNODERLY v. SNODERLY

Opinion of the Court

9

equalization payment due to Wife, it did not specify with certainty how or 

when that debt was to be paid. The decree plainly contemplated that after 

the marital residence was sold and the proceeds distributed, Husband 

would pay the equalization amount in future installment payments of 

unspecified amounts and at an unspecified interest rate. To further protect 

Wife’s right to future payments, the decree included the life insurance 

provision. Until the terms of payment were fleshed out in the Rule 69

agreement, the entire $300,000 debt was not due immediately upon entry of 

the decree and Wife had no right to execute on the $300,000 judgment. The 

statute of limitations in § 12-1551 does not begin to run until such a right 

exists. Cf. Groves v. Sorce, 161 Ariz. 619, 621 (App. 1989) (holding a statute 

of limitations “does not begin to run against a judgment if it is not suable”). 

¶18 For similar reasons, we reject Husband’s argument that 

because § 12-1551 applies to each installment payment as it came due, Wife 

is barred from collecting payments more than five years past due. In 

Johnson v. Johnson, 195 Ariz. 389, 391–92 (App. 1999), we held that the fiveyearrenewal limitation begins on the due date of each installment payment. 

But as noted above, the consent decree here did not specify the amounts of 

the installment payments or when they were to begin. The limitations 

period could not begin to run because the terms of the payment were not 

delineated. 

¶19 Husband argues the Rule 69 agreement specified the payment 

due date, thus making the judgment enforceable and subject to § 12-1551. 

The Rule 69 agreement stated the first installment payment was due 30 days 

after the sale of the marital residence closed. Although the agreement did 

not specify a closing date, Husband offered a warranty deed signed on 

April 30, 2007, as evidence of the closing date. This, he asserts, means that 

Wife had until April 30, 2016, to enforce the judgment and thus her 

December 1, 2016, Petition was untimely. 

¶20 Husband’s argument is based on the thought that the Rule 69 

agreement was a judgment, subject to renewal under § 12-1551. As 

applicable here, however, a judgment is “a decree or an order from which 

an appeal lies.” Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 78(a)(1); accord Ariz. Farmers Prod. 

Credit Ass’n v. Stewart Title & Tr. of Tucson, 24 Ariz. App. 5, 7 (1975) (holding 

that “judgment” as used in § 12-1551 has the same meaning as in Arizona 

Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a), i.e., “a decree and an order from which an 

appeal lies”). And the parties never submitted the Rule 69 agreement to the 

court to have it incorporated into an amended decree. Therefore, even if 

the Rule 69 agreement established the payment terms, it is not a judgment. 

Without the necessary “judgment,” the judgment renewal statute does not 
EANS-SNODERLY v. SNODERLY

Opinion of the Court

10

apply. The superior court therefore erred in granting Husband’s motion 

for summary judgment based on § 12-1551.

5 

¶21 Further, in denying Wife’s Petition, the superior court did not 

address Wife’s claims that Husband failed to maintain the business and 

name Wife as beneficiary of the life insurance policy until he had paid her 

in full. To the extent the court relied on § 12-1551 in dismissing these claims, 

it erred because Husband’s obligations to maintain the business and keep a 

life insurance policy in place are equitable directives, not money judgments 

“upon which execution or like process may be sought.” Jensen, 241 Ariz. at 

229, ¶ 13. On remand, the court should address and resolve the merits of

these claims.

C. Laches Defense

¶22 In the superior court, Husband claimed that the equitable 

defense of laches barred Wife’s Petition. To prevail on this defense, 

Husband had to show that Wife unreasonably delayed asserting her claims 

and he was prejudiced by the delay. See Flynn v. Rogers, 172 Ariz. 62, 66 

(1992). 

¶23 Husband asserted that Wife unreasonably delayed filing her 

Petition until seven years after he made his last payment, in January 2010. 

Wife countered that Husband asked her to wait to seek relief while he 

sought a loan and then until completion of his bankruptcy proceedings. 

Wife also presented evidence that Husband appeared to continue running 

the business after he stopped making payments, rendering her unaware of 

any alleged business failure or transfer of ownership. 

¶24 Wife also offered evidence that in 2016, Robert Scalf, who 

eventually took over the business, contacted Wife on Husband’s behalf. 

Through Scalf, Husband acknowledged he still owed Wife for her share of 

5 Husband has waived his alternative argument, raised for the first 

time on appeal, that Wife’s Petition is barred because it exceeded the sixyear statute of limitations applicable to written contracts for payment of a 

debt. See A.R.S. § 12-548(A); Uyleman v. D.S. Rentco, 194 Ariz. 300, 302, ¶ 10 

(App. 1999) (recognizing that a statute of limitation defense is waived if not 

timely asserted). Similarly, even assuming its applicability here, Husband 

has waived any claim that the one-year limitation on contempt proceedings

set forth in A.R.S. § 12-865(A) would bar Wife’s Petition because he did not 

raise it in the superior court. See Uyleman, 194 Ariz. at 302, ¶ 10. 
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Opinion of the Court

11

the business and was trying to settle this debt and make payment plans. 

After this communication, Husband began paying Wife $250 per month. 

Wife filed her Petition two months after Husband stopped making the $250 

monthly payments. 

¶25 Although much of this evidence related to payment of the

equalization debt, material disputed facts exist about the reasonableness of 

Wife’s delay in raising all her claims and whether Husband’s conduct and 

partial payments caused Wife to delay filing her Petition. Wife’s delay in 

seeking enforcement may not be unreasonable if Husband (1) appeared to 

still be in control of the business, (2) asked Wife to delay collection 

proceedings, or (3) reaffirmed the validity of the outstanding debt and 

negotiated alternative payment options. Cf. Certainteed Corp. v. United Pac. 

Ins. Co., 158 Ariz. 273, 277–79 (App. 1988) (holding that a defendant may be 

estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense if he induced the 

plaintiff to delay filing suit by leading the plaintiff to believe that the claim 

would settle without filing suit). 

¶26 Husband argues nonetheless he was prejudiced by the delay 

because relevant financial records are no longer available, and his memory 

has faded. He also argues it would be inequitable to enter a large judgment 

against him so many years after the divorce. But nothing in the record 

shows that Husband changed his financial position in reliance on Wife’s 

delay; mere allegations of prejudice are insufficient. See In re Marriage of 

Yuro, 192 Ariz. 568, 574 (App. 1998). Although the lack of available 

information on this issue might support a finding of prejudice, an 

evidentiary hearing is required because questions of fact exist regarding the 

reasonableness of Wife’s delay. The superior court therefore erred in 

granting summary judgment based on laches. 

D. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

¶27 The superior court awarded Husband $8,000 in attorneys’ 

fees and costs under A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and 12-341.01. Because we are 

vacating the court’s summary judgment order, we also vacate the award of 

attorneys’ fees and costs. Both parties request an award of attorneys’ fees 

on appeal pursuant to §§ 12-341.01 and 25-324. The court may reconsider 

on remand any requests for attorneys’ fees, including fees incurred in this 

appeal, pending the outcome of this litigation. See Tierra Ranchos 

Homeowners Ass’n, 216 Ariz. at 204, ¶ 37. 

¶28 Wife also requests attorneys’ fees as a sanction under A.R.S. 

§ 25-415. Because she failed to provide any supporting grounds, we deny 
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Opinion of the Court

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her request. However, as the successful party on appeal, Wife is entitled to 

an award of taxable costs upon compliance with ARCAP 21. 

CONCLUSION

¶29 We vacate the superior court’s order granting summary 

judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.