2010 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

11-5-2010

Michael Shemonsky v. John Thomas

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 10-2927

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Recommended Citation

"Michael Shemonsky v. John Thomas" (2010). 2010 Decisions. Paper 283.

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BLD-023 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 ___________ 

 No. 10-2927 

 ___________ 

MICHAEL R. SHEMONSKY, Debtor, 

 Appellant 

 v. 

JOHN J. THOMAS, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge 

 ____________________________________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-02882) 

District Judge: Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter 

 ____________________________________ 

Submitted for Possible Summary Action 

Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 

October 28, 2010 

 Before: SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY JR., Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: November 5, 2010) 

 _________ 

 OPINION 

 _________ 

PER CURIAM 

 Michael Shemonsky appeals pro se from the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s June 21, 2010 order. We will summarily affirm. 

 In June 2010, Shemonsky filed a complaint against a United States Bankruptcy 
Court Judge as well as an application to proceed in forma pauperis. In his complaint, 

Shemonsky sought over $5 billion dollars in damages for the 1990 “illegal theft of [his] 

savings and loan by the office of thrift supervision.” The complaint, which states that the 

bases for federal jurisdiction are “Article IV of the U.S. Constitution [and the] Fifth 

Amendment,” makes no reference Judge Thomas, the defendant. On June 21, 2010, the 

district court entered an order that granted Shemonsky’s application to proceed in forma 

pauperis but dismissed his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The district 

court explained that, under the doctrine of judicial immunity, Judge Thomas is absolutely 

immune from civil rights lawsuits that seek money damages for actions performed in a 

judicial capacity. See Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Additionally, the district 

court stated that Shemonsky’s action, which was filed twenty years after the alleged 

events in question occurred, was time-barred because federal civil rights actions are 

subject to Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitation for personal injury actions. See 

Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524. This appeal 

followed.1

 

 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and our review of the district 

court’s sua sponte dismissal of Shemonsky’s complaint is plenary. See Allah v. 

Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We may take summary action when we 

 1 After Shemonsky filed his notice of appeal from the June 21, 2010 order, he 

moved for reconsideration of that order. He attached documents from some of his 

previous cases (of which there are many), claiming that they supported his allegations 

regarding a “conspiracy to [sic] entrapment for financial gain.” The district court denied 

the motion, stating that Shemonsky did not address the bases for the dismissal of his 

complaint. Shemonsky did not appeal from the denial of the motion for reconsideration. 

 2 
 3 

conclude that an appeal presents no “substantial question.” 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 

10.6. 

 After granting a litigant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, a district court is 

required to dismiss the complaint if it fails to state a claim on which relief may be 

granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). For the reasons given by the district court, 

we agree that Shemonsky’s complaint failed to state a claim. 

 We have also held that a district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint 

without allowing the plaintiff leave to amend unless amendment would be inequitable or 

futile. See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004); Grayson v. Mayview State 

Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Although the district court did not explicitly 

state that amendment of the complaint would be futile, it is clear that this was the district 

court’s intent. Further, Shemonsky has had, and has taken, the opportunity to respond to 

the district court’s order, but has revealed no flaw in the dismissal of his complaint. We 

will therefore summarily affirm the judgment of the district court. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 

I.O.P. 10.6.