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TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
 

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
 

State of California
 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN
 

Attorney General
 

OPINION : 

: No. 95-302 

of : 

: December 20, 1995 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN : 

Attorney General : 

:
 

ANTHONY S. Da VIGO :
 

Deputy Attorney General :
 

: 

THE HONORABLE MILTON MARKS, MEMBER OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE 

SENATE, has requested an opinion on the following questions: 

1. May a county rent space to a private, non-profit organization for the operation of a 

contemporary art museum in a building maintained by the county for use of a veterans' association, 

where the veterans' association has not violated the terms or conditions of the county's dedication for 

such use, has not consented to the revocation of the dedication for such use, and has not abandoned its 

use of the building? 

2. May a charter county revoke its dedication of a building for use of a veterans' 

association without substituting alternative facilities, where the veterans' association has not violated 

the terms or conditions of the county's dedication for such use, has not consented to the revocation of 

the dedication for such use, and has not abandoned its use of the building? 

CONCLUSIONS 

1. A county may rent space to a private, non-profit organization for the operation of a 

contemporary art museum in a building maintained by the county for use of a veterans' association, 

even though the veterans' association has not violated the terms or conditions of the county's dedication 

for such use, has not consented to the revocation of the dedication for such use, and has not abandoned 

its use of the building, provided that the use of the building as a museum is incidental to, consistent 

with, and does not unduly interfere with the reasonable use of the building by the veterans' association. 

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2. A charter county may not revoke its dedication of a building for use of a veterans' 

association without substituting alternative facilities, where the veterans' association has not violated 

the terms or conditions of the county's dedication for such use, has not consented to the revocation of 

the dedication for such use, and has not abandoned its use of the building. 

ANALYSIS 

Pursuant to the provisions of Military and Veterans Code section 1262,1 the board of 

supervisors of a county may "provide, maintain or provide and maintain buildings, memorial halls, 

meeting places, memorial parks, or recreation centers for the use or benefit of one or more veterans' 

associations." (See Wall v. State of California (1946) 73 Cal.App.2d 838, 840-841; 62 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 655 (1979).) The provision of such a facility pursuant to section 1262 and its 

acceptance by the veterans' association constitutes a dedication for such use and benefit. (' 1266.) 

The two questions presented for consideration require an interpretation of section 1266. 

Specifically, it must be determined whether space within a building dedicated for use of a veterans' 

association may be rented for the operation of a contemporary art museum and whether a charter 

county may revoke a dedication for such use without providing an alternative facility to the veterans' 

association in the absence of a violation, consent, or abandonment by the association. Section 1266 

provides: 

"Whenever a county has provided, maintained, or provided and maintained any 

building, memorial hall, meeting place, memorial park, or recreation center for the use 

or benefit of one or more veterans' associations, pursuant to Section 1262, the provision 

of that facility and its acceptance by the veterans' association constitutes a dedication of 

that property to a public purpose, and the county may not revoke the dedication, so long 

as the veterans' association has not violated the terms and conditions of the dedication, 

unless it dedicates substitute facilities or unless the veterans' organization has either 

consented to the proposed county action or has abandoned its use of the facilities." 

1. Rental of Dedicated Space 

In Allied Architects' Assn. v. Payne (1923) 192 Cal. 431, the Supreme Court held that 

the dedication of a building by a county for the exclusive use of a veterans' association did not violate 

the constitutional prohibition against the making of gifts of public funds. After a lengthy analysis the 

court concluded: 

"It follows from what has been said that the board of supervisors, acting in 

pursuance of section 4041f of the Political Code [now section 1262], is empowered to 

erect as a memorial hall the building to be known and designated as Victory Hall. 

Furthermore, it is empowered to limit the use of the hall to a meeting place for 

associations of veterans who have served the United States honorably in its wars. We 

1 All section references herein are to the Military and Veterans Code. 

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do not, however, wish to be understood as holding that the legislature has not the power 

to enlarge the scope of the use of the hall to include kindred organizations or to open it 

to the public at large if future exigencies indicate that a wider use of the hall would 

enhance its usefulness and better subserve the public needs." (Id., at p. 440.) 

Six years later in Gridley Camp No. 104 v. Board of Supervisors (1929) 98 Cal.App. 585, the Court of 

Appeal explained the Payne decision as follows: 

"In behalf of the petitioners it is argued that the case of Allied Architects' 

Association of Los Angeles v. Payne, 192 Cal. 431, holds and adjudges that the Board 

of Supervisors, or the committee or custodian placed in charge of such building 

possesses no authority to permit the use thereof by any other than a veteran association. 

While there is language in the opinion in that case which is open to the construction 

that the author of the opinion entertained the idea that such buildings should properly 

be limited to the exclusive use of such organizations, and the case does hold that the 

Board of Supervisors may erect a building under the act which is devoted exclusively to 

the use of such organizations, the case does not go to the extent contended for by the 

petitioners. It is to be observed also that the case primarily was based upon a 

resolution of the Board of Supervisors of the county of Los Angeles, which specified 

that the building to be erected should be exclusively used as a meeting place for 

patriotic, fraternal and benevolent associations `whose membership shall be composed 

only of veterans,' etc. 

"While we are of the opinion that under the section of the Political Code 

authorizing the construction of memorial buildings, boards of supervisors possess the 

authority and power to limit the use thereof and of every room therein, exclusively to 

veterans, it does not follow that the language should be so narrowly construed as to 

prevent the incidental use thereof or the incidental use of the rooms therein, such as the 

main auditorium, in such a manner as not to interfere with the main purposes for which 

the building has been erected, and at times when such rooms would otherwise be 

vacant. While the section of the code authorizes the construction of such buildings, in 

the nature of things and in the ordinary course of events associations of veterans of wars 

that are past will cease to be. This is peculiarly applicable to cities no larger than the 

town of Gridley and it would be carrying the idea further than we think the language of 

the act requires to hold that when the veteran associations referred to have ceased to be, 

the building must remain vacant or stand as an empty monument. The complaint in 

this case is directed particularly to the use permitted of the auditorium, but from the 

facts before us it is apparent that the auditorium having a seating capacity of 1200 is 

designed for use only on special occasions, and under such circumstances we see no 

reason why the Board of Supervisors or the committee placed by it in control of the 

building, should not allow the incidental use of the auditorium for purposes not 

inconsistent with the objects for which the building was erected, or which do not 

obstruct or interfere with the use of the building by the different veteran organizations, 

either free of charge or for a stated compensation, and thus aid in defraying the 

expenses of maintaining the building." (Id., at pp. 591-592.) 

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On numerous occasions we have alluded to the issue of the incidental use of dedicated 

facilities. In 5 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 155 (1945), for example, we concluded that a board of supervisors 

may allow the use of a veterans' memorial hall by a non-veterans organization, where such use is not 

specifically restricted and would not interfere with its use by veterans. Similarly, in 13 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 56 (1949), respecting the use of such a facility in Imperial County, we stated in part: 

". . . We think, therefore, that the construction should be that where a veterans' 

association is given the use of the building for a regular meeting place or recreation 

center, such organization must be composed solely of veterans, but that this should not 

prohibit the supervisors from permitting the use of such buildings or parts thereof for 

other purposes incidental to the main purpose by the State and Federal Governments if 

the board, in the exercise of a sound discretion, determines that such use will not 

interfere with the main use or purpose for which such buildings were constructed." 

(Id., at p. 60; see also 16 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 64 (1950).) 

In 1955 the Legislature essentially codified the Gridley decision by enacting section 

1264. (Stats. 1955, ch. 1604, ' 1.) Section 1264 provides: 

"The governing body maintaining any facilities constructed or maintained 

pursuant to this chapter may provide for the use of such facilities by persons or 

organizations other than veterans, either free of charge or for stated compensation to aid 

in defraying the cost of maintenance, for any purpose not inconsistent with the 

continued use pursuant to this chapter, when such use will not unduly interfere with the 

reasonable use of the facilities by veterans' associations." 

In 1989, however, the Legislature enacted section 1266, as set forth at the outset. (Stats. 1989, ch. 102, 

' 1.) Section 1266 speaks of the provision by a county of a facility and its acceptance by a veterans' 

association as a "dedication" to a public purpose. Does such terminology affect or modify in any 

respect the right of a board of supervisors under the terms of section 1264 to provide for the use of a 

dedicated facility by persons other than veterans? 

In our view neither the term "dedication" nor the language of section 1266 as a whole 

has any such effect. First, section 1266 pertains specifically to the revocation of a dedication, as 

distinguished from a county's authority to allow consistent uses of a dedicated facility. Second, the 

words of a statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or 

sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the 

extent possible. (Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 245, 

268; 78 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 253, 260 (1995); 78 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 247, 251 (1995).) We may assume 

that had the Legislature intended to modify the meaning of section 1264 and the longstanding judicial 

precedent embodied therein, it would have amended that section so as to conform with such intention. 

(Cf. 78 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at 260; 75 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 256, 260 (1992).) Third, the 

Legislature, at the time of the enactment of section 1266, expressly stated in an uncodified provision: 

"It is the intent of the Legislature, in enacting Section 1266 of the Military and Veterans Code, to codify 

the holding of the court in the case of Gridley Camp No. 104 v. Board of Supervisors, 98 Cal.App. 

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585." (Stats. 1989, ch. 102, ' 2.) The grant of authority contained in section 1264 thus remains 

unchanged by the enactment of section 1266. 

Accordingly, it is concluded that a county may rent space to a private, non-profit 

organization for the operation of a contemporary art museum in a building maintained by the county for 

the use of a veterans' association, even though the veterans' association has not violated the terms or 

conditions of the county's dedication for such use, has not consented to the revocation of the dedication 

for such use, and has not abandoned its use of the building, provided that the use as a museum is 

incidental to, consistent with, and does not unduly interfere with the reasonable use of the building by 

the veterans' association. 

2. Revocation of Dedication 

The second inquiry concerns a charter county's revocation of the dedication for use of a 

county building by a veterans' association. Section 1266 prescribes the conditions under which a 

dedication may be revoked where the veterans' association has not violated the terms and conditions of 

the dedication, has not consented to the revocation, and has not abandoned its use of the facility. The 

principal obligation of the county under these circumstances would be to dedicate a substitute facility.2 

The question remains, however, whether the requirements of sections 1262-1266 are 

applicable to a charter county. Does having a charter mean that a county need not follow the 

Legislature's statutory requirements? The scope of authority reserved to a county by charter is more 

restricted than in the case of charter cities. (64 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 234, 237-238 (1981); 61 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 31, 33 (1978).) Specifically, the rule with respect to a charter county is that its 

legislation may supersede conflicting state law only as to those matters which are actually contained in 

the charter pursuant to express constitutional authorization. (Cal. Const., art. XI, '' 3, 4; 67 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 402, 403-404 (1984); 61 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 512, 519 (1978).) Here no such 

express authorization may be found in the Constitution. 

Further, with respect to matters of statewide concern, county charters are always 

subordinate to general laws. (Shean v. Edmunds (1948) 89 Cal.App.2d 315; 61 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., 

supra, at 33-34.) We entertain no doubt that the establishment and maintenance of facilities for 

veterans' associations throughout California are matters of statewide interest. The welfare of veterans 

and the promotion of patriotism are not peculiarly incidental to any particular local concern. On the 

contrary, the broader public purposes of veterans' associations were clearly envisioned by the Supreme 

Court in Allied Architects' Assn. v. Payne, supra, 192 Cal. at 434-435: 

"It is settled beyond question that the promotion of patriotism, involving as it 

does the sense of self-preservation, is not only a public purpose but the most elemental 

of public purposes. [Citations.] The continuity of our governmental institutions is 

dependent in a large measure upon the perpetuation of a patriotic impulse which is but 

2 We have previously determined that a dedication may, in the event of a substantial abandonment, be withdrawn without 

the necessity of dedicating a substitute facility. (20 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 199 (1952).) 

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the willingness to sacrifice all for the ideas and the ideals which form the foundation 

stones of our republic . . . . It is conceded, as indeed it must be, that the erection of a 

building as a memorial hall, to the extent that it would serve as a stimulus to patriotism, 

would be for a public purpose. [Citations.] 

". . . To permit the men whose associations have been effected for the purpose 

of inculcating and promoting patriotism to use the vacant halls as a rendezvous for 

revivifying and broadcasting the spirit of patriotism throughout the length and breadth 

of the land is clearly a public . . . purpose. 

". . . And the determination of the legislature to make the memorial hall in 

question a living force for the promulgation of patriotic principles by dedicating its use 

to associations created to foster the spirit of patriotism . . . was certainly a wise and 

commendable exercise of legislative power." 

Inasmuch as the power to establish and maintain a building for the use and benefit of a 

veterans' association is not expressly included in the Constitution among those which may be contained 

in a county charter and is further a matter of statewide concern, the terms and requirements of sections 

1262-1266 govern charter counties. (Cal. Const., art. XI, ' 1, subd. (b).)3 

It is concluded that a charter county may not revoke its dedication of a building for use 

of a veterans' association without substituting alternative facilities, where the veterans' association has 

not violated the terms or conditions of the county's dedication for such use, has not consented to the 

revocation of the dedication for such use, and has not abandoned its use of the building. 

* * * * * 

3 A charter city and county has the same authority with respect to municipal affairs as does a charter city. (Cal. Const., 

art. XI, ' 6; West Coast Adver. Co. v. San Francisco (1939) 14 Cal.2d 516, 520-522; 61 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at 518, fn. 

6.) Nevertheless, the same result would ensue for purposes of this inquiry. Where a charter city legislates with respect to 

municipal affairs, its charter prevails over the general laws. (Cal. Const., art. XI, ' 5, subd. (a).) As to matters of statewide 

concern, however, charter cities remain subject to state law. (Johnson v. Bradley (1992) 4 Cal.4th 389, 397-400; California 

Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1, 16-18; 78 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 143, 148-150 (1995).) 

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