Opinion filed July 25, 2013

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-11-00193-CR

__________

CARL DARHAL EVANS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 350th District Court

Taylor County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 9597-D

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The jury convicted Carl Darhal Evans of possession of a controlled 

substance and assessed his punishment at twenty years’ confinement in the 

Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and a $10,000 

fine. In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant complains that the trial court erred in 

denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.
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Background Facts

Officer Christopher Collins of the Abilene Police Department testified that 

he observed Appellant parked outside a residence at 1:30 a.m. on April 2, 2010. 

Officer Collins testified that the residence is well known as a location where the 

trafficking of illegal narcotics occurs. Appellant was sitting inside his car talking 

to a male outside of the residence. As Appellant drove away from the residence, 

Officer Collins observed him commit two traffic violations. Officer Collins 

initiated a traffic stop of Appellant upon observing the traffic violations. He 

testified that, at the time of the stop, he suspected that Appellant was engaging in

illegal drug activity. Appellant drove ten blocks before stopping his vehicle. After 

Appellant came to a stop, Officer Collins called for Officer Thomas Joel Peavy III, 

a “K-9” officer, to report to the scene to conduct an open air search of Appellant’s 

vehicle with a drug-detection dog. Officer Peavy had the dog conduct an open air 

search around the vehicle, and the dog alerted on the driver’s side door of the 

vehicle. Officer Peavy testified that he searched the vehicle and found a rock of 

crack cocaine located within a slit in the driver’s side seat.

Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of 

discretion. Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); 

Lujan v. State, 331 S.W.3d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). In reviewing a 

ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply a bifurcated standard of review. 

Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at 922–23; Hubert v. State, 312 S.W.3d 554, 559 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2010). First, we afford almost total deference to the trial court’s 

determination of historical facts and of mixed questions of law and fact that turn on 

the weight or credibility of the evidence. Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at 922–23; Lujan, 

331 S.W.3d at 771. Second, we review de novo the trial court’s determination of 

pure questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact that do not depend on 
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credibility determinations. Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at 923. Thus, we review de 

novo the issue of whether the totality of the circumstances was sufficient to support 

an officer’s reasonable suspicion to make a stop. Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 

504, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

Analysis

Appellant does not challenge Officer Collins’s basis for initiating the traffic 

stop in light of the evidence that the officer observed Appellant commit two traffic 

violations. A law enforcement officer may lawfully stop a motorist who commits a 

traffic violation. Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); 

Haas v. State, 172 S.W.3d 42, 50 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. ref’d). In general, 

the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable when an officer has probable 

cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 

538, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Haas, 172 S.W.3d at 50.

Appellant complains that Officer Collins did not have a valid basis to 

request an open air sniff by a drug-detection dog. We addressed a similar 

contention in Johnson v. State, 323 S.W.3d 561, 563–64 (Tex. App.—Eastland 

2010, pet. ref’d). Citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005), we held that a 

canine sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop is not a search under either the 

Fourth Amendment or Article I, section 9 of the Texas constitution. Accordingly, 

an officer is not required to have reasonable suspicion justifying a canine sniff 

during a lawful traffic stop. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409; see Johnson, 323 S.W.3d at 

563–64.

Appellant additionally contends that Officer Collins did not have a sufficient 

basis for continuing to detain him until the K-9 officer arrived. An investigatory 

detention is reasonable, and therefore constitutional, if (1) the officer’s action was 

justified at the detention’s inception and (2) the detention was reasonably related in 

scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. Terry v. 
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Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1968). The second prong of Terry deals with the scope 

of the detention: “[A]n investigative detention, ‘like any other search, must be 

strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.’” Davis v. 

State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 

25–26). A routine traffic stop includes investigation of the suspected offense as 

well as a license and warrant check. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 63 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2004). A traffic-stop investigation is not fully resolved until after a computer 

check of the license and warrant status of the driver is completed and the officer 

knows that this driver has a valid license and no outstanding warrants and that the 

car is not stolen. Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 63–64, 65. Once the reason for a routine 

traffic stop is resolved, the stop may not then be used as a fishing expedition for 

unrelated criminal activity. Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 243 (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 

519 U.S. 33, 41 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)). Reasonable suspicion that 

another offense was or is being committed is required to prolong the detention. 

Lambeth v. State, 221 S.W.3d 831, 836 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref’d); 

McQuarters v. State, 58 S.W.3d 250, 256 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. 

ref’d).

A review of the video taken of Officer Collins’s traffic stop of Appellant 

reveals that he followed Appellant for approximately twenty-five seconds prior to 

Appellant stopping. Officer Peavy arrived at the location within three minutes of 

Officer Collins’s initial contact with Appellant, and Officer Peavy conducted the 

open air sniff within approximately thirty seconds of arriving at the scene. During 

the few minutes prior to Officer Peavy’s arrival, the video depicts Officer Collins 

making contact with Appellant, obtaining information from Appellant, and 

returning to his patrol unit. Appellant testified at the suppression hearing that he 

did not have a valid driver’s license. Accordingly, the evidence shows that Officer 

Collins’s traffic-stop investigation was not fully resolved prior to the open air sniff 
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conducted by Officer Peavy’s drug-detection dog. We conclude that the duration 

of the stop was not unduly prolonged prior to the open air sniff and the subsequent 

discovery of a controlled substance within Appellant’s vehicle. Appellant’s sole 

issue is overruled.

This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

TERRY McCALL

JUSTICE

July 25, 2013

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

McCall, J., and Willson, J.