NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2010-3003

GARY P. EVANS, Petitioner,

v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Respondent.

Elliot A. Strokoff , Strokoff & Cowden, P.C., of Harris burg, Pennsylvania, for petitioner. P. Davis Oliver , Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigatio n Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Ju stice, of Washington, DC, for res pondent. With him on the brief were Tony West , Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson , Director, and Deborah A. Bynum , Assistant Director.

Appealed from: Merit S ystems Protection BoardNOTE: This disposit ion is nonprecedential. 

## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2010-3003

GARY P. EVANS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Respondent. Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection Board in PH0752070419-I-1.

______________________

DECIDED: May 5, 2010.

______________________ Before BRYSON, GAJARSA, and MOORE, Circuit Judges

. PER CURIAM. Gary P. Evans appeals the final order of the Merit Systems Protection Board (the “Board”) denying his petition for review of an initial decision dismissing his appeal as

settled. 1 See Evans v. U.S. Postal Serv. , PH-0752-07-0419-I-1 (M. S.P.B. Aug. 5, 2009). We affirm.

1 Mr. Evans filed a petition for revi ew with the Board two years after the dismissal of his appeal. Mr. Evans conten ds that he was unawa re of the settlement agreement because he was incarcer ated at the time of the initial decision. But the decision contains a certificate of service t hat certifies that the decision was mailed to Mr. Evans at the prison. However, despite finding that “a ques tion exists regarding the timeliness of the appellant’s petition for re view of the initial decision,” the Board dismissed on the basis that “t here is no new, previously unavai lable, evidence and that the administrative judge made no error in la w or regulation that affects the outcome.” Because the Board did not address the issue of timeliness, we likewise do not rely on that ground for deciding this case.The basis of Mr. Evan’s petition for review is his contention that the settlement agreement is “100 percent fraud” and that his attorneys “were never authorized to

settle” the case. A settlement agreement is pr esumed valid absent a show ing of fraud or mutual

mistake. Asberry v. U.S. Postal Serv. , 692 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1982); see Sargent v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. , 229 F.3d 1088, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Mere allegations of fraud, unsupported by corroborating evidence, are insufficient to satisfy the heavy burden that must be met in order to demonstrat e that a settlement agreement is invalid. See Tiburzi v. Dep’t of Justice , 269 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

Aside from uncorroborated assertions , Mr. Evans proffers no persuasive evidence in support of his allegations of fr aud. Mr. Evans was represented by counsel when he accepted the terms of the settle ment agreement, the last page of the agreement contains his signat ure, and all prior pages of the agreement contain the handwritten initials of Mr. Evans’s lawyer. Also, after reviewing the terms of the settlement agreement, the adminis trative judge found that it was “voluntarily entered into, understood by the parties, and lawful on its face.” There is nothing in the record to indicate otherwise. Furthermore, Mr. Evans offers no evidence to substantiate the alleged lack of settlement authority of his attorney. See Amin v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd. , 951 F.2d 1247, 1254-55 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[A]n attorney retained for litigation purposes is presumed to possess express authority to enter into a settlement agreement on behalf of the client, and the client bears the burden of rebutting this presumption with affirmative proof that the attorney lacked settlement authority.”).

2010-3003 22010-3003 3 As this court has previously made clea r, “[t]hose who employ the judicial appellate process to attack a settlement through which controversy has been sent to rest bear a properly heavy burden” of proving that the ag reement was involuntarily

obtained. Asberry , 692 F.2d at 1380. Our review is limited to setting aside any action that is “(1) arbitrary, capric ious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantia l evidence.” 5 U.S. C. § 7703(c) (2006); Briggs v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd. , 331 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Because bare allegations of fraud, abs ent evidence thereof, do not suffice to demonstrate the invalidity of a settlement agreement, the Board’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or, otherwise, not in accordance with law. No Costs.