alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Gary L. HILL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Avrian MENDEZ; et al., Defendants, Avrian Mendez; Ronald Baldeschwiser, Commanding Officer IV; Daniel Fernandez, Texas Department of Criminal Justice Captain; Edwin Lang, Texas Department of Criminal Justice Captain; Diane Lewis; Maximillo Herrera, M.D., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 04-41102.

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Decided June 21, 2006.

Gary L. Hill, Beeville, TX, pro se.

Timothy J. Flocos, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Texas, Austin, TX, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and WIENER and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

After a jury trial and a verdict in favor of the defendant, judgment was entered dismissing the civil rights complaint of Gary L. Hill, Texas state prisoner # 520863. The magistrate judge granted Hill leave to appeal in forma pauperis, but denied Hill’s motion for preparation of a trial transcript at government expense without prejudice. Hill has filed a motion with this court seeking preparation of a trial transcript at government expense. Hill did not timely file his motion for a transcript at government expense within 10 days after filing his notice of appeal as required by Fed. R.App. P. 10(b)(1) & (2). Hill also did not specify the issues he intended to raise on appeal before filing his brief. Hill filed an appellate brief in *474September 2004, and Mendez filed a letter brief in December 2004. Hill did not file his motion for a transcript at government expense until July 2005. Because Hill did not timely file a motion for preparation of a transcript at government expense, Hill’s motion for a transcript is DENIED.

The failure of an appellant to provide a transcript is a proper ground for dismissal of the appeal. *Richardson v. Henry,*902 F.2d 414, 416 (5th Cir.1990). Without the transcript, the court cannot determine whether the magistrate judge erred in making those evidentiary rulings or whether the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence. *See id.*Because Hill did not file a timely motion for a transcript at government expense, we are unable to review the claims he raises on appeal. Accordingly, Hill’s appeal is DISMISSED. *See id.*Hill’s motion for permission to file a supplemental brief is also DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
DISCRETIONARY APPEALS ALLOWED

96-2620.

#### Grace v. Koch.

Hamilton App. No. C-950802.

Douglas, Cook and Lundberg Stratton, JJ., dissent.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Leonel HERNANDEZ-HERNANDEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 05-41139.

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Decided June 20, 2006.

James Lee Turner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for PlaintiffAppellee.

Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender, Laura Fletcher Leavitt, Assistant Federal Public, Federal Public Defender’s Office Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before STEWART, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Leonel Hernandez-Hernandez (Hernandez) appeals his conviction for illegal reentry, challenging the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b). Hernandez argues that the “felony” and “aggravated felony” provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) and (2) are unconstitutional in light of *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).

The Government argues that the waiver provision in Hernandez’s plea agreement precludes his attack on the constitutionality of § 1326(b). We assume, *arguendo*only, that the waiver does not bar the instant appeal.

Hernandez’s constitutional challenge is foreclosed by *Almendarez-Torres v. United States,*523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Edüd 350 (1998). Although Hernandez contends that *AlmendarezTorres*was incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule *Almendarez-Torres*in light of *Apprendi,*we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the basis that *Almendarez-Torres*remains binding. *See United States v. Garza-Lopez,*410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied,*— U.S.-, 126 S.Ct. 298, 163 L.Ed.2d 260 (2005). Hernandez properly concedes that his argument is foreclosed in light of *Almendarez-Torres*and circuit precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for further review.

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>  5
<MULTIPLIER>  1,000
       
<S>                         <C>
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>           MAR-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-TYPE>               6-MOS
<CASH>                            2,923
<SECURITIES>                          0
<RECEIVABLES>                    44,229
<ALLOWANCES>                      1,269
<INVENTORY>                     130,540
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                183,768
<PP&E>                           87,566
<DEPRECIATION>                   29,137
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  288,265
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           146,371
<BONDS>                          94,296
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                 0
<PREFERRED>                       3,878
<COMMON>                          2,444
<OTHER-SE>                       29,310
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    288,265
<SALES>                         186,709
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                186,709
<CGS>                           166,112
<TOTAL-COSTS>                   166,112
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                    141
<LOSS-PROVISION>                      0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>               12,692
<INCOME-PRETAX>                  (9,267)
<INCOME-TAX>                     (3,578)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>              (5,689)
<DISCONTINUED>                        0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                       0
<CHANGES>                             0
<NET-INCOME>                     (5,689)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                    (3.54)
<EPS-DILUTED>                    (3.54)
        

</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-6643

ROBERT LEE BROCK,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

MICHALE ROACH,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, District Judge.

(CA-95-775-R)

Submitted: August 15, 1996 Decided: August 21, 1996

Before MURNAGHAN and ERVIN, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Robert Lee Brock, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying his

motion to alter or amend the judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. §

1983 (1988) action. We have reviewed the record and the district

court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we

affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Brock v. Roach, No.

CA-95-775-R (W.D. Va. Apr. 4, 1996).

We deny Appellant's motion for appointment of counsel and

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Office of Disciplinary Counsel *v.*Ginsberg.

[Cite as *Disciplinary Counsel v. Ginsberg*(1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 306.]

(No. 96-2477

Submitted January 22, 1997

Decided April 30, 1997.)

*308
      *Geoffrey Stem,*Disciplinary Counsel, and *Alvin E. Mathews,*Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.

*Charles W. Kettlewell,*for respondent.

*Per Curiam.*

Upon review of the record, we adopt the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the board. For violations of Section 371, Title 18, U.S.Code, we have previously imposed an indefinite suspension from the practice of law. *Disciplinary Counsel v. Felman*(1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 483, 650 N.E.2d 1358. Here, the record demonstrates that respondent had an excellent reputation prior to his felony conviction, that he worked with prosecutors and the IRS to unravel a complicated tax conspiracy, and that he has shown remorse for his actions. Nevertheless, respondent’s recognition of his involvement in this scheme to impede the IRS and his cooperation with federal authorities did not commence until after the formal investigation began. We see no reason to retreat from the type of sanction we have previously imposed.

Taking the facts most favorably to respondent, we find a case where an attorney’s reach for a more sophisticated practice exceeded his grasp of the legal tools required to work competently in the field. As a result, respondent did not try to nor was he able to understand the illegal or fraudulent actions which his clients were requesting. Our ethical considerations indicate that an attorney should accept employment only in matters which he is or intends to become competent to handle. This situation demonstrates what may befall an attorney unable to perform the “due diligence” necessary to practice in a particular area of law.

We hereby indefinitely suspend respondent from the practice of law in Ohio with no credit for time served. Costs taxed to respondent.

*Judgment accordingly.*

Moyer, C.J., Douglas, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney, Pfeifer, Cook and Lundberg Stratton, JJ., concur.
Exhibit
21
 
 
 **Subsidiaries**
 
 Registrant:
Angelica Corporation, State of Incorporation: Missouri
 
 Subsidiaries:
 
 ****
      **Name**
    **State
      of Incorporation**
    **Percentage
      of Voting**
      **Securities
      Owned**
      **by
      Registrant**Angelica
      Realty Co.
    California
    100%Angelica
      Textile Services, Inc.
    California
    100Angelica
      Textile Services, Inc.
    New York
    100Royal
      Institutional Services, Inc.
    Massachusetts
    100The
      Surgi-Pack Corporation
    Massachusetts
    100Southern
      Service Company
    California
    100
Exhibit 11.  Statement re: computation of per share earnings




<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                         Three Months Ending March 31,

                                                                1997                              1996
                                                     ----------------------------       ---------------------------
                                                                        Fully                            Fully
                                                        Primary        diluted            Primary        diluted



<S>                                                  <C>             <C>                <C>             <C>        
Net income (loss)                                    $  (956,279)    $  (956,279)       $ 2,213,263     $ 2,213,263
                                                     ============    ============       ===========     ===========


Weighted average of shares
  outstanding                                           7,457,717       7,457,717         6,221,444       6,221,444


Incremental shares from the assumed
  exercise of dilutive stock options                      541,884         541,884           426,277         426,277

Common shares assumed to have been
  repurchased, treasury stock method                     (474,835)       (474,835)         (288,434)       (288,434)
                                                    -------------  --------------     -------------  --------------

Weighted average common and
  common equivalent shares
  outstanding                                           7,524,766       7,524,766         6,359,287       6,359,287
                                                    =============  ==============     =============  ==============


Net income (loss) per share                          $      (.13)     $     (.13)       $      .35            .35
                                                    ===============================================================
</TABLE>
#### Nanomedicon, LLC, Respondent, v Research Foundation of State University of New York, Appellant, et al., Defendant. (And a Third-Party Action.)

[975 NYS2d 897]

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, the defendant Research Foundation of State University of New York appeals, as limited by its notice of appeal and brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Pines, J.), dated March 8, 2012, as denied those branches of its motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the first, second, third, and fifth causes of action.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, *594on the law, with costs, and those branches of the motion of the defendant Research Foundation of State University of New York which were for summary judgment dismissing the first, second, third, and fifth causes of action are granted.

The defendant Research Foundation of State University of New York (hereinafter Research Foundation) established, prima facie, that the plaintiff materially breached its licensing agreement with Research Foundation by failing to procure the requisite insurance (see *JT Queens Carwash, Inc. v 88-16 N. Blvd., LLC,*101 AD3d 1089, 1090 [2012]; *WILJEFF, LLC v United Realty Mgt. Corp.,*82 AD3d 1616, 1617-1618 [2011]; *166 Enters. Corp. v I G Second Generation Partners, L.P.,*81 AD3d 154, 158 [2011]; *Kyung Sik Kim v Idylwood, N.Y., LLC,*66 AD3d 528, 529 [2009]; *Brainerd Mfg. Co. v Dewey Garden Lanes,*78 AD2d 365, 367 [1981]). The plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition (see *New field v General Motors Corp.,*84 AD2d 548, 549 [1981], *affd 56*NY2d 818 [1982]). Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, it was required to obtain insurance when it entered into the licensing agreement in November 2007. In any event, even assuming that the plaintiff was not required to obtain insurance until June 1, 2010, as it claims, there is no dispute that after Research Foundation issued a June 24, 2010, notice of intent to terminate the licensing agreement based, inter alia, on the plaintiff’s failure to procure insurance, the plaintiff failed to obtain the mandated insurance within the 60-day cure period.

In light of the fact that the plaintiff committed a material breach, the Supreme Court erred in denying those branches of Research Foundation’s motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the first, second, third, and fifth causes of action. Those causes of action include allegations that Research Foundation breached the licensing agreement, whereas the plaintiff did not. The plaintiff, however, is entitled to recovery only if it substantially performed under the terms of the licensing agreement *(see Hadden v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y.,*34 NY2d 88, 96 [1974]; *Miller v Benjamin,*142 NY 613, 617 [1894]; *Kaye v Greenspan,*118 AD2d 831, 832 [1986]). Since the plaintiff materially breached the licensing agreement, it cannot establish substantial performance.

The plaintiff’s remaining contentions are without merit. Mastro, J.P, Angiolillo, Leventhal and Chambers, JJ., concur. [Prior Case History: 2012 NY Slip Op 30604(U).]
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Labor

###### Employment and Training Administration

          - [TA-W-65,864]

Pursuant to Section 221 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, an investigation was initiated on April 29, 2009, in response to a worker petition filed by workers of Baker Furniture, Hickory, North Carolina.

The petitioner has requested that the petition be withdrawn. Consequently, the investigation has been terminated.

Signed at Washington, DC, this 8th day of May 2009.

Elliott S. Kushner,

Certifying Officer, Division of Trade Adjustment Assistance.

[FR Doc. E9-13471 Filed 6-8-09; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4510-FN-P
#### UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Perry A. SANTIAGO-SALAZAR, Defendant, Appellant.

No. 05-2444.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Aug. 1, 2006.

Mariángela Tirado-Vales, on brief, for appellant.

Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Nelson PérezSosa, Assistant United States Attorney, and H.S. Garcia, United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.

Before BOUDIN, Chief Judge, STAHL, Senior Circuit Judge, and LIPEZ, Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Perry Santiago-Salazar pleaded guilty to possessing cocaine with intent to distribute after law enforcement officials seized a cocaine-filled suitcase that he had placed aboard an airline flight from Puerto Rico to New York. At his sentencing hearing in the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, Santiago-Salazar requested a downward adjustment in his federal Sentencing Guidelines offense level, arguing that he had played only a minor role in the offense. *See*USSG § 3B1.2. The court denied the adjustment and, after making other applicable adjustments, sentenced the defendant to 87 months in prison.

On appeal, Santiago-Salazar contends that the district court erred in declining to grant him the downward adjustment. We *24review a district court’s role-in-the-offense determination for clear error. *See United States v. Ortiz-Santiago,*211 F.3d 146, 148-49 (1st Cir.2000) (citing *United States v. Ocasio,*914 F.2d 330, 333 (1st Cir.1990)). The determination whether a defendant has played only a “minor” or “minimal” role in the offense, USSG § 3B1.2, is “notoriously fact-sensitive.” *Id.*at 148. A defendant seeking a minor-role adjustment bears the burden of showing that he is (1) less culpable than most other people involved in the particular offense for which he was convicted and (2) less culpable than most other perpetrators of comparable crimes. *See United States v. Mateo-Espejo,*426 F.3d 508, 512 (1st Cir.2005). The defendant here has made no such showing. To the contrary, the facts indicate that Santiago-Salazar was in charge of the illicit transaction, since he not only orchestrated the shipment of the suitcase but had follow-up conversations and meetings with a confidential source to determine the status of the suitcase and obtain a receipt for the drugs. The district court cited these follow-up activities as cause to deny the minor-role adjustment. We see no clear error in this logical determination. In fact, we have affirmed denials of minor-role adjustments to defendants who were simply couriers of contraband and did not engage in follow-up activities like the defendant in this case. *See Mateo-Espejo,*426 F.3d at 512-13 (collecting cases).

*Affirmed.*
| Subsidiary                                 |   | Jurisdiction of Organization          |
|--------------------------------------------|--------|---------------------------------------|
| Anaren Microwave, Inc.                     |   |     Delaware      |
| Anaren Ceramics, Inc.                      |   |     New Hampshire |
| Anaren GP, Inc.                            |   |     New York      |
| Anaren Communications Suzhou Company, Ltd. |   |     China         |
| Anaren Properties LLC                      |   |     New Hampshire |
| M. S. Kennedy Corp.                        |   |     New York      |
| Unicircuit, Inc.                           |   |     Colorado      |
Opinion issued July 7, 2016

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01
- 1 6
- 00 1 9 0
- CV

——————————— ERIC W. NORRIS , Appellant

V. HOME CARE PROFESSIONAL SERVICES , INC. , Appellee

O n Appeal from the 281st District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2014
- 41164

MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Eric W. Norris, proceeding pro se , ha s neither paid the required filing fee nor established indigence for purposes of appellate costs. See T EX . R. A PP
. P. 5, 20.1; see also T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE A NN . §§ 51.207, 51.208, 51.941(a), 101.041(1) (West Supp. 2015), § 101.0411 (West Supp. 201 5 ); Order , Fe es Charged in t he2

Supreme Court , in Civil Cases in the Courts of Appeals , and Before the Judicial Panel on Multi

- D istrict Litigation, Misc. Docket No. 1 5

- 91 58 (Tex. Aug. 28 , 20 1 5 )

. After being notified by the Clerk of this Court on March 24 , 201 6 , that this appeal was subject to dismissal for fai lure to pay the required fee , a ppellant did not timely respond. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 5 , 42.3 (b) , ( c )

. Accordingly, w e dismiss the appeal for nonpayment of all required fee s and for want of prosecution. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 5, 42.3(b), (c). PER CURIAM Panel consists of Justices Keyes , Brown, and H uddl e .
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Transportation

###### Office of the Secretary 

# AGENCY:

Department of Transportation. 

# ACTION:

Notice of Order to Show Cause (Order 2009-1-7); Dockets DOT-OST-2008-0224 and DOT-OST-2008-0231.

# SUMMARY:

The Department of Transportation is directing all interested persons to show cause why it should not issue orders finding Avjet Corporation, fit, willing, and able, and awarding it certificates of public convenience and necessity to engage in interstate and foreign charter air transportation of persons, property and mail. 

# DATES:

Persons wishing to file objections should do so no later than January 28, 2009. 

# ADDRESSES:

Objections and answers to objections should be filed in Dockets DOT-OST-2008-0224 and DOT-OST-2008-0231 and addressed to U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations (M-30), 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, and should be served upon the parties listed in Attachment A to the order. 

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Ms. Vanessa R. Balgobin, Air Carrier Fitness Division (X-56), U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, (202) 366-9721. 

Robert S. Goldner, 

Special Counsel for Aviation and International Affairs.

 [FR Doc. E9-1378 Filed 1-22-09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910-9X-P