Jf n tbe Wniteb ~tates (!Court of jf eberal QCiaitns 

No. 17-755C 

(Filed June 21, 2017) 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

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WILLIAM HENRY MORGAN, * 

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Plaintiff, * 

v. * 

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THE UNITED STATES, * 

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Defendant. * 

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ORDER 

FILED 

J :.J ! 2 1 2017 

U.S. COURT OF 

FEDERAL CLAIMS 

William Henry Morgan filed the complaint in this case prose on June 5, 

2017, along with an application to proceed in forma pauperis. It is clear from a 

review of the complaint that the subject matter is not within this court's 

jurisdiction, and accordingly t his case must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3) 

of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC). Mister Morgan's 

claims concern the actions of officials of the Washington State government and its 

localities and do not involve any entity of the United States government, and are 

therefore not within our subject-matter jurisdiction. 

Subject-matter jurisdiction can be challenged by the parties at any time, or 

by the court sua sponte. Folden v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 

2004). Pursuant to RCFC 12(h)(3), "[i]f the court determines at any time that it 

lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." When a court 

undertakes this determination, "the allegations stated in t he complaint are taken as 

true and jurisdiction is decided on the face of the pleadings." Folden, 379 F.3d at 

1354. It is understandable that Mr. Morgan, representing himself in this matter, 

would misunderstand the nature of our court and its jurisdiction. But if everything 

he has alleged in his complaint were true, our court would be powerless to remedy 

it, as none of it involves the actions of federal officials or operation of federal law. 

This court's jurisdiction must be based on the alleged existence of a contract 

with the federal government or on a violation by the federal government of a law or 

constitutional provision mandating the payment of money. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(l); 

7017 1450 DODD 1346 0133 
see also Total Med. Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 104 F.3d 1314, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 

1997) (holding that a plaintiff must plead the elements of a valid contract in order 

to establish jurisdiction based on a contract with the United States); United States 

v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976) (noting that the Tucker Act confers jurisdiction 

only where the federal statute allegedly violated confers "a substantive right to 

recover money damages from the United States"); Contreras v. United States, 64 

Fed. Cl. 583, 588 (2005) (holding that this court's jurisdiction "must be based on a 

law or regulation that either entitles the plaintiff to a payment of money from the 

government, or places a duty upon the government, the breach of which gives the 

plaintiff a money damages remedy"); Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 

1002, 1007 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (explaining that our court does not have jurisdiction to 

hear "every claim involving or invoking the Constitution"). This court has the 

power to hear only cases brought against the United States government; this court 

does not have jurisdiction over claims against state and city officials or agents. See 

28 U.S.C. § 1491; RCFC lO(a); Vlahahis v. United States, 215 Ct. Cl. 1018, 1018 

(1978); Clark v. United States, No. 11-lOC, 2014 WL 3728172, at *9 (Fed. Cl. July 

28, 2014). 

In this matter, Mr. Morgan is challenging the actions of Washington State 

entities. He questions why an uninsured motorist who rear-ended plaintiff's car 

was apparently not charged with criminal violations, see ECF No. 1 at 33, and he 

unsuccessfully sought money in Washington State courts from the Washington 

State Department of Labor and Industries. Plaintiff mistakenly refers to an 

Assistant Attorney General of Washington State as an agent of the United States. 

Compl. at 4; cf. Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 373 F.3d 1177, 1196 (Fed. 

Cir. 2004) (explaining the limited circumstances in which state officials act as 

federal agents, which are not applicable here). And Mr. Morgan curiously 

references the attachments to his complaint relating to his litigation against 

Washington State as "bonds" of which the United States has deprived him through 

the criminal conduct of fraud, racketeering, embezzlement, and counterfeiting. Id. 

at 2. Calling such documents "bonds" does not make them so, and such unspecified 

allegations would not be sufficient to state a claim within a federal court's 

jurisdiction, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (holding that a complaint requires 

"more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation"), even 

if our Court had jurisdiction over violations of criminal law --- which we do not, see, 

e.g., Stanwych v. United States, 127 Fed. Cl. 308, 314 (2015) ("[T]he principle that 

we do not exercise jurisdiction over criminal claims has been universally and 

thoroughly well-established by decisions of our court .... "). 

Thus, because there are no specific allegations of any actions taken by the 

United States government in Mr. Morgan's complaint, and because his claim and 

the attachment to his complaint concerns only the entities and officials of 

Washington State and its subdivisions, this court lacks jurisdiction over the 

complaint. Accordingly, plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED as beyond our court's 

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jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC 12(h)(3). Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma 

pauperis is hereby GRANTED, and thus Mr. Morgan need not pay the filing fee. 

The Clerk shall close the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

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