MAILING ADRESS: NIGC/DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 1849 C Street NW, Mail Stop #1621 Washington, DC 20040 Tel: 202.632.7003 Fax: 202.632.7066

REGIONAL OFFICES Portland, OR; Sacramento, CA; Phoenix, AZ; St. Paul, MN; Tulsa, OK; Oklahoma City, OK; Rapid City, SD

WWW.NIGC.GOV

Contact Us: contactus@nigc.gov

July 13, 2023 

Phone Scams at Tribal Gaming Operations 

Washington, D.C. – The National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) is alerting tribes, tribal gaming 

regulatory authorities (TGRAs), and tribal gaming operations of several nationwide impostor scams involving 

individuals claiming to be vendors, state, or tribal officials. We are urging tribes to report the calls immediately 

to tribal or local law enforcement, the local FBI office, and the U.S. Secret Service. These agencies can detect 

patterns of fraud from the information collected and share it with other law enforcement agencies. We urge 

tribal officials to ensure that persons working in the tribal gaming operations, such as cage, vault or accounting 

staff, who have direct access to cash assets or bank accounts are made aware of the scam and know what to do 

in the event of such a call or other communication. We also ask that you report these incidents to the NIGC 

Region Offices so that the information can be shared with other tribes through updated alerts, trainings, and 

other communications. 

Recently, there have been multiple instances of scams at commercial and tribal gaming operations with losses in 

the hundreds of thousands of dollars. The NIGC has been made aware of several failed attempts as well. 

During these calls, scammers attempt to collect a cash payment or facilitate a cash deposit under the pretense of 

a false “emergency,” such as a past due payment, a stalled delivery of goods or services, immediate need for 

transfer of funds, or other pressing event that, if not immediately addressed, will result in “dire” consequences 

to the operation, the tribe, or the other party. The scammer then tells the victim that the alleged dire 

consequences can be avoided by taking cash and transferring it to another party or entity, while they remain on 

the phone with the victim until the transfer or deposit is made. The transfer of the cash may take the form of a 

hand-delivery to an individual with whom the victim is directed to meet (usually off-site), by depositing the 

cash into Bitcoin deposit kiosks, or by a wire transfer of funds from one bank account to another. These are but 

a few examples of known cases, and scammers may attempt to use other means to get the victim to illegally

transfer the cash or funds. 

The following is a recent example of a reported scam: Someone impersonating a tribal official called the victim 

working in the vault, stating that a payment must be made immediately to ensure that a vital shipment of 

equipment is made. The victim was told to remove a specific amount of cash (i.e., $100,000, or more in some 

instances) from the vault. The victim was then directed to use their personal cell phone to remain on the line 

with the scammer. The victim was directed to drive, while on the phone, to a location(s) where the money was 
MAILING ADRESS: NIGC/DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 1849 C Street NW, Mail Stop #1621 Washington, DC 20040 Tel: 202.632.7003 Fax: 202.632.7066

REGIONAL OFFICES Portland, OR; Sacramento, CA; Phoenix, AZ; St. Paul, MN; Tulsa, OK; Oklahoma City, OK; Rapid City, SD

WWW.NIGC.GOV

to be deposited into a Bitcoin deposit kiosk (a victim may be directed to use multiple Bitcoin kiosks within the 

area). The victim was then instructed to send the QR code scanned at the Bitcoin deposit kiosks. 

These social engineering scams utilize perceived authority, fear, and urgency to manipulate employees into 

breaking internal controls. The scammers may sound and appear credible, often pretending to be a named casino 

manager, a gaming regulator, a vendor, a tribal official, and/or some other person of authority to whom the 

victim may feel obligated to listen. The scammer may provide the victim with what appears to be first-hand 

knowledge of the operation and procedures, and if initially questioned, the scammer may push back and 

intimidate the victim with fear of job loss or some other imminent legal action. The scammers may enhance 

their credibility through the use of spoofed phone numbers that appear on caller IDs, as if they are calling from 

a business, a government agency, a manager’s phone, or another phone number familiar to the victim. The call 

may come after normal business hours (e.g., between 5:00 PM and 8:00 AM), when most officials or top 

managers have already left for the day or there is a reduced number of gaming operations staff with whom the 

victim can confer.

Scammers’ Methods:

• Scammers pretend to be someone of authority. They use social engineering to learn about your business. 

Scammers will seem believable by pretending to be a known vendor, a customer or company, a government 

agency, a tribal official, or other individuals in positions of authority.

• Scammers will create urgency. They will rush you into making a quick decision, creating a sense of 

urgency and trying to persuade you to not follow internal controls or approval process, or other verification 

procedures. Scammers will likely keep you on the phone or remain in contact with you to prevent you from 

searching for proper verification.

• Scammers may use intimidation and fear. Scammers will tell you that something terrible is about to 

happen if they do not receive payment immediately. They may tell you that the casino’s electricity or slot 

accounting system will be disconnected or that you may be fired if you do not execute the payment 

immediately. Scammers may blame you for a past alleged error, and try to convince you that this is a way to 

correct the alleged error without anyone finding out.

• Scammers use untraceable payment methods. Scammers often want payment through peer-to-peer 

payments, Bitcoin, wire transfers, reloadable cards, gift cards, or cash. These are methods that are nearly 

impossible to reverse or track.

Helpful tips: 

• Train staff with access to cash and financial accounts to be aware of these and other similar scams.

• Ensure that approved internal controls, policies, and procedures are up-to-date and provide protection of 

casino assets. 

• Remind staff to follow the approved internal controls for movement of cash, transfer of funds, or payment 

of outstanding invoices. 
MAILING ADRESS: NIGC/DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 1849 C Street NW, Mail Stop #1621 Washington, DC 20040 Tel: 202.632.7003 Fax: 202.632.7066

REGIONAL OFFICES Portland, OR; Sacramento, CA; Phoenix, AZ; St. Paul, MN; Tulsa, OK; Oklahoma City, OK; Rapid City, SD

WWW.NIGC.GOV

• Remind staff to verify the request independently by calling or communicating directly with their supervisor 

or manager using the methods and means provided for in the internal controls or through established 

procedures.

• Train staff to be alert and understand what suspicious activities may look like with both guests and 

employees, and to report any such activities to a supervisor or manager. Such suspicious activities may 

include instances of other casino employees not following internal controls and/or policies and procedures. 

• Train staff to not deviate from established controls and procedures, regardless of who is allegedly on the 

phone, and to be aware of any caller who demands to stay on the phone and will not hang up or end the 

conversation. 

• Direct staff who receive such calls to immediately alert co-workers, security, surveillance, the supervisor or 

manager on duty, TGRA, and law enforcement.

• Train staff to consider limiting the direct transfer of external callers to sensitive areas, and instead transfer 

those calls to the Security Office for service.

• Report phone scams or other similar incidents (whether successful or not) to the NIGC Region Offices so

that the information can be shared with other tribal facilities to raise awareness and prevent other scam 

attempts. 

The NIGC offers technical assistance, training, audits, and other tools and resources to help identify potentially 

vulnerable areas and improve security and internal controls. For additional information, please email

training@nigc.gov, or contact your local NIGC Region Office. 

Resources

FBI Field Offices:

https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices

U.S. Secret Service Contact:

https://www.secretservice.gov/contact/field-offices

FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center:

https://www.ic3.gov

NIGC Region Offices: 

https://www.nigc.gov/compliance/regional-offices