FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D2022-2881

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EARNEST CARL DAUGTHREY,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Jackson County.

Ana Maria Garcia, Judge.

December 6, 2023

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was charged with fleeing or attempting to elude a 

law enforcement officer. Following a trial, the jury found him 

guilty of reckless driving, a lesser included offense. At sentencing, 

the State requested a six-month probation term and Appellant did 

not object. The written judgment and sentence included an 

assessment of $50 for prosecution costs. 

The trial court filed a written order of probation ninety-seven 

days after imposing the judgment and sentence. The written order

included additional probation conditions not orally pronounced. 

Appellant filed a motion to correct the sentencing error and it was 

denied. This appeal followed.
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Appellant’s first claim is that his six-month probationary 

sentence impermissibly exceeded the maximum lawful sentence. 

This is incorrect. Section 948.15(1) provides the legal basis for his 

sentence. We affirm on this claim.

Appellant’s second claim is that the trial court erred in 

imposing additional probation conditions in a written order filed 

more than sixty days after sentencing. Florida Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 3.800(c) “allows the trial court to reduce or modify a 

sentence to include the conditions mandated by chapter 948. 

However, the rule specifically requires that this must be 

accomplished within sixty days after imposition of the original 

legal sentence.” Kirizes v. State, 798 So. 2d 789, 794 (Fla. 5th DCA 

2001). We have adopted the rationale in Kiriazes. See Schutte v. 

State, 824 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Beal v. State, 978 So. 2d 

825 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

While the State is correct that the contested conditions did not 

require oral pronouncement, they did need to be timely imposed. 

“General conditions of probation not orally pronounced at 

sentencing may validly be imposed by subsequent timely written 

order of probation.” Hicks v. State, 1 So. 3d 1233, 1234 (1st DCA 

2009) (citing State v. Williams, 712 So. 2d 762, 764 (Fla. 1998)). 

Since the written order was filed outside of the sixty-day window, 

the additional probation conditions were improper. We reverse on 

this claim and remand for the trial court to enter a corrected order 

consistent with this opinion.

Appellant’s third claim is that the trial court erred in 

imposing a prosecution fee of $50. He argues that the State must 

request the prosecution fee at sentencing. We affirm on this claim. 

See Parks v. State, No. 1D22-1566, 2023 WL 4924857 (1st DCA 

2023). 

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

RAY, BILBREY, and LONG, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Tyler Kemper Payne, 

Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Kristie Regan, Assistant 

State Attorney, Tallahassee, for Appellee.