COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-11-00181-CR

AARON BENTON WATSON APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM THE 89TH DISTRICT COURT OF WICHITA COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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A jury convicted Appellant Aaron Benton Watson of murder and assessed 

his punishment at thirty years’ confinement and a $2,500 fine. The trial court 

sentenced him accordingly. Appellant brings six issues on appeal, arguing 

charge error and jury selection error and contending that the evidence is not 

sufficient to disprove his self-defense claim. Because the trial court committed 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

no reversible error and the evidence is sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction 

and the jury’s rejection of his claim of self-defense, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

Background Facts

On September 25, 2009, Appellant drove his girlfriend Amanda Buchanan 

to an engagement party. After the party, Appellant drove Buchanan and her 

friend, Heather Scoggins, back to Scoggins’s apartment. At Scoggins’s 

apartment, Appellant and Buchanan had a physical altercation in the bathroom; 

Appellant “kind of pushed her,” causing her to hit her head on the soap dish 

mounted in the tub.

Appellant left Scoggins’s apartment, walked to his truck, and tried to leave 

the apartment complex. Appellant could not find his car keys, however, so he 

returned to Scoggins’s apartment.

In the meantime, Scoggins had gone to her next-door neighbor’s 

apartment and borrowed a cell phone from Heather Gourley (Gourley), who was 

outside, to call the police. Gourley, her boyfriend Samuel Zamora, her sister 

Charlotte, and Charlotte’s husband Victor Vasquez, along with Victor and 

Charlotte’s children, all lived next door and were present that evening. Gourley’s 

cousin, Cody, was also visiting the apartment that evening.

Upon his return to Scoggins’s apartment, Appellant checked on Buchanan 

and asked her to leave with him, but she refused. As he left the apartment this 

time, Appellant noticed Scoggins in the front doorway, on the phone. Appellant 
3

asked her if she had called the police. At trial, witnesses testified to different 

versions of Appellant’s actions at this point.

It was the consensus that Appellant was angry, and Appellant and Gourley 

both testified that Appellant threw a bottle through Scoggins’s front window and 

then headed back to his truck.

Zamora, Gourley, Vasquez, and Cody followed Appellant to his car; 

Gourley testified that they did so to tell him to leave. Appellant retrieved a 

screwdriver from his truck and placed it under his shirt. Zamora and Appellant

swung at each other. Appellant punched Zamora with the hand that held the 

screwdriver and stabbed him in the head, causing injury that resulted in his

death. Appellant then fled the scene on foot.

At trial, Appellant testified and asserted self-defense. He testified that on 

the night in question, Zamora, Gourley, and Vasquez followed him to his truck 

and yelled at him while he was searching for his keys. Appellant testified that he 

felt threatened and that he got out of his truck to retrieve a screwdriver from the 

bed of his truck. Appellant placed the screwdriver under his shirt and pretended 

that he had a gun. He told Zamora, Gourley, and Vasquez to leave him alone or 

else he would shoot them. Appellant testified that his threats did not stop the 

group from advancing.

Appellant said that Gourley yelled at him about his behavior around 

children and that Zamora threatened to “kick [his] ass.” Appellant testified that he 

retreated from the group but that Zamora and Gourley followed him and Gourley 
4

“bow[ed] her chest” two or three times into his hand. Zamora “snapped” and 

said, “[Y]ou’re not going to put your hands on . . . my girl.” At that point, Zamora 

punched Appellant, and Appellant testified that he simultaneously punched 

Zamora while the screwdriver was in his hand. Appellant testified that he did not 

intend to stab Zamora and that he only intended to hit Zamora.

Gourley testified that she, Vasquez, Zamora, and Cody followed Appellant 

to his truck and told him to leave. Appellant’s truck was parked between the 

group and Appellant. Gourley said that Appellant never said anything to the 

group and that Zamora followed Appellant into the street but was not aggressive 

or confrontational. When Gourley joined the two men in the street, grabbed 

Zamora’s arm, and “told him [to] come on,” Appellant pushed her. Zamora tried 

to punch Appellant, and then Gourley heard a “loud boom” and saw Zamora’s 

eyes roll into the back of his head and his body fall to the ground.

Vasquez testified that as Appellant walked to his truck, he threatened to 

shoot all of the bystanders (including Zamora, Gourley, and Scoggins). 

According to Vasquez, he, Cody, Gourley, and Zamora followed Appellant to his 

truck and continued to follow him as he backed into the street. Vasquez testified 

that Appellant and Zamora were speaking but that he could not hear what they 

were saying. Zamora had a beer in his hand, but he put the beer down before he 

began struggling with Appellant. Vasquez testified that he thought he saw 

Gourley join the struggle between Zamora and Appellant and that eventually he 

saw Zamora fall to the ground.
5

Scoggins testified that she saw Zamora, Gourley, and Vasquez (and 

others that she could not identify) approach Appellant at his truck. Appellant 

backed away from the group, but they continued to walk toward him. Zamora 

was closest to Appellant. Zamora and Appellant struggled, and Scoggins saw 

Zamora fall.

Appellant was arrested and charged with murder.

Sufficiency of the Evidence to Disprove Self-defense

In his sixth issue, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to 

disprove his self-defense claim. A defendant has the burden of producing some 

evidence to support a claim of self-defense.2The State has the burden of 

persuasion in disproving self-defense.3This burden does not require the State to 

produce evidence refuting the self-defense claim; rather, the burden requires the 

State to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.4 Self-defense is an issue of 

fact to be determined by the jury.5 A jury verdict of guilty is an implicit finding 

rejecting the defendant’s self-defense theory.6

 

2

Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

3Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

4

Id.

5

Id. at 913–14.

6

Id. at 914.
6

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s rejection of 

Appellant’s self-defense theory, we examine all of the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the offense and also could have found against 

him on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt.7

Appellant argues that the evidence admitted at trial supports his contention 

that he feared death or serious bodily injury. Zamora was a member of a group 

of at least three people who were approaching Appellant in a threatening 

manner. Appellant was attempting to leave in his pickup, but he could not find 

his keys. He stepped out of his pickup and grabbed a screwdriver from the 

toolbox in the bed of the pickup. The record does not reflect that anyone other 

than Appellant exhibited a weapon. Of the group of others, the record reflects 

that, at the time Zamora was stabbed, only Zamora attempted to fight. Appellant 

testified that both he and Zamora swung a punch at the same time. Appellant 

was holding the screwdriver.

“Deadly force” is defined as “force that is intended or known by the actor to 

cause, or in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing, death or 

serious bodily injury.”8 Section 9.32 of the penal code provides,

A person is justified in using deadly force against another . . . if the 

actor would be justified in using force against the other under 

 

7See id.

8

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.01(3) (West 2011).
7

Section 9.31; and . . . when and to the degree the actor reasonably 

believes the deadly force is immediately necessary . . . to protect the 

actor against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly 

force.

9

Although Appellant is correct that he had the right to defend himself and 

was justified in the use of force, the record does not justify his use of deadly force

because there is no evidence that anyone other than Appellant had a weapon or 

otherwise used or threatened deadly force.

10 We therefore hold that the 

evidence is sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction and the jury’s rejection of 

his self-defense claim. We overrule Appellant’s sixth issue.

Jury Selection Issues

In his third issue, Appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible 

error when it denied his motion for access to information on potential jurors. 

Although Appellant argues (1) that the State indicated below that the information 

denied him was similar to the information contained on TCIC and NCIC and (2) 

that the trial court’s refusal to provide him that information was a denial of due 

process, he correctly states that the record is silent as to what information the jail 

management software to which he sought access would have provided him. 

Without more, we cannot know the extent to which he was denied information not 

available elsewhere. Nor can we know, without more, whether he could have 

 

9

Id. § 9.32.

10See id.
8

secured the information by other means. Consequently, we are compelled to 

overrule Appellant’s third issue.

In his fourth and fifth issues, Appellant argues that the trial court improperly 

sustained the State’s challenges to two members of the venire. The first 

veniremember explained that the district attorney is married to her former 

husband. When asked if the relationship would cause her to “lean either one 

way or the other in this case even the slightest bit,” she replied, “Possibly.” She 

conceded that “[o]ne side could start out ahead or behind in [her] mind just 

because of [her] relationship.” The trial court excluded her for cause over 

Appellant’s objection.

The State discovered an active warrant for misdemeanor theft by check in 

regard to the other excluded veniremember, Duran. She admitted to a dispute 

over a check several years before trial, but she denied that there was an active 

warrant. Duran also admitted to having had a financial dispute with the medical 

provider complainant named in the warrant but stated that she had paid her debt 

and had no knowledge that a warrant had been issued. The trial court heard the 

State’s information about the warrant and the veniremember’s explanation. The 

trial court granted the State’s challenge for cause over Appellant’s objection. We 

cannot say that the trial court erred by crediting the State’s statements that its

records reflected an active warrant rather than the venire member’s denial.

In any event, as to both veniremembers, we cannot say that their 

exclusion, even if error, requires reversal. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
9

has stated that “erroneous excusing of a veniremember will call for reversal only 

if the record shows that the error deprived the defendant of a lawfully constituted 

jury.”11 Under Jones, the issue is whether the sitting jurors were impartial.12 

Appellant does not challenge the sitting jury. We therefore overrule Appellant’s 

fourth and fifth issues.

Jury Charge

In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court’s refusal to grant his 

request to incorporate the self-defense instruction into the application paragraph 

of the murder instruction constituted reversible error under Almanza.

13

 Appellate 

review of claimed error in a jury charge involves a two-step process.14 We must 

first determine whether error occurred.15

The trial court instructed the jury on murder and provided an application 

paragraph. The charge then instructed the jury to consider self-defense if they 

found the State had proved murder but to consider manslaughter if they had a 

reasonable doubt that the State had proved murder. After explaining self-

 

11Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386, 394 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), cert. 

denied, 528 U.S. 985 (1999).

12Gamboa v. State, 296 S.W.3d 574, 580 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

13Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171–72 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. 

on reh’g).

14Abdnor v. State, 871 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); see Sakil 

v. State, 287 S.W.3d 23, 25–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

15See Abdnor, 871 S.W.2d at 731–32.
10

defense, the charge instructed the jury in an application paragraph dealing with 

self-defense in the murder context. The jury charge was sufficient to properly 

instruct the jury on self-defense and on the application of the law of self-defense 

to the facts of the case.16 We overrule Appellant’s first issue.

In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court reversibly erred by 

improperly instructing the jury on the requisite mental state of murder. We first 

determine whether error occurred.17

Murder is a result-oriented offense committed when the “conscious 

objective or desire of the perpetrator is to cause death or when the perpetrator is 

aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause death.”18 A proper jury 

charge does not contain the full statutory definition of “intentional” but only the 

portion of the definition requiring the jury to find that the defendant intended to 

cause a specific result of death.19

In the case now before this court, the trial court instructed the jury,

A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the 

result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to 

engage in the conduct or cause the result.

 

16See Caldwell v. State, 971 S.W.2d 663, 666–67 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

1998, pet. ref’d).

17See Abdnor, 871 S.W.2d at 731–32.

18Martinez v. State, 833 S.W.2d 188, 195 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, pet. 

ref’d).

19Cook v. State, 884 S.W.2d 485, 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
11

The State concedes that the trial court’s abstract definition of “intentionally” is 

erroneous because it is not limited to the result of the conduct, that is, causing 

the death.20

When there is error in the trial court=s charge but it was not preserved 

below, as in the case before us, we must decide whether the error was so 

egregious and created such harm that Appellant did not have a fair and impartial 

trial—in short, that Aegregious harm@ has occurred.21

Egregious harm “‘is a difficult standard to prove and such a determination 

must be done on a case-by-case basis.’”

22

 In making an egregious harm 

determination, Athe actual degree of harm must be assayed in light of the entire 

jury charge, the state of the evidence, including the contested issues and weight 

of probative evidence, the argument of counsel and any other relevant 

information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole.@

23

 Errors that result in 

egregious harm are those “that affect the very basis of the case, deprive the 

defendant of a valuable right, vitally affect the defensive theory, or make a case 

 

20See id.

21Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171; see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.19 

(West 2006); Hutch v. State, 922 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

22Taylor v. State, 332 S.W.3d 483, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting 

Hutch, 922 S.W.2d at 172).

23Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171; see generally Hutch, 922 S.W.2d at 172–

74.
12

for conviction clearly and significantly more persuasive.”24 The purpose of this 

review is to illuminate the actual, not just theoretical, harm to the accused.25

Appellant testified that he knew that he had the screwdriver in his hand but 

that he did not intend to stab Zamora, only to hit him. If the jury had believed 

Appellant’s testimony, they would have found that Appellant did not intend to 

engage in the conduct. That is, apart from any consideration of whether 

Appellant intended to cause Zamora’s death, the jury would have found that he 

did not intend to stab Zamora. We cannot say that Appellant suffered egregious 

harm from the trial court’s erroneous instruction. We overrule Appellant’s second 

issue.

 

24Taylor, 332 S.W.3d at 490 (citing Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 172).

25Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 174.
13

Conclusion

Having overruled Appellant’s six issues, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT

JUSTICE

PANEL: DAUPHINOT, MCCOY, and MEIER, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: May 17, 2012