Filed 9/5/13 P. v. Shiringoharian CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
AMIRHOSSEIN SHIRINGOHARIAN,
Defendant and Appellant. B239721
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. NA085709)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Supe rior Court of Los Angeles County. James B. Pierce, Judge. Affirmed.

Marilee Marshall, under appointment by th e Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Da ne R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Atto rney General, Stephanie A. Miyoshi and Robert C. Schneider, Deputy Attorneys Ge neral, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_____________ ____________2 Amirhossein Shiringoharian (defendant) was convicted on counts for grand theft automobile, receiving a stolen automobile, recei ving stolen property, grand theft of credit cards, theft of identifying inform ation to obtain credit, goods or services (identify theft), and burglary. On appeal, he c ontends that the convictions on c ounts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 12, 19, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 34 were based on insuffici ent evidence. Upon review, we find no error and affirm the judgment.
FACTS
The information The District Attorney of Los Angeles County file d an amended information against defendant on January 16, 2012. Coun t 1 alleged that defendant committed grand theft auto of a gray 20 06 BMW (Pen. Code, § 666.5). 1 The gray 2006 BMW belonged to Alison Austin (Austin). In count 2, defendant was charge d with receiving Austin’s BMW after it had been stolen (§ 666.5). 2 Count 3 charged defendant with receiving st olen property in violation of section 496, subdivision (a). That property was a de sktop computer belongi ng to Austin, checks belonging to Cheryl Paller (P aller), Triple A cards belonging to Jerry Kay (Kay), a driver’s license belonging to Erik Olsen (Olsen), a driver’s license and social security

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

2 Section 666.5, subdivision (a) increases the base term for a second felony theft of automobile. ( People v. Demara (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 448, 452.) The statute provides in part: “Every person who, having been previously convicted of a felony violation of Section 10851 of the Vehicle Code, or felony grand theft involving an automobile in violation of subdivision (d) of Section 487, . . . or a felony violation of Section 496d regardless of whether or not the person actua lly served a prior prison term for those offenses, is subsequently convicted of any of these offenses shall be punished by imprisonment pursuant to subdivis ion (h) of Section 1170 for two, three, or four years, or a fine of ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both the fine and the imprisonment.” (§ 666.5, subd. (a).) Though counts 1 and 2 charge d defendant with violating section 666.5, this was presumably shorthand for sayi ng the offenses were second violations of section 487, subdivision (d) [grand theft automobile] and section 496d, subdivision (a) [receiving a stolen automobile].3 card belonging to Christop her Moghaddam (Moghaddam), and a laptop computer belonging to Linda Shelvin (Shelvin). Counts 4, 5, 9, 10, 17, 20, 26, 29, 31, and 32, charged defenda nt with grand theft
of credit cards in violation of section 484e, subdivision (d). As is relevant to this appeal, and as alleged and/or argued by the prosecuto r, count 4 pertained to an Alaska Airlines Visa card belonging to Paller and stolen fro m her vehicle on Novemb er 2, 2009; count 5 pertained to two American Express cards an d two Bank of America Visa cards belonging
to Paller and stolen from her vehicle on Novemb er 2, 2009; count 10 pertained to a First Horizon Visa card belonging to Amanda Va al (Vaal) and stolen from her vehicle on November 17 or 18, 2009; count 26 pertained to a Wells Fargo Visa card belonging to
Olsen and stolen from his vehicle on November 24, 2009; and count 29 pertained to two Bank of America Visa cards belonging to Jonathan Kang (Kang) and stolen from his vehicle on November 24, 2009. 3 Defendant was charged in counts 6, 11, 12 , 13, 14, 15, 18, 21, 22, 24, 33, and 35, with identity theft in violation of section 530.5, subdivision (a ). As is relevant to this appeal, and as alleged and/or argued by the prosecutor, count 12 pertained to defendant’s fraudulent use of an American Express card belonging to Vaal to make a purchase at 6:04 p.m. at a Whole Foods market on November 21, 2009, in the amou nt of $14.16. In addition, count 24 pertained to defendant’s attempted fraudul ent use of a Citibank Visa card belonging to Orly Beards ley (Beardsley) on November 22, 2009, at a Whole Foods market, a FedEx Kinkos and DVD Play. 4

3 Counts 9, 17, 20, 31 and 32, respectively, pertained to cards belonging to Vaal, Lori Noravian (Noravian), Bobby Davi s (Davis), Chesare Bono (Bono) and Casey Binafard (Binafard) and stolen from their ve hicles. Defendant was convicted on all but count 31. He does not challenge the suffi ciency of the eviden ce to support these convictions.

4 Counts 6, 11, 13, 14, 15 , 18, 21, 22, 33, and 35, re spectively, pertained to defendant’s fraudulent use of cards belonging to Paller, Vaal, Noravian, Davis, Binafard and Daniel Field (Field). Defendant was co nvicted on all of these counts. These convictions are not challenged.4 In counts 7, 8, 16, 19, 23, 25, 28, 30, and 34, defend ant was charged with second degree burglary of various vehicl es in violation of section 459 . As is relevant to this appeal, and as alleged and/or argued by the prosecutor, count 19 pertained to the November 6, 2009, burglary of a 2006 Do dge Magnum belonging to Davis; count 23 pertained to the November 22, 2009, burglary of a 2006 BMW belonging to Beardsley; count 25 pertained to the November 3, 2009, burglary of a 2005 Saab belonging to Olsen; and count 28 pertained to the November 12, 20 09, burglary of a 2006 Lexus belonging to Kang. 5 With respect to count 27, defendant was charged with first degree residential burglary because Kang’s 200 6 Lexus was in his apar tment building’s garage. The People’s Case
The crimes 6 On November 4, 2009, Austin parked her BMW at the parking lo t connected to the
UCLA Medical Center in Westwood. It cont ained a desktop computer and a valet key. Subsequently, the car was stolen. About a week later, Kang’s vehicle was burglarized while it was parked in the ground floor park ing garage for his apartment building on Midvale Avenue in Los Angeles, which is near the UCLA Medical Center. Cash, two Bank of America Visa cards, an American Expr ess card and a driver’s license were stolen from the wallet that Kang kept in th e center console of his vehicle. In October and November of 2009, someone burglarized cars located in parking structures near the UCLA Medical Center, L. A. Fitness and a gym ca lled “Equinox” in an area of Los Angeles known as Westwood. 7 Specifically, the burglar stole Kay’s Triple A

5 Counts 7, 8, 16, 30 and 34, respectivel y, pertained to the burglary of vehicles belonging to Kay, Vaal, Noravian, Bono and Shelvin. Defendant was not convicted on counts 7 and 30. He was convicted on counts 8, 16 and 34. He does not challenge those convictions.

6 Defendant was accused of stealing a host of items. For the sake of brevity and clarity, our statement of facts does not list every item stolen.

7 Beardsley testified that Eq uinox and L.A. Fitness are “r ight across the street” from each other.5 cards, a Blockbuster card, and a country cl ub card; an alligator wallet from Paller containing two checks, an Alaska Airlines Visa card, two Bank of America Visa cards and two American Express cards; Olsen’s Wells Fargo Visa card, his California driver’s license and an old Texas driver’s license; Bono’s Wachovia Visa card; Vaal’s First Horizon Health Savings Visa card and American Express card ; Beardsley’s Citibank Visa card; Shelvin’s laptop computer, which was miss ing the letter “F”; No ravian’s debit card and Citibank Visa card; Moghad dam’s driver’s license and so cial security card; Davis’s driver’s license, social security card, and Visa cards; and Binafard’s Chase Mastercard. Many of the stolen credit cards were used . For example, defendant used Davis’s Arrowhead Visa card to charge $132.75 at We stland Cleaners. Vaal’s American Express card was used to make a fraudulent purchase at Whole Foods on November 21, 2009, in the amount of $14.16. On No vember 22, 2009, Beardsley’s Citibank Visa card was used at Whole Foods, FedEx Kink os and DVD Play. Defendan t used Noravian’s Citibank Visa card to purchase items, including a french roll, at Whole Foods on November 24, 2009, for a charge of $162.85. Field parked his car in the parking lot fo r Equinox on January 3, 2010. His Visa
card was stolen out of his car. The traffic stop; the search On the night of November 24, 2009, Long Beach police officers Javier Sepulveda
and Valente Marshall conducted a traffic stop of a blue Mazda. Defendant was the passenger. He identified himself to Officer Se pulveda as Cohen Bryan and gave a date of birth. When Officer Sepulveda determined that no such person ex isted and confronted defendant, defendant said his name was “A mirhossein Shirgon.” Officer Sepulveda checked that name, too. He found “Amirhos sein Shiringoharian” in the computer and
asked if that was defendant’s true name. He said yes. The blue Mazda was not registered
to either defendant or the driver. Officer Marshall searched the blue Mazda and found eight credit cards in a metal credit card holde r underneath defendan t’s seat. The cards
included an Alaska Airlines Vi sa card and American Express card in the name of Paller, a
Chase debit card and a Citibank Rewards card in the name of Nora vian, a Chase debit6 card in the name of Binafard, an American Express card in the name of Vaal, and a Citibank Visa card in the name of Beardsley. Kay’s Triple A cards, Blockbuster card and a country club card were found in the glove compartment.
Officer Aldo Decaravalho and Officer Chri stopher Ignacio searched a residence (apartment 301) located two blocks from wh ere the blue Mazda was stopped. From a shelf in the kitchen, Offi cer Decaravalho recovered mail and paperwork belonging to defendant, 8 and also a notebook. Some of the pa perwork had defendant’s photograph on
it. The notebook contained what Officer De caravalho believed were social security, vehicle identification and license plate numbers . Also in apartment 301, the officers recovered identity profiles for Thomas and Patricia B. that contained their addresses, dates of birth, social security numbers and bank account information; an identity profile for Jose L.; a Capital One bank application for Nerma C.; and a checkbook belonging to Timothy M.
Officer Decaravalho found a french roll in a package dated No vember 24, 2009. 9 In a closet adjacent to the kitc hen, he found Paller’s stolen wa llet. It contained Texas and California driver’s licenses belonging to Olse n. It also containe d two checks belonging to Paller, her insurance cards and her Calif ornia Real Estate identification card. The next day, Detective Ant hony Anast went to apartmen t 301. On the sofa, he found a laptop computer that was missing th e “F” key, and a desktop computer. The laptop computer belonged to Shelvin, and th e desktop belonged to Austin. Detective Anast found a dark brown Gap jacket on the sofa . When he lifted the jacket up, a vehicle remote fell out of the pocket . He went outside and pressed the remote. An alarm was activated in Austin’s BMW, wh ich was parked in an adjacent public parking lot. The vehicle was registered to Austin’s father, a nd had reportedly been stolen out of the UCLA

8 Officer Decaravalho testified that he did not think that the mail was addressed to apartment 301. But defense co unsel said, “I’ll stipulate that [defendant] had paperwork, that some of the paperwork . . . had that address on the paperwork.”

9 Officer Decaravalho called it a baguette.7 Medical Center parking lot in Westwood. Someone had taken the license plates from another vehicle and placed them on Austin’s BMW. Its actual license plates were in the trunk. In the center console, Detective Anas t found credit cards in a blue suede holder. The credit cards belonged to Davis, Vaal, Olsen and Kang. Continuing his search of Austin’s BMW, De tective Anast looked in the trunk. He found doctor scrubs, shoes, pants and a shirt. An identification card in the name of Brian W. was attached to the doctor scrubs. Next, Detective Anast found a pair of tan shorts
that contained two American Express cards and two Bank of America Visa cards that belonged to Paller, a Provident Bank Visa debit card that be longed to Davis, a Capital One Mastercard that belonged to Angela C ., and a Wells Fargo Visa debit card that belonged to Olsen. Inside the pocket of a pair of blue jeans, Detective Anast found a Bank of America Visa card in Kang’s name a nd a California driver’s license and social security card in Maghaddam’s name. In addition, Detective Anast found a white windbreaker jacket with green stripes on th e sleeves and a yellow shirt; some remote garage door openers and a vehicle remote that did not belong to Austin; and a license plate assigned to the blue Mazda. Defendant’s fingerprint was found on a CD case inside the pocket of the driver’s
door of Austin’s BMW. Video footage from the garage; interpretation of the footage The video footage and still images from th e parking structure attached to L.A.
Fitness showed the following. 10 Defendant drove a gray BMW into the parking structure on November 17, 2009. He parked. He walked around in blue or purp le medical scrubs. A few minutes later, he

10 Detective Anast was asked to describe th e parking structure. He stated: “The L.A. Fitness . . . would be on the ground fl oor at the corner of Wilshire Boulevard and [Gayley] Avenue. Attached to the L.A. Fitn ess is a sky rise medical building as well. And to the backside of both the L.A. Fitn ess and the medical building, which are on Wilshire, is a four story parking structure with the top [floor] being [uncovered], and . . . the three lower levels being covered.”8 entered a stairwell in the parking structure while wearing a white shirt with green sleeves. After about 20 minutes, he changed clothes agai n. He walked between the rows of cars and occasionally lifted his arm above his head . All the while, he turned his head and
looked from side to side. Ev entually, he changed into green colored clothing. He moved the gray BMW. He changed ba ck into the blue or purple medical scrubs he had been wearing before. In total, he spent ove r three hours in the parking structure. On November 18, 2009, defe ndant returned to the park ing structure in the same gray BMW. Once again, he walked around in the blue or purple medical scrubs. He
went to different levels of the parking structure. On the thir d level, he walked west then turned around and looked back with his right arm raised in the air. He moved the gray BMW to another parking stall. Upon exiting his vehicle, he took an elevator to the fourth level of the parking structure. He returned to the gray BMW and ob tained a jacket, which he put on. Soon after, he reparked his vehicl e. All told, he spent about an hour in the parking structure. On November 24, 2009, defe ndant drove into the park ing structure in a gray BMW and stayed for more than an hour. He loitered and wa lked around. He changed
clothes and moved the BMW several times. At one point he was wearing a white jacket and brown shorts. Noravian pa rked and left her vehicle. A few minutes later, defendant parked the gray BMW next to Noravian’s car and got out. He clasped his hands together and made an up and down motion near the pa ssenger door of Noravian’s car. Then he opened the door. He leaned in and began se arching around inside. Then he opened the driver’s side door and the trunk. He put hi s head inside the trunk as though looking for something. He pulled a white piece of cl othing out of the trunk. Before leaving Noravian’s car, he closed all the doors. Once he returned to the gray BMW, he got in and moved it to a different parking stall. He pr oceeded to get out, open his trunk and change his clothes. After he change d, he got back into the gr ay BMW and drove out of the parking structure. On December 30, 2009, and January 4, 2010, defendant entered the parking
structure on foot and walked around.9 Detective Anast explained that auto bur glars often use remotes to break into vehicles. He opined that that defendant ga ined access to Noravian’s car by using a device called a slim gym, and that when defendant ra ised his hand, he was using a remote to
unlock cars. Investigation into the use of the stolen credit cards Detective Anast contacted the issuing banks for the stolen credit cards and obtained a list of suspicious transactions. Th e credit cards were used at, inter alia, Ross, Target, Whole Foods and The Gap. Those stor es sent Detective Anast some surveillance video which showed that various suspicious transactions were made by defendant. Defendant’s arrest; his admission On January 16, 2010, defend ant was arrested at a Co ffee Bean in Westwood. During a search, the arresting officer found Fiel d’s credit card in the defendant’s wallet. Later, Detective Anast spoke to defendant. De fendant admitted that he had used Field’s credit card two or three times, and that he had just used it at the Coffee Bean. The conviction; the sentence
The case went to trial. The jury found defe ndant guilty on all counts except for counts 7, 30, and 31. Defendant was sentenced to a total of 21 y ears and 8 months in state prison. He was granted a total of 1,251 days of presentence credit. This timely appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW “In reviewing a challenge of the suffi ciency of the evid ence, we apply the following standard of review: ‘[We] consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment and presume the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence in suppo rt of the judgment. The test is whether substantial evidence supports the decision, not whether the evid ence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.] The United States Supreme Court has held: ‘[T]his inquiry does not require
a court to “ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.] Inst ead, the relevant question is whether after10 viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.] . . . [Citations.] The California Supreme Court has held, ‘Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears “tha t upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial eviden ce to support [the conviction].”’ [Citations.]” ( People v.
Gaut (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1430.)
DISCUSSION According to defendant, there is in sufficient evidence co nnecting him to the crimes charged in counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10 , 12, 19, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 34. In particular, he contends that there is insuffici ent evidence that he rece ived the items rather than someone else; that he knew that the prop erty at issue had been stolen; that he was connected to apartment 301; that he was connected to Austin’s BMW; or that he knew of the presence of the stolen property. We disagree.
A. The Law.
Grand theft is committed when a person takes another person’s automobile. (§ 487, subd. (d).) It is also committed when a “person who acquires or retains possession of access card account information with respect to an access card validly issued to another person, withou t the cardholder’s or issuer’s consent, with the intent to use it fraudulently.” (§ 484e, subd. (d).) Ever y person who receives property or a vehicle knowing it is stolen is guilty of felony. (§§ 496, subd. (a), 496d, subd. (a).) If a person enters a car or apartment with the intent to commit any felony, he is guilty of burglary. (§ 459.) A jury may infer guilt of a theft-re lated crime when a defendant is in possession of recently stolen property, and if there are other circumstances that tend to show guilt. ( People v. Lopez (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 698, 709.) It is unlawful to willfully and without consent obtain personal identifying information and us e it to obtain credit, goods or services. (§ 530.5, subd. (a).)11 B. Counts 1 and 2 (violation of section 487, subd. (d)—grand theft of Austin’s BMW; violation of section 496d, subd. (a)—receiving Austin’s stolen BMW). To begin, we reject defenda nt’s contention that he ha d no connection to apartment 301. During trial, defense counsel asked O fficer Decaravalho if he ever discovered who apartment 301 was rented to. The prosec utor asked to approach sidebar, and the following colloquy ensued: “[THE PROSECUTOR]: I believe one of th e ways they came to that location was through [defendant’s] parole. And I . . . inst ructed the officers not to mention that. I made sure not to mention it in my direct examination. But I believe— “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I’m not trying to open any doors that we agreed would be closed. . . . I don’t want the impression . . . that [this] was his place. I think the way they came to that location was th at [the driver of the blue M azda] . . . told them [that the defendant was living in apartment 301.] “[THE TRIAL COURT]: That’s a ll hearsay. [¶] . . . [¶] “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right. [¶] . . . [¶] Right. That’s why I was going into if—I’ll stipulate that he had paperwork, that some of the paperwork had . . . that address on the paperwork. But what I’m trying to get to is who the apartment was rented to. . . . I don’t want the jurors to have the impression that [this] was his permanent address, that’s where he lived. “[THE TRIAL COURT]: Well . . . , counsel, your choice is this. “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. “[THE TRIAL COURT]: If you make that an issue as to who’s living there and how he’s living there and why they searched [apartment 301], then they’re going to be able to bring into— “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay then. “[THE TRIAL COURT]: All authorities that showed that he’s living there, including the parole— “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Parole agent.12 “[THE TRIAL COURT]: So if I was you, if you’re satisfied that you can demonstrate to this jury that he wasn’t living there, then go ahead. But they are going to learn . . . that [the police] had information th rough the parole department that [defendant] was living [in apartment 301]. So because that’s become the issue— “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: All right. “[THE TRIAL COURT]: I would be very careful in attacking that issue. [¶] . . . [¶] “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I understand. I understand. Okay. I’ll just move on.” Defense counsel chose to let the jury pr esume defendant lived in apartment 301, most likely to prevent the ju ry from hearing that defend ant was on parole, and that apartment 301 was the address that the govern ment had on file for him. Based on the foregoing, we easily conclude that defendant is estopped from asserti ng on appeal that the People failed to prove that he lived in or was connec ted to apartment 301. ( People v.
Obremski (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1 346, 1351–1352 [appellant estopped from arguing on appeal that he was not suffici ently informed of th e charges against him to raise an alibi defense because the “record reveal[ed] no hist ory of appellant’s asserted interest in presenting an alibi defense”].) In any event, the evidence tie d defendant to apartment 301. Mail, paperwork and a notebook belongin g to defendant were recovered from a shelf in the kitchen of apartment 301. Per defense counsel’s admission or stipulation, some of the paperwork was addressed to that location. The notebook contained handwritten notes regarding social security , vehicle identification and license plate numbers. The police also recovered property that had been stolen from cars such as Austin’s desktop computer, Shelvin’s lapt op computer, Olsen’s California and Texas driver’s licenses, and Paller’s checks and ca rds. On top of that, the police discovered identity profiles for various people. The video and still images taken from the L.A. Fitness parking structure showed defendant brea king into Noravian’s car with the use of a slim gym. They also showed defendant lo itering in the parking structure, changing clothes and holding his hand in the air, wh ich Detective Anast opined was defendant’s13 attempt to break into cars w ith a remote. The police fou nd a french roll in a package dated November 24, 2009. Impliedly, that is the french roll defendant purchased at Whole Foods earlier that day with Noravian ’s credit card. These facts allow the reasonable and permissible infe rence that defendant was an auto burglar and apartment 301 was his base of operations.
As for defendant’s connection to Austin’s BMW, it was stolen from the Westwood vicinity where defendant had been focusing his criminal enterprise. A remote for the vehicle was found in apartment 301, and the ve hicle was parked close by. In addition, the license plate for the blue Mazda was r ecovered from the trunk of Austin’s BMW. Defendant’s fingerprint was on a CD case in the pocket of the driver’s door. Security cameras captured defendant driving into the L.A. Fitness parking structure in a gray BMW. After Austin’s gray BMW was seized, defendant returned to the parking structure
on foot. The inference is that defendant was on foot because he no longer had the use of
Austin’s BMW. Stolen credit cards were fou nd inside the vehicle, and in the trunk. Clothing found in Austin’s BMW was some of the clothing defendant was seen wearing. A jury was entitled to find that defenda nt possessed Austin’s BMW. That possession, together with the corroborating ev idence that defendant was an auto burglar, permitted the jury to conclude that defe ndant committed grand th eft automobile and knowingly received a stolen automobile. ( People v. O’Dell (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1574 [“Possession of recently stolen property itself raises a strong inference that the possessor knew the pr operty was stolen; only slight co rroboration is required to allow for a finding of guilt”].) C. Count 3 (violation of section 496, s ubd. (a)—receiving stolen property belonging to Austin, Paller, Kay, Olse n, Moghaddam and Shelvin). There was evidence that defendant posse ssed Austin’s and Shelvin’s computers,
Paller’s checks and Olsen’s driv er’s licenses because they were found in apartment 301.
Because there was evidence th at defendant possessed Austin ’s BMW, as discussed in part B of the Discussion, ante , there was suffici ent evidence that defendant possessed14 Moghaddam’s license and social security card s in the pocket of the jeans found in that
vehicle. Perhaps it is a closer call as to whethe r defendant possessed Kay’s Triple A cards, proof of insurance cards, Blockbuster card, a nd a country club card. They were all found in the glove compartment of the blue Mazda during the tra ffic stop. Defendant, however, does not suggest that insufficien cy of the evidence as to Kay’s cards would require us to
reverse the conviction on count 3. As a result, that issue is m oot. In any event, we note
that there is circumstantial ev idence that defendant did possess Kay’s cards. During the traffic stop, he displayed consciousness of guilt by giving the police two false names. In a metal credit card holder under the front passe nger seat of the blue Mazda, the police
recovered a Chase debit card and a Citibank Re wards card belonging to Noravian. There was video of defendant breaking into No ravian’s car on November 24, 2009, and
defendant used one of Noravian ’s cards to make a purchase at Whole Foods. Noravian’s cards and Kay’s cards were stolen out of thei r cars in the same vici nity within weeks. Because defendant was an auto burglar who possessed Noravian’s cards, it was reasonable to infer that he po ssessed all stolen cards in th e blue Mazda, including Kay’s
cards. The evidence of possession plus the corrobo rating evidence that defendant was an auto burglar who used stolen credit cards to make fraudulen t purchases was sufficient to support a finding that defendant received th e credit cards in his possession knowing that they had been stolen. D. Counts 4, 5, 10, 26 and 29 (violation of section 484e, subdivision (d)—grand theft of credit cards). 1. Count 4 (grand theft of Palle r’s Alaska Airlines Visa card)

. The evidence established that defendant st ole Paller’s Alaska Airlines Visa card. Her brown alligator wallet was stolen out of her car on November 2, 2009. It contained
her Alaska Airlines Visa card as well as mu ltiple other credit cards. Officer Decaravalho found the wallet in ap artment 301. As already discu ssed, the evidence showed that defendant used apartment 301 as the base of operations as an auto burglar. Officer15 Marshall recovered Paller’s Alaska Airlines Vi sa card and one of her American Express
cards from a metal credit card holder under defe ndant’s seat in the blue Mazda. Also
found in that metal credit card holder were st olen cards belonging to Noravian, Binafard, Vaal and Beardsley. Defenda nt possessed additional stolen credit cards in Austin’s BMW. Video surveillance captured defend ant breaking into Noravian’s vehicle on November 24, 2009. Thus, the eviden ce sufficiently showed possession and circumstances suggesting guilt.
The substance of defendant’s attack on co unt 4 is contained in two sentences. He
contends that “there was little evidence c onnecting [him] to the [b lue Mazda], let alone that he acquired or retained [the Alaska Airlin es Visa card] himself or that he planned to use [it].” He further contends that the People “failed to present any evidence” that he was in possession of the Alaska Airlines Visa card . The problem with th ese arguments is that the evidence showed his possession of the walle t in apartment 301 and the card in the blue Mazda. It is true that his possession can only be inferred. But “[i]nferences may constitute substantial evidence [if] . . . they [are] the product of logic and reason.” ( Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651.) Given all of the circumstances, it is logical to infer that defenda nt stole Paller’s Alaska Airlines Visa card. 2. Count 5 (grand theft of Paller’s Bank of America Visa Platinum card, Bank of American Platinum check card, American Ex press corporate card and American Express Business Platinum card)

. Defendant argues that “[w]hile the prosecuti on presented evidence that [he] was in possession and used one of Palle r’s American Express cards [a nd] one of Paller’s Visas, it failed to present any eviden ce regarding two of Paller’s Visas [and] the additional American Express [card][.]” Essentially, defendant concedes that count 5 is supported by
evidence that he stole one of Paller’s Americ an Express cards and one of her Bank of America Visa cards. He fails to explain why count 5 should be reversed in light of this concession. The issue is waived. ( Alvarez v. Jacmar Pacific Pizza Corp. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1206, fn. 11 [“It is not our responsibility to develop an appellant’s argument”].)16 Regardless, we note that the other Am erican Express card and other Visa card
were in Paller’s wallet when it was stolen. Th e wallet was later found in apartment 301. Then all the cards pertaining to count 5 were found in the tan shorts in Austin’s BMW. As previously indicated, the evidence established that defe ndant used apartment 301 as his base of operations as an au to burglar, and that he stole Austin’s BMW. In addition, the evidence showed that defendant kept clothe s in a BMW so that he could change while loitering in parking garages. All this evidence is sufficien t to establish that defendant stole the cards and then later possessed them . Based on defendant’s possession of the
cards and the evidence that he was an auto burglar, the jury was entitled to conclude that
he stole the four cards. 3. Count 10 (grand theft of First Horizon Visa card belonging to Vaal)

. According to defendant, he should not have been convicted on count 10 based on
the evidence that Vaal’s First Horizon Visa card was in th e felt card holder inside the console of Austin’s BMW. This argument mi sses the mark. The ev idence showed that
defendant was an active auto burglar. Vaal’s card was stolen on November 17 or 18, 2009, from the L.A. Fitness pa rking lot. Surveillance vide o showed him prowling there on those dates. Moreover, her American Expre ss card was stolen at the same time as her First Horizon Visa card, and surveillance video established that defendant used that American Express card at Whole Foods, Ross and The Gap store. The jury permissibly found that the person prowling the garage on the day Vaal’s credit cards were stolen, who used one of those credit cards, and who possesse d a second credit card in a stolen vehicle, was the person who stole the second credit card. 4. Count 26 (grand theft of a Wells Fargo Visa card belonging to Olsen)

. Olsen’s Wells Fargo Visa card was stolen in November 2009 from Olsen’s vehicle and subsequently located in the blue suede card holder in th e center console of Austin’s
BMW. Also in the blue sued e card holder were credit cards belonging to Davis, Vaal and Kang and stolen out of vehicles in the same Westwood vicinity. Olsen’s driver’s licenses were located in Paller’s alligator wallet in apartment 301, which was defendant’s base of operations for burglarizing vehicles in the Westwood area. The circumstantial17 evidence—the location of Olsen’s credit card in the blue suede card holder, the contents of apartment 301, defendant’s possession of various stolen credit cards and pieces of personal property, and his use of stolen cred it cards—established defendant was an auto burglar who possessed and therefore presumably stole Olsen’s credit card. The People’s
reliance on circumstantial evidence does not un dermine the strength of the case presented below. Because a “burglary is a crime of stealth, dependence must be placed in most cases upon circumstantial evidence.” ( People v. Jordan (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 782, 786.) As long as the circumstan tial evidence is substantial, it “‘is sufficient to support the judgment of guilty.’” ( Ibid .) 5. Count 29 (grand theft of two Bank of America Visa cards belonging to Kang)

. The evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant committed grand theft of Kang’s credit cards because it demonstrated possession and tended to corroborate guilt.
His credit cards were stolen from his vehicle wh ile it was parked in th e garage attached to his apartment building in We stwood on November 12, 2009. Along with credit cards belonging to other victims, one of Kang’s cred it cards was found in th e card holder in the center console of Austin’s BMW. Kang’s othe r credit card was found in the blue jeans in the trunks. The theft of Kang’s credit car ds matched defendant’s modus operandi, and defendant’s possession of other stolen items bolstered the inference that he stole Kang’s
credit cards. E. Counts 12 and 24 (violation of sectio n 530.5, subd. (a)—identity theft of Vaal through the use of her American Express card and identity theft of Beardsley through the use of her Citibank Visa card) The prosecutor argued that count 12 was supported by defendant’s use of Vaal’s American Express card at Whole Foods at 6: 04 p.m. on November 21, 2009, for $14.16. Defendant argues that while su rveillance video showed him using that card at Whole Foods on an earlier date, there is insufficient evidence that he used it on November 21, 2009. This argument lacks merit. Becaus e the police found the card in a metal card holder under the front passenger seat where defe ndant was sitting in the blue Mazda, the jury permissibly inferred that he possessed the card from the time he stole and used it on18 the earlier date to the time it was recovered. Thus, the ju ry permissibly inferred that
defendant used the card in the interim at a store where he had used the card only days
before. The prosecutor argued that count 24 was supported by defendant’s use of Beardsley’s Citibank Visa card on November 22, 2009, at Whole Foods, FedEX Kinkos and DVD Play. Contrary to de fendant’s position, the evidence supported his conviction. Beardsley’s card was stolen on November 22 , 2009. On November 24, 2009, the police
recovered her credit card as well as othe rs from under the front passenger seat where defendant was sitting in the blue Mazda. Th e jury was entitled to infer that defendant stole and possessed all of those cards. Furthe r, it was permissible for the jury to conclude that defendant used Beardsley’s card and stole her identity on November 22, 2009. F. Counts 19, 23, 25, 27, 28 and 34 (violation of sect ion 459—burglary of vehicles belonging to Davis, Beardsle y, Olsen, Kang and Shelvin). Defendant argues that “[t]here was absolu tely no evidence that [he] enter[e]d any of the cars [belonging to Davis, Beardsley, Olsen, Kang and Shelvin] or the apartment building of Kang or that [defendant] was in the area at the time the cars were burglarized.” This argument lacks merit. Defendant was found in possession of property stolen from the vehicles belong ing to these victims. Moreover, as we have indicated, the
evidence showed that defendant was an auto burglar who op erated in the same Westwood vicinity where the burglaries in question took place. The jury need ed nothing more to
convict.19 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

.

___________________ ___________, Acting P. J. ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

___________________ ____________, J. CHAVEZ

___________________ ____________, J. * FERNS

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.