An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in 

accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of 

Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-1243

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 1 April 2014

TAWANDA L. METTS,

Plaintiff,

v. Durham County

No. 10 CVS 5717

PAMELA PARKINSON,

Defendant.

Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 17 July 2013 by 

Judge Henry W. Hight, Jr., in Durham County Superior Court. 

Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 March 2014.

Taibi Kornbluth Law Group, P.A., by J. Michael Genest, for 

plaintiff-appellant.

Law Offices of Robert E. Ruegger, by Robert E. Ruegger, for 

defendant-appellee.

BRYANT, Judge.

Where plaintiff requests attorneys’ fees pursuant to N.C. 

Gen. Stat. § 6-21.1 the trial court may, upon consideration of 

the whole record and Washington factors, in its discretion award 

attorneys’ fees.
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On 22 September 2010, plaintiff Tawanda L. Metts filed a 

complaint against defendant Pamela Parkinson for negligence

arising from a car accident between them. In her complaint 

plaintiff sought an award in excess of $10,000.00 plus court 

costs and attorneys’ fees. On 31 May 2012, a jury awarded 

plaintiff $6,600.00. 

On 7 June 2012, plaintiff filed a motion for attorneys’ 

fees pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 6-21.1 and 7A-305. On 16 

July, the trial court awarded plaintiff $2,200.00 in attorneys’ 

fees and $1,907.77 in costs. Plaintiff appealed to this Court

arguing that the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded was not 

supported by proper findings of fact. This Court agreed and 

remanded to the trial court for findings of fact.

1

On remand, the trial court made findings of fact but 

sustained its prior award of $2,200.00 in attorneys’ fees to 

plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals. 

____________________________

On appeal, plaintiff raises several issues regarding the 

manner in which the trial court determined the amount of 

attorneys’ fees.

 

1 See Metts v. Parkinson, No. COA12-1357, 2013 N.C. App. LEXIS 

428 (May 7, 2013).
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Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in 

failing to base its award of attorneys’ fees on the hours worked 

by plaintiff’s attorney and for the time spent preparing for 

plaintiff’s appeal. We disagree.

We review a trial court’s awarding of attorneys’ fees for 

an abuse of discretion. Blackmon v. Bumgardner, 135 N.C. App. 

125, 130, 519 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1999). “Abuse of discretion 

results where the court's ruling is manifestly unsupported by 

reason or so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of 

a reasoned decision." Id. (citations omitted). "[T]he scope of 

appellate review . . . is strictly limited to determining 

whether the trial judge's underlying findings of fact are 

supported by competent evidence, in which event they are 

conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual 

findings in turn support the judge's ultimate conclusions of 

law." State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 

(1982) (citations omitted). A trial judge's determination to 

award attorneys’ fees will not be overturned absent an abuse of 

discretion. Whitfield v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 86 N.C. App. 

466, 469, 358 S.E.2d 92, 94 (1987) (citation omitted). 

Plaintiff first contends that the trial court erred in 

awarding attorneys’ fees because it failed to follow the 
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requirements of N.C.G.S. § 6-21.1. Specifically, plaintiff 

argues that by imposing a “one-third contingency fee in this 

case, without regard to the actual hours worked and customary 

rate,” the trial court has violated N.C.G.S. § 6-21.1.

North Carolina General Statutes, section 6-21.1., holds 

that:

In any personal injury . . . suit, 

instituted in a court of record, where the 

judgment for recovery of damages is ten 

thousand dollars ($10,000) or less, the 

presiding judge may, in his discretion, 

allow a reasonable attorney fee to the duly 

licensed attorney representing the litigant 

obtaining a judgment for damages in said 

suit, said attorney’s fee to be taxed as a 

part of the court costs.

N.C.G.S. § 6-21.1 (2009).2 A trial court’s decision to award 

attorneys’ fees pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 6-21.1 is not unbridled, 

however. Thorpe v. Perry-Riddick, 144 N.C. App. 567, 571, 551 

S.E.2d 852, 856 (2001). In determining whether to award 

attorneys’ fees, 

the trial court is to consider the entire 

record in properly exercising its 

discretion, including but not limited to the 

following factors: (1) settlement offers 

made prior to the institution of the action 

 

2 As plaintiff filed her complaint against defendant on 22 

September 2010, the applicable version of N.C.G.S. § 6-21.1 is 

the 2009 version. N.C.G.S. § 6-21.1 was subsequently amended by 

2011 N.C. Sess. Law 283, which applied to actions filed on or 

after 1 October 2011.
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[]; (2) offers of judgment pursuant to Rule 

68, and whether the "judgment finally 

obtained" was more favorable than such 

offers []; (3) whether defendant unjustly 

exercised "superior bargaining power" []; 

(4) in the case of an unwarranted refusal by 

an insurance company, the "context in which 

the dispute arose” []; (5) the timing of 

settlement offers []; (6) the amounts of the 

settlement offers as compared to the jury 

verdict []; and the whole record [].

Washington v. Horton, 132 N.C. App. 347, 351, 513 S.E.2d 331,

334—35 (1999) (citations omitted). “If the trial court elects 

to award attorney fees, it must also enter findings of fact as 

to the time and labor expended, skill required, customary fee 

for like work, and experience or ability of the attorney based 

on competent evidence.” Thorpe, 144 N.C. App. at 572, 551 

S.E.2d at 856 (citing Porterfield v. Goldkuhle, 137 N.C. App. 

376, 378, 528 S.E.2d 71, 73 (2000)).

In its order awarding attorneys’ fees to plaintiff, the 

trial court made findings of fact that: defendant’s insurance 

carrier denied liability for the accident prior to litigation; 

defendant did not make an offer of judgment to plaintiff; at 

mediation, plaintiff refused to settle for less than $35,000.00 

and defendant’s insurance carrier offered $5,500.00 to settle 

the case before an impasse was declared; a jury awarded 

plaintiff $6,600.00; defendant’s insurance carrier did not 
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exercise superior bargaining power; and “[t]he Court recalls the 

trial of this case and the issues involved, and has considered 

the whole record of the case[.] While a "[m]ere recitation by 

the trial court that it has considered all Washington factors" 

without making additional findings of fact is inadequate, 

Thorpe, 132 N.C. App. at 572, 551 S.E.2d at 857, "the trial 

court is not required to make detailed findings for each 

factor." Id. (citing Tew v. West, 143 N.C. App. 534, 546 S.E.2d 

183 (2001)). Rather, the trial court must merely make findings 

as to "those facts matching those Washington factors apposite to 

the instant case." Id., 132 N.C. App. at 573, 551 S.E.2d at 

857. As such, the trial court’s findings of fact are in 

accordance with the required factors of Washington.

On remand, the trial court made additional findings of 

fact: plaintiff incurred costs of $1,907.77; plaintiff’s counsel 

submitted affidavits indicating that plaintiff’s primary 

attorney spent 105.4 hours of time, at $225.00 per hour, while a 

second attorney spent 29.3 hours, at $250.00 per hour, on the 

case; plaintiff’s primary attorney is an associate attorney who 

became licensed to practice law in 2010; this was plaintiff’s 

attorney’s second jury trial; plaintiff’s second attorney took 

no active role in the trial; the case concerned a car accident 
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and had no significant evidentiary issues; the hours spent by 

plaintiff’s attorneys “are disproportionately higher than the 

hours reasonably and normally spent by plaintiff’s counsel in 

this type of civil case”; and that “[i]t is customary for an 

attorney to receive 1/3 (one third) of the settlement or

Judgment amount as a fee for services rendered.” The trial 

court concluded that plaintiff’s primary attorney “spent more 

than a reasonable amount of time on the case, and, in its 

discretion, finds that an attorney’s fee of $2,200.00 is 

appropriate in this case.” 

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred because its 

award of attorneys’ fees was not based on the affidavits 

submitted by plaintiff’s attorney. We disagree, as the language 

of N.C.G.S. § 6-21.1 clearly states that a trial court may award 

attorneys’ fees at its discretion. See Harrison v. Herbin, 35 

N.C. App. 259, 261, 241 S.E.2d 108, 109 (1978) (“While [N.C.G.S. 

§ 6-21.1] is aimed at encouraging injured parties to press their 

meritorious but pecuniarily small claims, we do not believe that 

it was intended to encourage parties to refuse reasonable 

settlement offers and give rise to needless litigation by 

guaranteeing that counsel will, in all cases, be compensated.”). 

Moreover, as the trial court considered the entire record before 
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it and made findings of facts as required by both Washington and 

Thorpe, the trial court acted within its discretion in awarding 

$2,200.00 in attorneys’ fees to plaintiff. See Messina v. Bell, 

158 N.C. App. 111, 115, 581 S.E.2d 80, 84 (2003) (“From the 

findings, it is clear that the trial court exercised its 

discretion by considering the whole record and in applying the 

Washington factors. Thus, the findings are sufficient to 

support the trial court's conclusion that plaintiff should be 

awarded attorney's fees, and therefore, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in granting plaintiff's motion.”).

Plaintiff further argues that the trial court erred in 

failing to award attorneys’ fees for the time spent preparing 

for plaintiff’s appeal. A trial court has the authority 

pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 6-21.1 to award additional attorney's 

fees for an appeal. Hill v. Jones, 26 N.C. App. 168, 171, 215 

S.E.2d 168, 170 (1975). A plaintiff must make a motion to the 

trial court seeking attorneys’ fees for an appeal. Davis v. 

Kelly, 147 N.C. App. 102, 109, 554 S.E.2d 402, 406—07 (2001).

On 10 July 2013, plaintiff made a motion to the trial court 

for attorneys’ fees relating to plaintiff’s initial appeal. 

Plaintiff provided to the trial court affidavits of her 

attorneys’ fees for both the original jury trial and appeal. 
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The trial court accepted these documents noting that “I’m going 

to have to take a look at it.” In its order awarding plaintiff 

$2,200.00 in attorneys’ fees, the trial court did not mention 

any fees or costs incurred as a result of plaintiff’s appeal. 

However, as discussed above, the trial court was not required to 

award attorneys’ fees to plaintiff for either an initial action 

or an appeal. Moreover, as we have already determined that the 

trial court considered the appropriate factors and made findings 

of fact regarding its decision to award attorneys’ fees to 

plaintiff, we cannot say that the trial court erred in not 

awarding attorneys’ fees to plaintiff for her appeal. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

awarding $2,200.00 in attorneys’ fees to plaintiff. See Overton 

v. Purvis, 162 N.C. App. 241, 247—48, 591 S.E.2d 18, 23 (2004) 

(“The record indicates that the trial court considered these 

statements, together with argument from counsel, in determining 

whether and to what extent attorneys' fees were appropriate. We 

hold that these statements are competent and sufficient to 

support the trial court's award and find no abuse of 

discretion.”). As such, we need not reach plaintiff’s third 

argument on appeal.

Affirmed.
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Judges STEPHENS and DILLON concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).