NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v. AJELA AKESI BANKS, AKA Ajela Akesha Banks,
Defendant

- Appellant. No. 21

- 30282
D.C. No. 3:19

- cr - 00005

- SLG

- MMS

- 1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska Sharon L. Gleason, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 8, 2022 * * Anchorage, Alaska
Before: HURWITZ, BRESS, and H. THOMAS, Circuit Judges. Ajela Akesi Banks appeals a ten

- month custodial sentence and a five

- year
term of supervised release imposed after the district court found she had violated
her previous supervised release conditions

. “ We rev iew sentences, including those

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

JUN 10 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

imposed upon revocation of supervised release, for reasonableness. ” United States

v. Simtob , 485 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220, 261

- 62 (2005)) . We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We vacate special condition four, which limits Banks’ contact with her own minor children , and remand for further proceedings

. In all other respects, we affirm.
1. The district court did not plainly err in sentencing Banks for her supervise d release violations

. A district court may not impose a sentence to

“‘ punish [defendants] for the criminal conduct underlying the revocation,’” nor
based “ solely, or even primarily, . . . on the severity of the new criminal offense underlying the revocatio n.” See Simtob , 485 F.3d at 1062 ( quotation omitted)

. The court may, however, “ properly ‘ sanction the violator for failing to abide by the
conditions of the court

- ordered supervision,’” and thereby breaching the court’s

trust. United States v. Miqbel , 444 F.3d 1173, 1182 (9th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted)

. Although the district court referred to “ a n eed to punish ” Banks , the
context of the court’s remarks made clear its intent to communicate its disappointment that Banks had breached its trus t by violating the release
conditions , and to sanction that breach

. T he mere use of the word “punish” does not transform an otherwise appropriate application of the § 3583 factors into error.
See Simtob , 485 F.3d at 1062

. 2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in its consideration of3

Banks’ medical needs ari sing from her pregnancy
. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553 (a)(2)(D), 3583(e). Our review is limited to “ whether the sentence is reasonable; only a procedurally erroneous or substantively unreasonable sentence will be set aside. ” United States v. Carty , 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc )

. The record makes clear that the district court considered the applicable § 3553(a) factors

. See § 3553(a)(2)(D). W here , as here, the “ sentencing judge listened to each argument ” and “ considered the supporting evidence, ” including a
defendant ’ s physical or medical conditions , and “ imposed a sentence that takes
them into account , ” a sentenc e is procedurally sufficient. Rita v. United States , 551 U.S. 338, 358 (2007) . The court was not required to address more ext ensively
Banks’ medical needs

. Nor is Banks’ within

- G uidelines sentence substantively unreasonable. Banks cites no case for the proposition that pregnancy renders incarceration categorically
unreasonable. United States v. Edwards , 595 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2010)

. 3. The district court erred by imposing a condition of supervised release limiting Banks’ contact with her minor children.
Where a district court imposes supervised release “ conditions that implicate a

‘ particularly significant liberty i nterest, ’” the district court must adhere to

“‘ enhanced procedural requirement [s].’” United States v. Wolf Child , 699 F.3d 1082, 1091 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Stoterau , 524 F.3d 988, 1005 (9th Cir.4

2008) ). A condition implicating the “fundamental liberty interest in having contact with one’s children” trigger s these enhanced procedural requirements. See id. at
1091

- 92.
As the government concedes , s pecial condition four

— insofar as it expressly prohibi ts Banks from having contact with her own minor children unless her probation officer pre

- approves that contact in writing

— imp licates a fundamental liberty interest. T he district court thus erred by fail ing to adequately explain its reasons for imposing that condition

. See Wolf Child , 699 F.3d at 1093. The district

court was also required to “ undertake an individualized review of [each] person and the relationship at issue, ” including “ all the relevant facts surrounding the relationship. ” Id. at 1093

– 94 ( quoting United States v. Napulou , 593 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 2010)). We therefore vacate the condition of supervised release concerning Banks’ contact with her minor children and remand for further proceedings.
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PAR T ; AND REMANDED
.