### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -00 468 -CR

Ri c ky Ta pps , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 299TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- DC-06 -90 -40 -49 , HO NORAB LE JO N N. WISSER , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N A jury found Ricky

Tapps g uilty

of unl awf ul possession of a firea

rm by a fe lon. After fi nd ingtw o e nh anc e me nt p ara g ra ph s tr ue , the dis tr ic t court a sse sse d sen te nc e a t thir ty -t wo y e a rs in pr iso n. Ta

pp s r a ise s se ve ra l is su e s o n a pp e a l. He c on te nd s th a t th e e vid e nc e is l e g a lly and fa c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

the c on vic tio n b e c a

us e he is n ot a fe lon in the se ns e int e nd e d b y the statut e and that the St ate failed t o car ry its burden of proof to show that he possessed a f irea rm within the time period pre scribed by

the statute prohibiting f

elons from possessing firearms. He c omplains that the trial cour

t allowed the St ate to ask a defense witness if she knew Tapps wa s a sex offende r, and

c on te nd s th a t th e a dmi ssi on of e vid e nc e of

e xtra ne ou s o ff e ns e s w a s e g re g iou s e rr or . H e a lso contends that he rec eived inef fec tive assistance of counsel beca use hi s trial counsel did not object to the a dmi ssi on of the e vid e nc e of e xtra ne ou s of fe ns e s. F ina lly , he c on te nd s—and th e S ta te

conce des—that the judg m en t should be ref ormed to re flec t that the court found only two2

en h an ce m en tp ar agr ap h s t ru e, ra t h er t h an fo u r. W e m o d i fy

t h e j u d gm en tb y

el i m i n at i n g t h e f

i n d i n gs of true reg arding two of the four enhanc ement para g raphs and by corr ectingthe date r ecited f or the commission of the offe nse, and a ffirm the judg ment as modified.

Fac tua l an d P

ro c e dural B ac kg

ro und The e y ewitnesses to the inc ident that result ed in t he cha rg es ag ainst Tapps—all of whom testified—wer e the owner , fore man, and employ ee of a construc tion company wher e Ta pps had wor ked as a flag g er. O wner

Donny Gamblin is the nephewof foreman David Gamblin and the cousin of employ ee L andin G am b l i n . All three te stified to the same ve rsion of eve nts. The Gamblins’ company

was installing a

water and sew er ma in on Thomps o n L an e, near Callahan’s Gene ral Store in Austin. Around 5 p . m . on Fr iday , J anuar y 20, 2006, Donny

and David were discussing the projec t at t he construction site, while L andin and the ot her employ ees w aited about half a mile away

at the “sta g ing a

rea .” F riday

is pay day at the compa

ny and pay chec ks are handed out at the jobsite. Nea

rby businesses wer e close d or closing beca use of the lateness of the hour. Tapps drove up in a tan Oldsmobile with a dar k top. He lef

t the car running , and approa ched D avid and Donny . Tapps believe d he w as o we d a week’s pa y , but the Gamblins b e l i e v e d h e h a d b e e np a i d

i nf u l l

. D u r i n g t h e c o n v e r s a t i o nb e t w e e nT a p p s , D a v i d , an d

D o n n y, L andin ar rived. The Gamblins testified t hat t he dis cussion did not ge t heated, a lthough Ta pps, who

was norma lly

quite calm, see med agitated. The discussion lasted about ten m inutes and, ac cording to Donny , was be coming repe titive. L andin then noticed a nd menti o n ed t o T ap p s that the Oldsmobile was slowly

rolling ba ckwa

rds. The Gamblins testified t hat t hey then heard a loud sound, like a tire blowingout o r a ca r b ac k fi re. The n they noticed that Ta

pps was holding a blac kA police r eport noted that L an din told the officer Tapps opene d his trunk to show the 1 fi re arm s. 3 .3 8 r e vo lve r. Th e y

ha d n ot s e e n h im r e tr ie ve it, bu t su rm ise d th a t th e gun h a d b e e n in on e of his pockets whe re his hands ha d been. They also noticed a

dime-sized bullet hole in the rig ht front side of the tan O ldsmobil e. David and L andin t estified that Ta pps told them he had more f irea rms in the

car ’s trunk. Tapps did not point the revolver at the Gamblins or directly threaten them. The 1 Gamblins did, however , retre at to their re spective ve hicles, and David and Donny called the police. The Gamblins and Tapps then l eft the construction site in their ca rs. The G amblins waited for the po lic e ne arb y . T a

pp s w a s arr e ste d at hi s h ome e le ve n d ay s late r. Th e re were no fi re a rm s, ammunition, or a tan Oldsmobile at the house w here he wa s arr ested.

Tapps’s f riend, Mar ie Hig g ins, testified t hat s he owns a 1990 Oldsmobile Rege ncy that is tan w itha

br ow n to p. She te sti fi e d that sh e le t Ta pp s sl e e p at he r h ou se tha t w int e r b e c a

us e his house lacke d utilit ies. She said she loane d him the vehicle on J anuar y 20, 2006, roug hly

betwee n 5 p.m. and 7 p.m. She testified that she wa s not a wa re o f an y bullet hole in her c ar be fore he borrowe d it or after

he re turned it. She testified t hat Tapps seeme d happy befor e he borrowe d the

car and when he returned it. She also testified in response to questioning by the State that Tapps ha d not told her and she ha d not known that he wa s a convic ted sex offende r.

At trial, the def

ense br ou gh t t

h e ta n Oldsmobile to the courthouse a nd reque sted a jury inspection of the car . The rec ord ref lects that the juror s inspected the c ar in the c ourthouse g ara g e. The re cord doe s not refle ct wh at t h at i nspection re veale d and no photog raphs of the ca r we re admitted into evidence . Howeve r, counse l for both Tapps a nd the State ac knowledged in final4

argument that the rele vant section of the car appea red undamag ed, althoug h the prosec utor noted that the incident had oc curr ed on J anuar y 20 and the defe nse produced the car for inspection by the jury on J uly 11. Other t h an t h e v i s ual inspection, the re cord doe s not refle ct any other testing or examination of the car

by either the State or the de fense

. Anal y sis Tapps wa s convicted of being a fe lon in possession of a firea rm. The statute provides in r e le va nt p art a s f oll ow s: A p e rs on wh o h a s b e e n c on vic te d o f a fe lony c omm its an o ff

e ns e if he po sse sse s a fi re arm : (1 ) a ft e r c on vic tio n and be fo re the fi ft h ann ive rs ary of the pe rso n’s rel e a se fr om c on fi ne me nt fo llo wi ng c on vic tio n of the fe lony or the pe rs on ’s re le a se from super

vision under communit y s u p ervision, par ole, or mandatory supervision, whiche ver date is later.

Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 46.04(a) (West Supp. 2007). Evidence showed that Ta pps was convic ted of the state jail f

elony of failure to c omply with se x offe nder r eg istration on Dece mber 14, 2004. See Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . Ann. art

. 62 .1 02 (We st 2 00 6) . T a pp s w a s se nte nc e d to se ve n mo nth s in state jail, and was to g et cr edit for 133 da y s time served. Ta pp s c on te nd s th a t th e e vid e nc e of his g uil t is ins uf fi c ie nt a s a

ma tte r o f l aw b e c a

us e there was no e vidence he wa s a convic ted of the ty pe of f elony that is covere d by

section 46.04. Ta pp s d oe s n ot c ha lle ng e the ve ra c ity of the e vid e nc e of his 20 04 c on vic tio n, bu t argue s th a t a state jail felony

is not a felony

for purposes of t he firear m possession statute. Tapps ac knowledg es that the statut e de fi nin g “ fe lon ie s” inc lud e s st a te ja il f e lon ie s:The fa ct that all unclassifie d felonies are statutorily presumed to be state jail felonies 2 undersc ores the c onclusion that state jail felonies a re f elonies unl ess t he languag e of the particula r statute in question indicates otherw ise. See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 12.04(b) ( West 2003). 5 (a) Fe lonies are classified acc ording to the relative seriousness of the offe ns e i n t o fi ve c a te g or ie s: (1 ) c a pit a l f e lon ie s; (2) f elonies of the f

irst deg ree ; (3) f elonies of the se cond deg ree ; (4) f elonies of the third de g ree ; and (5 ) s ta te ja il f

e lon ie s. (b) An offe nse desig nated a felony in this code without specification as to categ ory i s a s t a t e j a i l f

e l o n y.

Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 12.04 (West 2003); see also id. § 1.07(23) (West Supp. 2007) (fe lony is “an offe nse so desig nated by

law or punishable by

death or confine ment in a penitentiar y ”). Tapps re lies 2

on a c ourt of c ri min a l a

pp e a ls o pin ion

that r e c og nize d a

dis tin c tio n b e tw e e n f

e lon ie s a nd state ja il felonies in a statute g overningenhanc ement by previous off

enses. Se e Cam

pb e ll v . S tat e , 49 S.W .3d 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). The statute at issue in that c ase pr ovides that, when a person is on trial for a state jail felony , proof of

two prior convictions for “state j ail felonies” enhanc es the punishment to that of a third-deg ree felony , while proof of two prior convictions for “fe lonie s ” e n h an ce s t he punishment to that of a sec ond-deg ree felony

. Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 12.42(a) (West Supp. 2007). The Cam pb e ll court h el d t hat, “ as used in subsection 12.42( a) , th e te rm s ‘ fe lony ’ a

nd ‘s ta te ja il felony ’ ar e mutually

exclusive.” 49 S.W .3d at 878 (e mphasis added)

. Th is d istinc tio n b e tw e e n s ta te ja il f e lon ie s and

oth e r f e lon ie s d oe s n ot a

pp e a r i n the statute g overningunlawful p o s s es s i o n o f a f irea rm which is at issue her e. See Tex. P enal6

Code Ann. § 46.04. This statute ref ers only to a person convicted of “a f elony .” The absenc e of a

ny langua g e in se c tio n 46 .0 4 ind ic a tin g an int e nt to tr e a t fe lon ie s and state ja il fel on ies di ffer e ntl y distinguishes this statute from the statute at issue in Cam pb e ll

. The consistent use of the unmodified term “f elony ” in sec tion 46.04 indicates that there is no distinction in this statute betwee n levels or t y p es of felonies. See T e x. Pe n a l Co d e A n n . § § 1 2

. 0 4 , 4 6

. 0 4

. Si n c e th e r e is n o in d ication of a leg islative intent for the ter m “fe lony ” not to include state ja il felonies in section 46.04, we apply the g ener al def

inition of “felony ” found in sec tion 12.04. Tapps’s 2004 conviction for a state jail fe lony was suff icient to make him a “ person c onvicted of a felony” pursua nt to the statute prohibiting the possession of a fir ear

m by a fe lon. Tapps al s o co n t en ds that the State failed to mee t its burden of proof beca use the

e vid e nc e wa s insu ff

ic ie nt as a ma tte r of law to sho w that he wa s r e le a se d f ro m c on fi ne me nt w ith in five y ear s of the off

ense at issue in this case . A convicte d fel o n commits a crime by possessing a fire arm duringthe per iod “af ter c onviction an d b ef

ore the fifth anniver sary of the pe rson’s rele ase f rom confine ment following conviction.” Te x . P enal Code Ann. § 46.04(a) (1). Ta pps

argue s th a t, b e c a

us e the re is n o e vid e nc e that he wa s “ release d f ro m c on fi ne me nt, ” the State failed to c arr

y its burden of proof t o s h o w t hat he, in fa ct, possessed a firea rm within the period presc ribed by

the statute. Tapps re lies on the propositio n that an ele ment of the off ense that the State was

re qu ir e d to pr ov e is that he po sse sse d a fi re arm “ be fo re the fi ft

h a nn ive rs ary

of his re le a se fr om c on fi ne me nt f

oll ow ingc on vic tio n. ” He str e sse s that the State mus t pr ov e the date of re le a se from conf inement, and without such proof acquittal is re q u i re d , and cites the unpublished case of7

Mc Clu re v . S

tat e , No. 12-05-00209- CR, 2006 Tex. App. L EXI S 5907 (Tex. App.—Ty ler, June 30, 2006, no pet.). How ever , the issue in McClure was whether the def endant’ s stipulation t o the fa ct of a pre vious felony

conviction was, by

its e lf , sufficie nt to support a convic tion under sec tion 46.04. The Mc Clu re court he ld that there w as a timing element to a violation of section 46.04 and pr oof of

a pr i o r c o n v i c t i o n w i t h o u t s o m e p r o o f o f w h e n t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f f i r e ar m s o c c u r r e d i nre la tio n to that conviction was not e noug h to support a co n v i ct ion under the statute. T he Mc Clu re court e x pressly

noted: “On this rec ord, we cannot c onclude that Appe llant was wit hin five y ear s of his conviction or

rele ase f rom confine ment when the rifles wer e found in his home.” Mc Clu re , 2006 Tex. App. L EXI S 5907, at *11. The Mc Clu re court wa s fac ed with a c omplete fa ilure of pr oof of the timing of

the prior conviction. The court acknow ledg ed that if there had bee n at least proof of the date of the pr ior conviction there might have been suf ficient proof to support the conviction for a violation of section 46.04 depending on when the pr ior conviction occ urre d—i.e. within five y e ars of the po sse ssi on

of the fi re arm . We do not read se ction 46.04 to nece ssarily require proof of

the date of re lease from confine ment in all case s. Under se ction 46.04, the per iod during which firear m possession by

a fe lon is forbidden be g ins on the date of conviction (the date one is “convic ted of a felony ”) and ends on the fifth anniver sary

of the pe rson’s re lease from conf inement or the pe rson’s re lease from any form of super vision or parole, w hicheve r date is later. Id. ; se e als o Tex. Penal C ode Ann. § 46.04(a) (1). Thus, the minimum period that a felon will be prohibited fr om possessing a firea rm—assuming the fe lon is r e le a se d f

ro m c on fi ne me nt o r s up e rv isi on on the date of

c on vic tio n o r i s n e ve r c on fi ne d— is fi ve y e ars fr om t

he date of

c on vic tio n. Th e date of re le a se fr om c on fi ne me nt i s n e c e ssa ry toTapps conte nds that the signif icanc e of the State’s fa ilure to prove a rele ase date is that he 3 mig ht h ave be e n a

fu g iti ve or

ne ve r h a ve be e n c on fi ne d, and the re fo re , n e ve r r e le a se d. Th us, acc ording to Tapps, the cour t cannot si m p l y co n cl u de that ther e must have be en a r elea se date at so me po int

be c a us e it i s p os sib le tha

t th e re is n ot o ne . Se tti nga sid e that th is a lle g a tio n c on fl ic ts w ith te sti mony that he wa s arr e ste d a

nd se rv e d a t le a st 13 3 da

y s be fo re tr ia l, thi s argume nt i s r e le va nt o nly if the statute absolutely

require s proof of the date of re lease from conf inement in all case s. Howeve r, our view is that the lac k of proof of a rele ase date only has signific ance if the State is alleg ing that a fe lon possessed a firea

rm more than five y ear s afte r the date of conviction. Her e, the possession took place w ithin the first five y ear s after conviction. Thus, under this construc tion of section 46.04, proof of the date of

conviction is sufficient to satisfy the timing ele ment of the statute, and the tria l court did not nee d to presume or g uess at any

thing with re spect to a date of re lease

. 8 deter mine the maximum leng th of this period specific ally

when the pe riod extends bey ond five y ear s from the date of c onviction. The date of re lease from confinement i s not nece ssary when the a lleg ed possession occur s wi t h i n five y ear s of the date of convic tion because the per iod of prohibition extends for this duration in any event. I n this c ase, Tapps possessed a firea rm just over a y ear

afte r his conviction, which is well within the five-y ear period followi n g his conviction. Proof of the date of

c on vic tion to gether

wi th t he date of

po sse ssi on

in t his c ir c ums tanc e —und isp ute dly Dec ember

14, 2004, and January

20, 2006—was sufficient t o prove that Tapps was within the per iod pr e sc ri be d b y

the statut e ba

rr ingpo sse ssi on

of fi re arm s b y

fe lon s. 3 Ta pp s a lso argue s th a t th e evi de nc e wa s f a c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

his conviction. I n a fa ctual sufficie ncy revie w, we view the evidenc e in a neutra l lig ht a nd ask whether

a jury was rationally

justified in finding g

uilt bey ond a re asonable doubt. W ats on v . S tat e , 204 S.W .3d 404, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We the n deter mine whether

the evidenc e supporting the ver dict is s o w e a k th a t the ve rd ic t is c le arl y wr on g and manif e stl y un jus t or wh e the r t

he ve rd ic t is a g a ins t th e g r e a t w e ig h t an d p r e p o n d e r an c e o f th e e v id e n c e . Id. W e wi l l not reve rse a case on a fa ctual sufficie ncy

challeng e unless we can sa y , with s o m e objective basis in the rec ord, that the g reat9

weig ht and pre pondera

nce of the evidence contradicts the jury ’s ver dict. Id. a t 41 7. Ta pp s p oin ts out that the State did not produce a firea rm, a bu l let, a shell ca sing, or a bullet hole in a c ar. H e contends that the G amblins’ story that Tapps shot his own car is improbable and bizarre. He notes that no on e e lse re po rt e d h e ari nga guns hot. H e po int s o ut i nc on sis te nc ie s in the Ga mbl ins ’ descr iption of his clothes on the day of the incident. He f

urther note s an inconsistency betwee n the comment repor

ted by police that Tapps showed the Gamblins a cac he of wea pons in the car ’s trunk and the Ga

mblins’ trial testimony

in which they

variously did not mention or d enied se eing other

we a po ns . T a

p p s c o n t e n d s t h at t h e w e a kn e s s o f t h e e v i d e n c e f a v o r i n g c o n v i c t i o n u n d e r s c o r e s h is belief that the admission of irrele vant and inflammatory testimony

reg ardingextraneous offe nses or hy pothetical ac tions by

ty pical cr iminals unfairly

prejudice d him in the e y es o f t he jury . He also complains that the sente nce of thirty -t wo y ear s is too harsh for the of fense , espec ially

based on the evidenc e.

Ultimately , the re solution of the various questions raised by Tapp s re gardingthe evidenc e turn on an assessment of the cre dibilit y of the Ga mblins’ testim ony . None of the asser ted inconsist e n c ie s ar e f

u n d a me n ta l p r o b le ms w it h th e e v id e n c e if

o n e b e li e v e s th e te s ti mo n y o f the Gamblins. The Ga

mblins t estified unequivoc ally that they saw Tapps holding a g un. The jury was fre e to be lieve them. Although there are some unusual fe ature s to the evidenc e in this case, w e find

no thi ngin t

he re c or d th a t c on tr a dic ts t he G amb li ns ’ t e sti mony

in s uc h a wa y tha t no re a so na

ble p e r s o nc o u l d

b e l i e v e t h e i r

t e s t i m o n y. We m us t avo id s ub sti tut ingour j ud g me nt f or that of the fa c t fin de r, and we sh ou ld

no t s ubsta

nti a lly int ru de up on

the fa c t f ind e r’ s r ole a s th e so le jud g e of the we ig ht a

nd c re dib ili ty10

g iven to witness testimony

. J on es v . S tat e , 944 S.W .2d 642, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The jury is the s ole j udg e of the weight and c redibility of witness testimony

. Ba rn es v . S tat e , 62 S.W .3d 288, 298 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. ref ’d). The jury may acc ept or reje ct all or any of the e vidence prese nted by

either side, ma

y drawrea sonable infe renc es fr om the evidenc e, and must rec oncile any evidentiar y conflicts. Id. We de termine the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e by viewing the cumulative eff ect of all of the e vidence , not eac h fac t in isol ation. Id. at 297. We do not find sufficient inconsistencies or w eakne sses in the evidenc e to w arr ant the extraordinary step of neg ating the jury ’s d e t e r m i n a t i o nt o b e l i e v e t h e G a mb l i n s ’ t e s t i m o n y.

Acc epting the jury ’s appa rent credibility choice , the evidence is sufficie nt to support the conviction. The e vidence supports the finding that Tapps wa s a convic ted fe lon who had bee n

con v ic te d le s s th an f

iv e y e ar s b e f

o r e Ja n u ar

y 2 0 , 2 0 0 6

. T h e G a mb li n s ’ te s ti mo n y s u p ports the fi nd ingthat he po sse sse d a fi re arm on Janu ary 20 , 2 00 6. Th e e vi den ce i s f a c tua lly su ff ic ie nt t o support the conviction.

Tapps next contends that the court err ed by allowing the prosec utor to ask Hig g ins if she knew

that Tapps wa s a reg istered sex offe nder. Tapps called Higg ins to establish that she lent him he r c ar a nd that it did no t ha ve a bu lle t ho le in i t. T he State inq uir e d in to t

he natur e of

the ir relationship. Higg ins said s h e l et T ap p s sleep at her house, c onsidered him a f riend, but did not know much about him and he did not bother her. T he State then a s k ed i f Higg ins knew he ha d a previous convic tion. Tapps interrupted a nd objected that Higg ins was not a cha rac ter witness, but

a fa c t w itn e ss. Th e c ourt

ov e rr ule d th e ob

je c tio n, statin g “ Ithi nk

an in qu ir y in to t

he re la tio ns hip11

betwee n the witness and a party is a lway s rele vant.” Hig g ins te stified that Tapps did not tell her that he wa s a re g istered se x offe nder.

We r e v ie w th e a d mi s s io no f e v id e n c e u n d e r

ana b u s e o f d is c r e ti o ns tandar d. Cas e yv . S tat e , 2 15 S.W. 3d

87 0, 87 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ). A tri a l c ourt a bu se s it s d isc re tio n if its ruling is outside the zone of reasonable disag ree ment. Id. Evidence that does not have rele vance apar t fr o m ch ar acte r conf

ormity is inadmissi ble. Id. (citing Tex. R. Evi d. 404(b)) . Ex trane ous offe nse evide nce is a dmissibl e under Rule 404 if it is rele vant to a fa ct of c onsequenc e apa rt from its tendency

to show conduct in conf

ormity with char acte r. Id. I nquiry into the nature of the re lationship between the defe ndant and a witness may be re levant to show potential bias by the witness or c halleng e the wit n es s ’s cr edibility . The trial

co u rt h as d i s cr et i o na s t o t h e e x t en to f c ro s s -e x am i n at i o no f a wi t n es s t o s h o w b i as o r c h al l en ge

cre dibilit y . Can tu v . S

tat e , 939 S.W .2d 627, 635 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Whether the def endant ha s sh a re d ve ry pe rs on a l inf

or ma tio n is re le va

nt t o s ho wi ngthe c los e ne ss o f t he re la tio ns hip . T his is releva nce inde pendent of

rele vance to show conduct in conf ormity with char acte r. Ev e n if the a dmi ssi on of the te sti mony we re e rr on e ou s, it w a s n ot h arm fu l. B e c a us e Tapps does not make a constitutional challenge t o the trial cour t’s ruling , the er

ror must have aff ecte d substantial rig hts in order to wa rra nt reve rsal. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2( b). A substantial rig ht is aff

ecte d when the er

ror ha d a substantial and injurious ef fec t or influence in determining the jury ’s ver dict. Se e Kin g v . S tat e , 953 S.W .2d 266, 2 7 1 (T ex . C ri m. App. 1997). A c riminal conviction s hould not be overturne d for non- constitutional error if the appe llate cour

t, after examining the re cord a s a whole, ha s fair a ssuranc e that the err or did not influence the jury , or had12

but slight effec t on its verdict. Se e J oh ns on v . S

tat e , 967 S.W .2d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).

“ I t is we ll e sta

bli sh e d that the imp ro pe r a dmi ssi on of e vid e nc e do e s no t c on sti tut e rev ersib le

er ror if the same fa cts are shown by other e vidence which is not challeng ed.” C r o c k e r v . S t ate , 57 3 S. W.2 d 1 90 , 2 01 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 78 ); se e als o M i t c h e ll v . Stat e , 191 S.W .3d 219, 224 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, pet. re f’d) . Evidence that Tapps wa s a sex offende r wa s introduced jus t be fo re Hi g g ins te stifi ed. I n th e jur y ’s pr e se nc e , th e pa

rt ie s st ipu la te d to the a dmi ssi on int o evidenc e of r ecor ds pertainingto Tapps’s 2004 convic tion for fa ilure to reg ister as a sex offender

. Th e a dmi ssi on

of Hi g g ins ’s te sti mony

on the same su

bje c t w a s h arm le ss e ve n if it w a s e rr on e ou s. Tapps conte nds that eg reg ious error occur red upon the ad m i ssion into evidence of Austin Pol ice Of

fice r Eric Gates’ s testimony that he wor

ked in APD’s Care er Criminals Unit. Tapps did not object to the police off icer ’s stateme n t at t rial. He encour ag es this Court to im port the conc ept of e g reg ious error from cas es relating to unobjec ted-to jury char g e er

ror. See Al ma nz a v . S

tat e , 686 S.W .2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Eg reg ious error g oes to the ver

y basis of the c ase, de prives the accuse d of a valuable rig ht, or vi tally aff ects his def

ensive theor

y . See id. at 172. The error must deprive the def endant of a fa ir and impartial tria l. Se e J im e ne z v . S tat e , 32 S.W .3d 233, 235 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). A party waives error in the admis sion of evide nce by failing to object at the time evide nce is off ere d. W ill iam s v . S

tat e , 49 1 S.W. 2d 14 2, 14 3 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 73 ); see also Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. Even proper ly prese rved err or can be waived by failing t o o b j ect whe n other similar evide nce is off ere d. Le da

yv . S tat e , 9 8 3 S. W. 2 d

7 1 3 , 7 1 7-18 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ). Th e se we ll- e sta bli sh e d re qu ir e me nts fo r pr e se rv a tio n are inc on sis te nt w ith the c o n c e p t of

eg reg ious error

for unobjec ted-to evide nce—pa rticularly evidenc e such a s that at issue13

here

. T h e o f

f ic e r ’ s s tate me n t th a t h e w o r k e d in th e Ca

r e e r Cr im in a ls U n it d id n o t g o to the very ba s is o f th e c a s e , d e p r iv e th e a c c u s e d o f a v a lu a b le r ig h t, v it a ll y a f

f e c t h is d e f

e n s iv e th e o r

y , or deprive Tapps of a

fair a nd impartial trial. We see no leg al basis for e x tending the eg reg ious error theory relating to unobjected-to j ury char g e error to the admis sion of unobjec ted-to evide nce. T he admission of this evidence w as not reve rsible as e g reg ious error

.

Tapps also a sserts t hat he rec eived ineffec tive assistance of counsel. He f ocuses on trial counsel’ s failure to act in three instances. He contends that his co u n s el s hould have: (1 ) s tip ulate d to e vid e nc e of his pr ior of fe ns e s o uts ide the pres ence of the jur y , ( 2) ob je c te d to Offic er Gates’ s repe ated de scription of his employ ment as beingin the “Care er Criminals Unit,” and (3) objec ted to the prosec utor’s statement in closing argument that the S tate had not seen Hig g ins’s

car until that day

as outside the re cord a

nd g rossly

improper. We e va luate c la ims of

ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l a g a ins t the sta

nd ard se t f

or th in Strickland v. W

ashington

. See 46 6 U .S. 66 8, 68 7 ( 19 84 ); He rn an de z v . S tat e , 988 S.W .2d 770, 77 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ). I n d e c idi nga c la im o f i ne ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l, w e mus t deter mine whether

an attorne y ’s per formanc e wa s deficie nt, and if so, whethe r that def iciency prejudice d the def

ense. Strickland , 46 6 U.S

. a t 68 7; Tho mp so n v . S tat e , 9 S.W .3d 808, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). An attorney ’s per formanc e is defic ient if it falls below an obje ctive standard of

rea sonablene ss. Strickland , 466 U.S

. at 688; Thompson , 9 S.W .3d at 812. Def icient pe rf or manc e is p re

jud ic ia l w he n, bu t f

or the a tto rn e y ’s un

pr of e ssi on a l c on du c t, t

he re is a re a so na ble probability

that the outcome of

the proc ee d i n g would have be en diffe rent. Strickland , 4 66 U. S.

a t 69 4; Thompson , 9 S.W. 3d a t 81 2. A r e a so na

ble pr ob a bil ity is a probab il it y su ffi c ie nt t o14

undermine c onfidenc e in the outcome. Strickland , 4 66 U.S . at 69 4; Thompson , 9 S.W .3d at 812. Absent both showing s, we c annot conc lude th at t h er e h as bee n a bre akdown in the a dversa rial proce ss that r ender s the result of a trial unreliable

. T h o mps on , 9 S.W .3d at 813. I n deter mining whether an attorne y ’s per formanc e wa s deficie nt, we apply a strongpresumption that the attorne y ’s conduct was within the rang e of rea sonable professional assist ance . Id. a t 81 4. We d o n ot s pe c ulate ab o u t an attorney ’s strateg y . Bl e v ins v . S tat e , 1 8 S. W. 3 d 2 6 6 , 2 7 1 ( T e x. A p p . — A u s ti n 2000, no pet.). We re view the e ffe ctiveness of counsel in light of the totality of the re prese ntation and particula r circ umstances of

eac h case

. Thompson , 9 S.W .3d at 813. Tapps ar g ues that his counsel should have stipulated to t he fa ct that he ha d a prior fe lony and re qu e ste d th a t th e tr ia l c ourt no t a llo w the jur

y to k no w that the fe lony

wa s f or fa ili ngto

re g ist e r a s a

se x off e nd e r un de r the the or

y that the natur e of the pr ior fe lony wa s no t re le va nt to t his prosec uti o n an d wa s m ore pr ejudicial than pr obative. He contends that this particula r er ror wa s compounded be cause the fa ilure to reg ister offe nse also re vealed the additional prior se x offe nse. He relies on the U.S

. Supreme Court’s opinion in Old Chief v. United States , 519 U.S. 172 (1997), in wh ic h the Court

he ld t hat un de r c e rt a in c ir c ums tanc e s and with proper objection and stipulat ion a def endant may

be entitled to pr event a prosec utor from putting the details of a pr ior offe nse bef ore

a jury when the only rele vant aspec t of the prior offe nse is the fac t of conviction and the defe ndant is willi ng to stipul ate to that f act. The Court ba sed its holding on Rule of Evide nce 403 a nd made it c le ar t hat th e “ mor e pr e

jud ic ia l th an p ro bativ e ” ana ly sis wo uld have to be do ne on

a c a se -b y -c a se basis. Id. at 191-92.15 The st ra teg y

decision of whe ther to objec t to the admission of evidence is often

su bje c t to de bate , pa

rt ic ula rl y in hin ds ig ht. He re , in or de r t o a g re e wi th T a pp s’ s argume nt, we wo uld have to conclude that the decision by Tapps’s counsel not to stipulate to the prior convic tion and not to o bje c t to the a dmi ssi on of the natur e of the p ri or

c on vic tio n w a s d e fi c ie nt, bu t a lso that in

rea sonable proba

bility the outcome of the trial would have be en diffe rent. This re quires a two- step pr oc e ss i n this c a se . F ir st, we wo uld have to co nc lud e that, ha d the tr ia l c ourt be e n p re se nte d w ith the pr op os ed requ est t o e xclu de the natur e of the pr ior c on vic tio n, the Rul e 40 3 a na ly sis wo uld require a finding that the admission of the nature of the conviction would be more prejudicia l than probative on this re cord. Second, we would have to conc lude that in rea sonable proba bility the jury would no t h a v e c o n v ic te d T a p p s o f p o s s e s s in g a

f ir e ar m o nJa n u ar

y 2 0 , 2 0 0 6 , if

it h a d n o t be en

awa re that he had a prior conviction for failing to r eg ister as a sex offende r. We are not persuade d of either proposition. Tapps fa ils to explain how the fac t that his prior conviction was f

or fa iling to re g ister

a s a se x off e nd e r u nf a ir ly pr e jud ic e d th e jur

y a g a ins t hi m in

the ir e va luatio n o f w he the r h e wa s g uil ty of unlawf ully possessing a

firea rm. He simpl y as serts that his counsel wa s ineffe ctive in fa iling to pursue this course and compar e this case to Old Chief . H ow e ve r, the Rul e 40 3 c on sid e ra tio ns in Ol d Ch ie f are not simi lar to those in this case. T he def endant in Ol

d Ch ie f soug ht to sti pulate to a prior felony very much like the char g ed felony to avoid its mention at his t rial. Id. He wa s char g ed with assault wit h a dange rous weapon, us ing a firearm in relation to a crime of violence , and being a fe lon in possession of a wea pon, and soug ht to sti pulate to a prior conviction for a ssault causing serious bodily

injury

. Id. at 175. Thus, there was a conce rn that the jury

might improper ly

considerThe Supreme Court wrote: 4 I t is true that a prior off

ense ma y be so fa r re moved in time or nature from the c urre nt g un char g e and any others broug ht w ith it that its potential to pr ejudice the def endant unfairly will be minimal. S ome prior offe nses, i n fac t, may even ha ve some potential to prejudice the Gover

nment’s ca se unfa irly

. Thus an ex tremely old conviction for a re latively

minor fel o n y t h at nevertheless qua lifies under the statute might strike many jurors as a

foolish basis for convicting an ot herw ise upstanding member of the community

of otherw ise leg al g un possession. Old Chief v. United States , 519 U.S. 172, 185 n.8 (1997). 16 that the def

endant ha d been found g uilty of poss essing and usi ng a firear m in the past and, ther efor e, possibly think it m ore likely

that he had done so in the char g ed ins tance . The Old Chief court

rec og nized that, if the char g ed offense and the prior offe nse were dissi milar in time and sever ity , the defe ndant m ig h t i n s te a d

w an t t o h a v e th e n a tu

r e o f th e p r io r o f f e n s e f u ll y e xp lo r e d o nth e r e c ord. Id. at 185 n.8. 4 He re , n ei t her the failure to reg ister nor the unspe cified pr evious sex offense w as sim ila r t o th e c ha

rg e of un lawf

ul pos se ssi on of a fi re arm . At mo st, bo th t he fa ilure to r e g ist e r a s a

se x off e nd e r a nd the un sp e c if

ie d s e x off

e ns e sh ow that Ta

pp s did no t a

pp re c ia te the re str ic tio ns his previous off

enses plac ed on his curr ent behavior

. The probative eff ect of this is the same w hether the simple fac t of conviction is known to the jury or they are also made a

war e of w hat the convictions wer e for . I t is entirely possible and not unrea sonable that Tapps’s counsel could have conclude d that it would b e b et t er for the jur y to be awa

re that the prior convic tions had been f or

no nv iol e nt o ff

e ns e s suc h a s f

a ili ngto r e g ist e r a s a

se x off e nd e r t ha n to have the jur

y po te nti a lly be con ce rn ed ab out a violent felon possessing a g un. I t is not conclusive on this recor d that the17

district court would have been r equire d to bar a dmission of the nature of the prior c onvictions under Rule 4 0 3

. T h e r e is a ls o a p o te n ti a l s tr a te g ic r e a s o nf o r T a p p s to h a v e w an te d

th e ju r y to h e a r the

natur e of the c on vic tio ns . In th e se c ir c ums tanc e s, we c ann ot s ay c ouns e l’ s p e rf

or manc e wa s so defic ient for f

ailing to attempt to having the nature of the prior fe lonies to come into evidenc e that it und e rm ine s c on fi de nc e in t he re su lt. Tapps al s o co n t ends t hat his counsel should have objected to Gates’s re peate d statements that he wor

ks in the Caree r Criminals Unit. He asser ts that t h ese statements were particula rly harmful whe n Gates stated that his e x perie nce in a pprehe nding felons cause d him to not expect to find a handg un when appre hending Tapps ele ven day s after the incident. Gates testified that “[i] t’s common prac tice af ter a n offe nse has oc curr ed for suspects t o try to g et rid of evidence so it’s not retrieve d or re cover ed and possibly something that will be able to link them to the scene

or , y ou kn ow , in c ri min a te the m.” Ta pp s c on te nd s th a t thi s te sti mony pa int s him a s a c are e r c ri min a l, that it is h ig hly inf lammator y , a nd that hi s c ouns e l sh ou ld h a ve ob je c te d to it. We find no deficie ncy

in the fai l u re t o object. The fac t that Tapps has a criminal history is part of this case . I ndeed, T apps would have his counsel’s pe rfor mance held def

icient for fa ili ngto s tip ulate to a pr ior fe lony c on vic tio n. Th e fa c t th a t G a te s w or ke d in the Care e r C ri min a ls Unit might conc eivably

have a marg inally differ ent eff ect on a jury

than had they

hear d he wor

ked in s ome oth e r un it, bu t it i s n ot p art ic ula rl y pr e jud ic ia l w he n th e jur

y kn ow s th a t th e de fe nd ant i s a

re p e a t o f f e n d e r . G a t e s ’ s s t a t e m e n t t h a t a s u s p e c t m i g h t a t t e mp t t o d i s c ar d e v i d e n c e o f a c ri me sometim e i n t h e cour se of e leven da y s likely was not a r evelation to the jurors, nor is such a t echnique to avoid detec tion unique to care er c riminals. Furthe r, Tapps’ s counsel had G atesBe cause this assertion appea rs in a sec tion de d i cate d to the ineffe ctiveness of Tapps’s 5 counsel, we assume that Tapps contends that his c ounsel was inef fec tive for f

ailing to objec t to the State ’s argume nt. 18 emphasize the hy

pothetical natur e of his stateme nt. On cross e x amination, Tapps’s c ounsel elicited th e f o l l o w i n g t e s t i m o n y f

r o m G a t e s : “ I n e v e r s a i d t h a t M r . T a p p s [ d i s p o s e d o f

e v id e n c e ]. Ijust—from my

experience as a police office r that’s c ommon practice for suspec ts in serious case s to t ry to d isp os e of

e vid e nc e .” Couns e l pr e sse d o n, a sk ing , “T he bo tto m li ne is you do n’ t kn owif he dis posed of any evidenc e in this case; isn’t that cor rec t? ” Gates responde d, “Corre ct.” Ta pps’s counsel’s pe rfor m ance was not de ficient for failing to object to Gates na ming his plac e of employ ment or desc ribing ty

pical cr iminal behavior. Tapps also complains about the stateme nt by the prosec utor in closing a rg ument that

“ if that car had been pr od

uc e d to the State be fo re the la st d ay of tr ia l, p e rh a

ps mor e fo re ns ic investigations co u ld have be en per formed. B ut notably it wasn’t.” Permissible jury argument 5 includes summation of the evidenc e, re asonable deduction fr om the evidenc e, answ er to a rg ument of opposing counsel, a

nd plea f or law e nforc ement. Al lri dg e v . S tat e , 762 S.W .2d 146, 155 (T ex . Crim. App. 1988). To war rant reve rsal, argument must be manifestly improper, violate a statute, or inject ne w, har

mful fac ts into t he ca se. Ev e re tt v . S tat e , 70 7 S.W. 2d 63 8, 64 0 (T e x. Cr im. App. 1986). The jurors knew from testimony that police had not located the car immediately

afte r the in c id e n t o r

w h e nar r e s ti n g T a

p p s . T h e y

a ls o kn e w th a t H ig g in s te s ti f ie d th a t T a p p s borrowe d the c ar f or a bo ut t wo ho ur s o n th e date of

the inc ide nt, re tur

nin g it t o h e r u

nd a ma g e d at a

bo ut 7 p. m. t h at ev en i n g.19 Fa iling to object to this comment is not gr ounds for re versa l. The prose cutor’s comment at issue injects the fac t not in evidenc e that the State ha d not seen the c ar until the jurors did. The notion that Tapps or Hig g ins may have conce aled the alleg ed bullet hole wa s alrea dy befor e the jury , howeve r. J urors had befor e them the Gamblins ’ t estimony that Tapps shot a hole in the c ar he wa s driving at 5 p.m., and Higg ins’s testimony that the ca

r wa s undamag ed two hours late r and had neve r had a

bullet hole

. J urors knew that the State had not c apture d the ca r either at the sce ne of the incide nt, any

wher e else immediately

afte r the incide nt, at Tapps’s home eleve n day s later, or in the five months prior to trial. While the district court might h av e s u s t ai n ed an objec tion to the argument and g iven a reque sted instruction to disreg ard, the comment at issue war rante d no more. The prosec utor’s disputed comment did not inject for the first time the idea that Hig g ins might not be cr edible or mig ht even be in league with Tapps. That i mplication is inherent in the pre sentation of the c on fl ic tin g ve rs ion s o f t he c ar’ s in te g ri ty

on the da y of th e inc ide nt. Ev e n if

the fa ilure to object to this arg ument wer e def icient per formanc e, it did not unfairly prejudice the def

ense. Ta pp s’ s c ouns e l file d mo tio ns in l imi ne , ma de ob je c tio ns , a

nd e xami ne d w itn e sse s. He e mphasized the lack of phy sical evide nce s u p p o r ti n g the Gamblins’ story

and noted discr epanc ies in their very

simil ar ve rsions of eve nts. He re quested a nd rec eived a

jury inspectio n o f the c ar. We cannot say

that the alleg ed defec t s i n h is perfor mance —separ ately

or tog ether

—prejudice d Tapps’s de fense or under mine o u r co n fi dence in the verdic t when viewe d in the totality of counsel’s pe rfor

mance . Tapps contends and the State c oncede s that the judg ment incorre ctly states that the d i s t ri ct court found true as to all four prior fe lony

convictions alleg ed in the enha nceme nt20

para g raphs. The State conce des that the judg ment should be ref ormed a s Tapps sugge s t s , and additionally

reque sts that the judgment’ s statement of the date of the instant off en s e be c orre cted. We will modi fy

the judg ment as re quested.

Conclu sion The judg ment of the district cour t is hereby

modified to delete the fi ndings of true reg ardingalleg ations of convictions for Attempted Murder and for Possession of I lleg al Contraband in a Depa rtment of C orre ction Fa cility . The judg ment is also modified to state on pag e two that the instant offense was c ommitt ed on January 20, 2006, deleting t h e s t at ement that it occur red on December

14, 2004. The judg ment shall remain other wise uncha

ng ed, re flec ting a

conviction for the of fense of Unlaw ful Possession of a Fire arm c ommitt ed on January 20, 2006, enhanc ed by prior offe nses of Molestation of a J uvenile and Fe lon in Possession of a Fire arm . W e a ff i rm t he judgme nt as modified.

G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop Modified and, a s Modified, Aff irmed Filed: Apr il 17, 2008 Pub lis h