J-A23001-17

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CAMERON VINSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1271 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 27, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0009048-2015

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., DUBOW, J., and FITZGERALD*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED NOVEMBER 16, 2017

Appellant, Cameron Vinson, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on February 27, 2017, in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery 

County. On appeal, Vinson argues the Commonwealth presented insufficient 

evidence to sustain his convictions for prohibited offensive weapons (sawedoff shotgun), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 908(a), and persons not to possess firearms, 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1). We affirm.

In the early morning hours of November 21, 2015, Officer Kevin Hagan 

of the Norristown Police Department was on routine patrol in a marked 

police cruiser when he observed an SUV emerge from an alley, nearly hitting 

another car. Officer Hagan followed the SUV. He then watched as it ran two 

stop signs. At that point he activated the cruiser’s lights and siren, but the 
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SUV did not stop. A chase ensued and the driver, later identified as Vinson, 

eventually alighted from the SUV1 and ran into a wooded area. Officer Hagan 

chased Vinson on foot. Vinson hid, but ultimately called out to the officer 

that he was giving up and Officer Hagan took him into custody. While 

walking back to the cruiser, Vinson “volunteered” “that there was a shotgun 

in the back seat of the car.” N.T., Trial, 11/17/16, at 35. 

Officer Christopher Middleton searched the SUV and, on the center 

console in the back seat, found a backpack. The backpack contained “three 

pieces of a double barrel shotgun,” consisting of “the barrel, another piece to 

the barrel, and then the handle along with 13 live rounds of shotgun 

ammunition.” Id., at 53. The barrel of the shotgun measured just 13.5 

inches, an illegal length. 

Prior to trial, Vinson moved to suppress the shotgun. After a hearing,

the suppression court denied the motion and the matter later proceeded to a 

jury trial. At trial, the parties stipulated that Vinson had become a person 

who was not legally permitted to possess a firearm on May 26, 2011. The 

Commonwealth marked as an exhibit and entered into evidence the three 

pieces of the shotgun. In addition to his brief description of the parts, Officer 

Middleton testified he did not “know how to put the shotgun back together.” 

Id., at 56-57.

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1 Vinson did not own the SUV. The ownership of the vehicle was not an issue 

at trial.
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The jury convicted Vinson of prohibited offensive weapons (sawed-off 

shotgun), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 908(a), and persons not to possess firearms, 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1). And the trial court later imposed an aggregate 

sentence of four to eight years’ imprisonment. This timely appeal followed 

the denial of Vinson’s post-sentence motions. 

On appeal, Vinson argues the Commonwealth presented insufficient 

evidence to sustain the convictions. 

Our standard of review in a sufficiency of the evidence 

challenge is to determine if the Commonwealth established 

beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of the offense, 

considering all the evidence admitted at trial, and drawing all 

reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the Commonwealth 

as the verdict-winner. The trier of fact bears the responsibility of 

assessing the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the 

evidence presented. In doing so, the trier of fact is free to 

believe all, part, or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Pruitt, 951 A.2d 307, 313 (Pa. 2008) (citations 

omitted). 

Vinson first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence demonstrating 

he constructively possessed the backpack containing the disassembled 

shotgun. “At most,” he writes, “the evidence ... established that [Vinson] 

knew the items were in the back of someone else’s SUV.” Appellant’s Brief, 

at 14. We disagree.

As the officers did not recover the disassembled shotgun from 

Vinson’s person, the Commonwealth had to establish “constructive 

possession,” “a legal fiction” that is “a pragmatic construct to deal with the 

realities of criminal law enforcement.” Commonwealth v. Parker, 847 A.2d 
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745, 750 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). The concept is “an inference 

arising from a set of facts that possession of the contraband was more likely 

than not.” Id. (citation omitted). Constructive possession is “‘conscious 

dominion,’” id. (citation omitted), which is “the power to control the 

contraband and the intent to exercise that control.” Commonwealth v. 

Haskins, 677 A.2d 328, 330 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citation omitted). “To aid 

application ... constructive possession may be established by the totality of 

the circumstances.” Parker, 847 A.2d at 750 (citation omitted).

We have little difficulty concluding the Commonwealth presented 

sufficient evidence to prove Vinson constructively possessed the backpack 

containing the disassembled shotgun. Vinson fled the SUV, attempting to 

evade the police by hiding in a wooded area. Flight demonstrates his 

consciousness of guilt. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 146 A.3d 257, 263 

(Pa. Super. 2016). And upon apprehension he voluntarily admitted the 

backpack contained a “shotgun.” The totality of the circumstances reveals 

Vinson’s power to control the contraband and the intent to exercise that 

control—not simply, as Vinson asserts, that he knew the items were in the 

back of someone else’s SUV, but had no conscious dominion over them.

Vinson next argues the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence 

to sustain his convictions, alleging the Commonwealth failed to present 

evidence the three pieces could be assembled into a shotgun. As he 

succinctly puts it, “[T]he Commonwealth failed to establish that the three 
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pieces in the backpack could be put together.” Appellant’s Brief, at 14 

(emphasis in original). 

As mentioned, Officer Middleton testified the backpack contained 

“three pieces of a double barrel shotgun; it was the barrel, another piece to 

the barrel, and then the handle along with 13 live rounds of shotgun 

ammunition.” N.T., Trial, 11/17/16, at 53. And he readily conceded he did 

not “know how to put the shotgun back together.” Id., at 56-57. 

With that background testimony in mind, we will address each 

conviction separately.

In order to obtain a conviction under 18 Pa.C.S.[A]. § 

6105 the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the defendant possessed a firearm and that he was 

convicted of an enumerated offense that prohibits him from 

possessing, using, controlling, or transferring a firearm.

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 988 A.2d 669, 670 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

Vinson does not dispute that he was prohibited from possessing a 

firearm due to a prior conviction. Instead, he singularly relies on the 

assertion that the three pieces of the disassembled shotgun were not shown 

by the Commonwealth to constitute a firearm. 

“[T]he term ‘firearm’ shall include any weapons which are designed to 

or may readily be converted to expel any projectile by the action of an 

explosive or the frame or receiver of any such weapon.” 18 Pa.C.S.[A]. § 

6105(i). See also Thomas, 988 A.2d at 671-672. Operability is not an 

issue. See id., at 672 (“The statutory language is clear, and it does not 
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require proof that the weapon was capable of expelling a projectile when it 

was seized[.]”; “[T]he use of the terms ‘frame’ and ‘receiver’ in section 

6105(i) demonstrates that the legislature sought to eliminate the operability 

requirement....”)

Admittedly, the Commonwealth took a rather unconventional approach 

in proving the three pieces constituted a firearm. For example, the 

Commonwealth did not present a witness who could assemble the pieces 

into a shotgun, nor did they present a witness who testified explicitly that a 

specific piece of the shotgun was the “frame or receiver.”2 But, in any event,

the jury was certainly given enough information to infer and conclude the 

pieces constituted a firearm. 

What is most important is Vinson’s admission as testified to by Officer 

Hagan, which the jury obviously credited. As the Commonwealth aptly 

explains:

[Vinson’s] prior admissions prove his contention that the 

parts could not fit together into an operable weapon dubious. 

When [Vinson] informed the officers of the existence of the 

weapon, he did not say there were ... pieces of a weapon, he did 

not say there was a backpack, he did not say that there were 

three unidentifiable pieces; instead, he informed officers that 

there was a shotgun in the backseat of the vehicle. In other 

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2 The Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995 does not define “frame or 

receiver.” Nor is there a definition provided in the Pennsylvania Code. 

Federal regulations, however, define the term as “[t]hat part of a firearm 

which provides housing for the hammer, bolt or breechblock, and firing 

mechanism, and which is usually threaded at its forward portion to receive 

the barrel.” 27 CFR § 478.11 Meaning of terms. 
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words, [Vinson] knew exactly what would be assembled if and 

when the pieces were put together.

Commonwealth’s Brief, at 13 (emphasis added). Buttressing this admission 

is Vinson’s flight, which, as mentioned, is indicative of consciousness of 

guilt—why run from innocuous parts in a bag? And then are the thirteen live 

shotgun rounds found in the backpack, an indication the pieces, once 

assembled into a shotgun, could fire them. 

Accordingly, we find the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence 

to permit the jury to infer the three pieces constituted a firearm, namely a 

sawed-off shotgun, thus sustaining the conviction for persons not to possess 

firearms. 

A sawed-off shotgun is a shotgun that has “a barrel less than 18 

inches” in length and constitutes a prohibited offensive weapon. See 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 908(a), (c). Again, like the former offense, operability is not an 

issue. See Commonwealth v. Ponds, 345 A.2d 253, 256 (Pa. Super. 

1975) (“There is no such [operability] requirement spelled out in Section 

908, and we therefore conclude that the legislature did not intend to impose 

the operability requirement to Section 908....”; “The mere possession of an 

item identifiable as a sawed-off shotgun, even though inoperable is still an 

ominous presence, and has no place nor possible use in the community and 

should be prohibited.”) “To establish a violation of the statute prohibiting the 

carrying of a sawed-off shotgun, it is sufficient to show that the weapon 
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possessed the outward appearance and characteristics of a sawed-off 

shotgun.” Id.

Here, we have already concluded the Commonwealth presented 

sufficient evidence to establish the three pieces constituted a shotgun. And 

Officer Middleton testified the barrel measured just 13.5 inches, well below 

the legal length of 18 inches. See N.T., Trial, 11/17/16, at 55. Accordingly, 

we find the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to sustain the 

conviction for prohibited offensive weapon (sawed-off shotgun). 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judge Dubow joins in the memorandum.

Justice Fitzgerald concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/16/2017