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ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE

September 9, 2019

2019 CO 76

No. 17SC284, Alliance for a Safe and Independent Woodmen Hills v. Campaign 

Integrity Watchdog, LLC—Campaign Finance—Statutes of Limitations—Attorney 

Fees.

This case requires the supreme court to decide two questions regarding the 

meaning of article XXVIII, section 9(2)(a) of the Colorado Constitution. First, the 

court must construe the term “violation” as that term is used in section 9(2)(a) and 

decide whether the “violation” that triggers section 9(2)(a)’s one-year statute of 

limitations for private campaign finance enforcement actions can extend beyond 

the dates adjudicated and penalized in the decision being enforced. Second, the 

court must decide whether the attorney fees provision in section 9(2)(a) is 

self-executing or whether it must be read together with section 13-17-102(6), C.R.S. 

(2019), to limit attorney fee awards against a pro se party.

With regard to the first question, the court concludes that the term 

“violation,” as used in section 9(2)(a), refers to the violation as adjudicated and 

penalized in the decision being enforced. Accordingly, the court further concludes

that the division erred in perceiving a possible continuing violation under 
section 9(2)(a). Therefore, the enforcement action in this case was barred by the 

one-year statute of limitations.

With regard to the second question, the court concludes that section 9(2)(a)’s 

language stating that “[t]he prevailing party in a private enforcement action shall 

be entitled to reasonable attorneys fees and costs” is self-executing and that section 

13-17-102(6) cannot be construed to limit or nullify section 9(2)(a)’s unconditional 

award of attorney fees to the prevailing party. Accordingly, the court reverses the 

division’s contrary determination and concludes that petitioners, as the prevailing 

parties in this case, are entitled to an award of the reasonable attorney fees that 

they incurred in the district and appellate courts in this case.
The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado

2 East 14th Avenue • Denver, Colorado 80203

2019 CO 76

Supreme Court Case No. 17SC284

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals

Court of Appeals Case No. 16CA267

Petitioners:

Alliance for a Safe and Independent Woodmen Hills and Sarah Brittain Jack

v.

Respondent:

Campaign Integrity Watchdog, LLC.

Judgment Reversed

en banc

September 9, 2019

Attorneys for Petitioners:

Law Office of Robert S. Gardner 

Robert S. Gardner

Laura A. Gardner

Colorado Springs, Colorado 

Authorized Representative of Respondent:

Matthew Arnold

Denver, Colorado

JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court.
2

¶1 In this case, we are asked to decide two questions regarding the meaning of 

article XXVIII, section 9(2)(a) of the Colorado Constitution. First, we must 

construe the term “violation” as that term is used in section 9(2)(a) and decide 

whether the “violation” that triggers section 9(2)(a)’s one-year statute of 

limitations for private campaign finance enforcement actions can extend beyond 

the dates adjudicated and penalized in the decision being enforced. Second, we 

must decide whether the attorney fees provision in section 9(2)(a) is self-executing 

or whether it must be read together with section 13-17-102(6), C.R.S. (2019), to limit 

attorney fee awards against a pro se party.1

¶2 With regard to the first question, we conclude that the term “violation,” as 

used in section 9(2)(a), refers to the violation as adjudicated and penalized in the 

decision being enforced. Accordingly, we further conclude that the division erred 

 

1 Specifically, we granted certiorari to review the following issues:

1. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the “violation” 

triggering the statute of limitations for campaign-finance 

enforcement actions could extend beyond the dates adjudicated 

and penalized in the decision being enforced.

2. Whether the court of appeals erred in applying section 

13-17-102(6), C.R.S. (2017), to the attorneys’ fees provision of 

Article XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution.
3

in perceiving a possible continuing violation under section 9(2)(a). Therefore, the 

enforcement action in this case was barred by the one-year statute of limitations.

¶3 With regard to the second question, we conclude that section 9(2)(a)’s 

language stating that “[t]he prevailing party in a private enforcement action shall 

be entitled to reasonable attorneys fees and costs” is self-executing and that section 

13-17-102(6) cannot be construed to limit or nullify section 9(2)(a)’s unconditional 

award of attorney fees to the prevailing party. Accordingly, we reverse the 

division’s contrary determination and conclude that petitioners, Alliance for a Safe 

and Independent Woodmen Hills (“Alliance”) and Sarah Brittain Jack, as the 

prevailing parties in this case, are entitled to an award of the reasonable attorney 

fees that they incurred in the district and appellate courts in this case.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶4 In May 2014, Woodmen Hills Metropolitan District (“Woodmen Hills”) held 

an election to fill vacant positions on its board of directors, and Ron Pace was one 

of the candidates for such a position. Several months before the election, a group 

of Woodmen Hills residents formed Alliance, a non-profit organization headed by 

Jack, to educate Woodmen Hills residents about issues affecting their community.

¶5 Alliance subsequently undertook efforts advocating Pace’s defeat in the 

upcoming election. Among other things, in the months leading to the election, 

Alliance mailed four different postcards to over 2,400 Woodmen Hills residents,
4

each making negative comments about Pace. Alliance also established a Facebook 

page that featured posts sharply critical of Pace and that expressly called for his 

defeat in the upcoming election.

¶6 Pursuant to article XXVIII, section 9(2)(a) of the Colorado Constitution, 

respondent Campaign Integrity Watchdog (“Watchdog”), Pace, and another 

Woodmen Hills resident subsequently filed campaign finance complaints with the 

Colorado Secretary of State (“Secretary”). As pertinent here, Watchdog alleged

that Alliance violated the Colorado Fair Campaign Practices Act (“FCPA”), 

sections 1-45-101 to -118, C.R.S. (2019), and article XXVIII of the Colorado 

Constitution when it failed (1) to register as a political organization and political 

committee and (2) to report accurately all contributions received and all campaign 

spending or expenditures. The Secretary referred the complaints to the Office of 

Administrative Courts where they were consolidated.

¶7 Thereafter, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) held two days of hearings,

2

and on August 8, 2014, he issued a Final Agency Decision. In this decision, the 

ALJ found that Alliance was a political committee because it (1) expended over 

 

2 The ALJ held the initial hearing on June 26, 2014, but because of a power outage, 

the hearing could not be concluded in one day as scheduled but was completed 

on July 28, 2014.
5

$200 to oppose Pace’s election by expressly advocating his defeat on its Facebook 

page and (2) received contributions in excess of $200 that were intended for and 

used to oppose Pace’s election. The ALJ further found that as a political 

committee, Alliance was required to register with the Secretary and to make 

periodic reports of its contributions and expenditures but that it had not done so. 

Specifically, as to the failure to register, the ALJ ruled that “[b]ecause Alliance’s 

first contribution in excess of $200 was received on March 16, 2014, it was obligated 

to register as of that date. Because March 16 was a Sunday, Alliance’s registration 

was due the following workday, March 17th.” And as to the reporting violations, 

the ALJ concluded that “[t]he reporting periods for special district elections are 

defined by Secretary of State Rule 17.4 as the 21st day before, the Friday before, 

and the 30th day after the date of a regular election,” and “[b]ecause the election 

was held May 6, 2014, Alliance’s reports were due April 15, May 2, and June 5, 

2014.”

¶8 The ALJ then proceeded to address the applicable sanctions to which 

Alliance was subject under article XXVIII, sections 9(2) and 10(2) and 

section 1-45-111.5(1.5), of the FCPA. In this regard, the ALJ imposed the following 

sanctions:

a) Failure to register: Registration was due March 17, 2014, but not 

filed as of the first day of hearing, June 26, 2014; a period of 101 days, 

for a total of $5,050.
6

b) Failure to report: Alliance received two contributions ($10,000 on 

March 16, 2014; $7,500 on March 17, 2014) by April 10, 2014, and 

therefore was required to report those contributions by April 15, 2014. 

No report was filed as of June 26th, a period of 71 days, for a total of 

$3,550.

Alliance received no more contributions and made no expenditures 

prior to the closing date for the report due May 2, 2014.

Alliance received one final contribution of $500 on May 12, 2014; and 

made the expenditure associated with its Facebook based express 

advocacy on May 29, 2014. These were reportable on the report due 

June 5, 2014. This report was not filed as of June 26, 2014, a period of 

21 days, for a total of $1,050.

The total penalties therefore include $5,050 for failure to register as a 

political committee, and $4,600 for failure to file contributions and 

expenditures reports, for a total penalty of $9,650.

(Footnotes omitted.)

¶9 Alliance subsequently filed a motion to stay the ALJ’s decision pending 

appeal, but the ALJ denied that motion. Several days later, Alliance filed a notice 

of appeal and a motion to stay with the Colorado Court of Appeals. A division of 

that court denied this motion to stay, and on October 8, 2014, Alliance registered 

with the Secretary as a political committee and reported its contributions and 

expenditures as the ALJ ordered it to do.

¶10 Just over one month later, Alliance moved to dismiss its appeal voluntarily, 

and the court of appeals granted that motion. Thereafter, the Secretary invoiced 

Alliance for the $9,650 in penalties that Alliance still owed, but the Secretary does

not appear to have otherwise pursued enforcement of the ALJ’s order.
7

¶11 On September 15, 2015, Watchdog filed a complaint in the El Paso County

District Court seeking to enforce the portion of the ALJ’s August 8, 2014 Final 

Agency Decision ordering Alliance to pay the $9,650 in penalties. Alliance moved 

to dismiss this complaint, alleging that section 9(2)(a) requires that private

enforcement actions be brought within one year of the date of the violation and 

that Watchdog had filed its enforcement action more than one year after the latest

date of any violation stated in the ALJ’s decision.

¶12 Because both parties submitted documentary evidence supporting their 

positions on Alliance’s motion, the district court appears to have treated Alliance’s 

motion as a motion for summary judgment and granted that motion. In doing so, 

the court explained:

The relevant Constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, and 

it requires in pertinent part that “Any private action brought under

this section shall be brought within one year of the date of the 

violation in state district court.” Plaintiffs have not complied with 

this provision, and this Court accordingly has no jurisdiction to 

enforce the decision of the ALJ as a private action. [Watchdog’s] 

position that the word “violation” refers to something besides its 

common meaning, such as the date of an alleged failure to pay the 

fine, is unavailing.

¶13 The court further explained, “The same constitutional provision which is at 

the heart of this lawsuit provides that ‘[t]he prevailing party in a private 

enforcement action shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys fees and costs.’” 

Accordingly, it concluded that Alliance was entitled to an award of fees and costs.
8

¶14 Watchdog then appealed, contending, among other things, that it had

alleged a continuing violation and that therefore the district court had erred in 

determining that Watchdog’s complaint was time-barred by the one-year statute 

of limitations. Watchdog further argued that under Colorado statutory law, its 

status as a pro se party precluded the district court from awarding attorney fees 

against it.

¶15 In a divided, published opinion, a division of the court of appeals reversed 

the summary judgment for Alliance. Campaign Integrity Watchdog, LLC v. All. for a 

Safe & Indep. Woodmen Hills, 2017 COA 22, ¶ 1, __ P.3d __. The division majority

first reviewed the plain language of article XXVIII, section 9(2)(a) of the Colorado 

Constitution and “conclude[d] that the date of ‘violation’ means the date or dates 

the FCPA or [Constitutional] Amendment is violated, and that a private cause of 

action to enforce an ALJ’s decision must be filed within one year of that date.” Id.

at ¶ 24. The majority then proceeded to analyze whether the district court had 

properly identified the date of the violation. Id. at ¶ 25. The majority observed, 

“Because an ALJ has broad discretion to impose sanctions for violations, the dates 

he or she selects for determining the appropriate sanction are merely instructive 

and not binding for the purposes of the statute of limitations.” Id. at ¶ 34. The 

majority then determined that “to the extent the district court concluded that the 

last date of the penalty range, June 26, 2014, corresponded with the date of 
9

violation in § 9 of the Amendment, this conclusion was erroneous and was 

contradicted by other language in the decision.” Id. In support of this conclusion,

the division explained:

Here, the ALJ’s footnote shows that Alliance had not registered or 

filed reports as of July 2014, and its order to Alliance to do so within 

fourteen days of the decision shows that Alliance had not done so as 

of August 8, 2014. Therefore, if the district court assumed a 

continuing violation until June 26, 2014, the violation continued until 

at least August 8, 2014, and the record does not show when or if the 

continuing violation ended. When viewed in a light most favorable 

to [Watchdog], we conclude the complaint states a plausible claim of 

a continuing violation sufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b)(5) motion 

to dismiss based on the statute of limitations.

Id. at ¶ 35.

¶16 The majority therefore reversed the district court’s order, remanded the case 

for reinstatement of Watchdog’s complaint and further proceedings, and reversed 

the award of attorney fees to Alliance and Jack. Id. at ¶¶ 36–37. Because the issue 

could arise on remand, however, the majority proceeded to address Watchdog’s 

contention that its status as a pro se party precluded the district court from 

awarding attorney fees against it. In this regard, the majority initially noted that 

the plain language of section 9 entitles the prevailing party in a private 

enforcement action to reasonable attorney fees and costs. Id. at ¶ 38. The majority 

observed, however, that section 1-45-111.5(2) requires that a court consider 

sections 13-17-102(5) and (6) before awarding fees. Id. The majority then noted 

that under section 13-17-102(6), a district court may not assess fees against a pro 
10

se party unless the court finds that the party clearly knew or reasonably should 

have known that its action or defense, or any part thereof, was substantially 

frivolous, groundless, or vexatious. Id. The majority thus stated that if the issue 

were to arise again on remand, then the district court should make the requisite

statutory findings before assessing fees against Watchdog. Id.

¶17 Judge Kapelke concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the 

majority’s analysis of the meaning of the term “violation” in section 9(2)(a). Id. at 

¶ 40 (Kapelke, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He disagreed, 

however, with the majority’s conclusion that Watchdog’s complaint stated “a 

‘plausible claim for relief’ based on the need for a determination whether there 

was a ‘continuing violation.’” Id. at ¶ 41. In his view, the controlling “violation”

dates were, as the ALJ found, (1) the March 17, 2014 due date for Alliance to 

register as a political committee and (2) the April 15, May 2, and June 5, 2014 dates

by which Alliance was required to file its contribution and expenditure reports. 

Id. at ¶ 42. Because Watchdog’s private enforcement action was filed on 

September 15, 2015, more than one year after all of the respective dates of 

violations determined by the ALJ, and because “[s]ection 9(2)(a) does not 

recognize any exception for ‘continuing violations,’” Judge Kapelke would have

affirmed the district court’s order dismissing Watchdog’s complaint. Id. at 

¶¶ 43–44.
11

¶18 Alliance then petitioned this court for certiorari review, and we granted that 

petition.

II. Analysis

¶19 We begin with the applicable standard of review and principles of statutory

interpretation. Next, we analyze the plain language of article XXVIII,

section 9(2)(a) of the Colorado Constitution and conclude that when “violation” is 

read in context, it plainly means the violation as adjudicated and penalized in the 

decision being enforced. Thus, because Watchdog filed its complaint to enforce 

the ALJ’s decision more than one year after any of the dates of the violations found

and penalized in that decision, it was barred by the one-year statute of limitations. 

Finally, we turn to the attorney fees provision in section 9(2)(a) and conclude that 

that provision is self-executing and is not modified by section 13-17-102(6). 

Accordingly, we reverse the division majority’s contrary ruling, and pursuant to 

section 9(2)(a), we conclude that Alliance and Jack, as the prevailing parties in this 

case, are entitled to an award of the reasonable attorney fees that they incurred in 

the district court, on appeal in the court of appeals, and in this court.

A. Standard of Review and Principles of Construction

¶20 Constitutional interpretation and statutory construction present questions

of law that we review de novo. Gessler v. Colo. Common Cause, 2014 CO 44, ¶ 7, 

327 P.3d 232, 235.
12

¶21 In construing statutes and citizen initiatives, we seek to give effect to the 

General Assembly’s and the electorate’s intent, respectively. See People v. Lente, 

2017 CO 74, ¶ 16, 406 P.3d 829, 832 (citizen initiative); Teague v. People, 2017 CO 66, 

¶ 8, 395 P.3d 782, 784 (statute). We read words and phrases in context, according 

them their plain and ordinary meanings. Lente, ¶ 16, 406 P.3d at 832; Teague, ¶ 8,

395 P.3d at 784. If the language is clear, we apply it as written and need not resort 

to other tools of statutory interpretation. Lente, ¶ 16, 406 P.3d at 832; Teague, ¶ 8, 

395 P.3d at 784.

B. “Violation” Under Section 9(2)(a)

¶22 Article XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution concerns campaign and 

political finance and, among other things, establishes campaign contribution and

expenditure reporting requirements and provides for private enforcement of 

certain of its mandates.

¶23 As pertinent here, section 9(2)(a) of article XXVIII addresses the process and 

requirements for private enforcement. That section provides:

Any person who believes that a violation of section 3, section 4, 

section 5, section 6, section 7, or section 9(1)(e), of this article, or of 

sections 1-45-108, 1-45-114, 1-45-115, or 1-45-117 C.R.S., or any 

successor sections, has occurred may file a written complaint with the 

secretary of state no later than one hundred eighty days after the date 

of the alleged violation. The secretary of state shall refer the complaint 

to an administrative law judge within three days of the filing of the 

complaint. The administrative law judge shall hold a hearing within 

fifteen days of the referral of the complaint, and shall render a decision

within fifteen days of the hearing. The defendant shall be granted an 
13

extension of up to thirty days upon defendant’s motion, or longer 

upon a showing of good cause. If the administrative law judge 

determines that such violation has occurred, such decision shall include 

any appropriate order, sanction, or relief authorized by this article. 

The decision of the administrative law judge shall be final and subject 

to review by the court of appeals, pursuant to section 24-4-106(11), 

C.R.S., or any successor section. The secretary of state and the 

administrative law judge are not necessary parties to the review. The 

decision may be enforced by the secretary of state, or, if the secretary 

of state does not file an enforcement action within thirty days of the 

decision, in a private cause of action by the person filing the 

complaint. Any private action brought under this section shall be 

brought within one year of the date of the violation in state district 

court. The prevailing party in a private enforcement action shall be 

entitled to reasonable attorneys fees and costs.

§ 9(2)(a) (emphases added).3

¶24 Both parties, as well as the division below, agree that section 9(2)(a) requires

private enforcement actions to be brought within one year of the date of “the 

violation.” They disagree, however, as to the meaning of “the violation” for 

 

3 In Holland v. Williams, No. 16-cv-00138-RM-MLC, 2018 WL 2938320, at *8–9, 

11–13 (D. Colo. June 12, 2018), the United States District Court (1) granted the 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and found the private enforcement 

provision of section 9(2)(a) to be facially unconstitutional and (2) declined to enter 

judgment pending further proceedings on the plaintiff’s motion for a permanent 

injunction. Apparently, the defendant did not appeal that decision, but the case 

ended before the court ruled on the permanent injunction motion. This decision 

is not binding on this court, see Ahart v. Colo. Dep’t of Corrs., 964 P.2d 517, 522 (Colo. 

1998), and we need not address the constitutionality of section 9(2)(a)’s 

enforcement provision (an issue that neither party briefed here), because, 

assuming the provision is constitutional, Watchdog’s enforcement action is 

time-barred.
14

purposes of determining when the one-year limitation period accrues. Alliance 

argues that under the plain meaning of section 9(2)(a), the one-year limitation 

period begins to run as of the dates of violation found and penalized in the ALJ’s 

decision. Watchdog, in contrast, argues that the plain meaning of “violation” 

means the “last act” of breaking or dishonoring the FCPA, which can continue post 

judgment. We agree with Alliance.

¶25 Under section 9(2)(a), “[a]ny person who believes that a violation” has 

occurred can file a complaint with the Secretary, who then refers the case to an 

ALJ, who must hold a hearing within fifteen days of the referral and render a 

decision within fifteen days of the hearing. (Emphasis added.) “If the 

administrative law judge determines that such violation has occurred, such decision

shall include any appropriate order, sanction, or relief authorized by this article.”

Id. (emphases added).

¶26 Thereafter, the Secretary may enforce the decision, but if the Secretary does 

not file an enforcement action within thirty days of the decision, then the person 

filing the complaint may file a private enforcement action. Id. This action, 

however, must be brought within one year of “the date of the violation.” Id. 

(emphasis added). In our view, “the violation” referred to in the provision 

establishing a one-year statute of limitations refers to the violation found and 

penalized in the ALJ’s decision. That violation, in turn, refers back to the violation
15

alleged in the campaign finance complaint. Such a reading is not only consistent 

with section 9(2)(a)’s plain language, but also it is consistent with the notion of 

enforcing the ALJ’s order. Section 9(2)(a) allows a party to seek to enforce only an 

ALJ’s decision. It does not authorize a party to enforce a violation that the ALJ did 

not find or that has not occurred yet.

¶27 In his decision, the ALJ found that Alliance was required to register as a 

political committee by March 17, 2014, and that Alliance’s applicable contribution

and expenditure reports were due on April 15, May 2, and June 5, 2014. The ALJ 

subsequently calculated penalties for each violation based on the numbers of days 

that had elapsed between the due dates of the filings and the first date of the 

administrative hearing, which occurred on June 26, 2014. Accordingly, the latest 

date on which the ALJ found a specific violation was June 5, 2014, and the latest 

date for which the ALJ imposed a penalty was June 26, 2014. As a result, the latest 

date on which the ALJ could be said to have found a violation was June 26, 2014, 

and therefore, Watchdog’s private cause of action accrued no later than that date, 

giving Watchdog until, at the latest, June 26, 2015, to file any private enforcement 

action.

¶28 Because Watchdog did not file its complaint until September 15, 2015,

however, we conclude that its enforcement action was untimely.
16

¶29 We are not persuaded otherwise by Watchdog’s contention that it had 

alleged a continuing violation and therefore its cause of action did not accrue until 

October 8, 2014, the date on which Alliance registered and filed the required 

reports. Although it is not clear to us that Watchdog, in fact, alleged a continuing 

violation in its complaint, assuming without deciding that it did, the ALJ’s 

decision did not find a continuing violation but rather found and penalized 

violations through and including June 26, 2014, and as noted above, this is the 

latest date on which Watchdog’s cause of action can be said to have accrued.

¶30 Nor are we persuaded by Watchdog’s contention that it may be impossible 

for parties to file a timely enforcement action because the statute of limitations 

could run prior to the entry of judgment or the final appellate mandate regarding 

the administrative proceeding. In support of this contention, Watchdog asserts

that a private party may only file an enforcement action if the Secretary chooses 

not to file one. Watchdog further notes that the Secretary cannot file an 

enforcement action until the appellate mandate arising from the administrative 

proceeding issues because the district court would lack jurisdiction over such an 

action while an appeal concerning the administrative proceeding is pending. 

Accordingly, Watchdog contends that allowing the statute of limitations to begin 

to run from the date of the violation found and penalized in the ALJ’s decision 

would create an absurd result because the one-year statute of limitations could 
17

expire while the appeal from the administrative proceeding is pending, thus 

eliminating any opportunity to file an enforcement action. For three reasons, we 

disagree.

¶31 First, section 9(2)(a) does not state that the one-year statute of limitations 

begins to run from the date of the appellate mandate. It says, “Any private action 

brought under this section shall be brought within one year of the date of the 

violation in state district court.” § 9(2)(a) (emphasis added).

¶32 Second, Watchdog has provided no applicable authority, and we have seen 

none, to support its contention that a district court would lack jurisdiction over an 

enforcement action while an appeal concerning the administrative proceeding is 

pending. A district court generally loses jurisdiction when the case before that court

is on appeal. Schnier v. Dist. Court, 696 P.2d 264, 267 (Colo. 1985) (“Generally, the 

filing of a notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction, although this rule 

is subject to a number of exceptions.”). Here, in contrast, the enforcement action 

would be filed as a separate action, and a court does not lack jurisdiction due to the 

fact that a related case is on appeal. See Globe Indem. Co. v. Wrenn Ins. Agency of 

Mo., 816 F. Supp. 1379, 1381 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (“It is well settled that the fact that a 

case is proceeding in one court does not necessarily defeat jurisdiction of a parallel 

case in another court.”).
18

¶33 Third, if need be, a party filing an enforcement action can protect its rights 

by timely filing the enforcement action and then asking the court to stay that action 

pending the disposition of the appeal concerning the administrative proceeding. 

Such a procedure would be consistent with the constitution’s plain language, and 

it would avoid the absurd result that Watchdog posits.

¶34 For these reasons, we conclude that Watchdog’s enforcement action here is 

time-barred.

C. Attorney Fees Under Section 9(2)(a)

¶35 Alliance argues that if it prevails on appeal, then it is entitled to attorney 

fees under section 9(2)(a) and that the division erred in concluding that section 

13-17-102(6) effectively modifies section 9(2)(a). We agree with both points.

¶36 As noted above, section 9(2)(a) provides, in pertinent part, “The prevailing 

party in a private enforcement action shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys fees 

and costs.”

¶37 Section 13-17-102(6) provides:

No party who is appearing without an attorney shall be assessed 

attorney fees unless the court finds that the party clearly knew or 

reasonably should have known that his action or defense, or any part 

thereof, was substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or 

substantially vexatious; except that this subsection (6) shall not apply 

to situations in which an attorney licensed to practice law in this state 

is appearing without an attorney, in which case, he shall be held to 

the standards established for attorneys elsewhere in this article.
19

¶38 The question before us is whether section 13-17-102(6) can be construed as 

imposing a legislative limitation on section 9(2)(a).

¶39 In Yenter v. Baker, 248 P.2d 311, 314 (Colo. 1952), we made clear that a facially 

self-executing provision of our constitution is not subject to legislative restriction 

or curtailment:

A constitutional provision is a higher form of statutory law which the 

people may provide shall be self-executing; the object being to put it 

beyond the power of the Legislature to render it nugatory by refusing 

to pass laws to carry it into effect.

An equally important object of self-execution is to put it beyond the 

power of the legislature to render it nugatory by passing restrictive 

laws.

Only such legislation is permissible as is in furtherance of the 

purpose, or as will facilitate the enforcement, of such provision, and 

legislation which will impair, limit or destroy rights granted by the 

provision is not permissible.

If a constitutional provision is self-enforcing . . . then any legislation 

respecting the provision must facilitate enforcement and not curtail 

or limit any right created and conferred by the provision. If a 

legislative act undertakes to limit the provisions of the Constitution, 

then in a contest, the Constitution survives and the act falls.

The power to impair would be the power to destroy.

(Alteration in original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted.)

¶40 The question thus becomes whether section 9(2)(a) is self-executing. A 

constitutional provision is self-executing when it appears to take immediate effect 

and no further action by the legislature is required to implement the right given. 
20

Developmental Pathways v. Ritter, 178 P.3d 524, 531 (Colo. 2008). “Constitutional 

provisions are presumed to be self-executing,” and “[t]his presumption is even 

more appropriate when considering initiated amendments.” Davidson v. 

Sandstrom, 83 P.3d 648, 658 (Colo. 2004).

¶41 Because section 9(2)(a) appears to take immediate effect and no further 

action by the legislature is required to implement it, we conclude that it is 

self-executing. Therefore, section 13-17-102(6) cannot be read as imposing a 

limitation on section 9(2)(a)’s applicability.

¶42 In reaching this conclusion, we are not persuaded by Watchdog’s argument 

that under section 1-45-111.5(2) of the FCPA, section 9(2)(a) requires an analysis of

whether attorney fees can be awarded against a pro se party. Section 1-45-111.5(2) 

provides, in pertinent part, “[N]o attorney fees may be awarded under this 

subsection (2) unless the court or hearing officer, as applicable, has first considered 

and issued written findings regarding the provisions of section 13-17-102(5) and 

(6).” (Emphasis added.) Here, however, the district court did not award attorney 

fees under section 1-45-111.5(2). Rather, the court awarded fees directly under

article XXVIII, section 9(2)(a) of the Colorado Constitution. Moreover, for the 

same reasons that section 13-17-102(6) cannot be construed to limit section 9(2)(a), 

section 1-45-111.5(2) cannot be construed as imposing a legislative limitation on 

that self-executing constitutional provision.
21

¶43 Accordingly, under the plain language of section 9(2)(a), Alliance and Jack, 

as the prevailing parties here, are entitled to an award of their reasonable attorney 

fees.

III. Conclusion

¶44 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that for purposes of the one-year 

statute of limitations set forth in article XXVIII, section 9(2)(a) of the Colorado 

Constitution, the “violation” that starts the time for filing a private enforcement 

action is the violation that the ALJ found and penalized in the decision to be 

enforced. Here, because that violation occurred, at the latest, on June 26, 2014, 

Watchdog’s enforcement action, which was not filed until September 15, 2015, was 

time-barred.

¶45 We further conclude that the fee-shifting provision in section 9(2)(a) is 

self-executing and therefore cannot be construed to be limited by section 

13-17-102(6). Accordingly, as the prevailing parties here, Alliance and Jack are

entitled to an award of the reasonable attorney fees that they incurred in the 

district and appellate courts in this case, and we remand the case with instructions 

that the matter be returned to the district court for a determination of the 

reasonable fees to be awarded.

¶46 The judgment is therefore reversed, and this case is remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.