2005 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

7-12-2005 

# T r an v . Atty Ge n U SA
P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t N o . 02-3879

F o l low thi s a nd a dd it ion al work s at : http://d i git alc ommon s .l a w . vi l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2005

Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sity S choo l of L a

w Di git al Re posit or y

. It h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2005 D e c i sion s b y a n author i z e d a dmini s tr at or of V i l l a no va U nive r sity S choo l of L a

w Di git al Re posit or y

. F or mor e inform at ion, p le as e c on t a ct Be n j amin
. C a rl s on@l a

w . vi l l a no va . e du

. Re c omme nde d C it at ion

" T r a n v . Atty Ge n U SA" (2005). 2005 D e cisio n s . P ape r 773. http://d i git alc ommon s .l a

w . vi l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2005/773Substi tuted pursuant to Fe d. R. App. P. 43(c). * P RE CE DE NT I AL UN I TED STATES CO UR T OF A PP EALS F O R T H E T H IR D C IR C U IT

____________________ N o. 02- 3879

____________________
S ON DUC T RA N,

P et i t i oner

v. AL BE RT O GONZ AL E S , AT T OR NE Y GE NE RA L OF T HE * U N I TED STA TES,

R es pondent

O n Pet i t i on forR evi ew of O r derof t he B o a rd o f Im m ig ra tio n A p p e a ls ( B oar d N o. A 28- 102- 920)

A r gued: A pr i l 18, 2004 B e f o re : R O T H , F U E N T E S , a n d B E C K E R , C i rcui tJud ges. ( Fi l ed: J ul y12, 2005)

RA L F D. WI E DE M ANN ( AR GUE D) K l as ko, R ul on, St ock & Sel t zer 1 8 0 0 Jo h n F

. K en n ed yB o u leva rd2 Sui t e 1700 Phi l adel phi a, PA 19103 A t t or ney f

orP et i t i oner PETE R D

. KEI SLER A s s i s t antA t t or neyG ener al , C i vi l D i vi s i on DO NA LD E. KEEN ER D eput yD i r ect or GR E G D. M AC K ( AR GUE D) Seni orL i t i gat i on C ouns el LI NDA S

. W ERNE RY J OHN M

. M c ADA M S , J R. U ni t ed St at es D epart m entof J us t i ce O ffi ce of I m m i gr at i on L i t i gat i on B en Fr ankl i n St at i on P. O

. B ox 878 W as hi ngt on, D C 20044 A t t or neys f

orR es pondent

_____ OPI NI ON O F THE COURT

B E C K E R , C i r cui tJudge

. S o n D u c T ran p eti ti o n s fo r re v iew o f an o rde r of the B o ard of I m m i gr at i on A ppeal s ( B I A ) or der i ng hi m depor t ed as an aggr avat ed fe l on. T r an pl ed guil tyi n a Penns y l vani a courtt o t he cr i m e of “ r eckl es s bur ni ng orexpl odi ng, ” w hi ch the B oar d found w as a cr i m e of vi ol ence under 18 U

. S. C

. § 16( b) , and ther efor e an agg ravat ed fe l on y su pp ort i ng rem ov al

. T ran ar gu es t hat, becau se t his cri m e requi red onlya reckl ess m ens r ea, and i nv olved no ri sk t ha t h e wou l d i n t e n t i o n a l l y u s e f o r c e i n t h e c o mmi s s i o n of t he crim e, i t w as n o t a crim e o f v iolen ce u n d er § 1 6 (b). O urr evi ew of t h e l anguage of § 16( b) , and of the ca s es i nt erpr et i ng i t , l eave s l i t t l e doubtt hata cr i m e w hos e mens r ea is “pur e” r eckl es s nes s i s nota cr i m e of vi ol ence fori m m i gr at i on purpos es . Sect i on 16( b) r equi r es a s ubs t ant i al r i s k t hatphy s i cal3 for ce w i l l be us ed aga i ns tt he per s on or pr oper t y of another

. Such a ri sk i s not s yno ny m ou s w i t h reckl essness : t he sub sta n tial ri sk r equi r ed i n § 16( b) i s a r i s k of t he us e of f or ce , n o t a ri sk o f in

jury t o pe r s o n s o rd a ma g e t o p r o p e r t y . As t h e u s e o f f o r c e r e qui r es in ten t, an d a s T ra n ra n n o r is k o f in ten tio n a llyu sin g f

o rc e in comm i t t i ng hi s cr i m e, he di d not comm i t a cr i m e of vi ol ence under § 1 6 ( b )

. We wi l l t h e r e f

o r e g r a n tt h e p e t i t i o n f

o rr e v i e w. I. T r an i s a nat i ve and c i t i zen of V i etnam. H e cam e t o t he U ni t ed St at es as a r efuge e i n February1989, fl eei ng m or t al danger in h is h o m e lan d

. H e b e c a m e a law f u l p e rm a n e n t re sid e n t in F eb rua ry1 9 9 1 , an d ea rne d a b a c h e lor’s de g ree fro m W estern M i c h i g a n Un i v e r s i t y i n 1 9 9 6 , wh e r e h e r e ma i n e d t o p u r s u e a P h

. D. in c h e m istr y . H is p a re n ts, siste rs, a n d b ro th e rs- in -la w a ll l iv e in M ich ig a n , an d h e d o e s n o t ap p e a r to h a v e a n y im m e d iate f a m ilyin Vi e t n a m. I n J anuaryof 1997, T r an re cei ved a cal l fr om a fr i end, w ho h a d s a v e d h i s l i f

e wh e n t h e ywe r e f

l e e i n g p e r s e c u t i o n i n Vi e t n a m, a sk in g f o r h is h e lp w ith a n u n sp e c if ied m a tter. T h e f

rie n d w a s in M ich ig a n , an d T ra n , w h o a lso liv e d in M ich ig a n , w a s te m p o ra rily i n B os t on at t he t i m e. T r an agr eed t o dr i ve t he fr i end’ s br ot herback t o M i chi gan t o hel p t he fr i end. W hen theyarr i ved i n M i chi gan, t he frien d told T ran that h e h ad k il led a n o th e r m a n in a f igh t ov er a w om an. T he I m m i gr at i on J udge (IJ ) des cr i bes t he eve nt s t hat fol l ow ed: [T]he fr i end w ant ed t o di s pos e of the b o d y in [ a] w ayt hatm ade i t l ook l i ke t he per s on w as ki l l ed i n an aut om obi l e acc i dent

. T he r es pondent[Tra n] di d not w a n t to b e in v o lv e d a n d s a id th a t h is o n ly i nvol vement w oul d be t o dr i ve the m an’s br ot her bac k t o Bos t o n , i f

t h a ts h o u l d b e n e c e s s a r y . T hey ended up goi ng i n a car and t he m an’ s br ot herdr ove t he ca r of t he vi ct i m w hi ch had t he body i n i tand s et it o n f ire o n th e w a yf

ro m M ich ig a n to B o sto n in E ri e, P en n sy lvan ia. T h e re sp o n d en t had alreadygone ahead, notknow i ng t hatt hi s i s exac t l yw her e the body w as g o ing t o be di s pos ed of a nd he l ookedThat judg e, the Honorable F red P. Anthony of the Court of 1 Common P leas of Erie County , explained that, in some 29 year s on the be nc h, heha d n e ve r b e fo rewritt e n s uc h a le tt er, as he g e ne rally supported depor

tation in such cases. He felt that Tra n’s ca se wa s unique, and c omm e nd e d T ra

n’ s p e nit e nc e fo r h is c ri meand hisre sp on sible c iti zen sh ip i n o ther re sp e c ts. 4 b ac k and s aw t he ca ron fi r e and the br ot herof t he perpetr at orrunni ng t o t he r es pondent ’ s car . T hey dr ove on t hen t o B os t on. A few day s l at er , T r an r etur ned t o h is f am i l yi n M i chi gan. T h e p o lice q u e stio n e d h im a b o u t th e m u rd e r, an d h e c o n f e ss e d to hi s i nvol vement
. H e coope r at ed ful l yw i t h t he pol i ce a nd t es t i fi ed against h is f

r i end i n a M i chi gan murde rt r i al

. H e w as not p ro se c u ted in M ich ig a n , an d se e m s to h a v e b e e n g ra n ted im m u n ity i n e x c h a n g e f

o rh i s t e s t i m o n y. S o m e tw o y e a rs late r, T ra n w a s told th a t h e w a s w a n ted in P e n n s y l v a n i a o n c h a r g e s r e l a t e d t o t h e d e s t ru c t i o n o f t h e b o d y . He w en t t o P en n sy lvan ia, w as set fre e on b o n d , an d ap p ea red fo r co u rt proceed i ng s. In O ct ob er 1999 , he p l ed g uil ty to several cri m es, i ncl udi ng cons pi r acy t o comm i t r eckl es s bur ni ng, and w as s ent ence d t o 6 t o 24 m ont hs i m pr i s onm ent
. H e s er ved s i x m ont hs atW aym ar tSt at e C or r ect i onal I ns t i tut i on, and w as par ol ed i n m i d2000. I n N ovember 2000, t he I m m i gr at i on and N atur al i zat i on S e rv ice (IN S ) iss u e d a N o tice to A p p e a r c h a rg in g T ra n w ith r e mo v a b i l i t ya s a n a g g r a v a t e d f e l o n pur s u a n tt o 8 U. S

. C. § 1227( a) ( 2) ( A ) ( i i i )

. T r an cont es t ed r emovabi li t yand appl i ed for wi t h h o l d i n g o f

r e mo v a l u n d e r8 U. S

. C. § 1 2 3 1 ( b ) ( 3 ) ( A)

. He pr es ent ed l et t er s of s uppor tfr om t he Penns y l van i a j udge w ho convi ct ed and s entenc ed hi m , t he s uper i nt endentof t he pr i s on 1 w h e r e h e s e r v e d h i s s e n t e n c e , a n d f r o m c l e r g y, p r o f

e s s o r s , f a m i l y, and fri end s. T he IJ foun d thatT ran’ s cr i m es di d n ot const i tute a g g ra v a ted f

e lo n ies u n d e r th e im m ig ra tio n law s, a n d th e re f o re h e ld that h e w as n o t rem o v ab le. T h e g o v ern m en t app ea led to the B o ard of Imm i gr at i on A ppeal s . T he B I A r ever s ed, fi ndi ng t hatt he I J had m isa p p lied th e law in f in d in g th a t th e c o n sp ira c yto c o m m it r eckl es s bur ni ng w as n o tan aggr avat ed fe l ony . I tal s o deni edPrior to the Real ID Act, our jurisdiction to re v iew orders of 2 removal for ag gravated fe lonies was limited. The statute granting us jurisdic tio n to re view imm igra tio n orde rs prov ide s that “ no c ourtshal l have jurisdiction to review any final o rd er of removal ag ainst an alien wh o is re mov a

ble b y re a so n o f h avin gc omm itt e d a c ri min a l of

fens e c ov e re d in sect ion

. . . 1 22 7( a)( 2) (A )( iii ). ” 8 U .S. C. § 12 52 (a)( 2) (C ) (1999). We did, however, “ha ve jurisdiction to consider our jurisdiction,” Singh v . A sh c ro ft , 383 F.3d 144, 150 ( 3d Cir. 2004) , that is, to decidewhether

the “jurisdictional fa cts” of § 1252( a)( 2)(C) were prese nt, Drake

s v. Zimski , 240 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2001). I f wefound that the re levant fa cts—i.e., that the petitioner was an alien and that he 5 T r an’ s pet i t i on forw i t hhol di ng of r emoval , fi ndi ng i ns uffi ci ent e v i d e n c e t h a th e f

a c e d s e r i o u s r i s k s i n r e tu r n i n g t o Vi e t n a m. T r an fi l ed a t i m el ypet i t i t i on forr evi ew chal leng ing t he B I A ’ s deci s i on t hathe i s an aggr avat ed fe l on. II. T he governm entcont ends t hatT r an i s rem ovabl e under 8 U

. S. C

. § 1227( a) ( 2) ( A ) ( i i i ) , w hi ch cl as s i fi es as r emovabl e “[ a] ny al i en w ho i s convi ct ed of a n aggr avat ed fe l onyatan y ti m e af t er a d mi s s i o n . ” Th e t e r m “ a g g r a v a t e d f e l o n y ” i s d e f

i n e d b y8 U. S

. C. § 1101( a) ( 43) ; t he t er m i ncl udes “a c r i m e of vi ol ence ( as defi ned i n s ect i on 16 of Ti t l e 18, butnoti ncl u d ing a pur el ypol i t i cal o f f e n s e ) f o r w h ic h th e te rm o f

im p ri s o n m e n t [ is ] a t le a s t o n e y e a r.” 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1 1 0 1 (a)(43 )(F). T h e g o v ern m e n t co n tend s tha t T ran ’s Penns y l vani a cr i m e w as a cr i m e of vi ol ence under18 U

. S. C

. § 16, a n d t h u s q u a l i f

i e s a s a n a g g r a v a t e d f

e l o n y. W e have j ur i s dict i on overT r an’ s pet i t i on forr evi ew pur s uantt o 8 U

. S. C

. § 1252( a) ( 1)

. T he re cent R eal I D A ctcl ar i fi es t hatourj ur i s di ct i on ext ends t o “ques t i ons of l aw rai s ed upon a pet i t i on for r evi ew , ” i ncl udi ng pet i t i ons for r evi ew of rem o val o rd e r s b a s e d o n a g g ra v a te d f e lo n yc o n v ic tio n s . See R eal I D A ct § 1 0 6 (a)(1)(A )(i ii ), P u b

. L

. N o . 1 0 9 -13 , 1 1 9 S tat
. 2 3 1 , 3 1 0 (20 0 5 ), to b e codi

f i ed at 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1 25 2(a) (2) (D ). W e are thu s fr ee to c o n sid e r T ra n ’s p u re lyle g a l cla im th a t h is c rim e w a s n o t, i n f a c t, a n a g g ra v a te d f

e lo n yu n d e r t h e re le v a n t la w . See Papageor gi ou v. G onz al es , N o . 0 4 -31 3 5 , — F

. 3 d

— , 2 0 0 5 W L 1 4 9 0 4 5 4 , * 2 (3d C ir

. Ju n e 2 4 , 2 0 0 5 ). 2had c o mm itte d

ane numer ate d

o f f e n s e

— w e r e p r e s e nt, th e nw e wer e obligated to dismiss the petition for lac k of j urisdiction. I f, on the other h an d , w e f

o un d th at th e un d e rl yi n gc ri m e w a s n o tana g gr av at e d f e l o ny, weha d ju

ri sdic tio n o ve r t

hepe tit io n. W hi lethestatut or y me c ha nis m differed, the e nd result was the same: weare , and we re, f reeto consider a pe tit ion e r’ s legal

c l a i m s th ath i s c ri m e w a s n o t ana g gr av at e d f e l o ny, but w e are , a

nd were , wi tho ut jurisdic tio n to re c on sid e r t heB IA’ s factual finding s. See generally Papageorgiou, 2005 WL1490454, at *2. 6 I n S in g h v . A sh c ro

ft , 3 8 3 F

. 3 d 1 4 4 ( 3 d Ci r . 2 0 0 4 ) , we canva s s ed ourpr ece dent s t o det er m i ne the def er enc e due t o t he B I A ’ s i nt erpr et at i on and a p pl i cat i on of t he aggr avat ed fe l ony s ta tu te
. See 3 8 3 F .3 d a t 1 5 0 -1 5 2 . W h ile th e r e w e “ e x p re ss ly r es er ve[d] deci s i on on w hethers om e B I A i nt erpr et at i ons of § 1101( a) ( 43) ar e ent i t l ed t o defe r ence , ” id

. at 1 5 2 , the p arti es h ere are i n ag reem ent that no defe rence i s d ue, and t hat ou r r eview i s de novo . W e w i l l conducts uch a de novo r evi ew , m i ndful t h at t he sta tu te a t issu e h e re is n o t th e Im m ig ra tio n a n d N a tu ra liza tio n A c t, butr athert he cr i m i nal pr ovi s i ons of Ti t l e 18 o f t he U ni t ed St at es C ode. T he i nt erpr et at i on of cr i m i nal s t at u te s i s a t as k out s i de the B IA ’s s p e c ial c o m p e ten c e a n d c o n g re ss io n a l d e leg a tio n , w h ile it is v e ry m u c h a p a rt o f

th is C o u rt ’s c o m p e te n c e . See Franc is v. R eno , 2 6 9 F

. 3 d 1 6 2 , 1 6 8 (3d C ir

. 2 0 0 1 ). II I. T r an pl ed gui l t yt o t hr ee c r im es : hi nder i ng appr ehens i on, abu si ng a corpse, and cri m i nal conspir acyt o co m m i treckl ess b u rn in g o r e x p lo d in g . H in d e rin g a p p re h e n sio n is pr o h ib ited b y1 8 P a . C o n s. S tat. § 5105, w hi ch def

i nes t he cr i m e t o i ncl ude harbor i ng, conce al i ng, orai di ng anotherper s on “w i t h i nt entt o hi n d er the appr ehens i on, p ro s e c u tio n , c o n v ic tio n o r p u n is h m e n t o f a n o th e r f

o r [ a ] c ri m e .” Th e I NS a r g u e d b e fo r e t he I mmi g r a t i o n J u d g e t h a tt h i s c r i me c o n stitu tes a n “ o f

f e n se re latin g to o b stru c tio n o f ju stic e ,” w h ich is an ag g rav ate d f

e lo n yu n d er 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1 1 0 1 (a)(43 )(S). T h e IJ r ej ect ed t hi s ar gum ent , ci t i ng In re Esp i no za , 22 I

. & N

. D ec. 889 ( BI A 19 9 9 ) , f

o rt h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t“ o b s t ru c t i o n o f j u s t i ce” o ff en ses m us ti nt er fer e w i th ongo ing jud ici al pro ce ed ing s. T h e B IA decl i ned t o addr es s t hi s i s s ue on appea l , and the governm entdoesConspiracy to commit an ag gravated fe lony is itself an 3 ag gravated fe lony

. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (43)(U). We there foreproce ed as tho ugh T ra

n h a d b e e n c onvic te d o f t hesubstanti veof

fens e of re c kle ss burning , though in f

ac t he pled only

to conspirac y

to commit that offe nse. 7 notr ai s e i ther e. Si m i l ar l y , T r an’ s pl ea t o abus i ng a corps e, i n vi ol at i on of 18 Pa. C ons . St at
. § 5510, i s not befor e us. T he IJ found t hat i tw as not an aggr avat ed fe lon y , an d t he B I A di d notdi s turb t hi s fi ndi ng on a p p e a l. T h e o n lyc rim e th a t is befor e us is T r an’ s convi ct i on for cons pi r acyt o comm i tr eckl es s b u rning orexpl odi ng. C r i m i nal cons pi r acyi s defi ned by18 Pa. C ons . St at
. § 903, a t r adi t i onal cons pi r acys t atut e. R eckl es s bur ni ng orexpl odi ng i s pr ohi bi t ed by 3 18 Pa. C ons . St at
. § 3301, a s ect i on ent i t l ed “A r s on and r el at ed o f f e n se s” a n d c o m p risin g s e v e ra l d istin c t cr im e s. T h e c rim e to w hich T ran pl ed is defined as fo l l ow s: (d ) R e c k le s s b u r n in g o rex p lo d in g .— A per s on comm i t s a fe l onyof t he thi r d d egre e i f he i nt ent i onal l y start s a fi r e orcaus es an expl os i on, or if h e a id s, c o u n se ls, p a y s o r a g re e s to p a ya n o th e r to c a u s e a f

i r e o re x p l o s i o n , w h e t h e ro n h i s o wn pr oper t yoron t hat o f another , and ther eby r e c k l e s s l y: ( 1) pl ace s an uni nhabi t ed bui l di ng orunoccupi ed s t ructur e of a n ot heri n dangerof damage or des t ruct i on; or ( 2) pl ace s anyper s onal pr oper t yof anotherhavi ng a val ue t hatexceed s $ 5 , 000 ori f t he pr oper t yi s an au tom o b il e, airp lane , m o torcy cle, m o torboatorother m ot or - pr opel l ed vehi cl e i n dangerof damage or des t ruct i on. 1 8 P a . C o n s . S ta t. § 3 3 0 1 (d ). T he g ov ernm ent cont end s tha t th i s defi nit i on descri bes a cr i m e of vi ol enc e. F o rfede r al i m m i gr at i on purpos es , a cr i m e of viol ence is :In Singh , we also concluded that the fo r mal c ateg orical approa ch 4 does not bar us f

rom consi deringwhich numbered subsec tion of a criminal statute the pe titioner has violated. See383 F.3d at 162. Thus our inquiryis whether t h e co n d u ct co v er ed bysubsection 3301(d)( 2)—intentionally starting a fire , on one’s own property or that of anothe r, an d thereby

rec klessly

placingcer

tain personal property

of another in dang er of destruction—is a crime of violence , not whether any conduct covered by section 3301 is such a crime. Se eals o United States v. Remoi , 404 F.3d 789, 793 ( 3d Cir. 2005). 8 ( a) a n offe ns e thathas as an el ement t he us e, at t empt ed us e, ort hrea t ened us e of phy s i cal for ce agai ns tt he per s on orpr oper t yof another ; or (b ) a n yo th e r o f

f e n se th a t is a fe lo n y a n d th a t, b yits natur e, i nvol ves a s ubs t ant i al r i s k t hatphy s i cal for ce agai ns tt h e p e r s o n o rp r o p e r t yo f a n o t h e rma ybe us ed i n t he cour s e of c om m i t t i ng t he off ens e. 18 U

. S. C

. § 16. T h e g o v ern m en t, as i t m u st, arg u es t h at sec ti o n 3 3 0 1 (d)(2 ), o n its fa ce , co n sti tutes a c ri m e o f v iolen ce

— n o t th at T ran ’s co n d u ct, as p ro v ed b yex tr insic ev iden ce , fa ll s u n d er § 1 6 ’s s t r i ctur es . T hati s beca us e the l anguage of § 16 “r equi r es us t o l ook t o t he el ement s and t he nat ur e of t he offens e of c onvi ct i on, r ather t han t o t he par t i cul ar fac t s r el at i ng t o pet i t i oner ’ s cr i m e. ” Leocal v. A sh c ro ft , — U

. S. — , 125 S. C t
. 377, 381 ( 2004)

. W e have r efe r r ed t o t hi s r equi r ement as t he “form al cat egor i cal appr oach” of Tayl or v. U ni t ed Stat es , 4 9 5 U .S . 5 7 5 (1 9 9 0 ). See Si ngh , 383 F. 3d at147. 4
I V. O u r q u e stio n , the n , is sim p lyw h e th e r th e P e n n sy lv a n ia cr i m e of r eckl es s bur ni ng or expl odi ng i s cat egor i cal l y a cr i m e of vi ol ence under18 U

. S. C

. § 16. A. N ei t herpar t ynow cont ends t hatr eckl es s bur ni ng fal l s under § 16( a) , w hi ch r equi r es t he “us e” o f “phy s i cal for ce” agai ns tt he p e rso n or propert yof an other

. T he reckles s burni ng st atute cri m i nali zes t he act of i ntent i on al l yst art i ng a fi re w i t h a reckles sThe Parson panel wa s ultim ately co ncer ned with the 5 interpre tation of what is now United States SentencingGuidelines § 4B1.2( a), but it first dealt with the prelimi nary question whether

that 9 m ens r ea regar ding dam age to t he p ropertyof an other

. 18 P a. C on s. S tat. § 3 3 0 1 (d )(2 ). T h e f irst e lem e n t o f

th e c rim e , inte n tio n a lly sta rtin g a f

ire o n o n e ’s o w n p ro p e rty o r th a t o f a n o th e r, d o e s n o t in i t s el f nec es s i t at e the us e of phy s i cal for ce a gai nst the pr oper t yof a n o th e r. O n e m ig h t m a k e th e a rg u m e n t th a t re c k les sly damagi ng ( or r i s ki ng damage t o) t he pr oper t y of another , t he s econd e l ement of s ect i on 3301, cons t i tut es us i ng for ce a gai ns tt he pr opertyof an o ther, an d thu s q u ali fies a s a c ri m e o f v iolen ce u n d er § 1 6 (a). In Leocal , supra , the S u p re m e C o u rt re se r v e d ju d g m e n t o n th is qu est i on , decidi ng on l yt hat “[t ]he keyph ras e i n § 16 (a)

— t he ‘use

. . . o f phy s i cal for ce a gai ns tt he per s on orpr oper t yof another ’

— m os tnatur al l ys ugges t s a hi gher d egre e of i nt entt han n e g lig e n t o r m e re lya c c id e n tal c o n d u c t.” 1 2 5 S . C t. at 3 8 2 . T h is lan g u a g e lea v e s o p e n th e d o o r f o r a n a r g u m e n t th a t reckl ess co n d u ct qu ali fies a s the “u se o f f o rce . ” B u t neither the B IA ’s d e c isio n n o r th e g o v e rn m e n t’s a rg u m e n t b e f o re u s ra is e d th is c o n t enti on

— bo t h rel i ed inst ead o n § 16 (b)

— and w e con si der it w ai ved. T h a t sa id , w e m u st n o n e th e les s a d d re ss th e iss u e b e c a u se its reso luti o n is essen ti al to ou r d iscu ssion o f § 1 6 (b). O u r ow n C o u rt has s t at ed unequi vocal l y t hat t he “us e of phy s i cal for ce” u n d er § 1 6(a) requi res speci fi c i ntent ; reckl essness w i l l no tsuffice. “U se of phy s i cal for ce i s an i nt ent i onal act , and ther efor e the fi r s tpr ong of [§ 16] r equi r es s peci fi c i ntent t o us e for ce. ” U ni t ed Stat es v. P ars on , 955 F. 2d 858, 866 ( 3d C i r . 1992)

. T he B I A hel d, and the g o v e rn m e n t n o w a rg u e s, th a t P ars on is no t con tr o ll ing h ere beca us e i t s hol di ng co n cer ned the U ni t ed St at es Sent enci ng G ui del i nes and not§ 16. W e ac kno w ledg e t hatot hercour t s have r efe r r ed t o our di s cus s i on of § 16 i n P ars on as “di ct a, ” s ee U ni t ed St at es v. G onz al ez - Lopez , 3 3 5 F .3 d 7 9 3 , 7 9 7 (8 th C ir. 2 0 0 3 ); P ark v . I NS , 2 5 2 F

. 3 d 1 0 1 8 , 1 0 2 3 (9th C ir

. 2 0 0 1 ). Ind ee d , o u r ow n C o u rt m ayhave i m pl i ed as m uch i n Fr ancis v. R eno , 269 F. 3d 162, 173- 7 4 (3 d C ir . 2 0 0 1 ). A s w e expl ai n i n t he mar gi n, w e ar e not co n v i nced that P ars on ’ s i nt erpr et at i on of § 16 i s di ctum . A tal l eve n ts, w e nee d 5Guidelines sec tion wa s a per missibl e expansion of the statutory definition of a “crime of

violence”in § 16. See 955 F.2d at 866-67. Our interpre tation of § 16 wa s a prerequisite to our f inal conclusion that Guide lin e s § 4B 1. 2( a) w a s v a lid ; th us , th at inte rp re tatio n w ou ld s e e m to bepa rt of theho ldi ngrather t

ha n dic tum
. Fran c is did indeeddecline to draw c onclusions about § 16(b) from our discussion of § 4B1.2( a) in Parson , noting that the languag e of the two provisions diffe rs, and that the Sente ncingGuidelines are concerned w ith conduct rather than w ith the cate go rical approa ch require d under § 16(b). While our discussion of th e S entenc ing Guidelines in Parson is irreleva nt here , our discussion o f § 16(b) was nece ssary to our hol ding in Parson and is quite re levant in this case. The fa c t th at Parson int e rp re te d § 16 in t heSe ntenc ingGuide lin e s c onte xt, while we now interpre t it in the immigration c ontext , does no tp re vent our interpretation of § 16 in that ca se from binding us now. 10 no t decide t hat qu est i on , becau se w e are sat i sfi ed th a t P a rs on ’s requi rem ent of speci fi c i ntent un der § 16(a) i s corr ectand t hat “use of phy s i cal for ce i s an i nt ent i onal act
. ” P ars on , 9 5 5 F .2 d a t 8 6 6

. T h e v erb “u se” m ea n s “[ t] o m ak e use o f; to co n v ert t o o n e’s se rv ice ; to e m p lo y ; to a v a il o n e se lf o f; to u til ize ; to c a rryo u t a purpos e oract i on bym eans of; t o puti nt o ac ti o n ors er vi ce, es peci al l y t o at t ai n an end. ” B l ack’s La w D i ct i on ary 1541 ( 6t h ed. 1990)

. T he O xf

or d E ngl is h D i ct i onar

y d e f in e s th e v e rb to m e a n , in i t s m os tcomm on us ages , “[ t ] o m ake us e of ( s om e i m m at er i al t hi ng) as a means ori ns t rum ent ; to em pl oyfora ce r t ai n end or p u rpo se,” “ [t]o e m p loy o r m ak e u se o f (a n arti cle, etc. ), esp . fo r a pr ofi t abl e end orpurpos e; t o ut i l i ze, tur n t o acc ount , ” or“[t ] o w or k, empl oy , orm a n age ( an i m pl ement , i ns t rum ent , et c. ) ; t o m ani pul at e, oper at e, orhandl e, es p. t o s om e us eful or d esi r ed end. ” O xf ord E ngl is h D i ct i onar

y 3 5 7 4 (co m p ac t ed. 1 9 7 1 ) ( s . v. “ u s e , v. ,” defi ni t i ons 7a, 8a, 9a)

. T hes e defi ni t i ons s how an ob v ious co m m o n ali ty : th e “ u se” o f f o rc e m ea n s m o re tha n the m ere occurr ence of for ce; i tr equi r es t he i nt ent i onal empl oy m ent of t hat for ce, gener al l yt o obt ai n s om e end. T he pl ai n l anguage of t he s t atut e ther efo re co m pel s t he concl us i on t hatt he “us e” of for ce r equi r es s peci fi c i nt entt o empl oy for ce, and notm er e r eckl es s nes s as t o caus i ng har m . I n U ni t ed St at es v. Tri ni dad-A qui no , 2 5 9 F

. 3 d 1 1 4 0 , 1 1 4 5 & n . 2 (9th C ir

. 2001) , t he N i nt h C i r cui t ci t ed si m i l ar defi ni t i ons of t he w or d “us e” to co n clud e tha t th e w o rd “ co n tai n [s] a v o li ti o n al req u ir em en t. ” ItIn United States v. Nason , 2 69 F .3 d 1 0 ( 1s t Cir . 2 00 1) , th e F ir st 6 Circ uit c on sid e re d th e imp or

t of an ana log ou s p ro vis ion , 1 8 U .S. C. § 922(g )(8) (C)(ii), whic h also implicated the “use of physical force.” Nason ha d been c onvict ed o f assault under Maine la w, def ined as “intentionally , knowing ly , or reck lessly caus[ing] b o dily

injury or offe nsive phy sical contact to anoth er.” Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 20 7 ( 1 ) ( e mp h a s i s a d d e d)

. T h e F i r s tC i r c u i td e c l ar e d th atthi s leg islation “unambiguously involves the us e of physical force.” Nason , 269 F.3d at 20. Whil e that Court’s ruminations are less than pellucid, we c on je c ture tha

t it reache d it s d e te rm inatio n b a se d n ot o n a lin guis tic dissection of the statute but on a MaineSupreme Court opinion g lossing it t o requi re “u seof

un lawf ul f orc e a g a ins t ano ther c a

us ingbo dily injury .” Id

. (qu o t i n g Sta tev . Grif fin , 459 A.2d 1086, 1091 (Me. 1983)). At all e ve nts , to thee xtent th at th e F ir st Ci rcuit’ s c on c lus ion is coter minous with the Ninth C i rc uit’s decision that rec klessness ca n sufficefor the useof force, w e (ag ain) disagree . This conclusion is buttressed by the fa ct that § 16(a) cover s not 7 me re ly theus e of phy sic a l f

orc e , b ut also the atte mpt e d or thre ate ne d u se of such f orce . As we rece ntly stated, in discussing a New Y ork commonlaw atte mpt

c ri me , “ thec on c ept o f a n atte mpt e d re c kle ssn e ss cri meis nonsensical.” Kna

pik v . A sh c ro

ft , 384 F.3d 84, 91 (3d Cir. 2004) . I f one can attempt to use force , it stands to reason that the use of forc e re quires so me thi ngmore tha

n merere c kle ssn e ss.

11 t hus excl uded the pos s i bi l i t yof negl i gent u se o f for ce, but nonet hel es s hel d t hatr eckl e s s n e s s

— th a ti s , “cons ci ous di s r egar d of a r i s k of a ha r m t hatt he de fe ndanti s aw ar e of, ” id

. at 1 1 4 6

— sa ti s f

ies th is v o lit io n a l re q u ire m e n t. W e re sp e c tf u lly 6 di s agr ee. A s t he Supr eme C our ts ai d i n Leocal , “ ‘ u s e ’ r e q u i r es a c t i ve empl oy m ent
. ” 125 S. C t
. at382 ( emphasi s added)

. T he ac ti v e empl oy m entof for ce, gener al l yt o achi eve s om e end, corr espon ds cl osel yt o the con c e p tof int ent, no treckl essness . In ten t m e a n s a “ [ a ] sta te o f m in d in w h ich a p e rso n se e k s to acc om pl i s h a gi ven re s ul t t hr ough a cour s e of a ct i on. ” B l ack’s Law D i ct i on ary 810 ( 6t h ed. 1990)

. T he i dea of purpos efu l act i on, of act i vel yempl oy i ng a m eans t o achi eve a n end, i s an es s ent i al component of bot h “u se” and “i nt ent , ” and i s abs entfr om t he conce ptof “r eckl es s nes s . ” W e the r efor e hol d t hatt he “us e of for ce” i n § 16( a) r equi r es s peci fi c i nt entt o us e for ce. 7The g overnment c ites dicta in Francis v. Reno , 269 F.3d 162 ( 3d 8 Cir. 2001), to support the proposition that rec klessness may sufficefor a § 16(b) crime. In Fran c is we he ld that a Pennsylvania co nv iction for vehicular h o m i ci d e, a misdeme anor requiringa mens re a of c riminal n e g li g e n c e , d i d

n o tc o n s t i tut e a

c ri m e o f v i o l e n c e un d e r

§ 1 6 (b )

. We no te d th e retha

t, alth ou gh thePe nn sylva

nia c ourt s h a d s pe c if

ic a lly he ld that Francis’s crime require d only neg lige nce, the B IA had f ound that he 12 B. O nce w e concl ude t hat t he “us e of phy s i cal for ce” i n § 16( a) r equi r es s peci fi c i nt ent , our i nt erpr et at i on of § 16( b) i s det er m i ned byt he l anguage of t he s t atut e and by our pr ece dent s . Sect i on 16( b) cov ers any fel on y“t hat, byi t s nat ure, i nv olves a s ub st anti al ri sk t hatphy s i cal for ce a gai ns tt he per s on or pr oper t yof anotherm aybe us ed i n t he cour s e of comm i t t i ng t he offe ns e. ” G i ven the def i ni t i on of us e of phy s i cal for ce r eac hed above , w e ca n onl y concl ude that § 1 6 (b ) c rim e s a re th o se ra isin g a su b sta n tial risk th a t th e a c to r w ill in ten tio n a lly us e for ce i n t he fur t her ance of t he off ens e. P ars on is e x p licit o n th is p o in t: U s e of phy s i cal force i s an i nt ent i onal act , and t herefore [§ 1 6(a) ] r equ i res speci fi c i ntentt o u se for ce. A s t o [§ 16(b) ] , a defenda nt ’ s comm i s s i on of a cr i m e t hat , by i t s natur e, i s l i kel y t o r equi re f o rce sim ilarlysu g g e sts a w ill in g n e ss to risk h a v in g to c o m m it a c ri m e o f

s p e c if ic in te n t. F o r e x a m p le , a bur gl arof a dw el l i ng r i s ks havi ng t o us e for ce i f t he occupa nt s ar e home and hea r th e burgl ar . I n s uch a cas e, t he bur gl ar has a mens r ea l egal l ynear l yas bad as a s peci fi c i nt entt o us e for ce , fo r he ors he r eckl es s l yri sk s havi ng t o comm i ta s peci fi c i nt ent cr i m e. 955 F. 2d at866. I n P ars on , w e w ent on t o contr as tt he r equi r ement of § 16( b) , i n w hi ch the ac t orruns a ri sk o f i nt ent i onal l yus i ng for ce, w it h t he l ow erm ens r ea thatw e cha r act er i zed a s “‘ pur e’ r eckl es s nes s . ” Id

. W e not ed t hat cr i m es l i ke r eckl es s endange r i ng and drunk dr i vi ng, t hough t hey inv o lve a s er i ous r i s k of i nj ur i ng ot her s , do noti nvol ve anyr i s k of i nt ent i onal har m or us e of for ce. Id

. 8a c t e d r e c k l e s s l y . 2 6 9 F

. 3 d

at1 7 3

. T h i s , w e h e l d , w a s e r r o r : th e B IA sh ou ld h ave ap pli e d th e c ate g oric a l a pp ro a c h, and

c on sid e re d o nly Francis’s c rime of c onviction (neg lige nce) rathe r th an i t s own view of his underlying c onduct (re cklessness) . We stated that “re cklessness wa s not charg ed, and [Francis] w as not c onvicted of an offe nse re quiringthat mens rea .” Id. We do not takethi s la

nguag e to d e c idethat r e c kle ssn e ss w ou ld sufficefor a

§ 16(b) c rime; indeed, g iven the pre cedent of Pa r s on , the Fran c is p an e l w as fo re cl o s edfr o ms o d ec i d i n g. In s t ea d , th i s l an gu age from Fran c is i n d i cate s only that the B IA er

red in failing to follow the cate g orical approa ch, and that the proper question was whether Francis’s neg lige nce constituted a crime of violenceunder § 16(b). Of c ourse, we held, it did not. Id . at 174-75. 13 O urconcl us i on i n P ars on g a i n s s u p p o r t f r o m t h e S u p r e me C our t ’ s r ece ntdeci s i on i n Leocal . T h e C o u rt d isc u ss e d § 1 6 (b ) in t er m s t hatecho ourdi s cus s i on i n P ars on : [ S e c tio n 1 6 (b )] s im p ly c o v e rs o f f e n se s th a t n a tu ra lly i nvol ve a pe r s on act i ng i n d i s r egar d of t he r i s k t hat p hy si cal force m i gh t be used agai nst ano t her in c o m m itt in g a n o f

f e n se . T h e re c k les s d isre g a rd in § 16 r el at es nott o t he gene r al co n d uctort o t he p o ssibil ity that h arm w il l r esu ltfro m a p erso n ’s conduct , butt o t he r i s k t hat t he us e of phy s i cal for ce agai ns tanot herm i ghtb e requi r ed i n comm i t t i ng a crim e. T h e c lassic ex am p le i s b u rglary

. A b u rglary w oul d be cove r ed under§ 16( b) notbeca us e the offe ns e ca n be com m i t t ed i n a gener al l yr eckl es s w ay or becau se som eon e m aybe inj ured, bu tbecau se bu rgl ary , byi t s nat ure, i nv olves a sub st anti al ri sk th a t th e b u rg lar w ill u se f o rc e a g a in s t a v ictim in compl et i ng t he cr i m e. 1 2 5 S

. C t. at 38 2 -38 3 (fo o tno te om itted). In a f o o tno te, the C o u rt w as even mor e expl i ci tt hat“[t ] he ‘ s ubs t ant i al r i s k’ i n § 16( b) relates to the u se o f f

o rce , n o t t o th e p o s s ib le e ff ec t of a p erso n ’s conduct , ” and dr ew t he s ame di s t i nct i on t hatw e di d i n P ars on b e t wee n t h e r i s k o f us e of f or ce i n § 16( b) and the di s t i nctr i s k of i n j ur y in U n it ed S tat es S en tenc ing G u idelines § 4 B 1

. 2 (a)(2).14 Leocal , 1 2 5 S . C t. at 3 8 3 n .7 ; see al so P ars on , 955 F. 2d at866. T hr ee otherC our t s of A ppeal s have fol l ow ed the appr oach of P ars on , w h ic h w e r e a f f ir m to d a y . S e e J

o b so n v . A sh c ro

ft , 326 F .3 d 3 6 7 , 3 7 2 -7 3 (2 d C ir. 2 0 0 3 ); U nit ed S t ates v. C ha

pa -G a rza , 24 3 F

. 3d 92 1, 92 5-27 (5t h C i r. 20 01 ); Ba z a n - Re y e s v . I NS , 256 F. 3d 600, 610- 11 ( 7t h C i r . 2001)

. Four ot her s have notr equi r ed s p e c if ic in te n t to q u a lif

y a s a § 1 6 (b ) c ri m e o f

v io le n c e . See O m ar v . I NS , 2 9 8 F .3 d 7 1 0 , 7 1 5 -1 6 ( 8 th C ir. 2 0 0 2 ); P ark , 252 F. 3d at 1 0 2 3 -2 4 ; T

a p i a Ga r c i a v . I

NS , 2 3 7 F

. 3 d 1 2 1 6 , 1 2 2 2 (1 0 th C ir

. 2 0 0 1 ); Le v. U

ni t ed St at es A t t or ney G ener al , 196 F. 3d 1352, 1354 ( 11t h C i r . 1999)

. T he appr oache s of t he E i ght h, T en th, and E l eventh C i r cui t s di d notr equi r e eve n a r eckl es s m ens r ea t o m eet t he § 16( b) s t andar d, and thus have be en abr ogat ed, atl eas tt o t hat e x t e n t , b y Leocal

. Comp a r e Le ocal , 1 2 5 S . C t. a t 3 8 2 -8 3 , w ith O m ar , 2 9 8 F .3 d a t 7 1 5 -1 6 , T ap i a G arc ia , 2 3 7 F .3 d a t 1 2 2 2 , and Le , 1 9 6 F .3 d a t 1 3 5 4 . T h e N in th C irc u it’s a p p ro a c h re lies o n its hol di ng t hatt he “us e of f or ce” r equi r ement of § 16( a) m aybe s a tis f ie d b ya re c k le s s m e n s re a , see P ark , 2 5 2 F

. 3 d a t 1 0 2 4 ; we have r ej ect ed t hi s concl us i on bot h i n P ars on , 955 F. 2d at 866, and a t g re a te r l e n g th in P a rt IV .A , supra . W e t h us concl ude, fol l ow i ng P ars on and Leocal , tha t a cr i m e of vi ol ence under § 16( b) m us t i nvol ve a s ubs t ant i al r i s k t hat th e a c to r w ill in ten tio n a llyu se p h y sic a l f o r c e in c o m m itt in g h is cr i m e. C. I tr emai ns forus t o deci de w hetherT r an’ s cr i m e of convi ct i on, on i t s fac e, i nvol ves s uch a r i s k of i nt ent i onal l yus i ng f o rc e in th e c o m m iss io n o f th e c rim e . W e h o ld th a t itd o e s n o t. T ran inten ti o n all ystart ed a f ir e, b u t o f co u rse st arti n g a f ir e i s not i n i t s el f a cr i m e, m uch l es s a cr i m e of vi ol ence . T he s econd, di s pos i t i ve el ement of hi s cr i m e i s t he r eckl es s endange r i ng of t he pr oper t yof another

. T hi s el ement , on i t s fac e, i nvol ves a s ubs t ant i al r i s k of ca us i ng i nj ur yt o t he pr oper t yof another

. B uti tdoes not i nvol ve a s ubs t ant i al ris k of us i ng f or ce agai ns tt he pr oper t yof a n o th e r. T h e su b sta n tial risk in v o lv e d in th e P e n n sy lv a n ia s tatu te i s t he r i s k t hat the fi r e s t ar t ed byt he off enderw i l l s pr ead a nd damage t he pr oper t y of another

. T hi s r i s k cannot be s ai d t o i nvol ve t h e i n t e n t i o n a l u s e o f f

o r c e , a s r e q u i r e d b y P ars on . T he s t atut e does notcont empl at e a r i s k t hat t he r eckl es s - bur ni ng offe nderw i l l s t ep15 i n and comm i tan i nt ent i onalactof v i olence; i nst ead, the o nlyri sk i s t hathi s i ni t i al r eckl es s actw i l l caus e fur t herdamage. T r an’ s couns el ci t es s ever al exampl es of act i ons t hatm i ght q u a l i f ya s r e c k l e s s b u r n i n g o re x p l o d i n g u n d e rP e n n s y l v a n i a l a w. “A per s on s et t i ng fi r e t o a pi l e of l eave s i n hi s orhery ar d, pl ace d cl ose t o a neighbo r’ s car” w ou l d qu al i fy , as w ou l d o ne w ho “set [s] off fi recr ackers or s parkl ers near a gas st at i on . ” S uch reckl ess a c tio n s a re lik e lyto c a u se h a rm in m a n yc a se s, a n d P e n n sy lv a n ia cert ai n lyhas an i nt er es ti n puni s hi ng t hem. B utt heyar e nott he ki nd o f “v iol ent , act i ve cr i m es , ” Leocal , 125 S. C t
. at383, t hat q u a lifya s c rim e s o f v io len c e u n d e r § 1 6

. N e e d les s to sa y , the f a c ts o f t h i s c a s e a r e v e r yd i f

f e r e n tf r o m th e s e h yp o t h e t i c a l s . Bu twe r ei t er at e t h a twe a r e l i mi t e d t o d e c i d i n g whe th e rTr a n ’ s c r i me of c o n v ictio n is a c rim e o f v io len c e o n it s f

a c e , n o t w h e th e r h is c o n d u c t w a s in f

a c t v io le n t. See Leoc al , 125 S. C t
. at381. T he gover nm ent , l i ke the B I A , r el i es on t he B I A pr ece dent of I n r e Pal aci os , 22 I

. & N

. D ec. 434 ( B I A 1998) , w hi ch hel d t hat fi r s t
- degr ee a r s on underA l as ka l aw cons t i tut ed a c r i m e of vi ol ence under§ 16( b)

. T he A l as ka s t atut e cr i m i nal i zed i nt ent i onaldamage t o pr oper t ybyfi r e t hat r eckl es s l y pl ace s another per s on i n danger o f s e ri o u s p h y s ic a l in

ju ry. See 22 I

. & N

. D ec. at 435. T h e B IA held t hat “ar son in t he fir stdeg ree, byi ts v e ry n a ture, requi res a s ubs t ant i al r i s k of phy s i cal for ce a gai n st anot herper s on or pr oper t y . ” Id

. at 437. B ut i t s anal y s i s w as l i m i t ed t o i t s concl us i on th a t
t he i nt ent i onal s t ar t i ng of a f i r e o rcaus i ng an exp l o s i o n o r d i n a r i l ywou l d l e a d t o t h e s u b s t a n t i al risk o f d a m a g in g p ro p e rtyo f

a n o th e r. N o t o n lyis t her e a r i s k t o i t ems bel o n g ing t o ot her s t hatar e on ori n t he pr oper t y , i

. e. , s uch as i t ems l efti n a s t or e, t her e al w ay s exi s t s t he r i s k t hatt he fi r e w i l l s pr ead b e yo n d t h e o r i g i n a l i n t e n d e d p r o p e r t y. I d. T hus t he B I A di d n o t conduct t he i nqui r y , m andat ed by P ars on and Leocal , into w h e th e r th e A las k a a rso n sta tu te nece s s ar i l yinv o lve d a s ubs t ant i al r i s k of us i ng f or ce . In ste a d , it m er el yas s um ed thata s ubs t ant i al r i s k of da m a g in gp ro p e rty s at i s fi ed t he r equi r ement s of § 16( b)

. I n ourC i r cu it , t hat16 a s s u m p t i o n w a s f

o r e c l o s e d b y P ars on ; i t has now been f or ecl os ed n a t i o n a l l y b y Leocal

. W hi l e w e expr es s no opi ni on on w hethert he A l as ka ar s on s t atut e i n P al aci os defi nes a cr i m e of vi ol ence under § 16, w e thi nk i t cleart hatt he ana l y s i s of P al aci os m us tnow be c o n sid e re d to h a v e b e e n in e rro r, an d th a t itd o e s n o t co n tro l th is c a s e . M o re v e r, e v e n w e re its a n a lysis c o rr e c t, P alaci os is c lea rly di s t i ngui s habl e: t he A l as ka s t atut e i n P alaci os r equi r ed i nt ent i onal ly ca us i ng damage t o pr oper t y , and thus cont ai ned a s peci fi c i nt entel ement l acki ng i n t he Penns y l vani a s t atut e her e. T hu s, T ran’ s cr i m e— t he P e n n sy l van i a off ense of reckl ess b u rn in g o r ex p lod ing

— inv o lved n eit h er the u se o f f o rce n o r a s ubs t ant i al r i s k t hathe mig h t us e for ce. H e ther efor e di d not comm i ta cr i m e of vi ol ence under§ 16. A ccor di ngl y , w e w i l l gr ant t he pet i t i on forr evi ew and r em an d t o t he B I A forfur t her pr ocee di ngs cons i s t entw i t h t hi s opi ni on.