1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

SHAWN GRAY,

Defendant

Criminal Action No. 20-191 (CKK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(May 31, 2021)

In this criminal action, Defendant Shawn Gray is charged with (1) Unlawful Possession of 

Ammunition by a Person Convicted of a Crime Punishable by Imprisonment for a Term Exceeding 

One Year in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and (2) Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a 

Person Convicted of a Crime Punishable by Imprisonment for a Term Exceeding One Year in 

violation of D.C. Code § 22–4503(a). Indictment, ECF No. 1. In his [14] Motion to Suppress 

Evidence, Gray seeks to suppress a loaded firearm recovered from inside his underwear, which he 

contends was obtained as a result of an allegedly unlawful seizure and search. Gray argues that 

such evidence should be suppressed because it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

Gray has also filed a [22] Motion to Re-Open the Suppression Hearing, based on the Government’s

notice that it failed to notify the defendant of a potentially adverse credibility finding regarding 

one of it witnesses in advance of the evidentiary hearing. 

Upon consideration of the pleadings,1 the relevant legal authorities, and the record as a 

whole, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Suppress and DENIES Defendant’s Motion to

 1 The Court’s consideration has focused on the following materials:

• Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence (“Def.’s Mot. to Suppress”), ECF No. 14;

• Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence (“Gov.’s Opp’n”), 

ECF No. 15;
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Re-Open the Suppression Hearing. The Court concludes that the Fourth Amendment was not 

violated when law enforcement officers detained Gray, conducted a limited search of him, and 

seized from him a loaded firearm. The Court reaches this conclusion relying principally on the 

body-worn camera evidence and testimony of officers not implicated by the Government’s Giglio

notice, and does not find that re-opening the suppression hearing to recall the witnesses is required. 

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

The Court held an evidentiary hearing on Gray’s motion to suppress on May 6, 2021.2 The 

Court has considered the evidence presented during the hearing. In doing so, the Court considered 

the demeanor and behavior of the witnesses, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, whether the 

witnesses impressed the Court as truthful, whether the witnesses impressed the Court as having an 

accurate memory and recollection, whether the witnesses had any motive for not telling the truth, 

whether the witnesses had a full opportunity to observe the matters about which they testified, and 

whether the witnesses had any interest in the outcome of the case, or friendship or hostility to the 

other persons concerned with the case. The Court also considered the reasonableness or 

unreasonableness and the probability or improbability of the testimony of the witnesses in 

determining whether to accept it as true and accurate, as well as whether the testimony was 

 

• Defendant’s Motion to Re-Open the Suppression Hearing (“Def.’s Mot. to Re-Open

Hr’g”), ECF No. 22; and

• Government’s Reply to Defendant’s Motion to Re-Open Hearing (“Gov.’s Resp. to Mot. 

to Re-Open Hr’g”), ECF No 23. 

2 Due to health concerns surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic and with Gray’s consent, the 

evidentiary hearing was held by videoconference. See In re: Fourth Extension of Authorization 

for Use of Video Teleconferencing and Teleconferencing for Certain Criminal and Juvenile 

Delinquency Proceedings, Standing Order No. 21-14 (BAH) (Mar. 16, 2021) ¶. 8 (“For public 

health and safety reasons, the expectation is that most proceedings will be conducted remotely, via 

video or teleconference.”).
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contradicted or supported by other credible evidence. The Court has also considered the pleadings, 

the footage from officers’ body-worn cameras, and the entire record in this case.

Four witnesses testified during the May 6, 2021 evidentiary hearing: Metropolitan Police 

Department (“MPD”) Officers John Bewley, Markell Jones, and Daniel Tipps testified on behalf 

of the Government, and the defendant, Shawn Gray testified on his own behalf.3 

The Court makes the following findings of fact. The Court will first make findings of fact 

that are relevant to the Defendant’s motion and undisputed and/or uncontroverted by any evidence, 

and then make findings as to facts that are relevant and disputed or controverted by some evidence.

A. The Undisputed or Uncontroverted Relevant Evidence

MPD Officers John Bewley, 4 Markell Jones, and Daniel Tipps testified during the hearing. 

Officer Bewley has worked for MPD for nine years, Officer Jones for five years, and Officer Tipps 

for eight years. May 6, 2021 Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 21 (“Hr’g Tr.”) at 15:5–21 (Bewley),

5 60:25–61

(Jones), 106:4–6 (Tipps). As of September 2020, all three officers were assigned to MPD’s Gun 

Recovery Unit. Hr’g Tr. at 15:12–15 (Bewley), 61:3–6 (Jones), 106:7–10 (Tipps). The Gun 

Recovery Unit is a “proactive unit” assigned to respond to areas that are high in gun violence or 

gun trafficking. Hr’g Tr. at 16:5–14 (Bewley). Gun Recovery Unit officers wear plainclothes—

 3 Before Gray testified, the Court confirmed that he had discussed his Fifth Amendment rights 

with his counsel, and was aware that his testimony could be used to impeach him in a later 

proceeding. Hr’g Tr. at 113:21–115:10 (Gray). 

4 After the evidentiary hearing on May 6, 2021, the Government notified the Court of a “potential 

adverse credibility finding” regarding Officer Bewley’s testimony in a separate case. Although 

for the reasons discussed infra Section II(A), the Court does not find that this notice requires the 

Court to re-open the suppression hearing, the Court notes that its findings here rely primarily on 

the testimony of the other MPD officers and Gray, as well as the body-worn camera evidence. To 

the extent the Court relies on Officer Bewley’s testimony, it does so to corroborate the testimony 

of other witnesses or to provide additional contextual information. None of the facts in dispute 

rely solely on the testimony of Officer Bewley.

5 The name of the witness whose testimony is cited is indicated in parentheses following each 

citation to the May 6, 2021 Hearing Transcript.
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shorts or non-uniform pants and tee-shirts—with blue vests with the word “Police” on the front 

and “Metropolitan Police Department” on the back and a police badge. Hr’g Tr. at 17:9–23

(Bewley). Officers Bewley, Jones, and Tipps were equipped with body-worn cameras, located in 

the center of their chests. Hr’g Tr. at 19:14–18, 20:2–8 (Bewley), 100:17–22, 101:9–12 (Jones). 

Because the body-worn cameras focus only straight ahead and are lower than the officers’ sightline, the camera does not capture everything that each officer sees. See Hr’g Tr. at 100:23–7 

(Jones). 

On September 4, 2020, at 6:40 p.m.—while it was still daylight—approximately ten to 

twelve Gun Recovery Unit officers arrived at 1201 Mount Olivet Road NE in Washington, D.C.

in three or four unmarked cars. Hr’g Tr. at 17:24–18:4, 47:17–48:5 (Bewley). The Gun Recovery 

Unit responded to that address “in the gun interdiction capacity” because of reports of gunshots 

in the area in the past 24 hours and a recent “uptick in violence throughout the city.” Hr’g Tr. at 

62:4–14 (Jones). Officer Bewley also noted that, based on prior experience and information 

provided by officers in MPD’s Fifth District, this address is located in a “high gun-trafficking 

area.” Hr’g Tr. at 18:9–13, 19:2–3. (Bewley).

Officer Bewley drove one of the unmarked cars, with Officer Jones sitting directly behind 

him in the same car. See Hr’g Tr. at 20:9–17 (Bewley), 75:18–24 (Jones); Gov.’s Ex. 1, BodyWorn Camera Video of Officer Markell Jones (“Jones BWC”) at 18:40:00–18:40:37.6

 Officer 

Tipps rode in a separate car, sitting in the backseat on the passenger side. Gov.’s Ex. 3, BodyWorn Camera Video of Officer Daniel Tipps (“Tipps BWC”) at 18:40:04–18:40:25; Hr’g Tr. at 

112:17–25 (Tipps). The cars pulled into an alley from a road behind a convenience store and 

 6 The timestamps associated with all citations to body-worn camera videos refer to the time 

indicated in upper right-hand corner of the videos. 
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passed a silver BMW on their left-hand side, which was parked in the alley facing the road from 

which the police cars had entered. Hr’g Tr. at 20:13–17 (Bewley), 63:4–12 (Jones). Officer 

Bewley parked his car approximately 25-30 feet away from the BMW, so that the trunks of the 

cars faced each other. See Hr’g Tr. at 119:1–3 (Gray) (testifying that when the police stopped in 

the alley, they were “probably about 25, 30 feet from where he was standing”); Gov.’s Ex. 2, BodyWorn Camera Video of Officer John Bewley (“Bewley BWC”) at 18:40:47–18:40:50. Several 

other cars were parked in the alley, which connected the road behind the store with a parking lot 

at the front of the store. See Bewley BWC at 18:40:48–18:40:54.

When the Gun Recovery Unit officers exited their vehicles, some officers went towards 

the front of the store and spoke with individuals standing in the parking lot, asking who owned the 

cars parked there. See Tipps BWC at 18:41:29–18:42:40; Bewley BWC at 18:40:33–18:40:40; 

Hr’g Tr. 21:15–19. One officer can be heard asking an individual, “That’s your car? No guns in 

it or anything, right? Can we take a look quick?” to which the person responded “no.” Bewley 

BWC at 18:41:56–18:42:05.

When Officer Jones exited his vehicle, he began looking in the windows of a gray car 

parked in the alley. Jones BWC at 18:40:49–18:41:27. Officer Jones’s reflection on the side and 

windows of the car can be seen on his body-worn camera footage. The reflection shows Officer 

Jones checking inside the vehicle, and then looking up towards his left, in the direction of the silver 

BMW. Jones BWC at 18:41:09–18:41:11, 18:41:25–18:41:27; Hr’g Tr. at 86:12–24 (Jones).

Officer Jones testified that an individual standing by the car—later identified as Gray—caught his 

attention because he had moved from the driver’s side of the car to the passenger’s side as the 

police arrived (which Gray disputes, see infra Section I(B)), he was leaning over the car appearing 
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to try to hide something, and he was “looking at us with a wide-eyed stare and tracking our 

movements.” Hr’g Tr. at 64:17–24 (Jones). 

Officer Jones then walked towards the silver BMW, approaching from behind the car, on 

the passenger’s side. Jones BWC at 18:42:05. As Officer Jones approached, Gray was leaning 

over the front passenger side window, with his left leg (the leg closer to Officer Jones) lunged in 

front. Jones BWC at 18:42:07. Gray testified that he was speaking to his girlfriend, who was 

sitting in the driver’s seat of the car. Hr’g Tr. at 120:4–11 (Gray). There was approximately two

to three feet of space between Gray’s back and a chain-link fence lining the side of the alley. Hr’g 

Tr. at 119:20–22 (Gray); see also Jones BWC at 18:42:07. Gray was wearing a white tee-shirt and 

blue athletic shorts with an orange stripe on the side over black compression pants, which went to 

his ankles, and black sneakers. Jones BWC at 18:42:07. Officer Jones testified that once he was 

three or four feet away from Gray, he could see “an obvious bulge inconsistent with the human 

anatomy” in the front of Gray’s shorts. Hr’g Tr. at 64:17–24, 70:14–21 (Jones). 

As Officer Jones approached Gray, he asked, “How are you doing, sir? No guns, right?” 

Jones BWC at 18:42:06–18:42:11. Gray shook his head and said no. Jones BWC at 18:42:10–

18:42:11; Hr’g Tr. at 89:5–6 (Jones). Officer Jones stood a couple feet away from Gray, and said 

“Do you mind if I see your waistband real quick? I saw you flip to the other side.” Jones BWC at 

18:42:11. As Officer Jones was speaking, Gray lifted his tee-shirt to reveal the waistband of his 

shorts and his stomach. Jones BWC at 18:42:11–18:42:14. Gray was still standing so that the 

front of his body was directed towards the car, and his left side was towards Officer Jones. Officer 

Jones asked, “Do you mind hiking your shorts up?” at which point Gray began to pull up on his 

shorts from the pockets. Jones BWC at 18:42:14–18:42:16. Officer Jones then said, “Just pull 

them back. Grab the front of them and pull them back.” Jones BWC at 18:42:14–18:42:26. Officer 
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Jones testified that he had asked Gray to pull the shorts back because he had seen a bulge in the 

front of shorts that was “inconsistent with the male anatomy.” See Hr’g Tr. at 76:1–13 (Jones).

As Gray pulled his shorts up and back, a bulge can be seen in the front of his shorts. Jones BWC

at 18:42:20. Gray responded to Officer Jones by saying “ I pulled them back and lifted up my 

shirt,” and lifted his shirt again. Jones BWC at 18:42:24–18:42:26. Jones then said, “Do you mind 

stepping back real quick? I don’t mean to give you a hard time, I just saw you flip from the other 

side over here.” Jones BWC at 18:42:26-18:42:29. 

At this point, Officer Bewley can be seen walking around the front of the BMW, towards 

Gray’s right side; before that time, Officer Jones was the only officer standing near Gray and 

speaking with him. Jones BWC at 18:42:27. Officer Bewley testified that he walked towards 

Gray and Officer Jones because he had seen another person in the driver’s seat of the BMW. Hr’g 

Tr. at 21:20–23, 22:23–23:3 (Bewley). As Officer Bewley approached the BMW, another police 

officer can also be seen walking towards the driver’s side of the car. Bewley BWC at 18:42:21. 

Officer Bewley walked around the front, driver’s side of the BMW and stopped even with the 

front, right headlight of the car. Bewley BWC at 18:42:29–18:42:31. With Officer Bewley now 

standing on Gray’s right side and Officer Jones on his left side, Officer Jones said, “I’m gonna pat 

you down real quick, alright?” Jones BWC at 18:42:32–18:42:25. Gray responded, “Go ahead” 

and put his hands up. Jones BWC at 18:42:34–18:42:35; Hr’g Tr. at 68:23–69:1, 72:22–73:1 

(Jones). Officer Jones testified that he had “moved to conduct a protective patdown” because 

based on his “training and experience, individuals who often carry contraband, namely firearms, 

carry firearms in that exact same area.” Hr’g Tr. at 68:9–18 (Jones). Jones then used his left hand 

to pat down the area on the front of Gray’s shorts and immediately said the code word for a firearm. 
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Jones BWC at 18:42:35–18:42:39; Hr’g Tr. at 25:2–12 (Bewley), 94:11–14 (Jones). Gray was 

then handcuffed. Jones BWC at 18:42:39–18:43:08.

Officer Bewley retrieved a pair of gloves and a paper bag from the trunk of his car. Bewley 

BWC at 18:43:16–18:43:32. When Officer Bewley returned, Officer Jones pulled back the 

waistband of Gray’s blue athletic shorts and black compression pants, to show a pair of yellowgreen boxer briefs. Jones BWC at 18:43:54–18:44:01. Gray confirmed at the evidentiary hearing 

that he was wearing three layers of clothing (shorts, compression pants, and boxer briefs). Hr’g 

Tr. at 123:24–124:1 (Gray). A gun was positioned inside Gray’s underwear, with the handle of 

the gun placed through the slits of the underwear, and the barrel pointing down. Jones BWC at

18:43:54–18:43:56; Hr’g Tr. at 29:1–13 (Bewley). Officer Bewley pulled the gun out. Hr’g Tr. 

at 28:15–18 (Bewley). Both Officers Jones and Bewley testified that the gun was positioned in 

the location of Gray’s penis. Hr’g Tr. at 29:19–30:2, 30:13–20 (Bewley), 67:6–15 (Jones). During 

the hearing, to describe where the gun was located on his body, Gray stood up gestured on his 

body to the same location described by the officers. Hr’g Tr. at 122:15–21 (Gray). He also 

described the location of the gun as “[r]ight in front of my penis.” Hr’g Tr. at 123:4–8 (Gray). 

The gun retrieved from Gray is a 40-caliber pistol with a Glock 23 slide, which contained

eight rounds of ammunition in a fifteen-round capacity magazine. Gov.’s Opp’n at 4; Gov.’s 

Opp’n Ex. 4.

B. The Disputed or Controverted Relevant Evidence

The parties first dispute where Gray was standing in relation to the silver BMW as the Gun 

Recovery Unit officers drove into the alley. Officers Bewley and Jones testified that they saw 

Gray standing on the driver’s side of the BMW before walking around the vehicle to the 

passenger’s side when the officers arrived. See Hr’g Tr. at 20:13–20, 21:4–14 (Bewley), 63:4–12 
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(Jones). Officer Tipps testified that he did not recall seeing Gray as they entered the parking lot, 

but also noted that he was in the backseat of a separate car from Officers Bewley and Jones and 

there were “several people walking through the parking lot.” Hr’g Tr. at 110:22–11:2, 111:21–23, 

112:17–25 (Tipps). Gray, however, testified that he was standing on the passenger’s side of the 

BMW, talking to his girlfriend, as the police cars pulled into the parking lot. Hr’g Tr. at 118:8–10 

(Gray). 

The body-worn camera footage does not show where Gray was standing as the Gun 

Recovery Unit cars pulled into the alley. Officer Bewley’s camera does show the top of the 

windows of a silver vehicle on his left side as his car pulled even with, and then drove past that 

car, but does not show Gray standing there. Bewley BWC at 18:40:20. By the time Officer Bewley 

parked and exited the car, Gray was leaning on the window of the passenger’s side of the BMW. 

Bewley BWC at 18:40:49. 

However, audio from Officer Jones’s body-worn camera and his observations recorded in 

his Gerstein report corroborate his testimony that he saw Gray move from one side of the BMW 

to the other as the officers approached. See Def.’s Mot. to Suppress, Ex. 1, Gerstein Report of 

Officer Markell Jones (“Gerstein Report”), ECF No. 14-2. Officer Jones stated to Gray twice that 

he came over to talk to him because he saw him “flip” to the other side of the car. See Jones BWC 

at 18:42:11, 18:42:26–18:42:29. Officer Jones also noted in his Gerstein report that “upon 

noticing officers,” Gray “went to the other side of the vehicle, shielding his front waistband from 

view of officers, and leaned against the passenger side of the vehicle.” Gerstein Report at 2. Based 

on the contemporaneous statements of Officer Jones to Gray and the notes he recorded close in 

time to the encounter, the Court finds credible Officer Jones’s testimony that he saw Gray walk 

from the driver’s side of the car to the passenger’s side of the car upon the arrival of Gun Recovery 
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Unit officers in the alley. Moreover, Officer Jones and Officer Bewley—who both testified that 

they saw Gray standing on the driver’s side of the BMW—were on the driver’s side of the police

vehicle that passed directly next to the driver’s side of the BMW. Officer Tipps, in contrast, was 

sitting in the backseat on the passenger’s side of a separate car. Therefore, the Court does not find 

that Officer Tipps’s testimony that he did not recall seeing Gray as the officers entered the alley 

contradicts the observations of the other officers. Although Gray cannot be seen on any body-worn 

camera footage as the Gun Recovery Unit cars entered the parking lot, the angle of the cameras 

would not necessarily have caught him leaning over the driver’s side window, as both officers 

testified, because the videos showed only the very top of a silver car as the police officers passed 

it on their left. The Court credits the testimony of Officers Jones and Bewley that they saw Gray 

walk from the driver’s side of the BMW to the passenger’s side as the Gun Recovery Unit vehicles 

entered the alley. 

Gray also disputes Officer Jones’s observation that once the police officers entered the 

parking lot, he “began to look at us and he became wide-eyed,” Hr’g Tr. at 63:13–15 (Jones),

because Gray was wearing sunglasses. However, based on both the body-worn camera videos and 

Officer Jones’s testimony, Gray’s sunglasses were not darkly tinted. See Jones BWC at 18:42:11; 

Hr’g Tr. at 99:3–16 (Jones). Officer Jones also noted that Gray caught his attention because he 

was watching the officers’ movements, pointing out that his body-worn camera showed him 

looking in Gray’s direction as he looked in the window of a car. Jones BWC at 18:41:09–

18:41:11, 18:41:25–18:41:27; Hr’g Tr. at 86:12–24 (Jones). The Court credits Officer Jones’s 

testimony that he was able to see Gray watching the officers as they exited their vehicles and began 

to look inside cars parked in the alley for firearms. See Hr’g Tr. at 99:3–16 (Jones). 
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Lastly, Gray disputes Officer Jones’s testimony that he was able to see a bulge in Gray’s 

shorts as he approached Gray. Gray disagreed that the gun was “bulging out” of his shorts, noting 

that he was wearing compression pants. Hr’g Tr. at 123:9–20 (Gray). Review of Officer Jones’s 

body-worn camera video shows that as Officer Jones approached Gray from Gray’s left side, Gray 

was leaned over the window of the BMW, with his left leg in front and no visible bulge. Jones 

BWC at 18:42:06–18:42:10. As Officer Jones began speaking to Gray, however, Gray stood up 

straight and a small bulge can be seen in the front of Gray’s shorts. Jones BWC at 18:42:13. 

Officer Jones’s reflection in the window of the silver BMW also appeared to be looking down, in 

the direction of Gray’s groin area, which indicates that the small bulge caught his attention. Jones 

BWC at 18:42:13. As Officer Jones asked Gray to pull back his shorts, Gray’s groin area is not 

centered in the camera; however, as Gray pulled back his shorts, a bulge is plainly visible on the 

edge of the area captured by the body-worn camera. Jones BWC at 18:42:20. The Court, therefore, 

credits Officer Jones’s testimony that he noticed a bulge inconsistent with the male anatomy when 

he was standing close to Gray. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Re-Open the Suppression Hearing

Before discussing the merits of Gray’s motion to suppress, the Court shall address Gray’s 

[22] Motion to Re-Open the Suppression Hearing. After the evidentiary hearing on Gray’s motion 

to suppress, the Government filed a [20] Notice of the Existence of Giglio Information (“Gov.’s 

Giglio Notice”), in which the Government indicated that it had failed to notify Gray and his counsel 

in advance of the May 6, 2021 evidentiary hearing that “U.S. District Judge [Ketanji Brown] 

Jackson, in a separate case, had issued a ruling pertaining to Officer John Bewley, Metropolitan 
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Police Department, that could be characterized as an adverse credibility finding.” Gov.’s Giglio

Notice at 1. Specifically, Judge Jackson’s oral ruling indicated: 

[T]he Court declines to credit Officer Bewley’s statement during his 

testimony that the bulge he allegedly observed in Mr. Goodman's 

pants appeared to be hard metal or that it was a hard metal object or 

that the object appeared to have a hard edge, because Officer Bewley 

did not explain how he came to believe that the object was made of 

metal, and in my view, Officer Bewley’s body-worn camera footage 

does not corroborate that specific description of any alleged bulge.

Id. (quoting United States v. Goodman, 19-cv-297-KBJ (D.D.C.), Apr. 9, 2021 Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 

20-1).

Gray subsequently filed his [22] Motion to Re-Open the Suppression Hearing, contending 

that the Government’s failure to disclose the above-cited Giglio information deprived Gray of his 

ability to question both Officers Bewley and Jones about an alleged pretextual justification for 

(i.e., that the officers saw a bulge in Gray’s groin area). Def.’s Mot. to Re-Open Hr’g at 2–3. Gray 

contends that Judge Jackson’s “credibility determination” regarding Officer Bewley is pertinent to 

his case because in both cases “the gun cannot be seen, which the officers claimed they saw.” Id.

at 2. But, in this case, it was Officer Jones who testified that he saw the bulge as he approached 

Gray and asked him to pull back his shorts. A slight bulge in Gray’s groin area can be seen on 

Officer Jones’s body-worn camera video. Accordingly, the Court does not find that the potential 

adverse credibility determination made by Judge Jackson with respect to Officer Bewley has any 

bearing on the credibility of Officer Jones’s testimony that he a saw a bulge in Gray’s shorts—a 

topic about which defense counsel cross-examined Officer Jones during the hearing. See, e.g., 

Hr’g Tr. at 92:11–24 (Jones). 
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Moreover, after Gray filed his motion to re-open the suppression hearing, the Government

filed a supplemental response, indicating that it had sought clarification from Judge Jackson about 

her ruling with respect to Officer Bewley. In a Minute Order, Judge Jackson indicated:

The Court did not intend to make a “specific adverse credibility 

determination[ ] finding that Officer was untruthful under oath” with 

respect to his testimony that he observed an object with a hard metal 

edge in Defendant’s pants . . . Instead, as the Government suggests, 

the Court merely determined that “the evidence based on [Officer 

Bewley’s testimony] was not sufficiently supported to sustain the 

government’s burden.”

Gov.’s Suppl., ECF No. 24 (quoting Minute Order (May 19, 2021), United States v. Goodman, 19-

cv-297-KBJ (D.D.C.)). Judge Jackson’s ruling clarified that she had not made a “specific adverse 

credibility determination” as to Officer Bewley, but that the record lacked an explanation as to 

how he was able to determine that the bulge had a hard metal edge. Based on the salient facts 

presented during the evidentiary hearing and the Court’s reliance primarily on the testimony of 

other officers and body-worn camera videos, see supra note 4, the Court finds that Gray was not 

deprived of due process or a fair hearing. See Def.’s Mot. to Re-Open Hr’g at 3. Accordingly, the 

Court shall DENY Gray’s Motion to Re-Open, and shall proceed to discuss the merits of his 

Motion to Suppress Evidence based on the record as it presently stands.

B. Motion to Suppress Evidence

Gray argues that the tangible physical evidence seized by law enforcement from his body 

on September 4, 2020 was obtained as the result of an unlawful stop and search of his person, in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment. As such, Gray argues that the evidence should be suppressed. 

The Court disagrees and finds that the temporary stop and search of Gray was reasonable, and 

therefore the evidence was not seized unconstitutionally.
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“Time and again” the Supreme Court “has observed that searches and seizures conducted 

outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable 

under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated 

exceptions.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). As is relevant here, one of those exceptions occurs when officers conduct a “Terry 

search.” Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), during a properly justified stop on the street, if 

a law enforcement officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that “that the individual whose 

suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the 

officer or to others,” then that officer may conduct a limited search “to determine whether the 

person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.” Terry, 392 U.S. 

at 24. In order for a Terry search to be justified, the circumstances at the time of the search and 

seizure must “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was 

appropriate.” Id. at 22 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The parties do not dispute that Gray was “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth 

Amendment; rather they dispute the timing of the seizure. Defendant Gray appears to argue that 

the entire encounter with Officer Jones amounted to a seizure because he was not free to terminate 

the encounter and leave. See Def.’s Mot. to Suppress at 5; Hr’g Tr. at 120:17–20 (Gray) (Q: When 

Officer Jones approached you, how did you feel? A: I felt like . . I had no choice but to comply 

with what he was asking me.). The Government concedes that Gray was seized before being 

physically restrained in handcuffs, but contends that the seizure occurred when the “officers 

approached defendant from both sides[.]” Gov.’s Opp’n at 5. Because the timing of the seizure 

implicates the Court’s analysis of whether the officers had a reasonable articulable suspicion to 

stop and search Gray, the Court shall first identify the time at which the seizure occurred. 
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1. Timing of the Seizure 

A “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment occurs “when physical force is used to restrain 

movement or when a person submits to an officer's ‘show of authority.’” United States v. Delaney, 

955 F.3d 1077, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A “show 

of authority” is sufficient to constitute a seizure when “the police conduct would have 

communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and

go about his business,” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) (internal quotation marks 

omitted), or, in other words, where “a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free 

to leave,” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). In making this determination, 

courts consider the totality of the circumstances, including “whether the suspect was physically 

intimidated or touched, whether the officer displayed a weapon, wore a uniform, or restricted the 

defendant’s movements, the time and place of the encounter, and whether the officer’s use of 

language or tone of voice indicated that compliance with the officer's request might be 

compelled.” United States v. Castle, 825 F.3d 625, 632–33 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (internal citations, 

quotation marks and alterations omitted). The person challenging the seizure “bears the burden of 

demonstrating that he was seized.” Id. at 633.

Although the Fourth Amendment generally requires that officers have probable cause and 

a warrant to seize an individual, they need neither probable cause nor a warrant to “briefly detain 

a citizen” where they “ha[ve] a reasonable, articulable suspicion that ‘criminal activity may be 

afoot.’” United States v. Edmonds, 240 F.3d 55, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at

30). To “seize[ ] a person on less than probable cause,” a police officer “must be able to point to 

specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 

support a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person seized is engaged in criminal 
16

activity.” Castle, 825 F.3d at 634 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The 

government bears the “burden to provide evidence sufficient to support reasonable suspicion

justifying any such stop.” Id.

The Court’s first task is to “pinpoint the time of the stop.” Delaney, 955 F.3d at 1082. The

Court finds that Gray was not seized when Gun Recovery Unit officers entered the alley or during

his initial interactions with Officer Jones because a reasonable person would have felt free to

terminate the encounter and leave. “[T]he presence of multiple officers” wearing “[police] gear,

including guns and handcuffs” alone is an “insufficient show of authority to make a reasonable,

innocent person feel unfree to leave.” United States v. Goddard, 491 F.3d 457, 461–62 (D.C. Cir.

2007) (per curia). Rather, the defendant must point to “additional circumstances” that “transform

an otherwise consensual police-citizen encounter into a stop.” Delaney, 955 F.3d at 1082 (quoting

Goddard, 491 F.3d at 462).

Gray points to no “additional circumstances” during his initial communications with

Officer Jones that would have “communicated to a reasonable person” in his position that “he was

not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437.

For example, the police officers did not block the silver BMW from exiting from the alley, but

instead parked about 25 to 30 feet away from it, facing in the opposite direction. See, e.g., United

States v. Johnson, 212 F.3d 1313, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding that although “blocking a vehicle

can be the kind of application of physical force that constitutes a seizure,” no stop occurred when

the police cruiser parked “25 feet away” from the defendant’s car, “hardly close enough to block

it”). The Gun Recovery Unit arrived during daylight, in a parking lot populated with other

individuals. See Castle, 825 F.3d at 632 (noting that the “time and place” of the encounter are

relevant factors to consider). When Officer Jones first approached Gray, he did so by himself; the
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other Gun Recovery Unit officers were scattered throughout the parking lot and alley, looking

inside cars and speaking with other individuals. In fact, other officers asked individuals in the

parking lot if they could search their cars, which the individuals refused without incident. 

Gray relies on the concurring opinion in United States v. Gross, 784 F.3d 784 (D.C. Cir.

2015) for the proposition that “[n]othing about the Gun Recovery Unit’s modus operandi is

designed to convey a message that compliance is not required.” Def.’s Mot. to Suppress at 5–6

(quoting Gross, 784 F.3d at 790 (Brown, J., concurring)). Gray contends, for example, that the 

Gun Recovery Unit officers were patting down other patrons in the parking lot and telling other 

individuals in the parking lot to “lift their shirts up to see the waist area to see if anyone was 

carrying [a] gun.” Def.’s Mot. at 6; see also id. at 6–7 (describing “more than 10 officers [fanning] 

out and looking into the cars and patting people down”). If that had been the case, the Court would 

be less inclined to find that Gray’s initial interactions with Officer Jones were consensual. See, 

e.g., United States v. Mabry, --- F.3d ---, 2021 WL 2021618, at *3–4 (D.C. Cir. May 21, 2021)

(reasoning that officers’ conduct of stopping and patting down other individuals near defendant 

supported finding of “show of authority” conveying that compliance with the officers’ directives 

was required). But no evidence or testimony introduced during the May 6, 2021 evidentiary 

hearing supports these claims that the Gun Recovery Officers were patting down other individuals 

in the alley or store parking lot. 

Moreover, in Gross, the court concluded that the defendant had not been seized when an 

officer from the Gun Recovery Unit approached the defendant on the street, asked if he was 

carrying a gun, and asked him to expose his waistband. Gross, 784 F.3d at 787. The court reasoned 

that a “seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a

few questions.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Even when officers “have 
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no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual 

. . . as long as the police do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is 

required.” Id. (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435). Similarly, here, Officer Jones approached Gray

and asked him questions (e.g., “No guns, right? Do you mind if I see your waistband real quick?”). 

Officer Jones made his requests for Gray to lift up his shirt and pull back his shorts in a calm,

polite tone and never used “language or tone . . . indicat[ing] that compliance with [his] request[s]

might be compelled.” Castle, 825 F.3d at 632–33.

Gray also relies on the fact that he was “boxed in” by Officers Jones and Bewley in support 

of his claim that he was not free to leave. However, he imprecisely describes the timing of when 

this actually occurred, suggesting that he only complied with Officer Jones’s requests to lift his 

shirt and pull back his shorts because he was “blocked” from leaving by the two officers. Def.’s 

Mot. to Suppress at 6; see also Hr’g Tr. at 121:5–15 (Gray). But Officer Bewley did not come 

around the front of the car until after Officer Jones had already asked these questions and Gray 

had complied with them. See Jones BWC at 18:42:08–18:42:28; Bewley BWC at 18:42:29–

18:42:31. 

The Government concedes that at the point Officer Bewley walked around the front of the 

car, Gray was not free to leave. Gov.’s Opp’n at 5 (“Since officers approached the defendant from 

both sides, leaving was not an option.”). The Court agrees that at this point the consensual 

encounter ripened into a “show of authority” because Gray was now blocked on both sides by 

police officers and a reasonable person in that situation would not have felt free to leave. See, e.g., 

Mabry, 2021 WL 2021618, at *4 (noting that a “consensual encounter with the police can, subtly, 

but surely ripen into a show of authority that triggers the Fourth Amendment”). 
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2. Reasonableness of the Seizure and Search.

Having established the timing of the seizure, the Court next considers whether, at that point, 

the officers possessed “specific and articulable facts” to “support a reasonable and articulable 

suspicion that [Gray was] engaged in criminal activity.” Delaney, 955 F.3d at 1085 (quoting 

Castle, 825 F.3d at 634). In Terry, the Supreme Court “held that an officer may, consistent with 

the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, 

articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). 

The Court also held that “during such a stop, an officer may conduct a protective search of the 

outer layers of the suspect’s clothing if he has a “reasonable fear” that the suspect is armed and 

dangerous.” United States v. Brown, 334 F.3d 1161, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. 

at 30). In order to justify such a stop and/or search, the officer must be “able to point to specific 

and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from these facts, reasonably 

warrant that intrusion.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. In reviewing whether a stop was justified, courts 

“look to the record as a whole to determine what facts were known to the officer and then consider 

whether a reasonable officer in those circumstances would have been suspicious.” United States

v. McKie, 951 F.2d 399, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (per curiam). The government ultimately bears the 

burden of demonstrating that reasonable suspicion for a stop existed. See Castle, 825 F.3d at 630.

Here, several factors provide a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Gray was engaged 

in criminal activity to justify the stop. First, the address to which the Gun Recovery Unit officers 

responded was known to the police as an area of high gun-trafficking, where gunshots had recently 

been reported. See, e.g., Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (“[W]e have previously noted the fact that the 

stop occurred in a ‘high crime area’ among the relevant contextual considerations in 

a Terry analysis.”); Edmonds, 240 F.3d at 60 (“[T]he fact that a given locale is well known for 
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criminal activity will not by itself justify a Terry stop; but it is among the various factors that 

officers may take into account.”).

Moreover, Gray’s conduct as the Gun Recovery Unit officers arrived in the alley supported 

a reasonable articulable suspicion for the officers to stop and question him. Gray moved from the 

driver’s side of the BMW to the passenger’s side which was farther from the police officers. 

Officer Jones testified that Gray became “wide-eyed” when the officers entered the parking lot, 

and watched their movements as they exited their vehicles and looked in the windows of other 

parked cars. See, e.g., Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (“[N]ervous, evasive behavior is . . . a pertinent 

factor if determining reasonable suspicion.”). In addition, Gray was standing against the BMW in 

a way that Officer Jones found suspicious—leaning forward against the window with his left leg 

(the leg closer to the officer) lunged in front. The Court finds it reasonable that Gray’s apparent 

attempt to conceal the lower part of his body would contribute to Officer Jones’s reasonable 

articulable suspicion that Gray could be dangerous. See United States v. Dortch, 868 F.3d 674,

680 (8th Cir. 2017) (finding reasonable suspicion, in part, because the defendant appeared to be 

concealing something by “pressing the front of his body against the minivan”).

Most importantly, Officer Jones testified that when he was standing close to Gray, he 

observed a bulge in Gray’s shorts, “slightly beneath his waistband . . right where his penis would 

be,” and that the bulge was “inconsistent with the human anatomy.” Hr’g Tr. at 67:2–10 (Jones). 

He suspected, based on his “training and experience” that “individuals who often carry contraband, 

namely firearms, carry firearms in that exact same area[.]” Hr’g Tr. at 68:9–18 (Jones). As Gray 

lifted his shirt and then pulled back on his shorts, a bulge in the area described by Officer Jones is 

plainly visible. See Jones BWC at 18:42:20. Based on these facts, the Court finds that the officers 
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had a reasonable articulable suspicion that Gray was engaged in criminal activity to justify the 

seizure. 

Having found that Gray’s stop and temporary seizure were justified, the Court must now 

determine whether or not the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct a limited 

search “to determine whether [Defendant was] carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of 

physical harm.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 24. The Court concludes that the officers did have a reasonable 

articulable suspicion for conducting their limited pat-down of Gray, making the search lawful and 

the evidence obtained admissible. “The question of whether reasonable suspicion existed can only 

be answered by considering the totality of the circumstances as the officer on the scene experienced 

them . . . Hence, even though a single factor might not itself be sufficiently probative of 

wrongdoing to give rise to a reasonable suspicion, the combination of several factors — especially 

when viewed through the eyes of an experienced officer — may.” Brown, 334 F.3d at

1165 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Here, the same circumstances discussed with respect to the seizure of Gray also support a 

reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the patdown and subsequent search of Gray’s body to 

retrieve the gun. These circumstances include the fact that the Gun Recovery Unit officers were 

responding to a high gun-trafficking area due to reports of recent gunshots nearby, that Gray’s 

conduct suggested he was attempting to shield something from the police officers, and that Officer 

Jones was able to observe a bulge inconsistent with the male anatomy, which he suspected was a 

firearm based on his training and experience. When Officer Jones conducted the patdown, his left 

hand went immediately to the area he had observed the bulge, where he felt a “the slide and grip 

of a firearm.” Hr’g Tr. at 69:4–6 (Jones). Considering the totality of the evidence, the Court 

concludes that Officer Jones had a reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct a patdown of Gray’s 
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groin area, where he had observed the bulge. Accordingly, the officers’ search and seizure of the 

loaded firearm did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the September 4, 2020 search and 

seizure of Gray which resulted in the discovery of a loaded firearm was not in violation of Gray’s

Fourth Amendment rights. The Court’s conclusion relies on evidence and testimony not 

implicated by the Giglio Notice filed by the Government after the May 6, 2021 evidentiary hearing. 

Accordingly, the Court will DENY Defendant’s Motion to Re-Open the Suppression Hearing and 

will also DENY Defendant’s Motion to Suppress. An appropriate Order accompanies this 

Memorandum Opinion.

Dated: May 31, 2021 /S/ 

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY

United States District Judge