Docket No. 101263.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.

SHERMAN CAMPBELL, Appellee.

Opinion filed November 30, 2006.–Modified on denial of

rehearing January 22, 2007.

CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court,

with opinion.

Justices Freeman, Fitzgerald, Kilbride, Garman, Karmeier, and

Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

Defendant, Sherman Campbell, was charged with driving with a

suspended license, a Class A misdemeanor that is punishable by

imprisonment (625 ILCS 5/6–303(a) (West 2004); 730 ILCS

5/5–8–3(a)(1) (West 2004)). On the day of trial, defendant appeared

without counsel and requested a bench trial. Before proceeding with

defendant’s request, the circuit court of Will County admonished

defendant of his right to a jury trial and obtained from defendant a

signed jury waiver. The following exchange then occurred:

“COURT: And you are proceeding to trial without an

attorney, is that correct?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

COURT: All right. And you do not want an attorney?
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DEFENDANT: No.

COURT: All right. Then have a seat right there at counsel

table, and we will begin.”

A bench trial followed, and defendant was convicted. Although the

State requested a sentence of imprisonment, the trial court sentenced

defendant to 12 months of conditional discharge, subject to the

payment of a $100 fine and the performance of 240 hours of

community service.

Defendant appealed, arguing that his conviction should be

reversed because the trial court accepted his waiver of counsel

without first complying with Supreme Court Rule 401(a) (134 Ill. 2d

R. 401(a)). That rule states:

“(a) Waiver of Counsel. Any waiver of counsel shall be in

open court. The court shall not permit a waiver of counsel by

a person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment

without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open

court, informing him of and determining that he understands

the following:

(1) the nature of the charge;

(2) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by

law, including, when applicable, the penalty to which the

defendant may be subjected because of prior convictions or

consecutive sentences; and

(3) that he has a right to counsel and, if he is indigent, to

have counsel appointed for him by the court.” 134 Ill. 2d R.

401(a).

The appellate court agreed with defendant and vacated his conviction.

359 Ill. App. 3d 281. We allowed the State’s petition for leave to

appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).

ANALYSIS

At the outset, we note that defendant has fully discharged the

sentenced imposed in this case. This is of no consequence, however,

as this court has previously held that, while the completion of a

defendant’s sentence renders moot a challenge to the sentence, it does

not so render a challenge to the conviction. In re Christopher K., 217
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Ill. 2d 348, 359 (2005). This is because the nullification of a

conviction may hold important consequences for a defendant. In re

Christopher K., 217 Ill. 2d at 359. Here, defendant’s claim clearly

calls into question the validity of his conviction. The claim therefore

is not moot.

Turning to the merits, we are required in this case to construe the

scope and meaning of Supreme Court Rule 401(a). The principles by

which we construe supreme court rules are familiar and well settled.

The same principles that govern the interpretation of statutes govern

the interpretation of rules of this court. In re Estate of Rennick, 181

Ill. 2d 395 (1998). Our goal is to ascertain and give effect to the

intention of the drafters of the rule. Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d at 404. A

court will apply clear and unambiguous language of a rule as it is

written, without resorting to any further tools of construction.

Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d at 405. Like the interpretation of a statute, the

interpretation of a supreme court rule is a question of law that we

review de novo. Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d at 401.

The language of Rule 401(a) could not be clearer: a trial court

“shall not permit a waiver of counsel by a person accused of an

offense punishable by imprisonment without first *** informing him

of and determining that he understands *** that he has a right to

counsel and, if he is indigent, to have counsel appointed for him by the

court.” 134 Ill. 2d R. 401(a). The purpose of this rule is “to ensure

that a waiver of counsel is knowingly and intelligently made.” People

v. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, 241 (1996). Accordingly, substantial

compliance with Rule 401(a) is required for an effective waiver of

counsel. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d at 236.

Here, there was no compliance, substantial or otherwise, with

Rule 401(a). Although defendant was accused of an offense

punishable by imprisonment, the trial court allowed him to proceed to

trial pro se without making any attempt to inform him of the nature of

the charges, the range of possible penalties, or his right to counsel.

Defendant’s waiver of counsel was therefore ineffective, and his

conviction cannot stand.

In opposition to this result, the State argues that the trial court’s

failure to admonish defendant was harmless because it turns out that

defendant had no right to counsel in this case. In support, the State

relies upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S.
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367, 59 L. Ed. 2d 383, 99 S. Ct. 1158 (1979). In that case, the

Supreme Court explained that the sixth amendment right to counsel

prohibits the incarceration of any indigent defendant who is not

offered appointed counsel. In other words, under Scott, the sixth

amendment right to counsel exists only in those cases in which a

sentence of imprisonment is actually imposed. Scott v. Illinois, 440

U.S. at 373, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 389, 99 S. Ct. at 1162 (actual

imprisonment is “the line defining the constitutional right to

appointment of counsel”). Because this is not such a case, the State

maintains that defendant had no sixth amendment right to counsel and

therefore nothing to be advised of or waive.

The problem with the State’s argument is that Illinois provides a

right to counsel that is broader than the sixth amendment right to

counsel. Section 113–3(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963

states that “[i]n all cases, except where the penalty is a fine only, if the

court determines that the defendant is indigent and desires counsel, the

Public Defender shall be appointed as counsel.” 725 ILCS 5/113–3(b)

(West 2004). In People v. Hall, 114 Ill. 2d 376 (1986), this court

explained that “[t]he provisions of section 113–3(b) *** assure the

right to counsel to an indigent defendant.” (Emphasis added.) Hall,

114 Ill. 2d at 402. So even if defendant did not possess a sixth

amendment right to counsel in this case, he did possess a statutory

right to counsel, as this was not a case in which the penalty imposed

was a fine only.

Significantly, nothing in either Rule 401(a) or this court’s

jurisprudence supports the State’s assertion that Rule 401(a) is

concerned solely with waivers of the constitutional right to counsel.

On the contrary, this court has confirmed that Rule 401(a) is wholly

unconcerned with the source from which the right to counsel derives.

In People v. Dupree, 42 Ill. 2d 249, 252 (1969), the defendant was

charged with battery, a misdemeanor punishable by up to six months

in a penal institution “ ‘other than the penitentiary.’ ” He proceeded

to trial pro se, and the record established that he was neither informed

of nor made to waive his right to counsel. On appeal, the defendant

argued that these deficiencies violated both his statutory rights and

due process of law. In rejecting the defendant’s argument, the court

first explained that, under the plain language of section 113–3(b), a

defendant has no right to be informed of his statutory right to counsel:
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“It is patent from the plain words of the statute that this

statute envisages that there be a showing that defendant

desired and requested counsel. The evidence and contentions

here show no such desire or request by defendant. Therefore

we perceive no violation of this provision of the Code of

Criminal Procedure.” Dupree, 42 Ill. 2d at 251-52.

The court then explained that, under Supreme Court Rule 401(b)

(now Rule 401(a)), the trial court was under no obligation either to

inform the defendant of his right to counsel or to obtain from the

defendant an express waiver of that right. At the time, Rule 401(b)

required an express waiver of counsel only in cases in which the

charged crime was punishable by “imprisonment in the penitentiary.”

Because the defendant in Dupree was not charged with such a crime,

the court held that Rule 401(b) did not apply and that an express

waiver of counsel was therefore unnecessary. Dupree, 42 Ill. 2d at

252.

Dupree confirms that the scope of Rule 401’s express-waiver

requirement is defined by the plain language of the rule, not by the

scope of the sixth amendment right to counsel. Indeed, when Dupree

was decided, this court did not recognize a constitutional right to

counsel in misdemeanor prosecutions. See Dupree, 42 Ill. 2d at 253-

57. Consequently, the statutory right to counsel was the only right to

counsel that the defendant in Dupree possessed. Yet, in concluding

that Rule 401(b) did not require an express waiver of counsel in that

case, the Dupree court did not simply declare that Rule 401(b) was

inapplicable to waivers of the statutory right to counsel. Instead, the

court examined the crime with which the defendant was charged and

determined that it was not within the class of crimes for which Rule

401(b) required an express waiver. Thus, Dupree establishes that it is

not the source of the right to counsel that determines whether Rule

401 applies; rather, it is the plain language of the rule.

CONCLUSION

The rules of this court are not suggestions; rather, they have the

force of law, and the presumption must be that they will be obeyed

and enforced as written. Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 210 (1995).

Here, defendant was charged with an offense that is punishable by up
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In its petition for rehearing, the State insists that vacating the conviction

confers a “windfall” on defendant and that the only appropriate remedy in

this case is a new trial. We question whether defendant would perceive

himself the beneficiary of a “windfall,” having already served the 12 months

of conditional discharge, performed the 240 hours of community service, and

paid the $100 fine imposed in this case. In any event, the State did not raise

this argument in its brief and therefore under Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7)

(210 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7)) may not raise it in arguing for rehearing.

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to one year of imprisonment, and he expressed his desire to proceed

without counsel. Under the plain language of Rule 401(a), he was

entitled to be advised of his rights, and the trial court’s failure to do

so was error. Ordinarily, that error would compel the reversal of

defendant’s conviction and a remand for a new trial. In this case,

however, defendant has already discharged his sentence, and a new

trial therefore would be neither equitable nor productive. Accordingly,

we agree with the appellate court’s conclusion that defendant’s

conviction must be vacated.1

 The judgment of the appellate court is

therefore affirmed.

Appellate court judgment affirmed.