-1- 

### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

AK STEEL HOLDING CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, FOR PUBLICATION February 25, 2016 9:00 a.m.

v No. 327175 Court of Claims DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, LC No. 13-000180-MT

Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

JOHNSON MATTHEY, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v No. 327251 Court of Claims DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, LC No. 11-000067-MT

Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

EMCO ENTERPRISES, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v No. 327313 Court of Claims DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, LC No. 12-000152-MT

Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,-2- v No. 327314 Court of Claims DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, LC No. 12-000110-MT

Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

WATTS REGULATOR COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v No. 327315 Court of Claims DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, LC No. 13-000040-MT

Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

SLBP HOLDINGS CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v No. 327316 Court of Claims DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, LC No. 13-000003-MT

Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

RENEWAL BY ANDERSON CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v No. 327317 Court of Claims DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, LC No. 13-000002-MT

Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

ANDERSON WINDOWS, INC.,-3- Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v No. 327318 Court of Claims DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, LC No. 12-000153-MT

Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

SID TOOL COMPANY, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v No. 327319 Court of Claims DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, LC No. 13-000005-MT

Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

MARTIN SPROCKET & GEAR, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v No. 327320 Court of Claims DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, LC No. 12-000091-MT

Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

UNITED STATIONERS SUPPLY COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v No. 327321 Court of Claims DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, LC No. 12-000057-MT

Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.-4- RODALE, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v No. 327322 Court of Claims DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, LC No. 12-000048-MT

Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v No. 327323 Court of Claims DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, LC No. 12-000047-MT

Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

LESLIE CONTROLS, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v No. 327324 Court of Claims DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, LC No. 12-000055-MT

Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

HOKE, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v No. 327325 Court of Claims DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, LC No. 12-000054-MT

Defendant-Appellee/Cross--5- Appellant.

SPENCE ENGINEERING, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v No. 327326 Court of Claims DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, LC No. 12-000052-MT

Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

CIRCOR ENERGY PRODUCTS, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v No. 327327 Court of Claims DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, LC No. 12-000053-MT

Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

CIRCOR AEROSPACE, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v No. 327328 Court of Claims DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, LC No. 12-000056-MT

Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

GTECH CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v No. 327329 Court of Claims DEPARTMENT OF TREASU RY, LC No. 12-000050-MT-6-Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

CAMBREX CHARLES CITY, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 327330 Court of Claims DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, LC No. 13-000060-MT

Defendant-Appellee.

CAMBREX CHARLES CITY, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v No. 327331 Court of Claims DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, LC No. 12-000044-MT

Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

EMC CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v No. 327333 Court of Claims DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, LC No. 13-000048-MT

Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

EMC CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v No. 327334 Court of Claims-7- DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, LC No. 12-000040-MT

Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

Before: R IORDAN , P.J., and J ANSEN and H OOD , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

I. INTRODUCTION

In these 23 consolidated appeals, 1 the plaintiffs are taxpayers who respectively appeal as of right orders granting summary disposition in each case to de fendant, the Michigan Department of Treasury. Each appeal raises common issues challenging the Court of Claims’ holding that the mandatory apportionment provision of the Single Business Ta x Act (“SBTA”), MCL 208.1 et seq ., 2 impliedly repealed a provision of Michigan’s enactment of the Multistate Tax Compact (“the Compact”), MCL 205.581 et seq ., 3 which allowed multistate taxpayers to apportion their tax base using an equally weighted , three-factor formula set fo rth in the Compact. Plaintiffs further contend that an implied repeal of the Compact’s electio n provision violates the terms of the Compact—which, according to plaintiffs, was binding on subs equent legislatures—and violates state and federal constitutional provisions. Addition ally, in Docket N o. 327251, plaintiff Johnson Matthey, Inc. (“Johnson Ma tthey”) also argues that it w as entitled to apportion its Michigan Business Tax (“MBT”) base pursuant to the Compact appo rtionment formula, and that the retroactive repeal of the Compact by 2014 PA 282 violated t he terms of the Compact and various constitutional provisions.

In cross-appeals in all of the cases except for Cambrex Charles City, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury (Docket No. 327330), and as alternative grounds for affirmance in all of the cases, defendant argues that the SBT is not an income tax under the ap portionment election provision of the Compact and that the retroactive repeal of the Compact b y 2014 PA 282 barred plaintiffs from asserting their resp ective SBT refund claims.

Because we conclude that the SBTA did not impliedly repeal the Compact apportionment election provision, we reverse and r emand for further proceedin gs consistent wit h this opinion.

1 AK Steel Holding Corp v Dep’t of Treasury , unpublished order of the C ourt of Appeals, entered November 24, 2015 (Docket Nos. 327175 et al ).

2 The entire SBTA was repealed by 2006 PA 325 and replaced with the Michigan Business Tax Act (“MBTA”). All subsequent references to the SBTA, MCL 208.1 et seq., shall incorporate this repeal.

3 The Compact was expressly and retroactively repealed by 2014 P A 282, effective beginning January 1, 2008. All subsequent to the Compact should similarl y incorporate this later explicit repeal.-8- II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 4

Plaintiffs in the present cases are claiming SBT refunds for a t least one tax year between 2005 and 2007. In particular, pl aintiffs seek to reduce their SBT liability for the tax years at issue by apportioning their in come through the equally weighted , three-factor apportionment formula provided in the Compact rather than the three-factor fo rmula provided in the SBTA, which weighted the sales factor of the formula more heavily. A s the Court of Claims stated, the principal issue in these cases is “whether the SBT apportionmen t formula for the tax years in question is mandatory or whether an SBT taxpayer may elect to a pportion its tax base to Michigan using the Compact’s equa lly weighted, three-factor app ortionment formula.”

A. THE SBTA

From January 1, 1976, until its repeal effective December 31, 2007, the SBTA governed the taxation of business activity in Michigan. See 1975 PA 228 ; 2006 PA 325. Under the SBTA, a tax base was calculated by beginning with a business’s federal taxable income and then adding back compensation, deprec iation, and other factors, as w ell as making other adjustments. See Trinova Corp v Mich Dep’t of Treasury , 498 US 358, 366-367; 111 S Ct 818; 112 L Ed 2d 884 (1991) ( Trinova II ). Throughout its history, the SB T was apportioned using a thr ee-factor formula consisting of payroll, property, and sales. As the Cou rt of Claims explained in its opinion, this formula originally weighted the three factors equ ally, in accordance with previous business taxes in Michigan and the nearly universal practice of other states at the time. However, in later years, many st ates moved away from an equally weighted, three- factor formula by more heavily weighting the sale s factor. Following this tre nd, the Michigan Legislature abandoned uniform apportionment and began to more heavily weigh t the sales factor in 1991. See 1991 PA 77. Subsequent amendments continued to weigh the s ales factor even more heavily. For tax years 1999 through 2005, the sales factor was weighted at 90%, and for 2006 and 2007, the sales factor was weighted at 92.5%. See 1995 PA 283; 2005 PA 295; MCL 208.45a(1)(c), (2)(c), repealed by 2006 PA 325.

B. THE COMPACT

The Compact originally was adopted by seven states in 1967. Th e Michigan Legislature adopted the Compact provisions e ffective in 19 70. See 1969 PA 343. While Congress never approved the Compact, it was upheld against constitutional chal lenges. See US Steel Corp v Multistate Tax Comm , 434 US 452; 98 S Ct 799; 54 L Ed 2d 682 (1978). The Compact established the Multistate Tax Commission (“the Commission”), b ut each state remained free to adopt or reject the Commission’s rules and regulations and rema ined free to withdraw from the Compact at any time. See id . at 473. Most relevant to this appeal, Article IV of the Comp act set forth a three-factor apportionment formula that equally weighte d property, payroll, and sales factors. MCL 205.581, Art IV(9). Article III of the Compact p rovided that a taxpayer subject to

4 In summarizing the historical development of the law in Michig an, we rely heavily on the Court of Claims’ comprehensive and well-written recitation of t he relevant legal background in its opinion issued in EMCO Enterprises, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury (Docket No. 327313).-9- an income tax “in two or more party states may elect to apporti on and allocate his income in the manner provided by the laws of such states . . . without refere nce to this compact, or may elect to apportion and allocate in accordance with article IV.” MCL 205 .581, Art III(1).

On May 25, 2011, the Michigan Legislature passed 2011 PA 40, wh ich amended the Compact so that a multistate taxpayer subject to the MBTA or th e income tax act of 1967 could not elect the Compact apportionment formula beginning January 1 , 2011. Then, on September 11, 2014, our Legislature enacted 2014 PA 282, which retroactiv ely repealed the Compact provisions effective January 1, 2008, and mandated the use of a single sales-factor apportionment formula for the purpose of calculating the MBT an d the corporate income tax. As the Court of Claims explained in EMCO :
PA 282 thus amended the MBT to express the “original intent” o f the Legislature with regard to (1) the repeal of the Compact provis ions, (2) application of the MBT’s apportionment provision under MCL 208. 1301, and (3) the intended effect of the Comp act’s election provision under M CL 205.581. The effect of the amendments, as written, retroactively eliminates a taxpayer’s ability to elect a three-factor apportionment formula in calculating ta x liability under both the MBT and the [corporate income tax].

C. THE COURT OF CLAIMS’ DECISION

In one of the present appeals, EMCO Enterprises, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury (Docket No. 327313) (“ EMCO ”), the Court of Claims issued a 29-page opinion addressing the plaintiff’s claims and granting summary disposition in favor of defendant p ursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2). In summarizing its decision, the Court of Claims stated:

The Court, in fulfilling its dut y to ascertain and apply the i ntent of the Legislature, finds that the taxpayer is required to use the app ortionment formulas mandated under the SBTA for the t ax years in question, and is n ot entitled to elect a different apportionment formula under the Compact. Though th e SBT is an income tax within the meaning of t he Compact, future legislatur es were not bound by the policies of the legislature that en acted 1969 PA 343. T he purpose of state tax uniformity as embedded in both the Compact’s apportionment elective provision by the 1969 legislature, and the SBTA’s equally weigh ted, three-factor apportionment formula as originally enacted by the 1975 legisla ture, is not consistent with the purpose of later amendments made to apporti onment formulas by the Legislature. Under tradi tional rules of statutory const ruction, the apportionment formula under the SBTA for the tax years in quest ion must control.

More specifically, in its EMCO opinion, the Court of Claims concluded that the Compact was advisory and did not bind future legislatures, that the Compact was not a binding contract under Michigan law, and that the Legislature was therefore free to ma ndate the use of apportionment formulas that deviated from the formula set forth in the Compac t. The court further determined that the SBTA in effect during the tax years at issue conflicte d with the Compact apportionment election provision by requiring th e use of a different apportio nment formula from that provided in the Compact, and that these provisions could not be harmoniz ed. Thus, the Court of Claims-10- concluded that the SBTA apportionment provision was controlling and had impliedly repealed the Compact’s apportionment elec tion provision. Further, the c ourt rejected arguments that denying plaintiffs the right to elect the Compact’s equally wei ghted, three-factor apportionment formula violated the Commerce a nd Due Process Clauses of the Un ited States Constitution.

In the remaining appeals, the Court of Claims entered essential ly identical orders in each case granting summary dispositi on in favor of defendant pursuan t to MCR 2.116(I)(1) on the basis of the reasoning in the EMCO opinion. 5

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(1) is reviewed de novo

. Gillette Commercial Operations Nort h America & Subsidiaries v Dep’t of Treasury , ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2015) (Docket Nos. 32525 8 et al ); slip op at 16, lv pending (“ Gillette ”). MCR 2.116(I)(1) provides, “If the pleadings show that a pa rty is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or if the affidavits o r other proofs show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the court shall render judgment without delay.” 6 We also review de novo issues involving statutory interpretation as well as constituti onal questions. Gillette , ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 16.

IV. IMPLIED REPEAL OF THE C OMPACT ELECTION PROVISION

The central issue in this case is whether the Court of Claims erred in concluding that the SBTA’s mandatory apportionment provision impliedly repealed the Compact’s apportionment election provision for th e tax years at issue ( i.e. , 2005, 2006, and 2007). We agr ee with plaintiffs

5 In Johnson Matthey (Docket No. 327251), the Court of Claims’ order also included language referencing the Court of Claims’ opinions in two other cases ho lding that 2014 PA 282 negated the plaintiffs’ claims for refunds under the MBTA. The two cas es were Yaskawa America, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury (Docket No. 325475), and Ingram Micro, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury (Docket No. 325507), both of which were part of the 50 consolidated appeals that were the subject of this Court’s recent published opinion in Gillette Commercial Operations North America & Subsidiaries v Dep’t of Treasury , ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2015) (Docket Nos. 325258 et al ), lv pending, which is disc ussed later in this opinion.

6 The Court of Claims’ opinion in EMCO stated that it was granting summary disposition to defendant pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2 ), which states: “If it app ears to the court that the opposing party, rather than the moving party, is entitled to judgment, t he court may render judgment in favor of the opposing party.” However, the orders in the other 22 consolidated cases stated that summary disposition was granted to defendant pursuant to MCR 2. 116(I)(1). The issues raised in these cases concern questions of law. As such, whether defe ndant is entitled to summary disposition is a matter of law. Thus, we conclude that review under MCR 2.116(I)(1) is proper. It is well settled that regardless of the subrule cited by the trial court in granting summary disposition, this Court will rev iew the court’s order under the correct subrule. See Spiek v Dep’t of Transp , 456 Mich 331, 338 n 9; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).-11- and hold that the SBTA did not impliedly repeal the Compact’s a pportionment election provision.

A. BACKGROUND LAW

“When interpreting statutory language, our obligation is to as certain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words expressed in the statute.” Koontz v Ameritech Servs, Inc , 466 Mich 304, 312; 645 NW2d 34 (2002). “Courts must give eff ect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute, a nd must avoid an interpretati on that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.” Id . Statutory language must be read in context, and undefined words are to be given their plain and ordinary meanings. MidAmerican Energy Co v Dep’t of Treasury , 308 Mich App 362, 370; 863 NW2d 387 (2014). “If the language of the statute is unambiguous, the Legislature must have intended the meaning cle arly expressed, and the statute must be enforced as written.” Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward , 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999).

In general, “repeals by imp lication are disfavored.” Wayne Co Prosecutor v Dep’t of Corrections , 451 Mich 569, 576; 548 NW2d 900 (1996). As such, it is gener ally presumed “that if the Legislature had intended to repeal a statute or statutor y provision, it would have done so explicitly.” Id . When presented with a claim that two statutes conflict, a co urt must endeavor to construe the statutes ha rmoniously if possible. Id

. [R]epeal by implication will not be found if any other reasonab le construction may be given to the statutes, such as reading in pari materia two statutes that share a common purpose or subject, or as one law, even if the t wo statutes were enacted on different dates and contain no reference to one anot her. However, a repeal of a statute may be inferred in two instances: (1) where it is clear that a subsequent legislative act conflicts with a prior act; or (2) w hen a subsequent act of the Legislature clearly is in tended to occupy the entire fie ld covered by a prior enactment. [ City of Kalamazoo v KTS Indus, Inc , 263 Mich App 23, 36-37; 687 NW2d 319 (2004) (citations omitted; emphasis added).]

Similarly, the Michigan Supreme Court previously explained, “[ I]f the provisions of a later statute are so at variance with those of an earlier act, or a part thereof, that both cannot be given effect[,] then the later e nactment control[s] and there i s a repeal by implication. In such a case it must be presumed that the legislature intended a repeal .” Jackson v Mich Corrections Comm , 313 Mich 352, 357; 21 NW2d 159 (1946). “Repeals by implicati on are not favored, but do happen, and, when clear, must be given effect.” Id . (quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, “if there is such rep ugnance that both [statutes] ca nnot operate, then the last expression of the legislative will must control.” Id . at 356. “[T]he latter act operates to the extent of the repugnancy , as a repeal of the first . . . .” Id . at 357 (quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Metro Life Ins Co v Stoll , 276 Mich 637, 641; 268 NW 763 (1936) (“It is the rule that where two laws in pari materia are in irreconcilable conflict, the one last enacted will control or be regarded as an e xception to or qualification of t he prior statute.”). Notably, “when faced with two statutes that bear on the same subject, our task is not to discern the most logical construction of the more recent statute, but to labor to permit the survival of both enactments if-12- possible.” House Speaker v State Admin Bd , 441 Mich 547, 571-572; 495 NW2d 539 (1993) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. ANALYSIS

During the tax years at issue in this case, § 41 of the SBTA pr ovided that “[a] taxpayer whose business activities are taxable both within and without t his state, shall apportion his tax base as provided in this chapter.” MCL 208.41 (emphasis added) . As previously discussed, for tax years prior to 1991, the SBTA prescribed an equally weighte d, three-factor apportionment formula comprised of property, payroll, and sales factors. Beg inning with the 1991 tax year, however, the SBTA required the sa les factor to be weighted more heavily than the other factors, and the weight of the sales factor was further increased in lat er tax years by legislative amendments to the act. See MCL 208.45; MCL 208.45a. For the 2 005 tax year, the sales factor was weighted at 90%. MCL 208.45a(1)(c). For the 2006 and 2007 tax years, the sales factor was weighted at 92.5%. MCL 208.45a(2)(c).

To the contrary, during the tax years at issue, the Compact’s apportionment election provision stated:

(1) Any taxpayer subject to an income tax whose income is subj ect to apportionment and allocation for tax purposes pursuant to the l aws of a party state or pursuant to the laws of subdivisions in 2 or more party stat es may elect to apportion and allocate his income in the manner provided by the laws of such state or by the laws of such states and subdivisions without re ference to this compact, or may elect to apportion and allocate in accordance w ith Article IV . . . . [MCL 205.581, Art III(1).]

As explained supra , article IV of the Compact set forth an equally weighted, thre e-factor apportionment formula comprised of property, payroll, and sales factors. MCL 205.581, Art IV(9). Thus, the Compact electi on “provision allow[ed] a taxpa yer subject to an income tax to elect to use a party state’s apportionment formula or the Compa ct’s [equally weighted,] threefactor formula.” Int’l Business Machines Corp v Dep’t of Treasury , 496 Mich 642, 653; 852 NW2d 865 (2014) (opinion by V IVIANO , J.) (“ IBM ”).

The Court of Claims correctly concluded that an apparent confl ict exists between the language of the SBTA and the Compact election provision. Under § 41 of the SBTA, a multistate taxpayer “ shall apportion his tax base as provi ded in this chapter.” MCL 208. 41 (emphasis added). “The Legislature’s use of the word ‘shall’ g enerally indicates a mandatory directive, not a discretionary act.” Smitter v Thornapple Twp , 494 Mich 121, 136; 833 NW2d 875 (2013). The SBTA apportionment formula for the tax years a t issue weighted the sales factor more heavily than the other factors, MCL 208.45a(1)(c), (2)(c), and there is no language in the SBTA indicating that a taxpayer was permitted to use an app ortionment formula other than the one provided in that chapte r. By contrast, the language of the Compact allowed a taxpayer to choose the equally weighted, thre e-factor formula in the Compac t. MCL 205.581, Arts III(1), IV(9). As the Court of Claims explained, “[b]ecause the SBTA d uring the tax years in question mandates the use of one apportionment formula, while the Compac t provides for the discretionary use of another appo rtionment formula, the statute s are in apparent conflict.”-13- However, we disagree with the Court of Claims that the two stat utes cannot be harmonized. Rather, we find persuasive the reasoning utilized in the lead opinion in IBM , 496 Mich at 651-662 (opinion by V IVIANO , J.), 7 concerning the interplay between the MBT and the Compact. Consistent with that an alysis, we hold that it is pos sible to reasonably construe § 41 of the SBTA and Articles III(1) and I V(9) of the Compact in harmon y with each other.

The lead opinion explained,

[W]here the intent of the Legislature is claimed to be unclear, it is our duty to proceed on the assumption that the Legislature desired both sta tutes to continue in effect unless it manifestly appear s that such view is not reaso nably plausible. Repeals by implication will be allowed only when the inconsiste ncy and repugnancy are plain an d unavoidable. We will construe statute s, claimed to be in conflict, harmoniously to find any other reasonable construction than a repeal by implication. Only when we determine that two statutes are so i ncompatible that both cannot stand will we find a repeal by implication. [ IBM , 496 Mich at 651- 652 (opinion by V IVIANO , J.) (quotation marks and footnotes omitted).]

In attempting to find a harmonious construction, courts should consider all statutes addressing the same general subject matter as comprising part of one syste m. Id . at 652, citing Rathbun v Michigan , 284 Mich 521, 544; 280 NW 35 (1938). “Further, ‘[s]tatutes in pari materia , although in apparent conflict, should, so f ar as reasonably possible, be construed in harmony with each other, so as to give force and effect to each . . . .’ ” IBM , 496 Mich at 652 (opinion by V IVIANO , J.) (alterations in original), quoting Rathbun , 284 Mich at 544.

It is a well-established rule that in the construction of a par ticular statute, or in the interpretation of its provisions, all statutes relating to the same subject, or having the same general purpose, should be read in connection with it, as together constituting one law, although they were enacted at different t imes, and contain no reference to one another. The endeavor should be made, by t racing the history of legislation on the subject, t o ascertain the uniform and con sistent purpose of the legislature, or to discover how the policy of the legislature w ith reference to the subject-matter has been changed or modified from time to time. In other words, in determining the meaning of a particular statute, resort may be had to the established policy of t he legislature as disclosed by a general course of legislation. With this purpose in view theref ore it is proper to consider, n ot only acts passed at the same session of the legislature, but also acts passed at pr ior and subsequent sessions. [ IBM , 496 Mich at 652-653 (opinion by V IVIANO , J.), quoting Rathbun

, 284 Mich at 543-544 (block quote omitted).]

7 Because a majority of the justices in IBM did not agree on the implied- repeal analysis contained in the lead opinion, the lead opi nion’s holding on that issue i s not binding authority. See Burns v Olde Discount Corp , 212 Mich App 576, 582; 538 NW2d 686 (1995); Felsner v McDonald Rent-A-Car, Inc , 193 Mich App 565, 569; 484 NW2d 408 (1992).-14- Thus, the Compact’s election provision and § 41 of the SBTA sho uld be construed together as
statutes in pari materia because they share, like the Compact and the MBTA, “the common purpose of setting forth the methods of apportionment of a taxp ayer’s multistate business income.” IBM , 496 Mich at 653 (opinion by V IVIANO , J.). 8

In reviewing the statutes in pari materia , we conclude that the following reasoning, employed by the lead opinion in IBM with regard to the MBTA and the Compact, is equally applicable in this case:

[T]he Compact’s election provisi on, by using the terms “may ele ct,” contemplates a divergence between a party sta te’s mandated apportionment for mula and the Compact’s own formula—either at the time of the Compact’s adopt ion by a party state or at some point in the fu ture. Otherwise, there would b e no point in giving taxpayers an election between the two. In fact, reading the Co mpact’s election provision as forward-looking—i.e ., contemplating the future ena ctment of a state income tax with a mandatory apportionment formula different fro m the Compact’s apportionment formula—is the only way to give meaning to the provision when it was enacted in Michigan. Viewed in this ligh t, the [MBT’s] mandatory apportionment language may plausibly be read as compa tible with the Compact’s election provision.

8 We recognize that the rule of in pari materia “does not permit the use of a previous statute to control by way of former policy the plain language of a subsequ ent statute . . . .” Voorhies v Faust , 220 Mich 155, 157; 189 NW 1006 ( 1922). However, neither the IBM lead opinion, nor our opinion in this case, effectiv ely resolves the conflict bet ween the MBT or the SBT in favor of the Compact, i.e. , the earlier enacted statute, or permits the utilization of the apportionmen t provision in the Compact in such a way that contradicts the pla in language of a subsequent statute. Rather, as explained in this opinion, we conclude tha t the apportionment provisions of the SBTA and the Compact can be read harmoniously. Additionally, we recognize that “th e interpretive aid of the d octrine of in pari materia can only be utilized in a situation wh ere the section of the statut e under examination is itself ambiguous.” Tyler v Livonia Pub Sch , 459 Mich 382, 392; 590 NW2d 560 (1999), citing Voorhies , 220 Mich at 157; see also In re Indiana Mich Power Co , 297 Mich App 332, 344; 824 NW2d 246 (2012). However, this p rinciple does not preclude the use of the doctrine in this case. Although the language of § 41 of the SBTA arguably may be unamb iguous when read in isolation, the interpretation a nd construction of that section— or a determination of the applicability of that section on its own—is not at issue here. Rather, we are inescapably required to consider the effect of MCL 208.41 on th e Compact election provision

, which, in this case, clearly requires consideration of the statutes together in the context of the statutory scheme as a whole. Cf. KTS Indus, Inc , 263 Mich App at 36-37 (“[R]epeal by implication will not be f ound if any other reasonable construction may be given to the statut es, such as reading in pari materia two statutes that share a common purpose or subject, or as one law, even if the two statutes were enacted on different dates and c ontain no reference to one anot her.”).-15- * * *

Because the Legislature gave no clear indication that it inten ded to repeal the Compact’s election provision, we proceed under the assumpti on that the Legislature intended for both to remain in effect. After readi ng the statutes in pari materia , we conclude that a reasonable construction exists other than a repeal by implication. Under Article III (1) of the Compact, the Legis lature provided a multistate taxpayer with a choice between the apportionment met hod contained in the Compact or the apportionment method required by Michigan’s tax laws. If a taxpayer elects to apportion its income through the Compact, Ar ticle IV(9) mandates that the taxpayer do so using a three-factor apportion ment formula. Alternatively, if the taxpayer does not make the Compact electi on, then the taxpayer must use the apportionment formula set forth in Michig an’s governing tax laws. In this case, IBM’s tax base arose under the [MBT]. Had it not elected to use the Compact’s apportionment formula, IBM would have been required to apportion its tax base consisten tly with the mandatory language of the [MBT]— i.e., through the [MBT’s] sales -factor apportionment formula. Thus, we believe the [MBT] and the Compact are compatible and can be read as a h armonious whole. [ Id . at 656-658 (opinion by V IVIANO , J.).]

In the context of the instant case, the Legislature provided pl aintiffs with a choice, through Article III(1) of the Com pact, between the apportionmen t method contained in the Compact or the apportionment me thod required by the SBTA. If a taxpayer elects to apportion its income as provided by the Compact, Article IV(9) requires t hat the taxpayer do so using a three-factor apportionment formula. Alternatively, if the taxp ayer does not elect the apportionment method under the Co mpact, then the taxpayer is re quired to use the apportionment formula set forth in the applicable tax laws. There is a reaso nable construction that harmonizes the two statutes. Thus, the presumption against implied repeals has not been rebutted here. See id . at 660 (“[B]ecause the re is a presumption against implied repeals, it is our task to determine if there is any other reasonable construction that would harmonize the two statutes and avoid a repeal by implication.” [Footnotes omitted.]).

The lead opinion in IBM also found that its conclusion that the Compact apportionment provision was not impliedly repea led was consistent with the de velopment of Michigan tax law, concluding that a “review of the statutes in pari materia indicates a uniform and consistent purpose of the Legislature for the Compact’s election provision to operate alongs ide Michigan’s tax acts.” Id . at 656. The opinion noted that the Legislature, despite its full knowledge of the Compact, left its election provi sion intact while repealing or amending other acts that were inconsistent with provisions concerning business taxation. Id . at 657. Likewise, the opinion also noted the Legislature’s retroactiv e amendment of the Compact ef fective January 1, 2011, which did not apply to all tax years subject to the MBTA, in ascertai ning the Legislature’s intent to keep the Compact’s provisions intact despite the enactment and amendment of the MBTA. Id . at 658-659 (discussing 2011 PA 40).

We acknowledge the enactment of 2014 PA 282, which provides, in pertinent part:-16- Enacting section 1. 1969 PA 343, MCL 205.581 to 205.589, is re pealed retroactively and effective beginning January 1, 2008. It is the intent of the legislature that the repeal of 1969 PA 343, MCL 205.581 to 205.589, is to express the original intent of the legislature regarding the application of section 301 of the Michigan business tax act, 2007 PA 36, MCL 208.1301, and the intended effect of that section to eliminate the election provision incl uded within section 1 of 1969 PA 343, MCL 205.581, and that the 2011 amendatory act that amended section 1 of 1969 PA 343, MCL 205.581, was to further express t he original intent of the legislature regarding the application of section 301 of the Michigan business tax act, 2007 PA 36, MCL 208.1301, and to clarify that the election provision included within s ection 1 of 1969 PA 343, MCL 205.581 , is not available under the income t ax act of 1967, 1967 PA 281, MCL 20 6.1 to 206.713. [Emphasis added.]

Through 2014 PA 282, the Legislat ure clarified—contrary to the lead opinion’s conclusion in IBM —that it had intended to impliedly repeal the Compact when it e nacted the MBT through 2007 PA 36, and that this intent was further revealed by its su bsequent express repeal of the Compact election provision, e ffective January 1, 2011, under 20 11 PA 40.

However, in clarifying its legislative intent, the Legislature included nothing in 2014 PA 282 regarding the validity of th e Compact election provision fo r multistate taxpayers subject to the SBTA before the effective da te of the MBTA. In so doing, t he Legislature left open the application of the Compact apporti onment formula during tax yea rs subject to the SBTA. If it so chose, the Legislature easily could have closed this door. Ins tead, it chose not to, and it is not our role to second guess its reasoning for not doing so. Thus, we conclude, consistent with the lead opinion’s analysis in IBM , that

the Legislature, in enacting [and amending] the [SBTA], had ful l knowledge of the Compact and its provisions. Even with such knowledge on [multiple] occasions, the Legislature left the Compact’s election provisio n intact [with regard to the SBTA]. By contrast, the Legislature expressly re pealed or amended other inconsistent acts regarding the taxation of businesses[, including its repeal of the Compact with regard to tax years subject to the MBTA]. Had the Legislature believed that the C ompact’s election provision no l onger had a place in Michigan’s tax system or conflicted with the purpose of the [SBTA], it could have taken the necessary action to eliminate the election provi sion. [ IBM , 496 Mich at 657 (opinion by V IVIANO , J.).]

See also id . at 659 n 59 (“ ‘[T]he later expr ess repeal of a particular st atute may be some indication that the legislature did not previously intend to re peal the statute by implication.’ ”), quoting 1A Singer, Sutherland Sta tutory Construction (7th ed), § 23:11, p 485.

Accordingly, especially in light of the Legislature’s clear exp ressions of intent regarding the express and implied repeal of the Compact in conjunction wi th the enactment of the MBTA, and the lack of any indication that § 41 of the SBTA was intend ed to repeal the apportionment election provision in the Compact, we assume that the Legislatu re intended for the Compact-17- election provisions to remain in effect alongside the SBTA. Se e id . at 657. Additionally, as explained supra , the statutes may be reasona bly construed in harmony. See id

. Thus, because a “repeal by implication will not be found if any other reasonable construction may be given to the statutes,” KTS Indus , 263 Mich App at 36-37 (emphasis added), the Court of Claims erre d in concluding that the Compac t’s election provision was impliedly repealed by the SBTA.

V. THE BINDING NATURE OF THE CO MPACT AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES

Next, plaintiffs raise a series of arguments regarding whether the Compact was binding on subsequent legislatures, whether the Compact was superior to statutory law, and whether an implied repeal of the Compact would violate various state and f ederal constitutional provisions. These claims are rooted in the Court of Claims’ conclusion that the Compact was impliedly repealed by the SBTA. As explained supra , we hold that the SBTA did not impliedly repeal the Compact’s apportionment election provision. Thus, to the exten t that plaintiffs assert that a repeal of the apportionment election provision of the Compact was imp ermissible or violated state and federal constitutional provisions, we need not addres s those claims in light of our holding. 9 Furthermore, we reject any of plaintiffs’ additional claims t hat are not rooted in the assumption that the SBTA impliedl y repealed the election apport ionment provisions of Compact—and, instead, concern wh ether the Compact is binding an d superior to Michigan statutory law—for the reasons provided by this Court in reviewi ng the validity of 2014 PA 282 in Gillette , which are discussed next in the context of Johnson Matthey’s challenges to 2014 PA 282.

9 Plaintiffs also claim that the Court of Claims erred in determ ining that plaintiffs’ constitutional claims were untimely. For the r easons stated above, we need no t address this issue. Nevertheless, we note that the Court of Claims correctly held t hat plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges were untimely. Pursuant to MCL 205.2 7a(7), a taxpayer claiming a refund on the basis that a Michigan tax statute is invalid unde r, or is preempted by, a constitutional provision or fede ral law must claim a refund wit hin 90 days of the date set for filing a return. See also American States Ins Co v Dep’t of Treasury , 220 Mich App 586, 589, 591; 560 NW2d 644 (1996). Plaintiffs are seeking refunds premi sed in part on claims that an implied repeal of the Compact e lection provision would violate various constitutional provisions. As such, they are claiming refunds based on arguments that a ta x statute is preempted by constitutional provisions. A ccordingly, under MCL 205.27a, the y were required to file those claims within 90 days after the date set for filing a return. The Court of Claims found that plaintiffs did not assert their constitutional claims within the 90-day period, and plaintiffs fail to dispute that finding. Additionally, some plaintiffs do not even address the Court of Claim s’ ruling that the constitutiona l claims were untimely. To the extent that these plaintiffs fail to address the basis of the C ourt of Claims’ decision, we deem this argument abandoned. Derderian v Genesys Health Care Sys , 263 Mich App 364, 381; 689 NW2d 145 (2004).-18- VI. JOHNSON MATTHEY’S CHALLENGES TO 2014 PA 282

In Docket No. 327251, Johnson Matthey challenges the validity a nd constitutionality of 2014 PA 282 (hereinafter referred to as “PA 282”), which the Le gislature enacted to retroactively withdraw Michiga n from the Compact. We reject Jo hnson Matthey’s claims.

Johnson Matthey’s numerous state and federal constitutional c hallenges are identical in all relevant respects to the ar guments raised by some of the pl aintiffs in Gillette . In that case, we concluded that the Compact was not a binding contract on this s tate but was merely an advisory agreement, such that PA 282’s removal of Michigan from membersh ip in the Compact was not prohibited. Gillette , ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 18-19, 21-22. Further, “the Compact contained no features of a binding interstate compact and, ther efore, was not a compact enforceable under the Contract Clause.” Id . at ___; slip op at 20. Acco rdingly, the Compact was not superior to statutory law, a nd it was “subject to Michigan law concerning the interpretation of statutes.” Id . at ___; slip op at 18-19, 22. See also id . at ___ n 4; slip op at 19 n 4. Furthermore, a retroactive repea l of the Compact did not violat e the Contract Clauses of either the federal or state Constitutions. Id . at ___; slip op at 19, 21.

We also held that “the retroactive repeal of the Compact did no t violate the Due Process Clauses of either the state or federal [C]onstitutions or Michi gan’s rules regarding retrospective legislation. Nor did it violate the terms of the Compact itsel f.” Id . at ___; slip op at 22. Additionally, we held that the e nactment of PA 282 “did not vio late the separation of powers provision of the state Constitution[.]” Id . at ___; slip op at 30. Moreover, “PA 282 does not violate the Commerce Clause” of the United States Constitution. Id . at ___; slip op at 32. We also concluded that “the enactment of 2014 PA 282 did not viola te the Title-Object Clause, the Five-Day Rule, or the Distinct-Statement Clause of the Michigan Constitution.” Id . at ___; slip op at 34. Likewise, we rejected the plaintiffs’ change-in-purp ose challenge. Id . at ___; slip op at 38.

In sum, we rejected in Gillette the same arguments that Johnson Matthey raises here. Thus, Johnson Matthey’s constitu tional challenges to PA 282 are devoid of merit.

VII. WHETHER THE SBT IS AN INCOME TAX

Defendant argues on cross-appeal that the Court of Claims erre d in concluding that the SBT is an income tax for purposes of the Compact election provi sion, such that the court erroneously concluded that the SBT A was subject to, and therefo re conflicted with, the Compact’s election prov ision. We disagree.

As stated supra , the Compact’s apportionment election provision previously sta ted:

(1) Any taxpayer subject to an income tax whose income is subject to apportionment and allocation for tax purposes pursuant to the l aws of a party state or pursuant to the laws of subdivisions in 2 or more party stat es may elect to apportion and allocate his income in the manner provided by the laws of such state or by the laws of such states and subdivisions without re ference to this compact, or may elect to apportion and allocate in accordance w ith Article IV . . . . [MCL 205.581, Art III(1) (emphasis added).]-19- The Compact defined an “income tax” as “a tax imposed on or mea sured by net income including any tax imposed on or measured by an amount arrived a t by deducting expenses from gross income, 1 or more forms of which expenses are not specifi cally and directly related to particular transactions.” MCL 205.581, Art II(4). As such, “[ u]nder the Compact’s broad definition, a tax is an income tax if the tax measures net inco me by subtracting expenses from gross income, with at least one of the expense deductions not b eing specifically and directly related to a partic ular transaction.” IBM , 496 Mich at 663 (opinion by V IVIANO , J.).

The SBT fits this definition. The SBT base is calculated by u sing federal taxable income as a starting point and then ma king various additions and subtr actions as required by the act. Mobil Oil Corp v Dep’t of Treasury , 422 Mich 473, 497, 497 n 15; 373 NW2d 730 (1985). See also Trinova Corp v Dep’t of Treasury , 433 Mich 141, 150; 445 NW2d 428 (1989) ( Trinova I ), aff’d 498 US 358; 111 S Ct 818; 112 L Ed 2d 884 (1991); Lear Corp v Dep’t of Treasury , 299 Mich App 533, 537; 831 NW2d 255 (2013) (“The SBTA unambiguously stated that ‘[tax base] means business income’ and ‘[business income] means federal tax able income.’ MCL 208.9(1); MCL 208.3(3).” [Alterations in or iginal.]). Fed eral taxable i ncome, for purposes of the SBT, consists of gross income minus deductions allowed by the federa l tax code. See MCL 208.5(3), citing 26 USC 63. See also 26 USC 63(a); Mobil Oil , 422 Mich at 497 n 15. In general, deductions from gross income permitted by the federal tax code include ordinary and necessary expenses that are paid or incurred while running a business. S ee 26 USC 162(a); Mobil Oil , 422 Mich at 489.

As the Court of Claims explained, pursuant to MCL 208.9(2) thro ugh (6), “[t]he SBT . . . expands the income tax base by adding back some, but not all, o f the federal expense deductions taken to arrive at federal taxa ble income.” The Court of Claim s further explained:

For example, except for compensation, most ordinary and necessa ry business expenses incurred in the carrying on of a trade or business are deducted from gross income to arrive at federal taxable income, but are not a dded back as part of the SBT tax base. The resulting tax is thus in part measured b y “an amount arrived at by deducting expenses from gross income” for purpose s of defining income tax under the Compact. That some expenses such as compe nsation are also added back to the SBT tax base before the tax is calculate d does not alter the conclusion that the SBT is “ imposed on or measured by an amount arrived at by deducting expenses from gross income , 1 or more forms of which expenses are not specifically and directly rel ated to particular transaction s.” Under the plain language of the Compact, it is therefore an income tax for Comp act purposes. [Citations omitted.]

See also Trinova I , 433 Mich at 150-151 (explaining some of the adjustments to “business income,” i.e., federal taxable i ncome, which must be made when calculating the SBT base); id . at 149 n 6 (noting that the SBTA prescribed “various exclusions, e xemptions, and industry-specific adjustments”).-20- As the Court of Claims reasoned, some ordinary business expense s, such as insurance premiums, rent, 10 and research and development costs, which are deducted when ca lculating federal taxable income, 11 are not added back when determining the SBT base. See MCL 208 .9 (prescribing the adjustments to federal taxable income that are required in calculating the SBT base). Consistent with the Compact’s definition, these expense s are not specifica lly and directly related to particular trans actions. See MCL 205.581, Art II(4)

. Therefore, because the SBT is calculated by beginning with fede ral taxable income, which consists of gross income minus federally allowed deductio ns, and because some deductions allowed under the federal tax code are not added bac k to the SBT base, it follows that the SBT is measured by an amount arrived at through the deducti on of expenses from gross income. Thus, the Court of Claims properly determined that the SBTA qualifies as an income tax as defined by the Compact because it “tax[ed] a variation o f net income[.]” IBM , 496 Mich at 667 (opinion by V IVIANO , J.).

As defendant emphasizes on appeal, we recognize that a provisi on of the SBTA stated that “[t]he tax levied under this section and imposed is upon t he privilege of doing business and not upon income.” MCL 208.31(3). However, a similar provision of the MBTA provided that “[t]he [modified gross receipts tax (“MGRT”)] levied and impose d under this section is upon the privilege of doing business an d not upon income or property,” M CL 208.1203(2), and this provision did not prevent the Mic higan Supreme Court from unani mously concluding in IBM that the MGRT was an “income tax” under the broad definition of that term in the Compact, see IBM , 496 Mich at 665-667 (opinion by V IVIANO , J.); id . at 664 (“Although this statement indicates that the MGRT is not a tax upon income under the [M]B TA, we must still determine whether the MGRT fits under the broad definition of ‘income tax ’ under the Compact.”); id . at 668 (Z AHRA , J., concurring); id . at 672 n 3 (M C C ORMACK , J., dissenting).

As the lead opinion in IBM explained, the Court was not r equired to “put a definitive label on the MGRT, a task with which commentators have struggle d.” Id . at 663 n 70 (opinion by V IVIANO , J.). Commentators had characteri zed the MGRT as many types of taxes other than an income tax, but the lead opinion in IBM emphasized that its task was merely to determine whether the MGRT constituted an “income tax” under the Compact’ s definition. Id .; see also id

. at 667 n 85 (“Our holding is limited to the determination that the MGRT is included within the Compact definition of ‘income ta x.’ . . . [W]e do not need to reach the issue whether the MGRT, generally, is an income tax.”).

Likewise, here, the labels that have been used to describe the SBT in various contexts are not dispositive of whether the SBT qualifies as an income tax u nder the broad Compact

10 Although most rental expenses are not added back to the SBT ba se, MCL 208.9(4)(h) required a federal deduction for rent attributable to certain “lease bac k” transactions to be added back to the SBT base.

11 See 26 USC 162(a) (allowing federal deductions for ordinary an d necessary expenses paid or incurred in carrying on a trade or business).-21- definition of that term. Although both the United States Supre me Court and the Michigan Supreme Court have characterized the SBT as a value-added tax t hat measures business activity rather than an income tax, see Trinova II , 498 US at 367; Trinova I , 433 Mich at 149, those characterizations were not made i n the context of the Compact d efinition of an income tax. Similarly, even though this Court treated the SBT as a value-ad ded tax rather than an income tax in determining the application of a federal statute barring sta te taxes imposed on or measured by net income derived from interstate commerce, when the only acti vity in the state involved solicitation of orders, see Gillette Co v Dep’t of Treasury , 198 Mich App 303, 307-311; 497 NW2d 595 (1993), that analysis was not conducted under the Comp act definition of an income tax. The issue here is limited to the application of the Compa ct definition; no definitive characterization of the SBT is required, just as no definitive characterization of the MGRT was required in IBM in order to conclude that it w as an income tax under the Compac t. See IBM , 496 Mich at 663 n 70 (opinion by V IVIANO , J.).

VIII. WHETHER PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE RETROACTIVE REPEAL OF THE COMPACT BY 2014 PA 282

Lastly, defendant argues on cross- appeal that the explicit repe al of the Compact by PA 282 extends to tax years 2005, 2006, and 2007, and taxpayers su bject to the SBTA during those years. In particular, defendant contends that the language of PA 282 stating that the Compact “is repealed retroactively and effective beginning January 1, 2008, ” means that no taxpayer may attempt to elect the Compact a pportionment method following tha t date. We disagree.

Defendant’s contention is cont ravened by the language of the e nacting section of PA 282:

Enacting section 1. 1969 PA 343, MCL 205.581 to 205.589, is re pealed retroactively and effective beginning January 1, 2008. It is t he intent of the legislature that the repeal of 1969 PA 343, MCL 205.581 to 205. 589, is to express the original intent of the legislature regarding the applicatio n of section 301 of the Michigan business tax act, 2007 PA 36, MCL 208.1301, and the in tended effect of that section to eliminate th e election provision included wi thin section 1 of 1969 PA 343, MCL 205.581, and that the 2011 amendatory act that amended section 1 of 1969 PA 343, MCL 205.581, was to further express t he original intent of the legislature regarding the application of section 301 of the Michigan business tax act, 2007 PA 36, MCL 208.1301, and to clarify that the election provision included within s ection 1 of 1969 PA 343, MCL 205.581 , is not available under the inco me tax act of 1967, 1967 PA 281, MCL 20 6.1 to 206.713.

This language plainly indicates t hat the Compact was expressly repealed beginning January 1, 2008. The SBTA was no longer in effect on January 1, 2008, as it was repealed effective December 31, 2007. See 2006 PA 325. Moreover, the enacting se ction of PA 282 indicates that the Legislature’s explicit repeal of the Compact was intended t o effectuate the Legislature’s original intent concerning the application of MCL 208.1301, a s ection of the MBTA, and the intended effect of that section to eliminate the apportionment election provision of the Compact. The enacting section of PA 282 also explains that 2011 PA 40 wa s intended to further express the Legislature’s original intent with regard to the applicatio n of MCL 208.1301 and to clarify that the Compact apportionment election provision was not avail able under the income tax act of-22- 1967. There is no language in the enacting section that sugges ts a legislative intent to repeal the Compact with respect to tax years affected by the SBTA or with respect to SBT taxpayers. See Sun Valley Foods , 460 Mich at 236 (“If the language of the statute is unambiguo us, the Legislature must have intended the meaning clearly expressed, a nd the statute must be enforced as written.”).

Moreover, the lead and concurring opinions in IBM also support the co nclusion that PA 282’s explicit repeal of the Compact effective January 1, 2008 did not extend to tax years before 2008. In IBM , our Supreme Court analyzed 201 1 PA 40, which contained langua ge similar to the enacting section of PA 282. 2011 PA 40 stated that “beginn ing January 1, 2011[,]” a taxpayer subject to the MBTA or the income tax act of 1967 coul d not elect to use the Compact apportionment formula. The lead and concurring opinions conclu ded that the Compact election provision was in effect for the 2008 tax year at issue in IBM , implicitly finding that the “beginning January 1, 2011” language in 2011 PA 40 denotes tax years beginning in 2011. See IBM , 496 Mich at 659 (opinion by V IVIANO , J.); id . at 668-670 (Z AHRA , J., concurring). See also Gillette , ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 17 (“In IBM , the Supreme Court held that through 2011 PA 40 the Legislature created a window (from January 1, 2008 un til January 1, 2011) wherein relevant taxpayers could still utilize the apportionment option available under Article IV of the Compact.”). Likewise, the language in PA 282 stating that the Compact was repealed “effective beginning January 1, 2008,” is pr operly understood as indicatin g that the express repeal of the Compact applies to tax years beginning on January 1, 2008.

Thus, the express repeal of the Compact by PA 282 does not appl y to the SBTA.

IX. CONCLUSION

We agree with plaintiffs that the trial court erred in conclud ing that the SBTA impliedly repealed the Compact election provision. However, the rest of plaintiffs’ claims on appeal, as well as defendant’s alternative grounds for affirmance, lack me rit.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with t his opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. No costs, a n issue of public importance b eing involved. MCR 7.219(A).

/s/ Michael J. Riordan /s/ Kathleen Jansen /s/ Karen M. Fort Hood