### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 356 -CR

M ar k Lyn Shr ade r , A ppe lla nt

v . The State of Texas, App ellee

FR OM T HE C OU N T Y C OU R T A T L A W N O. 6 OF T R A V IS C OU N T Y NO. C1CR-0 8-2 0184 0 , HO NORAB LE JAN BRELAND , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N A jury found appe llant Mark Ly n S h ra d er gu i lty

of burg lary

of a c oin-operated machine a

nd assessed his punishment at nine months in jail. See Tex. P en al C o d e Ann. § 30.03 (West 2003). Appellant c halleng es the leg al and fac tual sufficie ncy of the evidenc e to sustain the jury ’s g uilty verdic t. He also contends that the trial court e rre d by ref using to a llow him to questi on a witness re g arding the witness’s citizenship status, by admitting evide nce of

an extraneous of

fense , by admitting testimonial hears ay , an d b y ref using a reque sted jury

char g e on whe ther ther e wa s probable cause to arre st. Finding no err or, we aff irm the conviction. On the day

in question, Caesar H err era , a maintena nce worker at the Austin Pacifica apar tments, was told by

a re sident of the complex that something w as happe ning in the la undryWe s pe ll H e rr e ra ’s fi rs t na me a s it appea

rs in t he re po rt e r’ s r e c or d. I n a pp e lla nt’ s b ri e f, it 1 is “Cesar.” 2 ro om. Her

rer a wa lked to the laun d ry ro o m , whi ch wa s near by , and looked throug h the window. 1 He sa w a man, ide ntified as appellant, “for cing the m achine with a crow bar.” Herre ra de scribed the bar a s “the one y ou use to cha ng e the tire s of the ca

rs.” He rre ra indicated t hat appe llant was using the bar to force open the c ash box on t he mac hine. Appellant sa w Her rer a, stopped wha t h e wa s doing, a nd left the room. Her

rer a called the apar

tment manag er, A lfredo T ijerina, a nd told him what he had se en. He rre ra, Tijer ina, and a nother a partment employ ee, Migue l Luna, followe d appellant to another a

partment c omplex and found him standing behind the laundr y room there . Appellant had what appea

rs from a photogr aph to be a tire tool inside his slee ve. The three men detaine d appellant until the police arr ived.

Ap pe lla nt c on te nd s that the e vid e nc e is le g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt to su stain t he guil ty verdic t. When there is a c halleng e to the suff iciency of the e vidence to sustain a criminal convic tion, the question prese nted i s whether a rational trier of fac t could have f ound the essential e lements of the offe nse bey

ond a re asonable doubt. J ac k so n v. Vi rg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) (le g al
su ffici e nc y

); Cla y ton v . S tat e , 235 S.W .3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (leg al suffic iency ); J oh ns on v . S

tat e , 2 3 S
. W
. 3 d 1 , 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (fa ctual suff iciency ). I n a leg al
su f f i c i e n c y r e v i e w , a l l t h e e v i d e n c e i s r e v i e w e d i n t h e l i g h t m o s t f a v o r a b l e t o t h e ve rd ic t; i t is assumed that the trie r of fact re solved conflicts in the testimony , weig hed the e vidence , and dre w
rea sonable infe renc es in a manne r that supports the ver dict. Clayton , 234 S.W .3d at 778.3 Ap pe lla nt a rgue s th a t th e Sta te fa ile d to pro ve that he suc c e ssf ull y op e ne d th e c oin box , and ther efor e he ur g es that the e vidence shows only an attempted bur g lary . For the purpose of a prose cution for bur g lary of a c oin operated machine , “entr y ” mea ns ever y kind of entry

except one made with the owne r’s e ffe ctive conse nt. Id . § 30.03(b). This definition appears to be derive d from the forme r pena l code. Se e Gr iff in v . S tat e , 815 S.W .2d 576, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (quoting former art. 1392). I

n Gr iff in , t h e c o u rt w r o t e t h a t “ e n t r y i n t h e s e n s e l o n g e s t a

b l i s h e d f o r b u r g l a r y”
means a “br eakingof the c lose.” Id
. at 579. Any intrusion into the protected enclosure is suffic ient to constitute an entry
. Se e Or te ga v . S tat e , 626 S.W .2d 746, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (holding that pr oo f of

e ntr y int o a re a be tw e e n s c re e n d oo r a

nd wo od e n d oo r w a s su ff

ic ie nt t o p ro ve e ntr

y int o ha bit a tio n) ; W

oo ds v . S tat e , 814 S.W .2d 213, 215-16 (Tex
. App.—Tyler 1991, no pet.) (holding that evidenc e def

endant c ut window and d oor scr eens w as suffic ient to prove e ntry ). The phy sical int ru sio n o f s ome pa

rt of the bo dy is n ot re qu ir e d; e ntr

y is a c c omp lis he d if

a n o bje c t c on ne c te d to the body intrudes into the protec ted premises. See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 30.02(b)( 2) (West 2003) (def ining “entry ” for purposes of burg lary statute). In Gr iff in , the court of cr iminal appeals stated that “ the int e rp re ta tio n o f e ntr y sh ou ld b e c on sis te nt” whe n a pp lyingthe burg lary

statut e s. 815 S.W .2d at 579.

He rr er a testified that he saw appellant attempting to pr y open the coin box with a
crow bar or t i re t o o l
. Ap p ell ant was f ound a fe w minutes later with a tire tool in his possession. He rr e ra ’s te sti mony

wa s a lso c or

ro bo ra te d b y ph oto g raphs sh ow ingdama g e to t he top of the c oin box wher e t h e l o ck wa s located. T he top was be nt upward, a s it would be if appellant ha d been forc ing the coin box open with the t ire tool . Viewing this evidence in the light most favor able to the4

ve rd ic t, the jur

y c ou ld ratio na lly

c on c lud e that a

pp e lla nt “ br ok e the c los e ” of

the c oin bo x by fo rc ibl y intruding the tire tool into the enclose d and locked portion of the box , and that h e d i d s o wi t h the intent to steal any

money the box m ight c ontain. Point of error one is overrule d. Appellant also c ontends that the evide nce is fa ctually insufficient to sustain the conviction. In a fa ct u al suffic iency revie w, all the evide nce is c onsidered e qually , including the testimony of def ense w i t nesses a

nd the exist ence of alter native hy potheses. Cle wis v . S

tat e , 92 2 S. W.2 d 1 26 , 1 29 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ); Or on a v . S tate , 8 3 6 S. W. 2 d

3 1 9 , 3 2 1 ( T e x. App.—Austin 1992, no pet.). The evidenc e will be dee med f ac t u all y insufficient if the e vidence
su pp or tin g the ve rd ic t is so we a k a s to ma ke the fi nd ing of g uil t c le a rl y wr on g or manif e stl y un jus t, or if the ve rdict is ag ainst the g reat wei gh t an d p re pondera nce of the ava ilable evidenc e. W atson
v . S tat e , 2 04 S.W. 3d

40 4, 41 4- 15 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ); Johnson , 23 S.W .3d at 11. Appellant urg es that the only evidenc e of his guilt ca me fro m “t h e s elf-serving te sti mony of se ve ra l emp loy e e s of the a pa rtme nt co mpl e x.” We mus t, how e ve r, a c c or d c on sid e ra ble defe re n ce t o the jury ’s fa ctual dete rminations, particular ly those conc erning the weig ht and
cre dibilit y

of the e vidence , and we may disag ree with the result onl y to preve nt a manife st injust ice. Johnson , 23 S.W. 3d a t 9; Cai n v. Sta te , 958 S.W .2d 404, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We do not believe that the jury ’s dec ision to believe Her rer a’s testimony

and that of the State’s other w itnesses was manife stly

wrong . Point of error two is ove rruled. Appellant conte nds that his Six th Amendment conf rontation rig ht was violated whe n Her rer a wa s allowed to testify that a re s i d en t o f the a

partment c omplex told him “something wa s ha pp e nin g a t th e la

un dr y ma t.” Ap pe lla

nt a sse rt s th a t th is w a s te sti mon ia l he a rs a y a nd that it s5

admis s i o n v i o l ated his rights under Crawf ord v. W ashington , 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The trial court
ru le d th a t th e state me nt w a s n ot o ff e re d to pro ve the tr

uth of the ma tte r s ta te d a

nd that, i n a ny e ve nt, the state me nt w a s n ot t e sti mon ia l.

A trial cour

t’s ruling admitting or e x cluding ev i d en ce is reviewe d for a n abuse of discretion. Ra mo s v . S

tat e , 24 5 S.W. 3d 41 0, 41 7- 18 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 08 ). Th e re c or d s up po rt s the trial court’s deter

mination that the challeng ed evide nce w as not offe red to prove that “something was ha ppening ” in the laundr

y room, but only

to expl ain why

Her rer a happe ned to g o there and catch appe l l an t i n the ac t of burg larizing the c oin box . The re cord f urther suppor

ts the court’s deter mination that the out- of-c ourt statement was not te stimoni al; that is, it was not made with the expectation that it would be used prose cutorially
. Se e Cra wfo rd , 541 U.S. at 51-52. Point of error five is over

ruled. Appellant also urg es that the trial c ourt err ed by admitting evide nce that h e had a
cra ck pipe in his possession. The ar resting office r testified that when he ar rived at the scene wher e ap p el l ant was being detained, T ijerina told him that appellant wa s armed. T he off icer frisked
a pp e lla nt f or we a po ns a nd fo un d th e tir e too l, w ir e c utt e rs , a sc re wd ri ve r, a g lov e , a kn if

e , s c iss or s, hedg e clipper s, and a small metal cra ck p i p e. The off icer said that he then a

rre sted appe llant for possession of narc otics para pherna lia. Appellant urg es t hat t he evidence he pos sessed the crac k pipe was unfa irly

prejudicia l. See Tex. R. Evi d. 403. Whe n d e c idi ng wh e the r t o e xclu de e vid e nc e un de r r ule 40 3, the tr ia l c ourt

mus t consider how

compelling ly

the challeng ed evidenc e serve s to make more or less proba ble a f act of
c on se qu e nc e , a

nd the n b a lanc e that a g a ins t the po te nti a l of the e vid e nc e to imp re ss the jur y in s ome6

irrational but never

theless indelible way
. Mo ntg om e ry v . S tat e , 81 0 S. W.2 d 3 72 , 3 89 -9 0 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1991) (op. on r eh’g ). I n this case, the tr ial court ove rruled a ppellant’s rule 403 objection af ter concluding that his possession of t he crac k pipe was rele vant t o explain the basis for his a rre st and as same tr ansac tion context ual evidenc e, a n d t h at the probative value of the evidenc e outweig hed any unfair prejudice
. The question is a close one, but a ffor ding the trial court’s d ec i s i o n the defe renc e it is due, we find no abuse of discretion. Moreove r, we conclude that if the cour t abused its discretion by

admitting the e vidence , the er ror wa s harmless. See Tex. R. App. P
. 44.2(b). The te s ti mo n y r e g a r d in g th e c r a c k

p ip e w a s b r ie f

a n d matt e r - o f

- f a c t. T h e St a te d id n o t s e e k to e mp h a s iz e
a pp e lla nt’ s p os se ssi on

of the pip e , a

nd ma de no fu

rt he r r e fe re nc e to it duri ng the tr ia l. T he on ly
me nti on of the pip e duri ng c los ing a rgume nts wa s by de fe ns e c ouns e l. On thi s re c or d, a ny e rr or in
a dmi tti ngthe e vid e nc e that a pp e lla nt p os se sse d a

c ra c k p ipe whe n ar

re ste d d id n ot p re

jud ic e his substantial rig hts. Poi nt of err or four is overrule d. Ap pe lla nt n e xt co nte nd s tha t his co ns tit uti on a l due pr oc e ss a

nd c on fr on ta tio n r ig hts
we re v i o l at ed when the trial court re fused to allow him to question one of the State’ s witnesses reg arding his citiz enship status. See U.S. Const. amend. V, V I , XI V. While cross-examining L una, appellant’ s counsel asked, “Ar e y ou a U.S. c itiz en, sir? ” When the State objected to t h e q uestion as irre levant, counse l responded that this was a prope r subject for i mpeac hment beca use ente ring the United States unlawfully is a crime of moral turpitude. He r epeats this arg ument on appea l, adding that if Lun a ha d be e n sh ow n to be a n il le g a l a lie n, thi s w ou ld b e e vid e nc e of a bia s o r m oti ve fo r h im to testify in his employ er’ s favor
.Counsel a sked Tijerina outside the jury ’s pre sence if he kne w Luna’s a nd Her rer a’s immigr ation 2 status . T ije ri na

sa id h e did

no t. 7 Th e Sixth A me ndme nt i nc lud e s th e ri g ht to cr os s- e xami ne wi tne sse s to a tta c k th e ir gen er al cr edibility

or to show their possible bias, self- interest, or motives in testifying. D a v is v. Alaska , 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974). T h i s ri g ht is not unqualified, however , and a tr ial judge has wide discre tion in li miting the scope and extent of cross-e x amination. De law ar e v . V an Ar sd all , 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). I n g ener al, the rig ht to pr esent e vidence and to cr oss-examine witnesses under the Six th Amendment does not conf lict with the corre sponding r ights unde r state ev i dence rules, and most questions reg ardingthe scope of cr oss-examination may be re solved by

looking to t h e ru l es of e vidence
. Ha mm e r v . S tat e , No. PD-0786-08, 2009 Te x . Crim. App. L EXI S 513, at *10-11 (T ex. C rim. App. Apr. 8, 2009) . Those rule s provide that evide nce of specific instances of c on du c t othe r tha

n co nv ic tio n of a cr ime may no t be inq uir e d into on c ro ss- e xami natio n. Te x. R. Evid. 608(b). Appe llant did not show and does not alleg e that L una has been convicted f

or ente ring the Un ite d St a te s u nla

wf ull y . App e lla

nt’ s argum e nt t

hat L un a ’s imm ig ra

tio n s ta tus g a ve him

a motive to t es t i fy

falsely was not ra ised below a

nd, in any

event, is not supported by the re cord. Counsel did not take Luna on voir dire or otherwise make a rec ord as to whe ther L una is or is not i n t h i s c o u n t r

y l a w f u l l y. See Te x. R. E vid . 6 13 (b ). No du e pr oc e ss o r c on fr on ta tio n v iol a tio n is 2 shown. Point of error

three is overrule d. Finally , appellant c ontends that the trial court erre d by ref using his re quest for a

n
a rti c le 3 8
. 2 3 in s tr

u c ti o n. See Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . A nn . a rt . 3 8. 23 (a ) ( Wes t 20 05 ). Un de r t his statute, a de fenda

nt is entitled to a jury instruction reg arding disputed issues of fa ct that ar e mater ialI n his brief, a ppellant states that “[t]he fact que stion for the jury [ wa s ] : Di d T i

j erina or the 3 me mbe rs of

his po sse , h a ve the po we r/aut ho ri ty to ho ld A pp e lla nt a g a ins t hi s w ill ? ” Th is i s a question of law, not a que stion of fac t. 8 to hi s cl aim of a c onstitut ional or statutory violation that would render evidenc e inadmissible. Ma dd e n v . S tat e , 242 S.W .3d 504, 509-10 (Te x . Crim. App. 2007). I n this case, appellant a sked for an instruction re g ardingwhether his d et en t i o n by

Tijerina, He rre ra, a

nd Luna wa s lawful under article 18.16. Se e id . art. 18.16 (pr eventing conseque nces of theft). Appe llant does not, howeve r, ide nti fy a ny dis pu te d f

a c t is su e s mate ri a l to the a pp lic a tio n o f arti cle 18 .1 6. I t is c le a r f ro m hi s arguments below and in this Court that appellant wa nted the jury

to decide the leg al question whether , under the undisputed fac ts, he was law fully detained. The re quest ed i nstruction was

3 proper ly ref used. Point of error

six is overrule d. The judg ment of convic tion is affirmed.

______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: Nove mber 10, 2009 Do No t Pu

bli sh