UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4058

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RUBEN JUAREZ GONZALEZ,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. Terrence W. Boyle, 

District Judge. (7:09-cr-00070-BO-3)

Submitted: November 29, 2010 Decided: December 14, 2010

Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Geoffrey W. Hosford, HOSFORD & HOSFORD, P.C., Wilmington, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States 

Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Michael G. James, Assistant United 

States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Ruben Juarez Gonzalez was convicted of: conspiracy to 

distribute and to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or 

more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2006); possession 

with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine and 

aiding and abetting the same, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006), 18 

U.S.C. § 2 (2006); illegal entry, 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006); and 

false representation of United States citizenship, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1325(a) (2006). He received an aggregate sentence of seventyeight months. Gonzalez now appeals, contending that the 

district court erred when it denied his Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 

motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to the two drug 

charges. We affirm.

“We review de novo the district court’s ruling on a 

motion for judgment of acquittal and . . . will uphold the 

verdict if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the government, it is supported by substantial evidence.” 

United States v. Reid, 523 F.3d 310, 317 (4th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 129 S. Ct. 663 (2008). “Substantial evidence is 

evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as 

adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted). We “can reverse a conviction on insufficiency grounds 

only when the prosecution’s failure is clear.” United States v. 
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Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). We review both direct and 

circumstantial evidence and permit “the government the benefit 

of all reasonable inferences from the facts proven to those 

sought to be established.” United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 

1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982). We “do not review the credibility 

of witnesses and assume the jury resolved all contradictions in 

the testimony in favor of the government.” United States v. 

Sun, 278 F.3d 302, 312 (4th Cir. 2002). 

To convict Gonzalez of conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. 

§ 846, the government had to prove “(1) an agreement between two 

or more persons to engage in conduct that violates a federal 

drug law, (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the conspiracy, and 

(3) the defendant’s knowing and voluntary participation in the 

conspiracy.” United States v. Kellam, 568 F.3d 125, 139 (4th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 657 (2009) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). “After a conspiracy is shown to exist, . . . 

the evidence need only establish a slight connection between the 

defendant and the conspiracy to support the conviction.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Testimony at trial established that “Maurice” and 

“Primo” visited confidential informant Anthony Caldwell and 

asked if he wanted to purchase one kilogram of cocaine. 

Caldwell testified that a third individual, “Rudy,” was known to 
4

be Maurice’s supplier. Caldwell replied that he could only 

afford one-half kilo but that he had a buyer for the remainder. 

Caldwell contacted authorities, alerting them to the impending 

transaction. The next day, Maurice, Rudy, and Gonzalez traveled 

to Caldwell’s residence. Maurice drove one truck, while 

Gonzalez drove Rudy in another truck. While traveling to the 

residence, Maurice and Rudy had numerous telephone conversations 

with Caldwell about the deal. Cell phone records disclosed that 

two phones belonging to Gonzalez were used during some of these 

calls. The conversations were recorded.

After Maurice, Rudy and Gonzalez arrived at the 

Caldwell residence, Caldwell spoke to Rudy and Maurice about the 

impending transaction. Gonzalez heard some of the 

conversations. Caldwell left the property and returned with an 

undercover officer, James Yowell, who posed as a potential buyer 

of one-half of the cocaine. Gonzalez saw Maurice retrieve the 

bundle of cocaine from his truck, and he entered the residence 

with Yowell, Caldwell, Maurice, and Rudy. The men went to the 

kitchen. Gonzalez was described as calm, and he said nothing 

when Yowell cut the bundle open to inspect the drug. Yowell 

testified that Gonzalez positioned himself so as to block the 

exit from the kitchen. 

Caldwell and Yowell left the residence on the pretext 

of having to get money to pay for the cocaine. When they did 
5

not return, Rudy, Maurice, and Gonzalez left the residence. 

Police soon initiated traffic stops of the trucks Gonzalez and 

Maurice were driving. Inside the Gonzalez truck, they found 

five cell phones. Two belonged to Gonzalez, and three to Rudy. 

This evidence was sufficient to convict Gonzalez of 

conspiracy. There clearly was an agreement among at least two 

persons to violate the drug laws. Gonzalez’s knowledge of and 

participation in the conspiracy are established by his driving 

Rudy to the Caldwell residence, the use of his two cell phones —

presumably to discuss the impending transaction — during the 

drive, his hearing conversations at the residence about drugs 

and money, his calm and unquestioning demeanor when Yowell cut 

open the bundle of cocaine, and his blocking the exit from the 

kitchen.

With respect to Count Two, the government was required 

to prove “(1) possession of the controlled substance; (2) 

knowledge of the possession; and (3) intent to distribute.” See

United States v. Hall, 551 F.3d 257, 267 n.10 (4th Cir. 2009). 

“A defendant is guilty of aiding and abetting if he has 

knowingly associated himself with and participated in the 

criminal venture.” United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 873 

(4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted); 

see 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). To prove association, the government need 

only establish that the defendant was “cognizant of the 
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principal’s criminal intent and the lawlessness of his 

activity.” Burgos, 94 F.3d at 873. “[P]articipation in every 

stage of an illegal venture is not required, only participation 

at some stage accompanied by knowledge of the result and intent 

to bring about that result.” United States v. Arrington, 719 

F.2d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

The evidence discussed above was sufficient to convict 

Gonzalez of aiding and abetting the possession with intent to 

distribute cocaine. He clearly was cognizant of the intent of 

Maurice and Rudy to distribute the cocaine, and he participated 

in the offense by, for instance, driving Rudy to and from the 

Caldwell residence, allowing the use of his cell phones to 

facilitate the anticipated transaction, and blocking the exit 

from the kitchen while the cocaine was inspected. 

We accordingly affirm. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED