IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2017-CA-00915-SCT IN THE INTEREST OF M.D.G., A MINOR, G.J., A MINOR, N.B., A MINOR: PASS CHRISTIAN SCHOOL DISTRICT

v. HARRISON COUNTY

Y OUTH COURT OF MISSISSIPPI, ROY

CUEV AS AND KIMBERLY CUEV AS, INDIV

I DUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIENDS AND GUARDIANS TO E.C., A MINOR DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/24/2017 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. MARGARET ALFONSO TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: SCOTT W ATSON W EATHERLY, JR. EDW ARD C. TAYLOR TERRENCE J. LESTELLE KATIE RYAN VAN CAMP RICHARD M. MORGAIN TRACE D. McRANEY ANDREW

W ILLIAM HORSTMYER COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: HARRISON COUNTY YOUTH COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: EDW ARD C. TAYLOR KATIE RYAN VAN CAMP ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: SCOTT W ATSON W EATHERLY, JR. TERRENCE J. LESTELLE NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - JUVENILE JUSTICE DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART - 07/25/2019 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE RANDOLPH, C.J., ISHEE AND GRIFFIS, JJ. ISHEE, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:¶1. E.C. 1 a lleged she was sexually assaulte d o n t h e p r e m i s e s o f P a s s Christian High

School. The H arriso n C o u nty Youth Court a djudicated the alleged perpetrators not delinquent. Later, R oy a nd Kim berly Cuevas, i ndividually , and on behalf of t h e ir m inor daughter, E.C., f

iled a negligence action i n the H arrison County Circu i t C o urt, seeking dam ages f

rom the Pass Christian School District associated with the alleged assault. ¶2. P ass Christian unsuccessf ully sought the records f

rom the y o uth-court action to use
in its def ense in the civil case. It argues o n appeal that the y outh-court jud g e a b u sed her discretion in deny ing i ts requests f o r disclosure of the y o u t

h

- court records and trial transcripts relating to the three m i nor perpetrator s . I t a l s o argues it would be denied due process and
f airnes s i f t h e sworn testim ony of E.C. were not released due to the conf identiality rules protecting the subjects of y outh-court actions. ¶3. We r e v e rse a nd rem and f or the circuit court to conduct a n in cam e r a r e v i e w o f t h e
y outh-court record to determ ine whether any o f it should be disclosed.
FACTS ¶4. E.C. alleged s h e was s exually assaulted o n the cam pus of Pass Christian High School. She said attended a practice f o r an end-o f

- t h e - y e a r program on April 20, 2015, in the
gy m n asium

. Af

t er the p ractice c oncluded, the s upervising teacher lef t the prem ises, leaving
E.C. unsupervised. E.C. claim s that, af t er the teacher lef

t , M.G. sexually assaulted her while
G.J. and N.B. a i d e d

. Five day s later, police asked the principal of Pass Christian High School if the school had surveillance f ootage. Pass Christian did not possess any surveillance

1 In itials are u sed to p ro t ect th e co n f id e n tiality

o f th e m in o rs. 2f

ootage that could conf

irm or deny the alleged assault, because the f ootage was taped over
every seventy -two hours. ¶5. A trial was conducted i n t h e y o u t h c o u r t , a n d the three alleged of f e nders were adjudicated not delinquent. Plaintif f s then f iled suit against Pass Christi a n in circuit court f or negligence. ¶6. P a s s C h r i s t i a n f

i r s t attem pted t o obtain t he t hree y o uth-court f iles by i s s u i n g a subpoena duces tecum f

r o m the circuit court on October 20, 2016. In response, the y outh

court f iled a m otion f

or a protective order on October 31, 2016. A hearing was held bef ore the circuit court on Novem ber 30, 2 016. The c ircuit court g ranted the y out h c ourt a
p r o t e c t i v e order, ruling that the disclosure o f the record and transcript was within th e discretion of

the y outh court. ¶7. Pass Christian then tried to gain access to the y out h

- c o u r t r e c o r d s b y f i l i n g t h r ee separate petitions f

or the r ecords in the y outh court. The Plaintif f s f iled a response objecting

to t he release of t he y o uth-court records o n A p ril 4, 2017. A hearing was held bef ore the

y outh c ourt, and on M ay 24, 2017, the y outh court entered an order deny ing P ass Christian’s request f or the records ¶8. On June 2 3 , 2017, Pass Christian f iled two notices of appeal, one to the c i rcuit court and o ne to this Court, along w ith a statem ent of t he i ssues and designation o f t h e record.
Pass C hristian sought disclosure o f the y outh-court records and trial transcript. The appeal

to the circuit court was v o l u n t a r i ly dism issed on J uly 11, 2017. On August 29, 2017, the

3y outh court entered an o r der e x c l uding the y outh-court r ecord and transcript f rom the appellate record. ¶9. On Septem

ber 12, 2 017, P ass Christian again s o ught access to the y outh-court record and trial transcript by f

iling a “Certif

icate of Exam ination and Proposed Corrections to the Record on Appeal” in the y outh court. Plaintif f s f iled their “ Certif

icate of Exam ination and Opposition to Proposed Corrections of Appellant” in the y outh court on Septem ber 25, 2017. The a ttorney f

or M.G. f iled a response opposing P ass Christian’s Certif icate of Exam ination and Proposed C orrections to the Record on Appeal on Septem ber 27, 2017. Pass Christian then f iled a m otion to correct the record on appeal in the y outh court on October 10, 2017. The Plaintif

f s f i led a response opposing the m otion o n O ctober 23, 2017. The y outh court entered an order on March 19, 2018, that denied a ccess t o the y outh-court records and trial transcript. ¶10. Once a g a i n , P a s s C h r i s t i a n tried to gain access t o the y outh-court records and trial transcript by

f iling a m otion to correct the record on appeal in this Court o n A pril 4, 2018. Plaintif f s and the y outh court f

iled responses o pposing the m otion on April 17, 2018. This Court entered an order deny ing Pass Christian’s m o tion on August 2, 2018.
ISSUES ¶11. Pass Chri s t i a n p r e s e n t s t wo issues on appeal: (1) whether deny ing the petitions f or
y outh-court records was an abuse of discretion and (2) whethe r k e e p i n g t he y outh-court records a nd trial transcript conf idential would deny it d

ue process and f

airness. These issues overlap and will be discussed together.

4DISCUSSION

¶12. Disclosure of y o uth-court records is subject to the discretion o f t he y outh-court judge. Miss. Code. Ann. § 43-21-261(1); see also State v. U.G. , 726 So. 2d 151, 154 (Miss. 1998). Section 43-21-261 of the Mississippi Code governs disclosure of y out h

- c o u r t records and states that records i nvolving children shall not be disclosed, other t han to necessary staf f of t he y outh court or a Court-Appointed S pecial Advocate (CASA) volunteer that m ay be a ssigned in an abuse and neglect case, except pursuant t o an order of the y outh court specif

y ing the person or persons to whom the records m ay be disclosed, the extent of the records which m ay be disclosed a nd the purpose of the disclosure. S uch court orders f or disclosure shal l b e l i m ited t o those instances in w hich the y outh court concludes, in its discretion, that disclosure is required f

o r the best interests o f

the child, the public saf

ety or t he f

unction of the y outh court. Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-261(1) ( Supp. 2018). If disclosure is deem e d p roper, the records are to go only

to: (a) The judge of

another y o uth court or m em ber o f another y outh court staf

f ; (b) The court of the parties in a child custody or adoption cause in another court; (c) A judge of

any other court or m em

bers of another court staf

f ; (d) Representatives of a public or private agency providing supervision or having custody

of the child under order of

the y outh court; (e) Any person engaged in a bona f ide r e s e a r c h purpose, provided that no i n f o r m ation identif

y ing the subject of the records shall b e m ade available t o the researcher unless it is absolutely essential to t he research purpose and the judge gives prior written approval, and the child, t hrough h i s o r her representative, gives perm ission to release the inf orm ation; (f ) The Mississippi Departm ent o f Em ploy m e nt Security , or its duly authorized representatives, f

or the p u r p o s e of a child’s enrollm ent i nto the J ob Corps

5Training Program as authoriz e d by T itle IV of the Com prehensive Em ploy m ent Training A ct of 1973 (29 USCS S ection 923 et seq.). However, no records, reports, investigations or inf orm ation d erived theref

rom pertaining to child abuse or neglect shall be disclosed; ( g ) T o a ny person pursuant to a f inding by a judge of the y outh court o f com pelling circum s tances af

f ecting the health, saf

ety or well-being of a child and that such disclosure is i n the best interests of the child or an adult who was f orm erly the subject of

a y outh court delinquency proceeding. Id. Pass Christian does not f i t into any of those specif

ied categories. ¶13. In I

n re J.E. v. S

tate , 726 So. 2d 547, 549 (Miss. 1998), a c r im inal def endant sought disclosure of the y outh-court records of a m inor who had accused him o f s e x u a l battery in order t o prepare his def

ense. W e f

ound that, in t he interest of conf identiality , the def

endant had no right to f

ull disclosure or inspection of the records. Id. at 553. For t he s am e reasons, d i s c l o s ure of the y outh-court record and trial transcripts directly to Pass C hristi a n i s inappropriate. ¶14. But Pass Christian also r equested that the y o u t h

- c o u r t record and trial t ranscript be disclosed to the c ircuit court f or a n in cam era review to determ ine relevance and adm issibility . In In re J.E. , this Court went on to hold that although the def endant did not have the right t o f

ull disclosure o r inspection of t he r ecords, he did have the right t o have the records d isclosed to the circuit court f or an in cam era review to d eterm ine if any inf orm ation

m aterial to the pending case was in the records. In re J.E. , 726 S o. 2d at 552-53. That is what should be done here.

6¶15. P a s s C h r i s tian is seeking the y outh-court record a nd th e t r a n s c r i p t o f w i t n e s s

testim o ny because i t believes t hat conf licting testim ony m ay be in t he record and transcript that could aid in its def

ense. Concerning conf

licting testim ony , this Court has held, The credibility o f [ the alleged victim ’s] r e canting t estim ony is the tightrope upon which [ the def

endant’s] conviction stands or f alls. T h e r easoning and authorities establish that the y outh court w ould a buse its discretion if it did not authorize disclosure here.
Y a rborough v

. S tate , 5 14 So. 2 d 1215, 1219 ( Miss. 1 987). In analy zing the h o l d i ng in
Y a rborough , this Court h as said, “The im plication of this statem ent is that this Court, at the
very least, contem

plated the notion that a y o uth court ought to disclose y outh court records when such can provide t h e basis f or the im peachm ent o f a witness

. . . . ” J.E. , 726 So. 2d
at 551. ¶16. This Co u r t r e c o g n i zes the statutory authority granted to the y outh court to use its discretion in deciding m atters of disclosure. Conf identiality o f y outh-court proceedings is crucial, but “ [ t]he right of ‘ conf identiality ’ on behalf of the child is a ‘qualif ied’ and not an ‘absolute’ privilege.” Daniels b y Glass v. Wal-Mart Stores, I nc. , 634 S o. 2d 88, 93 (Miss. 1993) (citing Ex Parte State Farm Fire & Cas. C o. , 529 So. 2d 975, 977 (Ala. 1988)). The

y outh court s hould c ooperate with the circuit court in order to achieve judicial e conom y and ef f iciency all the while m a intaining conf i dentiality , which are tenets of all of o ur courts. ¶17. As in J.E. , two very im portant interests intersect in this case: the Plaintif f s’ interest
in the conf

identiality of y outh-court records a n d Pass Christian’s interest in receiving a f air trial. “[ T ]he rig h t to im peach or attack a w itness’ c r edibility is secured b oth by the
M i s s i s s ippi Rules of Evidence and the conf rontation clauses of the state and f edera l

7constitutions.” J.E. , 7 2 6 So. 2 d at 550 (quoting Brown v. State , 690 So. 2d 2 76, 2 92 (Miss.

1996)). As the Daniels Court held, the search f or t ruth requires a t otal view of the e vidence.
Daniels , 6 3 4 S o . 2 d at 9 3. Allowing disclosure of inf orm ation deem ed relevant to Pass Christian’s def

ense through an in cam era review balances these t wo interests. “[ T]he State’s interest in the conf

i dentiality of such records is p rotected, our statutory schem e is satisf ied,

our y outh courts f

unction within constitutional param e ters, a n d our rules of discovery are honored, while allowing [ Pass Christian] lim ited access to inf orm a tion which m ight prove vital to [ i ts] def

e nse.” J.E. , 726 So. 2d at 553. ¶18. The nam es a nd addresses of the w i t n e s s e s w h o t e s t if ied in the related y outh-court proceedings should be d isclosed to P ass C h r i s t i a n . If Pass C hristian believes there is conf licting testim ony , it m ay ask the circuit court to perf orm an i n c am era review. Then, if the circuit court d etermi n es there is inf orm ation relevant to Pass Christian’s def ense, the relevant inf

o rm a tion should be disclosed to Pass Christian. ¶19. Finally , a ll inf

orm ation disclosed shall b e “lim i ted f or t he p urposes of the related civil litigation.” In re R.J.M.B. v. Jackson Cty. Dep’t of Hum an Servs. ,133 S o . 3 d 335, 341 (Miss. 2013) (citing Daniels , 634 So. 2d at 91).
CONCLUSION ¶20. In sum m a ry , the nam es and addresses o f all witnesses who t estif ied in the y o uth-court proceeding should be m ade available to Pass Christian. P ass Christian can then d epose those
persons. If Pass Christian believes any of the deponents testif ied c ontrary t o their testim ony in t he y outh-court proceedings, i t m ay ask the circuit judge to do an in cam era review of the

8deponent’s earl i e r t e s t i m ony . If the circuit judge f inds c ontrary testim ony , Pass Christian

ma y obtain the conf

licting testim ony to use in i ts d ef ense. All inf

orm ation disclosed s h a l l be used only

f or purposes of

the pending civil litigation. ¶21. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.

RANDOLP H , C . J . , MAX W ELL, BEAM A ND GRIFFIS, J J., CONCUR. K I NG, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY KITCHENS, P . J.; C OLEMAN AND CHAMBERL I N , JJ., J OIN IN PART. COLEMAN, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPA R A TE W R ITTEN OPINION JOINED BY CHAMBERLIN, J. KING, PRESIDING JUSTICE, DISSENTING: ¶22. This Court engages in discovery f or the Pa s s C h r i s t i a

n S c h o o l District, inappropriately awarding it a rem edy that Pass C hristian does not request. Further, the Court preem ptively , and without setting a legal standard, orders the y outh court to disclose i ts records to the

c ircuit court to potentially perf orm a n in camera review of the y outh-court records. Theref ore, I respectf

ully dissent. ¶23. The Court orders that “[ t]he nam e s and addresses of the witnesses who testif ied in the related y o u th-court proceedings should be disclosed to Pass Christian.” Maj. Op. ¶ 18. Pass Christian d i d n ot ask f

o r the nam es and addresses o f t he testif y ing y o uth-court witnesses, either f rom the y outh c ourt or this Court, nor has any party been availed the opportunity to respond t o this. See Pitchford v. State , 45 S o . 3 d 216, 232 (Miss. 2010) (“The trial court
cannot be held to err on an issue not presented to i t f or decision.

. . . A trial court has no duty

to sua sponte s econd-guess decisions by

. . . counsel.” (f ootnote om itted) (citation om itted));
Sanders v. State , 678 So. 2d 663, 669-70 (Miss. 1996) (Issues not raised in the appellant’s

9initial brief a r e w a i v ed. The a ppellees should not be denied an opportunity to respond to
argum ents.). This Court has i nappropriately created t his rem edy w i thout a request to do so. Pass Christian has presented no a rgum ent that this inf orm ation is essential to its c ase, nor any
argum ent that i t does not already know the identities of these witnesses. I ndeed, it is highly likely that P a s s C h ristian could sim ply glean this inf

orm ation through discovery requests and/or depositions, because Pass Christian clearly knows the id e n t i t i e s o f the f our m inors directly involved i n t h e alleged incident. I b elieve it is inappropriate f or this Court to proactively

engage in discovery

on behalf o f

Pass Christian and to order the y outh court to give Pass Christian inf

orm ation that Pa s s C h r i s t i an did not request and that it could likely obtain through other m eans. ¶24. The Court also preem ptively orders the y o uth court t o di s c l o s e t h e r ecords to the circuit court f

or a potential in camera review. The C ourt does not outline any s tandard f or when y outh-court records should be disclosed in s u ch a c a s e a s this: a civil c ase in which

none of the parties share privity of party with the y outh w ho was t he subject of t he y outhcourt case. 2 In such a case, t his Court m ust bala n c e the im

portance of y outh-court

2 T h e cases relied o n b y th is C o u r t are d istin g u ish a

b le. D a n i

els v . W a l-M a rt S to res, In c. in v o lv es p riv ity o f p a rty

— th e v ery y o u t h

- ad

j u d icated d elin q u en t su ed Wal-M art, h is v ictim , f o r d ef am atio n su rro u n d in g th e sam e issu e f o r w h ich h e w as ad

j u d icated d elin q u en t. D a n i els v. W a l-M a rt S to res, I n c. , 6 3 4 S o . 2 d 8 8 (M i ss. 1 9 9 3 ) . T h e h o ld in g in D a n iels is v ery lim ited , as w ell, f

in d in g th at th e co u rt d id n o t err i n ad m ittin g t h e y o u t h

- co u rt ad j u d icatio n b ecau se th e y o u th su b j ect to th e y o u th -co u r

t a d j u d icatio n p laced h is ch aracter d irectly at issu e in th e civ il litig atio n . It also n o ted th at Wal-M art, as th e v ictim , w as alread y en titled to in f

o rm atio n a

b o u t th e ad

j u d icatio n , w ith o u t restrictio n a s to th e u s e o f t h at in f o rm atio n . S

ee In re R .J

.M .B . v. J a ck so n C ty. D e p ’ t o f H u m a n S ervs. , 1 3 3 S o . 3 d 3 3 5 , 3 4 1 (M i ss. 2 0 1 3 ) (“We h o l d t h a t D a n i els d o e s n o t su p p o rt th e p ro p o sitio n th at reco rd co n f i d en tiality is w aiv ed co m p letely w h en ev er a related civ il su it is f iled

. ‘ D a n i

els stan d s o n ly f o r th e n a rro w p ro p o sitio n t h at a j u v en i le a d j u d icatio n is ad m issib le o n t h e issu e o f 1 0conf

identiality and t he strict rules of Mississippi Code Section 4 3-21-261(1) ( S upp. 2018) with a civil def

endant’s procedural due-process right to present a def ense. T his Court should

set a standard f

or such a bal a n ce. I suggest that this C ourt f ollow a b alance sim ilar to that
f ound in Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), which details when docum ents and things prepared in anticipation of litigation a re discoverable. Those item s are discoverable “only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the m aterials
in the p reparation of that party ’s c ase and that the p arty is u nable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the m aterials by other m e ans.” M.R.C.P. 26(b)(3). In civil l itigation, a party seeking to have the civil court review y outh-court records in camera f or relevance should f

irst show t hat the party has a substantial need of the review in order to
p r e s e r v e its procedural d

ue-process right to present a d ef e n se. It s hould then show that i t cannot obtain these m aterials or inf orm ation by

other m eans without substantial hardship. ¶25. At this juncture, Pass Christian has shown neither need nor that it cannot o therwise obtain this inf

orm a tion. A ccording to the r ecord bef ore this Court, Pass Christian has not y et deposed the f

our m inors d irectly involved. It m erely a sks that t he records be disclosed to the circuit court due to the potential that E.C. may give inconsistent s tatem ents i n th e f u t ure . Such speculation does not d em onstrate need. Pass Christian should be required to show need through deposition testim o ny or o ther discovery , nam ely , to show that it was highly likely

c h a r a c ter w h ere th at trait is at issu e, su ch a s , f o r ex am p l e, in a s lan d er su it.’” (q u o t i n g S a m p le v. S ta te , 6 4 3 S o . 2 d 5 2 4 , 5 2 8 n .1 (M iss. 1 9 9 4 ))). In re J .E . v. S ta t e is g ro u n d ed in th e rig h t o f crim in a l d ef

e n d an ts to receiv e f

r o m th e S t ate ev id en ce f

av o r ab le to th e d ef

en se an d /o r ev id e n ce m a terial as to g u ilt o r p u n ish m e n t. In re J .E . v. S ta te , 7 2 6 S o . 2 d 5 4 7 (M iss. 1 9 9 8 ). 1 1that i nconsistent state me n t s were m ade. 3 Moreover, without depositions or other

docum entation, it is dif

f i cult or im

possible f or Pass Christian to show that it cannot obtain this inf orm ation elsewhere. For exam ple, in a deposition, E.C. m ay adm it t o a ny s uspected inconsistencies. I t would be dif f icult f or Pass Christian then to argue that it also needed the conf idential y outh-court records to f urther bolster such an under-oath adm iss i o n . A t t his juncture, Pass Christian m erely asks this Court to order t hat t h e conf idential y outh-court records be disclosed to t he circuit court to engage i n a f i shing e xpedition. W hile Pass Christian m a y be able to establish a need f or in camera review at a l ater point, it has not y et d o n e s o . The im

portance of the conf

i dentiality of y outh-court records and the stat u t e requiring this conf

identiality d em and that we s trike a stricter standard f or d isclosure of those records than the m ajority o f f ers. For that reason, I would af f irm the y o uth court’s o rder and

rem and the case f

o r f urther p roceedings without prejudice to P ass Christian’s ability to f ile another petition seeking records t hat establish what is r e q u i r e d under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3). KITCHENS, P .J., JOINS THIS OPINION. COLEMAN AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION IN PART. COLEMAN, JUSTICE, DISSENTING: ¶30. The Harrison County Youth Court denied Pass Christian School District’s request to release t h e y o uth court r ecords pertaining t o an alleged a ssault o f a m i nor by t hree other

m inor students. Because the y outh court judge f o llowed the dictates of the a p plicable statute

3 F o r ex am

p le, P ass C h ristian co u ld a s k th e th r e e a c cu sed m in o rs w h eth er E .C .’s d ep o sitio n testim o n y

w as co n sisten t w ith h e r testim o n y t h e y w itn essed at y o u th co u rt.

1 2in ref

using to dissem inate the records at issue, a nd, with r espect, because t he m ajority does not, I would af

f irm

. ¶31. In her May 24, 2017, order, the y o u t h c o u r t j u d g e p r operly set f orth the standard required by statute, wri t i n g t h a t “ disclosure of records is allowed only where ‘ the Youth
Court c oncludes, in its discretion, that disclosure is required f or t he b est interests of the child, the p ublic saf

ety or the f

unctioning of the Youth Court’

. . . .” Her recitation of t he standard directly quotes Mississippi Code Section 43-21-261(1) ( Supp. 2018). 4 The y outh court judge noted that the three m inors, whose best interest was at issue in deciding whether to release the records, were not p a rties to the u nderly ing action in circuit court involving the Pass Christian school, and she f ound n o valid ground f

or holding that the release o f t he r ecord was in the best interest of

the m inors. ¶32. The m ajority m akes several reasonable and pragm a tic argum ents in f a v or of f orcing the release of parts of the y outh court record. Maj. O p . ¶ 1 7. H owever, u nlike the y outh court, the m ajority does n ot f ollow the Section 43-21-261(1) requirem ent t hat disclosure be “required f

or the best interests of t he child, t he public s a f ety o r the f

unctioning of the y outh
court.” ¶33. I ag r e e w i t h Presiding Justice King t hat In re J .E. v. State , 7 26 So. 2d 5 47 (Miss. 1998), does not apply

. The holding in In re J.E. r ested in l arge part upon the a p plication of the Conf rontation Clause of t he United States Constitution to a crim i nal def endant’s request f or records in o r der to enable cross-exam ination o f p otential witnesses. In re J.E. , 726 So.

4 E f f ectiv e Ju ly 1 , 2 0 1 9 , th e L eg islatu re am en d ed S ectio n 4 3 -2 1 -2 6 1 , b u t th e am en d m e n ts d o n o t

ap p ear to ch an g e th e stan d ard

.

1 32d at 549 (¶ 6 ). The underly ing litigation involving the Pass Christian S chool District is civil

in nature; accordingly , the Conf r ontation Clause and, by extension, In r e J.E. , do not apply

. ¶34. Justice King correctly points o u t t h a t t h e r e lief af f orded b y the m ajority , i.e. , the
par t i a l r e lease of the f

iles, has n ot been requested. T o the extent that his separate opinion

m akes the point, I join it. However, I, with r espect, disagree with Justice King’s assertion that the Court needs t o create a s tandard f or “when y outh-court records should be disclosed in a case such as this . . . .” King Dis. Op. ¶ 24. The s tandard, as n oted above, is supplied by statute. CHAMBERLIN, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.

1 4