### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A pr il 3, 200 7 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. ER IC BE RRIOS
App e al b y pe r m iss ion fro m th e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Crim inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 04–03042 P aula S kahan , Judge

No. W2005-01179-SC- R11-CD - F iled Augu st 17, 2007

The de fenda

nt, Eric B err ios, was cha

rg ed with one c ount of possession with intent to sell or deliver

mor e tha n thre e hund

re d g ra ms o f c oc a ine . A ft e r t

he tr ia l c ourt g ra

nte d th e de fe nd ant’ s mo tio n to suppress the c ocaine seized during the traffic stop, the State wa s g rante d an interloc utory appea l purs ua nt t o Ru le 9 o f t

he Te nn e sse e Rul e s of Ap pe llate Pr oc e dure

. Th e Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls

a ffirm ed th e su

pp re ssi on of the e vid e nc e . We g ra

nte d th e State ’s a

pp lic a tio n f

or pe rm iss ion

to appea l to determine whe ther the office r’s actions amounted to an unc onstitut ional seizure and, if so, whether the defe ndant’s consent to searc h the vehicle was suff iciently attenuate d from that illeg al act. Bec ause the seizure vi olated constit utional safe g uards and beca use the c onsent to sear ch wa s
n o t s u ff i ciently attenuate d from the violation, we a ffirm the suppr ession of the e vidence . The judgme nt of the Court of Criminal Appea ls is, therefor e, af firmed.
Tenn. R. App . P . 11; Judgme nt of th e Courtof Crim inal Ap peals Aff irm ed

G AR Y R. W ADE , J ., delivere d the opinio n o f t h e co u rt, in which W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , C.J ., and J ANI CE M. H O LDER and C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , J J ., joined.

Robert E. Cooper, J r., Attorney Gene ral and Reporter ; Mic hael E. Moore, Solicitor Gene ral; Mar k A. F ulk s, As sis tant Att or

ne y Ge ne ra l; Willia

m L . Gib bo ns , Dis tr ic t Atto rn e y Ge ne ra l; a

nd Va le ri e Smit h, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llant, State of Tenne ssee.

Willi a m D . M a sse y

and L or na S. M c Clu sk

y , M e mph is, Te nn e sse e , f or the a pp e lle e , E ri c B e rr ios

.

OP IN ION

On Fe bruar

y 25, 2004, Offic er K el l y Ni ch ols of the West Tennessee DrugTask F orce observe d Eric Ber

rios (“the Def

endant” ) drivingfifty -three miles per hour in a construction zone on I nterstate 40 in Shelby

County . The posted spe ed limit for the are a wa s forty -five miles pe r hour. When O ffice r Nichols activate d his emerg ency equipment, the De fenda

nt stopped his vehicle on the-2-

shoulder of the highw ay . The off i ce r t h en approa ched the vehicle on the driver’ s side, asked the Def endant f or his license a

nd vehicle r eg istration, and direc ted him out of the vehi cle. Af ter g lancingat the license and re g istration, Office r Nichols fr i s k ed t h e Def endant a nd led him to the backse at of the pa trol car . The De fenda nt was questioned a

nd ultimately

ag ree d to the office r’s reque st for conse nt to sear ch the vehicle. A larg e amount of coca ine was hidden in the f ender are a of the ve hicle.

F ac tu al a nd P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound

At the hear ing on the motion to s uppress, Of fice r Nichols, testifying f

or the State, stated that he dir ec t ed the Def

endant outside of the vehicle f or saf ety rea sons. He explained that “police office rs workingon highw ay s happen to be more likely t o b e ru n o v er by

vehicles tha

n shot and killed by a suspec t.” L ater

in his direct testimony , he adde d th at t h e cold and rainy weather wa s another rea son to place the Def

endant in the patrol car

. Offic er Nichols perfor med a pat-down sea

rch for we apons bef

ore putting the Def

en d an t i n the patrol c ar but found none . At the hea ring , he pointed out that it was his practice to frisk eve ry person he place d in the back of his vehicle.

Whil e ins ide the patr ol ca r, the De fe nd ant w a s a sk e d a numbe r o f q

ue sti on s a

bo ut h is

au to mo b il e , h is tr av e l p la n s , an d h is b u s in e s s

. O f

f ic e r N ic h o ls a ls o te le p h o n e d th e U nited States Cus tom s Serv ice to v e ri fy the va lid ity

of the De fe nd ant’ s d

ri ve r’ s li c e ns e and

re g istra tio n a nd to deter mine whether

the vehicle had re cently

crosse d the borde r fr om Mex ico. While awaiting the results of his inquiry , the offic er a sked for and re ceive d consent to sea rch the vehicle.

As he looked unde r the hood of the ve hicle, Of fice r Nichols discove red that the bolts holdi ng the fe nder in pla ce ha d been r emoved a nd repla ced. A fter unsuc cessf ully attempting to r emove the fende r, he called for S erg eant Mike McCord t o assist in the s ear ch, ex plaining that Serg eant Mc Cord “had a narc otics detec ting c anine a nd also

. . . had experienc e in sea rchingvehicles.” The dog aler ted t o the front fende r area, and t he two office rs dril led i nto the fende r, discover ing mor e than three hundred g rams of c ocaine hidden in the fire wall of the f ender

. Duringcross-e x amination, Offic er N ichols conce ded that the De fenda nt was coope rative during the stop. He a lso acknowle dg ed that he ha d seen nothing i n the interior of the ca r that ca used him to fear f

or his safe ty

or led him to suspect any

criminal ac tivity other than speeding . The off icer admit t ed that he did not believe that the Def endant wa s either a

rmed or da

ng erous. Upon f

urther questioning, O ffice r Nichols explained that bec ause the Def endant a ppear ed ner

vous during the initial encounter, his pur

pose in pla cing the Def

endant in the back of the patrol ca r wa s to determine whether the anxiety

level of the Def

endant would incr ease

.
At the conc lusion of the hear ing, the trial cour t took the motion under advisement and later issued a written memora

ndum and orde r g rantingthe motion to suppress. The trial cour t concluded that becaus e th e D e f

e n d an t w a s dr iv in g in

e xc e s s o f

th e s p e e d

li mi t, th e in it ia l s to p “ w a s n ot
unrea sonable” but a lso ruled that detainingthe Def endant in the police vehicle a nd asking questions-3-

“unre lated to spee ding” or “of fice r saf ety ” violated constitutional limits. Fur ther finding s by the trial

c ourt a s summa

ri zed by the Court

of Cr imi na l App e a ls, we re a s f oll ow s: [The officer] did not i nitiate the computer chec k on the [D] efe ndant’s license and reg is tr a ti o n u ntil appr ox imately

two minutes after

placingthe [D] efe ndant in the bac k of the sq uad car and fo ur

min ute s a ft e r i nit iatin g the tr a ff ic sto p. Af

te r t he c a ll t o U. S. Cu sto ms, [the of

fi c e r] co nti nu e d for fo ur min ute s to ask qu e sti on s unr e late d to the spee ding of

fense

. [The office r’s] questions exceede d both the duration and su bje c t m atte r of the stop.
Contrary to the state’s a

rgument, the [D] efe ndant’s re sponses to the offic er’ s questions were an insuffic ient basis for e x tending the detention.

The only possible indicator of criminal activity

. . . was th e [ D] efe ndant’s

ne rv ou sn e ss. Ne rv ou sn e ss a lon e is se ldo m su ff ic ie nt fo r fi nd ingreas on a ble

su sp ic ion , a

nd a lth ou g h it

c ou ld su ffi ce u

nd e r c e rt a in c ir c ums tanc e s, tho se circ umstances a

re not pre sent in this case.

Fr om numerous viewing s of t h e v i d eo tape of the traf fic stop, the cour

t cannot [ac]credit [the officer ’s] testim ony that the [D] efe ndant appe are d n er vous at the beg inning of

the stop and that the ne rvousness escalate d. Nothing a bout the [D]e fe nd ant’ s a

pp e ara nc e on c a me ra su g g e ste d th a t he wa s ner vo us e no ug h to r a ise

a re asonable suspicion of criminal ac tivity

. . . . Any nervousne ss that the [ D]efenda nt did exhibi t was likely

a re sult of being locked in the backse at of a

police ca

r while Nic hols re t ai n ed his driver’s lice nse. The [D]e fe nd ant n ot o nly

did no t f e e l fr e e to le a ve , but he wa s phy sic a lly un a ble to d o s o

. . . .
I n a su pp le me nta l or de r, the tr ia l c ourt als o rul e d th a t e ve n th ou g h th e De fe nd ant v olu nta ri ly consente d to the vehicle se arc h, the conse nt was not sufficie ntly at t en u at ed fr om the unlawful detention so as to allow the admission of the illeg al drug s. The Court of Criminal Appea ls affirme d the orde r of suppre ssion, concluding that the offic er’ s cond u ct , p at t i ng down the De fenda nt and pla c ing hi m in the ba c k o f t he patr ol c ar, amou

nte d to an il le g a l “ fr isk

and sit .” Th e int e rm e diate
c ourt a lso ru le d that the c on se nt to se arc h wa s not s uf fi c ie ntl y a tte nu a te d f

ro m th e ill e g a l c on du c t.

I n th is a pp e a l, t he State c on te nd s th a t bo th t he tr ia l c ourt

and the Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls

err ed by suppressingthe coc aine discove red in the ve hicle. In the alter native, the State a sserts that the conse nt to searc h was voluntary and s o u n re l ated to the unlawful seizure as to per mit the admission of the evidenc e.-4- Stand ard of Review

The standa

rd of review applicable to suppre ssion issues is well established. When the trial court makes finding s of fac t a t the conclusion of a suppression hear ing, the finding s are binding upon this Court unl ess the evide nce in the rec ord preponde rate s ag ainst them. State v. Odom, 928 S.W .2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996) . “Que s t i o n s of cr edibility of the witnesse s, the weig ht and value of the evidenc e, and r esolution of conflicts in the evide nce a re matters entrusted to the tr i al j u d ge as the trier of fac t.” I d. “The party

preva iling in the trial court is entitled to the strong est leg itimate view of the e vidence adduce d at the suppression hear ing as well as all rea sonable and leg itimate infere nces that may be dra wn from that e vidence .” I d. Our re view of a trial court’ s application of law to t he fac ts is de novo, with no presumption of correc tness. See State v. Walton, 41 S.W .3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001) (c iting S tate v. Crutcher , 989 S.W .2d 295, 299 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Yea rg an, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997) ). When the t rial cour t’s finding s of fa ct ar e base d entirely on evidenc e that do e s n ot i nv olv e iss ue s o f w itn e ss c re dib ili ty , h ow e ve r, a pp e llate c ourt s are a s c a

pa ble a s tr ia l c ourt s of re viewing the evidence and draw ing conclusions and the tria l court’s finding s of fa ct ar e subjec t to de novo re view. State v. B inette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 217 (Tenn. 2000).

Ana lys is

Both the state and fe d eral constitutions offe r protec tion from unrea sonable sea rche s and seizures; the g ener al rule is that a w arr antless sea rch or seizure i s presumed unrea sonable and any

e vid e nc e dis c ov e re d s ub

je c t to su pp re ssi on . Se e U. S. Co ns t. a me nd . IV ( “ Th e ri g ht o f t he pe op le to b e se c ur e in t

he ir pe rs on s, ho us e s, pa

pe rs , an d ef

fe c ts, a g a ins t unr e a so na

ble se arc he s and

se izur e s, sh a ll n ot b e vio late d .

. . .” ); Te nn

. Con st. art

. I , § 7 ( “ Th a t th e pe op le sh a ll b e se c ur e in t he ir pe rs on s, ho us e s, pa

pe rs and po sse ssi on s, fr om unr e a so na ble se arc he s and se izur e s .

. . .” ). “ [T]he mos t ba sic constitutional rule in this area is that ‘se arc hes conduc ted outside the judicial proc ess, without prior

a pp ro va l by jud g e or ma g istrate , ar e pe r se unre a so na ble un de r the F ourt

h Ame ndme nt –

su bje c t on ly to a few specific ally established and well delineate d exceptions.’” Coolidge v. New H ampshire, 403 U. S. 4 43 , 4 54 -5 5 ( 19 71 ) ( qu oti ngKatz v. Un ite d State s, 38 9 U. S. 34 7, 35 7 (1 96 7) ); se e a lso State v. Br idge s, 963 S.W .2d 487, 490 (Tenn. 1997) . This Court has rec og nized three c ateg ories of police interventions with private c itiz ens: a fu ll scale a rre st, which requir es proba ble ca use; a brie f investigatory

detention, re quiring rea sonable suspicion of wrong -doing ; and a br ief police -citizen encounte r, re quiring no objective justification. State v. Da niel, 12 S.W .3d 420, 424 (Tenn. 2000)

. “While arre s t s an d

i n v es t i gat o ry

s t o p s ar e s ei z u re s i mp l i ca t i n g co n s t i tu t i o n al p ro t ec t i o ns, consensua l encounte rs ar e not.” State v. Nicholson, 188 S.W .3d 649, 656 (Tenn. 2006). “[A] seiz ure doe s not
occur simply beca use a police office r approache s an indi vidual and asks a fewquestions.” Flor ida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) . Ex ceptions to the wa rr an t re q uirement include sear ches inc ide nt t o a

rr e st, pla in v ie w, ho t purs uit , e xig e nt c ir c ums tanc e s, and oth e rs , su c h a s the c on se nt t o
se arc h. Se e State v. Cox, 1 71 S.W. 2d 17 4, 17 9 ( Te nn . 2 00 5) . “ Th e F ourt h Ame ndme nt a

pp lie s to all seizures of the pe rson, including seizures that involve only a brie f dete ntion short of traditional

arr est.” United States v. B rig noni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (citing Davis v. Mississ ippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Ter

ry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1968)) . Reasonable ness is the “tou chst one of the Four th Amendment. ” Fl o ri d a v . J imeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (c iting Katz, 389 U.S . at“ The c or r ec t s pel l i ng of t he defenda nt ’ s na m e i s ‘ Pul l ey’ ; how eve r , i t i s c i t ed by W es t Publ i s hi ng Com pany 1
as ‘ Pu l l y

. ’” Y earg an , 95 8 S.W

. 2 d at 63 6 n.5 (R ei d , J

. , co n cu rr i n g ).

-5- 360); see a lso Ski nner v. Ry . L abor Executives’ As s n

. , 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989); State v. Sc arb or ou g h, 20 1 S. W.3 d 6 07 , 6 16 (T e nn . 200 6)

. Th e se c on sti tut ion a l pr ote c tio ns are de sig ne d to “‘sa feguard the privac y

and sec urity

of ind i viduals ag ainst arbitra ry invasions of g overnme nt officia ls.’” State v. Keith, 978 S.W .2d 861, 865 (Tenn. 1998) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 367 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)).
This Court has previousl y h eld that our state c onstitut ion offer s more prote ction than the

corr esponding provisions of the Fourth Amendment. S ee, e .g ., State v. J acumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 436 (Tenn. 1989 ); S tate v. L akin, 588 S.W.2d 544, 549 (Tenn. 1979). As under the fe dera l

c on sti tut ion , e vid e nc e ob ta ine d as a res ult of a wa rr antl e ss s e arc h o r s e izur e “ is s ub je c t to suppression unless the State demonstrates that the sea rch or seizure was conducte d pursuant to one of the narr owly define d exceptions to the war rant require ment.” Yea

rg an, 958 S.W.2d at 629. The State bear s the burden of

proof whe n a sea

rch or seizure is conducte d without a war rant. I d.
I. The Initial Stop

An a uto mob ile sto p c on sti tut e s a “ se izur e ” wi thi n th e me anin g of bo th t he F ourt h Amendment to t he United States Consti tution, see Mich. Dep’ t of State Police v. Sitz , 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990); De lawar e v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979) , and ar ticle I , section 7 of the T ennesse e Constit ution, see State v. Pulley , 863 S.W .2d 29, 30 (Tenn. 1993)

. As a g ener al rule, if the police 1 have pr obable c ause to be lieve a tr aff ic violation has occ urre d, the stop is constitut io n a ll y r easona ble. W h re n v

. Un i ted States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). In this case, the State c oncede s that the Def endant wa s seized when the of fice r initiated the traf

fic stop. Simil arly , the Def endant c oncede s that the offic er ha d probable cause based upon his excessive spe ed to conduc t the traff ic stop.

Be c a u s e th e D e f

e n d an t w a s dr iv in g e igh t m il e s p e r h o u r o v e r th e p o s te d

li mi t, O ffice r Ni c ho ls h a d p ro ba

ble c a us e to i nit iate a

tr a ff ic sto p. I n c on se qu e nc e , he wa s a uth or ize d p ur su ant t o Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 55-10-207 to issue a tra ffic c itation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55- 10-207(a )(1) (2004) ( “Wheneve r a pe rson is arr ested for a violation of any provision of . . . cha

pter 8 .

. . of thi s ti tle

. . . , punis ha

ble a s a mis de me ano r,

. . . th e arr est in g o ffice r s ha ll i ssu e a tr a ff ic citation to such person in lieu of arre st, continued custody and the takingof the a

rre sted person befor e a ma g istrate.”) . Although the re is no fe dera l constitutional prohibition ag ainst an ar rest for a minor traf

fic off ense, see Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) ( holding that the Fourth Amendment permits custodial arrest on the basis of probable cause t hat an individual has committed eve n a minor traf fic violation), our s tatut e pr e c lud e d th e of fi c e r f ro m do ingso in t

his

case , see Te nn. Code Ann. § 5 5 -10-207( a)( 1) (2004)

. In State v. Wa lker, 12 S.W.3d 460 (T enn. 2000), this Court concluded that Tennessee ’s “cite and re lease ” statute, Te nnessee Code Annotated section 40-7- 118, cre ated a “a p re sumptive right to be cited and r elea sed for the commission of a mis d em ea n o r. ” Id. at 464. Full custodial arr est is permitted only when one of the statutory-6-

exce ptions is m et. Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 55-10- 207 makes re fer ence to the “cite a nd rele ase” statute and provide s that the same e xceptions apply. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-207( f) (2004). None of the statutory e xceptions, howe ver, a re pr esent in this instance

. As indicated, the initial st op o f th e D e f e n d a nt’ s vehicle w as constitutionally permissible. The Un ite d St a te s Su

pr e me Court ha s he ld, ho we ve r, that “ [i]t is ne ve rt he le ss c le ar that a

se izur e that is lawf ul at it s in c e pti on

c an v iol a te the F ourt

h Ame ndme nt if its mann e r of e xec uti on unre a so na

bly infring es intere sts protected by t h e C o nstitut ion.” I llinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005) (c iti ngUn ite d St a te s v

. Jac ob se n, 46 6 U. S. 10 9, 12 4 (1 98 4) ). Mo re ov e r, a we ll- re c og nize d a

uth or ity

on the F ourt h A me ndme nt h a s a dd

re sse d th e “ ro uti ne tr a ff

ic sto p” a s f

oll ow s: Given that police c an ea sily come by a fa ctual basis for a tra ffic stop, that

su c h stop s ar e of

te n moti vate d by dr

ug -e nf or c e me nt pur

po se s, and that th e re e xists virtually no basis for que stioning the initiation of such a stop beca use of its prete x tual

or arb itr ary natur e , it

is a pp are nt t hat th e pe rm iss ibl e dim e ns ion s o f a lawf ul t ra ff ic stop are matters of some importanc e.
Way n e R. L a F av e , T h e “ Ro u ti n e T r a f f ic St o p ” F r o m S ta

rt t o F in is h : T o o M u c h“ Ro u ti n e , ” N ot Enoug h Four

th Amendment, 102 Mich. L . Rev. 1843, 1862 (2004).
II. Pat-down of the De

fendant and Placem ent in the Patrol Car

After the Def endant g ave the office r his driver’ s license a nd reg istration, the office r aske d the Def endant to step out of his ve hicle. The office r explained that he did so for his own safe ty , a constitutionally

justifiab l e p urpose. See Pennsy lvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-11 (1977) (h o l d i n g t h at an o ff

i ce r m ay , as a m at t er

o f c o u rs e, as k

t h ata d ri v er

s t ep o u t o f th e v eh i cl e du ri n g a traff ic stop). As he complied with the reque st, the Def endant asked permission to r emove his jac ket from the c ar. The office r re sponded by saying, “I ’m g oing to let y ou have a s eat back here.” He then patted down the D efe ndant and plac ed him in the secur ed ar ea of the patrol car

. At that point, the Def endant wa s no longe r fr ee to lea ve, a f act the of fice r a ck n o wl ed g ed duringthe suppression hear ing. F urther, the Def endant c ould not have opene d the bac k door fr om the inside.

The off icer , who did not ask for a computer c h ec k o n t he license and re g istration before placingthe Def

endant in the ba ck of the patrol ca r, provided a varie ty

of explanations for plac ing the Def endant ther e. Initially , he conte nded that he had d o n e so for safe ty rea sons. L ater , he adde d, “[P] lus it was also raining .” He ultima t el y admitted, howeve r, that he use d the detention as a n investigatory

tool. He explained that he wanted to de termine whether the Def endant’ s anxi ety

level incre ased w hen he w as plac ed in the police ve hicle.
The United States Supre me Court has obser ved that “[t]he permissibil ity of a pa rticular la w enfor ceme nt pr actice is judg ed by balanc ing its intrusion on the individual’s F ourth Am en dment interests ag ainst its promoti on of leg itimate gove rnmental intere sts.” Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654. The Court ha s a lso he ld t

hat “ an inve sti g a tiv e de te nti on mus t be te mpo ra

ry and la st n o lo ng e r t

ha n is

nece ssar y to e f f e c tu a te th e p u r

p o s e o f th e s to p

. Si mi la

r ly , th e inv e s ti g a ti v e me th o d s e mploy ed-7-

should be the lea st intrusive means re asonably available to verify

or dispel the off

icer ’s susp i ci on in a short per iod of time.” F lorida v. Roy er, 460 U .S. at 500. I n S t at e v

. Cox , 171 S.W .3d 174 (Tenn. 2005) , this Court adopted the rationa l e o f the U.S. Supreme Court in Roy er, making the fo llo wi ngob se rv a tio ns :

The dura tion of [a traffic ] st op, howeve r, must be “tempora ry and last no long er tha

n
nece ssary to effe ctuate the purpose o f the stop.” “The proper inquiry is whether during the detention the police diligently pursued a means of inve stigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly .” A tra ffic stop may be dee med “unre asonable ,” if the “ ‘time, manner or scope of t he investig ation exceeds the proper para meters.’ ”

I d. at 179-80 (c itations omi tted).
The United States Supre me Court has ruled th at an officer may order the occ upants out of the vehicle during a tra ffic stop:

Ag ainst this important interest [ of off icer safe ty ] we are asked to we igh the intrusion into t he drive r’s pe rsonal liberty occa sioned not by

the initial stop of the

v e h ic le , w h ic h w a s a dmi tt e d ly ju s ti f ie d , b u t b y

th e o r d e r t o g e t o u t o f

th e c ar

. We thi nk thi s a dd iti on a l in tr

us ion c an o nly be de sc ri be d as de min imi s. Th e dr ive r i s being asked to e x pose to view ve ry littl e more of his person than is a lrea dy exposed. The police have a lrea dy

lawfully decide d that the driver shall be briefly detained; the

on ly qu e sti on is wh e the r h e sh a ll s pe nd tha t pe ri od sittin g in t

he dr ive r’ s se a t of

his

car or s t an d i n g al o n gside it. Not only is the insist ence of the police on the latter

c ho ic e no t a

“ se ri ou s in tr

us ion up on the sanc tity

of the pe rs on ,” but it ha

rd ly ri se s to the level of

a “‘ petty i n d i gn i t y

. ’” What is at most a mere inconvenienc e ca nnot p r e v a i l w h e nb a l an c e d

a g a i n s tl e g i t i m a t e c o n c e r n s f o r t h e o f f i c e r ’ s s a f e t y.
Mimms, 434 U.S . at 111 (c itation omit ted). On the other ha nd , t h e plac ement of a

driver into the ba c ks e a t of

a patr ol c ar c ann ot b e de sc ri be d a s “ de min imu s” or a “ me re inc on ve nie nc e .” A p ro c e ss inv olv inga

fr isk and pla c e me nt i nto the ba c k o f a loc ke d pa tr ol ca r i s mo re akin

to a fu ll- sc a le arr e st than the brie f dete ntion ge nera lly incident to an ordina

ry traff ic stop. Af

t er a t ra ffic violation, a dr ive r c an g e ne ra lly

e xpe c t “ to s pe nd

a sh or t pe ri od of tim e ans we ri ngqu e sti on s and wa iti ngwh ile the offic er c hecks his license and reg istration, that he may then be g iven a citation, but that in the end he most likely

will be allowed to continue on his way .” B erke mer v. McCa rty , 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1 98 4) . “ Th e governme nt’ s g e ne ra l in te re st i n c ri min a l in ve sti g a tio n, wi tho ut m or e , is g e ne ra lly insufficient to outweig h the individual interest in e nding the detention.” United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1221 ( 10th Cir. 2001).
Other jurisdictions consider ing t he issue have permitted the “ frisk and sit” f or off icer convenie nce if

place ment in the patrol ca r is the leas t i ntrusive means of avoiding a dang erous-8-

condition outside the vehicle. F or example, in S t at e v

. L o z ada, 748 N .E.2d 520 (Ohio 2001), the Oh io S up re me Court

he ld a s f oll ow s:
[D] uring a routine traffic stop, it is rea sonable for an officer to sear ch the driver for weap o n s befor e plac ing the driver in a patrol ca r, if plac ing the driver in the patrol

car during the investigation pr events off icer s or the drive r fr om being subjected to a dang erous c ondition and placingthe driver in the patrol ca

r i s t h e l ea s t intrusive means to avoid the da

ng erous c ondition.

748 N.E.2d at 526. In Wil son v. S t at e, 745 N.E.2d 789 (I nd. 2001), the Indiana Supre me Court observe d that it could “envision various pa rticulariz ed cir cumstance s (including , for e x ample and wi th ou t limitatio n, inc le me nt w e a the r, the la c k o f a va ila ble lig hti ngfo r p a

pe rw or k, the ne e d to

acc ess equipment with the deta ined motorist, etc.) that may make it r easona bly nece ssary for police to require a st opped mot orist to enter a poli ce ve hicle,” but ne verthe less conclude d that “[a]n officer is not using the lea st intrusive means to investigate a tra ffic stop if, without a pa rticularized justification making it re asonably nece ssary , he plac es a person into his patrol vehicle and ther eby subjects t he person to a pat-dow n sear ch.” I d. at 793. Simil arly , the Minnesota Supreme Court has ruled that “a rea sonable basis must e x ist” for an office r to ask a drive r to wait in the patrol c ar dur ing a routine tra ffic stop. See State v. Var nado, 582 N.W.2d 886, 891 n.4 (Minn. 1998).

As to the fr isk , th e Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Court

ha s g ra nte d “ na rr ow ly dr awn a uth or ity to permit a re asonable sear ch for wea pons for the pr otection of the police office r, whe re he has re ason to believe that he is de aling with a n arme d and dang erous individual, reg ardle ss of whethe r he ha s probable cause to arr est the i ndividual for a crime.” Terr y , 392 U.S. at 27. The Court has r uled that the re is n o ju sti fi c a tio n f

or an e xce pti on

to t he wa rr ant r e qu ir e me nt f

or a se arc h inc ide nt to a

tr a ff ic stop, observing that “[t] he thre at to of fice r safe ty from issuing a traff ic citation, howeve r, is a g ood deal less than in the case of a custodial arr est.” Knowles v. I owa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998). The Court concluded that the interest of office r safety was sufficiently protec ted in a tra ffic stop setting t h r o u g h t h e s e ar c h p o w e r p e r m i t t e d u n d e r T e r r y

. S e e i d

. a t 1 1 7

- 1 8 ; s e e a l s o La F a v e , 1 0 2 M i c h

. L. Rev. at 1869 (f

or a discussion of this doc trine). That is to say , an off icer may conduct a

pat-down for we apons i f he has reasonable suspicion that the driver may be ar med. Knowles, 525 U .S. at 117- 18.
As stated, Of

fice r Nichols h ad p ro b ab le ca use to stop the Def

endant’ s vehicle a

nd issue a citation for spe eding . He did not, howeve r, write a citation and admittedly intended fr om the outset to ask for c onsent to sear ch the ve hicle. Withou t any suspicion that the Def

endant wa s armed or dang erous, the of

fice r fr isked the De fenda nt and place d him in the back o f t h e patrol car be fore chec king the validity

of his driver’ s license or vehicle reg istration. Despite the State’s insistence that the offic er pla ced the Def endant in th e p at ro l ca r to shield him from the rain and c old, the rec ord establishes that the office r place d the Def endant in the patrol car primarily to de termine whe ther he beca me more ne rvous. Moreove r, the videota pe of the traff

ic stop, which also includes sever al other traff ic stops conducted by

Offic er N ichols over the cou rse of the three -day period, re futes the explanation of

fe red by the State. In six of those dete ntions, all of which occ urre d at roug hly theE xam pl es of w hen i t m i gh t be rea so n ab l e t o p l ace a dr i ver i n t he s ecur ed ar ea of a pat r ol ca r ar e: w here a 2
d a n g e ro u s c ro w d th re a te n s th e o ff ic e r an d d riv e r, se e L o z a d a , 7 4 8 N .E .2 d a t 5 2 4 ; d u rin g in c le m e n t w e a th e r, se e S ta te

v. M er t z, 362 N

. W

. 2d 410 , 413 ( N

. D

. 198 5); and fa i l ure t o produ ce a dri ver’ s l i cens e du r i ng a t r af f i c s t op as r equi r ed b y s t at e l aw , s ee S t at e v

. E v an s, 61 8 N

. E

. 2 d 16 2 , 16 7 (O h i o 19 9 3 ).
-9- same location on I nterstate 40, the driver w as aske d to step outside the vehicle. O f those six , four

wer e fr isked and plac ed into the bac kseat of the patrol ca r. Only th e Defenda

nt’s stop involved inclement we ather . That the off icer conducte d a “f

risk and si t” in those instances r eg ardle ss of the

weather or the t ime of day supports our conclusion that the ex tended detention in this case lac ked

a re a so na ble ba sis

.
Whil e in this case O ffice r Nichols’ intuition and persistenc e fr ustrated the illega l activities of the De fenda

nt, a fa ct that would otherw ise merit praise , our appr oval of this particula r “f risk and sit” would deviate f

rom g ener ations of law in this are a. T h e Supreme Court has wa rned that “illeg itimate and unconstitutional pra ctices g et their first footing

. . . by silent a pproac hes and slig ht deviations from leg al modes of pr ocedur e.” B oy d v. United S t at es , 1 1 6 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). 2 Mor e o v e r , th o s e ju

r is d ic ti o n s th a t p e r

mi t a d e te n ti o n li k e th is d u r in g a r o u ti n e tr a f

f ic s to p do not allow a pat-down for weapons i n the abse nce of rea sonable suspicion. See, e .g ., L ozada, 748 N.E.2d at 524 (“ [D] uring a routine tr af fi c s t o p , it is unreasonable for a n office r to sear ch the dr iver for

wea pons befor e plac ing him or he r in a patrol car , if the sole re ason for pl ac i n g t h e d ri ver in the patrol ca r duringthe investig ation is f or the convenie nce of the office r.”) . Other jurisdictions have

c on c lud e d th a t a

pat- do wn

fo r w e a po ns is p e rm iss ibl e be fo re pla c inga pe rs on int o a pat rol c ar s o l o n g as t h er e w as a r ea s o n ab l e b as i s fo r th e pl ac em en t

. As s t at ed b y o n e Ne w Yo rkco u rt , “A l t h o u gh a police of

fice r may rea sonably

pat d o wn a per son befor e he pla ces him in the bac k of a police vehicle, the leg itimacy

of that proc edure depends on the leg itimacy of plac ing him in the police c ar in the first place .” People v. Kinse lla, 527 N.Y.S.2d 899, 899 (N.Y. A pp. Div. 1988).

Offic er N ichols lacke d a re asonable basis for plac ing the Def endant into t he secured a

rea of his patr ol c ar a

nd a lso la c ke d a

n in de pe nd e nt b a sis fo r t

he fr isk . The Cou

rt of Cr imi na l App e a ls s o held, re g ardle ss of whethe r the d u ra t i on and scope of the subseque nt interrog ation exceede d

c on sti tut ion a l li mit s. I n o ur vie w, that is the pr op e r a na ly sis

.
III . Consent to Search

I n the alter

native, the State argues t hat even if the “f risk and sit” wa s improper, the Court of Cr im in a l A p p e a ls e r

r e d b y c o n c lu d in g th a t th e D e f e n d an t’ s c o n s e n t to s e ar c h h is v e h ic le was not sufficie ntly

attenuate d from the c onstitut ional impropriety

. The S tate also argues t hat our decision in State v. Garc ia, 123 S.W.3d 335 (Tenn. 2003), should be overruled because it conflicts with the landmark de cision of the United States Supreme Court in Schne ckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U .S. 218 (1973).
Whether an individual voluntarily consents to a se arc h is a question of fa ct to be dete rmined from the totality

of the c ircumstance s. See Schnec kloth, 412 U.S. at 227; C ox , 171 S.W .3d at 184.-10-

The c onsent must be “‘une quivocal, specific, int ellige ntly g iven, and uncontaminated by duress or

coer cion.’” State v. Simps on, 968 S.W .2d 776, 7 8 4 (T en n

. 1 998) (quoting State v. Br own, 836 S.W .2d 530, 547 (Tenn.1992) ). “The pertinent que stion is t his: whether the [ i n d i v idual’s] act of

c on se nti ngis the pr od

uc t of an e sse nti a lly

fr e e and un c on str a ine d c ho ic e . I f the [ind ivi du a l’ s] w ill

wa s o ve rb or

ne and his or he r c a pa c ity for sel f-de te rm inatio n c ri tic a lly imp a ir e d, du e pr oc e ss i s offe nded.” Cox, 171 S .W.3d at 185 (citing Schne ckloth, 412 U.S. at 225-26).

I n Gar cia, this Court observe d that “‘a consent to search that is prece ded by an illeg al seizure is not ‘fruit of the poisonous tree ’ i f t he consent is both: 1) vol untary , and 2) not an expl oitation of the prior illeg ality .’” G arc ia, 123 S.W.3d at 346 (citing Way ne L aF ave, 3 Sear ch an d S eizure § 8.2(d) at 656 (3d ed. 1996)). We utiliz ed the f actor s established in Br own v. I llinois , 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975), f

or dete rmining w hether

a voluntary

confe ssion was sufficie ntly attenuate d from an

un lawf ul s e izur e . T ho se fa c tor s are “ 1) the te mpo ra l pr oximi ty of the ill e g a l se izur e and

c on se nt; 2) the pres en ce o f interveningcirc umstances; and 3) the purpose a nd flag ranc y

of the off

icial mis c on du c t.” Ga

rc ia , 1 23 S.W. 3d

a t 34 6. Th is C ourt

a c kn ow le dg ed th at “‘[ a ] br ie f t ime la ps e betwee n a F ourth Amendment violation and consent often indi cate s exploi tation [ of the prior illega l police action] beca

use t he effec ts of t he mi sconduct have not had ti me t o dissipate.’” I d. (quoting State v. Hanse n, 63 P.3d 650, 666 (U t ah 2002)) . By the application of these fa ctors to the illeg al “fr isk and sit” proce dure, the Court of C riminal Appea ls ruled that the Defenda nt’s consent to sea

rch was not suffic iently

attenuate d from the intrusive a ct. We agree

.
I n Schneckloth, the Court stated that “the Four th a nd Four teenth Amendments re quire that

a c on se nt n ot be c oe rc e d, by e xplic it o r i mpl ic it m e ans , b y imp lie d thre a t or

c ov e rt fo rc e .” 41 2 U .S.

a t 22 8. Whil e in G arc ia

thi s Co ur

t a c kn ow le dg e d th a t “ the B ro wn fa c tor s w e re de sig ne d to a id courts in deter

mining whe ther a

confe ssion was obtain ed b y exploi tation of an illeg al ar rest,” w e conclude d that “these fac tors may also be used by

courts to eva luate whe ther the causa l connec tion betwee n an unlawf

ul seizure and a subseq u en t consent ha s been br oken, i.e. whe ther the pr imary taint of an unlaw ful seizure has be en suff iciently attenuate d from the voluntar y consent.” Gar cia, 123 S.W .3d at 346. Our r uling in Ga

rcia u p h o lds the principle that whe n consent to sea rch is not sufficie ntly

attenuate d from an unla

wful seizure, it is presumptively the produc t of coe rcion.

I n t hi s case, the De fe nd ant c on se nte d to the se arc h o f h is v e hic le wh ile he wa s unla wf ull y detained in the se cure d area of the office r’s patrol car . The trial judg e, who sa w and he ard the witnesses firsthand, d et ermined that the consent wa s the direc t result of the unc onstitut ional detention. Ther e wa s no temporal sepa ration betwe en the illeg al ac t a nd the conse nt. Furthe r, there

we re no int e rv e nin g c ir c ums tanc e s se pa ra tin g the tw o e ve nts . F ina lly , in thi s in sta nc e , “ the purp os e and fla g ranc y

of the off icial misconduct” w eig hs marg inally in f avor of the Def

endant. As in Garc ia, a druginterdiction offic er r ather than a tra ffic of

fice r conduc ted the stop. The de tection of illeg al drug s rather

than the enf

orce ment of the tra ffic la

ws was the a

ppare nt purpose of the detention. See Gar cia, 123 S.W.3d at 347-48 (“K ohl’s status as a membe r of the dr ug task fo rc e adds t o the lik e lih oo d th a t he r p ro lon g e d a nd unre a so na

ble de te nti on

of the de fe nd ant wa s fo r the so le purp os e of ob ta ini ngc on se nt t o s e arc h h is v e hic le .” ). I n o ur vie w, the De fe nd ant’ s c on se nt t o th e vehic le

sear ch wa s the end produc t of his unlawful dete ntion.-11- CO NC LU SION I n these spec ific circ umstances, the a rre sting off

icer v i olated the state and fe dera l constitutions by

frisking t h e Defenda

nt and placinghim in the secure d are a of his patr ol car

. Be cause the conse nt to searc h was not ade quately attenuate d from the unlaw ful detentio n , the judgme nts of the trial court and Court of Criminal Appeals suppre ssing the e vidence seized during the sea rch of the Def endant’ s vehicle a

re a ffirme d.

Be cause the Def

endant is indig ent, costs of the a ppeal a re ta x ed to the State.

___________________________________ GA RY R. WA DE , JUST I CE