1 

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

Anne Y., 

Petitioner Below, Petitioner 

vs.) No. 22-ICA-229 (Fam. Ct. Cabell Cnty. No. 21-D-493) 

Daniel Y., 

Respondent Below, Respondent 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Petitioner Anne Y.1 appeals the Family Court of Cabell County’s October 6, 2022, 

order denying her motion for reconsideration of the parties’ property settlement agreement, 

which was ratified by the family court and incorporated in the parties’ final divorce order.2

Respondent Daniel Y. filed a timely response.3 Anne Y. filed a reply. 

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51-

11-4 (2022). After considering the parties’ oral and written arguments, the record on 

appeal, and applicable law, this Court finds no substantial question of law, no prejudicial 

error, and no abuse of discretion. For these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the 

family court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

The parties were married in 2003 and are the parents of three minor children. Daniel 

Y. is an attorney in West Virginia. Anne Y. has worked as a financial analyst, realtor, and 

previously served as a public official in Cabell County. In September of 2021, the parties 

1 Consistent with our practice in cases with sensitive facts, we use initials where 

necessary to protect the identities of those involved in the case. See W. Va. R. App. Pro 

40(e)(1); State v. Edward Charles L., 183 W. Va. 641, 645 n.1, 398 S.E.2d 123, 127 n.1 

(1990). 

2 We note that West Virginia Code § 51-2A-10(a) provides that a party to a family 

court proceeding may seek a reconsideration of an order for a list of reasons almost 

identical to that set forth in Rule 60(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. See 

David C. v. Mallory M., No. 15-0063, 2015 WL 7628825 (W. Va. November 23, 2015) 

(memorandum decision). 

3

 Anne Y. is represented by Jennifer D. Ransbottom, Esq. Daniel Y. is represented 

by Amy C. Crossan, Esq. 

FILED 

May 22, 2023 

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK 

INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS 

OF WEST VIRGINIA 
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separated, and, on October 21, 2021, Anne Y. filed for divorce and filed a corresponding 

financial disclosure.4 Thereafter, a settlement agreement was drafted to reflect the parties’ 

agreement as to all issues related to child custody, spousal support, and the parties’ assets.5

The settlement agreement, at Section 5, specifically referenced the parties’ interest in 

Daniel Y.’s law firm, the parties’ debts and other assets (including marital home, vacation 

home, rental property, vehicles, bank accounts, life insurance, retirement accounts, and 

household goods). The settlement agreement further noted that Daniel Y. would pay 

spousal support. 

On January 13, 2022, a final divorce hearing was held before the family court. 

During that hearing the parties were self-represented and participated in the hearing via 

remote technology. While both parties were self-represented, it was understood by the 

family court and both parties that Anne Y. and Daniel Y. had individually received advice 

from separate legal counsel as to the settlement agreement and final divorce proceedings.6

At the January 13, 2022, hearing, the parties presented their settlement agreement 

to the court and confirmed that the agreement embodied the terms to which they concurred. 

The court asked both parties if there was anything not in the settlement agreement that the 

parties believed should be talked about or brought up during the final divorce hearing, and 

both parties responded, “No.” As neither party was represented by counsel, the family court 

indicated that it would prepare the final order, within a week of receipt of parties’ executed 

settlement agreement. Thereafter, Anne Y. delivered the parties’ executed settlement 

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In her financial disclosure, filed in conjunction with her petition for divorce, Anne 

Y. listed Daniel Y.’s interest in his law firm as an asset but indicated that she did not know 

the value of the interest by noting a “?’ as to the value. It is undisputed that Daniel Y. did 

not file a financial disclosure with his response to Anne Y.’s petition for divorce. 

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 There is a factual dispute between the parties as to which party actually drafted the 

settlement agreement. In her Motion for Reconsideration Of The Final Order’s Property 

Settlement Agreement, at paragraph 4, Anne Y. asserts that the settlement agreement was 

drafted by Daniel Y. However, in his brief before this Court, at page 3, Daniel Y. states 

that prior to filing for divorce, Anne Y. presented to him a proposed settlement agreement 

that was “obviously prepared by” Attorney Jennifer Ransbottom, Anne Y’s current 

counsel. Regardless of who prepared the settlement agreement there is no dispute that when 

the settlement agreement was presented to the family court, both parties acknowledged 

their agreement to the terms and conditions of the same. 

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 In its October 6, 2022, order, the family court found that while Anne Y. was “selfrepresented, it is apparent that she consulted with an experienced family law attorney as 

she proceeded with the divorce.” Further, the court noted that while Daniel Y. is an 

attorney, neither he nor his then law firm “practice family law.”
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agreement to the court, and, on February 8, 2022, the family court’s Findings of Fact, 

Conclusions of Law, and Final Order was entered. 

In its February 8, 2022, order, the court found that the parties agreed upon a property 

settlement and the court incorporated, without any changes or amendments, the parties’ 

settlement agreement as part of the final order. Thereafter, upon learning of Daniel Y.’s 

departure from his law firm and his associated petition requesting a reduction in his child 

support obligation (filed on June 28, 2022), Anne Y. filed a Motion For Reconsideration 

Of The Final Order’s Property Settlement Agreement, pursuant to West Virginia Code § 

51-2A-10(a)(5).7 By order entered on October 6, 2022, the family court denied Anne Y.’s 

motion for reconsideration and found that “the parties represented to the court that they 

had an agreement on all matters, which included parenting, spousal support, and equitable 

distribution of property. Their agreement was placed upon the record for the court and 

confirmed by the parties.” 

The court further found that while Anne Y. was self-represented, it was apparent 

“that she consulted with an experienced family law attorney as she proceeded with the 

divorce.” The family court determined that the “parties went through their agreement at the 

final hearing and confirmed their desire for their agreement to become the order of the 

court and subsequently provided the court with a written executed copy of the agreement.” 

The court also noted that Anne Y. “was the driving force pursuing the divorce[;]” that 

Daniel Y. “did not appear to want the divorce and he was not rushing the divorce 

through[;]” and that both “parties participated in the final hearing and were given an 

opportunity to ask questions” of the court and each other. It is from the October 6, 2022, 

order that Anne Y. now appeals. 

Generally, we note that in reviewing petitioner’s claims, we consider such claims 

under the same parameters as a motion to vacate a judgment made pursuant to Rule 60(b) 

of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. Here, the motion that forms the basis of the 

family court’s October 6, 2022, order, was made pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51-2A7 West Virginia Code § 51-2A-10(a)(2001) provides, in part, that: 

[a]ny party may file a motion for reconsideration of a . . . final order of the 

family court for the following reasons: (1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, 

excusable neglect or unavoidable cause; (2) newly discovered evidence 

which by due diligence could not have been available at the time the matter 

was submitted to the court for decision; (3) fraud, misrepresentation or other 

misconduct of an adverse party; (4) clerical or other technical deficiencies 

contained in the order; or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the 

operation of the order. 
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10(a). The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia (“SCAWV”) has addressed such 

motions and found that: 

In Ray v. Ray, 216 W. Va. 11, 14 n.13, 602 S.E.2d 454, 457 n.13 (2004), 

overruled on other grounds by Allen v. Allen, 226 W. Va. 384, 701 S.E.2d 

106 (2009), we found that motions pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51-2A10 have replaced motions for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) of the 

West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure in the family court. 

Robert Brumfield v. Christina McComas, No. 22-0037, 2023 WL 1798562 (W. Va. 

February 7, 2023) (memorandum decision). 

Additionally, the SCAWV has held that “[a] motion to vacate a judgment made 

pursuant to Rule 60(b) . . . is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and the court’s 

ruling on such motion will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a showing of an abuse 

of such discretion.” Syl. Pt. 5, Toler v. Shelton, 157 W. Va. 778, 204 S.E.2d 85 (1974). 

Moreover, in addressing such appeals, the SCAWV has reasoned that “‘[a]n appeal of the 

denial of a Rule 60(b) motion brings to consideration for review only the order of denial 

itself and not . . . the final judgment order’ Syllabus Point 3, Toler v. Shelton, 157 W. Va. 

778, 204 S.E.2d 85 (1974).” Syl. Pt. 1, Builders’ Serv. and Supply Co. v. Dempsey, 224 W. 

Va. 80, 680 S.E.2d 95 (2009). 

As to settlement agreements in family law cases, West Virginia Code § 48-6-101(a) 

(2001) defines “[p]roperty settlement or separation agreement[s]” to include “a written 

agreement between a husband and wife whereby they agree to live separate and apart from 

each other[,]” which could include the agreement to “[s]ettle the property rights of the 

parties[.]” Further, the SCAWV has held “this Court favors fair and equitable contracts 

between divorcing parties.” Nakashima v. Nakashina, 171 W. Va. 9, 11, 297 S.E.2d 208, 

210 (1982). 

West Virginia Code § 48-6-201(a) (2001) provides, in pertinent part, that: 

[i]n cases where the parties . . . have executed a separation agreement, if the 

court finds that the agreement is fair and reasonable, and not obtained by 

fraud, duress or other unconscionable conduct by one of the parties, and 

further finds that the parties, through the separation agreement, have 

expressed themselves in terms which, if incorporated into a judicial order, 

would be enforceable by a court in future proceedings, then the court shall 

conform the relief which it is authorized to order . . . The separation 

agreement may contractually fix the division of property between the parties 

and may determine whether spousal support shall be awarded. . . 

Further, West Virginia Code § 48-7-102 (2001) states that: 
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In cases where the parties . . . have executed a separation agreement, then the 

court shall divide the marital property in accordance with the terms of the 

agreement, unless the court finds: (1) That the agreement was obtained by 

fraud, duress or otherwise unconscionable conduct by one of the parties; or 

(2) That the parties, in the separation agreement, have not expressed 

themselves in terms which, if incorporated into a judicial order, would be 

enforceable by a court in future proceedings; or (3) That the agreement, 

viewed in context of the actual contributions of the respective parties to the 

net value of the marital property of the parties, is so inequitable as to defeat 

the purposes of this section, and such agreement was inequitable at the time 

the same was executed. 

With these principals in mind, we now address Anne Y.’s two assignments of error 

on appeal, which we will address in turn. In her first assignment of error, she argues that 

the family court erred by approving the settlement agreement without requiring Daniel Y. 

to file a financial disclosure. We disagree. 

West Virginia Code § 48-7-206(1) (2001) provides, in part, that “[u]pon the failure 

by either party timely to file a complete disclosure statement . . . , the court may accept the 

statement of the other party as accurate.” In the instant case, that is exactly what the family 

court did. 

The petitioner argues that the family court erred in enforcing the settlement 

agreement when Daniel Y. did not file a financial statement and because the financial 

statement filed by Anne Y. indicated a “?” when noting the value of Daniel Y.’s law firm. 

We, like the family court, find her argument in that regard to be without merit.8 Anne Y. 

knew that Daniel Y. may have an interest in the law firm where he then worked. Her 

understanding as to the same is evidenced by her inclusion of Daniel Y.’s law firm on her 

disclosure form. We further agree with the family court’s reasoning that Anne Y. did not 

have the law firm valued or pursue discovery as to this issue and “appeared more interested 

in obtaining the divorce quickly and minimizing costs.” Accordingly, we find no error. The 

family court did not abuse its discretion in denying Anne Y.’s motion for reconsideration. 

In her second assignment of error, Anne Y. contends that the circuit court erred in 

not setting aside the settlement agreement after Anne Y. pointed out the lack of financial 

information in the record. Again, we disagree and find no error. In Clay v. Clay, 182 W. 

Va. 414, 419, 388 S.E.2d 288, 293 (1989), the SCAWV considered: 

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 Anne Y.’s argument that State ex rel St. Clair v. Howard, 244 W. Va. 679, 856 S.E.2d 

638 (2021) is applicable was also found to be without merit by the family court. Unlike St. Clair, 

Daniel Y., an attorney, was not the driving force behind the divorce and both parties participated 

in the final hearing. We agree with the family court that St. Clair is distinguishable. 
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whether the trial court could look behind a written separation agreement to 

determine its fairness where both parties were represented by counsel and 

testified they were satisfied with the settlement . . . . [and] concluded that . . 

. [West Virginia Code § 48-2-32(b) (1986) now West Virginia Code § 48-7-

102(2001)] was [sic] not “intended to force upon a trial court an affirmative 

duty to question the wisdom of a spouse’s apparent satisfaction with the 

terms of a property settlement agreement [.]” 182 W. Va. at 418, 388 S.E.2d 

at 292. 

Gangopadhyay v. Gangopadhyay, 184 W. Va. 695, 700, 403 S.E.2d 712, 717 (1991). The 

same reasoning is applicable in the instant case. Here, while the parties were not 

represented by counsel, the family court specifically found that it was clear that both parties 

had the benefit of consulting with experienced counsel.9 The family court accepted the 

parties’ settlement agreement because the parties represented that they were satisfied with 

the agreement, which included Daniel Y.’s share in his law firm. The settlement agreement 

states that Daniel Y. “will receive his interest in the law firm and the entity owning the real 

property in which it operates.” Prior to the entry of the final order incorporating the 

settlement agreement, neither party objected to any of the provisions of the agreement and 

made no allegations that the agreement was obtained by fraud, duress, or any other type of 

unconscionable conduct. 

Further, the SCAWV has long held that “[o]nce a competent party makes a 

settlement and acts affirmatively to enter into such settlement, his second thoughts at a later 

time as to the wisdom of the settlement [do] not constitute good cause for setting it aside.” 

Moreland v. Suttmiller, 183 W. Va. 621, 625, 397 S.E.2d 910, 914 (1990). In Fridley v. 

Plum, No. 15-1140, 2016 WL 6678991 (W. Va. November 14, 2016) (memorandum 

decision), the SCAWV reasoned that: 

“[v]oluntary settlement agreements that address and reconcile the conflicting 

interests of divorcing parties should be favored by the court; such 

arrangements enable parties to freely resolve their marital controversies and 

order their personal affairs.[”] See generally, Strangolagalli v. 

Strangolagalli, 742 N.Y.S.2d 914, 915 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (recognizing 

judicial review of settlement agreement in divorce action is to be exercised 

sparingly, with goal of encouraging parties to settle their disputes on their 

own). 

Upon our review of the record submitted, we find no error or abuse of discretion in 

the family court’s denial of Anne Y.’s Motion For Reconsideration Of The Final Order’s 

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 The experienced counsel referred to by the family court are the parties’ current counsel, 

Jennifer D. Ransbottom and Amy C. Crossan. 
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Property Settlement Agreement. The record supports the family court’s well-reasoned 

findings and conclusions as to the denial of Anne Y.’s Motion For Reconsideration Of The 

Final Order’s Property Settlement Agreement and the propriety of the parties’ settlement 

agreement. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Family Court of Cabell County’s October 

6, 2022. 

Affirmed. 

ISSUED: May 22, 2023 

CONCURRED IN BY: 

Chief Judge Daniel W. Greear 

Judge Charles O. Lorensen 

Judge Thomas E. Scarr