Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online vers ion of the cited material. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE KAY KAYONGO , ) No. 81615

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- I ) Appellant , )

) v. ) UNP UBLISHED OPINION ) RED ROOF INNS, INC., ) ) Responden t. )
B OWMAN , J.

— Kay Kayongo sued Red Roof Inns Inc. (RRI) for damages arising from RRI remov ing her belongings from her hotel room. On RRI’s motion,
t he court dismissed all but Kayongo’s conversion claim under CR 12(b)(6). The
court also noted that RRI was not th e proper defendant for Kayongo’s conversion claim but did not dismiss RRI from the case. Instead, t he court issued a deadline for Kayongo to seek leave to file an amended complaint substituting RRI with the proper party. When Kayongo failed to meet the d eadline , t he court closed her

case

. Because the order closing Kayongo’s case effectively dismiss ed her conversion claim without a sufficient basis, w e reverse and remand

. FACTS Kayongo claims that while she was a guest at a n RRI in Kent , she
returned fro m work to find her room “ empt ied” and her belongings missing. The
hotel told Kayongo it took her property because she owed money for the room.
The hotel later returned Kayongo’s belongings but she contends several valuableNo. 81615

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items were “stolen.” Represent ing herself, Kayongo sued RRI in King County Superior Court. 1 She asserted claims of search and seizure, wrongful eviction, violation of privacy, and conversion , seeking damages of $2,002,135

. RRI moved to dismiss Kayongo’s search and seizure, wrongful ev iction , and violation of privacy claims under CR 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted . The trial court granted the motion

. The court
noted on the order that Kayongo may proceed on her conversion claim b ut she
must subs titute the operator of the hotel, CL West Management LLC , for RRI as
the proper defendant. The court indicated it would “ allow Plaintiff to amend her complaint to substitute D efendant CL Management, LLC and file her proposed
Amended C omplaint to include o nly a claim for conversion.” But i t did not dismiss RRI as a defendant to the claim. Kayongo did not move for leave to amend the complaint. T he trial court
entered a “ Notice of Intent to Close Case ” 2 month s later, stating that it would
close the case unless Kayongo “ moves to amend her complaint and is granted leave to file and serve the complain [t] ” within 30 days. About 2 weeks later, Kayongo filed her “Amended Complaint for Damage Unlaw[ful] Conversion Without Legal Justification , ” an edited version of her original complaint. The complaint named CL West Management as the sole defendant

. But Kayongo did not move the court for leave to file and serve the amended complaint as directed
in the court’s Notice of Intent to Close Case

. After the d eadline for seeking leave to amend had passed , the trial court entered an order closing the case. The court determined that “ [a] lthough Plaintiff

1 The record includes only t he proposed amended complaint Kayongo later filed

.No. 81615

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filed a purported amended complaint . . . , she did not seek and was not granted leave to file it, and in fac t it failed to state a cause of action in any event.” Kayongo moved for reconsideration 11 days after entry of the order of dismissal. The court denied the motion as untimely 2 and “without merit.” Kayongo appeals the order s closing her case and den ying her motion for
reconsideration

. 3
ANALYSIS Order T o Close Case Kayongo argues the trial court erred by clos ing her case while she had an
active conversion claim pending against RRI

. 4 RRI contends the court proper ly
dismiss ed Kayongo’s conversion claim unde r CR 41(b) for “noncompliance” and “willful and deliberate disregard” of a court order

. We agree with Kayongo

. We review a trial court’s order dismissing a case for noncompliance with a court order for abuse of discretion. Apostolis v. City of Seattle , 1 01 Wn. App. 300, 303 , 3 P.3d 198 (2000)

. A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision
is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds

. Apostolis , 101 Wn. App. at 303. A court bases its decision on untenable grounds if it relies on an i ncorrect standard or the facts do not meet the requirements of the correct
standard. In re Marriage of Fiorito , 112 Wn. App. 657, 664, 50 P.3d 298 (2002).

2 A party must file a motion for reconsideration no later than 10 days after entry of the court’s order. CR 59(b).

3 Kayongo filed a motion for discretionary review of the order closing her case and deni al of her motion for reconsideration. A commissioner concluded the decisions were final orders appealable as of right.

4 In its Notice of Intent to Close Case, the trial court mistakenly stated that “Red Roof Inns was the sole defendant and has now been dismissed.” In fact, the court’s order did not dismiss Ka y o ngo’s conversion claim against RRI and the order closing her case effectively extinguished her claim.No. 81615

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4 Under CR 41(b) , a defendant may move to dismiss an action or any claim for “ failure of the plainti ff to prosecute or comply with these rules or any order of
the court .” A court must dismiss a civil action for want of prosecution whenever the plaintiff neglects to note the action for trial or hearing within one year “after any issue of law or fact has been joined.” CR 41(b)(1). CR 41 is not self

executing ; t he defendant must assert a violation of the rule in the form of a
motion to dismiss. Mitchell v. Kitsap County , 59 Wn. App 177, 185, 797 P.2d 516 (1990); see CR 41(b)(1). Here, RRI did not move t o dismiss Kayongo’s conversion claim under CR 41 (b)

. As a result, the rule cannot serve as the basis for the court’s dismissal of the claim. Alternatively , RRI contends the trial court could close Kayongo’s case because it “may impose such sanctions as it deems appropriate for violation of its scheduling orders to effectively manage its caseload, minimize backlog, and conserve scarce judicial resources.” RRI is correct that a “ trial court

. . . has the discretionary authority to manage its own affairs s o as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases,” including dismiss al for noncompliance with i t s orders. Woodhead v. Disc. Waterbeds, Inc. , 78 Wn. App. 125, 129, 896 P.2d 66 (1995). A trial court may dismiss an action when a party willfu lly or deliberately refus es to obey its orders , causing substantial prejudice to the other party. Johnson v. Horizon Fisheries, LLC , 148 Wn . App. 628, 638 , 201 P.3d 346 (2009). But a t rial court exercising that authority must support its conclusion on
th e record and show that it has considered sanctions less harsh than dismissal. Johnson , 148 Wn. App. at 6 38

- 39. Here, the trial court made no such findings.No. 81615

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5 Because t he record is inadequate to support the trial court’s dismiss al of Kayongo’s conversion cl aim , w e reverse the trial court’s order closing Ka y ongo’s
case and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 5

WE CONCUR:

5 Kayongo also appeals the trial court’s denial of her untimely motion for reconsideration. Because we conclude that the trial court erred in closing her case, w e do not reach this assignment of error

.