PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1858

VIRGINIA M. POINDEXTER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

MERCEDES-BENZ CREDIT CORPORATION, a/k/a Mercedes-Benz 

Financial,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior 

District Judge. (1:13-cv-01200-CMH-TCB)

Argued: May 12, 2015 Decided: July 7, 2015

Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote the opinion, in 

which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Wynn joined.

Joanna Lee Faust, CAMERON MCEVOY, PLLC, Fairfax, Virginia, for 

Appellant. Frank Joseph Mastro, SCHLOSSBERG & MASTRO, 

Hagerstown, Maryland, for Appellee.
2

AGEE, Circuit Judge:

Virginia M. Poindexter appeals the district court’s grant 

of summary judgment to Mercedes-Benz Credit Corporation (“MBCC”) 

on her claims arising from MBCC’s failure to timely release a 

lien placed on her residence after she satisfied her underlying 

debt obligation. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the 

district court’s judgment.

I.

In April 2001, Poindexter purchased an Audi sedan from HBL, 

Inc., an automobile dealer in northern Virginia. She originally 

entered into a retail installment contract with HBL, but HBL 

then assigned the contract to MBCC.

Soon after the assignment, MBCC offered Poindexter the 

opportunity to participate in its Home Owner’s Choice program. 

Under that program, Poindexter would grant MBCC a lien against 

her Potomac Falls residence by a deed of trust as security for 

the outstanding automobile loan. MBCC marketed the program as a 

way for borrowers to make the interest paid on the loan 

deductible for federal tax purposes. Unless the loan was 

structured as a mortgage loan, this interest would not be 

deductible. 

Poindexter voluntarily chose to participate in the program. 

In so doing, she signed a Servicing Disclosure Statement 
3

acknowledging that the “mortgage loan” would be covered by the 

federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), with 

MBCC acting as “servicer.” (J.A. 96-97.) Consistent with this 

arrangement, Poindexter executed a Deed of Trust in favor of 

MBCC, which was properly recorded in the land records of the 

Loudoun County, Virginia Circuit Court. The Deed of Trust 

contained a covenant in which MBCC promised to release the lien 

“[u]pon payment of all sums secured by [it].” (J.A. 10.)

In the spring of 2004, Poindexter traded in her Audi as 

part of a transaction with HBL to lease a Mercedes-Benz sedan. 

Her obligation to make further payments related to the Audi 

ended at that time. For reasons not fully explained in the 

record, however, MBCC did not record a certificate of 

satisfaction releasing the Deed of Trust. 

Poindexter discovered that the unreleased Deed of Trust 

remained a lien against her residence in May 2013, when she and 

her husband attempted to refinance their existing mortgage. 

Almost immediately, Poindexter’s husband and her attorney 

contacted MBCC on her behalf to demand that MBCC file a

certificate of satisfaction to release the lien.1 Although MBCC

remained in discussions with Poindexter and never refused to 

 1 By 2013, MBCC had been part of several mergers and its 

corporate successor was TD Auto Finance LLC. For ease of 

reference, however, the opinion will refer to these parties 

collectively as “MBCC.” 
4

record a certificate of satisfaction, it also did not timely

fulfill Poindexter’s demand. The lender Poindexter had 

approached to refinance her home denied her application.

Soon thereafter, in September 2013, Poindexter filed a 

complaint against MBCC in the United States District Court for 

the Eastern District of Virginia. The Complaint alleged six

causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) slander of title; 

(3) violation of RESPA; (4) violation of the Virginia Consumer 

Protection Act (“VCPA”); (5) violation of Virginia Code § 55-

66.3; and (6) declaratory judgment. She sought to have a 

certificate of satisfaction recorded and claimed $95,000 in 

damages, as she alleged that MBCC’s actions had, among other 

things, prevented her from securing a better interest rate 

during her mortgage refinancing.

Several weeks later, MBCC recorded a certificate of 

satisfaction that released the lien of the Deed of Trust against 

Poindexter’s residence. MBCC then moved for summary judgment on 

all of the claims, arguing they were time-barred. Furthermore, 

MBCC contended that Poindexter had, at least as to some of her 

claims, failed to demonstrate facts that would support all of 

their elements. 

As discussed in greater detail in context below, the 

district court granted summary judgment to MBCC as to all 

claims, often providing multiple grounds for doing so. 
5

Poindexter noted a timely appeal, and we have jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de 

novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Greater 

Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City of 

Balt., 721 F.3d 264, 283 (4th Cir. 2013) (en banc). Summary 

judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In addition to 

construing the evidence in the light most favorable to

Poindexter, the non-movant, we also draw all justifiable 

inferences in her favor. Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy 

Concerns, Inc., 721 F.3d at 283.

III.

We now address each of the claims raised by Poindexter in 

turn.2

 2 “[W]here a federal court addresses state law claims under 

its pendent jurisdiction,” the court must “apply state law . . . 

to those issues.” In re Merritt Dredging Co., 839 F.2d 203, 205 

(4th Cir. 1988). Thus, we look to Virginia law to decide 

Poindexter’s Virginia-law-based claims.
6

A. Breach of Contract

In analyzing Poindexter’s central cause of action for 

breach of contract, the district court noted that her claim 

accrued under Va. Code § 8.01-230 in 2004, when the debt was 

satisfied, but MBCC failed to record the certificate of 

satisfaction. The district court thus concluded that 

Poindexter’s claim, which was not filed until 2013, was untimely 

under any of the possible statutes of limitation, a point 

Poindexter concedes on appeal.3

Still, Poindexter contends, as she did below, that MBCC 

should be equitably estopped from pleading that the statute of 

limitations bars her claim. She argues that she should not be 

“held at fault for not realizing that MBCC had failed to release 

the lien” because MBCC had the duty to fulfill its contractual 

obligations under the Deed of Trust. (Opening Br. 19.) This 

amounts to no more than arguing that she is entitled to 

equitable estoppel because MBCC breached its contractual 

obligations. But Poindexter further posits that she was 

 3 The district court did not specifically identify which 

Virginia limitations period would apply. MBCC contends the 

general two-year limitations period in Va. Code § 8.01-248 

governs because the parties’ contract does not satisfy the 

various requirements for any of the lengthier periods set forth 

for personal actions based on contracts in § 8.01-246. This 

issue does not ultimately matter, however, given Poindexter’s 

concession that her claim does not satisfy any possibly 

applicable limitations period.
7

entitled to assume that MBCC had timely recorded a certificate 

of satisfaction, particularly in light of her 2004 and 2008 

dealings with MBCC, which led her to believe that it had done 

so.

Although the district court did not directly address 

Poindexter’s argument, she cannot successfully invoke equitable 

estoppel in this case. Under Virginia law, a party seeking to 

invoke equitable estoppel must prove “by clear, precise, and 

unequivocal evidence” that:

(1) A material fact was falsely represented or 

concealed; (2) The representation or concealment was 

made with knowledge of the facts; (3) The party to 

whom the representation was made was ignorant of the 

truth of the matter; (4) The representation as made 

with the intention that the other party should act 

upon it; (5) The other party was induced to act upon 

it; and (6) The party claiming estoppel was misled to 

his injury.

Boykins Narrow Fabrics Corp. v. Weldon Roofing & Sheet Metal, 

Inc., 266 S.E.2d 887, 890 (Va. 1980). Moreover, “‘[i]t is 

essential to the application of the principles of equitable 

estoppel, that the party claiming to have been influenced by the 

conduct or declarations of another to his injury, was not only 

ignorant of the true state of facts, but had no convenient and 

available means of acquiring such information.’” Id. (quoting 

Lindsay v. James, 51 S.E.2d 326, 332 (Va. 1949)) (internal 

omission omitted). 
8

The record does not contain evidence that Poindexter lacked 

a “convenient and available means of acquiring” the actual 

information about the status of the MBCC lien against her house. 

Although Poindexter claims that she should not have been 

required to go to the Loudoun County courthouse to check whether 

MBCC had filed a certificate of satisfaction, she also admits 

that nothing prevented her from doing so.4 Indeed, she was not 

required to go to the courthouse to obtain a copy of the record 

at all.5 Moreover, the record lacks any “clear, precise, and 

unequivocal evidence” to create a genuine issue of material fact 

as to whether MBCC made any false representation or tried to

conceal anything. 

Poindexter first points to her 2004 “dealings with MBCC” as 

a basis for her belief that a certificate of satisfaction was 

filed. But all she cites is the fact that she traded in her 

Audi for a new vehicle that year. Nothing in the record 

indicates an additional or new statement in 2004 by MBCC that 

had anything to do with the existing Deed of Trust or the filing 

of a certificate of satisfaction. 

 4 The Loudoun County real estate records are public records, 

open to inspection in person in the clerk’s office. See Va. 

Code §§ 2.2-3704, 17.1-276(C). 5 Copies of Virginia land records can be obtained via mail 

upon written request (for a nominal fee). In addition, records 

can be accessed remotely via the internet (with a paid 

subscription), see §§ 17.1-276, 17.1-294. 
9

Similarly, Poindexter’s reliance on a March 18, 2008 MBCC 

letter does not constitute a false representation or concealment 

of a material fact. To be sure, the letter “acknowledges [her] 

account has been paid in full and [that Mercedes-Benz had] 

released [its] security interest in [her] vehicle.” (J.A. 130.) 

But the 2008 letter lists a different account number, vehicle 

identification number, and vehicle description that were not the 

relevant numbers and description for the Audi. Thus, the letter 

contained an accurate statement concerning the release of a 

security interest in that other vehicle, and did not purport to 

relay any information regarding the security interest for the 

Audi. See Boykins Narrow Fabrics Corp., 266 S.E.2d at 890 

(rejecting plaintiff’s equitable estoppel argument where “[t]he 

record provide[d] no substantial support for [the plaintiff’s] 

claim that [the defendant] lulled it into a false sense of 

security through fraudulent acts” (emphasis added)). 

Having failed to demonstrate a false representation or 

concealment of any material fact related to the Deed of Trust or 

certificate of satisfaction, Poindexter cannot successfully 

invoke the principles of equitable estoppel. Accordingly, her 

breach of contract action is subject to the ordinarily 

applicable limitations period. 

Nonetheless, Poindexter also contends the district court 

granted summary judgment prematurely because she had moved for 
10

discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) to obtain 

all documents pertaining to her account that MBCC had in its 

possession. The district court did not rule on this motion 

before granting summary judgment. That said, Rule 56(d) only 

“mandates that summary judgment be denied when the nonmovant 

‘has not had the opportunity to discover information that is 

essential to his opposition.’” Pisano v. Strach, 743 F.3d 927, 

931 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Ingle ex rel. Estate of Ingle v. 

Yelton, 439 F.3d 191, 195 (4th Cir. 2006)). Poindexter has not 

explained – nor did she show to the district court – how the 

information in her MBCC account could possibly “create a genuine 

issue of material fact sufficient for [her] to survive summary 

judgment,” or otherwise affect the court’s analysis. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(d). For this reason, we find no error in the 

district court’s implicit denial of her motion.

Accordingly, we hold that the district court appropriately 

granted MBCC summary judgment on Poindexter’s breach of contract 

claim.

B. Slander of Title

Poindexter next alleged MBCC committed slander of title

under Virginia law. The district court disagreed for two 

reasons, first concluding that the record did not demonstrate 

“that MBCC published false words with malice that disparaging
11

[Poindexter’s] title to her property,” and then observing that 

the action was untimely since it had not been brought within the 

applicable five-year limitations period. (J.A. 168.)

Poindexter argues the district court erred on both grounds. 

She claims that MBCC’s failure to file a timely certificate of 

satisfaction could demonstrate the requisite gross indifference, 

recklessness, and wanton or willful disregard of her rights to 

constitute slander of title. In addition, she maintains that 

the limitations period did not begin until the tortious conduct 

stopped, i.e., when MBCC recorded a certificate of satisfaction.

The district court properly granted summary judgment as to 

this claim because, at a minimum, the record contains no 

evidence that MBCC acted with malice. “To prove slander of 

title, [Poindexter] must show that [MBCC] acted with malice or 

in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the

statement[.]” Wright v. Castles, 349 S.E.2d 125, 129 (Va. 

1986). The Supreme Court of Virginia has defined malice to be

“some sinister or corrupt motive such as hatred, revenge, 

personal spite, ill will, or desire to injure the plaintiff[; or 

a] communication . . . made with such gross indifference and 

recklessness as to amount to a wanton or willful disregard of 

the rights of the plaintiff.” Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. 

Ellington, 334 S.E.2d 846, 851 n.3 (Va. 1984), overruled on 

other grounds by Cashion v. Smith, 749 S.E.2d 526, 532 (Va. 
12

2013). “Reckless disregard,” too, consists of something 

substantially higher than ordinary negligence, akin to “willful” 

and “wanton” behavior, “in disregard to another person’s rights 

or . . . to the consequences, with the defendant aware, from his 

knowledge of existing circumstances and conditions, that his 

conduct probably would cause injury to another.” Giffin v. 

Shively, 315 S.E.2d 210, 212-13 (Va. 1984); see also Richmond 

Newspapers, Inc. v. Lipscomb, 362 S.E.2d 32, 37-38 (Va. 1987).

Contrary to Poindexter’s contention, the record lacks any 

evidence that would suggest MBCC acted with malice or reckless 

disregard. To satisfy her burden, Poindexter points to nothing 

in the record other than the “facts” that MBCC failed to file a 

certificate of satisfaction in 2004 and failed to immediately

file one after she contacted it in 2013. But MBCC explained 

that “it appear[ed] to have been simply an administrative 

oversight” and that it did “not know why [MBCC] did not release 

the Deed of Trust in 2004.” (J.A. 157.) At most, that evidence 

suggests negligence, and Poindexter offers no evidence to 

support another motive or reason for MBCC’s conduct. Although 

MBCC failed to fulfill its obligation, the evidence does not 

indicate any of the qualities necessary to create a question of 

fact as to malice or reckless disregard under Virginia law. 

Similarly, although MBCC could have (and should have) responded 

more promptly in 2013, the record similarly does not indicate 
13

malice or reckless disregard so much as corporate incompetence, 

confusion, and other responses that fell short of immediately

filing a certificate of satisfaction. Once again, this conduct

does not rise to the level necessary for a reasonable jury to 

conclude that MBCC acted with malice or reckless disregard under 

Virginia law. As such, the district court appropriately granted 

MBCC summary judgment, and we need not address the parties’ 

alternative arguments raised with respect to this claim.

C. RESPA

Under RESPA, “any servicer of a federally related mortgage 

loan [who] receives a qualified written request from the 

borrower (or an agent of the borrower) for information relating 

to the servicing of such loan, [has a duty to] provide a written 

response acknowledging receipt of the correspondence . . . 

unless the action requested is taken within such period.” 12 

U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(A). A “qualified written request” is a 

“written correspondence, other than notice on a payment coupon 

or other payment medium supplied by the service, that” 

“includes, or otherwise enables the servicer to identify, the 

name and account of the borrower” and “includes a statement of 

the reasons for the belief of the borrower, to the extent 

applicable, that the account is in error or provides sufficient 

detail to the servicer regarding other information sought by the 
14

borrower.” Id. § 2605(e)(1)(B). In relevant part, the thenapplicable version of the statute also provided that a servicer 

had to “make appropriate corrections” or “provide the borrower 

with a written explanation or clarification” within a set time 

frame of receiving a qualified written request. Id. § 

2605(e)(2).6 

In relevant part, then, to state a claim under § 

2605(e)(1)(B), Poindexter had to send MBCC a “qualified written 

request . . . for information relating to the servicing of such 

loan[.]” The district court concluded Poindexter never made 

such a request and thus did not trigger any obligations by MBCC

under RESPA. Poindexter contends the court erred because she –

through her husband and her attorney – made multiple requests

that satisfy the statutory requirements. 

Several of the “requests” Poindexter relies upon do not 

satisfy the definition of a “qualified written request.” To 

state the obvious, oral communications are not “written.” Nor 

 6 The district court relied on an earlier version of the 

statute that set the required time frame at sixty days. 

Poindexter contends that this was incorrect because the statute 

now requires a response within thirty days. For the reasons set 

out by the Tenth Circuit in Berneike v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 708 

F.3d 1141 (10th Cir. 2013), the sixty-day limit appears to 

govern this dispute. Id. at 1145 n.3 (explaining when the 

statutory changes, which were part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 

Reform and Consumer Protection Act, became effective). However, 

these statutory changes have no impact on the district court’s 

analysis or ours given that our focus is on Poindexter’s failure 

to trigger a duty under RESPA in the first instance.
15

would a combination of oral communications alongside a faxed 

copy of the Deed of Trust constitute a “qualified written 

request,” since that statutory term requires “written 

correspondence” that “includes a statement of the reasons for 

the belief of the borrower . . . that the account is in error or 

provides sufficient detail to the servicer regarding other 

information sought by the borrower.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B) 

(emphasis added). The July 2013 letter from Poindexter’s 

attorney to MBCC references a different account number, VIN, and 

vehicle other than the Audi for which the Deed of Trust was 

recorded. Thus, that letter also does not satisfy § 

2605(e)(1)(B)’s requirements: a “qualified written request” must 

identify the “account of the borrower” that is disputed. 

Regardless, all of the “requests” Poindexter cites suffer 

from a more fundamental omission. RESPA triggers a duty only 

upon receipt of a “qualified written request” that “relat[es] to 

the servicing of [a RESPA-governed] loan.” Id. § 2605(e)(1)(A). 

Section 2605(i)(3) defines “servicing” to mean “receiving any 

scheduled periodic payments from a borrower pursuant to the 

terms of any loan, including amounts for escrow accounts . . . , 

and making the payments of principal and interest and such other 

payments.” 

Although we have not previously opined on the parameters of 

this component of § 2605(e), we find the Ninth Circuit’s 
16

decision in Medrano v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 704 F.3d 661 (9th 

Cir. 2012), instructive. In that case, the court observed that 

the “relating to” component of § 2605(e) “ensures that the 

statutory duty to respond does not arise with respect to all

inquiries or complaints from borrowers to servicers.” Id. at 

666. Instead, § 2605(i)(3)’s definition of “servicing” “does 

not include the transactions and circumstances surrounding a 

loan’s origination—facts that would be relevant to a challenge 

to the validity of an underlying debt or the terms of a loan 

agreement,” which “precede the servicer’s role in receiving the 

borrower’s payments and making payments to the borrower’s 

creditors.” Id. at 666-67. For these reasons, the Ninth 

Circuit held that § 2605 “distinguishes between letters that 

relate to borrowers’ disputes regarding servicing, on the one 

hand, and those regarding the borrower’s contractual 

relationship with the lender, on the other.” Id. at 667. 

Applying these general principles to the letters at issue in the 

case, the Medrano court concluded that a letter challenging “the 

terms of the loan and mortgage documents, premised on an 

assertion that the existing documents [did] not accurately 

reflect the true agreement” and “request[ing] modification of 

those documents” did not “relate[] to servicing” and thus did 

not trigger the servicer’s RESPA obligations under § 2605(e). 

Id. at 667. 
17

A request concerning a failure to file a certificate of 

satisfaction upon satisfaction of the loan would not fall within 

this statutory framework either. Here, MBCC acted as both the 

originator and servicer of the loan at issue. Accordingly, MBCC 

would be subject to § 2605’s rules governing servicers. 12 

U.S.C. § 2605(i)(2) (defining “servicer” to mean “the person 

responsible for servicing of a loan (including the person who 

makes or holds a loan if such person also services the loan)”). 

However, Poindexter’s request to MBCC does not relate to its 

“servicing” of the loan, i.e., the receiving or making of loan 

payments. See id. § 2605(i)(3). Instead, as was the case in 

Medrano, Poindexter’s request relates back to “the terms of the 

loan and mortgage documents,” specifically, an obligation that 

arose after the loan was satisfied. 

Filing the certificate of satisfaction is one of the most 

elementary responsibilities of the originator (or his assignee) 

of the loan, not the loan servicer. See Va. Code § 55-66.3 

(repeatedly referring to the lien creditor’s responsibilities 

vis-à-vis the certificate of satisfaction). What is more, the 

servicer traditionally has no ability to file the certificate of 

satisfaction as a part of servicing the loan. Instead, its role 

is generally limited to collecting payments, directing them to 

the principal and interest, providing basic information on 

payoff amounts and periodic payments to the borrower, 
18

facilitating loss mitigation, and informing the originator when 

the obligation has been satisfied. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 

2605. Poindexter’s inquiry to MBCC – relating to the filing of 

a certificate of satisfaction – referenced an obligation MBCC

had under the Deed of Trust as the lien creditor. It did not 

reference any aspect of MBCC’s “servicing” the loan. 

In sum, because Poindexter’s communications did not 

constitute a “qualified written request[] . . . relating to the 

servicing of” her obligation with MBCC, they did not trigger any 

obligations under § 2605(e). Accordingly, the district court 

properly granted MBCC summary judgment on Poindexter’s RESPA 

claim as well. 

D. VCPA

Under the VCPA, a supplier in a consumer transaction cannot 

use any “deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, or 

misrepresentation in connection with a consumer transaction.” 

Va. Code § 59.1-200(14). But the VCPA does not apply to 

“mortgage lenders,” which are defined as “any person who 

directly or indirectly originates or makes mortgage loans.” Va. 

Code § 59.1-199(D); id. § 6.2-1600. 

The district court granted MBCC summary judgment on this 

claim because “MBCC functioned as a mortgage lender, thus, no 

VCPA can lie against [it] as a matter of law.” (J.A. 169.) 
19

Alternatively, it observed that the applicable limitations 

period (Va. Code § 59.1-204(A)) barred Poindexter’s claim.

Poindexter disputes both rulings, contending that MBCC is 

not a “mortgage lender” under the relevant code sections because 

it did not “originate[] or make[]” the loan to purchase the 

Audi. Rather, the initial car loan was between Poindexter and 

HDL; Poindexter began making payments on the loan; HDL assigned 

the loan to MBCC; and while MBCC obtained additional security 

for the loan in the form of the Deed of Trust, that process did 

not “magically transf[orm] the original loan from a vehicle loan 

to a mortgage loan.” (Opening Br. 10.) Poindexter also asserts 

that a reasonable jury could conclude that she timely filed her 

action since she exercised due diligence upon learning of MBCC’s 

misrepresentation that the lien would be released upon 

satisfying her obligation.

We disagree. Poindexter misreads the VCPA’s exemption to 

require MBCC to be the originator of the underlying obligation. 

To the contrary, the statutory definition of a “mortgage lender” 

includes “any person who directly or indirectly originates or 

makes a mortgage loan.” See Va. Code § 6.2-1600. Although the 

vehicle loan originated with HBL and then was transferred to 

MBCC, MBCC and Poindexter entered into a “modification” of the 

vehicle-loan agreement, which converted the vehicle loan into a 

“mortgage loan” with the lien on Poindexter’s real estate. 
20

(J.A. 96, 142.) MBCC thus “directly or indirectly . . . 

originat[ed] or ma[d]e” a “mortgage loan” for purposes of the 

VCPA exemption. 

Poindexter also failed to proffer evidence that her 

arrangement with MBCC did not satisfy the VCPA definition of a 

“mortgage loan.” Certainly, the terms used by the parties 

demonstrate their intent that the arrangement be considered a 

mortgage loan. That was the entire purpose of Poindexter’s 

voluntary application to participate in MBCC’s Home Owner’s 

Choice program. Based on the record before us, it appears that 

the loan was “made to an individual [Poindexter], the proceeds 

of which [were] to be used primarily for personal . . . purposes 

[purchasing the Audi], which loan [was] secured by a . . . deed 

of trust.” § 6.2-1600. For years, Poindexter benefited through 

tax deductions from having the loan classified as a “mortgage 

loan” as a result of her specific agreement with MBCC (not HBL),

and she cannot now evade its consequences. 

The district court thus did not err in holding that her 

claim failed as a matter of law or in granting MBCC summary 

judgment. In light of this conclusion, we need not address 

whether Poindexter’s claim is also barred by the statute of 

limtiations. 
21

E. Va. Code § 55-66.3

Lastly, Poindexter argues that MBCC violated Virginia Code 

§ 55-66.3, which requires secured real estate creditors to file 

certificates of satisfaction upon payment or satisfaction of the 

underlying obligation. She sought statutory relief for this 

violation under § 55-66.3(A)(1), which states that if the 

certificate of satisfaction has not been filed “within 90 days 

after payment, . . . the lien creditor shall forfeit $ 500 to 

the lien obligor. . . . Following the 90-day period, if the 

amount forfeited is not paid within 10 business days after 

written demand for payment is sent to the lien creditor . . . , 

the lien creditor shall pay any court costs and reasonable 

attorney’s fees incurred by the obligor in collecting the 

forfeiture.” 

The district court concluded that because Poindexter filed 

her complaint more than two years after the claim accrued, this

claim was time-barred. See Va. Code § 8.01-248 (setting a twoyear limitations period for “[e]very personal action . . . for 

which no limitation is otherwise prescribed”). 

Poindexter contends the district court misread the statute 

because a claim cannot arise until after a demand for 

satisfaction has been made and the 90- and 10-day periods have

passed. Under Poindexter’s reading of the statute, her claim 
22

was timely because it was filed within two years of when she 

demanded that MBCC record a certificate of satisfaction.

We disagree with Poindexter’s interpretation of § 55-

66.3(A)(1). The statute plainly provides that the $500 

forfeiture right arises by operation of law when a creditor 

fails to file a certificate of satisfaction “within 90 days 

after payment.” Poindexter’s cause of action to collect the 

forfeiture thus arose on the ninety-first day after payment. 

Because Poindexter satisfied her obligation on the Audi in 2004, 

a claim filed in 2013 falls well outside the two-year 

limitations period.

The statutory language about a written demand for payment 

of the forfeiture does not alter this analysis. That language 

does not refer to demanding that a lender file a certificate of 

satisfaction, but refers to a demand to pay the $500 forfeiture. 

Moreover, it does not affect when an obligor can collect the 

$500 forfeiture for failure to timely file a certificate of 

satisfaction, but instead refers to when an additional sum can 

also be collected for failure to pay the forfeiture. 

Consequently, the district court properly held that Poindexter’s 

claim was untimely.7

 7 As the statute of limitations bars Poindexter’s statutory 

forfeiture claim, there is no basis upon which Poindexter can 

(Continued)
23

IV.

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment 

in favor of MBCC.8 Nonetheless, we note the substandard nature 

of MBCC’s conduct in releasing the lien on Poindexter’s home. 

While the various statutory barriers cited negate Poindexter’s 

claims, had she acted diligently she may have had viable claims 

at least as to breach of contract and Va. Code § 55-66.3(B). 

MBCC would be well served to review its business practices to 

forestall such claims in future cases.

AFFIRMED

 

claim attorney’s fees or costs, as she has no forfeiture right 

to enforce.

8 Poindexter’s opening brief only refers in passing to the 

district court’s denial of her declaratory judgment claim. The 

district court concluded it was moot given that it related 

solely to MBCC needing to file the certificate of satisfaction, 

an act MBCC fulfilled before the court considered the case. In 

light of Poindexter’s failure to brief any specific error 

respecting this claim, we consider any challenge waived. See

Fed. R. App. P. 28(a); Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 

562 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. 2009) (concluding an appellant’s 

“fail[ure] to raise any argument to support [a broad] claim . . 

. failed to comply with the specific dictates of Rule 

28(a)(9)(A)” and thus were waived).