alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 10.1 to CapSource Financial, Inc. Form 8-K dated December 4, 2007






Exhibit 10.1


 


AMENDMENT NUMBER 1 TO LOAN AGREEMENT


DATED OCTOBER 31, 2007


 


This Amendment is entered into this
4th day of December 2007, by and between Randolph M. Pentel and CapSource Financial, Inc., a Colorado corporation,
(collectively “Parties”).


 


WHEREAS, the Parties entered into a loan agreement dated October 31, 2007 in the original principal amount of Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($750,000) (“Loan Agreement”);


 



WHEREAS, the Parties desire to modify the terms of the Loan Agreement;


 


 


NOW THEREFOR for good and valuable consideration, the sufficiency of which is acknowledged, the Parties agree as follows:


 


 



	1. 	Article
1 of the Loan Agreement the term “Loan Agreement” shall be and is hereby
amended to One Million Dollars ($1,000,000). 







	2. 	All
other terms and conditions of the Loan Agreement remain unchanged and hereby ratified. 







 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this amendment as of the date first set forth above.


 


 





	
            /s/ Randolph M. Pentel
 
	
            Randolph M. Pentel
 





 


 


 



CapSource Financial, Inc.


 





	
            /s/ Steven E. Reichert
 
	
            By Steven E. Reichert
 Its Vice President and General Counsel
# Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed April 20, 2022. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________ No. 3D20-1215 Lower Tribunal No. 18-32001

________________ 

### Dailany A. Pena , Appellant,
vs. 

### Kenya Williams, et al. , Appellees. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Peter R. Lopez, Judge. Jose Menendez, P.A., and Jose M. Menendez; Ralph O. Anderson P.A., and Ralph O. Anderson (Fort Lauderdale), for appellant. Banker Lopez Gassler P.A., and Sarah Lahlou-Amine (Tampa), for appellees. Before HENDON, MILLER and BOKOR, JJ. PER CURIAM.2

Affirmed. See Sanislo v. Give Kids the World, Inc., 157 So. 3d 256, 260–61 (Fla. 2015) (“Exculpatory clauses are unambiguous and enforceable where the intention to be relieved from liability was made clear and unequivocal and the wording was so clear and understandable that an ordinary and knowledgeable person will know what he or she is contracting away.”).
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 112 (Friday, June 12, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 28066-28067]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-13846]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Bureau of Land Management

[CO-921-07-1320-EL; COC-70615]


Notice of Public Meeting, To Receive for Comments on an 
Environmental Analysis, Finding of No Significant Impact, Maximum 
Economic Recovery Report, and Fair Market Value for Coal Lease 
Application COC-70615

AGENCY: Bureau of Land Management, Interior.

ACTION: Notice of correction.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Bureau of Land Management published a Notice of Federal 
Competitive Coal Lease Sale Offer in the Federal Register on May 28, 
2009 [74 FR 101]. The Legal Description should read as follows:

    T. 13 S., R. 90 W., 6th P.M., Sections 3, 4, 5, more 
particularly described as follows:

[[Page 28067]]

    Beginning at a point on the North Section line at the Section 
Corner common to Sections 4 and 5; thence S.87 degrees 22'08''E. 
5291.34 feet; thence S.87 degrees 32'05''E. 1604.94 feet; thence S.0 
degrees 04'31''W. 4246.44 feet; thence N.86 degrees 45'23''W. 
1558.38 feet; thence N.84 degrees 12'17''W. 5148.60 feet; thence 
N.86 degrees 44'37''W. 1321.91 feet; to the existing lease line for 
Coal lease COC-61357; thence along said existing lease line N.10 
degrees 00'13''W. 1382.68 feet; thence N.86 degrees 08'20''W. 390.65 
feet; thence N.00 degrees 1135.85 feet; to the southeasterly 
boundary of Tract 4; thence N.14 degrees 36'45'' E. 1463.19 feet; 
along said southeasterly boundary of Tract 4; thence S.87 degrees 
18'59''E. 1375.63 feet; along the north section line of section 5 to 
the Point of beginning.

Containing approximately 785.79 acres more or less, in Gunnison 
County, Colorado.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kurt Barton at BLM Colorado State 
Office, 2850 Youngfield Street, Lakewood, Colorado 80215, or by 
telephone 303-239-3714.

    Dated: June 8, 2009.
Kurt M. Barton,
Solid Minerals LLE, Division of Energy, Lands and Minerals.
[FR Doc. E9-13846 Filed 6-11-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310-JB-P
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

**COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,**

**Respondent**

**v.**

**DAVID R. MCGINLEY,**

**Petitioner :** 

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**: No. 130 MAL 2016** 

**Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court** 

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW **, this 23rd day of September, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of** 

**Appeal is** DENIED

**.**
MPD

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

DA 22-0358

_________________

WESTVIEW MOBILE HOME PARK, LLC,

 Plaintiff, Appellee,

 and Cross-Appellant.

 v.

DAVID LOCKHART AND DOREEN 

LOCKHART,

 Defendants and Appellants.

O R D E R

_________________

Upon consideration of Appellants’ motion for extension of time, and good cause 

appearing, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellee is granted an extension of time to and

including October 26, 2022, within which to prepare, serve, and file their opening brief. 

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

September 26 2022

09/26/2022

Case Number: DA 22-0358
# Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas

June 7, 2021

No. 04

- 21

- 0010 8

- CV

IN THE INTEREST OF B.K.C., A CHILD

From the 57th Judicial District Court

, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2019PA00984 Honorable Mary Lou Alvarez , Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

Appellant K.D. appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights. Appellant’s
court

- appointed attorney has filed a brief and motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which she asserts there are no meritorious issues to raise on appeal. We have held that in parental

- termination appeals, a procedure akin to Anders is necessary to best protect the statutory right to counsel on appeal, to provide a procedural mechanism for counsel to fulfill her ethical obligations, to assist the court in deciding appeals, and to provide consistent procedur es for all indigent litigants. In re R.R. , No. 04

- 03

- 00096

- CV, 2003 WL 21157944, at *4 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2003, no pet.); see In re P.M. , 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 n.10 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (applying Anders procedures in appeal from order terminating paren tal rights). In compliance with the procedure set out in Anders , appellant’s attorney has shown that she sent a letter to appellant, which explained his right to review the record and file a pro se brief. See Kelly v. State , 436 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); In re A.L.H. , No. 04

- 18

- 00153

- CV, 2018 WL 3861695, at *2 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio Aug. 15, 2018, no pet.); In re R.R. , 2003 WL 21157944, at *4. In the letter to appellant, counsel stated that she had enclosed copies of the brief and motion to withdra w. See Kelly , 436 S.W.3d at 313; In re A.L.H. , 2018 WL 3861695, at *2; In re R.R. , 2003 WL 21157944, at *4. Counsel’s letter also advised appellant that if he wished to review the appellate record, he must file a motion in this
court

. Counsel also enclosed a form motion for this purpose. See Kelly , 436 S.W.3d at 313; In re A.L.H.

, 2018 WL 3861695, at *2; In re R.R. , 2003 WL 21157944, at *4. If appellant desires to review the record, he must file a motion on or before June 17, 2021

.
Further, if appellan t desires to file a pro se brief, we ORDER that he do so on or before June 28, 2021 . If appellant files a pro se brief, appellee may file a responsive brief no later than twenty days after the date appellant’s pro se brief is filed in this court. We ORDER the motion to withdraw, filed by appellant’s counsel, to be HELD IN ABEYANCE pending further order of the court._________________________________ Liz a A. Rodriguez , Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 7th day of June, 2021

.

___________________________________ M ichael A. C ruz , Clerk of Court
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13

- 40298 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.
REYNALDO SALINAS

- MENDIOLA , Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 7:12

- CR

- 1366

- 1

Before DAVIS, DENNIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: *
The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Reynaldo Salinas

Mendiola (Salinas) has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in
accordance with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Salinas h a s not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED December 17, 2013 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 13-40298 Document: 00512474110 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/17/2013No. 13

- 40298

nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion fo r leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR

. R. 42.2.

2 Case: 13-40298 Document: 00512474110 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/17/2013
#### John MORGAL; Patricia Morgal, Plaintiffs—Appellants, v. NORTHWEST TITLE AGENCY, INC., Defendant—Appellee.

No. 05-16321.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Sept. 11, 2006.*

Decided Sept. 14, 2006.

John Morgal, Mesa, AZ, pro se.

*476Patricia Morgal, Mesa, AZ, pro se.

James J. Syme, Jr., Esq., Goodyear, AZ, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: PREGERSON, T.G. NELSON, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, we deny the Morgals’ request for oral argument.

MEMORANDUM **

John and Patricia Morgal appeal pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction their action alleging that Northwest Title Agency, Inc. (“Northwest”) violated the automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362 when it obtained an equitable mortgage on property the Morgals purchased from individuals who subsequently filed for bankruptcy. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. After de novo review, *Noel v. Hall,*341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir.2003), we affirm.

The district court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the Morgals’ action because they sought invalidation of the state court judgment permitting foreclosure of Northwest’s equitable mortgage. *See id.*at 1158. The Morgals’ action was thus a de facto appeal of the state court judgment, and the district court was required to “refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the state court.” *Id.*We reject the Morgals’ contention that they have standing to pursue an independent action based on Northwest’s alleged violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay. *See Magnoni v. Globe Inv. and Loan Co. (In re Globe Inv. and Loan Co.),*867 F.2d 556, 559-60 (9th Cir.1989).

The Morgals’ remaining contentions are also unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
<PAGE>                                                            Exhibit 11
                                                                     
                AIR & WATER TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION
                  COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS
               (in thousands except per share amounts)



<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                                        Three Months Ended
                                                            January 31,

                                                          1996         1995
                                                          ----         ----
<S>                                                  <C>          <C>
Primary Earnings (Loss) Per Share:
 1. Net loss                                          $ (2,945)    $ (7,393)
 2. Less preferred dividends                              (825)        (825)
                                                       -------      -------
 3. Net loss applicable to common shareholders          (3,770)      (8,218)
                                                       -------      -------    
 4. Weighted average shares outstanding                 32,018       32,018
                                                       -------      -------
 5. Net loss per share                                $   (.12)    $   (.26)
                                                       =======      =======

Fully Diluted Earnings (Loss) Per Share:

 6. Line 3. above                                     $ (3,770)    $ (8,218)
 7. Add back preferred dividends                           825          825
 8. Add back interest, on assumed
     conversion of the Company's 8% Convertible
     Debentures                                          2,300        2,300
                                                       -------      -------
 9. Net loss                                          $   (645)    $ (5,093)
                                                       -------      -------
10. Weighted average shares outstanding (Line 4)        32,018       32,018
11. Add additional shares issuable upon assumed
     conversion of preferred shares                      4,800        4,800
12. Add additional shares issuable upon assumed
     conversion of the Company's 8% Convertible
     Debentures                                          3,833        3,833
                                                       -------      -------
13. Adjusted weighted average shares outstanding        40,651       40,651
                                                       -------      -------
14. Net loss per share (9/13)*                        $   (.02)    $   (.13)
                                                       =======      =======
</TABLE>
*  Fully diluted earnings (loss) per share are not presented as the assumed
   conversion of the Company's 8% Convertible Debentures is anti-dilutive.
[968 NE2d 994, 945 NYS2d 639]

#### Sarbjeet Kaur, as Receiver of Gladys Towncars, Inc. and Another, Respondent, v American Transit Insurance Company et al., Defendants, and Baker, McEvoy, Morrissey & Moskovits, P.C., Appellant.

Decided May 1, 2012

*828APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Steinberg & Cavaliere, LLP,*White Plains *(Ronald W. Weiner*of counsel), for appellant.

*Sivin & Miller, L.L.P.,*New York City *(Edward Sivin*of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.11 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.11), order reversed, with costs, order of Supreme Court, New York County, reinstated and certified question answered in the negative. Triable issues of fact exist concerning defendant-appellant’s successor liability *(see Schumacher v Richards Shear Co.,*59 NY2d 239, 245 [1983]).

Concur: Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Cipakick, Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones.
May 25, 1993 

Mr. Mark Stevens 

.V.P., Marketing & Sales 

Infinational ~ecl~noloqies, Inc. 

9335 North 48th Street 

Omaha, Nebraska 68152 

Dear Mr. Stevens: 

Thank you for your letter of May 5, 1993, collcerning the role of 

the National Indian Gaming commission in reviewing electronic 

games and rendering opinions on whetl~er such games fall within 

class 11 or class I11 gaming. 

As tile commission made clear in the definitior~ regulations and 

the preamble to those regulations publisl~ed in the Federal 

Register on April 9, 1992, the test for determining whether a 

machine game falls within class 111 gaming is whether that game 

j.s a gambling device wj.thin the meaning of the Johnson Act, 15 

J.S.C. S 1171. You, as well as a number of tribes, disagree with 

tile commission that this is tile appropriate test. Until the 

Commissionts regulatiorls are judicially cletermined to be invalid, 

it will remain the Comrnissionls position that Congress did not 

intend to include any gambling devices within class 11 gaming. 

Z 

My staff and I ]lave reviewed the materials you submitted on 

llOasis Electronic Pull-Tab Network" and fail to see how your 

electronic video pull-tab machines are legally different than 

those that are at issula it1 the litigatiorl pet~ding here in the 

United States District Court for the District: of Columbia. Your 

pul-1-tab machines are (electronic facsimiles of the game of pulltabs and therefore fall witliin class 111 gaming.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> UT
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Entergy
New Orleans' financial statements for the year ended December 31, 1999 and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000071508
<NAME> ENTERGY NEW ORLEANS, INC.
<SUBSIDIARY>
   <NUMBER> 017
   <NAME> ENTERGY NEW ORLEANS, INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<BOOK-VALUE>                                  PER-BOOK
<TOTAL-NET-UTILITY-PLANT>                      322,076
<OTHER-PROPERTY-AND-INVEST>                      3,259
<TOTAL-CURRENT-ASSETS>                         113,934
<TOTAL-DEFERRED-CHARGES>                        46,477
<OTHER-ASSETS>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 485,746
<COMMON>                                        33,744
<CAPITAL-SURPLUS-PAID-IN>                       36,294
<RETAINED-EARNINGS>                             58,526
<TOTAL-COMMON-STOCKHOLDERS-EQ>                 128,564
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     19,780
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-NET>                           169,083
<SHORT-TERM-NOTES>                                   0
<LONG-TERM-NOTES-PAYABLE>                            0
<COMMERCIAL-PAPER-OBLIGATIONS>                       0
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-CURRENT-PORT>                        0
<PREFERRED-STOCK-CURRENT>                            0
<CAPITAL-LEASE-OBLIGATIONS>                          0
<LEASES-CURRENT>                                     0
<OTHER-ITEMS-CAPITAL-AND-LIAB>                 168,319
<TOT-CAPITALIZATION-AND-LIAB>                  485,746
<GROSS-OPERATING-REVENUE>                      507,788
<INCOME-TAX-EXPENSE>                            13,030
<OTHER-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                     465,252
<TOTAL-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                     465,252
<OPERATING-INCOME-LOSS>                         42,536
<OTHER-INCOME-NET>                               3,347
<INCOME-BEFORE-INTEREST-EXPEN>                  45,883
<TOTAL-INTEREST-EXPENSE>                        13,892
<NET-INCOME>                                    18,961
<PREFERRED-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                        965
<EARNINGS-AVAILABLE-FOR-COMM>                   17,996
<COMMON-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                        26,500
<TOTAL-INTEREST-ON-BONDS>                       14,281
<CASH-FLOW-OPERATIONS>                          60,162
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0



</TABLE>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Joseph Bullard, Appellant.

[821 NYS2d 912]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Mullen, J), rendered February 24, 2004, convicting him of attempted rape in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

An application to withdraw a plea of guilty is addressed to the sound discretion of the court *(see People v Turner,*23 AD3d 503 [2005]). The defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily admitted his guilt in a thorough and complete allocution, during which he denied that he was threatened or induced by promises to plead guilty *(see People v Fiumefreddo,*82 NY2d 536, 543 [1993]; *People v Telfair,*299 AD2d 429 [2002]; *People v Ramsingh,*267 AD2d 406 [1999]). Moreover, the Supreme Court conducted a sufficient inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s application to withdraw his plea of guilty *(see People v Fiumefreddo, supra*at 543; *People v Felix,*20 AD3d 433 [2005]; *People v Dunlop,*228 AD2d 692 [1996]). The defense counsel was given every opportunity to state the grounds for the application to withdraw the plea, and the defendant was given permission to add whatever he wanted to say but declined to do so. Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant’s application to withdraw his plea of guilty.

The defendant’s contention raised in point two of his supplemental pro se brief is unpreserved for appellate review, and his remaining contentions are without merit. Adams, J.E, Goldstein, Mastro and Lifson, JJ., concur.