AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed December 2, 2020 

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In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-19-00589-CV IN THE INTEREST OF L.M.T., A CHILD On Appeal from the 254th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DF-18-19417 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Schenck, Osborne, and Partida-Kipness Opinion by Justice Osborne Appellant Terry Powell appeals the trial court’s order denying his bill of review to set aside a 1995 judgment establishing his paternity of L.M.T. and ordering him to pay child support. In one issue, Powell argues that he w as not properly served with process in 1994. Concluding that the trial court did not a buse its discretion in denying the bill of review, we affi rm the trial court’s order.
B ACKGROUND Appellee the Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”) filed a pet ition to establish the parent-child relat ionship between Powell and L.M. T. on September 29, 1994. The petition recited that P owell was entitled to notice a nd that he resided at–2– 2337 Martha, Dallas, Texas 75229. A ccording to evidence offered by Powell at the hearing on his bill of review, this address was incorrect; inst ead, his parents’ address where he resided was 2331 Marfa Ave., Dallas, Texas 75216. The record does not reveal what attempts, if any, were made to serve Powell at the incorrect Martha Avenue address or at his parents’ resid ence. Instead, the constable attempted to serve Pow ell at a business called “Pager s R Us” at 3420 Sunnyvale, Dallas 75216. W hen five attempts to serve Powell at that address failed, the OAG filed a motion for s ubstitute service on Powell under r ule 106, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion was supported by the constable’s “Rule 106 Affidavit” describing “several attempts to obtain personal serv ice” on Powell at 3420 Sunnyvale on Octobe r 5, 18, and 20, and November 4 and 8, 1994, and stating that he believed that Powell was evading service. The affidavit included the constable’s statement that “I believe this party will be given effective notice of this suit by delivering a copy of said citation by serving anyone ov er sixteen years of age at the above address, or by securely attaching to the door at t he above address which is the party’s usual place of business.” The trial court granted the motion for substitute service, orde ring that the constable was authorized to se rve Powell by leaving the petitio n with anyone over sixteen years of age or by attaching it to the front door “of t he location specified in” the officer’s affidavit. The cons table completed service by del ivering the citation and petition to “a black female, w ho would not identify herself , who was older than–3– sixteen (16) years of age,” at 3420 Sunnyvale, shown on the fac e of the citation to be the address for Pa gers R Us, at 2:47 p. m. on January 26, 199 5. The trial court held a hearing on March 24, 1995, and on March 29, 1995, signed its “Default Order Estab lishing the Parent-Child Relatio nship” between Powell and L.M.T., appointing Powell as possessory conservator and ordering him to pay child support. About a wee k later, Powell went to prison for an unknown offense until March 2014. On September 24, 2018, twenty-three years after the trial court established the parent-child relationship between Powell and L.M.T., Powell fil ed his petition for bill of review alleging that the 1995 judgment was void because he was not personally served with citation. T he trial court held an eviden tiary hearing on January 16, 2019, hearing testimony from Powell, from L.M.T.’s mother (“Mother”), and from Daryl Carter, the owner of Pagers R Us in the relevant time period. Although Powell testified that he never lived at the Ma rtha Avenue address and never worked at Pagers R Us, there was conflicting testimon y about whether Powell could “probably be found” 1 for service of process at Pagers R Us in 1994 and early 1995. Carter testified that he knew both Powell and Powel l’s father—with whom Powell testified he was living—and knew how to contact Pow ell’s father, who was a customer of Carter’s services as a mechanic. When ask ed to state that

1 See T EX

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. P. 106(b), quoted and discussed below.–4– Powell “never frequented your pl ace of business,” Carter respon ded, “I don’t—I’m not going to say that, but I have seen him around the neighborh ood. It’s a big parking lot and there are other businesses there, so I have seen him at that location.” Mother, who appeared pro se, also asked questions of Carter directed to establishing that Pagers R Us “was just a known l ocation of where Mr. Powell hung out.” Powell himself acknowledged that he knew Carter “back in the 90s,” bef ore Powell went to prison. Powell also testified that as far as he knew, Carter ow ned Pagers R Us at that time. But Powell denied that he “hung out” at Pagers R Us or “f requent[ed] that location.” The trial court took the matter under advisement and denied the bill of review in an order dated February 4, 2019. Powell filed a motion for n ew trial that the trial court denied after a hearing. This appeal followed. In one issue, Powell argues “[t]he trial court should not have rendered a default judgment against Appellant-respondent because he was ne ver served with process and he was never served with the default judgment.” Pow ell contends that because the OAG failed to comply with civil procedure rules 106 and 107 in its attempts to serve him with process in 1995, the trial court sho uld have granted his petition for bill of review.
B ILL OF R EVIEW “A bill of review is an independent equitable proceeding brough t by a party to a former action who seeks to set aside a judgment that is no longer subject to–5– challenge by appeal.” PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera , 379 S.W.3d 267, 270 n.1 (Tex. 2012) (citations omitted). “Becau se of the importance of accord ing finality to judgments, the petitioner’s burde n is heavy and the grounds on which relief may be obtained by a bill of review are narrow and defined.” Singh v. Trinity Mktg. & Distrib. Co., Inc. , 397 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. App.—E l Paso 2013, no pet.) (citing King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman , 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003), and Transworld Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Briscoe , 722 S.W.2d 407, 407 (Tex. 1987)). Bill of review plaintiffs must ordinarily plead and prove (1) a meritorious defense to the underlying cause of action, (2) which the plaint iffs were prevented from making by the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the oppo sing party or official mistake, (3) unmixed with any fault or negligence on their own part. In re M.C.B. , 400 S.W.3d 630, 634 (Tex. App.—Dal las 2013, no pet.). But if a bill of review plaintiff was not served, cons titutional due process relieves h im from the need to establish the first two requirements. Id. Bill of review plaintiffs alleging they were not served with process must still prove “that the judgment was rendered unmixed with any fault or negligence of their own,” but this element “i s established if the plaintiff can prove that he or she was never served with proces s.” Id. As we explained
in M.C.B. , “[a]n individual who is not s erved with process cannot be at fault or negligent in allowing a default judgment to be rendered.” Id. We concluded, “[p]roof of non-service, then, will conclusively establish the third and only element that bill–6– of review plaintiffs are require d to prove when they are assert ing lack of service of process as their only defense.” Id. When reviewing a trial court’s grant or denial of a bill of rev iew, we indulge every presumption in favor of the court’s ruling, which we will not disturb absent an affirmative showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Singh , 397 S.W.3d at 262. A trial court abuses its discretion only if it has acted i n an unreasonable or arbitrary manner, or without reference to any guiding rules and principles. Okon v.
Boldon , No. 02-14-00334-CV, 2015 WL 4652 775, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Wo rth Aug. 6, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). An abuse of discretion does not occur when the trial court bases its decisi ons on conflicting evidence. Id. “The trial court is the fact finder at a hearing on a bill of review and has the duty of asc ertaining the true facts, and it is within the court’s province to judge the credibility of the witnesses and to determine the weight to be given their testimony.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).
D ISCUSSION 1. Rule 106 Civil procedure rule 106(a) provides that unless the citation o r an order of the court directs otherwise, the c itation “shall be served” by deli very to the defendant in person or by registered or certified mail. See T EX

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. P. 106(a)(1), (2). Rule 106(b), however, permits substituted service if attempts at in- person service have not been successful:–7– (b) Upon motion supported by affidavit stating the location of the defendant’s usual place of business or usual place of abode or other place where the defendant can probably be found and stating specifically the facts showing that service has been attempted under either (a)(1) [in-person deliver y] or (a)(2) [registered or cer tified mail] at the location named in such affidavit but has not been succes sful, the court may authorize service: (1) by leaving a true copy of the citation, with a copy of the petition attached, with anyone over sixteen years of age at the location specified in such affidavit, or (2) in any other manner that the affidavit or other evidence b efore the court shows will be reasonably effective to give the defend ant notice of the suit. T EX

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. P. 106(b). Substituted service of citation made under rule 106 does not violate due process if the manne r of service is “‘reasonably ef fective to give the defendant notice of the suit’ and the opportunity to appear and defend same.” Sgitcovich v. Sgitcovich , 241 S.W.2d 142, 148 (Tex. 1951) (quoting T EX

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. P. 106). Powell argues that he was not served with process because the a ddress shown on the 1995 certificate of last known address, 2337 Martha, doe s not exist. He offered evidence to support this assertion at the bill of revie w hearing, as well as testifying that he was residing in his parents’ home at 2331 Ma rfa Avenue until he went to prison in April 1995. Quoting Rhodes v. Kelly , No. 05-16-00888-CV, 2017 WL 2774452, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dall as June 27, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.), Powell argues that “[s]ervice of citation must be in strict com pliance with the rules of civil procedure to establish jurisdiction over a defendant a nd support a default–8– judgment.” As we explained in Rhodes , “[i]f strict complia nce is not shown, the service of process is inva lid and of no effect.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). Rule 106(b), however, permits service not only at “the location of the defendant’s usual place of business or usual place of abode,” b ut also at an “other place where the defendant can probably be found.” T EX

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. P. 106(b). The deputy constable’s rule 106 affidavit provided evidence that he “believe[d] def[endant] is avoiding service,” and that he “believe[d] this party will be given effective notice of this suit” t hrough substituted service at 3 420 Sunnyvale. The deputy constable’s return s howed service at 3420 Sunnyvale on “a black female, who would not identify he rself, who was older than sixt een (16) years of age.” The supreme court has explained: The return of service is not a trivial, formulaic document. It has long been considered prima facie evidence of the facts recited there in. The recitations in the return of service carry so much weight that they cannot be rebutted by the uncorroborate d proof of the moving party. Primate Constr., Inc. v. Silver , 884 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam) (citations omitted). Further, the supreme court has explained t hat where a court has authorized substituted service, requiring proof of actual notic e would “frustrate Rule 106(b)’s purpose” of providing alternate methods of service whe n service under rule 106(a) has failed. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Costley , 868 S.W.2d 298, 299 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam). Here, the deputy constable’s affi davit and return of service st rictly complied with rule 106. Although Powell claims that he did not receive a ctual notice of the–9– citation and petition, and the a ffidavit does not purport to es tablish that he did, it is nonetheless sufficient proof that substituted service was compl eted on Powell in accordance with the trial court’s order. See Williams v. Asset Acceptance LLC , No. 03-11-00520-CV, 2012 WL 2989219, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin July 2 0, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affidavit was sufficient proof of substituted service under rule 106 where it showed compliance with trial court’s rule 106 order). The question presented by Powell’s bill of review was one of fa ct, whether he could “probably be found” at the place where service was attemp ted and eventually made. See T EX

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. P. 106(b). The trial court hear d conflicting testimony on this question and was the sole judge o f the witnesses’ credibility. See Okon , 2015 WL 4652775, at *3; see also Brooks v. Office of Attorney Gen. , No. 03-06-00678-CV, 2008 WL 2388025, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin June 11, 2008, no pet. ) (mem. op.) (district court, as fact-finder in bill of review proceeding, w as free to resolve conflicts in evidence regarding whether defendant received noti ce of trial). We may not substitute our judgment for the trial court’s where, as her e, there is evidence to support its findings. See Okon , 2015 WL 4652775, at *3

. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in det ermining that the OAG’s service of its 1994 petition to establish the parent-chil d relationship between Powell and L.M.T. met the requirements of rule 106. See Singh , 397 S.W.3d at 262. We overrule the portion of Powell’s issue complaining that the OAG failed to comply with rule 106.–10– 2. Rule 107 Citing the current text of civil procedure rule 107, Powell arg ues that the officer’s return did not include the name of the person served. See T EX

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. P. 107(b)(5) (“The return, together with any document to which it is attached, must include the following informa tion: . . . (5) the person or enti ty served”). 2 He argues, “[t]he unknown black female could have been under sixteen years of age. The constable could have served anot her person who would identify t hemselves but chose not to do so.” The OAG responds that Powell’s “s peculative assertions” are not supported by the record and do not rebut the recitations in the officer’s return, which constitute prima facie evidence of the facts recited. See Primate Constr., Inc , 884 S.W.2d at 152 (“The recitations in the return of service carry so much we ight that they cannot be rebutted by the uncorroborate d proof of the moving party.”). The OAG further argues that the return fully complied with rule 107. Rule 107(f) expressly provides that when, as here, “citation is exec uted by an alternative method as authorized by Rule 106,” then “proof of service shall be made in the manner ordered by the court.” T EX

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. P. 107(f). The trial court’s rule 106 order

2 The OAG points out that rule 107 did not include this requirem ent in 1995 when the deputy constable served Powell. See Misc. Docket No. 11-9250 (Tex. Dec. 12, 2011) (amending rule 10 7). Then, rule 107 required the officer’s return to state “when the citation was s erved and the manner of service and be signed by the officer,” see id. , as the return here did. The 2011 amendments to rule 107 addin g subsection (b)(5) are available at https://www.txcourts.gov/All_Arch ived_Documents/SupremeCourt/Ad ministrativeOrde rs/miscdocket/11/ 11925000.pdf).–11– specified that “the Deputy Constable of DALLAS County be author ized to serve a Citation upon TERRY POWELL by leaving a true copy of the Petiti on attached, with anyone over sixteen years of age at, or by attaching same to the front door of the location specified in such Affidavit.” As quoted above, the deputy constable’s return complied with the trial c ourt’s order. We conclude that the return complied with rule 107’s requirements, and decide this portion of Powell ’s issue against him. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Powell’s petition for bill of review, we d ecide Powell’s sole issue agai nst him.
C ONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s February 4, 2019 “Order Denying Bil l of Review.”

190589F.P05 /Leslie Osborne/ LESLIE OSBORNE JUSTICE–12– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT

IN THE INTEREST OF L.M.T., A CHILD
No. 05-19-00589-CV On Appeal from the 254th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DF-18-19417. Opinion delivered by Justice Osborne. Justices Schenck and Partida-Kipness participating. In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the tria l court’s February 4, 2019 “Order Denying Bill of Review” is AFFIRMED

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Judgment entered December 2, 2020