alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 10.2

                                 PROMISSORY NOTE

PRINCIPAL AMOUNT: $3,253,049                            DATE: FEBRUARY 10, 2003

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned hereby promise to pay to the order of Guy W.
Millner
The sum of $ 3,253,049, together with interest thereon at the rate of 8% per
annum on the unpaid balance. Said sum shall be paid in the following manner:

Interest shall be paid quarterly beginning March 31, 2003. Beginning interest
period is January 17, 2003 for $ 2.7 million and January 1, 2003 for $ 553,049.
Principal payments will begin December 2004 and continue annually until paid in
full. Principal payment shall be $ 500,000 or 25% of Free Cash Flow, which ever
is greater. Free Cash Flow is defined as net income after tax plus non-cash
items minus working capital.

All payments shall be first applied to interest and the balance to principal.
This note may be prepaid, at any time, in whole or in part without penalty. All
parties liable for the payment of this Note agree to pay the holder reasonable
attorney's fees for services of counsel employed to collect this Note.

The Borrower hereby (a) waives demand, presentment of payment, notice of
nonpayment, protest, notice of protest and all other notice, filing of suit, and
diligence in collecting this note; (b) agrees that the Holder shall not be
required first to institute any suit, or to exhaust its remedies against the
Borrower or any other person or party to become liable hereunder, or against any
collateral in order to enforce payment of this Note; (c) consents to any
extension, rearrangement, renewal or postponement of time of payment of this
Note and to any other indulgence with respect hereto without notice, consent or
consideration; and (d) agrees that notwithstanding the occurrence of any of the
foregoing, except with the express written release by the Holder, the Borrower
shall be and remain directly and primarily liable for all sums due under this
Note.

This Note shall be construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the
State of Georgia.

SERCAP HOLDINGS, LLC

By: /s/ Lawrence Stumbaugh
    Name: Lawrence Stumbaugh
    Title: CEO
- 20110211174205669
- STGC Ltr to NIGC re NOI comments 2.10.11.pdf
<TABLE>                                                                
<CAPTION>
                                                                Exhibit 12(f)
                                                                                
                             System Energy Resources, Inc.
                Computation of Ratios of Earnings to Fixed Charges and
                           Ratios of Earnings to Fixed Charges
                                                                                                
                                                                                            
                                                                                            
                                                      1991     1992     1993     1994     1995
<S>                                                 <C>      <C>      <C>      <C>      <C> 
Fixed charges, as defined:                                                                      
  Interest on long-term debt                        $218,538 $196,618 $184,818 $162,517 $136,916
  Interest on notes payable                                0        0        0       88      473
  Amortization of expense and premium on debt-net      7,495    6,417    4,520    6,731    6,104
  Interest applicable to rentals                      10,007    6,265    6,790    7,546    6,475
  Other interest charges                               3,617    1,506    1,600    7,168    8,019
                                                    --------------------------------------------
Total fixed charges, as defined                     $239,657 $210,806 $197,728 $184,050 $157,987
                                                    ============================================
Earnings as defined:                                                                            
  Net Income                                        $104,622 $130,141  $93,927   $5,407  $93,039
  Add:                                                                                          
    Provision for income taxes:                                                                 
      Federal and State                              (26,848)  35,082   48,314   67,477  120,830
      Deferred Federal and State - net                37,168   23,648   60,690  (27,374) (41,871)
    Investment tax credit adjustment - net            63,256   30,123  (30,452)  (3,265)  (3,466)
    Fixed charges as above                           239,657  210,806  197,728  184,050  157,987
                                                    --------------------------------------------
Total earnings, as defined                          $417,855 $429,800 $370,207 $226,295 $326,519
                                                    ============================================
Ratio of earnings to fixed charges, as defined          1.74     2.04     1.87     1.23     2.07
                                                    ============================================
</TABLE>
97-554.

#### State v. Cooke.

Hamilton App. No. C-950736. On motion for leave to file delayed appeal. Motion denied.

Resnick, J., dissents.
<PAGE>

FORTIS BENEFITS INSURANCE COMPANY
NOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
(In thousands)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      STATEMENT OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Fortis Benefits Insurance
Company (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2003 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, the undersigned Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         1)       The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2)       The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.



/s/  LARRY M. CAINS
-----------------------------
Larry M. Cains
Chief Financial Officer
May 13, 2003
##### 



Exhibit 14
 
 §
    
    
    Ernst & Young Centre
    
    
    §
    
    
    Tel
    
    61 29248 5555680 George Street
    
    
    
    
    
    Fax
    
    61 2 9248 5959Sydney NSW 2000
    
    
    
    
    
    DX
    
    Sydney StockAustralia
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    Exchange 10172GPO Box 2646Sydney NSW 2001
 
  US Form 20-F Filing  30 June 2005
   
    
    the completeness and accuracy in Form 20-F of Note 48,  Differences between the Australian
and United States Accounting Principles;
    
    additional or amended disclosures made in the Form 20-F compared to the Australian Annual
Report; and
    
    any events occurring subsequent to the signing of the Australian Annual Report (10 August
2005) requiring disclosure in Form 20-F.
  /S/ S J Ferguson
*Wednesday, April 9, 1997*

MERIT DOCKET

97-300.

#### State ex rel. Velasquez v. Voinovich.

In Mandamus. On motion to dismiss. Motion to dismiss sustained. Cause dismissed.

Moyer, C.J., Douglas, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney, Pfeifer, Cook and Lundberg Stratton, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                       3,579,646
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             3,579,646
<PP&E>                                       5,912,316
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               9,491,962
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          139,136
<BONDS>                                      1,369,577
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   7,983,249
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 9,491,962
<SALES>                                      1,385,681
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             8,847,308
<CGS>                                          156,814
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  156,814
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               407,750
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              8,282,744
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          8,282,744
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 8,282,744
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   168.07
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   168.07
        

</TABLE>
### UNPUBLISHED



# UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT



#  K IM A. T HOMAS , Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 02-1066



#  N ATIONWIDE M UTUALI NSURANCE C OMPANY , Defendant-Appellee. 

# 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, District Judge. (CA-00-3335-PJM) Submitted: August 29, 2002 Decided: October 3, 2002 Before WIDENER, WILKINS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

COUNSEL Lisa Alexis Jones, JONES & TOWNS, P.L.L.C., Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Patricia McHugh Lambert, Steven B. Schwartzman, HODES, ULMAN, PESSIN & KATZ, P.A., Towson, Maryland, for Appellee.Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

OPINION
PER CURIAM:Kim A. Thomas appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. ("Nationwide") in this employment discrimination case under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000). On appeal, Thomas maintains that the district court erred in finding that shefailed to make out a prima facie case of race and gender discrimination and that, in any event, she could not show that Nationwide’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the challenged actions were pretextual.This court reviews a district court’s order granting summary judgment de novo and views the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scheduled Airlines Traffic Offices, Inc. v. Objective, Inc. , 180 F.3d 583, 590-91 (4th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Once the moving party discharges its burden by showing there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986), the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Summary judgment will be granted unless a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party on the evidence presented. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). In light of the arguments raised on appeal, we have reviewed the transcript of the court’s hearing on the motion for summary judgment and the other materials submitted in the joint appendix, and find noreversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See Thomas v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. , No. CA-00- 2 T HOMAS v. N ATIONWIDE M UTUALI NSURANCE3335-PJM (D. Md. Dec. 12, 2001) (granting Nationwide’s motion for summary judgment for the reasons stated from the bench). (J.A. at 916-33). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED 3 T HOMAS v. N ATIONWIDE M UTUALI NSURANCE
#### CORUS STAAL BV, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee, and United States Steel Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 05-1600.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

June 13, 2006.

Rehearing En Banc Denied Sept. 12, 2006.

Before RADER, Circuit Judge, PLAGER, Senior Circuit Judge, and LINN, Circuit Judge.

*998JUDGMENT

PER CURIAM

This CAUSE having been heard and considered it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
Mississippi Coast Coliseum & Convention Center

(with Southern Gaming Summit)

Room L3

2350 Beach Blvd

Biloxi, MS 39531

May 4, 2017

1:00 – 5:00 pm

I. Welcome and Opening prayer/Blessing.

II. Introduction of Commission and brief statements.

III. Introduction of NIGC Staff and Tribal leadership and representatives.

IV. Discuss format for the consultation

o Questions/comments will be taken after each topic presentation.

V. Opening statements/comments for those who cannot stay for the entire consultation.

VI. Housekeeping items

o Scheduled to go to 5:00 pm – however may end early if all topics covered and 

there is no tribal comments

o Meeting will be transcribed, when speaking please state name/organization and 

designees from your tribal governments – not open to the public or media.

VII. Topic order

1. Rural Outreach

2. Developing a Strong Tribal Workforce through Training

3. Management Contract Regulations and Procedures

4. Technical Standards for Mobile Gaming Devices

5. Fees

6. Draft guidance in accordance with Tribal comments received for voluntary nonbinding Class III minimum internal control standards (MICS) and regulatory 

changes as a result of the 2015-16 consultation.

VIII. Comment period will end July 1, 2017.

Page 1 of 1
#### The TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY v. Irvin M. LUPIN.

Civ. A. No. 18470.

United States District Court E. D. Pennsylvania.

June 6, 1955.

Pepper, Bodine, Frick, Scheetz & Hamilton, Philadelphia, Pa., by J. B. H. Carter, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

McBride & VonMoschzisker, Philadelphia, Pa., by John Rogers Carroll, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.

WELSH, District Judge.

One Jay Stanley 'Hartzell, the insured named in a policy of life insurance issued by the plaintiff company, died on July 13, 1954. On August 26, 1954 proofs of death were submitted and a claim for $15,000 (the face amount of the policy in question), was filed by the named beneficiary, the defendant here and business partner of the insured. An investigation was subsequently conducted by the plaintiff company, at the conclusion of which it commenced this action on January 28, 1955 to (1) cancel or rescind the policy in question because of the fraud of the insured in connection with the application for life insurance, (2) prohibit the defendant from assigning the policy or any rights thereunder and (3) prohibit defendant from instituting or prosecuting any action or proceeding against plaintiff company by reason of or based upon the policy. Defendant in due course filed his answer, putting in the question of fraud of the insured. Also, defendant in his answer filed a counterclaim for the face amount of the policy and made a demand for a jury trial in said counterclaim. Plaintiff company then filed the instant motions to (1) strike the counterclaim and the jury trial demand in connection therewith and (2) suspend action on the counterclaim and try the matter without a jury.

The purpose of plaintiff’s motions, as stated by its counsel at oral argument, is to have its case which is equitable in nature tried first to the Court without a jury. Defendant’s argument in opposition is that to do as urged by plaintiff would be to deprive defendant of his constitutional right to a trial by jury *68in his counterclaim. As we see it the question is: “Which case shall the Court try first, the case in equity or the case at law?”

Courts of equity have through the centuries been the forum for the trial of causes involving fraud or seeking certain forms of equitable relief. The present case typifies the genesis of equitable jurisdiction from earliest times. The priority of rights, so far as jurisdiction is concerned, is in the plaintiff company. We feel that under all the circumstances and the controlling principles of law that the plaintiff should not be displaced and forced to abandon his forum.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3239 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3239

   To repeal unwarranted provisions from the Patient Protection and 
  Affordable Care Act and to more efficiently use taxpayer dollars in 
                         health care spending.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 21, 2010

 Mr. Feingold introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To repeal unwarranted provisions from the Patient Protection and 
  Affordable Care Act and to more efficiently use taxpayer dollars in 
                         health care spending.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REPEALS.

    (a) Repeal of Provision That Provides for an Increase in Medicare 
Reimbursement Primarily for Hospitals in Connecticut and Michigan.--
Section 3137(a) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(Public Law 111-148), as amended by section 10317 of such Act, is 
amended--
            (1) in paragraph (2)--
                    (A) by striking ``fiscal year 2010'' and all that 
                follows through ``for purposes of implementation of the 
                amendment'' and inserting ``fiscal year 2010.--For 
                purposes of implementation of the amendment''; and
                    (B) by striking subparagraph (B); and
            (2) by striking paragraph (3).
    (b) Repeal of the Provision Granting Medicare Coverage for 
Individuals Exposed to Environmental Hazards in Libby, Montana.--
Section 10323 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Public 
Law 111-148) Act (and the amendments made by such section) is repealed.
    (c) Repeal of Provision That Provides for an Increase in Medicare 
Reimbursement for Frontier States.--Section 10324 of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (Public Law 111-148) (and the 
amendments made by such section) is repealed.
    (d) Repeal of Hospital Finding Provisions.--Section 10502 of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Public Law 111-148) is 
repealed.
    (e) Reduction of Special Adjustment to FMAP for States Recovering 
From a Major Disaster.--Section 1905(aa)(1) of the Social Security Act, 
as added by section 2006 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (Public Law 111-148), is amended--
            (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``50 percent'' and 
        inserting ``25 percent''; and
            (2) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``25 percent'' and 
        inserting ``12.5 percent''.
                                 <all>
```
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 12a0900n.06

No. 11-3531

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

MANUEL CARMELO VALDEZRODRIGUEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,

Respondent.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW

FROM THE UNITED STATES

BOARD OF IMMIGRATION

APPEALS

BEFORE: BOGGS, GILMAN, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Manuel Carmelo Valdez-Rodriguez petitions for review of an order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that affirmed an immigration judge’s (IJ) order of removal.

Valdez-Rodriguez is a native and citizen of Mexico. In April 2000, he entered the United

States without being admitted or paroled after inspection. In 2008, the Department of Homeland

Security initiated removal proceedings against him. Valdez-Rodriguez conceded removability, but

moved the IJ to continue or stay his removal proceedings pending the adjudication of an I-130 visa

petition that was to be filed on his behalf by his five-year-old son, who is a United States citizen. 

The IJ denied the request and ordered Valdez-Rodriguez removed from the country, concluding that,

under 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), a child must be at least twenty-one years old to file an I-130 visa

petition on behalf of a parent. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, declining to address ValdezRodriguez’s constitutional challenge to § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) as beyond its power of review.
No. 11-3531

Valdez-Rodriguez v. Holder

On appeal, Valdez-Rodriguez asserts two arguments: (1) his removal from the country and

his minor son’s inability to file an I-130 visa petition on his behalf violate their rights under the

United States Constitution and international law; and (2) the age requirement in § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i)

has no rational basis. When the BIA issues its own opinion rather than summarily adopting the

findings of the IJ, we review the BIA’s decision as the final agency determination. Bi Xia Qu v.

Holder, 618 F.3d 602, 605 (6th Cir. 2010). We review legal conclusions de novo and factual

findings under the substantial-evidence standard. Zhao v. Holder, 569 F.3d 238, 246 (6th Cir. 2009). 

The IJ’s order of removal did not violate the constitutional rights of either Valdez-Rodriguez

or his United States citizen son. See Payne-Barahona v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 1, 2-3 & n.1 (1st Cir.

2007); Newton v. INS, 736 F.2d 336, 342-43 (6th Cir. 1984); Hernandez-Rivera v. INS, 630 F.2d

1352, 1356 (9th Cir. 1980). Further, Valdez-Rodriguez has not identified any specific violation of

international law, and “[i]t is the role of Congress, not courts, to ensure that immigration laws

comport with family, societal, and other values.” Ukpabi v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 403, 408 (6th Cir.

2008) (citation omitted). Finally, the age requirement in § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) is not irrational because

it prevents individuals from entering the country illegally and promptly having children to avoid

deportation. Hernandez-Rivera, 630 F.2d at 1356. 

Accordingly, we deny Valdez-Rodriguez’s petition for review.

-2-
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Patrick Miller, Appellant.

[976 NYS2d 672]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (J. Goldberg, J.), rendered April 26, 2010, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s claims that the Supreme Court erred in excusing potential jurors based on their personal hardship and *857deprived him of his right to a public trial are unpreserved for appellate review *(see*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v George,*79 AD3d 1148 [2010]; *People v Casanova,*62 AD3d 88, 92 [2009]; *People v Toussaint,*40 AD3d 1017, 1017-1018 [2007]; *People v Vatansever,*5 AD3d 406, 407 [2004]; *cf. People v Alvarez,*20 NY3d 75 [2012]), and we decline to review them in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction. Balkin, J.E, Lott, Austin and Miller, JJ., concur.