Present: All the Justices 

RUSSELL COUNTY DEPARTMENT 

OF SOCIAL SERVICES 

OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 

v. Record No. 990309 January 14, 2000 

SHEILAH JACKSON O'QUINN 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RUSSELL COUNTY 

Nicholas E. Persin, Judge Designate 

 The primary issue we consider in this appeal is whether 

Code §§ 8.01-186 and -191, which are contained in the Virginia 

Declaratory Judgment Act, authorize a circuit court to award 

attorney's fees to a prevailing litigant. 

 The relevant facts are not in dispute. The Russell 

County Department of Social Services reassigned its employee, 

Sheilah Jackson O'Quinn, from a position of child protective 

services worker to a different position within the Department 

of Social Services. O'Quinn considered the reassignment a 

demotion, and she filed a grievance utilizing the Russell 

County grievance procedure. 

 James Gillespie, Russell County Administrator, ultimately 

determined that O'Quinn should be reinstated to her former 

position as a child protective services worker. The 

Department of Social Services filed a bill of complaint for 

declaratory judgment in the circuit court, styled Russell 

County Department of Social Services v. O'Quinn, and requested 

that the court declare that the county administrator had 
erroneously determined that O'Quinn's complaint was grievable. 

The circuit court dismissed the bill of complaint because the 

court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 

 O'Quinn instituted this proceeding by filing a suit for 

declaratory and injunctive relief. She requested that the 

circuit court compel the Department of Social Services to 

reinstate her to the position of child protective services 

worker. She also requested attorney's fees and costs. The 

circuit court entered a decree which, among other things, 

ordered O'Quinn's reinstatement and established a schedule for 

the filing of O'Quinn's verified petition for attorney's fees 

and costs. Subsequently, the court considered O'Quinn's 

petition for attorney's fees, and memoranda submitted by 

counsel for O'Quinn and the Department of Social Services, and 

entered a decree which awarded O'Quinn $6,405 in attorney's 

fees and $1,075 in costs. The court stated in its decree that 

a "[c]ourt, sitting in equity, is vested with the authority 

and discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees and costs 

as 'further relief' pursuant to . . . Code . . . §§ 8.01-186 

and 8.01-191." The Department of Social Services appeals. 

 Code § 8.01-186 states: 

 "Further relief based on a declaratory judgment 

order or decree may be granted whenever necessary or 

proper. The application shall be by motion to a 

court having jurisdiction to grant the relief. If 

the application is deemed sufficient the court 

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shall, on reasonable notice, require an adverse 

party whose rights have been adjudicated by the 

declaration of right to show cause why further 

relief should not be granted forthwith." 

Code § 8.01-191 states: 

 "This article is declared to be remedial. Its 

purpose is to afford relief from the uncertainty and 

insecurity attendant upon controversies over legal 

rights, without requiring one of the parties 

interested so to invade the rights asserted by the 

other as to entitle him to maintain an ordinary 

action therefor. It is to be liberally interpreted 

and administered with a view to making the courts 

more serviceable to the people." 

 The Department of Social Services argues that the circuit 

court erred in awarding attorney's fees to O'Quinn because 

neither the Virginia Declaratory Judgment Act nor any other 

statute provides for such an award. Responding, O'Quinn 

asserts that Code §§ 8.01-186 and -191 authorize a circuit 

court to award attorney's fees to a prevailing litigant. 

Continuing, O'Quinn contends that Code § 8.01-191 mandates 

that courts liberally construe the statutes contained in the 

Virginia Declaratory Judgment Act and that the words "further 

relief" contained in Code § 8.01-186 authorize a court to make 

an award of attorney's fees. We disagree with O'Quinn. 

 The plain language contained in Code § 8.01-191 requires 

that the courts interpret and administer the Virginia 

Declaratory Judgment Act "with a view to making the courts 

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more serviceable to the people." This statute, however, does 

not authorize a court to make an award of attorney's fees. 

 We have repeatedly stated that the "general rule in this 

Commonwealth is that in the absence of a statute or contract 

to the contrary, a court may not award attorney's fees to the 

prevailing party." Prospect Development Co. v. Bershader, 258 

Va. 75, 92, 515 S.E.2d 291, 300 (1999); accord Gilmore v. 

Basic Industries, Inc., 233 Va. 485, 490, 357 S.E.2d 514, 517 

(1987). Even though we have recognized that there are certain 

exceptions to this rule, none of those exceptions is pertinent 

here. See Bershader, 258 Va. at 92, 515 S.E.2d at 300. 

Rather, O'Quinn must identify a specific statutory grant of 

authority that enables a court to award attorney's fees to 

her. 

 Contrary to O'Quinn's assertion, the phrase "further 

relief" contained in § 8.01-186 does not authorize a court to 

award attorney's fees to a litigant. Rather, that term 

permits a court to enter necessary orders to implement or 

enforce a declaratory judgment entered by the court. See

Winborne v. Doyle, 190 Va. 867, 872-73, 59 S.E.2d 90, 93 

(1950). We simply cannot, and will not, infer that the 

General Assembly intended to authorize a court to award 

attorney's fees in a declaratory judgment action when the 

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Virginia Declaratory Judgment Act fails expressly to grant 

such authority. 

 The Department of Social Services also contends that the 

circuit court erred in awarding costs to O'Quinn that included 

costs she incurred in the first proceeding that the Department 

of Social Services initiated, and the present proceeding. The 

Department of Social Services asserts that the proceedings are 

two distinct proceedings, and O'Quinn is not entitled to 

recover for costs incurred in the former proceeding. The 

Department of Social Services also asserts that the circuit 

court abused its discretion by awarding certain costs because 

such costs are not recoverable. O'Quinn argues that the 

Department of Social Services failed to raise these issues in 

the circuit court and, therefore, these issues cannot be 

asserted for the first time on appeal. We agree with O'Quinn. 

 The Department of Social Services argued in the circuit 

court that the decision to award costs was within the 

discretion of the court, but it "would not be 'just and 

proper'" to award costs to O'Quinn. The Department of Social 

Services did not assert in the circuit court the arguments 

that it raises here. We will not permit the Department of 

Social Services to raise these issues for the first time on 

appeal. Rule 5:25. 

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 Accordingly, we will affirm that portion of the circuit 

court's judgment which awards costs to O'Quinn, we will 

reverse that portion of the judgment which awards attorney's 

fees, and we will enter final judgment here. 

Affirmed in part, 

reversed in part, 

and final judgment. 

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