FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAIME MEDRANO and MARIBEL

MEDRANO, husband and wife,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

FLAGSTAR BANK, FSB, a Federal

Savings Bank; EXODUS FINANCIAL

CORPORATION, a Nevada corporation

formerly known as Doe 1; JANE

FOWLER KELLEHER, formerly known

as Doe 2; STRATHAM MONTECITO

WEST, a California corporation;

STRATEGIC SALES AND MARKETING

GROUP, a California corporation;

JANIS KIM RANDAZZO, individually

and responsible managing officer of

Strategic Sales and Marketing

Group; FERNANDO CORDERO,

individually and responsible

managing officer of Exodus

Financial Corporation; and DORA

SENAIDA CORDERO,

Defendants-Appellees,

No. 11-55412

D.C. No.

2:10-cv-07285-

JHN-PLA

OPINION
2 MEDRANO V. FLAGSTAR BANK

and

PROTOFUND MORTGAGE

CORPORATION, a California

corporation,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Jacqueline H. Nguyen, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 6, 2012—Pasadena, California

Filed December 11, 2012

Before: Susan P. Graber, Sandra S. Ikuta,

and Andrew D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Graber
MEDRANO V. FLAGSTAR BANK 3

 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

*

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

SUMMARY

*

Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act

The panel affirmed the dismissal of a claim under the

Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act by borrowers seeking

damages for a mortgage-loan servicer’s failure to respond to

their inquiries.

Adopting the Seventh Circuit’s general approach, the

panel held that the borrowers’ letters challenging the monthly

payment due on their loan were not “qualified written

requests” triggering the servicer’s duty to respond under 12

U.S.C. § 2605 because the letters did not seek information

relating to the servicing of the loan, but rather challenged the

loan’s terms.

COUNSEL

Jerome Zamos, Law Offices of Jerome Zamos, Woodland

Hills, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Roland P. Reynolds and Frederick A. Haist, Palmer,

Lombardi & Donohue LLP, Los Angeles, California; Dale A.

Arakawa and Lisa P. Gruen, Ericksen Arbuthnot, Los

Angeles, California; and Carol L. Vallely, Law Office of

Carol L. Vallely, Verdugo City, California, for DefendantsAppellees.
4 MEDRANO V. FLAGSTAR BANK

 Before the district court, Plaintiffs also asserted other federal and state- 1

law claims. Plaintiffs asserted those claims against, in addition to

Flagstar, Defendants Exodus Financial Corporation, Jane Fowler Kelleher,

Stratham Montecito West, Strategic Sales and Marketing Group, Janis

Kim Randazzo, Fernando Cordero, and Dora Senaida Cordero. We

address all claims under appeal except Plaintiffs’ § 2605 claim against

Flagstar in a memorandum disposition filed this date.

OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”)

provides an action for damages against mortgage-loan

servicers who fail to respond to certain types of inquiries

from borrowers. Plaintiffs Jaime and Maribel Medrano allege

that Defendant Flagstar Bank, FSB, the servicer of their home

loan, violated 12 U.S.C. § 2605 because it did not respond

adequately to three letters in which they challenged the

monthly payment due on their loan. The district court

granted Flagstar’s motion to dismiss the claim because a

servicer must receive a valid “qualified written request” to

incur the duty to respond under § 2605, and it determined that

the letters were not qualified written requests that triggered

that statutory duty. Reviewing de novo, Colony Cove Props.,

LLC v. City of Carson, 640 F.3d 948, 955 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 132 S. Ct. 456 (2011), we hold that the letters did not

trigger the statutory duty to respond and therefore affirm.1

In 2009, Plaintiffs entered into a home loan agreement

and purchased a house in Los Angeles County. The loan was

secured by a deed of trust and, at all times relevant to this

action, was serviced by Flagstar.
MEDRANO V. FLAGSTAR BANK 5

The loan documents provided for an escrow account into

which Plaintiffs would make monthly payments to cover

taxes, insurance, interest, and principal. In February 2010,

Flagstar notified Plaintiffs that the escrow account would

have insufficient funds over the following 12-month period

and that they would be required either to increase their

monthly payment from $1,917.68 to $2,676.08 or to

contribute a one-time lump sum of $4,938.53 to cover the

deficiency.

Plaintiffs retained a lawyer who, between March 19,

2010, and August 10, 2010, sent three letters disputing any

obligation to make the increased payments. The first letter,

which was sent to Flagstar directly, asserted, in relevant part,

that the loan documents did not “accurately reflect . . . the

proper payment schedule represented by the loan broker.”

The letter went on to explain that, when Plaintiffs bought the

house, the broker assured them that their maximum monthly

payments would not exceed $1,900. The letter demanded that

Flagstar “revise all documentation concerning the current

loan” to reflect the “original terms” of the agreement and

limit Plaintiffs’ monthly payments accordingly.

The second letter, which also was sent to Flagstar

directly, made similar claims. It also told Flagstar that

Plaintiffs would continue to make payments of only

$1,917.68, as allegedly agreed, and that they expected

Flagstar “to apply that amount in full satisfaction of their

obligation.”

The third letter went to Flagstar’s legal counsel. It

repeated the assertion that Flagstar’s demand for increased

payments was invalid, even though it was consistent with the

loan and mortgage documents, because Plaintiffs had been
6 MEDRANO V. FLAGSTAR BANK

 During oral argument, the parties disputed whether Flagstar had

2

responded to the letters. But because that issue was neither argued before

the district court nor raised in the parties’ appellate briefs, we do not

address it here. See O’Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1063

n.3 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that arguments not raised before the district

court generally are waived); Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th

Cir. 1994) (“We review only issues which are argued specifically and

distinctly in a party’s opening brief.”). Instead, we assume, for purposes

of this appeal, that Flagstar’s responses, if any, were inadequate under

§ 2605.

advised when they purchased their home that their payments

would not exceed $1,900 per month.

Although Flagstar received Plaintiffs’ letters, it made no

changes to their account and—although the record is not clear

on this point—may have failed to respond at all.2

Plaintiffs commenced this action in California state court,

alleging that Flagstar violated state law. After Plaintiffs

added federal claims under RESPA, Flagstar removed the

action to federal court. The district court dismissed the

federal claims and remanded the action to the state court.

Plaintiffs timely appeal.

RESPA requires the servicer of a federally related

mortgage loan to provide a timely written response to

inquiries from borrowers regarding the servicing of their

loans. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(A), (e)(2). If the servicer fails

to respond properly to such a request, the statute entitles the

borrower to recover actual damages and, if there is a “pattern

or practice of noncompliance,” statutory damages of up to

$1,000. Id. § 2605(f). Here, Flagstar argues that, regardless
MEDRANO V. FLAGSTAR BANK 7

 If subject to § 2605(e)’s duty to respond, Flagstar would have been 3

required to acknowledge receipt of the correspondence within 20 days

and, within 60 days, (1) to make appropriate corrections to the account, (2)

to explain why it believed the account to be correct, or (3) to explain why

the information requested was unavailable or could not be obtained.

12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(A), (e)(2).

of how it responded to Plaintiffs’ letters, it is not liable under 3

the statute because the letters were not qualified written

requests and therefore did not require a response.

To decide whether Plaintiffs’ letters triggered § 2605(e)’s

duty to respond, we begin by turning to the text of the statute,

as well as its object and policy, to discern congressional

intent. United States v. $493,850 in U.S. Currency, 518 F.3d

1159, 1166–67 (9th Cir. 2008). RESPA defines a “qualified

written request” as follows:

For purposes of this subsection, a

qualified written request shall be a written

correspondence, other than notice on a

payment coupon or other payment medium

supplied by the servicer, that—

(i) includes, or otherwise enables the

servicer to identify, the name and account of

the borrower; and

(ii) includes a statement of the reasons for

the belief of the borrower, to the extent

applicable, that the account is in error or

provides sufficient detail to the servicer

regarding other information sought by the

borrower.
8 MEDRANO V. FLAGSTAR BANK

12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B). Under § 2605(e)(1)(A), a servicer

must respond to such a letter if it requests or challenges

“information relating to the servicing of such loan.” Id.

§ 2605(e)(1)(A), (e)(2).

Congress intended RESPA to serve consumer-protection

purposes. The statute’s first section, which is entitled

“Congressional findings and purpose,” expresses Congress’

determination that “significant reforms in the real estate

settlement process are needed to insure that consumers

throughout the Nation are provided with greater and more

timely information on the nature and costs of the settlement

process and are protected from unnecessarily high settlement

charges caused by certain abusive practices.” Id. § 2601(a);

see also Schuetz v. Banc One Mortg. Corp., 292 F.3d 1004,

1008–09 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing the enactment and

congressional purpose of RESPA). Although the “settlement

process” targeted by the statute was originally limited to the

negotiation and execution of mortgage contracts, Greenpoint

Mortg. Funding, Inc. v. Herrera (In re Herrera), 422 B.R.

698, 711 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Home Funds

Direct v. Monroy (In re Monroy), 650 F.3d 1300, 1301 (9th

Cir. 2011) (order), the scope of the statute’s provisions was

expanded in 1990 to encompass loan servicing, Pub. L. No.

101-625, tit. IX, subtit. C, § 941, 104 Stat. 4405 (1990).

Accordingly, RESPA’s provisions relating to loan servicing

procedures should be “construed liberally” to serve the

statute’s remedial purpose. Herrera, 422 B.R. at 711–12.

We have had no occasion to apply those principles to

interpretation of § 2605(e), and few other courts have done

so. In Catalan v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., 629 F.3d 676 (7th

Cir. 2011), however, the Seventh Circuit recently considered

the scope of § 2605(e). Specifically, in deciding whether a
MEDRANO V. FLAGSTAR BANK 9

qualified written request must identify specific reasons for a

borrower’s belief that his or her account is in error, the court

held:

RESPA does not require any magic

language before a servicer must construe a

written communication from a borrower as a

qualified written request and respond

accordingly. The language of the provision is

broad and clear. To be a qualified written

request, a written correspondence must

reasonably identify the borrower and account

and must “include a statement of the reasons

for the belief of the borrower, to the extent

applicable, that the account is in error or

provides sufficient detail to the servicer

regarding other information sought by the

borrower.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B)

(emphasis added). Any reasonably stated

written request for account information can be

a qualified written request. To the extent that

a borrower is able to provide reasons for a

belief that the account is in error, the borrower

should provide them, but any request for

information made with sufficient detail is

enough under RESPA to be a qualified written

request and thus to trigger the servicer’s

obligations to respond.

Catalan, 629 F.3d at 687. We agree and adopt the Seventh

Circuit’s general approach to defining what qualifies as a

qualified written request that will trigger § 2605(e)’s duty to

respond. The statute does not explicitly require any “magic”

words, and an interpretation according to which it did so
10 MEDRANO V. FLAGSTAR BANK

 The district court, like many courts that have addressed the issue, 4

conflated the statutory analysis by declaring that the letters were not

qualified written requests because they did not request information

relating to servicing. Section 2605(e)(1)(B), which defines what is a

qualified written request, does not refer to “information relating to . . .

servicing.” Instead, that requirement derives from § 2605(e)(1)(A), which

requires, as conditions for triggering the duty to respond, both (1) that the

letter is a qualified written request and (2) that it requests information

relating to servicing. Although this distinction may be meaningless in

most cases, we clarify that this opinion concerns the interpretation of

§ 2605(e)(1)(A).

implicitly would be inconsistent with Congress’ intent that

the statute serve a broad remedial purpose. Instead, under

§ 2605(e), a borrower’s written inquiry requires a response as

long as it (1) reasonably identifies the borrower’s name and

account, (2) either states the borrower’s “reasons for the

belief . . . that the account is in error” or “provides sufficient

detail to the servicer regarding other information sought by

the borrower,” and (3) seeks “information relating to the

servicing of [the] loan.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(A)–(B).4

Nonetheless, the third of those requirements—that the

letter must request information relating to servicing—ensures

that the statutory duty to respond does not arise with respect

to all inquiries or complaints from borrowers to servicers.

RESPA defines the term “servicing” to encompass only

“receiving any scheduled periodic payments from a borrower

pursuant to the terms of any loan, including amounts for

escrow accounts . . . , and making the payments of principal

and interest and such other payments.” Id. § 2605(i)(3).

“Servicing,” so defined, does not include the transactions and

circumstances surrounding a loan’s origination—facts that

would be relevant to a challenge to the validity of an

underlying debt or the terms of a loan agreement. Such
MEDRANO V. FLAGSTAR BANK 11

 Our holding is consistent with the decisions of many district courts that 5

have addressed the issue. See, e.g., Menashe v. Bank of N.Y., 850 F. Supp.

2d 1120, 1130 (D. Haw. 2012) (noting that requests regarding the validity

of loan and mortgage documents are not qualified written requests);

Jensen v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp, 702 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1196 (E.D. Cal.

2010) (dismissing a § 2605(e) claim for failure to allege that inquiries

related to servicing); Rivera v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 756 F.

Supp. 2d 1193, 1199 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (same); Sipe v. Countrywide Bank,

690 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1154 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that a demand for

rescission of the loan agreement does not relate to servicing under

§ 2605(e)); Consumer Solutions REO, LLC. v. Hillery, 658 F. Supp. 2d

1002, 1014 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that a qualified written request must

address the servicing of the loan, and not its validity); Champlaie v. BAC

Home Loans Servicing, LP, 706 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2009)

(same); Keen v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 1086,

1097 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (same); MorEquity, Inc. v. Naeem, 118 F. Supp. 2d

885, 901 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (same).

events precede the servicer’s role in receiving the borrower’s

payments and making payments to the borrower’s creditors.

Perhaps for that reason, Congress drafted the statute so as not

to include those matters.

The statute thus distinguishes between letters that relate

to borrowers’ disputes regarding servicing, on the one hand,

and those regarding the borrower’s contractual relationship

with the lender, on the other. That distinction makes sense

because only servicers ofloans are subject to § 2605(e)’s duty

to respond—and they are unlikely to have information

regarding those loans’ originations. In summary, we hold

that letters challenging only a loan’s validity or its terms are

not qualified written requests that give rise to a duty to

respond under § 2605(e).5

Turning to Plaintiffs’ letters in this case, it is clear that

they constitute challenges to the terms of the loan and
12 MEDRANO V. FLAGSTAR BANK

 Some borrowers mistakenly may request modification or challenge a 6

loan’s validity or terms when they identify a problem in a servicer’s

accounting. As we have made clear, RESPA does not require magic

words, and such letters may trigger a duty to respond under § 2605(e).

Here, the letters were drafted by counsel; we therefore assume that they

mean what they say.

mortgage documents and are not disputes regarding Flagstar’s

servicing of the loan. The first letter states that the loan

documents did not “accurately reflect . . . the proper payment

schedule represented by the loan broker.” That assertion

amounts to an allegation of fraud or mistake during the

closing of the loan and the drafting of the relevant

documentation. Thus, it concerns only the loan’s validity and

terms, not its servicing. Likewise, in the second letter,

Plaintiffs demanded that Flagstar “revise all documentation

concerning the current loan” to reflect the “original terms” of

the agreement. A request for modification of a loan

agreement, like one for rescission, does not concern the

loan’s servicing. Finally, the sole request in the third letter 6

is that Plaintiffs’ monthly payment be reduced because they

were told, when they purchased their home, that those

payments would not exceed $1,900. Again, that demand is a

challenge to the terms of the loan and mortgage documents,

premised on an assertion that the existing documents do not

accurately reflect the true agreement between Plaintiffs and

the originating lender. Because the letter requests

modification of those documents, it is not related to servicing.

In sum, because Plaintiffs’ letters to Flagstar challenged

the terms of their loan and requested modification of various

loan and mortgage documents, theywere not qualified written

requests relating to the servicing of Plaintiffs’ loan. Because

12 U.S.C. § 2605 does not require a servicer to respond to
MEDRANO V. FLAGSTAR BANK 13

such requests, the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs’

claim.

AFFIRMED.