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16-503-cr 

United States v. Diaz 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed 

on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 30th day of January, two thousand seventeen. 

PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

ROSEMARY S. POOLER, 

GERARD E. LYNCH, 

Circuit Judges. 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 16-503-cr 

v. 

MIGUEL DIAZ, AKA SMOOTH, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

 

FOR APPELLEE: Michael J. Gustafson, Marc H. Silverman, 

Assistant United States Attorneys, for 

Deirdre M. Daly, United States Attorney 

for the District of Connecticut, New 

Haven, CT. 

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Robin Christine Smith, Law Offices of 

Robin C. Smith, Esq., P.C., San Rafael, 

CA. 
 

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Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut 

(Vanessa L. Bryant, Judge). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court be and hereby is 

AFFIRMED. 

Defendant-appellant Miguel Diaz (“Diaz”) appeals from a February 19, 2016 judgment of 

conviction. Diaz pleaded guilty to possessing heroin with intent to distribute in violation of 21 

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking 

crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The District Court imposed a 90-month term of 

imprisonment. Diaz argues on appeal, in various iterations, that his sentence is procedurally 

unreasonable because the District Court declined to grant a downward departure or variance based 

on his claims of childhood abuse. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the 

procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 

“[T]his court may review a district court’s refusal to grant a downward departure—or the 

extent of such departure if granted—so long as the court’s decision was based on a mistaken 

conception of the court’s authority under the Guidelines or was otherwise illegal.” United States v. 

Bonner, 313 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 2002). Moreover, “[i]n the absence of clear evidence of a 

substantial risk that the judge misapprehended the scope of his departure authority, we presume that 

a sentenc[ing] judge understood the scope of his authority.” United States v. Stinson, 465 F.3d 113, 114 

(2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, there is nothing in the record to suggest that 

the District Court misunderstood its authority to depart from the Guidelines, or that its decision was 

otherwise illegal. Accordingly, Diaz’s challenges to the District Court’s refusal to grant a downward 

departure are not reviewable on appeal. 

Nor was Diaz’s sentence procedurally unreasonable because the District Court held a clearly 

erroneous view of the facts. See United States v. Jesurum, 819 F.3d 667, 670 (2d Cir. 2016). The District 

Court properly weighed the available evidence concerning Diaz’s claim that he had been abused as a 

child and found the evidence unreliable and the alleged abuse, if it occurred, not causally related to 

the crimes of conviction. Those findings were not clearly erroneous. 

CONCLUSION 

We have reviewed all of the arguments raised by Diaz on appeal and find them to be without 

merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the February 19, 2016 judgment of the District 

Court. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk