Slip Op. 07-127 UNI TED STATES COURT OF I NTERNATI ONAL

TRADE

____________________________________ : GI OR GI O F OO DS, I

NC ., :

: Plaintiff, : : v . : : UN I T E D S T AT E S , : Be fo re : W ALLAC H, J u d ge : Court No.: 03-00286 De fe nd ant, : : an d : : L .K. B OWMAN COMPANY, : MONTEREY MUSHROOMS, I NC., and : MUSHROOM CANNI

NG COMPANY, :

: De fe nd ant- Inte rv e no rs . : ____________________________________: [ P l a i n t i f f ’ s M o t i o nf

o r Le av e t o A m e n d

th e C o mp l a i n ti s G RA

N T E D IN P A R T an d

D E N IE D IN PART.] Dated: August 21, 2007 Arnold & Porter L L P, (Michael T. Shor) for Plaintiff Giorg io Foods, Inc. Peter D. K eisler, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; David M. Cohen, Direc tor, Commercial L itigation Br anch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justi ce ( Paul D. Kovac and David Sil verbr and), f or D e f e n d an tU n i t e d

S t a t e s C u s t o m s an d

B o r d e r P r o t e c t i o n ; an d

D av i d A
. J. G o l d f

i n e an d N e a l J. Rey nolds, Office of the Ge nera l Counsel, for Def endant U.S. International Trade Commi ssion. Ke lle y Dr y e Col lie r S ha

nn on , ( Mic ha e l J. Co ur se y and R. A lan L

ub e rd a ) f or De fe nd antInterve nors L .K. B owman Company , Monterey Mushrooms, I nc., and Mushr oom Canning C o mp a n y.2 OP IN ION Wallach, Jud ge: I IN TR OD UC TIO N Plaintiff Giorg io Foods, Inc. (“ Giorg io”) ha s filed a Motion for L eave to Amend the Complaint seeking to amend its Compl aint in five wa y s. First, it reque sts to drop its s tatutory claim that the United States International Trade Commi ssion’s (“I TC” or “ the Commiss ion”) decision to deny

it status as an “a ffe cted domestic pr oducer ” wa s in violation of the Conti nued Dumpi ngand

Sub sid y Of fs e t A c t, 1 9 U .S. C. § 16 75 (c ) ( “ CD SOA ” ). Me mor and um o f L aw i n Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for L eave to Amend the Complaint (“Plaintiff’s Motion”) at 1. Second, Giorg io seeks to add a claim that the CDSOA’s support re quirement violates the E qual Pr ote c tio n Cl a

us e of the Un ite d St a te s. I d. Th ir d, Pla int if f r e qu e sts the a dd iti on

of Sunny De ll F oo ds , Inc . ( “ Sunny

De ll” ) a s a

de fe nd ant, and

the a dd iti on

of a c la im f or re sti tut ion

/un jus t
e nr ic hme nt a g a ins t th e Go ve rnme nt, De fe nd ant- Inte rv e no rs and Sunny De ll. I d. F ourt

h, Gi or g io wants to “update” its claims and a dd “fa ctual alleg ations” to ac count for de velopments since the
case was filed a

nd stay ed in 2003 pendingresolution of cr oss motions for judg ment upon the
a g e nc y re c or d in P.S. Che z Sidn e y

v. U. S. Int’ l T ra de Comm’ n, Court No . 0 2- 00 63 5. I d. ; G ior g io Foods, Inc. v. United States, Court No. 03-00286 ( CI T Octobe r 10, 2003). F inally , Plaintiff seeks to cla

rify its requested r elief. Plaintiff’s Motion at 1. For the re asons stated be low, Giorg io’s Motion is gra nted in part a

nd denied in par

t. As to i ts f ir st, se c on d, fo ur

th a nd fi ft h r e qu e sts , it s Mo tio n is g ra nte d. As to i ts thir d, its re qu e st t o add Sunny

Dell as a defe ndant is denied, a

nd its request to add a

n unjust enrichment/re stitut ion19 U.S.C. § 1675c (2000), Pub. L . No. 106-387 § 1002, 114 Stat. 1549, repe aled by 1 Pub. L . No. 109-171, Title VI I , Subtit le F § 7601( a), 120 Stat. 154 (F ebrua ry 8, 2006). 3 claim is g rante d.

II BACK GR OUND This case was c ommenced on Ma y 23, 2003. After

the Complaint and Answer wer e filed, the c ourt issued an Or der stay ing this ca se pending

the re solution of cross motions for jud g me nt u

po n th e a g e nc y

re c or d in P.S. Che z Sidn e y

L L C v. U. S. Int’ l T ra de Comm’ n. Gi or g io F oo ds , Inc . v . U nit e d St a te s, Court No . 0 3- 00 28 6 ( CI T O c tob e r 1 0, 20 03 ). On July 13 , 2 00 6, thi s court issued its decision in Chez Si dney , holding the suppor t require ment of the Continued Dumpi ngand

Sub sid y Of fs e t A c t un c on sti tut ion a l a s v iol a tiv e of the F ir st A me ndme nt r ig ht t o 1 fre e spee ch. Chez Sidney , 442 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1333 (CI T 2006).
III STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW USCI T R. 15(a), which par allels Rule 15(a) of the F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure, g overns amendments to a par ty ’s complaint. When a par ty seeks to ame nd its pleading more than 20 day s after

service of the plea ding, a mendments may

be g rante d only

by leave of the c ourt or by written conse nt of the adve rse pa rty . USCI T R. 15(a). “ L eave shall be g iven fre ely when justice so require s.” I d.; Foman v. Da vis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S . Ct. 227, 9 L . Ed. 2d 222 (1962). The g rantingof a motion for le ave to amend the plea dings is within the sound discre tion of the c ourt. Intrepid v. Pollock, 907 F.2d 1125, 1129 (F ed. Cir. 1990). Abse nt any dilatory motive, undue ca

use for delay , repe ated f

ailures to cur e def

iciencie s by

amendments, futility

of4

amendment, or

undue pre

judice to the opposingparty , leave to amend should be libera lly g iven. Foman, 371 U .S. at 182. I n exercising its discretion, the court will consider a var iety of fa ctors including, but not limited to, “1) the timeliness of the motion to amend the plea dings; 2) the potential prejudice to the opposing pa rty ; 3) whethe r additional discover y will be nece ssary ; 4) the proc edura l posture of the litig ation; 5) whethe r the omitted counter claim is compulsory ; 6) the impact on the c ourt’s docke t; and 7) the public intere st.” Tomoeg awa (U.S.A.), Inc. v. United States, 15 CI T 182, 186, 763 F. Supp. 614 (1991) (citingBudd Co. v. Tra veler s I ndem. Co., 109 F.R.D. 561, 563 (E .D. Mich. 1986))
. IV DI SCU SSIO N Th e USC I T R. 15 (a ) p ro vis ion to f ile an ame ndme nt t o th e ple a din g s a s o f r ig ht c le arl y does not apply

here beca

use Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend is well beyond the 20-da y statutory limit , the orig inal Complaint having be en filed on Ma y 23, 2003. Both De fenda

nt United States and the United States International Trade Commi ssion ob je c t on ly to P la int if

f’ s r e qu e st t o a dd

an unju st e nr ic hme nt/

re sti tut ion

c la im Sunny

De ll a s a de fe nd ant. Def endant- Interve nors, the L .K. B owman Company , Monterey Mushrooms, I nc., and Mu sh ro om C ann ingCom pa ny , d o n ot o pp os e Pla int if f’ s f ir st r e qu e st t o d

ro p it s st a tut or

y c la im ag ainst the I TC and Plaintiff’s re quest to update the f acts it dee ms releva

nt to its claims. They take no position on Plainti ff’ s reque st to add an equa l protection ar g ument based on the court’s opinion in S KF U SA I nc. v. United States, 451 F . Supp. 2d 1355 (CI T 2006) and obje ct to the
rema ining a

mendments proposed by

Plaintiff. Partial Opposition to P laintiff’s Motion for L eave5

to Amend Complaint (“Def .-Interve nors’ Response” ) at 2.

1 P lai nt iff Ma y D r op i ts St at ut or y C lai m Ag ain stth e ITC Plaintiff seeks to drop its statutory claim ag ainst the I TC, in which it claimed that the I TC’s decision to deny

it “aff ecte d domestic produce r” status wa s in violation of the CDSOA. Def endant a nd Def endant- Interve nors havingno objections to droppingthis claim, and the cour t
se e ingno re a so n n ot t o g ra nt G ior g io’ s Mo tio n to Am e nd to d ro p th is c la im, Pla int if

f’ s r e qu e st i s g rante d.
2 P lai nt iff Ma y A dd a C lai m Al le gin g t hatth e Suppo r t R e quir e m e ntis i n Vi ola ti on o f the Equ al P rote ction Clause, Based on th e Outcom e in SKF USA Inc., 451 F . Sup p. 2d 1355 Pla int if f m ay ame nd its Com pla int to a dd a c la im a lle g ingthat th e su pp or t r e qu ir e me nt i n the CDSOA violates the Equa l Protection Clause bec ause the issue is a leg al one a nd no undue prejudice will result to the opposing pa rties if the amendment is permitted. See Timken Co. v. United States, 15 CI T 658, 659, 779 F. Supp. 1402 (1991). Plaintiff seeks to add this claim bec ause the CDSOA was held unc onstitut ional on equal pr ote c tio n g ro un ds in S KF USAInc ., 45 1 F . Su pp . 2 d 1 35 5. Th e ru lin g is r e le va nt t o th is c a se and De fenda

nt United States and the I TC would not be prejudice d by including this issue, since they have a lrea dy

encounte red it bef

ore. In Rhone Poulenc S.A. v. United States, 7 CI T 133, 583 F. Supp. 607 (1984), the court ba sed its decision to allow Plaintiff to amend its Compl aint on the court’s r easoningin Sil ver Ree d Americ a, Inc. v. United States, 7 CI T 23, 581 F. Supp. 1290 (1 98 4) , w hic h h e ld t

hat Pla int if

f c ou ld a me nd its ple a din g s w he n a

n o pin ion of thi s c ourt ,6

re le va nt t o it s c a se , w a s is su e d a ft e r a ll the re sp on siv e ple a din g s w e re se rv e d. Th e c ourt in Rhone Poulenc S.A. also stated that since the issue was one of law which did not require either additional fac t-finding or a ne w trial there was no undue prejudice to the Gover nment. Rhone P ou len c, 7 CI T at13 6; bu t s ee S aars tah l A G v. Uni tedS tat es, 20 CI T 1 41 3, 14 20 -21 , 9 49 F. Sup p. 86 3 ( 19 96 ) ( fi nd ingthat g ra nti ngPla int if

f’ s mo tio n f

or le ave to a

me nd wo uld “ ne c e ssi tate openingup the re cord a

nd would cre ate undue delay and expenditure of sc arc e par ty time and
resour ces;” such dela

y constitutes prejudice ). Def endant- Interve nors ar g ue that Giorg io could have r aised this claim in its original Complaint, and does not expl ain why it “waited until the Court’s dec ision in t he SKF c ase.” Def .-Interve nors’ Response a t 2. The fa ct that Giorg io did not originally raise this issue does not prec lude it from see king the addition of the cla im now. “[P ]arties ‘have been pe rmitted to amend the ir ple a din g s to a sse rt

ne w c la ims lon g a ft e r t

he y a c qu ir e d th e fa c ts n e c e ssa ry to s up po rt

tho se claims.’” Re sQNet.c om, I nc. v. L ansa, I nc., 382 F . Supp. 2d 424, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Ric ha rd so n G re e ns hie lds Se c s. , Inc . v . L a u, 82 5 F .2 d 6 47 , 6 53 n. 6 ( 2d Cir . 1 98 7) ). Th e sta

y in this case wa s lifted when the de cision in Chez S idney was issued, two months befor e the de cision in SKF USA Inc., 451 F . Supp. 2d 1355. L ess than one month later , Plaintiff filed motions for a temporar y restra ining or der a

nd a pre liminary

injunction. Three w eeks a fter those motions were decide d by

the cour t, Plainti ff f

iled its Moti on to for L eave to Amend Complaint. W hile “[a] lit ig ant’ s f

a ilure to a sse rt

a c la im a s so on

a s h e c ou ld h ave is p ro pe rl y a fa c tor to b e c on sid e re d in decidingwhether

to gr ant leave to amend,” G iorg io filed its moti on in a re asonable amount of time. Te-Moak Ba

nds of W. Shos hone Indians of Ne v. v. United States, 948 F.2d 1258, 1262 (F ed. Cir. 1991) (quotingCarson v. Polley , 689 F.2d 562, 584 ( 5th Cir. 1982)).7

Although Plaintiff c ould have br oug ht this claim in i ts origina l motion, absent prejudice to the opposing pa

rties, and g iven that the opposingparties do not objec t to this amendment, the liberal position of the fe dera l rules for grantingamendments we ighs in fa vor of Plaintiff her e. Thus, Plaintiff’s reque st to add a cla im is gra nted.
3 P lai nt iff Ma y A dd a C lai m for Re st it ut ion /U nj ustEnr ic hm e ntAg ain stth e G ov e r nm e ntand De fend ant -I nt e r ve nor s, ButNo t S unny D e ll Plaintiff seeks to add Sunny Dell, a domestic mushroom produc er, a s a def endant, a nd
a lso re qu e sts the a dd iti on of a c la im o f u

nju st e nr ic hme nt/

re sti tut ion

a g a ins t th e Go ve rnme nt, Def endant- Interve nors, and Sunny Dell. Plaintiff’s Motion at 3-4.

A P lai nt iff Ma y N otAdd SunnyDe ll a s a De fend ant Pla int if f i nit ia lly c on te ste d p ro po se d D e fe nd ant- Inte rv e no rs ’ i nte rv e nti on in t his c a se in its Oppositi on to Motion t o Interve ne, filed in August 2006, in which it stated that “the g ranting of int e rv e nti on

a t th is s ta g e . . . w ou ld p re jud ic e pla int if

f. ” Gi or g io F oo ds , Inc .’ s O pp os iti on to Motion to I nterve ne (“ Opposition”) at 1. The court he ld a hea ringon September 12, 2006,
conce rningproposed De fenda nt-Interve nor’s Motion to I nterve ne, at whic h time Plainti ff a rgued that it was prejudice d beca use there was no opportunity for discove ry

conce rninghow proposed Def endant- Interve nors used their CDSOA of fset distributions. At the hearing , Plaintiff stated that th e on ly

su bs tanti a l pr e

jud ic e it w ou ld s uf

fe r f ro m th e g ra

nti ngof De fe nd ant- Inte rv e no rs ’ Motion would be not having the Chief F inancial Of fice rs of e ach pr oposed interve nor as witnesses at the Pre liminary Injunction hear ing on a ccount of the short notice. The court ha dIn a fo otn ote , D e fe nd ant a lso argue s th a t Pla int if f’ s atte mpt

to i nc lud e Sunny

De ll i s 2 pr oc e dura lly

la c kin g sin c e it d id n ot a lso se e k to ame nd the summo ns . D e fe nd ant’ s Re sp on se a t 5 n.1. Plaintiff counters that it “would have bee n premature to file or serve Sunny

Dell with an ame nd e d s umm on s b e fo re the mot ion to a me nd is gra nte d. ” Pla int if

f’ s Re ply in S up po rt

of its Motion for L eave to Amend the Complaint at 17. The purpose of a summons is to provide notice to other pa rties of c ommenceme nt of an action. Da imlerChry sler v. United States, 442 F .3d 1313, 1318 (F ed. Cir. 2006); 5 Charle s Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, F eder al Prac tice & Procedur e § 1205 at 109, § 1215 at 173 (3d ed. 2004). Since the c ase ha s alrea dy commence d, Def

endant c annot claim lac k of notice or prejudice based on not re ceivinga sec ond summons. Amendment of the complaint and the summo ns are dis c re tio na

ry ; th e re fo re , Pl a int if

f i s c or re c t th a t it

wo uld have be e n p re matur e to serve an ame nded summons before its Moti on for L eave to Amend the Complaint is even g ra nte d. Se e USC I T R. 3( e ), 15 (a ). B e c a us e thi s is su e wi ll b e de c ide d o n a lte rn a te g ro un ds , th is 8 informed the pa

rties and pr oposed De fenda nt-Interve nors that fa ilure to produce such witnesses would result in the denial of the motion to int erve ne as to that c ompany . On September 13, 2006, the Motion to I nterve ne wa s g rante d as to Montere y Mushrooms, I nc., L .K. B owman Company , and Mushroom CanningCompany , and denie d as to Sunny Dell Foods, I

nc. Or der Gr anti ngin P art

and De nyingin P art

Mo tio n to Inte rv e ne , G ior g io F oo ds , Inc . v . U nit e d St a te s, Court No . 0 3- 00 28 6 ( CI T Se pte mbe r 1 3, 20 06 ). Th e Mo tio n w a s d e nie d a s to Sunny De ll beca use it failed to produc e a w itness at the hea ring . I d. In Pl a int if

f’ s Mo tio n f

or L e ave to A me nd

its Com pla int , Pl a int if

f a rgue s th a t Sunny

De ll sh ou ld b e a dd e d a s a

de fe nd ant, statin g that “ Sunny De ll i tse lf

pr e vio us ly

so ug ht t o inte rv e ne in this case, whic h intervention wa s denied only beca use it could not produce a witness for the preliminary

injunction hearing .” Plaintiff’s Motion at 4 (empha sis added). Plaintiff a lso states that the addition of Sunny Dell as a party would be “w ithout prejudice to any interested pa

rty .” I d. Def

endant a rgues that Sunny

Dell ca nnot be adde d as a pa

rty beca use the c ourt lacks persona l jurisdiction. Def endant’ s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the Complaint 2argument is not relevant to the c ourt’s dete rmination. 9 (“D efe ndant’s Response” ) at 5. Jurisdictional is sues ar e addr essed in the ne x t section. Def endant- Interve nors object to Plaintiff’s proposa l to add Sunny Dell as a Def endant beca use the c ourt lacks jurisdiction to enter tain a cla im of one private party ag ainst another private pa rty . Def .-Interve nors’ Reponse at 3. Havingpreviously

contested Sunny

Dell’s interve ntion as a def endant- intervenor , Plaintiff now seeks to add Sunny Dell as a defe ndant. Given that Sunny Dell dec lined to produce a witness at the H ear ing on its Motion to I nterve ne in orde r to succe ssfully intervene as per

the court’s instruc tion, the court havingpreviously ruled, ba sed on Giorg io’s alleg ations of pre judice, that th e a dd iti on

of a Sunny De ll a s a De fe nd ant- Inte rv e no r w ith out pr od uc tio n o f a

wi tne ss would unduly

prejudice Plaintiff, Plainti ff ha s prese nted no suffic ient rea son why its previous position shoul d be disreg arde d. I ts moti on is, on that point, denied.
B Unj ustEnr ic hm e nt/R e st it ut ion Cl aim Giorg io argues that bec ause its cha lleng es to the CDSOA fa ll within t he cour t’s orig inal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(2) a nd (4), the c ourt there fore possesses supplemental jurisdiction to entertain its claim of unjust enrichme nt/restitution. P roposed F irst Amended Co mp lai nt¶¶ 9 , 1 0 (r eferen cin g Uni tedS tat es v . Ha no ver I ns . C o. , 1 8 C I T 9 91 , 9 92 -93 , 8 69 F. Supp. 950 (1994), af

f’d 82 F .3d 1052 (F ed. Cir. 1996)). Plaintiff f urther a rgues that § 1367
a llo ws the e xer c ise of

su pp le me nta l juri sd ic tio n o ve r i ts c la im a s a sse rt e d a g a ins t th e pr ivate parties be cause it is related to the same case or controve rsy , citing the statute’s leg islative history and re lated ca se law a s support. Plainti ff’ s Reply in Support of its Mot ion for L eave to Amend10

the Complaint (“Reply ”) at 5 (citing Associac ao Dos Industriais de Cordoar ia E Redes v. United State s, 17 CI T 7 54 , 7 63 , 8 28 F . Su pp . 9 78 (1 99 3) ), 10 (r e fe re nc ing10 1 Co ng . Re c . S1 75 78 (d a ily ed. Oc tober 27, 1990) ( statement of Sen. Gr assley )). De fe nd ant c ounte rs that th e c ourt la c ks the jur isd ic tio n to a dju dic a te any c la ims perta ining to unjust enrichme nt or restitution. Defe ndant’s Response at 2. There fore , Def endant say s, any amendment to allow this claim would be f utile. I d. at 6. Def endant- Interve nors ar g ue that both they and Sunny

Dell will be pre

judiced by defe nding a

claim of unjust enric hment/restitution for which the c ourt does not have jurisdiction. Def .-Interve nors’ Response a t 3. The sole wa

y by which De fenda

nt-Interve nors alleg e they will be prejudice d is by

having “to spend the mone y

and re source s to defend a new a ction for whic h the Court has no jur isd ic tio n. ” I d. Whil e Gi or g io i nd e e d c arr ie s th e burd e n o f d e mon str a tin g that juri sd ic tio n is proper , in alleg ing pr ejudice, D efe ndant-Interve nors ca rry the burde n of showingthey will suffer
un du e pre ju di ce i f t hi s p artof P lai nt if f’s Mo ti onto Am endis grant ed. Re sQ Net .co m, Inc. , 3 82 F. Supp. 2d at 449. Moreover , “alleg ations that an ame ndment will require the expenditure of add it io nal ti me, effo rt , o r m on ey do no t co ns ti tu te ‘ un du e pre ju di ce.’ ” R esQ Net .co m, Inc. , 3 82 F. Supp. 2d at 451 (quoting A .V. B y Ver sace , Inc. v. Gianni Ve rsac e, S.p.A., 87 F. Supp. 2d 281, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)) . By the standar ds articulate d by other c ourts, Def

endant- Interve nors have not sufficiently

demonstrated how

allowanc e of the amendment would r esult in undue prejudice
. Def endant- Interve nors also conte st the court’s c itation to L askowksi v. Spellings, 443 F.3d 930, 934- 35 (7th Cir. 2006), and Ame rica ns United for Sepa

ration of Churc h and State v. Prison Fellowship Minstries, 432 F. Supp. 2d 862, 938 (S.D. I owa 2006) , in its Order de nying11

Pr e lim ina ry Inju nc tio n. Th e y

argue that th os e c a se s a

re ina pp os ite to whe the r P la int if f c ou ld purs ue a re me dy in e qu ity ba se d o n a

the or y of un jus t e nr ic hme nt b e c a

us e tho se ty

pe s o f a c tio ns , which involved “tax pay er suits compellingprivate pa rties to disgor g e public funds ba ck to an ag ency as a r esult of the unconstitutional use of the f unds by a private par

ty ,” ar e not ava ilable at this court. Def

.-Interve nors’ Response a t 6-7 (citingOrde r De nying Pre liminary Injunction, Giorg io Foods, Inc. v. United States, Court No. 03-00286 ( CI T September 22, 2006) ). De fe nd ant- Inte rv e no rs fu rt he r a rgue tha t th e c ourt

la c ks jur isd ic tio n w he n a pr ivate pa

rt y se e ks to disgor g e funds dire ctly

from anothe r private party , as is the ca se her e. I d. at 5. In a d d i t i o n , D e f

e n d an tar g u e s th a tth e c o urtl a c k s j ur i s d i c t i o nt o o r d e r r e l i e f i ne qu i ty, citing statutes conce rningsalary , secur ity , and assig nment of judg es, which spe cifica lly named the Court of International Trade and the f eder al district courts, as e vidence that the supplemental jurisdiction statute is inapplicable to this court. Def endant’ s Response at 4 (c iting Pub. L . No. 101-194, Title VI I§ 703, 103 Stat. 1768; 5 U.S.C . Appx. § 109(10); 28 U.S.C . § 292(e) ; 28 U.S.C. § 293(a); 28 U.S.C. § 566). Def endant a lso cites case s befor e the Customs Court as
su pp or t f or its argume nt. Th is l ine of argume nt i s in a

pp os ite . T he Cus tom s Co ur t w a s a n A rt ic le Ic ourt , w hil e thi s c ourt , a s a re su lt o f t

he Cus tom s Co ur

t A c t of 19 80 , is an A rt ic le I I Ic ourt , w ith the same po we r a s a

dis tr ic t c ourt . Cu sto ms C ou rt s A c t of 19 80 , Pu b. L . N o. 96 -4 17 , 9 4 St a t. 1727 (1980). Moreove r, under

28 U.S.C. § 1585, the Court of I nternational Trade possesses all the po we r i n la

w a nd e qu ity or a s c on fe rr e d b y

statut e on

a fe de ra l di str ic t c ourt . Se c tio n 1 58 5 s tate s: “The Court of International Trade shall possess all the power s in law and e quity of, or a s confe rre d by

statute upon, a district cour t of the United States.” T he F eder al Circuit’s statement12

in Borle m S.A.-Empree dimentos I ndustriais v. United States, 913 F.2d 933, 936 ( Fe d. Cir. 1990) is instructive here
. This court re cently

stated in Rhone Poulenc, Inc. v. United States, 880 F .2d 401, 402 (F ed. Cir. 1989) that “ [t he Court of International Trade ] i s a national c ourt under A rticle I I Iof the Constituti on” and note d that the leg islative history of 28 U.S.C. § 1585 (1980) provides the Court of I nternational Trade “with all the ne c e ssa ry re me dia l po we rs in l aw a nd e qu ity po sse sse d b y

oth e r f e de ra l c ourt s established under

Article I I Iof the Constituti on.” Bor lem, 913 F.2d at 936 (citations omitted). The cour t in W ear Me Appa rel Corp. v. United States, 1 CI T 194, 197-98, 511 F . Supp. 814 (1981), examining the same issue as that unde r analy sis here, note d: I t is further to be obse rved that not only does this court have subject matter jur isd ic tio n a s to a ll o f p la int if f’ s c la ims , it

a lso ha s th e po we r t o d o e qu ity reg ardingthem by

virtue of 28 U.S.C. 1585 and 2643 (c )(1) which likewise w ere pr ov ide d f

or in t he Cus tom s Co ur

ts A c t of 19 80
. . . . Un de r [2 8 U .S. C. § 15 85 ], it is clear that this court “does posse ss the same plena ry power s as a F eder al district court.” H.R. Rept. No. 96-1235. Adde d to that, section 2643(c) (1) pr ovides that (with ce rtain exceptions not releva nt here ), this court “ma

y . . . order any . . . form of re lief that is appropr iate in a c ivil action, including, but not limited to, decla ratory judgme nts, orders of

rema nd, injunctions, and writs of mandamus a nd prohibition.” As the House Committee on the Judi ciar y stated: “Subsection (c )(1) is a g ener al g rant of a

uthority for the Court of

International Trade to order a ny form of r elief that it deems appropr iate under the circ umstances [and] [ it] is the Commi ttee’s intent that this authorization be deeme d to gr ant the Court of International Trade reme dial power s coextensive with those of a F eder al district court.” Wear Me A

ppare l Corp., 1 CI T at 197-198 ( citations omitt ed). F inally , enac tment of the Customs Court Act re ndere d an ea rlier de cision holding that the pr edec essor Customs Court lacke d power

to gr ant equitable r elief no long er via ble pre cede nt. Rhone Poulenc, Inc., 880 F .2d at 401. Be cause it is established that the court possesses the power to order r elief in e quity , theSe c tio n 1 36 7( a ) s tate s: 3 Exc e pt a s p ro vid e d in

su bs e c tio ns (b ) a

nd (c ) o r a s e xpre ssl y

pr ov ide d o the rw ise by Fe dera l statute, in any

civil action of whic h the district courts have orig inal jurisdiction, the district courts shall have suppleme ntal jurisdiction over all other claims that are so relate d to claims in the action within such orig inal jurisdiction that they form par t of the same c ase or

controve rsy

under A rticle I I Iof the United States Consti tution. S uch supplementa l jurisdiction shall i nclude c laims that inv olv e the joi nd e r o r i nte rv e nti on of a dd iti on a l pa

rt ie s. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (e mphasis added)
. 13 seconda ry question is whether the court possesse s supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 to enterta in such a c laim by a private par

ty ag ainst a private party
. Ex x on Mobil Corp. v. 3 Allapattah Ser

vs., I nc., 545 U.S. 546, 559, 125 S. Ct. 2611, 162 L . Ed. 2d 502 (2005). Plaintiff has the burde n of demonstrating jurisdiction is proper . McNutt v. Gene ral Motors Ac cepta nce Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S. C t. 780, 80 L . Ed. 1135 (1936). Th e Court

of Inte rn a tio na l T ra de po sse sse s p ow e r e qu a l to the fe de ra l di str ic t c ourt s to fashion re medies, and “ 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) [is] made a pplicable to the Court of International Trade by 28 U.S.C. § 1585.” B- West I mports, I nc. v. United States, 75 F .3d 633, 635 (F ed. Cir. 1996). Howe ver, § 1585 c annot supply this court with subject matter jurisdiction when none otherwise e x ists under 28 U.S.C. § 1581-1584. Kidco, Inc. v. United States, 4 CI T 103, 104 (1982). The c laims contained in Plaintiff’s Complaint fall within the court’s orig inal jurisdiction under 28 U .S.C. § 1581(i)(2) and ( 4). Plaintiff’s unjust enrichme nt/restitution claim, as asserted
a g a ins t th e Go ve rnme nt, a lso fa lls wi thi n th is c ourt ’s or ig ina l juri sd ic tio n, un de r t ho se same sections. Since the c ourt is empower ed to orde r equity relief under § 1585, suppleme ntal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 is not necessar y to confe r subject matter

jurisdiction over14

Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment/re stitut ion claim ag ainst the United States. To the e x tent that the claim is asserte d ag ainst Defe ndant-Interve nors and Sunny Dell, the question is whether a dire ct claim asser

ted betwe en two private par ties is within t he scope of the c ourt’s supplemental jur isd ic tio n. Th e ans we r i s d e te rm ine d b y a re vie w o f t

he re le va nt s tatut e s a

nd pr e c e de nt. For purposes of or igina l jurisdiction, the parties ag ainst whom the Court of International Trade may

order a re medy is lim ited by

28 U.S.C. § 2643. The ty pes of r elief the court may
or de r i s art ic ulate d in

§ 2 64 3, wh ic h a llo ws the c ourt to e nte r m on e y

jud g me nts : (1) f or or a g ainst the United States in any civil action commenc ed under section 1581 or 1582 of this title; and (2) for or ag ainst the United States or a ny other party in any counter claim, cr oss-claim, or third-pa rty action. 28 U.S.C. § 2643(a); See 28 U .S.C. §§ 1581-1583. Th e statut e c le arl y

de lin e a te s th a t th e c ourt

may e nte r a mon e y jud g me nt a g a ins t a

pa rt y other the United States only in a counter claim, cr oss-claim, or third-pa rty action. 28 U.S.C. § 2643(a) ; cf. United States e x rel. F elton v. Allflex US A, Inc., 21 CI T 1344, 1346, 989 F. Supp. 259 (1997) ( wher e the a ction was not commenc ed by the United States pursua

nt to statute, the Court of International Trade did not possess subject matter jurisdiction, and the c ourt is “oblige d to decline jurisdiction.”) . Be cause Plaintiff’s claim is a direc t claim ag ainst private pa rties, the court may hear this claim by

invoking suppleme ntal jurisdiction under § 1367. In enac ting the supplemental jurisdiction statute, the House of Represe ntatives noted: “[i] n providing for
su pp le me nta l juri sd ic tio n o ve r c la ims inv olv ingthe a dd iti on of pa rt ie s, su bs e c tio n ( a ) e xplic itl y f u l f i l l s th e s t a tu t o r

y g a p n o t e d i nF i n l e y v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , [ 4 9 0 U
. S
. 5 4 5 , 1 0 9 S
. C t
. 2 0 0 3 , 1 0 4 L.Plaintiff quotes the House discussions prior to ena ctment of § 1367 a s standing f or the 4 proposition that statute was ena cted to “‘ era se any doubt’ about the a

uthority of . . . ‘the district courts to exercise supple mental jurisdiction over . . . c laims involvi ng the joinder of a dditional p arti e s . ” Pl a inti f

f ’ s Re p ly a t 1 0 ( c it in g id
. )
. H o w e v e r , r e a d in g th e s e n te n c e in c o n te xt demonstrates the lack of

cog ency in Plainti ff’ s argument: “In fede ral que stion cases, [the statute] br oa dly a uth or ize s th e dis tr ic t c ourt s to e xer c ise su pp le me nta l juri sd ic tio n o ve r a dd iti on a l c la ims , including c laims involvi ng the joinder of a dditional parties.” 101 Cong . Rec. S17578. The Court of International Trade ’s base s for subjec t matter jurisdiction are embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1581- 15 84 , a nd no t in the fe de ra l di str ic t c ourt s’ fe de ra l qu e sti on statut e , 2 8 U .S. C. § 13 31 . T his overstate ment is not fatal to Plaintiff’s argument though, be cause case law does suppor t Pla int if f’ s o ve ra ll p os iti on

that su pp le me nta l juri sd ic tio n is ava ila ble to t his c ourt
. 15 Ed. 2d 593 (1989)].” 101 Cong . Rec. S17578 (stateme nt of Sen. Gra ssley ). There fore , while 4 § 1585 provides for

equitable r emedial powe rs on par with the district courts, § 2643 provides this court with more limited jurisdiction t han that of the district courts. Associac ao, 17 CI T at 759 n.5. Plaintiff overstates the brea dth of Associac ao whe n it argues, “this Court made it clea r that it s su pp le me nta l juri sd ic tio n e xten de d to c la ims by a pr ivate pa

rt y a g a ins t ano the r p ri vate pa rt y . . . r e je c tin g the argume nt t

he Go ve rnme nt o nc e a g a in a dv anc e s h e re . . . . ” Re ply a t 5 (citingDef

endant’ s Response at 5). While the cour t in Associaca o did not dism iss outright the claims of one pr ivate par

ty ag ainst another pr ivate par ty , it did not reach the issue of whe ther
c ourt re ta ine d ju

ri sd ic tio n o ve r t

he pe tit ion e rs be c a

us e the c ourt ’s or ig ina l juri sd ic tio n c la ims
wer e dismissed, requiringit to dis miss the claims “whose jurisdiction was pur ely supplemental.” Associac ao, 17 CI T at 763. Ho we ve r, the Sup re me Court in E xx on Mo bil Cor

p. c lari fi e d th e iss ue , s tatin g that w hil e jur isd ic tio na l st a tut e s sh ou ld n ot b e int e rp re te d mo re e xpans ive ly tha n inte nd e d, it i s e qu a lly important “not to adopt an a rtificial construc tion that is narrowe r than wha t the text provides.” 545 U.S. at 558. The c ourt noted that additional par ties may be included w ithin the ambit of a16

court’s suppleme ntal jurisdiction, as long a s orig inal jurisdiction ex ists for the ac tion, saying “[t] he last sentenc e of § 1367( a) makes it clea r that the g rant of supple mental jurisdiction ext ends to claims involving joinder or intervention of a dditional parties.” I d. The Court continued, “[o] nce the court de termines it has orig inal jurisdiction over the c ivil action, it can turn to the question whether

it has a constitutional and statutory basis for e x erc ising supplementa l jurisdiction over the other claims in the ac tion.” I d. at 559. Her e, ther e is no jurisdiction to hear Pla int if f’ s Sunny De ll c la im, su

pp le me nta l or

oth e rw ise , s inc e Pla int if

f s e e ks to a dd

a pa rt y outside the court’ s jurisdiction. W ithout that jurisdi ction, this court does not possess the powe r to enterta in an unjust enrichment or restitution claim interposed by a private par

ty ag ainst another private pa rty . I d. at 558. As to t he no w e xistin g De fe nd ants , in c lud ing the De fe nd ant- Inte rv e no rs , Pl a int if f’ s c la im is related to the sa

me ca se and c ontroversy , which is Commerce ’s administration of the B y rd Amendment off

set distribution progr am. The issues a nd parties be ing suf

ficiently intertwined, th i s c o urth a s th e p o w e r

t o e x e r c i s e i t s s u

p p l e m e n t a l j ur i s d i c t i o nan d e n t e rt a i na

d i r e c tc l a i mb y a private pa rty ag ainst a private party . See id. Thus, Plaintiff may amend its Complaint to add a
c la im o f u

nju st e nr ic hme nt/

re sti tut ion

a g a ins t th e Go ve rnme nt a nd De fe nd ant- Inte rv e no rs . 4 P laintif f May Upd ate its F actual Allegations to Bring the Case Up-t o-Date Plaintiff seeks to update its fa ctual alleg ations to take ac count of the de velopments in the
case since the f

iling of its orig inal complaint in 2003, including infor mation it gaine d at the Preliminary

Injunction Hear ing a

nd fac ts in support of its new claims. Plaintiff’s Motion at 3. No pa rt ie s h avin g ob

je c te d to thi s r e qu e st, it i s g ra nte d. “ Th e fe de ra l c ourt s c on sis te ntl y17

g rant motions to amend wher e it appea rs that new f

acts a nd alleg ations were develope d during discovery , are closely

related to the orig inal claim, and a re f oresha dowed in ea

rlier plea dings.” Re sQ Ne t.c om, Inc ., 38 2 F . Su pp . 2 d at 45 0 ( qu oti ngXp re ssi on s F oo tw e ar C or p. v. Pe te rs , N os . 94 Civ. 6136 (J GK) e t al., 1995 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 19122, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1995))
. 5 P laintif f May Clarify i ts Requeste d Relief Gi or g io s e e ks to c lari fy

its re qu e ste d r e lie f i n a c c or da nc e wi th i ts m od if

ie d c la ims
. Plaintiff’s Motion at 1. Defe ndant-Interve nors object, without furthe r explanation, to Pl aintiff’s proposed a

mendment to clar ify

its requested r elief. D ef.- Interve nors’ Response at 3. The Go ve rnme nt d oe s n ot o bje c t. Be cause Def

endant- Interve nors have offe red no r eason why this amendment should not be allowe d, and no fa ctors in Foma n v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, weig hing a g ainst it, P laintiff’s reque st to clarify

its requested r elief is g rante d.18 V CO NC LU SION The intere sts of justice weig h in favor of liberally allowing amendments to plea dings. Pla int if f’ s Mo tio n to Am e nd

the Com pla int is gra nte d in pa rt , g ra nti nga ll c la ims but th e re qu e st to a dd Sunny De ll a s a de fe nd ant. Pla int if

f’ s A me nd e d Co mpl a int

is d e e me d f

ile d a s o f t

he date of this opinion.

_/s/ Evan J . Wallach______ E v an J
. W al l ac h , J u d ge Dated: August 21, 2007 New Y ork, Ne w YorkUNI TED STATES COURT OF I NTERNATI ONAL

TRADE

____________________________________ : GI OR GI O F OO DS, I

NC ., :

: Plaintiff, : : v . : : UN I T E D S T AT E S , : Be fo re : W ALLAC H, J u d ge : Court No.: 03-00286 De fe nd ant, : : an d : : L .K. B OWMAN COMPANY, : MONTEREY MUSHROOMS, I NC., and : MUSHROOM CANNI

NG COMPANY, :

: De fe nd ant- Inte rv e no rs . : ____________________________________: ORDER AND JUDGMENT Upon consider ation of Plaintiff’s Motion for L eave to Amend the Complaint (“Plaintiff’s Mo tio n” ); the c ourt

havin g re vie we d a ll p le a din g s a nd pa pe rs on fi le he re in, and

g oo d c a us e appea ringthere for, it is here by ORDE RED that Pla int if

f’ s Mo tio n is GR

AN TE D a s to its fi rs t, s e c on d, fo ur th a nd fi ft h reque sts to amend its Com plaint, set forth in its Memorandum of L aw in Support of Plaintiff’s Mo tio n f or L e ave to A me nd

the Com pla int , a nd DENI ED a s to its thi rd

re qu e st.

/s/ Evan J . Wallach_____ E v an J
. W al l ac h , J u d ge Dated: August 21, 2007 New Y ork, Ne w York