alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                         280,237
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   75,971
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                       5,309,927
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,618,952
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,465,949
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           37,142
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     941,539
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,465,949
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               318,966
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               133,187
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 7,338
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              87,450
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 90,991
<INCOME-TAX>                                    90,991
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             90,991
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    90,991
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    17.79
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    17.79
        

</TABLE>
(December 10, 2013)

#### Old Republic Construction Insurance Agency of New York, Inc., Respondent, v Fairmont Insurance Brokers, Ltd., Appellant.

[978 NYS2d 4]

Appeal from order, Supreme Court, New York County (Cynthia S. Kern, J.), entered August 6, 2012, which granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment, deemed appeal from judgment, same court and Justice, entered February 7, 2013, in plaintiff’s favor, and, so considered, said judgment unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the judgment vacated, and the matter remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.

Even though defendant appealed from an order and not the ensuing final judgment, under CPLR 5520 (c) this Court has the discretion to address the liability issues *(see Robertson v Greenstein,*308 AD2d 381 [1st Dept 2003], *appeal dismissed*2 NY3d 759 [2004]). In any event, the order that was appealed incorrectly concluded that the hearing would be limited to the amounts invoiced pursuant to the agreement between the parties. Therefore this issue is properly before us.

*457Under the parties’ producer agreement, pursuant to which defendant procured insurance for its clients through plaintiff, defendant is obligated to pay all insurance premiums, including those that plaintiff retroactively increased upon audit. Section 5.3 of the agreement states that “[defendant] guarantees to pay [plaintiff] *all premium*[sic] ... on any insurance placed or arranged for [defendant] by [plaintiff], irrespective of whether [defendant] has collected *such premiums . . .*from any customer or client of [defendant]” (emphasis added). Contrary to defendant’s contention, the term “all premium” does not refer to the “initial premium” only. Accordingly, the court properly granted plaintiff summary judgment as to defendant’s liability for the retroactive increases.

But it was incorrect for the court to proceed as though the invoices were correct and hold that defendant lacked standing to challenge plaintiffs calculation of the premium amounts due. Given that the producer agreement did not provide that defendant waived any defenses and that the guarantee was unconditional, defendant was entitled to raise the insureds’ defense that the audits were inaccurate and the increases were excessive under the policies *(see*Restatement [Third] of Suretyship & Guaranty § 34; *see also Sterling Natl. Bank v Biaggi,*47 AD3d 436, 436-437 [1st Dept 2008]). Thus, under CPLR 3212 (f), defendant was entitled to disclosure about the audits that plaintiffs used to calculate the premium increases before damages were determined. Concur — Freedman, J.E, Richter, Feinman and Gische, JJ.

The decision and order of this Court entered herein on November 26, 2013 (111 AD3d 553 [2013]) is hereby recalled and vacated.
Version Revision Date Name

1.0 8.18.23 A. McDonald

Please contact the CJIS Audit Unit at cau@nigc.gov with any questions.

The FBI CJIS Division will process the NGI Fingerprint reject responses as follows:

If fingerprints are 

rejected and your reject 

code is:

L0008 Reject Code with 

one of the following...

If "The quality of the 

characteristics is too low to be 

used. Candidate(s) were found." 

then...

Resubmit a new collection of 

fingerprints for comparison to 

the candidates(s) found.

If you receive the same 

reject response then... 

A CJIS Biographic 

Verification Request can be 

submitted to 

fingerprint_admin@nigc.gov

If “The quality of the 

characteristics is too low to be 

used” then...

The response should be treated 

the same as “no record based 

on biographic data.”

No further action needed.

No Biographic Verification to 

be processed. 

All other Reject 

Codes

Submit better quality 

prints.

(must be a new collection 

of prints)
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<MULTIPLIER>                                                          1
<CURRENCY>                                                          USD

       
<S>                                                        <C>                  


<PERIOD-TYPE>                                                     3-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                           DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                                              JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                                MAR-31-1996
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                                       1
<CASH>                                                          598,410
<SECURITIES>                                                          0
<RECEIVABLES>                                                22,031,419
<ALLOWANCES>                                                  3,378,658
<INVENTORY>                                                  23,753,634
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                             48,461,350
<PP&E>                                                        3,235,230
<DEPRECIATION>                                                1,490,612
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                               51,696,580
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                        21,688,281
<BONDS>                                                               0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                                 0
<PREFERRED>                                                           0
<COMMON>                                                      7,810,469
<OTHER-SE>                                                   22,197,830
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                                 51,696,580
<SALES>                                                      36,955,796
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                             33,245,098
<CGS>                                                        25,462,178
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                                 4,144,675
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                                 21,643
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                                      0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                              146,625
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                               3,513,263
<INCOME-TAX>                                                  1,300,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                           2,213,263
<DISCONTINUED>                                                        0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                       0
<CHANGES>                                                             0
<NET-INCOME>                                                  2,213,263
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                                       .36
<EPS-DILUTED>                                                       .35

        

</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 23.2

                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

We consent to the  incorporation by reference in the registration  statements of
COMFORCE  Corporation  on Form  S-3  (Registration  Nos.  033-60403,  333-31167,
333-43321,  333-44351,  333-47941,  333-61789, 333-74689 and 333-82201) and Form
S-8 (Registration Nos.  333-32271,  333-46787 and 333-82199) of our report dated
February 25, 1999 on our audits of the  consolidated  financial  statements  and
financial  statement  schedule of COMFORCE  Corporation  and  Subsidiaries as of
December  31, 1998 and for the years  ended  December  31, 1998 and 1997,  which
report is included in this Annual Report on Form 10-K.



                                        /s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

                                        PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP





Melville, New York
March 29, 2000

                                      E-8
111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 2950 

AN ACT 

To extend the pilot program for volunteer groups to obtain 

criminal history background checks. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

†S 2950 ES

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Criminal History 

3 Background Checks Pilot Extension Act of 2009’’. 

4 SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF PILOT PROGRAM. 

5 Section 108(a)(3)(A) of the PROTECT Act (42 

6 U.S.C. 5119a note) is amended by striking ‘‘a 78-month’’ 

7 and inserting ‘‘a 92-month’’. 

Passed the Senate January 25, 2010. 

Attest: 

Secretary. 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 2950 

AN ACT 

To extend the pilot program for volunteer groups to 

obtain criminal history background checks.
<PAGE>

                                   EXHIBIT 23

               CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

Hemagen Diagnostics, Inc.
Columbia, MD

          We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Prospectus
constituting a part of the Registration Statements on Form S-3 (Nos. 33-80009,
333-06147, 33-40606 and the Registration Statement on Form S-8 file No
333-03718) of our report dated November 8, 2002 (except for the second
paragraph of Note 16 as which the date is December 20, 2002), relating to
the consolidated financial statements of Hemagen Diagnostics, Inc. appearing in
Hemagen's Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the year ended September 30, 2002.

Grant Thornton, LLP
Baltimore, Maryland
December 23, 2002
#### SCOTT v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.

No. 8878.

United States District Court E. D. Pennsylvania.

Feb. 1, 1949.

Leonard Turner, of Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Philip Price and'Barnes, Dochert, Price, Smith & Qark all of Philadelphia, Pa., foi defendant.

McGRANERY, District Judge.

This is a negligence action based upon an allegedly premature start of a train. Defendant has moved to dismiss on two grounds; lack of diversity of citizenship and lack of jurisdictional amount. Defendant’s motion is supported by a deposition of plaintiff and an affidavit. Plaintiff has filed an answer to the motion supported by an affidavit by the attorney who represented plaintiff at the deposition.

Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., provides that a defense such as this one “shall be heard and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that the hearing and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.” It has been pointed out that the defense of lack of diversity is the sort of objection that should not be deferred until trial. See Comment, Preliminary Hearing of Defense Under Rule 12(d), 3 Federal Rules Service page 679. The emphasis is the other way where the defense is lack of jurisdictional amount. See Comment, supra, at page 660. The rule has been stated to be that a court will dismiss on this ground only “if, from the face of the pleadings, it is apparent, to a legal certainty, that plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed or if, from the proofs, the court is satisfied to a like certainty that plaintiff never was entitled to recover that amount, and that his claim was therefore colorable for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction * * See St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289, 58 S.Ct. 586, 590, 82 L.Ed. 845. In a tort case, where the elements of pain and suffering and disfigurement enter in, it would be possible to decide this issue beforehand only if plaintiff were put to almost his entire proof. See 2 Moore, Federal Practice, 2275.

Accordingly, I shall deny dismissal on this ground until the time of *549trial, when, after plaintiff’s evidence is in, or even after verdict returned, it will be possible to entertain the objection again. Cf. Tlusty v. Gillespie-Rogers-Pratt Co., D.C., 35 F.Supp. 910; Wilderman v. Roth, 3 Cir., 17 F.2d 486. However, I will direct in accordance with Rule 43(e) that a hearing be held on the issue of diversity of citizenship. It might be possible to resolve the question entirely on affidavits, but a just disposal of such a basic issue would be best served by the oral testimony in court of plaintiff, his niece, and other relevant witnesses. Cf. Green v. Keim, D.C., 74 F.Supp. 950. An order directing such a hearing will be entered in accordance with this opinion.
#### The Whitburn.

*(District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.*

May 18, 1881.)

1. WhakExVGE—When Inoubbed—Use oe WTiabe — Tempobaby ATTACHMENT OE LlNE — LANDING OVER WhABE — MOOBING VESSEL

Aoboss the Head oe.

A vessel injured by boating ice endeavored to enl er the dock ol wharf A, and in doing so attached for a short time a line to wharf B. Failing to enter the dock, she was moored across the head of wharf B, at a distance of eight or ten feet from and without attachment to it, her lines being made fast to adjoining wharves. She lay in this position for 24 hours, during which timo her captain landed by moans of a ladder from the vessel to wharf B. *Held,*that the vessel was liable to the owner of wharf B for wharfage.

In Admiralty. Libel for wharfage.

The facts are as follows: The steamship Whitburn sailed from Philadelphia, April 1, 1881, but being injured by floating ice put back to Philadelphia, leaking. She endeavored to enter the dock of pier 41, and in so doing made fast for a short time a line to pier 40. Failing, on account of the ice, to enter the dock, and it being unsafe on account of the ice and the darkness to seek another dock, she was moored across the head of pier 40, hut at the distance of eight or ten feet from, and without attachment to that pier, her lines being made fast to piers 41 and 39. In this position she remained for 24 hours, during which time her captain went ashore over pier 40 by means of a ladder from the vessel to that pier. The owner of pier 40 claimed a bill of wharfage of $10, that being the usual charge per day for the use of his wharf; and, the bill not being paid, he filed this libel.

*E. Ihmn Hanson,*for libellant.

*Charles Gibbons, Jr.,*for respondent.

Butler, D. J.

The respondent could make no use of the wharf without incurring liability to pay for it. That he did make use of it is plainly acknowledged in his own testimony. The extent of the use, and the circumstances under which it was enjoyed, are not important, in view of the amount claimed. The sum would have been promptly paid, the cap*926tain says, if it had been presented before he left. If he had paid it when informed of the demand, I would allow the libellant no costs. As it was not then paid, I will allow the claim for wharfage, ($10,) and half costs. A decree may be prepared accordingly.
*Thursday, February 20, 1997*

MISCELLANEOUS DISMISSALS

94-2706.

#### State ex rel. Cotton v. Ney.

Hamilton App. No. C-940951. This cause is pending before the court as an appeal from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County. It appears from the records of this court that appellant has not filed a merit brief, due February 13, 1995, in compliance with the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court and therefore has failed to prosecute this cause with the requisite diligence. Upon consideration thereof,

IT IS ORDERED by the court that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed *sua sponte,*effective February 19,1997.
Exhibit 99.1




                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                                18 U.S.C. S 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



     In  connection  with the Quarterly  Report of CNH Holdings  Company on Form
     10-QSB for the period  ending June 30, 2002,  as filed with the  Securities
     and  Exchange  Commission  on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  I,  Charles
     Stidham,  Chief Executive Officer of the Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18
     U.S.C. S 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
     of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

     (1)  the Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  the  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
          the Company.




/s/ Charles Stidham
Chief Executive Officer
August 12, 2002
Exhibit 13.2




CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO




SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the Annual Report on Form 20-F of Hadera Paper Ltd. (the “Company”) for the year ended December 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, Shaul Gliksberg, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of his knowledge, that:




(1)              The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and




(2              The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.




Date:           April 10, 2011                                                                                     /s/ Shaul Gliksberg


Shaul Gliksberg


ChiefFinancial and Business Development Officer
**EnginesChecklist #11**

**EnginesChecklist #11**

For the National Preparedness Review you will need to have the following items available for review.

**11-1Revised 2008**

**11-8****Revised 2008**
Exhibit 32.2



Section 1350

CERTIFICATION



The undersigned officer hereby certifies that,
to his knowledge, (1) the Annual Report on Form 10-K of COMFORCE Corporation for the year ended December 26, 2004 as to which this Certification is an exhibit fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)) and (2) the information contained in such Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of COMFORCE Corporation.



Signed March 24, 2005.



|                                                    
|----------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Harry V. Maccarrone                             
|Harry V. Maccarrone,                                
|Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer



E-9
#### In the Matter of Jomo Williams, Appellant, v W.C. Thompson, Jr., et al., Respondents.

Submitted September 13, 2010;

decided November 23, 2010

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine

*914the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution. Motion for poor person relief etc. dismissed as academic.
#### CREEDON v. SMITH et al.

Civ. Nos. 24739, 24865, 24867, 24871, 24891.

District Court, N. D. Ohio, E. D.

April 30, 1948.

Paul Marshall, of Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff.

David L. Kabaker, o.f Cleveland, Ohio, for defendant Sarah Smith.

Everett M. Tyler, of Cleveland, Ohio, for defendant Barto Fokes.

Carl Rabnick, of Cleveland, Ohio, for defendant Sobony.

M. S. Farmer, of Cleveland, Ohio, for defendant Lincoln.

H. I. Gardner., of Warren, Ohio, for defendant Kling.

JONES, District Judge.

Motions for the reconsideration and modification of judgment or, in the alternative, to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal have been filed by the plaintiff in five cases and may be considered and decided together since they present a common problem.

In each of these cases the court decided motions for summary judgment and held that the one year statute of limitations began to run from the date of the payment of the overcharge. Subsequently, on March 15, 1948, the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Woods v. Stone, 333 U.S. 472, 68 S.Ct. 624, held that the statute began to run from the date that a duty to refund was breached.

Plaintiff’s motions for reconsideration and modification of judgment do not state the Civil Rule upon which the plaintiff relies. The motions were not filed within the time limits of Rule 59, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, nor is, I think, the relief sought covered by Rule 60.

The authority of the court to enlarge the periods of time for certain filings has been denied by Rule 6(b). This was apparently done for the purpose of, at some determinable time, terminating the power of the court over its judgments thus making them final. The change m the law of the case presents no excuse to reopen a judgment which is final. This is certainly true if the court, by operation of law, has been divested of jurisdiction over its judgment. Safeway Stores Inc. v. Coe, 78 U.S.App.D.C. 19, 136 F.2d 771, 148 *163A.L.R. 782 and Lehman Co. of America Inc. v. Appleton Toy & Furniture Co., 7 Cir., 148 F.2d 988, and Phelan v. Bradbury Bldg. Corp., D.C.N.Y.1947, 7 F.R.D. 429.

The motions to reconsider and modify the judgments heretofore entered are, therefore, denied

The motions to extend the time for appeal will be denied. Rule 73(a) provides for an extension only under the exception contained in the Rule. Plaintiff makes no claim of failure to learn of the entry of judgment and, in fact, the plaintiff was notified of the judgment when entered.