DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

BRANDON HINCK,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D17-2198

[December 5, 2018]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Michael A. Robinson, Judge; L.T. Case No. 14015578 

CF10A.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Claire V. Madill, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Mitchell A. Egber, 

Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

GERBER, C.J.

The defendant appeals from his conviction for attempted second-degree 

murder, following an altercation in which the defendant stabbed the

alleged victim multiple times. The defendant primarily argues that the 

trial court erred in sustaining the state’s hearsay objection to the 

testimony of a witness who heard the defendant’s alleged excited utterance

less than a minute after the altercation, which testimony corroborated the 

defendant’s recitation of the alleged excited utterance and supported his 

self-defense claim. We agree with the defendant’s argument and reverse 

for a new trial.

The Trial Evidence

The alleged victim testified as follows. Using a social media website, he 

and the defendant agreed to meet for a sexual encounter. The alleged 

victim drove to pick up the defendant at a gas station. From there, they 

drove to a restaurant. During the drive and at the restaurant, the alleged 

victim and the defendant discussed their sexual interests. The defendant 
2

explained that, in the past, he had only female sexual partners, but he 

wanted to explore his attraction to men.

The alleged victim and the defendant ultimately went to the alleged 

victim’s third floor hotel room for their sexual encounter. According to the 

alleged victim, shortly after they arrived in the hotel room, the defendant,

without provocation, took out a knife, and slashed the victim’s throat. As 

the alleged victim tried to escape through the hotel room door, the 

defendant continued to stab the alleged victim in the torso and in the back 

of the head. The alleged victim managed to knock the knife out of the 

defendant’s hand and then open the hotel room door. As the alleged victim 

struggled to leave the room, the defendant ran past the alleged victim and 

fled down the hallway to the elevator.

The defendant chose to testify in his case-in-chief. According to the 

defendant, soon after going into the hotel room, he changed his mind

about the sexual encounter and tried to leave. However, the alleged victim 

blocked the defendant, began groping the defendant, pushed the 

defendant down onto the bed, and got on top of the defendant’s legs. The 

defendant began screaming. The alleged victim then said “he had turned 

many guys before but [the defendant] was feistiest.” The defendant, 

believing that the alleged victim was going to rape him, removed a knife 

from his front pocket, flicked it open, and slashed the victim’s throat. The 

defendant raced to the hotel room door, but the alleged victim got to the 

door first and held it shut, preventing the defendant from leaving. The 

defendant reacted by wildly slashing at the victim. The defendant then 

dropped the knife and ran out of the room. The defendant ran to the 

elevator and took “less than a minute” to get from the third floor to the 

lobby, where he found a hotel employee. The defendant testified that while 

still in shock and terrified, he told the hotel employee: “[T]here is a guy 

. . . he tried to molest me, I stabbed him, please call [t]he police and 

ambulance.” The defendant stayed until the police arrived. The defendant 

suffered no injuries.

Next, the defendant sought to call the hotel employee as a witness. 

Defense counsel alerted the court that an evidentiary issue existed which 

the court may wish to consider outside the jury’s presence. According to 

defense counsel, the hotel employee would testify that she saw the 

defendant come down to the lobby in a very excited state and immediately 

said, “I’ve just been attacked, call the police.” The state responded that it 

“would be objecting in the sense that it is a self-serving statement made 

by the defendant.” The defendant replied, “it comes under the hearsay 

exception of excited utterance.”
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Defense counsel then conducted the following proffer with the hotel 

employee:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: [T]ell me how you came into contact 

with [the defendant].

HOTEL EMPLOYEE: I was at the front desk and he came from 

behind.

. . .

DEFENSE COUNSEL: And clothing-wise what did you notice 

that was odd?

HOTEL EMPLOYEE: He was bloody everywhere.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. And now the demeanor, how he 

was, how he was acting, can you describe that for the Court?

HOTEL EMPLOYEE: Yes. He was shaking, he was scared, he 

was like muttering like trying to get the words out.

. . . 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: And what, what did he tell you?

HOTEL EMPLOYEE: [A]t first I was shocked, I looked and he 

was like: Help, I’ve been attacked, I stabbed someone . . . And 

then I said what? And then he was like: Yes, I’ve been 

attacked, help, I stabbed someone. And I said where and he 

said on the third floor. And, yeah, that’s what he said.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: And was his statement “I’ve been 

attacked; I stabbed someone” was that in response to any 

question that you posed to him?

HOTEL EMPLOYEE: No.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: It was just a spontaneous uttering?

HOTEL EMPLOYEE: The only question I asked him was 

where.
4

DEFENSE COUNSEL: And did this happen . . . immediately 

when he saw you, came up to you?

HOTEL EMPLOYEE: Yes.

Following the proffer, the state argued that the hotel employee had no 

knowledge of the defendant’s ordinary manner of speaking. The state 

acknowledged that the defendant made the statement to the hotel 

employee close in time to the altercation. However, the state argued that 

the statement was a self-serving statement and not an excited utterance.

Defense counsel reiterated the argument that the statement was an 

excited utterance, because the defendant made the statement less than a 

minute after the altercation, and both the defendant and the hotel 

employee testified “he was frightened, he was terrified by what he saw.”

The trial court sustained the state’s objection. The trial court reasoned:

The rule is clear in terms of hearsay. 801 suggest[s] 

obviously that it’s hearsay and I do find it’s hearsay. I don’t 

find any exceptions applicable to that particular statement. I 

do find that it is self-serving but more importantly it goes into 

exculpatory statements by a defendant. And there are a 

number of cases that would suggest that the statement is not 

admissible even if it were under an exception. . . . 

And the cases that I’m relying on include Rodriguez v. 

State, 591 So. 2d 308 [(Fla. 3d DCA 1991)]. You got Logan v. 

State, 511 So. 2d 442 [(Fla. 5th DCA 1987)]. Fagan v. State, 

425 So. 2d 214 [(Fla. 4th DCA 1983)]. And . . . Cotton v. State, 

763 So. 2d 437 [(Fla. 4th DCA 2000)].

The defendant is trying to introduce his own statement 

through somebody that’s exculpatory and for the truth of the 

matter asserted. Under the cases I just cited including the 

Cotton case[,] that will not allow this Court to admit that 

particular statement. [The hotel employee’s] observations are 

one thing, what she saw is not hearsay so she can testify as 

to her own observation. But as far as what the defendant said 

it is hearsay, not within exception, exculpatory, and selfserving . . . .
5

Hence . . . I’m not going to allow the exculpatory statement, 

[the hotel employee] is not allowed to testify regarding the 

statement that [the defendant] made.

Defense counsel stated that because of the trial court’s ruling, the 

defendant would not be calling the hotel employee as a witness. Instead, 

the defendant rested his case.

The jury found the defendant guilty of attempted second-degree murder 

as charged in the information.

This Appeal

This appeal followed. The defendant argues the trial court erred in 

sustaining the state’s objection to the hotel employee’s proffered recitation 

of the defendant’s alleged excited utterance, which recitation corroborated 

the defendant’s testimony and supported his self-defense claim.

A. Standard of Review and the Applicable Rules and Case Law

Our standard of review is abuse of discretion, limited by the rules of 

evidence. Dunbar v. State, 230 So. 3d 8, 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).

Section 90.801(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2017), defines “hearsay” as “a 

statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the 

trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 

asserted.”

Section 90.802, Florida Statutes (2017), provides that hearsay is 

inadmissible unless an exception exists under section 90.803 or section 

90.804, Florida Statutes (2017).

Section 90.803(2), Florida Statutes (2017), defines the “excited 

utterance” exception to the hearsay rule as: “A statement or excited 

utterance relating to a startling event or condition made while the 

declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or 

condition.”

To determine whether a statement qualifies as an “excited utterance”

under section 90.803(2), the Florida Supreme Court has set forth a threeprong test:

[T]he statement must be made: (1) regarding an event startling 

enough to cause nervous excitement; (2) before there was time 
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to contrive or misrepresent; and (3) while the person was 

under the stress or excitement caused by the event.

Hayward v. State, 24 So. 3d 17, 29 (Fla. 2009) (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

Elaborating upon the second prong, we have held:

There is no bright line standard by which to measure the 

length of a permissible time gap between a [startling event] 

and a [declarant’s] statement for purposes of analyzing the 

admissibility of the statement as an excited utterance. 

Instead, where the time interval between the event and the 

statement is long enough to permit reflective thought, the 

statement will be excluded in the absence of some proof that 

the declarant did not in fact engage in a reflective thought 

process.

Rivera v. State, 718 So. 2d 856, 858 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted).

B. The Trial Court’s Reasoning was Incorrect

As stated above, the trial court sustained the state’s objection to the 

hotel employee’s proffered recitation of the defendant’s statement, 

reasoning “that it is self-serving but more importantly it goes into 

exculpatory statements by a defendant. And there are a number of cases 

that would suggest that the statement is not admissible even if it were 

under an exception.”

The trial court’s reasoning was incorrect. We have held, where a 

defendant’s statement qualifies as an excited utterance admissible under 

section 90.803(2), “[t]he mere fact that statements are self-serving is not, 

in and of itself, a sufficient evidentiary basis for their exclusion from 

evidence.” Stiles v. State, 672 So. 2d 850, 851-52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) 

(emphasis added; citation omitted).

Moreover, the four cases upon which the trial court relied – Rodriguez 

v. State, 591 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Logan v. State, 511 So. 2d 

442 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); Fagan v. State, 425 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 4th DCA 

1983); and Cotton v. State, 763 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) – are all 

distinguishable. The first three cases did not involve situations in which 

a defendant was seeking to admit his own statements through section 

90.803(2)’s excited utterance exception. The fourth case, Cotton, was 
7

“devoid of any evidence that would qualify appellant’s statement as an 

excited utterance under [section] 90.803(2).” 763 So. 2d at 440.

Thus, the question we now turn to in this case is whether sufficient 

evidence existed that would qualify the defendant’s statement to the hotel 

employee as an “excited utterance” under section 90.803(2).

C. The Defendant’s Statement Qualified as an Excited Utterance

We conclude sufficient evidence existed to qualify the defendant’s 

statement to the hotel employee as an “excited utterance” under section 

90.803(2), as interpreted by our supreme court’s three-prong test. We 

examine each prong in turn.

First, the stabbing was an event startling enough to cause nervous 

excitement. See Harmon v. State, 854 So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) 

(“[A] bloody fight [is] an event startling enough to cause nervous 

excitement.”).

Second, sufficient evidence existed to show that the defendant made 

his statement to the hotel employee before there was time to contrive or 

misrepresent. It is undisputed that the amount of time between the 

altercation and the defendant’s statement to the hotel employee was less 

than one minute, during which the defendant ran down the hallway, took 

an elevator to the lobby, and immediately approached the hotel employee. 

The state presented no evidence to show that, during that time interval 

and under those circumstances, the defendant contrived or 

misrepresented his statement to the hotel employee. Further, the state 

presented no evidence, and the trial court articulated no evidence, that the 

defendant’s age or physical or mental condition, or the event’s 

characteristics, justified a finding that the defendant’s statement to the 

hotel employee was contrived or misrepresented. Although the state 

argued, and the trial court found, that the defendant’s statement to the 

hotel employee was exculpatory, i.e., self-serving, the state presented no 

evidence, and the trial court articulated no evidence, to justify the finding

that the mere self-serving nature of the defendant’s statement 

automatically required excluding the hotel employee’s testimony reciting 

the defendant’s statement.

Third, the hotel employee described the defendant as a person still 

under the stress or excitement caused by the event. See Lopez v. State, 

888 So. 2d 693, 697 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (evidence supported the trial 

court’s finding that the victim was under the stress of startling event where 

the victim appeared “nervous or shaken up and . . . was speaking rapidly”).
8

D. The State’s Cited Cases are Unpersuasive

The state nevertheless maintains in response to the defendant’s appeal

that his statement to the hotel employee did not qualify under the excited 

utterance exception’s second prong – that is, before there was time to 

contrive or misrepresent – because his statement was self-serving. In 

support of this argument, the state relies on Sunn v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 

556 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), and Overton v. State, 429 So. 2d 722 

(Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

Sunn is not persuasive. In Sunn, the Third District’s analysis conflated

the “spontaneous statement” exception under section 90.803(1) with the 

“excited utterance” exception under section 90.803(2):

[T]he [appellees] argue, inter alia, that the statements were 

properly admitted under the spontaneous exclamation or 

excited utterances exceptions to the hearsay rule contained in 

Section 90.803(1) and (2), Florida Statutes (1987).

The factors to be analyzed in determining whether a 

statement qualifies under the exceptions are: (a) the time gap 

between the incident and the statement, (b) the voluntariness 

of the statement, (c) whether the statement is self-serving, and 

(d) the declarant’s mental and physical state at the time the 

statement was made.

556 So. 2d at 1157-58 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).

The fact that the Sunn court conflated the “spontaneous statement”

exception and the “excited utterance” exception is significant. The 

“spontaneous statement” exception, besides being different in substance 

from the “excited utterance” exception, also facially contains an element 

which the “excited utterance” exception does not.

Section 90.803(1), Florida Statutes (2017), defines the “spontaneous 

statement” exception to the hearsay rule as follows: “A spontaneous 

statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the 

declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter

[is admissible], except when such statement is made under circumstances 

that indicate its lack of trustworthiness.” (emphasis added).

However, section 90.803(1)’s requirement to exclude a spontaneous 

statement “when such statement is made under circumstances that 

indicate its lack of trustworthiness” is conspicuously absent from the plain 
9

language of section 90.803(2)’s excited utterance exception. See § 

90.803(2), Fla. Stat. (2017) (“A statement or excited utterance relating to a 

startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress 

of excitement caused by the event or condition.”).

We recognize that the “spontaneous statement” exception’s “lack of 

trustworthiness” element may be considered as subsumed under the 

“excited utterance” exception’s second prong – that is, “before there was 

time to contrive or misrepresent.” However, we nevertheless maintain our 

previous holding that where a defendant’s statement otherwise qualifies 

by evidence as an excited utterance, “[t]he mere fact that statements are 

self-serving is not, in and of itself, a sufficient evidentiary basis for their 

exclusion from evidence.” Stiles, 672 So. 2d at 851-52 (emphasis added; 

citation omitted).

The state’s reliance on Overton is similarly unpersuasive. In Overton, 

the First District’s opinion on this issue states as follows:

[The defendant] complains that it was error to disallow 

testimony concerning his exculpatory statements made 

immediately upon apprehension as those statements fall 

within the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule and 

therefore are admissible, citing Section 90.803(2) relating to 

“excited utterance.” . . . The deputy’s proffered testimony was 

to the effect that [the defendant] told him he had “the wrong 

guy” and that the police were letting the “right guy” get away. 

[The defendant’s] professed purpose of offering the statement 

was to show his state of mind at the time of apprehension and 

to show that he did not have time to fabricate his version of 

the events. The trial court was correct in sustaining the state’s 

objection on the ground that the statement was “self-serving.” 

Although the statement was made at the time of . . .

apprehension and may be considered as part of the res gestae, 

if it is so self-serving and made under circumstances that 

indicate its lack of trustworthiness, then it should be 

excluded. See Section 90.803(1), Florida Statutes (1981).

429 So. 2d at 723 (emphasis added). Thus, the First District’s opinion 

ultimately was based not on section 90.803(2)’s “excited utterance” 

exception, but on section 90.803(1)’s “spontaneous statement” exception, 

including its express element that the statement not be made “under 

circumstances that indicate its lack of trustworthiness.”
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E. One More Recent Case for Comparison

Our research has discovered one recent case, Beckman v. State, 230 

So. 3d 77 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017), which neither party’s brief has discussed, 

but which addresses the argument upon which the state seeks to prevail 

in this case – that the defendant’s self-serving statement should not be 

admitted under the excited utterance exception. We shall examine 

Beckman in detail here, because the cases are distinguishable.

In Beckman, a teenager shot his father with a shotgun. 230 So. 3d at 

82. Within one minute of the shooting, the defendant called out, “Oh my 

God, call 911,” loud enough for a neighbor to hear. Id. During the 911 

call, the defendant stated, “Please, come quickly, I accidentally shot my 

father.” Id. The defendant then explained that he was going hunting with 

his father and went to the bathroom to show his father the shotgun. Id. 

The defendant claimed the gun accidentally went off, even though the 

safety was on. Id.

The state did not dispute that the 911 call was made instantly after the 

shooting and that the defendant sounded hysterical on the call. Id. at 89. 

Nevertheless, the trial court excluded the content of the defendant’s 911 

call, finding that the content did not satisfy the “excited utterance”

exception because the defendant had an opportunity to reflect before 

making the call. Id. In so ruling, the trial court relied upon the testimony 

of a witness that “two weeks prior to the shooting, the defendant had both 

shown [the witness] the shotgun and said that he wanted to shoot his 

father with it and make it look like self-defense.” Id. at 83 (emphasis 

added).

On appeal, the defendant claimed the trial court abused its discretion 

by excluding the content of the defendant’s 911 call. The Third District 

rejected this argument:

Here . . . the trial court was concerned that the defendant’s 

statements to 911 dispatch were not at all “spontaneous” 

given the defendant’s stated motivation to stage the shooting 

death of his father with a shotgun that he showed his friend 

. . . which had occurred just two weeks before the defendant 

actually shot his father with the same shotgun. The court 

therefore excluded the defendant’s comments to the 911 

operator because there was evidence that the defendant had 

contrived both the shooting (the startling event) and the 911 

call (the out-of-court statement).
11

In essence, the court below excluded the 911 call because 

the defendant could not satisfy his burden of demonstrating 

that he was under any stress or excitement at the time he 

called 911 and gave his self-serving statement. “The mere fact 

that statements are self-serving is not, in and of itself, a 

sufficient evidentiary basis for their exclusion from evidence.” 

Stiles v. State, 672 So. 2d 850, 851-52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). 

Nevertheless, the self-serving nature of the statement is still a 

factor that can be considered when determining whether the 

statement was fabricated. See Sunn v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 

556 So. 2d 1156, 1157 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (noting that one of 

the factors to be analyzed in determining whether a statement 

qualifies as an excited utterance includes “whether the 

statement is self-serving”); 2 McCormick on Evidence, § 272 

(7th ed.) (“Although not grounds for automatic exclusion,

evidence that the statement . . . was self-serving is an 

indication that the statement was the result of reflective 

thought.”) (footnotes omitted).

To this end, we find persuasive two federal cases that have 

touched upon this issue, albeit in dicta. See United States v. 

Moore, 791 F.2d 566, 571 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. 

Knife, 592 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1979). In Knife, the Eighth 

Circuit Court of Appeals opined that where there was evidence 

that the declarant had planned the shooting of the victim at a 

particular time, which then took place, that “it would be 

difficult to believe that the preplanned shooting . . . was an 

event so startling or unexpected as to suspend the defendant 

declarant’s powers of reflection.” In Moore, the Seventh 

Circuit Court of Appeals noted that “[t]he statement in Knife

assumes that the timing, location and circumstances of the 

[startling] event . . . were within the declarant’s control.” But, 

the Seventh Circuit declined to apply it because the declarant 

in Moore did not have the requisite control over the event in 

question. Here, the defendant clearly had the requisite control 

over the time, location and circumstances of the shooting.

For these reasons, we find the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in excluding the 911 call as hearsay. Moreover, 

because of this, we find no reversible error in the lower court’s 

decision also to exclude testimony that the defendant’s 

neighbor . . . heard the defendant making the 911 call.

230 So. 3d at 91-92 (footnote and other citations omitted).
12

The instant case is distinguishable from Beckman. In Beckman, the 

state presented credible evidence that the defendant had pre-planned the 

shooting (the startling event) and contrived the 911 call (the out-of-court 

statement). In the instant case, no evidence existed that the defendant 

had pre-planned the altercation and stabbing (the startling event) or

contrived his statement to the hotel employee (the out-of-court statement). 

Thus, the trial court in the instant case erred in excluding from the jury’s 

consideration the hotel employee’s proffered recitation of the defendant’s 

alleged excited utterance.

 

F. The Error Was Not Harmless

“The harmless error test . . . places the burden on the state, as the 

beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 

complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that 

there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the 

conviction.” State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1138 (Fla. 1986).

Here, the state has not met that burden. Witness credibility was critical 

in this case because no physical evidence or eyewitness testimony 

corroborated the alleged victim’s version of the events. Although the 

defendant was permitted to testify about his alleged excited utterance to 

the hotel employee, the hotel employee’s proffered recitation of the 

defendant’s alleged excited utterance may have, in the jurors’ minds, 

corroborated the defendant’s testimony and supported his self-defense 

claim. Given that possibility, the state cannot meet its burden to establish 

that the error in excluding the hotel employee’s testimony was harmless.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the defendant’s conviction and 

sentence and remand for a new trial. On all other evidentiary arguments 

which the defendant raised in this appeal, we affirm without further 

discussion. The sentencing argument which the defendant raised in this 

appeal is rendered moot by our reversal and remand for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded for new trial.

WARNER and FORST, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.