FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D17-5245

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XAVIER YOUNG,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Liberty County.

Barbara K. Hobbs, Judge.

April 9, 2019

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Xavier Young, appeals his convictions and 

sentences for multiple offenses, challenging the trial court’s denial 

of his motion to suppress statements he made to law enforcement. 

Appellant argues that his statements were unlawfully obtained in 

violation of Miranda.1 For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2

BACKGROUND

Appellant was charged with felony fleeing or attempting to 

elude an officer (Count 1), driving without a valid driver’s license

(Count 2), possession of cannabis (Count 3), and possession of 

paraphernalia (Count 4). He sought the suppression of his alleged 

statements in response to the deputy’s questions of “what 

happened” and “is there anyone else in the car” on the ground that 

he was subjected to custodial interrogation and had not been read 

his Miranda rights. The State, on the other hand, contended that 

Appellant was not subjected to custodial interrogation and the 

deputy asked the questions for officer safety reasons. 

At the suppression hearing, as well as at trial, Deputy Heath 

Cutshaw testified as follows. Around 2 a.m. on October 26, 2016, 

while on patrol in his marked agency vehicle in a rural area with 

“no lighting around,” he attempted to conduct a traffic stop on a 

Chevy for a faulty headlight. When the Chevy did not stop, 

Cutshaw activated his emergency siren and overhead lights. 

Instead of stopping, the Chevy accelerated to over 100 miles per 

hour, turned off its headlights, and swerved back and forth before 

eventually crashing into a tree. When Cutshaw arrived at the 

crash scene and exited his patrol vehicle, he saw Appellant “walk 

out from the vehicle” and walk towards him. At that point, 

Cutshaw drew his service weapon and ordered Appellant to the 

ground while he remained behind his vehicle. As soon as

Appellant complied, Cutshaw asked him, without Miranda

warnings, whether there was anybody else in the car and what 

happened. Cutshaw explained that he ordered Appellant to the 

ground at gunpoint and posed those questions to him for officer

safety reasons because he was the only officer at the scene, he did 

not know why Appellant was walking towards him and whether 

there were other occupants in the car, and he could not see 

everything in the dark. Appellant responded that no one was 

inside the vehicle and that he had fled because he did not have a 

driver’s license and there was marijuana in the center console. 

Cutshaw did not ask further questions. When backup arrived 

about thirty minutes later, Appellant was handcuffed, and inside 

the vehicle the deputies found a marijuana grinder with residue 

and some marijuana buds. Appellant was then arrested. 
3

The trial court denied the motion, ruling, “I don’t find him in 

custody. I think the officer did what he needed to do to protect 

himself on the street. I mean, you’ve got a shadow coming towards 

you after a high speed chase, he’s lucky he didn’t have a bullet in 

his head.” 

At trial, Appellant testified in part that he was merely a 

backseat passenger in the Chevy and that he did not answer the 

deputy’s questions while held at gunpoint because he was not 

advised about his Miranda rights. The jury found Appellant guilty

as charged, and the trial court adjudicated him guilty on each 

count and sentenced him to eighteen months of imprisonment on 

Count 1 and to time served on Counts 2 through 4. This appeal 

followed.

ANALYSIS

A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is presumed 

correct, and we must interpret the evidence and the reasonable 

inferences that can be derived from it in a manner most favorable 

to sustaining the trial court’s ruling. State v. Dickey, 203 So. 3d 

958, 961 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (noting that it is the trial court’s 

function to make credibility determinations and to weigh the 

evidence). We defer to the trial court’s findings of fact if supported 

by competent, substantial evidence, but review de novo the 

application of the law to those facts. Id. 

For Miranda warnings to be required, the suspect must be 

subject to in-custody interrogation. Ross v. State, 45 So. 3d 403, 

414 (Fla. 2010). The determination of whether a defendant was in 

custody involves a mixed question of law and fact and the following 

inquiries:

[F]irst, what were the circumstances surrounding 

the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, 

would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at 

liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. Once the 

scene is set and the players' lines and actions are 

reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test to 

resolve the ultimate inquiry: was there a formal arrest or 

restraint on freedom of movement of the degree 

associated with a formal arrest.
4

Id. at 414-15 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663 

(2004)). Courts are to consider the following four factors in making 

that determination:

(1) the manner in which police summon the suspect 

for questioning; (2) the purpose, place, and manner of the 

interrogation; (3) the extent to which the suspect is 

confronted with evidence of his or her guilt; [and] (4) 

whether the suspect is informed that he or she is free to 

leave the place of questioning.

Id. (quoting Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568, 574 (Fla. 1999)).

However, a person who is detained based on reasonable 

suspicion pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), is not 

necessarily in custody for purposes of Miranda. Johnson v. State, 

800 So. 2d 275, 279 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (citing Berkemer v. 

McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), where the Supreme Court held that 

“persons temporarily detained pursuant to [routine traffic] stops 

are not ‘in custody’ for the purposes of Miranda”). Nor is an 

investigatory stop automatically converted into an arrest when an 

officer draws a weapon and directs the suspect to lie on the ground; 

instead, “the police are entitled to take such action as is reasonable 

under the circumstances.” Carroll v. State, 636 So. 2d 1316, 1318 

(Fla. 1994); see also State v. K.N., 66 So. 3d 380, 385 (Fla. 5th DCA 

2011); Saturnino-Boudet v. State, 682 So. 2d 188, 191 (Fla. 3d DCA 

1996). Further, a traffic stop or investigatory stop is not 

transformed into a custodial interrogation or formal arrest when 

police ask the person if he or she has any weapons or drugs—such 

inquiry is permissible. See State v. Hinman, 100 So. 3d 220, 221 

(Fla. 3d DCA 2012); State v. Martissa, 18 So. 3d 49, 52 (Fla. 2d 

DCA 2009); State v. Olave, 948 So. 2d 995, 996-97 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2007); Hewitt v. State, 920 So. 2d 802, 805 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); see 

also Johnson, 800 So. 2d at 279 (concluding that the appellant was 

not in custody for Miranda purposes where he was briefly detained 

and, without Miranda warnings, asked the open-ended question, 

“what happened?”). 

Here, the parties disagree about whether Appellant was in 

custody at the time Deputy Cutshaw inquired of him so as to 

trigger the Miranda warning requirement. Although Appellant is 

correct in arguing that a reasonable person in his position would 
5

not have felt free to leave, he overlooks the fact that he was 

detained during an undisputedly lawful investigatory stop. It is 

uncontested that the deputy attempted to conduct a lawful traffic 

stop and turned on his blue lights and siren. Instead of stopping, 

the suspect vehicle sped up to speeds in excess of 100 miles per 

hour, turned off its headlights, and swerved back and forth before 

crashing into a tree. When the deputy caught up with the vehicle, 

Appellant approached him from the crashed vehicle. The deputy 

testified that he was the only officer at the scene, it was dark in 

the area, he did not see how many occupants the car had, and he 

could not clearly see the area. As such, for officer safety reasons, 

he drew his weapon as Appellant was approaching him and 

ordered him to the ground. Under these circumstances, the 

deputy’s actions of drawing his weapon and ordering Appellant to 

the ground were reasonable and did not transform the lawful 

investigatory stop into a formal arrest. The deputy then 

immediately asked Appellant, “was there anybody else in the 

vehicle” and “what happened.” Those questions were proper for 

officer safety reasons and did not convert the investigatory stop 

into custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. 

Turning to the factors we must consider in determining 

whether Appellant was in custody, he was not summoned for 

interrogation; the questioning took place during an investigatory 

stop that followed a high-speed chase, the vehicle crashing, and 

Appellant approaching the deputy; at the time, the deputy did not 

know what, if any, involvement Appellant had and whether there 

were others around for it was dark outside; the deputy was the 

only officer at the scene and was concerned for his safety; the 

deputy’s actions and questions were limited to ensuring his safety 

and he asked no further questions; and Appellant was not 

confronted with any evidence of his guilt.2 For the foregoing

reasons, we agree with the trial court that Appellant was not in 

 2 The fact that Appellant was held at gunpoint on the ground 

for nearly thirty minutes while the deputy waited for backup is 

irrelevant to the determination of whether he was in custody for 

purposes of Miranda because it is undisputed that the deputy

made his inquiries immediately upon ordering him to the ground. 
6

custody for the purposes of Miranda; as such, Deputy Cutshaw was 

not required to advise him of his constitutional rights. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court properly denied the 

motion to suppress and affirm Appellant’s convictions and 

sentences.

AFFIRMED.

LEWIS, WETHERELL, and WINOKUR, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Colleen Mullen, Assistant 

Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Jennifer Moore, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.