alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anderson BENITEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 05-16812

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

June 26, 2006.

Anne R. Schultz, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Robin J. Farnsworth, Patrick M. Hunt, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Kathleen M. Williams, Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before ANDERSON, BIRCH and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Robin J. Farnsworth, the Assistant Federal Public Defender assigned to Anderson Benitez on appeal, has filed a motion to allow the Federal Public Defender, Kathleen M. Williams, to withdraw on appeal supported by a brief pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Our independent review of the entire record reveals that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and Benitez’s convictions and sentences are AFFIRMED.

We further deny Benitez’s *pro se*motion to proceed *informa pauperis*as moot, and deny his *pro se*motions for an extension of time to file his argument on appeal and to appoint new counsel.
Shields UP! Russia’s attack on Ukraine may have consequences for US Critical 

Infrastructure.

Division of Technology

 NIGC Tech Alert

As suspected and planned for weeks, Russia has initiated an unprovoked attack on Ukraine. This attack has 

been accompanied by a multipronged and multifaceted series of cyber-attacks on Ukrainian government and 

business critical infrastructures. The response to these attacks from the US and our allies may have consequences 

for businesses and critical infrastructure here in the US, including tribal operations.

CISA (Cybersecurity And Infrastructure Security Agency) is highlighting this activity in their “Shields Up” 

awareness article and stated, “While there are no specific or credible cyber threats to the U.S. homeland at this 

time,... Every organization—large and small—must be prepared to respond to disruptive cyber activity.” To repeat, 

cyber-warfare poses stark risks to private businesses and government organizations alike, however reluctant they 

are to become participants or combatants. Escalating cyber conflict can lead to unanticipated consequences and 

casualties. No party is assured of remaining a mere spectator. Diligence and extra scrutiny and monitoring of 

critical systems and networks is highly recommended, especially in the coming days and weeks if indeed this cyberwar does escalate.

The assets of our tribal partners in Indian Country don’t typically fall within the conventional definition of 

what one thinks of when “critical infrastructure” is mentioned such as electrical grids or water purification systems.

This does NOT mean that tribal assets could not be affected by disruptions to other businesses, some more 

obviously critical, some less obvious. Be prepared for indirect attacks and disruptions or denial-of-service attacks 

on critical resources and vendors utilized by casinos and tribal entities to include but not limited to:

• Electrical, gas, and water utilities

• Traffic management

• Internet Service providers

• Cloud service providers

• Financial institutions

• Supply chain and logistics providers

The scope of the attacks and capabilities of nation-state threat actors are not limited to cyber attacks 

against critical infrastructure. Disinformation, misinformation, and social engineering attacks are ongoing and likely to 

increase in the coming days. Media literacy and mindfulness of phishing attempts are more critical than ever. Threat 

actors (Both state-sponsored and criminal syndicates) will take advantage of the anxiety, chaos, and also positive human 

emotions to commit acts of fraud. As an example, watch out for messages and websites from organizations claiming to 

be humanitarian charities.

For additional details and resources please visit:

CISA – Shield’s Up < https://www.cisa.gov/shields-up>

CISA – Free Cybersecurity Services and Tools < https://www.cisa.gov/free-cybersecurity-services-and-tools>

March 1, 2022
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 109 (Tuesday, June 9, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 27355]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-13444]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment and Training Administration

[TA-W-65,496]


Ovonic Energy Products, Inc., Springboro, OH; Notice of 
Termination of Investigation

    Pursuant to Section 221 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, an 
investigation was initiated on March 5, 2009, in response to a petition 
filed by the union on behalf of workers at Ovonic Energy Products, 
Inc., Springboro, Ohio.
    The petitioner has requested that the petition be withdrawn. 
Consequently, the investigation has been terminated.

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 1st day of May 2009.
Elliott S. Kushner,
Certifying Officer, Division of Trade Adjustment Assistance.
[FR Doc. E9-13444 Filed 6-8-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-FN-P
Exhibit 99.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


     In  connection  with the  quarterly  report of Synergx  Systems  Inc.  (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending March 31, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),  I, Daniel
S. Tamkin,  Chief  Executive  Officer of the Company,  and I, John A.  Poserina,
Chief Financial Officer of the Company certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350,
as  adopted  pursuant  to ss.  906  of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of  2002,  to my
knowledge, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.


                                              /s/ Daniel S. Tamkin
                                             ----------------------
                                             Daniel S. Tamkin
                                             Chief Executive Officer
                                             Synergx Systems Inc.
                                             May 13, 2003



                                             /s/ John A. Poserina
                                             ----------------------
                                             John A, Poserina
                                             Chief Financial  Officer
                                             Synergx Systems Inc.
May 14, 2003
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM
THE CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AT MARCH 31, 2000 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000008038
<NAME> ASTREX, INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                              57
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    2,220
<ALLOWANCES>                                      (79)
<INVENTORY>                                      4,437
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                    46
<PP&E>                                           1,237
<DEPRECIATION>                                   (533)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   7,706
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            1,802
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            65
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     7,706
<SALES>                                         16,512
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                16,512
<CGS>                                           12,771
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   12,771
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 3,069
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 183
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    488
<INCOME-TAX>                                        32
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                456
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       456
<EPS-BASIC>                                       $.08
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     $.08


</TABLE>
#### SIKES v. UNITED STATES.

Civil Action No. 7839.

District Court E. D. Pennsylvania.

March 10, 1948.

*35Edwin, Fischer, of Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Leon H. Fox, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Nor-ristown, Pa., for defendant.

BARD, District Judge.

The defendant, the United States of America, has moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action is barred by the statute of limitations.

The plaintiff’s complaint, which is purportedly based upon the Federal Tort Claims Act,1 alleges a cause of action for personal injury sustained by the plaintiff as a result of a fire which occurred on premises which were leased by the United States Government.

The record establishes beyond question that the plaintiff’s action was not instituted within the one year period of limitation established by Section 420 of the Federal Tort Claims Act. The plaintiff contends, however, that the defense of statute of limitations must be affirmatively pleaded, and cannot be raised by motion to dismiss.

It is true that Judge Kirkpatrick of this district has held, in Kraushaar v. Leschin, D. C., 4 F.R.D. 143, that a party must plead the statute of limitations in order to avail himself of *it*However, Judge Kirkpatrick further pointed out in the Kraushaar case, at 4 F.R.D. 144: “An exception to the foregoing general rule is to be found where the cause of action is one that does not exist at common law but is created by a statute which makes the bringing of a suit within a specified time a condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action itself. The distinction is between a substantive right and a procedural requirement.”

It is apparent from a consideration of the statute here involved that the instant case comes within the foregoing exception. Therefore, I think that the defense of statute of limitations has been properly raised by the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

An order may be entered granting defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint.

1

 August 2, 1946, c. 753, Title IV, 60 Stat. 843, 28 U.S.C.A. § 921 et seq.
Order entered December 13 ,2012



### In The

No. 05-12-00636-CR CEDRIC DERRELL MILLAGE, Appellant

VO THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

### On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 366-80247-07



### ORDER The Court ORDERS the trial court to make fmdings of fact regarding whether appellant has been deprived of the reporter’s record because of ineffective counsel, indigence, or for any other reason.

 ̄ The trial court shall first determine whether appellant desires to prosecute the appeal. If the trial court determines that appellant does not desire to prosecute this appeal, it shall make a finding to that effect.

 ̄ If the trial court determines that appellant desires to prosecute the appeal, it shall next determine whether appellant is indigent and entitled to proceed without payment of costs for the reporter’s record. If appellant is entitled to proceed without payment of costs, the trial court shall make a finding to that effect. Moreover, if appellant is indigent, the trial court is ORDERED to take such measures as may be necessary to assure effective representation, which may include appointment of new counsel. If the trial court finds appellant is not indigent, it shall determine whether retained counsel has abandoned the appeal.The trial court shall next determine: (l) the name and address of each court reporter who

recorded the proceedings m this cause; (2) the court reporter’s explanation for the delay in filing the reporter’s record; and (3) the earliest date by which the reporter’s record can be filed. 

### We ORDER the trial court to tmn~smit a supplemental record, contaimng the written findings of fact, any supporting documentation, and any orders, to this Court within THIRTY DAYS of the date of this order. 

### The appeal is ABATED to allow the trial court to comply with this order. It shall be reinstated thirty days from the date of this order or when the supplemental record is received, whichever is earlier.

DAVID L. GES 

### JUSTICE
For Immediate Release Media Contact: Sarah Beccio

 (202) 632-7003

Live from Indian Country, The NIGC announces largest tribal revenue 

gain in 10 years

Indian gaming continues to be a strong force for tribal economic development

Indio, Ca. – July 19, 2016 Today the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) released data 

showing revenues generated by the Indian gaming industry in 2015 totaled $29.9 billion dollars. After six 

years of modest, but stable growth, the 5% increase in GGR from 2014 is the largest increase in 10 years.

Chairman Jonodev Osceola Chaudhuri, Vice Chair Kathryn Isom-Clause, and Associate Commissioner E. 

Sequoyah Simermeyer made the announcement from within the homelands of the Cabazon Band of 

Mission Indians. 

“The strong regulation that tribes as well as federal regulators and other stake holders provides has played 

a key role in the stability and growth of the Indian gaming industry by providing consistency and 

predictability.” said the Chairman of the NIGC, Jonodev O. Chaudhuri.

The Commission also noted the role of the many small or moderately sized Indian gaming operations that 

support rural economic development where little else has. Only 6.5% of operations can show a $250 

million dollar or more GGR. The majority of tribes, 57%, generate less than $25 million per year in gross 

gaming revenue. And 20% of the total 474 tribal gaming operations produce less than $3 million per year.

The Chairman further stated that Indian gaming is fundamentally different than commercial enterprises; it 

directly provides resources for Indian people including, social services, public works, education, housing, 

health care, emergency services, public safety and cultural presentation programs that no other economic 

driver has yet to provide.

The announcement was made from a location that was historically significant to the tribal gaming 

industry. The Commission highlighted Cabazon’s early efforts to engage in gaming as a modest means of 

pursuing self-sufficiency and how those efforts ultimately contributed to the landmark U.S. Supreme 

Court case of California v. Cabazon, which recognized and reaffirmed the inherent authority of tribal 

nations to regulate gaming activities within their communities.

“The Indian gaming industry can look back on tremendous growth and advancement. In the 30 years 

since the Cabazon case was argued before the Supreme Court, Indian gaming has grown into a multibillion dollar industry annually. This is in no doubt due largely to the innovation, leadership, and positive 

reputation that Indian Country, in conjunction with the regulatory community, has cultivated since the 

advent of Indian gaming.” said Chairman Chaudhuri.

The 2015 GGR was calculated based on 474 independently audited financial statements received by 238 

tribes.

###

The National Indian Gaming Commission is an independent regulatory agency established pursuant

to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988.
EXHIBIT NO. 32.1
Form 10-QSB
Alliance Health, Inc.
File No. 33-17387

          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Alliance Health, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-QSB for the period ending June 30, 2008 as filed with the  Securities
and  Exchange  Commission  on the date  hereof  (the  "Report"),  I,  Sarkis  J.
Kechejian,  Chief Executive and Chief Financial Officer of the Company,  certify
pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350,  as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  the Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  the  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations
          of the Company.


Dated: August 1, 2008                       /s/ Sarkis J. Kechejian, M. D.
       --------------                       ------------------------------------
                                                      Sarkis J. Kechejian, M. D.
                                                         Chief Executive Officer
                                                     and Chief Financial Officer

A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has been
provided to Alliance Health,  Inc. and will be retained by Alliance Health, Inc.
and  furnished  to the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  or its staff upon
request.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 01-7493

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus MILTON SYLVESTER CURRIE, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. Voorhees, District Judge. (CR-98-289-V, CA-00-157-V) Submitted: January 17, 2002 Decided: January 29, 2002 Before WILKINS and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Milton Sylvester Currie, Appellant Pro Se. Gretchen C.F. Shappert, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Milton Sylvester Currie seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.2001). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. United States v. Currie , Nos. CR-98-289-V; CA00-157-V (W.D.N.C. July 5, 2001). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### Julia de Jesus VILLA DURAN; et al., Petitioners, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 05-71091.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 6, 2006.*

Filed Nov. 14, 2006.

*656Julia de Jesus Villa Duran, Lakewood, CA, pro se.

Nicolas Mauricio Cadin Villa, Lakewood, CA, pro se.

CAC-District Counsel, Esq., Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, Los Angeles, CA, Ronald E. LeFevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Nancy E. Friedman, Esq., U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: LEAVY, McKEOWN, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Julia de Jesus Villa Duran and Nicolas Mauricio Cadin Villa are natives and citizens of Colombia. They petition pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision that summarily affirmed the ruling of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying their application for asylum and withholding of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition in part, grant it in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Where, as here, the BIA summarily affirmed the IJ’s opinion, this court reviews the IJ’s opinion as the final agency decision. *See Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft,*350 F.3d 845, 849 (9th Cir.2003). This court will affirm the IJ’s decision if it is supported by reasonable evidence on the record considered as a whole, and may reverse only if the applicant shows that the evidence *compels*the conclusion that the asylum decision was incorrect. *INS v. Elias-Zacarias,*502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992).

Villa Duran and Cadin Villa contend that the IJ erred by denying asylum. We disagree. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that petitioners’ encounters with the guerrillas were not on account of a political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. *See id.*at 481-84, 112 S.Ct. 812; *see also Sangha v. INS,*103 F.3d 1482 (9th Cir.1997).

Because petitioners failed to satisfy the lower standard of proof for asylum, they necessarily failed to satisfy the more stringent standard for withholding of removal. *See Pedro-Mateo v. INS,*224 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir.2000).

The IJ granted voluntary departure for a 60-day period and the BIA streamlined and changed the voluntary departure period to 30 days. In *Padilla-Padilla v. Gonzales,*463 F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir.2006), we held “that because the BIA issued a streamlined order, it was required to affirm the entirety of the IJ’s decision, including the length of the voluntary departure period.” We therefore remand to the agency for further proceedings regarding voluntary departure.

DENIED in part; GRANTED in part and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.