MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2020 ME	17

Docket: Wal-18-440

Argued: September	25,	2019

Decided: January	30,	2020

Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER,	MEAD,	GORMAN,* and	HUMPHREY,	JJ.

**

STATE	OF	MAINE

v.

BRADLEY	WILLIAMS

PER	CURIAM

[¶1]	 	 Bradley	 Williams	 appeals	 from	 a	 judgment	 of	 conviction	 of	 two	

counts	 of	 stalking	 (Class	 D),	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 210-A(1)(A)(1)	 (2018),	 and	 two	

counts	of	harassment	(Class	E),	17-A	M.R.S.	§	506-A(1)(A)	(2018),	entered	by

the	trial	court (Waldo	County,	Billings,	J.)	after	a	jury	trial.		He	challenges	the	

fairness	of	the	trial	and	argues1 that	the	court	made	two	erroneous	evidentiary	

rulings	 and	 erred	 in	 denying	 his	 first	 motion	 for	 a	 judgment	 of	 acquittal,	 in	

 *

		Although	not	available	at	oral	argument,	Justice	Gorman	participated	in	the	development	of	this	

opinion.		See M.R.	App.	P.	12(a)(2)	(“A	qualified	Justice	may	participate	in	a	decision	even	though	not	

present	at	oral	argument.”).

** Although	Justice	Hjelm participated	in	the	appeal,	he	retired	before	this	opinion	was	certified.

1	 	 Williams	 also	 argues	 that	 his	 standby	 counsel	 was	 constitutionally	 ineffective	 in	 failing	 to	

request	a	Title	15	examination	to	determine	competency	and	in	failing	to	make	objections	at	trial.		

We	decline	to	depart	from	the	bright-line	rule	we	have	consistently	applied	for	over	two	decades	that	

we	will	not	consider	ineffective	assistance	of	counsel	claims	on	direct	appeal.		See	Petgrave	v.	State,	

2019	ME	72,	¶	10,	208	A.3d	371;	see also	15	M.R.S.	§§	2121-2132	(2018).		
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amending	the	complaint	sua	sponte	to	conform	to	the	evidence after	his	second	

motion	 for	 a	 judgment	 of	 acquittal,	 and	 in	 failing	 to	 give	 certain	 jury	

instructions.		We	affirm	the	judgment.

I.		BACKGROUND

[¶2]		When	the	evidence	is	viewed in	the	light	most	favorable	to	the	State,	

the	jury	 rationally	could	have	 found	 the	 following	 facts	beyond	a	 reasonable	

doubt.		See	State	v.	Woodard,	2013	ME	36,	¶	19,	68	A.3d	1250.		Williams	first	

met	the	victims—a	married	couple—shortly	after	they	moved	to	Lincolnville	in	

2006, when	he	appeared	at	 their	home	unsolicited	and	offered	 to	clean	 their	

chimneys.		The	victims	initially	hired	him, but	his	presence	in	their	home	made	

them	uncomfortable,	so	they	requested	that	he	not	return	to	complete	the	work.		

Williams	showed	up	at	the	victims’	home	uninvited	at	least	one	other	time	and	

was	told	to	leave.		Other	than	periodic,	incidental	interactions,	the	victims	had	

no	 further	 significant	 contact	 with	 Williams	 until	 August	 2014, when	 he	

appeared	 uninvited	 at	 a	 private	 sale	 at	 the	 victims’	 store.	 	 The	 victims	

repeatedly	asked	him	to	leave	them	alone.		

[¶3]		 In	August	 or	early	September	2014,	Williams	 sent	a	letter	 to	 the	

victims’	home	describing	a	 “series	 of	 three	 visions”	about	 one	 of	 the	 victims,	

including	one	in	which	he	“witnessed	[her]	death”	and	another	in	which	he	“saw	
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[her]	after	 [her]	death.”		The	 victims	and	others	who	read	 the	letter	 found	it	

disturbing	and	threatening.		The	victims	sought	and	obtained	cease	harassment	

notices	 against	 Williams,	 and	 Williams	 was	 served	 with	 those	 notices	 on	

September	3,	2014.		

[¶4]		On	September	4,	2014,	Williams	sent	another	letter	to	the	victims,	

this	 time	 articulating	 his	 belief	 that	 the	 cease	 harassment	 notices	 were	

“fraudulent.”		The	following	day,	Williams	sent	a	third	letter	to	the	victims,	in	

which	 he	 acknowledged	 that	 the	 victims	 wished	 to	 be	 left	 alone	 but	

nevertheless	accused	them	of	filing	a	false	report	against	him.		

[¶5]	 	 After	 receiving	 the	 third	 letter,	 the	 victims	 did	 not	 hear	 from	

Williams	again	until	January	2016.		Around	this	time,	Williams	sent	an	angry	

and	 threatening	letter	 to	 the	 victims’	 attorney.	 	Williams	 also	 began	 posting

fliers	 around	 Belfast	 accusing	 one	 of	 the	 victims	 of	 being	 a	 dangerous	

unprosecuted	 criminal.	 	 The	 victims	 sought	 and	 obtained	 two	 new	 cease	

harassment	notices,	which	were	issued	on	January	9,	2016.		On	June	3,	2016,	

the	 victims	 received	 another	letter	 from	Williams	 that	made	 various	 threats	

and	 demands.	 	 They	 brought	 this	letter	 to	 the	 attention	 of	law	 enforcement.		

Williams’s	 behavior	led	 the	 victims	 to	 take	 extensive	 safety	 precautions	 and	

caused	one	of	the	victims	to	seek	treatment	for	anxiety.
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[¶6]		In	August	2016,	Williams	was	charged	by	criminal	complaint	with	

two	counts	of	stalking	(Class	D),	17-A	M.R.S.	§	210-A(1)(A)(1),	and	two	counts	

of	 harassment	 (Class	 E),	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 506-A(1)(A).	 	 At	 his	 arraignment,	

Williams	entered	a	plea	of	not	guilty	on	all	four	counts.		Williams	requested	and	

was	appointed	counsel,	but	he	filed	a	request	to	proceed	pro	se	shortly	before	

the	original	trial	date.		

[¶7]	 	 Prior	 to	 trial,	 the	 court	 met	 with	Williams,	 his	 attorney,	 and	 the	

attorney	 for	 the	State	 to	discuss	Williams’s	 reasons	 for	wanting	 to	 represent	

himself.		Williams	felt	that	his	trial	counsel	was	not	sufficiently	knowledgeable	

about	 the	 underlying	 facts	 of	 the	 case	 and	 the	 history	 between	 him	 and	 the	

victims.	 	 The	 court	 then	 conducted	 an	 extensive	 and	 careful	 colloquy	 with	

Williams,	during	which	the	court	warned	him	of	the	many	risks	of	representing	

himself	 at	 trial.	 	 The	 court	 periodically	 confirmed with	 Williams that	 he

understood these	risks,	and	he	repeatedly	stated	that	he	did.		At	the	end	of	this	

exchange,	Williams	said	that	he	still	wished	to	represent	himself	at	trial, but	he	

agreed	to	have	his	appointed	attorney	serve	as	standby	counsel.		Later,	prior	to	

jury	 selection,	 Williams also	 agreed	 that,	 during	 the	 trial,	 standby	 counsel	

would	be	permitted	to	make	objections	on	his behalf	and	to	conduct	the	direct	

examination	of	him.		
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[¶8]		At	trial,	after	the	close of	the	State’s	evidence,	Williams	moved	for	a	

judgment	of	acquittal,	M.R.U.	Crim.	P.	29, on	one	of	the	harassment	counts	on	

the	ground	that	the	State	was	required	to	prove	two	acts	of	harassment	against	

the	victims	but	had	established	only	one—the	June	3, 2016, letter.		The	court	

denied	this	motion,	concluding	that	the	jury	could	make	a	reasonable	inference	

that	the	fliers	Williams	posted	in	January	2016	were	intended	to	harass	both	

victims	and	that	posting	the	fliers could	be	found	to	constitute	a	second	act	of	

harassment.		

[¶9]		Williams	then	made	a	second	motion	for	a	judgment	of	acquittal	on	

both	 harassment	 counts on	 the	 ground	 that	 the	 complaint	 alleged	 he	 had	

engaged	in	a	course	of	conduct	constituting	harassment	“beginning	on	or	about	

January	9,	2016, and	ending	on	or	about	 June	6,	2016,	in	Lincolnville,	Waldo	

County,	Maine,” but	the	evidence	at	trial	showed	that	some	of	the	acts forming	

the	basis	of	the	harassment	charges occurred in	Belfast,	a	different	municipality	

in	 Waldo	 County.	 	 The	 State	 opposed	 the	 motion,	 arguing	 that	 a	 course	 of	

conduct	can	take	place	in	multiple	locations,	and	the	complaint	merely	specifies	

the	 location	 where	 the	 course	 of	 conduct	 ended and	 does	 not	 list	 each	

municipality	or	jurisdiction	where	any part	of	the course	of	conduct	occurred.		

The	following	exchange	took	place:		
6

THE	COURT:		What	about—Mr.	Woodbury,	what	about	 the	other	

issue	 that	Mr.	McLean	is	 arguing,	 that	is	 sort	 of	 by	 the	 nature	 of	

harassment	charges	that	the	course	of	conduct	can	be	a	broader—

MR.	WOODBURY:		It	can.		He	should	have	said	in	Waldo	County.

MR.	MCLEAN:		It	does	say	Waldo,	it	says	Lincolnville,	Waldo	County.		

But	again,	it	could	cross	jurisdictional	lines.

MR.	WOODBURY:		Well,	Belfast	and	Lincolnville,	I	mean	he	should	

have	been	more	specific	I	think.		I	hate	to	argue	a	technical	point,	

but	it’s—it’s	there.

Although	 no	 formal	 motion,	written	 or	 oral,	was	 presented	 to	 the	 court,	the	

court,	over	Williams’s	objection and	based	on	the	parties’	arguments,	permitted	

the	amendment	of Counts	2	and	4	of	the complaint	to	allege	“in	Waldo	County,”

and	denied	the	second	motion	for	a	judgment	of	acquittal.		M.R.U.	Crim.	P.	3(d);	

M.R.U.	Crim.	P.	29.		The	court	stated	 that	it	did	not	perceive	any	prejudice	 to	

Williams	because	the	discovery	put	him	on	notice	that	some	of	the	acts	alleged	

to	 form	 part	 of	 the	 course	 of	 conduct	 constituting	 harassment	 occurred	 in	

Belfast.		

[¶10]		The	jury	returned	verdicts of	guilty	on	all	four	counts.		On	the	first	

stalking	charge,	the	court	sentenced	Williams	to	364	days	in	jail,	all	but	ninety	

days	 suspended,	 and	 a	 one-year	 term	 of	 probation.	 	 The	 court	 imposed	

concurrent	 jail	 sentences	 of	 ninety days	 on	 the	 second	 stalking	 charge	 and	
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forty-eight hours	on	each	harassment	charge.2		Finally,	 the	court	imposed	an	

additional	concurrent	sentence	of	thirty	days	for	contempt	based	on	Williams’s	

conduct	 during	 the	 trial.	 	 Williams	 timely	 appealed,	 and	 the	 court	 stayed	

execution	of	the	sentences pending	appeal.		

II.		DISCUSSION

A. The	Court’s	Conduct	During	the	Trial

[¶11]	 	 Williams	 argues	 that	 the	 trial	 court	 created	 a	 “prejudicial	 trial	

environment”	 and	 thereby	 violated	 his	 right	 to	 a	 fair	 trial.3	 	 The	 record,	

however,	tells	a	different	story.		

[¶12]		Williams	chose	to	proceed	without	counsel	and	was	a	difficult	and	

at	times	combative	litigant	who	repeatedly	disregarded	the	court’s	rulings	and	

instructions,	badgered	witnesses,	and	asked	inappropriate	questions during	his	

examination	 of	 them.	 	Despite	 this,	 the	 court	was	 patient	with	Williams	 and	

often	paused	to	explain	the	legal	basis	of	its	rulings	to	him.		During	a	chambers	

conference	at	the	conclusion	of	the	trial,	Williams	told	the	court	that	he	felt	it	

 2		Williams	was	also	ordered	to	pay	$20	to	the	Victims’ Compensation	Fund	on	each	count,	totaling	

$80.		

3		Williams	relies	in	large	part	on	a	statement	by	the	court,	made	outside	the	presence	of	the	jury,	

in	which	 the	court	said,	“I	think	it	would	be	 fair	to	say	that	 I	probably—I’ve	certainly	showed	my	

frustrations	with	you	and	at	times	I	may	have	shown	anger	with	you	in	front	of	the	jury	and	that	is	

not	something	I	intended	to	do	or	liked	to	do.”		
8

had	been	“amazingly	fair.”		The	court	also	instructed	the	jury	that	although	it	

had	 occasionally	 been	 required	 to	insert	itself	into	 the	 proceedings,	 the	jury	

alone	was	required	 to	decide	 the	 facts	based	on	 the	evidence	presented.		We	

conclude	that	Williams	received	a	fair	trial.		See	Lisenba	v.	California,	314	U.S.	

219,	 236	 (1941)	 (“[D]enial	 of	 due	 process	 is	 the	 failure	 to	 observe	 that	

fundamental	fairness	essential	to	the	very	concept	of	justice.		In	order	to	declare	

a	denial	of	it	we	must	find that	the	absence	of	that	fairness	fatally	infected	the	

trial;	the	acts	complained	of	must	be	of	such	quality	as	necessarily	prevents	a	

fair	trial.”).

B. Evidentiary	Rulings

[¶13]	 	Williams	 raises	two issues	 related	 to	 evidentiary	 rulings	 by	 the	

trial	court.		We	address	each	in	turn.

1. The	Previous	Protection	from	Harassment	Hearing

[¶14]		We	 reject	Williams’s	argument	 that	 the	judgment	entered	in	his	

favor	 in the	 prior	 protection	 from	 harassment	 (PFH) matter was	 entitled	 to	

res judicata	effect	in	this	criminal	prosecution.

[¶15]		Williams	argues	that	the	court	erred when	it	denied	him	the	ability	

to	present	evidence related	to	the previous	PFH	matter involving	him and	one	
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of	the	victims	because	that	hearing	resulted	in	a	judgment	in	Williams’s	favor	

and	was	entitled	to	res	judicata	effect.		

[¶16]	 	 Collateral	 estoppel,	 the	 prong	 of	 res	 judicata that	 prevents	 the	

re-litigation	of	factual	issues	previously	decided,	applies	when	“(1)	the	identical	

factual	 issue	 was	 decided	 by	 a	 prior	final	 judgment, and (2)	the	 party	 to	 be	

estopped	had	an opportunity	and an	incentive	to	litigate	the	issue at	the	prior	

proceeding.”		State	v.	Hughes,	2004	ME	141,	¶	5,	863	A.2d	266.		“A	party	has	a	

fair	 opportunity	to	litigate	an	issue	if	 that	party	either	controls	 the	litigation,	

substantially	 participates	in	 that	litigation,	 or	 could	 have	 participated	in	 the	

litigation	had	they	chosen	to	do	so.”		Id.	¶	5 (emphasis	in	original).	 “The	party	

who	asserts collateral	estoppel	bears	the	burden	of	establishing	that	the	party	

to	 be	 estopped	 had	 a fair opportunity	 to	 litigate	 the	 issue	 in	 the	 prior

proceeding.”		Id. ¶ 6.

[¶17]		The	record	does	not	clearly	establish	that	the	issues	litigated	at	the	

prior	PFH	hearing	were	the	same	as	the	issues litigated	at	the	trial	here,	and	the	

State	had	neither	a	fair	opportunity	nor	an	incentive	to	litigate	any	issues	at	the	

PFH	hearing.		At	 trial,	 to	support	 the	criminal	harassment	charges,	 the	State	

presented	evidence	that	Williams	had	sent	a	threatening	letter	to	the	victims	

on	 June	 3,	 2016,	 in	 violation	 of	 an	 active	 cease	 harassment	 order issued	 in	
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January	2016.		His	act	of	sending	that	letter	had	not	yet	occurred	on	April	25,	

2016,	when	 the	PFH	hearing	 took	place.		Although	both	 the	PFH	hearing	and	

the	criminal	trial	focused	on	whether	Williams	had	engaged	in	harassment	of	

the	victims,	the	PFH	hearing	did	not	address	the	issue	of	whether,	considering	

the	 June	 3,	 2016,	 letter,	 there	 was	 sufficient	 evidence	 to	 conclude	 beyond	 a	

reasonable doubt	that	Williams	violated	17-A	M.R.S.	§	506-A.		What	is	truly	fatal	

to	Williams’s	res	judicata	argument,	however,	is	that	the	State	was	not	a	party	

to	the	PFH	hearing, and	Williams	has	not	established	that	the	State “control[led]	

the	 litigation,	 substantially	 participate[d]	 in	 that	 litigation,	 or	 could	 have	

participated	in	 the	litigation	had	 [it]	chosen	 to	do	 so.”		See	Hughes,	2004	ME	

141,	 ¶¶	 2,	 5-6,	 863	 A.2d	 266 (rejecting	 claim	 of	 collateral	 estoppel	 where	

defendant	was	convicted	of	assault	against	a	victim	who	had	previously	sought	

and	 was	 denied	 a	 protection	 from	 harassment	 order	 based	 on	 the	 same	

incident).		Even	if	the	issues	presented	in	the	two	proceedings	were	identical,	

the	fact	that	the	State	did	not	have	a	“fair	opportunity	to	litigate	[any	issues]	in	

the	prior	proceeding,”	id.	¶	6,	nullifies	Williams’s	claim	that	the	judgment	in	his	

favor	following	the	PFH	hearing	was	entitled	to	res	judicata	effect.
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2. Victim’s	Testimony	Regarding	Prior	Civil	Lawsuit

[¶18]		We	are	also	not	persuaded	by	Williams’s	argument	that	the	court	

erred	when	it	allowed	one	of	the	victims	to	testify	that	a	lawsuit	Williams	filed	

against	the	victim	was	dismissed	with	prejudice. Williams	himself	elicited	this	

testimony	 by	 asking	 the	 victim	 about	 the	 lawsuit	 on	 cross-examination	 and	

neither	 Williams	 nor	 his	 standby	 counsel	 objected	 to	 the	 answers	 he	 now	

challenges	 on	 appeal.	 	 See State	 v.	 Pabon,	 2011 ME	 100,	 ¶	 29,	 28 A.3d 1147

(articulating	the	obvious	error	standard	of	review	for	unpreserved	claims).	

D. Motions	for	Judgment	of	Acquittal

1. The	First	Motion	for	a	Judgment	of	Acquittal

[¶19]		Williams	argues that	the	court	erred	in	denying	his	first	motion	for	

a	 judgment	 of	 acquittal,	 M.R.U.	 Crim.	 P.	 29, and that	 the	 court	 applied	 an	

incorrect	standard	in	ruling	on	that	motion.		On	appeal,	“[w]e	review	the	denial	

of	a	motion	for	judgment	of	acquittal	by	viewing	the	evidence	in	the	light	most	

favorable	to	the	State	to	determine	whether	a	jury	could	rationally	have	found	

each	element	of	the	crime	proven	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt.”		State	v.	Adams,	

2015 ME 30,	¶ 19,	113	A.3d	583 (quotation	marks	omitted).		The	jury	may	draw	

all	reasonable	inferences	from	the	evidence	presented	at	trial.		Woodard,	2013	

ME	36,	¶	19,	68 A.3d 1250.
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[¶20]	 	When the	 evidence	is	 viewed	in	 the	light	most	 favorable	 to	 the	

State,	and	given	the	content	of	the	fliers,	the	jury	rationally	could	have	found	

that	Williams	intended	to	harass	both	victims	when	he	posted	the	fliers	around	

Belfast	 and	 when	 he	 sent	 the	 June	 3,	 2016,	 letter.	 	 The	 fliers	 included	 the	

victims’	 home	 address,	 accused	 one	 of	 the	 victims	 of	 being	an	 unprosecuted	

criminal, referenced	 the	 victims’	 children,	 and	 encouraged	 people	 to	 call	 the	

police	regarding	one	of	the	victims.		The	June	3	letter,	which	threatened	one	of	

the	 victims	 and	 made	 accusations	 about	 that	 victim	 based	 on	 the	 victim’s	

marriage	 to	 the	 other	 victim,	could	support	an	inference	 that	 the	 fliers	were	

similarly	 intended	 to	 harass	 both	 victims.	 	 And,	 contrary	 to	 Williams’s	

contention,	the	trial	court	did	not	apply	an	incorrect	standard	in	ruling	on	the	

motion	 for	 judgment	 of	 acquittal.	 	 See	Woodard,	 2013	 ME	 36,	 ¶	 19,	 68	 A.3d	

1250.		The	court	correctly	concluded	that	the	jury	could	rationally	have	found	

each	element	of	the	crime	of	harassment	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt.

2. The	Second	Motion	for	a	Judgment	of	Acquittal

[¶21]	 	 Williams	 contends that	 the	 court	 erred	 in	 permitting	 the	

amendment	 of	 Counts	 2	 and	 4	 of	 the	 complaint to	 allege	 “in	Waldo	 County”	

rather	than	“in	Lincolnville,	Waldo	County,	Maine,” after	his	second	motion	for	

a	 judgment	 of	 acquittal. We	 review	 the	 court’s	 decision	 to	 permit	 the	
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amendment	of	 the	complaint	 for	an	abuse	of	discretion.		See	State	v.	Johnson,	

585	A.2d	825,	826	(Me.	1991).		

[¶22]	 	 Rule	 3(d) of	 the	 Maine	 Rules	 of	 Unified	 Criminal	 Procedure	

provides	that	“[t]he	court	may	permit	a	complaint	to	be	amended	at	any	time	

before	 verdict	 or	 finding	if	no	additional	 or	different	crime	is	charged	 and	if	

substantial	rights	of	the	defendant	are	not	prejudiced.”		Neither	Williams	nor	

the	State	formally	moved	to	amend	the	complaint;4 however,	in	arguing	their	

positions	 on	 the motion,	 the	 defense	 agreed	 with	 the	 State	 that	 a	 course	 of	

conduct	can	occur	in	more	 than	one	place	and	even	across	jurisdictions,	and	

stated,	 on	 the	 record,	 “He	 should	 have	 said	 in	 Waldo	 County.”	 	 Therefore,	

although	no	formal	motion	to	amend	the	complaint	was	made,	both	sides	had	

the	opportunity	to	argue	their	positions regarding	the	amendment,	and	agreed	

that	the	relevant	course	of	conduct	occurred	in	Waldo	County.		

[¶23]		As	 already	 discussed,	 the	 amendment	itself	merely	changed	 the	

location	alleged	in	the	complaint from	“Lincolnville,	Waldo	County”	to	“Waldo	

County.”	 	 The	 amendment	did	 not	 charge	 any	 additional	 or	 different	 crimes.		

Location	is	not	an	element	of	the	crime	of	harassment, and the	State	was	not	

 4		The	court	did	acknowledge,	when	the	motion	was	made,	that	“obviously	if	necessary	the	state	

could	move	to	amend	the	complaint	to	include	Lincolnville	and/or	Belfast.”	
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required	to	prove	that	the	course	of	conduct	constituting	harassment	occurred	

in	a	particular	location.		Cf. State	v.	Siviski,	663	A.2d	568,	570	(Me.	1995).		The	

court	 did	 not	 err	 in	 concluding	 that	 the	 amendment	 would	 not	 prejudice	

Williams because	 he	 was	 on	 notice	 of	 the	 facts	 alleged	 in	 the	 amended	

complaint	 through	 discovery.	 	 Cf. State	 v.	 Johnson,	 2005	 ME	 46,	 ¶¶ 15-16,	

870 A.2d 561.	 	 Therefore,	 the	 trial	 court	 did	 not	 abuse	 its	 discretion	 in	

permitting	the	complaint	to	be	amended to	conform	to	the	evidence	presented	

at	trial.

E.	 Jury	Instructions

[¶24]		Williams	also	contends	that	the	trial	court	erred	in	failing	to	give	

three	jury	instructions.5		Because	Williams	did	not	object	to	the	court’s	failure	

to	give	 these	jury	instructions	at	 trial,	or	 to	 the	instructions	 that	were	given,	

these	 claims	 of	 error	 are	 unpreserved	 on	 appeal,	 and	 we	 review	 the	 jury	

instructions	for	obvious	error.6		State	v.	Lajoie,	2017	ME	8,	¶	13,	154	A.3d	132.		

 5		Williams	argues	that	the	court	erroneously	failed	to	instruct	the	jury	that	(1)	“the	‘absence	of	

reasonable	cause’	 [is]	part	of	 the	State’s	burden	of	proof”	with	 respect	 to	 the	harassment	counts;

(2) “certain	speech,	such	as	political	speech,	is	protected	by	the	First	Amendment	of	the	United	States	

Constitution	and	by	Article	 I,	§§	4	and	6-A	of	 the	Maine Constitution,”	and	“a	public	 figure	may	be	

subject	to	certain	conduct	through	writings	and	speech	that	an	ordinary	person	may	not	be	subject	

to,	and	also	that	in	these	situations,	that	‘actual	malice’	had	to	be	proved”; and	(3) “anti-SLAPP	[is]	an	

affirmative	defense.”		

6		“To	demonstrate	obvious	error,	the	defendant	must	show	that	there	is	(1)	an	error,	(2)	that	is	

plain,	and	(3)	that	affects	substantial	rights.		Even	if	these	three	conditions	are	met,	we	will	set	aside	

a	jury’s	verdict	only	if	we	conclude	that	(4)	the	error	seriously	affects	the	fairness	and	integrity	or	
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Jury	 instructions	 must	 inform	 the	 jury	 correctly	 and	 fairly	 in	 all	 necessary	

respects	of	the	governing	law.		State	v.	Tucker,	2015	ME	68,	¶	11,	117	A.3d	595.		

Contrary	to	Williams’s	argument,	we	conclude	that	the	trial	court	committed	no	

obvious	error	in	its	instructions	to	the	jury.7

F. Ethical	Considerations

[¶25]	 	 Although	Williams	 is	 represented	 by	 counsel	 in	 this	 appeal,	 he	

argues, purportedly	in	a	self-represented capacity, that	the	bail	commissioner’s	

fee,	 paid	 directly	 to	 the	 bail	 commissioner,	 not	 to	 the	 court,	 and	 explicitly	

provided	for	in	15	M.R.S.	§	1023(5)	(2018),	constitutes	extortion	in	violation	of	

his	constitutional	due	process	rights.		The	argument	relies	on	specious	claims	

to	attack	the	integrity	of	Maine’s	state	courts.		The	argument	is	without	merit,

and	we	address it	no	further.

 

public	reputation	of	judicial	proceedings.”		State	v.	Pelletier,	2019	ME	92,	¶	9,	210 A.3d 177 (quotation	

marks	omitted).

7	 	 The	 record	 reveals	 that	 the	 trial	 court	 clearly	 instructed	 the	 jury	 regarding	 all	 statutorily	

required	 elements	 of	 the	 crimes	 of	 stalking	 (Class	 D),	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 210-A(1)(A)(1)	 (2018), and	

harassment	(Class	E),	17-A	M.R.S.	§	506-A(1)(A)	(2018).		The	trial	court	committed	no	obvious	error	

in	not	instructing	 the	jury	regarding	 the	First	Amendment	right	to	 freedom	of	speech	because	the	

conduct	proscribed	by	Maine’s	criminal	harassment	and	stalking	statutes	is	not	protected	by	the	First	

Amendment	of	the	United	States	Constitution	or	article	 I,	section	4	of	the	Maine	Constitution.		See	

Childs	v.	Ballou,	2016	ME	142,	¶¶	17,	24-27,	148	A.3d	291;	State	v.	Cropley,	544	A.2d	302,	304-05	(Me.	

1988).		Finally,	the	trial	court	committed	no	obvious	error	in	not	giving	a	jury	instruction	regarding	

Maine’s	anti-SLAPP	 (strategic	litigation	against	public	 participation) law,	14	M.R.S.	 §	 556	 (2018),

because,	by	its	plain	terms,	Maine’s	anti-SLAPP	statute applies	only	in	civil,	not	criminal,	cases.
16

[¶26]	 	 However,	 we	 are	 concerned	 that	 the	 claim	 was	 included	 in	

counsel’s	 brief.	 	 Although	 counsel	 attempted	 to	 distance	 himself	 from	 the	

allegation,	he	alone	signed	the	brief	that	incorporated	his	client’s	argument.		An	

unfounded	claim	such	as	this	appearing	in	a	brief	submitted	by	an	attorney,	if	

attributable	to	that	attorney,	could constitute	a	violation	of	Rule 8.2(a)	of	the	

Maine	Rules	of	Professional	Conduct,	which	prohibits	an	attorney	from	making	

any	statement	“the	lawyer	knows	to	be	false	or	with	reckless	disregard	as	to	its	

truth	or	falsity	concerning	the	integrity	of	a	judge.”

[¶27]	 	 We	 take	 this	 opportunity	 to	 remind	 Maine’s	 attorneys	 of	 their	

ethical	obligations	as	members	of	the	legal	profession.		Attorneys,	unlike	their	

clients,	are	subject	to	the	Maine	Rules	of	Professional	Conduct.		See	M.R.	Prof.	

Conduct	 8.4	 cmt.	 1	 (“Lawyers	 are	 subject	 to	 discipline	 when	 they	 violate	 or	

attempt	to	violate	the	Rules	of	Professional	Conduct	.	.	.	.”).		Attorneys	are	bound	

by	the	contents	of	the	briefs they	sign.		See	M.R.	Prof.	Conduct	3.3	cmt.	3	(“An	

advocate	 is	 responsible	 for	 pleadings	 and	 other	 documents	 prepared	 for	

litigation	.	.	.	.”).		Therefore,	when	a	client	who	is	represented	by	counsel	insists	

on	presenting	any	argument	or	assertion	that	is	not	endorsed	by	the attorney—

particularly	one	that,	if	made	by	the	attorney,	might	violate	the	Maine	Rules	of	

Professional	 Conduct,	see	M.R.	 Prof.	 Conduct	 1.2	 cmt.	 13—such	 argument	 or	
17

assertion	should	 not	be	incorporated	into	 the	brief	drafted	and	submitted	by	

the	attorney.		Rather,	it	is	incumbent	upon	the	attorney	to	advise	the	client	to	

obtain	leave	of	the	Court	to	independently	present	the	argument	or	assertion	

in	a	separate	brief	or	writing	signed	by	the	client	only.		

The	entry	is:

Judgment affirmed.

Ezra	A.	R.	Willey,	Esq.(orally),	Willey	Law	Offices,	Bangor,	for	appellant	Bradley	

Williams

Natasha	Irving,	District	Attorney,	and	Elizabeth	Noble,	Asst.	Dist.	Atty. (orally),	

Prosecutorial	District	VI,	Belfast,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine

Waldo	County	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket	number	CR-2016-711

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY