alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


     In  connection  with the  quarterly  report of Synergx  Systems  Inc.  (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending  December 31, 2005 as filed with
the Securities  and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  I,
Daniel  S.  Tamkin,  Chief  Executive  Officer  of the  Company,  and I, John A.
Poserina, Chief Financial Officer of the Company certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002, to
my knowledge, that:

     (1) The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.


                                              /S/ Daniel S. Tamkin
                                              ---------------------
                                              Daniel S. Tamkin
                                              Chief Executive Officer
                                              Synergx Systems Inc.
                                              February 14, 2006



                                              /S/ John A Poserina
                                              --------------------
                                              John A, Poserina
                                              Chief Financial  Officer
                                              Synergx Systems Inc.
                                              February 14, 2006
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Scott Liden, Appellant.

Submitted March 7, 2011;

decided May 3, 2011

*873Motion for leave to appeal granted. Motion for poor person relief granted.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Samuel Small, Also Known as Samuel Smalls, Appellant.

[976 NYS2d 575]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Sullivan, J.), rendered October 14, 2010, convicting him of burglary in the second degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial (Parker, J.; DiMango, J.; Foley, J.) of the defendant’s three motions to dismiss the indictment.

*858Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

While the defendant was in police custody after being arraigned on a felony complaint for a burglary that occurred on April 4, 2006, the People filed a felony complaint charging him with offenses relating to a burglary that occurred on February 23, 2006. The defendant was never arraigned on the felony complaint related to the February 23, 2006, burglary. On May 9, 2006, a grand jury returned an indictment charging the defendant with committing both burglaries.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, since he was not arrested pursuant to the arrest warrant that was issued in connection with the felony complaint related to the February 23, 2006, burglary, the police did not violate CPL 120.90 by failing to bring the defendant before a local criminal court without unnecessary delay *(see*CPL 120.90 [1]). Further, since the defendant was never arraigned upon the felony complaint related to the February 23, 2006, burglary, the People were not obligated to provide the defendant with notice that offenses arising from the February 23, 2006, burglary would be presented to the grand jury along with the offenses arising from the April 4, 2006 burglary *(see*CPL 190.50 [5] [a]; *People v Perez-Tavares,*238 AD2d 446, 447 [1997]; *People v Choi,*210 AD2d 495, 496 [1994]). In any event, the People ultimately apprised the defendant of the expanded scope of the grand jury’s inquiry, and afforded him an adequate and reasonable opportunity to exercise his right to testify *(see People v Choi,*210 AD2d at 496-497).

The defendant contends that he was improperly sentenced as a second violent felony offender because the sentence on his predicate violent felony conviction was imposed more than 10 years before the commission of the instant offense *(see*Penal Law § 70.04 [1] [b] [iv]), and the 10-year period was not sufficiently tolled by periods of incarceration *(see*Penal Law § 70.04 [1] [b] [v]). Contrary to the defendant’s contention, his imprisonment from August 7, 1992, to October 21, 1993, was not without reason or unconstitutional, and this period was thus properly excluded in calculating the 10-year period *(see id.; cf. People v Dozier,*78 NY2d 242, 249 [1991]; *People v Love,*71 NY2d 711, 716 [1988]). Accordingly, the defendant was properly adjudicated a second violent felony offender. Balkin, J.R, Lott, Austin and Miller, JJ., concur.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

_________________

No. 98-20156

No. 98-20157

Summary Calendar

_________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

HUMBERTO OCAMPO,

Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CENELIA OCAMPO-PEREZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(H-97-CR-109-1)

April 8, 1999

Before EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.* Pursuant to5th Circuit R. 47.5, the Cou rt has det ermined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limit ed circumstances set forth in Fifth Circuit Rule

47.5.4.

-2- PER CURIAM: *

Humberto Ocampo and Cenelia Ocampo-Perez appeal from their sentences aft er pleading

guilty to conspiracy and drug charges. Both defendants argue that the district court erred in

attributing to them 66.3 kilograms o f cocaine under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. The am ount of drugs

at t ribut ed t o a defendant must be upheld unless it is clearly erroneous. S ee United States v.

Maseratti

, 1 F.3d 330, 340 (5th Cir. 1993). Such a finding is not clearly erroneous if it is plausible

in light of the record as a whole. See id. The district court’s determination that the defendants are

responsible for 66.3 kilograms of cocaine is supported by the record. Furthermore, neither defendant

presented evidence to rebut their Pre-Sentence Reports (PSR), which also attributed 66.3 kilograms

of cocaine to the defendants. Unless a defendant presents rebuttal evidence, a sentencing court may

adopt a PSR’s factual findings without further inquiry. S ee United States v. Vital

, 68 F.3d 114, 120

(5th Cir. 1995).

Humberto Ocampo also argues that the district court erred in increasing his offense level by

three for his aggravating role in the offense. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) provides for a three-level increase

if the defendant was a manager or supervisor within a criminal activity involving five or more

participants. A sentencing court’s determination that a defendant played such a leadership role is a

factual finding reviewable only for clear error. S ee United States v. Parker

, 133 F.3d 322, 329, cert.

denied

, 118 S. Ct. 1851 (1998). The district court’s finding that Humberto Ocampo was a manager

o f the criminal enterprise is supported by the record. Furthermore, Humberto Ocampo failed t o

provide evidence rebutting his PSR. See Vital , 68 F.3d at 120.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court.
# U n i ted S ta te s Cou r t o f Appe a l s F OR T HE D IS TRICT OF C OLUM BIA C IRCUI T

___ ___ ___ ___ 

## No. 21-5303 September Term, 2021 1: 21-cv -030 58-UNA Filed O n: June 15 , 20 22 Jona tha n C. B ertan elli,

App ellant
v . Charlott e A . Bu rrows, etal.,

App ellees
ON A PPE A L FROM THE UNITED STA TES DIS TRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BEFORE: Ka tsas a nd Rao, Circuit Judges, and Se nte lle, Se nior Circuit Jud ge J U D G M E N T T his ap pea l was co nside red o n th e reco rd f rom the United Sta tes District Cou rt for th e District of

Colum bia a nd on the brief f iled b y ap pellan t. S ee Fed. R. Ap p. P

. 34(a )(2); D.C. Cir. Rule 34 (j). Upon consid eratio n o f the foregoing an d th e e me rg ency mo tion to se al, th e m otion to augm entthe record, an d th e m otion to exceed p age limits, it is ORDERED tha t th e e me rg ency mo tion to se al be granted in p art. T he Clerk is directe d to m ainta in un der se al th e m otion to seal. T he mo tion is den ied in all ot her respe cts, a s ap pellan t ha s sho w n n o b asis to warrant sealing of the se jud icial records. See Joh nson v. Greate r Se. Cmty. Hosp. Corp., 95 1 F.2 d 1 268 , 12 77 (D.C. Cir. 1991 ) (notin g the “stron g presum ption in favor of pu blic acce ss to judicial p rocee dings”). It is FURTHER ORDERED tha t th e m otion to augm entthe record be den ied. App ellantha s no t sho w n th at su pple me nta tion of the record on app eal is a ppro priate und er Fed eral Rule of

Ap pellat e P roced ure 1 0(e)(2)(C), or tha t it “would esta blish beyond an y

do ubtthe prop er resolu tion of the pe ndin g issues” or is ot herwi se “in t he intere sts of

justice. ” Colbe rt v . Po tter, 471 F.3d 15 8, 1 66 (D.C. Cir. 2006 ) (interna l citation s an d quot ation m arks om itted ). It is FURTHER ORDERED tha t th e m otion to exceed p age limits be grant ed. It is

# U n i ted S ta te s Cou r t o f Appe a l s F OR T HE D IS TRICT OF C OLUM BIA C IRCUI T

___ ___ ___ ___ 

## No. 21-5303 September Term, 2021
FURTHER ORDERED A ND ADJUDGED tha t th e d istrict court’s Novem ber 2 4, 202 1 d ismissal o rder be af f irmed . Con gress h as n ot a uth oriz ed, eith er expressly or imp liedly, a cau se o f

actio n a gainst th e E qual Em ploymen t Op portu nity Comm ission for challen ges to its proce ssing of a cla im. Se e S mith v. Casellas, 1 19 F.3d 33 , 34 (D.C. Cir. 199 7) (per cu riam). Pursua nt t o D.C. Circuit Ru le 36 , th is dispo sition will no t be pu blished . T he Clerk is directe d to w ithho ld issua nce of the m and ate he rein u ntil seven d ays af ter reso lution of an y tim ely petition for rehe aring or pe tition for rehe aring en ban c. S ee Fed. R. Ap p. P. 4 1(b); D.C. Cir. Rule 41

. Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT: Mark J. La nger, Clerk BY: /s/ Daniel J. Reidy Depu ty Cl erk

Page 2
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>       5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from
the consolidated financial statements for period ended January 25,
1997 and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial
statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                       1,000
       
<S>                       <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>             YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                            JAN-25-1997
<PERIOD-START>                               JAN-28-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                 JAN-25-1997
<CASH>                                             2,122
<SECURITIES>                                           0
<RECEIVABLES>                                     69,277
<ALLOWANCES>                                      (2,645)
<INVENTORY>                                      159,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 232,412
<PP&E>                                           216,893
<DEPRECIATION>                                  (114,063)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   374,104
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                             69,397
<BONDS>                                           97,417
<COMMON>                                           9,472
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                  0
<PREFERRED>                                            0
<OTHER-SE>                                       179,769
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     374,104
<SALES>                                          227,870
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 489,219
<CGS>                                            148,127
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    363,936
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 101,340
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   1,417
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 9,588
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   12,938
<INCOME-TAX>                                       4,916
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                    0
<DISCONTINUED>                                         0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                        0
<CHANGES>                                              0
<NET-INCOME>                                       8,022
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        .88
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        .88
        

</TABLE>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Aaron Richard Fisher, Appellant.

Submitted May 2, 2011;

decided May 5, 2011

Motion for assignment of counsel granted and Timothy P Donaher, Esq., Monroe County Public Defender, 10 N. Fitzhugh Street, Rochester, New York 14614 assigned as counsel to the appellant on the appeal herein.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-41007

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

ALFONSO RAMIREZ-GARZA,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:14-CR-409-1

Before JOLLY, GRAVES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appealing the judgment in a criminal case, Alfonso Ramirez-Garza 

raises an argument that is foreclosed by United States v. Martinez-Lugo, 782 

F.3d 198, 204-05 (5th Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed (June 19, 2015) (No. 14-

10355). In Martinez-Lugo, 782 F.3d at 204-05, we held that an enhancement 

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) for a prior conviction of a drug 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 18, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 14-41007 Document: 00513157982 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/18/2015
No. 14-41007

2

trafficking offense is warranted regardless whether the conviction for the prior 

offense required proof of remuneration or commercial activity.

Ramirez-Garza also raises an argument that is foreclosed by United 

States v. Rodriguez-Escareno, 700 F.3d 751, 753-54 (5th Cir. 2012), which held

that an enhancement pursuant to § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) applies to a prior 

conviction for the federal crime of conspiracy to commit a federal drug 

trafficking offense.

The motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, the alternative 

motion for an extension of time to file a brief is DENIED, and the judgment of 

the district court is AFFIRMED.

 Case: 14-41007 Document: 00513157982 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/18/2015
#### Gentry *v.*Grand View Mining & Smelting Co.*

*(Circuit Court, E. D. Missouri.*

September 27, 1882.)

Pleading—Counter- Claim.

Where the petition charged the defendant with the conversion of certain personal property, *held*that an answer which intermingled a seeming defense with a counter-claim, not arising on contract, or out of the transaction set forth in the petition, and unconnected with the subject of the action, was demurrable.

Demurrer to Answer.

Suit for damages for the conversion by defendant of silver ore owned by plaintiff.

The defendant alleges in its answer that the plaintiff came into possession of the ore in question while superintenden tof the Grand View Mining Company, and that, as superintendent of said company, he retained possession thereof until the first of April, 1881; that while plaintiff was acting as superintendent of said company, between January, 1880, and the fifteenth day of July, 1880, he misapplied and converted to his own use $7,511.11 belonging to said company, and refused to pay over or account for the same to the *545owner thereof; that on the first day of April, 1881, the Grand View Mining Company, for a good and valuable consideration, with the knowledge and consent of plaintiff, turned over and delivered possession of the ore described in the petition, and of its rights, title, and interest therein, to the defendant, and for good and valuable consideration, on the twenty-ninth day of August, 188'J, sold, assigned, and transferred to the defendant the cause of action heretofore described against the plaintiff, and the plaintiff has refused to pay said $7,511.11 to the defendant since said assignment, although often requested so to do.

Plaintiff demurred to the second defense and counter-claim set up in defendant’s answer, on the ground that “the said cause of action set up in said counter-claim does not arise out of the transactions set forth in plaintiff’s petition as the foundation of plaintiff’s claim, nor is it connected with the subject of the action, and plaintiff’s action does not arise on contract.”

*Overall é Judson,*for plaintiff.

*Dyer, Lee & Ellis,*for defendant.

*

Reported by B. F. Rex, Esq., of the St. Louis bar.

Treat, D. J.

The only difficulty arises from the fact that a seeming defense and a counter-claim are intermingled. If the ore in question did not belong to the plaintiff in his own right, the defense -would be complete; but instead of so averring, the pleading leaves it uncertain as to what it is designed to charge the plaintiff’s relations thereto were. The counter-claim does not show that it arises from the same transaction; but, on the contrary, that the defendant is an assignee of a cause of action involving, it may be, an accounting between-the plaintiff and the assignee as to a long course of dealings.

The demurrer is sustained, with leave to defendant to file an additional answer and counter-claim, if they can be brought within the rules governing the same as here stated.
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#### SCREEN WRITERS’ GUILD, Inc., et al. v. MOTION PICTURE ASS’N OF AMERICA, Inc., et al.

Civ. No. 46-165.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

Nov. 3, 1948.

Thurman Arnold and Walton Hamilton (of Arnold, Fortas & Porter), both of Washington, D. C., and James T. Bredin (of Monahan, Goldberg & Bredin), of New York City, for plaintiffs.

Rosenman Goldmark, Colin & Kaye, of New York City (Samuel I. Rosenman, Max Freund, and Robert Lowenstein, all of New York City, of counsel), for defendants Motion Picture Ass’n of America, Inc., and others.

KAUFMAN, District Judge.

The motion is granted to dismiss the complaint for non-compliance with Rule 8(a) and (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., with leave to plaintiffs to file an amended complaint.

The enumeration of writings, plays and the like contained in Paragraph 6(a) and (b) of the complaint should be omitted as evidentiary. Paragraph 18 should be omitted as inadequately linked to the present conspiracy. Paragraph 20 (including Appendix C-l), that portion of Paragraph 21 which recites Mr. Warner’s testimony (including Appendix C-2), the last sentence of Paragraph 22 (including Appendix C-3), that portion of Paragraph 24 which recites Mr. Hughes’ testimony (including Appendix C-5), and Paragraphs 25 and 26 (including Appendix C-4 and C-6) should be omitted as evidentiary.

The form of complaint has been considered with the widest latitude allowed to the pleader and, accordingly, except as above indicated, no other amendment is specifically directed. Nevertheless, on the amendment of the complaint, serious consideration should be given by the plaintiff to a greater degree of conciseness and directness of allegation, particularly to avoid argumentativeness when the purpose is to plead the meaning or effect of acts and documents.

Settle order on notice.
Biography

National Indian Gaming Commission

ACTING ASSOCIATE GENERAL COUNSEL

ESTHER DITTLER

Esther Dittler (Six Nations of the Grand River – Mohawk) is an Acting Associate 

General Counsel in the NIGC Office of General Counsel.

Esther first joined the NIGC as a Staff Attorney in 2006 and served as Region 

Attorney for several NIGC regions, most recently the Tulsa Region. She was 

promoted to Senior Attorney in 2017 and has worked at the NIGC for over 16 years.

Esther also has experience working as general counsel at a tribal gaming regulatory 

agency.

In 1996, Esther received a Bachelor of Arts from Binghamton University, located in 

Binghamton, New York, and in 2000 completed a Master’s of Public 

Administration from the University of Washington, located in Seattle, Washington. 

In 2003 she received her Juris Doctor from the University of Buffalo, located in 

Buffalo, New York, and was admitted to the New York Bar in 2004. 

The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act created the National Indian Gaming Commission to support tribal selfsufficiency and the integrity of Indian gaming. NIGC oversees the efficient regulation of 520 gaming 

establishments operated by 243 tribes across 29 states.

Updated 1/30/2023