UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4243

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RAYMOND CHARLES WEBBER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. 

Voorhees, District Judge. (5:08-cr-00048-RLV-DSC-4)

Submitted: November 18, 2010 Decided: November 29, 2010

Before SHEDD and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Steven T. Meier, MEIER LAW, Charlotte, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Raymond Charles Webber pled guilty to mail fraud, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 341 (2006). The district court 

sentenced Webber to 125 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, 

counsel for Webber has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no 

meritorious grounds for appeal, but challenging the sentence 

imposed. Specifically, counsel suggests Webber’s sentence at 

the top of the Sentencing Guidelines range is too harsh and that

the district court erred in not giving to Webber credit for time 

Webber spent in custody on an allegedly related charge. Webber 

has filed a pro se supplemental brief raising similar issues. 

The Government elected not to file a response. We affirm.

We review a sentence for reasonableness under an 

abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 

38, 51 (2007). This review requires appellate consideration of 

both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a 

sentence. Id. This court must assess whether the district 

court properly calculated the advisory Guidelines range, 

considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, analyzed any 

arguments presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained 

the selected sentence. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576 

(4th Cir. 2010) (“[A]n individualized explanation must accompany 

every sentence.”); United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 
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(4th Cir. 2009) (same). In addition, this court presumes a 

sentence within a properly determined advisory Guidelines range 

is substantively reasonable. United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 

178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007).

We conclude that Webber’s sentence is both 

procedurally and substantively reasonable. The district court 

properly calculated Webber’s Guidelines range, treated the 

Guidelines as advisory, and considered the applicable § 3553(a) 

factors. See United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th 

Cir. 2007). Moreover, the district court based its sentence on 

its individualized assessment of the facts of the case. Carter, 

564 F.3d at 328. Last, we conclude that Webber has not rebutted 

the presumption that his within-Guidelines sentence is 

presumptively reasonable. With respect to Webber’s assertion 

that the district court erred in not crediting him for time 

served on a related offense, the record reflects that the 

district court did not conclusively deny credit, rather it 

stated it would leave the record open for a ruling on credit 

because what was before the court was “too nebulous to permit a 

credit to be granted at the present time.” We conclude the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the 

chosen sentence.

As required by Anders, we have reviewed the record and

Webber’s pro se supplemental brief and find no meritorious 
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issues for review. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s 

judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Webber in 

writing of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United 

States for further review. If Webber requests that a petition 

be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be 

frivolous, then counsel may move this court for leave to 

withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that 

a copy thereof was served on Webber. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED