NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2010-3003 

 GARY P. EVANS, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, 

Respondent. 

Elliot A. Strokoff, Strokoff & Cowden, P.C., of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, for petitioner. 

P. Davis Oliver, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United 

States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent. With him on the brief were 

Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, and Deborah A. 

Bynum, Assistant Director. 

Appealed from: Merit Systems Protection Board
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2010-3003 

GARY P. EVANS, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, 

Respondent. 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection Board in PH0752070419-I-1. 

______________________ 

DECIDED: May 5, 2010. 

______________________ 

Before BRYSON, GAJARSA, and MOORE, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

Gary P. Evans appeals the final order of the Merit Systems Protection Board (the 

“Board”) denying his petition for review of an initial decision dismissing his appeal as 

settled.1

 See Evans v. U.S. Postal Serv., PH-0752-07-0419-I-1 (M.S.P.B. Aug. 5, 

2009). We affirm. 

 1

 Mr. Evans filed a petition for review with the Board two years after the 

dismissal of his appeal. Mr. Evans contends that he was unaware of the settlement 

agreement because he was incarcerated at the time of the initial decision. But the 

decision contains a certificate of service that certifies that the decision was mailed to 

Mr. Evans at the prison. However, despite finding that “a question exists regarding the 

timeliness of the appellant’s petition for review of the initial decision,” the Board 

dismissed on the basis that “there is no new, previously unavailable, evidence and that 

the administrative judge made no error in law or regulation that affects the outcome.” 

Because the Board did not address the issue of timeliness, we likewise do not rely on 

that ground for deciding this case. 
The basis of Mr. Evan’s petition for review is his contention that the settlement 

agreement is “100 percent fraud” and that his attorneys “were never authorized to 

settle” the case. 

A settlement agreement is presumed valid absent a showing of fraud or mutual 

mistake. Asberry v. U.S. Postal Serv., 692 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1982); see

Sargent v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 229 F.3d 1088, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 

Mere allegations of fraud, unsupported by corroborating evidence, are insufficient to 

satisfy the heavy burden that must be met in order to demonstrate that a settlement 

agreement is invalid. See Tiburzi v. Dep’t of Justice, 269 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 

2001). 

Aside from uncorroborated assertions, Mr. Evans proffers no persuasive 

evidence in support of his allegations of fraud. Mr. Evans was represented by counsel 

when he accepted the terms of the settlement agreement, the last page of the 

agreement contains his signature, and all prior pages of the agreement contain the 

handwritten initials of Mr. Evans’s lawyer. Also, after reviewing the terms of the 

settlement agreement, the administrative judge found that it was “voluntarily entered 

into, understood by the parties, and lawful on its face.” There is nothing in the record to 

indicate otherwise. Furthermore, Mr. Evans offers no evidence to substantiate the 

alleged lack of settlement authority of his attorney. See Amin v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 

951 F.2d 1247, 1254-55 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[A]n attorney retained for litigation purposes 

is presumed to possess express authority to enter into a settlement agreement on 

behalf of the client, and the client bears the burden of rebutting this presumption with 

affirmative proof that the attorney lacked settlement authority.”). 

2010-3003 2 
2010-3003 3 

As this court has previously made clear, “[t]hose who employ the judicial 

appellate process to attack a settlement through which controversy has been sent to 

rest bear a properly heavy burden” of proving that the agreement was involuntarily 

obtained. Asberry, 692 F.2d at 1380. Our review is limited to setting aside any action 

that is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 

with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having 

been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (2006); 

Briggs v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 331 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Because bare 

allegations of fraud, absent evidence thereof, do not suffice to demonstrate the invalidity 

of a settlement agreement, the Board’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 

of discretion or, otherwise, not in accordance with law. 

No Costs.