1

06- 4216- cv A r a r v . A sh c r o ft e t a l.
UN ITED STA TES CO URT OFAP P EALS F OR TH E S ECO N D CI RCU IT Aug us t T erm, 200 7 (A rgue d: No vem ber

9, 2 007 Dec id ed: J un e 30 , 20 08 Err ataFiled : Augus t 1 , 20 08) Do cket No . 06 -4 216 -cv M AHER A RAR , Pl

aint iff -A ppella nt ,
v. J OHN A S H CRO FT , f

ormer ly Atto rney

Gen er al o f the U ni te d S tat es ; L AR RY D. T HOMP S ON , fo rmer ly D epu ty At to rney Gen er al; T OM RI DGE , as Secretary of State of Homela nd Security; J. S CO TT B LAC KM AN , as Reg ional Director of the Reg

ional Office of I mmigr ati onandNat

ur ali zat io n S er vic es ; P AULA C O RRI GAN , Re gional Direc tor of I mmigr ati onandCus to ms Enf or cem ent ; E DWA R D J. M C E L R OY , f ormer ly D is tr ict Director of I mmigration and Naturaliz ation Service s for New Y ork District, and now Cus to ms Enf

or cem ent ; R O BERT M UEL L ER , Director of the Federal Bur eau of I nv es tigat io n; J OHN D OE 1-10, Federal Bureau of Investigation and/or Immigration and Natur ali zat

io n S er vic e Age nt s ; J AM E S W. Z I GLAR , formerly Commiss ioner for I mmigr ati onandNat

ur ali zat io n S er vic es ; U NI T ED S TATES O F A M ERI CA , Defenda nts-App ellees
. B ef or e: M C L

A U G H L IN , C AB R ANES , and S ACK , Circuit Jud ges. Pl ain ti ff , a d ual cit izenof Syr ia an d Can ada, who all eges th at h e was mi s tr eat ed b y U. S. o ff ici als inth e Unit ed S tat es andr emo vedto Syr ia wi thth e kn owl edg e or

in te nt io n that Syr ianautho r it ies would in te rr oga te hi m und er

to r tur e, b r ought

an ac ti onagai ns t the U ni te d S tat es andvar io us U.S . o ff

ici als purs uant to the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U. S.C. § 1350 note (“TVPA”), and the Fifth Ame nd men t t o the U .S. Con s ti tu ti on . D ef end ant s mo vedto di s mi s s th e co mp lai nt fo r lack of s ub ject matter juris diction and for failure to state a claim upon which relie f can be granted, and severalof the individualdefendants also moved to dismiss the complai nt for lackof pers onal jurisdiction. In2

addition, the Unite d States assert ed the state-secrets pr ivileg e with respect to information at the core of plaintiff’s claims. The United States Distr ict Court for the Eastern Dis trict of New York (David G. T r ager , Judge

) granted defendants’ motion to dismis s without r eac hing the issues r aised by the a ss ertion of th e s tat e- s ecr et s pr

ivileg e by th e Unit ed S tat es . We l

ikewis e evalu ateth e claim s pr es ent ed und er applic able l aw a nd beca use thos e claims do not s urvive that review , we do not consider whe ther the
assert ion of the state-s ecrets privilege by the United States compel s the dismiss al of this action; nor

nee d we det ermine o n thi s app eal whether , as def end ant s con te nd , the I mmigr ati onandNat io nal it y Act forecloses the litiga tion in federal district court of plaintiff’s r emoval-rela ted claims. With respect to the
other ju r is di ct io nal qu es ti on s r ais ed o n thi s app eal, we co nclud e that (1 ) the allegati on s s et

fo r thin plaintiff’s complaint are sufficient, at this early stage of the litiga tion, to establish pers onal jurisdiction

ov er def end ant s no t r es id ent

inNew York, b ut (2) p lai nt if f h as no t e s tab lis hedfe der al s ub ject matte r jurisdiction over his claim for declaratory relief. Furthermor e, we hold that (3) plaintiff’s allegations do
not st ate aclai m against defendants f or damages under the TVPA and (4) in light of the determinations of Congress and precedents of the Supreme Court and our Court, we ca nnot judicially crea te a ca use of action for damage s under the Fif th Amendment, for plaintiff, purs uant to the doctrine of Bi vens v . Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents , 403 U.S. 3 88 (1971). Affirmed. Judge Sack c oncurs in part and diss ents in part in a separate opinion. D A V I D C O LE , Cent er

fo r Con s ti tu ti on al Right s , N ew Yo r k, N .Y. (Katherine Galla gher, William Goodman, MariaCouri LaHood, Jules Lobel, Barbara Olshansky, Center for Constitutional Rights, New York, NY, Joshua S. Sohn. Robert Fink, Stanle y McDermott I II, Sarah J. Sterken, DL A P ip er U.S . L LP , N ew Yo r k, N Y, on the brief ), for Plainti ff-App ellant Mah er Arar. D E N N I S B ARGHAAN , Assis tant Unit ed S tat es At to rney (Ch uck Ros enb erg, U ni te d S tat es At to rney , La rry Gr egg, R. J os ephSh er , As s is tan t U ni te d S tat es At to rney s , o n th e brief ), United States Attorney’s Off ice for the Ea stern Di s tr ict of Vir ginia, Alex and r

ia, VA, for Defendant-Ap

pellee John Ashcroft.3 J AMI E K

I LB ERG (J oh n J . Cas s idy, S te ph en L . B r aga, J ef fr ey A. La mk en, Allys onN. Ho , St eph ani e R. D our ado , o n th e brief ), B aker B otts LLP, Was hi ngt on , D C, for DefendantAppellee Lar

ry T hompso n. J EF F R EY B UCHO LZ , P r

in cip al D epu ty

As s is tan t A tt orney Gen er al, (P et er

J . Keis ler , As s is tan t A tt orney Gen er al, Rosylnn R . Mauskopf, United States Attorney, Eastern Distr ict of New York, Barbara L. Herwig, Robert M. Lo eb, M ary Ham pt onM as on , J er emy S. B rum bel ow, on the brief ), Unit ed S tat es Dep ar tm ent of J us ti ce, Was hi ngt on , D C, for Official C apa city Defendants-Ap

pellees and for Amicus Cu riae the United States of America
. Shve taKa ka r, (

Je re my Maltby , Ma rga re t L. C a rte r, G eo rge Ja me s B agn all V) , O ’M elv eny

& Myer s LLP, Lo s Ang eles , CA andNew York, N Y, for Defendant-Ap pellee Robert S. Mueller III
. T ho mas G. Roth, Wes t O r ang e, N J , for Defendant-Ap

pellee J. Scott Bl ack man. Thomas M . Sulliva n (Debra L. Roth on the brief ), Sh aw, B r ans fo r d, Veilleux & Ro th , P .C., Was hi ngt on , D C, for Defenda nt-App ellee Edward J. McElroy. Will iamA. M cDa ni el, J r . (

B as s el B akh os , on the brief

), B alt im or e, M arylan d, for Defendant-Ap

pellee James W. Ziglar. Sid ney S. Ro s dei tc her , P aul , Wei s s , Rif kin d, Wharto n & Garris on LLP(Jonathan Hafetz , Br ennan C enter for J us ti ce at New York Unive r s it

y Sch oo l o f Law

, o n th e brief ), New York, N Y, fo r A mic

us Cur iae Ret ir ed F ede ral Judges, supporting Plain tiff-App ellant. Nan cy M or awetz, N ew Yo r k Unive r s it y Sch oo l o f Law, N ew York, N Y, for Amicus Cu riae U.S. an d C ana dia n Scholars, supp orting Plaintiff-Ap

pellan t. B r idget Ar im on d, Cent er

fo r I nt ernat io nal HumanRigh ts , No r th wes te rn U ni

ver s it y Sch oo l o f Law, Chicago, I L, for Amicus C uriae C enter for I nternationa l Huma n Ri

ghts of No rt hwe st er n Uni ver si ty Sc ho o l o f Law , s uppo rt ing Pl aint iff

Appella nt. Kris tine A. Hus key (Akbar Siddi qui, Sabrin a Balgamwalla, ofM r S id d iq u i a n d M s. B a lga m w a ll a ap p e a r p u rsu a n t t o L o c a l R u le 4 6 (e) (ap p e a ra n c e b y e li g ible l a w stu d e n ts). * 4 counsel ), Inte rna tio nal

Human Rig

hts La w Cl ini c, Am eri can * Univer sity Washingt on College of L aw, for Am icus C uriae Cent er f or Ju sti ce an d Account

abil ity , Inte rna tio nal

Fe de rat ion for Hu man Right s, Minn e so ta A dv oc a te s f

or H u man Right s, Worl d Organization Against T ort ure, supporting PlaintiffAppellant
. Baher Azmy (Jenny-Brooke Condon, Meetali Jain, Scott Mich elm an, of counsel

), Center for Social Justice, Seton Hall L aw Sc ho ol , fo r A mic

us Cur iae Schola rs of American Con s ti tu ti on al L aw, supp orting Plaintiff-Ap pellan t. J OS É A. C AB R ANES , Circuit Jud ge : On September 26, 2002 , plaintiff-appella nt Maher Arar, a dual c itizen of Syria a nd Ca nada, and the subject of a U.S. gov ernment “lookout,” J.A. 88, w as detained by U.S. authorities at John F. Kennedy International airport in New York Ci ty (“JFK Airport”) while e n route fr om Tunis ia to M on tr eal. On October 7, 2002, J. Scott Blackma n, then the U.S. Immigration and Na turalization Ser vic e ( “I NS ”) Regi on al D ir ect or fo r th e Eas te rn Reg

io n, det ermined , b as ed o n a r evi ew o f c las s if ied and uncla ss ified information, that Arar was a member of Al Qae da and the refore inadmiss ible to the United States. Purs uant to this determination, Blackman signed a n order authorizing Arar to be

r emo vedto Syr

ia “w itho ut fur th er in quir y be fo r e an immigr ati onju dge , inacco r dan ce wi th[8 U.S .C. § 122 5(c) (2)(

B ) an d 8 C.F .R. § 235 .8(

b) ]. ” Id
. at 8 6. In February 2004, the Ca nadia n Government convene d an official c ommiss ion (“the Commission”) to look into “the actions of Canadi an officials in relation to” A rar’s detention in the Unit ed S tat es , his even tu al r emo val to Syr ia, andhi s s ub s equ ent

det ent io n b y Syr ianautho r it ies
. See Commission of I nquiry into the Actions of Cana dian Officials in R elation to Maher Arar, Ana lysis and Reco mm end ati on s 11- 12 ( 200 6) (“ CanadianCom mi s s io n, Anal ys is andReco mm end ati on s ”) (d es cr ib ing the s cop e of

th e in quir

y) . The Co mmis s io n d et erminedth at Canadianof fi cial s had “requested” that America n authorities create lookouts for Arar and his wife, had de scribed Arar to America n authorities as an “Islamic Extremist individual[] suspected of being linked to the A l QaedaW e do no t adoptor ot her w i s e en dors e t he f i ndi ng s of

t he Com m i s s i on. O ur r ef er ence t o t he e xi s t ence of 1 t hes e f i ndi ng s i s con s i s t entwi t h our or der of O ct ober 23, 2007 , i n whi ch we g r ant ed A r ar ’ s m ot i on t o t ake j udi ci al noti ce o f th e e x ist e n c e o f th e re p o rt a n d sc o p e o f it s c o n ten ts bu t d e c li n e d to ta k e j u d icia l n o ti c e o f th e find ing s se t fo rth t her ei n. A r a r s u e s T h o mp s o n , Z i g l a r , B l a c k ma n , Mc E l r o y a n d t h e Do e d e f e n d a n t s i n t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l c a p a c i t i e s . He 2 s ues A s hcr of

t an d M uel l er i n bo t h t hei r i ndi vi dual an d off i ci al ca pac i t i es H i s com pl ai nt na m es t he Se cr et ar y of H o m e la n d S e c u r ity a n d th e R e g io n a l D ire c to r o f I m m ig r a tio n a n d C u sto m s E n fo r c e m e n t in th e ir o ff ic ia l c a p a c itie s o n ly
.
5 te rr or is t m ov eme nt ,” an d h ad p r ov id ed A mer

icanautho r

it ies with i nf

ormat io n d er ive d f r omth eir inves tigat io ns of Ar ar . Id
. at 1 3. The Co mmis s io n f ur th er det erminedth at “ [i

]t [wa ]s ver y li kely that , in making the de cisions to detain and remove Mr. Arar, American a uthorities r elied on i nformation about M r . Ar ar pr ov id ed b y the [

Royal CanadianM ount ed P ol

ice] .” Id
. at 14. Ac cordingly, the C ommiss ion recommended that C anadi an authorities consider granting Arar’s request for compensation fr om the Canadiangov ernm ent . Id

. at 369. In January 2007 , the Ca nadia n government entered into a settlement agreeme nt with Arar, whereby he receive d compensation of 11.5 million C anadi an dolla rs (ap pr oxim ate ly $ 9.7 5 mill

io n, at the t

im e) inexch ang e f

or withd r awing a la

ws ui t again s t the Can adi an gov ernm ent . See I an Au s te n, Ca nad a W ill Pay $9.75 Million to Man Sent to Syr ia a nd Tortured

, N .Y . Ti me s, J an. 27, 200 7, a t A 5. 1 OnJ anu ary 22 , 20 04, s ho r tly be fo r e the ini ti ati onof th e Cana di an inqui ry, Ar ar filedthis civ

il action a gainst Blackman, former U.S. Attorney Gene ral John Ashcrof t, FB I Director Robert Mueller, former Acting A ttorney General Larry D. Thomps on, former I NS Commissioner J ames W. Z iglar, INS Distr ict Director Edwa rd J. M cElroy, the Secretary of Homela nd Security, the R egiona l Director of Immigration and Customs Enfor cement for the New Y ork Region, and several unna med employe es of th e F B I andI NS
. Ar ar

all eges th at thes e in di

vid ual s mi s tr eat ed himwhile h e was inth e Unit ed S tat es 2 andth en r emo vedhi m t o S yr ia wi thth e kn owl edg e or

in te nt io n that he w ouldbe d et ain ed an d t or tur ed th er e. Count

on e of Ar ar ’s com pl ain t r equ es ts r eli ef un der th e T or tur e Vic tim P r ot ect io n Ac t, 28 U.S.C . § 1350 note (“TVPA”). Counts two and three request relief under the Fifth Amendment to the6

U.S. C onstitut

ion for Arar’s alle ged torture (Count two) and detention (Count three) in Syria. Count fo ur r equ es ts r eli ef

un der th e Fif thAme nd men t o f the U .S. Con s ti tu ti onfo r even ts all egedto hav e occurred while Arar was detaine d in the United State s. With respect to relief, Arar seeks a decla ratory ju dgm ent th at d ef end ant s ’ co nd uct

vio lat ed his “co ns ti tu ti on al, civ il, andin te rnat

io nal humanr igh ts ,”

as well as com pen s ato ry andpuni ti ve d amages fo r

th e s tatut or

y andcon s ti tu ti on al v

io lat io ns all egedin th e co mp lai nt . Com pl . 24
. In a memorandum and order dated February 16, 200 6, the United Sta tes Dis trict Court for the Eas te rn D is tr

ict of New York ( Dav idG. T r ager , Judge

) dis mi s s ed Co un ts on e thr ough thr ee o f A r ar ’s suit, pur suant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rule s of Civil Procedure, for f ailure to state a cl aim upon whi ch r eli ef

can b e gr ant ed. See Ar

ar v . A sh cr o ft , 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 287-88 (E.D.N.Y . 2006). The Di s tr ict Cour t dis mi s s ed Co un t f

our witho ut pr eju di ce, p ur s uan t t o Rule 1 2( b) (2), fo r lack of per s on al jurisdiction over the individual de fendants. Upon receiving notice that Arar had e lected not to ame nd hi s com pl ain t t o cur e the j ur is di ct io nal def ect s fo un d b y the D is tr

ict Cour t, th e Clerk o f Co ur t e nt er ed ju dgm ent di s mi s s ing the ac ti onwith p r eju di ce o n Augus t 1 7, 2 006 . Ar ar no w br ings this app eal. Ar ar ’s s ui t i mp lic ate s s ever al ques ti on s of fir s t imp r es s io n f

or our Cour t. On e thr es ho ld question pres ented on this appea l is whether, as defendants contend, the Immigration and Na tionality Act (“ I NA”), 8 U. S.C. § 11 01 et seq. , deprived the District Court of s ubject matter jurisdiction over the clai ms r aised in C ounts t

wo and three of Arar’s complaint. The adj udication of this question is , for the

r eas on s s et

fo r thbel ow, see infra

at [ 17- 19] , p ar ti cul arly dif fi cul t in l igh t o f the r eco r d b ef

or e us . Ho we ve r, b ec a use we a re co mp elle d to di smi ss the se c laim s onthe ba sis o f othe r th re sho ld—th a t i s, non-merits —grounds, we need not determine whether the INA did, in fact, strip the Dis trict Court of sub je ctma tte r ju risdic ti onto h ea r A ra r’s re mo va l-r el a te d c laim s. We must therefore determine (1) whether the distr ict court had personal jurisdiction over the in di vid ual def end ant s ; ( 2) whe th er

Ar ar ’s all egat

io n that U.S . o ff ici als con s pi r ed w

ith S yr ianautho r it ies
to to r tur e him s tat es a claim again s t the U .S. of fi cial s un der

th e T VPA; (3) whe th er

to cr eat e a ju di cial7

damag es remedy, pursuant to Bivens v . Six Unknown Federal Na rcotics Agents , 403 U.S. 3 88 (1971), for Ar ar ’s clai ms th at U .S. of

fi cial s (a) r emo vedhi m t o S yr ia wi thth e kn owl edg e or

in te nt io n that he w ould be detai ned and tortured there and (b) mistreated him whil e he w as detained i n the United States; and finally,(4 ) whether Ar ar may s eek adec lar ato ry ju dgm ent th at d ef end ant s ’ act

io ns vio lat ed his

co nsti tutio na l ri gh ts. For the reasons that follow, we conc lude that under the prece dents of the Supreme C ourt and

ou r Cou r t: (1 ) A r ar

has mad e a pri

ma fac ie s ho wing s uf

fi cien t t o es tab lis h p er s on al j ur is di ct io n o ver Thomps on, Ashcroft, and Mueller at this early stage of the litigation; (2) C ount one of Arar’s complaint

mu st be di smi ssed be ca use Ar a r’s a ll eg a ti on s re ga rdi ng hi s re mo va l t o S yriado no t sta te acl aim again st def end ant s un der

th e T VPA; (3) Count s tw o an d thr ee o f A r ar ’s com pl ain t, whi ch e nv is age the j udici al creation of a c ause of action pursuant to the doctrine of Bi vens, must also be dis miss ed bec ause (a) the

r eme di al s che me e s tab lis hedby Co ngr es s is s uf fi cien t t o cau s e us to r ef

r ainfr omcr eat

ing a f r ee standing damag es remedy for Arar’s removal-related c laims; and (b) assuming for the sake of the

argum ent th at the e xis te nce of

a r eme di al s che me e s tab lis hedby Co ngr es s was in s uf fi cien t t o co nv

in ce us, “sp ec ia l fa ct ors” of the ki ndid en ti fie d b y the Su pre me C ou rt i n i ts Bivens ju r is prud enc e co un s el agai ns t the j udici al cr eat

io n o f adam ages r eme dy f or clai ms ar is ing f r omAr ar ’s r emo val

to Syr ia; (4 ) Count four of Arar’s complaint must be dismiss ed bec ause Arar’s allega tions about the mistreatment he suff er ed wh il e i n th e U ni te d S ta te s do no t sta te acl aim again st de fe nd a nts u nd erthe Du e P roc ess Clau s e of th e Fif thAme nd men t; and(5 ) A r ar has no t ad equ ate ly es tab lis hedfe der al s ub ject matte r jurisdiction over his r equest for a judgment decla ring that defendants acted illega lly by removing him to Syr ia s o that Syr ianautho r it ies couldin te rr oga te hi m und er to r tur e. In the circumstances pres ented, we need not consider the issues r aised by the a ss ertion of the
state-s ecrets privilege by

the United States—particula rly, whether the ex clusion of information pursuant
to th e pr ivileg e might

r es ul t in the dis mi s s al o f c er tain o f A r ar ’s clai ms . We do not doubt that if Congress were so incline d, it could exe rcise its powers under the8

Constitution to authorize a ca use of action for money damage s to r edress the type of claims ass erted by Ar ar inthis act io n. T he f

act r emain s , h owever , that

Congr es s has no t d on e s o. I ns te ad, it has cho s en to es tab lis h a r eme di al p r oce s s th at d oes no t includ e a cau s e of act io n f or dam ages agai ns t U .S. of

fi cial s fo r in ju r ies ar is ing f r omth e exe r cis e of

th eir di s cr et io nar y autho r it y t o r emo ve i nad mi s s ib le al ien s . We
ar e no t f r ee t o b e in di ff

er ent to th e de te rminat

io ns of Congr es s , o r

to ign or e the S up r emeCour t’ s instructions to exercise great ca ution when considering whether to devise new a nd heretofore unknown, ca uses of

action. Judge Sac k concurs in part and dissents in part. Specific ally , Judge Sac k agree s with the maj or it y that (1 ) A r ar has mad e a prima

facie s ho wing s uf

fi cien t t o es tab lis h p er s on al j ur is di ct io n o ver T ho mp s on , As hcr of

t, andM ueller ; (

2) Ar ar ’s all egat

io ns r egar di ng his r emo val to Syr ia d o n ot s tat e a claim again s t d ef

end ant s un der

th e T VPA; an d (3) Ar ar

has no t ad equ ately es tab lis hedfe der al s ub ject matter juris diction over his request f or a judgment dec laring that defenda nts acted illeg ally by removing hi m t o S yr

ia s o that Syr ianautho r it ies couldin te rr oga te hi m und er to r tur e. Unlik e the m ajo r

it y, h owever , J udge S ack w ouldaccep t Ar ar ’s invitati onto ju di cially cr eat e a
new Bi vens r eme dy an d wo ul d p ermi t A r ar ’s clai ms fo r mo net ary dam ages to go f or war d b as ed o n his view tha t (1) the context giving rise to Counts two and three of Arar’s complaint—the detention and dep or tat io n o f as us pec te d t err or

is t p ur s uan t t o the dis cr et

io n co nf err ed o n the A tt orney General—raises no “‘specia l factors’ counsel[ing] agai nst the appli cation of Bi vens,” see Diss ent at [ 46] ; and(2) the c on s ti tu ti on al r igh ts th at A r ar ’s com pl ain t inv ok es ar e s uf fi cien tly br oadand“cl ear ” that Ar ar may s tat e a Bivens claim b as ed o n the c on di ti on s of hi s det ent

io n wi thinth e Unit ed S tat es , see i d. at [ 51] The analy sis by whic h Judge Sac k reache s thes e conc lusions is , in our view, unde rmined by

con tr adi ct or

y as s er ti on s andmi s s tat eme nt s of th e law . We highlig

ht th r ee p r omin ent

exam pl es her e. Firs t, Judge Sack ’s opinion does not grapple with the complic ated le gal que stions arising fromthe extraterritor

ial a pplica tion of the U.S. Constitution: it casts the cha llenge d actions “as perpetrated by U.S . age nt s ent

ir ely w ithi n the U ni te d S tat es ,” id. at [ 48 a t n .3 3] , but then looks to Arar’s alle ged torture9

by Sy ri an aut ho ri ti es in S y ri a as the basis for

Arar’s Fif th Amendment claim, id. at [29 -30 ] (o bs er ving that “interrogation by torture” undoubtedly “shocks the conscience ” and that “whether the defendants violated A rar’s Fifth Amendment rights” does not turn on who Arar claims committed the tortur e or where Arar claims the tortur e took plac e). Sec ond, despite recogniz ing that Arar’s Fifth Amendment claim i s bas ed o n allegati on s th at A r ar was re mo ved f rom the Uni ted St ate s i n o rde r t o be t o rt ur ed i n Sy ri a , J udge Sacknevertheless concludes that Arar’s suit involves no “questions of law a nd fact . . . a rising fr om any action tak en or proceeding brought to remove an a lien from the Uni ted States,” 8 U.S .C. § 125 2( b) (9 ) (e mp has is add ed) —ther eby avo iding the dif

fi cul t q ues ti onof whe th er § 12 52( b) (9 ) s tr ip pedth e Di s tr

ict Cou r t o f s ub ject

matte r ju r is di ct io n t o h ear

Ar ar ’s r emo val -r elat ed c lai ms . See Diss ent [ 45 n . 3 1]
. Third, J udge Sa ck take s the pos ition that “[t]he assess ment of Arar’s alleged c omplaint must take into

acco un t the e nt

ir e ar c of fa ctual all egat io ns th at A r ar

mak es ,” id

. at [ 27] , but criticizes the majority for

co nsi de rin g, wh enev alu a ti ng Ar a r’s Bi vens clai m, “the fac

t-speci fic ‘co nt ext ’ o f A r ar ’s tr eatmen t, ” id. at [ 40]
. Such is the freedom enjoye d by the writer of a dissenting opinion. Thos e cha rged with rendering decisions that carry the force of law have no such freedom, howeve r. Our task is to deliver a reasoned opinion that conforms t o the precede nts of the Supreme Court and our Court; we have done so here. We a gree, of course, with Judge Sac k’s view that threats to the nation’s security do not allow

us to jetti s onpr

in cip les of “s im pl e ju s ti ce an d f

air deal ing.” Id
. at [55 ] But these parlous times of national c halle nge ca n no more expand the pow ers of the judicia ry than they ca n contract the rights of individual s. The crea tion of civil dama ge cl aims is quintess entially a leg islative function, and the protection of national security and c onduct of for eign a ffairs are primarily exe cutive. W hateve r the

emo ti ve f or ce o f the dis s ent ’s char act er izat io n o f the c om pl ain t, we can no t dis figur e the j udici al function to satis fy personal indignation. I. Bac kgrou nd A. F act s al

le ge dJud ge Sack charact eri zes “[ t]he f act t hat A rar di d not choose t o veri fy hi s com pl ai nt . . . [ as] i rr el evan t . ” 3 D issen t [ 2 n. 3] A s s et f or t h be l ow, t hi s f

actdet er m i nes whet her t he c om pl ai nt i t s el f m ay s er ve a s evi dence i n s uppor t of t he a l l eg ati ons m ade t her ei n— an i s s ue t hat , i n t urn , bea r s on w het her t he I N A ’ s j uri s di ct i on- s t r i ppi ng pr ovi s i ons d e p r iv e d th e D istr ic t C o u r t o f s u b je c t m a tte r ju r isd ic tio n o v e r A r a r ’s r e m o v a l-r e la te d c la im s. Se ein f r a [ 18 - 20] 10 Arar’s complaint, whic h is unverified, sets forth the following rele vant factua l alle gations. On 3 September 26, 200 2, U.S. immigration officia ls detained Arar at JFK Airport while he wa s tr ansferr ing fl igh ts onhi s way f

r omT unis ia t o M on tr eal. He remaine d in U.S. custody for twelve da ys. For m ost of this time, he was held a t the Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”) in Brooklyn, NY. Arar claims th at o n the evening of

Sep te mb er

26, he w as “pl acedins ol

it ary co nf in eme nt ” ina r oo m wi thno bed andwith l igh ts th at w er e lef

t o n all nigh t. Com pl . ¶ 3 2. O n the m orni ng o f S ept emb er 27, he w as all egedly ques ti on ed b y F B I agen ts who ign or ed his r equ es ts to s ee a l awyer or mak e a t elep ho ne c all
. Ar ar all eges th at his r equ es ts to s ee a l awyer or mak e a t elep ho ne c all

wer e als o igno r ed b et

ween Sep te mb er

27 andOct ob er

1. OnOct ob er

1, A r ar was pr es ent ed w

ith a d ocumen t s tat

ing that th e I NS haddet erminedth at he w as a me mb er

of Al Q aedaandwas th er ef

or e in admis s ib le t o the U ni te d S tat es ; h e was th en permitted to make a tel ephone c all to his family, who retained alawy er on his behalf. The complaint fur th er all eges th at A r ar

met hi s lawy er

at the MDC o n the evening of Oct ob er 5; that , af te r this

mee ting, onth e eve ni ng o f S un day, Oct ob er 6, d ef end ant M cElr oy l ef

t a m es s age n ot

if ying Ar ar ’s lawy er that the INS wished to question Arar f urther; that I NS officials then immediately proceede d to question Arar, having falsely told him that his lawye r had chosen not to be present; that, on the fo llowing day, I NS of

fi cial s fals ely informed Arar’s lawy er that Arar had been transferred fr om the MDC to an unidentified de tention facility i n New Jersey when, i n fact, Arar wa s s till being he ld at the MDC; andth at o n O ct ob er 8, d ef end ant T ho mp s ons ign ed anor der autho r izing A r ar ’s r emo val
. The complaint further alleges that, al though Arar had designate d Ca nada a s the country to which he wished to be removed, on October 8, 2002, U.S . officials caused him to be transported fr om the MDC to New Jersey, where he was flown to Wa shington D.C.; and from Washington D.C . to11

Amm an, J or dan , wh er e J or danianautho r it ies turnedhi m o ver

to Syr ianmilitary of

fi cial s . Syr

ian authorities allege dly kept A rar in custody for approximately

twelve months; initially subjected him to “physicaland psychologi cal torture”—including regular bea tings and threats of severe physical ha rm; andcon finedhi m thr ougho ut this ti me in anun der

gr oundcell

s ix f eet lo ng, s evenfe et

high, andth r ee fe et wid e. Id
. ¶¶ 5 1- 58. Ar ar all eges , “[o] n i nf

ormat io n an d b eli ef

,” that he w as r emo vedto Syr

ia p ur s uan t t o the U .S. gov ernm ent ’s “ex tr aor di nar y r endit io n” p ol icy, with the kno wledge o r in te nt io n that Syr ianof fi cial s
wouldextr act

in fo rmat io n f r omhi m thr ough t or tur e. Id
. ¶ 57. He further alleg es, “[o]n information and beli ef,” that defenda nts pr ovided Syrian authorities with information about him, suggested s ubjects for Syrian authorities to int errogate him about, a nd receive d “all i nformation coerced from [him] dur ing [thes e] int err oga ti on s .” Id
. ¶¶ 55-56. Thompson, “as Acting Attorney Gene ral,” is alle ged “[o]n in fo rmat io n an d b eli ef

” t o h ave s ign ed the o r der autho r izing A r ar ’s r emo val

to Syr ia. Id
. ¶ 48
. B. Pr ocedural hi story OnJ anu ary 24 , 20 05, th e Unit ed S tat es fo rmally as s er te d the s tat e- s ecr et s pr ivileg e ov er in fo rmat io n r elat ing t o Co un ts on e thr ough thr ee o f A r ar ’s com pl ain t. Sp ecif ically, th e Unit ed S tat es explained: Li tigat ing [ Ar ar ’s claims] wo ul d n eces s it atedi s clo s ur e of clas s if iedin fo rmat

io n, in clu di ng: (1 ) th e bas is fo r

th e de cis io n t o ex clu de [

Ar ar ] f r om[the U ni te d S tat es] b as ed o n the f in di ng that [he] was a me mber of . . . al Qae da . . .; (2) the ba sis for the rejec tion of [Arar’s] designation of Ca nada a s the country to which [he] wished to be removed . . .; and (3) the considerations invo lve d i n the d ecis io n t o r emo ve [ Ar ar ] t o S yr ia. J .A. 131 -3 2, 1 35- 36. Sh or tly ther eaf te r , all d ef end ant s mo vedto di s mi s s Ar ar ’s claims agai ns t them
. They contended, among other things, that Counts one through thr ee of Arar’s complaint should be dismis sed because the a ss ertion of the s tate-secrets pr ivileg e by the Uni ted States prevented them fromI n Zuc ke rbr au n v . G e n e r

al D y n amic s C o r p. , 9 3 5 F .2 d 5 4 4 (2 d C ir. 1 9 9 1 ), w e o b se r v e d th a t, “[ o ]n c e p r o p e r ly 4 i nvok ed , t he eff

ect of t he [s t at e-s ecret s ] pri vi l ege i s t o excl ud e [ pri vi l eged ] evi d ence f rom t he case. ” Id. at 54 6. T hu s, a lt h o u g h a p lain ti ff ‘s co m p lain t m a y “sta te a c laim fo r re li e f u n d e r n o ti c e p lea d ing ru les,” th e p lain ti ff m a y n o t be ab le to obt ai n “access t o evi d ence necess ary . . . t o s t at e a pri m a f aci e cl ai m . ” Id. at547. U nder s uch ci r cum s t anc es , “ di s m i s s al i s pr oba bl y m os t ap pr opr i at e under R ul e 56 on t he g r ound t hatpl ai nt i ff , who bea r s t he b urden of pr oof , l ack s s uff

i ci ent evi d ence t o carry t hat burd en. ” Id. 12 in tr od ucing evid enc e r equ ir ed t o p r es ent

a me aningf

ul def ens e. B lackman , Ziglar , M cElr oy, 4 T ho mp s on , As hcr of

t, andM ueller

fur th er con te nd ed that

Ar ar hadno t alleg ed s uf

fi cien t p er s on al involveme nt to s tate a c laim a gainst them in their individual c apac ities. Thomps on, Ashcroft, and M ueller con te nd ed, mo r eov er , that th ey wer e no t s ub ject

to per s on al j ur

is di ct io n i n N ew Yo r k. In a memorandum and order filed on February 16, 2006, the Distr ict Court, without reachi ng the issues raised by the assertion of the state-secrets privilege by the United States, dismiss ed Counts

on e thr ough thr ee o f A r ar ’s com pl ain t w ith p r eju di ce an d Co un t f

our witho ut pr eju di ce. Wi thr es pec t to C ou nt o ne , the Di stri ctC ou rt c on cl ud ed tha t A ra r’s a ll eg a ti on s di d n ot st a te acl aim again st def end ant s un der

th e T VPA. See 414F. Supp . 2dat 2 87. With r es pec t t o Co un ts tw o an d thr ee, i t conclude d that “specialfactors” of the kind ide ntified by the Supreme C ourt counseled against the
ext ens io n o f a Bi

vens r eme dy, un der

th e Fif thAme nd men t, fo r

Ar ar ’s all egedin ju r

ies
. Id
. at 2 81- 83. With respect to Count four, involving Arar’s alleg ations about mistr eatment whi le in U.S. custody, the Di s tr ict Cour t d et erminedth at A r ar hads tat ed a c lai m und er

th e Fif thAme nd men t, id. at 2 86, th at def end ant s wer e no t e nt

it ledto qu ali fi ed imm unit

y, id. at 286, but that Arar had not a llege d suff icient personal involvement by

the defendant officia ls to s ue them in their individua l capa cities—let alone to
es tab lis h p er s on al j ur

is di ct io n o ver th os e de fe nd ant s do mi cil ed o ut s id e New York, id. Arar decline d to replead C ount four

of his complaint. Acc ordingly, on August 17, 2006, the Cle rk of Court entered a final judgment dismissing Arar’s complaint with prejudice. This timely appe al followe d. On October 23, we direc ted the parties to submit letter briefs on the question of “whether, and to what extent, the a ss ertion of the s tate-secrets pr ivileg e by the Uni ted States could foreclose our abilit y t o ad ju di cat e claim s ar

is ing f r omCount s on e thr ough thr ee o f the c om pl ain t. ” T he U ni te d13

St ate s , init s lette r

br ief , m ain tainedth at “ [t

]his Cour t c an an d s ho ul d af firm the [ D] is tr ict [C] ou r t’ s judgment without reac hing the [issues r aised by the Uni ted States’s ass ertion of the] s tate-secrets privilege, ” U.S. Letter Br. 8; but that, “if this Court were to reverse the dismis sal of claims 1, 2, or 3, the [D ]i s tr ict [C] our t w ouldth en b e r equ ir ed t o d et ermine o n r ema ndwhe th er any r ein s tat ed c lai m co ul d pr oce ed n ot

withs tan di ng the as s er ti onof th e s tat e- s ecr et s pr

ivileg e,” id. (int ernal

qu ot ati onmarks omitted). Ar ar , inhi s lette r br ief , “ag r ee[d] with the U ni te d S tat es th at thi s Cour t c an an d s ho ul d resolve the pending a ppeal without considering the state[-]s ecrets privilege,” Plaintiff’s L etter Br . 1, on the understanding that, if he prevaile d in our Court, the District Court could conduct the ne cessary “cas e- s pec if

ic inqui r ies [r egar di ng the s tat e- s ecr et s pr ivileg e] . . . o n r ema nd ,” id. at 5
. T her ef or e, wi thth e agr eem ent

of th e parti es , we evaluat e the c lai ms pr es ent ed und er app lic abl e law b ef or e co ns id er

ing wh ether

th e as s er ti onof

th e s tat e- s ecr et s pr

ivileg e by th e Unit ed S tat es r equ

ir es di s mi s s al o f thi s act

io n. II. Dis cussion We revi ew de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismis s pur suant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failur e t o s tat e a cl aim
. Se e, e. g ., In re NYSE Speciali

sts Securities Litigation , 50 3 F .3d89, 95 ( 2dCir . 20 07)
. I n d oi ng s o, we “ac cep t[

] as true the m ate r

ial fa ct s all egedinth e co mp lai nt anddr aw[

] all r eas on abl e in fe r enc es in[the] pl ain ti ff[’ s] f avo r .” See Iqbal v. Hasty , 49 0 F .3d143 , 15 2 ( 2dCir . 20 07) (int ernal qu ot ati onmarks omitte d) , cert. gr anted sub nom ., As

hcr o ft v. I qbal , 76 U.S .L .W. 3 417 , 20 08 WL 336 310 (U .S. J un e 16 , 20 08) (N o. 07- 101 5) . D ef end ant s als o ch all eng ed, pur s uan t t o Rule 1 2( b) (1 ), th e Di s tr

ict Court’s s ubject matter jurisdiction over Arar’s r emoval-rela ted claims and, purs uant to Rule 12(b)(2), its personal jurisdiction over Ashcrof t, Thomps on and Mueller. W e begi n our analysis with a

co nsi de ra ti onof the se thre sho ldissu es. A. Subject m atter ju risdictio n A federal c ourt has s ubject matter jurisdiction over a ca use of action only whe n it “has authority
to adj udicat e the c aus e” p r es s ed in the c om pl ain t. Si no che m In t’ l Co . v . M alay. I nt’ l Shippi ng Co rp. , 12 7 S.A ccor di ng l y, J udge Sac k i s pl ai nl y i ncor r ectt o a s s er t t hatt he a l l eg ati ons s et f or t h i n Arar ’ s com pl ai nt “ m us t be 5 tre a ted as e stab li sh e d fa c ts fo r p re se n t pu rp o se s.” D issen t [ 25]
.

D ef endant s do notcha l l eng e t he D i s t r i ct C our t ’ s s ubj ectm at t er j uri s di ct i on o ver C ount s tw o a nd t hr ee o n 6 A rt i cle II I grou nd s. W e a gre e tha t t he req u i rem en t s of A rt i cle II I hav e b ee n m et w i t h re ga rd t o the se co u nts. 14 Ct. 118 4, 1 188 (2 007). Det ermini ng the e xis te nce of s ub ject matte r ju r is di ct io n i s a th r es ho ldin quir

y,
see id ., anda claim i s “pr op erly dis mi s s ed f or lack of s ub ject matte r ju r is di ct io n und er Rul e 12 (b)( 1) whe n the dis tr

ict cour t l acks th e s tatut or

y or con s ti tu ti on al p owe r

to adj udicat e it ,” Makarova v. United States, 20 1 F .3d110 , 11 3 (

2dCir . 20 00) . Wh en j ur

is di ct io n i s challenged , the p lai nt if f “ bear s th e bur den of s ho wing by

a pr epo nd er anceof

th e evi den ce that

s ub ject matte r ju r is di ct io n exis ts ,” APWU v. Potter , 343 F. 3d619 , 62 3 (

2dCir . 20 03) (int ernal

qu ot ati onmarks omitte d) ; see also Aur ec chi o ne v. S cho o lman Transp. Sys. , 426 F.3d 635, 63 9 (2d Cir. 2005), a nd the distr ict court may ex amine e vidence outside of th e pl eadings to mak e thi s det erminat io n, see Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113. Acc ordingly, “‘[j]urisdiction

mu s t b e s ho wn af

firmat ive ly, andth at s ho wing is no t m ade b y dr awing f r omth e pl eadings in fe r enc es fa vo r abl e t o the p ar ty

as s er ting i t. ’” Potter

, 34 3 F .3dat 6 23 (qu ot

ing Shipp ing Fin. Servs. Corp v. Drakos , 140 F.3d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1998)). When c onsidering a district court ’s adjudica tion of s uch a motion, 5

we r evi ew it s fa ctual

findings fo r

clea r err or andit s legal co nclus io ns de n ov o. See id. at 6 23- 24; Aur ec chi o ne, 42 6 F .3dat 6 38. Def end ant s challenge, ons tatut or y gr ound s , the D is tr

ict Cour t’ s s ub ject

matte r ju r is di ct io n o ver Count s tw o an d thr ee o f A r ar ’s com pl ain t—th e Bi vens clai ms aris ing from his overseas detention and alle ged torture. Specific ally , they conte nd that Congress (1) explicitly foreclosed judici al revie w of the

6 At to rney Gen er al’ s di s cr et

io nar y de cis io ns whe n carrying ou t r emo val -r elat ed d ut ies and(2) c r eat ed an alt ernat ive fo rumto lit

igat e other

r emo val -r elat ed c lai ms , ther eby exce pt ing themfr omth e f

ede r al qu es ti onju r

is di ct io n o f the dis tr

ict cour t. Ar ar

r es po nd s th at his att emp ts to avail him s elf of th at alt ernat ive fo rumwer e thwarte d b y de fe nd ant s andth at i f h e is un abl e t o l it igat e thi s act

io n i n f ede r al di s tr ict cour t, he w

ill hav e no fo rumwhat s oev er to pr es s hi s con s ti tu ti on al cl aim s . The Supreme Court has observed that construing a statute to “preclude judicia l considerationSecti on 1 231 p r ovi des , i n r el eva nt pa r t , t hat“ [ t] he At t or ney G ener al m ay di s r eg ar d” an ali en’ s des i gn ati on o f 7 th e c o u n try to w h ich h e w ishe s to b e re m o v e d i f, a m o n g o th e r th ing s, “ th e go v e rn m e n t of the c o u n try i s n o t w il li n g to accep t t he al i en i nt o t he cou nt ry, ” id. § 1231 ( b) ( 2) ( C ) (i i i) or “ t he At t or ney G ener al deci des t hatr em ovi ng t he a l i en t o t he cou nt ry i s prej ud i ci al t o t he U ni t ed St at es, ” id. § 1 2 3 1 (b )(2 )(C )(iv ).

S e c tio n 1 2 5 2 (a )(2 )(B )(ii) sta te s, in re le v a n t p a r t, th a t “ n o c o u r t sh a ll h a v e ju r isd ic tio n to re v ie w . . . a n y . . . 8 d e c isio n o r a c tio n o f th e A tto r n e y G e n e r a l o r th e S e c r e ta r y o f H o m e la n d S e c u r ity th e a u th o r ity fo r w h ic h is sp e c ifie d
. . . t o be i n t he di s cr et i on o f t he At t or ney G ener al or t he Se cr et ar y of H om el and Sec uri t y, ot her t han t he g r anti ng of [a sy lu m ].”
15 . . . of
. . . an i mp or tan t ques ti onof law . . . w ouldr ais e s er

io us con s ti tu ti on al ques ti on s .” INS v. St. Cyr , 53 3 U. S. 2 89, 314(2 001 ) (of fe r ing thi s ob s er

vat io n i n the c on te xt

of a pet it io n f or wr it of hab eas
corpu s); see also Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 5 92, 603 (1988) (noting that a“‘serious cons titutional question’

. . . wouldar

is e if a f ede r al s tatut e wer e co ns truedto deny any ju di cial fo rumfo r

a col or abl e
con s ti tu ti on al cl aim ” (qu ot ing Bo wen v. M

ic hig an Ac ade my o f F amil y Phy si ci ans , 47 6 U. S. 6 67, 681 & n .12 (1 986)) ); Calc

ano -M art ine z, 232 F. 3dat 3 40. Acco r di ngl y, “whe r e Congr es s in te nd s to pr eclu de j udici al

r evi ew o f c on s ti tu ti on al cl aim s [,] i ts in te nt to do s o m us t b e cle ar .” Webster , 48 6 U. S. a t 6 03 (

no ting, with approval, the Court’s earlier observations t o this eff ect in Wei nbe rg er v. Salf i , 42 2 U. S. 7 49 ( 197 5) andJohnson v. Robison , 41 5 U. S. 3 61 ( 197 4) ). (1) As an ini ti al m att er , d ef

end ant s qu es ti onwhe th er

any f ede r al co ur t h as ju r

is di ct io n t o r evi ew th es e Bi vens clai ms, noting that the INA affor ds the Attorney Gene ral and his deleg ates discretion to send a removable alie n to a country other than the country he ha s designated, 8 U.S.C . § 1231(b)(2)(C), 7 andin s ul ate s fr omr evi ew act io ns tak en p ur s uan t t o that di s cr et io nar y autho r it y, id. § 1252(a

)(2)(B)(ii). 8 Se e, e. g ., Ashcroft B r. 23-25 (invoking 8 U.S.C . § 1231(b)(2)(C) and § 1252(a)(2)(B)( ii) in support

of the propos ition that “insofar as Arar complains about not being sent to his pr eferred designations or about th e de te rmi nat

io n as to mem ber s hip i n a t err or is t o r ganizat io n, Congr es s has fo r eclo s ed any ju di cial review” ). Congress has indeed declined to vest the federal courts with juris diction to review di scretionaryS ee A s hcr of tBr. 22 ( “[ U nder ] t he b as i c j udi ci al r evi ew s chem e of t he I N A [ , ]
. . . cl ai m s ar i s i ng out of ag ency 9 a c tio n s d o n o t b e lo n g in d istr ic t c o u r t.” ); T h o m p so n B r . 1 6 -1 7 ; M u e lle r B r . 1 n .1 (j o inin g i n c o -d e fe n d a n ts’ ar g u m e n ts); B lac k m a n B r. 27 (sam e ); M c E lro y B r. 25 (sam e ); Z iglar B r. 21 (sam e ). 16 dec is io ns of

th e Atto rney

Gen er al o th er

th an the gr ant

ing or denial of as ylum. See 8 U. S.C. § 1252(a )(2)(B)(ii); Camar

a v. De p’t o f H omel and S ec ., 497 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 2007); Atsilov v . Gonzal es , 468 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that the INA “neg ates our juris diction to review a‘decision or action of the Attorney Gene ral . . . the a uthority for which is specified . . . to be in the discretion of the At tor ne y G en er al” (qu oti ng 8 U .S .C . § 12 52 (a

)(2)(B) (ii) ) (fi rst alt er a ti oninori gi na l) ). C on gre ss ha s, ho weve r , in8 U. S.C. § 12 52(a)( 2) (D ), autho r

izedth e “ap pr op r

iat e co ur t o f app eals ” t o co ns id er “constitutional claims or

questions of

law rai sed upon a petition for review filed . . . i n acc ordance with [the j udici al r evi ew p r ov

is io ns of th e I NA] .” See, e.g. , Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. D ept. of Justice, 47 1 F .3d315 , 329 (2d Cir. 2006 ). This provision indicates that Congress did not intend to pr eclude our consideration of r emo val -r elat ed c lai ms th at r ais e qu es ti on s of law o r all ege c on s ti tu ti on al v

io lat io ns , s o l ong as th ey
ar e pr op erly b ef

or e thi s Cour t. (2) As asec on da ry

ma tte r, d ef

en da nts c on te ndtha t, ev enif A ra r ha s raise d c on sti tutio na l c laim s, such claims were not properly before the District Court; and therefor e, are not properly before us on app eal. Sp ecif

ically, th ey as s er t that

I NA p lace s r emoval -r elat ed c lai ms bey on d the r eachof a di s tr ict court’s f ederal que stion jur

isdiction by creating

an al ternative—and e xclusive—mec hanism for resolving those claims. Purs uant to 8 U.S.C . § 1252(b)(9), “all questions of law a nd fact, includi ng 9 in te rpr et ati onandapp lic ati onof con s ti tu ti on al an d s tatut or y pr ov is io ns , ar is ing f r omany a ct

io n t aken

or pr oce eding b r ought

to r emo ve anali en f

r omth e Unit ed S tat es ” ar e ch ann eledin to a ju di cial r evi ew
s che me p r ov

iding that “a p et it io n f or r evi ew f ile d wi than ap pr op r

iat e co ur t o f app eals inacco r dan ce with thi s s ect

io n s hall b e the s ol e andexclus ivemea ns fo r ju di cial r evi ew o f a n o r der

of r emo val ,” 8 U.S .C. § 125 2(a)( 5)
. See also id. § 1231 note (providing for clai ms r elating to the “involuntary return of17

any p er s onto a country inwhi ch ther e ar e s ub s tan ti al gr ound s fo r bel iev ing the p er s onwouldbe in dange r of being subjected to tortur e” to be brought under the judicia l review sche me established by

s ect io n 1 252); Ca lcano-Martinez v. INS. , 232 F. 3d328 , 34 0 ( 2dCir . 20 00) (n ot

ing that th e ju di cial

r evi ew pr ov is io ns of th e I NA p r ov

id e f or “ex clu s iveapp ell atecour t” ju r is di ct io n o ver r emo val -r elat ed c lai ms). De fe nd a nts u rge tha t A ra r’s Bi vens claims r elat ed t o his all egeddet ent io n an d t or tur e inSyr

ia “a r is [e] from [ the] action tak en . . . to remove [Arar] from the United States,” 8 U.S.C . § 1252(b)(9), and th er ef or e canbe r evi ewedonly b y pe ti ti onto th e app r op r iat e co ur t o f app eals —n ot by a f ede r al dis tr

ict
court. Federal district courts , like other Article IIIcourts, are “courts of limited jurisdiction . . . [that] po s s es s only that

po wer autho r izedby Co ns ti tu ti onands tatut e.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allap attahServs
. , 545 U.S . 54 6, 5 52 (

200 5) (int ernal

qu ot ati onmarks omitte d) . We h ave p r evi ou s ly o bs er vedth at “st a tut es . . . tha t v estju di ci al re vi ewof a dm inistra tive ord er s ex cl usive ly inthe co urt s of a pp ea ls a lso pr eclu de dis tr

ict cour ts fr omhear

ing cl aim s th at a r e ‘inex tr

icab ly int er tw

in ed’ with r evi ew o f s uch

or der s .” Merr

itt v. Shuttle, Inc. 245 F. 3d182 , 18 7 ( 2dCir . 20 01) . I n d oi ng s o, ho weve r , we h ave n ot ed tha t “ the te st fo r de te rmi ni ng wh ethe r [asta tut e v estin g e xc lu siv e j uri sdi ctio n i n th e c ou rts o f a pp ea ls] pr eclu des a di s tr

ict cour t f r omhear ing a p ar ti cul ar

clai m i s . . . whe th er

th e claim‘co ul d an d s ho ul d hav e be en’ pr es ent ed t o an d d ecid ed b y a co ur t o f app eals .” Id
. at 1 88 (qu ot

ing City of Tacoma v. T axpay er s o f T acoma , 357 U.S. 3 20, 339 (1958)). Ar ar con te nd s th at h e co ul d n ot hav e pr es ent ed his claims th r ough the p r oce dur e s et fo r thin

s ect io n 1 252 . H e all eges th at d ef end ant s in te nt

io nally p r even te d himfr ompur s ui ng the I NA’ s ju di cial review provisions by denying hi m acc ess t o counsel, conc eali ng his location from his lawyer, and

r emo ving him, ins ecr et , b ef or e hi s lawy er

couldfile a p et

it io n wi thour

Cour t. While we a re not ob liged t o as s um e the truth o f thes e all egat io ns whe n evalu ating whether a claim s ho ul d b e di s mi s s ed fo r lack of s ub ject matte r ju r is di ct io n, see Makarova, 20 1 F .3dat 1 13, we will d o s o h er e f or th e s ol e purpos e of considering whether Arar’s alleg ations, if true, would c ompel a de termination that the18

Di s tr ict Cour t h ad s ub ject

matte r ju r is di ct io n. T her e is autho r

it y f or th e pr op os it

io n that of fi cial ob s truct io n s imila r

to th at alle gedby A r ar may (1 ) e xcu s e a pl ain ti ff

’s failur e t o co mp ly wi tha f iling d eadl in e, see, e.g . , Os hiver v. Le v in, Fi sh bei n, Sedra n & B er

man , 38 F.3d 1380, 13 87 (3d Cir. 1994) (equita ble tolling), or (2) bar a defenda nt fr om
as s er ting c er tain d ef

ens es , s uchas failur e t o ex hau s t ad mini s tr ati ve r eme di es , see, e.

g. , Abne y v. M cG inni s, 380 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 2004) (equitabl e estoppel). Howev er, Arar has set f orth no authorit

y—and

we a re awa re of none—for the proposition that allega tions of past interference permit a plaintiff to avoid acongressionally manda ted remedial sche me altoge ther. In other words, it appears that no court has yet con s id er ed whether

of fi cial mi s con du ct

of th e s or t alleg ed b y Ar ar

may vit iat e Congr es s ’s determination that a fede ral distr ict court is not the appropriate forum for litigating c laims arising from

an o r der of r emo val
. T hat we ar e as kedto dec id e thi s is s ue o n the b as is of all egat io ns s et fo r thinan unv er

if ied

com pl ain t h eig

ht ens our hes it ati on . Whilea ver

if iedcom pl ain t m ade “ un der oath ab ou t a m att er withi n [ th e pl ain ti ff

’s] kno wledge, ” Doral Produce Corp. v. Paul Steinb erg As soc. , 347 F.3d 36, 39 (2d C ir. 200 3) , co ns ti tu te s evi den ce ins up po r t o f the f act s all egedinth e co mp lai nt , see Co lo n v. Co ug hli n , 58 F. 3d 865 , 87 2 ( 2dCir . 19 95) , “[a]nor di nar y or unver if iedcom pl ain t, ” s uchas th e on e f ile d b y Ar ar

inthis lit igat io n, “m ay no t c on s ti tu te [s uch ] ev id enc e,” 11 J ame s Wm. M oo r e et al. , Moo re’s Federal Practice

§ 56.14 (3d ed. 2 007). Permitting a plaintiff to circumvent a c ongress ionally mandated reme dial scheme by al leg ing inan unv er

if iedcom pl ain t—

perhap s onno thing m or e thanin fo rmat io n an d b eli ef

—that government officials blocke d acc ess t o the releva nt forum would permit widespread ev asion of the administrative mecha nisms that Congress has est ablished for challe nging a gency action: me chanisms that include j udicia l review by the court of appeals. It is, after all, the prerogative of Congress to determine the jurisdiction of the distr ict courts, and we a re loath to permit thos e determinations to beThe pa r t i al di s s entcon cl udes t hat“ [ b] eca us e Arar i s notcha l l eng i ng hi s r em ova l or der, ” t he j uri s di ct i on10 stripp ing p ro v isi o n s o f th e IN A “d o [] n o t ap p ly.” D issen t [ 45 n . 31] W e d i sagre e. A s t he d i ssent i t self ac kn ow l ed ge s, al t houg h Arar does notdi r ect l y ch al l eng e hi s or der of r em ova l , t he c i r cum s t anc es of hi s r em ova l s er ve a s a f act ual p r e d ic a te fo r th e c la im s s e t fo r th in c o u n ts tw o a n d th r e e o f A r a r ’s c o m p la in t. Id
. [ 27] ( exp r es s i ng t he v i ew t hat“ [ t] he a ss e ss m e n t o f A r a r ’s a lle g e d c o m p la in t m u st ta k e in to a c c o u n t th e e n tir e a r c o f f a c tu a l a lle g a tio n s th a t A r a r m a k e s— h is i nt er cepti on a nd ar r es t ; hi s ques t i oni ng , pr i nci pal l y by FB I ag ent s , ab out hi s put ati ve ti es t o t er r or i s t s ; hi s det enti on a nd m i s t r eat m entat

J FK A i r por t i n Q ueens an d t he M D C i n Bro okl yn; t he deli ber at e m i s l eadi ng of bot h hi s l awyer an d t he C ana di an C ons ul at e; an d hi s t r ans por t t o W as hi ng t on, D
. C
. , an d f or ced t r ans f

er t o Syr i an aut hor i t i es f or f urt her det enti on a nd ques t i oni ng under t or t ure ”)
. The I N A cl ear l y pr ovi des t hat“ [ j ] udi ci al r evi ew of al l ques t i ons of

l aw and fa c t, in c lu d in g in te r p r e ta tio n a n d a p p lic a tio n o f c o n stitu tio n a l a n d sta tu to r y p r o v isio n s, a rising f rom an y a ction tak en or p roceeding b rough t to rem ove a n a l ie n fr om the U nite d

S tates under t

h is sub ch a p ter s hal l be ava i l abl e on l y i n j udi ci al r evi ew of a f i nal ord er u nd er thi s s ec t i on . ” 8 U
. S
. C
. § 12 52 ( b)( 9) ( em ph asi s ad d ed )
. I n li gh t of t he se clea r i nstruc t i on s f rom C on gre ss, th e D istr ic t C o u r t’s ju r isd ic tio n to h e a r th is m a tte r c a n n o t b e re so lv e d a s e a sily a s th e d iss e n t m ig h t w ish
. C f
. R u hr gas AG , 5 2 6 U
. S
. at 5 8 3 (“F o r a c o u rt to p ro n o u n c e u p o n the m e rits w h e n i t ha s n o j u risd iction to d o so . . . i s fo r a c o u rt to a c t ultr a vires
. ” ) ( e llipsis a d d e d , i n ter n a l q u o tation m a rk s a n d m o d ifi c a ti o n s o m it ted ). 19 so easily thwarted. 10 (3) Because we affirm the Dis trict Court’s dismis sal of Counts two and three of Arar’s complaint

onth e bas is th at aju di cial

dam ages r eme dy i s no t au th or izedby Bi vens andit s pr oge ny, infra [ 30- 37] , we
nee d n ot det ermine whether

th e I NA d epr

ive d the D is tr

ict Cour t o f s ub ject

matte r ju r is di ct io n o ver Arar’s r emoval-rela ted Bi

vens claims . The Supreme Court has, on several occa sions , recogniz ed that “afederal court has leew ay ‘to cho os e am ong thr es ho ldgr ound s fo r denying au di enc e t o a ca s e onth e me r it s .’” Sinochem Intern. C

o. Ltd. v. M alay si a I nte rn . Shippi

ng , 12 7 S. Ct. 118 4, 1 191 (2 007) (qu ot ing Ruh rgas AG v. Marathon Oil C o. , 52 6 U.S. 574, 5 85 (1999)). As the Court has explaine d: “Juris diction is vital only i f the court pr oposes t o is s ue a j udgm ent

onth e me r

it s .” Id
. at 1 191 -9 2 (

in te rnal qu ot ati onmarks andbr acke ts omitte d)
. Acc ordingly, a fede ral court “that dismis ses on . . . non-mer its grounds . . . before finding subject-matter juris diction[] makes no assumption of law-declaring pow er that violates . . . separation of po wer s pr in cip les .” Ruh rgas AG , 52 6 U. S. a t 5 84 ( in te rnal qu ot ati onmarks omitte d) ; see al so id. at 5 85 (n ot ing that “di s tr ict cour ts do no t o ver s te p Arti cle I I I limit s whe n they dec lin e jur

is di ct io n o f s tat e- law clai ms on dis cretionary grounds without determining whether those claims fall wi thin their pendent ju r is di ct io n, see Mo o r v

. Co unt y o f A lameda , 411 U.S. 6 93, [715-16] (1973), or abstain under Younger v. Har ri s, 40 1 U. S. 3 7 ( 197 1) , wi th ou t d eciding wh ether th e parti es pr es ent

a cas e or con tr ov er s y, see Ellis v.20

Dyso n , 421 U.S. 4 26, [433-34] (1975)”). In Tenet v . Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005), the Court held that it could di smis s a suit pur suant to Totten v. United Sta tes

, 92 U.S . 10 5 ( 187 6) (p r eclu di ng s ui ts ar is ing f r oma s ecr et

es pi on age agr eem ent

bet ween th e pl ain ti ff

andth e Unit ed S tat es), witho ut fir s t d et ermini ng w

hether th e di s tr ict cour t h ad s ub ject
matte r ju r is di ct io n o ver th e claim s inqu es ti on . See Tenet , 54 4 U. S. a t 6 -7 n. 4. The Co ur t r eas on ed that th e is s ue o f whether

to ent er tain the p lai nt

if fs ’ cl aimwas , li ke Younger abs te nt io n o r prud ent ial s tan di ng, “the s or t o f ‘ th r es ho ldqu es ti on. . . [that ] m ay ber es ol

vedbef or e add r es s ing jur

is di ct io n. ” Id
. The Cou r t al s o o bs er

vedth at “ [i

]t wouldbe inco ns is te nt

with the uni qu e andcat ego r ical natur e of
. . . a rul e designed not merely to defea t the assert ed claims, but to pr eclude judicia l inquiry—to firs t allow di s cov er y or other pr oce edings inor der

to r es ol ve the j ur is di ct io nal qu es ti on .” Id

. Whether Ar ar ’s s ui t w as app r op r

iat ely b ef or e the D is tr

ict Cour t und eni ably r ais es com pl icat ed qu es ti on s of

law. In a dditio n, we have co nc lu de d th a t, inli gh t of the Su pre me C ou rt’ s Bi

vens ju r is prud enc e, wear e r equ

ir ed t o dis mi s s Count s tw o an d thr ee o f A r ar ’s com pl ain t as a th r es ho ld
matte r , wi th ou t c on s id er

ing the m er

it s of th e claim s r ais ed in tho s e co un ts . See infra , [ 30- 37]
. Acc ordingly, we need not dec ide whe ther the INA placed A rar’s r emoval-rela ted Bivens clai ms beyond th e r eachof

th e Di s tr ict Cour t’ s gen er al f

ede r al ques ti onju r

is di ct io n. Cf. Sin ochem, 12 7 S. Ct. at 1 194 (“If . . . a court can readily determine that it la cks jurisdiction over the cause or the defendant, the proper cours e would be to dismis s on that ground. . . . But where . . . j urisdiction is difficult to determine, and [other] considerations weigh he avily in favor of dismiss al, the c ourt pr operly take s the less bur densome course.”). B. P er son al

ju risdic ti onov er

Ash cr of t, Th om ps on , a nd

Mu elle r T he r equ ir eme nt th at f ede r al co ur ts hav e pe r s on al j ur is di ct io n o ver th e li tigan ts bef

or e them arises f rom “an individua l’s liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with whichhe h as es tab lis hedno meani ngf ul ‘co nt act s , t

ies , o r r elat io ns .’” Burger

King Corp. v. Rud

zewicz , 471 U.S. 46 2, 471-72 (1985) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washi

ngton , 326 U.S. 3 18, 319 (1945)). “In order to21

surv iv e amo ti onto d ism iss fo r la ckof p er son al j uri sdi ctio n [ pu rsua nt t o Rul e 1 2(b)(2) ], apl ain ti ff mu st mak e a pri ma fac ie s ho wing that

ju r is di ct io n exis ts .” T

homas v . A sh cr o ft , 47 0 F .3d491 , 49 5 (

2dCir . 20 06)
. A f ede r al co ur t’ s ju r

is di ct io n o ver no n- r es id ent

def end ant s is gov ernedby the l aw of th e s tat e inwhi ch the court sits —including tha t st ate’s long-arm statute—to the extent this law comports with the

r equ ir eme nt s of

du e pr oce s s . See Henderson v. I NS, 15 7 F .3d106 , 12 3 (

2dCir . 19 98) . Un der

New York’s long-arm s tatute, “a c ourt may exercise jurisdiction over a non-domicilia ry who ‘in person or through an age nt . . . commits a tortious act wi thin the state’ so long as the cause of action a rises from th at a ct .” Iq bal

, 49 0 F .3dat 1 77 (qu ot

ing N .Y. C.P .L .R. § 302 (a) (2))
. Defendants Ashcroft , Thomps on, and Muelle r contend that Arar has failed to make a sufficient

s ho wing of

th eir per s on al i nv ol

vem ent inth e t or ti ou s con du ct

he alleg es . Acc or di ngl

y, they ur ge that th e claim s br ought

agai ns t thembe dis mi s s ed f or lack of per s on al j ur

is di ct io n. As we r ecen tly ob s er

ved , p er s on al j ur

is di ct io n can no t b e pr edi cat ed s ol ely o n a d ef end ant ’s

s up er vis or y t it le; “[ r ]ather , a p lai nt

if f m us t s ho w that

a def end ant per s on ally t oo k p ar t in the ac ti vit ies giv ing r is e t o the ac ti onat i s s ue. ” Iq bal , 49 0 F .3dat 1 77 (

in te rnal cit ati onandqu ot ati onmarks omitte d)
. In Iq bal , we c on s id er ed the r elat ed ques ti on s of whe th er th e pl ain ti ff

hadpl eade d s uf

fi cien t p er s on al invo lve men t o f the d ef

end ant s to (1 ) d ef

eat a qu ali fi ed imm unit

y de fe ns e and

(2) e s tab lis h p er s on al ju r is di ct io n o ver th e de fe nd ant s . Id

. We a ddress ed first

the question of what a plaintiff mus t alleg e to
overcome asupervis or’s as sertion of qualified immunity on aRule 12(b)(6) motion t o dismis s, holding th at the al legati on s mu s t s ugges t that th e s up er vis or y of fi cial : (1) directly participa ted in the viola tion [of his constitutional rights], (2) failed to remedy the vio lat io n af te r being inf ormedof it by r epo r t o r

app eal, (3) c r eat ed a p ol

icy o r cus to m und er which the violation occ urred, (4) was gros sly neglige nt in supervis ing subordinates who committed the viola tion, or (5) was deliberately i ndifferent to the rights of others by failing to act on information that constitutional rights were being viola ted. Id
. at 1 52; see al

so id. at 1 57- 58 (

r equ ir ing a p lai nt

if f who s eeks to es tab lis h p er s on al i nv ol vem ent by a def end ant of fi cial “t o am pl if y [his] cl aimwith s om e f

actual all egat io ns inth os e co nt ext s whe r e s uchThe Supr em e C our t ha s r ecen t l y g r ant ed cer t i or ar i i n Iq ba l fo r th e p u rp o se o f c o n sid e rin g (1) th e ap p ro p riate 11 pl eadi ng s t andar d w hen a p l ai nt i ff s eeks t o s t at e a n i ndi vi dual

- cap aci t y cl ai m , pur s uant t o B ivens , ag ai ns t “ a c abi net

- l evel o ff ic e r o r o th e r h ig h -r a n k in g o ff ic ia l” a n d (2 ) “ [w ]h e th e r a c a b in e t-le v e l o ff ic e r o r o th e r h ig h -r a n k in g o ff ic ia l m a y b e h e ld per s ona l l y l i abl e f

or t he a l l eg edl y unco ns t i t ut i ona l ac t s of s ubor di nat e of

f i ci al s on t he g r ound t hat , as hi gh

- l evel s up ervi s ors , t hey had const ruct i ve noti ce of t he d i s cri m i nat i on al l eged l y carr i ed out by such subord i nat e off i ci al s . ” P e titio n fo r a W r it o f C e r tio r a r i, A s hc r o f t v . Iq ba l , 2 0 0 8 W L 3 3 6 2 2 5 (U .S . F e b . 6 , 2 0 0 8 ), cert. gra nted , 76 U
. S. L
. W
. 3417 , 2 0 0 8 W L 3 3 6 3 1 0 (U
. S
. Ju n e 1 6 , 2 0 0 8 ) (N o . 0 7 -1 0 1 5 ).

22 amplifica tion is needed to render the claim plausible”). 11 The complaint at issue in Iq bal s et fo r thth e “t

im e f r ame andpl ace” o f the ac ts all egedto hav e vio lat ed the p lai nt

if f’ s con s ti tu ti on al r

igh ts , id. at 1 66; all egedth at thes e vi ol ati on s ar os e f r om“po lic ies deali ng with the confine ment of thos e arrested on federal cha rges in the New York C ity areaand des ign ate d ‘ of

high int er es t’inth e af

te rmath o f 9 /1 1,” id. at 175-76; a nd further alleg ed that various fe der al o ff ici als , in clu di ng A s hcr of

t an d Mueller , h ad “ con do ned ” thes e po lic ies , id. at 1 65. We note d that the plaintiff’s allega tions, “although not entirely conc lusory, s uggest that some of the [p]laintiff’s claims are based not on facts supporting the claim but, rather, on generaliz ed all ega tions of s up er vis or y in vo lve men t. ” Id

. at 1 58. At

th e s ame time, we f

oundit pl aus ib le t o b eli eve that

s eni or of fi cial s of th e De partm ent

of J us ti ce wo ul d b e awar e of po lic ies conce rning the detention of those arres ted by federal office rs in the New Y ork City areain the af te rmath o f 9 /1 1 an d wo ul d kno w abo ut , co nd on e, o r other wis e hav e pe r s on al i nv ol

vem ent in th e im pl eme nt ati onof

th os e po lic ies
. Id
. at 166. Taking

into acc ount the preliminary stage of that litiga tion and the Supreme C ourt’s recent clar if icat io n o f the s tan dar d ap pl

icab le t o Rule 1 2(

b) (6) m ot io ns to di s mi s s , see B ell Atlanti c Corp. v. T wombly, 12 7 S. Ct. 195 5 (

200 7) , we c on clu dedth at the f actual cir cum s tan ces des cr

ib ed in the p lai nt

if f’ s complaint w ere suff

iciently “plausible” to defeat the defenda nts’ ass ertion of qualified immunity for lack of per s on al i nv ol

vem ent , id. at 1 66. Turning to the related que stion of whether the district court had pers onal jurisdiction over the defendants, we c oncluded in Iq bal that if a plaintiff has pleade d personal involvement sufficient to def eat a qu ali fi ed i mm unit

y de fe ns e, that

wouldals o “s uf

fi ce[ ] t o es tab lis h p er s on al j ur

is di ct io n. ” Iq bal

,23

490 F. 3dat 1 77. T he p lau s ib ili ty

s tan dar d ap pl

icab le t o a Rule 1 2(

b) (6) m ot io n t o dis mi s s is , o f c our s e, dis tinct from the prima

facie s ho wing r equ

ir ed t o d ef

eat a Rul e 12 (b)(

2) mo ti onto di s mi s s fo r

lack of per s on al jurisdiction. See Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A. , 902 F.2d 194, 19 6-98 (2d Cir. 1990). Howe ver, beca use our inquiries into the personal involvement ne cessary to pierce quali fied immunity and

es tab lis h p er s on al j ur

is di ct io n ar e un avo id ably “i nt er tw in [ed ], ” Iq bal , 49 0 F .3dat 1 77, we n ow c on s id er whether, in light of the considerations s et forth in Iq bal ’s qu ali fi ed imm unit

y analys is , Ar ar

has mad e a pri ma fac ie showing that personal jurisdiction exists
. As with the complai nt in Iq bal , Arar’s complaint states the time fr ame a nd place of the acts alle ged to have violated A rar’s r ights; allege s that thes e viola tions aros e from policies providing for the removal of non-U.S. citize ns “sus pected . . . of terr orist activity ” to countries where they coul d be in te rr oga te d und er

to r tur e, see Compl. ¶ 2 4; and further allege s that defendants “directed, ordered,

con firmed , [or

] ac quies ced ” inAr ar ’s r emo val to Syr ia an d the mis tr eatmen t h e s uf fe r ed ther e, id. ¶ 71
. We the refore conclude that, lik e the plaintiff in Iq bal , Ar ar has all egeds uf

fi cien t f act s abo ut th e r ol e that As hcr of t, T ho mp s on , an d Mueller pl ayedinvio lat

ing hi s r igh ts to mak e a pri

ma fac ie s ho wing that per s on al j ur

is di ct io n o ver th os e de fe nd ant s exi s ts un der New York’s lo ng- arm s tatut e. Ac cor di ngl y, we pro ce ed to c on sid erthe a rgu me nts tha t de fe nd a nts h ave raise d i n su pp ortof the ir m oti on s to d ism iss, for f ailure to state a cl aim upon whic h relief can be granted, Arar’s various causes of action.Seve r al C our t s of A ppea l s ha ve h el d t hatnei t her t he TV PA nor t he Al i en Tor t C l ai m s A ct es t abli s hes t he 12 U n ite d S ta te s’s c o n se n t to b e su e d u n d e r th e c a u se o f a c tio n c r e a te d b y th e T V P A
. S ee 2 8 U .S .C . § 1 3 5 0 ; see also G o l ds t ar (P a na m a ) S
. A
. v. U nite d

S tates , 96 7 F
. 2d 96 5, 96 8 (4th C i r. 19 92 ) ( “[A ]ny pa rt y a ssert i ng j u ri sd i cti on u nd er the A l i en T ort S ta tu te m u st e sta b lish , i n d e p e n d e n t o f th a t sta tu te , th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s h a s c o n se n te d to su it” ); K ooh i v. U nite d S tates , 976 F
. 2d 1328 , 1332 n. 4 ( 9t h C i r. 1992 ) ( not i ng t hat t he A l i en T ort C l ai m s do es not const i t ute a w ai ver of s overei gn im m u n ity); San che z-E s

pin o za v. R e agan , 7 7 0 F .2 d 2 0 2 , 2 0 7 (D .C . C ir. 1 9 8 5 ) (sa m e ). W e a g r e e w ith o u r sist e r c irc u its. A c c o r d in g ly , w e c o n c lu d e th a t a n y c a u se o f a c tio n A r a r h a s u n d e r th e T V P A e x ists a g a in st th e d e fe n d a n ts b e in g su e d in t hei r i ndi vi dual ca pac i t i es al one. 24 C. Th e To r tu r e Vi ctimP r ot ectio n Ac t ( Cou ntOn e) T he T VPA, whichis app end ed as a s tatut or y no te to th e Ali en T or t Cl aim s Act , 28 U.S .C. § 1350, c reates a ca use of action for damages against “[a]n individual who, under actua l or apparent
autho r it y, o r col or of law, of any f or eig n n ati on. . . s ub ject s an indivi du al t o t or tur e.” Id
. § 1350 note (a)(1). The District Court determined that the factual a llega tions s et forth in Arar’s complaint did not 12

s tat e a cl aimth at d ef

end ant s act ed “ un der

col or of fo r eign l aw.” Unit ed S tat es B r . 54 . We agr ee. Whens eeking g

ui dan ce o n wh at i t m eans to act un der “co lo r of fo r eign l aw” f

or th e purpo s es of th e T VPA, wegen er ally lo ok

to “pr in cip les of agen cy la w andto ju r

is prud enc e un der

42 U .S. C. § 19 83. ” K

adic v. K ara dži æ , 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995). As the Supreme C ourt has not ed, “[t]he traditional definition of acting under color of s tate lawrequires that the defendant in a § 1 983 ac tion hav e exe r cis ed p owe r

‘p os s es s ed b y vi r tu e of

s tat e law andmad e po s s ib le o nly be caus e the wr ongdo er is clo th ed w

ith the au th or

it y of s tat e law .’” Wes

t v . A tk ins , 48 7 U. S. 4 2, 4 9 ( 198 8) (q uo ting United Sta tes
v. Class ic , 31 3 U. S. 2 99, 326 (1 941 )) ; see also Hayut v . State Univ. of New York , 352 F.3d 733, 74 4 (2d Cir. 200 3)
. App lie d t o the p r es ent con te xt , thi s pr op os it

io n s ugges ts th at adef

end ant all egedto hav e violated the TVPA acts under color of f oreign lawwhen he “exe rcise[s] power ‘posses sed by virtue of [foreign] law’” a nd commits wrongs “‘made poss ible only beca use the wrongdoer is clothed with the
autho r it y of [f or eig n] law. ’” West

, 48 7 U. S. a t 4 9. Ar ar con te nd s th at o ur

pr io r ho ldings con te mp lat e a di ff er ent s tan dar d o f l

iab ili ty un der § 19 83 and, by e xtension, the TVPA. Specifica lly, he assert s that “ K letschk a [ v. Drive r

, 411 F.2d 436 (2d C ir. 196 9) (Lum bar d, C.J. )] holds that the § 198 3 test is satisf ied if the state or its officials playe d a significant role in the result,” Plaintiff’s B r. 25 (internal quotation marks omitted). We disagree. InT h e D istr ic t C o u r t a lso d e te r m in e d th a t A r a r , “a s a n o n -c itize n [,] is u n a b le to d e m o n str a te th a t h e h a s a v ia b le 13 caus e of ac t i on, ” 414 F. Supp. 2d. at287, on t he u nd ers t and i ng t hat “onl y U
. S. ci t i zens . . . are covered by t he T V P A , ” id. at263. B ec au se w e a ffi rm on othe r grou nd s, w e n ee d no t en ga ge i n e xten si ve an alysi s of t his i ssue . W e d o, ho w ev er, o b s e r v e t h a t p a s t h o l di n g s o f o ur Co ur t , a s we l l a s t h o s e o f o ur s i s t e r c o ur t s o f

a p p e a l s , s t r o n g l y s ug g e s t t h a t TVPA a c tio n s m a y in fa c t b e b r o u g h t b y n o n -U .S . c itize n s. S e e , e .g. , Wiw a v . R oy a l D u tch P etro leum C o., 226 F. 3d 88, 104- 05 ( 2d C ir. 2 0 0 0 ) (e x p r e ss in g th e v ie w th a t th e re m e d ie s p r o v id e d b y th e T V P A “ e x te n d []
. . . to a lie n s” ); Ka d ic, 70 F. 3d at 236 (r e v e r sin g a d istr ic t c o u r t ju d g m e n t th a t d ism iss e d , fo r fa ilu r e to sta te a c la im , a su it b r o u g h t b y “ C r o a t a n d M u slim c itize n s o f . . . B o sn ia -H e r z e g o v in a ” se e k in g re lie f u n d e r th e T V P A ); see also A rc e v . G a rcia , 4 3 4 F
. 3 d 1 2 5 4 , 1 2 5 7 -5 8 (11 th 25 Kletschka, we stated that, “[w ]hen [a] viola tion is the joint product of the exercise of a Sta te power and of a non-State power[,] . . . the test under the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1 983 is whether the state or its officials playe d a ‘significa nt’ role in the result.” 411 F.2d at 449. W e also noted, howe ver, that, whe n the “ no n- St ate ” act or is a f ede r al o ff ici al, we will n ot

findth at s tat e law

pl ayeda “s ignif

ican t r ol e” unless the complained-of actions can be attributed to “the control or inf luence of the State def end ant s .” Id

. As we ex plaine d, this “control or influence” test r eflects the “evide nt purpos e of § 1983[,] [whi ch is] to provide a remedy whe n federal rights have bee n violated through the use or misus e of a powe r derived from a State .” Id
. at 448-49 (emphasis added). Beca use federal officials cannot

exer cis e power

un der fo r eig n l aw wi th ou t s ub ject

ing them s elv es to th e co ntr ol or in fluen ce o f afo r eign state, our comments in Kletschka ar e en tir ely c on s is te nt

with the t es t f

or TVPA li abilit

y ou tl in ed ab ov e, which w e hereby a dopt in this opinion. Ar ar all eges th at d ef

end ant s r emo vedhi m t o S yr ia wi thth e kn owl edg e or

in te nt io n that Syr ian authorities would interrogate him under tortur e. He a lso allege s that, while he w as in Syria, de fendants provided Syrian a uthorities with information about him, suggested subjects for Syrian a uthorities t o in te rr oga te hi m ab ou t, andr ecei ved“all in fo rmat io n co er cedfr om[him

] d ur ing [ th es e] int err oga ti on s .” Com pl . ¶ 5 6. N owh er e, h owever , d oes he c on te ndth at d ef end ant s po s s es s ed any power un der Syr ian law, th at their

all egedly culp abl e act

io ns r es ul te d f

r omth e exe r cis e of

po wer un der Syr ianlaw, or

th at th ey wo ul d h ave b eenun abl e t o und er tak e thes e culp abl e act io ns hadth ey n ot

po s s es s ed s uchpo wer . Because prior precedents of the Supreme Court and our Court indicate that such all ega tions are

nece ss ary to state a claim under the TVPA, we a ffirm the Distr ict Court’s dismis sal of Count one of Arar’s complaint. 13C ir. 2 0 0 6 ) ( a ll o w ing T V P A c laim b y c itize n s o f E l S a lva d o r); H il a o v. E state of

M a rcos , 103 F. 3d 767, 771 ( 9t h C i r . 1996 ) (allow ing T V P A c laim b y c itize n s o f th e P h ilipp ine s). 26 D. Money damages under the F ifth Amen dment(Count s Two, Three, and Four) Counts two and three of Arar’s complaint alle ge that defenda nts violated Arar’s rights under the subs tantive due proce ss component of the Fifth Amendment by removing him to Syria with the knowledg e or intention that he would be detaine d and tortured there. Count four of Arar’s complaint alle ges that defendants violated A rar’s r ights to s ubstantive and procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment by mistreating him whi le he w as detained i n the United States. Arar contends that both of these alleg ed viola tions are actionable purs uant to Bivens v . Six Unknown Federal Na rcotics Agents , 40 3 U. S. 388 (1971). Onth e theo ry that , “in ap pr op r iat e cir cum s tan ces [,] a f

ede r al . . . c our t m ay pr ov

id e r eli ef in dam ages fo r

th e vi ol ati onof

con s ti tu ti on al r

igh ts if th er e ar e ‘n o s pec ial

fa ct or s couns ell

ing he s it ati onin th e abs enc e of

af firmat iveact io n b y Congr es s ,’” Dav

is v. P ass man, 442 U.S. 22 8, 245 (1979) (quoting Bi vens, 40 3 U. S. a t 3 96) , Bi

vens permitted plaintiffs t o seek money da mages for violations of the Fourth Ame nd men t. Sin ce then , h owever , the S up r emeCour t h as cr eat ed s uchr eme di es ononly t wo o th er
occa sions : the firs t for

employment discrimination in viol ation of the equalprotection component of th e Fif thAme nd men t’ s Du e P r oce s s Clau s e, Dav is , 442 U.S. a t 234, and the second for violations of the Eigh thAme nd men t b y f

ede r al p r is onof fi cial s , Ca rlson v. Green , 44 6 U. S. 1 4 ( 198 0)
. See Co rr . S er v s. Co rp. v. Malesko , 534 U.S. 6 1, 70 (2001) (“In 30 yea rs of Bi vens jurisprudence we have exte nded its holding only twic e, to provide an otherwise none xistent cause of action ag ainst individual officers alleg ed to hav e act ed unco ns ti tu ti on ally, o r to pr ov id e a cau s e of

act io n f or a pl ain ti ff who lack ed any alt ernat

ive

r eme dy f or harms caus ed b y an indivi du al o ff icer ’s un con s ti tu ti on al co nd uct .”)
. Indeed, the Supreme C ourt has “r esponded cautiously to suggestions that Bi vens remedies be
ext end ed int o n ew co nt ext s .” Schweiker v . Ch ilicky, 487 U.S . 41 2, 4 21 ( 198 8) ; see also Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct . 25 88, 259 7 (

200 7) (o bs er

ving that , “in m os t ins tan ces ,” the Co ur t “ ha[ s] f ounda Bi vens27

r eme dy unj us ti fi ed”); Malesko , 534U.S . at 70 ( no ting that , s in ce Ca rlson , the Co ur t h as “co ns is te nt ly rejected invitations to extend Bi vens ” to new c ontexts); FDIC v. Mey er , 510 U.S . 47 1, 4 84 ( 199 4) (discuss ing, with a pproval, the observations off ered by the C ourt in Schweiker ). B y as king us to dev

is e a new Bi

vens damag es action for allege d violations of the subs tantive due pr oce s s com po nen t o f the Fif thAme nd men t, Ar ar

ef fe ct ive ly inv it es us to di s r egar d the c lear in s truct io ns of th e Supr emeCour t b y ext ending Bi vens no t o nly t o a n ew co nt ext , b ut to a new con te xt requiring the courts t o intrude deeply i nto the national security polic ies and foreign relations of the Unit ed St a te s. (1) In its most r ece nt consideration of Bi vens, the Supreme C ourt s et out the following framework fo r anal yzing Bi vens cl aim s: [O]n the assum ption that a constitutionally recognized inte rest is adversely a ffected by the act io ns of fe der al em pl oye es , the d ecis io n wh ether to r eco gni ze a Bi

vens remedy may

require tw o s te ps . [

First ], there is the question whether any al ternative, ex isting process for pr otecting th e in te r es t am ount s to a con vin cing r eas onfo r

th e J udici al B r anchto r ef

r ainfr ompr ov

iding a new andfr ees tan di ng r eme dy in d amages . [Seco nd, th er e is th e pr in cip le that

] a Bi vens r eme dy i s a s ub ject of ju dgm ent : “the f

ede r al co ur ts mu s t m ake the k in d o f r eme di al d et erminat io n that is appropriate for a common-law tribunal, pa ying pa rticular heed, how ever, to any special fac tors couns ell ing he s it ati onbef

or e autho r

izing anew

kin d o f f ede r al l it igat io n. ” Ro bbins , 12 7 S. Ct. at 2 598 (quo ting Bu sh v. Luc as , 462 U.S. 3 67, 378 (1983)) (internal ci tation omitted, emphasis added). For gui da nc e o n wha t mi gh t c on sti tut e a“sp ec ia l fa ct or, ” w e turnto the Su pre me C ou rt’ s pa st considerations of Bi

vens. The Co ur t’ s pr

io r pr eced ent s r eveal a r elu ct anceto cr eat e Bivens r eme di es whe r e a co or di nat e br anchof gov ernm ent

is “ina f ar bette r po s it io n thana cour t, ” Bu

sh , 462 U.S . at 389 , t o “d ecid e wh ether

. . . a r eme dy s ho ul d b e pr ov id ed, ” id. at 380; a nd, if a remedy is to be provided, to decide what form this remedy should take. For example , in Bu sh v. Luc as , the Court decline d to create adamag es remedy for allege d violations of a federal e mployee ’s Fir st Amendment

r igh ts up ondet ermini ng that Congr es s was ina bette r

po s it io n “t o evalu ateth e im pact ” of dam ages
s ui ts “onth e ef

fi cien cy o f the c ivil s er

vic e.” Id
. at 389. Simil arly, in Cha

ppell v. W alla ce, 46 2 U. S. 2 9628

(1983), the Court decli ned to create adamag es remedy for allege d violations of constitut ional rights by milit ary of

fi cer s up onno ting that

th e Con s ti tu ti ongr ant s Congr es s “pl enar y co ntr ol ov er . . .
r egulat io ns , p r oce du r es , an d r eme di es r elat ed t o mili tar y di s cip lin e,” id. at 301; C ongress , in exe rcising this autho r

it y, cr eat ed a s ys te m o f mili tar y ju s ti ce that

di d n ot in clu de a d amages r eme dy f or all eged vio lat io ns of con s ti tu ti on al r

igh ts by mili tar

y of fi cer s , id. at 304; a nd, therefore, creation of such a

r eme dy b y the f

ede r al co ur ts “wo ul d b e pl ainly inco ns is te nt with Co ngr es s ’ au th or

it y inthis fi eld ,” id. In Schweiker v

. Ch ilicky , the Court, relying on the reasoning set forth in Bush and Chapell

, decli ned
to cr eat e a no n- s tatut or

y dam ages r eme dy again s t gov ernm ent of fi cial s all egedto hav e wr ongf ully
te rmi nat ed the p laint

if fs ’ So cial Secur it y be nef it s . As th e Cour t e xp lai ned , “m aki ng the inev it abl e
com pr omis es r equ

ir ed in the d es ign ” of

a wel fa r e pr ogr am i s th e r es po ns ib ili ty of Congr es s r ath er

th an th e co ur ts , 48 7 U. S. a t 4 29; Congr es s had“di s char gedth at r es po ns ib ili ty ,” id. , by crea ting “ela borate adminis tr ati

ve r eme di es ,” id. at 4 24, fo r di s s ati s fi ed S oci al S ecu r

it y claim ant s ; inview of

th e f act th at these remedies did not include aprovision f or recovery of money dama ges, the Court, in kee ping with it s pr io r pr eced ent s , wo ul d n ot

cr eat e a Bi

vens r eme dy, id. at 423 (noting that “[w]he n the design of a Go vernm ent

pr ogr am s ugges ts th at Co ngr es s has pr ov id ed what it con s id er s adeq

uat e r eme di al mecha nisms for cons titutional violations that may oc cur in the course of its administration, [the Court has] n ot cr eat ed ad di ti on al Bi

vens r eme di es ”)
. Schweiker

, therefore, establishes that “the conc ept of special fac tors counselling he sitation in the absence of affirmative a ction by C ongress has proved to in clu de anapp r op r

iat e ju di cial

def er enc e t o i ndicat

io ns th at c ongr es s io nal

in act io n h as no t b een in adv er te nt .” 4 87 U .S. at 4 23 ( in te rnal qu ot ati onmarks omitte d)
.I t i s notcl ear whet her A r ar ’ s com pl ai nt s eeks t o r ai s e a t hi r d pot enti al s et of cl ai m s , ar i s i ng f

r om t he g ener al 14 a ll e g a ti o n s tha t d e fe n d a n ts pr o v id e d S y rian au th o riti e s w it h i n fo rm a ti o n ab o u t him an d su g g e ste d su b jec ts fo r th e m to p u r su e in th e ir in te r r o g a tio n o f h im
. S ee C om pl
. ¶ ¶ 55- 56. W e ne ed notex pl or e t hi s i s s ue, however , as A r ar ha s not ra ised su c h a c laim i n h is w ritt e n an d o ra l p re se n tation s to th is C o u rt. S e e , e .g. , P lain ti ff’s B r. 37 (d e sc rib ing the F ifth A m endm entcl ai m s ar i s i ng f r om A r ar ’ s r em ova l t o Syr i a a s r es t i ng on t he f act ual al l eg ati ons t hat“ def endant s (i) ac t ed a g a inst [A ra r] w h il e h e w a s in F e d e ra l c u sto d y w it h in th e U n it e d S tate s a n d ; (i i) tra n sp o rte d h im ab ro a d p re c isely to e v a d e c o n stitu tio n a l p r o te c tio n s” ); s e eal s o id. at 3 (d e sc rib ing the F ifth A m e n d m e n t cla im s a rising fro m A ra r’s re m o v a l to S y r ia a s r e stin g o n th e fa c tu a l a lle g a tio n th a t d e fe n d a n ts “ tr a n sp o r t[e d ] A r a r to S y r ia ” so th a t S y r ia n a u th o r itie s c o u ld d e tain an d c o e rc ive ly in ter ro g a te h im ).

R at her t han addre s s t hes e l eg al cl ai m s as pl eaded by A r ar , J udge Sac k co ns ol i dat es al l of A r ar ’ s al l eg ati ons 15 i nt o a n om ni bus g ener al i z ed gr i eva nce, unm oor ed f r om an y r ecog ni z ed l eg al cl ai m . J udge Sac k woul d t ake t og et her ev en t s oc cu rri ng w i t hin the U nit ed States an d t ho s eo c cu r r in g o ve r s e as ; a lle g a tio n s o f m isc o n d u c t a ttr ib u te d to U .S . o ff ic ia ls a nd to f orei gn a gents ; an d vi ol at i ons t hatal l eg edl y oc cur r ed duri ng t he p er i od of t i m e t hatA r ar was hel d i n U
. S. cus t ody as we l l as t het i m eA r ar s pe n t in f o r e i g n cu s to dy
. S ee D issen t [27 -28 ] J u d g e S a c k o ffe r s n o a u th o r ity to ju stif y h is r e m a r k a b le t reat m ent of A rar ’ s com pl ai nt . I t i s cl ear, how ever, t hat hi s approach runs cont rar y t o t he Su prem e C ou rt ’ s l ongsta n d in g o b se r v a tio n s a b o u t th e c o n stitu tio n a l sig n ific a n c e o f g e o g r a p h ic b o r d e r s. C f. Z a d v y d a s v . D a v is , 533 U
. S. 678, 690, 693 ( 2001) ( “I t i s wel l es t abli s hed t hatcer t ai n co ns t i t ut i ona l pr ot ecti ons av ai l abl e t o pe r s ons i ns i de t he U ni t ed St at es a r e u n a v a ila b le to a lie n s o u tsid e o f o u r g e o g r a p h ic b o r d e r s.” ); U nite d S tates v. Verdu

go-U rquid ez, 494 U
. S. 259, 269 ( 1990) (n o ti n g tha t t h e S u p re m e C o u rt’ s “r e jec ti o n o f e x tra ter ritor ial ap p li c a ti o n o f th e F ifth A m e n d m e n t [ha s b e e n ] e m p h a ti c ” ); Joh nson v . E is entrag er

, 339 U
. S. 763, 771 ( 1950) ( noti ng t hat“ i n ex t endi ng con s t i t ut i ona l pr ot ecti ons bey ond t he c i t i z enr y, t he Court ha s bee n a t pa i ns t o po i ntout t hati t was t he a l i en’ s pr es ence wi t hi n i t s t er r i t or i al j uri s di ct i on t hatg ave t he Ju d icia ry p o w e r to ac t”). 29 (2) T o the b es t o f o ur

un der s tan di ng, Ar ar

s eeks a Bi

vens r eme dy f or at l eas t t wo an alyt ically dis tinct categ ories of claims. The first set of claims, described in Counts two and three of Arar’s complaint,

ar is es fr omAr ar ’s all egat

io n that def end ant s r emo vedhi m t o S yr ia wi thth e kn owl edg e or

in te nt io n that he would be detaine d and tortured there. The second set of claims, described in Count four of the

com pl ain t, ar

is es fr omAr ar ’s all egat

io ns abo ut

th e way in whichdef

end ant s tr eat ed himwhile h e was de tain ed inthe Unit ed St a te s. [A. 3 5] We c onsider each of these claims in turn. 14 15

( a) Ar a r’s re mo va l-r el a te d c laim s a rise from the all eg ed vi ol a ti onof h is su bsta ntive du e p roc ess interest in not being involuntarily removed to acountry where he w ould be detained and subjec ted to
to r tur e. S te p o ne o f the Bi vens inquiry reveal s that Congress has created a lternative processes for pr ot ect ing thi s in te r es t. T he F or eig n Af fair s Ref orm an d Res tructur

ing Act of 198 8, P ub L. 105 -2 77, codified a t 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note (“FARRA” ), states that the United Sta tes “shall . . . not . . . effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there a re subs tantial grounds for believing the per s onwouldbe in d ang er of being s ub ject ed t o t or tur e,” id. § 12 31 n ot e (a); andpr ov id es fo r an al ien30

to r ais e claim s bas ed o n thi s s ect io n “a s part o f the r evi ew o f afinal or der of r emo val pur s uan t t o . . . th e I mmigr ati onandNat

io nal it y Act ,” id. § 12 31 n ot e (d) . Thu s , as a gen er al m att er , Bi vens r eli ef would

no t b e availab le f

or r emo val -r elat ed c lai ms s uchas th e on e that Ar ar r ais es her e be caus e the I NA’ s “alternative , existing” mec hanism of review would normally provide “a c onvincing rea son for the J udici al B r anchto r ef

r ainfr ompr ov

iding a n ew an d f

r ees tan di ng r eme dy in d amages ,” Ro bbins , 12 7 S. Ct. at 259 8, under step one of our Bi vens a na ly sis. Ar a r main tain s, h ow ev er , tha t be ca use de fe nd a nts i nte nti on ally p re ve nte d him from ma ki ng use of th e I NA’ s ju di cial

r evi ew p r ov

is io ns , the allegati on s of

hi s com pl ain t c om pel

a di ff er ent con clu s io n. Assuming that Arar’s alle gations are true, it would be pe rvers e to allowdefendants to escape lia bility by po in ting t o the e xis te nce of th e ver y pr oce dur es th at they

all egedly o bs truct ed an d as s er ting that hi s
s ol e r eme dy l ay ther e. Ac cor di ngl y, wecouldr egar d thi s as a s ituat io n wh er e the p r es enc e of an alt ernat ive r eme di al s che me d oes no t “ amo un t t o a co nv in cing r eas onfo r

th e J udici al B r anchto r ef

r ain fr ompr ov iding a n ew an d f

r ees tan di ng r eme dy in d amages ,” Ro bbins , 12 7 S. Ct. at 2 598
. Faced with similar allega tions in Bishop v. Tice, 622 F.2d 349 (8th Ci r. 1980), the Court of App eals fo r

th e Eig hth Ci r cui t h eldth at f

ede r al o ff ici als who in te r fe r ed w

ith a p lai nt

if f’ s acces s to an exclusive a dministr ative remedi al scheme c ould, pursuant to Bi vens, b e he ldliabl e f

or th at int er fe r enc e in as mu ch as it

vio lat ed d ue p r oce s s , b ut

couldno t b e s uedfo r

th e un der lying inj ur y that th e r eme di al scheme wa s designed to redres s. In Bishop , the p lai nt if f, a f ede r al em pl oye e, alleg ed, int er ali a , wrongful
te rmi nat io n, id. at 353, a nd charged de fendants with obstructing his acc ess t o the releva nt adminis tr ati

ve r eme di es , id. at 3 53 n .4. T he Eighth Ci r cui t o bs er vedth at Co ngr es s hadenac te d “c ivil service discharge a ppeal proce dures” in order t o permit “a wrongfully dismissed employee to [obtain]

r ein s tat eme nt

andback pay. ” Id
. at 3 56. T he c our t n ot ed, howeve r , that “[ t] he e xis te nce of

civ il s er vic e discharge appe al procedures is of little avail to [the plaintiff] . . . if, as he has allege d, defendants bl ock ed his r es or t t o them .” Id
. at 3 57. Onthis bas is , the c our t d et erminedth at i f the p lai nt if f “ can prove [that] defendants interfered with his r ight to procedural due process [by obstructing ac cess to theW e a gr ee wi t h J udge Sac k t hatt he a l l eg ed ci r cum s t anc es of A r ar ’ s r em ova l m ay hav e m ade i t di ff i cul t f or 16 A r a r h im se lf to se e k re lie f th r o u g h th e p r o c e d u r e s s e t fo r th in th e IN A
. W e no t e, however , t hatA r ar di d have an at t or ney w or ki ng on hi s beh al f; an d t hathi s at t or ney w as i n a pos i t i on t o i nqui r e a bout bot h Arar ’ s wher eab out s an d t he sta tu s o f th e p r o c e e d in g s th a t th e IN S h a d in itia te d a g a in st h im
. 31 appea l process], he is entitled to the damages that ac tually resulted” pursuant to Bi vens. T he Eighth Ci r cui t didno t c on clu de, ho weve r , that th e in te r fe r enc e of

fe der al o ff

ici als permi tt ed the p lai nt

if f t o av oi d the p r oce dur es fo r app eal s et

fo r thby Co ngr es s by l

it igat ing hi s
un der lying c lai ms —wr ongf

ul te rminat io n an d d ef

amat io n—th r ough a Bi

vens act io n i n f ede r al dis tr

ict

cour t. Id
. The court explained: A Bi vens style remedy for wrongfully dismis sed federal employe es not only is unnecessary but als o wo ul d b e at

od ds with the e xis ting dis char ge ap peal pr oce dur es to th e ext ent

th at dis mi s s ed emp lo yees wouldbe e nco ur agedto byp as s th es e pr oce dur es inor der to s eek dir ect

ju di cial r eli ef again st e ithe r th e g ov er nm en t orin divi du al g ov er nm en t of fic er s. Id
. Thus , the plaintiff in Bishop couldmaint aina Bi

vens cause of ac tion against the off icia ls for interfering with his due process rights (a claim equiva lent to the claim brought by Arar in Count four of his complaint) but not for employment-related c laims subject to the relevant procedures for appealing civ il s er vic e di s char

ges —i n es s enc e, cl aim s of an an alo gou s s or t t o the c lai ms th at A r ar br ings in Counts two and three of his complaint. We find this reasoning compelli ng and, li ke the E ighth Circuit, a re reluctant to permit litigants
to avo idcongr es s io nally m and ate d r eme di al s che mes onth e bas is of mer e all egat

io ns of of fi cial in te r fe r enc e. Ac cor di ngl

y, the r evi ew p r oce dur es s et fo r thby the I NA p r ov

id e “a co nv

in cing r eas on ,” Ro bbins , 12 7 S. Ct. at 2 598 , f

or us to r es is t r eco gni zing a Bi vens cause of ac tion for Ar ar’s claims arising from his alle ged dete ntion and tortur e in Syria
. Even i f they did not, howeve r, our analysis of the 16

s ignif ican t “ s pec ial

fa ct or s ,” id. , im pl

icat ed b y thes e claim s wouldleadus to th e s ame r es ul t at s te p t wo of our Bi vens a na ly sis. Step two of our Bivens analysis r equires us t o determine whe ther Arar’s s uit implicate s what the Supr emeCour t h as des cr

ib ed as “s pec ial

fa ct or s ” that

wouldcouns el again s t c r eat io n o f a Bi

vens remedy. “The specia l factors counselling hesitation in the creation of a ne w remedy . . . d[o] not32

conce rn the merits of the particular remedy that [i]s sought. Rather, they rela te[] to the question of who should decide whether such a remedy should be provided . . . [and] whethe r there are reasons f or all owing Co ngr es s to pr es cr ib e the s cop e of

r eli ef th at i s mad e availab le. ” Bush , 46 2 U. S. a t 3 80. Purs uant to the framework set forth by the Supreme C ourt, we are compe lled to defer to the determination of Congress as to the availabili ty of a dama ges remedy in ci rcumst ance s where the adjudic ation of the claim at issue would nece ss arily intrude on the impleme ntation of national security po li ci es a ndin te rfe re wi th o ur c ou ntry’ s re la ti on s wi th f ore ign p ow er s. The Supreme Court has observed on numerous occa sions that determinations relating to national sec urity fall within “a n area of exe cutive a ction in whic h courts have long bee n hesitant to in trud e.” Linc

o ln v . V ig il , 50 8 U. S. 1 82, 192 (1 993) ( in te rnal qu ot ati onmarks omitte d) ; Departm ent of Nav y v. Eg an , 48 4 U. S. 5 18, 530 (1 988) ( no ting that , “unl es s Congr es s s pec if ically h as pr ov

id ed
other wis e, co ur ts tr adi ti on ally hav e be en r elu ct ant to in trud e up onth e autho r it y of th e Exe cut

ivein military and na tional security affairs” and citing i llustr ative c ases). At its core, this suit arises f rom the Exec ut ive B r anch ’s all egeddet erminat io n that (a) Ar ar was af filia te d wi thAl Q aeda , an d ther ef or e a threat to national security, a nd (b) his r emoval to Syria was appropriate in light of U.S. diplomatic a nd national sec urity interests . There can be no doubt that for Arar’s claims to pr ocee d, he must probe dee ply in to th e in ner

workings of

th e nat io nal s ecu r it y app ar atu s of

at l eas t thr ee f

or eign co un tr

ies , as well as th at o f the U ni te d S tat es , inor der to det ermine the b as is fo r hi s all egeddes ign ati onas an Al Qae da af filia te andhi s r emo val

to Syr ia v ia J or dandes pi te hi s r equ es t t o b e r emo vedto Canad a. Indeed, the C anadi an gove rnment, which has provided Arar with compe nsation for its r ole in the events giving rise to this litigation, has assert ed the nee d for Canadaitself to maintain the confidentiality of mat er ial th at goes to th e he ar t o f A r ar ’s clai ms . See 1 Commission of I nquiry into the Actions of CanadianOf

fi cial s inRelat

io n t o M aher

Ar ar , F actual

B ackgr ound11- 12 (

200 6) (“ Canadian Commission, Factual Background”) (noting that the C anadi an gove rnment required the Commiss ion to

r evi ew “[a] goo d d eal o f evid enc e . . . in cam era” out of a need to protect Ca nadia n “nationa l security33

and internationa l relations interests ”). For its part, the United States, as noted above , has invoked the
sta te -se cr et s privile ge inre spo nse to A ra r’s a ll eg a ti on s. Assuming that a suf

ficient record can e ven be de veloped i n light of the confidential na ture of the releva nt evidenc e and the i nvolvement of at le ast thr ee foreign gove rnments —Syria, Jordan, and Ca nada—i n the salient eve nts alleged in the complaint, the District Court would then be c alle d upon to rule on whether Arar’s removal wa s pr oper in light of the record. In s o doing, the effective functioning of U.S. foreign policy w ould be affecte d, if not undermined. For, to the extent that the fai r and impartial adj udication of Arar’s suit r equires the federal courts to cons ider and eva luate the im pl eme nt ati onof

th e f or eig n an d n ati on al s ecu r

it y po lic ies of

th e Unit ed S tat es andat l eas t thr ee fo r eign p owe r s , the ab ili ty of th e f ede r al go vernm ent

to s peak with o ne v oi ce t o i ts ov er s eas counterparts is diminished, and the c oherence a nd vitality of U.S. foreign poli cy is ca lled into question. On this point, the observations of the Court of Appea ls for the Distr ict of ColumbiaCircuit are particularly rele vant: [T ]h e s pec ial

nee ds of fo r eig n af fair s mu s t s tay

our han d i n the c r eat

io n o f d amage r eme di es agai ns t mili tar

y andfo r eig

n p ol icy o ff ici als fo r all egedly unco ns ti tu ti on al tr eatmen t o f f or eign subjects causing injury abroad. The foreign affairs implications of suit s s uch as this cannot be ign or ed–th eir

abilit y t o p r od uce what

th e Supr emeCour t h as call ed in an other con te xt “embarrassment of

our government abroad” through “multifarious pr onouncements by va rious departments on one question.” Whether or not the present litigation is motivated by considerations of geopolitics rather than pers onal ha rm, we think that as a ge neral matter the danger of fo r eig n ci ti zen s ’ u s ing the c our ts ins ituat io ns s uchas this to ob s truct th e f or eig n policy of our government is suf ficiently a cute that we must leave to Congress the judgment whe th er a dam age r eme dy s ho ul d exis t. Sanc he z-E spi no za v . Reag an , 77 0 F .2d202 , 20 9 (

D. C. Cir . 19 85) (S cali a, J

.) (quo ting Baker v. Carr

, 36 9 U. S. 186 , 22 6, 2 17 ( 196 2) ). Simila rly, we n eedno t d et ermine whether th e mo ti vat io n b ehindthis laws ui t arises f rom geopoliticalor pers onal considerations in order to r ecogni ze that litig ation of this s ort threatens to dis rupt the implementation of our country’s foreign and nationa l security policie s. The litigation of Arar’s claims would nec essarily require an exploration of the intellig ence relied upon by the of fi cial s char

gedwith i mp lem ent

ing our fo r eign an d n ati on al s ecu r it y po lic ies , the c on fi den ti al

com muni cat

io ns bet ween th e Unit ed S tat es andfo r eign p owe r s , an d o th er clas s if iedor con fi den ti alT h a t a d ju d ic a tio n o f A r a r ’s c la im s w o u ld re q u ire in q u iry in to n a tio n a l-s e c u r ity in te llig e n c e a n d d ip lo m a tic 17 com m uni cati ons ca nnotbe doubt ed i n l i gh t of f eder al r eg ul ati ons pr ovi di ng t hat , i n det er m i ni ng whet her r em ova l t o a p a r t i c u l a r c o u n t r y wo u l d b e c o n s i s t e n t wi t h t h e o b l i g a t i o n s i mp o s e d b y F ARR A,

( 1) T he Se cr et ar y of St at e m ay f

or w ar d t o t he At t or ney G ener al as s ura nces t hatt he Se cr et ar y ha s obt ai ned f

r om t he g over nm entof a s peci f i c co unt r y t hatan ali en woul d not be t or t ure d t her e i f t he al i en wer e r em oved t o t hatcount r y. ( 2) I f

t he Se cr et ar y of

St at e f or w ar ds as s ura nces des cr i bed i n pa r ag r aph ( c) ( 1) of t hi s s ecti on t o t he A t t or ney G ener al f

or con s i dera t i on b y t he At t or ney G ener al or her del eg at es under t hi s pa r ag r aph , t he A t t or ney G ener al s hal l det er m i ne, i n co ns ul t ati on wi t h t he Se cr et ar y of St at e, whet her t he a s s ura nces ar e s uff i ci ent l y r el i abl e t o a l l ow t he a l i en’ s r em ova l t o t hatcount r y co ns i s t entwi t h Art i cl e 3 of t he C o n v e n tio n A g a in st T o r tu r e . . . . 8 C
. F
. R
. § 2 0 8
. 1 8 (c). 34 aspects of thos e polici es, including, pe rhaps, whether or not s uch polici es even ex ist. There can be no 17 doubt that litigation of this s ort would interfere with the manage ment of our countr y’s relations with fo r eign p owe r s andaf

fe ct our gov ernm ent ’s abilit

y t o en s ur e nat

io nal s ecu r it y. I n ad di ti on , the S up r emeCour t h as ob s er vedth at, whe n co ns id er

ing “the p r act

ical

con s equ enc es of

mak ing [a] c aus e [o f a ct

io n] availab le t o l

it igan ts inth e f

ede r al co ur ts ,” Sosa v. Al v are z-M ach ain , 54 2 U. S. 6 92, 732 -3 3 ( 200 4) , “ther e is a s tr ong argum ent th at f ede r al co ur ts s ho ul d giv e s er io us weig ht to th e Exe cut

iveB r anch ’s view of

th e cas e’s im pact

onfo r eign p ol

icy, ” id at 7 33 n.21. Here, the U nited States has assert ed the state-secrets pr ivileg e over information at the core of the clai ms being raised and, in support of that assert

ion of privilege, both the A cting Attorney Gene ral and Secr et ary of

th e De partm ent

of Ho mel andSecur

it y hav e s ub mi tt ed s worn s tat eme nt s th at A r ar ’s removal-related c laims cannot be a djudica ted without harming the diploma tic and na tional security in te re sts of

the Unit ed St a te s. For the reasons s tated above , we a re not required, at this junctur e in the procee dings, to

con s id er th e po s s ib le co ns equ enc es of th e as s er ti onof

th e s tat e- s ecr et s pr

ivileg e by th e Unit ed S tat es . The asser tion of the state-secrets pr ivileg e is, howeve r, a matter of record, and a reminder of the undisputed fact that the clai ms under cons ideration involve significant nationa l security decisions made incon s ul tat

io n wi ths ever al f

or eig n p owe r s . Cf. a nte

at [34 -35 ] (n ot

ing the Can adi an gov ernm ent ’sO u r c o lle a g u e , i n h is p a r tia l d iss e n t, c r itic ize s th e m a jo r ity fo r ta k in g th e sta te -s e c r e ts d o c tr in e in to a c c o u n t in 18 t he co u rse of i t s B ivens

a n a ly sis
. S ee D i s s ent[ 46] H e woul d ra t her t hi s s ui t g o f or w ar d on t he under s t andi ng t hat“ [ a] ny l eg i t i m at e i nt er es t t hatt he U ni t ed St at es ha s i n s hi el di ng na t i ona l s ecur i t y po l i cy a nd f or ei gn poli cy f

r om i nt r us i on b y federal cou rt s . . . w ou l d be prot ect ed by t he proper i nvoc at i on of t he st at e-s ecret s privi l ege. ” Id. O n c e p u t i n to e ffe c t, however , t he s t at e- s ecr et s doct r i ne woul d have t he undoubt ed eff ectof ex cl udi ng i nf

or m ati on o f

cen t r al r el eva nce t o t he c la im s b r o u g h t in th is c o m p la in t. S ee a nte [11-12 ] ( des cr i bi ng t he i nf or m ati on o ver whi ch t he U ni t ed St at es ha s as s er t ed t he s t at e- s ecr et s pr i vi l eg e)
. The l i kel y r es ul t woul d be f or ecl os ure of

our ab i l i t y t o r es olve t he i m por t antl eg al i s s ues of fir st im p r e ss io n ra ise d b y th is c a se . Se eid. ; see also E l -M a sri v. U nite d

S tates , 479 F. 3d 296, 300, 313 ( 4t h C i r . 2007 ) ( di s m i s s i ng p l a i nti ff’ s c om pl a i nto n t he b a s i s o f t he i nv oc a t i on o f

t he s t a t e- s ec r et s do ct r i ne b y t he U ni t ed St a t es wi t ho ut co nside ri ng w he t he r, as a m att er o f l aw , plai nti ff cou l d st ate a c l aim u nd er B ivens or t he Al i en Tor t C l ai m s A ct ba s ed on hi s al l eg ati ons t hathe w as det ai ned an d i nt er r og at ed “p urs uant t o a n unl awful poli cy a nd pr acti ce . . . kno w n a s ‘ ext r aor di nar y r endi t i on’ : t he c l andes t i ne a bduct i on a nd det enti on o ut s i de t he U ni t ed St at es of per s ons s us pect ed of i nvolvem enti n t er r or i s t ac t i vi t i es , an d t hei r s ubs equent i nt er r og ati on us i ng m et hods i m per m i s s i bl e under U
. S. an d i nt er nati ona l l aws ”)
. I n l i gh t of t he p ar t i es ’ r eques t s f

or g ui dance on t he i m por t antques t i ons of f i r s t i m pr es s i on p r e se n te d b y th is su it, see an te [ 13 ] w e a re re l u ctan t t o tak e the pa t h o u r co l l ea gu e su gge st s. Ju d g e S a c k ag re e s tha t ad ju d ica ti o n o f A ra r’s cla im s re q u ire s u s to in tru d e d e e p ly in to the n a ti o n a l se c u rity 19 p o lic ie s a n d fo r e ig n re la tio n s o f th e U n ite d S ta te s, see D issen t [ 46- 48] , b u t, n e v e r th e le ss , w o u ld h o ld th a t A r a r ’s su it pre sen t s no “‘ spe cial factors’ co u nse l [i ng ] aga i nst t he ap pli ca t i on of B ivens , ” id. at [ 46]
. 35 effort s to pr otect evide nce rele vant to Ca nadia n “nationa l security and internationa l relations interests ”); CanadianCom mi s s io n, Anal ys is andReco mm end ati on s , ante , at 11 (stating that the go ve rnm en ts of

the Unit ed St a te s, Jo rda n, a ndSyriaallde clin ed to “ give evid en ce or o the rw ise participate” in the hea rings held by the Commission). In that sense, the government’s asser tion of the
state-s ecrets privilege in this litigation c onstitut es a further s pecia l factor counseling us to hesitate before creating anew c ause of action or recogniz ing one in adomain so clea rly inhospitable to the factfin di ng pro ce du re s a ndme tho ds o f a dj udic a ti onem pl oy ed by the fe de ral c ou rts. 18 That this action involves the intersection of r emoval de cisions and national security a lso weighs agai ns t c r eat

io n o f a Bi

vens re me dy . Th e S up re me C ou rt h a s re ce ntly n ote d th a t “ [r] em ov al d ec isi on s, in clu di ng the s elec ti onof

a r emo vedali en’ s des tinat io n, may im pl icat e our r elat io ns with f

or eign po wer s ,” Ja

ma v. I mmig rat io n and Cus

toms E nfo rc

ement , 54 3 U. S. 3 35, 348 (2 005 ) ( in te rnal qu ot ati onmarks omitted) (quoting

Mathews v. Di az , 42 6 U. S. 6 7, 8 1 ( 197 6) ); andit is well es tab lis hedth at “ [t

]h e co nd uct of the for eign rela tions of

our Government is committed by the C onstitut ion to the Exec utive and Le gis lat ive—the p ol

it ical —D epartm ent s of

th e Go vernm ent ,” Fi

rs t N at. Cit y Ba nk v . B anc o Nac io nal de Cuba , 40 6 U. S. 7 59, 766 (1 972) (qu ot ing Oetjen v. Central

Leath er Co. , 24 6 U. S. 2 97, 302 (1 918) ( in te rnal qu ot ati onmarks omitte d) ). I n that s ens e, Ar ar ’s r emo val -r elat ed c lai ms r ais e a di ff icult y s imila r to th at 19A l t houg h Arar des cr i bes hi s s econ d cl ai m as ar i s i ng under t he s ubs t anti ve due pr oces s com pone nt of t he 20 F ifth A m e n d m e n t, s e e

, e .g. , C om pl. at 23 , P l ainti ff’ s R ep l y B r. 21 , t he t he ory of l i ab i l i t y h e p roffe rs i s m ore sug ge st i ve of a p r o c e d u r a l d u e p r o c e ss c la im
. S e e , e .g. , P la in tiff’s R e p ly B r . 2 9 (a ss e r tin g th a t “ A r a r h a d a rig h t to th e a ss ista n c e o f h is a tto r n e y b e fo r e b e in g d e e m e d in a d m iss ib le , [a n d ] b e fo r e b e in g re m o v e d to a c o u n tr y w h e r e h e w o u ld b e to r tu r e d ” ); id. at 34 ( asserti ng t ha t A rar h ad “a right t o p eti t i on t he [rel ev an t co u rt] t o e njoi n h i s rem ov al t o a co u ntry that w ou l d t ortu re him ”). W e n ee d no t ex plore t his i ssue , ho w ev er, be ca u se, as set forth be l ow , A rar h as no t establi she d t ha t d efe nd an t s’ conduct am ount ed t o i nt er f er ence wi t h a c o n s t

it u t io n al ri gh t ; an d viol ati on of a “c on st i t u t i on all y re co gn i zed i ntere st ” i s a nece s s ar y el em entof

a B ivens c la im , s e e

, e .g. , R obbins , 127 S. C t . at2598
.

36 posed by the plaintiffs in Chappell . Here, as there, the cl aim under consideration raises questions
entrus te d p r

in cip ally t o o th er

br anch es of

gov ernm ent ; o ne o f thes e other br anch es —n ame ly, Congress—has exercised its authorit y to provide “wha t it considers adequa te remedial me chanisms for

con s ti tu ti on al v

io lat io ns ,” Schweiker

, 487 U.S. a t 423; and the remedi al scheme i n question—appella te
re vi ewof re mo va l d ec isi on s—d oe s no t pr ov id e f or re co ve ry

of m on ey da ma ge s. Inli gh t of

the se in di cat io ns th at abs enc e of

a Congr es s io nally- man dat ed d amages r eme dy “ has no t b eenin adv er te nt ,” Schweiker , 487 U.S . at

423 , we und er s tan d the j udici al cr eat io n o f adam ages r eme dy t o b e “p lai nly in con s is te nt ,” Chappell

, 46 2 U. S. a t 3 04, with Co ngr es s ’s exer cis e of autho r it y ov er r emo val -r elat ed cl aim s. I n s um , we h ol d that —b arr ing f ur th er gui dan ce f

r omth e Supr emeCour t— a Bi vens r eme dy i s
unavailable for claims “arising from any action tak en or proceeding brought to remove an a lien from the United States under” the a uthority conferr ed upon the Attorney Gene ral and his deleg ates by the I NA. 8 U. S.C. § 12 52(

b) (9 ). (b) The vitality of Arar’s request f or Bivens r eli ef

fo r clai ms ar is ing f r omCount

fo ur of hi s complaint (“domestic dete ntion”) turns , not on the existence of any “specialfactors,” but on the mor e commonplac e fact that Arar’s factual a llega tions f ail to state a c laim under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Arar apparently see ks to br ing two distinct types of claims based on events

all eg ed to h ave oc cu rre d i n th e U ni te d S ta te s. Th e f irstis a“d ue pro ce ss” c laim ba sed onde fe nd a nts’ alle ged obstruction of Arar’s acc ess t o counsel and to the courts. The second is a subs tantive due 20 process challenge to the conditions of Arar’s U.S. detention. W e consider eac h of these in turn.37 (i) T he c om pl ain t alleg es th at, while Ar ar was in car cer ate d at

th e MDC, def

end ant s ign or ed his init ial r equ es ts to s ee a l awyer , mis ledhi m ab ou t the avail abilit y of hi s lawy er

s o that th ey co ul d qu es ti onhi m o ut s id e he r

pr es enc e, an d mis ledhi s lawy er abo ut hi s whe r eabo ut s s o that

th ey co ul d pr even t h er

fr omchallenging hi s r emo val to Syr ia. Com pl . ¶¶

37, 44, 46. T hes e all egat

io ns , if tak en as true, may be s uf fi cien t t o es tab lis h that

on e or mo r e f ede r al o ff ici als in te nt

io nally o bs truct ed A r ar ’s

a cc ess t o c ou nse l a ndto the co urt s. Th ey a re no t, ho we ve r, su ffi ci en t to est a blish the a pp rop ria te ne ss of Bi vens r eli ef . Rather , f

or a Bi vens r eme dy t o b e availab le, Ar ar mu s t e s tab lis h that

(1 ) anin di

vid ual in hi s po sitio n p osse ssed aco nsti tutio na l ri gh t of a cc ess t o c ou nse l a ndthe co urt s, a nd(2) th a t de fe nd a nts’
act io ns vio lat ed thi s con s ti tu ti on al r igh t. See, e.g. , Ro bbins

, 127 S. C t. at 2598 (noting that viola tion of a “co ns ti tu ti on ally r eco gni zedin te r es t” is a nec es s ary ele men t o f a Bi vens clai m).

a . R ig h t t o Co u n s e l Ar ar con te nd s th at o ur

pr io r pr eced ent s —s pec if

ically, Montilla v. INS, 926 F.2d 162 (2d C ir. 1991) and Wa ldron v. INS, 17 F. 3d511 (2 d Ci r . 19 93) —es tab lis h that , al th ough h e was an unad mi tt ed alie n, he possess ed a c onstitut ional right to counsel under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. He also contends that he posses sed a due process right to couns el derived from the8 C
. F
. R
. § 23 5.8(a) rea d s as f oll ow s: 21 W h e n a n im m ig r a tio n o ff ic e r o r a n im m ig r a tio n ju d g e su sp e c ts th a t a n a r r iv in g a lie n a p p e a r s to b e in a d m iss ib le [ on s ecur i t y a nd r el at ed gr ounds ] , t he i m m i gr ati on o ff i cer or i m m i gr ati on j udge s hal l or der t he a l i en r em oved an d rep ort t he ac t i on pro m ptl y to the d i st ri ct d i rec t or w ho ha s ad m i nist rati ve j u ri sd i cti on ov er the place w he re t he a l i en h as ar r i ved or wher e t he h ear i ng i s bei ng hel d. The i m m i gr ati on o ff i cer s hal l , i f

pos s i bl e, t ake a br i ef s w or n ques t i on- and- ans w er s t at em entf r om t he a l i en, an d t he a l i en s hal l be noti f i ed by p er s ona l s er vi ce o f Form I

- 147, N ot i ce o f

Tem por ar y I nadm i s s i bi l i t y, of t he a ct i on t ake n a nd t he r i gh t t o s ubm i t a w r i t t en sta te m e n t a n d a d d itio n a l in fo r m a tio n fo r c o n sid e r a tio n b y th e A tto r n e y G e n e r a l. T h e d istr ic t d ire c to r sh a ll f or w ar d t he r epor t t o t he r eg i ona l di r ect or f or f urt her ac t i on a s pr ovi ded i n pa r ag r aph ( b) of t hi s s ecti on. 8 U
. S
. C
. § 1 3 6 2 state s tha t: 22 I n a ny r em ova l pr ocee di ng s bef or e a n i m m i gr ati on j udge an d i n a ny a ppea l pr ocee di ng s bef or e t he At t or ney G ener al f

r om an y s uch r em ova l pr ocee di ng s , t he p er s on c once r ned s hal l ha ve t he p r i vi l eg e of bei ng r epr es ent ed ( at no exp ens e t o t he G over nm ent ) by s uch co uns el , aut hor i z ed t o pr acti ce i n s uch pr ocee di ng s , as he s hal l cho os e. 8 U
. S. C
. § 1225 ( c) s et s out pr ocedur es f or t he r em ova l of

ali ens who hav e be en deem ed i nadm i s s i bl e “ on 23 s ecur i t y a nd r el at ed gr ounds
. ” Subs ecti on 1 225( c) ( 3) pr ovi des t hat , i n t he c as e of an ali en who f

al l s wi t hi n t he a m bi t of s ecti on 1 225( c) , “ [ t] he a l i en o r t he a l i en’ s r epr es ent ati ve m ay s ubm i t a w r i t t en s t at em entan d addi t i ona l i nf or m ati on f

or c o n sid e r a tio n b y th e A tto r n e y G e n e r a l.”

8 U
. S
. C
. § 1 2 2 5 (b )(1)(B ) sets fo rth p ro c e d u re s re lating to a sy lu m i n ter v iew s. S u b se c ti o n 1 2 2 5 (b )(1)(B )(iv ) 24 p r o v id e s th a t “ [a ]n a lie n w h o is e lig ib le fo r [a n a sy lu m ] in te r v ie w m a y c o n su lt w ith a p e r so n o r p e r so n s o f th e a lie n ’s choo s i ng pr i or t o t he i nt er vi ew or an y r evi ew t her eof , ac cor di ng t o r eg ul ati ons pr es cr i bed by t he At t or ney G ener al
. Such c o n su lta tio n sh a ll b e a t n o e x p e n se to th e G o v e r n m e n t a n d sh a ll n o t u n r e a so n a b ly d e la y th e p r o c e ss .” 38 rights accorded to him under 8 C.F.R. § 235.8(a ) and 8 U.S. C. § § 1362, 1225(c)(3), and 21 22 23 122 5( b) (1 )( B )( iv)
. We co nclud e that

cer tain o f the au th or

it ies up onwhi ch A r ar

r eli es —n ame ly, 24 Mo nti lla, Wa ldron , an d 8 U.S .C. § § 13 62 a nd122 5( b) (1 )( B )( iv) —ar e s im ply in app lic abl e t o anin di vid ual in Arar’s pos ition. We further conclude that, even i f an unadmitted alien does enjoy a deriva tive due process r ight to the assis tance of counsel unde r 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c)(3) and 8 C .F.R. § 2 35.8(a), that right

was nei th er

tr igg er ed n or

vio lat ed b y the f

actual all egat io ns s tat ed in Ar ar ’s com pl ain t. Sect io n 1 362 app lie s only t o “r emo val pr oce edings bef

or e an immigr ati onju dgeand
. . . app eal pr oce edings bef

or e the A tt orney

Gen er al. ” Simila rly, Mo nti lla and Wa ldron , recogniz e the exi stence of a du e p roc ess right t o c ou nse l i n asub setof the ci rc um sta nc es t o whi ch sec ti on13 62 a pp li es— tha t i s,
r emo val of an al ienth r ough d epo r tat

io n. See Wald

ron , 17 F. 3dat 5 17; Mo nti

lla, 92 6 F .2dat 1 66 As an unad mi tt ed al

ien , Ar ar as a matte r

of law l acke d a p hys ical

pr es enc e inth e Unit edJud ge Sack em phat i cal l y procl ai m s t hat t hi s i s not “an i m m i grati on case, ” see D issen t [ 22] , an d cont ends t hat 25 t he m aj ori t y i s i ncorrect t o “t reat [] A rar []
. . . as t hou gh he w ere an unad m i t t ed al i en, ” id. at [ 31]
. Spe ci f i cal l y, J udge Sac k t ake s t he p os i t i on t hat , i n r eg ar di ng A r ar as an unadm i t t ed al i en, t he m aj or i t y i ncor r ect l y “ t r eat s A r ar as t houg h he was an i m m i grant s eeki ng ent ry i nt o t he U ni t ed St at es. ” Id. at[ 32 n . 21] ; s e eal s o id. at32 ( t aki ng t he p os i t i on t hatA r ar ca nnot pr oper l y be t r eat ed “f

or i m m i gr at i on p urp os es , as t houg h he ha d been hel d or t urn ed bac k a t t he b or der” bec aus e Arar w a s n o t “se e k ing to im m igra te to the U n it e d S tate s” ) ( e m p h a sis om it ted ).

T h is r e p r e se n ts a m isc h a r a c te r iza tio n o f th e m a jo r ity ’s a p p r o a c h , a s w e ll a s th e re le v a n t la w a n d re g u la tio n s. A r ar ’ s i nt enti on, or l ack t her eof , t o i m m i gr at e t o t he U ni t ed St at es i s i r r el eva nt t o t he ques t i on o f whet her he w as an adm i t t ed or unadm i t t ed al i en. The I N A def i nes “ [ t] he t er m s ‘ adm i s s i on’ an d ‘ adm i t t ed’ [ t o] m ean , wi t h r es pectt o a n al i en, t he l aw ful ent ry of t he al i en i nt o t he U ni t ed St at es aft er i nspect i on and aut hori zati on by an i m m i grati on off i cer. ” 8 U .S .C . § 1 1 0 1 (a )(1 3 )(A ); s e eal s o id. § 1 1 0 1 (a)(4 ) ( “ T

h e t erm ‘ a p p l ication f or ad m ission’ ha s re

f ere nce to the ap

p l ication f or ad m ission into th e U nite d S tates a n d n o t t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r t h e i s s u a n c e o f

a n i mm i g r a n t o r n o n i mm i g r a n t v i s a . ” ) ( e mp h a s i s a d d e d )
. At th e ti m e tha t t h e e v e n ts d e sc rib e d i n this c o m p lain t t o o k p lac e , i n d ivid u a ls w h o , l ike A ra r, w e re e li g ible to tra n sfe r fli g h ts th ro u g h the U n it e d S tate s w it h o u t ob tain ing a v isa first, se e 8 C
. F. R
. § 1212
. 1( f ) ( 1) ( des cr i bi ng t he “ t r ans i t wi t hout vi s a” p r o g r a m ) w e r e n e v e r th e le ss su b je c t to “ th e fu ll b o r d e r in sp e c tio n p r o c e ss u p o n a r r iv a l in th e U .S ,” see Pres s R el eas e, D e p a r tm e n t o f H o m e la n d S e c u r ity , H o m e la n d S e c u r ity a n d D e p a r tm e n t o f S ta te T a k e Im m e d ia te S te p s T o M a k e A ir T ra v e l E v e n S a fe r (A u g . 2 , 2 0 0 3 ), av a il a b le a t ht t p: // w w w . dhs
. go v/xnews /rel eas es /pre s s _rel eas e_0227. s ht m (l as t vi s i t ed Ju n e 1 1 , 2 0 0 8 ).

A c c o rd ing ly, i t i s c lea r th a t ( 1 ) i n su b jec ti n g h im se lf t o i n sp e c ti o n u p o n ar riv a l a t JF K , A ra r so u g h t ad m issi o n to th e U n it e d S tate s fo r p u rp o se s o f th e IN A ; an d (2) b e c a u se the i m m igra ti o n o ffic e r re fu se d to a u th o rize A ra r’s en try i n to t he U ni t ed St at es , A r ar was not“ adm i t t ed” f or pur pos es of

t he I N A
. I n s um , t her e i s no bas i s — l eg al or f act ual

— f or t he c riti c ism s o ffe re d b y o u r c o ll e a g u e i n h is pa rtial d issen t.

O u r c o ll e a g u e , i n h is pa rtial d issen t, also as se rts tha t A ra r’s l e g a l statu s a s a n u n a d m it ted alien i s irre lev a n t t o 26 an y a na l ysis of A rar’ s co nsti t u t i on al clai m s. T hi s i s pl ai nl y i ncor r ect . The Supr em e C our t

— bot h r ecen t l y a nd i n t he pas t

— has l ooke d t o t he l eg al s t at us of ali ens under i m m i gr ati on l aw w hen cons i deri ng peti t i ons cha l l eng i ng t he c o n fin e m e n t o f th e se a lie n s u n d e r th e D u e P r o c e ss C la u se o f th e F ifth A m e n d m e n t. S e e , e .g. , Zadv y da s , 533 U
. S. at690 (i d e n ti fy ing the i ssu e u n d e r c o n sid e ra ti o n to b e w h e th e r th e “in d e fin it e d e ten ti o n o f a n alien ” v iola tes “[t]h e F ifth A m endm ent ’ s D ue Proc es s C l aus e” an d beg i nni ng t he a nal ys i s of t he c l ai m br ough t by noti ng t hat“ [ t] he di s t i ncti on be twee n a n a l i en who h a s e ff ec t ed a n en t r y i nt o t he U ni t ed St a t es a nd on e who h a s n ev er e nt er ed r un s t hr ou g ho ut i m m i grati on l aw ”)
. I n Kw ong H ai C hewv. C ol ding, 344 U
. S. 590 ( 1953) , f or ex am pl e, t he Court con s i dere d t he p et i t i on o f a n a l i en c ha l l en g i ng t he At t or ne y G en er a l ’ s a bi l i t y t o det a i n hi m “ wi t ho ut n oti ce o f a ny c ha r g e a g a i ns t h i m a nd wi t ho ut oppo rt un i t y t o be heard i n oppo s i t i on t heret o. ” Id
. at 595. T he C ou rtobser ved t hat , “[ f] or purposes of [as cert ai ni ng] [ t he p eti t i on er ’ s ] c on s t i t ut i on a l r i g htt o due p r oc es s , ” i t was r eq ui r ed t o t a ke i nt o a cc ou ntt ha t t he p eti t i on er ’ s l eg a l s t a t us w as t hat “of an al i en con t i nu ou s l y res i d i ng and physi cal l y pres ent i n t he U ni t ed St at es. ” Id. at 59 6. A s t he C ou rt ex pl a i ne d: The Bi l l o f

Ri g ht s i s a f

ut i l e a ut ho r i t y f

or t he a l i en s ee ki ng a dm i s s i on f or t he f i r s t t i m e t o t he s e s ho r es . But once an ali en l awful l y en t er s an d re s i des i n t hi s count r y he bec om es i nves t ed w i t h t he r i gh t s g uar ant eed by t he C o n sti tu ti o n to a llp e o p le w it h in o u r b o rd e rs. S u c h righ ts i n c lu d e tho se p ro tec ted b y the F irst an d the F ifth A m e n d m e n ts a n d b y th e d u e p r o c e ss c la u se o f th e F o u r te e n th A m e n d m e n t.” Id
. at596 n. 5. W i t h r es pectt o t he r el eva nce of an ali en’ s l eg al s t at us , J udge Sac k di s t i ng ui s hes betw een cl ai m ed violat i on s of “pro ce d u ral” d u e p roc ess, w he re h e c on ce d es that s t atu s i s rel ev an t , an d “su bstanti ve ” d u e p roc ess, w he re he m ai nt ai ns t hats t at us i s not . I n vi ew of t he f actt hatJ udge Sac k does notof f er an y s uppor t i ng aut hor i t y f r om t he Supr em e C our t or our C our t

— nor ar e we awar e of an y— w e decli ne t o di s r eg ar d bi ndi ng pr eceden t t hatt ake s ac countof a n a lie n ’s sta tu s w h e n c o n sid e r in g th e sc o p e o f th a t a lie n ’s d u e p r o c e ss rig h ts. 39 St a te s. See Kaplan v. Tod

, 26 7 U. S. 2 28, 230 (1 925 ) ( no ting that

an al ien“s to pp ed at

th e bo un dar

y line” 25 of the United States “had gained no foothold” in the country). His entitlement to a removalprocedure of the sorttha t w ouldtrigg erthe pro vi sio ns o f se ct io n 1 36 2 w a s the re fore li mi te d to wh a t C on gre ss andth e I NS s aw f

it to pr ov id e. See, e.g. , Zadv

y das v. Da v is , 533 U.S. 6 78, 693 (2001) (observing that the 26A r ar was r em oved pur s uant t o 8 U
. S. C
. § 1182 ( a) ( 3) ( r em ova bi l i t y on s ecur i t y a nd r el at ed gr ounds ) under t he 27 p ro c e d u re s se t fo rth i n 8 U
. S
. C
. § 1 2 2 5 (c); su b se c ti o n 1 2 2 5 (c)(2 )(B ) pr o v id e s tha t:

If th e A tto r n e y G e n e r a l (i) is sa tisf ie d o n th e b a sis o f c o n fid e n tia l in fo r m a tio n th a t th e a lie n is in a d m iss ib le
. . . and (i i) af

t er con s ul t i ng wi t h a ppr opr i at e s ecur i t y a ge nci es of t he U ni t ed St at es G over nm ent , con cl udes t hat di s cl os ure of

t he i nf or m at i on woul d be pr ej udi ci al t o t he p ubl i c i nt er es t , s af et y, or s ecur i t y, t he At t or ney G ener al m ay or der t he a l i en r em oved wi t hout f urt her i nqui r y or hea r i ng by an i m m i gr ati on j udge. 40 full p r ot ect

io ns of th e Du e P r oce s s Clau s e app ly o nly t o “‘ per s on s ’ wi thinth e Unit ed S tat es ”) ; La ndon v. Pl asenci a , 45 9 U. S. 2 1, 3 2 ( 198 2) (n ot ing that “anali en s eeking ini ti al ad mi s s io n t o the U ni te d S tat es . . . ha s no co nsti tutio na l ri gh ts re ga rdi ng hi s a pp li ca ti on , fo r th e p ow erto a dm itor e xc lu de ali en s is a

s ov er eign p r er oga ti

ve”); Knauff v. Sha ughnessy , 338 U.S. 5 37, 544 (1950) (holding tha t “[w]hateve r the pr oce du r e autho r

izedby Co ngr es s is , it

is du e pr oce s s as fa r

as an al iendeniedentry is con cerned .”)
. In this case, the a pplica ble statutory provis ions s pecifica lly a uthorized the Attorney Generalto
r emo ve Ar ar

“wi th ou t f

ur th er in quir y or hear ing by an i mmigr ati onju dge ” if

th e Atto rney

Gen er al, after reviewing the evidenc e establishing his inadmissibility, determined that a he aring “woul d be pr eju di cial to th e publ

ic int er es t, s af

et y, o r s ecu r it y. See 8 U. S.C. § 12 25(c) (2)( B ). Ar ar do es no t c lai m 27 that the Attorney General failed to properly reviewthe evide nce of his inadmissibility. Nor does he

con te ndth at the p r oce du r es s et fo r thins ect

io n 1 225 (c) w er e co ns ti tu ti on ally in adeq uat e. Cf. Shau ghnessy v . United Sta tes ex rel. Mezei

, 34 5 U. S. 2 06 ( 195 3) (h ol di ng that th e du e pr oce s s r

igh ts of an unadmitted ali en barred from entr y on security grounds were not violated when he w as exclude d from the United States without a he aring). Acc ordingly, Arar fails to establish that he poss essed any
ent it lem ent to a pr e- r emo val

hear ing. A ndbec aus e he po s s es s ed n o en ti tl eme nt to a hea r ing, h e f all s beyond the scope of section 1362 and—by e xtension—our holdings in Mo nti lla and Waldr

o n. Cf. Pl asenci a , 45 9 U. S. a t 2 5 (

no ting that

a “d epo r tat

io n h ear ing is th e us ual

mea ns of pr oce eding again s t an alie n already

physically in the United State s, . . . [and] [an] exc lusion hearing is the usual means of pr oce eding again s t anali en o ut s id e the U ni te d S tat es s eeking a dmis s io n, ” an d that “the al ienwho lo s es his right t o reside in the United States in a de portation hearing has a number of subs tantive rights not

available to the alien who is denied admission in an exc lusion proceeding”). A rar also falls beyond theW e not e t hat A rar ’ s al l egat i on t hat he “w as neve r g i ven a m eani ngful opport un i t y t o contes t [ t he] f i nd i ng” 28 t hat he bel onged t o A l Q aed a, C om pl
. ¶ 38, const i t utes a “ l egal concl usi on[] cou ched as [ a] fact ual al l egat i on[] , ” P ort D oc k &S to neC or

p. v. O l dcast l eN or the ast , Inc. , 5 0 7 F
. 3 d 1 1 7 , 1 2 1 (2 d C ir. 2 0 0 7 ).

41 scope of the right to counsel s et forth in s ection 1225 (b)(1)( B)( iv); this pr ovision is limited to applicants for a syl um a ndAr a r ne ithe r ma de a ndno r ma ke s no cl aim to a syl um inthe Unit ed St a te s. Section 122 5(c)(3) and 8 C.F.R . § 235.8 (a) both contemplate tha t an unadmitted a lien bei ng exclud ed o n s ecu r

it y gr ound s will h ave the o pp or tuni ty to s ub mi t “ a wr

itte n s tat eme nt

andaddit io nal in fo rmat io n f or con s id er ati onby the A tt orney Gen er al. ” As s uming f

or th e s ake o f a rgum ent

th at an
un admitte d al

ienwho cann ot

pr ov id e a wr itte n s tat eme nt

witho ut th e as s is tan ce o f c ouns el m ay en jo y a du e pr oce s s ent

it lem ent to couns el, we co nclud e that Ar ar has no t alleg ed any f

act s th at w ouldtr

igg er
s ucha r igh t. Fo r exam pl e, Ar ar ’s com pl ain t n owh er e all eges th at h e wis hedto s ub mi t a wr itte n
s tat eme nt bu t w as pr even te d f

r omdo ing s o b y the r es tr

ict io ns th at d ef

end ant s all egedly i mp os ed o n his

acces s to couns el. No r

do es it all ege any bac kgr oundcir cum s tan ces fr omwhi ch w e may dr aw s uchan in fe r enc e. 28 I n s um , Ar ar

is un abl e t o p oi nt

to any l egal

autho r it y s ugges ting that , as an unad mi tt ed al ien who wa s excluded pursuant to the procedures s et forth in 8 U.S.C. § 12 25(c), he possess ed any form of
ent it lem ent to th e as s is tan ce o f c ouns el— let alo ne a c on s ti tu ti on al en ti tl eme nt , the v io lat io n o f whi ch

couldcon s ti tu te a pr edi cat e f or th e Bi vens r eli ef he s eeks . Acc or di ngl

y, wecon clu de that

Ar ar ’s all egat io ns abo ut

th e var io us ways inwhi ch d ef

end ant s ob s truct ed his acces s to couns el f ail to s tat e a clai m under the Due Process Cla use of the Fif th Amendment. b
. R i g h t o f A c c e ss t o th e C o u r

ts As the Supreme Court has noted, the ultimate purpose of an acc ess t o the courts claim is to ob tain “e ff

ect ivevin di cat

io n f or a s epar ateanddi s tinct

r igh t t o s eek j udici al r eli ef

fo r s om e wr ong.” Christopher v. Harbu ry, 536 U.S. 4 03, 414-15 (2002). For this r eason, the complaint setting forth the clai m in question mus t include a n adequa te description of a “‘nonfrivolous,’ ‘arguable’ unde rlying claim” th at the p lai nt

if f h as lo s t as a r es ul t o f the c om pl ain ed- of of fi cial act io ns . Id
. at 4 15.42

Arar’s complaint fails this t est insof ar as his complaint fails to set f orth adequately

“the

un der lying c aus e of

act io n, ” id. at 4 18, th at d ef

end ant s ’ co nd uct

com pr omis ed. Comp are id. at 4 18 (finding exce ss ively

vague the plaintiff’s claim that the defenda nts’ “false and dece ptive information and

conce alment foreclosed [the plai ntiff] f rom effectively seeking

adequa te lega l redress ”) wi th Com pl . ¶ 9 3 (alleg ing that, by subjec ting Arar to “measures . . . that interfered with his access to lawyers and the

cour ts , D ef

end ant s . . . vio lat ed P lai nt if f’ s r igh t . . . t o p et

it io n the c our ts fo r

r edr es s of

hi s gr ievance s ”)
. Altho ughAr ar

no w claim s th at d ef

end ant s com pr omis ed his r igh t t o s eek acour t o r der

“en jo in [ing] hi s
re mo va l t o aco un try

tha t w ouldtor tur e h im , a s avi ol a ti onof F ARR A a nd[th e C onve nti onAg ain st Tor ture (“CAT”)],” Plaintiff’s Reply Br. 34, his complaint make s no mention of FARR A, the C AT, or th e po s s ib ili ty

of in junct iver eli ef
. Cf. Ha rbury , 5 36 U. S. a t 4 16 (“ Lik e a ny oth erel em en t of

a n a cc ess clai m, the underlying c ause of action a nd its los t remedy must be address ed by a llega tions in the

com pl ain t s uf

fi cien t t o gi

ve f air no ti ce t o a d ef

end ant .”) . I nd eed , Ar ar ’s com pl ain t alleg es th at “[d] ef en da nts . . . vi ol a te d [

p] lain ti ff’ s right .
. . to p etitio n th e c ou rts fo r re dre ss of h is grie va nc es” without any further elaboration wha tsoever. Compl. ¶ 93. This conclusory alle gation falls far shor t of the plea ding standard set forth in Harbury. See Harbury , 536 U.S. a t 418 (“[T]he complaint faile d to id ent if y the und erlying c aus e of

act io n that th e all egeddec ept

io n h ad co mp r omis ed, going n o f ur th er th an the p r ot ean alle gat

io n that th e St ateDep ar tm ent

andNS C def

end ant s ’ ‘f

als e anddec ept

ive in fo rmat io n an d co nce alm ent

fo r eclo s ed P lai nt

if f f r omef fe ct ive ly s eeking a dequat e legal r edr es s .’”). Acco r di ngl

y, wecon clu de that

Ar ar has faile d t o s tat e a du e pr oce s s claim b as ed o n d ef end ant s ’ alleg ed ob stru ctio n o f hi s a cc ess t o th e c ou rts. (ii) T he f r amework f

or evaluat ing a co ndit

io ns -o f- con finem ent

challenge b r ought

by anun admitte d ali en c on s ti tu te s a qu es ti onof fir s t i mp r es s io n f

or our Cour t. Cf. Ly nch

v. Cann atella

, 810 F. 2d136 3, 137 3 ( 5th Ci r . 19 87) (n ot

ing that “[ t] he ‘ entry f

ict io n’ th at e xclud abl e ali ens ar e t o b e tr eat ed as if detaine d at the border despite their physical presence in the U nited States . . . . does not limit the rightJu d ge Sa ck d i sagre es w i t h o u r d ec i si on t o e va l u ate A rar’ s s u bstanti ve d u e p roc ess clai m s un d er the st an d ard 29 t hatA r ar hi m s el f

pr opos es , cha r act er i z i ng t he Supr em e C our t ’ s an al ys i s i n W ol f ish as “ unhel pf

ul ” beca us e Arar “ w as not a p re -trial d e tain e e . ” D issen t [ 35 n. 24] A ccor di ng l y, we ar e puz z l ed t o no t e t hatJ udge Sac k el ect s t o ba s e hi s con cl us i on t hata B ivens

ac t i on s houl d be a vai l abl e t o Arar on tw o co u rts o f a p p ea ls d ec i si on s rel ati ng t o the ri gh t s of pre t ri al d etainee s: 43 of excluda ble aliens detained within United States territor y to humane treatment”). De fendants urge us
to ado pt th e po s it io n t akenby the Fif

thCir cui t an d El even thCir cui t, bo thof whi ch l oo k t o wh ether th e ch all eng ed ac ti on s amo un te d t o “g r os s phys ical

abu s e.” Ly nch

, 810 F. 2dat 1 374 ; see also Corr ea v. Thornburgh , 90 1 F .2d116 6, 1 171 n. 5 ( 2dCir . 19 90) (noting, in passing, the holding of Lynch ); Adras v. Nelso n, 917 F.2d 1552, 15 59 (11th Cir. 1990) (adopting a nd applyi ng the approac h set forth by the Fifth Circuit in Lynch

). Ar ar , inturn, ur

ges us to app ly the ap pr oachth at w e hav e tr adi ti on ally t akenwhe n evaluat ing s ub s tan ti

ve d ue p r oce s s challenges to con di ti on s of pr e- tr ial con finem ent . Thi s app r oach looks to whether the challe nged condi tions amount to “punis hment that may not constitutionally be in fli ct ed up on[p re -tri al] de tain ee s qua det ain ees .” Bell v. Wolfish , 44 1 U. S. 5 20, 539 (1 979); see also B lock v. Rutherford

, 468 U.S. 57 6, 584 (1984) (apply ing this approach); Iq bal

, 490 F.3d at 168-69 (same). Arar alleg es that, while in the United States, he w as subjected to “coerciv e and inv oluntary

cus to di al i nt err oga ti on s . . . . co nd uct ed f or exce s s ive ly l ong pe r

io ds of time a ndat o ddho ur s of

th e day and night” on three oc casions over twelve da ys; deprived of sleep and food on his firs t day of detention; and, thereafter, was “held in solitary c onfinement, chained and shac kled, [a nd] subjected to [an] invasive strip-s earch[].” C ompl. ¶ 4. These alle gations, while describing what might pe rhaps

con s ti tu te r elat

ive ly h ar s h co ndit

io ns of det ent io n, do no t am ount

to a claim o f g

r os s phys ical

abu s e. Cf. Adras, 917 F. 2dat 1 559 (f in di ng that

det ain ees hadno t s uf

fi cien tly all eged“gr os s phys ical abu s e” whe r e their

com pl ain t c lai med , int

er ali a , “ins uf fi cien t n our

is hm ent ,” “ pr ol ongedin car cer ati onun der ha rsh c on di ti on s,” “d ep riv a ti onof lib er ty , e mb a rra ssme nt, hu mili a ti on , disgra ce a ndin ju ry to f ee li ng s, phys ical andmen tal

pain an d s uf

fe r ing”) . F or

this r eas on , we c on clu de that Ar ar has no t ad equ ate ly

all eg ed tha t th e c on di ti on s of h is c on fin em en t v io la te d his Fi fthAm en dm en t sub sta ntive du e p roc ess
r igh ts un der

th e “gr os s phys ical

abu s e” ap pr oachof

th e Fif thCir cui t an d El even thCir cui t. Ar ar fa r es no bette r

un der th e alt ernat

ives tan dar d h e pr op os es . As th e Supr emeCou r t n ot ed 29Iq b a l v. H a sty, 4 9 0 F .3 d 1 4 3 (2 d C ir. 2 0 0 7 ), c e r t . g r an t e d su b n o m . A s hc r

o f t v . Iq ba l , 76 U
. S. L
. W
. 3417 ( U
. S. J une 16 , 2008 ) ( N o. 0 7- 10 15 ) a nd M a

glu ta v . S a m

p les, 3 7 5 F .3 d 1 2 6 9 (1 1 th C ir. 2 0 0 4 ). S ee D issen t [ 40, 42]
.

44 in Wolfish , “the f

act th at [ lawf ul ] d et ent io n i nt er fe r es with the d et ain ee’s un der s tan dab le d es ir e t o l ive as comfortably as poss ible a nd with as little restr aint as possible during confinement does not convert the conditions or r estrictions of detention into ‘punishment.’” 441 U.S. a t 537. Only if a de tention facility of fi cial has “ex pr es s ed int ent

to puni s h, ” id. at 5 38 o r

“a r es tr ict io n o r con di ti onis no t r eas on ably
r elat ed t o a l egi ti mat e go al” m ay a co ur t “ in fe r th at the p urpo s e of

th e go vernm ent al act

io n i s pu ni shm en t th a t ma y n ot c on sti tutio na lly b e i nflic te d u po n d et ain ee s qua det ain ees ,” id. at 5 39. Ar ar nowhere a llege s that the conditions of his confinement were inflicte d with punitive intent or were
other wis e un r elat ed t o a l egi ti mat e go vernm ent purpo s e. Rather , his com pl ain t r epe ate dly em ph as izes th at d ef end ant s kep t himincus to dy in o r der to in te rr oga te hi m, ands ought to in te rr oga te hi m in an ef fo r t t o o bt ainin fo rmat

io n “abo ut

hi s mem ber s hip i n o r

af filia ti onwith v ar

io us te rr or

is t gr oups .” Com pl . ¶ 3 1. N or

do th e other

in cid ent al co ndit

io ns of hi s det ent

io n— s pec if

ically, th e s hack

ling, s tr ip search, and de lay i n providing him with ade quate food and sleepi ng facili ties—ris e to the leve l of a

con s ti tu ti on al v

io lat io n. Cf. Wolfish , 441 U.S. a t 530, 543, 558 (rejecting the c laim that, in subjec ting pre-tr ial de tainee s to vis ual body c avity sea rches and using common rooms to provide temporary sle ep in g a cc om mo da ti on s, the off ic ia ls ru nnin g afe de ral d et en ti onfa ci li ty ha d v io la te d th e d et ain ee s’ rights of subs tantive due proce ss). For this reason, we conclude that Arar’s allega tions also f ail to state a claim under the punishment-f ocused approach w e have traditionally a pplied whe n analyzing

s ub s tan ti ve d ue p r oce s s challenges to con di ti on s of pr e- tr ial con finem ent . Because it is not implicated by the facts of this case, w e leave for another day the que stion of whether an una dmitted alien c halle nging his conditions of confinement has rights beyond the right to be f r ee o f “ gr os s phys ical

abu s e at th e han ds of

s tat e [a nd ] f ede r al o ff ici als ,” Ly nch

, 810 F. 2dat 1 374
. (iii) Having de termined that the alle gations set forth in Count four of Ar ar’s complaint do not45

state a claim under the Due Process Cla use of the Fif th Amendment, we affirm the or der dismis sing Count four of Arar’s complaint. C ontrary to J udge Sa ck’s suggestion, we do not hold that aBi vens act io n i s un availab le f

or th e claim s r ais ed in Co un t f our of Ar ar ’s com pl ain t. See Diss ent [ 21] Ra ther,

we de clin e t o re a ch thi s qu estio n i n light o f A ra r’s f ail ure to a ll eg e f

a ct s tha t, if t a ke n a s tru e, est a blish th e vi ol ati onof

any “ con s ti tu ti on ally pr ot ect ed int er es t. ” Ro bbins , 12 7 S. Ct. at 2 598
. E. Declarator

y relief (Gener al Prayer

for Relief) Arar’s pr aye r for

relief include s a request that this Court enter a judgment de claring tha t the actions defendants took with respect to him “are ille gal a nd violate [his] constitutional, civil , and international huma n rights.” Compl. at 24. Followi ng the Supreme C ourt’s instructions, we beg in our analysis by considering “whether this action for a decla ratory judgment is the sort of Article IIIcase or
con tr ov er s y t o whichfe der al co ur ts ar e li mi te d. ” Calde ro n v. A shmus , 52 3 U. S. 7 40, 745 (1 998) ( in te rnal qu ot ati onmarks omitte d)
. As th e Supr emeCour t h as fr equ ent ly n ot ed, “the c or e co mp on ent of s tan di ng i s an es s ent

ial andun changing pa r t o f the c as e- or -c on tr ov er s y r equ ir eme nt of Ar ti cle I I I ,” Lujan

v. De fende rs o f Wil dli fe, 504U.S . 55 5, 5 60 ( 199 2) ; an d “the irr edu cib le co ns ti tu ti on al minim umof s tan di ng c on tains th r ee elem ent s ,” id. : Fir s t, th e pl ain ti ff

mu s t h ave s uf

fe r ed anin jury infa ct

—aninvas io n o f alegally pr ot ect ed interest which is (a) concrete and pa rticularized, [a ffecting the plaintiff in a pe rs onal a nd in divi du al w ay] a nd(b) a ct ua l o r im mi ne nt, no t c on je ctura l o r hypo the ti ca l. Se co nd , the re mu st be a c ausal conne ction betwe en the injury a nd the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly . . . trace [able] to the cha llenge d action of the defenda nt, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the in dep end ent

act io n o f s om e thi r d p ar ty

no t b ef or e the c our t. T hi r d, it

mu s t b e li kely, as op po s ed t o m er ely s pec ul ati ve, th at the inj ur

y will b e r edr es s ed b y a f

avo r abl e de cis io n. Id
. at 5 60- 61 (cit ati on s andin te rnal qu ot ati onmarks omitte d, fir s t al te r ati ons up pl ied ); see also B aur v. Vene man , 352 F.3d 625, 63 1-32 (2d Cir. 2003). “The pa rty invoking federal jurisdiction bea rs the bu r denof es tab lis hi ng thes e ele men ts .” Lujan , 504U.S . at

561
. The co nd uc t of

wh ic h A ra r c om pl ain s is his a ll eg ed de te nti on , b y d ef en da nts, “f

or the pu rpo se of r emo ving him t o S yr

ia f or arbi tr ary de te nt

io n an d i nt err oga ti onun der to r tur e.” Pl ain ti ff

’s B r . 55
.46

The personal injury he alle ges is a “bar to reentering the United Sta tes,” which ha rms him “beca use he has worked for s ustained periods for U.S. compa nies in the past, and . . . w ould like to return to the U.S . f or th at p urpo s e, as well

as to vis it r elat ive s andfr

ien ds .” P lai nt

if f’ s B r . 54
. In examining A rar’s claim, we c onclude tha t he fails to meet both the “tracea bility” a nd “r edr es s abilit

y” p r ongs of

th e t es t f or con s ti tu ti on al s tan di ng s et fo r thby the S up r emeCour t. T he r eentry bar fr omwhi ch A r ar

s eeks r eli ef

ar is es as an au to mat

ic inci den t o f ( 1) th e f

in di ng that

Ar ar was in admis s ib le t o the U ni te d S tat es fo r r eas on s of

nat io nal s ecu r it y, see 8 U. S.C. § 11 82(a)(3) (B); and(2) th e en tr y of an o r der of r emo val pur s uan t t o that

finding, see 8 U.S.C . § 1225(c). It bears no relationship with the country of removal that defenda nts s elec ted for Arar. Any injury associated with th e r e- entry bar

is , ther ef or e, n ot “f air ly tr aceab le” to th e co nd uct of whi ch A r ar

com pl ain s —n ame ly, defendants’ removal of Arar “ to Sy ri a fo r arbi tr ary de te nt

io n an d i nt err oga ti onun der to r tur e.” Plaintiff’s B r. 55 (emphasis added). The problem with redress ability a rises beca use, as Arar’s s ubmiss ions to both this Court and the Distr ict Court unequivoc ally

establish, Arar does not dir ectly c halle nge his removal order or def end ant s ’ und erlying d ecis io n t o cl as s if y hi m as in admis s ib le t o the U ni te d S tat es . See 414F. Supp . 2d at 259 (dis cus s ing Ar ar ’s br ief inop po s it

io n t o d ef end ant s ’ m ot

io n t o dis mi s s). Ar ar

con te nd s th at “ if [he] prevails on his constitut ional c laims, the removal order will be expunge d as null and void, the reby lifting the current barrier t o [his] r e-entry into the U.S.” Plai ntiff’s Br . 53. He doe s not, however,

ar ti cul ate th e theo ry onwhi ch h e bas es this argum ent or , f or th at m att er , s et

fo r thany autho r

it y in suppor t of his position. We conc lude that Arar’s claime d injury—namely , the bar to his re-entr y to the Unit ed S tat es pur s uan t t o a r emo val or der , the l awf

ulnes s of whi ch h e do es no t c hallenge— is no t l ike ly to b e r ed re ssed (i nd ee d, ca nn ot b e r ed re ssed ) by the de cl a ra tory j ud gm en t he see ks. Tha t i s so b ec a use a dec lar ati onth at d ef

end ant s act ed ille gall

y by r emo ving Ar ar

to a parti cul ar

country f or a parti cul ar pu rpo s e wo ul d n ot

change the und erlying, un con te s te d f act th at Ar ar cann ot be ad mi tt ed t o the U ni te d States: Even i f Arar had been removed to C anadarather than Syria, he w ould still be inadmissible to the47

United States by virtue of the order of r emoval e ntered against him. Because Arar ca nnot meet the test for constitutional standing set forth by the Supreme C ourt, we la ck s ub ject

matte r ju r is di ct io n o ver hi s r equ es t f

or a ju dgm ent

dec lar ing that def end ant s vio lat ed his

r igh ts by r emo ving him t o S yr ia f or th e purpo s e of

arbi tr ary de te nt

io n an d i nt err oga ti onun der to r tur e. CONCLUSI ON T o s um mar

ize: (1 ) B ecau s e we co nclud e that r eas on s in dep end ent

of th e s tat e- s ecr et s pr

ivileg e r equ

ir e di s mi s s al of Ar ar ’s com pl ain t, we d o n ot con s id er whe th er , if

Ar ar wer e abl e t o s tat e a cl aimfo r r eli ef un der notice ple ading rules, the assertion of the state-secrets privilege by the United States would require dismis sal of Counts one through thr ee of his complaint

. (2) Because we c onclude tha t Arar’s complaint has not s tated a c laim upon whi ch relief ca n be gr ant ed, we n eedno t c on s id er def end ant s ’ ar

gum ent th at i f a ny o f A r ar ’s clai ms wer e co gni zabl e de fe nd a nts w ouldbe en ti tl ed to qua li fie d i mmu ni ty wi th r esp ec t to tho se c laim s. (3) Arar has s atisfied Article III r equirements as to the claims raised in Counts two and three of his complaint. Howe ver, the adjudic ation of whether, under the facts of this case, the INA stripped the Di s tr ict Cour t o f s ub ject

matte r ju r is di ct io n t o h ear

Ar ar ’s r emo val -r elat ed c on s ti tu ti on al cl aim s would be particula rly difficult in light of the record before us . Acc ordingly, we exercise our discretion to di s mi s s Count s tw o an d thr ee o n o th er th r es ho ld—that

is , n on -m er

it s —gr ound s , as s et

fo r thbel ow. (4 ) F or th e r eas on s s tat ed ab ov e, wecon clu de that Ar ar has mad e a pri

ma fac ie showing suff icient to establish personal jurisdiction over Thompson, Ashcrof t, and Mueller at this early stage of the litigation. As to the causes of action set forth in Arar’s complaint, we c onclude tha t: (5 ) Co un t o ne o f A r ar ’s com pl ain t m us t b e di s mi s s ed b ecau s e Ar ar ’s all egat io ns abo ut

th e events surrounding his r emoval to Syria do not state a claim against defendants under the Tortur e Vict imPr ot ect

io n Ac t;48

(6) Counts two and three of Arar’s complaint, which e nvisage the judi cialcreation of a c ause of action pursuant to the doctrine of Bi vens, must also be dis miss ed bec ause (a) the remedia l scheme established by Congress is s ufficient to convince us at st ep one of our Bi vens analysis to r efrain from creating afree standing damage s r emedy for Arar’s removal-related claims. Even givi ng Arar the benefit of the doubt and assuming that this r emedia l scheme we re insuff icient to convi nce us, (b) “sp ec ia l fa ct ors” of the ki ndid en ti fie d b y the Su pre me C ou rt i n i ts Bivens ju risp rud en ce co un selagain st th e ju di cial

cr eat io n o f adam ages r eme dy f or clai ms ar is ing f r omAr ar ’s r emo val

to Syr ia; (7) Count four of

Arar’s complaint must be dismiss ed bec ause Arar’s allega tions about the mistr eatment he suffered while in the United States do not state a claim against defendants under the Due Process Cla use of the Fif th Amendment; and (8) Wi thr es pec t t o Ar ar ’s pet it io n f or a dec lar ato ry ju dgm ent , Ar ar has no t ad equ ate ly established federal subject matter jurisdiction over his r equest for a judgment decla ring that defendants
act ed ille gall

y by r emo ving him t o S yr

ia s o that Syr ianautho r it ies couldin te rr oga te hi m und er to r tur e. The ju dgme nt o f th e D istric t C ou rt i s AF F IRME D
.49 1 Arar v. Ashcroft, No. 06-4216 2 Sack, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part 3 ------------------------------------------------------------- 4 I. OVERVIEW 5 Last year, in Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007) 6 (Newman, J.), cert. granted sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 76 U.S.L.W. 7 3417 (U.S. June 16, 2008) (No. 07-1015), "[w]e . . . recognize[d] 8 the gravity of the situation that confronted investigative 9 officials of the United States as a consequence of the 9/11 10 attacks. We also recognize[d] that some forms of governmental 11 action are permitted in emergency situations that would exceed 12 constitutional limits in normal times." Id. at 159 (citation 13 omitted). But, we pointed out, 14 most . . . rights . . . do not vary with 15 surrounding circumstances, such as the right 16 not to be subjected to needlessly harsh 17 conditions of confinement, the right to be free 18 from the use of excessive force, and the right 19 not to be subjected to ethnic or religious 20 discrimination. The strength of our system of 21 constitutional rights derives from the 22 steadfast protection of those rights in both 23 normal and unusual times. 24Th e S up r e m e Co ur t g r a n t e d c e r t i o r a r i i n I qb a l t o a dd r e s s ( 1 ) t h e r e qu i r e m e n t s u n de r Bi v e n s v . S i x Unk n o wn 1 N a m e d A g e n ts of

F e d
. B u re a u o f N a rc o ti c s, 4 0 3 U
. S
. 3 8 8 (19 7 1 ), fo r sta ti n g an "in d ivid u a l-ca p a c it y c laim []" ag a inst a "ca bi net

- l evelof

f i cer or ot her hi gh

- r ank i ng of f i ci al , " a nd ( 2) t he e xt entt o whi ch a "c abi net

- l evelof f i cer or ot her hi gh

- r ank i ng of

f i ci al " c an be h el d "per s ona l l y l i abl e f or t he a l l eg edl y unco ns t i t ut i ona l ac t s of s ubor di nat e of

f i ci al s . " A sh c r o ft v . Iq b a l, 7 6 U .S .L .W . 3 4 1 7 (U .S . Ju n e 1 6 , 2 0 0 8 ) (N o . 0 7 -1 0 1 5 ); se e a lso P e titio n fo r a W r it o f C e r tio r a r i, A s hcr of t v. I qbal , N o. 07- 1015 ( U
. S. cer t . g r ant ed s ub nom
. J une 16 , 2008 )
. Thes e ques t i ons ha ve n o be ar i ng on t he p r o p o sitio n s f

o r w h ic h th is d iss e n t c ite s Iq b a l. A s a t eena ge r , A r ar ha d em i gr at ed f r om Syr i a t o C ana da where he l i ved wi t h hi s pa r ent s , an d t hen hi s wi f e a nd 2 chi l dren
. F o r p re se n t pu rp o se s, o n this a p p e a l fro m a d ism issal o f th e c o m p lain t u n d e r F e d
. R
. C iv. P
. 1 2 (b )(6), th e fa c ts

3 ar e t he f act ual al l eg at i ons as pl eaded i n t he c om pl ai nt . See , e. g. , I qbal , 490 F. 3d at 147. The f actt hatA r ar di d not c h o o se to v e rify h is co m p lain t, se e an te a t [ 10 , 1 9] , i s i r r el eva nt . 5 C har l es A
. W r i gh t & A r t hur R
. M i l l er , Federa l Prac t i ce a nd Proce dure § 1339 ( 3d ed. 2004 ) ( "U nder Federa l R ul e 11 , pl eadi ng s , m ot i ons , an d ot her pa per s nee d not be v e r ifie d o r a c c o m p a n ie d b y a n a ff id a v it e x c e p t w h e n 'sp e c ific a lly p r o v id e d b y ru le o r sta tu te ' .
. . [a n d ] [ a ] p a r ty 's v e r ific a tio n o f a p le a d in g th a t n e e d n o t h a v e b e e n v e r ifie d d o e s n o t g iv e th e p le a d in g a n y a d d e d w e ig h t o r im p o r ta n c e in th e e y e s o f th e d ist ric t co u rt. " ). 50 1 Id. 1 2 The majority fails, in my view, fully to adhere to these 3 principles. It avoids them by mischaracterizing this as an 4 immigration case, when it is in fact about forbidden tactics 5 allegedly employed by United States law enforcement officers in a 6 terrorism inquiry. Although I concur in some parts of the 7 judgment, I respectfully dissent from its ultimate conclusion. I 8 would vacate the judgment of the district court granting the 9 defendants' motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10 12(b)(6) and remand for further proceedings 11 *** 12 The plaintiff-appellant, Maher Arar, a resident of 13 Ottawa, Canada, and a dual citizen of Canada and Syria, alleges 2 3 14 that on September 26, 2002, he was, by travel happenstance, a 15 transit passenger at New York's John F. Kennedy International 16 Airport ("JFK Airport") in Queens, New York. He had cut short a 17 family vacation in Tunisia and was bound, he thought, for a 18 business meeting in Montreal. What happened to him next wouldO n M ar ch 1 , 2003 , t he I N S was r econ s t i t ut ed as t he Bure au of I m m i gr ati on a nd C us t om s Enf or cem entan d 4 th e B u r e a u o f U n ite d S ta te s C itize n sh ip a n d Im m ig r a tio n S e r v ic e s, b o th w ith in th e D e p a r tm e n t o f H o m e la n d S e c u r ity
. The a cti on s a t i s s ue i n t hi s a pp ea l wer e t a ke n whe n t he a g en cy was s t i l l k no wn a s t he I N S. 51 1 beggar the imagination of Franz Kafka. 2 When Arar sought to pass through the immigration check3 point at JFK Airport in order to catch his connecting flight to 4 Montreal, he was detained by U.S. agents who had been led to 5 believe, on the basis of information provided by Canadian 6 government officials, that Arar had connections with al Qaeda. FBI 7 agents first, and then Immigration and Naturalization Service 8 ("INS") officers, held Arar largely incommunicado at several 4 9 locations in New York City for thirteen days, subjecting him to 10 harsh interrogation under abusive conditions of detention. 11 Unable to acquire from him the information they sought, 12 the agents attempted to obtain Arar's consent to be removed to 13 Syria. They expected Syrian officials to continue questioning him, 14 but under conditions of torture and abuse that they, the U.S. 15 government agents, would not themselves employ. When Arar declined 16 to consent, the agents sent him to Syria against his will for the 17 purpose, ultimately fulfilled, of having him held captive and 18 further questioned under torture there. 19 Arar brought suit in the United States District Court for 20 the Eastern District of New York on both statutory and 21 constitutional grounds. He seeks damages from the federal 22 officials he thinks responsible for his abuse. The district court 23 dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief 24 can be granted. This Court now affirms. I disagree in significant 25 part, and therefore respectfully dissent in significant part.Citations to the district court opinion are in parentheses. T he f oot not es 5 a n d su b h e a d in g s a r e m in e .

A r ar was em pl oyed by The M at hW or ks , I nc. , a pr i vat el y he l d, M as s ach us et t s - bas ed devel oper an d s uppl i er of 6 softw are for t ec hn i ca l co m pu t i ng . Se e C om plai nt, ¶ 12 ; A bo u t T he M athW ork s, h ttp:/ / w w w . m a th w o rk s.co m / c o m p a n y / a b o u tu s/ (l a st visited M a y 3 1 , 2 0 0 8 ).

That i s , cha ng es of

pl ane . 7 52 1 II. THE FACTS AS ALLEGED IN ARAR'S COMPLAINT 2 The majority provides a strikingly spare description of 3 the allegations of fact on the basis of which Arar mounts this 4 appeal. The district court's opinion, see Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. 5 Supp. 2d 250, 252-57 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), by contrast, rehearses the 6 facts in considerable detail. According to the district court, the 7 complaint alleges the following facts, repeated here nearly 8 verbatim. They "are assumed to be true for purposes of the 5 9 pending appeal[], as . . . [is] required [when] . . . reviewing a 10 ruling on a motion to dismiss." Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 147. 11 A. Arar's Apprehension, Detention, and Forcible 12 Transportation to Syria 13 14 Arar, in his thirties, is a native of Syria. He 15 immigrated to Canada with his family when he was a teenager. He is 16 a dual citizen of Syria and Canada. He resides in Ottawa. 17 In September 2002, while vacationing with his family in 18 Tunisia, he was called back to work by his employer to consult 6 19 with a prospective client. He purchased a return ticket to 20 Montreal with stops in Zurich and New York. He left Tunisia on 7 21 September 25, 2002. (Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 252.) 22 On September 26, 2002, Arar arrived from Switzerland at 23 JFK Airport in New York to catch a connecting flight to Montreal.A ccor di ng t o t he c om pl ai nt , on t hatday, A r ar was ques t i oned f i r s t by an FB I ag entf

or f i ve h our s , C pl t . ¶ 29, 8 t hen by a n i m m i gr at i on o ff i cer f or t hr ee h our s , C pl t . ¶ 31. 53 1 Upon presenting his passport to an immigration inspector, he was 2 identified as "the subject of a . . . lookout as being a member of 3 a known terrorist organization." Complaint ("Cplt.") Ex. D 4 (Decision of J. Scott Blackman, Regional Director) at 2. He was 5 interrogated by various officials for approximately eight hours. 8 6 The officials asked Arar if he had contacts with terrorist groups, 7 which he categorically denied. Arar was then transported to 8 another site at JFK Airport, where he was placed in solitary 9 confinement. He alleges that he was transported in chains and 10 shackles and was left in a room with no bed and with lights on 11 throughout the night. (Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 253.) 12 The following morning, September 27, 2002, starting at 13 approximately 9:00 a.m., two FBI agents interrogated Arar for about 14 five hours, asking him questions about Osama bin Laden, Iraq, and 15 Palestine. Arar alleges that the agents yelled and swore at him 16 throughout the interrogation. They ignored his repeated requests 17 to make a telephone call and see a lawyer. At 2:00 p.m. that day, 18 Arar was taken back to his cell, chained and shackled, and provided 19 a cold McDonald's meal -- his first food in nearly two days. (Id.) 20 That evening, Arar was given an opportunity to 21 voluntarily return to Syria, but refused, citing a fear of being 22 tortured if returned there and insisting that he be sent to Canada 23 or returned to Switzerland. An immigration officer told Arar that 24 the United States had a "special interest" in his case and then 25 asked him to sign a form, the contents of which he was not allowedT h is is th e sa m e fe d e r a l ja il in w h ic h , l e ss th a n a y e a r e a r lie r , Ja v a id Iq b a l w a s a lle g e d ly m istr e a te d
. Iq b a l, a 9 M us l i m i nm a t e a cc us ed of v i ol a t i on s o f

1 8 U
. S. C
. § § 3 71 a nd 10 28 ( co ns pi r a cy t o def r a ud t he U ni t ed St a t es a nd f r a ud w ith id e n tific a tio n ) a n d h e ld p o st- 9 / 1 1 in th e M D C , a lle g e d ly su ffe r e d " u n c o n stitu tio n a l a c tio n s a g a in st h im in c o n n e c tio n w ith h is c o n fin e m e n t u n d e r h a r sh c o n d itio n s . . . a ft e r se p a r a tio n fr o m th e g e n e r a l p r iso n p o p u la tio n ." Iq b a l, 490 F. 3d at 147, 148 n. 1. W e he l d, wi t h r es pectt o I qbal ' s s ubs equent Bi vens ac t i ons , t hats uch t r eat m entwas not pr ot ect ed, as a m at t er of l aw, under t he doct r i ne o f qual i f i ed i m m uni t y. I d. at177- 78. F i ve d ay s aft er A rar's arri va l i n the U nit ed States. 10I n N ew Y or k C i t y. 11 54 1 to read. That evening, Arar was transferred, in chains and 2 shackles, to the Metropolitan Detention Center ("MDC") in Brooklyn, 3 New York, where he was strip-searched and placed in solitary 9 4 confinement. During his initial three days at MDC, Arar's 5 continued requests to meet with a lawyer and make telephone calls 6 were refused. (Id.) 7 On October 1, 2002, the INS initiated removal 10 8 proceedings against Arar, who was charged with being temporarily 9 inadmissible because of his membership in al Qaeda, a group 10 designated by the Secretary of State as a foreign terrorist 11 organization. Upon being given permission to make one telephone 12 call, Arar called his mother-in-law in Ottawa, Canada. (Id.) 13 Upon learning of Arar's whereabouts, his family contacted 14 the Office for Consular Affairs ("Canadian Consulate") and 11 15 retained an attorney, Amal Oummih, to represent him. The Canadian 16 Consulate had not been notified of Arar's detention. On October 3, 17 2002, Arar received a visit from Maureen Girvan from the Canadian 18 Consulate, who, when presented with the document noting Arar's 19 inadmissibility to the United States, assured Arar that removal to 20 Syria was not an option. On October 4, 2002, Arar designated 21 Canada as the country to which he wished to be removed. (Id.) 22 On October 5, 2002, Arar had his only meeting with55 1 counsel. The following day, he was taken in chains and shackles to 2 a room where approximately seven INS officials questioned him about 3 his reasons for opposing removal to Syria. His attorney was not 4 provided advance notice of the interrogation, and Arar further 5 alleges that U.S. officials misled him into thinking his attorney 6 had chosen not to attend. During the interrogation, Arar continued 7 to express his fear of being tortured if returned to Syria. At the 8 conclusion of the six-hour interrogation, Arar was informed that 9 the officials were discussing his case with "Washington, D.C." 10 Arar was asked to sign a document that appeared to be a transcript. 11 He refused to sign the form. (Id. at 253-54.) 12 The following day (October 7, 2002), attorney Oummih 13 received two telephone calls informing her that Arar had been taken 14 for processing to an INS office at Varick Street in Manhattan, that 15 he would eventually be placed in a detention facility in New 16 Jersey, and that she should call back the following morning for 17 Arar's exact whereabouts. However, Arar alleges that he never left 18 the MDC and that the contents of both of these phone calls to his 19 counsel were false and misleading. (Id. at 254.) 20 That same day, October 7, 2002, the INS Regional 21 Director, J. Scott Blackman, determined from classified and 22 unclassified information that Arar is "clearly and unequivocally" a 23 member of al Qaeda and, therefore, "clearly and unequivocally 24 inadmissible to the United States" under 8 U.S.C. 25 § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(V). See Cplt. Ex. D. at 1, 3, 5. Based on that 26 finding, Blackman concluded "that there are reasonable grounds to 27 believe that [Arar] is a danger to the security of the United56 1 States." Id. at 6 (brackets in original). (Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d 2 at 254.) 3 At approximately 4:00 a.m. on October 8, 2002, Arar 4 learned that, based on classified information, INS regional 5 director Blackman had ordered that Arar be sent to Syria and that 6 his removal there was consistent with Article Three of the United 7 Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or 8 Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CAT"). Arar pleaded for 9 reconsideration but was told by INS officials that the agency was 10 not governed by the "Geneva Conventions" and that Arar was barred 11 from reentering the country for a period of five years and would be 12 admissible only with the permission of the Attorney General. (Id.) 13 Later that day, Arar was taken in chains and shackles to 14 a New Jersey airfield, where he boarded a small jet plane bound for 15 Washington, D.C. From there, he was flown to Amman, Jordan, 16 arriving there on October 9, 2002. He was then handed over to 17 Jordanian authorities, who delivered him to the Syrians later that 18 day. At this time, U.S. officials had not informed either Canadian 19 Consulate official Girvan or attorney Oummih that Arar had been 20 removed to Syria. Arar alleges that Syrian officials refused to 21 accept Arar directly from the United States. (Id.) 22 Arar's Final Notice of Inadmissability ("Final Notice") 23 ordered him removed without further inquiry before an immigration 24 judge. See Cplt. Ex. D. According to the Final Notice: "The 25 Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service has 26 determined that your removal to Syria would be consistent with 27 [CAT]." Id. It was dated October 8, 2002, and signed by Deputy57 1 Attorney General Larry Thompson. After oral argument in the 2 district court on the defendants' motions to dismiss, in a letter 3 dated August 18, 2005, counsel for Arar clarified that Arar 4 received the Final Notice within hours of boarding the aircraft 5 taking him to Jordan. See Dkt. No. 93. (Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 6 254.) 7 B. Arar's Detention in Syria 8 During his ten-month period of detention in Syria, Arar 9 alleges, he was placed in a "grave" cell measuring six feet long, 10 seven feet high, and three feet wide. The cell was located within 11 the Palestine Branch of the Syrian Military Intelligence 12 ("Palestine Branch"). The cell was damp and cold, contained very 13 little light, and was infested with rats, which would enter the 14 cell through a small aperture in the ceiling. Cats would urinate 15 on Arar through the aperture, and sanitary facilities were 16 nonexistent. Arar was allowed to bathe himself in cold water once 17 per week. He was prohibited from exercising and was provided 18 barely edible food. Arar lost forty pounds during his ten-month 19 period of detention in Syria. (Id.) 20 During his first twelve days in Syrian detention, Arar 21 was interrogated for eighteen hours per day and was physically and 22 psychologically tortured. He was beaten on his palms, hips, and 23 lower back with a two-inch-thick electric cable. His captors also 24 used their fists to beat him on his stomach, his face, and the back 25 of his neck. He was subjected to excruciating pain and pleaded 26 with his captors to stop, but they would not. He was placed in a 27 room where he could hear the screams of other detainees being58 1 tortured and was told that he, too, would be placed in a spine2 breaking "chair," hung upside down in a "tire" for beatings, and 3 subjected to electric shocks. To lessen his exposure to the 4 torture, Arar falsely confessed, among other things, to having 5 trained with terrorists in Afghanistan, even though he had never 6 been to Afghanistan and had never been involved in terrorist 7 activity. (Id. at 255.) 8 Arar alleges that his interrogation in Syria was 9 coordinated and planned by U.S. officials, who sent the Syrians a 10 dossier containing specific questions. As evidence of this, Arar 11 notes that the interrogations in the United States and Syria 12 contained identical questions, including a specific question about 13 his relationship with a particular individual wanted for terrorism. 14 In return, the Syrian officials supplied U.S. officials with all 15 information extracted from Arar; plaintiff cites a statement by one 16 Syrian official who has publicly stated that the Syrian government 17 shared information with the United States that it extracted from 18 Arar. See Cplt. Ex. E (January 21, 2004 transcript of CBS's Sixty 19 Minutes II: "His Year In Hell"). (Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 255.) 20 C. Arar's Contact with the Canadian Government 21 While Detained in Syria

22 The Canadian Embassy contacted the Syrian government 23 about Arar on October 20, 2002, and the following day, Syrian 24 officials confirmed that they were detaining him. At this point, 25 the Syrian officials ceased interrogating and torturing Arar. 26 (Id.)59 1 Canadian officials visited Arar at the Palestine Branch 2 five times during his ten-month detention. Prior to each visit, 3 Arar was warned not to disclose that he was being mistreated. He 4 complied but eventually broke down during the fifth visit, telling 5 the Canadian consular official that he was being tortured and kept 6 in a grave. (Id.) 7 Five days later, Arar was brought to a Syrian 8 investigation branch, where he was forced to sign a confession 9 stating that he had participated in terrorist training in 10 Afghanistan even though, Arar states, he has never been to 11 Afghanistan or participated in any terrorist activity. Arar was 12 then taken to an overcrowded Syrian prison, where he remained for 13 six weeks. (Id.) 14 On September 28, 2003, Arar was transferred back to the 15 Palestine Branch, where he was held for one week. During this 16 week, he heard other detainees screaming in pain and begging for 17 their torture to end. (Id.) 18 On October 5, 2003, Syria, without filing any charges 19 against Arar, released him into the custody of Canadian Embassy 20 officials in Damascus. He was flown to Ottawa the following day 21 and reunited with his family. (Id.) 22 Arar contends that he is not a member of any terrorist 23 organization, including al Qaeda, and has never knowingly 24 associated himself with terrorists, terrorist organizations or 25 terrorist activity. Arar claims that the individual about whom he 26 was questioned was a casual acquaintance whom Arar had last seen in 27 October 2001. He believes that he was removed to Syria forFoot not e i n di s t r i ct cour t opi ni on, r el ati ng t o t he s o- call ed "LaH ood Let t er " a bout a s ubs equent C ana di an 12 in q u iry , o m itte d
. S e e A r a r , 4 1 4 F . S u p p . 2 d a t 2 5 6 n .1
. 60 1 interrogation under torture because of his casual acquaintances 2 with this individual and others believed to be involved in 3 terrorist activity. But Arar contends "on information and belief" 4 that there has never been, nor is there now, any reasonable 5 suspicion that he was involved in such activity. Cplt. ¶ 2. 12 6 (Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 255-56.) 7 Arar alleges that he continues to suffer adverse effects 8 from his ordeal in Syria. He claims that he has trouble relating 9 to his wife and children, suffers from nightmares, is frequently 10 branded a terrorist, and is having trouble finding employment due 11 to his reputation and inability to travel in the United States. 12 (Id. at 256.) 13 D. U.S. Policy Related to Interrogation 14 of Detainees by Foreign Governments 15 16 The complaint alleges on information and belief that Arar 17 was removed to Syria under a covert U.S. policy of "extraordinary 18 rendition," according to which individuals are sent to foreign 19 countries to undergo methods of interrogation not permitted in the 20 United States. The "extraordinary rendition" policy involves the 21 removal of "non-U.S. citizens detained in this country and 22 elsewhere and suspected -- reasonably or unreasonably -- of 23 terrorist activity to countries, including Syria, where 24 interrogations under torture are routine." Cplt. ¶ 24. Arar 25 alleges on information and belief that the United States sends61 1 individuals "to countries like Syria precisely because those 2 countries can and do use methods of interrogation to obtain 3 information from detainees that would not be morally acceptable or 4 legal in the United States and other democracies." Id. The 5 complaint further alleges that the defendants "have facilitated 6 such human rights abuses, exchanging dossiers with intelligence 7 officials in the countries to which non-U.S. citizens are removed." 8 Id. The complaint also alleges that the United States involves 9 Syria in its "extraordinary rendition" program to extract counter10 terrorism information. (Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 256.) 11 This "extraordinary rendition" program is not part of any 12 official or declared U.S. public policy; nevertheless, it has 13 received extensive attention in the press, where unnamed U.S. 14 officials and certain foreign officials have admitted to the 15 existence of such a policy. Arar details a number of articles in 16 the mainstream press recounting both the incidents of this 17 particular case and the "extraordinary rendition" program more 18 broadly. These articles are attached as Exhibit C of his 19 complaint. (Id. at 256-57.) 20 Arar alleges that the defendants directed the 21 interrogations by providing information about Arar to Syrian 22 officials and receiving reports on Arar's responses. Consequently, 23 the defendants conspired with, and/or aided and abetted, Syrian 24 officials in arbitrarily detaining, interrogating, and torturing 25 Arar. Arar argues in the alternative that, at a minimum, the 26 defendants knew or at least should have known that there was a 27 substantial likelihood that he would be tortured upon his removalThe di s t r i ct cour t ' s des cr i pt i on o f t he f act s as al l eg ed i n t he c om pl ai nt ends her e. 13 62 1 to Syria. (Id. at 257.) 2 E. Syria's Human Rights Record 3 Arar's claim that he faced a likelihood of torture in 4 Syria is supported by U.S. State Department reports on Syria's 5 human rights practices. See, e.g., Bureau of Democracy, Human 6 Rights, and Labor, United States Department of State, 2004 Country 7 Reports on Human Rights Practices (Released February 28, 2005) 8 ("2004 Report"). According to the State Department, Syria's "human 9 rights record remained poor, and the Government continued to commit 10 numerous, serious abuses . . . includ[ing] the use of torture in 11 detention, which at times resulted in death." Id. at 1. Although 12 the Syrian constitution officially prohibits such practices, "there 13 was credible evidence that security forces continued to use torture 14 frequently." Id. at 2. The 2004 Report cites "numerous cases of 15 security forces using torture on prisoners in custody." Id. 16 Similar references throughout the 2004 Report, as well as State 17 Department reports from prior years, are legion. See, e.g., Cplt. 18 Ex. A (2002 State Department Human Rights Report on Syria). (Arar, 19 414 F. Supp. 2d at 257.) 13 20 F. The Canadian Government Inquiry 21 On September 18, 2006, a Commission of Inquiry into the 22 Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar ("Arar 23 Commission"), established by the government of Canada to 24 investigate the Arar affair, issued a three-volume report. SeeO n O c to b e r 2 3 , 2 0 0 7 , this C o u rt gr a n ted A ra r's m o ti o n to ta k e j u d icia l n o ti c e o f th e R e p o rt i n so fa r a s it s 14 exi s t ence an d t he s cope of i t s con t ent s were con cer ned, but deni ed t he m ot i on i ns of ar as i t m ay hav e s ough t j udi ci al n o ti c e o f th e fa c ts asse rte d i n the re p o rt. B u t cf
. an te a t [ 4- 5] (em p loy ing the re p o rt a s the so u rc e fo r fa c ts re lating to C a n a d ian i n v o lve m e n t i n the A ra r inc id e n t). 63 1 Arar Comm'n, Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar (2006). 14 2 A press release issued by the Commission summarized: "On Maher Arar 3 the Commissioner [Dennis O'Connor] comes to one important 4 conclusion: 'I am able to say categorically that there is no 5 evidence to indicate that Mr. Arar has committed any offence or 6 that his activities constitute a threat to the security of 7 Canada.'" Press Release, Arar Comm'n, Arar Commission Releases Its 8 Findings on the Handling of the Maher Arar Case 1 (Sept. 18, 2006) 9 (boldface in original), available at 10 http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/ReleaseFinal_Sept18.pdf (last 11 visited May 31, 2008). On January 26, 2007, the Office of the 12 Prime Minister of Canada issued the following announcement: 13 Prime Minister Stephen Harper today released 14 the letter of apology he has sent to Maher Arar 15 and his family for any role Canadian officials 16 may have played in what happened to Mr. Arar, 17 Monia Mazigh and their family in 2002 and 2003. 18 19 "Although the events leading up to this 20 terrible ordeal happened under the previous 21 government, our Government will do everything 22 in its power to ensure that the issues raised 23 by Commissioner O’Connor are addressed," said 24 the Prime Minister. "I sincerely hope that 25 these actions will help Mr. Arar and his family64 1 begin a new and hopeful chapter in their lives." 2 3 Canada’s New Government has accepted all 23 4 recommendations made in Commissioner O’Connor’s 5 first report, and has already begun acting upon 6 them. The Government has sent letters to both 7 the Syrian and the U.S. governments formally 8 objecting to the treatment of Mr. Arar. 9 Ministers Day and MacKay have also expressed 10 Canada’s concerns on this important issue to 11 their American counterparts. Finally, Canada 12 has removed Mr. Arar from Canadian lookout 13 lists, and requested that the United States 14 amend its own records accordingly. 15 16 The Prime Minister also announced that Canada’s 17 New Government has successfully completed the 18 mediation process with Mr. Arar, fulfilling 19 another one of Commissioner O’Connor’s 20 recommendations. This settlement, mutually 21 agreed upon by all parties, ensures that Mr. 22 Arar and his family will obtain fair 23 compensation, in the amount of $10.5 million, 24 plus legal costs, for the ordeal they have 25 suffered. 26 27 Press Release, Prime Minister Releases Letter of Apology to Maher65 1 Arar and His Family and Announces Completion of Mediation Process 2 (Jan. 26, 2007), available at http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media. 3 asp?id=1509 (last visited May 31, 2008); see also Margaret L. 4 Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and 5 the Rule of Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1333, 1339-40 (2007). 6 III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 7 A. The Complaint and the District Court's Opinion 8 On January 22, 2004, Arar filed a complaint in the United 9 States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. In 10 addition to its factual allegations, his complaint asserts as 11 "Claims for Relief": 12 1. That defendants, in contravention of the 13 Torture Victim Prevention Act of 1991 14 ("TVPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (note), acted in 15 concert with Jordanian and Syrian 16 officials, and under color of Syrian law, 17 to conspire and/or aid and abet in 18 violating his right to be free from torture 19 (Count 1). 20 21 2. That defendants knowingly or recklessly 22 subjected him to torture and coercive 23 interrogation in Syria in violation of his 24 Fifth Amendment right to substantive due 25 process (Count 2). 26 27 3. That defendants knowingly or recklessly66 1 subjected him to arbitrary detention 2 without trial in Syria in violation of his 3 Fifth Amendment right to substantive due 4 process (Count 3). 5 6 4. That defendants intentionally or recklessly 7 subjected him to arbitrary detention and 8 coercive and involuntary custodial 9 interrogation in the United States, and 10 interfered with his ability to obtain 11 counsel or petition the courts for redress, 12 in violation of his Fifth Amendment right 13 to substantive due process (Count 4). 14 15 See Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 257-58. 16 The district court denied Arar's claim for declaratory 17 relief, dismissed Counts 1, 2, and 3 with prejudice, and dismissed 18 Count 4 without prejudice and with leave to replead. Id. at 287- 19 88. The district court decided that: 1) Arar lacks standing to 20 bring a claim for declaratory relief; 2) Arar has no TVPA action 21 since (a) in the court's view, Congress provided no private right 22 of action under the TVPA for non-citizens such as Arar, and (b) he 23 cannot show that defendants were acting under "color of law, of any 24 foreign nation," id. at 287; 3) even though the Immigration and 25 Nationality Act ("INA") does not foreclose jurisdiction over Arar's 26 substantive due process claims, no cause of action under Bivens v. 27 Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 38867 1 (1971), can be extended in light of "special factors counselling 2 hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress," id. 3 at 396, namely the national security and foreign policy 4 considerations at stake; and 4) prior cases holding that 5 inadmissible aliens deserve little due process protection are 6 inapplicable to Arar's claim that he was deprived of due process 7 during his period of domestic detention because Arar was not 8 attempting to effect an entry into the United States, and therefore 9 the circumstances and conditions of confinement to which Arar was 10 subjected while in U.S. custody may potentially raise Bivens 11 claims, but Arar was required to replead them without regard to any 12 rendition claim and name those defendants that were personally 13 involved in the alleged unconstitutional treatment. Arar, 414 F. 14 Supp. 2d at 287-88. 15 Arar declined the district court's invitation to replead. 16 Instead, he appeals from the judgment of the district court. 17 B. The Panel's Majority Opinion 18 The panel affirms the judgment of the district court as 19 explained by the majority opinion. The majority concludes that (1) 20 the allegations set forth in Arar's complaint are sufficient, at 21 this early stage of the litigation, to establish personal 22 jurisdiction over defendants not resident in New York, but (2) Arar 23 has not established federal subject-matter jurisdiction over his 24 claim for declaratory relief. Ante at [7-8, 49-51] . It concludes 25 further that (3) Arar's allegations do not state a claim against 26 the defendants for damages under the TVPA, and (4) we cannot 27 provide Arar with a judicially created cause of action for damagesSee U ni t ed St at es v. R eyno l ds , 345 U
. S. 1 ( 1953) ; Zucker br aun v . G ener al D yna m i cs C or p. , 935 F. 2d 544 ( 2d 15 C ir. 1 9 9 1 ). 68 1 under the Fifth Amendment, pursuant to the Bivens doctrine. Id. at 2 [7-8, 49-51] . Finally, having decided to dismiss the complaint on 3 these grounds, the majority does not reach the question of whether 4 the INA or the state-secrets privilege foreclose Arar's pursuit of 5 this litigation. Id. at [49-50] . 6 I agree with the majority's conclusions as to personal 7 jurisdiction, Arar's request for a declaratory judgment, and his 8 claim under the TVPA. Unlike the majority, however, I conclude 9 that Arar adequately pleads violations of his constitutional rights 10 and is entitled to proceed with his claims for monetary damages 11 under Bivens. Finally, as Arar and the defendants agree, were the 12 complaint reinstated and this matter remanded, as I think it should 13 be, the district court could then consider the defendants' 14 assertion of the "state-secrets privilege" in the first instance, 15 15 and limit discovery as is necessary to meet legitimate national 16 security and related concerns. 17 IV. ANALYSIS 18 This is not an immigration case. Contrary to the 19 majority's analysis, Arar's allegations do not describe an action 20 arising under or to be decided according to the immigration laws of 21 the United States. Arar did not attempt to enter the United States 22 in any but the most trivial sense; he sought only to transfer 23 through JFK Airport in order to travel from one foreign country to 24 another. He was initially interrogated by FBI agents, not INS 25 officials; they sought to learn not about the bona fides of hisT h e d istr ic t c o u r t, b y c o n tr a st, d id n o t tr e a t th is a s a n im m ig r a tio n c a se . See Arar, 414 F. Supp. 16 2d at 285, 287. 69 1 attempt to "enter" the United States, but about his alleged links 2 to al Qaeda. The INS was not engaged in order to make a 3 determination as to Arar's immigration status. The agency's 4 principal involvement came after the FBI failed to obtain desired 5 information from him, in order to facilitate his transfer to Syria 6 so that he might be further held and questioned under torture. 7 This lawsuit is thus about the propriety and 8 constitutionality of the manner in which United States law 9 enforcement agents sought to obtain from Arar information about 10 terrorism or terrorists which they thought -- wrongly as it turned 11 out -- that he possessed. The majority goes astray when it accepts 12 the defendants' attempt to cast it as an immigration matter. 16 13 In my view, the issues raised on this appeal, approached 14 in light of the case Arar actually seeks to assert, are relatively 15 straightforward: 16 1. What is the gravamen of Arar's complaint? 17 18 2. Does it allege a deprivation of his right 19 to substantive due process under the Fifth 20 Amendment to the United States 21 Constitution? 22 23 3. If so, is a Bivens action available as a 24 vehicle by which he may seek redress for 25 the violation? 26 27 28 4. And, if so, are the defendants entitled to 29 qualified immunity? 30 31 A. The Gravamen of the Complaint 32 It is well-settled in this Circuit that "we may not 33 affirm the dismissal of [a plaintiff's] complaint because [he has]T h e F e d e r a l Ru l e s o f Ci v i l P r o c e d u r e t e l l u s t h a t " [ p ] l e a d i n g s mus tb e c o n s t r u e d s o a s t o d o j u s t i c e . " F e d
. R. 17 C iv. P
. 8 (e). W righ t an d M il ler 's tre a ti se c o u n se ls t h a t "[t]h is pr o v isi o n i s n o t si m p ly a p re c a to ry state m e n t bu t re flec ts one of t he b as i c ph i l os ophi es of pr acti ce under t he f

eder al r ul es . " 5 C har l es A
. W r i gh t & A r t hur R
. M i l l er , Federa l P ra c ti c e an d P ro c e d u re § 1 2 8 6 (3d e d
. 2 0 0 4 ). "O n e o f th e m o st i m p o rta n t ob jec ti v e s o f th e fe d e ra l ru les is tha t l a w su it s s houl d be det er m i ned on t hei r m er i t s an d acco r di ng t o t he di ct at es of j us t i ce, r at her t han i n t er m s of whet her or nott he a ve r m en t s i n t he p a pe r p l ea di ng s h a ve b ee n a r t f ul l y dr a wn. " I d.

70 1 proceeded under the wrong theory 'so long as [he has] alleged facts 2 sufficient to support a meritorious legal claim.'" Hack v. 3 President & Fellows of Yale College, 237 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2000) 4 (quoting Northrop v. Hoffman of Simsbury, Inc., 134 F.3d 41, 46 (2d 5 Cir. 1997)), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 888 (2001). In considering an 6 appeal such as this one from a district court's grant of the 7 defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "'[f]actual 8 allegations alone are what matter[].'" Northrop, 134 F.3d at 46 9 (quoting Albert v. Carovano, 851 F.2d 561, 571 n.3 (2d Cir. 1988) 10 (en banc) (citing Newman v. Silver, 713 F.2d 14, 15 n.1 (2d Cir. 11 1983))). We are, moreover, required to read the factual 17 12 allegations in a complaint "as a whole." See Shapiro v. Cantor, 13 123 F.3d 717, 719 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Aldana v. Del Monte 14 Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1252 n.11 (11th Cir. 15 2005) (per curiam), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 596 (2006); Goldwasser 16 v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 401 (7th Cir. 2000). 17 The allegations contained in Arar's complaint include 18 assertions, which must be treated as established facts for present 19 purposes, that: 1) Arar was apprehended by government agents as he 20 sought to change planes at JFK Airport; he was not seeking to enter 21 the United States; 2) his detention, based on false information 22 given by the government of Canada, was for the purpose of obtaining 23 information from him about terrorism and his alleged links with 24 terrorists and terrorist organizations; 3) he was interrogated71 1 harshly on that topic -- mostly by FBI agents –- for many hours 2 over a period of two days; 4) during that period, he was held 3 incommunicado and was mistreated by, among other things, being 4 deprived of food and water for a substantial portion of his time in 5 custody; 5) he was then taken from JFK Airport to the MDC in 6 Brooklyn, where he continued to be held incommunicado and in 7 solitary confinement for another three days; 6) while at the MDC, 8 INS agents sought unsuccessfully to have him agree to be removed to 9 Syria because they and other U.S. government agents intended that 10 he would be questioned there along similar lines, but under 11 torture; 7) thirteen days after Arar had been intercepted and 12 incarcerated at the airport, defendants sent him against his will 13 to Syria. The defendants intended that he be questioned in Syria 14 under torture and while enduring brutal and inhumane conditions of 15 captivity. This was, as alleged, all part of a single course of 16 action, conceived of and executed by the defendants in the United 17 States. Its purpose: to make Arar "talk." 18 Not until deep in its opinion, though, does the majority 19 come to address the heart of the matter: Arar's treatment by 20 defendants while he was present in the United States. When it 21 finally does, the opinion disposes of the issue by describing only 22 some of the pleaded facts: "[W]hile in the United States," it 23 says, Arar "was subjected to 'coercive and involuntary custodial 24 interrogations . . . conducted for excessively long periods of time 25 and at odd hours of the day and night' on three occasions over 26 thirteen days; 'deprived of sleep and food for extended periods of 27 time'; and, thereafter, was 'held in solitary confinement, chained72 1 and shackled, [and] subjected to [an] invasive strip-search[].'" 2 Ante at [45] . Having thus limited its consideration to only a 3 portion of the acts Arar complains of, the majority blandly 4 concludes: "These allegations, while describing what might perhaps 5 constitute relatively harsh conditions of detention, do not amount 6 to a claim of gross physical abuse" necessary to support a 7 conclusion that his due process rights had been infringed. Id. at 8 [45] . 9 But the majority reaches its conclusion by eliding, among 10 other things, the manner in which Arar was taken into custody and 11 the manner in which defendants disposed of him when their efforts 12 to obtain information from him here proved fruitless. Arar was, in 13 effect, abducted while attempting to transit at JFK Airport. And 14 when he failed to give defendants the information they were looking 15 for, and he refused to be sent "voluntarily" to Syria, they 16 forcibly sent him there to be detained and questioned under 17 torture. 18 It is true that after setting forth his allegations of 19 fact in detail in his complaint, Arar structures his "claims for 20 relief" to charge knowing or reckless subjection to torture, 21 coercive interrogation, and arbitrary detention in Syria (counts 22 two and three) separately from, among other things, arbitrary 23 detention and coercive and involuntary custodial interrogation in 24 the United States (count four). See Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 257- 25 58. The pleading's form may have contributed to the majority's 26 erroneous separation of the decision to send Arar to Syria to be 27 interrogated under torture from his "domestic" physical73 1 mistreatment. But, as noted, "'[f]actual allegations alone are 2 what matter[].'" Northrop, 134 F.3d at 46 (quoting Albert, 851 3 F.2d at 571 n.3). The assessment of Arar's alleged complaint must 4 take into account the entire arc of factual allegations that Arar 5 makes –- his interception and arrest; his questioning, principally 6 by FBI agents, about his putative ties to terrorists; his detention 7 and mistreatment at JFK Airport in Queens and the MDC in Brooklyn; 8 the deliberate misleading of both his lawyer and the Canadian 9 Consulate; and his transport to Washington, D.C., and forced 10 transfer to Syrian authorities for further detention and 11 questioning under torture. 12 B. Arar's Pleading of a Substantive Due Process Violation 13 14 Principles of substantive due process apply only to a 15 narrow band of extreme misbehavior by government agents acting 16 under color of law: mistreatment of a person that is "so egregious, 17 so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary 18 conscience." Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 2007) 19 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). When Arar's 20 complaint is read to include all of the actions allegedly taken by 21 the defendants against him within this country, including the 22 actions taken to send him to Syria with the intent that he be 23 tortured there, it alleges conduct that easily exceeds the level of 24 outrageousness needed to make out a due process claim. Indeed, 25 although the "shocks the conscience" test is undeniably vague, see 26 Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 430 F.3d 140, 156 (3d Cir. 2005); 27 Schaefer v. Goch, 153 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 1998), "[n]o one 28 doubts that under Supreme Court precedent, interrogation byT h e H a r b u r y c o u r t c o n c lu d e d , n o n e th e le ss , th a t b e c a u se th e m u r d e r e d a lie n 's m istr e a tm e n t o c c u r r e d e n tir e ly 18 abr oad, he had no t s uff er ed a v i ol at i on o f

hi s Fi f t h Am endm entr i gh t s . See H ar bur y, 233 F. 3d at 603- 04 ( r el yi ng on U n ite d S ta te s v . V e r d u g o -U r q u id e z , 4 9 4 U .S . 2 5 9 , 2 6 9 (1 9 9 0 )).

"[ R ] endi t i on - - t he m ar ketap pr oac h -

- out s our ces our cr i m es , whi ch p ut s us att he m er cy o f an yone who can 19 exp os e us , m ake s us dependenton s om e of t he wor l d' s m os t uns avo r y a ct or s , an d aba ndons ac count abi l i t y. I t i s an app r oac h we as s oci at e wi t h cr i m e f am i l i es , notwi t h g r eatna t i ons . " Phi l i p Bobbi t t , Terr or an d C ons ent : The W ar s f or th e T w e n ty- F irst C e n tu ry 3 8 8 (20 0 8 ). "[O ]n e c o u ld ge t t h e w o rst o f b o th w o rld s: n a ti o n a l re sp o n sibili ty fo r a c ts as to w hi ch t he a ge nt s we have em power ed ar e una ccount abl e. " I d. at387. 74 1 torture" meets that test, Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 602 2 (D.C. Cir. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 536 U.S. 403 (2002); 18 3 see also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) 4 (interrogation methods were "too close to the rack and the screw to 5 permit of constitutional differentiation"); Palko v. Connecticut, 6 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937) (noting that the Due Process Clause must 7 at least "give protection against torture, physical or mental"), 8 overruled on other grounds by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 9 (1969). The defendants did not themselves torture Arar; they 10 "outsourced" it. But I do not think that whether the defendants 19 11 violated Arar's Fifth Amendment rights turns on whom they selected 12 to do the torturing: themselves, a Syrian Intelligence officer, a 13 warlord in Somalia, a drug cartel in Colombia, a military 14 contractor in Baghdad or Boston, a Mafia family in New Jersey, or a 15 Crip set in South Los Angeles. 16 We have held that under the state-created danger 17 doctrine, "[w]here a government official takes an affirmative act 18 that creates an opportunity for a third party to harm a victim (or 19 increases the risk of such harm), the government official can 20 potentially be liable for damages." Lombardi, 485 F.3d at 80; see 21 also, e.g., Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 98-99 (2d Cir. 22 1993) (finding liability where the police allegedly gave the greenA ccor di ng l y, A r ar ' s cl ai m ca n be an al yz ed under ei t her of t he " tw o ' s epa r at e a nd di s t i nctt heor i es of l i abi l i t y' 20 u nd er the sub st an t i ve co m po ne nt of t he D u e P roc ess C l au se: ' spe cial relat i on ship' l i ab i l i t y o r ' st ate-cre ated -d an ge r' li a b ilit y . " B e n zm a n v . W h it m a n , 5 2 3 F
. 3 d 1 1 9 , 1 2 7 (2d C ir. 2 0 0 8 ). 75 1 light for skinheads to assault a group of flag-burners), overruled 2 on other grounds by Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics 3 Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993); see 4 also Velez-Diaz v. Vega-Irizarry, 421 F.3d 71, 79 (1st Cir. 2005) 5 ("[I]n scenarios in which government officials actively direct or 6 assist private actors in causing harm to an individual . . . the 7 government officials and the private actor are essentially joint 8 tortfeasors, and therefore, may incur shared constitutional 9 responsibility." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 10 We have also held that "when the State takes a person into its 11 custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution 12 imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility 13 for his safety and general well-being. Under these limited 14 circumstances, the state may owe the incarcerated person an 15 affirmative duty to protect against harms to his liberties 16 inflicted by third parties." Matican v. City of New York, 524 F.3d 17 151, 155-56 (2d Cir. 2008) (citations, internal quotation marks, 18 and footnotes omitted). This "duty arises solely from the State's 19 affirmative act of restraining the individual's freedom to act on 20 his own behalf through incarceration, institutionalization, or 21 other similar restraint of personal liberty." Id. 20 22 The majority reaches the wrong conclusion in large 23 measure, I think, by treating Arar's claims as though he were an 24 unadmitted alien seeking entry into the United States. The 25 majority asserts that "[a]s an unadmitted alien, Arar as a matterW h il e the m a jor it y o p inio n fro m ti m e to tim e tre a ts A ra r a s tho u g h h e w a s a n i m m igra n t see k ing e n try i n to 21 th e U n ite d S ta te s, th e IN A m a k e s a c le a r d istin c tio n b e tw e e n a n im m ig r a n t se e k in g e n tr y a n d a n a lie n se e k in g o n ly tra n sit t hr ou g h t he U ni t ed St a t es . Th e I N A ex cl ude s f r om t he de f

i ni t i on o f " i m m i g r a nt " a n a l i en " i n i m m edi a t e a nd co nti nu ou s t r ans i t t hr ough t he U ni t ed St at es . " 8 U
. S. C
. § 1101 ( a) ( 15) ( C )
. M or eove r , att he ti m e Arar f l ew t o J FK A i r por t , t he U nit ed States ha d i n p l ac e a T ran si t W i t ho u t V i sa pro gra m t ha t al l ow ed an al i en w ho w ou l d be req u i red t o o btain a v i sa t o en t er t he U ni t ed St at es t o t r ans i t t hr ough a U
. S. ai r por t wi t hout obt ai ni ng a vi s a. As a c i t i z en o f C ana da, a vi s a wai ver count r y, A r ar ha d no ne ed t o a vai l hi m s el f of t hi s pr og r am . But i t s ex i s t ence dem ons t r at es t he di s t i ncti on, r ecog ni z ed by t he g over nm ent , betw een t r ans i tpa s s eng er s , l i ke Ara r , an d i m m i gr ant s s eeki ng ent r y i nt o t he U ni t ed St at es . The p r o g r a m w a s s u sp e n d e d fo r se c u r ity re a so n s o n A u g u st 2 , 2 0 0 3 , l o n g a ft e r A r a r 's a tte m p t to tra n sit th r o u g h JF K A irp o r t. S e e P re ss R e lea se , D e p a rtm e n t of H o m e lan d S e c u rity, H o m e lan d S e c u rity a n d D e p a rtm e n t of S tate T a k e Im m e d iate S t ep s T o M ak e A i r T rav el E ve n S afe r (A u g. 2, 20 03 ) , av ail ab l e a t htt p:// w w w . d hs. go v/ xn ew s/ re lea se s/ p re ssre lea se s0 2 2 7
. sh tm (l a st visited M a y 3 0 , 2 0 0 8 ). 76 1 of law lacked a physical presence in the United States." Ante at 2 [39] . And it concludes from this that "the full protections of the 3 due process clause" do not apply to Arar because they "apply only 4 to 'persons within the United States.'" Id. (quoting Zadvydas v. 5 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (internal quotation marks 6 omitted)). 7 But the notion that, while in New York City, Arar was not 8 "physically present" in the United States, is a legal fiction 9 peculiar to immigration law. It is relevant only to the 10 determination of an alien's immigration status and related matters. 11 It is indeed a fiction that works largely to the benefit of aliens, 12 permitting them to remain here while immigration officials 13 determine whether they are legally admissible. 14 If Arar had been seeking to immigrate to the United 15 States, had he been detained at the immigration entry point at 21 16 JFK Airport; had he thereafter been held at the MDC in Brooklyn 17 pending deportation to his home in Canada, he presumably would have 18 properly been treated, for immigration purposes, as though he had 19 been held or turned back at the border. See Shaughnessy v. United 20 States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953) ("Aliens seeking 21 entry obviously can be turned back at the border withoutH u g h e s M e a rn s, A n ti g o n ish (1 8 9 9 ). 22The Supr em e C our t ' s deci s i ons an d our own i nvok e t he e nt r y f i ct i on i n ca s es r el at ed t o t he det er m i nati on o f 23 an al i en' s i m m i gr at i on s t at us , an d t he p r ocedur al due pr oces s t o whi ch a n a l i en i s enti t l ed by v i r t ue of t hats t at us , not c a s e s a d j u d i c a t i n g a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n s o f a n a l i e n ' s s u b s t a n t i v e d u e p r o c e s s r i g h t s d u r i n g d e t e n t i o n . S e e , e . g . , L e n g Ma y Ma v. Bar ber , 357 U
. S. 185 ( 1958) ( conc l udi ng t hatt em por ar y pa r ol e i n U ni t ed St at es whi l e a l i en' s adm i s s i bi l i t y was bei ng det er m i ned di d not enti t l e a l i en t o be nef i t of s t at ut e g i vi ng A t t or ney G ener al aut hor i t y t o wi t hhol d depor t ati on o f an y al i en " w i t hi n t he U ni t ed St at es " i f ali en woul d t her eby be s ubj ect ed t o ph ys i calper s ecut i on) ; M enon v. Esp er dy, 413 F. 2d 644, 647 ( 2d C i r . 1969 ) ( noti ng t hat"s i nce a p ar ol e does notcon s t i t ut e a n a dm i s s i on i nt o t he U ni t ed St at es . . . t h[ e] ap pe al i nv olve [d ] an e xc l u si on . . . rather tha n a n e xp u l si on "); D on g W i ng O t t v. Sh au gh ne ssy, 24 7 F
. 2d 76 9, 77 0 (2d C i r. 1 9 5 7 ) (p e r c u riam ) (h o ld ing tha t t h e A ttor n e y G e n e ra l' s " d iscr e ti o n a ry p o w e r to su sp e n d d e p o rta ti o n " d id n o t ap p ly to al i ens "wi t hi n t he c ount r y on pa r ol e, " b eca us e pa r ol e, "b y s t at ut e[ , was ] not[ t o] be r eg ar ded as an adm i s s i on o f t he a l i en" ( ci t ati on a nd i nt er nalquot at i on m ar ks om i t t ed) ) , cer t . deni ed, 357 U
. S. 925 ( 1958) ; K nauf f v. Sha ughn es s y, 179 F. 2d 628, 6 3 0 (2 d C ir. 1 9 5 0 ) (p e r c u r ia m ) (a lie n sto p p e d a t th e b o r d e r a n d d e ta in e d o n E llis Is la n d " is n o t 'in th e U n ite d S ta te s' . .
. [a n d th e r e fo r e ] is n o t e n title d to n a tu r a liza tio n " ); se e a lso M a r tin e z -A g u e r o v . G o n z a le z , 4 5 9 F .3 d 6 1 8 , 6 2 3 (5 th C ir.) (re jec ti n g ap p li c a ti o n o f th e e n try fiction to B ive n s c laim s inv o lvin g the u se o f e x c e ssiv e fo rc e ), c e rt. d e n ied , 1 2 7 S
. C t. 83 7 (20 06 ) ; K w ai F u n W on g v . U nit ed States, 37 3 F
. 3d 95 2, 97 3 (9th C i r. 20 04 ) ( "T he en t ry fi cti on i s be st seen . . . as a f ai r l y na r r ow d oct r i ne t hatpr i m ar i l y det er m i nes t he p r ocedur es t hatt he e xec ut i ve b r anc h m us t f ol l ow bef

or e t urn i ng an im m ig r a n t a w a y ." (e m p h a sis in o r ig in a l)). 77 1 more. . . . [T]emporary harborage, an act of legislative grace, 2 bestows no additional rights."); Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 3 (1925) (concluding that an unadmitted alien held on Ellis Island, 4 and later elsewhere within the United States, was "to be regarded 5 as stopped at the boundary line" for naturalization purposes). But 6 for purposes of assessing his treatment by law enforcement agents 7 during his detention and interrogation in several places in the 8 City of New York, it cannot follow from a legal fiction applicable 9 to immigration status that Arar, rather like the fictional "little 10 man who wasn't there," was never in this country. Arar sought 22 23 11 not to enter this country, but to leave it, after transiting 12 briefly through one of its airports. For purposes of identifying 13 the most rudimentary of his rights under the Constitution, the 14 fiction that Arar was not here is senseless. He was here, as a 15 matter of both fact and law, and was therefore entitled to 16 protection against mistreatment under the Due Process Clause. 17 *** 18 The majority acknowledges that even an unadmitted alien,78 1 treated under the immigration laws as though he was not physically 2 present within the United States, has constitutional rights. The 3 majority sees the scope of those rights as not extending "beyond" 4 freedom from "gross physical abuse." See ante at [47] . I think 5 that unduly narrow. It seems to me that Arar was entitled to the 6 bare-minimum protection that substantive due process affords. 7 In support of applying a "gross physical abuse" standard, 8 the majority cites Lynch v. Cannatella , 810 F.2d 1363, 1374 (5th 9 Cir. 1987), Correa v. Thornburgh, 901 F.2d 1166, 1171 n.5 (2d Cir. 10 1990), and Adras v. Nelson , 917 F.2d 1552, 1559 (11th Cir. 1990). 11 These cases are highly doubtful authority for present purposes. 12 Again, they are immigration cases. They deal with the treatment of 13 aliens who, having sought admission to the United States, were 14 awaiting removal or a determination of their status under the 15 immigration laws. It is difficult to understand the relevance of 16 those decisions to the rights of an alien who wished to transit 17 through an American airport but was taken into custody for 18 interrogation as to non-immigration matters instead. 19 Even accepting these cases as setting forth the 20 applicable standard, however, I think Arar adequately alleges a 21 violation of his substantive due process rights. His allegations, 22 properly construed, describe decisions made and actions taken by 23 defendants within the United States, while Arar was in the United 24 States, designed to obtain information from him, even if doing so 25 ultimately required his detention and torture abroad. Once the 26 defendants, having despaired of acquiring the information from Arar 27 here, physically caused him to be placed in the hands of someone,As t he m a j or i t y no t es , Ar a r a s s er t s t ha t h i s s ub s t a nti ve due p r oc es s r i g ht s s ho ul d b e a s s es s ed un der s t a nda r ds 24 es t abli s hed f

or pr e- t r i al det ai nees i n Bel l v. W ol f i s h, 441 U
. S. 520, 539 ( 1979) ( deci di ng whet her t he c hal l eng ed co ndi t i on s a m ou ntt o " pu ni s hm en t t ha t m a y no t c on s t i t ut i on a l l y be i nf l i ct ed up on [ pr e- t r i a l] de t a i ne es qua d e tain e e s" ), B loc k v . R u th e rfo rd , 4 6 8 U
. S
. 5 7 6 , 5 8 4 (19 8 4 ), an d Iq b a l, 4 9 0 F
. 3 d at 1 6 8 -6 9
. S e e an te a t [ 45- 46]
. I f i nd s uch a n ana l ys i s under t hes e ca s es t o be unhel pf ul
. The i s s ue her e i s notwhet her A r ar was "p uni s hed" a s a pr e- t r i al det ai nee w ith o u t fir st b e in g trie d a n d c o n v ic te d
. H e w a s n o t a p r e -tr ia l d e ta in e e . T h e q u e stio n is w h e th e r , a s a p e r so n d e ta in e d in t he U nit ed States for i nterro ga t i on , he m ay be m i st rea t ed an d sen t t o b e torture d i n the w ay t ha t he w as. 79 1 somewhere -- anyone, anywhere -- for the purpose of having him 2 tortured, it seems to me that they were subjecting him to the most 3 appalling kind of "gross physical abuse." They thereby violated 24 4 his right to due process even as the majority artificially limits 5 that right. 6 It may be worth noting, finally, that in order for one or 7 more of the defendants to be liable for the infringement of Arar's 8 substantive due process rights, that defendant or those defendants 9 would presumably have to be found by the trier of fact to have 10 participated in a broad enough swath of Arar's mistreatment to be 11 held responsible for the violation. A lone INS agent who asked 12 Arar questions at JFK Airport on September 26, or the pilot of the 13 airplane in which Arar was sent to Washington, D.C., en route to 14 Jordan and Syria on October 8, would be unlikely to be liable to 15 Arar for damages for their limited roles in the events. Who, if 16 anyone, fits that description, however, seems to me a question that 17 cannot be addressed at this time, without the fruits of pre-trial 18 discovery. 19 C. Availability of a Bivens Action 20 In Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of 21 Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Supreme Court "recognized for 22 the first time an implied private right of action for damages 23 against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen'sB iv e n s th u s g a v e p e r so n s w h o se c o n stitu tio n a l rig h ts w e r e v io la te d b y fe d e r a l o ff ic e r s a re m e d y ro u g h ly a k in 25 t o t hatav ai l abl e under 42 U
. S. C
. § 1983 t o pe r s ons ag gr i eved by t he a ct s of s t at e of f i cer s . U nl i ke a Bi vens ac t i on, t he rem ed y p rov i d ed by secti on 19 83 i s s t atu t ory i n n atu re. B u tt ha t st atu t e w as virt u all y a d ea d l ett er u nti l i t w as gi ve n li fe by a n i nt er pr et at i on o f

t he Supr em e C our t s om e ni net y ye ar s af t er i t was ena ct ed. See M onr oe v . Pape, 365 U
. S. 167, 171- 72 ( 1961) ( conc l udi ng t hatwhat i s now s ecti on 1 983, der i ved f r om s ecti on 1 of

t he " K u K l ux Act " o f

1871 , pr ovi des f o r a c a us e o f

a c t i o n a g a i n s t a s t a t e o ff i c i a l a c t i n g u n de r c o l o r o f s t a t e l a w e v e n i f

t h e r e i s n o a ut h o r i t y u n de r s t a t e l a w, cus t om , or us ag e f

or t he s t at e of

f i ci al t o do what he or s he di d) , ove r r ul ed on o t her g r ounds by M onel l v. D ep' t of Soc. S e rv s. o f C it y o f N e w Y o rk , 4 3 6 U
. S
. 6 5 8 , 6 6 3 (19 7 8 ). 80 1 constitutional rights." Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 2 U.S. 61, 66 (2001). The Bivens Court permitted "a victim of a 25 3 Fourth Amendment violation by federal officers [to] bring suit for 4 money damages against the officers in federal court." Id. 5 I have no quarrel with much of what I take to be the 6 majority's view of Bivens jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has 7 indeed been most reluctant to "extend" use of the "Bivens model." 8 Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2597 (2007). Since Bivens, the 9 Court has "extended" its reach only twice –- to "recognize[] an 10 implied damages remedy under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 11 Amendment, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), and the Cruel and 12 Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment, Carlson v. 13 Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980)." Malesko, 534 U.S. at 67; see also 14 Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2597-98. 15 The majority is also correct in observing that when 16 determining whether to extend Bivens, i.e., whether "to devise a 17 new Bivens damages action," Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2597, a court 18 must first determine whether Congress has provided "any 19 alternative, existing process for protecting the interest" in 20 question, id. at 2598. If no alternative remedial scheme exists, 21 whether to provide "a Bivens remedy is a matter of judicial 22 judgment." Id. "'[T]he federal courts must make the kind of 23 remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law81 1 tribunal, paying particular heed, however, to any special factors 2 counselling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal 3 litigation.'" Id. (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 4 (1983)). 5 But not every attempt to employ Bivens to redress 6 asserted constitutional violations requires a separate and 7 independent judicial inquiry as to whether the remedy is 8 appropriate in that particular case. Only when the court is being 9 asked "to devise a new Bivens damages action," id. at 2597 10 (emphasis added), do we make such an assessment. And a "new 11 Bivens damages action" is not being sought unless the plaintiff is 12 asking the court to "extend Bivens liability to a[] new context or 13 new category of defendants." Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68. 14 In the case before us, Arar seeks to add no new category 15 of defendants. Cf. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (refusing to extend 16 Bivens to claims against private prisons); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 17 471 (1994) (refusing to extend Bivens to claims against federal 18 agencies). Indeed, it was recovery of damages incurred as a result 19 of the violation of constitutional rights by federal agents and 20 officials, such as the defendants here, for which the Bivens remedy 21 was devised. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70 ("The purpose of Bivens 22 is to deter individual federal officers from committing 23 constitutional violations."). 24 We must ask, then, whether Arar seeks to extend Bivens 25 liability into a new context and, if so, what that new context is. 26 The task is complicated by the fact that the meaning that the 27 Supreme Court ascribes to the term "new context" is not entirelyI ndeed, i n t hos e l eg al con t ext s wher e Bi vens i s wel l

- es t abli s hed, cour t s do notcon duct a f r es h a s s es s m entas 26 t o whet her a B i vens ac t i on i s av ai l abl e ba s ed on t he f act s of ea ch c as e. See , e. g. , G r oh v
. R am i r ez , 540 U
. S. 551 ( 2004) (B ive n s a c ti o n fo r F o u rth A m e n d m e n t vio lation ); M c C a rth y v . M a d iga n , 5 0 3 U
. S
. 1 4 0 (19 9 2 ) (B ive n s a c ti o n fo r E igh th A m e n d m e n t vio lation ), su p e rse d e d b y statu te o n o th e r g ro u n d s a s state d i n B o o th v . C h u rn e r, 53 2 U
. S
. 7 3 1 (20 0 1 ); C as t r o v. U ni t ed St at es , 34 F. 3d 106 ( 2d C i r . 1994 ) ( Fourt h Am endm ent ) ; A r m s t r ong v. Sea r s , 33 F. 3d 182 ( 2d C i r . 1994 ) (sam e ); A n d e rso n v . B ra n e n , 1 7 F
. 3 d 5 5 2 (2d C ir. 1 9 9 4 ) ( sa m e ); H a ll o c k v . B o n n e r, 38 7 F
. 3 d 1 4 7 (2d C ir. 2 0 0 4 ) ( sa m e ), re v 'd o n o th e r g ro u n d s, 5 4 6 U
. S
. 3 4 5 (20 0 6 ). 82 1 clear. Compare Malesko, 534 U.S. at 67 (noting that Bivens was 2 extended to a new context in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), 3 when the Court "recognized an implied damages remedy under the Due 4 Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment" (emphasis added)), with id. 5 at 68 (describing Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988), in 6 which the plaintiffs sought damages under the Due Process Clause of 7 the Fifth Amendment for errors made by federal officials in "in 8 the[] handling [their] of Social Security applications," as 9 describing a new context to which the Court declined to extend 10 Bivens (emphasis added)). The majority seems to be of the view 11 that "new context" means a new set of facts, rather than a new 12 legal context. But every case we hear presents a new set of facts 13 to which we are expected to apply established law. Yet, each panel 14 of this Court does not decide for itself, on an ad hoc basis, 15 whether or not it is a good idea to allow a plaintiff, on the 16 particular factual circumstances presented, to avail him or herself 17 of a well-established remedy such as that afforded by Bivens. I 26 18 therefore think that the word "context," as employed for purposes 19 of deciding whether we are "devis[ing] a new Bivens damages 20 action," Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2597, is best understood to mean 21 legal context –- in this case a substantive due process claim by a 22 federal detainee –- and not, as the majority would have it, the 23 fact-specific "context" of Arar's treatment, from his being takenS h o r tly a ft e r w e d e c id e d Iq b a l, th e S u p r e m e C o u r t m a d e c le a r th a t b y a p p e a lin g fr o m th e d istr ic t c o u r t's 27 deni al of qual i f i ed i m m uni t y, t he def

endant s pl ace d w i t hi n our j uri s di ct i on " t he r ecog ni t i on o f t he e nt i r e ca us e of

ac t i on. " W i l ki e, 127 S. C t . at2597 n. 4. The di s t r i ct cour t i n I qbal ha d s peci f i cal l y r ej ect ed t he def

endant s ' ar gum entt hata B i vens acti on was unav ai l abl e. El m ag hr aby v. A s hcr of t , N o. 04 C V 0180 9, 2005 W L 2375 202, at* 14, 2 0 0 5 U
. S
. D ist
. L E X IS 21434 , * 44- * 45 ( E. D
. N
. Y. Sept
. 27, 2005 )
. Thus , ha d w e t houg ht t hatno B i vens ac t i on was av ai l abl e, we had t he p ower to re so lv e Iq b a l's c la im s o n th a t b a sis th e n . W ilk ie , 1 2 7 S . C t. a t 2 5 9 7 n .4
.

See a l s o Thom as v. A s hcr of t , 470 F. 3d 491 ( 2d C i r . 2006 ) ( r ever s i ng di s t r i ct cour t ' s di s m i s s al of B ive n s a c ti o n fo r v iola ti o n o f p lain ti ff's F ifth A m e n d m e n t su b stan ti v e d u e p ro c e ss righ ts w h il e d e tain e d at th e M D C ); C uo co v . M or i t s ug u, 2 22 F. 3d 99 ( 2d C i r . 2 00 0) ( di s m i s s i ng , o n qua l i f i ed i m m un i t y g r ou nds , p l a i nti ff ' s s ub s t a nti ve due pr oces s Bi vens cl ai m ag ai ns t f eder al pr i s on o ff

i ci al s , wi t hout ques t i oni ng whet her a caus e of ac t i on was av ai l abl e) ; Li v. C a na r oz z i , 1 42 F. 3d 83 ( 2d C i r . 1 99 8) ( a ff i r m i ng j udg m en t f

ol l owi ng j ur y ve r di ctf

or t he de f

en da nt s i n s ub s t a nti ve due p r o c e ss B iv e n s a c tio n b a se d o n a lle g a tio n s o f a b u se b y a p r iso n g u a r d a t th e fe d e r a l M e tr o p o lita n C o r r e c tio n a l C e n te r in N e w Y o rk C it y). 83 1 into custody as a suspected member of al Qaeda to his being sent to 2 Syria to be questioned under torture. 3 As far as I can determine, this Circuit has never 4 explicitly decided whether a Bivens action can lie for alleged 5 violations of substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment. 6 But our cases imply that such a remedy is appropriate. 7 In Iqbal, for example, we considered a Bivens action 8 brought on, inter alia, a Fifth Amendment substantive due process 9 theory. The plaintiff alleged his physical mistreatment and 10 humiliation, as a Muslim prisoner, by federal prison officials, 11 while he was detained at the MDC. After concluding, on 12 interlocutory appeal, that the defendants were not entitled to 13 qualified immunity, we returned the matter to the district court 14 for further proceedings. We did not so much as hint either that a 15 Bivens remedy was unavailable or that its availability would 16 constitute an unwarranted extension of the Bivens doctrine. 27 17 Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 177-78. 18 In any event, I see no reason why Bivens should not be 19 available to vindicate Fifth Amendment substantive due process 20 rights. As Judge Posner wrote for the Seventh Circuit with respectA l t houg h t her e i s s om e di s ag r eem enti n t he Ci r cui t s r eg ar di ng pr eci s el y when, f ol l owi ng ar r es t , ab us e of 28 det ai ned per s ons i s t o be an al yz ed under pr i nci pl es of s ubs t anti ve due pr oces s , we t hi nk W i l ki ns ' com m entas t o why t ho s e pr i nc i pl es m us t a pp l y a t s om e po i nti s i ns i g ht f ul a nd r em a i ns v a l i d. 84 1 to a Bivens action: 2 [I]f ever there were a strong case for 3 'substantive due process,' it would be a case 4 in which a person who had been arrested but not 5 charged or convicted was brutalized while in 6 custody. If the wanton or malicious infliction 7 of severe pain or suffering upon a person being 8 arrested violates the Fourth Amendment –- as no 9 one doubts –- and if the wanton or malicious 10 infliction of severe pain or suffering upon a 11 prison inmate violates the Eighth Amendment –- 12 as no one doubts –- it would be surprising if 13 the wanton or malicious infliction of severe 14 pain or suffering upon a person confined 15 following his arrest but not yet charged or 16 convicted were thought consistent with due 17 process. 18 19 Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 194 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 20 493 U.S. 1026 (1990); accord Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 1269 28 21 (11th Cir. 2004) (reversing district court's dismissal of pretrial 22 detainee's Bivens action alleging unconstitutional conditions of 23 confinement at federal penitentiary in violation of the Due Process 24 Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Cale v. Johnson, 861 F.2d 943, 946- 25 47 (6th Cir. 1988) (concluding that "federal courts have the 26 jurisdictional authority to entertain a Bivens action brought by a 27 federal prisoner, alleging violations of his right to substantive 28 due process"), abrogated on other grounds by Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 29 175 F.3d 378, 387-88 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Sell v. United 30 States, 539 U.S. 166, 193 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing, in 31 dissent, that "a [Bivens] action . . . is available to federal 32 pretrial detainees challenging the conditions of their confinement"W hi l e ca s es p er m i t t i ng p r e- t r i a l de t a i ne es t o br i ng Bi ve ns a cti on s f or v i ol a t i on s o f

t he i r s ub s t a nti ve due 29 pr oces s r i gh t s s uppor t t he a vai l abi l i t y of a B i vens ac t i on h er e, A r ar ' s s ubs t anti ve due pr oces s cl ai m s houl d not be eva l uat ed under t he s t andar d f or as s es s i ng t he c l ai m s of per s ons who, unl i ke Ara r , were det ai ned pr e- t r i al r at her t han f or t he p urp os e of

i nt er r og at i on. See s upr a [ not e 24]
. C f. a n te a t [ 46 n. 29]
. W e h av e n ot be en aske d by t he pa rt i es to ex am i ne t he po ssi bil i t y tha t A rar h as plead ed facts s u ffi cien t t o ra i se 30 a c l aim u nd er the ories othe r t ha n su bstanti ve d u e p roc ess -- suc h a s un d er the F ou rt h A m en d m en t , t he sel fi n c r i mi n a t i o n c l a u s e o f

t h e F i f t h A me n d me n t , o r e v e n t h e E i g h t h A me n d me n t . B e c a u s e t h i s i s a n a p p e a l f r o m a di s m i s s al on t he f

act s pl eaded i n t he c om pl ai nt under R ul e 12 ( b) ( 6) , I t hi nk t hateve n i f t hi s C our t were t o co ns i der s uch an al t er nat e t heor y a nd conc l ude t hati t was va l i d, t he c as e woul d be s ubj ectt o r em and t o t he di s t r i ct cour t f or f urt her pr ocee di ng s on t hatt heor y. See s ecti on I V
. A , s upr a. 85 1 (citing Lyons v. U.S. Marshals, 840 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1988)). 29 2 A federal inmate serving a prison sentence can employ 3 Bivens to seek damages resulting from mistreatment by prison 4 officials. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). It would be odd 5 if a federal detainee not charged with or convicted of any offense 6 could not bring an analogous claim. 30 7 *** 8 Even if "new context" for Bivens purposes does mean a new 9 set of facts, however, and even if Iqbal, despite its factual and 10 legal similarities, does not foreclose the notion that the facts of 11 this case are sufficiently new to present a "new context," I think 12 the majority's conclusion is in error. 13 The majority, applying the first step of the Bivens 14 inquiry, argues that the INA provided an alternative remedial 15 scheme for Arar. Ante at [31-33] . The district court correctly 16 noted to the contrary that "Arar alleges that his final order of 17 removal was issued moments before his removal to Syria, which 18 suggests that it may have been unforeseeable or impossible to 19 successfully seek a stay, preserving Arar's procedural rights under 20 the INA." Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 280. Nonetheless, the majority 21 ultimately finds that this claim of official interference does notA r ar r ai s es an ac t i ona bl e cl ai m under Bi vens f or con s t i t ut i ona l vi ol ati ons i ncur r ed att he h ands of f eder al 31 off i ci al s duri ng hi s det enti on i n t he U ni t ed St at es . The di s t r i ct cour t ha d j uri s di ct i on o ver A r ar ' s cl ai m s pur s uant t o 28 U
. S. C
. § 1331 , an d w e ha ve a ppel l at e j uri s di ct i on under 28 U
. S. C
. § 1291
. See C or r ecti ona l Ser vs . C or p. v. M al es ko, 534 U
. S
. 61 , 66 ( 20 01 ) ; M ac i as v. Z en k, 49 5 F
. 3d 37 , 40 ( 2d C i r. 20 07 )
. B ec au se A rar i s no t ch all en ging h i s rem ov al ord er, s ee ante at [49] , t he j uri s di ct i on- s t r i ppi ng pr ovi s i on o f t he I N A , 8 U
. S. C
. § 1252 ( a) ( 2) ( B ) (i i) (pr ovi di ng t hat"n o cour t s hal l ha ve j uri s di ct i on t o r evi ew . . . an y . . . deci s i on o r ac t i on o f t he At t or ney G ener al or t he Se cr et ar y of H om el and Sec uri t y t he a ut hor i t y f or whi ch i s s peci f

i ed .
. . t o be i n t he di s cr et i on o f t he At t or ney G ener al or t he S e c r e ta r y o f H o m e la n d S e c u r ity , o th e r th a n th e g r a n tin g o f [ a sy lu m ]" ) d o e s n o t a p p ly
. 86 1 exclude the INA as providing an alternative remedial scheme. It 2 relies on Bishop v. Tice, 622 F.2d 349 (8th Cir. 1980), which, it 3 says, stands for the proposition that "federal officials who 4 interfere[] with a plaintiff's access to an exclusive remedial 5 scheme c[an], pursuant to Bivens, be held liable for that 6 interference inasmuch as it violated due process, but c[an] not be 7 sued for the underlying injury that the remedial scheme was 8 designed to redress." Ante at [31-32] . 9 Arar is not, however, seeking relief for the underlying 10 injury that the INA was designed to redress. As the majority 11 recognizes, ante at [49] , he is not challenging his removal order. 12 Nor is he questioning this country's ability, however it might 13 limit itself under its immigration laws, to remove an alien under 14 those laws to a country of its choosing. He is challenging the 15 constitutionality of his treatment by defendant law-enforcement 16 officers while he was in detention in the United States. For 31 17 allegations of this sort, the INA offers no mechanism for redress. 18 As the district court noted correctly: 19 [T]he INA deals overwhelmingly with the 20 admission, exclusion and removal of aliens –- 21 almost all of whom seek to remain within this 22 country until their claims are fairly resolved. 23 That framework does not automatically lead to 24 an adequate and meaningful remedy for the 25 conduct alleged here.The majority says that its holding is limited to the conclusion that, 32 "barring further guidance from the Supreme Court . . . a Bivens remedy is unavailable for claims 'arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under' the authority conferred upon the Attorney General and his delegates by the INA." Ante at [38] (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)). But this is not an immigration case and it seems to me that "the authority conferred upon the Attorney General and his delegates by the INA" is therefore not relevant to the Bivens question presented. The majority offers no view as to whether a substantive due process Bivens action is available to detained persons generally. I cannot ultimately tell, then, what the majority's view would be as to Arar's ability to avail himself of Bivens if we were to treat this case, as I think we must, as a claim that law enforcement officials abused their authority under color of federal law rather than a case arising under and governed by immigration law. 87 1 Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 280. 32 2 The majority also errs, I think, in concluding that 3 "special factors" counsel against the application of Bivens here. 4 Ante at [33-38]. The majority dwells at length on the implications 5 of Arar's Bivens claim for diplomatic relations and foreign policy. 6 See ante at [33-38]. 7 Any legitimate interest that the United States has in 8 shielding national security policy and foreign policy from 9 intrusion by federal courts, however, would be protected by the 10 proper invocation of the state-secrets privilege. The majority 11 says that the "government's assertion of the state-secrets 12 privilege . . . constitutes a . . . special factor counseling this 13 Court to hesitate before creating a new [Bivens action]." Ante at 14 [36-37]. But as the majority earlier acknowledges, "[o]nce 15 properly invoked, the effect of the [state-secrets] privilege is to 16 exclude [privileged] evidence from the case." Ante at [12 n.4] 17 (citing Zuckerbraun v. General Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 546 18 (2d Cir. 1991)). 19 Moreover, the state-secrets privilege is a narrow device 20 that must be specifically invoked by the United States and88 1 established by it on a case-by-case basis. See Zuckerbraun, 935 2 F.2d at 546 ("The privilege may be invoked only by the government 3 and may be asserted even when the government is not a party to the 4 case."). That seems far preferable to the majority's blunderbuss 5 solution -- to withhold categorically the availability of a Bivens 6 cause of action in all such cases -- and the concomitant additional 7 license it gives federal officials to violate constitutional rights 8 with virtual impunity. Rather than counseling against applying 9 Bivens, the availability to the defendants of the state-secrets 10 privilege counsels permitting a Bivens action to go forward by 11 ensuring that such proceedings will not endanger the kinds of 12 interests that properly concern the majority. 13 The majority reaches its conclusion, moreover, on the 14 basis of the proposition that "[t]he conduct of the foreign 15 relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the 16 Executive and Legislative . . . Departments of the Government," 17 ante at [37] (citing First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de 18 Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 766 (1972) (plurality opinion)). But there is 19 a long history of judicial review of Executive and Legislative 20 decisions related to the conduct of foreign relations and national 21 security. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) 22 ("Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the 23 Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy 24 organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a 25 role for all three branches when individual liberties are at 26 stake."); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 523 (1985) ("[D]espite 27 our recognition of the importance of [the Attorney General'sI r r es pecti ve o f what ul t i m at el y ha ppen ed t o Arar ab r oad, t he a ct i ons t hathe cha l l eng es were per pet r at ed by 33 U
. S. ag ent s enti r el y wi t hi n t he U ni t ed St at es . Thi s ca s e i s t hus deci s i vel y di ff er entf r om U ni t ed St at es v. V er dugoU r q u id e z , 4 9 4 U .S . 2 5 9 (1 9 9 0 ), w h e r e th e a lle g e d ly u n c o n stitu tio n a l c o n d u c t, a n ille g a l se a r c h a n d se izu r e , to o k p la c e in Me x i c o . I t i s s i mi l a r l y d i ff e r e n t f r o m J o h n s o n v . E i s e n t r a g e r , 3 3 9 U
. S
. 7 6 3 ( 1 9 5 0 ) , w h i c h h e l d t h a t " ( a )
. . . a n e n e my a lie n ; (b ) [w h o ] h a s n e v e r b e e n o r re sid e d in th e U n ite d S ta te s; (c ) w a s c a p tu r e d o u tsid e o f o u r te r r ito r y a n d th e r e h e ld in m i l i t ar y cus t ody as a pr i s oner of war; ( d) was t r i ed and co nvi ct ed by a M i l i t ar y C om m i s s i on s i t t i ng out s i de t he U ni t ed St at es ; ( e) f

or of f ens es ag ai ns t l aws of

war com m i t t ed out s i de t he U ni t ed St at es ; ( f ) an d [w a] s atal l t i m es i m pr i s oned out s i de t he U ni t ed St at es " di d not ha ve a r i gh t t o s eek a wri t of ha bea s cor pus f

r om t he c our t s of

t he U ni t ed St at es on t he g r ounds t hat , i nt er ali a, hi s Fi f t h Am endm entr i gh t s ha d been vi ol at ed. I d. at777. Ei s ent r ag er r em ai ns g ood l aw f or t he pro po si t i on t ha t t he re is "n o a u t ho ri t y . . . for ho l d i ng t ha t t he F i ft h A m en d m en t co nfe rs ri gh t s up on al l pe rson s, w hat ever t hei r na t i ona l i t y, wher ever t hey ar e l oca t ed and what ever t hei r of f ens es , " i d. at783. But t hatpr opos i t i on i s not i nc on si st en t w i t h a ny principl e tha t A rar asserts or tha t t his d i ssent em bra ce s or ap pli es. 89 1 activities in the name of national security] to the safety of our 2 Nation and its democratic system of government, we cannot accept 3 the notion that restraints are completely unnecessary."); Home 4 Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) ("[E]ven 5 the war power does not remove constitutional limitations 6 safeguarding essential liberties."). As the Supreme Court 7 observed in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S 186 (1962), "it is error to 8 suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign 9 relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." Id. at 211; see also 10 Brief of Retired Federal Judges as Amici Curiae at 11 ("The Supreme 11 Court has made clear that the Executive's power to protect national 12 security or conduct foreign affairs does not deprive the judiciary 13 of its authority to act as a check against abuses of those powers 14 that violate individual rights."). 15 *** 16 The alleged intentional acts which resulted in Arar's 17 eventual torture and inhumane captivity were taken by federal 18 officials while the officials and Arar were within United States 19 borders, and while Arar was in the custody of those federal 20 officials. He therefore presents this Court with a classic, or 33 21 at the very least viable, Bivens claim –- a request for damages90 1 incurred as a result of violations of his Fifth Amendment 2 substantive due process rights by federal officials while they 3 detained him. 4 D. Qualified Immunity 5 Having thus found that Arar makes out an actionable claim 6 under Bivens, we must analyze whether the defendants are entitled 7 to qualified immunity. In Iqbal, we set forth the elements of 8 qualified immunity review: 9 The first step in a qualified immunity inquiry 10 is to determine whether the alleged facts 11 demonstrate that a defendant violated a 12 constitutional right. If the allegations show 13 that a defendant violated a constitutional 14 right, the next step is to determine whether 15 that right was clearly established at the time 16 of the challenged action –- that is, whether it 17 would be clear to a reasonable officer that his 18 conduct was unlawful in the situation he 19 confronted. A defendant will be entitled to 20 qualified immunity if either (1) his actions 21 did not violate clearly established law or (2) 22 it was objectively reasonable for him to 23 believe that his actions did not violate 24 clearly established law. 25 26 Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 152 (citations and internal quotation marks 27 omitted). For the reasons set forth above, I have little doubt as 28 to step one: The facts as alleged constitute a violation of Arar's 29 constitutional rights. 30 We must therefore ask whether these rights were clearly 31 established at the time of their violation. In Iqbal, as already 32 noted above, "[w]e . . . recognize[d] the gravity of the situation 33 that confronted investigative officials of the United States as a 34 consequence of the 9/11 attacks. We also recognize[d] that some 35 forms of governmental action are permitted in emergency situations 36 that would exceed constitutional limits in normal times." Iqbal,91 1 490 F.3d at 159. But we said that the right to substantive due 2 process –- including "the right not to be subjected to needlessly 3 harsh conditions of confinement, the right to be free from the use 4 of excessive force, and the right not to be subjected to ethnic or 5 religious discrimination" –- "do[es] not vary with surrounding 6 circumstances." Id. "The strength of our system of constitutional 7 rights derives from the steadfast protection of those rights in 8 both normal and unusual times." Id. We said nothing to indicate 9 that this notion was novel at the time of Iqbal's alleged 10 mistreatment; neither was it at the time of Arar's some months 11 later. 12 The question here is whether the treatment that Arar 13 received at the hands of the defendants in order to coerce him to 14 "talk" would be understood by a reasonable officer to be beyond the 15 constitutional pale. We need not recite the facts as alleged yet 16 again in order to conclude that they would have been. "No one 17 doubts that under Supreme Court precedent, interrogation by torture 18 like that alleged by [the plaintiff] shocks the conscience," 19 Harbury, 233 F.3d at 602, and would therefore constitute a 20 violation of the plaintiff's Fifth Amendment right to substantive 21 due process if perpetrated directly by the defendants, cf. Chavez 22 v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 773 (2003) (plurality opinion) (stating 23 that the Due Process Clause would "provide relief in appropriate 24 circumstances" for "police torture or other abuse"). 25 I think it would be no less "clear to a reasonable 26 officer" that attempting, however unsuccessfully, to obtain 27 information from Arar under abusive conditions of confinement and92 1 interrogation, and then outsourcing his further questioning under 2 torture to the same end, is "unlawful." The defendants here had 3 "fair warning that their alleged treatment of [Arar] was 4 unconstitutional." Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). I 5 would therefore conclude that they are not entitled to qualified 6 immunity at this stage of the proceedings. 7 It may seem odd that after all the deliberation that has 8 been expended in deciding this case at the trial and appellate 9 levels, I can conclude that the constitutional violation is clear. 10 But it is the availability of a Bivens action that has been the 11 focus of controversy. Perhaps no federal agent could foretell that 12 he or she would be subject to one. That, though, is not the 13 question. The question is whether the unconstitutional nature of 14 the conduct was clear. I think that it was. 15 E. Summary 16 In my view, then: 17 First, Arar's factual allegations -- beginning with his 18 interception, detention, and FBI interrogation at JFK Airport, and 19 continuing through his forced transportation to Syria in order that 20 he be questioned under torture -- must be considered in their 21 entirety and as a whole. 22 Second, that conduct is "so egregious, so outrageous, 23 that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience." 24 Lombardi, 485 F.3d at 79 (citations and internal quotation marks 25 omitted). Arar therefore alleges a violation of his right to 26 substantive due process. 27 Third, he may seek to recover the damages allegedly thus93 1 incurred in a Bivens action. 2 Finally, although a reasonable government official may 3 have wondered whether a Bivens action was available as a means for 4 Arar to redress his rights allegedly infringed, insofar as any one 5 of them was responsible for his treatment as a whole, he or she 6 could not have reasonably thought that his or her behavior was 7 constitutionally permissible and is therefore not entitled to 8 qualified immunity, at least at this stage of the proceedings. 9 The defendants' actions as alleged in the complaint, 10 considered together, constitute a violation of Arar's Fifth 11 Amendment right to substantive due process committed by government 12 agents acting in the United States under color of federal 13 authority. Whether Arar can establish, even in the teeth of the 14 state-secrets doctrine, properly applied, the truth of the 15 allegations of his mistreatment (including causation and damages), 16 should be tested in discovery proceedings, at the summary-judgment 17 phase, and perhaps at trial. 18 V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATION 19 I have no reason whatever to doubt the seriousness of the 20 challenge that terrorism poses to our safety and well-being. See 21 generally, e.g., Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent: The Wars for 22 the Twenty-First Century (2008). During another time of national 23 challenge, however, Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Frankfurter, 24 dissented from the Supreme Court's decision that the due process 25 rights of an unadmitted alien were not violated when he was kept 26 indefinitely on Ellis Island without a hearing. See Shaughnessy v. 27 United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). The alien'sThe Su pr em e C ou r t v er y r ec en t l y ob s er ve d: 34 Se cu r i t y dep en ds up on a s op hi s t i ca t ed i nt el l i g en ce a pp a r a t us a nd t he a bi l i t y of o ur A r m e d F o r c e s to a c t a n d to in te r d ic t. T h e r e a r e fu r th e r c o n sid e r a tio n s, h o w e v e r . S ec u ri t y su bsis t s, t oo , i n fi d eli t y to free d om ' s f i rstprincipl es. C hief am on g these are fr e e d o m fr o m a r b itr a r y a n d u n la w fu l re str a in t . . . . Boum edi en e v. Bus h, N o. 0 6- 11 95 , s l i p op . a t 6 8- 69 , 2 00 8 U
. S. LEX I S 4 88 7, a t * 12 7, 2 00 8 W L 23 69 62 8, a t * 46 ( U
. S. J u n e 1 2 , 2 0 0 8 ). 94 1 entry had been determined by the Attorney General to "be 2 prejudicial to the public interest for security reasons," id. at 3 208, and he had therefore been excluded from the United States. 4 Although Mezei was an immigration case with little bearing on the 5 matter before us today, Justice Jackson's observations then, at a 6 time when we thought ourselves in imminent and mortal danger from 7 international Communism, see, e.g., United States v. Dennis, 183 8 F.2d 201, 213 (2d Cir. 1950) (L. Hand, J.), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 9 (1951), are worth repeating now: 10 The Communist conspiratorial technique of 11 infiltration poses a problem which sorely 12 tempts the Government to resort to confinement 13 of suspects on secret information secretly 14 judged. I have not been one to discount the 15 Communist evil. But my apprehensions about the 16 security of our form of government are about 17 equally aroused by those who refuse to 18 recognize the dangers of Communism and those 19 who will not see danger in anything else. 20 Shaughnessy, 345 U.S. at 227 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 34 21 When it came to protection of the United States from then22 perceived threats from abroad, Jackson was no absolutist. See 23 American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 422-52 (1950) 24 (Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 25 (addressing the threat of international Communism); Terminiello v. 26 City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) 27 (warning that if "if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire95 1 logic [as to freedom of speech] with a little practical wisdom," 2 there is a danger that "it will convert the constitutional Bill of 3 Rights into a suicide pact"). But with respect to the government's 4 treatment of Mr. Mezei, he concluded: "It is inconceivable to me 5 that this measure of simple justice and fair dealing would menace 6 the security of this country. No one can make me believe that we 7 are that far gone." Shaughnessy, 345 U.S. at 227 (Jackson, J., 8 dissenting). I think Justice Jackson's observations warrant 9 careful consideration at the present time and under present 10 circumstances.