SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1131 

KA 11-00895 

PRESENT: FAHEY, J.P., CARNI, SCONIERS, GORSKI, AND MARTOCHE, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NYESHIA S. GIBSON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

TREVETT CRISTO SALZER & ANDOLINA P.C., ROCHESTER (ERIC M. DOLAN OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

MICHAEL C. GREEN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (NICOLE M. FANTIGROSSI

OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County

(Joseph D. Valentino, J.), rendered December 17, 2008. The judgment

convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of assault in the first

degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting her

following a jury trial of assault in the first degree (Penal Law §

120.10 [1]). Defendant preserved for our review her contention that

the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that she struck the

victim with a high-heeled shoe, but she failed to preserve for our

review her further contention that the evidence is legally

insufficient to establish that she intended to cause serious physical

injury to the victim (see People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 19). In any

event, we conclude that both of those contentions are without merit. 

In light of the testimony of the victim and several eyewitnesses, each

of whom provided an account of the altercation in question, the jury

reasonably could have found that defendant struck the victim in the

eye with the three-inch heel of her shoe. The medical testimony of

the victim’s ophthalmologist established that the victim sustained

injuries that left her permanently blind in her right eye and that

those injuries were caused by a penetrating blow from a non-blunt

object at least one inch in length. Thus, the People established that

the victim suffered a serious physical injury (see § 10.00 [10]), and

the jury concluded that such injury was caused by defendant. Inasmuch

as the eyewitnesses testified that defendant instigated the

altercation and that she jumped on the victim while holding her shoe

with the heel facing out and swung the hand in which she held the shoe

toward the victim’s face, the jury could have inferred defendant’s

intent from her conduct (see People v Terk, 24 AD3d 1038, 1039). 
-2- 1131 

KA 11-00895 

Under the circumstances described by the eyewitnesses, defendant’s

high-heeled shoe qualified as a “ ‘[d]angerous instrument’ ” (§ 10.00

[13]; see People v Lev, 33 AD3d 362; People v Edwards, 16 AD3d 226,

227, lv denied 5 NY3d 762).

Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as

charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349), we

conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence

(see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495). Although “an

acquittal would not have been unreasonable” based on the conflicting

accounts of what occurred during the altercation (Danielson, 9 NY3d at

348), we afford the appropriate deference to the jury’s credibility

determinations (see People v Flagg, 59 AD3d 1003, lv denied 12 NY3d

853), and we conclude that “the jury was justified in finding the

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” (Danielson, 9 NY3d at

348).

Contrary to defendant’s further contention, Supreme Court did not

abuse its discretion in refusing to adjudicate her a youthful offender

(see generally People v Shrubsall, 167 AD2d 929, 930). Although

defendant had no prior criminal record and the Department of Probation

recommended that she be afforded youthful offender status, defendant

was the first aggressor in the altercation and committed a serious

offense that resulted in a permanent and severe injury to the victim. 

In addition, defendant has a prognosis for lawful behavior that is

fair at best and has failed to accept responsibility. Taken together,

those factors support the determination denying defendant’s request

for youthful offender status (see People v Francis, 83 AD3d 1119,

1123, lv denied 17 NY3d 806). The sentence is not unduly harsh or

severe.

Finally, defendant contends that the People committed a Brady

violation by failing to disclose promptly a report prepared by a

security officer who was present at the scene of the altercation. We

reject that contention. The District Attorney’s Office did not

receive the report in question until three to four hours prior to the

time when the prosecutor provided it to defendant, and the prosecutor

did not actually receive and have the opportunity to read the report

until just before she provided it to defendant. Even assuming,

arguendo, that the report was exculpatory, we conclude under those

circumstances that the People did not “suppress[ ]” the report (People

v Fuentes, 12 NY3d 259, 263, rearg denied 13 NY3d 766). In any event,

“we conclude that reversal is not warranted inasmuch as defendant

received [the report] in time for its effective use at trial” (People

v Comfort, 60 AD3d 1298, 1300, lv denied 12 NY3d 924 [internal

quotation marks omitted]).

Entered: November 18, 2011 Patricia L. Morgan

Clerk of the Court