IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

March 6, 2001 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. STEVEN LEE WHITEHEAD

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County

No. 99-152 Roy B. Morgan, Judge

No. W2000-01062-CCA-R3-CD - Filed September 7, 2001

The appellant, Steven Lee Whitehead, was convicted by a jury in the Madison County Circuit Court

of three counts of rape. Pursuant to the appellant’s convictions, the trial court imposed concurrent

sentences of ten years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the

appellant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in excluding

at the appellant’s trial evidence of other sexual behavior by the victim; (2) whether the trial court

erred in excluding evidence of prior false testimony by the victim; (3) whether the trial court erred

in failing to either exclude DNA evidence or, in the alternative, grant the appellant a continuance of

the trial date; (4) whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence concerning the appellant’s

character; (5) whether the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient to support the appellant’s

convictions of rape; and (6) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on sexual

battery as a lesser-included offense of each count of rape. Following a thorough review of the record

and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the judgments of the trial court due to the court’s failure to instruct

the jury on sexual battery, and we remand these cases for a new trial.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court are Reversed and

Remanded.

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which GARY R. WADE, P.J., and

DAVID H. WELLES, J., joined.

Sam J. Watridge, Humboldt, Tennessee, for the appellant, Steven Lee Whitehead.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Kim R. Helper, Assistant Attorney General; Jerry

Woodall, District Attorney General; and Jody Pickens, Assistant District Attorney General, for the

appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual Background
1

It is the policy of this court to withhold the identity of minor victims of sexual offenses, referring to them

only by their initials.

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On March 16, 1999, a Madison County Grand Jury returned an indictment charging

the appellant with three counts of raping RB, the fifteen-year-old friend of his daughter Catie.1 The

indictment arose from RB’s allegation that the appellant sexually assaulted her during the late

evening hours of September 19, 1998, and the early morning hours of September 20, while she was

spending the night with Catie at the appellant’s apartment in Jackson, Tennessee. The appellant’s

case proceeded to trial on January 26, 2000.

At trial, RB testified that, on the night of the appellant’s offenses, she and Catie were

watching movies with the appellant in the living room of his apartment, and she fell asleep. When

she awakened, RB noticed that both Catie and the appellant had likewise fallen asleep, and the movie

had ended. RB, who is an insulin-dependent diabetic, then decided to give herself an insulin

injection. Accordingly, she retrieved her syringes from her overnight bag and went to the kitchen

where she had previously placed her insulin in the refrigerator. RB’s activity in the kitchen

awakened the appellant, who turned off the television and the videocassette recorder and inquired

if RB was ready to go to bed. RB responded affirmatively; at the time, she was already dressed in

preparation for bed, wearing underwear, boxer shorts, and a shirt that the appellant had loaned to her.

RB accompanied the appellant to the bedroom in which she was to sleep with Catie.

The appellant removed clothing from the bed and then indicated that he was going to carry his

sleeping daughter from the living room into the bedroom. Instead, however, the appellant merely

went into the hallway and turned off a light before returning to the bedroom. RB recalled, “He was

trying to joke around, laughing, and he kind of jumped on the bed in a wrestling kind of way.” She

testified that the appellant’s behavior “made [her] a little uncomfortable,” and, therefore, she asked

the appellant to go to the living room and get Catie. At this point, the appellant began kissing RB

and “rubbing” her “[o]n the chest and down towards [her] pants.” RB told the appellant to stop and

attempted to pull the appellant’s hands away from her. Nevertheless, he succeeded in rubbing her

vagina and inserting his finger into her vagina. When RB repeated her request that the appellant get

Catie from the living room, the appellant merely responded, “It’ll be all right. Just hold on a

second.”

The appellant next positioned RB on her back and attempted to pull her boxer shorts

down her legs. RB “grabbed” her boxer shorts and once again asked the appellant to get his

daughter. RB recalled, “He kept pulling my boxers down, and I kept trying to pull them up, but he

held my hands and pulled them down.” The appellant also removed RB’s underwear and performed

cunnilingus upon her, penetrating RB’s vagina with his tongue. RB recounted to the jury, “I was

crying and told him to stop, to go get Catie, and since I didn’t have my hands, I smashed his head

with my legs, and that didn’t bother him.” She explained to the jury that she did not scream because

she was afraid and because she did not want Catie to see what was happening.
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Following cunnilingus, the appellant continued to hold RB’s hands down and

removed his own shorts. He then engaged in sexual intercourse with RB, penetrating her vagina

with his penis. Only after ejaculating on RB’s stomach did the appellant finally leave the bedroom.

RB immediately ran to the bathroom where she cleaned her stomach and wiped herself between her

legs with her underwear. RB conceded at trial that, although she was sore following the appellant’s

assault, she did not suffer any bruises.

The appellant soon returned to the bedroom carrying Catie and placed his daughter

on the bed. When the appellant left the bedroom once again, RB began crying and threw an alarm

clock against the wall, awakening Catie. The noise also caused the appellant to briefly check on the

two girls. He inquired if RB was having a bad dream and kissed her on the forehead before leaving

the bedroom a final time.

The following morning, RB awakened at approximately 9:30 a.m. or 10:00 a.m. She

bathed before dressing and returning home. At home, RB did not immediately confide to her parents

that she had been raped. Instead, she first spoke with her boyfriend, Hunter Jones. Only later that

night did she finally disclose to her mother the appellant’s offenses. Her mother then drove her to

a local hospital.

RB’s mother also testified on behalf of the State at the appellant’s trial. She

confirmed that, in September 1998, she took her daughter to the Jackson-Madison County General

Hospital. She explained:

My daughter came to me in tears after she had tried to - - She didn’t

try to slash her wrists to kill herself, but self-mutilation was involved,

and it terrified me, and when - - in questioning her, she finally broke

down and stated to me that she had been raped, and we went [to the

hospital] because of the rape situation. 

RB gave her mother the boxer shorts and the underwear that she had worn during the rapes, and her

mother in turn gave the items to the Jackson Police Department. 

Stacey Hutchens, a sergeant with the Jackson Police Department, testified at trial that

he was the lead investigator in the appellant’s case and interviewed RB on the night of September

20, 1998. Hutchens described RB’s demeanor:

She was very upset. Of course, she had to tell what happened. She

already had told it to one officer and I think a nurse out there, and, of

course, I had to hear it again. So, I mean, it was hard for her to go

through it that third time again, just to relive it.

Hutchens also interviewed the appellant, who denied engaging in any form of sexual activity with

RB. Moreover, the appellant refused to provide a blood sample to investigators, and Hutchens was

forced to procure a search warrant in order to obtain the sample.

The State also presented the testimony of Steven M. Wiechman. Wiechman testified

that, at the time of these offenses, he was employed as a special agent forensic scientist by the
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Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) and worked in the Serology and DNA Unit of the TBI

Crime Laboratory in Jackson, Tennessee. He examined the underwear worn by RB at the time of

these offenses and confirmed the presence of spermatozoa and sperm. However, vaginal swabs

obtained from the victim contained no evidence of seminal fluid.

Chad Johnson, another special agent forensic scientist working in the Serology and

DNA Unit of the TBI Crime Laboratory in Jackson, related to the jury that he conducted polymerase

chain reaction (PCR) DNA analysis on a “cutting” from underwear retrieved from RB and on blood

samples submitted by RB and the appellant. The cutting yielded a mixture of DNA profiles

“consistent with both the victim and the subject, and, therefore, the subject couldn’t be excluded as

the donor of that stain.” After completing his analysis, Johnson transported a “cutting” from RB’s

underwear and blood samples submitted by RB and the appellant to the TBI Crime Laboratory in

Nashville for further testing.

Raymond A. DePriest, a special agent forensic scientist working in the Serology and

DNA Unit of the TBI Crime Laboratory in Nashville, testified on behalf of the State that he too

performed PCR DNA testing on a cutting of the underwear obtained from RB and blood samples

submitted by RB and the appellant. In contrast to Special Agent Johnson, DePriest used a form of

PCR DNA testing known as “STR.” DePriest explained that “STRs are the next step forward into

DNA profiling. They supply much more defining information. They give DNA a much greater

sense of uniqueness and identity when individualizing or trying to understand could a stain have

originated from an individual or not.” Using the “STR” method, DePriest found that the DNA

profile extracted from RB’s underwear matched the DNA profile extracted from the appellant’s

blood sample. Moreover, DePriest calculated that, within the Caucasian population, the probability

that someone other than the appellant contributed the DNA found on the underwear was one in 658

billion; within the black population, the probability was one in 215 trillion. He noted, however, that

the TBI officially does not report values larger than the world population. Accordingly, he

concluded that the probability that someone other than the appellant contributed the DNA found on

RB’s underwear was one in six billion.

As to the means bywhich he calculated the above probabilities, DePriest testified that

he used a data base of DNA samples provided by the Perken-Elmer Corporation. He explained:

Many of the crime labs across the United States are using the

Perken[-]Elmer database. We take their values, place them into the

FBI’s software and actually use the software or the mathematics that

the FBI has put forward that’s been accepted nationally to generate

statistical values or our final numbers that we use.

The special agent conceded that he was unaware of the geographical source of the DNA samples

contained in the data base. He noted, however, that the data base used by the TBI had been

compared with data bases used in other laboratories in the United States and had satisfied requisite

standards.

In defense, the appellant declined to testify on his own behalf. However, he did
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present the testimony of his daughter, Catie Whitehead. She testified that, prior to the appellant’s

offenses, she and RB were very good friends. Moreover, she confirmed that, on the night of the

appellant’s offenses, she and RB were staying at her father’s apartment. While watching a movie

with RB and her father, Catie fell asleep. She was awakened at approximately 2:30 a.m. by the

appellant, who carried her to the bedroom that she was sharing with RB. When Catie entered the

bedroom, RB was already in bed, but Catie noticed that her friend was crying. RB buried her head

in her pillows in an apparent attempt to hide her tears, and, when Catie inquired if anything was

wrong, RB refused to confide in her. Catie testified at trial that she then returned to the living room,

but her father remained in the bedroom with RB for approximately one hour. When he emerged

from the bedroom, the appellant claimed that he had fallen asleep and asked his daughter why she

had not awakened him. Finally, Catie recalled that RB was still visibly upset the following morning.

Catie testified, “[I]t looked like she was trying not to cry.” Also, RB persisted in her refusal to

confide in Catie, informing her “that she loved [her] and she didn’t want to hurt [her].”

In addition to the appellant’s daughter, Dr. Ronald T. Acton, a professor at the

University of Alabama in Birmingham, Alabama, testified on behalf of the appellant. Dr. Acton

stated that he worked as a professor in the Departments of Microbiology, Epidemiology, and

Medicine. He was also the director of the Immunogenetics DNA Diagnostics Laboratory of the

University of Alabama Health Services Foundation. With respect to the DNA testing performed by

the TBI in this case, Dr. Acton preliminarily observed that a DNA sample containing more than one

individual’s DNA profile will not yield statistical probabilities concerning the identity of the source

of the profiles. Moreover, upon studying “acetate overlays” or charts of the testing performed in

Nashville by Special Agent DePriest, he observed that at least one sample tested by DePriest

appeared to contain more than one DNA profile. Dr. Acton conceded, “I don’t know which [sample]

it is.”

Dr. Acton further observed that, assuming only one profile was present in a sample,

“there are certain population genetic considerations and rules that one has to follow in order to

calculate a probability that someone in the population other than the defendant would possess that

particular profile.” First, one would need to compile random samples of DNA from unrelated

individuals for purposes of comparison. Second, in compiling the random samples, one would need

to account for “different frequencies of genes that vary by racial groups and var[y] by ethnic groups

within a racial group.” Accordingly, one would need to separate samples relating to different races.

Moreover, 

you would hope that your sample of individuals, in order to establish

the frequencies of a given set of genes, would be . . . a large enough

sample that you would sort of take into consideration all the various

ethnic groups within a race.

Finally, Dr. Acton emphasized that racial and ethnic group distributions vary in different geographic

regions of the country. Accordingly, he asserted that one would need to ensure that the compilation

of random samples represents the racial and ethnic composition of the population where a particular

crime was committed. The doctor concluded that, although he had heard of the Perken-Elmer data

base, he had never studied the data base.
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In rebuttal of Dr. Acton’s testimony, the State recalled Special Agent DePriest to the

witness stand. DePriest asserted that the DNA sample obtained from RB’s underwear and tested in

Nashville did not contain a mixture of DNA profiles. DePriest noted that, during Dr. Acton’s

testimony concerning the presence of a mixture of DNA profiles in a sample tested by DePriest, Dr.

Acton appeared to be examining an “acetate overlay” or chart of

what is our national control or called the ladder. It is a mixture. It’s

a known mixture. It’s a nationally published mixture. The sample

which is the panty cutting that I received from TBI Agent Chad

Johnson was not picked up by the defense expert, and that is not a

mixture. It’s a pure DNA profile of one individual. As my report

indicated, I was able to get very good results . . . and the profile does

match the Defendant.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted the appellant of three counts of rape.

The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing on February 22, 2000, and imposed concurrent

sentences of ten years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction for each conviction.

The appellant now challenges his convictions in this appeal.

II. Analysis

A. Evidence of Other Sexual Behavior by the Victim

The appellant first challenges the trial court’s exclusion of evidence at the appellant’s

trial pertaining to other sexual behavior by RB. Although we are reversing the appellant’s

convictions on other grounds, we will address this issue as it may arise upon retrial of the appellant.

With respect to this issue, the record reflects that, on January 24, 2000, two days prior to his

scheduled trial date, the appellant filed a “Motion to Offer Specific Instances of Conduct of the

Victim” pursuant to Tenn. R. Evid. 412. In his motion, the appellant described testimony that he

intended to introduce at his trial concerning numerous occasions on which RB engaged in or

discussed engaging in sexual activity with other persons and one occasion on which she testified

falsely about another rape. The appellant alleged that “the victim’s pattern of past sexual behavior

would prove that victim’s alleged sexual acts with the accused, if true, were consensual.” In

explanation of his failure to file the motion within ten days of trial as required by Tenn. R. Evid.

412(d)(1)(i), the appellant asserted that his investigator only discovered the proffered evidence on

January 20, 2000.

The trial court conducted a hearing on the appellant’s motion on January 26, 2000,

the scheduled trial date. At the hearing, the appellant presented the testimony of his investigator,

Janet Morris. Morris testified that she was employed by the appellant two weeks prior to the

scheduled trial date and had since submitted to defense counsel three separate reports concerning

other sexual behavior by RB. She noted that she submitted her final report one week before the

filing of the appellant’s motion. 

On the basis of Morris’ testimony, the trial court denied the appellant’s motion.

Specifically, the trial court found that the motion was not timely because the proffered evidence did
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not relate to a newly arisen issue, and defense counsel could have obtained the evidence earlier with

the exercise of due diligence. The trial court did, however, allow the appellant to make an offer of

proof for purposes of appeal.

The appellant first presented the testimony of the victim, RB. She testified that,

following the appellant’s offenses, she engaged in sexual relations with several boys who were

approximately her own age. Specifically, she admitted engaging in sexual relations with a boy

named Russell Parker and another named Tim Bailey. Moreover, while initially denying engaging

in sexual relations with a boy named Justin Davis, she later clarified that she did perform oral sex

upon Davis. RB further added that, prior to the appellant’s offenses, she engaged in sexual relations

with her boyfriend, Hunter Jones, who was also approximately her own age. However, she denied

having sex with Jones at any time during the week immediately preceding these offenses. Finally,

RB confirmed that, during a November 5, 1998 preliminary hearing in the appellant’s case, she

testified that she was the victim of another rape that occurred on the New Year’s Eve preceding the

appellant’s offenses. RB further confirmed her testimony that, on the New Year’s Eve in question,

she was with three friends named Lindsey Lubbock, Cheryl Frazier, and Lisa June. She noted,

however, that her friends did not witness the rape, nor did she tell her friends about the rape or report

the rape to law enforcement authorities. Additionally, she conceded that she did not know the

identity of the New Year’s Eve rapist and could not recall the location of the rape. Nevertheless, she

firmly maintained the truth of her testimony at the preliminary hearing.

In addition to RB’s testimony, the appellant presented the testimony of Russell

Parker, who confirmed that he had engaged in sexual relations with RB. Specifically, he recalled

that, during a single forty- or forty-five-day time period, he had sex with the victim every night.

Moreover, a boy named Robert Pruitt testified that, although he had never engaged in sexual

relations with RB, he was present when she invited Tim Bailey to have sex with her. Hunter Jones

also confirmed that he had engaged in sexual relations with RB. He noted that, during the course

of his relationship with RB, they had sex once every two or three weeks. Finally, the appellant

presented the testimonies of Lindsey Lubbock, Cheryl Frazier, and Lisa June, all of whom denied

being with RB on the New Year’s Eve preceding these offenses.

Tenn. R. Evid. 412 is frequently referred to as Tennessee’s rape shield law and “limits

the admissibility of evidence about the prior sexual behavior of a victim of a sexual offense, and

establishes procedures for determining when evidence is admissible.” State v. Sheline, 955 S.W.2d

42, 45 (Tenn. 1997). In essence, Tenn. R. Evid. 412 is a rule of relevance, State v. Brown, 29

S.W.3d 427, 431 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 916, 121 S. Ct. 275 (2000), that rejects the

“anachronistic and sexist view[] that a woman who had sexual relations in the past [i]s more likely

to have consented to sexual relations with a specific criminal defendant,” Sheline, 955 S.W.2d at 44.

Simultaneously, the rule acknowledges that under certain circumstances the exclusion of evidence

about a victim’s sexual behavior may violate a defendant’s right of confrontation, his right to present

a defense, and, more broadly, his right to a fair trial. 

Accordingly, subsection (b) of Tenn. R. Evid. 412 permits the introduction of
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reputation or opinion evidence of a victim’s sexual behavior only if “admitted in accordance with

the procedures in subdivision (d) of this Rule and required by the Tennessee or United States

Constitution.” Subsection (c) of the rule more extensively provides:

Specific instances of conduct. - Evidence of specific instances of a

victim’s sexual behavior is inadmissible unless admitted in

accordance with the procedures in subdivision (d) of this Rule, and

the evidence is:

(1) Required by the Tennessee or United States Constitution, or

(2) Offered by the defendant on the issue of credibility of the victim,

provided the prosecutor or victim has presented evidence as to the

victim’s sexual behavior, and only to the extent needed to rebut the

specific evidence presented by the prosecutor or victim, or

(3) If the sexual behavior was with the accused, on the issue of

consent, or

(4) If the sexual behavior was with persons other than the accused, 

(i) to rebut or explain scientific or medical evidence,

or

(ii) to prove or explain the source of semen, injury,

disease, or knowledge of sexual matters, or

(iii) to prove consent if the evidence is of a pattern of

sexual behavior so distinctive and so closely

resembling the accused’s version of the alleged

encounter with the victim that it tends to prove that

the victim consented to the act charged or behaved in

such a manner as to lead the defendant reasonably to

believe that the victim consented.

If evidence of a victim’s sexual behavior satisfies either subsection (b) or subsection (c), Tenn. R.

Evid. 412(d)(4) further requires as a prerequisite to admissibility a determination by the court that

the probative value of the evidence outweighs its unfair prejudice to the victim.

Again, the appellant argued to the trial court that evidence of RB’s sexual behavior

was admissible pursuant to Tenn. R. Evid. 412(c)(4)(iii) relating to “a pattern of sexual behavior so

distinctive and so closely resembling the accused’s version of the alleged encounter with the victim

that it tends to prove that the victim consented to the act charged or behaved in such a manner as to

lead the defendant reasonably to believe that the victim consented.” The admissibility of the

evidence rested in the discretion of the trial court. Sheline, 955 S.W.2d at 46. On appeal, this court

will only “find an abuse of discretion when it appears that a trial court applied an incorrect legal

standard, or reached a decision which is against logic or reasoning that caused an injustice to the

party complaining.” State v. Shuck, 953 S.W.2d 662, 669 (Tenn. 1997). In this case, we cannot

conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of RB’s sexual behavior as

we agree that the tardiness of the appellant’s motion precluded admission of the evidence.

Tenn. R. Evid. 412(d) provides in relevant part:
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Procedures. - If a person accused of an offense covered by this Rule

intends to offer . . . under subdivision (c) specific instances of

conduct of the victim, the following procedures apply:

(1) The person must file a written motion to offer such

evidence.

(i) The motion shall be filed no later than ten

days before the date on which the trial is scheduled to

begin, except the court may allow the motion to be

made at a later date, including during trial, if the court

determines either that the evidence is newly

discovered and could not have been obtained earlier

through the exercise of due diligence or that the issue

to which such evidence relates has newly arisen in the

case.

Addressing the procedural requirements of Tenn. R. Evid. 412, this court has observed, “The policies

behind the rape shield law require strict compliance with the procedures set forth in Tenn. R. Evid.

412(d). ‘[P]rior sexual behavior with others by the victim is altogether inadmissible unless there is

compliance with Rule 412(d) . . . .’” State v. Benjamin F. Dishman, No. 03C01-9610-CR-00361,

1998 WL 191447, at *15 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, April 23, 1998)(alteration in original).

Thus, at the outset, “the trial court’s exercise of its discretion was limited to determining whether

the testimony presented in the offer of proof [related to a newly arisen issue or] was newly

discovered evidence or evidence which could not have been discovered beforehand with the exercise

of due diligence.” Id.

For the purpose of clarification, we note that the appellant does not mount a facial

challenge to the constitutionality of Tenn. R. Evid. 412's procedural requirement that a motion to

introduce other sexual behavior by the victim of a sexual offense be filed within ten days of trial.

Cf., e.g., Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 111 S. Ct. 1743 (1991). Moreover, he does not claim

that the ten-day time limitation is unconstitutional as applied in his case. Rather, the appellant

simply asserts that the facts of his case fall within the ambit of one of the exceptions to the ten-day

time limitation, namely the exercise of due diligence did not avail defense counsel in obtaining the

proffered evidence at an earlier date. He explains that

[i]t is difficult, if not impossible, to meet the [time limitation] of Rule

412 under the circumstances of this case,

(1) when the age of the alleged victim is 15 and one does not

normally suspect sexual conduct,

(2) when the sexual acts themselves represent a broad range. . . .

(3) when writing all the alleged acts about a 15 year old girl as

reported through other juveniles requires a careful and meticulous

review before the motion may be filed, and

(4) nondisclosure by the State.

Preliminarily, regardless of whether “one . . . normally expect[s] [other] sexual
2We note that the appellant did assert a Brady claim in his motion for new trial but elected not to pursue the

issue in this appe al.

3

The State conced ed at oral ar gument that the testimony of H unter Jone s concernin g his relationship with

RB mig ht have bee n admissible for the purp ose of exp laining the sour ce of the semen found o n RB’s und erwear. 

However, the ap pellant has never asserted T enn. R. Evid. 412 (c)(4)(ii) as a basis for the admission of Jo nes’

testimony.

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conduct” by a fifteen-year-old victim of a sexual offense, such conduct is not so improbable as to

relieve defense counsel of his obligation to investigate. Moreover, the record before this court

establishes that appellant’s counsel was in fact aware of the possibility of other sexual behavior by

RB well in advance of trial. Indeed, defense counsel attached to his motion for new trial a

preliminary investigation of such behavior that was authorized by his predecessor in this case,

Attorney Joe H. Byrd, and completed on June 4, 1999. In light of this preliminary investigation,

neither the “broad range” of RB’s sexual behavior nor defense counsel’s need to carefully and

meticulously review allegations of sexual behavior prior to submitting the allegations to the trial

court in a Rule 412 motion explain defense counsel’s failure to authorize further investigation until

two weeks prior to trial. Additionally, like the trial court, we note that the “broad range” of RB’s

sexual behavior apparently posed no difficulty to Investigator Morris in collecting the disputed

evidence. Finally, notwithstanding the appellant’s allegation of “nondisclosure by the State,” the

appellant does not claim in this appeal that the State violated the mandates of either Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), or Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16 by withholding evidence of

other sexual behavior by RB.2

 Indeed, the appellant assumes “for the purpose of this argument that

the State did not know of the alleged victim’s sexual history” and concludes by asking, “If the State

did not know, how could the Defendant’s attorney know?” The answer to the appellant’s question

was correctly supplied by the trial court: Defense counsel could have hired Morris more than two

weeks prior to trial.

In any event, regardless of the ten-day time limitation of Tenn. R. Evid. 412(d)(1)(i),

the evidence proffered by the appellant was largely inadmissible under Tenn. R. Evid. 412(c)(4)(iii)

for the purpose of proving a consensual encounter, and the appellant does not claim any other basis,

including the United States and Tennessee Constitutions, for the admission of the evidence. Cf., e.g.,

Sheline, 955 S.W.2d at 47-48.3

 In Sheline, id. at 46, our supreme court emphasized that, in order

for evidence of sexual behavior to qualify for admission pursuant to Tenn. R. Evid. 412(c)(4)(iii),

“the sexual conduct must be ‘so unusual, so outside the normal, that it had distinctive characteristics

which make it the complainant’s modus operandi.’” Additionally, the court emphasized that, “to

have probative value on the issue of consent, the pattern of distinctive sexual conduct must closely

resemble the defendant’s version of facts.” Id. The appellant in this case not only failed to

demonstrate any distinctive characteristics of other sexual behavior by RB but also denied engaging

in any sexual activity with RB. In other words, even assuming a distinctive pattern of sexual

behavior by RB, the appellant proffered no “version of the alleged encounter” with which to compare

the behavior.
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Finally, as noted earlier, the appellant included in his Tenn. R. Evid. 412 motion

evidence purportedly establishing that RB previously testified falsely about being the victim of

another rape. Specifically, the appellant asserted, “Lindsey Lubbock, Cheryl Frazier and Lisa June

will testify that [RB] lied about a rape which she testified at the preliminary hearing 11/5/98

occurred December 31, 1997 or January 1, 1998 (New Year’s Eve).” Again, the testimonies of

Lubbock, Frazier, and June disputed RB’s assertion that the three girls were with RB on the New

Year’s Eve in question. Notwithstanding his inclusion of this evidence in his Rule 412 motion, the

appellant also asserted that the evidence was “admissible to impeach [RB]. The fact that she was

sworn under oath is admissible for the purpose of impeaching where it shows that she - - somebody

is not telling the truth.” Defense counsel elaborated that the proffered evidence revealed “a prior

inconsistent statement that shows dishonesty.” He explained that, if RB were on the witness stand,

I would ask her did she report a rape prior that had not occurred,

number one; that if she testified in the preliminary hearing that a rape

did occur, that she couldn’t say where it was, couldn’t say who it was,

couldn’t say where it was, any of those things, and she went on to

name three people who she said was with her, and we have those

three people here, and we anticipate that they will say it didn’t

happen.

The trial court initially agreed that the proffered evidence “could likely come in

because it attacks her credibility, from the standpoint that she has testified falsely in the past.”

However, after hearing the proffered evidence and upon further reflection, the court concluded:

I think because of the nature of this case, we’ve still got to rely on

412 to some extent, and for that reason, looking to this situation and

what the real issue is as to whether these three individuals were there,

not whether or not this happened, I’m going to disallow it at this time.

Defense counsel still has in the record what these three would have

said, simply they weren’t with her on that date, if their memory is

correct. That has been some time back. So that offer of proof is also

in the record at this time.

InStatev.AnthonyLynnWyrick,No.E1999-02206-CCA-R3-CD, 2001WL472849,

at *16 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, May 4, 2001), this court held that a prior false accusation of

rape does “not constitute ‘sexual behavior’ as contemplated under Rule 412” and is not subject to

exclusion under the rape shield law. Notably, however, the trial court in this case essentially found

that the appellant failed to establish that RB’s former testimony concerning the New Year’s Eve rape

was false. State v. Stinnett, 958 S.W.2d 329, 330 n.5 (Tenn. 1997); Tenn. R. Evid. 104(b). We

cannot say that the evidence preponderates against this finding by the trial court. State v. Edison,

9 S.W.3d 75, 77 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Stamper, 863 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tenn. 1993). Accordingly,

we cannot say that the trial court erred in excluding the proffered evidence under Tenn. R. Evid. 412.

Cf., e.g., State v. Terry Allen Dominy, No. 01C01-9512-CC-00404, 1997 WL 284591, at **3-4

(Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, May 30, 1997), reversed on other grounds by State v. Dominy, 6

S.W.3d 472 (Tenn. 1999). This issue is without merit.
4

In his brief, the appellant actually cites “[Tenn. R. Evid.] 803, Prior Former testimony.” Because Tenn. R.

Evid. 80 3 does n ot contain a provisio n relating to former testimon y, we w ill assume th at the app ellant intend s to

rely upon Tenn. R. Evid. 804 (b)(1).

-12-

B. Evidence of Prior False Testimony by RB

The appellant characterizes as a separate issue his contention that RB’s former

testimony about the New Year’s Eve rape was admissible pursuant to Tenn. R. Evid. 804(b)(1),4 and

the testimonies of Lubbock, Frazier, and June were admissible as prior inconsistent statements

pursuant to Tenn. R. Evid. 806 and Tenn. R. Evid. 613. We preliminarily note that the appellant’s

reliance upon these rules of evidence, a tenuous proposition at best, is undermined by the complete

absence from his brief of any accompanying argument. Tenn. Ct. of Crim. App. Rule 10(b); Tenn.

R. App. P. 27(a)(7). Moreover, the appellant’s argument before the trial court was devoid of any

reference to the rules governing the admission of hearsay evidence. Tenn. R. Evid. 103(a)(2); Tenn.

R. App. P. 36(a). In any event, our preceding conclusion that the trial court properly applied Tenn.

R. Evid. 412 to exclude evidence concerning RB’s former testimony entails our rejection of the

appellant’s contention. Because this issue may arise once again upon retrial, we will address it in

more detail.

Regardless of whether RB’s former testimony about the New Year’s Eve rape

constituted hearsay, the evidence was inadmissible if irrelevant. Tenn. R. Evid. 402. The appellant

effectively conceded in the trial court that the former testimony was irrelevant unless RB’s report

of another rape occurring on New Year’s Eve was untruthful. We have already noted the trial court’s

finding that the “prior inconsistent statements” offered by the appellant failed to establish the

untruthfulness of RB’s former testimony. Additionally, even assuming that the appellant established

the untruthfulness of RB’s former testimony, he failed to demonstrate or even argue the admissibility

of evidence thereof pursuant to Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b). Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b) prohibits the

introduction as substantive evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts . . . to prove the character of

a person in order to show action in conformity with the character trait” but authorizes the

introduction of such evidence “for other purposes.” Thus, in Wyrick, No. E1999-02206-CCA-R3-

CD, 2001 WL 472849, at *21, we held:

Like any other prior wrong or act, a victim’s prior false accusation of

a sexual offense must relate to a fact at issue at trial in order to be

admissible substantively. Otherwise, the relevance of the evidence

stems from its tendency to show that the victim has a propensity to

lie, a purpose that directly conflicts with Rule 404(b), Tenn. R. Evid.

The appellant does not contend in this appeal nor did he contend in the trial court that the relevance

of the evidence of RB’s prior false testimony stemmed from anything other than its tendency to show

that RB has a propensity to lie. Conversely, the appellant does not contend in this appeal nor did he

explicitly contend in the trial court that he was entitled under Tenn. R. Evid. 608(b) to question RB

on cross-examination concerning prior false testimony for the purpose of attacking her credibility

as a witness. Significantly, under Tenn. R. Evid. 608(b), “the witness’s answers must be taken as

given. Other witnesses cannot be called to rebut the first witness’s responses.” NEIL P. COHEN ET
-13-

AL., TENNESSEE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 608.4, at 350 (Michie ed., 3d ed. 1995).

Moreover, because the appellant did not wish to introduce RB’s former testimony for

the purpose of proving the truth of the matter asserted therein, the former testimony did not

constitute hearsay, and the appellant could not use Tenn. R. Evid. 806 as a vehicle for attacking RB’s

credibility. Tenn. R. Evid. 801(c). Again, the difficulty with the evidence proffered by the appellant

lay not in its hearsay nature but in its lack of relevance.

Finally, the appellant could not bypass the requirements of Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b) and

Tenn. R. Evid. 608(b) by relying upon Tenn. R. Evid. 613. Tenn. R. Evid. 613 authorizes the

admission of evidence of prior inconsistent statements to impeach the credibility of a witness. See

also State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 279 (Tenn. 2000). However, the rule requires that the prior

statement be inconsistent with the witness’ trial testimony rather than other pre-trial statements or

testimony. See, e.g., State v. Michael Brady, No. M1999-02253-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 30220, at

*9 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, January 12, 2001), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 2001); see also

Doochin v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 854 S.W.2d 109, 114 (Tenn. App. 1993)(“Although the rule

does not define an inconsistent statement as one inconsistent with a statement offered at trial, we

think that is all it can mean.”). Also, Rule 613 clearly contemplates the impeachment of a witness’

trial testimony by the witness’ own prior statement, not by a third party’s statement. State v.

Michael N. Grey, No. M1999-01428-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1681220, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. at

Nashville, November 9, 2000); James William Taylor v. State, No. 01C01-9809-CC-00384, 2000

WL 641148, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, May 19, 2000), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn.

2000). 

Indeed, even assuming satisfaction of the above requirements, Tennessee courts have

long held that “[e]xtrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement of a witness is inadmissible to

impeach the statement of a witness on cross-examination as to collateral matters.” State v. Mayo,

735 S.W.2d 811, 817 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). We acknowledge the observation of one noted

authority that “neither Rule 613 nor any other provision in the Tennessee Rules of Evidence

indicates whether the collateral fact rule [still] applies.” NEIL P.COHEN ET AL., TENNESSEE LAW OF

EVIDENCE § 613.5, at 413-414 (Michie ed., 3d ed. 1995). But see State v. Electroplating, Inc., 990

S.W.2d 211, 226 n.17 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)(observing in dicta that the collateral evidence rule

is applied in conjunction with Tenn. R. Evid. 613). That having been said, the witness’ trial

testimony must itself satisfy the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, including rules relating to relevance.

In other words, Tenn. R. Evid. 613 does not authorize the elicitation of testimony from a witness that

is irrelevant to the instant proceeding for the sole purpose of impeaching the testimony with a prior

inconsistent statement. Cf. State v. Jones, 15 S.W.3d 880, 892 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999), perm. to

appeal denied, (Tenn. 2000). This issue is without merit.

C. DNA Evidence

Anticipating potential discovery issues upon retrial, we next address the appellant’s

contention that the trial court erred in failing to exclude DNA evidence proffered by the State or, in

the alternative, grant the appellant a continuance of the trial date. The appellant filed a motion on
5At trial, Special Agent DePriest testified that “the amount of information that was requested was more than

what would fit into the trunk of a T aurus vehicle . It was a tremen dous amount of inform ation.”

6

Specifically, defense counsel reque sted the following items:

1. The names an d curriculum vitae of all laboratory technicians, sup ervisors,

directors and any other personnel involved in collecting the evidence,

establishing the test methodology, perform ing and interpreting the test results,

preparing the final report, sampling the population and preparing the database of

gene frequencies that may be u sed to calculate the proba bility that anyone else

could have contributed the evidence reported in this case.

2. The name and cu rriculum vitae o f any expert wh o may be c alled to testify in

this case. 

3. The p rocedur es manual d etailing the pro tocols used to perform the tests

conducted in this case.

4. Provide documentation of any license and/or accreditation that the laboratory

may hold fo r using PCR methodo logies for ana lysis of DNA evidence in forensic

cases.

5. Provide documentation for any proficiency testing programs that the

laboratory participates that covers the genes assessed used in this case.

6. Provide the laboratory bench notes generated in this case.

7. Provide the PCR raw data submitted to any proficiency testing program and

the reports received from the proficiency testing agency indicating whether the

results submitted were corre ct or incorre ct. Include d ata two years su bsequen t to

the time when the tests were performed in this case up until the present time.

8. Documentation o f the laborato ry error rate in fo rensic DN A testing. Th is

should include reports that may have been retracted, errors that were detected by

the laboratory after a report was submitted or errors that were detected by other

(continued ...)

-14-

January 24, 2000, to “suppress” any DNA evidence proffered by the State. In support of his motion,

the appellant argued that the State had violated Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16 by failing to respond to his

requests for information relating to DNA testing conducted by the TBI. The appellant brought the

motion to the trial court’s attention on January 26, 2000, the day on which his trial was to

commence. The prosecutor responded that the appellant’s motion was untimely pursuant to Tenn.

R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3). Additionally, the prosecutor noted that the appellant had been granted

complete access to his file, and Special Agent DePriest had invited the appellant to visit the TBI

Crime Laboratory in Nashville and review any materials in the TBI’s possession. The prosecutor

explained that the TBI extended the invitation to the appellant instead of sending requested materials

because

what [defense counsel] . . . requested would [have] require[d] three

to four people working months to come up with the information . . .

, and it’s just so cumulative and it’s so burdensome, it would require

them to stop everything that they are doing and respond to that.5

As relevant to the appellant’s January 24, 2000 motion, the record further reflects

that, on October 12, 1999, defense counsel wrote a letter to the prosecutor assigned to the appellant’s

case requesting information concerning DNA testing conducted by the TBI.6

 On October 15, 1999,
6

(...continued)

persons.

9. The sampling methodology used to estimate the frequency of alleles in the

population samp led, that may be used to estimate the pro bability that anyone else

could have contributed the evidence reported in this case.

10. The criteria used to determine the racial and/or ethnic group of the

population sampled.

11. The place of birth and curren t residence (sta te, county, city) of the subjects

sampled to estimate the frequency of alleles used in this case to calculate the

probab ility that anyone else c ould have contributed the evidenc e reported in this

case.

12. The method used to estimate the allele frequencies in the population

detected at each locus assessed in this case.

13. A list of ph enotypes an d/or geno types stratified by ra cial and/or e thnic

group of the subjects sampled that were used to estimate allele frequencies and

probab ility that anyone else c ould have contributed the evidenc e reported in this

case.

14. Studies performed and raw data generated to determine whether the alleles

at each locus assessed in this case are in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium in the

population sampled and in the population where the crime was committed.

15. Studies performed and raw data generated to determine if the frequency of

alleles used to estimate probability in this case are the same as the frequency of

alleles in the population where the crime was committed.

16. Provide good quality photographic copies (not Xerox copies) of the dot

blots generated in this case.

 

-15-

the prosecutor wrote the following letter to defense counsel:

This letter is to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated October 12,

1999, and this letter is in reference to you[r] discovery requests.

Please be advised that this office has an open file policy concerning

discovery and as such you are welcome at any time to come and copy

my entire file. Also, I have spoken to the TBI crime lab concerning

this matter and informed them that you may be calling for

information. Any information concerning the TBI and DNA testing

will have to come from them. If you have any difficulty or run into

any problems in this endeavor please do not hesitate to call upon me.

In turn, defense counsel responded in a letter dated October 18, 1999, that he did “not feel

comfortable” with the prosecutor’s open file policy. He further informed the prosecutor that he was,

therefore, filing a formal motion for discovery and requesting a formal response by the State.

Simultaneously, defense counsel contacted the TBI directly and requested the items originally listed

in his October 12, 1999 letter to the prosecutor.

On October 20, 1999, defense counsel filed a motion for discovery, to which the State

responded by reiterating its open file policy. Accordingly, on December 3, 1999, the appellant filed

a motion to compel discovery. The trial court conducted a hearing on the appellant’s motion on

December 16, 1999. At the hearing, the appellant principally complained that he had not yet
-16-

received “dot-blots” or chartsof preliminaryDNA testing performed by Special Agent Chad Johnson

at the TBI laboratory in Jackson. In particular, he complained that he had experienced some

difficulty determining whether the “dot-blots” were located at the TBI laboratory in Jackson or the

TBI laboratory in Nashville. The prosecutor clarified that Special Agent Johnson’s final report was

included in his file and available to defense counsel, but other items including the “dot-blots” were

likely located at the laboratory in Nashville where the TBI was conducting further testing.

Additionally, the prosecutor noted that the special agent conducting the testing in Nashville had not

yet issued a final report. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the appellant’s

motion. The order granting the appellant’s motion provides:

The Court specifically ordered all dot blots (good quality

photographic copies (not xerox copies)) generated in the case (all

tests) to be provided Defendant’s counsel no later than January 3,

2000.

On January 3, 2000, the State notified defense counsel that photographic copies of

the “dot-blots” generated by the DNA testing performed by Special Agent Johnson were available.

Additionally, in a letter dated January 3, 2000, the prosecutor communicated to defense counsel:

I have also talked with the agent in Nashville who has conducted the

more precise testing and he has informed me that the testing that he

does cannot be photographed. Additionally, Agent Depriest has

informed me that he would be willing to allow you to go to Nashville

and follow him through his testing of DNA samples.

Special Agent DePriest reiterated the above invitation in a letter dated January 12, 2000, that was

addressed to the prosecutor and apparently forwarded to and received by defense counsel by January

14, 2000. In the letter, DePriest stated:

I have recently received and reviewed the two DNA discovery

requests (dated 12/8/99 and 1/11/2000) for laboratory information

regarding [the appellant’s case]. In [light] of the short time period

and vast amount of information requested, I have been authorized to

offer the defense the opportunity to visit the TBI crime laboratory to

view and discuss all of the requested information. Given the volume

of material, this would greatly facilitate efficient use of time by both

the state and defense counsel.

The “Official Serology/DNA Report” setting forth the results of Special Agent DePriest’s DNA

testing was attached to the January 12, 2000 letter. The appellant filed a copy of DePriest’s letter

and a copy of the “Official Serology/DNA Report” with the trial court on January 18, 2000.

In ruling upon the appellant’s January 24, 2000 motion to exclude DNA evidence

proffered by the State, the trial court added that, following the hearing on the appellant’s motion to

compel discovery, the court again met with the parties in chambers to discuss the appellant’s

discovery of DNA evidence and that, since the meeting in chambers, the court had received no

communications from defense counsel indicating any dissatisfaction with the State’s provision of

discovery. Accordingly, the trial court agreed with the State that the appellant’s motion was
-17-

untimely under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12. Moreover, the court found:

I’ve got to look to the spirit of Rule 16, and in this case, it’s been

undisputed that the State has agreed to furnish their experts to defense

counsel, to defense experts. They’ve offered the phone numbers, the

location. They’ve offered the State’s laboratory procedures and

protocol and everything be furnished, and you go up there at your

leisure and discover all that you want to discover, and I take it that’d

be much more than could be put on your desk. I think that sometimes

discovery can get over burdensome, but they’ve got around that by

furnishing everything to you, by someone appearing on behalf of the

Defendant, be it an expert or counsel, or both, or five people,

whatever it would take, and that’s through Mr. DePriest’s

cooperation, that being the expert witness. I think the spirit was met

under Rule 16.

Initially, Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3) does require that “[m]otions to suppress

evidence” be filed prior to trial. Courts have interpreted the phrase “prior to trial” to mean that a

motion to suppress must be raised “‘sometime earlier than “the day of the trial when the jury is

waiting in the hall.”’” Spicer v. State, 12 S.W.3d 438, 444 n.6 (Tenn. 2000); see also State v. Smith,

701 S.W.2d 216, 217 (Tenn. 1985); State v. Hamilton, 628 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1981). Moreover, “[t]he mere filing of a motion to suppress is not sufficient to raise an issue for the

court to decide. The proponent must bring the motion to the attention of the trial judge and obtain

a ruling thereon.” State v. Marvin K. Ferguson, No. 03C01-9406-CR-00235, 1997 WL 401825, at

*2 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, July 17, 1997), affirmed by State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912

(Tenn. 1999); see also State v. Burtis, 664 S.W.2d 305, 310 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983). Although

defense counsel in this case filed his motion to suppress DNA evidence two days prior to trial, he

failed to bring the motion to the attention of the trial court until the morning of trial. Accordingly,

if the appellant’s motion was subject to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3), the motion was indeed untimely.

However, in State v. Cook, 9 S.W.3d 98, 101 (Tenn. 1999), our supreme court recently quoted with

approval the following construction of the federal counterpart to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3) by the

United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit:

At least as used in 12(b), “suppress” has a rather definite and limited

meaning . . . . Motions to suppress are described as “objections to

evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained”, including

“evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search” and “other forms

of illegality such as the use of unconstitutional means to obtain a

confession.” Put generally, then, suppression motions concern the

“application of the exclusionary rule of evidence”, or matters of

“‘police conduct not immediately relevant to the question of guilt’”

. . . .

United States v. Barletta, 644 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 1981)(citation omitted). As the appellant’s motion

in this case was grounded in the State’s failure to fully comply with the rules of discovery rather than

the State’s illegal acquisition of the DNA evidence, it is uncertain whether the appellant was required
7An open file policy does not, however, relieve a prosecutor of his obligation under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16(c)

to notify defense counsel if he “d iscovers ad ditional evid ence or material previo usly requested or ordere d, which is

subject to d iscovery or in spection un der [Te nn. R. Crim. P . 16].”

-18-

under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3) to file his motion prior to trial.

That having been said, this court has held that under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(4),

“[f]ailure to complain of the alleged discovery violation and to seek a remedy as soon as the defense

learns of it may be treated as waiver.” State v. Quincy L. Henderson, No. 02C01-9706-CR-00227,

1998 WL 242608, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, May 12, 1998). As indicated above, the

appellant was at least aware by January 14, 2000, twelve days prior to trial, of the alleged discovery

violation. Nevertheless, he waited until the day of trial to bring the alleged violation to the trial

court’s attention. Accordingly, the appellant has waived his complaint.

Notwithstanding waiver, we agree with the trial court that the State did not violate

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16. In State v. Zane Allen Davis, Jr., No. M2000-00737-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL

1879518, at **4-5 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, December 28, 2000), we observed that Tenn. R.

Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C) & (D) authorizes the discovery of both results or reports of scientific tests and

documents and tangible objects necessary to determine the accuracy of the tests and test results. Cf.

the discussion in United States v. Liquid Sugars, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 466, 469-473 (E.D. Cal. 1994).

In this case, the State provided the appellant complete access both to the results of DNA testing

conducted by the TBI and to information relating to the accuracy of the tests and test results. The

sole dispute was whether defense counsel should be required to visit the TBI laboratory in Nashville

in order to obtain the latter information.

This court has previously noted that, generally speaking, Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16 does

not obligate the State “to furnish the appellant with information, evidence, or material which is

available or accessible to him or which he could obtain by exercising reasonable diligence.” State

v. Dickerson, 885 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993);see alsoState v. Gilford E. Williams, No.

W1999-01556-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 43176, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, January 17,

2001), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 2001). This principle underlies our holdings that, when

defense counsel is granted complete access to the State’s file, “[t]he State is not obliged to determine

whether defense counsel is aware of each and every item in the file. That is the function of defense

counsel to whom the file is opened.” Henderson, No. 02C01-9706-CR-00227, 1998 WL 242608,

at *4; see also State v. David Dotson, No. 45, 1988 WL 74595 at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville,

July 21, 1988).7 Similarly, we have held that “[s]ome responsibility must be placed upon a

defendant, with full knowledge that an expert will testify, to adequately investigate.” Williams, No.

W1999-01556-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 43176, at *5; see also State v. Chico Lopez Chigano, No.

1333, 1991 WL 188875, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, September 26, 1991); State v. Dan

Baron Reid, No. 16, 1986 WL 8297, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, July 30, 1986). In short,

absent evidence that the State’s invitation to defense counsel to visit the TBI laboratory in Nashville

was a tactic designed to hinder the appellant’s discovery of material evidence or otherwise harass

the appellant, it was indeed the responsibility of defense counsel to visit the laboratory and thereby
-19-

obtain the requested information.

We recognize that the State’s invitation to defense counsel to visit the TBI laboratory

in Nashville was issued approximately three weeks prior to trial. Conceivably, defense counsel

would have faced some difficulty scheduling a visit to the TBI laboratory in Nashville within those

three weeks. However, the appellant never requested a continuance of the trial date for the purpose

of arranging a visit to the laboratory, nor in fact did the appellant ever request a continuance due to

the State’s alleged discovery violation. Rather, the appellant asserted in his motion “that the least

relief he should receive is the suppression of all state offered DNA evidence.” Even assuming that

the State violated Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16, a prerequisite to the remedy of exclusion was the appellant’s

demonstration by a preponderance of the evidence that he was “actually prejudiced by the failure to

comply with the discovery [rule] and that the prejudice [could not] be otherwise eradicated.” State

v. Garland, 617 S.W.2d 176, 185 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981); see also State v. Danny Jerome Jones,

No. 01C01-9307-CR-00233, 1994 WL 369728, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, July 14,

1994)(citing, among other authorities, State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 548 (Tenn. 1992)). In this

regard, “[t]he inquiry is what prejudice has resulted from the discovery violation, not simply the

prejudicial effect the evidence, otherwise admissible, has on the issue of a defendant’s guilt.”

Henderson, No. 02C01-9706-CR-00227, 1998 WL 242608, at *5. Suffice it to say that the appellant

failed to demonstrate that the State’s requirement that defense counsel visit the TBI laboratory in

Nashville in order to obtain requested information was so prejudicial as to preclude any remedy other

than exclusion. Cf. id. (“This court will not presume prejudice from a mere allegation. Moreover,

prejudice arising from a discovery violation will not be found if it is shown that the defense was

otherwise aware of the undisclosed evidence.”).

Finally, we note that, on appeal, the appellant cites for the first time Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. at 83, 83 S. Ct. at 1194, for the proposition that the trial court should have

excluded DNA evidence proffered by the State. Although the appellant made a cursory reference

to due process in his motion to exclude the DNA evidence, defense counsel’s argument before the

trial court focused exclusively upon Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16. Moreover, the sole Brady violation

alleged in the appellant’s motion for new trial related to the State’s failure to provide the appellant

exculpatory evidence concerning other sexual behavior by the victim. A party may not make an

objection based upon a non-constitutional ground at trial, and assert a constitutional ground for the

objection post-trial. State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 635 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Moreover,

on the basis of the record before this court, the appellant is not otherwise entitled to relief. Tenn. R.

Crim. P. 52(b); Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 282-283. This issue is without merit.

D. Evidence of the Appellant’s Character

The appellant also claims that the trial court erred in excluding evidence at trial

concerning his truthfulness, yet another issue that may resurface upon retrial. As relevant to this

issue, the appellant introduced at trial the testimony of his ex-wife, Connie Sue Gary, that she was

previously married to the appellant for four years and she “guessed” that the appellant “was always

honest with [her]” during that time period. The State objected to Gary’s testimony on the basis that

the appellant had not yet testified. The appellant responded that the State had introduced into
8

Conceivably, the interplay of Tenn. R. Evid. 806 and the appellant’s introduction of his own exculpatory

statement und er Tenn . R. Evid. 10 6 would a void Rule 608(a)’s a pparent re quiremen t that the appe llant be a witness. 

Howev er, in this case, the ap pellant’s excu lpatory statement was introd uced by the State and d id not constitute

hearsay. 

-20-

evidence the appellant’s statement to the police, thereby placing the appellant’s truthfulness at issue.

Following argument by counsel, the trial court concluded:

I’ve never understood the law to allow this type testimony, as brief as

it was, without the Defendant’s testimony coming first. I have no

idea whether the defendant is going to testify or not. I don’t think it’s

prior testimony. I believe the objection is good at this point in time.

Once the Defendant takes the stand, if you want to offer this proof

and other proof, but at this point I’m just going to sustain the

objection and ask that it be stricken.

Tenn. R. Evid. 404(a) provides that “[e]vidence of a person’s character or a trait of

character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity with the character or trait

on a particular occasion.” Exceptions to this general proscription include evidence admissible

pursuant to Tenn. R. Evid. 608. See Tenn. R. Evid. 404(a)(3). Rule 608(a) provides:

The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence

in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations:

(1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or

untruthfulness, and (2) the evidence oftruthful character is admissible

only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been

attacked.

Id. The trial court evidently relied upon Tenn. R. Evid. 608(a) in excluding Gary’s testimony. This

court will not find error in the trial court’s ruling absent an abuse of discretion. State v. McLeod,

937 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Tenn. 1996).

In McKinney v. State, 552 S.W.2d 787, 790 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977), this court

observed, “An accused may not, of course, show evidence of his credibility as a witness by the use

of character witnesses unless he first testifies.” McKinney, however, was written prior to the

adoption of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. Moreover, the appellant correctly notes that,

notwithstanding Rule 608(a)’s unambiguous reference to the “credibility of a witness,” this court has

since suggested that a defendant’s right under the rule to present evidence of his truthful character

upon attack by the State “is not contingent upon his relinquishment of his Fifth Amendment

privilege.” State v. Phipps, 883 S.W.2d 138, 153 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Nevertheless, our

conclusion in Phipps constituted dictum, and nothing in Tenn. R. Evid. 608(a) or the Advisory

Commission Comments thereto suggests an intent by the drafters to abandon McKinney’s limitation

upon an accused’s use of character evidence for the purpose of bolstering his credibility.

8

Additionally, we note our agreement with the State that the appellant minimally at

best complied with the requirement that he establish a proper foundation for the introduction of
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opinion testimony concerning his character. State v. Dutton, 896 S.W.2d 114, 118 (Tenn. 1995);

see alsoState v. Sammy Goff, No. W1999-01976-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 91951, at *3 (Tenn. Crim.

App. at Jackson, January 31, 2001), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 2001). Gary did not indicate

when she and the appellant were married, nor did she indicate the extent of her contact with the

appellant since their divorce. As one commentator has observed,

[s]ince the reputation or opinion evidence is introduced to provide

evidence of a witness’s character so that the trier of fact can more

accurately assess the witness’s credibility, the key issue is the

witness’s character at or near the time of testimony. Accordingly, the

reputation or opinion proof under Rule 608(a) should relate to the

witness’s character at the time of the proceeding.

NEIL P. COHEN ET AL., TENNESSEE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 608.2, at 346 (Michie ed., 3d ed. 1995). 

Even assuming that the appellant established a proper foundation, the appellant was

not entitled to present Gary’s testimony because the State had not yet attacked the appellant’s

character for truthfulness. In this regard, we note that the United States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit, in interpreting the essentially identical federal counterpart to Tenn. R. Evid. 608(a),

carefully distinguished between attacks by the State upon a witness’ credibility in the current case

and attacks by the State upon the witness’ prior history or general character for truthfulness, stating

that only the latter triggers rehabilitation under Rule 608(a). United States v. Dring, 930 F.2d 687,

690-692 (9th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, the State’s introduction of testimony by other witnesses

contradicting the appellant’s version of the facts generally does not trigger rehabilitation under Rule

608(a). Id. at 691; see also United States v. Angelini, 678 F.2d 380, 382 n.1 (1st Cir. 1982); United

States v. Danehy, 680 F.2d 1311, 1314 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046,

1055 (5th Cir. 1979); cf. People v. Miller, 890 P.2d 84, 93-96 (Colo. 1995); State v. Rabe, 687 P.2d

554, 561 (Haw. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Ross, 685 A.2d 1234, 1236 (N.H. 1996); Spector v. State,

746 S.W.2d 946, 950-951 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Eugenio, 579 N.W.2d 642, 648-649 (Wis.

1998). One commentator explained, “[C]ontradiction evidence might be offered to prove the witness

has intentionally lied, but for reasons that are case-specific and have nothing to do with general

trustworthiness.” 28 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 6116, at 70 (West Publishing Co. ed., 1993). The record before this court reflects that

the State did nothing more than offer evidence contradicting the appellant’s statement to the police

concerning whether or not he raped RB. Certainly, the appellant’s motive to lie about those facts

was entirely case-specific.

Of course, “[e]vidence barred by Rule 608 may be admissible by another evidence

rule.” 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE §

608.02(3)(c), at 608-13 (Joseph M. McLaughlin & Matthew Bender & Co. eds., 2d ed. 2001). In

contrast to Rule 608(a), Tenn. R. Evid. 404(a)(1) addresses the admissibility of proof of the character

of the accused as substantive evidence. Specifically, Rule 404(a)(1) permits the introduction of

“[e]vidence of a pertinent character trait offered by the accused or by the prosecution to rebut the

same.” Under Tenn. R. Evid. 405(a), such “proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by

testimony in the form of an opinion.”
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Like Rule 608(a), Rule 404(a)(1) is substantially identical to its federal counterpart.

Accordingly, we note that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has opined that

“pertinent” is a term synonymous with “relevant,” and a defendant’s truthfulness is relevant in the

following three situations:

(1) The offense charged is crimen falsi; i.e., a lie by the defendant is

an element of the crime. (2) The defendant has testified on his own

behalf and his credibility has been attacked. (3) The truth of out-ofcourt statements made by the defendant has been attacked.

United States v. Hewitt, 634 F.2d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1981)(citations omitted); see also United States

v. Lechoco, 542 F.2d 84, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1976)(holding that, when the State challenged the veracity

of a defendant’s statements to psychiatrists, on which statements the doctors based their opinions

concerning the defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense, evidence of the defendant’s

character for truthfulness “went to the heart of his guilt or innocence” and was admissible

substantively). Consistent with Hewitt, this court held in State v. William B. Thurbley, No. 03C01-

9709-CC-00414, 1999 WL 301591, at *15 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, May 11, 1999), perm.

to appeal granted, (Tenn. 1999), that, when evidence of a defendant’s character for truthfulness

relates to the credibility of a statement that he gave to the police, the evidence is admissible under

Tenn. R. Evid. 404(a)(1).

Of course, the issue of whether the appellant established an adequate foundation for

Gary’s testimony is equally of concern whether determining the admissibility of Gary’s testimony

under Rule 608(a) or Rule 404(a)(1). Moreover, Gary’s testimony that she “guessed” that the

appellant was truthful with her during their marriage was hardly a ringing endorsement of his

character for truthfulness. Accordingly, the exclusion of the evidence, if error, does not afford an

independent basis for the reversal of the appellant’s convictions. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(a); Tenn. R.

App. P. 36(b). 

E. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The appellant next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his

convictions of rape. In order to prevail, the appellant must demonstrate to this court that no “rational

trier of fact” could have found the essential elements of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d

913, 914 (Tenn. 1982); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). In other words, on appeal, the State is entitled to the

strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom.

State v. Williams, 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983). All factual issues raised by the evidence,

including questions concerning the credibility of witnesses and the weight and value to be given the

evidence, are resolved by the trier of fact and not the appellate courts. State v. Pruett, 788 S.W.2d

559, 561 (Tenn. 1990). These standards apply to convictions based upon direct evidence,

circumstantial evidence, or both. State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 557 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied,

__ U.S. __, 121 S. Ct. 2600 (2001); State v. Vann, 976 S.W.2d 93, 111-112 (Tenn. 1998)(appendix).

Again, the State charged the appellant in this case with three counts of rape, each

count relating to a separate act of penetration. State v. Phillips, 924 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tenn.
9We need not consider the effect of the trial court’s instruction on coercion as we must reverse the

appellant’s convictions and remand this case for a new trial due to the court’s failure to instruct the jury on sexual

battery as a lesser-included offense of each rape charge. At the new trial, however, the trial court should omit any

instruction to the jury on coercion.

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1996)(“‘[A]n accused may be convicted of more than one offense when the rape involves separate

acts’ of sexual penetration.”). With respect to each count, the State was required to prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that (1) the appellant engaged in unlawful sexual penetration of RB; (2) the

appellant used force to accomplish the act; and (3) the appellant acted intentionally, knowingly, or

recklessly. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-503 (1997). The appellant challenges his convictions on the

basis that “[t]here is not evidence of force, coercion in this case.” We note as a preliminary matter

that each count of the indictment in this case charged only rape by force rather than rape by force

or coercion. Accordingly, notwithstanding the trial court’s instructions to the jury,9 we will only

address whether the evidence established the appellant’s use of force to commit the charged rapes.

Cf. State v. Fitz, 19 S.W.3d 213, 215 & 217 n.5 (Tenn. 2000).

Our legislature has defined “force” as “compulsion by the use of physical power or

violence” and has directed that the term “be broadly construed to accomplish the purposes of this

title.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106(a)(12) (1997). Briefly summarizing the evidence in this case,

RB first testified that she was unsuccessfully attempting to push the appellant’s hands away from

her body when he penetrated her vagina with his finger. Second, the appellant engaged in a struggle

with RB to pull her boxer shorts down her legs prior to performing cunnilingus upon her; he held

her hands down during cunnilingus; and he persisted in performing cunnilingus despite RB’s effort

to “smash[] his head with [her] legs.” Third, the appellant continued to hold RB’s hands down while

penetrating her vagina with his penis. According to RB, the appellant’s confinement of her hands

prevented her from moving. She concluded that, although she did not suffer any bruises as a result

of the appellant’s offenses, she was “sore” following the offenses. In short, the evidence adduced

at trial established the appellant’s use of “compulsion by the use of physical power” with respect to

each count of the indictment. See, e.g., State v. McKnight, 900 S.W.2d 36, 48 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1994); State v. Arthur Clark, No. W1999-01747-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1224756, at *3 (Tenn.

Crim. App. at Jackson, August 25, 2000), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 2001); cf. State v. Wade

Henry Allen Marsh, No. E1998-00057-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 555231, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. at

Knoxville, May 8, 2000), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 2001). This issue is without merit.

F. Lesser-Included Offenses

Finally, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury

on sexual battery as a lesser-included offense of each count of rape. Initially, we note that the

appellant failed to object to the trial court’s jury instructions. Nevertheless, a trial court’s duty to

charge a jury as to the law of each offense included in an indictment exists regardless of any request

or objection by the appellant. See, e.g., State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 464 (Tenn. 1999); Tenn. Code

Ann. § 40-18-110(a) (1997). Sexual battery is a lesser-included offense of rape under the test

enunciated by our supreme court in Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 466-467. See State v. Timothy R. Bowles,

No. M1997-00092-SC-R11-CD, 2001 WL 856575, at *4 (Tenn. at Nashville, July 31,
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2001)(publication pending). Accordingly, with respect to each count of rape, the trial court was

obligated to instruct the jury on sexual battery if there existed evidence that reasonable minds could

accept as to the lesser-included offense and this evidence was legally sufficient to support a

conviction of the lesser-included offense. Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 469. In determining whether the

evidence warranted an instruction on sexual battery, the court was required to “view the evidence

liberally in the light most favorable to the existence of the lesser-included offense without making

any judgments on the credibility of such evidence.” Id.

As relevant to this case, the offense of sexual battery comprises the following

essential elements: (1) unlawful sexual contact with the victim by the defendant; (2) force was used

to accomplish the act; and (3) the defendant acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. Tenn.

Code Ann. § 39-13-505 (1997). “‘Sexual contact’ includes the intentional touching of the victim’s,

the defendant’s, or any other person’s intimate parts, . . . if that intentional touching can be

reasonably construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.” Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 39-13-501(6) (1997). In proving the offenses of rape, the State necessarily proved all the essential

elements of sexual battery with the exception of the requirement that the sexual contact be for the

purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. Bowles, No. M1997-00092-SC-R11-CD, 2001 WL

856575, at *4. Because the jury could reasonably have construed the sexual contact in this case to

be for the purpose of sexual arousal and gratification, the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on

sexual battery was error. In this regard, we reiterate our supreme court’s observation that “[w]hether

sufficient evidence supports a conviction of the charged offense does not affect the trial court’s duty

to instruct on the lesser offense if evidence also supports a finding of guilt on the lesser offense.”

Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 472. Additionally, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial

court’s error was harmless as the jury was not afforded an opportunity to consider an intermediate

lesser-included offense. Bowles, No. M1997-00092-SC-R11-CD, 2001 WL 856575, at *5; State v.

Curtis Jason Ely, Nos. E1998-00099-SC-R11-CD & E1999-00170-SC-R11-CD, 2001 WL 605097,

at *14 (Tenn. at Knoxville, June 5, 2001)(publication pending).

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the appellant’s convictions of rape and remand

these cases to the trial court for a new trial.

___________________________________ 

NORMA McGEE OGLE, JUDGE