Centennial finally filed a suit in district court seeking, among 

other claims, damages for Scala's alleged breach of contract. After the 

district court denied Scala's motion for summary judgment on statute of 

limitation grounds, the parties proceeded to mediation. As a result of the 

mediation, the parties reached a memorandum of understanding ("MOU") 

that outlined a number of duties and benefits. Attempts to draft an 

amenable formal settlement agreement failed and Centennial filed a 

motion seeking enforcement of the MOU, which the district court granted. 

Scala now appeals. 

The district court did not err in denying Scala's motion for summary 

judgment 

Scala argues that the district court improperly denied his 

motion for summary judgment on statute of limitation grounds because 

Centennial knew in 2001 that Scala would never pay for the maintenance 

of the PMAs, which commenced the accrual of Centennial's cause of action. 

We review the district court's denial of summary judgment de novo. Wood 

v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). 

"Summary judgment is appropriate. . . when the pleadings and other 

evidence. . . demonstrate that no 'genuine issue [of] material fact 

[remains] and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 

of law." Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting NRCP 56(c)). 

Here, the district court denied Scala's motion for summary 

judgment without prejudice because "there [were] too many issues of fact." 

The point at which Centennial "should have known of the facts 

constituting the elements of [its] cause of action" presented a genuine 

issue of material fact for the trier of fact to consider. Soper v. Means, 111 

Nev. 1290, 1294, 903 P.2d 222, 224 (1995) (determining that the point 

when plaintiff discovers facts constituting his cause of action is a question 

of fact); see also Bemis v. Estate of Bemis, 114 Nev. 1021, 1024-25, 967 

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P.2d 437, 440 (1998) (discussing that the "discovery rule" provides that the 

cause of action accrues as soon as the plaintiff discovers or reasonably 

should have discovered the facts constituting a breach); Massey v. Litton, 

99 Nev. 723, 728, 669 P.2d 248, 252 (1983) (providing that the point at 

which the statute of limitation begins to run presented a factual issue 

precluding summary judgment). In particular, the impact of Scala's 

October 21, 2001 letter, and the purpose and effect of the payments Scala 

made later presented genuine issues of material fact for the trier of fact to 

determine. See NRS 11.200 ("The time in NRS 11.190 shall be deemed to 

date from the last transaction or last item charged or last credit given 

. . ."). Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Scala's motion for 

summary judgment on the statute of limitations issue. 

Substantial evidence supported the district court's decision to enforce the 

MOU as a settlement agreement 

Scala also claims the MOU is an unenforceable settlement 

agreement because the parties did not agree to all material terms, 

particularly one dealing with Centennial's development of a trail system 

on its property. A settlement agreement is a contract, so principles of 

contract law govern its construction and enforcement. May v. Anderson, 

121 Nev. 668, 672, 119 P.3d 1254, 1257 (2005). Whether a contract exists 

is a question of fact, and this court defers to district court findings 

supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 672-73, 119 P.3d at 1257. The 

district court made nineteen written findings of fact in its final judgment 

to enforce the MOU as a settlement agreement. 

This court upholds the enforcement of settlement agreements 

"put on record and approved in open court." See Grisham v. Grisham, 128 

Nev. , 289 P.3d 230, 233-34 (2012) (enforcing an oral settlement 

agreement when read into the record and approved in open court even 

though one party later disagreed with its terms). Here, the district court's 

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finding that the MOU was an enforceable settlement agreement was 

supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, the MOU was drafted at 

the end of a ten-hour mediation, both parties signed the document, and 

the agreement was read into the record in open court without objection by 

Scala. Although Scala argues the trail system was an essential term of 

the agreement, insufficient evidence exists to establish that parties 

discussed the trail system at mediation. Therefore, substantial evidence 

supports the district court's decision to enforce the MOU as a settlement 

agreement. 2 

We have considered the parties' remaining arguments and 

conclude they are without merit. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

Gibbons 

Douglas 

Saitta 

2Scala also argues the district court erred in interpreting the MOU 

because its terms were ambiguous. However, since the question in front of 

the district court was whether the MOU was an enforceable settlement 

agreement, not whether one party violated its terms (which would have 

required interpretation), we conclude Scala's argument is misplaced. We 

conclude the terms of the MOU were sufficiently certain and definite for 

the district court to compel compliance if necessary. See Grisham, 128 

Nev. at , 289 P.3d at 235. 
cc: Hon. Susan Johnson, District Judge 

Glen J. Lerner & Associates 

Ales & Bryson 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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