alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Richard West, Appellant.

[961 NYS2d 785]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Mullen, J.), rendered August 12, 2009, convicting him of rape in the first degree and rape in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant contends that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel *(see People v Benevento,*91 NY2d 708, 712 [1998]; *People v Baldi,*54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]). However, the record in this case demonstrates that defense counsel effectively cross-examined the People’s witnesses, presented an alibi defense, made competent opening and closing statements which were consistent with that defense, and filed various pretrial and posttrial motions on the defendant’s behalf *(see People v Prescott,*63 AD3d 1090 [2009]; *People v Cabezudo,*303 AD2d 596 [2003]). Moreover, the defendant has failed to demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations for counsel’s alleged shortcomings *(see People v Caban,*5 NY3d 143, 152 [2005]; *People v Rivera,*71 NY2d 705, 709 [1988]). Accordingly, the defendant has failed to establish that he was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel *(see People v Caban,*5 NY3d at 152; *People v Rivera,*71 NY2d at 709).

The defendant’s contention, raised in his pro se supplemental brief, that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his convictions is unpreserved for appellate review *(see*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Hawkins,*11 NY3d 484 [2008]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt of rape in the *782first degree and rape in the third degree beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon our independent review pursuant to CPL 470.15 (5), we are satisfied that the verdicts of guilt were not against the weight of the evidence *(see People v Danielson,*9 NY3d 342 [2007]; *People v Romero,*7 NY3d 633 [2006]).

The remaining contentions raised in the defendant’s pro se supplemental brief are unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, are without merit.

Balkin, J.E, Leventhal, Roman and Hinds-Radix, JJ, concur.
<PAGE>

                                                               Exhibit 10.28


                            ANGELICA CORPORATION
                            EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
                               FIRST AMENDMENT
                               ---------------

         This Amendment ("Amendment") has been entered into as of the 1st
day of February, 2004, by and between Angelica Corporation, a Missouri
Corporation ("Angelica") and James W. Shaffer, an individual ("Employee").

         WHEREAS, Angelica currently employs Employee as Vice President and
Treasurer of Angelica pursuant to that certain Employment Agreement, dated
the 1st day of February, 2003 (the "Agreement"); and

         WHEREAS, Angelica and Employee wish to continue the employment
relationship between them and to amend the Agreement as set forth in this
Amendment.

         NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises herein
contained, the parties hereto agree to amend the Agreement as follows:

         1. Section 2.1 of the Agreement is hereby amended to read as follows:

                  2.1 INITIAL TERM OF AGREEMENT; RENEWAL TERMS. The initial
                  Term of this Agreement shall be for one year commencing on
                  the Effective Date, subject to automatic renewal for one
                  or more additional Terms of one year each commencing
                  immediately upon the end of the initial Term or the
                  then-current renewal Term, as the case may be, unless
                  either party to this Agreement gives a Notice of
                  Non-Renewal to the other party not later than 90 days
                  prior to the end of the initial Term or the then-current
                  renewal Term, as the case may be. In the event that such a
                  Notice of Non-Renewal is given as set forth in this
                  Section 2.1, the Date of Termination will be the last day
                  of the initial Term or the then-current Term, as the case
                  may be.

         2. Except as otherwise expressly amended by this Amendment, all
            other terms, conditions and covenants of the Agreement shall
            remain unchanged and in full force and effect.

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Employee and Angelica, pursuant to the
authorization from its Board, have caused this Amendment to be executed in
its name on its behalf, all as of the day and year first above written.

                                             /s/ James W. Shaffer
                                             ----------------------------
                                             James W. Shaffer



                                             ANGELICA CORPORATION

                                             By: /s/ Stephen M. O'Hara
                                                 ------------------------
                                             Name: Stephen M. O'Hara
                                             Title: President & CEO
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF RIBOZYME PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., FOR THE TWELVE MONTHS
ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
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<CASH>                                       6,511,512
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                3,898,581
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            10,613,325
<PP&E>                                      11,125,936
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<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,044,836
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<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        91,815
<OTHER-SE>                                  10,942,573
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                19,224,291
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             9,622,427
<CGS>                                                0
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            16,941,652
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             703,711
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (10,917,567)
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<NET-INCOME>                              (10,917,567)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.22)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 04-6741

JOHNNY LEE LUCAS, Petitioner - Appellant, versus WILLIE EAGLETON, Warden of Evans Correctional Institution; HENRY MCMASTER, Attorney General of the State of South Carolina, Respondents - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Rock Hill. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., District Judge. (CA-03-330-0-13BD) Submitted: September 16, 2004 Decided: September 22, 2004 Before LUTTIG, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Johnny Lee Lucas, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Chief Deputy Attorney General, John William McIntosh, Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Johnny Lee Lucas seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). An appeal may not be taken from the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a state court unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue for claims addressed by a district court on the merits absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). As to claims dismissed by the district court solely on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability will not issue unless the petitioner can demonstrate both “(1) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right’ and (2) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.’” Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 684 (4th Cir.) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Lucas has not satisfied either standard. See Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. See28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are- 3 - adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1

               CONSENT OF ERNST & YOUNG LLP, INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
(Form S-8 File Nos. 333-58100, 333-50432, 333-32834, 333-77007, 333-59051,
333-27499, 333-03806 and 33-90728) pertaining to the Credence Systems
Corporation Supplemental Stock Option Plan, 1993 Stock Option Plan, and the 1994
Employee Stock Purchase Plan, (Form S-8 No. 333-38428) pertaining to the 1996
Stock Option Plan of TMT, Inc. (assumed by Credence Systems Corporation), (Form
S-8 No. 333-69584) pertaining to the 1995 Stock Incentive Plan, 1995 Stock
Option Plan for Non-Employee Directors, 1995 Employee Stock Purchase Plan, and
the 2000 Nonqualified Stock Option Plan of Integrated Measurement Systems, Inc.
(each assumed by Credence Systems Corporation), and (Form S-8 No. 333-74346)
pertaining to the Fluence Technology, Inc.1997 Stock Option Plan (assumed by
Credence Systems Corporation), the Opmaxx, Inc. 1997 Stock Option/Stock Issuance
Plan (assumed by Credence Systems Corporation), the Credence Systems Corporation
1993 Stock Option Plan and the Credence Systems Corporation Supplemental Stock
Option Plan, of our report dated November 21, 2001, with respect to the
consolidated financial statements and schedule of Credence Systems Corporation
included in the Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended October 31, 2001.

                                                 /s/ ERNST & YOUNG LLP

San Jose, California
January 28, 2002
Exhibit 31.2I, John A. Betts, certify that:1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K/A for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2005of Centrue Financial Corporation;2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report; and3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport.        Date:  May 11, 2006 /s/ John A. Betts   John A. Betts   Corporate Controller and Interim Principal Financial Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
          This schedule  contains summary financial  information  extracted from
          the Consolidate  Statements of Operations,  the  Consolidated  Balance
          Sheets,  and the  Accompanying  Notes  to the  Consolidated  Financial
          Statements,  and is  qualified  in its  entirety by  reference to such
          financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0000893162
<NAME>                        q#ygjp9a
<MULTIPLIER>                          1
<CURRENCY>                  U.S. Dollar
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-Mos 
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                         Oct-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                            Nov-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                              Oct-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                     1
<CASH>                                         50,791
<SECURITIES>                                   83,134
<RECEIVABLES>                                  39,310
<ALLOWANCES>                                    5,409
<INVENTORY>                                    37,406
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                              225,551
<PP&E>                                         88,264
<DEPRECIATION>                                 46,500
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                306,189
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          40,945
<BONDS>                                       115,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                           21
<OTHER-SE>                                    149,996
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  306,189
<SALES>                                       216,803
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                              216,803
<CGS>                                         125,356
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 125,356
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              134,019
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              6,693
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (41,270)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  (14,785)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (26,282)
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (26,282)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.22)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.22)
        


</TABLE>
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     I, John A. Poserina,  Chief  Financial  Officer of Synergx  Systems certify
that:

     1. I have reviewed this quarterly  report on Form 10-QSB of Synergx Systems
Inc.;

     2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact  necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the  circumstances  under which such statements
were made, not  misleading  with respect to the period covered by this quarterly
report;

     3. Based on my knowledge,  the financial  statements,  and other  financial
information  included in this quarterly  report,  fairly present in all material
respects  the  financial  condition,  results  of  operations  and cash flows of
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

     4. The  registrant's  other  certifying  officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining  disclosure  controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:

     a)  Designed  such  disclosure  controls  and  procedures,  or caused  such
disclosure  controls and  procedures to be designed  under our  supervision,  to
ensure that  material  information  relating to the  registrant,  including  its
consolidated subsidiaries,  is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;

     c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's  disclosure controls and
procedures  and presented in this  quarterly  report our  conclusions  about the
effectiveness  of the disclosure  controls and procedures,  as of the end of the
period cover by this report based on such evaluation; and

     c)  Disclosed  in this  quarterly  report  any  change in the  registrant's
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during registrant's most
recent fiscal  quarter that has  materially  affected,  or reasonably  likely to
materially affect, the registrant's  internal control over financial  reporting;
and

     5. The registrant's other certifying  officers and I have disclosed,  based
on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial  reporting,  to
the  registrant's  auditors  and the audit  committee of  registrant's  board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions);

     a)  All  significant  deficiencies  in  material  weakness  the  design  or
operation of internal  controls over  financial  reporting  which are reasonably
likely  to  adversely  affect  the  registrant's  ability  to  record,  process,
summarize and report financial information; and

     b) Any fraud,  whether or not material,  that involves  management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's  internal control over
financial reporting.

Date:    May 12, 2006
         /S/ John A. Poserina
         John A. Poserina
         Chief Financial Officer
#### Norbert Rijos, Respondent, v Riverbay Corporation, Appellant.

[963 NYS2d 26]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Mary Ann BriganttiHughes, J.), entered on or about March 7, 2012, which denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendant failed to establish its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law in this action where plaintiff alleges that he was injured when he slipped and fell on an accumulation of rainwater that was approximately one inch deep in the lobby of the building where he lived. Plaintiff testified, and meteorological records showed, that it was raining heavily on the day of the accident and that the rain was accompanied by strong winds. Plaintiff also stated that when he arrived at his building the lobby doors had been blown open by the wind, causing the rain to come indoors.

Defendant seeks to rely on the “storm in progress” doctrine to relieve itself of liability. However, the condition described by plaintiff, namely the flooding of the building’s lobby, is distinguishable from those instances where the doctrine is typically applied *{compare Richardson v S.I.K. Assoc., L.P,*102 AD3d 554 [1st Dept 2013]; *Hussein v New York City Tr. Auth.,*266 AD2d 146 [1st Dept 1999]). Moreover, even where the doctrine is available for such indoor accidents, “all of the circumstances regarding a defendant’s maintenance efforts must be scrutinized in ascertaining whether the defendant exercised reasonable care in remedying a dangerous condition” *{Pomahac v TrizecHahn 1065 Ave. of Ams., LLC,*65 AD3d 462, 465-466 [1st Dept 2009]). Here, defendant failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that it took reasonable measures to remedy the allegedly dangerous condition. Defendant’s witnesses did not aver that any such ac*424tion was taken during their shifts, and they offered no knowledge of any action taken after their shifts ended, which was several hours before plaintiff’s fall.

Concur—Friedman, J.P., Sweeny, Renwick, Richter and Román, JJ.
#### CHRISTON v. UNITED STATES et al.

No. 55 of 1947.

United States District Court E. D. Pennsylvania.

Aug. 25, 1947.

Harry R. Kozart, of Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Raymond A. White, Jr., of Philadelphia, Pa., for intervening plaintiff.

Krusen, Evans & Shaw, of Philadelphia, Pa., for respondent.

KIRKPATRICK, District Judge.

An employee of the Maritime Ship Cleaning and Maintenance Co., Inc., lost his life in an accident while working on one of the respondent’s ships. His admin-istratrix did not accept compensation under the Longshoremen’s Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq., from the employer but elected to bring this suit against the respondent, alleging unseaworthiness of the vessel. The United States Casualty Co. as insurance carrier for the employer seeks to in*328tervene as party plaintiff. Since no compensation has been paid under any award it has no rights by assignment or subrogation of the plaintiff’s claim, but if the plaintiff should recover less than the compensation which could be awarded she could then call upon the Casualty Co. to pay the difference. Hence, to that extent, it is to the interest of the Casualty Co. to see that the award is as high or higher than its liability. If this were the whole case the insurance carrier could properly be aligned as a party with the plaintiff.

However, the respondent has moved to implead the employer, the Maritime Ship Cleaning and Maintenance Co., on the ground that it is liable over to the respondent for all or a part of whatever damages the respondent may have to pay. The motion to implead seeks recovery by way of contribution or indemnity only. A motion of this kind is not precluded by Sec. 5 of the Longshoremen’s Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 90S. American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 67 S.Ct. 847, 91 L.Ed. 1011; Calvino v. Pan-Atlantic S. S. Corporation, D.C., 29 F.Supp. 1022. The motion will be granted.

Now, if the Casualty Company’s policy protects Maritime against claims of this nature, the Casualty Company would benefit by keeping the verdict against Maritime down to a figure no higher than the amount of compensation due the plaintiff adminis-tratrix under the Longshoremen’s Act. It would in any event be liable for the full amount of that compensation. Its interest, to this extent, would be against that of the plaintiff and in accord with that of Maritime and, from this point of view, it should be aligned with the two respondents.

Obviously the Casualty Company may not take a dual position. The only way that it might properly be a party plaintiff would be if Maritime were not impleaded and the suit were to proceed against the United States. As the suit stands, its motion to intervene will be denied.

As to the possibility, apparently feared by the Casualty Company, of a large settlement or verdict being received and a very small amount allotted by the administra-trix to herself as dependent, in order to recover additional moneys from the Casualty Company under the Longshoremen’s Act, there is ample remedy by intervention later in these proceedings or by way of defense in any others which may be brought