Al t h ou g h t h e r ec or d i n di ca t es t h at t h e def en dan t ’ s f

u l l n ame a ppea r s t o be J ame s Edga r W h i t e, J r

. , t h i s opi n i on 1
wi l l r ef er t o t he def

endan t as he was na med i n t he i ndi ct ment wh i ch i ni t i at ed t hi s ca s e. 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs F eb ru ar y 6, 200 7

STATE OF TENNESS EE v . EDGAR WHI TE, J R.

Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Dyer County No. C05-438 Lee Moore , Judge

No. W2006-00655-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled March 20, 2007

T h e d e f e n d an t , E d g ar

W h i t e , J r

. , w a s c o n v i c t e d o f dr i v i n g u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e ( f i r s to f f e n s e ) ( D U I) and simple possession of marijuana , both Class A misdemeanors, and w as sentenc ed to eleve n months, twenty -nine da

y s in ja il f

or eac h, suspended to thirty day s, to be serve d concur rently . On

a pp e a l, t he de fe nd ant c ha lle ng e s b oth the su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e that f

or me d the ba sis of

his

c on vic tio ns and

the le ng th of his se nte nc e

. We co nc lud e that th e e vid e nc e wa s su ff ic ie nt t o s us ta in both c onvictions, a

nd we aff irm the convictions. We a lso a ffirm the sentenc e imposed by the trial court.

Te nn . R

. A pp . P

. 3 A pp e a l a s o f R ig ht ; J ud g m e nt s o f t he C ir c ui t C o ur t are Affir m e d.

D. K EL L Y T HOMAS , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON , P.J ., and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J ., joined.

J ames E. L anier , District Public Defe nder; Patrick R. McG ill, Assis tant District Public Defe nder, f or the appe llant, Edg ar White, J r. 1
Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney Gene ral a

nd R ep o rt er; J ennife r L . Ble dsoe, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; C. Phill ip Bivens, District Attorne y Gene ral; L ance E. Webb, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION

At tr ia l, S e rg e ant Joh n Ca

nn on of the Dy e r Count S he ri ff ’s De pa rtme nt t e sti fi e d th a t on

July 2 , 2 0 0 5 , h e noticed a

vehicle le aving the par

king lot of Pea

rl’s, a D y ersbur g bar. Sg t. Cannon observe d the driver

was not wea

ring his seatbe lt, so Sgt. Cannon stopped the ve hicle. Sg t. Cannon noted that the driver, whom he identifie d as the de fenda nt, had difficulty

producinghis driver’sT h er e i s n o i n di ca t i on on t h e r ec or d, h owe v er , t h at t h e of f i ce r ch emi ca l l y t es t ed t h e s u bs t an ce i n t h e f i el d or 2

se n t t h e su b sta n c e to a c rim e lab fo r a d d iti o n a l t e sting

. -2- license. Sg t. Cannon testified t hat t he defenda nt had a bottle betwee n the s eats of his vehicle. T he defe ndant initially

told Sg t. Ca

nnon that the bottle w as an antique, but upon f urther que stioning, the driver a dmitted the bottle contained homemade wine. Sg t. Cannon noted the s m el l of alc ohol

emanating from the vehicle, and he also testified that the defe ndant’s speec h was slurre d and his ey es
wer e bloodshot. Acc ording to Sgt. Cannon, the de fenda nt stated that he ha d co nsumed two bee rs d u ri n g t h e e v en i n g.
Sgt. Cannon testified that he aske d the def endant to per form fie ld sobriety tests. The de fe nd ant s a id t

hat he ha d kn e e pr ob le ms wh ic h wo uld a ff e c t his a bil ity to pe rf

or m so me te sts , s o Sgt. Cannon did not have the defe ndant conduct the “heel t o toe” walking test. Sgt. C annon first ha d the def endant pe rfor

m a test that involved counting on his finge rs from one to four, the n backw ards from four to one. Acc ording to Sgt. C annon, the defe ndant failed this test. Sgt. Cannon then ha d the def endant attempt the “fing er to nose” test, but the defe ndant co u l d n o t touch his nose, which constituted a fa ilure of the te st. Sgt. Cannon then had t h e d ef endant walk from the of

fice r to the defe ndant’s vehic le and ba ck ag ain. Sgt. Cannon te stified that the d ef en d ant s tumbled into the roadw ay on his first attempt but did better on the second attempt. Neve rtheless, Sg t. Cannon arr ested the def endant on suspicion of dr iving unde r the influenc e.

I ncident to the arr est, Sgt. Cannon sear ched the defe ndant’s vehicle. Sgt. Cannon noted the prese nce of a partially -smoked ciga rette. Sgt. C annon’s init ial impression was that the c iga rette w as
a hand-r olled tobacc o cig are tte, but a fter visua lly inspecting the cig are tte, he testified that ba sed on his e xpe ri e nc e a s a po lic e of fi c e r, he be lie ve d the c ig are tte ins te a d c on ta ine d mari juana. Sg t.

2 Cannon testified that the de fe n d ant became ve rbally abusive towa

rd him as he tra

nsported the defe ndant to the sherif

f’s off ice . At the sherif

f’s off ice, the de fenda

nt refuse d to submit to a br e a tha ly zer te st. Sg t. C ann on

the n tr ans po rt e d th e de fe nd ant t o th e c ounty ja il.

On cr oss-exam i n at i on, Sgt. Cannon a dmitted that he did not notice the def endant dr iving

err atically befor e he stoppe d the def endant. Sg t. Cannon stated that it may have taken the de fenda

nt twenty seconds to pull out his license, instead of the forty -five minutes he had claimed on d i rect examination. He also noted that some of the defe ndant’s actions could have resulted f rom his being

nervous o v e r

b e in g inv e s ti g a te d

f o r D U I

. Sg t. Ca

n n o ns tate d

th a t t h e d e f e n d an t a p pear ed “clubf ooted” a n d t h at the def

endant ha d told him t hat he ( the def endant) had re cently

underg one
o p e n h e art s u r g e r

y , w h ic h c o u ld h a v e a f

f e c te d h is b a la

n c e

. Sg t. Ca

n n o n a ls o a d mi tt e d th at the defe ndant stated that he had no idea h o w t he cig are tte ended up in his vehic le. Sgt. Cannon acknow ledg ed that while the defe ndant was verba lly abusive, the defe ndant never tried to initi ate a phy sical alter cation.

J err y Hinson, a cor

rec tional office r at the D y er Cou n t y J ail, testified that he spe nt approximately

an hour a

nd fiftee n minutes with the defenda nt the night he was arr es t ed

. Hinson stated that whe n the def

endant a rrived at the jail, he appe are d a little unsteady on his feet a

nd had-3-

sli g htl y slurr e d s pe e c h. Hi ns on no te d that the de fe nd ant w a s a g itate d w he n h e fi rs t arr ive d at th e ja il, bu t he ulti ma te ly c a lme d dow n. Hi ns on a lso sme lle d a

n o do r o f a lc oh ol c omi ngfr om t he de fe nd a nt, and in Hinson’s opinion, the defe ndant was intox icated that evening . On cr oss-examination, Hinson noted that the def

en d an t ’s anger

was what, in part, led Hinson to believe that the defe ndant was intox icated.

The defe ndant’s first witness, Geor g e McKe e, testified that he saw the de fenda nt at another Dy ersbur g establishment, the Old Hickory House, the nig ht of the def endant’ s arr est. McKe e testified that he only

saw the de fenda

nt drink coff

ee w hile McKe e was at the Old Hickory House, fr om a ro un d 8 :00 p. m. t o 9 :30 p. m., bu t th a t th e de fendan t w a s st ill a t th e ba r w he n M c Ke e le ft

. Br ian White, the defe ndant’s son, testified that he bonded the def endant out of ja il the night of the defe ndant’s ar

rest. B rian White testified that his father was upset wh en h e ar ri ved at the ja il. He also stated that the de fenda nt was re quired to take medications that made the def endant lig ht-hea ded. The defe ndant’s son testified that the defe ndant appea red nervous but wa s not intox icated, did not have slurr e d s pe e c h, and

did no t sm e ll o f a lc oh ol.

J err y Pritchett testified that he was at P ear l’s the ni g ht the def endant wa s arr ested a

nd saw the de fe nd ant t

he re . Pr itc he tt tes tif

ie d tha t he did no t see the de fe nd ant dr ink a lc oh ol d ur ingthe ir time there, but he only

saw the de fenda

nt periodica lly . Pritchett stated that he did not know the exact time the defe ndant ar

rived at the bar. Pritche tt testified that when the de fenda nt left Pearl’ s, the defe ndant told Pritche tt that he (the defe ndant) wa s g lad that he ha d not been dr inking be cause he had hea rd there wer e DUI

roadbloc ks that evening . The de fenda nt did not testify in his own defe nse.

SUF F I CI EN CY OF EV I DENC E
Standard of Review
An appe llate cour

t’s standard of

revie w when the defe ndant questions the suffic iency of the evidenc e on appe al is “whe ther, a fter vie wi n g t h e ev idence in the light most favor able to the prosec ution, anyrational trier of fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of the crime be y ond

a re asonable doubt.” J ackson v. V i rgi n ia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)

. T h e c o urt d o es n o tre we i gh the evidence; rather, it presumes that the j ury has re solved all conflicts in the testimony and dra wn all rea sonable inferenc es from the evidenc e in favor of the state. See State v. Sheff ield, 676 S.W .2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984) ; State v. Cabbag e, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978)

. Questions reg arding witness cre dibi l i t y , conflicts in t estimony , and the we ight a nd value to be g iven to evidenc e we re resolved by

the jury . See State v

. Bl and, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). A guilty verdic t

remove s the presumption of innoce nce a nd repla ces it with a pre sumption of guilt, and on appe al the de fe nd ant ha s the burd e n of illu str a tin g wh y the e vid e nc e is i ns uf

fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

the jur y ’s ve rd ic t. I d. ; State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).

DUI Convic tion

The de fenda

nt w as co n v i cted of driving unde r the influenc e in violation Tennesse e Code-4-

Anno ta te d Se c tio n 5 5- 10 -4 01 . T he statut e state s, in p e rt ine nt p art : (a) I t is unlawful fo r an y p erson to drive or to be in phy sical control of any
a u t o m o b i l e o r o t h e r

m o t o r dr i v e nv e h i c l e o nan y o f

t h e p u b l i c r o a d s an d

h i g h w ays of the state, or

on any streets or a lley s, or while on t he pre mises of any shopping

c e nte r, tr a ile r p ark

or any a pa rtme nt h ou se c omp le x, or any oth e r p re mis e s w hic h is g ener ally fre quented by

the public at lar g e, while:
(1 ) U n d er t h e i n fl u en ce o f a n y i n t o x i ca n t , m ar i j u an a, n ar co t i c d ru g,
or dr ugpr od uc ing sti mul a tin g e ff

e c ts on the c e ntr a l ne rv ou s sy ste m;

. . . . Tenn. Code Ann. § 55- 10-401(a )(1) (2004).

The de fenda

nt claims that the evidenc e produc ed at tria l i s i n s u ff i cient to convict the defe ndant of a

DUI char g e. The defe ndant contends that testimony of the de fense witnesses and the video tape f

rom the officer’ s in-dash camera “should convince this Court that there was insuffic ient evidenc e to convict the de fenda nt of DUI .” We disa g ree

. First, we note that the video tape is not in the record on appea l. Also, this court has held t hat i n DUI case s, a poli ce of fice r’s testimony , by itself, is sufficient evide nce to c onvict a def endant of driving under the influence

. State v. Vasser , 870 S.W .2d 543, 544 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) . I n this case, the a rre sting office r testified that the de fe nd ant s me lle d o f a lc oh ol, slurr e d h is s pe e c h, ha d b loo ds ho t e y e s, and fa ile d thre e fi e ld s ob ri e ty tests. The office r at the county jail te stified that the defe ndant was unsteady on his f eet, ha d slurred speec h, and smelled of a lcohol. The testim ony of t he two officer s was suff icient for a

rational trier of fa ct to find the def

endant guilty

bey ond a re asonable doubt of driving under the influence

. Possession of Marijuana Conviction

The de fenda

nt was also convicted of simple posse ssion of a controlled substance, a violation of sec tion 39-17-418 of the Te nnessee Code An notated. The evidenc e re lating to the de fenda nt’s marijuana possession consisted solely of the arr esting office r’s visual examination of the substance

a t th e ar r e s t s it e

. T h e o f

f ic e r te s ti f ie d th a t thr o u g h h is w o r

k e xp e r ie n c e , h e w a s familiar with the look and smell of marijuana . On appe al, the def endant a rg ues that the e vidence produce d at trial wa s insufficient to support a c onviction for simple possession of marijuana , as the a rre sting off

icer failed to describe any

specific experience or trainingthat enable d h i m to identify marijuana , and the substance f

ound in the defe ndant’s ca r wa s not tested in the field or in a lab. Howe ver, the defe ndant did not object to the office r’s testimony reg arding the m arijuana cig are tte at t rial. The jury hear d the office r identify

the substance as marijuana , and the jury obviously believed the office r. Ther efor e,
we c onclude that the e vidence is sufficient to convict t h e defenda nt of simple possession of marijuana

.
SEN TENC E
Standard of Review-5-

An appe llate cour

t’s revie w of sentenc ing is de novo on the re cord w ith a presumption that the trial cour

t’s deter minations are c orre ct. Tenn. Code A nn

. § 4 0 -3 5 -401(d) (2003). As the SentencingCommi ssion Com ments to this s ection note, on a ppeal the bu rd en i s on the defe ndant to show that the sente n ce is im proper . This means that if the tria l court followed the statutory sentenc ing pr ocedur e, made finding s of fa ct t h at are adequately supported in the re cord, a nd g ave due conside ration and pr oper w eig ht to the fac tors and princ ipl es that are rele vant to sentenc ing under the 1989 SentencingAct, the c ourt may not disturb the sentence even if a diffe rent re sult were pref err ed. State v. F letcher , 805 S.W .2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)

.
In c o n d u c t i n g i t s d e n o v o r e v i e w , t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u rt m u s t c o n s i d e r ( 1 ) t h e e v i d e n c e , i f a n y,
rec eived at the trial and sen t en ci n g h ea ring , (2) the pr esente nce r eport, (3) the principles of sent e n c in g a n d ar g u me n ts a s to s e n te n c in g a lt e r n a ti v e s , ( 4 ) th e n a tu

r e an d c h ar a c te r is ti c s of the criminal conduc t , (5 ) any mitigating or statutory

enhanc ement fa ctors, (6) any statement that the defe ndant made on his own behalf, a nd (7) the pote ntial for re habilitation or treatment. Te nn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102 , -103, -210 (2003) ; see State v. Ashby

, 82 3 S. W.2 d 1 66 , 1 68 (T e nn . 1 99 1) ; State

v. Mo ss , 727 S.W .2d 229, 236-37 (Te nn. 1986).

A def endant c onvicted of a

misdemeanor is not entitled to the pres u m p t ion of a minimum

se nte nc e . St a te v. Cr e a sy

, 885 S.W .2d 829, 832 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). More over, misdemea nor sentenc es do not contain ra ng es of punishments, and a misdemeanor def

en d an t may

be sente nced to the maxi mum term provided for the offe nse as longas the sentence imposed is consistent with the purposes of the sentenc ing a ct. State v. Palmer

, 902 S.W .2d 391, 393 (Tenn. 1995) . Tenne ssee’ s statutor y sy ste m c on c e rn ingmis de me ano r s e nte nc ingis d e sig ne d to pr ov ide tr ia l c ourt s w ith continuing jur isdiction and a g reat deal of flexibi lity . See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 302(d), S e n t e n c i n g C o m m i s s i o n C o m m e n t s ; S t a t e v

. B o yd

, 925 S.W .2d 237, 244 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)

. Reg ardingDUI

offe nses, Tenne ssee Code A nnota te d s e c ti o n 5 5

- 1 0

- 4 0 3 ( a)( 1) sets mandatory minimum periods for

confine ment dependingon whether the offe nse is a first or subseque nt offense , and subsec tion (m) provides, “N othing in . . . the Sentenc ing Re form Act of 1989[ ] shall be

c on str ue d a s alt e ri ng , ame nd ing or de c re a sin g the pe na lti e s e sta bli sh e d in thi s se c tio n f

or the of fe ns e of driving under the influence of an intoxi cant.” I n addre ssing w h et h er DU I o ffe nders must be sentenc ed in ac corda

nce w ith the sentencingact, our supreme c ourt noted:
[T] he leg islature has spe cifica lly excluded DUI offe nders from the provisions of the Ac t w he n th e a

pp lic a tio n o f t

he Ac t wou ld se rv e to ei the r al te r, a me nd , o r d e c re a se the s pecif ic pena lties provided for D UI offe nders. A tr ial judge may desig nate a service perc entag e in a DU Icase under Te nnessee Code Annotated Sec t ion 40-35-302( d) but that perc entag e may not operate to reduc e the mandatory minimum sentenc ing pr ovisions of the DUI statute.

Palmer

, 902 S.W .2d at 394. A DUIoffe nder c an be se ntence d to serve the maxi mum punishm ent for the of fense s o long a s the impositi on of that sentenc e is in acc ordanc e with the princ iples and-6-

purposes of the Criminal Sentencing Reform Ac t of 1989. I d.

The de fenda

nt cont en d s t h at the trial cour t erre d by failing to adher e to the misdemea nor
se nte nc ingg uid e lin e s, wh ic h p ro vid e in p e rt ine nt p art :

I n imposing a misdemea

nor sentenc e, the c ourt shall fix a per centa g e of the sentenc e wh i ch t h e d ef

en d an ts h al l s er v e [ i n co n fi n em en t ]

. . . . I nd et er m i n i n g t h e p er ce n t age of the sente nce to be s er v ed i n actua l confineme nt, the court shall conside r the purposes of t h i s chapte r, the princ iples of sentenc ing, a nd the enha

nceme nt and mitigating fac tors set forth in this chapter and shall not impose such per centa g es
ar b i t r ar i l y.

Te nn . Co de Ann. § 4 0- 35 -3 02 (d ) ( 20 03 ). Spe c if ic a lly , th e de fe nd ant c la ims the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in applying the enhanc ement fa ctor re g ardin g t he def endant’ s prior DUI

conviction, in finding no mit ig a tin g fa c tor s, and

se nte nc ing the de fe nd ant t o th ir ty da y s in ja il. We w ill a dd

re ss e a c h o f t

he se claims in turn.

En ha nc e me nt F ac tor s

We conclude that the trial court a cted pr operly in u s i n g t h e d efe ndant’s pre vious DUI

c on vic tio n a s an e nh anc e me nt fact or des pit e the fa c t th a t th e de fe nd ant w a s c on vic te d f or a fi rs toffe nse DUI . This court has rec ently held t hat t he trial court properly applied a de fenda

nt’s previous DUI conviction as a

n enhanc ement fac tor to the defe ndant’s subseque nt DUI conviction, despite the fa c t th at th e su

bs e qu e nt c on vic tio n w a s a fi rs t off e ns e DU Ic on vic tio n. State v. JohnSte rl ingL e wi s, No. M2004-02450-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 1816317, at *4-*5 (Tenn. Crim. App. J une 28, 2006), app. denie d, (Tenn. N ov. 20, 2006). I n light of the L ewis ruling , we f ind no error

in the trial court’ s use of the de fenda

nt’s previous DUI

as an e nhance ment fac tor in this case.

Mi tga tin g F

ac tor s

We also conclude that the trial cour t did not err in its finding that no mitiga ting f actor s
a pp lie d to the de fe nd ant. Th e de fe nd ant ar g ue s tha t mitig a tin g fa c tor (6 ), “ Th e de fe nd ant, be c a us e of y outh or old ag e, lac ked substantial judg ment in committi ng the offe nse,” should apply . Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 113(6) ( 2006). Howe ver, the defe ndant makes this claim without elabor ation. The de fenda

nt states that he wa s, at the time of sente ncing , six ty -five y ear s old, but the defenda nt fai ls to s h o w h o w h is a d v an c e d a g e c a u s e d h im to la c k s u

b s ta n ti a l ju d g me n t in c o mm itti n g the offe nse. Absent a

ny theory why the m itigatingfac tor should apply , this court cannot be persua ded that the trial cour

t committed error

in refusingto apply

the fa ctor. See S tate v. Care y Stanford Richmond, No. E2003-01316-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL1102408, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Ma y 18, 2004). The de fend an t al s o argues that the de fenda nt’s milit ary

service falls under

the “a ny other fac tor consistent with the purposes of t his chapte r” ex ception of se ction 40-35-113, subsec tion 13. Ho we ve r, wh ile the tr ia l c ourt may c on sid e r mil ita ry se rv ic e a s a mit ig a tin g fa c tor , th is c ourt ha s h e ld that a trial c ourt’s re fusal to m itigate a defenda nt’s sentenc e based on past military service was not-7-

err or. See St ate v. Chad Michae l Knig ht, No. M2005-00779-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL1491573, at *3-*4 (Tenn. Crim. App. M ay 31, 2006); State v. Calvin L ouis Hill, No. M2004-00597-CCA-R3- CD, 2005 WL 554710, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2005), app. de nied, (Te nn. J une 27, 2005). Thus, the trial cour

t was within its dis cre tion in refusing to consider the de fenda nt’s milit ary

service as a mitig ating fac tor.
Defendant’ s Confinement

F ina lly , w e ho ld t

hat th e tr ia l c ourt

did no t e rr in s e nte nc ing the de fe nd ant to thir ty da y s in the county

jail. I n addition to its finding of an enhanc ement factor and no mitigating fac tors, the trial court based its sente nce on application of the “princ iples of sentenc ing” to the evidenc e pre sented in the case

. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-302( d). Such principles include w hether “[c]onfinement is nece ssary

to avoid depre ciating the seriousne ss of the offe nse or c onfinement is par ticularly suited to provide an e ffe ctive dete rre nce to other s l ikely to commit si milar offe nses,” a nd whether

the defe ndan t h as t he potential to be r ehabilitated. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 103 (1)( B) , (5) ( 2006).

I n this case , in addition to the enhance ment fac tor of the de fenda nt’s previous DUI , the trial judge took note of the de fenda nt’s verba l abuse towa

rd the a rre sting off

icer and the state ments made by the def endant at the sentenc ing he aring . At the hea ring , the def

endant told the trial judg e such things a s “I ’ve been in this county rig ht here ever

since I was sixt een months old and I ’ve ne ver ha d my ri g hts vio la te d b e fo re un ti l th is t ime ,” “ Iwa nt t he De pu ty

She ri ff s th a t [we re ] inv olv e d in

my
arr es t th a t n ig h t to b e c h ar g e d w it h a s s a u lt , ” “ I w a s mo c k e d an d ma d e f u n o f

. . . b y the District Attorney ,” and

Ifee l like that my rig hts [wer e] violate d by allowing the Deputy Sheriffs that a

rre sted me to oper ate a

nd control the video e quipment and to also have acc ess to the drug room over the re at the Sheriff’ s Offic e by bring ing a

big old mar ijuana joint up here in c ourt that di d n ot b e lon g to m e and Ic an p ro ve it.

Th e se state me nts did

no t im pr e ss t he tr ia l ju dg e , w ho tol d th e de fe nd ant:
[The] statements y ou made that day at trial and what y ou’re saying he re toda y makes it very clea r that y ou’re acc epting no responsibility at all for . . . w hat y ou have done and for being convicted. It’s as if . . . every body else is wrongand y ou’re rig ht . . . y ou ’r e a c c e pti ngno re sp on sib ili ty fo r your a c tio ns a t a ll.

The de fenda

nt’s verba l abuse of the arr esting office r and the defendant’s neg ative views toward the

cr i m i n al j u s t i ce s y s t em m ad e it u n l i k el y t h at t h e d ef

en d an two u l d

h av e b ee nre h ab i l i t at edt h ro u gh

a le sse r s e nte nc e , a

nd c on fi nin g the de fe nd ant w a s n e c e ssa ry to a vo id d e pr e c ia tin g the se ri ou sn e ss of the d ef

endant’ s offe nse. Such conc lusions were r eac hed by this court in ear lier ca ses. See g ener ally J ohn Sterling L ewis, 2006 WL1816317, at *5 (trial court’s sentenc e for first-off ense D UI of eleve n months, twe nty -nine day s, suspended to six months, was appropr iate g iven enha nceme nt fac tor of pre vious DUIconviction and lac k of potential for reha bilitation); S tate v. Carl Ma rtin, No.-8-

W20 02 -0 00 66 -C CA -R 3- CD , 2 00 3 WL 57 31 1, a t *9 (T e nn . Crim . App . J an. 2, 20 03 ) ( fi rs t- of fe ns e DUI sentenc e of eleve n months, twe nty -nine day s, suspended to thirty day s, appropr iate g iven the defe ndant’s “c rude a

nd obnox ious” treatment of arr esting office r, which showe d that the def endant ha d “ a bs olute ly no re sp e c t f

or the l aw” and wa s u

nli ke ly to b e re ha

bil itate d) . T he se ho ldi ng s, coupled with the latitude our sentencing g uidelines g rant to trial judge s in the rea lm of misdemeanor sentenc ing, ma

ke it evident to this court that the trial c ourt did not abuse it s discretion in sentenc ing the def endant to thirty

day s in jail.

CONCL USI ON

The e vidence produce d at trial wa s sufficient f or the jury

to find bey ond a reasonable doubt that the de fe nd ant wa s d

ri vin g un de r t

he inf lue nc e and

po sse sse d ma

ri jua na a t th e tim e of

his a rr e st. Al so , th e tr ia l c ourt

di d no t abu se its dis c re tio n in se nte nc ingthe de fe nd ant t o e le ve n mo nth s, twenty -nine da

y s in jail, suspended to thirty day s, for each DUI conviction. Thus, t he judg ments are aff irmed.

___________________________________ D. KEL L Y THOMAS, JR ., J UDGE