Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not 

be regarded as precedent or cited 

before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of 

res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the 

law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

VALERIE K. BOOTS GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana 

Indianapolis, Indiana

JODI KATHRYN STEIN

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

ERIC LISCOMB, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A02-1108-CR-715

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Carol J. Orbison, Judge

Cause No. 49G22-1007-MR-56779

June 6, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

ROBB, Chief Judge
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Case Summary and Issues

Following a jury trial, Eric Liscomb appeals his convictions of murder, a felony, 

robbery, a Class B felony, carrying a handgun without a license, a Class A misdemeanor, 

and conspiracy to commit robbery, a Class C felony, and sixty-five-year aggregate 

sentence thereon. He raises two issues for our review, which we restate as: whether the 

trial court erred in allowing the State to enter into evidence a statement Liscomb made to 

police, and whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and 

character. Concluding that the trial court committed harmless error, if at all, and that his 

sentence is not inappropriate, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

Liscomb, Norman Barker, Jessica Brackett, and Jessica Owens together decided to 

rob Robert Spaulding because they believed he had large amounts of cash and marijuana 

in his home. Barker volunteered use of his .40 caliber semi-automatic and .38 caliber 

revolver. On July 20, 2010, Brackett drove the four to a store to purchase ammunition, 

and later that night drove the four to Spaulding’s neighborhood. Spaulding was home 

with his fiancée, their two-year-old daughter, and a group of friends and family. 

Spaulding’s friends and family left around 10 p.m., and at around midnight, Spaulding’s 

fiancée left the home to check in on a family member’s pet, leaving Spaulding alone 

sleeping on the couch and their daughter in a nearby bedroom.

Soon thereafter, Brackett and Owens stayed in the parked car while Liscomb and 

Barker, armed with Barker’s two guns, walked to Spaulding’s home and into his open 

front door.
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Several of Spaulding’s neighbors happened to be on their front porches at this 

time, at least one of whom was doing so as part of a neighborhood watch group. 

Neighbors observed Barker and Liscomb walk up to and into Spaulding’s home, and at 

least one neighbor could see right into Spaulding’s living room, where the ensuing 

struggle took place. Once inside Spaulding’s home, Barker and Spaulding struggled with 

each other hand-to-hand, and Liscomb fired multiple shots. Barker and Liscomb soon 

ran from Spaulding’s home and back to the car where Brackett and Owens were waiting.

Neighbors rushed to Spaulding’s home, found him laying face down with a 

gunshot wound to his back, and called 911 at 12:16 a.m. Spaulding was dead within ten 

minutes.

Barker had a gunshot wound to his left arm and was bleeding heavily. Brackett 

began driving to a hospital, but pulled over at a gas station because it appeared Barker 

would lose consciousness. The four decided on a fake story to tell authorities: Owens 

and Barker were walking along the street, someone in a car driving past them shot 

Barker, and the two then called Brackett and Liscomb to come to their aid. After this 

story was decided upon and while Brackett was still driving, Brackett shouted, “[t]hrow 

the gun out the window.” Id. at 417. Liscomb screamed, “[g]o straight, go straight, you 

can’t be this close to a robbery.” Id. at 416-17. Meanwhile, Owens called 911 on 

Brackett’s cellular phone, also at 12:16 a.m., relayed the fake story, and officers met 

them at the gas station.1

 

1 During the investigation which ensued, officers listened to a recording of Owens’s 911 call and in the 

background heard Brackett’s statement about throwing the gun out the window and Liscomb’s statement that they 

should be farther from the scene of the robbery.
4

Barker was transported to a hospital for treatment and hours later was taken to the 

police station for questioning because officers suspected he was involved in the incident 

at Spaulding’s home. Brackett, Owens, and Liscomb agreed to be questioned at the 

police station as well and were transported from the gas station directly there, but at this 

point the three were considered witnesses to what happened to Barker and not suspects 

regarding the incident at Spaulding’s. 

Liscomb was placed in an interview room shortly after 1:00 a.m. and the door was 

locked, but he was not handcuffed, he was permitted to use the restroom as he requested, 

he was provided with water, and at some point he was permitted to receive food which 

Brackett brought to him. At 7:24 a.m., Detective Brian Schemenaur and Detective 

Jeffrey Wager entered Liscomb’s interview room and began to speak with him. They 

recorded this conversation with a hand-held audio recorder but did not video-record this 

statement. Liscomb told officers the fake story upon which the group agreed. Detectives 

Schemenaur and Wager then left Liscomb in the same room while they spoke with 

Barker.

After speaking with Barker, Detectives Schemenaur and Wager considered 

Liscomb a suspect in Spaulding’s killing as well. At 11:51 a.m., they returned to 

Liscomb’s interview room after turning on a video and audio recording device for that 

room, and again brought a hand-held audio recording device. Detective Brian 

Schemenaur began advising Liscomb of his rights, and Liscomb asked that they shut off 

the hand-held recording device, which they did. They did not terminate the room’s video 

and audio recording or tell him that he was still being recorded.
5

Liscomb proceeded to speak with them and provide a story substantially different 

from his first statement. He admitted he agreed with Barker to commit a robbery, Ex. at 

156, 171, 183-84, 194, that he went with Barker to and into Spaulding’s home, and that 

he fired his gun at the pair who were wrestling in front of him, id. at 162, 164, 167, 190. 

He also stated that he used a .38 caliber revolver, id. at 169-70, and that he does not know 

what happened to Barker’s gun, id. at 191.

Owens later told her uncle about what happened and that Liscomb threw a gun 

behind the gas station. Owens witnessed her uncle retrieve the gun and turn it over to 

police. A forensic scientist later testified that the bullet found in Spaulding’s back, which 

was deemed to be the cause of death, was fired by the .38 caliber revolver which Owens’s 

uncle retrieved. Tr. at 342. The .40 caliber semiautomatic which Barker used was found 

on the floor of Spaulding’s home, with one bullet jamming the gun and an otherwise full 

cartridge of ammunition.

The State charged Liscomb with murder, a felony, felony murder, robbery, a Class 

A felony, carrying a handgun without a license, a Class A misdemeanor, and conspiracy 

to commit robbery, a Class A felony. At a jury trial, Detective Schemenaur briefly 

reiterated the fake story Liscomb told him and Detective Wager during the first 

statement. The State also presented the jury with the video and audio recording of 

Liscomb’s second statement. 

The jury found Liscomb guilty as charged and, following a sentencing hearing, the 

trial court merged the felony murder count into the murder count and reclassified the 

robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery counts downward to avoid violation of double 

jeopardy principles. The trial court entered a judgment of conviction regarding murder as 
6

a felony, robbery as a Class B felony, carrying a handgun without a license as a Class A 

misdemeanor, and conspiracy to commit robbery as a Class C felony. The trial court then 

sentenced Liscomb to sixty-five years for murder, concurrent with twenty years for 

robbery, concurrent with 365 days for carrying a handgun without a license, concurrent 

with eight years for conspiracy to commit robbery. Liscomb now appeals. Additional 

facts will be supplied as appropriate.

Discussion and Decision

I. Liscomb’s First Statement to Police

A. Standard of Review

Before delving into discussion of the issues, we pause to clarify Liscomb’s 

appellate challenge regarding his statement to police which he alleges was erroneously 

introduced into evidence. He made two statements to police within twenty-four hours 

after Spaulding was killed. The first was from around 7:30 a.m. to around 8:00 a.m., and 

the second was from around 11:50 a.m. to around 12:30 p.m. On appeal he contends the 

trial court erred in allowing Detective Schemenaur to testify regarding what Liscomb said 

during his first statement.

A “trial court has inherent discretionary power on the admission of evidence, and 

its decisions are reviewed only for abuse of that discretion.” Vasquez v. State, 868 

N.E.2d 473, 476 (Ind. 2007) (quoting Jones v. State, 780 N.E.2d 373, 376 (Ind. 2002)). 

An abuse of discretion occurs “where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect 

of the facts and circumstances.” Bradford v. State, 960 N.E.2d 871, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2012) (quoting Smith v. State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind. 2001)). We do not reweigh the 

evidence, we consider conflicting evidence in a manner most favorable to the trial court’s 
7

ruling, and we consider uncontested evidence in a manner favorable to the defendant. 

Hirshey v. State, 852 N.E.2d 1008, 1012 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (quotations and citation 

omitted), trans. denied. 

Liscomb gratuitously offers on appeal that he must meet the fundamental error 

standard of review because he failed to object at trial to what he now contends is an error. 

But Liscomb did object to the admission of the evidence he now challenges. Tr. at 417-

18. Therefore, we review the trial court’s admission of such evidence for an abuse of 

discretion.

B. Harmless Error

Even when reviewing the admission of this evidence for an abuse of discretion, we 

will not reverse Liscomb’s conviction if an error did not affect his substantial rights. See

Combs v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1252, 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. If the 

erroneously admitted evidence is merely cumulative of other evidence in the record, it is 

harmless error and not grounds for reversal. Bryant v. State, 802 N.E.2d 486, 494 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. If a conviction is supported by substantial independent 

evidence of guilt which satisfies the reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood 

the challenged evidence contributed to the conviction, the error is harmless. Morales v. 

State, 749 N.E.2d 1260, 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). “Harmlessness is ultimately a 

question of likely impact of the evidence on the jury.” Combs, 895 N.E.2d at 1258 

(quotation omitted).

Liscomb essentially argues that his first statement – in which he told the fake story 

– should not have been allowed into evidence because officers obtained this statement 

improperly by not advising him of his Miranda rights before that statement or obtaining a 
8

valid waiver of rights. The State responds that he was not a suspect at the time of his first 

statement, so a Miranda advisement was unnecessary at that time.

For the sake of argument, we might accept Liscomb’s argument and conclude that 

his first statement was obtained improperly and what he said therein should not have been 

allowed into evidence. Even if we were to do so, our review of the trial court record 

leads us to conclude that any error in allowing this statement into evidence was harmless 

error because there is no substantial likelihood Detective Schemenaur’s brief restatement 

of Liscomb’s first statement impacted the evidence which the jury weighed or otherwise 

contributed to his convictions.

In Liscomb’s second statement, which he does not now challenge, he admitted to 

committing several acts which support his convictions, and therefore the State’s apparent 

attempt to impeach his credibility by referring to his prior inconsistent statement would 

not have mattered to the jury. Specifically, he stated that he was at Spaulding’s home 

with Barker, he was armed with the .38 caliber revolver, and he fired his gun at the two 

who were wrestling in front of him. A forensic scientist later testified that the bullet 

which killed Spaulding was fired by the .38 caliber revolver which Liscomb referred to in 

this admission, his second statement.

This constitutes substantial independent evidence of guilt and makes clear there 

was no credibility issue as to his level of involvement which would lead the jury to 

impart any significance to the apparent inconsistency of Liscomb’s first and second 

statements. In sum, we are convinced there is no substantial likelihood Detective 

Schemenaur’s brief restatement of Liscomb’s first statement impacted the evidence 
9

which the jury weighed or otherwise contributed to his convictions, and his convictions 

are therefore affirmed.

II. Inappropriate Sentence

Liscomb next argues his aggregate sentence of sixty-five years is inappropriate. 

This court has authority to revise a sentence “if, after due consideration of the trial court’s 

decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). We may “revise 

sentences when certain broad conditions are satisfied,” Neale v. State, 826 N.E.2d 635, 

639 (Ind. 2005), and we recognize the advisory sentence “is the starting point the 

legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Weiss v. 

State, 848 N.E.2d 1070, 1072 (Ind. 2006). When examining the nature of the offense and 

the character of the offender, we may look to any factors appearing in the record. Spitler 

v. State, 908 N.E.2d 694, 696 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. The burden is on the 

defendant to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 

N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). 

In discussing whether Liscomb’s sentence is inappropriate, it is helpful to restate 

the specific details of his current sentence. He was sentenced to sixty-five years for 

murder, a felony; a crime for which the sentencing range is forty-five to sixty-five years 

and the advisory sentence is fifty-five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3(a). He was 

sentenced to twenty years for robbery as a Class B felony, for which the sentencing range 

is six to twenty years and the advisory sentence is ten years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5. He 

was sentenced to eight years for conspiracy to commit robbery as a Class C felony, for 

which the sentencing range is two to eight years and the advisory sentence is four years. 
10

Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6. And finally, he was sentenced to 365 days for carrying a handgun 

without a license as a Class A misdemeanor, for which the maximum imprisonment is not 

more than one year. Ind. Code § 35-50-3-2. The trial court ordered that Liscomb serve 

the sixty-five-year, twenty-year, eight-year, and 365-day sentences concurrently, for a 

total of sixty-five years.

For the most part, the nature of these offenses is not significantly different from 

other robbery-murders which are committed with an unlawful handgun and as part of a 

conspiracy. But, there is some evidence that Liscomb was aware that Spaulding’s twoyear-old child was home during the incident, as Liscomb stated that Spaulding “kind of 

flipped out [when Barker went towards the farthest room in the house]. It might have 

been his child or something like that. . . .” Ex. at 189 (ellipses in original, all capitals 

omitted). It is therefore evident that Liscomb was aware that he was placing a child in 

grave danger by firing a gun in her presence, even though it is not completely clear 

whether Liscomb fired at Spaulding while in the same bedroom or while in another room 

of the home. There is also some evidence that Liscomb was under the influence of 

marijuana and/or prescription medications at the time of these offenses.

Liscomb’s character warrants a more lengthy discussion because of his history of 

criminal involvement. In 2005, at the age of fourteen, officers arrested him for 

possession of marijuana or hash, a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult. The 

juvenile court entered a true finding, and he violated the terms of his home detention and 

probation at least twice. Later in 2005 and in 2006, Liscomb was arrested as a runaway 

twice, and for fleeing law enforcement, consumption of alcohol, attempted theft, and 

criminal mischief. Of these, true findings were entered as to fleeing law enforcement and 
11

criminal mischief, and he failed to abide by the terms of his home detention and 

probation on at least four more occasions, not including his failure to pay various fees. In 

2007, Liscomb admitted to stealing a car and using a stolen handgun to rob a pharmacy 

of prescription drugs. Liscomb also robbed a different pharmacy in a similar manner 

about two weeks earlier, as part of “a rash of robberies during a month period.” PreSentence Investigation Report (“PSI”) at 6. For this conduct the trial court entered a true 

finding as to robbery and attempted robbery, which would have been Class B felonies if 

committed by an adult. In 2008, Liscomb was arrested for battery and possession of 

alcohol by a minor.

As an adult, Liscomb was arrested in June 2009 for possession of a controlled 

substance as a Class D felony and possession of marijuana or hash as a Class A 

misdemeanor, and was convicted of possession of a controlled substance as a Class A 

misdemeanor. He was ordered to serve a 365-day sentence on home detention, and upon 

violating the terms of his home detention, he served a period in the Indiana Department 

of Correction. Just five months after Liscomb was released from prison, he committed 

the current offenses.

The PSI also reveals that at the time of these offenses Liscomb provided for 

himself by “hustling,” and that his interests and leisure activities include “smoking 

weed.” Id. at 12. He first consumed alcohol at the age of thirteen, and began regularly 

using marijuana at that time as well. At the time of the offense he was consuming about 

four to five grams of marijuana per day. He began abusing prescription medications at 

the age of fourteen and began regularly consuming large amounts of those medications. 
12

This includes 300 milligrams of morphine daily. He has also used methamphetamine and 

cocaine several times, although he claims inconsistent use thereof.

Even aside from the sheer length of Liscomb’s history of criminal conduct, this 

summary is also troubling because of the recurring themes of drug abuse and unlawful 

use of a handgun. Liscomb has been offered the favor of probation several times and has 

violated the terms of his probation several times as well. The PSI suggests he has grown 

accustomed to a criminal lifestyle of drug abuse, obtaining money unlawfully, and 

flouting any legal limitations on his behavior. For these reasons, an enhanced sentence 

for the offense of murder is not inappropriate. Further, the fact that the trial court ordered 

that he serve all of the sentences concurrently, rather than consecutively, provides 

additional support for our conclusion that a total of sixty-five years in prison is not 

inappropriate in light of his character.

We note that the abstract of judgment states that the trial court entered a judgment 

of conviction and sentenced Liscomb for the offenses of murder as a felony, robbery as a 

Class A felony, carrying a handgun without a license as a Class A misdemeanor, and 

conspiracy to commit robbery as a Class A felony. Appellant’s Appendix at 22. This is 

incorrect. As indicated in the transcript, the trial court entered a judgment of conviction 

for murder as a felony, robbery as a Class B felony, carrying a handgun as a Class A 

misdemeanor, and conspiracy to commit robbery as a Class C felony. Tr. at 581-82. The 

abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect Liscomb’s convictions. These 

corrections, however, will not affect his sentence.
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Conclusion

For the trial court to allow the State’s witness to testify regarding Liscomb’s first 

statement to police was harmless error, if error at all. Further, Liscomb’s sentence is not 

inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and character. Therefore, we affirm his 

convictions and sentence. We also remand and order the trial court to correct the 

incorrect classifications of Liscomb’s offenses on the abstract of judgment.

Affirmed and remanded.

BAILEY, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.