### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 12

– 0098
Filed November 16 , 2012

MICHELLE POSTELL , Appellant ,

vs.
AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. , Appellee.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, John D.
Telleen , Judge.

An insured appeals an adverse judgment denying her coverage as
an innocent coinsured spouse under her homeowner’s policy.
AFFIRMED
.

Joseph C. Creen of Bush, Motto, Creen, Koury & Halligan, P.L.C., Davenport, for appellant

.

Ted J. Wallace, Davenport , for appellee.2
WIGGINS, Justice. This case involves the denial of coverage under a fire insurance policy. The policy included an intentional loss exclusion, voiding
coverage when any insured intentionally causes a loss or damage. The district court denied coverage. In this appeal , we find substantial evidence supports the district court’s finding that the coinsured who set
fire to the insured dwellin g in order to commit sui cide had the requisite
intent to “ cause a loss ” under the policy. We further find that under the language of the policy, the innocent coinsured spouse, who did not participate in the intentional acts of the other coinsured, can not recover due to the inten tional loss exclusion. Finally, we hold that the innocent
coinsured can not recover under the recently amended Iowa standard fire policy in Iowa Code section 515.109 (2009 )

. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
A. The Fire. Michelle and David Postell were married for thirty

one years. Since 1989, they r esided at a home in Dixon. The couple owned the house as joint tenants. Throughout their marriage, David and Michelle struggled with
marita l problems. Michelle had left David numerous times because he was verbally, physically, and emotionally abusive, but the couple always
reconciled. S he permanently separated from him in January 2009 and was in the process of seeking a divorce. During tha t time, Michelle still considered the house to be her residence and planned to return there
after David moved out

. Accordingly, Michelle informed David that she was filing for
divorce. He responded “ the marriage wasn’t going to be over until he3

said it was over.” Michelle testified that he then “offered to shoot me and
kill himself.” Thereafter, David became depressed and suicidal. On Super Bowl Sunday in 2009, approximately one week before the fire, he attempted suicide with a gun. David called the police and told them “they needed to come and clean up the mess.” A sheriff’s deputy arrived in time to stop the attempt. The family subsequently removed all firearms from the
house.
On Saturday , February 14, David left a voicemail for Michelle,
telli ng her “this is a Valentine’s Day you will remember for the rest of your life .” He detailed how he had poured gasoline throughout the house, turned on the stove, and lit candles. He said that if Michelle did not want him, “he would take care of the probl em and he was going to blow himself up.” Later that day, the couple’s son, Jared, called his father who was asleep at the house. Jared testified that David sounded very jovial and indicated surprise at talking to his son. David told Jared that he had
g otten five

- gallon gas oline cans, spread gasoline throughout the house, lit candles, turned on the stove, and laid down, not planning to wake up.
David asked his son to call Michelle to tell her about “all of this” so she would feel pain. While on the phone with his father, Jared heard his brother’s fiancée, Amanda, arrive at the house. Jared overheard David tell her, “[G]et out of here because .

. . the house is going to blow.” Amanda reported to police that she smelled a strong odor of gasoline when she entered the house. When she went further inside, she

saw numerous large gas oline cans tipped over and observed the carpet was so soaked with gasoline that it was “as if someone had dumped water all over it.” In addition, she said the smell of gas oline was so4 strong her eyes were tearing up and her t hroat felt like it w as closing. She then saw David with a lighter clenched in his right hand and heard him yell that she should get out of the house because he was going to
“blow it!” Another son, Justin, then arrived at the scene. He spoke with his father on the phone. David told him that if he or anyone else came near
the h ouse he would light it on fire. David’s friend, Michael Rowe, arrived at the house after Justin
called. Michael said David was planning to blow up the house with him
inside. He kicked down the doo r to the residence and entered. He also indicated the odor of gasoline was so strong his eyes watered. Michael reported to police that he saw smoke coming from the living room where
he also observed a five

- gallon, red plastic gas oline can on the floor.
David continuously told him to g et out. Specifically, David told him to “get the f

___ out,” and “it’s fixing to go.” David subsequently set fire to the residence. Justin was still talking to his father on the phone at the time he reportedly lit the curtains on fire. David sustained burns on sixty to seventy percent of his body. Nonetheless, medical records indicate David was alert and
walked in to the emergency room. Both en route to and initially at the
emergency room, David ref used treatment . He gave medical personnel a full rendition of his story and his concerns about wanting to die. Medical records show that David said he had “[lit] his house on fire in an attempt to kill himself with what he reports was going to be much
b etter for all of them.” Elsewhere, the medical staff recorded how David attempted suicide by pouring gasoline on himself and his home and lit
himself on fire.5 Medical treatment only commenced after personnel informed David that he was mentally ill and t hey would restrain him if he did not cooperate. David died due to his injuries three days after the fire. The same day as the fire, an agent from the Iowa State Fire
Marshal ’s office conducted an investigation at the house. He smelled gasoline througho ut the residence. He determined that two separate
fires were set

— one in the bedroom and one in the living room . In the bedroom, he observed ignitable liquid pour patterns. In the living room, he found a red plastic receptacle which, when tested at the l aboratory, contained the presence of gasoline. The agent also noticed the stovetop and oven were on. He concluded that David had poured gasoline throughout the house and the cause of the fire was arson. It is uncontested Michelle had no role in setting or contributing to
the fire.
B. American Family Policy. Michelle and David purchased a residential fire insurance policy from American Family Mutual Insurance Company at the time they moved into the residence. Michelle paid all the premiums. The par ties stipulated the policy was effective on the day of the fire. It is undisputed t hat David and Michelle Postell are the “named insureds” of the policy.
Section I of t he American Family policy provides replacement coverage for fire damage caused to the insured dwelling and personal property contained therein, as well as loss o f use. However, it only

covers damage from “accidental direct physical loss,” subject to exclusions. The exclusions section, wh ich applies to coverage of the dwelling, personal property, and loss of use, indicates:6 We 1 [American Family] do not insure for loss caused directly or indirectly by any of the following. Such loss is excluded regardless of any other cause or event contri buting concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.

. . . . 2. Intentional Loss , meaning any loss or damage arising out of any act committed:

a. by or at the direction of any insured ; and
b. with the intent to cause a loss. ( E mphasis added.) Michelle testified she was aware the policy included an intentional
loss exclusion. However, she thought each person under the policy was a separate insured. The policy includes two other provisions, pertaining to actions by the insured parties, which result in denial of coverage:

Part A

. . . . 2. Neglect of any insured to use all reasonable means to protect covered property at and after the time of loss.

. . . . Part B

. . . . 1. Fraud. We will not provide coverage for all or any part of a loss if, bef ore or after the loss, any insured has committed fraud. Fraud means any concealment, misrepresentation or attempt to defraud by any insured either in causing any loss or in presenting any claim under this policy. ( E mphasis added.)

1 The policy indicates: “ The following words in this policy have defined meanings. They will be printed in bold type
. ” This bolding has been preserved throughout the opinion.7

Section II of the policy contains the conditions to coverage. Those conditions only apply to “Section II of this policy.” The severability
claus e i n section II states: “This insurance applies separately to each
insured. This condition will not increase our limit for any one
occurrence.” After the fire, on A ugust 11, Michelle submitted a proof of l oss claim to American Family for recovery under the fire insurance policy. Michelle reported loss es in the amount of $195,902.28 for buildings, $44,140.96 for personal property, and $3786 for loss of use.
C. Proceedings. On February 20, LaSalle Bank , the mortgage holder on the property, filed a petition for foreclosure on the destroyed residence. On December 11, Michelle filed a cross petition against third

party de fendant, American Family, for denying her proof of l oss claim and refusing to pay under the fire insurance policy. LaSalle Bank dismissed its petition with prejudice on June 3, 2010 , because American Family paid off the mortgage under the fire insurance policy. American Family filed a motion for summary judgment. American Family argued that since David intentionally set fire to the residence, Michelle could not recover under the poli cy’s intentional loss exclusion. Michelle filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment.
T he district court denied both American Family’s motion for summary judgment and Michelle’s motion for partial summary judgment. First, the court found there was no genuine issue of material fact that David intentionally lit the fire or caused a loss to th e residence. Second, the district court considered whether an innocent coinsured could recover under the policy that included an intentional
loss exclusion. The district court could not find the legislature intended

to overrule our decision in Sager v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co

. ,8 680 N.W.2d 8 (Iowa 2004), when it amended the Code in 2005

. In Sager , we held the standard fire insurance f orm required by the legislature prohibited an insurance company from applying the intentional loss
exclusion to a coinsured who did not participate in the intentional act. 2
680 N.W.2d a t 12

– 14. Thus, although the district court found here that the language , “any insured , ” in the American Family policy barred coverage, it refused to uphold the exclusion under Sager

. Though the
district court found Michelle was entitled to replacement coverage, it denied her motion for partial summary judgment because damages, breach of contract, and affirmative defenses still had to be resolved. At trial, the district court inform ed counsel it was not bound by the summary judgment ruling and accordingly, reached a different conclusion. The district court held that the statutory amendment allows American Family, under the policy as written, to deny coverage to an
innocent coinsured

. Michelle did not ask for a continuance so she could prepare further. After a trial on the merits, t he district court found David intended to cause damage to the residence. The district court also found the 2005
amendments overrule d our decision in Sager . Thus, the intentional loss exclusion applied , an d Michelle had no coverage for the fire started by David, a coinsured. On this basis, the district court dismissed Michelle’s petition. Michelle appeals.

2 At the time we decided Sager v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. , 680 N.W.2d 8 (Iowa 2004), the standard fire insurance policy was found at 515.138 (2003). It is now located at Iowa Code section 515.109 (2009).9

II. Issues. On appeal, Michelle asks us t o decide whether the suicidal coinsured, David, who set fire to the insured house , formed the requisite intent to cause a loss within the meaning of the American Family poli cy’s intentional loss exclusion; whether an innocent coinsured, Michelle, may

recov er under the American Family policy which excludes coverage when “any insur ed” causes an “intentional loss ” ; and whether an innocent coinsured, Michelle, may recover under the standard fire policy in section
515.109 , which denies coverage when “an insured” “causes or increases”

a hazard to the insured property.
III. Standard of Review. When the district court determines the meaning of words used in a

contract , it interprets the contract. Am. Soil Processing, Inc. v. Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. , 586 N.W.2d 325, 329 (Iowa 1998). When the court decides the legal effect of
such words, it construes the contract. Id. Our review of the district

court ’ s construction of the contract is for errors at law. Id

. Similar ly, we
review the district court ’ s i nterpretation of the contract for errors at law , unless the court used extrinsic evidence to interpret the words of the

contract. Id. If extrinsic evidence is used, the trial court’s fact findings are binding on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. Hartig Drug Co. v. Hartig , 602 N.W.2d 794, 797 (Iowa 1999). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment
when a party argues the trial court’ s ruling is not supported by
substantial evidence. Fischer v. City of Sioux City , 695 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Iowa 2005)

. Evidence is substantial when reasonable minds accept the evidence as adequate to reach a conclusion. Id. “Evidence is not insubstantial merely because we may draw different conclusions from i t;10 the ultimate question is whether it supports the finding actually made, not whether the evidence would support a different finding.” Raper v. State , 688 N.W.2d 29 , 36 ( Iowa 2004 ). Finally, we review questions of statutory construction for
correction of errors at law. Estate of Ryan v. Heritage Trails Assocs., Inc. , 745 N.W.2d 724, 728 (Iowa 2008).
I V
. Analysis.
We first must determine under the facts of this case whether
substantial evidenc e supports the district court ’s finding that David had the requisite intent to cause a loss under the fire insurance policy. If it does, we must next decide if American Family is required to pay the innocent coinsured spouse for the resulting fire loss un der the replacement polic y which excludes coverage when any insured causes intentional loss to the insured premises. Finally, we must decide if the
intentional loss exclusion is enforceable in light of the legislative change s to section 515.109

. A. David ’s Intent to Cause a Loss. Insurance companies “ha [ ve ] a duty to define any limitations or exclusionary clauses in clear and explicit terms.” Allied Mut. Ins. Co. v. C ostello , 557 N.W.2d 284, 286 (Iowa 1996). The insurer bears the burden of showing the exclusion applies. Id . “ ‘ [ E ] xclusions will be strictly construed against the
insurer. ’ ” Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Corrigan , 697 N.W.2d 108, 111 (Iowa 2005) (quoting Kalell v. Mut. Fire & Auto. Ins. Co. , 471 N.W.2d 865, 867 (Iowa 1991)). If the policy does not define a term, we give the term its ordinary meaning. Interstate Power Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am. , 603 N.W.2d 751, 754 (Iowa 1999). When doing so, we must construe the policy as a whole. Greenfield v. Cincinnati Ins. Co. , 737 N.W.2d 112, 118 (Iowa 2007). The11 court adopts the construction most favorable to the insured when the insurance policy is ambiguous, requires interpretation, or is open to two equally plausible constructions. Hamm v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co. , 612 N.W.2d 775, 778 (Iowa 2000). We do so because insurance policies
constitute adhesion contracts. Costello , 557 N.W.2d at 286.
T he American Family policy’s intentional lo ss exclusion has th ree parts. First, it requires intentional loss. This is defined in the policy as

“ any loss or damage arising out of any act.” (Emphasis added.) The evidence easily satisfies the plain language of this destructive act requirement. David’s conduct of pouring gasoline in the house and lighting it caused extensive damage to the structure. Second, the policy requires the act be committed “by or at the
direction of any insured .” ( E mphasis added .) This is the actor requirement. Here , the policy lists the “named insured” as “Postell,
David & Michelle.” 3 “ Insured ” means “ you .” The policy defines “ You ” as “the person or people shown as the named insured .” The definitions section also indicates that each person described under the pol icy as an

“ insured ” is a “separate insured .” Thus, acts conducted by or at the direction of either one may result in intentional loss pursuant to the policy. Since David is an eligible actor, his intentional acts alone may trigger the exclusion. Our ju risprudence supports this interpretation.

3 Michelle argues that the use of the ampersand indicates that the “named insured ” are a unit: both David and Michelle. She claims that such use of a conjunctive “&” between the names indicates that both parties must act in concert before the exclusion is triggered. The definitions refute this construction: “ you ” means an “ insured ,” and “ you ” refers to “the person or people shown as the named insured .” (Emphasis added.)12 We have previously established that when an intentional loss exclusion refers to the actions of “an,” “a,” or “any” insured, the policy
refers to either party. See Sager , 680 N.W.2d at 11

– 12 (finding that under the insurance company’s policy, the innocent spouse would be barred from recovery because it applies to intentional acts of “an insured”); Webb v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. , 493 N.W.2d 808, 813 (Iowa 1992) (denying coverage to innocen t coinsured spouse when husband materially misrepresented the amount of loss under policy excluding coverage for fraud by “any insured”); Vance v. Pekin Ins. Co. , 457 N.W.2d 589, 593 (Iowa 1990) (holding that coinsured spouse was barred from recovery under the policy referring to “an insured” for intentional loss caused by husband convicted of arson).
The exclusion’s third prong is the intent requirement. The policy
indicates the actor must commit the destructive act “with the intent to
cause a loss.” The policy does not define “intent” or “loss,” so we must rely on other sources to ascertain the common meaning of these terms.
Michelle argues substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that David acted with the intent to cause a loss within the meaning of the American Family policy’s intentional loss exclusion. Instead, she claims David suffered from a mental defect causing an “uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide by fire.” We disagree.
Intent is defined as “ [ t ] he state of mind a ccompanying an act.” 4 Black’s Law Dictionary 881 (9 th ed. 2009 ). In the context of an intentional loss exclusion , we recognize the intent of an individual to cause an injury may be “actual or may be inferred by the nature of the

4 David’s actions constitute arso n. The Iowa Code defines the scienter requirement for arson as “inten[t] to destroy or damage” or “knowingly endanger[]” the property. Iowa Code § 712.1 (2009).13 act and the accompanying reasonable foreseeability of harm

. ” Altena v.
United Fire & Cas. Co. , 422 N.W.2d 485, 488, 490 (Iowa 1988) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (inferring insured’s intent to do
the act and cause injury to victim by sexual acts under the policy ’s intentional act exclusion); s ee also Amco Ins. Co. v. Haht , 490 N.W.2d 843, 845 (Iowa 1992). Thus, we consider the individual’s objective intent, not subjective intent

. 5 Additionally, once we find the malfeasant insured had the intent to cause the inj ury, “it is immaterial that the actual injury caused is of a different character or magnitude than that
intended.” Altena , 422 N.W.2d at 488 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Substantial evidence supports the district court’s finding that
David did not suffer from a mental defect causing him to have an uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide by fire. Substantial evidence also supports the district court’s finding that David d id have the requisite intent to destroy the house in his suicide attempt. The record supports a finding that David was capable of forming intent and did not act under an irresistible impulse , because he acted premeditatedly (in both previously attempting suicide and planning the house fire), with the awareness of the nature and consequences of his
action s . Furthermore, the record lacks any evidence that David was hallucinating, deranged, or delusional. See Costello , 557 N.W.2d at 286

–

5 Our prior cases dealt specifically with intentional injury exclusions, which prohibit covera ge for acts causing personal injury. See Amco Ins. Co. v. Haht , 490 N.W.2d 843, 845 (Iowa 1992); Altena v. United Fire & Cas. Co. , 422 N.W.2d 485, 490 (Iowa 1988) (inferring from the insured’s acts that he had the intent to cause injury, per the policy’s intentional acts exclusion, to victim of sexual assault). If we are willing to infer intent to cause injury to a person from the insured’s acts, it seems logical we would do the same for the (arguably) less serious offense of injury to property

.14 88 (declining to ad opt a legal standard when an insured’s mental illness will negate an intentional exclusion clause in an insurance policy where the court finds the actor was not mentally ill at the time the insured committed the act). The record supports the district court finding that on the day of the fire, David was mentally alert, orientated , and acted with calculation. Specifically, prior to the fire, he purchased twenty

- five gallons of gasoline. He then spread the gasoline throughout the house. He lit
candles. He turned on the stove. He then recounted these details to Michelle and his son, demonstrating he understood the nature of his conduct. In particular, he recognized the events he had set in motion
would result in his death and in “blow[ing] up the house.” David understood the consequences of his acts, specifically, the danger he was creating by lighting the house on fire. This is demonstrated through the concern he showed for other’s safety. Specifically, he warned his son’s fiancée, Amanda, and his frie nd, Michael, to get out because the house was going to “blow,” and he did not want anyone else to die. Even after the fire, David was responsive, descriptive as to how he set the fire, and alert. Medical records indicate that he walked into the
emergenc y room. He did not act in a trance, but rather, was coherent and comprehended the entirety of the event, as indicated in medical records that rep orted he provided staff with a full rendition of his story
and his concerns about wanting to die. Moreover, h e was alert enough both en route to the hospital and once in the emergency room to refuse
treatment and t o t ell personnel he just wanted to die

.15 Additionally , after the fire, we have Michelle’s admissions that
David intended to se t the fire. Michelle admitted: “Yes David set the fire , he lost his life, that was his intention .” (Emphasis added.) This third prong also requires that we find David intended to cause a loss. Loss is defined as “[a]n undesirable outcome of a risk; t he disappearance or diminution of value, usu [ ally ] in an unexpected or relatively un predictable way.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1029

. F or insurance purposes, loss is “ [t]he amount of financial detriment caused by an insured person’s death or an insured prop erty’s damage, for which
the insurer becomes liable.” Id . at 1030 . The American Family policy clearly indicates that, under the intentional loss exclusi o n , “[s]uch loss is excluded regardless of any other cause or event contributing concurrently or in an y sequence to the loss. ” Substantial evidence also supports the district court’s finding that
David intended to cause a loss , because he repeatedly acknowledged the threat of property damage. He told at least three witnesse s to the event
that the house was going to “blow.” He explained to his son that after pouring gasoline in the house, lighting candles, and turning on the stove, he did not plan to wake up. This demonstrates the fact that he intended to incinerate himself by burning the house down, th ereby creating a loss. In addition, David told Michelle in the voicemail that he was going to use the house fire as a way to “blow himself up.” While it is true David acted ultimately with the intent to commit suicide, our court of appeals has recognize d t he “intent to commit suicide [ by setting fire to property ] does not negate the existence of the intent to

c ommit intermediate acts necessary to achieve the ultimate objective. ”
See State v. Bartnick , 478 N.W.2d 878, 880 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991). “ [T] he

ex istence of the intent to commit suicide does not negate the existence of16 the knowledge the property would be damaged or destroyed by the alleged suicide attempt.” Id

. Thus, because we find substantial evidence supports the district

court ’s finding that David acted intentionally in setting the fire, Michelle is not entitled to recovery , unless she can demonstrate a right to compensation under the American Family policy or the s tandard fire
i nsurance policy found in section 515.109. B. Recovery U nder th e Policy. Michelle makes three arguments to support her claim for recovery under the language of the policy issued by American Family. First, she argues that under the policy , she is an innocent spouse. Next, she asserts that a severability clause in th e policy provides coverage. Finally, she makes a claim for recovery under
the doc trine of reasonable expectation s
. 1

. Innocent coinsured d octrine. Michelle’s right to compensation from American Family hinges upon the interpretatio n of the policy. Determining Michelle’s rights requires us to engage in a two

- part analysis, as we did in Sager . 680 N.W.2d at 11

– 12 . First, the court looks at the innocent coinsured’s rights under the language of the insurance policy. Id . If that policy denies coverag e, then the court
considers the coinsured’s potential recoverability under the standard policy to determine the statutory minimum protection to which the
insured is entitled. Id .; see also Iowa Code § 515.109.
We apply the “best reasoned rule” to the American Family policy when construing the provisions of the company’s insurance policy.
Vance , 457 N.W.2d at 592. Under this approach, we interpret the exclusion using contract theories “peculiar to insurance policies

. ” Id

. Accordingly, we no longer focus on property theories or marital relationships. Id

.17 To begin, we conduct a textual analysis of the American Family policy. It contains three relevant exclusions to coverage, all of which are contingent upon the conduc t of the insured persons. First is the
intentional loss exclusion:

We [American Family] do not insure for loss caused directly or indirectly by any of the following. Such loss is excluded regardless of any other cause or event contributing concurrently o r in any sequence to the loss.

. . . . 2. Intentional Loss , meaning any loss or damage arising out of any act committed:

a. by or at the direction of any insured ; and
b. with the intent to cause a loss. ( E mphasis added.) Second, the policy includes exclusion s for neglect and for fraud :
Part A

. . . . 2. Neglect of any insured to use all reasonable means to protect covered property at and after the time of loss.

. . . . Part B

. . . . 1. Fraud. We will not provide coverage for all or any part of a loss if, before or after the loss, any insured has committed fraud. Fraud means any concealment, misrepresentation or attempt to defraud by any insured either in causing any loss or in presenting any cla im under this policy. ( E mphasis added.) Each of these exclusions refers to “ any insured.” Although the intentional loss exclusion is only at issue in this case, we
look to all three exclusions to properly interpret the whole policy.18

It is well

- settled l aw in this state that the use of the words, “ a ny insured , ” is an unambiguous phrase that precludes coverage for all insureds, including an innocent coinsured spouse. See Corrigan , 697
N.W.2d at 116 (finding “any insured” bars recovery); Sager , 680 N.W.2d

at 11

– 12 (recognizing that if “any insured” sets fire to a house, all insureds, including the innocent coinsured spouse, are barred compensation); Johnson v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. , 533 N.W.2d 203,
207 (Iowa 1995) (holding that “any insured” resulted in denial of coverage
to all insured s under the exclusion for bodily injury); Webb , 493 N.W.2d

at 813 (denying coverage to innocent coinsured spouse whose husband materially misrepresented the amount of loss under the policy excluding recovery for fraud by “ any insured”); Vance , 457 N.W.2d at 593 (explaining “any insured” unambiguously excludes coverage to an innocent coinsured spouse). In Vance , we went so far as to encourage insurance companies to purge their fire insurance policies of ambiguity by replacing the exclusion language of “the” insured with “a,” “any,” or “an” insured. 457 N.W.2d at 593 ( citing Leane English Cerven, The Problem of the Innocent Co

- insured Spouse : Three Theories on Recovery , 17 Val. U. L. Rev. 849, 872 (1983)). This rule is consistent with other jurisdictions. 6

6 See Ch acon v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. , 788 P.2d 748, 752 (Colo. 1990) (finding “any insured” created a joint obligation under the policy’s intentional acts exclusion applying to the insured innocent parents and insured minor son who committed vandalism); Trinit y Universal Ins. Co. v. Kirsling , 73 P.3d 102, 105 (Idaho 2003) (holding that an intentional acts exclusion which excluded “any loss” arising out of any act committed by or at the direction of “an insured” and “with the intent to cause a loss” barred cover age); Woodhouse v. Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co. , 785 P.2d 192, 194 (Mont. 1990) (holding “an insured” unambiguously bars coverage to an innocent coinsured); McAllister v. Millville Mut. Ins. Co. , 640 A.2d 1283, 1289 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (denying coverage t o innocent coinsured when other insured committed arson and policy included an intentional acts provision referring to “an insured” and a neglect exclusion referring to “any insured”); Dolcy v. R.I. Joint Reins. Ass’n , 589 A.2d 313, 316 (R.I. 1991)19 Sager did not distur b this textual construction of company insurance policies. 680 N.W.2d at 11

– 12

. In Sager , we found, as a threshold matter, that the language of the insurance policy referring to
“an insured” means “an unspecified insured.” Id

. Consequently, “ if any insured sets fire to the house, all insureds are barred from recovering.” Thus, u nder the language of the policy, the innocent coinsured was
denied coverage. 680 N.W.2d at 12.
Therefore , under our long

- standing rule of construing “any insured” in insurance policies as barr ing recovery to the innocent

co insured spouse, American Fami ly properly denied coverage to Michelle
under the intentional loss exclusion.
2. Severability c lause. Michelle next argues a severability clause in the definitions section of the American Family policy provides her coverage under the policy . This pro vision states, “ E ach person described above is a separate insured under this policy.” Accordingly, she urges the court to interpret the policy as if Michelle was the only insured. This reading would allow Michelle to recover , because she did not set fire to the house.
We have already considered the question of what effect severability

- of

- interest clauses have on insurance policy exclusions. The

answer

— none. We reach this conclusion by first recognizing that “ ‘ the purpose of severability clauses is to spread protection, to the limits of

_______________________ (holdin g that the policy’s intentional loss exclusion referring to “an insured” imposes a joint obligation); Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Crook , 980 P.2d 685, 688 (Utah 1999) (finding the intentional loss exclusion referring to “an insured” denied coverage to inn ocent coinsured when the other coinsured burned down the house); see also Century

- Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Garcia , 51 Cal. 4th 564, 568

– 69 (2011) (recognizing that statutory language of “any insured” increasing the hazard of loss or concealing fraud refers to joint or collective liability, not several as when the standard policy refers to “the insured”).20 coverage, among all of the named insureds . The purpose is not to negate bargained

- for exclusions which are plainly worded. ’ ” Corrigan , 697
N.W.2d at 116

– 17 (quoting Nat’l Ins. Un derwriters v. Lexington Flying
Club , Inc. , 603 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979)). Here, the policy
illustrate s this fact because after the severability clause, it states, “This
does not increase our limit.” In addition, we found such clauses serve as a conduit by which the insurance company can communicate that, unde r the policy, the term
insured does not always mean “any” insured person, but sometimes, only “the” insured claiming coverage. See Zenti v. Home Ins. Co. , 262 N.W.2d
589

– 92 (Iowa 1978) (f inding on first impression that the severability clause was inserted to clarify that only “the insured,” namely the employer, was liable under the “bodily injury to an y employee” exclusion when the phrase “the insured” was used). Thus, the severability cl ause serves to reinforce the language differentiating between joint obligations (“any” or “an” insured) and separate o bligations (“the” insured ). Moreover, in construing the language of this policy, the severability clause does not create an ambiguity. Throughout the policy, we find “the insured.” However, it unambiguously refers to “any insured” in other sections, namely the exclusions provisions. Thus, the severability clause operates to set apart these provisions. Furthermore, if we construe all r eferences to “any” or “the” insured as a “separate insure d,” this renders the exclusion’s express language imposin g joint obligations a nullity. See IMT Ins. Co. v. Crestmoor Golf
Club , 702 N.W.2d 492, 497 (Iowa 2005) (holding that the severability

- of

interest clause does not affect the denial of coverage when a criminal acts exclusion refers to “any insured”); Corrigan , 697 N.W.2d at 116

– 17 (finding that the severability clause did not remove joint obligations21 under the criminal acts exclusion referring to “any insured”). Our rule remains consistent with the majority position of other jurisdictions. 7
3. The doctrine of reasonable e xpectations

. Michelle makes a doctrine
of reasonable expectation s argument in her brief . This doctrine is only used when an exclusion is “(1) bizarre or oppressive, (2) eviscerates terms explicitly agreed to, or (3) eliminates the dominant purpose of the
transaction.” Corrigan , 697 N.W.2d at 118 ( citation and internal quotation marks omitted ). Moreover, the doctrine is “ ‘ carefully circumscribed and does not contemplate the expansion of coverage on a

7 See EMCASCO Ins. Co. v. Diedrich , 394 F.3d 1091, 1097

– 98 (8th Cir. 2005) (imposing joint obligations under South Dakota law for an intentional acts exclusion referring to “one or more insureds,” despite the severability clause); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Proctor , 286 F. Supp. 2d 567, 574

– 75 (D. Md. 2003) (indicating that “any” is not ambiguous under Maryland law and exclusion is collective, regardless of severa bility clause); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim , 121 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1308 (D. Hawaii 2000) (finding “an insured” is unambiguous, applies to innocent coinsureds, and is not affected by the severability clause); Chacon , 788 P.2d at 752 (preferring to give full ef fect to exclusions referring to “any insured,” despite a severability clause, in order to respect the party’s contractual expectations and enforce the court’s contractual analysis); Johnson v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 687 A.2d 642, 644

– 45 (Me. 1997) (finding sev erability clauses do not change the collective effect of an intentional acts exclusion referring to “an insured”); SECURA Supreme Ins. Co. v. M.S.M. , 755 N.W.2d 320, 328

– 29 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that the severability clause did not make the crimin al acts exclusion referring to “any” insured ambiguous); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Copeland

- Williams , 941 S.W.2d 625, 627

– 29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that “any insured” in the exclusionary clause is unambiguously collective rather than several, despi te severability clause); Villa v. Short , 947 A.2d 1217, 1224

– 25 (N.J. 2008) (finding that a severability clause does not inject ambiguity or remove the joint obligation imposed by intentional and criminal acts exclusions referring to either “an insured” or “any insured”); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. White , 913 N.E.2d 426, 441

– 42 (Ohio 2009) (holding that a severability clause does not affect the plain meaning and application of “an insured” or “any insured” in the exclusions denying coverage to innocent coins ureds); McAllister , 640 A.2d at 1289 (finding joint obligations under the exclusion even though the policy defined each named insured as a “separate insured”); Great Cent. Ins. Co. v. Roemmich , 291 N.W.2d 772, 774

– 75 (S.D. 1980) (establishing that an exclu sion applying to “any insured” is unambiguous and unaffected by a severability clause); Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Cross , 10 P.3d 440, 445 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (establishing that a severability clause does not affect the meaning of “an insured” as used in an intentional acts exclusion); J.G. v. Wangard , 753 N.W.2d 475, 488 (Wis. 2008) (denying coverage to all coinsureds under the intentional acts exclusion referring to “any” insured, despite the severability clause )

.22 general equitable basis. ’ ” Id . (quoting Johnson , 533 N.W.2d at 206 )

. Instead, it is only relied upon when the insured establishes “that an ordinary layperson would misunderstand the policy coverage or that
there are circumstances attributable to the insurer that led the insured to expect coverage.” Id

. As we found in Corrigan , a reasonable person understands the phrase, “an insured , ” in an exclusion bars coverage to all the insured s
. 69 7 N.W.2d at 108 (citing Vance , 457 N.W.2d at 593). Unlike in Corrigan , Michelle claims two American Family employees told her they
ha d “recommended the policy be paid.” However, those representations
occurred after the fire, not when the parties entered the insurance

contract

. We have only applied the reasonable expectations doctrine to “representations made by the insurer at the time of policy negotiation
and issuance.” Vos v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. , 667 N.W.2d 36, 50 (Iowa 2003); see also Rodman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 208 N.W.2d 903 , 908 (Iowa 1973). However, we have recognized there may
be “other circumstances attributable to the insurer” which could create such expectations. Rodman , 208 N.W.2d at 908. A representation made
after a loss is not such a circu mstance . Thus, Michelle did not have a reasonable expectation that the policy covered thi s sort of loss, and accordingly, she is not entitled to recover under the reasonable expectations doctrine.
C . Recovery U nder Iowa’s Standard Fire Policy. In Sager , we added “a second step to the contractual analysis” when the company’s fire insurance policy unambiguously denies coverage to the innocent23

coinsured. 8 680 N.W.2d at 14 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) . This statute

- based theory of recovery requires us to analyze whether the company’s policy conflicts with the minimum protection provided in the standard fire policy. Id

. at 12. If the company’s policy denies the statutory minimum, the insurance policy is unenforceable , and we must reform it to comply with the statute. Id

. Accordingly, our first inquiry is what “minimum coverage” is required under the standard policy. When we decided Sager , section 515.138 of the 2003 Code of Iowa contained the stan dard policy’s language and requirements. T he standard policy made no reference to “an insured” or “any insu red.” Iowa Code § 515.138 (2003 ). Instead, it exclusively referred to “the insured” sixteen times. Id

. Thus, in Sager , we held the policy requir ed an innocent spouse to be covered. 680 N.W.2d at 15. We filed Sager on May 12, 2004. Id . at 8.
On April 13, 2005 , during the next legislative session after we
decided Sager , House F ile 854 was introduced in the house of representatives. H

. J ournal , 81 st G.A., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2005)

. House F ile
854 replaced “the insured” with “an insured” five times in the standard policy

— at the places pertaining to the conduct

- related exclusions in the standard policy . H.F. 854 , 81 st G.A. , 1st Sess. ( Iowa 2005). In the explanation, the bill stated , “Code section 515.138 [now section 515.109] revises language about intention al acts in standard fire policy language which are noncompensable.” H.F. 854, 81st G.A., 1st Sess., explanation (Iowa 2005). Senate F ile 360 contained the same language regarding the

8 Other states have adopted this same analytical framework. See, e.g., Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Dean , 441 S.E.2d 436, 438 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Osborn v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. , 632 So. 2d 1158, 1161 (La. 1994); Borman v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. , 521 N.W.2d 266, 267

– 68 (Mich. 1994); Watson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n , 566 N.W.2d 683, 689 (Minn. 1997).24

amendments to section 515. 138. S.F. 360, 81 st G.A., 1st Sess . (Iowa 2005) . On A pril 19, the house substituted Senate F ile 360 for House F ile 854 and passed Senate F ile 360 . H. Journal, 81 st G.A., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2005)

. The amendments in Senate F ile 360 changing “the insured” to “an insured” eventually passed . 2005 Iowa Acts ch. 70, §§ 19

– 21 (now codified at Iowa Code § 515.109)

. When confronted with the task of statutory interpretation, we have
stated: The goal of statutory construction is to determine legislative intent. We determine legislative intent from the words chosen by the legislature, not what it should or might have said. Absent a statutory definition or an established meanin g in the law, words in the statute are given their ordinary and common meaning by considering the context within which they are used. Under the guise of construction, an interpreting body may not extend, enlarge, or otherwise change the meaning of a statu te. Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div. , 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004) (citations omitted). We derive legislative intent not only from the language use d but
also from “the statute’ s ‘subject matter, the object sought to be accomplished, the purpose to be s erved, underlying policies, remedies provided, and the consequences of the various interpretations.’ ” Cox v.
State , 686 N.W.2d 209, 213 (Iowa 2004) ( quoting State v. Albrecht , 657 N.W.2d 474, 479 (Iowa 2003) ). The legislative history of a statute is also
instructive in determining legislative intent

. State v. Allen , 708 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Iowa 2006) ; Richards v. Iowa Dep’ t of Revenue , 362 N.W.2d 486, 488 (Iowa 1985 ). Additionally, we give weight to explanations
attached to a bill. City of Cedar Rapids v. James Prop s

. , Inc. , 701 N.W.2d 673, 677 (Iowa 2005). Finally, when the legislature amends a statute, it25

raises a presumption that the legislature intended a change in the law.
Id. It is clear from the timing of the amendments and the explanation
of the bill that the legislature intended to amend section 515.109 , narrow the intentional acts that are compensable under the standard policy, and
overrule our holding in Sager , where we held the standard policy provided coverage to the innocent spouse. Th us, the amendments
returned the law to as it existed prior to our decision in Sager

. Consequently, American Family properly denied coverage to Michelle
under the intentional loss exclusion. V. Disposition. We affirm the judgment of the district court be cause we find substantial evidence supports the district court finding that the coinsured, David Postell, who set fire to the insured dwelling in order to
commit suicide , had the requisite intent to cause a loss under the policy; that under the language of the policy, the innocent coinsured spouse, who did not participate in the intentional acts of the other coinsured,

ca n n ot recover due to the intentional loss exclusion; and that an
innocent coinsured cannot recover under the rec ently amended Iowa standard fire poli cy in Iowa Code section 515.109.
AFFIRMED.