Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

Chief Justice: Justices: 

Clifford W. Taylor Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver Opinion Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED APRIL 11, 2007 

BRIAN J. PERRY, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v No. 129943 

GOLLING CHRYSLER PLYMOUTH 

JEEP, INC., 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 

TAYLOR, C.J. 

In this case, we are called on to determine whether, pursuant to MCL 

257.233(9), an application for title to a motor vehicle is “executed” and therefore 

the title is transferred to the new owner at the time the application is signed, or if 

the application is not “executed” and the title transferred until the application is 

sent to the Secretary of State. We hold that “execution” is complete at signing and 

thus at that moment title transfers to the new owner, without regard to mailing or 

delivery to the Secretary of State. Because the Court of Appeals held to the 

contrary on the basis of Goins v Greenfield Jeep Eagle, Inc, 449 Mich 1; 534 
NW2d 467 (1995), we reverse its judgment and reinstate the trial court’s grant of 

summary disposition for defendant. 

The relevant facts in this case are brief. Ksenia Nichols sought to purchase 

a vehicle from Golling Chrysler Plymouth Jeep, Inc. In that process, much of the 

paperwork had been completed, including the application for title that Nichols had 

signed. Hours after taking possession of the vehicle, Nichols collided with a 

parked car, causing injury to Brian Perry. Perry sued Golling, asserting that 

Golling was still the owner of the vehicle and thus liable under MCL 257.401 for 

the acts of its permissive user (Nichols), because, although the application for title 

had been signed, the title was not effectively transferred until the application was 

delivered to the Secretary of State. In making this argument, Perry relied on 

Goins, supra, to assert that the transfer was incomplete until the mailing or 

delivery of the application of title to the Secretary of State. Defendant argued that 

this was a misinterpretation of Goins and that the transfer was effective upon the 

signing of the application for title. Defendant sought summary disposition under 

MCR 2.116(C)(10) on the basis of its understanding of when title is transferred, 

and the trial court granted defendant’s motion, ruling that at signing the title had 

transferred to Nichols and thus Golling was no longer the owner at the time of the 

accident. The Court of Appeals reversed, however, on the basis of its 

interpretation of Goins, concluding that a question of fact existed regarding 

ownership of the vehicle. Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued October 11, 

2005 (Docket No. 254121). Golling sought leave to appeal from the judgment of 

2
 
 

the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court directed the clerk to schedule oral 

argument on whether to grant the application. 474 Mich 1135 (2006). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

We review de novo an issue of statutory construction, and ascertain the 

legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words expressed in the 

statute. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362-363; 547 NW2d 314 

(1996). Likewise, a trial court’s grant of summary disposition is reviewed de 

novo. Chandler v Muskegon Co, 467 Mich 315, 319; 652 NW2d 224 (2002). 

ANALYSIS 

Under MCL 257.401, the “owner” of a vehicle is liable for injury resulting 

from operation of the vehicle, even if the owner is not the driver. An “owner” is 

one who holds the title (unless the vehicle is leased). MCL 257.37. MCL 

257.233(9) explains when title is transferred (emphasis added): 

Upon the delivery of a motor vehicle and the transfer, sale, or 

assignment of the title or interest in a motor vehicle by a person, 

including a dealer, the effective date of the transfer of title or interest 

in the vehicle shall be the date of execution of either the application 

for title or the assignment of the certificate of title.[1] 

1

 We note that MCL 257.233 was amended by 2006 PA 317, effective 

January 3, 2007. Subsection 9 now provides: 

Upon the delivery of a motor vehicle and the transfer, sale, or 

assignment of the title or interest in a motor vehicle by a person, 

including a dealer, the effective date of the transfer of title or interest 

in the vehicle is the date of signature on either the application for 

title or the assignment of the certificate of title by the purchaser, 

transferee, or assignee. 

3
 
 

Thus, we must determine in this case what is the date of execution of either the 

application for title or the assignment of the certificate of title. 

In Goins, supra, the issue was whether the title had been transferred where 

the Secretary of State had received the application and issued a certificate of title, 

even though the dealer failed to ensure that the buyer had proper insurance, which 

should have precluded his being issued a title.2

 The Goins Court, in concluding 

that the title in that case had been transferred, said, “The application for title was 

executed when defendant sent the necessary forms to the Secretary of State, and 

the certificate of title was executed when the Secretary of State issued a new 

certificate in the purchaser’s name.” Goins, supra at 14. This statement, by itself, 

does not clearly say when execution occurred: because of sending and receipt at 

the Secretary of State or an earlier point (perhaps at the time of mailing before 

receipt or possibly at the moment of signing). This is not a flaw in the opinion 

because the only question the Goins Court had to answer, and did answer, was 

whether a title application sent to and received by the Secretary of State is one that 

has been executed. In fact, the question the present case poses actually builds on 

the Goins question and asks: Conceding that execution was surely effected when 

the application was sent to the Secretary of State, was the execution effective at 

2

 MCL 257.233 was slightly different at that time, with title transferring on 

“the date of execution of either the application for title or the certificate of title,” 

rather than the “assignment of the certificate of title.” 

4
 
 

some point before that? We believe it was effective even earlier. It was effective 

at the moment of signing. 

Our caselaw has consistently held that execution requires signing, and that 

delivery is separate from execution.3

 Other statutes within the Michigan Vehicle 

Code likewise indicate that mailing or delivery occurs after execution.4 This is 

also consistent with the definition of “execute” found in Black’s Law Dictionary 

(6th ed): “To complete; to make; to sign; to perform; to do; to follow out; to carry 

out according to its terms; to fulfill the command or purpose of.” This, then, is the 

correct understanding of “executed” in MCL 257.233(9), and Goins is entirely 

harmonious with this reading of the statute. The dissent’s suggestion that our 

holding necessitates overruling Goins reflects a misunderstanding of our holding, 

and we reject it. 

We conclude that the application for title was executed in this case because 

it was signed by the parties. Defendant was not required to send the application to 

the Secretary of State in order to complete the execution. We clarify that the 

statement in Goins was incorrectly understood by the Court of Appeals to require 

3

 See, e.g., Farrell v Nutter, 362 Mich 639; 107 NW2d 770 (1961); 

Wiedbrauk v Wiedbrauk, 284 Mich 15; 278 NW 747 (1938); Roth v Smilay, 251 

Mich 381; 232 NW 220 (1930). 

4

 For example, MCL 257.238, which requires the person named as the 

owner on the certificate of title to add security interests to the title, requires the 

owner to first “execute” an application, then “deliver” it to the holder of the 

security interest, and then requires that the owner “shall cause the [application] to 

be mailed or delivered” to the Secretary of State. 

5
 
delivery as part of the execution. We reverse the Court of Appeals judgment and 

reinstate the trial court’s grant of summary disposition for defendant. 

Clifford W. Taylor 

 Elizabeth A. Weaver 

 Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

6
 
 

v 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

BRIAN J. PERRY, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

No. 129943 

GOLLING CHRYSLER PLYMOUTH 

JEEP, INC., a Michigan corporation, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

KELLY, J. (dissenting). 

I would deny the application for leave to appeal. Although the majority 

contends that it merely expands on this Court’s holding in Goins,

1

 in point of fact, 

it distorts and actually rewrites the Goins holding. Also, the critical statement in 

Goins that “[t]he application for title was executed when defendant sent the 

necessary forms to the Secretary of State,” id., was essential to the determination 

of the case and therefore is binding precedent for this case. When the majority 

misreads the statement, it effectively overrules Goins. I maintain that Goins 

should not be overruled. 

1 Goins v Greenfield Jeep Eagle, Inc, 449 Mich 1, 14; 534 NW2d 467 

(1995). 
 

THE GOINS DECISION
 

The issue in Goins was whether an automobile dealership remained the 

owner of a vehicle when the dealership failed to send proof of its purchaser’s 

insurance coverage to the Secretary of State. Goins v Greenfield Jeep Eagle, Inc, 

449 Mich 1, 2; 534 NW2d 467 (1995). In deciding the case, the Michigan 

Supreme Court noted that the dealership’s liability turned on whether the 

dealership owned the vehicle on the date the vehicle was involved in an accident. 

Id. at 4. The Court reiterated the importance to ownership of the transfer of title. 

Id. at 13-14. Specifically, it noted that “[t]itle transfers when there has been an 

‘execution of either the application for title or the certificate of title.’” Id. at 14, 

citing MCL 257.233(5).2 In that regard, the Goins Court made this statement: 

The application for title was executed when [the dealership] 

sent the necessary forms to the Secretary of State, and the certificate 

of title was executed when the Secretary of State issued a new 

certificate in the purchaser’s name. [Goins, 449 Mich at 14.] 

2

 1998 PA 346 redesignated subsection 5 as subsection 9. 1999 PA 206 

amended subsection 9 by inserting the term “assignment of the.” When the instant 

case accrued, MCL 257.233(9) stated: 

Upon the delivery of a motor vehicle and the transfer, sale, or 

assignment of the title or interest in a motor vehicle by a person, 

including a dealer, the effective date of the transfer of title or interest 

in the vehicle shall be the date of the execution of either the 

application for title or the assignment of the certificate of title. 

2
 
Therefore, because both events had occurred by the time of the accident, the Court 

concluded that title had transferred and the dealership was not the vehicle owner, 

hence not liable. Id. at 14. 

THE MAJORITY DISTORTS THE HOLDING OF GOINS 

The majority contends that its opinion does not necessitate an overruling of 

Goins because its opinion is a harmonious extension of the Goins holding. The 

irrefutable fact is that the Goins Court wrote that the application for “title was 

executed when [the dealership] sent the necessary forms to the Secretary of State.” 

Goins, 449 Mich at 14. The majority effectively rewrites this sentence to read, 

“the application for title had been executed by the time the dealership sent the 

necessary forms to the Secretary of State.” It then adds that the application for 

title was executed at the moment the purchaser signed the application for title. 

The majority implies that the Goins Court was sloppy in its phraseology. 

That seems unlikely given that the Goins Court dedicated a significant portion of 

its analysis to past decisions that emphasized the importance of the transfer of title 

to the transfer of ownership. See Goins, 449 Mich at 10-14. Considering its 

detailed discussion of the importance of deciding when title transferred, it is not 

credible that the Goins Court found it unnecessary to specify the exact moment the 

title transferred. For that reason, I conclude that the Goins Court meant what it 

wrote: the application for title was executed, hence title transferred, “when [the 

dealership] sent the necessary forms to the Secretary of State.” 

3
 
 

THE STATEMENT IN GOINS WAS CENTRAL TO THE HOLDING OF THE CASE 

The statement under consideration was not dictum for the reason that it was 

essential to the determination of the case.3 As indicated above, the dealership’s 

liability in Goins turned on whether it owned the vehicle at the time of the 

accident. Goins, 449 Mich at 4. The Goins Court concluded that the dealership 

did not own it because both requirements of MCL 257.233(5) had been satisfied. 

Id. at 14. In order to make that determination, the Court had to ascertain whether, 

at the time of the accident, the application for title had been executed. Id. 

Accordingly, the Court’s statement that the application was executed when the 

necessary forms were sent to the Secretary of State was part of the resolution of 

the central issue. 

The Court of Appeals was correct in relying on Goins to conclude that the 

date the dealership mailed the application to the Secretary of State determined 

whether the dealership was liable. Perry v Golling Chrysler Plymouth Jeep, Inc ̧ 

unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 11, 2005 

(Docket No. 254121). Moreover, the statement in Goins binds this Court in this 

case. 

3

 “Statements and comments in an opinion concerning some rule of law or 

legal proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the 

case in hand are obiter dicta, and lack the force of an adjudication.” Black’s Law 

Dictionary (6th ed), defining “dictum.” 

4
 
 

 

APPLICATION OF THE ROBINSON FACTORS 

Because the majority reads Goins as it does, it denies that it has overruled 

that case. As a consequence, it makes no mention of the Robinson4 factors. But 

given that the Robinson Court held that precedent should not be overturned 

without consideration of these factors, I will apply them now. We should consider 

whether Goins was wrongly decided. Robinsion, 462 Mich at 464. We should 

also determine whether Goins “defies ‘practical workability,’ whether reliance 

interests would work an undue hardship, and whether changes in the law or facts 

no longer justify the [Goins] decision.” Id. 

My application of the Robinson factors reveals that Goins should not be 

overturned. First and most importantly, the Goins Court did not err in holding that 

the application for title was executed when the dealership sent it to the Secretary 

of State. This conclusion requires an understanding of MCL 257.233. When the 

claim in Goins occurred, the Legislature had not defined the term “execute,” as it 

appears in the statute. However, the statute does address owners transferring title. 

Therefore, it was reasonable for the Goins Court to conclude that the term 

“execute” referred to an action that the owner, i.e., the dealership, must take. 

Moreover, the Goins Court’s statement that execution occurred when the 

dealership sent the necessary forms to the Secretary of State was consistent with 

how Michigan courts interpreted the statute at the time. In Zechlin v Bridges 

4 Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439; 613 NW2d 307 (2000). 

5
 
 

Motors Sales,

5

 which the Goins Court cited, the Court of Appeals observed that 

the effective date of a transfer of title is the date of the execution of the application 

for title. Id. at 342. In Zechlin, the dealership had filed the application for title 

with the Secretary of State before the accident occurred. Id. at 342. Therefore, the 

Court of Appeals concluded that the dealership’s ownership interest in the vehicle 

terminated before the accident. Id. Accordingly, the Goins Court’s determination 

that execution occurred when the dealership sent the necessary forms to the 

Secretary of State was consistent with how the Court of Appeals interpreted the 

statute at the time. 

There is also a public policy basis for the Goins decision. By holding that 

the application was executed when the dealership sent the application for title to 

the Secretary of State, the Goins Court prevented a possible fraud on buyers. 

Were execution interpreted to occur when the buyer signed the application, the 

dealership, no longer the owner, could escape liability for a subsequent accident 

yet retain the application. It could thereby try to prevent the buyer from obtaining 

a certificate of title until the buyer paid it more for the vehicle. The Goins holding 

circumvented this problem. For the above reasons, I believe that Goins was 

correctly decided. 

Additionally, no argument has been made that the Goins decision cannot be 

applied in a practical manner. Robinson, 462 Mich at 464. The Goins rule that the 

5

 190 Mich App 339, 342; 475 NW2d 60 (1991). 

6
 
 

 

application for title is considered executed when the dealership sends it to the 

Secretary of State is easy to understand and to apply.6 

The next Robinson factor to consider is whether, if the decision were 

overturned, reliance interests would work an undue hardship. Robinson, 462 Mich 

at 464. It is unknown whether or how dealerships and vehicle purchasers altered 

their procedures in order to conform to the holding in Goins. Therefore, it is not 

possible to ascertain whether there will be any hardship when Goins is overturned. 

The final factor to consider is whether changes in the law or facts no longer 

justify the decision. Id. From the time Goins was decided until the time the 

instant case arose, the relevant portion of MCL 257.233 remained the same. 

Specifically, the statute provided that one could ascertain the date of transfer of 

title by identifying the date of execution of the application for title. Also, the 

record does not reflect that the procedure for obtaining title to a motor vehicle has 

changed. Accordingly, no change has occurred in the law or facts. Considering 

all the Robinson factors, Goins should not be overturned. 

6

 See, e.g., Akmakjian v Make a Deal Auto Sales, Inc, unpublished opinion 

per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued August 6, 1996 (Docket No. 181933) 

(referring to Goins and deciding that the application for title was executed on the 

date that the dealership completed the application for title), and Hartford Accident 

& Indemnity Co v The Used Car Factory, Inc, unpublished opinion per curiam of 

the Court of Appeals, issued December 9, 1997 (Docket No. 198104) (The court 

rejected the dealership’s argument that title transferred when the dealership and 

the purchaser signed the application. It also referred to Goins for the proposition 

that execution of the application for title does not occur until the dealership sends 

the necessary forms to the Secretary of State.). 

7
 
CONCLUSION
 

The majority has rewritten the holding in Goins. Moreover, the statement 

in Goins that execution occurred when the dealership sent the necessary forms to 

the Secretary of State was essential to the determination of that case. Therefore, it 

is binding precedent. Finally, the Robinson factors do not support overruling 

Goins. For these reasons, Goins should remain good law. Its holding governs this 

case, as the Court of Appeals recognized. Therefore the Court of Appeals decision 

was proper and the application for leave to appeal should be denied.

 Marilyn Kelly 

Cavanagh, J. I would deny leave to appeal. 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

8