# /56ZtS

No. 

# ORIGINAL

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas 

# RECEIVEDIN Mark Eugene Engle, Appellant COURTOFCRIMINALAPPEALS

vs.
The State of Texas, Apellee

Petition for Discretionary Review From the 6th Court of Appeals

In Appellate Case No: 06-14-00239-CR

Petition for Appellant o 

## DEC 02 2015 

## AbelAcosia, Clerk

FILED IN JOURT OFCRIMINALAPPEALS

Abel Acosta, Cierk

Honarable Justices: Comes now the Appellant and submits this PDR pursuant to the provisions of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure in support of his request for the judgement of the conviction to be overturned.



# 0)TABLE OF CONTENTS

Index of Authorities Statement Regarding oral Argument
Statement of the Case Statement of Procedural History Grounds for Review Argument with Authorities Prayer . . Appendix . 

# .i 5



## _i3 

# £er-Mic<tfe o§ Service -j "betlanwtiot^ . '/2-

ObIndex of Authorities



### Federal Cases mAs^
Groh v Ramirez 540 US- 551 (2004)
— —

State Cases 

# 4

Green v State 872 S.W-2d 717,721 (TexCrimApp 1994) <% Pham v State 324 S.W.3d. 869,874 (Tex App-Houston[ 14th Dist] pet ref'd) jf Rios v State 901 S.W.2d 794,706 (Tex App-San Antonio 1995 no pet.) ^ 

### Tijerina v State 334 S.W.3d 825,835 (Tex App-Amarillo 2011 pet ref'd) ^ State v Cullen 195 W.W.3d 696,700 (Tex Crim App 2006) __ . g 

# State v Daugherty 931 S.W.2d 268,270 (Tex Crim App 1996) « "

State Statutes
TRAP 44.2(a) Constitutional Error : '— ° TRAP 44.4(a) Remedial Error ———- O



# Cs)Statement Regarding Oral Argument

Oral Argument is requested to help the court understand the significance of the Abuse of Discretion, the probable cause findings, and the preservation of issues for Appellate Review. Among other things, also the Violation of the Appellants rights under the 4th Ammendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Texas Constitution Article 1 sec 9.



# faSTATEMENT OF THE CASE 

### This is an appeal of and sentence in criminal case from the 354th Judicial District, in Hunt County, Texas. Appellant was 

### convicted Manufacturing and Delivery of a Controlled Substance 

### Penalty Group 1 More than Four grams but less than 200 grams. After Appellant's :motion to supress the evidence was denied by 

### the trial court, Appellant Plead Guilty. Appellant was assessed 

## a sentence of Life Imprisonment on October 1, 2014 by a Jury. Notice of Appeal was given on October 3, 2014. The clerk's record was filed February 5th, 2015. The reporter's record was filed on April 29th, 2015.



# (&PROCEDURAL HISTORY


### (1) Opinion was handed down by the 6th Court of Appeals on 3rd day of November, 2015. . 

# V> It (2) Motion for Rehearing was filed Pro Se on /^ day of AlUV' 201! (3) Motion for Rehearing was disposed/ .2015.



# (ti i^r kl i overruled on / / day of A* PV'GROUNDS FOR REVIEW 

### 1. Incomplete record denied the Appellant a proper review.

- Motion for Rehearing. 

### 2. Court of Appeals failed to apply the proper standard under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure when there is a 4th Ammendment: violation. 

### 3. Standing was established as the contraband was removed from a personal safe. RR vol 22 States Exhibit No. 7 4. Affidavit for Search Warrant was sealed at the time of service 

### and did not travel with the Search Warrant. RR vol 22 Joint Exhibit no. 1. 

### 5. Search Warrant is ffacially invalid- as it fails to particularly 

### describe the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. RR vol 22 Joint Exhibit No. 2. 

### 6. Examining Trial Feb. 4th, 2013, Order from Examining Trial 

## signed April 8th 2013 of No Probable Cause for the specific offense of Sexual Assault. Now see CR page 90. Is this abuse of discretion?



# 6)ARGUMENT WITH AUTHORITIES

Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 44.4(a) Remediable Error of the Trial Court. The Record is Incomplete. All hearinqs and rulings and orders Pre-Ihdictment have been left out. Green v State 872 S.W.2d 717,721 (Tex Crim App 1994) "An examining trial ...is arguably a critical stage for purposes of Sixth Amendment analysis." The judge signed a final order of No Probable Cause ofii; the specific offense that the Court of Appeals continues to prevail on as it tries to keep this Invalid Affidavit for Search Warrant alive. order signed April 8th, 2013. State v Cullen 195 S.W.3d 696,700 (Tex Crim App 2006) "Because

•- ' '• '• -"" • ••"'• ' "' ' ••.•• -—I.. Il.l- ••••••• I. .1 • I ...n, ••••—•••• ••••I... ••••••- Wto I. II.. an Appellate Court's review of a Trial Court's ruling is re-'

•stricted by an inadequate record of the basis for the Trial Court's ruling, we find it necessary to require a Trial Court to express its findings of the fact and conclusions of law when requested by the losing party." If the court of appeals would have had a complete record of all proceedings in this case, Writ #07259, Cause No. 29110, the outcome would have been different.
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a) Constitutional Violation Court of Appels errored when it did not consider the full 4th Amendment to the Constitution of the Unitied States. The SHt 4th Amendment states that no warrants shall be issued without 

### 3 things - Probable Cause, Oath or Affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The Court of Appeals has used the wrong analysis. Tijerina

mum iii iii am ——m v State 334 S.W.3d 825,835 (Tex App - AmarilLo 2011, pet ref'd) "We review the harm resulting from a trial court's erroneous 

### denial of a motion to supress and subsequent admission of evidence obtained in violation of the [U.S. Const] Fourth Amendment under
——• v> " 

### the constitutional standard of the [TRAP] 44.2(a). Under 44.2(a) «*—__
— ' ——-——-—————————————— — "We evaluate the entire record in a aeutral, impartial, and even

### handed manner, not in the light most favorable to the prosectution." Pham v State 324 S.W.3d. 869, 874 (Tex Crim App - Houston [14th 

### Dist] 2010 pet ref'd) "Standing is a question of law which we m i / 

### review de novo... only after a defendant has established standing 

# C8)

### to complain may a court consider whether >he suffered a sub- i stantive Fourth Amendment or Art.l sec. 9 violation." 

### State v Daugherty 931 S.W.2d 268,270 (Tex Crim App 1996) 

### "The language of Art. 38.23 plainly does not accomadate a doctrine of inevitable discovery." Nowhere in the Affidavit for Search Warrant is it spoken or 

### suggested that a search of any locked boxes or safes would further the investigation. The officers removed the safe and took it inside the police station, Beyond the scope of what the warrant allows. The terms 'locked boxes' and 'safes* in the warrant is over-broad. They do not particularly describe. Rios v State 901 •* m mi i i i i ••• ••• i • 

### S.W.2d. 704,706 (Tex App - San Antonio 1995, no pet.) "Both the

'

— i Texas Constitution and [CCP] provide that a search warrant
—» •••••• i- ' • .I., ii— i—. ••" . ' i. i • • i i

— .i 

### describe the place to be searched Tas near as may ber. A valid search warrant must cgntain a description of the place to be searched [HI]- The description contained in the affidavit limits and controls the description contained in the warrant." The search warrant is facially invalid. Exactly what our 

### constitution is intekled to protect against. Warrants that are facially invalid and do not particularly describe can not be considered as anything but unreasonable. Groh v Ramirez 540 U.S. 551 (2004) The Supreme Court Justice Stevens held that: 

### (1) Search warrant that utterly failed to describe the persons 

### or things to be seized was invalid on its face, not withstand

### ing that requisite particularized description was provided «—h—— III nil- •• I I II I • •• » I I——^—!•——I—^—•-^—•^—i^——^^—1^^—1^^^^— in search wqrrant application; 

### (2) residential search that was conducted pursuant to this 

### facially invalid warrant could not be regarded as "reasonable" though items to be seized were described in search warrant 

### application and though officers conducting search exercised restraint in application; and «• 

## (3) agents who had prepared and executed warrant were not entitled to qualified immunity from liability. 

# CK"Search warrant that utterly failed to describe the persons or 

### things to be seized was invalid on its face... and where appli^ cation, having been sealed, did not accompany warrant. A facially invalid search warrant can not be cured by an incorporated aff- T - . . . _____ —' ' ' " ""*" ' ' " ^ idavit. Especially when the affidavit was sealed."



# Co)PRAYER «_IM*M_a__ Appellant prays this Honorable Court will qrant Discretionary Review in this case and reverse the judqement of the Court of Appeals and acquit him. Appellant further prays for all other lawful relief to which he my be entitled", at law or in equity. Sincerely Submitted,

Pro Se
Mark Eugene Engle 899 Fm 632 Kenedy, TX 78119 TDC#1958430



# 6t)CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoinq instrument was served on all parties to this petition 

### by U.S. Postal Service on J2.7 day of AlQ}fPAlMO(>y~ 2015.


# Mb* TFeKVL ItfVl ProSe

DECLARATION
i HefeBy swear under penalty of perjury that everything contained in this petition is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Pro Se

Mark Eugene Engle



# <r«oAPPENDIX
Copy of Opinion



# 6$In The 

## Court of Appeals 

## Sixth Appellate District ofTexas at Texarkana

No. 06-14-00239-CR

MARK EUGENE ENGLE, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee


### On Appeal from the 354th District Court Hunt County, Texas Trial CourtNo. 29,110

Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.



### Memorandum Opinion by Justice MoseleyMEMORANDUM OPINION 

### Mark Eugene Engle, charged with the manufacture or delivery ofmore than four grams but 

### less than 200 grams ofa controlledsubstance,1 filed a motion to suppress evidence. After this motion to suppress was denied by the trial court, Engle entered a plea ofguilty to the charge and 

### submitted the issueofpunishmentto a HuntCountyjury, whichassessed a life sentence.2 Engle has appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in its refusal to suppress the evidence obtained during a search afterthe issuance ofa search warrant. Engle attacks the search warrant on two fronts. First, he claims that the affidavit by Greenville Police Detective Felecia White, made in support ofits issuance, was insufficient to establish probable cause that evidence ofcriminal activity would be found. Second, he claims White made her affidavit with reckless disregard for the truth, and, therefore, the warrant was 

### invalid underFranks v. Delaware, 438U.S. 154 (1978).3 In hisbrief, although Engle questions why an alleged transientperson's word would be sufficiently reliable to supportthe issuance ofa search warrant and seems distressed that the affiant relies on hearsay upon hearsay in the affidavit
lSeeTEX. HEALTH & SAFETYCODE ANN. § 481.112(d) (West 2010). 2TheState alleged and proved two prior convictions for enhancement purposes. In making this claim, Engle seems to be relying on Harrisv.State,227 S.W.3d 83, 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56), which states, in part, Under Franks,a defendant who makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement was made in a warrant affidavit knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, may be entitledby the FourthAmendmentto ahearing, uponthe defendant's request. This hearing is requiredonly where the false statementis essentialto the probable cause finding. Ifat the hearing the defendant establishes the allegationofperjury or reckless disregard by a preponderanceofthe evidence, the affidavit's false material is set aside. Ifthe remaining content ofthe affidavit does not then still establish sufficient probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the evidence resulting from that search excluded.for the warrant, he neitherpoints out any apparent falsehood in the affidavit nor specifically says why the relied-upon information would be incorrect. I. Contents ofthe Affidavitfor Search Warrant Part ofEngle's complaint about Detective White's affidavit is that the facts attested to for 

### the issuance ofthe search warrant came from secondhandknowledge she obtained from the report of another Greenville police officer. White's affidavit stated that she had reviewed a report generated by Greenville Police Corporal Victor Petrea. The relied-uponreport described ameeting 

### between Petrea and a woman, Jane Doe,4 who told ofcoming to Greenville with a friend, Brooke 

### Addington.5 Thereport relates that Doe andAddington visited various friends in the city and eventually metup with a man named Mark. White's affidavit detailed the parties' actions, which 

### led to Doe being alone in Mark's car with him at a particular truck stop, which was a location specified in the affidavit. Doe described a drug transaction in which Markengaged, and then they drove toward Wolfe City in search ofotherdrug deals. At this point, Doe described Markpulling onto a back road, getting out ofthe car, opening Doe's door, strangling her, then binding her feet with a rope and her hands with a belt. According to Doe, Mark then took her to a Motel 6 in Greenville to what she believed was room number 123. Once in the room, although the report

"White's affidavitstated Jane Doe was a pseudonym, and she was assigned an identifyingnumber. At the suppression hearing, Doe was identified by her given name. We will refer to her by the pseudonym used in the trial court. See TEX.Code Crm. Proc. ANN. art. 57.02 (West Supp. 2014). 5The affidavit suggests Addington and Doe were not from Greenville. Subsequent investigation showed the motel room had been registered to a Mark Engle, who was shown to have a white Saturn, matching the description ofthe car given by Doe, registered to an address in Fort Worth. Engle's driver's license showed an address in Watagua. 3

### indicates that Mark sexually assaulted6 Doe repeatedly "for several hours," the report does not detail the assaults. Petrea's report, as rendered in White's affidavit, related that MarktookDoe on another drug-selling trip and then returned to the motel to further sexually assault her, with Doe reporting that "this time was worse that [sic] the othertime." Id. Doe went on to relate thatMark used a handheld video camera to film the rape, and she said that she also saw a computer with a lens mounted on it, leading her to believe that Mark was broadcasting the rape over the internet. Thereafter, Mark returned Doe to the car and went for another drive, during which she escaped when Mark stopped at a stop sign. Doe was rescued by police who were in a vehicle behind them. White's affidavit also describes hermeeting with Holly Robinson, the Executive Director ofthe Crisis Center ofNortheast Texas. Robinson told White that she had met with Doe at a local 

### hospital, where Doe described Engle's penile penetration ofDoe's mouth, vagina, and anus while in the room ofthe motel, saying further that Mark had ejaculated upon multiple places ofDoe's 

### body. "Jane Doe told Holly Robinson that Mark had injected what Jane Doe believed to be Methamphetamine into the vagina ofJane Doe. Jane Doe told Holly Robinson that Mark had injected methamphetamine into Mark's neck and could not complete the injection so Mark made Jane Doe finish injecting the Methamphetamine into Mark's neck." Doe also described to 

### Robinson that Engle had shaved her head with a set offace clippers. Doe described Mark as a forty-year-old white male "with a long tattoo ofa naked woman on [his] back and skulls tattooed on [his] forearms." 6Although the initialinvestigation was into Doe's allegation ofsexual assaults, a largeamountofmethamphetamine wasfoundin Engle's car, a discoverywhichled to the indictmentgivingrise to the trialin this matter. Thereis nothing in the record filed with this Court to indicate that Engle was indicted for anyofthe sexual assault offenses. 4Engle complains that affiant White relates information she gathered from an investigative report generated by Officer Petrea and from "facts she read from another officer." Engle does not consider the fact that information shared among law enforcementpersonnel can establish a basis for issuance ofa warrant. "Observations reported to the affiant by other officers engaged in the investigation can constitute a reliable basis for issuing a warrant." Gishv. State, 606 S.W.2d 883, 

### 886 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980) (citing UnitedStatesv. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965)). Engle claims that "one cannot discern from the four corners ofthe affidavit that entry in the hotel room will further the investigation." A close inspection ofWhite's affidavit shows that she says her proposed search would look for "[i]tems utilized in the offense ofAggravated Sexual Assault 

### offense [sic] consisting of body fluids, clothing items, towels, wash cloths, syringes, methamphetamine, video cameras, cellular telephones, 'SIM' cards for cellular telephones, 

### computers, items used for bindings." Based on the reported sexual assaults described in White's affidavit, the items which the search warrant indicates would be the objects ofthe search would 

### reasonably appear to be objects which could serve as evidence ofthe reported crimes. Even though Engle does not point out what he claims to be false statements contained in the affidavit, he maintains that the affidavit does not establish the reliability ofDoe. Because of 

### this, Engle claims that Doe should not be accorded any more credibilitythan one would attribute to a confidential informant. Using that rationale, Engle claims (without proffering any authority 

### for theposition), that Doe's statements required corroboration as apredicate to its beingused as the basis for a search warrant.

### Engle avers in his briefthat there is nothing in White's affidavit suggesting that the sexual acts related by Doe were committed without Doe's consent. We find this position belied by White's recitation that Doe told police Engle had bound her hands and her feet, took her to the motel, and sexually assaulted her as she remained bound. Engle took Doe out ofthe room, 

### allegedlyto sell drugs; he took her back to the room and sexuallyassaultedher again. These things hardly describe a willing participation by Doe in the sexual act. We also take Doe's description 

### of Engle injectingmethamphetamine into Doe's vagina and Engle's compellingDoe to assist him in injectingmethamphetamine into his neck as evidence from which the reviewing magistrate could reasonably inferthat the sexual activities were without Doe's consent. II. The Law on Suppression and Warrants 

### We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review, givingalmost totaldeference to the trial court's determination ofhistorical facts that turn on credibilityand demeanorwhile reviewingde novo otherapplication-of-law-to-factissues. See Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d644,652-53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Carmouchev. State, 10 S.W.3d 

### 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Appellate courts should also afford nearly total deference to 

### trial courtrulings onapplication-of-law-to-fact questions (alsosometimes calledmixedquestions 

### of lawandfact) if theresolution ofthose ultimate questions turnson factdeterminations, suchas an evaluationofcredibilityanddemeanor. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d85, 89 (Tex. Crim.App. 

### 1997). Appellate courts review mixed questions oflaw andfact notfalling within this category on a de novo basis. Id. We must affirm the trial court's decision if it is correct on any theory of 

### lawthatfinds supportintherecord. Osbournv. State,92S.W.3d531,538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)."Probable cause to supportthe issuance ofa search warrantexists where the facts submitted 

### to the magistrate are sufficient tojustify a conclusion that the object ofthe search is probably on the premises to be searched at the time the warrant is issued." Cassias v. State, 719 S.W.2d 585, 

### 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Reviewing a magistrate's issuance ofa search warrant, "we apply a highly deferential standard because ofthe constitutional preference for searches to be conducted pursuant to a warrant as opposed to a warrantless search. As long as the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed, we will uphold the magistrate's 

### probable cause determination." State v. McLain, 337 S.W.3d 268, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citations omitted). A reviewing court is "not to analyze the affidavit in a hyper-technical manner," but is to '"interpret the affidavit in a commonsensical and realistic manner, recognizing that the 

### magistrate may draw reasonable inferences. When in doubt, we defer to all reasonable inferences that the magistrate could have made.'" Id. (quoting Rodriguez v. State,232 S.W.3d 55, 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (footnote omitted)). We review a denial ofa motion to suppress to determine ifthat denial represents an abuse 

### ofdiscretion. Shepherdv. State,273 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). When we review a trial court's denial ofa motion to suppress, we give "almost total deference to a trial court's 

### express or implied determination of historical facts [while] review[ing] de novo the court's 

### application of the law ofsearch and seizure to those facts." Id. We '"view the evidence in the 

### lightmostfavorable to the trial court's ruling.'" Wiede v. State, 214S.W.3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quotingState v. Kelly, 204S.W.3d 808, 818(Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).

### "The law imposes no requirement that information provided by the victim ofan offense be corroborated to support issuance ofa warrant." Jarnagin v. State, 392 S.W.3d 223, 228 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, no pet.). In Jarnagan, the Amarillo Court ofAppeals found no abuse of discretion in a situation arising when the affidavit for search warrant related allegations made by the fourteen-year-old sexual assault complainant. The court found the trial court within its discretion to find the child's statements "sufficiently reliable to support a determination of 

### probable cause." Id. Further, inJackson v. State, 470 S.W.2d 201, 203 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971), the affiant was a police officer who had worked with the complainant, a rape victim. The victim identifiedJackson's photograph as a photo ofher attacker. The policeofficer's affidavit in support ofthe warrant stated that the affiant had good reason (based on the identification ofJackson in a 

### photograph) to believe that Jackson had committed the offense. The CourtofCriminal Appeals found that this photographic identification established the complainant's reliability "because she was the victim ofthe crime; and the underlying circumstances ofwhy she knew the appellant was her assailant were shown." Id. We can find no reason that Doe's information tendered to police 

### and set out in White's affidavit failed to sufficiently establishDoe's reliability in order to justify the issuance ofthe search warrant. 

### White's affidavit reflected the state ofthe investigation conducted by the Greenville Police 

### Department, and itwas proper forWhite to reference other officers' reports orinvestigations in her affidavit. Absent such practice, it may have beennecessary for multiple affidavits from 

### differentaffiantsbeobtainedtosupportasinglewarrant. Thefourcornersoftheaffidavitestablish 

### probable cause tobelieve atleast one sexual assault occurred inthe motel room described intheaffidavit. There was an indication thatneitherDoe norher attackerwere residents ofthe Greenville
area. Even so, the trial courtwas within its discretion to find probable cause in the affidavit's four

corners. III. No Franks Violation Shown 

### Engle also attacks White's affidavit as having been executed with a reckless disregard for 

### the truth. While Engle points to matters developed on cross-examination in the suppression hearing, he has not established that affiant White was either untruthful or that she exhibited a reckless disregard for the truth in her affidavit. 

### In support ofthis allegation, Engle points to his questioning ofWhite about her knowledge ofDoe's background and veracity. Q [By Engle's attorney] Y'all have absolutely no idea about her history, hertruthfulness or lack thereof, correct? A [By White] Correct. 

### Q She spins a tale for you and you fill out an affidavit for a search warrant, correct? A Yes. 

### Engle then points to White's statementthat she had only pursued three or four search warrants in 

### herthirty-one-yearcareeras aGreenvillepoliceofficer(aftereight yearsas a patrolofficer, White said she had been a detective the past twenty-three years). Engle complains that Doe was a 

### "transient person" notknown to Greenville police and that the lawenforcement officers did not corroborate the information Doe gave to them.

### As with other probable cause issues, our review ofa trial court's decision on aFranksissue is made pursuant to a dual standard: "We give almost total deference to a trial court's rulings on 

### questions ofhistorical fact and application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanorwhile we review de novo application-of-law-to-factquestions thatdo not turn on credibility and demeanor." Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652-53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The trial court considers the affidavit in support of a search warrant and any evidence offered by the party seeking suppression, since that party has claimed the affidavit contains false 

### statements. Statev. Verde, 432 S.W.3d 475, 481 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. refd) (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56). "As the sole fact-finder andjudge ofthe witnesses' credibility and 

### weight ofthe evidence, the trial court is owed great deference, and its ruling will be overruled only ifoutside the bounds ofreasonable disagreement." Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 462 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (per curiam). First, the word "transient" in reference to Doe's status was employed by Engle. White's 

### affidavit certainly provided the information that Doe and her friend resided outside Greenville and came there, spending their day visiting various people. At the hearing, Engle's trial attorney 

### capably developed the fact that local law enforcement was not familiar with Doe and that she was 

### likelyfrom outsideofGreenville. Drawingfrom thatinformation, one might inferthat Doe might be more difficult to locate or contact in the future than a permanent resident ofthe community. 

### The affidavit also stated that Doe had been raped multiple times by a man known to Doe as "Mark" and that the motel room she identified as the site ofsome ofthat activity was rented by a man 

### namedMarkEngle. ThefactthatDoewasnot alocal residentwasafactor whichtheissuerof the
10search warrant could take into account in the totality ofthe circumstances to be considered in the trial court's determination ofprobable cause. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in finding the existence ofprobable cause for the issuance ofthe warrant. 

### Under examination by Engle, White agreed that many ofDoe's statements could not be corroborated. The testimony at the suppression hearing to which Engle refers was as follows: 

### Q [ByEngle's attorney] Okay. So none ofthe information in the first ~ from page 2, 3, and down to that paragraph on page 4, none ofthat information that was provided was independently corroborated or verified; is that correct? A [By White] Well, that's what the victim alleged also, yes. 

### Q Exactly. You —the police were not able to corroborate anything that was said in those paragraphs? A Well, later on, yes. 

### Q No, no, no, ma'am, I'm talking about: At the time that you filled 

### out the search warrant, had the police made any effort to corroborate any ofthe 

### allegations to determine whether or not they were being given true information by [Jane Doe] or did theyjustrely on what she said? A Part ofthat is true, and then part ofthis says this is what Sergeant Walden verified. 

### Q All right. Well, let me get with you on that. A Okay. 

### Q SergeantWalden[7] verifiedthatMr. Engle wasstaying at theMotel 6; is that correct? A That's correct. 

### Q And he verified the room number, correct? 7White's affidavitalso said shespokebytelephonewithSergeantSteveWalden; sheincludedfacts learnedbyWalden in her affidavit. 11A Correct. Q And he verified the color and carthatMr. Engle was driving? A That's correct. Q And the fact thatMr. Engle was a white male with tattoos, correct? A I don't know about the tattoos; but yes, all that other, yes. Q Okay. That's all ofwhat [Jane Doe] told the officers that Sergeant Walden was able to corroborate, correct? A Yes. Q That's information, is it not, that anybody could have come in that 

### knew Mr. Engle or knew where he was staying could have provided to the police department, correct? Rather than finding that the issuance ofthe search warrant was fatally flawed due to the lack ofcorroboration for Doe's allegations, we find the record supports a reasonable inference by the trial court that based on the sexual assaults Doe had described to police, law enforcement 

### officers had corroborated what they could and then continued their investigation by seeking a warrant to search the room where the alleged assaults occurred. There is, however, a striking difference between a lack ofcorroboration and either a falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth. 

### More to the point, we find nothing in the record (and specifically nothing in the portions 

### of the recordto which Englerefers) to suggestthat White's affidavit contained falseinformation 

### or that sherecklessly disregarded thetruth. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial ofEngle's suppression motion.
12

### We overrule Engle's point oferror and affirm the trial court'sjudgment and sentence.

Date Submitted: October 27,2015 Date Decided: November 3,2015 Do Not Publish Bailey C. Moseley Justice

13

## Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District ofTexas
JUDGMENT

MarkEugene Engle, Appellant No. 06-14-00239-CR v. The State ofTexas, Appellee 

### Appeal from the 354th District Court of Hunt County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 29,110). Memorandum Opinion delivered by Justice 

### Moseley, ChiefJustice Morriss and Justice Burgess participating.


### As statedin the Court's opinion of this date, we find no error in thejudgmentof the court below. We affirm thejudgmentofthe trial court. 

### We note that the appellant, Mark Eugene Engle, has adequately indicatedhis inability to pay costs ofappeal. Therefore, we waive payment ofcosts.

ATTEST: Debra K. Autrey, Clerk RENDERED NOVEMBER 3, 2015 BY ORDER OF THE COURT JOSH R. MORRISS, III CHIEF JUSTICE