UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

MIGUEL CARRANZA; AMELIA SANCHEZ, as natural parents of Jesúa M.V. Carranza Sanchez, deceased, Plaintiffs–Appellants,

v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant–Appellee. No. 12-4149 (D.C. No. 2:07-CV-00291-DAK) (D. Utah)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before LUCERO , ANDERSON , and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs Miguel Carranza and Amelia Sanchez brought this suit pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2671-2680, after their child, Jesúa Miguel Valentin Carranz a Sánchez, was delivered stillborn. Following a bench trial, the district court ente red judgment in favor of the United

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not mate rially assist the de termination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### May 17, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court-2- States on plaintiffs’ medical malpractice/wrongful death claim. Proceeding pro se, plaintiffs appeal from the district court’s order denying their motion for reconsideration. Because th eir appellate issues relate to the sufficiency of the evidence and they did not provide an adequa te record on appeal, we must affirm the decision of the district court.
I Beginning on January 5, 2006, Mrs. Sa nchez was seen regul arly for prenatal visits at Mountainlands Community Health Center (“Mountainlands”). On April 19, 2006, late in her pregnancy, she was admitted to Moun tainlands after she stopped feeling movement of her baby. Tests at the hospital rev ealed no fetal heartbeat or movement, and an ultrasound examina tion confirmed the baby’s demise. Dr. Vernon White, the Mountainlands p hysician on call, induced labor and delivered a stillborn baby the next day. Dr . White noted that th e umbilical cord was wrapped tightly around the baby’s neck (“nucha l cord”). He told plaintiffs that the nuchal cord was the most likel y cause of the baby’s death. At trial, plaintiffs’ expert witness, Dr. Robert Romney, testified that the Mountainlands healthcare providers breached the applicable st andard of care in numerous ways during the time period leading up to the ba by’s death. The district court excluded some of Dr. Romney’s opini ons because they were not disclosed to the defense prior to trial. In any event, it concluded th at all of his opinions were-3- contradicted by other evidence and were outweighed by the testimony of the defendants’ expert obstetricia n, Dr. Robert Later. Relying on Dr. Later’s testimony, the dist rict court conclude d that “the most likely explanation of the stillbirth was fe tal asphyxia due to the nuchal cord, which was not caused by any act or omission of th e Mountainlands health care providers.” Accordingly, it granted judgment for the United States. Plaintiffs moved pro se for reconsideration of the verdic t, contending that their attorney had failed to presen t certain evidence relevant to their healthcare providers’ medical negligence. The district court cons trued their pleading as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion, and concluded that plaintiffs had failed to es tablish their entitlement to relief under that rule. It denied their motion. Plaintiffs appeal.
II Plaintiffs’ pro se notice of appeal is ambiguous. It is not clear which order they intended to appeal from: the underl ying judgment or the order denying their Rule 60(b) motion. The notice states th at they are appealing “from the final judgment [in] favor of defendants,” which seems to refer to the judgment on the district court’s bench trial verdict. Bu t immediately following this statement, the notice specifies that “the decision was signed on the 3r d of [A]ugust and was sent to the post office the 8th of [A]ugust 2012[.]” Those dates appear to correspond with the order denying their Rule 60(b) motion.-4- We note, however, that the notice of a ppeal was only timely as regarding the order denying Rule 60(b) relief. 1 The district court ente red its judgment on April 19, 2012. Plaintiffs did not file their Rule 60(b) motion until June 19, 2012. The motion was therefore not filed within twenty-eight days of the district court’s judgment and did not toll the sixty-day time period for seek ing review of that judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B)(i) (requiring notice of appeal be filed within sixty days in cases where United States is a party); 4(a)(4)(A )(vi) (tolling time period for notice of appeal where “the motion is filed no late r than 28 days after the judgment is entered”). The sixty days to appeal thus expired before pl aintiffs filed their notice of appeal on August 22, 2012. However, the notice of appeal is timel y to seek review of the order denying plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b) moti on, which was entered August 3, 2012. We therefore confine ourselves to reviewi ng the denial of that motion. We review the district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for an abuse of discreti on. Walters v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 703 F.3d 11 67, 1172 (10th Cir. 2013).
III Plaintiffs contend they were poorly se rved by their counsel at trial. They assert that counsel failed to present evidence in favor of their claim that should have

1 This court previously entered an order to show cause, instructing the plaintiffs to explain if a nd why their appeal was timely from the underlying final judgment entered April 19, 2012. We have considered plaintiffs’ arguments in response to the order, along with the response filed by defendants.-5- been brought to the district court’s attention. Even if this is true, an attorney’s ineffective representation in a civil case is not a basis for reversing the district court’s verdict. See Nelson v. Boeing Co., 446 F.3d 11 18, 1119 (10th Cir. 2006). 2 Through their pro se Rule 60(b) motion, plaintiffs attempted to persuade the district court to rehear a nd reweigh the evidence in favor of their claims. They attached numerous exhibits to their mo tion, which they contended required a different result. The distri ct court disagreed, concluding that most of the motion merely rehashed arguments made by plaintiffs’ counsel at trial, that plaintiffs failed to show that the evidence was “new” in th e sense that they discovered it after the trial, and that the evidence did not supp ort plaintiffs’ allega tions. In sum, it concluded that none of the evidence w ould produce a different result. On appeal, plaintiffs ag ain present issues relati ng to their alleged new evidence, which they contend demonstrates that the distri ct court should have granted their Rule 60(b) motion because a new tr ial with the additional evidence would probably have produced a different result. The district court’s ruling on their Rule 60(b) motion relied heavily on the evidence pr esented at trial as well as the evidence plaintiffs presented with their motion. Plaintiffs have not provided us with a complete trial transcript permitting review of the evidence presented at trial.

2 Plaintiffs complain that they did not have a Spanish- language translator during trial, except during their own testim ony. Because they were represented by counsel during trial, we view this as a complaint that th eir attorneys fa iled to obtain the services of a translator for them. Again, counsel’s in effective assist ance, even if proved, would not entitle plaintiffs to a reversal or retrial.-6- An adequate record on appeal, which allows us to examine the relevant materials and proceedings before the district court, is necessary for us to undertake appellate review. The burden is on plaintiffs to “provide all portions of the transcript necessary to give [us] a complete and accura te record of the proceedings related to the issues on appeal.” 10th Cir. R. 10.1(A)(1 ). Where an appellan t raises sufficiency of the evidence, “the entire re levant trial transcript must be provided.” Id. Because the record plaintiffs have pr esented does not contain a comple te trial transcript, it is inadequate for us to review both the sufficiency of the evid ence at trial and the effect of the alleged new evidence on the district c ourt’s verdict. We must therefore affirm the district court’s denial of pl aintiffs’ Rule 60(b) motion. See Roberts v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1098, 1104- 05 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1998). IV
We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of pl aintiffs’ Rule 60(b) motion. We GRANT plaintiffs’ motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

Entered for the Court

Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge