alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In connection with the Quarterly Report of International Packaging and Logistic Group, Inc., (the "Company") on Form 10Q for the period ending June 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Steve Westlund, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec.
1350, as adopted pursuant to Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of the undersigned’s knowledge and belief:





(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.








/s/ Steve Westlund


Steve Westlund


Chief Financial Officer





August 7, 2009
In the United States Court of Federal Claims 

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 19-0135V

UNPUBLISHED

MARGUERITE BRADLEY,

 Petitioner,

v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES,

 Respondent.

Chief Special Master Corcoran 

Filed: March 2, 2020

Special Processing Unit (SPU);

Ruling on Entitlement; Concession;

Table Injury; Influenza (Flu) Vaccine;

Shoulder Injury Related to Vaccine 

Administration (SIRVA)

Bridget Candace McCullough, Muller Brazil, LLP, Dresher, PA, for petitioner.

Althea Walker Davis, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

RULING ON ENTITLEMENT1

On January 28, 2019, Marguerite Bradley filed a petition for compensation under 

the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.

2

(the 

“Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that she suffered left shoulder injuries related to 

vaccine administration (“SIRVA”) as a result of an influenza (“flu”) vaccine received on

November 29, 2017. Petition at 1. The case was assigned to the Special Processing 

Unit of the Office of Special Masters.

On February 28, 2020, Respondent filed his Rule 4(c) report in which he

concedes that Petitioner is entitled to compensation in this case. Respondent’s Rule 

4(c) Report at 1. Specifically, Respondent agrees “that petitioner has satisfied the 

 

1 Because this unpublished ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I am 

required to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website in accordance with the EGovernment Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of 

Electronic Government Services). This means the ruling will be available to anyone with access to 

the internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to 

redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of 

privacy. If, upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such 

material from public access. 

2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for 

ease of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. 

§ 300aa (2012).
2

criteria set forth in the Vaccine Injury Table and the Qualifications and Aids to 

Interpretation for a SIRVA injury: petitioner had no history of pain, inflammation, or 

dysfunction in her left shoulder; her pain and reduced range of motion occurred within

48 hours of receipt of an intramuscular vaccination; her symptoms were limited to the 

shoulder in which the vaccine was administered; and no other condition or abnormality 

was identified to explain her symptoms.” Id. at 3-4. 

In view of Respondent’s position and the evidence of record, I find that 

Petitioner is entitled to compensation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Brian H. Corcoran

Brian H. Corcoran

Chief Special Master
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Timothy BROOKS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-6187.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 22, 2006.

Decided: June 29, 2006.

Timothy Brooks, Appellant Pro Se. John Francis Purcell, Jr., Office of the United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

*386Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Timothy Brooks seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed.

When the United States or its officer or agency is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed no more than sixty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order, Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(B), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” *Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr.,*434 U.S. 257, 264, 98 S. Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (quoting *United States v. Robinson,*361 U.S. 220, 229, 80 S.Ct. 282, 4 L.Ed.2d 259 (1960)).

The district court’s order was entered on the docket on August 24, 2005. The notice of appeal was filed on January 27, 2006. Because Brooks failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. Brooks’ motion for appointment of counsel is denied. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
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</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Shane COWLEY, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 06-6621.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 15, 2006.

Decided: June 21, 2006.

Shane Cowley, Appellant Pro Se. Kasey Warner, United States Attorney, Michael Lee Keller, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Before KING, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Shane Cowley seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. The order is not appeal-able unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dis-positive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. *Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir.2001). We have independently reviewed the rec*409ord and conclude that Cowley has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
<PAGE>
 
                                                                   Exhibit 10.33
                                                                   -------------

                                   AMENDMENT
 
                                    to the

                    THE AMETEK SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT PLAN
                    --------------------------------------

                                Amendment No. 7
                                ---------------


          WHEREAS, there was adopted and made effective as of October 1, 1984,
The AMETEK Savings and Investment Plan (the "Plan"); and

          WHEREAS, the Plan was amended and restated in its entirety, effective
October 1, 1992; and

          WHEREAS, Section 10.1 of the Plan provides that AMETEK, Inc.
("AMETEK") may amend the Plan at any time, and from time to time; and

          WHEREAS, AMETEK now desires to amend the Plan in certain respects;

          NOW, THEREFORE, the Plan is hereby amended as follows:

          FIRST: A new Appendix X is hereby added to the Plan, to read in its
          -----                                         
entirety as follows:

                                  "APPENDIX X

                     SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO CERTAIN
                      EMPLOYEES OF THE MICROFOAM DIVISION
                      -----------------------------------

          1.  Notwithstanding any other provision of the Plan to the contrary,
     each Participant who was an Employee in the Company's Microfoam Division
     and who transferred his employment on the closing date of the sale of the
     Microfoam Division to Astro-Valcour, Inc., pursuant to the Asset Purchase
     Agreement dated March 21, 1995, shall be entitled to one hundred percent
     (100%) of his Employer Contribution Account regardless of the number of
     Years of Service he completed prior to the closing date of the sale.

          2.  Defined terms used in this Appendix X shall have the same meaning
     as the identical defined terms as used in The AMETEK, Inc. Savings and
     Investment Plan."

          SECOND:  The provisions of this Amendment No. 7 shall be effective as
          ------                                                               
of the closing date of the sale to Astro-Valcour, Inc.
 
          IN WITNESS WHEREOF, AMETEK has caused these presents to be executed,
in its corporate name, by its duly authorized officer, and its corporate seal to
be affixed on this 15th day of May, 1995.


                                 AMETEK, Inc.
 

                                 By: /s/ Robert W. Yannarell
                                    ----------------------------

Attest:


  /s/ Dorothy M. Misetic
 -------------------------------
(Seal)
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                         1,092,178
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  216,188
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               1,432,255
<PP&E>                                         0
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 15,473,264
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          1,144,724
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    70
<COMMON>                                       1,034
<OTHER-SE>                                     11,206,201
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   15,473,264
<SALES>                                        4,605,927
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               4,605,927
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  3,527,511
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             597,921
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                1,068,391
<INCOME-TAX>                                   344,082
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            724,309
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   724,309
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  .05
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  .05
        


</TABLE>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 21
- 0115 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. ALEXANDER KIM TORPPE ,

Defendant and Appellant .

**GRANT** Pursuant to authority granted under Mont. R. App. P. 26(1), the Appellant is given an extension of time until June 1 8 , 2021, to prepare, file, and serve the Appellant’s opening brief.

Electronically signed by: Bowen Greenwood Clerk of the Supreme Court May 20 2021

05/20/2021

Case Number: DA 21-0115
# Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed September 28, 2016.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D15-2396

Lower Tribunal No. 04-9793-B

________________



### Jorge Slaughter,

Appellant,

vs.



### The State of Florida

, Appellee.

An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from the

Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Jose L. Fernandez

, Judge.

Jorge Slaughter

, in proper person.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Sandra Lipman, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Before SUAREZ, C.J., and WELLS and LOGUE, JJ.

SUAREZ, C.J.

This is an appeal from an order summarily denying Defendant’s postconviction motion to correct his sentence. The Order ostensibly denies thedefendant’s motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). On

appeal from a summary denial, this Court must reverse unless the postconviction

record shows conclusively that the appellant is entitled to no relief. See Fla. R.

App. P. 9.141(b)(2) (A) and (D).

Because the postconviction record now before this Court fails to make the

required showing, we reverse the order and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion. First, the trial court order is facially inconsistent in

that it is captioned “Order Denying” defendant’s motion, but within the body of the

order it states that the court “hereby grants the Defendant’s Motion to Correct

Illegal Sentence by: ....” However, further within the body of the Order, it states

that the motion is “hereby DENIED.”

Additionally, the Order recites some history of Defendant’s sentencing in

this case and makes reference to an affirmation of a later sentence imposed after a

violation and goes on to state: “[t]he defendant is once again incorrect as to his

sentence, as such this motion is legally and factually wrong” but provides no

elaboration of what portion of the motion is incorrect or what impact the

resentencing had with regard to the claims made in Defendant’s present motion.

Neither the trial court nor the State provided any record documentation to

substantiate the Order. If the trial court again enters an order summarily denying

the post-conviction motion, the court shall attach record excerpts that specifically

2address the appellant’s sentencing argument and conclusively show that the

appellant is not entitled to any relief.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

3
#### Joan E. JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Peter GEREN, The Honorable, Acting Secretary, Department of the Army, Defendant—Appellee, v. Brianna Skinner-Harris, Movant.

No. 09-1081.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 29, 2009.

Decided: May 13, 2009.

Joan E. Jackson, Appellant Pro Se. Alex Gordon, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Dr. Joan E. Jackson appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the Honorable Peter Geren, Acting Secretary, Department of the Army, on her claim for retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Jackson v. Geren,*No. 8:07-cv-00851-AW (D.Md. Nov. 14, 2008). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
BG

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 19-0545

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

RANDY CHRISTOPHER ARCHIBALD SR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellee’s motion for a 30-day extension of time, and

good cause appearing therefor, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellee is granted an extension of time to 

and including December 30, 2020, within which to prepare, serve, and file its 

response brief.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

November 18 2020

11/18/2020

Case Number: DA 19-0545
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Nelson ARMSTRONG, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-7246.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Oct. 23, 2006.

Decided: Nov. 3, 2006.

Michael Nelson Armstrong, Appellant Pro Se. Steve R. Matheny, Office of the United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

*198PER CURIAM:

Michael Nelson Armstrong seeks to appeal the district court’s orders dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion and denying his application for a certificate of appealability. The order dismissing Armstrong’s § 2255 motion is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. *Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir.2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Armstrong has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*