NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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Nos. 23-1126, 23-1137, 23-1138, 23-1141, 23-1166

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JUAN CRESPO a/k/a PAPO, ASNAY FERNANDEZ, ISMAEL MANZANO-SUAREZ, 

FELIX CASTILLO a/k/a Mayito, & CARLOS DUVERGEL,

Appellants

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On Appeal from the District Court 

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Nos. 3:19-cr-00922-002, 3:19-cr-00922-004, 3:19-cr-00922-005, 

3:19-cr-00922-003, 3:19-cr-00922-001)

District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan

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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

on June 24, 2024

Before: KRAUSE, RESTREPO, & MATEY, Circuit Judges

(Filed: July 17, 2024)

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OPINION*

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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding 

precedent.
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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

Appellants Juan Crespo, Asnay Fernandez, Ismael Manzano-Suarez, Felix 

Castillo, and Carlos Duvergel appeal their federal convictions for transportation of stolen 

property in interstate commerce and conspiracy to transport stolen property in interstate 

commerce. Discerning no error, we will affirm.

I. DISCUSSION1

Appellants argue that (1) the District Court abused its discretion by allowing 

Yunior Estevez to testify that Appellants assaulted him; (2) the District Court erred in 

admitting evidence of Appellants’ guilty pleas in state court; (3) the District Court erred 

when it permitted the Government to introduce evidence that the stolen goods were worth 

$2.25 million but precluded Appellants from rebutting that testimony; (4) the 

Government violated the rule set forth in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), by 

eliciting and failing to correct false testimony; and (5) the District Court erred by

allowing a police detective to comment on surveillance footage shown to the jury. We 

address each of these arguments in turn, but none is persuasive. 

1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for abuse of discretion both a district 

court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence, see United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196,

213–14 (3d Cir. 2009), and its decision to limit cross-examination, see United States v. 

Fattah, 914 F.3d 112, 180 (3d Cir. 2019). An error under the Federal Rules of Evidence 

warrants reversal only if it prejudiced the defendant; a harmless error does not require 

reversal. See United States v. Browne, 834 F.3d 403, 416 (3d Cir. 2016). Finally, because 

Appellants failed to object at trial, we apply plain-error review to their claim that the 

Government elicited and failed to correct false testimony under Napue v. Illinois, 360 

U.S. 264 (1959). See United States v. Cardena, 842 F.3d 959, 976 (7th Cir. 2016). 
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First, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Estevez to testify 

that the Appellants threatened and assaulted him because that testimony was intrinsic 

evidence of a criminal conspiracy. It is true, as Appellants point out, that under Federal 

Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1), evidence of “any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible 

to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person 

acted in accordance with the character.” But this limitation does not apply to “intrinsic 

evidence”—including evidence of acts that directly prove the charged offense or “acts 

performed contemporaneously with the charged crime . . . if they facilitate the 

commission of the charged crime,” United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 249 (3d Cir. 

2010) (citation omitted)—because such evidence is “part and parcel of the charged 

offense,” United States v. Williams, 974 F.3d 320, 357 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

And here, the District Court correctly determined that Estevez’s testimony about the

assault qualified as intrinsic evidence because the assault occurred within the “temporal 

parameters” of the charged crime, United States v. Bailey, 840 F.3d 99, 128 (3d Cir. 

2016), and reflects a concerted effort to recover the profits of “a conspiratorial agreement 

or [in] furtherance of the conspiracy’s illegal objectives,” Williams, 974 F.3d at 357.

Second, there was no error in the District Court’s stipulation that Appellants were 

lawfully arrested for attempted burglary in May 2018. Contrary to Appellants’ assertion, 

the Court did not “force” Appellants to enter that stipulation. United States v. Duvergel, 

629 F. Supp. 3d 246, 259 (D.N.J. 2022). Instead, it was Appellants who suggested the 

stipulation while the Court was considering whether the state plea colloquies were 

admissible. Having voluntarily agreed to that stipulation during trial, Appellants “invited 
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any error and cannot complain now.” United States v. Kolodesh, 787 F.3d 224, 231 (3d 

Cir. 2015); see also United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 660 (3d Cir. 1993) (“A 

defendant cannot complain on appeal of alleged errors invited or induced by himself, 

particularly where, as here, it is not clear that the defendant was prejudiced thereby.”

(citation omitted)). 

Third, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by limiting Appellants’ crossexamination concerning the financial loss sustained because of the burglary. District 

courts have “wide discretion in limiting cross-examination,” United States v. Casoni, 950 

F.2d 893, 918 (3d Cir. 1991), and may impose such limits when the cross-examination 

would be “repetitive or only marginally relevant,” United States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 

342, 356 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)). 

That was the case here: The District Court did not allow defense counsel to crossexamine the owner of the burglarized warehouse about her testimony that the company 

lost $2.25 million in inventory because the exact amount of the loss was not relevant to 

the jury’s determination of guilt. The Government only had to prove a loss of more than 

$5,000 under 18 U.S.C. § 2314, and Appellants did not dispute that the loss exceeded that 

amount. 

Fourth, any false testimony that Estevez offered about his cooperation agreement 

with the Government was promptly corrected. It is well-established that “a conviction 

obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State, 

must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Napue, 360 U.S. at 269; see also United 

States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976) (noting Napue’s rule applies to the federal 
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government under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause). Here, Appellants 

contend that the Government failed to correct two misrepresentations that Estevez made 

about his cooperation agreement with the Government. First, Appellants assert that 

Estevez lied when he testified that he faced up to ten years in prison for transporting 

stolen goods in interstate commerce and up to five years in prison for conspiring to 

transport stolen goods in interstate commerce. But the cross-examination testimony 

correctly reflected Estevez’s sentencing exposure under federal law, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 

371, 2314, and Estevez’s cooperation agreement did not change the statutory maximum 

terms that he faced. Rather, the Government agreed to “move the sentencing judge” to 

depart from the Sentencing Guidelines, and the agreement made clear that the 

Government’s recommendation did not bind the District Court in any way. App. 1364. 

Second, Appellants contend that Estevez lied when he stated that the Government had not 

“made any promises for [him]” in exchange for his testimony. Opening Br. 33 (citing 

App. 642). Even if this testimony was misleading, however, Estevez corrected it by 

acknowledging on cross-examination that the Government had made a commitment to 

“request to [the District Court] a lower sentence.” App. 823–24. This testimony clarified 

any ambiguity from Estevez’s initial testimony and discharged the Government’s duty to 

correct the purported misrepresentation.

Finally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by allowing a police officer 

to testify about his investigation into the November 2017 burglary while the jury viewed 

surveillance footage of the incident. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, a lay witness

may only offer opinion testimony that is “rationally based on the witness’s perception,” 
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“helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in 

issue,” and “not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge[.]” Appellants argue that the Court should not have allowed a police officer 

to “provide narration” of the surveillance footage shown to the jury because that 

testimony was not based on the officer’s perception as an eyewitness. Opening Br. 42.

But this mischaracterizes the officer’s testimony. The officer did not merely narrate the 

video, but rather testified about how the video informed his investigation and explained 

how details in the video led him to particular conclusions during that investigation, so the 

admission was not in error. That testimony was “rationally based on the [officer’s] 

perception” because it was based on his personal familiarity with the crime scene and 

with his investigation. See United States v. Fulton, 837 F.3d 281, 301 (3d Cir. 2016) 

(explaining that a lay witness could offer testimony about a crime scene that he was 

“personally familiar with” even though he was not present when the crime occurred). 

II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.