IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

In re the Marriage of: No. 48132-4-II

ARACELI FELIX,

 Appellant,

 v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LUIS MELENDEZ,

 Respondent.

MELNICK, J. — Araceli Felix appeals the trial court’s order granting Luis Melendez 

permission to permanently relocate their two daughters from Washington to Florida and denying 

her petition for a modification of the parenting plan to make her the primary residential parent. 

We conclude that the trial court did not err by granting the petition for relocation, denying the 

petition for modification, or denying Felix’s motion for reconsideration. We do not consider 

whether the trial court erred in its evidentiary rulings. We affirm.

FACTS

Felix and Melendez married on October 5, 2007. They had two daughters. Felix and 

Melendez separated on April 1, 2011. 

On March 8, 2012, Felix served Melendez with a petition for dissolution of their marriage. 

Richard Bartholomew became the guardian ad litem (GAL) for the children. 

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

March 14, 2017
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The superior court entered a final parenting plan and ordered that upon enrollment in 

school, the children would primarily reside with Melendez. It also ordered that the children were 

not to be left alone with Virgilio Martin Rodriguez, Felix’s fiancé, and that Rodriguez obtain a 

domestic violence assessment. 

Felix alleged Amica Santiago, Melendez’s wife, abused the children and filed two ex parte 

motions for restraining orders against Santiago. The trial court temporarily placed the children

with Felix, and restrained Melendez from allowing the children to be around Santiago. After a 

hearing, the trial court denied Felix’s motions. The trial court ordered both Felix and Melendez to 

complete mental health evaluations. The trial court again appointed Bartholomew as the GAL for 

the children. Finally, the trial court ordered the parties to return to the previous parenting schedule. 

Melendez filed a notice of intended relocation to Florida.1 Felix filed an objection to 

relocation, a motion to restrain any temporary relocation, and a petition for a major modification 

of the parenting plan. After a hearing on the motion, the superior court allowed the relocation on 

a temporary basis. 

II. TRIAL

The trial court held a trial on both Felix’s petition for a major modification of the parenting 

plan and Melendez’s petition for permanent relocation. 

Bartholomew did not see any grounds for a modification of the parenting plan, and he did 

not find abuse in either household, nor did Child Protective Services (CPS). Bartholomew testified 

that the only applicable modification factor was that the children’s present environment was 

detrimental to the children’s physical, mental or emotional health, and the likely harm to be caused 

 

1 This document is not included in the record on appeal. In addition, Felix’s motion for a major 

modification of the parenting plan related to the alleged abuse by Santiago is also not included in 

the record on appeal. 
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by a change was outweighed by the advantage of a change. He did not see anything negative in 

Melendez’s house that would warrant a modification. Bartholomew testified that the children 

reported to their counselors that Felix told them that Santiago was mean to them and that Melendez 

did not love them. When Bartholomew spoke with the children about statements they made about 

alleged abuse by Santiago, they could not provide him with details; they would respond, “Well, 

that’s what mom told us.” 1 Report of Proceedings (RP) at 28. Bartholomew did believe that 

Santiago had been “rougher with [one of the children]” but not to the level of abuse. 1 RP at 28. 

CPS determined any referrals either “unfounded” or lacking a need for investigation. 1 RP at 28.

Bartholomew visited the children in Felix’s home. He observed the children to be 

comfortable there. They were comfortable with both Felix and Rodriguez. Bartholomew also had 

a Skype conversation with the children after they moved to Florida. He also observed that in their 

Skype conversation, Melendez’s Florida house looked appropriate, the children were “clearly 

comfortable” and “clearly happy where they were.” 1 RP at 34. When he observed the children 

in Melendez’s home, the children were very comfortable with Santiago. He did note that in the 

past, Felix had problems getting one of the children to school on time, even though they lived 

within walking distance. 

Melendez testified that he moved to Florida with the children, approximately 25 to 30 

minutes from Orlando. Their new house in Florida was a three bedroom, two bathroom house 

with an office. Melendez enrolled the girls in a highly rated elementary school in Florida. 

Melendez testified that he moved in “good faith” because he was subject to a layoff, and 

neither party had family in Washington, but he and the children had an established support system 

in Florida, including extended family. 2 RP at 268. Melendez worked at Joint Base Lewis-
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McChord (JBLM) as a helicopter mechanic. He quit because Santiago acquired a position in 

Florida and moved there with her own children. 

Melendez testified that disrupting the children’s contact with him would impose a safety 

risk to the children. The children did not have serious problems in school and were doing well in 

Florida. He also opined that if the court prevented the relocation, it would put their education at 

risk because Felix had difficulty getting one of the children to school on time or at all when they 

lived close to the school. 

Melendez testified that the children have a bond with both sets of parents, and they have a 

bond with their step-siblings and half-siblings, but he was the primary residence for two years and 

two months. 

Felix also testified that the children had a great bond with both herself and Melendez. The 

children were close to both their step-siblings and their half-siblings. Felix believed that disrupting 

the children’s relationship with Melendez would be “less beneficial for their emotional wellbeing.” 2 RP at 305. She testified that her daughters told their counselors and CPS reporters that 

they would prefer to live with her. 

Felix believed that she opposed the relocation in good faith because she did not have the 

financial means to relocate to Florida and would be unable to move to Florida for another five to 

six years. In addition, she could not move because her fiancé and father of her other two children, 

Rodriguez, was in the military and assigned to a unit at JBLM. 

After hearing the evidence and asking specific questions of both parents related to the 

relocation factors, the trial court expressed its findings on each factor on the record. The trial court 

concluded that the evidence supported permitting Melendez to relocate the children. The trial 

court denied Felix’s modification petition. The trial court entered a final parenting plan and order 
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on relocation that permitted Melendez to relocate the children with specific findings on each 

relocation factor. The order denied Felix’s motion for a major modification. 

Felix filed a motion for reconsideration of the parenting plan and relocation order. She 

argued that the children’s physical, mental, and emotional well-being were in danger based on a 

recent incident in Florida, where she alleged in her declaration Melendez joined a “cult” that calls 

itself a church. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 420. In the declaration, Felix stated Melendez called the 

police because Santiago would not let him take the children to a meeting of the cult. Felix further 

stated that from the information she received from Santiago, “this has been going on for a year.” 

CP at 423. Felix included an e-mail from Santiago, which stated that the church or cult in 

Washington was a few people in a house, and in Florida, it was based in a hotel. Felix included 

screen shots of text messages with Santiago that also stated that Melendez previously participated 

in this church while living in Washington. 

The trial court denied Felix’s motion for reconsideration in a written order without oral 

argument because it found that none of the allegations raised by Felix constituted newly discovered 

evidence under CR 59. Felix appeals.

ANALYSIS

I. NONCOMPLIANCE WITH RAP’S 

As an initial matter, neither Felix nor Melendez complied with the Rules of Appellate 

Procedure in their briefs. Both parties are self-represented litigants (SRL’s). In general, SRL’s 

are held to the same standard and rules of procedure as attorneys. In re Marriage of Olson, 69 

Wn. App. 621, 626, 850 P.2d 527 (1993).

RAP 10.3(a)(5) requires a party to make “[a] fair statement of the facts and procedure 

relevant to the issues presented” and include “[r]eference to the record . . . for each factual 
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statement.” Both parties provided minimal citations to the record to support their statement of the 

facts or their arguments. The purpose of this rule is to enable the court and opposing counsel to 

efficiently and expeditiously review the accuracy of the factual statements made in the briefs. 

Litho Color, Inc. v. Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 98 Wn. App. 286, 305-06, 991 P.2d 638 (1999). We 

disregard any alleged facts not supported by the record. Lemond v. Dep’t of Licensing, 143 Wn. 

App. 797, 807, 180 P.3d 829 (2008).

Felix argues that the trial court violated her right to a fair trial and due process because it 

made “comments at the September 2015 hearings indicating the judge had decided the case prior 

to hearing testimony.” Br. of Appellant at 25. She does not indicate which specific comments she 

challenges. We are not required to search the record to locate the portions relevant to a litigant’s 

arguments, and we decline to do so with respect to these arguments. Cowiche Canyon 

Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 819, 828 P.2d 549 (1992). In addition, “parties raising 

constitutional issues must present considered arguments to this court. . . . ‘[N]aked castings into 

the constitutional sea are not sufficient to command judicial consideration and discussion.’” City 

of Tacoma v. Price, 137 Wn. App. 187, 200-01, 152 P.3d 357 (2007) (quoting State v. Johnson, 

119, Wn.2d 167, 171, 829 P.2d 1082 (1992)). We decline to consider this issue. 

II. EVIDENTIARY CHALLENGES

Felix assigns error to the trial court’s refusal “to enter evidence into the exhibit list” and 

“to [allow] witness(s) to speak about abuse within the home of the father despite that the evidence 

pertaining to the adequate cause which is the reason why the [trial] was initially started.” Br. of 

Appellant at 4. We do not consider these issues. 

Felix provides no citation to the record or authority for either of these assignments of error. 

Because Felix provides no substantive argument on these assignments of error, we do not consider 
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them. RAP 10.3(a)(6); In re Marriage of Fahey, 164 Wn. App. 42, 59, 262 P.3d 128 (2011). As 

stated above, we are not required to search the record to locate the portions relevant to a litigant’s 

arguments, and we decline to do so with respect to these arguments. Cowiche Canyon, 118 Wn.2d 

at 819. 

III. RELOCATION 

Felix argues that the trial court erred by granting the relocation and entering the new 

parenting plan because substantial evidence did not support the decision. We disagree.

A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Washington’s Child Relocation Act provides procedural and substantive rules for a primary 

custodial parent to relocate the children. RCW 26.09.405–.560; In re Custody of Osborne, 119 

Wn. App. 133, 140, 79 P.3d 465 (2003). “If a person entitled to residential time or visitation 

objects to a child’s relocation, the person seeking to move the child may not relocate the child 

without court approval.” In re Marriage of McNaught, 189 Wn. App. 545, 553, 359 P.3d 811 

(2015), review denied, 185 Wn.2d 1005 (2016).

RCW 26.09.520 provides the framework under which a court must decide if a parent can 

relocate the children. First, the person proposing the relocation must provide his or her reasons 

for the intended relocation. RCW 26.09.520. There is a rebuttable presumption that the intended 

relocation will be permitted. RCW 26.09.520. The basis for this “‘presumption’” is that a “‘fit 

parent will act in the best interests of [his or her] child.’” In re Marriage of Horner, 151 Wn.2d 

884, 895, 93 P.3d 124 (2004) (quoting Osborne, 119 Wn. App. at 144). A party may object to the 

relocation by demonstrating that “the detrimental effect of the relocation outweighs the benefit of 

the change to the child and the relocating person” based on consideration of 11 child relocation 

factors. RCW 26.09.520. “Upon a proper objection, a trial court must conduct a fact-finding 
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hearing on the proposed move.” McNaught, 189 Wn. App. at 553. The person opposing the 

relocation must rebut the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. McNaught, 189 Wn. 

App. at 553-54. 

A trial court has discretion to grant or deny a relocation after considering all 11 relocation 

factors contained in RCW 26.09.520. Horner, 151 Wn.2d at 894; Fahey, 164 Wn. App. at 56. We 

defer to the trial court’s relocation ruling unless it is an abuse of discretion. Horner, 151 Wn.2d 

at 893. A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on 

untenable grounds or untenable reasons. Horner, 151 Wn.2d at 893. 

The relocation factors are not weighted and no inference is to be drawn from the order in 

which they are listed, include:

(1) The relative strength, nature, quality, extent of involvement, and 

stability of the child’s relationship with each parent, siblings, and other significant 

persons in the child’s life;

(2) Prior agreements of the parties;

(3) Whether disrupting the contact between the child and the person with 

whom the child resides a majority of the time would be more detrimental to the 

child than disrupting contact between the child and the person objecting to the 

relocation;

(4) Whether either parent or a person entitled to residential time with the 

child is subject to limitations under RCW 26.09.191 [which limits residential time 

if the parent has engaged in willful abandonment, abuse, domestic violence or 

assault];

(5) The reasons of each person for seeking or opposing the relocation and 

the good faith of each of the parties in requesting or opposing the relocation;

(6) The age, developmental stage, and needs of the child, and the likely 

impact the relocation or its prevention will have on the child’s physical, 

educational, and emotional development, taking into consideration any special 

needs of the child;

(7) The quality of life, resources, and opportunities available to the child 

and to the relocating party in the current and proposed geographic locations;

(8) The availability of alternative arrangements to foster and continue the 

child’s relationship with and access to the other parent;

(9) The alternatives to relocation and whether it is feasible and desirable for 

the other party to relocate also;
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(10) The financial impact and logistics of the relocation or its prevention; 

and

(11) For a temporary order, the amount of time before a final decision can 

be made at trial.[2]

RCW 26.09.520. 

“When considering whether a trial court abused its discretion by allowing relocation, we 

first look to see if the trial court entered specific findings of fact on each factor.” Bay v. Jensen, 

147 Wn. App. 641, 655, 196 P.3d 753 (2008). “The trial court must enter specific findings on each 

factor, or parties must have presented substantial evidence on each factor with the trial court 

making findings and oral articulations that reflect its consideration of each.” McNaught, 189 Wn. 

App. at 556. The trial court abuses it discretion when it fails to consider each factor or satisfy 

either method of documenting its consideration of the factors. McNaught, 189 Wn. App. at 556; 

Bay, 147 Wn. App. at 655. 

We uphold trial court findings that are supported by substantial evidence. In re Marriage 

of McDole, 122 Wn.2d 604, 610, 859 P.2d 1239 (1993). “‘Substantial evidence exists if the record 

contains evidence of sufficient quantity to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of 

the declared premise.’” In re Marriage of Griswold, 112 Wn. App. 333, 339, 48 P.3d 1018 (2002) 

(quoting Bering v. SHARE, 106 Wn.2d 212, 220, 721 P.2d 918 (1986)). We review conclusions 

of law to determine whether factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence in turn 

support the conclusions. In re Marriage of Myers, 123 Wn. App. 889, 893, 99 P.3d 398 (2004).

B. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS ON FACTORS

The trial court heard testimony on each of the factors from both the parents and the GAL. 

The trial court filed written findings on the each of the relocation factors. In addition, in its oral 

 

2 The eleventh factor is not relevant to this case since it does not involve a temporary relocation.
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ruling, the trial court articulated its consideration of each of the factors. We view the written order 

as implicitly embodying any findings made by the court, and we look to the oral ruling, which was 

consistent with the written order, to help interpret these implicit findings. In re Marriage of 

Kimpel, 122 Wn. App. 729, 735, 94 P.3d 1022 (2004). Accordingly, we must determine whether 

substantial evidence supported each factor and reflected its consideration of each in its findings. 

McNaught, 189 Wn. App. at 556.

Felix does not assign error to any of the trial court’s findings in its order, rendering them 

verities on appeal. Postema v. Pollution Control Hr’gs Bd., 142 Wn.2d 68, 100, 11 P.3d 726 

(2000).

We have reviewed the record and conclude that substantial evidence supports each of the 

trial court’s findings of fact on every relocation factor. In addition, the trial court’s conclusions of 

law allowing the relocation are supported by its findings of fact. The trial court did not abuse its 

discretion. 

IV. MODIFICATION 

Felix also challenges the trial court’s denial of her petition for a major modification of the 

parenting plan and its denial to make her the primary custodial parent. The trial court did not abuse 

its discretion. 

A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

We consider a challenge to a modification ruling for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage 

of Zigler, 154 Wn. App. 803, 808, 226 P.3d 202 (2010). A trial court abuses its discretion when it 

is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. In re Marriage of McDevitt, 181 Wn. 

App. 765, 769, 326 P.3d 865, review denied, 181 Wn.2d 1018 (2014). There is a strong 

presumption against modification. McDole, 122 Wn.2d at 610.
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RCW 26.09.260 governs modification of a parenting plan. Subsection (1) and (2)(c) state: 

(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (4), (5), (6), (8), and (10) 

of this section, the court shall not modify a prior custody decree or a parenting plan 

unless it finds, upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior decree or plan 

or that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree or plan, that a 

substantial change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the nonmoving 

party and that the modification is in the best interest of the child and is necessary 

to serve the best interests of the child.

. . . . 

(2) In applying these standards, the court shall retain the residential schedule 

established by the decree or parenting plan unless:

. . . .

(c) The child’s present environment is detrimental to the child’s physical, 

mental, or emotional health and the harm likely to be caused by a change of 

environment is outweighed by the advantage of a change to the child.

(Emphasis added).

In a relocation case, it is not necessary for the court to consider whether substantial change 

in circumstances exist other than the relocation itself, or to consider the factors contained in RCW 

26.09.260(2). In re Marriage of Raskob, 183 Wn. App. 503, 513, 334 P.3d 30 (2014). 

The best interests of the child are served by “parenting arrangement[s] that best maintain a 

child’s emotional growth, health and stability, and physical care.” RCW 26.09.002. The “best 

interest of the child is ordinarily served when the existing pattern of interaction between a parent 

and child is altered only to the extent necessitated by the changed relationship of the parents or as 

required to protect the child from physical, mental, or emotional harm.” RCW 26.09.002.

Because the trial court hears evidence firsthand and has a unique opportunity to observe 

the witnesses, we are “‘extremely reluctant to disturb child placement dispositions.’” In re 

Parentage of Schroeder, 106 Wn. App. 343, 349, 22 P.3d 1280 (2001) (quoting In re Marriage of 

Schneider, 82 Wn. App. 471, 476, 918 P.2d 543 (1996), overruled on other grounds by Littlefield,

133 Wn.2d 39). 
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B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 

Felix moved for a major modification based on an allegation that Santiago abused the 

children. Felix testified that she believed that the primary person taking care of the children was 

Santiago, not Melendez. 

Bartholomew testified that the only applicable modification factor involved whether the 

children’s present environment was detrimental to the children’s physical, mental, or emotional 

health, and whether the likely harm to be caused by a change was outweighed by the advantage of 

a change. He focused on this factor because of Felix’s allegations of abuse by Santiago. 

Bartholomew testified that the children reported to their counselors that Felix told them that 

Santiago was mean to them and that Melendez does not love them. However, when Bartholomew

spoke with the children they could not provide him with details of any abuse. They responded, 

“Well, that’s what mom told us.” 1 RP at 28. Bartholomew did believe that Santiago had been 

“rougher with [one of the children]” but not to the level of abuse. 1 RP at 28. CPS determined 

any referrals were either “unfounded” or it did not require an investigation. 1 RP at 28.

Bartholomew opined no grounds for a modification of the parenting plan existed, and that 

there was no abuse in either household. When Bartholomew observed the children in Melendez’s 

home, the children were very comfortable with Santiago. In addition, the children’s counselor also 

expressed an opinion that the children were comfortable with Santiago when she attended their 

counseling sessions. 

The trial court denied Felix’s petition for modification at the same hearing it permitted the 

permanent relocation of the children, and entered a new parenting plan. 

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Felix’s petition for 

modification.
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V. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Felix argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion for reconsideration because 

she submitted new evidence. We disagree.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration for an abuse 

of discretion. Jacob’s Meadow Owners Ass’n v. Plateau 44 II, LLC, 139 Wn. App. 743, 752 n.1, 

162 P.3d 1153 (2007). A trial court’s decision is an abuse of discretion if it is manifestly 

unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons. Horner, 151 Wn.2d at 893. The decision 

is “‘manifestly unreasonable if it is outside the range of acceptable choices, given the facts and the 

legal standard.’” Horner, 151 Wn.2d at 894 (quoting Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d at 47). Thus, the court 

must base its decision on the correct legal standard and correctly apply that standard to the facts, 

which in turn must be supported by the record. Horner, 151 Wn.2d at 894.

B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION

Felix filed her motion for reconsideration under CR 59(a)(4), which allows for a motion’s 

reconsideration based on “[n]ewly discovered evidence . . . which the party could not with 

reasonable diligence have discovered or produced at trial.”

The trial court denied Felix’s motion for reconsideration without oral argument because 

none of the allegations raised by Felix constituted newly discovered evidence under CR 59. The 

trial court stated in its order that one document submitted had been offered at trial by Felix and 

admitted. 

The trial court thought that another document Felix relied on in her motion, an e-mail from 

Santiago, had been admitted as a trial exhibit. However, the trial court was mistaken. The e-mail 
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was written to “serve[ ] as a record of what happened” on that same evening when Melendez called 

the police, but this was not determined to be newly discovered evidence either. CP at 427. 

Felix also alleged that she had newly discovered evidence on a cult with which Melendez 

had involvement. However, the trial court ruled that Felix knew about Melendez’s involvement 

with this organization at the time of trial. 

Because the trial court properly found none of the information Felix alleged in her motion 

for reconsideration constituted newly discovered evidence under CR 59, it did not abuse its 

discretion in denying the motion. 

We affirm.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 

2.06.040, it is so ordered.

Melnick, J.

We concur:

Maxa, A.C.J.

Lee, J.