J-S05024-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

DAVID FINK 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 690 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 9, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-SA-0000433-2023

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: April 26, 2024

Appellant, David Fink, appeals pro se from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, following his bench 

trial conviction for failing to stop at a stop sign.

1

 We affirm. 

The trial court opinion set forth the relevant facts of this appeal as 

follows: 

... Officer Kyle Taylor, with the Brentwood Borough Police 

Department, testified that he observed [Appellant] fail to 

stop at a stop sign on February 19, 2023, at approximately 

9:35 p.m. Officer Taylor was parked in an unmarked vehicle 

located on Kaplan Avenue, facing Greenlee Road, coming up 

Route 51. He observed [Appellant’s] vehicle drive up 

Greenlee Road and slowly approach the three-way 

intersection, then accelerate a little as it went through the 

stop sign. [Appellant] was driving and did not stop at the 

stop sign. Instead, he accelerated through it. 

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1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(b). 
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[Appellant] testified during the hearing [before the trial 

court]. His defense was that the traffic citation lists the 

intersection of Bremen Avenue and Greenlee Road and there 

is no stop sign at this intersection. [Appellant] did not 

dispute that he drove through a stop sign at Greenlee Road 

and Kaplan Avenue, but he argued that the stop sign was 

not at the location that was written on his citation. 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/25/23, at 2) (record citations omitted)

(unnumbered). 

The trial court opinion set forth the remaining procedural history of this 

appeal as follows: 

[Appellant] filed a summary appeal from a conviction in the 

magisterial district court for failing to stop at a stop sign, in 

violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323. [The trial] court found 

[Appellant] guilty following a de novo trial on June 9, 2023, 

and imposed a fine of $25.00, plus court costs. [Appellant] 

filed a timely [pro se notice of] appeal to the Pennsylvania 

Superior Court on June 14, 2023. On June 2[8], 2023, [the 

trial] court ordered [Appellant] to file a [Pa.R.A.P.] 1925(b) 

statement of the errors complained of on appeal within 21 

days. [Appellant] filed a motion for an extension on July 11, 

2023, since the trial transcript had not been filed. He was 

granted an extension. ... [Appellant] filed his [Rule] 

1925(b) statement on August 1, 2023. 

(Id. at 1) (unnumbered) (some capitalization omitted). 

Appellant now raises five issues for our review: 

Were my rights to a fair procedural due process violated? 

Were there discrepancies between the hearing before [the 

trial court] and the transcript? 

Is there a stop sign at the intersection cited, Greenlee and 

Bremen? 

Did [the trial court] state in [its] opinion dated and filed 

October 23, 2023, that I had admitted to not stopping at the 
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stop sign at Kaplan and Greenlee? 

Did [the trial court] find me guilty of failure to stop at a nonexisting stop sign at Bremen and Greenlee Roads in 

Brentwood Pa.? 

(Appellant’s Brief at 5-6). 

On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court misconstrued his 

testimony regarding whether he failed to stop at the stop sign at the

intersection of Kaplan Avenue and Greenlee Road.2 Appellant denies the 

court’s assertion that Appellant “never disputed that [he] failed to stop at a 

stop sign at Kaplan and Greenlee[.]” (Id. at 9). Appellant insists that he 

“only testified to the intersection at Bremen and Greenlee which [he] was cited 

for[.]” (Id.) Appellant maintains that the court should have afforded him the 

opportunity to present additional evidence to demonstrate that there was no

stop sign at the intersection of Bremen Avenue and Greenlee Road. Further, 

Appellant baldly asserts that the court found him guilty because he refused to 

enter a guilty plea to a lesser offense. Appellant effectively concludes that the 

Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to support the conviction, and 

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2 We note that the argument section of Appellant’s brief is not divided into 

separate parts that correspond to each issue presented in the statement of 

questions involved. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (stating: “The argument shall be 

divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have 

at the head of each part ... the particular point treated therein, followed by 

such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent”). 

Nevertheless, this briefing defect has not hampered our ability to conduct 

meaningful appellate review of the one issue Appellant has developed in his 

brief. 
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the verdict was against the weight of evidence.

3

 We disagree. 

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard 

of review is as follows:

As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency 

claims requires that we evaluate the record in the light most 

favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the 

benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 

evidence. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the 

verdict when it establishes each material element of the 

crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the 

Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical 

certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be 

resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of 

fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances. 

The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of 

wholly circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that 

the evidence establishing a defendant’s participation in a 

crime is circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where 

the evidence coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom overcomes the presumption of innocence. 

Significantly, we may not substitute our judgment for that 

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3 “Ordinarily, a challenge to the weight of the evidence is waived unless it is 

presented in the first instance to the trial court. Preservation of this type of 

claim normally takes the form of a post-sentence motion. However, a 

defendant convicted of a summary offense is precluded from filing any postsentence motions.” Commonwealth v. Dougherty, 679 A.2d 779, 784 

(Pa.Super. 1996). See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(D) (stating there shall be no 

post-sentence motion in summary case appeals following trial de novo). Here, 

Appellant did not have the opportunity to file a post-sentence motion following 

the trial court’s de novo review of the summary appeal. Consequently, we 

decline to find Appellant’s issue waived on this basis. See Dougherty, supra

at 784-85 (declining to find weight issue waived on appeal following de novo

review of summary offense; noting it would be unjust to deprive appellant of 

right to raise weight issue on grounds he failed to file motion he was not 

entitled to file; moreover, trial court explicitly addressed credibility and weight 

of evidence in its written opinion). 
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of the fact finder; thus, so long as the evidence adduced, 

accepted in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

demonstrates the respective elements of a defendant’s 

crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s 

convictions will be upheld. 

Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 336-37 (Pa.Super. 2019) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 719, 722-23 (Pa.Super. 

2013)). 

Our standard of review regarding challenges to the weight of the 

evidence is as follows:

The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder 

of fact who is free to believe all, part, or none of the 

evidence and to determine the credibility of the 

witnesses. An appellate court cannot substitute its 

judgment for that of the finder of fact. Thus, we may 

only reverse the ... verdict if it is so contrary to the 

evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. 

Commonwealth v. Small, 559 Pa. 423, [435,] 741 A.2d 

666, 672-73 (1999). Moreover, where the trial court has 

ruled on the weight claim below, an appellate court’s role is 

not to consider the underlying question of whether the 

verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Rather, 

appellate review is limited to whether the trial court palpably 

abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim. 

Commonwealth v. Champney, 574 Pa. 435, 444, 832 A.2d 403, 408 

(2003), cert denied, 542 U.S. 939, 124 S.Ct. 2906, 159 L.Ed.2d 816 (2004) 

(most internal citations omitted). We have also explained: 

[A] new trial should not be granted because of a mere 

conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same 

facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, 

the role of the trial court is to determine that 

notwithstanding all the evidence, certain facts are so clearly 

of greater weight that to ignore them, or to give them equal 
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weight with all the facts, is to deny justice. 

Commonwealth v. Landis, 89 A.3d 694, 699 (Pa.Super. 2014) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 603 Pa. 340, 362, 983 A.2d 1211, 1225 (2009)). 

Additionally, the Motor Vehicle Code provides, in relevant part, as 

follows:

§ 3323. Stop signs and yield signs

* * *

(b) Duties at stop signs.—Except when directed to 

proceed by a police officer or appropriately attired persons 

authorized to direct, control or regulate traffic, every driver 

of a vehicle approaching a stop sign shall stop at a clearly 

marked stop line or, if no stop line is present, before 

entering a crosswalk on the near side of the intersection or, 

if no crosswalk is present, then at the point nearest the 

intersecting roadway where the driver has a clear view of 

approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before 

entering. If, after stopping at a crosswalk or clearly marked 

stop line, a driver does not have a clear view of approaching 

traffic, the driver shall after yielding the right-of-way to any 

pedestrian in the crosswalk slowly pull forward from the 

stopped position to a point where the driver has a clear view 

of approaching traffic. The driver shall yield the right-ofway to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on 

another roadway so closely as to constitute a hazard during 

the time when the driver is moving across or within the 

intersection or junction of roadways and enter the 

intersection when it is safe to do so. 

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(b). 

Instantly, Officer Taylor was sitting in his unmarked patrol car on Kaplan 

Avenue, and he was facing the intersection of Kaplan Avenue and Greenlee 

Road. Officer Taylor noticed Appellant’s vehicle traveling down Greenlee Road

“at a slow rate of speed.” (N.T. Trial, 6/9/23, at 7). Appellant’s vehicle 
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approached the “three-way stop intersection,” where there is a “bend” in 

Greenlee Road. (Id. at 7, 9). Officer Taylor stated: “Coming up to the stop 

sign, [Appellant] actually accelerated through the stop sign and the 

intersection.” (Id. at 9). In response, Appellant testified: “If you look at the 

ticket it says Greenlee and Bremen. There is no stop sign at Greenlee and 

Bremen. We never approached Greenlee and Bremen and went through a 

stop sign.” (Id. at 14).

The parties subsequently engaged in the following exchange: 

THE COURT: Officer Taylor said that [Appellant] 

approached at a slow rate of speed. He was parked. I don’t 

know if you remember parked. 

[APPELLANT]: Yes, he was. 

THE COURT: What was that, Kaplan? 

[APPELLANT]: Kaplan and Greenlee. 

THE COURT: Is there a stop sign at Kaplan? 

[APPELLANT]: There is. That’s a three stop sign—

THE OFFICER: That’s the one that he went through. 

THE COURT: Okay. 

[APPELLANT]: The ticket shows Bremen and 

Greenlee. We did not—we stopped at Kaplan. We were 

having a discussion about our house fire, we were not going 

fast. 

THE COURT: Well, so you didn’t have to be moving 

in and of itself, the rule is you stop at a stop sign. 

[APPELLANT]: There is no stop sign at Bremen and 

Greenlee. 
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[THE COURT]: I got you. But you didn’t stop at the 

stop sign at Kaplan? 

[APPELLANT]: But that’s not what is on the citation. 

Do you want—

(Id. at 14-15). At that point, the court found Appellant guilty. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth 

as verdict winner, sufficient evidence supported Appellant’s conviction. See 

Sebolka, supra. Officer Taylor unequivocally testified that Appellant failed 

to stop at the stop sign at the intersection of Kaplan Avenue and Greenlee

Road, thereby establishing a violation of Section 3323(b). See 75 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 3323(b). The trial court found Officer Taylor’s testimony credible. (See

Trial Court Opinion at 3) (unnumbered). Although the court considered 

Appellant’s argument that the citation listed the offense as having occurred at 

the intersection of Bremen Avenue and Greenlee Road, the court found any

error on the citation to be “de minimis.” (Id. at 2) (unnumbered). Following 

our review, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s weighing of 

the evidence. See Champney, supra; Landis, supra. Accordingly, we 

affirm the judgment of sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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FILED: 4/26/2024