FILED

December 8, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

AUGUST SESSION, 1998

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9709-CR-00375

)

Appellant, )

) SULLIVAN COUNTY

V. ) 

)

) HON. PHYLLIS H. MILLER, JUDGE

PAUL J. SEYMOUR, ) 

)

Appellee. ) (AGGRAVATED ASSAULT) 

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

JULIE A. MARTIN JOHN KNOX WALKUP 

Attorney at Law Attorney General & Reporter

P.O. Box 426 

Knoxville, TN 37901-0426 GEORGIA BLYTHE FELNER

(On Appeal) Assistant Attorney General

2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building

STEPHEN M. WALLACE 425 Fifth Avenue North 

District Public Defender Nashville, TN 37243

LESLIE S. HALE H. GREELEY WELLS, JR.

Assistant Public Defender District Attorney General 

P.O. Box 839

Blountville, TN 37617-0829 EDWARD EUGENE WILSON 

(At Trial) Assistant District Attorney General

140 Blountville Bypass

P.O. Box 526 

Blountville, TN 37617-0526

OPINION FILED ________________________

AFFIRMED 

THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
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OPINION

The Defendant, Paul Junior Seymour, appeals as of right from the revocation

of his probation by the Sullivan County Criminal Court. He contends that the trial

court erred in revoking his probation. W e affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The facts reveal that on August 16, 1996, police officer Shannon Castle was

dispatched to a trailer park after receiving a call that Defendant was trying to run

over his wife with a motorcycle. When the officer arrived at the scene he stopped

Defendant. Defendant then got off the motorcycle and approached the officer in a

violent manner saying that the officer would have to use his gun if he was going to

take Defendant to jail. Defendant also told the officer that his wife had stolen one

hundred dollars of his money and that he was going to kill her. Defendant’s wife told

the officer that Defendant had threatened to kill her and their children. Defendant

had told his family to leave the trailer, and then as Defendant’s wife was walking

down the road with her three children, Elizabeth (9), Paul (14) and Michael (4),

Defendant tried to run over them with a motorcycle at least twice.

Additionally, during the evening of August 30, 1996, Defendant became very

argumentative with his 14-year-old son and choked him several times. Later,

Defendant pulled a knife on him and threatened to kill him. 

On April 14, 1997, Defendant pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court

to aggravated assault, felony reckless endangerment, simple assault, violation of

registration laws, and driving without a motorcycle license. Defendant received an

effective sentence of eight (8) years which was suspended and Defendant was
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placed on supervised probation. He was ordered to continue and keep all

counseling appointments, take his medications, perform 300 hours of community

service, and stay in the state of Tennessee. 

On April 16, 1997, and April 18, 1997, Probation Officer Bill Edwards filed

probation violation warrants. The warrants alleged,and Defendant admitted, that the

address he gave as his home address was false and that he had failed to notify the

probation officer of his change of address. Defendant also admitted that he failed

to call his probation officer, failed to continue his mental health treatment, and that

he left the state without permission. Defendant’s probation was revoked on August

1, 1997, and he was ordered the serve his sentence in the Tennessee Department

of Correction.

In revoking Defendant’s probation, the trial court noted:

[T]hese were very violent offenses involving danger to

your wife, your children and it was very critical. One of the

most critical things was that you continue your mental

health treatment.

. . .

[Y]ou did leave a voice mail message on April 16th

indicating that you had moved, but you have not reported

since then. You, in effect, absconded. You apparently,

according to your own admission, that’s exactly what you

did. You knew about transferring probation, you knew that

it had to be done, yet it was never done before you moved

around. You completely abandoned the mental health

treatment. The officers in these cases, one was opposed

to probation because due to the violence of the offense,

the other officer said you needed mental health treatment,

stated the victims [Defendant’s wife and children] were

scared to death of you.
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A trial court may revoke probation and order the imposition of the original

sentence upon a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the person has

violated a condition of probation. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-310, 311. The

decision to revoke probation rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. State

v. Mitchell, 810 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). Probation revocations

are subject to an abuse of discretion, rather than a de novo standard of review.

State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tenn. 1991). An abuse of discretion is shown

if the record is devoid of substantial evidence to support the conclusion that a

violation of probation has occurred. Id. The evidence at the revocation hearing

need only show that the trial court exercised a conscientious and intelligent judgment

in making its decision. State v. Leach, 914 S.W.2d 104, 106 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1995). Once it is determined that a defendant has violated his probation, the court

has the discretion to order the defendant to begin serving his sentence as originally

entered. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-311(d) and 40-36-106(e)(3)(B) and (4);

Sentencing Commission Comments to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-310; State v. Duke,

902 S.W .2d 424, 427 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). 

Defendant admitted at the hearing that he violated the terms of his probation,

so that was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s revocation order. See,

e.g., State v. Yvonne Burnette, C.C.A. No. 03C01-9608-CR-00314, Knox County

(Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, July 25, 1997) (mandate issued Apr. 22, 1998). The

lower court was statutorily authorized to impose Defendant’s original eight (8) year

sentence upon revocation of probation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-310.

Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, we are not required at this stage to reconsider the

sentencing principles. See Burnette, C.C.A. No. 03C01-9608-CR-00314; State v.

Stevie Q. Taylor, C.C.A. No. 02C01-9504-CC-00108, Madison County (Tenn. Crim.
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App., Jackson, May 1, 1996) (no Rule 11 application filed). We cannot say that the

trial court abused its discretion in ordering Defendant to serve the terms of his

original sentence.

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

____________________________________

THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge

CONCUR:

___________________________________

JOSEPH M. TIPTON, Judge

___________________________________

JOE G. RILEY, Judge