### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON O ct obe r 7, 200 3 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. YD ALE BA NKS
Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 96-06381-88 Jose ph B . Brown , Jr., Judge

No. W2000-00963-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Jul y 28, 2004

A Shelby CountyCriminal Court juryconvicted the defe ndant, Ydale Banks, of first-de g ree felony murder, f ir s t- d e g r e ep r e me d it ate d

mur d e r , c o n s p ir a c ies to commit both m odes of f irst-deg ree murder, espec ially ag g ravated burglary , espec ially ag g ravated robbe ry , three counts of espe cially ag g ravated kid na pp ing , a ndthr e e c ou nts of a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult . T he de fe nd a nt n ow c la ims on app e a l th a t: (1 ) thetria l c ou rt

e rr e d inde nying thede fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n to su pp re ss h is p re tria l state me nt; (2) the trial court erre d in refusing to gr ant the def endant’ s motion f

o r a j u d gm ent of
a c qu itt a l; (3 ) thee vid e nc e pr e se nte d at tria l is ins uf fi cie nt to s up po rt

thec on vic tio ns fo r f

ir stdeg ree murder; (4) the trial court erre d in admitting pre judicial photogr aphs into evidenc e in the
se nte nc ing ph a se of

tria l; (5) the trial court erre d in admitting victim-impact evidenc e during the sentenc e phase ; (6 ) thepr ov isi on s o f Te nn e sse e Cod e An no tate d s e c tio n 3 9- 13 -2 04 (c ) r e lativ e to the us e of vic tim -i mpa c t e vid e nc e areun c on sti tut ion a l; (7) the trial court erre d in instructing the jury ; and (8) the trial court erre d in instructing the jury as to the def

inition of “knowing ly .”

We reve rse the judg ment of convic tion of conspiracy to commit felony murder but other wise af

firm thejud g me nts of

thetria l c ou rt

. Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e nt s o f theCr im ina l C our t a r e Affir m e d in P ar t, Re ve r se d in P ar t, and R e m ande d.

J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J O HN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.

Mic ha e l E . Sc ho ll, Me mph is, Te nn e sse e , f or theAp pe llant, Yd a le B a nk s.-2-

Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral & Reporter ; Tho m as E

. Wil liams, I I I , Assistant Attorney Gene ra l ; Wil liam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and Paul Goodma n and Tom Hoove r, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

The c onvictions now under r eview e manated f rom eve nts of Aug ust 12, 1995, which
re su lte d in the de a th of Do ro thy Web be r, a 47 -y e ar- oldnu rs e a ndbe auty sh op op e rator . T he vic tim
re sid e d w ith he r hus ba nd , L e sli e B . Webb e r, Sr ., a ndon thenig ht o f A ug us t 12 , 1 99 5, he r s on , L e sli e B. Webbe r, Jr., was stay ing at her re sidence

.

Th e vic tim ’s so n te sti fi e d th a t, on th at nig ht, he a wa ke ne d to dis c ov e r a

fe ma le stand ing in the ha llw a y . Sh e he ld a re vo lve r andtol d the y ou ng e r Web be r that he wa s “ su pp os e d to be asle ep.” A male intruder then enter ed the r oom, held a pistol to the y oung er Webbe r’s he ad, and tie d h is h a nd s w itha

va c uu m c le a ne r c or d. Th e int ru de rs wo re be ig e pa nts , w hit e sh irts, a ndwh ite caps. Theshirts and ca

ps bore “ Krispy

Kre me Doug hnut” logos. They oung er Mr . Webber he ard the voice of

a third intruder , a male. At one point, a male intrude r pl ac ed a pillow over Mr. Webber’ s head, and Mr. Webber he ard someoneransa cking his room. He testified that the intrude rs asked wher e the money was, a nd Mr. Webber r eplied ther e wa s no money in the house. Mr. W ebber hear d the intruders
a dd re ssi ng thee lde r M r. Web be r i n th e famil y de n an d tel lin g him that the int ru de rs we retakin g his wife, the victim, with them. W hen the y oung er Mr . Webber untied himself and went into the den, the intruders w ere g one, and hefound his fathe r handc uffe d, dazed, and wi t h a k n o t on his head. Both the vic tim and the victim’s car , a Toy ota C amry , wer e gone. The y oung er Mr . Webber testified that the intruders ha d enter ed the house by posing as Krispy Kre me employ ees selling or g iving a way doug hnuts. A box of doug hnuts was left be hind in the den.

Approxim ately

ten day s later, the vic tim’s body was found in a field in a rura l are a in Missi ssippi. Her hands had been cuffe d behind her back, and duct tape ha d been w rappe d around her he ad. The medical e x aminer te stified that the victim had died betwe en Aug ust 13 and 16; she had suff ocate d as a r esult of the tape acr oss her mouth and nose.

Severa l weeks a fter the body was discovered, Memphis Police Offic ers interviewed the def endant a bout the hom e invasion and the death of the vic tim. I n the re sulting statement, the defe ndant a d m i t t ed t hat he ha d been involved in the planning of a robbe ry

or kidnapping . Three other men, a woman, and the defe ndant believe d that a sec ond son of the Webber s, Kevin Webber,
was a drug deale r who ha d amassed $300,000 in c ash

. T h e ca b al of five de cided thre e of the m wo uldg a in e ntry to the Web be r ho us e by po sin g a s K ri sp y Kr e me e mpl oy e e s. Th e y

pu rc ha se d w hit e s h i rt s an d ca ps and ar

rang ed to have Krispy

Kre me log os aff

ix ed. The g roup talked a bout kidnappin g t h e v i ct i m as a means of extracting a $300,000 ransom pay ment from Ke vin Webber, sh ou l d t h e m o n e y

n o tb e f o u n d i n t h e e l d e r

W e b b e r s ’ h o u s e
. T h e d e f e n d a n tw a i t e d i n a

v e hic le while three of hi s associate s enter ed the house. After about fiftee n minutes, the intruders eme rg ed-3-

fr om the Web be rs ’ g ara g e in the vic tim ’s Ca mry ; the vic tim wa s intheba c ks e a t. In h is s tate me nt, the def endant s t at ed t hat the g roup took the victim to a room in the Elvis Presley I nn. L ater , they took her to a tire shop to which they had ac ces s ; t h ey k ep t her ther e throug hout the night. On the following morning , they

place d the victim inside a U-Ha ul truck, and the defe ndant drove the truck into Miss issippi, where he backe d it into a field. Acc ording to the defendant’s statement, two of the other men r emoved the still-consc ious victim from the truck and le ft her in the field. The victim was not “supposed to die.”

Following g uiltyverdic ts on the various char g ed off enses and fac ed with the state’ s quest for the death pe nalty , the lower court c onducted a

jury hearing on the i ssue of penalty on the murder c onvictions. The victim’s mother t estified that the l oss of her daug hter “ meant eve rything to [ her] beca

use [she did not] have he r any more, a nd .

. . [would not ] see her any more.” She te sti fi e d th a t th e vic tim

wa s “ thelov e of

thefamil y

a nde ve ry

bo dy lov e d h e r. ” Fol lo wi ng thi s testimony , t h e s t at e introduced photog raphs of the victim’s body

taken at the sceneand in the morg ue.
Th e de fe nd a nt’ s si ste rs te sti fi e d inhis be ha lf . One tes ti fi e d th a t th e de fe nd a nt i s a “valua ble asset to [his] family ” and is loved by them. She testified that the def endant ha d a six -y ear
old daug hter, with whom he ma intained a c lose relationship despite his incar cer ation. The other
s i s t e r a f f i r m e d t h e f

a m i l y’ s a f f e c t i o n f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t a n d t e s t i f

i e d t h a tt h e d e f

e n d a n th a d a l w a ys held a job and did so until he wa s incarc erated. She testified that he w as skilled as a c ook.

The mother of the defe ndant’s daug hter testified that the defe ndant worke d very hard and aspire d to be a c hef. She te stified that the defendant ha d a strong bond with his daug hter a nd pr ov ide d w e ll f

or he r f inanc ia lly . D e sp ite thede fe nd a nt’ s in c arc e rat ion , h e re ma ine d c los e to h is daug hter. I . Su pp re ssi on of theDe fe nd a nt’ s State me nt.

I n his first appellate issue, the defendant c laims that the trial court e rre d in deny ing his pr e tria l motio n to supp re ss his inc ulp a tory state me nt. Th e re c or d re fl e c ts that th e tria l c ou rt he ld
a n e vid e nti ary

he ari ng on the de fe nd a nt’ s mot ion to su pp re ss thestate me nt. I n th e he ari ng , M e mph is Police Lieutenant, then- Serg eant Dw ight Eldridg e Woods testified that on October 26, 1995, he
a lon g wi th the n- Se rg e a nt M art z int e rv ie we d th e de fe nd a nt at th e po lic e statio n inc on ne c tio n w ith his investigation of the death of the victim. He testified that Serg eant Ma rtz read the Miranda ri g hts to the defe ndant, and at 4:25 p.m., the defe ndant signe d the waiver of rig hts f orm, indicating that he understood his rig hts and desired t o waive the m. See M iranda v. Arizona , 3 84 U. S. 4 36 , 8 6 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).

The intervie w beg an shortly afte r the de fendant signe d the waiver form. During the i n i t i al p a r t o f t h e i n t er v i ew , t h e d ef en d an t“d en i ed an y

k n o wl ed ge o f w h ath ap p en ed

. ” D u ri n g a brea k when Serg eant Martz ha d left the interview room about 7:30 p.m., the de fe n d an t asked Serg eant Woods what he should do, and Woods told the defendant that he should tell what he kne w about the victim ’s death. Woods testified t hat t he defendant was c ooperative and g ave the office rs-4-

no problems. The de fendant asked Serg eant Woods whether Woods co u l d h el p him, and Woods testified that he told the def endant, “ Well, I ’m not in charg e of the case [, and] I can’ t help y ou.. . . [T] he homicide pe ople [] , if y ou cooper ate they may let the [j] udg e, or pr osecutors know that y ou c oo pe rate d

. . . . ” Se rg e a nt Wo od s d e nie d p ro mis ing a nythi ng to the de fe nd a nt o r thr e a te nin g him

. He a c kn ow le dg e d th a t, du ri ng theint e rv ie w, thede fe nd a nt a sk e d h im t o h oldthede fe nd a nt’ s h a nd s, which Serg eant Woods did. The def endant c ried and said that he “knew about what happene d and that he would tell us.”

After Martz returne d to the room, the interview resumed, and ultimately , the 22-y ear
old , tw e lf th- g ra de -e du c a te d d e fe nd a nt g a ve a fo rm a l, tr a ns c ri be d state me nt. Whe n p re se nte d w ith the transc ript and aske d to review it to make any neede d chang es, the de fendant sugge sted no chang es. He initialed the first five pa g es of the statement and sig ned the sixt h and fina l pag e at 11:15 p.m. Serg ean t W o o d s te s ti f ie d th at t hr o u g h o u t the interview pr ocess, the de fendant seemed to understand the pr ocess and never seeme d confuse d or aske d to stop the interview.

On cr o s s -e x am i n at i o n , S er gea n tW oods testified that, to the besto f h i s u n d er s t an d i n g, thede fe nd a nt ha d be e n arr e ste d a nd br ou g ht to the po lic e statio n on Oc tob e r 26 , 19 95

. He wa s in custody at the time the intervie w commenc ed. During the in t erview, the def endant’ s hands wer e fre e, but his leg was c uffe d to his chair. Woods denied discussin g t h e issue of pena lty with the defe ndant and spe cifica lly denied mentioning t he death penalty to the def endant. Woods testified that he told the def

endant that if he cooper ated, the o ff i ce rs “may

tell the attorney

g ener al that he cooper ated.” Woods t estified that the de fendant never asked f or an attorney

. The de fendant testified in support of his suppr ession motion that when he was picke d up by the po lic e ata

b o w l i n g a l l e y , h e w a s t o l d t h a th e w a s b e i n g c h ar g e d w i t h c r i m i n a l a t t e m pt, based upon his voice being on tape with re g ard to some r obberie s. L ater , Woods told him t hat if he told them anything about the vi ctim’s death, W oods “can see a bout ge tting the . . . c riminal attempt felony char g es droppe d.” The defe ndant testified that Woods told him that the de fendant could g et the d e a th p e n a lty in th e We b b e r c a s e a n d th a t “ n in e ti me s o u t o f te n if [th e a c c u s e d g iv e s ] a statement, then, that would proba bly show a whole lot of leniency

. . . [and] probably wouldn’t g et
a wh olelot of tim e ou t of it.” Th e de fe nd a nt fu rthe r te sti fi e d that Woods c la ime d to ha ve ta lke d to the def endant’ s mother and that she had expressed a desire for the Webber c ase to be resolved. H e testified that Woods threate n ed that unless the def endant r evea led his knowledg e about the c ase, Woods could char g e the defe ndant’s sister and have her fired from her job. The defe ndant testified that de sp ite his inf

ormin g Woo ds that hewa s r e c ov e ri ng fr om a g un sh ot w ou ndto h is l e ft ha nd , h is left hand w as cuf

fed to the c hair during the interview on October 26, 1995. He testified that hewas sc are d a nd a sk e d to c on ta c t Attorne y Kathry n Swi sh e r. He state d that the of fi c e rs tol d h im that Ms

. Swisher was at home in bed and would not come down to help him.-5- Al tho ug h th e re c or d o n a

pp e a l c on ta ins no c le ar i nd ic a tio n o f t h etria l ju dg e ’s sp e c if

ic ruling on the motion to suppress, the admission of t he defenda nt’s pretria l statement into evidenc e at trial indicate s that the suppression motion was denied.

On appe al, the def

endant cl ai m s the trial court should have suppre ssed his pretria l statement bec ause his will to exercise his rig ht to refr ain fr o m co n fe s s i ng was ove rborne by the office rs and be cause the offic ers pr evente d the defendant fr om exercising his rig ht to counsel. The state ar g ues that the e vidence of re cord supports the lower court’s de termination that the conf ession was fr eely

and voluntarily rende red, as well as its implicit determination that the defe ndant made no reque st for counse l.

The F ifth Amendment to the United States Constituti on provides that “[n] o person . . . shall be compe lled in any criminal ca se to be a witness ag ainst himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Th e corres po nd in g prov is io n o f t he T enn ess ee C on st it ut io n s tat es “[ t] hatin al l c ri min al pros e c uti on s, the ac cused shall not be compelled to g ive evidenc e ag ainst himself.” Tenn. Const. art. I , § 9. Our supreme c ourt has pre viouslyheld that “[t] he sig nificant d i ff er en ce be tween the se two provisions is that the test of voluntariness f or conf essions under Article 1, § 9 is broade r and moreprotec tive of individual rig hts than t he test of voluntariness under the Fifth Ame ndment.” State v. Crump , 834 S.W .2d 265 (Tenn. 1992)

.

To admit a def

endant’ s statement into evidence , the statement must have bee n g iven
vo lun tari ly

by a de fe nd a nt kno wl edg e ableof his c on sti tut ion a l rig hts a nda c c omp a nie d b y a va lid and knowing waiver of those rig hts. See State v . Middlebrooks , 840 S.W .2d 317, 326 (Tenn. 1992)

. The prose cution may

not use statements, whe ther in culpatory or exculpatory , that stem from custodi al i n terrog ation unless it demonstrates the use of proce dural saf

eg uards that e ffe ctively

secur e the privileg e ag ainst self-incrimination. Miranda , 38 4 U. S. at 44 4, 86 S. Ct . at 16 12 ; Crump , 834 S.W. 2da t 26 8; State v. Hick s , 629 S.W .2d 908, 910 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981) (de fendant’s statement g iven three hours af

ter Miranda warnings he ld to be admissible).

B e fo rea de fe nd a nt c a n kno wi ng ly a nd vo lu nt arily

waivehis Miranda rig hts, the defe ndant must be “a dequate ly and ef fec tively apprised of

his rights.” Middlebrooks , 840 S.W .2d
a t 32 6. I f the waive r i s ma de “ vo lun tari ly , kn ow ing ly a nd int e lli g e ntl y ,” a de fe nd a nt ma y waivehis rig hts. Miranda , 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612. The state ha s the burden of proving the waive r by a p reponderanc e of the evidenc e at the he aring on the motion to suppress. Sta te v . B us h , 942 S.W. 2d48 9, 50 0 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) . In d e te rm ini ng wh e the r a de fe nd a nt ha s va lid ly waive d h is Miranda rig hts, courts look to the totalityof the c ircumstance s. Middlebrooks , 840 S.W .2d at 326.

Furthermore , a conf

ession must be fre e and voluntary , and it must not be extracted by a ny so rt of thr e a ts or vio le nc e , nor ob ta ine d by a ny dir e c t or i mpl ie d p ro mis e s, ho we ve r s lig ht, nor by the exertion of any

improper influe n ce o r other e vidence of police ove rre aching

. Bram v. United States , 1 6 8 U. S

. 5 3 2 , 1 8 S

. C t

. 1 8 3 (1 8 9 7 ). T h e i s s u e o f v o l u n t ar i n es s re q u i re s t h e t ri al j u d ge to focus on whether the accused’ s will to resist making a confession was ove rborne

. Sta te v . Ke lly , 603 S.W .2d 726, 728 (Tenn. 1980)

.-6- When a def

endant c laims that his statement was compelled by coer cive police tactics such as pr omises of lenienc y , the pertinent inquiry is not merely

whet h er t h e s tatement wa s made only as a r esult of such promise. Ke lly , 603 S.W .2d at 729. Rather, it is “whe ther the a ccuse d was
so g ripped by the hope of l enienc y that he did not or could not fre ely and rationally

choose among the available cour ses of a ction.” Id. (q u o t i n g Hunter v. Swenson , 372 F. Supp. 287, 300-01 (W.D. Mo . 1 97 4) ); se e Sta te v . S mi th , 933 S.W .2d 450, 455 (Tenn. 1996)

. Special rules attend the admission of a defe ndant’s pretria l statem en t wh en the statement wa s prec eded by the de fe n d an t ’s request for the a ssistance of c ounsel. Gene rally , the defe ndant is entitled to suppression of his statement if he une quivocally reque sted counsel and that reque st was not honored. See State v, Saylor, 117 S.W .3 d 2 3 9 , 2 44 (Tenn. 2003) . Whether an
acc used reque sted the assistance of counse l or whethe r a r equest wa s equivoca l is a question of fac t to be re solved by

the trial court. Id. ; State v. Harbison, 704 S.W .2d 314, 318 (Tenn. 1986)

. When review ing a

trial court’ s findings of fac t and conc lusions of law on a motion to suppress evidenc e, we are g uided by the standar d of re view set forth in State v. Odom , 928 S.W .2d 18 (T e nn . 1 99 6)

. Un de r thi s st a nd ard , “ a tria l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f f

a c t in a su pp re ssi on he ari ng wi ll be upheld unless the evidence pr eponder ates other wise.” Id. at 23. Howeve r, whe n the trial court do e s n ot s e t f

orth i ts f ind ing s o f f

a c t up on there c or d o f the pr oc e e din g s, theapp e llate c ou rt mus t decide wher e the pr eponder anceof the e vidence lies. Fi e lds v . S tate , 40 S.W .3d 450, 457 n.5 (Tenn. 20 01 ); se e als o G an ze v oo rt v . R us se ll , 94 9 S.W. 2d 29 3, 29 6 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) . A s ina ll c a se s o n a pp e a l, “[t] he pre vailing pa

rty in the trial court is aff

orded the ‘strong est leg itimate view of the evidenc e and all rea sonable and leg itimate infere nces that may be dra wn from that e vidence .’” See State v . Carter , 1 6 S

. W

. 3 d 7 6 2 , 7 6 5 (T en n
. 2 0 0 0 ) ( q u o t i n g Sta te v . Ke ith , 978 S.W .2d 861, 864 (Tenn. 1998) ). Furthermore , we r eview the trial court’ s conclusions of law unde r a de novo sta n d ar d wi t hout
acc ording any presumption of cor rec tness to those conclusions. See, e .g., State v. W alton , 41 S.W .3d 75 , 8 1 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) ; State v. Crutcher , 989 S.W .2d 295, 299 (Tenn. 1999) . L ast, we a re mindful that in e va luatin g the c or

re c tne ss of a tria l c ou rt ’s ru lin g on a pr e tria l mo tio n to su pp re ss, app e llate courts may

consider pr oof adduc ed both at the suppre ssion hearing and at tria l. State v. He n ning , 975 S.W .2d 290, 299 (Tenn. 1998)

.

I n the pre sent ca se, the trial c o u rt m ad e no finding s on the rec ord conc erning the
su pp re ssi on iss ue s, a nd the re fo re , we mus t de te rm ine wh e re thepr e po nd e ranc e of thee vid e nc e lie s. See Fields , 40 S.W .3d at 457 n.5. That notwithstanding , the state, a s the prevailing party b el o w, benef its from the strong est leg itimate view of the evidence, as well as all reasona ble infer ence s that may be dra wn there from. Carter , 16 S.W .3d at 765. I n d ulging the state this benef it, the rec ord
su pp orts the de nia l of the mot ion to sup pr e ss. Lie ute na nt, the n- Se rg e a nt Wo od s d e ta ile d a n o rd e rl y pr oc e ss in whi c h the of

fi c e rs a dv ise d th e de fe nd a nt o f h is Miranda rig hts, procure d a written waiver of his rig hts, obta i n ed an i nformal state ment, and proc ured the defe ndant’s adoption of a formal tr ans cri ptof t he s tat eme nt . T he o ffi cer’s tes ti mo nyth at t he d efen dan t w aiv ed h is Miranda rig hts was
no t f a c tua lly c ha lle ng e d. Th us , th e state c arrie d its bu rd e n o f d e mon str a tin g that th e hig h- sc ho oleducated def

endant voluntarily

and under standing ly

wai v ed his rig hts. Furthermore, the of fice r aff irmatively

contra dicted the de fendant’s claim that his will to remain sile n t h ad b ee n overborne-7-

by promises of lenienc y , phy sical discomfort, and threats that the defe ndant’s sister would lose her job un le ss the de fe nd a nt c on fe sse d. I nd ulg ing thestate a s th e pr e va ili ng pa rty be low thestr on g e st leg itimate view of the e vidence , the def endant’ s left hand wa s not handcuff ed during the interview , a ndhe wa s n ot t oldthat hi s si ste r w ou ld l os e her job le st h e c on fe sse d. Mo re ov e r, theof fi c e r d id not discuss punishment with the defe ndant, nor did the defe ndant reque st the assistance of counse l during the interview proce ss. I n short, the re cord supports the trial court’s de termi n at i o n t h at no constitutional iss ues pre vented the a dmission of the defendant’s pretria l statement.

I I . Sufficienc y

of the Evidenc e.
Ne xt, w e a dd re ss t wo of

thede fe nd a nt’ s is su e s in combin a tio n. I n th e fi rs t, h e c la ims that th e tria l c ou rt

e rr e d inno t g ranti ng a jud g me nt of a c qu itt a l onthec ha

rg e of pr e me dit a te d f

ir stdeg ree murder, and secondly , he claims that the evidence insufficiently supports the convictions of both premeditate d and fe lony murder.

Both issues ef

fec t i v el y re q u i re t h e s am e l ega l an al y s i s. Tennesse e Criminal Procedure Rule 29(a) confe rs upon the trial c ourt the authority t o en t er a judg ment of ac quittal, either at the tim e thestate re sts or

a t th e c onclu sio n o f a ll the e vid e nc e , w he n th e e vid e nc e is i ns uf fi c ie nt t o justify a convic tion. T en n
. R

. C ri m
. P. 29(a). When such a Rule 29(a) motion is made, the trial court is r equire d to f

avor the state with the strong est leg itimate vie w of the evidenc e, which includes all rea sonable infere nces draw n there from, and to disc ard any countervailing e vidence

. See State v

. Price , 46 S.W .3d 785, 818 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) . As such, the judgment of a cquittal standard “is, in essenc e, the same standard applicable on appeal w hen this c ourt is called upon to dete rmine the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence afte r a c onviction.” Id. ; se e Sta te v . B all , 973 S.W .2d 288, 292 (Tenn. Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ). A j ury ve rd ic t of

g uil t r e mov e s th e pr e su mpt ion of inn oc e nc e , r e pla c e s it

wi th a pre sumption of guilt, se e Sta te v . Tu gg le , 639 S.W .2d 913 , 914 (Tenn. 1982) , acc redits the testimonyof t he witnesses for the state, and r esolves all conf licts in favor of the theory of the state, State v. Grac e , 4 93 S.W. 2d47 4, 47 6 ( Te nn . 1 97 3) . On ap pe a l, the state is en tit le d to th e str on g e st le g iti mate vie w o f the e vid e nc e a nda ny re a so na bleinf e re nc e s w hic h mi g ht b e dr a wnthe re fr om. State v. Cabbage , 571 S.W .2d 832, 836 (Tenn. 1978)

.

In det er m i n i n g t h e s u ff

i ci en cyo f t h e c o n v i ct i n g ev i d en ce , t h e a p p el l at e c o u rtd oes not
re- weig h or re- evaluate the evidenc e, Sta te v . M att he ws , 805 S.W .2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990), and doe s not substi tute its infe renc es for those draw n by the trier of

fac t from circ umstantial evidenc e, Lia k

as v . S tate , 199 Tenn. 298, 305, 286 S.W .2d 856, 859 (1956). The app el l at e c o urt must review the r ecor d to determine i f t h e ev idence adduce d at trial is sufficie nt “to support the fi nd ing by

the trie r of fa c t of

g uil t be y on d a

re a so na bledo ub t.” Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( e ). Th is r ule is applicable to finding s of g uilt based upon dire ct ev i d ence, circ umstantial evidence , or a combination of direc t and circ umstantial evid en ce
. State v. Dy kes , 803 S.W .2d 250, 253 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990), overruled on othe r grounds by State v. Hoope r , 29 S.W .3d 1 (Tenn. 2000)

.

A p e rs on c omm its fi rs t- de g re e mur de r w ho pr e me dit ate dly a ndint e nti on a lly

kil ls another , Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202( a)( 1) (2003), or who kills anothe r in the per petration of or-8-

attempt to perpe trate a

kidnapping , id. § 3 9- 13 -2 02 (a )( 2) (2 00 3) . A ho mic ide , o nc e e sta bli sh e d, is p r e s u me d to b e s e c o n d

- d e g r e e mu r der. St ate v . B ro wn , 836 S.W .2d 530, 543 (Tenn. 1992) . The state then ha s the burden of proving elements whic h elevate the homicide to first-de g ree mu rd er. Id.

The e vidence in the prese nt case sug g ests that t h e def endant wa s convicted via a theory of criminal responsibilit y for the act of another. O ur Code authorizes such convictions: “A pe rs on is c ri min a lly

re sp on sib le fo r an of

fe ns e c omm itt e d by thec on du c t of a no the r i f[, a ]ct ing wi th intent to promote or assist the commission of the offe nse, or to bene fit in the proce eds or r esults of the offe nse, the pe rson . . . aids . . . another per son to commit t he off ense.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 11-402(a )(2) (2003).
(a) Premeditated Mur der.

F ir st, we e xami ne thede fe nd a nt’ s c la im that th e c on vic tin g e vid e nc e fails to e sta bli sh that th e de fe nd a nt i s g uil ty of thepr e me dit a te d mu rd e r o f the vic tim

. A pre meditated ac t is “one done a fter the exercise of ref lection and judg ment.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-1 3 -2 0 1 (b )( 2) (2003) . “‘Pre meditation involves a previously formed de sign, or
a c tua l intention to kill.’” Br own , 8 3 6 S

. W

. 2 d at5 3 9 (q u o t i n g Le wis v . S tate , 40 Tenn. 127, 147-48 (1859)) (italics adde d in Br own ). It is the process “ of thinking a b o u t a propose d killing bef ore eng ag ing in the homicidal conduct.” Id. at 541. “[N]o specific period of time need e lapse be tween th e d e f e n d a n t’ s f o r mu lati o n o f th e d e s ig n to k il l a n d th e e xe c u ti o n o f th a t p lan . . . .” Id. at 543. Premeditation “may

be shown by

circ umstantial evidence .” I d

. a t 54 1; see State v. Carter , 970 S.W .2d 5 0 9 , 5 1 6 ( T e n n
. Crim

. A p p
. 1 9 9 7 )

. T h u s , p r e me d it a ti o n may b e in f e rr e d f r o m the circ umstances surr ounding the killing. Sta te v . G e ntr y , 881 S.W .2d 1, 3 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). For instance, f

acts whic h might allow a

jury to infer pr emeditation include: (1) f acts a bout how and what the defe ndant did prio r t o the ac tual killing which show he was e ng ag ed in ac tivitydirec ted towar d the k i l l i n g , t h a ti s p l a n n i n g a c t i v i t y; (2) fac ts a bout the defe ndant’s prior relationship and conduct with the victim from which motive may be infe rre d; and (3) facts about the nature of the killing f rom which it may

be infe rre d that the manner

of t he kil ling was so particula r and exacting that the defe ndant m ust have intentionally killed acc ording to a pre conce ived desig n.
Sta te v . B or

dis , 905 S.W .2d 214, 222 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). I n particula r, Tennessee c ourts have ide nti fi e d s omere le va nt c ir c ums ta nc e s:-9- the use of a d eadly

wea pon upon an unarmed victim; the particular
c ru e lty of th e kil lin g ; de c laratio ns by thede fe nd a nt o f an in te nt t o kill; evidence of

p rocurement of a

wea pon; prepa

rations bef

ore the killing for c oncea lment of the crime; and ca lmness immediate ly afte r the killing.

State v. Bland , 958 S.W .2d 651, 660 (Tenn. 1997)

.

Th e de fe nd a nt a

rg ue s tha t the pr e me dit a te d mur de r co nv ic tio n is g ro un dle ss b e c aus e thede fe nd a nt’ s p re tria l st a tem ent , whi c h w a s c ru c ia l in inc ulp a tin g thede fe nd a nt i n th e c ri me s, shows that the victim’s death wa s unintended a n d t h at s h e was alive and c onscious when the defe ndant last saw he r. In our re view of the evidenc e in the light most favora ble to the state, we are n o tb o u n d b y

t h e s e l f

- s e r v i n g e l e m e n t s o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s s t a t e m e n t s , a n d n e i t h e r w a s t h e j u r y
. In Es pit ia v . S tate , 199 Tenn. 696, 288 S.W .2d 731 (1956), our supreme c ourt said, “It is for the jury to s a y wh a t w e ig ht s ha ll b e g ive n to these ve ra l pa rt s o f the [pr e tria l] state me nt, fo r the y ma y we ll believe that part which char g es the prisone r, and r ejec t that which tends to exculpate him.” Id . at 699, 288 S.W .2d at 733 (e mphasis removed)

.

The majority of t he panel of t he court conclude s that, taking the evidence pr esente d in lig ht most favorable to the state, suffic ient evidenc e exists t o allow a r ational jury to conclude that the def endant wa s g uiltybey ond a re asonable doubt of first-de g ree preme ditated murder . The defe ndant confe ssed that he was involved in the kidnapping and death of the victim. He admitted having detailed discussions with others conc erning the pl an to kidnap t he victim for r ansom. The plan took a we ek to put in motion and invol ved the defe ndant s oliciting other s to help car ry out the kidnapping . The de fendant “ca sed” t h e v ictim’s home on at least thre e occ asions prior to the kidnapping . The plan inc luded obtaining hats, shirts, and si x dozen donuts so as to pose as Krispy Kre me employ ees. Afema le was involved to make the entry even more plausible, while a llowing theutm os t of

su rp ri se to theun su sp e c tin g vic tim . T he de fe nd a nt w a s in vo lve d inde c isi on s a s to wh e re the vic tim wo uld be ho us e d. F ir st, thevic tim wa s p la c e d inthetir e sh op , th e n intheho te l, the n the ba c k of a U- Haul va n, a nd ult imate ly , in a re mot e fi e ld in Mis sis sip pi. Th e de fe nd a nt d id not g o into the v ic ti m’ s h o meb u t a d mi tt e d , “ I w a s to s u p e r v is e th e o p e r a ti o n
. ” A ll e v id e n ce supports that the defe ndant did, in fac t, supervise the e ntire oper ation from seizure to death.

The medical evidenc e clearly established the cause of death -- suffocation. The trial court
a c c e pte d th e te sti mon y

of Dr . O. C . Sm itha s a n e xpe rt in the fi e ld o f F or e ns ic Pa tho log y . D r. Smith testified that the ca

use of de ath was suffoc ation, which rende red the victim unc onscious within two minutes and resulted in de ath within another two minutes. He opined that g ray duct tape ha d been
app lie d a ro un d th e he a d a ndne c k o f the vic tim in su c h a fa sh ion a s to ob str uc t the vic tim ’s abil ity to b re a th, re su lti ng in h e r d e a th. Dr . Sm ithte sti fi e d th a t:

I primarily looked at the he ad and ne ck re g io n b ynaked e y e and w ith glow power mag nification, and photog raphic documentation of the wra ps of tape about her-10-

head and neck, a s well as dra wing diag rams depic ting how the tape had been a pplied to that are a.
The e x amination showed that there wer e multiple wraps of tape be g inning at thene c k s ur fa c e , a

bo ut w he re I ’m po int ing he re , whe rethelow e r p ortio n o f the c hin joins the neck, ha ving a

ppl i ed i n s u ch a fashion that they wer e wr aps of tape . The tape, two wr aps of tapewer e underneath the ne ck, and the n it went over the fac e.
At thetim e I e xami ne d th e bo dy

thetape e xten de d fr om h e r u pp e r l ip a c ro ss the nose and then above the ey es. But with de tail e x amination I formed the opinion that the tape ha d orig inated, orig inally been a pplied over the lower lip as we ll, which would have c ompletely

blocked the mouth. I made that c onclusion based upon the fac t that there w as a bla nching of the skin in a h o ri zontal li ne that would be consistent with the tape be ing a pplied in a horizontal f

ashion ac ross the bottom lip, closing the mouth.

And as a result of decomposition the t issues had pull ed away from the tape, and the tape ha d slipped up. I , additionally , had that opinion reinfor ced by the fa ct that there was flattening of the tissues of the mouth in the nose up ag ainst the teeth, wh ic h me a nt that pr e ssu re wo uld ha ve to h a ve be e n a pp lie d, a ndthat pr e ssu rewo uld have be en most consistently applied by

tape that ha d cover ed her mouth.

Additionall y wh en a per son decomposes f luids form in the body

that are pushed out by

the g ases th at bui ld up, and the fluids will come out of the nose , the mouth and the other body opening s. I n Mrs. Webber’ s case the purg ing f luids did not exit the nose a nd the mouth, indicating that some thing had obstructed them while she
wa s inthewe t st a g e . T hat, a g a in, re inf or c e d my op ini on that the mou th w a s f or c ibl y closed by the tape at the time that she died. And a s a re sult of the decomposition proce ss the tape ha d slipped up below the uppe r lip. The photog raphs r evea l that the tape a lso covere d the nose a nd ey es of the vic tim.

A rational jury , from the evidenc e present, had ample proof to conclude that the duct tap e , a s ap p li e d to th is v ic ti m, w a s d o n e s o w il lf u ll y , d e li b e r a te ly , a n d in te n ti o n a ll y to cause the victim ’s s u ff

o ca t i o n and death. The def endant wa s prese nt when the tapewas a pplied bya code fe nd a nt and , b e c aus e of h i s o v e rw he lmi ng pa

rt ic ipatio n inthi s c ri me , th e de fe nd a nt w a s c ri min a lly responsible for

the conduc t of another

. It is the jury ’s pre rog ative to re ject the defe ndant’s explanation of how the vic tim’s death oc curr ed or w here it occurr ed.

The duct tape was obtained from the t ire shop. The victim was housed in the bac k of a U -Haul van beside the tire shop. The kidnapping for r ansom plan neve r re ache d the demand f orT he aut ho r of t hi s o p i ni o n respe ct f

ul l y d i f fers f rom t he m ajo ri t y t hat s uf f i ci ent evi d ence exis t s t o co nvi ct t he 1 d efend ant of p rem ed i t at ed m urder and co nspi racy t o co m m i t prem ed i t at ed m urder. In t he aut ho r’ s vi ew, al t ho ugh t he
re c o rd re v e a ls e x te n siv e p la n n ing fo r a kid n a p p ing w h ic h c e rta inly is a p re d ic a te fo r a c o n v ic tio n o f f el ony m urder, t he
rec o rd rev ea l s no p re-ho m i cid e a cti vit y which su g g e st s th a t th e m urd er w as pre m edi t at ed . O the r th a n the vic tim ’s p o te n tially b e ing a b le to id e n tif y he r a b d u c to rs , t h e e v id e n c e re v e a ls no thin g a b o u t t h e re la tio n sh ip b e tw e e n the vic tim and her abd uct o rs whi ch sugges t s a m o t i ve fo r murd er. Furt herm o re, t here i s no t hi ng s o pa rt i cul ar and exac t i ng ab o ut t he vi ct i m ’ s d eat h t hat t he o f fend ers m ust have i nt entio n a l l y ki l l ed t he vi ct i m acco rding t o a preco ncei ved de si gn. O b vi o usl y , placi ng t ap e around a pe rs o n’ s m o ut h and no se m ay p revent breathi ng, de p end i ng upo n t he t aut ness of t he t ape, an d t he pers on’ s r es ul t i ng deat h c oul d re as onab l y b e viewed as a k nowi ng or r eck l es s homi ci de. T he evi dence bef ore us , howev er , i n t he aut hor ’ s vi ew, f ai l s t o s uppl y t he ci r cums t anc es of t he ki l l i ng , i ncl udi ng t he phy s i cal dy nami cs of t h e pl ac eme n t of

t h e t ape , an d ev en i n t h e l i g h t mos t f av or abl e t o t h e s t at e, w e wou l d h av e t o c on j ec t u r e t h at t h e t ape
w a s a ff ixe d in a m a n n e r c a lc u la te d to su ff o c a te the vic tim

.
A l so, t he aut ho r quest i o ns whether t he st at e est ab l i shed “t erri t o ri al jur i sdi ct i o n” i n co nnect i o n wi t h t he p re m e d itate d m u rd e r c h a rg e a n d a p p lica b le les se r-inc lud e d o ff e n se s. See T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 9

- 1 1

- 1 0 3 (20 0 3 ) ( “E very per s on , w h et h er a n i n h abi t an t of t h i s or a n y ot h er s t at e or c ou n t r y , i s l i abl e t o pu n i s h men t by t h e l aw s of t h i s s t at e, for
an offens e com mi t t ed i n t hi s s t at e.
. . . ”)

. T er r i t ori al j ur i s di ct i on – not t o be conf us ed wi t h v enu e – “ r ecogn i zes t he po wer of a s t at e t o pu n i s h c r i mi n al c on du ct oc cu r r i n g w i t h i n i t s borde r s , . . . [ an d i t ] r ef l ec t s t h at ‘ [ a] s t at e’ s c r i mi n al l aw i s of no force an d ef

fect bey ond i t s t er r i t ori al l i mi t s
. ’ ” St at e v. Le gg , 9 S

. W .3 d 1 1 1 , 1 1 4 ( T e n n
. 19 9 9 ) ( q uo t i ng C of f ee v. P et er bi l t of

Na s hvi l l e, Inc. , 7 9 5 S .W .2 d 6 5 6 , 6 5 8 -5 9 (T e n n . 1 9 9 0 )) . T h e d e fen d a n t’s sta te m e n t re flec ts tha t t h e vic tim
w a s ta p e d in M ississip p i. See T enn
. C od e A nn
. § 39- 11

- 1- 3(c) ( 20 03 ) ( “ W hen t he com mi s s i on of an offens e c om menced
w ithin this sta te is co n su m m a te d o u tsid e it s b o u n d a rie s, the o ff e n se is liab le to p u n ish m e n t in th is sta te

. . . .”) ; Le gg , 9 S. W

. 3d at 115 ( “ T he nat ur al an d ordi nar y meani ng of t he t er m ‘ co nsum m ate’ is t o f i ni s h by comp l et i ng wh at was i nt ended

. . . . ”) ( em p hasi s ad d ed ).

Acc or di n g l y , i n t h e au t h or ’ s v i ew , t h e con v i ct i on of pr eme di t at ed mu r der s h ou l d be r ev er s ed.

A d d iti o n a lly, a s a m a tter o f p la in e rr o r, s ee T en n
. R. Cr i m. P. 52( b) , t h e au t h or be l i ev es t h at t h e con v i ct i on of
c o n sp ira c y to c o m m it p re m e d itate d m u rd e r is u n su p p o rte d b y su ff ic ie n t ev id e n c e
.
T he o f fense of co nspi racy i s co m m i t t ed i f t wo (2) o r m o re p eo p l e, each havi ng t he cul pabl e m ent al st at e requi r ed for t he offens e whi ch i s t he ob j ect o f t he cons pi r acy and e ach ac t i ng for t he pur po s e of promo t i ng or f aci l i t at i ng comm i s si o n of an offens e, ag r ee t hat o ne ( 1) or mo r e of t hem wi l l en gag e i n c onduct wh i ch cons t i t ut es (c o n tinu e d ...)
-11- ransom phase . There fore , the criminal participants, including the def endant, we re ide ntifiable by the victim. The jury was fre e to rejec t any notion from this defendant that the victim was ca rried to a remote field in Mississippi, ha ndcuff ed behind her back and duct taped around he r nec k and hea d, for the pur

pose of be ing f

ound and re turned to her fa m i l y al i v e. This jury had bef ore it suffic ient evidenc e to conc lude that the kidnappe rs h ad co n t rol of a vic tim who could identify the criminal participa nts and who wa s expendable. The duct t ape used to cover the vi ctim’s neck and head w as available at the tire shop. The jury was fr ee to r ejec t the defe ndant’s conte ntion t h at t h e tape was applied in Mississi ppi rather than at the tire shop. The jury hear d evidenc e that the defendant a nd two oth er s rode in the f

ront of the U- Haul van to Mississippi. Dr. Smi th stated there was no evidence o f a strug g le wher e the body was located in Mississ ippi and described how suff ocation would usually

result i n strug g ling by the vi ctim. The re mote location wher e the body was found and its bo un d c on di ti on seems to d e bu nk a ny no tio n th a t th e de fe nd a nt e xpe c te d th e vic tim to
m i r a c u l o u s l y b e f

o u n d a l i v e b y s o m e p a s s e r s b y. 1(

. . . con t i n u ed) 1

s uch offens e.

T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 3 9 -1 2 -1 0 3 (a ) (2 0 0 3 ). B e c a u se the sta te faile d to e sta b lish t h a t the d e fen d a n t p re m e d itate d the d e a th of t he vi ct i m, an d becaus e c ons pi r acy t o com mi t pre med i t at ed mur der r equi r es t hat t he defendan t ha d t he cul pabl e ment al
s t at e of pre med i t at i on, t he aut hor bel i eve s t he cons pi r acy conv i ct i on s uf fer s f r om t he s ame pauci t y of evi dence as does t h e pr eme di t at ed mu r der c on v i ct i on
. T h e con v i ct i on of c on s pi r ac y t o c ommi t pr eme di t at ed mu r der mu s t be r ev er s ed.

-12- (b) F elony

Murder

. For purposes of our

analy sis of felony

murder a s that offe nse wa s alleged i n the indictment in the present c ase, kidna pping is “ false imprisonment . . . [u] nder c ircumstance s exposi ng the [victim ] t o substantial risk of bodily injur y
. ” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-303( a)( 2) (2003). F alse imprisonment is committed by a person who “knowing ly remove s or conf

ines another unlawfully

so as to interfe re substantially with the other’s liberty .” Id. § 39-13-302( a) ( 2003).

The de fendant urg es t his court to hold that the victim’s killing wa s not in perpetration of the kidnapping

. We disa g ree
. I ndeed, a determination that an acc used committed felony murder must be g rounded upon a finding that the killing and the predicate felony wer e “closely connec ted in time, place , and causation, and continuit y of action.” State v. Pierc e , 23 S.W .3d 289, 295 (Tenn. 2000). In the present case , howeve r, t he perpetrators wer e st ill unlawfully confining the victim, thus interfe ring with her liberty , when she was killed. We hold that the homicide wa s committed in the p erp et ra t i o n o f k i d n ap p i n g. (c) Conspiracy to Comm it Felony

Murder

. Although not spe cifica lly raised a s an issue by

the def endant, wehold that the conviction of c onspiracy

to commit felony murder must be reverse d and that charg e dismissed. A conspirac y is c ommitt ed when two or more people, “ eac h having the culpable mental state re quired for the of fense which is the objec t of the conspira cy and eac h acting for the purpose of promoting or fa cilitating c ommissi on of an of fense , ag ree that one (1) or m ore of them will eng ag e in conduc t which constitutes such off ense.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-103(a) ( 2003). This court ha s held that “conspira cy to c ommit fe lony murder

. . . is not an offe nse in Tennesse e.” Sta te v . A nth on y Pe rry , No. W1999-01370-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 8 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, J uly 13, 2001). Based upon that holding, the de fendant’s conviction of conspiracy to commit felony must be reve rsed, and the cha rg e must be dismissed.

I I I . Ph oto g ra ph s.T he t ri al co urt ove rr ul ed t he d efend ant ’ s p ret ri al m o t i o n i n l i m i ne to e x c lud e the p h o to g ra p h s o f t h e vic tim in 2
t he penal t y phas e. T he t r i al cour t gr ant ed t he mo t i on wi t h r es pect t o us e of t he phot ogr aphs dur i ng t he gu i l t phas e. -13- I n his nex t iss u e, t h e defenda nt claims that the trial court erre d by admitting ph oto g ra ph s o f the vic tim ’s bo dy

. Th e ph oto g ra ph s sh ow e d th e vic tim ’s de c omp os ing bo dy bo th 2 in s itu and in the morg ue. The defe ndant ar g ues that the photog raphs, whic h showed de composing tis su e a ndthee ff

e c ts o f i ns e c t a c tiv ity

on thec or

ps e , w e reinflam mat ory

a ndwe reno t r e le va nt t o any sentenc ing issue.

Te nn e sse e Cod e An no tate d sec tio n 39- 13 -2 04 (c ) (2 00 3) pr ov ide s in pe rt ine nt p art :
I n the s en t encing pr ocee ding, e vidence may be pre sented a s to any matter that the c ourt deem s re l ev ant t o the punishment and may include, but not be limited to, the nature and circ umsta n ce s of the crime; the defe ndant’s cha rac ter, ba ckg r o u n d

h is to r y , an d phy sical condition; any evidenc e tending to e stablish or rebut the a g g ravating circ umstances e numerated in s u b s e c ti o n(i); and any evidenc e tending to establish or rebut any

mitigating fac tors. Any

such evide nce w hich the court deems to have probative value on the issue of punishment may be re ceive d reg ard l es s o f its admissibil ity under the rules of
e vid e nc e ; pr ov ide d, that the de fe nd a nt is a c c or de d a fair op po rtun ity to r e but anyhe ars a y

state me nts so a dmi tte d. Ho we ve r, thi s subsection (c ) shall not be construed t o authorize the introduction of any evidenc e sec ured in violation o f the c onstitut ion of the United States or the constitution of Tenne ssee.
Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 9- 13 -2 04 (c ) ( 20 03 ). Onapp e a l, the tria l c ou rt ’s de c isi on to admit a photogr aphic exhibi t is revie wable for abuse of discre tion. State v. Bank s , 564 S.W .2d 947, 949 (Tenn. 1978)

.

Th e st ate soug ht a sentenc e of de ath base d upon the statutory ag g ravator that the offe nse wa s “heinous, atr ocious and c ruel in that it involved torture or serious phy sical abuse be y ond that nece ssary

to produce death.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204( i)(5) (2003). Althoug h the trial
c ou rt de te rm ine d th a t th e ph oto g ra ph s sh ou ld be e xclu de d fr om the g uil t ph a se of thetria l be c aus e the pre j u d icial ef

fec t outweig hed the pr obative value , see Tenn. R. Evid. 403, it ruled that, for purposes of the pena lty

phase, the photogr aphs we re r elevant to establish the ag g ravating f actor . The tria l ju dg e op ine d th a t th e ph oto g ra ph s d e pic te d th e of

fe nd e rs ’ atte mpt

to “ se nda

me ssa g e ” to
se g me nts of

thec ommun ity

. I n part ic ula r, the jud g e be lie ve d that th e po sit ion ing of thebo dy wi th the g enitalia exposed was sug g estive of the a g g ravating f actor

. On the re cord, the court’s r ationale f or admitting the photogr aphs is not persuasive. Th e no tio n that thevic tim ’s bo dy wa s p os iti on e d to “ se nd

a me ssa g e ” wa s n ot pe r se e sta bli sh e d in the re cord, and we a

re not c onvinced that t h e i m p u t ed reason for the body ’s positioning could beI n di s po s i ng of a c hal l eng e t o t he appl i cabi l i t y of t he ( i ) ( 5) a gg r ava t or, t he t r i al j udge expr es s ed hi s vi ew t hat 3
t he t w o m i nu t es o r so i n w hich t he victi m suf fere d f ro m t he p ain an d t erro r o f i m p en d i ng su f

fo ca t i o n sup p o rted t he use
o f t he (i )( 5 ) fact o r. T he chal l enged e xhi b i t s i l l ust rat e t he m et ho d o f w rapp i ng the vi ct i m ’ s head w i t h t ap e and of cuf f i ng t he vi ct i m ’ s hand s b ehi nd her back. Ini t i al l y , we agree i n pri nci p l e wi t h t he st at e’ s cl ai m t hat t he p i ct ures were rel evant t o s ho w t he nat ure of

t he m urder as i t rel at es t o the (i )( 5 ) aggr avat o r. H o wever, we ackno wl ed ge t hat t he p ho t o graphs
ar e ex t r eme l y u n pl ea s an t a n d i n v ar y i n g de g r ee s , g r u es ome i n t h at t h ey de pi ct t h e v i ct i m ’ s b o dy i n a s t at e of d eco m p o si t i o n. W hen co nsi d ered in t hei r t o t al i t y , t he p rejudi ci al val ue o f t he si x pho t o graphs outwei ghs t hei r prob at i ve val ue. T he t ri al co urt s ho ul d not have ad m i t t ed al l s i x pho t o graphs. T hat s ai d , ho w e v e r, w e b el i eve t hat t wo of t he p h o to g ra p h s, e x h ib its 2 3 a n d 2 4 , w h ic h a re c lo se sh o ts o f the v ic tim ’s ta p e d h e a d a n d h a n d c u ff e d w rists, w e re p ro p e rly
a d m itt e d a s m o re p ro b a tive tha n p reju d ic ia l o n the issu e o f t h e (i)( 5 ) a g g ra v a to r. -14- re a so na bly inf e rr e d. At a ny rate , th e po sit ion ing of

the vic tim ’s c or

ps e ha s no dir e c t r e latio ns hip to t h e ap p l i c ab l e a g g r a v a t i n g f a c t o r , w h i c h r e q u i r e s t h a tt h e t o rt u r e o r ab u s e e x c e e d t h a tn e c e s s ar y to produce de ath. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-204(i)( 5) (2003)

. 3

Ha vin g sa id that a ndde sp ite thepo te nti a l fo r p re jud ic e be ing a

dyna mic in determining that admitting the photogr aphs wa s err or, we hold that the err or wa s harmless. See Tenn. R. C ri m
. P

. 5 2 (a ); Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b). We do not believe that the er ror a ffe cted the judgme nt. See id. During the guilt phase of the t rial, t he jury hear d the medica l examiner describe in detail the condition of the body , the jury would have be en exposed to some pictur es of portions of the body , and more over, the jury esche wed the de ath pena lty , a re sult that belies the defe ndant’s claim that the photogra

phs inflamed the jury ’s passions ag ainst him. We discern no indication that the photog raphs a f

f e c te d the re sult of the sentenc ing pr ocee ding and decline to va cate the first-de g ree mur de r s e nte nc ing jud g me nt.

I V. Victim I mpact Evidenc e.

We combine two issues relating to the use of vi ctim impact evidenc e. In the first, the defe ndant claims that the trial court err ed in a llowing the victim’s mother to te stify and in approving her te stimonybefor e holding a jury -out hea ring . I n the sec ond issue, the def endant c laims that the statute authorizing the use of victim impact testimony is unconstituti onal.
( a ) S p e c i f

i c V i c t i mIm p a c tT e s t i m o n y.
The de fendant claims that the trial court err ed allowing the victim’s mother to testify about the experienc e of loss re sulting fr om the victim’s death, and s ec o n d arily , he claims that the trial court e rrone ously made this decision without first conducting a jury -out hea ring of the prof

fer of thepr op os e d w itn e ss’ te sti mon y . We re je c t bo th c la ims

. Neither the United States Constitut ion nor the Tenne ssee Const i t u t i on prohibit the
us e of vic tim imp a c t tes tim on y to se rv e a s a re min de r to the jury in a ca pit a l ca se that “ thevic tim is an individual whose de ath re prese nts a unique loss to society and in particular to his family .” Sta te
v . Ne sb it , 978 S.W .2d 872, 889 (Tenn. 1998) (quoting Payne v. Tennesse e , 501 U.S. 808, 825, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2608 (1991))

. Acc ording ly , victim impact evidencemay be pre sented in a se ntencing-15-

proce dure w hen authorized by state law, id. at 890, and our Code section 39-13-204(c) authorizes the use of vic tim im pact testimony in a first-de g ree murder jury sentenc ing pr ocedur e:
The co u rt shall permit a member or member s, or a repr esentative or re prese ntatives of the victim’s familyto testify at the sentenc ing he aring about the victim and about the impac t of the murder on the family of t he victim and other rele vant persons. Such evidence may

be conside red by

the jury in determining which sentenc e to impose. The c ourt s h all permit members or
re pr e se ntativ e s of the vic tim ’s famil y to a tte nd the tria l, and tho se pe rs on s sh a ll n ot b e exclu de d b e c aus e thepe rs on or pe rs on s sh a ll testify during the sentenc ing pr ocee ding a s to the impact o f the offe nse, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-204(c ) (2003) . “[V]i ctim impact evidenc e,” how ever , “which thr eate ns to render the trial fundamentally

unfair or which poses a

dang er of unfair pr ejudice is not appropriate and should be e x cluded by the trial judg e.” Ne sb it , 978 S.W .2d at 891. Furthermore , To ena ble the trial c ourt t o a d e q uately supervise the admission of victim impact proof, w e concl u d e that the State must notify the trial court of

it s i ntent to produce victim impact evidence . Upon
rec eiving notification, the trial court must hol d a hea ring outside the prese nce of

the jury to determine the admissibili ty o f the e vidence

. The victim impact evide nce should not be a dmitt ed u n t il the trial court determines that evide nce of one or moreag g ravating circ umstances is alre ady

prese nt in the rec ord.

Ge n e r a l l y , v i c t i mi m p a c te v i d e n c e s h o u l d b e l i m i t e d to information desig ned to s how those unique c hara cteristics which prov id e a b r ie f g li mp s e in to th e li f e o f th e in d iv id u a l w h o h a s been killed, the contemporaneo us and prospe ctive cir cumstance s s u rr o unding the individual’s death, and how those circ umstances financ ially , emo t i o n al l y , p s y ch o l o gi ca l l y o r p h y s i ca l l y

i m p ac ted upon members of

the victim’s immediate fa mily . Of these types of proof, evidenc e re g arding the emo t i o n al i mpact of the murder on the victim’s family

should be most closely

scrutini z ed bec ause it poses the g reatest threat to du e proce ss and risk of undueprejudice , pa rt ic ula rl y if no pr oo f i s o ff

e re d on th e oth e r type s o f v ic tim imp a c t. Ho we ve r, the re is no br ig ht- lin e te st, a ndthea dmi ssi bil ity of sp e c if ic types of victim i m p act evidence must be determined on a
c a se -b y -c a se ba sis

.-16- Id. (citations and f

ootnote omitted).

I n the pre sent ca se, bef

ore the jury

sentenc ing pr ocedur e beg an, the trial court he ard
ar gu m en t s co n ce rn i n g t h e ad m i s s i b i l i t y o f v i ct i mi m p ac tev i d en ce an d , wi t h o u ta j u ry -o u th ea ri n g, ruled that the state could us e such evidenc e. A close inspection of t he record, however , reve als that the court was ruling upon a question of law – whether victim impact evidenc e under the Tenne ssee statut e a s a

me a ns of e sta bli sh ing a n a g g ravating fa c tor is generally ad m i s s i b l e. T h e t ri al j u d ge reje cted these a

rg uments. The assistant district attorney g ener al then re quested a

jury -out hea

ring on the sp e c ifi c testimony , which the state proposed to pre sent via the victim’s mot h er. The court conducte d t h e hea

ring and appr oved the victim’s mother’ s proposed testimony . I n our view, the
c ou rt pr oc e e de d ina

pr op e r f a sh ion , a ndwe fi ndno fa ult wi th i t.
As to the trial court’s substantive ruling on the use of testimony of the mother of the victim, we hold that the testimony fit wi t h i n the boundaries ere cted by Ne sb it . Although the testimony articulated t he emotional impact upon the victim’s immediate fa milyand such e vidence must be closely

scrutinized so as to avoid undue pre judic e, se e Ne sb it , 978 S.W .2d at 891, and althoug h no other ty

pe of vic tim i m p act e vidence was pre sented, we hold that the testimony prese nted was na

rrow and within proper bounds. We discern no e rror in this case in allowing the state to prese nt the victim’s mother to testify as to the impact of the victim’s death. (b) L eg al Claim: Cons tituti onality of Code Section 39-13-204( c).

The de fendant cl ai m s that the victim impact evidenc e statute, Code se ction 39-13- 204(c) , violates the “la w of the la nd” clause of the T ennesse e Constituti on. See T e n n
. C o n s t

. art

. I, § 8. He a ssails the statute on bases that it is unlim ited, broad, va g ue, and impermissibl y authorizes the jury ’s valuation of the victim’s life.

Th is b id t o in va lid a te se c tio n 3 0- 13 -2 04 (c ) f a ils . T he de fe nd a nt ci te s to no app lic able
auth ority to s up po rt

his c la im, a ndmor e ov e r, se c tio n 39 -1 3- 20 4 ha s be e n he ld to be c omp liant w ith Tenne ssee Const itution article I , section 8. Sta te v . She ph e rd , 902 S.W .2d 895, 907 (Tenn. 1995)

. We a rebo un d b y

thepr e c e de nt o f the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt

.

V. J ury

I nstructions.

The de fendant mounts t wo cha lleng es to the trial court’ s jury instructions. First, he claims that the instructions wer e uncle ar and confusing . Second, he c laims that the trial court delivere d err oneous i n s t ructions on the def inition of “knowing ” as an element of second- deg ree murder.
(a) Unclea r, Confusing I nstructions.-17- This issue that th e instructions may have c onfused the jury

as to the numeration of the char g ed counts was prese nted for the first time on appea l. The issue is w aived, t h er ef ore, beca use it was not pre sented in the de fendant’s motion for new tria l. See Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 3 (e ) ( in all case s tried by

a jury , no iss u e p re s en t ed for revie w shall be pre dicated upon e rror in . . . jury ins truc tio ns g rante d o r r e fu se d .

. . or oth e r g ro un d u po n w hic h a ne w t ri a l is so ug ht, un le ss the sa me was spec ifically

stated in a motion for a new trial; otherwise, such issues will be tre ated a s waived)

.

(b) De finition of “Knowing ” and “ I ntentional”.

The de fendant next arg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in not limiting the de finition of “knowing ” and “ intentional” for pur poses of instructing the jury as to these respe ctive ele ments of second- deg ree and first-de g re e, premeditated murde r. He bases his ar g ument upon State v. Page , 81 S.W .3d 781 (Tenn. 2002) . I n Page , this court held t hat t he trial c ourt should not inst ruct the jury as to the n at u re o f conduc t mode of the “ knowing ” ele ment of sec ond deg ree murder, a result of conduct c rime. Id. at 789.

T h i s cl ai m i s also waived f or failure to include it in the motion for new tria l. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e)

. Notwithstanding waiver , to the extent that the de fendant mentions the trial court’s inc lusion of the n ature of conduc t definition of “knowing ” for purposes of e x plaining the elements of se cond-de g ree murder, the issue was re ndere d moot by the jury ’s ver dicts of first-de g ree murder. See State v . Paul Graham Manning , No. M2002-00547-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 8-9 (Te nn. Crim. App., Nashville, Fe b. 14, 2003). To the extent that the defe ndant s eeks to apply the principles of Page to a finding of pre meditated first-de g ree murder, this court has held that an instruc tion that included the nature of c onduct mode of the definition of “intentional” is harmless error. See, id., sli p op. at __; Sta te v . H

ill , 118 S.W .3d 380, 385-86 (Te nn. Crim. App. 2002).

VI . Conclusion.

The de fendant’s convictions for preme ditated first-deg ree murder and for c onspiracy to commit that offe nse m ust be reverse d. I n all other re spects, the judg ments of the trial c ourt are aff irmed.

_________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE