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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 12-3159

U NI T E D S TAT E SOF A M E RI C A , Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

V E R NA P I L ON

, Defen dant-Appellant.
Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the Nor thern Distri ct o f Il l i noi s, Eastern Di v i sio n. No. 10 CR 12 9 — Virgin ia M. K end al l , Judg e.
A RGU E D S E PT E MB E R 19, 2013

— D E C I D E D O C T OB E R 30, 2013

Before M AN I O N

, K AN N E, and S YKE S

, Circ uit Judges. M AN I O N , Circui t Judge

. After ei ght wit ne sses had testifi ed at her jury tr i al, V

erna Pi lon pleaded gui lty to fiv e counts of wi re fraud in connecti on wi th a P onzi sch eme she ran wi th her husband. At sentencing, the di stric t court deni ed cr edi t for acceptanc e of responsibi li ty , appli ed an enhan c e m e nt for abus e of a posi tion of tr ust, and sentenced her to 78 months’ incarcer ation. On appeal, Pi lon a r g ue s t hat the di stric t court err ed in denyi ng credi t for acceptanc e of responsibi li ty , in applying an2 No. 12-3159
enhanc ement for abuse of a posi tion of trust, and by i gnor ing mi tigati on arg uments that her atto rney made at sentencing. In addi tion to these procedural arg uments, Pi lon also arg ues that her 78-month sentence w as subst anti v ely unreasonable. W e affi rm. I. FactualBackground Through compani es they oper ated and contro lled, V erna Pi lon and her husband James Pi lon offered tw o inv e st me nt oppor tuni ties : the “Mor tgag e Acceleration Progr am” and the “Pri v ate Plac ement Prog ram.” Pi lon falsely repr esented that the Mor tgag e Ac c e l e ra ti on P ro gr a m w ou l d ge n e ra te si gni fi cant ret urns for inv estor s on thei r money , such that she w ould pay the inv estor s’ monthly ho me mort gage payments going forw ard, completely pay off the outstandi ng balanc e on the inv estor s’ mort gage s wi thi n tw o y ears, and make a bonus cash payment to inv estor s at the end of the tw o-y ear period. Many of the inv estor s in the M o r t gage Acceleration Prog ram w ere already financi ally strugg ling so they refin anced their mort

gage s to get the money necess ary to inv est in the prog ram, resulti ng in a hi gher monthly mort gage payment. Wi th respect to the Pri v ate Plac ement Prog ram, Pi lon falsely repr esented to inv estor s that she w ould inv est their money in a hi gh-yield fund and that the inv estor s w ould receiv e betw een a hundred percent or mo r e o n their inv estments wi thi n 90 days or a sli ghtly l o nger period as a result of the Pri v ate Plac ement Prog ram. Pi lon ro ped in inv estor s not just by the promis e of ret urns, but also by hinti ng at religi ous and human i tar i a n purposes. Among her compani es w ere “Pray er Inter nati onal” and “Ow eNo. 12-3159 3
No One Inter nati onal Min i stry .” Pi lon perpet uated the M o r t

g a ge Acceleration Prog ram by payin g early inv estor s’ mort

gage s wi th later inve st o rs’ money (a P onzi scheme) and she kept the Pri v ate Plac ement Pr o g r a m ali v e by tellin g the inv estor s that the prog ram was gener atin g si gni fi cant retur ns when i t w as not

. Appro xim ately fort y people w ere lured by Pi lon into inv esting amounts ranging from $4,000 to $110,000. Inv estor s entrusted a tot al of $1,027,900 to the Pil ons. The inv est ment prog rams w ere frauds; $967,702 of the inv estor s’ fund s were lo st. Pi lon di d not inv est the money she receiv ed from her inv estor s, but instead used the money in a manner inconsi stent wi th her repr esentations to inv estor s. F o r instance, she used the money to pay fo r a 2 0 04 Cadi llac Esc alade, a $14,000 di amond ring, a $125,000 earnest money payment on a $21 mi lli on home in Cali fornia (purport edly to use as a temple for the W ashi taw Nation) , hotel stays, ai rlin e tic ket s, and to pay off personal debt. In Mar ch 2005, the Illinoi s Departme nt of Securiti es or dered Pi lon to cease offer ing inv estments; she i gnor ed t he or der

. As w as inevitable, Pi lon’s prog rams
ev entually unrav eled. Her inv estor s—at thi s po int, vic

tim s—lost the money t hey had giv en her . Addi tionally , many who had refin anced their mo rt gage s to fund the inv estments lost their homes. Pi lon w as ind ict e d for wi re fraud on Februar y 17, 2010. Pilon w as a member of a sov ereign ci tizen mov ement called the W ashi taw Nation. A s such, Pi lon mov ed to di smi ss the indi ctment a g a inst her becau se she beli ev ed that she w as not subject to the laws of the Uni ted St ates or to the jurisdi cti on of i ts courts. The motion w as deni ed and a jury tr i al w as set for4 No. 12-3159 May 2 2, 2012. The mornin g of May 22, right before jury selecti on w as to begi n, Pi lon informed the di stric t court of her intent to plead gui lty to the indi ctment. The di stric t court conduc ted a change of plea hearin g, and began by informing Pi lon of her rights and explain ing the statuto ry gui delines and the maxi mum penalti es. How ev er , when the government proffere d the factual basi s of her o ff ense, Ms. Pi lon deni ed
ev ery thi ng; she deni ed any knowledge of the fraud, she deni ed mak ing any repr esentations to inv estor s (stating instead that she follow ed a scri pt), and she deni ed knowi ng that any of the repr esentations w ere false. The di stric t court told Pi lon that she had not admi tte d gui lt and thus the court w ould not accept her gui lty plea. The court th e n proceeded to select a jury and adjo urned for the day

. On May 23, 2012, the di stric t court conv ened for the fi rst day of Pi lon’s jury tr i al. Before the tr i al began, Pi lon’s atto rney informed the courtthat Pi lon w ould li ke to “revis i t a possi ble ch a ng e of plea,” but that the atto rney thought i t could w ait unti l lunch. The court advis ed Pi lon that, to plead gui lty , she

w ould hav e to admit fac ts that show gui lt. Pi lon requested to speak, and the c ourt advis ed her to c onsult wi th her at tor ney
. After speaking w i th P i lon, her attor ney stated they w ould tr y the pl ea at lu nch. The parties proceeded to gi v e their openi ng statements to the jury and e ig ht of the government’s wi tness es—vi cti ms of Pi lon’s sch eme—test i fi ed. No change of plea w as atte mpted at lunch. Instead, at the end of the day , the court un dert ook a second change of plea hearin g. The di stric t
c ou rt a gain explain ed Pi lon’s rights and the se n te n c in g p ro c e s s, and the governme nt proffere d the same facts, but thi s tim eNo. 12-3159 5
Pi lon admi tte d to the sch eme and suc cess fully pleaded gui lty to t he indi ctment. On Sept ember 6, 2012, the di stric t court held Pi lon’s sentencing hearin g. In calculating Pi lon’s gui deline range, the court appli ed an enhanc ement for abu se of a posi tion of tr ust. Pi lon’s co un se l stated that there w as no objection to the enhanc ement (as he had also repr esented in Pi lon’s sentencing memorandum). The di stric t court also declined to credi t Pi lon for acceptanc e of responsi bi li ty , finding that she di d not accept responsibi li ty “unti l the 11th hour , and that i t w as not based on tr ue remor se but, rat he r , up on the reality that she w ould be convic ted.” After hearin g the sentencing arg uments, the court sentenced Pi lon to 78 months’ incarceration, wi thi n the mi ddle of the guideline range, and im posed $967,702 in restituti on. II. Disc uss ion On appeal, Pi lon contends that t he d ist ric t court err ed by (1) denyi ng credi t for acceptanc e of responsibi li ty; (2) applying
an enhanc ement for abus e of a posi tion o f t r ust; (3) fai ling to adequa te l y c on s i d e r h e r m i ti ga ti on arg uments; and (4) sentencing her to a ter m of incarceration that i s sub stanti v ely un r e a sonable. A. Acceptan ce of Respons ibil ity W e rev i ew the di stric t court’s appli cati on of the gui delines de novo and rev i ew i ts factual de t e rminati ons for clear err or
. United States v
. W

alsh , 723 F .3d 802, 807 (7th Ci r
. 2013)

. Our precedent i s clear that not accepting responsibi li ty unti l the elev enth hour i s a suffi ci ent reason for a di stric t court to deny

a defendant credi t for acceptance of responsibi li ty

. See United6 No. 12-3159
States v
. Redmond, 667 F .3d 863, 874 (7th Ci r
. 2012). Pi lon clearly pleaded gui lty well past the elev enth hour , but she atte mpts to ski rt our holdings by contending that the di stric t court’s deni al of credi t w as not based on th e l a t e ness of her plea, but r ather
on a cle a r l y e r ro neous finding of fact. See United States v
. Ritsema , 31 F .3d 559, 568 (7th Ci r
. 1 9 9 4 ) (rev ersing where the di stric t court err oneously deni ed acceptanc e-of-responsi bi li ty credi t based on the defendant’s refusal to accept responsibi li ty for co nduct that w as not relev ant to the convic tion). Speci fi

cally , Pi lon contends that the di stric t court err ed in finding that sh e d id not accept responsibi li ty unti l after hearin g the testim ony ag ainst her durin g the first day of tr i al. At sentencing, Pi lon’s atto rney relay ed to the court that Pi lon’s fi rst atte mpt to plead gui lty fai led becau se she becam e angry and ups e t at her husband when hearin g the government’s proffer of facts. He stated that Pi lon knew that she had inappro p r ia t e l y deni ed the facts, but that she w as ready to plead gui lt y the mornin g of May 23, before hearin g the testim ony again st her

. Pi lon’s atto rney informed the court that the only reason she di d not plead gui lty the mornin g of t he second day w as to let the government proceed wi th i ts out-oftown wit ne sses who w ere already present. Nev ert heless, the court stat ed: I do think, fro m what I observ ed at the tr i al, the f act that it w as after the sev en wi tnesses 1 who testifi ed each w ere br inging her closer

There were ei ght, not sev en, witnesses, as cl arif i ed l ater b y the di str i c t 1

cour t.No. 12-3159 7
and closer into the ambi t of the cri minal scope of acti vity that she w as becoming more and more aw are that there w as going to be a convic tion. And so as much as I sympathi ze wi th y our challe ng e s, I don’t thi nk that she accepted responsibi li ty until the 11th hour , and that it

w as not based upon tr ue remor se but, rat her , upon the reality that she w ould be convic ted. Pi lon contends that thi s finding w as clearly err oneous becau se she had deci ded to plea d gui lty , and conv ey ed that deci si on to the c ourt thro ugh her atto rney , the mornin g of the second day—before hearing any testim ony ag ainst her

. Thi s contention i s meritless

. The di stric t court heard Pi lon’s arg ument about when she made the decisio n to plead gui lty , but nonetheless found, based on t he court’s observ ations of Pi lon, that she pleaded gui lty only after the t e st imo ny of her vic tim s made her face the reali ty of convic tion, not becau se of
remor se. The di stric t court i s in the best positi on to make thi s deter minati on an d, especi ally giv en that Pi lon had deci ded to p l e a d g uilt y the day before, but then deni ed all the facts, the court’s finding i s not clearly er ro neous.

B. Abuse of a Positi on of T rust Pi lon asserts that the di stric t cour t appli ed too broad a defini tion of “posi tion of tr ust” and there fore err ed in finding Pi lon occupi ed such a posi tion. Pi lon w ai v ed t his a rg ument when her atto rney stated e x p l i ci tly on the recor d that there

w ere no objections to t he abus e of tr ust enhanc ement and,8 No. 12-3159
instead, focus ed her arg ument on acceptanc e of responsibi li ty

. See United St at e s v
. V

asquez, 673 F .3d 680, 684 (7th Ci r
. 2012) (“For fei ture take s place when co unsel or a defendant negli

gently bypasses a v ali d arg ument. W ai v er , on the o ther hand, inv olv es an intentional abandonment of a known right

. ”) (ci tations omi t t e d ). The recor d shows that Pi lon abandoned any arg ument that the enhancement di d not apply in the fac e of an uphi ll battle for acceptanc e of responsi bi li ty credi t. In addit io n t o statin g that there w ere no objections to the enhancem ent at sentencing, Pi lon’s sentencing memorandum
e x p l i ci tly says, “The PSR has found that ‘... the defendant abus ed a posi tion of publi c or p r iv ate tr ust, or used a speci al ski ll, in a manner that si gni fi cantly faci li tate d the c ommi ssi on
or concealm ent of the offense.’ Therefore , tw o lev els are added to the offense lev el. The defendant accepts thi s upw ard adjustment.” T

aken as a whole, these ci rcums tances evinc e an intent to abandon the arg ument that the enhanc ement di d not apply , and i t is there fore w ai v ed. Ev en i f t hi s ar gument w as merely for fei ted, appli cati on of the enhanc ement w as not plain e r ro r
. The gui delines instruct
a di stric t court that, i f a defendant “abus ed a posi tion of publi c
or priv ate tr ust

... in a manner that si gni fi cantly faci li tate d the commi ssi on
... of the offense,” the court should increase the offense lev el by tw o. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. In rev i ewing a deci si on to apply the enhanc ement, w e mus t consi der “(1) whether the defendant occupi ed a posi tion of t r us t ; and (2) whether hi s abus e o f the posi tion of tr ust si gni fi cantly faci li tate d the cri me.” United Stat es v
. Sierr a, 188 F .3d 798, 802 (7th Ci r
. 1999). Appli cati on Note 1 to § 3B1.3 clari fi es that a posi tion of “publi c
or priv ate tr ust” i s one characterized by “sub stanti al di scre-No. 12-3159 9 tionary judgment that i s or d inar i ly given consi derable defer

ence,” and, to clari fy wha t is meant by di screti on, the note giv es the example of “a bank executiv e’s fraudulent loan sch eme,” as opposed to “embezzlement or theft by an or dinary bank teller .” Id

. F ur t her , Appli cati on Note 3 states that the abus e of a posi tion of tr ust enhanc ement “also appli es in a case in whi ch the defendant prov i des suffi ci ent indi ci a to the vic tim that the defendant legiti mately holds a posi tion of priv ate or pub l ic t rust, when in fact, the defendant does not.” Id. That note prov i des the example of a “defendant who

... perpet rat es
a financi al fraud by le ading an inv estor to beli ev e the defendant i s a legi tim ate inv estment brok er .” Id. Here, the rec o r d sh o ws that Pi lon held herself out to her vic tim s as oper atin g and contro ll in g the c om p ani e s th at offered the inv estment prog rams, she represented thatshe had m ade money for other indi vidu als thro ugh t he prog rams, and she p ro mi sed that i f the inv estor s w ould inv est the necess ary fund s, she w ould prov i de them wi th astro nomi cal ret urns. Her vic tim s placed their money in her and her husband’s prog rams and their fai th in her and he r hu sban d’s management of the prog r a ms. Thi s fai th w as akin to the tr ust placed in any inv estment manager or brok er’s management of inv estments. Furt her , the inv estor s in the Mor tgag e Accele r a t ion Prog ram relied on Pi lon t o make their home mort gage payments for them from the inv estment pro ceeds. The di stric t court adopted the pres entence repo rt ’s sum mary that Pi lon “assu med a fi duci ary duty in relat i on to those inv estor s by ca usin g them to beli ev e that they w ere enter ing into a co ntractual agr eement wi th the defendant's bus iness entiti es.” Thi s i s an apt sum mary; her vic tim s entrusted their10 No. 12-3159
money to her di screti on, for their benefi t. Pi lon’s other arg uments o n t his enhanc ement do not require discuss i on as t hey do not co me close to demonstrating err or —plain or otherwi se—in the di stric t court’s appli cati on of the enhancement. See V asquez, 673 F .3d at 684- 85 (“Under p lain err or rev i ew , the court rev erses only when there i s: ‘(1) an err or or defect (2) that i s clear or obvious (3) affec tin g the d e fe nd ant’s sub stanti al rights (4) and seri ously i mpugning the fai rness, integr i ty , or publi c reputat i on of judi ci al proceedings.’” (quoti ng United States v. Anderson , 604 F .3d 997, 1002 (7th Ci r . 2010)))

. C. Consid eration of Mitigation Arguments Pi lon also arg ues that the di stric t court di d not adequately consi der her mi tigati on arg uments in deter mining her sentence. Speci fi cally

, Pi lon arg ue d t ha t her poor health and the burden her incarceration w ould hav e on her fami ly called for

a low er sentence. Whi le the sentencin g gui delines are advis or y , the di stric t court mus t apply the sen t e ncing factors. United States v
. Mi r an d a , 505 F .3d 785, 791 (7th Ci r
. 2007). T w o such factors that the court mus t consi d er are the “hi stor y and characteris tic s o f t he defendant” and “the need

... to prov i de the defendant wi th needed

... medical care
... in the most effecti v e manner
. ” 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)( 1); (a)( 2)(d)

. How ev er , the di stric t cour t “need not comment on ev ery arg ument the defendant rais es.” Miranda, 505 F .3d a t 79 2

. Ra ther , “arg uments clearly wi thout merit can, and for the sake of judi ci al economy should, be pass ed ov er in si lence.” United States v
. Cun nin gham , 429 F .3d 673, 678 (7th Ci r
. 2005) “But when a court giv es little
or no atte nti on to the defendant’s prin ci pal arg ument when that arg ument ‘w as not so w eak as not to merit di scu ssi on,’ w e cannot hav e confi dence that the j udge adequately consi deredNo. 12-3159 11
the se ct i on 3553(a) factor s.” Miranda, 505 F .3d at 792 (quoti ng Cun nin gham , 429 F .3d at 679). “Miti gating arg uments about

... gener al hardshi ps typical ly do not requ ire any di scu ssi on at all.” United States v
. Gary, 613 F .3d 706, 710 (7th Ci r
. 2010). Ho wev er

, “a sentencing court cannot sum mari ly di sreg a r d a defendant’s potent i ally mer it or i ous arg ument as i t relat es to ext rao rdin ary fami ly ci rcums tances.” Id

. at 711. That i s not what happened h ere. At the tim e of her sentencing, Pi lon w as 60 y ea r s old and

w as sufferin g from sarcoi dosi s, asthma, an i rr egular heartbeat, and fus ed v ert ebrae in her spine. She had gr owths in her ey es that w ere causing pain and vi si on pro blems . Furt her , she had t w o hi gh sch ool-age chi ldren, one of whom w as 19 and ha d
canc er
. Wi th her husband also incar ce r a t ed, care for these chi ldren w as left to her eldest daughter , who had three chi ldren of her own and w as facing a di v or ce. Before sentenc

ing, Pi lon’s couns el fi led a sent encing memorandum whi ch refer enced an attached lette r from Pi lon contai ning thi s informatio n (t he speci fi cs of her i llness w ere in her prese ntence repo rt ); thi s information w as, how ev er , a small part of Pi lon’s sentencing arg ument. At her sentencin g hearin g, Pi lon ’ s a tto rney’ s arg ument focus ed almost entirely on her loy alty to her husband, her loy alty to the W a sh it a w Nation, and the clai m that Pi lon may hav e thought there w as a chanc e of ret urning the money to her inv esto r s. The har dshi p on her fami ly w as only men tioned in pass ing at t he beginning of her
couns el’s argument. The di stric t court w as not persuaded by Pi lon’s arg uments for leni ency

. After conductin g an analysi s of the sentencing12 No. 12-3159 factors, and then prono unc ing i ts sentence, the court further explain ed: I als o note that some of the v ery same thi ngs that y ou seek the Court to be sympa t he tic reg ardin g, for example, the fact that the prim ary caregiv er wi ll now be i mpri soned and that t he re’s li mi ted financi al means for y our fami ly

, th o se w ere consi derat i ons that y ou di dn’t giv e to the vic tim s in the case earlier on when they were in li mi ted financi al places

. Thi s statement demonstrate s that the di stric t court consi dered Pi lon’s arg uments about her age, he r ro le as caregiv er , and the hardshi p on her fami ly , but found that these consi der

ations w ere outw ei ghed by the need for her sentence to reflect the serious ness of her o ffens e. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). Thi s court has reco g nized that a si ck, y oung chi ld who requires speci al care presents an ext rao rdin ary fami ly ci rcumstance that the court mus t co nsi der in selecting i ts sentence—and a statement that the ci rcums tance i s t he d efendant’s fault i s not a d e quate consi derat i on. United States v
. Schroeder , 536 F .3d 746, 756 (7th Ci r
. 2008). Nonetheless, Pi lon’s fami ly hardshi p arg ument w as not a major part of her sentencing strat egy

, and the di s tr i c t court gav e consi derat i on commensurate wi th the arg ument that w as made. The d i stric t court demonstrate d th a t it had read her lette r and consi dered her fami ly hardshi p, but thought th a t t he ci rcums tances di d not outw ei gh the seri ousness of her offense. Cf. Schroeder , 536 F .3d at 751 (holding that sum mari ly blaming the fami ly hardshi p onNo. 12-3159 13
the d e fe ndant w as insu ffi ci ent consi derat i on where the defendant made fami ly hardshi p a focal point by p ro viding medi cal documentati on, offerin g testim ony about the fami ly’s hardshi p, and making the ci rcumstances a key poin t of arg ument at sentencing). Furt her , by Pi lon’s own admi ssi on, her older daughter has cared for her son wi th canc e r for some tim e. Her son i s not a minor
. Cf. Schroeder

, 536 F .3d at 750-51 (ch i ld w as daycare age). Furt her , when Pi lon w as finally arr ested for her cri me, she w as found in Nort h Caro lina (for medi cal reasons) far from her son in Illinoi s. The di stric t court adequately consi dered Pi lon’s mi tigati on arg uments. See United States v
. Diekemper, 604 F .3d 345, 355 (7th Ci r
. 2010) (“ t he fact that the di stric t court acknowledged thi s arg ument i s di sposi tiv e—as long as a sentencing court consi ders the arg uments made in mi tigati on,
ev en i f i mpli cit l y and i mpreci sely , the sentence i mposed wi ll be found r e a so na ble”); cf. Schroeder , 536 F .3d at 756 (holding that a di stric t c ourt ’s rej ecti on of an arg ument for an inappropriate r eason w as erro r). Finall y , Pi lon’s arguments about her health and age were not exceptional. See United States v
. Mor eland, 703 F .3d 976, 991 (7th Ci r
. 201 2 ) (“ A s for age and infi rmi ty , age 59 i s not elderly in our soci ety ; the elderly do not hav e a li cens e to commi t cri me, and adequate medi cal care i s
av ai lable in feder a l pris ons.”) (ci tations omi tte d). Whi le the court i s sympathetic to the tr agedy of leaving the care of a son wi th canc er to an already burdened fa m i ly member , the di stric t court did n ot fail to adequately consi der Pi lon’s arguments.14 No. 12-3159
D. Subst antive Reas onableness of Pilon’s Sentenc e P ilon’s last arg ument bui lds u p on h e r m i ti ga ti on a rgu m e n ts by adding an arg ument t ha t her personal characteris tic s and low cri minal hi stor y pu t her , statis tic ally

, at a v ery low ris k of reci di vis m, and all thi ngs consi dered a sentence of 78 months’ incarcer a t i on w as sub stanti v ely unreasonable. “A corr ectly calculated, wi thi n-Gu i delines sentence i s entitled to a presum ption of reasonableness.” United States v

. B arn es , 660 F .3d 1000 , 1 010 (7th Ci r
. 2011). “T o sus tain the presumpti on, a di stric t court need prov i de only a justi fi cati on for its sentenc e ‘adequate to allow for meaningful appellate rev i ew and to promo te the perception of fai r sentencing.’” Id. (quoti ng United States v. Scott, 555 F .3d 605, 608 (7th Ci r . 2009)). Here, Pi lon arg ues that her age and health, her fami ly ties, her nonexis tent cri minal hi stor y , and her statis tic ally low chanc e of reci di vis m make her sentence subst a nt i v ely unreasonable. But the d ist r ict court found that her cri me w as v ery seri ous, and t he fa ct that i t inv olv ed “prey ing upon w eak people” who “ w e r e tar get ed for their vulnerabi li ty to be gullible enough to thi nk that thi s w as going to sav e them during some challen gin g tim es and, instead, i t w as exactly the thi ng that push ed them o ver the cli ff” w as “an ext remely aggr av atin g factor .” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)( 2)(A) (the court
mus t consi der the need for the sentence “to reflect the seri ousness of t he o ffense, to promo te respect for the law , and to prov i de just p un i shm ent for the offense”)

. Mor eov er , whi le Pi lon arg ues from statis tic s about reci di vis m, the court assess ed her individu ally , and consi dering her r e fu sal to recog ni ze the jurisdi cti on of the court and t he l a ws of the Uni ted St ates in the context of her l o y a l t y t o her husband and theNo. 12-3159 15
W ashi taw Nation found that Pi lon w as “someone who i s prone to reci di vis m and not acceptanc e, someone who i s p r o ne to hi ding the reality of the si tuation rat her than accep t ing the
remor sefu l reality of i t.” Fin ally , the di stric t court noted th at Pi lon’s scheme:

w ent on for a period o f y ears, i t had a br oad base wi th numerous v ict i ms, [and so i t] requires a sentence that wi ll both be a sanc tion for the defendant as w ell as a mess age to ot he r s who w ould consi der such a sch eme, that they shouldn’t do i t, because the sentence wi ll be one that i s seri ous enough to deter the conduct of other s in the future. Accordi ngly

, the di stric t court beli ev ed that Pi lon’s sentence w as justifi ed by the need for gen e r a l a nd speci al deter

rence and becau se of the seri ousness of her offense. The di stric t
co urt’s findings and rat i onales w ere not err oneous and th e y prov i de a suffi ci ent justifi cati on for Pi lon’s pr e sumptiv ely reasonable sentence. III. For the for ego ing reasons, Pi lon’s sentence i s AFFI RMED.