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Filed 2/9/22 P. v. Westfall CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Tehama)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LOGAN ALLEN WESTFALL,

Defendant and Appellant.

C093433

(Super. Ct. No. 18CR001330)

Appointed counsel for defendant Logan Allen Westfall filed an opening brief that 

sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record and determine 

whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 

436.) After examining the record and considering defendant’s contentions in his 

supplemental brief, we find no arguable error that would result in a disposition more 

favorable to defendant and affirm.
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BACKGROUND1

On May 10, 2018, defendant, who was 22 years old, moved in with his father, 

stepmother, and seven-year-old stepsister. Over the next several days, defendant went 

into his stepsister’s room at night, woke her up while everyone else slept, and sexually 

assaulted her multiple times. On May 15, 2018, defendant’s stepsister told her mother. 

His stepsister reported that defendant inserted his fingers into her vagina and rectum, 

forced her to orally copulate him, and inserted his penis in her vagina and rectum.

A pediatric sexual assault examination identified a low level of possible male 

DNA found in the sperm fraction of the victim’s inner thigh swab. During a subsequent 

police interview, defendant conceded that the biological fluid collected from his 

stepsister’s inner thigh would match him. 

Defendant said that on the first occasion, his stepsister touched his penis, but he 

did not touch her vagina. During the second incident, defendant admitted he put his penis 

in his stepsister’s mouth but did not ejaculate. He also admitted touching her vagina but 

denied inserting his finger. On a third occasion, defendant said he rubbed his penis on his 

stepsister’s vaginal and rectal areas. While doing so, his penis may have “ ‘slipped’ 

inside a little bit.” Defendant admitted ejaculating on her genitalia during this incident.

Defendant was charged with sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child who is 10 

years of age or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a), count I),2three counts of oral 

copulation or sexual penetration with a child who is 10 years of age or younger (§ 288.7, 

subd. (b), counts II-IV), two counts of forcible lewd or lascivious acts on a child who is 

under the age of 14 years (§ 288, subd. (b)(1), counts V-VI), and two counts of lewd or 

1

 Because defendant pleaded guilty before trial, the facts are based on the probation 

report, which describes Red Bluff Police Department report No. 18-1474, which 

defendant stipulated to as the factual basis for his plea.

2

 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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lascivious acts on a child who is under the age of 14 years (§ 288, subd. (a), counts VIIVIII). The court appointed him counsel and he pleaded not guilty to the charges. 

Defendant waived a preliminary hearing and was held to answer.

At a pretrial hearing on November 9, 2018, defendant requested a Marsden3

hearing. The court cleared the courtroom and heard from defendant and defense counsel. 

Defendant complained about not receiving discovery until a couple weeks prior to the 

hearing, not knowing this was the final pretrial conference, that defense counsel had 

supposedly discussed a mental evaluation with him but the judge denied it, and that 

defense counsel had discussed his case with three doctors without his permission. 

Counsel responded that when he first met with defendant in May 2018, defendant said he 

did not want to have a copy of the discovery, that he had visited defendant multiple times 

in jail to discuss the progress of the case and what to expect procedurally, and that 

defendant had asked him to declare him incompetent, but in speaking with defendant, 

counsel did not believe he was incompetent to stand trial. In fact, counsel believed 

defendant was “very competent and . . . under[stood] the nature of the proceedings.” 

Defense counsel also informed the court that he had considered the possibility of pretrial 

diversion under section 1001.36, and had met with three doctors to assess the possibility, 

but each expert believed defendant did not qualify because of a likely diagnosis of 

pedophilia. After considering defendant’s concerns and counsel’s responses, the court 

denied the Marsden motion, finding defense counsel was appropriately communicating 

with defendant and consulting with experts in preparing defendant’s case for trial. 

Upon reopening the courtroom, the court asked defendant if he wanted more time 

to consider the prosecutor’s offer of 50 years to life given that his maximum exposure 

was 36 years determinate plus 70 years to life. The court trailed the matter to allow 

3

 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
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defendant to confer with his counsel. When the case was recalled, defendant pleaded 

guilty to counts II, III, IV, and V, and agreed to waive his section 654 and appellate 

rights. The remaining counts were dismissed. The parties stipulated that the probation 

report and police report (Red Bluff Police Department report No. 18-1474) could serve as 

the factual basis of the plea. At the plea colloquy, the court asked defendant whether he 

had read and understood the plea form; whether he had initialed, dated, and signed the 

form; whether he had had sufficient time to talk to his attorney about the plea; and 

whether he understood that by pleading guilty he was giving up the right to trial by jury, 

the right to see, hear, and question witnesses, the right to present evidence in his own 

defense, and the privilege against self-incrimination. Defendant responded “yes” to all of 

the court’s inquiries.

On January 3, 2019, the court sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of 15 

years to life each for counts II, III, and IV, plus a consecutive five years for count V. He 

was awarded 233 actual days of credit plus 34 days of conduct credit for a total of 267 

days of credit. The court imposed a $160 court security assessment (§ 1465.8), a $120 

court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373), a $1,080 sex offender fine and 

applicable assessments (§ 290.3), a $10,000 restitution fine (§ 1202.4), and a $10,000 

parole revocation restitution fine (§ 1202.45), which was suspended unless parole was 

revoked. 

Defendant appealed without a certificate of probable cause, and this court deemed 

the appeal timely under the constructive filing doctrine. Defendant later filed a corrected 

notice of appeal with a certificate of probable cause, which this court construed as a 

timely notice of appeal for all appellate purposes.

DISCUSSION

We appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed an opening 

brief setting forth the facts of the case and requesting that this court review the record to 

determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende, supra, 
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25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 

days of the date of filing of the opening brief. 

Defendant filed a supplemental brief raising several arguments. He first contends 

the court violated his due process rights by not suspending proceedings and evaluating 

whether he was competent to stand trial under section 1369, subdivision (a)(3).4 He 

argues that his autism was a developmental disability that rendered him incompetent, and 

he claims he informed the court about his autism during the Marsden hearing and asked 

to be evaluated. In his view, his autism should have prompted the court to question his 

competency during the hearing and to ask whether he understood the trial process.

The record belies his argument. At no time during the Marsden hearing did 

defendant inform the court that he believed he was incompetent to stand trial because he 

was autistic. Instead, defendant complained about when he received discovery, about not 

knowing that the pretrial hearing was the last before trial, that defense counsel had 

spoken to him about a mental evaluation, and that counsel had spoken with three doctors 

about his case without his permission.

During the Marsden hearing, defense counsel specifically addressed the 

incompetency issue, noting that defendant had asked him to declare him incompetent, but 

that counsel did not agree he was incompetent. According to defense counsel, defendant 

sufficiently understood the nature of the proceedings. After listening to defendant and 

counsel, the court implicitly agreed and denied the Marsden motion, finding defense 

counsel’s representation adequate. 

4

 Section 1369 sets forth the procedure for an incompetency trial.
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Defendant incorrectly relies on section 1369, subdivision (a)(3)5 when arguing the 

court was required to appoint the director of the regional center to examine him to 

determine whether he had a developmental disability that rendered him incompetent for 

trial. Section 1369, which delineates how a mental competency trial shall proceed, is 

triggered when counsel informs the court that he or she believes a defendant is or may be 

mentally incompetent, or if the court believes so, and orders a hearing. (§ 1368, subd. (b) 

[“If counsel informs the court that he or she believes the defendant is or may be mentally 

incompetent, the court shall order that the question of the defendant’s mental competence 

is to be determined in a hearing which is held pursuant to Sections 1368.1 and 1369. If 

counsel informs the court that he or she believes the defendant is mentally competent, the 

court may nevertheless order a hearing. Any hearing shall be held in the superior 

court.”].) 

In this case, based on counsel’s many interactions with defendant throughout the 

course of the criminal proceedings, counsel believed defendant was “very competent” 

and “under[stood] the nature of the proceedings.” The court apparently did not disagree 

as it did not order a mental competency hearing when the issue was brought to its 

attention during the Marsden hearing.

To the extent defendant argues that defense counsel should have had defendant 

evaluated for incompetency even though counsel did not believe he was incompetent 

because nothing defendant said during a competency evaluation could be used against 

him during trial if he was found to be competent (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.130(d)(3)), 

we are not persuaded. An attorney is not required to take any action simply because there 

5

 Section 1369 provides in relevant part: “Except as stated in subdivision (g), a trial by 

court or jury of the question of mental competence shall proceed in the following order: 

[¶] . . . [¶] [(a)](3) If it is suspected the defendant has a developmental disability, the 

court shall appoint the director of the regional center . . . to examine the defendant to 

determine whether he or she has a developmental disability.”
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is “nothing to lose.” (Knowles v. Mirzayance (2009) 556 U.S. 111, 121-123 [counsel was 

not ineffective for abandoning not guilty by reasons of insanity defense because there

was “nothing to lose by pursuing it”; “nothing to lose” is not proper standard of review 

for ineffective assistance of counsel claims].)

Defendant next contends that during the sentencing hearing, he informed the court 

he was taking Prozac and Zyprexa for anxiety and depression, which should have also 

prompted the court to order a competency evaluation. The record again fails to support 

defendant’s contention. At no time during the hearing did defendant disclose to the court 

any medications he might have been taking. In any event, defendant’s argument that 

taking medication to help alleviate the symptoms of anxiety and depression somehow 

rendered him incompetent to stand trial is speculative. As defendant concedes, the 

medication actually helped with a chemical imbalance.

Defendant also argues that he initially signed the plea form in the designated spot 

for his attorney’s signature, and that someone crossed out his signature and then signed 

his name for him in the correct spot because the signatures, according to him and his 

cellmate who helped him prepare his supplemental brief, do not appear to match. But 

defendant does not deny that he signed and executed the plea form. The court, moreover, 

expressly asked defendant if he had signed, initialed, and executed the plea form, and 

defendant confirmed that he had. Defendant also confirmed that he understood the form 

and that he did not need additional time to speak with his attorney about the plea.

Defendant contends his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on his trial counsel’s failure to raise a 

competency issue given his autism and his medication. He requests that we dismiss his 

appellate counsel and appoint new counsel. We have previously rejected defendant’s 

request to dismiss his appellate counsel, and nothing in defendant’s supplemental brief 

convinces us that appellate counsel should be dismissed and replaced. 
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Defendant finally argues his trial counsel was ineffective because he allegedly did 

not research the side effects of defendant’s medication. To establish ineffective 

assistance of counsel, defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his 

counsel’s representation fell below the standard of a competent advocate and a reasonable 

probability exists that, but for counsel’s errors, the result would have been different. 

(People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-218.) A “ ‘reasonable probability’ ” is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. (People v. Bolin (1998) 

18 Cal.4th 297, 333.) Where “ ‘ “the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel 

acted or failed to act in the manner challenged[,] . . . unless counsel was asked for an 

explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory 

explanation,” the claim on appeal must be rejected.’ ” (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 

15 Cal.4th 264, 266.) “A claim of ineffective assistance in such a case is more 

appropriately decided in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (Id. at pp. 266-267)

At the outset, we note there is nothing in the record to support defendant’s 

statement that counsel did not research the effects of his medication. In any event, based 

on counsel’s statements during the Marsden hearing, trial counsel believed defendant was 

“very competent” and had no difficulty understanding the nature of the criminal 

proceedings. Given that defendant was able to communicate with counsel and 

understand the proceedings, counsel reasonably could have determined that researching 

defendant’s medication was unnecessary.

Having rejected defendant’s arguments and after examining the record, we find no 

arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant.
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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

 /s/

HOCH, J.

We concur:

 /s/

BLEASE, Acting P. J.

 /s/

HULL, J.