UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

 

MIGUEL CARRANZA; AMELIA 

SANCHEZ, as natural parents of 

Jesúa M.V. Carranza Sanchez, deceased, 

 Plaintiffs–Appellants, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Defendant–Appellee. 

No. 12-4149 

(D.C. No. 2:07-CV-00291-DAK) 

(D. Utah)

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 

Before LUCERO, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

 

 Plaintiffs Miguel Carranza and Amelia Sanchez brought this suit pursuant to 

the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2671-2680, after 

their child, Jesúa Miguel Valentin Carranza Sánchez, was delivered stillborn. 

Following a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the United 

 *

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

May 17, 2013

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
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States on plaintiffs’ medical malpractice/wrongful death claim. Proceeding pro se, 

plaintiffs appeal from the district court’s order denying their motion for 

reconsideration. Because their appellate issues relate to the sufficiency of the 

evidence and they did not provide an adequate record on appeal, we must affirm the 

decision of the district court. 

I 

 Beginning on January 5, 2006, Mrs. Sanchez was seen regularly for prenatal 

visits at Mountainlands Community Health Center (“Mountainlands”). On April 19, 

2006, late in her pregnancy, she was admitted to Mountainlands after she stopped 

feeling movement of her baby. Tests at the hospital revealed no fetal heartbeat or 

movement, and an ultrasound examination confirmed the baby’s demise. 

Dr. Vernon White, the Mountainlands physician on call, induced labor and 

delivered a stillborn baby the next day. Dr. White noted that the umbilical cord was 

wrapped tightly around the baby’s neck (“nuchal cord”). He told plaintiffs that the 

nuchal cord was the most likely cause of the baby’s death. 

At trial, plaintiffs’ expert witness, Dr. Robert Romney, testified that the 

Mountainlands healthcare providers breached the applicable standard of care in 

numerous ways during the time period leading up to the baby’s death. The district 

court excluded some of Dr. Romney’s opinions because they were not disclosed to 

the defense prior to trial. In any event, it concluded that all of his opinions were 
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contradicted by other evidence and were outweighed by the testimony of the 

defendants’ expert obstetrician, Dr. Robert Later. 

Relying on Dr. Later’s testimony, the district court concluded that “the most 

likely explanation of the stillbirth was fetal asphyxia due to the nuchal cord, which 

was not caused by any act or omission of the Mountainlands healthcare providers.” 

Accordingly, it granted judgment for the United States. 

Plaintiffs moved pro se for reconsideration of the verdict, contending that their 

attorney had failed to present certain evidence relevant to their healthcare providers’ 

medical negligence. The district court construed their pleading as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 

60(b) motion, and concluded that plaintiffs had failed to establish their entitlement to 

relief under that rule. It denied their motion. Plaintiffs appeal. 

II 

 Plaintiffs’ pro se notice of appeal is ambiguous. It is not clear which order 

they intended to appeal from: the underlying judgment or the order denying their 

Rule 60(b) motion. The notice states that they are appealing “from the final 

judgment [in] favor of defendants,” which seems to refer to the judgment on the 

district court’s bench trial verdict. But immediately following this statement, the 

notice specifies that “the decision was signed on the 3rd of [A]ugust and was sent to 

the post office the 8th of [A]ugust 2012[.]” Those dates appear to correspond with 

the order denying their Rule 60(b) motion. 
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 We note, however, that the notice of appeal was only timely as regarding the 

order denying Rule 60(b) relief.1

 The district court entered its judgment on April 19, 

2012. Plaintiffs did not file their Rule 60(b) motion until June 19, 2012. The motion 

was therefore not filed within twenty-eight days of the district court’s judgment and 

did not toll the sixty-day time period for seeking review of that judgment. See Fed. 

R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B)(i) (requiring notice of appeal be filed within sixty days in cases 

where United States is a party); 4(a)(4)(A)(vi) (tolling time period for notice of 

appeal where “the motion is filed no later than 28 days after the judgment is 

entered”). The sixty days to appeal thus expired before plaintiffs filed their notice of 

appeal on August 22, 2012. 

However, the notice of appeal is timely to seek review of the order denying 

plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b) motion, which was entered August 3, 2012. We therefore 

confine ourselves to reviewing the denial of that motion. We review the district 

court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for an abuse of discretion. Walters v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 703 F.3d 1167, 1172 (10th Cir. 2013). 

III 

 Plaintiffs contend they were poorly served by their counsel at trial. They 

assert that counsel failed to present evidence in favor of their claim that should have 

 1

 This court previously entered an order to show cause, instructing the 

plaintiffs to explain if and why their appeal was timely from the underlying final 

judgment entered April 19, 2012. We have considered plaintiffs’ arguments in 

response to the order, along with the response filed by defendants. 
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been brought to the district court’s attention. Even if this is true, an attorney’s 

ineffective representation in a civil case is not a basis for reversing the district court’s 

verdict. See Nelson v. Boeing Co., 446 F.3d 1118, 1119 (10th Cir. 2006).2

 Through their pro se Rule 60(b) motion, plaintiffs attempted to persuade the 

district court to rehear and reweigh the evidence in favor of their claims. They 

attached numerous exhibits to their motion, which they contended required a 

different result. The district court disagreed, concluding that most of the motion 

merely rehashed arguments made by plaintiffs’ counsel at trial, that plaintiffs failed 

to show that the evidence was “new” in the sense that they discovered it after the 

trial, and that the evidence did not support plaintiffs’ allegations. In sum, it 

concluded that none of the evidence would produce a different result. 

On appeal, plaintiffs again present issues relating to their alleged new 

evidence, which they contend demonstrates that the district court should have granted 

their Rule 60(b) motion because a new trial with the additional evidence would 

probably have produced a different result. The district court’s ruling on their Rule 

60(b) motion relied heavily on the evidence presented at trial as well as the evidence 

plaintiffs presented with their motion. Plaintiffs have not provided us with a 

complete trial transcript permitting review of the evidence presented at trial. 

 2

 Plaintiffs complain that they did not have a Spanish-language translator 

during trial, except during their own testimony. Because they were represented by 

counsel during trial, we view this as a complaint that their attorneys failed to obtain 

the services of a translator for them. Again, counsel’s ineffective assistance, even if 

proved, would not entitle plaintiffs to a reversal or retrial. 
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An adequate record on appeal, which allows us to examine the relevant 

materials and proceedings before the district court, is necessary for us to undertake 

appellate review. The burden is on plaintiffs to “provide all portions of the transcript 

necessary to give [us] a complete and accurate record of the proceedings related to 

the issues on appeal.” 10th Cir. R. 10.1(A)(1). Where an appellant raises sufficiency 

of the evidence, “the entire relevant trial transcript must be provided.” Id. Because 

the record plaintiffs have presented does not contain a complete trial transcript, it is 

inadequate for us to review both the sufficiency of the evidence at trial and the effect 

of the alleged new evidence on the district court’s verdict. We must therefore affirm 

the district court’s denial of plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b) motion. See Roberts v. Roadway 

Exp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1098, 1104-05 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1998). 

IV 

 We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b) motion. We 

GRANT plaintiffs’ motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. 

 Entered for the Court 

 Carlos F. Lucero 

 Circuit Judge