IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-50668

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

SERGIO ZAMORA, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 3:18-CR-2556-1

Before JOLLY, JONES, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Sergio Zamora appeals his conviction for possession of marijuana with 

intent to distribute on the ground that the Border Patrol agent who conducted 

the traffic stop that led to his arrest lacked reasonable suspicion in violation of 

the Fourth Amendment. Zamora argues that the district court erred by 

denying his motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of the stop. Finding 

no error, we AFFIRM.

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 23, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 19-50668 Document: 00515500575 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/23/2020
No. 19-50668

2

BACKGROUND

The relevant facts are undisputed. Early one morning in August 2018, 

a few minutes before 5:00 a.m., a sensor deployed by the United States Border 

Patrol to detect activity along the border went off. The sensor was 

approximately 10 miles east of the Fort Hancock, Texas, port of entry. At 

5:05 a.m., Agent Robert Cardiel responded to the area of the sensor activation

and discovered two sets of horse prints heading north from the US/Mexico 

border. This section of the border and Interstate 10 run roughly parallel, 

between two and three miles apart. Using his radio, Agent Cardiel alerted

other agents in the area.

Agent Oscar Pinon heard the notification about the sensor and the hoof 

prints. Entering Interstate 10 at mile marker 78, Agent Pinon drove east 

toward mile marker 81, the point toward which the horses appeared to be 

traveling. It was pitch dark at that hour of the morning, and there was no 

lighting in that section of roadway. Agent Pinon saw the brake lights of a 

vehicle on the shoulder of the interstate parked near mile marker 81, directly 

north of where Agent Cardiel found the hoof prints and exactly where Agent 

Cardiel said the horses were headed. As Agent Pinon approached, the vehicle 

entered Interstate 10, exited almost immediately, turned around on an 

overpass, and began heading westbound on Interstate 10 toward Fort 

Hancock. Agent Pinon crossed the median and began following the vehicle, a 

white Dodge pickup. He activated his emergency lights, called dispatch to 

request a check on the license plate, and learned the truck was registered to 

someone in Fort Hancock.

After following the truck for several miles, Agent Pinon pulled the truck 

over. A strong odor of marijuana wafted from the vehicle, and Agent Pinon 

asked Zamora for permission to search the truck. Zamora consented to the 

search and informed Agent Pinon before his search began that there were 

 Case: 19-50668 Document: 00515500575 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/23/2020
No. 19-50668

3

drugs in the truck. Agent Pinon discovered 73.68 kilograms of marijuana in

the bed of the truck and arrested Zamora.

During the evidentiary hearing, Agent Pinon testified that the following 

facts contributed to his suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. The area 

Agent Pinon first saw Zamora is in close proximity to the border and is a known 

corridor for narcotics and alien smuggling. The time of day—5:00 a.m.—meant 

that it was very dark, and it was close to a shift change. In Agent Pinon’s 

experience, the timing was significant because smugglers often try to take 

advantage of shift changes because of the increased delay in the agents’ 

response time. Zamora’s vehicle was parked directly north of where the 

hoofprints were headed.1 Agent Pinon explained that smugglers frequently 

use this section of Interstate 10 to load vehicles with smuggled drugs or people. 

Typically, smugglers turn around and drive west after loading in order to avoid 

a Border Patrol checkpoint to the east. Pickup trucks are easy to load, and 

white is a color commonly used by drug smugglers in that area. Based on these 

observations, Agent Pinon stopped the truck. From the foregoing facts, the 

district court held that Agent Pinon had a reasonable suspicion to stop Zamora 

and denied the motion to suppress.

The district court then held a bench trial on stipulated facts. The court 

found Zamora guilty and sentenced him to five years’ probation. During trial, 

Zamora expressly reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to 

suppress. Zamora now appeals that decision.

DISCUSSION

“When reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress evidence, this Court 

reviews factual findings for clear error and the ultimate constitutionality of 

1 Zamora was parked on the eastbound side of the interstate, the side closer to the 

border.

 Case: 19-50668 Document: 00515500575 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/23/2020
No. 19-50668

4

law enforcement action de novo.” United States v. Robinson, 741 F.3d 588, 594 

(5th Cir. 2014). “Factual findings are clearly erroneous only if a review of the 

record leaves this Court with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 

been committed.” United States v. Hearn, 563 F.3d 95, 101 (5th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We view evidence presented 

at a pre-trial hearing on a motion to suppress in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party, United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 347 (5th Cir. 2010), and 

“[w]here a district court’s denial of a suppression motion is based on live oral 

testimony, the clearly erroneous standard is particularly strong because the

judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses,” United 

States v. Santiago, 410 F.3d 193, 197 (5th Cir. 2005). “[I]f there is any 

reasonable view of the evidence to support it,” the district court’s denial of a 

suppression motion should be upheld. United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 

838, 841 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

“A temporary, warrantless detention of an individual constitutes a 

seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes and must be justified by reasonable 

suspicion that criminal activity has taken or is currently taking place . . .” 

United States v. Garza, 727 F.3d 436, 440 (5th Cir. 2013). “A border patrol 

agent conducting a roving patrol may make a temporary investigative stop of

a vehicle only if the agent is aware of specific articulable facts, together with 

rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that 

the vehicle’s occupant is engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. 

Jacquinot, 258 F.3d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U.S. 873, 884, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2582 (1975). “Reasonable suspicion 

requires more than merely an unparticularized hunch, but considerably less 

than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.” Garza, 727 F.3d 

at 440 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

 Case: 19-50668 Document: 00515500575 Page: 4 Date Filed: 07/23/2020
No. 19-50668

5

When determining whether reasonable suspicion existed, we examine 

the totality of the circumstances and weigh the factors established in BrignoniPonce.

Factors that may be considered include: (1) the characteristics of 

the area in which the vehicle is encountered; (2) the arresting 

agent’s previous experience with criminal activity; (3) the area’s 

proximity to the border, (4) the usual traffic patterns on the road; 

(5) information about recent illegal trafficking in aliens or 

narcotics in the area; (6) the appearance of the vehicle; (7) the 

driver’s behavior; and, (8) the passengers’ number, appearance, 

and behavior.

United States v. Hernandez, 477 F.3d 210, 213 (5th Cir. 2007); see also United 

States v. Cervantes, 797 F.3d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 2015). These factors are not 

exclusive nor is any single factor dispositive. “[E]ach case must be examined 

based on the totality of the circumstances known to the agents at the time of 

the stop and their experience in evaluating such circumstances.” United States 

v. Rangel-Portillo, 586 F.3d 376, 380 (5th Cir. 2009). “Factors that ordinarily 

constitute innocent behavior may provide a composite picture sufficient to 

raise reasonable suspicion in the minds of experienced officers.” Jacquinot, 

258 F.3d at 427–28.

In the instant case, the district court found that the totality of the 

circumstances provided Agent Pinon with reasonable suspicion, warranting 

his stop of Zamora. We agree. Agent Pinon encountered Zamora along a 

stretch of interstate well known as a drug trafficking corridor and loading zone. 

See Garza, 727 F.3d at 440 (holding that an “area’s reputation as a smuggling 

route support[ed] [an agent’s] reasonable suspicion”). Agents Pinon and 

Cardiel have fifteen and fourteen years of experience, respectively, as Border 

Patrol agents in the Fort Hancock area. Such experience “inform[s] our 

assessment of the circumstances likely to arouse suspicion in the area.” Id. at 

441. Drawing upon this experience, Agent Pinon testified that drug smugglers 

 Case: 19-50668 Document: 00515500575 Page: 5 Date Filed: 07/23/2020
No. 19-50668

6

often transport their illicit wares to waiting vehicles on Interstate 10 and then 

return over the border to avoid detection by the border patrol. The interstate’s 

proximity to the border facilitates this pattern of activity. At mile marker 81, 

Interstate 10 is three miles or less from the border. See id. (holding that 

“[p]roximity to the border is a paramount factor” (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted)). Agent Pinon also explained that smugglers along this 

stretch of highway frequently turnaround and drive westbound in order to 

avoid the Border Patrol checkpoint east of Fort Hancock, exactly as Zamora 

did here. Additionally, the color and type of vehicle Zamora was driving 

contributed to Agent Pinon’s suspicion because drug smugglers commonly used 

vehicles with those characteristics.

The fifth factor—information about recent illegal trafficking in the 

area—is especially important in this case. Agent Pinon did not just happen 

upon Zamora; instead, Agent Pinon was responding to a radio call offering 

specific information about potential trafficking activity heading for the precise 

location he encountered Zamora. Zamora counters that there was no evidence 

of illegal activity, but Agent Pinon testified that horseback riders were 

uncommon in that area, especially at 5:00 a.m. Moreover, Agent Pinon knew 

that a sensor had indicated activity along the border at a time of night offering 

traffickers the advantages of darkness and an impending Border Patrol shift 

change. In sum, Agent Pinon encountered a vehicle that he had strong reason 

to suspect of being involved in drug trafficking that he then observed following 

a pattern of behavior typical of drug traffickers. We therefore agree with the 

district court that Agent Pinon acted on more than “an unparticularized 

hunch.” United States v. Gonzalez, 190 F.3d 668, 671 (5th Cir.1999).

Zamora offers two counterarguments. First, he contends that the vast 

majority of the traffic along Interstate 10 is for innocent purposes. Second, he 

asserts that nothing specific about his behavior or the vehicle could supply 

 Case: 19-50668 Document: 00515500575 Page: 6 Date Filed: 07/23/2020
No. 19-50668

7

reasonable suspicion. The first argument disregards the fact that the 

reasonable suspicion analysis considers the combination of factors leading to 

an investigatory stop. Cervantes, 797 F.3d at 329 (“We look to the totality of 

the circumstances, and not every factor must weigh in favor of reasonable 

suspicion for it to be present.”). We have previously opined that “the possibility 

that [a defendant] could have been an innocent traveler” does not negate other 

factors supporting reasonable suspicion. United States v. Villalobos, 161 F.3d 

285, 289 (5th Cir. 1998). Here, Agent Pinon had ample reason to suspect that 

Zamora was not merely an innocent traveler. The second argument likewise 

fails because Agent Pinon testified to specific reasons that a white pickup truck 

and Zamora’s pattern of behavior were significant to him.

Under the totality of the circumstances, considered in connection with 

the Brignoni–Ponce factors, we conclude that Agent Pinon had reasonable 

suspicion to stop Zamora’s truck.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the district court’s order denying Zamora’s motion 

to suppress is AFFIRMED.

 Case: 19-50668 Document: 00515500575 Page: 7 Date Filed: 07/23/2020