COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Bray 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

CHARLES DOUGLAS CALFEE 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2622-97-2 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

 JANUARY 26, 1999 

LISA WHITE CALFEE 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 

Timothy J. Hauler, Judge 

 Edwin F. Brooks (Jackson, Pickus & 

Associates, P.C., on brief), for appellant. 

 Sharon B. Ten (Cawthorn, Picard & Rowe, P.C., 

on brief), for appellee. 

 Charles Douglas Calfee (husband) appeals an order of the 

trial court (1) finding him in contempt for failure to comply 

with the court's prior order of child support and establishing 

related arrearages, (2) modifying the previous order, and (3) 

awarding Lisa White Calfee (wife) attorney's fees. Husband 

challenges the jurisdiction of the court, arguing that the 

matters in issue were within the exclusive province of the 

Chesterfield Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (J&D 

Court).1

 We agree and reverse the decree. 

 I. 

 The procedural history of this appeal is substantially 

uncontroverted. Wife petitioned the J&D Court for an award of 

support from husband for the parties' two infant children. 

 

 1Husband also complains that he was denied due process 

during the proceedings, but our decision moots this issue. 
- 2 - 

Following a hearing, the J&D Court ordered husband to pay $109 

per week support and a portion of the children's medical costs 

unpaid by insurance. The order, entered October 6, 1993, further 

provided that husband's obligations would escalate on November 1, 

1993, to $128 per week support and forty percent of the specified 

medical expenses. 

 Husband appealed the J&D Court order to the trial court and 

a de novo hearing was conducted on February 17, 1994. Husband 

failed to appear but was represented by counsel. By order 

entered February 28, 1994, the court "denied" husband's appeal, 

ruled that he was "in arrears . . . a total . . . of $2,951.18" 

under the award of the J&D Court, and assessed additional 

attorney's fees.2

 The court further ordered "all sums due" 

payable ten days after service of the order upon husband or "a 

warrant for [husband's] arrest shall be issued." The trial court 

later revisited the proceeding, sua sponte, by order dated 

September 29, 1994, and "remanded" the cause to the J&D Court, 

after expressly finding "the purpose of this matter having been 

accomplished." 

 The record is thereafter silent until June 2, 1997, when 

wife filed motions with the trial court to "reinstate this matter 

on the docket" and to modify the earlier support order of the J&D 

Court. Wife also alleged husband's noncompliance with the trial 

 

 2The trial court did not explicitly redetermine a support 

award but simply acted on the order of the J&D Court on appeal. 
- 3 - 

court order of February, 1994, and petitioned, inter alia, that 

he be punished for contempt. In response, the court ordered 

"this matter . . . reinstated on the active docket" and that 

husband appear "on July 25, 1997, to show cause . . . why he 

should not be held in contempt for the alleged failure to comply 

with [the] . . . prior order." Husband was present, pro se, at 

the appointed date and hour, evidence was heard ore tenus, and, 

by order of August 1, 1997, the court adjudicated him in contempt 

of the February order, required that he pay wife arrearages of 

$9,306.64 "within 180 days," and sentenced him to twelve months 

in jail.3

 The court also increased husband's child support and 

health care obligations and awarded wife attorney's fees. 

 Thereafter, husband, by counsel, moved to vacate the order, 

arguing that the court had "terminated [its] . . . jurisdiction 

. . . over the . . . dispute" upon remand to the J&D Court by 

order entered September 29, 1994. In denying husband's motion, 

the court concluded that, "[a]fter remand[, it] had concurrent 

jurisdiction with the [J&D Court] to enforce [the] court's order 

of February 28, 1994," thereby providing wife with "the option to 

go to either court." Husband now appeals, pursuing the 

jurisdictional issue before this Court. 

 II. 

 Code § 16.1-241(A), unless otherwise "provided," vests 

 

 3The jail sentence was subject to suspension upon husband's 

"posting . . . a $10,000.00 bond." 
- 4 - 

"exclusive original jurisdiction" in the juvenile and domestic 

relations district courts (J&D courts) "over all cases, matters 

and proceedings involving: A. The . . . support . . . of a 

child: . . . 3. [w]hose . . . support is a subject of 

controversy or requires determination." Code § 16.1-241(A)(3). 

However, "[i]n such cases[,] jurisdiction shall be concurrent 

with and not exclusive of courts having equity jurisdiction, 

except as provided in [Code] § 16.1-244." Id. (emphasis added). 

 Code § 16.1-244(A) empowers the circuit court, concurrently with 

the J&D courts, "to determine the . . . support of children when 

. . . incidental to the determination of causes pending in such 

[circuit] courts." Code § 16.1-244(A). An exception divests J&D 

courts of jurisdiction if "a suit for divorce has been filed in a 

circuit court, in which the . . . support of children of the 

parties . . . is raised by the pleadings and a hearing is set by 

the . . . court . . . on such issue for a date . . . within 

twenty-one days of the filing." Id.; see also Code § 20-79(a). 

 "[C]ircuit courts may assume jurisdiction [of child support 

issues] either by an appeal from the [J&D] courts or by the 

direct filing of an appropriate proceeding in the circuit 

courts." Peple v. Peple, 5 Va. App. 414, 418, 364 S.E.2d 232, 

235 (1988); see Code § 16.1-296; Title 20. When, as here, 

jurisdiction is invoked by appeal from a child support order of 

the J&D court, the attendant "proceedings in the circuit court 

shall conform to the equity practice where evidence is heard ore
- 5 - 

tenus," Code § 16.1-296(F), and "shall be heard de novo[,] . . . 

without formal pleadings in writing." Code § 16.1-136; see

Peple, 5 Va. App. at 419, 364 S.E.2d at 236 ("circuit court must 

conduct a de novo hearing . . . on appeal from the [J&D] 

courts"). Such appeal "'annuls the judgment of the inferior 

tribunal as completely as if there had been no previous trial.'" 

Peple, 5 Va. App. at 419, 364 S.E.2d at 236 (citation omitted). 

 

 "Upon the rendition of final judgment upon an appeal from 

the [J&D] court, the circuit court shall cause a copy of its 

judgment to be filed with the [J&D] court within twenty-one days 

of entry of its order, which shall thereupon become the judgment 

of the [J&D] court." Code § 16.1-297. Additionally, 

 the circuit court may remand [the 

proceedings] to the jurisdiction of the [J&D] 

court . . ., under the terms of its order or 

judgment, and thereafter such . . . shall be 

and remain under the jurisdiction of the 

[J&D] court in the same manner as if such 

court had rendered the judgment in the first 

instances. 

Id. Thus, upon remand of a judgment rendered on appeal, the 

former jurisdiction of the J&D court over the proceedings is 

restored, once again subject to the potential exercise of 

jurisdiction by the circuit court in accordance with Code 

§§ 16.1-241, 16.1-244 and 16.1-296. 

 Similarly, jurisdiction lost by the J&D court to the circuit 

court "[i]n any suit for divorce" may be resumed by "transfer to 

the [J&D] court" by the circuit court for "enforcement of its 
- 6 - 

orders" or "[a]fter the entry of a decree of divorce" for "any 

other matters pertaining to support" pursuant to Code § 20-79(c). 

 Thereafter, both courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction to 

adjudicate such issues, with the circuit court exercising "its 

continuing jurisdiction" by simply "reinstat[ing] the case on its 

docket." Crabtree v. Crabtree, 17 Va. App. 81, 84, 435 S.E.2d 

883, 886 (1993); see Romine v. Romine, 22 Va. App. 760, 763-64, 

473 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1996); see also Code § 20-121.1.4

 Nevertheless, "the procedural distinction between an appeal 

under Code § 16.1-136 and a divestiture of further jurisdiction 

in the [J&D] court by operation of Code § 16.1-244(A) 

[(institution of divorce proceedings)] is significant." Peple, 5 

Va. App. at 419-20, 364 S.E.2d at 236. A decree or order of the 

circuit court emanating from a "suit for divorce," after 

displacing the jurisdiction of the J&D court, may be transferred 

to such court for enforcement or related matters, thereby 

restoring concurrent jurisdiction in both courts, without 

impairing the properly invoked exercise of jurisdiction by the 

circuit court over the transferred issues. In contrast, an order 

adjudicating an appeal from the J&D court to the circuit court is 

not entitled to the procedural convenience of transfer provided 

by Code § 20-79. Such order, together with the related issues 

 

 4"In any suit which has been stricken from the docket, and 

in which complete relief has not been obtained, upon the motion 

or application of either party . . ., the same shall be 

reinstated upon the docket . . . to grant full relief to the 

parties." Code § 20-121.1. 
- 7 - 

embraced by the appeal, rests within the exclusive jurisdiction 

of the circuit court pending disposition by that court. 

 III. 

 Here, upon resolution of the appeal, the circuit court 

declared its "purpose . . . accomplished" and "remanded" the 

"matter" to the Chesterfield J&D Court, thereby expressly 

surrendering jurisdiction to the original statutory authority of 

the J&D Court pursuant to Code § 16.1-297. Unaided by Code 

§ 20-79, such "remand" created no concurrent jurisdiction in the 

circuit court, save that provided by Code §§ 16.1-241, 16.1-244, 

and precluded reinstatement of the cause to the docket of the 

trial court as a decree or order related to divorce or 

maintenance in accordance with Code §§ 20-79(c), 20-121.1. Thus, 

the trial court's belated attempt to exercise concurrent 

jurisdiction through the disputed order was without statutory 

authority and jurisdictionally infirm. See Church v. Church, 24 

Va. App. 502, 505, 483 S.E.2d 498, 500 (1997). 

 Accordingly, we reverse the decree. 

 Reversed and final judgment. 
- 8 - 

Benton, J., concurring. 

 I concur except as to the parts of the opinion that conflict 

with views I expressed in Crabtree v. Crabtree, 17 Va. App. 81, 

89-92, 435 S.E.2d 883, 888-91 (1993) (Benton, J., dissenting), 

and I concur in the judgment reversing the decree.