[Cite as State v. Kincaid, 2024-Ohio-2668.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

MEIGS COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. 22CA4

v. :

JOHN P. KINCAID, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY 

Defendant-Appellant. :

________________________________________________________________

APPEARANCES:

Donald K. Pond, Akron, Ohio, for appellant1. 

James K. Stanley, Meigs County Prosecuting Attorney, Pomeroy, 

Ohio, for appellee.

________________________________________________________________

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT

DATE JOURNALIZED:7-5-24

ABELE, J.

{¶1} This is an appeal from a Meigs County Common Pleas 

Court judgment of conviction and sentence. John Kincaid, 

defendant below and appellant herein, assigns two errors for 

review: 

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY OVERRULING 

APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS, CONTRARY TO 

APPELLANT’S RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE 

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PURSUANT TO THE 

FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE 

1 Different counsel represented appellant during the trial

court proceedings.
MEIGS 22CA4 2

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE I, 

SECTION 14 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.”

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY OVERRULING 

APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS, CONTRARY TO 

APPELLANT’S RIGHT AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION, PURSUANT TO THE FIFTH AND 

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF 

THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.”

{¶2} In January 2021, a Meigs County Grand Jury returned an 

indictment that charged appellant with (1) one count of 

possession of drugs (heroin) in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), 

(2) one count of possession of drugs (fentanyl) in violation of 

R.C. 2925.11(A), (3) one count of trafficking in drugs (heroin) 

in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), and (4) one count of 

trafficking in drugs (fentanyl) in violation of R.C. 

2925.03(A)(2), all second degree felonies. Appellant pleaded 

not guilty to all charges.

{¶3} Subsequently, appellant filed a motion to suppress 

evidence. At the suppression hearing, Meigs County Sheriff’s 

Deputy Tylun Campbell, a canine handler, testified that during 

the nighttime hours of December 26, 2019 he observed a vehicle’s 

left side tires cross a two-lane road center line. Campbell 

checked the license plate and learned that the vehicle belonged 

to appellant. Campbell also stated that he had received “prior 

information that he [appellant] was trafficking in drugs * * * 
MEIGS 22CA4 3

in our county.” When Campbell initiated the traffic stop, he 

recognized appellant because he had “seen him around,” but did 

not personally know him. When Campbell informed appellant of 

the reason for the stop, appellant stated he had been “blinded 

by my [Campbell’s] lights.” 

{¶4} At that point, Deputy Campbell requested another 

officer come to the scene to be present when Campbell deployed 

his canine. Campbell waited “less than ten (10), five minutes. 

Something like that” for Deputy Marty Hutton to arrive. 

Campbell also spoke to appellant and to passenger Austin Johnson 

and asked if they had “anything illegal * * * inside the 

vehicle.” Both stated no. Campbell then checked their 

licenses, found no warrants, and after Hutton arrived, appellant 

and Johnson remained in the vehicle while Campbell deployed his 

canine. The canine alerted to the driver’s side door. 

{¶5} After the positive canine alert, Deputy Campbell 

removed appellant and Johnson from the vehicle, patted them 

down, then placed appellant in front of Campbell’s cruiser and 

Johnson in Deputy Hutton’s cruiser. When Campbell asked 

appellant if anything in the vehicle could harm him, appellant 

said he “may have dropped a bag of heroin.” Campbell testified 

that the vehicle search revealed a cigarette box under the 

driver’s seat with “a bunch of bags of, uh, I believed to be 

heroin.” Campbell observed that the cigarette box contained 
MEIGS 22CA4 4

“multiple individual knotted bags of heroin and fentanyl, I 

believe.” Campbell also found money “under the floorboard.” 

Appellant told Campbell the money came “from the * * * drugs 

that he was selling.” At that point, Campbell advised appellant 

of his Miranda rights and placed him in handcuffs. Appellant 

later told Campbell, “he was selling the drugs for another 

individual, uh, named, uh, chops, I believe. Uh, his real name 

is Dryshaun Bear.” 

{¶6} On cross-examination, Deputy Campbell conceded that he 

did not issue a citation for the traffic violation. When asked 

if he performed any further investigation regarding the marked 

lanes violation, Campbell stated, “No.” When asked, “[y]our 

investigation essentially, of that issue, was over at the time 

that you pulled him over and made him aware as to why you 

stopped him, correct,” Campbell stated, “[u]h, yes.” Campbell 

testified, “When I made the decision to run the dog is when I 

observed John Kincaid as the driver of the vehicle.” 

{¶7} The trial court eventually overruled appellant’s 

motion to suppress evidence and appellant pleaded no contest to 

Count Three, trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 

2925.03(A)(2), a second-degree felony, and Count Four, 

trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), a 

second-degree felony. The court accepted appellant’s pleas, 

found appellant guilty and: (1) imposed a three-year minimum up 
MEIGS 22CA4 5

to four and one-half years indeterminate prison sentence for 

Count Three; (2) merged counts three and four for purposes of 

sentencing, (3) forfeited the $1,570 seized, and (4) ordered a 

mandatory post-release control term. This appeal followed. 

I.

{¶8} In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts 

that the trial court’s decision to overrule his motion to 

suppress evidence violates his rights under the Fourth and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 

Article 1, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. In particular, 

appellant argues that (1) the totality of circumstances of the 

traffic stop did not justify appellant’s detention for a vehicle 

canine sniff, and (2) the police officer did not develop 

rational inferences, based on specific, articulable facts, to 

justify the extended investigatory detention of, and intrusion 

upon, appellant following the traffic stop.

{¶9} Generally, appellate review of a motion to suppress 

evidence presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. 

Hawkins, 158 Ohio St.3d 94, 2019-Ohio-4210, 140 N.E.3d 577, ¶ 

16, citing State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8l, State v. Hansard, 4th Dist. Gallia 

No. 19CA11, 2020-Ohio-5528, ¶ 15. When ruling on a motion to 

suppress evidence, a trial court assumes the role of trier of 
MEIGS 22CA4 6

fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact 

and evaluate witness credibility. State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio 

St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 1168, ¶ 100. Thus, a 

reviewing court must defer to a trial court's findings of fact 

if competent, credible evidence exists to support the trial 

court's findings. Id.; State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 

437 N.E.2d 583 (1982); State v. Debrossard, 4th Dist. Ross No. 

13CA3395, 2015-Ohio-1054, ¶ 9. A reviewing court must then 

independently determine, without deference to the trial court, 

whether the trial court properly applied the substantive law to 

the case's facts. See Roberts at ¶ 100; Burnside, supra, at ¶ 

8.

{¶10} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

and Article I, Section Fourteen of the Ohio Constitution protect 

individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. 

Emerson, 134 Ohio St.3d 191, 2012-Ohio-5047, 981 N.E.2d 787, ¶ 

15; State v. Shrewsbury, 4th Dist. Ross No. 13CA3402, 2014-Ohio716, ¶ 14. The exclusionary rule protects this constitutional 

guarantee and mandates excluding evidence obtained from an 

unreasonable search and seizure. Id.

{¶11} The case sub judice involves a vehicle traffic stop 

after an officer observed a traffic law violation. The Supreme 

Court of Ohio has also held “[w]here a police officer stops a 

vehicle based on probable cause that a traffic violation has 
MEIGS 22CA4 7

occurred or was occurring, the stop is not unreasonable under 

the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution even if 

the officer had some ulterior motive for making the stop [.]” 

Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996), 

paragraph one of the syllabus. See, also, Whren v. United 

States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); 

Debrossard, supra, at ¶ 13; State v. Guseman, 4th Dist. Athens 

No. 08CA15, 2009-Ohio-952, ¶ 20.

{¶12} In the case sub judice, appellant argues that after 

the initial stop, the officer did not provide sufficient 

justification to extend the length of the stop in order to 

conduct the canine sniff. Appellant points out that no 

additional facts in the record support reasonable suspicion to 

extend the stop, the officer did not see or smell drugs or 

observe other contraband in the vehicle, and no indication 

existed that appellant or his passenger appeared to be impaired. 

Appellant claims that the only facts offered in support of the 

prolonged detention is the traffic violation itself and Deputy 

Campbell’s prior knowledge of appellant’s alleged drug 

trafficking history. 

{¶13} We recognize that “knowledge of a person’s prior 

criminal involvement (to say nothing of a mere arrest) is alone 

insufficient to give rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion” 

to justify a shift in an investigatory intrusion from the 
MEIGS 22CA4 8

traffic stop to a firearms or drugs investigation. State v. 

Whitman, 184 Ohio App.3d. 733, 2009-Ohio-5647, 922 N.E.2d 293 

(5th Dist.2009), citing United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 

542 (10th Cir.1994). As the court explained in Sandoval:

If the law were otherwise, any person with any sort of 

criminal record - or even worse, a person with arrests

but no convictions - could be subjected to a Terry-type 

investigative stop by a law enforcement officer at any 

time without the need for any other justification at 

all. Any such rule would clearly run counter to the 

requirement of a reasonable suspicion, and of the need 

that such stops by justified in light of a balancing of 

the competing interests at stake. Id. at 543. Accord 

Joshua v. DeWitt (C.A.6, 2003) 341 F.3d 430, 446. 

Thus, a “person’s reputation or past record does not, standing 

alone, provide an officer with a reasonable suspicion to support 

a Terry-type investigative stop or search.” Whitman at ¶ 16, 

citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 

(1968).

{¶14} Additionally, we recognize that courts have concluded 

that the use of a drug detection canine does not constitute a 

“search” and an officer is not required, prior to a canine 

sniff, to establish either probable cause or a reasonable 

suspicion that drugs are concealed in the vehicle. See Illinois 

v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 

(2005). Consequently, an officer needs no suspicion or cause to 

run a dog around a stopped vehicle if performed 

contemporaneously with legitimate activities associated with the 
MEIGS 22CA4 9

traffic violation. Id. Thus, a canine walk-around of a vehicle 

that occurs during a lawful traffic stop and does not extend the 

time necessary to effectuate the stop, does not violate an 

individual’s constitutional rights. Id. However, absent a 

reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct an officer may not 

extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop to conduct a canine 

sniff. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 135 S.Ct. 

1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015). 

{¶15} In general, an investigative stop may last no longer 

than necessary to accomplish the initial goal of the stop:

Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police 

inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by 

the seizure's “mission”—to address the traffic violation 

that warranted the stop, Caballes, 543 U.S., at 407, 125 

S.Ct. 834 and attend to related safety concerns, infra, 

at 1619 – 1620. See also United States v. Sharpe, 470 

U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); 

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 

L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion) (“The scope of 

the detention must be carefully tailored to its 

underlying justification.”). Because addressing the 

infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may “last no 

longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.” 

Ibid. See also Caballes, 543 U.S., at 407, 125 S.Ct. 

834. Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied 

to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have 

been—completed. See Sharpe, 470 U.S., at 686, 105 S.Ct. 

1568 (in determining the reasonable duration of a stop, 

“it [is] appropriate to examine whether the police 

diligently pursued [the] investigation”).

Rodriguez, 575 U.S. 348 at 354, 135 S.Ct. 1609. Therefore, the 

pertinent question is not whether a canine sniff occurs before 

or after an officer issues, or could have issued, a traffic 
MEIGS 22CA4 10

citation, but whether the canine sniff extends the stop. Id.

{¶16} Law enforcement tasks generally associated with 

traffic infractions include: (1) determining whether to issue a 

traffic citation, (2) checking the driver’s license, (3) 

determining the existence of outstanding warrants, (4) 

inspecting the vehicle’s registration, and (5) examining proof 

of insurance. “These checks serve the same objective as 

enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the 

road are operated safely and responsibly.” State v. Farrow, 

2023-Ohio-682, 209 N.E.3d 830, ¶ 14 (4th Dist.), citing 

Rodriguez at 355, 135 S.Ct. 1609; State v. Aguirre, 4th Dist. 

Gallia No. 03CA5, 2003-Ohio-4909, ¶ 36 (during a traffic stop, 

motorist may be detained for a period of time sufficient to 

issue a citation “and to perform routine procedures such as a 

computer check on the motorist’s driver’s license, registration, 

and vehicle plates”).

{¶17} After a reasonable time for the purpose of the 

original traffic stop to elapse, an officer must then have “‘a 

reasonable articulable suspicion of illegal activity to continue 

the detention.’” State v. Jones, 2022-Ohio-561, 185 N.E.3d 131, 

¶ 22 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Ramos, 155 Ohio App.3d 396, 

2003-Ohio-6535, 801 N.E.2d 523, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.). 

When a police officer’s objective justification to 

continue detention of a person stopped for a traffic 

violation for the purpose of searching the person’s 
MEIGS 22CA4 11

vehicle is not related to the purpose of the original 

stop, and when that continued detention is not based on 

any articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of some 

illegal activity justifying an extension of the 

detention, the continuing detention to conduct a search 

constitutes an illegal seizure. 

State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997), 

paragraph one of the syllabus.

{¶18} Thus, if after talking with a driver a reasonable 

police officer would be satisfied that no unlawful activity had 

occurred, the driver must be permitted to continue on his way. 

State v. Venham, 96 Ohio App.3d 649, 656, 645 N.E.2d 831, 835 

(4th Dist.1994). If, however, the officer “ascertained 

reasonably articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of 

criminal activity, the officer may then further detain and 

implement a more in-depth investigation of the individual.” 

Robinette at 241, 685 N.E.2d 762. The detention of the motorist 

may last as long as the reasonable suspicion of criminal 

activity continues. “However, the lawfulness of the initial 

stop will not support a ‘fishing expedition’ for evidence of 

another crime.” Venham, 96 Ohio App.3d 649, 655, 645 N.E.2d 

831, 834 (4th Dist.1994).

{¶19} Consequently, “[t]he detention of a stopped driver may 

continue beyond [the normal] time frame when additional facts 

are encountered that give rise to a reasonable, articulable 

suspicion of criminal activity beyond that which prompted the 
MEIGS 22CA4 12

intial stop.” Batchilli at ¶ 15, citing State v. Myers, 63 Ohio 

App.3d 765, 771, 580 N.E.2d 61 (2d Dist.1990); Venham, 96 Ohio 

App.3d 649, 655, 645 N.E.2d 831, State v. Howard, 12th Dist. 

Preble No. CA 2006-02-002, CA 2006-02-003, 2006-Ohio-5656, ¶ 16. 

The “reasonable and articulable” standard applied to a prolonged 

traffic stop encompasses the totality of the circumstances.” Id.

at ¶ 16, citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274, 122 

S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). However, Rodriguez v. United 

States, supra, prohibits seizures that result from inquiries 

unrelated to the purpose of a traffic stop that “measurably 

extend[s] the duration of the stop.” Id. at 1615. 

{¶20} Ohio courts do not apply a bright-line test as to a 

specific amount of elapsed time to determine whether a traffic 

stop has been unreasonably prolonged. The Supreme Court of Ohio 

has held, “[a] traffic stop is not unconstitutionally prolonged 

when permissible background checks have been diligently 

undertaken and not yet completed at the time a drug dog alerts 

on the vehicle.” State v. Batchilli, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-

Ohio-2204, 865 N.S.2d 1282, ¶ 14 (Emphasis added). Instead, 

courts look at the totality of the circumstances to determine if 

an unreasonable prolonged delay occurred. The Second District 

Court of Appeals observed: 

In the wake of Rodriguez, Ohio courts have continued to 

apply a duration-based standard for evaluating traffic 

stops such as the stop at issue in this case. See, e.g., 
MEIGS 22CA4 13

State v. Matheney, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26876, 2016-

Ohio-7690, 2016 WL 6672805, ¶ 21–32; State v. Neal, 10th 

Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-771, 2016-Ohio-1406, 2016 WL 

1288000, ¶ 15–23; State v. Reece, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. 

C-140635, 2015-Ohio-3638, 2015 WL 5257151, ¶ 15–25; but 

see State v. Hill, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26345, 2016-

Ohio-3087, 2016 WL 2944821, ¶ 10–14 (describing 

Rodriguez as “arguably prohibit[ing] [a] seizure[ ] 

resulting from inquiries unrelated to the initial 

purpose of a traffic stop” if the unrelated inquiries 

measurably extend the stop's duration). These cases 

establish that to determine whether a police officer 

completes a traffic stop within a reasonable length of 

time, a court should evaluate the duration of the stop 

in light of the totality of the circumstances and 

consider whether the officer diligently pursued the 

corresponding investigation. (Citations omitted.) 

Matheney, 2016-Ohio-7690, 2016 WL 6672805, ¶ 22. 

State v. Mee, 2017-Ohio-7343, 96 N.E.3d 1020, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.). 

{¶21} Some Ohio courts have found constitutional violations 

that involved a relatively short stop duration. See State v. 

Byrd, 2022-Ohio-4635, 204 N.E.3d 681 (8th Dist.)(although canine 

sniff within 15 minutes of traffic stop, officer acknowledged 

investigation concluded eight minutes before canine’s arrival), 

State v. Thomas, 2020-Ohio-3539, 154 N.E.3d 1074 (9th Dist.) 

(traffic stop not completed within reasonable period of time 

given officer normally takes 10-15 minutes to write warning, but 

evidence showed “a pause of more than three minutes during the 

stop, prior to the arrival of the K-9 unit, where the officer 

was not diligently conducting the investigation.”), State v. 

Neyhard, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2021-A-0005, 2022-Ohio-1098 

(10 minutes unreasonable when video and testimony did not 
MEIGS 22CA4 14

“affirmatively demonstrate that the officer was awaiting any 

information from dispatch necessary to finishing the tasks 

reasonably related to the purpose of the stop.”); State v. 

Green, 2016-Ohio-4810, 69 N.E.3d 59 (7th Dist.)(similar to 

Rodriguez, officer made the stop, then called for canine 

officer, wrote and issued the warning in one to two minutes, 

canine took 10 minutes to arrive and another three to search the 

vehicle; dog did not complete the vehicle sniff until 11–12 

minutes after warning issued, this improperly extended time 

beyond time required for traffic stop).

{¶22} However, other Ohio courts have concluded that a very 

brief stop, similar to the duration of the stop in the present 

case, does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See State v. 

Johnson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20624, 2005-Ohio-1367 (no 

violation when officer testified typical stop requires 15-20 

minutes to complete and sniff occurred 7 minutes into stop), 

State v. Blatchford, 2016-Ohio-8456, 79 N.E.3d 97 (12th 

Dist.)(no violation when officer testified normal traffic stop 

between 15-20 minutes, dog arrived within ten minutes and 

alerted within 12.5 minutes), State v. Cook, 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 

521-522, 605 N.E.2d 70 (1992) (15 minute detention reasonable). 

See also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 

84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (20 minute detention reasonable); Illinois 

v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 
MEIGS 22CA4 15

(2005) (no constitutional violation when canine sniff less than 

10 minutes after initiation of stop, defendant placed in cruiser 

and officer not yet issued a citation); Batchilli, 113 Ohio 

St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204, 865 N.E.2d 1282, at ¶ 14 (no evidence 

to suggest detention for traffic violation of sufficient length 

to make it constitutionally dubious when dog alerted eight 

minutes and 56 seconds into the stop and neither background 

check nor traffic citation had been completed); State v. Brown, 

183 Ohio App.3d 337, 2009-Ohio-3804, 916 N.E.2d 1138, ¶ 23 (6th 

Dist.)(no violation when canine sniff occurred within 15 minutes 

of stop, a reasonable time to process a traffic citation).

{¶23} While many of the cited cases are pre-Rodriguez, in 

State v. Gurley, 2015-Ohio-5361, 54 N.E.3d 768 (4th Dist.), we 

considered a post-Rodriguez case when the officer observed the 

defendant following another vehicle too closely, a canine 

alerted 5 minutes into the stop, the officer testified it 

typically takes 10-12 minutes to issue a citation during a 

routine traffic stop, the officer recalled a previous stop of 

the defendant, and the officer’s investigation revealed the 

defendant had limited driving privileges. There, the officer 

testified that a normal stop takes 10 to 12 minutes and the dog 

sniff did not prolong the stop. 

{¶24} Similarly, In State v. Miles, 5th Dist. Licking No. 

2020 CA 00052, 2021-Ohio-1029, three minutes after law 
MEIGS 22CA4 16

enforcement conducted a traffic stop, an officer requested a 

canine handler, who arrived in two minutes. Three minutes after 

the canine arrived, the dog alerted on the car. When the 

defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress 

evidence, the court held:

In the case at bar, the stop occurred at approximately 

9:38 p.m. At approximately 9:41 p.m., Officer Carter 

requested a canine handler report to his location. The 

officer and the drug-sniffing dog arrived at 

approximately 9:43 p.m. At approximately 9:46 p.m., the 

doc alerted on the car. Thus, eight minutes elapsed 

from the time the car was stopped until the canine 

alerted to possible drugs in the car. Officer Carter 

testified that it normally takes him ten to fifteen 

minutes to write a traffic citation. There is no 

evidence in the record that Officer Carter could have 

completed writing the traffic citations before 9:43 p.m. 

Nor is there evidence that Officer Carter could have 

completed issuing the traffic citations before 9:46 

p.m., the time that the canine alerted on the car. Once 

the drug dog alerted to the vehicle, the police had 

probable cause to search that vehicle for contraband. 

Accordingly, in the case at bar the canine sniff did not 

add time to the time necessary to complete issuing 

traffic citations for driving under suspension and a 

turn signal violation. In other words, the dog sniff 

did not add time to the traffic stop. Rodriguez v. 

United States, 575 U.S. at 357, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 

L.Ed.2d 492. 

Miles at ¶ 14-15.

{¶25} In the case sub judice, Deputy Campbell testified 

that, after he checked appellant’s license plate before the 

late-night stop, he knew when he approached the vehicle that the 

driver, appellant, had been “trafficking drugs in our * * * 
MEIGS 22CA4 17

county.” Campbell testified that2, although he intended to 

2

 The following testimony is particularly relevant to our 

analysis.

Page 14 of the transcript provides: 

Q: Ok. And, if you would, tell me... tell me why you had to wait 

for somebody else to get there after you made the decision you 

were going to run your canine around the vehicle?

A: Um, mainly just for officer safety. I mean, it was dark, 

there was two of them, um, it’s better to have eyes on, you 

know, I’m paying attention to my dog running around the vehicle 

and having, you know, people inside the vehicle that I can’t pay 

attention to is...

Q: Ok. And, so do you recall about how long it was when Deputy 

Hutton got there?

A: Uh, it was less than ten (10), five minutes. Something like 

that.

Q: Ok. And, that would be on the logs you have...

A: Right.

Page 17 of the transcript states:

Q: What was the purpose?

A: Um, so we could search the vehicle.

Q: Ok. So, based on the hit from the dog, you decided to search 

the vehicle?

A: Yes.

Q: Ok. And, so what happened when you got to the vehicle and 

basically told them what you were

wanting them to do?

A: Um, Austin Johnson got out of the vehicle, I believe, Deputy 

Hutton may have patted him down and then, no, I patted ... I 

patted Austin Johnson down and returned back to the vehicle. We 

asked John Kincaid to exit the vehicle, uh, he ... at first, he 

refused to exit the vehicle, he said no, I’m not getting out of 

the car, and then I opened the driver’s door and he said ok, ok, 

I’m getting out, I’m getting out, don’t hurt me.

Q: Ok.

A: So, then he was then patted down and searched at that time.

Q: Ok. And, where ... where was Mr. Kincaid and Mr. Johnson 

placed, if you know, while were you were going to begin your 

search of the vehicle? 

A: Uh, John Kincaid was placed at the front of my vehicle.

Page 29 of the transcript states:

Q: Yea. And at that point informed him of the marked lanes 
MEIGS 22CA4 18

violation. Correct?

A: Correct.

Q: And, then immediately thereafter you made the decision to run 

your dog. Is that correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And, when I say immediately thereafter, are we just talking a 

few seconds after?

A: I’d say a few minutes, yea.

Q: Ok. And, so, fill me in on what occurred during those few 

minutes.

A: Um, I, like I stated earlier, I marked Deputy Hutton to come 

to my location and then after he arrived there, I deployed my 

canine.

Q: And, you would agree with me that when you ... when you 

called for Deputy Hutton, at that time, you had made the 

decision that you wanted ... you were going to run the dog. 

Correct?

A: Uh, yes.

Q: I mean, that was the point in bringing backup to ... to a 

traffic stop.

A: Sure.

Q: Correct?

A: Yea.

Finally, page 34 of the transcript states:

Q: I’m trying to figure out when you made the decision to run 

the dog.

A: When I made the decision to run the dog is when I observed 

John Kincaid as the driver of the vehicle.

Q: Ok. And ... and what ... had you met with Mr. Kincaid 

before?

A: No, but I ... I did have prior information that he was 

trafficking drugs in our ... in our county.

Q: Ok. And, so you identified Mr. Kinkaid, um, did you ... did 

you identify Mr. Kincaid prior to pulling him over?

A: Um, no. I ... I seen the vehicle when I was behind it and I 

observed the marked lanes violations and when I walked up to the 

vehicle, I ... I identified that it was John Kincaid driving the 

vehicle.
MEIGS 22CA4 19

immediately deploy the canine that accompanied him in his 

vehicle, for safety reasons, due to the lateness of the hour and 

the fact that two individuals occupied the suspect’s vehicle, he 

waited for Deputy Hutton to arrive to serve as back-up 

protection. Campbell then spoke with appellant and Johnson to 

ask if they had anything illegal in the vehicle, and he 

performed administrative tasks associated with the traffic stop, 

such as a check of the status of appellant’s and Johnson’s 

driver’s licenses and to discover the existence of any 

outstanding warrants. 

{¶26} We recognize that in the case at bar the officer did 

not offer sufficient information or justification to prolong the 

traffic stop beyond the time associated with normal duties 

generally associated with traffic stops. We also recognize that 

the officer did not provide detailed testimony concerning the 

normal general administrative duties associated with traffic 

stops, including the check of appellant’s registration, the 

status of appellant’s driver’s license, the vehicle’s insurance 

coverage or provide the exact time when Deputy Campbell 

concluded these administrative tasks while he waited for Deputy 

Hutton to arrive. The only reference to the stop’s duration is 

Campbell’s testimony that Hutton arrived less than ten minutes 

after he summoned him. Moreover, although Campbell agreed with 

trial counsel’s question, “[y]our investigation essentially, of 
MEIGS 22CA4 20

that issue, was over at the time that you pulled him over and 

made him aware as to whey you stopped him, correct?,” we observe 

that this testimony should not necessarily result in the 

conclusion that the duration of the stop terminated at the 

moment the stop began as appellee suggests. Instead, after this 

stop for a violation of traffic law that the officer initially 

determined that he did not wish to pursue, the officer performed 

general administrative tasks associated with the stop. Also, 

there is no requirement that an officer issue a citation for a 

minor misdemeanor traffic violation even if the offense had 

sufficient basis to make the stop. Admittedly, although a more 

detailed recitation of the officer’s activities during that ten 

minute time period would have been advisable, after our review, 

and based upon the specific facts adduced in the case sub 

judice, we do not conclude that the canine sniff improperly or 

unreasonably prolonged this traffic stop. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. 

348, 135 S.Ct. 1609, paragraph one of the syllabus. Here, the 

dog alerted to the presence of drugs less than ten minutes into 

the stop, similar to Miles, supra, when the dog alerted eight 

minutes into the stop. Once alerted to the presence of drugs, 

the officer then possessed probable cause to search appellant’s 

vehicle. Gurley at ¶ 28. 

{¶27} Once again, we recognize that Deputy Campbell did not 

initially possess specific and sufficient information about 
MEIGS 22CA4 21

appellant’s alleged drug trafficking activity to extend the time 

and purpose of the stop beyond the reason for the initial stop. 

However, most importantly in this case, although Campbell 

immediately decided to deploy his canine, the only reason he did 

not immediately do so involved his personal safety. Thus, the 

canine sniff occurred less than ten minutes into the stop after 

Hutton arrived to engage in back-up duties. This is not 

unreasonable conduct in light of the fact that traffic stops, 

especially stops late at night and with multiple occupants in a 

vehicle, represent some of the most perilous encounters for law 

enforcement officers. Consequently, officer safety should be of 

paramount importance and a legitimate consideration if such 

activity does not unreasonably extend the time required to 

conduct a traffic stop. Here, our review of the facts reveal 

that arrival of the back-up officer did not unreasonably extend 

the traffic stop’s duration. 

{¶28} Thus, because we conclude the traffic stop’s duration 

did not improperly and unreasonably extend the length of the 

stop, we overrule appellant’s first assignment of error. 

II.

{¶29} In his second assignment of error, appellant asserts 

the trial court erred when it overruled appellant’s motion to 

suppress evidence of incriminating statements, pursuant to the 
MEIGS 22CA4 22

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution, and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio 

Constitution. In particular, appellant argues that, before 

Deputy Campbell issued the required Miranda warnings, he 

conducted a custodial interrogation of appellant at the scene of 

the traffic stop and elicited incriminating statements about 

drug activity. 

{¶30} In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 

L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that 

statements made during custodial interrogation, i.e., 

“‘questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a 

person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his 

freedom of action in any significant way,” are admissible only 

upon a showing that law enforcement officials followed certain 

procedural safeguards to secure the accused’s Fifth Amendment 

privilege against self-incrimination.’” State v. Phillips, 4th 

Dist. Highland No. 11CA11, 2011-Ohio-6773, ¶ 9, quoting Miranda,

at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Those safeguards include informing 

defendant of “the right to remain silent, that anything the 

defendant says can be used against him a court of law, that he 

has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he 

cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to 

any questioning if he so desires.” Miranda at 479, 86 S.Ct. 

1602. 
MEIGS 22CA4 23

{¶31} The requirement that police officers administer 

Miranda warnings applies “only when a suspect is subjected to 

both custody and interrogation.” State v. Dunn, 131 Ohio St.3d 

325, 2012-Ohio-1008, 964 N.E.2d 1037, ¶ 24. In the case at bar, 

we conclude that appellant had not been placed in custody when 

he made these statements. 

The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that an individual 

temporarily detained as part of a routine traffic or 

investigatory stop ordinarily is not “in custody” and is 

not, therefore, entitled to Miranda warnings. State v. 

Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519, 2006-Ohio-3255, 849 N.E.2d 

985, ¶ 13; citing Berkemer v. McCarty at 439–440, 104 

S.Ct. 3138 (noting that investigative stops are not 

subject to Miranda requirements and holding that Miranda 

not implicated during traffic stop for swerving when 

officer questioned driver about his drinking). Thus, 

“most traffic stops and accompanying investigatory 

questioning do not constitute custodial interrogations 

warranting the right to Miranda warnings.” State v. 

Brocker, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2014-P-0070, 2015-Ohio3412, 2015 WL 5005120, ¶ 17 (citations omitted); see 

State v. Jackson, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 27132, 27200, 

27133, 27158, 2015-Ohio-5246, 2015 WL 9048666 

(determining that Miranda did not apply to traffic stop 

during which officer asked defendant where he had been 

and whether he had purchased any items at the store where 

he had been); State v. Campbell, 2nd Dist. Montgomery 

No. 26497, 2015-Ohio-3381, 2015 WL 4993574, (determining 

that Miranda not implicated during investigative stop to 

ascertain whether eighteen-year-old defendant had been 

drinking when there was no evidence that defendant was 

handcuffed, and the defendant was not informed that he 

was under arrest or detained in police car); State v. 

Smoot, 2015-Ohio-2717, 38 N.E.3d 1094, 1112–13, ¶ 41 

(determining that defendant was not in custody for 

purposes of Miranda when officer asked defendant about 

the contents of his vehicle during traffic stop); State 

v. Vineyard, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 25854, 2014-Ohio3846, 2014 WL 4384153 (determining that defendant not in 

custody during traffic stop even though officer asked 

defendant to exit his vehicle and asked defendant 
MEIGS 22CA4 24

whether he had any weapons); State v. Ware, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 89945, 2008-Ohio-2038, 2008 WL 1903993 

(concluding that Miranda was not applicable during a 

routine traffic stop in which officer asked defendant if 

he had any weapons, drugs, or contraband in the vehicle); 

State v. Leonard, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-060595, 2007-

Ohio-3312, 2007 WL 1874232 (holding that Miranda 

warnings were not required when an officer removed 

defendant from his vehicle and placed defendant in front 

passenger seat of officer's patrol vehicle for 

questioning). However, during a traffic or 

investigative stop circumstances may change and render 

an individual “in custody” for practical purposes and, 

thus, “ ‘entitled to the full panoply of protections 

prescribed by Miranda.’ ” Farris at ¶ 13; quoting 

Berkemer at 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138.

State v. Casteel, 2017-Ohio-8303, 98 N.E.3d 889, ¶ 17 (4th 

Dist.). 

{¶32} The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the relevant 

inquiry is “whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s 

position would have understood himself or herself to be in 

custody.” Cleveland v. Oles, 152 Ohio St.3d 1, 2017-Ohio-5834, 

92 N.E.3d 810, ¶ 30. Ultimately the court concluded that, based 

on the totality of the circumstances, the suspect was not in 

custody and no constitutional violation occurred when the 

officer stopped the suspect, asked him to sit in the patrol car, 

questioned him regarding his destination and how much alcohol he 

had consumed, directed him to perform field sobriety tests, and 

arrested him, all without giving Miranda warnings. Id. at ¶ 2-

4, 33. The court added that “[f]or purposes of the 

constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, the test is 
MEIGS 22CA4 25

not whether the individual feels free to leave but whether the 

situation ‘exerts upon a detained person pressure that 

sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against 

self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his 

constitutional rights.’ ” Id. at ¶ 31, citing Berkemer v. 

McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed. 2d 317 

(1984).

{¶33} In the case sub judice, after our review we believe 

that appellant’s statements, made during the traffic stop and 

prior to the search, did not rise to the level of custodial 

interrogation that requires Miranda warnings. When Deputy 

Campbell asked appellant if he “was sure there was no illegal 

drugs inside the vehicle, and he said he may have dropped a bag 

of heroin,” this exchange did not occur during a custodial 

interrogation because appellant had not been placed in custody. 

Thus, the trial court did not err by denying appellant’s motion 

to suppress evidence.

{¶34} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we 

overrule appellant’s second assignment of error and affirm the 

trial court’s judgment.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 
MEIGS 22CA4 26

Hess, J.: Dissenting Opinion

{¶35} I respectfully dissent. The trial court erred in 

overruling Kincaid’s motion to suppress the evidence from the 

traffic stop because the officer extended the traffic stop 

without sufficient justification. The officer testified that he 

stopped Kincaid for a marked lane violation. The officer ran the 

license plate on the vehicle prior to stopping the vehicle and 

knew prior to stopping Kincaid that the vehicle belonged to him. 

Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer explained the reason 

for the stop and inquired whether Kincaid and his passenger had 

any illegal drugs inside the vehicle. Kincaid apologized for the 

marked lane violation and both he and his passenger answered, 

“No” when asked about the presence of illegal drugs. The officer 

decided not to issue a citation for the marked lane violation. 

At that point, Kincaid should have been permitted to leave 

because the reason for the stop had been addressed and there was 

no further justification to detain Kincaid. The officer 

testified that his investigation of the marked lane violation 

was over at the time that he informed Kincaid of the marked lane 

violation. However, the officer testified that he decided to 

perform a canine sniff of the vehicle based on his understanding 

of Kincaid’s reputation as a drug trafficker. He called a second 

officer to the scene so that the canine sniff could be conducted 
MEIGS 22CA4 27

safely. The officer waited approximately 5 to 10 minutes for the 

second officer to arrive and then conducted the canine sniff. 

{¶36} The officer’s only justification for prolonging the stop 

was Kincaid’s reputation as an alleged drug trafficker. However, 

as the majority astutely recognizes, “knowledge of a person’s prior 

criminal involvement . . . is alone insufficient to give rise to 

the requisite reasonable suspicion.” State v. Whitman, 2009-Ohio5647, ¶ 15 (5th Dist.); State v. Stevens, 2016-Ohio-5017, ¶ 36 

(4th Dist.) (Harsha, J., concurring) (“It is important to note 

that a person's past criminal history, standing alone, does not 

provide the required level of suspicion to justify expanding the 

scope of the initial intrusion from a traffic stop into a criminal 

investigation.”). Kincaid should have been free to leave after he 

was informed of the marked lane violation. Florida v. Royer, 460 

U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (the scope and duration of a routine traffic 

stop must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification 

and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of 

the stop). However, the officer decided to investigate matters not 

reasonably within the scope of his suspicion and look for evidence 

of another crime. He detained Kincaid for 5 to 10 more minutes to 

conduct a canine sniff even though there was no justification to 

do so. After the reasonable time for issuing a citation has 

elapsed, an officer must have a reasonable articulable suspicion 

of illegal activity to continue the detention. State v. Jones, 
MEIGS 22CA4 28

2022-Ohio-561, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.). The officer gave no facts to 

support a reasonable suspicion that would justify extending the 

traffic stop. The continued detention of Kincaid to conduct the 

canine sniff constituted an illegal seizure and violated his right

against unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed by the 

Fourth Amendment.
MEIGS 22CA4 29

JUDGMENTY ENTRY

It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed. Appellee 

shall recover of appellant the costs herein taxed.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this 

appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this 

Court directing the Meigs County Common Pleas Court to carry 

this judgment into execution.

If a stay of execution of sentence and release upon bail 

has been previously granted by the trial court or this court, it 

is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon 

the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is 

to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an 

application for a stay during the pendency of the proceedings in 

that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will 

terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, 

or the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with 

the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant 

to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court 

of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses 

the appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will 

terminate as of the date of such dismissal. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that 

mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Hess, J.: Dissents with Dissenting Opinion

Wilkin, J.: Concurs in Judgment & Opinion

For the Court

______________________

 Peter B. Abele, Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a 

final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal 

commences from the date of filing with the clerk.