UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 98-4178

MIGUEL A. FLORES,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston.

David C. Norton, District Judge.

(CR-96-806)

Argued: September 22, 1999

Decided: October 29, 1999

Before MURNAGHAN, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinon.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Louis H. Lang, CALLISON, TIGHE, ROBINSON &

HAWKINS, L.L.P., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.

Rebecca K. Troth, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Bill Lann Lee, Acting

Assistant Attorney General, Dennis J. Dimsey, UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; J. Rene Josey,

United States Attorney, Marshall Prince, Assistant United States

Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Miguel A. Flores appeals the 180-month sentence imposed upon

his convictions of: six counts of holding others in involuntary servitude; six counts of collection of extensions of credit by extortionate

means; six counts of transporting illegal aliens within the United

States; concealing and harboring illegal aliens; transporting migrant

farm workers in unsafe vehicles; and conspiracy to commit these

crimes.1 We affirm.

I.

Flores ran a business that provided agricultural workers to plant

and harvest crops in the area around Manning, South Carolina. Two

of Flores's employees, Nolasco Castaneda and Andre Ixcoy, recruited

undocumented migrant farm workers who spoke little or no English

and had little education. The workers were transported from the Mexican border to South Carolina in vans that had been modified to hold

up to twenty-six men. During the trip from Arizona to South Carolina,

the workers usually were not allowed to leave the vans.

_________________________________________________________________

1 Flores was convicted on his guilty pleas to the following charges:

(a) Count One -- conspiracy, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 371;

(b) Counts Two through Seven -- involuntary servitude, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1584;

(c) Counts Eight through Thirteen -- collection of extensions

of credit by extortionate means, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 894;

(d) Counts Fifteen through Twenty-one -- transporting or harboring certain aliens, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(C);

(e) Count Twenty-two -- transporting certain aliens by unsafe

means, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1841.

 2
The workers were taken to several labor camps near Manning. The

main camp was in a secluded area, surrounded by woods and

marshes. The only exit from the camp was an unlit, unpaved lane running to the main road.

Upon arrival in South Carolina, Flores extended credit to the workers. The workers were informed that they had to work for the Flores

operation for as long as it took to pay off a smuggling fee, through

deductions from their pay. This prolonged the length of the workers'

servitude. Workers were told that anyone who attempted to leave the

camps would be hunted down and killed. Additionally, Flores and

others intimidated the workers by brandishing and sometimes discharging firearms.

On approximately June 19, 1992, Flores and a supervisor, Sebastian Gomez, beat migrant worker Antonio Perez as punishment for his

complaints about the camp conditions. Ramon Pena attempted to

intervene, and Flores struck him in the head with a semi-automatic

pistol. Pena was hospitalized until June 26 with severe contusions and

lacerations to his head.

II.

Flores entered his guilty plea with the understanding that he could

appeal his sentence. Subsequently, he entered into an "Addendum to

Plea Agreement" that contained a clause purporting to waive, inter

alia, his appellate rights. At Flores's sentencing hearing, the court

gave counsel an opportunity to discuss the Addendum with Flores.

However, there was no rearraignment and the district court did not

question Flores directly about his understanding or acceptance of the

appeal waiver. Neither Flores nor his counsel confirmed to the court

that Flores understood the waiver's significance. We do not decide

the thorny issue of whether Flores effectively waived his right to

appeal his sentence2 because, in any event, Flores's arguments on the

merits are without substance.

_________________________________________________________________

2 At oral argument, counsel for the Government represented that, if the

merits of Flores's appeal are considered, the Government will not seek

to vacate the two-point reduction in Flores's offense level that he

received upon the Government's recommendation, pursuant to terms of

the Addendum.

 3
III.

Flores claims that the district court improperly increased his

offense level on Counts Eight through Thirteen by five levels because

he discharged a firearm. See USSG § 2E2.1(b)(1)(A) (1991).3 We

review the district court's factual findings at sentencing for clear

error. See United States v. Melton, 970 F.2d 1328, 1331 (4th Cir.

1992).

Flores admits that firearms were discharged -- evidently, in the

fields and at night -- but contends that they were not related to any

offense conduct, including the extortion counts. Relevant conduct for

the determination of the challenged specific offense characteristic

includes all acts committed, aided, abetted, counseled, induced, or

willfully caused by the defendant, and all reasonably foreseeable acts

of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity,

where those acts occurred during the preparation for or the commission of the offense. See USSG § 1B1.3.

It may reasonably be inferred that displaying firearms contributed

to a climate of fear prevailing in the camps; the admitted discharge

of firearms made this threat all the more real, and thus facilitated Flores's extortion scheme. We therefore conclude that there was no clear

error in increasing the offense level by five levels pursuant to

§ 2E1.1(b)(1)(A).

IV.

Flores also contends that the district court erred when it enhanced

his sentence because Pena sustained serious bodily injury. See USSG

_________________________________________________________________

3 The 1991 version of the guidelines was applied in this case, because

it was less punitive than the version in effect at the time of sentencing.

However, Flores contends that he should have the benefit of the amended

guideline, which provides for a three-level reduction in offense level for

acceptance of responsibility rather than the two-level reduction in effect

in 1991. See USSG § 3E1.1 (1997). Flores's argument has no merit. "The

court shall not apply . . . one guideline section from one edition of the

Guidelines Manual and another guideline section from a different edition

of the Guidelines Manual." USSG § 1B1.11(b)(2) (1997).

 4
§ 2E2.1(b)(2)(B). Pena was named in the conspiracy count but not

identified as a victim of Flores's extortion. At sentencing, the district

court found that Flores beat Pena when Pena tried to stop Flores and

Gomez from beating Perez, a named extortion victim. The court noted

that Pena's injuries were so severe that he was hospitalized for seven

days.

The district court found that the enhancement was proper, because

Pena was a named victim of the conspiracy. The court observed that

not only was Pena beaten, but Flores, in furtherance of the conspiracy

to extort and to hold others in servitude, attempted to conceal from

authorities how Pena sustained his injuries.

We conclude that the enhancement for serious bodily injury was

proper. The conspiracy count was grouped with the count charging

Flores with extortion from Perez. In sentencing for a conspiracy

offense, the base offense level is determined by reference to the

guideline for the substantive offense, which in this case is extortion,

plus "any adjustments from such guideline for any intended offense

conduct that can be established with reasonable certainty." USSG

§ 2X1.1(a). Because Pena was a victim of the conspiracy, it was

appropriate to enhance Flores's sentence to reflect Pena's injuries.

V.

Pursuant to the foregoing, we reject Flores's arguments on their

merits, and affirm the sentence imposed on his multiple convictions.

AFFIRMED

 5