COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

March 14, 2023

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2022AP1394 Cir. Ct. No. 2015ME181

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT III

IN THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL COMMITMENT OF T. R. H.:

MARATHON COUNTY,

 PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

 V.

T. R. H.,

 RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Marathon County: 

LAMONT K. JACOBSON, Judge. Reversed. 

¶1 STARK, P.J.1 Thomas2appeals from a recommitment order and an 

associated order for the involuntary administration of his medication and 

 

1

 This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2) (2021-22). All 

references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise noted.
No. 2022AP1394

2

treatment. Thomas argues that these orders must be reversed because, in finding 

him dangerous, the circuit court failed to reference a specific statutory subdivision 

paragraph in WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2. and failed to make the required factual 

findings as mandated by Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, 391 Wis. 2d 

231, 942 N.W.2d 277. Additionally, Thomas argues that Marathon County failed 

to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was dangerous. 

¶2 We conclude that the circuit court found Thomas was dangerous 

under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.; however, we further conclude that the court’s 

finding in that regard was clearly erroneous because the County failed to meet its 

burden to prove that Thomas was dangerous as required for recommitment under 

that subdivision paragraph. We therefore reverse the recommitment and 

involuntary medication and treatment orders.

3

BACKGROUND

¶3 Thomas was initially committed in 2015, and he has remained under 

commitment since that time. In January 2022, the County filed a petition for 

Thomas’s recommitment. At the time of the petition, Thomas was seventy-one

 

2

 For ease of reading, we refer to the appellant in this confidential appeal using a 

pseudonym, rather than his initials.

3

 Thomas separately argues that the involuntary medication and treatment order must be 

reversed because the County did not provide sufficient testimony to meet its burden of proof. 

However, an order allowing for the involuntary administration of medication and treatment 

requires the existence of a valid commitment order. See WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g)3. Because we 

reverse the commitment order, reversal of the associated involuntary medication order is also 

required and we need not address Thomas’s separate argument regarding that order. See Turner 

v. Taylor, 2003 WI App 256, ¶1 n.1, 268 Wis. 2d 628, 673 N.W.2d 716 (the court of appeals need 

not address all issues if one issue raised by the parties is dispositive).
No. 2022AP1394

3

years old, living independently, taking care of his daily needs and finances without 

assistance, and was receiving outpatient services. 

¶4 The County called Drs. John Coates and Courtney Derus as 

witnesses at the recommitment hearing. Both doctors wrote reports prior to the 

hearing, but neither of the doctors’ reports were admitted into evidence. No 

treatment records were submitted as evidence at the hearing. Thomas also

testified at the hearing. 

¶5 Thomas was scheduled to meet with Dr. Coates prior to the hearing, 

but Coates testified that Thomas failed to appear. Thomas later testified that he 

was ill at the time of his scheduled appointment with Coates. Coates stated that he 

last met with Thomas in August 2021. While Coates agreed that it was possible 

Thomas had improved since that time, he testified that he did not have a recent 

opportunity to assess Thomas. Coates did recall that when they last met, Thomas 

was taking medication and was stable enough to remain in the community but 

“still was symptomatic.” 

¶6 Doctor Coates testified that he reviewed Thomas’s treatment records

to prepare his report and testify at the hearing. He diagnosed Thomas with 

schizophrenia, paranoid type, explaining that the condition qualified as a 

substantial disorder of mood or thought that is treatable, mainly with psychotropic 

medication. Coates testified that, in the past, Thomas had problems with 

delusions, paranoia, and disorganized thinking. Additionally, Coates testified that 

he believed Thomas had a history of treatment noncompliance and Thomas had

been hospitalized multiple times. Coates stated that Thomas had been on the same 

medication for “a couple of years.” 
No. 2022AP1394

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¶7 Doctor Coates acknowledged that “over the past few years there has 

been some stability” for Thomas, but Coates noted he believes Thomas “continues 

to have persecutory, grandiose delusions and ... social impairment.” If treatment 

were withdrawn, Coates testified that it was his belief Thomas would “become a 

danger to himself.” Coates explained that when treatment has been withdrawn

from Thomas in the past, Thomas has shown “some social impairment,” but 

without treatment, Thomas mainly presents “a danger to himself in terms of lack 

of self-care.” Specifically, Coates testified that when Thomas “goes off his 

medication[,] his thinking becomes grossly disorganized,” he faces “mood 

instability” and “gets to a point where he just cannot properly socialize. He has 

trouble interacting with others.” As an example of this behavior, Coates stated 

that he has seen Thomas with “facial makeup on” while “acting very, very 

bizarre.” 

¶8 Doctor Coates opined that if Thomas were not under a commitment 

order, he would likely stop taking his medication. Coates testified that he believes 

Thomas is “incompetent to apply a good understanding of the advantages and 

disadvantages” of his medication due to Thomas’s “lack of insight and impaired 

judgment.” Coates also opined that there was a substantial probability Thomas 

would develop impaired judgment if treatment were withdrawn, and his impaired

judgment was likely to result in further harm to either Thomas’s own physical 

health or the health of others. 

¶9 Doctor Derus testified that she was also unable to meet with Thomas

prior to the hearing. Thomas later explained that he had attempted to attend the 

examination with Derus at 1:30 p.m. on a Friday but that “[Derus] wouldn’t see

[him]” as she thought he was untidy. Similar to Coates, Derus testified that she 

last met with Thomas in August 2021 and had not seen him since that time. Derus 
No. 2022AP1394

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also reviewed Thomas’s treatment records to prepare her report and her testimony. 

Derus testified that Thomas’s treatment records indicated that, in the past, he had

“demonstrated a lack of treatment compliance due to a lack of insight about his 

mental illness and some paranoia.” The prior paranoia that Thomas had exhibited, 

Derus explained, was in regard to his treatment providers who he thought were 

“retaliating or threatening him.” 

¶10 Doctor Derus diagnosed Thomas with schizophrenia, a condition she 

also stated qualified as a substantial disorder of mood or thought and a mental 

illness that can be improved with treatment. Derus opined that if treatment were 

withdrawn, Thomas would present a substantial probability of harm to himself or 

others. Derus explained that Thomas’s records “indicate that he has [a] history of 

delusions that are paranoid in nature and he could become dangerous due to his 

lack of reality testing.” She further testified that Thomas “has an inability to 

function adequately in the community.” If Thomas were not under court-ordered

commitment and treatment, Derus testified that based upon his past history, there 

was a substantial probability of Thomas’s judgment becoming impaired, and that 

impaired judgment was likely to result in physical impairment to Thomas. Lastly, 

Derus testified that she believed Thomas was not competent to accept or refuse 

medication due to his mental illness. 

¶11 Thomas testified that, at the time of the hearing, he lived in a rental 

unit that he paid for on his own. He was not working, but he testified that he had

hobbies and collected social security retirement income monthly, and he stated the

monthly amount he received from social security. Thomas testified that he had no 

difficulty managing his own finances, and that he had his own bank account and 

credit card. Thomas explained he had a cell phone that he operated by himself. 

He also testified that he knew his own credit score and stated that number when 
No. 2022AP1394

6

asked. If he became ill or injured, Thomas that testified he knew how to get 

himself to the hospital. Furthermore, Thomas stated he had not fallen recently. 

¶12 Thomas further testified that he owned a car, which he drove to court 

for the hearing. He explained that no one helped him with his living situation and 

he completed his own shopping. Thomas testified that he was able to 

independently dress and bathe himself, and take his medication. He stated that he 

currently took ten milligrams of Olanzapine and that the medication makes him 

“focus” and become “more stable.” If he were not under a commitment order, 

Thomas testified that he would still take his medication and see his doctor, noting 

that he liked his current doctor. Thomas further testified that he had no recent 

suicidal thoughts or thoughts about harming others. 

¶13 The circuit court concluded that Thomas was mentally ill and had a 

treatable condition. Relying on the testimony of Drs. Coates and Derus, the court 

found that the County presented clear and convincing evidence in support of

Thomas’s recommitment. The court stated that “the big issue here is not so much 

what [Thomas’s] current level of functioning is, but it’s to look forward to what 

his level of functioning would be if treatment were withdrawn.” Mentioning how 

“both doctors testified that historically [Thomas] has not indicated a willingness to

take his medications,” the court determined that the doctors believed Thomas 

presented “a substantial likelihood that he would become a proper subject for 

treatment if treatment were withdrawn based upon an impaired judgment.” The 

court further noted that Thomas presented “a substantial probability of physical 

impairment to himself.” 

¶14 “[B]ased upon the opinions of the doctors,” the circuit court also 

stated that Thomas was “substantially incapable of applying an understanding of 
No. 2022AP1394

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the ... advantages and disadvantages of medication” “due to his mental illness.” 

The court ordered a twelve-month extension of Thomas’s commitment. At the 

end of its ruling, the court addressed Thomas stating that “it’s no comment as to 

how you’re doing now, you’re doing well, and I think it’s just appropriate that you 

continue on the course you’re on.” 

¶15 After the hearing, the circuit court entered written orders for the 

extension of Thomas’s commitment and allowing for the involuntary 

administration of his medication and treatment. The court checked a box in the 

written extension order stating that Thomas was dangerous because there was “a 

substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to himself ... or other 

individuals due to impaired judgment.” The form also stated that this risk was 

manifested or shown in Thomas by “a substantial likelihood, based on the subject 

individual’s treatment record, that the individual would be a proper subject for 

commitment if treatment were withdrawn.” Thomas now appeals from both 

orders. 

DISCUSSION

¶16 Thomas does not dispute that he is mentally ill and a proper subject 

for treatment. He challenges only the circuit court’s conclusion that he is

dangerous. Whether a petitioner has “presented clear and convincing evidence to 

justify recommitment is a mixed question of fact and law.” Sauk County v. 

S.A.M., 2022 WI 46, ¶17, 402 Wis. 2d 379, 975 N.W.2d 162. A circuit court’s 

findings of fact are upheld unless they are clearly erroneous, but whether those 

facts satisfy the statutory standard of dangerousness is a question of law that we 

review de novo. Marathon County v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶18, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 

N.W.2d 901; WIS. STAT. § 805.17(2). “[A] finding of fact is clearly erroneous 
No. 2022AP1394

8

when ‘it is against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.’” 

Phelps v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 2009 WI 74, ¶39, 319 Wis. 2d 1, 768 

N.W.2d 615 (citation omitted). 

¶17 For an individual to be recommitted, the petitioner must prove that 

the individual fulfills three requirements: “the subject must be (1) mentally ill; 

(2) a proper subject for treatment; and (3) dangerous to themselves or others.” 

Sheboygan County v. M.W., 2022 WI 40, ¶¶17-18, 402 Wis. 2d 1, 974 N.W.2d 

733; WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)1.-2. “Upon each petition to extend a term of 

commitment, a county must establish the same elements with the same quantum of 

proof.” Waukesha County v. J.W.J., 2017 WI 57, ¶20, 375 Wis. 2d 542, 895 

N.W.2d 783. 

¶18 There are five ways a petitioner can meet its burden to prove 

dangerousness. Outagamie County v. Michael H., 2014 WI 127, 359 Wis. 2d 

272, 856 N.W.2d 603; WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.a.-e. Each recommitment 

hearing requires proof of “current dangerousness,” and “[i]t is not enough that [an] 

individual was at one point dangerous.” D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶34 (citation 

omitted). “[C]ircuit courts in recommitment [hearings] are to make specific 

factual findings with reference to the subdivision paragraph of § 51.20(1)(a)2. on 

which the recommitment is based.” Id., ¶40. 

¶19 “Because an individual’s behavior might change while receiving 

treatment, WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(am) provides a different avenue for proving 

dangerousness if the individual has been the subject of treatment for mental illness 

immediately prior” to a recommitment hearing. M.W., 402 Wis. 2d 1, ¶19

(citation omitted). Section 51.20(1)(am) allows a petitioner to prove 

dangerousness by showing that there is “a substantial likelihood, based on the 
No. 2022AP1394

9

subject individual’s treatment record, that the individual would be a proper subject 

for commitment if treatment were withdrawn.” This alternative path does not 

change the requirement that the petitioner prove, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that the individual in question is mentally ill, a proper subject for 

treatment, and currently dangerous. Waupaca County v. K.E.K., 2021 WI 9, ¶26, 

395 Wis. 2d 460, 954 N.W.2d 366, cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 594 (2021). 

¶20 Thomas argues that the recommitment order must be reversed 

because the circuit court failed to comply with D.J.W.’s requirement that the court 

make factual findings regarding his dangerousness with reference to the specific 

subdivision paragraph in WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which his recommitment 

was based. Additionally, Thomas notes that the County, in its petition and at the 

recommitment hearing, did not reference a subdivision paragraph under which it 

sought his recommitment. 

¶21 The County concedes the latter point, acknowledging that it failed to 

specify—at least by specific statutory reference—the dangerousness standard on 

which it relied in seeking Thomas’s recommitment. However, the County argues 

that the circuit court complied with D.J.W.’s requirement because it restated the 

language of WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. in its oral ruling, and the written order 

contained language that mirrored § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. as well.

¶22 Based upon the circuit court’s oral ruling and its written order, we 

agree with the County and conclude that the court found Thomas dangerous under 

WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. Section 51.20(1)(a)2.c. states that an individual can 

be found dangerous if he or she “evidences such impaired judgment ... that there 

is a substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to himself or herself or 

other individuals.” In its written order, the court checked a box that stated Thomas 
No. 2022AP1394

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presented “a substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to 

himself ... or other individuals due to impaired judgment.” That language 

mirrored part of the wording in § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. And in its oral ruling, the court 

found, based on the doctors’ testimony, that Thomas presented “a substantial 

likelihood that he would become a proper subject for treatment if treatment were 

withdrawn based upon an impaired judgment and ... a substantial probability of 

physical impairment to himself.” Again, this language mirrored the dangerousness 

standard set forth in § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.

¶23 Under D.J.W., however, the circuit court was not merely required to 

identify which dangerousness standard it relied on in finding Thomas dangerous; 

the court was also required “to make specific factual findings” referencing a 

subdivision paragraph in WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment 

was based. See D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶3 (emphasis added). Here, we 

conclude the court failed to make the required factual findings.

¶24 The County argues that the circuit court implicitly adopted the 

findings and conclusions of Drs. Coates and Derus4regarding dangerousness, 

specifically emphasizing the doctors’ opinions regarding Thomas’s level of 

functioning if treatment were to be withdrawn. Moreover, the County points out 

that the court noted, in its ruling, Thomas’s historical unwillingness to continue his 

medication and the connection between that unwillingness and Thomas’s impaired 

judgment, leading Thomas to be dangerous to himself or others. 

 

4

 The County, in its briefing, states “the findings and conclusions of Doctors Coates and 

Starr.” (Emphasis added.) Given that the two testifying doctors in this case were Coates and 

Dr. Derus, we assume that the County meant to refer to Derus. 
No. 2022AP1394

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¶25 While the County correctly notes that the circuit court relied upon 

both doctors’ findings and conclusions in finding Thomas dangerous, the court 

made no specific factual findings in support of its dangerousness determination. 

The doctors’ testimony failed to provide any evidence as to how Thomas would 

become dangerous to himself or others if treatment were withdrawn, and the court 

did not cite any evidence establishing that factor in its oral ruling and written 

order.

¶26 Doctor Coates testified that he believed Thomas would cease taking 

his medication if he were not under a commitment order. Should that occur, 

Coates opined that Thomas would then possibly experience disorganized thinking, 

mood instability, and impaired judgment, and could become delusional and 

paranoid. Based on Thomas’s history from an unspecified time, Coates also 

testified that when Thomas stopped taking his medication in the past, he exhibited 

a lack of self-care, antisocial behavior, and had difficulty interacting with others. 

Dr. Derus testified that Thomas “has an inability to function adequately in the 

community,” and if Thomas were not under court-ordered commitment and 

treatment, there was a substantial probability of Thomas’s judgment becoming 

impaired, with that impaired judgment likely to result in physical harm to Thomas. 

¶27 However, there was no evidence presented—and, accordingly, the 

circuit court made no findings—as to how these behaviors and possible future 

symptoms would cause physical impairment or injury to Thomas, or otherwise 

make him a danger to himself or others. As a result, the doctors’ testimony was 

insufficient for the court to make a factual finding that there was “a substantial 

likelihood that [Thomas] would become a proper subject for treatment if treatment 

were withdrawn based upon an impaired judgment.” The court merely repeated
No. 2022AP1394

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the statutory language without relying upon any facts in the record, which is 

insufficient to comply with D.J.W. 

¶28 Even if we were to conclude that the circuit court made specific 

factual findings with reference to the subdivision paragraph of WIS. STAT.

§ 51.20(1)(a)2.c. on which the recommitment was based, we would conclude that 

such findings are clearly erroneous. As Thomas contends, the County failed to 

prove there was a substantial likelihood that he would be a proper subject for 

commitment if treatment were withdrawn. Thomas correctly argues that 

dangerousness “cannot be assumed from [a] prior commitment order” and that the 

County “provided no evidence of dangerous acts that meet the standard in WIS.

STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.” Thomas further argues that each recommitment must be 

based on “current, dual findings of mental illness and dangerousness.” See 

Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶21, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509. 

¶29 The County asserts that it presented sufficient evidence for 

Thomas’s recommitment under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(am) and that Thomas 

improperly focuses solely on whether the County presented evidence of his recent 

acts or omissions evidencing his dangerousness. It claims that the circuit court 

properly relied on the doctors’ testimony about Thomas’s long-standing history of 

mental illness that was accompanied by problems with delusions, paranoia, and 

disorganized thinking when treatment was withdrawn. The County contends that 

the doctors in this case testified regarding Thomas’s previous behaviors and 

continuing patterns, and the court then reasonably relied on that testimony when 

making its required findings. According to the County, behavior prior to, or 

earlier in, a commitment is a proper basis for a finding of current dangerousness 

under the recommitment standard because “[d]angerousness in an extension 

proceeding can and often must be based on the individual’s precommitment 
No. 2022AP1394

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behavior, coupled with an expert’s informed opinions and predictions.” 

Winnebago County v. S.H., 2020 WI App 46, ¶13, 393 Wis. 2d 511, 947 N.W.2d 

761. The County therefore argues that the evidence was sufficient in this case to 

support a finding that Thomas is currently dangerous if treatment were withdrawn. 

¶30 We disagree and conclude that the evidence presented at the hearing 

was insufficient to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Thomas would be 

a proper subject for commitment under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. if his 

treatment were withdrawn. The County presented no evidence about Thomas’s

past dangerousness. Further, it failed to present any evidence about how Thomas

was dangerous in the past when he was not receiving treatment, or how Thomas 

would likely become dangerous at this time if treatment were withdrawn such that 

there would be “a substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to 

himself ... or other individuals.” See § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.

¶31 The County argues that it provided sufficient evidence of how 

Thomas would become dangerous to himself or others if his treatment were 

withdrawn. Specifically, it points to Dr. Coates’ testimony that Thomas becomes 

“grossly disorganized” “when [he] is off his medications” and that Thomas 

experiences “mood instability” and disorganized thoughts. In the past, and 

without treatment, Coates testified that Thomas reached a point where he could 

not interact with others or care for himself. 

¶32 The County, however, presented no evidence as to when these prior 

symptoms occurred or how they caused Thomas to become a danger to himself or 

others. Likewise, the County provided no specifics as to how Thomas has failed 

to care for himself in the past or why his ability to interact with others caused a 

“substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to himself ... or other 
No. 2022AP1394

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individuals.” See WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. At most, the evidence showed that 

Thomas has previously failed to maintain his self-care, has exhibited paranoia and 

had delusions, and may have not interacted in a socially appropriate manner. 

None of these behaviors—especially without evidence of specific incidents—

clearly and convincingly show that Thomas was dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.

at the time of the recommitment hearing, or would likely become so if his 

treatment were withdrawn. See § 51.20(1)(am). 

¶33 Accordingly, the County failed to present clear and convincing 

evidence that Thomas was dangerous under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. and 

(1)(am). We therefore reverse the recommitment order and the associated 

involuntary medication order. 

By the Court.—Orders reversed. 

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.