[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-11671

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MICHAEL TYRONE LINDSEY, 

Defendant- Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:22-cr-00044-MCR-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11671

Before WILSON, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Michael Tyrone Lindsey appeals his twenty-year total 

sentence for possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more 

of methamphetamine, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a 

drug trafficking crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted 

felon. Lindsey was sentenced to a fifteen-year minimum penalty 

on the felon-in-possession count under the Armed Career Criminal 

Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), because he had three prior convictions for 

a “violent felony” or “serious drug offense.” He was also sentenced 

to a fifteen-year minimum penalty on the possession-with-intentto-distribute charge under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) because he had 

a prior conviction for a “serious drug felony.” On appeal, Lindsey 

objects to both statutory enhancements, arguing that his two prior 

Florida-law convictions for cocaine-related offenses cannot be 

counted toward either enhancement.

We apply the categorical approach to determine whether a 

defendant’s state conviction is a serious drug offense under ACCA, 

18 U.S.C. § 924(e). United States v. Conage, 976 F.3d 1244, 1250 (11th 

Cir. 2020). Under the categorical approach, we consider only the 

statutory definition of the state offense rather than the facts of the 

crime itself. Id. A state conviction qualifies as a serious drug 

offense only if the statute under which the defendant was convicted 

defines the offense in the same way as, or more narrowly than, 

ACCA’s definition of a serious drug offense. Id.

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23-11671 Opinion of the Court 3

Lindsey bases his argument on United States v. Jackson 

(Jackson I), 36 F.4th 1294 (11th Cir. 2022). There, we held that 

ACCA’s definition of a serious drug offense incorporates the 

version of the federal drug schedules in effect when the defendant 

commits the federal gun offense for which he is being sentenced. 

Id. at 1300. Ioflupane, a cocaine derivative, was criminalized in 

Florida until 2017 but was removed from the federal drug 

schedules in 2015. Id. at 1301–03. Lindsey argues that his two 

Florida-law cocaine-related convictions—for offenses committed in 

2003 and 2009—thus should not qualify as serious drug offenses, 

because the definition of cocaine under Florida law at the time was 

broader than the federal definition at the time of his firearm 

charge.

Under Jackson I, this was likely a winning argument. See id. 

at 1304. But as Lindsey acknowledges, we vacated the opinion in 

Jackson I and issued a superseding opinion, United States v. Jackson 

(Jackson II), 55 F.4th 846 (11th Cir. 2022). In Jackson II, we instead 

held that ACCA’s definition of a serious drug offense incorporates 

the version of the federal drug schedules in effect at the time of the 

defendant’s prior state drug offense, not the later federal firearm 

offense. Id. at 861. And after briefing concluded in this appeal, the 

Supreme Court affirmed our Jackson II decision in Brown v. United 

States, 144 S. Ct. 1195 (2024). Therefore, because Florida’s 

definition of cocaine matched the federal definition in 2003 and 

2009 when Lindsey committed his prior state offenses, both qualify 

as serious drug offenses under ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). See 

Jackson II, 55 F.4th at 861; Brown, 144 S. Ct. at 1202, 1204.

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4 Opinion of the Court 23-11671

Finally, the definition of “serious drug felony” under 21 

U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) incorporates the definition of “serious drug 

offense” under ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2). See 21 U.S.C. § 802(57). 

Additionally, the offender must have “served a term of 

imprisonment of more than 12 months” and his “release from any 

term of imprisonment” must be “within 15 years of the 

commencement of the instant offense.” Id. These latter two 

elements were met for Lindsey’s 2009 conviction. So our 

conclusion that the 2009 conviction qualifies as a “serious drug 

offense” under ACCA mandates the conclusion that it also qualifies 

as a “serious drug felony” under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).

AFFIRMED. 

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