J-S89014-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JULIAN WILLIAMS,

Appellant No. 2625 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 29, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002117-2015

BEFORE: SHOGAN, MOULTON, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED January 13, 2017

Appellant, Julian Williams, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered following his conviction of unauthorized use of automobiles and 

other vehicles. We affirm.

The trial court set forth a detailed summary of the underlying facts of 

this case as follows:

The Complainant, Mr. Wayne White, testified that on 

January 15, 2015, in the area of [the] 6700 block of North 18th

Street in Philadelphia, PA, at approximately 9:30, 9:45 p.m., he 

was delivering a pizza to a customer’s home when someone got 

into his parked car and drove away.4 (N.T. 7/29/15 pp. 8-9). 

Mr. White stated that he ran after the car but could not catch up 

and therefore had to walk back to the pizza shop where he then 

called the police. (N.T. 7/29/15 p. 9). Mr. White described his 

vehicle as a red Dodge 1500 pick-up truck with license plate 

____________________________________________

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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number YTW-9042. Id. Mr. White stated that after dialing 911 

he waited for the police to arrive to the pizza shop where they 

took a report. (N.T. 7/29/15 p. 10). Mr. White further stated 

that he contacted the low jack system on his car and his 

insurance company at that time to inform them that his car had 

been stolen. Id. Mr. White explained that about twenty (20) 

minutes had passed between the time he saw his car pulling off 

and the time he activated the low jack. Id.

4 All references to the record refer to the transcript 

of the non-jury trial recorded on July 29, 2015.

Mr. White testified that he did not give anyone permission 

to take his car on the evening in question. (N.T. 7/29/15 p. 10). 

When asked to describe the condition of his car at the time he 

last left it, Mr. White stated that there was nothing wrong with it 

and that, in fact, he had the car painted a couple days prior to 

the incident. Id. Mr. White also testified that he had left the 

vehicle unlocked and the keys in the car when he went up to the 

customer’s house to deliver the pizza. (N.T. 7/29/15 p. 10).

Mr. White stated that after he reported that his car was 

stolen, the low jack was activated. (N.T. 7/29/15 p. 10). He 

testified that since there was nothing else for him to do at the 

pizza shop, the owner drove him home to South Philadelphia 

where within five (5) minutes police officers knocked on the door 

and notified Mr. White that he could pick up his car. (N.T. 

7/29/15 p. 11). He stated that thirty (30) to forty (40) minutes 

passed before he could get his car back. (N.T. 7/29/15 p. 12).

Philadelphia Police Officer Renaldo Agront, assigned to the 

39th District, testified that on January 15, 2015 at approximately 

10:15, 10:30 p.m. his tour of duty took him to the area of 5200 

Magnolia Street, Philadelphia, PA. (N.T. 7/29/15 p. 13). Officer 

Agront explained that he was on regular patrol in a marked 

vehicle and in full uniform in the area of Green and Logan 

Streets when he received a low jack activation on his vehicle. 

(N.T. 7/29/15 pp. 13-14). Officer Agront stated that he followed 

the signal to the 5200 block of Magnolia Street where he 

observed [Appellant]5operating a red Dodge Ram 1500 with PA 

tag YTW-9042. (N.T. 7/29/15 p. 14). Officer Agront then 

verified that the vehicle with this description was in stolen status 

with police radio. Id. Officer Agront observed the vehicle 

coming off of Ashmead Street, just past a driveway on Magnolia 
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Street. Id. Officer Agront explained that the driveway is a city 

block long and behind houses each with its own little driveway. 

Id. Officer Agront stated that he observed [Appellant] pull the 

car up and back down the driveway. (N.T. 7/29/15 pp. 14-15). 

At this time, Officer Agront and his partner, Officer Collins, 

pulled in front of the vehicle. (N.T. 7/29/15 p. 15). Officer 

Agront stated that he noticed a ledge at that location and the 

way [Appellant] had the car angled, he could not back up any 

further. Id.

5 Officer Agront identified [Appellant] in court.

Officer Agront testified that when he and his partner exited 

their vehicle, they observed [Appellant] in the stolen vehicle in 

motion. (N.T. 7/29/15 p. 15). Officer Agront stopped the 

vehicle, took [Appellant] out, and also removed a juvenile from 

the front seat of the vehicle. Id. Officer Agront stated that 

[Appellant] explained that he was moving the car for the 

juvenile. (N.T. 7/29/15 p. 16). Officer Agront stated that 

[Appellant] asked officers to close his front door to his home, 

located at the opposite end of the driveway where he was 

coming from, as he explained that he had left it open to move 

the vehicle for the juvenile. Id.

Officer Agront testified that the juvenile appeared to be 

between thirteen (13) and fifteen (15) years old. (N.T. 7/29/15 

p. 17). Officer Agront stated that keys were in the vehicle and 

that he sent out a note to get in touch with the vehicle’s owner 

for it to be recovered. Id. Officer Agront testified that ten (10) 

to twelve (12) minutes had passed between the time he received 

the low jack hit and the time he found the vehicle. Id.

On cross-examination, Officer Agront testified that he 

prepared paperwork in preparation of the case but did not review 

it prior to his testimony. (N.T. 7/29/15 pp. 18-19). After 

Defense counsel presented Officer Agront with the 48-A, Officer 

Agront stated that [Appellant] was wearing gray flip-flops on the 

day in question. (N.T. 7/29/15 p. 19). He confirmed that it was 

cold outside as it was the middle of January and that [Appellant] 

was also wearing a jacket. Id. Officer Agront testified that 

[Appellant] lived at 544 East Ashmead Street but that he 

stopped him on Magnolia Street. (N.T. 7/29/15 p. 20).
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Officer Agront testified that when he first came in contact 

with [Appellant], [Appellant] was operating the car. (N.T. 

7/29/15 p. 20). Officer Agront stated that there was a juvenile 

passenger in the car. Id. Officer Agront explained that he did 

the paperwork for [Appellant] but did not do the paperwork for 

the juvenile, as other officers stopped the juvenile. Id. He did 

not know if paperwork was completed for the juvenile. (N.T. 

7/29/15 p. 21). Officer Agront stated that he only spoke to the 

[juvenile] to ask him if he knew [Appellant]. Id. He further 

stated that [Appellant] was cooperative during the investigation 

and that [Appellant] stated that he was helping the juvenile 

passenger move the car. Id.

On redirect examination, Officer Agront identified 

[Appellant] as the individual he saw driving the car on the date 

in question seated next to counsel. (N.T. 7/29/15 p. 22).

[Appellant] testified that on January 15, 2015 at 

approximately 10:15 p.m. he was at home at 544 East Ashmead 

Street, Philadelphia, PA where he has lived for eleven (11) years. 

(N.T. 7/29/15 p. 24). [Appellant] stated that he was getting 

ready for bed as he had to work in New Jersey at 8:30 a.m. the 

next day. Id. He explained that his bedroom is in the basement 

on the ground floor in the back of the house. Id. At this time, 

he stated that he heard a loud bang and thought that someone 

had hit the house. Id. [Appellant] explained that he lives at the 

end of a dead end driveway with only one way to get in and out 

and with little traffic, almost none. (N.T. 7/29/15 p. 24).

[Appellant] testified that he opened the door and saw 

headlights pointing towards his house, with the car trying to 

make a u-turn. (N.T. 7/29/15 p. 24). [Appellant] explained that 

it is too narrow to make a u-turn and that he was worried that 

his house would get hit again so he asked the driver if he needed 

assistance to back up. Id. The driver rolled [down the] window 

and agreed. Id. [Appellant] then backed the car down the 

driveway, which is about the length of a whole block, and when 

he got to the end police officers appeared and informed 

[Appellant] that the vehicle was stolen. Id.

[Appellant] testified that the car was inches away from his 

home when he first encountered it. (N.T. 7/29/15 p. 25). He 

stated that he was able to move the car about one city block. 

Id. [Appellant] further stated that when officers arrived, they 
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informed him the car was stolen and asked him to put his hands 

up and turn off the ignition. Id. [Appellant] testified that when 

he was operating the vehicle it had a key and he did not notice 

any damage to it. Id. When asked why he helped this juvenile, 

[Appellant] stated that he was worried that his house would get 

hit again. Id. He explained that the kitchen sits on stilts and 

hangs off the side of the home. (N.T. 7/29/15 p. 25). 

[Appellant] stated that the stilts keep the kitchen from sagging 

and the car was about to hit them. (N.T. 7/29/15 pp. 25-26).

Trial Court Opinion, 4/12/16, at 2-6.

Appellant was arrested and charged with theft, receiving stolen 

property, and unauthorized use of automobiles and other vehicles. On July 

29, 2015, at the conclusion of a nonjury trial, Appellant was convicted of 

unauthorized use of automobiles and other vehicles. At the conclusion of 

trial, the court immediately sentenced Appellant to serve a term of probation 

of twelve months. Appellant filed timely post-sentence motions, which the 

trial court denied on August 14, 2015. This timely appeal followed. Both 

Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

1. Was not the evidence insufficient as a matter of law to sustain 

a conviction for unauthorized use of an automobile where the 

Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that [A]ppellant knew, or 

should have known, that he did not have the owner’s permission 

to use the vehicle?

2. Was not the verdict so contrary to the weight of the evidence 

as to shock one’s sense of justice and should not a new trial be 

awarded?
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Appellant’s Brief at 4.1

Appellant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his 

conviction. Appellant’s Brief at 13-24. In essence, Appellant claims that the 

Commonwealth failed to prove that Appellant possessed the appropriate 

mens rea that he recklessly operated the vehicle without the rightful owner’s 

consent. Id. at 14-15.

We analyze arguments challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 

under the following parameters:

Our standard when reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether the evidence at trial, and all reasonable 

inferences derived therefrom, when viewed in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, are sufficient 

to establish all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 

doubt. We may not weigh the evidence or substitute our 

judgment for that of the fact-finder. Additionally, the evidence 

at trial need not preclude every possibility of innocence, and the 

fact-finder is free to resolve any doubts regarding a defendant’s 

guilt unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a 

matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the 

combined circumstances. When evaluating the credibility and 

weight of the evidence, the fact-finder is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence. For purposes of our review under these 

principles, we must review the entire record and consider all of 

the evidence introduced.

____________________________________________

1 We note the Commonwealth alleges that Appellant waived these issues on 

appeal due to an alleged failure to provide a complete record to this Court. 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 6. Specifically, the Commonwealth asserts that 

the certified record lacks a trial transcript. Id. However, we observe that a 

transcript of Appellant’s combined trial and sentencing, which took place on 

July 29, 2015, has been included in the certified record received from the 

trial court.
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Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 96 A.3d 1031, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Emler, 903 A.2d 1273, 1276-1277 (Pa. Super. 

2006)).

The crime of unauthorized use of an automobile is codified as follows:

§ 3928. Unauthorized use of automobiles and other 

vehicles

(a) Offense defined.-A person is guilty of a misdemeanor of 

the second degree if he operates the automobile, airplane, 

motorcycle, motorboat, or other motor-propelled vehicle of 

another without consent of the owner.

(b) Defense.-It is a defense to prosecution under this section 

that the actor reasonably believed that the owner would have 

consented to the operation had he known it.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3928. “A conviction for unauthorized use of a vehicle must be 

predicated on proof that the defendant operated the vehicle without the 

owner’s consent and that the defendant knew or had reason to know that he 

lacked the owner’s permission to operate the vehicle.” Commonwealth v. 

Carson, 592 A.2d 1318, 1321 (Pa. Super. 1991).

Our courts have held that whether a person is in actual physical 

control of a motor vehicle is determined based on the totality of the 

circumstances, including the location of the vehicle, whether the engine was 

running and whether there was other evidence indicating that the defendant 

had driven the vehicle at some point prior to the arrival of police on the 

scene. Commonwealth v. Wolen, 685 A.2d 1384, 1385 (Pa. 1996). With 

respect to the crime of unauthorized use of an automobile, the intent 
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element is more relaxed because the Commonwealth must only establish the 

defendant was reckless “with respect to the owner’s lack of consent to the 

[defendant’s] operation of the vehicle.” Commonwealth v. Dunlap, 505 

A.2d 255, 257 (Pa. Super. 1985). See Commonwealth v. Hogan, 468 

A.2d 493, 495-96 (Pa. Super. 1983) (finding recklessness as minimum 

standard for mens rea for crime of unauthorized use of automobiles and 

other vehicles).

Further, it is well-settled that:

a permissible inference of guilty knowledge may be drawn from 

the unexplained possession of recently stolen goods .... 

However, the mere possession of stolen property is insufficient 

to permit an inference of guilty knowledge; there must be 

additional evidence, circumstantial or direct, which would 

indicate that the defendant knew or had reason to know that the 

property was stolen.

Commonwealth v. Matthews, 632 A.2d 570, 572 (Pa. Super. 1993).

In addressing Appellant’s claim that the Commonwealth failed to 

present sufficient evidence to support his conviction, the trial court offered 

the following thorough analysis, which we adopt as our own:

In the instant matter, Officer Agront testified credibly that 

he observed [Appellant] driving a vehicle matching the license 

plate number of the reported stolen vehicle on 5200 Magnolia 

Street fifteen (15) to thirty (30) minutes after the reported theft. 

(N.T. 7/29/15 p. 13). [Appellant] testified that he operated the 

Dodge Ram pickup on Magnolia Street and the driveway behind 

his home. (N.T. 7/29/15 pp. 24-25, 27). The owner of the 

vehicle, Wayne White, testified that he last left his vehicle in the 

area of the 6700 block of North 18

th Street during his pizza 

delivery. (N.T. 7/29/15 p. 9). Mr. White also testified that he 

saw someone drive off in his truck on North 18th Street. (N.T. 

7/29/15 p. 9). Mr. White stated that he left the keys to the 
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truck inside the vehicle without locking the doors. (N.T. 7/29/15 

p. 10). Mr. White testified that he did not give anyone 

permission to drive or operate his motor vehicle on the day and 

time in question. (N.T. 7/29/15 p. 10).

[Appellant] admits to operating this stolen vehicle 

approximately thirty (30) minutes after it was initially stolen. 

(N.T. 7/29/15 p. 24). However, [Appellant] contends that he 

reasonably believed he had permission to operate the vehicle 

and that the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that he 

should have known that he did not have the owner’s permission 

to use the vehicle. (Statement of Errors Complained of on 

Appeal 11/12/15 para. 1).

This [c]ourt found that the Commonwealth provided ample 

circumstantial evidence to show that [Appellant] had reason to 

know that he lacked permission by the owner to operate the 

vehicle. Police Officer Agront testified that a thirteen (13) to 

fifteen (15) year-old juvenile was in the passenger seat of the 

stolen vehicle when stopped at approximately 10:30 p.m. (N.T. 

7/29/15 p. 17). The vehicle was described as a red Dodge Ram 

1500 with PA tag YTW-9042. (N.T. 7/29/15 p. 14). [Appellant] 

testified that a juvenile driving the stolen vehicle gave him 

permission to operate the Dodge Ram 1500 pickup truck. (N.T. 

7/29/15 p. 24). [Appellant’s] account of the incident and how 

he interfaced with the juvenile lacked credibility. (N.T. 7/29/15 

p. 30). [Appellant] described the juvenile as sixteen (16) or 

eighteen (18) years old. (N.T. 7/29/15 p. 27). [Appellant] did 

not include in his testimony that he believed the juvenile to be 

the owner of the vehicle but described the juvenile driver’s 

inability to turn the vehicle around and difficulty in maneuvering 

a Dodge Ram pickup in great detail. (N.T. 7/29/15 p. 24).

Under the totality of the circumstances, this [c]ourt found 

that evidence of the juvenile’s age and his inability to maneuver 

the large, freshly painted vehicle at 10:30 p.m. at night made it 

unlikely that [Appellant] could have reasonably believed that the 

juvenile was the owner. Accordingly, the evidence supports 

[Appellant’s] conviction for unauthorized use of automobiles and 

other vehicles and this [c]ourt finds his claim to be meritless.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/12/16, at 8-9.
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Indeed, our review of the certified record reflects that the 

Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s 

conviction of unauthorized use of an automobile or motor vehicle. N.T., 

7/29/15, at 8-23. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, the evidence presented by 

the owner of the vehicle and the arresting police officer was sufficient to 

prove that Appellant recklessly operated the vehicle in question without the 

consent of the owner. The evidence, while circumstantial, was also sufficient 

to prove that Appellant knew or had reason to know that his use of the 

vehicle was not authorized. Accordingly, Appellant’s claim lacks merit.

To the extent that Appellant presents an additional argument that the 

trial court erred in convicting Appellant because he was allegedly justified in 

operating the vehicle, Appellant’s Brief at 20-24, we agree with the 

Commonwealth that such claim is waived. Commonwealth’s Brief at 12-13. 

Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 302, issues that are 

not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first 

time on appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Moreover, we have long held that “[a] 

claim which has not been raised before the trial court cannot be raised for 

the first time on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Lopata, 754 A.2d 685, 689 

(Pa. Super. 2000). Even issues of constitutional dimension cannot be raised 

for the first time on appeal. Commonwealth v. Strunk, 953 A.2d 577, 579 

(Pa. Super. 2008). See Commonwealth v. Ryan, 909 A.2d 839, 845 (Pa. 
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Super. 2006) (noting that “[a] theory of error different from that presented 

to the trial jurist is waived on appeal, even if both theories support the same 

basic allegation of error which gives rise to the claim for relief.”). Thus, only 

claims properly presented in the trial court are preserved for appeal. In 

addition, it is an appellant’s obligation to demonstrate which appellate issues 

were preserved for review. Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c), 2119(e).

Furthermore, as the Commonwealth has observed in its appellate 

brief, Appellant failed to include in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement a claim 

that the trial court erred in ignoring his justification defense. 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 12. In Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 

309 (Pa. 1998), our Supreme Court held that if an appellant is directed to 

file a concise statement of matters to be raised on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), any issues not raised in that statement are waived. In 

Commonwealth v. Butler, 812 A.2d 631 (Pa. 2002), the Court further 

expanded the Lord holding, stating that waiver automatically applies when a 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement is not filed or if an issue is not included in the 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, even when the question of waiver has not 

been raised by the other party, and even when the trial court has chosen to 

overlook the failure by addressing the issues it assumed would be raised. 

We have thoroughly reviewed Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement and 

agree with the Commonwealth’s position that Appellant has failed to include 

the issue pertaining to his justification defense in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 
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statement. Hence, for this reason too, the issue is waived. Moreover, even 

if Appellant had included the issue in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, we 

have stated that “[a] party cannot rectify the failure to preserve an issue by 

proffering it in response to a [Pa.R.A.P.] 1925(b) order.” Commonwealth 

v. Kohan, 825 A.2d 702, 706 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations omitted).

Appellant next argues that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of 

the evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 25-27. Appellant asserts that the trial 

court abused its discretion in not granting his motion for a new trial on this 

basis because the conviction was based upon mere suspicion and conjecture. 

Id. at 26-27.

In Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049 (Pa. 2013), our Supreme 

Court set forth the following standards to be employed in addressing 

challenges to the weight of the evidence:

A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict 

is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the 

discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 

Pa. 308, 319, 744 A.2d 745, 751-[7]52 (2000); 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 538 Pa. 410, 435, 648 A.2d 1177, 

1189 (1994). A new trial should not be granted because of a 

mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same 

facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Widmer, 560 

A.2d at 319-[3]20, 744 A.2d at 752. Rather, “the role of the 

trial judge is to determine that ‘notwithstanding all the facts, 

certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them 

or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny 

justice.’” Id. at 320, 744 A.2d at 752 (citation omitted). It has 

often been stated that “a new trial should be awarded when the 

jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s 

sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so 

that right may be given another opportunity to prevail.” Brown, 

538 Pa. at 435, 648 A.2d at 1189.
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An appellate court’s standard of review when presented 

with a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard 

of review applied by the trial court:

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the 

exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question 

of whether the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence. Brown, 648 A.2d at 1189. Because the 

trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see 

the evidence presented, an appellate court will give 

the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons 

advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial 

court’s determination that the verdict is against the 

weight of the evidence. Commonwealth v. 

Farquharson, 467 Pa. 50, 354 A.2d 545 (Pa. 1976). 

One of the least assailable reasons for granting or 

denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction 

that the verdict was or was not against the weight of 

the evidence and that a new trial should be granted 

in the interest of justice.

Widmer, 560 Pa. at 321-[3]22, 744 A.2d at 753 (emphasis 

added).

This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by the 

trial court in granting or denying a motion for a new trial based 

on a challenge to the weight of the evidence is unfettered. In 

describing the limits of a trial court’s discretion, we have 

explained:

The term “discretion” imports the exercise of 

judgment, wisdom and skill so as to reach a 

dispassionate conclusion within the framework of the 

law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving 

effect to the will of the judge. Discretion must be 

exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed to 

prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary 

actions. Discretion is abused where the course 

pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, 

but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable 

or where the law is not applied or where the record 

shows that the action is a result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill-will.
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Widmer, 560 A.2d at 322, 744 A.2d at 753 (quoting Coker v. 

S.M. Flickinger Co., 533 Pa. 441, 447, 625 A.2d 1181, 1184-

[11]85 (1993)).

Clay, 64 A.3d at 1054-1055. “Thus, the trial court’s denial of a motion for a 

new trial based on a weight of the evidence claim is the least assailable of its 

rulings.” Commonwealth v. Diggs, 949 A.2d 873, 879-880 (Pa. 2008).

The trial court aptly addressed this issue as follows:

In the present case, the evidence that [Appellant] 

operated the motor vehicle without permission from the vehicle’s 

legitimate owner is uncontested. Both Officer Agront and 

[Appellant] testified that [Appellant] operated the vehicle. (N.T. 

7/29/15 pp. 15, 24-25). The vehicle owner, Wayne White, 

testified that he witnessed his car being stolen on North 18th

Street at approximately 9:30, 9:45 p.m. on January 15, 2015 

and did not give permission to [Appellant] nor anyone else to 

operate it. (N.T. 7/29/15 pp. 9-10).

[Appellant] concedes to operating the vehicle at 

approximately 10:15 p.m. or 10:30 p.m. in the area of the 5200 

block of Magnolia Street. (N.T. 7/29/15 p. 27). The rest of his 

claims were questionable, unproven, and uncorroborated. 

[Appellant] stated he heard a loud bang outside of his house 

before exiting his home and witnessing the juvenile struggling to 

operate the Dodge Ram pickup. (N.T. 7/29/15 p. 24). 

[Appellant] also testified that a juvenile driving the stolen vehicle 

gave him permission to operate the Dodge Ram 1500 pickup 

truck. (N.T. 7/29/15 p. 24). [Appellant] stated that the juvenile 

could have been sixteen (16) or eighteen (18) years old. (N.T. 

7/29/15 p. 27). [Appellant] further stated that he did not know 

the individual but chose to help him back out of the street 

behind his home to avoid the truck hitting his house again. 

(N.T. 7/29/15 pp. 24 -26). [Appellant] further stated that the

truck was inches from his house in the area that had 

construction stilts propping up a sagging wall. (N.T. 7/29/15 p. 

25).

This [c]ourt, sitting as fact-finder, found Officer Agront’s 

testimony that the juvenile passenger was thirteen (13) to 

fifteen (15) years old to be credible. The evidence presented 
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lends itself to the conclusion that a juvenile of the reported age 

by Officer Agront could in no way legally be the legitimate owner 

of the pickup truck. This incident occurred at roughly 10:30 

p.m. at night, a late hour. Moreover, [Appellant’s] own 

testimony that the juvenile was incapable of backing up or 

turning the motor vehicle around in the driveway, further 

supports that it was not reasonable to believe the juvenile was 

the legitimate owner of the truck.

The circumstantial evidence provided this [c]ourt with no 

evidentiary basis to find that [Appellant] could have reasonably 

believed that a juvenile struggling to operate a motor vehicle, at 

night, was the legitimate owner. Accordingly, this [c]ourt was 

unconvinced with [Appellant’s] argument that he reasonably 

believed the juvenile to be the owner of the vehicle–a result 

which does not at all shock one’s sense of justice.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/12/16, at 9-10.

Based upon our complete review of the record, we are compelled to 

agree with the trial court. Here, the trial court, sitting as the finder of fact, 

was free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence against Appellant. The 

trial judge weighed the evidence and concluded Appellant perpetrated the 

crime of unauthorized use of automobiles and other vehicles. We agree that 

this determination is not so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense 

of justice. We decline Appellant’s invitation to assume the role of fact-finder 

and to reweigh the evidence. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant relief on Appellant’s 

challenge to the weight of the evidence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judge Moulton joins the Memorandum.

Justice Fitzgerald concurs in the result.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/13/2017