[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio342.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-342

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF OHIO ET AL. v. OHIO REDISTRICTING 

COMMISSION ET AL. 

BENNETT ET AL. v. OHIO REDISTRICTING COMMISSION ET AL. 

OHIO ORGANIZING COLLABORATIVE ET AL. v. OHIO REDISTRICTING 

COMMISSION ET AL.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., 

Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-342.] 

Redistricting—Original actions under Ohio Constitution, Article XI—The Ohio 

Redistricting Commission’s revised plan violates Article XI, Sections 6(A) 

and 6(B) of the Ohio Constitution—Revised plan is invalid—The Ohio 

Redistricting Commission shall be reconstituted, convene, and adopt an 

entirely new plan in conformity with the Ohio Constitution. 

(Nos. 2021-1193, 2021-1198, and 2021-1210—Submitted February 1, 2022—

Decided February 7, 2022.) 

ORIGINAL ACTIONS filed pursuant to Ohio Constitution, Article XI, Section 9. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2

__________________ 

Per Curiam. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

{¶ 1} On January 12, 2022, this court held that the General Assembly–

district plan adopted by respondent Ohio Redistricting Commission in September 

2021 was invalid. League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., 

___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-65, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 2, 138. We held that 

petitioners1

 had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the commission had not 

attempted to draw a district plan that met the standard in Article XI, Section 6(A) 

of the Ohio Constitution—which requires that no plan be drawn primarily to favor 

a political party—or the proportionality standard in Article XI, Section 6(B)—

which requires that the statewide proportion of districts whose voters favor each 

political party correspond closely to the statewide preferences of the voters of 

Ohio. Id. at ¶ 2, 114, 131, 138. We ordered the commission to be reconstituted and 

to adopt a new plan in conformity with the standards set forth in Sections 6(A) and 

6(B) within ten days of our judgment. Id. at ¶ 137-139. We retained jurisdiction 

for the purpose of reviewing the new plan and authorized petitioners to file 

objections to the new plan within three days of the plan’s adoption. Id. at ¶ 139. 

{¶ 2} The commission adopted a plan on January 22. Petitioners timely 

objected, arguing that the plan does not meet the standards set forth in Sections 

6(A) and 6(B). Some of the petitioners also argue that the plan improperly splits 

municipalities and townships in violation of Article XI, Section 3(D)(3) and that 

1. Petitioners in case No. 2021-1193 are the League of Women Voters of Ohio, the A. Philip 

Randolph Institute of Ohio, and six individual voters: Tom Harry, Tracy Beavers, Valerie Lee, Iris 

Meltzer, Sherry Rose, and Bonnie Bishop. Petitioners in case No. 2021-1198 are ten individual 

voters: Bria Bennett, Regina C. Adams, Kathleen M. Brinkman, Martha Clark, Susanne L. Dyke, 

Carrie Kubicki, Meryl Neiman, Holly Oyster, Constance Rubin, and Everett Totty. Petitioners in 

case No. 2021-1210 are the Ohio Organizing Collaborative, the Ohio chapter of the Council on 

American-Islamic Relations, the Ohio Environmental Council, and six individual voters: Pierrette 

Talley, Samuel Gresham Jr., Ahmad Aboukar, Mikayla Lee, Prentiss Haney, and Crystal Bryant. 
January Term, 2022 

 3

the commission violated certain procedural requirements in Article XI, Section 

1(C). The commission timely responded to the objections. 

{¶ 3} We hold that petitioners have shown beyond a reasonable doubt that 

the plan adopted by the commission on January 22 violates Article XI, Sections 

6(A) and 6(B) of the Ohio Constitution. We do not reach the alleged violations of 

Article XI, Section 1(C) and Section 3(D)(3). As explained in more detail below, 

we again order the commission to be reconstituted and to adopt a new plan in 

conformity with the Ohio Constitution. 

II. BACKGROUND 

A. The commission reconvenes 

{¶ 4} On January 16, 2022—four days after we issued our decision 

invalidating the original district plan—the commission announced that it would 

reconvene on January 18. The commission’s announcement stated that individual 

commission members were instructing their respective staff members to “begin 

identifying possible areas to address the court’s ruling regarding Section 6 of the 

Ohio Constitution” and that commission members would “have access to other 

commission members’ relevant staff and contractors.” 

{¶ 5} On January 17, Ray DiRossi and Blake Springhetti, who worked for 

the Senate and House Republican Caucuses, respectively, and who were the map 

drawers for the commission’s original district plan, met with staffers for the Senate 

and House Democratic Caucuses and Chris Glassburn, a consultant retained by the 

Democratic legislative caucuses for map-drawing purposes. Among other things, 

they all seem to have agreed that they would use election data from all statewide 

federal and state partisan elections from 2016 to 2020.2

2. Article XI, Section 6(B)’s proportionality standard refers to “statewide state and federal partisan 

general election results during the last ten years.” Ohio Constitution, Article XI, Section 6(B); see 

also League of Women Voters of Ohio, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-65, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 105. In 

their objections, petitioners have not contested the commission’s use of statewide election results 

from 2016 to 2020 rather than from the entire ten-year period. 
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4

{¶ 6} During the January 18 commission meeting, Governor Mike DeWine 

administered the oath of office to a new commission member, House Minority 

Leader Allison Russo, who replaced Representative Emilia Sykes.3

 Some of the 

commission members expressed their understanding of the commission’s task in 

light of this court’s ruling. Yet the commission members did not engage in any 

map drawing or otherwise specifically explain how they intended to redraw the 

district plan. 

{¶ 7} After the meeting, staff representatives of each commission member 

met and agreed to continue meeting in the days ahead. At some point, the 

commission members decided to take a “regional” approach to the map-drawing 

process. On January 19, DiRossi and Springhetti began emailing other staff 

representatives possible changes to House and Senate districts in different regions 

of the state, requesting feedback. DiRossi and Springhetti started with proposed 

changes in Franklin and Hamilton Counties and later sent a proposal regarding 

Lorain County. On January 20, Glassburn replied with the “[D]emocratic 

responses” to the proposals for Franklin and Hamilton Counties.

B. The commission’s January 20 meeting

{¶ 8} The commission met again on January 20. Speaker of the House 

Robert Cupp, who cochaired the commission with Senator Vernon Sykes, said that 

staff for each of the commission members—both the legislative members and the 

statewide-officeholder members—had been working together but that the 

commission had not yet reached an agreement. House Speaker Cupp further said 

that “[w]e”—presumably referring to himself and President of the Senate Matthew 

Huffman or to Republican members of the commission—had proposals for 

Franklin and Hamilton Counties and their surrounding areas, which had been 

posted to the commission’s website. In an affidavit submitted to this court, Senator 

3. On January 12, the House Democratic Caucus elected Russo as the House Minority Leader, and 

on January 26, she was sworn into that office. 
January Term, 2022 

 5

Sykes stated that he was “caught off guard” by that statement because he did not 

know that the Republican commission members would be submitting their own 

county maps on the commission’s website before the commission had reached a 

consensus on how those districts would be drawn. Senator Sykes requested a 

recess. 

{¶ 9} House Speaker Cupp’s proposal included a map of the areas in and 

around Franklin and Hamilton Counties, the boundaries of the proposed districts in 

those areas, and the “index”—i.e., the partisan leaning—for each district. For 

example, under his proposal, Franklin and Union Counties would include 11 

Democratic-leaning House districts, 1 Republican-leaning House district, 4 

Democratic-leaning Senate districts, and 0 Republican-leaning Senate districts—

which was one fewer Republican-leaning House district and one fewer Republicanleaning Senate district than in the same territory under the commission’s original 

district plan. But some of the Democratic-leaning districts favored Democratic 

candidates by very slim margins, including a Senate district with a 50.08 

Democratic index and a House district with a 50.14 Democratic index. House 

Speaker Cupp’s proposal for Hamilton and Warren Counties included one fewer 

Republican-leaning House district than in the commission’s original district plan. 

But again, one House district had a 50.14 Democratic index. 

{¶ 10} After the recess, House Speaker Cupp gave a brief presentation of 

his proposal. He said that the maps were drawn to keep the districts compact and 

competitive and “to take a step towards the proportionality requirement of the 

Constitution, as explained by the Ohio Supreme Court.” Senator Sykes introduced 

Glassburn to present a “counter” on behalf of the Democratic members of the 

commission. Glassburn distributed his own maps for Franklin and Hamilton 

Counties—which by that point had also been posted on the commission’s 

website—and explained the similarities with and differences from the 

“Republicans’ proposal.” Significantly, he noted that in the Democratic proposal, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6

both Senate districts within Hamilton County leaned Democratic, while the 

Republican proposal included only one Democratic-leaning Senate district. 

Senator Sykes repeatedly said that reconfiguring those Hamilton County Senate 

districts would be a simple way for the commission to move toward proportionality. 

Glassburn also cautioned that if one political party had a disproportionate number 

of districts in which the party was favored by just over 50 percent, the “court’s 

concerns regarding the asymmetry of districts * * * will come into play.” 

{¶ 11} In response to a question from Auditor of State Keith Faber, 

Glassburn said it was “more than possible” to comply with Article XI, Sections 2, 

3, 4, 5, and 7 of the Ohio Constitution, to draw compact districts, and to “meet the 

ratio established by the court” under Section 6(B).4

 Auditor Faber noted that in 

League of Women Voters of Ohio, see __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-65, __ N.E.3d 

__, at ¶ 112, we had cited a proposed plan submitted by one of petitioners’ experts, 

Dr. Jonathan Rodden, that purportedly complied with all of Article XI’s 

requirements and was more proportional to statewide voter preferences than the 

plan originally adopted by the commission. But that plan, Auditor Faber said, “was 

not a 54 or 55 map” but a “57 or 58 map.” 

{¶ 12} After questioning Glassburn, Senator Sykes said that instead of

adjourning, the commission would recess “because our time is short and we want 

to make sure we provide adequate notice.” The commission therefore recessed 

until 9:30 a.m. the following day, Friday, January 21. The commission, however, 

did not meet on January 21. 

4. In League of Women Voters of Ohio, we found that votes cast in statewide elections over the 

relevant period showed that “about 54 percent of Ohio voters preferred Republican candidates and 

about 46 percent of Ohio voters preferred Democratic candidates. Accordingly, under Section 6(B), 

the commission is required to attempt to draw a plan in which the statewide proportion of 

Republican-leaning districts to Democratic-leaning districts closely corresponds to those 

percentages.” __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-65, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 108. 
January Term, 2022 

 7

{¶ 13} Throughout the January 20 meeting, commission members noted 

that their staffs had been working together to comply with this court’s order. 

Senator Sykes stated: “This is the first time I believe in the history of the state that 

Republican and Democrat staff have been working together on maps. It’s a 

herculean task, but I think we’re up to trying to make sure we comply with the court 

order * * *.” But Senator Sykes’s optimism did not last long. In affidavits filed in 

this litigation, he and House Minority Leader Russo averred that the Republican 

commission members and/or their staffs ultimately would not commit to the goal 

of drawing a proportional plan and refused to collaborate with them or consider 

their suggestions to make the plan more proportional. 

C. Petitioners submit a proposed plan and the commission releases more 

regional maps

{¶ 14} On January 20, counsel for the petitioners in Bennett v. Ohio 

Redistricting Comm. (Supreme Court case No. 2021-1198) submitted to the 

commission a revised version of a proposed General Assembly–district plan drafted 

by Dr. Rodden (the “Rodden II plan”).5

{¶ 15} On January 21, the commission posted a proposal for Lorain County 

to its website. In comparison to the commission’s original plan, the proposal 

changed one Republican-leaning House district and one Republican-leaning Senate 

district to Democratic-leaning districts. The proposal included a House district with 

5. In October 2021, the Bennett petitioners submitted an expert report from Dr. Rodden in which

he claimed that he had drafted a district plan that complied with Article XI’s line-drawing 

requirements and was more proportional than the commission’s original plan. In their merit briefs, 

respondents did not contest Dr. Rodden’s assertion, and in League of Women Voters of Ohio, __ 

Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-65, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 126, we noted that Dr. Rodden’s district plan 

“complied with Article XI” and resulted in a partisan split favoring Republican candidates by 57 

percent to 43 percent in the House and 55 percent to 45 percent in the Senate. Dr. Rodden, however, 

later discovered that his plan included splits that are impermissible under Article XI, Section 3 of 

the Ohio Constitution, and he therefore submitted a revised version during the commission’s 

redrawing process. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8

a Democratic index of only 50.003 and a Senate district with a Democratic index 

of 50.030. 

{¶ 16} Also on January 21, DiRossi sent to staff representatives a proposal 

for changes to Cuyahoga and Summit Counties and again asked for feedback. That 

proposal was posted to the commission’s website on January 22. Compared to the 

commission’s original plan, the proposal changed two Republican-leaning House 

districts and one Republican-leaning Senate district to Democratic-leaning districts. 

Under this proposal, six of the region’s Democratic-leaning House districts had 

indexes between 50 and 51 percent. 

{¶ 17} Early on January 22—the tenth day after this court’s decision 

invalidating the original plan—DiRossi and Glassburn each distributed their final 

proposed General Assembly–district plans to staff representatives for the 

commission members. 

D. The commission adopts a district plan on January 22

{¶ 18} In the afternoon of January 22, the commission resumed the meeting 

it had commenced on January 20. House Speaker Cupp said that he and Senator 

Sykes had agreed that the respective map drawers for the “Republicans” and the 

“Democrats” would each present their proposed district plans to the commission 

and that the commission members could discuss the proposals after the 

presentations. 

{¶ 19} During DiRossi and Springhetti’s presentation, Springhetti noted that 

they had been instructed to use the “base map”—i.e., the plan that we had invalidated 

in League of Women Voters of Ohio—as a “starting point” because it was familiar to 

them and complied with Article XI, Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7. DiRossi said that he 

had been “actively engaged daily and around the clock with the staff of all seven 

members of the Commission,” and he explained how DiRossi and Springhetti had 

incrementally proposed changes regarding urban areas of the state to comply with 

this court’s order. In total, they had changed five House districts in the commission’s 
January Term, 2022 

 9

original plan from Republican-leaning to Democratic-leaning and had changed three 

Senate districts from Republican-leaning to Democratic-leaning. Their proposal had 

57 Republican-leaning and 42 Democratic-leaning House districts and 20 

Republican-leaning and 13 Democratic-leaning Senate districts. DiRossi said that 

they could not devise a plan containing fewer than 57 Republican-leaning House 

districts without otherwise violating another section of Article XI. 

{¶ 20} House Minority Leader Russo noted that under DiRossi and 

Springhetti’s proposal, 14 of the 42 Democratic-leaning House districts had a 

Democratic index between 50 and 52 percent but none of the Republican-leaning 

House districts had an index between 50 and 52 percent. That result, she noted, 

appeared to evince “an intentional approach to drive as many of those close to 50 

to technically say that you have created a Democratic leaning district without 

actually in good faith creating as many Democratic leaning districts that are 

possible” under the Constitution’s proportionality standard. In response to those 

comments, DiRossi explained the process for changing a district from Republicanleaning to Democratic-leaning and noted, “[W]hether we ended at 49.2, or 49.8, or 

49.9, or 48.2, when you finally get over the hurdle to go under 50, and everything 

else balances, and everything else matches, I would move on to another district.” 

{¶ 21} Senator Sykes repeatedly asked DiRossi and Springhetti to identify 

what prevented them from achieving a more proportional plan and from changing 

the Senate pairings in Hamilton County to create another Democratic-leaning 

Senate district in that county—as he had previously recommended. In varying 

ways, DiRossi and Springhetti responded that they had attempted to comply with 

this court’s order and that any alternative proposals coming closer to providing 

perfect proportionality contained constitutional defects. But they did not 

specifically explain what prevented them from reconfiguring the Hamilton County 

Senate districts. When Senator Sykes pressed DiRossi and Springhetti about the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

10 

Hamilton County districts, House Speaker Cupp cut off the questioning and said 

that DiRossi and Springhetti had responded in the best way they could. 

{¶ 22} Glassburn claimed during his presentation that his proposal met the 

proportionality standard in Article XI, Section 6(B) and that it complied with 

Article XI’s other requirements. Senate President Huffman, however, identified 

what he considered to be constitutional defects in Glassburn’s plan, including 

possible violations of Article XI, Section 3(D)(3), Section 5, and Section 6(C). 

{¶ 23} Auditor Faber expressed concerns about not having received a 

proposal from the Democratic members until the day of the commission’s deadline 

and said, “It appeared to many of us that because we wouldn’t say that we 

absolutely were going to do a 45-54 map, that somebody took their ball and went 

home.” Auditor Faber also expressed concerns about intentionally placing 

Republican voters in Democratic-leaning districts to “hit some superficial ratio.” 

In his words, Glassburn’s proposal was “effectively taking districts and 

gerrymandering them to hit some Democratic ratio.” Later in the meeting, Auditor 

Faber explained why he believed “this arbitrary percentage * * * is a little bit 

suspect.” And he again noted that Dr. Rodden had had 57 Republican-leaning 

House districts in his original plan and that we had cited that plan in League of 

Women Voters of Ohio; therefore, according to Auditor Faber, this court had 

already indicated that a plan with 57 Republican-leaning House districts would be 

constitutional.6

{¶ 24} After the commission members had finished questioning Glassburn, 

Senator Sykes said that it was never his or House Minority Leader Russo’s 

“intention to produce a map because we were directed by the court for the 

6. In actuality, we cited the Rodden plan as an example of a plan that met Article XI’s line-drawing 

requirements and was more proportional than the original plan; we did not state that a plan 

potentially providing any specific number of House seats for a particular political party would pass 

constitutional muster. League of Women Voters of Ohio, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-65, __ 

N.E.3d __, at ¶ 126, 130-131. 
January Term, 2022 

 11 

commission to produce a map, not to have the Democratic map and a Republican 

map.” He had recommended the “regional” approach to the map-drawing process, 

he said, because the commission members could not initially agree on which plan 

to use as a starting point. He also said that he had been informed only a day or two 

before the January 22 meeting that other commission members or their staff 

believed that Article XI, Section 6(B)’s proportionality requirement could not be 

met. Therefore, he—and presumably House Minority Leader Russo—had asked 

Glassburn to put together a district plan to show that by employing a different 

strategy, the commission could adopt a map that meets Section 6(B)’s 

proportionality standard. 

{¶ 25} After a recess, the commission voted five to two, along party lines, 

to adopt DiRossi and Springhetti’s proposal as the final General Assembly–district 

plan. Because the majority vote adopting the plan did not have the level of 

bipartisan support required by Article XI, Section 8(B) of the Ohio Constitution for 

the plan to remain in effect for ten years, the plan can remain in effect for no more 

than four years. Ohio Constitution, Article XI, Section 8(C)(1)(a). 

{¶ 26} The Article XI, Section 8(C)(2) statement adopted by the five 

commission members who voted for the revised plan said that neither the Ohio 

Constitution nor this court’s decision in League of Women Voters of Ohio required 

the commission to adopt a plan that achieves strict proportionality.7

 The statement 

indicated that the commission was required to attempt to draw a plan that closely 

corresponds to statewide voter preferences and that the commission had met that 

standard. The statement also indicated that the revised plan was the only submitted 

7. As noted in League of Women Voters of Ohio, if the commission adopts a four-year plan, the 

plan must include a statement explaining how the commission complied with Article XI, Section 

6(B)—that is, explaining what the commission determined to be the statewide preferences of Ohio 

voters and how the commission’s plan corresponds to those preferences. __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-

Ohio-62, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 8, 25. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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plan that fully complied with Article XI, Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 and with all 

subsections of Section 6. 

{¶ 27} Senator Sykes and House Minority Leader Russo submitted a 

separate statement. Among other things, they indicated that the commission had 

failed to comply with Section 6 as interpreted by this court and that it is not 

impossible to draw a proportional map that is compliant with the Constitution’s 

line-drawing requirements. They also cited Republican commission members’ 

failures to properly instruct their staff to comply with the proportionality 

requirement, and they stated that the Republican members did not consider 

proposed maps submitted by the public and rejected their offers to work together 

on the plan. They stated, “It is possible to meet the Court’s order; it just appears 

that the majority of Commissioners do not want to.” 

E. Petitioners file objections

{¶ 28} On January 25, petitioners filed objections to the commission’s

revised plan. The petitioners in all three cases argue that the revised plan violates 

Article XI, Sections 6(A) and 6(B). The Bennett petitioners argue that the revised 

plan also violates Article XI, Section 1(C) and Section 3(D)(3). With their 

objections, petitioners have collectively submitted five new expert reports. On 

January 28, the commission filed a response to the objections, which included a 

new affidavit from DiRossi. Senator Sykes and House Minority Leader Russo filed 

a separate pro se response to the objections, which included affidavits from Senator 

Sykes, House Minority Leader Russo, and Glassburn. 

III. ANALYSIS 

A. The burden and standard of proof 

{¶ 29} As we explained in League of Women Voters of Ohio, we have 

generally treated apportionment plans as presumptively constitutional. __ Ohio 

St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-65, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 76. Petitioners therefore have the 

burden of proving that the revised plan violates the Constitution. Id. at ¶ 76-77. 
January Term, 2022 

 13 

They must prove factual issues beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Yet, the 

presumption and high burden of proof do not require us to defer to the 

commission’s interpretation of Article XI. 

B. Article XI, Section 6(A) 

1. Our prior decision 

{¶ 30} Article XI, Section 6(A) of the Ohio Constitution provides that the 

commission must attempt to meet the standard that “[n]o general assembly district 

plan shall be drawn primarily to favor or disfavor a political party.” Thus, Section 

6(A) “requires this court to discern the map drawers’ intent.” League of Women 

Voters of Ohio at ¶ 116. In our prior decision, we recognized that “direct or 

circumstantial evidence may establish that a districting plan was drawn primarily 

to favor one political party over another.” Id. at ¶ 117. 

{¶ 31} “A map-drawing process may support an inference of predominant 

partisan intent.” Id. at ¶ 118. In finding that the predominant intent in drafting the 

original plan was to favor Republicans, we noted that Senate President Huffman 

and House Speaker Cupp had “controlled the process of drawing the maps that the 

commission ultimately adopted.” Id. We observed that “[w]hen a single party 

exclusively controls the redistricting process, ‘it should not be difficult to prove 

that the likely political consequences of the reapportionment were intended.’ ” Id.

at ¶ 120, quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 129, 106 S.Ct. 2797, 92 L.Ed.2d 

85 (1986) (plurality opinion), abrogated on other grounds by Rucho v. Common 

Cause, __ U.S. __, 139 S.Ct. 2484, 204 L.Ed.2d 931 (2019). 

{¶ 32} We also examined expert evidence—including reports from Dr. 

Michael Latner, Dr. Kosuke Imai, and Dr. Rodden—to determine whether the 

original plan’s partisan skew could be “explained solely by nondiscriminatory 

factors.” Id., __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-65, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 121. Dr. Latner 

opined that the original plan displayed partisan asymmetry caused by deliberate 

choices to create safe seats for Republican candidates. Id. at ¶ 122-123. Dr. Imai 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

14 

concluded that the original plan was more favorable to Republicans than any of his 

5,000 simulated plans. Id. at ¶ 124. And Dr. Rodden purported to have drawn an 

Article XI–compliant plan that favored the Republican Party in 57 percent of House 

districts and 55 percent of Senate districts.8 Id. at ¶ 126. 

{¶ 33} Based on this evidence, we held that the extreme partisan skew of 

the original plan was not due to Ohio’s political geography but, rather, to the 

commission’s carrying out its intent to favor the Republican Party at the expense 

of the Democratic Party. Id. at ¶ 131. 

2. The commission violated Section 6(A)

{¶ 34} Article XI, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution requires the 

“commission” to draft a district plan. Although the Republican and Democratic 

commission members were somewhat more cooperative in the development of the 

revised plan, as noted above, Senator Sykes’s optimism about collaboration proved 

short-lived. DiRossi and Springhetti still ultimately drafted the plan, and they 

answered only to Senate President Huffman and House Speaker Cupp. As before, 

“the commission itself did not engage in any map drawing or hire independent staff 

to do so,” League of Women Voters of Ohio at ¶ 119. 

{¶ 35} Moreover, in League of Women Voters of Ohio, we noted the 

distinction between Section 9(B), which “contemplates that this court may declare 

a plan invalid and order the commission to adopt an entirely new plan,” and Section 

9(D)(3), under which this court does “not have to declare a plan entirely invalid if 

violations of Section 2, 3, 4, 5 or 7 are isolated or would require amendments 

regarding relatively few districts.” (Emphasis added.) __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-

Ohio-65, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 96. We made clear that we were invalidating the 

original plan, in its entirety, under Section 9(B). 

8. After this court’s judgment, petitioners acknowledged that the plan Dr. Rodden previously 

submitted did not comply with all of Article XI’s requirements. Dr. Rodden submitted the Rodden 

II plan, in which he purported to correct the violations.
January Term, 2022 

 15 

{¶ 36} Yet the commission did not adopt an entirely new plan. DiRossi and 

Springhetti started with the same plan that we invalidated and then merely adjusted 

certain districts just enough so that they could nominally be reclassified as 

“Democratic-leaning.” As DiRossi testified before the commission, when he 

finally got “over the hurdle to go under 50 [percent of Republican vote share in a 

district],” he “would move on to another district.” At the same hearing, DiRossi 

was asked why the plan contained many districts with a Democratic vote share 

between 50 and 52 percent but contained zero districts with a Republican vote share 

of less than 52 percent. The questioner asserted, “So effectively, you know, you 

are creating districts with less opportunity for clearly perhaps Democrats to sit into 

those seats,” and then she asked why those decisions had been made. DiRossi 

responded: 

[I]f you’re asking if we were identifying collectively as a staff a 

district that might favor Republican by 53 percent and trying to 

make it a Democrat-leaning seat, yes is moving to the other side of 

the ledger, so I think that’s why there is an absence of those seats on 

the Republican side because they were identified by the staff, they 

were—they were modified to make Democrat-leaning and so that’s 

why they’re not there anymore. 

{¶ 37} It is clear that the map drawers and the commission knew that their 

approach—starting with the invalidated map and switching competitive 

Republican-leaning districts to competitive Democratic-leaning districts—would 

have the dual effect of eliminating weak Republican districts and creating weak 

Democratic districts. The commission nevertheless adopted the revised map using 

that process—on a party-line vote. This was not the process that our decision 

contemplates, and the commission’s awareness of the partisan effects supports an 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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“inference of predominant partisan intent” similar to the one we found with respect 

to the original plan, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-65, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 118. 

{¶ 38} We find unavailing the claim that the map makers started with the 

original plan because time was short and they were familiar with it. We clearly 

invalidated the entire original plan in League of Women Voters of Ohio. The 

commission’s choice to nevertheless start with that plan and change it as little as 

possible is tantamount to an intent to preserve as much partisan favoritism as could 

be salvaged from the invalidated plan. 

{¶ 39} It is also clear that the commission rejected, without explanation, 

easy and obvious changes that would have made the revised map more proportional. 

Senator Sykes proposed to swap the Senate districts to which House districts 26 

and 30—both in Hamilton County—are assigned, which would have created an 

additional Democratic-leaning Senate district. This simple swap would have posed 

no other constitutional problems and would have resulted in Senate districts that 

are at least as compact as those in the revised plan. Yet the commission refused to 

adopt the change, with House Speaker Cupp abruptly and inexplicably cutting off 

Senator Sykes’s questioning of DiRossi and Springhetti about the proposal. The 

commission’s choice to avoid a more proportional plan for no explicable reason 

points unavoidably toward an intent to favor the Republican Party. In reaching this 

conclusion, we are not unmindful of the fact that 20 is the number of senators 

necessary to constitute a veto-proof supermajority in the Senate, see Ohio 

Constitution, Article II, Section 16 (a vote of 60 percent of the members of each 

chamber is required to override the governor’s veto). 

{¶ 40} Article XI, Section 6(B) provides that the commission shall attempt 

to draft a plan in which “[t]he statewide proportion of districts whose voters * * * 

favor each political party shall correspond closely to the statewide preferences of 

the voters of Ohio.” (Emphasis added.) Yet the commission knowingly adopted a 

plan in which all the House districts whose voters favor Republicans do so at vote 
January Term, 2022 

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shares of 52.6 percent and above, while more than a quarter (12 out of 42) of the 

House districts whose voters “favor” Democrats do so at a vote share between 50 

and 51 percent (meaning that a 1 percent swell in Republican vote share would 

sweep 12 additional districts into the Republican column). Nine of those districts 

favor Democrats at a level under 50.5 percent. While the Constitution does not 

require exact parity in terms of the vote share of each district, the commission’s 

adoption of a plan in which the quality of partisan favoritism is monolithically 

disparate is further evidence of a Section 6(A) violation. In other words, in a plan 

in which every toss-up district is a “Democratic district,” the commission has not 

applied the term “favor” as used in Section 6(B) equally to the two parties. The 

commission’s adoption of a plan that absurdly labels what are by any definition 

“competitive” or “toss-up” districts as “Democratic-leaning”—at least when the 

plan contains no proportional share of similar “Republican-leaning” districts—is 

demonstrative of an intent to favor the Republican Party. Indeed, if a Republican 

candidate were to win in half of the 12 House districts in which the Democratic 

vote share is between 50 and 51 percent, the Republican Party could expect to have 

a 63 to 36 majority in the House. This is an even larger Republican majority than 

the one contemplated in the September 2021 plan that we invalidated. See League 

of Women Voters of Ohio, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-65, __ N.E.3d __ at ¶ 24 

(noting that Senate President Huffman estimated that 62 seats in the House would 

favor Republican candidates). Regardless, the revised plan’s structure guarantees 

that the 58 percent seat share for Republicans is a floor whereas the 42 percent seat 

share for Democrats is a ceiling. 

{¶ 41} In League of Women Voters of Ohio, we also relied on statistical 

evidence—including a partisan-symmetry analysis and a determination that the 

original plan was a partisan outlier compared to Dr. Imai’s 5,000 simulated plans—

to support our finding of a violation of Article XI, Section 6(A). Id. at ¶ 122-126. 

As support for that finding of primarily partisan intent, we also cited evidence that 
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the original plan had a heavier partisan skew than would be dictated merely by 

Ohio’s political geography and the neutral map-drawing requirements of Article 

XI, Sections 3 and 4. Id. at ¶ 131. 

{¶ 42} As in the original plan that this court invalidated, there is evidence 

that the revised plan has a high degree of partisan asymmetry: Dr. Latner’s analysis 

indicates that with 50 percent of the statewide vote, Democrats would expect to win 

43 percent of the House seats and 42 percent of the Senate seats. By contrast, the 

Republicans would win 57 percent of the House seats and 58 percent of the Senate 

seats with the same percentage of the statewide vote. Dr. Latner concludes that 

“the asymmetry in both the revised House and Senate maps is only a marginal 

improvement from the Original Plan and lags far behind all other comparison 

plans.” He further opined that “the Commission intentionally created a large 

number of highly competitive but Democratic-leaning districts, while keeping more 

Republican voters in safer districts. That decision is a major source of the observed 

asymmetry.” 

{¶ 43} There is also evidence that the revised plan is a statistical outlier in 

terms of Republican seat share (more than five standard deviations greater) and in 

terms of various accepted metrics in political science for measuring partisan bias 

(ranging between six and nine standard deviations), as compared with Dr. Imai’s 

5,000 simulated plans. As we said in League of Women Voters of Ohio, “[t]he fact 

that the adopted plan is an outlier among 5,000 simulated plans is strong evidence 

that the plan’s result was by design.” __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-65, __ N.E.3d 

__, at ¶ 124. We again find petitioners’ statistical evidence to be compelling. 

{¶ 44} As in the original plan that this court invalidated, there is also 

evidence that it was possible for the commission—had it committed to attempting 

a proportional map, worked collaboratively toward that end, and used its allotted 

time efficiently—to draw a map that achieved or closely achieved the 54 to 46 

percent partisan share that we identified in League of Women Voters of Ohio. The 
January Term, 2022 

 19 

record indicates that the commission did not reconvene until January 18—six days 

after our ruling ordering the commission to draft a new plan within ten days—and 

did not hold a substantive meeting until January 20, forcing the process to be 

rushed. While DiRossi and Springhetti, who worked for Republican commission 

members, and Glassburn, who worked for Democratic commission members, 

nominally met with commission members and their staffs, DiRossi and Springhetti 

still prepared a statewide map about which Senator Sykes was “in the dark,” about 

which House Minority Leader Russo had “little clue,” and that was introduced and 

later adopted on the same day. 

{¶ 45} In League of Women Voters of Ohio, we further found the existence 

of an alternative, more proportional plan to be probative evidence that the 

commission had drawn the original plan primarily to favor the Republican Party. 

Id. at ¶ 126. Petitioners focus on the Rodden II plan, which they claim is less 

skewed than the revised plan. The commission asserts that the Rodden II plan 

contains violations of Article XI, Section 3(D)(3) that “affect thousands of people 

and would require substantial redrawing.” The commission, however, relies on 

DiRossi’s opinion, which at this point we do not view as an objective measure of 

the validity or constitutionality of the various plans. 

{¶ 46} Regardless, Glassburn has also prepared a map that he avers is both 

proportional and otherwise constitutional. Glassburn submitted an initial version 

of his map to the commission on its final day. Commission members identified 

potential constitutional violations in that map, which Glassburn avers he could have 

addressed if given several hours. The commission did not permit him to do so. The 

commission also rejected his offers to work to add additional Democratic seats to 

the revised plan, citing time pressure (which, of course, the commission itself had 

created). Glassburn avers that he later corrected the errors in his map and that he 

now has a map that addresses the issues the commission raised with his original 
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map and is proportional, containing 54 Republican House seats, 45 Democratic 

House seats, 18 Republican Senate seats, and 15 Democratic Senate seats. 

{¶ 47} Despite its unwillingness to work toward fixing Glassburn’s more 

proportional plan, the commission concedes that its revised plan also contains “a 

few minor violations of Section 3(D)(3).” We find the evidence regarding 

alternative plans to be just as persuasive here as the original Rodden plan was in 

League of Women Voters of Ohio. 

{¶ 48} The decennial reapportionment of seats in the General Assembly is 

a weighty and important task, which the people of Ohio, by their overwhelming 

approval in 2015 of amendments to Article XI of the Ohio Constitution, entrusted 

to a special body of limited duration and singular purpose: the Ohio Redistricting 

Commission. See Article XI, Section 1(A). The commission is composed, in part, 

of three of the state’s highest executive officeholders. Id. Their duties as 

commission members, however, do not overlap with their roles as governor, 

secretary of state, or auditor. Id.; see generally Article XI. Rather, the Constitution 

taps these high officeholders to help usher Ohio through its redistricting because 

they can be counted on as reliable stewards of the public trust. The commission’s 

remaining members are persons appointed by the Speaker of the House of 

Representatives, the House Minority Leader, the President of the Senate, and the 

Senate Minority Leader. Article XI, Section 1(A). The Constitution does not 

require these officeholders to appoint themselves to the commission—although that 

is what most of them have chosen to do in this case. In fact, it does not require the 

persons they appoint to be members of the legislature. Id. But whichever persons 

are appointed, the commission members are all public servants, regardless of their 

roles outside the commission, and they are entrusted with the solemn duty to draw 

a district plan that complies with the requirements of Article XI. They are charged 

with drawing a plan that inures to the benefit of not just one political party, not just 

one constituency, but of Ohio as a whole. Members of the legislature selected to 
January Term, 2022 

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serve on the commission must be, in good faith, commission members first, setting 

aside their usual partisan modes. Section 6(A) directly prohibits actions in conflict 

with this principle. 

{¶ 49} We hold that the evidence discussed above demonstrates beyond a

reasonable doubt that in drawing the revised plan, the commission failed to comply 

with Article XI, Section 6(A) of the Ohio Constitution. As explained in more detail 

below, we invalidate the entire revised plan and order the commission to draft an 

entirely new plan—this time in accordance with all of Article XI, including Section 

6(A), as explained above. 

C. Article XI, Section 6(B) 

1. Our prior decision 

{¶ 50} Article XI, Section 6(B) of the Ohio Constitution provides that the 

commission shall “attempt” to draw a district plan that meets the following 

standard: “The statewide proportion of districts whose voters, based on statewide 

state and federal partisan general election results during the last ten years, favor 

each political party shall correspond closely to the statewide preferences of the 

voters of Ohio.” In League of Women Voters of Ohio, we explained that the 

qualifying word “attempt” does not mean that the Section 6(B) standard is merely 

aspirational. League of Women Voters of Ohio, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-65, 

__ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 90. Indeed, “there might be circumstances that make it 

impossible for the commission to meet the standards of Section 6 while also 

following the map-drawing requirements of Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7.” Id. at ¶ 88. 

But “[i]f it is possible for a district plan to comply with Section 6 and Sections 2, 

3, 4, 5, and 7, the commission must adopt a plan that does so.” (Emphasis sic and 

footnote omitted.) Id. 

{¶ 51} As we explained in League of Women Voters of Ohio, Article XI, 

Section 6(B) “requires the calculation—and then the comparison—of two things.” 

Id. at ¶ 105. The commission first must calculate “the statewide proportion of 
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districts whose voters favor each political party,” which requires the commission 

to “examin[e] the statewide federal and state partisan election results from the 

previous ten years” to “determine how voters in the proposed districts are likely to 

vote in future elections.” Id. It then must calculate “the statewide preferences of 

the voters of Ohio,” id. at ¶ 106, which requires the commission to total “the votes 

cast in statewide partisan elections and [calculate] the percentages of votes received 

by candidates of each political party,” id. at ¶ 107. Under this methodology, there 

is no dispute that “about 54 percent of Ohio voters preferred Republican candidates 

and about 46 percent of Ohio voters preferred Democratic candidates” in the 

relevant past elections. Id. at ¶ 108. 

{¶ 52} We concluded that Senate President Huffman and House Speaker 

Cupp never instructed the map drawers, DiRossi and Springhetti, to attempt to 

comply with Article XI, Section 6. Id. at ¶ 109. We also determined that Senate 

President Huffman and House Speaker Cupp—as reflected in the commission’s 

statement explaining its determinations pursuant to Section 8(C)(2)—had an 

incorrect understanding of the proper methodology, because they asserted that the 

share of Ohio voters preferring Republican candidates was somewhere between 54 

and 81 percent. Id. at ¶ 106-108. These two facts led us to conclude that the 

original plan failed to comply with Section 6(B) because “the individuals who drew 

the plan did not try to comply with” the standard of that section and because they 

“did not have the right target in mind.” Id. at ¶ 102. 

{¶ 53} We also pointed out that the majority-party members’ negotiation 

with the minority-party members—or even that party’s acquiescence to a plan—

does not necessarily indicate that the commission attempted to draw a plan that 

meets the Section 6(B) standard. Id., __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-65, __ N.E.3d 

__, at ¶ 110-111. 

{¶ 54} Finally, we relied on substantial expert evidence showing that “the 

commission could have drawn a more proportional plan.” Id. at ¶ 112. This 
January Term, 2022 

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evidence included the reports of Dr. Imai, who had created 5,000 simulated plans, 

none of which favored a party as strongly as the plan that had been adopted by the 

commission, and Dr. Rodden, who had purported to have drawn an Article XI–

compliant plan that was more proportional than the plan that had been adopted by 

the commission. Id. This evidence, we explained, “further support[ed] the 

conclusion that the commission did not attempt to meet the standard set forth in 

Section 6(B).” Id. at ¶ 113. 

2. The commission violated Section 6(B) 

{¶ 55} Petitioners argue that like the invalidated plan, the revised plan 

violates Article XI, Section 6(B) because it does not “closely correspond[] with 

statewide voter preferences.” We agree. 

{¶ 56} Petitioners have presented a new report by their expert, Dr. Imai, 

who opines that the commission’s methodology for assessing the revised plan’s seat 

share grossly overestimates the number of Democratic-leaning seats. Dr. Imai 

points out that under the commission’s method, two hypothetical districts having 

Republican vote shares of 49.9 percent and 50.1 percent would be classified as 

Democratic-leaning and Republican-leaning respectively, yet because their 

Republican vote shares differ by only .2 percentage points, their partisan leans are 

essentially the same. Both are truly “toss-up” districts. Yet the commission’s 

methodology would count the first as a Democratic district and the second as a 

Republican one. 

{¶ 57} Dr. Imai then demonstrates that the commission’s revised plan 

contains 12 House districts in which the Democratic vote share is between 50 and 

51 percent—nine of which have Democratic vote shares between 50 and 50.5 

percent. The commission calls them all Democratic-leaning districts. Yet, Dr. Imai 

points out that the revised plan contains no House districts within one percent above

a 50 percent Republican vote share—i.e., no similarly close districts that are labeled 

Republican-leaning. The closest Republican-leaning House district in the revised 
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24 

plan has a Republican vote share of 52.6 percent. The following plot from Dr. 

Imai’s report shows the disparity in the number of extremely close toss-up House 

districts assigned to each party: 

The blue dots running in a line nearly parallel to the 50-percent line represent the 

dozen toss-up “Democratic-leaning” House districts that have been identified by 

Dr. Imai. This plot also visually demonstrates Dr. Imai’s conclusion that “a shift 

in election results by just one percentage point towards the Republicans could lead 

to as many as 12 more Republican-won seats.” Dr. Imai opines, “By counting what 

are really toss-up districts as ‘Democratic-leaning’ in this way, the Commission’s 

methodology grossly overestimates the number of Democratic-leaning districts 

under the revised plan.” 

{¶ 58} Dr. Imai sets forth a different methodology that he claims provides 

a superior measure of a district’s partisan lean. That methodology, which was also 

used in his initial report, looks at whether a Republican or Democrat would have 

won the district based on the data from each election out of the nine statewide 

elections between 2016 and 2020, the same election years used by the commission. 
January Term, 2022 

 25 

It then labels each seat fractionally—for example, Dr. Imai calculates that House 

district 52, which the commission calls “Democratic-leaning,” would have been 

won by Republicans in four out of the nine elections, so his methodology counts 

that district as 4/9ths of a Republican-leaning seat and 5/9ths of a Democraticleaning seat. (Dr. Imai applies this method to safer seats as well—for example, a 

seat counted as 8/9ths of a Republican seat.) According to Dr. Imai, when 

averaging across the 2016 through 2020 statewide elections, Republicans would 

have won 6 out of the 12 “toss-up” House districts that the commission has labeled 

Democratic-leaning. Using this method, Dr. Imai calculates that the Republican 

Party is expected to win 61.6 House seats. 

{¶ 59} Dr. Imai compared this result to his 5,000 simulated plans. The 

revised plan’s 61.6 Republican House–seat share is 2.7 seats higher than in the 

average simulated plan, which had 58.9 Republican House seats. In fact, all 5,000 

of the simulated plans contained fewer than 61.6 Republican House seats. Dr. Imai 

opines that “[t]he difference between the revised plan and the average simulated 

plan exceeds 5 standard deviations of the simulated plans and is therefore 

statistically significant.” He also compares the revised plan and the 5,000 simulated 

plans under a metric assessing the percentage of House seats a plan would net the 

Republican Party when compared with a strictly proportional plan. He calculates 

that the average simulated plan would contain 6.5 percent more Republican House 

seats than a strictly proportional plan, while the revised plan contains 9.2 percent 

more Republican House seats than a strictly proportional plan—a difference he 

again says is greater than five standard deviations and therefore statistically 

significant. He concludes that the revised plan makes it “almost certain for the 

Republican party to win disproportionately more seats relative to their statewide 

vote share.” 

{¶ 60} Article XI, Section 6 contains no specific language regarding the 

methodology that the commission is to employ when determining “[t]he statewide 
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26 

proportion of districts whose voters * * * favor each political party,” other than to 

provide that the calculation shall be “based on statewide state and federal partisan 

general election results during the last ten years.” The parties have apparently 

agreed that 2016 through 2020 are the practicable years of data to use. Even using 

those same election years, Dr. Imai demonstrated how his method is preferable and 

more accurate than the commission’s. 

{¶ 61} But we need not endorse Dr. Imai’s methodology to conclude that

the commission’s methodology, as applied here, violates Article XI, Section 6(B) 

of the Ohio Constitution. Bluntly, the commission’s labeling of a district with a 

Democratic vote share between 50 and 51 percent (in one case, a district having a 

50.03 percent vote share) as “Democratic-leaning” is absurd on its face. Section 

6(B) requires the commission to attempt to draft a plan in which the statewide 

proportion of districts whose voters “favor” each party closely corresponds to the 

statewide voters’ preferences. Here, the quality and degree of favoritism in each 

party’s allocated districts is grossly disparate. When 12 of the 42 “Democraticleaning” House districts (i.e., more than 25 percent) are very close “toss-up 

districts” yet there are 0 “Republican-leaning” districts that are similarly close, the 

proportion of districts whose voters “favor” each party is not being assessed 

properly. 

{¶ 62} To be clear, we do not read Article XI, Section 6(B) as prohibiting 

the creation of competitive districts. But competitive districts—which the 12 

districts identified by Dr. Imai surely are, under any reasonable measure—must 

either be excluded from the proportionality assessment or be allocated to each party 

in close proportion to its statewide vote share. 

{¶ 63} Petitioners have established beyond a reasonable doubt that there are 

far fewer than 42 Democratic-leaning House districts in the revised plan. Yet even 

at 57 to 42 seats in the House and 20 to 13 seats in the Senate, petitioners have 

shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the commission did not attempt to adopt a 
January Term, 2022 

 27 

plan in which the statewide proportion of districts favoring each party closely 

corresponds to the statewide preferences of the voters. We are convinced that a 

more closely proportional plan could have been achieved. We cannot credit the 

claims of those who drew the revised plan that that plan was the most proportional 

one possible, because the map drawers misunderstood their task. They were guided 

by incorrect directives, began with an invalidated plan, and worked to eliminate 

closely Republican-leaning districts by turning them into competitive “Democraticleaning” districts. The commission set its compass wrong, and it wound up in the 

wrong place. 

{¶ 64} Finally, we reject the suggestion that our order constitutes a mandate 

to gerrymander to create Democratic-leaning districts. This suggestion implies that 

neither the September 2021 plan nor the revised plan were Republican-favoring 

gerrymanders. The evidence demonstrates otherwise. Throughout the process, the 

Republican map drawers refused to expressly work toward a 54 to 46 percent 

partisan share. Yet that is not a “superficial ratio,” a “Democratic ratio,” or an 

“arbitrary percentage,” as one commissioner cavalierly dismissed it. Rather, as we 

made clear in League of Women Voters of Ohio, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-65, 

__ N.E.3d __, it is a foundational ratio created not by this court or by any particular 

political party but instead etched by the voters of Ohio into our Constitution. To 

be sure, the ratio may be different in the next reapportionment, but for this 

reapportionment, the “statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio,” Article XI, 

Section 6(B), are 54 percent in favor of the Republican Party and 46 percent in 

favor of the Democratic Party. The revised plan does not attempt to closely 

correspond to that constitutionally defined ratio. Our instruction to the commission 

is—simply—to comply with the Constitution. 

D. The election calendar 

{¶ 65} In its response to petitioners’ objections, the commission asks us to 

decide this matter by February 11, 2022, or, alternatively, to stay our decision until 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

28 

the 2022 general election has been completed using the revised plan. The 

commission notes that the deadline for partisan candidates to file their candidacies 

for General Assembly offices was February 2 (see R.C. 3515.05 (candidate 

petitions are due 90 days before the primary election)) and that other deadlines 

related to the May 3 primary election are quickly approaching. 

{¶ 66} The General Assembly established the date of the primary election, 

see R.C. 3501.01(E)(1), and it has the authority to ease the pressure that the 

commission’s failure to adopt a constitutional redistricting plan has placed on the 

secretary of state and on county boards of elections by moving the primary election, 

should that action become necessary. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

{¶ 67} We sustain petitioners’ objections relating to the revised plan’s 

violation of Article XI, Sections 6(A) and 6(B) of the Ohio Constitution. We 

invalidate the revised plan in its entirety. We further order the commission to be 

reconstituted, to convene, and to draft and adopt an entirely new General 

Assembly–district plan that conforms with the Ohio Constitution, including Article 

XI, Sections 6(A) and 6(B) as we have explained those provisions above. 

{¶ 68} We further order the commission to adopt the new plan and file it 

with the secretary of state no later than February 17, 2022, and to file a copy of that 

plan with this court by 9:00 a.m. on February 18, 2022. We retain jurisdiction for 

the purpose of reviewing the new plan. 

{¶ 69} Petitioners shall file objections, if any, to the new plan, by 9:00 a.m., 

three days after the plan is filed in this court. Respondents shall file responses, if 

any, to the objections, by 9:00 a.m., three days after the objections are filed. If the 

deadline for the objections or responses falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday, the 

objections or responses shall be filed by 9:00 a.m. on the next business day. 

Petitioners shall not file a reply or any motion for leave to file a reply. The clerk 
January Term, 2022 

 29 

shall refuse to accept any filings under this paragraph that are untimely or 

prohibited. 

{¶ 70} No requests or stipulations for extension of time shall be filed, and 

the clerk of this court shall refuse to file any requests or stipulations for extension 

of time. 

{¶ 71} Because we sustain the objections as to Sections 6(A) and 6(B) and 

invalidate the plan in its entirety, we do not reach petitioners’ objections regarding 

Article XI, Sections 1 and 3(D)(3). 

Objections sustained in part. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and DONNELLY, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 

KENNEDY and DEWINE, JJ., dissent, with an opinion. 

FISCHER, J., dissents, with an opinion. 

_________________ 

KENNEDY and DEWINE, JJ., dissenting. 

{¶ 72} We dissent from the majority’s pronouncement that the revised 

General Assembly-district plan violates Article XI, Sections 6(A) and 6(B) of the 

Ohio Constitution and is therefore invalid. And we disagree with the majority’s 

decision to retain jurisdiction over this case and to set arbitrary time limitations and 

new rules for the Ohio Redistricting Commission’s work that have no basis in the 

text of the Ohio Constitution. 

{¶ 73} It is apparent that in disregard of constitutional standards, four 

members of this court have now commandeered the redistricting process and that 

they will continue to reject any General Assembly-district plan until they get the 

plan they want. It would simplify matters if the commission would just provide the 

majority with the map-drawing software, Maptitude, so that they can draw the map 

themselves. At this point, one must wonder which seven-member body is the true 

redistricting commission—the constitutionally named officers or this court? 
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30 

{¶ 74} The Ohio Constitution entrusts the responsibility for redistricting to 

the commission, not to this court. In its previous decision, the majority exceeded 

its authority by declaring a map invalid based on alleged violations of Article XI, 

Sections 6(A) and 6(B), despite the fact that our Constitution does not make standalone violations of these sections judicially enforceable. Today, the majority 

doubles down on its error by invalidating a revised plan that satisfies the same 

metrics that it held out as a model of constitutionality in its first decision. In today’s 

astonishing order, the majority compels the commission to design districts that 

guarantee Democratic victories. There is a word for the action the majority has 

ordered the commission to undertake—gerrymandering. See Article XI, Section 

6(A), Ohio Constitution. 

{¶ 75} Article XI, Section 6(A) provides that the commission “shall 

attempt” to adopt a plan that is not “drawn primarily to favor or disfavor a political 

party,” and Section 6(B) directs it to draw the plan so that “[t]he statewide 

proportion of districts whose voters * * * favor each political party shall correspond 

closely to the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio.” The evidence submitted 

by petitioners in these cases confirms that the districts that the majority finds 

objectionable “favor” Democrats. Majority opinion, ¶ 30, 50. The majority now, 

however, holds that it is not enough that a district “favor” a political party; it now 

decrees that the commission must draw districts that favor Democrats to a degree 

of the majority’s liking. But nothing in the Ohio Constitution requires the creation 

of districts that guarantee victories for a political party. The Constitution requires 

only an attempt to create districts that favor one side or the other in close 

correspondence to statewide preferences, and that is exactly what the revised map 

does. 

{¶ 76} Furthermore, the majority lacks the authority to impose deadlines on 

the commission and to retain jurisdiction for the purpose of reviewing a new plan. 

When a plan is invalidated by a court, Article XI, Section 9(B) mandates the 
January Term, 2022 

 31 

reconstitution of the commission pursuant to Section 1. Once reconstituted, the 

commission is required to “convene, and ascertain and determine a general 

assembly district plan in conformity with” the provisions of Article XI that are still 

valid. Article XI, Section 9(B), Ohio Constitution. Therefore, the work of the 

commission is controlled by the Ohio Constitution, not by judicial fiat. The 

arbitrary timeline set by the majority usurps the right of the people to have a voice 

in the redistricting process that is guaranteed by Article XI, Section 1(C). By 

rejecting the revised plan, improperly retaining jurisdiction over these cases, and 

setting another arbitrary deadline of ten days, it is apparent that the majority has in 

mind the number of Democratic-leaning districts that must exist and the percentage 

of voters that is necessary in a district to guarantee electoral victories for 

Democrats. Things would be much easier if they just told the commission exactly 

what they want. 

{¶ 77} We reject the assertion that the revised plan violates Article XI, 

Section 1(C); that provision is directory and not judicially enforceable. The 

commission concedes that the revised plan contains a few municipal splits that 

violate Article XI, Section 3(D)(3). Because these violations are “isolated” and do 

not materially affect the plan, the commission should amend the plan to correct the 

violations pursuant to Article XI, Section 9(D)(3)(a). 

{¶ 78} Therefore, we would overrule the objections claiming that the 

revised plan is invalid under Sections 6(A), 6(B), and 1(C), sustain the objection 

regarding the isolated violations of Section 3(D)(3) as conceded by the commission, 

and order the commission to amend the revised plan pursuant to Section 9(D)(3)(a) 

to correct those minor violations. Because the majority holds otherwise, we dissent. 

 
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I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

A. The General Assembly-District Plan Is Invalidated 

and a Revised Plan Is Adopted 

{¶ 79} On January 12, 2022, a divided court invalidated the original 

General Assembly-district plan adopted by the commission on September 16, 2021, 

and directed the commission to adopt a new plan within ten days. 

{¶ 80} The commission reconvened and held its first public meeting on 

January 18, 2022. The commission did not start from scratch; instead, it directed 

staff to collaborate and determine which currently Republican-leaning districts 

could be redrawn to be Democratic-leaning districts without violating the 

requirements of Article XI, Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7. The commission unanimously 

agreed to take a regional approach to redrawing the map. It started with Hamilton 

and Franklin Counties, with a goal of meeting the proportionality requirement 

unless doing so would result in violations of other constitutional requirements. 

Over the following days, support staff discussed and shared proposals for 

increasing the number of Democratic-leaning districts, particularly in Hamilton, 

Franklin, Cuyahoga, Summit, and Lorain Counties. Senator Vernon Sykes, a 

Democrat and a member of the commission, stated: “The staffs have been working 

together. This is the first time, I believe, in the history of the state that Republican 

and Democratic staff have been working together on maps.” 

{¶ 81} On January 20, 2022, the commission held a public meeting; rather 

than adjourning the meeting, the commission went into recess. When it reconvened 

on January 22, commission members introduced proposed plans. The commission, 

by a party-line vote, adopted the plan prepared by members of the Republican 

caucus in collaboration with, but not always agreement with, members of the 

Democratic caucus. 

 
January Term, 2022 

 33 

B. The Realities of Ohio’s Political Geography

{¶ 82} Before we get to the revised map, some background is necessary to 

understand the constraints under which General Assembly redistricting takes place 

in Ohio. Start with Ohio’s political demographics. No one disputes the fact that 

the partisan preferences of Ohio voters are not evenly distributed. Democratic 

voters are clustered predominately in densely populated areas around Ohio’s six 

largest cities. Republicans are more uniformly distributed—and large, rural swaths 

of the state are solidly Republican as the below maps show:9

9. The first map is from the expert report of Michael Barber, Ph.D. The second map is from the 

expert report of Sean P. Trende. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

34 

Importantly for redistricting purposes, the concentration of Democratic voters is 

much higher in Democratic areas than that of Republican voters in Republicanleaning areas. Election results10 from the most recent presidential election help 

illustrate this point (the percentage is the Republican-vote share in each county): 

10. This map was created using data from the Ohio Secretary of State’s Office. See Ohio Secretary 

of State, 2020 Official Elections Results, available at https://www.ohiosos.gov/elections/electionresults-and-data/2020/ (accessed Feb. 7, 2022) [https://perma.cc/FY23-HYMD]. It was created 

using a template available at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ohio_Presidential_ 

Election_Results_2020.svg (accessed Feb. 7, 2022) [https://perma.cc/BBR5-SXGH]. 
January Term, 2022 

 35 

73.8%

33.5%

63.2%

74.1%

73.6%

44.5%

71.0%

52.7%

73.5%

69.2%

71.2%

76.3%

74.3% 74.6%

75.6%

69.2%

75.7%

83.4%

73.6%

73.6%

68.9%

81.0%

75.1%

70.5%

76.9%

76.4%

68.4%

64.8%

69.7% 61.0%

75.1% 72.9%

66.9%

69.7% 66.2% 61.1%

67.7% 58.5%

55.5%

79.7%

75.5%

58.8%

60.8%

73.1%

76.9%

67.9%

62.8%

71.4%

80.9%

80.7%

69.0%

82.4%

50.5%

61.0%

56.2%

32.4%

54.9%

60.9%

60.9%

54.7%

50.4%

71.7%

68.5%

71.2%

76.4%

69.6%

41.7%

75.9%

77.1%

72.2%

81.3% 70.6%

64.7%

78.1%

48.1%

67.5%

61.3%

41.3%

78.1%

81.1%

81.9%

77.9%

74.9%

67.3% 52.9%

40.8%

69.1% 72.1%
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

36 

{¶ 83} Now layer on top of this political reality the mandatory requirements 

of the Ohio Constitution. Districts must be compact and contiguous, and there are 

explicit limitations on splitting political subdivisions. Restrictions against splitting 

political subdivisions are explicitly given precedence over the exhortations of 

Article XI, Sections 6 that a plan shall not be drawn to favor a political party and 

shall closely correspond to the statewide voter preferences. 

{¶ 84} As Dr. Michael Barber explained, the constitutional requirements for 

territorial continuity, district compactness, political-unit integrity, and 

proportionality are in tension with the creation of a map that achieves proportional 

representation along party lines. Compliance with these requirements means that 

Democrats tend to be clustered in districts that result in so-called “wasted votes” in 

which Democrats win by overwhelming numbers while Republicans tend to be in 

more competitive districts in which Republican candidates win by smaller margins. 

{¶ 85} Dr. Barber detailed the challenges facing mapmakers who want to

achieve exact proportionality by creating House districts that correspond to the 

preferences of Ohio voters (i.e., 54 Republican seats to 45 Democratic seats). He 

described the following demographic breakdown of the state: 

 65 counties are uniformly Republican and represent approximately one-third of 

the House districts. 

 17 counties are “purple cluster” counties—counties that are uniformly 

Republican except that they have a small-to-medium municipality that is 

majority Democratic. These represent 26 House districts, but only 5 could be 

drawn as Democratic districts in compliance with the requirement to avoid 

splitting governmental units. 

 6 “urban blue” counties, which split approximately 60 percent Democratic and 

40 percent Republican and account for approximately 41 House districts. 

{¶ 86} Based on these demographics, a mapmaker who seeks to achieve 

anything close to 45 Democratic-leaning districts faces significant challenges. A 
January Term, 2022 

 37 

mapmaker would need to draw all 5 possible Democratic-leaning districts in the 

“purple cluster” counties, and 40 out of the 41 “urban blue” districts would have to 

be Democratic. In other words, for the statewide proportion of House districts to 

achieve exact proportionality, the commission would need to go to extraordinary 

lengths to draw districts in the purple-cluster counties and the urban blue counties 

in a way that gives maximum political advantage to Democrats. That is, a plan that 

overcomes Ohio’s political geography would necessarily provide Democrats with 

virtually all the available seats in urban counties—a far cry from the representation 

that voting preferences in those counties would merit. 

C. Issues Presented 

{¶ 87} These cases present two issues for this court’s consideration: Does 

this court have authority to invalidate the revised General Assembly-district plan 

based on stand-alone violations of Article XI, Sections 1 and 6? The answer is no. 

And have the petitioners in Bennett v. Ohio Redistricting Comm. (Supreme Court 

case No. 2021-1198) demonstrated that the commission violated Article XI, Section 

3(D)(3)? The answer to that question is yes. As the commission concedes, the 

revised plan contains isolated violations of Article XI, Section 3(D)(3), and 

pursuant to Section 9(D)(3)(a), this court should remand the revised plan to the 

commission to correct those violations. 

II. ANALYSIS 

A. Judicial Reviewability of a General Assembly-District Plan 

{¶ 88} As the first dissenting opinion explains in League of Women Voters 

of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., Article XI, Section 9(D) limits this court’s 

authority to review General Assembly-district plans. ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-

Ohio-65, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 227 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The power to invalidate 

a plan, in whole or in part, depends on the existence of a predicate violation of the 

requirements of Section 2, 3, 4, 5, or 7. For “isolated violations of those 

requirements,” Section 9(D)(3)(a) requires this court to order the commission to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

38 

amend a plan to remedy the violations. When the violations are more extensive, 

requiring the commission to amend at least six House districts or two Senate 

districts, Section 9(D)(3)(b) directs the court to wholly invalidate the plan. Finally, 

Section 9(D)(3)(c) permits the court to invalidate a plan adopted under Section 8(C) 

if a significant violation or violations of Section 2, 3, 4, 5, or 7 materially affect the 

ability of the plan to provide proportional representation and the proportion of 

districts does not correspond closely to the statewide preferences of Ohio voters. 

{¶ 89} Contrary to the majority’s claim, nothing in Article XI, Section 9(B) 

empowers this court to invalidate the revised plan based on a stand-alone violation 

of Section 6. Further, 

the negative implication of Article XI, Section 9 is obvious. Section 

9(D) is a provision that limits the authority of this court in reviewing 

a General Assembly-district plan. It prohibits this court from

ordering the commission to adopt a specific plan and from drawing 

the districts ourselves. And that same provision provides that this 

court may invalidate a General Assembly district-plan in whole or 

in part only if we first find a violation of Article XI, Section 2, 3, 4, 

5, or 7. 

Id. at ¶ 227 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 

{¶ 90} Indeed, “[i]f violations of Section 6 were intended to be actionable, 

one would naturally expect Section 9(D) to say so. But that language is 

conspicuously absent.” Id. at ¶ 217 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The exclusion of 

Section 6 from the remedies expressly provided by Section 9(D)(3) demonstrates 

that such violations are not judicially enforceable—the inclusion of Sections 2, 3, 

4, 5, and 7 in this remedy portends the exclusion of Section 6. See Scalia & Garner, 

Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 107 (2012). For this reason, “the 
January Term, 2022 

 39 

standards established by Article XI, Section 6 are directory and therefore not 

judicially enforceable.” League of Women Voters at ¶ 245 (Kennedy, J., 

dissenting). 

{¶ 91} Because this court lacks authority to invalidate a plan based on a 

stand-alone violation of Sections 6(A) or 6(B), petitioners’ objections that are 

premised on those provisions fail. 

B. The Commission Did Not Violate Article XI, Section 6 

{¶ 92} Because there has been no showing of the necessary predicate 

violation of Article XI, Section 2, 3, 4, 5, or 7, this court has no authority to wholly 

invalidate the plan for a violation of Section 6. Nevertheless, because the majority 

ignores this limit on its authority, we address the majority’s conclusion that the 

revised plan violates Sections 6(A) and 6(B). 

{¶ 93} Article XI, Section 6 establishes three standards that the commission 

must “attempt” to follow when drawing a General Assembly-district plan. The 

commission must attempt to produce a map that (A) is not drawn primarily to favor 

a political party, (B) contains a statewide proportion of districts whose voters favor 

a political party in close correspondence to statewide voter preferences, and (C) 

contains compact districts. But in pursuing these goals, the commission shall not 

violate Section 2, 3, 4, 5, or 7—the neutral map-drawing requirements designed to 

prevent gerrymandering. 

1. The Revised Map Does Not Violate Article XI, Section 6(A) 

{¶ 94} Article XI, Section 6(A) provides, “No general assembly district 

plan shall be drawn primarily to favor or disfavor a political party.” The operative 

word in the provision is “primarily,” which is ordinarily understood to mean 

“predominantly.” Therefore, under the plain language of this provision, to show a 

violation of Section 6(A), petitioners needed to prove that the commission’s 

predominant motivation in drawing the revised plan was to favor or disfavor a 

political party. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

40 

a. There has been no showing that partisan favoritism 

was the commission’s primary motivation

{¶ 95} Petitioners argue that the commission did not attempt to comply with 

Article XI, Section 6(A). The crux of the argument is that the commission’s revised 

map purposefully creates districts that lean toward Democrats only marginally, and, 

so petitioners say, Republicans might end up winning some of these districts and 

obtaining a greater than proportionate share of representation. We disagree that the 

commission’s predominant motivation was to favor a political party. 

{¶ 96} The commission’s members understood that under the majority’s 

holding in League of Women Voters, they had to comply with Sections 6(A) and 

6(B) unless doing so caused the revised plan to violate Section 2, 3, 4, 5, or 7. The 

staffs of the Republican and Democratic caucuses collaborated intensely in drawing 

a map, even if there was not always agreement on how each district should be 

drawn. Mapdrawer Ray DiRossi explained that “the Commission decided to 

proceed with this Court-ordered re-draw by drawing districts in various geographic 

regions of the state where it is possible to draw Democratic leaning districts while 

complying with Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 of Article XI of the Ohio Constitution.” 

This way, they started with a plan that they knew already complied with Sections 

2, 3, 4, 5, and 7. Even then, DiRossi noted that it took “hours of work” to change 

a Republican-leaning district to lean toward Democrats, but because of this court’s 

order for the commission to adopt a revised plan in ten days, time was short. 

DiRossi explained that it was not possible to adopt a map that had fewer than 57 

Republican-leaning House districts without also violating other provisions of 

Article XI, and he testified that other proposed maps he had seen did not comply 

with all the requirements of Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7. Blake Springhetti, a 

Republican staffer who helped draw the revised plan, also noted that he had not 

seen a constitutional map that gave Democrats more districts than the commission’s 

revised map. 
January Term, 2022 

 41 

{¶ 97} When asked why the revised plan made Democratic-leaning seats 

more competitive, Springhetti explained that “the decisions were centered around 

complying with the court order and closely corresponding with Section 6.” And in 

responding to a question whether drawing competitive districts was intended to 

disfavor Democrats, DiRossi stated, “[I]f you’re asking if a 53 percent Republicanleaning seat that becomes a 48 percent Republican-leaning seat is—makes it easier 

for a Republican to win, I mean, that just wouldn’t make sense to me.” 

{¶ 98} Petitioners’ own expert, Dr. Kosuke Imai, admitted that in the 

revised plan’s most competitive district, Democrats would win the election five out 

of nine times. And in the four next most competitive districts, Democrats could 

have won at least six out of nine elections. It stands to reason that the other seven 

competitive districts with larger margins of political advantage for the Democrats 

would have been even more likely to elect Democratic legislators. 

{¶ 99} In effect, petitioners assert, and the majority apparently agrees, that 

the revised plan does not favor the Democratic Party enough. But changing the 

map to add more “safe” Democratic districts would mean that the commission had 

a primary purpose to favor the Democratic Party when Article XI, Section 6(A) 

strictly prohibits such action. 

b. The majority’s Section 6(A) analysis 

{¶ 100} The majority does not cite any direct evidence that partisan 

favoritism was the drafters’ primary motivation. Instead, it draws inferences from 

three sources to support its conclusion that the commission’s primary motivation 

was to favor the Republican Party: (1) the fact that the commission took as a starting 

point the map this court previously invalidated in drawing new districts, (2) the fact 

that the map did not achieve perfect partisan proportionality, and (3) the fact that 

many of the districts favored the Democratic Party only by small margins. This 

evidence does not prove the majority’s faulty conclusion. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

42 

{¶ 101} The majority begins by complaining that “the commission did not

adopt an entirely new plan” but, rather, began by making revisions to the old map. 

Majority opinion at ¶ 36. But, of course, this has nothing do with whether the 

commission intended to “primarily” favor or disfavor a political party. It was a 

Democratic member of the commission, Senator Sykes, who proposed the idea to 

adopt the “regional” approach to grapple with the reality of Ohio’s political 

geography. Starting from the invalidated map was a bipartisan decision, motivated 

primarily by the need to comply with the majority’s order to redraw the plan within 

ten days. Certainly, the decision is not evidence that the commission’s primary 

motivation was to favor Republicans. 

{¶ 102} Moreover, there is nothing in Article XI that authorizes the majority 

to micromanage the manner in which the commission carries out its map-drawing 

functions. The commission’s unanimous decision to take a regional approach to 

redrawing the plan makes perfect sense when one considers that no one challenged 

the previous plan for failing to comply with the neutral line-drawing requirements 

of the Constitution. Indeed, starting completely from scratch would have made 

little sense. The Constitution mandates that the starting point for the creation of the 

districts be Franklin County, the most populous county, and it also mandates the 

order in which the remaining districts be drawn. So, any new map would have been 

based on the same parameters as the old one. 

{¶ 103} Furthermore, the demographics of Ohio dictate that Ohio’s rural

districts are going to be Republican; readjustments of the boundaries of these 

districts would have done nothing to change the Republican/Democratic ratio of 

districts. The only place for the commission to add more Democratic districts was 

in the urban counties. So, it was perfectly reasonable for the commission to start 

exactly where it did. 

{¶ 104} Second, the majority infers that the drafters had an improper 

partisan motivation from the fact that the revised plan did not achieve perfectly 
January Term, 2022 

 43 

proportional representation. In doing so, it conflates the issue of proportionality 

under Article XI, Section 6(B) with the intent determination of Section 6(A). 

Section 6(B) is a mathematical problem. It asks whether the statewide proportion 

of districts “correspond[s] closely” to the statewide preference of voters. Section 

6(A) is a question of intent and asks whether the commission acted above all else 

to favor or disfavor one party over the other. The fact that the majority today does 

not view the revised plan as sufficiently proportional does not prove that the 

commission intended to favor or disfavor a particular party. As explained below in 

the discussion of Section 6(B), the majority’s decision in League of Women Voters, 

__ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-65, __ N.E.3d __, suggested that the partisan 

proportionality of the revised plan would comply with Section 6(B). At best, the 

proportionality of the revised plan shows that the commission acted primarily to 

obey the majority’s order, not to disfavor Democrats. 

{¶ 105} Lastly, the majority today finds “other evidence” that supports a 

violation of Article XI, Section 6(A) in a lack of “parity in terms of vote share of 

each district.” Majority opinion at ¶ 40. But competitive districts do not favor or 

disfavor a particular political party, so they cannot be evidence of the commission’s 

intent to disfavor the Democrats. Rather, the narrow margins of partisan preference 

were largely a function of demographics. As outlined above, the political 

demographics of Ohio meant that in order to obtain proportionality, the 

overwhelming majority of Republican districts in Ohio’s urban counties had to be 

transformed into Democratic ones despite the fact that Republican voters constitute 

a significant proportion of Ohio’s urban population. This necessarily meant 

drawing districts having small Democratic margins. Furthermore, by allowing the 

commission so little time to revise the plan, the majority exacerbated these 

constraints, as changing even one district to lean toward Democrats was time 

consuming. The drafters also had to comply with Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7, without 

losing sight of the compactness standard of Section 6(C). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

44 

{¶ 106} The record establishes that the commission’s primary purpose in

adopting the revised plan was to comply with this court’s order to adopt a plan with 

a proportion of districts that more closely corresponds with the partisan preferences 

of Ohio voters without also violating the neutral map-drawing requirements of 

Article XI and dealing with the consequences of Ohio’s political geography. The 

plan therefore was not drawn primarily to favor or disfavor any particular political 

party. Partisan considerations are not forbidden by Section 6(A); they just must not 

be the primary motivation in drawing the plan, and here they were not. 

{¶ 107} For these reasons, we would reject the objections premised on a

violation of Article XI, Section 6(A). 

2. The Revised Plan Does Not Violate Article XI, Section 6(B)

{¶ 108} Going further, the majority concludes that the redistricting 

commission did not comply with this court’s direction in League of Women Voters

that the commission attempt to adopt a plan under Article XI, Section 6(B) in which 

“[t]he statewide proportion of districts whose voters, based on statewide state and 

federal partisan general election results during the last ten years, favor each political 

party * * * correspond closely to the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio.” 

a. The Majority’s Decision in League of Women Voters of Ohio 

{¶ 109} In League of Women Voters, this court explained that prior election 

results showed “about 54 percent of Ohio voters preferred Republican candidates 

and about 46 percent of Ohio voters preferred Democratic candidates.” __ Ohio 

St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-65, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 108. Based on this distribution of 

partisan preference, precise proportionality would mean that there are 71.28 total 

House and Senate districts (54 percent of the sum of the 99 House districts and 33 

Senate districts) that lean toward the Republicans and 60.72 that lean toward the 

Democrats (46 percent of the same sum). But close correspondence is not precise 

proportionality. By modifying the word “correspond” with the adverb “closely,” 

Article XI, Section 6(B) provides that proportionality need not be exact but just 
January Term, 2022 

 45 

close enough. In contrast, the word “favor” in Section 6(B) is not similarly 

modified. If a district prefers a political party by the smallest statistical amount, it 

necessarily favors that party. In this analysis, there can be no toss-ups; one party is 

favored based on past election data, and one is not. 

{¶ 110} But how does the majority understand the term “closely”? It is

important to consider what it suggested was close enough in League of Women 

Voters. In determining that the commission’s original plan did not comply with 

Article XI, Section 6(B), the majority pointed to the report of Dr. Imai, an expert in 

districting statistics who was hired by petitioners. Id. at ¶ 112. Dr. Imai’s original 

report filed in these cases stated that the average of the 5,000 plans he generated 

contained 79 total Republican-leaning districts (60 percent) and 53 total 

Democratic-leaning districts (40 percent). The majority stated, “Dr. Imai’s analysis 

showed that the plan adopted by the commission was an outlier, displaying a greater 

degree of disproportionality than any of the simulated maps he generated.” Id.

{¶ 111} The majority in League of Women Voters also relied on Dr. 

Jonathan Rodden’s report and stated that “[he] drew a plan that was compliant with 

Article XI and that is more proportional to the statewide voter preferences than the 

plan adopted by the commission.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 112. It further 

claimed that “when Dr. Rodden drew his district plan that adhered to traditional 

redistricting principles, complied with Article XI, and did not endeavor to help or 

harm any political party, the result was much different: a plan with more compact 

districts and in which the partisan split in Republican candidates’ favor was 57 

percent to 43 percent in the House and 55 percent to 45 percent in the Senate.” 

(Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 126. The majority in League of Women Voters of Ohio

unambiguously stated that Dr. Rodden’s plan complied with Article XI, including 

Section 6(B). 

{¶ 112} Notably, after League of Women Voters was decided, a notice of 

correspondence was filed in this court in which counsel for the Bennett petitioners 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

46 

informed the commission that Dr. Rodden’s plan did not comply with the 

mandatory map-drawing requirements of Article XI, stating, “[W]e now believe 

that [Dr. Rodden’s] plan contained some technical issues that may result in 

municipal corporation and township splits beyond those permitted by the strict 

language of Article XI, Section 3.” Dr. Rodden’s original plan also did not number 

the Senate districts, as required by Article XI, Section 5. And it is not clear that he 

began drawing House districts with the most populous county—Franklin County—

as required by Section 3(C)(1). This is problematic, because Dr. Rodden stated in 

his report that he began preparing his plan by first “resolving the dilemma of 

Northeast Ohio.” Nonetheless, the majority in League of Women Voters favorably 

cited Dr. Rodden’s plan in its decision. Consequently, despite the flaws in Dr. 

Rodden’s work, the clear message that the majority sent to the commission was that 

a plan having levels of proportionality similar to those determined by Dr. Rodden 

would withstand constitutional scrutiny. 

{¶ 113} In addition, the commission was aware that on September 13, 2021, 

a Democratic member of the commission, Senator Sykes, had previously proposed 

a plan that contained 77 total Republican-leaning House and Senate districts and 55 

Democratic-leaning House and Senate districts. See League of Women Voters, __ 

Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-65, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 46. 

b. The Majority Moves the Goalposts 

{¶ 114} Against this backdrop in which the majority had set Dr. Imai’s and 

Dr. Rodden’s reports as exemplars for drawing a plan that is compliant with Article 

XI, Section 6(B), the commission adopted the revised plan, which provided 77 total 

Republican-leaning districts in the House and Senate—about 58 percent—and 55 

total Democratic-leaning House and Senate districts—about 42 percent. By the 

standards set forth by the majority in League of Women Voters, the revised plan is 

constitutional. In its previous decision, the majority relied on Dr. Imai’s simulation 

in concluding that the original plan was an “outlier,” id. at ¶ 112, but under the 
January Term, 2022 

 47 

same data, the revised plan is not. In fact, the revised plan provides more total 

Democratic-leaning districts than the majority of Dr. Imai’s 5,000 simulated plans. 

Further, the partisan makeup of the revised plan is almost identical to the partisan 

makeup of Dr. Rodden’s original plan—the plan that the majority held up as a 

model of constitutionality in its original decision. The revised plan also contained 

the exact division of total Republican- and Democratic-leaning districts proposed 

in Senator Sykes’s September 13, 2021 plan. According to the majority, the plan 

initially proposed by the minority-party members of the commission would 

somehow unconstitutionally favor their opposing party. That is as good of an 

indication as any of just how far afield the majority has veered. 

{¶ 115} Indeed, a fair reading of the majority’s previous decision is that the 

revised plan satisfies Article XI, Section 6(B), and the majority is now simply 

moving the goalposts to avoid upholding the plan. What it indicated in its previous 

decision regarding what would be a close enough division of districts is no longer 

close enough. Instead, under today’s decision, the commission must undertake a 

reverse-gerrymandering to guarantee Democratic victories to achieve exact 

proportional representation. 

{¶ 116} The majority asserts that the existence of alternative plans is

probative in evaluating the revised plan. It should then be relevant that Dr. Rodden 

submitted to the commission a revised plan containing 74 total Republican-leaning 

districts and 58 total Democratic-leaning ones. But although that plan may contain 

a slightly more proportional division of districts than the commission’s revised 

plan, it does so at the expense of once again violating some of the mandatory mapdrawing requirements of Article XI. The commission submitted evidence that Dr. 

Rodden’s plan unconstitutionally divided more than one municipality or township 

in nine districts, in violation of Article XI, Section 3(D)(3). Some of these divisions 

could not be corrected without overpopulating or underpopulating the district, 

sending ripple effects throughout the entire plan. Dr. Rodden’s plan also 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

48 

erroneously numbered numerous Senate districts, see Article XI, Section 5, causing 

at least one senator to be up for reelection two years before the conclusion of his 

term. 

{¶ 117} Therefore, while the majority faults the commission for not 

adopting a more proportional plan, it is significant that no plans that were both more 

proportional and satisfied the other relevant constitutional standards were presented 

to the commission. 

c. It Is Not Possible to Draw Perfectly Proportional District Plans 

{¶ 118} DiRossi testified that none of the plans he had seen provided 

proportional representation without also violating other requirements of Article XI. 

Apparently not liking what DiRossi says, the majority simply disregards his 

testimony. But DiRossi’s testimony is backed up by other evidence in the record. 

Dr. Rodden is an expert in matters pertaining to redistricting, but even he was not 

able to draft a plan with a proportion of districts that more closely corresponds with 

the partisan preferences of Ohio voters while still complying with the neutral mapdrawing requirements of Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7. Similarly, Senator Sykes’s 

September 13 plan and the Ohio Citizens Redistricting Commission’s plan, which 

were both cited in Dr. Rodden’s first report, were not able to reach much closer 

proportionality even though they also violated the neutral map-drawing 

requirements and were therefore unconstitutional. 

{¶ 119} Further, out of all of Dr. Imai’s 5,000 simulated plans that he

claimed complied with all of Article XI’s requirements, none of the plans were able 

to reach perfect proportionality, i.e., 71.28 total Republican-leaning House and 

Senate districts and 60.72 total Democratic-leaning House and Senate districts. 

None even came within 5 percent of perfect proportionality. His average ratio was 

between slightly more than 78 Republican-leaning districts and slightly more than 

53 Democratic-leaning districts, and his plans ranged from approximately 76 

districts leaning Republican to 81 leaning Republican. The commission’s revised 
January Term, 2022 

 49 

plan is therefore more proportional than the majority of Dr. Imai’s 5,000 plans. 

And to reach the proportionality apparently required by the majority’s decision 

today, the plan would be an outlier in Dr. Imai’s study, with about five fewer 

Republican districts than even his most pro-Democratic simulated plan. 

{¶ 120} And while the Democratic members of the commission prepared a 

plan purportedly containing 72 total Republican-leaning House and Senate districts 

and 60 total Democratic-leaning House and Senate districts, all indications are that 

the plan included little if any attempt to comply with all the requirements of Article 

XI, Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7. Senator Sykes noted that the purpose of his plan was 

to show that proportional districts could be drawn, without worrying whether they 

were “error free.” And the plan contained constitutional errors, improperly dividing 

municipalities and townships in a way that cannot be corrected without 

overpopulating some districts and “caus[ing] ripple effects throughout the entire 

county, and likely beyond.” It also improperly numbered some Senate districts in 

a way that puts at least two senators on the ballot in the middle of their four-year 

terms, violating Article XI, Section 5. (The drafter of this plan, Chris Glassburn, 

claimed that he was subsequently able to correct these errors, but the maps attached 

to his affidavit are, at the very least, not numbered, in violation of Sections 3, 4, 

and 5.) 

{¶ 121} The majority should apply the plain language of Article XI, Section 

6(B) and not demand exact proportionality when there is scant evidence that it is 

possible to draw districts that are exactly proportional to the partisan preferences of 

Ohio voters without also violating the neutral map-drawing requirements of 

Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7. Section 6(B) states that the commission shall “attempt” 

to achieve a proportion of districts that “closely” corresponds to the partisan 

preferences of Ohio voters—it does not require that proportion to perfectly match 

those preferences. 

 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

50 

d. The Revised Plan Does Not Improperly Favor a Political Party

{¶ 122} Lastly, the majority rejects the commission’s methodology for 

determining how many districts favor Republicans and how may favor Democrats. 

It concludes that the commission’s revised plan would result in more Republican 

election victories than the plan purports to have because Republicans might win in 

some districts where Democrats have only a narrow demographic advantage. 

However, nothing in Article XI, Section 6(B) requires the commission to allocate 

guaranteed victories to any party. Rather, Section 6(B) directs the commission to 

adopt a plan in which “[t]he statewide proportion of districts whose voters * * * 

favor each political party shall correspond closely to the statewide preferences of 

the voters of Ohio.” (Emphasis added.) Article XI, Section 6(B), Ohio 

Constitution. It does not give a margin by which the district’s voters should favor 

one party or the other. And although the margins may be narrow in some districts, 

those districts nonetheless favor Democrats based on the partisan preference of 

voters there. The Constitution’s words control: a district that narrowly favors the 

Democratic Party nevertheless favors it. 

{¶ 123} To require these districts to favor Democrats enough to guarantee 

that Democrats will always be elected—i.e., to significantly favor a party by more 

than 52 percent—would require adding words to the Constitution; however, a court 

may not “add to or subtract from the plain and usual meaning of [a] constitutional 

provision,” State v. Billotto, 104 Ohio St. 13, 15-16, 135 N.E. 285 (1922). 

e. The Majority’s Holding Requires Intentional Gerrymandering 

{¶ 124} The result of the majority’s decision today is to require the 

commission to intentionally gerrymander the General Assembly-district plan in 

order to overcome the political geography of Ohio in which Democrats are more 

concentrated in urban areas while Republican voters dominate the suburban and 

rural areas of the state. To draw five more safe Democratic-leaning districts, the 

commission will have to crack the areas in which Democrats live and pack them 
January Term, 2022 

 51 

into new districts containing far-flung Republican voters in the suburbs and rural 

areas. Dr. Barber, an associate professor of political science at Brigham Young 

University, indicated that this could be accomplished by drawing districts that 

radiate from the urban core and then extend them “like slices of pizza,” which 

would capture large numbers of Democrats in cities as well as Republican voters in 

the suburbs and rural areas. He also suggested that districts could be drawn like a 

“snake” through the rural, heavily Republican areas by stringing together smaller 

cities where Democrats live to create a majority Democratic-leaning district in what 

would otherwise be a Republican-leaning district. 

{¶ 125} The problem, Dr. Barber notes, is that creating these districts

requires intentional gerrymandering and violates Article XI’s neutral map-making 

requirements. The “slice” districts would violate Section 3(D)(3) by dividing too 

many municipalities and townships, while the “snake” districts would violate 

Section 3(C)’s prohibition of excessive divisions of counties. Creating “snake” 

districts would also require the commission to violate the directory duty imposed 

by Section 6(C) to draw compact districts. Complying with this court’s apparent 

order to create exactly proportional districts improperly elevates Section 6(B) over 

Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7, which the Constitution expressly prioritizes, and over 

Section 6(C), which is coequal to Section (6)(B). See Article XI, Section 6, Ohio 

Constitution (“Nothing in this section permits the commission to violate the district 

standards described in Section 2, 3, 4, 5, or 7 of this article”). 

{¶ 126} It also will require the commission to go to absurd lengths to dilute 

Republican votes in urban counties. For example, Dr. Rodden’s plan divides 11 

districts in Franklin County in such a way that all 11 districts would skew in favor 

of Democrats. So, while the partisan divide of Franklin County is approximately 

63 percent Democrats and 37 percent Republicans, Dr. Rodden’s plan would give 

100 percent of the districts to the Democrats. Similarly, Hamilton County is 55 

percent Democrats and 45 percent Republicans. Dr. Rodden’s plan, however, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

52 

would provide six out of seven House districts (or approximately 85 percent) to 

Democrats by cracking Republican-leaning areas of the county and packing them 

with urban areas where Democrats predominate. This intentional gerrymandering 

therefore unnecessarily dilutes the votes of Republican voters in the areas 

surrounding cities. 

{¶ 127} The same majority as today recently decried the evils of partisan 

gerrymandering: 

Gerrymandering is the antithetical perversion of 

representative democracy. It is an abuse of power—by whichever

political party has control to draw geographic boundaries for elected 

state and congressional offices and engages in that practice—that 

strategically exaggerates the power of voters who tend to support 

the favored party while diminishing the power of voters who tend to 

support the disfavored party. 

Adams v. DeWine, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-89, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 2. Yet today, 

it apparently orders the commission to do just that, compelling the commission to 

separate political subdivisions and communities of interest and to dilute the vote of 

some Ohioans to enhance the vote of others. This is the direct result of the 

majority’s failing to adhere to the limits of the Constitution and elevating Article 

XI, Section 6(B) by replacing the neutral map-drawing requirements with one that 

is unapologetically partisan. And this is plainly not what the people of this state 

had in mind when they ratified the limits on gerrymandering in Article XI. 

{¶ 128} Redistricting reform was intended to reduce political polarization. 

But in putting its own political objectives ahead of constitutional requirements, the 

majority will undoubtedly increase political polarization. The majority ordains a 

map in which urban counties effectively have representation from only one political 
January Term, 2022 

 53 

party. For those who complain about a rural/urban division in Ohio, just wait until 

we have a legislature in which one party exclusively represents urban centers and 

the other party represents the rest of the state. 

{¶ 129} Furthermore, by the majority’s decree, elections in urban counties 

will not be competitive. Instead, the commission must guarantee safe Democratic 

seats—taking general-election voters out of the equation and ensuring that elections 

are decided by the lines that are drawn and not by the ballots cast. Under such a 

regime, the most important election will often be the primary—thereby 

incentivizing candidates to appeal to their political base rather than the electorate 

as a whole. That is not good for voter engagement. And that is not good for 

democracy. 

C. This Court Has No Authority to Commandeer the Commission 

{¶ 130} In addition to erroneously concluding that the commission violated 

Article XI, Section 6, the majority exceeds its constitutional authority by placing 

an arbitrary time limit on the work of the commission and by retaining jurisdiction 

over the case. Under Section 9(B), if this court invalidates a plan, the reconstitution 

of the commission is self-executing—it occurs automatically and the commission 

is to “convene, and ascertain and determine” a new plan “in conformity with such 

provisions of this constitution as are then valid.” Article XI, Section 9(B), Ohio 

Constitution. 

{¶ 131} Article XI does not authorize this court to control the work of the 

commission. It does not prohibit the commission from using an invalidated plan as 

a starting point as it strives to adopt a valid one. The Constitution is silent on when 

the commission is to hold meetings, adopt rules, hire staff, expend funds, or propose 

or adopt a new plan. Article XI, Section 9(B) contains no such time requirements, 

and it does not provide this court with the authority to create one by ordering the 

commission to adopt a new plan within ten days. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

54 

{¶ 132} Likewise, the majority’s reliance on Article IV, Section 2(B)(1)(f) 

as authority for retaining jurisdiction over these cases and controlling the work of 

the commission is undermined by the plain, unambiguous language of the 

provision. Section 2(B)(1)(f) grants this court “original jurisdiction * * * [i]n any 

cause on review as may be necessary to its complete determination.” Article IV, 

Section 2(B)(1)(f), Ohio Constitution. But this court’s determination of League of 

Women Voters was “complete” when it declared the General Assembly-district plan 

invalid. Because there was nothing left for this court to do, setting a timeline and 

a drop-dead date by which the commission was to act was nothing more than an 

exercise of raw judicial power. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222, 93 S.Ct. 

762, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) (White, J., dissenting). 

D. Article XI, Section 1 Is Not Judicially Enforceable 

{¶ 133} Because petitioners’ Article XI, Sections 6(A) and 6(B) arguments 

fail, it is necessary to address the Bennett petitioners’ remaining objections. 

{¶ 134} In objecting to the revised plan, the Bennett petitioners argue that 

the commission violated Article XI, Section 1(C) by failing to release the proposed 

plan to the public before adopting it, failing to allow members of the public and the 

commission an adequate opportunity to provide input on the proposed plan, and 

failing to hold three public meetings before adopting a plan. However, a violation 

of Section 1(C) does not provide a basis for this court to invalidate a General 

Assembly-district plan. 

{¶ 135} Article XI, Section 9(D)(3) authorizes this court to invalidate a 

General Assembly-district plan only if it determines that the plan violates Article 

XI, Section 2, 3, 4, 5, or 7. Absent from that list is Section 1. The exclusion of a 

violation of Section 1 from the remedy expressly provided by Section 9(D)(3) 

shows that Section 1 is not judicially enforceable. See Scalia & Garner at 107 (the 

inclusion of one is the exclusion of others). As is the case with Section 6, because 

Article XI, Section 9(D)(3) provides no mechanism by which to enforce 
January Term, 2022 

 55 

compliance with Section 1(C), it is a directory requirement that is not judicially 

enforceable. 

{¶ 136} Moreover, to accept the Bennett petitioners’ position would mean 

that this court has the power to strike down a plan for a technical violation of 

Section 1 even if that violation had no palpable effect on the plan itself and did not 

violate any constitutional or federal voter-rights protections. But even the majority 

in League of Women Voters did not go to that extreme. Although it recognized that 

the commission had not complied with Article XI, Section 8(C)(1)(a) because it 

had adopted the original plan a day late, that violation was not a basis for the 

majority to invalidate the plan. __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-65, __ N.E.3d __, at 

¶ 64, fn. 9. 

{¶ 137} For these reasons, the Bennett petitioners’ objection asserting that 

the revised General Assembly-district plan violates Article XI, Section 1(C) should 

be rejected. 

E. The Commission Concedes that There Are Isolated Violations 

of Article XI, Section 3(D)(3) 

{¶ 138} The only actionable claim that the General Assembly-district plan 

is invalid is the Bennett petitioners’ objection that it violates Article XI, Section 

3(D)(3). That provision states that “not more than one municipal corporation or 

township may be split per representative district.” Article XI, Section 3(D)(3), 

Ohio Constitution. 

{¶ 139} The commission concedes that the General Assembly-district plan

splits multiple municipalities in four separate districts. The only relevant evidence 

shows these violations to be minor and to impact only four districts. Revising the 

plan to keep Grove City, Jackson Township, and Copley Township intact would 

affect fewer than 200 residents and would not cause any of these districts to be 

overpopulated or underpopulated. This means that the commission can repair these 

defects in isolation, without affecting any other districts. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

56 

{¶ 140} Having found a technical violation in the revised plan, we turn to 

Article XI’s remedies provision. Section 9(D)(3)(a) provides that for “isolated” 

violations of Section 2, 3, 4, 5, or 7, “the court shall order the commission to amend 

the plan to correct the violation[s].” Article XI, Section 9(D)(3)(a), Ohio 

Constitution. As a consequence, rather than invalidate the revised General 

Assembly-district plan in its entirety, we would order the commission to amend the 

revised plan to correct the improper division of municipalities and townships in 

Districts 5, 10, 31, and 33. 

F. Effects of Unmooring Review from the Plain Language of the Ohio 

Constitution 

{¶ 141} The parties ask this court to intervene in varying ways in the 2022 

election process. The Bennett petitioners ask this court to stay or postpone the 

deadline for filing candidacy petitions and declarations of candidacy for legislative 

offices. The petitioners in League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting 

Comm. (Supreme Court case No. 2021-1193) ask this court to direct the legislature 

to adjust the election schedule. The commission requests that the court issue a 

decision by February 11, 2022, or, alternatively, stay the issuance of a decision until 

the 2022 general-election cycle is complete using the revised plan. 

{¶ 142} The majority, as if existing in a vacuum, asserts that the General 

Assembly has the “authority to ease the pressure * * * by moving the primary 

election.” Majority opinion at ¶ 66. But such a response belies how the 2022 Ohio 

election cycle got to this chaotic state; four members of the Supreme Court of Ohio 

brought us to this juncture—and no one else. 

{¶ 143} Unmoored from the plain language of the Ohio Constitution, the 

majority has now cast uncertainty and confusion into the 2022 election cycle. By 

distorting and misrepresenting the plain language of Article XI, Section 9(B), the 

majority uses a provision that is not judicially enforceable to embolden and 

empower itself to strike down any redistricting map that the commission adopts. It 
January Term, 2022 

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is now what suits the majority’s fancy that determines what is an “attempt” to 

“primarily * * * favor or disfavor a political party,” Section 6(A), and to 

“correspond closely to the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio,” Section 

6(B). And the path of standardless judging that the majority has chosen for Ohio 

leads to its decision today—shifting sands rather than the rule of law, a morass 

surely to follow. Detached from constitutional limitations, the majority uses ad hoc 

rules to usurp the authority of an independent constitutional body. 

{¶ 144} The guidepost of judicial modesty should be recognizing that the 

text of a constitutional provision is supreme. When legislative, executive, or 

administrative bodies ignore the text of the Constitution that sets the limitation of 

their powers, the judiciary stands at the ready to apply the text of the Constitution 

to restore balance. But when it is the judiciary that unmoors itself from the text of 

the Constitution, the rule of law itself is at stake.

G. History Repeats Itself 

{¶ 145} It bears repeating that four members of this court believe it 

reasonable to commandeer the work of the redistricting commission, and they will 

continue to reject any General Assembly-district plan until they get the plan they 

want. The majority stops just short of drawing the new map themselves or directing 

the commission to adopt one of the plans that has been placed in evidence only 

because even they recognize that that is expressly forbidden by Article XI, Section 

9(C)(1) and (2). Nonetheless, one could not blame the commission for wanting to 

yield the map-drawing software to the majority and to let them draw the map, 

because that is what is happening here, albeit by way of a series of orders saying to 

try again. 

{¶ 146} One would also think that after the DeRolph debacle, this court 

would have learned its lesson not to demand that independent constitutional bodies 

heed this court’s ill-defined favor. In DeRolph v. State, 78 Ohio St.3d 193, 677 

N.E.2d 733 (1997) (“DeRolph I”), this court declared Ohio’s system of public-
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58 

school funding unconstitutional. In DeRolph I, this court required the General 

Assembly to create a new public-school-funding system, but it provided no specific 

guidance on how to achieve a constitutional system. Three years later, after several 

changes by the General Assembly, this court declared that the system was still 

unconstitutional. See DeRolph v. State, 89 Ohio St.3d 1, 728 N.E.2d 993 (2000) 

(“DeRolph II”). Again, without giving any specific guidance, this court concluded 

that “even more is required” to create a constitutional public-school-funding 

system. Id. at 36. By the third DeRolph case, this court had decided that saying 

“not good enough” was not good enough, and it attempted to institute some 

parameters for the legislature to follow. See DeRolph v. State, 93 Ohio St.3d 309, 

754 N.E.2d 1184 (2001) (“DeRolph III”). One parameter required the removal of 

wealth screens from the basic funding formula. What some justices expected to 

have a price tag of approximately $400 million actually would have cost the state 

$1.2 billion. See Candisky, Keep funding fix, group says, Columbus Dispatch 

(Sept. 25, 2001) 1B. On reconsideration, the court explained that it had relied on 

faulty information contained in a brief: “Both sides acknowledge in their 

memoranda in support of and opposition to the motion for reconsideration that the 

evidence and one of the briefs filed in DeRolph III contained inaccurate analysis 

regarding the cost of funding the base cost formula with wealth screens eliminated.” 

DeRolph v. State, 93 Ohio St.3d 628, 631, 758 N.E.2d 1113 (2001). 

{¶ 147} How soon the majority forgets that it relied on Dr. Rodden’s plan 

in the first iteration of these cases, when the expert admitted that his plan was 

unconstitutional after this court’s opinion had been published. That plan that the 

majority called “good enough” had predicate violations of Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 

7 and, even then, did not meet the majority’s new concept of proportionality. But 

the majority nonetheless bets the ranch on its reliance on its chosen experts—or at 

least what it cherry-picks from their evidence—even though there seems to be little 

proof that adopting a General Assembly-district plan in accord with its holdings in 
January Term, 2022 

 59 

League of Women Voters and today is remotely possible given the realities of 

Ohio’s political geography. With only ten days to adopt a new plan, there will not 

be time for a DeRolph-type motion for reconsideration to set the majority straight. 

III. CONCLUSION

{¶ 148} The objections filed in this court are, for the most part, not well 

taken. The directory requirements of Article XI, Sections 1 and 6 are not judicially 

enforceable. Regardless, the Ohio Redistricting Commission complied with 

Sections 6(A) and 6(B) in adopting the revised plan, and any failure to comply with 

Section 1(C) was caused by this court’s improper order directing the commission 

to adopt a new plan within ten days. The revised plan does not comply with Section 

3(D)(3), but those isolated violations may be corrected by directing the commission 

to amend the revised plan without affecting its overall validity. For these reasons, 

we dissent from the majority’s decision to invalidate the revised plan. 

_________________ 

FISCHER, J., dissenting.

{¶ 149} I must respectfully dissent. Like the previous majority opinion in 

these cases, this second majority opinion does not follow the text of the Ohio 

Constitution. As stated in my previous dissent, I would not reach the merits of the 

cases. The majority opinion again attempts to exercise authority not granted to this 

court by the state Constitution. See League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio 

Redistricting Comm., __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-65, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 279 

(Fischer, J., dissenting). 

{¶ 150} Because, pursuant to Article XI, Section 8(C)(1)(a) of the Ohio

Constitution, at least two commission members representing each of the two largest 

political parties did not vote for the General Assembly–district plan currently before 

this court, we are once again faced with a four-year plan, which, as petitioners have 

repeatedly conceded, see id. at ¶ 280 (Fischer, J., dissenting), is subject to the 

impasse provisions of Article XI, Section 8. By not following the wording of the 
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60 

Ohio Constitution in Article XI, Section 8(C)(1)(a), the majority opinion impinges 

upon the citizens’ right to vote in two General Assembly elections according to the 

terms of Article XI. 

{¶ 151} Article XI, Section 8 sets forth a precise constitutional roadmap for 

how this state shall proceed in redistricting Ohio House and Ohio Senate districts 

when the Ohio Redistricting Commission sets forth a four-year plan. By not 

following these constitutionally required “directions,” the first majority opinion in 

these cases led this state the wrong way down a one-way street, undermining and 

subverting the purpose of the constitutional roadmap. Today, instead of turning 

around and heading back in the proper constitutional direction imposed by 71 

percent of Ohio’s voters in 2015, the majority opinion doubles down and continues 

driving the state unconstitutionally in the wrong direction, toward a brick wall 

comprising both a panoply of election-related deadlines and a potential 

constitutional crisis. 

{¶ 152} The parties all acknowledge that Article XI, Section 8 applies 

because the redistricting commission has adopted a four-year plan upon an impasse. 

The applicable provision, Section 8(C)(1)(a), makes clear that Section 9 does not 

apply. In fact, Section 9 is not mentioned in that provision, unlike in the provision 

addressing a ten-year plan, Section 8(B), or in the provision addressing a six-year 

plan, Section 8(C)(1)(b): 

(B) If the commission adopts a final general assembly 

district plan in accordance with division (A)(3) of this section by the 

vote required to adopt a plan under division (B)(3) of Section 1 of 

this article, the plan shall take effect upon filing with the secretary 

of state and shall remain effective until the next year ending in the 

numeral one, except as provided in Section 9 of this article. 
January Term, 2022 

 61 

(C)(1)(a) Except as otherwise provided in division (C)(1)(b) 

of this section, if the commission adopts a final general assembly 

district plan in accordance with division (A)(3) of this section by a 

simple majority vote of the commission, and not by the vote required 

to adopt a plan under division (B)(3) of Section 1 of this article, the 

plan shall take effect upon filing with the secretary of state and shall 

remain effective until two general elections for the house of 

representatives have occurred under the plan. 

(b) If the commission adopts a final general assembly district 

plan in accordance with division (A)(3) of this section by a simple 

majority vote of the commission, and not by the vote required to 

adopt a plan under division (B) of Section 1 of this article, and that 

plan is adopted to replace a plan that ceased to be effective under 

division (C)(1)(a) of this section before a year ending in the numeral 

one, the plan adopted under this division shall take effect upon filing 

with the secretary of state and shall remain effective until a year 

ending in the numeral one, except as provided in Section 9 of this 

article. 

(Emphasis added.) Ohio Constitution, Article XI, Section 8. A four-year plan does 

not constitutionally come before this court, because there are no Section 9 

exceptions in the Constitution’s text in Section 8(C)(1)(a), as Article XI was 

designed to keep this court out of a four-year-plan dispute. By adjudicating this 

dispute without the state Constitution’s calling upon this court to do so, the two 

majority opinions have created the exact issues and problems that this court now 

faces in these cases upon their return. 

{¶ 153} In doing so, the majority opinion is seemingly more interested in 

making policy than enforcing the Constitution’s text as written. The majority 
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62 

opinion outlines a policy preference for a specific type of plan/map that the 

Constitution does not require. Under this state’s Constitution, specifically Article 

XI, that policy choice must be made by the Ohio Redistricting Commission (a 

constitutionally created entity), not this court (a separately created constitutional 

institution). 

{¶ 154} While I still conclude that we do not have the constitutional 

authority to review this four-year plan, see League of Women Voters of Ohio, __ 

Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-65, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 280-301 (Fischer, J., dissenting), 

because the majority opinion does review the plan, I am forced to respond, to an 

extent, on the merits, as I was forced to do in State v. Gonzales, 150 Ohio St.3d 

276, 2017-Ohio-777, 81 N.E.3d 419, ¶ 24, 29 (Fischer, J., concurring in part and 

dissenting in part), and State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 489, 2017-Ohio-2956, 83 

N.E.3d 883, ¶ 51 (Fischer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 

{¶ 155} Notably, Article XI, Section 6(B) of the Ohio Constitution uses the 

term “favor”—not “substantially favor,” “significantly favor,” or “assuredly 

favor.” The Constitution does not set forth when a plan crosses the threshold to 

having been drawn “primarily to favor” a political party. See Ohio Constitution, 

Article XI, Section 6(A). The majority opinion evinces a desire to create a 

requirement—one not found anywhere in Article XI—that a political party be 

guaranteed to have (or that a political party not be guaranteed to have) a certain 

number of seats in the Ohio House and Ohio Senate. Not only does the majority 

opinion seek to create a requirement regarding the number of seats, it also implies 

a requirement that the plan meet certain percentage thresholds, which are also not 

found in Article XI. The Ohio Supreme Court should not, and lacks any 

constitutional authority to, determine winners and losers of elections, but this 

majority opinion creates that authority without supporting constitutional text. In 

finding the two four-year plans adopted by the commission unconstitutional for the 

reasons set forth in the majority opinions, this court is attempting to do just that—
January Term, 2022 

 63 

determine winners and losers of elections—which, again, it is not permitted to do. 

By effectively ordering the commission to adopt a plan meeting very specific 

criteria not set forth in the Ohio Constitution, the majority opinion is effectively 

and unconstitutionally usurping authority over creating a plan. In doing so, the 

majority opinion once again breaches the separation-of-powers principles inherent 

in the Ohio Constitution. See League of Women Voters of Ohio at ¶ 339 (Fischer, 

J., dissenting). 

{¶ 156} As explained in the first dissenting opinion herein, in disregarding 

the separation-of-powers principles, the majority opinion sets up another de facto 

DeRolph situation. Dissenting opinion of Kennedy and DeWine, JJ., ¶ 146, citing 

DeRolph v. State, 78 Ohio St.3d 193, 677 N.E.2d 733 (1997); DeRolph v. State, 89 

Ohio St.3d 1, 728 N.E.2d 993 (2000); and DeRolph v. State, 93 Ohio St.3d 309, 

754 N.E.2d 1184 (2001). By reaching beyond this court’s authority in declaring 

the two redistricting plans unconstitutional, the majority opinion creates a 

constitutional crisis within the state government. The unconstitutional approach of 

the majority opinion continues to undermine this court’s independence, 

impartiality, and reputation for integrity. 

{¶ 157} The bottom line is obvious. If the majority opinion had followed 

the specific wording of Article XI, Section 8, which logically follows from the rest 

of the text of Article XI, this court would: (1) be abiding by and respecting the 

constitutional requirements and structure of Article XI, (2) not be interfering in 

Ohioans’ voting rights, (3) not be creating unauthorized deadlines for the Ohio 

Redistricting Commission, and (4) not be forcing the General Assembly to alter 

candidate nominating laws. Moreover, this dispute would be dealt with after two 

more General Assembly elections—as set forth in Article XI, Section 8(C)(1)(a)’s 

requirement that four-year plans “shall remain effective until two general elections 

for the house of representatives have occurred under the plan.” (Emphasis added.) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

64 

{¶ 158} Moreover, as noted in my previous dissenting opinion in these 

cases, League of Women Voters of Ohio, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-65, __ 

N.E.3d __, at ¶ 340, and as acknowledged in the majority opinion, majority opinion 

at ¶ 29, the standard of proof in these cases is beyond a reasonable doubt. 

{¶ 159} Petitioners have not reached that high standard as a matter of fact 

or of law. The first dissenting opinion contains a detailed analysis supporting the 

conclusions that the plan currently before us was not drawn primarily to favor or 

disfavor a political party under Article XI, Section 6(A) and that the commission 

attempted to comply with Article XI, Section 6(B). This reasoned analysis raises 

more than a reasonable doubt as to whether, under the facts currently before us, the 

commission failed to comply with Article XI, Section 6. Thus, the facts before us 

show a highly and closely contested case in which neither side has carried the day. 

Petitioners, who have the heavy burden, could not carry a clear-and-convincing 

burden nor meet a preponderance standard and thus can never reach and carry a 

beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden. Because petitioners have not satisfied the 

undisputed burden of proof in these cases of beyond a reasonable doubt, this court 

cannot invalidate the plan on this basis, although it purports to do so. 

{¶ 160} As detailed in the first dissenting opinion, the evidence submitted 

shows only a few technical problems that are within this court’s authority to 

address, assuming this court has any authority at all at this time in these cases. 

Those technical flaws could easily be corrected by the commission (and, notably, 

by February 11, 2022, the date on which respondents assert that House and Senate 

districts must be finalized in order for the election process to proceed on schedule). 

By moving beyond those limited technical problems and invalidating the entire 

plan, in an unconstitutional attempt to impose its policy decisions upon the Ohio 

Redistricting Commission, the majority opinion directly impinges upon Ohioans’ 

right to vote. 
January Term, 2022 

 65 

{¶ 161} The majority opinion forces its policy viewpoints on a 

constitutional institution created by 71 percent of the voters of Ohio, violates the 

separation-of-powers principles inherent in the Ohio Constitution, and violates 

long-standing Ohio Supreme Court case law that proof of a constitutional violation 

in this situation must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt; therefore, it undermines 

this court’s independence, impartiality, and integrity. For these reasons, I must 

respectfully dissent. 

_________________ 

ACLU of Ohio Foundation, Inc., Freda J. Levenson, and David J. Carey; 

American Civil Liberties Union, Alora Thomas, and Julie A. Ebenstein; and 

Covington & Burling, L.L.P., Robert D. Fram, Donald Brown, Joshua González, 

Juliana Goldrosen, David Denuyl, L. Brady Bender, Alex Thomson, Anupam 

Sharma, and Yale Fu, for petitioners in case No. 2021-1193. 

McTigue, Colombo & Clinger, L.L.C., Donald J. McTigue, and Derek S. 

Clinger; and Elias Law Group, L.L.P., Abha Khanna, Ben Stafford, Jyoti Jasrasaria, 

and Spencer W. Klein, for petitioners in case No. 2021-1198. 

Reed Smith, L.L.P., Peter M. Ellis, M. Patrick Yingling, Brian A. 

Sutherland, Ben R. Fliegel, Brad A. Funari, and Danielle L. Stewart; and Brennan 

Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, Alicia L. Bannon, Yurij 

Rudensky, Michael Li, Harry Black, and Ethan Herenstein, for petitioners in case 

No. 2021-1210. 

Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Organ Law, L.L.P., Erik J. Clark, and 

Ashley Merino, special counsel to Attorney General Dave Yost, for respondent 

Ohio Redistricting Commission. 

Senator Vernon Sykes and House Minority Leader Allison Russo, pro se. 

_________________