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******************************************************KETTLE BROOK REALTY, LLC v. TOWN OF EAST WINDSOR (AC 36817)
Lavine, Beach and Prescott, Js. Argued April 8—officially released July 21, 2015 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Hon. Arnold W. Aronson, judge trial referee.)
Jonathan M. Starble, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Laura A. Cardillo, with whom, on the brief, was Tiffany K. Spinella, for the appellee (defendant).Opinion LAVINE, J. The plaintiff, Kettle Brook Realty, LLC, appeals from thejudgment ofthe trial court dismissing itsrealestatetaxappeal.1 Onappeal, theplaintiffclaims thatthe trial courtimproperly concludedthat, pursuant to General Statutes § 12-117a,2 it was required to serve the defendant, the TownofEastWindsor (town), within two months of the date notice of a decision by its BoardofAssessmentAppeals (board) wasmailed. More particularly, the plaintiffclaims that (1) it met the filing and service requirements of § 12-177a and (2) the court failedto distinguishproperlytheproceduraldifferences between § 12-117a and common-law civil actions. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. There is no dispute with regard to the following underlying facts. The plaintiffis the owner ofreal property located at 96 Prospect Hill Road in the town. With regard to the town’s Grand List as of October 1, 2012, the town’s tax assessor valued the plaintiff’s property at $4,089,130. The plaintiff appealed the assessment of thepropertytotheboardandappearedbeforetheboard to request a reduction in the assessment. On April 29, 2013, the board denied the plaintiff’s request for a change of the assessment. The assessor mailed the board’s decision to the plaintiff on May 1, 2013.
On June 28, 2013, the plaintiff filed an application in the Superior Court. The application was titled ‘‘Complaint’’ and bore a return date ofJuly 23, 2013. On July 10, 2013, amarshal served the application, citation, and recognizance on the town and on July 17, 2013, filed the return of service in court. On August 14, 2013, the town filed amotionto dismissthe appeal onthe ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff had failed to serve the appeal within two months of the date notice of the board’s decision was mailed. The plaintiff opposed the motion to dismiss contending that there is § 12-117a does not require a tax appeal to be served within two months of the board’s decision and that §12-117a ‘‘clearly requires atax appealbe commencedbyfiling an application with the court within two months after the town’s action.’’ (Emphasis in original.) The parties appeared before the court to argue the town’s motion to dismiss. The courtissued amemorandum ofdecision
on April 14, 2014, in which it granted the motion.
Inadjudicatingthemotionto dismiss, the courtstated that the present case is a companion case to Chestnut Point Realty, LLCv. East Windsor, in which the same issue was considered and decided by the court. The court found that the pertinent facts in the Chestnut Point Realty case are the same as the facts in the present case. The trial court stated that the key issue in both cases ‘‘is whether § 12-117a requires the filing of
an application ofappealto the courtwithintwo monthsfollowing the date of the notice from the [board] or whether § 12-117a requires service ofprocess upon the town in order to effect a proper appeal.’’ The court concluded that service ofprocess is necessary to commence an appeal pursuant to § 12-117a.
In its memorandum of decision, the trial court referredtoitsanalysisinitsmemorandumofdecisionin adjudicatingthe motionto dismiss filed inthe Chestnut PointRealty, LLC, case. The court notedthatthe plaintiff had isolated one term in the statute and taken it out of context, as did the plaintiff in Chestnut Point Realty, LLC

. The court stated that a statute must be read as a whole, rather than in separate parts. See Wiseman v. Armstrong, 269 Conn. 802, 810, 850 A.2d 114 (2004). The court granted the town’s motion to dismiss because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to the plaintiff’s failure to serve the town within two months notice of the board’s decision.
The claims raised in the present appeal are identical tothoseraisedinthe companioncase ofChestnutPoint Realty, LLC v. East Windsor, 158 Conn. App. 565, A.3d (2015), which we also decide today. Our decision in that case controls the present appeal.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 This case was heard with Chestnut Point Realty, LLC v. East Windsor, 158 Conn. App. 577, A.3d (2015). Although they are substantively related, the two cases were considered separately and have been reported separately.

2 General Statutes § 12-117a provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person

. . . claiming to be aggrieved by the action of the

. . . board of assessment appeals

. . . may, within two months from the date ofthe mailing ofnotice of such action, make application, in the nature of an appeal therefrom

. . . to the superior court

. . . which shall be accompanied by a citation to such town

. . . to appear before said court. Such citation shall be signed by the

same authority and such appeal shall be returnable at the same time and served and returned inthe same manner as is required in case ofasummons in a civil action.

. . .’’