J-S39026-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIAM FRANK STRINE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 492 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 12, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-67-CR-0002304-2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 09, 2023

William Frank Strine (“Appellant”) appeals from the judgment of 

sentence of 72 hours to 6 months’ incarceration, imposed after he was 

convicted of one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”).

1

 Appellant 

alleges the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. We affirm. 

We reproduce the Commonwealth’s factual summary of the incident 

which led to Appellant’s conviction:

On January 6, 2020, Officer Steven Knickel was out on patrol in 

Northern York County. Officer Knickel noticed a vehicle heading 

north[,] swerving across the lanes, going onto the shoulder of the 

roadway multiple times[,] and failing to use any signals for lane 

changes. The vehicle then sped up to what the officer estimated 

to be 92 miles per hour, in a 55 mile per hour zone. 

Officer Knickel subsequently pulled the vehicle over; upon 

approach, the officer had to instruct the driver to place the vehicle 

in park. It was determined that [Appellant] was the driver and 

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1 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2).
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sole occupant. [Appellant] was jittery, talkative, and “all over the 

place;” he also exhibited some paranoia. When asked if he was 

under the influence of drugs or alcohol, [Appellant] acknowledged 

that he had prescriptions for Suboxone and Adderall. [Appellant] 

advised he had taken his Suboxone earlier in the day and then 

indicated he actually had another prescription, mumbling 

“something about Oxycodone.” 

[Appellant] was then asked to exit the vehicle. His movements 

were very uncoordinated, and he appeared unsure of his footing. 

The officer had [Appellant] perform standard field sobriety tests 

on the side of the road, which was flat and level; there were no 

adverse weather conditions at the time and traffic was light. 

During the Modified Romberg test, [Appellant] exhibited a sway 

side to side or forward to backwards and estimated 30 seconds at 

20 seconds. [Appellant] next attempted the walk and turn test; 

he had an extremely difficult time just getting into starting 

position, with Officer Knickel describing his efforts as looking “like 

an individual walking a tight rope.” [Appellant] was unable to stay 

in the instructional position, leaving it multiple times and using his 

hands for balance. The test was stopped almost as soon as 

[Appellant] began it to ensure no one would get hurt due to the 

severe issue he was having trying to complete the test. 

[Appellant] next attempted the one-leg stand test. During the 

test, he used his arms, had extreme difficulty getting into position, 

put his foot down, hopped, and failed to follow directions by 

putting his hands in front of himself rather than down at his sides. 

Following [Appellant’s] failure to successfully complete the 

standardized field sobriety tests, Officer Knickel contacted the 

Harrisburg barracks for an on-duty Drug Recognition Expert 

(DRE). [Appellant] indicated he was willing to meet with the DRE 

and do some additional tests, so the officer transported him to the 

Harrisburg barracks, arriving about 4 a.m., roughly an hour after 

the initial stop. The DRE performed “most of those same tests 

again in a controlled-level environment in a room at the 

Harrisburg station[,]” as well as an additional “finger-to-nose” 

test. At the conclusion of the testing, Officer Knickel believed 

[Appellant] to be impaired. When asked, [Appellant] agreed to 

submit to a blood test, which was completed at 5:34 a.m.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 6-8 (citations to record omitted). 
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The Commonwealth further summarized the procedural history of this 

matter as follows:

On February 10, 2020, [Appellant] was charged by the 

Pennsylvania State Police with [DUI] and attendant traffic 

summaries for [the] incident that occurred on January 6, 2020. 

The charges were held for court following a preliminary hearing 

on June 15, 2020. [Appellant] was then formally charged by 

Information on July 9, 2020, with two counts of DUI, both graded 

as ungraded misdemeanors, and four traffic summary offenses. 

A non-jury trial was held on ... July 29, 2021. Following testimony, 

[Appellant] was convicted of one count of [DUI,] as well as the 

four traffic violations. He was then sentenced on the DUI to 72 

hours to [6] months in York County Prison, payment of court costs

and a $1,000 fine, and completion of DUI conditions; he was 

ordered to pay a fine and court costs on each summary offense. 

On October 22, 2021, [Appellant] filed a post-sentence motion;

the sole claim raised was that his verdict was against the weight 

of the evidence. The [trial] court then denied [his] motion on 

February 22, 2022. 

Id. at 5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

On March 24, 2022, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, followed 

by a timely, court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal. The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on the 

same day, in which it incorporated its February 24, 2022 opinion in support of 

its order denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion. On appeal, Appellant 

presents the following, sole issue for our review: “Whether the trial court 

abused its discretion when it held the verdict was not against the weight of 

the evidence where the greater weight of the evidence showed [Appellant] 

was not impaired by Adderall consumption and the trial court’s decision was 

manifestly unreasonable[?]” Appellant’s Brief at 4. 
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We review a weight of the evidence claim according to the following 

standard:

A claim alleging the verdict was against the weight of the evidence 

is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. Accordingly, an 

appellate court reviews the exercise of the trial court’s discretion; 

it does not answer for itself whether the verdict was against the 

weight of the evidence. It is well settled that the [fact-finder] is 

free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine 

the credibility of the witnesses, and a new trial based on a weight 

of the evidence claim is only warranted where the ... verdict is so 

contrary to the evidence that it shocks one’s sense of justice. In 

determining whether this standard has been met, appellate review 

is limited to whether the trial judge’s discretion was properly 

exercised, and relief will only be granted where the facts and 

inferences of record disclose a palpable abuse of discretion. 

Commonwealth v. Tejada, 107 A.3d 788, 795-96 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(citation and brackets omitted). 

Instantly, Appellant claims his DUI conviction was against the weight of 

the evidence, which he maintains “demonstrated [his] driving was due to his 

belief he was being followed” — not impairment by Adderall consumption —

and that “[h]is performance on the field sobriety tests was due to 

environmental factors, his anxiety, and his footwear.” Appellant’s Brief at 15-

16. Appellant explains that “his weaving and increased speed were attempts 

to verify [his] belief” that someone was following him. Id. at 21. He states 

that the evidence establishes he was, in fact, being followed at the time he 

was pulled over — albeit by the police — and that it was his belief that he was 

being followed — not his Adderall consumption — that caused him to violate 

numerous traffic laws. Id. at 22. Additionally, Appellant asserts that the field 
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sobriety tests were not developed to determine Adderall impairment. Id. at 

16.

In support of his argument, Appellant points to the testimony of Dr. 

Guzzardi, an expert in medical toxicology. Dr. Guzzardi indicated that 

Appellant has a chronic paranoid personality and that his “unusual thought 

processes ... are independent of the use of amphetamine[,] which is prescribed 

for [Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (‘ADHD’)].” Id. at 18 (citation 

omitted). Dr. Guzzardi also asserted that the field sobriety tests administered 

on Appellant were not validated to test for impairment due to an 

amphetamine. Id. at 23 (citing Appellant’s Exhibit 1 at 11-12 (Dr. Guzzardi’s 

Expert Report concluding that neither the walk and turn test or the one-leg 

stand test are able to measure impairment by drugs)). He concluded, “there 

is no evidence that indicates ... [Appellant’s] use of amphetamines caused any 

impairments that could be significant enough to affect his ability to safely drive 

a motor vehicle.” Id. at 19. 

The trial court did not find Dr. Guzzardi credible, however, and stated 

that his contention regarding the lack of evidence to establish Appellant’s 

impairment by Adderall consumption was “wholly without merit and belied by 

the other evidence of record.” Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 2/24/22, at 8, 10. 

The court also opined that it did not find Appellant’s excuses for his erratic 

driving and his poor performance on the field sobriety tests to be credible. Id.

at 2 (dismissing Appellant’s excuses that he was feeling anxious because he 

believed someone was following him, that he was changing lanes to confirm 
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this belief, and that environmental conditions affected his ability to perform 

the sobriety tests). 

In support of its denial of Appellant’s post-sentence motion, the trial 

court explained:

[Appellant] was convicted of DUI under Subsection 3802(d)(2), 

which provides, in pertinent part:

(d) Controlled substances. – An individual may not drive, 

operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of 

a vehicle under any of the following circumstances: ...

(2) The individual is under the influence of a drug or 

combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the 

individual’s ability to safely drive, operate or be in actual 

physical control of the movement of the vehicle. 

75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2). Pursuant to this statute, whether or not 

the amphetamine in [Appellant’s] system was the result of 

prescription medication he was taking, and whether or not 

[Appellant] was taking the prescribed dosage for that medication, 

has no bearing on his conviction. 

Id. at 4-5. 

At trial, Ayako Chan-Hosokawa, a forensic toxicologist at NMS Labs, 

testified for the Commonwealth. Id. at 2. 

Ms. Chan-Hosokawa testified that she prepared a toxicology 

report ... regarding [Appellant’s] blood sample. The parties 

stipulated to the chain of custody of [Appellant’s] blood, to the 

authenticity of the report, and to the testing on the blood sample. 

In regard to [Appellant’s] blood sample, Ms. Chan-Hosokawa 

testified [that] ... [s]he found amphetamine at a concentration of 

230 plus or minus 50 nanograms per milliliter in [Appellant’s] 

blood[.]

Id. at 3 (citations to record omitted). She further stated:

100 nanograms per milliliter is the most common observation in 

the blood when somebody gets prescription amphetamines[.] ... 
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While she has seen someone prescribed enough amphetamine to 

get the level [Appellant] had in his blood, if someone [was] not 

prescribed that much or if somebody [was] overusing that 

medication, some of the symptoms of impairment would be 

agitation, fast speech, even maybe hallucinogenic type of 

behavior. Moreover, Ms. Chan-Hosokawa testified that simply 

because a particular drug that can cause impairment is being 

prescribed and used at a therapeutic level does not lead to the 

conclusion that therefore no impairment can occur as a result of 

the use of that drug at that level.

Id. at 5 (some paragraph breaks omitted). 

Ms. Chan-Hosokawa explained:

Amphetamine is a stimulant[.] Some signs of impairment that 

you would see with someone under the influence of amphetamine 

are agitation, hallucination, fast speech, and maybe poor 

balance[.] ... After listening to the testimony and watching the 

DVD that was played in [c]ourt[,] which showed [Appellant’s] field 

sobriety tests, she testified that [Appellant’s] actions were 

consistent with impairment as a result of amphetamine use, 

including: [Appellant’s] speeding; [Appellant’s] weaving; 

[Appellant’s] switching lanes without signaling; [Appellant’s] poor 

balance; [Appellant’s] agitated speech; and [Appellant’s] 

hallucinogenic behavior like having someone following him.

Id. at 3 (citations to record and paragraph breaks omitted). The trial court 

found Ms. Chan-Hosokawa’s testimony to be credible. Id.

The trial court also found Trooper Knickel’s testimony regarding 

Appellant’s behavior on the date of the incident credible and in direct contrast 

to Dr. Guzzardi’s assertion that there is no evidence indicating Appellant’s use 

of amphetamines caused any impairments that would be significant enough 
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to affect his ability to safely drive a motor vehicle. Id. at 8.2 Specifically, the 

trial court relied on the following testimony:

[Trooper Knickel] saw [Appellant’s] vehicle jut to the side and then 

come back over; he observed the vehicle swerving all over the 

roadway; he saw the vehicle go across both lanes of traffic and 

then cut back across both lanes of traffic onto the shoulder, and 

then back onto the roadway; [Appellant’s] vehicle accelerated up 

to 92 miles per hour in a 55 miles per hour zone; there were a 

few times where the vehicle left its lane, came back into its lane, 

and went onto the shoulder of the roadway; and at no point did 

[Appellant] signal for a lane change when doing so. 

Id. (paragraph breaks, bullet points, unnecessary capitalization, and citation 

to record omitted). 

Trooper Knickel further observed:

[Appellant] was very jittery, all over the place, very talkative, and 

hard to follow; [he] exhibited some paranoia; when [Appellant] 

got out of the car, he was very uncoordinated, unsure of his 

footing, and his movements in general were very uncoordinated; 

and when [he] stopped his vehicle, he did not place the vehicle in 

park and had to be told to do so. 

Id. at 9 (paragraph breaks, bullet points, unnecessary capitalization, and 

citation to record omitted). 

Regarding the field sobriety tests Appellant was asked to perform, 

Trooper Knickel testified:

The road where [Appellant] was asked to perform these tests was 

a very flat, paved road[.] It was not raining and there were no 

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2 See also id. (noting that Trooper Knickel has been with the State Police for 

four and a half years; has been trained in regard to impaired drivers and 

Advanced Roadside Impaired Driving Enforcement (“ARIDE”); is certified in 

administering standard field sobriety tests; and has been involved in 

approximately 300-400 DUI investigations). 
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other adverse weather conditions that night[.] During the 

Modified Romberg test[, Appellant] swayed a little from side to 

side or forward to backwards ... [and his] estimation of 30 seconds 

was actually around 20 seconds. During the walk and turn test[, 

Appellant] could not maintain the instructional phase and left that 

position a couple of times[. He] used his hands for balance[,] and 

Trooper Nickel [sic] had to stop the test when [Appellant] started 

to begin it because he was having such a difficult time and the 

Trooper did not want him to get hurt. In regard to the one-leg 

stand test[, Appellant] was using his arms and having an 

extremely difficult time[. Appellant] put his foot down[] and was 

hopping, trying not to fall over[. He] did not perform the test as 

instructed[. Appellant’s] hands were in front of him instead of at 

his sides[.] At the conclusion of these tests, Trooper Knickel told 

[Appellant] that he believed him to be impaired. 

Id. at 9-10 (paragraph breaks, bullet points, unnecessary capitalization, and 

citation to record omitted). 

Finally, regarding Dr. Guzzardi’s claim that field sobriety tests have not 

been validated to test for impairment by drugs, the trial court noted that Dr. 

Guzzardi is an expert in the field of medical toxicology, not forensic toxicology. 

Id. at 5-6. It further stated that even if Dr. Guzzardi’s contention is true, field 

sobriety tests continue to be used in DUI cases as evidence of impairment. 

Moreover, “it is common knowledge that field sobriety tests are used to assess 

an individual’s motor skills and divided attention necessary for driving a motor 

vehicle.” Id. at 6. See also Commonwealth v. Griffith, 32 A.3d 1231, 

1240 (Pa. 2011) (concluding that an experienced police officer’s observation 

of the appellee’s “behavior, demeanor, unsteadiness, and inability to perform 

field sobriety tests, all of which led him to request laboratory tests for the 

detection of controlled substances in [the a]ppellee’s blood[,]” was sufficient 
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evidence to establish that the appellee was under the influence of a drug or 

combination of drugs to a degree that impaired her ability to safely drive). 

It is undisputed that Appellant had amphetamine in his system in the 

amount specified by Ms. Chan-Hosokawa. TCO at 6. Based on this fact, along 

with the testimony of Trooper Knickel and Ms. Chan-Hosokawa, and what 

could be seen on the motor video recording, the trial court concluded that the 

Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was driving 

impaired as a result of those amphetamines. Id. 

Assessing all the evidence according to the governing principles cited 

above, we simply cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion 

when it found that the verdict did not shock its conscience and denied 

Appellant’s motion for a new trial. Consequently, Appellant’s weight challenge 

fails. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 03/09/2023