# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 30 , 20 20 * Decided May 4 , 20 20

Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK , Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES , Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE , Circuit Judge
No. 19

- 3454

LAMONTE A. EALY , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v

.

BREA GRIFFIN , et al. , Defendant s

- Appellee s

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin

.

No

. 1 9

- C

- 1630

William C. Griesbach , Judge

.

O R D E R
Lamonte Ealy, a Wisconsin prisoner, sued police officers , prosecutors, his defense attorneys, and others under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on events occurring before, during, and after his criminal trial. The district court dismissed the complaint at screening for failing to state a claim , 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and w e affirm.

* The district court dismissed the complaint in this case at screening before any defendant had appeared. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The appellees are not participating in this appeal. We agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the brief and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2)(C)

. NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 1 9

- 3454 Page 2

Ealy a ccuses nearly every one involved with his criminal case of violating his constitutional rights. H is arrest , he alleges, lack ed probable cause because it was based on a witness’s lies to the police

. E vidence obtained from his home under a search
warrant supported by those lies , he continues , was illegally acquired by the police , improperly used by prosecut ors , and should have been objected to by his lawyers

. He concludes that he was then wrongfully convicted based on insufficient ev idence

. Ealy

s eeks “ injunctive relief ” from his criminal judgment and damages from the defendants

.

The judge dismissed his complaint at screening as legally deficient. Regarding the police who arrested him and searched his home, the judge explained, Ealy did not allege that the y knew that the information on which they relied w as false

. The judge reasoned that the prosecutors were immune from suit because Ealy’s allegations concerned only their prosecutorial duties. And h is defense attorneys and witnesses at his trial were not state actors subject to liability under § 1983

. Finally, for the remaining defendants , Ealy raised no allegations relevant to any of his claims

.

On a ppeal Ealy argues that his criminal conviction s “can’t be upheld

. ” He protests that the jury’s verdicts were inconsistent and his punishment was impermissibly based on multiplicitous counts

. But in so arguing Ealy is contesting the validity of his conviction s and sentence , so his sole federal remedy is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, not a § 1983 action. See Preiser v. Rodriguez , 411 U.S. 475, 489, 500 (1973).

Ealy also argues that he adequately pleaded damages claims against the police for arrest ing him based on a witness’s lies and against his attorneys and state prosecutor for accepting those lies

. These claims have insuperable fatal flaws. First, t o the extent that Ealy alleges that the same witness ’s “lies” that led to his arrest were also repeated at trial and necessarily produced his conviction, proof of these claim s would necessarily imply the invalidity of his still

- intact conviction and run afoul of Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). See Okoro v . Callaghan , 324 F.3d 488, 489

– 90 (7th Cir. 2003). Second, police acquire probable cause to arrest when an eyewitness states that a crime occurred , just as Ealy alleges happened here , unless the police have good reason to doubt the veracity of the statement. Askew v. City of Chicago , 440 F.3d 894 , 895

– 96 ( 7 th Cir. 2006). But Ealy does not specify in his complaint any information known to the arresting officer t hat undermined the witness ’s report . I n his brief on appeal, he argues tha t the officer “ knew or should have known ” that the witness was lying because the officer “ recklessly disregarded the truth and accurate information. ” This is a legal conclusion that is still devoid of any factual information known to the officer

. “ WhileNo. 1 9

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legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint , they must be supported by factual allegations .” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Finally , apart from the obst acle of Heck , the judge correctly observed that prosecutors are absol utely immune for pros ecutorial decisions, Imbler v. Pachtman , 424 U.S. 409 , 430

– 31 ( 1976) , and (with exceptions not applicable here) defense attorneys are not state actors subject to suit under § 1983, Polk C ounty v. Dodson , 454 U.S. 312 , 325 (1981).

This appeal counts as a second “strike” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

AFFIRMED