ORNEY GENERAL

OFTEXAS

June 6, 1962

Plr.F. A. Taylor OpinionNo. Wi-1346 County Auditor Brazoria County Re: Payment of claims for Angleton,Texas equipment,materials and suppliesused in construction of county roads, and Dear Mr. Taylor: related questions.

Your request for an opinion asks the following questions:
"(1) Upon the refusal of the CountyRoad

Administratorto certify that the equipment, material, and supplieshave been received, and that the chargesmade for the same are correct,
can I, as County Auditor,pay the bills even If ordered to do so by the Commissioners'Court?
"(2) What are my dutieswith reference to investigationto determinewhether or not these bills are proper and that the County did in fact receive the material, equipment,and supplies? "(3) Can the Commissioners'Court of Brazorla County under the OptionalRoad Law act as a factfinding body and certify the facts to me that the equipment,material, and serviceswere delivered and performed and that the charges fop the same are correctwhen the County Road Administratorrefuses tomake such certificationon the grounds that he has no Informationavailableupon which to base such certification,and such equipment,materials and supplieswere not ordered, authorized, or ratifiedby him?
"(4) After the recent 'HurricaneCarla' the Federal Qovernmentgranted Brazorla County a specific sum of money for the alleviation of hardship, public health, and the restoration of bridges, roada, and highways. When bills are lncurred'under this Orant,whose duty Is It to certify tome the facts necessary to qhow that the particular servicesMr. F. A. Taylor, page 2 (WW-1346)

and materials come under this Grant and Aid when the County Road Administratorrefuses to do 80 on the ground that he has no knowledge of the goods having been delivered or the materials having been furnished OF the labor having been performed?"

The statutesof this State confer the powers to build and maintain the county roads upon the commissionerscourt and the commissioners court in discharging Its dutymust consider the needs of the county as a whole: Canales v; Laughlin, 14~7 Tex: 169, 214 S.W.2d 451 256, 103 S.W.2d 363 (1937 1948); Stovall Shivers 129 ; Guerra 'v.Rod&uez; 234 S.W.%xb15 (Civ.App.1951). In Querra v. Rodriguez, supra, it was held:

"Article2351,~Vernon's'Ann.Clv.Stats., places general control over all county roads in the CommIaslonerslCourt,but various statutes have provided speolalmethods by whloh the court may perform or delegate these functions. Tanales v. Laughlin, 147 Tex. 169, 214 S.W.2d 451, 457. (1) Itmay let the work on contract to independent contractors. Vernon's Ann.Civ.Stats. (2) ItmayA~~~oZ3an
overseer for each PO&~ precinct and designate all hands'liable to work on public roads. Arts. 6718-6736, 6739, 6755. (3) Itmay employ not more than four road commissioners. Arts. 6737-6742. (4) It may appoint a road superintendentfor the county or one for each precinct. Arts. 6743-6761. (5) Provided the county has forty thousand inhabitants, themembers of the Commissioners' Court shallbe ex-officio road commissionersof their respectiveprecincts. Art. 6762. (6) It may employ a County Road Engineerwith broad statutorypowers In the event the county by an election determines to adopt the Optional County Road Law of 1947. Art. 6716-1,”

In IXlnbar,v.

Brazoria County 224 S.W.2d 738 (Civ.App.
error ref.7. the court. In consider&z the auestion of whether1949,

the county.road engineer of Brazorla i?ounty,- employedpursuant to the OptionalRoad Law adopted by Brazorla County,was a public officer, stated:m. F. A. Taylor, page 3 (if-1346)

“After the hearing of the charges against appellant, the CommissionersCourt entered an order removinghim from the office of County Road Engineer.

“Article6716-1, Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes, Acts 50th Legislature, 1947, Chapter 178, page 288, authorizes the employment of a County Road’Englneer to have general supervision of the roads’

of a county, if the provisions of the statute are adopted by a majority vote of its qualifiedvoters,
“Sections‘1and 2 of the Artltile are not, we’think, ‘materialto the consideration of the instant case. Sedtlon 3 of said Article vests the construction ‘andmaintenande’of county roads In the co,unty’road departmentand provides that it shall be composed of the Commissioners Court *as the policy-determiningbody* the County Road Engineer ‘as,,the

chief executive officers,’ and other administrativepersonnel and road employees.

“Section4 of said Articleprovides that the administration of the road department shall be
on the basis of the,county as a~.whole without regard to Commissioners’precincts.

“Section5 provides that: ‘TheCounty Roads Engineer shall be appointedby the Commissioners Court. He shall be a licensedprofessional engineer, experienced in road constructionand maintenance,who shallmeet the qualificationsrequired by the State Highway Department for its county engineers.’

“Section6 provides for salary of not to exceed $7200per year, the exact amount to be determined by the Commissioners Court, out of the road and bridge fund of the county.
“Section7 provides that: ‘TheCounty Road Engineer shall hold his position for an indefinite term and may be removed by a majority vote of the CommissionersCourt. Removal shall not become effectiveuntil thirty (30)days after he shallMr. **F.** A. Taylor, page 4 (~~-1346)

have been notified'inwriting **of** the Intention of the'CommIasioneraCourt to remove him, and until after a public 'hearingonthe question of"his~removal shallhave been held, if such a hearing is requestedby 017 the Commissioners &- Court in writing by the ounty Road Engineer.'

"Section8 provides that In the absence or inability of the County Road Engineer to perform his duties, the CommissionersCourtmay designate a qualified administrativeofficer to perform these duties during such absence or inability.
11

. . .
'Worn an analysis of said Article 6716-1, It Is, we think, apparent that the legislature intended In enacting the Statute to make the County Road Engineer a member of the.administratlve'personnelof the County Road Department-and not an officer as contemplated in Article'l6, Section 30 of the Constitution of this State.

"The~Artlcleprovides that the County Road Engineer shallhold his 'positionfor an indeflnlte term and that he may be removed by a majority vote of the CommissionersCourt."

It Is apparent from Bunbar v. Braxorla County, su ra that the construction and maintenance of county roads under t e Option-P al Road Law is vested In the commissioners court.

In Attorney General's Opinion O-6506 (1945), It was held:

"Where supplieshave been purchased under contractby the commissioners'court or under emergency requisitions authorizedby the commissioners* court, the functions of the county auditor with respect to such purchased are defined in Articles 1660 and 1661, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes. Under the provisions of said ArtFclea the County Auditor's fun&Ion is to examine 'allclaims, bills and accounts against the county' (Art. 1660) and 'he shall notor. F. A. Taylor,page 5 (WW-1346)

held: audit or approve any such claim unlek&It has been contra&ad as provided by law, nor any acdount for the purohase of supplies or materials for the use of said county or any of”lts officers,unless, In addition to other requirements of l&w, there Is attached thereto a tiequitiltlon

signedby the officer ordering
same and approved by the aounty judge. Said ?iqulsltlonmust be made out and signed an& approved In trlplicati3 by“the said officers, the triplicat6 to remainwith the officer desiring the purchas6;‘thedupliciite to be’ filed with the county a~~ltor,~and~the,or’lglnal to be”delIVered to tihe party from whom said’ purohase Is to be made before any purchase shall be made.t (Art. 1661).

‘With reference to’. the matte?,of”requisIMona, ‘Article1661 clearly states that .requisitions are.‘to

bb’slgned by the officermaking the purchase’and approved by the county judge. We find no’authbrity‘forthe county auditor to require,,

as a prlreaulsite to approvdl 0r a cl&GM based on suoh’purchaee,thatthe requisition shall be signed br approved b$ him when the purohaee is made.

II

. . . ‘“Alfhoughthe county auditor has general oversight over the flnancea’of the oounty, the exercise of.&uch bversightwith reference to purchasesmade and expenses incurred for the use of the county or by certain offibei-s In the conduct of’their offiaes, is defined and oontrolled by the specificprovisiona of the statute8 pertalnIng to such purchases and expenses. In view 0r the foregoing and In view of the fdcts given, it Is the opinion of this department that’ the county auditor la not authorized’torequire, as a prerequisite to his approval of a alaim or Items of expenee, that 811 requi~itlonafor suoh purchaaea
or expenae Items shall be signed or approved by him at the tine the purchase is made or the expense incurred.I’

In AttorneyGeneral’s OpinionWW-1328 (1962), It wasMr. F. A. Taylor,page6 (W-1346)

“AttorneyGeneral OpinionV-1111 (October 3, 1950) construed the duties of the county auditor to examine and approve claIm& in connectionwith expenses of visiting district judges. We believe that the facts of the oplnIdn are sufficiently in point for it to be relevant

.“Article 1660,Vernon’s Civil Statutes, repuir&s that’iio-claim, bill or account shall be allowed or paid by the cowlllssiohers court until it has been examined and,approved,bythe county audltdr

. Section 10 0r Arti~Ole: 200a provides that when dlatrfct judgea are assigned to dlstricts other than their own, they shall retielve actual expense for travel and subsistencewhich shall be p&Id out of the General Fund’of the county In which their dutlea are performed, tipon accounts certified and approvedby the presiding judge of the admlnlatratlvedistrict.

“The opinionheld that expense aacounts of the visiting district judge are subject to audit by the county audltor~from a ‘bookkeepingetkndpolnt,’ but suah audit la not to Be construed a0 as to authorize a county auditor to review the legality i5fitems **of** expendfture’containedin the expetibe &count when the same has been certified and approved by the #reeldIng judge of the admlnietratlve district.

In view of the foregoing authorities, it is our opinion that the Commissioners Court of Brazoria County la the factfinding body to determinewhether equipment,material ‘and serviceswere delivered to the county, and the reasonable value of such equipment and aervlaee.

It la OUP further opinion that the county auditor is required to pay bills if Artld.lea 1660 and 1661, Vernon’s Civil Statutes, are compliedwith.

This opinion is not to be construed as pas(sing OII any raat question. Such questionemust be determinedby the Commissioners Court of Brazorla County.Mr. F. A. Taylor, page 7 (WW-1346)

SUMMARY

The CommissionersCourt of Brazoria County is the fact-findingbody to determinewhether equipment,material and serviceswere delivered to the countyI and the reasonablevalue of such equipment and services.

The county auditor is required to pay bills If Articles 1660,and 1661, Vernon's Civil Statutes, are compliedwith.

Yours very truly,

WILL WILSON Attorney Oeneral of Texas

Assistant

JR:ms

APPROVED:

OPINION COMMITTEE W. V. Geppert, Chairman

Henry Braswell Jerry Roberts Grundy Williams J. C. Davis

REVIEWEDFORTRE ATPORWEY(IENERAL By: Leonard Passmore