### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Brie fs Jun e 23, 200 5 I N RE 

### M.W.M., W.W.M., S.M.M., & A.M.M. Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Law renceCounty No. 11033-02 TimHam ilton, Ju dge

No. M2005- 00053-COA-R 3-P T - F iled Augu st 1, 2005

W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J
. , co n cu rr i n g. The e vidence in this case, both as to termination of pa renta l rig hts and to the best intere st of the childre n, indicates that termination of pare ntal rig hts w ould survive even the ultimate standard of “be y ond a re asonable doubt.” I a dh e reto m y

lon g stand ing dis a g re e me nt w iththema jority in i ts a sse rtionthat: The he ighte ned burde n of proof mandated by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1- 113(c) (1) r equire s us to a dapt Tenn. R. A pp. P. 13(d)’s customary standard of

revie w for c ases of

this sort. First, we must revie w the trial c ourt’s spec ific finding s of fa ct de novo in ac cordan ce wi t h Tenn.R.App. P. 13 (d). Thus, e ach of the trial court’s specific fac tual finding s wil l b e p resumed to be corr ect unless the e vidence preponde rate s otherwise. Sec ond, we must determine whether the fa cts, either a s fo un d b y thetria l c ou rt or

a s su pp orte d b y

thepr e po nd e ranc e of

thee vid e nc e , c le arl y and convinc ingly

establish the eleme nts require d to terminate a biological pare nt’s pare ntal rig hts. J

on e s v . G ar re tt , 9 2 S
. W
. 3 da t8 3 8 ; In re Valentine , 79 S.W .3d at 54 8- 49 ; In re S.M

. , 1 49 S.W. 3da t 64 0; In re M .J.B. , 140 S.W .3d at 654. 9
T he se d ec i si o ns d raw a d i st i nc t i o n b etwe en sp ec i f i c fac ts a n d t h e c o m b i ne d we i gh t o f t he se facts. 9 T enn . R
. A pp . P
. 13(d) r equi r es us t o defer t o t he t r i al co ur t ’ s speci f i c f i ndi ng s of

f act as l ong a s t hey ar e s uppo r t ed by a pr epon d era nc e o f the ev i dence
. H owever , we ar e t he ones wh o m us t t hen det er mi ne whe t her t he com bi ned wei gh t of t hes e f act s provi des cl ear and convi nci ng ev i d ence su p p o rting the trial c o u rt’s ultim a te fac tua l c o n c lu s io n . T h e T e n n e sse e S u p re m e C o u rt u se d this ap p roac h i n In r e Val ent i ne wh en i t recogn i zed t he di f fer enc e b et ween t he concl us i on t hat a bi ol ogi cal pare nt ha d not comp l i ed s ubs t ant i al l y wi t h her ob l i gat i ons i n a perman enc y pl an and t he f act s r el i ed u p o n b y the trial c o u rt to su p p o rt this c o n c lus io n . In r e Val ent i ne , 7 9 S .W .3 d a t 5 4 8 -4 9 ; see a l so J o n e s v . G a rre tt , 92 S. W
. 3d a t 838- 39. This effort to separate “c lear and convinc ing e vidence ” as a standard f

or the initial trier of fac t from “c lear

and convinc ing e vidence ” in apply ing the proper standard of appe llate re view is like-2-

try ing to s e pa

rate theins e pa

ra ble
. Th e “ c le ar andc on vin c ing e vid e nc e ” stand ardis the same bo th at the trial leve l and at th e ap p el late leve l, and likewise at both levels, a “pr eponder anceof the evidenc e” standard and a “c lear and convinc ing e vidence ” standa rd ar e totally

incompatible. The re as o n s supporting my

view ar e set forth at leng th in Estate of Acuff v. O’Linger , 56 S.W .3d 527, 535-37 ( T en n .Ct.App.2001) and In re Z.J.S. and M .J.P. , N o . M 2 0 0 2

- 0 2 2 3 5

- C O A

- R 3

- JV (Tenn.Ct.App.2003). Since under

any standard of

revie w termination of pa

renta l rig hts in thi s case is unassailable, I c on c ur in the jud g me nt.

___________________________________ WI LL I AM B. CAIN, J UDGE