NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ANTHONY ZAPPIA, Plaintiff/Appellant, 

v.

AMANDEEP S. SODHI, et al., Defendants/Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-CV 18-0743 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2016-053025 

The Honorable Bruce R. Cohen, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Anthony Zappia, Sun City

Plaintiff/Appellant

Jennings, Strouss & Salmon, P.L.C., Phoenix

By Jay A. Fradkin, R. Ryan Womack 

Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

FILED 3-3-2020
ZAPPIA v. SODHI, et al.

Decision of the Court

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1 Plaintiff Anthony Zappia appeals from a grant of summary 

judgment in favor of defendant Banner Boswell Rehabilitation Center. For 

the reasons stated below, we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to Zappia. 

Stramka v. Salt River Recreation, Inc., 179 Ariz. 283, 284 (App. 1994). In 

September 2014, Zappia had back surgery at Banner Boswell Medical 

Center. He was transferred to Banner Boswell Rehabilitation Center

(“Boswell”) for rehabilitative services. A week later, and twelve days after

surgery, Zappia complained of “’severe pain’ in [the left] lower chest.” Dr. 

Amandeep Sodhi ordered a chest x-ray and believed that Zappia’s vital 

signs were not indicative of a pulmonary embolism. Sodhi’s notes suggest 

that while he then ordered a CT angiogram, the test was still pending at the 

time. 

¶3 The next day, after continued pain, Zappia’s niece Joanne 

Marozzi, a registered nurse, grew increasingly concerned. As a result of her 

concern, 9-1-1 was called and emergency services transported Zappia to the 

hospital. A CT angiogram at the hospital revealed that Zappia was, in fact, 

experiencing a pulmonary embolism. Doctors at the hospital treated Zappia

for the embolism and he survived. Zappia now takes blood thinners and 

continues to experience pain that Marozzi believes is not related to the back 

surgery. 

¶4 Zappia sued Sodhi, Boswell, and others for medical 

malpractice, alleging that the defendants’ failure to conduct a CT 

angiogram earlier either caused or worsened the embolism. Zappia also 

alleged that the defendants’ conduct constituted abuse of a vulnerable 

adult. Zappia proffered Marozzi as his expert on the proper standard of 

care for the nurses at Boswell. Marozzi, who has been a nurse for more than 

three decades, worked as an intensive care unit (“ICU”) floor nurse at 
ZAPPIA v. SODHI, et al.

Decision of the Court

3 

Banner Estrella Medical Center one day a week in the year before the 

embolism. Marozzi spent the remainder of the week working as a case 

manager for CIGNA Healthcare and babysitting her grandchildren. 

¶5 Boswell filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that 

Marozzi was not a qualified expert under A.R.S. § 12-2604. Although the

trial court found that Marozzi’s work as an ICU floor nurse satisfied A.R.S. 

§ 12-2604(A)(1) (the “same specialty” requirement), it found that Marozzi 

did not devote a majority of her professional time to her work as an ICU

nurse and therefore did not meet the requirements of subsection (A)(2) (the 

“majority of professional time in the prior year” requirement). The court 

further denied Zappia’s attempt to invoke Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure

56(d) to seek additional time to obtain a substitute expert based on lack of 

compliance with the rule. Because Zappia did not have a proposed 

standard of care expert apart from Marozzi, the trial court granted

Boswell’s motion for summary judgment on Zappia’s claims against 

Boswell. 

¶6 Zappia timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

¶7 We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. 

Palmer v. Palmer, 217 Ariz. 67, 69, ¶ 7 (App. 2007). Summary judgment is 

proper when no genuine issues of material fact exist, and the moving party 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

¶8 A medical malpractice plaintiff must prove (1) “[t]he health 

care provider failed to exercise that degree of care, skill and learning 

expected of a reasonable, prudent health care provider in the profession or 

class to which he belongs within the state acting in the same or similar 

circumstances” and that (2) “[s]uch failure was the proximate cause of the 

injury.” A.R.S. § 12-563. 

¶9 Unless the alleged malpractice is a matter of common 

knowledge, Arizona requires that the standard of care be established by 

expert medical testimony. Rasor v. Nw. Hosp., LLC, 243 Ariz. 160, 163, ¶ 12 

(2017). This also applies when a medical malpractice claim is brought as an 

abuse of a vulnerable adult claim. Equihua v. Carondelet Health Network, 235 

Ariz. 504, 509, ¶¶ 19–20 (App. 2014) (citing Cornerstone Hosp. of Se. Ariz., 

L.L.C. v. Marner ex rel. Cty. of Pima, 231 Ariz. 67, 71–72, ¶¶ 7, 14 (App. 2012)). 

The failure of a plaintiff to provide such expert medical testimony is 

ordinarily an appropriate ground for summary judgment in favor of a 

defendant. Rasor, 243 Ariz. at 166, ¶ 31 (reversing on other grounds). 
ZAPPIA v. SODHI, et al.

Decision of the Court

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1. The Trial Court Correctly Denied Zappia’s Expert Under A.R.S. § 

12-2604(A)(2). 

¶10 Zappia first challenges the trial court’s determination that 

Marozzi was not qualified to testify as an expert under A.R.S. § 12-

2604(A)(2). Subsection (A)(2) requires that the proposed expert, “[d]uring 

the year immediately preceding the occurrence giving rise to the lawsuit, 

devoted a majority of the person’s professional time to either or both of . . .

the active clinical practice of the same health profession as the defendant” 

or teaching students in a relevant accredited program. 

¶11 We review a trial court’s determination of expert 

qualifications for abuse of discretion. Baker v. Univ. Physicians Healthcare, 

231 Ariz. 379, 387, ¶ 30 (2013). The evidence presented to the trial court was 

that, in the year before the incident challenged here, Marozzi worked as a 

nurse just one day a week. Working in the qualifying profession for only 

one day per work week does not constitute a majority of Marozzi’s 

professional time. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting her 

as a standard of care expert.

2. The Trial Court Correctly Denied Zappia’s Attempt to Invoke Rule 

56(d). 

¶12 Second, Zappia contends that the trial court should have 

granted Rule 56(d) relief, an issue we review for an abuse of discretion. St. 

George v. Plimpton, 241 Ariz. 163, 165, ¶ 11 (App. 2016). Rule 56(d) permits 

a party to request relief and an expedited hearing when a party opposing 

summary judgment cannot present evidence to justify its opposition. The 

rule states that such a request “must be accompanied” by a supporting 

affidavit containing information specified in the rule. Ariz. R. Civ. P.

56(d)(1) (emphasis added). Also, the filer must attach a Rule 7.1(h) good 

faith consultation certificate to the motion. Id. Failure to comply with the 

Rule 56 provisions is grounds for denial of such relief. See St. George, 241 

Ariz. at 168, ¶¶ 29–32 (App. 2016). 

¶13 Zappia’s purported Rule 56(d) request consisted of a single 

sentence on page 8 of his response to the motion for summary judgment. 

Merely citing to the rule in a response to a motion for summary judgment, 

as the trial court correctly observed, “does not come close to complying 

with the rule.” Counsel did not identify any of the information listed in Rule 

56(d)(1)(A) and did not file a good faith certificate under Rule 7.1(h). 

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rule 56(d) 

relief.
ZAPPIA v. SODHI, et al.

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶14 We affirm.