IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Lisa George, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1247 C.D. 2016

: Submitted: December 9, 2016

Unemployment Compensation Board :

of Review, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: April 19, 2017

Lisa George (Claimant) petitions for review of an Order of the 

Unemployment Compensation (UC) Board of Review (Board) affirming a UC 

Referee’s (Referee) Decision finding Claimant ineligible for UC benefits pursuant 

to Section 402(e) of the UC Law (Law).1 On appeal,2 Claimant argues that the 

 

1 Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. 

§ 802(e). Section 402(e) provides that an employee is ineligible for UC benefits if “h[er]

unemployment is due to h[er] discharge or temporary suspension from work for willful 

misconduct connected with h[er] work.” Id.

2 Claimant’s brief is somewhat difficult to follow. While she uses headings within her 

Argument section that correspond to her Statement of Questions Involved, she makes a number 

of different arguments under each heading that do not, necessarily, correspond to each heading. 

(Continued...)
2

Board erred in finding her ineligible because: (1) the Mercer County District 

Attorney’s Office (Employer)3did not satisfy its burden of proving willful 

misconduct because her actions did not amount to insubordination, or willful 

misconduct; (2) even if Claimant did violate Employer’s policy or rule, she had 

good cause for doing so; and (3) the Board erred in finding Claimant ineligible for 

benefits. Because we conclude that Claimant has not established good cause for 

her actions, we affirm.

Claimant was employed by Employer from January 1987 until March 1, 

2016, however, her last day of work before she was placed on paid administrative 

leave was January 29, 2016. (R.R. at 8a.) At the time of her discharge, Claimant 

was a diversionary trial case manager. (Id.) Claimant filed an application for UC 

benefits on March 6, 2016. (Claim Record, R. Item 1.) Claimant stated that she 

was discharged for accidentally saying “the F word” to a victim on the phone, and 

further, “for seve[ra]l things but I guess it was the misrepresenting the office while 

I was suspended” and for “call[ing] the police department in defense of my 

reputation.” (Claimant Questionnaire, R. Item 3.)

On the request for separation and wage information, Employer stated that

Claimant was discharged for “[r]ule [v]iolations, [u]nsatisfactory [w]ork 

[p]erformance and [for being] a disruptive influence with conduct that was adverse 

to the District At[torney’s] Office.” (Employer’s Notice of Application, R. Item 

2.) Employer attached a letter of termination dated March 1, 2016, from the 

 

Nevertheless, we have read through Claimant’s brief and have tried to address the arguments that 

Claimant raises.

3

Employer has intervened in this matter, and the Board has not filed a brief because it 

“believes that the Intervenor’s brief adequately covers the issues that the Board would have 

briefed.” (Board Letter, filed Nov. 17, 2016.)
3

Mercer County District Attorney advising Claimant that she was being terminated, 

and another letter dated February 25, 2016, from the Greenville-West Salem Police 

Department, notifying Employer that Claimant had called various police 

departments on behalf of Employer to conduct a survey about her job performance. 

(Id.; R.R. at 92a, 95a.) Employer also attached various documents to its Employer 

Questionnaire, including a copy of meeting notes dated January 29, 2016, a 

suspension letter dated February 1, 2016, a letter notifying Claimant of a follow-up 

meeting dated February 3, 2016, another letter dated February 18, 2016, from 

Human Resources that provided Claimant with the opportunity to respond, and 

Claimant’s response dated February 26, 2016. (Employer Questionnaire and 

Follow-up Letter, R. Item 2; R.R. at 82a-87a.) In response to the UC Service 

Center’s oral interview question asking Claimant if she had been warned in the 

past about her attitude and being a disruptive influence, Claimant responded that 

she had previously been warned in writing, but that she could not remember the 

date of the warning. (Record of Oral Interview, R. Item 4.)

The UC Service Center issued a Notice of Determination on March 29, 

2016, finding Claimant ineligible for benefits pursuant to Section 402(e) of the 

Law. (R.R. at 1a.) The UC Service Center determined that “Claimant was 

discharged for misrepresentation of the District Attorney[’]s Office while under 

suspension” and for “[c]ontacting police departments and other staff while on 

probation.” (Id.) Thus, Claimant’s actions constituted willful misconduct, and 

“Claimant [did] not show[] good cause for her actions.” (Id.) Accordingly, the UC 

Service Center concluded that Claimant was ineligible for benefits beginning with 

the waiting week ending March 12, 2016. (Id.) 
4

Claimant appealed to the Referee asserting that she “disagree[d] with the 

findings of fact concerning the misrepresentation of the DA’s office.” (Petition for 

Appeal, R. Item 6.) A hearing on Claimant’s appeal was held before the Referee 

on April 25, 2016. (Notice of Hearing, R. Item 8.) Employer appeared with 

counsel and four witnesses: Human Resources Director; Assistant District 

Attorney; District Attorney; and Director of the Office of Victim Services.

Claimant appeared with counsel and one witness, her husband, who did not testify.

Claimant testified4that she was not given specific instructions as to what she 

could and could not do during her administrative leave. Claimant did not think 

Human Resources Director would accept a written response from her in response 

to the February 18, 2016 letter, so Claimant decided to call various police 

departments and crime victims because they knew her best. Claimant admitted to 

making the calls while she was on administrative leave, but she denied indicating 

to those individuals that she was calling on behalf of the District Attorney. 

Further, she did not tell the individuals that she was on paid administrative leave

when she called. Claimant also admitted to using profanity on the phone with a 

crime victim, though she thought he had hung up, and to her co-workers; keeping a 

diary on her work computer, which included comments about her co-workers; and 

creating a file folder about Director of the Office of Victim Services, referred to as 

“Attack on J[ . . . ],”5in which Claimant kept close tabs on Director of the Office 

of Victim Services’ whereabouts during the workday.

 

4 Claimant’s testimony appears on pages 60a-78a of the Reproduced Record.

5

Pages from the “Attack on J[ . . . ]” file appear on pages 98a-111a of the Reproduced 

Record.
5

Human Resources Director testified6about the January 29, 2016 meeting 

with Claimant and District Attorney, at which Claimant admitted to saying “f*** 

you” to a crime victim on the phone. (R.R. at 11a.) Further, in the meeting, 

Claimant tried to defend herself and also used the term to describe such victims as 

“dregs of society.” (Id.) Human Resources Director stated that Claimant was very 

angry, raised her voice, yelled at District Attorney, and insulted Human Resources 

Director during the meeting. Human Resources Director recalled that she and 

District Attorney had found out about several other incidents involving Claimant, 

which resulted in them extending Claimant’s suspension. At the February 5, 2016

meeting, Human Resources Director testified that Claimant denied the comment 

she had made in the January 29, 2016 meeting. Human Resources Director noted 

that at that meeting, she and District Attorney addressed Claimant’s general 

interactions with her co-workers. Human Resources Director also recalled 

numerous complaints filed by other employees in the office and a file that was 

found on Claimant’s desk titled “Attack on [J . . . ].” (Id. at 17a.) Human 

Resources Director also explained that the office had to be restructured so 

Claimant did not have much interaction with staff and that Claimant continued to 

act in an unprofessional manner to her fellow employees. Human Resources 

Director also testified regarding Employer’s Employee Conduct and Discipline 

Policy, which lists certain unacceptable behavior including “[f]ailure to follow a 

supervisor’s specific instructions or to perform assigned official duties” and 

“[o]bscene or abusive language.” (Id. at 21a-22a; Employee Conduct and 

Discipline Policy, R.R. at 123a.) In addition, the policy prohibits insubordination, 

 

6 Human Resource Director’s testimony appears on pages 8a-32a of the Reproduced 

Record.
6

“[i]mmoral, indecent, abusive or menacing conduct,” and “[j]ob incompetence, 

including non-adherence to established policies and procedures[.]” (Id. at 123a24a.)

Assistant District Attorney testified7about his awareness of the file Claimant 

kept on Director of the Office of Victim Services and the changes made in the 

office due to Claimant’s behavior and Claimant’s use of profanity. He recalled 

incidents that occurred between Claimant and Director of the Office of Victim 

Services, including one after which Claimant was ordered by the previous District 

Attorney to cease having any verbal interaction with Director of the Office of 

Victim Services, though she spoke to Director of the Office of Victim Services

despite being ordered not to. Assistant District Attorney also explained an incident 

that occurred between himself and Claimant, in which Claimant made insulting 

comments to Assistant District Attorney. Assistant District Attorney testified that 

the atmosphere in the office changed when Claimant was there and that other 

employees were afraid to get on her bad side. Assistant District Attorney also 

recalled Claimant’s inappropriate actions regarding a criminal case involving her 

nephew, including an entry she made in her diary on her work computer that she 

had searched her co-workers’ desks in an attempt to locate her nephew’s case file.

District Attorney testified8that he spoke to Claimant and all employees of 

the office shortly after taking office and informed them that they would act 

professionally at all times. District Attorney recalled signing Claimant’s 

termination letter, which resulted from Claimant’s actions in calling different 

 

7 Assistant District Attorney’s testimony appears on pages 32a-40a of the Reproduced 

Record.

8 District Attorney’s testimony appears on pages 40a-54a of the Reproduced Record.
7

police departments and victims about her work performance. District Attorney

stated that Claimant “had no authority to be calling anyone on [his] behalf and 

representing that she was, in fact, representing the office . . . .” (R.R. at 45a.) He 

also testified to being present when Claimant made the “dregs of society” comment 

at the January 29, 2016 meeting, and that Claimant thereafter denied ever making 

that comment. District Attorney indicated that it was a difficult decision to fire 

Claimant, and that her termination was warranted based upon the 

misrepresentations she made to other police departments and victims that she was 

acting on his behalf without his permission.

Director of the Office of Victim Services testified9briefly that she made 

multiple complaints regarding Claimant’s conduct. In particular, Director of the 

Office of Victim Services explained her reaction to finding a folder in the office 

titled “Attack on J[ . . . ]” and that she did not know what to do. (R.R. at 55a.) 

Director of the Office of Victim Services recalled that Claimant had used profanity 

towards her, glared at her, slammed doors, made insulting comments to her, and 

spoke to her when Claimant was ordered not to. 

Based on the evidence presented, the Referee made the following findings of 

fact:

1. The [C]laimant was employed by the Mercer County District 

Attorney’s Office as a trial case manager earning $55,000 per 

year from January 1987 through January 29, 2016, her last day of 

work.

2. The [C]laimant was issued verbal reprimands regarding her 

unprofessional interactions with staff in 2012 and 2014.

 

9 Director of the Office of Victim Services’ testimony appears on pages 54a-59a of the 

Reproduced Record.
8

3. The [C]laimant received a formal written reprimand on July 21, 

2014, for continued confrontational and unprofessional 

insubordinate actions.

4. On January 29, 2016, the [E]mployer met with the [C]laimant to 

discuss a complaint they [sic] received from a victim who 

indicated the [C]laimant had said “F*[**] you” to the victim 

while he was on the telephone with her.

5. During the January 29, 2016 meeting, the [C]laimant admitted to 

saying “F*[**] you” but indicated she believed the caller had 

already hung up before she made the statement out of frustration.

6. During the January 29, 2016 [meeting], the [C]laimant expressed 

her frustrations of working with the “dregs of the society[.]”

7. The [C]laimant was placed on a one-week suspension effective 

January 29, 2016.

8. While the [C]laimant was on suspension, the Human Resource 

department reviewed the [C]laimant’s past disciplinary action 

with the current District Attorney.

9. District Attorney . . . had just taken over the position of District 

Attorney effective January 4, 2016.

10. On District Attorney[’s] . . . second day on the job, he met with 

the [C]laimant to discuss his requirement[s] that the [C]laimant

act in a professional manner and communicate professionally 

with her coworkers.

11. District Attorney . . . also met with the entire staff of his office 

advising all staff that he expected the office to interact with the 

constituents in a professional and customer[-]friendly manner.

12. As a result of the review of the [C]laimant’s previous disciplinary 

action, as well as the statement she made during the January 29, 

2016[] disciplinary meeting, the District Attorney decided to 

extend the [C]laimant’s suspension while he could further 

investigate the appropriate disciplinary action.
9

13. On February 5, 2016, the [E]mployer met with the [C]laimant

and spoke to her about her additional comments of referring to 

the members of the community as the “dregs of society[.]”

14. During the February 5, 2016 meeting, the [C]laimant denied 

making the comment referring to anyone as “dregs of society[.]”

15. While the [C]laimant was on suspension, the [E]mployer became 

aware of an incident where the [C]laimant had taken steps to look 

in other employee’s [sic] desks to find a file of her nephew which 

was being handled by the District Attorney’s office.

16. On February 18, 2016, the [E]mployer sent a letter to the 

[C]laimant advising her of the issues they [sic] were reviewing in 

determining what actions would be taken regarding her 

employment.

17. The February 18, 2016[] letter listed the issues of the 

[C]laimant’s telephone call with a victim, her statements made 

during the January 29, 2016[] suspension meeting, her history of 

unprofessional conduct with the [A]ssistant District Attorney and 

office manager, as well as an issue of her handling her 

nephew[’]s case which had been assigned to the District 

Attorney’s office.

18. The letter advised the [C]laimant that “Because we did not know 

the facts of this last matter about your nephew’s case before we 

met with you, we did not discuss it with you. For that reason, you 

are being given an opportunity to respond to the information 

above. . .”

19. Upon the [C]laimant’s receipt of the February [1]8, 2016[] letter, 

she decided to contact police departments and victims she had 

worked with in the past to take a survey regarding her work 

performance.

20. When the [C]laimant contacted the police departments, she did 

not advise them that she was on suspension and asked if they 

would be willing to answer a survey question indicating that the 

survey responses would be given to the District Attorney.

21. The [C]laimant asked the police officers, “In your opinion and 

based on your experiences, is Lisa George professional, 
10

responsible, respectful and knowledgeable of the criminal justice 

system and criminal cases, and a good ambassador for the DA’s 

office?”

22. The [C]laimant wrote a response letter dated February 26, 201[6], 

to the [E]mployer advising the [E]mployer that she had contacted 

various police departments and victims and they affirmed she 

was a good ambassador for the DA’s office.

23. On February 25, 2016, the District Attorney received a telephone 

call from the Greenville Police Department reporting that the 

[C]laimant had called conducting a survey.

24. The [C]laimant was terminated from her position, via letter dated 

March 1, 2016, for several incidents of misconduct, 

unprofessionalism and behaving in an inappropriately 

confrontational manner with coworkers and others.

(Referee Decision, Findings of Fact (FOF) ¶¶ 1-24.) The Referee determined that 

“[C]laimant was terminated for multiple offenses of unprofessionalism and 

inappropriate behavior . . . [and] that . . . [C]laimant had received warnings over 

the years advising her that she needed to act in a professional manner.” (Referee 

Decision at 3.) The Referee further clarified that “[C]laimant was ultimately 

terminated for her actions which occurred while she was under investigatory 

suspension[,]” which include her contacting police departments and crime victims. 

(Id.) The Referee found that “[C]laimant’s continued act of unprofessional 

behavior during her suspension is a disregard of the standards of behavior that . . . 

[E]mployer has the right to expect.” (Id.) The Referee concluded that Employer 

had met its burden of showing that Claimant committed willful misconduct. 

Accordingly, the Referee affirmed the UC Service Center’s determination and 

concluded that Claimant was ineligible for benefits under Section 402(e) of the 

Law.
11

Claimant appealed the Referee’s Decision to the Board, which adopted and 

incorporated the Referee’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and affirmed the 

Referee’s Decision finding Claimant ineligible for UC benefits under Section 

402(e) of the Law. (Board Order, Intervenor’s Br., App. A.) The Board also 

denied Claimant’s request for a remand hearing. (Id.) Claimant now petitions this 

Court for review of the Board’s Order.10

On appeal, Claimant argues that the Board erred in finding her ineligible for 

benefits based on: (1) her use of an expletive over the phone to a crime victim; (2) 

her work history from 2008-2015; (3) her actions in response to her interest in her 

nephew’s criminal case; and (4) her action in calling various police departments 

and crime victims to conduct a survey of her work performance. Claimant 

contends, generally, that no rules or policies were established regarding her 

conduct and that her conduct did not rise to the level of willful misconduct. Even 

if she did commit willful misconduct, Claimant argues that she had good cause for 

her actions. Claimant also asserts that she did not get the opportunity to present all 

 

10 This Court’s scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights 

were violated, whether an error of law was committed, or whether necessary findings of fact 

were supported by substantial evidence. Johns v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 87 A.3d 

1006, 1009 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). The Board is the factfinder in UC cases and is, thus, 

empowered to make credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence presented. 

Curran v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 752 A.2d 938, 940 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). The 

Board’s findings are conclusive on appeal if the record, as a whole, is supported by substantial 

evidence. Mathis v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 64 A.3d 293, 299 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2013). We view the record in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed before the 

Board, and we afford that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 

the evidence to determine if substantial evidence exists. Big Mountain Imaging v. 

Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 48 A.3d 492, 494-95 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). “Substantial 

evidence is such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support 

a conclusion.” Am. Gen. Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 

648 A.2d 1245, 1248 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994).
12

of her testimony and evidence at the Referee hearing. In response, Employer, 

intervenor in this matter, argues that substantial evidence supports the Board’s 

findings of fact, and the Board and Referee properly concluded that Claimant 

committed willful misconduct and that she did not have good cause for her actions.

Section 402(e) of the UC Law provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]n employe 

shall be ineligible for compensation for any week . . . [i]n which h[er] 

unemployment is due to h[er] discharge or temporary suspension from work for 

willful misconduct connected with h[er] work.” 43 P.S. § 802(e). While the Law 

does not define “willful misconduct,” our Court has defined it as: 

(1) a wanton or willful disregard for an employer’s interests; (2) a 

deliberate violation of an employer’s rules; (3) a disregard for 

standards of behavior which an employer can rightfully expect of an 

employee; or (4) negligence indicating an intentional disregard of the 

employer’s interest or an employee’s duties or obligations.

Phila. Parking Auth. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 1 A.3d 965, 968 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). The employer bears the burden of proving a claimant’s 

willful misconduct. Spirnak v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 557 A.2d 

451, 453 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989). Where an employer alleges willful misconduct 

based on a claimant’s violation of a work rule or policy, the employer must prove 

the existence of the rule, the reasonableness of the rule, and that the claimant 

violated the rule. Ellis v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 59 A.3d 1159, 

1162 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). If an employer makes a showing of willful misconduct, 

the burden shifts to the employee to establish good cause for his or her actions. 

Phila. Parking Auth., 1 A.3d at 968. Whether a claimant has good cause for his or 

her conduct is a question of law subject to our review and must be viewed in light 

of all of the attendant circumstances, “including the reasons for his or her 
13

noncompliance with the employer’s directives.” Id.; see also Docherty v. 

Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 898 A.2d 1205, 1208-09 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2006). A claimant has good cause if his or her actions are justifiable or reasonable 

under the circumstances. Docherty, 898 A.2d at 1208-09.

We begin by addressing Claimant’s assertion that she did not get the 

opportunity to present all of her testimony and evidence at the Referee hearing. 

Specifically, Claimant argues that the Referee erred by not allowing Claimant to 

testify regarding her work history, her two sons’ and nephew’s autism, her flexible 

work schedule, her harassment allegations, and her interest in her nephew’s 

criminal case.

11

 In this regard, Claimant asserts that Employer used those things 

“to discipline her, to cause distress, hardship and harassment, and to hasten her 

termination[,]” and by not allowing testimony about those things, Claimant was 

prejudiced as a result. (Claimant’s Br. at 31.) She also alleges that much of 

Employer’s witnesses’ testimony was hearsay, and thus, prejudicial to her case.

Although we appreciate that the UC appeals process can be challenging, we 

note that Claimant was represented by counsel at the Referee hearing. Further, our 

review of the record and hearing transcript reveals that the Referee informed the 

parties that each witness, including Claimant, would be permitted to give testimony 

and would all be subject to cross-examination. (R.R. at 7a-8a.) In addition, 

Claimant’s counsel was afforded the opportunity to object to all of the exhibits 

entered into evidence at the hearing, though he did not object when first presented 

with that opportunity. (Id. at 7a.) Nevertheless, throughout the hearing, 

Claimant’s counsel made numerous objections to certain testimony and documents 

 

11 Claimant has also attached a number of documents to her brief, including a harassment 

complaint that she had filed, which were not introduced into evidence at the Referee hearing.
14

based on hearsay, and the Referee sustained some, but not all of the objections. 

For example, the Referee overruled Claimant’s counsel’s relevancy objections to 

the entry of two documents into evidence, which include: the December 28, 2012 

letter from the former District Attorney, which notified Claimant that her behavior 

regarding her “Attack on J[ . . . ]” file was unacceptable and directed her to “return 

[her] behavior to the previous high levels I have expected from you . . . ,” and the 

July 21, 2014 formal reprimand from the former District Attorney advising 

Claimant that her unprofessional behaviors needed to stop immediately. (R.R. at 

16a, 21a, 97a, 119a-20a.) Additionally, the Referee sustained an objection made 

by Claimant’s counsel regarding testimony about a Greenville Police Department

employee’s statements regarding Claimant’s call to the department. (Id. at 42a43a.) The Referee also sustained Employer’s counsel’s relevancy objection to 

Claimant’s testimony about her work history, permitting the parties to go back only 

to 2012, and her sons’ autism. (Id. at 60a-61a.) Further, the Referee concluded 

that Claimant’s flexible work schedule had no bearing on her decision in the case. 

(Id. at 61a.) As for Claimant’s hearsay allegations, the Referee stated that she 

“do[es] understand in my position . . . I cannot base my Decision of eligibility on 

any hearsay whether it’s been admitted to the record or not[,]” and that she would 

not consider “the portions of any of the letters that contain hearsay . . . in making 

my Decision.” (Id. at 43a, 79a.) Thus, we conclude that Claimant did have ample 

opportunity to present her testimony and additional evidence and to object to other 

testimony and evidence at the hearing.

Turning to the merits, Claimant argues that the Board erred in finding her 

ineligible for benefits based on her use of an expletive over the phone to a crime 

victim, her work history from 2008-2015, her actions in response to her interest in 
15

her nephew’s criminal case, and her actions in calling various police departments 

and crime victims to conduct a survey of her work performance.

We will first address Claimant’s argument that the Board erred in finding 

her ineligible for benefits based on her work history from 2008-2015 because she 

was denied the opportunity to question her immediate boss at the time, the former 

District Attorney, who did not testify at the Referee hearing. Initially, we note that 

the Notice of Hearing informed Claimant that she could call witnesses about 

matters that would be testified to at the hearing. (Notice of Hearing, R. Item 8 at 

2.) She did not call the former District Attorney as a witness on her behalf, and 

Employer did not find it necessary to procure his testimony either. In addition, the 

Referee overruled objections to the entry of documents into evidence that were 

written by the former District Attorney on the basis that they were “official 

business” and also found in Claimant’s personnel file. (R.R. at 16a-17a, 21a.)

Moreover, Claimant was terminated for several incidents that occurred after 

the former District Attorney left office in January 2016, including Claimant’s 

comment, made during the January 29, 2016 disciplinary meeting, that her work 

requires her to interact with the “dregs of society,” the fact that she denied ever 

making that comment during the February 5, 2016 meeting, her actions in looking 

in her co-workers’ desks to locate her nephew’s case file, and finally, her actions in 

calling various police departments and crime victims when she did not have 

permission to do so while on paid administrative leave. (FOF ¶¶ 4-7, 13-15, 17, 

19-22, 24; Referee Decision at 3; Termination Letter, R.R. at 92a-94a.) The four 

witnesses that did testify on behalf of Employer had direct knowledge of the above 

conduct by Claimant that ultimately led to her termination. We therefore are not 

persuaded by this argument and conclude that the Board did not err in this regard.
16

As for the other incidents on which the Board relied, Claimant contends that 

she did not violate any of Employer’s rules, and thus did not commit willful 

misconduct, because Employer did not establish any rules regarding her actions. 

She also asserts that, if there were rules in this regard, they were not effectively 

communicated to her, and she was not warned of the consequences of violating 

such rules. However, Claimant did not testify at the hearing that Employer did not 

have any rules regarding employee conduct when dealing with constituents. 

Though Claimant testified that she was not told what she could or could not do 

while on administrative leave, (R.R. at 62a), Claimant also did not testify that she 

was permitted by District Attorney to make the phone calls to conduct the survey 

or that she was not aware of Employer’s insubordination policy. (See Termination 

Letter, R.R. at 94a (“I never requested that you conduct any such ‘survey’ and you 

were suspended from performing all job duties at the time you purported to be 

taking such ‘survey.’”).) In her brief, Claimant acknowledges the existence of the 

Mercer County Employee Handbook. Claimant also admitted that she had been 

warned in the past about her behavior, including by the former District Attorney,

and that she had been directed to discontinue her unacceptable behavior and 

“confrontational and unprofessional insubordinate actions.” (FOF ¶¶ 1-3; Record 

of Oral Interview, R. Item 4; R.R. at 73a-74a, 119a-20a.) 

Employer, on the other hand, presented evidence at the hearing, through the 

testimony of Human Resources Director, that established its Employee Conduct 

and Discipline Policy, which lists certain unacceptable behavior including 

“[f]ailure to follow a supervisor’s specific instructions or to perform assigned 

official duties” and using “[o]bscene or abusive language.” (R.R. at 21a-22a, 

121a-25a.) In addition, the policy prohibits “[i]nsubordination,” “[i]mmoral, 
17

indecent, abusive or menacing conduct,” and “[j]ob incompetence, including nonadherence to established policies and procedures[.]” (Id. at 123a-24a.) Employer 

proved that Claimant was aware of these policies because she signed the Employee 

Handbook Acknowledgement on April 17, 2013. (Id. at 126a.) Employer also 

established that Claimant violated Employer’s insubordination policy by refusing 

to follow District Attorney’s reasonable directives to act and communicate

professionally with her co-workers and others and to stop her unacceptable 

behavior, and the Referee and the Board, after review, determined that Claimant

did continue to engage in unacceptable and unprofessional conduct. (FOF ¶¶ 4-5, 

9-11, 12-14, 16, 18-22; R.R. at 119a-20a.) “[A] conclusion that the employee has 

engaged in disqualifying willful misconduct is especially warranted in . . . cases 

where . . . the employee has been warned and/or reprimanded for prior similar 

conduct.” Oyetayo v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 110 A.3d 1117, 1125 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (quoting Ellis, 59 A.3d at 1163). Thus, there is substantial 

evidence of record showing that Employer met its burden of proving willful 

misconduct.

As for Claimant’s contention that the Board erred in finding Employer’s 

witnesses credible, (Claimant’s Br. at 14-16), and that its findings are not 

supported by substantial evidence, (id. at 19), we note that it is well-settled that the 

Board is the ultimate factfinder in UC cases and is, thus, empowered to make 

credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence presented. Curran 

v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 752 A.2d 938, 940 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). 

The Board here found Employer’s testimony and evidence regarding Claimant’s 

continued unacceptable, unprofessional, and insubordinate behavior to be more 

credible than the testimony and evidence offered by Claimant, which it was 
18

empowered to do. As such, the Board did not err in concluding that Employer met 

its burden of proving willful misconduct, and the burden shifted to Claimant to 

establish good cause for her actions. Phila. Parking Auth., 1 A.3d at 968.

Claimant next argues that even if she did violate Employer’s rules, she had 

good cause for her actions because: (1) she did not utter the expletive on the phone 

intentionally; (2) her actions with respect to her nephew’s criminal case “were not 

divisive to the office nor were the actions done to circumvent justice on behalf of a 

relative”; and (3) she knew Employer would not honor a meaningful response from 

her to the February 18, 2016 letter, so she thought it would be best to ask the 

people that knew her best about her work performance to try and save her job. 

(R.R. at 64a; Claimant’s Br. at 31.) Claimant also argues for the first time on 

appeal that she was disciplined because she made a sexual harassment complaint to 

the County Commissioners, and that she endured a hostile work environment. 

(Claimant’s Br. at 11-12, 30; R.R. at 70a.)

We are to review the record in the light most favorable to Employer, as the 

party that prevailed before the Board, and we are to afford that party the benefit of 

all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence to determine if 

substantial evidence exists. Big Mountain Imaging v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. 

of Review, 48 A.3d 492, 494-95 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). Our review of the record in 

this case, when viewed in the light most favorable to Employer, demonstrates that 

there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s determination that Claimant did 

not have good cause for repeatedly refusing to comply with Employer’s reasonable 

directives to Claimant to stop her unprofessional behaviors and to act appropriately 

and professionally at work to her co-workers and others. There is also no evidence 

that Employer would not have accepted a written response from Claimant in 
19

response to the February 18, 2016 letter, which permitted Claimant to submit to 

Employer a response regarding the incident involving her nephew’s case file. 

Neither the February 18, 2016 letter, nor District Attorney, himself, permitted

Claimant to call various crime victims and police departments about her work 

performance, and Claimant has not provided any good cause for doing so. There is 

evidence, however, that Claimant’s actions in making those calls, in addition to her 

other conduct, was “unprofessional, hostile, and inappropriate.” (Termination 

Letter, Mar. 1, 2016, R.R. at 92a-94a.) As for Claimant’s sexual harassment and 

hostile work environment claims, Claimant had the opportunity to raise and 

develop these arguments before the Referee, but failed to do so. We therefore 

cannot consider them on appeal. As such, we agree with the Board that Claimant’s 

allegations against Employer do not constitute good cause for her refusal to follow 

Employer’s prior reasonable directives to change her behavior. Therefore, the 

Board did not err in finding Claimant ineligible for benefits pursuant to Section 

402(e) of the Law.

Accordingly, the Board’s Order is affirmed.

________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Lisa George, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1247 C.D. 2016

:

Unemployment Compensation Board :

of Review, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

NOW, April 19, 2017, the Order of the Unemployment Compensation 

Board of Review, entered in the above-captioned matter, is hereby AFFIRMED.

________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge