### J-S92028-16

NON

### -PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE 

### SUPERIORCOURT

### I.O.P. 

### 65.37 INTHE INTEREST OF: A.M.,A MINOR

1 INTHE SUPERIORCOURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: L.M., FATHER No. 1041 WDA 2016 Appeal

### from theOrderJune 13, 2016 In the

### Court ofCommon Pleas of BeaverCounty Juvenile Division 

### at No(s): CP-4-DP-

### 0000047-2015, NO. 117

### -2015

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., MOULTON, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.* MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: 

### FILEDJANUARY 17,

### 2017 L.M. (

### "Father") appeals 

### from the June 13, 2016 decree entered in 

### the Beaver 

### County Court of Common Pleas 

### terminating his 

### parental rights to A.M. ("Child

### "), born in May 2013. We

### affirm. Since 

### shortly after Child's 

### birth, Children and Youth Services ("CYS") had an 

### active case 

### regarding Child due to 

### Mother's addiction to Vicodin and Father's homelessness. On May 29, 2014, CYS filed an 

### emergency motion 

### for protectivecustodyofChild in 

### Allegheny County. On May 30, 2014, Child

was ordered to remain at the Families United ("FUN") 

### foster home, and on June 2, 

### 2014, Child was 

### adjudicated dependent as to Mother. Because

* Retired SeniorJudgeassigned to

### the Superior Court.

### J-S92028-16

neither parent was capable of caring 

### for Child, Child was placed 

### with Mother's

### aunt, M.E., and her 

### partner, K.V. At the June 16, 2014 dependency hearing, Father, who was represented by counsel, failed to appear, and Child was 

### adjudicated dependent as to 

### Father.' The

### trial courtfound 

### that Father's 

### criminal history included 10 

### years' incarceration 

### for involuntary deviate sexual 

### intercourse and 

### corruption of a 

### minor. Father was classified as a Megan's Law 

### offender and was required to 

### attend sexual 

### offender 

### treatment to 

### properly care 

### for Child. 

### Furthermore, the 

### trial courtfound 

### that Father had tested positive 

### for tetrahydrocannabinol ("THC") on June 2, 2014. At the conclusion of the hearing, the

### trial court ordered Fatherto: become clean and sober; attend a drug and alcohol 

### evaluation and recommended 

### treatment and 

### screenings; attend supervised 

### visitations with Child once per 

### week; attend sexual 

### offender

### treatment; and 

### obtain safe and 

### appropriate housing. At 

### the October 27, 2014 

### permanency review hearing, the 

### trial court found 

### that Father had 

### voluntarily reduced his 

### visits with Child to one 

### hour perweek, continued to refuse sexual 

### offender

### treatment, and tested positive 

### for THC. The 

### next hearing was held on

### January 16, 2015, which Father did not 

### attend. The 

### trial court found no 

### compliance 

### with the permanency plan



### ' Although generally a child is 

### adjudicated dependent as to both parents at the same 

### hearing, the 

### trial court adjudicated child 

### dependent as to Mother on June 2, 2014 based on a 

### stipulation and 

### deferred Father's contested

### adjudicatory hearing 

### until June 16, 2014. 

## -2

### J-S92028-16

and found 

### that Father had notattended 

### visitswith Child since 

### November 24, 2014. The 

### next hearing was on 

### April 10, 2015, which Father did 

### attend. The

### trial court again found no 

### compliance and asked Father

### why hewas not addressing hisgoals. Father responded

### that he had 

### "no

### timeto run

### around." On 

### August 24, 

### 2015, the case was 

### transferred to Beaver 

### County because Mother had moved. On October 13, 

### 2015, a 

### permanency review hearing was held, which Father did not 

### attend. Because Motherwas making progress,the

### trial court reunified Child and Mother on

### thisdate. Three

### other permanency review hearingswere held, none ofwhich Father

### attended. On April 4, 

### 2016, CYSfiled a 

### motion requesting Child be 

### returnedto 

### fostercare, because Mother had relapsed to drug and alcohol abuse, 

### struggled 

### with mental health issues, and was homeless. The

### trial courtgranted the 

### motion. On May 3, 

### 2016, the 

### trial court held a 

### permanency review and goal change hearing. This was 

### the 

### first hearing in Beaver 

### County 

### that Father 

### attended. The 

### trial court explained to Father 

### that the 

### matter was 

### urgent because Child had been in 

### placement

### for 17 ofthe last 22 

### months. The

### trial court continued the case 

### until June 13, 2016 so 

### that Father had 

### time to 

### complete his 

### parenting evaluation and 

### obtain a lawyer. At the June 13, 2016 hearing, 

### the

### trial courtmade

### thefollowing findings: Father was provided the 

### family service plan 

### from Beaver 

### County in February 2016. 

### [It was 

### substantially the same plan as

### the plan 

### fromAlleghenyCounty.] Hewas 

### informed numerous 

### times of his 

### right to counsel, 

### but never completed an 

### application to have a 

### lawyer appointed until May 

### 2016, the 

### first time he appeared in 

### court. From 

### the inception of the case, both in 

### Allegheny and Beaver 

# -3-

### J-S92028-16 County, Father resisted any 

### involvement from CYS, and refused to 

### attend anyevaluations orservices. Among 

### the tasks Father was to 

### complete in 

### the Family Service Plan were a 

### parenting evaluation and sexual 

### offender

### treatment. The 

### parenting evaluation was 

### part of the Family Service Plan since 

### August 2015. Father never attended the 

### evaluation and 

### the 

### initial referral was closed. The 

### referral 

### for a 

### parenting evaluation was made again in May 2016, and 

### the evaluation was scheduled 

### for Father on two separate occasions. The case 

### worker attributed the 

### first missed 

### appointment to a 

### miscommunication, because when she 

### went to pick up Father 

### following the 

### visit with the child, he was not 

### there. He had gone home. 

### Apparently, he claimed 

### that he did 

### not know 

### whether he had a ride to 

### the 

### appointment, although the parenting evaluator confirmed with him 

### the day before 

### that she would be seeing him. The second 

### appointment was cancelled because Father 

### overslept. The 

### appointment was scheduled 

### for 12:30 p.m. and he was to be picked up in Monaca at 

### 12:15 p.m. Father 

### never called CYS or the 

### evaluatorto explainwhy he

### wasn't there on

### time. Parenting 

### evaluations can 

### take months to schedule. In 

### this case, 

### accommodations were made

### for Fatherto have two 

### opportunities, in a 

### veryquick

### timeframe, to be ableto 

### complete the evaluation prior to 

### the hearing, and he missed 

### them both. 

### Itwas expected 

### thatthe parenting evaluation would reveal 

### other services 

### that might be necessary 

### for the parents to 

### complete. 

### It is a 

### well-rounded 

### evaluation 

### thattalks about how 

### the parent was raised as a child, 

### marital history, drug and alcohol 

### use[,] 

### me[n]tal health, criminal 

### history, etc. At the 

### time of the hearing, however, Father 

### still had not completed the 

### parenting evaluation. Father was offered 

### eight visits with [Child] since 

### the last 

### time he appeared in

### court on May 3, 2016. He missed 

### five 

### visits and 

### attended three. Father claimed 

### that he was not involved 

### with the 

### minor 

### throughout the case because he was homeless 

### for several 

### months. Fatherwas homeless

### forapproximatelythe

### first 9 

### months of 

### this case, at which 

### time he lived in his car. However, he 

### admitted 

### that he was back on his

### feetfor the 

# -4-

### J-S92028-16
past 

### year, and 

### still did not 

### visit regularly or 

### attend services. He has 

### never had 

### [Child] in his care, and

### for the past

### year, at least, has not had herat his home, even

### for a 

### visit, unless Mother 

### took her

### there during the 

### brief period of 

### reunification. See 1925(a) Opinion, 

### 9/1/16, at 5-7 (

### "1925(a) Op.") 

### (unpaginated) (internal citations and

### footnotes

### omitted). On July 13, 2016, Father

### timelyfiled a notice

### of appeal. Father raises 

### thefollowing issue: 

### Whether the 

### trial court abused its 

### discretion and

### /or erred as a 

### matter of law in 

### determining 

### that the agency, [CYS], established by 

### clear and convincing evidence 

### that the parental rights of 

### [Father] should be 

### terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511? Father's Br. at 4. We 

### review a 

### trial court's order

### terminating parental rights

### for an abuse of 

### discretion. In 

### re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 

### 817, 826 (Pa. 

### 2012). An abuse of 

### discretion "does not 

### result merely because 

### the reviewing 

### court might have reached a 

### different conclusion. 

### Instead, a decision may be reversed 

### for an abuse 

### of discretion only upon 

### demonstration of 

### manifest unreasonableness, 

### partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-

### will." 

### Id. (internal citations

### omitted). The Pennsylvania 

### Supreme Court has explained the reason 

### for applying a 

### particularlydeferential standard to

### termination decisions: 

### [U]nlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the 

### fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the

### trialjudges are observing 

### the parties during 

### the relevant hearing and 

### often presiding over numerous 

### other hearings regarding the child and parents. 

### Therefore, even 

# -5-

### J-S92028-16

where the facts could 

### support an 

### opposite result, as is 

### often the case in 

### dependency and 

### termination cases, an 

### appellate 

### court must resist the urge to second guess 

### the 

### trial court and impose its own 

### credibility determinations and

### judgment; instead we

### must deferto

### the

### trialjudges so long as 

### the factual findings are 

### supported by 

### the record and 

### the 

### court's legal conclusions are not the 

### result of an 

### errorof law oran abuse

### ofdiscretion. 

### Id. at 826-27 

### (internal citations omitted). At the same

### time, 

### "[t]he burden of 

### proof is on 

### the 

### party seeking 

### termination to establish by clear and convincing evidencethe existence ofgrounds

### fordoing 

### so." In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1116 (Pa.Super. 

### 2010). Termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 

### of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 

### 2511,which requires a 

### bifurcated analysis. 

### Initially, the focus is on 

### the conduct of the parent. The 

### party seeking 

### termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

### that the parent's conduct satisfies the 

### statutory grounds 

### for termination delineated in Section 

### 2511(a). Only if 

### the 

### court determines 

### that the parent's conduct 

### warrants termination of his or her 

### parental rights does

### the 

### courtengage in 

### the second 

### part of the analysis 

### pursuant to Section 

### 2511(b): determination of the needs and 

### welfare of the child 

### under the standard of best 

### interests ofthe child. One 

### major aspect 

### of the needs and 

### welfareanalysis concernsthe nature and 

### status ofthe 

### emotional bond between 

### parent and child, 

### with close 

### attention paid to 

### the effect on 

### the child of 

### permanently severing any such bond. In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 

### 2007) 

### (citations

### omitted). The 

### trial court found two grounds 

### fortermination of Father's parental 

### rights, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 

### 2511(a)(2) and 

### (8). However, we need 

### only agree 

### with the 

### trial court's determination as to one subsection of section 

### 2511(a) in 

### order to 

### affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 

### 2004) (en 

## -6

### J-S92028-16

banc). Thus, we will analyze the 

### trial court's decision to 

### terminate under section 

### 2511(a)(2),which provides: 

### (a) General 

### rule.--The rights of a 

### parent in regard to a child may be 

### terminated after a 

### petition filed on any ofthe following grounds: * * * (2) The repeated and 

### continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal ofthe 

### parent has caused 

### the child to be 

### without essential 

### parental care, 

### control or subsistence necessary 

### for his physical or 

### mental well-being and 

### the conditions and causes 

### of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal 

### cannot or will not be remedied by

### the parent. 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 

### 2511(a)(2). To 

### terminate parental rights pursuant to section 

### 2511(a)(2), the following 

### three elements must be 

### met: (1) repeated and 

### continued incapacity, abuse, 

### neglect or 

### refusal; (2) such 

### incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused 

### the child to be 

### without essential 

### parental care, 

### control or subsistence necessary 

### for 

### [her] physical or mental 

### wellbeing; and 

### (3)the causes 

### ofthe incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal 

### cannot orwill not be 

### remedied. 

## InreAdoption

## ofC.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa.Super. 

### 2015) (quoting 

## InreAdoption

## ofM.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 

### 2003)). Father contends 

### that CYS did not 

### present clear and convincing evidence to 

### meet the 

### elements 

### for section 

### 2511(a)(2). Father's Br. at 9. Father does not 

### dispute 

### that he failed to 

### comply with the Family Service Plan; 

### rather, he argues 

### that he is 

### now willing to comply. 

### Id. at 9-10. Father 

### maintains 

### that his 

### failure to 

### attend scheduled supervised 

### visits was based on 

### travel demands occasioned by 

### the distance he lived 

### from the 

# -7-

### J-S92028-16

visitation site. 

### Id. at 10. He 

### further suggests 

### that Child could live in his home 

### with his two 

### other children. 

### Id. Finally, Father 

### maintains 

### that CYS has not proven

### that he is 

### unwilling to 

### remedy his neglect. 

### Id. In its 

### opinion,the 

### trial court set

### forth its reasoning 

### for finding grounds 

### fortermination undersection

### 2511(a)(2): [F]rom the inception of this case

. . . Father 

### outright refused to

### attend sexual

### offenders'

### treatment. He believed 

### the 

### treatment was 

### irrelevant and 

### that he did not need to 

### attend. He was 

### informed at the 

### time of the 

### adjudication hearing, in June 

### 2014, 

### that his 

### treatment was necessary. As of 

### the final hearing on June 13, 2016, two years later, he had not begun 

### treatment. His refusal to 

### follow the 

### family service plan has 

### left [Child] 

### without essential parental control necessary 

### for her 

### well-being. The 

### court cannot place 

### this child 

### with Father, who has a 

### conviction 

### for involuntary deviant sexual 

### intercourse with a 

### minor, before he 

### completes this 

### treatment. For 

### more than two years, the cause 

### of the neglect or refusal to 

### attend 

### treatment was not be 

### [sic] remedied by Father, and 

### the 

### court has no 

### indication, other than Father's last 

### minute promise to 

### attend, 

### that he will ever complete the 

### treatmentfornecessary

### reunification. 1925(a) Op. at 8-9 

### (internal citation omitted). In addition, Fatherfailed to 

### attend the parenting 

### evaluation, even

### though itwas scheduled on 

### morethan

one occasion and he was provided 

### transportation. 

### Id. at 5-6. We conclude 

### that the 

### trial court did not abuse its 

### discretion when it found 

### that section 

### 2511(a)(2) warrants

### termination of Father's 

### parental rights.2

2Weacknowledge

### thatdistancewasan issue

### for Father; however,

### that was 

### merely one 

### factor in 

### the 

### trial court's determination. In 

### terminating (Footnote ContinuedNextPage) 

## -8

### J-S92028-16

We 

### next

### turn to section 

### 2511(b), which we have described as

### follows: Section 

### 2511(b) focuses on 

### whether termination of parental rights would best serve the 

### developmental, physical, and 

### emotional needs and 

### welfare of the child. As 

### this Court has 

### explained, Section 

### 2511(b) does not 

### explicitly require a bonding analysis and 

### the 

### term 

### 'bond' is not defined in 

### the AdoptionAct. Case law, 

### however, provides

### thatanalysis ofthe 

### emotional bond, if any, between 

### parent and child is a 

### factor to be considered as 

### part ofour analysis. While a 

### parent's emotional bond

### with his or her child is a 

### major aspect of the subsection 

### 2511(b) best- 

### interest analysis, it is nonetheless only oneof

### manyfactors to be considered by 

### the 

### court when 

### determining what is in 

### the best 

### interest ofthe child. 

### [I]n addition to a bond 

### examination, the 

### trial court can 

### equally emphasize the 

### safety needs 

### ofthe child, and should also 

### considerthe intangibles, such as

### the love, 

### comfort, security, and 

### stability the child 

### might have 

### with the 

### foster parent. 

### Additionally, this Court stated 

### that the 

### trial court should consider the 

### importanceof

### continuity of 

### relationships and

### whether any 

### existing parent-child bond can be severed 

### without detrimental effects on

### the child. C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219 

### (quoting 

## In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 

### 2011)) (citations and 

### internal quotations

### omitted). Father claims 

### that CYS failed to present clearand convincing evidence regarding the 

### emotional bond between Father and Child and 

### the effect of 

### permanently severing the parental bond. Father's Br. at 11. Father states 

### that he did not obtain counsel 

### until May 2016 and did not have 

### adequate 

### time to review his case 

### with counsel 

### prior to 

### the 

### termination hearing. 

### Id.

(Footnote Continued) Father's 

### parental rights, the 

### trial court focused 

### primarily on Father's 

### failure to 

### completethe parenting evaluation and

### the sexual 

### offender

### treatment. 

## -9

### J-S92028-16

Father contends 

### that after consulting 

### with counsel, he made a reasonable 

### requestfor

### timeto

### complywith CYS and 

### the FamilyService Plan. 

## Id. The 

### trial court considered the 

### developmental, physical, and 

### emotional needs and 

### welfareofthe child. The

### trial courtfound 

### that it could not

### entrust Child 

### with Father 

### without the required evaluation and 

### treatment. 1925(a) Op. at 10. 

### Itfurther stated 

### that Father had not been involved in Child's life and resisted any services 

### for two years. 

## Id. The 

### trial court found 

### that it

was not in Child's best 

### interest to remain 

### without a 

### permanent home, 

### that Father had neglected his 

### parental duties, and 

### that termination of 

### parental rights was 

### appropriateto serve 

### the needs of Child and 

### provide permanency. 

## Id. at 9

### -10; 

### InvoluntaryTermination of Parental Rights Decree, 

### 6/13/16. Contrary to Father's 

### contentions, the

### trial court did considerthe 

### effect

on severing the parental bond, if any existed. The 

### trial court stated, 

### "[Father] has done 

### very little to 

### foster [a] relationship. From 

### the 

### very beginning of the case, he

### voluntarily reduced his 

### visits to once a 

### week 

### for

one 

### hour." 1925(a) Op. at 7. The 

### trial court went on to explain how Father's 

### constant refusal to attend 

### the parenting evaluation and sexual 

### offender

### treatment indicated hewas not

### taking the necessarysteps

### for Child to be placed in his care. 

## Id. at 9-10. Finally, the 

### trial court stated 

### that "[Father's] bond 

### with his 

### daughter is not a strong one, due to his lack of 

### visits. Severing the bond atthis 

### pointwill not have a 

### negative impact on 

### the 

### child." 

## Id. at 7.

- 10 -

### J-S92028-16

As 

### the

### trial courtobserved, Father had 

### multiple opportunities to 

### retain counsel and chose to

### wait until May of2016to do so. Hisconscious decision not to 

### complete the parenting evaluation or sexual 

### offender 

### treatment for twoyears led to

### the

### termination of his 

### parental rights. Fatherargues

### that all he is asking 

### for is one 

### opportunity to remain in his 

### daughter's life, Father's Br. at 12, but he fails to 

### acknowledge 

### that he has been 

### given, and 

### squandered, many such 

### opportunities. 

### "[A] parent'svow to 

### cooperate,

### after

a long period 

### of uncooperativeness regarding the necessityof 

### availability of services, may 

### properly be rejected as 

### untimely or 

### disingenuous." 

## In re
A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa.Super. 

### 2002). Child has been in 

### placement 

### for most ofher life, and we agree

### with the

### trial court

### that sheshould not be 

### left to 

### linger until Father decides 

### that this 

### time he 

### will 

### truly comply. Child deserves 

### permanency in a 

### family 

### that can 

### provide her 

### with the care and 

### attention she needs. We conclude 

### the 

### trial court did not abuse its 

### discretion in 

### finding 

### termination of Father's 

### parental rights would best serve Child's 

### developmental, physical, and 

### emotional needs and

### welfare. Decree 

### affirmed.

### J-S92028-16 Judgment Entered.

J seph D. 

### Seletyn, Prothonotary

Date: 

### 1/17/2017

- 12 -