F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

A M I N A A N W A R ; D A V I D C. M C C L A N A H A N , Appellants

,

v

.

D. L E E J O H

N S O N ; D A

V I D L Y N V E R G E Y L E ; M A R

G A R E T H O R N E V E R G E Y L E , and the marital community composed of David L y n Verg ey le and Marg aret Horne Verg ey le, A ppellees

. N o. 11-16612

D.C. No. 2:10-cv-02036- SRB

ORDER AND OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Ariz o na Susan R. B olton, District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted F ebruary 12, 2013—Stanford, California

F iled J uly 2, 2013

B efore: J erome F a

rris, Sidney

R. Thomas, and N. Randy

Smith, Circuit J udg es.

Opinion by

J udg e ThomasA N W A R V

. J O H

N S O N 2

SUMMARY *

Bankruptcy

The panel g r anted a m otion requesting publication of a memorandum disposition filed F ebruary 19, 2013, affirming the district court’s a f

firmance of the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of nondischarg eability c omplaints.

The panel held that the F ede r a l Rules of B ankruptcy Procedure d o n ot afford the bankruptcy court the discretion
t o e x t e n d r e t r o a c t i v e l y t h e d e a d l i n e f o r f i l i n g nondischarg eability complaints when a n attorney ’s computer difficulties cause him to miss the electronic filing deadline.

COUNSEL

Mark Clarence McClanahan (arg ued), Po r t l and, Oreg on; Mark E. Hall, Chandler, Ariz ona, for Appellants.

Randy Nussbaum (arg

ued) and B eth J

. Shapiro, Nussbaum, Gillis & Dinner P.C., Scottsdale, Ariz ona, for Appellees.

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.A N W A R V

. J O H

N S O N 3

ORDER

Appellants’ motion requesting publication of the memorandum d i s p o sition filed F ebruary 19, 2013, is GRANTED. The memoran d u m d isposition is hereby withdrawn and replaced with the opinion filed concur r e n t l y with this order. N o further petition s f o r r ehearing o r rehearing en banc will be entertained.

OP INION

THOMAS, Circuit J udg e :

The humorist Doug las Adams was fond o f say ing

, “I love deadlines. I love the whooshing sound they make as they fly by .” B ut the law more often follows B enjamin F ranklin’s
stern admonition: “You may delay

, but t i m e w i l l not.” T o paraphrase Émile Z ola, deadlines a r e often the t errible anvil on which a leg al result is forg ed.

This appeal presents the question of whether the F ederal Rules of B ankruptcy Procedure afford the B ankruptcy Court the discr e t i o n to ex tend retroactively the deadline for filing nondischarg eability complaints when an attorney ’s computer difficulties cause him to miss the electronic filing d eadline. W e conclude that the Rules of B ankruptcy Procedure do not allow retroactive ex tension of the deadline, and we affirm the judg ment of the district court.A N W A R V

. J O H

N S O N 4

I

A mina Anwar a

n d David C. McClanahan (collective l y , “Anwar”) are f

ormer employ ees of the now-bankrupt X perex corporation, of w hich D. L e e J ohnson and David Verg ey le

were the founders, princ i p al shareholders, and Chief F inancial Officer and Chief E x e cutive Officer, r e s pectively

. J ohnson a nd Verg ey le f

iled a voluntary petition in bankruptcy under Chapter 7 o f the U nited States B ankruptcy Code in the District of Ariz ona.

Upon receipt of the petition, the Ariz ona bankruptcy court mailed n otices to Anwar a n d other creditors listed in J ohnson and V erg ey le’s b a n k r u

ptcy schedules, which informed the creditors of the pending bankruptcy proceeding s, the date of the creditors’ meeting in e ach case, a nd the deadline for filing

a complaint to challeng e the discharg e ability of p a rticular debts. The bankruptcy court informed A n w a r and the other creditors that the deadline for filing nondischarg eability complaints in J ohnson’s case was November 10, 2 009, a nd the deadline in Verg ey le’s case was November 20, 2009.

On November 10 and 24, 2009, Anwar f i l e d timely motions to e x tend the filing deadlines in J ohnson’s a nd Ve r ge y le’s cases, respectively

. After a h earing

, the bankruptcy court g r anted the motions and ex tended the deadline in both cases to April 13, 2010.

A n w a r s o u gh t t o c h a l l e n g e the d ischarge a b i l i t y o f t h e debts owed to her based on section 523(a) of the B ankruptcy Code, which ex cepts from discharg e debts obtained by fraud.A N W A R V

. J O H

N S O N 5

11 U.S.C. § 5 23(a). 1 However, even debts obtained by fraud will be discharg ed unless the creditor timel y r e q u ests a determination by the bankruptcy court that the d ebt is n o t di s c h arg eable. 11 U.S.C. § 523(c). F ederal Rule o f B ankruptcy Procedure (“F RB P”) 4007(c) “imposes a strict 60-day time limit for f i l i n g complaints to determine discharg eability of debts l isted in § 523(c).” Allred v

. Kenner l e y ( In re Kennerley)

, 995 F .2d 145, 146 (9th Cir. 1993).

B y local rule, th e Ariz ona bankruptcy court has

e s t ablished a mandatory electronic filing sy stem, wi t h

ex c e ptions not relevant h ere. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the D i s t

. o f Ariz

., L ocal R

. B ankr. P. 5005-2 (2007). Parties access the
sy stem throug h an online portal on t h e bankruptcy court’s website. A creditor seekin g t o electronically file a nondischarg eability complaint mus t complete two steps: F irst, the c reditor must o pen an “adversary proceeding ” in the bankruptcy court’s electronic filing s y s t e m. Second, the creditor must electronically file a nondischarge a b ility complaint. Under the federal bankruptcy rules, the deadline for all e lectronic filing s is midnig h t local time on the day set by the relevant order of the bankruptcy c ourt. F ed. R. B ankr. P. 9006(a)(4)(A). Thus, the d eadline for Anwar to file her

1 A n w ar’ s n o n d isch arg eab ility co m p lain ts alleg e th at J o h n s o n an d Verg ey le f

rau d u len tly rep resen ted t o A n w ar an d o th er Xp erex em p lo y ees th at, in d i sso l v in g th e f

ailin g co m

p an y , Xp erex w o u ld en su re p ay m en t of all p ast an d on g o in g em

p l o y ee ben ef

its o blig atio n s an d w o u l d g i v e th ose

o b lig atio n s f

irst p rio rity o v er all o th er deb ts, w h en in f act Xp erex h ad
g ran ted a b lan k et secu rity in terest in th e co m

p an y to J o h n so n ’ s sister- in

law

. T h e co m

p lain ts asserted v ario u s to rt claim s arisin g f ro m th is alleg ed

m isrep re s en t atio n

. A s ex plain ed belo w , h ow ev er, th e n atu re o f th e alleg atio n s in A

n w ar’ s n o n d isch arg eab ility co m p lain ts d o es n o t af

f ect ou r

an aly sis o f

th e issu e o n

ap p eal.A N W A R V

. J O H

N S O N 6

nondischarg eability complaints in the J o hnson and Verg ey le proceeding s was midnig h t Ariz ona time on April 13, 2010.

Anwar’s counsel d id not meet this deadline. Counsel did
not initiate the first step of t h e electronic filing process— opening ad v e r sary proceeding s—until after 9:00 p.m. on April 13, 2010—the last day of the ex tended period for filing nondischarg eability complaints in the J o hnson and Verg ey le

cases. 2 Due to technical problems with c ounsel’s computer, 3 he did not successfully file the nondischarg eability complaint in the J o hnson case until 1 2:26 a

. m. on April 14, 2 010. He did n o t file the c omplaint in the Verg e y le case until 12:38

a.m.

On May 18, 2010, J o hn s o n a nd Verg ey le moved to dismiss Anwar’s nondischarg eability complaints as u n t imely

. Anwar responded with a motion “for r elief from untimely filing and to determine timeliness.” The ban kruptcy court, after a hearing

, g ranted J ohnson and Verg e y le’s motion, denied Anwar’s, and dismissed the complain t s w i t h p r e j u d ice. The ban k r u p t cy c o urt e x plained that, under the federal bankruptcy rules and controlling precedent interpreting them,

2 T h e reco rd ref

lects th at A n w a r ’s co u

n sel o p en ed an ad v ersary p ro ceed in g in th e J o h n so n case at 9 :3 4 p .m

. o n A p ril 1 3
, 2 0 10
, an d d id so in th e Verg ey le case at 9 :5 1 p .m . o n A p ril 1 3 , 2 0 1 0

.

3 T h e leg al secretary f

o r A n w ar’ s co u

n s e l

, w h o w as resp o n sib l e f

or

co m pletin g th e electro n ic f

ilin g s, testif

ied th at sh e en co u n tered d if f icu lties

w h ile co n v ertin g th e n o n d isch arg eab ility co m p lain ts an d attach m en ts in to P o r t a b l e D o cu

m en t Fo rm at (“ P DF”) as req u ired b y th e A rizo n a b an k ru p tc y c o u rt’ s electro n i c f ilin g in stru ctio n s. S p ecif ically

, th e p ro g ram s s h e w as u sin g to co n v ert t h e files sto p p ed resp o n d in g , w h ich

r e q u ired h er to restart th e co m p u ter n u m ero u s tim es. B ecau se o f t h e

en su in g delay

, sh e w as u n ab le t o co m

p lete th e co n v ersio n an d f ilin g p ro cess b ef

o re th e m id n ig h t

d ead lin e o n

A p ril 1 3, 2 0 1 0

.A N W A R V

. J O H

N S O N 7

he lacked discretion to g r ant retroactive ex tensions of F RB P 4007(c)’s deadline. That the r elevant a uthorities pre-dated the a dvent of the Ariz ona bankruptcy court’ s mandatory electronic filing sy stem did not chang e the bankruptcy court’s analy sis. Reviewing de novo, the district court affirmed.

II

The sole issue on appeal is whether the bankruptcy court erred in refusing to g r a

n t Anwar a retroactive ex tension o f the deadline for filing her n ondischarg eability compl aints, so a s to render timely h e r

counsel’s filing s in the wee hours of the morning following the midnig ht deadline.

“‘On appeal from a district court’s affirmance o f a bankruptcy court decision, we independently review the bankruptcy

court’s decision, without g iving deference to the district court.’” R osson v. Fitzgerald ( In re Rosson)

, 545 F .3d 764, 770 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Hebbring v

. U

. S. Trustee
, 463 F .3d 9 02, 905 (9th Cir. 2006)). “The bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law a

nd interpretation of the B ankruptcy Code

are reviewed d e novo a

nd its factual finding s for clear error.” Greene v. Savage (

In re Greene)

, 583 F

. 3d 614, 618 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Salazar v. McDonald ( In re Salazar)

, 430 F .3d 992, 994 (9th Cir. 2005)). W e review the bankruptcy court’s decision to dismiss A nwar’s complaints with p r e judice for abuse of discretion. See Emine n c e Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc. , 316 F .3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003).A N W A R V

. J O H

N S O N 8

A

The b ankruptcy court correctly held that the F ederal Rules of B a nkruptcy Procedure afford it no d iscretion to ex tend retroactively the deadli n e set in F RB P 4007(c) for filing nondischarg eability complaints. That rule provides, with an

ex c e ption not relevant here, that

a complaint to determine the discharg eability of a debt under § 523(c) shall be filed no later than 60 d ay s a f

t e r the f irst d a te set for the meeting of creditors u nder § 341(a)

. The
court shall g ive a ll creditors no less than 30 day s’ notice of the time so fix ed in the manner provided by Rule 2002. On motion of a party i n interest, after hearing on notice, the cour t may f or cause ex tend the time fix ed under this subdivision. The motion shall be filed before the time has ex p ired.

F ed. R. B ankr. P. 4007(c). 4

Thus, b y i ts terms, the rule requires creditors such a s Anwar to file nondischarg eability complaints within six ty day s o f the credi t o r s ’ meeting

. A creditor may move to

ex tend the deadline fo r cause—as A nwar successfully did once—but “[ t] he motion shall b e filed before t h e t i m e has

4 A n w ar d o es no t d isp u te th at th e b an k ru p tcy co u rt p ro v id ed h er th e req u isite n o tice u n d er FRB P 4 0 0 7 (c).A N W A R V

. J O H

N S O N 9

ex p ired.” Id. 5 Reinforcing the statement that c reditors must

move for ex tensions of F RB P 4 0 07(c)’s filing d e adline before the tim e for filing has ex pired, F RB P 9006(b)(3) states that bankruptcy courts may e x t end this deadline “only to the

ex tent and under the conditions stated in” F RB P 4007(c) i tself. F e d. R. B ankr. P. 9006(b)(3). This requirement disting uishes F RB P 4007(c)’s deadline from most others set by the bankruptcy rules, w hich bankruptcy courts may ex tend
at any time u

pon a s h o w ing of g ood cause or ex cusable
neg lect. F ed. R. B ankr. P. 9006(b)(1).

Consistent with the plain lang uag e of F RB P 4007(c) a nd 9 0 0 6 ( b )(3), we have repeatedly held that the six ty -day time limit for f

iling nondischarg eability complaints under 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) is “strict” and, without qualification, “cannot be ex tended unless a motion is mad e b e fore the 60- day lim it ex pires.” In re Kennerley

, 995 F .2d at 146 (citing Anwiler v. P atchett (

In re Anwiler)

, 9 58 F .2d 9 2 5 ( 9 th Cir. 1992)); see a lso, e.g. , Classic Auto R efinishing, Inc. v

. Marino ( In re Marino)

, 3 7 F

. 3 d 1354, 1 3 5 8 (9th Cir. 1 994); Jones v. Hill (

In re Hill)

, 811 F .2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1987). According ly

, Anwar was not e n titled to a ret roactive

ex tension of the filing d ea dline based on equitable considerations or a local r u l e o f bankruptcy procedure that

5 T h e b a n k

ru p tcy co d e pro v id es o n e ex cep tio n f ro m th e pro h ib itio n ag ain st retro activ e ex ten sio n s o f FRB P 40 0 7 (c)’ s fi l i n g d ead lin e—f o r a

co m p l a i n t c h allen g in g th e d isch arg eab i lity o f a d eb t th at w as “ n eith er listed n o r sch ed

u led

. . . in tim e to p erm it

. . . tim ely f ilin g o f a p ro o f of

c l a im an d tim ely req u est f o r a determ i n atio n o f d isch arg eab ility o f s uc h d eb t,” u n less th e cre d ito r “ h ad n otice o r actu al k n o w l ed g e o f th e [b an k ru p tcy ] case in tim e f

o r su ch tim ely f

i l i n g an d [co m

p l ain t].” 1 1 U.S.C. § 5 2 3 (a)(3 )(B ). B ecau se A n w ar did n o t i n v o k e th is ex cep tio n b ef o re th e d istrict co u rt, w e d e c l i n e t o co n sid er it f o r th e f irst t im e on ap p eal. Un ited

S ta tes v. Oreg o n , 7 6 9 F.2 d 1 4 1 0 , 1 4 1 4 (9 th Cir. 1 9 8 5 ).A N W A R V

. J O H

N S O N 10

purports to g rant the bankruptcy cour t d iscretion to ex cuse untimely filing s.

B

The bankruptcy c o urt lacked equitable power to g rant Anwar relief f

rom h er untimely filing s. “I n bankruptcy cases,

a court’s equitable power is deri v ed f rom 11 U .S.C. § 105 (a )

, ” In re Anwiler

, 958 F .2d at 928 n.5, which authoriz es the court to “issue any o rder, process, or judg ment that is n ecessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions o f [ the B ankruptcy Code] ,” 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). H o w e ver, “whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be ex ercised wi t h i n the confines of the B ankruptcy Code.” Norwest Bank W orthington v. Ahlers

, 485 U .S. 197, 206 (1988). These confines i nclude deadlines
set by the F ederal Rules of B ankruptcy Procedure. See Zidell, Inc. v. Forsch (

In re Coastal Alaska Lines, I n c .)

, 920 F .2d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the b ankruptcy court may not invoke its equitable power under § 105(a) to enlarg e the time for filing a proof o f claim under F R BP 3 0 0 2(c), where F RB P 9006(b)(3) limits the g rounds f o r e x tension to those s t a t ed in F RB P 3002(c) itself). B e cause g ranting Anwar a retroactive e x tension o f t h e filing deadline would conflict with the plain lang uag e of F RB P 4007(c) a nd 9006(b)(3), the bankruptcy court could not rely on its equitable powers to do so. See Childress v. Middleton Arms, L.P. ( I n re Middleton Arms, L.P.)

, 934 F .2d 723, 725 (6th Cir. 1991) (“bankruptcy c ourts cannot use equitable principles toA N W A R V

. J O H

N S O N 11

disreg ard unambig uous statutory lang uag e”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 6

Thus, the fact that An w a r missed the filing deadline b y less than an hour is immaterial. S ee Kelly v. Gordon (

I n re Gordon)

, 988 F .2d 1000, 1001 ( 9th Cir. 1993 ) (deny ing equitable relief fr o m F R B P 4 0 0 7(c) deadline w here complaint filed two d ay s late); Moody v. Bucknum ( In r e B ucknum)

, 951 F .2d 204, 205–06 (9th Cir. 1991) (same). Nor is the lack of prejudi c e t o the debtors sig nificant. See B aldwin Cnty. W elcome Ctr. v. B r o w n , 466 U.S. 147, 1 52 ( 1984) (holding that lack of prejudice to o pposing p arty “is n ot an independent basis for invoking [ equitable ex ceptions] a nd sanctioning d eviations from established procedures”). Th at Anwar seeks to file a fraud claim is similarly irrelevant to the analy sis. See In re Kennerl ey , 9 9 5 F .2d at 146. F inally

, the advent of mandatory electronic filing sy stems does not upend this body of precedent, a nd the fact tha t A n w ar’s untimely filing stemmed from difficulty with an electronic filing
sy stem is immaterial. Paper filing sy stems present their o wn unique opportunities for parties to m i s s their deadlines; a s the b ankruptcy court in this case n oted, the A r i z o na bankruptcy court’s electronic filing sy stem made it e asier for

6 W e ack n o w led g e th at th e U.S. S u p r e m e Co u rt h as n o t ex p ressly ad d ressed w

h eth er FRB P 4 00 7 (c)’ s f

i lin g d ead l in e ad m i ts o f an y eq u itab le

ex cep tio n s an d th at l o w er co u rts are div id ed o n th e issu e. S ee Ko n trick v. Rya n , 5 4 0 U.S. 4 4 3
, 4 5 7 & n n .1 1

– 12 (2 0 0 4 ) (d eclin in g to d ecid e q u estio n

an d n otin g circu it sp lit). W e n eed n o t, an d d o n o t, reach th e q u estio n o f

w h eth er ex tern al f

o rces th at p rev en ted an y f i lin g s

— s u ch as em erg en cy situ atio n s, t

h e l o ss of th e co u

rt’ s o w n e l e c t r o n ic f

ilin g cap acity

, o r th e

co u rt’ s a ffirm ativ e m islead in g of a p arty —w o u ld w arran t su ch an

e x c e p t i o n

. S

ee, e.g

. , In re Ken n erley

, 9 9 5 F.2 d at 1 4 7– 4 8 ; see a l s o Tickn o r v. Ch o i ce H

o t e l s I n t ern ., In c. , 2 7 5 F.3 d 1 1 6 4
, 1 1 6 5 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 2 ).A N W A R V

. J O H

N S O N 12

Anwar’s counsel to timely file the complaints from h is office in Ore g on. I n short, a b sent unique and ex ceptional circumstances not present here, we do not inquire into t h e reason a party

failed to file on time in assessing whether she is entitled to an equita b l e e x ception from F RB P 4007(c)’s filing deadline; under the plain lang uag e of the rules and our controlling precedent, there is no such ex ception.

C

Contrary to Anwar’s assertion, the A r iz ona bankruptcy court’s local r

ules do n o t provide relief. Pursuant to F RB P 9029(a)(1), federal district c o urts may promulg ate local rules of bankruptcy procedure “ w hich are c onsistent with—but not duplicative of—Acts of Cong ress and [the F RB P] and which do not prohibit or limit the u se o f the Offi c i a l Forms

. . . . ” F ed. R. B ankr. P. 9029(a)(1). I n addition, F RB P 5005(a)(2) authoriz es district co u

r t s to promulg ate local bankruptcy rules that r equire electronic filing

, provided s u c h rules comport with technical standards established by the J udicial Conference of the United States and allo w for “reasonable

ex c e ptions.” F ed. R. B ankr. P. 5 0 05(a)(2). The bankruptcy
court f or the Distric t o f Ariz ona, as noted above, has

ex e r cised its authority to establish an electronic filing sy stem and has promulg ated local procedural rules g overning its u se. Of relevanc e t o t his appeal, L ocal Rule of B ankruptcy Procedure (“L RB P”) 5005-2(n) provides that an a t t orney o r party whose electronic filing “is untimely or otherwise improper may s e ek a

ppropriate relief f

rom the bankruptcy
court upon a showing of g ood cause or ex cusable n egl e c t

. ” L ocal R. B a

nkr. P. 5005-2(n). Anwar arg ues that this local rule g ives the bankruptcy c our t d iscretion to consider untimely nondischarg eability complaints where the late filingA N W A R V

. J O H

N S O N 13

results f rom tech n i c al difficulty with the electronic filing
sy stem.

However, a local rule of bankruptcy procedure c annot be applied in a manner that conflicts w ith the federal rules. See Pradier v. E lespuru

, 6 41 F .2d 80 8
, 810 (9th Cir. 1981). District and b ankruptcy courts have been deleg ated authority
to adopt local rules prescribing the condu c t o f business but the rules must be consistent w i t h t he B ankruptcy Code a nd
t he F ederal Rules of B ankruptcy Procedure. S igma M i c r o Corp. v. Healthcentral.com ( In re H e a lthcentral.com)

, 504 F .3d 775, 784 (9th Cir. 2007). L ocal bank r u p t c y rules
may not “enlarg e, abridg e, or modify any substantive rig ht.” Sunahara v. Burchard (

I n r e S unahara)

, 326 B .R. 768, 782 (B .A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). B e cause the federal bankruptcy rules do not p ermit

an “ex cusable neg lect” e x ception to FR BP 4007(c)’s filing deadline, L RB P 5005-2(n) cannot provide Anwar relief.

I t is of no moment that L RB P 5005-2(n) closely tracks a model rule of local b ankruptcy p rocedure d e v eloped by the J udicial Conference of the United States. 7 A model rule is, b y definition, only an advisory template. B y itself, it h as no

7 T h e relev an t m o d el ru l e p ro v i d es th at a u ser o f an electr o n i c fi l i ng sy stem “ w

h o se f ilin g is m ad e u n tim ely

as th e resu lt o f

a tech n ical f

ailu re

m ay seek ap p r o p r i a te relief f ro m th e co u rt.” U .S. J u d i cial Co n f eren ce, Cm te. on Co u rt A d m in

. & Case Mg m t., Mo del L o cal B an k

ru p t cy Co u rt Ru les f o r Electro n ic Case Filin g , Ru le 1 1

– T ech n ical Failu res (J u n e 2 9
, 2 0 0 1 ). T h e a s so ciated co m m en tary states t

h at th e m o d el ru le ad d resses b o th “ th e p o s sib ility th at a party m ay n o t m eet a fi l i n g d e ad lin e b ecau s e th e co u rt’ s w eb site is n o t accessib l e f o r so m e reaso n ” an d “ th e po s sib ility th at th e f iler’ s o w n u n a n ticip ated s y stem f ailu re m i g h t m ak e th e f

i ler

u n ab le to m eet a f

ilin g d ead lin e.” Id

. at cm t. 1

.A N W A R V

. J O H

N S O N 14

leg al force and cannot trump the F ederal Rules of B ankruptcy Procedure.

III

W e decline Anwar’s invitation to revise the F ederal Rules of B ankruptcy Procedure, which plainly provide that a party may file a nondischarg eability complaint under 11 U .S.C. § 523 outside the six ty -day win d o w established by F RB P 4007(c) if, and only if, she files a motion showing g ood cause for an e x tension before the six ty -day period laps e s. F ed. R. B ankr. P. 4007(c), 9006(b)(3).

B e cause neither the f

ederal rules

, l o cal r

ules, n or model rules of b ankruptcy pr o c e dure g ave the bankruptcy court authority to r elieve Anwar f r o m the consequences of her

un t i m e l y f

i l i n g, w e a f

f i r m t h e d i s m i s sal of her nondischarg eability

complaints with prejudice.

AF F IRMED.