United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued June 10, 2015

Decided August 11, 2015

Before

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 14-2548

JASON P. EDWARDS,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of 

Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 12-cv-963

Larry J. McKinney,

Judge.

O R D E R

Jason Edwards was an active police officer in Indianapolis when he went along 

with a scheme put together by another police officer (Long) whereby they would steal 

drugs from dealers in the process of making searches and arrests. Edwards, now a 

federal prisoner, is serving a sentence of 204 months’ imprisonment after he was 

convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute the 

drug, two substantive possession counts, and one count of attempt. United States v. 

Long, 639 F.3d 293 (7th Cir. 2011). In his motion to vacate, see 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Edwards 

charges his attorney, Kevin McShane, with providing ineffective assistance and advice 

in connection with the government’s offer of a binding plea agreement, see FED. R. CIV.

P. 11(c)(1)(C), that, if accepted by the district court, would have locked in a prison term 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 14-2548 Page 2

of 120 months. The district court, proceeding on the premise that the key issue was 

what McShane advised Edwards regarding possible post-trial sentencing outcomes, 

disagreed that McShane had provided ineffective advice, and denied Edwards’s 

motion. 

Edwards’s sole contention in this appeal is that McShane misled him into 

thinking that he had “nothing to lose” by rejecting the plea agreement. The district 

court held an evidentiary hearing to address Edwards’s theory. Edwards’s testimony at 

the hearing repeated his underlying allegation that McShane gave him the impression 

that no matter whether he accepted or rejected the offer, he likely would not face a 

sentence greater than 10 years’ imprisonment. 

McShane testified that he told Edwards that they had little chance to beat any of 

the marijuana charges because the evidence was overwhelming. (Edwards also was 

charged with possessing a firearm in furtherance of his drug crimes; McShane 

anticipated that he could obtain an acquittal on the gun charge, and did.) Nevertheless, 

McShane told Edwards that should he proceed to trial, McShane would argue for a 

sentence within a guidelines range of 27 to 33 months. McShane also discussed with 

Edwards the possibility of a sentence as great as 30 years, warned him that his 

guidelines range very well might exceed 120 months when all was said and done, and 

cautioned that his status as a corrupt police officer was likely to weigh heavily against 

him at sentencing. Ultimately, McShane averred, he left the decision whether to accept 

or reject the plea offer to Edwards.

The district court found that “on points of direct conflict” McShane was more 

believable than Edwards. The court found that McShane had advised Edwards that if he 

was found guilty by a jury a number of sentencing options would be available to the 

judge. McShane stressed that Edwards’s position as a corrupt police officer was likely to 

weigh heavily against him, and that an increase in his guidelines range was likely. The 

judge found that McShane discussed with Edwards the possibility of a short prison 

term of between 27 and 33 months, but concluded that McShane had strong potential 

sentencing arguments, and thus discussing this lower possibility did not amount to 

ineffective assistance.

Criminal defendants are entitled to the effective assistance of counsel when 

choosing to accept or reject an offer of a plea bargain. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 

1384–85 (2012); Julian v. Bartley, 495 F.3d 487, 494–95 (7th Cir. 2007). But effective 

assistance is precisely what Edwards received. Edwards does not meaningfully contest 
No. 14-2548 Page 3

the judge’s factual findings, and neither do we find them to be clearly erroneous. 

See Blake v. United States, 723 F.3d 870, 879 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that factual 

findings are reviewed for clear error). Those findings establish that McShane informed 

Edwards of the low and high sentencing possibilities present in his case, as well as 

points in between. On this record, we cannot say that McShane in any way misled 

Edwards. And when all was said and done, McShane left the decision whether or not to 

plead guilty up to Edwards, as he should have. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 

31–32 (1974); Johnson v. Duckworth, 793 F.2d 898, 900 (7th Cir. 1986).

The district court did not comment on whether Edwards suffered any prejudice, 

but we add briefly that we believe he did not. Crucially, Edwards cannot show that the 

district judge would have accepted the binding plea agreement. Under the guidelines, 

plea agreements that require a specific sentence must be tied to the applicable 

guidelines range. See U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2(c) (2008). And a binding plea agreement is 

supposed to reflect the correct guidelines range, even if it calls for a variance. 

See Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685, 2692 (2011) (plurality op.). The parties 

inform us that the guidelines range contemplated by the rejected plea offer assumed a 

base offense level of 20, eight levels below the range ultimately calculated by the district 

judge. In the end, the 120 months that would have been locked in fell below the true 

guidelines range of 151 to 188 months. What’s more, the parties recognized that an 

upward variance was appropriate: the plea agreement called for what purported to be

an above-guidelines prison term, and McShane testified repeatedly that he had believed 

that Edwards’s job as a police officer would weigh heavily against him at sentencing. 

And we know that the judge, too, believed that the guidelines did not adequately 

account for Edwards’s breach of trust. So, had the judge realized that the parties’ 

proposed prison term actually fell below the correct guidelines range, he almost 

certainly would have rejected the agreement.

AFFIRMED.