COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Alston, Ch afin and Senior Judge Haley

HELLEN BANGURA MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 2236-14-4 PER CURIAM JUNE 9, 2015 ALEXANDRIA DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY & HUMAN SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA James C. Clark, Judge (Douglas A. Steinberg, on brief), for appellant. (Jonathan Westreich, Special Coun sel to the Alexandria Department of Community and Human Services ; James L. Banks, Jr., City Attorney; Jill A. Schaub, Senior Assistant City Attorney; Sameena Sabir, Guardian ad litem for the minor children; Office of the City Attorney, on brief), for appellee.
Hellen Bangura (mother) appeals the orders re garding three of her ch ildren, S.K., P.B., and
I.S. 1 The circuit court terminated mother’s parent al rights and approved the goal of adoption for
P.B. 2 Mother argues that the trial court erred by (1) terminating he r parental rights to P.B. under Code § 16.1-283 because the eviden ce did not prove that sh e failed to rehabilita te herself within the statutory time frame, and specifically, (A) termin ating her parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(1) because there wa s insufficient evidence to prove that she “failed to provide or substantially plan for the future of the child for a period of six months after the child’s placement in

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.

1 While the foster care case was pending, mother gave birth to another child in July 2014. That child is not a subject of these proceedings.

2 Mother’s assignments of error relate to the te rmination of her parental rights to P.B., so this Court will not review the trial court’s rulings for S.K. and I.S.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - foster care;” (B) terminating her parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1 -283(C)(2) because there was insufficient evidence to prove that she failed to make “substantial progress towards elimination of the conditions which led to or required continua tion of the child’s foster care placement within twelve months;” and (C) terminating her parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B) because she made substantial prog ress toward correcting or eliminating the conditions that would allow the child to be returned home safely; (2) terminating her parental rights under Code § 16.1-283 “when it had elected outcomes that were less drastic, (placement with ot her family) than termination and had not removed or made any steps to protect [her] yo ungest minor child;” and (3) terminatin g mother’s parental rights and approving the goal of adoptio n for P.B. and approving the goal of family placement for S.K. and I.S. because it is not in P.B.’s best interests to se ver her relationship with her siblings and mother’s family. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of th e parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingl y, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
BACKGROUND We view the evidence in the light most favor able to the prevailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991). As of August 2, 2013, mother had three childr en - - S.K., who was six years old, P.B., who was two years old, and I.S., who was one year old. 3 A maintenance worker discovered the children had been left alone in mother’s home. The maintenance worker contacted the police, who subsequently contacted the Alexandria Depa rtment of Community & Human Services (the Department). The conditions of the home we re deplorable. The house was infested with roaches, bed bugs, and mice. There was no telep hone, and the children di d not have a contact

3 The children have different fathers.- 3 - number for mother. There was limited food in the house, and hazardous chemicals, including pesticides and cleaning supplies, were within the children’s reac h. There were no beds, and the bathroom and bedroom had “a strong odor.” S.K. told the social worker thatshe frequently cares for her siblings when her mother works and, as a result, misses school. Mother arrived two hours after the police arri ved. She denied leaving the children home alone. She said that she asked her roommate to watch the children because her babysitter was not available. Mother became increasingly aggressi ve. She threatened to kill herself and others. The police detained her and transported her to receive psychiatric treatment. The Department removed the children and pla ced them in foster care. The Alexandria Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (the JDR court) found that the children were abused and neglected. Due to the situation on August 2, 2013, mother was charged with six felonies and three misdemeanors. The trial court granted her motion to strike the three count s of reckless care of a child and three counts of causing cr uelty and injury to a child. Sh e was convicted of three counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The Department provided numerous services to mother. They recommended that she participate in a mental health examination, which she did on September 5, 2013. The examiner stated that mother “appears unabl e to function independently as a parent” and was “at high risk for child abuse and neglect.” The examiner ma de several recommendations , including individual psychotherapy, a psychological examination, home- based services, stable housing, and reliable childcare. Mother subsequently participated in a psychological evaluation. The examiner concluded that “[r]isk for child ne glect is high” and that mother’s “ability to effectively care for her children, make thoughtful decisions, and pr oblem solve may be sign ificantly compromised due to her limited comprehension abilities, depressive symptoms, and her difficulties with- 4 - emotional regulation.” The examiner reco mmended a neuropsychology evaluation, individual psychotherapy, continued contact wi th her children, pare nting classes, and development of her support networks. As a result of the recommenda tions, mother started weekly meetings with a therapist. In February 2014, the Department placed I.S. wi th his father, and S.K. and P.B. with their maternal great aunt and uncle. In March 2014, S.K.’s father expr essed interest in having custody of S.K. The Department arranged for weekly supe rvised visitation between mother and the children. Mother attended most visitations, but ha d to cancel some visits due to illness and work. In September 2014, mother did not return the te lephone calls from the social worker who was trying to schedule visitation. Moth er did not visit with the chil dren in September or October
2014. The Department also assisted mother with housing. She had difficulty paying the rent, despite being employed at the time. Then, in July 2014, mother was fired from her job. Her fourth child was born in July 2014. She received financial assistance w ith her housing, and she also received food stamps. On October 7, 2014, the JDR court terminated mother’s parental rights to P.B. and approved the goal of adoption. It approved the perm anency plan to return S.K. to her father’s home 4 and I.S. to his father’s home. 5 Mother appealed these orders to the circuit court. The parties appeared before the circuit cour t on November 19, 2014 . After hearing the evidence and argument, th e circuit court found that it was in P.B.’s best intere sts to terminate mother’s parental rights to P.B. pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B), (C)(1), and (C)(2). The circuit

4 There was a concurrent goal of adoption for S.K.

5 I.S.’s father was awarded custody.- 5 - court then entered orders terminating mother’s pare ntal rights to P.B. and approving the goal of adoption. The circuit co urt also entered orders approving the permanency planning goals for S.K. and I.S. 6 This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS “Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus , its finding is en titled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unle ss plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Martin v. Pittsylvania Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986) (citations omitted). Assignment of error #1 Mother argues that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights to P.B. pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B), (C)(1), and (C)(2) because the evidence did not prove that she failed to rehabilitate herself within the statutory time frame. A court may terminate parental rights if: The parent or parents, without good cause, have been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed twelve months from the date the child wa s placed in foster care to remedy substantially the conditio ns which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). [S]ubsection C termination decisions hinge not so much on the magnitude of the problem that cr eated the original danger to the child, but on the demonstrated fa ilure of the parent to make reasonable changes. Considerably more “retrospective in nature,” subsection C requires the court to determine whether the parent has been unwilling or unable to remedy the problems during the period in which he has been offered rehabilitation services.

6 Counsel for S.K.’s father filed a letter reque sting that this Court affirm the trial court’s ruling regarding S.K. Mother did not assign error to that ruling, so this Court will not review it.- 6 - Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs ., 46 Va. App. 257, 271, 616 S.E.2d 765, 772 (2005) (quoting City of Newport News Dep’t of So c. Servs. v. Winslow, 40 Va. App. 556, 562-63, 580 S.E.2d 463, 466 (2003)). The Department removed the children from mo ther’s care due to inadequate supervision and the fact that S.K. missed school to take care of her siblings. There also was concern about the condition of the home and the presen ce of pesticides within the chil dren’s reach. The Department provided numerous services to mother. However, mother was unable to re medy the situation that led to P.B. being placed in and rema ining in foster care. At the time of the ci rcuit court’s hearing, mother was unemplo yed. She had been receiving rental as sistance for approximately one year, and that assistance was expiring. He r lease also was ending on Nove mber 30, 2014, and she did not have a plan for where she was going to li ve or how she was going to pay for it. The Department cancelled two vi sits in October 2014 because “[t]here were concerns about Ms. Bangura’s mental and emotional stability at the time of the scheduled visits.” After the children were removed, the Department arranged for mother to have a mental h ealth interview and a psychological examination. In both reports, there was concern ab out mother’s abilit y to parent. The examiners predicted a high risk of child ne glect. Despite mother ’s involvement with a therapist, the social worker testified that mother still “gets very easily over whelmed and when she is faced with a problem or s ituation that is not to he r liking[,] she can get extremely emotional and is not able to rationalize or make a plan in those moments.” The social worker testified th at mother had not made the progress necessary to have P.B. returned to her. “The twelve-month time limit established by Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) was designed to prevent an indeterminate state of fo ster care ‘drift’ and to encourage timeliness by the courts and social services in addressing the circumstances th at resulted in the foster care placement.” L.G. v. Amherst Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 41 Va. App. 51, 56, 581 S.E.2d 886,- 7 - 889 (2003). “It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his [or her] responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). At the time of the circuit court’s hearing, P. B. had been in foster care for approximately fifteen months. Mother had not su bstantially remedied th e conditions that led to P.B. being placed and remaining in foster care. The trial court did not err in terminating moth er’s parental rights to P.B. pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). When a trial court’s judgment is made on alternative grounds, we need only consider whether any one of the alternatives is sufficient to sustain the judgment of the trial court, and if so, we need not address the other grounds. See Fields v. Dinwiddie Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 8, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659 (2005) (the Cour t affirmed termination of parental rights under one subsection of Code § 16.1-283 and did not need to address termination of parental rights pursuant to another subsection). Therefore, we will not consider whether the trial court erred in terminating mother’s pa rental rights to P.B. pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C)(1). Assignment of error #2 Mother argues that the trial co urt erred in terminating her pa rental rights to P.B. because mother still had custody of her infa nt at the time of the circuit court hearing. As noted above, mother had a fourth child in July 2014 and, as of November 2014, the ch ild was still in her custody. Mother notes that the social worker “con ceded she could care for an infant, and in fact was doing so at the time of the hearing.” Mother asserts that her parental rights to P.B. should not have been terminated because the Department did not have concerns about her ability to care for the infant. At the time of the hearing, the Department was monitoring the situation between mother and the infant. In its brief, the Departme nt states that the “situation has subsequently- 8 - changed.” However, the custodial arrangement with the infant does not aff ect mother’s ability to care for P.B. The evidence proved that mother wa s unable to remedy the situation within twelve months to care for P.B. Assignment of error #3 Mother argues that termination of her parental rights to P.B. and the goal of adoption are not in P.B.’s best interests because the different outcomes for S.K., I.S, and P.B. may mean that P.B. loses contact with her siblings. When considering termination of parental righ ts, “the paramount cons ideration of a trial court is the child’s best interests.” Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463. The evidence proved that P.B. needed perm anency, and adoption was the best way to achieve permanency for P.B. Contrary to moth er’s arguments, the tria l court did not err in determining P.B.’s best interests.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s ru ling is summarily affirmed. Rule 5A:27. Affirmed.