* After examining the briefs and appellate record, t his panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of the appeal in No. 02-4173. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1 (G). The 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JUN 3 2003 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, vs. JOSE JUAN LORA-SOLANO, also known as Lora Salono, Defendant - Appellant. No. 02-4139

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, vs. NICOLAS CORTEZ-CRUZ, also known as Nicko Cortez, Defendant - Appellant. No. 02-4173

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH (D.C. No. 2:00-CR-596-03-TC) (D.C. No. 2:00-CR-596-01-TC)

Submitted on the briefs: *case therefore is ordered submitted without oral ar gument. - 2 - Laurie J. Sartorio, Assistant United States Attorne y (and Paul M. Warner, United States Attorney, on the brief), United States’ Atto rney’s Office, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff - Appellee. Robert Breeze, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant - Appellant Jose Juan LoraSolano. Joseph Jardine, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant- Appellant Nicolas CortezCruz.

Before TACHA , Chief Judge, HOLLOWAY , and KELLY , Circuit Judges.

KELLY , Circuit Judge.

In these cases consolidated for purposes of decisio n, Defendants-Appellants Jose Juan Lora-Solano and Nicholas Cortez-Cruz appe al their convictions for possession with intent to distribute controlled sub stances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) following entry of conditional pleas pr eserving their rights to appeal the district court’s denial of their motions to sup press. Mr. Lora-Solano raises two issues in his appeal: (1) the judge pro tempore who signed the search warrant was not authorized, and (2) the search warrant was not supported by probable cause and lacked sufficient particularity in descri bing the premises to be searched. Mr. Cortez-Cruz raises six issues in his appeal, wh ich can be grouped under four topics: (1) the lack of authority of the judge pro tempore to issue a search warrant- 3 -

in this case, (2) the lack of probable cause and de scription of the place to be searched with sufficient particularity in the warra nt, (3) the district court’s denial of his motion for a continuance, and (4) the distri ct court’s increase of his offense level by three levels under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Background Relying upon information provided by informant Marc os Lenin Juarez, officers and agents from the Utah Criminal Bureau o f Investigation and the DEA Metro Narcotics Task Force planned to intercept a d elivery of drugs on November 20, 2000. Mr. Juarez agreed to perform a controlle d delivery of drugs to a residence at 2021 Camelot Way in Salt Lake City, Ut ah, and he told police that he had been paid $2000 by an individual in Phoenix, Ar izona, to deliver the drugs to someone named “Nico” (later identified as Mr. Corte z-Cruz). Mr. Juarez was not certain of the exact street address but had visited the house previously. Agents dispatched to 2021 Camelot Way were unable to ident ify a residence at that address, and so Mr. Juarez went with an officer to the area and realized that the correct address was, in fact, 2051 (not 2021) Camel ot Way. Apparently, the new address was not communicated to the officer chargedwith obtaining the warrant, and the address on the warrant was listed incorrect ly as 2021 Camelot Way.- 4 -

That evening, Mr. Juarez went to the residence at 2 051 Camelot Way. Several individuals came out of the house and took items from Mr. Juarez’s car. Once the individuals were back inside the house, of ficers approached the house. Mr. Lora-Solano fled out the back door and was purs ued by police. A search of the premises found 50 pounds of marijuana and one k ilogram of cocaine. Mr. Lora-Solano told police that he was renting a room at the house, which was owned by Mr. Cortez-Cruz. Mr. Juarez told the poli ce that Mr. Cortez-Cruz had inspected the drugs before the police entered the r esidence.

Discussion A. Authority of the Judge Pro Tempore Under the Fourth Amendment, a neutral and detached magistrate must issue a search warrant for the warrant to be valid. Unit ed States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984). We review de novo the legal issue of w hether a search or seizure comported with the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Lyons , 7 F.3d 973, 975 (10th Cir. 1993). The search warrant was obtained by Officer Troy Den ney from Walter Ellett, a state judge pro tempore. Judge Ellet was appointed on June 27, 2000, for a six-month term or until a vacancy was filled. On December 8, 2000, Judge Ellet’s appointment was renewed for a period beginn ing December 27, 2000, for- 5 -

six months or until a vacancy was filled. Judge Ra ndall Skanchy was selected to fill the vacancy on November 15, 2000, but not sworn into office until January 3, 2001. At issue here, then, is whether Judge Skanchy’s selection on November 15, 2000, means that Judge Ellet was not an active judg e when he signed the search warrant on November 20, 2000. Relying on language in the Utah Constitution suggesting that a vacancy is “filled” when a personis appointed by the Governor (and not when a person is sworn into office), Appel lants contend that Judge Ellet was not an active judge when he signed the warrant. After reviewing the relevant provisions of the UtahConstitution, Article VIII, Section 8 of the Utah Constitution merely pro vides the mechanism whereby the state fills vacancies in the judiciary. That p rovision does not, contrary to Appellants’ assertion, determine when a judge begin s service and thereby ends the term of a pro tempore judge. A more relevant provi sion of the Utah Constitution governs the powers of judges pro tempore: “Except a s otherwise provided by this constitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authori ze retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duti es.” Utah Const. art. VIII, § 4. By appointing Judge Ellet a judge pro tempore i n June of 2000 and renewing his appointment in December–well after he signed th e warrant in this case–the state was obviously exercising its authority to authorize Judge Ellet to perform judicial duties throughout the period during which the warrant was signed.- 6 -

Furthermore, the testimony at the suppression heari ng regarding the practice of the Utah state judiciary leaves no doub t that Judge Ellet was an active judge at the time of signing the warrant. Judge El let was, according to the Utah state judiciary, employed as a judge at the time he signed the warrant. As the district court noted, the December 8, 2000, renewal order stated that Judge Ellet’s appointment as a pro tempore judge was being “renew ed,” with an active date of December 27, the date on which the first appointmen t would expire. Until Judge Skanchy took the oath on January 3, 2001, then, Jud ge Ellet was properly acting as a Utah state judge and was empowered to issue a warrant on November 20,
2000. B. Search Warrant We review a district court’s factual findings under lying its decision to deny a motion to suppress for clear error. United State s v. Downs , 151 F.3d 1301, 1302 (10th Cir. 1998). We review de novo the ultim ate determination on the reasonableness of a search or seizure under the Fou rth Amendment. United States v. Anderson , 114 F.3d 1059, 1063 (10th Cir. 1997). Mr. Lora-Solano and Mr. Cortez-Cruz essentially rai se three objections to the anticipatory search warrant issued in this case . First, they argue that listing the wrong house number (2021 instead of 2051) displ ays a lack of sufficient particularity. Second and similarly, they argue th at a failure to provide a physical- 7 -

description of the premises to be searched under th e warrant also constitutes a lack of sufficient particularity. Finally, they ar gue that the affidavit supporting the warrant incorrectly alleged that a conversation between the police informant and Mr. Cortez-Cruz took place and was recorded. An anticipatory search warrant, such as the warrantin this case, is valid “when the warrant application indicates there will be a government-controlled delivery of contraband to the place to be searched, probable cause for a search is established and . . . provided the warrant’s execut ion is conditioned on the contraband’s delivery to, or receipt at, the design ated place.” United States v. Rowland , 145 F.3d 1194, 1202 (10th Cir. 1998). Under our holding in United States v. Hugoboom , 112 F.3d 1081 (10th Cir. 1997), the probable caus e requirement is satisfied by reference to a controll ed delivery of contraband in the supporting affidavit. See Rowland , 145 F.3d at 1202-03 (“[W]hen the warrant affidavit refers to a controlled delivery of contra band to the place designated for search, the nexus requirement of probable cause is satisfied and the affidavit need not provide additional independent evidence linking the place to be searched to criminal activity.”) (citing Hugoboom , 112 F.3d at 1086). By adequately stating the conditions precedent to the warrant’s execution(particularly the cooperation of an informant) in the affidavit, the warrant is v alid despite the lack of a physical description of the premises.- 8 -

The district court found that the police had reliab ly believed Mr. Juarez’s claim that he spoke with Mr. Cortez-Cruz, and we do not find that determination clearly erroneous. So also a miscommunication about whether a call between the informant and Mr. Cortez-Cruz was recorded does notrender the warrant invalid. The important issue is that the informant did, in f act, have a telephone conversation with Mr. Cortez-Cruz and relayed the c ontents of the conversation to the police (most importantly, the address of the ho use where the delivery of drugs would take place). Thus, the statements in the aff idavit regarding the telephone call do not rise to the level of deliberately false statements so as to render the warrant invalid. The error in the warrant regarding the house numberto be searched is a closer issue in light of this court’s ruling in Uni ted States v. Williamson , 1 F.3d 1134 (10th Cir. 1993). “The test for determining t he adequacy of the description of the location to be searched is whether the descr iption is sufficient ‘to enable the executing officer to locate and identify the pr emises with reasonable effort, and whether there is any reasonable probability that another premise might be mistakenly searched.’” United States v. Pervaz , 118 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). Clearly, the second concern ( reasonable probability that another premise might be mistakenly searched) is no t implicated here–unless one could imagine that residents in two houses on the s ame street, including one at an- 9 -

address that does not exist, were expecting deliver ies of illegal drugs on November 20, 2000. The district judge’s findings o f fact expressly state that CIB agents dispatched to 2021 Camelot Way “were not abl e to identify a residence” at that location and that another agent then drove wit h the informant to the neighborhood and ascertained the correct address. I. Rec. Doc. 106 at 3. The fact that 2021 Camelot Way apparently does not exist and the officers’ knowledge of that fact “make[s] the mistaken search of the wrong premises unlikely,” a factor we may appropriately consider in upholding the warr ant. United States v. Gitcho , 601 F.2d 369, 372 (8th Cir. 1979). Furthermore, inthis case “additional circumstances indicate that there would not have be en a mistaken search of other premises,” United States v. Pelayo-Landero , 285 F.3d 491, 497 (6th Cir. 2002), namely the presence of an informant who was to make a controlled delivery of drugs before the warrant was executed. Because “no reasonable probability existed that the officers would search the wrong pr emises as a result of the inaccuracies in the warrant,” United States v. Durk , 149 F.3d 464, 466 (6th Cir. 1998), the warrant satisfies that portion of the co nstitutional requirements for particular description. As to the first concern (locate and identify the pr emises with reasonable effort), a clerical error as to the number of the h ouse to be searched does not entail an error as to which house would, in fact be searched. “[P]ractical- 10 -

accuracy rather than technical precision controls t he determination of whether a search warrant adequately describes the premises to be searched.” United States v. Dorrough , 927 F.2d 498, 500 (10th Cir. 1991); see also United States v.
Ventresca , 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965); United States v. DePugh , 452 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir. 1971). A technically wrong address does not invalidate a warrant if it otherwise describes the premises with sufficient particularity so that the police can ascertain and identify the place to be searched . See Steele v. United States , 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925); United States v. Sturmosk i , 971 F.2d 452, 458 (10th Cir. 1992). “The requisite specificity of the description . . . depends heavily on the facts of each case.” Dorrough , 927 F.2d at 500. In Williamson , a warrant that misstated the premises to be searched so as not to be even “practically accurate” was held invalid. 1 F.3d at 1136. The dissent rel ies on Williamsonwithout noting the significant differences between the fact s in that case and in the cases before us. The warrant in Williamsondesignated a rural mail box nine miles away from the premises that were searched, and the government argued unsuccessfully that the executing officer’s knowled ge of the actual location of the business alone cured the defective warrant. That i s hardly the rule we are adopting here, nor are we “dispens[ing] with anyrequirement that an anticipatory search warrant contain a description of the premise s to be searched.” Dissent at 5- 11 -

(emphasis in original). The warrant here was an anticipatory warrant in which the police relied on an informant to direct them to the proper house, so this is not a case in which an executing officer is the sole sour ce of information about the location of the premises to be searched. This court has not gone so far as to say that an officer’s knowledge may not cure a technica lly inaccurate warrant–Williamsonacknowledged just the opposite, provided that the officer’s knowledge is not the sole source of the location. 1 F.3d at 1136; see also Sturmoski , 971 F.2d at 458. Here we have the correct street , an address off by one digit, and an informant identifying the mistake ; it is perfectly appropriate in such circumstances to cure the problem with the off icer’s knowledge. We disagree with the dissent’s claim that the “sear ch warrant relied on here indicated only an address of ‘2021 Camelot Way’ with no other supporting description.” Dissent at 1; see also id . at 1 (“The search warrant here contained no description whatever of the place to be searched other than the wrong street number . . . .”); id . at 4 n.1 (“[N]o language can be found in the warr ant conditioning its execution on the delivery of the c ontraband.”). The warrant states that the “Affiant anticipates that a control led deliveryof a large quantity of marijuana and cocaine . . . will be made by Agents of the Criminal Investigations Bureau,” and that “[y]our Affiant prays to include in this affidavit for a search warrant for any rooms, attics, basements, crawl spa ces and other parts therein as- 12 -

they pertain to the home where the drugs are expect ed to be delivered .” I. Rec. Doc. 63, Exhibit B at 1-2 (emphases added). The re ferences in the warrant to the controlled delivery of drugs may not strictly be co nditions precedent to execution of the warrant, but we can still look at the warran t as a whole and see that the warrant (and the supporting affidavit) make extensi ve reference to the expected drug sale. The warrant and the affidavit gave a pr ecise description of the place to be searched–the house to be searched was the house where a controlled delivery of drugs would take place. The danger that the particular description requirement seeks to avoid is the threat of general and exploratory searches, Andresen v. Maryland , 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976), and it is difficult ind eed to see how that worry is implicated in these cases. Finally, even if we were to find that misstating th e address on the warrant by a single digit but relying on an informant to id entify the premises before execution of the warrant did, in fact, render the w arrant invalid, the good faith exception of Leon , 468 U.S. at 920-24, would apply. “[W]hen police officers act in good faith and reasonable reliance on a search w arrant, the evidence obtained during the search should not be suppressed even if the warrant was lacking in probable cause.” United States v. Price , 265 F.3d 1097, 1102 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Leon , 468 U.S. at 913). The incorrect address providedto the magistrate and reflected in the warrant was clearly not an ins tance of “a police officer- 13 -

ma[king] false statements in an affidavit supportin g a search warrant knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth.” United States v. Tuter , 240 F.3d 1292, 1299 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Franks v. Delaware , 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)). Thus, the warrant here was “not so lacking in indic ia of probable cause that the executing officer should have known the search was illegal despite the state magistrate’s authorization.” United States v. Danh auer , 229 F.3d 1002, 1007 (10th Cir. 2000). C. Denial of Motion for Continuance As to Mr. Cortez-Cruz’s appeal of the district court’s denial of a request for a continuance, a defendant may enter a conditional plea in order to preserve “the right to have an appellate court review an adverse determination of a specified pretrial motion .” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2) (emphasis added). Th e district court’s decision not to grant a continuance was never menti oned as an issue on which the plea was conditioned, and Cortez-Cruz thereby waive d his right to appeal that issue and all other nonjurisdictional defenses by e ntering a plea. See United States v. Salazar , 323 F.3d 852, 856 (10th Cir. 2003). D. Sentencing Increase Finally, under the Sentencing Guidelines, a distric t court may impose a three level increase in a defendant’s offense level where the criminal activity involved five or more participants and the defendan t played a managerial or- 14 -

supervisory role. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). We review the district court’s determination that a defendant was a manager or sup ervisor of criminal activity for clear error. United States v. Vanmeter , 278 F.3d 1156, 1166 (10th Cir. 2002). We conclude from a review of the record that the di strict court properly found that Mr. Cortez-Cruz met the requirements fora three level increase. The government showed by a preponderance of the evidenc e that there were at least five participants in the drug dealing. Based on th e fact that it was Mr. CortezCruz’s home that was the center of this activity an d that Mr. Cortez-Cruz planned much of the activity, the district court did not co mmit clear error in finding that he was a supervisor or manager of the operation. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment of convi ction and sentence in these cases is AFFIRMED.No. 02-4139, United States v. Lora-Solano

No. 02-4173, United States v. Cortez-Cruz
HOLLOWAY , Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:

The Fourth Amendment mandates, inter alia , that no search warrant shall issue, “but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, a nd the persons or things to be seized.” Here the Majority Opinion concludes that the warrant issued was valid under the Fourth Amendment even though it had an ad mittedly erroneous address of the home to be searched, and the warrant gave no other particulars describing the property. Because I cannot agree with this dis regard of the commands of the Constitution, I must respectfully dissent from PartB of the Majority Opinion addressing the search warrant and from the reliance on the United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), exception.
I The search warrant relied on here indicated only an address of “2021 Camelot Way” with no other supporting description. The house that was actually searched was described as “2051 Camelot Way.” The search warrant here contained no description whatever of the place to b e searched other than the wrong street number, “2021 Camelot Way.” Reliance on such a warrant with these deficiencies cannot be justified under our pr ecedents. We have held that:

To pass muster under the Fourth Amendment, “[t]he w arrant-2-

must describe the place to be searched with suffici ent particularity so that the executing officer can locate and identify it with reasonable effort. The requisite specificity of the descripti on differs for rural and urban areas and depends heavily on the facts of each case.” United States v. Dorrough , 927 F.2d 498, 500 (10th Cir. 1991). “[P]ractical accuracy rather than technical precisi on controls the determination of whether a search warrant adequatel y describes the premises to be searched.” Id. United States v. Williamson , 1 F.3d 1134, 1135-36 (10th Cir. 1993). I would conclude here, as we did in Williamson , that “the warrant at issue did not describe the premises to be searched with s ufficient particularity because it cannot be described as even ‘practically accurat e.’” 1 F.3d at 1136. The Majority Opinion concedes that the issue of particu larity in the designation of the place to be searched is “a closer issue” in light o f Williamson. The Majority Opinion attempts to escape the Williamson holding by saying “this is not a case in which an executing officer is the sole source of in formation about the location of the premises to be searched.” Here, as in Williamson , the critical point is that the warrant’s onlyattempt to describe the property with the required particul arity was defective. The Majority Opinion blurs the line between the probabl e cause requirement and the mandate that the warrant describe with particularity the place to be searched. After concluding, properly, that a controlled deliv ery satisfies the probable cause requirement, the Majority Opinion states that conse quently, “the warrant is valid despite the lack of a physical description of the p remises.” Majority Opinion at 7.-3-

But the Fourth Amendment requires both probable cause and a particular description of the place to be searched. The Major ity Opinion offers no authority for its bold assumption that satisfaction of the pr obable cause requirement obviates the requirement of a particular descriptio n of the premises to be searched. The Majority Opinion confesses that the error in the description here is “a closer issue” in light of Williamson , as noted. I am concerned that the Majority Opinion’s unsupported statement that satis faction of the probable cause requirement renders the warrant “valid despite the lack of a physical description,” Majority Opinion at 7, will cause confusion and dis array in our Fourth Amendment precedents. The difficulty is compoundedwhen the Majority Opinion relies again on the presence of probable ca use to shore up the absence of any description of the property to be searched in i ts Leon analysis. Majority Opinion at 12. I would hold that Williamson requires us to reverse the denial of the motion to suppress here. In that case, there was no quest ion that the officers had probable cause and that the officers knew what prem ises were the target of the search. But, as in Williamson , the government here “asks us to adopt a rule that an executing officer’s [or informant’s] knowledge alone is sufficient to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement.” 1 F .3d at 1136 (emphasis in original). In Williamson we rejected the government’s argument because “suc h a1 At all stages, it seems, all parties have assumed t hat the warrant is a

conditional one. As the majority notes, we have he ld that such warrants may satisfy the probable cause requirement “provided th e warrant’s execution is conditioned on the contraband’s delivery to, or rec eipt at, the designated place.” Slip op. at 7 (quoting United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1202 (10th Cir. 1998)). Here, of course, the place was not properl y designated, as discussed throughout this dissent. Of additional concern, ho wever, is the fact that no language can be found in the warrant conditioning i ts execution on the delivery of the contraband.

2 See, e.g., United States v. Occhipinti , 998 F.2d 791, 799 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Owens , 848 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Hutchings , 127 F.3d 1255, 1259-60 (10th Cir. 1997).

3 See, e.g., United States v. Williamson , 1 F.3d 1134 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Dahlman , 13 F.3d 1391, 1394-96 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Ellis , 971 F.2d 701, 703-04 (11th Cir. 1992); Shedd v. State , 358 So.2d 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). -4- rule would be fundamentally inconsistent with the r equirement of a written

warrant. . . .” Id. (emphasis in original). This is exactly why we s hould reject the government’s similar argument here. While the instant case is said to involve an anticipatory or conditional warrant, 1 the Majority Opinion fails to explain how an anticipatory or conditional warrant negates the express particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. A number of precedents are reported in which searchwarrants have been held valid in spite of errors or ambiguities in the descriptions of the places to be searched, 2 as well as a good number of cases in which the def ects have been held fatal. 3 This Majority Opinion’s holding appears to be an extremely significant departure from our previous precedents because it s imply cannot be denied that-5-

the Majority Opinion’s holding dispenses with anyrequirement that an anticipatory search warrant contain a description o f the premises to be searched. The Majority Opinion cites no authority directly supporting this important holding, and I find scant authority to that effect. See State v. Morris , 668 P.2d 857 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). Morris did uphold a search under an anticipatory warrant that did not specify with particularity the place to be searched for the package of drugs. Id. at 862. There is, however, no persuasive analysis in Morris which supports a far reaching holding like that of the Majority Opinion here that an anticipatory warrant need not contain a descript ion of the premises to be searched. As in United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1201 (10th Cir. 1998), the issuance of an anticipatory warrant may be uphe ld where the magistrate determines, based on the information presented in the warrant application, “that there is probable cause to believe the items to be seized will be at the designated place when the search is to take place.” (emphasis added ) (citing United States v.
Garcia , 882 F.2d 699, 702 (2nd Cir. 1989)). The Majority Opinion fails to explain the reasoning for its remarkable holding dispensing with any requirement that an ant icipatory search warrant contain an accurate designation of an address of th e premises to be searched or any description of the premises. Aside from the a lready noted conflation of the separate and critical probable cause and particular ity requirements, the Majority-6-

Opinion offers very little. The Majority Opinion s ays that a “technically wrong address . . . does not invalidate a warrant if it o therwise describes the premises with sufficient particularity so that the police ca n ascertain and identify the place to be searched.” Majority Opinion at 10. This st atement reveals further why the warrant cannot be valid here: The warrant here fai ls again. It does not “otherwise describe the premises” in any manner whatsoever, much less with “sufficient particularity.” I must object to the i mplication that this principle supports the result in this case, when it manifestl y compels the opposite result.
II Nor can I join the Majority Opinion’s alternative h olding that the denial of the suppression motion can be affirmed under the go od faith rationale of United
States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897 (1984). We are not to weigh the off icers’ subjective good faith. Instead, we are instructed that the “o fficers’s reliance . . . on the technical sufficiency of the warrant . . . must be objectively reasonable . . . .”
Leon , 468 U.S. at 922. I reject the notion that the of ficers could reasonably rely on a search warrant that failed to properly identif y the home that the officers entered and searched. The majority concludes that the warrant was not so lacking in probable cause that the executing officer should have known that the search was illegal. But patently the warrant was totallylacking in probable cause to search the home at 2051 Camelot Way, which was not mentioned in the warrant or-7-

the affidavit. Once again, the majority conflates the probable cause requirement and the particularity requirement without any convi ncing explanation.

III For these reasons I must respectfully dissent from Part B of the Majority Opinion.