COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Koontz and Willis 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

MARION CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT CENTER 

v. Record No. 1442-94-3 OPINION BY 

 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

GARLAND L. HENDERSON JUNE 13, 1995 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 

 James W. Osborne, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General; Gregory 

E. Lucyk, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 

Richard L. Walton, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney 

General, on briefs), for appellant. 

 Darrell A. Poe (Bradford & Poe, P.C., on brief), 

 for appellee. 

 Marion Correctional Treatment Center appeals an award of 

medical benefits by the Workers' Compensation Commission to the 

appellee, Garland L. Henderson. The sole issue on appeal is 

whether the evidence was sufficient to support the commission's 

finding that appellee's injury "arose out of" his employment. 

 Garland Henderson is a correctional officer at the Marion 

Correctional Treatment Center. He testified that on April 23, at 

approximately 10:15 p.m. as he was returning to the main 

building, 

 I'd just got through acknowledging the tower 

officer in tower two, which is to the left of 

the steps, and I started down the steps and I 

was looking at tower one to see if the 

officer there was seeing me coming. And, I 

went to put my right foot down on I think 

it's the third or fourth step, which it's in 

the report but I can't remember which one it 

was. My heel slid off the steps, I had onto 

the rail, and I put all the weight on the 
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left knee when I did. I didn't actually 

fall, but when my foot slipped down to the 

next step on the right foot all my weight to 

my left knee and when I went something popped 

in my knee. 

 The commission found that, because Henderson's job 

responsibilities caused him to watch the tower guards rather than 

the steps, how he performed his job provided the "critical link" 

between the conditions of the workplace and the injury, and 

therefore, Henderson's injury arose out of his employment. See

County of Chesterfield v. Johnson, 237 Va. 180, 186, 376 S.E.2d 

73, 76 (1989). We affirm that holding. 

 An injury, to be compensable under the Workers' Compensation 

Act, must "arise out of" and be "in the course of" employment. 

Code § 65.2-101. See Johnson, 237 Va. at 183, 376 S.E.2d at 74. 

 "Arising out of" refers to the origin or cause of the injury. 

Richmond Memorial Hospital v. Crane, 222 Va. 283, 285, 278 S.E.2d 

877, 878 (1981). Whether an accident arises out of employment is 

a mixed question of law and fact which is reviewable on appeal. 

Mullins v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 10 Va. App. 304, 307, 391 

S.E.2d 609, 611 (1990). An injury arises out of the employment 

if there is apparent to the rational mind a causal connection 

between the conditions under which the work is required to be 

performed and the resulting injury. United Parcel Service v. 

Fetterman, 230 Va. 257, 258, 336 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1985). An 

injury does not arise out of one's employment if it is caused by 

"a hazard to which the employee would have been equally exposed 
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apart from the employment." Johnson, 237 Va. at 183, 376 S.E.2d 

at 75. However, if an injury "has followed as a natural incident 

of the work and has been a result of an exposure occasioned by 

the nature of the employment," then the injury "arises out of" 

the employment. Fetterman, 230 Va. at 258, 336 S.E.2d at 893. 

 Virginia has adopted an "actual risk" test and has rejected 

the "positional risk" test followed by other jurisdictions. See

Johnson, 237 Va. at 185, 376 S.E.2d at 75-76. The actual risk 

test "'requires only that the employment expose the workman to a 

particular danger from which he was injured, notwithstanding the 

exposure of the public generally to like risks.'" Olsten v. 

Leftwich, 230 Va. 317, 319, 336 S.E.2d 893, 894 (1985) (quoting 

Lucas v. Lucas, 212 Va. 561, 563, 186 S.E.2d 63, 64 (1972)). 

 Officer Henderson testified at the evidentiary hearing that 

he was "trained to observe" and that his work duties included 

"[a]ll security, security and safety of the inmates and the other 

employees." Henderson testified that every time he walked 

through the correctional unit, he checked the tower officers "to 

make sure they're alert and just wave at them and have them wave 

back." Henderson testified that on the day he slipped, he had 

just acknowledged tower two, was descending the stairs, and was 

observing tower one when the accident occurred. Observation of 

the guard towers was one of the security functions of his 

employment. The way in which he performed this aspect of his job 

increased his risk of falling on this occasion and directly 
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contributed to cause his fall and injury. Cf. Fetterman, 230 Va. 

at 259, 336 S.E.2d at 893. He would not have been equally 

exposed to the risk apart from his duty to observe the guard 

towers and provide security at the facility. Cf. Bradshaw v. 

Aronovitch, 170 Va. 329, 335, 196 S.E. 684, 686 (1938). 

Henderson's injury occurred because of the performance of his job 

duties in a particular manner. Therefore, the cause of the 

injury was not "unrelated to any hazard common to the workplace." 

Fetterman, 230 Va. at 259, 336 S.E.2d at 893. Because 

Henderson's employment exposed him to a danger that caused his 

injury, it arose out of his employment. Id. The commission did 

not err in its award of medical benefits. 

Affirmed.