NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 10a0485n.06
No. 09-3597 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT BA RB AR

A R OSE; RO BER T R OSE, P lai nt iffs- App e lla nt s,
v. TRUCK CENTERS, INC., et al., Defendan t, and TRW AUTOMOTIVE, U.S., L LC, Defendan t-Appellee. / ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE NO RT HER

N D ISTRIC T OF OHI O

OP IN ION

BEF OR E: CL AY , R OG ER S, a nd C OOK , C ir c uitJudg e s. CLAY, Circ uit Jud ge. Pla int if fs B arb ara and Rob e rt Ros e a pp e a l an or de r en te re d in

thi s products liability

actio n b y t h e district cour t gr anting Def

endant TRW Automotive, U.S., L L C’s
m o t i o nf o r s u m m a r y j u d g m e n tb a s e d o nt h e i n a d m i s s i b i l i t y

o f P l a i n t i f f s ’ e x p e rt ’ s t e s t i m o n y . In g ranting summary

judgme nt, the district court conc luded that P laintiffs’ ex pert wa s not a qualified expert under F eder al Rule of Evidence 702 and that the proff ere d expert’s opinion was unre liable. For the re asons set for

th below, we AF F IRM the district court’s de cision.No. 09-3597

2 I. BACKG ROUND A. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound De fe nd ant T RW Autom oti ve U. S., L L C ( “ TRW” ) i s a ne w a nd re -manu fact

ur e d p a rt s supplier for t h e au t o motive industry , providing , int e r a lia , steeringg ear s. As part of its re

manufa cturing proce ss, Defe ndant uses oiled valve housing bolts to secur e the va lve housing to the steeringg ear

and the bolts are torqued to 75 to 91 foot pound s in acc ordanc e with Def endant’ s sp e c if ic a tio ns fo r ste e ri ng g e ars . Ea c h ste e ri ng g e ar is su bje c te d to va

ri ou s le a k te sts , wh ic h it

mus t pass in order

to be shipped. I f, and only if, a re -manufa cture d steeringg ear passes the le ak tests, a serial number

is stamped on the g ear

and the g ear

is shipped to Defe ndant’s customer s. On May 6, 2006, Plaintiffs Rober t Rose and his w ife Ba

rbar a had a tra ffic a ccide nt as they
were t ra v el i n g southbound on I -75 nea r Toledo, Ohio. Rober

t was driving the couple’ s 1997 Fr eig htliner truck as Ba

rbar a rode in the sleepe r compa rtment. Fr om October

2005 to Dece mber 2005, maintenanc e had be en per formed on the truck to re pair damag e fr om a pre vious acc ident that
occur red in Oc tober 2005. The se re pairs included r eplac ement of the s t ee ri n g gea r with one of De fe nd ant’ s r e -m anu fa c tur e d s te e ri ngg e ars , w hic h Tr uc k Ce nte rs , Inc . in sta lle d in Tr oy , I lli no is i n D e c e mb e r 2 0 0 5
. A f

t e r t h e D e c e mb e r 2 0 0 5 r e p a i r s , P l a i n t i f f s dr o v e t h e t r

u c k t o t h e i r

ho me in Stanton, Kentucky , wher e it r emained until the couple embar ked on a se ries of trips in May 2006. Plaintiffs alleg e that the truc k’s steer ing “ g ave out” and the truc k “cr ashed into the media n resulting in injurie s” to B arba ra. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Robert Rose testified that his truck “ just went where it wanted” a

nd was “f

re e wh eeling .” (Rober

t Rose Dep. 48.) H e desc ribed “ fre e whe eling ” as tur nin g the ste e ri ngwh e e l r a pid ly wi tho ut a ny re sp on se by his tr

uc k. Af te r t he a c c ide nt, the Ros e s’No. 09-3597

3 truck wa s towed to the Tol edo P olice Department im pound lot and a few day s later, to a F reig htliner deale r in Toledo. The truck was subsequently towed to the Roses’ home in Stanton, Kentucky and
arr ived May

13, 2006. Mr. Rose testified tha t t h e t ruck w as workingperf ectly rig ht up until t he moment of the
acc ident, at which point M r. R ose stated that the tr uck “f ree whee led” a

nd veer ed to the lef

t. At the time of th e a c c id e n t, M r . Ro s e h a d dr iv e nth e tr

u c k , w it h o u t i n c id e n t, s o me 6 , 0 0 0 mi le s since repla ceme nt of the re -manufa cture d steeringg ear . Mr. Rose also conf irmed that prior to lea

ving Oakville, Ontar io, Canada the morningof May 6, 20 0 6 , he inspec ted the truc k and found no pr ob le ms w ithe ith e r t

he ste e ri ngg e ar o r t

he va lve ho us ingbo lts
. Pla int if fs pr e se nte d Ph ili p Sm ith , a n A SE c e rt if

ie d tr uc k me c ha

nic , a s th e ir

e xpe rt . Sm ith te sti fi e d th a t he wa s an e xpe rt in the are a s of “ [t]ru c k me c ha nic a l iss ue s, e le c tr on ic c on tr ol m od ule s, dr ive r i ss ues , log s, hir ingpr a c tic e s, [an d] he a vy ha uli ng ” and

an e xpe rt in s te e ri ngg e ars . ( Smith Dep. 164.) Smit h rec eived a diploma from Denve r Auto & Diesel Colleg e, completinga stee ring g ear s course during his training. Smith testified that in the steeringg ear s course he lea rned how ste e ri ngg e ars op e rate and le arn e d “ dia g no sis and

ov e rh a ul a nd re pa ir .” (S mith D e p. 16 7. ) S mith also testified that he attended one F reig htliner seminar in 1986 that provide d training on Def endant’ s steeringg ear s. I n conductinghis inspection of Plaintiffs’ truck on November 10, 2006, Smit h noted that the
va lve ho us ing bo lts we re “ e xtre me ly loo se ” and no te d the numbe r of re vo lut ion s it

too k f or him toNo. 09-3597

Plaintiffs produced a photogr aph dated J uly 8, 2006 showing that at least one of the va lve 1 housing bolts was, at the time the photogr aph wa s taken, c ompletel y s ep ar at ed from the steering g ear . Howeve r, whe n Smit h conducte d his inspection, the bolts were thr eade d into the steering g ear . 4 remove them. (Smith R eport 2.) I n his report, Smith concluded that “ the ca use of [t he] acc ident 1 was the loss of powe r s t ee ri n g fluid due to . . . loose valve housingbolts.” (Smith R eport 4.) Smith’ s r e po rt

state d th a t “ [w]ith th e bo lts com in g l oo se , th e pr e ssu ri zed [pow e r s te e ri ng ] fl uid would quickly

esca pe lea ving the driver w ithout the benefit of powe r steer ing” and that “w ith the valve housing bolts in t heir loosene d condition, Mr. Rose would have [had] to turn the steer ing wh e e l a pp ro xima te ly 22 5 de g re e s be fo re the tr a c tor [-tra ile r] wo uld [have ] be g [un] t o r e sp on d to his steeringinputs.” (Smith R eport 4.) Smit h testified that the acc ident was likely cause d by a def ective r e-ma

nufac tured stee ring g ear . In particula

r, Smith t estified that: (1) D efe ndant fa iled to p ro p er ly torque the va lve housing bolts that seal the steer ing g ear ; (2) the bolts be came loose as a re sult of road vibrations; (3) the truck lost powe r s t ee ri n g fluid as a r esult of the bolts becoming loose; and (4) Robert Rose beg an “fr eew heeling ” and lost control of the truck, c ausing the ac cident. B. P roce dural Hi story On Oct o b er 17, 2007, Plaintiffs filed individual feder al diversity actions ag ainst Truck Ce n te r s , I n c . , F r e ig h tl in e r , L L C, an d T RW A u to mo ti v e U
. S. , L L C, a ll e g in g n e g li g e n c e , strict lia bil ity , a nd statut or y lia bil ity a g a ins t e a c h p art

y and re qu e sti ng punit ive dama g e s w ithre sp e c t to
eac h party . The c ases we re c onsolidated. Truc k Centers, Inc. an d Freig htliner, L L C both filed motions for summary

judgme nt, which wer e g rante d without opposit ion.No. 09-3597

5 Def endant subseque ntly

moved for summa ry j u d g ment on J anuar y 5, 2009, arguing that Smit h’s opinions reg ardingthe ca use of t h e acc ident constituted inadmissibl e evide nce a nd that be c a us e Smith’ s o pin ion s w e re the on ly e vid e nc e Pla int if

fs ha d to supp or

t th e ir c a se , Pl a int if

fs c ou ld
n e it h e r me e t th e ir b u r d e n o f p r o o f n o r s a ti s f y th e r e qu ir e me n ts for a p r i ma f acie c a se of

pr od uc ts liability . The district cour t held a hearing on Def

endant’ s motion for summary judgme nt at which Pla int if fs c on c e de d th a t w ith ou t Smith’ s te sti mony , s umm ary jud g me nt w ou ld b e a

pp ro pr ia te in t

his
case . On

Ap ri l 24 , 2 00 9, the dis tr ic t c ourt g ra nte d D e fe nd ant’ s mo tio n f or su mm ary

jud g me nt, concludingthat Smit h was not qualified as an ex pert unde r F eder al Rule of Evidenc e 702 and that Smit h’s opinion was inadmissible under Rule 702 be cause it was unre liable. On May 13, 2009, B arb ara Ros e fi le d a

mot ion fo r r e lie f f

ro m ju dg me nt, arguin g that “ a jur y c ou ld s til l r e asona

bly conclude that the steer ing g ear was de fec tive without ex pert testimony .” (Pl.’s Mot. for Relief from J . Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) 3.) The next day , Plaintiffs filed a notice of appea l of the district court’s A pril 24, 2009 order g ranting summary judgme nt in favor of Def endant. On June 17, 2009, the dis tr ic t c ourt

de nie d B arb ara

Ros e ’s mot ion

fo r r e lie f f

ro m ju dg me nt. II. DI SCU SSIO N A. Stand ard of Review Th is C ourt

re vie ws de novo a district c ourt’s g rant or denial of summary judgme nt. Seaway Fo od T ow n, Inc . v . M

e d. Mu t. o f O hio , 347 F.3d 610, 616 ( 6th Cir. 2003). Summ ary judgme nt sh ou ld b e g ra

nte d “if the ple a din g s, the dis c ov e ry and dis c los ur e ma te ri a ls on f ile , a nd any a ff ida vit sNo. 09-3597

6 show that there is no ge nuine issue as to any materia l fac t and that the movant is entitled to judgme nt
as a matter of law .” F ed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Th e burd e n is ini tia lly up on the mov ing pa rt y to sh ow that the re do e s no t re ma in i n d isp ute any g enuine issue of

materia l fac t. Gen. M

otors Corp. v. Lanar d Toys, Inc ., 46 8 F .3 d 4 05 , 4 12 (6 th Cir. 2006). The moving party may satisfy this burde n by pointing out to the district c ourt that there is no evidence underlying the non -m o v i n g party ’s ca se. Id. On c e the mov ingpa rt y su pp or ts i ts mot ion fo r s umm ary jud g me nt, the op po sin g pa rt y mus t g o b e y on d th e c on te nts of its ple a din g s to
se t for th sp eci fi c fa c ts i nd ic a tin g the e xiste nc e of a g e nu ine iss ue to b e lit ig a te d. F e d. R. C iv. P. 56 (e ). Whe n a

c ourt the re a ft e r r e vie ws the re c or d, it i s to dr aw a ll in fe re nc e s in the lig ht m os t favor able to the non-movi ng party
. Ma tsu sh ita El e c . In du s. Co. v . Ze nit h R ad io C or p ., 475 U.S. 574, 58 7 ( 19 86 ). Ul tim a te ly , th e pr op e r i nq uir y is w he the r t

he state of

the evi den ce is su ch tha t a
rea sonable jury

could re turn a ve rdict for the non-moving party
. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). This Court reviews a

district court’s decision to admit or exclude evidenc e for an abuse of discretion. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael , 5 26 U. S. 1 37 , 1 52 (1 99 9) ; H a rd y m a n v . N

o r f o l k & W. Ry. Co. , 243 F.3d 255, 258 ( 6th Cir. 2001). “A district cour t a buses its discr etion if it bases its ruling
on an err oneous view of the law or a cle arly err oneous asse ssment of the evide nce.” Ky. Spee dway, LLC v. Nat’l Assoc. of Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc

. , 588 F.3d 908, 915 (6t h C i r. 2 0 0 9 ) (quoting Brown v. Raymond Corp. , 432 F.3d 640, 647 (6th Cir. 2005)) (c itation and internal quotation marks omitted). We will only reve rse for an abuse of discretion where w e ar e lef t with “the def

inite and firm conviction that the district co u rt m ad e a clea r er ror of judgme nt in its conclusion.” Gaeth v.No. 09-3597

Neither party disputes that Ohio law applie s s i n ce the acc ident occur red in Toledo, O hio. 2 I n Ohio, a “pr oduct liability claim” de scribes a civil claim seekingto rec over c ompensatory damag es fr om a manu fa c tur e r o r sup pli e r fo r de a th, ph y sic a l injury , emo tio na l di str e ss, or ph y sic a l pr op e rt

y damag e (othe r than the pr oduct in question) ar ising fr om: (1) “[t] he desig n, formulation, produc tion, construction, cr eation, asse mbly , rebuilding , testing, o r m ar keting of that produc t”; (2) “ [a] ny war ning or instruction, or lack of war ning or instruction, a ssociated with that product”; or ( 3) “[a]ny failure of that produc t to conform t o an y re l ev ant re prese ntation or war ranty .” Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.71(A)( 13). 7 Hartford Li

fe Ins. Co. , 5 3 8 F. 3 d

5 2 4 , 5 2 8 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Moon v. U num Provident Corp. , 461 F.3d 639, 643 ( 6th Cir. 2006)) (interna l quotation marks omitted). B. Ana lys is I n ord e r to es ta

bli sh the e le me nts of a pr od uc t liab ili ty c la im und e r Oh io l aw, a pla int if f m us t show that “(1) there was a defe ct in the produc t manufac t u re d and sold by the def endant, ( 2) the defe ct exist ed at the time the pr oduct left the defe ndant’s control, and (3) the defe ct was the direc t and proxi mate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries or losses.” Donegal Mut. Ins. v . W hite Consol. Indus., 2 Inc. , 8 5 2 N. E
. 2 d

2 1 5 , 2 2 0 (O h i o C t
. A p p . 2 0 0 6 ) (c i t i n g State Farm Fire &Cas. Co v. Chrysler Corp. , 5 23 N. E. 2d

48 9, 49 3 ( Oh io 198 8) ). De fe nd ant co nte nd s tha t Pla int if fs are un a ble to e sta bli sh any of the thre e ele ments beca use Plaintiffs’ expert testimony is inadmissi ble. Under Fe dera l Rule of Evidence 702, “[i] f scienti fi c, tec hnical, or othe r spec ialized knowledg e will assist the trier of f act to under stand the evide nce or t o d et er mine a fa ct in issue, a
w i t n e s s qu a l i f

i e d a s ane x p e rtb y kn o w l e d g e , s k i l l , e x p e r i e n c e , t r a i n i n g , o r e d u c a t i o n , m ay t e s t i f

y” if the wi tne ss’ te sti mony

is “bas ed up on suff

ic ie nt f a c ts o r d a ta , . . . is the pr od uc t of re lia ble principles and me thods, and . .
. the wit ness has applied the principles a nd methods reliably

to the fac ts o f t he ca se.” Rule 702 wa s amende d in 2000 in response to Daubert v. M errill DowNo. 09-3597

8 Pharmace uticals, Inc. , 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael , 526 U.S. 137 (1999). “In Da ub e rt

the Court char g ed trial judg es with the re sponsibili ty of ac ting a s g ateke eper s to exclude unreliable e x pert testimony , and the Court in Kumho clar ified that this gat ek eepe r function ap p l i es t o all expert testimony , not just t estimony based in scie nce.” Fe d. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s notes. Da ub e rt attempts to strike a balanc e betwe en libera l admissibil ity for rele vant evidenc e and the need to e x clude misleading “junk scienc e.” Best v. Lowe’s Hom e Ctrs., Inc. , 5 63 F .3 d 1 71 , 1 76 -7 7 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 9) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n m ark s o mit te d) . A n e xpe rt mus t
u t i l i z e i n t h e courtroom the “same level of intellectual rig or that cha rac terizes the pra ctice of

an expert in the releva

nt field.” Id. at 177. De te rm ini ngthe a dmi ssi bil ity of e xpe rt te sti mo ny

purs ua nt t o Ru le 70 2 e nta ils a

fl e xible inquiry
. Da ub e rt , 509 U.S. at 594. As a g ateke epe r, t h e t ri al j udg e has discr etion in determining whether a propose d expert’s testimony is a dmissibl e based on whether the testimony is both relevant and re liable. Johnson v. Mani towoc Boom Trucks, Inc

. , 4 84 F .3 d 4 26 , 4 29 (6 th C ir . 2 00 7) ; see Da ub e rt , 509 U.S. at 589 (“[U]nder the Rules [of Evidence ] the trial judge must ensure that a ny and all s ci en t i fi c testimony

or evide nce a dmitted is not only rele vant, but reliable .”) “ I n short, under Da ub e rt and its prog eny , a par

ty proff ering expert testimony

must show by

a pre pondera

nce of proof t h at t h e e x p er twh o s e t es t i m o n y i s b ei n g o ff er ed i s qu al i fi ed an d wi l l t es t i fy t o s ci en t i fi c k n o wl ed ge that wi l l as s i s t t h e trier

of fa ct in understandingand disposing of rele vant issues.” Sigler v. Am. Honda Motor Co. , 5 3 2 F. 3 d 4 6 9 , 4 7 8 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Pride v. BIC Corp. , 218 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2000)) (inter

nal quotation marks omitted).No. 09-3597

9 1. Sm it h’ s Qua lific at ion s I n o rd e r t o q

ua lif y a s an e xpe rt

un de r R ule 70 2, a wi tne ss m

us t e sta bli shhis or

he r e xpe rt ise b y re fe re n ce t o “k n o wl ed ge, s k i l l , ex p er i en ce , t ra i n i n g, o r e d u ca t i o n . ” F ed
. R
. E v i d
. 7 0 2
. Al t h o u gh thi s r e qu ir e me nt i s ty

pic a lly tr e a te d li be ra lly , a

wi tne ss i s n ot a

n e xpe rt sim ply be c a us e he c la ims to be. Pride , 218 F.3d at 577. “The issue with r eg ard to e x pert testimony is not the qualifications of
a wi tne ss i n th e a

bs tr a c t, b ut w he the r t

ho se qu a lif

ic a tio ns pr ov ide a

fo undati on

fo r a wi tne ss t o
answe r a spe cific que stion.” Be rry v . City of D e tro it , 25 F.3d 1342, 1351 (6th Cir. 1994)
. I n Be rry , the Court delineate d by

analog y the kinds of testimony witnesses are qualified to g ive based upon the ir e xpe rt ise —s c ie nti fi c or

te c hn ic a l: The distinction betwee n s cientific a nd non-scientific expert testimony is a critica l on e . B y wa y of ill us tr a tio n, if

on e wa nte d to e xpla in t o a

jur y ho w a bu mble be e is able to f ly , an aer onautical eng ineer might be a helpful witness. S i n ce fl ight principles have some universa lity , the expert could apply gen er al principles to the c a se of the bumbl e be e . Con c e iva bly , ev e n if he ha d ne ve r se e n a bumb le be e , h e sti ll wo uld be qu a lif ie d to te sti fy , a s lo nga s h e wa s f a mil iar w ithits c omp on e nt p art s. On the other

hand, if one wanted to prove that bumblebees a lway s take off into the wind, a bee keepe r with no scientific tra ini n g at all would be a n acc eptable e x pert wi tne ss if a pr op e r f ound a tio n w e re la id fo r his c on c lus ion s. Th e fo un datio n w ou ld not relate to his formal training , but to his firsthand observations. In other wor ds, the beeke eper

does not know any

more a bout flight princ iples than the jurors, but he has seen a lot more bumblebee s than they have. Id. at 1349-50. Smith te sti fi e d th a t he wa s an e xpe rt in t he are a s o f “ [t]ru c k me c ha nic a l is su e s, e le c tr on ic control m odules, driver issues, logs, hiring practice s, [and] heavy hauling ” and a

n expert in steering g ear s. (Smith De p. 164.) De fenda nt argues that Smith’s education and e x perie nce do not pr ovide him with the requisite qualifications to offer opinion on pr o duct def ect or causation. Pl aintiffsNo. 09-3597

10 counter that the absence of a proffer ed ex pert’s qualifications “almost alway s bear s on the weig ht that the jury

should assign to the [ex pert’s] testimony and not on the admissibilit y

of the testimony itself.” (A

ppellants’ B r. 10.) The district cour

t con cl u d ed that Smit h’s testimony exceede d the scope of his expertise. Specifica lly , the cour

t pointed to Smith’s opinion re g ardingthe ca use of the a ccide nt and Smith’s conclusion that the stee ring g ear was de fec tive. The district cour t found that Smit h lacke d the forma l education, training, a

nd experience to offer

an opinion reg ardingwhether the steer ing g ear

was d ef ec t i v e a n d

co n cl u d edt h at S m i t h fa i l edt o d em o n s t ra t e t h at h e p o s s es s edan y m o re kn o wl ed ge about mecha

nical eng ineer ing pr inciples than an a vera g e juror. Howeve r, as this Court has stated, “ Rule 702 should be broadly interpre ted on the basis of whether the use of e x pert testimony will assist t he trier

of fa ct.” Davis v. Combustion Eng’g, I nc. , 742 F.2d 916, 919 ( 6th Cir. 1984). The re cord in this case shows that Smit h wa s q u al i fi ed as a n expert since his testimony would ce rt ai n l y assist the trier of f act in under standing the evidenc e. Smit h’s experienc es as a mecha nic g ive him spe cialized knowledg e in the are as of truc k mecha nics
and ste e ri ng g e ars and , in his de po sit ion te sti mony , e na

ble d Sm ithto t

ho ro ug hly

dis c us s th e pr oc e ss of torquing the steer ing g ear bolts and how a misstep in that proce ss c ould a ffe ct the integ rity of the ste e ri ngg e ar a

nd po ssi bly re su lt i n a

n a uto mob ile a c c ide nt. Ac c or din g ly , we c on c lud e that Smi th was qua lified as an e x pert, at least for some pur poses, pursuant to Rule 702.No. 09-3597

The dist rict court also relied on El swi c k v . v . Ni c ho ls , 144 F. Supp. 2d 758 (E.D. K y . 2001), 3 a medica l malprac tice ca se, in support of its conclusion reg arding Smit h’s qualifications. Howeve r, in Elswick , t he p lai nt if

f’s ex pert adm it t e d th at c aus ati on was ou ts id e her area o f ex pert is e, 1 44 F. Supp. 2d at 767, where as her e, Smith has made no such a dmission. 11 Contrary to the di strict court’s c onclusion, this C ourt’s opinion in Sigler v. Ame rican Honda Motor Co. , 532 F.3d 469 ( 6th Cir. 2008), does not alter our conclusion. I n Sigler , the plaintiff’s

3 exper t p r o v id e d o p in io n , v ia a r e p o rt an d a s w o r n d e c la r a ti o n , r e g ar d in g th e s p e e d a t which the vehicle involved in the a ccide nt likely str u ck a tree and the possible cause for the f ailure of the vehicle’ s airba g to de ploy
. The trial c ourt in Sig le r g rante d Def endant’ s motion in limine excluding Plaintiff’s proff

ere d expert, a mec hanic with twenty -six y ear s’ experienc e repa iring and diag nosing automobile problems. This Court upheld the exclusion of the expert’s testimony in Sig le r beca

use t he is sue of the
car ’s spee d at the time of the accident invol ved ac cident re construction, an a rea in which the expert had no trai n i n g. T h e C ourt noted that the mec hanic wa s an expert with reg ard to a naly zing an automobile afte r an acc ident, but c oncluded that he lacke d the expertise to rende r opinion about an airba g defe ct

with ou t ph

y sic all ye x am ini ng thev e hic le , w hic h h e ha d f a ile d to do. T his c a se is dis tin g uis ha

ble fr om Sigler

be c a us e he re , Pl a int if

fs ’ e xpe rt did ph y sic a lly

e xami ne the a lle g e d f

a ult y pr od uc t. D e sp ite Smith’ s qu a lif ic a tio ns , ho we ve r, we c on c lud e that th e dis tr ic t c ourt did no t a bu se its discretion in ex cluding Smit h ’s o p i n i o n beca use, as e x plained below, Smith’s opinion was unreliable
.No. 09-3597

12 2. Reliability F e de ra l Ru le of

Ev ide nc e 70 2 r e qu ir e s an e xpe rt wi tne ss t o te sti fy

a s to “ sc ie nti fi c , te c hn ic a l, or other spe cialized knowled g e.” A s the Supreme Court in Da ub e rt noted, this require ment establishes a standard of “evide ntiary reliability ” or “trustworthiness.” 509 U.S. at 590 n.9. District
c ourt s mu st d e te rm ine wh e the r “ the pr inc ipl e s and me tho do log y un de rl y ing the [pr of fe re d e xpe rt ’s ] testimony itself are valid.” Pride , 218 F.3d at 577. As the district court corr ectly noted, the re liability inquiry focuse s “solely

on the principles and m et h o d o l o gy , not on the conclusions they g ener ate.” Da ub e rt , 509 U.S. at 594-95. Expert testimony may not be based on mere speculation, McLean v. 988011 Ontario, Lt d. , 224 F.3d 797, 800-01 (6th Cir. 2000), a

nd assumptions must be supported by evidenc e in the rec ord. See Sigler , 532 F.3d at 481-82. An ex pert’s conclusions reg ardingcausation must have a n established fa ctual basis and ca

nnot be pre mised on mere suppositions. McLean , 224 F.3d at 801. “[M] ere ‘we aknesse s in the fac tual basis of an e x pert witness’ opinion . . . bea r on the we ight of

the evidenc e rather than on its admissi bility .’” Id. (q u o t i n g United States v. L.E. Cooke Co. , 99 1 F. 2 d 3 3 6 , 342 (6th Cir. 1993)) ( alteration in original). The Court in Da ub e rt

set out sever al fa ctors to be c onsidered in d et er m i n ing w hether a proff ere d expert’s testimony

is reliable: the testab i l ity of the e x pert’s hy

potheses, whe ther the
e xpe rt ’s me tho do log y

ha s b e e n s ub

je c te d to pe e r re vie w an d p ub lic a tio n, the kn ow n o r p ote nti a l r a te of er ror with re spect to the e x pert’s me thodology , and whe the r th e me th o dology

is ge nera lly

acc epted in the scientific c ommunity
. Da ub e rt , 509 U.S. at 593-94.No. 09-3597

13 I n this case, Smith admitted that he eng ag ed in no testing to replicate hi s t h eory of what
occur red dur ing the acc ident. He a lso could not ide ntify any tests by another person de monstrating how the bolts would suddenly loosen in the manner he desc ribes af

ter thousands of miles of nor mal op e ratio n. Smith a dmi tte d th a t he kn e w of no oth e r ins tanc e wh e re the bo lts on a ste e ri ngg e ar c a me loose in the manner

commensurate with his theory . Moreove r, vibration is a critica l c omponent of Sm it h ’ s th e o r y , y e t h e c o n d

u c te d n o te s ti n g to d e te r

mi n e th e v ib r a ti o n le v e l o f Pl a in ti f f s ’ truck or sim ila r t ru c ks
. Smit h first inspected the steeringg ear at Plaintiffs’ home in N o v e mb e r 2006, six months after the a c c ide nt. Ac c or din g to S mith, up on ins pe c tin g the ste e ri ngg e ar, “ the fo ur va lve ho us ingbo lts
we re e xtremel y loose to t he po int that 3 o f t

he bo lts re qu ir e d s lig htl y mor e tha

n o ne tur n to completely

remove them and the f

ourth bolt took approximately two and one- half turns to re move it.” (Smith’s Report 2.) Smit h obtained an exemplar of Def endant’ s re- manufa cture d steeringg ear
and loo se ne d th e va lve hous ingbo lts to t he same de g re e a s Pla int if fs ’ s te e ri ngg e ar, e ve ntu a lly concludingthat the steering whee l w ould ha ve to be rotated 225 deg ree s befor e the tra ctor-tr ailer’ s front tires would be g in to move. Acc ording ly , Smit h’s conc lusions in hi s repor t are based on the assumption that on the day he inspec ted the stee ring g ear , the bolts were at the pre cise de g ree of looseness that they wer e at the time of the ac cident. Howe ver, a s the district court correc tly noted, a photogr aph of the s teer ing g ear taken in Jul y

2006 indicates that the position of the bolts wa s al t er ed b et ween the time of the
a c c ide nt a nd Smith’ s e xami natio n. Spe c if ic a lly , th e ph oto g ra

phsh ow s tha t at lea st o ne of the bo lts
wa s c omp le te ly

se pa rate d f ro m th e ste e ri ngg e ar a

nd no t e ve n p art ia lly fa ste ne d a s it wa s inNo. 09-3597

14 No ve mbe r 2 00 6 at th e tim e of Smith’ s in sp e c tio n. Pla int if fs c on te nd that th e dis tr ic t c ourt fa ile d to understand that the bolts “were ‘ac tually worse’ or mo re loo se ” in t he ph oto g ra

phtha n w he n Sm ith inspected the truck. (A

ppellants’ B r. 24.) Conseque ntly , argue Plaintiffs, the photogr aph does not detra ct from Smith’s opinion that the loose bolts caused Plaintiffs’ loss of steer ing c apabilities. We disag ree . First, we note that deter mining the we ight that should be affor ded to Smith’s te sti mony is a fu nc tio n th a t c le arl y

be lon g s in the re a lm of the tr ie r of fa c t. H ow e ve r, wh e re , a s in this case, e vidence has been altere d, such evidenc e cannot r eliably support the expert’s conc lusion. Smith te sti fi e d th a t ba se d on the ph oto g ra ph , he ha d no wa

y of kn ow ingwh e the r t

he bo lts we re in the same po sit ion w hen he ins pe c te d th e m a s th e y we re a t th e tim e of

the a c c ide nt. Smith a lso acknow ledg ed t hat his opinion that the alleg ed def ective ste eringg ear

cause d Plaintiffs’ acc ident
wa s b a se d o n h is a ssumpt ion tha t th e bo lts ha d the same de g re e of tig htn e ss that the y ha d at th e tim e of the a ccide nt. Smi th further stated that at the time of his inspec tion, he was una war e th at the po sit ion s o f t

he bo lts wh e n h e ins pe c te d th e m di ff e re d f ro m the ir po sit ion a t the tim e of the a c c ide nt. Consequently , beca

use Smith’s assumpti on reg ardingthe deg ree of tig h t n ess of the bolts on the steeringg ear

i s n o t o nly

unsupported, but contra dicted by evidenc e in the re cord, his conc lusions reg ar d i n g t h e s t eer ing g ear ’s alleg ed def ect a nd the ca usation of the ac cident ar e unre liable. See Sigler , 532 F.3d at 481-82. Ther efor e, by excluding the e x pert’s t es timony , the district court proper ly exercised its g ateke eping function under Da ub e rt and Kumho
. See 509 U.S. at 592-93 and 526 U.S. at 147. Be cause the evidenc e under ly ing Smith’s conclusion re g ard in g d e f e c t a n d c a u s a ti o n had bee n
a lte re d p ri or

to h is i ns pe c tio n a

nd e va luatio n, the dis tr ict court did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n inNo. 09-3597

15 excluding Plaintiffs’ expert’s testimony . Acc ording ly , since the only e v id e n c e p r o f

f e r e d b y Pl a intiff s
r e g ar d i n g p r o d

u c td e f e c tan d c a u s a t i o ni s S m i t h ’ s u n r e l i a b l e
— an d t h u s i n a d m i s s i b l e
—t e s t i m o n y,
we c onclude that the district c ourt proper ly g rante d summary

judgme nt in favor of

Def endant. III . C ON CL USI ON For the rea sons stated above, w e AF F IRM the district court’s g rant of summar y judgme nt fo r D e fe nd a nt.