Present: All the Justices 

MELISSA ANN WAGNER 

v. Record No. 981454 OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 

 April 16, 1999 

KAREN DENISE SHIRD 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE GEORGE COUNTY 

James F. D’Alton, Judge 

 In this appeal, we address the finality of judgments 

under Rule 1:1 and determine whether the circuit court 

still had control over a final order at the time it 

modified that order. Because the court’s 30-day suspension 

of its final order expired without entry of an order to 

extend the length of the stay, we conclude that the court 

no longer retained jurisdiction over this action when it 

entered an order of remittitur. Accordingly, we will 

reverse the judgment of the circuit court and reinstate the 

jury’s verdict in favor of the plaintiff. 

On September 1, 1994, Melissa Ann Wagner filed a 

motion for judgment against Karen Denise Shird seeking 

damages for personal injuries sustained and medical 

expenses incurred as a result of an automobile accident 

that occurred in 1993. After hearing evidence from both 

parties on January 6, 1998, a jury returned a verdict in 

favor of Wagner in the amount of $106,000. That same day, 
the circuit court entered a final order awarding judgment 

for Wagner based on the jury’s verdict. 

 Subsequently, in an order dated January 27, 1998, the 

circuit court granted Shird’s motion to stay the final 

order it had previously entered. The January 27th order 

specifically stated that “the Order of Final Judgment of 

January 6, 1998 is stayed or suspended for a period of 30 

days for argument and decision upon [Shird’s] Motion for 

Remittitur.” The court heard argument on the motion for 

remittitur on February 24, 1998, and at the conclusion of 

the hearing, orally announced its decision from the bench. 

The court granted the motion, reducing the jury’s verdict 

to $60,000, but it did not enter a written order of 

remittitur and final judgment until April 21, 1998. 

 The sole issue in this appeal is whether the circuit 

court retained jurisdiction over this action at the time it 

entered the April 21st order. Wagner acknowledges that the 

circuit court had the authority under Rule 1:1 to modify, 

vacate, or suspend its January 6th final order within 21 

days after the date of entry and that the court entered its 

January 27th order within that 21-day period. However, 

Wagner contends that the January 27th order did not stay 

the January 6th order indefinitely but, instead, 

specifically limited the duration of the stay to 30 days. 

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According to Wagner, that 30-day period expired on February 

26, 1998, without an additional order being entered to 

extend the length of the stay. Thus, posits Wagner, the 

January 6th order became final on February 26th, and the 

circuit court, thereafter, retained no jurisdiction to 

enter the order of remittitur and final judgment on April 

21st, almost two months later. 

 Shird, on the other hand, argues that the circuit 

court did not merely suspend the January 6th final order 

for a specified period but stayed it until the court heard 

argument on and decided the motion for remittitur. Thus, 

Shird asserts that the circuit court continued to have 

jurisdiction over the case until it entered the written 

order on April 21st reflecting its oral ruling to reduce 

the jury’s verdict. We do not agree. 

 Rule 1:1 addresses the finality of judgments and 

provides the following, in pertinent part: 

All final judgments, orders, and decrees, 

irrespective of terms of court, shall remain under the 

control of the trial court and subject to be modified, 

vacated, or suspended for twenty-one days after the 

date of entry, and no longer. . . . The date of entry 

of any final judgment, order, or decree shall be the 

date the judgment, order, or decree is signed by the 

judge. 

However, “[t]he running of time under [this rule] may be 

interrupted . . . by the entry, within the 21-day period 

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after final judgment, of an order suspending or vacating 

the final order.” School Bd. of City of Lynchburg v. 

Caudill Rowlett Scott, Inc., 237 Va. 550, 556, 379 S.E.2d 

319, 323 (1989); accord Davis v. Mullins, 251 Va. 141, 148-

49, 466 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1996). 

 In the present case, the circuit court suspended the 

January 6th final order within the 21-day period allowed in 

Rule 1:1 by entering the order of stay on January 27, 1998. 

Contrary to Shird’s position, the duration of the stay was 

not tied to the court’s resolution of the motion for 

remittitur. Instead, it was expressly limited to “a period 

of 30 days.” Since the court did not enter an additional 

order within that 30-day period to continue the stay, the 

January 6th order became final well before April 21, 1998.1

The pendency of Shird’s motion for remittitur on the 

last day of the stay did not extend or toll the running of 

the 30-day period. See School Bd. of City of Lynchburg, 

237 Va. at 556, 379 S.E.2d at 323 (holding pendency of 

post-judgment motion does not toll or extend running of 21-

day period prescribed in Rule 1:1). Nor does the fact that 

the circuit court had orally announced its decision to 

 1

 The court also did not enter an order to continue the 

stay during the 21 days after the stay ended. See Norris 

v. Mitchell, 255 Va. 235, 239, 495 S.E.2d 809, 811 (1998); 

Rule 1:1. 

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grant Shird’s motion for remittitur before the expiration 

of the 30-day suspension period, but had not yet entered a 

written order reflecting that decision, extend the length 

of the stay. 

“There is a distinction between the rendition of a 

judgment and the entry of a judgment.” McDowell v. Dye, 

193 Va. 390, 393, 69 S.E.2d 459, 462 (1952). While the 

circuit court may have rendered its judgment on Shird’s 

motion for remittitur at the conclusion of the hearing on 

February 24, 1998, it did not enter that judgment until 

April 21, 1998. At that time, the court no longer had 

jurisdiction over the action because the 30-day stay of the 

January 6th final order had expired and the court had not 

entered another order extending the length of the stay. 

Thus, the April 21st order was a nullity. Davis, 251 Va. 

at 149, 466 S.E.2d at 94. 

 Nevertheless, Shird contends that Wagner consented to 

an extension of the 30-day stay after the court orally 

announced its decision on the motion for remittitur. While 

not waiving her argument that the original order of 

suspension was ineffective, Wagner did indeed agree to 

continue the stay for an additional period of 30 days so 

 

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that the transcript of the hearing could be prepared.2 

Additionally, when questioned about the length of the stay 

granted in the January 27th order, the court stated, “It 

did have a 30-day time limit within which to have this 

hearing . . . .” 

Regardless of any agreement by Wagner to extend the 

length of the stay or the circuit court’s statement about 

the January 27th order, a court speaks only through its 

written orders. Davis, 251 Va. at 148, 466 S.E.2d at 94. 

And, “‘orders speak as of the day they were entered.’” Id.

(quoting Vick v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 474, 476, 111 S.E.2d 

824, 826 (1960)). Moreover, the parties cannot confer 

subject matter jurisdiction on the court by agreement. 

Morrison v. Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 169-70, 387 S.E.2d 753, 

755 (1990). 

For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 

circuit court as reflected in the April 21, 1998 order, 

reinstate the jury’s verdict, and enter final judgment here 

in favor of Wagner. 

Reversed and final judgment. 

 2

 The circuit court wanted its rationale for granting 

the motion for remittitur to be recited verbatim in the 

order. 

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