Filed 8/26/22 Marriage of Moss and Carroll CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re the Marriage of

JACQUELINE MOSS and 

WALTER CARROLL.

B312983

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. YD065980

JACQUELINE MOSS,

Respondent,

v.

WALTER CARROLL,

Appellant;

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES 

DEPARTMENT,

Respondent.

APPEAL from a post-judgment order of the Superior Court 

of Los Angeles County, Frank W. Chen, Commissioner. Affirmed.
2

Walter Carroll, in pro. per., for Appellant.

No appearances for Respondents.

_________________________

Walter Carroll (appellant), a self-represented litigant

on appeal and in the trial court, challenges the trial court’s 

order denying his request to modify a prior child support order 

to recalculate his support payments based on his actual income. 

Finding appellant has not demonstrated affirmative error, 

we affirm.

BACKGROUND

In accordance with our standard of review, we state the 

facts—from what we can discern from the appellate record—

in the light most favorable to the court’s order and draw all 

reasonable inferences in favor of it. (In re Marriage of Calcaterra 

& Badakhsh (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 28, 34.)

1. Original child support order

Appellant and Jacqueline Moss were married and have 

a minor child. Moss petitioned for divorce in December 2014 

and filed a request for child support in September 2018. 

Following a hearing on February 6, 2019, the court (Judge Bosley

in Torrance) ordered appellant to pay $1,100 in monthly child 

support, plus $275 per month in arrears, based on appellant’s 

capacity to earn $9,803 per month. The court’s written 

order filed March 13, 2019, includes the DissoMaster report, 

calculating a monthly guideline payment at $1,102 based on

appellant’s imputed income of $9,803 per month, Moss’s income 

of $6,375 per month, and their child spending 29% of the time 

with appellant. The court simultaneously issued an income 

withholding order directed to appellant’s then-employer, 
3

the International Association of Machinist and Aerospace

Workers (IAMAW).

Appellant apparently had worked for IAMAW since 2015

and earned $9,803 per month as a business representative/

organizer. He declared he had a mental and emotional 

breakdown in August 2018 due to job-related stress, went on 

medical leave, and filed a worker’s compensation claim alleging 

psychological disability. The Worker’s Compensation Appeals 

Board (WCAB) denied his claim. In response to Moss’s 

September 2018 request for child support, appellant apparently 

contended this stress disorder/psychological disability prevented 

him from working.

According to Moss’s counsel, appellant presented 

documentation at the February 2019 hearing stating he had 

been placed off work, but the Torrance court found the evidence 

lacking as to the specific nature of appellant’s stress disorder

and how it affected his ability to work.

1 Appellant also

apparently had declined his employer’s offer of a reasonable 

accommodation. The Torrance court thus apparently determined 

appellant’s allegations about his disability and inability to work 

were unfounded. Accordingly, when calculating the guideline 

support payment, the court imputed earning capacity income 

to appellant based on what he had been making at IAMAW. 

Appellant immediately filed a motion for reconsideration that 

the court rejected.

1 The court apparently wanted detailed information such as

how long appellant could sit or lift his hand.
4

2. Requests to modify child support

A few months later, on June 3, 2019, appellant filed 

a request for order (RFO)—in the Torrance court—asking the 

court to change the ordered monthly child support and arrears 

payment and associated income withholding order. Appellant

asserted his employment ended in May 2019, and his application 

for unemployment was pending. In his attached declaration,

appellant attested he had returned to work around February 1, 

2019, but was laid off on May 9, 2019, and thus no longer could 

afford the $1,375 combined monthly child support and arrears 

payment. Appellant averred his current income was zero 

pending a determination of his unemployment application. He

asked the court to modify the child support based on whatever 

his income was at the hearing date.

On September 11, 2019, appellant filed a reply declaration

in support of his RFO. This time appellant re-asserted that

his stress disorder/disability forced him to take medical leave. 

He declared he “tried an unsuccessful return to work” from 

February 1, 2019 through the end of April 2019 when he 

“went out again on worker’s compensation, as a result of [the] 

continuing stress-related disorder.” Appellant asserted the 

WCAB reevaluated his stress disorder claim around April 30, 

2019, “with a determination pending.”

Appellant declared his “company demoted” him, and 

he earned $5,300 per month during the three-month period.2

Appellant again stated IAMAW laid him off on May 9, 2019

2 An exhibit to appellant’s June 2019 declaration includes 

his weekly earnings statements for that period. They show 

his hourly rate was decreased from $55.05 to $33.23 when he 
5

—apparently after he had taken leave. He asserted he 

“immediately became eligible for State Disability Benefits”

and began receiving $5,300 per month. Appellant averred he 

received doctors’ notes stating he was disabled from April 30 

through July 25, 2019; July 26 through July 31, 2019; and 

August 1 through September 15, 2019. He also declared he 

“subsequently received a determination that [he] was temporarily 

totally disabled due to a continuing psychological/psychiatric 

stress disorder and . . . would begin receiving these workers 

compensation-related benefits on or about May 2019.”

The only exhibit appellant attached to his September 2019 

declaration is a form “Certificate of Disability and/or Return 

to Work” dated August 1, 2019, and signed by a qualified 

medical evaluator (certificate of disability). The form includes 

a date range from August 1, 2019 to September 15, 2019, and

under remarks states “Mr. Carroll is temp. totally disabled”

in handwriting. The space next to “[d]iagnosis” is blank.

On May 7, 2020, the Los Angeles County Child Support 

Services Department (CSSD) filed a motion to modify child 

support (at appellant’s request). That motion apparently was

scheduled to be heard on November 12, 2020 in the Central Civil 

West Courthouse. On August 27, 2020, at respondent’s request, 

the Torrance court transferred and continued the hearing on 

returned to work in February 2019, which translates to $1,329.60 

for a 40-hour work week or a little over $5,300 per month.
6

appellant’s June 2019 RFO to the same date in Central Civil 

West.

3

3. Hearings on request to modify child support

The court convened hearings on the modification request 

on November 12, 2020 and February 25, 2021. Appellant 

represented himself at both and was sworn in to testify at 

the second hearing. At the initial hearing, counsel for CSSD

explained it had filed its May 2020 modification motion at 

appellant’s request after he informed CSSD he had “had a 

change of income and he was on disability and when it ran out, 

he went on unemployment.”

Counsel for Moss described the history of appellant’s 

claimed inability to work leading the Torrance court to impute 

income to appellant based on his prior job. She asserted 

appellant had submitted documentation again stating he 

was “unable to work because of . . . stress-related injury.”

Specifically, Moss’s counsel just had received documents from 

appellant’s doctors stating he was placed on disability from 

May through October 21 (presumably 2020) based on “emotional 

and anxiety issues”—“similar to” those he originally had claimed 

in February 2019—and he had suffered a shoulder injury on 

October 21.

Counsel asked for a continuance to obtain medical records

and records from appellant’s employer as to whether appellant 

had a disability, appellant’s specific limitations, and whether 

3 The May 2020 motion is not part of the appellate record. 

The August 27, 2020 minute order is an exhibit to appellant’s 

opening brief but is not part of the Clerk’s Transcript. On our 

own motion, we augment the record to include it.
7

any reasonable accommodations existed or had been offered to

appellant. Appellant told the court he had tried but was unable 

to go back to work and was on disability. He then injured his 

shoulder and could not return to work.

4 He would be starting 

physical therapy in two weeks.

The court continued the hearing date to February 25, 2021, 

to allow Moss to conduct discovery and to give appellant time 

to complete some physical therapy and see if he could return 

to work. The court asked counsel if there was anything the order 

should include “with respect to evidence regarding medical 

condition.” CSSD’s counsel asked that appellant provide 

evidence concerning his prognosis, diagnosis, ability to work, 

and reasonable accommodations.5 The court ordered appellant

—if he claimed disability at the next hearing—to bring evidence 

of his inability to work due to his medical condition, such as 

a letter from his doctor.

Another judicial officer (Commissioner Chen) presided 

over the continued hearing on February 25, 2021. The court 

noted appellant also had filed his own RFO that had been 

continued and then transferred to be heard with CSSD’s motion. 

CSSD’s counsel was unaware the RFO had been filed. Because 

4 Appellant said he was an airplane mechanic. His injury 

consisted of a “torn rotator cuff and a lacerated bicep tendon.”

5 The November 12, 2020 minute order does not include that 

level of detail. The court directed CSSD to prepare an order after 

hearing, however, which it did. We presume that formal, written 

order included those details; it is not part of the appellate record.
8

the June 3, 2019 RFO had no proof of service, the court stated 

it would be hearing only the motion filed May 7, 2020.

Counsel for CSSD again summarized the basis for the

request for modification, specifying appellant had stopped 

working and gone on disability in March 2020. Counsel added 

that, following his October 2020 shoulder injury, appellant 

had shoulder surgery and expected to be off work until April 

2021. Moss’s counsel asked the court to deny modification 

on the ground appellant had failed to provide sufficient medical 

documentation, as the court had ordered, and had asked for 

modification based on previously rejected medical claims.

Appellant had filed, on February 18, 2021, a declaration 

with four attached exhibits.

6 Appellant confirmed he filed those 

exhibits in response to the court’s order to provide documentation 

from a physician regarding his ability or inability to work. 

The court, who had examined the exhibits, asked appellant, 

“Is that all you have?” Appellant responded he also had “this 

return to work, ability to work. This was given to my employer 

before.”7

The court explained, “I looked through all the four exhibits 

attached to your declaration, and there’s really nothing that 

specifically concludes that you’re not able to work.” The court 

described the exhibits as “a little bit conflicting” because some 

6 They are not part of the appellate record.

7 We presume appellant was referring to the August 1, 2019 

certificate of disability that he filed with his September 2019 

declaration.
9

of the documentation referred to appellant’s “mental impairment”

and others to his physical impairment.

The court also noted one exhibit conclusorily stated

appellant should be placed off work from February 7, 2021 

through April 7, 2021, but no basis was stated for “why that 

would be so.” A second document from a different physician,

dated January 29, 2021, stated appellant was “able to work 

but may experience some functional limitations.” Appellant 

clarified the first letter was from his surgeon and was based 

on his professional opinion after repairing appellant’s shoulder. 

Appellant said the second document was from his “treating 

doctor,” rather than his surgeon. He explained, “[T]hat goes 

into when I filed—and the retroactivity was from June of 2019. 

This is my treating doctor that is discussing that piece of it.”

Appellant also explained he had new evidence and facts

that had not been available when he appeared before the 

Torrance court—and therefore the court could not consider them

—when it imputed his earning capacity to calculate the $1,100-

per-month guideline child support payment. He said he now 

had “this report right here”8 from his doctor—dated before the

February 2019 hearing but not provided to appellant—showing

“over 51 percent of what’s going on with me was related [to] 

my job.” “From there on,” appellant said the state had awarded 

him disability benefits from February 2019 through April 2019,

and he had another worker’s compensation claim “because of it.”

Moss’s counsel argued “nothing ha[d] changed.” She 

repeated the details of appellant’s previous claim that the 

8 The report presumably was one of appellant’s exhibits.
10

same stress disorder/disability prevented him from working,

and his failure to present sufficient supporting evidence of that 

claim at the February 2019 hearing, leading the court to impute 

his earning capacity of $9,800 to calculate child support. Counsel 

asserted that, as in 2019, appellant still had not provided the 

requested documents—“[n]o prognosis, no diagnosis, no ability 

to work, no reasonable accommodation.”

Counsel also directed the court’s attention to another one of 

appellant’s documents, “the ‘final post-operative,’ ” that described 

steps appellant could take three, four, and six weeks after his

shoulder surgery, which appears to have been on November 3, 

2020.

9 Based on that report, appellant currently was “about 60 

days” from the time he could discontinue using a night brace at 

six weeks post-surgery after having discontinued his sling and 

started “active assist range of motion” at four weeks post-surgery, 

and begun “range of motion” at three weeks post-surgery.

The court received into evidence appellant’s February 18, 

2021 declaration and the four attached exhibits. The court 

confirmed CSSD had brought its motion for modification on 

appellant’s behalf and at his request. The court then ruled 

as follows,

“The court does not find that the burden has 

been met to demonstrate a material change 

in circumstances to warrant a modification of 

9 The document stated appellant had a shoulder injury on 

November 3, 2020, but documents counsel received earlier stated 

appellant’s injury occurred October 21, 2020. As the document 

is a post-operative report, we can infer the November 3 date 

is the date of surgery.
11

child support. The declaration with exhibits 

attached, the court has reviewed extensively 

but [it] does not satisfy the court’s order 

from the last hearing . . . to provide sufficient 

evidence from a physician showing the ability 

or inability to work. Most of the information 

provided is inconclusive and certainly does not 

conclude a complete inability to work. [¶] So 

the burden has not been met to demonstrate 

a material change in circumstances to warrant 

a modification of child support at this time.” 

The court denied the motion, but “welcome[d]” any party to file 

an RFO or motion to seek modification of child support “if and 

when there is evidence to support it.”

Finally, the court stated appellant’s June 2019 RFO was 

“considered consolidated” with CSSD’s May 7, 2020 motion based 

on the Torrance court’s August 27, 2020 minute order. The court 

directed CSSD to prepare the Order after Hearing. The Order

after Hearing, filed March 2, 2021, states, “Respondent’s request 

for modification is denied. All existing orders remain in full force 

and effect.”

Appellant filed a notice of appeal on April 22, 2021, 

purporting to appeal from the order entered February 25, 2021. 

The minute order entered on that date is not appealable. (Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 8.104(c)(2) [“The entry date of an appealable 

order that is entered in the minutes is the date it is entered 

in the permanent minutes. But if the minute order directs 

that a written order be prepared, the entry date is the date the 

signed order is filed.”].) Seeing no prejudice to Moss, we liberally 

construe appellant’s notice of appeal to include the March 2, 2021
12

Order after Hearing denying the request for modification.

10 

(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2) [notice of appeal to 

be liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency]; In re Marriage 

of Macfarlane & Lang (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 247, 252 [broadly 

construing notice of appeal to include order of dismissal where 

appellant clearly was seeking review of the dismissal, the 

notice of appeal was timely, and the opposing party was not 

prejudiced].) 

DISCUSSION

1. Applicable law and standard of review

“California has a strong public policy in favor of adequate 

child support.” (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th

269, 283.) California thus has established a mandatory, 

statewide uniform guideline to determine court-ordered child 

support. (See Fam. Code, §§ 4050–4076.)11 In determining 

child support under the guideline, courts must adhere to 

certain principles, including that “[a] parent’s first and principal 

obligation is to support the parent’s minor children according 

to the parent’s circumstances and station in life” (§ 4053, 

subd. (a)), and “[e]ach parent should pay for the support of 

the children according to his or her ability” (§ 4053, subd. (d)). 

(See also In re Marriage of Cheriton, at p. 283.) California’s 

guideline support thus places the interests of the children 

as “the state’s top priority.” (§ 4053, subd. (e).)

10 Appellant attached that order to his Civil Case Information 

Statement filed in this court, but it is not part of the Clerk’s 

Transcript. We augment the record to include it on our own 

motion.

11 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
13

Section 4055 sets out a complicated mathematical formula 

to determine child support. (§ 4055.) “Although this formula 

is referred to as the statewide uniform ‘guideline’ (§ 4055), 

‘guideline’ is a misleading term” as the “formula support amount 

is ‘presumptively correct’ in all cases.” (In re Marriage of Cryer

(2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1047–1048; § 4057, subd. (a).)

12 

Under the guideline, child support is calculated based on 

“each parent’s actual income and level of responsibility for 

the children.” (§ 4053, subd. (c); § 4055, subd. (b)(1).) Section 

4058, subdivision (b), however, grants trial courts discretion 

to set child support based on a parent’s earning capacity 

rather than actual income if doing so is consistent with the 

best interests of the child. “So long as a parent has an earning 

capacity, that is, the ability and the opportunity to earn income, 

the trial court may attribute income.” (In re Marriage of Destein

(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1392; see also In re Marriage of 

McHugh (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1246 [earning capacity

is comprised of “ ‘ “the ability to work, including such factors 

as age, occupation, skills, education, health, background, work 

experience and qualifications . . . and . . . an opportunity to 

work” ’ ” (italics omitted)].) Thus, a court is limited in imputing 

income to a parent only to the extent the parent has no earning 

capacity or relying on earning capacity would be contrary to the 

child’s best interests. (In re Marriage of McHugh, at p. 1246.)

12 Because section 4055 “involves, literally, an algebraic 

formula,” trial courts may use a computer program called 

DissoMaster to make the guideline child support calculation. 

(In re Marriage of Schulze (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 519, 523–524, 

fn. 2.)
14

“A child support order may be modified when there 

has been a material change of circumstances. [Citation.]

The party seeking the modification bears the burden of showing 

that circumstances have changed such that modification is 

warranted. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Cryer, supra, 198 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1054; see also § 3651, subd. (a).) Thus, where 

the payor parent “ ‘seeks a reduction in court-ordered support 

based on the changed circumstances of lack of income, it will 

be the payor parent, as moving party, who bears the burden 

of showing a lack of ability and opportunity to earn income.’ ”

(In re Marriage of McHugh, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1246–

1247.) “ ‘The ultimate determination of whether the individual 

facts of the case warrant modification of support is within the 

discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] The reviewing court 

will resolve any conflicts in the evidence in favor of the trial 

court’s determination.’ ” (In re Marriage of Cryer, at p. 1054.)

Thus, we will affirm the trial court’s order regarding 

a request to modify child support unless the court abused its 

discretion, and will reverse the order “ ‘only if prejudicial error 

is found from examining the record below.’ ” (In re Marriage 

of Williams (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1233–1234.) In our 

review for abuse of discretion, “we do not substitute our judgment 

for that of the trial court, and we will disturb the trial court’s 

decision only if no judge could have reasonably made the 

challenged decision.” (In re Marriage of Cryer, supra, 198 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 1046–1047.) Nevertheless, “ ‘the trial court’s 

discretion is not so broad that it “may ignore or contravene 

the purposes of the law regarding . . . child support.” ’ ” (In re 

Marriage of Bodo (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 373, 384.)
15

“ ‘To the extent [the appellant] challenges the trial court’s 

factual findings, our review follows established principles 

concerning the existence of substantial evidence in support of 

the findings. On review for substantial evidence, we examine 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party 

and give that party the benefit of every reasonable inference. 

[Citation.] We accept all evidence favorable to the prevailing 

party as true and discard contrary evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘We do 

not reweigh the evidence or reconsider credibility determinations. 

[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Calcaterra &

Badakhsh, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 34.) And, in a case 

where the trial court concluded the party bearing the burden 

of proof did not meet that burden—as is the situation here—

the question is not so much whether substantial evidence 

supports the court’s findings, but “ ‘whether the evidence 

compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.’ ”

(Juen v. Alain Pinel Realtors, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 972, 

978–979 [specifically, whether appellant’s evidence was 

uncontradicted, unimpeached, and “ ‘ “of such a character

and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination 

that it was insufficient to support a finding” ’ ”].)

2. Appellant has failed to show the trial court abused 

its discretion

Appellant asks us to reverse the court’s order denying his 

request for modification13 and to enter a new order calculating 

13 Although CSSD technically filed the May 2020 motion, 

in effect it was appellant’s request for modification. The trial 

court treated it as such, as do we.
16

guideline child support based on his actual income (or lack 

thereof) received from June 3, 2019 through July 23, 2021.

Appellant initially contends the trial court—in entering 

the March 2019 child support order—used “an erroneous 

dissomaster with [his] income based on $9,803.00 monthly, 

instead of $5,300.00 monthly from EDD State Disability, EDD 

Unemployment, and Unemployment which caused Child Support, 

Arrears, and Interest to be calculated erroneously in the amount 

of approximately $27,000.” However, appellant’s appeal is not 

from the March 2019 child support order, but from the order 

denying his request to modify that order. As appellant never 

appealed from the March 2019 child support order, it cannot be 

challenged now, and the issues determined by it are res judicata. 

(In re Marriage of Gruen (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 627, 637–638; 

§ 3554 [appeal may be taken from an order under the statutory 

division governing child support].) 

When the court made the March 2019 order, it imputed 

income to appellant based on his earning capacity of $9,803 

per month—appellant’s income at IAMAW before he took 

medical leave in 2018 for a claimed stress disorder and filed 

an unsuccessful worker’s compensation claim. As discussed, 

in doing so, the Torrance court apparently rejected as insufficient 

the evidence appellant submitted to show he was unable to 

work due to that stress disorder/disability. As appellant never 

challenged the March 2019 order, we must presume that, in 

calculating guideline child support based on appellant’s earning 

capacity, rather than his actual income, the court found—

based on substantial evidence—appellant had the ability

and opportunity to work and earn that level of income, despite

his asserted stress disorder/disability. (See In re Marriage 
17

of McHugh, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246–1247 [calculation 

of child support based on earning capacity is appropriate

unless parent has no earning capacity, meaning no ability 

or opportunity to work, or not in the child’s best interests].) 

In seeking modification of that order, therefore, appellant

had the burden to present evidence showing his circumstances 

had changed since then—namely, that he no longer had the

ability and opportunity to earn $9,803 per month.14 Essentially, 

appellant asserted his inability to work due to his ongoing stress 

disorder/disability and his October 2020 shoulder injury and 

subsequent surgery demonstrated changed circumstances 

requiring the court to modify his child support obligation 

based on his actual income rather than his earning capacity. 

In an apparent response to the court’s order at the 

November 2020 hearing to produce evidence from his healthcare 

provider showing his ability or inability to work, appellant filed, 

on February 18, 2021, a declaration and four exhibits. The 

court “extensively” reviewed the declaration and exhibits, and 

received them into evidence. In response to the court’s query 

as to whether appellant had any other evidence that complied 

14 Appellant appears to have argued below that he did not 

have the ability to work, rather than no opportunity to work. 

He does not address that issue on appeal; we thus do not consider 

it. (See Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 

784–785 [“When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it 

but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to 

authority, we treat the point as [forfeited].”]; Munro v. Regents 

of University of California (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 977, 988 [party 

“may not raise on appeal issues not raised in trial court”].)
18

with its order, appellant referred the court to “this return to 

work, ability to work. This was given to my employer before.” 

We presume appellant was referring to the August 1, 2019 

certificate of disability attached to his September 2019 

declaration.

The court found appellant’s February 2021 declaration 

and exhibits did not satisfy the court’s earlier order “to provide 

sufficient evidence from a physician showing the ability or 

inability to work.” We can infer the court similarly rejected the 

August 2019 certificate of disability—that we infer appellant 

presented at the hearing—as it does not state appellant’s 

diagnosis or the basis for the temporary disability. The 

court noted most of the information appellant provided was 

“inconclusive and certainly does not conclude a complete inability 

to work.” It thus found appellant failed to meet his burden 

to establish a material change in circumstances to warrant 

modifying the child support order at that time.

Appellant’s February 2021 declaration and exhibits are not 

part of the appellate record. While we are mindful appellant is 

representing himself on appeal, he “is to be treated like any other 

party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration 

than other litigants and attorneys.” (Barton v. New United Motor 

Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1210.) He 

thus is required to follow the most fundamental rule of appellate 

review: the judgment or order challenged on appeal is presumed 

to be correct, and “it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively 

demonstrate error.” (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 

1567, 1573.) “All intendments and presumptions are indulged 

to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error 

must be affirmatively shown.” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 
19

2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) To overcome this presumption, an appellant 

must provide a record that allows for meaningful review of the 

challenged order. (Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 

198 Cal.App.4th 181, 187.) “ ‘Failure to provide an adequate 

record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against 

[the] [appellant].’ ” (Ibid.) If the record does not include all 

the evidence and materials the trial court relied on in making 

its determination, we will not find error. (Haywood v. Superior 

Court (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 949, 955.) Rather, we will infer 

substantial evidence supports the court’s findings. (Ibid.) 

The reporter’s transcript describes some of the evidence

appellant proffered, as we discussed, summarized here:

• The August 1, 2019 certificate of disability stating

appellant was temporarily totally disabled from August 1, 

2019 to September 15, 2019.

• A doctor’s report (apparently prepared before the March 

2019 order but unavailable to appellant) stating “over 

51 percent of what’s going on with me [presumably, 

his stress disability] was related [to] my job.”

• A letter from appellant’s “treating doctor” dated 

January 29, 2021, stating appellant was able to work 

but might experience some functional limitations.

• A letter from appellant’s shoulder surgeon stating 

appellant should be placed off work from February 7, 2021 

through April 7, 2021.

• A “ ‘final post-operative’ ” report from appellant’s surgeon 

stating appellant had a shoulder injury on November 3, 

2020, presumably the surgery date, and noting appellant 

could start range of motion activity three weeks postsurgery, could discontinue his sling and progress to 
20

“active assist range of motion” four weeks post-surgery, and

could discontinue his brace at night six weeks post-surgery

(which counsel stated would have been December 15, 2020).

Appellant also testified the state awarded him disability benefits 

from February 2019 through April 2019 based on his doctor’s 

report; he had a second worker’s compensation claim—as far as 

we can discern—due to his need to stop work at the end of April 

or beginning of May 2019, based on the same stress disorder;

and he currently was in physical therapy for his shoulder and 

“getting better” so he could “get back to work.”15

Appellant argued the documentation he submitted showed 

he continued to be unable to work due to his stress disorder/

psychological disability after the entry of the child support order, 

and he could not return to work as an airplane mechanic—his 

most recent position—due to his shoulder injury and surgery. 

Although the evidence may show appellant was not working, 

we cannot conclude it compels a finding that he lacked the ability 

to work and thus no longer had the earning capacity attributed 

to him in the March 2019 child support order. 

As the trial court noted, the evidence was contradictory. 

While appellant’s treating doctor apparently concluded appellant 

was able to work in January 2021, his surgeon placed him 

off work from February 2021 through April 2021. Nor does 

the documentation, as the court also noted, provide a basis 

for appellant’s inability to work. And, as Moss’s counsel added, 

15 The record does not include documentation, other than 

appellant’s declaration, concerning his disability award or 

worker’s compensation claims.
21

according to the surgeon’s instructions, plaintiff would have 

been sling free, even at night, for the two months preceding 

the February 2021 hearing.

Although appellant explained these inconsistencies, we 

can infer the trial court did not credit appellant’s explanations, 

and resolve the apparent conflict in the evidence in support of 

the court’s determination. (In re Marriage of Cryer, supra,

198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1054 ; In re Marriage of Calcaterra &

Badakhsh, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 34.) Certainly, on the 

record before us, appellant’s evidence was neither uncontradicted 

nor of such character and weight as to compel a finding in 

his favor that his stress disorder or injury prevented him 

from working at all. (See Juen v. Alain Pinel Realtors, Inc., 

supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 979.)

Moreover, the fact appellant’s doctor may have placed 

him off work due to his stress disorder or injury does not compel 

a finding that appellant had no ability to work, and thus had 

no earning capacity. True, appellant’s economic situation had 

changed, but he bore the burden to show he lacked the ability 

or opportunity to continue to earn income at the same level—

for example, with a reasonable accommodation or in a temporary 

position. The court reasonably determined he did not. As Moss’s 

counsel noted, appellant did not provide documentation, as 

the court had ordered at the November 2020 hearing, from 

his healthcare provider as to his diagnosis, prognosis, or ability 

to work,

16 or information from his employer about whether a 

16 Moss’s counsel noted appellant failed to provide specifics as 

to his ability to work for the February 2019 child support hearing 

as well. As we discussed, the documentation in the record does 
22

reasonable accommodation existed or had been offered. Nor 

is there any indication that appellant asked for a reasonable 

accommodation or to work in a different position that would not 

have aggravated his disability or injury. And, he apparently had 

declined an accommodation before the court entered the original 

child support order. Given the actual documentation the court 

considered is not part of the appellate record, we must infer 

it supported the court’s implicit finding that it was insufficient 

to show appellant’s earning capacity had changed due to his 

continuing stress disorder/disability or shoulder injury. (See 

In re Marriage of McHugh, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1246–

1247 [payor parent must show “ ‘lack of ability and opportunity to 

earn income’ ” to demonstrate changed circumstances to warrant 

modification of child support order based on earning capacity].)

As we discussed, whether the individual facts presented 

warrant modification of child support remains within the broad 

discretion of the trial court. (In re Marriage of Cryer, supra, 198 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1054.) On this record, we cannot say no judge 

reasonably could have found appellant failed to meet his burden

to prove changed circumstances required modifying the initial

child support calculation to appellant’s then-current income

rather than his earning capacity. (Id. at pp. 1046–1047.) 

Accordingly, appellant has not demonstrated the trial court 

erred in denying his request to modify the child support 

and income withholding orders.

not provide a basis for, or the specific effects of, appellant’s 

disability. We presume the exhibits omitted from the record 

also did not, as the court found. 
23

In reaching our conclusion, we do not suggest appellant

did not have a stress disorder or a shoulder injury. Rather, 

appellant failed to demonstrate with sufficient evidence the 

impact his disability and injury had on his earning capacity

and ability to pay child support. We note the trial court invited 

any party to move to change the child support order when there 

was evidence to support its modification.

3. The court did not err when it did not separately hear 

appellant’s June 2019 RFO 

Appellant appears to contend the trial court should have 

considered his June 2019 RFO because CSSD knew of the 

June 3, 2019 RFO through minute orders it had received,17

and appellant’s RFO sought to modify the child support order 

retroactive to June 3, 2019. As we discussed, the court did not 

hear the June 2019 RFO because there was no proof of service 

showing it had been served and considered it consolidated with 

the May 2020 motion. Although CSSD may have been aware 

that appellant filed his own RFO, nothing in the record 

demonstrates CSSD ever was served with the RFO nor does 

appellant contend he served CSSD. 

Even if the court also should have heard the June 2019 

RFO, however, appellant has failed to show prejudice from 

the purported error. An appellant has the burden not only 

to show error but prejudice from that error as well. (See Cal. 

17 The clerk served CSSD with notice of the August 27, 2020 

minute order that continued and transferred appellant’s RFO 

to be heard with CSSD’s motion, and the November 12, 2020 

and February 25, 2021 minute orders identify the nature of 

the proceedings as appellant’s June 3, 2019 RFO.
24

Const., art. VI, § 13 [miscarriage of justice required for reversal].) 

If an appellant fails to satisfy that burden, his argument will 

be rejected on appeal. (Century Surety Co. v. Polisso (2006) 

139 Cal.App.4th 922, 963; see also see also In re Marriage of 

Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 823 [miscarriage 

of justice will not be found “ ‘unless it appears reasonably 

probable that, absent the error, the appellant would have 

obtained a more favorable result’ ”].)

As the May 2020 motion for modification was for 

appellant’s benefit and filed at his request, we can infer 

it included the information appellant provided in support 

of his own RFO. We similarly can infer appellant’s February 

2021 declaration reiterated the statements he made in his 

2019 supporting and reply declarations about his ongoing stress 

disorder/psychological disability, his worker’s compensation 

claims, disability award, and unemployment. We thus can 

presume the court considered that information despite hearing 

only the May 2020 motion. And, as discussed, we can infer 

the court considered the certificate of disability attached to 

appellant’s September 2019 declaration and found it insufficient 

because it did not state the basis for appellant’s temporary 

total disability.

At the hearing, no one mentioned appellant’s reduced 

pay rate for three months when he temporarily returned to work 

for IAMAW on February 1, 2019, or his subsequent termination 

on May 9, 2019. That evidence was included in appellant’s 2019 

declarations, although the termination letter from his employer

is not part of the appellate record.

Even if that evidence were not included with CSSD’s 

motion, however, the court’s consideration of it would not have 
25

reasonably led the court to rule differently. Again, that 

appellant’s income was reduced—or even eliminated—does not

necessarily demonstrate an inability to earn income. Appellant 

does not explain why his hourly rate was reduced, for example, 

or the circumstances surrounding his termination. (See, e.g., 

In re Marriage of McHugh, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th 1241–1242

[discretion to set child support based on earning capacity includes

imputing income based on earnings at a prior job, “without 

evidence the parent has the current opportunity to earn at that 

same level, if the parent left or otherwise lost the job in a manner 

reflecting a voluntary and deliberate divestiture of financial 

resources required to pay child support obligations”].)

In short, as the evidence appellant submitted with his 

June 3, 2019 RFO does not compel a finding that he lacked the 

ability to work and to earn income at the level imputed to him in 

the March 2019 child support order, appellant was not prejudiced 

by any purported error on the trial court’s part in not hearing 

the June 3, 2019 RFO. And, as we have concluded the court 

did not err in denying the request for modification, appellant’s 

desire to have any child support modification made retroactive 

to June 3, 2019, is moot. (§ 3653, subd. (a) [order modifying 

child support “may be made retroactive” to the date of filing 

notice of motion].)

Finally, appellant appears to argue, without citation to 

the record, that he was denied the ability to enter exhibits into 

evidence. The record does not support appellant’s contention. 

The trial court received appellant’s February 18, 2021 declaration 

and attached exhibits into evidence. Nothing in the record 

demonstrates appellant asked the trial court to receive any other 
26

exhibits into evidence or that the court declined to do so. (See, 

e.g., Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007) 154

Cal.App.4th 547, 557 [ordinarily, errors not reflected in the 

trial record cannot sustain reversal on appeal].)

DISPOSITION

The March 2, 2021 order is affirmed. Because respondents 

elected not to file briefs in this court, there are no costs on appeal 

to award.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

LAVIN, Acting P. J.

KIM, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned 

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.