IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA No. 23

- 0940 Filed September 27, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF D.O., Minor Child, C.R., Mother, Appellant.

________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, William S. Owens , Associate Juvenile Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

Lynnette M. Lindgren of Faulkner, Broerman, & Lindgren, Ottumwa, for appellant mother. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee State. Sarah L. Wenke, Ottumwa, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Tabor, P.J. , Buller, J., and Vogel, S.J.* *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2023 ).2

VOGEL , Senior Judge

. A mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights to D.O., born in 2011. 1 She argues the State failed to prove a statutory ground for termination, termination is not in D.O.’s best interests, placing custody of D.O. with a relative should preclude term ination, and the State failed to provide reasonable efforts toward reunification. We reject her arguments and affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings In April 2021, D.O. reported to school officials that the mother hit him. HHS and law enforcement obse rved multiple injuries on his body, including two large bruises on his thigh. In a n interview with HHS , the mother acknowledged spanking her children , including D.O., but she denied leaving any marks

. D.O. was soon removed from the mother’s custody and p laced with his other legal parent. In June, D.O. was adjudicated as being in need of assistance. In November 2022, the State filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights to D.O . The matter proceeded to a termination trial in March 2023. The juvenile court then terminated the parental rights of the mother and any unknown or known putative fathers

. 2 Only the mother appeals

. II. Standard of Review We apply de novo review to an order terminating parental r ights. In re A.B. , 957 N.W.2d 280, 293 (Iowa 2021). We give weight to the juvenile court’s factual

1 The mother has other childre n who are not part of this proceeding. Additional ly, the Iowa D epartment of H ealth and H uman S ervices (HHS) was involved with the mother between 2011 and 2017 to address concerns with her mental health and substance abuse. 2 The record is unclear on the identity of the child’s other legal parent, whose parental rights were unaffected by the termination.3

determinations, especially regarding witness credibility, but we are not bound by them. Id.
III. Analysis Generally, we use “ a three

- step analysis to review termination of parental rights. First, we consider whether there are statutory grounds for termination. Second, we determine whether termination is in the best interest of the child. Third, we consider whether we should e xercise any of the permissive exceptions for termination. ” In re L.B. , 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022) (citing In re A.S. , 906 N.W.2d 467, 472

– 73 (Iowa 2018)).
A. Statutory Ground The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)( d), (e), (f), and (g) (202 2 ). “On appeal, we may affirm the juvenile court ’ s termination order on any ground that we find supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re D.W. , 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010). T he mother only c hallenges termination under section 232.116(1)(f). 3 Because the mother failed to challenge the other statutory grounds for termination, she waive s any challenge to those grounds on appeal. See In re P.L. , 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010 ) ( stating we need n ot discuss the statutory grounds for termination when the parent does not dispute the existence of at least one ground ); Hyler v. Garner , 548 N.W.2d 864, 870 (Iowa 1996) (“[O]ur review is confined to those propositions relied upon by the appellant for reve rsal on appeal.”).

3 The mot her also asserts termination was improper under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)( l

). Because the State did not petition to terminate her parental rights under paragraph ( l

) , and the juvenile court did not terminate her rights under paragraph ( l

) , we do not co nsider this paragraph.4

Furthermore , as explained below, the mother failed to adequately address her parenting and general behavior after removal . Thus, even if paragraph (f) were the only statutory ground at issue, we would find the State satisfied that grou nd for termination.
B. Best Interests When evaluating the best interests of the child, we “ give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long

term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). In arguing termination is not in D.O.’s best interests, the mother points to her participation in ment al

health treatment, her sobriety, and her stable housing, employment, and transportation as evidence of her progress. HHS became involved here due to concerns the mother was physically abusing D.O. , and the mother’s general behavior immediately raised ad ditional concerns. During HHS’s first interview with the mother, she was belligerent and uncooperative with HHS, and she shifted blame for D.O.’s injuries onto him for being aggressive and lying. When presented with the removal order, the mother attempte d to flee from and then fought with law enforcement, resulting in her arrest for interference with official acts. Soon a fter removal, a physician examined D.O. and noted multiple injuries consistent with non

- accidental trauma.
T he mother initially rece ived fully supervised visitation with D.O. She continued cursing at and resisting the service providers during these visits. She also used physical force to punish or otherwise direct D.O. and her other children during visitations, contrary to the explic it directions of supervising providers. In5

September 2021, D.O. began refusing to participate in visits with the mother. Following his wishes and his therapist’s advice, the mother has had no contact with D.O. since then. The HHS termination report show s the mother often refused to cooperate with HHS through out the juvenile proceedings. Following removal, HHS recognized the mother needed to improve her mental health

. In t he child

- in

- need

- of

- assistance adjudication , the juvenile court determined the mother should follow HHS recommendations to submit to a psychological evaluation and cooperate with follow

- up treatment . Accordingly, t he mother underwent a psychological evaluation dated November 2021. The evaluating psychologist opined t he mother met the criteria for borderline personality disorder; major depressive disorder, moderate, recurrent ; and post

traumatic stress disorder; and she showed features of obsessive

- compulsive personality disorder. The psychologist recommended the moth er participate in psychotherapy , s pecifically dialectical behavioral treatment. The mother largely resisted treatment recommendations from the psychologist and HHS. Instead, the mother continued seeing her long

- time therapist , whom she had seen for upw ards of twelve years

. While s he made some efforts to address her mental health through her therapist , this therapist told HHS that the mother’s “progress was minimal” and “this was as good as she kind of was going to be.” T he therapist also told HHS that , while he advocates for his client, he was “not sure [the mother] would benefit ” D.O. due to her instability. Additionally, t he mother has been inconsistent in taking prescribed medications for her mental health.6

The mother underwent a second psycholo gical assessment with a different psychologist dated October 2022. This ensuing report was similar to the first, underscoring the mother’s lack of progress on her mental health. The second psychologist noted the mother’s “long history of uneven performan ce, poor impulse control, and acting out behaviors directed against her children.” The psychologist recommended intensive services, but the psychologist opined the mother would likely continue having “problems with emotional control and stability” and her prognosis was “at best, guarded” considering her current attitude and past history. The mother’s testimony at the termination trial confirms her lack of progress. She continued her defensive behavior, minimiz ing the physical and emotional harm she inflicted on D.O. and her other children. For example, she denied punching her older child in the face during a supervised vis it, claiming instead she only “popped him in his mouth because he was using some profanity.” She also insisted she “never left a mark on [her] children” despite all evidence to the contrary , which include s photographs of the marks found on D.O

. Furthermore, D.O. has thrived since removal from the mother. Both D.O. ’s therapist and the HHS wor ker testified his behaviors have greatly stabilized and improved in the year leading up to termination and he feels comfortable in his other parent’s home. Considering the harm the mother inflicted on D.O. before removal and her lack of progress since t hen, we agree termination of her parental rights is in D.O.’s best interests.7

C. Relative Custody The mother argues termination is not appropriate because D.O.’s other parent has legal custody. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(a) (stating the court need not termi nate parental rights if “[a] relative has legal custody of the child”). This exception is “permissive, not mandatory.” In re A.S. , 906 N.W.2d 467, 475 (Iowa 2018) (quoting In re A.M. , 843 N.W.2d 100, 113 (Iowa 2014)). “An appropriate determination to te rminate a parent

- child relationship is not to be countermanded by the ability and willingness of a family relative to take the child. The child ’ s best interests always remain the first consideration.” Id. (quoting In re C.K. , 558 N.W.2d 170, 174 (Iowa 19 97)). As explained above, termination is in D.O.’s best interests, and he is thriving in the other parent’s custody. We decline to apply this exception to termination.
D. Reasonable Efforts HHS must “make every reasonable effort to return the child to the child’s home as quickly as possible consistent with the best interests of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.102(6). The mother argues HHS failed to make reasonable efforts because s he had no con tact with D.O. after he began refusing visits in September
2021 , which refusal was supported by D.O. ’s therapist

. However, a parent must object to the service s offered “early in the process so appropriate changes can be made.” In re L.M. , 904 N.W.2d 835, 840 (Iowa 2017) (quoting In re C.B. , 611 N.W.2d 489, 493

– 94 (Iowa 2000)). “In general, if a parent fails to request other services at the proper time, the parent waives the issue and may not later challenge it at the termination proceeding.” Id. ( citati on omitted); see also In re C.H. , 652 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 2002) (“If a parent has a complaint regarding8

services, the parent must make such challenge at the removal, when the case permanency plan is entered, or at later review hearings.”)

. The mother di d not file a motion requesting additional contact with D.O. until March 2023, three months after the State filed the termination petition. Thus, she waived any reasonable

efforts challenge during the pendency of these proceedings. See L.M. , 904 N.W.2d at 840. Furthermore, we note the lack of contact resulted from the mother’s behavior, which inflicted harm on D.O. , along with her refusal to fully address her mental health and otherwise cooperate with the other services HHS offered.
IV. Conclusion The mother waived her challenge to the statutory grounds for termination, termination is in the best interests of D.O. , placing him in the custody of his other parent does not preclude termination, and the mother waived her reasonable

efforts challenge.
AFFIRMED.