alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 7
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<DEBT-HELD-FOR-SALE>                        34,896,624
<DEBT-CARRYING-VALUE>                                0
<DEBT-MARKET-VALUE>                                  0
<EQUITIES>                                   7,773,791
<MORTGAGE>                                           0
<REAL-ESTATE>                                        0
<TOTAL-INVEST>                              42,670,415
<CASH>                                       2,269,829
<RECOVER-REINSURE>                                   0
<DEFERRED-ACQUISITION>                         901,190
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              49,282,478
<POLICY-LOSSES>                             22,920,782
<UNEARNED-PREMIUMS>                          3,162,071
<POLICY-OTHER>                                       0
<POLICY-HOLDER-FUNDS>                                0
<NOTES-PAYABLE>                                      0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         3,323
<OTHER-SE>                                  21,120,340
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                49,282,478
<PREMIUMS>                                   1,827,838
<INVESTMENT-INCOME>                            541,050
<INVESTMENT-GAINS>                             243,398
<OTHER-INCOME>                                       0
<BENEFITS>                                   1,827,838
<UNDERWRITING-AMORTIZATION>                    523,501
<UNDERWRITING-OTHER>                           261,124
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  (177)
<INCOME-TAX>                                    41,173
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (195,816)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (195,816)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.59)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<RESERVE-OPEN>                              20,842,402
<PROVISION-CURRENT>                          1,827,838
<PROVISION-PRIOR>                                    0
<PAYMENTS-CURRENT>                                   0
<PAYMENTS-PRIOR>                               625,143
<RESERVE-CLOSE>                             22,045,097
<CUMULATIVE-DEFICIENCY>                              0
        


</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 99-7111

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus JOSEPH FRANCIS SHEA, a/k/a Diamond Joe, Defendant - Appellant.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. J. Calvitt Clarke, Jr., Senior District Judge. (CR-93-55, CA-96-1198-2) Submitted: October 8, 1999 Decided: November 10, 1999 Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Joseph Francis Shea, Appellant Pro Se. Kevin Michael Comstock, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* Although the district court’s order is marked as “filed” on July 28, 1999, the district court’s records show that it was entered on the docket sheet on July 29, 1999. Pursuant to Rules 58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the date that the order was entered on the docket sheet that we take as the effective date of the district court’s decision. See Wilson v. Murray, 806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1986). 2 PER CURIAM: Joseph Francis Shea seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 1999). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s order and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See United States v. Shea , Nos. CR-93-55; CA-96- 1198-2 (E.D. Va. July 29, 1999). * We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### REDINGTON v. OFFICE EQUIPMENT CO.

(Circuit Court, W. D. Kentucky.

May 27, 1911.)

Patents (a 228*) — Invention—Mucilage Holder.

The Redington patent, No. 625,517, for a mucilage holder, is for a combination of old elements, requiring no more than mechanical skill, and is void for lack of patentable invention.

In Equity. Suit by William IT. Redington against the Office Equip.ment Company. Decree for defendant.

Brown & Hopkins, for complainant.

W. P. Preble, Jr., for defendant.

*

For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am, Digs. 1907 to date, & Itep’r Indexes

EVANS, District Judge.

The complainant alleges an infringement of his patent, No. 625,517, for certain alleged new and useful improvements in mucilage holders. Whether or not the construction exhibited by the complainant as having been made in conformity with his patent and its third claim conforms thereto, it is certain that the defendant’s construction is an exact, and we think intentional, imitation of it. This, however, is not a suit to restrain unfair competition in business, if such were admissible; but it is a suit to enforce rights based upon the patent, and relief necessarily depends upon the validity of the patent itself.

All the separate elements sought to be combined by complainant’s device certainly are old, and we must not be misled by the facility of technical speech apparent here, as in patent cases usually. The cup, the brush, the top or cover, and the screws by which the latter is fastened to the cup, and the interior well or cup for holding water, one and all are far from being novelties. The complainant claims, however, that he so arranged, relocated, or combined these things as to produce better and more useful results than any heretofore obtained. In a sense probably this is quite true; but, notwithstanding the presumptions indulged in favor of patents issued by the government, we have not been able to see how the mechanical effort necessary to aggregate and readjust the various old and commonly used elements in the way it was done by complainant amounted to what is called “invention” in patent law. Rudiger v. Thaddeus Davids Co. (C. C.) 126 Fed. 960, affirmed 133 Fed. 1021, 66 C. C. A. 240; Walker on Patents, § 32.

The temperate and clearly stated views of the defendant’s expert witness Brandenburg are, to say the least, more agreeable reading than those of Matthews, who testified as an expert for the complainant. In a somewhat extended experience wc have never seen anything quite like the tone of the latter, and it may he barely possible that his manner of expressing himself has obscured the merits that otherwise might appear in his testimony. The contrast between the manner of stating their views by the two witnesses respectively is so remarkable as to suggest comment.

It results, from the conclusion we have reached as to the absence of invention in complainant’s device, that his claim to relief has not *636been made out. Other grounds of opposition to the claims made by the bill need not be passed upon.

The bill will be dismissed, with costs.
#### State v. Hennis

Case below: 184 N.C. App.-(3 July 2007)

No. 342P07

1. AG’s Motion for Temporary Stay (COA06-1134)

2. AG’s Petition for Writ of Supersedeas

3. AG’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31

1. Allowed 07/19/07 361 N.C. 572 Stay dissolved 10/11/07

2. Denied 10/11/07

3. Denied 10/11/07
## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS OF TE XAS
N O . A P - 75, 888

EX PA R TE A N TH O N Y R . BR O W N , A ppl i c ant
ON AP P LI CAT I ON F OR A W RI T OF HABE AS CORP US CAUS E N O. 2 1 2 0 6 A I N T HE 8 6 TH DI S TR I CT COURT

FROM KA UFM AN CO UNTY

P er cur i am . O P I N I O N Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Crim i n al P ro ce dure, the cler k of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for writ of habe as cor

pus. Ex pa rte Y oung , 418 S.W
. 2 d 8 2 4 , 8 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant wa s convicted of murder and sentenc ed to life imprisonment. The Fifth Court of Appe als aff irmed his conviction. Brown v. State, No. 05-04-00872- CR (Tex. App. – Dallas, Marc h 30, 2005, no pet.)
. Applicant conte n d s th a

t h is a p p e ll a tec o u n s el re ndere d ineffe ctive assistanc e bec ause c ounsel failed to infor

m him of his right to file a pr o s epetition for discre tionary revie w . Appellate c ounsel filed an a ffidavit with the trial court. Ba sed on that af fidavit, the trial cour

thas ente red f indings of fac t and conc lusions of law that appe llate counse l failed to inform Applica nt of his rig ht to file a pr o s e petition for discre tionary revie w. The tria l court re commends that re lief be gra nted. Ex parte W

ilson , 956 S.W .2d 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We find, theref ore, that Applicant is entitled to the opportunity to file an out-of- time petition for discretionar y revie w of the judgme nt of the FifthCourt of Appeals in Cause No. 05-04-00872- CR that aff irmed his conviction in C a se No
. 21 20 6Afr om t he 86 thJudic ia l D istri c t Cour t of Ka uf manCounty . App lic ant s ha ll f ile his petition for discre tionary revie w with the Fifth Court of Appeals within 30 day s of t he date on wh ic h th is C ourt ’s mand a te iss ue s.

Deliver ed: April 9, 2008 Do no t pu bli sh
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ENACTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of FC Banc Corp. (the Company) on Form 10-KSB for the period ending December 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Coleman J. Clougherty, Principal Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as enacted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of
section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                           
|---------------------------
|/S/ COLEMAN J. CLOUGHERTY  
|Coleman J. Clougherty      
|Principal Executive Officer
|                           
|March 29, 2005
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Angelo CARTHAN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 08-16307

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

May 11, 2009.

Bernardo Lopez, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, Kathleen M. Williams, Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellant.

John P. Gonsoulin, Anne R. Schultz, Kathleen M. Salyer, Laura Thomas Rive-ro, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before CARNES, BARKETT and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Angelo Carthan, through counsel, appeals the denial of his motion for a sentence reduction, under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The district court denied Carthan’s motion, finding that he was ineligible for a reduction because he was sentenced as a career offender, under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. On appeal, Carthan argues that the district court erred in finding that he was ineligible for a reduction because the court initially sentenced him based on an erroneous career-offender offense level.

“We review *de novo*a district court’s conclusions about the scope of its legal authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).” A district court may modify a term of imprisonment in the case of a defendant who was sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that subsequently has been lowered by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Any reduction, however, must be “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The applicable policy statements, found in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, state that a reduction is not authorized if the amendment “does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range.” U.S.S.G. § lB1.10(a)(2)(B).

Upon careful review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we discern no reversible error. To the extent that Carthan challenges his career-offender offense level, such a challenge cannot prevail. “This Circuit has been very clear *882in holding that a sentencing adjustment undertaken pursuant to Section 3582(c)(2) does not constitute a de novo resentencing.” *United States v. Bravo,*203 F.3d 778, 781 (11th Cir.2000). Rather, in a § 3582(c)(2) resentencing, *“all*original sentencing determinations remain unchanged with the sole exception of the guideline range that has been amended since the original sentencing.” *Id.*Moreover, because Carthan was sentenced based on the career-offender offense level, the district court correctly found that he was not eligible for a sentence reduction. *See United States v. Moore,*541 F.3d 1323, 1330 (11th Cir.2008), *cert. denied, McFadden v. United States,*— U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 965, 173 L.Ed.2d 156 (2009), *and cert. denied,*— U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 1601, 173 L.Ed.2d 689 (2009) (holding that the district court does not have the authority to reduce the sentence of a defendant who was sentenced as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1). Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Transportation

###### Office of the Secretary

The following Agreements were filed with the Department of Transportation under the Sections 412 and 414 of the Federal Aviation Act, as amended (49 U.S.C. 1383 and 1384) and procedures governing proceedings to enforce these provisions. Answers may be filed within 21 days after the filing of the application.

*Docket Number:*                     DOT-OST-2009-0113.                

*Date Filed:*                     May 11, 2009.                

*Parties:*                     Members of the International Air Transport Association.                

*Subject:*                     CSC/31/Meet/005/09 dated April 8, 2009. Finally Adopted Resolutions: Resolution 623 and Recommended Practice 1630. Intended effective date: 1 October 2009.                

Renee V. Wright,

Program Manager, Docket Operations, Federal Register Liaison.

[FR Doc. E9-12576 Filed 5-28-09; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-9X-P
**EXHIBIT          32.2**

**CERTIFICATION          PURSUANT TO**

**18          U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

**AS          ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION          906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 **

|   | (1)       | The                    Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)                    or 15(d) of                    the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                                  |
|--------|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
|   | (2)  | The                    information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                    respects, the financial condition and result of operations of                    the                    Company. |

|         |                                                                                                      |                                      |
|--------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
|         |                                                                                                      |
|    |                                                                                                 |                                 |
|         | By:                                                                                             | /s/ David                L. Weinberg |
|         | David                  L. WeinbergChief                  Financial OfficerAugust                  2, 2005 |

----
[947 NE2d 153, 922 NYS2d 262]

#### In the Matter of Commissioner of Social Services, on Behalf of Maudlyn V.R., Respondent, v Paul C., Appellant.

Decided April 5, 2011

*847APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Barry A. Elisofon,*Brooklyn, for appellant.

*Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel,*New York City *(Julie Steiner*of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs, and the certified question not answered upon the ground it is unnecessary.

In this child support proceeding, the courts below correctly held that the Commissioner of Social Services was not required to prove that the award of public assistance to the mother was justified. The father suggested that he could bear the burden of proving that the mother had undisclosed resources available for support of the child, but failed to make an adequate offer of proof on this issue.

Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Cipaeick, Geapfeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur in memorandum.

*848On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.11 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.11), order affirmed, etc.
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2668 

To extend temporarily the suspension of duty on erasers of vulcanized rubber 

other than hard rubber or cellular rubber. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

NOVEMBER 2, 2009 

Mr. BURR introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to 

the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To extend temporarily the suspension of duty on erasers 

of vulcanized rubber other than hard rubber or cellular 

rubber. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. ERASERS OF VULCANIZED RUBBER OTHER 

4 THAN HARD RUBBER OR CELLULAR RUBBER. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Heading 9902.25.51 of the Har6 monized Tariff Schedule of the United States (relating to 

7 erasers of vulcanized rubber other than hard rubber or 

8 cellular rubber) is amended by striking the date in the 

9 effective period column and inserting ‘‘12/31/2011’’. 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2668 IS

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 

3 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

4 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-15-00249-CR

Juan Gonzalez a/k/a Juan Gonzales Sr., a/k/a Juan Gonzalez Sr.

v.

The State of Texas

On Appeal from the

445th District Court of Cameron County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 2014-DCR-1894-I

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be AFFIRMED. The Court 

orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

May 26, 2016
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

KATHY FUNTILA, AKA Kathy Retter, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20-10441 

D.C. No. 1:17-cr-00515-LEK-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

Leslie E. Kobayashi, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 12, 2022**

Before: SCHROEDER, R. NELSON, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Kathy Funtila appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying her

second motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we vacate and remand.

With respect to Funtila’s first motion for compassionate release, the district 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUL 19 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 20-10441 

court concluded that (1) Funtila had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, 

but that her failure to exhaust was excused because exhaustion would have been 

futile, and (2) Funtila had not shown extraordinary and compelling reasons for 

compassionate release under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. The court denied Funtila’s 

second compassionate release motion, which it described as “almost identical to 

her first motion,” because she had again failed to provide any extraordinary and 

compelling reasons. 

After the district court issued its orders, we decided United States v. Keller, 

2 F.4th 1278 (9th Cir. 2021) and United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 799 (9th Cir. 

2021). Because the district court did not have the benefit of these decisions when 

it reviewed Funtila’s motions, we vacate the district court’s orders and remand for 

the district court to reassess Funtila’s motion under the standards set forth in those 

opinions. 

We offer no view of the merits of Funtila’s request for compassionate 

release.

VACATED and REMANDED.
No. 738.

#### United States *v.*Kerr, Administratrix.

February 16, 1942.

Death of Elizabeth Kerr suggested and Citizens Loan & Trust Co., Administrator *de bonis non*of the estate of Joseph Kelly Kerr, deceased, substituted as the party respondent herein, per stipulation of counsel, on motion of *Solicitor General Fahy*in that behalf. See 314 U. S. 605.