* The Honorable Bobby R. Baldock, United States Circuit Judge for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 10-2758

___________ United States of America, *
* Plaintiff - Appellee, * Appeal from the United States * District Court of the v. * Western District of Missouri.
* Clifton D. Taylor, *
* Defendant - Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: April 11, 2011 Filed: August 30, 2011

___________ Before LOKEN, BALDOCK, * and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________ LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
Clifton D. Taylor entered the FDIC-insur ed Central Bank of Kansas City, slid a threatening note to a bank-teller, and exited the bank with $2,700 in hundred-dollar bills. Bank employees followed Taylor as he fled on foot, ab andoned the green cap and jacket he was wearing, and entered a store. They called the police, who arrested Taylor as he left the store. At Taylor’s bank robbery trial, the government presented video evidence of Taylor in the store and DNA evidence linking Taylor to the green hat found in a parked truck along with a l eather jacket and $2700 cash. Based on this1 The Honorable Ortrie D. Smith, United St ates District Judge for the Western District of Missouri. Pretrial motion rulings, including those at issue on appeal, were made initially by the Honorable Robert E. Larsen, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Missouri.

2 Appellate counsel argues that Magistrate Judge Larsen “missed” Taylor’s legitimate concern with Poindexter’s failure to move to suppress an incriminating statement Taylor made to FB I agents. After careful revi ew of the hearing transcript and Taylor’s pro se motions, we conclude Taylor e xpressed a desire to suppress only inadmissible “hearsay evidence,” not his ad mission. The record on appeal contains not the slightest hint that a motion to suppress the admission had merit.
-2- and other overwhelming evidence, a jury convicted Taylor of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Taylor appeals the conviction, arguing that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court 1 abused its discretion when it denied his repeated pretrial requests for new appointed counsel, which rendered involuntary his ultimate decision to waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and defend himself at trial. We affirm.

I.

Taylor was indicted and arraigned inApril 2009. Assistant Federal Public Defender Travis Poindexter wa s appointed to represent Taylor and moved to continue trial from the June docket. Ta ylor soon filed many extensive pro se motions, followed in June by a Motion for Ineffective Assist ance seeking the appointment of substitute counsel. Magistrate Judge Larsen held a hearing and asked Taylor why he was dissatisfied with attorney Poindexter. Tayl or complained that Poindexter had refused to file Taylor’s pro se motions “alleging Governmentmisconduct” and requesting a hearing “to challenge the reliability of w itness statements.” After a lengthy colloquy discussing these issues, Magistrate Judge Larsen concluded that a different lawyer would not have filed those motions. 2“So I’m not going to replace him because I don’t think he’s done anything or failed to do anything that reflects on the adequacy of the-3- representation.” Magistrate Judge Larsen explained that Taylor’s options were to continue to be represented by Poindexter, to retain substitu te counsel, or to represent himself with Poindexter likely serving as st andby counsel. Taylor’s response: “I want a change of venue.”

Taylor next filed a “criminal compla int” against Poindexter alleging due process violations and entrapment. He also filed numerous additional pro se motions, including one that Magistrate Judge Larsen interpreted as a motion to recuse. All were denied because Taylor was represen ted by counsel, but Magistrate Judge Larsen also explained why each motion was basele ss. In denying the motion to recuse, Magistrate Judge Larsen explained:

Defendant’s second reason . . . is esse ntially that I will not give him his own way. Defendant asked for a new attorney. I held a hearing on that motion and determined that Mr. Poindexter had done a satisfactory job of representing defendant and that no other attorney would have handled defendant’s issues differently. Refus ing to terminate an attorney and hire a new one to start all over, without any plausible grounds at all, does not provide justification for my recu sal. . . . There is no competent attorney who would do the things de fendant is requesting as they have no basis in law.

After this ruling, Taylor continued to file numerous pro se motions, including an August motion giving notice that his appointed counsel was making him insane. Attorney Poindexter filed a motion for ment al examination, which was granted. In October, Taylor was found co mpetent. He filed more pro se motions and again alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, pr ompting Magistrate Judge Larsen to hold another hearing on the repeated requests for appointment of new counsel. At the start of this hearing, Magistrate Judge Larsen asked Taylor, “tell me what it is that you’re complaining about here with regard to Mr. Poindexter.” Taylor replied:-4- “I don’t like him. He’s not worki ng in my best interest. He’s not arguing with the evidence. He hasn ’t filed one motion since I’ve been incarcerated. He doesn’t come to s ee me, he doesn’t talk about my case. And he’s like a dead-beat dad. And I don’t need him on my case. And it’s going to be a problem because I don’t want him on my case.

Taylor then lost control a nd was removed from the courtroom . Poindexter advised the court that Taylor had refused Poindexter’s recent attempts at contact. Returned to the courtroom, Taylor reiterated the meritless ev identiary motions he wanted Poindexter to file and asserted, “there’s just no way he ’s going to be working in my best interest because I requested that he be removed from the bar.” Magistrate Judge Larsen explained to Taylor the flaws in each of his motions. After a further exchange, Magistrate Judge Larsen informed Taylor he was not going to replace Poindexter, upon which Taylor stood up violently, overturni ng the counsel table, an action raising serious security issues that we re carefully resolved at trial.

Taylor continued to file ineffectiv e assistance motions asserting the same issues, which were denied without a hearing. Three weeks before the January 2010 trial, Taylor filed a motion to proceed pro se . Magistrate Judge Larsen held a hearing at which he advised Taylor regarding aspects of pretrial preparation and trial for which Taylor would become responsible, and exte nsively warned Taylor of the dangers of proceeding pro se . When Taylor persisted, Magi strate Judge Larsen found a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of Tayl or’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, relieved Poindexter as appointed couns el, and appointed Poindexter as standby counsel “to be available in the courtroom if we run into a problem.” When Taylor protested, “I want [Poindexter] out of my life,” Magistrate Judge Larsen directed that Poindexter “be available by phone,” not in the courtroom, “if that’s acceptable with Judge Smith, who makes the final decisions on these issues.”

At the start of trial, Judge Smith agai n cautioned Taylor about the disadvantages of representing himself and offered to have standby counsel Poindexter reappointed-5- as trial counsel. Taylor reaffirmed his wa iver of counsel and refused to have any assistance from Poindexter at trial.

II.

A motion for appointment of substitute counsel is committed to the district court’s sound discretion. United States v. Webster , 84 F.3d 1056, 1062 (8th Cir. 1996). Taylor argues the district court abusedits discretion in denying his repeated motions for appointment of new counsel. To prevail on this claim, Taylor must show “justifiable dissatisfaction” with attorn ey Poindexter, whic h “can arise from irreconcilable conflict, a complete breakdow n in communication, or any other factor interfering significantly with an attorney’s ability to provide zealous representation.” United States v. Boone , 437 F.3d 829, 839 (8th Cir. 2006). Given the importance of the attorney-client relationship, “[t]he court must conduct an adequate inquiry into the nature and extent of an alleged breakdown in attorney-client communications.” United States v. Barrow , 287 F.3d 733, 738 (8th Cir.), cert. denied , 537 U.S. 1024 (2002).

It is clear from this reco rd that the district cour t made a careful and thorough inquiry into Taylor’s repeated claims of justifiable dissatisfaction with appointed counsel Poindexter before denying Taylor’s requests fo r substitute counsel. “The defendant’s right to counsel . . . does not involve the right to a ‘meaningful relationship’ between an accused and his counsel.” United States v. Swinney , 970 F.2d 494, 499 (8th Cir. 1992), citing Morris v. Slappy , 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983). Thus, frustration with appointed couns el’s performance or disagreement with counsel’s tactical decisions is not justif iable dissatisfaction. “The proper focus in evaluating claims of dissatisfaction with counsel is on the quality of advocacy.” United States v. Exson , 328 F.3d 456, 460 (8th Cir.) (c itation omitted), cert. denied , 540 U.S. 1011 (2003). After careful review of the record, we agree with Magistrate Judge Larsen that Taylor failed to show that attorney Poindexter was unprepared, was-6- unable or unwilling to continue representing Taylor, or had failed to take actions on Taylor’s behalf that would cause “justif iable dissatisfaction” with the quality of Poindexter’s advocacy.

By the time Magistrate Judge Larsen gr anted Taylor’s request to represent himself at trial, it was obvious there wa s “a complete breakdown in communication” between attorney and client. For months , Taylor had refused all contact with a competent appointed attorney. He filed a “criminal complaint” against counsel, demanded a “change of venue,” and employed every other t actic he could think of to coerce the court into appointing a new c ounsel with whom, the court reasonably concluded, Taylor was unlikel y to have any better relati ons. Is this a variety of “justifiable dissatisfaction” requiring us to conclude the district court abused its discretion? This court, and others, have sensibly declinedto do so. Taylor “was not entitled to new counsel if his refusal to cooperate with [Poinde xter] was simply a ‘stonewalling effort to select counsel of his own choice.’” Hunter v. Delo , 62 F.3d 271, 275 (8th Cir. 1995), quoting United States v. Horon , 845 F.2d 1414, 1418 (7th Cir. 1988); accordUnited States v. Simpson , 645 F.3d 300, ___ (5th Cir. 2011). Properly viewed, this was not a breakdow n of communication requiring appointment of new counsel, only an unwillingness on Taylor’s part to communicate with appointed counsel. See United States v. Anderson , 570 F.3d 1025, 1032 (8th Cir. 2009), and cases cited. The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to grant Taylor’s requests for new counsel. See Exson , 328 F.3d at 460-61.

Taylor further argues that his waiver of counsel was involuntary because the district court refused to grant him substitu te counsel. A defendant’s right to counsel includes the right to conduct his own defense. Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). But the court must “assure itself th at the waiver of the right to appointed counsel is knowing and voluntary. ” United States v. Mentzos , 462 F.3d 830, 838 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied , 549 U.S. 1359 (2007). A waiver is involuntary if the defendant is offered the “Hobson’s choice” of proceeding to trial with unprepared3 Taylor also rejected Poindexter’s se rvices as standby counsel at trial and unwisely called Poindexter as a witness, attempting to show that Poindexter had conspired with the prosecution in gather ing incriminating DNA evidence. But this was Taylor’s choice. “The re is no constitutional right to hybrid representation.” United States v. Einfeldt , 138 F.3d 373, 378 (8th Cir.), cert. denied , 517 U.S. 1174 (1996); see generally McKaskle v. Wiggins , 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
-7- counsel or no counsel at all. See Gilbert v. Lockhart , 930 F.2d 1356, 1360 (8th Cir. 1991). “However, if defendant’s counsel is competent and defendant cannot establish good cause entitling him to appointment of new counsel, his waiver will be deemed voluntary.” United States v. Taylor , 183 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 528 U.S. 904 (1999). “[A] persistent, unreas onable demand for dismissal of counsel and appointment of new counsel . . . is the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel. In such an in stance, the trial court may proceed to trial with the defendant representing hi mself.” United States v. Moore , 706 F.2d 538, 540 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 464 U.S. 859 (1983); accordMeyer v. Sargent , 854 F.2d 1110, 1114 (8th Cir. 1988). The district court pr operly cautioned Taylor as to the dangers of self-representation. In these circum stances, his waiver of counsel was valid. 3

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. We deny Taylor’s pro se motion claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

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