1 Filed 12/18/13 In re J.O. CA1/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re J.O., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. J.O., Defendant and Appellant. A137895
(Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J0300300)

After minor J.O. pleaded no contest to allegations that he committed felony grand theft, misdemeanor assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury, and misdemeanor battery, the juvenile court plac ed him on probation in the custody of the probation department. In addition to many standard terms and conditions of probation, the court also imposed gang-related pr obation conditions. J.O. challenges the gang-related conditions, contending the court abused its discretion in imposing them
because there was insufficient evidence of his gang involveme nt. We disagree, and we
affirm.2 BACKGROUND 1 On October 28, 2012, 17-year-old J.O. and a companion were at the Richmond BART station when they spotted a woman ex iting the station. After following her across the street and down the block, J.O. approach ed her and attempted to grab her cell phone. When she resisted, he threw her to the ground, snatched the phone, and ran off laughing.
The woman contacted her husband and, using a GPS application, they tracked her phone to the Hilltop Mall. They we nt to the mall, where the woman spotted J.O., recognizing
him as the assailant. When they confronted him, he took off running. The victim’s husband tackled him from behind, and while J.O. was pinned down, he punched and
kicked the husband in the h ead and bit him on his thigh. Mall security arrived and detained J.O. until the police responded, wher eupon J.O. was arrested and detained at juvenile hall. J.O. later admitted that he had smoked marijuana befo re the incident and
was still under the influence of it at the time of the robbery. 2 On October 30, 2012, the di strict attorney filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleging two felony count s against J.O.: second degree robbery (count 1; Pen. Code, § 211/212.5, subd. (c)), and assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury (count 2; Pe n. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)). On November 16, 2012, pursua nt to a negotiated dispositi on, the district attorney amended the petition to add three additional co unts: felony grand theft (count 3; Pen. Code, § 487); misdemeanor assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury (count 4; Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)); an d misdemeanor battery (count 5; Pen. Code,

1 Because J.O. pleaded no contest prior to an evidentiary hearing, we derive the background facts from the reports of the police and probation departments.

2 At the time of his arrest, J.O. was a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 dependent of Contra Costa County. The De partment of Children and Family Services had removed him from his parents’ care in 2003 due to physical abuse inflicted by his father. He lived with an aunt until 2007, when his behavior es calated to the point that she was unable to care for him. He was placed in a group home in Davis and later transferred to a home in Richmond, where he resided at the time of his arrest. Although J.O. reportedly saw his father weekly, neither his mother nor his father was actively involved in his case plan or made an y reunification efforts.3 § 242, subd. (a)). J.O. pleaded no contest to counts 3 through 5, the court sustained those counts, and the first two counts were dismissed. On December 5, 2012, the probation department submitted its recommendation report to the court. It advised that J.O. had a prior referral for attempted robbery, possession of a weapon on school grounds, a nd brandishing a replica firearm, although no petition was filed after that arrest. A dditionally, the “Juvenile Assessment and Intervention System” had classified J.O. as having a high risk level for reoffending. He was on “level three” behavior status at juvenile hall, where he had been detained since his arrest. According to hall sta ff, he often refused to go to school and would not follow directions. He had also received consequences such as room restrictions and “meal trays” for instances of talking on silence, not foll owing directions, refusi ng to attend school, school kick-outs, and staff manipulations. According to the probation department, J.O.
would benefit from a limit se tting supervision strategy. As particularly relevant here, the proba tion department also informed the court:
“J.O. has known most of his friends for two years and believes some of them are either on probation or in trouble with the law, but believes none of his friends associate with any gang. J.O. denied any ga ng association of his own; however, Juvenile Hall records
indicate the minor claims a Central Richmond gang membership.” And while in juvenile hall pending disposition of this case, J.O. was placed in “Conf lict Resolution Needed”
status after an altercation with another resident who said so mething negative about
“Central Richmond.” In terms of disposition, the probation department recommended placement in a
home or institution. It also recommende d, among other proba tion conditions, four prohibitions against gang-related activities. According to th e department, those restrictions were necessary “to discourage fu rther relationship or association with gang activities, gang members, negative influences that may jeopardize his rehabilitation, and ensure the protection of the community.” On December 5, the matter came on for dis position. At the outset of the hearing,
counsel for J.O. indicated he would subm it on the placement recommendation, but he4 objected to the gang-related probation conditions . As he explained it, “I don’t think that the offense, underlying offense in the petition involved gang activity at all. There are no gang allegations made in the petition and ap parently it was an alleged robbery charged initially. [¶] There was a co-resp onsible but there doesn’t seem to be anything to indicate it was gang related at all, and J.O. has denied any gang association or membership.” The deputy district attorney responded that “[t]he disposition re port notes that in Juvenile Hall the minor has claimed Central Richmond ga ng affiliation. [¶] Accordingly, it is appropriate in rehabilitation to impose the terms that the pr obation department has laid out. We are in juvenile court and the issue in juvenile court is the rehabilitation of the minor. The Court may impose rehabilitative pr obation conditions so long as the Court finds that they are appropriate to rehabilitate the minor.” After discussion of additional probation co nditions that are not at issue here, the court adjudged J.O. a ward of the court w ith no termination date and terminated his dependency wardship. He was ordered deta ined in juvenile hall pending placement by the probation department in a court-approved home or institution, with a likely date of returning home of December 5, 2013. Th e court also imposed numerous terms and conditions of probation, includ ing the gang-related conditions disputed here. These were detailed in a “Supplemental Minute Order Gang Conditions” as follows: “You shall not participate in any gang activ ity and shall not visit or remain in any specific location known to you to be, or that the Probation Officer informs you to be, an area of gang-related activity. “You shall not knowingly po ssess, display or wear any insignia, clothing, logos, emblems, badges or buttons, or display any gang signs or gestur es that you know to be, or
that the Probation Officer info rms you to be, gang related. “You shall not obtain any new tattoos that you know to be, or that the Probation Officer informs you to be, gang related. “You shall not post, display or transmit on or through your cell phone any symbols or information that you know to be, or the Probation Officer informs you to be, gang
related.5 “For the purposes of these probati on conditions, the words ‘gang’ and ‘gang-related’ means [ sic ] a ‘criminal street gang’ as defined in Penal Code Section 186.22 subdivision (f).” J.O. was ultimately placed at the Childre n’s Home of Stockton, and this timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION J.O. asserts one argument on appeal: that the court erred in imposing the gang-related probation conditions. This is so, he contends, because his offenses were not related to gang activities and there was insu fficient evidence establishing that he associated with a gang. We review a j uvenile court’s imposition of probation conditions for an abuse of discretion. ( People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234; In re Christopher M. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 684, 692.) In the absence of manifest abuse, we must affirm. ( Id. at p. 692.) We conclude th ere was no manifest abuse here.
Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Co de section 730, subd ivision (b), when a juvenile court places a minor in the custody of the probation depa rtment, it “may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehab ilitation of the ward
enhanced.” “ ‘A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it “(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offe nder was convicted, (2) relates to conduct
which is not in itself criminal , and (3) requires or forbids co nduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality.” ’ ” ( In re R.V. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 239, 246; see also
In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1 077, 1084 [“ ‘a conditio n of probation which requires or forbids conduct which is not itsel f criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the crime of which th e defendant was convic ted or to future criminality’ ”]; In re Bernardino S. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 613 , 622 [“A valid condition must either bear a relationship to the crim e of which the offender was convicted or be reasonably related to the avoidanc e of future criminality.”].)
The court In re Laylah K. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1496 ( Laylah K. ) considered an argument similar to that made by J.O., and we find the holding instructive here. In6 Laylah K. , two minor sisters and two other girls (including one gang member) accosted a woman walking her dog, demanding to know why she was wearing red clothing, shouting obscenities, and assaulting her. ( Id. at p. 1499.) One sister admitted allegations of fighting or challenging to fight in a public place and provid ing false identification to a police officer, while the other admitted using o ffensive words likely to incite violence. The juvenile court declared them wards of the court, placed them on probation, and ordered them to comply with certain term s and conditions, including a prohibition against associating with known members of a particular gang. ( Ibid. ) On appeal, the sisters argued that the co ndition was not reasonably related to their crimes or their rehabilitation. ( Laylah K., supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 1500.) According to them, there was no evidence they were members of a gang. The only evidence suggesting that their offenses had a gang conn ection was, they claime d, the reference to the victim’s red clothing, but the statement by the probation department that this indicated “gang overtones” was merely specula tive, as was an aunt’s representation that they were associating with gangs. ( Ibid .) The Court of Appeal rejected their claims. ( Id. at pp. 1501–1503.) It noted that the sister s’ history reflected “i ncreasingly undirected behavior”: they were runaways and beyond their parents’ control, and one sister had stopped attending school because of pressure there to join a gang, while the other sister was often truant and frequently got into fights when she did attend school. ( Id. at p. 1501.) According to the co urt, they were both “clearly in danger of succumbing to gang pressures.” And, the court continued, where it was concerned that the minor was in danger of falling under the influence of a st reet gang, “an order directing a minor to refrain from gang association is a reasonabl e preventive measure in avoiding future criminality and setting the minor on a productive course.” ( Id. at p. 1502.) Here, as in Laylah K. , the record demonstrates th at the gang-related probation conditions were a reasonable preventive measur e aimed at avoiding future criminality. Most obviously, according to J. O.’s juvenile hall records, he claimed membership in the Central Richmond gang. While that alone would support imposition of the disputed conditions, there was more eviden ce suggesting that J.O. had a gang affiliation: while in7 the hall, he was involved in a conflict with another inmate who made negative comments
about “Central Richmond.” Moreover, the primary goal of juvenile pr obation is rehabilitation of the minor. ( In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 81, ove rruled on other grounds in In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128.) The pr obation report classified J.O. as having a high risk level for reoffending. He did not appear to be remorseful for his actions, minimizing his involvement in the offense and attempting to place the blame on his accomplice. As described by the probation officer, “The minor’s actions in the offense suggest a lack of strong decision making skills and it appears the minor does not fully understand the consequences for his behavior nor accept re sponsibility for his actions as demonstrated by minimizing involvement.” And, the incide nt resulting in the petition was not J.O.’s first contact with the law. In February 2012—only six months before the cell phone theft—J.O. was arrested for brandishing a fi rearm, possession of a weapon on school grounds, and attempted robbery. His next offense—the theft of the cell phone—involved
violence directed at both the initial victim an d her husband. That this second incident involved violence suggests an escalation in criminality. Given these circumstances, the juvenile court could reasonably have concluded that the gang restrictions were necessary to prevent future criminality an d enhance J.O.’s rehabilitation. J.O. seeks to distinguish Laylah K. , claiming it “has barely any semblance to this case and cannot be seen as governing the resu lt here.” This is so, he argues, because
there the minors’ “criminal conduct was over tly gang related and their social life was heavily infused with associati ons to members of the Crips, a well established criminal street gang.” J.O. is wrong for two reasons. First, the evidence of gang association here was arguably stronger than in Laylah K. According to the probation report, J.O. claimed membership in a str eet gang, while in Laylah K. , the minors did not purport to be gang members but were merely associa ting with other gang members. Second, to be sure, there ar e cases in which th e evidence of gang association that justified imposition of the no- gang-contact probation conditio n was more substantial. (See, e.g., In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1 134-1135 [minor was wearing8 gang clothing at the time of his arrest, ha d gang references on his cell phone, had two tattoos, and told the police that he had been “norte” for two years]; People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 6 22 [defendant was a self-a dmitted gang member, claimed Norteño, and had two “XIV” tattoos].) But this does not, as J.O. would have it, mean that “a far higher evidentiary showing of gang in volvement or association is required to sustain the imposition of gang pr obation conditions.” Rather, as noted above, a probation condition may be imposed where it relates to the offense committed or is reasonably related to the prevention of future criminality. ( In re R.V., supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 246; In re Babak, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 1084.) And given the circumstances here, the juvenile court was within its discre tion in concluding that the gang restrictions
satisfied these criteria.
J.O. submits that his case is “far closer” to People v. Brandão (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 568 ( Brandão ). We disagree. In Brandão , defendant was arrested after a police officer determined that the registra tion of the car he was driving was expired despite that the car bore a seemingly valid re gistration sticker. Defendant was ultimately charged with displaying the invalid sticker, operating an unr egistered vehicle, possession of marijuana and methamphetamines, and violating probation. ( Id. at p. 571.) He was granted probation, a condition of which required that he “[n]ot associate with any individuals you know or are told by the Pr obation Officer to be gang members . . . .” ( Ibid .) On appeal, defendant claimed that th e trial court erred in imposing the no-gang-contact probation condition. ( Brandão, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 570.) The Court of Appeal agreed. It rejected the trial court’s justification that imposing the condition would help forestall th e risk of future criminal be havior, stating, “What the law authorizes, however, are probation conditions that, if not tied to the crime or crimes adjudicated in the current proceeding and not intended to restrict noncriminal behavior,
are conditions “ ‘ reasonably related to . . . future crim inality.’ ” [Citation.] When a probation condition ‘lack[s] any reasonable nexus to . . . pres ent or future criminality’ [citation], there is ‘no reasona ble basis for sustaining [the] condition’ [citation].” ( Id. at9 p. 574.) The court further explained: “N ot every probation cond ition bearing a remote, attenuated, tangential, or diaphanous conn ection to future crim inal conduct can be
considered reasonable. Because it is undi sputed that the no-gang-contact probation condition imposed here involves noncriminal conduct and has no connection to the crime of which defendant was convicted, we must decide whether the condition is reasonably related to a risk that defendant will reoffend.” ( Ibid. ) It then found no ties between defendant and any criminal street gang, no su ch ties involving any member of his family, and no criminal history showing or strongly suggesti ng a gang tie. ( Id. at p. 576.) As such, it concluded the no-gang-contact condition was erroneously imposed. ( Ibid. ) J.O. urges us to follow Brandão , contending that the probation report’s “oblique remark” that, according to his juvenile hall records, he claimed membership in the Central Richmond gang was the only “attenuated statement” distinguishing his case from
Brandão . That one factor, he argues, is “insu fficient to support th e probation conditions
as there is no substantive evid ence that J.O. ever engaged in criminal activity through association with a gang . . . . Clearly, there is no nexus between this allege[d] gang affiliation and J.O.’s adjudicated conduct, and the single reference is too thin a reed on which to predicate future criminal ity.” His argument is unavailing. As a preliminary matter, Brandão involved an adult defend ant, not a juvenile. This distinction is significant because the court is afforded greater leeway in imposing probation conditions on minors than adults. ( In re Todd L. (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 14, 19 [“special purposes of the Juvenile Court Law” can render a probation condition that would be impermissible for an adult reasona ble for a juvenile].) As the California Supreme Court has explained: “The juve nile court’s broad discretion to fashion appropriate conditions of proba tion is distinguishable from that exercised by an adult court when sentencing an adult offender to probation. Althou gh the goal of both types of probation is the rehabilitation of the offender , ‘[j]uvenile probation is not, as with an adult, an act of leniency in lieu of statutory punishment; it is an ingredient of a final order
for the minor’s reformation and rehabilitation .’ [Citation.] . . . [¶] In light of this difference, a condition of proba tion that would be unconstitutional or otherwise improper10 for an adult probationer may be permissibl e for a minor under the supervision of the juvenile court. [Citations.] ‘ “Even conditions which infri nge on constitutional rights may not be invalid if tailored specifically to me et the needs of the juvenile [citation].” ’ [Citations.]” ( In re Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 81–82.)
Brandão is also distinguishable in that there was no evid ence whatsoever of any gang involvement. Here, J. O.’s juvenile hall record indicated that he claimed membership in the Central Richmond gang, and he was involved in an altercation with
another resident who insulted “Central Richmond .” While J.O. submits this is “too thin a reed on which to predicate futu re criminality,” the juvenile court was within its discretion to disagree. Lastly, J.O. argues there was no evidence establishing that “Central Richmond” was a criminal street gang. The only reason able inference of the probation department’s notation that J.O. claimed membership in “C entral Richmond” and that he was involved in a conflict when another individual spok e negatively about “Cen tral Richmond” was
that “Central Richmond” was a criminal stre et gang as defined in Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (f). No ot her evidence was needed.
DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

_ ____________ ____________ Richman, J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ Kline, P.J.

_____________ ____________ Haerle, J.