.

Hon. A. C. Winborn

District Attorney HaPrls County Civil Courts Building Houston 2, Texas

Dear Sir: Attention: Mr. Robert R. Casey. OpinionNo. O-7159 Re: Is it mandatory for citationby publication to be returned to a term of court in tax suits inHarrls County in citationby publicatl.on under Article 7345b? And related questions.

You request the opinion of thisDepartment upon the questions contained in your letter,which we quote in part below:

“Thepresent statutes coveringdelinquent taxes,
as set forth in ChapterX, Title 122 of the Revised Statutes of the State of Texas, are, to say the least, very confusing. It Is difficult to determine under which of the various provisions of these statutes suits may bB brought and property redeemed after tax sales.

“Wedesire to submit these various statutes to your office for a ruling interpretingthe same, and respectfully request that the various questivns be answered.

‘IArtIcle

7330 provides that the Sheriff shallmake
a deed or deeds to the purchaser In all cases Inwhich lands have been sold or may be sold for default In the payment of taxes.
“( 1) Question: Does this statute limit the executions to be leviedunder tax sales to be made by sheriffs only,
or may a constable levg an execiatlon under a valid tax suit and execute the deeds provided for therein?

9,

. . . . . . “(2) Question: We desire an explanationandI-Ion,

A. C.Winborn, page 2 o-7159

interpretationof these several statutes,and request that you adviseus underwhich of these variousprovisionswe shouldproceed to permit redemptions to be made.
II

. . . . . . "(3) Question: InHarris Countywhere we have continuous terms of Courtwhich run from January to July and from July to January, is it mandatory that our cltations by publicationbe returnable to the next term of Court?
"(

4) Questlon: Does the citationby publication Issuedunder the suitby the Cityunder the provisions of Subdivisiond, Section III,Article 7345b make It necessary that these notices show the amount of the taxesdue the State and County? "(5) Question: What Is the effect of the failure of the notice to so show the amount of the taxesdue the State and Countyunder Its Intervention In the suit fliedby the City? "(6) Question: What 1s the effect of the judgment renderedby the Court in favor of the State and County's claim for taxes where the property has been sold to a privatepurchaser at the foreclosure tax sale?

"Article734513,

SectionX, as amendedby the 47th Legislature of 1941, states: 'Thepurchaser of property sold for taxes In such foreclosure suit shall take title free and clear of all liens for ad valorem taxes against suchpropertydelinquent at the time of judgment in said suit to any taxingunit which was a party to such suit
orwhich had been served citation In said suit, as required by this Act.'

"(7) Question: Does this act mean that If the State and County have failed to interven.e In a pending tax suit that In the event judgment for foreclosure Is rendered in such tax suit and the property sold at tax sale, the State and Countywould lose Its right to the tax liens heretofore existingagainst said property?"

We answer your questions 'inthe order presented.
~(1) Under Article 7330, V.R.C.S., the sheriff Is the only officer authorized to executea deed, hence It follows that he onlymay serve the execution In tax foreclosure sales.Hon. A.C. Winborn, page 3 O-7159

(2) Your secondquestion raises the construction to be placedupon various statutesmentioned by you as to the rights of redemptionby the tax debtor or others having an interest inthe land foreclosedupon. (Articles7340 - 7345b Section 9.Article 7345b, Section 12; and Articles 7283, 7284 and 7284bj

We think most of the confusion that arisesupon this question may be dispelled by the simple statement thatsince the enactment of Art. 7345b, the provisions of this statute govern as to the method of redemption,with the possible exception of a suitwhere there Is only one taxingunit and no other taxingunit has a claim for delinquent taxes. This exception, however, If It exists need not require further attention here for we do not conceive It to be Involved In your request. The rule is thus stated In the case of City of El Paso v. Fort1 (S.Ct.) 181 S.W. (2d) 579:

"It Is not necessar t forus to decide lnthls case whether or not Article 73 5b, Section 12,~~repealed and made wholly inoperativeArticle 7340 or any other article relating to redemption from tax foreclosures. It might be held in cases where only one taxingunit Is a party and no other taxingunit has a claim for delinquent taxes that such articles are still In effect but that they do not operate in a case broughtunder 73&jb,but we~do not pass on that question. Article 7345b prescribes a method of redemption in all cases broughtunder that articleunder which, If one taxingunit bids In the property, it takes
same as trustee for the other taxingunits In whose favor judgmentran In the foreclosure suit. Until Article 7345b
was enacted a suit like the instant one, In which all taxing units became partles,was unauthorized. Prior to Its enactment there were various statuteswith reference to redemptlon. For example, these articlesmay be cited: Articles 1065, 7284a and 7340,Vernon's Clv. St., each being applicable In the character of suit towhich it related. Their provisionsvariedwidely. It seems clear to us thatwhen the Legislature enacted 7345b,whereby all taxingunits could be joined. In oneunit and the propertybid In by one suchunit for the benefit of all, and prescrlblng the termsupon which samemight be redeemed, it intended that those terms should govern In all cases of redemption In that character of sult regardless ofwho became the purchaser at the sale. The confusionwhich would result from a contrary holding In a case like the instant one, Is obvious. To determine the amount to be paid to the variousunits, If possible to do so,when under the statutesabove cited different terms
were prescribedwould bring Into play some highly Involved.

Hon. A. C. Wlnborn, page 4 o-7159

computations. We cannot ascribe to the Legislature the intent to create confusionwhen Its evidentpurposewas simplificationand clarity,”

It Is, therefore, our conclusion thatunder all the conditionspresentedby you, redemption shouldbe under the terms ofArt. 7345b, regardless of whether a private individual becomes the purchaser or one of the taxingunits for the benefit of all, and this regardless ofwhether the redemption is by the owner, his assigness, or anyonemerely having an interest therein,
or their heirs or assigns or legal representatives.

We come now to your third question,which frankly has given us no small concern,because of the provisions of Sec. 3, Subdivisiond of Art. 7345b, requlrlng citationby publication to be returned to the first day of the next term of court In which the suit Is filed.

The third paragraph of S.B. No. 271,Acts of the 46th Legislature, page 184,which created the 127thDistrict Court of Harris Cauntg, provides:

"There shallbe two terms of each of said six cfvll district courts InHarris County In eachyear, and the first term shallbe known as the January-June term, shall begin on the first Monday In January, and shall continue until and Including Sunday next before the first Monday In July; and the second term shallbe known as the JulyDecember term, shallbegin on the first Monday In July and shall continueuntil and IncludingSunday next before the first Monday In the followingJanuary."

This is merely a restatement of the law with respect to terms of the civil district courts ofHarris County,which has persisted since the enactment ofwhat is commonly referred to as the Special PracticeAct, first enacted in 1923, and applicable to Harris and some otherdereleg populated counties in the same classification, Every dlstrlct court, In order to conform to Art, 5, Sec. 7, of the Constltutlon,must have at least two terms of court each gear. After providing for two terms of court as above stated, thus conforming to the Constitution,these terms of court had little further slgnlficance In the scheme of the Special PracticeAct applicable to Harris County. The Special PracticeActwas codlfled as Art. 2092,V.R.C.S., and was last amendedby the 46th Legislature, H.B. No. 1074, General Laws of that session,page 205, with
no significantchanges Insofar as the problem presentlybefore
us is concerned.

Article 2092 provides:Hon. A. C.Winborn, page 5 o-7159

"The following rules of practice and procedure shall govern and be followed In the civil district courts. s
. a in all clvll litigation in ccuntles having five or more dls??%trts with either civil or crln$nal jurlsdlctlon
or both clvll and criminal jurisdiction.

Harris County has five or more district courtswith civil jurlsdiction, hence operatedunder the provislons of Art. 2092. Certainly suits for delinquent taxeswould come under "allcivil lltlgatlon."

Section 6, Art. 2092, provided:

"Citationby Publication. If citation Is to be served by publication it shall be returnable forty-two (42)days after the date of issue and shall command the defendant to appear at or before ten o'clock a.m. of the Monday next following the expirationof forty-two (42)days after the citationwas Issued, and shall specify the day of the week, the day of the month and the time of day the defendant Is required to appear and answer, and shall be servedby being published in the manner and for the length of time reouired by law for cltatlonsby ntbllcatlon In the same kind of
cases or matters in otherDlstrlct Courts at the time the publication Is made and the first publication shall be at least twenty-eight (28) days before the returnday of the citation."

The rules of practice and procedureprovidedby Art. 2092,V.R.C.S., prevailed In Harrls County and other counties In the same general classiflcatlonuntil repealedwith minor exceptions,not Importanthere, by the rules of civil procedure, which became effective Sept. 1, 1941. Up to this date the foregoing quoted Section 6, Art.'2092, constituted the basis for service of citation In tax suits in Harris County by publication.

We therefore say that Art. 7345b, Subset. d of Sec.;3, construed In connectionwith Sec. 6, Art. 2092, constituteda le al basis for citationby publication In tax suitsunder Art. 73 5b, without requiring the return to be made to the first day & of the next term of court, so long as Harris County operated under the Special PracticeAct.

At this point we deem It helpful to consider the general scope of Art. 2092, the Special PracticeAct, and we shall not be able to state It more comprehensively than was done by Judge Cody in the case of Walker Avenue Realty Co. v. Alaskan

fir co., 123 S.W. (2d) 999, fromwhich we quote:

(1

. . .The court below is ruled In its practiceHon. A. C. Wlnborn, page 6 o-7159

and procedureby the special practice act, Article 2092, R.S. 1925,Vernon's Ann. Clv. St. art. 2092.

"Thecare and skillwith which Articles 2092 and 2093 -- component parts of the same enactment -- are drawn Iswhat Is to be desired, rather than expected, in this type of legislature. The purpose of the enactment was to adjust the practice and procedure lh the civildistrict courts of certain of the populous counties to dispose of their continuous litigation,without lnterfering In any way with the practice and procedure of the other courts of the State. The validity of this special practice act, as a proper exerciseby the Legislature of Its power to classify subjects,was upheld by our Supreme Court In PhilH. Pierce Co. v. Watkins, 114 Tex. 153, 263 S.W. 905. For the purpose of the practice and procedure establishedby Art. 2092, the clvil~dlstr~ct courts of Harris County (end of the other countieswhich
are ruled by the statute) fDrm a separateand distinct class of courts from the other courts of the State; and such courts are placed In a class separateand distinct from that to which other courts of record (of the first instance)belong, for the avowed purpose of making It possible for the rules of practiceand procedurewhich are applied in them, and which are inconsistentwith the rules that are applied to other courts, to co-existwith such other rules, and yet not be In conflict. It Is perfectly clear that even though the rules bf practice and procedure establishedby Art. 2092 are different from and inconsistentwith the rules establishedto regulate the practice and procedure In other courts of the State, these two separate sets of rules do not conflict. And this, simplybecause such
courts as the civil district courts of Harris County have been formed into a~separateclass,wherein, by
reason of Art. 2093, 'Alllnconslstent laws and rules of practice and procedure shallbe inoperative in the civil district courts of the class Includedwithin this chapter (I.e.Chapter 6, Title 42), but shallnot be affected~by this law in so far as they relate to other district courts.* * *I ('All Inconsistent laws and rules', etc., include future as well as existent lnconsistent laws and rules.)"

In brief, what we now say consistentwith Judge Cody's opinion from which we have just quoted Is thatArt. 2092 Constituted a complete and harmonious system of procedure in Harrls County and other counties of the same classification, the provisions of which constituted the procedure In such counties to the exclusion of any conflicting or inconsistent laws applicableHon. A. C.Winborn, page 7 o-7159

to other courts In general. This applied to tax suits as well
as other civil suits in general. It matters not how confllctlng or inconsistent such other statutes~ or parts thereof may be with Art. 2092, theywere simply Inoperativeunder Art. 2092; said article provided Its own procedure applicable to Harris County In tax suits eswell as other clvll suits.

We now come to the crucial questlon in our problem, whether or not the rules of civil procedure,which repealed all of Art. 2092 except Sec. 18, Assignment Clerk, and Sec. 23, Judge Disqualified, require a different conclusion and constwction In tax suits in'HarrisCounty than prevailedunder Art. 2092, the Special PracticeAct. Rule No. 2 of the present rules of procedure In civil actions,pronmlgatedby the Supreme Court of Texas, in part reeds as follows:

"All statutes in effect Immediatelyprior to Sept. 1, 1941,prescribing rules of procedure in tax suits, are hereby continued in effect es rules of procedure governing such cases, but where such statutesprescribeno rules of procedure in such cases, these rules apply."

We are constralned to the view that Immediatelyprior to Sept.1, 1941, the rule of procedure In tax suits In Harris County, in regard to citationby publication,was as firmly fixed. by Sec. 6 of Art. 2092, when construed in connectionwith Subsectiond of Sec. 3, Art. 7345b, es any other rules of procedurewith respect to tax suits,and these statutesconstltuted an exclusivebasls of procedure in tax suitswhere citation by publicationwas required,and by force of the above quoted portion of Rule 2 continued In effect as rules of procedure governing such cases in Harris County. To hold otherwlse would In our view be in effect to say that Immediatelyprior to Sept. 1, 1941, Harris Countydid not have~~eny rules of procedure in tax suitsunder Art. 2092, except as might be-~provlded by general statutes outside the scope of said article, and this
we think is not the case. Subdivision 19 of the Special PracticeAct as originally enactedprovided "All Inconsistent laws and rules of practice end procedure shallbe Inoperative ln the CivilDistrict Courts of the class includedwithin this act.'

Language simller to this has been employed in subsequent amendments to the,ect, the latestbeing Art. 2093 (Acts 1939, 46th Leg., page 205, Sec. 1) which reads es follows,:

"All Inconsistentlaws and rules of practice and procedure shallbe lnoperatlve In the clvll district courts of the class Includedwlthln this chapter,but shall not be affectedby this 1aw"lnsofaras they relate to otherdlstrlct courts. ~11 laws and rules of practice end procedureHon. A.C. Wlnborn, page 8 o-7159

provided for other district courts shall continue In effect end operateend be observed In the civil dlstrlct courts of the class coveredby this law."

We feel justified In concluding that Sec. 6 of Art. 2092, construed In connectionwith Art. 7345b, Subset.d, Sec. 3, and Rule 2 of the rules of civil procedure,constitute a sufflclentbesls for citationby publicationunder said article without requiring the citation to be returned tothefirst day of the next term of court. To hold otherwisewe would be compelled to say that citationby publication,as provided In Subsec.d, Sec. 3, Art. 7345b,would require citation to be returned to the first day of the next term of court, that Is; either to the first Monday in January or the firstMonday In July, and would render the collection ofdelinquent taxesby suit,where serviceby publicationwas necessary, confusing,and would defeat the verypurpose of the act,which is to expedite suits for dellnquent taxes, as is made clear by Sec. 11 of Art. 7345b, which provides:

"Suits for delinquent taxes shall have precedence end priority In the dlstrlct courts of this State, and In the appellate courts thereof."

We cannot see any cogent reasonwhy we shouldnot give the same effect to what we conceive to be the statutes governing citationby publication in tax suitsunder Art: 2092, applicable to Harris County and other densely populated counties in the same classification,that would be given to any other statute with respect to tax suits under the above quoted portion ofRule 2, which continued In effect the statutesgoverning tax suits In existenceSept~.1, 1941,at which time Sec. 6 was under the terms of Art. 2092 applicable to tax suits es well as other civil suits In general. It Is not so much a question of repeal
as It Is that the rules continue all statutes in effect immedlately prior to Sept. 1, 1941, prescribingrules of procedure in tax suits, and to this ext-ent we think these statutes continue In effect as rules of procedure In tax suits inHarris County and other counties in the same classiflcatlon.

The purpose of the present rules of civil procedure
was to simplify end expedite litigation,and not to retard or prolong It. It Is slgniflcentthat the rules have definitely sought to get away from terms of court as the objective to which process shouldbe returned, and we shouldnot reach any conclusion contrary to this wholesome purpose of the rulesunless compelled to do so. The Special PracticeAct, Articles 2092 and 2093,V.R.C.S,, end the presentRules of Civil Procedure

are remedial in nature. They are, therefore, entitled to a liberal construction end appllcetlon In order properly to effect-Hon. A. C.Wlnborn, page 9 o-7159

uate the legislative Intent to simplify end expedite court procedure thereunder. Indeed the Rules of Civil Proceduredeclare that the rules are to be liberallyconstrued. See Rule No. 1. As applied to the problem here considered,we think strict constructionmust yield to the evident spirit end purpose of the statute and Rules of Civil Procedurewhen this is necessary to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Absurb and unjust resultswould follow to say that since the adoption of the rules of civil procedureHarris County and otherdensely populated counties in the same classificationare relegated to having process returned in tax suits,when citation by publlcation is necessary, to a term of court, e procedure abandoned in such~

courts by virtue of the Special PracticeAct in 1923. Unjust and absurd consequencesare, if possible, to be avoided. No less en authority than the Supreme Court of the United States has pronounced this rule. Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47, 59, 12 S. Ct. 517, 36 L. Rd. 340;Hawaii V. Mankichl, 190 U.S. 197, 213, 23 S. Ct. 787, 47 L. Rd. 1016. The courts of our State have likewise adhered to this rule. Only
a few cases, all by the Supreme Court need be noted; State Hi 162hwayDept. v. Gorham, 162 S.W. (2df 934; Cramer v. Sheppard, S.W. (2d) 147; Kllday v. Germany, 163 S.W. (2d) 184. We thfnk this was never the intentionof the Legislature nor the Intention of the Supreme Court in promulgating the rules. If
we should say thatArt. 7342 is still in effect and shouldbe followed,we would stillbe facedwith the question of the process being returned to the next term of court, for a reading of ltwe think clearly Implies that the return is to be made to the next term of court.

We therefore summarize our answer to your third question es follows: First, that citationby publicationmay be had InHarris County In delinquent tax suitsunder Subset. d of Sec. 3, Art. 7345b, wlthout return being made to the first Monday of the next term of court,but shouldbe as prescribed In Set, 6 of Art. 2092, which Is the same as prescribedby Rule 114 of the rules of civil procedure, requiring the defendant to appear and answer it or before 10 o'clockA.M. of the Monday next after the expiration of forty-twodays after Issuance. Second, that If citation shouldbe issuedunder the~provlslons ofRule 114 of the rules of clvll procedure, the same result would be accomplished for the source of Rule 114 Is Section 6 of the Special PracticeAct.

We restate your questlon No. 4:

"Does the citationby publication issuedunder the suitby the city under the provlsions of Subdivisiond, Sec. 3, Art. 7345b,make It necessary that these notlces show the amount of taxesdue the State end county?"Hon. A, C. Wlnborn, page 10 O-7159

We answer this question in the affirmativewith the qualificationshereinafter stated. Said sectionprovldes:

"Suchnotices shall show the amount of taxes alleged to be due each plaintiff and lntervenor, exclusive of interest,penalties,~andcosts, and shall recite that all interest,penalties and costs allowed by law are included in the suit."

It is observed that this section of the statute is applicable only to plaintiffs and interveners,which means the plaintiffs and interveners,which are partles to the suit at the time such citation issued. If a taxingunit Is made a party defendantby the city or any other taxingunit filing the suit,
as It may be under the terms of the statute, it is not necessary that the citation show the amount of taxes alleged to be due such taxingunit made a defendant. If, however,a taxingunit Intervenes In a sult where the defendants are citedunder Art. 7345b, after the citation providedby the statutehas been given, and is not a party to the suit at the time the citation issued, eitheras plaintiff, intervenorOP defendant,the courtwould not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the delinquent tax claim of such taxingunit without the Issuance of service in Its own behalf upon the defendant or defendants.

This is su Estate, 126 S.W. (2d P ported by the case of State v. Bagby's 687, fromwhich we quote:
II

. . .Section 3(c), Article 7345b require8 a citation by publication to state 'theamount of the taxes due each party plaintiff and intervener,exclusive of Interest, penalties, and costs l * *0' It Is observed that this citationdid not state the amount of taxes due each of the plaintiffs,but, on the contrary, stated the gross amount due plaintiffs jointly. This did not meet the requirements oftsaid Section 3(c) supra. Section 13 ofArticle 7345b states: 'Theprovisions of this Act shallbe cumulative of and in addition to all other rights and remedies to which any taxingunit may be entitled,but as to any proceeding broughtunder this Act, If any part or portion of this Act be in conflictwith any part or portion of anylaw of the State, the terms and provisions of this Act shall govern a8 to suchproceeding. * * *' In 33 T,J. p. 851, supported by abundant authorities-therecited, it Is said: 'Since authority for citationby publication comes solely from the statutes, enactmentsauthorizing that mode of service are strictly construed; In cases fallingwithin the provisions of the statutes there must be a strict compliancewith every essential requirement in respect of sexvice.' See Borden v. City of Bouaton, 26 Tex. Clv. pp. 29,Hon. A. C. Winborn, page 11 o-7159

62 S.W. 426, and authorities therediscussed. The failure of this citation to state the amount of taxes due each plalntlff,under the foregolngauthorltiest, warranted the action of the court in quashing same.

We restate your question No. 5:

"What is the effect of the failure of the notice to so show the amount of the taxes due the State and County under its intervention in the suit filed by the City?

Ifwe interpret this question, construed in connection with the explanatorypart of your letter, to call for an answer as to the effect of the failure of the city to make the State and county parties to a suitwhere citation by publication is required,but after citation had Issued the State and county In response to the notice of the pendency of the suit, intervenes and setsup its claim for taxes, stating in such Intervention the amount of the taxesdue, then it is our opinion that the courtwould not have jurisdictionto adjudicate the claim of such taxingunit without serviceupon its claim; but if such taxingunit has been made a party defendant, then and in that event the court would have jurisdictionto adjudicate the claim of suchdefendant, a taxingunit, without the amount of the taxes~owing to such taxingunit being stated In the citation. As stated in our answer to question No. 4, the statuterequiring the amount of taxes to be stated In the citation owing to each unit is applicable only to plaintiffs and lntervenorsat the time of the citation's issuance.

This, we think, Is in accordwith the holding in the
case of State v. Bagby's Estate, supra, fromwhich we quote as follows:

"Theaction of the trial court in refusing to render judgment In favor of intervenor,Clarksville Independent SchoolDistrict, against the unknown heirs of Ada Bagby. - -_ deceased, is sustained. This interventionwas filed after service of citation had been had on the defendant. Intervenor did not cause citation to issue on Its cause of action. Defendants made no appearance in this suit. The trial court did not have jurisdictionto enter judgment in favor of intervenoras to any defendantsnamed." (Emphas ours)

We are therefore of the opinion that the court would be without jurisdictionto adjudicate the tax llablllty in favor of the State and county,which intervened subsequent to the issuance of citation,unless another citation is issued isHon. A.C. Winborn, page 12 o-7159

upon the cause of action of the State and county. This would not be true, however, If the State and countywere made defendants before the issuance of citation.

We restate your questionNo. 6:

"What Is the effect of the judgmentrenderedby the Court in favor of the State and County's claim for taxes where the property has been sold to a privatepurchaser at the foreclosure tax sale?"

If this question calls for an answer as to the effect of a judgmentrendered by the court In favor of the State and county's claimfbr taxesupon an intervention in a casewhere citationby publication Is necessaryupon defendant or defendants, and the State and countywere not plaintiffs, intervenors or defendants at the time of the Issuance of citationas prescribed by the statute, thenwe are of the opinion that a judgment renderedby the court upon the interventionof the State and county would,

be void for lack of service in behalf of the State and countyupon the defendant or defendants. If, however, the State and countywere made defendantsby the citybefore issuance of citation,and setup their claim by answer and Intervention, the courtwould have jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim of the State and county, and this regardless ofwhether or not the citation showed the amount of taxes owning to the State Andy county. In otherwords, subsectiond of Sec. 3, Art. 7345b, does not apply insofaras notice of the amount of taxes Is concerned owning to a taxing unit that Ismade a defendant, as distinguished from a plaintiff and lntervenor. In the latter instance judgmentwould be valid, and the State and county would shareproportionatelywfth all other taxingunits, parties to the judgment,as prescribedby Art. 7345b. A purchaser at such foreclosure saleunder the last stated conditionswould purchase free and clear of the State and county lien for taxes under.the judgmentas prescribed In Sec. 10 of ARt. 734513. The samewould be true in the first conditionmentioned above also; the only difference being that the State and countywould shareproportionately In the taxes collectedunder the judgment in the last instance,but would not be entitled to collect in the first instance,because basedupon avoid judgment insofar
as the State and county is concerned. In otherwords the private purchaser takes titlefreeand clear of State and county lien for taxes in either instance, for the State and county are partles to the suit, notwithstanding the judgment in their behalf might be void. They are neverthelessprecludedby the
~exnressterms of Sec. 10 of Art. 7345b from subsequently asserting a lien against the purchaser at such foreclosure sale.

We restateyour questionNo. 7:_ . . .

Hon. A. C. Wlnborn, page 13 o-7159

%oes this act mean that If the State and County have failed to Intervene in a pending tax suit that in the event judgment for foreclosure Is rendered in such tax suit and the property sold at tax sale, the State and countywould lose its right to the tax liens heretofore existingagainst saidproperty?"

This we have heretoforeansweredby our opinionNo. 0-7076, a copy ofwhich is herewith enclosed. We call to your attention, however, that Sectlon 10 of Art. 7345b isby its express terms limited to "any taxingunit which was a party to said suit OP which had been servedwith citationin said suit."

We have attempted to clearup a troublesomeand complex questlon, and we frankly state that our effortshavenot been altogether satisfactoryto us, but we think the views here expressed are in accord with the practice and procedurewhich has heretoforebeen substantially followed inHarris County, and which we would be very reluctant toupset unless compelled todo 80 by the plain and explicitprovisions of the statutes and Rules of Civil Procedure. We believe our construction of the statutesand the presentRules of Civil Procedure, insofar
as saidRules of Civil Procedureare applicable to tax suits, is reasonable and justified.

Very truly your8

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

LPL:AMM:wc

Enclosure By s/L,P, Lollar L. P, Lollar Assistant

APPROVED J'UL17, 1946 s/Carlo8C. Ashley FIRST ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

This opinion considered and approved in limited conference.