alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### AKTIEBOLAGET VARGOS et al. v. CLARK.

Civil Action No. 35347.

United States District Court District of Columbia.

Feb. 24, 1949.

*636Inzer B. Wyatt, of New York City, and Hugh H. Obear of Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs.

John L. Burling, of Washington, D. C., for defendant.

HOLTZOFF, District Judge.

In determining the objections that have been filed by the defendant to the plaintiffs’ interrogatories, I think it would be useful to review some basic principles governing interrogatories under existing Federal practice. In the Federal courts interrogatories serve two distinct purposes: First, to ascertain facts and to procure evidence, or secure information as to where pertinent evidence exists and can be obtained; second, to narrow the issues. These two functions of interrogatories are distinct and separate. The second function may be attained by exacting admissions or obtaining commitments as to the position that an adverse party takes as to issues of fact, but not as to issues of law. The utmost liberality should prevail in allowing a wide scope to the legitimate use of interrogatories. This course is in the interest of a fair trial, eliminating surprise and achieving substantial justice.

On the other hand, interrogatories are not to be used as a device or a stratagem to maneuver the adverse party into an unfavorable tactical position. To do so is to pervert a remedy designed to advance the disposition of controversies on their merits, into a weapon to revive what has been aptly denominated as “the sporting theory of justice”—the very shortcoming of the old procedure that the new rules were designed to cure.

So, too, interrogatories are not to be used in an oppressive manner. An adverse party should not be required to perform burdensome labors or to execute difficult and expensive tasks, in searching for facts and classifying and compiling data. A litigant may not compel his adversary to go to work for him.

Specifically, an interrogatory calling upon an adverse party to enumerate the items of evidence by which the latter expects to prove some ultimate fact is objectionable. It is likewise objectionable to demand by interrogatory a list of witnesses whom the adverse party expects to call at the trial to prove some specific fact.

True, under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 26(b), 28 U.S.C.A., which governs the scope both of depositions and interrogatories, it is permissible to inquire into the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts, for the purpose of discovery. This provision, however, must not be confused with an attempt *637to secure a list of witnesses whom the adverse party intends to call at the trial.

On the basis of these general principles, the Court will allow interrogatories numbered 12, 14, and 15. The Court will sustain the objections to the remaining interrogatories, with the observation, however, that interrogatory numbered 2 may be proper if reframed and narrowed.

The parties may submit an order accordingly.
CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS


We  hereby  consent  to the  incorporation  by  reference  in the  Registration
Statement on Form S-8 (33-317553) of Watson Wyatt & Company of our report dated
September 8, 1999, except as to the information presented in Notes 5 and 6, for
which the date is December 9, 1999,  relating to the financial  statements  and
financial statement schedule, which appears in this Form 10-K/A.



/S/PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP
--------------------------
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP
Washington, D.C.
May 12, 2000
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of the Interior

###### Bureau of Land Management

          - [LLORL00000-L10200000.MJ0000.LXSS021H0000; HAG 09-0201]

# AGENCY:

Bureau of Land Management, Interior.

# ACTION:

Notice of public meeting.

# SUMMARY:

Pursuant to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, the U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Southeast Oregon Resource Advisory Council (SEORAC) will meet as indicated below:

# DATES:

The meeting will begin at 7 p.m. on July 1, 2009.

# ADDRESSES:

The Council will meet by teleconference. For a copy of the material to be discussed and/or the conference call number, please contact Scott Stoffel; information below.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Scott Stoffel, Public Affairs Specialist, 1301 South G Street, Lakeview, OR 97630, (541) 947-6237.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

                    The SEORAC advises the Secretary of the Interior, through the BLM, on a variety                           ( print page 27046)                        of planning and management issues for public lands in the Lakeview, Burns and Vale BLM Districts and the Fremont-Winema and Malheur National Forests. The Council will conduct a public meeting by teleconference on July 1, 2009 to discuss and come to consensus on the contents of comments to be sent to the BLM's Oregon/Washington State Director on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Vegetation Treatments Using Herbicides on BLM Lands in Oregon. The public is welcome to listen to the entire teleconference and make oral comments to the Council from 7:45 p.m. to 8 p.m.                

Dated: May 27, 2009.

Carol A. Benkosky,

District Manager, Lakeview District Office.

[FR Doc. E9-13106 Filed 6-4-09; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4310-33-P
#### Janice SCHMIDT, Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN UTILITIES DISTRICT, Appellee.

No. 08-1097.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: May 18, 2009.

Filed: May 27, 2009.

Before WOLLMAN, MURPHY, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Janice Schmidt appeals the district court’s1 adverse grant of summary judgment in this employment-discrimination action against her former employer, Metropolitan Utilities District, asserting violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Upon careful de novo review, *see Johnson v. Blaukat,*453 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir.2006) (standard of review), we conclude that summary judgment was proper.

We agree with the district court that Schmidt failed to establish a prima facie case because she failed to make a sufficient *480showing that she was “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA: while her knee injury impacted her ability to walk, it did not “substantially limit” that major life activity. *See*42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (defining disability); *Gretillat v. Care*Initiatives, 481 F.3d 649, 653 (8th Cir.2007) (major life activities include walking, but difficulty walking long distances is not disability under ADA); *Nuzum v. Ozark Auto. Distribs., Inc.,*432 F.3d 839, 846-48 (8th Cir.2005) (“substantially limited” means limited considerably or to large degree; to assess substantiality of limitation, nature, severity, duration, and impact must be examined); *Schuhardt v. Washington Univ.,*390 F.3d 563, 566 (8th Cir.2004) (defendant is entitled to summary judgment if plaintiff failed to make sufficient showing on essential element of her case); *Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc.,*339 F.3d 682, 684 (8th Cir.2003) (prima facie case under ADA).

Even if Schmidt had established an ADA-qualifying disability, she failed to create a trialworthy issue as to whether she could have performed the essential functions of her position. *See Alexander v. Northland Inn,*321 F.3d 723, 727 (8th Cir.2003) (ADA plaintiff has burden to prove he can perform essential functions of job with reasonable accommodation); *Dropinski v. Douglas County,*298 F.3d 704, 709-10 (8th Cir.2002) (job restructuring is possible accommodation under ADA, but employer need not reallocate or eliminate essential functions of job); *see also Lee v. Spellings,*447 F.3d 1087, 1088-89 (8th Cir.2006) (court may affirm on any basis supported by record).

Accordingly, we affirm.

1

. The Honorable Laurie Smith Camp, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v. DULTON EARL JOHNSON,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 14

- 302 47 D.C. No. 4:13

- cr - 00227

- BLW

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho B. Lynn Winmill, Chief Judge, Presiding Submitted October 14, 2015 **
Before: SILVERMAN, BYBEE , and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Dulton Earl Johnson appeals fr om the district court’s judgment and challenges the 70

- month sentence imposed following his guilty

- plea conviction for assault resulting in serious bodily injury committed within Indian Country , in
violation of 18 U.S .C. § § 113(a)(6) and 1153. We have jurisdiction under 28

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

OCT 20 2015 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 14

- 30247

U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Johnson contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to
consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing facto rs adequately and address his argument for a within

- Guidelines sentence. We review for plain error, see United
States v. Valencia

- Barragan , 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir . 2010), and find none.
The record reflects that the district court considered Johnson’s arguments and thoroughly explained its reasons for imposing the above

- Guidelines sentence

. See United States v. Carty , 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)

. Johnson next contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable

. T he
district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Johnson’s sentence. See
Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The above

- Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the section 3553(a) sentencing factors and th e totality of the circumstances, including the troubling nature of the offense

. See
Gall , 552 U.S. at 51

. AFFIRMED.
#### State v. Speight

Case below: 361 N.C. 106

No. 491PA04-2

Defs Motion to Stay Issuance of Mandate and to Withdraw the Court’s Slip Opinion (COA03-776)

Denied 01/03/07
-Exhibit 32-1
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Financial Report of NoFire Technologies,
Inc. on Form 10QSB for the Quarter ended 02/28/2007 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof,
I, Sam Gottfried, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Form 10QSB fully complies with the requirements of Section
13 (a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78m or 78o(d)); and

(2) The information contained in the Form 10QSB fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.



Dated: April 20 , 2007

Name  /s/ Sam Gottfried (CEO)


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906,
or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting
 the signature that  appears in typed form within the electronic
version of this written  statement required by Section 906, has been
provided to NoFire Technologies, Inc. and will be retained by NoFire
Technologies, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or
its staff upon request.







Exhibit 32-2
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Financial Report of NoFire Technologies,
Inc. on Form 10QSB for the Quarter ended 02/28/200 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof,
I, Sam Oolie, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Form 10QSB fully complies with the requirements of Section
13 (a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78m or 78o(d)); and


(2) The information contained in the Form 10KSB fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.



Dated: April 20, 2007
Name  /s/ Sam Oolie (CFO)


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906,
or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting
the signature that  appears in typed form within the electronic
version of this written  statement required by Section 906, has been
provided to NoFire Technologies, Inc. and will be retained by NoFire
Technologies, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or
its staff upon request.
Exhibit 31.1
 
 CEO Certification
 
 I, Steve Westlund, certify that:
 
 The undersigned certifies that:
 
 1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Kaire Holdings, Incorporated. (the "Company");
 
 2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report; and
 
 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report.
 
 4. The Company's other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the Company and have:
 
 a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the Company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;
 
 b) evaluated the effectiveness of the Company's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and
 
 c) disclosed in this report any change in the Company's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the Company's most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Company's internal control over financial reporting;
 
 5. The Company's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Company's auditors and the audit committee of Company's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions);
 
 a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the Company's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the Company's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and
 
 b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the Company's internal controls over financial reporting.
 
 Date: August 20, 2004
 
 /s/ Steve Westlund
 Steve Westlund, Chief Executive Officer,
 President, Chief Accounting Officer and Director
No. —, original.

#### Ex parte Stanley B. Peplowski.

February 16, 1942.

314 U. S. 578.
#### LA SALLE NAT. BANK v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO. CAGLE v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.

Nos. 47C1715 and 47C1720.

United States District Court N. D. Illinois, E. D.

May 14, 1948.

Edward L. Richter, of Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff La Salle Nat. Bank.

Leo M. Tarpey, of Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff Walter O. Cagle.

Theodore Schmidt and P. J. Cronin, both of Chicago, Ill., for defendant for both cases.

CAMPBELL, District Judge.

The only question to be determined now is which of these suits should proceed to trial. Walter O. Cagle is the domiciliary administrator, appointed by the Circuit Court of Vigo County, Indiana. The La-Salle National Bank was appointed administrator by the Probate Court of Cook County, Illinois. The asset being administered is the cause of action on behalf of the decedent’s widow against the defendant under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq.

This act gives the right of action in a death case to the employee’s personal representative for the benefit of his widow if he leaves one surviving. The act does not limit the personal representative who can enforce such right of action to the domiciliary representative. Anderson v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 6 Cir., 1914, 210 F. 689. Thus actions by different ad*317ministrators can proceed in different jurisdictions; but since there can be only one recovery, the first action to proceed to judgment precludes recovery in any others. Scott v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., 7 Cir., 1947, 159 F.2d 618.

Federal Civil Rule 17(b) leaves the capacity to sue of one acting in a representative capacity to be determined by the law of the state in which the district court is held. Thus the capacity to sue, of the personal representative who is enforcing the right of action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, is to be determined by state law. Kleckner v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., D.C.E.D.N.Y. 1940, 36 F.Supp. 600.

The Illinois Probate Act allows foreign administrators to su'e without ancillary appointment in the absence of appointment of a resident administrator; but upon the appointment of a resident administrator, the latter shall be substituted for the nonresident administrator, the suit heard and determined as if originally filed by the resident administrator, and the benefit of the judgment shall inure to and be assets in his hands. Smith-Hurd Ill.Ann.Stat., c. 3, § 419. The effect of this section is to withdraw the capacity to sue of a foreign administrator during the course of proceedings upon the appointment of a resident administrator; it follows that a non-resident administrator has no capacity to file a suit if a resident administrator has been appointed.

It also appears from the testimony of the decedent’s widow on this hearing that she desires the resident administrator to enforce the action on her behalf.

It is accordingly ordered that case 47C1720 be dismissed for the plaintiff’s lack of capacity to sue; and that case 47C1715 be set for trial on Friday, September 24, 1948.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     I, Daniel S. Tamkin,  Chief  Executive  Officer of Synergx  Systems certify
that:

       1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Synergx
Systems Inc.;

       2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
quarterly report;

       3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

        4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:

        a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period cover by this report based on such evaluation; and

        c) Disclosed in this quarterly report any change in the registrant's
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during registrant's most
recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting;
and

       5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based
on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to
the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions);

        a) All significant deficiencies in material weakness the design or
operation of internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

      b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.


Date:    May 12, 2005
         /s/ Daniel S. Tamkin_
         --------------------
         Daniel S. Tamkin
         Chief Executive Officer