RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 24a0136p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BENJAMIN STANLEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY; WARREN HILLS and 

KATIE DECAMP, individually and in their professional 

capacities,

Defendants-Appellees.

┐

│

│

│

│

│

│

│

│

│

┘

No. 23-1808

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.

No. 1:23-cv-00206—Jane M. Beckering, District Judge.

Decided and Filed: June 24, 2024

Before: CLAY, THAPAR, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Eric Delaporte, DELAPORTE LYNCH, PLLC, Mason, Michigan, for Appellant. 

Daniel B. Tukel, Joseph E. Richotte, BUTZEL LONG, P.C., Troy, Michigan, for Appellees.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

MATHIS, Circuit Judge. Benjamin Stanley worked for Western Michigan University 

(“WMU”) for about one month when WMU terminated his employment. Stanley then sued 

WMU and a few of its employees. He claimed that WMU and certain supervisors discriminated 

and retaliated against in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Stanley also 

brought a claim under Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (“PWDCRA”), 

>
No. 23-1808 Stanley v. W. Mich. Univ. Page 2

as well as a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed 

Stanley’s federal claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on Eleventh Amendment 

immunity and dismissed his state-law claims for failure to comply with the Michigan Court of 

Claims Act’s notification statute. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.6431. The district court also 

denied leave for Stanley to amend his complaint. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of 

Stanley’s federal claims and the denial of Stanley’s motion for leave to amend his complaint, but 

we vacate the judgment in part and remand to the district court to dismiss Stanley’s federal and 

state-law claims without prejudice. 

I.

WMU is a public university in Michigan. WMU employed Benjamin Stanley as a utility 

food worker in its dining hall for 31 days, from early October to mid-November 2020. Stanley 

claims he did not complete training for the job because “[p]artway through the training, the 

employee leading the training was called away for another task.” R. 1, PageID 2. 

WMU terminated Stanley’s employment during his probationary period for excessive 

tardiness and failure to follow proper clocking-in procedures. Stanley has severe ADHD that he 

claims impacted his ability to timely clock in, such as by causing him to occasionally forget his 

swiping ID card. Stanley claims he was “disciplined for being late after having to wait for WMU 

staff to perform his required temperature check for COVID-19 purposes,” even though he was 

told he would not be disciplined following such occurrences. Id. at 3. Because Stanley 

sometimes forgot his ID card, he requested a reasonable accommodation—such as a punch card 

to be kept onsite—which WMU denied. Stanley also spoke to WMU’s office of institutional 

equity to determine whether he would be able to use his service dog in any department, including 

dining services, which Stanley claims led to employees in that office “asking improper questions 

regarding [his] disability.” Id. Stanley disclosed the tasks his service dog performed but did not 

elaborate on his disability or medical history.

Before Stanley requested a reasonable accommodation, he was “told that he was doing a 

fine job and was on track to complete his probationary period.” Id. However, “WMU’s praise 

changed” when, on or about November 10, 2020, WMU told Stanley to stop showing up to work 
No. 23-1808 Stanley v. W. Mich. Univ. Page 3

late. Id. at 4. Stanley claims that he could not comply with WMU’s timeliness standards 

because of his disability, for which WMU did not provide a reasonable accommodation. Katie 

DeCamp, the head supervisor of dining services at WMU, indicated that Stanley was told during 

training that he could use the speaker at the building’s entrance to ask someone to open the door 

for him so that he would not be late, but Stanley claims he was never told about the speaker. On 

November 10, Stanley claims he was informed that the hospitality department “doesn’t do” 

accommodations, after which he contacted WMU’s human resources department. Id. The 

following day, WMU terminated Stanley.

After receiving his notice of right to sue from the U.S. Department of Justice, Stanley 

filed suit. He brought three claims: (1) discrimination under Title I of the ADA; (2) retaliation 

and intimidation under Title V of the ADA and under the PWDCRA; and (3) intentional 

infliction of emotional distress against all defendants, including unknown John Doe and Jane 

Doe employees of WMU, in their individual and professional capacities. Stanley sought the 

following relief: “actual and compensatory damages”; punitive damages, attorney fees, and 

costs; “whatever other legal or equitable remedies [the district court] deems reasonable and just 

pursuant to statute and common law”; and “any other relief the [district court] deems fit.” Id. at 

6. 

WMU, DeCamp, and Warren Hills (“Defendants”) moved to dismiss Stanley’s 

complaint. They sought to dismiss the ADA claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on 

Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, and the state-law claims for failure to comply with 

Michigan procedural law. Stanley responded in opposition to Defendants’ motion and sought 

leave to amend his complaint.

The district court dismissed all of Stanley’s claims against Defendants with prejudice. 

The district court also denied Stanley leave to file an amended complaint, finding that Stanley’s 

proposed amendment would be futile. 

II.

As an initial matter, Defendants contend that we lack jurisdiction to adjudicate Stanley’s 

appeal. That is because, according to Defendants, when Stanley appealed, the district court had 
No. 23-1808 Stanley v. W. Mich. Univ. Page 4

not entered a final judgment. And when the district court did enter a final judgment, Stanley did 

not file a new or amended notice of appeal.

Before reaching the merits, we must ensure that we have appellate jurisdiction. Watkins 

v. Healy, 986 F.3d 648, 657 (6th Cir. 2021). Subject to exceptions not applicable here, Congress 

has granted us appellate jurisdiction “only from ‘final decisions’ of the district courts.” Mitchell 

v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524 (1985) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1291). A final decision “ends the 

litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Catlin 

v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). After entry of a final decision, a party must 

generally file a notice of appeal within 30 days. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). Filing a notice of 

appeal “after the court announces a decision or order—but before entry of the judgment or 

order—is treated as filed on the date of and after the entry.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2); see Bonner 

v. Perry, 564 F.3d 424, 427 (6th Cir. 2009).

On August 7, 2023, the district court dismissed all claims that Stanley brought against 

Defendants and denied Stanley leave to file an amended complaint. The district court also gave 

Stanley fourteen days to show cause why the John Doe and Jane Doe defendants should not be 

dismissed “for failure to timely identify and effect service on them.” R. 19, PageID 235. 

Stanley did not respond to the show-cause order. Instead, on September 5, 2023, he filed a 

notice of appeal. On September 7, the district court dismissed Stanley’s claims against John Doe 

and Jane Doe without prejudice and entered a final judgment.1 Thus, Stanley filed a notice of 

appeal two days before the district court made its “final decision.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Stanley’s premature notice of appeal does not deprive us of jurisdiction. “A notice of 

appeal filed too early,” as we explained recently, “ripens when the window to appeal begins.” 

Winters v. Taskila, 88 F.4th 665, 671 (6th Cir. 2023); see Preferred Props., Inc. v. Indian River 

Ests., Inc., 276 F.3d 790, 796 n.4 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[A] premature notice of appeal is effective to 

vest appellate jurisdiction when the judgment becomes final prior to the disposition of the 

appeal.”). Stanley’s notice of appeal ripened on September 7, 2023. We therefore have 

jurisdiction.

1Stanley does not appeal the dismissal of the claims against the unknown John Doe and Jane Doe 

employees of WMU. 
No. 23-1808 Stanley v. W. Mich. Univ. Page 5

III.

The district court dismissed Stanley’s ADA claims against Defendants for lack of 

subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), finding Defendants 

were entitled to sovereign immunity. We review that decision de novo. Skatemore, Inc. v. 

Whitmer, 40 F.4th 727, 731 (6th Cir. 2022). In doing so, we “construe the complaint in the light 

most favorable to the Plaintiff[]; however, [we] need ‘not presume the truth of factual allegations 

pertaining to our jurisdiction to hear the case.’” Id. at 731–32 (quoting Russell v. LunderganGrimes, 784 F.3d 1037, 1045 (6th Cir. 2015)). 

The Eleventh Amendment provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any 

suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States 

by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment bars actions “against states unless they 

consent to be sued or Congress, pursuant to a valid exercise of its power, unequivocally 

expresses its intent to abrogate sovereign immunity.” Ashford v. Univ. of Mich., 89 F.4th 960, 

969 (6th Cir. 2024) (citations omitted). And that bar also applies to “state officers acting in their 

official capacity” and “entities acting on behalf of the state.” Id. Although the text does not 

explicitly say so, Eleventh Amendment immunity precludes suits brought against a State by its 

own citizens. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 517 (2004).

The Eleventh Amendment affords broad protections for States against private suits. 

Unless immunity is removed, individuals cannot seek “monetary damages or retrospective 

relief.” Ashford, 89 F.4th at 969. But they can “seek prospective injunctive relief against state 

officials in their official capacity before those officials violate the plaintiff’s federal 

constitutional or statutory rights.” Skatemore, 40 F.4th at 733; see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 

(1908).

With this background in mind, we now address whether Defendants are entitled to 

immunity from Stanley’s ADA claims.
No. 23-1808 Stanley v. W. Mich. Univ. Page 6

A. Discrimination under Title I of the ADA

In Count I of his complaint, Stanley brought a claim under Title I of the ADA, which 

prohibits employers from discriminating against employees “on the basis of disability.” 42 

U.S.C. § 12112(a). He sought various forms of monetary damages and “whatever other legal or 

equitable remedies [the district court] deem[ed] reasonable and just pursuant to statute and 

common law.” R. 1, PageID 6. 

WMU is chartered under the Michigan Constitution. See Mich. Const. art. VIII, § 4; W. 

Mich. Univ. Bd. of Control v. State, 565 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Mich. 1997) (opining that “[s]tate 

universities are clearly a part of state government in Michigan” and that “Western Michigan 

University is ‘the state’”). State universities in Michigan “are organically part of the state 

government.” W. Mich. Univ. Bd. of Control, 565 N.W.2d at 832 (citing Auditor Gen. v. Regents 

of the Univ., 47 N.W. 440, 441 (Mich. 1890)). Because WMU is an arm of the State of 

Michigan, a suit against WMU is a suit against Michigan. And the Supreme Court has held that 

an employee cannot maintain an action under Title I of the ADA against the State. Bd. of Trs. of 

Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001).

Recognizing that Garrett bars his claim for money damages, Stanley tries to take 

advantage of the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. But Ex parte 

Young does not allow suits “against the state itself.” Puckett v. Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cnty. 

Gov’t, 833 F.3d 590, 598 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Thus, Ex parte Young does not 

apply to Stanley’s ADA discrimination claim against WMU. 

But what about his ADA discrimination claims against DeCamp and Hills? Those must 

also fail. To the extent Stanley seeks damages against DeCamp and Hills in their official 

capacities, they enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391, 409–

10 (6th Cir. 2017) (“[Eleventh Amendment immunity] protects states, as well as state officials 

sued in their official capacity for money damages, from suit in federal court.”). And to the extent 

he seeks damages against them in their personal capacities, they are not subject to liability under 

the ADA. See Hiler v. Brown, 177 F.3d 542, 546 (6th Cir. 1999) (personal-capacity defendants 

are not “employers” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Wathen v. Gen. Elec. Co., 
No. 23-1808 Stanley v. W. Mich. Univ. Page 7

115 F.3d 400, 404–405 & n.6 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting Title VII and the ADA are “essentially the 

same” with respect to “an employee/supervisor’s individual liability”).

Stanley also fails to allege the necessary facts that show that his requested relief—an 

injunction barring all Defendants, including DeCamp and Hills, from firing him—will redress his 

injury. Nowhere does his complaint specify that DeCamp and Hills fired him or can reinstate 

him. Therefore, he lacks standing to pursue injunctive relief against DeCamp and Hills. 

B. Retaliation under Title V of the ADA

In Count II of his complaint, Stanley alleges that WMU retaliated against him in 

violation of Title V of the ADA. Specifically, Stanley contends that “WMU retaliated against 

[him] by firing him for simply exercising his rights under the ADA . . . when making reasonable 

request [sic] for an accommodation based in alternative method [sic] for clocking in and for the 

use of his service animal.” R. 1, PageID 6. Title V prohibits employers from retaliating 

against employees for “oppos[ing] any act or practice made unlawful by [the ADA].” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12203(a).

Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has addressed previously whether the States are 

entitled to immunity from claims brought under Title V of the ADA. See Cook v. Garner, No. 

19-5931, 2020 WL 4876309, at *3 (6th Cir. June 17, 2020) (order). To determine whether 

WMU is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from Stanley’s Title V ADA claim, we must 

decide: (1) “whether Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate that immunity” 

and, if so, (2) “whether Congress acted pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.” 

Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000).

Congress clearly expressed its intention to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity in 

the ADA. It stated that “[a] State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the 

Constitution . . . from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation 

of [the ADA].” 42 U.S.C. § 12202. 

So we consider whether Congress had constitutional authority to remove the States’ 

immunity for claims brought under Title V. Congress cannot rely on “the powers enumerated in 
No. 23-1808 Stanley v. W. Mich. Univ. Page 8

Article I” of the Constitution to remove Eleventh Amendment immunity. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 

364. It can apply the ADA to the States only “pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under § 5 

of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Lane, 541 U.S. at 518 (citation omitted); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 

364; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4). Section 5 grants Congress authority “to pass appropriate 

legislation to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.” Trump v. Anderson, 601 U.S. 100, 109–10 

(2024) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). This power to enforce the Fourteenth 

Amendment “includes the authority both to remedy and to deter violation of rights guaranteed 

thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not 

itself forbidden by the Amendment’s text.” Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81. 

We must first identify “the scope of the constitutional right at issue.” Garrett, 531 U.S. 

at 365. That constitutional right comes from § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects 

individuals’ equal-protection and due-process rights from encroachment by the States. The 

Supreme Court has held previously that “States are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment 

to make special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions toward such 

individuals are rational.” Id. at 367. Title V’s prohibition against retaliation protects related but 

nonetheless distinct interests than Title I. Cf. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 

U.S. 53, 63 (2006) (“The substantive provision [of the related and substantively identical Title 

VII] seeks to prevent injury to individuals based on who they are, i.e., their status. The 

antiretaliation provision seeks to prevent harm to individuals based on what they do, i.e., their 

conduct.”). But, as in this case, Title V claims are frequently predicated on Title I claims, such 

as when a plaintiff alleges retaliation for complaining about the very disability discrimination he 

experienced. It logically follows that if states have no affirmative duty, beyond rationality, to 

accommodate a disabled citizen in that instance, then the right against retaliation for opposition 

to such discrimination is similarly narrow.

Next, we must consider “whether Congress identified a history and pattern of 

unconstitutional” retaliation in the employment context “by the States against the disabled.” 

Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368. Congress’s legislative findings do not reveal a history of the 

States retaliating against their employees for opposing disability discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12101(a). And the House and Senate Committee Reports on the ADA “made no mention of 
No. 23-1808 Stanley v. W. Mich. Univ. Page 9

discrimination in public employment.” Lane, 541 U.S. at 522 (citation omitted). Not 

surprisingly, the committee reports do not discuss employment retaliation based on opposing 

disability discrimination in the public sector. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485 (1990); S. Rep. No. 

101-116 (1989). 

Because Congress’s legislative findings and the congressional record do not reflect a 

history and pattern of retaliation by the States against public employees for opposing disability 

discrimination, we hold that Congress did not have authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth 

Amendment to remove States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity for ADA retaliation claims 

predicated on a violation of Title I of the ADA. Our holding flows naturally from Garrett: if 

Congress did not validly abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity for Title I claims, then it also 

did not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity for a claim under Title V alleging retaliation 

for a Title I claim. See Dupree v. Owens, 92 F.4th 999, 1007 (11th Cir. 2024) (“Title V cannot 

serve as a congruent and proportional remedy when paired with a Title I claim. . . . [W]hen the 

underlying provision—here, Title I—does not allow a plaintiff to assert a claim against the State, 

it logically follows that a Title V claim that is based on the exercise of a right arising only from 

Title I cannot be levied against the State.”). In reaching our holding today, we join every circuit 

to have addressed this issue. See id.; Block v. Tex. Bd. of Law Exam’rs, 952 F.3d 613, 619 (5th 

Cir. 2020); Demshki v. Monteith, 255 F.3d 986, 989 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The Ex parte Young exception does not help Stanley for his retaliation claim any more 

than for his discrimination claim. He cannot obtain an injunction against WMU because WMU 

functions as the State. See Puckett, 833 F.3d at 598. And, as stated above, his request for 

injunctive relief from the individual Defendants was deficient.

* * *

The district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Stanley’s ADA claims 

because Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and Stanley lacks standing 

to request injunctive relief from DeCamp and Hills. Because the dismissal was for lack of 

subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court should have dismissed Stanley’s ADA claims 

without prejudice. See Taylor v. Owens, 990 F.3d 493, 496 (6th Cir. 2021).
No. 23-1808 Stanley v. W. Mich. Univ. Page 10

IV.

Stanley brought state-law PWDCRA and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress 

claims against Defendants. The district court could resolve those claims only through 

supplemental jurisdiction because there was no basis for original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367(a). District courts do not have to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and they may 

decline to do so if, as relevant here, “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has 

original jurisdiction[.]” Id. § 1367(c)(3). Thus, a district court has discretion in deciding 

whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. “That discretion, however, is bounded by 

constitutional and prudential limits on the use of federal judicial power.” Musson Theatrical, 

Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254 (6th Cir. 1996), as amended, 1998 WL 117980 

(6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1998) (order). 

Not all pretrial dismissals are created equal. “When all federal claims are dismissed 

before trial, the balance of considerations usually will point to dismissing the state law claims[.]” 

Id. at 1254–55 (citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)). But 

when federal claims are dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 

“supplemental jurisdiction can never exist” because a Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal indicates “that 

there never was a valid federal claim.” Id. at 1255. That is the case here. The district court did 

not have jurisdiction to decide Stanley’s state-law claims because “the district court lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction over any federal issues.” Bigelow v. Mich. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 970 

F.2d 154, 160 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Musson, 89 F.3d at 1256 (“[W]hen a federal claim is 

dismissed as insubstantial, the Constitution absolutely forbids a district court from exercising 

supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state claim.”); Whittington v. Milby, 928 F.2d 188, 

194 (6th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (holding that state law claims “should have been dismissed 

without prejudice once plaintiff’s federal jurisdictional claim was held to be inappropriate.” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)); Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Corp v. Schieffer, 715 F.3d 712, 

713 (8th Cir. 2013) (opining that “courts have uniformly held that” supplemental jurisdiction is 

unavailable “when original federal jurisdiction is wholly lacking”). Therefore, we remand to the 

district court with instructions to dismiss those claims without prejudice. See Whittington, 928 

F.2d at 194; 28 U.S.C. § 2106.
No. 23-1808 Stanley v. W. Mich. Univ. Page 11

V.

Finally, we address the district court’s denial of Stanley’s motion to amend his complaint. 

We generally review the district court’s decision to deny a motion to amend a complaint for an 

abuse of discretion. U.S. ex rel. Sheldon v. Kettering Health Network, 816 F.3d 399, 407 (6th 

Cir. 2016). But because the district court’s denial rests on the conclusion that amendment would 

be futile, we review the decision de novo. Id.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, a party may amend his pleading with the 

court’s approval, which shall be freely given “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(a)(2). There are circumstances, however, where justice counsels against amendment, “such 

as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure 

deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue 

of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 

(1962). An amendment is futile “when, after including the proposed changes, the complaint still 

could not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Skatemore, 40 F.4th at 737–38 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must include “enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007). Thus, a plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Courts construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff and accept the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Thompson v. Bank 

of Am., N.A., 773 F.3d 741, 750 (6th Cir. 2014). 

Stanley’s proposed amended complaint included eight additional paragraphs, and he 

requested to amend the relief sought to include an order that would enjoin Defendants from 

firing him and that would reinstate him to his position at WMU. Specifically, Stanley argues that 

his proposed amended complaint “would have provided clarification and additional factual 

allegations to further support his claim for Ex parte Young relief, cure other minor deficiencies in 
No. 23-1808 Stanley v. W. Mich. Univ. Page 12

the pleading, and would have ensured [he] withstood a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” D. 14 at 

p.28.

The district court did not err in denying Stanley’s motion. First, none of the newly added 

paragraphs include facts that would support a claim under Ex parte Young. The only one that 

comes remotely close is Paragraph 3 of the proposed amended complaint where Stanley claims 

“[d]uring all relevant times, Defendants Warren Hills, Katie DeCamp, and Unknown John Doe 

and Jane Doe employees of WMU acted as agents of WMU, and upon information and belief, 

maintained 15 or more employees each working day.” R. 17-2, PageID 200. Stanley added this 

allegation so that the district court would consider Hills and DeCamp “employers,” which could 

trigger personal liability under the ADA. But it states a legal conclusion that the district court 

did not have to accept as true. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678. Second, his proposed amended 

complaint does not indicate that DeCamp or Hills have the power to reinstate him. Although 

Stanley claims DeCamp and Hills “presumably had the power to reinstate” by virtue of their 

positions at WMU, D. 14 at p.32, we are not required to presume as much. 

VI. 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Stanley’s ADA 

claims and the denial of Stanley’s motion for leave to amend his complaint. We VACATE the 

district court’s judgment dismissing Stanley’s federal and state-law claims with prejudice and 

REMAND this case to the district court with instructions to dismiss Stanley’s federal and statelaw claims without prejudice.