United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 13-2782

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Christopher Hampton,

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company; Ozark Motor Lines Inc. Benefit Plan,

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellants.

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 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Pine Bluff

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 Submitted: April 17, 2014

 Filed: October 7, 2014

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Before SMITH, COLLOTON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

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COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

After being diagnosed with insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus, Christopher

Hampton ceased work as an over-the-road truck driver for Ozark Motor Lines, Inc. 

Pursuant to the company’s employee-benefit plan—Ozark Motor Lines Inc. Benefit

Plan—which is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974

(“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461, Hampton submitted a claim for long-term
disability benefits to Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company, the Plan’s insurer

and claims-review fiduciary. Reliance Standard concluded that Hampton was not

disabled under the terms of the Plan and denied the claim on that basis. 

Hampton sued Reliance Standard and the Plan, arguing that Reliance Standard

abused its discretion. The district court granted judgment on the record for Hampton. 

Reliance Standard and the Plan appeal, and we reverse.

I.

FromJuly 2008 to November 2010, Hampton worked as an over-the-road truck

driver for Ozark Motor Lines, Inc. In November 2010, Hampton was diagnosed with

diabetes mellitus. As a result of Hampton’s diagnosis, he was unable to continue

work as an over-the-road truck driver: Regulations of the United States Department

of Transportation provide that any person with insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus

is not qualified to operate a commercial motor vehicle. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 391.11,

391.41(b)(3). As a result, Arkansas disqualified his commercial driver’s license. See

001-00-004 Ark. Code R. 17.1.

Hampton filed claims for short-termand long-termdisabilitybenefits under the

Plan. In support of his claims, he submitted a December 2010 statement from

William Hawkins, M.D., the doctor who had diagnosed him, stating that Hampton

could not work because he was “unable to obtain a DOT health card with this new

diagnosis.” Dr. Hawkins wrote a follow-up letter to Reliance Standard in June 2011

repeating that he “d[id] not feel that Mr. Hampton will be able to obtain gainful

employment noting his insulin dependent diabetes mellitus, which precludes him

from operating any sort of heavy machinery or motorized vehicles based on the

Department of Transportation regulations.”

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Hampton received short-term benefits, but Reliance Standard denied his claim

for long-term benefits. To qualify as “Totally Disabled” under the Plan’s long-term

disability policy, an insured must be unable to perform the material duties of his

regular occupation due to injury or sickness. The Plan further provides that if the

insured “requires a license for such occupation, the loss ofsuch license for any reason

does not in and of itself constitute ‘Total Disability.’” In its July 2011 denial letter,

Reliance Standard explained that although Hampton’s submission asserted that his

diagnosis of diabetes mellitus precluded him frommaintaining a commercial driver’s

license under the federal regulations, there was no evidence that any symptoms of

diabetes mellitus prevented him from performing his occupation under the terms of

the Plan. 

Hampton filed an administrative appeal with Reliance Standard in January

2012, arguing that the diabetes-related loss of his commercial driver’s license

prevented him from performing his job duties. In May 2012, Reliance Standard

upheld the denial, reasoning that the Plan “explains that loss of a license does not

constitute disability” and that “there must be evidence that one is physically or

mentally incapable of performing the material duties of his occupation as a truck

driver” to qualify as totally disabled. Dr. Hawkins’s submissions, the decision

maintained, referred only to the federalregulations and “failed to identify any specific

restrictions or limitations Mr. Hampton suffered due to insulin-dependent diabetes,

nor provide any insight as to how Mr. Hampton’s symptoms were preventing him

from performing his duties as a truck driver.” Reliance Standard also cited the

conclusions of another doctor, who had reviewed Hampton’s claimfile and found that

“there was no evidence to substantiate [Hampton’s] inability to perform the duties of

a truck driver, other than the regulation set forth by the Department of

Transportation.” 

Hampton sued Reliance Standard in Arkansas state court in July 2012, and

Reliance Standard removed the case to federal court. Hampton then filed an amended

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complaint, naming both Reliance Standard and the Plan as defendants. The amended

complaint alleged thatReliance Standard unreasonably denied his claimfor long-term

disability benefits. The partiesfiled cross-motionsfor judgment on the administrative

record, and the district court entered judgment for Hampton. The court also ordered

Reliance Standard and the Plan to pay Hampton attorneys’ fees and costs. 

The district court reasoned first that although Reliance Standard had discretion

to interpret the Plan, less deference than usual was appropriate, because Reliance

Standard was also responsible for paying benefits under the Plan. The court then

concluded that Reliance Standard abused its discretion by adopting an unreasonable

interpretation of the Plan as applied to Hampton. The court determined that Hampton

was totally disabled under the terms of the Plan, because he lost his license “as a

result of an Injury or Sickness,” namely his insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus. 

Citing the Department of Transportation’s medical advisory criteria for evaluation

under 49 C.F.R. § 391.41, the district court noted that the federal government forbids

insulin-dependent diabetics from operating commercial motor vehicles because the

stresses of long-haul driving exacerbate the symptoms of diabetes. 

Reliance Standard and the Plan appeal, and we review the district court’s grant

of judgment on the record de novo. See McClelland v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 679

F.3d 755, 759 (8th Cir. 2012).

II.

Where, as here, an ERISA-governed employee-benefit plan grants the plan

administrator or another fiduciary discretion to interpret the plan and to determine

eligibility for benefits, we review the fiduciary’s decision for abuse of discretion. See

Wakkinen v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 531 F.3d 575, 580-81 (8th Cir. 2008). 

Under this standard of review, we must uphold Reliance Standard’s decision so long

asit is based on a reasonable interpretation of the Plan and issupported by substantial

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evidence. See King v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 414 F.3d 994, 998-1000

(8th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Where a fiduciary both evaluates claims for benefits and

pays benefits claims, the court still applies the deferential abuse-of-discretion

standard, but the fiduciary’s conflict of interest is one factor to be considered in the

review. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 112, 115-18 (2008).

We first address Reliance Standard’s interpretation of the terms of the Plan. 

The Plan provides for benefits in the event of “Total Disability,” which occurs when

“as a result of an Injury or Sickness . . . , an Insured cannot perform the material

duties of his/her Regular Occupation.” The Plan further providesthat “[i]f an Insured

. . . requires a license for such occupation, the loss ofsuch license for any reason does

not in and of itself constitute ‘Total Disability.’” Reliance Standard interpreted this

language to require “evidence that one is physically or mentally incapable of

performing the material duties of his occupation,” independent of his loss of a license. 

Hampton argues, and the district court agreed, that a claimant qualifies for benefits

under the Plan if he lost his license as a result of an injury or sickness. 

We conclude that Reliance Standard’s interpretation of the Plan is reasonable. 

The loss-of-license provision states that the loss of a license for any reason is

insufficient in and of itself to entitle a claimant to benefits. Diagnosis with diabetes

mellitus caused Hampton to lose his license, but that is not enough by itself to justify

benefits. Reliance Standard’s interpretation does not foreclose a claimant who loses

his license based on injury orsicknessfrom receiving benefits; it merely requiresthat

the claimant show that the injury or sickness itself—independent of the loss of

license—renders him unable to perform his occupation. 

Under Hampton’s contrary interpretation, loss of license by itself does not

entitle the claimant to benefits if the loss is for a non-medical reason, but it would be

sufficient if the license is lost due to sickness or injury. This interpretation would

render the loss-of-license provision surplusage. The definition of “Total Disability”

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includes only inability to work due to injury or sickness, so a driver who is unable to

drive for non-medical reasons (e.g., a failed drug test or a bad driving record) would

not qualify for benefits in the first place. For the loss-of-license provision to have

force, it must apply to a loss of license based on the driver’s health. At a minimum,

it wasreasonable for the fiduciary to adopt an interpretation that avoidsrendering the

policy language meaningless. See King, 414 F.3d at 999. Although Reliance

Standard’s conflict of interest in serving both as claims-review fiduciary and payer

of benefits is a factor to be considered in the analysis, Reliance Standard advancesthe

better reading of the disputed provision, and this is not the sort of case in which the

fiduciary’s conflict likely was determinative. See Jones v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co., 615

F.3d 941, 946 (8th Cir. 2010). 

We next consider whether Reliance Standard’s determination that Hampton

was not totally disabled was supported by substantial evidence—that is, “such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” King, 414 F.3d at 999 (internal quotation omitted). Reliance Standard

explained its view of the evidence in its denial of Hampton’s appeal. Although

Hampton’s physician, Dr. Hawkins, opined that Hampton would be unable to work

as an over-the-road truck driver based on the Department of Transportation’s

regulations, he identified no physical limitations on Hampton’s ability to do so as a

direct result of his diabetes. Reliance Standard also asked another doctor to review

Hampton’s claim file, and that doctor found no evidence that diabetes mellitus

impaired Hampton’s ability to perform his occupation. 

Based on the evidence before it, Reliance Standard’s denial of benefits was

reasonable. The materials from Dr. Hawkins explained only that Hampton would be

unable to work due to the Department of Transportation’s regulations. The materials

did not independently link Hampton’s inability to work to the symptoms of his

diabetes mellitus. It wasreasonable for Reliance Standard to view those submissions

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asinsufficient to show that Hampton was physicallyormentally incapable of working

as an over-the-road truck driver due to his diabetes mellitus. 

Hampton cites the Department ofTransportation’s medical advisory criteria for

evaluation under 49 C.F.R. § 391.41, which effectively apply an irrebuttable

presumption that a person afflicted with insulin-dependent diabetes is at risk of

passing out, becoming disoriented, or going into a diabetic coma or shock while

working as an over-the-road truck driver. But the Plan requires a claimant like

Hampton to present evidence that his illness actually presents those risks; for

whatever reason, Hampton did not do so. It was permissible for Reliance Standard

to require some evidence specific to Hampton, as opposed to the generalizations upon

which the government sometimes must rely in its regulatory capacity to avoid

significant administrative burdens. See Ward v. Skinner, 943 F.2d 157, 162-64 (1st

Cir. 1991). Again, while the fiduciary’s conflict of interest is relevant, the record

does not show a history of biased claim administration or other circumstances

suggesting a high likelihood that the fiduciary’s financial incentives drove the

evidentiary determination here. See Glenn, 554 U.S. at 117-18; Green v. Union Sec.

Ins. Co., 646 F.3d 1042, 1053-54 (8th Cir. 2011). 

* * *

The judgment of the district court is reversed. Because Hampton is no longer

the prevailing party in the suit, we also vacate the district court’s award of attorneys’

fees and costs.

SMITH, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. Like the district court, I conclude that Reliance Standard

abused its discretion in denying Hampton long-term disability benefits. Specifically,

in reaching its decision, Reliance Standard failed to consider relevant federal

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regulations specifically referenced by Hampton's physician. I would affirm the

judgment of the district court. 

Where "'the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary

authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan,'" we

review the administrator's decision for abuse of discretion. Siegel v. Conn. Gen. Life

Ins. Co., 702 F.3d 1044, 1049 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.

v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989)). "'A plan administrator abusesits discretion when

it ignoresrelevant evidence.'" Gerhardt v. Liberty Assurance Co. of Boston, 736 F.3d

777, 780 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Willcox v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston,

552 F.3d 693, 701 (8th Cir. 2009)). 

"[I]f a benefit plan gives discretion to an administrator or fiduciary who is

operating under a conflict of interest, that conflict must be weighed as a factor in

determining whether there is an abuse of discretion." Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115

(quotation and citation omitted). "[W]hen judges review the lawfulness of benefit

denials, they will often take account of several different considerations of which a

conflict of interest is one." Glenn, 554 U.S. at 117. In these cases, "any one factor will

act as a tiebreaker when the other factors are closely balanced, the degree of closeness

necessary depending upon the tiebreaking factor's inherent or case-specific

importance." Id. Where "the record in [a] case contains little evidence about either

[the administrator's] claims administration history or its efforts to ensure that claims

assessment is not affected by the conflict," "this Court gives the conflict some

weight." Darvell v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 597 F.3d 929, 934 (8th Cir. 2010)

(emphasis added). 

Here, Reliance Standard relies on the loss-of-license clause in the Plan to argue

that Hampton's loss of his commercial driver'slicense does not alone constitute "Total

Disability." Reliance Standard's interpretation of this clause is reasonable—a loss of

license alone does not equate to, or is not determinative of, "Total Disability."

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However, Hampton's case includes more than the absence of a license; it includes

proof of the presence of a disabling physical condition. The question is whether other

evidence exists that Hampton is "Totally Disabled" because he cannot "perform the

material duties of" a long-haul truck driver "due to an Injury or Sickness." I find that

there is evidence apart from the loss of license demonstrating Hampton's "Total

Disability"—specifically, the federal regulations—that Reliance Standard failed to

consider in denying Hampton's claim for long-term disability benefits. See Gerhardt,

736 F.3d at 780. 

The relevant Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations define the "general

qualifications of drivers" as follows:

(a) A person shall not drive a commercial motor vehicle unless he/she

is qualified to drive a commercial motor vehicle. Except as provided in

§ 391.63, a motor carrier shall not require or permit a person to drive a

commercial motor vehicle unless that person is qualified to drive a

commercial motor vehicle.

(b) Except as provided in subpart G of this part, a person is qualified to

drive a motor vehicle if he/she . . . 

(4) Is physically qualified to drive a commercial motor

vehicle in accordance with subpart E--Physical

Qualifications and Examinations of this part . . . .

49 C.F.R. § 391.11 (emphasis added). 

In turn, the federal regulations set forth the "physical qualifications for

drivers," providing:

(a)(1)(i) A person subject to this part must not operate a commercial

motor vehicle unless he or she is medically certified as physically

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qualified to do so, and, . . . when on-duty has on his or her person the

original, or a copy, of a current medical examiner's certificate that he or

she is physically qualified to drive a commercial motor vehicle . . . . 

* * *

(b) A person is physically qualified to drive a commercial motor vehicle

if that person— 

* * *

(3) Has no established medical history or clinical diagnosis

of diabetes mellitus currently requiring insulin for control

. . . .

49 C.F.R. § 391.41 (emphases added). 

The United States Department of Transportation (DOT) has provided the

following regulatory guidance for interpreting § 391.41:

Question 1: Who is responsible for ensuring that medical certifications

meet the requirements?

Guidance: Medical certification determinations are the responsibility of

the medical examiner. The motor carrier has the responsibility to ensure

that the medical examiner is informed of the minimum medical

requirements and the characteristics of the work to be performed. The

motor carrier is also responsible for ensuring that only medically

qualified drivers are operating CMVs in interstate commerce.

* * *

Question 3: What are the physical qualification requirements for

operating a CMV in interstate commerce?

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Guidance: The physical qualification regulationsfor driversin interstate

commerce are found at §391.41. Instructions to medical examiners

performing physical examinations of these drivers are found at §391.43.

Interpretive guidelines are distributed upon request.

The qualification standards cover 13 areas which directly relate to the

driving function. All but four of the standards require a judgement by

the medical examiner. A person's qualification to drive is determined by

a medical examiner who is knowledgeable about the driver's functions

and whether a particular condition would interfere with the driver's

ability to operate a CMV safely. In the case of vision, hearing,

insulin-using diabetes, and epilepsy, the current standards are absolute,

providing no discretion to the medical examiner.

RegulatoryGuidance for the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, 62 FR 16370-

01, 1997 WL 153864, at *16410–11 (DOT Apr. 4, 1997). 

In turn, the Medical Advisory Criteria for Evaluation applicable to

§ 391.41(b)(3) states:

A person is physically qualified to drive a commercial vehicle if that

person:

Has no established medical history or clinical diagnosis of diabetes

mellitus currently requiring insulin for control. 

Diabetes mellitus is a disease which, on occasion, can result in a loss of

consciousness or disorientation in time and space. Individuals who

require insulin for control have conditions which can get out of control

by the use of too much or too little insulin, or food intake not consistent

with the insulin dosage. Incapacitation may occur from symptoms of

hyperglycemic or hypoglycemic reactions (drowsiness,

semiconsciousness, diabetic coma, or insulin shock). 

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The administration of insulin is within itself, a complicated process

requiring insulin, syringe, needle, alcohol sponge and a sterile

technique. Factors related to long-haul commercial motor vehicle

operationssuch asfatigue, lack ofsleep, poor diet, emotional conditions,

stress, and concomitant illness, compound the diabetic problem. Because

of these inherent dangers, the FMCSA has consistently held that a

1

diabetic who uses insulin for control does not meet the minimum

physical requirements of the FMCSRs.

2

(Emphases added.)

In the present case, Dr. Hawkins opined in his June 2011 letter to Reliance

Standard that he "d[id] not feel that Mr. Hampton will be able to obtain gainful

employment noting his insulin dependent diabetes mellitus, which precludes him

from operating any sort of heavy machinery or motorized vehicles based on the

Department of Transportation regulations [("DOT regulations")]." Appellants' App.

at 78 (emphasis added). Although Dr. Hawkins makes only a general reference to the

DOT regulations, his reference to Hampton's "insulin dependant diabetes mellitus"

makes clear that he was referencing 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b)(3). In rendering his

medical opinion, Dr. Hawkins never stated that Hampton was physically incapable

of performing the material duties of his job because he could not obtain a license;

instead, he opined that Hampton could not perform such duties "based on the

Department of Transportation regulations." As detailed supra, these regulations and

the accompanying guidance make clear that Hampton, who no one disputesisinsulindependent with diabetes mellitus, is physically disqualified from driving a long-haul

commercial vehicle because of the delineated risks and inherent dangers arising from

his sickness. Put another way, Hampton is physically incapable of performing the

material duties of a long-haul truck driver because of diabetes mellitus. 

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 1

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations 2

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In denying Hampton benefits, Reliance Standard neverreferred to the relevant

federal regulations in conjunction with Dr. Hawkins's June 2011 letter. In doing so,

it failed to consider all relevant evidence. See Gerhardt, 736 F.3d at 780. Taking into

account's Reliance Standard's position as both administrator and insurer, I conclude

that Reliance Standard abused its discretion in denying Hampton long-termdisability

benefits. See id. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the district court. 

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