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FIONA C. v. KEVIN L.*

(AC 38495)

DiPentima, C. J., and Mullins and Jongbloed, Js.

Argued May 12—officially released July 12, 2016

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Danbury, Ozalis, J.)

Bruce Seeliger, for the appellant (defendant).

Beverley Rogers, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

DiPENTIMA, C. J. The defendant, Kevin L., appeals

from the judgment of the trial court granting the application for a civil protection order pursuant to General

Statutes § 46b-16a filed by the plaintiff, Fiona C. On

appeal, the defendant raises interrelated claims that (1)

the courtimproperly interpreted General Statutes § 53a181d, the stalking in the second degree statute, and

(2) under the proper interpretation of that statute, the

plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant

the granting of her application for a civil protection

order. We agree with the defendant and, accordingly,

reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as found by the trial court, and

procedural history are relevant to our discussion. On

August 31, 2015, the plaintiff filed an application for an

order of civil protection, alleging that she had been the

victim of stalking. She requested that the court order

that the defendant (1) not assault, threaten, abuse,

harass, follow, interfere with or stalk the plaintiff, (2)

stay away from her home, (3) not contact her in any

manner, (4) stay 100 yards away from her and (5) be

educated at a different educational facility from the one

she attended, or be home schooled. The court granted

the application and issued an ex parte civil protection order.

The court held a hearing on September 10, 2015. At

the outset, the court noted that both the plaintiff and the

defendant were under the age of eighteen. The plaintiff

testified that she and the defendant attended the same

school starting in the first grade. They were in the same

class in the third grade, and according to the plaintiff’s

testimony, an incident occurred at that time. Specifically, the plaintiff testified that the defendant had

threatened her by stating that he wanted to slit her

throat. As a result, she felt scared and after telling her

teacher about this event, the principal removed the

defendant from the plaintiff’s class. The plaintiff further

testified that although the defendant eventually

returned to her third grade class, there were no further

threats made against her either that year or during the

fourth and fifth grades when the parties were at the

same school but in different classrooms. According to

the plaintiff, during her sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth

grade years, the defendant was enrolled in a different

school. There was no interaction between the two during that time.

In the tenth grade, the plaintiff transferred to an alternative high school with a single classroom, a kitchen

and an office. Less than ten students attend this school.

In the spring of 2015, the plaintiff learned that the defendant would be transferred to her school when the new

school year started in August, 2015. After hearing this,

the plaintiff, who still feared the defendant, became
concerned. She informed the coordinator of the alternative school of her past history with the defendant and

her present concerns for her safety.

On the third day of school, both the plaintiff and

the defendant were present. The plaintiff informed the

administration that she could not attend school if the

defendant was present. The plaintiff then went home.

The direct examination concluded with the plaintiff’s

testimony thatthe defendant had a reputation forthreatening other students and ‘‘was not a good person.’’

On cross-examination, the plaintiff acknowledged

that the last time she had been threatened by the defendant was in the third grade. Upon questioning from

the court, the plaintiff indicated that the defendant’s

threatening to ‘‘kill’’ other students and his bullying of

other students occurred throughout elementary school.

The plaintiff heard of threats made by the defendant

against others while in high school. The plaintiff’s father

then testified, after which the plaintiff’s counsel rested.

During a colloquy with the court, the plaintiff’s counsel conceded that there had been no recent interactions

between the plaintiff and the defendant. After a recess,

the court concluded that it needed further evidence in

order to reach a decision on the plaintiff’s application.1

The court continued the order of protection until the

next court date.

On October 7, 2015, the hearing resumed. The court

heard testimony from various school administrators.

During a recess, the court reviewed, in camera, certain

school records of the defendant.2 After the hearing

resumed, the court noted the following on the record:

‘‘The [school] records reflect threatening statements by

[the defendant] in the second grade, third grade, [and]

fourth grade. That [the defendant] brought a weapon

to school during what appears to be third grade. It was

a knife.

‘‘That in fourth grade there were threatening statements made according to the records and that it—it

was alleged in the records that he showed a weapon

to the staff.

‘‘Also, the records indicate and reflect that [the defendant] has made threats to peers, and that was [during

a later time period]. And that he brought a knife to

school in the seventh grade, and that’s reflected in the

record, and that was in February of 2012 that that

action occurred.

* * *

‘‘But I will note forthe record that in the—forthe 2015

period, there were—actually beginning in November,

2014, there were at least four occasions noted in the

record in which some event occurred. Some statements

were made regarding [the defendant] that at least one

of the teachers viewed to be concerning, and that one
of the matters was referred to the dean. Because of the

cryptic nature of the notes, I have no idea what that

refers or relates to.’’

After hearing closing arguments from counsel, the

court rendered an oral decision granting the plaintiff’s

application for a civil protection order. Specifically,

the court found reasonable grounds to believe that the

defendant had committed stalking in the second degree

pursuant to § 53a-181d and that he would continue to

commit such acts or acts designed to intimidate or

retaliate against the plaintiff. The court based its findings on the school records that it had reviewed and

the defendant’s ‘‘continuing course of conduct toward

peers and weapons being brought to school.’’

The defendant’s counsel asked for a clarification of

the court’s decision, specifically, what two acts constituted the course of conduct required under the stalking

statute. The court replied: ‘‘I found the initial acts of

him threatening to slit her throat and bringing a knife

into the school, and I find all of the continuing acts

that he did threatening his peers and bringing a weapon

into school. It was a consistent course of conduct

toward peers that are in his immediate vicinity.’’

The defendant’s counsel then furtherinquired: ‘‘Okay.

So you—so just for—so you’re—in terms of [the plaintiff], you’re finding just one incident where he threatened to slit her throat?’’ The court responded:

‘‘Threatened to slit her throat and then his continuous

course of conduct threatening other students . . .

bringing weapons to school, threatening to harm other

students. It has continued continuously from second

grade till it appears to recently.’’ This appeal followed.

On appeal the defendant claims, inter alia, that the

court misconstrued the course of conduct element set

forth in § 53a-181d and that there was insufficient evidence to grant the civil protection order on the basis

of stalking in the second degree.3 We agree with the

defendant.

The first component of the defendant’s claim is that

the court improperly construed the course of conduct

element of stalking in the second degree, which was

the predicate offense establishing the plaintiff’s eligibility for a civil protection order. ‘‘Issues of statutory construction raise questions of law, over which we exercise

plenary review. . . . When construing a statute, [o]ur

fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to

the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In seeking

to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z

directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself

and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining

such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does

not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual

evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be
considered.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotations

marks omitted.) State v. Moreno-Hernandez, 317 Conn.

292, 299, 118 A.3d 26 (2015); see also State v. Wright,

320 Conn. 781, 801, 135 A.3d 1 (2016). We note that ‘‘[i]t

is our duty to interpret statutes as they are written.

. . . Courts cannot, by construction, read into statutes

provisions which are not clearly stated.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fetscher, 162 Conn. App.

145, 152, 130 A.3d 892 (2015), cert. denied, 321 Conn.

904, A.3d (2016).

This court recently has interpreted § 46b-16a, and

that case provides a roadmap for our analysis in the

present matter. In Kayla M. v. Greene, 163 Conn. App.

493, 503, A.3d (2016), we concluded that ‘‘an

applicant for a civil protection order on the basis of

stalking is required to prove only that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a defendant stalked and

will continue to stalk, as described in §§ 53a-181c, 53a181d or 53a-181e.’’ (Emphasis in original.)

We then addressed the defendants’ claim of insufficient evidence. Id. At the outset, we noted that the

same standard of review used in cases involving civil

restraining orders under General Statutes § 46b-15

applies in cases involving § 46b-16a. Id., 504. ‘‘Thus, we

will not disturb a trial court’s orders unless the court

has abused its discretion or it is found that it could

not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the facts

presented.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The

deferential standard ofreview, does not apply, however,

to a trial court’s interpretation and application of the

law to the facts. Id. ‘‘It is axiomatic that a matter of

law is entitled to plenary review on appeal.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id.; see also Stacy B. v.

Robert S., 165 Conn. App. 374, 386, A.3d (2016).

We proceeded to interpret the elements of stalking

in the second degree, one of the underlying predicate

offenses set forth in § 46b-16a (a), and the specific

offense for which the court granted the plaintiff’s application for a civil protection order. ‘‘Stalking in the second degree under § 53a-181d (b) (1) includes the

following elements: (1) that the respondent acting

knowingly, (2) that the respondent engaged in a course

of conduct directed at the victim, and (3) that such

conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear for

his or her physical safety or for the physical safety of

a third person.’’ Kayla M. v. Greene, supra, 163 Conn.

App. 505. We then recited the statutory definition of

‘‘course of conduct’’ as follows: ‘‘A course of conduct

is defined as two or more acts, including, but not limited

to, acts in which a person directly, indirectly or through

a third party, by any action, method, device or means,

(1)follows, lies in wait for, monitors, observes, surveils,

threatens, harasses, communicates with or sends

unwanted gifts to, a person, or (2) interferes with a

person’s property. General Statutes § 53a-181d (a).’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 505–506.

In the present case, the court determined that there

were reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant

had violated § 53a-181d. The court based this determination on the defendant’s threat to harm the plaintiff made

when they were in the third grade, the defendant’s continuing course of conduct of threats made toward peers,

and the weapons that he brought to school, which the

court found consistent with the plaintiff’s testimony.

Upon a request for clarification from the defendant’s

counsel, the court explained that the third grade incident and his threats toward his peers satisfied the

course of conduct elements contained in § 53a-181d

(b) (1).

Section 53a-181d (a) defines the phrase ‘‘course of

conduct’’ as requiring ‘‘two or more acts.’’ A person

violates this statute, inter alia, when he or she engages

a course of conduct directed at a specific person. See

General Statutes § 53a-181d (b) (1). Reading these two

parts of the stalking in the second degree statute

together, we conclude that the two or more acts must

be directed at a specific person, in this case the plaintiff.

The trial court employed a broader interpretation in its

analysis. Specifically, it determined that the ‘‘course of

conduct’’ was met by the defendant’s past threat to slit

the plaintiff’s throat and his later threats made toward

other students.

The court’s interpretation ignores the plain language

of § 53a-181d (a) (1) that the course of conduct be

directed at a specific person. We iterate that we are

bound to interpret the statute as it is written and cannot ignore the words used by the legislature. ‘‘It is a

basic tenet of statutory construction that the legislature

does not intend to enact meaningless provisions. . . .

Every word and phrase [in a statute] is presumed to

have meaning, and we do not construe statutes so as to

render certain words and phrases surplusage.’’(Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pommer, 110 Conn.

App. 608, 614, 955 A.2d 637, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 951,

961 A.2d 418 (2008).

We find support for this interpretation in our case

law. For example, in Sherman v. Niewola, Superior

Court, judicial district of Tolland at Rockville, Docket

No. CV-15-4022631-S (April 29, 2015), the Superior Court

noted that one of the elements of stalking in the second

degree is that the perpetrator embark on a course of

conduct directed toward an applicant for a civil protection order. In other words, the course of conduct, statutorily defined as two or more acts, must be directed at

the same person. See also Stacy B. v. Robert S., Superior

Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV15-4034547-S (May 28, 2015) (court found probable

cause that perpetrator committed crime of stalking

given his course of conduct directed at applicant for

civil protection order), aff’d, Stacy B. v. Robert S., supra,
165 Conn. App. 374; see generally State v. Arthurs,

121 Conn. App. 520, 524–25, 997 A.2d 568 (2010), cert.

denied, 310 Conn. 957, 82 A.3d 626 (2013); State v.

Culmo, 43 Conn. Supp. 46, 60, 642 A.2d 90 (1993).4

Finally, we note that in Kayla M. v. Greene, supra, 163

Conn. App. 516, we concluded that the court properly

granted the plaintiff’s application for a civil protection

order against the defendants. In reviewing the claim of

one of the defendants, we agreed that she had ‘‘knowingly engaged in a course of conduct [i.e., multiple acts]

directed at the [plaintiff] that would cause a reasonable

person to fear for such person’s physical safety.’’

(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 514. For these reasons, we conclude that the trial

court misconstrued the course of conduct element contained in the stalking in the second degree statute.

We next turn to the second component of the defendant’s appellate argument, that is, under a proper interpretation of the § 46b-16a, there was insufficient

evidence forthe court to grant the plaintiff’s application

for a civil protection order. We agree with the defendant

that the court’s finding regarding the course of conduct

element of the predicate offense of stalking in the second degree was not supported by the evidence, and,

therefore, was improper. We conclude, therefore, that

the court abused its discretion in granting the application for a civil protection order. See Kayla M. v. Greene,

supra, 163 Conn. App. 504.

The plaintiff presented evidence of the threat made

against her by the defendant when they both were in the

third grade. We assume, arguendo, that his statement

constituted an act in which he threatened a specific

person. See General Statutes § 53a-181d (a) and (b) (1).

The dispositive inquiry is whether there was evidence

of a second act directed against the plaintiff necessary

to satisfy the ‘‘course of conduct’’ element of § 53a181d. We conclude that there was no evidence of a

second act directed against the plaintiff.

The plaintiff testified that there had been no interactions with the defendant when they were in the fourth,

fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth or tenth grades. In

its oral decision, the court focused on the defendant’s

conduct with respect to his peers at school but, aside

from the third grade incident, his conduct was not

directed toward the plaintiff. Upon a request for clarification, the court stated the basis for its finding of a

course of conduct as follows: ‘‘I found the initial act of

him threatening to slit her throat and bringing a knife

into school,5 and I find all of the continuing acts that

he did threatening his peers and bringing a weapon into

school including a knife. It was a consistent course

of conduct toward peers that are in his immediate

vicinity.’’ (Footnote added.) The court then iterated:

‘‘Threatened to slit her throat and then his continuous

course of conduct threatening other students – bringing
weapons to school, threatening to harm other students.

It has continued continuously from second grade till it

appears to recently.’’

After a thorough review of the record, we conclude

that there was no evidence of a second act by the

defendant directed specifically at the plaintiff. The

court relied on the defendant’s actions against his peers

in his immediate vicinity. There was no finding that the

plaintiff was part of this group. Moreover, the plaintiff’s

own testimony would not support such a finding. Simply

put, the record does not support a finding that the

defendant had engaged in a course of conduct directed

against the plaintiff. As a result, the court’s determination that the defendant had committed behavior constituting stalking in the second degree was improper. We

conclude, therefore, that the court abused its discretion

in granting the application for a civil protection order.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded

with direction to vacate the order of protection.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interest of the

applicant for a protective order, we decline to identify the applicant or

others through whom the applicant’s identity may be ascertained.

1 Specifically, the court stated: ‘‘I’ve had the opportunity to consider the

statute and also the testimony and the evidence that’s been produced today.

I have serious concerns here about this issue and I feel like I do not have

sufficient evidence in front of me, not to make a decision on this application.

‘‘And I find that there [are] reasonable grounds for the [plaintiff] to be

concerned with respect to [the defendant]. However, I don’t know whether

or not those concerns are within the recent history of events. There’s been

testimony here today about threats by [the defendant] within the last few

years as to other students and I want to know more about that.

‘‘And I’m going to continue this hearing out for two weeks. I want the

school administrator here. I want you to subpoena her. And I want to know

about what the school knows about the—if any, if they exist, whether there

have been any threats at any of the schools. And that’s the issue we’re going

to focus on at the two week period.

* * *

‘‘This is a [plaintiff] who has been threatened by [the defendant], albeit

years ago. And he did threaten to slit her throat and there’s evidence before

the Court, as to how both of their lives have proceeded over the last few

years. And before I make a decision on how this serious issue should

proceed, because it impacts both your lives on how you’re getting your

education, I want this information from the school.’’

2 These school records are not part of the record before us, and, therefore,

we have not reviewed them.

3 The defendant also argued that the court improperly determined, as a

matter of law, that § 46b-16a applied retroactively. Because we agree with

the defendant that the court misinterpreted the stalking statute and, as

result, there was insufficient evidence to grant the plaintiff’s application for

a civil protection order on that basis, we need not address the claim regarding

the retroactive application of § 46b-16a.

4 We are mindful that under the prior version of § 53a-181d (a), the perpetrator was prohibited from wilfully and repeatedly following or lying in wait

for another person. Kayla M. v. Greene, supra, 163 Conn. App. 510 and n.8.

General Statutes (Rev. to 2012) § 53a-181d (a) provided in relevant part: ‘‘A

person is guilty of stalking in the second degree when, with intent to cause

another person to fear for his physical safety, he wilfully and repeatedly

follows or waits for such other person and causes such other person to

reasonably fear for his physical safety. . . .’’ Nevertheless, this prior version

of the statute, and the cases interpreting it, support our conclusion that

same person must be the target or object of the perpetrator’s acts.

5 We note that there is no evidence of a second incident involving a knife

and the plaintiff when she was in the third grade.