1

No. 03-15-00328-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 

TEXAS AT AUSTIN, TEXAS 

******

DANIEL LORENZO WILSON 

VS. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS 

******

ON APPEAL FROM THE 264th DISTRICT COURT 

OF BELL COUNTY, TEXAS 

Cause No. 72,334 

******

STATE’S BRIEF

******

 HENRY GARZA 

 DISTRICT ATTORNEY 

 BOB D. ODOM 

 ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY 

 P.O. Box 540 

 Belton, Tx 76513 

 (254) 933-5215 

 FAX (254) 933-5704 

 DistrictAttorney@co.bell.tx.us 

 SBA No. 15200000

Oral Argument Not Requested 

ACCEPTED

03-15-00328-cr

6704983

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

8/28/2015 2:51:46 PM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 8/28/2015 2:51:46 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ITEM PAGE

Index of Authorities ........................................................................... 3

Statement Regarding Oral Argument ............................................... 5

Statement of the Case ........................................................................ 5

Statement of Facts ............................................................................. 6

Summary of State’s Argument .......................................................... 10

Argument and Authorities ................................................................ 11

Issue on Appeal ........................................................................ 11

TRIAL COURT ABUSE DISCRETION IN ADMITTING 

CRIME SCENE PHOTOGRAPHS IN NON-JURY 

PUNISHMENT HEARING UNDER RULE 403?

Standard of Review ................................................................. 11

Application and Analysis ........................................................ 12

Prayer ................................................................................................. 30

Certificate of Compliance with Rule 9 ............................................. 30

Certificate of Service ......................................................................... 31
3

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES PAGE

Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230 ................................. 16, 17, 23, 27

(Tx. Cr. App. 1999)

Corley v. State, 987 S.W.2d 615 ........................................................ 15

(Tx. App. Austin 3rd Dist. 1999 no pet.)

Erazo v. State, 144 S.W.3d 487 (Tx. Cr. App. 2004) ........................ 17-20

Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757 (Tx. Cr. App. 2007) .....................11-12, 14

Hernandez v. State, 390 S.W.3d 310 (Tx. Cr. App. 2012) ............... 14

Jackson v. State, No. AP-75,707, 2010 Tex. Crim. App. .................... 19-20

Unpub. LEXIS 30, (Tx. Cr. App. 2010), not designated 

for publication

Jean v. State, No. AP-76,601, 2013 Tex. Crim. App. ......................... 27-28

Unpub. LEXIS 785, (Tx. Cr. App. 2013), not designated 

for publication

Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372 .............................................. 14, 21

(Tx. Cr. App. 1990) op. on reh’ng.

Pawlak v. State, 420 S.W.3d 807 (Tx. Cr. App. 2013) ..................... 14

Reese v. State, 33 S.W.3d 238 (Tx. Cr. App. 2000) .......................... 17-20

Sonnier v. State, 913 S.W.2d 511 (Tx. Cr. App. 1995) ............... 15-16, 27

Ex Parte Twine, 111 S.W.3d 664 (Tx. App. Ft. Worth ..................... 15, 23

2nd Dist. 2003 rev. ref.)

Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540 (Tx. Cr. App. 2000) ............... 11
4

OTHER PAGE

Texas Penal Code

Section 12.32 ........................................................................... 21

Section 19.02 ........................................................................... 21

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure

Article 37.07(3) ....................................................................... 22, 24

Texas Rules of Evidence

Rule 403 ................................................ 10-11, 13-16, 20-21, 27-28

Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure

Rule 33.1 ................................................................................. 13

Rule 44.2(b) ............................................................................ 28
5

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

The State does not request oral argument.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Appellant, Daniel Lorenzo Wilson, was charged by indictment 

with the offense of murder. The indictment alleged that he intentionally 

and knowingly caused the death of Karen Edwards by shooting her with 

a firearm and stabbing and cutting her with a knife. (RR-4).

The Appellant waived a jury and entered a plea of guilty to the 

offense charged. (CR-15-22; RR2-7, 8). The trial court took judicial 

notice of the Appellant’s judicial confession admitting all of the elements 

of the offense as charged in the indictment. (CR-20; RR2-8). There was 

no plea bargain with the State. (CR-15; RR2-8). The trial court found the 

evidence sufficient to support a finding of guilty and recessed the 

hearing for a presentence report. (RR2-9).

After an extensive subsequent hearing on punishment the court 

found the Appellant guilty and sentenced him to life in the Texas 

Department of Corrections, Institutional Division. (CR-25; RR3-174, 

175).
6

The Appellant gave timely notice of appeal (CR-29) and the trial 

court certified his right to do so. (CR-23).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Latasha Brown was hanging out with the Appellant at his home. 

They were drinking beer and Brown was using cocaine when Karen 

Edwards, who had dated the Appellant, arrived. (RR3-21, 24). Edwards 

sat down on the sofa and Ms. Brown got up and walked into the 

bathroom. (RR3-25). As she was closing the bathroom door, however, 

Brown heard a shot. (RR3-26). She knew that the Appellant kept a gun 

in a drawer in the sectional sofa. (RR3-26). She had heard no argument 

prior to the shot. (RR3-27).

After the shot was fired Ms. Brown heard Karen Edwards 

screaming and saw her seated on the couch holding her leg. The 

Appellant was next to her with the gun. (RR3-27, 28). Edwards kept 

asking him to let her leave and promised not to tell anybody and would 

just walk home. She promised to say that it was an accident. (RR3-29, 

30, 31). The Appellant replied that she was not leaving and got a towel 

or something to try to stop the bleeding. (RR3-31).
7

Ms. Edwards kept screaming “Daniel, you shot me, you shot me”. 

The Appellant told her to shut up because he could not think and that he 

loved her. (RR3-32).

About 30 minutes later, Karen Edwards was still seated on the 

couch and the Appellant was standing over her, when he said “mother 

fucker you’re going to learn to stop playing me” and accused her of 

never loving him. He then he pointed the gun at her and shot her in the 

stomach. Brown ran and hid in the shower. (RR3-32, 33). 

Ms. Brown heard Edwards begging for her life and pleading with 

the Appellant to let her call and talk to her kids and her mother one last 

time. (RR3-34). She heard Edwards scream something that sounded 

like “my life is leaving me”. She then saw Edwards slide across the floor 

to the bathroom door. (RR3-35). 

Ms. Brown urged Edwards to come with her and they would jump 

out the bathroom window but Edwards said that the Appellant would 

kill her if she tried that and she could not walk. (RR3-36). The Appellant 

started taunting Edwards by waiving the gun around and told her that 

he hoped she had prayed to her maker. (RR3-37). Brown tried to lift her 

up but could not do so. (RR3-37).
8

At that point the Appellant grabbed Karen Edwards by the front of 

her shirt and tossed her aside. He told her again to pray to her maker 

and shot her in the head. (RR3-39). Then, when he saw she was still 

breathing, he took a flashlight and started beating her about the face. 

(RR3-39). The Appellant shot at her head a second time but seemed to 

have missed. (RR3-39). About an hour had passed between the first 

shot in the leg and the shots to the head. (RR3-39).

Ms. Edwards was still gurgling from the wound in her head. She 

was breathing but not talking at that point. The Appellant grabbed her, 

threw her down on the floor and stepped on her neck, saying “why don’t 

you just die, bitch”. (RR3-41). He then grabbed a sword off of the table 

and just started chopping down on Karen Edwards, cutting and stabbing 

her. (RR3-42, 43). 

The Appellant then ordered Latasha Brown to “get this trash out 

of my house” but Brown could not lift the body. The Appellant told 

Brown that she was going to help him get rid of it “or you are next”. He 

pointed the gun at Brown and pulled the trigger, but had no more 

bullets. (RR3-43, 44). 
9

The Appellant and Ms. Brown first put the body of Karen Edwards 

on the porch and then dragged it across the street behind a vacant 

house. (RR3-43, 45, 46). 

The Appellant told Brown to get back in the house and as they did 

he locked the door. He changed his clothes and ordered her to put them 

in a plastic bag. (RR3-46). Brown then asked him if he had any bleach 

with which to clean up the scene and told him that she would go and get 

some. He gave her $5.00 and she left after she called a friend to come 

and pick her up. (RR3-47). 

Latasha Brown was “high out of her mind” and did not know what 

to do. She went to a friend’s house and used more cocaine and alcohol 

but the memory would not go away. She still had brain matter on her 

clothing. (RR3-48). Finally, a friend convinced her to call 911 and 

report the incident. (RR3-49). 

Killeen Police Officers went to the scene and arrested the 

Appellant. They investigated the scene of the crime as well as where the 

body was located and took photographs. (RR3-101, 102, 104). 

The autopsy on the body of Karen Edwards established that she 

had suffered 4 gunshot wounds, one in the leg, another in the abdomen, 

one in the forehead, and one that grazed the side of her head. (RR3-86, 
10

87). She also had a slicing cut on her neck, numerous stab wounds on 

the abdomen and blunt force injuries to her face and forehead that 

caused numerous facial fractures. (RR3-87, 88, 89, 90, 91). 

SUMMARY OF STATE’S ARGUMENT

The photographs were not unfairly prejudicial but merely 

depicted the reality of the brutal and heinous crime admittedly 

committed by the Appellant and Rule 403 has no application. The 

photographs were admissible to show the circumstances of the 

commission of the crime at the punishment hearing before the trial 

court and without a jury. They also served to corroborate the 

eyewitness to the murder. Any prejudice created was not unfair as the 

evidence only illustrated the Appellant’s own actions. 

Even if the evidence had been unfairly prejudicial it did not 

substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence. 

Had the trial court erred in the admission of the photographs that 

error would have been harmless as not affecting the Appellant’s 

substantial rights in view of his admission and the evidence of an 

extremely brutal murder. 
11

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

Issue on Appeal

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in overruling the 

Appellant’s objections to certain photographs on the grounds that they 

were unfairly prejudicial and that the probative value of that evidence 

was substantially outweighed by such prejudice?

Standard of Review

A trial court’s ruling upon the admissibility of evidence is 

reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard and the ruling will be 

upheld as long as it is within the zone of reasonable disagreement. 

Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W. 3d 540, 542 (Tx. Cr. App. 2000). 

The admission of a photograph is within the sound discretion of 

the trial judge and generally a photograph is admissible if verbal 

testimony is admissible as to matters depicted in the photograph. If 

verbal testimony is relevant, photographs of the same are also relevant. 

Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 762 (Tx. Cr. App. 2007).

Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, however allows the 

exclusion of relevant evidence when its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The Rule favors 
12

admission of relevant evidence and carries a presumption that relevant 

evidence will be more probative than prejudicial. Gallo at 762.

Application and Analysis

The Photographs

In this case the State offered photographs designated State’s 

Exhibits 4 through 38. They were all taken at the scene of the crime. 

When the State offered State’s Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 20, 21, 

22, 23, 24, 25, 31, 34, and 35 the Appellant objected to them because he 

alleged they were “unduly prejudicial” and their probative value was 

very limited. The trial court overruled the objection and admitted those 

exhibits. (RR3-52).

Later the State offered those photographs marked State’s exhibits 

4, 5, 6, 12, 15, 17, 18, 19, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, and 36. As to those 

exhibits the Appellant had no objection and they were admitted. (RR3-

105, 106). 

On appeal the Appellant says he complains of the admission of 

State’s Exhibits 4, 7, 8, 15, 16, 17, and 18 (Appellant’s Brief at pg. 23), 

however, he then cites Exhibits 9, 13, 14, 25, 31, 34 and 35 as examples 

of what he characterizes as “grossly prejudicial” and does not include 

those he earlier stated were the basis of his appellate complaint. 
13

The exhibits are set out in numerical order in RR4. State’s Exhibit 

41 is a photograph of the outside of the residence where the murder 

occurred. State’s Exhibit 7 show the body behind the vacant house at a 

distance. Exhibit 8 is a closer view of the body as it was found. State’s 

Exhibit 9 is a photograph showing the wounds on the face of Karen 

Edwards. Exhibit 13 and Exhibit 14 show blood on the sidewalk. 

Exhibit 15 is a close up of blood pooled on the walk. Exhibit 16 shows 

the sidewalk itself and 17 the back of the house and the porch. Exhibit 

18 is a photograph of the back of a house. Exhibit 25 is a photograph of 

the sword lying on a table inside the house. Exhibit 31 appears to show 

part of the inside of the house. Exhibits 34 and 35 are photographs of 

the flashlight from different angles.

Rule 403

Rule 403 requires the court to conduct a balancing test in which it 

must weigh the probative value of the evidence against the danger of 

unfair prejudice. The Appellant does not contest that the photographs 

were both relevant and probative in this case, but merely that they were 

unfairly prejudicial to the extent that the unfair prejudice substantially 

 

1 State’s Exhibit 4 was offered and admitted without objection (RR3-105, 106) and 

therefore nothing is presented for review. Rule 33.1, Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.
14

outweighed the probative value. The rule, however, requires a 

presumption that relevant evidence will be more probative than 

unfairly prejudicial. Gallo at 762.

Not Unfairly Prejudicial

In this case the photographs admitted by the trial court over the 

Appellant’s objection, were not unfairly prejudicial in the first place. All 

evidence is prejudicial to one party or other. What Rule 403 requires is 

a balancing between unfair prejudice and probative value and the rule is 

inapplicable where there is not a clear disparity between such prejudice 

and probative value. Hernandez v. State, 390 S.W.3d 310, 324 (Tx. Cr. 

App. 2012). Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it has an undue 

tendency to suggest that a decision be made on an improper basis, 

usually an emotional one. Pawlak v. State, 420 S.W.3d 807, 809 (Tx. Cr. 

App. 2013), Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 389 (Tx. Cr. App. 

1990) op. on reh’ng.

In this case it must be remembered that the photographs 

complained of were offered at a sentencing hearing conducted before 

the trial court, without a jury, subsequent to a plea of guilty. The judge 

was the fact finder and charged with the duty of making the decision as 

to punishment. The danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403 is greatly 
15

reduced when the judge is the trier of fact. Ex Parte Twine, 111 S.W.3d 

664, 668(Tx. App. Ft. Worth 2nd Dist. 2003 rev. ref.); Corley v. State, 987 

S.W.2d 615, 621 (Tx. App. Austin 3rd Dist. 1999 no pet.). There is 

nothing in the record to indicate or even imply that the trial judge was 

prejudiced by the admission of the photographs so as to make an 

emotionally charged or improper decision as to punishment. 

The Appellant alleges that the photographs he cites were unfairly 

prejudicial because they were “gruesome”. Three of the photographs he 

cites are State’s Exhibits 7, 8, and 9. State’s Exhibits 7 and 8 show the 

body of Karen Edwards where it was found. State’s Exhibit 9 shows the 

wounds admittedly inflicted by the Appellant on her face. Exhibits 13, 

14, and 15 show the blood trail on the sidewalk where her body was 

dragged. Other photographs show the flashlight and sword used to 

inflict the injuries. (Exhibits 25, 34, 35).

Undoubtedly these photographs prejudiced the Appellant, but was 

that effect unfair? In Sonnier v. State, 913 S.W.2d 511 (Tx. Cr. App. 

1995) the defendant complained of the admission of photographs of the 

bodies of two victims in a bathtub full of bloody water with visible stab 

wounds as gruesome and claimed they should not have been admitted 

under Rule 403. The Court of Criminal Appeals, however, stated:
16

“The photographs are gruesome. That is to say they are

disagreeable to look at, but they depict nothing more

than the reality of a brutal crime committed. The 

 photographs are powerful visual evidence, probative of

various aspects of the State’s theory of the offense, 

including the brutality and heinousness of the offense.

The Appellant must realize that it is precisely the quality

of which we describe as ‘powerful’ which gives rise to his

arguments that the photographs are prejudicially

inflammatory. But when the power of the visible evidence

emanates from nothing more than what the defendant 

himself has done we cannot hold that the trial court has

abused its discretion merely because it admitted the 

 evidence. A trial court does not err merely because it 

admits into evidence photographs which are gruesome.”

Sonnier at 519. 

Similarly, in Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230 (Tx. Cr. App. 

1999), the defendant complained of color photographs showing a close 

up of the victim face with brain matter extruded and other wounds. He 

claimed they were unfairly prejudicial and lacked probative value under 

Rule 403 because they merely depicted what was included in the oral 

testimony of the pathologist and were inflammatory. First of all, the 

Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the premise that visual evidence 

accompanying oral testimony was thereby rendered insignificantly 

probative. The Court noted that visual evidence that accompanies oral 

testimony often gives the fact finder a point of comparison against 

which to test the credibility of the witness. Moreover, the court did not 
17

agree that the photographs were inflammatory, noting that “The 

photographs are gruesome in that they depict disagreeable realities, but 

they depict nothing more than the reality of the brutal crime committed. 

And it is precisely because they depict the reality of the offense that they 

are powerful visual evidence, probative of various aspects of the State’s 

case. Chamberlain at 237.

In this case the only eye witness to the murder was Ms. Brown. 

She was admittedly very high on cocaine and alcohol. The photographs 

taken at the crime scene were corroborative of her testimony and, as in 

Chamberlain, allowed the court, as the trier of fact, to assess the 

credibility of the sole witness. They were all taken at the scene and 

were photographs of the victim, some of the weapons used in the 

murder, and of the premises where the crime took place. The 

photographs of Karen Edwards are unquestionably disagreeable to look 

at but they depict only what the Appellant admitted doing and the 

extreme brutality and heinousness of the crime. They may have 

prejudiced the Appellant but they were by no means unfair. 

The Appellant relies heavily upon Erazo v. State, 144 S.W.3d 487 

(Tx. Cr. App. 2004) and Reese v. State, 33 S.W.3d 238 (Tx. Cr. App. 2000). 

That reliance is misplaced. In Erazo the photograph in question was of a 
18

fetus removed from the murder victim at autopsy. In finding a lack of 

probative value the Court held that the photograph did not illustrate the 

testimony “In contrast to a crime-scene photograph, which would assist 

the jury in visualizing the scene...”. Erazo at 493. The Court of Criminal 

Appeals distinguished the photographs in that case from those where 

the photographs showed the wounds suffered by the victim or victims 

for whose death the defendants were on trial. Erazo at 494. 

The photographs in this case fall precisely into those 

distinguished from the Erazo photographs. They were taken at the 

crime scene and assisted the trial court in visualizing that scene. They 

showed the wounds suffered by the victim alleged in the indictment and 

the weapons used. They were illustrative of the testimony of Latasha 

Brown and served to corroborate her testimony. That was crucial in 

light of her admittedly being heavily under the influence of cocaine at 

the time. 

In Reese the photograph was of the victim and her unborn child 

lying in a casket. The fetus had been removed from her body after her 

death. The unborn child was not named as a victim in the indictment. 

Reese at 239. The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the death of the 

fetus was not a fact of consequence related to an issue in dispute. Reese 
19

at 242. The court held that the photograph that included the unborn 

child did not depict facts relevant to the fact finders determination of 

the case and that the photograph of a tiny, innocent, vulnerable unborn 

child suggested that the jury’s decision would be made on an emotional 

basis. Reese at 242. 

In this case the photographs were of the victim alleged in the 

indictment taken at the crime scene and of other aspects of that scene. 

They accurately reflected what had occurred and what was, by his own 

admission, caused by the Appellant. They corroborated the testimony 

of the sole witness to the crime and served as a comparison from which 

the court could determine her credibility. They were not taken, as those 

in Reese, with the intention to inflame the fact finder. The sentencing 

hearing was before the trial court without a jury. It is impossible to say 

that the judge was swept away improperly by emotions so as to make an 

improper decision in the case as a result of the photographs. 

The photographs complained of in this case were all of the alleged 

victim and all taken at the scene of the crime. In Jackson v. State, No. AP75,707, 2010 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 30 (Tx. Cr. App. 2010), not 

designated for publication, the defendant attempted to rely upon both 

Erazo and Reese when contesting the admission of crime scene and 
20

autopsy photographs under Rule 403. In affirming the admission of 

those photographs the Court of Criminal Appeals distinguished them 

from those in Erazo and Reese because they were photographs of the 

victim named in the indictment, whereas the photographs in those cases 

were not. The Court went on to note, “Although some of the 

photographs contained gruesome depictions of the victim’s head 

injuries, these and other photographs simply reflected the brutality of 

the offense.” Jackson op. pg. 2.

The photographs which the Appellant complains of in this case 

were properly admitted by the trial court. They were all of the crime 

scene and the victim named in the indictment. They merely reflected 

the extreme brutality of the offense committed by the Appellant and 

displayed only the results of his own actions. They served as a point of 

comparison from which the trial court, as fact finder, could judge the 

credibility of the admittedly impaired eye witness to the crime. Those 

photographs were not unfairly prejudicial to the Appellant. There is 

nothing to show that the trial court was improperly influenced by them 

so as to produce a purely emotional or irrational decision about the 

punishment assessed. Because there was no unfair prejudice from the 

evidence Rule 403 is inapplicable.
21

Balancing Test

In conducting a balancing test as required by Rule 403 the 

following factors may be considered: (1) the probative value of the 

evidence; (2) the potential to impress the fact finder in some irrational, 

yet indelible way; (3) the time needed to develop the evidence; and (4) 

the proponent’s need for the evidence. Montgomery, supra. Even had 

the evidence had an element of unfair prejudice the probative value of 

the evidence would not have been substantially outweighed by that 

unfair prejudice.

Probative Value of the Evidence

The Appellant concedes that the challenged photographs had 

probative value as to the extent of the injuries suffered by Karen 

Edwards and as to his own culpable mental state, however, he attempts 

to dismiss that value because of his plea of guilty. (Appellant’s Brief at 

pg. 23). There was no plea bargain as to punishment. The offense of 

murder carries a wide range of punishment, from 5 years to 99 years or 

life. Sections 12.32 and 19.02, Texas Penal Code. Upon the Appellant’s 

election it was the duty of the trial court to decide where, within that 

range, punishment for this offense should be assessed.
22

At a punishment hearing evidence may be offered as to any matter 

the court deems relevant to sentencing, specifically including the 

circumstances of the offense. Article 37.07(3), Texas Code of Criminal 

Procedure. Whether or not the sentencing hearing occurs after a plea of 

guilty or a contested trial that evidence is relevant and admissible on 

the question of punishment to be assessed. 

The photographs in this case, taken of the victim at the crime 

scene and the scene itself, visually illustrated the circumstances of the 

commission of the offense. They also gave the trial court a basis for 

comparison allowing it to judge the credibility of the eye witness. They 

were of great probative value.

Potential to Impress Fact Finder in Irrational and Indelible way

The Appellant argues that the photographs have a potential to 

impress the fact finder in an irrational and indelible way due to their 

depiction of the body of the victim at the crime scene, the place where 

the murder occurred and the blood on the sidewalk where he dragged 

her. He also says that the photographs of the flashlight and sword used 

by him in the murder had such a potential. 

The Appellant says that these photographs “appealed to the trial 

judge’s emotions and encouraged her to make her punishment decision 
23

on an emotional basis without regard to the probative force of the 

evidence.” (Appellant’s Brief at pg. 26). The record does not support 

that speculation. The court uttered not one word indicating it was 

sentencing the Appellant because the photographs inflamed emotion 

that overcame its ability to make a rational decision based on the 

evidence. This was the trial court, not a jury, making the decision and 

the danger of such an emotional decision based upon unfairly 

prejudicial evidence is greatly reduced under those circumstances. Ex 

Parte Twine at 668.

Contrary to the Appellant’s theory, the mere nature of the 

photographs as gruesome is insufficient to show the required potential 

to unfairly prejudice the trial court. They merely reflected the 

disagreeable realities of the brutal crime the Appellant committed and 

which the trial court properly considered in making the punishment 

decision. They were not inflammatory and nothing indicates the trial 

court was inflamed by them. Chamberlain at 237. The evidence of an 

extremely brutal crime certainly logically explains the assessment of a 

life sentence and it cannot be said that such a decision resulted from an 

improper emotional basis as a result of the photographs as opposed to 

all of the evidence regarding the circumstances of the murder.
24

Time Needed to Develop Evidence

The Appellant concedes that the State did not use an inordinate 

amount of time during the hearing to the admission of the photographs. 

(Appellant’s Brief at pg. 26).

State’s Need for the Evidence

The Appellant begins by stating that the State’s need for the 

photographs as evidence was to show his culpable mental state and the 

extent of the victim’s injuries, ignoring any other need for the evidence.

He then argues that these were not at issue because of his plea of guilty. 

This is incorrect.

The issue before the trial court was the punishment to be 

assessed for the offense the Appellant committed. The circumstances of 

that offense were admissible and vital so that the judge could make a 

decision on that issue. The fact that he entered a plea of guilty had no 

effect upon the duty of the court, nor did it render evidence of the 

circumstances of the offense inadmissible or improper. Article 37.07(3), 

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. By his plea the Appellant admitted 

that he intentionally and knowingly murdered Karen Edwards by 

shooting her with a gun and cutting and stabbing her with a knife. His 

admission did not include the circumstances of the commission of that 
25

offense. Those circumstances were not only highly relevant to the 

decision of the trial court, but were necessary to make a rational 

decision on that issue and were admissible on punishment by statute. It 

is illogical and self-serving to suggest that the trial court as fact finder 

on punishment should be unable to learn of the circumstances of the 

offense in assessing punishment beyond the admitted elements of the 

offense set out in the indictment. Clearly Ms. Brown’s testimony was 

admissible at the sentencing hearing and the photographs were visual 

representations of that testimony. The State had both a duty and a need 

to provide that evidence to the court so that it could determine the 

punishment to be assessed. 

Balancing

The photographs had great probative value as to the 

circumstances of the commission of the offense going to the issue of the 

proper assessment of punishment. They were of probative value in the 

assessment by the trial court of the credibility of Ms. Brown, the eye 

witness to the murder, and as to the circumstances of the crime 

committed. The Appellant’s conclusion that they “doubtless” had an 

emotional impact on the experienced trial judge is without any basis in 

fact or the record. His view seems to be that because the photographs 
26

prejudiced him by showing the results of his own actions that prejudice 

must have thus been unfair. Those photographs were properly before 

the trial court and could be considered in assessing punishment and it 

was not at all unfair to allow the court to know what the Appellant had 

done. 

The Appellant’s plea of guilty to the offense charged in the 

indictment, contrary to his assertion, has no effect upon the 

admissibility or the probative value of the evidence of the circumstances 

of the offense as bearing on the punishment to be assessed. There need 

not have been a contested issue on the extent of Edward’s injuries nor 

the Appellant’s culpable mental state in order to make the evidence of 

the circumstances of the offense probative on punishment. The 

Appellant’s plea of guilty without a plea bargain is what put the issue of 

proper punishment before the court and rendered the evidence as to the 

circumstances of the offense probative and fair. 

The State’s need for the evidence is not restricted to the 

Appellant’s incorrect representation of the basis for that need. Even 

with the offense admitted by him, the State still “needed” to present the 

circumstances of the offense to the court for consideration as to 

punishment to be assessed. It did not need for culpability or the extent 
27

of the injuries to the victim to be contested in order to do so. The 

photographs were visual evidence accompanying the oral testimony of 

Ms. Brown and were not cumulative, Chamberlain at 237, and their 

evidentiary power emanated from nothing more than what the 

Appellant had done. Sonnier at 519. The need for that evidence in order 

to provide the trial court with a rational basis for the assessment of 

punishment was great. 

The essence of the Appellant’s complaint is that, in his view the 

pictures are gruesome and, therefore, their probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and that the 

fact that he pled guilty and Ms. Brown testified to the matters contained 

in the photograph rendered them unnecessary and irrelevant.

In Jean v. State, No. AP-76,601, 2013 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 

785 (Tx. Cr. App. 2013), not designated for publication, the Court of 

Criminal Appeals, in affirming the decision of the trial court to admit 

photographs of the victim taken at the crime scene over a Rule 403 

objection stated:

“Photographs depicting the location of the body and

the victim’s injuries are relevant. And even if photographs

are gruesome, under Rule 403 their probative value

are not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
28

prejudice if they ‘are no more gruesome than the crime 

scene itself as it was found by the police.’ Likewise, under 

Rule 403, photographs of a victim’s injuries are admissible if 

they show ‘only the injuries that the victim received and are 

no more gruesome than would be expected.’ Moreover, the 

fact that the jury also heard testimony regarding the 

injuries depicted does not reduce the relevance of the visual 

depiction.”

Jean, Op. at pg. 5.

That is precisely the situation in this case and the probative value of 

these photographs is, likewise, not substantially outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice. 

In the end all of the factors, taken individually and together, 

support the admission of the complained of photographs over the 

Appellant’s Rule 403 objection and the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in doing so.

Harmless

Non-constitutional error that does not affect substantial rights 

must be disregarded. Rule 44.2(b), Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

In this case the trial court did not err in admitting the photographs. Had 

that not been the case, however, in light of the Appellant’s plea of guilty 

to the allegations in the murder and Latasha Brown’s testimony that the 

Appellant, her close friend, shot Karen Edwards four times, twice in the 
29

head, over a period of more than an hour (RR3-39) and then when she 

would not stop breathing beat her in the face with a flashlight, stepped 

on her neck, cut her on the neck and then hacked her with a sword, 

before dragging her body by the ankles across the street and dumping it 

behind a vacant house, it could not be said that the photographs affected 

the Appellant’s substantial rights. 

The testimony coupled with the Appellant’s judicial confession 

established an extremely brutal and heinous murder. Whatever 

gruesomeness that may be found in the photographs consisted of a 

visual representation of Brown’s testimony as to the circumstances of 

the offense. The Appellant never contested the admissibility of that 

testimony. The State respectfully submits that it cannot be reasonably 

concluded that the outcome of the punishment hearing would have been 

different had the trial court excluded the photographs. Had the trial 

court erred the error would have clearly been harmless. 
30

PRAYER

The State of Texas respectfully prays that the judgment of 

conviction herein be, in all things, be affirmed.

Respectfully Submitted,

HENRY GARZA

District Attorney

/s/ 

BOB D. ODOM

Assistant District Attorney

P.O. Box 540

Belton, Tx 76513

(254) 933-5215

FAX (254) 933-5704

DistrictAttorney@co.bell.tx.us

SBA No. 15200000

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9

This is to certify that the State’s Brief is in compliance with Rule 9 

of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and that portion which must be 

included under Rule 9.4(i)(1) contains 5,110 words.

/s/ 

BOB D. ODOM

Assistant District Attorney
31

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that a true and correct copy of this brief has been 

served upon, E. Alan Bennett, Counsel for Appellant, by electronic 

transfer via Email, addressed to him at abennett@slmpc.com on this 

28th day of August, 2015.

/s/ 

BOB D. ODOM

Assistant District Attorney