alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
##### 



EXHIBIT 31.1 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 I, Steven G. Mihaylo, certify that:  1.
    
    I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of
Inter-Tel, Incorporated.2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect
to the period covered by this report.3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other
financial information included in this report, fairly present in all
material respects the financial condition, results of operations and
cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented
in this report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are
responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and
procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:  a.
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and
procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures
to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others
within those entities, particularly during the period in
which this report is being prepared;b.
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants
disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this
report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; andc.
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the
registrants internal control over financial reporting that
occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrants internal control over
financial reporting; and  5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have
disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control
over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and audit
committee of the registrants board of directors:  a.
    
    All significant deficiencies and material
weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control
over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; andb.
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that
involves management or other employees who have a significant
role in the registrants internal control over financial
reporting. Date: May 10, 2004
    By:
    /s/  Steven G. MihayloName:
    Steven G. MihayloTitle:
    Chief Executive Officer 37
----

|   | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and |
|--------|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant. |
|--------|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:  | March 31, 2011 |
|-------------|----------------|

|   | BY:    | /s/ Terry E. Michaelson                                        |
|--------|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   |       Terry E. Michaelson             |
|   |   |       Chief Executive Officer         |
|   |   |       (Principal Executive Officer)   |
|   |   |                                                           |
|   | BY:    | /s/ Mark D. Moreland                                           |
|   |   |       Mark D. Moreland                |
|   |   |       Chief Financial Officer         |
|   |   |          and Treasurer |
|   |   |       (Principal Financial Officer)   |

----
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

December 28, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice
132160 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices

v SC: 132160 COA: 272062 Wayne CC: 88-002260 SHERMAN BELL, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the applicati on for leave to appeal the August 10, 2006 order of the Court of Appeal s is considered, and it is DE NIED, because the defendant’s motion for relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G).

s1218 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

December 28, 2006

Clerk
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and coll ateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### FEB 4 2003 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

JOHN A. HUDSON, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA; GARLAND JEFFERS, Warden; FIGUEARO, Deputy Warden; DEPUTY BRADLEY, Deputy Warden; DEPUTY DELGADO, Deputy Warden; DEPUTY AVERY, Deputy Warden, Defendants - Appellees. No. 02-6140 D.C. No. CIV-00-1606-A (W.D. Oklahoma)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before KELLY , McKAY , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, t his panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.-2-

Proceeding pro se , Plaintiff John A. Hudson appeals the district cou rt’s dismissal of the civil rights complaint he brought against defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Upon review of the parties’ appell ate briefs and de novo review of the entire record on appeal, this court affirms the district court’s dismissal of Hudson’s complaint for substantially those reasons set forth in the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation dated June 6, 2001 and the district court’s orders dated July 20, 2001 and October 11, 2001. ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Michael R. Murphy Circuit Judge
June 19, 2012



### JUDGMENT 

## The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

JERAMIAH CLARK , Appellant
NO. 14

- 11

- 00959

- CR V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

________________________________

This cause was heard on the transcript of the record of the court below. Having considered the record, this Court holds that there was no error in judgment. The Court orders the judgment AFFIRMED , and that this decision be certified below for observance.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-6981

WILLIAM ELWOOD WELLER, JR., Petitioner - Appellant,
versus RONALD ANGELONE, Director, Department of Corrections, Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert R. Merhige, Jr., Senior District Judge. (CA-97-241) Submitted: November 10, 1998 Decided: December 21, 1998 Before HAMILTON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HALL, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Randolph Daniel Stowe, RANDOLPH D. STOWE, P.C., Norfolk, Virginia,for Appellant. Michael Thomas Judge, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. To the extent that Weller challenges the exclusion on due process grounds of evidence allegedly tending to show the guilt of other individuals, we note that, even though Weller failed to present the claim in this form before the Virginia Court of Appeals, because the Virginia Supreme Court did not rely on this procedural bar in its decision, Weller is not barred from asserting this claim in a federal habeas petition. See Coleman v. Thompson , 501 U.S. 722 (1991). However, much of this evidence was hearsay, and the remainder was irrelevant. To the extent that Weller challenges on federal due process grounds the state court’s refusal to permit the defense to call a witness as adverse and the state court’s exclusion of certain testimony, Weller failed to properly exhaust these claims, see Matthews v. Evatt , 105 F.3d 907, 911 (4th Cir. 1997), and would be procedurally barred from raising the claims now in a second state habeas petition. See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-654(B)(2) (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1998); Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932, 936-37 (4th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal substantially on the reasoning of the district court. See Weller v. Angelone , No. CA-97-241 (E.D. Va. June 4,3 1998). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately set forth in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### John W. HEARNE, Petitioner—Appellant, v. Keith DAVIS, Warden, Respondent—Appellee.

No. 09-6101.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 21, 2009.

Decided: May 6, 2009.

John W. Hearne, Appellant Pro Se. Jennifer Conrad Williamson, Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond. Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

*172PER CURIAM:

John W. Hearne seeks to appeal the magistrate judge’s * order dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. *Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir.2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Hearne has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny his motion for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*

*

 Both parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (2006).
December 18, 2014



### JUDGMENT


## The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

ROBERT PRIMO , Appellant

NO. 14

- 13

- 00492

- CV V.

GREAT AMERICAN INSUR ANCE COMPANY

, Appellee

________________________________ This cause, an appeal from the judgment in favor of appellee, Great American Insurance Company, signed May 5, 2013, was heard on the transcript of the record. We have inspected the record and find error in the jud gment. We therefore order the judgment of the court below REVERSED and REMAND the cause for proceedings in accordance with the court's opinion.

We further order that all costs incurred by reason of this appeal be paid by appellee, Great American Insurance Company.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
 

Arcenio C., FILED 

Petitioner Below, Petitioner January 14, 2013 

RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK 

vs.) No. 11-1111 (Boone County 10-D-338) SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS 

OF WEST VIRGINIA 

Mollie C.,
 

Respondent Below, Respondent
 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Petitioner Arcenio C., by counsel Peter A. Hendricks, appeals the June 27, 2011 order of 

the Circuit Court of Boone County denying his petition for appeal from the final order of the 

family court. Respondent Mollie C., by counsel Steven M. Thorne, has filed a response and a 

supplemental appendix. 

The Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these 

reasons, a memorandum decision is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. 

On June 3, 2011, the family court entered its “Final Order of Divorce,” which petitioner 

appealed to the Circuit Court of Boone County. By order entered on June 27, 2011, petitioner’s 

appeal to the circuit court was denied. On appeal, petitioner alleges that the family court erred in 

denying him parenting time with his child until such time as he could prove he was legally in the 

country, and also that the family court erred in calculating child support payments in an amount 

that attributed his wages as an electrician because he was forced to resign from that position. 

Respondent argues that because petitioner used various forms of false identification to obtain 

employment during the course of their marriage, the family court properly attributed his prior 

wages in calculating child support because he could have continued in his employment. Further, 

respondent argues that the circuit court’s requirement as to petitioner providing identification in 

order to obtain parenting time was based upon the fact he posed a significant flight risk due to his 

numerous aliases. 

“In reviewing a final order entered by a circuit court judge upon a review of, or upon a 

refusal to review, a final order of a family court judge, we review the findings of fact made by 

the family court judge under the clearly erroneous standard, and the application of law to the 

facts under an abuse of discretion standard. We review questions of law de novo.” Syl., Carr v. 

Hancock, 216 W.Va. 474, 607 S.E.2d 803 (2004). After careful consideration of the parties’ 

arguments, this Court concludes that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

petitioner’s appeal. 

1
­
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court and its June 

27, 2011 order denying petitioner’s appeal is affirmed. 

Affirmed. 

ISSUED: January 14, 2013 

CONCURRED IN BY: 

Chief Justice Brent D. Benjamin 

Justice Robin Jean Davis 

Justice Margaret L. Workman 

Justice Menis E. Ketchum 

Justice Allen H. Loughry II 

2
­
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2649 

To suspend temporarily the duty on power electronics boxes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

NOVEMBER 2, 2009 

Mr. BUNNING introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To suspend temporarily the duty on power electronics boxes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. POWER ELECTRONICS BOXES. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of 

5 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is 

6 amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following 

7 new heading: 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2649 IS

‘‘ 9902.01.00 Power electronics box and 

static converter composite 

units, combining the functions of an AC inverter and 

an auxiliary power module, 

capable of reducing DC voltage from 42 V (supplied by 

battery) to 12 V output and 

providing three-phase AC 

output to motor generator 

unit, the foregoing certified 

by the importer for use in hybrid electric motor vehicles 

(provided for in subheading 

8504.40.95) ........................... Free No change No change On or before 

12/31/2011 ’’. 

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 

3 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

4 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 40729

STATE OF IDAHO ,
Plaintiff-Respondent ,

v.

DUSTIN JAMES FAULKNER ,
Defendant-Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 689

Filed: October 2, 2013

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Michael E. Weth erell , District Judge.

Appeal from j udgment of conviction and three

- year determinate sentence for aggravated battery

, dismissed

.
Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Ben Patrick McGreevy

, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming , Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

________________________________________________ Before GUTIERREZ, Chief Judge; LANSING, Judge; and MELANSON, Judge

PER CURIAM
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Dustin James Faulkner pled guilty to aggravated battery,
Idaho Code § § 18

- 903(a ) and 18

- 907 (1 ) (a)

. As part of the plea agreement, t he parties st ipulated

to a three

- year determina t e sentence and Faulkner agreed to waive his right to appeal his

sentence . The district court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Faulkner to a

d eterminate term of three years to run concurrently with the other sentences Faulkner was serving

. 1 Faulkner now appeals, contending only that his sentence is excessive.

1 Before sentencing, Faulkner filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for reduction of his sentence. The district court declined to rule on the motion, as no judgment or sentence had been entered.2 The State argues this appeal should be dismissed because Faulkner waived his right to
appeal his senten ce. We agree. A waiver of the right to appeal a sentence, as a component of a
plea agreement, is valid and enforceable if it was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently

. State v. Murphy , 125 Idaho 456, 872 P.2d 719 (1994)

. See also I.C.R 11(f )( 1)

. Faulkner has not
presented any argument as to why the waiver should be deemed invalid or unenforceable: he
does not challenge the validity of the waiver provision in the plea agreement, does not contend
the State violated the plea agreement, and does not claim that he did not enter into the plea

agreement voluntarily , knowing ly , and intelligent ly

. As such, we will enforce the waiver

. The
appeal is hereby dismissed.
#### Steven VLASICH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. S.D. SUPERIOR CT., San Diego Superior Court; California Department of Corrections; Terry Boehme; W.A. Duncan; Laura Hill; Sandi Menefee; Jesus Rodriguez, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 07-15667.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted April 15, 2009.

Filed May 22, 2009.

Steven Vlasich, Corcoran, CA, pro se.

Before: SILER,* KLEINFELD, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr., Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM **

Steven Vlasich appeals the dismissal of his amended complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1

Dismissal of Vlasich’s *ex post facto*claim was proper because the post-conviction amendments to California Penal Code § 2085.5 do not impose additional punishment on Vlasich. *Quarles v. Kane,*482 F.3d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir.2007); *see also United States v. Gianelli,*543 F.3d 1178, 1183-84 (9th Cir.2008).

The district court did err in ordering a preemptive “strike.” Should Vlasich bring another civil action or appeal the judgment in another proceeding, the court may then decide whether this dismissal should count as a strike. *See*28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); *see also O’Neal v. Price,*531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir.2008).

The dismissal of Vlasich’s complaint is AFFIRMED. The order assessing a strike is VACATED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.

1

. As clarified at oral argument, Vlasich does not appeal the dismissal of his claims against Judge Rodriguez or the San Diego Superior Court challenging the restitution order’s validity or amount. Accordingly, we do not address these claims.
Motion Granted; Order filed October 29, 2018

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-18-00709-CV

____________

In the Interest of J.S., a child

On Appeal from the 313th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2017-03057J

ORDER

This is an accelerated appeal from a judgment in a parental termination appeal. 

Appellant’s brief was due October 26, 2018. No brief has been filed. On October 

29, 2018 appellant filed a request for extension of time to file the brief to November 

2, 2018. The motion is granted.

We order appellant’s appointed counsel Donald Crane, to file appellant’s brief 

no later than November 2, 2018. If the brief is not filed by that date, counsel may 

be required to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. In 

addition, the court may require appointment of new counsel due to the failure to 

timely file appellant’s brief. 

PER CURIAM
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2516 

To suspend temporarily the duty on nonwoven diffusion media. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 29, 2009 

Mr. GRAHAM introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To suspend temporarily the duty on nonwoven diffusion 

media. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. NONWOVEN DIFFUSION MEDIA. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of 

5 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is 

6 amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following 

7 new heading: 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2516 IS

‘‘ 9902.01.00 Nonwoven air filter and diffusion media having layers of 

fine denier polyester fibers (2 

to 10 decitex, with a length 

of 40 mm or more, but not 

more than 80 mm), weighing 

400 to 700 g/m2, thermally 

bonded and impregnated in 

full depth with an adhesive 

coating, reinforced on one 

side with a supporting woven 

open-mesh scrim, used in 

downdraft spray cabins for 

painting applications where 

the media is required both as 

an air filter and as an air diffuser, providing uniform, 

nonturbulent air flow (provided for in subheading 

5911.40.00 or 5911.90.00) ... Free No change No change On or before 

12/31/2011 ’’. 

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 

3 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

4 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS