J-S16002-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

STACY BUCKLAW AND DIANE 

BUCKLAW

v.

TOLL BROTHERS, INC., TOLL BROS., 

INC., TOLL PA IV, L.P., TOLL PA GP 

CORP., AND ANDERSEN WINDOWS, 

INC.

APPEAL OF: TOLL BROTHERS, INC., 

TOLL BROS., INC., TOLL PA IV, L.P., 

TOLL PA GP CORP

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3255 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered October 10, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): 170600001

ANDREW L. PALSKY AND CHRISTINA 

M. PALSKY

v.

TOLL BROTHERS, INC., AND TOLL PA 

IV, L.P., AND TOLL PA VI, L.P., AND 

TOLL PA GP CORP., AND TOLL 

BROS., INC. AND ANDERSEN 

WINDOWS, INC.

APPEAL OF: TOLL BROTHERS, INC., 

AND TOLL PA IV, L.P., AND TOLL PA 

VI, L.P., AND TOLL PA GP CORP., 

AND TOLL BROS., INC.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 423 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered December 20, 2018
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In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): No. 180703480

KALPESH SHAH AND SEJAL SHAH

v.

TOLL BROTHERS INC., TOLL BROS., 

INC., TOLL PA IV,. L.P., AND TOLL PA 

GP CORP. (COLLECTIVELY, "TOLL 

DEFENDANTS”)

ANDERSEN WINDOWS, INC.

APPEAL OF: TOLL BROTHERS INC., 

TOLL BROS., INC., TOLL PA IV,. L.P., 

AND TOLL PA GP CORP. 

(COLLECTIVELY, "TOLL 

DEFENDANTS”)

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 620 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Dated January 7, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): 180701952

ANDREW BONAS AND LAURA L. 

BONAS

v.

TOL BROTHERS INC., TOLL BROS 

INC., TOLL PA IV L.P., TOLL PA VI 

L.P. AND TOLL PA GP CORP. AND 

ANDERSON WINDOWS

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1037 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered March 26, 2019
J-S16002-20

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In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): No. 1807001954

BILLY ERNEST FLURRY AND MISTY 

LAW FLURRY

v.

TOLL BROTHERS, INC., ET AL. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1066 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered March 26, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): NO. 180701953

AJITH MANJAMATTATHIL AND 

MARINA JOSEPH

v.

TOLL BROTHERS, INC.; TOLL BROS., 

INC.; TOLL PA II, L.P. AND TOLL GP 

CORP. AND ANDERSEN WINDOWS, 

INC. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1080 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered March 26, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): No 180701242

THOMAS LEVIEN

v.

TOLL BROTHERS, INC., AND TOLL PA 

IV, L.P. AND TOLL PA VI, L.P. AND 

TOLL PA GP CORP., AND TOLL 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1426 EDA 2019
J-S16002-20

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BROS., INC., AND ANDERSEN 

WINDOWS, INC.

APPEAL OF: TOLL BROTHERS, INC., 

TOLL BROS., INC., TOLL PA IV, L.P., 

TOLL PA VI, L.P. AND TOLL PA GP 

CORP. (COLLECTIVELY, "TOLL 

DEFENDANTS”)

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Appeal from the Order Entered April 4, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): No. 180703136

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED APRIL 21, 2020

In this consolidated appeal, Toll Brothers, Inc., Toll Bros., Inc., Toll PA, 

II, L.P., Toll PA IV, L.P., Toll PA IV, and Toll PA, GP, Corp. (collectively, 

“Appellant”), appeals from the trial court’s Orders denying Appellant’s 

Petitions to Compel Arbitration. Appellant avers that the trial court erred in 

finding that the mandatory arbitration clauses in the warranties provided by 

Appellant to the original purchasers of the homes built and sold by Appellant 

did not bind Appellees, all of whom were subsequent purchasers of those 

homes. After careful review, we conclude that we are bound by this Court’s 

recent holding in Porter v. Toll Brothers, Inc., 217 A.3d 337 (Pa. Super. 

2019).1 We, therefore, affirm.

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1 On October 23, 2019, this Court denied Appellant’s Petition for Reargument 

in Porter. Appellant’s Petitions for Allowance of Appeal, filed on November 

22, 2019, remain pending before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
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Briefly, Appellant is a builder and seller of residential homes. For the 

benefit of “homeowners,” Appellant provides a 10-year limited warranty

(“Limited Warranty”) on all of its homes. The Limited Warranty defines 

“homeowner” as “the first person to whom a home . . . is sold . . . and such 

person’s successors . . . provided a Subsequent Home Buyer 

Acknowledgement form (TB Form 1302) is signed by the subsequent 

homeowner.” Limited Warranty at 12 (some capitalization removed and 

emphasis added).

The Limited Warranty is transferrable from original purchasers of 

Appellant’s homes to subsequent purchasers “provided that you or the new 

owners notify the warranty program administrator in writing, utilizing 

the Subsequent Home Buyer Acknowledgement and Assignment Form 

[(TB Form 1302)] attached to this limited warranty after ownership is 

transferred.” Id. at 9 (some capitalization removed and emphasis added).

TB Form 1302 provides for the transfer of any coverage remaining under 

the Limited Warranty from the original purchaser of a home built and sold by 

Appellant to a subsequent purchaser “[u]pon execution of this form[.]” Id.

at 37 (some capitalization removed and emphasis added). TB Form 1302 

includes a mandatory arbitration clause. Id.

Appellees purchased their homes, built and originally sold by Appellant, 

from the homes’ original owners between 2005 and 2016. It is undisputed 

that no Appellee executed TB Form 1302.
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Between September and November 2018, Appellees each filed 

Complaints in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas against 

Appellant and Andersen Windows, Inc.,2 generally alleging construction 

defects in their homes and raising, variously, counts of violations of the 

Uniform Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law,3 negligent 

representation, fraud, and negligence. Between September and December 

2018, Appellant filed a Petition to Compel Arbitration in every case arguing: 

(1) the home warranty transferred from the original purchasers to Appellees 

and, thus, Appellees were third-party beneficiaries of the warranties; and (2) 

all of Appellees’ rights against Appellant arise from the home warranty that 

requires that disputes be resolved by arbitration. 

One of Appellant’s Petitions was assigned to the Honorable Shelley 

Robbins New, four were assigned to the Honorable John M. Younge, and two 

were assigned to the Honorable Linda A. Carpenter (collectively, the “trial 

court”). The trial court denied Appellant’s Petitions, generally concluding that 

execution by the subsequent purchasers of the TB Form 1302 was a condition 

precedent to transference of the Limited Warranty. Because no Appellee had 

executed the TB Form 1302, the trial court concluded that Appellees had not 

agreed to, and were, therefore, not bound by, the Limited Warranty or its 

arbitration clause. See also Porter, 217 A.3d at 348-52.

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2 Andersen Windows, Inc. supplied the windows installed in the homes built 

by Appellant. 

3 See 73 P.S §§ 201-1 to 201.93.
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This timely appeal followed, in which Appellant raises the following two 

issues:

1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law by denying [P]etitions 

to [C]ompel [A]rbitration filed by [Appellant] when (a) the limited 

warranty (on which [Appellees] rely to state their claims) contains 

a valid arbitration agreement; (b) [Appellees] are bound by the 

valid arbitration agreement that transferred to them with the 

home they subsequently purchased from the original home buyer 

either as third-party beneficiaries or by estoppel; and (c) the 

unlimited arbitration agreement expressly states that [Appellees’] 

claims are subject to arbitration?

2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law by denying a [P]etition 

to [C]ompel [A]rbitration filed by [Appellant] when, contrary to 

the trial court’s conclusions, (a) [Appellees] are bound by the 

arbitration provision whether or not they signed it or any particular 

form, whether or not the agreement identifies them by name, and 

whether or not [Appellees] invoke third-party beneficiary status; 

and (b) [Appellees’] claims fall within the scope of the arbitration 

agreement regardless of the label they use or the relief they seek?

Appellant’s Brief at 11.

Appellant’s issues are identical to those decided by this Court in Porter. 

See Porter, 217 A.3d at 346-47. In addition, in its appellate Brief, Appellant 

concedes that “[t]hese cases are controlled by legal issues briefed, argued, 

and recently decided by this Court in [Porter].4 Appellant’s Brief at 1. 

Because Appellant raises the same issues and provides essentially the same 

analysis as it did in Porter, we adopt the Porter analysis and conclude that 

we are bound by its holding. We, thus, affirm the Orders denying Appellant’s 

Petitions to Compel Arbitration.

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4 The Porter plaintiffs are the subsequent purchasers of 30 homes built and 

sold by Appellant. 
J-S16002-20

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Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 04/21/2020