NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

LUIS ALBERTO BAUTISTA, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 14-0497 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR 98-05875

The Honorable Bruce R. Cohen, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix

By Diane Meloche

Counsel for Respondent

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Tennie B. Martin, Mikel Steinfeld

Counsel for Petitioner
STATE v. BAUTISTA

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Patricia K. Norris delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Patricia A. Orozco and Judge Peter B. Swann joined.

N O R R I S, Judge:

¶1 Petitioner Luis Alberto Bautista petitions this court for review 

of the superior court’s order denying him post-conviction relief, pursuant 

to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. We grant review and, for the 

following reasons, deny relief.

¶2 A jury convicted Bautista of first degree murder, second 

degree murder, disorderly conduct, and threatening and intimidating—

offenses he committed in 1998 when he was 16. The superior court 

sentenced Bautista to life imprisonment for first degree murder without the 

possibility of parole for 25 years, and a consecutive, aggregate term of 31 

years imprisonment for the remaining counts. This court affirmed 

Bautista’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal. 

¶3 Bautista’s notice of post-conviction relief challenged his 

sentence based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Miller v. Alabama, “that 

mandatory life [sentences] without parole for those under the age of 18 at 

the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on 

‘cruel and unusual punishments.’” __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460, 183 L. 

Ed. 2d 407 (2012). Bautista argued Miller was a significant change in the 

law requiring the superior court to resentence him. 

¶4 The superior court considered Bautista’s post-conviction 

relief proceeding with other post-conviction relief proceedings filed by 

other petitioners who raised identical claims. The court ordered the parties 

to file briefs addressing whether Miller was retroactive, and whether the 

petitioners’ claims were cognizable given they had not yet served 25 years 

of their sentences. Before holding oral argument on these issues, our 

Legislature passed H.B. 2593, which enacted Arizona Revised Statutes 

(“A.R.S.”) section 13-716 (Supp. 2015)1 and amended A.R.S. § 41-1604.09(I)

 

1Effective July 24, 2014, A.R.S. § 13–716 provides:
STATE v. BAUTISTA

Decision of the Court

3

(Supp. 2015), establishing parole eligibility for juveniles sentenced to life 

imprisonment. See 2014 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 156, §§ 2, 3. After oral 

argument, the superior court denied relief “with the condition that upon . . 

. § 13-716 and § 41-1604.09(I) becoming effective under Arizona law, the 

Arizona Department of Corrections shall set a specific date for [Bautista’s] 

parole eligibility.” The superior court concluded Miller applied

retroactively and H.B. 2593 resolved the residual issues of whether 

Bautista’s “sentence violated the letter and spirit of Miller.” The superior 

court also held Bautista is not eligible for release.

¶5 Bautista argues on review that the superior court abused its 

discretion in denying his request for resentencing. More specifically he 

argues that the court’s denial precluded him from challenging H.B. 2593 by 

arguing, for example, H.B. 2593’s statutory changes were not retroactive 

and violated Miller, the prohibition against ex post facto laws, and the 

separation of powers doctrine.

2 Bautista requests that we “vacate the trial 

court’s judgment, as it relates to the automatic resentencing by HB 2593, 

and remand this matter for a full resentencing.”

¶6 The superior court did not abuse its discretion in summarily 

dismissing Bautista’s Rule 32 proceeding. State v. Amaral, 239 Ariz. 217, 219, 

¶ 9, 368 P.3d 925, 927 (2016) (appellate court reviews superior court’s 

summary dismissal of a Rule 32 proceeding for abuse of discretion). 

¶7 First, as the superior court correctly determined, Miller is a 

significant change in the law and is retroactive. Montgomery v. Louisiana, __ 

U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016); State v. Valencia, 239 

Ariz. 255, 259, ¶ 17, 370 P.3d 124, 128 (App. 2016). Second, as the superior 

court also correctly determined, a “State may remedy a Miller violation by 

 

Notwithstanding any other law, a person who is sentenced to 

life imprisonment with the possibility of release after serving a minimum 

number of calendar years for an offense that was committed before the 

person attained eighteen years of age is eligible for parole on completion of 

service of the minimum sentence, regardless of whether the offense was 

committed on or after January 1, 1994. If granted parole, the person shall 

remain on parole for the remainder of the person’s life except that the 

person’s parole may be revoked pursuant to § 31-415.

2Bautista concedes he did not raise these issues until the oral 

argument below. 
STATE v. BAUTISTA

Decision of the Court

4

permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather 

than by resentencing them.” Montgomery, __ U.S. at __, 136 S. Ct. at 736. 

Thus, H.B. 2593 and the resulting statutory changes remedied that violation 

because they permit “juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for 

parole.” Id.

¶8 Finally, as the State argues, in State v. Vera this court 

considered the arguments identified by Bautista in his petition, including 

the argument that resentencing is required, and rejected them. 235 Ariz. 

571, 576-78, ¶¶ 21-22, 26 & nn.6-7, 334 P.3d 754, 759-61 & nn.6-7 (App. 

2014),3 cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 121, 193 L. Ed. 2d 95 (2015). 

Therefore, remanding this matter would not serve any purpose. See Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 32.6(c) (summary disposition appropriate when “no purpose 

would be served by any further proceedings”).

¶9 For the foregoing reasons, we grant review but deny relief.

 

3Bautista also argues this court’s decision in State v. Randles, 

235 Ariz. 547, 334 P.3d 730 (App. 2014), conflicts with Vera. In Randles, we

held the statutory changes from H.B. 2593 “satisfie[d] the requirements of 

the Eighth Amendment by expressly providing that juvenile offenders 

sentenced to life imprisonment shall be eligible for parole upon completion 

of their minimum sentence ‘regardless of whether the offense was 

committed on or after January 1, 1994.’” 235 Ariz. at 549, ¶ 9, 334 P.3d at 

732 (quoting A.R.S. § 13-716 and citing A.R.S. § 41-1604.09(I)(2)). We further 

concluded the “change in the law is applicable to all such sentences, and 

accordingly, applies retroactively to Randles’ sentence.” Id. at 550, ¶ 10, 334 

P.3d at 733. Randles did not hold A.R.S. § 13-716 was retroactive in violation 

of A.R.S. § 1-244 (2010). In applying the statute “retroactively” to Randles’ 

sentence, we merely recognized that the statute was applicable to 

antecedent events, consistent with the court’s discussion in Vera. See 235 

Ariz. at 576, ¶ 21, 334 P.3d at 759.