[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-11267

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOSHUA MANLEY WILLIAMS, 

a.k.a. Marcus Limark Rivers, 

a.k.a. Kevin, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11267

D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20058-RNS-1

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Before WILSON, LUCK, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Prior to filing an initial brief, Joshua Manley Williams moves 

for summary reversal of his total sentence.

In 2021, a grand jury charged Williams with, in relevant part, 

one count of attempt to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams 

or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (Count 2); and one 

count of illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(1) (Count 3). He 

later pled guilty to these charges pursuant to a written plea agreement. At sentencing, he objected to being disqualified for “safety 

valve” relief based on having a prior three-point offense. The district court overruled his objection and sentenced him to the minimum total sentence of 60-months’ imprisonment for Count 2 and 

24 months for Count 3, set to run concurrently, for a total of 60 

months’ imprisonment. This appeal follows.

In his motion for summary reversal, Williams asserts a recently decided case, United States v. Garcon, 54 F.4th 1274 (11th 

Cir. 2022) (en banc) petition for cert. filed No. 22-851 (U.S. Mar. 6, 

2023), applies to him, meaning that he now qualifies for “safety 

valve” relief. Additionally, he asserts that time is of the essence. 

The Government responds by conceding that our decision in Garcon means that Williams is eligible for “safety valve” relief, 

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22-11267 Opinion of the Court 3

although it also notes it believes the Garcon decision was wrongly 

decided.

“Safety valve relief allows for sentencing without regard to 

any statutory minimum, with respect to certain offenses.” United 

States v. Milkintas, 470 F.3d 1339, 1344 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotations

omitted). The statutory basis for “safety valve” relief, however, 

imposes certain conditions on defendants to be eligible. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(f)(1). One of those conditions, in relevant part, is that the 

defendant does not have a prior three-point offense in his criminal 

history. Id. § 3553(f)(1) (B). Other conditions in that subsection 

include the defendant not having: (1) more than 4 criminal history 

points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-

point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and 

(2) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines. Id. § 3553(f)(1)(A), (C). 

In Garcon, we held Garcon qualified for “safety valve” relief 

despite having a prior 3-point offense in his criminal history. Garcon, 54 F.4th at 1276. We looked at the text of the statute and applied the ordinary meaning of the word “and” to it, meaning that 

the disqualifying list in § 3553(f)(1)(A)–(C) was conjunctive. Id. at 

1277–78. We held to be ineligible for “safety valve” protections, a 

defendant needs to meet all three disqualifying conditions. Id. at 

1279–80.

We grant Williams’ motion for summary reversal. See 

Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 

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1969)1 (explaining summary disposition is appropriate where “time 

is truly of the essence[, or] the position of one of the parties is 

clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial 

question as to the outcome of the case”). Under our en banc decision in Garcon, the district court erred by finding the disqualifying 

list for “safety valve” protections was disjunctive. See id. at 1277–

78. Additionally, as Williams had only one disqualifying condition—a past offense of three criminal history points—and not the 

other conditions, he qualified for “safety valve” protections, and 

the district court stated it would have sentenced him below the 

mandatory minimum for Count 2.2 Id. at 1279–80. 

We conclude Williams is correct as a matter of law.3 Groendyke Transp., Inc., 406 F.2d at 1162. Finally, we note Williams is 

1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), 

this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981. 

2 At sentencing and before the en banc opinion in Garcon was issued, the district court noted Williams had been in state custody and immigration custody, 

and if there had not been a mandatory minimum sentence, it would have 

given him a variance based on that time served. It explained it would have 

considered sentencing him to 41 months’ imprisonment if he had been eligible 

for “safety valve” relief, and then varied downward by 9 months, due to the 

time he had already spent in custody, for a total sentence of 32 months’ imprisonment. 

3 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Pulsifer v. United States, No. 22-

340, on February 27, 2023. Pulsifer presents the question our en banc court 

answered in Garcon--specifically, whether the “and” in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) 

means “and,” so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not 

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set to be released from custody in December of 2024. This, when 

considered along with comments made by the district court at his 

sentencing, show us that time is of the essence as well. Id. 

Based on the foregoing, we GRANT Williams' motion, summarily reverse his total sentence, and remand his case for resentencing consistent with this opinion. 

REVERSED and REMANDED.

have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, and (C) a 

2-point offense (as the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits hold), or whether the 

“and” means “or,” so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does 

not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, or (C) a 

2-point violent offense (as the Seventh and Eighth Circuits hold). Pulsifer is 

scheduled to be argued in the October 2023 Term. “The grant of certiorari on 

an issue does not suggest a view on the merits,” Schwab v. Sec., Dept. of Corr., 

507 F.3d 1297, 1299 (11th Cir. 2007), and “a grant of certiorari does not change 

the law,” Rutherford v. McDonough, 466 F.3d 970, 977 (11th Cir. 2006). Garcon is the law of this Circuit. 

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