COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-11-00441-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF J.P.M., A 

CHILD

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FROM THE 324TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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Appellant F.M. (Father) and Appellee G.P.M (Mother) entered into an 

agreed decree of divorce in December 2001. The decree appointed Father and 

Mother joint managing conservators of their child, J.P.M., but gave Mother the 

exclusive right to designate J.P.M.’s primary residence. In January 2011, Father 

filed a petition to modify the parent-child relationship, seeking appointment as the

person with the exclusive right to establish J.P.M.’s primary residence. Trial was 

to the bench, which denied Father’s petition. In a single issue, Father argues 

that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his petition to modify 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

conservatorship because “there is practically no evidence, and the evidence is 

certainly insufficient, to support a denial of the requested modification.” We will 

affirm.

Mother initially contends that Father waived his argument for appellate 

review because his attorney agreed to both the form and substance of the order 

denying the petition to modify. For a judgment to be considered an agreed or 

consent judgment such that no appeal can be taken, either the body of the 

judgment itself or the record must indicate that the parties came to some 

agreement as to the case’s disposition; simple approval of the form and 

substance of the judgment does not suffice. DeClaris Assocs. v. McCoy 

Workplace Solutions, L.P., 331 S.W.3d 556, 560 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Leeper v. Woodrick, No. 02-04-00371-CV, 2005 WL 

1475614, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 23, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.). 

Father did not waive his right to appeal because the parties did not come to any 

agreement regarding the disposition of the petition to modify. The case was—

and continues to be—contested.

We review the trial court’s modification of managing conservatorship for an 

abuse of discretion. In re T.D.C., 91 S.W.3d 865, 872 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

2002, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g); see In re A.B.H., 266 S.W.3d 596, 601 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (op. on reh’g) (applying standard). A trial court 

abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily and unreasonably or without reference to 

guiding principles. Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. 2011); Low v. Henry, 221 
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S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007). Legal and factual sufficiency are not independent 

grounds of error in modification cases, but they are relevant factors in deciding 

whether the trial court abused its discretion. T.D.C., 91 S.W.3d at 872.

The family code authorizes a trial court to modify an order that provides for 

the terms and conditions of conservatorship if (1) modification would be in the 

best interest of the child and (2) the child is at least twelve years old and has 

expressed to the court in chambers, as provided by section 153.009, the name of 

the person who is the child’s preference to have the exclusive right to designate 

the primary residence of the child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 156.101(a)(2) (West 

Supp. 2011); see also id. § 153.009 (West 2008). In this case, the trial court did 

not file any separate findings of fact and conclusions of law, but it did state in the 

final order that it “finds that it would not be in the best interest of the child to 

modify primary possession of the child.” Also, the trial court met with J.P.M. and

later stated in a letter to the parties that it “realize[s] that [J.P.M.] wants to live 

with his father.” Therefore, like Mother and Father, we will focus our analysis on 

the best-interest prong.2

 

2

To the extent that the trial court’s statement in the final order that 

modification is not in J.P.M.’s best interest is a finding of fact, it is reviewable for 

legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. See Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 

770, 772 (Tex. 1996); Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994). To 

the extent that the statement is not a finding of fact, a complete reporter’s record 

was filed, and Father may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support 

the implied best-interest finding. See Sixth RMA Partners, L.P. v. Sibley, 111 

S.W.3d 46, 52 (Tex. 2003); Neyland v. Raymond, 324 S.W.3d 646, 649 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.).
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A court’s primary consideration when determining issues of 

conservatorship shall always be the best interest of the child. Tex. Fam. Code 

Ann. § 153.002 (West 2008). Courts may use a nonexhaustive list of factors to 

determine the child’s best interest. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 

(Tex. 1976); T.D.C., 91 S.W.3d at 873. Those factors include:

(A) the desires of the child;

(B) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the 

future;

(C) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the 

future;

(D) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;

(E) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote 

the best interest of the child;

(F) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency 

seeking custody;

(G) the stability of the home or proposed placement;

(H) the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the 

existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and

(I) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.

Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72 (citations omitted). Other factors to consider in 

modification suits include the child’s stability and the need to prevent constant 

litigation in child custody cases. In re V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d 338, 343 (Tex. 2000).

Here, Father testified that he filed the petition to modify because J.P.M. 

had pleaded with him to do so on several occasions. Father opined that it was in 

J.P.M.’s best interest to grant the petition to modify because Father is “clearly a 
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better parent” than Mother. According to Father, he has a technical degree in 

mechanical engineering; he can better help J.P.M. (whose grades had recently 

suffered) with his homework; and he has “more knowledge of what it[’

]

s like to be 

a fifteen year old being raised in American culture.” Although Father currently 

leaves for work five days a week at 6:00 a.m., he explained that if J.P.M. lived 

with him, he could adjust his schedule so that he leaves for work a little after 8:00 

a.m. and returns in time to meet J.P.M. Father described Mother, who is 

originally from Colombia, as an “average mother”; he declined to describe her as 

a “bad mother.” Father acknowledged that Mother lives only about 500 feet from 

his residence, that he goes to the gym after work three to four times a week for 

over an hour, that he had taken J.P.M. out of school three times without 

permission and once for an office Christmas party, that he could not name any of 

J.P.M.’s teachers, and that he had bought J.P.M. a dirt bike and a .22 rifle, which 

Father kept locked away.

Mother opined that it is in J.P.M.’s best interest to live with her. She

testified that she is around children all day because she works as a teacher for 

“Child Care Associate”; that she has worked in a “Head Start” program for ten 

years; that she has taken English lessons on and off and has no difficulty reading 

English; that she is a United States citizen; and that she permits J.P.M. to visit

Father even when J.P.M. is not scheduled to do so. Mother explained that she 

set up tutoring for J.P.M., that she told J.P.M.’s teachers to contact her with any 

concerns they have about J.P.M.’s schoolwork, that she registered J.P.M. for 
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soccer, and that she helped J.P.M. sign up for band. Mother expressed concern

that J.P.M. was too young to learn how to ride a dirt bike or to use a gun, and she 

testified that Father had a temper, used bad language around J.P.M., was a “very 

aggressive” person, and had once left a gun on a night table at his house when 

J.P.M. was there.

Having reviewed the short record, we conclude that the trial court had 

sufficient evidence upon which to determine that it would not be in J.P.M.’s best 

interest to modify the conservatorship such that Father would have the exclusive 

right to designate J.P.M.’s primary residence. Accordingly, we hold the trial court

did not abuse its discretion by denying Father’s petition to modify 

conservatorship. See, e.g., In re R.T.H., 175 S.W.3d 519, 521–22 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (holding that conflicting evidence in modification 

proceeding supported trial court’s implied finding that denial of petition to modify 

was in child’s best interest and that trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

denying petition). We overrule Father’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s 

order.

BILL MEIER

JUSTICE

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; GARDNER and MEIER, JJ.

DELIVERED: June 28, 2012