J-S31005-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

SAUL ALVAREZ 

Appellant

v.

JOSEPH TERRA

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 782 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered December 1, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 

2022-09460-MJ

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED OCTOBER 4, 2023

Appellant, Saul Alvarez, appeals from the December 1, 2022 order 

dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum and petition 

for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. We affirm, albeit on different 

grounds.

1

 

The facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. Appellant 

initiated the present matter on November 29, 2022 by filing a petition for writ 

of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum and petition for leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis. In Appellant’s petition for habeas corpus, he sought relief regarding 

his sentences imposed at the following criminal dockets: 

CP-15-CR-0003051-2007 (hereinafter, “Docket Number 3051-2007”) and 

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1

It “is well settled that where the result is correct, an appellate court may 

affirm a lower court’s decision on any ground without regard to the ground 

relied upon by the lower court itself.” Commonwealth v. Lehman, 275 A.3d 

513, 520 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2022) (quotation omitted). 
J-S31005-23

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CP-15-CR-0001959-2013 (hereinafter, “Docket Number 1959-2013”). 

Appellant alleged that the trial court failed to “award him []credit for time 

served prior to his [v]iolation of [p]robation” and, as such, issued an illegal 

sentence. Appellant’s Petition, 11/29/22, at 5. Appellant also set forth claims 

of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 9-14. 

On December 1, 2022, the trial court entered an order dismissing 

Appellant’s petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(j)(1) 

(“If, simultaneous with the commencement of an action or proceeding or the 

taking of an appeal, a party has filed a petition for leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis, the court prior to acting upon the petition may dismiss the action, 

proceeding or appeal if the allegation of poverty is untrue or if it is satisfied 

that the action, proceeding or appeal is frivolous.”). The trial court did so 

based upon its conclusion that “the relief requested [was] only cognizable 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act [(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 9541-9546]” and that, “as presented, th[e] action lack[ed] an arguable 

basis in law and fact.” Trial Court Order, 12/1/22, at 1, n.1. The trial court 

also dismissed Appellant’s petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis as 

moot. Trial Court Order, 12/1/22, at 1. Thereafter, on February 9, 2023, 

Appellant filed an application for leave to file an appeal nunc pro tunc, which 

the trial court granted the next day. Trial Court Order, 2/10/23, at 1. This 

appeal followed. 

Appellant raises the following issues on appeal: 
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1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or 

committed an error of law in denying and dismissing 

Appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus ad 

subjiciendum without a hearing or issu[ing] a rule to show 

cause?

2. Why this appeal should not be transferred to the 

Commonwealth Court?

3. Did the sentencing court err as a matter of law or fact when 

it sentenced [Appellant] in violation of 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] 

§ 9760(1) by not awarding [Appellant] credit for time served 

prior to his violation of probation?

4. Did the trial court err as a matter of law when it s[e]ntenced 

[Appellant] in violation of 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9725[] by failing 

to regard the nature and circumstances of the crime and the 

history, character and condition of [Appellant]?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (superfluous capitalization omitted, emphasis added). 

When confronted with a filing styled as a petition for habeas corpus, but 

which sets froth claims cognizable under the PCRA, this Court has previously 

stated: 

It is well-established that the timeliness of a PCRA petition is 

jurisdictional and that if the petition is untimely, courts lack 

jurisdiction over the petition and cannot grant relief. [T]he 

PCRA is intended to be the sole means of achieving 

post-conviction collateral relief. If an issue is cognizable under 

the PCRA, the issue must be raised in a timely PCRA petition 

and cannot be raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. In 

other words, a defendant cannot escape the PCRA time-bar by 

titling his petition or motion as a writ of habeas corpus. 

Moreover, regardless of how a petition is titled, courts are to 

treat a petition filed after a judgment of sentence becomes final 

as a PCRA petition if it requests relief contemplated by the 

PCRA.

Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 994–995 (Pa. Super. 2022) 

(internal quotations, citations and brackets omitted). 
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Appellant, on November 29, 2022, filed a petition titled “writ for habeas 

corpus ad subjiciendum,” arguing that, because the trial court failed to award 

him with credit for time served, the trial court issued an illegal sentence. 

Appellant’s Petition, 11/29/22, at 5-9. In addition, Appellant raised various 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 9-14. Thus, Appellant’s 

submission set forth issues cognizable under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9543(a)(2)(i) (authorizing collateral relief where conviction or sentence 

results from violation of Pennsylvania Constitution or the Constitution or laws 

of the United States); Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 115 A.3d 876, 879 (Pa. 

Super. 2015) (“It [is] only when the petitioner challenges the legality of a trial 

court's alleged failure to award credit for time served as required by law in 

imposing sentence, that a challenge to the sentence [is] deemed cognizable 

as a due process claim in PCRA proceedings.”) (citation omitted); see also 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii) (authorizing collateral relief where conviction or 

sentence results from ineffective assistance of counsel). As such, the court 

was required to treat Appellant’s filing as a PCRA petition. See

Commonwealth v. Torres, 223 A.3d 715, 716 (Pa. Super. 2019) (stating, 

“so long as a pleading falls within the ambit of the PCRA, the court should 

treat any pleading filed after the judgment of sentence is final as a PCRA 

petition”) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Hromek, 232 A.3d 

881, 884 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“Generally, the PCRA ‘shall be the sole means of 

obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and 

statutory remedies . . . including habeas corpus and coram nobis.’”) (quotation 
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and citation omitted). Therefore, before considering the merits of Appellant’s 

submission, we must first determine whether it is timely under the PCRA's 

jurisdictional time-bar. 

A PCRA petition, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be 

filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(1). Judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, 

“including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking 

the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Herein, Appellant’s petition related 

to two criminal dockets: Docket Number 3051-2007 and Docket Number 

1959-2013. Upon review, we conclude that Appellant’s judgment of sentence 

at Docket Number 3051-2007 became final on January 9, 2008, when the 

30-day time period for filing a direct appeal to this Court expired after the 

Appellant entered his guilty plea and the trial court issued its sentence. See

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); see also Pa.R.A.P. 903 (notice of appeal “shall be 

filed within 30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is 

taken”). In addition, we conclude that Appellant’s judgment of sentence at 

Docket Number 1959-2013 became final on June 12, 2014, when the 30-day 

time period for filing a direct appeal to this Court expired after the Appellant 

entered his guilty plea and the trial court issued its sentence. See id. Based 

upon the foregoing, we conclude that Appellant’s current petition, filed on 

November 29, 2022, is patently untimely, as it was filed more than 14 years 

after his judgment of sentence at Docket Number 3051-2007 became final
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and eight years after his judgment of sentence at Docket Number 1959-2013 

became final. 

There are, however, three exceptions to the one-year PCRA time-bar, 

set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Indeed, Section 9545(b) provides 

that, to surmount the PCRA’s timeliness requirements, a petitioner must allege 

and prove that:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of 

the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown 

to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the 

exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided 

in this section and has been held by that court to apply 

retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Additionally, Section 9545(b)(2) requires 

that any petition attempting to invoke one of these exceptions “be filed within 

one year of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(2).

Herein, Appellant makes no attempt to plead and prove, much less 

invoke, one of the enumerated exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar. As 

indicated above, the PCRA is “the sole means of achieving post-conviction 

collateral relief” and Appellant “cannot escape the PCRA time-bar by titling his 

petition . . . as a writ of habeas corpus” and baldly asserting its jurisdictional 
J-S31005-23

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requirements are inapplicable. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d at 995 (citation omitted). 

Because Appellant's petition was untimely and because he failed to properly 

invoke an exception to the PCRA's timeliness requirements, neither the trial 

court nor this Court has jurisdiction over the instant claims for collateral relief, 

including all claims alleging that trial counsel was ineffective or that the trial 

court imposed an illegal sentence.

2

 Accordingly, we affirm the order 

dismissing Appellant's PCRA petition.

Order affirmed. 

Date: October 4, 2023

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2 Appellant, of course, remains free to litigate claims before the 

Commonwealth Court which challenge the Department of Corrections 

calculation of his sentence. See Wyatt, 115 A.3d at 879 (“If the alleged error 

is thought to be the result of an erroneous computation of sentence by the 

Bureau of Corrections, then the appropriate vehicle for redress would be an 

original action in the Commonwealth Court challenging the Bureau's 

computation”) (citation omitted).