Attorney Grievance Commission v. Ross D. Hecht , Misc. Docket AG No. 97, September

Term, 2016

. Opinion by Getty, J. ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE

— SANCTIONS

— INDEFINITE SUSPENSION

— The Court of Appeals indefinitely suspended with the right to p etition for reinstatement after twelve months from the date of this opinion an attorney who took on representation of a client but was then suspended from the practice of law due to an unrelated matter. While representing the client, the attorney failed t o communicate to his client that he was suspended, made misrepresentations to the client about his suspension, continued to render legal assistance on behalf of the client, and made misrepresentations to Bar Counsel during the investigation. These actions violated the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4(a) and (b) (Communication), 1.16 (a) and (d) (Declining or Terminating Representation), 3.2 (Expediting Litigation) , 3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal) , 3.4 (d) (Fairness to Opposing Party and Attorney) , 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others) , 5.5 (a) and (b) (Unauthorized Practice of Law) , 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4 (a), ( b ) , (c), and (d) (Misconduct)

.Circuit Court for Prince George’s County

Case No.: CAE17

- 06394 Argued: February 5, 2018

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
M isc. Docket AG No. 97 September Term, 201 6

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION

OF MARYLAND

v. ROSS D. HECHT

Barbera, C.J. Greene, Adkins, McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty,
JJ.

Opinion by G etty , J. Greene and Watts, JJ., dissent.

Filed: May 10, 2018This attorney discipline case involves an attorney who took on representation of a

client but was then suspended from the practice of law due to an unrelated matter

. While representing the client , the attorney failed to communicate to his client that he was suspended, made misrepresentations to the client about his suspension, continued to render legal assistance on behalf of the client , and made mi srepresentations to Bar Counsel during
the investigation. On February 23, 2017, t he Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“ Bar Counsel ”) filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“Petition”) alleging that Ross D. Hecht ( “Hecht”) had violated the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct ( “MLRPC”). 1 The Petition alleged that Hecht , during representation of Diana Lynn Crummitt (“Lynn Crummit”) , had violated the following rules of th e MLRPC: 1.1 (Competence); 1.2(a) (Scope of Representation); 1.3 (Diligence); 1.4(a) ; and (b) (Commun ication); 1.16(a) a nd (d) (Declining or Terminating Representation); 3.2 (Expediting Litigation); 3.3 (a) (Candor Toward the Tribunal); 3.4 (c) and (d) (Fairness to Opposing Party and Attorney); 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others); 5.5 (Unauthorized Practice of Law); 8 .1(a) (Bar Admiss ions and Disciplinary Matters); and 8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d) (Misconduct).

1 Effective July 1, 2016, t he MLRPC were renamed the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) and moved to Title 19, Chapter 300 of the Maryland Rules. This opinion refers to the MLRPC, not the MARPC, because all relevant conduct took place before July 1, 2016.2

By Order dated March 1, 2017, we designated Judge John P. Davey (“the hearing judge”) of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County to conduct a hearing concerni ng the alleged violations and to provide findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law. Md. Rule 19

- 722(a). The hearing took place on August 30 and 3 1, 2017 (“evidentiary hearing”) . At the hearing, Bar Counsel introduced in to evidence various documentary exhibits, including Hecht’s correspondence with his client, Lynn Crummitt. Several witnesses, including Hecht and Lynn Crummitt, testified.
T he hearing judge issued a memorandum opinion in which he made detailed findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law to this Court on October 25, 2017

. In his recommended conclusions of law , t he hearing judge concluded that Hecht violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4 , 1.16 (a) and (d), 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 4.1, 5.5, 8.1 (a), and 8.4(a ), (b), and (c)

. Both parties filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact and
recommended conclusions of law. Bar Counsel excepts “to the trial court’s failure to conclude that [Hecht] . . . violated Rules 8.1(a) and 8.4(c) during the course of the Bar Counsel’s disciplinary investigation, and that the [Hecht’s] conduct, taken as a whole, violated Rule 8.4(d).” Bar Counsel recommends that we disbar Hecht. Hecht excepts extensively to the trial judge’s factual findings as well as his r ecommended conclusions of law regarding MLRPC 3.3, 3.4, 4.1, 5.5, 8.1, and 8.4 . Hecht requests that we continue his indefinite suspension. 2 On February 5, 2018, we heard oral argument in this matter. For

2 Hecht has been indefinitely suspended since June 15, 2013

. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hecht , 431 Md. 443 (2013).3

the reasons explained below, we indefinitely susp end Hecht with the right to petition for
reinstatement after twelve months from the date of this opinion

. BACKGROUND We summarize the hearing judge’s factual findings below.

Beginning of Representation Hecht was admitted to the Bar of this Court on June 23, 1994. In late September 2009 , Lynn Crummitt was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Frederick County, Maryland. In early 201 0, Lynn Crummitt and her husband, Irving J. Crummitt (“Jay
C ru mmitt”) (collectively, “the Crummitts”) retained Hecht to represent them in a motor tort action resulting from the accident on a contingency basis

. Hecht filed a complaint o n behalf of the Crummitts in the Cir cuit Court for Frederick County. D efendants’ attorney , Keith M. Bonner (“Bonner”) , filed an answer to the complaint and subsequently sent dis covery requests to Hecht on May 9, 2013

. Hecht’s Suspension On May 16, 2013, we indefinitely suspended Hecht from the practice of law with the right to p etition for reinstatement after six months on a matter unrelated to the representation of the Crummitts

. Hecht’s suspension began on June 15, 2013.
At t he evidentiary hearing in the Crummitts matter, the hearing judge found that

“ [Hecht] , upon his suspension, turned off his office phones and cable and physically to ok the sign off the door of his law office. [Hecht] took these steps with the intent of shutting down his law practice ” and “ [a] lthough [Hecht] attempted to notify his clients in person, over the telephone and in writing that h e had been suspended from the practice of law in4

Maryland, [Hecht] did not withdraw his appearance with the court from the Crummitts’

case. ” The hearing judge noted that Hecht believed he had notified the Crummitts of his suspension by email, but that he could not confirm that the email had been sent. Alt hough
Hecht did not specifically withdraw his appearance with the circuit court from the Crummitts’ case, he did notify the U.S. District Courts in both Maryland and the District
of Columbia that he had been indefinitely suspen ded from the practice of law in Maryland. Hecht’s Continued Representation When neither Hecht nor the Crummitts responded by the discovery deadline , Bonner sent a letter dated July 1, 2013 to Hecht’s law office stating that if dis covery responses were not rec eived within ten days that Bonner would file a motion to compel with the court

. In his review of the discovery dispute, the hearing judge found that Hecht
did not realize until August 6, 2013 that the “Crummitts had not retained new counsel or responded to the discovery requests,” which “upset” and “worried” Hecht

. T he discovery responses were not rec eived within the allotted time, and Bonner filed a m otion to c ompel
d iscovery

. T he circuit court granted Bonner’ s m otion to c ompel on August 28, 2013 and
issued an order requiring the Crummitts to provide discovery responses within ten days. Lynn Crummitt asked Hecht for an update in the status of her case in early September 2013

. Responding to Lynn Crummitt ’s text messages , Hecht did not disclose his suspension but did suggest that she meet with Pe ter Fayne (“Fayne”) to gauge Fayne’s willingness to serve as the Crummitts ’ attorney

. This was Hecht’s first attempt at finding
alternative counsel for the Crummitt s. Hecht , claim ing to be acting as an informal advisor5

rather than a legal practitioner , drafte d the Crummitts’ overdue a nswer to i nterr ogatories,

r esponse to d ocu ment r equests, and c ertificate re garding d isc overy on approximately September 19, 2013

. Hecht then emailed drafts of the se discovery responses to Lynn Crummitt for her review. The next day , Heidi Hecht, wife of Respondent , followed up with Lynn Crummitt by text message to inquire whether Hecht had permission to sign the Cru mmitts’ names on
the discovery responses. Hecht believed he had perm ission to sign on behalf of the Crummitts , for these and future legal documents, because Heidi Hecht asked Lynn Crummitt, “Can Ross sign your signatures and send it in?” and Lynn Crummitt responded, “Yes he can.” After receiving Lynn Crummitt’s approval, Hecht signed and emailed the Crummitts’ discovery responses to Bonner on September 30, 2013 . In the same email,
Hecht apprised Bonner of his suspension from the practice of law. The hearing judge found that the text messages were ambiguous as to “which documents Lynn Crummitt was giving permission for [Hecht] to sign and whether Lynn Crummitt was giving [Hecht] permission to sign for Lynn Crummitt or both Lynn and Jay Crummitt.”
On October 22, 2013, Hecht r ecommended that Lynn Crummitt request an extension
since the discovery deadline was the following day and there was an outstanding request for records from opposing counsel

. Hecht drafted a request for an extension of the discovery deadline. The hearing judge found that , without the knowledge or consent of the Crummitts, “ [Hecht] drafted a re quest to the court

. . . on the Crum mitts’ letterhead ” and signed their names

.6

Bo nner filed a m otion to c ontinue the s cheduling o rder, p re - t rial c onference, and

t rial d ates on October 29, 2013. In this motion, Bonner also informed the circuit court of
Hecht ’s suspension from the practice of law in Maryland

. Because Hecht was suspended,
Bonner also sent a copy of the motion to the Crummitts

. T hus, t he Crummitts first learned
of Hecht’s suspension when they received this motion directly from Bonner

. At the evidentiary hearing, Lynn Crummitt testif ied that when confronted a bout his suspension,
Hecht responded that he avoided tell ing her because he did not want to increase her stress level, that his suspension was a “slap o n the wrist , ” and that he would be reinstated prior

to her trial. A fter Lynn Crummitt confronted Hecht about his suspension, Hecht requested
that she forward all correspondence related to her case to him

. Hecht attended a status conference on December 4, 2013 for the Crummitts’ case . At this and all future court proceedings involving the Crummitts ’ case, Hecht sat in the gallery in support of Lynn Crummitt and did not address the cour t or step behind the bar of the court. Previous to the status conference , Hecht had informed Lynn Crummitt that he “couldn’t go in front of the judge” but that he wou ld sit close enough in the gallery that “if [she] had any problems, he would tell [her] what to say.” At the status conference , Lynn Crummitt told Judge Dwyer, “ I didn’t realize [ Hecht] w as gonna be suspended so I have been trying to get another attorney.” Lynn Crummi tt also notified Judge Dwyer that she had an appointment with a new attorney. Bon ner informed the court that the Crummitts had failed to respond fully to discovery req uests. Judge Dwyer rescheduled the status conference to December 11, 2013. Judge Dwyer indicated that a n updated sc heduling order would be entered after the Crummitts retained new counsel.7

Following the status conference , Hecht made a second attempt to secure new counsel by recommending Robert F i ore (“Fiore”) at the law firm of Miller & Zois

. Lynn Crummitt met with Fiore who was noncommittal at the meeting and said he would discuss the case with his partners. Afterwards, Miller & Zois sent a letter to Hecht stating they would only agree to take the case under certain conditions related to their malpractice liability

. The hearing judge found that Hecht informed Lynn Crummitt that Miller & Zois declined the represen tation even though Miller & Zois had agr eed to take the case if certain liability conditions were met.
At the rescheduled status conference on December 11, 2013, Lynn Crummitt appeared while Hecht again sat in the gallery

. Bo nner moved for dismissal during the
conference based on the Crummitts’ failure to comply wit h discovery requ ests. Lynn Crummitt responded that she would provide Bonner with additional documents. Judge Dwyer deferred ruling on the motion and scheduled a hearing for January 2, 2014. On the morning of the hearing on January 2, 2014 , Hecht attempted for the third
time to secure the Crummitts with new counsel . He arranged a meeting between Aaron
Blank (“Blank”) , an attorney with Fayne’s law office, and Lynn Crummitt. With Hecht in the gallery, Blank attended the hearing but told Judge Dwyer that he could not represent Lynn Crummitt in her lawsuit unless more time was granted for discovery and the trial was postponed

. While Blank did not formally enter his appearance, he verbally requested that
the court reopen discovery in the case. Bonner countered that the case should be dismissed
because he still had not receive d the required discovery materials from the Crummitts.8

Judge Dwyer reserved on Bonner’s prior m otion to d ismiss and scheduled trial for January 21, 2014. After this hearing, Hecht drafted Plaintiffs’ supplemental discovery responses and
emailed them to Lynn Crummitt for her review. Hecht signed Lynn Crummitt’s name on both documents. Hecht also drafted two c ertificates r ega rding d iscovery and signed them without allowing Lyn n Crummitt an opportunity to review the documents

. Hecht sent the
documents to Bonner and delivered the discovery materials on electronic media to the
circuit court. Before the trial , Blank communicated to Hecht tha t he could not become counsel
for the Crummitts until his firm talked to the expert that Hecht had been consulting with
and thus, Blank would not attend the trial on January 21, 2014

. Further, Blank stated that
Hecht did not file expert identification which precluded call ing any expert witnes ses at trial

. At the January 21, 2014 trial, Hecht misinformed Lynn Crummitt that Blank would not be in attendance due to snow. With Hecht in the gallery , Lynn Crummitt relied on Hecht’s false information and informed the court that Blank’s absence was d ue to snow

. In response, t he circuit court denied Bonner’s motion to dismiss and issued an a mended Scheduling Or der setting a trial date for May 2014

. Thereafter, He c h t drafted twelve discovery documents for the Crummitts during March 2014

. W ithout showing these documents to the Crummitts, He idi Hecht signed the
documents on behalf of the Crummitts

. Hecht sent the Crummitts’ disco very documents
to Bonner and filed them with the circuit court. In response, Bonner filed a m otion to

c ompel the Crummitts’ c omplete d iscovery r esponses and sent a motion indicating that9

Bonner intended t o depose the Crummitts in early April 2014. The Crummitts forwarded
both motions to Hecht

. Though Lynn Crummitt alerted Hecht that she would be unable to be depose d on the date specified by Bonner , Hecht did not inform Bonner of Lynn Crummitt’s unavailability until after the deposition was scheduled to begin.
Bonner again moved to have the case dismissed in early April 2014

. In response, Hecht drafted a m o tion to c ontinue t rial and sent i t to Lynn Crummitt for review. Hecht sig ned Lynn Crummitt’s name and filed the motion with the circuit court in late April 2014

. After submitting this motion , Hecht recommended that Ly nn Crummitt meet with
Elizabeth Cawood (“ Cawood”) to see if Cawood would be willing to ent er as counsel in
her case

. This was Hecht’s fourth and final attempt to secure new counsel for the Crummitts

. After an initial meeting, Cawood’s law firm partner decided that the firm should decline repres entation

. When Hecht relayed this news t o Lynn Crummitt, she
terminated his representation. On May 14, 2014, the court granted Bonner’s m otion to
d i smiss and dismissed the Crummitts’ case with prejudice. The hearing judge recognized that Hecht was remorseful and had admitted his mistakes in the Crummitts’ case . Additionally, the hearing judge concluded that Hecht made “ numerous unsuccessful efforts to assist L ynn Crummitt in retaining a new attorney. ” The hearing judge also acknowledged that H echt “ paid $30,000.00 of his personal funds in money damages to the Crummitts as restitution for the Crummitts’ lawsuit being
dismissed. ” Finally, the hearing judge noted that Joseph Ruddy, Esq., an Assistant State’s Attorney for Prince George’s County, Judge C. Philip Nichols, Jr. of the Circuit Court for10

Prince George’s County, and Judge Leo Green, Jr. of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County each testified to Hecht’s competence and truthfulness. Standard of Review In an attorney discipline proce eding, this Court reviews for clear error a hearing judge’s findings of fact, and reviews without deference a hearing judge’s conclusions of
law. See Md. Rule 19

- 741(b)(2)(B) (“The Court [of Appeals] shall give due regard to the opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of witnesses.”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Chanthunya , 446 Md. 576, 588 (2016) (“This Court reviews for clear error a hearing judge’s findings of fact.” (Citations omitted)); Md . Rule 19

- 741(b)(1) (“The Court of Appeals shall review de novo the [hearing] judge’s conclusions of law.”). This Court determines whether clear and convincing evidence establishes that a lawyer violated an MLRPC. See Md. Rule 19

- 727(c) (“Bar Counsel has the burden of proving the averments of the petition [for disciplinary or remedial action] by clear and convincing evidence.”). If exceptions to the findings of fact are filed, the Court “shall determine whether the findings of fact have been proved by the requisite standard of proof set out in Rul e 19

- 727(c)

. ” Md. Rule 19

- 741(b)(2)(B) ; See Attorney Grievance Comm’ n v. Mahone , 435 Md. 84, 104 (2013). DISCUSSION
A. Exceptions to the Hearing Judge’s Findings of Fact11

Bar Counsel does not except to any of the hearing judge’s findings of fact. Hecht

note s several exceptions to the hearing judge’s factual findings that primarily argue for the
inclusion of additional information instead of disput ing specific finding s . First, Hecht excepts to the hearing judge’s finding s of fact and requests to add the
fact that after his suspension , he did not take on new clients and he referred prospective and existing clients to other attorneys

. Further, Hecht believed that his appearance in criminal cases had been stricken by operation of law , and thus he did not check the mail at his closed office for sixty days

. Although the hearing judge found that Hecht discovered the Crummitts had not retained new counsel on August 6, 2013, Hecht
contends that he did not realize the Crummitts had not retained new counsel or respond ed
to disco v ery until September 18, 2013. These assertions are supported by Hecht’s testimony and because Bar Counsel does not dispute Hecht’s testimony as it relates to these exceptions , we sustain the exceptions. Second, Hecht excepts to the hearing judge’s findings of fact and requests to add facts regarding his attempts to secure new counsel for the Crummitts. Specifically, after his suspension , he contacted and facilitated communication by Lynn Crummitt with four attorneys : 1. Peter Fayne . After co mmunicating in person and by text message on

May 31, 2013 , Hecht believed that Fayne would enter his appearance in the Crummitts’ case

. 2. Robert Fiore and the law firm Miller & Zois . A t the December 11, 2013 status conference , Lynn Crummitt told Judge Dwyer that she had been in communication with Fior e and Fayne about representation and that both attorneys needed a continuance in order to join the case

.12

3. Aaron Blank . L ynn Crummitt represented to Judge Dwyer that she had an attorney, refer ring to Blank, with her at the January 2, 2014 hearing

. 4. Beth Cawood

. W hen Cawood declined representation of Lynn Crummitt, Hecht stated tha t he had found another attorney willing to assist the Crummitts

. These assertions are supported by Hecht’s tes timony and because Bar Counsel does not dispute this testimony as it relates to these exceptions, we sustain the exceptions. Third, Hecht excepts to the factual finding s regarding the date that he notified the Crummitts of his suspension. His exception stat es that “ on approximately September 18, 2013, Hecht told Lynn Crummitt that he was suspended, that he would assist her in fending
off the then

- present motion to dismiss, and that Lynn had to hire another attorney, ‘ Peter

or someone .’” Lynn Crummitt te stified that at no point during these September 18, 2013 communications did Hecht admit he was suspended from the practice of law. Lynn Crummitt stated that Hecht mentioned Fayne to her, explaining that Hecht wanted Fayne involved because he “was a very s uccessful person al injury attorney” and that her case “needed a big firm like his for their clout.” Due to Lynn Crummitt’s testimony , we cannot conclude that the hearing judge erred in determining the date that he told Lynn Crummitt he was suspended. Thu s, Hecht’s exception as to when he told Lynn Crummitt that he was suspended is overruled. Fourth, Hecht excepts to the hearing judge’s findings of fact regarding the authority for him to sign documents on behalf of the Crummitts. Hecht avers that he had

t he authority to sign the Crummitts’ name on various pleadings and documents after the text message conversation between Hecht’s wife and Lynn Crummitt and that Hecht13

believed he had the authority to execute certain documents due to his correspondence with Lynn Crummitt dated September 20, 2013 and December 31, 2013

. While this
assertion is supported as to the documents referenced in the September 20, 2013 and
December 31, 2013 communications , it is not clear or reasonable that Hecht had continuing permission to sign the Crummitts’ documents before and after these
communications . As such, Hecht’s exception is sustained to the documents discussed during the September 20 , 2013 and December 31, 2013 communications , but the exception is overruled in regard to any documents in which Hecht did not affirmatively ask the Crummitts’ permission to sign

. B. Conclusions of Law Bar Counsel excepts to the hearing judge’s failure to fin d that Hecht violated
MLRPC 8.1(a) and 8.4(c) during the course of the Bar Counsel’s disciplinary investigation,
and that Hecht’s conduct, taken as a whole, violated MLRPC 8.4(d). Hecht excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law regarding MLRPC 3.3, 3.4, 4.1, 5.5, 8.1, and 8.4. Based upon our independent review of the record , we sustain Bar Counsel’s exceptions as to
MLRPC 8.1(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d), overrule Hecht’s exceptions to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law, and uphold the rest of th e hearing judge’s conclusions of law. MLRPC 1.1 , 1.3 , 3.2 , and 3.4 The hearing judge found Hecht “failed to timely and adequately respond to discovery requests on behalf of the Crummitts ,” ultimately “ resulting in their case being dismissed with prejudice , ” violating MLRPC 1.1, 1.3 , 3.2 , and 3.4

. MLRPC 1 .1 requires that an attorney “ provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation14

requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the represent ation.” MLRPC 1.3 requires that a lawyer must also “ act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” Conduct which violates MLRPC 1.1 will often also violate MLRPC 1.3. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McCulloch , 4 04 Md. 388 , 398 ( 20 08). Under MLRPC 3.2, a lawyer is required to “make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.” MLRPC 3.4 (d) requires that a lawyer not “fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply” with an opposing
p ar t y ’s discovery request. Hecht excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that he violated
MLRPC 3.4 (d)

. While we acknowledge Hecht’s many attempts to find new counsel for the Crummitts , Hecht repeatedly failed to comply with discovery deadlines. Hecht’s
involvement in the lawsuit , both before and after the Crummitts realized he was suspended , delayed the trial unnecessarily and ultimately caused the case to be dismissed. We conclude that these facts display a l ack of competent representation, diligence , and expedience. Therefore, we agree with the hearing judge and conclude that Hecht’s conduct violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3 , 3.2 , and 3.4(d) and overrule Hecht’s exception. MLRPC 1.4 and 1.16
MLRPC 1.4 provides , in part : (a) A lawyer shall: (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(f), is required by these Rules; (2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; (3) promptly comply with reasonab le requests for information; and15 (4) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. ( b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
MLRPC 1.16(a) states : (a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, whe re representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: (1) the representation will result in violation of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct or other law: (2) the lawyer’s physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer’s ability to represent the client; or (3) the lawyer is discharged.
MLRPC 1.16(d) provides: (d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s intere sts, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law. The hearing judge found Hecht in violation of MLRPC 1.4 and 1.16 “ because
he failed to specifically notify the Crummitts that he had been suspended from the practice of law and could no longer act as t heir attorney. ” Hecht was suspended on May 16, 2013, and the suspension began on June 15, 2013. The Crummitts did not know that Hecht, who acted as though he was still an active attorney, had been suspended until October 29, 2013

. Further, they only became aware of Hecht’s suspension due to Bonner sending a motion directly to the Crummitts. Even after the Crummitts learned that Hecht was suspended, Hecht failed to aff irmatively assert to the16

Crummitts that he was barred from providing legal services , such as drafting legal documents, or rendering legal advice. Based upon these facts, the hearing judge found that Hecht was not forthcoming about his suspension or his in ability to practice law when suspended. Moreover, Hecht’s lack of candor regarding his professional status exacerbated the problems facing the Crummitts in pursuing their lawsuit. Accordingly,

we agree with the hearing judge and hold that Hecht ’s conduct violated MLRPC 1.4(a) , 1.4 (b) , 1.16(a), and 1.16(d). MLRPC 3.3, 4.1 , and 5.5 Hecht excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that he violated MLRPC 3.3, 4.1, and
5.5. The hearing judge found Hecht sent pleadings and discovery responses to the Court
and Bonner “ purported to be prepared by the Crummit ts themselves that in fact were prepared and signed by [Hecht] ” and that Hecht “ was untruthful with the Crummitts in failing to explain hi s suspension, ” violating MLRPC 3.3 and 4.1. Because of these actions,
the hearing judge also concluded that Hecht violated MLRPC 5.5

. Though he does not specifically refer to MLRPC 3.3, 4.1, and 5.5 , Hecht argues that “he attempted to informally” assist the Crummitts which was “well

- intentioned but inartfully executed.”
T he hearing ju dge concluded that Hecht “misle d his client by alleging Aaron Blank would not appear at the January 21, 2014 court hearing due to inclement weather and Lynn Crummitt repeating the assertion to the court.” A ccording to his testimony , Hecht
kno wingly misrepresented to Lynn Crummitt in an effort to reduce her stress. MLRPC 3.3(a) states that an attorney must not “ make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal .” Regardless of his reasoning, Hecht made a false statement to Lynn Crummitt who, acting17

on Hecht’s advice and information, unintentionally informed the circuit court of a misrepresentation upon which the circuit court relied . The record is clear that Hech t’s conduct violated MLRPC 3.3 and t herefore, we overrule Hecht’s exception.
Cont rary to his assertion, Hecht’s actions rose to the level of performing legal tasks rather than, as Hecht argues, i nformal, non

- legal assistance . In certain instances, Hecht would sign the Crummitts’ signature s on documents he drafted and submit the legal documents to the circuit court or opposing party even though he was suspended. MLRPC 5.5 forbids an attorney from engaging in the practice of law “in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction” and forbids a suspended attorney from “hold[ing] out to the public” that the attorney is authorized to practice law. By not affirmatively telling the Crummitts that he was suspended, Hecht held himself out to be an attorney authorized to practice law in Maryland. Hec ht’s suspension combined with his admission that he drafted various discovery documents on the Crummitts’ behalf lead to the inescapable conclusion that Hecht participated in the unauthorized practice of law. MLRPC 4.1 states that a lawyer must not “make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person.” Hecht was not honest in his communications with the Crummitts, opposing counsel, or the circuit court and misrepresented the source of the Crummitts’ discovery responses to opposing counsel and the circuit court. Therefore, we agree with the hearing judge and conclude that this conduct violated MLRPC 4.1 , 5.5 (a), and 5.5(b)

. For these reasons, we overrule Hecht’s exception s . MLRPC 8.1 and 8.418

Bar Counsel excepts to the hearing judge’s failure to conclude that Hecht violated
MLRPC 8.1(a) , 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) based upon Hecht’s alleged misrepresentations to Bar Counsel during the disciplinary investigation and Hecht’s overall conduct

. Specifically, Bar Counsel asserts that Hecht violated MLRPC 8.1(a) and 8.4(c ) “by knowingly and intentionally testifying falsely that: (a) he notified the Crummitts of his indefinite suspension; (b) he simply ‘assisted’ Lynn Crummitt in drafting discovery materials and pleadings; and (c) he had obtained the C rummitts’ authorization to affix their signatures to all of the documents.” Hecht excepts generally to the hearing judge’s finding that he violated MLRPC 8.1 and 8.4

. MLRPC 8.1(a) requires that a lawyer involved in a disciplinary matter must not

“ knowin gly make a fals e statement of material fact.” The hearing judge found that Hecht violated MLRPC 8.1 (a) based on his submission of an affidavit to Bar Counsel in which he “ misrepresented to Bar Counsel that he had notified the Crummitts of his suspension. ” The hearing judge additionally noted that Hecht “ had not notified [the Crummitts] and
continued to give [the Crummitts] legal advice. ” The hearing judge recognized that “Mr.
Hecht testified at the evidentiary hearing that he did email the Crummitts the suspension notice; however, he was uncertain if the letter was actually transmitted and took no follow

up steps. ” In his affidavit to Bar Counsel, Hecht stated that his email had been sent to the Crummitts, giving them notification o f his suspension. Wh ile Hecht asserts that he believed his email to the Crummitts had been submitted, his subsequent action s , including providing the Crummitts with legal services and acting evasively when questioned by the Crummitts about his suspension, belie this claim. As such, we believe clear and convincing19

evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that Hecht “knowingly and intentionally” attempted to de ceive Bar Counsel in his submission of an affidavit to Bar Counsel

. Thus, we find that Hecht violated MLRPC 8.1 (a) for this issue , and we overrule Hecht’s exception and sustain Bar Counsel’s exception.
Hecht violate d MLRPC 8.1 (a) by testifying falsely that he only “assisted” Lynn Crummitt in drafting discovery materials and pleadings. As we have discussed prev iously , Hecht’s actions clearly rose to the practice of law. The Crummitts did nothing other than
review or allow Hecht to submit the items he drafted. As such, Hecht violated MLRPC
8.1 (a) for “knowingly and intentionally” testifying falsely that he only “assisted” Lynn Crummitt in drafting discovery materials and pleadings , and we overrule Hecht’s exception and sustain Bar Counsel’s exception. Finally, clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that
Hecht lied under oath that the Crummitts granted Hecht the ability to sign and submit documents on their behalf. While the September 20, 2013 text message communication between Heidi Hecht and Lynn Crummitt granted Hecht the ability to sign the Crummitts’ signatures for those part icular interrogatories , the Crummitts did not grant Hecht blanket authorization to sign their signatures on any future legal document. It is illogical that these text messages would lead an attorney to believe that he had continuing permission to sign
cli ents’ signatures on future legal documents

. If Hecht believed the September 20, 2013
communication to be unclear , i t was incumbent on Hecht to ask the Crummitts’ permission to sign future documents . As such, clear and convincing evidence establishes that Hecht’s
conduct violated MLRPC 8.1 (a) when he lied under oath that the Crummitts granted him20

the ability to sign and submit documents on their behalf in the instances described above, and we overrule Hecht’s exception and s ustain Bar Counsel’s exception. MLRPC 8.4(a) states that it is professional misconduct for an attorney to “violate . . . the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct.” MLRPC 8.4(b) forbids a lawyer from “ commit [ing] a criminal act that reflects adversely on the attorney’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as an attorney .” The hearing judge found Hecht violated MLRPC 8.4(b) because “[n] otwithstanding the fact [Hecht] was suspended from the practice of law, [Hecht] continued to practice law and represent the Crummitts as their attorney for a period of more than ten (10) months .” As discussed in detail supra , Hecht practiced “ law in the State of Maryland without an active law license , ” committing a criminal offense

. Md. Code. , Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 10

- 606(c). Hecht’s unauthorized practice of law reflected adversely on his honesty and trustworthiness as an attorney. Accordingly, Hecht ’s conduct
violated both MLRPC 8.4 (a) and (b) , and we overrule Hecht’s exception.
A lawyer violates MLRPC 8.4(c) if the lawyer “ engage [s] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation .” The hearing judge further found Hecht

“ misrepresented and mischaracterized to the Crummit ts the nature of his suspension” and
that Hecht “ misled the Crummitts and signed, or directed his wife to sign, the Crummitts’ discovery responses without their knowledge or consent. ” The hearing judge concluded that Hecht’s conduct was “clearly dishonest and deceitful” because by “ submitting the discovery materials to opposing counsel and filing the pleadings with the Court, [Hecht] knowingly ga ve them the false impression that the Crummitts were representing themselves. ” As found in o ur discussion regarding MLRPC 8.1 , Hecht engaged in conduct21

that involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation

. Therefore, his conduct violated MLRPC 8.4(c) , and we overrule Hecht’s exception. Under MLRPC 8.4(d), it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Bar Counsel excepts to the hearing judge not making a finding that Hecht’s conduct viola ted MLRPC 8.4(d). Bar Counsel argues that since Hecht violated both MLRPC 8.4(b) and 8.4(c), Hecht also violated MLRPC 8.4(d). In suppor t , Bar Counsel cites to Attorney Grievance Commission v. Shryock , in which we stated that, “[o]rdinarily [violations of MLRPC 8.4(b) and (c)] would constitute a violation of M RPC 8.4(d), in that the conduct which supports a violation of MRPC 8.4(b) and (c) amounts to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.” 408 Md. 105, 125 (2009). Since we have concluded that Hecht committed a criminal act when he engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and that Hecht made multiple misrepresentations bo th to his client and to Bar Counsel, we also determine that Hecht has engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice , and, a s such, his
conduct violated MLRPC 8.4(d) . We overrule Hecht’s exception and sustain Bar Counsel’s excepti on. SANCTION As we have often stated, the purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public and deter other lawyers from engaging in misconduct rather than simply punishing the lawyer. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mollock , 450 Md. 13 3, 158 (2016). The public is protected when sanctions are “commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with which they were committed.” Attorney Grievance22

Comm’n v. Pennington , 387 Md. 565, 596 (2 005) (citing Attorney Grieva nce Comm’n v. Ellison , 384 Md. 688, 714 (2005)). Th is Court has established standards to weigh the severity of an attorney’s misconduct. 3

3 In determining an appropriate sanction for a lawyer’s misconduct, this Court considers: (1) the MLRPC that the lawyer violated; (2) the lawyer’s mental state; (3) the injury that the lawyer’s misconduct caused or could have caused; and (4) aggravating factors and/or mitigating factors. Aggravating factors include: (1) prior attorney discipline; (2) a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) a pattern of misconduct; (4) multiple violations of the MLRPC; (5) bad faith obstruction of the attorney discipline proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency; (6) submission of false evidence, false statem ents, or other deceptive practices during the attorney discipline proceeding; (7) a refusal to acknowledge the misconduct’s wrongful nature; (8) the victim’s vulnerability; (9) substantial experience in the practice of law; (10) indifference to making res titution or rectifying the misconduct’s consequences; (11) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of controlled substances; and (12) likelihood of repetition of the misconduct. Mitigating factors include: (1) the absence of prior attorney disci pline; (2) the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) personal or emotional problems; (4) timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify the misconduct’s consequences; (5) full and free disclosure to Bar Counsel or a cooperative attitud e toward the attorney discipline proceeding; (6) inexperience in the practice of law; (7) character or reputation; (8) a physical disability; (9) a mental disability or chemical dependency, including alcoholism or drug abuse, where: (a) th ere is medical ev idence that the lawyer is affected by a chemical dependency or mental disability; (b) the chemical dependency or mental disability caused the misconduct; (c) the lawyer’s recovery from the chemical dependency or mental disability is demonstrated by a meani ngful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; and (d) the recovery arrested the misconduct, and the misconduct’s recurrence is unlikely; (10) delay in the attorney discipline proceeding; (11) the imposition of other penalties or sanctions; (12) remorse; (13) remoteness of prior violations of the MLRPC; and (14) unlikelihood of repetition of the misconduct. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Allenbaugh , 450 Md. 250, 277

– 78 (2016) (c leaned up).23

Bar Counsel recommends that we disbar Hecht. In support of this argument, Bar Counsel argues that “[c]onduct involving fraud, dishonesty, or deceit will ordinarily result in disbarment absent compelling extenuating circumstances.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gerace , 433 Md. 632, 650 (2012) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ross , 428 Md. 50, 86 (2012)). Bar Counsel argues that the present matter is similar to Attorney Grievance Commission v. Maig n an because in Maignan , we “disbarred an attorney for knowingly engaging in the practice of law at a time when his license to practice law was suspended.”
423 Md . 191 (2011). The suspended lawyer in Maignan began legal representation of a client for a matter before the United States District Court for the District of Columbia even though the lawyer was not licensed in the United States District Court for the Dist rict of Columbia. Id. at 197

– 98. The lawyer did not alert his client about his suspension until late into the representation. Id. at 199. While representing the client, the lawyer advised and counseled the client, drafted various pleadings, signed the pleadings on behalf of the client, and filed them with the court. Id. at 198. While considering the appropriate sanction, we discussed that the lawyer had been disciplined three times in seven years, with the prior two cases both resulting in indefinite suspensions for the attorney. Id. at 206. We concluded by stating that “[w] hen a member of the legal profession consistently violates the Rules of Professional Conduct and continues to disregard repeated admonishments in derogation of the trust and confi dence of the public, disbarment is the only remedy. ” Id. Hecht asks that we continue his indefinite suspension. Hecht again admits his mistakes and states that he was only “motivated by a desire to protect the Crummitts’ legal24

interests” rather than “gr eed or ill

- will.” He also points to his “reputation as a competent and truthful practitioner” and that he “made restitution to the Crummitts in the amount of $30,000 from his own funds.” Our holding in Maignan has only marginal value here. In both Maignan and the present case, suspended attorneys engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and did not immediately alert clients to their suspensions. Unlike the attorney in Maignan though, once suspended, Hecht shut down his law practice and did not b egin representation of any new clients. Additionally, Hecht’s improper conduct was not motivated by financial gain but by, as the hearing judge found, “[a]ttempting to help his wife’s friends.” Hecht made multiple attempts to obtain new counsel for his c lients whereas the lawyer in Maignan made no such efforts. Rather than receive a fee for his unauthorized practice of law like the lawyer in Maignan did, Hecht reimbursed his clients as restitution for their lawsuit ultimately being dismissed. Importantl y, Hecht has been suspended once while the lawyer
in Maignan had been suspended twice before he was ultimately disbarred. The hearing judge concluded that four aggravating factors apply to Hecht. Hecht received prior attorney discipline when he was inde finitely suspended by this Court on May 16, 2013. Additionally, as noted by the hearing judge , Hecht ’s conduct involved “ a pattern of dishonest or deceitful conduct in an effort to delay the resolution of the Crummitts’ case” and he “committed multiple offenses when he, for a period of almost ten months, practiced law and represented the Crummitts as their attorney without an active law license.” Finally, we note that Hecht had practiced law for a significant period of time
since he had been a member of the Maryla nd Bar for over twenty years

.25

The hearing court also recognize d several mitigating factors

. Hecht has repeatedly
admitted that he made mistakes in the way he handled the Crummitts’ case. As the hearing judge noted , Hecht h as “ expressed remorse for the mistakes he made in this matter and did not profit from the Crummitts case , ” instead pa ying the Crummitts $30,000 of his own
money as restitution. Finally, the hearing judge found that Hecht “ made numerous
unsuccessful effort s to get new counsel to represent the Crummitts and had a reputation as a competent and truthful practitioner .” Although we agree with Bar Counsel that Hecht’s conduct did involve “ fraud, dishonesty, or deceit ” and that conduct involving “fraud, dishonesty, or deceit” usually results in disbarment, we conclude there is sufficient mitigation to warrant deviating from
disbarment in this case

. Hecht, upon being suspended, turned away prospective clients and attemp ted to inform all of his current clients that he was suspended an d could no longer represent them . When he discovered that his attempted suspension communication to the Crummitts had failed , he made the wrong decision , predicated on worry and a sense of
l oyalty for his wife’s friends, in continuing to act as their attorney while attempting to find alternative counsel for them

. When the Crummitts’ lawsuit was dismissed, Hecht financially reimbursed them. Upon our independent review, we conclude that indefinite suspension is the proper sanction

. For the reasons found above, we indefinitely suspend
Hecht with the right to petition for reinstatement after twelve months from the date of this opinion

.26 IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 19
- 709(d) . JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST ROSS D. HECHT IN THE SUM OF THESE COSTS.IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 97 September Term, 2016

____________ __________________________ ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION

OF MARYLAND

v. ROSS D. HECHT

__________ ____________________________

Barbera , C.J. Greene Adkins McDonald Watts Hotten Getty , JJ.

____________ __________________________ Dissent ing Opinion by W atts , J. , which Greene,

J., joins.

__________ ____________________________

Filed: May 10, 2018 Circuit Court for Prince George’s County Case No. CAE17

- 06394 Argued: February 5, 2018Respectfully, I dissent

. I agree with the Majority that Ross D. Hecht, Respondent,

violated multiple Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”)

. I disagree, however, that imposition of an indefinite suspension with the right to apply for reinstatement after twelve months is the appropriate sanction, see Maj. Slip Op. at 3, given
the numerous instances and serious na ture of the misconduct in which Hecht engaged, as well as the aggravating factors present, including , most importantly, Hecht’s history of prior attorney discipline

. U nder the circumstances of this case, absent any facts that could possibly constitute com pelling extenuating circumstances, disbarment is the appropriate sanction “to protect the public and the public’s confidence in the legal profession.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Allenbaugh , 450 Md. 250, 277, 148 A.3d 300, 316 (2016) (citation omitted).
I t is undisputed that Hecht has a significant history of prior attorney discipline. See id. at 277, 148 A.3d at 316. A t the time that Hecht engaged in the misconduct at issue, he was already indefinitely suspended by consent from the practice of law in Maryland with the right to apply for reinstatement after six months. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Hecht , 431 Md. 443, 66 A.3d 46 (2013). Indeed, to this day, Hecht remains indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in Maryland. Moreover, accord ing to the Commission, in September 2008, the Commission reprimanded Hecht for violating MLRPC 1.16(d) and 8.1(b). Thus, Hecht has two instances of prior attorney discipline, including the serious sanction of indefinite suspension , to which he consented , for prior violations of the
MLRPC

. I n this case, Hecht violated a multitude of MLRPC , namely, 1.1 (Competence), 1.3- 2

-

(Diligence), 1.4(a), 1.4(b) (Communication), 1.16(a), 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation), 3.2 (Expediting Litigation), 3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal), 3.4(d) (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel), 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Othe rs), 5.5(a), 5.5(b) (Unauthorized Practice of Law), 8.1(a) (Disciplinary Matters), 8.(b) (Criminal Act), 8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (Conduct That Is Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice), and 8.4(a) (Violating the MLRPC).
See Maj. Slip Op. at 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21. Significantly, Hecht’s violations include MLRPC 8.4(b), involving Hecht’s unauthorized practice of law, and MLRPC 8.1(a) and 8.4(c) , involving Hecht’s intentionally dishonest conduct

. Hecht violat ed MLRPC 8.4(b)
b y practicing law and representing the Crummitts while indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in Maryland, thereby commit ting a criminal offense. 1 Indeed , the Majority
concludes that “Hecht’s unauthorized practice of law reflected adversely on his honesty and trustworthiness as an attorney.” Maj. Slip Op. at 20. Importantly, though, Hecht’s dishonest behavior extended beyond engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. As the Majority concludes, Hecht engaged in intentionally

1 Md. Code Ann., Bus. Occ. & Prof. (1989, 2010 Repl. Vol.) (“BOP”) § 10

- 601(b)(3) (“While an . . . individual’s right to practice law is suspended . . . , the individual may[] perform any other act that is necessary to conclude the affairs of a law practice but that does not constitute practicing law.” (Paragraph break o mitted)); BOP § 10

- 602 (“Unless authorized by law to practice law in the State, a person may not represent to the public, by use of a title, including ‘lawyer’, ‘attorney at law’, or ‘counselor at law’, by description of services, methods, or procedures, o r otherwise, that the person is authorized to practice law in the State.”); BOP § 10

- 606(c) (“Except as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, a person who violates any provision of this title is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is s ubject to a fine not exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or both.”).- 3

-

di shonest conduct in several instances. According to the Majority, Hecht violated MLRPC 8.1(a) in three respects

— (1) by “‘knowingly and intentionally’ attempt[ing] to deceive Bar Counsel in his submission of an affidavit to Bar Counsel”; (2) by “‘knowingly and intentionally’ testifying falsely that he only ‘assisted’ Lynn Crummitt in drafting di scovery materials and pleadings ” ; and (3) by “ l[ying] under oath that the Crummitts [had] granted [him] the ability to sign and submit documents on their behalf [

. ] ” Maj. Slip Op. at 19

- 20

. The Majority also concludes that, based on his violations of MLRPC 8.1(a), “Hecht engaged in conduct that involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation” in violation of MLRPC 8.4(c). Maj. Slip Op. at 20

- 21

. Among other things, Hecht falsely testified that he only assisted Lynn Crummitt in drafting discovery materials and pleadings when, in actuality, the Crummitts did not draft discovery materials and pleadings, but instead simply reviewed items that Hecht had drafted o r allowed Hecht to submit items that he had drafted. See Maj. Slip Op. at 19. Hecht also “lied under oath” that the Crummitts had granted him authority to sign and submit documents on their behalf when, in actuality, the September 20, 2013 text message c ommunication between Heidi Hecht and Lynn Crummitt simply authorized Hecht to sign specific interrogatories on the Crummitts’
behalf , and did not provide Hecht with a blanket authorization or continuing permission to sign for the Crummitts on future legal documents. See Maj. Slip Op. at 19. T hese instances
clear l y demonstrate that Hecht’s testimony during the attorney discipline proceeding involved knowi ngly false statement s of material fact in violation on MLRPC 8.1(a), and, correspondingly, conduct invo lving dishonesty, fraud, deceit , or misrepresentation in violation of MLRPC 8.4(c). In other words, Hecht engaged in intentionally dishonest- 4

-

conduct. And, as noted by the Majority, among four aggravating factors, the hearing judge specifically concluded that Hecht’s conduct involved “a pattern of dishonest or deceitful conduct in an effort to delay the resolution of the Crummitts’ case” and he “committed multiple offenses when he, for a period of almost ten months, practiced law and represented the Crummi tts as their attorney without an active law license.” Maj. Slip Op. at 24

. Recently, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Smith , 457 Md. 159, 222

- 23, 177 A.3d
640 , 678 (2018), this Court explained the significance and effect of intentional dishonest
conduct b y a lawyer:

In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde , we articulated our admonishment of attorneys who engaged in deceitful behavior to the detriment of the public: Upon reflection as a Court, in disciplinary matters, we will not in the future attempt to distinguish between degrees of intentional dishonesty based upon convictions, testimonials or other factors. Unlike matters relating to competency, diligence and the like, intentional dishonest conduct is closely entwined with the most important matters of basic character to such a degree as to make intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer almost beyond excuse. Honesty and dishonesty are, or are not, present in an a ttorney’ s character. Disbarment ordinarily should be the sanction for intentional dishonest conduct. 364 Md. 376, 418, 773 A.2d 463, 488 (2001). Dishonest conduct reflects a range of acts, from misappropriation of funds to misrepresentations to a clien t, Bar Counsel, or the court. Indeed, t his Court has said time and time again that, “[g]enerally, the sanction of- 5

-

disbarment is appropriate when an attorney has acted with intentional dishonesty in violation of [MLRPC] 8.4(c), absent [compelling] extenuating circumstances.” Smith , 457 Md. at 223, 177 A.3d at 678 (citations omitted) ; see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Guida , 391 Md. 33, 63, 891 A.2d 1085, 1102

- 03 (2006) (The lawyer “engaged in
int entional dishonesty and deceit that undermines the trust that must be at the center of the lawyer

- client relationship. This Court has stated that intentional dishonest conduct by an attorney is almost beyond excuse and that disbarment should ordinarily be the sanction for such conduct.” (Cleaned up))

. In short , intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer is among the most serious misconduct that a lawyer can commit, and where a lawyer engages in such intentionally dishonest conduct in violation of MLRPC 8. 4(c), and where there are no compelling extenuating circumstances justifying a sanction less than disbarment, ordinarily, disbarment is warranted. In my view, given Hecht’s intentionally dishonest conduct and other numerous instances of misconduct, and tha t there are no compelling extenuating circumstances, the sanction of disbarment is warranted . I would conclude that the mitigating factors found by the hearing judge, which the majority opinion accepts

— remorse, restitution, and reputation, see Maj. Slip O p. at 2 5

— do not constitute compelling extenuating circumstances and are insufficient to mitigate Hecht’s misconduct such that a second indefinite suspension is appropriate. Obviously, the previous indefinite suspension imposed by consent against Hecht was insufficient to protect the public, and it is unclear why a second indefinite suspension would somehow now be sufficient given the multitude of MLRPC that Hecht violated while indefinitely suspended from the practice of law the- 6

-

first time

. B y imposing an indefinite suspension with the right to apply for reinstatement after twelve months, the Majority has given Hecht yet another bite at the apple with respect to harming the public and further eroding the public’s confidence in the legal pr ofession. With this sanction, despite his intentional dishonest conduct, the Majority has guaranteed
Hecht yet a nother date by which he has the right to apply for reinstatement to the practice of law in Maryland. In my view, the indefinite suspension imp osed by the Majority is inadequate to protect the public under the circumstances of the case. In sum, given the lack of compelling extenuating circumstances, Hecht’s intentionally dishonest conduct, his numerous other violations of the MLRPC, the
aggrava ting factors present , most importantly his history of prior attorney discipline, and recognizing that the misconduct in this case occurred while Hecht was already indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in Maryland, I would conclude that disbarment is warranted. For the above reasons, respectfully, I dissent. Judge Greene has authorized me to state that he joins in this opinion.