SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4870-17T3

SHIRL DAVID,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ANTONIO J. WYNN,

Defendant-Respondent.

_________________________

Argued September 11, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Haas and Mayer.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County, 

Docket No. FM-12-2156-13.

Stilianos Michael Cambilis argued the cause for 

appellant (The Law Office of Rajeh A. Saadeh, LLC, 

attorneys; Rajeh A. Saadeh and Kelscey Ann Boyle, on 

the brief).

Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

September 17, 2019
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This post-judgment matrimonial matter returns to us after remand 

proceedings directed by our previous opinion. David v. Wynn, No. A-2707-16 

(App. Div. March 5, 2018).1 In compliance with our remand order, the judge 

rendered a lengthy order and statement of reasons on July 31, 2018, and detailed 

the basis for his decision to take a measured, incremental approach to ensuring 

that defendant met his financial obligations going forward.

Specifically, the judge: (1) granted plaintiff's motion to find defendant in 

violation of litigant's rights in connection with the alimony and equitable 

distribution provisions of the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement; (2) directed 

defendant to pay plaintiff an additional $100 per week to address his alimony 

arrears; (3) ordered defendant to pay plaintiff $5018.23, "representing 

[p]laintiff's one-half share of the former marital home"; and (4) granted 

plaintiff's request for counsel fees incurred in connection with two of her 

previous enforcement motions. 

The judge denied plaintiff's requests for the imposition of additional 

sanctions against defendant, such as her demand that the court incarcerate 

defendant until he made full payment of all of his financial obligations with 

 

1

 We assume familiarity with, and incorporate by reference, the underlying 

procedural history and facts contained in our prior opinion. Id. at 1-6.
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interest. However, these denials were without prejudice, and preserved 

plaintiff's ability to request the Family Part to take more stringent enforcement 

measures in the event defendant later failed to abide by the order. The judge 

also denied plaintiff's application for counsel fees in the appeal that led to the 

remand under R. 2:11-4(c), and in other trial court proceedings involving the 

parties.

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial judge should have: imposed 

additional sanctions against defendant; ordered him to pay her additional monies 

in connection with the former marital home; directed him to reimburse more of 

her counsel fees; and required him to pay interest on all of his outstanding 

financial obligations. Based on our review of the record and the applicable law, 

we conclude that plaintiff's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant 

extended discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add the 

following brief comments.

Our standard of review is well settled. Rule 1:10-3 "provide[s] a 

mechanism, coercive in nature, to afford relief to a litigant who has not received 

what a Court Order or Judgment entitles that litigant to receive." D'Atria v. 
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D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 407 (Ch. Div. 1990).2 "The particular manner in 

which compliance may be sought is left to the court's sound discretion." Bd. of 

Educ. of Middletown v. Middletown Twp. Educ. Ass'n, 352 N.J. Super. 501, 509 

(Ch. Div. 2001). We will also not disturb a counsel fee award in a matrimonial 

case under Rule 5:3-5(c) except "on the 'rarest occasion,' and then only because 

of clear abuse of discretion." Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 317 (App. 

Div. 2008) (quoting Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 317 (1995)). 

We owe substantial deference to the Family Part's findings of fact because 

of that court's special expertise in family matters. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J.

394, 411-12 (1998). Thus, "[a] reviewing court should uphold the factual 

findings undergirding the trial court's decision if they are supported by adequate, 

substantial and credible evidence on the record." MacKinnon v. MacKinnon, 

191 N.J. 240, 253-54 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth 

& Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007)).

While we owe no special deference to the judge's legal conclusions, 

Manalapan Realty v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995), 

we "should not disturb the factual findings and legal 

conclusions of the trial judge unless . . . convinced that 

 

2 The D'Atria opinion refers to Rule 1:10-5, but that rule has been amended and 

re-designated as Rule 1:10-3. Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, 

note on R. 1:10-3 (2019).
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they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent 

with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible 

evidence as to offend the interests of justice" or when 

we determine the court has palpably abused its 

discretion. 

[Parish v. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. 39, 47 (App. Div. 

2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J.

at 412).] 

We will reverse the judge's decision "[o]nly when the trial court's 

conclusions are so 'clearly mistaken' or 'wide of the mark' . . . to ensure that there 

is not a denial of justice." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J.

88, 104 (2008) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 

596, 605 (2007)).

Applying these principles, plaintiff's arguments concerning the July 31, 

2018 remand order reveal nothing "so wide of the mark" that we could 

reasonably conclude that a clear mistake was made by the judge. We discern no 

basis for disturbing the judge's determination to begin the enforcement process 

by requiring defendant to first pay plaintiff an additional $100 per week toward 

his alimony arrearages, together with a specified sum in connection with the 

parties' former home, while holding other, more stringent enforcement options 

in abeyance for possible future use in the event defendant continued his 

recalcitrance.
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Similarly, the judge did not mistakenly exercise his discretion in awarding 

plaintiff some, but not all, of the counsel fees she sought. The judge 

meticulously applied the factors under Rule 5:3-5(c), with the beneficial 

perspective of having presided over the majority of the proceedings involving 

the parties.

Finally, we reject plaintiff's request that we again remand the matter and 

order the judge to provide additional findings concerning his determinations. 

Contrary to plaintiff's contention, the judge's written order and statement of 

reasons demonstrated that all of plaintiff's contentions were heard and 

considered.

Affirmed.