United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 96-4147

_____________ United States of America, * * Plaintiff-Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of Nebraska. Eliseo Tinoco Carrate, * also known as Tinoco Eliceo, * also known as Carrate Eliceo * Tinoco, * * Defendant-Appellant. *

_____________ Submitted: April 17, 1997 Filed: September 4, 1997

_____________ Before BOWMAN, HANSEN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

_____________ HANSEN, Circuit Judge.We are told t hat the correct use of the appellant's surname, short of using both 1 his middle and last name, is to refer to his middle name--Tinoco. The Honorable William G. Cambridge, Chief Judge, United States Distric t 2 Court for the District of Nebraska, adopting the report and recommendation of th e Hon orable Thomas D. Thalken, United States Magistrate Judge for the District o f Nebraska. 2 Eliseo Tinoco Carrate (Tinoco ) appeals the judgment of the distric t 1 court denying his motion to suppress the evidence regarding a package containin g 2 app roximately one kilogram of cocaine that was discovered when state trooper s searched the car that Tinoco was driving at the time he was stopped for traffi c violations. In support of his argument that the district court erred in denying hi s mo tion, Tinoco asserts that (1) the state troopers improperly detained him afte r completing the purpose of the traffic stop, (2) he did not consent to the search of the automobile, and (3) even if he did consent to the search , his consent was not voluntary. After reviewing the parties' arguments, we affirm the district court's decision to deny Tinoco's motion to suppress.

I.

Just before midnight on the evening of February 16, 1996, Tinoco was driving eastb oundon Interstate 80 in a 1990 Oldsmobile with Illinois license plates whe n Nebraska State Highway Patrol Troopers Pelowski and Wagner stopped him near North Platte, Nebraska, for an in operative headlight and a speeding violation. Trooper Pelowski approached the driver's side window and asked Tinoco for his driver's license and regis tration. The driver's license identified Tinoco as Eliseo Tinoco Carrate o f Sa nta Ana, California. The registration indicated that the owner of the vehicle wa s Guad alupe Gonzalez of Chicago, Illinois. Trooper Pelowski then inquired as to th e origin and desti nation of Tinoco's trip. Tinoco, a Hispanic male, answered, in broken3

English, that h e was en route from California to Chicago and that he was transporting the car for a friend. Troopers Pelowski and Wagner returned to their patrol car and ran a computer records check on both Tinoco and the vehicle. The record s check revealed that Tinoco
was not wanted on any arrest warrants and that his license was not suspended, but it didindicate that Tinoco had an unspecified criminal record. There were no alerts on the Oldsmobile. The troopers decided to issue Tinoco a warning ticket f or the speeding infraction and a violation notice for the inoperative headlight. Based on thei r observation of several factors that the tro opers' training and experience caused them to be suspicious that Tinoco may be transporting illegal drugs, they also decided to ask Tinoco for permission to search the vehicle. Trooper Pelowski returned to the driver's side window of the Oldsmobile with the ti cket and warning, while Trooper Wagner stationed himself at the rear of th e vehicle. Trooper Pelowski asked Tinoco to step out o f the car and go to the rear of the veh icle so that he could explain the ticket and warning to Tinoco. What else, i f anything, was said by Trooper Pelowskiat this point in time is disputed by the parties. Tinoco maintains that Trooper Pelowski also told him that the troopers had the right to
searc h the Oldsmobile because Tinoco was on probation in California. Tinoco als o claims that as soon a s he got out of the car, Trooper Pelowski asked Tinoco if Tinoco could open the trunk, thus, accordi ng to Tinoco, explaining why Tinoco turned around and reached back into the car to retri eve the keys from the ignition. Trooper Pelowski denies making these statements a nd maintains that he did not ask to search the vehicle until after Tinoco had walked to the rear of the car and had signed the traffic ticket

. Whi le the traffic stop and subsequent search of the vehicle were videotaped by a cam eramounted in the front windshield area of the troopers' patrol car, there is n o accompanying audio recording to verify what statements were actually made.4

Nevertheless, it is undisputed, as evidenced by the videotape, that after Tinoco got out of the car, he turned around and reached back into the ca r and took the keys out of the ignition. Tinoco then walked to the back of the Oldsmobile w here both Troopers Pe lowski and Wagner were now standing, and he immediately inserted the car key s into the trunk lock. Trooper Pelowski prevented Tinoco from opening the trunk and
ex plainedthe significance of the ticket and warning that he was giving to Tinoco

. Tinoco signed the ticket using the trunk lid as a writing surface. Both troopers maintain that a fter returning Tinoco's driver's license and the registration, Trooper Pelowski asked Tinoco if he had any weapons, illegal drugs, or alcohol in the Oldsmobile, and Tinoco responded "No." Both troopers also claim that Trooper Pelowski then asked Tinoco i f they could look in the car and he said they could and he opened the trunk

. Tinoco, however, claims that Trooper Pelowski did not ask him these questions an d that after signing the ticket, Tinoco opened the trunk to comply with Troope r Pelowski's alleged earlier directive to open the trunk.
After Tino co opened the trunk, the troopers began their search of the entir e vehicle. While Trooper Pelowski searched the trunk, Trooper Wagner searched th e front of the car. Approximately ten minutes later, Trooper Wagner discovered a wellwrapped package beh ind the glove compartment and underneath the dashboard of the
car. Tro oper Pelowski then disassembled the dashboard and removed the package

. The package contained a one-kilogram block of powder cocaine.
Tino co was charged with one count of possession with intent to distribut e cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and with one count of criminal forfeiture of the 1990 Oldsmobile under 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(2). After the district court denied Tinoco's motion to suppress, Tinoco entered a conditional plea of guilty to both counts, reserving the right to appeal the district court's adverse suppre ssion ruling. Tinoco then received a sentence of 6 0 months' imprisonment with five years of supervised release. Tinoco now appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress.5 II. Tinoco does not challenge the validity of the initial traffic stop, but he argues that the troopers were not justified in continuing to detain him after they handed him hi s traffic citations. An officer must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person is involved i n criminal activity unrelated to the traffic violation before the officer may expand th e scope of the traffic stop and continue to detain the person for additiona l invest igation. See United States v. Ramos , 42 F.3d 1160, 1163 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied , 115 S . Ct. 2015 (1995); United States v. White , 42 F.3d 457, 460 (8th Cir

. 1994). "While we review the distric t court's findings of fact for clear error, we review de novo the district cour

t's ultimate finding of reasonable suspicion." United States v. Dodso n , 109 F.3d 486, 488 (8th Cir. 1997). In determining whether reasonabl e suspicion existed, "[w]e look to the totality of the circumstan ces, in light of the officer's experience." Id. See also United States v. Bloomfield , 40 F.3d 910, 918 (8th Cir

. 1994) (en banc). In the circumstances of this case, we believe that the troopers were justified in asking Tinoco the two questions after issuing the traffic citations. The t roopers testified that the following factors raised their suspicion that Tin oco may have been transporting drugs: (1) Tinoco was not the owner of the vehicle, (2) Tinoco was in route fro m California to Illinois, (3) California is a point of origin for illegal drugs, (4) Chicago is
a common destination for the shipment of illegal drugs, (5) Tinoco had very littl e clothing in the car to suggest a legitimate trip, (6) the six y ear-old car had high mileage, and (7) Tin oco had a prior criminal record in California. The experience and training of the troopers had informed them that the listed factors were consistent with an d indicative of drug courier characteristics. We find that the facts of th is case collectively provided the troopers wi th a reasonable suspicion that Tinoco was transporting illegal drugs, thus justif

ying their further questioning, detention, and investigation of Tinoco. See Ramos , 42 F.3d at 1163 ("A trained officer may properly infer from a collection6

of circumstances, no one of which itself indicates illegal activity, that further inquiry is appropriate.").

III. Tinoco next argues that he did not consent to the search of the Oldsmobile; he merely complied with Trooper Pelowski's alleged instruction to open the trunk. Tinoco reli es heavily on the videotaped account of the traffic stop to make his argument. As mentioned above, the videotape reveals tha t a few seconds after Tinoco stepped out of the car, he turned around and leaned back into the car to retrieve the keys from th e ignition. While Tinoco made these movements, the troopers took only a small ste p toward Tin oco. Tinoco claims that the troopers' casual response to Tinoco's abrup t movement indicates that the troopers knew that Tinoco was reaching merely for the car keys, as opposed to something more threatening, thus suggesting that Trooper Pelowski had, in fact, directed Tinoco to open th e trunk. Tinoco reasons that if the troopers had not told him to open the trunk, as they maintain, they would have made mor e apprehensive movements towards Tinoco, fearing that he was reaching into the car for a weapon. Additionally, Tinoco claims that it is unlikely that Trooper Pelowski asked him for consent to search the car during the brief interval between the time Tinoc o finished signing the ticket and the time he opened the trunk, as the troopers claim. The district court rejected Tinoco's fa ctual rendition and found that the troopers' slig ht movement toward Tinoco as he reached back into the car "supports th e proposi tion that the Troopers were surprised by [Tinoco's] movement and that the y halted their movement toward [Tinoco] when he immediately appeared with the keys from the ignition." (Appellant's Adden. at 21a.) The court then considered th e possibility that Tinoco voluntarily brought the keys to the rear of the car and attempted to open the tru nk before being asked to do so in order to misdirect the troopers b y acting as if he had nothing to hide, knowing that the package of cocaine was behind the dashboard of the car. The district court thus concluded that Tinoco was first asked to7

consent to a search of the car after he had signed the traffic citation and that he did, in fact, consent to such a search. We will overturn a district court's determination regarding cons ent to search only if it is clearly erroneous. See United States v. Black , 88 F.3d 678, 680 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied , 117 S. Ct. 994 (1997). We consider this issue in light of the totality of the circum stances. Id. While the videotape reveals that Tinoco's interpretation of th e movements that occurred during the traffic stop might be plausibl e, it does not establish that th e district court's alternative conclusion is clearly erroneous. Nor does th e vide otape contradict the direct testimony of the troopers indicating that they did no t direct Tinoco to open the trunk nor tell him that they had the right to search his car because he was on probation. The district court was free to believe the troopers ' stateme nt that they asked Tinoco if they could search his car after he had signed th e traffic ticket and th at Tinoco then allowed them to conduct the search. Moreover, we believe that there was sufficient time for Trooper Pelowski to ask Tinoco for hi s conse nt during the interval between the time Tinoco signed the ticket and the time he open ed the trunk. We find no clear error in the court's conclusion that Tinoc o consented to the search.

IV. Finally , Tinoco asserts that even if he did consent to the search, he did no t voluntarily

do so. Tinoco claims that his limited ability to speak Engli sh combined with the fact that the troo pers did not provide him with a written consent-to-search form or
a ver bal admonition that he was free to leave indicates that his consent was no t vo luntarily given. The district court disagreed and found that Tinoco voluntaril y consented to the search.
The volunt ariness of a person's consent to search is a question of fact that w e review under the clearly erroneous standard. See Schneckloth v. Bus tamonte , 412 U.S.8

218 , 227 (1973); United States v. Czeck , 105 F.3d 1235, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997). W e have previously listed eleven factors r elating to the characteristics of the person giving the consent and the environment in which the consent was provided that are relevant in determining whether such consent was voluntarily offered. See United States v

. Chaidez , 906 F.2d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1990). Tinoco's age, sobriety, and previou s experience with the criminal justice system in California all suggest that Tinoc o voluntarily consented to the search. Despite Tinoco's supposed limited ability to speak English , he understood and appropriately answered all of the troopers' questions, and he was able to testify at the suppression hearing as to the subject matter of th e conversation that he had had with the troopers on the night in question. Furthermore,
even tho ugh the troopers did not provide Tinoco with a written consent form o r explicitly inform him of his right to withhold his consent, such action s are not necessary predicates t o establish that a person voluntarily consented to a search. See Ohio v

. Robinette , 117 S. Ct. 417, 421 (1996). Additionally, the environment in which Ti noco consented to the search supports the district court's finding that Tinoco's consent was voluntary. Tinoco had bee n detained for only a short amount of time w hen he consented to the search; the troopers did n ot threaten or physically intimidate Tinoco; they did not make any promises o r misrepresentations to him; Tinoco was not in custody or under arrest at the time h e conse nted; he was on a public interstate; and he idly stood by while the trooper s searched his car, never indicating that he objected to the search. T hus, we find no clear
error in the district court's determination that Tinoco voluntarily consented to th e search.

V. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.9

A true copy.
Attest:
CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.