J-S71002-16 

NON -PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.G., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

MINOR PENNSYLVANIA 

APPEAL OF: S.G., MOTHER 

: No. 907 EDA 2016 

Appeal from the Order February 29, 2016 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP- 51 -AP- 0000582 -2013, 

CP- 51 -DP- 0000448 -2013 

IN THE INTEREST OF: B.H., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

MINOR PENNSYLVANIA 

APPEAL OF: S.G., MOTHER 

: No. 909 EDA 2016 

Appeal from the Order February 29, 2016 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP- 51 -AP- 0000581 -2013, 

CP- 51 -DP- 0000189 -2012 
J-S71002-16 

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.H., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

MINOR PENNSYLVANIA 

APPEAL OF: S.G., MOTHER 

: No. 910 EDA 2016 

Appeal from the Order February 29, 2016 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP- 51 -AP- 0000580 -2013, 

CP- 51 -DP- 0000159 -2012 

BEFORE: BOWES, PANELLA, and FITZGERALD*, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 08, 2016 

S.G. ( "Mother ") appeals from the February 29, 2016 decrees 

involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her two sons, J.H. and J.G., 

and her daughter, B.H.1 We affirm.2 

B.H. was born during September 2001 to Mother and Father. That 

relationship also produced J.H. during June 2005. J.G. was born of the 

relationship during February 2013, after the Philadelphia Department of 

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 

1 On the same date, the trial court involuntarily terminated the parental 

rights of E.H. ( "Father "), the biological father of all three children. We 

address Father's appeals separately. 

2 Mother also appealed the trial court order changing the children's 

permanency goals from reunification to adoption; however, she 

subsequently abandoned those claims in her brief. 

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Human Services ( "DHS ") became involved with the family. J.H. suffers from 

cerebral palsy and is wheelchair bound. He is deaf, and, since he depends 

on a gastronomy tube for nourishment, he is unable to feed himself. 

DHS's first interaction occurred on January 8, 2012 in response to an 

emergency protective service report. The subsequent investigation revealed 

that Mother abused drugs, and that she and Father were not taking J.H. to 

his medical appointments. DHS also learned that J.H. and B.H. were 

chronically truant from school, and that Mother had insufficient food in her 

home. 

On February 7, 2012, the trial court adjudicated J.H. and B.H. 

dependent. The children were placed in foster care on February 9, 2012. 

During February 2013, DHS discovered that Mother had given birth to J.G., 

and that both Mother and J.G. had tested positive for cocaine. Upon 

discharge from the hospital, J.G. was placed in his current pre- adoptive 

foster care with B.H. He was adjudicated dependent on March 12, 2013. 

The initial permanency goal for all of the children was reunification. In 

furtherance of that goal the court directed Mother to participate in the 

following services: (1) attend the Achieving Reunification Center ( "ARC ") for 

a mental health referral and for parenting classes; (2) complete drug and 

alcohol treatment; (3) complete a parenting capacity evaluation; (4) attend 

regular visitations with J.H., B.H., and J.G.; (5) accompany J.H. to his 

medical appointments; and (6) obtain appropriate housing. 

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Mother's compliance with her Family Service Plan ( "FSP ") goals was 

minimal. She disappeared for months at a time, was uncooperative with the 

children's safety plan, and as of J.G.'s birth, she continued to abuse cocaine. 

Additionally, Mother was found noncompliant with all her FSP goals during 

the permanency review hearings during March and June 2013. Mother was 

dismissed from ARC due to non -attendance, she failed to attend the 

parenting evaluation, and she neglected to visit her infant son after his 

discharge from the hospital. 

On October 11, 2013, DHS filed a petition for the involuntary 

termination of Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), 

(2), (5), (8), and (b). During a four -day hearing, the trial court heard 

testimony from the DHS caseworker, Charles Younger; the Children's Choice 

caseworker who supervised Mother's visitations, Jill Danhour; the 

Community Umbrella Agency ( "CUA ") caseworker, Leticia Jones; the Child 

Advocate social worker, James Cosby; and Mother. 

On February 29, 2016, the trial court involuntarily terminated Mother's 

parental rights. Mother timely filed notices of appeal and concise statements 

of errors complained of on appeal, which this Court consolidated sua sponte. 

On June 2, 2016, the trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion. 

On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for our review: 

A. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it 

involuntarily terminated [M]other's parental rights where such 

determination was not supported by clear and convincing 

evidence under . . . 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), 

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(a)(8) as [M]other made progress towards working [on] and 

meeting her FSP goals, namely staying drug -free, working 

towards obtaining housing, working on parenting skills, and 

other goals during [J.H.'s, B.H.'s, and J.G.'s] placement? 

B. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it 

involuntarily terminated [M]other's parental rights without giving 

the primary consideration to the effect that the termination 

would have on the developmental[,] physical[,] and emotional 

needs of [J.H., B.H., and J.G.] as required by ... 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(b)? 

Mother's brief at 5. 

Our standard of review is as follows: 

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill -will. The trial 

court's decision, however, should not be reversed merely 

because the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first -hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings. 

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the Adoption 

Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101 -2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

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the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

We need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of § 

2511(a), as well as § 2511(b), in order to affirm. See In re B.L.W., 843 

A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, we conclude that the 

certified record supports the trial court's decision to terminate under 

2511(a)(2) and (b), which provides as follows. 

(a) General rule. --The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds: 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well -being and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied by the parent. 

(b) Other considerations. --The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

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consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b). 

To terminate parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(2), the petitioner 

must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following 

elements: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; 

(2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or 

mental well- being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 

A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003). 

This Court has explained that, "[t]he grounds for termination due to 

parental incapacity that cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative 

misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as 

well as incapacity to perform parental duties." In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 

337 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citations omitted). Parents are required to make 

diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental 

responsibilities. Id. at 340. A parent's vow to cooperate, after a long period 

of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of services, may 

properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous. Id. 

The crux of Mother's first argument is that DHS did not prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that "the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

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abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied." 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511(a)(2). Mother asserts that she made "efforts to remain close to her 

children and [complete] her objectives, [which] exhibited that she was 

eradicating any repeated [neglect] that caused them to be placed in foster 

care." Mother's brief at 9. Further, Mother asserts that she "has 

demonstrated her commitment to maintain sobriety which is the main 

reason that brought the children into the custody of DHS." Id. In short, 

Mother argues, "DHS has not proved that she could not remedy such 

conditions." Id. We disagree. 

The certified record belies Mother's assertions. Charles Younger was 

the DHS caseworker assigned to this family since March of 2012, about one 

month after DHS became involved. He testified that Mother missed an 

excessive number of medical appointments that she was required to attend 

with J.H. N.T., 8/20/14, at 51. Mother confirmed her failures in this regard 

during her direct examination. She indicated that it had been one year since 

she last went to a medical appointment with J.H. N.T., 10/17/15, at 11. 

Mother's failure to care for her son is undeniable. Indeed, Mr. Younger 

opined that, as of the date of the hearing, J.H. could not be safely reunified 

with Mother. N.T., 8/20/14, at 45. 

With respect to Mother's continued drug abuse, Mr. Younger testified 

that, after J.G. was born with cocaine in his system, Mother acknowledged 

that she needed help with her drug addiction. Id. at 33 -34. Although he 

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referred Mother for dual diagnoses services at the Clinical Evaluation Unit 

( "CEU "), she never attended. Id. at 35. While Mother reported being in 

drug and alcohol treatment on two separate occasions, one inpatient and the 

other outpatient, she failed to provide any documentation to verify that she 

completed either treatment program. Id. at 36 -37. As such, Mr. Younger 

concluded that Mother failed to satisfy the requirement that she obtain 

services for her drug addiction. Id. at 37. Even after DHS initiated the 

termination proceedings on October 11, 2013, Mother continued to abuse 

drugs. The CUA caseworker, Leticia Jones, testified during the evidentiary 

hearing that in January 2016, Mother gave birth to a fourth child who was 

born with symptoms of withdrawal from cocaine. N.T., 2/29/16, at 70. 

While that child is not a subject of this appeal, the testimony gives lie to 

Mother's claim that she addressed her drug addiction. 

As it relates to the remaining aspects of Mother's FSP goals, Mr. 

Younger testified that DHS referred Mother on three occasions for a 

parenting capacity evaluation, but she never complied. Id. at 37 -38. 

Likewise, DHS referred Mother on three occasions to ARC for the purpose of 

assisting her to obtain employment, housing, parenting skills, and a mental 

health evaluation. N.T., 8/20/14, at 28 -31. Mother never provided 

documentation that she completed any ARC services. Id. at 30. Indeed, 

after DHS made the second referral, ARC closed the file due to Mother's 

nonparticipation. The third referral has remained open since 2014. Id. at 

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31. As such, Mr. Younger concluded that Mother never completed ARC 

services. Id. at 31 -32. 

With respect to the housing component, Mr. Younger explained that 

Mother was transient throughout the history of this case. Id. at 50 -51. He 

added that he assessed Mother's most recent home, and determined that it 

was too small to accommodate all three children. Id. at 51. 

Mr. Younger also described Mother's abysmal record of attending the 

supervised visitations. DHS provided Mother two hours visitation with the 

children per week. Id. at 39. Since March of 2014, Mother has attended 

only eleven out of twenty visits. This rate of approximately fifty - percent 

attendance represents Mother's high -water mark over the history of the 

case. Id. at 54. Mr. Younger explained, "on several different occasions 

during the course of this case, I had not heard from [M]other in months." 

Id. at 29. Mr. Younger testified that he did not hear from Mother between 

June of 2012 and September of 2012, and then he did not have contact with 

her again until the birth of J.G. in February of 2013. Id. at 29, 39. 

DHS also presented Jill Danhour, the caseworker from Children's 

Choice. Ms. Danhour supervised some of the visitations between Mother and 

the children. She testified that Mother attended 40% of the total visitations 

offered during the history of the case. N.T., 1/13/15, at 73. Specifically, 

she testified that Mother attended 60 out of 147 visitations. Id. at 89. 

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Based on the foregoing evidence, we discern no abuse of discretion by 

the trial court in terminating Mother's parental rights pursuant to § 

2511(a)(2). Mother failed every component of the FSP and her progress 

toward completion was minimal. Moreover, her repeated and continued 

incapacity, neglect, or refusal to comply and /or complete the required 

services caused J.H., B.H., and J.G. to be without essential parental care, 

control, or subsistence necessary for their physical and mental well- being. 

Further, we reject Mother's argument that the testimonial evidence is 

insufficient to demonstrate that the causes of the incapacity, neglect, or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied. Mr. Younger testified that, 

"throughout the course of the case . . . we've had FSP goals in place and 

they haven't changed or deviated much." N.T., 8/20/14, at 45. He 

continued that, as of the date of the hearing, Mother's compliance with the 

required services was minimal. Id. at 44. In addition, Mother refused to 

acknowledge her role in the children's placement with DHS. We observe 

that Mother insists that J.H. and B.H. were placed due to "[a] false call . . . made to DHS" about neglect. N.T., 10/7/15, at 7. Similarly, she did not 

acknowledge any responsibility for the placement of J.G., which occurred at 

his birth in February of 2013 due to her cocaine abuse. In light of these 

facts and Mother's failure to comply with and /or complete any of the 

required services, her claims regarding § 2511(a)(2) are meritless. 
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In her second issue, Mother asserts that the trial court abused its 

discretion by failing to adequately consider "the emotional needs of the 

children because [she] continued to maintain a bond with her children while 

she was attempting to complete her reunification objectives. . . ." Mother's 

brief at 14. We disagree. 

With respect to § 2511(b), this Court has explained that, "[i]ntangibles 

such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into 

the needs and welfare of the child." In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 

(Pa.Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Further, the trial court "must also 

discern the nature and status of the parent -child bond, with utmost attention 

to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond." Id. (citation 

omitted). However, "[i]n cases where there is no evidence of any bond 

between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. 

The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the 

circumstances of the particular case." In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762 -763 

(Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted). 

This Court has explained the needs and welfare analysis as follows: 

While a parent's emotional bond with his or her child is a 

major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best -interest analysis, it 

is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child. 

In re K.K.R.S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 -536 (Pa.Super. 2008). The 

mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the 

termination of parental rights. See In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910 

(Pa.Super. 2008) (trial court's decision to terminate parents' 

parental rights was affirmed where court balanced strong 

emotional bond against parents' inability to serve needs of 

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child). Rather, the orphans' court must examine the status of 

the bond to determine whether its termination "would destroy an 

existing, necessary and beneficial relationship." In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 397 (Pa.Super. 2003). As we 

explained in In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa.Super. 2010), 

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and 

should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child might have with 

the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated that the 

trial court should consider the importance of continuity of 

relationships and whether any existing parent -child bond 

can be severed without detrimental effects on the child. 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011). 

Instantly, the trial court reasoned as follows: 

J.G. and B.H. reside in the same pre- adoptive home. They share 

their primary parental bond with the kinship parent. They both 

look to the kinship parent to meet their day to day needs. B.H. 

has stated that she no longer wants to visit with her biological 

parents. J.G. has never lived with his biological parents. J.H. 

resides in a pre- adoptive foster home. The foster mother has 

the appropriate medical training to care for the child. She is a 

registered nurse. J.H. is bonded to the foster mother. The 

foster mother is very attentive to J.H. and meets all of his 

medical needs. Furthermore, the children would not suffer 

permanent /irreparable harm if the parental rights of the parents 

were terminated. 

Trial Court Opinion, 6/2/16, at unnumbered 6 (citations to record omitted). 

Our review of the certified record supports the trial court's findings. 

First, we highlight that the testimony of Mr. Young and Ms. Danhour 

confirms the meaningful bond that the children share with their respective 

foster families. Now three -and -one -half -year old J.G. has been in pre - adoptive foster care since birth. Similarly, J.H. is bonded with his pre- 

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adoptive foster family, who provides the necessary attention and dedication 

to his special needs that Mother neglected to deliver. With respect to B.H., 

who was ten years old at the time of placement and fourteen years old when 

the termination hearings occurred, the record validates the child's desire to 

cease contact with Mother. James Cosby, the Child Advocate social worker 

assigned to B.H. since 2012, described how B.H. initially wanted to return to 

her parents but ultimately changed her mind and informed the agency that 

she did not want to continue attending supervised visitations with her 

parents any longer. Id. As such, B.H. has not seen Mother for more than 

one and one -half years. Id. at 22. Significantly, Mr. Cosby testified that 

B.H. has "been adamant about wanting to be adopted by [her foster 

mother]." Id. at 24. 

Based on the foregoing evidence, we conclude that involuntarily 

terminating Mother's parental rights will serve the developmental, physical 

and emotional needs and welfare of B.H., J.H., and J.G. Therefore, we 

discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in terminating Mother's 

parental rights pursuant to § 2511(b). Accordingly, we affirm the decrees 

involuntarily terminating her parental rights to the children and the orders 

changing the children's permanency goals from reunification to adoption. 

Decrees affirmed. Orders affirmed. 

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Judgment Entered. 

J: seph D. Seletyn, 

Prothonotary 

Date: 11/8/2016 

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