This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A16-0889 State of Minnesota, Respondent,

vs. Aaron James Helgeson, Appellant. Filed January 30, 2017 Affirmed Reilly, Judge Stearns County District Court File No. 73-CR-15-3414 Lori Swanson, Attorney Gene ral, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Matthew A. Staehling, St . Cloud City Attorney, Mark C. Hansen, Assistant City Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent) Todd V. Peterson, Todd V. Peterson, P. A., Sauk Rapids, Minnesota (for appellant) Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Bjorkman, Judge. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY , Judge Appellant challenges his impaired-driving co nviction on the basis that the district court committed reversible error by refusing to suppress evidence discovered during an investigative encounter because (1) the investigating office r’s conduct constituted seizure;2 and (2) the investigating officer lacked a re asonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Because the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress, we affirm. FACTS On March 8, 2015, at appr oximately 3:00 a.m., a Stea rns County Deputy Sheriff observed a vehicle with two occupants idling in a St. Cloud apartment complex’s parking lot with its headlights on, park ed about five feet off the ro adway and positioned at an angle blocking several parking spots. The officer lived near the apartmen t complex and testified that there was a history of break-ins in the area. The officer ran the license plate and discovered that the vehicle was registered to an address in Sauk Centre. The officer parked his squad vehicle behind the vehi cle but did not activate his em ergency lights. The officer approached the vehicle with hi s flashlight activated and iden tified the driver as appellant, Aaron James Helgeson. The officer noticed a “very strong odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle,” and appellant admitted that he had been drinking. An assisting officer arrived at the scene and conducted a preliminary breath test on appellant, which revealed an alcohol concentration of .121. The assisting office r placed appellant under arrest for impaired driving. The state subsequently charged appellant wi th impaired driving. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence and di smiss the complaint on the gr ound that the investigating officer seized him without a r easonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. The district court denied the motion. Appellant waived his trial ri ghts and opted for a stipulatedevidence trial pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Criminal Proc edure 26.01, subdivision 4. The3 district court found appellant guilty of impair ed driving and imposed a stayed sentence. This appeal now follows. D E C I S I O N Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his suppression motion. When reviewing a district court’s pr etrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we review the factual findings for clear error and the legal determinations de novo. State v. Gauster , 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008). A reviewing court determines independently the existence of a constitutional violation. State v. Othoudt , 482 N.W.2d 218, 22 1 (Minn. 1992). The United States and Minnesota Constitutio ns prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10 . A traffic stop constitutes a seizure implicating this constitutional prohibition. State v. Thiel , 846 N.W.2d 605, 610 (Minn. App. 2014), review denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 2014). We review an unconstitutionalseizure determination de novo. Illi v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 873 N.W.2d 149, 151 (Minn. App. 2015). Appellant argues that the investigating offi cer’s actions constitute a seizure because the officer “boxed [his] car in with a marked squad car.” The officer testified that there was room for appellant to back around the o fficer’s squad vehicle. The district court reviewed the investigating officer’s testimony, along with squad video from the night of the incident and the assisting officer’s report, and determined that appe llant was “not seized when the [investigating office r] initially approached him,” because the officer parked behind appellant’s vehicle “without his emer gency lights on and parked . . . so that [appellant] could have backed around [the squad vehicle] in order to leave.”4 We agree with the district court. In Minn esota, a seizure occurs when “a reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes would have concluded that he or she was not free to leave,” given the totality of the circumstances. In re Welfare of E.D.J ., 502 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Minn. 1993). Not every interaction betwee n a police officer and a citizen amounts to a seizure. State v. Klamar , 823 N.W.2d 687, 692 (Minn. App. 2012). “Courts generally have held that it does not by its elf constitute a seizure for an o fficer to simply walk up and talk . . . to a driver sitting in an already stopped car.” Id . (quotation omitted); see, e.g. , Illi , 873 N.W.2d at 152. Here, the evidentiary record, including the squad video, supports the district court’s finding that the investigati ng officer pulled up behi nd appellant’s alreadyparked vehicle but did not position his squad ve hicle in such a way as to completely block appellant’s exit. Further, the officer did not use any physical force or make an express show of authority toward appellant. Cf. State v. Cripps , 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 1995) (noting that an officer’s use of physical force or show of authority ma y constitute a seizure); State v. Lopez , 698 N.W.2d 18, 22 (Minn. App. 2005) (determining that officer seized driver by partially blocking vehicle, activat ing emergency lights, p ounding on driver’s window, and opening driver’s door). 1

1 Appellant relies on two unpublished case s to support his seizure argument. See State v. Deml , No. A06-859, 2007 WL 1674060, at *2 (Minn. App. June 12, 2007) (determining that seizure occurred when officer completely blocked driver in a nd rapped on vehicle’s window); State v. Taylor , No. CX-03-218, 2003 WL 22533577, at *2 (Minn. App. Nov. 10, 2003) (determining that seizure occurred when officer blocked vehicle in and driver was unable to leave), review denied (Minn. Jan. 20, 2004). As a threshold matter, Deml and Taylor are unpublished decisions and do not bind this court. See Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016) (“Unpublished op inions of the Court of Appe als are not precedential.”). Further, the facts in this case are distinguish able because the investigating officer did not prevent appellant from leaving.5 Because a seizure generally does not occur “when an officer mere ly walks up to and speaks with a driver sitting in an already-stopped vehicle,” Illi , 873 N.W.2d at 152, and because the investigating office r did not block appella nt’s exit or otherwise exert force or authority against him, Cripps , 533 N.W.2d at 391, we concl ude that the officer’s conduct did not constitute a seizure. Th e district court correctly ruled that appellant was not seized when the officer approached his parked vehicle, and we therefore determine that the district court properly denied the suppression motion. 2
Affirmed.

2 Because we hold that the investigating offi cer did not seize appellant by parking behind and approaching his vehicle, we need not consider the partie s’ dispute over whether the officer had a reasonable, articulable basis for these actions. Nevertheless, we agree with the district court that appellant’s unusual positi oning of his vehicle in a parking lot late at night in an area with a history of break-in s gave the officer a reasonable, articulable suspicion for an investigative stop. See, e.g. , State v. Uber , 604 N.W.2d 799, 801 (Minn. App. 1999) (noting that “[s]us picious activity may itself provide the basis to stop a suspect” and that “[s]uspicious activity in an area th at has had problems with crime augments the basis for a lawful investigatory stop”).