Docket No. 100239. 

IN THE 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

ROBERT C. MAHONEY, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL 

 COMMISSION et al. (United Airlines, 

Appellant). 

Opinion filed January 20, 2006.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion. 

Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman, McMorrow, 

Fitzgerald, Garman, and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and 

opinion. 

OPINION

In this worker=s compensation case, we decide whether the site of 

a contract of hire is the sole determining factor for applying the 

Illinois Workers= Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. 

(West 2002)) to an employment injury sustained by a worker outside 

this state. Robert Mahoney, who was hired in Illinois, sustained two 

separate injuries while working for United Airlines (United) at its 

Orlando, Florida, facility. He filed applications for adjustment of his 

claims with the Illinois Industrial Commission (Commission), now 

known as the Illinois Workers= Compensation Commission (see 820 

ILCS 305/13 (West 2004)) seeking benefits under the Act. After the 

claims were consolidated for hearing, an arbitrator denied benefits. 
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The Commission affirmed and adopted the arbitrator=s decision. On 

judicial review, the circuit court of Cook County confirmed the 

Commission=s decision. The appellate court reversed. 355 Ill. App. 3d 

267. 

On denial of rehearing, all of the justices filed a statement that the 

case involved a substantial question warranting consideration by this 

court. We allowed United=s petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 

315. We granted the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association leave to file 

an amicus curiae brief in support of Mahoney=s position. 155 Ill. 2d 

R. 345. We now affirm the appellate court. 

BACKGROUND 

The arbitrator=s findings of fact are undisputed. Robert Mahoney 

was hired by United Airlines on January 6, 1969, to work as a ramp 

serviceman at O=Hare International Airport in Chicago, Illinois. He 

worked for United continuously in Illinois until 1993, when, 

following his divorce, he voluntarily applied for transfer to United=s 

facility at Orlando International Airport in Orlando, Florida. 

Mahoney had the necessary seniority to choose among many 

locations throughout the United States. 

There was no interruption between Mahoney=s last day of work in 

Chicago and the beginning of his work the next day in Orlando. He 

has worked continuously in ramp service for United at Orlando until 

the present time. 

Mahoney continues to reside in Orlando, where he purchased a 

home in 1994. He remarried in Florida. He has a Florida driver=s 

license, pays taxes in Florida, and pays no taxes in Illinois. Although 

he has the right, he has never sought to relocate back to Illinois or to 

any other state. 

Since his transfer, Mahoney has returned to Illinois 

approximately three times for training sessions and has also returned 

for family visits. When he returned to Illinois, he stayed in local 

hotels. He has not been injured in Illinois. 

Mahoney sustained compensable injuries in Orlando, Florida, on 

March 19, 1999, and January 2, 2001. He received temporary total 

disability benefits consistent with the Florida Workers= Compensation 

Act, and medical treatment for his injuries was provided near his 

home in Orlando. 
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Mahoney filed applications for adjustment of his claims for both 

injuries in Illinois. On Mahoney=s motion, the cases were 

consolidated for hearing. The arbitrator found no Illinois jurisdiction. 

The arbitrator noted that Mahoney relied exclusively on the fact that 

he was initially hired in Illinois as the basis for asserting Illinois 

jurisdiction. Rather than finding that fact solely determinative, the 

arbitrator also considered: (1) the continuity of employment between 

the time of contract and the time of injury; (2) whether the transfer 

was voluntary; (3) the length of time between the departure from 

Illinois and the injury; and (4) the significance of Mahoney=s contacts 

with Illinois following his departure. 

The arbitrator found Mahoney had no employment relationship 

with United in Illinois because neither the accident nor his resulting 

treatment occurred here and he voluntarily transferred to Florida from 

Illinois for personal reasons six years before the first accident. 

Accordingly, the arbitrator found no persuasive reason for the 

Commission to accept jurisdiction, and Mahoney=s claims were 

denied. 

The Commission affirmed and adopted the arbitrator=s decision, 

finding the jurisdiction issue controlled by Carroll v. Industrial 

Comm=n, 205 Ill. App. 3d 885 (1990), and United Airlines v. 

Industrial Comm=n, 252 Ill. App. 3d 972 (1993) (hereinafter, 

Rankins). On judicial review, the circuit court confirmed the decision 

in a written order, finding it was not against the manifest weight of 

the evidence and not clearly erroneous. 

The appellate court reversed. 355 Ill. App. 3d 267. The court held 

the plain language of the Act Aclearly states that site of the contract 

for hire is the exclusive test for determining the applicability of the 

Act to persons whose employment is outside Illinois where the 

contract of hire is made within Illinois.@ (Emphasis in original.) 355 

Ill. App. 3d at 269. The court noted that this court=s decision in 

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Industrial Comm=n, 79 Ill. 2d 425 

(1980), established a bright-line rule for future courts. If the 

employment contract is made in Illinois, a claimant injured in another 

state is covered under the Act. Conversely, if the contract of hire is 

not made in Illinois, there is no coverage for injuries incurred outside 

the state. 355 Ill. App. 3d at 271. 

The appellate court reasoned United Airlines, Inc. v. Industrial 
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Comm=n, 96 Ill. 2d 126 (1983) (hereinafter, Walker), involving a fact 

situation nearly identical to the present case, is directly apposite. The 

appellate court noted that in light of Walker, this court interpreted the 

Act to provide jurisdiction when the contract of hire was made in 

Illinois, even if the employee permanently transferred to another state 

and the injury occurred several years after the transfer. 355 Ill. App. 

3d at 272. Therefore, the appellate court held that the Asitus of the 

contract is the sole determinate of jurisdiction under the Act for a 

person whose employment is outside Illinois where the contract of 

hire is made within Illinois.@ 355 Ill. App. 3d at 274. The court 

Aoverruled@ Carroll and Rankins, the appellate precedent relied on by 

the Commission, to the extent those cases deviated from its 

announced holding. 355 Ill. App. 3d at 274. 

ANALYSIS 

Section 2 of the Act imposes liability on employers for injuries to 

employees arising out of and in the course of employment. 820 ILCS 

305/2 (West 2002). Section 1(b)(2) of the Act defines Aemployee@ as: 

AEvery person in the service of another under any contract 

of hire, express or implied, oral or written, including persons 

whose employment is outside of the State of Illinois where 

the contract of hire is made within the State of Illinois, 

persons whose employment results in fatal or non-fatal 

injuries within the State of Illinois where the contract of hire 

is made outside of the State of Illinois, and persons whose 

employment is principally localized within the State of 

Illinois, regardless of the place of the accident or the place 

where the contract of hire was made ***.@ 820 ILCS 

305/1(b)(2) (West 2002). 

Section 1(b)(3) of the Act provides: 

AAn employee or his dependents under this Act who shall 

have a cause of action by reason of any injury, disablement or 

death arising out of and in the course of his employment may 

elect to pursue his remedy in the State where injured or 

disabled, or in the State where the contract of hire is made, or 

in the State where the employment is principally localized.@

820 ILCS 305/1(b)(3) (West 2002). 

Resolution of the issue presented in this appeal presents a 
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question of law dependent on construction of the preceding statutory 

language. Questions of statutory construction are subject to de novo 

review. Sylvester v. Industrial Comm=n, 197 Ill. 2d 225, 232 (2001). 

In construing a statute, we are guided by familiar principles. The 

best indication of legislative intent is the plain and ordinary meaning 

of the statutory language. Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 

469, 479 (1994). When the language is clear and unambiguous, the 

court must apply it as written without reading into it exceptions, 

limitations or conditions not expressed by the legislature. Davis v. 

Toshiba Machine Co., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181, 184-85 (1999). We 

presume the General Assembly did not intend absurdity, 

inconvenience, or injustice. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. 

County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000). AThe Workers=

Compensation Act is to be interpreted liberally [citation] to effectuate 

its main purposeBproviding financial protection for interruption or 

termination of a worker=s earning power.@ Sylvester, 197 Ill. 2d at 

232. 

 In Union Bridge & Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm=n, 287 

Ill. 396 (1919), this court considered the question of whether the Act 

provided a remedy for the mother of a young construction worker 

hired in Illinois who was killed while working in Kentucky. The 1913 

version of the Act, then in effect, defined the term Aemployee@

without the express extraterritorial application provisions contained 

in the present statute. As the statutory definition of Aemployee@ was 

of no assistance in deciding the question of Illinois jurisdiction, the 

court turned to the language of the Act=s title, stating the express 

purpose of the Act was to provide A >compensation for accidental 

injuries or deaths suffered in the course of employment within this 

state.= @ (Emphasis added.) Union Bridge, 287 Ill. at 399, quoting Ill. 

Rev. Stat. 1913, ch. 48. Based on this language, the court denied 

compensation. Although acknowledging the remedial purpose of the 

Act required a liberal construction, the court noted there was no 

provision authorizing compensation for an injury occurring outside 

this state. Union Bridge, 287 Ill. at 400. 

In 1925, the legislature amended both the title to the Act and the 

definition of Aemployee,@ expressly providing for the Act=s 

application to injuries occurring outside the state when the contract 

for hire is made within Illinois. The constitutionality of the 
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amendment was challenged in Beall Bros. Supply Co. v. Industrial 

Comm=n, 341 Ill. 193 (1930). The amendment defined Aemployee@ as: 

A >every person in the service of another under any contract of 

hire, express or implied, oral or written, including persons 

whose employment is outside of the State of Illinois where 

the contract of hire is made within the State of Illinois.= @

Beall Bros., 341 Ill. at 195-96, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1925, 

ch. 48, par. 142. 

This court upheld the statute, holding that when persons contract 

under the Act, Athey are conclusively presumed to have accepted its 

provisions and to be bound thereby,@ and that A[a] law effective in 

this State may create rights and liabilities arising from acts occurring 

outside of this State. [Citation.]@ Beall Bros., 341 Ill. at 199. 

Accordingly, the court upheld an award of compensation to a 

traveling salesman based in Denver, Colorado, who was injured in 

Colorado over a year after being hired in Illinois. Beall Bros., 341 Ill. 

at 199. 

In 1951, the legislature repealed the Act of 1913 and reenacted it, 

restructuring sections of the previous Act and incorporating the 1925 

amendment providing for extraterritorial application when the 

contract of hire is made in Illinois. The title of the Act was: 

AAn Act to promote the general welfare of the people of 

this State by providing compensation for accidental injuries 

or death suffered in the course of employment within this 

State, and without this State where the contract of 

employment is made within this State; providing for the 

enforcement and administering thereof, and a penalty for its 

violation, and repealing an Act therein named.@ 1951 Ill. 

Laws 1060, eff. July 9, 1951. 

In 1975, the legislature again amended section 1(b)(2), 

broadening the definition of employment to include Aemployment 

principally localized in Illinois.@ The section has not since been 

amended. 

Almost three decades after its passage, this court construed the 

1951 version of section 1(b)(2) in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 

Industrial Comm=n, 79 Ill. 2d 425 (1980). In Youngstown, the 

claimant was originally hired in Illinois, laid off, and rehired at a 

different facility in Indiana. A provision in the collective-bargaining 
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agreement between the United Steelworker=s Union and the company 

allowed the claimant to retain his seniority because he was rehired by 

the company within two years. The claimant was, however, required 

to serve a probationary period following his rehiring. After his injury 

in Indiana, the claimant filed a workers= compensation claim in 

Illinois and received an award. On appeal, this court reversed. 

The court applied the place-of-hire test, finding it apparent from a 

reading of section 1(b)(2) that Aan out-of-State injury falls within the 

Act where the contract of employment was made in Illinois.@

Youngstown, 79 Ill. 2d at 430. The court concluded, however, that a 

new contract of employment was formed in Indiana following the 

termination of the employment relationship in Illinois, noting the 

claimant was interviewed for employment in Indiana, underwent a 

preemployment physical examination in Indiana, received a new 

employee identification number, joined a different local of the union, 

and was not placed in a position comparable to his Illinois 

employment. Youngstown, 79 Ill. 2d at 433. Thus, the court held 

Illinois lacked jurisdiction, observing that its Ajurisdictional finding@

was Aparticularly appropriate *** where the employee has not even 

worked in the State in which he is seeking relief for over 12 years.@

Youngstown, 79 Ill. 2d at 434. We note that the court=s observation 

that the claimant had not worked in Illinois for 12 years was not 

dispositive. The decision was based solely on a determination that the 

claimant=s contract of hire in Illinois was terminated, and a new 

contract of hire was then created in Indiana. 

In 1981, this court upheld the constitutionality of the 1975 

amendment in a case involving an employee hired in Illinois who 

worked in several states and sustained injuries resulting in his death 

in Michigan. Goldblatt Brothers, Inc. v. Industrial Comm=n, 86 Ill. 2d 

141 (1981). The court rejected as without merit the employer=s 

argument that section 1(b)(2) of the Act denied it equal protection of 

the law under the United States Constitution and the Illinois 

Constitution because the employee, if hired in Michigan and injured 

under the same circumstances, would be subject to Michigan law, and 

his survivors would receive much lower benefits. Goldblatt Brothers, 

86 Ill. 2d at 144-45. The court noted that the claimant=s widow was 

authorized to bring the action in either forum, and the fortuitous 

circumstance that the Illinois statute allowed a greater recovery did 

not defeat her right. Goldblatt Brothers, 86 Ill. 2d at 146. 
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In Walker, 96 Ill. 2d 126, the court upheld a Commission decision 

finding jurisdiction of the claims of a worker hired in Illinois in 1972, 

who voluntarily transferred to a permanent position in United=s 

facility in San Francisco, California, in February 1976. Nearly eight 

months later, he sustained the first of three work-related injuries. 

Eight months after that, he sustained another injury and was injured 

again approximately two years later. He received temporary total 

disability benefits and filed applications for permanent compensation 

in California. While those applications were pending, he also filed 

applications for adjustment of his claims in Illinois. The Commission 

found Illinois jurisdiction, and United sought judicial review. The 

circuit court consolidated all three claims and reversed the 

Commission, finding that the Aspirit of this court=s decision@ in 

Youngstown required a conclusion that the Commission lacked 

jurisdiction. Walker, 96 Ill. 2d at 129. 

This court reversed the decision, holding the circuit court=s 

reliance on Youngstown misplaced, because Youngstown is factually 

distinguishable. Walker, 96 Ill. 2d at 130. The court noted that the 

Youngstown claimant was permanently laid off from his position 

before learning, several months later, of an opening at his former 

employer=s Indiana facility. He entered into a new contract of hire in 

Indiana, and his new employment relationship was governed by that 

contract, rather than his former employment contract in Illinois. 

Walker, 96 Ill. 2d at 131. Conversely, in Walker, the claimant=s 

employment was continuous and uninterrupted at the time of his 

transfer to California. Therefore, the Commission=s finding that the 

employment contract existing at the time of his injuries was made in 

Illinois was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Walker, 

96 Ill. 2d at 132. 

Our court rejected United=s argument urging application of a 

theory of jurisdiction suggested in a learned treatise by Professor 

Larson. According to Professor Larson, jurisdiction over 

compensation issues is present only in the forum where the 

employment relationship is Acentered,@ and the status of the 

relationship should be determined by rules similar to those governing 

an individual=s domicile. See 4 A. Larson, Workmen=s Compensation, 

''87.40 through 87.42 (1982). The court held application of that 

theory is inconsistent with the contractual basis of jurisdiction 

specified in the Act, and any change would require a legislative 
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mandate. Walker, 96 Ill. 2d at 131. 

The dissent in Walker, authored by Justice Simon and joined by 

Chief Justice Ryan, relied principally on Professor Larson=s theory. 

The dissent noted New Hampshire, whose workers= compensation 

statute has language nearly identical to the Illinois provision in 

question, has adopted the Aemployment relation@ standard advocated 

by Professor Larson. Walker, 96 Ill. 2d at 136 (Simon, J., dissenting, 

joined by Ryan, C.J.). 

Subsequently, the Walker majority holding was applied by our 

appellate court in Trans World Airlines v. Industrial Comm=n, 191 Ill. 

App. 3d 856 (1989). The court upheld compensation awards to two 

employees injured in Missouri following transfer from their 

employer=s Illinois facility. The court observed, AOur supreme court 

has carefully explained that any exclusive application of the theory of 

using an analysis similar to those governing questions concerning an 

individual=s domicile is not consistent with the contractual basis of 

jurisdiction specified by our Workers= Compensation Act, and >any 

change therein will have to be legislatively mandated.= [Citation.]@

Trans World Airlines, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 866. 

Despite the clear direction given by this court in an unbroken line 

of cases beginning with Beall Bros. in 1930, and despite the 

application of our holding in Walker by the appellate court in Trans 

World Airlines, the appellate court departed from a strict application 

of the place-of-the-contract-of-hire standard in two cases: Carroll v. 

Industrial Comm=n, 205 Ill. App. 3d 885 (1990), and Rankins, 252 Ill. 

App. 3d 972. 

In Carroll, the circuit court reversed a Commission award to a 

truck driver hired in Illinois, who lived and worked in other states 

under the same contract of employment, and who was injured in the 

State of Washington 19 years after his hiring in Illinois. On appeal, 

the claimant contended that his employment pursuant to his contract 

of hire in Illinois was continuous and uninterrupted because he was 

not required to fill out a new employment application or submit to a 

physical examination before reporting to each new jobsite. The 

appellate court acknowledged that those kinds of facts affect the 

continuity of employment, but are not exclusively determinative, and 

held that the court looks to Athe totality of arrangements for 

reemployment. [Citations.]@ Carroll, 205 Ill. App. 3d at 889-90. 
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The court then considered that the claimant=s transfer was 

involuntary and without a right of recall to employment in Illinois; 

that the injury occurred 18 years after his transfer and 19 years after 

he last lived in Illinois; and that the employment relationship=s most 

significant contacts were in states other than Illinois. The court then 

concluded that the claimant=s original hiring in Illinois did not lead to 

an automatic finding of jurisdiction, and thus held the trial court 

correctly found no jurisdiction. Carroll, 205 Ill. App. 3d at 889-90. 

In Rankins, the appellate court found the reasoning in Carroll

dispositive of the issue of jurisdiction in the case of an airline flight 

attendant domiciled in San Francisco, California, who was injured in 

California. Her initial employment interview in 1969 was in 

California, where she was told she would be hired if she successfully 

completed a 52-week training course in Chicago, Illinois. At the 

completion of her training, she was commissioned to perform the 

duties of a Amainliner stewardess@ and, at her request, was assigned to 

duty in New York. She later transferred to California. Her employer 

maintained a seniority list governing bidding on schedules, flight 

passes, vacation, retirement, and insurance benefits. Her date of hire, 

for purposes of seniority, was the first date of her attendance at the 

training school. 

Following her injury in 1983, she filed an application for 

adjustment of claim in Illinois. The Commission found that the 

contract for hire was finalized at the completion of the training 

program in Illinois and therefore found jurisdiction over the claim. 

Rankins, 252 Ill. App. 3d at 976. The circuit court reversed, relying 

on the analysis in Carroll. Rankins, 252 Ill. App. 3d at 976. 

The appellate court acknowledged the holding in Beall Bros. that 

the Act may be applied to claimants hired in Illinois who are injured 

outside of Illinois. The court distinguished Beall Bros., however, on 

the basis that it did not address what factors should be considered in 

determining the Act=s applicability to a particular claim and further 

noted that Beall Bros. involved annual contracts entered into in 

Illinois. Rankins, 252 Ill. App. 3d at 978. 

The court then held that the site of the contract for hire is not the 

exclusive test for determining the applicability of the Act, but Ais only 

one of the factors the Commission is to consider within the totality of 

the arrangements. Carroll, 205 Ill. App. 3d at 888 ***.@ Rankins, 252 
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Ill. App. 3d at 978. 

The appellate court acknowledged that the finding of the 

arbitrator, Commission and circuit court, determining that the 

contract of hire was made in Illinois, was not against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. Rankins, 252 Ill. App. 3d at 980. Further, the 

court acknowledged that the evidence indicated the claimant did not 

have to submit a new application or undergo another physical 

examination to be Arehired@ each time she changed domiciles. Yet, 

despite acknowledging that the employment contract was made in 

Illinois and that the claimant=s injury occurred while she was working 

under that contract, the court nevertheless found those facts not solely 

determinative of the jurisdiction issue. Instead, the court relied on the 

lapse of time between her hiring in Illinois and her work history in 

other jurisdictions, the fact that she did not continue to maintain 

significant contacts with Illinois following her initial training period, 

and the voluntariness of her transfer to California when she could 

have worked in Illinois. Accordingly, the court held the Commission 

lacked jurisdiction of the claim. Rankins, 252 Ill. App. 3d at 982-83. 

Nonetheless, the appellate court here correctly noted that this 

court in Youngstown applied a bright-line test based on the plain 

language of the Act for future courts. A[I]f the employment contract 

was made in Illinois, a claimant injured while working in another 

state was covered under the Act. Conversely, if the contract for hire 

was not entered into in Illinois, then there was no coverage.@ 355 Ill. 

App. 3d at 271. United argues this is not a correct interpretation of 

Youngstown because that case clearly reviewed the Atotality of the 

arrangements@ for reemployment. 

The Youngstown court indeed reviewed the Atotality of the 

arrangements,@ but only in the context of determining whether the 

claimant continued employment under the initial contract of hire 

executed in Illinois. The threshold issue of determining the place of 

the initial contract of hire and the continuation of the contract is an 

entirely separate inquiry. Here, United concedes Mahoney was hired 

in Illinois and has not severed his employment contract. The 

Youngstown court=s holding that there was no jurisdiction under the 

Act resulted from its determination that the claimant=s old contract of 

hire ended with his layoff and that his injury occurred while working 

under a new contract of hire executed in Indiana. Youngstown, 79 Ill. 
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2d at 433. Accordingly, a review of the Atotality of the arrangements@

in this case leads only to the conclusion that Mahoney was still 

working under his original contract of hire at the time of his injuries. 

United also urges reversal of the appellate court decision because 

it is inconsistent with the purpose of the Act and the legislative intent 

expressed in its title. While acknowledging the plain language of 

section 1(b)(2), United nevertheless argues that it does not exist in a 

vacuum. United notes that the title of the Act describes its application 

as Ato promote the general welfare of the people of this State ***.@

1951 Ill. Laws 1060, eff. July 9, 1951. The title of an act can provide 

guidance in interpreting the statute. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. 

Ames, 364 Ill. 362, 365 (1936). ATo the extent that any express

language in a statute contradicts a preamble, the statutory language 

controls.@ (Emphasis in original.) Atkins v. Deere & Co., 177 Ill. 2d 

222, 234 (1997). 

 In Burtis v. Industrial Comm=n, 275 Ill App. 3d 840 (1995), the 

court held that the title suggests that the purpose of the Act is to 

benefit the citizens of the State of Illinois. Burtis, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 

843. The claimant in Burtis, although injured in New Jersey after a 

transfer to Tennessee, was, at the time of the Commission hearing, a 

resident of Illinois. The court thus distinguished Carroll and Rankins 

and found that, under those circumstances, the Illinois contract of hire 

was sufficient to confer jurisdiction under the Act. Burtis, 275 Ill. 

App. 3d at 843-44. United argues that a person who at one point lived 

and worked in Illinois but has since moved to a different state and has 

lived and worked there for many years, while maintaining no contact 

with Illinois, cannot be considered a citizen of Illinois. 

We note that in Walker this court considered both the title of the 

Act and the express language of section 1(b)(2) in determining the 

claimant=s injuries were within the jurisdictional scope of the Act. 

Walker, 96 Ill. 2d at 130. We do not consider the expression in the 

title of the Act of an intention to promote the general welfare of the 

people of this state to limit application of the plain, unambiguous 

language of section 1(b)(2). See Atkins, 177 Ill. 2d at 234. 

United also argues that to allow nonresidents of Illinois who fail 

to maintain significant contact with this state to claim workers=

compensation benefits here would unfairly burden Illinois. United 

suggests a parade of negative consequences likely to result, including 
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increased taxpayer cost due to a congested Industrial Commission 

docket, loss of potential employers who will fear high insurance 

premiums, and distorted statistics on work-related injuries, thus 

affecting promulgation of Illinois safety regulations and laws. 

Allowing Mahoney to file a claim in Illinois despite the availability 

of a forum in Florida encourages forum shopping for the jurisdiction 

with the most liberal benefits. The legislature, United asserts, could 

not have intended this result. Accordingly, United urges this court to 

adopt Professor Larson=s employment relation analysis, as advocated 

by the dissenters in Walker, and confirm the application of the 

Carroll-Rankins standard by the Commission. 

We decline United=s invitation. The plain, unambiguous language 

of section 1(b)(2), as consistently interpreted by this court in an 

unbroken line of cases dating to 1930, confers jurisdiction to the 

Commission over injuries occurring outside Illinois when the contract 

of hire is made within Illinois. As long as the initial contract remains 

in force, the Commission retains jurisdiction. The section does not 

speak to lapse of time, failure to maintain significant contacts, or 

voluntariness of transfers, and imposes no requirement other than the 

existence of an employment contract in this state. Although Professor 

Larson=s analysis is certainly reasonable, adoption of the standard he 

advocates is properly addressed by the legislature, not this court. 

Accordingly, we hold that the place of the contract of hire is the 

sole determining factor for the existence of jurisdiction over 

employment injuries occurring outside this state. Mahoney=s original 

contract of hire was still in effect when he was injured in Florida and, 

thus, he is entitled to pursue his claims in Illinois. 

CONCLUSION 

The arbitrator, Commission, and the circuit court of Cook County 

erred in applying a broader standard than the situs of the employment 

contract in finding no jurisdiction. As Mahoney=s injuries occurred 

while his employment was still governed by his initial Illinois 

contract of hire, he is entitled to assert his claims in Illinois. We 

therefore affirm the judgment of the appellate court. 

Appellate court judgment affirmed.