alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Barney Guzzo, Respondent, v. Susanne Guzzo, Appellant.

[973 NYS2d 265]

In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Quinn, J.), dated January 23, 2012, which granted her application for an award of an attorney’s fee only to the extent of awarding her an attorney’s fee in the sum of $35,000.

Ordered that on the Court’s own motion, the notice of appeal is treated as an application for leave to appeal, and leave to appeal is granted *(see*CFLR 5701 [c]); and it is further,

Ordered that the order is modified, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, by deleting the provision thereof awarding the defendant an attorney’s fee in the sum of $35,000, and substituting therefor a provision awarding the defendant an attorney’s fee in the sum of $100,000; as so modified, the order is affirmed; and it is further,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant.

The parties were married in 1997. In 2006, the plaintiff commenced this action for a divorce. After the parties entered into a stipulation of settlement, the defendant applied for an award of an attorney’s fee in the sum of $161,707.21. The Supreme Court granted the defendant’s application to the extent of awarding her an attorney’s fee in the sum of $35,000.

An award of reasonable counsel fees in a matrimonial action is a matter within the discretion of the trial court *(see*Domestic Relations Law § 237; *DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete,*70 NY2d 879, 881 [1987]; *Quinn v Quinn,*73 AD3d 887 [2010]). In determin*766ing an application for such fees, the trial court must consider, inter alia, the relative financial circumstances of the parties *(see Siskind v Siskind,*89 AD3d 832 [2011]; *Quinn v Quinn,*73 AD3d 887 [2010]; *Raynor v Raynor,*68 AD3d 835, 839 [2009]; *Peritore v Peritore,*50 AD3d 874, 875 [2008]). Further, the trial court may also take into account whether one party has engaged in conduct or taken positions resulting in delay or unnecessary litigation *(see Khan v Ahmed,*98 AD3d 471, 473 [2012]; *Chaudry v Chaudry,*95 AD3d 1058 [2012]; *Siskind v Siskind,*89 AD3d 832 [2011]; *Aloi v Simoni,*82 AD3d 683, 686-687 [2011]; *Quinn v Quinn,*73 AD3d 887 [2010]; *Levy v Levy,*4 AD3d 398, 398-399 [2004]).

Here, there is a significant income disparity between the parties, and, as the Supreme Court recognized, the plaintiff’s egregious tactics unnecessarily prolonged the litigation and caused the defendant to incur additional legal fees. Under these circumstances, the defendant should have been awarded $100,000 of her outstanding attorney’s fee of $158,207 *(see Khan v Ahmed,*98 AD3d at 473; *Raynor v Raynor,*68 AD3d at 839; *Peritore v Peritore,*50 AD3d at 875; *Levy v Levy,*4 AD3d at 398-399). Skelos, J.P., Balkin, Austin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2639 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2639

    To extend the temporary suspension of duty on butanedioic acid, 
     dimethyl ester, polymer with 4-hydroxy-2,2,6,6,-tetramethyl-1-
                           piperidineethanol.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            November 2, 2009

 Mr. Sessions introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To extend the temporary suspension of duty on butanedioic acid, 
     dimethyl ester, polymer with 4-hydroxy-2,2,6,6,-tetramethyl-1-
                           piperidineethanol.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. BUTANEDIOIC ACID, DIMETHYL ESTER, POLYMER WITH 4-HYDROXY-
              2,2,6,6,-TETRAMETHYL-1-PIPERIDINEETHANOL.

    (a) In General.--Heading 9902.10.47 of the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule of the United States (relating to butanedioic acid, dimethyl 
ester, polymer with 4-hydroxy-2,2,6,6,-tetramethyl-1-piperidineethanol) 
is amended by striking ``12/31/2009'' and inserting ``12/31/2011''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 21-0212

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

JOSHUA GLEN REID,

Defendant and Appellant. 

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and 

good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including August 11, 2022, within which to prepare, file, 

and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

July 6 2022

07/06/2022

Case Number: DA 21-0212
#### The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v Fayola McIntosh, Respondent.

Submitted September 27, 2010;

decided October 14, 2010

Motion for assignment of counsel granted and Richard M. Greenberg, Esq., Office of the Appellate Defender, 11 Park Place, Suite 1601, New York, NY 10007 assigned as counsel to the respondent on the appeal herein.
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 99-3561

___________

Melynda Parish, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of South Dakota.

Gateway 2000, Inc., *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Defendant - Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: June 14, 2000

Filed: July 14, 2000 

___________

Before LOKEN, BRIGHT, and ROSS, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Melynda Parish began working for Gateway 2000, Inc., as a customer service

technician in December 1995. Over the next eleven months, she was repeatedly absent

from work, late for work, and tardy in returning from breaks and lunches. Gateway

terminated her in November 1996, and Parish commenced this Title VII action,

claiming that her supervisor’s sexual harassment had created a hostile work

environment and that her termination was in retaliation for complaining about the
1The HONORABLE JOHN B. JONES, United States District Judge for the

District of South Dakota.

-2-

supervisor’s offensive conduct. The district court1 granted Gateway’s motion for

summary judgment and dismissed Parish’s complaint, concluding that the supervisor’s

conduct was neither severe nor pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment;

that Parish had failed to show that Gateway’s stated reason for her termination --

repeated non-compliance with its work attendance policy -- was a pretext for retaliation

discrimination; and that Parish had no evidence to support her state law claim of

negligent employee training and supervision. Parish appeals, arguing the district court

erred in granting summary judgment because there are genuine issues of material fact

regarding her hostile work environment, retaliation, and negligence claims. After

careful review of the record, we affirm for the reasons stated in the district court’s

Memorandum Opinion and Order dated August 11, 1999. See 8th Cir. Rule 47B. 

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
## Breadcrumb

-  Home 
-  About Us 
-  Staff Directory 

# Staff Directory

                  - A 
                  - B 
                  - C 
                  - D 
                  - E 
                  - F 
                  - G 
                  - H 
                  - I 
                  - J 
                  - K 
                  - L 
                  - M 
                  - N 
                  - O 
                  - P 
                  - Q 
                  - R 
                  - S 
                  - T 
                  - V 
                  - W 
                  - Y 
                  - Z 

-  COVID-19 
-  Accessibility 
-  Contact Us 
-  Free Publications 
-  Freedom of Information Act 
-  Privacy 
-  Site Map 
-  Syndication 
-  Vulnerability Disclosure 
-  Website Policies 
-  Subscribe to NIDCD Email Updates 

Facebook

X

800-241-1044

nidcdinfo@nidcd.nih.gov

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

National Institutes of Health

USA.gov—Government Made Easy
#### TOLLE v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.

Civil Action No. 883.

District Court, S. D. Ohio, IV. D.

Sept. 18, 1947.

*580Robert H. Wead and Wead & Aultman, all of Xenia, Ohio, for plaintiff.

Hugh A. Altick and Matthews & Altick, all of Dayton, Ohio, for defendant.

NEVIN, District Judge.

On July 16, 1947, plaintiff filed his complaint in this cause, in this Court.

On August 13, 1947, defendant filed a motion to strike from the complaint certain portions thereof as in the motion set forth. The cause is now before the Court on this motion.

Defendant alleges that the portions of the complaint which it seeks to have stricken out should be stricken because “the same are irrelevant and immaterial.”

Plaintiff’s counsel, on the other hand, urge in their brief on the motion that the allegations referred to should remain in the complaint, stating that “it is proper that the petition set forth all the operative facts having a bearing upon the material issues in the case.”

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, were designed and adopted for the purpose, among others, of simplifying pleadings. It is no longer necessary in the United States Court to set forth in a petition “all the operative facts having a bearing upon the material issues in the case.”

In an Appendix to the Rules of Civil Procedure are found a number of “forms.” 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c. It is true that it is stated that these forms are “for illustration only.” Nevertheless, they serve as an indication of the extent to which the committee formulating the rules thought it to be necessary to allege the facts in a complaint.

Form No. 9, found in the Appendix referred to, sets forth all that it was deemed necessary to recite in a “Complaint for Negligence.” As will be observed from a reading of that form, a Complaint for Negligence filed in the United States District Court can now be couched in very simple language.

In the instant case, the pleader has gone into great detail, far beyond what is necessary in a complaint in the United States District Court. It may be, therefore, as defendant asserts, that many of the allegations are now “irrelevant and immaterial.” However, the Court is of the opinion that none of them are prejudicial. Plaintiff has simply set forth in his pleading, more details than he is required to set forth under the Rules of Civil Procedure in a complaint filed in a United States Cotfrt.

It does not appear, however, that any useful purpose would be served in striking out the allegations referred to in defendant’s motion. It would merely cause delay and the filing of an amended complaint. Under these circumstances, the Court finds defendant’s motion not well taken and that it should be, and it is, overruled.

Counsel may prepare and submit an order accordingly.
EXHIBIT 32.1


                                  CERTIFICATION
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of A-Fem Medical Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending September 30, 2005 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Walter Witoshkin, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that to my knowledge:

1. the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


                                        /s/ Walter Witoshkin
                                        -------------------------------
                                        Walter Witoshkin,
                                        Chief Executive Officer

Date: November 10, 2005

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
No. 529.

#### Holland, Administrator, Wage and Hour Division, U. S. Department of Labor, *v.*Lowell Sun Co.

Argued February 4, 5, 1942.

Decided March 2, 1942.

*Mr, Warner W. Gardner,*with whom *Solicitor General Fahy*and *Messrs. Richard S. Salant, Irving J. Levy,*and *Jacob D. Hyman*were on the brief, for petitioner. *Mr. Elisha Hanson,*with whom *Mr. Frank Goldman*was on the brief, for respondent. *Mr. Victor W. Klein*filed a brief, as *amicus curiae,*in support of respondent.

*Per Curiam:*

The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court. Mr. Justice Murphy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
CERTIFICATION OF

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL
OFFICER

PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
OF 2002



I, Howard Thomson, the Chief Executive
Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Terrace Ventures Inc. (the “Company”), hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:



| | (i) | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company, for the fiscal quarter ended July 31, 2012, and
to which this certification is attached as Exhibit 32.1 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (ii) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | ---- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | By:    | /s/ Howard Thomson                                 
| | ------ | ---------------------------------------------------
| | Name:  | HOWARD THOMSON                                     
| |        |                                                    
| | Title: | Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
| |        |                                                    
| | Date:  | September 14, 2012                                 



A signed original of this written statement
required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company
and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



This certification accompanies the Form
10-Q to which it relates, is not deemed filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is not to be incorporated by reference
into any filing of the Company under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (whether made before or
after the date of the Form 10-Q), irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.
#### Willie Lee BERRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. M. Timothy PORTERFIELD, Defendant—Appellee.

No. 08-8571.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 21, 2009.

Decided: May 27, 2009.

*246Willie Lee Berry, Appellant Pro Se.

Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Willie Lee Berry appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for reconsideration of its previous order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) action. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Berry v. Porterfield,*No. 3:01-cv-00627-GCM, 2008 WL 5115284 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 4, 2008). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
##### 



EXHIBIT 10.20
 SUMMARY SHEET
OF
DIRECTOR COMPENSATION AND EXECUTIVE CASH COMPENSATION
 DIRECTOR COMPENSATION
  Stock-based Compensation:
 
    
    Each non-employee director, other than A-B designated directors, is entitled to receive
a grant of 3,500 shares of Redhook common stock upon their election to the board of
directors at the Annual Meeting of Shareholders. In lieu of receiving 3,500 shares,
directors may elect to receive a lesser number of shares plus a cash payment equal to the
taxes to be paid on their stock grant.
 Cash Compensation:
 
    
    Each non-employee director is entitled to receive annual compensation of $10,000, which
will be paid quarterly.
    
    The Chairs of each of the Nominating and Governance, Audit, Marketing and Compensation
Committees are entitled to receive additional annual compensation of $4,000, which will be
paid following the Annual Meeting of Shareholders.
    
    Audit Committee members are entitled to receive an additional annual payment of $1,000,
which will be paid following the Annual Meeting of Shareholders.
    
    Members of the Corporate Strategy Committee are entitled to receive, for service through
March 31, 2008, compensation of $7,500 per quarter. The Chair of the Corporate Strategy
Committee is also entitled to receive an additional quarterly payment of $2,500 for service
through March 31, 2008.
 EXECUTIVE OFFICER COMPENSATION
  Paul S. ShipmanChief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board
    
    $
    267,800David J. MickelsonPresident
    
    $
    199,250Jay T. CaldwellChief Financial Officer and Treasurer
    
    $
    180,000
  Paul S. ShipmanChief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board
    
    $
    53,560David J. MickelsonPresident
    
    $
    100,000Jay T. CaldwellChief Financial Officer and Treasurer
    
    $
    36,000
----

|                                           |                   | Doing Business            |
|------------------------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| Subsidiary                                     | State of Incorporation | under the Following Names |
|                                           |                   |                      |
|                                           |                   |                      |
| Sign Builders of America, Inc.                 | Delaware               | N/A                       |
|                                           |                   |                      |
| Applied Nanotech, Inc.                         | Delaware               | Applied Nanotech, Inc.    |
|                                           |                   |                      |
| Electronic Billboard                           |                   | Electronic Billboard      |
|      Technology, Inc. | Delaware               | Technology, Inc.          |
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

September 26, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

131416 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 131416 

 COA: 268913 

Washtenaw CC: 03-000186-FH 

JEREMY DANIEL SCHUH,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 19, 2006 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded 

that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

p0918 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

September 26, 2006 

 Clerk
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 101 (Thursday, May 28, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 25489]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-12404]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Foreign-Trade Zones Board

[Order No. 1622]


Approval of Manufacturing Authority Within Foreign-Trade Zone 50 
Long Beach, CA; Phoenix MC, Inc. d/b/a Phoenix Motorcars, Inc. (Motor 
Vehicles)

    Pursuant to its authority under the Foreign-Trade Zones Act of 
June 18, 1934, as amended (19 U.S.C. 81a-81u) (the Act), the 
Foreign-Trade Zones Board (the Board) adopts the following Order:

    Whereas, the Board of Harbor Commissioners of the Port of Long 
Beach, grantee of FTZ 50, has requested authority under Section 
400.28(a)(2) of the Board's regulations on behalf of Phoenix MC, Inc. 
d/b/a Phoenix Motorcars, Inc., to assemble light-duty passenger 
electric vehicles under FTZ procedures within FTZ 50--Site 2, Ontario, 
California (FTZ Docket 40-2008, filed 6-13-2008);
    Whereas, notice inviting public comment has been given in the 
Federal Register (73 FR 34916, 6-19-2008);
    Whereas, the Board adopts the findings and recommendations of the 
examiner's report, and finds that the requirements of the FTZ Act and 
the Board's regulations are satisfied, and that approval of the 
application is in the public interest;
    Now, therefore, the Board hereby grants authority for the assembly 
of light-duty passenger electric vehicles within FTZ 50 for Phoenix MC, 
Inc. d/b/a Phoenix Motorcars, Inc., as described in the application and 
Federal Register notice, subject to the Act and the Board's 
regulations, including Section 400.28.

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 15th day of May 2009.
Ronald K. Lorentzen,
Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Import Administration, 
Alternate Chairman, Foreign-Trade Zones Board.

    Attest:
Andrew McGilvray,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. E9-12404 Filed 5-27-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
#### In the Matter of Huntington Hebrew Congregation of Huntington, Respondent, v Melvyn Tanenbaum, Appellant, and Split Rock Developers, Inc., Respondent, et al., Respondent.

Submitted September 21, 2009;

decided November 24, 2009

Reported below, 62 AD3d 704; 2009 NY Slip Op 79897(U).

*855Motion, insofar as it seeks leave to appeal from the Appellate Division order denying renewal, reargument or, in the alternative, leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, dismissed upon the ground that such order does not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution; motion for leave to appeal otherwise denied.
#### Fidelity National Title Insurance Company et al., Respondents, and Sheila Ferrari et al., Intervenors-Appellants, v Regent Abstract Services, Ltd., et al., Respondents. New York Life Insurance Company, Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.

Submitted June 1, 2010;

decided August 31, 2010

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed as untimely *(see*CPLR 5513 [b]; *Matter of Haverstraw Park v Runcible Props. Corp.,*33 NY2d 637 [1973]).