United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 17, 2021 Decided March 26, 2021

No. 20-7110

IN RE: LARRY ELLIOTT KLAYMAN,

RESPONDENT

Larry Klayman argued the cause and filed the brief for 

respondent.

Before: HENDERSON and TATEL, Circuit Judges, and 

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: Suspended for ninety days by the 

District of Columbia Court of Appeals, Larry Klayman, a 

member of this court’s bar, seeks to avoid reciprocal discipline. 

For the reasons set forth below, we impose a reciprocal ninetyday suspension and refer this matter to the Committee on 

Admissions and Grievances for recommendations on whether 

further discipline is warranted. 

I.

Larry Klayman founded Judicial Watch in 1994 and 

served as its general counsel until he left in 2003. Since then, 

he has worked as “a public interest attorney and advocate.” Br. 

13.
2

Following the filing of a complaint with the District of 

Columbia Bar in 2013, the Bar’s Hearing Committee Number 

Nine concluded that Mr. Klayman violated Rules 8.4(d) and

1.9 of the District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct. 

See Report and Recommendation, In re Klayman, No. 13-BD084, slip op. at 2 (D.C. Bd. of Prof. Resp. Hearing Comm. June 

19, 2017). Rule 1.9 provides that “[a] lawyer who has formerly 

represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent 

another person in the same or a substantially related matter in 

which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the 

interests of the former client unless the former client gives 

informed consent.” D.C. Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9.

According to the comments to Rule 1.9, the relevant “matter” 

is not limited to litigation: “[w]hen a lawyer has been directly 

involved in a specific transaction, subsequent representation of 

other clients with materially adverse interests clearly is 

prohibited.” Id. The D.C. Bar complaint against Mr. Klayman 

focused on his representation of three clients in suits against his 

former employer, Judicial Watch. 

The first client, Sandra Cobas, served as director of 

Judicial Watch’s Miami Regional Office. While there, Cobas

alleged that she faced a hostile work environment, and Mr. 

Klayman, as general counsel, advised Judicial Watch about her 

complaints. After ending her employment with Judicial Watch, 

Cobas filed suit against the organization in Florida state court. 

The Florida court dismissed her complaint, calling it “silly and 

vindictive.” In re Klayman, 228 A.3d 713, 716 (D.C. 2020)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Then, after Mr. Klayman 

left Judicial Watch and without seeking its consent, he entered 

an appearance on Cobas’s behalf and filed a motion asking the 

court to vacate its order of dismissal. When the motion was 

denied, Mr. Klayman initiated and briefed an appeal. The 

appellate court affirmed the dismissal.
3

The second client was Louise Benson, from whom Mr. 

Klayman, while serving as Judicial Watch’s chairman and 

general counsel, solicited a commitment to donate $50,000 for 

a fund to purchase a building. She made an initial payment of

$15,000, but Judicial Watch ultimately did not purchase a 

building. Years later, after Mr. Klayman had left Judicial 

Watch, Benson sued the organization, seeking the return of her 

donation. She was initially represented by another attorney, but 

Mr. Klayman later entered an appearance as co-counsel, again

without seeking consent from Judicial Watch. Judicial Watch 

asked Mr. Klayman to withdraw, pointing out that he had 

“organized the fundraising effort” and that “Benson had 

identified him as a fact witness.” Id. When Mr. Klayman failed 

to withdraw, Judicial Watch moved to disqualify him, but the 

motion was never resolved because the parties agreed to 

dismiss the case.

Last is Peter Paul. Judicial Watch represented Paul with 

respect to several legal issues, including an investigation and 

potential litigation arising from Paul’s fundraising activities 

during his campaign for the New York State Senate. On behalf 

of Judicial Watch, Mr. Klayman prepared the representation 

agreement and authorized its signing as well as a subsequent

modification. Judicial Watch lawyers later represented Paul in 

a civil lawsuit in California state court. After Mr. Klayman left 

Judicial Watch, the organization’s lawyers withdrew from the 

representation. Paul then sued Judicial Watch in the United 

States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that 

the organization’s lawyers had breached the representation 

agreement. Although Paul was initially represented by other 

counsel, Mr. Klayman later entered an appearance—again

without seeking Judicial Watch’s consent.

Judicial Watch moved to disqualify Mr. Klayman, and the 

district court, then-Chief Judge Royce Lamberth, granted the 
4

motion. Paul v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 2d 17, 27 

(D.D.C. 2008). He first concluded that “it [wa]s clear that Mr. 

Klayman’s representation of Mr. Paul” was an “unambiguous 

violation” of Rule 1.9. Id. at 21. The representation, Judge 

Lamberth explained, was “the very type of ‘changing of sides 

in the matter’ forbidden by Rule 1.9.” Id. (quoting D.C. Rule 

of Professional Conduct 1.9). And although “not 

unsympathetic” to the prejudice that Paul might suffer due to 

Mr. Klayman’s disqualification, Judge Lamberth explained 

that he “simply [could not] condone such a flagrant violation 

of a Rule of Professional Conduct essential to the proper 

functioning of our system of justice.” Id. at 27. 

Following a hearing, Hearing Committee Number Nine 

found that “Mr. Klayman violated Rule 1.9 (or its Florida 

equivalent) in all three” representations. In re Klayman, 

228 A.3d at 717. The Hearing Committee also found that Mr. 

Klayman’s representation of Paul violated Rule 8.4(d), which 

prohibits lawyers from “[e]ngag[ing] in conduct that seriously 

interferes with the administration of justice.” Lastly, it found 

that Mr. Klayman gave false testimony before the Hearing 

Committee. The Committee recommended that Mr. Klayman

“be suspended for ninety days, with reinstatement contingent 

upon a showing of his fitness to practice law.” Id.

The Board on Professional Responsibility agreed that Mr. 

Klayman had violated Rule 1.9 and recommended that he “be 

suspended for ninety days.” Id. The Board, however,

“disagreed with the Hearing Committee’s finding that 

Disciplinary Counsel proved a violation of Rule 8.4(d),” as 

well as with its finding that Mr. Klayman had “provided false 

testimony,” and it rejected the Hearing Committee’s 

reinstatement condition. Id. 
5

In the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, Mr. 

Klayman chose not to challenge the Board’s conclusion that he 

had violated Rule 1.9. See id. at 717 (“Before this court, neither 

Mr. Klayman nor Disciplinary Counsel takes issue with the 

finding that Mr. Klayman violated Rule 1.9 or its Florida 

equivalent.”). On June 11, 2020, the Court of Appeals accepted 

the Board’s findings; suspended Mr. Klayman for ninety days, 

effective July 11, 2020; and required that he complete a 

continuing legal education course on conflicts of interest as a 

condition of reinstatement.

Under Rule X of this court’s Rules of Disciplinary 

Enforcement, Mr. Klayman was obligated to “notify the Clerk 

of this Court in writing within ten days of such discipline”—

his suspension by the D.C. Court of Appeals. D.C. Cir. Rules, 

App. II, Rule X. He failed to do so. 

On July 24, this court received notice from the D.C. Court 

of Appeals of Mr. Klayman’s ninety-day suspension. See 

Certified Copy of Order, In re Klayman, No. 20-8511 (D.C. 

Cir. Aug. 4, 2020). Almost two weeks later, on August 4, we

ordered Mr. Klayman to “show cause . . . why the imposition 

of identical discipline by this court would be unwarranted.”

Order, In re Klayman, No. 20-8511 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 4, 2020).

In response, Mr. Klayman filed the brief now before us. Mr. 

Klayman was reinstated to the District of Columbia Bar

effective December 10, 2020. 

II.

As our court has explained, “[a] member of this court’s bar 

who ‘has been suspended or disbarred from practice in any 

other court’ is subject to reciprocal discipline in this court.” In 

re Zdravkovich, 634 F.3d 574, 577 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting 

Fed. R. App. P. 46(b)(1)(A)). In determining whether to impose 

reciprocal discipline, “we must undertake an ‘intrinsic 
6

consideration of the state record,’ recognizing that a state 

court’s decision to impose a particular sanction ‘is not 

conclusively binding on the federal courts.’” Id. at 577 (citation 

omitted) (quoting Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51 (1917); 

In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 547 (1968)). “Nevertheless, the 

state court’s substantive findings are entitled to a high degree 

of respect,” id., as “we are not sitting as a court of review to 

discover error in the [judge’s] or the [state] courts’ 

proceedings,” In re Sibley, 564 F.3d 1335, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 

2009). “The burden of showing why the court should not 

impose reciprocal discipline rests with” Mr. Klayman. See id.

at 1340.

Under Rule IV(c) of our Rules of Disciplinary 

Enforcement, “this Court shall impose the identical discipline” 

imposed by the D.C. Court of Appeals “unless the attorney 

demonstrates, or this Court is satisfied that:”

(1) the procedure was so lacking in notice or 

opportunity to be heard as to constitute a 

deprivation of due process; or

(2) there was such an infirmity of proof 

establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the 

clear conviction that this Court could not, 

consistent with its duty, accept as final the 

conclusion on that subject; or

(3) the imposition of the same discipline by this 

Court would result in grave injustice; or

(4) the misconduct warrants substantially 

different discipline.

D.C. Cir. Rules, App. II, Rule IV(c).
7

Mr. Klayman does not challenge the Hearing Committee’s 

finding that, in violation of Rule 1.9, he represented Cobas, 

Benson, and Paul in the same or substantially similar matters 

on which he advised Judicial Watch, all without seeking 

consent from Judicial Watch. Instead, Mr. Klayman argues that 

he qualifies for three of the four Rule IV(c) exceptions. We 

consider each, though in a slightly different order.

A.

We begin with the second exception, which requires that 

we consider whether “there was such an infirmity of proof 

establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear 

conviction that this Court could not, consistent with its duty, 

accept as final the conclusion on that subject.” As noted above, 

Mr. Klayman acknowledges that he represented Cobas, 

Benson, and Paul in the same or substantially similar matters 

on which he advised Judicial Watch without seeking Judicial 

Watch’s consent. It is thus hardly surprising that he never even 

tries to make the “difficult showing” that there was an infirmity

of proof. In re Zdravkovich, 634 F.3d at 579.

Relying on a letter from “renowned legal ethics expert”

Ronald Rotunda, Br. 4, Mr. Klayman argues that he committed 

no ethical violation because he was “simply pursu[ing] an 

obligation that he knew that he owed to Sandra Cobas, Peter 

Paul, and Louise Benson,” Br. 6 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). According to Mr. Klayman, he was fulfilling his duty 

under Rule 1.3(a), which requires lawyers to represent clients 

“zealously and diligently,” as Cobas, Benson, and Paul were 

otherwise unable to afford counsel and they would have “los[t]

their legal rights.” Br. 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Insisting that he had an “ethical obligation . . . to zealously and 

diligently represent” the three clients, Mr. Klayman contends 

that he committed no ethical violation despite representing 
8

them without seeking consent from Judicial Watch. Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

This argument is entirely without merit. Even though Mr. 

Klayman owed a duty of zealous representation to Cobas, 

Benson, and Paul, Rule 1.9 is absolute. Absent informed 

consent from Judicial Watch, Mr. Klayman may not “represent 

another person in the same or a substantially related matter in 

which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the 

interests of” Judicial Watch. As Judge Lamberth put it, “Rule 

1.9 provides no exception to its prohibition on successive

representation.” Paul, 571 F. Supp. 2d at 27. 

Next, Mr. Klayman quotes at length from a portion of the 

Rotunda letter that relies heavily on the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266 (2012). See Br. 

6–7. There, the Court concluded that counsel’s failure to 

properly withdraw from representation of a death row inmate 

excused the inmate’s failure to meet a crucial filing deadline

because counsel’s effective abandonment was an 

“extraordinary circumstance.” See Maples, 565 U.S. at 289.

From this, Rotunda concludes that “it [was] reasonable and 

understandable that Mr. Klayman believed that he had an 

ethical obligation . . . to zealously and diligently represent”

Cobas, Benson, and Paul. Br. 7 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Maples, however, has nothing whatsoever to do with 

this case, as the lawyers involved there were not representing a 

client whose interests were adverse to a former client. Maples

is about client abandonment, not switching sides. 

Seeking support from Judge Lamberth, Mr. Klayman 

points out that the judge found “ambiguity with respect to the 

standard for disqualification in the face of a violation of Rule 

1.9.” Br. 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). But as the plain 

language of this quote demonstrates, the ambiguity Judge 
9

Lamberth found related to the standard for “disqualification” 

of a lawyer who violated Rule 1.9. He found no ambiguity at 

all with respect to whether Mr. Klayman had in fact violated 

Rule 1.9. Quite to the contrary, Judge Lamberth thought it 

“clear” that Mr. Klayman’s representation of Paul amounted to

“an unambiguous violation” of the rule. Id. at 21. In any event,

Judge Lamberth ultimately disqualified Mr. Klayman. Id. at 

26–27.

B.

Invoking the first Rule IV(c) exception—whether “the 

procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard 

as to constitute a deprivation of due process”—Mr. Klayman 

argues that because “the bar proceeding was instituted nearly 

eight (8) years after the alleged ethical infractions occurred,” 

he suffered “undue prejudice,” as he was unable to “produce 

all of the documentary evidence and witnesses in support of his 

defenses.” Br. 10. 

On its face, however, the exception concerns due process 

violations arising from “lack[] [of] notice or opportunity to be 

heard,” and it is undisputed that Mr. Klayman “was given 

notice of the charges against him and . . . had the opportunity 

to call and cross-examine witnesses, make arguments, and 

submit evidence.” In re Zdravkovich, 634 F.3d at 578. Even if 

due process concerns extend beyond the exception’s plain 

language, Mr. Klayman has failed to show any prejudice. See 

In re Ekekwe-Kauffman, 210 A.3d 775, 785 (D.C. 2019)

(explaining that in disciplinary proceedings, an “[u]ndue delay 

may result in a due process violation” when “the respondent 

demonstrates actual prejudice—that is, that the delay in 

prosecution impaired [his] defense”). He quotes the Rotunda 

letter for the proposition that, at the time of the disciplinary 

proceedings, Paul “[was] in federal prison in Texas,” “Cobas 

ha[d] health problems,” and “Benson [was] an 83-year-old 
10

woman.” Br. 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). But when 

pressed at oral argument, Mr. Klayman was unable to explain 

how any of this—or indeed anything else—actually prejudiced 

him. See Oral Arg. Tr. 15–16. 

Mr. Klayman’s remaining arguments are equally without 

merit. He invokes the doctrine of laches but fails to cite a case

from either this circuit or the D.C. Court of Appeals that applies 

laches to disciplinary proceedings, nor are we aware of one.

Quoting the Rotunda letter, he claims that “Judicial Watch 

submitted boxes full of voluminous documents to the Bar 

Counsel’s office in secret” and those documents were not 

served to “Mr. Klayman until the Petition was filed,” Br. 13 

(internal quotation marks omitted), but he provides no evidence 

of this alleged due process violation. See Allen v. District of 

Columbia, 969 F.3d 397, 405 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (explaining that 

this court does not “consider arguments raised in such skeletal 

form”).

C.

In support of his argument under Rule IV(c)’s third 

exception, which applies when “imposition of the same 

discipline by this Court would result in grave injustice,” Mr. 

Klayman largely reiterates his unmeritorious infirmity of proof

and due process arguments, and then urges us to consider his 

“course of work as a public interest attorney.” Br. 13. 

Specifically, he explains that he “often takes cases on pro bono 

. . . to try to make society a better place.” Br. 13. 

Rule 1.9, however, contains no exception for public 

interest lawyers. Indeed, many fine public interest lawyers 

appear in this court, and we think they would be stunned at the 

suggestion that the rule does not apply to them. As Judge 

Lamberth emphasized, Rule 1.9’s bar is “essential to the proper 

functioning of our system of justice.” Paul, 571 F. Supp. 2d at 
11

27. Underlying the rule is counsel’s “duty of loyalty” to a 

client, which incorporates “a duty to avoid conflicts of 

interest.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 

“Without such a rule, clients may be reluctant to confide 

completely in their attorneys.” In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust 

Litigation, 748 F.2d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 1984). In view of the 

principles animating Rule 1.9, recognizing the public interest 

exception Mr. Klayman urges would in fact be contrary to the 

public interest.

III.

Because Mr. Klayman has failed to carry his “burden of 

showing why the court should not impose reciprocal 

discipline,” In re Sibley, 564 F.3d at 1340, we shall impose a 

ninety-day suspension. Mr. Klayman protests that he “has 

already served a 90-day suspension period,” claiming that from 

August 12 to December 18, he made no appearances in the D.C. 

Circuit. Br. 15. 

This argument rests on a flawed assumption: that our

ninety-day suspension will apply nunc pro tunc to the date 

when the D.C. Court of Appeals imposed its suspension. 

Although we sometimes do impose reciprocal discipline 

retroactively, we do so only in limited situations, such as where 

the attorney, pursuant to Disciplinary Rule X, promptly notifies 

this court of the discipline imposed, and/or refrains from

representing clients in this court while suspended before 

another court. Mr. Klayman did neither.

When asked at oral argument why he had failed to notify 

the court pursuant to Rule X, Mr. Klayman offered no coherent 

explanation. See Oral Arg. Tr. 10–12. In a self-styled 

“Supplement to Respondent’s Initial Brief,” filed just after oral 

argument, Mr. Klayman told us that “[t]he reason that he did 

not immediately inform” this court of his suspension “was 
12

because” his petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc of 

his suspension “were pending [in the D.C. Court of Appeals] at 

the time and Mr. Klayman believed that he would be successful 

in obtaining a favorable ruling.” Supplement to Respondent’s 

Initial Br. 2. This is an astonishing argument. Rule X is crystal 

clear: “an attorney admitted to practice before this Court” who 

is “subjected to public discipline for professional misconduct 

. . . shall so notify the Clerk of this Court in writing within ten 

days of such discipline.” See Disciplinary Rule X (emphasis

added). “Shall” means shall, and, unsurprisingly, the rule

contains no exceptions for lawyers who think they might 

successfully challenge their discipline on appeal. 

With respect to the second basis for considering imposing 

discipline retroactively—voluntary withdrawal from practice 

before this court—Mr. Klayman failed to withdraw from

representing three clients until after we issued our order to 

show cause. See Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, Luhn v. Scott, 

No. 19-7146 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 2020); Motion to Withdraw 

as Counsel, Lovelien v. United States, No. 19-5325 (D.C. Cir. 

Aug. 12, 2020); Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, Corsi v. 

Mueller, No. 19-5314 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 12, 2020). Indeed, Mr. 

Klayman failed to mention one of those cases in his brief, see

Br. 15, and even filed a brief on behalf of one client two days 

after his D.C. suspension took effect, see Appellants’ Final 

Reply Br., Lovelien v. United States, No. 19-5325 (D.C. Cir. 

July 13, 2020).

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, Larry Klayman is suspended 

from practice before this court for ninety days, effective as of 

the date of this opinion and the accompanying order. Mr. 

Klayman is prohibited from holding himself out to be an 

attorney at law licensed to practice before the United States 

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit during 
13

the suspension. In addition, pursuant to Disciplinary Rule II(d), 

this matter is referred to the Committee on Admissions and 

Grievances for recommendations about any further discipline

warranted by Mr. Klayman’s failure to comply with Rule X.

So ordered.