FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D2023-0966

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ANTONIO JAY WHITE,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Santa Rosa County.

James Scott Duncan, Judge.

September 11, 2024

PER CURIAM.

Antonio Jay White appeals his judgment and sentence of lewd 

and lascivious molestation. On appeal, White asserts that the trial 

court erred by (1) denying White’s motion for judgment of 

acquittal, (2) permitting certain questions during White’s crossexamination, and (3) imposing costs of prosecution. After careful 

review and consideration, we affirm as to the second and third 

issues without further discussion. See Giddens v. State, 322 So. 3d 

745, 747 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (explaining that “[b]y law, we cannot 

reverse a judgment unless we are of the opinion that the error 

‘injuriously affected the substantial rights of’ [the defendant]”) 

(quoting § 924.33, Fla. Stat.)); Parks v. State, 371 So. 3d 392, 393 

(Fla. 1st DCA 2023) (“Section 938.27(8) establishes a minimum 
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‘[c]osts for the state attorney’ assessment as a mandatory cost of 

prosecution.”).

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for judgment of 

acquittal de novo “to determine whether the evidence is legally 

sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.” State v. Burrows, 940 So. 

2d 1259, 1261 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). We apply the competent, 

substantial evidence standard, and we consider the evidence and 

all reasonable inferences in a light more favorable to the State. Id. 

“If the State has presented competent evidence to establish every 

element of the crime, then a judgment of acquittal is improper.” 

Id. at 1261–62 (quoting State v. Williams, 742 So. 2d 509, 510 (Fla. 

1st DCA 1999)). 

Lewd and lascivious molestation requires an intentional 

touching of “the breasts, genitals, genital area, or buttocks, or the 

clothing covering them.” § 800.04(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2020). White 

claims the State presented no evidence that he touched the victim’s 

“genitals” or “genital area,” because the victim only testified, he 

touched “[n]ear [her] vagina” and “[n]ot far above it.” We disagree. 

The version of section 800.04 in effect on the date that White 

committed the offense did not define “genital area” or “genitals.” 

See § 800.04, Fla. Stat. (2020). Even so, the question is whether 

the State presented competent evidence to establish the element 

of the crime. We find that the victim’s testimony is legally 

sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to determine that White 

touched the victim’s genitals or genital area. 

The victim testified that White “stuck his hands down [her] 

pants,” beneath her underwear, and slid “side to side.” The victim 

also stated that he touched “[n]ear [her] vagina” and “[n]ot far 

above it.” We find that this testimony is legally sufficient to permit 

a reasonable jury to determine that White touched the victim’s 

genitals or genital area. The ultimate question of whether White, 

in fact, touched her genitals or genital area is a jury question. See 

State v. Sholl, 18 So. 3d 1158, 1161 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (explaining 

that because the legislature has not defined lewd or lascivious 

behavior, whether the defendant’s behavior violated the statute is 

a question of fact that must be decided by the jury). 
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AFFIRMED.

OSTERHAUS, C.J., and M.K. THOMAS and LONG, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Danielle Jorden, Assistant 

Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Zachary F. Lawton, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.