### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs O ct obe r 3, 200 6
RIC KEY HOGA N v. TON Y P AR KER , WA RD EN

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Laud erdale County

No. 6053 Joseph H. Walk er, Judge

No. W2006-01199-C CA-R 3-HC - F iled March 15, 2007

Pe tit ion e r, Ric ke y

Ho g a n, app eal s th e or de r d ism iss ing his pe tit ion fo r a writ o f h abe a s c or

pu s, raising two issues: (1) whe ther his conc urre nt, forty -y ear sentenc es, imposed i n 1985 for r obbery wit h a d ea d l y weapon and sec ond deg ree murder, a re void; and ( 2) whe ther the D epartment of Correc tion has m iscalculated t he ex piration date of his sentence s. Following our re view, we aff irm the ha be a s c or pu s c ou rt ’s or de r o f d ism iss a l. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed
T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D G. H AYES and R O BERT W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined. Rickey Hog an, He nning, T ennesse e, pro s e . Robert E. Cooper, Jr., At t o rney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; and David H. F indley , Assistant Attorney Gene ral; and Elizabeth T. Rice, D istrict Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
. OP IN ION
This is P etitioner’s sec ond pro s e pe tit ion fo r a writ o f h abe a s c or

pu s; h is f ir st w a s u lti ma te ly adjudicate d by

the Tenne ssee Supre me Court. Se e Ho ga n v . Mill s , 168 S.W .3d 753 (Tenn. 2005)

. The following proce dural history was re dacte d from our hig h court’s opinion in that ca se:
I n 1981, the petitioner .

. . pleade d g uiltyto robbery and re ceive d a five -to-ten y ear sentenc e. I n 1985, [he] p l ea d ed g uiltyto second de g ree murder and robbery with a dea dly

wea pon. He r ece ived conc urre nt forty -y ear sentenc es f

o r the 1985 c on vic tio ns
. I n 2003, [P etitioner] filed a pro se petition for writ of habea s corpus. . . . The petition may

be re ad to alleg e that the 1985 se ntence s are il l ega l b ec au se they run concur rently with e ach other or beca use they run concur

rently with the 1 9 81-2-

se nte nc e . [Pe tit ion e r] atta c he d v ari ou s d oc ume nts to h is pe tit ionsu pp ortin g his assertion that he was on parole for his 1981 conviction when he committed the offe nses re sulting in his 1985 convictions. These documents indicate that a fter the 1985 convictions the Board of Paroles declined t o impose the balance of the sentenc e for the 1981 c onviction.
The tr i al court summarily dismiss ed [Petit ioner’s] petition. [ Petitioner] appea led the dismissa l. The Court of Criminal Appea ls held that concur rent sentenc es for

his 1985 convictions would di re ct l y contra vene T ennesse e Rule of C ri m i n al Procedur e 32(c )(3) and, ther efor e, would be illeg al if [Petit ioner] was on parole when he committed the se offe nses. The intermediate a ppellate c ourt reve rsed the trial court’s judgme nt and re manded the c ase to de termi n e wh ether the rec ords of [P etitioner’s] 1985 c onvictions contain satisfac tory proof that [Petiti oner] was on pa ro le wh e n h e c omm itt e d th e se of fe ns e s. Id . at 754-55.
The supreme court reve rsed this court’ s judgme nt, holding that Petitioner’s sente nces w ere not illega l and that h e wa s not entitled to habeas c orpus re lief “w hen: (1) the trial court imposed concur rent sente nces f

or two off enses c ommitt ed by the petit ioner while on parole ; [ or whe n] (2) the trial court f

ailed to orde r these ne w sentenc es to be serve d consec utively to the rema ining se ntence for the pa roled off ense.” Id

. at 754. More specifica lly , the court found t hat R ule 32(c )(3) (A) doe s not mandate that his 1985 se n t en ce s b e served conse cutively to one another

beca use they wer e c omm itt e d w hil e on pa

ro le fo r the 19 81 of

fe ns e a ndthat a s th e 19 85 jud g men ts did no t e xplic itl y state that the forty -y ear sentenc es must be serve d concur rently with the 1981 sentenc e, they are “at most voidable and not void.” Se e id . at 756–57. Petitioner filed the pre sent pet i t i on on May 19, 2006, asserting thre e g rounds for ha beas corpus r elief. The first is essentially identical to the arg ument prese nted in his orig inal petition – that his 1985 sentence s violate Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 40-28-123( a) a nd Rule 32(c) (3)( A) of the Te nnessee Rules of Criminal Procedure beca use he w as on par ole for the 1981 offe nse whe n the 1985 offe nses wer e committed, and thus the 1985 sentenc es must be serve d consec utively to the 1981 sentenc e.
Se c on dly , h e a sse rt s th a t th e De pa rt me nt o f C or

re c tio n h a s mi sc a lc ulate d th e e xpir a tio n d a te of hi s sentenc e, “under orders of the P arole Boa rd,” and beca

use of its miscalculation, he is being held bey ond the expiration date of his sentenc e. L astly , in an interre lated arg ument, he contends that the Depa rtment of Corre ction has illeg ally altere d the leng th of his sentence

. On Ma y 23 , 20 06 , the ha

be a s c or pu s c ou rt su mma

ri ly dis mis se d his pe tit ion , ru lin g that hi s fi rs t ground for relief

had bee n previously

adjudicate d. As for his sec ond and third g rounds for relief , the habe as cor

pus court found that, based on the f ace of his judgme nts, his sentences ha ve not-3-

expired and that his claims relating to the pr oper c alculation of his sentenc e mus t be broug ht under the Un if orm A dmi nis tr a tiv e Pr oc e du re s A c t.
AN AL YSI S
The re medy

provided by

a writ of habea s corpus is limit ed in scope and may only be invoked wher e the judgme nt is void or the petitioner' s term of imprisonment has expired. Sta te v . R itc hie , 20 S.W. 3d62 4, 63 0 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) ; Sta te v . D av e np or t , 9 8 0 S

. W

. 2 d 407, 409 (Tenn. Crim. App. 19 98 ). A voi d, a s opp os e d to a vo ida ble , ju dg me nt i s “ on e in w hic h th e jud g me nt i s f a c ia lly inv a lid beca use the c ourt did not have the statutory authority to rende r such judg ment.” Dykes v. Compton , 97 8 S. W.2 d 5 28 , 5 29 (T e nn . 1 99 8) ; se e als o Tay lor v . S tat e , 995 S.W .2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999) . The petitioner has the burden of establishing by a pre ponderance of

the evidenc e that a judg ment is void. Pa ssa re lla v . S tat e , 891 S.W .2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), superc eded by statute as stated in State v. Newman , No. 02C01-9707-CC-00266, 1998 WL 104492, at *1 n.2 (Te nn. Crim. App., at J ackson, Ma

r. 11, 1998) ( no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed)

. The judg ment of a court of g ener al jurisdiction is conclusive and presumed to be valid, and such a judg ment can only be impeac hed i f t he re cord a ffirmatively shows that the re ndering court was without persona l or subject matter jurisdiction. Arc he r v . S tat e , 851 S.W .2d 157, 162 (Tenn. 1993). Thus, habea s corpus relief is a vailable only when “‘it appea rs upon the fa ce of

the judg ment or the recor d of t he procee dings upon which the judg ment is render ed’ that a convicting court wa s wi t h o u t j u ri sdiction or authority to sentence a def

endant, or

that a def

endant' s sentence of imprisonment . . . has expi red.” Archer , 8 51 S.W. 2dat 16 4 ( c itatio n omit te d) . Whethe r r e lie f s ho uld be g rante d is a qu e sti on of la w wh ic h this c ou rt re vie ws de novo

. Ha rt v . S tat e , 21 S.W .3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000)

. On app e a l, P e tit ion e r a

rg ue s th a t th e ha

be a s c or pu s c ou rt e rr e d b y su mma ri ly dis mis sin g his petition and essentially puts forth the same arg uments prese nted t o that court. How ever , we a g ree with the rea soning of

the habe as cor

pus co u rt on all counts. Petitioner’s ar g ument reg arding the integ rity of his 1985 judgme nts was previously adjudicate d by

our supre me court. See H ogan , 168 S.W. 3da t 75 7. Mo re ov e r, a pe tit ion fo r a

writ o f h abe a s c or

pu s is no t th e pr op e r rem e dy fo r h is complaints reg arding the Bo ar d o f Paroles’ calc ulation of his sentence s or the implementation there of by

the Tenne ssee De partment of Corr ection bec ause, a s previously stated by this court, [t ]he sole remedy

available when a

prisoner alleg es that the B oard of Paroles has acte d improperly is to file a writ of certiorari in the Chance ry Co u rt o f D av idson County

. Brigham v. Lack , 7 5 5 S. W. 2 d 4 6 9 , 4 7 1 ( T e n n
. Crim

. A p p
. 1 9 8 8 )

. I f the pe tit ion e r c la ims that th e Te nn ess e e De pa rt me nt o f C or

re c tio n h a s in c or

re c tly c a lc ulate d h is s e nte nc e s o r i nc or re c tly int e rp re te d th e a c tio n of the B oa rdof Paro le s, the app ro pria te re me dy

is fo un d und e r the Un if

orm A dmi nis tr a tiv e Pr oc e du re s A c t. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4- 5-101 et seq . (1991).-4-

Ro be rt L. Fe rre ll v . S tat e , No. 01C01-9610-CR-00454, 1997 WL 578999, at *1 (Te nn. Crim. App. Se pt. 19 , 19 97 ) (n o Te nn
. R. Ap p. P. 11 app lic a tio n f ile d) ; se e als o Max De be rry v . Ed G ore , No. W2003-02679-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2609193, at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App., at J ackson, Nov. 17, 2004), perm. app. de nied

(Tenn. Ma

r. 21, 2005).

CO NC LU SION
Ba sed on the for eg oing a

uthorities and re asoning , we a ffirm the ha beas c orpus court’s order of dis mis sa l.

___________________________________ T HO M AS T

. W OO DA LL , J u d ge