IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

James Silbaugh, :

Petitioner :

 :

v. : No. 57 C.D. 2019

 : Submitted: August 30, 2019

Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board (Penn Line Corporation), :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: November 25, 2019

James Silbaugh (Claimant) petitions for review of the Order of the Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board (Board) that affirmed the decision of a Workers’ 

Compensation Judge (WCJ) denying Claimant’s Claim Petition based on the WCJ’s 

determination that Pennsylvania does not have jurisdiction over Claimant’s work 

injury, which occurred in Virginia, pursuant to Section 305.2(a) of the Workers’ 

Compensation Act (Act),1 77 P.S. § 411.2(a). On appeal, Claimant argues 

Pennsylvania has jurisdiction because his contract for hire was made in 

Pennsylvania, his employment was not principally localized in any state, and the 

 

1 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, added by Section 9 of the Act of December 

5, 1974, P.L. 782, 77 P.S. § 411.2(a).
2

WCJ’s interpretation of Section 305.2(a) to conclude otherwise is inconsistent with 

the humanitarian purpose of the Act. Upon review, we affirm.

I. Background

Claimant filed a Claim Petition on August 18, 2015, alleging he sustained, 

among other injuries, a severe crush injury to his left thigh and leg on April 29, 2015, 

while topping a tree for Penn Line Corporation (Employer) in Virginia. 

(Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 6a-7a.) Claimant resides in Pennsylvania, and 

Employer’s headquarters are in Pennsylvania (Pennsylvania Office). Employer filed 

an Answer, challenging, in relevant part, Pennsylvania’s jurisdiction over the work 

injury that had occurred in Virginia. (Id. at 16a.) The WCJ bifurcated the matter so 

as to decide the jurisdictional question first. Multiple hearings were held before the 

WCJ, at which both Claimant and Employer presented testimonial and documentary 

evidence.

A. Proceedings Before the WCJ

Claimant testified twice before the WCJ as follows.2 He lives in 

Pennsylvania, he interviewed with Employer in 2012 at Employer’s Pennsylvania 

Office, and he was hired at that office to work full-time as a tree trimmer/climber. 

Claimant worked for Employer for a total of four years, working for about two years 

followed by a one-year break. His most recent work period with Employer began in 

September 2014 and ended in May 2015 after he was injured on April 29, 2015. 

Claimant explained that, consistent with his understanding of what his job would 

entail, he performed work for Employer in Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and 

 

2 Claimant’s testimony is summarized in Findings of Fact 4 and 7 and is found at pages 

86a-103a and 242a-56a of the Reproduced Record.
3

Virginia, and that he was sent wherever Employer had work. As part of that work, 

Claimant would meet his foreman in Pennsylvania on a Sunday, the four- or fiveperson crew would travel out of state for work, and the crew would return to 

Pennsylvania on Thursday. Claimant took a break from his employment for about a 

year in 2013 for personal reasons and returned to Employer in September 2014, at 

which time he had to complete a drug test and paperwork. Claimant acknowledged 

that, upon his return in 2014, he only worked for Employer in Virginia and that, 

following his work injury, he received workers’ compensation (WC) benefits under 

a WC claim in Virginia.

Claimant later clarified that the work he believed he had performed in 

Pennsylvania during his initial period of employment had actually been in West 

Virginia. He explained that, throughout his employment, he was requested to take 

vehicles from Employer’s Virginia locations to the Pennsylvania Office and return 

new vehicles to Virginia. During his most recent employment period, Claimant did 

this four or five times. In August 2015, Claimant received a modified duty job offer 

to work in the Pennsylvania Office, but was later notified that he could not work at 

that office due to his having a non-work-related MRSA infection. In May 2016, he 

returned to modified duty work in Virginia, but was assigned to a different work 

crew, requiring him to drive to his new foreman’s home in West Virginia from which 

the crew left to do work in Virginia. Claimant’s prior foreman advised Claimant 

that his prior crew was working in North Carolina. Claimant has been released to 

regular duty work, and he has returned to work for Employer in Virginia, but 

Employer has not let him work as a climber.
4

Employer presented the testimony of the lead foreman of Employer’s tree 

division (Lead Foreman), who testified as follows.3 Lead Foreman is employed by 

Employer in Virginia and supervises 14 crews. Employer has a contract with 

Dominion Virginia Power (Dominion) to perform tree work, such as clearing new 

right-of-ways, tree trimming for new power lines, and maintenance trimming for 

existing lines. While Employer’s Pennsylvania Office is the parent office of the 

company, directions for work assignments come either from Employer’s Ashland, 

Virginia office (Virginia Office) or directly from Dominion foresters. Lead Foreman 

never had any contact with the Pennsylvania Office about the work his Virginia 

crews performed and no direction regarding that work ever came from that office. 

Dominion’s lines were in Virginia, although it had acquired lines in North Carolina 

on which some of Employer’s crews could be directed by Dominion to work. (R.R. 

at 128a.) Employee paychecks and other human relations matters are handled by the 

Pennsylvania Office, although Lead Foreman finalized all the timesheets that were 

sent to that office. Lead Foreman did not hire Claimant, but he was familiar with 

Claimant having been Claimant’s supervisor when Claimant worked for Employer 

from September 2014 through May 2015. During that period, Claimant worked only 

in Virginia.

Employer also offered the testimony of its Casualty Claims Manager (Claims 

Manager), who twice testified before the WCJ as follows.4 Claims Manager works 

in the Pennsylvania Office and explained Claimant’s work history as reflected in his 

work records. Claimant worked from July 16, 2012, until August 2, 2012, when he 

 

3 Lead Foreman’s testimony is summarized in Finding of Fact 5 and is found at pages 113a37a of the Reproduced Record.

4 Claims Manager’s testimony is summarized in Findings of Fact 6 and 8 and is found at 

pages 139a-69a and 271a-78a of the Reproduced Record.
5

left due to a work injury suffered in Virginia. He returned to work on September 4, 

2012, and worked until May 19, 2013, when he left his employment to care for a 

sick family member and did not have enough time working for Employer to qualify 

for leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act.

5

 Claimant had a new hire date 

of May 28, 2013, but was discharged for absenteeism on August 8, 2013. Claimant 

was rehired on September 2, 2014, and worked until April 29, 2015, the date of the 

work injury at issue. Claims Manager explained that, under Employer’s policies, 

when an employee quits or is discharged and then rehired, the employee loses all of 

the employee’s prior seniority, has a new hire date, and is considered as starting 

again. Further, once an employee is hired in one location, the employee cannot just 

switch locations under Employer’s policies, but must first leave for a period of time 

and then get permission to move to a different location. (R.R. at 141a.) Under 

Employer’s policies, when Claimant was rehired on September 2, 2014, Employer 

considered him a new employee. During that new period of employment, Claimant 

worked exclusively in Virginia and, even when he worked for Employer in 2012 and 

2013, Claimant’s work records reflected he worked only in Virginia. Every 

timesheet Employer had for Claimant between 2012 and 2015 reflected that he 

worked in Virginia. Claims Manager handled Claimant’s current WC claim in

Virginia, Claimant was paid Virginia WC benefits, and Claimant’s medical benefits 

were still being paid through the Virginia claim.

B. The WCJ Decision

Based on all of the evidence presented, the WCJ found that Claimant “had 

separate and distinct periods of employment with [Employer]” and “prior to his date 

of injury of April 29, 2015, the claimant’s most recent period of employment with 

 

5

29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654.
6

[Employer] began on September 2, 2014.” (WCJ Decision, Finding of Fact (FOF) 

¶ 9.) According to the WCJ, the credible testimony of Claimant and Claims Manager 

confirmed that Claimant was first hired in 2012, stopped working in 2013, began 

working for Employer again on September 2, 2014, and worked until April 29, 2015, 

the date of his injury. The WCJ credited Claims Manager’s testimony, based on 

Claims Manager’s familiarity with Employer’s hiring and seniority policies, that 

Claimant lost all of his seniority and was considered a new employee when he was 

rehired on September 2, 2014. The WCJ found Claims Manager’s 

testimony in this regard is critical to the outcome of the jurisdiction 

issue in this matter, because[ Claims Manager] has credibly testified, 

and the claimant’s time records have credibly confirmed, that when the 

claimant worked for [Employer] from September 2, 2014 through the 

date of his injury on April 29, 2015, his work was exclusively 

performed in . . . Virginia.

(Id.) 

Based on the testimony of Claimant and Claims Manager that Claimant only 

worked in Virginia between September 2014 and April 2015, the WCJ found that, 

at the time Claimant sustained his injury, his work was not localized in Pennsylvania, 

but in Virginia. (Id. ¶ 11.) The WCJ found that the four or five occasions Claimant 

moved vehicles between the Pennsylvania Office and Employer’s work locations in 

Virginia did not alter this finding. The WCJ reasoned that “such limited work 

activity in Pennsylvania is insufficient to establish that the claimant’s employment 

with [Employer] was principally localized in . . . Pennsylvania” particularly in light 

of the documentary evidence which reflected “that just about every job the claimant 

was assigned to work for the employer after he was rehired in September, 2014 was 

a job that involved the claimant working in . . . Virginia.” (Id.) The WCJ 

acknowledged Claimant’s arguments regarding the many connections between 
7

Claimant’s work with Employer and Pennsylvania, but held those contacts did not 

support a finding that Claimant’s employment was principally located in 

Pennsylvania where almost all of the work he performed in the relevant employment 

period occurred in Virginia. The WCJ credited Lead Foreman’s testimony that, 

although Employer’s headquarters was its Pennsylvania Office, all of the work 

Claimant performed for Employer was in Virginia and all of the directions related 

to that work came from the Virginia Office or Dominion’s foresters, not the 

Pennsylvania Office. 

Crediting Claims Manager’s and Lead Foreman’s testimony, as well as 

Employer’s documentary evidence showing where Claimant worked during the 

relevant period of employment, the WCJ found “that, at the time he sustained his 

work injury . . . , the claimant . . . was working employment principally localized in 

. . . Virginia.” (Id. ¶ 12.) The WCJ determined that the WC laws of Virginia applied 

to Employer, as reflected by the credible testimony of Claims Manager that Claimant 

was paid WC benefits, pursuant to those laws, for the April 29, 2015 work injury. 

(Id. ¶ 13.)

Based on the above findings of fact and credibility determinations, the WCJ 

concluded that Claimant failed to meet his burden of proving that Pennsylvania had 

jurisdiction over his WC claim for the April 29, 2015 work injuries. (WCJ Decision, 

Conclusion of Law ¶ 1.) Specifically, the WCJ held that Claimant had failed to meet 

any of the extraterritorial provisions set forth in Section 305.2(a) that would have 

given Pennsylvania jurisdiction. Accordingly, the WCJ denied and dismissed the 

Claim Petition due to lack of jurisdiction. (Id. ¶ 2; WCJ Order.)
8

C. The Board Decision

Claimant appealed to the Board, arguing the WCJ erred in concluding that 

Pennsylvania lacked jurisdiction over his Claim Petition, citing S.I. Industries v. 

Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Zon), 613 A.2d 170 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992),

because his employment was not principally located in any one state. Noting the 

WCJ’s credibility determinations and factual findings, the Board affirmed. The 

Board held these determinations and findings supported the WCJ’s conclusions that 

Claimant had distinct periods of employment with Employer, his employment at the 

time of his injury was principally localized in Virginia, and Virginia’s WC laws had 

applied to the work injury. The Board distinguished Zon on the basis that, in Zon, 

the parties clearly contemplated that the claimant would work anywhere required by 

the employer’s business needs. Here, the Board explained, no such arrangement was 

contemplated by Employer as established by Claims Manager’s credible testimony 

that once Employer hired an employee for one location, the employee stayed in that 

location and could not move to a different location without first leaving Employer 

for a period of time and then obtaining permission to move to another area. (R.R. at 

141a.) Accordingly, there was no error, the Board held, in the WCJ’s concluding 

that Claimant did not meet his burden of proof under Section 305.2(a) and denying 

and dismissing the Claim Petition for lack of jurisdiction. Claimant now petitions 

this Court for review.6

 

6

In reviewing a decision of the Board, “[o]ur review is limited to determining whether an 

error of law was committed, whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial 

evidence, and whether constitutional rights were violated.” McDermott v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal 

Bd. (Brand Indus. Servs., Inc.), 204 A.3d 549, 554 n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019).
9

II. Discussion

A. The Parties’ Arguments

Claimant argues that Pennsylvania has jurisdiction over the Claim Petition 

pursuant to Section 305.2(a)(2), which authorizes coverage under the Act where the 

employee “is working under a contract of hire made in this State in employment not 

principally localized in any state.” (Claimant’s Brief (Br.) at 13 (quoting 77 P.S. 

§ 411.2(a)(2)).) Claimant asserts there is evidence that he worked in different states,

Employer contemplated moving him (and other employees) to any state in which 

Employer conducts its business, as reflected by Lead Foreman’s testimony, (R.R. at 

128a), and Employer’s contract with Dominion demonstrates that Employer’s 

employees can be assigned to work in both Virginia and North Carolina to maintain 

Dominion’s lines. These facts, he argues, support the conclusion that his

employment was not principally located in any state, including Virginia, making Zon 

directly on point. (Claimant’s Br. at 21 (citing Zon, 613 A.2d 170).) This conclusion 

is further supported, Claimant contends, by the significant contacts his employment 

relationship with Employer has with Pennsylvania, including his residing here, 

Employer being headquartered here, his contract for hire occurring here, and his 

leaving from his foreman’s Pennsylvania home for his work in Virginia, and that he 

was offered a modified duty position at the Pennsylvania Office. 

Claimant also contends that the Act is intended to benefit injured workers and 

must be liberally construed in the injured worker’s favor in order to effectuate the 

Act’s humanitarian purpose. Cytemp Specialty Steel v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. 

(Servey), 811 A.2d 114, 118 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). Claimant argues that, contrary to 

this humanitarian purpose and the liberal construction requirement, the WCJ 

narrowly interpreted Section 305.2(a) of the Act to dismiss the Claim Petition
10

notwithstanding that it was filed by a Pennsylvania resident based on a work injury 

sustained while working for a company operating in multiple states with its 

headquarters in Pennsylvania. Such denial makes it difficult for Claimant to obtain 

treatment from local physicians, who do not always accept out-of-state WC benefits.

Employer responds that the WCJ’s decision that Pennsylvania lacked 

jurisdiction because Claimant’s employment was principally located in Virginia and 

his work injury was covered by Virginia’s WC laws is supported by substantial, 

competent evidence in the record. Employer contends this conclusion is consistent 

with Meyer v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Raytheon Co.), 776 A.2d 338 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2001), because, as in that case, Claimant’s work for Employer could 

not be considered continuous and, therefore, the only period of employment relevant 

is that beginning in September 2014. During that period, Employer asserts, Claimant 

worked exclusively in Virginia. Although Claimant asserts there is evidence to 

support the fact that his employment was not principally located in any state, the fact 

that “it was possible that the Employer could have sent him to job sites in other 

states” does not support a finding that Claimant’s employment was not principally 

located anywhere under Section 305.2(d)(4), Employer argues. (Employer’s Br. at 

16 (emphasis in original).) Under that section, according to Employer, the definition 

of “principally located” requires two things: one, that “the employee regularly 

works at or from a place of business within the state,” and two, “his duties have 

required him to go out of state for less than one year.” (Id. (citing 77 P.S. § 

411.2(d)(4)).) Both of these provisions are met, argues Employer, because: (1) 

Claimant admitted that, during the relevant period of employment, he worked 

exclusively in Virginia and his work assignments came from the Virginia Office; 

and (2) there was no evidence that Claimant had been required to work outside of 
11

Virginia for a year or more. Accepting Claimant’s argument that his employment 

had no principal location because Employer has a multistate operation and that at 

some time it was possible that he may be offered work in another state, would, 

Employer contends, render an absurd result.

Employer further argues that Claimant cannot establish Pennsylvania’s 

jurisdiction, pursuant to George Liko Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal 

Board (Stripay), 616 A.2d 197 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992), due to his work being principally 

localized in Virginia and his acknowledgment of receiving WC benefits in Virginia. 

According to Employer, Claimant’s reliance in Zon is misplaced because that case 

is factually distinguishable. Employer reiterates Claimant worked only in Virginia 

and explains Claimant was only offered work at the Pennsylvania Office due to his 

work injury, employment that was certainly not contemplated when Claimant was 

rehired as a tree climber in September 2014. Finally, Employer argues there is no 

violation of the humanitarian purpose of the Act because the Act is intended to 

benefit the workers of this Commonwealth, and Claimant was not a worker of this 

Commonwealth when he was injured. Employer notes that while Claimant may be 

inconvenienced by the fact that his WC claim is covered by Virginia, this is a 

“natural consequence of a Pennsylvania resident travelling daily or weekly to work 

full time in a different state.” (Employer’s Br. at 20.)

B. Analysis

Where a work injury occurs outside of Pennsylvania, a claimant bears the 

burden of proving that Pennsylvania has jurisdiction over the claimant’s WC claim

through the Act’s extraterritorial provisions. Williams v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal 

Bd. (POHL Transp.), 4 A.3d 742, 745 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). Section 305.2(a) of the 

Act sets forth those extraterritorial provisions and states:
12

If an employe, while working outside the territorial limits of this State, 

suffers an injury on account of which he, or in the event of his death, 

his dependents, would have been entitled to the benefits provided by 

this act had such injury occurred within this State, such employe, or in 

the event of his death resulting from such injury, his dependents, shall 

be entitled to the benefits provided by this act, provided that at the time 

of such injury:

(1) His employment is principally localized in this State, or

(2) He is working under a contract of hire made in this State in 

employment not principally localized in any state, or

(3) He is working under a contract of hire made in this State in 

employment principally localized in another state whose [workers’]

compensation law is not applicable to his employer, or

(4) He is working under a contract of hire made in this State for 

employment outside the United States and Canada.

77 P.S. § 411.2(a) (emphasis added). The focus of Section 305.2(a) is the locale of 

a claimant’s employment “at the time of [the] injury.” Id.; McDermott v. Workers’ 

Comp. Appeal Bd. (Brand Indus. Servs., Inc.), 204 A.3d 549, 558 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2019). As used in this provision, a claimant’s 

[e]mployment is principally localized in this or another state when 

(i) his employer has a place of business in this or such other state 

and he regularly works at or from such place of business, or (ii) 

having worked at or from such place of business, his duties have 

required him to go outside of the State not over one year, or (iii) if 

clauses (1) and (2) of the foregoing are not applicable, he is domiciled 

and spends a substantial part of his working time in the service of his 

employer in this or such other state.

77 P.S. § 411.2(d)(4) (emphasis added). An award of WC benefits in another state 

does not preclude a claimant from seeking benefits in Pennsylvania, but the claimant 
13

must meet the burden of proving an entitlement to such benefits under the Act. 

Williams, 4 A.3d at 745.

At issue here are subsections 305.2(a)(2) and (a)(3). The WCJ applied 

subsection (a)(3) to find Pennsylvania lacked jurisdiction based on the 

determinations that Claimant was principally employed in Virginia and Virginia’s 

WC law applied to Employer, but Claimant argues there is jurisdiction under 

subsection (a)(2) because “[h]e [wa]s working under a contract of hire made in this 

State in employment not principally localized in any state.” 77 P.S. § 305.2(a)(2). 

Relying on his own testimony regarding his working for Employer in states other 

than Virginia, as well as Lead Foreman’s testimony that suggested that employees 

may be moved to other states when needed, Claimant argues his employment is not 

principally localized in any state. Claimant’s argument that subsection (a)(2) 

applies, however, is not supported by the WCJ’s factual findings or the credited 

evidence of record. 

Where, as here, a claimant has different periods of employment with the same 

employer, each period will be considered distinct for Section 305.2(a) purposes 

unless the claimant shows the existence of a continuous employment relationship.

Meyer, 776 A.2d at 340. The WCJ found that Claimant’s employment relationship 

with Employer involved separate and distinct periods of employment, citing Claims 

Manager’s credited testimony about the break in Claimant’s employment between 

August 2013 and September 2014, that Claimant lost all of his seniority after August 

2013, and that Claimant was considered a new hire when he was rehired in 

September 2014. (FOF ¶ 9.) As the ultimate fact-finder in workers’ compensation 

cases, the WCJ “has exclusive province over questions of credibility and evidentiary 

weight . . . .” Anderson v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Penn Ctr. For Rehab), 15 
14

A.3d 944, 949 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). “The WCJ’s authority over questions of 

credibility, conflicting evidence and evidentiary weight is unquestioned,” and we are 

bound by those determinations. Minicozzi v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Indus. 

Metal Plating, Inc.), 873 A.2d 25, 28-29 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). The credited 

testimony of Claims Manager constitutes substantial evidence7that supports the 

WCJ’s finding that Claimant had distinct periods of employment and, therefore, the 

relevant period began on September 2, 2014. 

Focusing on the relevant employment period, the WCJ found that Claimant’s 

work was principally localized in Virginia. (FOF ¶ 11.) Pursuant to Section 

305.2(d)(4), work is principally localized in a state if: (i) the claimant’s “employer 

has a place of business in . . . such . . . state and [the claimant] regularly works at or 

from such place of business” or “having worked at or from such place of business, 

[the claimant’s] duties have required him to go outside of the State not over one 

year.” 77 P.S. § 411.2(d)(4). The WCJ based this determination on the facts that, 

during this time period, Claimant worked exclusively in Virginia and that work was 

directed from Employer’s Ashland, Virginia office or from Dominion’s foresters in 

Virginia. (FOF ¶¶ 9, 11.) These findings are supported by the credited testimony of 

Claims Manager and Lead Foreman, both of whom testified as such. Applying the 

definition of “principally localized” to the facts supported by the credible evidence, 

the WCJ did not err in finding that Claimant’s work was principally localized in 

Virginia. 

Claimant challenges this determination based on his testimony that he worked

in other states, his four or five trips between Virginia and Pennsylvania to transport 

 

7

“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” WAWA v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Seltzer), 951 A.2d 405, 

408 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).
15

cars for Employer, and the testimony of Lead Foreman indicating that it was possible 

for some Virginia crews to work on Dominion lines in North Carolina. However, 

Claimant’s challenges to the WCJ’s application of Section 305.2(a)(3) are

unavailing. 

First, although Claimant testified about working in other states, that testimony 

was contradicted by the credited testimony of Claims Manager and Claimant’s work 

records reflecting that Claimant worked only in Virginia. More importantly, even if 

Claimant’s testimony was considered, the claimed non-Virginia work occurred prior 

to the distinct employment period at issue. As noted above, once Claimant began 

working for Employer again on September 2, 2014, his work assignments were 

exclusively in Virginia. Thus, that Claimant may have worked in other states during 

a different employment period is of no moment to whether his employment after 

September 2, 2014, was principally localized in Virginia.

Second, we agree with the WCJ that while there were occasions when 

Claimant drove a vehicle from Virginia to Pennsylvania and vice versa, these 

occasional job duties do not diminish the fact that Claimant regularly worked from 

Employer’s place of business in Virginia and that every job assignment he had 

during the relevant period was in Virginia. Further, as pointed out by Employer, 

unless a claimant’s “duties have required [the claimant] to go outside of that 

State” for more than a year, there is no change to the claimant’s principal place of 

employment. 77 P.S. § 411.2(d)(4) (emphasis added). As four to five trips between 

Pennsylvania and Virginia would not meet this standard, these occasional job duties 

do not require a different conclusion. 

Third, although Lead Foreman testified it was possible that some Virginia 

crews could be called to work on Dominion lines in North Carolina, there is no 
16

evidence that Claimant ever did so in the time period at issue. The mere potential, 

however, that some crew of Employer’s could be called to work in a different state 

does not mean that Claimant would be required to do so. Moreover, Claims Manager 

credibly testified Claimant was hired to work in Virginia and, in order for him to 

work in a different state, he would have to leave Employer for six months before 

obtaining permission to work elsewhere. “The focus of Section 305.2 of the Act is 

on the claimant’s employment, not on the employer.” McDermott, 204 A.3d at 

555 (emphasis added). With that focus in mind, the above credited testimony and 

procedures do not support the conclusion that Claimant’s employment was not 

principally located in any state and do not warrant reversal.

Claimant next asserts, as he did before the Board, that Zon requires reversal. 

As in that case, he argues, Section 305.2(a)(2) applies here to give Pennsylvania 

jurisdiction because his contract for hire was made in Pennsylvania8 and his 

employment was not principally localized in any state in that it was contemplated 

that he would work wherever Employer’s business needs required. Zon, however, 

is distinguishable. 

In Zon, the claimant was awarded WC benefits pursuant to Section 305.2(a)(2) 

because the claimant’s contract for hire was made in Pennsylvania and the claimant’s 

employment was not principally localized in any state. 613 A.2d at 170. The 

employer, whose main office was in Pennsylvania but whose operations extended 

into numerous states, challenged the latter determination. The claimant worked for 

the employer at two locations in Ohio followed by one location in Pennsylvania

between August 26, 1985, and March 7, 1986. When one job was over, the employer 

 

8 Under “the Act’s place-of-contract-test, a contract is created wherever the acceptance 

occurs.” Zon, 613 A.2d at 171. Here, Claimant accepted his employment with Employer at the 

Pennsylvania Office. Thus, his contract for hire was entered into in Pennsylvania.
17

would characterize the claimant’s departure as a “termination,” but the claimant 

began working at a different location within a matter of days, completing new 

paperwork each time. Id. at 171. Following the completion of the last job, the 

claimant filed a claim petition seeking temporary total disability benefits for work 

injuries he sustained on September 25, 1985, while working on the first job in Ohio. 

The employer argued the claimant was terminated after each job and, therefore, 

could not establish that his employment was not localized in any state. Id. We 

rejected that argument, citing the testimony of the employer’s witness that the 

claimant was hired for the initial job and any other jobs for which the claimant was 

qualified, the claimant was only laid off between jobs, and the new paperwork was 

necessary because each job site was a separate corporation. Id. at 172-73. Based on 

that testimony, we held there was an ongoing employment relationship that 

contemplated that the claimant would work at multiple job sites, including in 

different states, and, therefore, the claimant’s employment was not principally 

localized in any state. Id. at 173.

Unlike in Zon, the WCJ here found that Claimant had separate and distinct 

periods of employment with Employer, rather than an ongoing employment 

relationship, and that during the relevant period of employment Claimant was hired 

to work, and only worked, in Virginia. These findings are supported by Claims 

Manager’s credited testimony regarding Claimant’s work history and his 

employment that began on September 2, 2014, which reflects that Claimant was 

hired to work only in Virginia. Although some evidence suggested that some of 

Employer’s crews may have been directed to work in North Carolina at some time,

this does not establish that Employer and Claimant contemplated that Claimant 

would do so, particularly given Claims Manager’s testimony to the contrary. 
18

Moreover, it cannot be said that Employer and Claimant would have contemplated 

Claimant working a modified duty position in the Pennsylvania Office at the time 

he was hired as a tree climber for work in Virginia. Thus, Zon does not require a 

different result.

Claimant also attempts to establish Pennsylvania jurisdiction through the 

connections his employment relationship has with Pennsylvania, the fact that 

Employer’s headquarters are in Pennsylvania, and the humanitarian purpose of the 

Act. However, those connections are not relevant to whether Pennsylvania has 

jurisdiction pursuant to Section 305.2(a). “The focus of Section 305.2 of the Act is 

on the claimant’s employment, not on the employer,” McDermott, 204 A.3d at 555, 

and, here, the credited evidence supports the findings that Claimant’s employment 

was principally localized in Virginia. Further, Claimant’s arguments based on the 

humanitarian purpose of the Act are not persuasive. It is not contrary to or 

inconsistent with the humanitarian purpose to apply the Act’s provisions as written 

to facts that are supported by substantial evidence, even if doing so results in 

Pennsylvania not having jurisdiction over a WC claim. 

For these reasons, we find no error in the WCJ applying Section 305.2(a)(3) 

to determine whether Pennsylvania has jurisdiction over the Claim Petition. Because 

Claimant’s place of employment was principally located in Virginia, the only way 

Claimant could establish Pennsylvania’s jurisdiction under Section 305.2(a)(3) was 

to prove that Virginia’s “work[ers’] compensation law is not applicable to his 

employer.” 77 P.S. § 411.2(a)(3); see also Stripay, 616 A.2d at 198 (under Section 

305.2(a)(3), a claimant bears the burden of showing that the claimant would be 

denied the protections of the WC law in the state in which the employment was 

principally localized). However, the evidence credited, including Claimant’s own 
19

testimony, unquestionably establishes that Virginia’s WC law applied to Employer

and Claimant, in fact, received WC benefits in Virginia. Therefore, Claimant did

not meet his burden of proving that Pennsylvania has jurisdiction over his 

extraterritorial injury under Section 305.2(a).

III. Conclusion

Because the WCJ’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and 

those findings support the conclusion that Claimant did not meet his burden of 

proving that Pennsylvania has jurisdiction under Section 305.2(a) of the Act, we 

affirm.

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

Judges McCullough and Fizzano Cannon did not participate in the decision of this 

case. 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

James Silbaugh, :

Petitioner :

 :

v. : No. 57 C.D. 2019 

 : 

Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board (Penn Line Corporation), :

Respondent :

O R D E R

NOW, November 25, 2019, the Order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal 

Board is AFFIRMED.

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge