ORNEY GENERAL 

OFTEXAS 

June 6, 1962 

Plr. F. A. Taylor Opinion No. Wi-1346 

County Auditor 

Brazoria County Re: Payment of claims for 

Angleton, Texas equipment, materials and 

supplies used in construction of county roads, and 

Dear Mr. Taylor: related questions. 

Your request for an opinion asks the following questions: 

"(1) Upon the refusal of the County Road 

Administrator to certify that the equipment, 

material, and supplies have been received, and 

that the charges made for the same are correct, 

can I, as County Auditor, pay the bills even If 

ordered to do so by the Commissioners' Court? 

"(2) What are my duties with reference to 

investigation to determine whether or not these 

bills are proper and that the County did in fact 

receive the material, equipment, and supplies? 

"(3) Can the Commissioners' Court of Brazorla 

County under the Optional Road Law act as a factfinding body and certify the facts to me that the 

equipment, material, and services were delivered 

and performed and that the charges fop the same are 

correct when the County Road Administrator refuses 

to make such certification on the grounds that he 

has no Information available upon which to base 

such certification, and such equipment, materials 

and supplies were not ordered, authorized, or 

ratified by him? 

"(4) After the recent 'Hurricane Carla' the 

Federal Qovernment granted Brazorla County a 

specific sum of money for the alleviation of hardship, public health, and the restoration of bridges, 

roada, and highways. When bills are lncurred'under 

this Orant, whose duty Is It to certify to me the 

facts necessary to qhow that the particular services 
Mr. F. A. Taylor, page 2 (WW-1346) 

and materials come under this Grant and Aid 

when the County Road Administrator refuses to 

do 80 on the ground that he has no knowledge of 

the goods having been delivered or the materials 

having been furnished OF the labor having been 

performed?" 

The statutes of this State confer the powers to build 

and maintain the county roads upon the commissioners court and 

the commissioners court in discharging Its duty must consider 

the needs of the county as a whole: Canales v; Laughlin, 14~7 

Tex: 169, 214 S.W.2d 451 

256, 103 S.W.2d 363 (1937 

1948); Stovall Shivers 129 

; Guerra 'v. Rod&uez; 234 S.W.%xb15 

(Civ.App. 1951). In Querra v. Rodriguez, supra, it was held: 

"Article 2351, ~Vernon's 'Ann.Clv.Stats., 

places general control over all county roads 

in the CommIaslonersl Court, but various statutes have provided speolal methods by whloh 

the court may perform or delegate these functions. Tanales v. Laughlin, 147 Tex. 169, 214 

S.W.2d 451, 457. (1) It may let the work on contract to independent contractors. 

Vernon's Ann.Civ.Stats. (2) It mayA~~~oZ3an 

overseer for each PO&~ precinct and designate 

all hands'liable to work on public roads. Arts. 

6718-6736, 6739, 6755. (3) It may employ not more 

than four road commissioners. Arts. 6737-6742. 

(4) It may appoint a road superintendent for the 

county or one for each precinct. Arts. 6743-6761. 

(5) Provided the county has forty thousand inhabitants, the members of the Commissioners' 

Court shall be ex-officio road commissioners of 

their respective precincts. Art. 6762. (6) It 

may employ a County Road Engineer with broad 

statutory powers In the event the county by an 

election determines to adopt the Optional County 

Road Law of 1947. Art. 6716-1,” 

In IXlnbar,v. Brazoria County 224 S.W.2d 738 (Civ.App. 

error ref.7. the court. In consider&z the auestion of whether 

1949, 

the county.road engineer of Brazorla i?ounty,- employed pursuant 

to the Optional Road Law adopted by Brazorla County, was a public 

officer, stated: 
m. F. A. Taylor, page 3 (if-1346) 

“After the hearing of the charges against 

appellant, the Commissioners Court entered an 

order removing him from the office of County 

Road Engineer. 

“Article 6716-1, Vernon’s Annotated Civil 

Statutes, Acts 50th Legislature, 1947, Chapter 

178, page 288, authorizes the employment of a 

County Road’Englneer to have general supervision 

of the roads’ of a county, if the provisions of 

the statute are adopted by a majority vote of 

its qualified voters, 

“Sections ‘1 and 2 of the Artltile are not, 

we’think, ‘material to the consideration of the 

instant case. Sedtlon 3 of said Article vests 

the construction ‘and maintenande’of county roads 

In the co,unty’road departmentand provides that 

it shall be composed of the Commissioners Court 

*as the policy-determining body* the County Road 

Engineer ‘as,,the chief executive officers,’ and 

other administrative personnel and road employees. 

“Section 4 of said Article provides that 

the administration of the road department shall be 

on the basis of the, county as a~.whole without regard to Commissioners’ precincts. 

“Section 5 provides that: ‘The County Roads 

Engineer shall be appointed by the Commissioners 

Court. He shall be a licensed professional engineer, experienced in road construction and maintenance, who shall meet the qualifications required by the State Highway Department for its 

county engineers.’ 

“Section 6 provides for salary of not to exceed $7200 per year, the exact amount to be determined by the Commissioners Court, out of the road 

and bridge fund of the county. 

“Section 7 provides that: ‘The County Road 

Engineer shall hold his position for an indefinite 

term and may be removed by a majority vote of the 

Commissioners Court. Removal shall not become 

effective until thirty (30) days after he shall 
Mr. F. A. Taylor, page 4 (~~-1346) 

have been notified'in writing of the Intention of the'CommIasionera Court to remove him, 

and until after a public 'hearing onthe question 

of"his~removal shall have been held, if such a 

hearing is requested by 017 the Commissioners 

Court in writing by the &- ounty Road Engineer.' 

"Section 8 provides that In the absence or 

inability of the County Road Engineer to perform his duties, the Commissioners Court may 

designate a qualified administrative officer to 

perform these duties during such absence or inability. 

11 

. . . 

'Worn an analysis of said Article 6716-1, 

It Is, we think, apparent that the legislature 

intended In enacting the Statute to make the 

County Road Engineer a member of the.administratlve'personnel of the County Road Department-and 

not an officer as contemplated in Article'l6, 

Section 30 of the Constitution of this State. 

"The~Artlcle provides that the County Road 

Engineer shall hold his 'position for an indeflnlte term and that he may be removed by a majority 

vote of the Commissioners Court." 

It Is apparent from Bunbar v. Braxorla County, su ra that 

the construction and maintenance of county roads under -P t e Optional Road Law is vested In the commissioners court. 

In Attorney General's Opinion O-6506 (1945), It was held: 

"Where supplies have been purchased under 

contract by the commissioners' court or under 

emergency requisitions authorized by the commissioners* court, the functions of the county 

auditor with respect to such purchased are defined in Articles 1660 and 1661, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes. Under the provisions of 

said ArtFclea the County Auditor's fun&Ion is 

to examine 'all claims, bills and accounts 

against the county' (Art. 1660) and 'he shall not 
or. F. A. Taylor, page 5 (WW-1346) 

held: 

audit or approve any such claim unlek&It 

has been contra&ad as provided by law, nor 

any acdount for the purohase of supplies or 

materials for the use of said county or any 

of”lts officers, unless, In addition to other 

requirements of l&w, there Is attached thereto a tiequitiltlon signed by the officer ordering 

same and approved by the aounty judge. Said 

?iqulsltlon must be made out and signed an& 

approved In trlplicati3 by“the said officers, 

the triplicat6 to remain with the officer 

desiring the purchas6;‘the dupliciite to be’ 

filed with the county a~~ltor,~and~the,or’lglnal 

to be”delIVered to tihe party from whom said’ 

purohase Is to be made before any purchase shall 

be made. t (Art. 1661). 

‘With reference to’. the matte?, of”requisIMona, ‘Article 1661 clearly states that .requisitions are.‘to bb’slgned by the officer making the 

purchase’and approved by the county judge. We 

find no’authbrity‘for the county auditor to require,, as a prlreaulsite to approvdl 0r a cl&GM 

based on suoh’purchaee,that the requisition shall 

be signed br approved b$ him when the purohaee is 

made. 

II . . . 

‘“Alfhough the county auditor has general 

oversight over the flnancea’of the oounty, the 

exercise of.&uch bversight with reference to 

purchases made and expenses incurred for the use 

of the county or by certain offibei-s In the conduct of’their offiaes, is defined and oontrolled 

by the specific provisiona of the statute8 pertalnIng to such purchases and expenses. In view 0r 

the foregoing and In view of the fdcts given, it 

Is the opinion of this department that’ the county 

auditor la not authorized’to require, as a prerequisite to his approval of a alaim or Items of 

expenee, that 811 requi~itlona for suoh purchaaea 

or expenae Items shall be signed or approved by 

him at the tine the purchase is made or the expense 

incurred. I’ 

In Attorney General’s Opinion WW-1328 (1962), It was 
Mr. F. A. Taylor,page 6 (W-1346) 

“Attorney General Opinion V-1111 (October 

3, 1950) construed the duties of the county 

auditor to examine and approve claIm& in connection with expenses of visiting district 

judges. We believe that the facts of the oplnIdn are sufficiently in point for it to be relevant . 

“Article 1660, Vernon’s Civil Statutes, repuir&s that’iio-claim, bill or account shall be 

allowed or paid by the cowlllssiohers court until 

it has been examined and,approved,by the county 

audltdr . Section 10 0r Arti~Ole: 200a provides 

that when dlatrfct judgea are assigned to dlstricts other than their own, they shall retielve 

actual expense for travel and subsistence which 

shall be p&Id out of the General Fund’of the 

county In which their dutlea are performed, tipon 

accounts certified and approved by the presiding 

judge of the admlnlatratlve district. 

“The opinion held that expense aacounts of 

the visiting district judge are subject to audit by 

the county audltor~from a ‘bookkeeping etkndpolnt,’ 

but suah audit la not to Be construed a0 as to 

authorize a county auditor to review the legality 

i5f items of expendfture’contained in the expetibe 

&count when the same has been certified and approved by the #reeldIng judge of the admlnietratlve district. 

In view of the foregoing authorities, it is our opinion 

that the Commissioners Court of Brazoria County la the factfinding body to determine whether equipment, material ‘and 

services were delivered to the county, and the reasonable 

value of such equipment and aervlaee. 

It la OUP further opinion that the county auditor is 

required to pay bills if Artld.lea 1660 and 1661, Vernon’s 

Civil Statutes, are complied with. 

This opinion is not to be construed as pas(sing OII any 

raat question. Such questione must be determined by the Commissioners Court of Brazorla County. 
Mr. F. A. Taylor, page 7 (WW-1346) 

SUMMARY 

The Commissioners Court of Brazoria 

County is the fact-finding body to 

determine whether equipment, material 

and services were delivered to the 

countyI and the reasonable value of 

such equipment and services. 

The county auditor is required to pay 

bills If Articles 1660,and 1661, Vernon's 

Civil Statutes, are complied with. 

Yours very truly, 

WILL WILSON 

Attorney Oeneral of Texas 

Assistant 

JR:ms 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

W. V. Geppert, Chairman 

Henry Braswell 

Jerry Roberts 

Grundy Williams 

J. C. Davis 

REVIEWEDFORTRE ATPORWEY(IENERAL 

By: Leonard Passmore