III 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. CON. RES. 40 

Recognizing and commending the President and the governments of other 

countries that have participated in the Proliferation Security Initiative 

for the historic efforts and successes of the Proliferation Security Initiative in reducing the threat posed by illicit trafficking in weapons of 

mass destruction, their means of delivery, and related materials, on 

the occasion of the second anniversary of the establishment of the Proliferation Security Initiative. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 26, 2005 

Mr. LUGAR submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred 

to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

Recognizing and commending the President and the governments of other countries that have participated in the 

Proliferation Security Initiative for the historic efforts 

and successes of the Proliferation Security Initiative in 

reducing the threat posed by illicit trafficking in weapons 

of mass destruction, their means of delivery, and related 

materials, on the occasion of the second anniversary of 

the establishment of the Proliferation Security Initiative. 

Whereas, on May 31, 2003, at Wawel Royal Castle, Krakow, 

Poland, President George W. Bush declared that ‘‘today 

I announce a new effort to fight proliferation called the 

Proliferation Security Initiative. The United States and 
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•SCON 40 IS

a number of our close allies, including Poland, have 

begun working on new agreements to search planes and 

ships carrying suspect cargo and to seize illegal weapons 

or missile technologies. Over time, we will extend this 

partnership as broadly as possible to keep the world’s 

most destructive weapons away from our shores and out 

of the hands of our common enemies’’; 

Whereas, since May 2003, more than 60 countries have indicated their support for the Proliferation Security Initiative; 

Whereas, in September 2003, 11 countries agreed to and 

published the Proliferation Security Initiative Statement 

of Interdiction Principles, which, among other things, 

identifies specific steps for effectively interdicting shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery, and related materials and for preventing proliferation facilitators, brokers, and middlemen from engaging 

in this deadly trade; 

Whereas the Proliferation Security Initiative has led to the 

negotiation of bilateral ship boarding agreements designed to facilitate the interdiction of weapons of mass 

destruction, their means of delivery, and related materials, including agreements with the Governments of Panama, Liberia, and the Marshall Islands; 

Whereas, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, 

proposed by President Bush and adopted unanimously by 

the Security Council on April 28, 2004, calls on all countries to take cooperative action to prevent trafficking in 

weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery, and 

related materials; 
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Whereas the actions of the United States and its Proliferation Security Initiative partners Germany and Italy contributed to the interdiction of the ship ‘‘BBC China’’, a 

commercial ship carrying centrifuge components for 

Libya’s illicit nuclear program, en route to Tripoli, and 

also contributed to the constructive decision made by the 

Government of Libya on December 19, 2003, to acknowledge its illegal weapons of mass destruction programs 

and its agreement to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction and long-range missile programs and rejoin the 

international community by eliminating all elements of its 

chemical and nuclear weapons programs, declaring all nuclear materials and activities to the International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA), eliminating ballistic missiles with 

a range greater than 300 kilometers with payloads of 500 

or more kilograms, accepting international inspections to 

ensure Libya’s complete adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, signing the Additional Protocol, 

eliminating all chemical weapons stocks and munitions 

and acceding to the Chemical Weapons Convention, and 

allowing immediate inspections and monitoring to verify 

all of these actions; 

Whereas the Report of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and 

Changes finds that ‘‘[r]ecent experience of the activities 

of the A.Q. Khan network has demonstrated the need for 

and the value of measures taken to interdict the illicit 

and clandestine trade in components for nuclear programs’’; 

Whereas the same Report also welcomes ‘‘the voluntary Proliferation Security Initiative, under which more and more 
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states are cooperating to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, biological and chemical weapons’’; 

Whereas, acknowledging that existing non-proliferation agreements and export control regimes are necessary but no 

longer sufficient, the Secretary-General of the United Nations has stated: ‘‘I applaud the efforts of the Proliferation Security Initiative to fill a gap in our defenses’’; 

Whereas the United States and many of its Proliferation Security Initiative partners have conducted 14 ground, air, 

maritime, and tabletop interdiction exercises over the last 

2 years, beginning with the Australian-led exercise Pacific Protector in September 2003; and 

Whereas multiple countries have now participated in and observed air, land, and sea interdiction training exercises, 

in particular the October 2004 Team Samurai exercise, 

in which Japan, the United States, Australia, and France 

contributed operational assets and Canada, Cambodia, 

Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 

Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, and the United 

Kingdom participated as observers, and most recently in 

Exercise Ninfa ’05, a joint maritime and ground interdiction exercise led by Portugal: Now, therefore be it 

1 Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives 

2 concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that— 

3 (1) the President is to be commended on the oc4 casion of the second anniversary of the creation of 

5 the Proliferation Security Initiative for its broad6 ening membership, increasing international support, 

7 and successful operational training and exercises; 
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1 (2) all the governments of countries coordi2 nating and cooperating in intelligence sharing, train3 ing exercises, and legal agreements with the United 

4 States under the Proliferation Security Initiative, in 

5 particular the meetings of the PSI Operational Ex6 perts Group, are to be commended for their support 

7 in the global effort to prevent the proliferation of 

8 weapons of mass destruction, their means of deliv9 ery, and related materials; 

10 (3) the Proliferation Security Initiative con11 stitutes an important tool for coordinating diplo12 matic, law enforcement, customs, intelligence, and 

13 military capabilities against the illicit trade in weap14 ons of mass destruction, their means of delivery, and 

15 related materials; 

16 (4) all countries must work together, particu17 larly under the auspices of the committee established 

18 pursuant to operative paragraph 4 of United Na19 tions Security Council Resolution 1540, popularly 

20 called the ‘‘1540 Committee’’, to further the imple21 mentation of the provisions of Resolution 1540 relat22 ing to the international legal bases for continued, 

23 aggressive enforcement of all agreements, treaties, 

24 and regimes that aim through interdiction activities 
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1 to end the illicit trade in weapons of mass destruc2 tion, their means of delivery, and related materials; 

3 (5) the governments of all responsible countries 

4 should endorse the PSI Statement of Interdiction 

5 Principles and cooperate actively to interdict and 

6 disrupt illicit trade in weapons of mass destruction, 

7 their means of delivery, and related materials; and 

8 (6) as evidenced in the historic December 19, 

9 2003, decision of Libya to acknowledge and convert 

10 or dismantle its illegal weapons of mass destruction 

11 programs, the Proliferation Security Initiative can 

12 provide significantly enhanced enforcement of and 

13 adherence to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of 

14 Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and 

15 Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 

16 5, 1970 (commonly known as the ‘‘Nuclear Non17 Proliferation Treaty’’), the Convention on the Prohi18 bition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling 

19 and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their De20 struction, with Annexes, done at Paris January 13, 

21 1993, and entered into force April 29, 1997 (com22 monly known as the ‘‘Chemical Weapons Conven23 tion’’), the Convention on the Prohibition of the De24 velopment, Production and Stockpiling of Bacterio25 logical (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
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1 Destruction, done at Washington, London, and Mos2 cow April 10, 1972, and entered into force March 

3 26, 1975 (commonly known as the ‘‘Biological 

4 Weapons Convention’’), the safeguards system of the 

5 International Atomic Energy Agency, and the com6 mitments and control lists of the Missile Technology 

7 Control Regime, the Australia Group, and the Nu8 clear Suppliers Group. 

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