Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1887 | February 6, 2020 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Deborah Markisohn

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

J.T. Whitehead

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Andrew Lee Kimmons,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

February 6, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-1887

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Alicia Gooden, 

Judge 

The Honorable Richard 

Hagenmaier, Commissioner

Trial Court Cause No.

49G21-1811-F2-39687

Tavitas, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1887 | February 6, 2020 Page 2 of 9

Case Summary

[1] Andrew Kimmons appeals the trial court’s restitution order, which required

Kimmons to pay $5,000.00 after Kimmons’ guilty plea pursuant to a plea 

agreement. The State asks us to remand for a new sentencing hearing; 

however, we reverse the trial court’s entry of a restitution order and remand. 

Issue

[2] Kimmons raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as whether the trial court 

erred in ordering Kimmons to pay $5,000.00 in restitution. 

Facts

[3] On November 10, 2018, Kimmons hit the parked vehicle of Kristin Towe while 

driving in his vehicle on East Michigan Street in Marion County. Kimmons 

drove away from the scene of the accident. Law enforcement later found 

Kimmons in possession of several illegal substances. On November 13, 2018, 

Kimmons was charged with Count I, dealing in a narcotic drug, a Level 2 

felony; Count II, possession of a narcotic drug, a Level 4 felony; Count III, 

dealing in methamphetamine, a Level 4 felony; Count IV, possession of 

methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony; Count V, possession of cocaine, a Level 6 

felony; and Count VI, leaving the scene of an accident, a Class B misdemeanor, 

under cause number 49G21-1811-F2-039687 (“Cause 687”). On November 16, 

2018, the State filed a notice of intent to file an habitual offender enhancement. 

[4] The State also made a motion to consolidate the instant cause, Cause 687, with 

Kimmons’ other pending causes under cause numbers 49G14-1412-CM-055668 
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(“Cause 668”), 49G14-1611-F6-043556 (“Cause 556”), and 49G14-1801-F6-

002956 (“Cause 956”). 

[5] On June 11, 2019, Kimmons entered into a plea agreement in the above cause 

numbers. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Kimmons pleaded guilty to 

possession of a narcotic drug, a Level 6 felony, and theft, a Level 6 felony,

under Cause 956; and dealing a narcotic drug, a Level 2 felony, and leaving the 

scene of an accident, a Class B misdemeanor, under Cause 687. In exchange, 

the State agreed to dismiss Cause 668, Cause 556, and the remaining counts 

under Cause 687. 

[6] The State and Kimmons agreed to the following sentence: 

a. [Cause 956]

1. Count I 

a. A total sentence of 910 days with

i. Two (2) years monitored by Marion County 

Community Corrections Home Detention; 

ii. 180 days suspended with all time monitored by 

Marion County Probation; 

b. Defendant to pay statutory interdiction fee with 

amount to be determined by the court; 

2. Count II
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a. A total sentence of 910 days with

i. Two (2) years monitored by Marion County 

Community Corrections Home Detention; 

b. 180 days suspended with all time monitored by Marion 

County Probation; and, 

3. Counts to run concurrent. 

b. [Cause 687] 

1. Count I 

a. A total sentence of fifteen (15) years

i. Five (5) years shall [be] executed with 

placement to be determined by the court after 

argument from the parties; 

ii. The remaining ten (10) years shall be 

suspended; 

1. Three (3) years shall be monitored by 

Marion County Probation; 

b. Defendant to complete substance abuse evaluation 

and treatment as recommended; 

c. Defendant to pay statutory interdiction fee with 

amount to be determined by the Court; 
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2. Count VI

a. A total sentence of 180 days; 

i. No additional executed time with all 

remaining time to be suspended; 

3. Sentence on [Cause 687] is statutorily consecutive to 

[Cause 956]. 

* * * * *

13. This agreement embodies the entire agreement between the 

parties and no promises or inducements have been made or given 

to the Defendant by the State which is not part of this written 

agreement. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 57-58. 

[7] On June 11, 2019, the trial court orally accepted Kimmons’ plea agreement, 

finding that: (1) Kimmons “understands his rights”; (2) Kimmons “understands 

the possible sentencing and fines they are under”; and (3) Kimmons’ plea “is 

freely and voluntarily made and that a factual basis exists” for the plea. Tr. 

Vol. II pp. 12-13. On July 17, 2019, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. 

At the sentencing hearing, the State called Towe, who made a victim impact 

statement. The trial court then asked Towe “how much [Towe] th[ought] the 

car was worth at the time it was hit,” to which Towe responded: “I would say 

probably around five thousand.” Id. at 38. Subsequently, while making its oral 

sentencing statement, the trial court stated: “I am going to award $5,000.00 for 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1887 | February 6, 2020 Page 6 of 9

restitution to [Towe].” Id. at 48-49. Kimmons’ attorney objected to the reward 

of the restitution award, which the trial court overruled. Kimmons now appeals 

the restitution order. 

Analysis

[8] Kimmons argues that the trial court erred in entering the restitution order when 

the plea agreement did not contemplate restitution. The State concedes that the 

record “does not do a very good job in this case of establishing proof of 

Defendant’s ability to pay restitution,” and that the sentencing order is less than 

clear regarding restitution, and thus, asks us to remand. Appellee’s Br. p. 6. In 

his reply brief, however, Kimmons argues that we should not remand, but, 

instead, should reverse the trial court’s entry of the restitution order because the 

trial court had no authority to impose it. 

[9] “An order of restitution is a matter within the trial court’s sound discretion and 

will only be reversed upon a showing of abuse of discretion.” Archer v. State, 81 

N.E.3d 212, 215 (Ind. 2017) (citing Bell v. State, 59 N.E.3d 959, 962 (Ind. 

2016)). Indiana Code Section 35-35-3-3(e) states: “If the court accepts a plea 

agreement, [the court] shall be bound by its terms.” Berry v. State, 10 N.E. 3d 

1243, 1246 (Ind. 2014); see Vaughn v. State, 982 N.E.2d 1071, 1073 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2013) (“A plea agreement is contractual in nature, binding the defendant, 

the State and the trial court.”). 

[10] The State acknowledges that “[t]his Court has held that a trial court cannot 

order restitution following a plea agreement in cases in which the plea 
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agreement is silent with respect to restitution.” Appellee’s Br. p. 6. The State 

also acknowledges, however, that “[t]his Court has also held that a trial court 

may order restitution, following a plea agreement, even though the plea 

agreement was completely silent on the issue of restitution.” Id.at 7. In support 

of this statement, the State cites three cases. 

[11] The first case is Huddleston v. State, 756 N.E.2d 1054 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)

(“Huddleston 1”), vacated on reh’g at Huddleston v. State, 764 N.E.2d 655, 657 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2002) (“Huddleston 2”).1

 In Huddleston 1, our Court “concluded that 

the trial court abused its discretion in ordering restitution for the lost wages of . 

. . the mother of the victim” based on insufficient evidence. Huddleston, 764 

N.E.2d at 657. On rehearing, the State asked that we reconsider our decision

because a clerical error prevented entry of appellee’s appendix on the docket, 

which resulted in our Court not having access to this portion of the record. Our 

Court held in Huddleston 2 that this portion of the record demonstrated sufficient 

evidence to support restitution in Huddleston’s open plea because the plea 

agreement specifically “left the issue of sentencing to the trial court’s 

discretion.” Id. at 657. 

[12] In the second case cited by the State, Gil v. State, 988 N.E.2d 1231, 1235 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2013), the defendant entered an open guilty plea in which sentencing 

was left to the trial court’s discretion. Our Court held that “the trial court did 

1 Although Huddleston 1 was vacated upon rehearing, we cite both to clarify the differences in the opinions. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1887 | February 6, 2020 Page 8 of 9

not abuse its discretion by imposing restitution and a fine because the open plea 

agreement left sentencing to the judge’s discretion.”2

 Gil, 988 N.E.2d at 1235. 

In doing so, our Court squarely contrasted an open plea case from cases in 

which “defendants [were] pleading guilty pursuant to recommended or fixed 

sentences.” Id. 

[13] In Morris v. State, 985 N.E.2d 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (“Morris 1”), clarified on 

reh’g in Morris v. State, 2 N.E.3d 7, 8-9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (“Morris 2”), our 

Court held: “because the plea agreement was completely silent on the issue of 

restitution, the trial court lacked the authority to order Morris to pay $14,972.45 

in restitution toward the burial expenses of Morris’s fiancée, Jennifer, who was 

killed when she was thrown from the ATV that Morris was operating while 

intoxicated.” Morris, 2 N.E.3d at 8. On rehearing, the State argued that our 

Court should follow Huddleston and Gil and affirm the restitution order. In

Morris 2, our Court did reconsider the restitution order stating, “[u]pon careful 

consideration, . . . Morris’s guilty plea was entirely open and left his sentence 

entirely to the trial court’s discretion[; therefore,] the court was free to enter an 

award of restitution as part of Morris’s sentence.” Id. 

[14] As shown above, these cases are readily distinguishable from Kimmons’ case, 

and the State’s reliance on these cases is misplaced. Kimmons entered into a 

fixed plea agreement, which clearly set forth his sentence and did not include an 

2 Our Court did reverse the restitution order, however, as “the record was devoid of any evidence establishing 

the value” of the stolen property and damages at issue. Gil, 988 N.E.2d at 1236. 
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award of restitution. See Sinn v. State, 693 N.E.2d 78, 80 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)

(finding “the trial court erred in ordering [the defendant] to pay restitution 

when the plea agreement contained no provision allowing such an order”). 

Accordingly, we “emphasize that plea agreements ideally should be more 

artfully drafted. . . . if the State wishes to seek restitution.” Morris, 2 N.E.3d at 

9. Based on the record before us, the trial court did not have the authority to 

enter the restitution order. 

Conclusion 

[15] The trial court did not have the authority to enter the restitution order, and 

thus, we reverse the trial court’s entry of the restitution order only and remand 

with instructions to vacate the restitution order. 

[16] Reversed and remanded. 

Najam, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.