* Pursu ant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under

the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 95-31096

Summary Calendar

__________________

WAYNE R. CENTANNI,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

HARRY LEE, in his individual capacity; ANGLO AMERICAN

INSURANCE COMPANY, LIMITED; STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY;

LOUISIANA SHERIFFS' RISK MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, Originally

sued as Louisiana Sheriff's Risk Management Program; DANIEL R.

MARTINY; FRANZ L. ZIBILICH; LEE, MARTINY & CARACCI,

Defendants - Appellees.

______________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Louisiana

(93-CV-265-C)

______________________________________________

August 28, 1996

Before DAVIS, WIENER and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Wayne Centanni appeals fromadverse orders of the district

court dismissing his various § 1983 and state law claims against

Jefferson Parish Sheriff Harry Lee, the Louisiana Sheriffs' Risk1 Both the Forde lawsuit and this action were filed in the

Eastern District of Louisia na. Judge Feldman presided over the

Forde litigation and held that the State Farm homeowner's policy

did not provide coverage. Judge Berrigan presided over the many

orders and issues presented in Centanni's lawsuit.

2 Management Associat ion ("LSRMA"), State Farm Fire and Casualty

Company ("State Farm"), Anglo American Insurance Company ("Anglo"),

attorneys Daniel Ma rtiny and Franz Zibilich, and their law firm.

Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm for essentially the

reasons provided in the district court's thorough orders.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In August 1990, Wayne Centanni, then an uncompensated

volunteer reserve deputy, and other deputies were involved in a

physical altercation with Brian Forde at a restaurant in Jefferson

Parish. Forde sued Centanni, the other deputies, and Sheriff Lee

alleging § 1983 violations. The LSRMA, the sheriff's selfinsurance program, assumed defense of Lee and the deputies in the

Forde litigation and hired the law firm of Lee, Martiny and Caracci

("LM&C") to represent the defendants. LM&C attorneys Daniel

Martiny and Franz Zibilich provided the defense. Prior to the

Forde trial, Centanni also notified his homeowner's insurer, State

Farm, of the claim against him. State Farm provided him additional

counsel w hile expressly reserving its right to contest coverage.

On the eve of trial in the Forde litigation, the di strict court 1

determined that State Farm's policy did not provide coverage; State

Farm's counsel withdrew.

The F orde jury returned a verdict against the deputies,3

including Centanni. It also found Lee liable under a respondeat

superior theory. After entry of judgment, LM&C appealed on behalf

of all defendants. Centanni also filed a separate pro se appeal.

Following a settlement agre ement in which the other defendants

satisfied the judgment against Centanni, th e LM&C appeal was

dismissed by this Court with prejudice; Centanni's in dependent

appeal was dismissed as moot.

While the appeals in the Forde litigation were pending,

C entanni filed this lawsuit against Lee, LSRMA, LM&C, Martiny

,

Zibilich, State Farm, and an excess coverage insurer, Anglo. The

essence of his claims against the defendants was that he received

inade quate representation in the Forde litigation. Centanni

alleged that LM&C should not have been appointed to represent him

in the Forde lawsuit because the firm also represented members of

a condominium association that were involved in an unrelated civil

suit against Centanni. At bottom, Centanni asserted that the law

firmessentially "sacrificed" his interests in order to protect

Lee, such as failing to impeach the credibility of those witnesses

testifying against him. Centanni claimed these grievances amounted

to constitutional violations redressable under § 1983. Moreover,

Centanni alleged that State Farm should not have been allowed to

withdraw as counsel in the Forde litigation and that Anglo

similarly had a duty to defend.

Despite Centanni's blunderbuss approach to this lawsuit, the

district court adroitly issued a series of orders resolving his2 Specifically, the district court granted Lee's Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss the § 1983 cl aim for failure to state a claim.

Subsequently, the court granted motions for summary judgment on the

similar § 1983 claims against the remaining defendants.

4 complaints against each of the defendants. As to Sheriff Lee and

the other alleged state actors, the district court found there was

no clearly established constitutional right to conflict-free

counsel in this context and hence qualified immunity. Centanni's

claim of retaliatory firing was dismissed on the ground that he was

an uncompensated volunteer. Additional state law claims against

LSRMA were dismissed because, assuming a conflict existed, there

w as no causal link between Centanni's alleged injury and the

conduct of Centanni's attorney in the Forde lit igation. The

district court als o granted summary judgment for State Farm and

Anglo on the basis that n either had a duty to defend Centanni.

Centanni now appeals each of the conclusions.

DISCUSSION

A. Claims against Lee, LSRMA, LM&C, Martiny & Zibilich

At the heart of Centanni's lawsuit is his contention that he

was denied conflict-free counsel in the Forde litigation and that

this denial rises to a constitutional dimension. The district

court dis missed these claims 2 on the basis that, even assuming a

conflict existed, there was no clearly established constitutional

right to conflict-free counsel in this context. The district court

is correct.

Strip ped of all the constitutional buzz words, Centanni5

essentially contend s that if he had been appointed independent

counsel, a different trial strategy would have been used. He

further speculates that had a different plan been used, the outcome

would somehow be different. Significantly, Centanni cites no

authority for the proposition that he p ossessed a constitutional

right to have independent counsel appointed for him and to direct

the trial strategy in this civil lawsuit. While the right of

physical access to the courts exists and may stand to bar

i mpediments to filing suit, such a claim is not raised in thi s

case. Rather, Centanni alleges that he lacked meaningful access

because trial counsel failed to protect his interests in the Forde

lit igation. However, there is no clearly established

constitutional right to the appointment of independent, conflictf ree counsel. The right to appointed counsel in civil cases is

extremely limited. S ee Glick v. Henderson

, 855 F.2d 536, 541 (8th

Cir. 1988). If there is no right to counsel, there is obviously no

righ t to effective counsel. I d. Moreover, there is no clearly

established constitutional right to be free of post-filing

violations. S ee Foster v. City of Lake Jackson

, 28 F.3d 425, 430-

31 (5th Cir. 1994). In the absence of a clearly established

constitutional right, the defendants properly invoked qualified

immunity. Because the plaintiff was unable to overcome the

immunity defense, the district court properly dismissed the § 1983

claims.

The residual state law claims similarly fall. Centanni3 It is unclear if Centanni asserts any cl aims against LSRMA

other t han the § 1983 claim. In his briefing to this Court,

Centanni claims error in the dismissal of the § 1983 claim. The

district court, however, granted summary judgment against any state

law claim for failure to provide conflict-free counsel. Out of

caution, we briefly address the failure of any state claim in this

context.

4 Moreover, the specific manifestations of conflict Centanni

cites il lustrate the dubious nature of this claim. Centanni

complains that members of the condomi nium association testified

against him in the Forde trial. However, the record reflects that

counsel objected to this testimony at tr ial. Additionally,

Centanni and the other defendants were represented by Zibilich at

trial while other members of the law firm were in volved in the

6 alleges retaliatory firing against Lee. It is undisputed that Lee

t erminated Centanni's commission as reserve deputy following a

citizen's complaint. However, Centanni was an uncompensated,

volunteer deputy. As such, he cannot assert any protected interest

arising from continued "employment" or "firing." S ee Swick v. City

of Chicago

, 11 F.3d 85, 86-87 (7th Cir. 1993). Moreover, Centanni

never requested a name-clearing hearing after termination as this

Court has counseled is required. S ee Howze v. City of Austin

, 917

F.2d 208, 208 (5th Cir. 1990).

Additionally, any state law claims 3 against LSRMA were

appropriately disposed by summary judgment. The district court

properly noted that, as a matter of law, Centanni could not

establish a causal link between any alleged conflict of counsel and

his asserted damages. The jury in the underlying Forde litigation

returned a verdict against Sheriff Lee and three deputies. No

reasonable juror could c onclude that counsel somehow sacrificed

Centanni's interests in favor of Lee. 4condo lawsuit.

7

B. Claims against State Farm & Anglo

The district court also grante d summary judgment to two

insurers, State Farm and Anglo, on the basis that they had no duty

to provide an independent defense to Centanni. Again, this was not

error. After notification of the claim against Centanni, State

Farm initially provided indep endent counsel under an express

reservation of right to contest coverage in the Forde litigation.

Before trial, the Forde court specifically declared that the State

Farm homeowner's insurance policy did not provide coverage for the

claims against Centanni. State Farm's counsel naturally withdrew.

The absence of a duty to defend Centanni has been established as a

matter of law. S ee West v. Board of Comm'rs

, 591 So.2d 1358, 1360

(La. App. 1991) (in the absence of coverage, there is n o duty to

defend). To escape this fact, Centanni attempts to recast his

claim on appeal arguing that he does not see k to relitigate the

coverage issue. Rather, he claims that even though State Farm

conclusively had no duty to defend, State Farm still could not

withdraw its counsel on the eve of trial because it created undue

prejudice to Centanni

.

Centanni mistakenly relies on Pareti v. Sentry Indem. Co.

, 536

So.2d 417 (La. 1988), for this assertion. In P areti

, the Louisiana

Supreme Court held that once a liability insurer exhausted its

policy limits through good-faith settlement, it was no longer

obligated to defend the insured in separate actions based on the5 We also note that the alleged conflict with counsel was not

brought to the attention of the Forde trial court until after the

adverse jury verdict was returned.

8 same accident. 536 So.2d at 423-24. In dicta, the court noted

that the insu rer should make efforts to avoid prejudicing the

insured by its timing of withdraw. I d. at 423 & n.9. However, the

language of Pareti does not extend to situations such as this one

where the insurance policy provided no coverage and hence no duty

to defend whatsoever. Additionally, we note that in this case,

State Farm specifically notified Centanni from the outset that it

would contest coverage and indicated that he sh ould retain

additional counsel at his own expense. Finally, Centanni was not

left "high and dry" at trial, but was provided counsel by LM&C. 5

Consequently, summary judgment was appropriate on the state law

claim against State Farm.

Summary judgment was al so appropriate for the claim against

Anglo. Anglo provided excess coverage to the sheriff's department.

As with the other defendants, Centanni alleged th at Anglo was

liable for failure to provide conflict-free counsel. However, the

unambiguous language of the Anglo policy states that it had "the

right but not the duty" to participate in the defense of claims.

Anglo chose not to provide Centanni a defense in the Forde

litigation as was its right under the contract. Centanni tries to

escape summary judgement by alleging that there is a fact issue

regarding whether Anglo participated in his defense. The summary

judgment evidence, however, reflects that at most Anglo was kept9

abreast of the Forde litigation through correspondence with LM&C.

The district court properly held that on such evidence no

reasonable juror could conclude that Anglo pr ovided Centanni a

defense.

CONCLUSION

The district c ourt properly dismissed the § 1983 claims

against Lee and the other alleged state actors because of qualified

immunity. Similarly, summary judgment was appropriate on the

retaliatory firing claim because Centanni was an uncompensated

volunteer and any state law claim against LSRMA because of lack of

causation. Finally, State Farm and Anglo had no duty to provide

Centann i a defense and hence no claim arises against these

insurers. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.