This opinion will be unpublished and 

may not be cited except as provided by 

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016). 

STATE OF MINNESOTA 

IN COURT OF APPEALS 

A16-0889 

State of Minnesota, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

Aaron James Helgeson, 

Appellant. 

Filed January 30, 2017 

Affirmed 

Reilly, Judge 

Stearns County District Court 

File No. 73-CR-15-3414 

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and 

Matthew A. Staehling, St. Cloud City Attorney, Mark C. Hansen, Assistant City Attorney, 

St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent) 

Todd V. Peterson, Todd V. Peterson, P.A., Sauk Rapids, Minnesota (for appellant) 

 Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and 

Bjorkman, Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N 

REILLY, Judge 

Appellant challenges his impaired-driving conviction on the basis that the district 

court committed reversible error by refusing to suppress evidence discovered during an 

investigative encounter because (1) the investigating officer’s conduct constituted seizure; 
2 

and (2) the investigating officer lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal 

activity. Because the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress, we affirm. 

FACTS 

On March 8, 2015, at approximately 3:00 a.m., a Stearns County Deputy Sheriff 

observed a vehicle with two occupants idling in a St. Cloud apartment complex’s parking 

lot with its headlights on, parked about five feet off the roadway and positioned at an angle 

blocking several parking spots. The officer lived near the apartment complex and testified 

that there was a history of break-ins in the area. The officer ran the license plate and 

discovered that the vehicle was registered to an address in Sauk Centre. The officer parked 

his squad vehicle behind the vehicle but did not activate his emergency lights. The officer 

approached the vehicle with his flashlight activated and identified the driver as appellant, 

Aaron James Helgeson. The officer noticed a “very strong odor of alcohol coming from 

the vehicle,” and appellant admitted that he had been drinking. An assisting officer arrived 

at the scene and conducted a preliminary breath test on appellant, which revealed an alcohol 

concentration of .121. The assisting officer placed appellant under arrest for impaired 

driving. 

The state subsequently charged appellant with impaired driving. Appellant moved 

to suppress the evidence and dismiss the complaint on the ground that the investigating 

officer seized him without a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. The 

district court denied the motion. Appellant waived his trial rights and opted for a stipulatedevidence trial pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.01, subdivision 4. The 
3 

district court found appellant guilty of impaired driving and imposed a stayed sentence. 

This appeal now follows. 

D E C I S I O N 

Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his suppression motion. When 

reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we review the 

factual findings for clear error and the legal determinations de novo. State v. Gauster, 752 

N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008). A reviewing court determines independently the existence 

of a constitutional violation. State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 221 (Minn. 1992). 

The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and 

seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. A traffic stop constitutes a 

seizure implicating this constitutional prohibition. State v. Thiel, 846 N.W.2d 605, 610 

(Minn. App. 2014), review denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 2014). We review an unconstitutionalseizure determination de novo. Illi v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 873 N.W.2d 149, 151 (Minn. 

App. 2015). 

Appellant argues that the investigating officer’s actions constitute a seizure because 

the officer “boxed [his] car in with a marked squad car.” The officer testified that there 

was room for appellant to back around the officer’s squad vehicle. The district court 

reviewed the investigating officer’s testimony, along with squad video from the night of 

the incident and the assisting officer’s report, and determined that appellant was “not seized 

when the [investigating officer] initially approached him,” because the officer parked 

behind appellant’s vehicle “without his emergency lights on and parked . . . so that 

[appellant] could have backed around [the squad vehicle] in order to leave.” 
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We agree with the district court. In Minnesota, a seizure occurs when “a reasonable 

person in the defendant’s shoes would have concluded that he or she was not free to leave,” 

given the totality of the circumstances. In re Welfare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 783 

(Minn. 1993). Not every interaction between a police officer and a citizen amounts to a 

seizure. State v. Klamar, 823 N.W.2d 687, 692 (Minn. App. 2012). “Courts generally 

have held that it does not by itself constitute a seizure for an officer to simply walk up and 

talk . . . to a driver sitting in an already stopped car.” Id. (quotation omitted); see, e.g., Illi, 

873 N.W.2d at 152. Here, the evidentiary record, including the squad video, supports the 

district court’s finding that the investigating officer pulled up behind appellant’s alreadyparked vehicle but did not position his squad vehicle in such a way as to completely block 

appellant’s exit. Further, the officer did not use any physical force or make an express 

show of authority toward appellant. Cf. State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 1995) 

(noting that an officer’s use of physical force or show of authority may constitute a seizure); 

State v. Lopez, 698 N.W.2d 18, 22 (Minn. App. 2005) (determining that officer seized 

driver by partially blocking vehicle, activating emergency lights, pounding on driver’s 

window, and opening driver’s door).1

 

 

1

 Appellant relies on two unpublished cases to support his seizure argument. See State v. 

Deml, No. A06-859, 2007 WL 1674060, at *2 (Minn. App. June 12, 2007) (determining 

that seizure occurred when officer completely blocked driver in and rapped on vehicle’s 

window); State v. Taylor, No. CX-03-218, 2003 WL 22533577, at *2 (Minn. App. Nov. 10, 

2003) (determining that seizure occurred when officer blocked vehicle in and driver was 

unable to leave), review denied (Minn. Jan. 20, 2004). As a threshold matter, Deml and 

Taylor are unpublished decisions and do not bind this court. See Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, 

subd. 3 (2016) (“Unpublished opinions of the Court of Appeals are not precedential.”). 

Further, the facts in this case are distinguishable because the investigating officer did not 

prevent appellant from leaving. 
5 

Because a seizure generally does not occur “when an officer merely walks up to and 

speaks with a driver sitting in an already-stopped vehicle,” Illi, 873 N.W.2d at 152, and 

because the investigating officer did not block appellant’s exit or otherwise exert force or 

authority against him, Cripps, 533 N.W.2d at 391, we conclude that the officer’s conduct 

did not constitute a seizure. The district court correctly ruled that appellant was not seized 

when the officer approached his parked vehicle, and we therefore determine that the district 

court properly denied the suppression motion.2

Affirmed. 

 

2

 Because we hold that the investigating officer did not seize appellant by parking behind 

and approaching his vehicle, we need not consider the parties’ dispute over whether the 

officer had a reasonable, articulable basis for these actions. Nevertheless, we agree with 

the district court that appellant’s unusual positioning of his vehicle in a parking lot late at 

night in an area with a history of break-ins gave the officer a reasonable, articulable 

suspicion for an investigative stop. See, e.g., State v. Uber, 604 N.W.2d 799, 801 (Minn. 

App. 1999) (noting that “[s]uspicious activity may itself provide the basis to stop a suspect” 

and that “[s]uspicious activity in an area that has had problems with crime augments the 

basis for a lawful investigatory stop”).