Filed 4/19/21 In re E.A. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re E.A. et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B307114

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

M.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct.

 Nos. 17CCJP00273B,

 17CCJP00273C,

 17CCJP00273D)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Rudolph A. Diaz, Judge. Affirmed.

Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant M.G.
2

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Brian Mahler, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

M.G. (mother) appeals from orders of the juvenile court 

denying her petition filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions 

Code section 388.1 We affirm the juvenile court orders.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

These dependency proceedings began in September 2017, 

when then one-year-old J.R. ingested methamphetamine and was 

hospitalized. Mother had left J.R. and his twin brother, A.R., 

overnight in the care of her roommate. She left the twins’ then 

three-year-old sister, E.A., with a neighbor.

2 When mother 

returned home the next morning, she noticed J.R. was shaking. 

He appeared to be having a seizure. Mother took J.R. to the 

emergency room and learned he had ingested methamphetamine. 

A police officer investigating the incident found a drug pipe on 

the couch in mother’s home. 

Mother knew that her roommate smoked 

methamphetamine and had a history of using drugs. Mother also 

admitted that two weeks earlier she left J.R. and A.R. with the 

same roommate and A.R. had fallen off a bed. However, she 

claimed the roommate did not use drugs around the children. 

Mother initially denied that she used drugs, but later admitted 

she snorted methamphetamine, smoked marijuana, and drank 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.

2 Mother’s oldest child, G.A., was in the care of her father. 

G.A. is not a subject of these proceedings. 
3

alcohol every week. She also admitted recently using 

methamphetamine when out with her roommate. She denied 

ever using drugs at home or in the presence of the children. 

The Los Angeles County Department of Children and 

Family Services (DCFS) detained the children and filed a petition 

seeking dependency jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision

(b). In interviews for the detention and jurisdiction and 

disposition reports, mother told DCFS social workers that when 

she was a minor, her own mother used drugs and drank alcohol. 

Mother spent time in foster care because of her mother’s drug 

addiction. Mother began using cocaine, alcohol, and marijuana at 

age 14; she began using methamphetamine at 21.3 Mother 

admitted suffering from anxiety and depression. She was not 

receiving any mental health treatment. Although the children 

were generally in good health, neither twin was walking or 

speaking. A foster parent noted A.R. appeared to be suffering 

from significant developmental delays.

In January 2018, mother entered a plea of no contest. The 

juvenile court sustained allegations that mother’s substance 

abuse, her actions in allowing the roommate to have unlimited 

access to the children, and her inadequate supervision and care

all placed the children at substantial risk of suffering serious 

physical harm or illness. In March 2018, the juvenile court 

asserted dependency jurisdiction over the children and removed 

them from mother.4 The court ordered DCFS to provide mother 

3 Mother was 26 years old when these proceedings began. 

She said she stopped using drugs each time she became 

pregnant. 

4 The court found M.R. to be the children’s alleged father. 

Throughout the proceedings, M.R. resided out of the country and 
4

with family reunification services. Mother was to participate in 

random or on demand drug and alcohol testing, a full drug and 

alcohol program with aftercare, a 12-step program, parenting 

classes, and individual counseling. The written case plan

indicated a missed or diluted drug test would be presumed to be a 

positive test. The court further ordered that mother’s individual 

counseling must address “all underlying [issues] contributing to 

mother’s drug/alcohol abuse” and “the detrimental impact that 

mother’s drug abuse has upon her ability to appropriately parent 

and attend to her children’s special needs.” The individual 

counseling was to be with a licensed therapist, or under the 

supervision of a licensed therapist. Mother was awarded 

monitored visits with the children, at a minimum of two visits 

per week. 

Mother was discharged from two substance abuse 

programs. At the end of February 2018, and again in March 

2018, mother relapsed. Although mother’s substance abuse 

counselor recommended that she participate in an inpatient 

program, mother refused and instead enrolled in a third 

outpatient program in April 2018. In July 2018, mother tested 

positive for methamphetamine. In January 2019, mother 

completed the substance abuse program.

Mother participated in individual counseling, however her 

first therapist informed a DCFS social worker that her agency 

would not accept documentation regarding the case and the 

agency “did not follow [c]ourt orders.” The therapist also told the 

social worker that she would not be able to provide information 

did not make an appearance in the case. M.R. is not a party to 

this appeal.
5

about mother’s progress beyond her dates of attendance. 

Although the therapist later provided the social worker with 

information about mother’s progress, mother stopped receiving 

therapy in December 2018. She began again in February 2019. 

DCFS had difficulty obtaining information about mother’s 

psychiatric care. In late 2018, DCFS verified that a psychiatrist 

had prescribed medication for mother, but in February 2019, the 

psychiatrist’s office informed a social worker that mother had not 

met with the psychiatrist since late November 2018. 

Throughout the proceedings, DCFS reported there were 

problems with mother’s visits. In May 2018, the caregiver told 

DCFS mother was inconsistent and left visits early. Mother 

argued with the caregiver and brought other individuals to the 

visits, which was “distracting and cause[d] issues during the 

visits.” In September 2018, DCFS reported mother canceled 

several visits and was usually late to the visits she did attend. 

In the months that followed, mother continued to bring 

other individuals to the visits. At a visit in February 2019, 

mother brought a male friend to the caregiver’s home. E.A. later 

told the caregiver that at a party two years earlier, this male 

friend took off his clothes, threw up, and “pooped inside the 

jumper at the party.” E.A. also told the caregiver that the same

male friend tried to remove her clothes and told her to go in the 

jumper and “shake her ‘booty.’ ” 

E.A. subsequently told a DCFS social worker more of her 

recollections about mother’s friend. E.A. recalled that she once 

woke up and found mother and the friend next to her, in her bed, 

“moving up and down very fast.” When E.A. asked them to stop, 

mother slapped her. Mother and the friend continued, keeping 

E.A. awake. E.A. also told the caregiver she saw a man touch 
6

mother while both were naked. E.A. discussed mother’s many 

boyfriends, and remarked on seeing mother arriving at a visit 

with a “different boyfriend.” E.A. began receiving mental health 

services to help her manage the negative feelings associated with 

these past experiences. The caregiver also received guidance 

from a mental health liaison to help E.A. cope with her 

disturbing memories. 

In March 2019, DCFS reported that mother continued to 

change the days of visitation and still brought strangers to her 

visits. Mother’s visits remained monitored. Mother admitted a 

male friend transported her to visits but denied the children had 

any contact with him. When asked about E.A.’s reports of seeing 

the friend at mother’s visits, “mother appeared oblivious and did 

not show any empathy on how this male friend has impacted the 

child’s life.” Mother could not explain why E.A. would say the 

friend had tried to remove her clothes, but mother also did not 

seem surprised, angry, or concerned about the disclosure. She

claimed the caregiver was lying and “putting things in [E.A.’s] 

head that would make mother look bad.” Yet, the social worker 

saw a video on mother’s Facebook page from February 2019 

clearly showing mother’s friend was present at one of mother’s 

visits with the children that month.

In April 2019, mother filed a petition seeking a change of 

court order pursuant to section 388. Mother asked for 

unmonitored visits, arguing no one could care for her children or 

love them as she could. She attached a number of documents to 

the petition, including certificates showing her completion of a 

substance abuse program, parenting classes, and stress and 

anger management classes; character references; and 12-step 

program attendance certificates and logs. She also attached 
7

documents showing her participation in mental health services 

through the end of 2018, and two 2019 appointments.

In a subsequent last minute information, DCFS expressed 

concern about E.A.’s disclosures, the presence of mother’s male 

friend at her visits, and mother’s denials and lack of concern 

about what E.A. had disclosed. DCFS further reported that 

although mother indicated she was seeing a specific psychiatrist, 

the social worker’s further investigation revealed the individual 

mother named was a therapist rather than a psychiatrist. DCFS 

additionally reported mother showed a lack of interest and 

interaction with J.R. and A.R. According to the report, mother 

demonstrated little bonding with the twins, despite both the 

caregiver’s and the social worker’s efforts to encourage mother to 

spend more time with the twins, instead of excluding them while 

focusing on E.A. Mother had only recently begun to show greater 

interest in J.R. and A.R. An additional last minute information 

provided details of mother’s psychiatric treatment. The report 

noted mother had only recently started seeing a psychiatrist. 

DCFS again expressed concerns about mother’s lack of consistent 

mental health treatment. 

At the 18-month review hearing in May 2019, counsel for 

DCFS argued that although mother had received over 20 months 

of services, and although she had participated in programs and 

testified in a manner that seemed genuine, her actual progress 

was minimal.5 Counsel argued the cross-examination of mother 

5 Although the 18-month review hearing was originally set 

for March 26, 2019, it was continued several times and did not 

proceed until May 9, 2019. Mother and the social worker 

testified on that date and the matter was continued to May 14, 
8

revealed she twice left substance abuse programs; she had 

continued in individual therapy that was insufficient given the 

agency’s unwillingness to cooperate with DCFS or the court; 

mother repeatedly switched psychiatrists; and, despite 

participating in a 12-step program for nearly two years, mother 

was still only on the program’s first step. Counsel pointed to 

mother’s dismissive response to E.A.’s disclosures and her lack of 

concern as evidence that mother was not ready for unmonitored 

visits. Counsel further asserted the court could not trust mother 

to stay away from the people she associated with when she was 

using drugs. 

The children’s counsel similarly argued that mother 

continued to be seen with the male friend who was also around 

when the family first came to the attention of DCFS, when 

mother was still using drugs and J.R. ingested 

methamphetamine. The children’s counsel asserted mother 

continued to deny responsibility for what happened to J.R. 

Mother’s counsel pointed to mother’s completion of 

programs and participation in services as evidence that she had, 

in fact, made significant progress. Mother’s counsel argued there 

was no risk to the children in being returned to mother’s care 

with continued supervision. 

The juvenile court acknowledged mother had participated 

in programs, yet noted that in her testimony she took no 

responsibility for J.R. ingesting methamphetamine at the outset 

of the case. The court expressed concern that after more than a 

year, mother was still on the first step in her 12-step program, 

2019, for argument and the court’s ruling. The record on appeal 

does not include a transcript of the May 9, 2019 proceedings.
9

and the court did not believe mother was taking the program 

seriously. The court further noted that while mother had 

addressed her drug use, she had missed many tests in the prior 

five or six months and her associations and lifestyle created 

concerns about her ongoing sobriety. In its ruling, the court 

stated it was considering the special needs of J.R. and A.R., and 

the trauma E.A. had suffered, as reflected by her disclosures

about her interactions with mother’s friend. The court 

terminated mother’s reunification services and set a hearing 

pursuant to section 366.26 (.26 hearing). The court further 

denied mother’s 388 petition, finding it did not state new 

evidence or a change of circumstances, and the proposed change 

of order did not promote the best interests of the children. 

In a September 2019 report for the .26 hearing, DCFS 

informed the court the children had lived with their caregiver—a 

non-related extended family member—for around 18 months. 

The caregiver was meeting all of the children’s needs and 

included them in her family. The caregiver and children were 

mutually affectionate. The bond between them was apparent.

In September 2019, mother filed another 388 petition, 

requesting her “parental rights back.” She stated she was in 

compliance with her case plan and had completed programs as 

ordered. Mother further argued it was in the children’s best 

interest to be returned to her because she was their mother, she 

could care for them unconditionally, the children told her they 

loved her, and she had been consistently visiting. Mother 

attached the documents she had submitted with the prior 388 

petition. The juvenile court denied the petition, again finding the 

request did not state new evidence or a change of circumstances, 

and the requested change would not promote the children’s best 
10

interests. The court noted the documents attached to the petition 

were the same as those previously submitted and considered at 

the 18-month review hearing. 

A November 2019 status review report continued to note 

mother’s inconsistent visits, although DCFS acknowledged that 

most of the cancelled visits occurred because the children or 

mother were sick. Still, the report noted mother frequently made 

false promises to the children and called the caregiver at odd 

times of the day. E.A. informed the social worker that mother 

had instructed her to tell the social worker that she loved mother 

and wanted to live with her. When the social worker asked E.A. 

how she felt about this, E.A. responded that she loved the 

caregiver because the caregiver was nice to her. The caregiver 

told DCFS she was attached to the children, wanted to provide a 

safe and stable home for them, and wished to adopt. 

In advance of a continued .26 hearing in May 2020, a social 

worker reported the children were affectionate and loving 

towards the caregiver. The twins looked to the caregiver for 

attention and support when playing. They hugged her and 

stayed close to her, trusting her for safety and care. E.A. told the 

social worker she loved her “mommy,” referring to the caregiver. 

In July 2020, mother filed another 388 petition seeking 

return of the children, additional family reunification services, or 

an order vacating the .26 hearing and granting mother 

unmonitored visits. The petition asserted the requested change 

in court orders would benefit the children because they were 

bonded with mother and she could provide a safe and loving 

home for them. In addition to certificates submitted with prior 

388 petitions, mother attached documents showing her 

participation in therapy and psychiatric services in March, April, 
11

and May 2020. A letter indicated mother enrolled in further 

outpatient drug and alcohol treatment in September 2019, and 

she completed the program in April 2020. She also submitted a 

log showing 12-step meeting attendance in 2020. 

A July 30, 2020 last minute information reported mother 

had not participated in random drug testing through the DCFSapproved testing facility in the prior six months. DCFS noted 

that mother’s 388 petition and the attached documents did not 

address the concerns of E.A.’s disclosures about mother’s male 

friend, mother’s continued association with that individual as 

evidenced by her bringing him to visits, mother’s dishonesty 

about the male friend’s presence at visits, and mother’s decision 

to instead insist E.A. and the caregiver were lying. The report 

again noted the children were “very stabilized, closely bonded 

and emotionally secure in their pre-adoptive home with the 

caregiver,” and opined it would not be in the children’s best 

interests to “disrupt their lives again.” 

At the July 30, 2020 hearing, the juvenile court summarily 

denied the 388 petition. The court then proceeded to the .26 

hearing and terminated parental rights. Mother’s appeal timely 

followed. 

DISCUSSION

I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in

Denying Mother’s 388 Petition

Mother’s sole argument on appeal is that the juvenile court 

abused its discretion in denying her 388 petition without an 

evidentiary hearing. We find no error.

A. Applicable Legal Principles

“Section 388 provides for modification of juvenile court 

orders when the moving party presents new evidence or a change 
12

of circumstances and demonstrates modification of the previous 

order is in the child’s best interests. [Citations.] To obtain a 

hearing on a section 388 petition, the parent must make a prima 

facie showing as to both elements. [Citations.] [¶] The petition 

should be liberally construed in favor of granting a hearing, but 

‘[t]he prima facie requirement is not met unless the facts alleged, 

if supported by evidence given credit at the hearing, would 

sustain a favorable decision on the petition.’ [Citations.] The 

petition may not consist of ‘general, conclusory allegations.’ 

[Citation.] ‘Successful petitions have included declarations or 

other attachments which demonstrate the showing the petitioner 

will make at [the] hearing . . . .’ [Citation.] When determining 

whether the petition makes the necessary showing, ‘the court 

may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the 

case.’ ” (In re Samuel A. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1, 6–7.)

After the juvenile court has terminated family reunification 

services, family reunification is no longer the primary goal of the 

proceedings. Instead, “ ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child 

for permanency and stability’ [citation], and in fact, there is a 

rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the best 

interests of the child. [Citation.] A court hearing a motion for 

change of placement at this stage of the proceedings must 

recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question 

before it, that is, the best interests of the child.” (In re 

Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317; In re K.L. (2016) 

248 Cal.App.4th 52, 62.)

We review a juvenile court order summarily denying a 

388 petition for abuse of discretion. (In re Samuel A., supra,

55 Cal.App.5th at p. 7; In re K.L., supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 62.) “ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether 
13

the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more 

inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the 

reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for 

that of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at 

pp. 318–319.)

B. Discussion

Mother has not established the juvenile court’s summary 

denial of her 388 petition exceeded the bounds of reason. By the 

time mother filed her last 388 petition, evidence had previously 

been submitted to the court establishing that mother had 

completed a substance abuse program, that she had at least 

intermittently participated in mental health services, and that 

she regularly attended 12-step meetings. The documentation 

submitted in connection with the last 388 petition showed, at 

most, continued participation in services. It did not address, for 

example, mother’s failure to regularly drug test. 

However, even if mother’s petition sufficiently alleged new 

evidence or changed circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion 

in the juvenile court’s conclusion that mother did not establish a 

prima facie case that the requested orders would be in the 

children’s best interests. As noted above, once the juvenile court 

terminates reunification services, the focus of the proceedings 

changes from family reunification to the needs of the children for 

permanence and stability. (In re J.H. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 

174, 182–183 [children need stability and permanency, not 

protracted legal proceedings that prolong uncertainty for them].) 

Mother’s 388 petition asked the court to return the children to 

her, grant her further reunification services, or vacate the 

hearing to select a permanent plan. The petition asserted only 

that the children were bonded with mother and she could provide 
14

a safe and loving home for them. These were conclusory 

statements that were in conflict with the record before the 

juvenile court. Although the children were detained over two 

years earlier, mother still had only monitored visits. The visits 

mother did have were plagued by issues such as mother bringing 

third parties to visits, including the friend who had interacted 

inappropriately with E.A., mother’s efforts to coach E.A., and at 

times her inconsistency in visiting. The juvenile court had 

previously concluded that although mother completed programs, 

her long-term sobriety remained in question because of missed 

drug tests, and her lack of meaningful progress in her 12-step 

program. 

On the other hand, the children were in a stable placement 

with the caregiver and had a bond and attachment to her. When 

DCFS first detained the twins they appeared to be suffering from 

undiagnosed developmental delays. They began receiving 

Regional Center services with the assistance of the caregiver. By 

November 2019, DCFS was able to report that the twins’ speech 

had improved and their aggression had decreased. The caregiver 

was the adult who interacted with the children’s service 

providers. J.R. and A.R. looked to the caregiver to provide 

security and care. In contrast, mother’s bond with the twins was 

minimal. The social worker and the caregiver had to repeatedly 

encourage mother to attempt to develop her relationship with 

them. 

E.A. likewise confided in the caregiver and referred to her 

as “mommy.” After E.A. disclosed her memories about mother’s 

male friend and what she had witnessed while in mother’s care, 

she experienced anxiety, sleep issues, and “negative memories 

associated with her past trauma.” By June 2020, E.A.’s mental 
15

health services provider indicated she had made significant 

progress in mental health treatment, all while in the home of the 

caregiver. (See In re D.R. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1512

[although bond with caregiver is not dispositive, disruption of an 

existing psychological bond between children and caretakers is 

an extremely important factor in 388 motion, citing In re 

Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 408].)

Mother’s 388 petition did not allege facts to rebut the 

presumption that continued foster care was in the children’s best 

interests at this advanced stage of the proceedings. (In re K.L,

supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at pp. 63–64.) The children were in a 

stable placement and had a secure attachment to the caregiver, 

who had attended to their specific needs. Mother had received 

nearly two years of services, yet still had only monitored visits 

with the children. She continued some form of relationship with

the male friend with whom she had associated when using drugs, 

and who had been a source of emotional trauma for E.A. Mother 

also had a long history of drug abuse beginning when she was 

14 years old; her many missed drug tests reasonably indicated to 

the court that her sobriety remained in question. (See In re 

Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 225 [chronic drug abuse 

presents a lifelong challenge and may put children of drug 

abusers in danger]; In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 

205–206.) Delaying permanency to provide mother with further 

reunification services “would deprive [the children] of a 

permanent, stable home in exchange for an uncertain future.” (In 

re Ernesto R., at p. 225.)

Mother’s unsupported statements that she could provide 

the children with a safe home and the children were bonded to 

her, did not constitute a prima facie case for returning the 
16

children to mother’s physical custody, providing further 

reunification services, or vacating the .26 hearing. “On the eve of 

a section 366.26 hearing, the child’s interest in stability is the 

court’s foremost concern, outweighing the parent’s interest in 

reunification. Thus, a section 388 petition seeking 

reinstatement . . . of reunification services must be directed at 

the best interest of the child.” (In re Ramone R. (2005) 

132 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1348–1349.) Mother’s allegations in the 

petition did not state reasons to show how delaying permanence 

and stability would be in the children’s best interests. The 

juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in summarily denying 

the 388 petition. (See In re Jackson W. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 

247, 260 [summary denial not abuse of discretion where petition 

made no showing of how the minors’ best interests would be 

served by depriving them of a permanent, stable home in 

exchange for an uncertain future]; In re A.S. (2009) 

180 Cal.App.4th 351, 358.)
17

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ADAMS, J.*

We concur:

LAVIN, Acting P. J.

EGERTON, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned 

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.