Filed 7/19/13

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

HAPPY NAILS & SPA OF FASHION 

VALLEY, L.P., et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

JULIE A. SU, as Labor Commissioner, etc.,

Defendant and Respondent.

D060621

(Super. Ct. No. 37-2009-00090193-

CU-WM-CTL)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, John S. 

Meyer, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.

Law Office of Stuart Miller and Stuart Miller; Scott & Whitehead, R. Craig Scott 

and Diane D. Stalder for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Deborah D. Graves for Defendant and Respondent.

Happy Nails & Spa of Fashion Valley, L.P. (Happy Nails of Fashion Valley); 

Happy Nails & Spa of Mira Mesa, L.P. (Happy Nails of Mira Mesa); and The H & N 

Group Management Co. (H & N Group) (collectively Happy Nails) appeal the judgment 
2

denying relief on their verified complaint and petition (the complaint) against the Labor 

Commissioner of the State of California (the Commissioner). By the complaint, Happy 

Nails sought to set aside an administrative decision assessing civil penalties for its failure 

to provide cosmetologists who work at its salons with employee wage statements that 

itemize deductions. We agree with Happy Nails that a final decision of the California 

Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (the Board) that the cosmetologists are not 

employees collaterally estops the Commissioner from assessing those penalties. We 

therefore reverse the judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings concerning 

other relief requested by Happy Nails.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Happy Nails' Business

Happy Nails of Fashion Valley and Happy Nails of Mira Mesa are limited 

partnerships that own salons in which cosmetologists provide manicures, pedicures, and 

face and skin treatments to clients. H & N Group is the general partner of Happy Nails of 

Fashion Valley, Happy Nails of Mira Mesa, and other limited partnerships doing business 

under the Happy Nails name. H & N Group also provides management services to 

incorporated salons doing business under the Happy Nails name.

In 2001, Happy Nails hired a consultant to help restructure its business operations 

in such a way that the cosmetologists would be independent contractors rather than 

employees. By early 2003, Happy Nails implemented the changes recommended by the 

consultant at all of its salons.
3

B. The Proceedings Before the Employment Development Department and the Board

In 2004, the Employment Development Department (the Department), an entity 

within the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (Unemp. Ins. Code, § 301), issued 

assessments against H & N Group, Happy Nails of Fashion Valley, Happy Nails of Mira 

Mesa, and 35 other salons doing business under the Happy Nails name, for unpaid 

unemployment insurance contributions (id., § 1126). H & N Group and the salons 

petitioned the Department for reassessment. At the direction of the administrative law 

judge assigned to hear the petitions, H & N Group selected one salon (located in Chino 

Hills) and the Department selected another (located in Irvine) for a combined hearing. 

The parties later stipulated that the record from that hearing would be used to decide the 

reassessment petitions for the remaining 35 salons.

After a two-day hearing at which eight witnesses testified and more than 50 

exhibits were admitted concerning business operations at the salons, the administrative 

law judge issued decisions granting the petitions for reassessment. Each decision states: 

"The issues in this case are whether the workers were employees of the petitioner and, if 

so, whether the petitioner is liable for unemployment, employment training, and disability 

contributions, personal income tax withholdings, penalties, and interest." After 

summarizing the facts regarding the conduct of business at the salons, the administrative 

law judge listed the factors relevant to determining whether a worker is an employee or 
4

an independent contractor,1 and then applied those factors to the facts. Specifically, the 

administrative law judge found the cosmetologists were not terminable at will, but could 

only be terminated for death, bankruptcy, or gross violation of the written contract with 

the salon; the salons exercised no control over the cosmetologists, who used their own 

skill and judgment in performing services; the cosmetologists provided, at their own 

expense, many of the materials and all of the equipment they used; the cosmetologists 

were engaged in a skilled occupation that required many hours of training for licensure; 

and the processing of payments for services was handled by an independent third party. 

Based on these findings, the administrative law judge concluded the cosmetologists were 

 

1 The administrative law judge cited Empire Star Mines Co. v. Cal. Emp. Com. 

(1946) 28 Cal.2d 33, 43-44 (Empire Star Mines), where the California Supreme Court 

stated: "In determining whether one who performs services for another is an employee or 

an independent contractor, the most important factor is the right to control the manner 

and means of accomplishing the result desired. If the employer has the authority to 

exercise complete control, whether or not that right is exercised with respect to all details, 

an employer-employee relationship exists. Strong evidence in support of an employment 

relationship is the right to discharge at will, without cause. [Citations.] Other factors to 

be taken into consideration are (a) whether or not the one performing services is engaged 

in a distinct occupation or business; (b) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, 

in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the principal or by a 

specialist without supervision; (c) the skill required in the particular occupation; 

(d) whether the principal or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools and the 

place of work for the person doing the work; (e) the length of time for which the services 

are to be performed; (f) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; 

(g) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the principal; and 

(h) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relationship of employeremployee." California courts have applied this multi-factor test in subsequent cases 

where the issue was whether workers were employees or independent contractors. (See, 

e.g., S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 

341, 350-351; Tieberg v. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 943, 949 

(Tieberg); Arnold v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 580, 588-590 

(Arnold); Air Couriers Internat. v. Employment Development Dept. (2007) 150 

Cal.App.4th 923, 933 (Air Couriers).)
5

independent contractors rather than employees, and therefore H & N Group and the 

salons were not liable for the contributions assessed by the Department. The 

administrative law judge later issued similar decisions reaching the same conclusions as 

to the other 35 salons, including Happy Nails of Fashion Valley and Happy Nails of Mira 

Mesa.

The Department appealed the administrative law judge's decisions to the Board. 

The Board affirmed the decisions in the cases involving the Chino Hills and Irvine salons 

on November 7, 2007, and affirmed the decisions regarding the other 35 salons on 

November 24, 2008. The Department did not seek judicial review of the Board's 

decisions.

C. The Proceedings Before the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement

In August 2008, the Commissioner, acting through the Division of Labor 

Standards Enforcement (the Division), an entity within the Department of Industrial 

Relations (Lab. Code, § 79), issued citations to and assessed civil penalties against Happy 

Nails for paying the cosmetologists who worked at Happy Nails of Fashion Valley and 

Happy Nails of Mira Mesa without giving them properly itemized wage statements (id., 

§§ 226, subd. (a), 226.3, 226.4). Happy Nails contested the citations and requested a 

hearing. (Id., § 226.5.) A combined hearing concerning the two salons was set for 

February 2009.

Before the hearing, Happy Nails submitted a brief with supporting exhibits in 

which it argued an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary because the prior decisions of the 

Department and the Board conclusively determined the cosmetologists working at Happy 
6

Nails of Fashion Valley and at Happy Nails of Mira Mesa were independent contractors 

and not employees. In the brief, Happy Nails complained that it had "already spent 

hundreds of thousands of dollars, and borne the burden of years of administrative 

proceedings, to determine that [its] [c]osmetologists are not employees." Based on the 

Board's decision and principles of collateral estoppel, Happy Nails urged the hearing 

officer "to 'avoid chaos' and make a determination consistent with that of the [Board]: 

that Happy Nails [c]osmetologists are properly classified as independent contractors." 

The Division submitted an opposition brief in which it contended for various reasons that 

application of collateral estoppel was "inappropriate in this case." The record contains no 

ruling by the hearing officer on the collateral estoppel defense raised by Happy Nails.

The hearing officer conducted a one-day hearing at which 10 witnesses testified 

and 31 exhibits were admitted concerning business operations at the salons. The 

evidence presented by Happy Nails and the Division was substantially the same as that 

introduced by Happy Nails and the Department at the prior hearing before the 

administrative law judge. On March 30, 2009, the hearing officer issued findings and 

orders affirming the citations and civil penalties assessed by the Division. After 

summarizing the testimony of the witnesses and describing some of the exhibits, the 

hearing officer considered various factors relevant to determining whether a worker is an 

employee or an independent contractor,2 and concluded Happy Nails is subject to the 

 

2 The hearing officer cited Labor Code section 2750.5, which lists several factors 

relevant to determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor, 

but by its terms applies only to those doing work within the scope of the Contractors' 
7

civil penalties because the cosmetologists are employees, not independent contractors. 

The findings and orders did not mention the prior, contrary decisions of the Department 

or the Board.

D. The Proceedings Before the Trial Court

On May 20, 2009, Happy Nails filed the complaint against the Commissioner in 

which it challenged the Division's findings and orders. Happy Nails alleged that the 

Board's decisions that the cosmetologists working at its salons are independent 

contractors rather than employees are binding on all state agencies, and that the 

Division's contrary findings and orders subject Happy Nails to inconsistent legal 

obligations. Happy Nails also alleged the findings and orders were unsupported by the 

evidence, were issued in excess of the Division's jurisdiction, were the result of an unfair 

hearing, and violated Happy Nails' federal and state constitutional due process rights. 

Based on these allegations, Happy Nails asserted several separately labeled "causes of 

action"; and in the prayer for relief, it requested a writ of administrative mandate to set 

aside the Division's findings and orders (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5), a permanent 

injunction against future prosecutions of H & N Group or the owners of Happy Nails 

salons based on the contention that the cosmetologists working at the salons are 

employees; and attorney fees for violations of its federal due process rights (42 U.S.C. 

§§ 1983, 1988).

 

State License Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7000 et seq.). Although cosmetologists are not 

covered by that law, we note that the factors listed in Labor Code section 2750.5 are 

substantially similar to those identified in Empire Star Mines, supra, 28 Cal.2d 33.
8

The Commissioner answered Happy Nails' complaint. In the answer, the 

Commissioner denied that the Board's decisions have preclusive effect on other state 

agencies and that the Division's findings and orders were unsupported by the evidence, 

were issued in excess of the Division's jurisdiction, were the result of an unfair hearing, 

or violated Happy Nails' due process rights. The Commissioner requested that Happy 

Nails be denied all relief demanded in the complaint.

Happy Nails moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Board's 

determination that the cosmetologists working at its salons are independent contractors, 

rather than employees, collaterally estopped the Division from issuing citations and 

assessing civil penalties for Happy Nails' failure to provide the cosmetologists with 

itemized wage statements. The Commissioner opposed the motion on the ground that 

collateral estoppel did not apply. The trial court denied the motion, stating that Happy 

Nails "ha[s] not shown that the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation is identical 

to the issue decided in the former proceeding, or that the issue was actually litigated in 

the former proceeding. [¶] . . . [¶] In addition, even if collateral estoppel applies, triable 

issues of fact exist relative to a determination of whether the facts litigated in [the hearing 

involving Department] are the same as those litigated in the [hearing involving the 

Division]. This alone defeats summary adjudication."

The parties then submitted additional briefing on Happy Nails' request for a writ of 

administrative mandate, and the trial court held a hearing on that request. In a minute 

order issued July 22, 2011, the court rejected Happy Nails' collateral estoppel argument, 

and determined there was substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the 
9

Division's findings that the cosmetologists working at Happy Nails salons are employees 

and not independent contractors. Based on this determination and Happy Nails' 

concession that it had not provided the cosmetologists with itemized wage statements, the 

court concluded the Division had properly issued the citations and assessed civil 

penalties. The court therefore denied Happy Nails' request for writ relief. A judgment 

denying all relief requested in the complaint was entered August 18, 2011.

II.

DISCUSSION

Happy Nails seeks reversal of the judgment denying its request for a writ of 

administrative mandate and upholding the Division's findings and orders assessing civil 

penalties for failure to provide cosmetologists with itemized wage statements on the 

grounds that: (1) the Board's decision that the cosmetologists are not employees binds 

the Division under the doctrine of collateral estoppel and prohibits it from deciding that 

issue contrarily to the Board; (2) the Division's prosecution of Happy Nails after it 

prevailed before the Board violated its due process rights; (3) the trial court applied the 

wrong standard of review to the Division's findings and orders; (4) the Division did not 

give Happy Nails a fair hearing; and (5) the Division's findings are not supported by the 

evidence. Happy Nails also contends it is entitled to an award of attorney fees and an 

injunction prohibiting the Division from further asserting that the cosmetologists who 

work at the salons that were the subject of the Board's decisions are employees unless the 

Division shows the relationship between the cosmetologists and those salons has 

materially changed.
10

As we shall explain, we agree with Happy Nails that the judgment denying its 

request for a writ of administrative mandate must be reversed and the Division's findings 

and orders set aside based on principles of collateral estoppel. We therefore need not and 

do not address the other grounds on which Happy Nails attacks the judgment. We 

remand the case for further proceedings on Happy Nails' related claims for an injunction 

and attorney fees.

A. The Trial Court Erred by Denying Happy Nails' Request for Writ of 

Administrative Mandate

We first address Happy Nails' request for a writ of administrative mandate to set 

aside the Division's findings and orders. We shall set forth the applicable standard of 

review, explain why the Board's decisions collaterally estop the Division, and then reject 

the Commissioner's arguments that collateral estoppel does not apply.

1. The Standard of Review Is De Novo

"Insofar as the appeal from the administrative mandamus proceeding presents 

questions of law, our review is de novo." (California Dept. of Corrections v. State 

Personnel Bd. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1601, 1611.) "The issue whether collateral 

estoppel applies is itself a question of law, which question we review de novo." (Jenkins 

v. County of Riverside (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 593, 618; see also Murphy v. Murphy 

(2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 376, 399 (Murphy) ["We review do novo the trial court's 

determination that respondent's claims in the instant action are not barred by collateral 

estoppel."].)
11

2. The Requirements for Application of Collateral Estoppel Are Satisfied

Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents parties or their privies from 

relitigating issues litigated and decided in a prior proceeding. (Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. 

Dominion Ins. Co. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 601, 604; Gabriel v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2010) 

188 Cal.App.4th 547, 556.) "It is settled that the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue 

preclusion is applicable to final decisions of administrative agencies acting in a judicial 

or quasi-judicial capacity." (Murray v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 860, 867 

(Murray).)3 For an issue to be precluded from relitigation, the following requirements 

must be satisfied: (1) the issue must be identical to an issue decided in a prior 

proceeding; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the 

issue must have been necessarily decided in the prior proceeding; (4) the decision in the 

prior proceeding must be final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom 

preclusion is sought must have been a party to or in privity with a party to the prior 

proceeding. (People v. Garcia (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1070, 1077; Castillo v. City of Los 

Angeles (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 477, 481 (Castillo).) As we explain below, each 

requirement is satisfied in this case.

 

3 "'[I]ndicia of [administrative] proceedings undertaken in a judicial capacity 

include a hearing before an impartial decision maker; testimony given under oath or 

affirmation; a party's ability to subpoena, call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, to 

introduce documentary evidence, and to make oral and written argument; the taking of a 

record of the proceeding; and a written statement of reasons for the decision.' " (Murray, 

supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 867-868.) The hearing before the administrative law judge had 

these indicia, and the Commissioner does not contend otherwise.
12

a. The Issues Are Identical

The identical issue requirement of collateral estoppel "addresses whether 'identical 

factual allegations' are at stake in the two proceedings." (Lucido v. Superior Court 

(1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 342 (Lucido); Basurto v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (2012) 211 

Cal.App.4th 866, 887 (Basurto); Castillo, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 481.) To determine 

whether two proceedings involved identical issues, courts "consider several factors: 'Is 

there a substantial overlap between the evidence or argument to be advanced in the 

second proceeding and that advanced in the first? Does the new evidence or argument 

involve application of the same rule of law as that involved in the prior proceeding? 

Could pretrial preparation and discovery relating to the matter presented in the first action 

reasonably be expected to have embraced the matter sought to be presented in the 

second? How closely related are the claims involved in the two proceedings?' " 

(Burdette v. Carrier Corp. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1668, 1689 (Burdette).) In making 

this determination, we may examine the entire record of each proceeding. (Hernandez v. 

City of Pomona (2009) 46 Cal.4th 501, 511 (Hernandez); Murphy, supra, 164 

Cal.App.4th at p. 401; see Castillo, at pp. 481-482.)

In the proceedings to which the Department was a party, the decisions of the 

administrative law judge state: "The issues in this case are whether the workers were 

employees of the petitioner and, if so, whether the petitioner is liable for unemployment, 

employment training, and disability contributions, personal income tax withholdings, 

penalties, and interest." (Italics added.) The decisions then analyze the facts and legal 

principles relevant to a determination of that issue, and conclude Happy Nails is not 
13

liable for the challenged assessments because the cosmetologists working at its salons are 

independent contractors. 

In the proceedings to which the Division was a party, the findings and orders of 

the hearing officer do not state explicitly the issues to be decided. They do, however, 

identify several "factors to be considered in determining whether or not the relationship 

between the parties is that of an employer[-]employee or principal[-]independent 

contractor." (Italics added.) The findings and orders go on to apply those factors to the 

evidence introduced at the hearing, and ultimately conclude Happy Nails is liable for the 

civil penalties assessed because the cosmetologists working at the salons are employees.

From these written decisions, it is clear that in both administrative proceedings the 

decision maker applied the same multi-factor test to substantially the same evidence to 

decide whether the cosmetologists working at Happy Nails salons are employees or 

independent contractors. (See fns. 1 & 2, ante.) We therefore conclude that " 'identical 

factual allegations' [were] at stake in the two proceedings," and that the identical issue 

requirement of collateral estoppel is met. (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 342.)

b. The Issue Was Actually Litigated

The issue of the cosmetologists' status as employees or independent contractors 

was actually litigated in the proceedings involving the Department. "For purposes of 

collateral estoppel, an issue was actually litigated in a prior proceeding if it was properly 

raised, submitted for determination, and determined in that proceeding." (Hernandez, 

supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 511.) In the hearing before the administrative law judge, the 

Department contended the cosmetologists are employees while Happy Nails contended 
14

they are independent contractors, the parties presented testimony and documents in 

support of their opposing views, and the administrative law judge determined the 

cosmetologists are independent contractors. Upon appeal by the Department, the Board 

affirmed that determination. The "actually litigated" element of collateral estoppel is 

therefore satisfied. (See, e.g., Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 341 [issue was actually 

litigated in prior proceeding when "parties each presented evidence and witnesses in 

support of their positions"]; Castillo, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 482 [issue was actually 

litigated in prior administrative proceeding when party raised issue and presented 

evidence at hearing, and issue was resolved in written decision].)

c. The Issue Was Necessarily Decided

The issue of the cosmetologists' status as employees or independent contractors 

was also necessarily decided in the administrative proceedings involving the Department. 

For purposes of collateral estoppel, an issue is considered to have been necessarily 

decided in a prior proceeding as long as the issue was not " 'entirely unnecessary' " to the 

decision in that proceeding. (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 342; Basurto, supra, 211 

Cal.App.4th at p. 887.) Though somewhat circular, this test is easily satisfied here.

The cosmetologists' status as employees or independent contractors determines 

Happy Nails' liability for contributions and taxes under the Unemployment Insurance 

Code. Such liability exists only if workers are employees rather than independent 

contractors. (Tieberg, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 946; Hunt Building Corp. v. Bernick (2000) 

79 Cal.App.4th 213, 219.) Hence, to resolve Happy Nails' reassessment petitions, the 

administrative law judge and the Board had to, and did, decide whether the 
15

cosmetologists working at Happy Nails salons are employees or independent contractors. 

Since resolution of that issue was dispositive of Happy Nail's petitions, the issue 

obviously was not " 'entirely unnecessary' " to that decision. (Lucido, at p. 342; see 

Mattson v. City of Costa Mesa (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 441, 445 (Mattson) [collateral 

estoppel precludes relitigation of "dispositive factual questions [that] were actually 

litigated" in prior proceeding].)

d. The Decisions Are Final and on the Merits

The Board's decisions affirming those of the administrative law judge are final and 

on the merits. A decision of the Board becomes final six months after it is issued if it is 

not challenged in court during that time. (Unemp. Ins. Code, § 410; Tarkington v. 

California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1502; Long 

Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. State of California (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 155, 169.) Since 

the Department did not seek judicial review of the Board's decisions, they became final 

on May 7, 2008, and May 24, 2009, six months after they were issued. The Board's 

decisions were thus final for purposes of the trial court proceedings. (See Causey v. 

Board of Pension Commissioners (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 484, 490 (Causey) [when 

administrative decision becomes final during pendency of court proceeding, decision may 

be given collateral estoppel effect in court proceeding].) The decisions also were on the 

merits because, as we explained earlier, they "followed a 'full hearing' in which ' "the 

substance of the claim [was] tried and determined." '" (Castillo, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 483; accord, Basurto, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 892.)
16

e. The Department and the Division Are in Privity

The final requirement for application of collateral estoppel is that the party to be 

estopped must have been a party to, or in privity with a party to, the prior proceeding. 

The determination that parties are in privity is essentially a policy decision that the parties 

have a sufficiently close relationship or an identity of interests that justifies application of 

the doctrine of collateral estoppel. (Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 849 (Gikas); 

People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 486-487 (Sims); Kelly v. Vons Companies, Inc. 

(1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1338.) Generally, "the courts have held that the agents of 

the same government are in privity with each other, since they represent not their own 

rights but the right of the government." (Lerner v. Los Angeles City Board of Education 

(1963) 59 Cal.2d 382, 398; accord, Sims, at p. 487; Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. 

State of California (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 521, 535 (Carmel Valley).) But, "[w]here two 

public agencies' interests conflict, there is no privity." (Hudson v. Board of 

Administration (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1330 (Hudson).)

The general rule that agents of the same government are in privity applies here. 

The Department and the Division are both state agencies charged with enforcement of 

laws designed to benefit and protect employees. (See Lab. Code, § 79, 95; Unemp. Ins. 

Code, § 301; Gattuso v. Harte-Hanks Shoppers, Inc. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 554, 563 ["The 

[Division] is the state agency authorized to enforce California's labor laws."]; Air 

Couriers, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 931-932 [describing employee benefit programs 

funded by employers and employees and administered by Department].) The agencies 

thus share the goal of ensuring that workers are correctly classified as employees or 
17

independent contractors. Since, as we have explained, that was the central issue in both 

administrative proceedings, the Division was in privity with the Department for purposes 

of collateral estoppel. (See Gikas, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 864 ["California law is clear that 

when two agents of the state substantially share a goal, resolution of an issue adversely to 

one binds the other."]; Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 487-488 [district attorney involved in 

criminal action was in privity with county social services department involved in prior 

administrative proceeding because both entities acted to control welfare fraud, the issue 

central to both proceedings]; Carmel Valley, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at pp. 530, fn. 1, 

535-536 [state agencies involved in mandate proceeding were in privity with other state 

agencies involved in prior administrative proceeding because all were interested in 

reimbursement issue central to both proceedings].)

3. The Commissioner's Arguments Against Application of Collateral Estoppel 

Have No Merit

The Commissioner argues the Board's decisions cannot operate as a bar to the 

Division's enforcement action because the requirements of collateral estoppel have not 

been met. Specifically, the Commissioner contends: (1) the issues litigated in the two 

proceedings were not identical because the facts presented in the two administrative 

hearings involved different salons and time periods and were otherwise not the same; 

(2) the issue that Happy Nails sought to preclude the Division from litigating, which the 

Commissioner identifies as Happy Nails' liability for failing to provide itemized wage 

statements to the cosmetologists working at its salons during a certain time period, was 

not actually litigated by the Department, which litigated only Happy Nails' tax liability 
18

for an earlier time period; and (3) the Department and the Division are not in privity 

because they were established by different statutes, enforce different statutes and 

regulations, and use different definitions of "employee." The Commissioner also asserts 

that "collateral estoppel should not be applied because public policy dictates that the 

[Division] should not be precluded from making its own determination of employment 

status." We are not persuaded.

a. The Commissioner Misunderstands What Constitutes the "Issue" for 

Preclusion Purposes

The Commissioner's first two arguments proceed from a misunderstanding of what 

constitutes the "issue" for purposes of collateral estoppel in this case. Collateral estoppel 

applies when "'an issue of ultimate fact' " has been previously and finally decided. 

(People v. Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903, 912; California Logistics, Inc. v. State of 

California (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 249; Lucas v. County of Los Angeles (1996) 47 

Cal.App.4th 277, 286.) An ultimate fact is one that involves application of law to fact, 

such as an essential element of a claim or a defense, as distinguished from an evidentiary 

fact or a legal conclusion. (Metis Development LLC v. Bohacek (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 

679, 689; Rest.2d Judgments, § 27, com. c., p. 253; Black's Law Dict. (9th ed. 2009) 

p. 671, col. 1.) Whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor is an issue 

of ultimate fact. (Arnold, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 590; Stoica v. Pocol (2001) 136 

Idaho 661, 664 [39 P.3d 601, 604]; Felice v. St. Agnes Hospital (N.Y.App.Div. 1978) 65 

A.D.2d 388, 396 [411 N.Y.S.2d 901, 907].) Thus, the Board's prior and final decision 

that the cosmetologists working at Happy Nails salons are independent contractors rather 
19

than employees is a decision of an issue of ultimate fact and as such is entitled to 

collateral estoppel effect in the proceedings involving the Division.

b. The Commissioner May Not Avoid Preclusion Based on Differences 

in the Evidence Presented at the Two Administrative Hearings

The Division may not avoid the bar of collateral estoppel simply because evidence 

concerning different salons was presented at the two administrative hearings. It is true, as 

the Commissioner points out, that the hearing to which the Department was a party 

focused on salons in Chino Hills and Irvine, whereas the hearing to which the Division 

was a party focused on Happy Nails of Fashion Valley and Happy Nails of Mira Mesa. 

To streamline the proceedings, however, the Department stipulated that the evidence 

concerning the Chino Hills and Irvine salons would be used to determine Happy Nails' 

petitions for reassessment concerning the other 35 salons, including Happy Nails of 

Fashion Valley and Happy Nails of Mira Mesa. (See Unemp. Ins. Code, § 1951 ["The 

appeals board shall require administrative law judges to consolidate for hearing cases 

with respect to which the alleged facts and the points of law are the same."].) Final 

administrative decisions based on stipulated facts have collateral estoppel effect in later 

administrative proceedings. (Causey, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d at pp. 486, 490; Greatorex 

v. Board of Administration (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 54, 58.) Accordingly, the Board's 

decision that the cosmetologists working at Happy Nails of Fashion Valley and Happy 

Nails of Mira Mesa are independent contractors, which was based on stipulated facts 

from the hearing involving the Department, precludes the Division from relitigating that 

issue.
20

The Commissioner contends the Board's decisions do not bind the Division 

because there are differences in the time periods covered by the two administrative 

hearings and disparities in the facts presented at those hearings.4 The Commissioner 

cites no legal authority to support this contention, however, and the law is actually to the 

contrary. The prior determination of an issue is conclusive in a subsequent proceeding 

between the same parties or their privies not only as to that issue but also as to every 

factual matter which might have been urged to sustain or defeat its determination. 

(Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McConnell (1955) 44 Cal.2d 715, 724-725; Basurto, supra, 

211 Cal.App.4th at p. 888; Frommhagen v. Board of Supervisors (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 

1292, 1301.) Thus, where, as here, the "party against whom preclusion is sought did in 

fact litigate an issue of ultimate fact and suffered an adverse determination, new 

 

4 The Commissioner asserts the assessments at issue in the prior administrative 

hearing to which the Department was a party concerned 2003 and 2004, whereas the 

penalties at issue in the later hearing to which the Division was a party concerned 2007 

and 2008. The Commissioner also claims the evidence at the prior hearing showed the 

cosmetologists were offered the services of a certain payment processor and paid the 

processing fees, were free to set their own hours, were required to have business licenses, 

frequently deviated from the salon's price list, had keys to the salons, and frequently 

worked outside normal salon operating hours. In contrast, the Commissioner contends, 

the evidence at the later hearing showed the cosmetologists were required to use the same 

payment processor, but the salons paid the processing fees from the rent paid by the 

cosmetologists; would be in material breach of their agreements with the salons if they 

were not at the salons during scheduled times; did not have business licenses; could not 

set their own prices for standard services, but could charge additional amounts for 

additional services not on the salon's price list; do not all have keys to the salons; and 

generally do not work outside normal salon operating hours. Lastly, the Commissioner 

states the following facts were not mentioned at the hearing involving the Department but 

were established at the hearing involving the Division: None of the cosmetologists 

advertise their own businesses or keep their own appointment books, and all business 

cards contain the Happy Nails logo.
21

evidentiary facts may not be brought forward to obtain a different determination of that 

ultimate fact." (Rest.2d Judgments, § 27, com. c, p. 253; see Direct Shopping Network, 

LLC v. James (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1561 (Direct Shopping Network) ["new 

evidence, however compelling, is generally insufficient to avoid application of collateral 

estoppel"]; Burdette, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1690 ["'a party may not be permitted 

to introduce new or different evidence to relitigate a factual issue which was presented 

and determined in a former action' "]; MIB, Inc. v. Superior Court (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 

228, 235 ["Plaintiffs cannot escape the bar of the prior decisions by asserting . . . [they] 

have other evidence which was not introduced in the earlier proceedings."].)

The Restatement rule stated above is, of course, not absolute. In particular, 

"collateral estoppel 'was never intended to operate so as to prevent a re-examination of 

the same question between the same parties where, in the interval between the first and 

second actions, the facts have materially changed or new facts have occurred which may 

have altered the legal rights or relations of the litigants.'" (Evans v. Celotex Corp. 

(1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 741, 748 (Evans), italics added; see also People v. Ocean Shore 

Railroad (1948) 32 Cal.2d 406, 418 [collateral estoppel does not apply "where there are 

changed conditions and new facts which did not exist at the time of the prior judgment"].) 

The record here does not establish such a material change in circumstances, however.

Many of the differences the Commissioner perceives in the evidence introduced at 

the two administrative hearings actually do not exist. For example, the agreements 

introduced at both hearings were the same form contracts, which require the 

cosmetologists to have licenses and to use the same payment processor, and require the 
22

salons to give the cosmetologists keys so that they may have access to the salons to do 

their work. Other perceived differences are merely different descriptions, 

characterizations, or interpretations by the administrative law judge and the hearing 

officer of the same or similar evidence introduced at the hearings (e.g., the extent to 

which cosmetologists deviated from the salon's price list or were free to set their own 

working hours). Still other perceived differences resulted from the introduction at the 

hearing to which the Division was a party of evidence concerning minor details that could 

have been, but was not, introduced at the prior hearing to which the Department was a 

party (e.g., whether individual cosmetologists advertise or use business cards containing 

the Happy Nails logo). In any event, the few evidentiary differences that exist do not 

establish that in the time between the two administrative hearings, the relationship 

between the salons and the cosmetologists had changed to such an extent that the 

Division was justified in reexamining the Board's determination that the cosmetologists 

are independent contractors rather than employees.

c. The Commissioner May Not Avoid Preclusion Based on Differences 

in the Statutes Involved in the Two Administrative Hearings

The Division also may not avoid the preclusive effect of the Board's determination 

on the ground the Department sought to impose liability under the Unemployment 

Insurance Code on Happy Nails for contributions and taxes, whereas the Division sought 

to impose civil penalties under the Labor Code for failure to provide itemized wage 

statements. "The application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel depends on whether 

the issue in both actions is the same, not whether the issue arises in the same context." 
23

(First N.B.S. Corp. v. Gabrielsen (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1189, 1195-1196.) Indeed, the 

doctrine typically applies when the two proceedings involve different causes of action or 

forms of relief. (See, e.g., Murray, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 867 [collateral estoppel 

"'"involves a second action between the same parties on a different cause of action" '"]; 

South Sutter, LLC v. LJ Sutter Partners, L.P. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 634, 660-661 

["Most commonly, issue preclusion arises from successive suits on different claims; this 

is referred to as collateral estoppel."]; Lumpkin v. Jordan (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1223, 

1231 (Lumpkin) ["collateral estoppel depends on what issues are adjudicated, not the 

nature of the proceeding or the relief requested"]; Interinsurance Exchange of the Auto.

Club v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 177, 181 ["that different forms of relief 

are sought in the two lawsuits is irrelevant" to application of collateral estoppel]; Evans, 

supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at p. 746 ["Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of the same issues; 

it does not require identity of legal theories or causes of action."].) Thus, what matters 

for purposes of applying collateral estoppel in this case is that "dispositive factual 

questions were actually litigated" and finally decided in the prior administrative 

proceeding. (Mattson, supra, 106 Cal.App.3d at p. 445, italics added.)

d. The Department and the Division Are in Privity Even Though They 

Were Created by and Enforce Different Statutes

Next, the Commissioner contends the Department and the Division are not in 

privity for purposes of collateral estoppel because the two agencies were created by 

different statutes and enforce different statutory and regulatory schemes. We disagree. 

Although the differences identified by the Commissioner establish that the Department 
24

and the Division are separate and distinct entities, "[a] public agency may not avoid 

estoppel by privity on the ground the conduct giving rise to estoppel was committed by 

an independent public entity." (Crumpler v. Board of Administration (1973) 32 

Cal.App.3d 567, 583.) Further, although there is no privity where "two public agencies' 

interests conflict" (Hudson, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 1330), the statutory and 

regulatory differences upon which the Commissioner relies do not show any conflict of 

interest regarding the issue determined by the Department, namely, whether the 

cosmetologists working at Happy Nails salons are employees or independent 

contractors.5 Rather, as we noted earlier, the interests of the Department and the 

Division in that regard are completely aligned. (See pt. II.A.2.e., ante.) Where, as here, 

 

5 In particular, we do not see any significant difference in the definitions of 

"employee" used by the Department and the Division as they pertain to this case. The 

Commissioner contends the Department uses the common law definition of "employee" 

(Unemp. Ins. Code, § 621, subd. (b)), but the Division uses a broader definition found in 

a wage order that "incorporates the common law definition as one alternative" (Martinez 

v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35, 64). The wage order cited by the Commissioner defines 

"employee" for purposes of the personal service industry as "any person employed by an 

employer, and includes any lessee who is charged rent, or who pays rent for a chair, 

booth, or space and [¶] (1) [w]ho does not use his/her own funds to purchase requisite 

supplies; and [¶] (2) [w]ho does not maintain an appointment book separate and distinct 

from that of the establishment in which the space is located; and [¶] (3) [w]ho does not 

have a business license where applicable." (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11020, subd. 2(E).) 

This definition merely took some of the factors from the common law test and adapted 

them to the particular context of the personal service industry. (See Empire Star Mines, 

supra, 28 Cal.2d at pp. 43, 44 [common law factors include "whether the principal or the 

workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools and the place of work for the person doing 

the work"; "whether or not the one performing services is engaged in a distinct 

occupation or business"; and "whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of 

the principal"].) We thus conclude the Department and the Division used substantially 

similar definitions of "employee" in the proceedings at issue on this appeal.
25

"two agents of the state substantially share a goal, resolution of an issue adversely to one 

binds the other." (Gikas, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 864.)

e. Public Policy Does Not Prohibit Giving Preclusive Effect to the 

Board's Decisions

Finally, the Commissioner argues public policy prohibits the application of 

collateral estoppel in this case. More specifically, the Commissioner contends greater 

flexibility is required when applying collateral estoppel to administrative decisions than 

when court decisions are involved, and determining whether a worker is an employee or 

an independent contractor is so fact-specific and the public policy of protecting workers

from misclassification is so great that the Division should be able to make its own 

determination regardless of the determination made by the Department. We reject this 

argument.

Public policy may prevent application of collateral estoppel in certain 

circumstances. Our Supreme Court has held that even when the technical requirements 

for application of collateral estoppel are satisfied, it will be applied "only where such 

application comports with fairness and sound public policy." (Vandenberg v. Superior 

Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815, 835.) Thus, a court may not give preclusive effect to a 

prior decision "if doing so is contrary to the intent of the legislative body that established 

the proceeding in which . . . collateral estoppel is urged" (Brosterhous v. State Bar (1995) 

12 Cal.4th 315, 326), or, more generally, if doing so would not be "fair to the parties" or 

would not constitute "sound judicial policy" (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 343). No 

such concerns prevent application of collateral estoppel in this case.
26

The Commissioner has not identified any law expressing a legislative intent that 

neither she nor the agencies under her control be collaterally estopped from relitigating 

whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor when that issue has been 

previously determined. The Commissioner certainly has a legitimate interest in that issue 

because implementation of the public policy expressed in California's labor laws depends 

on correct classification of workers as employees or independent contractors so that those 

who are employees may secure the benefits and protections to which they are entitled 

under those laws. The Commissioner's interest in that issue is not exclusive, however. 

The Department and the Board also have a legitimate interest in ensuring workers are 

correctly classified as employees or independent contractors, so that the unemployment 

insurance and other programs they administer on behalf of employees are adequately 

funded by employer and employee contributions. (See Air Couriers, supra, 150 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 931-932 [describing unemployment insurance, disability insurance, 

and job placement programs administered by Department for employees].) Thus, the 

Department and the Board must also regularly determine whether a worker is an 

employee or an independent contractor. When the Board makes a final determination of 

that issue, the Commissioner may not disregard that determination and relitigate the 

issue, no matter how zealous her desire may be to enforce the labor laws on behalf of 

employees. (Cf. Lumpkin, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at p. 1231 [public interest in vigorous 

enforcement of antidiscrimination laws did not allow party asserting religious 

discrimination to avoid preclusive effect of prior adverse determination of dispositive 

factual issue]; Acuña v. Regents of University of California (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 639, 
27

652 [public policy against employment discrimination did not allow party to avoid bar of 

prior judgment that resolved race, ethnicity, and age discrimination claims].)

The Commissioner also has not explained how applying collateral estoppel in this 

case would be unfair to the parties or would be unsound judicial policy. In fact, she 

could not do so. As we shall explain, giving the Board's decisions preclusive effect in 

this case clearly would serve the public policies underlying the doctrine of collateral 

estoppel — preservation of the integrity of administrative and judicial proceedings, 

promotion of judicial economy, and protection of litigants from harassment by repeated 

litigation. (Murray, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 879; Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 343; 

Castillo, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at pp. 483-484.)

Giving preclusive effect to the Board's decisions fosters the integrity of both 

administrative and judicial proceedings. The California Supreme Court has held that "the 

possibility of inconsistent judgments which may undermine the integrity of the judicial 

system would be prevented by applying collateral estoppel to the [administrative] 

decision." (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 488.) That possibility exists here because 

businesses "have varying responsibilities with respect to persons performing services on 

their behalf," which "depend, in part, on whether those persons are classified as 

employees or independent contractors." (Cristler v. Express Messenger Systems, Inc. 

(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 72, 76.) For example, under the Board's determination that the 

cosmetologists are independent contractors, Happy Nails has no authority or obligation to 

withhold income taxes or disability insurance contributions from their wages, because 

such withholding is only authorized and required for workers who are employees. 
28

(Unemp. Ins. Code, §§ 984, 986, 13020, 13021; Air Couriers, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 932.) But under the Division's subsequent contrary determination that the 

cosmetologists are employees, which the trial court upheld, Happy Nails must withhold 

those taxes and contributions, and also must provide the cosmetologists with wage 

statements that itemize the amounts withheld. (Lab. Code, § 226, subd. (a).) Hence, if 

collateral estoppel is not applied and these contrary determinations are allowed to coexist, 

"not only the integrity of the judicial system, but also the integrity of the [administrative] 

hearing process will be called into question." (Sims, at p. 488.)6

Giving preclusive effect to the Board's decisions also would prevent the efficacy 

of its proceedings from being undermined by the litigation here. The California Supreme 

Court has held that "[r]efusing to give binding effect to the findings of administrative 

agencies in quasi-judicial proceedings would . . . undermine the efficacy of such 

 

6 At oral argument, the Commissioner's counsel repeatedly and vehemently asserted 

the inconsistency between the two administrative decisions could be avoided if Happy 

Nails simply treated the cosmetologists as employees, as it had done before they 

restructured their business relationship in 2003. Such insistence, in the face of a final and 

binding determination by the Board that the cosmetologists are independent contractors, 

betrays the Commissioner's unwillingness to accept that a worker's status may change 

from employee to independent contractor. The law, however, does not require private 

parties to share the Commissioner's "once an employee, always an employee" mindset. 

Rather, private parties are free to change the nature of their business relationship in 

accordance with the "long-standing established public policy in California which respects 

and promotes the freedom of private parties to contract" (Brisbane Lodging, L.P. v. 

Webcor Builders, Inc. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1262) and which allows them "the 

widest latitude in this regard" (Stephens v. Southern Pacific Co. (1895) 109 Cal. 86, 89). 

Our adoption of the position advocated by the Commissioner's counsel at oral argument 

would effectively nullify the Board's determination and would impermissibly deny 

Happy Nails and the cosmetologists "their freedom to contract as they please" (Rosen v. 

State Farm General Ins. Co. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1070, 1080), which they exercised by 

restructuring their business relationship.
29

proceedings, rendering them in many cases little more than rehearsals for litigation." 

(Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 72.)

"Judicial economy is also served by applying issue preclusion. Allowing the trial 

court to rely on the litigated and necessary findings from the administrative process 

would 'minimiz[e] repetitive litigation.' " (Castillo, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 483.)

"Finally, applying issue preclusion serves the policy of protecting parties from 

vexatious litigation." (Castillo, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 483.) "The purpose of 

collateral estoppel is to prevent a party from repeatedly litigating an issue in order to 

secure a different result." (Direct Shopping Network, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 1562.) 

Here, the Division relitigated the issue of whether the cosmetologists working at Happy 

Nails salons are employees or independent contractors in an attempt to obtain a result 

different from the result reached by the Board, and in doing so forced Happy Nails to 

incur costs and attorney fees in addition to the hundreds of thousands of dollars it had 

already incurred in the proceedings before the Board. Such a "manifestly unfair" 

situation should be avoided by application of collateral estoppel, which is designed to 

protect parties "from being harassed by repeated litigation." (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at 

p. 489.)

"In short, we find no inequity in applying collateral estoppel to bring this litigation 

to a close." (Direct Shopping Network, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 1563.) Under that 

doctrine, the Board's prior, final determination that the cosmetologists working at Happy 

Nails salons are independent contractors, not employees, is binding on the Division and 

prevents it from relitigating that issue to obtain a contrary result.
30

B. The Trial Court Must Consider Happy Nails' Requests for an Injunction and 

Attorney Fees on Remand

In addition to its request that we reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to 

enter a new judgment annulling the Division's findings and orders, Happy Nails asks that 

we direct the trial court to enjoin the Division from asserting in the future that the 

cosmetologists at any of the salons covered by the Board's decisions are employees 

unless the Division makes a preliminary evidentiary showing of a material change in the 

relationship between the cosmetologists and the salons, and to award Happy Nails 

attorney fees. The trial court did not specifically address Happy Nails' requests for an 

injunction or fees, and we decline to do so in the first instance. Rather, as we shall 

explain, these matters must be addressed on remand.

In its complaint, Happy Nails requested a prohibitory injunction and an award of 

attorney fees in addition to a writ of administrative mandate setting aside the Division's 

findings and orders. Although the parties submitted briefs regarding the requested writ 

relief in the trial court, they did not submit briefs on the requested injunction or attorney 

fees, and the court did not rule on those requests. The parties' appellate briefs similarly 

do not directly address Happy Nails' requests for an injunction or attorney fees. 

Ordinarily, we do not consider claims or issues that were not decided by the trial court 

and were not adequately briefed on appeal, and instead deem them forfeited. (See, e.g., 

Hansen v. Board of Registered Nursing (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 664, 672; Cinnamon 

Square Shopping Center v. Meadowlark Enterprises (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1837, 1844.) 

Here, however, Happy Nails' requests for an injunction and attorney fees became moot 
31

when the trial court set a separate hearing on the request for a writ of administrative 

mandate and then denied that request. Under these circumstances, we remand the case to 

allow the parties an opportunity to litigate the issues concerning Happy Nails' requests for 

an injunction and attorney fees. (See, e.g., K.G. v. Meredith (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 164, 

168 [reversing dismissal and remanding matter for consideration of propriety of request 

for mandamus relief that trial court did not address]; Hughes Electronics Corp. v. 

Citibank Delaware (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 251, 271 [remand for litigation of issue was 

appropriate when issue was rendered moot by erroneous trial court ruling].)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded for further proceedings on 

Happy Nails' requests for a permanent injunction and attorney fees. Upon conclusion of 

those proceedings, the trial court shall enter a judgment commanding the Commissioner 

to set aside the Division's findings and orders dated March 30, 2009, and granting Happy 

Nails any other relief to which the court determines it is entitled.

IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

BENKE, Acting P. J.

MCINTYRE, J.