[Cite as State v. Willette, 2013-Ohio-223.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

WASHINGTON COUNTY 

State of Ohio, : 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 : Case No. 11CA32 

v. : 

 : DECISION AND 

Frank K. Willette, : JUDGMENT ENTRY

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : Filed: January 23, 2013 

_____________________________________________________________________ 

APPEARANCES:

Robert W. Bright, Middleport, Ohio, for Appellant. 

James E. Schneider, Washington County Prosecuting Attorney, and Alison L. Cauthorn, 

Washington County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Marietta, Ohio, for Appellee. 

_____________________________________________________________________ 

Kline, J.: 

{¶1} Frank K. Willette appeals the judgment of the Washington County Court of 

Common Pleas, which convicted him of possession of cocaine after denying a motion to 

suppress. Initially, Willette contends that a state trooper conducted an unconstitutional 

pat down of Willette before the trooper placed Willette in a police cruiser. This first pat 

down did not, however, reveal the presence of contraband. Consequently, Willette 

cannot show that he was prejudiced by the allegedly unconstitutional pat down. Next, 

Willette contends that a later pat down of Willette, by a different state trooper, was 

unconstitutional. Because the second pat down of Willette was a legitimate protective 

search for weapons, we disagree. Next, Willette contends that the trial court should 

have granted his motion to suppress because the officer could not have seen the 
Washington App. No. 11CA32 2 

contraband through the outstretched fabric of Willette’s sock. The trial court found that 

the contraband in Willette’s sock was visible. Furthermore, competent credible 

evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact. As a result, Willette’s argument lacks 

merit. Accordingly, we overrule Willette’s assignments of error and affirm the judgment 

of the trial court. 

I. 

{¶2} On September 19, 2010, at approximately 2:45 a.m., Willette was driving 

westbound on State Route 550. There were two passengers in the car with Willette. 

Tyson Butcher was the front-seat passenger, and Walter Harrell was riding in the back 

seat. 

{¶3} At the same time, Trooper John Smith and Sgt. Todd McDonald of the 

Ohio Highway Patrol were in a cruiser travelling on State Route 550. Trooper Smith 

was driving the cruiser, and he initiated a traffic stop of Willette’s vehicle. Willette exited 

the vehicle so that Trooper Smith could conduct a field sobriety test. Trooper Smith 

decided to administer the test in the front seat of the cruiser. And before placing 

Willette in the cruiser, Trooper Smith conducted a routine pat down of Willette. 

(Hereinafter, we will refer to Trooper Smith’s pat down of Willette as the “first pat 

down.”) The first pat down did not reveal the presence of weapons or contraband. 

{¶4} While Trooper Smith conducted Willette’s field sobriety test, Sgt. 

McDonald investigated Butcher. (Sgt. McDonald believed that he saw marijuana on 

Butcher’s shirt.) Eventually, Sgt. McDonald discovered that Butcher had contraband on 

his person, and he suggested that Butcher work with law enforcement by participating in 

a drug purchase. Apparently, Butcher did not want Willette and Harrell to know that he 
Washington App. No. 11CA32 3 

was discussing the possibility of cooperating with law enforcement. And at some point 

during that discussion, Butcher told Sgt. McDonald that Willette and Harrell were 

“killers.” Suppression Hearing Tr. at 71. 

{¶5} As a result of Butcher’s comment, Sgt. McDonald became concerned for 

his and Trooper Smith’s safety. Sgt. McDonald advised Trooper Smith to be on alert. 

Then Sgt. McDonald ordered Willette out of the cruiser to conduct another pat down of 

Willette. (Hereinafter, we will refer to Sgt. McDonald’s pat down of Willette as the 

“second pat down.”) During the second pat down, Sgt. McDonald observed a baggie 

containing a white substance inside Willette’s black sock. Sgt. McDonald stated that 

Willette’s black socks were stretched tight enough that the substance was visible 

through the fabric. Additionally, Sgt. McDonald testified that he believed the substance 

was crack cocaine. Sgt. McDonald seized the substance in Willette’s sock, and Willette 

was placed under arrest. 

{¶6} Willette filed a motion to suppress the evidence found during the traffic 

stop, but the trial court denied Willette’s motion. Eventually, a jury found Willette guilty 

of possession of cocaine. 

{¶7} Willette appeals and asserts the following assignments of error: I. “THE 

TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE FIRST PAT DOWN OF THE 

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT WAS LEGALLY PERMISSIBLE.” II. “THE TRIAL COURT 

ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SECOND PAT DOWN OF THE 

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT WAS LEGALLY PERMISSIBLE.” And III. “THE TRIAL 

COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS THE BAGGIE FOUND IN THE 
Washington App. No. 11CA32 4 

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT’S SOCK AS A RESULT OF THE ILLEGAL SECOND PAT 

DOWN.” 

II. 

{¶8} All three assignments of error challenge the trial court’s denial of Willette’s 

motion to suppress. As a result, we will use the same standard of review for each 

assignment of error. 

{¶9} Our “review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and 

fact. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of 

fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the 

credibility of witnesses.” State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 

N.E.2d 1168, ¶ 100, quoting State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 

797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. Therefore, we “must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they 

are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Burnside at ¶ 8. “Accepting these 

facts as true, [we] must then independently determine, without deference to the 

conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” Id. 

Accord Roberts at ¶ 100; State v. Stepp, 4th Dist. No. 09CA3328, 2010-Ohio-3540, ¶ 

14. 

A. 

{¶10} In his first assignment of error, Willette contends that the first pat down 

was unconstitutional. 

{¶11} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The 

right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
Washington App. No. 11CA32 5 

but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 

the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The Fourth 

Amendment “applie[s] to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.” State v. 

Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 48, 734 N.E.2d 804 (2000). 

{¶12} “For a search or seizure to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, it 

must be based upon probable cause and executed pursuant to a warrant.” Id. at 49, 

citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); 

State v. Brown, 63 Ohio St.3d 349, 350, 588 N.E.2d 113 (1992). This involves a twostep analysis. “First, there must be probable cause.” Moore at 49. “‘Probable cause’ is 

defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion that is supported by facts and 

circumstances, which are sufficiently strong to warrant a prudent person in believing 

that an accused person had committed or was committing an offense.” State v. Jones, 

4th Dist. No. 03CA61, 2004-Ohio-7280, ¶ 40. “If probable cause exists, then a search 

warrant must be obtained unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. If the 

state fails to satisfy either step, the evidence seized in the unreasonable search must be 

suppressed.” Moore at 49, citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 

1081 (1961); AL Post 763 v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm., 82 Ohio St.3d 108, 111, 694 

N.E.2d 905 (1998). 

{¶13} However, “[d]uring a routine traffic stop, an officer may conduct a patdown 

search for weapons upon [an occupant of] the vehicle if the officer has a ‘reason to 

believe that [the officer] is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless 

of whether [the officer] has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.’” State v. 

Kelley, 4th Dist. No. 10CA3182, 2011-Ohio-3545, ¶ 18, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
Washington App. No. 11CA32 6 

1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). “‘The purpose of this limited search is not 

to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without 

fear of violence * * *.’” (Omission sic.) Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373, 113 

S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993), quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 

S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). “If, during a protective search, officers discover 

contraband, it is admissible.” State v. Hackett, 171 Ohio App.3d 235, 2007-Ohio-1868, 

870 N.E.2d 235, ¶ 16 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Goodwin, 2d Dist. No. 21101, 2006-

Ohio-3368, ¶ 15. 

{¶14} Trooper Smith testified that he routinely pats down individuals before 

placing them inside a cruiser. Willette claims that there was no evidence that Trooper 

Smith had a reasonable suspicion that Willette was armed and dangerous. As a result, 

Willette argues that the first pat down was not a legitimate protective search under 

Terry. 

{¶15} Even assuming that the first pat down was not justified under Terry, 

Willette cannot show that he was prejudiced by the pat down. This is so because 

Trooper Smith did not discover any evidence during the first pat down. See State v. 

Hodge, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-1099, 2012-Ohio-4306, ¶ 9 (“[A]ppellant cannot establish 

that the search resulted in prejudice to him because no evidence was obtained from 

it.”); see also State v. Ward, 9th Dist. No. 91CA005069, 1991 WL 274494, *2 (Dec. 18, 

1991). 

{¶16} Accordingly, we overrule Willette’s first assignment of error. 

B. 
Washington App. No. 11CA32 7 

{¶17} In his second assignment of error, Willette argues that the second pat 

down of Willette was unconstitutional because Trooper Smith had already conducted a 

pat down. 

{¶18} “When a protective search exceeds the determination of whether the 

suspect is armed, it is not valid under Terry, and its fruits will be suppressed.” Hackett, 

171 Ohio App.3d 235, 2007-Ohio-1868, 870 N.E.2d 235, at ¶ 13, citing Dickerson, 508 

U.S. at 373, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334. “The rationale for a protective search * * 

* becomes attenuated with successive searches.” Hackett at ¶16, citing Jackson v. 

State, 785 N.E.2d 615, 620 (Ind.App.2003). Thus, “[a] protective search for weapons 

during an investigative search is acceptable to a point.” Hackett at ¶ 17. However, 

“[w]hen the use of multiple protective searches exceeds the rationale behind a Terrytype investigation, it becomes unreasonable.” Id.

{¶19} Here, the evidence shows that Sgt. McDonald had “‘reason to believe that 

[he was] dealing with [] armed and dangerous individual[s].’” Kelley, 2011-Ohio-3545, at 

¶ 18, quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889. The statement that 

Willette and Harrell were “killers” justified Sgt. McDonald’s belief that Willette and Harrell 

may have posed a danger. Additionally, Sgt. McDonald testified about his concerns 

regarding Harrell’s actions: “[T]he back seat passenger actually lays down at some point 

and we can’t even see what he’s doing in the car. So I was concerned that we’d 

probably be in a shooting.” Id. at 76. 

{¶20} Moreover, the evidence shows that Sgt. McDonald took Butcher’s 

statement about Willette and Harrell being killers seriously. After Butcher’s statement, 

Sgt. McDonald immediately called for backup. Sgt. McDonald testified: “I had Trooper 
Washington App. No. 11CA32 8 

Smith exit the cruiser, and then I told him to cover down, which essentially means, draw 

his weapon and to watch.” Suppression Hearing Tr. at 72. Therefore, because Sgt. 

McDonald had reason to believe that he was dealing with an armed and dangerous 

individual, we find that the second pat down was a legitimate, protective search under 

Terry. 

{¶21} Willette argues that “Sgt. McDonald was using a second weapons pat 

down as a mere pretext for a search for drugs on [Willette].” Appellant’s Brief at 14. In 

making this argument, Willette relies on Hackett, 171 Ohio App.3d 235, 2007-Ohio1868, 870 N.E.2d 235. In Hackett, the police suspected that Hackett was carrying 

drugs based on a tip from a confidential informant. Id. at ¶ 5. The police searched 

Hackett twice but did not discover anything. Id. After the informant told the detective to 

look in Hackett’s pants pockets, a third search revealed contraband. Id. In finding the 

third search unconstitutional, the court held that the third search was unrelated to a 

protective search for weapons. See Id. at ¶ 17. 

{¶22} First, as stated above, the second pat down was a legitimate, protective 

search for weapons. Moreover, the evidence demonstrates that the second pat down 

was not a pretext to search Willette for drugs. Sgt. McDonald testified that he was not 

comfortable with Trooper Smith’s initial pat down. Specifically, Sgt. McDonald stated as 

follows: “I’m aware that [Trooper Smith] patted [Willette] down. Doesn’t mean I feel 

comfortable with him not missing something on a pat down.” Id. at 89. The events that 

caused Sgt. McDonald to conclude that he should pat Willette down occurred after

Trooper Smith had already patted Willette down. Thus, considering Butcher’s comment 

and Sgt. McDonald’s observation of Harrell laying down in the back seat, Sgt. 
Washington App. No. 11CA32 9 

McDonald’s concern regarding the adequacy of the first pat down was legitimate. And 

therefore, we conclude that the second pat down was reasonable despite the fact that 

Trooper McDonald had already conducted a pat down of Willette. See generally State 

v. Jaeger, 4th Dist. No. 92 CA 30, 1993 WL 248605, *4 (July 9, 1993) (stating that it 

would be “unreasonable to prevent the police” from conducting a second pat down 

when there was concern regarding the adequacy of the initial pat down) (emphasis sic). 

{¶23} Thus, contrary to Willette’s assertion, the evidence shows that Sgt. 

McDonald was not using the second pat down as a pretext to search for drugs. 

Moreover, the second pat down did not exceed the rationale behind a Terry-type 

investigation. Accordingly, we overrule Willette’s second assignment of error. 

C. 

{¶24} In his third assignment of error, Willette argues that, even assuming the 

second pat down was permissible, Sgt. McDonald’s “story about seeing the plastic 

baggie in [Willette’s] sock is simply unbelievable.” Appellant’s Merit Brief at 16. As a 

result, Willette contends that the trial court should have suppressed the baggie from 

evidence. 

{¶25} As stated above, the second pat down of Willette was a permissible Terry

search. Additionally, a law enforcement officer may seize contraband that he or she 

observes in “plain view” while conducting a Terry search. See State v. Jackson, 11th 

Dist. No. 2011-L-107, 2012-Ohio-2123, ¶ 32; State v. Howard, 146 Ohio App.3d 335, 

341-342, 766 N.E.2d 179 (5th Dist.2001); State v. Hanifon, 11th Dist. No. 90-L-15-173, 

1992 WL 25281, *2 (Jan. 24, 1992); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050, 103 S.Ct. 

3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). 
Washington App. No. 11CA32 10 

{¶26} The trial court found that the contraband in Willette’s sock was in plain 

view. Specifically, the court found (1) that Sgt. McDonald “noted a baggie containing a 

white substance in Willette’s sock” and (2) that “[t]he sock was stretched tightly over 

Willette’s leg so that the substance was visible through the sock.” Ruling on Motion to 

Suppress at 4. The court also found “[t]here was immediate probable cause to believe 

that the substance was cocaine.” Id.

{¶27} Considering our standard of review, we must determine whether 

competent, credible evidence supports the trial court’s findings. Here, there is 

competent, credible evidence that the contraband was in plain view. Sgt. McDonald 

testified that Willette was wearing black socks. Sgt. McDonald also stated as follows: 

“As I looked down, I saw in his sock, his left sock, was pulled so tight, there was some 

contraband in a plastic bag. It looked like crack or cocaine in that baggie. * * * 

[Willette’s] sock was pulled so tight, that the stitching was, I guess, spread, and it, the 

bag was right there, plainly visible.” Suppression Hearing Tr. at 76-77. 

{¶28} Moreover, Sgt. McDonald made a statement during the second pat down 

that demonstrates the contraband in Willette’s sock was in plain view. Sgt. McDonald 

informed Willette that Butcher had drugs. Willette indicated that he was unaware that 

Butcher was carrying drugs. Sgt. McDonald testified that he responded to Willette as 

follows: “And I asked [Willette], why are you so surprised? You got a bag of crack right 

there in your left pocket – or left sock. So it was plainly visible.” Suppression Hearing 

Tr. at 77. 

{¶29} Because competent, credible evidence supports the trial court’s findings of 

fact, we must accept these findings. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 
Washington App. No. 11CA32 11 

797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. As a result, we find that the contraband in Willette’s sock was in 

plain view. And because Sgt. McDonald viewed the contraband during a legitimate 

Terry search, Sgt. McDonald did not violate Willette’s Fourth Amendment rights by 

seizing the contraband that was inside Willette’s sock. 

{¶30} Accordingly, we overrule Willette’s third assignment of error. Having 

overruled all of Willette’s assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 
Washington App. No. 11CA32 12 

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED. Appellant shall pay the costs 

herein taxed. 

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the 

Washington County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. 

McFarland, P.J. & Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion. 

For the Court 

 

 

 BY:_____________________________ 

 Roger L. Kline, Judge 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment 

entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing 

with the clerk.