Attorney Grievance Commission v. Ross D. Hecht, Misc. Docket AG No. 97, September 

Term, 2016. Opinion by Getty, J.

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE — SANCTIONS — INDEFINITE SUSPENSION — The 

Court of Appeals indefinitely suspended with the right to petition for reinstatement after 

twelve months from the date of this opinion an attorney who took on representation of a 

client but was then suspended from the practice of law due to an unrelated matter. While

representing the client, the attorney failed to communicate to his client that he was 

suspended, made misrepresentations to the client about his suspension, continued to render 

legal assistance on behalf of the client, and made misrepresentations to Bar Counsel during 

the investigation. These actions violated the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional 

Conduct Rules 1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4(a) and (b) (Communication), 1.16(a) 

and (d) (Declining or Terminating Representation), 3.2 (Expediting Litigation), 3.3

(Candor Toward the Tribunal), 3.4(d) (Fairness to Opposing Party and Attorney), 4.1

(Truthfulness in Statements to Others), 5.5(a) and (b) (Unauthorized Practice of Law), 8.1

(Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d) (Misconduct).
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County

Case No.: CAE17-06394

Argued: February 5, 2018

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

Misc. Docket AG No. 97

September Term, 2016

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 

OF MARYLAND

v.

ROSS D. HECHT

Barbera, C.J.

Greene,

Adkins,

McDonald,

Watts,

Hotten,

Getty,

JJ.

Opinion by Getty, J.

Greene and Watts, JJ., dissent.

Filed: May 10, 2018
This attorney discipline case involves an attorney who took on representation of a 

client but was then suspended from the practice of law due to an unrelated matter. While

representing the client, the attorney failed to communicate to his client that he was 

suspended, made misrepresentations to the client about his suspension, continued to render 

legal assistance on behalf of the client, and made misrepresentations to Bar Counsel during 

the investigation.

On February 23, 2017, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“Bar 

Counsel”) filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“Petition”) alleging that

Ross D. Hecht (“Hecht”) had violated the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional 

Conduct (“MLRPC”).1 The Petition alleged that Hecht, during representation of Diana 

Lynn Crummitt (“Lynn Crummit”), had violated the following rules of the MLRPC: 1.1 

(Competence); 1.2(a) (Scope of Representation); 1.3 (Diligence); 1.4(a); and (b) 

(Communication); 1.16(a) and (d) (Declining or Terminating Representation); 3.2 

(Expediting Litigation); 3.3(a) (Candor Toward the Tribunal); 3.4(c) and (d) (Fairness to 

Opposing Party and Attorney); 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others); 5.5 

(Unauthorized Practice of Law); 8.1(a) (Bar Admissions and Disciplinary Matters); and 

8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d) (Misconduct).

 

1 Effective July 1, 2016, the MLRPC were renamed the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of 

Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) and moved to Title 19, Chapter 300 of the Maryland 

Rules. This opinion refers to the MLRPC, not the MARPC, because all relevant conduct 

took place before July 1, 2016.
2

By Order dated March 1, 2017, we designated Judge John P. Davey (“the hearing 

judge”) of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County to conduct a hearing concerning 

the alleged violations and to provide findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law. 

Md. Rule 19-722(a). The hearing took place on August 30 and 31, 2017 (“evidentiary 

hearing”). At the hearing, Bar Counsel introduced into evidence various documentary 

exhibits, including Hecht’s correspondence with his client, Lynn Crummitt. Several 

witnesses, including Hecht and Lynn Crummitt, testified.

The hearing judge issued a memorandum opinion in which he made detailed

findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law to this Court on October 25, 2017.

In his recommended conclusions of law, the hearing judge concluded that Hecht violated 

MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.16(a) and (d), 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 4.1, 5.5, 8.1(a), and 8.4(a), (b), and (c).

Both parties filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact and 

recommended conclusions of law. Bar Counsel excepts “to the trial court’s failure to 

conclude that [Hecht] . . . violated Rules 8.1(a) and 8.4(c) during the course of the Bar 

Counsel’s disciplinary investigation, and that the [Hecht’s] conduct, taken as a whole, 

violated Rule 8.4(d).” Bar Counsel recommends that we disbar Hecht. Hecht excepts 

extensively to the trial judge’s factual findings as well as his recommended conclusions of 

law regarding MLRPC 3.3, 3.4, 4.1, 5.5, 8.1, and 8.4. Hecht requests that we continue his 

indefinite suspension.2 On February 5, 2018, we heard oral argument in this matter. For 

 

2 Hecht has been indefinitely suspended since June 15, 2013. Attorney Grievance Comm’n 

v. Hecht, 431 Md. 443 (2013). 
3

the reasons explained below, we indefinitely suspend Hecht with the right to petition for 

reinstatement after twelve months from the date of this opinion.

BACKGROUND

We summarize the hearing judge’s factual findings below.

Beginning of Representation

Hecht was admitted to the Bar of this Court on June 23, 1994. In late September 

2009, Lynn Crummitt was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Frederick County, 

Maryland. In early 2010, Lynn Crummitt and her husband, Irving J. Crummitt (“Jay 

Crummitt”) (collectively, “the Crummitts”) retained Hecht to represent them in a motor 

tort action resulting from the accident on a contingency basis. Hecht filed a complaint on 

behalf of the Crummitts in the Circuit Court for Frederick County. Defendants’ attorney,

Keith M. Bonner (“Bonner”), filed an answer to the complaint and subsequently sent

discovery requests to Hecht on May 9, 2013. 

Hecht’s Suspension

On May 16, 2013, we indefinitely suspended Hecht from the practice of law with 

the right to petition for reinstatement after six months on a matter unrelated to the 

representation of the Crummitts. Hecht’s suspension began on June 15, 2013.

At the evidentiary hearing in the Crummitts matter, the hearing judge found that

“[Hecht], upon his suspension, turned off his office phones and cable and physically took 

the sign off the door of his law office. [Hecht] took these steps with the intent of shutting 

down his law practice” and “[a]lthough [Hecht] attempted to notify his clients in person, 

over the telephone and in writing that he had been suspended from the practice of law in 
4

Maryland, [Hecht] did not withdraw his appearance with the court from the Crummitts’ 

case.”

The hearing judge noted that Hecht believed he had notified the Crummitts of his 

suspension by email, but that he could not confirm that the email had been sent. Although 

Hecht did not specifically withdraw his appearance with the circuit court from the 

Crummitts’ case, he did notify the U.S. District Courts in both Maryland and the District 

of Columbia that he had been indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in Maryland. 

Hecht’s Continued Representation

When neither Hecht nor the Crummitts responded by the discovery deadline,

Bonner sent a letter dated July 1, 2013 to Hecht’s law office stating that if discovery 

responses were not received within ten days that Bonner would file a motion to compel

with the court. In his review of the discovery dispute, the hearing judge found that Hecht 

did not realize until August 6, 2013 that the “Crummitts had not retained new counsel or 

responded to the discovery requests,” which “upset” and “worried” Hecht. The discovery 

responses were not received within the allotted time, and Bonner filed a motion to compel 

discovery. The circuit court granted Bonner’s motion to compel on August 28, 2013 and

issued an order requiring the Crummitts to provide discovery responses within ten days. 

Lynn Crummitt asked Hecht for an update in the status of her case in early 

September 2013. Responding to Lynn Crummitt’s text messages, Hecht did not disclose 

his suspension but did suggest that she meet with Peter Fayne (“Fayne”) to gauge Fayne’s

willingness to serve as the Crummitts’ attorney. This was Hecht’s first attempt at finding 

alternative counsel for the Crummitts. Hecht, claiming to be acting as an informal advisor 
5

rather than a legal practitioner, drafted the Crummitts’ overdue answer to interrogatories, 

response to document requests, and certificate regarding discovery on approximately 

September 19, 2013. Hecht then emailed drafts of these discovery responses to Lynn 

Crummitt for her review. 

The next day, Heidi Hecht, wife of Respondent, followed up with Lynn Crummitt 

by text message to inquire whether Hecht had permission to sign the Crummitts’ names on

the discovery responses. Hecht believed he had permission to sign on behalf of the 

Crummitts, for these and future legal documents, because Heidi Hecht asked Lynn 

Crummitt, “Can Ross sign your signatures and send it in?” and Lynn Crummitt responded, 

“Yes he can.” After receiving Lynn Crummitt’s approval, Hecht signed and emailed the

Crummitts’ discovery responses to Bonner on September 30, 2013. In the same email, 

Hecht apprised Bonner of his suspension from the practice of law. The hearing judge found 

that the text messages were ambiguous as to “which documents Lynn Crummitt was giving 

permission for [Hecht] to sign and whether Lynn Crummitt was giving [Hecht] permission 

to sign for Lynn Crummitt or both Lynn and Jay Crummitt.” 

On October 22, 2013, Hecht recommended that Lynn Crummitt request an extension

since the discovery deadline was the following day and there was an outstanding request 

for records from opposing counsel. Hecht drafted a request for an extension of the 

discovery deadline. The hearing judge found that, without the knowledge or consent of the 

Crummitts, “[Hecht] drafted a request to the court . . . on the Crummitts’ letterhead” and 

signed their names. 
6

Bonner filed a motion to continue the scheduling order, pre-trial conference, and 

trial dates on October 29, 2013. In this motion, Bonner also informed the circuit court of 

Hecht’s suspension from the practice of law in Maryland. Because Hecht was suspended, 

Bonner also sent a copy of the motion to the Crummitts. Thus, the Crummitts first learned 

of Hecht’s suspension when they received this motion directly from Bonner. At the 

evidentiary hearing, Lynn Crummitt testified that when confronted about his suspension, 

Hecht responded that he avoided telling her because he did not want to increase her stress 

level, that his suspension was a “slap on the wrist,” and that he would be reinstated prior 

to her trial. After Lynn Crummitt confronted Hecht about his suspension, Hecht requested 

that she forward all correspondence related to her case to him.

Hecht attended a status conference on December 4, 2013 for the Crummitts’ case. 

At this and all future court proceedings involving the Crummitts’ case, Hecht sat in the 

gallery in support of Lynn Crummitt and did not address the court or step behind the bar 

of the court. Previous to the status conference, Hecht had informed Lynn Crummitt that 

he “couldn’t go in front of the judge” but that he would sit close enough in the gallery that

“if [she] had any problems, he would tell [her] what to say.” At the status conference, 

Lynn Crummitt told Judge Dwyer, “I didn’t realize [Hecht] was gonna be suspended so I 

have been trying to get another attorney.” Lynn Crummitt also notified Judge Dwyer that 

she had an appointment with a new attorney. Bonner informed the court that the Crummitts 

had failed to respond fully to discovery requests. Judge Dwyer rescheduled the status 

conference to December 11, 2013. Judge Dwyer indicated that an updated scheduling order 

would be entered after the Crummitts retained new counsel.
7

Following the status conference, Hecht made a second attempt to secure new 

counsel by recommending Robert Fiore (“Fiore”) at the law firm of Miller & Zois. Lynn 

Crummitt met with Fiore who was noncommittal at the meeting and said he would discuss 

the case with his partners. Afterwards, Miller & Zois sent a letter to Hecht stating they 

would only agree to take the case under certain conditions related to their malpractice 

liability. The hearing judge found that Hecht informed Lynn Crummitt that Miller & Zois 

declined the representation even though Miller & Zois had agreed to take the case if certain 

liability conditions were met. 

At the rescheduled status conference on December 11, 2013, Lynn Crummitt 

appeared while Hecht again sat in the gallery. Bonner moved for dismissal during the 

conference based on the Crummitts’ failure to comply with discovery requests. Lynn 

Crummitt responded that she would provide Bonner with additional documents. Judge 

Dwyer deferred ruling on the motion and scheduled a hearing for January 2, 2014. 

On the morning of the hearing on January 2, 2014, Hecht attempted for the third 

time to secure the Crummitts with new counsel. He arranged a meeting between Aaron 

Blank (“Blank”), an attorney with Fayne’s law office, and Lynn Crummitt. With Hecht in 

the gallery, Blank attended the hearing but told Judge Dwyer that he could not represent 

Lynn Crummitt in her lawsuit unless more time was granted for discovery and the trial was 

postponed. While Blank did not formally enter his appearance, he verbally requested that 

the court reopen discovery in the case. Bonner countered that the case should be dismissed 

because he still had not received the required discovery materials from the Crummitts. 
8

Judge Dwyer reserved on Bonner’s prior motion to dismiss and scheduled trial for January 

21, 2014. 

After this hearing, Hecht drafted Plaintiffs’ supplemental discovery responses and 

emailed them to Lynn Crummitt for her review. Hecht signed Lynn Crummitt’s name on 

both documents. Hecht also drafted two certificates regarding discovery and signed them

without allowing Lynn Crummitt an opportunity to review the documents. Hecht sent the 

documents to Bonner and delivered the discovery materials on electronic media to the 

circuit court.

Before the trial, Blank communicated to Hecht that he could not become counsel 

for the Crummitts until his firm talked to the expert that Hecht had been consulting with

and thus, Blank would not attend the trial on January 21, 2014. Further, Blank stated that 

Hecht did not file expert identification which precluded calling any expert witnesses at 

trial. At the January 21, 2014 trial, Hecht misinformed Lynn Crummitt that Blank would 

not be in attendance due to snow. With Hecht in the gallery, Lynn Crummitt relied on 

Hecht’s false information and informed the court that Blank’s absence was due to snow. 

In response, the circuit court denied Bonner’s motion to dismiss and issued an amended 

Scheduling Order setting a trial date for May 2014.

Thereafter, Hecht drafted twelve discovery documents for the Crummitts during

March 2014. Without showing these documents to the Crummitts, Heidi Hecht signed the 

documents on behalf of the Crummitts. Hecht sent the Crummitts’ discovery documents

to Bonner and filed them with the circuit court. In response, Bonner filed a motion to 

compel the Crummitts’ complete discovery responses and sent a motion indicating that 
9

Bonner intended to depose the Crummitts in early April 2014. The Crummitts forwarded 

both motions to Hecht. Though Lynn Crummitt alerted Hecht that she would be unable to 

be deposed on the date specified by Bonner, Hecht did not inform Bonner of Lynn 

Crummitt’s unavailability until after the deposition was scheduled to begin. 

Bonner again moved to have the case dismissed in early April 2014. In response, 

Hecht drafted a motion to continue trial and sent it to Lynn Crummitt for review. Hecht

signed Lynn Crummitt’s name and filed the motion with the circuit court in late April 2014. 

After submitting this motion, Hecht recommended that Lynn Crummitt meet with 

Elizabeth Cawood (“Cawood”) to see if Cawood would be willing to enter as counsel in 

her case. This was Hecht’s fourth and final attempt to secure new counsel for the 

Crummitts. After an initial meeting, Cawood’s law firm partner decided that the firm 

should decline representation. When Hecht relayed this news to Lynn Crummitt, she 

terminated his representation. On May 14, 2014, the court granted Bonner’s motion to 

dismiss and dismissed the Crummitts’ case with prejudice.

The hearing judge recognized that Hecht was remorseful and had admitted his 

mistakes in the Crummitts’ case. Additionally, the hearing judge concluded that Hecht 

made “numerous unsuccessful efforts to assist Lynn Crummitt in retaining a new attorney.” 

The hearing judge also acknowledged that Hecht “paid $30,000.00 of his personal funds in 

money damages to the Crummitts as restitution for the Crummitts’ lawsuit being 

dismissed.” Finally, the hearing judge noted that Joseph Ruddy, Esq., an Assistant State’s 

Attorney for Prince George’s County, Judge C. Philip Nichols, Jr. of the Circuit Court for 
10

Prince George’s County, and Judge Leo Green, Jr. of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s 

County each testified to Hecht’s competence and truthfulness.

Standard of Review

In an attorney discipline proceeding, this Court reviews for clear error a hearing 

judge’s findings of fact, and reviews without deference a hearing judge’s conclusions of 

law. See Md. Rule 19-741(b)(2)(B) (“The Court [of Appeals] shall give due regard to the 

opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of witnesses.”); Attorney 

Grievance Comm’n v. Chanthunya, 446 Md. 576, 588 (2016) (“This Court reviews for 

clear error a hearing judge’s findings of fact.” (Citations omitted)); Md. Rule 19-

741(b)(1) (“The Court of Appeals shall review de novo the [hearing] judge’s conclusions 

of law.”). This Court determines whether clear and convincing evidence establishes that 

a lawyer violated an MLRPC. See Md. Rule 19-727(c) (“Bar Counsel has the burden of 

proving the averments of the petition [for disciplinary or remedial action] by clear and 

convincing evidence.”).

If exceptions to the findings of fact are filed, the Court “shall determine whether 

the findings of fact have been proved by the requisite standard of proof set out in Rule 

19-727(c).” Md. Rule 19-741(b)(2)(B); See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mahone, 435 

Md. 84, 104 (2013).

DISCUSSION

A. Exceptions to the Hearing Judge’s Findings of Fact
11

Bar Counsel does not except to any of the hearing judge’s findings of fact. Hecht

notes several exceptions to the hearing judge’s factual findings that primarily argue for the 

inclusion of additional information instead of disputing specific findings.

First, Hecht excepts to the hearing judge’s findings of fact and requests to add the 

fact that after his suspension, he did not take on new clients and he referred prospective 

and existing clients to other attorneys. Further, Hecht believed that his appearance in 

criminal cases had been stricken by operation of law, and thus he did not check the mail 

at his closed office for sixty days. Although the hearing judge found that Hecht 

discovered the Crummitts had not retained new counsel on August 6, 2013, Hecht 

contends that he did not realize the Crummitts had not retained new counsel or responded 

to discovery until September 18, 2013. These assertions are supported by Hecht’s

testimony and because Bar Counsel does not dispute Hecht’s testimony as it relates to 

these exceptions, we sustain the exceptions.

Second, Hecht excepts to the hearing judge’s findings of fact and requests to add 

facts regarding his attempts to secure new counsel for the Crummitts. Specifically, after 

his suspension, he contacted and facilitated communication by Lynn Crummitt with four 

attorneys: 

1. Peter Fayne. After communicating in person and by text message on 

May 31, 2013, Hecht believed that Fayne would enter his appearance 

in the Crummitts’ case. 

2. Robert Fiore and the law firm Miller & Zois. At the December 11, 

2013 status conference, Lynn Crummitt told Judge Dwyer that she 

had been in communication with Fiore and Fayne about representation 

and that both attorneys needed a continuance in order to join the case.
12

3. Aaron Blank. Lynn Crummitt represented to Judge Dwyer that she 

had an attorney, referring to Blank, with her at the January 2, 2014 

hearing. 

4. Beth Cawood. When Cawood declined representation of Lynn 

Crummitt, Hecht stated that he had found another attorney willing to 

assist the Crummitts. 

These assertions are supported by Hecht’s testimony and because Bar Counsel does not 

dispute this testimony as it relates to these exceptions, we sustain the exceptions.

Third, Hecht excepts to the factual findings regarding the date that he notified the 

Crummitts of his suspension. His exception states that “on approximately September 18, 

2013, Hecht told Lynn Crummitt that he was suspended, that he would assist her in fending 

off the then-present motion to dismiss, and that Lynn had to hire another attorney, ‘Peter 

or someone.’” Lynn Crummitt testified that at no point during these September 18, 2013 

communications did Hecht admit he was suspended from the practice of law. Lynn 

Crummitt stated that Hecht mentioned Fayne to her, explaining that Hecht wanted Fayne 

involved because he “was a very successful personal injury attorney” and that her case 

“needed a big firm like his for their clout.” Due to Lynn Crummitt’s testimony, we cannot 

conclude that the hearing judge erred in determining the date that he told Lynn Crummitt 

he was suspended. Thus, Hecht’s exception as to when he told Lynn Crummitt that he was 

suspended is overruled.

Fourth, Hecht excepts to the hearing judge’s findings of fact regarding the 

authority for him to sign documents on behalf of the Crummitts. Hecht avers that he had 

the authority to sign the Crummitts’ name on various pleadings and documents after the 

text message conversation between Hecht’s wife and Lynn Crummitt and that Hecht 
13

believed he had the authority to execute certain documents due to his correspondence 

with Lynn Crummitt dated September 20, 2013 and December 31, 2013. While this 

assertion is supported as to the documents referenced in the September 20, 2013 and 

December 31, 2013 communications, it is not clear or reasonable that Hecht had 

continuing permission to sign the Crummitts’ documents before and after these 

communications. As such, Hecht’s exception is sustained to the documents discussed 

during the September 20, 2013 and December 31, 2013 communications, but the 

exception is overruled in regard to any documents in which Hecht did not affirmatively 

ask the Crummitts’ permission to sign.

B. Conclusions of Law

Bar Counsel excepts to the hearing judge’s failure to find that Hecht violated 

MLRPC 8.1(a) and 8.4(c) during the course of the Bar Counsel’s disciplinary investigation, 

and that Hecht’s conduct, taken as a whole, violated MLRPC 8.4(d). Hecht excepts to the 

hearing judge’s conclusions of law regarding MLRPC 3.3, 3.4, 4.1, 5.5, 8.1, and 8.4. Based 

upon our independent review of the record, we sustain Bar Counsel’s exceptions as to 

MLRPC 8.1(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d), overrule Hecht’s exceptions to the hearing judge’s 

conclusions of law, and uphold the rest of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law.

MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 3.2, and 3.4

The hearing judge found Hecht “failed to timely and adequately respond to 

discovery requests on behalf of the Crummitts,” ultimately “resulting in their case being 

dismissed with prejudice,” violating MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 3.2, and 3.4. MLRPC 1.1 requires 

that an attorney “provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation 
14

requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for 

the representation.” MLRPC 1.3 requires that a lawyer must also “act with reasonable 

diligence and promptness in representing a client.” Conduct which violates MLRPC 1.1 

will often also violate MLRPC 1.3. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McCulloch, 404

Md. 388, 398 (2008). Under MLRPC 3.2, a lawyer is required to “make reasonable efforts 

to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.” MLRPC 3.4(d) requires 

that a lawyer not “fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply” with an opposing 

party’s discovery request. Hecht excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that he violated

MLRPC 3.4(d). 

While we acknowledge Hecht’s many attempts to find new counsel for the

Crummitts, Hecht repeatedly failed to comply with discovery deadlines. Hecht’s 

involvement in the lawsuit, both before and after the Crummitts realized he was suspended,

delayed the trial unnecessarily and ultimately caused the case to be dismissed. We 

conclude that these facts display a lack of competent representation, diligence, and 

expedience. Therefore, we agree with the hearing judge and conclude that Hecht’s conduct 

violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 3.2, and 3.4(d) and overrule Hecht’s exception.

MLRPC 1.4 and 1.16

MLRPC 1.4 provides, in part:

(a) A lawyer shall:

(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with 

respect to which the client’s informed consent, as defined in Rule 

1.0(f), is required by these Rules;

(2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;

(3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and
15

(4) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the 

lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects 

assistance not permitted by the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of 

Professional Conduct or other law.

(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to 

permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

MLRPC 1.16(a) states:

(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, 

where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of 

a client if:

(1) the representation will result in violation of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules 

of Professional Conduct or other law:

(2) the lawyer’s physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer’s

ability to represent the client; or

(3) the lawyer is discharged.

MLRPC 1.16(d) provides:

(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent 

reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving reasonable 

notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering 

papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance 

payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred. The lawyer may 

retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law.

The hearing judge found Hecht in violation of MLRPC 1.4 and 1.16 “because 

he failed to specifically notify the Crummitts that he had been suspended from the 

practice of law and could no longer act as their attorney.” Hecht was suspended on 

May 16, 2013, and the suspension began on June 15, 2013. The Crummitts did not 

know that Hecht, who acted as though he was still an active attorney, had been 

suspended until October 29, 2013. Further, they only became aware of Hecht’s 

suspension due to Bonner sending a motion directly to the Crummitts. Even after the 

Crummitts learned that Hecht was suspended, Hecht failed to affirmatively assert to the 
16

Crummitts that he was barred from providing legal services, such as drafting legal 

documents, or rendering legal advice. Based upon these facts, the hearing judge found 

that Hecht was not forthcoming about his suspension or his inability to practice law 

when suspended. Moreover, Hecht’s lack of candor regarding his professional status 

exacerbated the problems facing the Crummitts in pursuing their lawsuit. Accordingly, 

we agree with the hearing judge and hold that Hecht’s conduct violated MLRPC 1.4(a),

1.4(b), 1.16(a), and 1.16(d).

MLRPC 3.3, 4.1, and 5.5

Hecht excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that he violated MLRPC 3.3, 4.1, and 

5.5. The hearing judge found Hecht sent pleadings and discovery responses to the Court 

and Bonner “purported to be prepared by the Crummitts themselves that in fact were 

prepared and signed by [Hecht]” and that Hecht “was untruthful with the Crummitts in 

failing to explain his suspension,” violating MLRPC 3.3 and 4.1. Because of these actions, 

the hearing judge also concluded that Hecht violated MLRPC 5.5. Though he does not 

specifically refer to MLRPC 3.3, 4.1, and 5.5, Hecht argues that “he attempted to 

informally” assist the Crummitts which was “well-intentioned but inartfully executed.” 

The hearing judge concluded that Hecht “misled his client by alleging Aaron Blank 

would not appear at the January 21, 2014 court hearing due to inclement weather and Lynn 

Crummitt repeating the assertion to the court.” According to his testimony, Hecht 

knowingly misrepresented to Lynn Crummitt in an effort to reduce her stress. MLRPC 

3.3(a) states that an attorney must not “make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal.” 

Regardless of his reasoning, Hecht made a false statement to Lynn Crummitt who, acting 
17

on Hecht’s advice and information, unintentionally informed the circuit court of a 

misrepresentation upon which the circuit court relied. The record is clear that Hecht’s 

conduct violated MLRPC 3.3 and therefore, we overrule Hecht’s exception.

Contrary to his assertion, Hecht’s actions rose to the level of performing legal tasks 

rather than, as Hecht argues, informal, non-legal assistance. In certain instances, Hecht 

would sign the Crummitts’ signatures on documents he drafted and submit the legal 

documents to the circuit court or opposing party even though he was suspended. MLRPC 

5.5 forbids an attorney from engaging in the practice of law “in a jurisdiction in violation 

of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction” and forbids a suspended 

attorney from “hold[ing] out to the public” that the attorney is authorized to practice law. 

By not affirmatively telling the Crummitts that he was suspended, Hecht held himself out 

to be an attorney authorized to practice law in Maryland. Hecht’s suspension combined 

with his admission that he drafted various discovery documents on the Crummitts’ behalf 

lead to the inescapable conclusion that Hecht participated in the unauthorized practice of 

law. MLRPC 4.1 states that a lawyer must not “make a false statement of material fact or 

law to a third person.” Hecht was not honest in his communications with the Crummitts, 

opposing counsel, or the circuit court and misrepresented the source of the Crummitts’ 

discovery responses to opposing counsel and the circuit court. Therefore, we agree with 

the hearing judge and conclude that this conduct violated MLRPC 4.1, 5.5(a), and 5.5(b). 

For these reasons, we overrule Hecht’s exceptions.

MLRPC 8.1 and 8.4
18

Bar Counsel excepts to the hearing judge’s failure to conclude that Hecht violated 

MLRPC 8.1(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) based upon Hecht’s alleged misrepresentations to Bar 

Counsel during the disciplinary investigation and Hecht’s overall conduct. Specifically, 

Bar Counsel asserts that Hecht violated MLRPC 8.1(a) and 8.4(c) “by knowingly and 

intentionally testifying falsely that: (a) he notified the Crummitts of his indefinite 

suspension; (b) he simply ‘assisted’ Lynn Crummitt in drafting discovery materials and 

pleadings; and (c) he had obtained the Crummitts’ authorization to affix their signatures to 

all of the documents.” Hecht excepts generally to the hearing judge’s finding that he 

violated MLRPC 8.1 and 8.4. 

MLRPC 8.1(a) requires that a lawyer involved in a disciplinary matter must not 

“knowingly make a false statement of material fact.” The hearing judge found that Hecht

violated MLRPC 8.1(a) based on his submission of an affidavit to Bar Counsel in which 

he “misrepresented to Bar Counsel that he had notified the Crummitts of his suspension.” 

The hearing judge additionally noted that Hecht “had not notified [the Crummitts] and 

continued to give [the Crummitts] legal advice.” The hearing judge recognized that “Mr. 

Hecht testified at the evidentiary hearing that he did email the Crummitts the suspension 

notice; however, he was uncertain if the letter was actually transmitted and took no followup steps.” In his affidavit to Bar Counsel, Hecht stated that his email had been sent to the 

Crummitts, giving them notification of his suspension. While Hecht asserts that he 

believed his email to the Crummitts had been submitted, his subsequent actions, including 

providing the Crummitts with legal services and acting evasively when questioned by the 

Crummitts about his suspension, belie this claim. As such, we believe clear and convincing 
19

evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that Hecht “knowingly and intentionally” 

attempted to deceive Bar Counsel in his submission of an affidavit to Bar Counsel. Thus, 

we find that Hecht violated MLRPC 8.1(a) for this issue, and we overrule Hecht’s 

exception and sustain Bar Counsel’s exception.

Hecht violated MLRPC 8.1(a) by testifying falsely that he only “assisted” Lynn 

Crummitt in drafting discovery materials and pleadings. As we have discussed previously, 

Hecht’s actions clearly rose to the practice of law. The Crummitts did nothing other than 

review or allow Hecht to submit the items he drafted. As such, Hecht violated MLRPC 

8.1(a) for “knowingly and intentionally” testifying falsely that he only “assisted” Lynn 

Crummitt in drafting discovery materials and pleadings, and we overrule Hecht’s exception 

and sustain Bar Counsel’s exception.

Finally, clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that 

Hecht lied under oath that the Crummitts granted Hecht the ability to sign and submit 

documents on their behalf. While the September 20, 2013 text message communication 

between Heidi Hecht and Lynn Crummitt granted Hecht the ability to sign the Crummitts’ 

signatures for those particular interrogatories, the Crummitts did not grant Hecht blanket 

authorization to sign their signatures on any future legal document. It is illogical that these 

text messages would lead an attorney to believe that he had continuing permission to sign 

clients’ signatures on future legal documents. If Hecht believed the September 20, 2013 

communication to be unclear, it was incumbent on Hecht to ask the Crummitts’ permission

to sign future documents. As such, clear and convincing evidence establishes that Hecht’s

conduct violated MLRPC 8.1(a) when he lied under oath that the Crummitts granted him
20

the ability to sign and submit documents on their behalf in the instances described above, 

and we overrule Hecht’s exception and sustain Bar Counsel’s exception.

MLRPC 8.4(a) states that it is professional misconduct for an attorney to “violate . 

. . the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct.” MLRPC 8.4(b) forbids a lawyer 

from “commit[ing] a criminal act that reflects adversely on the attorney’s honesty, 

trustworthiness or fitness as an attorney.” The hearing judge found Hecht violated MLRPC 

8.4(b) because “[n]otwithstanding the fact [Hecht] was suspended from the practice of law, 

[Hecht] continued to practice law and represent the Crummitts as their attorney for a period 

of more than ten (10) months.” As discussed in detail supra, Hecht practiced “law in the 

State of Maryland without an active law license,” committing a criminal offense. Md. 

Code., Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 10-606(c). Hecht’s unauthorized practice of law reflected 

adversely on his honesty and trustworthiness as an attorney. Accordingly, Hecht’s conduct

violated both MLRPC 8.4(a) and (b), and we overrule Hecht’s exception.

A lawyer violates MLRPC 8.4(c) if the lawyer “engage[s] in conduct involving 

dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” The hearing judge further found Hecht 

“misrepresented and mischaracterized to the Crummitts the nature of his suspension” and 

that Hecht “misled the Crummitts and signed, or directed his wife to sign, the Crummitts’ 

discovery responses without their knowledge or consent.” The hearing judge concluded 

that Hecht’s conduct was “clearly dishonest and deceitful” because by “submitting the

discovery materials to opposing counsel and filing the pleadings with the Court, [Hecht]

knowingly gave them the false impression that the Crummitts were representing 

themselves.” As found in our discussion regarding MLRPC 8.1, Hecht engaged in conduct 
21

that involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Therefore, his conduct

violated MLRPC 8.4(c), and we overrule Hecht’s exception.

Under MLRPC 8.4(d), it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in 

conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Bar Counsel excepts to the 

hearing judge not making a finding that Hecht’s conduct violated MLRPC 8.4(d). Bar 

Counsel argues that since Hecht violated both MLRPC 8.4(b) and 8.4(c), Hecht also 

violated MLRPC 8.4(d). In support, Bar Counsel cites to Attorney Grievance Commission 

v. Shryock, in which we stated that, “[o]rdinarily [violations of MLRPC 8.4(b) and (c)] 

would constitute a violation of MRPC 8.4(d), in that the conduct which supports a violation 

of MRPC 8.4(b) and (c) amounts to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.” 

408 Md. 105, 125 (2009). Since we have concluded that Hecht committed a criminal act 

when he engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and that Hecht made multiple 

misrepresentations both to his client and to Bar Counsel, we also determine that Hecht has 

engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, and, as such, his 

conduct violated MLRPC 8.4(d). We overrule Hecht’s exception and sustain Bar 

Counsel’s exception.

SANCTION

As we have often stated, the purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings is to 

protect the public and deter other lawyers from engaging in misconduct rather than simply 

punishing the lawyer. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mollock, 450 Md. 133, 158 (2016). 

The public is protected when sanctions are “commensurate with the nature and gravity of 

the violations and the intent with which they were committed.” Attorney Grievance 
22

Comm’n v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 596 (2005) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 

Ellison, 384 Md. 688, 714 (2005)). This Court has established standards to weigh the 

severity of an attorney’s misconduct.3 

 

3

In determining an appropriate sanction for a lawyer’s misconduct, this

Court considers: (1) the MLRPC that the lawyer violated; (2) the lawyer’s

mental state; (3) the injury that the lawyer’s misconduct caused or could have

caused; and (4) aggravating factors and/or mitigating factors.

Aggravating factors include: (1) prior attorney discipline; (2) a

dishonest or selfish motive; (3) a pattern of misconduct; (4) multiple

violations of the MLRPC; (5) bad faith obstruction of the attorney discipline

proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the

disciplinary agency; (6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or

other deceptive practices during the attorney discipline proceeding; (7) a

refusal to acknowledge the misconduct’s wrongful nature; (8) the victim’s

vulnerability; (9) substantial experience in the practice of law; (10)

indifference to making restitution or rectifying the misconduct’s

consequences; (11) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of

controlled substances; and (12) likelihood of repetition of the misconduct.

Mitigating factors include: (1) the absence of prior attorney discipline;

(2) the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) personal or emotional

problems; (4) timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify the

misconduct’s consequences; (5) full and free disclosure to Bar Counsel or a

cooperative attitude toward the attorney discipline proceeding; (6)

inexperience in the practice of law; (7) character or reputation; (8) a physical

disability; (9) a mental disability or chemical dependency, including

alcoholism or drug abuse, where: (a) there is medical evidence that the 

lawyer is affected by a chemical dependency or mental disability; (b) the

chemical dependency or mental disability caused the misconduct; (c) the

lawyer’s recovery from the chemical dependency or mental disability is

demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful

rehabilitation; and (d) the recovery arrested the misconduct, and the

misconduct’s recurrence is unlikely; (10) delay in the attorney discipline

proceeding; (11) the imposition of other penalties or sanctions; (12) remorse;

(13) remoteness of prior violations of the MLRPC; and (14) unlikelihood of

repetition of the misconduct.

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Allenbaugh, 450 Md. 250, 277–78 (2016) (cleaned up).
23

Bar Counsel recommends that we disbar Hecht. In support of this argument, Bar 

Counsel argues that “[c]onduct involving fraud, dishonesty, or deceit will ordinarily result 

in disbarment absent compelling extenuating circumstances.” Attorney Grievance 

Comm’n v. Gerace, 433 Md. 632, 650 (2012) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ross, 

428 Md. 50, 86 (2012)). 

Bar Counsel argues that the present matter is similar to Attorney Grievance 

Commission v. Maignan because in Maignan, we “disbarred an attorney for knowingly 

engaging in the practice of law at a time when his license to practice law was suspended.” 

423 Md. 191 (2011). The suspended lawyer in Maignan began legal representation of a 

client for a matter before the United States District Court for the District of Columbia even 

though the lawyer was not licensed in the United States District Court for the District of 

Columbia. Id. at 197–98. The lawyer did not alert his client about his suspension until late 

into the representation. Id. at 199. While representing the client, the lawyer advised and 

counseled the client, drafted various pleadings, signed the pleadings on behalf of the client, 

and filed them with the court. Id. at 198. While considering the appropriate sanction, we 

discussed that the lawyer had been disciplined three times in seven years, with the prior 

two cases both resulting in indefinite suspensions for the attorney. Id. at 206. We 

concluded by stating that “[w]hen a member of the legal profession consistently violates 

the Rules of Professional Conduct and continues to disregard repeated admonishments in 

derogation of the trust and confidence of the public, disbarment is the only remedy.” Id.

Hecht asks that we continue his indefinite suspension. Hecht again admits his 

mistakes and states that he was only “motivated by a desire to protect the Crummitts’ legal 
24

interests” rather than “greed or ill-will.” He also points to his “reputation as a competent 

and truthful practitioner” and that he “made restitution to the Crummitts in the amount of 

$30,000 from his own funds.” 

Our holding in Maignan has only marginal value here. In both Maignan and the 

present case, suspended attorneys engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and did not

immediately alert clients to their suspensions. Unlike the attorney in Maignan though,

once suspended, Hecht shut down his law practice and did not begin representation of any 

new clients. Additionally, Hecht’s improper conduct was not motivated by financial gain 

but by, as the hearing judge found, “[a]ttempting to help his wife’s friends.” Hecht made 

multiple attempts to obtain new counsel for his clients whereas the lawyer in Maignan

made no such efforts. Rather than receive a fee for his unauthorized practice of law like 

the lawyer in Maignan did, Hecht reimbursed his clients as restitution for their lawsuit 

ultimately being dismissed. Importantly, Hecht has been suspended once while the lawyer 

in Maignan had been suspended twice before he was ultimately disbarred. 

The hearing judge concluded that four aggravating factors apply to Hecht. Hecht 

received prior attorney discipline when he was indefinitely suspended by this Court on 

May 16, 2013. Additionally, as noted by the hearing judge, Hecht’s conduct involved “a 

pattern of dishonest or deceitful conduct in an effort to delay the resolution of the 

Crummitts’ case” and he “committed multiple offenses when he, for a period of almost ten 

months, practiced law and represented the Crummitts as their attorney without an active 

law license.” Finally, we note that Hecht had practiced law for a significant period of time 

since he had been a member of the Maryland Bar for over twenty years.
25

The hearing court also recognized several mitigating factors. Hecht has repeatedly 

admitted that he made mistakes in the way he handled the Crummitts’ case. As the hearing 

judge noted, Hecht has “expressed remorse for the mistakes he made in this matter and did 

not profit from the Crummitts case,” instead paying the Crummitts $30,000 of his own 

money as restitution. Finally, the hearing judge found that Hecht “made numerous 

unsuccessful efforts to get new counsel to represent the Crummitts and had a reputation as 

a competent and truthful practitioner.”

Although we agree with Bar Counsel that Hecht’s conduct did involve “fraud, 

dishonesty, or deceit” and that conduct involving “fraud, dishonesty, or deceit” usually 

results in disbarment, we conclude there is sufficient mitigation to warrant deviating from 

disbarment in this case. Hecht, upon being suspended, turned away prospective clients and

attempted to inform all of his current clients that he was suspended and could no longer 

represent them. When he discovered that his attempted suspension communication to the 

Crummitts had failed, he made the wrong decision, predicated on worry and a sense of 

loyalty for his wife’s friends, in continuing to act as their attorney while attempting to find 

alternative counsel for them. When the Crummitts’ lawsuit was dismissed, Hecht 

financially reimbursed them. Upon our independent review, we conclude that indefinite 

suspension is the proper sanction. For the reasons found above, we indefinitely suspend 

Hecht with the right to petition for reinstatement after twelve months from the date of this 

opinion.
26

IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT 

SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED 

BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, 

INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL 

TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO 

MARYLAND RULE 19-709(d). 

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR 

OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE 

COMMISSION AGAINST ROSS D. 

HECHT IN THE SUM OF THESE 

COSTS.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

Misc. Docket AG No. 97

September Term, 2016

______________________________________

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 

OF MARYLAND

v.

ROSS D. HECHT

______________________________________

Barbera, C.J.

Greene

Adkins

McDonald

Watts

Hotten

Getty,

JJ.

______________________________________

Dissenting Opinion by Watts, J., which Greene, 

J., joins.

______________________________________

Filed: May 10, 2018

Circuit Court for Prince George’s County

Case No. CAE17-06394

Argued: February 5, 2018
Respectfully, I dissent. I agree with the Majority that Ross D. Hecht, Respondent, 

violated multiple Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”). I 

disagree, however, that imposition of an indefinite suspension with the right to apply for 

reinstatement after twelve months is the appropriate sanction, see Maj. Slip Op. at 3, given 

the numerous instances and serious nature of the misconduct in which Hecht engaged, as 

well as the aggravating factors present, including, most importantly, Hecht’s history of

prior attorney discipline. Under the circumstances of this case, absent any facts that could 

possibly constitute compelling extenuating circumstances, disbarment is the appropriate 

sanction “to protect the public and the public’s confidence in the legal profession.” 

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Allenbaugh, 450 Md. 250, 277, 148 A.3d 300, 316 (2016) 

(citation omitted).

It is undisputed that Hecht has a significant history of prior attorney discipline. See

id. at 277, 148 A.3d at 316. At the time that Hecht engaged in the misconduct at issue, he 

was already indefinitely suspended by consent from the practice of law in Maryland with 

the right to apply for reinstatement after six months. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 

Hecht, 431 Md. 443, 66 A.3d 46 (2013). Indeed, to this day, Hecht remains indefinitely 

suspended from the practice of law in Maryland. Moreover, according to the Commission, 

in September 2008, the Commission reprimanded Hecht for violating MLRPC 1.16(d) and 

8.1(b). Thus, Hecht has two instances of prior attorney discipline, including the serious 

sanction of indefinite suspension, to which he consented, for prior violations of the 

MLRPC.

In this case, Hecht violated a multitude of MLRPC, namely, 1.1 (Competence), 1.3 
- 2 -

(Diligence), 1.4(a), 1.4(b) (Communication), 1.16(a), 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating 

Representation), 3.2 (Expediting Litigation), 3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal), 3.4(d) 

(Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel), 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others), 

5.5(a), 5.5(b) (Unauthorized Practice of Law), 8.1(a) (Disciplinary Matters), 8.(b) 

(Criminal Act), 8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (Conduct 

That Is Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice), and 8.4(a) (Violating the MLRPC). 

See Maj. Slip Op. at 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21. Significantly, Hecht’s violations include 

MLRPC 8.4(b), involving Hecht’s unauthorized practice of law, and MLRPC 8.1(a) and 

8.4(c), involving Hecht’s intentionally dishonest conduct. Hecht violated MLRPC 8.4(b) 

by practicing law and representing the Crummitts while indefinitely suspended from the 

practice of law in Maryland, thereby committing a criminal offense.1 Indeed, the Majority 

concludes that “Hecht’s unauthorized practice of law reflected adversely on his honesty 

and trustworthiness as an attorney.” Maj. Slip Op. at 20.

Importantly, though, Hecht’s dishonest behavior extended beyond engaging in the 

unauthorized practice of law. As the Majority concludes, Hecht engaged in intentionally 

 

1Md. Code Ann., Bus. Occ. & Prof. (1989, 2010 Repl. Vol.) (“BOP”) § 10-601(b)(3) 

(“While an . . . individual’s right to practice law is suspended . . . , the individual may[] 

perform any other act that is necessary to conclude the affairs of a law practice but that 

does not constitute practicing law.” (Paragraph break omitted)); BOP § 10-602 (“Unless 

authorized by law to practice law in the State, a person may not represent to the public, by 

use of a title, including ‘lawyer’, ‘attorney at law’, or ‘counselor at law’, by description of 

services, methods, or procedures, or otherwise, that the person is authorized to practice law 

in the State.”); BOP § 10-606(c) (“Except as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this 

section, a person who violates any provision of this title is guilty of a misdemeanor and on 

conviction is subject to a fine not exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 1 year 

or both.”).
- 3 -

dishonest conduct in several instances. According to the Majority, Hecht violated MLRPC 

8.1(a) in three respects—(1) by “‘knowingly and intentionally’ attempt[ing] to deceive Bar 

Counsel in his submission of an affidavit to Bar Counsel”; (2) by “‘knowingly and 

intentionally’ testifying falsely that he only ‘assisted’ Lynn Crummitt in drafting discovery 

materials and pleadings”; and (3) by “l[ying] under oath that the Crummitts [had] granted 

[him] the ability to sign and submit documents on their behalf[.]” Maj. Slip Op. at 19-20. 

The Majority also concludes that, based on his violations of MLRPC 8.1(a), “Hecht 

engaged in conduct that involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation” in 

violation of MLRPC 8.4(c). Maj. Slip Op. at 20-21. Among other things, Hecht falsely 

testified that he only assisted Lynn Crummitt in drafting discovery materials and pleadings 

when, in actuality, the Crummitts did not draft discovery materials and pleadings, but 

instead simply reviewed items that Hecht had drafted or allowed Hecht to submit items that 

he had drafted. See Maj. Slip Op. at 19. Hecht also “lied under oath” that the Crummitts 

had granted him authority to sign and submit documents on their behalf when, in actuality, 

the September 20, 2013 text message communication between Heidi Hecht and Lynn 

Crummitt simply authorized Hecht to sign specific interrogatories on the Crummitts’

behalf, and did not provide Hecht with a blanket authorization or continuing permission to 

sign for the Crummitts on future legal documents. See Maj. Slip Op. at 19. These instances 

clearly demonstrate that Hecht’s testimony during the attorney discipline proceeding 

involved knowingly false statements of material fact in violation on MLRPC 8.1(a), and, 

correspondingly, conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in 

violation of MLRPC 8.4(c). In other words, Hecht engaged in intentionally dishonest 
- 4 -

conduct.

And, as noted by the Majority, among four aggravating factors, the hearing judge 

specifically concluded that

Hecht’s conduct involved “a pattern of dishonest or deceitful conduct in an 

effort to delay the resolution of the Crummitts’ case” and he “committed 

multiple offenses when he, for a period of almost ten months, practiced law 

and represented the Crummitts as their attorney without an active law 

license.”

Maj. Slip Op. at 24.

Recently, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Smith, 457 Md. 159, 222-23, 177 A.3d 

640, 678 (2018), this Court explained the significance and effect of intentional dishonest 

conduct by a lawyer: 

In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, we articulated our 

admonishment of attorneys who engaged in deceitful behavior to the 

detriment of the public:

Upon reflection as a Court, in disciplinary matters, we will not 

in the future attempt to distinguish between degrees of 

intentional dishonesty based upon convictions, testimonials or 

other factors. Unlike matters relating to competency, diligence 

and the like, intentional dishonest conduct is closely entwined 

with the most important matters of basic character to such a 

degree as to make intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer 

almost beyond excuse. Honesty and dishonesty are, or are not, 

present in an attorney’s character.

Disbarment ordinarily should be the sanction for intentional 

dishonest conduct.

364 Md. 376, 418, 773 A.2d 463, 488 (2001).

Dishonest conduct reflects a range of acts, from misappropriation of 

funds to misrepresentations to a client, Bar Counsel, or the court.

Indeed, this Court has said time and time again that, “[g]enerally, the sanction of 
- 5 -

disbarment is appropriate when an attorney has acted with intentional dishonesty in 

violation of [MLRPC] 8.4(c), absent [compelling] extenuating circumstances.” Smith, 457 

Md. at 223, 177 A.3d at 678 (citations omitted); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 

Guida, 391 Md. 33, 63, 891 A.2d 1085, 1102-03 (2006) (The lawyer “engaged in 

intentional dishonesty and deceit that undermines the trust that must be at the center of the 

lawyer-client relationship. This Court has stated that intentional dishonest conduct by an 

attorney is almost beyond excuse and that disbarment should ordinarily be the sanction for 

such conduct.” (Cleaned up)). In short, intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer is among 

the most serious misconduct that a lawyer can commit, and where a lawyer engages in such 

intentionally dishonest conduct in violation of MLRPC 8.4(c), and where there are no 

compelling extenuating circumstances justifying a sanction less than disbarment, 

ordinarily, disbarment is warranted.

In my view, given Hecht’s intentionally dishonest conduct and other numerous 

instances of misconduct, and that there are no compelling extenuating circumstances, the 

sanction of disbarment is warranted. I would conclude that the mitigating factors found by 

the hearing judge, which the majority opinion accepts—remorse, restitution, and 

reputation, see Maj. Slip Op. at 25—do not constitute compelling extenuating 

circumstances and are insufficient to mitigate Hecht’s misconduct such that a second 

indefinite suspension is appropriate. Obviously, the previous indefinite suspension 

imposed by consent against Hecht was insufficient to protect the public, and it is unclear 

why a second indefinite suspension would somehow now be sufficient given the multitude 

of MLRPC that Hecht violated while indefinitely suspended from the practice of law the 
- 6 -

first time. By imposing an indefinite suspension with the right to apply for reinstatement 

after twelve months, the Majority has given Hecht yet another bite at the apple with respect 

to harming the public and further eroding the public’s confidence in the legal profession. 

With this sanction, despite his intentional dishonest conduct, the Majority has guaranteed 

Hecht yet another date by which he has the right to apply for reinstatement to the practice 

of law in Maryland. In my view, the indefinite suspension imposed by the Majority is 

inadequate to protect the public under the circumstances of the case. 

In sum, given the lack of compelling extenuating circumstances, Hecht’s

intentionally dishonest conduct, his numerous other violations of the MLRPC, the 

aggravating factors present, most importantly his history of prior attorney discipline, and 

recognizing that the misconduct in this case occurred while Hecht was already indefinitely 

suspended from the practice of law in Maryland, I would conclude that disbarment is 

warranted. For the above reasons, respectfully, I dissent.

Judge Greene has authorized me to state that he joins in this opinion.