## IN THE SUPREME COURT O F TEX AS

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. 12-0357

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O N P E T I T I O N F O R R E V I E W F R O M T H E C O U R T O F A P P E A L S F O R T H E F I R S T D I S T R I C T O F T E X A S

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Argued F ebruary 5, 2013

J U S T I C E L E H R M A N N delivere d the opinion of the Court.

I n this interloc utory appea l, we are once ag ain called upon to inter pret and apply the Texas Medica l L iability Act’s (TML A) expert-re port require ment, contained in s e c ti o n 74.351 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Wit h respe ct to health car e liability claims go v er n ed b y the
TML A, a claimant is g ener ally require d to serve an ex pert report on eac h phy sician or health care provider a g ainst whom such a c laim is asserted no late r than 120 da y s after the original petit ion is filed. T E X
. C I V
. P R A C
. & R E M
. C O D E § 74.351(a)

. Fa ilure to do so results in dismiss al of the claim 1

S e c t i o n 7 4

. 3 5 1 ( a ) w a s r e c e n t l y a m e n d e d , a n d t h e a m e n d e d s t a t u t e w i l l t a k e e f f e c t o n S e p t e m b e r 1 , 2 0 1 3

. S e e 1 A c t o f M a y 2 6 , 2 0 1 3 , 8 3 r d L e g . , R

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e r e n c e d f

u r t h e r i n t h i s o p i n i o n .with prejudice and an awa rd of att orney ’s fee s on the motion of the aff ecte d defe ndant. Id. § 74.351(b). The issue prese nted here is whether a claimant’s nonsuit of a health car e liability claim befor e the expiration of the 120-day period tolls the expert-re port period until suit is ref iled. For the

rea sons discussed below, we hold that it does a nd there fore aff

irm the court of a

ppeals’ judg ment. I. Background Scott and Ang ela L idji, as next friends of their daug hter, R.L ., sued CHCA Woman’s Hospital, L .P. d/b/a The Woman’s Hospital of Texas and Woman’s Hospital of Texas, I nc. (CHCA) for injuries su s t ai n ed b y R

. L

. following her prema ture birth. The L idjis alleg e that, as a result of improper trea

tment while in CHCA’s Neona tal I ntensive Care Unit, R.L

. suffe red sever e and
perma nent neurolog ical damag e. The L idjis filed a hea l t h ca re l i ability claim ag ainst CHCA on April 2, 2009 (t h e First Suit). On J uly 27, 2009, 116 day s afte r filing their orig inal petition, the
L idjis nonsuited their claim. J ust over two y ear s later, on Aug ust 15, 2011, the L idjis fi l ed a new lawsuit ag ainst CHCA and sever al other health car e providers (the Second Suit). The same day they 2
filed the Sec ond Suit, the L idjis served an e x pert re port on CHCA. 3
C HC A objected to the repor t as untimely and moved to dismiss the claim ag ainst it wi t h prejudice

. See T E X
. C I V
. P R A C
. & R E M
. C O D E § 74.351(b). CHCA asser ted that the deadline to serve the repor t expired on J uly 31, 2009, which was the 120th day afte r the L idjis fi l ed t h ei r o rig inal

T h e o t h e r d e f

e n d a n t s i n t h i s s u i t a r e W i l l i a m S c o t t J a r r i e l , M

. D

. , K a r e n T

. D e v i l l e , M

. D

. , B r e n d a H

. M c I n t y r e , 2 M

. D

. , D e b o r a h S e l m a E n a d d e G u z m a n , M

. D

. , a n d M e d i c a l C e n t e r N e o n a t o l o g y A s s o c i a t e s , P

. A

. T h e y w e r e n o t n a m e d i n t h e F i r s t S u i t a n d a r e n o t p a r t i e s t o t h e i n t e r l o c u t o r y a p p e a l

.

T h e L i d j i s f i l e d a n d s e r v e d t h e i r o r i g i n a l p e t i t i o n i n t h e S e c o n d S u i t w e l l w i t h i n t h e T M L A ’ s s t a t u t e o f 3 l i m i t a t i o n s . S e e T E X
. C IV
. P R A C
. & R E M
. C O D E § 7 4

. 2 5 1 ( s u b j e c t t o a t e n - y e a r s t a t u t e o f r e p o s e , m i n o r s u n d e r t h e a g e o f 1 2 s h a l l h a v e u n t i l t h e i r 1 4 t h b i r t h d a y t o f i l e , o r h a v e f

i l e d o n t h e i r b e h a l f

, a h e a l t h c a r e l i a b i l i t y c l a i m )

. 2petition in the First Suit. The L idjis responde d that their nonsuit tolled the expert-re port deadline, 4
such t hat t hey had four day s afte r fili ng the original petit ion in the S econd Suit to serve the report on CHCA. The trial cour t overrule d CHCA’s objection and de nied the motion to dism iss.
CHCA appea led the trial court’s order

. See id. § 51.014(a) (9) (allowing an in t erloc utory
appea l from an order deny ing relief soug ht under section 74.351(b))

. The court of appea ls aff irmed, holding that “a claimant’s nons u i t, filed prior to the expiration of section 74.351’s 120-day time period for serving expert repor ts, tolls the running of the 120-da y period until the claimant re- files his claims, at which point the claimant has the time rema ining from the 120-day period to serve the defe ndant with his expert re p o rt

. ” 369 S.W .3d 488, 496. Acc ording ly , the court of appea ls conclude d that the L idjis timely serve d their ex pert report on day 117 of t he st atutory period. See id.
CHCA now seeks interlocutory revie w by this Court. The L idjis moved to dismiss CHCA’s petition for review, arguing that we lack s ubject matter jurisdiction over t he merits of t he appeal.
We first deter

mine whether we have such jurisdiction befor e resolving the substantive issue
prese nted.
II. Interlocutor y Appeal Jurisd iction As indicated above, a party who has been denied relief sought under section 74.351 of the
TML A may seek an interloc utory appea l of the trial cour

t’s order . T E X
. C I V
. P R A C
. & R E M
. C O D E § 51.014(a) (9). Howeve r, the court of appea ls’ judgme nt in an interlocutory appea l is g ener ally final,

C H C A d i d n o t o b j e c t t o t h e r e p o r t o n a n y o t h e r g r o u n d s . 4
3an d we l ack jurisdiction over such case s unless a specific exception applies. T E X
. G O V ’ T C O D E

§ 22.22 5 (b )( 3 ). On e such exception allows us to consider a petition for revie w on interlocutory
appea l in a ca s e i n wh ich the court of appea ls “holds differ ently from a prior decision of another
court of appea ls

. . . on a question of law materia l to a decision of the case .” Id

. § 22.001(a) (2); accord id. § 22.225(c)

. For jurisdictional purposes, “one court holds differ ently from another when there is inconsistency in their respe ctive decisions that should be clar ified to remove unnece ssary

uncer tainty in the law and unfairne ss to litigants.” Id. § 22.001(e)

. CHCA asser ts that the court of
appea ls’ decision in this case conflicts with that of the Third Court of Appea ls in Estate of Allen v. Scott & W hite Clini c , No. 03-08-00576- CV, 2011 WL 2993259 (Tex. App.—Austin J uly 22, 2011, no pet.) (me m. op.), there by confe rring jurisdiction. W e ag ree . I n Estate of Allen , the claimant Estate sued sever al health car e providers under the TML A and nonsuited its claims 118 day s afte r filing its o ri gi n al petition. Id. at *2. Nea rly four months later, the Estate filed a second TML A suit ag ainst the providers and attache d an expert repor t to its petition. Id. On the date the petition in the second suit was filed, the Estate made arr ang ements for the sheriff

’s office to serve the providers with p rocess and furnished the office with the rele vant documents; howeve r, the providers wer e not actua lly serve d with the petition and expert repor t until four day s later. Id. Th e t ri al co u rt g rante d the providers’ motion to dismiss

. Id. The court of
appea ls aff

irmed, holding that the “Estate’ s decision to nonsuit [t he providers ] d i d not toll the
passag e of the 120-day deadline.” Id. at *5. This is the exact opposite conclusion, on the same issue, that the cour

t of appe als rea ched in the c ase a t hand.

4The L idjis contend that the court of appea ls’ discussion of the tolling issue in Estate of Allen

was dicta, as the focus of the parties’ dispute i n that case was not whether the nonsuit tolled the
repor t deadline, but whether the Estate’s service of the repor t two day s after the tolled deadline should r elate back to the date it made arr ang ements for service beca use it a cted with due diligenc e in attempting to serve the providers. The L idjis, howeve r, mischara cter ize the holding in Estate of Allen

. The court of appea ls expressly decide d that case on the tolling issue, holding that the deadline expired befor e “the Estate made arr ang ements to se rve and actua lly serve d [t he provide rs] with i ts expert repor

t.” Id. By resolving the tolling issue ag ainst the Estate, the court of appea ls did not even

rea ch the due diligenc e question. I n fac t, one justice on the panel concur red in the judgme nt on the
g rounds that the Estate had failed to prove that a due-dilig ence exception applied, but never theless disag ree d with the majority opinion, opining that “the f iling of a nonsuit tolls the 120 day s for the period be tween the filing of the nonsuit and the re filing of the s ame claim.” Id. at *6 (Henson, J .,

concur ring in part and dissenting in part).
I n sum, we hold that the Fir st Court of Appeals in the unde rly ing c ase a nd the Third Court of Appea ls in Estate of

Allen held differ ently on a question of law materia l to a decision of the case : whether a plaintiff’s nonsuit of a healt h ca re l iability claim tolls the expert-re port deadline. 5
Acc ording ly , we have jurisdiction over CHCA’s petition for revie w under sections 22.001(a) (2) and 22.225(c) of the Te x as Gove rnment Code.

S e e a l s o W

h i t e v
. B a y l o r A l l S a i n t s M e d

. C t r
. , N o . 0 7

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- C V , 2 0 0 9 W L 1 3 6 1 6 1 2 , a t * 1

– 2 ( T e x . 5 A p p . — A m a r i l l o M a y 1 3 , 2 0 0 9 , p e t

. d e n i e d ) ( m e m . o p . ) ( h o l d i n g p r i n c i p a l l y t h a t t h e c l a i m a n t ’ s n o n s u i t d i d n o t r e s t a r t t h e e x p e r t

- r e p o r t c l o c k a n d a l t e r n a t i v e l y t h a t t h e c l a i m a n t ’ s n o n s u i t d i d n o t t o l l t h e r e p o r t d e a d l i n e )

. 5III. Analysi s of T ollin g Issue

The outcome of this case rests on our interpre tation of various provisi o n s o f the TML A.
Matters of statutory construction are leg al questions tha t w e revie w de novo. Tex. W

. Oaks Hosp.,
LP v. W illiams , 371 S.W .3d 171, 177 (Tex. 2012). The aim of statutory construction is to deter mine and g ive eff

ect t o the L eg islature’s intent, id. , which is g ener ally ref lected in the statute’s plain lang uag e, Prairie View A& M Univ. v. Chatha , 381 S .W.3d 500, 507 (Tex. 2012). We analy ze statutory l anguag e in context, considering the specific section at issue as well as the statute as a whole. In re OAG , ___ S.W .3d ___, ___ (Tex. 2013) (citing Fitzgerald v. Advanc ed Spine Fixation Sys., Inc

. , 996 S.W .2d 864, 866 (Tex. 1999)). The TML A provides a sta t u t o ry fr amewor k g overning health car e liability claims. The
L eg islature’s stated purposes in enac ting the TML A included “re duc[ing] excessive fre quency and

sever ity of health car e liability claims” and “dec rea s[i ng ] the cost of those claims,” but doing so “in

a manner that will not unduly restric t a claimant’s rig hts.” Act of J une 2, 2003, 78th L eg ., R.S., ch. 204, § 10.11(b)( 1)–(3) , 2003 Tex. Gen. L aws 847, 884. We have noted that, with these purposes in mind, “the L eg islature struck a car eful balanc e betwee n era dicating frivolous claims and prese rving meritorious ones.” Leland v. Brandal , 257 S.W .3d 204, 208 (Tex. 2008).
As part of this statutory fra mework, the TML A sets forth the following expert-re p ort require ment:
I n a health car e liability claim, a claimant shall, not later than the 120th day afte r the date the orig inal petition was filed, serve on eac h party or the party ’s attorney one or m o re ex pert repor

ts, with a curr iculum vitae of eac h expert listed in the report fo r eac h phy sician or health car e provider ag ainst whom a liability claim is asser ted. The date for serving the repor t may be extended by written agr ee ment of the aff ecte d

6parties. Eac h defe n d an t p h y sician or health car e provider whose conduct is

implicated in a repor

t must file and serve any objection to the sufficie ncy of the repor t not later than the 21st day afte r the date it was serve d, failing which all objections are waived.
T E X
. C I V
. P R A C
. & R E M
. C O D E § 74.351(a)

. We have descr ibed this “thre shold repor t require ment

as a substantive hurdl e for frivolous medical liability suits befor e litigation g ets underw ay .” Spectrum Healthcare Res., Inc. v. McD aniel , 306 S.W .3d 249, 253 (Tex. 2010). I n this case , we consider the eff

ect of a cla imant’s nonsuit on the statutory expert-re port dea dline.
Severa l courts of appea ls have addre ssed and reje cted the arg ument, which the L idjis do not

asser t here , that a claimant’s nonsuit and subsequent ref iling of a petition asser

ting a health car e liability claim restar

ts the 120-day period to se rve an expert repor t. See, e.g. , Runcie v. Foley , 274
S.W .3d 232, 236 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.); Mokk ala v. Mead , 178 S.W .3d 66, 71, 73 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2005, pet. denied)

. As discussed above, the L idjis arg ue 6

not that the expert-re port period restar ted upon their filing of the Second Suit, but that the period was tolled during the time betwee n the pre- deadline nonsuit of the First Suit and the filing of the orig inal petition in the Second Suit. Thus, t he L idjis contend, they are entitled to a total of 120 day s while their health car e liability claim is pending to serve the repor t. CHCA responds that the L idjis’ filing of the orig inal petition in the First Suit trig g ere d an “expert repor t countdown” and that the TML A contains no lang uag e tolling or abating the dea dline in the event of a nonsuit.

I n M o k k a l a , w h i c h w a s o n e o f t h e f i r s t o p i n i o n s t o a d d r e s s t h e i s s u e , t h e 1 2 0

- d a y p e r i o d h a d e x p i r e d b e f o r e 6 t h e c l a i m a n t ’ s n o n s u i t

. 1 7 8 S

. W

. 3 d a t 6 8 n . 3

. T h e M o k k a l a c o u r t t h u s n o t e d t h a t i t “ n e e d n o t d e c i d e w h e t h e r f i l i n g o f a n o n s u i t b e f

o r e t h e e x p i r a t i o n o f t h e 1 2 0

- d a y p e r i o d w o u l d t o l l ” t h e p e r i o d b e t w e e n t h e n o n s u i t a n d t h e r e f i l i n g o f t h e c l a i m . I d

. 7Under Texas law, parties have “an absolute rig ht to nonsuit their own claims for relief at any

time during the litigation until they have introduced all evidenc e other than rebuttal evidenc e at trial.” Villafani v. T

rejo , 2 5 1 S

. W

. 3d 466, 468–69 (Tex. 2008); T E X
. R. C I V
. P. 162. Howeve r, a voluntary nonsuit does not interrupt the running of the statute of limit ations. See Bailey v. Gardner , 154 S.W .3d 917, 920 (Tex. App

. — Da l l as 2 005, no pet.). The L idjis contend that construing the expert-re port require ment to pro h i b i t tolling in the event of a nonsuit would interfe re with their absolute rig ht to nonsuit the claims in the First Suit and that such leg islative intent is not reflecte d in the statute’s plain lang uag e. We ag ree . The TML A neither expressly allows nor expre s s l y prohibits tolling of the expert-re port period in the event of a claimant’s nonsuit. I n Gardner v. U.S. Imaging, Inc. , howeve r, we held, in the defa ult-judgme nt context, that a defe ndant’s failure to timely answe r af t er proper service of citation tolled the statutory period to serve the expert repor t until the defe ndant made an appea ranc e. 274 S.W .3d 6 6 9 , 6 7 1 (T ex . 2008) (per curia m). The situation at hand is not identical to that in Gardner , but Gardner did not purport to cre ate a lone tolling scena rio. Rather, as noted by the court of appea ls, we rec og nized in Gardner that tolling of the expert-re port period can be proper under

ce rt ain circ umstances notwiths tanding the s tatute’s si lence on the m atter. See 369 S.W .3d at 4 9 4 (citing Gardner , 274 S.W .3d at 671). As we hold today , one such circ umstance is when a claimant nonsuits a health ca

re liability

claim prior to the e x piration of the de adline to serve the re port. Tolling the expert-re port period both protec ts a cl ai m an t ’s absolut e right t o nonsuit and is consistent with the statute’s overa ll structure

. To that end, we ag ree with the L idjis that the various provisions of the TML A’s expert-re port requirem en t , construed toge ther, demonstrate leg islative

8intent that the expert repor t be provided within the context of pending litigation. See, e.g. , T E X
. C I V
. P R A C
. & R E M
. C O D E § 74.351(a) (re quiring service of the repor t on the “par

ty or the party ’s attorney ” and requiring the “def

endant” that is the subject of the repor t to “file and serve ” objections to the sufficie ncy of the repor

t wi t h i n 2 1 day s of service ); id. § 74.351(b) (providing for dismiss al of a claim and an award of attorney ’s fees and costs “on the motion of t he affec ted [ defe ndant] ” i f t h e
repor t is not timely serve d); id. § 74.351(c) (per mitti ng a court to g rant one thirty -day extension to the claimant to cure deficienc ies found i n the report). Construing the TML A to require service of

an expert repor

t in the absenc e of a pending l aw s u i t wo u l d thus g ive rise to a host of proce dural compl i ca t i o n s t h at the statute does not envision and cannot adequately addre ss. We decline to attribute such intent to the L eg islature without a cle ar e x pression of it in the statute’s lang uag e. Our interpre tation of the TML A is also co n s i s t en t with the statute’s purposes of reduc ing
expense and eliminating frivolous cl aim s ear ly in the lawsuit. First, it encour ag es plaintiffs to 7 voluntarily nonsuit claims that appea r to lack merit ear ly in the litiga t i o n p ro cess, without being penalized for doing so in the event additional investiga tion streng thens those claims. Fur ther, when a cla im is nonsui ted, the def endant a g ainst whom the claim was asser ted does not incur additional litigation expenses unless and until the claim is ref iled. Any extra expense incurre d by the defe ndant

as a result of the nonsuit and ref iling will likely be minimal, as a claimant’s lawsuit on a health car e liability claim may only be maintained fo r a fi n i t e period of time without service of the expert

A l t h o u g h t h e T M L A c o n t r o l s “ [ i ] n t h e e v e n t o f a c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n [ t h e T M L A ] a n d a n o t h e r l a w , ” T E X
. C IV
. 7 P R A C
. & R E M
. C O D E § 7 4

. 0 0 2 , w e c o n c l u d e t h e T M L A i s p r o p e r l y c o n s t r u e d a s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e p r o c e d u r a l r i g h t t o n o n s u i t

. 9repor

t. The expert repor

t thus rema ins a “thre shold” require ment that must be met “bef ore litigation 8
g ets underw ay .” Spectrum He a l thcare Res., Inc. , 306 S.W .3d at 253. And of course , health car e liability claimants are subject to the TML A’s overa rching statute of limit ations. T E X
. C I V
. P R A C
. &
R E M
. C O D E § 74.251.
CHCA’s interpre tation of the TML A to prohibit tolling promotes ear ly elimination of health

ca re liability claims without reg ard to their merit. But “[t] he L eg islature’s direc tive that the ci v i l just i ce s y s t em repe l wea k claims stands along side its insistence that malprac tice be penalized.” Hernande z v. Ebro m , 2 8 9 S

. W.3d 316, 329 (Tex. 2009) (Jeffer son, C.J ., dissenting)

. Tolling the expert-re port period when a claimant nonsuits befor e the deadline promotes both s i d es o f the leg islative equation and, when the repor t provisions are proper ly considere d toge ther, eff ectua tes the statute’s plain lang uag e. IV. Conclusion
Be cause we have conflicts jurisdiction over CHCA’s petition for revie w in this interlocutory
appea l, we deny the L idjis’ motion to dismiss

. We hold t h at , wh en a claimant nonsuits a claim
g overne d by the TML A befor e the expiration of the statutory deadline to serve an expert repor t and subsequently ref

iles the claim ag ainst the same defe ndant, the expert-re port period is tolled betwee n the date nonsuit was taken an d t h e d at e the new lawsuit is filed. Her e, the L idjis nonsuited their claims ag ainst CHCA in the First Suit four day s befor e the deadline expired and serve d their expert
repor t on CHCA the same d ay they filed the orig inal petition in the Second Suit. The L idjis thus

T h e p a r t i e s m a y e x t e n d t h e d e a d l i n e b y w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t

. T E X
. C IV
. P R A C
. & R E M
. C O D E § 7 4

. 3 5 1 ( a )

. 8
1 0complied with s ec tion 74.351, and the trial court corr ectly denied CHCA’s motion to dismiss

.

Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the c ourt of appe als’ judg ment.

____________________________________ Debr a H. L ehrma

nn J ustice
OP INION DELIVERED: J une 21, 2013

1 1