III 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. CON. RES. 36 

Expressing the sense of Congress concerning actions to support the Nuclear 

Non-Proliferation Treaty on the occasion of the Seventh NPT Review 

Conference. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 23, 2005 

Mrs. FEINSTEIN (for herself, Mr. HAGEL, Mr. LAUTENBERG, Mr. DURBIN, 

Mr. CORZINE, Mr. FEINGOLD, and Mr. LEVIN) submitted the following 

concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign 

Relations 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

Expressing the sense of Congress concerning actions to support the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on the occasion of the Seventh NPT Review Conference.

Whereas the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 

1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (in this 

resolution referred to as the ‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Treaty’’), codifies one of the most important international security arrangements in the history of arms 

control, the arrangement by which states without nuclear 

weapons pledge not to acquire them, states with nuclear 

weapons commit to eventually eliminate them, and non-
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nuclear states are allowed to use for peaceful purposes 

nuclear technology under strict and verifiable control; 

Whereas the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is one of the 

most widely supported multilateral agreements, with 188 

countries adhering to the Treaty; 

Whereas the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has encouraged many countries to officially abandon nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons programs, including Argentina, 

Belarus, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Libya, South Africa, South 

Korea, Ukraine, and Taiwan; 

Whereas, at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the states-parties agreed to extend the Nuclear 

Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely, to reaffirm the 

principles and objectives of the Treaty, to strengthen the 

Treaty review process, and to implement further specific 

and practical steps on non-proliferation and disarmament; 

Whereas, at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the statesparties agreed to further practical steps on non-proliferation and disarmament; 

Whereas President George W. Bush stated on March 7, 

2005, that ‘‘the NPT represents a key legal barrier to 

nuclear weapons proliferation and makes a critical contribution to international security,’’ and that ‘‘the United 

States is firmly committed to its obligations under the 

NPT’’; 

Whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is 

responsible for monitoring compliance with safeguard 

agreements pursuant to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Treaty and reporting safeguard violations to the United 

Nations Security Council; 
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Whereas Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin 

stated on February 24, 2005, that ‘‘[w]e bear a special 

responsibility for the security of nuclear weapons and 

fissile material in order to ensure that there is no possibility such weapons or materials would fall into terrorist 

hands’’; 

Whereas Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 

calls for the fullest possible exchange of equipment and 

materials for peaceful nuclear endeavors and allows 

states to acquire sensitive technologies to produce nuclear 

fuel for energy purposes but also recognizes that such 

fuel could be used to secretly produce fissile material for 

nuclear weapons programs or quickly produce such material if the state were to decide to withdraw from the 

Treaty; 

Whereas the Government of North Korea ejected international inspectors from that country in 2002, announced 

its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 

in 2003, has recently declared its possession of nuclear 

weapons, and is in possession of facilities capable of producing additional nuclear weapons-usable material; 

Whereas the Government of Iran has pursued an undeclared 

program to develop a uranium enrichment capacity, repeatedly failed to fully comply with and provide full information to the IAEA regarding its nuclear activities, and 

stated that it will not permanently abandon its uranium 

enrichment program which it has temporarily suspended 

through an agreement with the European Union; 

Whereas the network of arms traffickers associated with A.Q. 

Khan has facilitated black-market nuclear transfers involving several countries, including Iran, Libya, and 
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North Korea, and represents a new and dangerous form 

of proliferation; 

Whereas governments should cooperate to control exports of 

and interdict illegal transfers of sensitive nuclear and 

missile-related technologies to prevent their proliferation; 

Whereas the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level 

Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change concluded that 

‘‘[a]lmost 60 States currently operate or are constructing 

nuclear power or research reactors, and at least 40 possess the industrial and scientific infrastructure which 

would enable them, if they chose, to build nuclear weapons at relatively short notice if the legal and normative 

constraints of the Treaty regime no longer apply,’’ and 

warned that ‘‘[w]e are approaching a point at which the 

erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation’’; 

Whereas stronger international support and cooperation to 

achieve universal compliance with tighter nuclear nonproliferation rules and standards constitute essential elements of nuclear non-proliferation efforts; 

Whereas sustained leadership by the United States Government is essential to help implement existing legal and political commitments established by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to realize a more robust and effective global nuclear non-proliferation system; and 

Whereas the governments of the United States and other 

countries should pursue a comprehensive and balanced 

approach to strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation system, beginning with the Seventh NPT Review 

Conference of 2005: Now, therefore, be it 
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1 Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives 

2 concurring), 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This resolution may be cited as the ‘‘Reinforce the 

5 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Act of 2005’’. 

6 SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SUPPORT OF THE NU7 CLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. 

8 Congress— 

9 (1) reaffirms its support for the objectives of 

10 the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and expresses 

11 its support for all appropriate measures to strength12 en the Treaty and to attain its objectives; and 

13 (2) calls on all parties participating in the Sev14 enth Nuclear NPT Review Conference— 

15 (A) to insist on strict compliance with the 

16 non-proliferation obligations of the Nuclear 

17 Non-Proliferation Treaty and to undertake ef18 fective enforcement measures against states 

19 that are in violation of their Article I or Article 

20 II obligations under the Treaty; 

21 (B) to agree to establish more effective 

22 controls on sensitive technologies that can be 

23 used to produce materials for nuclear weapons; 

24 (C) to expand the ability of the Inter25 national Atomic Energy Agency to inspect and 
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1 monitor compliance with non-proliferation rules 

2 and standards to which all states should adhere 

3 through existing authority and the additional 

4 protocols signed by the states party to the Nu5 clear Non-Proliferation Treaty; 

6 (D) to demonstrate the international com7 munity’s unified opposition to a nuclear weap8 ons program in Iran by— 

9 (i) supporting the efforts of the 

10 United States and the European Union to 

11 prevent the Government of Iran from ac12 quiring a nuclear weapons capability; and 

13 (ii) using all appropriate diplomatic 

14 and other means at their disposal to con15 vince the Government of Iran to abandon 

16 its uranium enrichment program; 

17 (E) to strongly support the ongoing United 

18 States diplomatic efforts in the context of the 

19 six-party talks that seek the verifiable and in20 controvertible dismantlement of North Korea’s 

21 nuclear weapons programs and to use all appro22 priate diplomatic and other means to achieve 

23 this result; 

24 (F) to pursue diplomacy designed to ad25 dress the underlying regional security problems 
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1 in Northeast Asia, South Asia, and the Middle 

2 East, which would facilitate non-proliferation 

3 and disarmament efforts in those regions; 

4 (G) to accelerate programs to safeguard 

5 and eliminate nuclear weapons-usable material 

6 to the highest standards to prevent access by 

7 terrorists and governments; 

8 (H) to halt the use of highly enriched ura9 nium in civilian reactors; 

10 (I) to strengthen national and inter11 national export controls and relevant security 

12 measures as required by United Nations Secu13 rity Council Resolution 1540; 

14 (J) to agree that no state may withdraw 

15 from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and 

16 escape responsibility for prior violations of the 

17 Treaty or retain access to controlled materials 

18 and equipment acquired for ‘‘peaceful’’ pur19 poses; 

20 (K) to accelerate implementation of disar21 mament obligations and commitments under 

22 the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty for the 

23 purpose of reducing the world’s stockpiles of 

24 nuclear weapons and weapons-grade fissile ma25 terial; and 
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1 (L) to strengthen and expand support for 

2 the Proliferation Security Initiative. 

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