PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

_______________________

No. 22-2208

_______________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

CLIFTON JUNIUS,

a/k/a MAX,

a/k/a TYJAE,

a/k/a TYJAE RAVENELL,

a/k/a TYJAE JENKINS,

 Appellant

_______________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

District Court No. 2-01-cr-00457-005

District Judge: The Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg

__________________________

No. 22-2267

__________________________
2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

DANIEL COACH, JR., a/k/a SMOKEY, a/k/a PAULIE, 

a/k/a SMOKE,

a/k/a PAUL WESTPHAL, a/k/a UNCLE PAULIE, a/k/a 

SMIZ, a/k/a SKELS,

 Appellant

______________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

District Court No. 2-01-cr-00457-001

District Judge: The Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg

_________________________

Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

September 29, 2023

Before: KRAUSE, AMBRO, and SMITH, Circuit Judges

(Filed: November 20, 2023)
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Joanne M. Heisey

Federal Community Defender Office for the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania

Capital Habeas Unit

601 Walnut Street

The Curtis Center, Suite 545 West

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Brett G. Sweitzer

Federal Community Defender Office for the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania

601 Walnut Street

The Curtis Center, Suite 545 West

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Counsel for Clifton Junius & Daniel Coach

Bernadette A. McKeon

Robert A. Zauzmer

Office of United States Attorney

615 Chestnut Street

Suite 1250

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Counsel for the United States

________________________
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OPINION OF THE COURT

__________________________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Daniel Coach and Clifton Junius appeal the denials 

of their respective motions for sentence reduction under 

the First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 

(2018). They argue that a conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 

848(e)(1)(A) for intentional killing in furtherance of a 

continuing criminal conspiracy is a “covered offense” 

under the Act, and that they are therefore eligible for 

sentencing relief for their convictions under that statute. 

We agree with the District Court that drug-related murder 

in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) is not a covered 

offense under the First Step Act, and we thus will affirm.1

1 In the alternative, Appellants argue that the murder and 

drug charges on which they were sentenced are 

interdependent, so that they are eligible for sentence 

reduction under the sentencing package doctrine. 

However, the sentencing package doctrine does not apply 

to this case. 

This Court has recognized that “when a defendant 

is found guilty on a multicount indictment, there is a strong 

likelihood that the district court will craft a disposition in 

which the sentences on the various counts form part of an 
5

overall plan.” United States v. Davis, 112 F.3d 118, 122 

(3d Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. PimientaRedondo, 874 F.2d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 

U.S. 890 (1989)). Under the sentencing package doctrine, 

if a conviction on one of the component counts of the 

overall plan, or sentencing package, is vacated, and the 

sentences on the underlying counts are interdependent, a 

judge may “review the efficacy of what remains in light of 

the original plan, and []reconstruct the sentencing 

architecture upon remand, within the applicable 

constitutional and statutory limits . . . .” Id. (quoting 

Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d at 14).

This Court recently recognized that “[w]hether two 

sentences are interdependent turns on whether they ‘result 

in an aggregate sentence’ as opposed to ‘sentences which 

may be treated discretely.’” United States v. Norwood, 49 

F.4th 189, 203 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. 

Murray, 144 F.3d 270, 273 n.4 (3d Cir. 1998)). It thus 

follows that the sentencing package doctrine does not 

usually apply to sentences grouped together under the 

Sentencing Guidelines or to concurrent sentences. See id.; 

McKeever v. Warden SCI-Graterford, 486 F.3d 81, 87 (3d 

Cir. 2007). 

The sentences imposed on Coach and Junius for 

murder in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise 

were imposed independently from their cocaine base 

distribution charges. So they were not part of a sentencing 

package. The sentencing court separated the murder 
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I.

This appeal arises from the involvement of Coach 

and Junius in a drug distribution operation in North 

Philadelphia from early 1992 through May 2001. Coach 

was head of the operation and engaged in multiple acts of 

violence, including several homicides. Junius, in his role, 

engaged in long-term drug distribution. Like Coach, he 

engaged in acts of violence, including homicides.

In 2003, Coach and Junius pled guilty to multiple 

charges related to their involvement in the drug 

distribution operation. Coach pled guilty to possession 

with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine 

base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) 

and intentional killing in furtherance of a continuing 

criminal enterprise (“CCE”) in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 848(e)(1)(A), along with other counts.2 Junius pled 

offense of each Appellant from the rest of his offenses. 

The District Court also imposed their sentences on the 

separate offenses to run concurrently. Because it is clear 

that each Appellant’s drug-related murder sentence could 

be treated discretely, the sentencing package doctrine does 

not apply.

2 He also pled guilty to operation of a house for the storage 

and distribution of a controlled substance in violation of 
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guilty to conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of 

cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and 

intentional killing in furtherance of a continuing criminal 

enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A). The 

District Court sentenced Coach to 60 years on each charge 

to which he pled guilty and Junius to 40 years on each 

charge to which he pled guilty. The prison sentences on all 

counts, as to each defendant, are to run concurrently.3

21 U.S.C. § 856 and engaging in a continuing criminal 

enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848. 

3 In addition to determining that 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) 

is not a covered offense under the First Step Act, the 

District Court declined to exercise its discretion to reduce 

defendants’ drug offense sentences. The Appellants argue 

in their opening brief that “[t]his Court cannot be satisfied 

with the district court’s statements that it would not reduce 

Appellants’ sentences if it had the discretion to do so.” 

Appellants’ Opening Brief at 42. They elaborate in their 

reply brief that “the district court cannot have properly 

considered the statutory sentencing factors because it 

misunderstood the currently applicable penalty ranges.” 

Appellants’ Reply Brief at 9 (internal citation omitted).

That is not the case. When judges conduct First Step Act 

resentencings, they must “‘articulate . . . a brief statement 

of reasons’ in which they ‘explain their decisions and 

demonstrate that they considered the parties’ arguments.’” 
8

The District Court also denied all motions that 

Coach and Junius filed seeking sentence reductions. For 

Coach, those included motions to correct the sentence, 

construed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a motion for 

compassionate release, and the instant motion for sentence 

reduction pursuant to the First Step Act. For Junius, they 

included a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the 

sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, post-conviction 

sentence reduction motions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(2), a motion for compassionate release, and the 

First Step Act motion which is at issue here. 

Undaunted by the District Court’s denial of their 

previous motions, Coach and Junius both filed motions 

seeking a sentence reduction under the First Step Act. 

They asserted that their convictions were covered offenses

under the First Step Act, thus making them eligible for 

sentencing relief. Coach and Junius supported their 

United States v. Shields, 48 F.4th 183, 193 (3d Cir. 2022) 

(quoting Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 501

(2022)). For each Appellant, the District Court articulated 

the statutory factors courts consider in adjudicating First 

Step Act motions, acknowledged Appellants’ 

rehabilitation arguments, and explained why it would 

nevertheless exercise its discretion to deny sentencing 

relief. The Court’s alternative analyses were procedurally 

sound and did not otherwise constitute an abuse of 

discretion.
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motions with descriptions of their rehabilitation efforts 

and letters from character references. The District Court 

denied both motions, holding in relevant part that a 

conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) for murder in 

furtherance of a CCE is not a “covered offense” under the 

First Step Act and the sentencing package doctrine is 

inapplicable. Further, the District Court reasoned that, 

even if Coach’s and Junius’ offenses were covered 

offenses under the First Step Act, the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

sentencing factors counsel against reducing their terms of 

imprisonment. 

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 

review statutory interpretation questions and questions 

related to the sentencing package doctrine de novo. United 

States v. Hodge, 948 F.3d 160, 162 (3d Cir. 2020); 

Norwood, 49 F.4th at 200.

III.

The First Step Act operates by making retroactive 

the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,4 a statute which reduced

penalty disparities between offenses involving crack 

cocaine and powder cocaine. See United States v. Birt, 966 

F.3d 257, 259–60 (3d Cir. 2020). Thus, under the First 

4 Pub. L. No. 111–220, 124 Stat. 2372.
10 

Step Act, a district court may reduce a pre-2010 sentence 

“as if the revised penalties for crack cocaine enacted in the 

Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 were in effect at the time the 

offense was committed.” Concepcion, 597 U.S. at 486

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

The First Step Act’s plain language and structure 

confirm that capital murder convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 

848(e)(1)(A) are not “covered offenses” under the Act. All 

of our sister courts of appeals that have considered 

whether a violation of § 848(e)(1)(A) is a covered offense 

under the Act have likewise reached this conclusion. See 

United States v. Roane, 51 F.4th 541, 548–50 (4th Cir. 

2022); United States v. Fletcher, 997 F.3d 95, 97–98 (2d 

Cir. 2021); United States v. Snow, 967 F.3d 563, 564–65

(

6th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).5 Section 404 of the First Step 

5 Further, when considering the issue in the Double 

Jeopardy Clause context, “[e]very court of appeals to 

consider the question has concluded that § 848(e)(1)(A) 

sets forth separate offenses—offenses for which the 

defendant may be prosecuted, convicted, and punished in 

addition to the underlying predicate drug-trafficking 

offenses.” United States v. Vasquez, 899 F.3d 363, 383 

(5th Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. Honken, 541 F.3d 

1146, 1154–58 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. CollazoAponte, 216 F.3d 163, 200 (1st Cir. 2000), cert. granted in 

part and judgment vacated, 532 U.S. 1036 (2001); United 

States v. Snow, 48 F.3d 198, 200 (6th Cir. 1995); United 
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Act, in relevant part, defines “covered offenses” under the 

Act:

(a) DEFINITION OF COVERED OFFENSE.—In 

this section, the term ‘‘covered offense’’ means a 

violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory 

penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 

of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (Public Law 

111–220; 124 Stat. 2372), that was committed 

before August 3, 2010. 

(b) DEFENDANTS PREVIOUSLY 

SENTENCED.—A court that imposed a sentence 

for a covered offense may, on motion of the 

defendant, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, the 

attorney for the Government, or the court, impose a 

reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair 

Sentencing Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–220; 124 

Stat. 2372) were in effect at the time the covered 

offense was committed. 

In Terry v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1858, 1862 (2021), 

the Supreme Court focused on the text in § 404(a) and 

clarified that the term “‘statutory penalties’ references the 

entire phrase ‘a violation of a Federal criminal statute,’” 

States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1104–05 (10th Cir. 

1996)).
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which “thus directs our focus to the statutory penalties for 

petitioner’s offense, not the statute or statutory scheme.” 

Id. at 1863 (emphasis in original). It further instructed that 

a court determining whether an offense is covered under 

the First Step Act must “ask whether the Fair Sentencing 

Act modified the statutory penalties for petitioner’s 

offense.” Id. at 1862.

Section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act expressly 

modified penalties associated with convictions under only 

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), 

960(b)(1)(C), and 960(b)(2)(C). It did so by increasing 

drug quantity thresholds necessary to trigger the 

mandatory minimum sentence for each of these statutory 

provisions. Section 3, by eliminating mandatory minimum 

sentences for cocaine base possession, modified the 

penalties related solely to 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). But the Fair 

Sentencing Act did not modify the statutory penalty for a 

§ 848(e)(1)(A) violation, which remained punishable by a 

mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 20 years 

and a maximum term of life imprisonment or a sentence 

of death.

It is true that a conviction for murder in furtherance 

of a CCE rests on a § 841(b)(1)(A) violation. And the Fair 

Sentencing Act modified the latter statute by raising the 

quantity of crack cocaine, from 50 grams to 280 grams, 

that triggers the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence 

under that subsection. But, as the Sixth Circuit reasoned, 
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the Fair Sentencing Act did not “modify” the penalties for 

the drug-related murder violations of § 848(e)(1)(A) for

which Coach and Junius were convicted. Snow, 967 F.3d 

at 565. Instead, it eliminated liability for violations of § 

848(e) predicated upon drug crimes involving less than 

280 grams of crack cocaine. Id. We agree with the Sixth 

Circuit that it would “put[] great strain on the ordinary 

meaning of the word ‘modify’” to call the elimination of 

statutory penalties a modification of them. Id. Thus, 

because the Fair Sentencing Act did not modify the drugrelated murder penalties under § 848(e)(1)(A), those 

offenses are not “covered” under the First Step Act. 

IV.

As murder in furtherance of a CCE is not a “covered 

offense” under the First Step Act, and since the sentencing 

package doctrine is inapplicable to the facts of this case, 

the District Court was correct to conclude that Coach and 

Junius were each ineligible for sentence reductions. We 

will thus affirm the District Court’s orders denying 

Coach’s and Junius’ motions for sentence reduction.