alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-6735

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JUSTIN DEONTA STROM, a/k/a Jae Dee, a/k/a Jae, a/k/a J-Dirt,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (1:12-cr-00159-LMB-1; 1:15-cv00632-JCC)

Submitted: October 23, 2018 Decided: October 26, 2018

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Justin Deonta Strom, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Justin Deonta Strom seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration of the district court’s June 6, 2017, order, which 

denied relief on two unadjudicated claims initially raised in Strom’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

(2012) motion. This order, which was entered on June 8, 2018, is not appealable unless a 

circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) 

(2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court 

denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that 

reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see MillerEl v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on 

procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural 

ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a 

constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Strom has not made 

the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss 

the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

DISMISSED
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350,**

**As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906**

**of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

Inconnection with the Annual Report of Sport-Haley, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Kfor the year ended June 30, 2005, as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), we, the undersignedInterim Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, docertify, to our knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adoptedpursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)                                  The Report fully complies with therequirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)                                  The information contained in theReport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresult of operations of the Company.

 

Dated:  October 13, 2005

 

 
| /s/ DONALD  W. JEWELL            |   |
|----------------------------------|--------|
| Donald W.  Jewell                |
| Interim  Chief Executive Officer |
|                             |
|                             |
| /s/ PATRICK  W. HURLEY           |   |
| Patrick W.  Hurley               |
| Chief  Financial Officer         |

 

----
**Exhibit31.2**

# **Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

 

I, Douglas P. Baker, certify that:

1.             I have reviewedthis annual report on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2003 of Nano-Proprietary, Inc. (“NNPP”);

2.            Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material factnecessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading withrespect to the period covered by this report;

3.             Based on myknowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present, in all materialrespects, the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of NNPP as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport.

4.             NNPP’sother certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inthe Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for NNPP and have:

a.                Designed such disclosurecontrols and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure thatmaterial information relating to NNPP, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b.                Evaluated the effectiveness ofNNPP’s disclosure control’s and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c.                Disclosed in this report anychange in NNPP’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during NNPP’s most recent fiscal quarter thathas materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, NNPP’s internal control over financial reporting;and

5.             NNPP’sother certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting,to NNPP’s auditors and the audit committee of NNPP’s board of directors:

a.                All significant deficienciesand material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect NNPP’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

b.     Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management orother employees who have a significant role in NNPP’s internal controlover financial reporting. 

 

Date:    March 9, 2004       

 

/s/Douglas P. Baker              Douglas P. BakerChief Financial Officer
Executive Compensation for the Fiscal Year Ended August 31, 2007




 Exhibit 10.8 
 Description of Executive Compensation 
 For the fiscal year ended August 31, 2007 compensation
paid to the executive officers consisted of their individual salaries, a bonus paid equally to all employees in December 2006, Company matching 401K contributions, and for the Chief Executive officer, life insurance premiums paid by the Company.
These amounts were as follows: 
  

																
	 Name and Position
	  	Salary	  	Bonus	  	 401k
 Contribution
	  	Life
Insurance
Premium	  	Total
	 Robert A. Placek
Chairman of the
Board, President and
Chief Executive Officer;
Director
	  	$	179,078	  	$	500	  	$	10,173	  	$	2,883	  	$	192,634
						
	 C. Troy Woodbury, Jr.
Treasurer and Chief
Financial Officer;
Director
	  	$	131,424	  	$	500	  	$	10,173	  	$	—  	  	$	142,097
						
	 Ned L. Mountain
President and Chief
Operation Officer of
WCI; Director
	  	$	140,000	  	$	500	  	$	10,173	  	$	—  	  	$	150,673
#### Rite Aid of New York, Inc., et al., Respondents, v Chalfonte Realty Corp., Appellant.

[963 NYS2d 178]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Melvin L. Schweitzer, J.), entered August 17, 2012, which, to the extent appealed from, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the first cause of action, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Plaintiffs adequately alleged that they did not possess the information necessary to determine that they had been overcharged under the provision of the parties’ commercial lease relating to real estate taxes until 2012, and the documentary evidence submitted by defendant, consisting of annual invoices for real estate taxes and the accompanying documentation, failed to conclusively rebut plaintiffs’ allegations *(compare Goldman Copeland Assoc. v Goodstein Bros. & Co.,*268 AD2d 370 [1st Dept 2000], *lv dismissed*95 NY2d 825 [2000], 96 NY2d 796 [2001]).

Moreover, the lease is silent as to which party bears the responsibility for ascertaining whether the increase in the building’s real estate assessment is attributable to a rise in the value of the building’s commercial units, for which plaintiffs would be partially responsible, or to a rise in the value of the building’s residential units, for which plaintiffs would bear no liability. In addition, plaintiffs adequately alleged that they did not know that defendant was assessing them based on the increase in residential value, because the only documentation of the valuations was provided by the City to defendant, and defendant never forwarded this information to plaintiffs along with the real estate tax invoices, and therefore they had no reason to suspect improper assessments. Under these circumstances, the documentary evidence does not refute plaintiffs’ al*471legations that payments were made under material mistakes of fact and law *(see Dillon v U-A Columbia Cablevision of West*chester, 100 NY2d 525 [2003]).

We have considered defendant’s remaining arguments and find them unavailing.

Concur—Mazzarelli, J.E, Acosta, Renwick, Richter and Gische, JJ.
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 102 (Friday, May 29, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 25719]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-12504]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary


Defense Science Board

AGENCY: Department of Defense.

ACTION: Notice of advisory committee meeting; cancellation.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: On Monday, March 16, 2009 (74 FR 11090-11091) the Department 
of Defense announced closed meetings of the Defense Science Board (DSB) 
Spring Quarterly. On Friday, May 8, 2009 (74 FR 21664) the Department 
of Defense announced that these meetings were rescheduled to June 3-4, 
2009. This notice announces that the Defense Science Board Spring 
Quarterly meetings have been cancelled.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Debra Rose, Executive Officer, 
Defense Science Board, 3140 Defense Pentagon, Room 3B888A, Washington, 
DC 20301-3140, via e-mail at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#abcfcec9d9ca85d9c4d8ceebc4d8cf85c6c2c7"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="e28687809083cc908d9187a28d9186cc8f8b8e">[email protected]</span></a>, or via phone at (703) 
571-0084.

Morgan E. Frazier,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
[FR Doc. E9-12504 Filed 5-28-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001-06-P


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[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 203 (Thursday, October 22, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 54594]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-25302]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division


Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and

    Production Act of 1993--OpenSAF Foundation
    Notice is hereby given that, on September 10, 2009, pursuant to 
Section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 
1993, 15 U.S.C. 4301 et seq. (``the Act''), OpenSAF Foundation has 
filed written notifications simultaneously with the Attorney General 
and the Federal Trade Commission disclosing changes in its membership. 
The notifications were filed for the purpose of extending the Act's 
provisions limiting the recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to actual 
damages under specified circumstances. Specifically, Tail-f Systems AD, 
Stockholm, SWEDEN; and IP Infusion, Sunnyvale, CA have been added as 
parties to this venture.
    No other changes have been made in either the membership or planned 
activity of the group research project. Membership in this group 
research project remains open, and OpenSAF Foundation intends to file 
additional written notifications disclosing all changes in membership.
    On April 8, 2008, OpenSAF Foundation filed its original 
notification pursuant to Section 6(a) of the Act. The Department of 
Justice published a notice in the Federal Register pursuant to Section 
6(b) of the Act on May 16, 2008 (73 FR 28508).
    The last notification was filed with the Department on November 6, 
2008. A notice was published in the Federal Register pursuant to 
Section 6(b) of the Act on December 12, 2008 (73 FR 75772).

Patricia A. Brink,
Deputy Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.
[FR Doc. E9-25302 Filed 10-21-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-11-M
Exhibit 10.1


 


SEPRACOR
INC.


 


0%
CONVERTIBLE SENIOR SUBORDINATED NOTES DUE 2024


 


AMENDMENT TO
PURCHASE AGREEMENT DATED SEPTEMBER 17, 2004


 


 


October 15, 2004


 


Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated

1585 Broadway

New York, New York 10036


 


Dear Sirs and Mesdames:


 


We refer to
the Purchase Agreement, dated September 17, 2004, between Sepracor Inc., a
Delaware corporation (the “Company”) and
Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated, as Initial Purchaser (the “Purchase Agreement”). 
Capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise defined shall have the
meanings assigned to such terms in the Purchase Agreement.


 


The Company
and the Initial Purchaser have agreed to amend the Purchase Agreement, such
amendment to be effective as of the date hereof, by replacing the second
sentence of the second paragraph of Section 2 of the Purchase Agreement, with
the following:


 


“You may exercise this right in whole or from time to time in part by
giving written notice not later than November 29, 2004.”


 


On and after the date hereof, each reference in the Purchase Agreement
to “this Agreement,” “hereunder,” “hereof” or words of like import referring to
the Purchase Agreement, and each reference in the Indenture and the
Registration Rights Agreement to “Purchase Agreement,” “thereunder,” “thereof”
or words of like import referring to the Purchase Agreement, shall mean and be
a reference to the Purchase Agreement, as amended by this Amendment.


 


The Purchase Agreement, as specifically amended by this Agreement, is
and shall continue to be in full force and effect and is hereby in all respects
ratified and confirmed.  The execution,
delivery and effectiveness of this Amendment shall not, except as expressly
provided herein, operate as a waiver of any of your rights, powers or remedies
under the Purchase Agreement, nor constitute a waiver of any provision of the
Purchase Agreement.


 


This Amendment may be signed in any number of counterparts, each of
which shall be an original, with the same effect as if the signatures thereto
and hereto were upon the same instrument.


 


This Amendment shall be governed by and construed in accordance with
the internal laws of the State of New York.


 





















 


	
   

  	
  Very truly yours,

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  SEPRACOR INC.

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  By:

  	
  /s/ Robert F.
  Scumaci  

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Name: Robert F. Scumaci  

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Title: Executive Vice President, Finance

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  and Administration

  
	
  Accepted as of the date hereof

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
  MORGAN STANLEY & CO.

  INCORPORATED

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
  By:

  	
  /s/ Rizvan Dhalla

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  Name: Rizvan Dhalla

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  Title: Vice President
#### TYE v. HERTZ DRIVURSELF STATIONS, Inc.

Civil Action No. 5692.

District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania

Nov. 26, 1947.

M. E. Maurer, of Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Conlen, LaBrum & Beechwood, of Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.

McGRANERY, District Judge.

This was an action under the Fair Labor •Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq., for overtime pay and liquidated damages allegedly due the plaintiff. At trial a verdict was returned for plaintiff, which was later set aside on plaintiff’s motion for a partial new trial. Within ten days after that verdict defendant moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. That motion was denied in my Memorandum Opinion filed June 17, 1947. Defendant has mow filed another motion for a judgment .notwithstanding the verdict, basing it upon the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. A. § 251 et seq. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 50(b), 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, under which authority defendant makes its motion, provides:

> “Within 10 days after the reception of a verdict, a party who has moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict.”

Defendant’s present motion is clearly not timely. Therefore it must be denied.
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<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Wolverine Tube, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-Q for the period ending April 3, 2005 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, Thomas B. Sabol, Chief Financial
Officer of Wolverine Tube, Inc., certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the
best of my knowledge and belief:

      (1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Wolverine Tube, Inc. and will be retained by Wolverine Tube, Inc.
and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.

/s/ Thomas B. Sabol
------------------------------
Thomas B. Sabol
Chief Financial Officer
May 13, 2005
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A18E0017. MORGAN v. CROSS et al.

Corey B. Morgan, a candidate for City Council of the City of Camilla, has

petitioned this Court for a stay pending appeal pursuant to OCGA § 21-2-528. Morgan

is listed on the ballot for City Council, but the local elections superintendent concluded

that his name will be removed because he does not meet the applicable residency

requirements. The superior court agreed with the superintendent’s decision. Morgan

has now filed an emergency motion for a stay pending review before this Court. See

OCGA § 21-2-528. Appellate jurisdiction over Morgan’s case, however, lies in the

Supreme Court.

The Georgia Constitution provides that the Supreme Court of Georgia has

exclusive appellate jurisdiction over “[a]ll cases of election contest.” Ga. Const. of

1983 Art. VI, § VI, Para. II (2). The Supreme Court has determined that “the phrase

‘[a]ll cases of election contest’ as used in the 1983 Constitution includes . . .

challenges to the candidates for and results of elections[.]” Cook v. Bd. of Registrars,

291 Ga. 67, 70 (2) (a) (2) (727 SE2d 478) (2012). Thus, where a candidate seeks

review of a local authority’s decision that he is disqualified from serving in the position

because he does not satisfy the relevant residency requirement, the Supreme Court has

exclusive jurisdiction to resolve his appeal. Burgess v. Liberty County Bd. of

Elections, 291 Ga. 802, 802-803 (1) (733 SE2d 774) (2012).

1

1 Pursuant to the Appellate Jurisdiction Reform Act of 2016, the Court of

Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the denial of a nomination

petition in which the notice of appeal or application to appeal was filed on or after

October 27, 2017
Here, Morgan seeks review of the local superintendent’s decision that he is

disqualified from the City Council position because he does not satisfy the residency

requirements. Accordingly, appellate jurisdiction lies in the Supreme Court, and this

emergency motion for a stay is hereby TRANSFERRED to the Supreme Court. See

id.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

C l e r k ’ s O f f i c e ,

Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

January 1, 2017. OCGA § 21-2-171; see Ga. L. 2016, p. 883, § 6-1 (c) (effective

date). The Act also provides that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to consider

an application for stay pending appeal. OCGA § 21-2-528. Here, Morgan is not

challenging a decision on his nomination petition, so these provisions do not apply.

10/27/2017