J-S29014-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

DANIEL C. HARRIS 

 Appellant No. 1291 MDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 10, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0002176-2012 

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., WECHT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

 

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.: FILED AUGUST 22, 2014 

 Appellant, Daniel C. Harris, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered January 10, 2013, by the Honorable Richard A. Lewis, Court of 

Common Pleas of Dauphin County. We affirm. 

 On the evening of February 20, 2012, Harrisburg City Police Officers 

were dispatched to an apartment located at 1416 Thompson Street to 

investigate a reported shooting.1

 Therein, police discovered the victim, Matt 

Harrell, lying in a fetal position on the floor next to a bed with a gunshot 

wound to the back of the head. The victim was pronounced dead at the 

scene. Eyewitnesses Chuck Long, Tandra Jones and Thalia Waddell, who 

____________________________________________ 

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 For a detailed recitation of the facts and history of this case, we direct the 

reader to the trial court’s well-written memorandum opinion. See Trial 

Court Opinion, 11/20/13 at 3-19.
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were present at the time of the shooting, observed that a fight had ensued 

between Harris, who had been at the apartment selling crack cocaine, and 

the victim, because Harris believed the victim had stolen a bag of drugs. 

During the altercation, Harris shot the victim, who then fell off a bed onto 

the floor. Harris reportedly then stood over the victim and shot him several 

more times, including a shot to the back of the head, while the victim was 

on his knees on the floor. Shortly thereafter, Long reported the crime to the 

police. Both Long and Jones identified Harris as the shooter. 

 Harris was arrested and charged with, among other crimes, one count 

of Criminal Homicide2

 and Firearms Not to be Carried without a License.3 

Following a jury trial, on January 10, 2013, Harris was convicted of both 

charges and sentenced to an aggregate term of life imprisonment. On April 

26, 2013, by agreement with the Commonwealth, the trial court reinstated 

Harris’s appellate rights nunc pro tunc. Thereafter, on May 6, 2013, Harris 

filed a post-sentence motion requesting a new trial, which the court denied 

on June 18, 2013. This timely appeal followed. 

On appeal, Harris raises the following issues for our review: 

I. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Harris’s] PostSentence Motion where the jury’s verdict was against the 

weight of the evidence so as to shock one’s sense of 

justice where the Commonwealth: presented the 

unreliable, contradictory, and inconsistent testimony of 

____________________________________________ 

2 18 PA.CONS.STAT.ANN. § 2501(a). 

3 18 PA.CONS.STAT.ANN. § 6106. 
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Tandras Jones, Charles Long, and Thalia Waddell, and; 

[sic] failed to prove that Appellant committed the crimes 

charged? 

II. Assuming arguendo that [Harris] was the shooter, whether 

the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to 

sustain [Harris’s] convictions where the Commonwealth 

failed to prove that [Harris] possessed specific intent and

... instead acted out of a sudden and intense passion and 

self-defense? 

Appellant’s Brief at 5. 

 Harris challenges both the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence 

in support of his convictions. We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence as follows: 

The standard we apply when reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we 

may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the 

fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt 

may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so 

weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of 

fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The 

Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element 

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly 

circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, 

the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually 

received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while 

passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the 

evidence produced is free to believe all, part or none of the 

evidence. Furthermore, when reviewing a sufficiency claim, our 

Court is required to give the prosecution the benefit of all 

reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. 

However, the inferences must flow from facts and circumstances 

proven in the record, and must be of such volume and quality as 

to overcome the presumption of innocence and satisfy the jury 
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of an accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The trier of fact 

cannot base a conviction on conjecture and speculation and a 

verdict which is premised on suspicion will fail even under the 

limited scrutiny of appellate review. 

Commonwealth v. Slocum, 86 A.3d 272, 275-276 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citation omitted). 

 Conversely, a challenge to the weight of the evidence “concedes that 

the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict, but seeks a new trial on the 

ground that the evidence was so one-sided or so weighted in favor of 

acquittal that a guilty verdict shocks one's sense of justice.” 

Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983, 1015 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted). Our standard when reviewing a weight of the evidence claim is 

well settled. 

A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion 

of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a 

mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same 

facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, “the 

role of the trial judge is to determine that ‘notwithstanding all 

the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to 

ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to 

deny justice.’ ” It has often been stated that “a new trial should 

be awarded when the jury's verdict is so contrary to the 

evidence as to shock one's sense of justice and the award of a 

new trial is imperative so that right may be given another 

opportunity to prevail.”

An appellate court's standard of review when presented with a 

weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of 

review applied by the trial court: 

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the

exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of 

whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. 

Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear 
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and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will

give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons 

advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court's 

determination that the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting 

or denying a new trial is the lower court's conviction that 

the verdict was or was not against the weight of the 

evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the 

interest of justice. 

This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by the trial 

court in granting or denying a motion for a new trial based on a 

challenge to the weight of the evidence is unfettered. In 

describing the limits of a trial court's discretion, we have 

explained: 

The term “discretion” imports the exercise of judgment, 

wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion 

within the framework of the law, and is not exercised for 

the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge. 

Discretion must be exercised on the foundation of reason, 

as opposed to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or

arbitrary actions. Discretion is abused where the course 

pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, but 

where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where

the law is not applied or where the record shows that the 

action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. 

Id. at 1015-1016 (citation omitted). 

 Instantly, Harris first argues that the testimony of Commonwealth 

witnesses Jones, Long, and Waddell was so unreliable, contradictory and 

inconsistent as to render the verdict against the weight of the evidence. 

Specifically, Harris alleges the witnesses did not accurately describe the 

outfit worn by Harris the night of the murder, that they incorrectly testified 

that Harris was covered in the victim’s blood, and that the witnesses were 

habitual drug abusers who had previous convictions for crimes involving 

dishonesty. Appellant’s Brief at 12-13. 
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Our review of the record reveals that, on the whole, the witnesses’ 

accounts of the shooting were substantially similar in all major aspects. The 

trial court summarized the testimony thusly: 

Chuck Long and Tandras Jones provided eyewitness 

testimony stating that Harris [shot the victim] in the neck during 

the struggle on the bed. (N.T. 1/18/13, pp. 172-177; 222). 

Within a day of the incident, Long and Jones positively identified 

Harris as the shooter by choosing his picture out of a photo array 

and also identified him at trial. (N.T. 1/18/13, pp. 180; 233-

234). Jones and Long testified that after the first shot, they saw 

Harris put the gun to [the victim’s] head while the argument 

continued over the missing sack of drugs. (N.T. 1/18/13, pp. 

177; 223-224). Ms. Jones and Mr. Long also testified that they 

saw Harris shoot [the victim] in the head while [the victim] was 

on his knees. (N.T. 1/18/13, pp. 224; 229-230). Additionally, 

Thalia Waddell heard the first shot then heard [the victim] say “I 

got shot” as he fell on the floor. (N.T. 1/18/13, pp. 286-287). 

When she ran into the bathroom for safety, she heard two more 

shots and a person hitting the floor. Ms. Waddell came out of 

the bathroom and found [the victim] curled upon the floor as he 

took his last breath. (N.T. 1/1/13, pp. 288-290). 

Mr. Long’s, Ms. Jones’ and Ms. Waddell’s testimony 

presented essentially the same set of factual circumstances 

leading up to the murder: the individuals who were present at 

the time of the shooting; Harris had been in the apartment 

several times that day to sell drugs; [the victim] was trying to 

trade barber clips to Harris for crack cocaine; Harris discovered 

that a bag of drugs belonging to him was missing; he pulled a 

gun on [the victim] as he believed that while they were 

interacting to make a drug transaction ... [the victim] took the 

drugs; an argument and physical fight ensued; Harris shot [the 

victim] during a struggle on the bed and then shot him at least 

two more times while [the victim] was off the bed, on his knees, 

still denying that he had stolen any drugs. 

See Trial Court Opinion, 11/20/13 at 20-21. 

The striking similarity of the witnesses’ description of the events 

surrounding the murder belies Harris’s claim that the accounts were so 
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inconsistent as to be unreliable. The jury clearly resolved any 

inconsistencies among the testimony as it saw fit and reached a verdict. 

See Orie, 88 A.3d at 1017 (“It is well settled that the jury is free to believe 

all, part or none of the evidence and must determine the credibility of the 

witnesses.”). The trial judge, after observing the proceedings, determined 

that the jury’s verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. After 

reviewing the record, we find no misapplication of law or abuse of discretion 

in that decision. Accordingly, we find Harris’s claim to be meritless. 

Lastly, Harris contends that, assuming arguendo he did shoot the 

victim, the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for first-degree 

murder because the Commonwealth failed to establish Harris possessed a 

specific intent to kill. Appellant’s Brief at 14. Harris argues that he instead 

acted “out of a sudden and intense passion and self-defense.” Id. “To

obtain a first-degree murder conviction, the Commonwealth must 

demonstrate that a human being was unlawfully killed, the defendant 

perpetrated the killing, and that the defendant acted with malice and a 

specific intent to kill.” Commonwealth v. Burno, --- A.3d ---, 2014 WL 

2722758 at *10 (Pa., filed June 26, 2014) (citation omitted). A specific 

intent to kill “may be established through circumstantial evidence such as 

the use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim’s body.” Id. 

(citation omitted). 

Regarding Harris’s self-defense claim, we note that “[t]he use of force 

upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that 
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such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself 

against the use of unlawful force by the other person.” 18 PA.CONS.STAT.ANN. 

§ 505(a). “Although the defendant has no burden to prove self-defense, ... 

before the defense is properly in issue, ‘there must be some evidence, from 

whatever source, to justify such a finding.’” Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 

53 A.3d 738, 740 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted). Once a justification defense 

is properly raised, “the Commonwealth bears the burden to disprove such a 

defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Torres, 766 

A.2d 342, 345 (Pa. 2001). 

The Commonwealth sustains its burden if “it establishes at least one of 

the following: 1) the accused did not reasonably believe that he was in 

danger of death or serious bodily injury; or 2) the accused provoked or 

continued the use of force; or 3) the accused had a duty to retreat and the 

retreat was possible with complete safety.” Commonwealth v. 

McClendon, 874 A.2d 1223, 1230 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). “It 

remains the province of the [finder of fact] to determine whether the 

accused's belief was reasonable, whether he was free of provocation, and 

whether he had no duty to retreat.” Id. 

 In support of his self-defense claim, Harris claims that he reasonably 

believed he was in danger of death or serious bodily injury “as the 

intoxicated victim stole Appellant’s crack, causing Appellant to confront the 

victim in an attempt to recover his property.” Appellant’s Brief at 15. Harris 

contends the victim, who outweighed Harris, then pinned him to the ground 
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so that he was unable to retreat. Id. at 16. We do not find these 

allegations sufficient to support a finding that Harris reasonably believed he 

was in danger of death or serious bodily injury. Moreover, as previously 

noted, three separate Commonwealth witnesses testified that they observed 

Harris shoot the victim in the head while the victim was on his knees—

directly contradicting Harris’s testimony that the he had been pinned by the 

victim or that he was unable to safely retreat. Clearly, the jury credited the 

witnesses’ testimony, and we find no evidence to substantiate Harris’s claim 

that he acted in self-defense. 

 For the same reason, we find no merit to Harris’s claim that he killed 

the victim as a result of serious provocation. “A person who kills an 

individual without lawful justification commits voluntary manslaughter if at 

the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion 

resulting from serious provocation by ... the individual killed ....” 18 Pa.C.S 

§ 2503(a). “The test for [serious] provocation is whether a reasonable 

person confronted by the same series of events, would become impassioned 

to the extent that his mind would be incapable of cool reflection.” 

Commonwealth v. Truong, 36 A.3d 592, 600 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation 

omitted), appeal denied, 618 Pa. 688, 57 A.3d 70 (2012). Harris baldly 

claims that “the victim’s attack ... terrified Appellant, rendering Appellant’s 

mind incapable of reason.” Appellant’s Brief at 19. We find no facts of 

record to substantiate this claim. Therefore, this claim, too, fails. 
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As we find no merit to Harris’s claims that his convictions were against 

the weight and sufficiency of the evidence, we affirm his judgment of 

sentence. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/22/2014