IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 17-1574

Filed June 19, 2019

DANIEL SAMUEL JASON,

Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Chad A. Kepros, 

Judge.

Daniel Jason appeals the district court’s denial of his two applications for 

postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.

Lanny M. Van Daele of Van Daele Law, LLC, North Liberty, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee State.

Considered by Potterfield, P.J., May, J., and Mahan, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2019).
2

PER CURIAM.

In 2007, Daniel Jason was convicted of simple assault and three counts of 

harassment concerning his unwanted actions toward his former girlfriend, C.C. A 

previously-entered no-contact order was extended for five years. “Contrary to 

Jason’s declaration at [the] sentencing hearing that he would never contact [C.C.] 

again,” he contacted her just hours after his release from jail. See State v. Jason, 

No. 14-1162, 2015 WL 6510334, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2015) (hereinafter 

Jason II). 

Jason’s conduct toward C.C. persisted. In 2007, he was convicted by a jury 

of stalking in violation of a no-contact order and tampering with a witness. On 

direct appeal, this court affirmed his convictions but ordered a limited remand to 

apply Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177–78 (2008), to determine whether 

Jason “was competent to stand trial, but not competent to take on the expanded 

role of representing himself at trial.” State v. Jason, 779 N.W.2d 66, 75–76 (Iowa 

Ct. App. 2009).

1

 The court also ordered resentencing, finding the district court “did 

not provide any reasons for its decision to impose consecutive sentences.” Id. at 

77. 

On remand, following a “meaningful hearing,” the district court concluded 

Jason was competent to represent himself at trial. Meanwhile, separate from the 

hearing and court’s decision, the parties stipulated Jason was competent to 

 

1 Jason is “an intelligent man with a photographic memory. When he was fifteen, he was 

diagnosed with Asperger’s Syndrome, a high-functioning autistic spectrum disorder.” 

Jason II, 2015 WL 6510334, at *1. According to Jason, “the disorder ‘impairs [one’s] ability 

to interact with others, to understand social cues, to have eye contact, to understand the 

[reciprocity] in social relationships and people’s feelings . . . . Also some . . . problems 

with impulse control.’” Id. (alterations in original).
3

represent himself at trial and that his sentences should run concurrently. The court 

imposed concurrent sentences. 

Upon his release from prison in 2012, Jason resumed contact with C.C. 

despite the no-contact order still in effect, “starting her ordeal all over again.” Jason 

II, 2015 WL 6510334, at *2. In 2014, following a bench trial, Jason was convicted 

of stalking in violation of a no-contact order and two counts of extortion, enhanced 

as an habitual offender. On direct appeal, this court affirmed his convictions. See 

id. at *14. 

Jason filed two postconviction-relief (PCR) applications: in 2011, he filed 

PCCV073198, challenging his 2007 convictions and 2010 sentence (a prerequisite 

for his subsequent habitual-offender enhancements); and in 2015, he filed 

PCCV077747, challenging his 2014 convictions. The two applications were 

consolidated, and a trial took place over two days in 2017. Thereafter, the district 

court entered a ruling denying Jason’s applications.

On appeal,2 Jason contends his trial counsel in 2010 was ineffective in 

failing to challenge his competency to represent himself at his 2007 trial; his trial 

counsel in 2014 was ineffective in allowing him to waive a jury trial, failing to object 

at sentencing when the State introduced a risk-assessment report, failing to 

demand a “guilty-plea like colloquy” before he stipulated to the issue of identity 

during the “habitual-offender phase,” failing to renew his motion for new trial “upon 

learning of the court’s impartial bias,” failing to challenge the sufficiency of the 

evidence to prove extortion, and failing to advise him to accept a plea offer. He 

 

2 We decline Jason’s request to change our decision to hear his appeal without oral 

argument.
4

also asserts this court applied the wrong standard in evaluating his challenge to 

the denial of his motions for recusal in Jason II, 2015 WL 6510334, at *6–7. In a 

pro se brief, Jason contends his PCR counsel was ineffective in failing to “raise 

ineffective appellate counsel claims” regarding the district court’s refusal to let him 

represent himself at his 2014 trial.3 

On our de novo review,4 we agree with the district court’s well-reasoned 

findings and conclusions in its thorough and detailed ruling. With the exception of 

Jason’s pro se claim regarding PCR counsel,5the court considered each of the 

issues raised in this appeal and provided a thorough and meaningful analysis of 

each issue. We agree with the ruling of the district court, and we affirm without 

further opinion. See Iowa Ct. R. 21.26(1)(b), (d), and (e). 

AFFIRMED.

 

3 Jason also raises two additional pro se claims which are cumulative to issues raised by 

counsel and noted above. 

4 Although we generally review PCR proceedings for correction of errors at law, we review 

constitutional claims de novo. See Diaz v. State, 896 N.W.2d 723, 727 (Iowa 2017).

5 Jason states, “How can I be competent to represent myself in 2010, yet in 2013 I’m not 

able to.” The State counters that Jason’s claim is “incompatible with another claim” 

because it “would require establishing that Jason was competent to represent himself (and 

not disruptive),” and accordingly, “Jason cannot prove breach” where “counsel necessarily 

[made a] judgment call[] in deciding between two potentially inconsistent claims.” 

We agree the claim is facially inconsistent, but we believe the record is inadequate 

to resolve the issue on direct appeal. See State v. Harris, 919 N.W.2d 753, 754 (Iowa 

2018) (“If the record is insufficient to allow for a review on direct appeal, we do not reach 

the issue on direct appeal and allow the defendant to raise the claim in a separate 

postconviction-relief action.”); State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 494 (Iowa 2012) (observing 

such claims are ordinarily preserved for PCR proceedings “particularly . . . where the 

challenged actions of counsel implicate trial tactics or strategy which might be explained 

in a record fully developed to address those issues” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, we 

preserve the claim for a possible postconviction-relief action. Cf. Harris, 919 N.W.2d at

754.