alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2554 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2554

   To extend the temporary suspension of duty on 2-amino-4-methoxy-6-
                         methyl-1,3,5-triazine.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 30, 2009

  Mr. Burris introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To extend the temporary suspension of duty on 2-amino-4-methoxy-6-
                         methyl-1,3,5-triazine.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. 2-AMINO-4-METHOXY-6-METHYL-1,3,5-TRIAZINE.

    (a) In General.--Heading 9902.13.42 of the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule of the United States (relating to 2-Amino-4-methoxy-6-methyl-
1,3,5-triazine) is amended by striking ``12/31/2009'' and inserting 
``12/31/2011''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
with respect to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for 
consumption, on or after the 15th day after the date of the enactment 
of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
No. 894.

#### Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, *v.*Sprouse.

March 2, 1942.

Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Murphy are of opinion that the petition for writ of certiorari should be granted. *Solid-*
      *811
      *tor General Fahy*for petitioner;

*810Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
#### Olmsted *against*C. Stewart.

whéíe a.'deii•vers a promis* sory noté to B;, 03 agent of C, and a., at the thate8thepe c?4 8asm thed ae mount of the note, to which statement B,mak|é8 no-objection, and-p., afterwards as1 holder of the note, brings-an action against A , A vriil be allowed to show what-was really due froth him to C , and thus reduce the amount to be recovered, by B., who does not stand ja .the-.sitiiation.of.-aii innocent hold'er óf a nóte, taking it. beforeit becomes, due, in a regiiJar course of business.

IN ERROR, on *certiofd/ñ.*tó a j.Ustieeis court.

, . _ *.*. . , . The suit m the. court belojv was op. a promissory note execu- - > - * ted by Olmsted, the defendant, below, payable to *Enos Stewart*of bearer. *C.*the • plaintiffibgjow, As agent of *E. Stezt* aRr.*hud presented An Order on. the., defendant for the amount *239of an account due *E.*Stewart, and for which it was alleged that the note in question was given. The defendant produced witnesses to prove that the order on which the’note was obtained was a forgery; but the justice, from his own inspection, decided that the note was genuine. The defendant then offered to prove that when he gave the note he stated to the plaintiff that there was not as much due as he gave the note for; that he had mislaid his papers ; that he would give the note, and let it lie until he could find his papers: and then offered to prove that there were only due *E. Stewart*6 dollars and 80 cents, which he had tendered. The evidence was rejected, on the ground that the note became the property of the plaintiff before it fell due; and the justice gave judgment for the plaintiff below for the amount of the note.

*Per Curiam.*

The judgment in this case is clearly against evidence, with respect to the handwriting of *Enos Stewart*to the order. Two witnesses swore that they did not believe it to-be his writing; and that he uniformly wrote his name Steward, instead of *Stewart;*and the only evidence opposed to this was,, the opinion of the justice from comparing this writing with other writing admitted to be genuine. Whether the judgment ought to be reversed, on this ground, may be questionable. Bui the testimony offered to show that there was not so much due *E. Stewart*as the amount of the note, ought to have been received. The plaintiff does not stand in the character of an innocent holder of a note, coming into his hands in the regular course of business, before it fell due. He took the note himself, and without making any objections to the statement made by the defendant; he must, therefore, be considered as receiving it subject to the examination to be made by the defendant, as to the state of the accounts between him and *E. Stewart.*The note must be deemed to have been given with this express understanding and reservation. If the note had not been taken by the plaintiff himself, it would have altered the case. The judgment must, therefore, be reversed.

Judgment reversed-.
#### Jerry MONTERO ORDANZA, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 05-74741.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*700Submitted Dec. 4, 2006.*

Filed Dec. 8, 2006.

J. Antonio Nierras, Tancinco Law Offices, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner.

Ronald E. Lefevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel, San Francisco, CA, Laurel A. Bedig, U.S. Department of Justice, Environmental & Natural Resources Div., Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before GOODWIN, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM**

Jerry Montero Ordanza (“Ordanza”), a native and citizen of the Philippines, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order summarily affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum and withholding of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and review the IJ’s determinations for substantial evidence. *INS v. Elias-Zacarias,*502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992); *Prasad v. INS,*47 F.3d 336, 338 (9th Cir.1995). We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that the New People’s Army’s extortion and harassment of Ordanza while he supervised a public works project in the Philippines was not based on his actual or imputed political opinion. *See Sangha v. INS,*103 F.3d 1482, 1491 (9th Cir.1997) (concluding that petitioner failed to show that he faced problems on account of his political opinion); *see also Bolshakov v. INS,*133 F.3d 1279, 1280-81 (9th Cir.1998) (denying petition for review because petitioners failed to establish that extortion was on account of an enumerated ground). We therefore uphold the IJ’s determination that Ordanza is not eligible for asylum.

Because Ordanza did not establish eligibility for asylum, it follows that he did not satisfy the more stringent standard of proof for withholding of removal. *See Ze**701*hatye v. Gonzales,*453 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir.2006).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Cir. R. 36-3.
**Exhibit 31.1**
**Sarbanes-Oxley Section 302 Certification**
I, Stephen J. Hansbrough, certify that:
1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of HearUSA, Inc.;
2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement ofa material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements weremade, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this l report, fairly present in all material respectsthe financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrantas of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:
 a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or causedsuch disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made knownto us by others within those entities, particularly during theperiod in which this report is being prepared;  b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosurecontrols and procedures and presented in this report our conclusionsabout the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures,as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluations; and  c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourthfiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and
5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on ourmost recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent function):
 a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in thedesign or operation of internal control over financial reportingwhich are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and  b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves managementor other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting.
Date: May 10, 2004
/s/Stephen J. HansbroughStephen J. Hansbrough
#### Michael TALIEFERRO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Joseph P. SACCHET, Warden; Attorney General for the State of Maryland, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 06-6209.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 22, 2006.

Decided: June 29, 2006.

Michael Talieferro, Appellant Pro Se. Edward John Kelley, Office of the Attorney General of Maryland, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Michael Talieferro appeals the district court’s orders denying his motions to vacate and set aside judgment or, in the alternative, motion for leave to amend the court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254*387(2000) petition. The orders are not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. *Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir.2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Talieferro has not made the requisite showing.* Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*

*

 To the extent Talieferro seeks to appeal the district court’s original denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, his appeal is untimely.
|   | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|--------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| /s/ Gino Chouinard                   |
|------------------------------------------------|
| Gino Chouinard                            |
| Interim Chief Executive Officer |
| HearUSA, Inc.                             |
| June 24, 2011                        |
|                                           |
| /s/ Francisco Puñal             |
| Francisco Puñal                      |
| Senior Vice President and       |
| Chief Financial Officer              |
| HearUSA, Inc.                             |
| June 24, 2011                        |

----
EXHIBIT 10.17

                           AGREEMENT WITH TIM C. FURST


July 27, 1998

Mr. Tim Furst
9842 South 43rd Place
Phoenix, AZ 85044

Dear Tim:

Microtest has accepted your resignation effective July 31, 1998. The Company has
agreed to provide the following:

1.   For not going to work for a direct  competitor and for not recruiting  from
     Microtest  any of its current  employees  for a period of one year you will
     receive a payment of $60,000.

2.   The  Company's  coverage  for  health,  dental and vision  insurance  until
     December  31, 1998 or until you are covered by a new  employer's  policies,
     whichever comes first. This coverage has a dollar value of $2,978.95.

3.   In  consideration of your nearly achieving your second quarter 1998 revenue
     objective, you will receive a performance bonus of $20,000.

4.   The Company will forgive the $5,000.00  travel  advance  extended to you in
     1997.

5.   You have the option of assuming both company-owned  insurance  policies:  a
     $350,000 policy with an annual premium of $6,899.00; and, a $650,000 policy
     with an annual  premium of  $7,200.00.  The policies  have cost the Company
     $20,697.00  to  date.   You've  stated  your  desire  to  acquire  coverage
     comparable to these policies.  The option is yours; however,  Microtest can
     bear no  responsibility  for  information  you have received  independently
     regarding the cost of similar coverage.

Separate  from the above,  you will receive a check in the amount of  $13,314.32
for accrued but unused vacation time.

Tim, I'd like to take this  opportunity  to thank you  personally  for the eight
successful years you've contributed to Microtest.

Sincerely,

/s/  Richard G. Meise

Richard G. Meise
Chief Executive Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>


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<CIK>                         0000820756
<NAME>                        Duty Free International
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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JAN-25-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-26-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   APR-27-1997
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1.000
<CASH>                                              42,125
<SECURITIES>                                        15,591
<RECEIVABLES>                                       22,710
<ALLOWANCES>                                           485
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<DEPRECIATION>                                      50,653
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                     420,811
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</TABLE>
*Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 95-20809

_____________________

RORY KEITH JONES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF HOUSTON, c/o Kathy Whitmire and Lee Brown,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(H-87-CV-912)

_________________________________________________________________

February 3, 1997

Before KING, GARWOOD, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

 Prisoner-appellant Rory Keith Jones filed a notice of

appeal in this civil action before April 26, 1996, the effective

date of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Among other

things, the PLRA requires prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis

to submit a prison trust fund account statement and an affidavit

listing their assets. The PLRA requires a prisoner appealing in

forma pauperis in a civil action to pay the full amount of the
2

filing fee, $105. If funds for immediate payment are not

available, this court is to assess, and, when funds exist,

collect, as a partial payment of the filing fee, twenty percent

of the greater of: (a) the average monthly deposits to Jones’s

trust-fund account or (b) the average monthly balance in that

account for the six-month period immediately preceding September

18, 1995, the date of the filing of the notice of appeal herein. 

After payment of the initial partial filing fee, funds shall be

deducted from Jones’s account until the full filing fees are

paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), (2); Strickland v. Rankin

County Correctional Facility, No. 96-60306, --- F.3d --- (5th

Cir. Jan. 30, 1997).

Jones has thirty days from the date of this order to comply

with the PLRA requirements, including:

1) payment of the appellate filing fee of $105 to the

clerk of the district court or

2)(a) the filing in this court of an affidavit stating all

assets that Jones possesses and

 (b) the filing of a certified statement by the custodian

of Jones’s trust-fund account for the six-month

period immediately preceding the date of the filing

of the notice of appeal herein.

The clerk of this court is directed to provide Jones with

the proper forms for compliance herewith.
3

The appeal is held in abeyance until Jones complies herewith

or until the expiration of thirty days, whichever comes first. 

If Jones does not comply within the thirty days, the clerk of

this court is directed to dismiss the appeal for lack of

prosecution. See Fifth Circuit Rule 42.3.

APPEAL HELD IN ABEYANCE. COSTS ORDER ENTERED.
#### CREEDON v. POLIS.

No. 7491.

District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.

Jan. 8, 1948.

Conrad G. Moffett and Albert C. Osofsky, both of Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Charles Polis, of Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.

BARD, District Judge.

This is an action by the Housing Expediter against the defendant landlord to recover damages for alleged rental overcharges, to compel restitution to the tenants of rental payments in excess of the maximum legal rent allegedly exacted from the tenants by the defendant, and for injunctive relief.

The defendant has moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to join indispensable parties. The “indispensable parties”, says the defendant, are the tenants to whom he would be obliged to make restitution, should restitution be awarded. The defendant in his motion to dismiss alleges that “there are conflicting claims and counterclaims between the defendant and the omitted persons.”

I do not agree with the defendant’s argument that the tenants to whom he would be obliged to make restitution are “indispensable parties”. However, I think that they are certainly interested parties. Since the plaintiff’s prayer for restitution is addressed to the equitable discretion of the Court, I think that, on equitable principles, it would be highly desirable to have the tenants before the Court in determining the issue of restitution, inasmuch as the defendant has alleged the existence of claims and counterclaims against such tenants. The United States Supreme Court has indicated the desirability of this procedure in the leading case of Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 66 S. Ct. 1086, 90 L.Ed. 1332. In that case Mr. Justice Murphy, speaking for the Court, said, in 328 U.S. at page 403, 66 S.Ct. at page 1091: “Should the court decide to issue a restitution order and should there *653appear to be conflicting claims and counterclaims between tenants and landlord as to the amounts due, the Court has inherent power to bring in all the interested parties and settle the controversies or to retain the case until the matters are otherwise litigated.”

The defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint will be denied. However, an order may be entered directing that the tenants be added as parties plaintiff in the Housing Expediter’s action for restitution, so that any counterclaims of the defendant relating to the cause of action may be proved in an amount not to exceed the plaintiff’s claim.