Damian Gerety v. State of Maryland , No. 2349, September Term , 2019; Briana

Antkowiak v. State of Maryland , No. 2365, September Term, 20 19

. O pinion by Naza rian, J. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

– CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

– DEFENSES

– MEDICAL NECES SITY OR ASSISTANCE
Pe ople who possessed and used her oin in a vehicl e parked in a public par king lot were immune from prosecuti on charges for simple possession of heroin under Maryland ’ s Good Samaritan Law, (2018 Repl. Vol.) , § 1

- 210 (c) of the C riminal Procedure Article (“CP”) because t he police were present at the scene, and discovered them and the drugs , solely as a result of a 911 call by a passer - by

. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

– C ONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

– DEFENSES

– ATTENUATION
I mmun ity from prosecuti on under CP § 1

- 210 (c) is not at tenuated or otherwise eliminated b y the fact that the person possessing her oin had outstanding warrants that were discovered during the encounter with p olice

.Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County

Case No s
. C

- 02

- CR

- 19

- 002625 & C

- 02

- CR

- 19

- 0 2 623
REPORTED
IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND
No s
. 2349 & 2365 Septembe r Term, 201 9

________________ ___________________ ___

DAMIAN GERETY v. STATE OF MARYL AN D

____________ __________________________

BRIANA ANTKOWIAK

v. STATE OF MARYLAND

_______________ _______________________ Kehoe , Nazarian , Eyler , James R. (Sen ior Judge, Specially Assigned) , JJ.

___________ ___________________________

Opinion b y Nazarian , J.

______________________________________ Filed: February 24, 2021This case probes the boundarie s of the immunity provisions of Maryland’s Good

Samaritan Law, M aryland Code ( 2002, 2018 Repl. Vol.) , § 1

- 210 of the C riminal
Procedure Article (“CP”)

. That statute grants im munit y from ar rest, charge, and prosecution for certain drug and alcohol related c rimes , and for sanctions flowing from those crimes, when the evi dence supporti ng the charges is obtained “ sol ely as a result ” of
a person s eeking or receiving medical assista nce f or a s uspected drug or alcohol
overdose

. In cases consolidated in the Circ uit Court for Anne Arundel County, Damian Gerety and Briana Antk owiak each ple ade d not guilty on an agreed st atement o f facts t o

one such crime

—

p ossession of heroin

— then move d for judgment of acquittal , arguing that they were immune from prosecution for th e charge s because the drug evidence was seized “solely as a resu lt of” a call for medical assistance made by a bystand er. Se e CP § 1

- 210(c). The circuit court denied the moti on s , convicted each of the single charge , and sentenced each to time served. We h o ld that b ecause the police were present
at the scene and discove red the eviden ce supporting the charges “sole ly as a r esult” of a
call for medical assistan ce, Mr. Gerety and Ms. A ntkowiak were immun e from prosecution , and we reverse the conviction s
. I. BA CKGROUND
A. The 911 Call
On October 23, 2019, around 6:3 0 p.m ., a man ident if ying himself only as Charles
called 911 fro m the parking lot of a Du nkin Donuts on Camp Meade Road in Li nthicum Heights

. The dispatcher asked if he needed “police, fire, or am bulance” and he2

responded, “I was tryin g to get a police car.” He then told the dispatcher that a man and a

wo man wer e insid e a parked SUV and appeared t o be “either sleeping or they are really highed out.” 1 He provided the make and model of the vehicle , a s well a s the license plate
number. In response, the dispatcher s aid , “let me g et the pa ramedics on the line

. ” Charles
told the paramedics , “I don’t know if they’re just slee p ing, or

– or they’re really high

– you know, really hig h.” At the end of the call, he said, “I’m pretty sure they’re okay; you
know what I mean ?” He a dded, “I don’ t want to knock on their window and frighten

t hem.” He asked if he needed to stay at the scene a n d the dispatcher told him he was free to go

. B. The Police and Medical Respons e Anne Arundel County Police Officer Sam Silva responded to the D unkin Donuts
f or a “report of a check a sick or injured subject.” Emergency medical technicians from
the fir e department w ere on the scene already

. An EMT advised Officer Silva th at the
SUV was no longer in the par king lot , but believed it had moved to a p arking lot acr oss the street , the lot serving a Checkers restaurant

. Officer Silva responded to that locat io n while t he medics remained behind. He
discover ed two people , later identified a s Mr. Gerety and Ms. Antkowiak , in the front

seat s of an SUV

. Mr. G erety was in the driver’s seat. Both wer e “n odd ing out , ” which
Officer Silva knew to be “ a symptom of recen t drug use. ” He knocked on t he passenger

1 The transcript from the hearin g m istakenly quotes the caller as stating that the couple was “either tripping , or they are really highed out. ” (Emphasis add ed.)3

window 2 and Ms. A ntkowiak lowered it

. Off icer Silva asked if they needed medical
assistance and b oth partie s responded “N o
. ” Of ficer Silva explained tha t h e was there
because a citizen reported that they were “passe d out in their vehicle” and “ was concerned for their wellbeing. ” Mr. G erety “conti nued to nod in and out , ” causing Officer
Silva to ask him again if he was al l ri ght. Mr. G erety responded “Yeah , I ’m good.”
Officer Silva asked both occupants of t he vehicl e for identification. M r. Gerety lit a cigarette and “appeared nervous as he fidge ted through his center console, looking for his driver’ s license.” Ms. Antkowiak claimed that she was seventeen ye ars old and did not have any identifi catio n
. 3 She provided a f alse na me and date of birth , slurr ed her words as she spoke , and “continuously n odded in and out

. ” Mr. Gerety provided hi s real
name and date of b irth , but said that he did not have his ident ifi cation with him

. Officer Silva asked Mr. Geret y if there w er e any illegal items in his vehicle. Mr. Gerety responded “No.” Officer Silva ask ed for cons ent to search the vehicle. Mr. Gerety “appeared nervous , and in a slu rred voice said, ‘ I do n’t thin k s o; this isn’t my car. ’ ”
Two other officers monitored the ve hi cle while Officer Silva ran Mr. Gerety ’s

name ( and the false name provided by Ms . Antkowiak ) through computer databases. He
discovered that Mr. Ge rety had “outs tanding warrants” for his arre st. Office r Silva returned to the vehicle, directed Mr. Gerety t o step out, and placed him under arrest.

2 The SUV was parke d too close to an adjacent vehicl e for Officer Silva t o approach the driver’s side

. 3 Ms. A n tkowiak was almo st twenty

- one years old.4

Before Mr. Ger ety complied with Officer S ilva’s command, “he was observed to be reaching down . . . towards the area unde r his seat, between the seat a nd door.” The police search ed the area around the driver’s sea t and found a “clear triangular capsule” containi ng suspected cocaine

. At that poi nt, the police directed Ms. Antkowiak to get out of the ve hicle , a nd Officer Sil va conducted a fu ll search of the SUV. He
uncovered “multiple colored and clear capsules conta in ing an off

- white powder substance” suspected to be heroin and Fentanyl; “multipl e clear, triangular vials
contain ing a white, rock

- l ike substance” suspected to be crack c ocaine; “several sma ll
trashcans contain ing a white, rock

- like substance”; “multiple u nmarked pills”; “several glass jar s, with pink lids” containing suspected cocain e; a syringe; and a glass pipe

. The A nne A r unde l C ounty P olice D epartmen t ’ s Cr ime Lab analyzed some of the
i tem s seized and found 1.44 grams of heroin

. C. The Criminal Pr oce edings
On November 1 5, 2019, Mr. Gerety and Ms. Antkowiak each were charged by
criminal indictment with thirteen counts: possession with intent t o distribute h eroin , cocaine, fentanyl , a mi xtu re of heroin and fentanyl, and pregab a lin 4 under Maryland
Co de ( 2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.) § 5

- 602 of the Criminal Law Article ( “ C R ” ) ; co nspiracy to distribute heroin, cocaine, fentanyl, and pregabalin; and possessio n of heroin , cocaine, fentanyl , and pr egab a lin un der C R § 5

- 601

. Their cases we re consolidated.

4 Pregabalin is marketed under the brand name Lyrica and is a Schedule V controlled dangerous subst ance. See CR § 5

- 406(e)( 4).5

At a he ari ng on January 31, 2020, the State informed the court that it was proceeding onl y on the count charging eac h defendant with simple possession of heroin , subject to an agreed statement o f facts

. 5 Mr. Gerety and Ms. Antkowiak each ent ered a plea of not gui lty to that charge with the understanding that after the State presented th e
agree d statement of facts , they would argue that they were immune from prosecution
under CP § 1

- 210(c)

. The State played t he recording of the 911 call for the court, read into t he record the agreed statement of fact s , and introduced the d rug analysis into evi dence. Defense counsel then moved for judgment of acquittal as to each defendant, arguing that they

were immun e from pr osecution for simple possessi on under the agreed facts. Th e d efense

too k the position that because the on ly concern raised by the 911 cal ler was the safety of Mr. Gerety and Ms. Antkowiak, who appeared to be high and possibly unconscious, the police respon se resulted directly from the ca ll, so they fell within th e immunity provisions of the law.
Th e State responded that the defendants were not immune under the agreed facts because they did not receive me dical assistance

— in f act, they refused it

— and therefo re

w ere not actually experien cin g a medical emer gency. Alt ernatively, the State argued

5 During se ntencing, t he Stat e told the court that it elected not to go forwar d with the posses sion with i ntent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute charges because its expert did not believe th at the quanti ties of drugs f ound in the vehicle were consistent with distr ibut ion of narcotics. The State entered a nolle prose qui to the remaining cou nts again st each defendant at the end of the hearing.6

“ inevitable discovery ” based upon Mr. Gerety’s out standing warrants, which justified a search of the v ehicle independent of the welfare check. 6
After tak ing a recess t o review the law, t he court r ule d that the defendants w ere not immune under CP § 1

- 210(c)

. It found “that there [were] facts that disting uish [ed]
Noble [ v. State , 238 Md. A pp. 153 (2018) ] , ” and rea soned that it was “enormously important” that the police “di d not respond to the location wh ere their attention wa s

o riginally drawn by the c aller.” That was significant, in the court’s view, beca use the
movement of the vehicle implicated public safety concerns that must be balanced against the legisl ative aim unde rlying the statute, i.e. , to com bat the opioid epidemi c b y encouraging rep orting of overdoses

. 7 The court concluded that the legislature did not “intend [] to c reate a forever shield [for] everything factually downstream from a
response []

. . . to a call[.] ”
The cour t also noted th at th e movement of the vehi cle served as evidence that
Mr. Gerety, at least, had regained his faculties after the 911 call was made , and to a degree that perm itted him to operate a motor vehicle

. This diminished the likelihood th at Mr. Ger ety was suffering f rom a medical emergenc y a nd demonstrated that he should no longer be “under the . . . umbrella Good Samarit an shield of protection

. . . . ” The court
also considered tha t t he 911 caller initially asked for the pol ice, not param edics, to respond, and that t he caller was a stran ger to the defendants.

6 The trial court cut off this argu ment, noting that the defend ants were not r aising a “Fourth Amendme nt supp ression issue. ”
7 T he Stat e did not charge Mr. Gerety with a traffic violation

.7

For all of those reasons, the court denied the m otion for judg ment of acquittal and convicted Mr. Gerety and Ms. Antkow iak of the charge of possession of heroin. The

co urt sentenced them to time served (101 days ) , and t his timely appeal fo llowed

. II. DISCUSSION
Mr. Gerety and Ms. Antkowiak reprise on appeal the arg ument they made in the circuit court, i.e ., that CP § 1

- 210(c) immunized from criminal prosecution for pos sessio n of her oin because the police d isco ver ed them and the drugs s ole ly as a result of the 911
call. 8 We agree with them that the circuit cou rt’s na rrow construction of Maryland’s
Good Samaritan statute was inconsis tent with the plain language of the sta tute and its
l egislative purpose , as first an alyzed in Noble , 238 Md . A pp. at 153 , and hold that both
were immun e from prosecution under these circums tances

. Because the sole issu e on appeal turns on the construction of CP § 1

- 210, we review the circui t c ourt ’ s ruling de novo

. See Bellard v. Stat e , 452 Md. 467, 480 (2017) ( “ An appellate court reviews without d eference a trial court ’ s interpretation of a statute. ” ( quoting Howard v. State , 440 Md. 427, 434 (2014) )

. In construing CP § 1

- 210, our
pr imary tas k is to determi ne what the General Assembly in ten ded :

The cardinal ru le of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the real and actua l intent of the Legislature. A court ’ s primary goal in interpreting statutory lang uage is to discern the leg islative purpo se, the ends to be accomplis hed , o r the evils to be re med ied by the statutory provision under scrutiny.

8 The y p hra sed the Q ue stion Presented in their briefs as follows : “Were appellants immune from cri minal prosecution under the Goo d Samaritan sta tute, Criminal Procedure Article § 1

- 210?”8 To ascertain the intent of th e General Assembly, we begin with the normal, plain meaning of the statute. If the language of the statute i s unambiguous and clearly consistent with the st atute ’ s apparent pur pos e, our inquiry as to the legislative intent ends ordinarily and we apply the st atute as written without resort to other rules of construction. We neither add n or delete language so as t o reflect an i ntent not evidenced in the p lai n a nd unambiguous langu age of the statute, and we do not construe a statute with “forced or subtle inte rp retations” that limit or extend its application. We, however, do not read statu tory language in a vacuum, nor do we con fine strictly our interpreta tio n o f a statute ’ s plain lan guage to the isolated section alone. Rather, the plain language must be viewe d within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislatu re in enacting the statute. We pre sume that the Legisl atu re intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious bo dy of law, and, thus, we seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent possible co nsistent with the statute ’ s object and sco pe. W here the words of a sta tute are ambiguous and subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, or w here the words are clear and unambiguous when viewed in isolation, but become am biguous when read as part of a larger st atutory scheme, a court must re sol ve the ambiguity by sea rching for legislative intent in other indicia, including the history of the le gislation or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative p rocess. In resolving ambig uities, a cour t considers the structure of th e s tatute, how it relat es to other laws, its general purpose and relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions. In every case, the statute must be given a re asonable interpretation, n ot one that is absurd, illogical or incomp ati ble with common sense.
St ate v. Bey , 452 Md. 255, 265

- 66 (2017) ( quoting State v. Johnson , 415 Md. 413 , 421

– 22 (2010) ( quoting Lockshin v. Semsker , 412 Md. 257, 274

– 77 (2010)) ).9

Consistent with these principl es, o ur starti ng point is the la nguage of the statute. C P § 1

- 210 is de signed to provide a form of immunity from prosecution and sanctions for
substan ce users w ho report or exper ience a medical emergency :

(a) The act of seeking, providing, or assisting wit h the provisio n of medical assistance for ano ther person who is expe rie ncing a medical emergency a fter ingesting or using alcohol or drugs may be used as a mitigating factor in a criminal prosecution of: (1) the person who experienced the medical emergen cy; or (2) a ny person who sought, provid ed, or assisted in the pro vis ion of medical assistance. (b) A person who, in good faith, seeks, provides, or assists with the provision of medical assistance for a person reasonably believed to be experiencing a medical emerge ncy after ingesting or using al cohol or drugs shall be im mune from criminal arrest, charge, or prosecution for a violation of § 5

- 601, § 5

- 619, § 5

- 620, § 10

- 114, § 10

- 116, or § 10

- 117 of the Criminal Law Article if the evidence for the crimi nal arrest, ch arge, or prosecution was obt ain ed solely as a result o f t he person ’ s seeking, provid ing, or assisting with the provision of medical assi sta nce. (c) A person who reasonably believes that the person is experiencing a medical emergency after in gesting or usi ng alcohol or drugs shall be im mune from criminal arre st, charge, or prosecution for a violation of § 5

- 601, § 5

- 619, § 5

- 620, § 10

- 114, § 10

- 116, or § 10

- 117 of the Criminal Law Article if the evidence for the criminal arrest, charge, or pro secution was o btained solely as a result o f t he person seeking or re cei ving medical assistance. ( d) A person who seeks, provides, or assists with the pr ovision of medical assistance in accordance with subsection (b) or (c) of this section may not be sanct ioned for a vi olation of a condition of pr etr ial release, probation, or parole if the evidence of the violation was obtained solely as a result of the10 pe rson seeking, providing, or assisting with the provision of medical assistance. The first case analyz ing this statu te, Noble , addressed and res olv ed one source of
amb igu ity : whether the immunity atta ched only t o the person who called for assistance,

a s the State argued there, or also to the per son experiencing the medical emergency

. Noble involved subsect ion (d) of the statute, which re l ates to s anc tions for violation of

con ditions of pretrial release , probation, and parole , because the appellant in th at case challenged a finding that he had violated his probation by failing to abstain from drugs.
238 Md. App. at 156. T he circuit court had found h im in vi olation based o n e vid ence found after a 911 call placed by his girlfriend . He argued that he was imm une from sanction under CP § 1

- 210(d) even though he hadn ’ t himself made the call, i d

. at 157

– 59 , and we a greed, holding that though subsection (d) did not speci fy that it ap pli ed to passive recipients of medical assistance, that section cross

- referenced s ubsection (c), which did apply to persons “receiving medical assistance.” Id

. at 16 4. We grounded o ur ho lding in Noble in the purpose of the statu te , which was enacted in r esp onse to the o pioid crisis and recognized a shift in public policy toward priori tizing the prevention of overdose deaths over the prosecution of “certain, limited, crimes” often committe d by drug user s. Id

. at 167 (footnote omit ted ). The overarching
purp ose of CP § 1

- 21 0 i s to “sav e lives” by “encourag [ing] people to call for medical assistance when a person is believed to be suffering from an overdose.” Id

. To achieve that purpose, CP § 1

- 210 grant s l imited immunity both to pers ons who seek or obtain
med ica l assistance for others at subsection (b) , and to persons who seek medical11

assi stance for themselves or are passive recipients of medical assistance because of another’s actions , under subsection (c )

. Id. at 165

– 72. We held tha t t o construe the statute

not to protect p assive reci pients of medical assistance would be “inconsistent wit h the General Assembly’s stated goal of saving lives by encouraging people to call for help” because a per son who suspe c t s that another i s overdosin g m ight be deterred from s eek ing help by f ear of the legal repercussions for the recipient of medical aid. I d

. at 172

. T his appeal implicates CP § 1

- 210 (c)

. To qualify for immunity under that
subsection , a defe ndant must sat isfy three elements

. First , t he person seeking medical

at tention mus t hold a reasonable belief that the subject of the call is “experien cing a medical emergency after ingesting or using alcohol or drugs.” CP § 1

- 210(c). Second , the subject (s) of t he call m ust be arrested, charged, or criminally prosecuted wit h o ne of the

enumer ated criminal violations. Id

. Third , the evidence supporting th e arrest, charge, or criminal prosecution must have been “obtained solely as a result of the person seekin g or receiving medical assistance.” Id. All three of these elements wer e satisfied here.
A. The 9 11 Caller Reasonably Believed T hat Mr. Gerety A nd Ms. Antkowiak W ere Experiencing A Medical Emergency . The trial court in this case concluded that Mr. Ge rety and Ms. A ntk owiak were not experien cin g a medical emergency , bo th because of t he movement of th e vehicle after the 911 call was placed and becaus e they declined medical assistance at the scene. On appeal, Mr. Gerety and Ms. Antkowiak contend that the stat ute does not r equ ire certainty that the
sub ject of a call for me dical a ssistance is experiencing an overdose, only a reasonable
belief. The State does not argue to the contrary , and we agree that the circui t court12

focused on the wrong question

. In Nobl e , 238 Md. App . at 153, we recounted t he legislative history of CP § 1

- 210
in constru ing subsection (d) , and t he ame ndments to subsection (c) of t he law we reviewed in Noble are relevant here

. See Md

. Nat ’ l Bank v. Pearce , 329 Md. 602, 619 (1993 ) ( legislat ive history is persuasive evidence of the meaning of a statute )

. As
ori ginally enacted in 2014, subsection (c) was more focused on the user , and t he l anguage seemed to require greater certa i nty about the fact of an emergency :

(c) A person who experiences a medical emerg ency after ingesting or usi ng alcohol or drugs sha ll b e i mmune from criminal prosecution for a violation of §§ 5

- 601 , 5

- 619, 10

- 114, 10

- 116, and 10

- 117 of the Criminal Law Article if the evidence fo r the criminal prosecution was obtained sole ly as a result of another person ’ s see kin g medical assistance.
2014 Md . Laws, ch ap. 401. The 2015 amendments to the law broadened the univers e of people entit led to immunity and specifically reduced the trigger from a certain emergency
to a reasonable bel i ef :

(c) A pe rson who experiences rea son ably believes that the perso n is experiencing a medical emergency after ingesting or using alcohol or dru gs shall be immune from criminal arrest, charge, or prosecution for a violation of §§ 5

- 601, 5

- 61 9, 5
- 620, 10

- 114, 10

- 116, a nd 10

- 117 of the Crimina l L aw Article if the evide nce f or the criminal arrest, charge, or prosecution was obtained solely as a resul t of another person ’ s the person seeking or receiving medical assistance. 2015 Md. Laws, ch ap. 375 (deletions indicated by s trikethroughs ; additions i ndicated by bolding). Th e F isca l and Policy Note f or the 2015 amendments confirms this intention: [The am endment] establishes that immunity applies to situations involving a person who, in good faith provides med ica l assistance t o another reasonably bel ie ved to be13 experiencing a me dica l emerge ncy , or, a person who reasonably believes that he or she is experie ncing a medical emergency , rather than the current application of immunity to situations involving a person wh o is experienc ing a medical emergency. Dep ’ t Legis. Servs., Fis cal and Policy Note, S

. B

. 654 , at 1

– 2 (20 1 5 Session) ( e mphasis added)

. Thus, betwe en 2014 and 2015, the legislature extended immunity to a recipient of
medical assistance , even if they did not suffer a medi cal emergency , so long a s the person seeking medic al atte ntion reasonably believed the recip ient was experiencing a drug or
alcohol induced medical emergency. This change encourag es drug users and bystanders alike to call 911 at the first sig n of distress without fear that if the y are mistaken about the

e xtent o f the emergency, that they c ould face criminal consequences for minor drug and
alcohol offenses

. That purpose was served here

. Charles , a citizen with no apparent connection to
Mr. Ge rety or M s . An tkowiak, called 911 to r ep ort his concern that the y were passed out because they were “really high.” Alt hough Charles ask ed initiall y for police to respond , the 911 operator understood this as a medical emergency call and connected Charles wi th
the fire de pa rtment. Officer Silva also was dis patched to the scene, but his purpose was to perform a welfare check, as his note s reflected and as he advised Mr. Gerety and
Ms. Antkowiak. Section 1

- 210(c) does not require a citizen to evaluate the subje ct of a

c all m edically , nor does it re quire there to be an e m erg ency af ter all

— t he statute requires only that the caller act on a reasonable belie f that the subject is experienc ing a drug or
alcohol induced medical emergency. That is exactly what happened here and, to i ts c redit,
the State doe s not conten d otherwise

.14

B . Mr. Gerety A n d Ms. Ant kow ia k W ere C harged W ith A nd P rosecuted F or O ne O f T he E n umerated Crimes . The criminal violations covered by the immunity provisions of CP § 1

- 210 are simple possess ion of drugs, CR § 5

- 601; possession o f drug parap hernalia, CR § § 5

- 619

- 20; and crimes related to underage possession of alcohol. CR §§ 10

- 114, 10

- 116, & 10

- 117. Although Mr. Gerety and Ms. Antkowiak initially were charged with possessio n with intent to di stribute and c onspiracy to distribute cocaine, her oin, fent anyl , and
pr egab a lin

— charge s that would not be shielded by the immunity provisions

— t he State ultimately elected to proceed on a single count of possession of heroin against each of
the m. I f CP § 1

- 210 is otherwi se satisfied , then, they were immune from prosecut i on for
th at charge

. 9
C . T he E vidence S upporting T he C riminal P rosecution W as O b tained S olely As A Result Of The Call For M edical A ssistance . The State does not dis pute that Mr. Gerety an d Ms. Antkowia k , as passive recipients of a medical assistance i n itiate d b y a 911 call for a suspected drug overdose ,

were protected persons under CP § 1

- 210 (c)

. Instead, the State argues that the drugs
seized from the SUV w e re not “obtained solely as a re sult” of their receipt of medical

9 And t his dis tinguishes this case f rom our recent dec ision in Glanden v. State , ___ Md. Ap p. ___, No s. 1114, 1 871, 1872, and 1873 , Sept. Term 2019 (Feb. 5, 202 1)

. The defendant in Glanden was convi cted of possess ion with intent to distr ibute fentanyl, a charge n ot immu nized under § 1

- 210 (b) or (c)

. When t he State cited the conviction as a vio la tion of his ex isting probation , he argued that he was entitled to immunity under (d)

. We disagreed, holding that the v iola tion of proba tion result ed from the non

- immunized convict ion, and not “ solely a s a result ” of the requ est f or medical assistanc e tha t led authorities to the scene. Glanden , s lip op. at 15

– 17. But here, we don ’ t have the intervening step . The lone pos session charge at issue here is indispu tably among those listed in ( b) and (c)

.15

assi stance. (Emph asis added.) I n the State’s view, the police searched the vehicle only after Mr. Gerety was arr ested on outstanding warrants, which broke the causal chain
between the 911 call and the evidence supporting t he possession charge

. 10 It an alogize s t o the doctrine of at tenuat i on und er Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Th e attenuation doctrine permits a cou rt to ask, “whether there exists a strong enough causal connection between the primary taint [of a Fourth Amen dment violatio n]
and the challenged ev idence to re quire the excl u sion o f that information.” Myers v. State , 395 Md. 261, 28 6 (2006)

. This doctrine , like the inevitable discovery and independent

sourc e doctrines, permit s the government to purge the taint of unlawful poli ce conduct

a nd avoid the harsh impac t of the exclu s ionary rule. See Miles v. State , 365 Md. 488,
520

– 21 (2001). T hese doctrines “ bal ance [ e ] the protections of the Fourt h Amendment
with the need for effective law enforcement

. . . . ” Id

. at 52 0.
The proble m with the State ’ s argum ent is that there is no Fo u rth Am endment taint here to be purged. All else being equal, Mr. Gere ty ’ s outstan ding warrants would have
allowed the officers to arrest him and search him and the vehicle in cide nt to arrest. But

u nlike th e exclusionary rule, whi ch bars the State fr om int r oducin g evidence seized in a

10 As ment ioned, a variant of this argument was raised b y the State in the trial court , but was not a basis of the court ’ s ruling that Mr. Gerety and M s. Antkowiak were not i mmunized by CP § 1

- 210. We may, of co urs e, affirm the tr ial cou rt’s ruling on any bas is adequately supported by the record. See, e.g. , Ell io tt v. State , 417 Md. 413, 435 (2010) (“Where the record in a case adequately demonstra tes that the decision of the t rial court was correct, although on a gr ound not relied upon by the trial court and p erhaps not even raised by the parties, an appellate c ou rt will affirm.” ( quoting Robeson v. State , 285 Md. 498, 502 (1979 ) )

. Because the court did not rule on this basis, however , Mr. Ge rety and Ms. Antkowiak did not address th is argu ment in their brief in this Court.16

manner t hat violates the Fourth Amendment (and witho ut regard to the ser iousness of the
crime ) , the immunity provisions of CP § 1

- 210 apply to minor charges suppo rted by
eviden ce obtain ed solely as a result of a call for medic a l assi stance

. Put another way, § 1

- 210 ask s a different question: why were office rs at the scene in the first place? If they were there solely as a result of a call for emergency medical assi stance, the ca ller and recipi ent (s) of assis tan ce are immu n e fro m pr ose cut ion for the listed charges , whatever evidence might properly have been s eized

. Section 1

- 210 is not a “get

- out

- of

- jail free card.” Noble , 238 Md . App. at 168 ( quoting Hearing on H.B . 416 Before t he H. Judiciary Comm ., 2 014 Reg. Sess. (Feb. 11,
2 014)). T he legislature struck a balance betwe en pros ecuting minor drug crimes and encouraging reporting of suspec ted overdoses

. Section 1

- 210 does not prohibit police from conducting searches and s eizures o f evidence

— to the contr ary, it anticipate s that

ev idence w ill be seized as officers and medica l profe ssional s arrive at the scene an d
deliver medical care. 11 If they find evidence that supports charges not covered by the

11 The legislature al so anticipated that o utstanding warrants would be discovered and executed during emergency medical calls governed by CP § 1

- 210

. As origi nal ly proposed, House Bill 416 would have prohibited the police from arre sting a person on an outstanding warrant disc overed during drug a n d alcohol related medical calls. See House Bill 416 (2014), first reader. The provision that ultimately became subsec tio n (c) then s tated: (B) A person who experiences an a lcohol

– or a dru g - related

overdose and is in need of medical assistance (1) Sha l l be immune from criminal prosecution for a violation of §§ 5

- 601, 5

- 619, 10

- 116, and 10

- 117 of the Criminal Law Artic le if the evide nce for the (Continued...)17

immun ity provisions of § 1

- 210 , comp are Glanden , ___ Md. App. a t ___, slip op. at 15

– 1 7, offi c ers are free to a rrest on and prosecut e those c harges in the normal course

. If, as in
Glanden , the discovery included a quantity of controlled dangerous substances consistent
with the inte nt to dist ri bute or drug paraphernali a consistent with distr ibution , § 1

- 210
wouldn ’ t affect the case
. But w here, a s here, the evidence seized su pports only charges
enumerated in § 1

- 210, the limited immunity provisions apply so long as the evidence
was “o btained so lely as a result o f the per son seeking or receivin g medic al assistance.”
The State ’ s argument he re woul d require us to create a ba ck

- door judicial exception to the statut ory sche me
. But it would be inconsistent with the balance the
Gener al Ass e mbly struc k to allow an after

- th e - fact justification for the charge s when

o f f icers were on the scene, and thus i n a position to check Mr. Gere ty ’ s outstanding
warrants, “solely as a result ” of a call for medical assistance

. E vidence routinely will be

(...conti nu ed) criminal p rosecution was obta ined so lely a s a result of

the person’s seeking medical a ssistance; and (2) May no t be detained on or prosecuted in connection with an outstanding warrant for another nonviolent crime if the pers on ’s seeking medi cal assistance is the reason for the pers on’s en coun ter with law enforcement

. Id. (emphasis add ed). The Maryland State’s A tt orneys’ Association opposed that provision, however, and it was deleted as part of the amendments made before th e bi ll received a f

avorable report from the House Judiciary Committ ee. See Hearing on H.B. 416 Before the H. Judici ary Comm ., 2014 Reg. Sess. (F eb. 11, 2014); House Bill 416 (2014), third reader (striking out the outstanding warrant provision). The languag e pe rtaining to the discovery of evidenc e during a medical r esponse ca ll under CP § 1

- 210 remained unchanged and wa s not the subject of debat e
.18

“obtained” duri ng medical response ca lls . Police may, as here, se ek cons ent to search , may conduct a searc h incident to arrest on ch arges not cover ed by the immunity provisions, may see evidence in plain view, or, as here, conduc t a search after execut ing

a n outstanding warrant discovered dur ing a routine identification check. In each scenario, the evidence would be lawfully obtained through means ar gu ably independent of anyone seeking or recei ving medical assistance. But a llowing charges for the liste d off enses under tho se circumstances w ould eviscerate the immunity pro visions of CP § 1

- 210 and
defeat the overarchin g purpose of encouraging peopl e to report suspected overdose s. And indeed, if the General Assembly had intended to limit immunity in cases
wher e evidence was seized in a search inci d ent to arrest or other ind ependen t means during a response to a call for medical a ssistance, it could ha ve d one so. The statutes in a t least four states

— Illinois, 12 Minnesota , Pennsylvania , and Vermon t

— specify that cha rges arising fr om evidence obtained th rough an indep endent source fall o utside the immunity protections under their Good Samarit an statutes

. 13 S ee 7 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 570/414 (limited immunity does not apply “ if law enforcement has reasonable

12 An Illinois appellate court interpreted the independent source exception narrowly in People v. Ma rkham , 126 N.E.3d 759, 764 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019) (reas oning that heroin di scovere d in a defendant’s wallet after he had been admi nistered Naloxone inside a re sidence was obtained “as a re sult” of the call for medical assistance even though the defendant ask ed the police to retrieve his wa llet for him because to construe the stat ute oth erwise would eviscerate the purpose the statute)

. 13 Althou gh the Minnesota st atute was enacted the same yea r as CP § 1

- 210 and the Pennsylvania statute followed passage of the M aryland bill, th e Illinois and Vermont statute s prec eded our Good Samari tan sta tute and w ere referenced in “Exhibit 2” to the Fiscal and Policy Note , sum m ar izing common characteristics o f statutes around the nation

. See Dep ’ t Legis. Servs., Fiscal and Poli cy Note, H.B. 4 1 6 , at 6 (20 14 S ession)

.19

suspic ion or probable cause to detain, arres t, or se arch the person des cribed in subsection (b) or (c) of this Section for criminal ac tivity and the reas onable suspicion or probable cause is based on information obtained prior to or independent of the individual described
in s ubsection (b) or (c) ta king act ion to seek or obta in emer gency medical assistance and
not obtained as a direct re sult of the act ion of seek ing or obtaining emergency medical assistance”) (emphasis added) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604A.05 (limited immunity statut e does not “preclude pr osecutio n of a person on th e basis of evidence obtained from an independent source ”) (emph asis added) ; 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780

- 113.7 (statute does not “bar charging or prosecuting a person for offenses enumerated in su bsection (b) if a law
enforcement offi cer obtai ns information pri or to o r independent of the action of seeking or obtaining emerg ency assistanc e as describ ed in subsection (a) ” ) (emphasis added) ; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4254 (statute does not “ preclude p rosecution of t he person on the
basis of evidenc e obtained from a n indep endent source ”) (emphasis added). It didn ’ t. When determining wh ether e vide nce was o b tained “s olely as a result ” of a ca ll for
medical assistance, then, CP § 1

- 210 requires courts to f ocus solely on the reason officers

are at the scene at all . If of ficers are only at a scene because someone called for medical assistance, evid ence supporting th e enumerated charges would n ot have been discovered
but for the presence of law enforcement rel ated to a repor t of a drug or alcohol related medical emergency , and the caller and anyone receiv ing medical services are entitled to
limited i mmun ity

. I f the police were present for reasons other than a call for medica l assistance, evidence found would no t be obtained “ solely as a result ” of the medical20

call. 14 CP § 1

- 2 10(c) ( emphasis added). That is exactly what happened her e. Officer Silva wen t to the Chec ker s in
Linthicum Heights “ solely ” because a bystander called 911 to report concerns that
Mr. Gerety and Ms. Antkow iak were “really high” and appeared to be unconsci ous in a vehicle. Officer Silva’s execution of the medical welfare check was t he o nly reaso n h e noticed that Mr. Gerety was under the influence of drugs and was behaving nervously , which was the justificati on for the request for identification that led to the dis co very of the outstanding warrant s
. Mr. Gerety and Ms. Ant kowiak were prot e cted persons under CP § 1

- 210(c) because they were the subject of a call for medical assistance for a suspect ed opioid overd ose. The h eroin seized from the SUV in which they were fo und was obtained solely because the police were called to the scene to che c k on their welfare

. T hey were immune from prosecution for possession of heroin , and w e reverse their
convic tions. JUDGMEN T S OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY R E VERSED. CO STS TO BE PAID BY ANNE AR UNDEL COUNTY .

14 Virginia m ake s explicit in its Good S amaritan statute that if the request for medical assistance is m ade during th e execution of a search warrant or during an arrest , the immunity provisions don ’ t apply

. See Va. Code Ann. § 18.2

- 2 51.03.C (immuni ty protections do not apply “ to any perso n who s eeks or obtains emergency medical atte ntion for himself o r anoth er individu al , or to a person experiencing an overdose when ano ther individual seeks or obtains emergency medical attention for h im, during the execution of a search warrant or during t he cond uct of a lawful search or a lawful arr est ”) (emphasis added)

.