United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 24, 2020*

Decided February 26, 2020

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

No. 19‐2722

SONYA NEWSON,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

AURORA HEALTH CARE, INC.,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District

of Wisconsin.

No. 17‐CV‐883

David E. Jones,

Magistrate Judge.

O R D E R

Aurora Health Care fired Sonya Newson after she disclosed patients’ Protected

Health Information in connection with a discrimination complaint she filed against

Aurora with a state agency. She then sued Aurora in federal court, asserting that her

termination was retaliatory and discriminatory and that she faced other discriminatory

treatment—including a failure to promote her and a hostile work environment—while

                                                 

* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would

not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).   

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 19‐2722    Page 2

employed by Aurora. The district court entered summary judgment for Aurora, and

because Newson lacks evidence that undermines the neutral reason for her termination

or otherwise supports her claims, we affirm that decision.   

Background

Newson, an African‐American woman, worked at Aurora Health Care, Inc., a

non‐profit healthcare network, for 18 years until she was fired in January 2016. Since

2008, she worked as a loss prevention officer. Newson was responsible for ensuring the

security of Aurora’s property, employees, patients, and visitors. She investigated

incidents that occurred on hospital property and prepared reports about them.

In addition to regular job training, Newson also received annual training on the

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) as well as

Aurora’s policies on the protection and disclosure of patient information. The law

requires Aurora, as a healthcare organization, to protect patients’ personal information

and safeguard Protected Health Information (PHI); Newson’s HIPAA trainings outlined

her obligations regarding PHI.   

Robert Solie managed the loss prevention department from July 2013 through

Newson’s termination and was her direct supervisor. Solie told Newson that her job

required her to take a certification exam. Newson experienced scheduling issues,

computer glitches, and external distractions (such as a noisy test‐taking environment),

but she passed the exam on her third try.

Newson twice sought promotion to security sergeant unsuccessfully. When she

first applied, Newson was not eligible because she had received a corrective action for

attendance issues within the previous six months. When Newson reapplied, she was

interviewed but received the lowest score of the applicants and was not selected.

Newson complained to Iris Lowery in the human resources department about

her alleged unfair treatment by Solie. She cited not being selected to the security

sergeant position and having to take the certification exam multiple times under

unfavorable conditions. She also took issue with receiving emails from Solie that

requested incident reports about events she was unaware of. Lowery shared those

concerns with Solie and then scheduled a meeting with Newson to discuss Solie’s

responses. But Newson missed the meeting (because she was carjacked) and did not

reschedule it.   
No. 19‐2722    Page 3

Believing that she was not being taken seriously, Newson then filed her first

complaint with the State of Wisconsin’s Department of Workforce Development Equal

Rights Division (ERD). That complaint alleged that Solie discriminated against Newson

based on her race and sex by requiring her to write incident reports, failing to meet with

her when she wanted to contest a wrongful writeup, making her take the certification

test in a substandard testing environment, and denying her promotion despite her long

history with Aurora. Aurora sought to mediate the complaint, but when mediation was

unsuccessful, it submitted its position statement.

Newson filed a rebuttal submission, which included documents she believed

supported her allegations. Some of those documents contained PHI, including patients’

names, dates of birth, and medical‐record numbers. Aurora contacted the ERD to redact

that information from Newson’s submissions and then conducted an internal

investigation to determine whether the disclosure violated HIPAA or Aurora’s policies.

After determining that it did, Aurora terminated Newson’s employment.

Newson then filed a second complaint with the ERD, alleging that Aurora

terminated her (1) in retaliation for filing the first complaint and (2) because of her race

and sex. After the ERD determined that there was no probable cause to pursue the case,

Newson came to federal court. In the operative complaint, she alleged that her

termination was wrongful because she believed she had provided information that the

ERD had requested, and she did not know she had to redact it. She also alleged that she

was fired in retaliation for the first ERD complaint, that she had been subjected to a

hostile work environment, and that Aurora had wrongfully failed to promote her. She

asserted generally that white men were treated more favorably than she was.

The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. After a lengthy

discovery period, Aurora moved for summary judgment. Newson opposed the motion

but failed to comply with local rules requiring her to explain and provide evidence

supporting any factual disputes. The magistrate judge stated that her noncompliance

was reason enough to enter summary judgment for Aurora but nonetheless decided the

motion on the merits, concluding that no reasonable jury could find that Aurora was

liable for discrimination, hostile work environment, or retaliation. Newson appeals.
No. 19‐2722    Page 4

Analysis

Newson’s brief is not easy to follow, but we understand her to primarily

challenge the conclusion that she was fired for disclosing sensitive information in

violation of HIPAA and Aurora’s policies, rather than because of her race, sex, and

protected activity. In reviewing Newson’s discrimination and retaliation claims, we

look at the evidence holistically and ask whether a reasonable jury could conclude that

her race or sex, or her administrative complaint of discrimination, caused her to be

fired. Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016); Lord v. High

Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2016). With respect to the discrimination

claim, she had to produce evidence that her race or sex was a “motivating factor,”

see Smith v. Wilson, 705 F.3d 674, 679 (7th Cir. 2013), and with respect to retaliation, she

needed evidence that her administrative charge was the “but‐for” cause, see Ferrill

v. Oak Creek‐Franklin Joint Sch. Dist., 860 F.3d 494, 501 (7th Cir. 2017). She fell short.   

Aurora provided evidence that it fired Newson for a nondiscriminatory,

nonretaliatory reason—her disclosure of PHI—and Newson did not raise a factual

dispute about whether an unlawful consideration was the real cause. Her protestations

that she received insufficient training on HIPAA, that she did not disclose PHI

knowingly, and that her disclosure should not have outweighed her 18 years of service

are irrelevant. We do not evaluate the merits of the employer’s decision to terminate

someone, only whether the explanation was “honestly believed.” Lord, 839 F.3d at 564;

Barnes v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Illinois, 946 F.3d 384, 389‐90 (7th Cir. 2020). But Newson

questions only the merits of the reason, not its veracity. Beyond that, she has only her

own speculation that she was fired for an impermissible reason, which is insufficient to

raise a genuine issue of material fact. See Haynes v. Indiana Univ., 902 F.3d 724, 734

(7th Cir. 2018).   

Newson also appears to question the magistrate judge’s decision on her

hostile‐work‐environment claim; she asserts that she established a pattern of

disrespectful treatment by Solie. To survive summary judgment, Newson needed

evidence that (1) the work environment was subjectively and objectively offensive;

(2) the harassment was based on membership in a protected class; (3) the conduct was

severe or pervasive; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability. Nichols v. Mich. City

Plant Planning Dep’t, 755 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 2014). In looking at whether conduct is

severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment, we ask “whether

it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Id. at 601.   
No. 19‐2722    Page 5

Newson suggests that the magistrate judge “overlooked” or failed to consider

her evidence on this claim, but we cannot discern evidence of conditions that rise to the

level of an objectively hostile work environment. Her summary judgment brief argued

that Solie scrutinized her work too closely, questioned her work ethic, and improperly

requested incident reports. But the emails that Newson cites show Solie asking

appropriate work‐related questions in his capacity as a supervisor. He asked for more

information about hospital security incidents, including one in which a patient had a

gun and the panic alarm did not sound properly and another in which a patient’s

money went missing. The emails further showed her being held accountable for her

lateness and for a uniform violation. Newson also submitted an affidavit from a

coworker and one from her sister, but each generally corroborated Newson’s concerns

without offering personal observations about her work environment or Solie’s conduct.

None of this is sufficient evidence from which a jury could determine that Solie

subjected Newson to an objectively offensive work environment. See Alexander v. Casino

Queen, Inc., 739 F.3d 972, 982 (7th Cir. 2014) (determining that a work environment was

not hostile where it “was not physically threatening, nor was it openly racist, nor did it

unreasonably interfere with plaintiffsʹ performance”).

Finally, Newson reasserts on appeal that, in not promoting her to security

sergeant, Solie discriminated against her. An applicant can establish a discriminatory

failure to promote with evidence that she was qualified for the position and someone

outside the protected class who was “not better qualified” was hired instead. Barnes,

946 F.3d at 389. But Newson did not submit evidence on either of these points. Instead,

the evidence shows that she was ineligible for a promotion when she first applied

because of attendance issues and was the lowest‐scoring interviewee when she applied

next. To the extent Newson argues that the magistrate judge entirely overlooked the

failure‐to‐promote claim, we cannot find grounds for reversal given the absence of any

evidence to support it.   

AFFIRMED