# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 10 , 20 20 * Decided November 1 2 , 20 20

Before

DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge

JOEL M. FLAUM

, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN

, Circuit Judge

No. 20

- 1947

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

, Plaintiff

- Appell ee ,

v

.

JAWANZA A. WILLIAMS

, Defendant

- Appell ant

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin

.

No. 15

- CR

- 217

Pamela Pepper

, Chief Judge

.

O R D E R

J awanza Williams , a federal inmate housed in a New Jersey prison

, 1 sought his release to home confinement under 18 U. S.C. § 3624(c)(2 ) in light of the COVID

- 19

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. F ED

. R

. A PP

. P

. 34(a)(2)(C).

1 The circumstances behind Williams’s placement at FC I

- Fairton in New Jersey are not reflected in the record

. NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 20

- 1947 Page 2

pandemic. The district court denied the order, explaining that only the Federal Bureau of Prisons could authorize this request . And to the extent that he sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), added the court, he did not exhaust his administrative remedies

. W e affirm.

In April 2020 , Williams moved th e district court under § 3624(c)(2 ) to order the
Bureau of Prisons to release him to home confinement based on the COVID

- 19 pandemic that had “taken over the Tri

- State area, ” including New Jersey . He pointed to the non

- violent nature of his conviction, his participation in prison program m ing, his familial support, and his completion of more than two

- thirds of his sente nce. The government opposed the motion , arguing first that an inmate’s transfer to home confinement could be ordered only by the Bureau , and second that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies if he wished to seek compassionate release under § 3 58 2(c)(1)(a)

.

T he district court agreed with the government and denied Williams’s motion

. T he court explained that the Bureau had sole authority under § 3624(c)(2) to p lace him in home confinement. And t o the extent Williams sought compassionate releas e, the

court could not reach the merits of that request because he had not satisfied § 3 582 (c)(1)(a) ’s exhaustion requirement by showing that he had filed the proper request with the w arden

.
On appeal

, Williams generally contends that the district court erred when it found that it could not order the Bureau to release him to home confinement under § 3624(c)(2)

. He seems to believe that the newly enacted Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act modified § 3624(c)(2) to a uthorize courts to grant inmates’ home

- confinement requests. See CARES Act § 12003(b)(2) , Pub. L. No. 116

– 136,
134 Stat. 281 (2020)

.
Williams misapprehends the nature of the CARES Act. T he act expand ed the
Bureau ’s power to “ place a prisoner in home confinement ” under § 3624(c)(2)
, see CARES Act, § 12003(b)(2)

, but reserved the determination of “suitable candidates” for home confinement to the Bureau. United States v. Alam , 960 F.3d 831, 836 (6 th Cir. 2020) (quoting Increasing Use of Home Confinement at Institutions Most Affected by COVID

19 , Of f. Att’y Ge n. (Apr. 3, 2020) )

. T he act carved out no role for the courts in making

s uch determinations

. Nor for that matter is any such role envisioned under § 3624(c)(2)
, which authorizes the Bureau “ to the extent practicable

, [to] place prisoners with lower risk levels and lower needs on home confinement

. . . . ” As the Supreme CourtNo. 20

- 1947 Page 3

emphasizes, t he Bureau has “plenary control” over an inmate’s placement. Tapia v. United States , 564 U.S. 319, 331 (2011) ; see United State s v. Ko , 739 F.3d 558, 561 (10 th Cir. 2014) ( explaining that an inmate remains under the Bureau’s custody during home confinement)

.
As for compassionate release under § 3 582 (c)(1)( A )
, Williams disputes the district

court ’s conclusion that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies . He asserts that he filed the “proper Administrative Remedy Procedure” with his w arden

. In any event, he adds, the district court should have waived the exhaustion requirement based on the unprecedented nature of COVID

- 19 , which presents an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for his release.

T he district court correctly de nied compassionate release for Williams based on his failure to present proof that he had satisfied § 3582(c) (1)(A)’s exhaust ion requirement

. The First Step Act amended § 3582(c) (1)(A) to permit an inmate to move for compassionate release as long as he exhausted his administrative appeals or the facility’s warden did n ot respond to his compassionate

- release request within 30 days.
See

, e.g. , United States v. Ruffin

, No. 20

- 5748, 2020 WL 6268582, at *3 (6 th Cir. Oct. 26, 2020) ; United States v. Franco , 973 F.3d 465, 467 (5 th Cir. 2020), petition for cert. filed

, (U.S. Oct. 7, 2020) (No. 20

- 5997) ; United States v. Rodd , 966 F.3d 740, 743 (8 th Cir. 2020)

. Williams provided proof of neither. T his exhaustion requirement is a mandatory claim

processing rule

. S ee Franco , 973 F.3d at 468 ; United States v. Alam , 960 F.3d 831, 833

– 34 (6 th Cir. 2020)

. W aiver cannot apply here because the government timely objected to Williams’s failure to exhaust at every opportunity

. See Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Serv. of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13, 1 8 (2017).

We have considered Willia ms ’s other arguments, and none has merit.

AFFIRM ED