MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 20 20 ME 17 Docket: Wal

- 18

- 440 Argued: September	25,	2019 Decided: January	30,	2020 Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER,	MEAD,	GORMAN, * and	HUMPHREY,	JJ

. **

STATE	OF	MAINE

v. BRADLEY WILLIAMS

PER	CURIAM [¶1]	 	 Bradley	 Williams	 appeals	 from	 a	 judgment	 of	 conviction	 of	 two counts	 of	 stalking	 (Class	 D),	 17

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 210

- A(1)(A)(1)	 (2018),	 and	 two counts	of	harassment	(Class	E),	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	506

- A(1)(A)	(2018),	entered by the trial court (Waldo	County, Billings,	J. )	after	a	jury	trial.		He challenges	the fairness	of	the	trial	and argues 1 that	the	court	made two erroneous	evidentiary rulings	 and	 erred	 in	 denying	 his	 first	 motion	 for	 a	 judgment	 of	 acquittal,	 in

* Although	not	available	at	oral	argument,	Justice	Gorman	participated	in	the	development	of	this opinion. See M.R.	App.	P.	12(a)(2)	(“A	qualified	Justice	may	participate	in	a	decision	even	though	not present	at	oral	argument.”).

** Although	Justice	Hjelm participated	in	the	appeal,	he	retired	before	this	opinion	was	certified.

1 Williams	 also	 argues	 that	 his	 standby	 counsel	 was	 constitutionally	 ineffective	 in	 failing	 to request	a	Title	15	examination to	determine	competency and	in	failing	to	make	objecti ons	at	trial. We	decline	to	depart	from	the	bright

- line	rule	we	have	consistently	applied	for	over	two	decades	that we	will	not	consider	ineffective	assistance	of	counsel	claims	on	direct	appeal. See	Petgrave	v.	State , 2019	ME	72,	¶	10,	208	A.3d	371; see also 15	M.R.S.	§§	2121

- 2132	(2018).2 amending	the	complaint	s ua	sponte	to	conform	to	the	evidence after	his	second motion	 for	 a	 judgment	 of	 acquittal ,	 and	 in	 failing	 to	 give	 certain	 jury instructions.		We	affirm	the	judgment.
I.		BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ] When	the	evidence	is	viewed in	the	light	most	favorable	to	the	State, the	jury	 rationally	could	have	 found	 the	 following	 facts	beyond	a	 reasonable doubt. See State	v.	Woodard ,	2013	ME	36,	¶	19,	68	A.3d	1250 .		Williams	first met	the	victims

— a	married	couple

— shortly	after	they	moved to	Lincolnville	in
2006 , when	he	appeared	at	 their	home	unsolicited	and	offered	 to	clean	 their chimneys. The	victims	initially	hired	him , but	his	presence	in	their	home	made them	uncomfortable,	so	they	requested	that	he	not	return	to	complete	the	work.
W illiams	showed	up	at	the	victims’	home	uninvited	at	least	one	other	time	and was	told	to	leave.		Other	than	periodic,	incidental	interactions,	the	victims	had no	 further	 significant	 contact	 with	 Williams	 until	 August	 2014 , when	 he appeared uninvited at	 a	 p rivate	 sale	 at	 the	 victims’	 store.	 	 The	 victims repeatedly	asked	him	to	leave	them	alone. [¶ 3 ]		 In	August	 or	early	September	2014,	Williams	 sent	a	letter	 to	 the victims’	home	describing	a	 “series	 of	 three	 visions”	about	 one	 of	 the	 victims, including	one in	which	he	“witnessed	[her]	death”	and	another	in	which	he	“saw3 [her]	after	 [her]	death.”		The	 victims	and	others	who	read	 the	letter	 found	it disturbing	and	threatening.		The	victims	sought	and	obtained	cease	harassment notices	 against	 Williams,	 and	 Will iams	 was	 served	 with	 those	 notices	 on September	3,	2014. [¶ 4 ]		On	September	4,	2014,	Williams	sent	another	letter	to	the	victims, this	 time articulating	 his	 belief	 that	 the	 cease	 harassment	 notices	 were “fraudulent.”		The	following	day,	Williams	sent	a	t hird	letter	to	the	victims,	in which	 he	 acknowledged	 that	 the	 victims	 wished	 to	 be	 left	 alone	 but nevertheless	accused	them	of	filing	a	false	report	against	him. [¶ 5 ]	 	 After	 receiving	 the	 third	 letter,	 the	 victims	 did	 not	 hear	 from Williams	again	until	J anuary	2016.		Around	this	time,	Williams	sent	an	angry and	 threatening	letter	 to	 the	 victims’	 attorney.	 	Williams also	 began	 posting fliers	 around	 Belfast	 accusing	 one	 of	 the	 victims	 of	 being	 a	 dangerous unprosecuted criminal .	 	 The	 victims	 sought	 and	 obtai ned	 two	 new	 cease harassment	notices,	which	were	issued	on	January	9,	2016.		On	June	3,	2016, the	 victims	 received	 another	letter	 from	Williams	 that	made	 various	 threats and	 demands.	 	 They	 brought	 this	letter	 to	 the	 attention	 of	law	 enforcement. Williams’ s	 behavior	led	 the	 victims	 to	 take	 extensive	 safety	 precautions	 and caused	one	of	the	victims	to	seek	treatment	for	anxiety

.4 [¶ 6 ]		In	August	2016,	Williams	was	charged	by	criminal	complaint	with two	counts	of	stalking	(Class	D),	17

- A	M.R.S.	§ 210

- A(1)(A)(1),	and	two	counts of	 harassment	 (Class	 E),	 17

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 506

- A(1)(A)

. At	 his	 arraignment, Williams	entered	a	plea	of	not	guilty	on	all	four	counts.		Williams	requested	and was	appointed	counsel, but he	filed	a	request	to	proceed	pro	se	shortl y	before the	original	trial	date. [¶ 7 ]	 	 Prior	 to	 trial,	 the	 court	 met	 with	Williams,	 his	 attorney,	 and	 the attorney	 for	 the	State	 to	discuss	Williams’s	 reasons	 for	wanting	 to	 represent himself.		Williams	felt	that	his	trial	counsel	was	not	sufficiently	k nowledgeable about	 the	 underlying	 facts	 of	 the	 case	 and	 the	 history	 between	 him	 and	 the victims.	 	 The	 court	 then	 conducted	 an	 extensive and care ful colloquy	 with Williams ,	during	which	the	court	warned	him	of the many risks	of	representing himself	 at	 trial .	 	 The	 court	 periodically	 confirm ed with Williams that he understood these	risks ,	and	he	repeatedly	stated	that	he	did.		At	the	end	of	this exchange,	Williams	said	that	he	still	wished	to	represent	himself	at	trial , but	he agreed	to	have	his	appointed	atto rney	serve	as	standby	counsel.		Later,	prior	to jury	 selection, Williams also	 agreed	 that,	 during	 the	 trial,	 standby	 counsel would	be	permitted	to	make	objections	on his behalf	and	to	conduct	the	direct examination	of him

.5 [¶ 8 ]		At	trial,	after	the	close of	the	State’s	evidence,	Williams	moved	for	a judgment	of	acquittal ,	M.R.U.	Crim.	P.	29, on	one	of	the	harassment	counts	on the	ground	that	the	State	was	required	to	prove	two	acts	of	harassment	against the	victims	but	had	established only one — the	June	3, 2016 , letter.		The	court denied	this	motion,	concluding	that	the	jury	could	make	a	reasonable	inference that	the	fliers	Williams	posted	in	January	2016	were	intended	to	harass	both victims	and	that posting	the	fliers could	be	found	to	constitute	a	second act	of harassment. [¶ 9 ]		Williams	then	made	a	second	motion	for	a	judgment	of	acquittal	on both	 harassment	 counts on	 the	 ground	 that	 the	 complaint	 alleged he	 had engaged	in	a	course	of	conduct	constituting	harassment	“ beginning	on	or	about January	9,	201 6, and	ending	on	or	about	 June	6,	2016,	in	Lincolnville,	Waldo County,	Maine , ” but	the	evidence	at	trial	showed	that some	of	the acts forming the	basis	of	the	harassment	charge s occurred in	Belfast ,	a	different	municipality in	 Waldo	 County

. The	 State	 opposed	 the	 motion,	 arguing	 that a	 course	 of conduct	can	take	place	in	multiple	locations,	and the	complaint	merely	specifies the	 location	 where	 the	 course	 of	 conduct ended and	 does	 not	 list	 each municipality	or	jurisdiction	where any part	of	the course	of	conduct	occurred. The	following	exchange took	place :6 THE	COURT:		What	about

— Mr.	Woodbury,	what	about	 the	other issue	 that	Mr.	McLean	is	 arguing,	 that	is	 sort	 of	 by	 the	 nature	 of harassment	charges	that	the	course	of	conduct	can	be	a	broader

— MR.	WOODBURY:		It	can.		He	should	have	said	in	Waldo	County. MR.	MCLEAN:		It	does	say	Waldo,	it	says	Lincolnville,	Waldo	County. But	again,	it	could	cross	jurisdictional	lines. MR.	WOODBURY:		Well,	Belfast	and	Lincolnville,	I	mean	he	should have	been	m ore	specific	I	think.		I	hate	to	argue	a	technical	point, but	it’s

— it’s	there. Although	 no	 formal	 motion,	written	 or	 oral,	was	 presented	 to	 t he	 court, the
court, o ver	Williams’s	objection and	based	on	the	parties’	arguments , permitted the	amendment	of Cou nts	2	and	4	of	the complaint to	allege “in Waldo	County , ” and	denied	the	second	motion	for	a	judgment	of	acquittal. M.R.U.	Crim.	P.	3(d) ; M.R.U.	Crim.	P.	29

. The	court	stated	 that	it	did	not	perceive	any	prejudice	 to Williams	because	the	discovery	put	him	on	notice	that	some	of	the	acts	alleged to	 form	 part	 of	 the	 course	 of	 conduct	 constituting	 harassment	 occurred	 in Belfast. [¶1 0 ]		The	jury	returned	verdicts of	guilty	on	all	four	counts.		On	the	first stalking	charge,	the	court	sentenced	Williams	to	364	days	in	jail,	all	but	ninety days	 suspended,	 and	 a	 one

- year	 term	 of	 probation.	 	 The	 court	 imposed concurrent	 jail	 sentences	 of ninety days	 on	 the	 second	 stalk ing	 charge	 and7 forty

- eight hours	on	each	harassment	charge. 2 Finally,	 the	court	imposed	an additional	concurrent	sentence	of	thirty	days	for	contempt	based	on	Williams’s conduct	 during	 the	 trial.	 	 Williams	 timely	 appealed,	 and	 the	 court	 stayed
execution	o f the sentence s pending	appeal.
II.		DISCUSSION
A. The	Court’s	Conduct	During	the	Trial [¶1 1 ]	 	 Williams	 argues	 that	 the	 trial	 court	 created	 a	 “prejudicial	 trial environment”	 and	 thereby	 violated	 his	 right	 to	 a	 fair	 trial. 3 The	 record, however,	tells	a	different	story. [¶1 2 ]		Williams chose	to	proceed	without	counsel	and was	a	difficult	and at	times	combative	litigant	who	repeatedly	disregarded	the	court’s	rulings	and instructions,	badgered	witnesses,	and	asked	inappropri ate	questions during	his examination	 of	 them .	 	Despite	 this,	 the	 court	was	 patient	with	Williams	 and often	paused	to	explain	the	legal	basis	of	its	rulings	to	him. During	a	chambers conference	a t	the	conclusion	of	the	trial,	Williams	told	the	court	that	h e	felt	it

2 Williams	was	also	ordered	to	pay	$20	to	the V ictims ’ C ompensation F und	on	each	count,	totaling $80.

3 Williams	relies	in	large	part	on	a	statement	by	the	court,	made	outside	the	presence	of	the	jury, in	which	 th e	court	said,	“I	think	it	would	be	 fair	to	say	that	 I	probably

— I’ve	certainly	showed	my frustrations	with	you	and	at	times	I	may	have	shown	anger	with	you	in	front	of	the	jury	and	that	is not	something	I	intended	to	do	or	liked	to	do.”8 had	been	“amazingly	fair.”		The	court	also	instructed	the	jury	that	although	it had	 occasionally	 been	 required	 to	insert	itself	into	 the	 proceedings,	 the	jury alone	was	required	 to	decide	 the	 facts	based	on	 the	evidence	presented.		We conclude	th at	Williams	received	a	fair	trial. See	Lisenba	v.	California ,	314	U.S. 219, 236	 (1941)	 (“[D]enial	 of	 due	 process	 is	 the	 failure	 to	 observe	 that fundamental	fairness	essential	to	the	very	concept	of	justice.		In	order	to	declare a	denial	of	it	we	must	find that	the	absence	of	that	fairness	fatally	infected	the trial;	the	acts	complained	of	must	be	of	such	quality	as	necessarily	prevents	a fair	trial.”).
B. Evidentiary	Rulings [¶1 3 ]	 	Williams	 raises two issues	 related	 to	 evidentiary	 rulings	 by	 the trial	cou rt.		We	address	each	in	turn.
1. The Previous Protection	from	Harassment	Hearing [¶14]		We	 reject	Williams’s	argument	 that	 the	judgment	entered	in	his favor in the	 prior protection	 from	 harassment	 ( PFH ) matter was	 entitled	 to

res judicata	effect	in	this criminal	prosecution. [¶1 5 ] Williams	argues	that	the	court err ed when	it	denied	him	the	ability to	present	evidence related	to the previous PFH matter involving him and one9 of	the	victims	because	that	hearing	resulted	in	a	judgment	in	Williams’s favor and	was	entitled	to	res	judicata	effect. [¶16] Collateral	 estoppel,	 the	 prong	 of	 res	 judicata that	 prevents	 the

re - litigation	of	factual	issues	previously	decided,	applies	when “(1) the identical factual	 issue	 was	 decided	 by	 a prior final	 judgment , and (2) the	 party	 to	 be estopped	had	a n opportunity	and an incentive	to	litigate	the	issue at	the	prior proceeding

. ” State	v.	Hughes ,	2004	ME	141,	¶	5,	863	A.2d	266

. “A	party	has	a fair	 opportunity to	litigate	an	issue	if	 that	party	either	controls	 the	litigation, substantially	 participates	in	 that	litigation,	 or	 could	 have	 participated	in	 the litigation	had	they	chosen	to	do	so.” Id. ¶	5 (emphasis	in	original). “ The	party who	asserts collateral	es toppel	bears	the	burden	of	establishing	that	the	party to	 be	 estopped	 had	 a fair opportunity	 to	 litigate	 the	 issue	 in	 the prior proceeding. ” Id

. ¶ 6. [¶1 7 ] The	record	does	not	clearly	establish	that	the	issues	litigated	at	the prior PFH	hearing	were	the same	as	the	issue s litigated	at the trial	here,	and	the State	had	neither	a	fair	opportunity	nor	an	incentive	to	litigate	any	issues	at	the PFH	hearing.		At	 trial,	 to	support	 the criminal harassment	charges,	 the	State presented	evidence	that	Williams had s ent	a	threatening	letter	to	the	victims on	 June	 3,	 2016,	 in	 violation	 of	 an	 active	 cease	 harassment	 order issued	 in10 January	2016 .		His	act	of	sending	that	letter	had	not	yet	occurred	on	April	25, 2016,	when	 the	PFH	hearing	 took	place. Although	both	 the	PF H	hearing	and the criminal trial	focused	on	whether	Williams	had	engaged	in	harassment	of the	victims,	the	PFH	hearing	did	not	address	the	issue	of	whether,	considering the	 June	 3,	 2016,	 letter,	 there	 was	 sufficient	 evidence	 to	 conclude	 beyond	 a reasonable doubt	that	Williams	violated	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	506

- A. What	is tru ly	fatal to	Williams’s	res	judicata	argument,	however,	is	that	the State	was	not	a	party to	the	PFH	hearing , and	Williams	has	not	established	that	the	State “control[led] the	 litigation,	 substa ntially	 participate[d]	 in	 that	 litigation,	 or	 could	 have participated	in	 the	litigation	had	 [it]	chosen	 to	do	 so

. ” See Hughes ,	2004	ME 141,	 ¶ ¶	 2, 5

- 6 ,	 863	 A.2d	 266 (rejecting	 claim	 of	 collateral	 estoppel	 where defendant	was	convicted	of	assault	against	a victim	who	had	previously	sought and	 was	 denied	 a	 protection	 from	 harassment	 order	 based	 on	 the	 same incident)

. Even	if	the	issues	presented	in	the	two	proceedings	were	identical, the	fact	that	the	State	did	not	have	a	“fair	opportunity	to	litigate	[any	i ssues]	in the	prior	proceeding,” id. ¶	6,	nullifies	Williams’s	claim	that	the	judgment	in	his favor	following	the	PFH	hearing	was	entitled	to	res	judicata	effect.11 2. Victim’s	Testimony	Regarding	Prior	Civil	Lawsuit [¶1 8 ] W e	are also not	persuaded	by	William s’s	argument	that	the	court erred	when	it	allowed	one	of	the	victims	to	testify	that	a	lawsuit	Williams	filed against	the	victim	was	dismissed	with	prejudice. Williams	himself	elicited	this testimony	 by	 asking	 the	 victim	 about	 the	 lawsuit	 on	 cross

- examina tion	 and neither	 Williams	 nor	 his	 standby	 counsel	 objected	 to	 the	 answers	 he	 now challenges	 on	 appeal

. See State	 v.	 P abon ,	 201 1 ME 100 ,	 ¶ 2 9,	 2 8 A.3d 1 147 ( articulating	the	obvious	error	standard	of	review	for	unpreserved	claims )

. D. Motions	for Judgment	of	Acquittal
1. The	First	Motion	for	a	Judgment	of	Acquittal [¶1 9 ] Williams	argues that	the	court	erred	in	denying	his	first	motion	for a	 judgment	 of	 acquittal ,	 M.R.U.	 Crim.	 P.	 29, and that	 the	 court	 applied	 an incorrect	standard	in	ruling	on	that	motion.		On	appeal,	“[w]e	review	the	denial of	a	motion	for	judgment	of	acquittal	by	viewing	the	evidence	in	the	light	most favorable	to	the	State	to	determine	whether	a	jury	could	rationally have	found each	element	of	the	crime	proven	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt.” State	v. Adams , 2015 ME 30,	¶ 19,	113	A.3d	583 (quotation	marks	omitted) .		The	jury	may	draw all	reasonable	inferences	from	the	evidence	presented	at	trial. Woodard ,	2013 ME	36,	¶	19 ,	68 A.3d 1250

.12 [¶ 20 ] When the	 evidence is	 viewed in	 the	light	most	 favorable	 to	 the State, and	given	the	content	of	the	fliers, the	jury rationally could	have	found that	Williams	intended	to	harass	both	victims	when	he	posted	the	fliers	around Belfast	 and	 when	 he	 sent	 the	 June	 3,	 2016,	 letter.	 	 The fli ers	 included	 the victims’	 home	 address,	 accused	 one	 of	 the	 victims	 of	 being an	 unprosecuted criminal , referenced	 the	 victims’	 children,	 and	 encouraged	 people	 to	 call	 the police regarding	one	of	the	victims .		The	June	3	letter,	which threatened	one	of the	 victims	 and	 made	 accusations	 about	 that	 victim	 based	 on the	 victim’s marriage	 to	 the	 other	 victim , cou ld support	an	inference	 that	 the	 fliers	were similarly	 intended	 to	 harass	 both	 victims. And,	 c ontrary	 to	 Williams’s contention,	the	trial	court	did	not	apply	an	incorrect	standard in	ruling	on	the motion	 for	 judgment	 of	 acquittal

. See	Woodard ,	 2013	 ME	 36 ,	 ¶	 19,	 68	 A.3d 1250. T he court	correctly	concluded	that	the jury	could	rationally	have	found each	element	of	the	crime	of	harassment	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt.
2. The	Second	Motion	for	a	Judgment	of	Acquittal [¶ 2 1 ] Williams	 contends that	 the	 court	 erred	 in permitting	 the amendment	 of	 Counts	 2	 and	 4	 of	 the	 complaint to	 allege	 “in	Waldo	 County” rather	than	“in	Lincolnville,	Waldo	County,	Maine , ” after	his	second	motion	for a	 judgment	 of	 acquittal. W e	 review	 the	 court’s	 decision	 to	 per mit	 the13 amendment	of	 the	complaint	 for	an	abuse	of	discretion. See State	v.	Johnson , 585	A.2d	825,	826	(Me.	1991)

. [¶ 2 2 ]	 	 Rule 3(d) of	 the	 Maine	 Rules	 of	 Unified	 Criminal	 Procedure provides	that	“[t]he	court	may	permit a	complaint	to	be	amended	at	any time before	 verdict	 or	 finding	if	no	additional	 or	different	crime	is	charged	 and	if substantial	rights	of	the	defendant	are	not	prejudiced. ” Neither	Williams	nor the	State	formally	moved	to	amend	the	complaint; 4 however,	in	arguing	their positions	 on	 the motion,	 the	 defense agreed	 with	 the	 State	 that	 a	 course	 of conduct	can	occur	in	more	 than	one	place	and	even	across	jurisdictions,	and stated,	 on	 the	 record,	 “He	 should	 have	 said	 in	 Waldo	 County.”	 	 The refore, although	no	formal	motion	to	amend	the	complai nt	was	made,	both	sides	had the	opportunity	to	argue	their	position s regarding	the	amendment,	and	agreed that	the	relevant	course	of	conduct	occurred	in	Waldo	County. [¶ 2 3 ] As	 already	 discussed,	 t he	 amendment itself merely	changed	 the location	alleged in	the	complaint from	“Lincolnville,	Waldo	County”	to	“Waldo County.”	 	 The	 amendment did	 not	 charge	 any	 additional	 or	 different	 crimes.
L ocation	is	not	an	element	of	the	crime	of	harassment , and the	State	was	not

4 The	court	did	a cknowledge,	when	the	motion	was	made,	that	“obviously	if	necessary	the	state could	move	to	amend	the	complaint	to	include	Lincolnville	and/or	Belfast.”14 required	to	prove	that	the	course	of	condu ct	constituting	harassment	occurred in	a	particular	location. Cf. State	v.	Siviski ,	663	A.2d	568,	570	(Me.	1995)

. The court	 did	 not	 err	 in	 concluding	 that	 the	 amendment	 would	 not	 prejudice Williams because	 he	 was	 on	 notice	 of	 the	 facts	 alleged	 in	 the	 ame nded complaint	 through	 discovery. Cf. State	 v. Johnson ,	 2005	 ME	 46,	 ¶¶ 15

- 16,
870 A.2d 561.	 	 Therefore,	 the	 trial	 court	 did	 not	 abuse	 its	 discretion	 in permitting	the complaint	to	be	amended to	conform	to	the	evidence	presented at	trial.
E. Jury Instructions [¶ 2 4 ]		Williams	also	contends	that	the	trial	court	erred	in	failing	to	give three	jury	instructions. 5 Because	Williams	did	not	object	to	the	court’s	failure to	give	 these	jury	instructions	at	 trial,	or	 to	 the	instructions	 that	were	given, th ese	 claims	 of	 error	 are	 unpreserved	 on	 appeal,	 and	 we	 review	 the	 jury instructions	for	obvious	error. 6 State	v.	Lajoie ,	2017	ME	8,	¶	13,	154	A.3d	132

.

5 Williams	argues	that	the	court	erroneously	failed	to	instruct	the	jury	that	(1)	“the	‘absence	of rea sonable	cause’	 [is]	part	of	 the	State’s	burden	of	proof”	with	 respect	 to	 the	harassment	counts ; (2) “certain	speech,	such	as	political	speech,	is	protected	by	the	First	Amendment	of	the	United	States Constitution	and	by	Article	 I,	§§	4	and	6

- A	of	 the	Maine Constitution , ”	and	“a	public	 figure	may	be subject	to	certain	conduct	through	writings	and	speech	that	an	ordinary	person	may	not	be	subject to,	and	also	that	in	these	situations,	that	‘actual	malice’	had	to	be	proved” ; and	(3) “anti

- SLAPP	[is]	an affirma tive	defense.”

6 “To	demonstrate	obvious	error,	the	defendant	must	show	that	there	is	(1)	an	error,	(2)	that	is plain,	and	(3)	that	affects	substantial	rights.		Even	if	these	three	conditions	are	met,	we	will	set	aside a	jury’s	verdict	only	if	we	conclude	that	(4)	the	er ror	seriously	affects	the	fairness	and	integrity	or15 Jury	 instructions	 must	 inform	 the	 jury	 correctly	 and	 fairly	 in	 all	 necessary respects	of	the	governing law. State	v.	Tucker ,	2015	ME	68,	¶	11,	117	A.3d	595

. Contrary	to	Williams’s	argument,	we	conclude	that	the	trial	court	committed	no obvious	error	in	its	instructions	to	the	jury. 7
F. Ethical	Considerations [¶ 2 5 ]	 	 Although	Williams	 is	 represented	 by	 cou nsel	 in	 this	 appeal,	 he
argues , purportedly in	a self

- represented capacity , that	the	bail	commissioner’s fee, paid	 directly	 to	 the	 bail	 commissioner,	 not	 to	 the	 court,	 and	 explicitly provided	for	in	15	M.R.S.	§	1023(5)	(2018),	constitutes	extortion	in	violation	of his constitutional due	process	rights.		The	argument relies on specious	claims to	attack	the	integrity	of	Maine’s	state	courts.		The	argument	is	without	merit , and	we	address it	no	further.

public	reputation	of	judicial	proceedings.” State	v.	Pelletier ,	2019	ME	92,	¶	9,	210 A.3d 177 (quotation marks	omitted)

.
7 T he	 record	 reveals	 that	 the	 trial	 court	 clearly	 instructed	 the	 jury	 regarding	 a ll	 statutorily required	 elements	 of	 the	 crimes	 of	 stalking	 (Class	 D),	 17

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 210

- A(1)(A)(1)	 (2018) , and harassment	(Class	E),	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	506

- A(1)(A)	(2018). T he	trial	court	committed	no	obvious	error in	not	instructing	 the	jury	regarding	 the	Fir st	Amendment	right	to	 freedom	of	speech	because	the conduct	proscribed	by	Maine’s	criminal	harassment	and	stalking	statutes	is	not	protected	by	the	First Amendment	of	the	United	States	Constitution	or a rticle	 I, s ection	4	of	the	Maine	Constitution. See Ch ilds	v.	Ballou ,	2016	ME	142,	¶¶	17,	24

- 27,	148	A.3d	291 ; State	v.	Cropley ,	544	A.2d	302,	304

- 05	(Me. 1988) .		Finally,	the	trial	court	committed	no	obvious	error	in	not	giving	a	jury	instruction	regarding Maine’s	anti

- SLAPP	 ( strategic	litigation	against	pub lic	 participation ) law, 14	M.R.S.	 §	 556	 (2018) , because,	by	its	plain	terms,	Maine’s	anti

- SLAPP	statute applies	only	in	civil,	not	criminal,	cases.16 [¶ 2 6 ]	 	 However,	 we	 are	 concerned	 that	 the	 claim	 was	 included	 in counsel’s	 brief.	 	 Although	 counsel	 attempted	 to	 distance	 himself	 from	 the allegation,	he alone	signed	the	brief	that	incorporated	his	client’s	argument. An unfounded	claim	su ch	as	this	appearing	in	a	brief	submitted	by	an	attorney,	if attributable	to	that	attorney, could constitute	a	violation	of	Rule 8.2(a)	of	the Maine	Rules	of	Professional	Conduct,	which	prohibits an attorney	from	making any	statement	“the	lawyer	knows	to	b e	false	or	with	reckless	disregard	as	to	its truth	or	falsity	concerning	the	integrity	of	a	judge.” [¶ 2 7 ]	 	 We	 take	 this	 opportunity	 to	 remind	 Maine’s	 attorneys	 of	 their ethical	obligations	as	members	of	the	legal	profession.		Attorneys,	unlike	their clien ts,	are	subject	to	the	Maine	Rules	of	Professional	Conduct. See M.R.	Prof. Conduct	 8.4	 cmt.	 1	 (“Lawyers	 are	 subject	 to	 discipline	 when	 they	 violate	 or attempt	to	violate	the	Rules	of	Professional	Conduct	.	.	.	.”).		Attorneys	are	bound by	the	contents	of the	briefs they	sign

. See M.R.	Prof.	Conduct	3.3	cmt.	3	(“An advocate	 is	 responsible	 for	 pleadings	 and	 other	 documents	 prepared	 for litigation	.	.	.	.”).		Therefore,	when	a	client	who	is	represented	by	counsel	insists on	presenting	any	argument	or assertion	that	is	not	endorsed	by	the attorney

— particularly	one	that,	if	made	by	the	attorney,	might	violate	the	Maine	Rules	of Professional	 Conduct, see M.R.	 Prof.	 Conduct	 1.2	 cmt.	 13

— such	 argument	 or17
assertion should	 not be	incorporated	into	 the	brief	dr afted	and	submitted	by the	attorney.		Rather,	it	is	incumbent	upon	the	attorney	to	advise	the	client	to obtain	leave	of	the	Court	to independently	present	the	argument	or	assertion in	a	separate	brief	or	writing	signed	by	the	client	only. The	entry	is: J udgment affirmed.

Ezra	A.	R.	Willey,	Esq. (orally) ,	Willey	Law	Offices,	Bangor,	for	appellant	Bradley Williams Natasha	Irving,	District	Attorney,	and	Elizabeth	Noble,	Asst.	Dist.	Atty. (orally) , Prosecutorial	District	VI,	Belfast,	for	appellee State	of	Maine

Waldo	County	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket	number	CR

- 2016

- 711 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY