IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN RE TRUST UNDER WILL OF WALLACE 

B. FLINT FOR THE BENEFIT OF 

KATHERINE F. SHADEK

)

)

)

C.A. No. 10593-VCL

OPINION

Date Submitted: March 20, 2015

Date Decided: June 17, 2012

Todd A. Flubacher, Kimberly Gill McKinnon, MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & 

TUNNELL, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Attorneys for Petitioner.

LASTER, Vice Chancellor.
1

The current income beneficiary of a testamentary trust petitioned for an order that 

would modify the trust’s terms by rewriting its administrative provisions, thereby 

converting the trust from the traditional, trustee-managed structure that the settlor 

contemplated into a directed trust where the trustee would serve only an administrative 

role. The petition also seeks an order providing that Delaware law will govern the 

administration of the trust unless the application of Delaware law ―would or might‖ have

adverse tax consequences, in which case New York law—the law that originally 

governed the trust under the settlor’s estate plan—would spring back into effect. The 

petition is denied.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Wallace B. Flint established a detailed estate plan in his Last Will and Testament 

dated December 12, 1934 (the ―Will‖). Among other things, the Will created a 

testamentary trust that would receive as its corpus the residue of his estate (the ―Trust‖). 

A. The Terms Of The Trust

The Will contains detailed provisions for the Trust, reflecting Wallace’s careful 

attention to how he wanted the residue of his estate distributed after his death. The initial 

purpose of the Trust was to provide income for his wife, Margaret McClenahan Flint, for 

the duration of her life. Article SEVENTH of the Will stated:

All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, whether real, personal or 

mixed, and wheresoever situate, I give, devise and bequeath to my Trustees 

herein-after named, their successor or successors, in trust nevertheless, to 

invest and reinvest the same during the term of natural life of my said wife 

MARGARET McCLENAHAN FLINT, and during such term to pay over 

to her the net rents, income and profits thereof in monthly or quarterly 

installments as my said Trustees may determine.
2

Under the plain language of this provision, Wallace expected his trustees to determine 

how to invest the corpus of the Trust.

Wallace provided that after Margaret’s death, the Trust would continue for the 

benefit of his daughter, Katherine Frances Flint (now Katherine F. Shadek), and provide 

income to her for the duration of her life. Article EIGHTH stated:

Upon the death of my said wife MARGARET McCLENAHAN FLINT ..., 

I give, devise and bequeath my said estate to my said Trustees, their 

successor or successors, in further trust nevertheless, to invest and reinvest 

the same during the term of the natural life of my daughter KATHERINE 

FRANCES FLINT and during such term to pay over to her the net rents, 

income and profits thereof in monthly or quarterly installments as my 

Trustees may determine, except that during the minority of my said 

daughter such payments shall be made to her testamentary guardian 

hereinbelow named.

Once again, under the plain language of this provision, Wallace expected his trustees to 

determine how to invest the corpus of the Trust.

Under Article EIGHTH, Wallace gave Katherine two opportunities to invade the 

principal of the Trust. Upon attaining age thirty-five, she could direct that the trustees

divide the corpus into fourths and pay one fourth over to her. Upon attaining age forty, 

she again could direct that the trustees divide the corpus into fourths and pay another 

fourth over to her. By providing these opportunities, Wallace recognized that Katherine 

might desire some degree of control over property being used for her benefit, and so he 

created two chances for her to obtain control over what works out to approximately 44% 

of the corpus (1⁄4 + (1⁄4 * 3⁄4)). Notably, Wallace did not permit Katherine to access the 

entire corpus, nor did he otherwise authorize her to direct how the corpus of the Trust 

would be invested.
3

In Article NINTH of the Will, Wallace granted Katherine a testamentary power of 

appointment over the corpus of the Trust that remained at her death. Wallace took care to 

address what would happen if Katherine failed to exercise her power. He specified two 

alternatives. If Katherine had lawful descendants, then the trustees would divide the Trust 

corpus and pay it over to them per stirpes. If she did not, then the trustees would divide 

the Trust corpus and pay it over, per stirpes, to five different individuals whom Wallace 

named. Three were the children of his cousin, Henry D. Scribner, and two were the 

children of his brother-in-law, Henry Molwitz.

In Article THIRTEENTH, Wallace granted the trustees a limited power to invade 

the Trust corpus for the benefit of his wife or daughter if the trustees deemed it 

appropriate in their sole discretion. Notably, Wallace limited the amount to a maximum 

of $10,000 in any calendar year. By imposing this limit, Wallace ensured that the bulk of 

Trust corpus would remain intact and under the direction of his trustees so that his estate 

plan could be carried out.

Evidencing his desire to have trustworthy persons exercise judgment over the 

Trust corpus, Wallace provided in his Will that the initial trustees would be Henry 

Scribner, Henry Molwitz, Margaret, and the Chemical Bank and Trust Company, a New 

York corporate trustee. Wallace did not make Margaret, initially the only income 

beneficiary, the sole trustee. 

B. The Trust Migrates To Delaware.

After Wallace died, the Surrogate’s Court of the State of New York, Queen’s 

County (the ―New York Court‖), issued letters of trusteeship dated February 16, 1938, to 
4

the initial trustees. By instrument dated June 10, 1949, Katherine restricted her 

testamentary power of appointment to an exercise in favor of her spouse, descendants, 

and donees. 

After Henry Scribner and Margaret died, the New York Court appointed Katherine

as a successor co-trustee. After Henry Molwitz died, Katherine and Chemical Bank 

continued as the sole remaining co-trustees.

As noted, Katherine had the power to obtain (i) a distribution of one-fourth of the 

Trust corpus when she turned thirty-five and (ii) a distribution of one-fourth of the 

remaining corpus when she turned forty. She did not exercise either power. Today, 

Katherine has four adult children who are the presumptive remainder beneficiaries under 

the Trust. She has grandchildren who are contingent remainder beneficiaries. She has 

potential additional descendants, as yet unborn and perhaps not even contemplated. They 

are also contingent remainder beneficiaries.

In 2001, Katherine and Chemical Bank took steps to move the Trust to Delaware. 

They obtained an order from this court dated October 5, 2001, that provisionally 

approved the change of the Trust’s situs. It stated:

(A) Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A. shall be appointed successor cotrustee of the Trust and this Court shall accept jurisdiction over the Trust at 

such time as the Surrogate’s Court of New York, Queens County, enters an 

Order authorizing (i) The Chase Manhattan Bank to resign as trustee, and 

(ii) the change of the situs of the Trust to Delaware; and 

(B) following the revocation of her Letters of Trusteeship by the 

Surrogate’s Court of New York, Queen’s County, this Court affirms the 

continuation of Katherine F. Shadek as trustee of the Trust.
5

Obtaining the New York order took some time. Nearly one year later, on 

September 25, 2002, the New York Court entered an order that provided as follows:

(1) Katherine F. Shadek and JPMorgan Chase Bank are hereby given 

leave to transfer the situs of the Trust to the State of Delaware for 

administration thereof under the jurisdiction of the Court of 

Chancery of the State of Delaware, County of New Castle and the 

assets comprising the corpus of the Trust shall be transferred to 

Katherine F. Shadek and J.P. Morgan Trust Company of Delaware, 

as Trustees.

(2) JPMorgan Chase Bank, successor in interest to The Chase 

Manhattan Bank, is hereby authorized to resign as co-Trustee.

(3) J.P. Morgan Trust Company of Delaware shall be appointed 

successor co-Trustee upon the transfer of the Trust pursuant to the 

terms of the order of the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, 

County of New Castle.

(4) The Letters of Trusteeship issued to Katherine F. Shadek and The 

Chase Manhattan Bank (now known as JPMorgan Chase Bank), 

shall be revoked upon the appointment as co-Trustees of Katherine 

F. Shadek and J.P. Morgan Trust Company of Delaware by order of 

the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, County of New 

Castle.

Approximately one month later, Katherine and Chemical Bank obtained an 

additional order from this court dated October 29, 2002 (the ―2002 Order‖). It declared 

that effective as September 25, 2002, the date of the New York Court’s order, the 

following items were true:

(A) J.P. Morgan Trust Company of Delaware and Katherine F. Shadek 

are appointed as successor co-trustees of the Trust; 

(B) this Court has accepted jurisdiction over the Trust; and 

(C) Sections 3302, 3312, 3313 and 3402 of Title 12 of the Delaware 

Code shall govern all matters concerning the administration of the 

Trust that are addressed thereunder, and New York law shall 

continue to govern all other matters concerning the administration of 
6

the Trust; provided, however, that the co-trustees shall not be 

required to account in any court other than one of the courts of the 

State of Delaware.

Although the entry of the 2002 Order reflected this court’s practice at the time when 

evaluating trust consent petitions, Delaware decisions have held subsequently that a 

petition seeking consensual declarations that do not require judicial implementation does 

not give rise to an actual controversy supporting declaratory relief.1

C. The Trust’s Concentrated Corpus

Approximately 81% of the fair market value of the Trust corpus is invested in the 

stock of International Business Machines Corporation (―IBM‖). Wallace’s brother, 

Charles Flint, founded Computing Tabulating Recording Company in 1911, which was 

renamed IBM in 1924. When Wallace died, shares of IBM stock formed a preponderance 

of the corpus.

JP Morgan has recommended diversifying the Trust. Katherine and her children do 

not want to diversify the Trust. Although the Trust is not a directed trust, JP Morgan has 

acceded to their wishes. To hedge against a decline in the value of the stock, JP Morgan 

has been entering annually into principal installment stock monetization transactions, 

which the petition labels ―PrISM‖ transactions. The PrISM transactions have not been 

described in detail. 

 

1

See In re In re Peierls Family Inter Vivos Trusts, 77 A.3d 249, 266-67 (Del. 2013). See 

generally 10 Del. C. § 6504; Rollins Int'l Inc. v. Int'l Hydronics Corp., 303 A.2d 660, 662–63 

(Del. 1973).
7

The plain language of the Trust appears to contemplate that the trustees can retain 

the IBM stock. Article SIXTEENTH of Wallace’s Will provides that his trustees can 

continue to hold investments that he held. It states:

[M]y Trustees as well and [their] successors . . . shall have full power and 

authority in their absolute and uncontrolled discretion to hold and retain 

any property coming into their hands hereunder in the same form of 

investment as that in which it may exist at the time of my death although it 

may not be of the character of investment permitted by law to Trustees . . . .

Article SIXTEENTH does not say that the trustees can retain an investment that Wallace 

held even if they believe that it would be in the best interests of the Trust to sell it.

In recent years, JP Morgan has insisted that additional steps be taken in light of 

Katherine and her children’s desire to maintain the Trust’s concentrated investment in 

IBM stock. First, the trustees distanced themselves from the actual investment decisions. 

In 2012, they delegated to Laurence A. Shadek and James M. Shadek, two of Katherine’s 

adult children, ―all duties and powers in connection with the investment of the assets of 

the Trust,‖ including but not limited to a list of specific types of investments (the 

―Investment Managers‖). Katherine’s adult children, including Laurence and James,

signed the delegations to Laurence and James on behalf of themselves and their 

descendants.

Second, in each of the last four years, Katherine and her adult children have 

entered into consent, release, and indemnification agreements with JP Morgan and with 

Laurence and James in their capacities as Investment Managers. Through these 

agreements, Katherine and her adult children approved and consented to the 

concentration of the Trust corpus, released JP Morgan and the Investment Managers from 
8

any liability, and agreed to indemnify JP Morgan and the Investment Managers against 

any claims arising out of (i) the decision not to diversify the Trust’s investments other 

than through the PrISM transactions, (ii) the PrISM transactions themselves, and (iii) the 

delegation of investment authority to the Investment Managers. Katherine’s children 

signed the delegations on behalf of themselves and their descendants.

D. The Petition To Modify The Trust

By petition dated October 24, 2014, Katherine sought to modify the terms of the 

Trust. The brief in support of the petition stated that the changes are ―intended to 

formalize the current investment management structure and replace the ad hoc 

mechanism of delegations of investment responsibilities to the Investment Managers 

which requires the annual burden of drafting and executing consent, release and 

indemnification agreements between all interested parties.‖ 

To achieve this result, the petition asks the court to approve a document titled the 

―Modified and Restated Last Will and Testament of Wallace B. Flint.‖ The petition 

shortens this to the ―Restated Will.‖ Both are newspeak. The new document would no 

longer be the Last Will and Testament of Wallace B. Flint. It would be a new will and 

testament, written for him by Katherine’s current lawyers, eighty-one years after his 

death. 

The Restated Will would differ substantially from the original Will. Its length 

more than doubles from the original Will’s nine pages to the Restated Will’s nineteen. 

The additional bulk comes from four new articles that convert the Trust from a traditional 

trustee-managed structure into a directed trust. The heart of the change is a new Article 
9

TWENTY-SEVENTH, which creates the position of Investment Advisor, appoints 

Laurence as the initial Investment Advisor, and provides that Katherine and her adult 

children shall have the power by majority vote to appoint a new investment advisor.

Section C of the new Article TWENTY-SEVENTH directs the trustees to exercise 

their investment powers only as directed by the Investment Advisor:

(C) Investment Direction. My Trustees shall exercise all 

investment powers granted to it under Sections (2) through 

(5), and (7) through (14) of Section 3325 of Title 12 of the 

Delaware Code2or any successor provision thereto, all 

 

2

These sections provide as follows:

Without limiting the authority conferred by § 3324 of this title, a 

trustee may:

...

(2) Acquire or sell property, for cash or on credit, at public or 

private sale;

(3) Exchange, partition or otherwise change the character of trust 

property;

(4) Deposit trust funds in an account in a regulated financial 

services institution, including an institution operated by or 

affiliated with the trustee;

(5) Borrow money, with or without security, and mortgage or 

pledge trust property for a period within or extending beyond the 

duration of the trust;

... 

(7) With respect to an interest in a proprietorship, partnership, 

limited liability company, statutory trust, business trust, 

corporation or other form of business or enterprise, continue the 

business or other enterprise and take any action that may be taken 

by shareholders, members or property owners, including merging, 

dissolving or otherwise changing the form of business organization 

or contributing additional capital;
10

 

(8) With respect to stocks or other securities, to exercise the rights 

of an absolute owner, including the right to:

a. Vote, or give proxies to vote, with or without power of 

substitution, or enter into or continue a voting trust agreement;

b. Hold a security in the name of a nominee or in other 

form without disclosure of the trust so that title may pass by 

delivery;

c. Pay calls, assessments and other sums chargeable or 

accruing against the securities, and sell or exercise stock 

subscription or conversion rights; and

d. Deposit the securities with a securities depository or 

other regulated financial services institution;

(9) With respect to an interest in real property, construct, make 

ordinary or extraordinary repairs, alterations or improvements in 

buildings or other structures, demolish improvements, raze existing 

or erect new party walls or buildings, subdivide or develop land, 

dedicate land to public use or grant public or private easements, 

and make or vacate plats and adjust boundaries;

(10) Enter into a lease for any purpose as lessor or lessee, 

including a lease or other arrangement for exploration and removal 

of natural resources, with or without the option to purchase or 

renew, for a period within the duration of the trust;

(11) Grant an option involving a sale, lease or other disposition of 

trust property or take an option for the acquisition of property, 

excluding an option exercisable beyond the duration of the trust, 

and exercise an option so acquired;

(12) Insure the property of the trust against damage or loss and 

insure the trustee, the trustee's agents and beneficiaries against 

liability arising from the administration of the trust;

(13) Abandon or decline to administer property of no value or of 

insufficient value to justify its collection or continued 

administration;

(14) With respect to possible liability for environmental 

conditions:
11

powers granted in Articles SIXTEENTH and TWENTIETH 

of this my will [sic], and all other powers relating to the 

acquisition, disposition, retention, exchange, change in 

character, lending, borrowing, pledging, mortgaging, 

managing, voting, leasing, granting of options with respect to, 

insuring, abandoning, or in any other way relating to the 

investment or management of the trust estate, only upon the 

written direction of the [I]nvestment [A]dvisor . . . .

(Footnote added). In his actual Will, Wallace placed the trustees in charge of investing 

the Trust’s corpus. The original Will did not contemplate the position of Investment 

Advisor or the concept of a directed trust, nor did it incorporate statutory language postdating Wallace’s death.

Section D of the new Article TWENTY-SEVENTH relieves the trustees of any 

duty to monitor the Investment Advisor:

 

a. Inspect or investigate property the trustee holds or has 

been asked to hold, or property owned or operated by an entity in 

which the trustee holds or has been asked to hold an interest, for 

the purpose of determining the application of environmental law 

with respect to the property;

b. Take action to prevent, abate or otherwise remedy any 

actual or potential violation of any environmental law affecting 

property held directly or indirectly by the trustee, whether taken 

before or after the initiation of a claim or governmental 

enforcement action;

c. Decline to accept property into trust or to disclaim any 

power with respect to property that has or may have environmental 

liability attached;

d. Compromise claims against the trust which may be 

asserted for an alleged violation of environmental law; and

e. Pay the expense of any inspection, review, abatement or 

remedial action to comply with environmental law . . . .

12 Del. C. § 3325.
12

(D) Trustee Has No Duty to Monitor. My Trustees shall 

have no responsibility to undertake any review of, or to 

provide advice regarding, any part of the trust estate subject 

to the direction of the Investment adviser. My Trustees shall 

have no duty or obligation to (a) communicate with or warn 

any beneficiary or any third party concerning instances in 

which my Trustees would or might have exercised their 

discretion in a manner different than the manner exercised by 

the Investment Advisor, (b) to inquire into or monitor the 

directions of the Investment Adviser notwithstanding any 

appearance of or actual conflict of interest of the Investment 

Advisor, or (c) inquire into, monitor or question the prudence 

of or inform any beneficiary with respect to the investment of 

the trust estate subject to the direction of the Investment 

Advisor, and any and all review of the investments by my 

Trustees shall be presumed to be solely for statement, tax 

reporting and/or other administrative purposes. My Trustees 

shall have no duty to seek the direction of the Investment 

Advisor in the absence of any direction. My Trustees shall be 

entitled to the full protection of Section 3313(e) of Title 12 of 

the Delaware Code3 without limitation. This Article has been 

 

3

This section provides as follows:

Whenever a governing instrument provides that a fiduciary 

is to follow the direction of an adviser with respect to investment 

decisions, distribution decisions, or other decisions of the 

fiduciary, then, except to the extent that the governing instrument 

provides otherwise, the fiduciary shall have no duty to:

(1) Monitor the conduct of the adviser;

(2) Provide advice to the adviser or consult with the adviser; or

(3) Communicate with or warn or apprise any beneficiary or third 

party concerning instances in which the fiduciary would or might 

have exercised the fiduciary's own discretion in a manner different 

from the manner directed by the adviser.

Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the actions 

of the fiduciary pertaining to matters within the scope of the 

adviser's authority (such as confirming that the adviser's directions 

have been carried out and recording and reporting actions taken at 

the adviser's direction), shall be presumed to be administrative 
13

included in order to effectively bifurcate the investment

function from other functions of my Trustees in order for 

investment decisions to be made by the Investment Adviser 

without the interference of my Trustees.

(Footnote added). In his actual Will, Wallace placed the trustees in charge of the Trust. 

The Restated Will not only alters this arrangement, but it justifies it by referring to the 

trustees’ management and oversight of the Trust as ―interference.‖ That is a strange 

choice of words.

Section E of the new Article TWENTY-SEVENTH directs the trustees to robosign documents provided to them by the Investment Advisor:

(D) My Trustees shall execute all documents necessary or 

appropriate in connection with any matter that is the subject 

of directions from the Investment Advisor, including, without 

limitation, making any representation, warranty or covenant 

required in order to make or maintain any investment of the 

trust, and any future action with respect to any such 

representation, warranty or covenant, only as directed by the 

Investment Adviser. My Trustees shall have no duty to 

conduct any independent review of documents presented to it 

[sic] by the Investment Adviser in furtherance of the 

Investment Adviser’s written instruction to my Trustees and 

shall sign the same as presented. Further, the Investment 

Adviser shall have the authority to direct my Trustees with 

regard to amending, securing, paying, and otherwise dealing 

with any debts, promissory notes, and other obligations of the 

trust. My Trustees shall act solely at the direction of the 

 

actions taken by the fiduciary solely to allow the fiduciary to 

perform those duties assigned to the fiduciary under the governing 

instrument and such administrative actions shall not be deemed to 

constitute an undertaking by the fiduciary to monitor the adviser or 

otherwise participate in actions within the scope of the adviser's 

authority.

12 Del. C. § 3313(e).
14

Investment Adviser in executing and delivering any and all 

documents in connection with any matter that is the subject to 

direction from the Investment Adviser, such as purchase and 

sale agreements, necessary or convenient to, or otherwise 

prepared in connection with, the purchase, sale, exchange, 

transfer, pledge or other disposition or encumbrance of trust 

investments and in making any and all representations and 

warranties appearing in any such documents.

In his original Will, Wallace contemplated that the trustees would exercise judgment and 

discretion, not act as marionettes for the Investment Advisor.

A new Article TWENTY-EIGHTH exculpates the trustees from all liability when 

acting at the direction of the Investment Advisor ―except in cases of such Trustee’s own 

willful misconduct.‖ The same new article provides broad indemnification and 

advancement rights to the trustees and former trustees for ―any threatened, pending or 

completed action, claim, demand, suit or proceeding, whether civil, criminal, 

administrative or investigative, falling within the exculpatory provisions of the preceding 

paragraph or to which the Trustee is made a party, or threatened to be made a party, by 

reason of serving as Trustee.‖ The original Will did not provide the trustees with such an 

extensive degree of insulation from accountability to their beneficiaries. 

Finally, a new Article TWENTY-FIFTH broadens the powers of the Investment 

Advisor by providing that the Investment Advisor may direct the trustees 

to acquire and retain investments not regarded as traditional for trusts, 

including investments that would be forbidden or would be regarded as 

imprudent, improper, or unlawful by the ―prudent person‖ rule, ―Prudent 

investor‖ rule, Section 3302 of Title 12 of the Delaware Code,4any rule or 

 

4

This section provides as follows:
15

 

(a) When investing, reinvesting, purchasing, acquiring, exchanging, retaining, 

selling and managing property for the benefit of another, a fiduciary shall act with 

the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing 

that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters 

would use to attain the purposes of the account. In making investment decisions, a 

fiduciary may consider the general economic conditions, the anticipated tax 

consequences of the investment and the anticipated duration of the account and 

the needs of its beneficiaries.

(b) Within the limitations of the foregoing standard and considering individual 

investments as part of an overall investment strategy, a fiduciary is authorized to 

acquire every kind of property, real, personal or mixed, and every kind of 

investment, wherever located, whether within or without the United States, 

including, but not by way of limitation, bonds, debentures and other corporate 

obligations, stocks, preferred or common, shares or interests in common funds or 

common trust funds, securities of any open-end or closed-end management type 

investment company or investment trust registered under the Federal Investment 

Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq.), options, futures, warrants, 

limited partnership interests and life insurance. No investment made by a 

fiduciary shall be deemed imprudent solely because the investment is not 

specifically mentioned in this subsection.

(c) The propriety of an investment decision is to be determined by what the 

fiduciary knew or should have known at the time of the decision about:

(1) The inherent nature and expected performance of the investment 

portfolio;

(2) The limitations of the standard set forth in subsection (a) of this 

section; and

(3) The nature and extent of other investments and resources, whether 

held in trust or otherwise, available to the beneficiaries as they existed at the time 

of the decision; provided however, that the fiduciary shall have no duty to inquire 

as to the nature and extent of any such other investments and resources not held 

by the fiduciary or held by the fiduciary in a trust or trust account subject to the 

direction of an adviser authorized to direct the fiduciary with respect to 

investment decisions, within the meaning of § 3313(d) of this title, concerning the 

assets held in the trust or trust account.

Any determination of liability for investment performance shall consider 

the performance of the entire portfolio and such other factors as the fiduciary 

considered when the investment decision was made.
16

 

(d) Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, a trustee who 

discloses the application of this subsection and the limitation of the trustee's 

duties thereunder either in the governing instrument or in a separate writing 

delivered to each insured at the inception of a contract of life insurance or 

thereafter if prior to an event giving rise to a claim thereunder, may acquire or 

retain a contract of life insurance upon the life of the trustor or the trustor's 

spouse, or both, without liability for a loss arising from the trustee's failure to:

(1) Determine whether the contract is or remains a proper investment;

(2) Investigate the financial strength or changes in the financial strength 

of the life insurance company;

(3) Make a determination of whether to exercise any policy option 

available under the contract;

(4) Make a determination of whether to diversify such contracts relative 

to 1 another or to other assets, if any, administered by the trustee; or

(5) Inquire about changes in the health or financial condition of the 

insured or insureds relative to any such contract.

(e) Any fiduciary acting under a governing instrument shall not be liable to 

anyone whose interests arise from that instrument for breach of fiduciary duty for 

the fiduciary's good faith reliance on the express provisions of such instrument. 

The standards set forth in this section may be expanded, restricted or eliminated 

by express provisions in a governing instrument.

(f) Where a bank or trust company acting in a fiduciary capacity invests trust 

funds in, or otherwise acquires an interest in, a common trust fund which it or 1 of 

its affiliates manages, as defined in § 23A of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 

§ 371c), the plan for such common trust fund shall be filed and recorded in the 

office of the Register in Chancery of the county in which is located the main 

office in Delaware of the bank or trust company which is the fiduciary for such 

trust funds.

(g) Fees may be charged for making an investment through a computerized or 

automated process, such as sweeping otherwise uninvested cash into a cash 

management vehicle, provided that the amount of such fees is disclosed on a 

continuing basis as a separate item on the regular periodic statements furnished to 

the beneficiaries of the account.

(h) A fiduciary is authorized, in the absence of an express provision to the 

contrary, whenever a law, regulation, governing instrument or order directs, 

requires, authorizes or permits investment in United States government 
17

law concerning the duty of loyalty or any other rule or law which restricts a 

fiduciary’s capacity to invest.

(Footnote added). The original Will did not contemplate this expansive degree of 

investment authority. Moreover, given the broad range of investment authority

contemplated by Section 3302, it seems odd to expand it further, and particularly extreme 

to encompass investments that otherwise would be ―unlawful.‖

Ironically, the Restated Will would continue to bear Wallace’s signature and the 

signatures of his three original witnesses. It also would continue to recite that it was 

―SIGNED, SEALED, PUBLISHED AND DECLARED by [Wallace] . . . in his presence 

and in the presence of [the witnesses] this 12th day of December, 1934.‖ That would no 

longer be true.

 

obligations, to invest in those obligations, either directly or in the form of 

securities of, or other interests in, any open-end or closed-end management 

investment company or investment trust registered under the Investment 

Company Act of 1940 (54 Stat. 847, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq.), if the portfolio of 

that investment company or investment trust is limited to United States 

government obligations and to repurchase agreements fully collateralized by 

United States government obligations, which collateral shall be delivered to or 

held by the investment company or investment trust, either directly or through an 

authorized custodian.

(i) Except in the case of United States government obligations, which are treated 

in subsection (h) of this section above, the authority to invest in specified types of 

investments includes authorization to invest in any open-end or closed-end 

management investment company or investment trust registered under the 

Investment Company Act of 1940 (54 Stat. 847, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq.), or in 

any common or collective trust fund established and maintained by a corporate 

fiduciary, if the portfolio of the investment company or investment trust, or of the 

common or collective trust fund, consists substantially of the specified types of 

investments and is otherwise in conformity with the laws of the State.

12 Del. C. § 3302.
18

E. The Modification Of The 2002 Order

In addition to modifying the trust through the creation of the Restated Will, 

Katherine wishes to modify the 2002 Order’s declaration regarding the law governing the 

Trust. Rather than choosing a single state’s law to govern the administration of the Trust, 

the 2002 Order picked two. Delaware law governed the matters set forth in Sections 

3302, 3312, 3313 and 3402 of Title 12 of the Delaware Code, and New York law 

continued to govern all other administrative matters.

In the petition, Katherine asks for a more amorphous, complex, and unpredictable 

division in the form of language that would provide as follows:

Delaware law shall govern all matters pertaining to the administration of 

the Trust except those matters concerning administration which, if the law 

governing administration were changed from New York to Delaware law, 

would or might change the time of the vesting of interests in the property of 

the Trust, extend the duration of the Trust, or shift a beneficial interest in 

the Trust to any beneficiary who occupies a lower generation (as defined in 

Section 261 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended), than the 

person or persons who held the beneficial interest prior to the change in the 

law governing administration, and all matters concerning the validity and 

construction of the Trust, and all matters concerning administration 

excepted from the application of Delaware law pursuant to the foregoing 

provisions, shall continue to be governed by new York law; provided, 

however, that the co-trustees shall not be required to account to any court 

other than one of the courts of the State of Delaware.

As a practical matter, this language would create a contingent choice of law provision, in 

which Delaware law would govern all issues of administration unless it ―would or might‖ 

create adverse tax affects, in which case the law governing that particular issue would 

revert back to New York.
19

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

This case presents two issues: the modification of the Trust and the modification 

of the 2002 Order. Both requests are denied.

A. The Modification Of The Trust

The petition seeks to modify the Trust by having the court adopt the Restated Will. 

The supporting brief stresses that the petition seeks modification, not reformation, and

candidly defines a modification as any change to a trust that departs from its original 

terms. Katherine thus admits that she wants to rewrite Wallace’s estate plan so that it says 

what she wants it to say, and she claims she should be able to do so simply because she 

and her adult children agree. 

The problem with this approach is that it conflicts with Wallace’s intent. When he 

drafted his Will, he did not create a directed trust in which the beneficiaries picked an 

Investment Advisor—here, one of themselves—and the trustees simply did whatever the 

Investment Advisor said. Wallace’s Trust contemplates that the trustees will use their 

judgment when investing and re-investing the Trust corpus. The beneficiaries are not 

supposed to exercise the degree of control over the Trust that the Restated Will would 

give them. Wallace’s actual Will evidences his intent by placing limitations on 

Katherine’s ability to access the corpus and limiting the trustees’ power to invade 

principal on Katherine’s behalf. The most direct control Katherine could have was over 

44% of the Trust corpus, and to get it she had to elect to receive one-fourth at age thirtyfive and one-fourth of the remainder at age forty. The most the trustees can do to invade 

principal on Katherine’s behalf is a maximum of $10,000 per calendar year. 
20

Wallace plainly intended for the Trust to benefit from the expertise and judgment 

of individuals whom he trusted and who were not beneficiaries, like Henry Scribner and 

Henry Molwitz. He also plainly intended for the Trust to benefit from the involvement of 

a corporate trustee that actually would fulfill a trustee’s traditional role. The use of 

independent trustees and the involvement of a corporate trustee have been thought to 

provide meaningful protection against mismanagement and self-dealing. 

Doubtless Katherine and her adult children have good reasons for wanting to 

change Wallace’s estate plan. Under the quite different administrative structure that the 

petition advocates, a corporate trustee likely would charge far lower fees, because its 

responsibilities would be reduced from those of a real trustee to those of an 

administrative agent. Although short-term savings can have long-term costs, the costs of 

re-writing Wallace’s estate plan are currently distant and contingent. The savings are 

immediate and tangible.

Whether the wishes of living beneficiaries should prevail over the wishes of a 

dead settlor is a contestable issue where reasonable minds can disagree. Different 

jurisdictions have reached different results. English law has long made the wishes of the 

beneficiaries paramount. See Saunders v. Vautier, 49 Eng. Rep. 282 (Ch. 1841). By 

contrast, under the Claflin doctrine, the majority rule in the United States has long 

prioritized the settlor’s intent. See Claflin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889). Recent 

statutory initiatives, including the Uniform Trust Code, have eroded the Claflin doctrine 

and moved towards prioritizing the wishes of beneficiaries. See generally Richard C. 
21

Ausness, Sherlock Holmes and the Problem of the Dead Hand: The Modification and 

Termination of “Irrevocable Trusts,” 28 Quinnipiac Prob. L.J. 327 (2015).

In Delaware, the settlor’s intent controls. Our Supreme Court has stated repeatedly 

that ―[t]he cardinal rule of law in a trust case is that the intent of the settlor.‖5 Our Trust 

Code makes it the policy of the State of Delaware ―to give maximum effect to the 

principle of freedom of disposition and to the enforceability of governing instruments.‖ 

12 Del. C. § 3303(a). It would undercut this policy, and might well be described as 

duplicitous, for our State to represent to a settlor that our law will respect his dispositions 

and enforce his governing instrument, only to enable his beneficiaries to rewrite that 

instrument after his death.

Delaware obviously permits a settlor to create a new trust containing all of the 

features that the petition seeks to implement. Re-writing an existing trust to incorporate 

those features, contrary to the settlor’s intent as manifested by the instrument that the 

settlor executed, is a different matter. 

1. Prior Consent Decrees

In an effort to persuade the court to grant the relief sought, the petition cites a 

laundry list of orders and suggests that court previously granted the type of relief that the 

petition requests. A rote listing of orders is not persuasive. Many date from a period when 

this court routinely granted relief to which all parties consented, without independently 

 

5 Chavin v. PNC Bank, 816 A.2d 781, 783 (Del. 2003) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); accord Annan v. Wilm. Trust Co., 559 A.2d 1289, 1292 (Del. 1989); Dutra de 

Amorim v. Norment, 460 A.2d 511, 514 (Del. 1983).
22

testing whether there was a live dispute or similar basis for jurisdiction and without 

examining carefully whether there were adequate grounds for the relief requested. All 

pre-dated the Pierels decisions6and the adoption of a statutory mechanism for 

nonjudicial settlement.7They are not precedential.

2. Other Doctrines

Next, the petition cites a number of other doctrines and contends that they support 

relief in this case. Recognizing that none apply, the petition does not actually rely on any 

of them. Rather, the petition contends that when taken together, they imply the existence 

of a judicial power to rewrite a trust when all current beneficiaries consent. Put 

differently, the petitioner perceives within the penumbra of these doctrines the ability to 

modify a trust by consent. To my mind, the doctrines’ limited reach supports the opposite 

inference, namely that Delaware law does not countenance wholesale consensual 

modification and only departs from the settlor’s intent in narrow circumstances. 

a) Reformation

―Trust reformation is an equitable remedy and is an ordinary remedy for mistake 

in the terms of a trust instrument.‖ 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 92 (footnotes omitted). ―A trust may 

be rescinded or reformed upon the same grounds as those upon which a transfer of 

 

6

See In re Peierls Family Inter Vivos Trusts, 59 A.3d 471 (Del. Ch. 2012), aff’d in 

part & rev’d in part, 77 A.3d 249 (Del. 2013); In re Ethel F. Peierls Charitable Lead 

Unitrust, 59 A.3d 464 (Del. Ch. 2012), aff’d sub nom. In re Peierls Charitable Lead 

Unitrust, 77 A.3d 232 (Del. 2013); In re Peierls Family Testamentary Trusts, 58 A.3d 

985 (Del. Ch. 2012), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 77 A.3d 223 Del. 2013).

7

See 79 Del. Laws, c. 172, § 2 (2013).
23

property not in trust may be rescinded or reformed.‖ Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 62. 

―Where no consideration is involved in the creation of a trust, it can be rescinded or 

reformed upon the same grounds, such as fraud, duress, undue influence, or mistake, as 

those upon which a gratuitous transfer of property not in trust can be rescinded or 

reformed.‖ Id. cmt. a.

Delaware adheres to these principles and, with one exception, applies the 

traditional law of reformation to an application to reform a trust. See Roos v. Roos, 203 

A.2d 140, 142 (Del. Ch. 1964). ―It is a basic principle of equity that the Court of 

Chancery has jurisdiction to reform a document to make it conform to the original intent 

of the parties.‖ Waggoner v. Laster, 581 A.2d 1127, 1135 (Del. 1990). Outside of the 

trust context, ―reformation is appropriate only when the contract does not represent the 

parties' intent because of fraud, mutual mistake or, in exceptional cases, a unilateral 

mistake coupled with the other parties' knowing silence.‖ Emmert v. Prade, 711 A.2d 

1217, 1219 (Del.Ch.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The doctrine of reformation for mistake with regard to trusts differs from 

instruments such as contracts in one important respect; in contract law, 

reformation will not be granted unless the parties' mistake is mutual, but 

mutuality of mistake is not always required where trusts are concerned, in 

that, because a settlor usually receives no consideration for the creation of a 

trust, a unilateral mistake on the part of the settlor is ordinarily sufficient to 

warrant reformation.

90 C.J.S. Trusts § 92 (footnote omitted); accord Roos, 203 A.2d at 142.

The Court of Chancery has the power to reform a voluntary trust instrument even 

after the death of the settlor, as long as the record ―clearly and affirmatively establishes‖ 

the grounds for reformation. Roos, 203 A.2d at 143. Notwithstanding that all parties to a 
24

case seek relief via consent petition, the petitioners still must introduce ―clear and 

convincing evidence of the decedent's intent‖ in order to obtain reformation. In re Estate 

of Tuthill, 754 A.2d 272, 273 (D.C.Ct.App.2000). ―Even though a unilateral mistake by 

the settlor is a sufficient ground for reforming a trust that was created without any 

consideration, the burden is nonetheless on the party seeking reformation to establish by 

clear and convincing evidence the mistake.‖ 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 92 (footnote omitted).

The petition concedes that grounds for reformation do not exist here, because the 

Will accurately reflects Wallace’s plan for his estate, including the terms he wished to 

establish for the Trust. But the petition argues that because the court has the power to 

reform a trust instrument under limited circumstances, it should assert and exercise the 

more expansive power to modify a trust instrument whenever all current beneficiaries 

consent. In my view, the limited circumstances under which a Delaware court will order 

reformation indicate the opposite and suggest that that modification is not freely available 

as a matter of convenience.

b) Common Law Cy Pres

Cy pres is a French phrase meaning ―as near.‖ The Delaware courts first applied 

common law cy pres in 1948.8 Under that doctrine,

 

8

See Del. Trust Co. v. Graham, 61 A.2d 110, 113–14 (Del. Ch. 1948); see also

E.L. Fisch, Cy Pres Comes to Delaware, 9 Md. L. Rev. 359, 359 (1948). In 1979, the 

Delaware General Assembly established a statutory version of cy pres under the rubric of 

judicial modification. See 12 Del. C. § 3541. This decision discusses judicial 

modification separately. When adopting Section 3541, the General Assembly did not 

indicate to what degree the statute displaced common law cy pres, leading this Court to 

observe that ―[i]t is unclear to what extent [the statute] is meant to abrogate the Delaware 
25

where the general charitable purpose of a trust would fail due to a 

circumstance, unanticipated by the settlor, that renders the literal fulfillment 

of the trust impossible or impractical, the court may designate an alternative 

beneficiary ―cy pres ‖ (as near as may be) to the named beneficiary, to 

facilitate the settlor's general intent.

PNC Bank, Del. v. N.J. State Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 2008 WL 

2891150, at *6 (Del. Ch. July 14, 2008). If, however, the settlor’s ―particular intent 

remain[s] possible, the bequest will be so applied. The general intention is of the last 

resort.‖ S.A. Anderson, The Cy Pres Doctrine as Affecting the Construction of Deeds and 

Wills, 1 Colum. L.T. 8, 12 (1887) (citation omitted). 

Because cy pres is a last resort, a court will not invoke the doctrine ―merely 

because some imaginary benefit is anticipated from giving latitude to the language of the 

written instrument, or on any bare suggestion of expediency.‖ Id. Only when it becomes 

―absolutely impossible to accomplish the particular purpose‖ of the trust will cy pres

empower a court to craft an imperfect solution to make the trust functional. Id.

As with reformation, the petition does not rely on common law cy pres. That 

doctrine only can be invoked for charitable trust, which the Trust is not. Ronald Chester, 

George Gleason Bogert & George Taylor Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees, § 431, 

at 118 (3rd ed. 2005) (―Cy pres has no application to private trusts....‖). Once again, the 

 

common law doctrine.‖ See PNC Bank, Del. v. N.J. State Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty 

to Animals, 2008 WL 2891150, at *7 n. 18 (Del. Ch. July 14, 2008) (citing In re Estate of 

du Pont, 663 A.2d 470, 478 n. 14 (Del. Ch. 1994)). This decision need not address the 

continuing vitality of common law cy pres because the petitioner has referenced it only 

by way of illustration to indicate the type of reformative powers that the petitioner 

believes this court should wield. No one contends that common law cy pres applies on the 

facts of the case.
26

petition cites cy pres as indicative of a broad power to modify trusts that this court should 

wield freely. In my view, the doctrine is informative because it only permits modification 

in the limited circumstances where the literal fulfillment of the trust’s purpose becomes 

impossible or impractical. Applied by analogy, this court should modify the Trust only if 

it is no longer possible to achieve Wallace’s intent. No one claims that is the case.

c) Deviation

The common law doctrine of deviation permits a departure from the literal terms 

of a trust ―where compliance is impossible or illegal, or where owing to circumstances 

not known to the settlor and not anticipated by him compliance would defeat or 

substantially impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust.‖9 As with 

reformation and common law cy pres, the petition does not rely on deviation directly but 

rather as suggesting unbridled equitable authority over trusts. To my mind, once again, 

the limitations of the doctrine suggest the opposite. A court could deviate from Wallace’s 

estate plan only if his scheme became impossible or illegal. Neither has occurred. 

d) Statutory Modification

By statute, Delaware authorizes a court to modify a trust, including a 

noncharitable trust. The Trust Code provides as follows:

(a) Subject to subsection (b) of this section, if a particular charitable 

purpose or noncharitable purpose becomes unlawful under the Constitution 

of this State or the United States or the trust would otherwise no longer 

 

9

Bank of Del. v. Buckson, 255 A.2d 710, 716 (Del. Ch.1969) (quoting William F. 

Fratcher, Scott on Trusts, § 383 (4th ed. 1989); see 12 Del. C. § 3306 (preserving 

common law doctrine of deviation).
27

serve any religious, charitable, scientific, literary, educational, or 

noncharitable purpose:

(1) The trust does not fail in whole or in part;

(2) The trust property does not revert to the trustor or the trustor's 

successors in interest; and

(3) The Court of Chancery shall modify or terminate the trust and 

direct that the trust property be applied or distributed, in whole or in part, in 

a manner consistent with the trustor's charitable or noncharitable purposes, 

whether or not such purposes be specific or general.

(b) The power of the Court of Chancery to modify or terminate a charitable 

or noncharitable purpose trust, as provided in subsection (a) of this section, 

is in all cases subject to a contrary provision in the terms of the trust 

instrument, whether such contrary provision directs that the trust property 

be distributed to a charitable or noncharitable beneficiary.

(c) For purposes of this section, a ―noncharitable purpose‖ is a purpose 

within the meaning of § 355510 or § 355611 of this title.

 

10 Section 3555 authorizes trusts for the care of an animal. See 12 Del. C. § 3555.

11 Section 3556 authorizes trusts for ―Other Noncharitable Purposes.‖ It states:

(a) In addition to the provisions of § 3555 of this title, a trust for a declared 

purpose that is not impossible of attainment is valid notwithstanding that 

the trust might not be deemed to be for charitable purposes.

(b) A trust authorized by subsection (a) of this section shall not be invalid 

because it lacks an identifiable person as beneficiary.

(c) A trust authorized by subsection (a) of this section may be enforced by a 

person appointed in the terms of the trust or, if there is no such person or if 

the last such person no longer is willing and able to serve, by a person 

appointed by the Court of Chancery. A person who has an interest in the 

declared purpose of the trust other than a general public interest may 

petition the Court of Chancery for an order that appoints a person to 

enforce the terms of the trust or to remove that person.

(d) Property of a trust authorized by this section may be applied only to its 

intended use. Upon the termination of the trust, any property of the trust 
28

12 Del. C. § 3541 (emphasis added; footnotes supplied). 

Section 3541 identifies the limited circumstances in which the General Assembly 

has granted the court the power to modify a trust. The statute prescribes a two step 

inquiry before judicial modification can take place. Initially, the court must determine 

that (i) the trust's purpose has become unlawful or (ii) the trust does not otherwise serve 

―any ... noncharitable purpose.‖ 12 Del. C. § 3541(a). If so, then the court must evaluate 

whether the settlor contemplated the particular contingency and provided for it. See 12 

Del. C. § 3541(b). The court only may modify or terminate a trust if the first inquiry is 

met and the trust instrument does not address the contingency. Id.; see PNC Bank, Del., 

2008 WL 2891150, at *7.

As with the other doctrines, the petition does not rely on judicial modification per 

se, but rather cites it as illustrative. As with the other doctrines, I see a different picture. 

By analogy to Section 3541, a court should not modify the Trust unless its purpose has

become unlawful or it no longer serves ―any ... noncharitable purpose.‖ Neither is the 

case.

3. The Request For Modification Is Denied.

The petition seeks to modify the Will in a manner that conflicts with Wallace’s 

intent. Under Delaware law, the settlor’s intent controls, and it is the public policy of this 

 

remaining shall be distributed in accordance with the terms of the trust or, 

in the absence of such terms, as provided in § 3592 of this title.

12 Del. C. § 3556.
29

state ―to give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of disposition and to the 

enforceability of governing instruments.‖ 12 Del. C. § 3303(a). The petitioners are not 

permitted to rewrite Wallace’s Will to suit their current convenience.12

B. The Modification Of The Order

The petition also seeks to modify the 2002 Order to impose a contingent choiceof-law scheme. Under the proposed provision, the law governing administration would 

flip back and forth between Delaware and New York depending on whether the 

application of Delaware law ―will or might‖ have adverse consequences for the trust. In 

my view, the proposed language is too vague and uncertain to be implemented. 

III. CONCLUSION

The relief sought in the petition is denied. Wallace’s intent controls. The language 

of the 2002 Order continues to establish the law governing the Trust.

 

12 The petition also confronts the obstacle that the terms of the Trust are set forth 

in the Will. This court has held that it lacks the equitable power to reform or modify a 

will. See In re Last Will and Testament of Daland, 2010 WL 716160 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 

2010). Under Daland, the court cannot modify a testamentary trust, like the current Trust, 

where the provisions appear in a will. See Bogert, supra, § 991 at 133-34 (―[T]he 

traditional presumption against reforming mistakes in wills may present an additional 

challenge for a petitioner who seeks the reformation of a testamentary trust.‖). The 

petitioner argued that Daland should be limited to its facts and that the Court of Chancery 

should be able to reform both wills and testamentary trusts. In light of the disposition of 

the petition on the merits, this decision need not reach the issue.