[Cite as State v. Jirac, 2016-Ohio-8187.]

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 MONTGOMERY COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellant 

v. 

HASSAN O. JIRAC 

Defendant-Appellee 

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Appellate Case No. 27003 

Trial Court Case No. 15-CR-756 

(Criminal Appeal from 

 Common Pleas Court) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 16th day of December, 2016. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by MICHELE D. PHIPPS, Atty. Reg. No. 0069829, Montgomery 

County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, P.O. 

Box 972, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45402 

 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 

 

V. GAYLE MILLER, 130 West Second Street, Suite 1624, Dayton, Ohio 45402 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellee 

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FAIN, J. 

{¶ 1} The State appeals from an order of the trial court suppressing evidence. 

The State contends that the trial court erred by suppressing statements made to the 
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police, based on an incorrect conclusion that the defendant was in custody at the time he 

was questioned before being advised of his constitutional rights. Defendant-appellee 

Hassan Jirac has not filed a brief. 

{¶ 2} We conclude that the trial court did not err in suppressing the evidence. The 

State’s sole assignment of error is overruled, and the suppression order is Affirmed. 

 

I. Interception of UPS Package Leads to Interrogation 

{¶ 3} The trial court made the following findings in support of its decision to sustain 

the motion to suppress: 

I note that on October 21, 2013, and really unexplained fashion, a 

large quantity of Cathinone, known by the nickname of khat, which I’m going 

to use throughout the rest of this decision. A large quantity of that Schedule 

I drug was intercepted in Lexington, Kentucky. In fact the amount of khat 

that we are dealing with is nine kilos. Upon the interception of the khat in 

Lexington, Kentucky, a decision was made to allow the khat to continue to 

its destination at the Centerville, Ohio UPS office, located on State Route 

725, here in Montgomery, Ohio, so that the person picking up the khat could 

be intercepted. 

In order to accomplish the interception, a group of officers was 

assembled and placed in and around the Centerville UPS location. Special 

Agent Richard Miller, who was, and perhaps still is, assigned to the range 

task force was the lead investigator. Agent Miller, along with Montgomery 

County Detective O’Connell were posted inside the UPS store to await the 
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person who was going to pick up the khat. Mr. Jirac did arrived [sic] to pick 

up the package containing the khat. Mr. Jirac was allowed to obtain 

possession of the package, and to walk towards the UPS exit. Mr. Jirac, 

however, was not allowed to leave the UPS store, as Agent Miller and 

Detective O’Connell intercepted him before he was able to exit the store. 

Agent Miller informed Mr. Jirac why he was being detained. Mr. Jirac, after 

being informed of the reason for the detention, was taken through the store 

and out the back door, so that Agent Miller could talk to Mr. Jirac in a more 

private setting. 

Mr. Jirac was informed that he was not under arrest, but as Agent 

Miller conceded during examination, conducted by the Court, Mr. Jirac was 

not free to leave. And had Mr. Jirac indicated he was not going to cooperate 

and intended to simply walk away, Mr. Jirac would have been arrested. 

Agent Miller’s plan, in any event, and understandably, was to gain 

Mr. Jirac’s cooperation, so that the person who had hired Mr. Jirac to pick 

up the khat could be identified, with the obvious goal being to move up the 

so-called food chain. And I note that Mr. Jirac informed Agent Miller of the 

name of the person for whom he had picked up the khat, and that he had 

been paid the sum of $300 for that particular service. All of that information 

was obtained [by] Agent Miller as a result of Mr. Jirac being questioned 

about the circumstances under which he had arrived at the UPS store to 

pick up the khat. And I note that this interview occurred without Mr. Jirac 

being provided Miranda warnings. 
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Mr. Jirac agreed to cooperate and he provided Agent Miller with 

again the details of his involvement regarding the pick-up that had occurred. 

Mr. Jirac, as part of his cooperation, made telephone calls to the person 

who had hired him to pick up the khat, in the hope of creating a scenario so 

that this person could be implicated and arrested. The attempt to do so, 

however, failed primarily it seems because Agent Miller was not able to 

obtain the cooperation of the Columbus Police Department. Evidently even 

though we are dealing with nine kilos of this Schedule I drug, that was an 

insufficient quantity for the Columbus Police Department to have sufficient 

interest to be involved in the process. 

At one point we know, based upon that which I heard during my 

review of the audio tape, we know that Mr. Jirac was in the back of a van 

and they were proceeding towards Columbus. But ultimately that all came 

to a halt because again the Columbus Police Department was not willing to 

provide cooperation to Agent Miller. And so ultimately Mr. Jirac was brought 

back to a Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office sub-station and it was at the 

sub-station that Mr. Jirac was ultimately provided his Miranda warnings and 

interviewed once again by Agent Miller. 

Agent Miller informed Mr. Jirac of his Miranda Rights using a preinterview form, which was marked and introduced into evidence at the 

hearing as State’s Exhibit 1. Mr. Jirac waived his Miranda Rights and 

provided a confirming statement of his involvement in the pick-up of the 
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khat. And when I say confirming statement, he simply reiterated that which 

had already been revealed during the previous contact and the previous 

interview conducted by Agent Miller in the effort to obtain Mr. Jirac’s 

cooperation upon his interception at the UPS store. Agent Miller upon 

obtaining Mr. Jirac’s Miranda waiver told Mr. Jirac we are going to go over 

“stuff we already talked about.” Additionally, Mr. Jirac at one point during 

the Miranda interview, deviated from what he had said in the nonmirandized interview with Agent Miller pointing out the discrepancy and then 

chastising Mr. Jirac for the indicated discrepancy. 

Ultimately, the interview ended. Mr. Jirac, it seems, at the end of the 

interview complained of chest pains, resulting in his transport to the hospital. 

Mr. Jirac obviously was released from the hospital. And upon his release 

from the hospital he was not arrested. Agent Miller thereafter did contact 

Mr. Jirac on an occasion or two concerning Mr. Jirac’s continued 

cooperation. Evidently that did not lead to any further cooperation by 

Mr. Jirac. And ultimately Mr. Jirac was indicted for the possession of the 

khat. Again the nine kilograms that are at issue in this case. 

These facts raise the following issues. Was Mr. Jirac in custody when 

he was initially interviewed without being provided Miranda warnings? And 

number two, was the mirandized interrogation of Mr. Jirac a so-called 

interview first, mirandized later scenario triggering the suppression of the 

statements Mr. Jirac made during the second mirandized interview? 

Going into the first issue - - I want to go back to the facts just for a 
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moment. I do want to note that as a final factual finding that between the 

time that Mr. Jirac was intercepted leaving the UPS store and when he was 

Mirandized and interviewed again by Agent Miller, that several hours had 

passed. And during that time Mr. Jirac had been in the presence of Agent 

Miller and other officers for a considerable period of time. It was also noted 

that when Mr. Jirac was interviewed outside the UPS store, outside the back 

door of the UPS store, we know that Agent Miller was there, and that there 

were several other officers nearby who were part of the operation, which 

led to Mr. Jirac being intercepted as he was attempting to leave the UPS 

store with the quantity of khat that he had picked up. 

Transcript pgs. 55-59. 

II. The Course of Proceedings 

{¶ 4} Jirac was indicted on one count of Aggravated Possession of a Controlled 

Substance, a felony of the first degree, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A). Jirac moved to 

suppress the statements he made before he was given the warnings required by Miranda 

v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The trial court 

conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress, at which Special Agent Richard Miller 

testified as the only witness. 

{¶ 5} Based on the evidence presented, the trial court found that Jirac was in 

custody at the time of the questioning and sustained the motion, after reviewing the 

factors discussed in State v. Sell, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26458, 2015-Ohio-1940, ¶¶ 

15-18, State v. Gaddis, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24007, 2011-Ohio-2822, and State v. 
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Estepp, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16279, 1997 WL 736501 (Nov. 26, 1997), including the 

location of the questioning, whether the defendant was a suspect at the time of the 

questioning, whether the defendant’s freedom to leave was restricted, whether the 

defendant was told he was under arrest, whether threats or physical intimidation were 

utilized, whether the police dominated the interrogation, the defendant’s reason for being 

at the location where the questioning took place, and whether any neutral parties were 

present at any point during the questioning. Applying these factors, the trial court found 

that the questioning took place in surroundings where Jirac would not have been 

comfortable or felt free to leave. At the time of questioning, Jirac was a suspect. Jirac’s 

freedom of movement was restricted. Jirac was not handcuffed, was told he was not 

under arrest, and no threats or physical intimidation were utilized. The court found that 

the police did dominate the interrogation, with the goal of obtaining Jirac’s cooperation, 

and no neutral parties were present. Jirac’s purpose of being at the UPS Store was to 

pick up the package, and the purpose of going behind the store was to question Jirac 

regarding the khat in his possession. The trial court further found that “though Mr. Jirac 

was not tricked or coerced into making a statement, Agent Miller indicated to him that his 

cooperation could be helpful regarding criminal charges relating to Mr. Jirac’s possession 

off [sic] the khat.” T. at 65. This finding led the trial court to conclude that the officer’s 

“statement regarding cooperation would have communicated to a reasonable person that 

he was going to be arrested and charged for the possession of the controlled substance 

he had just picked up.” T. at 65. 

{¶ 6} Based on these facts, the trial court concluded, “[t]he Estep factors, though 

not all pointing to a custody determination, lead in the Court’s mind, to the conclusion that 
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when Agent Miller interviewed Mr. Jirac behind the UPS store, and as he interviewed him 

throughout the course of the remaining hours until he was finally mirandized, a reasonable 

person in Mr. Jirac’s situation would have concluded there was a restraint of his freedom 

of movement to the extent associated with a formal arrest. He was in fact in custody, for 

Miranda purposes.” T. at 65-66. 

{¶ 7} The trial court also reviewed the case law applicable to the issue of whether 

in-custody non-Mirandized admissions taint admissions made subsequent to the 

administration of Miranda warnings, including our opinion in State v. Cook, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 24524, 2012-Ohio-111, citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 

1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), and Missouri v. Seibert , 542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 

L.Ed.2d 643 (2004). The trial court explained its reasoning as follows: 

The Seibert Court identified a series of relevant factors that bear on 

whether Miranda warnings delivered midstream could be effective enough 

to accomplish their object. One, the completeness in detail of the questions 

and answers in the first round of interrogation. The overlapping content of 

the two statements. The timing and setting of the first and second. Four, the 

continuity of police personnel, and five, the degree to which the 

interrogator’s questions treated the second round as continuance with the 

first. Accordingly, in such a scenario, the post-Miranda warning statements 

are inadmissible because the earlier and later statements are realistically 

seen as part of a single unwarned sequence of questioning. 

And so I’m going to go through those factors in this case. And though 

we don’t know the full detail of Agent Miller’s pre-Miranda questioning, we 
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know the questions produced in admission from Mr. Jirac that he had 

traveled from Columbus in his cab to the UPS store to pick up the khat for 

a person identified by Mr. Jirac during the course of Agent Miller’s interview, 

and that Mr. Jirac’s fee for this service was $300.00. 

Going to the second factor, the content of the two interrogations, the 

pre-Miranda interrogation and the post-Miranda interrogation certainly 

overlap. In fact as stated by Agent Miller in the mirandized portion of the 

interview, he says basically we’re going to talk about the stuff we’ve already 

talked about. 

Going to the third factor, the timing and setting of the two interviews 

reveals in essence once [sic] continuous interview. By the time Mr. Jirac 

was Mirandized, he had been with Agent Miller and the other officers for a 

number of hours. There had already been an interview where the details of 

Mr. Jirac’s possession of the khat had been revealed. There had been this 

effort for cooperation which failed. And finally, when the mirandized 

statement ultimately occurred, it was at the end of all of that, and part of one 

continuous interaction with the officers. 

Going to the fourth factor, Agent Miller was the primary officer 

involved in each interrogation. 

And finally going to factor five, Agent Miller by stating in the postMiranda interview that “we are going to go over the stuff we already talked 

about”, and by pointing out to Mr. Jirac the discrepancy between his initial 

statement and his statement that he gave post-Miranda, that certainly 
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reveals that the two interviews were in essence not two interviews, but one 

continuous effort by Agent Miller, to obtain information from Mr. Jirac that 

was in essence one continuous interview. 

It is based upon this analysis concluded that Mr. Jirac’s post-Miranda 

statements are so tainted by his pre-Miranda statements that the postMiranda statements must be suppressed. So all the statements will be 

suppressed. 

Transcript pgs. 68-70. 

{¶ 8} From the order of the trial court suppressing Jirac’s statements, the State 

appeals. 

III. Standard of Review 

{¶ 9} Appellate review of a trial court's decision regarding a motion to suppress 

evidence involves mixed questions of law and fact. When ruling on a motion to suppress 

evidence, a trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve 

questions of fact and to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio 

St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. Consequently, an appellate court must 

accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible 

evidence. Id. Accepting the facts as true, the reviewing court then must independently 

determine, without deference to the trial court, whether the trial court properly applied the 

substantive law to the facts of the case. Id. Therefore, an appellate court reviews the 

trial court’s application of the law to its factual findings based on a de novo standard of 

review. State v. Belton, Ohio Supreme Court Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-1581, ¶ 100. 
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IV. Based Upon the Trial Court’s Findings, which Are Supported by Evidence in 

the Record, the Trial Court Did Not Err in Concluding that Jirac’s Statements 

Were Made During a Custodial Interrogation 

{¶ 10} The State argues that Jirac’s statements were made during a consensual 

encounter, and therefore no Miranda warnings were necessary prior to questioning. The 

State claims that the trial court incorrectly determined that Jirac was in custody at the time 

he was initially questioned at the UPS store. We agree with the findings of the trial court 

that Jirac’s statements at the UPS store were made during a custodial interrogation, 

before he was given Miranda warnings. We recently reviewed the factors to consider to 

determine if a defendant is in custody for Miranda purposes as follows: 

 “The procedural safeguards prescribed by Miranda apply only when 

persons are subjected to ‘custodial interrogation.’ ” State v. Thomas, 2d 

Dist. Montgomery No. 20643, 2005-Ohio-3064, ¶ 27, citing Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 

“ ‘Custodial interrogation’ means questioning initiated by the police after the 

person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom to 

the degree associated with a formal arrest.” (Citations omitted.) State v. 

Vineyard, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25854, 2014-Ohio-3846, ¶ 32. 

 “In order to determine whether a person is in custody for purposes 

of receiving Miranda warnings, courts must first inquire into the 

circumstances surrounding the questioning and, second, given those 

circumstances, determine whether a reasonable person would have felt that 
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he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interview and leave.” State v. 

Hoffner, 102 Ohio St.3d 358, 2004-Ohio-3430, 811 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 27, citing 

Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 

(1995). “Once the factual circumstances surrounding the interrogation are 

reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test to resolve ‘the ultimate 

inquiry’ of whether there was a ‘ “formal arrest or restraint on freedom of 

movement” ’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Id., quoting 

California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 

1275 (1983), quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 

711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977). 

 “The factors a court should consider in applying this reasonable 

person test include whether the encounter takes place in surroundings that 

are familiar to the suspect; the number of law enforcement officers present, 

as well as their conduct and demeanor; the degree of physical restraint 

imposed; and the duration and character of the interrogation.” (Citation 

omitted.) State v. Farrell, 2d Dist. Miami No. 99-CA-24, 1999 WL 812249, 

*3 (Oct. 8, 1999). We note that “a police officer's subjective intent to arrest 

a suspect is immaterial to the issue of whether the suspect is in custody for 

Miranda purposes, unless and until that intent is communicated to the 

suspect.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Cross, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 

25838, 2014-Ohio-1534, ¶ 13. Rather, the issue is whether a reasonable 

person in the suspect's situation would have understood that he was in 

custody. Id. 
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 Individuals are not “in custody” for purposes of Miranda during a 

typical investigatory detention such as a routine traffic stop. State v. Cundiff,

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24171, 2011-Ohio-3414, ¶ 60, citing Berkemer v. 

McCarty, 468 U .S. 420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). “An 

individual is subject to an investigatory detention when, in view of all the 

circumstances surrounding the incident, by means of physical force or show 

of authority, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free 

to leave or was compelled to respond to questions.” (Citations omitted.) 

State v. Hardy, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24114, 2011-Ohio-241, ¶ 34. 

During an investigatory detention, “the officer may ask the detainee a 

moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain 

information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions” without the 

need to first advise the detainee of his Miranda rights. Berkemer at 439–

440. “However, if the individual is, during the course of the detention, 

‘subjected to treatment that renders him “in custody” for practical purposes, 

he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda.’ ”

State v. Keggan, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2006 CA 9, 2006-Ohio-6663, ¶ 31, 

citing Berkemer at 440. (Other citation omitted.) 

State v. Sell, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26458, 2015-Ohio-1940, ¶¶ 15-18. See also State 

v. Brown, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26937, 2016-Ohio-4973, ¶ 9. 

{¶ 11} We have also considered factors such as “ ‘the location of the interview 

and the defendant's reason for being there, whether the defendant was a suspect, 
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whether the defendant was handcuffed or told he was under arrest or whether his freedom 

to leave was restricted in any other way, whether there were threats or intimidation, 

whether the police verbally dominated the interrogation or tricked or coerced the 

confession, and the presence of neutral parties.’ ” State v. Zan, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 

24600, 2013-Ohio-1064, ¶ 17, quoting State v. Hatten, 186 Ohio App.3d 286, 2010-Ohio499, 927 N.E.2d 632, ¶ 50 (2d Dist.). 

{¶ 12} The trial did consider the totality of the circumstances, and reached its 

conclusion based on the objective test whether a reasonable person, under similar 

circumstances, would have understood that he was in custody at the time of the 

interrogation. The trial court relied on evidence in the record to find that, by show of 

authority, Jirac was detained from leaving the UPS Store, was told that the package 

contained illegal substances, was directed to the back parking lot so that he could not 

flee, and was then questioned about the drugs in the presence of multiple officers. We 

agree that these factual findings are supported by competent, credible evidence and 

support a conclusion that the statements made by Jirac were made during a custodial 

interrogation, triggering his Miranda rights. 

{¶ 13} We also agree that the trial court properly applied the law applicable to 

statements made after Miranda warnings are given that confirm statements made before 

the Miranda warnings were given. In State v. Cook, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24524, 

2012-Ohio-111, and State v. Zan, supra, we have discussed the precedent established 

by the Supreme Court of the United States regarding the admissibility of statements made 

in successive interrogations when Miranda warnings are not given until the second phase 

of the interrogation. Id., citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.E.2d 
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222 (1985) and Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.E. 2d 643 (2004). 

{¶ 14} As we explained in Cook, supra, “[t]he Elstad Court held that a suspect who 

has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from 

waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings.” 

Cook at ¶ 23. However, in the more recent decision in Seibert, supra, the Supreme Court 

held that post-warning statements are inadmissible when the Miranda warning does not 

effectively advise the suspect that he has a real choice about giving an admissible 

statement that he has essentially already given. Cook at ¶ 18. The Supreme Court of 

Ohio has distinguished the two cases, finding that “Elstad and Seibert stand on opposite 

sides of the line defining where prewarning statements irretrievably affect postwarning 

statements. Still, that line cannot be said to be bright or sharply defined.” State v. Farris,

109 Ohio St.3d 519, 849 N.E.2d 985, 2006-Ohio-3255, ¶ 22. 

{¶ 15} In Farris, the court discussed factors to consider in making the decision 

whether an intermediate Miranda warning can be sufficient, including “the completeness 

and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of interrogation, the overlapping 

content of the two statements, the timing and setting of the first and the second, the 

continuity of police personnel, and the degree to which the interrogator's questions treated 

the second round as continuous with the first.” Id. at ¶ 28. In Zan, supra, the determinative 

factor for finding that the defendant’s post-Miranda statements were voluntarily given was 

the consensual nature of the first interrogation. We conclude that the trial court properly 

considered the evidence in the record that Jirac’s initial encounter with the police resulted 

in a custodial interrogation at the UPS store, before any discussion of his Miranda rights, 

that the same person conducted both pre- and post-Miranda interviews, and that the 
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interrogator treated the second interrogation as continuous with the first by asserting at 

the outset that it was designed to review what had already been discussed, and by 

clarifying any discrepancies in the two statements by asking Jirac to affirm the specific 

statements he initially made in the first interrogation. Therefore, applying the elements 

set forth in Farris, supra, we agree with the trial court that a defendant in similar 

circumstances reasonably would not believe after being given a Miranda warning that he 

had any other choice but to affirm the statements he had already made to the police 

before that warning. Since Jirac’s post-warning statements were not the result of an 

informed, voluntary choice to waive his rights, the statements are inadmissible, and the 

trial court properly sustained the motion to suppress. 

V. Conclusion 

{¶ 16} The State’s sole assignment of error having been overruled, the order of the 

trial court suppressing evidence is Affirmed. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

FROELICH, J., concurs. 

HALL, J., dissenting: 

{¶ 17} In my opinion, although the record supports the facts determined by the trial 

court, the resulting legal conclusion should be that when Jirac was questioned at the UPS 

store, a reasonable person in his situation would not believe he was in custody and the 

encounter was not a custodial interrogation. Jirac was told he was not under arrest and 

was not led to believe that he would be arrested, he was not in custody or restrained from 

freedom of movement, and he had expressed his voluntary decision to cooperate, without 
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coercion or complaint. The trial court indicated that Special Agent Miller admitted Jirac 

was not free to leave and would have been arrested had he attempted to flee. However, 

the subjective intent of the officer is not relevant in determining whether a defendant was 

in custody. State v. Cundiff, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24171, 2011-Ohio-3414, ¶ 57. 

Because I conclude a reasonable person, under similar circumstances, would have 

understood that he was not in custody at the time of the interrogation, Jirac was not 

subjected to a custodial interrogation and Miranda rights were not required. Therefore, 

the statements made by Jirac at the UPS store should not be suppressed. 

{¶ 18} Based on the conclusion that Jirac’s statements made at the UPS store 

should not be suppressed, I believe we do not need to decide whether Jirac’s postMiranda statements were tainted by his pre-Miranda statements. If the pre-Miranda

statements were not unlawfully obtained, there is no taint to affect the post-Miranda

statements and they too should be admissible. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . 

Copies mailed to: 

Mathias H. Heck, Jr. 

Michele D. Phipps 

V. Gayle Miller 

Hon. Michael Tucker