No. 15 March 28, 2013 411

15353 Or In re Renshaw 2013 March 28, 2013

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

In re Complaint as to the Conduct of

JEFFREY F. RENSHAW,

Accused.

(OSB 10-08; SC S059839)

En Banc

On review of the decision of a trial panel of the Disciplinary 

Board.

Argued and submitted January 10, 2013.

Marc D. Blackman, Ransom Blackman LLP, Portland, 

argued the cause and filed the brief for the accused.

Stacy J. Hankin, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Tigard, 

argued the cause and filed the briefs for the Oregon State 

Bar.

PER CURIAM

The accused is disbarred, effective 60 days from the date 

of this decision.

In this lawyer discipline proceeding, the Bar alleged that the accused 

violated Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 8.4(a)(2), which prohibits 

criminal conduct that reflects adversely on a lawyer’s honesty and 

trustworthiness, and RPC 8.4(a)(3), which prohibits conduct involving 

honesty and misrepresentation that reflects adversely on a lawyer’s fitness 

to practice law. The accused acknowledged having misappropriated 

approximately $100,000 of law firm funds to pay personal expenses but 

contended that that conduct did not amount to criminal conduct in 

violation of RPC 8.4(a)(2). The trial panel found that the accused had 

violated both rules, suspended him for one year, and imposed certain 

conditions on his reinstatement. Held: On de novo review, the Court 

found that the accused had violated both rules and that disbarment was 

the appropriate sanction. The Court found that the accused’s conduct 

constituted theft by deception in violation of ORS 164.085, the duration 

and magnitude of which was sufficiently serious to warrant disbarment. 

The Court further concluded that the accused’s conduct seriously 

adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law. 

The accused is disbarred, effective 60 days from the date of this 

decision.
412 In re Renshaw

PER CURIAM

In this lawyer discipline proceeding, the Bar alleged 

that the accused violated Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 

8.4(a)(2), which prohibits criminal conduct that reflects 

adversely on a lawyer’s honesty and trustworthiness, and 

RPC 8.4(a)(3), which prohibits conduct involving dishonesty 

and misrepresentation that reflects adversely on a lawyer’s 

fitness to practice law. The trial panel found that the accused 

had violated both rules, suspended him for one year, and 

imposed certain conditions on his reinstatement. On review, 

the Bar asks us to affirm the trial panel’s findings regarding 

the rule violations but contends that we should disbar the 

accused. The accused, for his part, acknowledges that he 

violated RPC 8.4(a)(3), contends that he did not violate RPC 

8.4(a)(2), and submits that the sanction that the trial panel 

imposed was appropriate. On de novo review, we find that the 

accused violated both rules and conclude that disbarment is 

the appropriate sanction.

We find the following facts by clear and convincing 

evidence. The accused was admitted to practice in Oregon in 

1993. In 2003, the accused and two other lawyers formed a 

law firm, Johnson, Renshaw & Lechman-Su, P.C. (the firm). 

They organized the firm as a professional corporation under 

Oregon law and as an S corporation under the Internal 

Revenue Code. Each lawyer was an equal shareholder in the 

firm. After the firm was formed, each shareholder assumed 

different management roles. Johnson handled marketing 

and accounts receivables. Lechman-Su handled “big picture 

financial items.” The accused handled day-to-day operations, 

including paying the firm’s bills, processing funds received 

from clients, and addressing personnel matters.

During the relevant time period, the firm had a 

general checking account and a line of credit through which 

each shareholder was issued a firm credit card. All accounts 

were to be used only for business purposes. Each month, 

the expenses charged to each shareholder’s credit card were 

reviewed and entered into Quickbooks, a program that the 

firm used to record financial transactions. The firm’s parttime bookkeeper reviewed and recorded Johnson’s and 
Cite as 353 Or 411 (2013) 413

Lechman-Su’s credit card statements. The accused reviewed 

and recorded his own statements.1

Johnson, Lechman-Su, and the accused were 

compensated in two ways. Each received a regular paycheck, 

and, when firm revenue allowed, each also received periodic 

shareholder distributions. The accused was responsible 

for determining whether there was sufficient revenue at 

any given time to make a distribution. Generally, when 

a distribution was made, each of the three shareholders 

received the same amount.

In 2006, the accused made three shareholder 

distributions to himself without making distributions to 

Johnson and Lechman-Su. Those three distributions totaled 

$3,250. Each time that the accused made a distribution only 

to himself, he told Johnson and Lechman-Su that the firm 

lacked sufficient funds to make a shareholder distribution. 

When the firm’s accountant was preparing the shareholders’ 

2006 corporate tax returns, she discovered that disparity 

and brought it to the accused’s attention because he was the 

managing shareholder. The accused, however, did not bring 

the disparity to the attention of Johnson and Lechman-Su.

In 2007, the accused made at least four shareholder 

distributions only to himself. As before, each time that the 

accused made a distribution only to himself, he told Johnson 

and Lechman-Su that the firm lacked sufficient funds to 

make any distribution. As a result of those distributions, 

the accused received at least $4,000 more in distributions 

that year than the other two shareholders. When the firm’s 

accountant was preparing the firm’s 2007 corporate tax 

returns, she discovered a disparity in the amounts that 

the three shareholders owed the firm. According to the 

accountant’s figures, as of December 31, 2007, the accused 

owed the firm $28,118.56.2

 Johnson owed $2,781.00, and 

Lechman-Su owed $1,752.00. Because of her concern for the 

1 On a few occasions, the bookkeeper offered to review and record the accused’s 

statements, but the accused declined those offers.

2 That amount was a combination of the accused’s unauthorized shareholder 

distributions and a series of transactions in which the accused had used firm funds 

to pay personal expenses and coded them to accounts receivable.
414 In re Renshaw

firm’s status as an S corporation, the accountant notified all 

three shareholders of the disparity.

The accused responded directly to the accountant, 

promising to repay the debt by the end of June 2008. He 

then sent an e-mail to Johnson and Lechman-Su, the subject 

line of which was “mea culpa.” The e-mail stated,

“I am physically ill about this right now, so I need to cleanse 

my soul to you two.

“*****

“[T]his is simply an accumulation of three years and my 

dealing with several things as a result of going through and 

losing the lawsuit against the title company. I am already in 

the midst of plans to get this cleared. It amounts to this—I 

owe the firm and it will be repaid.

“God I feel horrible right now. I am so sorry.”

Shortly after receiving the accused’s e-mail, Johnson, 

Lechman-Su, and the accused met to discuss the accused’s 

actions. The accused denied experiencing personal problems 

and attributed the debt to the financial consequences of 

an unsuccessful lawsuit and also to promises that he had 

made to his wife to remodel their home. At the meeting, the 

accused did not tell Johnson or Lechman-Su that he had 

taken any sums other than the ones that the accountant 

had discovered.

The following month, while the accused was on 

vacation in Hawaii, Johnson and the firm’s part-time 

bookkeeper discovered records of the accused’s transactions 

in which he had used the firm’s line of credit to pay personal 

expenses. For example, in February 2008, the accused had 

used the firm credit card to pay a personal Visa bill in the 

amount of $3,541.72. Also in February, the accused had 

made two transfers of $1,000 each from the firm’s account 

into two nonfirm checking accounts, one of which was held 

by the accused’s wife.

Johnson and the bookkeeper also discovered records 

of the accused’s transactions in which he had used his firm 

credit card to pay personal expenses and either had failed to 

denote in QuickBooks that they were personal expenses or 
Cite as 353 Or 411 (2013) 415

had coded the expenses in QuickBooks as business expenses. 

Those transactions occurred in 2005, 2006, 2007, and early 

2008. In 2005, for example, the accused had used his firm 

credit card to pay Companion Pet Clinic in the amount of 

$66.75 and Nordstrom in the amount of $965.00. In 2006, 

he used his firm credit card to purchase airline tickets for 

his family to go to Florida and also to pay various lodging 

expenses associated with that family vacation. The airline 

tickets were coded in QuickBooks as “Legal Library,” and 

the remaining expenses were coded as “Travel,” “Meals,” and 

“Professional Development.” In 2007, the accused used his 

firm credit card to pay a contractor to perform remodeling 

work on his home. He coded those expenses, which totaled 

$9,454.73, as “Reference Materials” and “Subcontractors.”

When the accused returned from vacation, Johnson 

and Lechman-Su asked the accused to resign, which he did. 

After the accused’s resignation, Johnson and the bookkeeper 

continued to review the accused’s financial records to 

better understand the extent of the accused’s actions. 

After uncovering a number of additional transactions in 

which the accused had used firm funds to pay personal 

expenses, they estimated conservatively that the accused 

had misappropriated at least $150,000 of the law firm’s 

funds.3

 All of the instances in which the accused had coded 

a personal expense as a business expense occurred before 

March 2008—that is, before the meeting at which the 

accused had met with Johnson and Lechman-Su and sought 

to “cleanse [his] soul.” As noted, the accused did not mention 

to his law partners any misappropriations at that meeting 

other than the ones that the accountant previously had 

discovered.

In March 2010, the Bar filed a formal complaint 

against the accused, alleging that he had violated RPC 

8.4(a)(2) and RPC 8.4(a)(3).4

 As noted, in its first cause 

3 The accused admitted at the trial panel hearing that he took approximately 

$100,000 from the firm but disputed that he took more than that. We need not 

decide whether the accused took $100,000, as he admitted, or $150,000, as Johnson 

estimated. The difference does not affect our determination regarding either the 

alleged rule violations or the sanction. 

4 Under RPC 8.4(a),

“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
416 In re Renshaw

of complaint, the Bar alleged that the accused’s conduct 

involved dishonesty and misrepresentation in violation of 

RPC 8.4(a)(3). In its second cause of complaint, the Bar 

alleged that the accused had committed a criminal act in 

violation of RPC 8.4(a)(2) because his conduct constituted 

theft by deception. See ORS 164.085 (defining that offense). 

The accused filed an answer denying the Bar’s allegations.

At a hearing before the trial panel, the accused 

acknowledged that he took shareholder distributions in 

excess of those authorized by Johnson and Lechman-Su, 

that he used firm resources to pay personal expenses, and 

that he had miscoded the expenses in the firm’s financial 

records. He acknowledged that, when he miscoded his 

personal expenses as business expenses, he knew that doing 

so would make it more difficult for his partners to discover 

his actions. He acknowledged that his actions “involve[ed] 

dishonesty [and] misrepresentation” in violation of RPC 

8.4(a)(3), but he contended that his actions did not constitute 

criminal conduct and thus did not violate RPC 8.4(a)(2).

According to the accused, under the American Bar 

Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

(1991) (amended 1992) (the ABA Standards) and this court’s 

case law, his conduct warranted a sanction no greater than “18 

months, with 12 months stayed during a three * ** year term 

of probation on the conditions that [the accused’s] practice 

and financial affairs be monitored by the State Lawyers 

Assistance Committee and that [he] actively participate in 

mental health counseling.” The trial panel issued an opinion 

finding that the accused had violated both RPC 8.4(a)(2) and 

RPC 8.4(a)(3). After considering aggravating and mitigating 

factors, the panel suspended the accused for one year with 

certain conditions of reinstatement.5

“*****

“(2) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, 

trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;

“(3) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 

misrepresentation that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s fitness to 

practice law[.]”

5 The conditions required the accused to complete a full psychological 

evaluation by a qualified mental health care provider and to comply with that 

provider’s recommended treatment plan.
Cite as 353 Or 411 (2013) 417

On review, the Bar asks this court to find, as the trial 

panel did, that the accused violated RPC 8.4(a)(2) and RPC 

8.4(a)(3) but to disbar the accused instead of suspending 

him. Before considering the appropriate sanction, we 

first consider whether the Bar has established by clear 

and convincing evidence that the accused committed the 

alleged violations. See In re Koch, 345 Or 444, 447, 198 

P3d 910 (2008). Because the accused does not dispute that 

he violated RPC 8.4(a)(3), we consider only whether he 

violated RPC 8.4(a)(2). That disciplinary rule provides that

“[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to * ** commit a 

criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, 

trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects[.]” 

RPC 8.4(a)(2). As noted, the Bar alleged that the accused 

committed theft by deception in violation of ORS 164.085. 

That statute provides:

“A person, who obtains property of another thereby, commits 

theft by deception when, with intent to defraud, the person 

*** [c]reates or confirms another’s false impression of law, 

value, intention or other state of mind that the actor does 

not believe to be true[.]”

ORS 164.085(1)(a). Specifically, the Bar contends that the 

accused’s conduct constituted theft by deception because 

he obtained funds that the firm, a professional corporation, 

owned, intentionally miscoded personal expenses as business 

expenses to obtain those funds, and failed to disclose his 

conduct to Johnson and Lechman-Su.

The accused’s response is limited. As noted, the 

accused does not dispute that he took substantial funds 

from the law firm. He does not dispute that his conduct

“[c]reate[d] or confirm[ed] another’s false impression ** * or 

other state of mind that the [accused] d[id] not believe to 

be true.” And he does not dispute that he had the requisite 

intent to defraud. The accused argues only that his conduct 

did not constitute theft because he did not “obtai[n the] 

property of another.” See ORS 164.085(1)(a) (stating that 

requirement).

In response to the Bar’s argument that he took 

property that the firm—a professional corporation—owned, 

the accused argues that the firm did not observe any of the 
418 In re Renshaw

formalities required of a corporation. It follows, he reasons, 

that the firm forfeited its corporate status and operated as a 

partnership and that he and his partners jointly owned the 

firm’s funds. Relying on State v. Durant, 122 Or App 380, 

857 P2d 891 (1993), the accused argues that, because he and 

his partners owned the firm’s funds jointly and because no 

partner’s interest in the funds was superior to another’s, he 

could not and did not take the “property of another” within 

the meaning of the theft statutes.

We need not decide whether the firm lost its 

corporate status and should be viewed as a partnership, as 

the accused argues. Even if the accused were correct that the 

firm was operating as a partnership, the money that he took 

belonged to the partnership, not to the partners. See ORS 

67.060 (“Property acquired by a partnership is property of 

the partnership and not of the partners individually.”). The 

Court of Appeals decision on which the accused bases his 

argument preceded the enactment of ORS 67.060 and is no 

longer good law. When the accused took the firm’s funds, he 

took the property of another.

The accused argues alternatively that he did not 

engage in theft because he “reasonably believed that [he] 

was entitled to the property[.]” See ORS 164.035 (defining 

that defense to theft). The accused’s argument may rest on 

two related but separate factual premises. It may rest on 

the premise that some of the expenses that all the partners 

charged to the firm, such as lunches at which business was 

discussed, should be viewed as personal rather than business 

expenses. It also may rest on the premise that one partner 

on limited occasions charged personal expenses to the firm 

as a business expense. For example, that partner attended 

an American Bar Association conference in another city 

and charged all the cost of a rental car to the firm without 

distinguishing the day that he used the car for personal 

reasons from the days that he used it for business purposes. 

As we understand the accused’s argument, he reasons from 

one or both of those factual premises that, because the other 

two partners used firm funds for personal expenses, he 

reasonably believed that he was entitled to do the same.

As the trial panel concluded, the distinction between 

business and personal expenses may not always have been 
Cite as 353 Or 411 (2013) 419

precise, and there may have been a few, relatively minor 

instances in which another partner in the firm failed to 

honor the distinction. However, those few instances provided 

no reasonable basis for the accused to believe that he was 

either entitled or authorized to take approximately $100,000 

of the firm’s funds to pay for remodeling his home, family 

vacations, and the like. Indeed, the fact that the accused 

intentionally misrepresented his reasons for charging his 

personal expenses to the firm is at odds with his claim 

that he reasonably believed that he was entitled to do so. 

The Bar proved by clear and convincing evidence that the 

accused committed “a criminal act [theft by deception] that 

reflects adversely on [his] honesty [and] trustworthiness[.]” 

See RPC 8.4(a)(2).6

Having found that the accused violated RPC 8.4(a)(2)

and (3), we turn to the appropriate sanction. We first 

consider the duty violated, the accused’s state of mind, 

and the actual or potential injury caused by the accused’s 

conduct. In re Kluge, 332 Or 251, 259, 27 P3d 102 (2001); 

ABA Standard 3.0. We next decide whether any aggravating 

or mitigating circumstances exist. Kluge, 332 Or at 259. 

Finally, we consider the appropriate sanction in light of this 

court’s case law. Id. In determining the appropriate sanction, 

our purpose is to protect the public and the administration 

of justice from lawyers who have not discharged properly 

their duties to clients, the public, the legal system, or the 

profession. See ABA Standard 1.1.

In violating RPC 8.4(a)(2) and RPC 8.4(a)(3), the 

accused breached the duty that he owed the public. See id.

at 59 (listing a violation of RPC 8.4(a) as breaching that 

duty).7

 We also find that the accused acted intentionally both 

in taking the property and misrepresenting his bases for 

doing so. See ABA Standards at 7 (defining “intent” as “the 

6 Our finding that the accused violated RPC 8.4(a)(2) does not, of course, 

establish that the criminal act that is the predicate of that ethical violation has 

been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

7 The accused also breached the duty of loyalty that he owed the other two 

shareholders in the firm. See In re Pennington, 220 Or 343, 349, 348 P2d 774 

(1960). However, that duty is not one of the duties that the ABA Standards uses to 

gauge the appropriate sanction. See ABA Standards at 5-6 (classifying sanctions 

based on the duties that a lawyer owes to the client, the public, the legal system, 

and the profession).
420 In re Renshaw

conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular 

result”). Finally, the accused caused actual injury to his 

firm and his former law partners. He intentionally took at 

least $100,000 from the firm, funds in which the other two 

shareholders had an interest.

The ABA Standards identify two situations in which 

disbarment is the appropriate sanction for a lawyer’s breach 

of a duty owed to the public. Both apply here. Disbarment 

is appropriate when a lawyer engages in “serious criminal 

conduct, a necessary element of which includes *** 

misrepresentation ** * or theft.” ABA Standard 5.11(a). In 

this case, the accused committed acts that constitute theft 

by deception. Because misrepresentation and theft are 

necessary elements of that crime, the criminal conduct in 

which the accused engaged comes within the terms of ABA 

Standard 5.11(a). We note, however, that not every criminal 

act that includes those elements will warrant disbarment. 

The criminal conduct must be “serious.” See id. In this case, 

it was. This was not an isolated instance of, for example, 

petty shoplifting. Rather, from 2005 to 2008, the accused 

repeatedly and systematically took money from his firm by 

misrepresenting either the firm’s finances or his reasons 

for using the firm’s money. Moreover, the accused does not 

dispute that he wrongfully took at least $100,000 from the 

firm. Both the duration of the accused’s conduct and the 

magnitude of his theft make the accused’s crime a serious 

one.

The ABA Standards also provide that disbarment 

is appropriate when a lawyer engages in “any other 

intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, 

or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on 

the lawyer’s fitness to practice.” Standard 5.11(b). For 

the reasons discussed above, we find that the accused 

intentionally engaged in dishonesty and misrepresentation 

when he told the other two shareholders that the firm 

lacked sufficient funds to make shareholder distributions 

and when he coded personal expenses as firm expenses. 

Because the accused acknowledges that his conduct 

violated RPC 8.4(a)(3), he necessarily acknowledges that 

his dishonesty and misrepresentation “reflec[t] adversely 

on [his] fitness to practice law.” See RPC 8.4(a)(3) (requiring 
Cite as 353 Or 411 (2013) 421

that element to establish the violation). Again, the question 

regarding the sanction is whether the accused’s dishonesty 

and misrepresentation “seriously” adversely reflect on his 

fitness to practice law. See ABA Standard 5.11(b). We find 

that they do.

The accused owed a fiduciary duty to the other 

shareholders in his firm. See In re Pennington, 220 Or 343, 

349, 348 P2d 774 (1960). He breached that duty when he 

repeatedly took funds that the firm owned and in which the 

other shareholders had an interest. This court considered 

a comparable issue in Pennington and concluded that a 

lawyer’s practice of taking funds from his law partner over 

the course of several years called into serious question 

his trustworthiness in handling other people’s money, 

particularly his clients’ money. The court reasoned,

“It is also urged that the accused has taken no funds of 

any client. He did not disclose taking his partner’s funds 

until called to account. The long practice of taking and 

secreting funds not his own reflects directly on his right to 

be placed in a position to handle other people’s property. If 

these were the funds of a client there would be no hesitancy 

in imposing the most severe sanction; particularly when we 

consider the intent evidenced by the long course of conduct. 

The same violation of the fiduciary duty to partnership 

funds is no less abhorrent.”

Id. Following Pennington, we conclude that the duration and 

effect of the accused’s intentional misrepresentations and 

dishonesty are such that they seriously adversely reflect on 

his fitness to practice law.

Applying the ABA Standards, we determine 

preliminarily that disbarment is the appropriate sanction. 

We now consider whether there are any mitigating factors 

or aggravating factors that lead to a different conclusion. We 

find four aggravating factors, two of which we have already 

considered in determining the seriousness of the accused’s 

criminal conduct under ABA Standard 5.11(a). First, as we 

have already explained, the accused committed a crime. See

ABA Standard 9.22(k). Second, the record establishes that 

the accused engaged in a pattern of repeated thefts from 

2005 to early 2008. See ABA Standard 9.22(c). Third, the 

accused was admitted to practice in Oregon in 1993 and 
422 In re Renshaw

has substantial experience in the practice of law. See ABA 

Standard 9.22(i). Fourth, the accused acted with a selfish 

motive. See ABA Standard 9.22(b).

We also find four mitigating factors. First, the 

accused has no prior disciplinary record. See ABA Standard 

9.32(a). Second, he displayed a cooperative attitude toward 

the disciplinary proceedings and during the trial panel 

hearing. See ABA Standard 9.32(e). Third, the accused had 

a good reputation as a competent family law attorney. See

ABA Standard 9.32(g). Fourth, the accused demonstrated 

remorse for his actions. See ABA Standard 9.32(l).

We note that the trial panel found, as a mitigating 

factor, that the accused acted without a “self motive.” 

Specifically, the panel stated that the accused “offered 

credible evidence that he misappropriated the Firm’s 

resources out of desperation to provide for his family, not 

to fund any self need or desire[.]” At oral argument, counsel 

for the accused stated that, while the accused acknowledged 

that his conduct was selfish, the fact that it was not a “self 

motive”—that is, that the money was not “for himself”—

identifies an important distinction in “trying to gauge the 

moral quality of his misconduct.” It is difficult to describe 

taking at least $100,000 of someone else’s money to pay 

for your family’s vacations, pet care, and home remodeling 

as either selfless or morally neutral acts. Far from being 

a mitigating factor, the reasons that the accused took the 

firm’s funds constitute an aggravating factor. See ABA 

Standard 9.22(b) (providing that acting for selfish reasons 

is an aggravating factor).

The accused also urges us to consider, as a mitigating 

factor, his “personal or emotional problems.” See ABA 

Standard 9.32(c). On that point, however, the accused offered 

no expert testimony before the trial panel to demonstrate 

that he suffered from any psychological or other condition 

that would explain his actions or mitigate his culpability. 

He offered no evidence that, before the hearing, he had seen 

a mental health professional to help him deal with any 

personal or emotional problems that might have caused 

his behavior. The only evidence of his personal or emotional 

problems came from the accused, who testified that he 
Cite as 353 Or 411 (2013) 423

does not handle conflict well and has a fear of failure. We 

do not find that the personal and emotional problems that 

the accused self-described are a mitigating factor. Having 

considered the aggravating and the mitigating factors, we 

are not persuaded that they warrant a sanction less than 

disbarment. We now turn to our precedent.

Two cases are virtually identical to this one. See In 

re Murdock, 328 Or 18, 968 P2d 1270 (1998); Pennington, 

220 Or at 349. In each case, the lawyer took money from 

his firm by intentionally withholding part or all of the fees 

that the lawyer collected. Over eight years, Pennington 

“secreted” approximately $50,000. 220 Or at 345. Over two 

years, Murdock withheld from his firm slightly less than 

$10,000. 328 Or at 21.8

 In both cases, this court observed 

that a lawyer who “embezzles” funds from the lawyer’s firm 

is no different from a lawyer who takes his or her client’s 

funds and held that “disbarment generally will follow” from 

that conduct. Murdock, 328 Or at 36; Pennington, 220 Or at 

349.

In Murdock, the lawyer had argued that a lesser 

sanction was appropriate because his actions were the 

result of a “long-term addiction to alcohol and illegal drugs.” 

328 Or at 29. The court reasoned that, even if Murdock were 

“affected” by a chemical dependency, that dependency did not 

“cause” him to take the firm’s funds. Id. at 30. In Pennington, 

the only explanation that the lawyer offered for his conduct 

was that he had produced more of the firm’s income than his 

partner, a fact that, in his view, permitted him to withhold 

payments that belonged to the partnership. 220 Or at 345. 

Pennington also offered evidence from witnesses of “high 

standing” that he was an able lawyer, that those witnesses 

had no reason to doubt his integrity, that they had no reason 

to believe that he had ever cheated a client, and that they 

believed that he “would not transgress again.” Id. at 346.

Despite that mitigating evidence, this court ruled 

in both cases that the magnitude of the lawyers’ ethical 

8 The lawyers in Pennington and Murdock withheld money that should have 

gone to their firms. In this case, the accused wrongfully took money that the firm 

already had received. Although the timing of the thefts differs, the effect is the 

same. In each case, the lawyer deprived his firm of funds to which the firm and the 

lawyer’s partners were entitled.
424 In re Renshaw

violations warranted disbarment. Murdock, 328 Or at 36; 

Pennington, 220 Or at 349. That conclusion follows equally 

here. The accused does not suffer from the sort of addictive 

behavior that Murdock did and, as explained above, offered 

no expert evidence to establish a psychological or emotional 

condition that might explain his actions or mitigate his 

culpability. Although the accused offered character evidence 

on his behalf, we see no material difference between that 

evidence and the character evidence that Pennington 

offered. For more than 50 years, this court has held that the 

sort of conduct that the accused engaged in here warrants 

disbarment.9

The accused, however, relies on five cases that, in 

his view, have resulted in lesser sanctions for comparable 

conduct. The accused relies primarily on In re Leisure, 338 

Or 508, 113 P3d 412 (2005). In that case, the Bar alleged 

that Leisure had engaged in criminal conduct in violation 

of former DR 1-102(A)(2) “by writing numerous checks that, 

when she wrote them, her checking account could not cover.” 

Id. at 510.10 The Bar did not allege nor did this court find 

that Leisure had committed the crime of theft. See id. at 

516-19. Rather, the Bar alleged and this court found that 

Leisure had committed the crime of negotiating a bad check, 

ORS 165.065, which the court distinguished from theft. Id.

In setting out the facts in Leisure, the court 

described one of several matters (the Combs matter) that 

had resulted in Leisure’s writing multiple bad checks. See 

9 We note that the effect of disbarment has not been constant. Initially, a 

disbarred lawyer could apply for reinstatement or admission after a period of 

time had passed. Bar Rule (BR) 6.1(d) changed that practice. It provided that a 

lawyer “disbarred as a result of a disciplinary proceeding commenced by formal 

complaint after December 31, 1995, shall never be eligible” to apply for admission 

or reinstatement. Because the Bar filed the formal complaint in Murdock in 1996, 

BR 6.1(d) applied in that case. That did not affect, however, this court’s conclusion 

that Murdock’s conduct warranted disbarment, as Pennington’s conduct had 

earlier.

10 The Bar also alleged and this court found that Leisure had violated former 

DR 1-102(A)(3), which prohibited conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 

misrepresentation. Leisure, 338 Or at 510. The court based its finding on Leisure’s 

false statements that her bank would honor certain checks, that her bank had not 

cleared a deposit for payment, and that she would cover certain dishonored checks. 

Id. at 520-21.
Cite as 353 Or 411 (2013) 425

id. at 512-14.11 It may be that some of the acts that Leisure 

took in the Combs matter would permit an inference that 

she intended to commit the crime of theft rather than the 

crime of negotiating bad checks. The Bar, however, did not 

allege that Leisure had committed the crime of theft, and 

this court did not find by clear and convincing evidence that 

she had intended to deprive anyone permanently of their 

money. In this case, by contrast, we find that the accused 

intended to deprive his firm and his partners permanently 

of a substantial sum of money and, in carrying out that 

intent, committed acts that constitute theft. The fact that 

Leisure was suspended for writing bad checks does not 

suggest that a lawyer who commits theft from his or her 

firm is not subject to disbarment.

The accused also relies on In re Carstens, 297 Or 

155, 683 P2d 992 (1984). That case, however, provides less 

support for the accused than Leisure. In that case, Carstens 

and his wife jointly owned a truck, a boat, and a trailer. Id. at 

157. After they had filed a petition for dissolution but during 

a period of reconciliation, Carstens signed his wife’s name to 

certificates of title for the boat and the trailer, transferring 

them to his professional corporation for tax purposes. Id.

at 158. After the reconciliation failed, Carstens sold the 

truck for more than it had been valued and signed his wife’s 

name to the certificate of title for the truck. Id. Before doing 

so, however, Carstens called his lawyer in the dissolution 

proceeding, who advised him to go ahead with the sale. Id.

Carstens deposited the proceeds from the sale in a separate 

11 The facts giving rise to the Combs matter were: A client owed Leisure and 

her co-counsel a substantial sum, which the client refused to pay. A third lawyer 

recovered a judgment from the client, which that lawyer then sought to collect. 

Between January and August 2002, the lawyer collected some of the judgment and 

disbursed approximately $9,000 to Leisure. Leisure did not disclose receipt of that 

money to her co-counsel. In August 2002, the lawyer collected the remainder of the 

judgment from the client and disbursed $122,807.05 to Leisure, who deposited the 

money on August 30, 2002, into her business account. Also on August 30, the lawyer 

who had collected the money told Leisure’s co-counsel that he had recovered it.

Co-counsel assumed that Leisure would send him his share of the money and went 

on vacation. When co-counsel returned from vacation on September 9, Leisure 

had not paid him his share, nor had she disclosed receipt of the money to him. 

He demanded his share, and Leisure wrote him a check for it. However, at that 

time, her business account was not sufficient to cover the check, and she ended 

up writing her co-counsel a series of bad checks to cover her obligation, which she 

ultimately paid. Id. at 513-14.
426 In re Renshaw

account and promptly advised his wife of the sale. Id. at 

158-59.

On learning of the sale, Carstens’ wife initiated 

criminal charges against her husband, claiming that he had 

forged her name on the titles for the truck, boat, and trailer 

and that, as a result, he had stolen her interest in them. Id.

at 159. In the criminal proceeding, a trial court convicted 

Carstens of one count of forgery and one count of theft, both 

of which counts arose from the sale of the truck; however, 

the court dismissed the counts arising from the transfer of 

the titles to the boat and the trailer. Id. at 160. The Bar then 

brought a disciplinary proceeding against Carstens, based 

on those two convictions and additionally on the ground 

that forging his wife’s name on the titles for the boat and 

trailer violated former DR 1-102(A)(3) and (4). Id. at 160-61.

In reviewing the Bar’s charges, this court explained 

that it was bound by the criminal convictions and could not 

look behind them. Id. at 163. Regarding the other claims 

based on Carstens’ forging his wife’s name on the titles for 

the boat and trailer, the court found that no forgery had 

occurred. It reasoned that Carstens had “implied authority 

to sign his wife’s name to the certificates of title to the boat 

trailer and the boat.” Id. at 164-65. Regarding the sale of 

the truck, the court observed that Carstens should have 

“realized that any implied authority he previously had to 

sign his wife’s name [to the certificate of title] must have 

been revoked when the reconciliation failed” and that he had 

“made a serious mistake in judgment by signing his wife’s 

name to the certificate of title to the truck[,]” a mistake 

that the court attributed to the acrimonious relationship 

between Carstens and his wife. Id. at 166-67. However, 

considering that Carstens had sought advice from his lawyer 

before selling the truck, placed the proceeds of the sale in 

a separate account, promptly notified his wife of the sale, 

and, on learning of his wife’s objections, promptly notified 

the purchaser that he would hold him harmless, the court 

concluded that only a public reprimand was warranted. Id.

Carstens provides no basis for distinguishing 

Pennington and Murdock, nor do the other three cases on 
Cite as 353 Or 411 (2013) 427

which the accused relies.12 Having found no basis to depart 

from the ABA Standards or our case law, we conclude that, 

to protect the public and the administration of justice, the 

accused should be disbarred.

The accused is disbarred, effective 60 days from the 

date of this decision.

12 The third case on which accused relies, In re Goff, 352 Or 104, 280 P3d 984 

(2012), identified the rules that the attorney had violated but said nothing about 

the facts that gave rise to those violations. The fourth case, In re Toth-Fejel, 14 

DB Rptr 179 (2000), involved a stipulation for discipline and has no precedential 

value. See Murdock, 328 Or at 24 n 1. In the final case on which the accused relies, 

In re Fitzhenry, 343 Or 86, 162 P3d 260 (2007), Fitzhenry and other members of 

the corporation for which Fitzhenry worked signed a management representation 

letter that misrepresented that one of several listed transactions met the criteria 

necessary to show the transaction as a “bill and hold” transaction on the company’s 

books. That misrepresentation permitted the company to overstate its earnings, 

but Fitzhenry did not commit a theft of another’s money in the way that the 

accused did here. The final three cases that the accused cites provide less support 

for his position than Leisure and Carstens.