Pursuant to Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should *

not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Fifth

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-10908

Summary Calendar

RACHEL RUIZ,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

ESTATE OF BRADLEY JAMES THOMPSON, Deceased,

Intervenor – Appellant

v.

PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA,

Defendant – Third Party Plaintiff

v.

KRISTINA THOMPSON,

Third Party Defendant – Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth Division

USDC No. 4:07-CV-029-BE

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BARKSDALE, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

March 25, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-10908

Circuit Rule 47.5.

 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Waltman v. Payne, 535 F.3d 342, 1

349 (2008). In addition to granting summary judgment for Kristina Thompson against Ruiz,

the trial court denied Ruiz’s motion for summary judgment. We interpret Ruiz’s appellate

brief to challenge the granting of Thompson’s motion, rather than the denial of her own, but

in any case we would uphold the trial court on both decisions.

2

Arkansas Army National Guard member Bradley James Thompson died

on October 20, 2006, triggering a payout on his Servicemen’s Group Life

Insurance Act policy. Appellant Rachel Ruiz was Bradley Thompson’s wife at

the time of his death. As executor of his estate, and on her own behalf as a

putative beneficiary of the SGLIA policy, Ruiz appeals an order of summary

judgment holding that Third Party Defendant–Appellee Kristina Thompson,

Bradley Thompson’s previous wife, is a 25 percent beneficiary of the SGLIA

policy. Reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo, we affirm.1

Federal law directly governs the procedures for designating beneficiaries

of an SGLIA policy. See generally Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981).

Under Ridgway, neither state law nor state court orders such as divorce decrees

can modify designated beneficiaries under the SGLIA. Dohnalik v. Somner, 467

F.3d 488, 490–91 (5th Cir. 2006). The designated beneficiaries can only be

changed if “the proper office” receives, prior to the death of the insured, an

appropriate signed document changing the beneficiary. Id. at 490, 491. 

It is clear from the record that prior to Bradley and Kristina Thompson’s

divorce on September 16, 2006, the proper military office received an appropriate

designation of beneficiary form, signed by Bradley, designating Kristina a 25

percent beneficiary of his SGLIA policy. The parties dispute, however, whether

he changed that designation after he and Kristina divorced. 

Kristina Thompson submitted as evidence an affidavit from Sergeant First

Class Paul J. Melton, in which he states it was his responsibility, as a member

of Bradley Thompson’s National Guard unit, to review personnel files and
No. 08-10908

3

ascertain the SGLIA designation of beneficiary form in force upon the death of

a member of the unit. He states that Bradley Thompson had possession of his

own personnel file at the time of his death, because he needed it to apply for a

job in Texas. Melton traveled to Texas to attend Bradley Thompson’s funeral

and recover the file. He states that “[t]he most recent designation form in

[Bradley Thompson’s] file is the one . . . in which Kristina Thompson was

designated a 25 percent lump-sum beneficiary . . . dated September 19, 2005.”

Ruiz presented a document purporting to be a subsequent form in which

Bradley, after the divorce, substitutes Ruiz for Kristina Thompson. It contains

a “Bradley Thompson” signature, but it is not signed or acknowledged in the

appropriate boxes to indicate receipt by the military. Ruiz claims it is a copy she

found in Bradley Thompson’s truck, and speculates that he must have turned in

the original form prior to his death. She also challenges various aspects of the

Melton affidavit. Most importantly she argues that Melton does not claim

personal knowledge sufficient to rule out Thompson having turned in a

subsequent form.

We need not decide whether the objections to the Melton affidavit are

valid, because we agree with the district court that Ruiz fails to raise a fact issue

on whether a proper office ever received a signed form substituting Ruiz for

Kristina Thompson. Kristina Thompson’s motion for summary judgment

appropriately demonstrated that she was the properly designated beneficiary as

of September 19, 2005. To survive summary judgment it was then incumbent

upon Ruiz, by affidavits of her own, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or

admissions on file, to demonstrate a fact issue as to whether the proper office

later received a signed form substituting Ruiz as the beneficiary. See Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Ruiz pleaded contrary facts, but failed

to support them with evidence. According to her brief, Ruiz’s evidence that the

proper office received such a change of beneficiary form consists of “Appellant’s
No. 08-10908

 We note that Ruiz, supposedly “[f]or purposes of brevity and convenience,” declined 2

to include “a formal statement of the facts” in her brief. She likewise failed to attach

supporting record excerpts or otherwise cite supporting evidence in the record. She argues she

raised fact issues “based upon the pleadings alone.” 

4

opinion” that Melton “was earlier personally involved . . . with absconding with

and losing or intentionally losing or destroying the original copy of the

Decedent’s signed change of beneficiary form which he had executed in behalf

of his new wife.” Ruiz cites no evidence that Bradley Thompson ever gave such 2

a form to Melton or that Melton would have been the appropriate person to

receive the form at the time, nor any evidence that Melton lost or absconded

with such a form. She states no possible motive for such conduct. She does not

contest that she declined to depose Melton, and she cites no evidence that he is

anything other than an upstanding serviceman. In light of these omissions, her

copy of the purported change of beneficiary form does not create a fact issue

under the strict standards of Ridgway.

Ruiz’s remaining arguments against summary judgment are without

merit. She attempts to avoid Kristina Thompson’s evidence by proposing we

apply various canons of statutory construction to an order below, to absurdly

conclude that the trial court meant to grant leave to file a motion, but not the

accompanying brief and exhibits. We decline to do so; the trial court’s contrary

intent appears from the order itself, common sense, and subsequent rulings. We

also reject Ruiz’s argument that various facts should be deemed admitted by

Kristina Thompson based on failure to deny assertions in Ruiz’s cross-claims.

The trial court properly concluded that the cross-claims were “no more than the

inverse of the cross-claim asserted by [Kristina] Thompson.” Ruiz had notice of

Kristina Thompson’s contrary assertions, and therefore cannot prevail based

solely on unsupported pleadings. See Trotter v. Jack Anderson Enters., Inc., 818

F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1987).
No. 08-10908

5

The ruling below is therefore AFFIRMED.