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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

312 Nebraska Reports

STATE V. GODE

Cite as 312 Neb. 1004

State of Nebraska, appellee, v. 

James T. Godek, appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed December 2, 2022. No. S-22-015.

1. Convictions: Appeal and Error. A conviction will be affirmed, in the 

absence of prejudicial error, if the properly admitted evidence, viewed 

and construed most favorably to the State, is sufficient to support the 

conviction.

2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing questions of law, an 

appellate court resolves the questions independently of the lower court’s 

conclusions.

3. Statutes. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law.

4. ____. Statutory interpretation begins with the text, and the text is to be 

given its plain and ordinary meaning.

5. Statutes: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will not resort to interpretation of statutory language to ascertain the meaning of words which 

are plain, direct, and unambiguous.

6. Statutes. It is not within the province of the courts to read meaning 

into a statute that is not there or to read anything direct and plain out of 

a statute.

7. Criminal Law: Statutes. Penal statutes must be strictly construed and 

are considered in the context of the object sought to be accomplished, 

the evils and mischiefs sought to be remedied, and the purpose sought 

to be served.

8. Statutes. A court must place on a statute a reasonable construction 

which best achieves the statute’s purpose, rather than a construction 

which would defeat that purpose.

9. Statutes: Legislature. It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that words generally should be interpreted as taking their ordinary 

meaning at the time the Legislature enacted the statute.

10. Criminal Law: Words and Phrases. The term “threaten” used in Neb. 

Rev. Stat. § 28-311.01 (Reissue 2016) requires communication of a 

threat to a listener or recipient.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

12/02/2022 09:05 AM CST
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11. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question which does 

not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a 

matter of law.

12. Criminal Law: Jurisdiction. Ordinarily, no penalty can be incurred 

under the law of this state except for transactions occurring within this 

state, and our state law has no extraterritorial effect.

13. ____: ____. When some requisite elements of a crime are committed 

outside Nebraska, but an essential element of the crime is committed or 

occurs in Nebraska, a Nebraska court has subject matter jurisdiction for 

prosecution of a defendant charged with the crime.

14. Venue. Venue is the place where a court’s inherent power to adjudicate 

may be exercised.

15. Criminal Law: Jurisdiction. The courts of the county where an offense 

is committed have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the cause and 

jurisdiction to try the accused for the crime charged.

16. Criminal Law: Venue: Jurisdiction: Waiver: Proof. In a criminal 

case, proper venue is a jurisdictional fact that, in the absence of a 

defendant’s waiver by requesting a change of venue, the State has the 

burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt.

17. Appeal and Error. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an 

analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy 

before it.

Appeal from the District Court for Sarpy County: Stefanie 

A. Martinez, Judge. Affirmed.

Todd A. West, Assistant Sarpy County Public Defender, for 

appellant.

Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Nathan A. Liss 

for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, 

Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

Cassel, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

James T. Godek appeals from his conviction and sentence 

for terroristic threats, 1 based upon phone calls he placed from 

Council Bluffs, Iowa, to persons in Bellevue, Sarpy County, 

1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.01 (Reissue 2016).
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Nebraska. Arguing that the elements of the offense do not 

require a recipient or listener, he contests the district court’s 

territorial jurisdiction and venue; sufficiency of the evidence; 

the court’s instruction on venue; and its denial of his motions 

to quash, for directed verdict, for mistrial, and for new trial. 

Because we reject his premise, his assigned errors lack merit. 

We affirm the judgment.

II. BACKGROUND

1. Factual Background

Godek placed a series of phone calls from his residence in 

Council Bluffs to his sister’s business, which is in Bellevue. 

Prior to making the phone calls, Godek had not seen or spoken 

with his sister, Jayme Cronk, in approximately 3 years. Cronk 

was working at her business with Jennifer Merriman, Godek’s 

other sister, when Godek made the phone calls at issue.

Cronk answered the first phone call. Godek identified himself to Cronk and then stated that he lost his job and wanted 

to die. According to Cronk, Godek became belligerent while 

speaking to her on the phone and proceeded to blame Cronk, 

Merriman, and Cronk’s husband for his situation. Godek then 

stated that he wanted Cronk dead. After Cronk hung up the 

phone, she called the 911 emergency dispatch service to report 

the incident. Cronk was told that an officer would be sent to 

her business to make a report.

Godek called the business a second time. This time Merriman 

answered the phone. Godek continued making threatening 

statements, including telling Merriman that he was going to kill 

Cronk’s husband, who was working in Council Bluffs. Cronk 

recorded the second phone call on her cell phone because she 

“knew it wasn’t going to be good.” Cronk promptly called her 

husband to notify him of Godek’s threats.

Godek called a third time. While Cronk and Merriman were 

speaking with Godek, an officer from the Bellevue Police 

Department arrived at Cronk’s business.

Godek then called yet again. Merriman answered the phone, 

identified the caller as Godek, and gave the phone to the 
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officer. The officer attempted to talk with Godek and observed 

that he seemed agitated and upset. Godek challenged the officer to come to Council Bluffs to fight him.

Thereafter, the officer notified law enforcement in Council 

Bluffs of Godek’s situation. Law enforcement officers 

responded that they had done a welfare check at Godek’s 

residence earlier that day and indicated that they would not be 

investigating the phone calls. The officer applied for an arrest 

warrant in Sarpy County.

2. Procedural History

(a) Information

The State filed an amended information in the district court 

for Sarpy County charging Godek with terroristic threats, a 

Class IIIA felony, pursuant to § 28-311.01.

(b) Pretrial Motion to Quash

Prior to trial, Godek filed a motion to quash, asserting lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction and improper venue. Godek 

contended that terroristic threats did not take place in Sarpy 

County because Godek uttered the threats while he was in 

Iowa. The State countered that the terroristic threats statute 

requires that a threat be made toward “another,” 2 meaning 

that a recipient is a material element of the offense. The State 

asserted that the recipient here received the threats in Sarpy 

County, making jurisdiction and venue appropriate. 3 The court 

agreed with the State and overruled the motion to quash.

(c) Jury Trial

The court, with a jury, tried Godek for terroristic threats. 

After the State rested its case, Godek moved for a directed verdict. Godek asserted that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged terroristic threats took place in 

Sarpy County. The court disagreed with Godek and overruled 

2 See § 28-311.01(1)(a).

3 See State v. Red Kettle, 239 Neb. 317, 476 N.W.2d 220 (1991).
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the motion, reasoning that the State met its burden to prove a 

material element of terroristic threats—receipt of the threat by 

another—took place in Sarpy County.

At the close of the evidence, the parties held a conference 

regarding the court’s proposed jury instructions. The State 

proposed the following instruction to define the elements of 

terroristic threats:

The material elements of the charge of terroristic 

threats, as charged in Count 1, are as follows:

1. The defendant, . . . Godek, did threaten to commit a 

crime of violence

a. with the intent to terrorize another; or

b. in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such 

terror;

2. The act took place on or about August 12, 2020; and

3. At least one of the material elements in paragraph 1 

above took place in Sarpy County, Nebraska.

Godek objected to provision (3) as a misstatement of law, 

arguing that the instruction improperly expanded jurisdiction 

based on a nonexistent element of terroristic threats—a recipient. The court adopted the State’s instruction and read it to 

the jury.

During closing arguments, the State told the jury that a 

recipient is a material element of terroristic threats. The State 

further explained that the offense is not committed until someone hears or receives the alleged threat. The State argued that 

the recipients of Godek’s threats were located in Sarpy County, 

which was sufficient to show that Godek’s offense took place 

there. Godek objected and moved to strike the State’s argument. In addition, Godek moved for a curative instruction to 

the jury or, in the alternative, a mistrial. The court overruled 

his motion.

(d) Verdict, New Trial Motion, 

and Sentencing

The jury found Godek guilty of terroristic threats. He 

timely moved for a new trial on various grounds, including 
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prosecutorial misconduct, insufficiency of the State’s evidence, 

and improperly instructing the jury on the elements of terroristic threats. Following a hearing, the court denied the motion 

for a new trial. It sentenced him to 2 years’ imprisonment, followed by 18 months of post-release supervision.

Godek filed a timely appeal, which we moved to our docket. 4

III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Godek assigns, restated, that the district court erred by 

(1) overruling the motion to quash for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction; (2) giving the jury an “improper and misleading” 

instruction of the law, which stated that venue was appropriate 

in Sarpy County; (3) overruling Godek’s objection to the prosecutor’s “improper[]” statements during closing arguments, not 

issuing a curative instruction, and overruling the motion for a 

mistrial; (4) overruling Godek’s motion for a directed verdict; 

(5) finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the jury’s guilty 

verdict; and (6) overruling the motion for a new trial.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1,2] We set forth two overarching standards of review. A 

conviction will be affirmed, in the absence of prejudicial error, 

if the properly admitted evidence, viewed and construed most 

favorably to the State, is sufficient to support the conviction. 5

When reviewing questions of law, an appellate court resolves 

the questions independently of the lower court’s conclusions. 6

Additional standards are set forth at appropriate points in the 

analysis section below.

V. ANALYSIS

At oral argument, Godek iterated two concessions, both 

of which are consistent with his arguments in brief. First, 

there is no dispute regarding the facts relating to the phone 

4 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Cum. Supp. 2022).

5 State v. Pauly, 311 Neb. 418, 972 N.W.2d 907 (2022).

6 State v. Jones, 307 Neb. 809, 950 N.W.2d 625 (2020).
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calls. Second, all of his assignments of error are based on 

his interpretation of the elements of terroristic threats under 

§ 28-311.01.

Ordinarily, we would first address the district court’s jurisdiction. But here, to answer the jurisdictional question, we 

must first determine the elements of terroristic threats as 

applied to these facts.

1. Elements of § 28-311.01

(a) Godek’s Contention and State’s Response

Godek contends that the district court erred by interpreting 

the word “another” in the terroristic threats statute 7 to require 

that someone actually receive the threat as an element of his 

offense. Godek points to the plain language of § 28-311.01(1), 

which, he argues, does not state that the person must “communicate” the threat or that the threat must be “receive[d]” by 

another person. 8 Godek asserts that the court improperly read 

those terms into the statute. Godek also suggests that the word 

“another” refers only to the defendant’s mens rea, or the requisite intent for committing terroristic threats.

The State counters that the plain language of the statute 

requires making threats “[w]ith the intent to terrorize another” 9

or “[i]n reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.” 10

The State asserts that this language indicates that a threat must 

be “communicated or conveyed to another.” 11 The State also 

asserts that a “‘threat,’” by definition, means “‘[a] communicated intent to inflict harm or loss on another or on another’s 

property.’” 12 Finally, the State suggests that Godek’s position, 

which would permit a conviction for terroristic threats even in 

7 See § 28-311.01(1)(a).

8 Brief for appellant at 26.

9 § 28-311.01(1)(a).

10 § 28-311.01(1)(c).

11 Brief for appellee at 14.

12 Id. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1519 (8th ed. 1999)).
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the absence of a communication, is a “non sequitur” in light of 

the statute’s purpose. 13

(b) Standard of Review

[3] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law. 14

(c) Resolution

[4-6] To determine the elements of terroristic threats as 

applied to these facts, we begin by setting forth familiar 

principles of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation 

begins with the text, and the text is to be given its plain and 

ordinary meaning. 15 An appellate court will not resort to interpretation of statutory language to ascertain the meaning of 

words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. 16 Similarly, 

it is not within the province of the courts to read meaning into 

a statute that is not there or to read anything direct and plain 

out of a statute. 17

[7,8] Penal statutes must be strictly construed and are considered in the context of the object sought to be accomplished, 

the evils and mischiefs sought to be remedied, and the purpose sought to be served. 18 A court must place on a statute 

a reasonable construction which best achieves the statute’s 

purpose, rather than a construction which would defeat that 

purpose. 19

Section 28-311.01, which creates the offense of terroristic 

threats, provides:

(1) A person commits terroristic threats if he or she 

threatens to commit any crime of violence:

13 Id. at 15.

14 State v. Space, ante p. 456, 980 N.W.2d 1 (2022).

15 Dutcher v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., ante p. 405, 979 N.W.2d 245 

(2022).

16 Id.

17 State v. Knight, 311 Neb. 485, 973 N.W.2d 356 (2022).

18 State v. Hofmann, 310 Neb. 609, 967 N.W.2d 435 (2021).

19 State v. Pauly, supra note 5.
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(a) With the intent to terrorize another;

(b) With the intent of causing the evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public transportation; or

(c) In reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or evacuation.

(2) Terroristic threats is a Class IIIA felony.

We first turn to the plain language of the statute. Section 

28-311.01(1)(a) states that terroristic threats occur when a 

person “threatens” to commit a crime of violence intending to terrorize “another.” Although we have not previously 

defined the word “threatens” under § 28-311.01, we have considered various definitions and held that it is a term of common usage and understanding. 20 In reaching that conclusion, 

we referred to definitions that recognized the existence of a 

communication. 21

[9] The cited legal definitions are consistent with the common definition of “threaten” at the time the Legislature adopted 

§ 28-311.01 in 1986. 22 It is a fundamental canon of statutory 

construction that words generally should be interpreted as taking their ordinary meaning at the time the Legislature enacted 

the statute. 23 Dictionaries defined “threaten” as “[t]o try to 

20 See State v. Schmailzl, 243 Neb. 734, 502 N.W.2d 463 (1993).

21 See, e.g., United States v. Baish, 460 A.2d 38, 42 (D.C. 1983), abrogated 

on other grounds, Carrell v. U.S., 80 A.3d 163 (D.C. 2013) (“a person 

‘threatens’ when she utters words, which are intended to convey her desire 

to inflict physical or other harm on any person or on property, and these 

words are communicated to someone”); State v. Porter, 384 A.2d 429, 

434 (Me. 1978) (“[a] communication is a threat if it carries the promise 

of evil under such circumstances that a reasonable person receiving the 

communication would believe that such was to ensue at the hands of the 

communicator, or his allies”); State v. Gunzelman, 210 Kan. 481, 486, 

502 P.2d 705, 710 (1972) (“[t]he word ‘threat’ . . . means a communicated 

intent to inflict physical or other harm on any person or on property”).

22 See 1986 Neb. Laws, L.B. 956, § 11.

23 Nebraska Republican Party v. Shively, 311 Neb. 160, 971 N.W.2d 128 

(2022).
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influence (a person) by menaces; to utter or hold out a threat 

against; to declare . . . one’s intention of inflicting injury 

upon” 24; “to utter threats against : promise punishment, reprisal, or other distress to” 25; and “to be a menace or source of 

danger to.” 26 These definitions teach that the transitive verb 

“threaten” includes the concept of a listener or recipient.

We also agree with the State that the statutory language 

indicates that the threat must be received by “another” for the 

offense to occur. Godek argues that the word “another” refers 

only to the actor’s intent and directs our attention to our analysis in State v. Smith.

 27

The issue in Smith was whether third degree assault is 

a lesser-included offense of terroristic threats. We applied a 

statutory elements test in which a court looks to the statutory 

elements of each crime rather than the particular facts of a 

specific case.

We first noted that the two offenses have at least one element in common: a threat. We observed that in addition to a 

threat, § 28-311.01(1)(a) requires that the threat to commit a 

violent crime be made “[w]ith the intent to terrorize another.” 

We explained that “the intent to terrorize another is an intent 

to produce intense fear or anxiety in another.” 28

In analyzing the elements of § 28-311.01 in Smith, we made 

two other observations pertinent here. First, we explained 

that “[terroristic threats] need not produce a result in the 

24 17 The Oxford English Dictionary 998 (2d ed. 1989).

25 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, 

Unabridged 2382 (1986); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 

of the English Language, Unabridged 2382 (1981). See, also, Webster’s 

Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1229 (1983) (“to utter threats against,” 

“to give signs or warning of,” “to hang over dangerously,” and “to 

announce as intended or possible”).

26 Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language 

1478 (1989).

27 State v. Smith, 267 Neb. 917, 678 N.W.2d 733 (2004).

28 Id. at 921, 678 N.W.2d at 736 (emphasis supplied).
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victim.” 29 Second, § 28-311.01(1)(a) “does not require that 

the recipient of the threat be actually terrorized, and it does 

not require an intent to execute the threats made.” 30

[10] Our analysis in Smith confirms that the word “another” 

refers to the person hearing or receiving the threat. We agree 

with the State that the only way in which a person could conceivably intend “to produce intense fear or anxiety in another” 

is by communicating the threat to someone other than the 

actor. Additionally, our references in Smith to a “victim” and 

a “recipient” support our conclusion that the word “another” 

refers to the person hearing or receiving the threat. We hold 

that the term “threaten” used in § 28-311.01 requires com

munication of a threat to a listener or recipient.

We also find some guidance in our decision in State v. 

Hamilton,

 31 holding an earlier version of a terroristic threats 

statute unconstitutional. Although that decision considered 

statutory language quite different from our current statute, we 

noted that the statute there contained the word “threaten,” but 

it did not define the term “threat.” We further explained that 

the statute did not “describe how or to whom, if anyone, the 

threat must be made.” 32 Thus, we asked: “Is it a violation of 

this act to make the threat if the threat is neither heard nor 

received by the anticipated victim, or does a violation occur 

only if there is knowledge and understanding by the party to 

whom it is directed?” 33

We also explained that the statute there, which had been 

adopted in 1977, 34 while similar in purpose to the Model Penal 

29 Id. at 922, 678 N.W.2d at 737 (emphasis supplied).

30 Id. at 921, 678 N.W.2d at 736 (emphasis supplied) (citing State v. 

Saltzman, 235 Neb. 964, 458 N.W.2d 239 (1990)).

31 State v. Hamilton, 215 Neb. 694, 340 N.W.2d 397 (1983) (declaring Neb. 

Rev. Stat. § 28-311 (Reissue 1979) unconstitutionally vague).

32 Id. at 697, 340 N.W.2d at 399.

33 Id.

34 1977 Neb. Laws, L.B. 38, § 26.
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Code, was a significant departure from the code’s language. 

We quoted from the code, which provided: “‘A person is guilty 

of a felony of the third degree if he threatens to commit any 

crime of violence with purpose to terrorize another . . . .’” 35

Contrasting that language with § 28-311, we stated:

The language of the Model Penal Code is certainly much 

clearer than that adopted by the Nebraska Legislature. 

An actor violates the Model Penal Code when he or 

she threatens to commit any crime of violence, with 

the intent to terrorize another, regardless of what the 

outcome of the act will be or of how the victim receives 

the threat.

 36

On appeal here, Godek makes a similar argument, asserting 

that the statute does not describe how or to whom, if anyone, 

the threat must be made. But the statute now before us incorporated the Model Penal Code language. Thus, our discussion 

in Hamilton supports our conclusions that the word “another” 

refers to the person who receives the threat and that the word 

“threaten” requires communication of a threat to a listener 

or recipient.

Because the terroristic threats statute requires that the threat 

be communicated to another, a recipient was an essential element of Godek’s offense. Accordingly, the district court did 

not err in its interpretation of § 28-311.01(1)(a) as applied to 

these facts.

2. Jurisdiction and Venue

(a) Godek’s Contention

We next address Godek’s arguments regarding jurisdiction 

and venue. Godek asserts that he committed the offense in 

Iowa rather than Nebraska, depriving the district court of 

35 See State v. Hamilton, supra note 31, 215 Neb. at 698, 340 N.W.2d at 399 

(emphasis in original). See, also, Model Penal Code § 211.3, 10A U.L.A. 

418 (2001).

36 State v. Hamilton, supra note 31, 215 Neb. at 698-99, 340 N.W.2d at 399-

400 (emphasis supplied).
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subject matter jurisdiction and rendering venue improper. 

Godek contends that the district court erred by inventing a 

new element of terroristic threats—receipt of the threat by 

another—in order to exercise jurisdiction.

(b) Standard of Review

[11] A jurisdictional question which does not involve a 

factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter 

of law. 37

(c) Resolution

Godek’s argument challenges only Nebraska’s territorial 

jurisdiction and the related requirement of proper venue. He 

does not otherwise challenge the district court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction. We limit our analysis accordingly.

[12,13] In criminal matters, two territorial jurisdiction principles may apply. Ordinarily, no penalty can be incurred under 

the law of this state except for transactions occurring within 

this state, and our state law has no extraterritorial effect. 38

However, when some requisite elements of a crime are committed outside Nebraska, but an essential element of the 

crime is committed or occurs in Nebraska, a Nebraska court 

has subject matter jurisdiction for prosecution of a defendant 

charged with the crime. 39 It follows that any element of an 

offense can confer territorial jurisdiction. 40

[14] Venue is the place where a court’s inherent power to 

adjudicate may be exercised. 41 Article I, § 11, of the Nebraska 

Constitution provides that an accused shall have the right to 

37 Mann v. Mann, ante p. 275, 978 N.W.2d 606 (2022).

38 State v. Karsten, 194 Neb. 227, 231 N.W.2d 335 (1975) (citing State v. 

Hyslop, 131 Neb. 681, 269 N.W. 512 (1936)).

39 State v. Red Kettle, supra note 3; State v. Schaaf, 234 Neb. 144, 449 

N.W.2d 762 (1989); State v. Manchester, 213 Neb. 670, 331 N.W.2d 776 

(1983); State v. Hilpert, 213 Neb. 564, 330 N.W.2d 729 (1983).

40 See State v. Manchester, supra note 39.

41 State v. Warlick, 308 Neb. 656, 956 N.W.2d 269 (2021).
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a jury trial in the “county or district in which the offense is 

alleged to have been committed.” Similarly, Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 29-1301 (Reissue 2016) generally requires that a criminal trial 

take place “in the county where the offense was committed.”

[15,16] The courts of the county where an offense is committed have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the cause and 

jurisdiction to try the accused for the crime charged. 42 In a 

criminal case, proper venue is a jurisdictional fact that, in the 

absence of a defendant’s waiver by requesting a change of 

venue, the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt. 43

In this case, jurisdiction and venue turn on the elements of 

terroristic threats. We have already determined that a recipient was an essential element of Godek’s offense. Because it is 

undisputed that the recipients here received the threats in Sarpy 

County, we conclude that an essential element of Godek’s 

offense occurred in Nebraska. That element conferred territorial jurisdiction.

We next turn to Godek’s argument that venue was improper 

in the district court for Sarpy County. In light of our conclusion that an essential element of Godek’s offense took place 

where the recipients of Godek’s threats were located, we find 

that Sarpy County was “the county where the offense was 

committed” under the venue statute, § 29-1301. Accordingly, 

we conclude that venue was proper to prosecute Godek for terroristic threats.

Godek also argues that because a new, additional venue 

statute 44 was added after his conviction, somehow the preexisting venue statute did not provide for his offense. We 

disagree. Section 29-1301 covered the offense here, and we 

need not speculate as to the motive of legislators in adding the 

new statute.

42 State v. Furstenau, 167 Neb. 439, 93 N.W.2d 384 (1958).

43 State v. Warlick, supra note 41.

44 See § 29-1301.04 (Cum. Supp. 2022).
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Because venue was proper under § 29-1301, we do not 

address Godek’s other arguments regarding the venue statute’s 

exceptions. 45 Godek’s offense occurred in only one county in 

Nebraska. For the same reason, we need not address the State’s 

argument regarding venue when an offense originates in one 

county and terminates in another. 46

3. Remaining Assignments 

of Error

Based on his statutory elements argument, Godek attacks 

his conviction on various grounds regarding the pretrial, trial, 

and posttrial proceedings. His claims involve the motion to 

quash, the jury instructions, the sufficiency of the evidence, 

the motion for a directed verdict, alleged prosecutorial misconduct, the motion for a mistrial, and the motion for a 

new trial.

[17] An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an 

analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy before it. 47 That principle applies here.

As Godek’s briefing and oral argument conceded, all of his 

remaining arguments rely on his statutory elements argument. 

Because we have already rejected his elements argument, his 

other arguments also fail. We need not give further consideration to his other assignments of error.

45 See, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-412.03 (Reissue 2016) (cases subject to interlocal 

cooperation agreement); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1301.01 (Reissue 2016) 

(crimes against person committed in multiple counties); Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 29-1301.02 (Reissue 2016) (crimes committed on moving means of 

transportation in multiple counties); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1301.03 (Reissue 

2016) (crimes already adjudicated in one county, which are barred from 

prosecution in another county); § 29-1301.04 (crimes committed in 

multiple counties using electronic communication device).

46 See, § 29-1301.01; State v. Tiff, 199 Neb. 519, 260 N.W.2d 296 (1977); 

State v. Lindsey, 193 Neb. 442, 227 N.W.2d 599 (1975); State v. Garza, 

191 Neb. 118, 214 N.W.2d 30 (1974).

47 State v. Huston, 298 Neb. 323, 903 N.W.2d 907 (2017).
- 1019 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

312 Nebraska Reports

STATE V. GODE

Cite as 312 Neb. 1004

VI. CONCLUSION

We find no merit to Godek’s argument that the terroristic threats statute does not require a recipient of the threat. 

Because a recipient is an essential element of the offense, 

Godek’s other arguments fail. Viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, we determine the State 

offered sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that an element of terroristic threats occurred in Sarpy County, 

where Godek’s sisters received the threats. Accordingly, we 

find that the district court had jurisdiction and that venue was 

proper. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

Affirmed.