## FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT : ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE : BARBARA J. SIMMONS GREGORY F. ZOELLER Oldenburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
RYAN J. JOHANNINGSMEIER Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana


## IN THE COURT OF APPEAL S OF INDIANA

JEROME YATES , ) ) Appellant

- Defendant, ) ) vs. ) No. 49A02

- 1312

- CR

- 993 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee

- Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Carol Orbison, Senior Judge Cause No. 49F19

- 1307

- CM

- 47932

Septemb er 5, 2014
OPINION
- FOR PUBLICATION MAY, Judge2

Jerome Yates was convicted after a jury trial of Class A misdemeanor resisting law
enforcement. 1 He argues on appeal he could not have been convicted of resisting law enforcement by fleeing because he d id not have a duty to stop. 2 We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On July 22, 2013, Officer Philip Robinette of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department saw Yates riding a bicycle in front of him. Yates was “swerving across both
lanes of trave l. Kind of like in an ‘S’ pattern on his bicycle.” (Tr. at 107.) Officer
Robinette , who was a member of the bike unit and had been trained on bicycle laws , noted Yates did not have any type of audible device required by law on his bicycle

. Yates turn ed around and saw the patrol car. At that point, he “began to frantically pedal

. . . like he was doing a marathon with his bicycle.” ( Id. at 113. ) Officer Robinette turned on the light bar on top of his patrol car and tripped the siren three or four ti mes. Yates again turned around and looked at the patrol car, then turned onto a nearby street without signal ing

. Officer Robinette followed Yates and had to speed up his patrol car to keep up with
him. Yates attempted to turn into a gravel driveway, b ut fell off of his bicycle. Officer Robinette got out of his car and yelled “Police, stop.” ( Id. at 119

- 20. ) Yates ran away. Officer Robinette followed, chasing Yates over a chain link fence and between houses ,

1 Ind. Code § 35

- 44

- 3

- 3(a)(3).

2 Yates presents his argument as one alleging insufficient evidence, and the State responds in kind. But to the extent Yates argues he was free to disregard the officer’s order to stop because there was no reasonable suspicion he committed a crime, his argument is a constitutional one.3

ordering Yates at least on ce more to stop

. Robinette eventually caught Yates . T he State charged him with Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
We review de novo trial court determinations of reasonable suspicion

. Armfield v.
State , 918 N.E.2d 316, 319 (Ind. 20 09)

. We make reasonable

- s uspicion determinations by looking at the totality of the circumstances of each case to see wheth er the detaining officer
had a par ticularized and objective basis for susp ecting legal wrongdoing. Our legislature defined resist ing law enforcement as occurring when : A person who knowingly or intentionally

. . . flees from a law enforcement officer after the officer has, by visible or audible means, including operation of the law enforcement officer’s siren or emergency lights, i dentified himself or hers el f and ordered the person to stop; com m its resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor.
Ind. Code § 35

- 44.1

- 3

- 1. The facts most favorable to the judgment demonstrate Yates was riding a bicycle on a public street when Offi cer Robinette activated the lights and siren on his patrol car, identified himself as a police officer, and ordered Yates to stop. In addition , after Yates fell off the bicycle, he ran away from Officer Robinette as the officer continued to
order Yates to stop. Thus, Yates twice violated Ind. Code § 35

- 44.1

- 3

- 1 by fle eing from a
law enforcement officer after the officer had identified him self by visible and audible means
and ordered Yates to stop.
Y ates argues he had no duty to stop because Officer Robi nette had no reasonable suspicion that criminal activity “may be afoot

. ” Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)

. T he language of the resisting law e nforcement statute, on its face, does not expressly require that4

the order to stop be lawful. Literally ap plied, however, the “after the officer has . . . ordered the person to stop” element of the statute, if applied in the absence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion, constitutes an unreasonable detention and impairs a citizen’ s “right to ignore the pol ice and go about his business,” [ Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)] , contrary to the Fourth Amendment.
Gaddie v. State , 10 N.E.3d 1249, 1254

- 55 (Ind. 2014)

. Officer Robinette had reasonable suspicion to order Yates to stop

. O fficer Robinett e saw Yates commit two infractions, operating a bicycle left of center and operating a bicycle on a public roadway without an audible device, which provided reasonable suspicion t o stop
Yates. See Veerkamp v. State , 7 N.E.3d 390, 395 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) ( “[b] ecause Veerkamp committed a traffic infraction, we conclude that Officer Wells had reasonable suspicion to stop Veerkamp and that the stop was permiss ible under the Fourth Amendment”), reh ’ g denied

. We accordingly affirm.
Affirmed. VAIDIK, C.J., a nd FRIEDLANDER, J., concur.