J-S16012-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ROGER E. VALDEZ

Appellant No. 1339 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 30, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-38-CR-0001053-2013

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and OTT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED JUNE 01, 2015

Appellant, Roger E. Valdez, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

following his conviction of rape of a child and related charges, entered on 

July 30, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County. No relief is 

due. 

We write primarily for the parties’ benefit and recite only the facts and 

procedural history essential to our disposition. Valdez was charged with one 

count of rape of a child, three counts of involuntary deviate sexual 

intercourse with a child, one count of unlawful contact with a minor, one 

count of aggravated indecent assault, one count of indecent assault, and one 
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count of corruption of minors.1 The charges stem from an incident in which 

Valdez, who at the time of the offenses was 37 years old, posed as a 17-

year-old in an online chat forum and lured a 12-year-old victim into 

engaging in sexual intercourse. The matter was scheduled for trial on March 

4 and 5, 2014. Immediately prior to trial, on March 3, 2014, Valdez entered 

an open guilty plea to all charges. Valdez then filled out and signed a 

written guilty plea colloquy, after which the trial court engaged in a lengthy 

oral colloquy. See N.T., Guilty Plea Hearing, 3/3/15. 

Prior to sentencing, Valdez filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea,2

which the trial court denied. At sentencing on July 30, 2014, Valdez again 

reiterated his request to withdraw his plea. Valdez did not assert his 

innocence, but rather repeatedly maintained that the 12-year-old-victim 

“went after me and preyed on me,” and that “what she has done is wrong ... 

and that the fact [is] that she has been doing this to several other men....” 

N.T., Sentencing, 7/30/14 at 24 (emphasis added). The trial court denied 

Valdez’s request and sentenced him to an aggregate term of 10 to 30 years’ 

incarceration. This timely appeal followed. 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(c); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(b); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

6318(a)(1); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(a)(7); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7); and 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(i). 

2 Valdez did not state in his motion a specific reason to support his request 

to withdraw his plea. 
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On appeal, Valdez claims that the lower court abused its discretion by 

denying his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He maintains 

that the court insufficiently established the nature of the offenses charged 

and the factual basis to establish such charges during the guilty plea 

colloquy in violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 590.3 See 

Appellant’s Brief at 11. 

The standard of review that we employ in challenges to a 

trial court’s decision regarding a presentence motion to withdraw 

a guilty plea is well-settled. “A trial court’s decision regarding 

whether to permit a guilty plea to be withdrawn should not be 

upset absent an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion 

exists when a defendant shows any ‘fair and just’ reasons for 

withdrawing his plea absent ‘substantial prejudice’ to the 

Commonwealth.” Commonwealth v. Pardo, 35 A.3d 1222, 

1227 (Pa. Super.2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Prysock,

972 A.2d 539, 541 (Pa. Super.2009); citing Commonwealth v. 

Anthony, 504 Pa. 551, 475 A.2d 1303, 1308 (1984)). In its 

discretion, a trial court may grant a motion for the withdrawal of 

a guilty plea at any time before the imposition of sentence. 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 591(A). “Although there is no absolute right to 

withdraw a guilty plea, properly received by the trial court, it is 

clear that a request made before sentencing ... should be 

liberally allowed.” Commonwealth v. Forbes, 450 Pa. 185, 

299 A.2d 268, 271 (1973). The policy underlying this liberal 

____________________________________________

3 The Commonwealth maintains that Valdez has not preserved this issue for 

our review. In his Rule 1925(b) Concise Statement of Errors Complained of 

on Appeal, Valdez alleged only that his “plea was not knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily entered.” Statement of Errors Complained of on 

Appeal, 8/27/14. The Commonwealth argues that this general statement did 

not adequately preserve the more specific issue now raised on appeal, that 

the trial court insufficiently established the factual predicate for the offenses 

charged. However, as we find that this issue does implicate the 

voluntariness of Valdez’s guilty plea, we decline to find this claim to be 

waived. 
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exercise of discretion is well-established: “The trial courts in 

exercising their discretion must recognize that ‘before judgment, 

the courts should show solicitude for a defendant who wishes to 

undo a waiver of all constitutional rights that surround the right 

to trial—perhaps the most devastating waiver possible under our 

constitution.’ ” Commonwealth v. Santos, 450 Pa. 492, 301 

A.2d 829, 830 (1973) (quoting Commonwealth v. Neely, 449 

Pa. 3, 295 A.2d 75, 76 (1972)). In Forbes, our Supreme Court 

instructed that, “in determining whether to grant a presentence 

motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea, ‘the test to be applied by 

the trial courts is fairness and justice.’ ” Forbes, 299 A.2d at 

271 (quoting United States v. Stayton, 408 F.2d 559, 561 (3d 

Cir.1969)).

Commonwealth v. Elia, 83 A.2d 254, 261-262 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal 

denied, 94 A.3d 1007 (Pa. 2014). 

“It is well-settled that an assertion of innocence may constitute a fair 

and just reason for the pre-sentence withdrawal of a guilty plea.” Id. at 263 

(citations omitted). Herein, as previously noted, Valdez did not assert his 

innocence at the plea withdrawal hearing. To the contrary, Valdez instead 

repeatedly placed the blame for his crimes on the 12-year-old victim. He 

now argues that his plea was involuntary because “the [c]ourt failed to 

properly explain the nature of the charges....” Appellant’s Brief at 11. 

In assessing the voluntariness of a plea, we note that “[t]he law does 

not require that appellant be pleased with the outcome of his decision to 

enter a plea of guilty: All that is required is that [appellant’s] decision to 

plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made.” 

Commonwealth v. Yager, 685 A.2d 1000, 1004 (Pa. Super. 1996) (en 

banc) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Once a defendant has entered a plea of guilty, it is presumed 

that he was aware of what he was doing, and the burden of 

proving involuntariness is upon him. Therefore, where the 

record clearly demonstrates that a guilty plea colloquy was 

conducted, during which it became evident that the defendant 

understood the nature of the charges against him, the 

voluntariness of the plea is established. ... Determining whether 

a defendant understood the connotations of his plea and its 

consequences requires an examination of the totality of the 

circumstances surrounding the plea. 

[I]n order to determine the voluntariness of the plea and 

whether the defendant acted knowingly and intelligently, the 

trial court must, at a minimum, inquire into the following six 

areas: 

(1) Does the defendant understand the nature of the charges to 

which he is pleading guilty? 

(2) Is there a factual basis for the plea? 

(3) Does the defendant understand that he has a right to trial by 

jury? 

(4) Does the defendant understand that he is presumed innocent 

until he is found guilty? 

(5) Is the defendant aware of the permissible ranges of 

sentences and/or fines for the offenses charged? 

(6) Is the defendant aware that the judge is not bound by the 

terms of any plea agreement tendered unless the judge accepts 

such agreement? 

Commonwealth v. McCauley, 797 A.2d 920, 922 (Pa. Super. 2001) 

(citation omitted). This examination may be conducted by defense counsel 

or the attorney for the Commonwealth, as permitted by the judge. See 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, Comment. 

The record belies Valdez’s assertion that the trial court failed to explain 

the nature of the charges or establish the factual basis for the plea. At the 
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outset of the guilty plea hearing, the trial court explained the charges to 

which Valdez was pleading guilty as follows.

On or about April 23 through April 28, 2013, at 500 East 

Main Street in the Borough of Palmyra, Lebanon County, Count 

I, Rape of a Child, in that you did engage in sexual intercourse 

with the victim ... when the child was less than 13 years of age; 

Count II, Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse, in that you did 

engage in anal intercourse with this young lady; Count III, 

Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse of the Child, in that you 

did perform oral intercourse on [the victim]; Count IV, 

Involuntary Sexual Intercourse with a Child, in that you did 

cause [the victim] to perform oral sexual intercourse upon you; 

Count V, Unlawful Contact or Communication with a Minor, in 

that you did communicate with [the victim] for the purpose of 

engaging in sexual relations with [the victim], or did engage in 

sexual intercourse with [the victim]; Count VI, Aggravated 

Indecent Assault, in that you did digitally penetrate the vagina of 

[the victim]; Count VII, Indecent Assault, in that you did touch 

[the victim’s] vagina, buttocks, breast and/or kissed her; and 

Count VIII, Corruption of a Minor, in that you, being 20 years of

age or older, did engage in sexual contact with – and her being 

less than 18 years of age, rather, and you being I believe you 

said 26 [sic] at the time these matters occurred, did engage in 

sexual contact and/or communication with [the victim]. 

N.T., Plea Hearing, 3/3/14 at 3-4. When the trial court later specifically 

asked whether Valdez had vaginal sexual intercourse with the victim, he 

admitted, “[y]es, sir.” Id. at 6-7. Valdez additionally acknowledged that he 

“accept[ed] all of those charges, sir.” Id. at 7. 

Considering the trial court’s detailed explanation of the factual 

surrounding the charges, as well as Valdez’s own admission and acceptance 

of the charges as stated, we are more than satisfied that Valdez was 

adequately apprised of the nature of the charges and the factual basis for 

the plea. Our decision is further reinforced by the fact that in response to 
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question 11 on the written guilty plea colloquy form, which asked “Do you 

admit to committing the crime or crimes to which you are pleading guilty 

and did your criminal conduct fit the legal elements explained to you which 

make up the crime or crimes,” Valdez answered in the affirmative. 

“Appellant is bound by these statements, which he made in open court while 

under oath, and he may not now asserts grounds for withdrawing the plea 

which contradict the statements.” Commonwealth v. Willis, 68 A.3d 997, 

1009 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876 

(Pa. Super. 2007)).

In light of the foregoing, we find no evidence to suggest that Valdez’s 

plea was involuntarily entered. It therefore follows that Valdez has failed to 

establish a “fair and just reason” for the presentence withdrawal of his plea. 

Accordingly, we find no basis to conclude that the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying Valdez’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/1/2015