IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-41317

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JUAN DE DIOS GARCIA-LEAL,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:10-CR-2556-1

Before CLEMENT, ELROD, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Juan De Dios Garcia-Leal, federal prisoner # 81103-279, moves for leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal from the grant of his motion for 

a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based upon Amendment 782

to the Sentencing Guidelines. The district court denied his IFP motion and 

certified that the appeal was not taken in good faith. By moving for IFP status, 

Garcia-Leal is challenging the district court’s certification decision. See Baugh 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 5, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 15-41317

2

v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). Our inquiry into an appellant’s 

good faith “is limited to whether the appeal involves legal points arguable on 

their merits (and therefore not frivolous).” Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 

(5th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Garcia-Leal asserts that the district court erred in granting relief under 

§ 3582(c)(2), and reducing his sentence to only 85 months in prison. He argues

that, at his initial sentencing, he was sentenced in the middle of the guidelines 

sentencing range, and the district court, upon granting his § 3582(c)(2) motion, 

did not impose a comparable sentence; he asserts that the district court instead 

sentenced him near the top of the amended guidelines range. He contends that 

the district court should have sentenced him to 80 months in prison. We review 

the district court’s decision whether to reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(2) for 

an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Evans, 587 F.3d 667, 672 (5th Cir. 

2009).

The district court – which considered, inter alia, Garcia-Leal’s motion, 

the initial and amended guidelines ranges, the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing 

factors, and Garcia-Leal’s post-sentencing conduct – exercised its discretion 

and concluded that the pertinent factors weighed in favor of Garcia-Leal being 

granted a reduction within the amended guidelines range. See Evans, 587 F.3d 

at 673. While Garcia-Leal suggests that the district court did not sufficiently 

reduce his sentence, his argument is misguided. Because the district court was 

not obligated to reduce Garcia-Leal’s sentence at all, the district court did not 

have to reduce it further than it did within the recalculated guidelines range. 

Id. Accordingly, Garcia-Leal has not shown that the district court abused its 

discretion by not granting him a greater reduction in sentence. See id.

Thus, Garcia-Leal’s appeal does not present a nonfrivolous issue and has 

not been brought in good faith. See Howard, 707 F.2d at 220. The motion for 

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leave to proceed IFP is DENIED, and the appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. 

See Baugh, 117 F.3d at n.24; 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

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