UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4962

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

RUFUS HOPKINS, a/k/a Rock, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District 

Judge. (3:07-cr-00153-JFA-1) 

Submitted: September 10, 2009 Decided: October 8, 2009 

Before MOTZ and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge. 

Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion. 

Andrew Mackenzie, BARRETT-MACKENZIE, LLC, Greenville, 

South Carolina, for Appellant. Mark C. Moore, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Rufus Hopkins appeals from his convictions for 

conspiracy to distribute cocaine and a related financial 

conspiracy, as well as his resulting life sentence. His 

attorney filed an Anders* brief, stating that there are no 

meritorious issues for appeal given Hopkins’s waiver of 

appellate rights in his plea agreement, but raising the 

questions of whether the district court abused its discretion in 

denying Hopkins’s motion to withdraw his plea or whether the 

district court clearly erred in determining that Hopkins was not 

entitled to an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. Hopkins 

filed a pro se supplemental brief, alleging that his prosecution 

violated the statute of limitations for conspiracy. The 

Government moved to dismiss the appeal based upon the waiver. 

We affirm in part and dismiss in part. 

 A defendant may waive the right to appeal if that 

waiver is knowing and intelligent. United States v. Blick, 408 

F.3d 162, 169 (4th Cir. 2005). Generally, if the district court 

fully questions a defendant regarding the waiver of his right to 

appeal during the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy, the waiver is 

both valid and enforceable. See United States v. Johnson, 410 

F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Wessells, 936 

 * Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 

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F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1991). The question of whether a 

defendant validly waived his right to appeal is a question of 

law that this court reviews de novo. Blick, 408 F.3d at 168. 

 Waiver of appeal of a sentence does not bar the appeal 

of a sentence imposed in excess of the statutory maximum or a 

challenge to the validity of a guilty plea. United States v. 

General, 278 F.3d 389, 399 n.4 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. 

Marin, 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 1992). Further, a defendant 

does not waive the right to appeal a sentence based on a 

constitutionally impermissible factor such as race, Marin, 961 

F.2d at 496, or proceedings conducted in violation of the Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel following the entry of the guilty 

plea. United States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 732-33 (4th Cir. 

1994). 

 The district court informed Hopkins of the waiver at 

the Rule 11 hearing, and Hopkins stated that he understood. 

Moreover, at sentencing, the district court rejected Hopkins’s 

assertions that his plea was coerced and unknowing; we will 

generally not review a district court’s credibility decision. 

See United States v. Lowe, 65 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th Cir. 1995). 

Therefore, we find that Hopkins knowingly and intelligently 

waived the right to appeal his conviction and sentence. 

 Thus, given the scope of his waiver, Hopkins has 

waived review of his claims that the district court improperly 

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denied him an acceptance of responsibility adjustment and that 

his conviction violated the statute of limitations. These 

claims involved neither the validity of the guilty plea nor the 

legality of the sentence. However, Hopkins’s assertion that the 

district court improperly denied his motion to withdraw his 

guilty plea does implicate the validity of the plea and is, 

thus, unwaived. Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion 

to dismiss in part and dismiss the challenges to Hopkins’s 

sentence and the statute of limitations claim. We deny the 

motion with regard to Hopkins’s challenge to his conviction. 

 Turning to this latter challenge -- the denial of 

Hopkins’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea -- we have reviewed 

the Anders brief and the record, and we find no reversible 

error. Accordingly, we conclude, for the reasons stated by the 

district court, that the motion was properly denied. (See E.R. 

at 368-76.) In addition, in accordance with Anders, we have 

examined the entire record for unwaived error and found none. 

Thus, we affirm Hopkins’s convictions. 

 This court requires that counsel inform his client, in 

writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

United States for further review. If the client requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition 

would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for 

leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must 

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state that a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED IN PART; 

DISMISSED IN PART