[Cite as State v. Riley, 2024-Ohio-2519.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

ALLEN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

CASE NO. 1-23-62

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

 v.

STAYCE L. RILEY, O P I N I O N

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court

Trial Court No. CR2021 0154

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: July 1, 2024

APPEARANCES:

F. Stephen Chamberlain for Appellant

John R. Willamowski, Jr. for Appellee
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BALDWIN, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Stayce L. Riley (“Riley”), appeals the judgment 

of conviction and sentence entered in the Allen County Court of Common Pleas on 

September 13, 2023. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Procedural History

{¶2} This case originated on May 13, 2021, when the Allen County Grand 

Jury returned a two-count indictment against Riley, charging her as follows: Count 

1 – Endangering Children, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2919.22(A) and 

(E)(2)(c); and Count 2 – Involuntary Manslaughter, a first-degree felony in violation 

of R.C. 2903.04(A).

{¶3} On May 18, 2021, Riley filed a written plea of not guilty to both counts 

in the indictment. Over two years of pretrial proceedings then ensued.

{¶4} On July 31, 2023, a change of plea hearing occurred. At that time, Riley 

entered a plea of guilty to both offenses charged in the indictment. The trial court 

accepted the guilty plea and scheduled sentencing for a later date.

{¶5} On September 8, 2023, a sentencing hearing was held. At the start of 

that hearing, the trial court heard arguments from counsel with regard to the merger

of the offenses. Following the presentations of counsel, the trial court ruled that the 

two offenses at issue in the case did not merge for sentencing purposes. Riley was 
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then sentenced on Count 1 to a prison term of 24 months and on Count 2 to a 

minimum prison term of 11 years and a potential maximum prison term of 16 1⁄2 

years. The trial court ordered that the prison sentences were to be served 

consecutively.

{¶6} On September 20, 2023, Riley filed the instant appeal.

Factual Background

{¶7} In the merit briefs filed in this appeal, both parties set forth the 

following factual summary:

On April 12th, 2021, officers from the Lima Police Department 

responded to a home on Elizabeth Street, Lima, Allen County, Ohio. 

This call was for an unresponsive four year old female. Officers 

arrived and found M.D. unresponsive in her bed. First responders 

began CPR. M.D. was then transported to Mercy Health / St. Rita’s 

Medical Center and was shortly pronounced deceased by Medical 

Professionals. 

M.D. had numerous bruises on her body and her head. An autopsy 

was later performed by the Lucas County Coroner’s Office. The 

autopsy showed M.D. had numerous internal injuries to her abdomen 

including a laceration to her pancreas which eventually lead [sic] to 

her death. M.D. was also found to have a severe injury to her head. 

Both of these injuries were determined to be approximately a week 

old. 

Detectives interviewed M.D.’s mother, Appellant Riley. [Riley] told 

detectives that M.D. had not been feeling well and complained of 

stomach aches for approximately a week. [Riley] said M.D. first 

mentioned this to her on Easter Sunday (April 4th). [Riley] said M.D. 

would not eat food, and would only drink Ensure milk shakes during 

the week before her death. [Riley] also said M.D. defecated in the bed 

several times. [Riley] said she did not seek medical attention for M.D. 

during the week she complained of stomach pain. [Riley] said she 
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was drinking and using cocaine the night before she found M.D. 

unresponsive, and last checked on her around 4:00 a.m.

Romiere Hale was the live-in boyfriend of [Riley]. During his 

interview with detectives, Hale described himself as being the main 

person who disciplined M.D. and her brother K.R. who also lived in 

the home. Hale admitted to detectives that he used a belt, a coat 

hanger, as well as his hands to strike both children as a form of 

punishment. Hale told detectives he would also have the children do 

wallsits when they would not behave.

Hale said M.D. was not listening and was disrespectful on Saturday 

April 3rd so he made M.D. do a wall sit as her punishment. Hale said 

M.D. refused to do the wall sit correctly. Hale said he got up off the 

couch and punched M.D. in the abdomen while she was doing the wall 

sit. Hale also admitted to being addicted to “K2”, or synthetic 

marijuana. 

Hale was charged in a 10 count indictment for his actions against M.D. 

that caused her death, and to K.R. in Allen County Common Pleas 

Court Case No. CR2021 0153. After plea negotiations, Hale plead 

guilty to Murder related to the death of M.D. and Child Endangering 

related to K.R. Hale was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 18 

years to life in prison. * * *

Detectives also interviewed is [sic] the 7 year old brother of M.D., 

K.R. He described being forced to do wall sits and being “whooped” 

by Hale who used a belt on him. Hale would punch K.R. in the chest 

as a form of punishment.

During a second interview with detectives, [Riley] said she was aware 

of Mr. Hale’s behavior towards her children. [Riley] was aware Hale 

used a belt and coat hanger to discipline M.D. and K.R. as well as 

punching them in the chest and making the children do wall-sits. 

[Riley] admitted to having a drinking problem, and drinking large 

amounts of alcohol every day.
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Assignment of Error

The trial court committed error that was prejudicial to the 

Appellant by failing to merge Counts One and Two upon a plea 

of guilty where Count One – Endangering Children is the 

predicate offense of Count Two – Involuntary Manslaughter.

{¶8} In the sole assignment of error, Riley contends that the trial court erred 

by not merging for sentencing the two offenses to which Riley pled guilty. Riley 

argues that the endangering children offense and the involuntary manslaughter 

offense should have merged because the two offenses involved identical conduct 

and therefore were not committed separately. 

{¶9} Pursuant to R.C. 2941.25, Ohio’s multiple-count statute, the imposition 

of multiple punishments for the same criminal conduct is prohibited. Specifically, 

R.C. 2941.25 provides:

(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to 

constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the 

indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, 

but the defendant may be convicted of only one.

(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses 

of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more 

offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a 

separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may contain 

counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of 

all of them.

{¶10} In determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import 

and should be merged for sentencing pursuant to R.C. 2941.25, courts are instructed 

to consider three separate factors – the conduct, the animus, and the import. State v. 
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Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, paragraph one of the syllabus. Offenses 

do not merge and a defendant may be convicted and sentenced for multiple offenses 

if any one of the following is true: “(1) the conduct constitutes offenses of dissimilar 

import, (2) the conduct shows that the offenses were committed separately, or (3) 

the conduct shows that the offenses were committed with separate animus.” Ruff,

paragraph three of the syllabus. Two or more offenses of dissimilar import exist 

“when the defendant’s conduct constitutes offenses involving separate victims or if 

the harm that results from each offense is separate and identifiable.” Ruff, paragraph 

two of the syllabus. 

{¶11} “The defendant bears the burden of establishing his entitlement to the 

protection provided by R.C. 2941.25 against multiple punishments for a single 

criminal act.” State v. Smith, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-23-04, 2024-Ohio-886, ¶ 45, 

citing State v. Washington, 137 Ohio St.3d 427, 2013-Ohio-4982, ¶ 18. The 

determination as to whether a defendant has been found guilty of allied offenses of 

similar import “is dependent upon the facts of a case because R.C. 2941.25 focuses 

on the defendant’s conduct,” Ruff, at ¶ 26, and “an offense may be committed in a 

variety of ways * * *.” Ruff, at ¶ 30. “No bright-line rule can govern every 

situation.” Id.
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{¶12} On appeal, a de novo standard of review is applied when reviewing a 

trial court’s merger determination. State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 482, 2012-

Ohio-5699, ¶ 28.

{¶13} In the instant case, Riley was convicted on Count 1 of Endangering 

Children in violation of R.C. 2919.22(A) and (E)(2)(c). In relevant part, R.C. 

2919.22(A) provides that “[n]o person, who is the parent * * * of a child under 

eighteen years of age * * *, shall create a substantial risk to the health or safety of 

the child, by violating a duty of care, protection, or support.” Pursuant to R.C. 

2919.22(E)(2)(c), Endangering Children in violation of R.C. 2919.22(A) is a felony 

of the third degree if the violation results in serious physical harm to the child 

involved.

{¶14} On Count 2, Riley was convicted of Involuntary Manslaughter in 

violation of R.C. 2903.04(A), which provides in relevant part that “[n]o person shall 

cause the death of another * * * as a proximate result of the offender’s committing 

or attempting to commit a felony.” Count 2 of the indictment alleged that the crime

of Endangering Children was the felony offense upon which the Involuntary 

Manslaughter was predicated.

{¶15} When the issue of merger was argued at sentencing, the prosecution 

noted that the bill of particulars alleged there had been multiple ways in which Riley 

had committed Endangering Children in this case and that it was the State’s position 
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that there had been at least two separate violations of Riley’s duty of care to her 

daughter that resulted in serious physical harm to M.D. The State asserted that the 

initial violation occurred on April 3rd or 4th, which was when Romiere Hale caused 

serious physical harm to M.D. by punching her in the abdomen, after Riley left M.D. 

in Hale’s care, knowing that Hale was abusive toward M.D. The State asserted that 

a second child endangering violation then occurred on subsequent dates, when M.D. 

exhibited symptoms of illness or injury for several days, complained of 

stomachaches, could not eat, and lost control of her bowels, and Riley did not seek 

medical attention for her child who was in clear distress. In support of that assertion, 

the prosecutor noted that Dr. Schlievert, the medical expert who would have assisted 

the State at trial, had opined that if medical attention had been sought for M.D., she 

may have survived. Accordingly, the prosecution asserted that those facts, along 

with the time frame between the separate violations, supported the position that the 

predicate offense for the involuntary manslaughter charge in Count 2 was a separate 

violation from the endangering children offense charged in the first count of the 

indictment.

{¶16} In response to that, Riley argued that the two offenses charged in the 

indictment, and to which she pled guilty, must be merged for sentencing on the basis 

of the bill of particulars filed by the State. Riley asserted that the language of the 

bill of particulars served to allege that the same conduct constituted the offense 
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charged in Count 1 and the offense charged in Count 2, and that the prosecution was 

bound by that allegation for purposes of the merger determination. Riley now 

makes the same argument on appeal.

{¶17} The bill of particulars filed by the State of Ohio on June 17, 2021, 

when this case was pending in the trial court, reads as follows:

To the extent not already contained in the Indictment, the State of 

Ohio hereby furnishes the defendant with the following Bill of 

Particulars setting up specifically the nature of offense charged and 

the conduct of the defendant alleged to constitute the offense pursuant 

to Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 7(E).

COUNT ONE OF THE ORIGINAL INDICTMENT

On or about April 3, 2021 through April 12, 2021, the defendant who 

is the mother of a child, to wit: M.D., who was four years old at that 

time, did create a substantial risk to the health and safety of M.D. by 

violating her duty of care, protection and support of M.D. in many 

ways which resulted in serious physical harm to M.D. These incidents 

occurred at 535 North Elizabeth Street in Lima, Allen County, Ohio.

COUNT TWO OF THE ORIGINAL INDICTMENT

On or about April 3, 2021 through April 12, 2021, the defendant did 

cause the death of Defendant’s four year old daughter, to wit: M.D. 

as M.D.’s death was the proximate result of Defendant creating a 

substantial risk to the health and safety of M.D. by violating 

Defendant’s duty of care, protection and support of M.D. in many 

ways which resulted in serious physical harm to M.D. Defendant’s 

actions constitute a felony offense of Child Endangering as set forth 

in Ohio Revised Code Sections 2919.22(A) and 2919.22(E)(2)(c). 

These incidents occurred at 535 North Elizabeth Street in Lima, Allen 

County, Ohio.
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(Plaintiff State of Ohio’s Response to Defendant’s Request for Bill of Particulars, 

Docket No. 35).

{¶18} Riley argues that the bill of particulars establishes that the two offenses 

in this case were not committed separately, as the same date range was alleged as to 

when the offenses occurred and because, Riley claims, the bill of particulars 

combines all acts or omissions on Riley’s part into a single allegation that resulted 

in harm and death to M.D. Upon review, we find Riley’s argument to lack merit.

{¶19} As an initial matter, we note that Riley does not argue that multiple 

acts of Endangering Children did not occur in this case between approximately April 

3, 2021 and April 12, 2021. Rather, Riley argues that based on the language of the 

bill of particulars, the State was precluded from arguing separate acts and offenses 

at sentencing. 

{¶20} Following our own review of the bill of particulars, this Court does

not agree with Riley’s contention that the language contained in the bill of 

particulars served to somehow aggregate multiple acts or omissions on Riley’s part 

into the allegation of a single act in support of the offenses charged in both counts 

of the indictment. 

{¶21} Contrary to Riley’s argument, the bill of particulars specifically 

alleges as to Count Two that Riley’s daughter’s death was the proximate result of 

Riley creating a substantial risk to the health and safety of M.D. through violating 
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Riley’s duty of care, protection and support (i.e. committing the offense of 

Endangering Children) in many ways. The bill of particulars also alleged that those 

“incidents”, in the plural, occurred at the address stated.

{¶22} More importantly, Riley has failed to present this Court with any 

citations to legal authority supporting her claim that the prosecution is strictly bound 

by the allegations set forth in a bill of particulars when arguing the issue of merger 

at sentencing, or that a trial court cannot rely upon supplemental information 

presented by the parties at sentencing when making a merger determination. On the 

contrary, in State v. Washington, 137 Ohio St.3d 427, 2013-Ohio-4982, the Supreme 

Court of Ohio found that the court of appeals had erred in concluding that a trial 

court is limited to considering only the State’s theory of the case asserted at trial 

when assessing a defendant’s conduct for merger purposes at the time of sentencing. 

The Ohio Supreme Court held that “[w]hen deciding whether to merge multiple 

offenses at sentencing pursuant to R.C. 2941.25, a court must review the entire 

record, including arguments and information presented at the sentencing hearing, to 

determine whether the offenses were committed separately or with a separate 

animus. Id., at syllabus. 

{¶23} In this case, we conclude that the State’s recitation of the facts at 

sentencing supports the imposition of separate sentences based on separate conduct, 

if not also separate and identifiable harm, in light of the full week that M.D. clearly 
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suffered greatly and with no medical care, after having been initially injured by what 

had to have been a painful punch to her abdomen by her abuser. Beyond the 

language of the bill of particulars, Riley has not pointed to anything in the record 

overcoming the State’s recitation of the facts at the time of sentencing and the 

State’s assertion that the offenses at issue were committed separately. We therefore 

find no error in the trial court’s decision not to merge the convictions for sentencing 

purposes.

{¶24} The assignment of error is overruled.

Conclusion

{¶25} Having found no error prejudicial to the defendant-appellant, Stayce 

Riley, in the particulars assigned and argued, the judgment of the Allen County 

Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed

ZIMMERMAN and MILLER, J.J., concur.

**Judge Craig R. Baldwin of the Fifth District Court of Appeals, sitting by 

Assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.