COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Haley, Millette and Senior Judge Coleman 

DAWN BRANCH 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 2120-07-2 PER CURIAM 

FEBRUARY 12, 2008 

PETERSBURG DEPARTMENT 

 OF SOCIAL SERVICES 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PETERSBURG 

Pamela S. Baskervill, Judge 

 (John G. LaFratta, on brief), for appellant. 

 (Joan M. O’Donnell; J. Wicker Traylor, Guardian ad litem for the 

infant child, on brief), for appellee. 

 Dawn Branch (hereinafter “mother”) contends the trial court erred in terminating her 

parental rights to her minor child, K.L. Mother argues the trial court erred by finding the 

evidence sufficient to terminate her parental rights and to approve the goal of adoption. For the 

reasons stated herein, we summarily affirm the trial court’s decision. Rule 5A:27. 

Background

We view the evidence1

 in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and grant 

to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of 

Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991). 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.

1

 The facts are drawn from the Statement of Facts filed with the trial court in lieu of a 

transcript pursuant to Rule 5A:8. The parties stipulated to the evidence offered by the Petersburg 

Department of Social Services (“PDSS”) in its case-in-chief, and mother conceded the evidence 

was sufficient to make out a prima facie case warranting termination of her parental rights. 
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K.L. was born on October 25, 2006. Because she was born prematurely, she weighed 

only one pound and required intensive medical support, including frequent feedings and an apnea 

monitor. K.L. remained in the hospital until February 20, 2007. She continued to require an 

apnea monitor upon her discharge and remained on the monitor at the time of the termination 

hearing on August 6, 2007. 

Shortly before K.L.’s release from the hospital, PDSS received a report that mother was 

unable to administer the child’s medication properly even though it had been “color-coded.” 

Mother could not operate the apnea monitor and, on one occasion, had failed to recognize K.L. 

was in respiratory distress. 

K.L. was placed in foster care pursuant to an emergency removal order on February 20, 

2007. A few weeks later, the juvenile and domestic relations district court ruled that K.L. was an 

abused child and approved the goal of adoption. Mother appealed to the circuit court. 

Much of the evidence presented by PDSS at the termination hearing related to mother’s 

parenting history with K.L.’s older sibling, D.L. Mother’s parental rights to D.L. were 

terminated in 2006. Like K.L., the older child was born prematurely and required support such 

as frequent feedings and use of an apnea monitor. D.L. remained in the hospital nearly three 

months after her birth. Prior to her discharge, hospital staff provided mother with intensive 

training to care for the older child, including proper use of the apnea monitor. 

While D.L. was in the hospital, mother failed to respond to the alarm of the apnea 

monitor on at least two occasions and appeared incapable of caring for the older child on a daily 

basis. PDSS met with mother to determine her ability to care for the older child and requested a 

psychological evaluation to determine what services, if any, were available to assist or enhance 

mother’s ability to care for D.L. 
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The psychological evaluation was completed on July 20, 2005 by Dr. Greg Wolber. 

Mother’s overall scores on intelligence tests administered by Dr. Wolber bordered on mental 

retardation and revealed her incapable of performing simple multiplication and division 

computations. Dr. Wolber concluded mother would “likely have difficulty with more complex 

aspects of daily living, i.e., handling a budget, planning meals and shopping for groceries, 

providing the correct medication, mixing formula, etc.” Dr. Wolber acknowledged she would 

likely be able to perform “some of these tasks” with supervision. If mother were to retain 

custody of her child, Dr. Wolber recommended an “intense level of supervision not only to train 

her in appropriate childcare but also to continue to monitor and assess her ability to parent.” 

In addition to training at the hospital and parenting classes, PDSS employee Gail 

Davis-Lee provided in-home supervised visitation and individual parenting instruction upon 

D.L.’s release from the hospital in August 2005. Davis-Lee provided this instruction to mother 

twice a week for fourteen months, but observed little improvement in mother’s parenting skills. 

Based upon her observations, Davis-Lee did not believe the older child could be left safely in 

mother’s sole care. 

On or about October 4, 2006, mother’s parental rights to the older child were terminated 

pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). The juvenile court found that mother suffered from a 

“combination of intellectual, cognitive, and psychiatric difficulties” which required the older 

child’s continued placement in foster care and which available rehabilitative services could not 

eliminate. 

Mother countered the evidence regarding her capacity to parent K.L. with expert 

testimony from Dr. Penny L. Sprecher. Dr. Sprecher testified that mother was not mentally 

retarded and was able to function at the level of an eighteen year old. However, Dr. Sprecher’s 

report indicates that mother’s scores on the intelligence tests administered to her “resulted in 
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Verbal, Performance and Full Scale scores within the [m]ild range of Mental Retardation.” 

Dr. Sprecher, whose report attributes mother’s poor test scores to anxiety, concludes that mother 

“is probably functioning in the [b]orderline range of intelligence.” 

 While Dr. Sprecher’s report concluded that mother was “capable of caring for her self 

[sic] and . . . her young children,” she admitted at the termination hearing her conclusions were 

based upon information provided by mother and her friend, Vicki Parham. Dr. Sprecher also 

acknowledged she had no information about the medical needs of mother’s child and that she 

had not visited mother’s home or observed mother caring for any children. 

 Vicki Parham testified that she visited mother four or five days each week and assisted 

her with her finances. Parham was the payee on the mother’s disability checks and paid 

mother’s rent and utilities bills with those funds. She stated that she transported mother to visit 

K.L. in the hospital several times and was willing to assist mother in caring for K.L. Parham 

admitted, however, she had applied for financial aid for K.L. after the child was placed in foster 

care, and produced three checks which were confiscated by the trial court. 

 Mother testified she was capable of caring for K.L. and knew how to use the apnea 

monitor from instruction she had received at the hospital. She indicated she had been employed 

at a fast-food restaurant, but had left that job to care for her children. 

 In addition to the evidence stipulated in its case-in-chief, PDSS proffered testimony from 

Davis-Lee that K.L. had been placed in the same foster home where her sister resided, and PDSS 

had no plans to move her. PDSS proffered through Davis-Lee that K.L. was happy and 

well-adjusted, but had medical needs which were more serious and required more intensive care 

than those of her older sister. 

 The trial court concluded that “[b]oth children were placed in foster care due to the 

mother’s inability to comprehend their needs and to follow instructions for their care.” This 
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instruction included “training at MCV Hospital and Chippenham Hospital, parenting classes, 

individual parenting instruction and a psychological evaluation to determine her level of 

functioning.” The trial court noted that “mother d[id] not maintain employment or independent 

housing,” and relied on social security income for disability. Finally, the trial court found that 

“mother ha[d] a combination of intellectual, cognitive and psychiatric difficulties which 

require[d] the child’s continued placement in foster care and which available rehabilitative 

services [could] not eliminate.” 

 The trial court’s order found that termination was warranted under subsections (B)(2)(a), 

(C)(2), and (E) of Code § 16.1-283. This appeal followed. 

Analysis

“Code § 16.1-283 embodies ‘the statutory scheme for the . . . termination of residual 

parental rights in this Commonwealth’ [which] . . . ‘provides detailed procedures designed to 

protect the rights of the parents and their child,’ balancing their interests while seeking to 

preserve the family.” Lecky v. Reed, 20 Va. App. 306, 311, 456 S.E.2d 538, 540 (1995) 

(citations omitted). The trial judge’s findings, “‘when based on evidence heard ore tenus, will 

not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Logan, 13 

Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463 (quoting Peple v. Peple, 5 Va. App. 414, 422, 364 S.E.2d 

232, 237 (1988)). 

When considering termination of a parent’s residual rights to a child, “the paramount 

consideration of a trial court is the child’s best interests.” Id. “‘[T]ermination of [residual] 

parental rights is a grave, drastic, and irreversible action.’” Helen W. v. Fairfax County Dep’t of 

Human Dev., 12 Va. App. 877, 883, 407 S.E.2d 25, 28-29 (1991) (quoting Lowe v. Dep’t of Pub. 

Welfare of the City of Richmond, 231 Va. 272, 280, 343 S.E.2d 70, 72 (1986)). On review, “[a] 

trial court is presumed to have thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory 
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requirements, and made its determination based on the child’s best interests.” Farley v. Farley, 9 

Va. App. 326, 329, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990). 

Code § 16.1-283 provides for the termination of residual parental rights under carefully 

defined circumstances. Here, the trial court concluded that the evidence warranted termination 

of mother’s residual parental rights to K.L. on three alternative grounds. Without specifically 

referring to any of these sections, mother argues the trial court erred in terminating her parental 

rights because the evidence did not support its finding that she had mental limitations which 

could not be overcome. Specifically, mother contends the trial court erred by rejecting her 

expert’s testimony that she was capable of parenting K.L. 

We need not address whether the trial court erred in deciding termination was warranted 

under subsection (B)(2)(a), i.e., that mother’s mental condition rendered her incapable of 

providing the necessary care to K.L, because the record supports the trial court’s decision on 

subsection (E) grounds. Where a trial court’s judgment is made on alternative grounds, we need 

only consider whether any one of the alternatives is sufficient to sustain the judgment of the trial 

court and, if we so find, need not address the other grounds. See Boone v. C. Arthur Weaver 

Co., 235 Va. 157, 161, 365 S.E.2d 764, 766 (1988). 

Subsection (E) of Code § 16.1-283 provides as follows: 

The residual parental rights of a parent or parents of a child who is 

in the custody of a local board or licensed child-placing agency 

may be terminated by the court if the court finds, based upon clear 

and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interests of the child 

and that (i) the residual parental rights of the parent regarding a 

sibling of the child have previously been involuntarily 

terminated . . . . 

 The evidence is undisputed that mother’s parental rights to her older child were 

terminated in October 2006. However, mother maintains the evidence did not support the trial 

court’s finding that termination was in K.L.’s best interests. We disagree. 
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 Despite extensive training and prior experience with her first child, mother demonstrated 

an inability to operate K.L.’s apnea monitor and administer her medications properly. Through 

Davis-Lee, PDSS established that fourteen months of individual training had little effect on 

mother’s ability to address her first child’s needs. Davis-Lee’s observations were corroborated 

by mother’s subsequent failure to recognize that K.L. was in respiratory distress and by her 

inability to administer her child’s medications properly. K.L., who has more demanding medical 

needs than those of the sister with whom she is placed, is “happy and well-adjusted in her 

placement.” 

The record contains credible evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination 

is in the best interests of K.L. and that the requirements of Code § 16.1-283(E)2

 have been 

proven. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. 

 Affirmed.

 2

 As subsection (E) does not impose an obligation on PDSS to provide services, we also 

reject mother’s argument that PDSS failed to fulfill its obligation to provide all reasonable, 

appropriate, and available services to perpetuate the parent-child relationship.