Filed 8/26/22 Marriage of Moss and Carroll CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re the Marriage of JACQUELINE MOSS and WALTER CAR R OLL

. B 312983

Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. YD065980 JACQUELINE MOSS

,
Respondent

,

v.

WALTER CARROLL

,
Appellant ;

LOS ANGELES COUNTY CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES DEPARTMENT,

Respondent.

APPEAL from a post

- judgment order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Frank W. Chen

, Commissioner

. Affirmed

.2 Walter Carroll , in pro. per., for Appellant

. No appearance s for Respondent s

.

_________________________ Walter Carroll (appellant) , a self

- represented litigant

on appeal and in the trial court

, challenges the trial court’s
order denying his request to modify a prior child support order

to recalculate his support payments based on his actual income

. Finding appellant has not demonstrated affirmative error,

we affirm. BACKGROUND
In accordance with our standard of review, we state the facts

— from what we can discern from the appellate record

— in the light most favorable to the court’s order and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of it

. ( In re Marriage of Calcaterra & Badakhsh (2005) 132 Cal.App. 4th 28, 34.)
1. Original child support order Appellant and Jacqueline Moss were married and have

a minor child. Moss petitioned for divorce in December 2014
and filed a request for child support in September 2018.
F ollowing a hearing on Februa r y 6, 2019, the court (Judge Bosley
in Torrance ) ordered a ppellant to pay $1

, 100 in month ly child support , plus $275 per month in arrears, based on a ppellant ’s capacity to earn $9,803 per month. The court ’s written
order filed March 13, 2019, includes the DissoMaste r report
, calculating a monthly guideline payment at $1,102 based on

a ppellant ’s imputed income of $9,803 per month, Moss’s income of $6,375 per month, and their child spending 29% of the time
with a ppellant

. The court simultaneously issued an income
with holding order direct ed to a ppellant ’s then

- employer,3

the In t ernational Association of Machinist and Aerospace
Workers (IAMAW)

. Appellant apparently had work ed for IAM AW since 2015 and earned $9

, 8 03 per month as a business representative/ organizer. He dec lared he had a mental and emotional breakdown in August 2018 due to job

- related stress, went on medical leave, and filed a w orker’s c ompensation claim alleging psychological disability. The Worker’s Compensation Appeals
Board (WCAB) denied his claim. In response to Moss’s September 2018 request for child support, appellant apparently
contended this stress disorder /psychological disability prevented him from working. According to Moss’s counsel, a p p ellant presented
document ation a t the February 2019 hearin g stat ing he had been placed off work, but the Torrance court found the evidence lacking as to the specific nature of appellant’s stress disorder
and how it affected his ability to work

. 1 A ppellant also apparently had declined his employer’s offer of a re asonable accommodation. T he Torrance court thus apparently determined

a ppellant’s allegation s about his disability and inability to work

w ere unfounded. Accordingly, when calculating the guideline support payment, the court imputed earning capacity incom e
to appellant based on what he had been making at IAMAW. Appellant immediately filed a motion for reconsideration that
the court rejected

.

1 The court apparently wanted detailed information such as how long appellant could sit or lift his hand.4

2. Requests to modify child support A few months later, o n June 3, 2019, a ppellant filed

a request for order (RFO)

— in the Torrance court

— asking the

court to change the ordered monthly child support and arrears payment and associated income withholding order. Appellant
asserted his employment ended in May 2019

, and his application for unemployment was pending

. In his attached declaration

,
a ppellant attested he had returned to work around Februa ry 1, 2019, but was laid off on May 9, 2019

, and thus no longer could afford the $1

, 375 combined monthly child support and arrears payment. Appellant averred his current income was zero pending a determination of his unemployment application

. He asked the court to modify the child support based on w hatever
his income was at the hearing date. On September 11, 2019, a ppellant filed a reply declaration in support of his RFO. This time a ppellant re

- asserted that
his stress disorder / disability forced him to take medical leave

. He declared he “tried an unsuccessful return to work ” from February 1, 2019 through the end of April 2019 when he “went out aga i n on worker’s compensation, as a result of [ the ] continuing stress

- related disorder.” Appellant asserted the WCAB reevaluated his stress disorder claim around April 30,
2019 , “with a determination pending

. ” Appellant declared his “company demoted” him , and
he earned $ 5,300 per month d uring the three

- month period. 2 Appellant again stated I A MAW laid him off on May 9, 2019

2 An exhibit to appellant’s June 2019 declaration includes his weekly earnings statements for th at period. They show his hourly rate was decreased from $55.05 to $33.23 when he5

— apparently after he ha d taken leave. He asserted he “immediately became eligible for S tate D isability B enefits ”
and began receiving $5

, 300 per month. Appellant aver red he received doctors’ notes stating he was disabled from April 30 through July 25, 2019; July 26 through July 31, 2019; and August 1 through September 15, 2019. He also declared he “subsequently received a determination that [he] was temporarily
totall y disabled due to a continuing psychological/psychiatric
stress disorder and

. . . would begin receiving these workers compensation

- related benefits on or about May 2019. ” The only exhibit appellant attached to his September 2019
declaration is a form “ Cer tificate of Disability a nd/ o r Return

to Work” dated August 1, 2019, and signed by a qualified
medical e valuator (certifi cate of disability)

. The form includes

a date range from August 1, 2019 to September 15, 2019 , and
under remarks states “Mr. Carroll is temp. total ly disabled”
in handwriting . The space next to “[d]iagnosis” is blank. On May 7, 2020 , the Los Angeles County Child Support Services Department ( CSSD ) file d a motion to modify child support (at appellant’s request)

. That motion apparently was
scheduled to be hear d on November 12, 20 20 in the Central Civil
West C ourthouse. On August 27, 2020, at respondent’s request,
the Torrance court transfer red and continued the hearing on

returned to work in February 2019 , which translates to $1,329.60 for a 40

- hour work week or a little over $5,300 per month

.6

appellant’s June 2019 RFO to the same date in Central Civil
West

. 3
3

. Hearings on request to modify child support The court convened hearings on the modification request

o n November 12, 2020 and February 25, 2021. Appellant represented himself at both and was sworn in to testify at
the second hearing. At the initial hear ing, c ounsel for CSSD explained it had filed its May 2020 modification motion at appellant’s request after he informed CSSD he had “had a change of income and he was on disability and when it ran out, he went on unemployment.”
Counsel for Moss described th e history of appellant’s claimed inability to work leading the Torrance court to impute
income to appellant based on his pr ior job. She asserted appellant had submitted documentation again stating he

was “unable to work because of

. . . stress

- related inj ury.” S pecifically, Moss’s counsel just had received documents from appellant’s doctors stating he was placed on disability from May through October 2 1 (presumably 2020) based on “ emotional and anxiety issues ”

— “ similar to ” those he originally had claimed in February 2019

— and he had suffered a shoulder injury on October 21.
Counsel asked for a continuance to obtain medical records
and records from appellant’s employer as to whether appellant had a disability, appellant’s specific limitations

, and whether

3 The May 2020 motion is not part of the appellate record. The August 27, 2020 minute order is an exhibit to appellant’s opening brief but is not part of the C lerk’s Transcript

. On our own motion, we augment the record to include it.7

an y reasonable accommodations existed or had been offered to appellant

. Appellant told the court he had tried but was unable to go back to work and was on disability. He then injured his
shoulder and could not return to work

. 4 He would be starting physica l therapy in two weeks. The court continued the hearing date to February 25, 2021, to allow Moss to conduct discovery and to give a ppellant time

to complete some physical therapy and see if he could return

to work. The court asked counsel if there w as any thing the orde r should include “ w ith respect to evidence regarding medical condition

. ” CSSD’s counsel asked that appellant provide evidence concerning his prognosis, diagnosis, ability to work,
and reasonable accommodations. 5 The court ordered a ppellant

— if he claimed disability at the next hearing

— to bring evidence of his inability to work due to his medical condition, such as

a letter from his doctor. Another judicial officer (Commissioner Chen) presided

over the continued hearing on February 25, 2021. The court noted appellant also had filed his own RFO that had been continued and then transferred to be heard with CSSD’s motion.
CSSD’s counsel was unaware the RFO had been filed. Because

4 Appellant said he was an airplane mechanic . His injury consisted of a “torn rotator cuff and a lacerated bicep tendon.”

5 T he November 12, 2020 minute order does not include t hat level of detail

. The court directed CSSD to prepare an order after hearing, however, which it did. W e p res ume that formal, written order included those details ; it is not part of the appellate record.8

the June 3, 2019 RFO had no proof of service, the court stated
i t would be hearing only the motion filed May 7, 2020.
Counsel for CSSD again summarized the basis for the request for modification

, specifying appellant had stopped working and gone on disability in March 2020 . Counsel added that, following his October 20 20 should er injury , appellant
had shoulder surgery and expected to be off work until April
2021. Moss ’s counsel asked the court to deny modification

on the ground appellant had failed to provide sufficient medical
documentation , as the court had order e d, and had asked for modification based on previously rejected medical claims. Appellant had filed, o n February 18, 2021, a declaration with four attached exhibits

. 6 Appellant confirmed he filed those exhibits in response to the court’s order to provide docu mentation from a p hysician regarding his ability or inability to work.
The court , who had examined the exhibits, asked a ppellant

,

“ I s that all you have?” A ppellant responded he also had “this return to work, ability to work. This was given to my employe r before.” 7 The court explained , “I looke d through all the four exhibits attached to your declaration, and there’s really nothing that specifically concludes that you’re not able to work. ” The court
described the exhibits as “a little bit conflicting ” bec ause some

6 They are not part of the appellate record.

7 We presume appellant was referring to the August 1, 2019 certificate of disability that he filed with his September 2019 declaration.9

of the documentation refe r r ed to appellant’s “ mental impairment ” and others to his physical impairment.
The court also noted one exhibit conclusorily stated

a ppellant should be placed off work from February 7, 2021 through April 7, 2021, but no b asis was stated for “why that would be so.” A second document from a different physician, dated January 29, 2021, stated appellant was “ able to work
but may experience some functional limitations. ” Appellant
clarified the first letter was from his surgeo n and was based

on his professional opinion after repairing a ppellant’s shoulder. Appellant said the second document w as from his “ treating
doctor

, ” rather than his surgeon

. He explained

, “[T]hat goes
into when I filed

— and the retroactivity was from June of 2019

. This is my treating doctor that is discussing th at piece of it.” Appellant also explained he had new evidence and facts that had not been available when he appeared before the
Torrance court

— and therefore the court could not consider them

— when it imputed his earning capacity to calculate the $1,100

- per

- month guideline child support payment. He said he now had “this report right her e” 8 from his docto r

— dated before the February 2019 hearing but not provided to appellant

— showing “over 51 percent o f what’s going on with me was related [to]

my job.” “From there on,” appellant said the stat e had awarded
him disability benefits from February 2019 through April 2019

, and he had another worker’s compensation claim “because of it.” Moss’s counsel argued “nothing ha [ d ] changed.” She repeated the details of appellant’s pr e vious cla im that the

8 The report presumably was one of appellant’s exhibits.10

same stress disorder/disabili ty prevented him from working

, and his failure to pr esent sufficient supporting evidence of that
claim at the February 2019 hearing , lead ing the court to impute his earning capacity of $9,800 to calculate child support

. Counsel
asserted that, as in 2019, appellant still had not provided the requested documents

— “ [ n ] o prognosis, no diagnosis, no ability

to work, no reasonable accommodation.” Counsel also directed the court’s attention to another one of appellant’s documents, “the ‘final post

- operative

, ’ ” that described steps appellant could tak e three, four, and six weeks after his
shoulder sur ger y, which appears to have been on November 3,
2020

. 9 Based on that report, appellant currently was “about 60 days” from the time he could discontinue using a night brace at six weeks post

- surgery after having discontinued his sling and started “active assist range of motion” at four weeks post

- surger y, and begun “range of motion ” at three weeks post

- surgery. The court received into evidence appellant’s February 18,
2021 declaration and the four attached exhibits. The court confirmed CSSD had brought its motion for modification on appellant’s behalf a nd at his request

. The court then rule d

as follows, “The court does not find that the burden has

been met to demonstrate a material change
in circumstances to warrant a modification of

9 The document s tate d appellant had a should er injury on Novemb er 3, 2020, but documents counsel received earlier stated appellant ’s injury occurred October 21, 2020

. As the document is a post

- operative report, we can infer the November 3 date is the date of surgery.11 child support. The declaration with exhibits
attache d, the court has reviewed extensively but [it] does not satisfy the court’s order from the last hearing

. . . to provide sufficient evidence from a physician showing the ability or inability to work. Most of the information provided is inconclusive and certainly does not conclude a complete inability to work

. [¶] So
the burden has not been met to demonstrate

a material change in circumstances to warrant a modification of child support at this time. ” The court denied the motion, but “ welcome [ d ]” any party to file an RFO o r motion to seek modification of child support “if and when there is evidence to support it.”
Fi nally, the court stated a ppellant’s June 2019 RFO was

“ considered consolidated” with CSSD’s May 7, 2020 motion based on the Torrance court’s August 27, 2020 min ute order. The court directed CSSD to prepare the Order after Hearing. The Order after Hearing, filed March 2, 2021, states, “R espondent’s request for modification is denied. All existing orders remain in full force
and effect.” Appellant filed a notice of appeal on April 22, 2021, purporting to appeal from the order entered February 25, 20 21. The minute order entered on that date is not appe a lable 

### . ( Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(c)(2) [“The entry date of an appealable
order that is entered in the mi nutes is the date it is entered
in the permanent minutes. But if the minute order directs
that a written order be prepared, the entry date is the date the signed order is filed

. ” ].) Seeing no prejudice to Moss, we liberally

construe a ppellant’s notice of appeal to include the March 2, 202112

Order after Hearing denying the request for modification

. 10 (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2) [notice of appeal to
be liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency ]; In re Marriage of Macfarlane & Lang (1992) 8 Cal.App. 4th 247, 252 [ broadly construing notice of appeal to include order of dismissal where appellant clearly was seeking review of the dismissal, the
notice of appeal was timely, and the opposing party was not prejudiced ].)
DISCUSSION
1. A pplicable law and standard of review “California has a strong public policy in favor of adequate child support.” ( In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App. 4th 269, 283.) California thus has established a mandatory, statewide uniform guideline to determine cou rt

- ordered child

suppor t . (See Fam. Code, §§ 4050

– 4076.) 11 In determining
child support under the guideline , courts must adhere to certain principles, including that “[a] parent ’ s first and principal obligation is to support the parent ’ s minor children ac cording

to the parent ’ s circumstances and station in life ” (§ 4 0 53, subd. (a) ), and “[e]ach parent should pay for the support of
the children according to his or her ability ” (§ 4053, subd. (d))

. (See also In re Marriage of Cheriton , at p. 283.) Californ ia’s guideline support thus places the interests of the child ren

as “ the state’s top priority.” ( § 4053, subd. (e). )

10 Appellant attached that order to his Civil Case Information Statement filed in this court, but it is not part of the Clerk’s Transcript. We augment the record to include it on our own motion.

11 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family C ode.13 S ection 4055 sets out a complicated mathematical formula

to determine child support . (§ 4055

. ) “Although this formula
is referred to as the statewide uniform ‘guideline’ (§ 4055)

, ‘guideline’ is a misleading term” as the “formula support amount
is ‘ presumptively correct ’ in all cases

. ” ( In re Marriage of Cryer (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1039, 10 47

– 10 48 ; § 4057 , subd. (a)

. ) 12 Under the guideli ne, child support is calculated based on

“ each parent’s actual income and level of responsibility for
the children. ” ( § 4053, subd. (c); § 4055 , subd. (b)(1). ) S ection 4058, subdivision (b), however, grants trial courts discretion

to set child support ba sed on a parent ’ s earning capacity
rather than actual income if doing so is consistent with the
best interests of the child. “ So long as a parent has an earning capacity, that is, the ability and the opportunity to earn income, the trial court may attribu te income .” ( In re Marriage of Destein (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1392 ; see also In re Marriage of McHugh (2014) 231 Cal.App. 4th 1238, 1246 [earning capacity
is comprise d of “ ‘ “ the ability to work, including such factors

as age, occupation, skills, edu cation, health, background, work experience and qualifications . . . and . . . an opportunity to
work ” ’ ” ( italics omitted ) ]. ) Thus, a court is limited in imputing income to a parent only to the extent the parent has no earning capacity or relying on ear ning capacity would be contrary to the child’s best interests . ( In re Marriage of McHugh , at p. 1246.)

12 Because section 4055 “involves, literally, an algebraic formula,” trial courts may use a computer program called DissoMaster to make the guideline child support calculation. ( In re Marriage of Schulze (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 519, 523

– 524, fn. 2.)14 “ A child support order may be modified when there
has been a material change of circumstances. [Citation.]
The party seeking the modification bears t he burden of showing that circumstances have changed such that modification is
warranted. [Citation.] ” ( In re Marriage of Cryer, supra , 198 Cal.App. 4th at p. 1054 ; see also § 3651, subd. (a) .) Thus, where the payor parent “ ‘seeks a reduction in court

- o rdered support based on the changed circumstances of lack of income, it will
be the payor parent, as moving party, who bears the burden of showing a lack of ability and opportunity to earn income.’ ” ( In re Marriage of McHugh , supra , 231 Cal.App.4 th at pp. 1246

– 1247 .) “ ‘The ultimate determination of whether the individual facts of the case warrant modification of support is within the
discretion of the trial court. [Citation .] The reviewing court will resolve any conflicts in the evidence in favor of the trial

court ’ s determination.’ ” ( In re Marriage of Cryer , at p. 1054.) Thus, we will affi r m the trial court’ s order regarding

a request to modify child support unless the c ourt abused its discretion, and will reverse the order “ ‘ only if prejudicial error
is found from examining the record below.’ ” ( In re Marriage of Williams (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1233

– 1234 .) In our review for abuse of discretion, “ w e do not substi tute our judgm ent for that of the trial court, and we will disturb the trial court’s decision only if no judge could have reasonably made the challenged decision. ” ( In re Marriage of Cryer, supra , 198 Cal.App.4th at p p. 1046

– 1047.) Nevertheless, “ ‘the t rial court’s discretion is not so broad that it “may ignore or contravene the purposes of the law regarding . . . child support.” ’ ” ( In re Marriage of Bodo (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 373, 384.)15 “ ‘ To the extent [the appellant] challenges the trial court’s
f actual findings, our review follows established principles concerning the existence of substantial evidence in support of
the findings. On review for substantial evidence, we examine
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and giv e that party the benefit of every reasonable inference. [Citation.] We accept all evidence favorable to the prevailing party as true and discard contrary evidence. ’ [Citation.] ‘We do not reweigh the evidence or reconsider credibility determinations. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ” ( In re Marriage of Calcaterra &
Badakhsh , supra , 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 34.) And, i n a case where the trial court concluded the party bearing the burden of proof did not meet that burde n

— as is the situation here

— the question is not so much whether substantial evidence supports the court’s findings , but “ ‘ whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. ’ ” ( Juen v. Alain Pinel Realtors, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 972,
978

– 979 [ specifically , wh ether appellant’s evidence was uncontradicted, unimpeached, and “ ‘ “of such a character
and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination
that it was insufficient to support a finding ” ’ ” ].)
2. Appellant has failed to show the trial court abuse d
its discretion Appellant asks us to reverse the court’s order denying his request for modification 13 and to enter a new order calculating

13 Although CSSD technically filed the May 2020 motion

, in effect it was appellant’s request for modification . The trial court treated it as such, as do we.16

guideline child support based on his actual income (or lack thereof) received from June 3, 201 9 through July 23, 202 1

. A ppellant initially contends the trial court

— in entering
the March 2019 child support order

— used “an erroneous
dissomaster with [his] income based on $9,803.00 monthly, instead of $5,300. 00 monthly from EDD State Disability, EDD Unemployment, and Unemp loyment which caused Child Support, Arrears, and Interest to be calculated erroneously in the amount of approximately $27,000.” However, a ppellant ’s appeal is not from the March 2019 child support order

, but from the order denying his request to modify th at order

. As appellant never appealed from the March 2019 child support order, it cannot be challenged now

, and the issue s determined by it are res judicata. ( In re Marriage of Gruen (2011) 191 Cal.App. 4th 627, 637

– 638 ; § 3554 [appeal may be taken from a n order under the statutory division governing child support] .)
When the court made the March 2019 orde r, it imputed income to appellant based on his earning capacity of $9,803

per month

— appellant’s income at IAMAW before he took
medical leave in 2018 fo r a claimed stress disorder and filed

an unsuccessful worker’s compensation claim. As discussed,
in doing so

, the Torrance court apparently rejected as insufficient the evidence appellant submitted to show he was unable to
work due to that stress disorder /di s ability. As appellant never challenged the March 2019 order, w e must presume that , in calculating guideline child support based on appellant’s earning capacity

, rather than his actual income, the court found

— based on substantial evidence

— appellant had the ability
and opportunity to work and earn that level of income

, despite
his asserted stress disorder/ disability. (See In re Marriage17

of McHugh, supra , 231 Cal.App. 4th at p. 1246

– 1247 [ calculation of child support based on earning capacity is appropria te unless parent has no earning capacity, meaning no ability

or opportunity to work , or not in the child’s best interests ].) In seeking modification of that order, therefore, a ppellant had the burden to present evidence showing his circumstances
had chan ged since then

— namely, that he no longer had the ability and opportunity to earn $9,803 per month. 14 Essentially

, appellant asserted his inability to work due to his ongoing stress disorder/disability and his October 2020 shoulder injury and subsequent sur ger y demonstrated changed circumstances requiring the court to modify his child support obligation
based on his actual income rather than his earning capacity. In an apparent response to the court’s order at the
November 2020 hearing to produce evidence f rom his healthcare provider showing his ability or inability to work , appellant filed

,
on February 18, 2021 , a declaration and four exhibits. The

court “extensively” reviewed the declaration and exhibits, and
received them into evidence

. In response to t he court’s query

as to whether appellant had any other evidence that complied

14 Appellant appears to have argued below that he did not have the ability to work, rather than no opportunity to work

. He does not address that issue on appeal ; w e thus do not consider it. (See Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784

– 785 [“When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point a s [ forfeited ].”] ; Munro v. Regents of University of California (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 977 , 988 [party “may not raise on appeal issues not raised in trial court ” ] .)18

with its order, appellant referred the court to “ this return to work, ability to work. This was given to my employer before.” We presume appellant was referring to the August 1 , 2019 certificate of disability attached to his September 2019
declaration.
The court found appellant’s February 2021 declaration
and exhibits did not satisfy the court’s earlier order “to provide sufficient evidence from a physician showing the ability or inability to work.” We can infer the court similarly rejected the August 2019 certificate of disability

— that we infer appellant presented at the hearing

— as it does not state appellant’s diagnosis or the basis for the temporary disability. The

court no ted most of the information appellant provided was “inconclusive and certainly does not conclude a complete inability to work.” It thus found appellant failed to meet his burden

to establish a material change in circumstances to warrant modifying the chil d support order at that time. Appellant’s February 2021 declaration and exhibits are not part of the appellate record

. While we are mindful appellant is representing himself on appeal, he “is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.” ( Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1210.) He thus is required to follow the most fundamental rule of appellate
review : the judgment or order chal lenged on appeal is presumed to be correct, and “it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively
demonstrate error.” ( People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573.) “All intendments and presumptions are indulged

to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.” ( Denham v. Superior Court (1970)19

2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) To overcome this presumption, an appellant must provide a record that allows for meaningful review of the challenged order. (

Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 187. ) “ ‘ Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [the] [appellant].’ ” ( Ibid. ) I f the record does not include all
the evidence and materials t he trial court relied on in making
its determination, we will not find error

. ( Haywood v. Superior
Court (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 949, 955.) Rather, we will infer substantial evidence supports the court’s findings. ( Ibid .) The reporter’s transcript descr ibes some of the evidence appellant proffered , as we discussed

, summarize d here :

• The August 1, 2019 certificate of disability stating appellant was temporarily totally disabled from August 1, 2019 to September 15, 2019

.

• A doctor’s report ( apparently prepar ed before the March
2019 order but unavaila ble to appellant ) stating “over
51 percent of what’s going on with me [presumably,
his stress disability] was related [to] my job.”

• A letter from appellant’s “treating doctor” dated January 29, 2021, stating appel lant was able to work
but might experience some functional limitations.

• A letter from appellant’s shoulder surgeon stating appellant should be placed off work from February 7, 2021 through April 7, 2021

.

• A “ ‘final post

- operative’ ” report from appellant’s surgeon stating appellant had a shoulder injury on November 3
, 2020, presumably the surgery date , and noting appellant
could start range of motion activity three weeks post

surgery, could discontinue his sling and progress to20 “active assist range of motio n” four week s post

- surgery , and could discontinue his brace at night six weeks post

- surgery ( which counsel stated would have be en December 15, 2020 )

. Appellant also testified the state awarded him disability benefits from February 2019 through April 2019 b ased on his doctor’s report ; he had a second worker’s compensation claim

— as far as
we can discern

— due to his need to stop work at the end of April or beginning of May 2019, based on the same stress disorder ; and he currently was in physical therapy for his shoulder and “getting better” so he could “get back to work.” 15 Appellant argued the documentation he submitted showed
he continued to be unable to work due to his stress disorder/ psychological disability after the entry of the child support order,
and he could not return to work as an airplane mechanic

— his most recent position

— due to his shoulder injury and surgery. Although the evidence may show appellant was not working,

w e cannot conclude it compels a finding that he lacked the ability
to work and thu s no longer had the earning capacity attributed

to him in the March 2019 child support order. As the trial court noted, the evidence was contradictory

. While appellant’s treating doctor apparently concluded appellant was able to work in January 2021, hi s surgeon placed him
off work from February 2021 through April 2021

. Nor does
the documentation, as the court also noted, provide a basis
for a p p ellant’s inability to work. And, as Moss’s counsel added,

15 The record does not include documentation , other than appellant’s declaration, concerning his disability award or worker’s compensation claims.21

according to the surgeon’s instructions, plaintiff would have
been sling free, even at night, for the two months preceding
the February 2021 hearing. Although appellant explained these inconsistencies

, we

can infer the trial court did not credit appellant’s explanations

, and resolve the apparent conflict i n the evidence in support of
the court’s determination. ( In re Marriage of Cryer, supra

, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1054 ; In re Marriage of Calcaterra &
Badakhsh , supra , 132 Cal.App. 4th at p. 34 .) Certainly, on the record before us, appellant’s evidence was neither uncontradicted nor of such character and weight as to compel a finding in
his favor that his stress disorder or injury prevented him from worki ng at all

. (See Juen v. Alain Pinel Realtors, Inc.

, supra , 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 979.) Moreover, t he fact appellant’s doctor may have placed
him off work due to his stress disorder or injury d oes not compel

a find ing that appellant had no ability to work

, and thus had

no earning capacity

. True, appellant’s economic situation had changed, but he bore the burd en to show he lacked the ability

or opportunity to continue to earn income at the same level

— for example, with a reasonable accommodation or in a temporary position. The court reasonably determined he did not. As Moss’s counsel noted, appellant did not p rovide documentation , as the court had ordered at the November 2020 hearing, from
his healthcare provider as to his diagnosis, p rognosis, or ability

to work

, 16 or information from his employer about whether a

16 Moss’s counsel noted appellant failed to provide specifics as to his ability to work for the February 2019 child support hearing as well

. As we discussed, the documentation in the record does22

reasonable accommodation existed or had been off ered

. Nor is there any indication that appellant asked for a reasonable
accommodation or to work in a differen t position that would not have aggravated his disability or injury. And, h e apparently had
declined an accommodation before the court entered th e original child support order. Given the actual documentation the court considered is not part of the appellate record , we must infer
it supported the court’s implicit finding that it was insufficient

to show appellant’s earning capacity had changed due to his continuing stress disorder/ disability or shoulder injury. (See
In re Marriage of McHugh , supra , 231 Cal.App.4th at p p . 1246

– 1247 [payor parent must show “ ‘ lack of ability and opportunity to earn income’ ” to demonstrate changed circumstances to wa rrant modification of child support order based on earning capacity ].) As we discussed , whether the individual facts presented

warrant modification of child support remains within the broad
discretion of the trial court

. ( In re Marriage of Cryer, supra , 1 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 1054.) On this record, w e cannot say no judge reasonably could have found appellant failed to meet his burden to prove changed circumstances required modifying the initial child support calculation to appellant’s then

- current income

r ather than his earning capacity

. ( Id. at pp. 1046

– 1047 .) Accordingly, appellant has not demonstrated the trial court
erred in denying his request to modify the child support
and income withholding orders.

not pr ovide a basis for

, or the specific effects of

, appellant’s disabilit y. W e presume the exhibits omitted from the record also did not, as the court found.23 In reaching our conclusion, w e do not suggest app ellant
did not have a stress disorder or a shoulder injury . Rather, appellant f

a iled to demonstrate with sufficient evidence the impact his disability and injury had on his earning capacity
and ability to pay child support. We note the trial court invite d any party to move to change t he child support order when there was evidence to support its modification.
3. The court did not err when it did not separately hear

a ppellant ’s June 2019 RFO Appellant appears to contend the trial court should have
consider ed his June 2019 RFO because CSSD knew of the
June 3, 2019 RFO through minute orders it had received, 17 and appellant’s RFO sought to modify the child support order retroactive to June 3, 2019. As we discussed, the court did not hear the June 2019 RFO beca use there was no proof of service showing it had been served and considered it consolidated with the May 2020 motion

. Although CSSD may have been aware that appellant filed his own RFO, nothing in the record demonstrates CSSD ever was served with the RFO nor does appellant contend he served CSSD.
Even if the court also should have heard the June 2019 RFO, however, appellant has failed to show prejudice from
the purported error. An appellant has the burden not only

to show error but prejudice from that e rror as well . (See Cal.

17 The clerk served CSSD with notice of the August 27, 2020 minute order that continued and transfer red appellant’s RFO
to be heard with CSSD’s motion, and the November 12, 2020 and February 25, 2021 minute orders identify the nature of the proceedings as appellant’s June 3, 2019 RFO.24

Const., art. VI, § 13 [miscarriage of justice required for reversal ].) If an appellant fails to satisfy that burden, his argument will
be rejected on appeal. ( Century Surety Co. v. Polisso (2006)
139 Cal.App.4th 922, 963 ; see als o see also In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008 ) 164 Cal.App. 4 th 814, 823 [ miscarriage of justice will not be found “ ‘unless it appears reasonably probabl e that, absent the error, the appellant would have obtained a more favorable result’ ” ]. )
As the Ma y 2020 motion for modification was for appellant’s benefit and filed at his request

, we can infer
it included the information appellant provided in support of his own RFO

. We similarly can infer appellant’s February
2021 declaration reiterated the stateme nts he made in his
2019 supporting and reply declarations about his ongoing stress disorder/psychological disability, his worker’s compensation claims, disability award, and unemployment

. We thus can presume the court considered that information despite h earing only the May 2020 motion. And, as discussed, we can infer
the court considered the certificate of disability attached to appellant’s September 2019 declaration and found it insufficient because it did not state the basis for appellant’s temporary

t otal disability

. At the hearing, no one mentioned appellant’s reduced

pay rate for three months when he temporarily returned to work
for IAMAW on February 1, 2019

, or his subsequent termination on May 9, 2019

. That evidence w as included in appellant’s 201 9
decl arations, although the termination l et ter from his employer
is not part of the appellate record

. Even if that evidence were not included with CSSD’s
motion

, however, the court’s consideration of it would not have25

reasonably led the court to rule diff erently. Again, that appellant’s income was reduced

— or even eliminated

— does not necessarily demonstrate an inability to earn income. Appellant does not explain why his hourly rate was reduced, for example

,

or the circumstances surrounding his termination

. (See, e.g.,
In re Marriage of McHugh , supra , 231 Cal.App.4th 1241

– 1242 [discretion to set child support based on earning capacity includes imputing income based on earnings at a prior job, “ without evidence the parent has the current opportunity to earn at that same level, if the parent left or otherwise lost the job in a manner reflecting a voluntary and deliberate divestiture of financial resources required to pay child support obligations” ].)
In short

, as t he evidence appellant submitted with his
June 3, 2019 RFO does not compel a finding that he lacked the ability to work and to earn income at the level imputed to him in the March 2019 child support order

, appellant was not prejudiced by any purported error on the trial court’s part in not hearing
the June 3, 2019 RFO. And, as we have concluded the court
did not err in denying the request for modification, appellant’s desire to have any child support modification made retroactive

to June 3, 2019, is moot. ( § 3653, subd. (a) [order modifying
child sup port “may be made retroactive” to the date of filing notice of motion].) Finally, appellant appears to argue, without citation to
the record, that he was denied the ability to enter exhibits into
evidence. The record does not support appellant’s contentio n. T he trial court received appellant’s February 18, 2021 declaration
and attached exhibits into evidence. Nothing in the record demonstrates appellant asked the trial court to receive any other26

exhibits into evidence or t hat the court declined to do s o. (See,

e.g., Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 547, 557 [ ordinarily, errors not reflected in the
trial record cannot sustain reversal on appeal] .)
DISPOSITION
The March 2, 2021 order is affirmed. Because respondents
elec ted not to file briefs in this court, there are no costs on appeal
to award.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPOR T S

EGERTON

, J.

W e concur:

LAVIN, Acting P. J.

KIM
, J. *

* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by the Chi ef Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.