[Cite as State v. Carmen, 2013-Ohio-3325.] 

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: July 31, 2013 

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Phil Cummings, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Michaela Stagnaro, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 vs. 

CHARLES CARMEN, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

 

:

: 

: 

: 

: 

APPEAL NO. C-120692 

TRIAL NO. B-1200408 

 

 O P I N I O N.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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FISCHER, Judge. 

{¶1} Following a bench trial, defendant-appellant Charles Carmen was 

found guilty of one count of attempted murder, two counts of felonious assault, one 

count of having a weapon under a disability, and the accompanying firearm 

specifications in connection with his shooting of Alvin Sanders. At sentencing, the 

trial court merged the felonious assaults with the attempted murder. It also merged 

the firearm specifications. The trial court sentenced Carmen to eight years for the 

attempted murder, to 36 months for the weapons-under-disability offense, and to 

three years on the merged firearm specifications. The trial court ordered the terms 

be served consecutively for a total sentence of 14 years in prison. 

{¶2} In two assignments of error, Carmen claims (1) that his convictions are 

not supported by the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence, and (2) that his 

sentence is contrary to law because the trial court failed to consider the purposes and 

principles of sentencing and the factors in R.C. 2929.12 and failed to make the findings 

to impose consecutive prison terms. Finding merit in neither assignment of error, we 

affirm the trial court’s judgment and sentences. 

{¶3} On the afternoon of January 16, 2011, Alvin Sanders was sitting in his car 

when he saw Carmen across the street. Sanders testified that he was angry with Carmen 

because Carmen owed him money and Sanders had been unable to “catch up” with him. 

Sanders got out of his car, crossed the street, and confronted Carmen, asking him for the 

money. When Carmen refused to pay him, Sanders began cussing at Carmen and 

threatening to “kick his ass.” Carmen pulled a gun from his coat and told Sanders that 

he was “going to die today.” He shot Sanders at close range multiple times in the face 

and body. Sanders fell to the ground after the first or second shot, but Carmen 

continued shooting. Carmen then ran off. 
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{¶4} Sanders’s girlfriend, Tamara Taylor, and James Marion, an uninterested 

bystander, both witnessed the shooting. Marion called the police. When they arrived, 

they found Sanders lying unconscious on the sidewalk. Because Sanders had sustained 

life-threatening injuries, he was immediately transported to the hospital. Sanders 

testified that he had suffered gunshot wounds to multiple parts of his body, and that he 

had remained in the hospital for months, undergoing several surgeries. He stated that 

he was using a wheelchair while he learned to walk again, but that he would never 

completely recover from his injuries. 

{¶5} At the scene of the shooting, the police collected evidence. They 

recovered three .25-caliber casings on the sidewalk. They interviewed Taylor and 

Marion, and they obtained still photographs of a man taken just before and after the 

shooting by a surveillance camera at a nearby convenience store. After identifying 

Carmen as the man in the photos, the police gave the photos to the local news media in 

hopes of learning Carmen’s whereabouts. 

{¶6} The following day, Carmen turned himself in to the police. He was 

arrested, advised of his Miranda rights, and interviewed by the police. Carmen’s 

interview was recorded and played during the trial. Carmen told police that Sanders 

had confronted him two times. He had tried to walk away, but Sanders had continued to 

pursue him. Carmen told police that he had dated Sanders’s sister, but that he did not 

know why Sanders had confronted him. Carmen told police that Sanders often carried a 

gun, and that Sanders had kept his hands in his pockets during their altercation. He 

said that he had shot Sanders with a semi-automatic pistol because he was afraid that 

Sanders was going to shoot him. 

{¶7} Sanders, Taylor, and Marion testified at trial. Taylor and Marion 

corroborated Sanders’s testimony. They testified that Sanders had initiated the incident 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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by running across the street to confront Carmen, and that Sanders had yelled and 

threatened to harm Carmen, but that he had never actually raised his hand to strike 

Carmen or pulled a weapon on Carmen. Carmen had then stepped forward, pulled a 

gun from his pocket, and shot Sanders multiple times. Carmen made no attempt to walk 

away from Sanders before firing. Carmen did not testify at trial, but relied on his earlier 

statement to police that he had shot Sanders in self-defense. 

{¶8} In his first assignment of error, Carmen argues that his convictions 

for attempted murder and felonious assault were supported by insufficient evidence 

and were contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶9} While the trial court found Carmen guilty of attempted murder and 

two counts of felonious assault, it merged the felonious assaults with the attempted 

murder and sentenced Carmen only on the attempted-murder offense. Thus, 

Carmen was never convicted of the felonious assaults. See State v. Robinson, 187 

Ohio App.3d 253, 2010-Ohio-543, 931 N.E.2d 1110, ¶ 26–27 (1st Dist.) As a result, 

we confine our analysis to the attempted-murder conviction. 

{¶10} In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this 

court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to 

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 

the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 

380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). In addressing a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence 

challenge, we must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in 

resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created 

such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new 

trial ordered. Id. at 387. 
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{¶11} To convict Carmen of attempted murder, the state had to prove 

that he had purposely engaged in conduct, which if successful, would have 

constituted or resulted in murder. See R.C. 2923.02(A) and 2903.02(A). 

{¶12} The state presented sufficient evidence to support Carmen’s 

conviction for attempted murder. Multiple witnesses, including Sanders, testified 

that following a verbal altercation between Sanders and Carmen, Carmen had pulled 

out a weapon and shot Sanders, who was unarmed, at close range multiple times in 

the face and body. Although Carmen argues that the state failed to prove that he had 

purposely attempted to cause Sanders’s death, the trial court could have inferred that 

Carmen had acted purposely, given Carmen’s statement to Sanders prior to the 

shooting that Sanders was “going to die today,” Carmen’s repeated shooting of 

Sanders even after Sanders had fallen to the ground, and the nature and extent of the 

wounds Sanders had suffered. 

{¶13} Carmen also argues that the trial court lost its way in finding him 

guilty of the attempted murder of Sanders. He claims that he was acting in selfdefense when he shot Sanders. 

{¶14} Under Ohio law, “self-defense is an affirmative defense that legally 

excuses admitted criminal conduct.” State v. Edwards, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C110773, 2013-Ohio-239, ¶ 5, citing State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19, 294 N.E.2d 

888 (1973). To establish self-defense, Carmen had to prove by a preponderance of 

the evidence (1) that he was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the 

affray, (2) that he had a bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or 

great bodily harm, and that his only means of escape from such danger was in the use 

of such force, and (3) that he did not violate any duty to retreat or avoid the danger. 

State v. Robbins, 58 Ohio St.2d 74, 79-80, 388 N.E.2d 755 (1979); see R.C. 
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2901.05(A). The elements of the defense are cumulative. Thus, Carmen’s failure to 

prove any one of the three elements by a preponderance of the evidence would 

negate the defense. State v. Cassano, 96 Ohio St.3d 94, 2002-Ohio-3751, 772 N.E.2d 

81, ¶ 73; see Edwards at ¶ 9. 

{¶15} The trial court concluded that Carmen had failed to prove the 

second element of the defense―that he had acted upon a bona fide belief that he was 

in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm―and that Carmen had used 

excessive force in pulling out a gun to shoot Sanders, who had been unarmed and 

incapable of inflicting death or great bodily harm upon Carmen. See In re Maupin, 

1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-980094, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 5907, *5-6 (Dec. 11, 1998). 

{¶16} Based upon our review of the record, we cannot say that the trial 

court lost its way in concluding that Carmen had failed to carry his burden to 

establish that he had acted in self-defense. Edwards at ¶ 10. The trial evidence 

established that Sanders had approached Carmen, cussing at him and threatening to 

“kick his ass,” but that he had never actually raised his hand to hit Carmen. Carmen 

then responded by shooting Sanders multiple times in the face and body. 

{¶17} Although Carmen argues that Sanders had a prior criminal history, 

which included a conviction for possession of an AK-47, and that he feared Sanders 

would pull out a weapon and shoot him, there is no evidence that Sanders had a gun 

the day Carmen shot him. And multiple witnesses testified, despite Carmen’s claims 

to the contrary, that Carmen could have retreated from Sanders had he chosen to do 

so. Accordingly, we conclude that Carmen’s attempted-murder conviction was not 

contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 

678 N.E.2d 541; see also State v. Jackson, 22 Ohio St.3d 281, 284, 490 N.E.2d 893 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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(1986); State v. McLeod, 82 Ohio App. 155, 157, 80 N.E.2d 699 (9th Dist.1948). We, 

therefore, overrule his first assignment of error. 

{¶18} In his second assignment of error, Carmen argues that his 14-year 

prison sentence was contrary to law because (1) the trial court failed to consider the 

purposes and principles of sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and the factors set forth in R.C. 

2929.12 and (2) it failed to make the appropriate findings to impose consecutive 

sentences as set forth in R.C. 2929.14(C). 

{¶19} Although we may presume that the trial court considered the 

factors under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12, here the trial court, prior to imposing 

Carmen’s sentence, orally stated the applicable R.C. 2929.12 seriousness and 

recidivism factors. See State v. Alexander, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-110828 and C110829, 2012-Ohio-3349, ¶ 24. The trial court stated that Carmen was 23-years-old, 

had four delinquency adjudications, had two felony and four misdemeanor 

convictions as an adult, had failed to successfully complete felony probation, and had 

served a prior prison term. The trial court further stated that Carmen had been 

released from prison on July 1, 2008, and was considered a high risk to reoffend. 

The trial court acknowledged that Sanders had been the aggressor and had started 

the incident, but stated that Sanders had been shot several times and had been 

seriously injured. 

{¶20} The trial court additionally journalized a sentencing-findings 

worksheet which contained findings under R.C. 2929.12 as well as the necessary 

findings to impose consecutive sentences under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). The trial court 

found that consecutive terms were necessary to protect the public and to punish 

Carmen and were not disproportionate to the seriousness of Carmen’s conduct and 

the danger he posed to the public. The trial court further found that the harm caused 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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by the offenses was so great or unusual that no single term would adequately reflect 

the seriousness of Carmen’s conduct, and that his criminal history showed a need to 

protect the public. See R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) and (c). 

{¶21} The record reflects that the trial court expressly considered the 

seriousness and recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12 and made the necessary findings for 

imposing consecutive sentences on the journalized sentencing-findings worksheet. The 

record, furthermore, supports the court’s findings. Therefore, we overrule Carmen’s 

second assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Judgment affirmed. 

CUNNINGHAM, P.J, and DINKELACKER, J., concur.

Please note: 

 The court has recorded its own entry this date.