### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE
JIMMY RICHARDSON v. THE TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County No. 98-931-I Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr., Chancellor

No. M1999-02796-COA-R3-CV - Decided May 31, 2000

Appellant, Jimmy Richardson, a ppeals a final or

der of the Chance

ry Court of Davidso

n County wherein the Chancellor sustained a summary judgment motion in his suit for a declaratory order. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgmen

t of the Chancery

Court Affirmed.
C AIN , J., delivered the opinion of the court, i n which C ANTRELL , P.J., M.S., and C OTTRELL , J., joined. Jimmy Richardson, Nashville, Tennessee, pro se.
Paul G. Summers, Mi

chael E. Moore and Abigail Turner, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Correction.

OPINION

Jimmy Richardson was arrested on January 11, 1976 on charges of rape,armed robbery w ith a deadly weapon, kidnaping, assault with int ent to com mit murder and grand larceny. He was convictedof

all offenses on June 18, 1976 and sentenced to 99 years in prison for rape, a consecutive life sentence for ar

med robbery, a c

onsecutive 6 to 21 y

ear sentence f

or assault with inte

nt to commit murder and a consecutive 6 to 10 year sentence for grand larceny. Because of his 99 year sentence andhis life sentence, he is not eligible for consider ation for parole until he serves 30 f

ull years in prison, less any sentence credits received under former Tennessee Code Annotated sec tion 40-3613. Slagle v. Reynolds , 845 S.W.2d 167 (Tenn. 1992).
Mr. Richardson, Appe

llant, asserts in hi

s suit for a decla

ratory order th

at he has been erroneously

deniedvarious sentence cred its which, if prope

rly allowed, would

make him presently eligible for parole. H e further asserts that he is eligible for mandatory parole under former Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-3614.

### -2-

In sustaining the Department of Correction’s petition for summary judgment, the trial court held: Petitioner

erroneously believ es th at he was entitled to accumulate sentence creditspursuant to Tenn. C ode Ann. §§ 41-332 and 41-334 to reduce the statutory minimum of thirty (30) years that he must serve of his ninety-nine (99) year sentence pursu ant to T

enn. Code Ann. § 40-3615. Howeve r, petitioner’s c

ontention is completely

ungrounded. In Howell v. State , 569 S.W.2d 428, 431 at n.4 (Ten n. 1978), the Tennessee Sup

reme Court h

eld that i nmates serving determinate sentences were not entitled to accrue either Good Time or Honor Time

creditsto reduce their parole eligibility dates. See also Gilbre[a] th v. Bell , C.C.A. No. 01C01-9506-CC00171 (Tenn.C rim.App . at Jackson) (Jan. 26, 1996). In addition, petitioner’s reliance on Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-229 is also to no avail since sai d statute provides that good time and honor

time credits cann

ot reduce manda

tory sentences.
For reasons not apparent in the record, the Department of Corrections has awarded Appellant 165 prisoner performance sentence credits under Tenness ee Code Annotated section 41-21-230. However, since no party is compl aining a bout these particular credits, they will not be further noticed.
A s to mandatory parole, under former Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-3 614 (no w section 40-28-117), Appellant is not eligible for such parole. The statute provide s: “Priso ners serving a determinate or indeterminate sentence with a maximumterm of over ten (10) years as fixed by the court shall be paroled b y the board six (6) months prior to the completion of the maximum termof sentence less credit for good and honor time.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40 -3614 (1975 replacement) (

emphasisadded). Appellant began to serve his sentence on January 11, 1976 when he was arrested a

nd would not be eligi

ble for mandator

y parole until six mon

ths prior to th e completion of his determinate 99 year sentence.
From any practical point of view, sentence reduction creditscould only assist Ap pellant in determin ing the earliest date

on which he becom

es eligible

for parole under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-3613 (1975 replacement). This date, as is settled in Slagle v. Reynolds , 845 S.W.2d 167 (Tenn. 1 992), is 30 years le ss such sentence reduction credits as he is eligible to earn andhas actually earned. Once he becom es eligible for p arole, it is in the di scretion of the pa

role boardas to whether or not he will actual ly be parol ed. Doyle v. Hampton , 207 Tenn. 399, 340 S.W.2d 891 (Tenn. 1 960); Ivey v. Meadows , 216 Tenn. 678, 393 S.W.2d 744 (1965). Appellant next compl ains that because he was sentenced in1976 he is entitled to credits under the provisions of former Tennessee Code Annotated sections 41-332 and 41-334. The chancellor correctly held that because he is serving a 99 year determinate sentence, he is not eligible for any creditsunder these

sections of the co

de no matter when

he began serving

his sentence. McFadden
v. State , 532 S.W.2d 944 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975); Howell v. State , 569 S.W.2d 428 (Tenn. 1978). As present Tennessee Code Annotated sections 41-21-212 and 41-21-214 are simply replacements of prior Tennessee Code Annotated sections 41-332 and 41-334, the same

rule applies and Appellant is not eligible for s

uch credits.

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Appel lant is entitled only to credits under Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-236 which was enacted in 1985 and provided in part: “Any person who committed a felony, including any Class X felony, prior to Decembe r 11, 1985, may become eligible for the sentence reduction creditsauthorized by this action by signing a written waiver waiving the right to serve the sentence under the law in

effect at the time the crime

was committed. How

ever, sentence

reduction credi

ts authorized

by this section may be awarded only for conduct and/or performance from and after the date a person becomes eligible under this subsection.” Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21- 236(c)(3). Appellant

signed his appropriate waiver on March 1, 1986, and he does not dispute that the department has pr

operly calculat

ed credits for hi

munder this statute

since the date that he signed the waiver.
The action of the tria

l court in granting summary judgment to the Department of Correction, is affirmed with costs on appeal assessed to Appellant, Jimmy Richardson.