Opinion issued July 7, 2015.

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NOS. 01-14-00505-CR

 01-14-00506-CR

 01-14-00507-CR

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DANIEL DESANTIAGO-CARAZA, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 240th District Court

Fort Bend County, Texas

Trial Court Case Nos. 12-DCR-059402, 12-DCR-059524, 12-DCR-059902

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Daniel DeSantiago-Caraza, pleaded guilty to aggravated 

robbery,

1

aggravated assault,2and arson,

3

and, after a presentence investigation 

 

1 Appellate court number 01-14-00505-CR, trial court number 12-DCR-059402.
2

report was prepared and a punishment hearing held, the trial court assessed 

punishment at 60 years’ confinement for the aggravated robbery, 20 years’ 

confinement for the aggravated assault, and 20 years’ confinement for the arson. 

In a single issue on appeal, appellant contends he was denied due process because 

the trial court refused to consider the entire range of punishment and mitigating 

evidence. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

At appellant’s punishment hearing, Officer J. Thompson from the Rosenberg 

Police Department testified that on January 18, 2012, at approximately 3:30 a.m,

he responded to a call involving a car fire. When he arrived, he assisted with 

security and then heard gunshots nearby. Thompson saw a gray Ford F150 pickup 

truck leaving the location and followed the truck until it stopped in front of 

appellant’s stepfather’s home. Thompson initiated a traffic stop and spoke with the 

driver, appellant. He ordered appellant and the passenger to lie face-down on the

ground. Appellant asked Thompson to shoot and kill him. Specifically, appellant 

said he did not care about dying and asked Thompson “to blast him.” During the 

detention, the passenger got up and fled. Because he had a “second subject now to

deal with,” Thompson shot appellant with his taser. Thompson testified that he 

 

2 Appellate court number 01-14-00506-CR, trial court number 12-DCR-059524.

3 Appellate court number 01-14-00507-CR, trial court number 12-DCR-059902.
3

never found a weapon on appellant, and that the passenger was the person who had 

previously fired shots near the location of the burning car. 

After Thompson’s testimony, the following exchange took place between 

the trial court and the prosecutor:

[TRIAL COURT]: All right. Thank you, sir. You are excused. 

Counsel, let me have you both at the bench. I don’t know if you want 

this conversation on or off the record, but we have the defendant’s 

nolo or guilty pleas, we have the plea sentence investigation report. 

Isn’t the purpose of this hearing to put of record any disagreements as 

to what the PSI reports.

[PROSECUTOR]: I don’t think it’s just that matter, Judge. I think 

what Mr.—and I—

[TRIAL COURT]: I’m not going to spend an hour repeating all the 

testimony that was heard in the earlier case.

[PROSECUTOR]: Judge, that’s not the intent. But as I said earlier, we 

do have to establish a record should [appellant] choose to appeal—

[TRIAL COURT]: Well, here’s the—have we executed plea papers?

[PROSECUTOR]: He has, Judge, as to the guilt/innocence.

[TRIAL COURT]: Okay.

[PROSECUTOR]: I guess what I’m saying, Judge, I think that 

certainly if there is other evidence that supports this defendant’s 

involvement, and I think what—and [defense counsel] can stop me if 

I’m wrong, which is I believe that certainly while he has pled and in 

that regard the State of Texas doesn’t distinguish readily between 

parties and principles. I believe that that’s a very significant core of 

events.
4

[TRIAL COURT]: I just—my real concern is should [defense 

counsel] present and examine the witnesses. I presume he wants to 

refute some of what’s in the PSI report. 

[PROSECUTOR]: He might, Judge, but the burden still rests upon the 

State. 

[TRIAL COURT]: Has the State met its burden by—by the—are you 

satisfied that you’ve got accurate, adequate plea papers that were 

drawn in these matters?

[PROSECUTOR]: Yes, we are satisfied with those. Yes, sir, we are.

[TRIAL COURT]: So what more do you need?

[PROSECUTOR]: Judge, I believe that the Court can consider, for 

example, when the victims testify the Court can consider his particular 

actions as they relate to the victim.

[TRIAL COURT]: Okay. Should we then confine what we’re going to 

be testifying here about to this specific defendant’s actions?

[PROSECUTOR]: We certainly can do that. And I think, Judge, that’s 

what we were referencing his actions out there.

[TRIAL COURT]: Well, really 10 percent of this focused on that. It 

seems the rest was just totally repetitive with what we heard in the 

trial.

[PROSECUTOR]: And, Judge, I understand it’s repetitive to the 

Court, but it’s not repetitive to a record. And so should this matter be 

appealed in its sum, then we just want to make sure that out of 

abundance of caution that we have a record that supports the plea, as 

well as a record that supports whatever the Court’s imposition it 

sentences.

[TRIAL COURT]: Well, why isn’t the plea established by the plea 

papers?

[PROSECUTOR]: I’m sorry, sir?
5

[TRIAL COURT]: Why isn’t the plea not established by the plea 

papers?

[PROSECUTOR]: Judge, the plea itself is in terms of the 

guilt/innocence, but in terms of his particular involvement, I don’t 

believe that the plea papers indicate—

[TRIAL COURT]: Well, why did he execute papers of they didn’t 

involve him?

[PROSECUTOR]: I didn’t say—I didn’t say that they didn’t 

involve—the level of his involvement, perhaps I should have been 

more clear. The level of his participation. If the Court doesn’t want to 

hear from those witnesses, we certainly won’t present them. But we 

certainly want to have enough to show if they raise—if they’re 

raising, which I believe that they will, that he’s just a party, that his 

involvement is minimal, and, therefore, we think that he should get a 

lenient sentence, I think that we would be entitled to offer evidence 

that shows that his participation was more than just minimal. 

[TRIAL COURT]: Okay. How many witnesses are we going to have?

[PROSECUTOR]: Judge, I could probably cut out two more. So I 

would say seven or eight.

[TRIAL COURT]: So you’re going to have eight hours’ worth of 

testimony to back up a guilty plea? 

[PROSECUTOR]: No, Judge. 

[TRIAL COURT]: You’ve killed an hour already.

[PROSECUTOR]: Judge, I think we started at 1:30, it’s 2:10. And so I 

think he was one of the meatier witnesses, quite frankly.

[TRIAL COURT]: Let’s go along with it then. But I’m not sure we’re 

making good use of the time, and I’m not sure we’re addressing any 

of [defense counsel’s] concerns.
6

[PROSECUTOR]: Well, I don’t know all of his concerns. He can do 

that through cross-examination.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We’ll—we’ll get there. But for right now I 

think we should limit as much as we can.

[PROSECUTOR]: But the State has a right to put on our case.

[TRIAL COURT]: Do you [have] a right—

[PROSECUTOR]: And we’re asking the Court to consider the full 

range of punishment. 

[TRIAL COURT]: You have presented a plea packet. And the Judge 

has found that to be sufficient. Obviously, your signature is real 

legible, but other than that, it’s fine.

[PROSECUTOR]: That’s [sic] be yours and Ms. Patel’s.

[TRIAL COURT]: These lawyers don’t know how to write anymore. 

But I think—my guess is there’s been a satisfact[ory] plea packet 

done through your plea of guilty or no contest. So guilt/innocence is 

not an issue, is it? Or is it?

[PROSECUTOR]: It is not. That’s correct, Judge. You’re correct.

[TRIAL COURT]: So—of course I’m correct. But I guess my concern 

is can we confine it to those matters that are disputed. Of course, you 

don’t really know what’s disputed so maybe a minimal presentation 

on your part, then followed by [defense counsel’s] cross-examination 

would tend to focus what’s in issue. Because I—I either know or am 

going to know everything that’s in these packets here, but that’s going 

to take a little time as well.

[PROSECUTOR]: Okay.

[TRIAL COURT]: But go ahead and let’s just see how it goes.

[PROSECUTOR]: And I’ll certainly speed things up, Judge.
7

[TRIAL COURT]: Please.

[PROSECUTOR]: And see if we can’t cut out some things.

[TRIAL COURT]: All right.

Thereafter, the State presented an additional seven witnesses who presented 

evidence that appellant and his co-actor, a 14-year-old juvenile, had participated in 

a crime spree on the night of the offenses that involved a car-jacking, several 

armed robberies, and an arson. Multiple witnesses testified that they were shot at 

during the robberies, and at least one was injured. The crime spree culminated in 

the arrest detailed by Officer Thompson. 

The defense presented the testimony of appellant’s stepfather, and appellant 

testified on his own behalf. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated, 

“All right, counsel may I hear from each of you briefly in argument since I’ve read 

all of the instruments that have been filed and attentively listen[ed] to you.” After 

hearing arguments by counsel, the trial court assessed punishment at 60 years’ 

confinement for the aggravated robbery and 20 years’ confinement each for the 

aggravated assault and the arson.

DUE PROCESS

In his sole issue on appeal, appellant contends that he “suffered a Due 

Process Violation when the trial court refused to consider the entire range of 
8

punishment and refused to consider relevant evidence that mitigated appellant’s 

punishment.” 

Applicable Law

Due process requires a neutral and detached judicial officer. Gagnon v. 

Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1762 (1973); Jaenicke v. State, 109 

S.W.3d 793, 796 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d). “A court’s 

arbitrary refusal to consider the entire range of punishment would constitute a 

denial of due process . . . .” McClenan v. State, 661 S.W.2d 108, 110 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1983) (emphasis added). Additionally, a court denies a defendant due process 

when it refuses to consider the evidence or when it imposes a predetermined 

punishment. Howard v. State, 830 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 

1992, pet. ref’d). In the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, a reviewing 

court will presume that the trial court was neutral and detached. See Steadman v. 

State, 31 S.W.3d 738, 741–42 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d). 

“Absent a clear showing of bias, a trial court’s actions will be presumed to have 

been correct.” Brumit v. State, 206 S.W.3d 639, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see 

Steadman, 31 S.W.3d at 741.

Analysis

Appellant complains that the “trial court expressed its opinion that it did not 

need to hear evidence from the offenses in this case[,]” and that the trial court 
9

made such statement “before [a]ppellant had a chance to present mitigating 

evidence, including overwhelming evidence that [a]ppellant did not remember the 

events in question and acted largely as a party.” Appellant also complains that the 

trial court “refused to consider evidence of [a]ppellant’s mental health history, his 

abusive childhood, and the recent death of a very close friend which affected his 

mental state prior to commission of the offenses.” The State responds that 

appellant was afforded “a full hearing to present evidence on his behalf and there is 

nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court did not consider the evidence 

presented at the hearing.” We agree with the State.

While the trial court did question the State about why it needed to go into 

such detail about the facts of the underlying case, the record supports the 

conclusion that the trial court was not refusing to hear mitigating evidence, but was 

actually attempting to make sure that appellant’s counsel had sufficient 

opportunity to address any issues appellant had with the PSI. This is reflected in 

the trial court’s statement, “Let’s go along with it then. But I’m not sure we’re 

making good use of the time, and I’m not sure we’re addressing any of [defense 

counsel’s] concerns.” Defense counsel agreed that his concerns could be 

addressed on cross-examination and with the trial court’s statement that “[f]or right 

now I think we should limit [the State’s exploration of the details of the case] as 

much as we can.”
10

There is nothing in the record to show that the trial court excluded or refused 

to consider any mitigating evidence offered by either side. To the contrary, it 

heard from at least nine witness and considered the PSI that was admitted during 

the hearing, and, in doing so, stated that it had “read all of the instruments that 

have been filed and attentively listen[ed] to you.” Accordingly, appellant has 

failed to rebut the presumption that the trial court was neutral and detached and 

that its actions were correct. See Steadman, 31 S.W.3d at 741-42.

We overrule appellant’s sole issue on appeal.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Sherry Radack

Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Higley and Massengale.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).