alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### SUTHERLAND PAPER CO. v. GRANT PAPER BOX CO. et al.

Civ. A. No. 6013.

District *Court,*W. D. Pennsylvania.

June 24, 1947.

See, also, 7 F.R.D. 357.

Rose, Eichenauer, Stewart & Lewis and T. W. Pomeroy, Jr., all of Pittsburgh, Pa., for plaintiff.

Christy, Parmelee & Strickland, of Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendants.

GIBSON, District Judge.

Carl G. Drayman has moved the Court to dismiss the complaint as to him. It appears from the amended complaint that the petitioner was the inventor of the patent in suit who had assigned it to the Grant Paper Box Company but had reserved the right to approve all licenses granted by the assignor, with certain other reservations.

Whether Mr. Drayman was a necessary party is questionable, but undoubtedly his interest is such that he is a desirable party.

His motion will be denied.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2601 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2601

          To suspend temporarily the duty on Neodymium oxide.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 30, 2009

Mrs. Hutchison introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
          To suspend temporarily the duty on Neodymium oxide.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. NEODYMIUM OXIDE.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:

``     9902.01.00      Neodymium oxide     Free         No change        No change        On or before 12/  ''.
                        (CAS No. 1313-97-                                                  31/2011.......
                        9) (provided for
                        in subheading
                        2846.90.80)......

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### Smith *v.*The State.

1. In view of the whole charge as given, there was no error in any of the instructions complained of, nor in refusing to charge as requested.

2. The evidence warranted the jury in rejecting the theory of accidental drowning and in finding that the accused drowned his wife in the manner charged in the indictment, and the court did not err in denying a new trial. *Judgment affirmed.*

June 4, 1894.

Indictment for murder. Before Judge Bartlett. Bibb superior court. November term, 1893.

Simmons, J.,

dissenting. The evidence tends only to raise a suspicion of guilt. It is altogether circumstantial, and does not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis than the guilt of the accused. It does not show his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The law does not sanction a conviction on suspicion, however strong it may be.

Will Smith was indicted for tbe murder of his wife by shoving her into a pool of water and drowning her. He was convicted with a recommendation to life imprisonnient, and his motion for a new trial was overruled. It appeared from the evidence, among other things, that he and his wife were seen going together in the direc*592tion of the pool in which she was drowned, between 5 and 6 o’clock on a morning in June. About two hours afterward, he came to where men were working on a railroad, stated that his wife was drowned, and asked "them to help get her out. She was found standing in the pool (which was about six feet deep) with her head bent forward in a stooping position. Some time after she was taken out, a small wound was found in her head, as if made by some sharp instrument, the depth of the incision not appearing. It was proved that defendant could swim. He had some months before quarrelled with his wife; and it seems that he had on a previous occasion pushed her into a lake. There was other •evidence that they got along well and peaceably together. He appears to have made several contradictory statements; and so far as the evidence discloses, his feelings were not excited by the discovery of his wife drowned, if the drowning was accidental, as claimed in his statement to the jury.

J. L. Anderson, M. G. Ogden and G. S. Jones, for plaintiff in error. J. M. Terrell, attorney-general, and W. H. Felton, Jr., solicitor-general, *contra.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                           4,292
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                           4,933
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                 7,985
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     85,813
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                             319
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                               327
<LOANS>                                        235,683
<ALLOWANCE>                                      2,360
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 350,643
<DEPOSITS>                                     277,348
<SHORT-TERM>                                    26,820
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              2,256
<LONG-TERM>                                      7,725
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        16,199
<OTHER-SE>                                      20,295
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 350,643
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 19,139
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                4,522
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                 2,147
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                25,808
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              13,500
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              15,199
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           10,609
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                       42
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                  20
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 10,215
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,489
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       1,776
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,776
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.18
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.18
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    3.11
<LOANS-NON>                                      1,920
<LOANS-PAST>                                     1,954
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 2,388
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                      126
<RECOVERIES>                                        56
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                2,360
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             2,110
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                            250
        

</TABLE>
#### JACOBSON et al. v. SHOBER.

No. 7640.

District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.

Jan. 7, 1948.

Edward Marcu, of Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Michael A. Foley, of Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.

BARD, District Judge.

Oscar Jacobson and Anna Jacobson, his wife, and Harry Towne are joined as plaintiffs in this case, which arises out of a collision between an automobile driven by Oscar Jacobson and the defendant’s automobile. Anna Jacobson, the wife, and Harry Towne were passengers in the automobile operated by Oscar Jacobson at the time of the collision.

The defendant has moved to sever the cause of action of Oscar Jacobson from that of Anna Jacobson and Harry Towne, so that Oscar Jacobson may be joined as an additional defendant to the actions of Anna Jacobson and Harry Towne. The defendant contends that Oscar Jacobson was either solely responsible or jointly responsible for the accident, and, in the latter event, she wishes to protect her right to contribution from Oscar Jacobson by joining him as an additional defendant.

I am of the opinion that the defendant’s contention must be sustained and that her motion for severance must be granted. See opinion by President Judge Keller in Fisher v. Diehl, 156 Pa.Super. 476, 40 A.2d 912, and cases there cited.

An order may be entered severing the cause of action of Oscar Jacobson from that of Anna Jacobson and Harry Towne.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

March 12, 2018

No. 04-17-00517-CR

John Nathan CAVANESS,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 452nd District Court, Mason County, Texas

Trial Court No. 16-4724

The Honorable Robert Rey Hofmann, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

The State’s motion for extension of time to file its brief is granted.

_________________________________

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 12th day of March, 2018.

___________________________________

KEITH E. HOTTLE,

Clerk of Court
#### In the Matter of O., Respondent, v M., Appellant.

Submitted December 27, 2010;

decided January 18, 2011

Motion, insofar as it seeks leave to appeal from the November 2009 Appellate Division order, dismissed upon the ground that it does not lie, appellant having previously moved for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals from the Appellate Division order from which leave to appeal is currently sought (14 NY3d 881 [2010]); motion, insofar as it seeks leave to appeal from the November 2010 Family Court order, dismissed upon the ground that such order does not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution and thus does not constitute a final judgment within the meaning of CPLR 5602 (a) (1) (ii), *738and upon the further ground that simultaneous appeals do not lie to both the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals *(see Parker v Rogerson,*35 NY2d 751, 753 [1974]). Motion for a stay dismissed as academic.
No. 781.

#### Royal Indemnity Co. *v.*United States.

January 12, 1942.

*Mr. Chas. I. Dawson*for petitioner. *Solicitor General Fahy, Assistant Attor*
      *798
      *ney General Clark,*and *Messrs. J. Louis Monarch*and *Paul R. Russell*for the United States.

*797Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration and decision of this application.
#### State of New York, Respondent, v C.J. Burth Services, Inc., et al., Appellants.

Submitted January 10, 2011;

decided February 24, 2011

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 31.1

                                 CERTIFICATIONS

I, Clyde B. Anderson, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K/A of Books-A-Million, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the periods presented in this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report.

4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:


      a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
      disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision,
      to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including
      its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
      entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
      prepared;

      b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
      procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
      effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of
      the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

      c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal
      control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's
      most recent fiscal year that has materially affected, or is reasonably
      likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over
      financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent functions):

      a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

      b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.

Date: April 28, 2005

                                                 /s/ Clyde B. Anderson
                                                 ------------------------------
                                                 Clyde B. Anderson
                                                 Executive Chairman of the Board
II 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 804 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow certain coins to 

be acquired by individual retirement accounts and other individually 

directed pension plan accounts, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

APRIL 14, 2005 

Mr. VITTER introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow certain coins to be acquired by individual retirement accounts and other individually directed pension plan accounts, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Options for Investors 

5 through United States Certified Coins Act of 2005’’. 
2 

•S 804 IS

1 SEC. 2. CERTAIN COINS NOT TREATED AS COLLECTIBLES. 

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—Paragraph (3) of section 408(m) 

3 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to excep4 tion for certain coins and bullion) is amended— 

5 (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ‘‘or’’ at 

6 the end of clause (iii) and by inserting after clause 

7 (iv) the following new clause: 

8 ‘‘(v) a coin which— 

9 ‘‘(I) is certified by an inde10 pendent, third-party grading service, 

11 ‘‘(II) is, or was at any time, legal 

12 tender in the United States, and 

13 ‘‘(III) is traded on a nationally 

14 recognized electronic coin trading net15 work or listed by an independent coin 

16 wholesale reporting service, or’’, and 

17 (2) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ‘‘in coin 

18 or bar form’’ after ‘‘bullion’’. 

19 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

20 this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after 

21 December 31, 2004. 

Æ
Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-14-0001342

15-MAY-2015

09:07 AM
#### In the Matter of Transitional Services of New York for Long Island, Inc., Respondent-Appellant, v New York State Office of Mental Health et al., Appellants-Respondents.

Submitted August 24, 2009;

decided October 15, 2009

Reported below, 44 AD3d 673.

Motion to dismiss the cross appeal by petitioner herein granted, without costs, and cross appeal dismissed as moot.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

 FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

SILAS PIERCE AND ESTATE 

SALES STARS,

Appellants,

v. Case No. 5D15-2364

CHRISTOPHER KROHA,

Appellee.

________________________________/

Opinion filed September 30, 2016

Non-Final Appeal from the 

Circuit Court for Lake County,

Mark J. Hill, Judge.

Pamela R. Masters, Daytona Beach,

and Nicholas A. Shannin, of Shannin 

Law Firm, P.A., Orlando, for Appellants.

Sherri K. Dewitt, Moses R. Dewitt and 

Melissa L. Newmons, of Dewitt Law 

Firm, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The trial court entered a default judgment after Appellants (defendants below)1

filed a motion to dismiss and motion to clarify instead of an answer, as they had been 

 1 We use the term “Appellants” in the plural because that is the way the appeal is 

styled, and the arguments are framed as if two distinct defendants were involved. In fact, 

it appears from the record that “Estate Sales Stars” is simply a fictitious name for 
2

ordered to do. This was an abuse of discretion. Osheroff v. Osheroff, 694 So. 2d 855 

(Fla. 3d DCA 1997). Although the better practice to challenge this error would have been 

a direct appeal, there is authority that it may be challenged by a motion to vacate the 

judgment. Thaw, Gopman & Assocs., P.A. v. Jack J. Greenberg, M.D. & Assocs., P.A., 

595 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). Accordingly, we reverse and remand this cause for 

further proceedings.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

SAWAYA, TORPY and COHEN, JJ., concur.

 

defendant Pierce. Although the complaint and other pleadings refer to the so-called entity 

as “a Florida Corporation,” Appellee’s process server’s affidavit asserts to the contrary. 

Indeed, if it is a corporation, it is not correctly named. A Florida corporation’s name must 

contain words such as “corporation,” “incorporated,” “company,” or abbreviations for the

foregoing. § 607.0401(1), Fla. Stat. (2016). Although this issue is not raised in this appeal, 

the sloppy pleadings should be corrected to reflect the correct status and names of the 

parties.
Exhibit 32

CERTIFICATIONS

The
undersigned certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

| |     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | (1) | The
 accompanying Rimage Corporation Annual Report on Form 10-K for the period
 ended December 31, 2009, fully complies with the requirements of Section
 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| |     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
| | (2) | The
 information contained in the accompanying report fairly presents, in all
 material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
 Company.                                                

|                |                                        
|--------------- | ---------------------------------------
|March 12,
 2010 | /s/ Sherman
 L. Black                  
|                | President,
 Chief Executive Officer and
|                | Chief
 Operating Officer               
|                |                                        
|                | /s/ Robert
 M. Wolf                    
|                | Chief
 Financial Officer               

---
II 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 931 

To reduce temporarily the duty on certain articles of natural cork. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

APRIL 27, 2005 

Mr. BURNS introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To reduce temporarily the duty on certain articles of natural 

cork. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. CERTAIN ARTICLES OF NATURAL CORK. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of 

5 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is 

6 amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following 

7 new heading: 

‘‘ 9902.45.03 Articles of natural cork (provided for in subheading 

4503.90.60) ....... 6% No change No change On or before 

12/31/2008 ’’. 
2 

•S 931 IS 

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 subsection (a) applies with respect to goods entered, or 

3 withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 

4 the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED June 30, 2004 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-60644 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus TONY TERRELL ARMSTEAD, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 4:02-CR-21-ALL-LS

-------------------- Before JONES, BENAVIDES, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Tony Terrell Armstead appeals his conviction for burglary of the United States Post Office at Rose Hill, Mississippi, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2115. Armstead argues that the evidence fails to support his conviction. Armstead contends that two Government witnesses implicated him in an attempt to exonerate themselves and that their testimony was not worthy of belief. The jury accepted the Government’s evidence and rejectedNo. 03-60644 -2- Armstead’s explanation of events. We will not disturb that credibility determination. United States v. Runyan , 290 F.3d 223, 240 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 537 U.S. 888 (2002) . The evidence supports Armstead’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.