I ntere stingly , despite the trial court’s express finding that there w ere no chang ed cir cumstance s 1 justi fy i n g a modification in the order, the c ourt g rante d Duck’ s reque st for modification of the possession order c oncer

ning T hursday

nights. As Wil liamson does not appea l the g rant of ove rnig ht possession on Thursday s, the majority opinion does not address this appa rent inconsistenc y . 

### TEX A S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00311- CV

In the Interestof

J . R. D. and T . C. D.

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COU NTY, 353RD J UDICIAL DISTRI CT NO. FM00 2362 , HONO RABLE LOR A J . LIVINGSTON, J UDGE PRESIDING

C O N C U R

R I N G O P I N I O N The majority

appar ently

aff irms the district c ourt’s decision that Duck f ailed to show “cha ng ed cir cumstance s” so as to justify modification of the order
. Be cause Iag ree that the cour t 1 did not err in its decision in that reg ard, I concur in the result rea ched by the majority . Howeve r, I write sepa

rate ly to express my

belief that the standards c urren t l y u s ed in making and re viewing order s that have t h e ef

fe ct o f l imiti ng a par ent’s ac cess to his or her children do not re flec t the le g isl a tiv e mand a te re g ard ingpa re nta l a c c e ss, no r do the y a de qu a te ly re sp e c t th e sc op e of

the lib e rt y interest enjoy ed by

a par ent in rea

ring his or her ow n children. Be cause of the g ravity

of the c onstitut ional ri gh t s an d i ntere sts at stake in such proce eding s, and bec ause the curr ent standar d is based upon outdate d n o t i o ns of par enting that2

pr e date the fa

mil y c od e and ru n c ounte r t o th e le g isl a tur e ’s state d p oli c y c on c e rn ingc hil dr e n’ s b e st interests, trial cour

ts should jus tify deviation from maximum fea sible time with both parents by clea r and convinc ing e vidence and make fac tual finding s, and appe llate cour ts shoul d car efully

revie w those finding s.

Th e c us tod

y is su e ent ert aine d b y

the c ourt in t his c a se is o ne fa c e d b y

tr ia l c ourt s countless times ever

y day . Yet, while t h e l i b erty interest at issue is “pe rhaps the olde st of the fundame ntal interests re cog nized,” Tro x e l v. Gr an v ill e , 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000), the standa rds by which the trial courts decide and conseque ntly , by which appellate courts revie w thes e d ec isions of fe r min ima l re c og nit ion of the g ra vit y of the lib e rt

y int e re sts pa

re nts and c hil dr e n ho ld in th eir rela t i o n s h ips and littl e prote ction to the individuals invol ved. Our trial courts ope rate under a p re p o n d era

nce of the evidenc e standa

rd in these c ases a

nd appellate courts apply an abuse of dis c re tion stand ard

in r e vie wi ngtho se de c isi on s. Thus , e ve n a g a ins t th e ba c kg ro un d o f t he se monumental rig hts a

nd expli cit leg islative direc tives to limit a pare nt’s time wi t h a child on ly as
nece ssary , see Te x. F a m. Cod e An n. § 15 3. 19 3 (We st 20 02 ), a tr ia l c ourt , if it we re e ve r s o s lig htl y
mor e pe rs ua de d in one dir e c tio n than an oth e r, may make a de c isi on pr of ound ly a ff e c tin g the ri g hts
and a bil iti e s of pare nts to ra ise the ir c hil dr e n, and un le ss we c an say that no re a so na

ble min d c ou ld have r eac hed the c ourt’s conc l u s i o n , we leave it undist urbed. Apare nt’s interest in the
c omp anio ns hip , c are , c us tod y , and mana g e me nt of his or he r c hil dr e n is pa ra mou nt a nd de mand s a respe ct much g reater than that due the liberties de ri v e d f r o m m e r e “ s h if

tingeconomic a

rra ng ements.” Sta nle yv . I lli no is , 4 05 U. S. 6 45 , 6 51 (1 97 2) . H ow e ve r, in p ra c tic e , issu es of sh if tin g e c on omi c
arr ang e me nts of

te n r e c e ive mor e pr ote c tio n. F or ins tanc e , in a divo rc e , a par ty se e kin g to o ve rc ome3

the community proper

ty presumption must prove an item is separate prope rty by the hig her standa

rd of cle ar a nd convincing evidenc e. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.003 ( West 1998). Clear and c onvincing evidenc e is that measure or degr ee of proof that produce s in the m ind of a fact- finder a firm belief or convic tion of the truth of the matter soug ht to be established. In re C.H. , 8 9 S. W. 3 d 1 7 , 2 3 ( T e x. 2002). L imitations on pare ntal acc ess to children, how ever , need not be supported by evidenc e upon wh ic h th e fa c t- fi nd e r c ou ld f or m a fi rm be lie f o r c on vic tio n. Th is s tand ard is t ota ll y at odds wi th both the fundame ntal nature of the constitutional rig hts at issue and the leg islature’s stated p o l icy and mandate.
Intere sts of p arents and child ren and the State

Th e ri g ht t o th e c omp anio ns hip , c are , c us tod y , a nd c on tr ol of on e’s ow n c hil d is a fundame ntal liberty

interest fa

r more pr ecious than a

ny proper ty rig ht. In re M

.S. , 115 S.W .3d 534, 5 4 7 -4 8 (T ex . 2 0 0 3 ) ( ci t i n g Santosky v . Kramer , 4 5 5 U
. S. 7 4 5 , 7 5 8

- 5 9 ( 1 9 8 2 ) )
. T h u s , “the relationship betwee n pare nt and child is constitutionally protec ted.” Troxel , 530 U.S. at 66 (citing Qu ill ion v . W

alc ott , 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978))
. Parents have t he responsibili ty and the rig ht to direct the upbring ing a

nd educa tion of their childre n. Id
. at 6 5 (c i t i n g Pi e rc e v . S oc ie ty of S ist e rs , 2 68 U. S. 51 0, 53 4- 35 (1 92 5) ). I n f a c t, i t is “ c ard ina l” that the c us tod y , care , an d nur

tur e of a c hil d r e sid e in the par ents. Id
. at 6 5 (c i t i n g Pr inc e v . M as sa c hu se tts , 3 21 U. S. 1 58 , 1 66 (1 94 4) ). I t ha s b e e n f ir mly est ablished that the Due Process Clause of the Four

teenth Amendme nt to the United States Constit ution protects the funda mental rig ht s o f parents to make de cisions conce rning the ca re, custody , and contr ol of their childre n. Id. at 66. “[T]he Due Proce ss Clause does not permit States4

to inf ri ng e on the fu

nd a me nta l r ig ht o f p are nts to m a ke c hil d r e ari ngde c isi on s si mpl y be c a us e a state judge believes a

‘better ’ dec ision could be made.” Id . at 72-73. Chi ldr e n a lso have a

su bs tanti a l i nt e re st i n th e pr oc e e din g s th a t de te rm ine the ir custody and the dire ction of their lives. See M .S. , 115 S.W .3d at 547. B oth pare nt and child have
a we i gh t y i n t erest in the acc urac y and justice of a

decision af

fec ting their

ability to have a relationship wit h one anothe r. Id
. (re cog nizi ng this substantial interest in contex t of termination of pa re nta l r ig hts ). Th e State a lso ha s an in te re st i n p ro te c tin g the we lf are of its c hil dr e n, wh ic h “ mus t initially manifest itself by working toward preserv ing the fa mil ia l bo nd ” be tw e e n a

pa re nt a nd c hil d unless that pare nt will not provide a safe , stable environme nt. Id. at 548.

Whil e the g ra

nt o f c us tod

y to a no the r or the lim itatio n of a pare nt’ s a c c e ss t o a c hil d is not tantamount to absolute termination of pare ntal rig hts, the State must tread ver y car efully when it in f r in g e s u p o n a p ar e n t’ s a

b il it y to p arti c ip a te in c h il d

rea ring
. S

ee Troxel , 530 U.S. at 72-73. Even whe n it does not terminate rig hts, a court that tre nches on a pare nt’s ability

to rea r his or her children may also violate the United States Constitution. Id
. at 67. Also, the Tex as S upreme Court has re cog nized that custody deter minations as betwee n fit pare nts can risk a sig nificant de privation simil ar to ter

mination of the relationship. See Lewel l i n g v. L ewelling , 796 S.W .2d 164, 168 n.8 (Tex. 1990) (“[w]hile this may not . .
. technica lly be a te rmination of par ental rig hts action, it may have suc h an ef

fec t”; wher e mother without adequate transpor tation lives some distance fr om son, exis tence of visitation rights is likely to be insufficie nt to allow he r “to have a substantial role in her
c hil d’ s u pb ri ng ing ” ). Th e we ig hty int e re sts of pa re nts , c hil dr e n, and the Sta te in a jus t and a c c ur a te d e c i s i o n m a n d a t e tha t “ any signific ant risk of e rrone ous deprivation is unac cepta ble.” M.S. , 1155

S.W. 3d a t 54 9 ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . O ur govern ment re sp e c ts f

it p are nts ’ a

bil iti e s to a c t in

the be st interests of their

children by

applying a presumption that they do so. Troxel , 530 U.S. at 68. The Un it ed S tat es Sup re me Cou rt ha s r e c og nize d th a t, i n a c c or d w iththi s p re su mpt ion , s o lo nga s a pare nt is “fit,” there is nor mally no rea son for the State to injec t itself betwee n pare nt a nd child or disturb that pare nt’s rea

ring of his or her

children. Id
. at 68-69. I n other wor ds, court interf ere nce with the rig ht of a fit pare nt to bring up his or her ow n child impacts a funda mental rig ht and may violate the Due Process Clause.
The fam ilyc ode

Th e fa mil y c od e ’s statut or

y sc he me fo c us e s o n t he childr e n’ s w e lf are and be st interests. Tex. F am. Code Ann. § 153.002 (2002) ( “The best interest of the child shall alway s be the primary co n s i d eration of the cour t in determining the issues of conse rvatorship a nd possession of
and a c c e ss t o th e c hil d. ” ); M.S. , 1 1 5 S.W. 3da t 54 9; Lenz v. Lenz , 79 S.W .3d 10, 14 (Tex. 2002) (re iterating l egi s l ature’s mandate that best interest of c hild is primary consideration). Consist ent wi th l e g isl a tiv e mand a te , T e xas c ourt s h a ve reco gniz ed th a t it is i n th e be st i nte re st o f c hil dr e n to have “maximum rea sonable visitation” with parents. See W ood v. W ood , 5 1 0 S. W. 2 d

3 9 9 , 4 0 0 ( T e x. Civ . App .—F or

t Wor th 19 74 , n o w ri t) (l a me nti ngthat di vo rc e d p are nts of te n a llo w t

he ir anim os ity towards one another

to overshadow

conce rn that childre n maintain healthy relationships wit h other pare nt, harming children w hether resulting in constant conflict or g radua l absenc e of one pare nt). The W ood court’s te rminology

is an incident of its t i m e; t h e current f amily code doe s not use the
wo rd “ v i s i t a t i o n , ” an d

c o u rt s h a v e a d o p t e d

t h e v i e w t h a ta

p ar e n t ’ s t i m e o f

p o s s e s s i o nan d

a c c e ss6

should not be considere d “visiting w i t h ” t h at par ent, but “living w ith” him or her. See Norris v. Nor ris , 56 S.W .3d 333, 335 n.1, 345 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2001, no pet.) (r ecog nizi ng meaning ful distinction between “ visiti ng ” and “ pare nting” ). We shou l d re cognize that fit pare nts should be allowed not just to visit , but to parent their c hildren.

Our leg islature has pr onounced its policy deter mination in all sui ts aff

ec t i n g the pare nt-child relationship: (a ) Th e pu

bli c po lic y

of thi s st a te is t o: (1 ) a ssu re tha t c hil dr e n w ill have fr e qu e nt and c on tin uin g c on ta c t w ithpa

re nts wh o h a ve sh ow n th e a

bil ity to a c t in the be st i nte re st o f t

he c hil d; (2) provide a

safe , stable, and nonviolent e nvironment for the child; and (3) encour ag e parents t o share in the rig hts and duties of ra ising their c hild after the par ents have separ ated or dissolved their marr iag e.
Te x. F a m. Cod e Ann. § 15 3. 00 1( a ) (We st 20 02 ). I t is inc umb e nt up on c ourt s to fo llo w s uc h p ub lic policy imperatives in interpr eting the family code. Lenz , 79 S
. W
. 3 d at 14 (re viewing policy and applying it to modification and r elocation context ).

The leg islature has implemente d this policy by direc ting c ourts that “[t] he ter ms of
ano r d e r th a t d e n ie s p o s s e s s io no f a c h il d to a p ar e n t o r im p o s e s r e s tr ic ti o n s o r

li mi tations on a pare nt’s rig ht to possession of or acc ess t o a child may not ex cee d those that are required to protect the best intere st of the child.” Te x . Fam. Code Ann. § 153.193 (West 2002) (“ Minimal Restriction on Parent’s Possession or Acc ess”) (empha sis added). In order to protect c hildren’s a

biliti es to have
a mea ningf ul relationship with their pare nts, the l eg islature determined that the standa rd possessionB u t s e e T ex . Fa m . C o d e An n . § 153.317 (West Supp. 2004-05) (extending e vening periods 2 including Sunday s to the time school beg ins the following da y ). 7 order would set a pre sumptive minimum amount of time f or possession of a child by a j o int manag ing c onservator pare nt. Id . § 15 3. 13 7 (We st Supp . 200 4- 05 ). I n its in str uc tio ns ho w t o a

pp ly the “ g uid e lin e s e sta

bli sh e d in

the sta nd ard po sse ssi on

or de r, ” the l egislatur e re pe a te d it s char acte rization of the perio d s as the minimum guar antee d to a joint manag ing c onservator. Id
. § 153.251 (West 2002) (standa rd orde r is “intended to guide the courts in orde ring the terms and conditions for possession of a c hild by a par ent named a s a possessory conser vator or as the minimum possession for a joint manag ing c onservator”) ( emphasis adde d).

Sa dly , in many c a se s, tr i a l c o u

r ts atte mpt ingto d isp os e of me ssy div or c e s a s e qu ita

bly and expeditiously

as possible simply

automati cally

adopt the minimum outl ined in the standar d possession order w ithout considering whether that order

wi l l impose limi ts upon possession and
acc ess in excess of those ne ce s s ar y t o p rot ect the be st interests of the c hildren. The tr ial court’s emphasis on the standa

rd possession order in this case is illustrative. The cour t, in gr anting Duck’ s reque st for Thursd ay o v er n ight stay s, expl ained, “ That’s in the standa rd possession schedule and there ’s no re ason why

he ca n’t make that e lection and have the standard sc hedule that e very other dad g ets.” In denying the Sunday night ove rnig ht reque st, the court opined that the sta ndard po sse ssi on

or de r w a s a

pp ro pr ia te and

tha t it did no t in c lud e that ni g ht. Th e c ourt awa rd e d f e e s to 2 the m o ther, a lthough she only partially preva iled, beca

use she ha d to defe nd ag ainst Duck’s unpersua sive Constit utional c laims, sa y ing “I think that rea lly if dad had just wa nted a T h ursdayAlso, the court repe atedly expressed concern that, beca use the children wer e thriving under the 3 curr ent orde r, it would be better to leave the schedule unch an ged rather than r isk disrupting the c hil dr e n. Th e ide a

that mo re tim e wi th a

fi t pa re nt w ho is a c tiv e ly

e ng a g e d in a chi ld ’s life is potentially

a risk or detrimental to a child runs counter to stated leg islative policy favor ing pa

renta l inv olv e me nt i n c hil dr e n’ s li ve s. 8 overnig ht, pursuant to the standar d schedule , that would have been hard for mom to re sist,” imply ing that, had Duc k mere ly

reque sted the statutory

minimum , the cour

t would not have aw arded fee s ag ainst him. The court appea rs to ha ve inadver

tently substitut ed the word “ rea sonable” wher e the 3 leg islature used “ minimum ” in se ction 153.137' s direc tion f or the prope r application of the standar d possession order
. The family code does not envision lim iting a pa rent’s time with a c hild to what “eve ry other da d g ets.” Courts h a v e a

r e s p o n s ib il it

y to d o mo r e th ana

u to mati c a ll y

a d o p t a s ta ndard minimum . I nstead, in making and re viewing these de cisions we nee d to rec og ni z e t h at t he circ umstances of

eac h case will dictate diffe rent c ustody arr ang ements and that, for the c hildren of Texas, one size does not fit all. Reading sections 153.193 (a llowing only nece ssary limit ations on pa re nt’ s a c c e ss) , 1 53 .1 37 (s ta nd ard or de r p re su mpt ive min imum) , a nd 15 3. 25 1 ( sta

nd ard or de r s e ts minimum for joint manag ing conservators) t og ether , it appea rs t hat, t o comply with the family code,
ever y court that imposes limitations on a parent’s r ight to possession o f o r ac cess to a c hild by adopting the s t an d ard posse ssion order ha s made a n express or implied finding of fac t that that pa rt ic ula r l imi ta tio n o n th e pa

re nt’ s ti me wi th t

he c hil d is required to protec t the best i ntere sts of the child. The leg islature has de clar ed a pr esumpt i o n t h at i t i s i n the child’s best intere st to have the minimum amount of time with anyre a so na bly sa fe pa re nt, and it mak es no se ns e —n or is i tUnder the abuse of discre tion standard, we defe r to the trial cour t’s finding s beca

use the trial 4 court “ is in the best positi on to observe the demea nor and pe rsonalities of the w i t n es s es an d can ‘fe el’ the f

orce s, powers, a

nd influences that cannot be discerne d” fr om rea ding a cold re cord. Nor ris v . No rri

s , 56 S.W .3d 333, 338 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2001, no pet.). 9 a uth or ize d—

to b lin dly a pp ly that sa me min imum of

tim e to a pare nt w ho is n ot m e re ly sa fe bu t is an intere sted and a ctive influenc e in his or her child’s life without r eg ard to the deg ree of emotional eng ag ement or bondingbet we en t h e p are nt and child. Whatever latitude courts have in setting possession pe riods, they do not ha ve the discretion to automatica lly adopt the minimum and ignor e the le g isl a tur e ’s e xplic it d ir e c tiv e in s e c tio n 153 .1 93 to a llo w m a ximumfe a sib le tim e wi th b oth pa re nts un le ss d oin g oth e rw ise wo uld imp a ir the c hil dr e n’ s in te re sts
. Stand ard of Proof and S tandard of Review The leg islature has not a

rticulated a

standard by which appellate courts should review
or de rs se tti ng po sse ssi on pe ri od s; be c a us e tr ia l court s ar e the fa c t- fi nd e rs wh o d e te rm ine wh a t is in the childre n’s best intere st, appellate courts have applied an abuse of discr etion standard of revie w. See , e.g. , Gi lle

sp ie v . G ill esp ie , 6 44 S.W. 2d 44 9, 45 1 ( Te x. 19 82 ). Th e dis c re tio n c ourt s h a ve in 4 deter mining the f

actua l issue of

children’ s best interests, howe ver, is not unfe ttered. See H olley v. Adams , 5 44 S.W. 2d

36 7, 37 1- 72 (T e x. 19 76 ) (no n-exha us tiv e ly lis tin g fa c tor s c ourt s c on sid e r i n deter mining whether termination of par ental rig hts is in children’s best intere sts); See also In reJane Doe 2 , 1 9 S. W. 3 d 2 7 8 , 2 8 2 ( T e x. 2 0 0 0 ) ( a p p ly in g n o n - e xh a

u s ti v e li s t of Holley

fac tors “for deter mining a minor’ s best interests” to fa ctual dete rmination of best interest of minor in par ental notification ca se). The supreme c ourt reco gn i zed in Jane D oe 2 that a trial c ourt should make10

expli cit fac t findings r eg ardinga child’s be st inter est in or der to a llow me aning ful appe llate re view. See J ane Doe2 , 19 S.W .3d at 282. Wit hout suc h finding s, it is i mpossible to meaningf ully revie w any such dec isions. Id
.

Texas appellate c ourts’ treatment of best intere st deter m i n at ions in the context of termination of par ental rig hts is inconsistent with their treatment of the best intere st determination trial courts a

re dire cted to make (and a ppellate c ourt s must review) in custody and possession decisions. Ter

mination findings, including the best intere st finding, survive fac tual sufficie ncy
c ha lle ng e s o nly

if the fo llo wi nghe ig hte ne d s tand ard is m e t; the e vid e nc e mus t be su c h that a
rea sonable fa ct finder

could form a

firm belief

or convic tion that the finding s are corr ect. C.H. , 89 S.W .3d at 18-19. The y

survive leg al suffic iency challeng es where, in examining t he evidence in the light mos t favor able to the findi ng s and dis reg ardingevidenc e a r easona ble fa ct finder

could have disbelieved, the a

ppellate c ourt deter

mines that a re asonable fac t finder c ould have fo rm ed a firm belief or conviction that the finding s are corr ect. In re J .F .C. , 96 S.W .3d 256, 265-66 (Te x . 2002). Th is h e ig hte ne d s tand ard is a pp ro pr ia te be c a

us e c a se s in vo lving ter mina tio n o f p are nta l r ig hts
r e qu ir e th e f

in d in g s to b e b a s e d u

p o n c le ar an d c o n v in c ing e vidence
. Id
. at 2 6 4 (c i t i n g C.H. , 89 S.W. 3d a t 25 ). Te rm inatio n fi nd ing s mus t be su pp or te d b y c le ar a nd c on vin c inge vid e nc e be c a us e termination of the pare nt-child rela tionship is a drastic r emedy of such we ight a

nd g ravity

that due proce ss require s the state to justify it by more substantial proof

than a pr eponder ance of the e vidence
. C.H. , 89 S.W .3d at 23.

Although c ustody

and possession deter

minations as betwee n pare n t s are not as pe rm ane nt o r d

ra sti c a s ter

min a tio n of pare nta l rig hts , thos e iss ue s c an s e ve re ly lim it the re la tio ns hipFor

instance, the standard posse ssion order c ompletely subjects a p ar en t ’s ri gh t t o have a ny 5 c on ta c t w ithhe r c hil d to the dis c re tio n of the oth e r p are nt d

ur ingpe ri od s d

ur ingwh ic h th e c hil d is in the other pa

rent’s posse ssion, often for da y s or wee ks at a time. 11 and have the potential to profoundly impair the fundame ntal liberty interest of pare nts a nd children in the pare nt-child relationship. There fore , Iwould urg e that the standa rd of pr oof in the trial cour t 5 be re -examined. The standa rd of pr oof instructs the fa ct fi n d er on the deg ree of conf idence our society believes it should have in the corr ectne ss of fac tual conclusions for a ny g iven adjudication. Santosky , 4 5 5 U. S
. at 7 5 4 -5 5 (c i t i n g Addington v. Texas , 441 U.S. 418 (1979)). Thus, the standard
re fl e c ts the w eig ht a

nd g ra vit y of the int e re sts a ff

e c te d a nd so c ie ty ’s jud g me nt a

bo ut h owthe ri sk of er ror should be distributed. Id . at 755. The U nited States Supreme Court “ha s mandated a n intermediate standard of proof—‘ clea r and convincing evidenc e’—w hen the individual intere sts at stake in a state pr ocee ding a re both ‘pa

rticularly important’ and ‘ more substantial than mer e loss of money .’” Id
. at 7 5 6 (c i t i n g Addington , 4 41 U. S. at 42 4)
. Th e Court de e me d th is l e ve l of c e rt a int y
nece ssary to preser ve funda mental fairness i n a variety of proceeding s that threaten the individual involved with a sig nificant de privation of liberty
. Id . Whether the loss threatene d by any g iven proce eding is sufficiently gra v e t o war rant re quiring a heig htened leve l of ce rtainty turns on the nature of the private intere st and the per manenc y of the thre atene d loss. Id . at 758. Where, a s here , the threatened loss is compelling , incre asing the burden of proof is a way to impress the fa ct finder with the g ravity

of the de cision. Se e id . at 764-65. The c urre nt court-c reated standar d allows a trial c o u rt holding se vere ly curta iling pa re nta l r ig hts to s tand

so lon g a s th e re is some evidenc e upon which to ba se its fin d i n gs and an appellant doe s not show that the court failed to follow anyg uiding r ules or princ iples. This standard12

is inc onsistent with the Constit utional na ture and weig hty import of the rig hts at issue. Se e Tro x e l, 53 0 U. S. a t 72 -7 3 (f

un dame nta l ri g ht of pa

re nts to r e ar c hil dr e n c ann ot b e inf ri ng e d s imp ly

be c a us e state cour t has dec ided it would be bett er for c hildren). I t presents a signific ant risk of e rrone ous deprivation of the most sacre d of l i b er t y i n t er es t s of par ents and c hildren. Se e id . at 73 (c iting Pierce , 268 U.S. at 534-35, which holds spec ial liberty interest of pa

rents includes r ight to dire ct up br ing ingof

c hil dr e n) ; M.S. , 115 S.W .3d at 549 (sig nificant risk of de privation unac cepta ble). I t also falls far

short of showing proper

respe ct to the leg islature’s deliberate policy de c isi on s c om man di ng Tex as co urt s t o s up po rtandcul ti vat e rel ati on sh ip s b etw een ch il dren a nd the ir pa re nts so lon g a s tho se pa

re nts are fi t and to imp le me nt ma ximumpa re nt- c hil d c on ta c t to a c tiv e ly preserv e family

relationships often ma de all too fra g ile by pare nts’ inabilities to set aside persona l animosity long e noug h to rec og nize their children’ s need f or their other

pare nt. The cur

rent sta nd ard s p re date su c h p oli c y de te rm inatio ns and

thu s, un surpr is ing ly , f

a ils to t a ke the m in to
acc ount. I n Gi lle

sp ie , the supreme court rec ited the abuse of discretion standard and supported it by ref ere nce to Le it ho ld

v. Plas s , 413 S.W .2d 698, 700 (Tex. 1967), and for mer Te x as F amily

Code sections 14.01 and 14.05. Se e Gi lle sp ie , 644 S.W .2d at 451. Howe ver, “ Le ith old is b a se d e nti re ly on common, judge -made law. I t prec eded the enac tment of the F am i l y C o d e, specific ally section 153.131, which makes joint custody the public policy

of this state.” De nn is v . S mi th , 962 S.W .2d 67, 69 (Tex. A

pp.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1997, pet. denied)
. Le ith old , along with the standard it has pr op a g a te d, is a re lic of ano the r time ; it dis tin g uis he d b e tw e e n a

c ha ng e in c us tod

y and a c ha ng e in visitation, concepts the fa mily code no long er f

avors, by ref ere nce to the supe rior rig hts one pare nt enjoy ed over

the other, w hich is “a f

undamental dif

fer ence ” fr om the curr ent family code policy13

f a v o r in g jo in t ma

n a g in g c o n s e r

v a torship. Se e De nn is , 9 6 2 S
. W
. 2 d at 6 9 (a l s o n o t i n g Le ith old dis se nt’ s anti qu a te d c on de mna tio n of “e vil ” of

“ sp lit c us tod y ,” a pp are ntl y bo rn fr om c on te xt in wh ic h “ the law the n e nd or se d s e x dis c ri min a tio n in fa vo r of wo me n, g ivi ngthe m pr e fe re nc e in c hil d
c us tody c a se s, ” and

c on tr a sti ngc ur

re nt n or ms e mbo die d in

joi nt m ana g ingc on se rv a tor statut e desig ned to undo that very construct) . The diff

ere nces be tween the curr ent and or igina l family code provisions similarly show that the old sta ndard is no longe r appropr iate. For mer c h ap t er 14, g overningconser

vatorship, possession, and ac cess, envisioned appointment of a manag ing
c on se rv a tor , p re fe ra

bly a pa re nt, e sse nti a lly

g ivi ng the tr ia l c ourt the c ho ic e be tw e e n tw o p os sib le
conser vators, a c hoice that wa s difficult for a ppellate c ourts to second-guess. See Act of Ma y 25, 1973, 63d L eg ., R.S., ch. 543, 1973 Tex. Gen. L aws 1411, 1422-26, re peale d Act of A pril 6, 1995, 74th L eg ., R.S., ch. 20, § 2, 1995 Tex. Gen. L aws 113 , 282. Current fa mily code c hapter

153, g overning conser

vatorship, possession, a

nd acc ess, no longe r leave s that broad choic e t o t h e t rial court; it has ef

fec tively chosen bo th pare nts as the childre n’s conse rvators by p ro v i d i n g fo r joint manag ing c onservatorship, Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.005 (West 2002), ar ticulating the policy

that pare nts should share in the rig hts and duties of child rea ring and have fre quent, continuing contac t with the child, id . § 153.001, and mandating only minimal restriction on either pa rent’s posse ssion
o r a cce ss, id
. § 1 5 3
. 1 9 3
. U n d e r f o r me r c h a p te r 1 4 , w h ic h c o n ta in e d te n s e c ti o n s , tr ia l courts had broad discr etion to determine a nd eff ectuate c h i l d re n ’s best i ntere sts. I n curr ent cha pter 153, containing some six ty sections, i n contra st, the leg islature has spe cified a nd articulated pre fer ence s
an d g u id an c e f

o r c o u rts ma k in g c o n s e r

v a to r s h ip an d

p o s s e s s io nd e te r

mi n a ti o n s . I ns h o rt, t

h e c o n te xt that g a ve ri se to the a

bu se of dis c re tio n sta

nd ard of re vie w in the se c a se s— a c ourt havin g to a

pp ly14

presumptions in favor of one or the other pa rent a nd decide what is in a child’s be st interest based entirely upon the par

ties’ cr edibility and other fac ts before it—no longer exis ts. Today ’s cour

ts have g uidance and re sponsibili ties bey ond those exist ing forty y ear s ag o, y et our pe rsistence in apply ing a lesser standard still allows our judicial sy stem to g loss over the leg islature’s directives and affir m a trial court’s authority to rule on the ba rest of e vidence if any

rea sonable mind could have rea ched the same c onclusion.

Despite the U nited States Supreme Court’s dete rmination to s u b j ect infr inge ment upon such funda

mental rig hts to strict scrutiny and of our own leg islature’s mandate to preserve and foster pa rent-c hild relationship s , T e xa s c o u r ts h a v e d e v e lo p e d

a jur isprudence under w hich trial cour t decisions seve rely

curta iling that relationship stand absent an abuse of discretion. Se e Gi lle

sp ie , 644 S.W .2d at 451. Considering the importance of and the risk to the rig hts at issue and the leg islature’s clea r mandates that courts take measure s to p ro t ect this most sacre d of re lationships, I believe w e need to c are ful l y re -ex amine the standa rds by which dec isions that li mit a pare nt’s acc ess to or possession of a c hild are ma de and r eviewe d.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Filed: Jul y

14, 2005