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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PAULETTE STENZEL, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

FOR PUBLICATION 

December 22, 2016 

9:00 a.m. 

v No. 328804 

Ingham Circuit Court 

BEST BUY COMPANY, INC. and SAMSUNG 

ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., 

LC No. 14-000527-NO 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and O’CONNELL and BECKERING, JJ. 

M. J. KELLY, P.J. 

 Plaintiff Paulette Stenzel appeals as of right the trial court’s orders granting summary 

disposition in favor of defendants Best Buy Company Incorporated (Best Buy) and Samsung 

Electronics America Incorporated (Samsung). For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm 

the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of Samsung but reverse the trial 

court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of Best Buy. 

I. BASIC FACTS 

 This case arises from Stenzel’s purchase of a Samsung refrigerator/freezer (the 

refrigerator) from Best Buy. According to Stenzel, Best Buy delivered the appliance to her home 

and installed it. As part of the installation, Best Buy connected the refrigerator’s ice maker and 

water dispenser to the existing water line in the home. About two days later, Stenzel returned 

home to find that the refrigerator had begun spraying water through the dispenser on its front 

door and onto her kitchen floor. Stenzel unsuccessfully attempted to stop the water by adjusting 

a water or ice dispenser lever, pressing buttons on the control panel, and, at the direction of a 

Best Buy employee, trying to disconnect the flow of water to the refrigerator using a valve at the 

back of the appliance. When none of those steps worked, the Best Buy employee directed her to 

shut off the water line for her home, which she did after climbing a ladder in her basement into a 

crawl space under her kitchen. Stenzel testified that when she was in the crawl space, she 

discovered that water had leaked through the floor into the crawl space. Further, she testified 

that the coating of water in the kitchen extended partially around an island counter that was three 

and a half to four feet away from the refrigerator. 
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 Stenzel testified that she was frantic to clean up the standing water because she was 

concerned about water damage. She explained that she took every towel available and covered 

almost the entire surface where water had been standing. Stenzel testified that at first she 

attempted to wring the wet towels out in the sink, but there was too much water. She then put 

some of the towels in a lattice laundry basket. Because it was heavy with water and wet towels, 

she dragged the basket through her living room, down two steps in her sunroom, and across the 

sunroom in order to get the towels outside. After hanging the towels, she returned for a second 

load. According to Stenzel, this time when she was walking through her sunroom, attempting to 

drag the basket outside, her “foot went out from under [her]” and she fell and broke her leg and 

ankle. She testified that she fell because her feet were wet or because the floor in the sunroom 

was wet from dragging the basket of wet towels through the room. 

 In April 2014, Stenzel brought suit against Best Buy, alleging negligence, breach of 

contract, and breach of warranty. In May 2015, she amended her complaint to add claims 

against Samsung. Best Buy moved for summary disposition, which the trial court granted in 

April 2015 after finding that Stenzel had failed to establish causation. Samsung also moved for 

summary disposition, which the trial court granted in July 2015 after finding that Stenzel had 

again failed to establish causation and that her claims against Samsung were barred by the statute 

of limitations. 

II. SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 Stenzel argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition in favor of Best 

Buy and Samsung. This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary 

disposition. Marilyn Froling Revocable Living Trust v Bloomfield Hills Country Club, 283 Mich 

App 264, 279; 769 NW2d 234 (2009). Under MCR 2.116(C)(10), a party may be entitled to 

summary disposition if there is no genuine issue with respect to any material fact and the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 278. All documentary evidence submitted 

by the parties is considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. 

B. CAUSATION 

 In order to establish causation, a plaintiff must establish both cause in fact and legal 

cause, i.e. proximate cause. Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 162-163; 516 NW2d 475 

(1994). “The cause in fact element generally requires showing that “but for” the defendant’s 

actions, the plaintiff’s injury would not have occurred.” Id. at 163. Legal cause “normally 

involves examining the foreseeability of consequences, and whether a defendant should be held 

legally responsible for such consequences.” Id. Here, the trial court found that Stenzel had 

failed to establish either cause in fact or proximate cause. 

 In Skinner, our Supreme Court explained: 

 The plaintiff must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for 

the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was 

a cause in fact of the result. A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; 

and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the 
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probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct 

a verdict for the defendant. [Id. at 165 (quotation and internal quotation marks 

omitted).] 

Here, the record reflects that a significant quantity of water leaked from the refrigerator and onto 

the floor. While cleaning that water up to prevent water damage, Stenzel slipped in her sunroom 

on what she described as “wet.” Although she was not certain whether the wet came from water 

on her foot or whether it came from water on the floor, she was absolutely certain that it was 

from one or the other. Her testimony further established that she was barefoot while cleaning up 

and that she had attempted to clean the water up by laying down towels, which she then dragged 

through the sunroom in a lattice laundry basket. Viewed in the light most favorable to Stenzel, a 

reasonable jury could infer that it is more likely than not that water leaked from the laundry 

basket onto the floor while she was dragging the basket out. Alternatively, a jury could infer that 

it is more likely than not that Stenzel’s feet were wet because of the water in the kitchen which 

came from the refrigerator.1

 Accordingly, on this record, but for Best Buy and Samsung’s 

alleged negligence, Stenzel would not have had water on either her feet or on the floor in the 

sunroom and she would not have fallen while cleaning up the water caused by the defective 

refrigerator. The trial court erred in dismissing the case based on a finding of no cause in fact. 

 Best Buy and Samsung argue that even if cause in fact is established, Stenzel still failed 

to establish proximate cause because it was not foreseeable that she would injure herself in a 

different room after she succeeded in stopping the water from spraying from the refrigerator. 

Proximate cause is “such cause as operates to produce particular consequences without the 

intervention of any independent, unforeseen cause, without which the injuries would not have 

occurred.” Babula v Robertson, 212 Mich App 45, 54; 536 NW2d 834 (1995). In order for an 

injury to be proximately caused by a defendant’s actions, “the injury must be the natural and 

probable consequence of a negligent act or omission, which under the circumstances, an ordinary 

prudent person ought reasonably to have foreseen might probably occur as a result of his 

negligent act.” Dawe v Bar-Levav & Assoc (On Remand), 289 Mich App 380, 393-394; 808 

NW2d 240 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Proximate cause is usually a 

factual issue to be decided by the trier of fact, but if the facts bearing on proximate cause are not 

disputed and if reasonable minds could not differ, the issue is one of law for the court. Nichols v 

Dobler, 253 Mich App 530, 532; 655 NW2d 787 (2002). 

 In this case, the conduct that created a risk of harm was either Best Buy installing the 

appliance improperly or Samsung providing a defective appliance, causing water to spray from 

the appliance and onto the kitchen floor. A “foreseeable, natural, and probable consequence” of 

 

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 Samsung suggests that the “wet” on Stenzel’s feet could have come from outside. However, 

there is nothing in the record that indicates whether there was anything outside that could have 

caused Stenzel’s feet to become wet, i.e., there is no testimony that it was raining, that the grass 

outside was wet, etc. Therefore, given that this theory is based wholly on speculation with no 

basis in the record, it is not sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of fact with regard to where 

the water on Stenzel’s feet came from. 
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water on the floor is that someone may slip and fall after coming into contact with the water. 

The fact that Stenzel slipped and fell in the sunroom, not the kitchen, after she saw the water and 

stopped it from flowing from the refrigerator is not an intervening cause breaking the chain of 

causation because the intervening act, i.e., cleaning up the mess, was reasonably foreseeable. 

See McMillian v Vliet, 422 Mich 570, 576; 374 NW2d 679 (1985) (“An intervening cause breaks 

the chain of causation and constitutes a superseding cause which relieves the original actor of 

liability, unless it is found that the intervening act was ‘reasonably foreseeable.’ ”). Moreover, 

the fact that Stenzel slipped after becoming aware of the water goes to whether or not she was 

comparatively at fault, which is a question of fact for the jury. See Poch v Anderson, 229 Mich 

App 40, 51; 580 NW2d 456 (1998). Accordingly, on this record, the trial court erred in granting 

summary disposition on the basis that there was no proximate cause. 

C. AMENDMENT ADDING SAMSUNG 

 Stenzel also argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her claims against Samsung on 

the grounds that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations 

for product liability or negligence claims is three years. MCL 600.5805(10), (13). Stenzel’s 

claim against Samsung was filed outside the limitations period. However, she argues that 

because she added Samsung as a party within 91 days of Samsung being named as a nonparty at 

fault, her amended complaint relates back to the date of her original complaint, which was filed 

within the limitations period. Samsung, however, argues that because Stenzel amended her 

complaint without leave of the court under MCR 2.112(K)(4), the relation-back provision in 

MCL 600.2957(2) does not apply. 

 MCL 600.2957(2) provides: 

 (2) Upon motion of a party within 91 days after identification of a 

nonparty, the court shall grant leave to the moving party to file and serve an 

amended pleading alleging 1 or more causes of action against that nonparty. A 

cause of action added under this subsection is not barred by a period of limitation 

unless the cause of action would have been barred by a period of limitation at the 

time of the filing of the original action. 

“MCR 2.112(K) was essentially intended to implement MCL 600.2957.” Holton v A+ Ins 

Assoc, Inc, 255 Mich App 318, 324; 661 NW2d 248 (2003). MCR 2.112(K)(2) provides that 

“the trier of fact shall not assess the fault of a nonparty unless notice has been given as provided 

in this subrule.” MCR 2.112(K)(3) sets for the requirements that a party must follow in order to 

allege that a nonparty is wholly or partially at fault. MCR 2.112(K)(4), the provision at issue in 

this case, provides what an opposing party must do after receiving notice of a nonparty at fault. 

It provides: 

 (4) A party served with a notice under this subrule may file an amended 

pleading stating a claim or claims against the nonparty within 91 days of service 

of the first notice identifying that nonparty. The court may permit later 

amendment as provided in MCR 2.118. 
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Notably, unlike the statute, the court rule does not require leave of the court to file an amended 

complaint adding a nonparty if the amended complaint is filed within 91 days of the notice 

identifying the nonparty. Further, unlike the statute, the court rule does not expressly provide 

that the amended complaint will relate back to the date of the original complaint. 

 This case is controlled by the holding in Williams v Arbor Home, Inc, 254 Mich App 439; 

656 NW2d 873 (2002), vacated in part on other grounds 469 NW2d 898 (2003). In that case we 

addressed whether an amended pleading adding a nonparty is effective in the absence of a 

motion seeking leave of the court to amend the pleadings. We concluded that: 

The court rule plainly allows a plaintiff to file an amended complaint adding a 

nonparty but does not specifically mention whether leave of the court is also 

required. The statute, on the other hand, states that leave of the court is indeed 

required. As argued by defendants, the statute therefore merely includes more 

detail than the court rule. Moreover, the court rule specifically refers to MCL 

600.2957, see MCR 2.112(K)(1), and the statute is again specifically mentioned 

in the staff comment to the 1997 amendment of MCR 2.112.. The staff comment 

to the 1997 amendment indicates that the court rule was essentially meant to 

implement the statute. Reading the court rule and the statute in conjunction, we 

conclude that leave of the court is indeed required before an amended pleading 

adding a nonparty becomes effective.

 Because plaintiff did not seek leave of the court to add MEC as a party, 

MEC was never properly added to this lawsuit. [Id. at 443-444 (second emphasis 

added).] 

Under Williams, Samsung was never properly added to the lawsuit because Stenzel did not seek 

leave of the court to add it as a party. 

 Were we not bound by Williams,

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 we would follow the reasoning of Judge O’CONNELL in 

his partial dissent in Williams, 254 Mich App 439. In Williams, Judge O’CONNELL stated: 

I concur with the majority opinion that the sole issue in this case involves the 

application of MCR 2.112(K)(4). I also concur with the majority opinion that 

plaintiff’s amended complaint complies with the requirements set forth in MCR 

2.112(K). However, I disagree with the majority’s opinion that there exists no 

conflict between MCR 2.112(K)(4) and MCL 600.2957(2). I also disagree with 

the majority’s conclusion that plaintiff, who complied with the requirements of 

the court rule, should be denied access to the appellate courts. Therefore, I would 

allow the appeal to proceed. 

 

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 See MCR 7.215(J)(2). 
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 In my opinion, the majority achieves three unacceptable results in this 

case. First, the decision is in conflict with Staff v Johnson, 242 Mich App 521; 

619 NW2d 57 (2000) (HOOD, P.J., writing for the majority; O’CONNELL, J., 

dissenting on other grounds). Second, the majority effectively denies plaintiff any 

appellate review of the lower court decision because plaintiff followed the court 

rules exactly. Third, the decision subjects numerous Michigan attorneys to 

malpractice claims for the common practice of filing an amended complaint 

without leave granted. In Staff, supra at 531, Judge HOOD held that MCR 

2.112(K) and MCL 600.2957(2) were in conflict. Then, Judge HOOD concluded, 

“the conflict between the court rules and the statute is resolved in favor of the 

court rules because it involves a matter of procedure.” Staff, supra at 533, citing 

McDougall v Schanz, 461 Mich 15, 26; 597 NW2d 148 (1999). The majority, 

using what can best be described as a process of smoke and mirrors, concludes 

that the present subsections of the court rules and the statute are not in conflict. I 

prefer to use previous case law that is exactly on point to conclude that a conflict 

exists. I also note that this issue would not exist unless the parties had already 

confronted this conflict between the statute and the court rule. 

 In my opinion, the conflict is extremely simple. The court rule provides 

that under the present factual situation, leave of the court is not required to file an 

amended complaint. MCR 2.112(K)(4). On the other hand, the statute implies 

that leave of the court must be obtained before filing an amended complaint. 

MCL 600.2957(2). Ordinary common sense dictates that either plaintiff is 

required to obtain leave of the court to file an amended complaint, or plaintiff is 

not required to obtain leave of the court. Hence, a conflict exists. I concur with 

Judge HOOD’S conclusion in Staff, supra, that the issue whether a plaintiff must 

file for leave to amend a complaint is a matter of procedure, and, therefore, the 

court rule controls. See also McDougall, supra. 

 Even if I accepted the majority’s dubious logic concerning the interplay 

between the statute and the court rule, I would not penalize the plaintiff for 

precisely following the court rule. The unintended consequences of the majority’s 

opinion is that numerous competent attorneys in this state will now be subject to 

legal malpractice lawsuits for precisely following the court rules. 

 In my opinion, plaintiff should be allowed access to the appellate courts to 

argue his substantive appellate issues. Therefore, I would allow the appeal to 

proceed. [Williams, 254 Mich App at 444-446 (O’CONNELL, J., dissenting in 

part).] 
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Following that approach, we would conclude that because Stenzel followed the requirements set 

forth in MCR 2.112(K)(4), she properly added Samsung as a party and her amended complaint 

was timely because it related back to the date of her original complaint.3

 However, because we 

 

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 Alternatively, we conclude that Williams was wrongly decided for the reasons stated by Judge 

ZAHRA in his concurrence in Bint v Doe, 274 Mich App 232; 732 NW2d 156 (2008). In Bint, 

Judge ZAHRA stated: 

I write separately because I disagree with the conclusion reached in Staff v 

Johnson, 242 Mich App 521; 619 NW2d 57 (2000), that there is a conflict 

between MCR 2.112(K) and MCL 600.2957(2). 

 In Staff, the plaintiff argued that MCL 600.2957(2) extended the period of 

limitations for parties added pursuant to MCR 2.112(K). Staff, supra at 530. This 

Court rejected the literal meaning of the statute and concluded that the statute 

conflicts with the court rule. Id. at 531. This Court further concluded that statutes 

of limitations are procedural, and, therefore, the court rule prevails over the 

statute. Id. at 533. 

Staff wrongly concluded that a conflict exists between the court rule and 

the statute. A conflict does not exist merely because the court rule uses the 

permissive word “may” while the statute uses the mandatory word “shall.” The 

court rule addresses the conduct of the parties. A party served with a notice of a 

nonparty being at fault may file an amended pleading within 91 days of receipt of 

the notice. The permissive word “may” is used in the court rule because a 

plaintiff controls his or her pleadings and cannot be required to amend a 

complaint. By contrast, the statute is directed at the conduct of the court. The 

statute provides that if a plaintiff elects to file a motion to amend within 91 days 

of receipt of a notice of a nonparty being at fault, the court “shall grant leave to 

the moving party. . . .” MCL 600.2957(2). 

 The statute and the court rule are consistent. The plaintiff may elect to 

amend the complaint. If the plaintiff so elects, the court shall grant the 

amendment. There being no conflict between the statute and the court rule, we 

are bound to implement the remainder of MCL 600.2957(2), which provides that 

a “cause of action added under this subsection is not barred by a period of 

limitation unless the cause of action would have been barred by a period of 

limitation at the time of the filing of the original action.” 

 Applying this statutory provision to the facts of the present case, it is clear 

that the cause of action asserted against defendants, although brought nine years 

after the events occurred, is timely because the claim against defendants, had it 

been asserted in the original action, would have been timely. If the Legislature 

did not intend such stale claims to be initiated under MCL 600.2957(2), it is for 
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are bound by Williams, we affirm the trial court’s order and request this Court to convene a 

special conflict panel, MCR 7.215(J)(2). 

 Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 

/s/ Michael J. Kelly 

/s/ Peter D. O'Connell 

/s/ Jane M. Beckering 

the Legislature, not the courts, to say so. [Bint, 274 Mich App at 237-238 (ZAHRA 

P.J., concurring).] 

We recognize that in his Williams dissent Judge O’CONNELL found that Staff correctly identified 

a conflict between the court rule and the statute, whereas in his Bint concurrence Judge ZAHRA

found that there was no conflict. However, we believe that, regardless of whether there is a 

conflict between the court rule and the statute, Williams was wrongly decided. If there is a 

conflict between the court rule and the statute, then Williams was wrongly decided for the 

reasons stated by Judge O’CONNELL in his Williams dissent. If there is no conflict between the 

court rule and the statute, then Williams was wrongly decided for the reasons stated by Judge 

ZAHRA in his concurrence in Bint.