1

Filed 3/7/22 In re Layla R. CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re LAYLA R., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SONOMA COUNTY HUMAN 

SERVICES DEPARTMENT,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DIANA S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A162649

 (Sonoma County

 Super. Ct. No. DEP-5732-01)

After an 18-month review hearing, the juvenile court found 

that five-year-old Layla R. was at substantial risk of detriment if 

returned to her mother’s custody. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.22, 

subd. (a)(1).)1 Diana S. (Mother) appeals from that order, 

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile 

court’s finding. We affirm. 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code. 
2

BACKGROUND

A.

Layla is the youngest of Mother’s four children. Mother’s 

oldest son is an adult. Mother’s two middle children (J. and C.) 

are also dependents of the juvenile court but are not subject to 

the challenged order. 

In late 2018, it was reported that Mother failed to protect J. 

from sexual abuse at the hands of multiple perpetrators—

including J.’s older sibling (in 2010), an adult family member (in 

2013 and 2016), and Mother’s 49-year-old roommate (in 2018). 

Mother did not report to law enforcement her knowledge that her 

roommate was having an ongoing sexual relationship with then 

15-year-old J. Nor did she make efforts to restrict any of the 

perpetrators’ access to J. 

It was also reported that Mother neglected the children’s 

medical, mental health, safe housing, and educational needs. C. 

frequently complained of being hungry and was often sent to 

school without lunch. When social workers inspected Mother’s 

home, it was observed to be dirty, dilapidated, and without 

electricity. Mother’s roommate’s bedroom contained unsecured 

pellet guns that were accessible to the children. The home was 

condemned. 

The Sonoma County Human Services Department 

(Department) filed a dependency petition on behalf of Layla, 

pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). The 

Department alleged that Layla was at substantial risk of serious 

physical harm due to Mother’s substance abuse, neglect, and 

unsafe living conditions. It was further alleged that Layla was at 

substantial risk of being abused or neglected because Mother 

failed to protect J. from sexual abuse. 

The Department noted, in its detention report, that it had 

received nine referrals involving the children over the course of 
3

10 years, and had initiated a voluntary family maintenance case 

a few years earlier. 

J. had not regularly attended school for years. C. also 

missed significant amounts of class time and did not have enough 

to eat. Even though two-year-old Layla had not begun talking, 

Mother had not taken her to the doctor in more than a year. 

Mother had an admitted history of substance abuse and 

was initially referred to a residential treatment program, where 

the children could have lived with her. However, Mother was 

terminated from the program because she minimized both her 

substance abuse, as well as the neglect and abuse her children 

suffered. 

At the detention hearing, Layla was detained and placed in 

foster care. 

B.

The social worker noted, in the Department’s jurisdiction 

report, that Mother believed it was “a good thing” that J. was 

having sex with adult men because J. “was happier and not 

trying to kill herself.” Mother admitted most of the petition’s 

additional allegations. However, she denied having an active 

substance abuse problem. Family members reported that Mother 

repeatedly left Layla unsupervised. Believing mental health 

challenges could be causing some of the family’s problems, the 

social worker asked that a psychological evaluation be ordered for 

Mother. 

In the disposition report, the social worker reported Layla 

had speech delays, trouble maintaining eye contact, and 

attachment challenges that manifested in tantrums, biting, and 

hitting. Layla was referred to therapy and developmental 

services. With more structure and routine, her behavior 

improved. Mother was appropriate, loving, and affectionate with 
4

Layla during their supervised visits. Layla was always happy to 

see her. 

At the combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the 

juvenile court sustained the Department’s amended petition, 

declared Layla a dependent of the juvenile court, and ordered her 

removed from Mother’s custody. The juvenile court also adopted 

the Department’s case plan, which, among other things, required 

Mother to: (1) engage in individual therapy; (2) complete a 

psychological evaluation; (3) complete a parenting class and 

sexual abuse education; (4) maintain sobriety, drug test, and 

complete a substance abuse treatment program; and (5) safely 

and appropriately parent her children. 

C.

The Department’s six-month review report indicated 

Mother was employed full-time, had completed a parenting class, 

and was engaged in an outpatient “relapse prevention” treatment 

program. She was regularly testing (negative) for all substances 

and completed her psychological evaluation. 

Mother’s psychological evaluation recommended therapy, 

as well as one-on-one parent coaching to address her “significant 

denial” and minimization. Mother’s therapist noted that their 

progress was slowed because Mother “is still fighting the 

allegations and will not admit any responsibility.” 

Mother consistently visited Layla. Their visits had 

progressed to “lightly supervised” and continued to be 

appropriate. Layla was excited for their visits and showed a 

connection to Mother. 

Now in her third foster home, Layla’s speech was 

improving with speech therapy and preschool. Her behavioral 

challenges were also subsiding. Layla had been diagnosed with 

“mild autism,” as well as post-traumatic stress disorder and 

attachment issues, which “magnified” her autism. Although 
5

Layla was 30 months old at the time of her assessment, her 

language skills were in the six- to nine-month developmental 

range. Layla’s autism assessment also noted that “transitions 

are hard for her.” 

The Department recommended continuing Mother’s 

reunification services. However, the Department warned that 

Mother’s denial that neglect and abuse occurred in her home was 

a barrier to reunification. Mother was also instructed to 

complete autism parenting education. 

At the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court found 

Mother made “significant progress” on resolving the underlying 

issues and ordered an additional six months of services. 

D.

The Department’s 12-month review report observed that 

Mother continued working hard on her case plan and had 

“move[d] closer to having her children returned to her care.” In 

particular, she completed a relapse prevention treatment 

program; complied with drug testing; remained employed; 

worked on obtaining long-term housing; completed another 

parenting class; and consistently attended therapy with two 

therapists (one focused solely on sexual abuse issues). 

Given Mother’s consistently negative test results, the social 

worker wrote that she had “no concerns” about current substance 

use. Because Mother had not started any autism education, the 

social worker was concerned Layla would not receive necessary 

services if returned to Mother’s care. 

Mother had begun unsupervised visits with Layla. The 

social worker was concerned that Mother allowed her new 

boyfriend to attend at least two visits without alerting the 

Department. Mother also did not see any issue with having 

Layla’s father help with childcare and transportation, despite his 
6

failure to participate in services. However, the social worker did 

not recommend returning to supervised visits. 

Layla remained happy and engaged during visits. But she 

began to struggle with the related transitions. During and after 

visits, Layla complained of injuries and stomach pain. She also 

vomited, attempted to make herself vomit, and experienced night 

terrors. Nonetheless, the Department asked the juvenile court to 

authorize a trial home visit. 

The Department remained concerned about Mother’s 

ability to protect Layla. Despite her engagement in therapy, 

Mother continued to minimize her role in the dependency. At the 

12-month review hearing, the court found Mother had made 

“significant” progress and followed the Department’s 

recommendation to continue services for an additional six 

months. 

E.

The 18-month review hearing was continued after COVID19 emerged and shelter-in-place orders impacted Mother’s ability 

to progress with reunification. Ultimately, the Department 

recommended terminating Mother’s reunification services. 

After an unsupervised visit with Mother in February 2020, 

Layla’s foster parents reported that her ankle and hand were 

swollen. Until the injury was determined to be accidental, 

Mother’s visits reverted to “lightly supervised.” During a visit 

the next month, Layla complained of arm pain. An emergency 

room doctor observed no injury and said Layla appeared to be 

suffering a “psychosomatic stress response.” 

Between March of 2020 and July of 2020, Layla’s and 

Mother’s visits were virtual. When in-person visits resumed, 

Layla appeared happy and engaged. However, on one occasion, 

Layla reportedly cried, begged not to attend, and refused to get 

out of her foster parents’ car. After in-person visits, Layla also 
7

vomited, cried uncontrollably, regressed to baby-like behavior, 

and withdrew. The social worker attributed this was caused, at 

least in part, by the pause in personal contact required by the 

shelter in place order. 

Although no effort had been made to address Layla’s 

somatic responses through joint therapy with Mother, Layla was 

referred to an individual play therapist. Layla’s therapist, Linda 

Ibitz, stated that Layla’s responses to visits were indicative of a 

severe stress response. Ibitz also opined that Layla’s severe 

developmental delays were consistent with her autism diagnosis, 

but also indicated significant neglect occurred prior to age three. 

Mother continued to be employed full-time and had moved 

into her own home, in a neighboring county. She also continued 

to attend therapy (virtually) during this period. One therapist 

reported Mother had recently opened up. But both therapists 

stated Mother remained hesitant to discuss J.’s sexual abuse. 

Mother only talked about a recent inappropriate incident—

involving C. acting out sexually against his foster mother—when 

pressed to do so. One therapist believed Mother’s hesitancy was 

an indicator that “if [Layla] returned to her care, there would be 

a recurrence of abuse.” 

In November 2020, Layla’s therapist completed a report 

documenting her observations after attending one visit with 

Mother and watching several videos of Layla taken (by the foster 

parent) before visits. In the videos, Layla begged not to attend 

visits and then would shut down and become very quiet. Ibitz 

recommended terminating visits because prolonged exposure to 

such an overwhelming amount of distress could have long-term 

mental health consequences for Layla. Accordingly, the 

Department recommended terminating Mother’s visits. 

Around the same time, a social worker observed one of 

Mother’s and Layla’s visits—at the request of Mother’s counsel. 

The social worker opined that Mother was appropriate, that 
8

Layla seemed to have a good time, and that, with the exception of 

a very brief period on arrival, Layla did not appear anxious. 

Mother, who Layla called “momma Diana” handled the transition 

well. 

F.

The contested 18-month review hearing occurred over a 

series of dates between December 2020 and March 2021. 

Mother’s primary therapist testified that Mother was 

originally guarded in therapy but ultimately made progress on all 

of her therapeutic goals. She demonstrated responsibility by 

acknowledging that her drug use caused her to neglect her 

children. Mother also now acknowledged that she missed the 

signs of sexual abuse, regretted it, and felt guilt and shame. 

Mother improved her parenting skills by learning how to set 

boundaries and how to create structure and routine. Mother also 

developed a safety plan for Layla’s return home. In short, 

Mother “turned her whole life around.” 

The social worker who supervised visits (in 2019) testified 

that these early visits went well, transitions were smooth, and 

that Layla was not afraid of Mother. However, when supervised 

in-person visits resumed in 2020 after the pause necessitated by 

COVID-19, Layla became tentative at the beginning of visits and 

excited to go home with her foster mother. 

Layla’s pediatrician testified that an x-ray of Layla’s ankle 

showed a “growth recovery line[],” which purportedly 

demonstrated Layla’s recovery from a period of stunted growth. 

The pediatrician did not know when any stunted growth occurred 

and acknowledged that Layla’s height and weight were both 

above average five weeks after Layla entered foster care. 

Dr. Jacqueline Singer testified, as an expert, that Layla’s 

somatic responses were not caused by Mother doing anything 

objectionable during visits. Dr. Singer opined that Layla began 
9

experiencing somatic stress, around December 2019 or January 

2020, due to the stress of trying to reconcile two maternal figures. 

Dr. Singer also opined that Layla’s stress symptoms were due to 

the interruption caused by COVID-19, including social distancing 

rules that prevented Layla from having physical contact with 

Mother even after in-person visits resumed. On crossexamination, Dr. Singer testified that Layla’s somatic stress 

responses were also triggered by having suffered past trauma in 

Mother’s care. 

Dr. Singer believed that parent-child therapy would assist 

Mother and Layla by allowing them to process Layla’s traumatic 

experiences together. Dr. Singer believed that it would be 

harmful for Layla to return to Mother’s care right away, but 

opined that with increased contact (and therapy) Layla could 

develop a sense of security in the relationship. Dr. Singer opined 

that such therapy should have begun much earlier in this case—

ideally when Layla first experienced difficulty around visits. 

The social worker confirmed that the Department had not 

provided Mother an opportunity for therapy with Layla. The 

Department reached out to several local parent-child interaction 

therapists in November 2020, at Mother’s counsel’s request. One 

therapist had been available, but the Department did not move 

forward because it was concerned about the safety of in-person 

therapy and that therapy could quickly end if the case did not 

move towards reunification. 

Mother’s home was deemed safe when it was inspected in 

January 2021. However, Mother’s visits remained supervised 

because she had been observed violating social distancing 

protocols during visits—for instance, by blowing bubbles with 

Layla and picking her up. 

The social worker testified that the Department 

recommended terminating Mother’s reunification services 

because it believed that Mother had not met her reunification 
10

goals and was not in a position to keep Layla (who is particularly 

vulnerable) safe. The social worker considered it especially 

troubling that Mother did not reach out for help in addressing the 

sexual issue that arose with C. The social worker also believed 

the discovery of the growth recovery line on Layla’s ankle was 

important. 

Mother testified that she last used drugs in 2018 and that 

sobriety changed her life. She now had new resources and 

support. Mother also gained insight into her need, as a parent, to 

provide structure and boundaries. She also realized that her 

drug use had caused her to neglect her home and children. She 

recently completed a parenting course on autism spectrum 

disorder and understood that Layla and C. could never be alone 

together. 

Mother admitted it had been difficult to keep Layla 

engaged during virtual visits. When their visits resumed inperson, near the Department’s parking lot, Layla seemed 

confused when a social worker told her that she could not sit in 

Mother’s lap due to COVID-19. Visits were solely virtual again 

between December 2020 and February 2021. 

Layla’s therapist, Ibitz, testified that she had not reviewed 

any of the Department’s reports or visitation notes before writing 

her earlier report to the court. As a result, Ibitz was unaware 

that, during the first six months of reunification, Layla had been 

very excited to see Mother at visits. This did not change Ibitz’s 

opinion that it was detrimental for Layla to continue visiting 

Mother because Layla repeatedly entered a dissociative state to 

escape the associated stress. Long-term exposure to such stress 

responses could make Layla prone to mental health challenges as 

an adult. 

Ibitz also believed that it would be too traumatic for Layla 

to participate in parent-child therapy with Mother. Joint therapy 

was not appropriate, according to Ibitz, because Mother severely 
11

neglected Layla in the past. Ibitz based her opinion—that 

Mother severely neglected Layla—on the significant 

developmental delays reflected in Layla’s autism assessment 

reports. Ibitz believed severe neglect was involved because 

Layla’s autism alone would not have caused such significant 

developmental delays. 

G.

Layla’s counsel joined the Department’s recommendation to 

terminate reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. 

Mother’s counsel objected to that recommendation, and asked for 

Layla to be returned to Mother’s custody—with supportive 

therapy and a long transition plan. In the event that Layla was 

not immediately returned to Mother’s custody, Mother’s counsel 

argued for an extension of reunification services. 

The juvenile court found Mother “substantial[ly]” met her 

case plan objectives, and that return of Layla to Mother’s custody 

would be detrimental because of Layla’s “severe” somatic 

responses while transitioning to and from visits. Otherwise, the 

court concluded that the Department had not met its burden to 

show detriment, rejecting the social worker’s view that Mother 

failed to gain sufficient insight to protect Layla. 

Finding the Department failed to offer reasonable services 

to address Layla’s somatic responses, the juvenile court extended 

services for six months. It ordered the Department to provide 

therapeutic visits for Mother and Layla with a neutral therapist. 

The court denied the Department’s request to find continued 

visitation between Mother and Layla detrimental. However, the 

court ordered Mother’s visits temporarily suspended until a 

therapeutic setting was found. 
12

DISCUSSION

A.

Mother maintains the Department did not meet its burden 

to prove that Layla faced a substantial risk of detriment if 

returned to Mother’s custody. We disagree.

1.

At the 18-month review hearing, the juvenile court must 

order a child returned to her parent’s custody unless it finds, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that “return of the child . . . would 

create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or 

physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.22, subd. 

(a)(1), italics added.) 

“The standard for showing detriment is ‘a fairly high one. 

It cannot mean merely that the parent in question is less than 

ideal, did not benefit from the reunification services as much as 

we might have hoped, or seems less capable than an available 

foster parent or other family member.’ [Citation.] Rather, the 

risk of detriment must be substantial, such that returning a child 

to parental custody represents some danger to the child’s physical 

or emotional well-being. [Citations.] [¶] In evaluating detriment, 

the juvenile court must consider the extent to which the parent 

participated in reunification services. [Citations.] The court 

must also consider the efforts or progress the parent has made 

toward eliminating the conditions that led to the child’s out-ofhome placement.” (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 

1400; accord, § 366.22, subd. (a)(1).)

We review a juvenile court’s detriment finding for 

substantial evidence. (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 

Cal.App.4th 758, 763.) 
13

2. 

Mother contends the sole basis for the juvenile court’s 

detriment finding is legally insufficient because Layla’s somatic 

stress responses were purportedly not caused by Mother’s actions 

that led to Layla’s detention. 

In assessing detriment, a number of factors are considered. 

The parent’s compliance with the case plan is one important 

consideration. (Jennifer A. v. Superior Court (2004) 117 

Cal.App.4th 1322, 1341 (Jennifer A.).) But compliance with a 

court-ordered reunification plan does not guarantee return of the 

child. (Ibid.; In re Dustin R. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1143 

(Dustin R.); In re Joseph B. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 890, 901 

(Joseph B.).) 

There are other factors, including the parent’s progress 

toward remedying the circumstances that led to the child’s 

removal. (Jennifer A., supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1344.) 

Another key consideration is the impact that return to the 

parent’s custody would have on the child’s emotional well-being. 

(Constance K. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 689, 705 

[even if parent has fully complied with reunification plan, 

juvenile court may consider “properly supported psychological 

evaluations which indicate return to a parent would be 

detrimental to a minor”]; Joseph B., supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at pp. 

894, 901.)

Here, the juvenile court found that Mother substantially 

complied with the requirements of her reunification plan. 

Accordingly, there was no “prima facie evidence that return 

would be detrimental.” (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1).) However, the 

juvenile court’s finding—that Layla is at substantial risk of 

emotional harm—is supported by undisputed evidence that Layla 

displayed considerable anxiety—expressed somatically—before 

and after visits with Mother. Both Ibitz and Dr. Singer testified 

that returning Layla to Mother’s custody in these circumstances 
14

would be detrimental to Layla’s emotional wellbeing. The 

juvenile court agreed. 

These facts are similar to those presented in Joseph B., 

supra, 42 Cal.App.4th 890. In that case, the child was removed 

from his parents’ custody due to physical abuse, pursuant to 

section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). (Joseph B., supra, at p. 

893.) By the time of the 18-month review hearing, the child’s 

mother had sufficiently addressed that issue and the child was no 

longer at substantial risk of physical harm. The juvenile court 

noted that the child was nonetheless anxious and afraid of his 

mother, but concluded it could not ground its detriment finding 

on that evidence because the child had not been removed for 

emotional harm pursuant to section 300, subdivision (c). (Joseph 

B., at pp. 897-898.)

The Joseph B. court reversed, holding that “placement 

must continue regardless of whether that detriment mirrors the 

harm which had required the child’s removal from parental 

custody.” (Joseph B., supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 900.) The court 

reasoned: “By authorizing the continued removal of a child from 

parental custody based on the risk of either physical detriment or 

emotional detriment, sections 366.21 and 366.22 focus on the 

child’s well-being at the time of the review hearing rather than on 

the initial basis for juvenile court intervention. [Citation.] Thus, 

while the court must consider the extent the parent has 

cooperated with the services provided and the efforts the parent 

has made to correct the problems which gave rise to the 

dependency (§ 366.22, subd. (a)), the decision whether to return 

the child to parental custody depends on the effect that action 

would have on the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” 

(Joseph B., supra, at p. 899, italics added.) 

Mother suggests that Joseph B. is distinguishable because 

the juvenile court, in that case, expressly found that the 

emotional detriment it relied on “was a manifestation of the 
15

original basis for dependency: the minor’s substantial emotional 

trauma was caused by the physical abuse he received from [his 

mother] and by his fear of further physical abuse if he returned to 

her custody.” (Joseph B., supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 903, italics 

added.) We assume, without deciding, that the Joseph B. holding 

applies “only when the risk of detriment at the 18-month hearing 

was caused by the parent’s actions leading to the out-of-home 

placement” and does not permit a court to raise wholly “new 

issues” at the 18-month review hearing. (Dustin R., supra, 54 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1140, italics added.) According to Mother, no 

such link exists in this case. We disagree.

The record may not support a finding that Layla’s somatic 

stress responses were caused by anything Mother did at visits. 

But Dr. Singer testified, on cross-examination, that Layla’s 

somatic stress responses were triggered by having suffered past 

trauma (neglect) in Mother’s care.2 This alone is substantial 

evidence to support the order. Moreover, the fact that Layla may 

also experience somatic stress in situations other than when she 

is visiting Mother—such as in respite care—does not mean that 

there is no causal link to Mother’s neglect. It might simply mean, 

as Dr. Singer suggested, that Layla’s separation from her foster 

parents reminds her of that past trauma. 

Dr. Singer also testified that Layla’s somatic responses 

were caused, in part, by confusion relating to her mixed 

allegiances to two maternal figures—Mother and her foster 

mother. This circumstance is also linked to Mother’s neglect. 

Were it not for Mother’s neglect, Layla would not have been 

placed in a foster home.

2 We accept, as we must, the juvenile court’s finding that 

Dr. Singer’s expert testimony was more credible and persuasive 

than Ibitz’s. (See In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633 [juvenile 

court resolves issues of fact and credibility].)
16

Mother is no doubt correct that other factors—such as 

Layla’s autism and pandemic-related social distancing—

exacerbate Layla’s emotional reaction to visits. However, we are 

aware of no authority that suggests the presence of these other 

factors somehow negates the juvenile court’s (otherwise 

supported) detriment finding. In any event, the record is clear 

that Layla was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and 

noted to have attachment challenges, in addition to autism 

spectrum disorder, long before the pandemic began—suggesting 

that her somatic responses to visits cannot be so easily explained. 

Substantial evidence supports an implicit finding that 

Layla’s anxiety was caused, at least in part, by the neglect that 

led to Layla’s removal from Mother’s custody. (See Dustin R., 

supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1140.) 

3.

We similarly reject Mother’s related argument that a slow 

transition to her home, along with family maintenance services, 

could have adequately ensured Layla’s safety. As we described in 

more detail above, there is substantial evidence in the record to 

support the juvenile court’s finding that this could not be safely 

accomplished—especially given Layla’s extreme vulnerability. 

Mother’s own expert believed it would be harmful for Layla to 

return to Mother’s care right away. 

The juvenile court did not leave Mother without options to 

address the new harm Layla was suffering. Rather, it properly 

ordered additional reunification services, specifically joint 

therapy, to improve the parent-child relationship and address 

Layla’s somatic issues. (See Jennifer A., supra, 117 Cal.App.4th 

at pp. 1344-1345; Dustin R., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1143.) 

Mother’s participation in court-ordered services and 

progress on the overall objectives of her reunification plan are 

commendable. However, substantial evidence nonetheless 
17

demonstrates a substantial risk of detriment to Layla if she were 

returned to Mother’s custody. Faced with this dilemma, the trial 

court made a reasonable decision to treat Layla’s serious 

emotional issues with the goal of avoiding further harm to the 

child and reunifying her with Mother. We believe the court had a 

sound basis for doing so. 

DISPOSITION 

The challenged 18-month review order is affirmed. 
18

_______________________

BURNS, J. 

We concur:

____________________________

SIMONS, ACTING P.J. 

____________________________

NEEDHAM, J.

A162649