IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 18-1855

Filed February 5, 2020

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

TONDALAYA BRIDGES,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Joel A. 

Dalrymple, Judge.

Tondalaya Bridges appeals her conviction and sentence for first-degree 

burglary. CONVICTION AFFIRMED, SENTENCE VACATED IN PART, AND 

REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Robert P. Ranschau, 

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kyle Hanson and Tyler J. Buller, 

Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.

Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Tabor and Schumacher, JJ.
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DOYLE, Presiding Judge.

In February 2017, Tondalaya Bridges forced her way into Ashley Martin’s 

apartment without permission and hit Martin on the head with a bottle. The State 

charged Bridges with one count of first-degree burglary. A jury found her guilty as 

charged, and the court sentenced Bridges to serve an indeterminate term of 

incarceration not to exceed twenty-five years. Bridges appeals.

Bridges first alleges her trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move for a 

new trial because the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence.1 We 

review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo. See Lamasters v. State, 

821 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Iowa 2012). To succeed, a defendant must show counsel 

breached a duty and prejudice resulted. See State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 

869 (Iowa 2003). 

A motion for new trial should be granted only in exceptional cases. See 

State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 705 (Iowa 2016). In evaluating the weight of the 

evidence, the court considers whether a greater amount of credible evidence 

supports the verdict than supports the alternative verdict. See id. at 706. The 

weight-of-the-evidence standard

is broader than the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard in that it 

permits the court to consider the credibility of witnesses. 

Nonetheless, it is also more stringent than the sufficiency-of-theevidence standard in that it allows the court to grant a motion for new 

trial only if more evidence supports the alternative verdict as opposed 

to the verdict rendered. The question for the court is not whether 

there was sufficient credible evidence to support the verdict rendered 

or an alternative verdict, but whether “a greater amount of credible 

 

1 Our supreme court decided recent amendments to Iowa Code section 814.7 that 

prohibit consideration of ineffective-assistance-of counsel claims on direct appeal 

apply only prospectively and not to cases, like this one, pending on July 1, 2019. 

See State v. Macke, 933 N.W.2d 226, 235 (Iowa 2019).
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evidence” suggests the verdict rendered was a miscarriage of 

justice.

Id. (internal citations omitted). 

Bridges argues the verdict went against the weight of the evidence because 

she could not form the necessary intent to commit the crime based on her 

intoxication. To commit first-degree burglary, a person must have the specific 

intent to commit a felony, assault, or theft. See Iowa Code § 713.2 (2017). 

Intoxication may provide a defense if it negates the specific-intent element of the 

crime. See id. § 701.5. But mere drunkenness or use of intoxicants is not enough. 

See State v. Guerrero Cordero, 861 N.W.2d 253, 259 (Iowa 2015), overruled on 

other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int’l Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699, 708 (Iowa 2016). 

The level of intoxication must render the accused incapable of forming the specific 

intent to commit the crime. See id. at 261. Because there is rarely direct evidence 

of intent, we may infer it from the circumstances and the defendant’s actions. See 

State v. Keeton, 710 N.W.2d 531, 534 (Iowa 2006).

During the altercation, Martin stabbed Bridges in the chest and neck. After 

her transport to the hospital for treatment of injuries, Bridges’s blood alcohol level 

tested at .150. And though she claims she drank alcohol laced with the ecstasy, 

a screen of Bridges’s urine was negative for drugs. The emergency-room doctor 

who treated Bridges testified he “was somewhat surprised” by her blood alcohol 

level because he typically sees the degree of unresponsiveness exhibited by 

Bridges with “a much higher level of blood alcohol.” He also testified that the 

amount of blood Bridges lost from the stabbing could have contributed to the 

decline in her responsiveness. Bridges’s level of intoxication does not 
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preponderate heavily against the verdict because the evidence shows she could 

still form specific intent. 

Bridges’s conduct on the night in question shows she had specific intent to 

commit an assault when she entered Martin’s apartment. Bridges and Martin had 

fought earlier in the night. After the first fight, Bridges went to Martin’s apartment 

while Martin was out and upended Martin’s belongings. When she returned to the 

apartment later, Bridges overpowered Martin’s daughter to force her way inside 

and hit Martin in the head with a bottle she had been holding when she entered. 

See State v. Finnel, 515 N.W.2d 41, 42-43 (Iowa 1994) (finding that the

defendant’s intent to commit an assault could be inferred from evidence of his 

“violent, nonconsensual entry” into another’s apartment, knowledge that the 

complaining witness wanted no contact with him, prior threats of violence against 

her, and assaultive actions after entry). Because a finding that Bridges had the 

specific intent to commit an assault is not against the weight of the evidence, 

counsel had no duty to move for new trial. See State v. Ortiz, 905 N.W.2d 174, 

183 (Iowa 2017) (noting counsel has no duty to raise a meritless issue). 

Bridges also challenges her sentence because the district court ordered her 

to pay court costs without first considering her reasonable ability to pay.2 Under 

Iowa Code section 910.2(1), the sentencing court must order an offender to pay 

 

2 The State argues this challenge is premature because the plan of restitution is 

not complete. We disagree. Although the supreme court has stated “[r]estitution 

orders entered by the court prior to the final order are not appealable as final 

orders,” State v. Albright, 925 N.W.2d 144, 161 (Iowa 2019), both of Iowa’s 

appellate courts have often vacated restitution-related orders absent a final 

restitution order. See State v. Moore, No. 18-1877, 2019 WL 4297255, at *5 n.3 

(Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2019) (collecting cases), affirmed in part and vacated in 

part on other grounds, State v. Moore, 936 N.W.2d 436, 440 (2019).
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fees and costs as restitution “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to 

pay.” See also State v. Albright, 925 N.W.2d 144, 159 (Iowa 2019). Because the

district court ordered Bridges to pay court costs without first considering her 

reasonable ability to pay as outlined in Albright, we vacate this portion of the 

sentencing order and remand the matter to the district court to impose restitution 

consistent with Bridges’s reasonable ability to pay. See State v. Headley, 926 

N.W.2d 545, 553 (Iowa 2019).

CONVICTION AFFIRMED, SENTENCE VACATED IN PART, AND 

REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.