J-A34031-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE A.K.S. AND A.L.S., MINORS IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF A.W., MOTHER

Nos: 1108 MDA 2014, 1109 

MDA 2014, 1173 MDA 2014, 

1174 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Orders Entered June 6, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Juvenile Division at Nos: CP-67-DP-0000082-2010 and CP-67-DP-0000004-

2011, and the Decrees Entered June 6, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas 

of York County Orphans’ Court at Nos: 2013-0005 and 2013-0007

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and STABILE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 24, 2015

Appellant, A.W. (“Mother”), appeals from the June 6, 2014 orders 

changing the goal for minor children A.K.S. and A.L.S. (the “Children”) from 

reunification to adoption, and the June 6, 2014 decrees terminating Mother’s 

parental rights to the Children.1 We affirm. 

The trial court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion sets forth the pertinent 

facts and procedural history: 

The York County Office of Children, Youth, and Families 

(hereafter the “Agency”) received an initial referral regarding the 

____________________________________________

1

 The four consolidated docket numbers correspond to one goal change 

order and one termination order for each child. 
J-A34031-14

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minor Children [...], on August 13, 2010 for a lack of supervision 

on the part of the Children’s Mother. Protective services were 

offered, but despite the withdrawal of the dependency Petition, 

such services failed. On January 4, 2011, legal and physical 

custody of the Children were given to the paternal Grandparents 

by Court Order. A hearing was held on February 7, 2011 which 

reaffirmed that order. Unfortunately, the Agency was forced to 

file a dependency Petition on February 23, 2011, as the 

Grandparents were not supervising the Children. The Children 

were adjudicated dependent on March 3, 2011. However, 

physical custody remained with the Grandparents. By March 16, 

2011, the Children were placed in foster care as a result of 

concerns regarding the appropriateness of care in the 

Grandparents’ home. At that time, both parents were living with 

paternal grandparents. 

Multiple family service plans were put into effect starting 

October 7, 2010 and continuing through April 1, 2013. All plans, 

with the exception of the April 1, 2013 plan, were reviewed by 

the Court for the parent’s degree and level of compliance. The 

record is supported by Exhibits “A” through “G”, and Exhibit “P” 

regarding Mother’s compliance. We note that this Court has not 

reviewed Father’s compliance with the family service plans, as 

his parental rights were previously terminated. 

The family service plans of April 2011 and November 2011 

revealed substantial compliance by Mother. These were the only 

two occasions in the thirty-eight months that these Children 

have been dependent that Mother was compliant to any degree. 

All prior plans reflected minimal compliance or effort by Mother 

to achieve the goals set for her. Mother was never in jail, 

probation or parole, in the United States armed services, in any 

rehabilitation recovery program, or engaged in any other 

capacity which would, up until the time of filing the instant 

Petition to Terminate Parental Rights and Change of Goal, 

interfere with her ability to work towards her goals. 

Mother participated in a psychiatric evaluation by Doctor 

Mark Famador and a neuropsychological evaluation by Doctor 

David Nicodemus. Mother expended limited energy in dealing 

with her psychological needs and was sporadic in taking her 

medication. Three teams were assigned to work with Mother to 

aid and assist her, the first being Pressley Ridge, which closed 

unsuccessfully after only two months; Catholic Charities, which 
J-A34031-14

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closed unsuccessfully after three months; and, lastly, the Justice 

Works team. They worked with Mother from April 2011 until 

January 2013, at which time they closed unsuccessfully. 

Mother was partially successful in obtaining housing. 

However, by the count of this Court, Mother has had nine 

different addresses from August 2010 to the present. Mother’s 

last address was 427 W. Market Street, York, Pennsylvania, 

which was Section 8 housing and from which Mother was evicted 

as a result of Father’s criminal activities on the premises. While 

Mother was ultimately successful in her appeal and now again 

has obtained Section 8 housing, it was Mother’s poor choices 

which cost her the home. 

The Agency filed a Petition to Change of Goal [sic] and to 

Terminate Mother’s parental rights in January 2013. The matter 

was tried on August 9, 2013 and the goal was changed from 

reunification to adoption, and Mother’s parental rights were 

terminated. Mother had asked the Court to appoint her new 

counsel prior to the hearing. When we declined to do so, Mother 

asked to represent herself, which we permitted. Mother 

appealed, counsel was reappointed after the Superior Court 

reversed and remanded on the issue of counsel with instructions 

that this case was to be retried within forty-five days. At the 

time of the first hearing, the Children had been in care for 

twenty-nine months. On May 30, 2014, a second hearing was 

held pursuant to the Superior Court’s mandate. Rather than 

litigating the relationship between counsel and Mother, this Court 

appointed a substitute counsel. Mother confirmed to the Court 

at the time of the hearing that she was satisfied with her new 

counsel and wished to proceed. 

Trial Court Opinion, 6/3/14, at 1-4. 

After the May 30, 2014 hearing, the trial court took the matter under 

advisement and issued the orders on appeal on June 6, 2014. On appeal, 

Mother argues the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights and in 

changing the goal for each child from reunification to adoption. 
J-A34031-14

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The following standard governs our review of the decrees terminating 

Mother’s parental rights: 

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating 

parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the 

decision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence. 

Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient 

evidentiary support for the trial court’s decision, the decree must 

stand. Where a trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily 

terminate parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing 

judge’s decision the same deference that it would give to a jury 

verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the 

record in order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is 

supported by competent evidence. 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 821 (Pa. 2012). “The burden is upon 

the petitioning person or agency to prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that its asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are 

valid.” In the Interest of T.M.T., 64 A.3d 1119, 1124 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

“Moreover, we have explained: The standard of clear and convincing 

evidence is defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and 

convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, 

without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. 

We review the goal change orders as follows: 

An order granting a goal change pursuant to the Juvenile 

Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301-6365, is final and appealable. Our 

standard of review in such cases is abuse of discretion. When 

reviewing such a decision we are bound by the facts as found by 

the trial court unless they are not supported in the record. 

Furthermore, in a change of goal proceeding, the trial court must 

focus on the child and determine the goal in accordance with the 

child's best interests and not those of his or her parents.
J-A34031-14

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In the Interest of C.J.R., 782 A.2d 568, 569 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citations 

omitted). 

We have reviewed the parties’ briefs, the trial court’s opinion, the 

applicable law, and the certified record. We concluded that the trial court’s 

thorough and well-reasoned opinion June 3, 2014 opinion adequately 

addressees Appellant’s arguments. We therefore affirm the trial court’s 

decrees for the reasons explained in that opinion. We direct that a copy of 

the trial court’s June 3, 2014 opinion be attached to any future filings in this 

case.

Orders and Decrees affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/24/2015
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF YORK COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

In Re: 

In Re: 

".3_, A Minor 

~ .. ~, 

A Minor 

No. 2013-0007 

CP-67 -DP-00082-201 0 

Orphan's COllrt Division 

No. 2013·0005 c';.' 

CP-67 -DP-00004-iO{1 "1J' 

Orphan's Court DiVision 

MEMORANDUM OPINlm\1 

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE 

The York County Office of Children, Youth, and Families (hereafter the 

"Agency") received an initial referral regarding the minor Childre 

(hereafter the "Children'), on AUrJlIst ~3, 20'IC 

for a lack of supervision on the part of tile Children'S Mother. F'rotectlve S6rV,C('; lV(,W 

offered but, despite the withdrawal of the dependency Petition. such services ',lied 

On January 4.2011, legal and physical custody of the Children were given to il1(' 

paternal Grandparents by Court Order. A hearing was held on February 7. 2C '1 

whicll reaffirmed that Order. 
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Unfortunately, the Agellcy was forced to file a clepenclency Petition ali 

February 23,2011. as the Grandparents were not supervisin(1 the Children. Tll'" 

Children were adjudicated dependent on March 3, 2011. However, physical:lI"toely 

remained with the Granciparents. By March 16, 2011, tile Children were placed in 

foster care as a result of concerns regarding the appropl'iatencss of ccm~ in th,,, 

Grandparent's home, At that time, both parents were living with paternal 

grandparents, 

Multiple family service plans were put into effect startillg October 7, ZQ 1) aile! 

continuing through April 1, 2013, All plans, with the exception of the April 1, 2013 

plan, were reviewed by the Court for the parent's degree and level of compliance. 

The record is supported by Exhibits "A" through "G", and Exhibit "P" regareling 

Mother's compliance, We note tllat this Court has not reviewed ['ather's cOlllpl·aneE, 

with the family service plans, as his parental rights were previously lerllllilLll8d 

The family service plans of April 2011 and November 2011 revealed 

substantial compliance by Mother. These were the only two occasions in the thirly' 

eight months that these Children have been dependent that Mother was compliant to 

any degree. All prior plans reflected minimal compliance or effort 'oy Mother to 

achieve the goals set for her. Mother was never in jail, probation or parole. in the 

. United States armed services, in any rehabilitation recovery program, or en~Jaqed ill 

any other capacity which would. Lip until the time of filing tile IIlstant Petition 1.0 

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Terminate Parental Rights and Change of Goal, interfere Witll her Clbility to work 

towards her goals, 

Mother participated in a psychiatric evaluation by Doctor Mark Famador and a 

neuropsychological eva luation by Doctor David Nicodemus, Mother expended 

limited energy in deali~g with her psychological needs and W<lS sporCldic in taf.lllg 

her medication, Three teams were assigned to work with Mother to aiel and as~ist 

her, the first being Pressley Ridge, which closed unsuccessfullY after only two 

months; Catholic Charities, which closed unsuccessfully after three months; and, 

lastly, the Justice Works team, They worked with Mother from April 2011 until 

January 2013, at which time they closed unsuccessfully, 

Mother was partially successful in obtaining housing, However, by tilE' (;)1,11': 

of this Court Mother has had nine different addresses from August 2010 to ,hE: 

present Mother.'s last address was 427 W Market Street, York, Pellnsylvani<l, whiel 

was Section 8 housing and from which Mother was evicted as a result of Father's 

criminal activities on the premises. While Mother was ultimately successful in her 

appeal and now again has obtained Section 8 housing, it was Mother's poor choices 

which cost her the home, 

The Agency filed a Petitioll to Change of Goal and to Terminate Molher s 

parelltal rights ill JanualY 2013, Tile matter was tried 01, August 9. 2013 and ille 

goal was changed from reunification to adoption, and Mother's parental rights were 

terminated, Mother had asked the Courllo appoint her Ilew counsel prior to the 

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nearing. When we declined to do so. Mother asked to represellt ~h"rseIL whlc!' we 

permitted. Mother appealed. counsel was reappointed after the Superior COllr! 

reversed and remanded on the issue of counsel with instructions that this case was 

to be retried within forty-five days. At the time of the first hearing, the Children had 

been in care for twenty-nine months. On May 30, 2004, a second ;leanng was held 

pursuant to the Superior COLIrt'S mandate. Rather than litigating the relationship 

between counsel and Mother, this Court appointed a substitute coullsei Mothe! 

confirmed to the Court at the time of the hearing that she wa" s8tisfied wltll hu' '18'(, 

counsel' and wished to proceed. Testimony and exhibits were taken and this C[Jurt s 

Opinion follows. 

DISCUSSION 

1. Petition To Change The COLirt Ordered Goal. 

Before the COLili can change the goal for a child in a Juve>iile depend.ancy 

action, CYS must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the cllilnge of po;]1 

would be in the child's best interest. In the Interest of M.B, 674 A.2d 702, 704 (P". 

Super. Ct. 1996). In addition to the factors outlined in the Juvenile Act. any and all 

other factors that bear upon the welfal'e of the child must be t,lkel! into 

consideration. If) re Davis. 465 A.2d 614 620 (Pa 1983) 

Tile purpose of the Juvenile Act IS to preserve family uility-or proviGc' elll 

alternative family when required-and to "provide for the care, protecti011, silfc'ly ClI'(1 

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wholesome mental and physical development" of the child. 4:2 P<1.CS. § 6301 (i)l\ 1, 

(1.1). The Juvenile Act was not intended to place children in a 1110"e perfoclllOillO: 

instead, the Act gives the Court the authority to "intervene to ensure that parenls 

meet certain legislatively determined irreducibfe minimulIl standards in exeGlJtiri~i 

their pal'ental rights." In re J.W" 578 A.2d 952,958 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (emJ:hasis 

added). 

Because the Juvenile Act addresses the concerns of both child and p<lI'lli. 

the Act is drawn broadly and must therefore be construed liberally upon 

interpretation. In the Malter of T.R., 665 A.2d 1260, 1264 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995), 

reversed 011 other grounds, 731 A.2d 1276 (Pa. 1999). 

Pursuant to the Juvenile Act, the Court Illust make a deterillilli.ltion as to e8ch of the 

following factors 

(1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of tile plav~ment 

(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of compliance with Ihe 

permanency plan developed for the child. 

(3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating the circumstances 

which necessitated the original placement. 

(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current placement goal 

for the child. 

(5) The likely date by which the placement goal for the child might be 

achieved. 

(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize the 

permanency plan in effect. 

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(6) Whether the child is safe 

42 Pa,C.S, § 6351{f)(1) - (6), 

Based on our considerations of these factors, the Court muslthcn decidt~ 

what disposition would be best suited to protect the physical, l11ent81 Clnci mOlal 

welfare of the child, Id. § 6351 (g). Specifically, the Court must determine: 

(a) If and when the child will be returned to the child's parent, guardian 

or custodian; or 

(b) If and when the child will be placed for adoption, and tile cOlinty 

agency will file for termination of parental rights, 

42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f1), 

The present goal of the family service plan IS reunification of the Chiidr'~n Wltll 

Mother. CYS is seeking to change the current goal of termination of parental ri9hts 

and placement for adoption pursuant to the Juvenile Act. 42 Pa.C,S. § 6301 at sou, 

A. Continuing Necessity For and Appropriateness Of P~acernent 

In this case, continued placement is necessary due to Mother'S iailurE, if) 1Il'::tj 

any of the goals set forth by the Agency for Mother and approved by the COLIlt 

without objection by Mother. 

Mother has done little on her own to ach'leve the goals which were set by the 

Agency, Whether it is mental health issues or jllst plain orneriness, Mother do'"s nOi 

work well wittl others, As we indicateci, the first two teams put In p,ace for Moillel, 

while initially successful, were Ultimately closed ullslIccessfully ,)S set forth i:l (he 

closing summaries of those teams in Exhibits ",)" and "K". Wtllie it is true :J~i1i r\~(\the; 

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worked well with Justice Works, this was because sho was al;Gepting of then I I c;n'i 

her transportation to attend her appointments, to look for work, to apply for Social 

Security disability, and any other service that the team could provide for her. What 

Mother was incapable of doing was attaclling with her Children, boncling with tholli. 

and playing any parental role in their lives. 

B. Appropriateness, Feasibility, And Extent Of Compliance With 

Permanency Plan. 

There was ample testimony at the lime of the hearing as to Mother's 

opportunity to visit with her Children and her failures to do so. In 2012, Motile; hal: 

an opportunity to visit the Children three times a week - tWice at tne Agency ;,lI]<j 

once at home over the weekend. Those viSits started in February 2012. Motner only 

exercised 47 out of over more than 150 opportunities to visit with the Childrcil. 

Mother has never had unsupervised visits. By aCcoullts of all witnesses, except fOi 

Grandfather, Mother displays little interaction with her Children, with tile Agency 

fundamentally babySitting while MotileI' was on her cell phone. 11 bocame SUC!I ,i 

bone of contention that this Court had to order Mother to surmncier her ceilulal 

phone when she was with her Children. This observation WClS shared by Doctor 

Nicodemus who indicated that, throughout his neuropsychoiogical examina~ion. 

Mottler continually looked at her cell phone and kept it in view on her ICip. The 

Guardian Ad l item. Attorney Brooke Popper. perhaps tongue-iil-cheek, sllmF'~stej 

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that we should tie cell phones around the Children, so that Mother would enga[jp. 

with them. 

There was never any engagement whatsoever betweEn: lVIother '1I,(j t;1'.~ 

younger Child, who was placed In foster care sllortly ait()r her billh. TllC:re V,/'.1:3 LI!I\ 

engagement between the Motiler and the older Child, although the older C/1Jid wa5 

not afraid of Mother and would approach her. Early Intervention and Early Head 

Start beCame involved with the Children in Mother's home during these visitillions 

time periods in an effort to get Mother involved with the Children. These dior:s 

failed. All suggestions made to Mother were never implementod. and It was ar:p,H"::I, 

that Mother did not understand them. 

The Agency further had a great deal of concern about Mother's ability to 

provide safety for the youngest Child, who suffered from a peanut allergy. It W,1$ 

fundamentally left to the Agency to check all foods, as MotllOr was not :)cjeqU;l[(dy 

protecting the Child when visits occurred. When asked at the !leaiing il Moth"r WClS 

ready for the Children at the present time, she answered "if God toici Iwr to ;ilf,,: till 

kids she would." Short of divine intervention, this Court does not believe Mother is 

capable of providing for the Children, even after thirty-nine 1ll0nti1S. We should nole; 

that Mother last saW both Children in July 2013. However, Moliler only visited ttle 

Children sporadically in 2013. having had eleven visits during a six-ancl-a-hali IllOi1ii1 

period of time. 

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C. Extent Of Progress Toward Alleviating The Circumstances Which 

Necessitated Original Placement. 

As we have indicated, Motherhas made little progress towmds allevialing il'(' 

conditions that resulted in the placement. While Mother now I1,IS nousing th;'oliqll 

Section 8 and is employed part-time, she continues to not deal WiU1 her omotlol1al 

issues. By testimony, Mother indicated that she has not seen her counselor ill ovel a 

year since the birth of her third child in May 2013, nor has Sl10 taken any of her 

medication since November 2012. Mother's mental health issues continue to be 

obvious as she displays persistent, inappropriate giggling al1ci iall~;hing rlilring 1:"18 

proceedings, talking out loud and interrupting despite the Courl's warnlllgs. li1 erfect. 

Mother has no appreciation that she suffers from any mental health issues. 

D. Appropriateness and Feasibility Of The Current Placement Goal. 

The current placement goal is reunification. Reunification does not appear to 

be feasible at this time. Father's rights have previously been terminated while 

Mother claimed that she wishes to be reunited with the Childi·en. 

While Mother says she IS ready, we believet!1at Mother's actions 

demonstrate otherwise. Mother continues to suffer from this Court's greatesl concell" 

- Mother's lack of supervision of the Children. As we have indicated, Mother has 

been inconsistent with her visitation with the Children to the extent that the yOI!ngest 

Child quite honestly does not know who slle is viSiting. While the oldest Child cads 

Mother "mommy," she also calls her [OSler mother t1er . momrrr,' Testilliony9 
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Indicated that neither Child has a parent-child bond with Mother, wllereas the 

Children have a strong bonding relationship with the foster mother, the preadoillivlo'? 

resource. 

E. Likely Date By Which The Goal Might Be Achieved 

After thirty-nine months, Mother's minimal progress is offset to a great degree 

by the relationship that the Children do not have with her and do have wilh tile foster 

mother. Mother's own witness, the paternal Grandfather, testifiecl ',ilat he did !lot 

believe Mottler was in a position at Ihe time of the hea ring to be able to reSLInle 

custody without mental health help from tile Agency. Coupled willl thelt, Mot'n' 

made a statement during trial tlla! she would Ilot work with anybody, sinGe sh.) 11Oll! 

done so much without success, that she did not see the point ill trYllig <1g<llll, 1Ili11 

she simply waits for God to restore the relationship with the Childleil, and takes no 

steps on her own to achieve this goal. 

F. Whether Reasonable Efforts Were Made To Finalize The Permanency 

Plan In Effect. 

This Courl believes lhat Mother made no reasonable eifort" to finalize the 

permanency plan in place. As we indicated, despite the vasl opportunities to visit 

with her Children during the period of placement, Mother had ;ninll'llal visitatlon~. ill 

2012, lessening visits III 2013, and Ilone in the past year. She 1185, by her own 

testimony, indicated ttlal she is not working on any mental health issues as Clccorded 

to her by her mental health physicians. Mother indicated Ih"lt, when Mothers cie,ctm:; 

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realized they had talked about everything there was to talk about it, they Indicated 

that she should come back to see them if slle had any other matters to discuss. We 

simply do not believe Mother that her doctors indicated this t,) her On the 0,:18:' 

Iland, tile Agency deployed reasonable efforts lo achieve tlK: '.10,,:5 without ,liX8S:, 

by Mother. 

G. Whether The Children Are Safe. 

The Children are safe where they are presently living, For the reasons 

discussed above, we do not believe the Children would be safe with Mother 

H. Analysis of Factors, 

Based on all the above factors, especially the feasibilily of rCLlllificaticn ;;l!lG 

the likely date of reunification, this Court believes it is appropria'e to Ch,lll~I(" :ile £IDa: 

to adoption. Both Children are happy, 11ealthy, loved, and sMe ii' Iheir curreilt 

environment, none of which we believe would be the case if tlley were to be returneel 

to Mother. It is clear that, after thirty-eight months, Mother i~ incapable oi acilif,,,ing 

the goal of reunification and that these Children are entitled to peli1l3ncncy, s;<1I)III\. 

and safety in their lives. We do not believe that Molher will be able to get hel!'.elf 

together In fact. we note that Mother has had her third chilo removed Iror:1 1'Tr d 

child Ilaving been born prior to the first change of goal and termination Order. 

II. Petition for Involuntary Termination Of Parental Rights. 

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CYS argues that Mother's parental rights to the Childrel; Sill)uld be termi18t,;c' 

pursuant to Section 2511, subsections (a)(1) or (a)(5) of the Adoption Act. TIH?se 

subsections provide as follows: 

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be 

terminated after a petition filed on any of the following glounds: 

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six 

months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has 

evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parenlal claim to a 

child or has refused or failed to perform parelltal duties. 

* •• 

(5) The child has been removed from the care olthe pClrent by the 

court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of 

at least six months, the conditions which led to the removal 01 

placement 01 the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will 

not remedy those conditions wililin a reasonab Ie pemcl of lime, the 

services or assistance reasonably available to the [Jill"ent ale Ilot 

likely to remedy the conditions which led to the relllo>}" I or 

placement of tile child within a reasollable period of ;illle and 

termination of the parental rights would best serve Ihe needs ancl 

welfare of the child. 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 (a)(1), (5). 

CYS has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that 

statutory grounds exist to justify the involuntary termination of parental righls III re 

Child M., 681 A.2d 793, 797 (Pa Super. Ct. 1996). The clear nlld cOllvlllci'lg 

standard meallS that the evidence Presented by CYS is so "clear, direct WCI'li,iy 

and convincing that one can come to clear conviction, without Ilesitancy, of the truth 

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of the precise facts in issue." Maller of Sylvester. 555 A.2d 12:12. 1203-120!,.i'" 

1989). 

CYS must also present evidence proving that the termination of til" parentai 

rights will serve the Children's needs and welfare. In 1110 Matler or Adoplion 'Jf 

Charles E.D.M. 11,708 A.2d 88. 92-93 (Pa 1998). FUI·ther, Section 2511. SlIiJS"ctj,)ll 

(b) of the Acloption Act provides: 

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a 

parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental. physical 

and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a pElfcnt 

shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors 

such as inadequate housing. furnishing's, income. c!othi'lg and medic,)1 

care if found to be beyond the contml of the pclrent. With respect to 

any peWion filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1). (6) or (8;, IIle court 

shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy tile conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to tile glvlllg or 

notice of the filing of the petition 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 (b). 

CYS has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the parental rights of c' 

parent should be involuntarily terminated pursuanUo 23Pa. C 8;§25 i 1 (a)(5) ,\(ld 

(a)( 8) 

The most critical part of the Court's allalysis of the six Illonths Ilnllledlntd; 

preceding the riling of the petition. III re O)'S .. 737 A.2d 283, ?8Cl ;Pa Supe; Cl 

1999), (citing In re A.P., 692 A.2d 240 (Pa Super Ct. 1997)). However. the Court 

'mllst consider the whole history of a given case and not mechanically apply the six13 
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month statutory provisions. but instead consider the indivrdual crrcumstancesJf 

each case." Id. (citation omitted) F LI rthermore, the Su pe rior COli it has s tat8ci: 

To be legally significant, the [post-abandonmerlt] contact must br, stemi'J ,m.j 

consistent over a period of time, contribute to the psychological health of thr:! 

child, and must demonstrate a serious intent on th8 pil It of the pment to 

recultrvate a parent-child relationship and must also deillonslr'ate " 

willingness and capacity to undertake the parental role TIlf) parent wish'llg lc 

reestablish his parental responsibilrties bears tile burden of proof orl his 

question. lei. (quoting In re Hamilton. 549 A.2d 1291, .~. Wi ·;IOa, Super:.:! 

1988)). 

A § 2511 (a)(5) AnalysiS 

The Agency contends that this Court should involuntarily t8rminate Molher's 

parental rights under subsection (a)(5) of Section 2511 of the .i\cloption Act. To 

satisfy the statutory provision the Agency must prove by clenr 81lC corlVincinSi 

evidence that several conditions exrst. First. the Children IIlll,',l i1[;Ve beerl r"';'IOVi'U 

from parental care by court order or Agency agreement for Cit lei1s1 six rnOliL1S 

before tile filing of the petition totenninate parental rights. Second, the condi:ioil~. 

that led to the removal must continue to exist. Third, Mother must 110t lJe able or 

willing to remedy those conditions within a reasonable period)f time. Forth. Ii;E 

services or assistance reasonably available to the parent must not be I:keiy (0 

remedy the conditions that led to the removal within a reasonilble Deliacl of time. 

Fifth, termination of parental might rights must best serve the neecls and wcl:arc of 

the child. See III re C.G .. 791 A.2d 430, 435-36 (Pa Super. CL 2002) 

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In this case, the oldest Child 11as been removed rrolll MOUlds (;,11,' will'l1 sh" 

was eighteen months old and the youngest child since she was one month oid Tlw 

conditions that led to this removal still exist. Mother has taken ollly minor steps to 

reunify and continues to not have tile capacity to care for the girls 8t the prese:lt 

time. 

The conditions are not likely to be remedied within a reasonable period c,f 

time. Of great concern is Mother's statement that she would no longer work willi 

anybody at the Agency if the Children were to be returned to her and Mother's Litle; 

refusal to deal with her mental health issues. There is no indie<illo.: as to hO\ll: icng !I 

will take for Mother to get her life in order. However, since Mother IS not working on 

any goals, the answer is likely 'never.' Consequently, it does ;10t appear that ;\1ntli('f 

is ready to parent her Children. 

Finally, termination of parental rights will serve the needs and welfare of the 

Children. As indicated, the Children have been ill foster care SI:lce April 20 i ~ nn • .I 

have a bond with the foster family that they simplyd() nd(hi:!0Edb al\yextent wl1l1 

Mother. As we previously indicated, the youngest Child not only does not recoglw:e 

Mother as a source of love and affection but will also not even go to Mother. TillS 

appears to be fine with Mother, since being with this Child wOUid interfere with her 

texting. Children need some structure and finality In tile familial rei:'ltionships ~;'I.CC 

tilere is no bOlld between the Children and Motller, and there .is a strong bond with 

the foster family. we believe that termination is appropriate. 

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B. § 251 1(a)(1) 

Because the Court finds that involuntary terminatioll of parental rights I~; 

appropriate llnder seetioll (a)(5), tlie Court will not undertake an analysis of 

termination pursuant to subsection (a)(1). 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

1. The current placement of the Children continues to be necessary and 

appropriate 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f}(1). 

2. Mother has not complied with family service plans. 42 F'a.C.S ~i ij3f;i(!,L). 

3. The circumstances that necessitated the Children's origillal placement 

continue to exist. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351 (f)(3). 

4. The current placement goal of reunification of the Childlen with tl1e Mother '5 

no longer appropriate and feasible. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351 (f)(4). 

5. CYS has made reasonable efforts to finalize tile permanency plan til,.! W[lS ::; 

effect duringthe Children's placement 42 Pa.C.S.§ 53SFI)(51) 

6. The Children safe in their current placement setting. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(1)(6). 

7. CYS has proven by clear and cOllvincing evidence that the Children hale 

been removed from the care of the Mother by the COllrt or under a vOlulltary 

agreement with an agency for a per'lod of at least six 11101'1hs, lhe condition" 

that led to the removal or placement the Children continue to eXist, thE' Moll1(~: 

cannot or will not remedy those conditions witllin a reclsonable period of time, 

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the services or assistance readily available to the parents are not likely to 

remedy the conditions that led to the removal or placement of the Children 

within a reasonable period of time, and termination of parental rights would 

best serve the needs and welfare of the Children. 23 Pa.C.S, § 2511 (a)(5). 

8. Termination of all parental rights of the Mother of the Children would best 

serve their development, physical, and emotional needs and welfare. 23 

Pa,C.S § 2511 (b). 

The following decree and order shall issue, 

BY THE COURT: 

Date: June 3,2014 

HARRYM.NESS, Judge 

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