alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The E. A. Baisley.

*(District Court, E. D. New York.*

October 9, 1882.)

Admiralty—Services of Cooper—Performance on Request.

"Where a vessel laden with sugar was discharged at quarantine in Yew York harbor, the master being sick and the mate temporarily in charge, anda master cooper thereafter libeled the vessel for services said to have been performed by one of his men in coopering casks on board, and the claimants of the vessel, in defense, undertook to show that the cooper was accidentally there, and was not employed by any one on behalf of the ship, *held,*that the facts proved—the presence of the cooper; that casks were necessarily coopered; that the mate who had charge brought, the cooper there; and that a bill rendered for the work was not objected to by the mate, save one item, which was corrected,—were sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the mate directed the work to be done on behalf of the vessel with apparent authority, and that the cooper performed it at his request.

*Beebe, Wilcox d Hobbs,*for libelant.

*Benedict, Taft &*Benedict, for claimant.

*704Benedict, D. J.

The. necessity for the services of a cooper in behalf of the vessel is shown by the evidence that the lightermen refused to receive the cargo until the casks were coopered. The testimony to 'this fact is not contradicted. The presence of the cooper, Kippel, on board the vessel while the cargo was being delivered to the lighter is proved not only by the libelant’s witnesses, but also by the claimant’s witness Lewis; and it does not appear that Kippel had any business there unless it was to cooper the cargo. Two witnesses testify that the mate of the vessel employed Kippel to cooper the cargo before it left the vessel, and brought him to the vessel for that purpose. This testimony is not contradicted. The claimant’s witness Lewis proves that the mate had charge of the delivery of the cargo to the lighters, showing that if the cargo required to be coopered the mate would naturally have been the man to order it. The mate is not called in behalf of the vessel, and his absence is not accounted for. Kippel made a demand of the libelant for labor performed by him in'coopering this cargo, and he has been paid therefor by the libelant. When Lewis saw the bill of libelant for Kippel’s labor and one empty cask, the only objection he made was to the item of the cask, and the bill was corrected in that particular. These facts compel the conclusion that the services sued for were rendered on board the vessel by Kippel, and that they were performed at the request of the mate, who had an apparent authority to contract therefor. The liability of the vessel follows, of course.

Upon the evidence the libelant can recover for four days at five dollars per day. There is no evidence as to the quantity or value of material furnished. Let the decree be for $20 and costs.
The District Court of the 1st Judicial District. County of Lewis and Clark.

#### *49STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff, vs. ROBERT RICKMAN, Defendant.

CAUSE NO. ADC-06-328 DECISION

On April 18,2007, the defendant was sentenced to life in the Montana state Prison, with no parole eligibility for fifty-five (55) years, for the offense of Deliberate Homicide, a felony.

On May 6,2010, the defendant’s application for review of that sentence was heard by the Sentence Review Division of the Montana Supreme Court.

The defendant was present and was represented by Randi Hood and Joslyn Hunt. The state was not represented.

Before hearing the application, the defendant was advised that the Sentence Review Division has the authority not only to reduce the sentence or affirm it, but also increase it. The defendant was further advised that there is no appeal from a decision of the Sentence Review Division. The defendant acknowledged that he understood this and stated that he wished to proceed.

Rule 17 of the Rules of the Sentence Review Division of the Supreme Court of Montana provides that “the sentence imposed by the District Court is presumed correct, and the sentence will not be reduced or increased unless it is deemed clearly inadequate or excessive.” (§46-18-904(3), MCA).

The majority of the Division finds that the reasons advanced for modification are insufficient to hold that the sentence imposed by the District Court is inadequate or excessive.

Therefore, it is the majority decision of the Sentence Review Division that the sentence shall be affirmed.

Done in open Court this 6th day of May, 2010.

DATED this 26th day of May, 2010.

Chairperson, Hon. Blair Jones and Member, Hon. Ray Dayton.

The Hon. Richard Simonton

dissents.

It is Judge Simonton’s opinion that the sentence is excessive in light of the defendant’s age, the fact that the defendant did not wield the murder weapon, and that the fifty five year parole restriction far exceeds other sentences for similar crimes around the state. A parole restriction of thirty years before the defendant is parole eligible would be sufficient time for the defendant to change and for the result of any change to be observed by the Parole Board. If, at that time, there were no significant change, the Parole Board could deny parole.

Member, Hon. Richard Simonton.
1 Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-50889 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus JAVIER SANCHEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. MO-01-CR-36-12-S

- - - - - - - - - - September 20, 2002 Before DUHÉ, WIENER, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: 1 Javier Sanchez appeals his guilty plea conviction for aiding and abetting possess ion with intent to distribute marihuana. He
argues that th e district court violated F E D . R. C RIM . P. 11 by failing to fully inform him regarding the effect of supervised release.
As part of his plea agreement, Sanchez waived his right to appeal “any aspect of the conviction and sentence” with the2

exception of certain ineffective assistance and prosecutorial misconduct claims. Sanchez has not challenged the validity of this waiver, and the rec ord reveals that he knowingly and voluntarily agreed to this provision. See United States v. Portillo , 18 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1994). Because this appeal is in contravention of the waiver of appeal provision, it is dismissed. S ee United States v. Melancon , 972 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 1992).
APPEAL DISMISSED.
AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed January 12, 2015.

In The 

## Court of Appeals **Fifth District of Texas at Dallas** No. 05 - 1 4 - 00 356 - CR PAUL LEWIS WARREN , Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee On Appeal from the 380th Judicial Distri ct Court Collin County, Tex as Trial Court Cause No. 380 - 81292 - 2013 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Francis, Evans, and Stoddart Opinion b y Justice Evans Paul Lewis Warren appeals from the revocation of his community supervision for felony driving while intoxicated . See T EX . P ENAL C ODE A NN . § § 49.04(a), 49.09(b)(2) (West Supp. 2014). The trial court assessed punishment at two years’ imprisonment and a $1,000 fine. On appeal, appellant’s attorney filed a brief in which he concludes the appeal is wholly frivolous and without m erit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The brief presents a professional evaluation of the record showing why, in effect, there are no arguable grounds to advance. See High v. State , 573 S.W.2d 807, 811

– 12 ( Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). Counsel delivered a copy of the brief to appellant. We advised appellant of- 2

- his right to file a pro se response, but he did not file a pro se response. See Kelly v. State , 436 S.W.3d 313, 319

– 21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (identifying duties of appellate courts and counsel in Anders cases). We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief

. See Bledsoe v. State , 178 S.W.3d 824, 82 6

– 2 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (explaining appellate court’s duty in Anders cases)

. We agree the appeal is frivolous and without merit. We find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/ David Evans/ DAVID EVANS JUSTICE Do Not Publish T EX . R. A PP . P. 47 140356F.U05- 3

- 

## Court of Appeals **Fif th District of Texas at Dallas** 

JUDGMENT

PAUL LEWIS WARREN , Appellant No. 05

- 1 4

- 00356

- CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee Appeal from the 380th Judicial District Court of Collin County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 380

- 81292

- 2013 ). Opinion delivered by Justice Evans , Justices Francis and Stoddart participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is AFFIRMED

.
Judgment entered January 12 , 2015.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Steve Johnson, Appellant.

Submitted August 30, 2010;

decided September 16, 2010

Motion for assignment of counsel granted and Steven Banks, Esq., the Legal Aid Society, 199 Water Street, New York, NY 10038 assigned as counsel to the appellant on the appeal herein.
#### State v. Turner

Case below: 177 N.C. App. 423

No. 298P06

1. Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 (COA05-1046)

2. Defs Alternative PWC To Review Decision of COA

1. Denied 01/25/07

2. Denied 01/25/07
#### Killmer *against*Crary.

The admission of the persoSrta^the-; for tLe purpose second^'durnl count of the rial rests in thetíHthedjusücé^ appear that thát be^nabused, hfs iot be reversed!

IN ERROR* on *certiorari*to a justice’s court.

The plaintiff in error, who was the defendant in the court be.low, having* ©n the return of the'summons, obtained an adjournmeht, appeared* on the day to which the causé,was adjourned, attorney, and requested another adjournment on account of the absence of material, witnesses. The application was opposed' ' *».*% the plaintiff below, and oné of the grounds of opposition was, t^t attorney OOuld not make the affidavit that the witnesses were material; upon which the attorney stated that'the defendánt was sick, and could not attend. The justice examined a witness as1 to that fact, and concluded, from what the .witness stated, that the defendant could have attended, add refused the affidavit, of the attorney. The parties then, proceeded £0 trial* ahd' a verdict was. found for the plaintiff.below,the, deféndant in error.

*Per Curiam.*

The only'question in this case is* whether the justice ought to have received the affidavit of the attorney, as to the absence and materiality of the Witnesses. This Was, .in'; Some manner,. á; matter resting in the spund discretion of the justice ; and .from the evidence returned, as to the inability of the defendant to attend the court, wq oannót say that there: was -such án abuse of this discretion as to'justify the setting aside the -judgment, it is clear ■ that .the-defendant might have attended court; The cause of his inability alleged, was a complaint in his face, arising, as the, witness at first supposed, from intoxication ; afterwards he thought it was occasioned by poison: he had but a day or two before walked ten miles. As the first adjournment was • at the request of the defendant* and, for any thing, that appears, for as long a time as he wanted in order to prepare for the trial; *229and as the dispensing -with the affidavit of the.party himself was a question proper for the justice, and resting in sound, discretion, we think the judgment must be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-2266

MILREACE MALONE, Rickey Malone,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

LEWISBURG, USP; WARDEN, Regional Office of P.A.; DRESSLER, Mr.; 

HENDRICKS, Mr.,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. 

Ellen L. Hollander, District Judge. (1:17-cv-02471-ELH)

Submitted: March 13, 2018 Decided: March 15, 2018

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Milreace Malone, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Milreace Malone appeals the district court’s order dismissing her civil action for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012).∗

 We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. 

Accordingly, we grant Malone’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and affirm for the 

reasons stated by the district court. Malone v. Lewisburg, USP, No. 1:17-cv-02471-ELH 

(D. Md. filed Oct. 23, 2017 & entered Oct. 24, 2017). We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

 ∗ Although the district court dismissed the action without prejudice, the district 

court’s order is final and appealable under Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc’y, Inc., 807 

F.3d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 2015), and Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 247 (4th Cir. 2017)

(“repeated, ineffective attempts at amendment suggest that further amendment of the 

complaint would be futile”).
EXHIBIT 10.5





FOURTH AMENDMENT TO


1992 OUTSIDE DIRECTORS STOCK OPTION AND INCENTIVE PLAN




THIS FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE PERMA-FIX ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INC. OUTSIDE DIRECTORS STOCK OPTION AND INCENTIVE PLAN (the “Fourth Amendment”) was approved by the Board of Directors (the “Board”) of Perma-Fix Environmental Services, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company’’), on May 20, 1998.




WHEREAS, Article VII of the 1992 Outside Directors Stock Option and Incentive Plan, as amended (the “Plan”), provides that the Board may at any time, and from time to time and, in any respect amend or modify the Plan;




WHEREAS, as of December 31, 1997, options to purchase up to two hundred twenty-seven thousand (227,000) shares of Common Stock of the two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shares of Common Stock which may be issued under the Plan have been granted to Eligible Directors, pursuant to the terms of the Plan;




WHEREAS, in order to continue to attract and retain qualified members of the Board who are not employees of the Company, the Board is of the opinion that it is necessary that the maximum number of shares of Common Stock that may be issued under the Plan be increased from two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shares to five hundred thousand (500,000) shares (subject to adjustment as provided in the Plan), and




NOW, THEREFORE, the following amendments to the Plan are unanimously adopted by the Board, subject to the approval of the stockholders of the Company:





A.       Section 4.1 of the Plan is hereby amended by deleting the number “250,000” from the first full sentence contained therein and substituting in lieu thereof the number “500,000.”




The Plan is amended and modified only to the extent specifically amended or modified by this Fourth Amendment to the 1992 Outside Directors Stock Option and Incentive Plan, and none of the terms, conditions or provisions of the Plan, as previously amended, is amended or modified by this Fourth Amendment to the 1992 Outside Directors Stock Option and Incentive Plan.
ex10_34.htm


    
      

    

    
      [ViewSonic
        Europe Letterhead]

       

      Notice
        of Amendment to Stock Options Awarded Under the ViewSonic Corporation 2004
        Equity Incentive Plan (“2004 Plan”)

      


      


      Dear
        Jan,

      


      This
        letter notifies you of certain amendments to the terms and conditions of
        each of
        the stock options granted to you under the 2004 Plan (collectively referred
        to
        as the “Jensen Grants”). This letter should be read in conjunction with the
        compromise agreement between you and Viewsonic Netherlands (for and on behalf
        of
        Viewsonic Europe Limited (the “Company”)) dated on or about the date hereof (the
“Compromise Agreement”).

      


      At
        a duly
        constituted meeting held on November 26, 2007, the Compensation Committee
        of the
        Board of Directors approved resolutions amending the terms and conditions
        of the
        Jensen Grants as follows:

      


      Your
        continued employment by the Company during the Transition Period (as defined
        in
        the Compromise Agreement) will be regarded as continuous employment by an
        affiliate of Viewsonic Corporation for the purposes of the 2004 Plan, provided
        that you comply with the terms of the Compromise Agreement; and

      


      Provided
        that you comply with the terms of the Compromise Agreement, the Jensen Grants
        will continue to vest until the end of the Transition Period (i.e. July 5,
        2008)
        at which time vesting shall cease.

      


      The
        Jensen Grants to the extent they have vested at the end of the Transition
        Period
        on July 5, 2008 shall be exercisable on or before December 31, 2008, after
        which
        they shall lapse.

      


      Please
        acknowledge your agreement to these amended terms by signing the enclosed
        duplicate copy of this letter and returning it to me.

      


      Regards,

      


      /s/
        Tim
        Ashcroft

      


      Tim
        Ashcroft

      VP
        Corporate Human Resources

      


      I
        hereby
        agree to the amendments to the Jensen Grants set out in the above
        letter.

      


      


      
        	
                /s/
                  Jan Jensen

              	
                November
                  27, 2007

              
	 	 
	
                Jan
                  Jensen
#### Marshall Ray MILLER, Petitioner—Appellant, v. UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL; Bureau of Prisons; McKither Bodison, Respondents—Appellees.

No. 09-6004.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 21, 2009.

Decided: May 28, 2009.

Marshall Ray Miller, Appellant Pro Se.

Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Marshall Ray Miller, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006) petition. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Miller v. United States Attorney General,*No. 3:08-cv-02806-TLW, 2008 WL 5244579 (D.S.C. Dec. 15, 2008). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
<PAGE>


                                                                    Exhibit 99.5

                         SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION--CFO

In connection with Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report of Plains Exploration &
Production Company (the "Company") on Form 10-K/A for the period ending December
31, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), I, Stephen A. Thorington, Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

To the best of my knowledge, after reasonable investigation:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
          the Company.


Dated: April 30, 2003.

                                               /s/ Stephen A. Thorington
                                              ----------------------------------
                                              Stephen A. Thorington
                                              Chief Financial Officer

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and is not being filed as part of the Report or
as a separate disclosure document.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Highway Safety Grants Program                                  

# FY 2019 Grant Funding Table

Share:*Facebook**Twitter**LinkedIn**Mail*

FY 2019 Grant Funding TableFY 2019 State Grant Determinations

													FY 2019 Grant Funding Table													

                - FY 2019 State Grant Determinations

# FY 2019 State Grant Determinations

Resource

Printable FY2019 Grants Determination Table
Download

Section 4010 of the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act, P.L. 114-94, requires NHTSA to post on a public website information about grant determinations under the National Priority Safety Programs (23 U.S.C. 405). Specifically, 60 days after making grant award determinations, NHTSA must identify:
                  - The States that received grant awards,
                  - The States that applied for but did not receive grant awards, and
                  - The States that did not apply for grants. Note that there are many reasons why a State may not apply for a grant, including knowledge that the State does not qualify for the grant.

For those States that applied for but did not receive grant awards, NHTSA must additionally provide a list of deficiencies that made the States ineligible for award.

The tables below address these FAST Act requirements. The first table identifies items #1 through #3 above. Subsequent tables, broken out by grant program, identify some of the significant deficiencies that prevented a State from receiving an award. NHTSA reviewed State laws based on the legal citations provided by States in their application package. While we exercised due diligence in that effort, inaccurate or incomplete legal citations in some State applications may have affected NHTSA’s review.

In order to make timely award determinations and notifications to the States, once a determination was made that a State did not meet the mandatory requirements listed in the “Deficiencies” tables, NHTSA did not proceed with further evaluation. As a result, the list of deficiencies in the tables below should not be viewed as comprehensive.

As always, NHTSA remains available to provide a review of proposed bills as individual States pursue legislative efforts to achieve compliance with these important grant programs. We will do our best to provide fast turnaround guidance in those situations, including telephone discussions at a State’s request when its legislative process is moving rapidly. It is our hope that the information provided below will assist States in their legislative efforts.

#           FY 2019 Section 405 Grant Determination Results        

#           Summary Table        

# 
State Traffic Safety Information System Improvement Grant (Deficiencies in State Application)

# 
Ignition Interlock Law Grant (Deficiencies in State Application)

# 
24-7 Sobriety Program Grant (Deficiencies in State Application)

# 
Comprehensive Distracted Driving Grant (Deficiencies in State Application)

# 
Motorcyclist Safety Grant (Deficiencies in State Application)

# 
Graduated Driver Licensing Law Grant (Deficiencies in State Application)