1

Filed 3/30/17

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

A.T.,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SOLANO 

COUNTY,

Respondent;

THE PEOPLE,

Real Party in Interest.

 A149772

 (Solano County Super. Ct.

 No. J43654)

THE COURT:

1

Petitioner A.T. filed a writ petition asking us to direct the juvenile court to vacate 

its November 3, 2016 order denying her request to be released to her mother’s custody

pending the disposition of criminal charges. The petition alleges the court improperly 

considered her refusal to accept a “package-deal” plea bargain, as well as the suitability 

of the Vallejo neighborhood where her mother lives in a two-bedroom apartment, in 

deciding to detain her. The Attorney General urges us to dismiss A.T.’s petition as moot, 

noting the girl was released on November 10, 2016, upon pleading guilty to a 

misdemeanor, after serving 16 days in custody. 

We exercise our inherent jurisdiction to resolve the issues presented by this writ 

petition because they are of broad public interest, likely to recur, generally “encountered 

. . . at a level of ‘low visibility’ in the criminal process . . . and involve[] asserted errors 

 

1 Before Kline, P.J., Richman, J., and Stewart, J.
2

. . . not ordinarily reviewable on appeal.” (In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 24-26

(William M.); see also In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1403-1404; In re 

Raymond G. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 964, 967.) Further, we note that, after pleading 

guilty, A.T. filed a motion to withdraw her November 9, 2016 plea of guilty. That 

motion is still pending, in accordance with a stay we issued on December 23, 2016. This 

opinion is intended to guide the juvenile court in considering A.T.’s motion to withdraw 

her plea.

BACKGROUND

A.T. is enrolled in high school in Fairfield, California, where her attendance is 

regular, and she earns passing grades. She has no prior delinquent history. On October 

24, 2016, she was riding with another minor in a car driven by her brother, who is also a 

minor with no delinquent history. Police stopped the car because its registration had 

expired. When they learned that no one inside the vehicle possessed a valid driver’s 

license, they arrested her brother for driving without a license. While performing an 

inventory search in preparation for the vehicle to be towed, officers found a small 

handgun wrapped in a shirt inside a backpack that was inside the trunk. At that point, 

A.T. and the other minor were arrested.

A.T. waived her Miranda rights, and told police that her brother had found the gun 

early that morning, and shown it to her. She said they had agreed to wrap it up and put it 

inside her backpack, and to leave it inside the trunk of the car to show later to their father.

The father of her brother’s girlfriend subsequently reported the gun was stolen from him.

By a petition filed October 25, 2016, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 602, subdivision (a),

2 A.T. was charged with grand theft (count 1); possession of 

a firearm by a minor (count 2); and carrying a loaded/stolen firearm (count 3).

3 At her 

arraignment on October 26, 2016, A.T. denied each charge. Despite her youth, lack of 

prior delinquent history, solid ties to the community, and positive parental support, the

 

2 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

3

The record indicates that brother was charged with an additional crime, count 4, 

presumably related to his driving without a license. 
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juvenile court rejected the probation department’s recommendation that she be 

conditionally released to her mother subject to home supervision.

On November 3, 2016, after A.T. had spent 10 days in custody, the court held a

readiness conference and a hearing on the prosecutor’s motion to join her case with that 

of her brother. A.T. objected to joinder, explaining that she believed her brother would 

provide exculpatory testimony if he had the opportunity to testify at her separate trial. He

also objected to joinder. After hearing argument, the juvenile court joined the two 

matters over the minors’ objections. 

The court then inquired whether the parties had made any progress toward

resolving the cases. The prosecutor responded that she had offered the minors a 

“package deal,” whereby A.T. would plead guilty to count 3, as a misdemeanor, and 

brother would plead guilty to count 3, as a misdemeanor, as well as count 4, and both 

minors would receive formal probation. A.T.’s brother wanted to take the deal, but she

did not. The court indicated it was willing to accept her brother’s plea, and to let A.T.’s 

case go forward. The prosecutor insisted, however, that the plea offer depended on both 

minors’ admitting the charges.

A.T. then renewed her request to be released from detention to the custody of her 

mother, who was present in court.4 At the court’s prompting, A.T.’s mother provided her 

address. The court then asked, “What’s at [that address]? What is the building?”

A.T.’s mother said, “Well, . . . they have a lot of storefronts, but . . . .”

The court agreed, “Yes, they do. It’s downtown Vallejo, right.” 

A.T.’s mother then said, “Yes, sir. It’s nice. It’s quiet. I mean, the building is 

quiet. It’s not a lot of drama in there. I don’t know what else to say. I have the only 

two-bedroom in there.” 

 

4

The record reflects that A.T.’s father was the custodial parent. At the time of the 

hearing, however, he had recently separated from his wife, A.T.’s stepmother. While he 

looked for a new apartment, he had been sleeping at his place of business, while A.T. 

lived with an aunt. A.T.’s father and mother were both present at the hearing, along with

a family friend, Mrs. Nelson, who also offered to take custody of the minors pending 

disposition of the charges.
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The court responded, “I don’t know what to say either. Okay? I’m extremely 

familiar with Vallejo. I grew up in Vallejo. I’ve got a pretty good feel of what’s 

happening in downtown Vallejo.” 

After further discussion, the court announced, “I’ll be frank with you, I’m 

disappointed that we’re not able to find some resolution of this today. . . . I’d like to have 

you come back and give this one more try on another readiness conference.” Counsel for 

A.T. then asked to pass the matter, and the court obliged, saying, “Anything to see if we 

can find a resolution, yes. We’ll pass these cases briefly.” 

After a lunch recess, the court re-called the cases. At the afternoon hearing, 

counsel for A.T. informed the court that she had looked up A.T.’s mother’s address on 

Google Maps, and confirmed it appeared to be a residential apartment complex above a 

business located on the first floor. 

The court stated, “Well, I believe that there’s a residential unit. That’s not the 

only reason that I’ve denied the custodial status be changed.” The court explained its 

concern for A.T.’s safety, and stated it was not going to change its mind about keeping 

her detained at that point. The court then inquired once more if it needed to set the 

matters for a contest, or whether some resolution had been reached. 

Her brother’s counsel indicated that his client’s position remained the same.

A.T.’s counsel asked the court to clarify its concerns for A.T.’s safety due to her 

mother’s neighborhood. The court responded, “Well, it’s downtown Vallejo . . . about 

two blocks away from the Marina apartments, which are—have some notoriety about the 

nature of the criminal activity that takes place there. I know this area very, very well. 

Okay?” 

Counsel for A.T. reiterated that her client was a 14-year-old child with no prior 

record and that she needed to be home with her mother. At that point, counsel stated that 

A.T. was prepared to resolve her case for a misdemeanor, in accordance with the offered 

plea bargain. She went on to respond to the court’s comments about downtown Vallejo, 

noting that families who are poor cannot afford to live wherever they choose. Counsel 
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stated that downtown Vallejo is where A.T.’s mother could afford to live, and A.T. had 

been to the apartment before without incident. 

While explaining that it did not have enough information to decide whether going 

to her mother’s home would be in A.T.’s best interest, the court stated, “Okay, I’ll tell 

you what I’d be willing to do with [A.T.]: I’d be willing to grant her probation officer 

discretion to release her to her mother’s home pending the disposition hearing. Okay? 

And I take it that would be over [the prosecutor’s] objection, right?” 

The prosecutor affirmed her objection, and the court reiterated its willingness to 

grant A.T.’s probation officer discretion to release her to her mother on home 

supervision. 

In the midst of her brother’s admission colloquy, however, A.T. interrupted

through counsel to inform the court that, if the court were to grant A.T.’s release, then 

A.T. would prefer to hold off on making an admission. Counsel expressed concern that 

the girl intended to admit to the charges only to expedite her release from custody. 

The court responded that it did not want A.T. to do that. 

Counsel informed the court that A.T. was prepared to waive time, if the court was 

still inclined to grant the probation department discretion to release her. 

The court then indicated it was no longer willing to grant the probation department 

discretion to release A.T., saying, “Let’s just set it for contest, and you can all think about 

this carefully. . . . I’m not in the habit of somehow coercing minors to admit to things 

that they don’t—that they’re not voluntarily doing. I don’t feel comfortable with that.”

The prosecutor confirmed that she would accept only a global resolution, and the 

court responded, “And if we can’t get a resolution for [A.T.], then we’re just going to set 

it for a contest?” The prosecutor agreed, and the court set the contest for November 15, 

2016, stating once more that it would not release A.T. “[g]iven the nature of these 

charges.” 

On November 9, 2016, after she had spent 15 days in custody, at a scheduled 

readiness conference, A.T. asked once more to be released from detention. The juvenile 
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court denied that request again, and then again denied A.T.’s next request that the 

probation department be granted discretion to release her. 

Immediately after that, A.T. changed her plea to admit count 3 of the petition. 

Only then, after she admitted a misdemeanor allegation, did the trial court give the 

probation department discretion to release her. A.T. filed her petition for writ of mandate 

on the same day. The following day, she was released to home supervision, having spent 

16 days in custody.

On December 2, 2016, the Attorney General filed a letter brief urging the 

mootness of A.T.’s petition, and, on December 13, A.T. filed a reply, in which she stated 

that she had filed a motion to withdraw her admission in the juvenile court on December 

12. On December 23, we issued an order staying all further proceedings related to A.T.’s 

prosecution, including the scheduled hearing on her motion to withdraw her guilty plea, 

pending our resolution of this writ petition.

The record reveals beyond a doubt that the juvenile court detained A.T. for 15 

days in order to pressure her to accept a plea bargain. It also shows that when it denied 

her request for release on November 3, 2016, the juvenile court gave improper weight to 

its own assessment of the suitability of A.T.’s mother’s neighborhood. 

GOVERNING PRINCIPLES

It is the declared purpose of our Juvenile Court Law “to provide for the protection 

and safety of the public and each minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and to 

preserve and strengthen the minor’s family ties whenever possible, removing the minor 

from the custody of his or her parents only when necessary for his or her welfare or for 

the safety and protection of the public.” (§ 202, subd. (a).) 

To this end, section 635 directs that, after holding a detention hearing, “the court 

shall make its order releasing the minor from custody,” “unless it appears . . . that it is a 

matter of immediate and urgent necessity for the protection of the minor or reasonably 

necessary for the protection of the person or property of another that he or she be 

detained or that the minor is likely to flee to avoid the jurisdiction of the court[.]” (§ 635, 

italics added.) “By requiring that the minor be released unless the case [falls] within one 
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of the specified categories, the Legislature indicated its intention that detention be the 

exception, not the rule.” (William M., supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 26.)

“[T]he determination whether to detain a minor following a warrantless arrest for 

criminal activity is a complex one, requiring consideration of various factors personal to 

the minor and [her] family situation [citation], and the application of several important 

statutory presumptions favoring the minor’s early release to a parent, guardian or 

responsible relative. . . .” (Alfredo A. v. Superior Court (1994) 6 Cal.4th 1212, 1222.)

“The basic predicate of the Juvenile Court Law is that each juvenile be treated as 

an individual.” (William M., supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 31.) “ ‘[T]he Juvenile Court Law 

protects the minor’s right to an individualized detention hearing, in which the court may 

not dispose of cases by mechanical rules on a categorical basis.’ ” (In re Bianca S.

(2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1275, quoting William M., at p. 19.) 

“[S]ection 636 contains alternative grounds for detention. Hence, the juvenile 

court must at least specify the ground which the facts support. [Citation.] In the absence 

of such findings the reviewing court may well be faced with great difficulty in 

determining the factual basis for detention.” (William M., supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 27,

fn. 19.) 

“The nature of the charged offense cannot in itself constitute the basis for 

detention. [Citations.]” (William M., supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 30.) Further, “[t]he juvenile 

court, of course, may not assume guilt if the minor denies responsibility for the alleged 

offense. [Citations.] Nor may the juvenile court condition the juvenile’s release upon 

[her] waiver of [the] privilege against self-incrimination. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 29, 

fn. 23; People v. Superior Court (Felmann) (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 270, 276 [a court may 

not treat a defendant more harshly because she exercises her right to trial].) “[T]o punish 

a person for exercising a constitutional right is ‘a due process violation of the most basic 

sort.’ ” (In re Lewallen (1979) 23 Cal.3d 274, 278, quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes 

(1978) 434 U.S. 357, 363 [trial courts may not chill the exercise of the constitutional right 

to trial by jury].)
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In adult criminal courts, our Supreme Court has observed, package-deal plea 

bargains pose a particular danger of coercing guilty pleas because “[e]xtraneous factors 

not related to the case . . . may be brought into play.” (In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3d 277, 

287 (Ibarra).) “Because such considerations do not bear any direct relation to whether 

the defendant himself is guilty, special scrutiny must be employed to ensure a voluntary 

plea.” (Id. at p. 287.) For this reason, we are charged with examining “ ‘the totality of 

the circumstances whenever a plea is taken pursuant to a “package-deal” bargain.’ ” 

(People v. Sandoval (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 111, 125, quoting Ibarra, at p. 288.) 

“ ‘ “[T]he voluntariness of a plea bargain which contemplates special concessions to 

another—especially a sibling or a loved one—bears particular scrutiny by a trial or 

reviewing court conscious of the psychological pressures upon an accused such a 

situation creates.” ’ ” (Sandoval, at p. 125, quoting Ibarra, at p. 289.)

ANALYSIS

1. A.T. Was Under Pressure To Plead Guilty

Our Supreme Court has recognized that serious concerns arise when codefendants 

are presented with package-deal plea bargains. (See Ibarra, supra, 34 Cal.3d, 277.) We 

believe these concerns are greatly magnified when the codefendants are minors. Indeed, 

given “[t]he basic predicate of the Juvenile Court Law . . . that each juvenile be treated as 

an individual” (William M., supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 31), we question whether package-deal 

plea offers have any place at all in juvenile court. 

In the case before us, reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we have little 

trouble concluding that A.T. was under pressure to plead guilty based on “considerations 

. . . bear[ing] no direct relation to whether” she was guilty in fact. (Ibarra, supra, 34 

Cal.3d at p. 287.) From the day she was arrested, A.T. indicated that: She was innocent 

of the charges against her; she wanted to go to trial; and she expected her brother’s 

truthful testimony, if permitted, would exonerate her. The prosecutor’s insistence on a 

package plea deal, however, virtually guaranteed that A.T.’s defense would never come 

to light.
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First, the record suggests that the offer was of benefit to her brother, but not to 

A.T. He wanted to accept the bargain. As the Supreme Court recognized in Ibarra, this 

circumstance in itself may place pressure on an innocent sibling to plead guilty. (Ibarra, 

supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 289 [“ ‘[t]he voluntariness of a plea bargain which contemplates 

special concessions to another—especially a sibling or a loved one—bears particular 

scrutiny by a trial or reviewing court’ ”].) 

Even if she withstood the pressure to go along with her brother, A.T. would have 

had to refuse the deal in light of the court’s order joining their cases. By declining the 

plea offer, A.T. could have forced her brother to go to trial, but she could not have forced

him to take the stand at their joint trial and give the self-incriminating testimony most 

likely to exonerate her. In fact, the court’s joinder order further weighted the scale in 

favor of A.T.’s pleading guilty by creating a risk that her brother would testify against her

at trial. The package nature of the plea offer also ensured that her brother could not 

bargain for immunity in exchange for giving truthful testimony at A.T.’s trial. 

Worse, as the November 3, 2016 hearing progressed, it became increasingly 

apparent that pleading guilty was the only way A.T.—who by then had spent 10 days in 

custody—had any chance of being released. Indeed, A.T.’s counsel informed the court 

that her client was tempted to plead guilty only because she perceived that doing so 

would allow her to go home. This perception was entirely justified. While asserting he 

did not want her “to admit to things that [she was] not voluntarily doing,” the juvenile 

court judge appeared to do exactly that: On November 3, 2016, when A.T.’s counsel told 

him she was prepared to accept a plea bargain, he indicated he would grant the probation 

department discretion to release her to her mother on home supervision. But when he 

learned that A.T. no longer accepted the offer, the judge changed his mind, announcing 

he would not grant the probation department such discretion. 

Similarly, on November 9, 2016, after A.T. had spent 15 days in custody, the 

juvenile court again denied her request to be released. It was only moments later, after 

she changed her mind and pleaded guilty, that the court changed its mind and authorized 

the probation department to release her. On this record, we are compelled to conclude
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that A.T, a 14-year-old girl who had never been incarcerated or otherwise removed from 

her parents’ custody, was being penalized for exercising her constitutional right to go to

trial. Under these circumstances, her ultimate relinquishment of that right is less 

surprising than the fact she refused for more than two weeks.

2. The Court Failed to Consider A.T.’s Case On Its Individual Merits 

As we have said, the court must make an individualized and evidence-based 

assessment of a juvenile defendant’s fitness for release based upon the criteria set forth in 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 635. The court must also specify the facts 

supporting its determination, keeping in mind that, “the intendments [of the Juvenile 

Court Law] are all against detention, and it may not be ordered unless there is clear proof 

of the ‘urgent necessity’ which sections 635 and 636 require.” (In re Dennis H. (1971) 

19 Cal. App.3d 350, 354, fn. omitted, citing William M., supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 25-31.) 

The court justified detaining A.T. by pointing to the seriousness of the charges 

against her, but, as we have said, “[t]he nature of the charged offense cannot in itself 

constitute the basis for detention.” (William M., supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 30.) The available 

evidence suggested A.T.’s involvement, if any, in stealing or carrying the gun was 

minimal. In fact, the prosecutor was willing to dismiss the three serious charges against 

her in return for her plea to a lone misdemeanor.

The court also relied on its personal view that A.T.’s mother lived in an unsafe

neighborhood. While the Juvenile Court Law “provide[s] ample authority for the 

detention of children for their own protection” (William M., supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 26, 

fn. 17), the determination that a child needs this sort of protection must be fact-based. In 

pursuit of the needed facts, the court must “hear relevant evidence the minor [or] . . . her 

parent . . . desires to present.” (§ 635.) Here, the court heard testimony from A.T.’s 

mother that her “building is quiet [and] [i]t’s not a lot of drama in there.” But instead of 

deferring to this uncontradicted evidence, the court detained A.T. based upon its own 

subjective and categorical opinions about downtown Vallejo. In doing so, the court

denied A.T. the “elementary requirements of individualized justice and due process.” 

(William M., at p. 31.)
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We note further that the court’s stated rationales for detaining A.T. ring hollow in 

light of its willingness to send her home after she admitted the charges. A.T. was surely 

no less dangerous to the public, and her mother’s neighborhood no safer, after she 

pleaded guilty than before. 

CONCLUSION

“The decision to take a minor away from [her] home, [her] parents, and [her] 

friends is fraught with . . . grave consequences. . . .” (William M., supra, 3 Cal.3d at 

pp. 30-31, fn. omitted.) It is for this reason “[t]he Legislature has indicated that children 

should be released except under certain specific conditions of ‘immediate and urgent 

necessity.’ ” (Ibid.) The record before us reveals no such necessity.

The court is directed to consider A.T.’s motion to withdraw the plea of guilty she 

entered on November 9, 2016, in light of the foregoing. This court’s December 23, 2016

order temporarily staying proceedings in the juvenile court is vacated. To expedite 

proceedings in the juvenile court, this decision shall be final as to this court five days 

after its filing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)
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Trial Court: Solano County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. D. Scott Daniels

Attorneys for Petitioner: Solano County Alternate Public Defender

Michiko K. Yamamoto

Damian Carl Douglass Spieckerman

Deputy Public Defender

Attorneys for Respondent: Office of the Attorney General

Kamala D. Harris

Attorney General of California

Joan Killeen

Deputy Attorney General