1 CONDITIONALLY GRANT and Opin ion Filed September 23, 2020 

# S

In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-20-00680-CV IN RE PRINCE OF PEACE CHRISTIAN SCHOOL, Relator

Original Proceeding from the 471st Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 471-06418-2019 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Burns, a nd Justices Myers and Evans Opinion by Chief Justice Burns This original proceeding arises from a suit filed by parents wh ose children were expelled from a religiously affiliated private school. Re lator Prince of Peace Christian School contends the ecc lesiastical abstention doctrin e deprives the trial court of jurisdiction and thus the trial court abused its discr etion in denying its plea to the jurisdiction. Because we conclude that any decision reg arding the merits of this dispute would require judicial intrusion upon Prince of Pe ace’s entitlement to manage its internal affairs accord ing to its own policies and b eliefs, we conditionally grant the writ.–2– FACTUAL BACKGROUND 1
A. The School Prince of Peace, a private school, defines its mission as “prov id[ing] a Christcentered, exemplary education, equipping children as disciples and leaders for service and success in the 21st century.” Although established and operated for more than 30 years by Prince of Peace Lutheran Church with which it shares a campus, in 2012, the school became an indepe ndent 501(c)(3) non-profit ent ity. Like its mission statement, the school’s A rticles of Incorporation defin e the purpose of the corporation as providing “a Chris tian education program that is centered upon Biblical principles.” Prince of Peace is accredited by secular organizations as well as Lutheran school organizations, which evaluate schools on the basis of their academic and spiritual qualities. As a separate entity, Prince of P eace has no privity or legal r elationship with the Lutheran Church, but is a “R ecognized Service Organization” (RSO), by which it seeks to carry out the Lutheran Church’s objectives, includi ng providing a “Christcentered” education and providing a place for its teachers to “ live out their faith in word and deed.” Many of its teachers and administrators are “C alled” or

1 We derive the relevant jurisdictional facts from Parents’ Orig inal Petition and the jurisdictional evidence submitted in response to the school’s plea to the jurisdiction. We recite the facts in some detail so as to enable reliance on the incidents in question, rather than gener alized or hyperbolic descriptions of those incidents.–3– “Commissioned” ministers, 2 having studied at synodical teaching institutions and received certifications for ministry by the faculty of those in stitutions or commissions from Lutheran Church congregations. According to t he school’s policies, even teachers and sta ff who are not ministers or “Cal led” are expected to teach Christian values and embr ace their roles “as missionaries ” in “making disciples” of the school’s student body and their families. Al l of Prince of Peace’s students participate in weekly chapel and theology classes, and high school students must complete four theology class credits. Devotions or prayers begin each class, and all classes are taught fro m a Christian point of view. The school’s code of conduct found in its Parent/Student Handbo oks outline the goals of the “Christ-centered” education Prince of Peace se eks to provide, as well as the school’s policies and di sciplinary procedures governing its relationships with its students, their families, and its teachers and staff. Adhe rence to Lutheran faith principles, as reflected in scri pture references, guides these goals and policies, and the Handbooks stress adherence to Christian principles and subm ission to the school’s decisions. For example, specific scripture references frame the school’s expectations of the relationshi p among its teachers, students a nd parents, such as “speaking the truth in love” (Ephesians 4:15), encouragement (1 Thess. 5:11), accountability (James 1:9), respect and trust (1 Thess. 5:12-13 ; Proverbs 3:56).

2 Headmaster Chris Hahn, High School Principal Dr. Jeremy Lower, and former Assistant High School Principal Paul Stark, whose conduc t is at issue in this proceed ing, are Called or Commissioned Ministers.–4– Prince of Peace graduates are exp ected to demonstrate “principl es of Christian leadership, based on integrity and service” and, “realize . . . that the policies and decisions affect many people and must be measured by Christian standards of justice, charity and empathy.” Faculty members are expected to create an orderly school environment, as well as to serve as “role models of love , forgiveness, and grace that are part of a maturin g relationship with Jesus Chris t.” The code of conduct also include s policies against bullying, ha rassment, smoking, and substance abuse, and outline the school’s expectat ions regarding conflict resolution, search and se izure and drug testing, and b ehavioral disorders. Each policy rests on Lutheran beliefs. All students and enroll ed families agree to abide by Prince of Peace’s code of conduct and its tuition cont ract allows Prince of Peace the right to “remove a st udent at any time for any reason , including failure of the parent(s) to adhere to the policies, philosophies, and proc edures of the school.”
B. Prince of Peace’s discipline of Students and Parents’ complaint s During their freshman and sophomore years of high school, B.O. and S.R. (collectively “Students”), were disciplined several times by Hi gh School Assistant Principal Stark and two different coaches. Parents assert Stud ents were on a “watch list” created by Stark for problem students; Stark and other ad ministrative employees treated Students unfairly and “treated other students more favo rably” than they treated Students; and, Stark sta lked Students, including freque ntly entering the restroom when Students were usi ng it and using any urinal close to where Students–5– were urinating. Parents contend, that Stark, through close and excessive supervision and discipline, sexua lly harassed Students. 3 Parents allege Students were traumatized by Stark’s behavior , and B.O. developed post-trauma tic stress disorder, which rendered him unable to use the restroom in the presence o f any other person. Although Stark justified his close supervision of Students by c laiming they were likely vaping, Parents assert St udents were never caught doing so. Near the end of Students’ freshma n year, they and several other students were discovered by a coach in a loc ker room without permission. The coach also discovered a drawing of genitali a and a homophobic message on adry-erase board about one of the students who was present. Parents contend the coach incorrectly assumed the message reflected bu llying. They assert the messag e and drawing were a joke and the student who was the subject of the message and d rawing was neither upset nor offended. All students who were d iscovered in the loc ker room were questi oned in Stark’s office. Parents allege a secretary lied to the boys ab out surveillance in the locker room in an effort to soli cit a confession. They assert the secretary’s efforts reveal discussion of “confidentia l discipline matters” among th e office personnel and gossip about false accusations. Although Students denied w riting the offending picture and message, Parents comp lain Students were threatened with a Saturday

3 Parents do not specifically define what conduct constituted “s exual harassment,” but the discussion of facts from their Petition demonstrates they rely on Prince of P eace employees’ following Students into the bathroom or observing Students’ entering and leaving the bathro om for this allegation.–6– detention. The incident—which we discern from Parents’ pleadin gs as having been questioned in the school office rather than creating the homoph obic drawing and message—was so upsetting that St udents’ ability to study for th eir exams was impaired. B.O., who suffers fr om several learning disorders, “ had such trouble thinking clearly as a result of the incident,” that he failed m ost of his final exams. S.R., likewise, had difficulty focusing on his studies and fail ed some of his exams. Further, Parents contend Stark fa iled to call Parents to discus s the incident as he had informed Students he woul d. Instead, Parents met with t he principal, Dr. Lowe, about Stark’s “biased handling” of the incident, an “inap propriate” email from Stark, and his “ongoing harassment” of Students, his “obse ssive stalking” of Students, as well as his “poor judgment and mismanagement of si tuations” involving Students. Although Dr. Lowe in itially defended the “investigat ion and interrogations,” he eventually o ffered repeated apologies, admi tted the administration’s response to the incident had been “overboard,” and acknowledged Stark needed training over the summer. Dr. Lowe also conceded neither B.O. nor S.R. had ever been in “serious t rouble” with the school, but al so noted that Students and the group with which they a ssociated were known on campus a s a “wolf pack,” which merited close supervision. Parents requested that Dr. Lo we prohibit Stark from disciplining Students without Parents’ presence. Dr. Lowe agreed he would “try to keep the boys from being alone with” Stark.–7– Students returned to Prince of P eace for their sophomore year t o even greater attention. Parents contend Star k enlisted additional faculty t o harass Students, warn others that Students were “bad” and that associating with Stude nts would end in trouble. One coach began following Students into the restroom as Stark had, and other unnamed faculty members stood outside of restrooms when S tudents entered. Shortly after the semester started, Stark confronted Students i n the lunchroom after they had returned from th e restroom and “within view of t he entire cafeteria and within earshot of at least the students and faculty at near by tables.” Stark accused Students of placing toilet paper on the bathroom floor, 4 and Parents allege Stark publicly humiliated Students to “perpetuate the myth” tha t they were discipline problems. The following day, a similar incident occurred, and Stark accus ed Students of clogging a toilet and leaving more toilet paper on the floor, w hich Students denied. Stark lectured Students and thr eatened to restrict their bathro om privileges. A few days later, a different coach called Students to the scho ol office based on information from another stude nt that Students were vaping o n campus. Students had recently refused to sit with the student who reported the v aping, and Parents asserted that student was “motivated” to accuse B.O. Upon arri ving at the office,

4 Parents initially describe the conduct at issue as “putting a roll of toilet paper” on the bathroom floor but later describe Stark’s belief that Students had been “throwing” toilet paper.–8– B.O. admitted having a vape pod but said he had picked it up as trash in the school parking lot. After these incidents, two of the four parents met with Princip al Dr. Lowe and Stark to report that Stark “continued to follow and harass” Stu dents. Stark explained he believed Students had thrown t oilet paper because of their l aughter as they left the bathroom, but offered no jus tification for questioning Stud ents in the cafeteria about the incident. Parents also confronted Stark about having observed Students in the bathroom, but Stark “showed no regard” for Students’ “disco mfort” and did not apologize. In response to Parents’ inquiries about why Stark h ad been permitted to search B.O. before calling his mother, 5 Dr. Lowe explained that he had been out of town on the day of the incident. At this meeting, Parents aske d for the “sexual harassment” to stop. About a month later, a different coach learned Students and oth ers were vaping on campus during a football game. The group was taken t o the gym by the coach and a police officer, and questioned and lectured about t he dangers of vaping and the disciplinary consequen ces outlined in the Handbooks. A lthough the students were not searched, vaping paraphe rnalia was discovered in the p ossession of one student.

5 Our record does not disclose any incident during which Student s were searched.–9– Several months later, another te acher questioned a student grou p that included Students about spraying water in a bathroom using a broken hose . When others in the group suggested Students were responsible for the damage, B .O. admitted to spraying water. About a week later, Prince of Peace expelled both B.O. and S.R. and wrote each family a detailed letter. Prince of Peace explained it ha d fully investigated all allegations by Parents regardi ng unlawful or inappropriate cond uct by its employees, including each of Parents’ complaints of “ongoing harassment, d efamation and bullying,” public humiliation, and threats directed at Students by staff. The school wrote that all disciplinary actions it had taken regarding Stud ents were reasonable and conformed to its policies a nd procedures. Prince of Peace alleged Parents’ “aggressive” and “unf ounded” accusations were inconsistent with its Lutheran Christian philosophy, its goal of developing good home–school c ommunications in furtherance of a “quality Christia n education,” and resulted in the school’s inability to assist Parents in providing a Christian education for Studen ts. Parents were informed: POPCS must be able to effectively communicate and work together with parents in accordance with POPCS’ mission “to provide a Christian education program that is centered upon Biblical prin ciples.” You have demanded that the admin istration of the high school no t speak to your son or daughter without you present. You have demanded that Assistant Principal Stark not be involved in any investigation and/or meeting with your son. You have r equired POPCS to communicate with you through attorneys. Your demands contradict the normal operating procedures and philosophies of POPCS. In addition, yo ur–10– threats of litigation and negative accusations against school p ersonnel have resulted in both teachers and administrators being unable to perform their duties as it rela tes to your children and/or appr opriately minister to your family. Further, you have publicly portrayed POPCS in a negative manner. Your actions clearly indicate that you c an no longer adhere to the policies, ph ilosophies and procedures of t he school. As such, POPCS can no longer minister to your family and comple te its mission. Parents filed suit alleging Prince of Peace breached its contra ct by (1) failing to operate the school in compliance with applicable state laws regarding the supervision and care of childre n, including by failing to repor t abuse or neglect which purportedly occurred when S tark sexually harassed Student s; and (2) failing to employ qualified faculty to a ddress bullying and harassment by the school’s staff. Parents also pleaded a negligence claim premised on Prince of P eace’s alleged failure to hire suitable employees and appropriately supervise those employees. Parents sought the value of their lost tuition payments, compen sation for Students’ mental and physical anguish, and attorneys’ fees. Prince of Peace filed a plea to the jurisdiction, contending ju dicial resolution was prohibited by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. This mandamus proceeding followed the trial court’s denial of the plea.
DISCUSSION
A. Mandamus standards related to pleas to the jurisdiction Entitlement to mandamus relief requires a demonstration that th e trial court clearly abused its discretion, and the absence of an adequate r emedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. , 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).–11– Although an appeal generally provides an adequate remedy for de nial of a jurisdictional plea, In re Godwin , 293 S.W.3d 742, 747 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, orig. proceeding), where First Amendment rights are at is sue an appeal does not suffice. Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 682 (Tex. 1996); In re Episcopal Sch. of Dallas, Inc. , 556 S.W.3d 347, 352 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, orig. proceeding); see also Republican Party of Tex. v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86, 94 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) (“mandamu s jurisdiction may be properl y invoked when First Amendment rights are at issue”).
B. Procedure governing jurisdictional challenges A de novo review controls review of a plea to the jurisdiction premised on subject matter jurisdiction. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). If the plea challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we employ the same procedure that governs a traditional summary ju dgment, by which the movant presents evidence demonstrating the absence of juris diction, with the burden then shifting to the opposing party to demonstrate a dis puted material fact regarding jurisdiction. Id . In such circumstance, we necessarily consider evidence beyond the pleadings. Id. (“[I]f a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we consider relevant evidence submitted b y the parties when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised, as the t rial court is required to do.”); In re Episcopal Sch. of Dallas, Inc. , 556 S.W.3d at 352 (“If a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existe nce of jurisdictional facts, the trial court may–12– consider evidence beyond the pleadings and must do so when nece ssary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised.”). Although we do not decide any mer its issues or resolve any ques tions of fact, if undisputed evidence implicates the merits as well as our jur isdictional inquiry, we must consider it. Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife , 133 S.W.3d at 226 (“In this case, we address a plea to the jurisdiction in which undisputed evide nce implicates both the subject matter jurisdiction of the court and the merits of the case.”); see also Doe v. Archdiocese of Galveston-Houston , No. 01-18-01056-CV, 2020 WL 3820886, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist. ] July 7, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (relying on school’s jurisdictional evidence t o demonstrate absence of juri sdiction without accepting truth of same evidence regarding merits of dispute); Becker v. Clardy , No. 03-10-00376-CV, 2011 WL 6756999, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 2 2, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (relying on undi sputed evidence regarding sc hool’s resolution of claim against plaintiff in deci ding jurisdictional question). Jurisdiction must exist for each claim. Thomas v. Long , 207 S.W.3d 334, 338– 39 (Tex. 2006) (“[I]t is proper for a trial court to dismiss cl aims over which it does not have subject matter jurisdiction but retain claims in the s ame case over which it has jurisdiction.”). Where the same facts govern jurisdiction over different claims, however, we need not address each claim separately. Shannon v. Mem’l Drive Presbyterian Church U.S. , 476 S.W.3d 612, 620 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [14th Dist.]–13– 2015, pet. denied); see also City of Dallas v. Jones , No. 05-07-00831-CV, 2008 WL 588997, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 5, 2008, pet. denied) (mem . op).
C. The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine Ecclesiastical abstention arises from the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, 6 and prohibits government action that “burdens the free exercis e of religion.” Jennison v. Prasifka , 391 S.W.3d 660, 664-65 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.). In deciding whether ecclesiastical abstention applie s, we look to the substance and effect of a plaintiff’s complaint to determine it s “ecclesiastical implication not its emblemata.” Shannon , 476 S.W.3d at 622; In re Vida , No. 04- 14-00636-CV, 2015 WL 82717, at *2 (T ex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 7 , 2015, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (“[I]n deciding whether a court should r efrain from exercising jurisdiction under the doctrine, courts must conside r the substance and nature of the claim and the effect of a judicial resolution.” emphasis original)). “[W]hether a judicial resolution will encroach on the instituti on’s governance and affairs” frames the “key inquiry.” In re Episcopal Sch. of Dallas, Inc. , 556 S.W.3d at 356. Even if secular principles define and provide the elem ents of the claims asserted, determining civil lia bility may nonetheless impermiss ibly infringe on a faith-based organization’s right to “construe and administer ch urch doctrine.”

6 “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of rel igion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof....” U.S. C ONST . amend. I.–14– Becker , 2011 WL 6756999, at *3 (quoting Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v.
Shubert , 264 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex. 2008)). If otherwise applicable, religi ous organizations, including sch ools whose operation or curriculum depend on faith-based principles, fall within the doctrine’s protection. In re Episcopal Sch. of Dallas , Inc. , 556 S.W.3d at 357 (Although school was undisputedly not a church, “the record establishes that it is nonetheless a faithbased institution enjoying First Amendment protection for the f ree exercise of religion.” internal quote omitted)); In re St. Thomas High Sch. , 495 S.W.3d 500, 508 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, orig. proceeding) (reject ing contention that Catholic school, which was neither a church, nor owned by a chu rch, was exempt from ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, because record demonst rated school’s purpose involved “substantial re ligious activity and purpose”); Patterson v. Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary , 858 S.W.2d 602, 605–06 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1993, no writ) (dismissing wrongful termination suit against Ba ptist seminary not owned or operated by church); see also Hosanna-Tabor Evange lical Lutheran
Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C. , 565 U.S. 171, 182 (2012) (applying ecclesiastical abstention to religious school, and describing the doctrine’s r each as prohibiting interference with decisions o f “religious groups”).
D. Ecclesiastical abstention precl udes jurisdiction over Parents’ claims Parents allege the doctrine has no application because (1) Prin ce of Peace is not a faith-based entity; and (2) Parents’ claims do not rely o n Students’ or any–15– “employee’s adherence to religious standards or morals, or the implementation of religious beliefs.” Parents fail to raise a genuine question o f material fact regarding either argument.
1. Prince of Peace is a faith-based entity Parents contend Prince of Peace’s legally separate existence fr om the Lutheran Church, as well as its secular focus on a quality educ ation, diversity, and its adherence to secular laws and accreditations, distinguish i t from other “religious entities.” We observe, however, no meaningful distinction betw een Prince of Peace and any other school or entity which we or our sister courts ha ve determined qualified as “faith-based” entities entitled to ecclesiastical abstention. See In re Episcopal Sch. of Dallas, Inc. , 556 S.W.3d at 355–56 (facts demonstrated “that the school endeavors to imbue its st udents and staff with Christian principles and values even if those persons do not already subscribe to them”); In re St. Thomas High Sch. , 495 S.W.3d at 509–10 (Biblically–ba sed mission, students’ manda ted participation in church-related services and activities, and faith-based curr iculum demonstrated school was a religious institution). That Prince of Peace also subjects itself to secular accreditation and strives to ach ieve metrics unrelated to relig ion, in no way diminishes the extensive evidence demonstrating its reliance on Biblical principles, Biblical doctrine, and faith-based measures guiding its operati on and the education it seeks to provide. Parents failed to raise a question of fac t regarding Prince of–16– Peace’s qualification as a faith -based entity entitled to invok e the protection of ecclesiastical abstention.
2. Ecclesiastical abstention precludes interference with a religio us entity’s management of its internal affairs Parents assert their claims re st on secular duties and do not r equire evaluation of any religious doctrine or belief for resolution. Parents co ntend the claims are governed by general laws regarding reporting child abuse and co ntractual enforcement regarding the school’s promises to employ “faculty who, at minimum, refrain from harming students i n their care, and its obligation to appropriately supervise employees so that they do not harass students without violating the principles of the First Amendment.” Parents also endeavor to d istinguish four cases in which Texas appellate courts have applied ecclesiastical abs tention to claims asserted against religious schools, 7 and one between teachers at such a school. 8 Neither argument persuades us.

a. Judicial resolution would require interference with Prince of Peace’s internal affairs Parents first argue that unlike Becker and Archdiocese of Galveston-Houston , their claims are not premised on “violations of internal polici es,” and are instead

7 Archdiocese of Galveston-Houston , 2020 WL 3820886, at *5; In re Episcopal Sch. of Dallas, Inc. , 556 S.W.3d at 357; In re St. Thomas High Sch. , 495 S.W.3d at 509; In re Vida , 2015 WL 82717, at *3.
8 Becker , 2011 WL 6756999, at *5.–17– grounded solely on secular obliga tions. Even if the argument c orrectly characterized Parents’ claims, 9 however, we would reject it. Application of ecclesiastical abstention does not require that Parents’ claims expressly depend on any Biblical principle, interpretation of P rince of Peace’s policies, or include an overt req uest for interference with Pri nce of Peace’s internal affairs. Shannon , 476 S.W.3d at 622 (substance and effect of a plaintiff’s compla int, rather than specific claims or support, inform evaluation of ab stention). Resulting interference in internal affairs as the effect of judicially re solving a claim, even those not clearly grounded in a religious doctrine, requires abstenti on. Westbrook v. Penley , 231 S.W.3d 389, 395 (Tex. 2007) ( “Government action may burde n the free exercise of religion in two quite different ways: by interferin g with an individual’s observance or practice of a particular faith . . . and by encro aching on the church’s ability to manage its internal a ffairs.” internal quotation and citation omitted)); Archdiocese of Galveston-Houston , 2020 WL 3820886, at *5 (“The key inquiry is whether a judicial resolution will encroach on the institution’ s governance and affairs.”); In re Vida , 2015 WL 82717, at *3 (applicati on of doctrine turns on “effec t of judicial resolution,” not just “nature of the claims” assert ed); see also Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru , 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2060 (2020) (“The independence of religious institutions in matters of ‘faith and doctrine’ is closely

9 Parents allege Prince of Peace’s handbook and related material s promise a “certain educational environment,” “faculty who are expected to serve as role models ,” recognize that “harassment and bullying negatively impact [students’] well-being and safety,” and inclu de “set rules about behavior and discipline.”–18– linked to independence in what we have termed ‘matters of chur ch government.’”) internal quotation omitted)). Moreover, Parents’ efforts to fra me the dispute as reliant only on secular duties ignores Prince of Peace’s controverting but undisputed j urisdictional evidence. We cannot divorce Parents’ contentions of abuse, har assment, and failure to report abuse, from Prince of Peace’s supervision and discipl ine of Students, its investigation of Parents’ complaints, and its ultimate expulsio n of Students and their families. Resolution of Parents’ claims will require a trial c ourt or jury to determine whether Prince of Peace’s policies, investigation, management o f student and staff conduct, and employment and enrollment decisions satisfied cont ractual and common law duties regarding Stude nts’ education and psychologic al well-being. Ecclesiastical abstention prohib its that judicial interference. See Archdiocese of
Galveston-Houston , 2020 WL 3820886, at *5 (dismissing claims premised on school’s discipline process following family’s complaints that teacher bullied, harassed and abused young child); In re Episcopal Sch. of Dallas, Inc. , 556 S.W.3d at 357 (dismissing claims premised on school’s discipline of st udent who smoked marijuana, used another student’s urine for drug test, etc.); In re St. Thomas High
Sch. , 495 S.W.3d at 509 (dismissing claims premised on school’s exp ulsion of family where parents characterized grading dispute and teachers ’ failure to return parent’s call as sex ual harassment); In re Vida , 2015 WL 82717, at *3 (dismissing claims premised on school’s refusal to promote five year–old to first grade in–19– violation of its policy); Becker, 2011 WL 6756999, at *5 (dismissing libel and slander claims asserted by one teacher against another, premise d in part, on school’s investigation and decision not t o impose any discipline on defe ndant teacher, despite plaintiff’s decision to not sue school and her contention that school’s discipline was not challenged). The facts at issue in St. Thomas High School are particularly close. In that case, after a student and his teacher were unable to resolve a dispute about a grade, the student’s parents complained to the school. The parents ac cused two faculty members of “intimidating and harassing the student in response to legitimate concerns regarding testing proce dures” and alleged one teacher had engaged in sexual harassment by telling the student the teacher did not re turn the student’s afterschool call because the teacher was preparing for a romantic ev ening celebrating his wedding anniversary. 495 S.W.3d at 503. The parents also alle ged the teachers’ behavior violated the school’s g oals in spiritually educating t heir son and demanded the school investigate “willful abus es of power and harassment” of their child. Id. Upon concluding its investigation and determining the parents’ accusations were baseless, the school also de termined the parents’ behavior violated the school’s handbook in which the school outlined insults, threats, and abu ses of teachers by parents as grounds for a student’s expulsion. Id. at 504. The parents sued and sought an injunction compelling their child’s re-enrollment. In respo nse to the school’s plea to the jurisdiction, the parents argued neutral legal principle s would govern their–20– breach of contract claim, that asserted St. Thomas failed to pr ovide the education promised. Id. at 509. The court rejected the argument because application of ecclesiastical abstention does not focus on the presence or abs ence of an express dispute concerning religious doctrine. Id. Instead, the court concluded “spiritual standards and religious doctrin e” permeated the school’s decisi on to expel the students, as well as the quality a nd type of education parents sought for their children, and governmental action would encroach on the school’ s ability to manage its internal affairs. Id. at 510, 513. The parallels between St. Thomas and this dispute are compelling. We also reject Parents’ efforts to limit St. Thomas ’ holding through their argument that since their claim s forgo any reliance on expulsio n or re-enrollment, their claims do not implicate membership in a religious organiz ation. The argument ignores undisputed jurisdictiona l facts that Students’ expulsio n precipitated this lawsuit and implicitly elevates one type of interference to the only type of interference justifying abstent ion. In making this argument, P arents seek to distinguish Archdiocese of Galveston-Houston, 2020 WL 3820886, and Episcopal School of Dallas, 556 S.W.3d at 347 , and similarly assert that based on the focus on “enrollment or retention,” their claims are unlike those in St. Thomas High School , 495 S.W.3d at 500, and Vida, 2015 WL 82717, at *3. But the reasons for the school’s actions in each case—its internal discipline and management of its affairs—rather than the result of that discipline warranted application of the doctrine. Archdiocese–21– of Galveston-Houston , 2020 WL 3820886, at *6; In re Episcopal Sch. of Dallas , Inc. , 556 S.W.3d at 359 (“[R]esolving th ose [parents’] claims would r equire a court to pass judgment on the school’s internal affairs and governanc e—matters exclusively within the province of an ecclesiastical institutio n.”); In re St. Thomas High Sch. , 495 S.W.3d at 509–10 (“[P]laintiffs’ exclusive focus on the p resence or absence of an express dispute concerning religious doctrine dem onstrates an unduly narrow conception of the applicable protections.”); In re Vida , 2015 WL 82717, at *3 (“[E]ven if the School’s age requirement was not required by Texas law, imposing civil tort liability on the superintendent of Catholic schools for enforcing a policy that established an age requirement would impinge upon the Diocese’s ability to manage its internal a ffairs by adopting policies reg arding admission requirements for Catholic schools.” emphasis original)). The a bsence of an additional interference that would result from efforts to compe l re-enrollment in no way diminishes the interference from judicial evaluation of eff orts to hire, supervise, and discipline teachers and stud ents in a manner Parents deem c ompliant with the school’s promises regardi ng Students’ education. We identify no meaningful distinc tion between any of these “sch ool cases” and the one before us now. We c onclude that, as in each of the se preceding cases, ecclesiastical abstention prohib its judicial intervention in th e dispute at hand.–22– b. Cases evaluating intentional torts, physical injuries, or claims which explicitly exclude the basis for abstention provide no support for Parents By our decision today we do not diminish any person’s obligatio n to report suspected abuse or imply that abstention would ever interfere w ith enforcement of a law requiring such reports by those vested with the duty and au thority to enforce it.

10 An obligation to report an injury to a child cannot depend on whether faith-based principles inform the suspicions of the person alerted to poten tial abuse, or whether a criminal complaint premised on Family Code section 261.101 wo uld otherwise interfere with First Amendment rights. See Op. Tex. Att’y Gen. No. JM-342 (1985) (requiring clergyman to report evidence of child abuse or negle ct disclosed confidentially by parishioner doe s not violate Free Exercise Cl ause, because “[t]he freedom to believe is absolute, but the freedom to act is condu ct subject to regulation for the protection of society.”). But here, Parents are asserting a breach of contract claim prem ised on the frequency, intrusiveness, and pr oximity of school administrator s’ supervision in or near a restroom, and a school’s investigation regarding complai nts about that supervision. Regardless of how Parents characterize the conduc t about which they

10 Although our decision today does not assess the merits of Pare nts’ claims, we question the existence of any breach of contract claim premised on failure to report abus e as required by Family Code § 261.101, because we see no causation between any alleged injury and the failure to report the conduct about which Parents complain, and because th e statute creates no private ca use of action. Perry v. S.N. , 973 S.W.2d 301, 306 (Tex. 1998) (rejecting Family Code § 261.101 as creati ng a duty in tort); Doe v. Apostolic Assembly of Faith in Christ Jesus , No. EP-19-CV-240-KC, 2020 WL 1684227, at *14 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2020) ( Perry court rejected Family Code § 261.101 as creating duty and stand ard, “in any context” other than as a potential crime).–23– complain, we are not presented with intentional torts, physical injuries, or crimes. Neither do the undisputed facts present threats to public healt h, safety, or general welfare, which are intolerable even if otherwise protected as a religious belief. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God , 264 S.W.3d at 12; Tilton , 925 S.W.2d at 677 (ecclesiastical abstention will not apply to actions which viol ate social duties or are “subversive of good order.”) (quoting T EX

. C ONST . art. I, § 6 interp. commentary (Vernon 1984)); see also Westbrook , 231 S.W.3d at 404 (“Neither was his revelation an intentional tort that endangered Penley’s or the public’s he alth or safety.”);
Becker , 2011 WL 6756999, at *5 (“[I]n determining whether the Doctrine applies to tort claims, the courts distinguish intentional torts that enda nger public health and safety and that cause physical harm from torts that only cause intangible or emotional harms.”). Accordingly, our deci sion here does not speak to ins tances in which those facts exist. Likewise, we decline Parents’ invitation to equat e the allegations here with those in Doe I v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Galveston-Houston , No. CV H05-1047, 2006 WL 8446968, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2006), 11 or cases in which

11 Claims against the church rested upon allegations that the “Archdiocese Defendants neglig ently: (1) investigated, hired, supervised, reassigned, and retained cleri cs known to have abused minors; (2) failed to warn parishioners that a cleric assigned to their parishes coul d be a threat to their children; (3) ignored warnings from medical professionals retained by various Church officials and organizations, directly or indirectly, that certain clerics posed a danger to children; (4 ) lied to victims who asked for information about abusers; (5) failed to provide medical professionals eval uating abusers who were clerics with the necessary facts and, in some cases, lying to the medical profes sionals about the clerics’ background or concealing material facts; (6) ignored warnings from others wit hin the church and bishop’s conference who warned that certain clerics posed a threat to children; (7) fai led to report the crimes committed by certain clerics to law enforcement and obstructed or interfering with l aw enforcement investigations concerning abusive clerics; (8) failed to alert members of parishes where abusive clerics had previously served that their children were exposed to known or suspected child moleste rs; (9) made decisions that valued the–24– facts similar to Doe I are at issue. We also observe t hat other courts have applied abstention in the face of the same or similar claims as those r aised by Parents where neither intentional conduct nor physical harm was alleged. Archdiocese of
Galveston-Houston , 2020 WL 3820886, at *3 (dismissing claim that family’s expulsion was “an effort to conceal abuse”); In re Pleasant Glade Assembly of God , 991 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1993, no writ) (applyin g ecclesiastical abstention to negligence per se claim premised on violation of Family Code chapter 261). Finally, cases in which the conduct at issue rested on a relati onship outside of the one between the religious entity and the plaintiff fail to defeat application of abstention here. For instance, in both Hawkins v. Trinity Baptist Church , 30 S.W.3d 446, 451–52 (Tex. App.—Tyl er 2000, no pet.), and Sanders v. Casa View Baptist
Church , 134 F.3d 331, 337–38 (5th Cir. 1998), the complained of condu ct occurred in the context of marital counseling, which thus gave rise to a relationship and duties outside of the protected relati onship between the church and it s members.

interests of abusive clerics and the Church’s desire to avoid s candal over the interests of children who had been abused by clerics; (10) used Church influence to alter the outcome of the criminal legal process relating to clerics who engaged in illegal sexual acts; (11) fostered an environment and culture that allowed child abuse to flourish and made it clear that there was no accountab ility for criminal sexual acts against children; (12) negligently destroyed documents about clerics’ child sexua l abuse or illegally withheld them from authorities, victims’ families, and the public; and (13) failed to warn Church members about facts such as the ‘Beal deposition,’ ‘i.e., that priests have been ‘hitting’ on penitents, including children, since the inception of the private confession-box in the sixteenth centur y.’” Roman Catholic Diocese of GalvestonHouston , 2006 WL 8446968, at *9.–25– Moreover, in Hawkins , the church’s potential liability arose from violations of the Sexual Exploitation by Me ntal Health Services Provider A ct 12 through the church’s negligent hiring or supervision of the minister whose conduct was at issue.
Hawkins , 30 S.W.3d at 453. That statute expressly defined the ministe r’s challenged conduct as not including activities protected by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.
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. C ODE § 81.001(7) (“‘Mental health services,’ as defined by this section, provided by a member of the clergy does not inclu de religious, moral, and spiritual counseling, teachi ng, and instruction.”). The in quiry excluded by the statute—whether inquiry into Pri nce of Peace’s internal practic es or religious beliefs with respect to its hiring and supervision of its administrator s—is the precise question at issue here. Thus, t hese authoritie s lend no suppor t to Parents’ position.
CONCLUSION Parents’ claims are pr emised on allegations that Prince of Peac e failed to hire qualified staff and appropriately supervise its staff’s interac tions with Students, including by failing to report suspected abuse of Students by i ts staff. Defense of these claims rests on Prince of Peace’s internal and religiousl y-informed policies and code of conduct. Judicial resolu tion of the claims would thus require impermissible intrusion in Prince of Peace’s management of these matters.

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. C ODE §§ 81.001–81.009.–26– Accordingly, we conditionally grant mandamus relief. The writ will issue only if respondent fails to grant Prince of Peace’s plea to the jurisdiction.

200680F.P05 /Robert D. Burns, III/ ROBERT D. BURNS, III CHIEF JUSTICE