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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED In re A. B. LYNCH, Minor. September 22, 2016

No. 330613 Oakland Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 13-815214-NA

Before: B ORRELLO , P.J., and M ARKEY and R IORDAN , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Respondent mother appeals by ri ght the trial court’s order ter minating her parental rights to the minor child purs uant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ), (g), and (j). We affirm.

Respondent argues that the trial court erred in finding that astatutory ground for termination was established by c lear and convincing evidence. We disagree.

In an action to terminate parental rights, the petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that at leas t one statutory ground for term ination in MCL 712A.19b(3) exists. MCR 3.977(A)(3) and (H)(3); In re Trejo , 462 Mich 341, 356; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). The trial court’s decision is reviewed for clear error. MCR 3. 977(K); In re Trejo , 462 Mich at 356-357. A finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing cou rt is left with the firm and definite conviction that a mistake was made. In re JK , 468 Mich 202, 209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). “[T]his Court accords deference to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” In re Fried , 266 Mich App 535, 541; 702 NW2d 192 (2005); MCR 2.613(C).

Respondent’s parental rights were terminated pursuant to MCL 7 12A.19b(3)(c)( i ), (g), and (j), which permit termination under the following circumstances:
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of aninitial dispositional order, and the c ourt, by clear and convincing evi dence, finds either of the following:

( i ) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exis t and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectifi ed within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.-2- * * *

(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide pr oper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation th at the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable tim e considering the child’s age.

* * *

(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.

Respondent argues that the trial court erred in finding that s he failed to rectify the conditions that led to the adjudication because the court’s fin dings in its order of adjudication were erroneous. She argues that the CPS worker gave unreliable testimony because the worker failed to document all of her fi ndings when she investigated th e neglect complaint. Respondent specifically complains that the worker failed to document that she had warned respondent that her child could be harmed by exposure to Xanax through breast m ilk. Respondent also argues that the worker’s opinion that r espondent was delusional for be lieving the child’s father’s kidnapping story was not justified because the father confirmed that he told the story to respondent.

Respondent’s attempt to attack t he trial court’s adjudication findings cons titutes an improper collateral attack on th e adjudication order. When an adjudicatory hearing is held with respect to the parent challenging the assumption of jurisdictio n and termination is not ordered at the initial dispositional hearing, the trial court’s exercise o f jurisdiction cannot be challenged in an appeal of a subsequent termination order; it can only be cha llenged by direct appeal from the initial order of disposition. In re Hatcher, 443 Mich 426, 444; 505 NW2d 834 (1993); In re SLH, AJH, & VAH , 277 Mich App 662, 668-669; 747 NW2d 547 ( 2008). Accordingly, we reject respondent’s attacks on the trial court’s order of adjudication

. The evidence presented at the t ermination hearing was sufficie nt to prove clearly and convincingly each statutory ground for termination that the tri al court found. The court assumed jurisdiction because respondent was mentally unstable and unabl e to provide consistent care. Respondent failed to benefit from mental health services. Alth ough her case manager, Mark Rogers, gave generally favorable testimony, he also admitted th at respondent made excuses to delay her recommended participation in a dialectical behavior t herapy program. Respondent was resistant to medication, and alt hough she attributed her resist ance to her pseudoscientific belief that medicine is poison, she showed a preference for benzodiaze pine, which she had previously abused. Rogers attributed responde nt’s improved stability to h er marriage, but the circumstances of respondent’s marriage supported the trial court’s inference that the marriage was unstable. Respondent showed no interest in gaining independence through e mployment. She continued to reside with her sisters, although one abused substances. Altho ugh respondent behaved appropriately with the child, she demonstrated immature and err atic behavior through her repeated abusive messages to the caseworker and the child’s pat ernal grandparents. This evidence supported termina tion under subsection 19b(3)(c)( i ).-3- In addition, evidence that respondent failed to progress towar d emotional stability and to establish a reliable home and means of supporting the child als o supported termination under subsection 19b(3)(g) and (j). A lmost two years after the child had been removed from her care, respondent remained unable to provide proper care and custody. Her mental health services caseworker indicated that she would require another year to ena ble herself to care for the child. The trial court’s less optimistic opinion was justified by resp ondent’s continued irrational behavior, including sending a sexually graphic photo to the cas eworker while the termination hearing was pending. Evidence that respondent could not provid e safe care and that she relied on a marriage of questionable s oundness for stab ility also supp orted the conclusion that the child was reasonably likely to be harme d if returned to respondent’s home.

Respondent also argues that the evidence did not support the t rial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best inte rests. Once a statutory ground for termination is established, the trial court shall order termina tion of parental rights if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence th at termination is in the child’ s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Moss , 301 Mich App 76, 86, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). The trial court’s best-interest decision is als o reviewed for clear error. In re White , 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014).

A court may consider a variety of factors in considering wheth er termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests. Id. , at 713-714. These factors i nclude the existence of a bond between the child and the parent, the parent’s ability to paren t, the child’s need for permanency and stability, the advantages of a foster home over the parent’ s home, the parent’s compliance with his or her service plan, th e parent’s visitation history w ith the child, the child’s well-being, and the possibility of adoption. Id. A child’s placement with relatives is an additional factor fo r the court to consider, and this factor weighs against terminati on. In re Mason , 486 Mich 142, 164; 782 NW2d 747 (2010); In re Olive/Metts , 297 Mich App 35, 43; 823 NW2d 144 (2012).

Respondent argues that there was no urgency to terminate her p arental rights because the child was placed with relatives and the child’s father was allo wed more time to work toward reunification. The trial court c onsidered the child’s relative placement, but found that the child’s need for permanency outweighed that consideration and favored t erminating respondent’s parental rights. This finding is supported by evidence that th e child was well cared for by her paternal grandparents and strongl y bonded to them. Respondent, in contrast, remained unable to provide care. Moreover, responde nt’s abusive actions toward th e paternal grandparents negated any possibility that respondent could cooperate with the grandp arents as part of a cohesive family unit were custody to be transferred back to respondent. The child’s interests would not be served by maintaining a disrupt ive and dysfunctional environmen t. Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests.

We affirm.

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello /s/ Jane E. Markey /s/ Michael J. Riordan