IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs June 21, 2016

CORDELL L. BUTLER v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 2013-C-2570 Steve R. Dozier, Judge

No. M2015-01708-CCA-R3-PC – Filed April 6, 2017

The Petitioner, Cordell L. Butler, filed in the Davidson County Criminal Court a petition 

for post-conviction relief from his convictions of conspiracy to sell over fifty grams of 

hydromorphone and possession of over fifty grams of hydromorphone. The Petitioner 

alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his guilty pleas were not knowing 

and voluntary. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. 

Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT 

WILLIAMS and TIMOTHY L. EASTER,JJ., joined.

Holly L. Troutman, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Cordell L. Butler. 

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Clark B. Thornton, Senior 

Counsel; Glenn R. Funk, District Attorney General; and J. Wesley King and Edward S. 

Ryan, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual Background

The Petitioner was charged with conspiracy to sell fifty grams or more of a 

substance containing hydromorphone, a Schedule II controlled substance, within a school 

zone; possession of fifty grams or more of a substance containing hydromorphone with 

intent to sell within a school zone; and being a convicted felon in possession of a weapon. 

The potential sentence for each drug offense was sixty years, and the weapon offense had 
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a potential sentence of three to fifteen years. In exchange for the dismissal of the weapon 

charge and the school zone enhancement, the Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to 

conspiracy to sell over fifty grams of hydromorphone and possession of over fifty grams 

of hydromorphone, Class A felonies. The plea agreement provided that the Petitioner 

would be sentenced as an especially mitigated offender to concurrent sentences of twenty 

years for each offense and that he would be eligible for release after serving twenty 

percent of the sentences in confinement. 

At the June 19, 2014 guilty plea hearing, the Petitioner told the trial court that he 

understood the plea agreement, that he knew the rights he was waiving by entering his 

guilty pleas, that his guilty pleas were not the result of threats, and that he was satisfied 

with trial counsel. The State recited the following factual basis for the pleas:

[I]f the State‟s witnesses were called to testify, they would 

testify that with regard to count one, conspiracy charges, 

police were investigating a drug conspiracy that began in June 

of 2012 through May of 2013 where co-defendants James 

Hannah, Ricky Vaughn and others were selling large 

quantities of Dilaudid pills. The [Petitioner] from time to 

time assisted that conspiracy on some occasions he could 

transport the defendants to the Nashville airport for [the]

purpose of them going out of town to pick up the pills.

[Regarding the possession charges,] on April 10th, 

2010, [the Petitioner] was arrested at the [G]reyhound bus 

station at 709 5th Avenue South. He was in possession of 

4,815 Dilaudid pills that he obtained from New York.

Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that 

his trial counsel was ineffective and that his guilty pleas were not knowing and voluntary. 

At the post-conviction hearing, the Petitioner testified that he met with trial counsel two 

or three times prior to accepting the State‟s offer. Each meeting lasted fifteen or twenty

minutes. The Petitioner said that he thought trial counsel was “a fine attorney” and “a 

good guy” but that he had “a lot . . . on his plate” and was “just a little overworked and 

overwhelmed” because he was transitioning from the public defender‟s office to private 

practice. 

The Petitioner said that the discovery materials included six compact discs (CDs) 

of recordings from wiretaps. The Petitioner and trial counsel discussed the discovery 

materials, but the Petitioner could not listen to the CDs because he did not have a device 

to play the discs or a transcript of the recordings. The Petitioner acknowledged that he 
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saw the “takedown reports” and some supplemental reports from the Metro Nashville 

Police Department. 

The Petitioner said that he wanted counsel to file a motion to suppress and take his 

case to trial instead of accepting a plea offer. The Petitioner thought evidence that pills 

were found on him at the jail would be suppressed because of Detective Young‟s

preliminary hearing testimony that the Petitioner had no drugs or weapons when he was 

arrested. Nevertheless, trial counsel did not have the preliminary hearing transcribed and 

advised the Petitioner to accept a plea offer instead of pursuing the suppression issue. 

Trial counsel warned the Petitioner that the State would rescind plea offers and would not 

make any other offers if the Petitioner filed the motion. Additionally, trial counsel 

advised the Petitioner that he would likely receive a sentence of sixty years if he were 

convicted at trial. The Petitioner said that trial counsel did not discuss any potential 

defenses and discussed only the plea offer. The Petitioner said that he “felt threatened

because [trial counsel said] if [the Petitioner went] through with a suppression hearing 

[he] would get 60 years, [he] would get this much time and never get an offer.” 

The Petitioner said that he thought the reason counsel never discussed a defense 

was because trial counsel was “busy.” Nevertheless, the Petitioner said that he and trial 

counsel had a good working relationship. 

The Petitioner said that the State made two plea offers. One included a sentence 

of fifteen years as a Range I, standard offender and required that he serve thirty percent 

of the sentence in confinement before he would be eligible for release. The other offer 

was a sentence of twenty years as an especially mitigated offender with release eligibility 

after serving twenty percent in confinement. Trial counsel advised the Petitioner that he 

would have a chance to be released sooner if he accepted the sentence of twenty years as 

an especially mitigated offender. The Petitioner asserted that trial counsel guaranteed he

would be released after he served twenty percent of the twenty-year sentence. 

After the Petitioner went to the penitentiary, “law clerks” advised him that he 

should have accepted the fifteen-year sentence. The Petitioner maintained that he 

thought his release would be automatic and that he did not realize the parole board would 

decide whether he would be released. The Petitioner stated that he had fourteen months‟

of jail credit at the time he was sentenced. The Petitioner said that he had been before the 

parole board but that he was denied release because it would “disrespect” a sentence of 

twenty years. The Petitioner did not think his release would have been denied if he had 

accepted the fifteen-year sentence. 

The Petitioner said that trial counsel advised him to respond “yes, sir” or “no, sir” 

to all of the trial court‟s questions at the guilty plea hearing. Trial counsel told the 

Petitioner that he needed to convince the trial court that he wanted to plead guilty. 
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On cross-examination, the Petitioner said that he and trial counsel understood each 

other but that they “were just at two different points.” The Petitioner wanted a 

suppression hearing, and trial counsel wanted the Petitioner to accept a plea offer. When 

asked if trial counsel told him to lie to the trial court during the guilty plea hearing, the 

Petitioner responded, “I wouldn‟t say he said lie to the judge, but make sure you answer 

yes or no to the questions and it doesn‟t seem like, you know, that it‟s not what you 

want.” The Petitioner acknowledged that he lied to the trial court when he stated that he 

did not feel threatened, explaining that he felt he “was pushed into the plea.” The 

Petitioner conceded that he made the decision to plead guilty. 

When asked if he would have filed for post-conviction relief if the parole board 

had released him, the Petitioner initially stated, “Yeah, I probably would.” However, 

when the post-conviction court asked, “If you were on parole now, out in society, you 

would still file this and risk facing what you said earlier, 60 years,” the Petitioner 

responded, “No, no, not that.” 

The Petitioner said that Detective Young‟s testimony at the preliminary hearing 

was not the only reason he wanted a suppression hearing. The Petitioner said, “I wasn‟t 

on any parole, probation. I wasn‟t on any wiretaps. If my attorney would have 

investigated the conspiracy, I wasn‟t on no conspiracy. I wasn‟t on surveillance, no buys, 

no anything, nothing.” The Petitioner acknowledged that he took a Greyhound bus from 

New York to Nashville. When he arrived in Nashville, the police took him into custody. 

He was searched, but the police found no drugs or weapons. The police handcuffed him, 

put him in the police car, and took him to another location. Approximately two hours 

later, the police searched him again and found over 4,000 pills in his pants. The 

Petitioner said that he did not put the pills in his pants and that the police did not plant the 

pills on him. 

The Petitioner acknowledged that he had prior felony convictions but stated that 

he had never appeared before a parole board. He said that trial counsel promised him that 

he would get out of jail in two years, which included his jail credit. 

Trial counsel testified that he had practiced law for approximately four years and 

that his practice was almost exclusively criminal defense. He began his practice in the 

public defender‟s office but left in December 2013 to practice with an association of 

attorneys. The other attorneys practiced criminal law, and they discussed cases with each 

other. 

Trial counsel was appointed to represent the Petitioner in January 2014 after his 

previous attorney withdrew. The Petitioner was charged with two Class A felony drug 

offenses within a drug-free school zone. Trial counsel said that if convicted of the 
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charged offenses, the Petitioner would have been sentenced as a Range II, multiple 

offender and required to serve one hundred percent of the sentences in confinement. 

Trial counsel said that he and the Petitioner had a good relationship. Trial counsel 

met with the Petitioner nine or ten times. They discussed the case against the Petitioner 

and the sentences he faced. Trial counsel acknowledged that he received a large amount

of discovery materials and that he gave the Petitioner the materials relevant to his case. 

Trial counsel said that most of the discovery materials related to another case with which 

the Petitioner had little involvement but that he discussed the other case with the 

Petitioner. Trial counsel said that the other case concerned wiretaps. The Petitioner‟s

telephone was not tapped, and his voice was on only two of the recorded telephone calls. 

Trial counsel said that he and the Petitioner “discussed those calls and the takedown 

primarily.” 

Trial counsel said that

the police investigation showed that other individuals had 

gone back to New York and ridden back on a Greyhound bus. 

And they had been surveilling people, the main people in the 

case, them selling Dilaudid.

And the police had information that [the Petitioner] 

had a one way ticket to New York, was coming back on a 

Greyhound bus and they assumed that that would be the 

opportunity to take them down and catch them with the drugs. 

Trial counsel said that the Petitioner‟s case “basically would rise and fall with 

th[e] suppression motion,” noting that the Petitioner was caught with the Dilaudid pills in 

his possession. The Petitioner never told trial counsel that the pills had been planted by 

someone else. Trial counsel said that the Petitioner was 

correct that at the preliminary hearing was something to the 

effect of the first officer that searched him didn‟t find the bag 

that [the pills] were in. But they were taken in a different 

location because the takedown happened in the terminal for

[the] Greyhound bus station so they took them to a different 

location to investigate further and search further, and that‟s 

when they found the pills on [the Petitioner]. 

Trial counsel never asked the Petitioner how the pills got inside his pants, 

explaining, “I just kind of assumed where they were found on him that he knew how they 

got there.” Trial counsel recalled that the pills were found in “some sort of contraption 
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that [the Petitioner] wore around his underwear that had the pills like wrapped in plastic 

Kroger bags.” Trial counsel advised the Petitioner that in order to prevail on a 

suppression motion, the defense needed to argue that the State did not have probable 

cause to apprehend him. Trial counsel said that he and the Petitioner discussed whether 

to file a motion to suppress. Trial counsel advised the Petitioner that trying to win a 

suppression motion would “be a very uphill battle.” 

Trial counsel said that the State made an initial offer of twenty-five years at thirty 

percent. Through negotiations, trial counsel obtained alternate offers of fifteen years at 

thirty percent or twenty years at twenty percent. The State cautioned trial counsel that if 

the Petitioner filed a motion to suppress, the State would revoke all plea offers and 

proceed to trial. Trial counsel conveyed the information to the Petitioner and advised 

him that counsel “couldn‟t guarantee him getting an offer back ever.” Trial counsel 

warned the Petitioner that if he were convicted a trial, he faced a lengthy sentence and 

that he would have to serve one hundred percent of that sentence in confinement; 

accordingly, pursuing a motion to suppress “was incredibly risky.” 

Trial counsel and the Petitioner discussed the alternate plea offers of fifteen years 

at thirty percent or twenty years at twenty percent. They also discussed the likelihood of 

the Petitioner‟s being granted parole. Trial counsel stated:

I don‟t typically ever tell a client on a felony sentence 

that you could expect to get out on this particular day because 

there [are] so many factors. But we did talk about when he 

could see the parole board on the 20 at 20 because that‟s a 

pretty certain calculation. And the 15 at 30 and that‟s about 

four and a half to four years depending on which option he 

took.

Trial counsel said that he and the Petitioner discussed the Petitioner‟s time credits and 

what he could do to make himself a better candidate for parole, but trial counsel never 

promised that the Petitioner would be granted parole. Trial counsel specifically denied 

telling the Petitioner that he would be released in two years. Trial counsel said that the 

Petitioner had at least two “discussion dates” to consider the plea offers. 

Trial counsel said that he was not overwhelmed while representing the Petitioner. 

He recalled that the Petitioner‟s case was difficult and that he received a lot of discovery 

materials. Trial counsel stated, “I could see how someone in his position feels that way 

when nothing is happening quickly in his case but I didn‟t feel overwhelmed.” Trial 

counsel thought the Petitioner understood the plea agreement. 
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On cross-examination, trial counsel said that he advised the Petitioner the State 

would revoke all plea offers and proceed to trial if the Petitioner filed a motion to 

suppress. Trial counsel told the Petitioner the suppression motion would be difficult; 

therefore, filing the suppression motion and refusing the guilty plea offers was a “risky

decision.” Trial counsel told the Petitioner that if he lost the suppression motion, the trial 

would be difficult to win. Trial counsel did not file the motion to suppress but would 

have filed the motion if the Petitioner had been “adamant” that he wanted it filed. 

Trial counsel recalled that the State offered fifteen years at thirty percent and that 

the Petitioner “was satisfied at that point saying that that‟s kind of what he wanted, he 

would rather plead.” The Petitioner asked trial counsel to try to negotiate for twelve 

years at thirty percent. The State refused that offer but made a counteroffer of twenty 

years at twenty percent. Trial counsel thought that after the State made the plea offers, he 

and the Petitioner continued to discuss the motion to suppress, but they mainly discussed 

which plea offer to accept. 

Trial counsel advised the Petitioner that

if he wanted a shorter sentence to take the 15. And if he 

wanted the opportunity to see the parole board sooner, he 

could take the 20 but that he did have some things on his 

record[, namely an attempted homicide conviction and federal 

drug charges,] that might give the parole board pause about 

releasing him. So if he wanted the shorter guarantee[d]

sentence to take the 15. 

However, trial counsel never guaranteed the Petitioner that he would be granted parole

because “no one can guarantee what the parole board is going to do.” In response to 

questioning by the post-conviction court, trial counsel said that after the Petitioner pled 

guilty, he had “heard anecdotally that . . . there is a difference in the length of your 

sentence whether you can get to an annex or things like that, but I didn‟t know that.” 

The post-conviction court accredited trial counsel‟s testimony and found that trial 

counsel was not ineffective and that the Petitioner‟s guilty pleas were knowing and 

voluntary. Accordingly, the post-conviction court denied relief. 

II. Analysis

To be successful in a claim for post-conviction relief, a petitioner must prove the 

factual allegations contained in the post-conviction petition by clear and convincing 

evidence. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110(f). “„Clear and convincing evidence means 

evidence in which there is no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the 
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conclusions drawn from the evidence.‟” State v. Holder, 15 S.W.3d 905, 911 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 1999) (quoting Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 n.3 (Tenn. 

1992)). Issues regarding the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be accorded 

their testimony, and the factual questions raised by the evidence adduced at trial are to be 

resolved by the post-conviction court as the trier of fact. See Henley v. State, 960 

S.W.2d 572, 579 (Tenn. 1997). Therefore, the post-conviction court‟s findings of fact are 

entitled to substantial deference on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against 

those findings. See Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001).

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. 

See State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999). We will review the post-conviction 

court‟s findings of fact de novo with a presumption that those findings are correct. See

Fields, 40 S.W.3d at 458. However, we will review the post-conviction court‟s 

conclusions of law purely de novo. Id. 

When a petitioner seeks post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, “the petitioner bears the burden of proving both that counsel‟s 

performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.” Goad v. 

State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

687 (1984)). To establish deficient performance, the petitioner must show that counsel‟s 

performance was below “the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal 

cases.” Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). To establish prejudice, the 

petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‟s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Further,

[b]ecause a petitioner must establish both prongs of the 

test, a failure to prove either deficiency or prejudice provides 

a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective assistance 

claim. Indeed, a court need not address the components in 

any particular order or even address both if the [petitioner] 

makes an insufficient showing of one component.

Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). Moreover, in the context 

of a guilty plea, “the petitioner must show „prejudice‟ by demonstrating that, but for 

counsel‟s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted upon going to 

trial.” Hicks v. State, 983 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998); see also Hill v. 

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).

When a defendant enters a plea of guilty, certain constitutional rights are waived, 

including the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to confront witnesses, and the 
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right to a trial by jury. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). Therefore, in 

order to comply with constitutional requirements a guilty plea must be a “voluntary and 

intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” North 

Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970). In order to ensure that a defendant 

understands the constitutional rights being relinquished, the trial court must advise the 

defendant of the consequences of a guilty plea, and determine whether the defendant 

understands those consequences. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244. 

In determining whether the petitioner‟s guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary, 

this court looks to the following factors: 

the relative intelligence of the defendant; the degree of his 

familiarity with criminal proceedings; whether he was 

represented by competent counsel and had the opportunity to 

confer with counsel about the options available to him; the 

extent of advice from counsel and the court concerning the 

charges against him; and the reasons for his decision to plead 

guilty, including a desire to avoid a greater penalty that might 

result from a jury trial. 

Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993). Further, we note that “[a] 

petitioner‟s solemn declaration in open court that his plea is knowing and voluntary 

creates a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceeding because these 

declarations „carry a strong presumption of verity.‟” Dale Wayne Wilbanks v. State, No. 

E2014-00229-CCA-R3-PC, 2015 WL 354773, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, 

Jan. 28, 2015) (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977)).

On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the proof at the post-conviction hearing 

established that trial counsel was ineffective and that the Petitioner entered his guilty 

pleas “without fully understanding the nature and consequences of what he was doing.” 

The Petitioner maintains that he wanted trial counsel to file a motion to suppress but that 

trial counsel refused. He alleged that the State, through trial counsel, coerced him into 

pleading guilty by threatening to withdraw plea offers if the Petitioner filed a motion to 

suppress. The Petitioner asserts trial counsel guaranteed that if he accepted the twentyyear sentence, he would automatically be released from confinement in two years. The 

Petitioner contends that trial counsel failed to review the six CDs of discovery materials 

with him. The State asserts that the post-conviction court correctly denied postconviction relief. We agree with the State. 

The post-conviction court accredited trial counsel‟s testimony and found that trial 

counsel shared all relevant discovery materials with the Petitioner and discussed the 

evidence against him. Trial counsel also discussed the plea options with the Petitioner 
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and did not guarantee the Petitioner‟s release. Additionally, trial counsel advised the 

Petitioner that the risks involved in pursuing a suppression hearing were great, given the 

likelihood that the motion would not be successful, that the State would revoke all plea 

offers, and that the Petitioner then likely faced a conviction at trial. The Petitioner 

entered his guilty pleas in order to avoid the risk of being convicted at trial, receiving a 

sentence of sixty years, and having to serve one hundred percent of the sentence in 

confinement. The trial court determined that the Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily 

entered his guilty pleas and that his trial counsel was not ineffective. The proof at the 

post-conviction hearing does not preponderate against the judgment of the postconviction court. 

III. Conclusion

Based upon the record and the parties‟ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court. 

_________________________________ 

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JUDGE