SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO . A

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- 17T3 SHIRL DAVID, Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. ANTONIO J. WYNN, Defendant

- Respondent.

_________________________

Argued September 11, 2019

– Decided Before Judges Haas and Mayer. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex C ounty, Docket No. FM

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- 2156

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. Stilianos Michael Cambilis argued the cause for appellant (The Law Office of Rajeh A. Saadeh, LLC, attorney s ; Rajeh A. Saadeh and Kelscey Ann Boyle, on the brief). Respon dent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet , this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36

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September 17, 20192 A

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This post

- judgment matrimonial matter returns to us after remand proceedings directed by our previous opinion. David v. Wynn , No. A

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- 16 (App. Div. March 5, 2018). 1 In compliance with our remand order, the judg e rendered a lengthy order and statement of reasons on July 31, 2018, and detailed the basis for his decision to take a measured, incremental approach to ensuring that defendant met his financial obligations going forward. Specifically, the judge: (1) gra nted plain t i ff's motion to find defendant in violation of litigant's rights in connection with the alimony and equitable distribution provisions of the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement; (2) directed defendant to pay plaintiff an additional $100 per we ek to address his alimony arrears; (3) ordered defen dant to pay plaintiff $5018.23, "representing [p]laintiff's one

- half share of the former marital home"; and (4) granted plaintiff's request for counsel fees incurred in connection with two of her previous enforcement motions. The judge denied plaintiff's requests for the imposition of additional sanctions against defendant, such as her demand that the court incarcerate defendant until he made full payment of all of his financial obligations with

1 We assume familiarity with, and incorporate by reference, the underlying procedural history and facts contained in our prior opinion. Id. at 1

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interest . However, these denials were without prejudice, and preserved plaintiff's ability to request the Family Part to take more stringent enforcement measures in the event defendant later failed to abide by the order. The judge also denied plaintiff's applica tion for counsel fees in the appeal that led to the remand under R. 2:11

- 4(c), and in other trial court proceedings involving the parties. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial judge should have: imposed additional sanctions against defendant; ordere d him to pay her additional monies in connection with the former marital home; directed him to reimburse more of her counsel fees; and required him to pay interest on all of his outstanding financial obligations. Based on our review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that plaintiff's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11

- 3(e)(1)(E). We add the following brief comments. Our standard of review is well settled. Rule 1:10

- 3 "provi de[s] a mechanism, coercive in nature, to afford relief to a litigant who has not received what a Court Order or Judgment entitles that litigant to receive." D'Atria v.4 A

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D'Atria , 242 N.J. Super. 392, 407 (Ch. Div. 1990). 2 "The particular manner in which c ompliance may be sought is left to the court's sound discretion." Bd. of Educ. of Middletown v. Middletown Twp. Educ. Ass'n , 352 N.J. Super. 501, 509 (Ch. Div. 2001). We will also not disturb a counsel fee award in a matrimonial case under Rule 5:3

- 5(c) except "on the 'rarest occasion,' and then only because of clear abuse of discretion." Strahan v. Strahan , 402 N.J. Super. 298, 317 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Rendine v. Pantzer , 141 N.J. 292, 317 (1995)). We owe substantial deference to the Family Part's findings of fact because of that court's speci al expertise in family matters. Cesare v. Cesare , 154 N.J. 394, 411

- 12 (1998). Thus, "[a] reviewing court should uphold the factual findings undergirding the trial court's decision if they are supported by adequate, substantial and cr edible evidence on the record." MacKinnon v. MacKinnon , 191 N.J. 240, 253

- 54 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M. , 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007))

. While we owe no special deference to t he judge's legal conclusions, Manalapan Realty v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan , 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995),

we " should not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless . . . convinced that

2 The D'Atria opinion refers to Rule 1:10

- 5, but that rule has been amended and re - designated as R ule 1:10

- 3. Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules , note on R. 1:10

- 3 (2019).5 A

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- 17T3 they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice" or when we determine the court has palpably abused its disc retion. [ Parish v. Parish , 412 N.J. Super. 39, 47 (App. Div. 2010) (alteration i n original) (quoting Cesare , 154 N.J. at 412).] We will reverse the judge's decision "[o]nly when the trial court's conclusions are so 'clearly mistaken' or 'wide of the mark' . . . to ensure that there is not a denial of justice." N .J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P. , 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008) (quoting N .J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L. , 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007)). Applying these principles, plaintiff's arguments concerning the July 31, 2018 remand order reveal nothing "so wide of the mark" that we could reasonably conclude that a clear mistake was made by the judge. We discern no basis for disturbing the judge's determination to begin the enforcement process by requiring defendant to first pay plaintiff an additional $100 per week toward
hi s alimony arrearages, together with a specified sum in connection with the parties' former home, while holding other, more stringent enforcement options in abeyance for possible future use in the event defendant continued his recalcitrance.6 A

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Similarly, the judge did not mistakenly exercise his discretion in awarding plaintiff some, but not all, of the counsel fees she sought. The judge meticulously applied the factors under Rule 5:3

- 5(c), with the beneficial perspective of having presided over the majority of the proceedings involving the parties. Finally, we reject plaintiff's request that we again remand the matter and order the judge to provide additional findings concerning his determinations. Contrary to plaintiff's contention, the judge's written orde r and statement of reasons demonstrated that all of plaintiff's contentions were heard and considered. Affirmed.