J

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NON

- PRECEDENTIAL DECISION

- SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENN SYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JEFFRY MCBRIDE

Appellant No. 2187 EDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order June 26, 2015 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division

at No(s): CP

- 51

- CR

- 0013114

- 2007

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. , SHOGAN, J. , and FITZGERALD, * J.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED JANUARY 25, 2017

Appellant, Jeffry McBride, appeals from the order entered in the

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas denying his first petition filed

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 1 (“PCRA”). Appellant contends

trial counsel was inef fective and that his mandatory sentence of life without

parole (“LWOP”) is unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama , 132 S. Ct.

2455 (2012) and Montgomery v. Louisiana , 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). We

affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence, and

remand for resentencing.

In its opinion, the PCRA court summarizes the relevant facts of this

case as follows:

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S §§ 9541

- 9546.J

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- 2

- On April 21, 2007, approximately twenty (20) to fifty (50) people were in the Kenderton Elementary playground.
Demond Brown (decedent/victim, also identified on the record as “Demond”) had recently finished a game of basketball and was standing on the sideline. The decedent’s cousin, Anthony Harris (also identified on the record as “Tony”), and best friend, Hassan Durant, wer e standing on the basketball court.

Armel Baxter and [Appellant] were in the backseat of their friend Rachel Marcelis’ car, driving to their friend Daryl Mack’s (also identified on the record as “Mack”) aunt’s house. Either, Baxter or [Appellant] said they saw someone on the playground and told Rachel Marcelis to go back so they could be sure. Rachel Marcelis drove around the block, and Baxter and [Appellant] exited the car.

Anthony Harris and Hassan Durant saw Baxter and [Appellant] enter the pla yground with ‘hoodies’ on. People on the playground noticed Baxter and [Appellant] because both men were wearing hoodies on a very hot day. The decedent turned around, noticed Baxter and [Appellant], and began to run. Baxter and [Appellant] began shooti ng, and continued to shoot as they walked together side by side. The decedent ran in a “zigzag” pattern towards the
15th Street exit. The decedent stumbled out of the playground and fell in the middle of the street.

Baxter and [Appellant] ran out of the playground, and headed east on Ontario Street, then south on 15th Street. Rachel Marcelis saw Baxter and [Appellant] running in her direction, and let them back in her car. While in the car, Rachel Marcelis heard Baxter and [Appellant] talking about how [Appellant’s] gun did not work and he could “not get any rounds off”. When they arrived at Daryl Mack’s aunt’s house, Rachel Marcelis asked [Appellant] “if that was the person who shot De

- Nyce.” [Appellant] answered “Yes.” After they left the house, Rachel Marcelis, Baxter and [Appellant] drove to Wilkes

- Barre for the weekend, but only Rachel Marcelis returned the following Monday.

An arrest warrant was issued for both Baxter and [Appellant] on May 4, 2007. [Appellant] was arrested in
Wilkes

- Bar re on May 7, 2007, after police were informed ofJ

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- 3

- his outstanding warrant. Baxter was found at a motel in
Wilkes

- Barre on July 10, 2007 . . . .

PCRA Ct. Op., 10/21/15, at 2

- 3.

A jury convicted Appellant on February 5, 2009, of first

- degree

murder 2 , c riminal conspiracy 3 , and possessing an instrument of crime 4

(“PIC”). That same day, the court sentenced Appellant to LWOP for murder

and concurrent sentences of ten to twenty years’ imprisonment and one to

two years’ imprisonment for conspiracy and PIC, r espectively. This Court

affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on March 22, 2010, and our

Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on September 16, 2010. See

Commonwealth v. McBride , 440 EDA 2009 (Pa. Super. March 22, 2010),

appeal denied , 163 EAL 201 0 (Pa. Sept. 16, 2010).

On April 14, 2011, Appellant timely filed his first PCRA petition pro se

.

The PCRA court appointed counsel on December 19, 2011. PCRA counsel

subsequently filed several amended petitions, which raised Appellant’s

claims of tria l counsel’s ineffectiveness and the constitutionality of his LWOP

sentence pursuant to Miller . The PCRA court dismissed without a hearing

Appellant’s claims regarding Miller and trial counsel’s failure to call several

character witnesses at trial. Howeve r, the PCRA court ultimately held an

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a).

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a)(1).

4 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a).J

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-

evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s claims regarding trial counsel’s failure to

call several exculpatory witnesses at trial and to cross

- examine Rachel

Marcelis on her immunity agreement. The PCRA court denied Appellant ’s

petition on June 26, 2015. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on July

9, 2015, and complied with the court’s order to file a concise statement of

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

Appellant raises the following iss ues for our review:

I. The PCRA Court erred for failing to grant PCRA relief because trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate, interview, and call Darryl Mack, Stephan Studivant, Zan’ea Jones, Ikenia Harris and Deborah McBride, who would be exculpatory eyewitnesses at trial.

II. The PCRA Court erred for failing to grant PCRA relief because trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate, interview, and call Kyle Carter, Derrick McMillan, Gregory Blackmon, Shawn Lowry, Theresa

Bro wn, Tyrone Lewis, Malik Wooden and McCoy Matthews and the PCRA judge failed to grant an evidentiary hearing
for these witnesses.

III. The PCRA Court erred for failing to grant PCRA relief
because trial counsel was ineffective because he received
the Com monwealth’s Petition for Immunity and the Order for Immunity and failed to cross

- examine Rachel Marcelis concerning this favorable treatment by the
Commonwealth.

IV. The PCRA Court erred for failing to grant PCRA relief because Appellant’s sentence of m andatory [LWOP] is “cruel punishment” under Article 1, §§ 1, 9, and 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and “cruel and unusual punishment” under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

V. The PCRA Court erred for failing to grant PCRA relief because Appellant’s sentence of mandatory sentence ofJ

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- [LWOP] is unconstitutional under both Article 1, §§ 1, 9, and 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution because two classes of prisoners sentenced to mandatory [LWOP] are treated differently.

VI. The Pennsylvania Code therefore does not establish a constitutional sentence for first degree murder committed by a juvenile. It would violate [A]ppellant’s rights under
the ex post facto clause to inflict “punishments, where the party was not, by law, liable to any punishment” or to inflict “greater punishment, than the law annexed to the offense.[”] Stogner v. California , 539 U.S. 607, 612 (2003).

VII. The PCRA Court erred for failing to grant PCRA relief
because Miller v. Alabama , 132 S. Ct 2455 (2012), applies retroactively to . . . [A]ppellant who has exhausted his appeal rights and is proceeding under the [PCRA] because: (1) Mill er ’s companion case, Jackson v. Hobbs

, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) was decided on collateral review and (2) cases from both strands of precedent relied upon by the Court in Miller have been applied retroactively.

Appellant’s Brief at 3

- 4.

We address Appell ant’s issues regarding trial counsel’s ineffectiveness

together. Appellant argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

investigate, interview, and call several character witnesses and exculpatory

witnesses at trial. Specifically, Appellant claims he submitted to trial counsel

a list of several eyewitnesses who were available to testify that Appellant

was not involved in decedent Brown’s shooting. Appellant alleges trial

counsel’s failure to call these witnesses prejudiced Appellant and denied him

a fair trial. Moreover, Appellant contends trial counsel failed to call

witnesses who were willing to testify to Appellant’s reputation forJ

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-

peacefulness. Appellant further claims the PCRA court erred in failing to

conduct an evidentiary hearing on Appel lant’s claim regarding these

character witnesses. Additionally, Appellant argues trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to cross

- examine Rachel Marcelis regarding her

immunity. Appellant maintains Rachel Marcelis received favorable treatment

from the Commonwealth in exchange for her testimony against Appellant.

Appellant concludes he is entitled to a new trial. We disagree.

Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to

examining whether the evidence of record supports the c ourt’s

determination and whether its decision is free of legal error.

Commonwealth v. Conway , 14 A.3d 101 (Pa. Super. 2011). This Court

grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if the record

contains any support for those findings. Commo nwealth v. Boyd , 923

A.2d 513 (Pa. Super. 2007). We give no such deference, however, to the

court’s legal conclusions. Commonwealth v. Ford , 44 A.3d 1190, 1194

(Pa. Super. 2012). Traditionally, credibility issues are resolved by the trier

of fact who ha d the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor.

Commonwealth v. Abu

- Jamal , 720 A.2d 79, 99 (Pa. 1998), cert. denied

,

120 S. Ct. 41 (1999). Where the record supports the PCRA court’s

credibility resolutions, they are binding on this Court. Id.

Nevertheless, “a PCRA petitioner is not automatically entitled to an

evidentiary hearing. We review the PCRA court’s decision dismissing aJ

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petition without a hearing for an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v.

Miller , 102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). Further,

when the PCRA court denies relief without an evidentiary hearing, this Court

must examine each of the issues raised in light of the record to determine

whether the PCRA court erred in concluding there were no genuine issues o f

material fact. Id. (citation omitted).

[C]ounsel is presumed to have provided effective representation unless the PCRA petitioner pleads and

proves that: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her conduct;
and (3) [a]ppellant was prejudiced by counsel ’ s action or omission. To demonstrate prejudice, an appellant must

prove that a reasonable probability of acquittal existed but
for the action or omission of trial counsel. A claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel will fail if the petitioner
does not meet any of the three prongs. Further, a PCRA petitioner must exhibit a concerted effort to develop his
ineffectiveness claim and may not rely on boilerplate allegations of ineffectiveness.

Commonwealth v. Perry

, 959 A.2d 932, 936 (Pa. Super. 2008) (quotation

marks and citations omitted).

“In order to prevail on a claim of ineffectiveness for failing to call a

witness, a defendant must prove, in addition to meeting the three

[ineffectivene ss] requirements, that: (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness

was available to testify for the defense; (3) counsel knew or should have

known of the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify

for the defense; and (5) the absence of the witness’s testimony was so

prejudicial as to have denied him a fair trial.” Commonwealth v. Walls

,J

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-

993 A.2d 289, 302 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Wright

,

961 A.2d 119, 155 (Pa. 2008)).

Instantly, the PCRA court addressed Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims

as follows:

1. Failing to Call Darryl Mack, Stephan Studivant,

Zan’ea Jones, Ikenia Harris, and Deborah McBride

[Appellant] first asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “investigate, interview and call” Darryl Mack, Stephan Studivant, Zan’ea Jones, Ikenia Harris, and Deborah McBride as exculpatory witnesses at trial. This claim is without merit. . . . Here, the evidence presented at the hearing clearly established that trial counsel, Michael Wallace, was not inef fective as he had a reasonable basis for not calling the above witnesses to testify on [Appellant’s] behalf.

Regarding witness Darryl Mack, [Appellant] alleged that Mack would have testified at trial that he was present with
Rachel Marcelis at the time of the shooting, that Mack was driving―not Marcelis, and that Marcelis was heavily under the influence of drugs. At the PCRA hearing, Mr. Wallace testified that, after questioning Mack, he determined that Mack’s testimony would not be helpful at trial. Mr. Wallace
also testified that he had information that what Mack was saying was not truthful, so that his testimony at trial would be false. Finally, Mr. Wallace testified that he consulted with [Appellant] regarding Mack’s testimony and [Appellant] agre ed to not call Mack at trial. The [PCRA c]ourt found Mr. Wallace’s testimony to be credible and that Mr. Wallace’s belief that Mack was not helpful and
would lie on the stand was a reasonable basis for not calling Mack at trial. Because this finding is s upported by the record, [Appellant] cannot show that [trial] counsel’s actions lacked a reasonable basis. Therefore, the [PCRA c]ourt did not err in dismissing [Appellant’s] claim of [trial] counsel[’s] ineffectiveness for failing to call Mack at trial.

Regarding witness Stephan [Studivant], [Appellant] alleged that [Studivant] was present at the scene of theJ

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- shooting, that he could not see the shooters[’] faces as they were concealed by hoodies, but that he heard Anthony Harris inform police that Mali k Ware was the shooter. Mr. Wallace testified at the PCRA hearing that [Studivant] told Wallace’s investigator that he was not even at the scene of the shooting, and only later claimed to have been a witness. The [PCRA c]ourt found Mr.
Wallace’s testimon y to be credible and that not presenting fabricated testimony was a reasonable basis for not calling [Studivant] to testify at trial. As [Appellant] cannot show that [trial] counsel’s actions lacked a reasonable basis, the [PCRA c]ourt did not err in dism issing [Appellant’s] claim of [trial] counsel[’s] ineffectiveness for failing to call [Studivant] at trial.

Regarding witnesses Zan’ea Jones, Ikenia Harris, and Deborah McBride, [Appellant] sought to establish through
these witnesses that Rachel Marcel is had animosity towards [Appellant] stemming from her failed relationship with [Appellant’s] brother and because [Appellant] took advantage of her. [Appellant] alleged that this evidence would have demonstrated that Marcelis was biased against [Appellant ] and therefore incredible. However, at the PCRA hearing, Mr. Wallace testified that he believed that none of these witnesses would have supported an argument that Marcelis was biased against [Appellant]. Jones, Harris, and McBride were all family member s of [Appellant]. Wallace testified that all three of these witnesses were close with Marcelis, that Marcelis ate with them, that Marcelis stayed overnight with them, and that all of them partied together as recently as the very night before the shooting. Therefore, it was Wallace’s view that
these witnesses would have established a close relationship among Marcelis, [Appellant] and [Appellant’s] family, rather than any bad feelings that would have caused Marcelis to be biased. As [trial] counsel had a

r easonable basis for not calling the above three women, the [PCRA c]ourt did not err in dismissing [Appellant’s] claim of [trial] counsel[’s] ineffectiveness.

2. Failing to Call Kyle Carter, Derrick McMillan, Gregory Blackmon, Shawn Lowry, Theresa Brown, Ty rone Lewis, Malik Wooden, and McCoy MatthewsJ

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- [Appellant] next asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate, interview, and call Kyle Carter, Derrick McMillan, Gregory Blackmon, Shawn Lowry, Theresa Brown, [Tyrone] Lewis, Malik Wo oden, and McCoy Matthews at trial and that the [PCRA c]ourt erred in failing to grant an evidentiary hearing on these witnesses. This
claim is without merit.

Regarding Kyle Carter, [Appellant] alleged that Carter would have testified that he was present at the shooting, and that he heard “Tone” (Anthony Harris) say that Malik Ware, not [Appellant], shot [decedent] Brown. However, the record establishes that, w hile Carter was subpoenaed to appear at trial, Carter was not present in court when he would have been called to testify. While Wallace attempted to request a continuance to attempt to compel Carter to appear, the trial judge would not agree to a

continua nce for that purpose. The trial judge’s decision to refuse the continuance request was upheld by the Superior Court on [Appellant’s] direct appeal. As Carter failed to appear in court, despite having been properly subpoenaed,
and since the trial court re fused to continue the case to allow further efforts to secure his appearance, Carter was unavailable to testify on [Appellant’s] behalf. Therefore, [Appellant’s] claim of [trial] counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to call Carter at trial is without arg uable merit. Accordingly, the [PCRA c]ourt did not err in denying [Appellant’s] claim without an evidentiary hearing.

Regarding witness Derrick McMillan, [Appellant] alleged that McMillan would testify that [Appellant] “did not have a reputation for f ighting or shooting.” At trial, counsel stipulated that five different family members would testify at trial that [Appellant’s] reputation “for being peaceful and nonviolent [was] excellent.” Because McMillan’s testimony regarding [Appellant’s] character would have been cumulative, merely repeating the stipulated testimony of five other character witnesses, [trial] counsel cannot be ineffective for not calling him as a witness. Therefore, the [PCRA c]ourt did not err in failing to grant an evidentiary he aring on this claim.

Regarding Gregory Blackmon, [Appellant] alleged that Blackmon would have testified that [decedent] Brown wasJ

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- shot by individuals who were taller and slimmer than [Appellant]. As with witness Kyle Carter, . . . Blackmon was subpoen aed for trial but failed to appear, and the trial judge refused to continue the case to allow further efforts to secure his appearance. For the reasons stated above regarding Carter, [Appellant’s] claim regarding witness Blackmon was properly rejected wit hout an evidentiary hearing.

Regarding Shawn Lowry, [Appellant] alleged that Lowry would testify that he “had knowledge of who was present on the playground when the shooting took place.” However, [Appellant] did not assert anywhere in his
Amended Pet ition how this testimony would have been relevant or exculpatory. Indeed, [Lowry’s] statement to police . . . does not provide any reason to believe that [Lowry] saw the actual shooting or could testify that [Appellant] did not shoot [decedent] Brown. Mo reover, the record demonstrates that both trial counsel and
counsel for co

- defendant Baxter attempted to locate [Lowry], but that these attempts were unsuccessful and [Lowry] never appeared at trial. Accordingly, as [Appellant] failed to aver the existenc e of evidence that could establish that he was prejudiced by the lack of [Lowry’s] testimony, and since the record demonstrates that [Lowry] was unavailable, [trial] counsel was not ineffective for failing to call him at trial.

Regarding Theresa Brown, [Appellant] alleged that [Theresa] Brown would have testified that she saw “two males wearing light colored hoodies and the ‘hoodies’ were up.” As with [Lowry], . . . [Appellant] does not allege that this testimony would, in any way, exculpate [Appellant ] or provide any additional, relevant testimony. Moreover, [Appellant] cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the lack of this testimony, since both Hassan Durant and Anthony Harris both testified that the shooters were wearing hoodies, with the hoo ds up, but that they could see enough of [Appellant’s] face to identify him as a shooter. Harris additionally testified that he saw [Appellant’s] face before [Appellant] raised the hood. As [Appellant] could not have been prejudiced by the lack of [There sa] Brown’s testimony, [Appellant] cannot establishJ

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- that counsel was ineffective for failing to call [her] to testify at trial.

Regarding Tyrone Lewis, [Appellant] alleged that Lewis “had knowledge of who was present on the playground when the shooting took place.” As with [Lowry], . . . [Appellant] does not allege that this testimony would, in any way, exculpate [Appellant] or provide any additional, relevant testimony. Further, the record indicates that both
trial counsel and counsel for co

- defendan t Baxter attempted to locate Lewis, but that these attempts were unsuccessful and Lewis never appeared at trial. Accordingly, as [Appellant] failed to aver the existence of evidence that could establish that he was prejudiced by the lack of [Lowry’s] test imony, and since the record demonstrates that [Lowry] was unavailable, counsel was not ineffective for failing to call him at trial.

Regarding Malik Wooden, [Appellant] alleged that
Wooden would have testified that one of the two shooters
“had a dark c omplexion and this was not consistent with [Appellant] or his co

- defendant Armel Baxter.” [Appellant] fails to demonstrate how this additional testimony would have exculpated [him]. Even assuming arguendo that [Appellant’s] complexion could not properly be described as “dark,” Wooden did not describe the complexion of both shooters. Moreover, . . . [Appellant] was identified by two individuals, one of whom testified that he saw [Appellant] before [he] covered his face with his hoodie. Further, [Appellan t] failed to allege anywhere that Wooden was available to testify on his behalf. As [Appellant] was not prejudiced by the lack of Wooden’s testimony, and as
there is no reason to believe that Wooden was available to testify at trial, [trial] counsel was n ot ineffective for failing
to call Wooden as a witness.

Regarding McCoy Matthews, [Appellant] asserts that Matthews “had knowledge of who was present on the playground when the shooting took place.” For the reasons set forth above for witnesses Lowry and Lewis, [Appellant] fails to establish how Matthews[’] testimony would have been relevant or exculpatory at trial. [Matthews’] statement to police . . . does not provide any reason to believe that Matthews saw the actual shooting orJ

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- could testify that [Appellant] did not shoot [decedent] Brown. Further, [Appellant] never alleges that Matthews was available to testify on his behalf. As [Appellant] was not prejudiced by the lack of Matthews’ testimony, and as
there is no reason to believe that Matthews was available to testify at trial, [trial] counsel was not ineffective for failing to call Matthews as a witness.

3. Failing to Cross

- Examine Rachel Marcelis Regarding Immunity

[Appellant] next asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to cr oss

- examine Rachel Marcelis concerning the Commonwealth’s Petition for Immunity and the Order for Immunity which counsel received prior to
trial. This claim is without merit.

At trial, defense counsel conducted an extensive cross

examination of Marcel is concerning her involvement in the playground shooting. However, Mr. Wallace did not question Marcelis concerning the immunity granted to her by the Commonwealth. At the PCRA hearing, Mr. Wallace testified that he was fully aware of the immunity, but
d eclined to question [Marcelis] about it since he believed it would hurt [Appellant’s] case. The [PCRA c]ourt found Mr. Wallace’s testimony to be credible. Under the Commonwealth’s theory, Marcelis drove [Appellant] to and from the murder, and therefore c ould have been charged as an accomplice. Under the defense theory, Marcelis and [Appellant] were in a car together, but had nothing to do with the murder. Accordingly, Marcelis only had criminal exposure if the Commonwealth’s contentions were correct.

B ringing out the immunity agreement under those circumstances could tend to support the Commonwealth’s version of the facts. Under these circumstances, Wallace’s strategic decision to not bring out the immunity had a reasonable basis. Therefore, [trial] c ounsel was not ineffective for choosing to omit this testimony.

PCRA Ct. Op. at 5

- 12 (citations and footnotes omitted). We agree with the

PCRA court’s conclusions. Furthermore, regarding the immunity claim,

Appellant has failed to demonstrate he was p rejudiced by trial counsel ’ sJ

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-

failure to cross

- examine Marcelis on her immunity agreement. See Perry

,

959 A.2d at 936. At trial, Hassan Durant and Anthony Harris both testified

to seeing Appellant and co

- defendant shoot decedent Brown. See N.T. Trial,

1/29/09, at 76

- 77; N.T. Trial, 1/30/09, at 4

- 6. Thus, Appellant has not

proven there is a reasonable probability the outcome of his trial would have

been different but for trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness. See Perry , 959

A.2d at 936. Accordingly, Appellant’s claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness

merit no relief, and we affirm the PCRA court’s dismissal of these claims.

Appellant’s remaining issues challenge his LWOP sentence; therefore,

we will address them together. Appellant argues his mandatory sentence of

LWOP constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment” under the Pennsylvania

and United States Constitutions because he was a juvenile when the crimes

were committed. Appellant contends he was seventeen

- years

- old at the

time of the offense and, therefore, his mandatory LWOP sentence is

unconstitutional pursuant to Miller and Montgomery . Appellant concludes

he is entitled to resentencing under Miller and Montgomery . We agree.

On January 25, 2016, while the instant appeal was pending, 5 the

United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Montgomery and held,

“ Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law. Like other

substantive rules, Miller is retroactive[.]” Montgomery , 136 S. Ct. at 734.

5 Appellant filed his pro se PCRA petition on April 14, 2011, prior to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller on June 25, 2012.J

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-

Thereafter, this Co urt issued its decision in Commonwealth v. Secreti , 134

A.3d 77 (Pa. Super. 2016) and held the decision in Montgomery renders

Miller retroactive “effective as of the date of the Miller decision.” Secreti

,

134 A.3d at 82. Therefore, pursuant to the decisi ons in Miller

,

Montgomery , and Secreti , we reverse the PCRA court’s order denying

relief on this claim, vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence, and remand for

resentencing.

Order affirmed in part and reversed in part. Judgment of sentence

vacated. Re mand for resentencing. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 1/25/2017