In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-14-00052-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF P.D. AND C.D., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 402nd Judicial District Court

Wood County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2013-378

Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

After many years’ use of methamphetamine and the resulting chaotic home life, Amy1

lost her parental rights to her young children, P.D. and C.D., in a bench trial in Wood County.2 

On appeal, Amy challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support selected 

elements of the trial court’s order of termination under grounds set out in subsections (D), (E), 

(I), (O), and (P) of Section 161.001(1) of the Texas Family Code.3

 Amy does not contest the 

trial court’s finding that termination is in the best interests of the children, but attacks only the 

trial court’s findings of the above grounds for termination.

4

 We affirm the judgment of the trial 

court because the evidence is sufficient to support the order of termination under Section 

161.001(1)(O).5

Parental rights may be terminated if the parent has

failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established 

the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the child who has been 

 1

We will refer to appellant as “Amy” and the children as “P.D.” and “C.D.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8.

2

The trial court also terminated the parental rights of each of the fathers of P.D. and C.D., who have not appealed.

3

The trial court’s order of termination found that there was clear and convincing evidence to support termination of 

Amy’s parental rights under those five grounds and that termination was in the best interest of the children. See

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1) (D), (E), (I), (O) and (P); § 161.001(2) (West 2014). The trial court also 

entered findings of facts and conclusions of law finding the same.

4

Under grounds (D), (E), and (P), all requiring proof, in some way, that the children were endangered, Amy argues 

that there is insufficient proof of endangerment. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(D), (E), & (P). Ground (I) 

involves “contumaciously” refusing to submit to a court order, and Amy asserts that the evidence does not 

demonstrate that her limited failure to comply was contumacious, that is, stubborn or willful. See TEX. FAM. CODE 

ANN. § 161.001(1)(I). Because we find sufficient evidence to establish ground (O), we do not reach these 

arguments. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(O).

5

When there is a finding that the termination is in the best interest of the child, only one statutory ground under 

Section 161.001(1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003); 

In re O.R.F., 417 S.W.3d 24, 37 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. denied).
3

in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of 

Family and Protective Services for not less than nine months as a result of the 

child’s removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the 

child . . . .

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(O).

On appeal, Amy does not contest that she failed to comply with the provisions of the 

court order establishing the actions she needed to take to obtain the return of the children.6 Amy 

challenges only the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding that the 

children had been removed “as a result of abuse or neglect.”7 Therefore, we consider the 

evidence relating to the original removal of the children to determine whether it is sufficient to 

support the trial court’s finding that they were removed as a result of abuse or neglect. See, e.g.,

In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239 (Tex. 2013).

Texas courts have historically shown great respect for the biological bond between parent 

and child, recognizing that the ‘“natural right which exists between parents and their children is 

one of constitutional dimensions.’” In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 194–95 (Tex. 1994) (quoting 

Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. 1976)). They also recognize, however, that “the 

rights of natural parents are not absolute; protection of the child is paramount. . . . The rights of 

parenthood are accorded only to those fit to accept the accompanying responsibilities.” A.V., 113 

S.W.3d at 361. The child’s emotional and physical interests will not be sacrificed merely to 

preserve parental rights. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002).

 6

The record reveals that Amy failed to comply with at least three of the required actions, including continuing with 

counseling and following all recommendations of the counselor, submitting to all drug tests requested by the 

Department or ordered by the court, and maintaining a stable home and income.

7

Amy’s briefing on this issue is sparse, at best. In the interest of justice and since the State has fully briefed this 

point, we will address it.
4

Terminating parental rights under the Texas Family Code requires proof by clear and 

convincing evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1) (West 2014). Clear and convincing 

evidence is “proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as 

to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007 (West 

2014); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264 (Tex. 2002). When the legal sufficiency of evidence is 

challenged, we “look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine 

whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding 

was true.” J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. In a bench trial, “we assume that the trial court resolved 

disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable fact-finder could do so, but disregard all 

evidence that a reasonable fact-finder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.”

In re K.W., 335 S.W.3d 767, 770 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.) (citing In re J.O.A., 283 

S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2009)).

In reviewing for factual sufficiency, we also consider disputed and conflicting evidence. 

If we find, after reviewing the entire record, “the disputed evidence that a reasonable fact-finder

could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a fact-finder could not 

reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient.” 

In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 344.

We turn to the underlying facts in this record.

The petition for temporary managing conservatorship was supported by an affidavit 

recounting the facts requiring the removal of P.D. and C.D. In addition, Teresa Huffine, the 

Child Protective Services caseworker who performed the initial investigation testified at the final 
5

hearing regarding the events leading up to the removal of the children. The evidence shows 

Amy and her children came to the attention of CPS in May 2013, when it received a report of a 

possible failure to seek medical treatment concerning C.D. At that time, Amy and her children 

were staying with her grandmother. Huffine investigated the report; interviewed Amy, her 

grandmother, and her mother; and observed the children. Huffine also observed that the home 

was clean and had working utilities and ample food and toys for the children. 

During the initial investigation, Amy admitted using methamphetamine and alcohol and 

signed a substance abuse acknowledgement. A safety plan was instituted with Amy’s 

grandmother as the supervised contact. Amy also agreed that she would refrain from any further 

use of illegal substances. During the two months before removal of the children, several 

incidents of domestic violence occurred. In one instance, Amy’s mother was accused of criminal 

trespass by the Wood County Sheriff’s Department. In another visit to the home, Huffine was 

accompanied by a deputy, and Amy and her grandmother were hostile toward each other, with 

the grandmother stating she would protect herself with a gun or knife if necessary. Two days 

before removal of the children, Amy’s grandmother said she was planning on evicting Amy. 

The grandmother claimed there were two more people living at the house that were not supposed 

to be there and that there had been another instance of domestic dispute, again mentioning the 

use of a gun to protect herself if necessary. Two days before the removal of the children, 

Huffine interviewed Amy’s cousin, who was frequently at the home. The cousin advised that 

Amy and her grandmother argue constantly and that “it can be very serious at times.” P.D., who 

was four years old, and C.D., who was four and one-half months, were in the home during these 
6

arguments. Huffine testified that, although these arguments were non-physical, they still 

exposed the children to domestic violence and posed a threat to their emotional well-being and 

cognitive development. Huffine was also concerned that the escalating arguments might turn 

physical and that they posed a danger to the children. At the final hearing, Amy testified that her 

grandmother verbally abused her in front of her children. Amy denied that she had mood swings 

or anger issues at that time, but admitted they had arguments.

On three of the home visits, there were persons present in the home that Huffine 

recognized from other, unrelated, CPS cases. All were known to her to use drugs and have 

criminal histories. She continued to counsel Amy on making better decisions on whom she 

allowed in the home, but to no avail. On her last visit to the house, Huffine learned that another 

woman had moved into the home. This woman had moved from another home that had a history 

of drug use and domestic violence. Earlier that day, Amy and her grandmother had another 

altercation in front of the children, and her grandmother called CPS. On that visit, she also 

learned from Amy’s cousin that there was a regular stream of visits by men to see Amy in her 

room.

During the course of the investigation, Amy admitted “recreational” use of alcohol and 

methamphetamine that had continued for about five years, although she stated she used it away 

from home. In the two months before removal, Amy admitted that she continued to use 

methamphetamine and that she was involved with people with criminal histories who also used 

drugs. Although Huffine did not believe Amy was using drugs inside the home, she testified 

that, in her experience, the effects of methamphetamine use may last several days and affect 
7

parenting by clouding judgment. Amy denied that her drug use affected her parenting skills or 

posed any danger to her children. She also did not recognize that the presence of drug users with 

criminal histories posed any kind of threat or risk of harm to her children. However, at the final 

hearing she acknowledged that she now sees that her drug use may have had an effect on how 

she took care of her children. She also agreed that, when she was using methamphetamine, her 

judgment was impaired as far as decisions she made regarding her children. 

Bonnie McBride, a licensed clinical social worker and family therapist who counseled 

Amy, testified that Amy’s drug use and home environment endangered the children’s emotional 

and physical well-being. She agreed that Amy’s drug use, the instability of her home life, and 

the domestic violence endangered the physical health and emotional well-being of the children. 

Dawn McClain, a licensed professional counselor, testified that Amy’s methamphetamine use 

and the domestic violence in the home would place the children in danger and harm them 

emotionally. 

After two months, Amy still would not adhere to the safety plan, and she would not 

acknowledge that her decisions and conduct might expose the children to danger. On July 9, 

2013, another investigator, Laura Cranford, visited with both Amy and her grandmother in the 

home. During that visit, Amy admitted she had used methamphetamine within the previous two 

days. Cranford also learned that Amy’s grandmother was not complying with the safety plan by 

allowing Amy unsupervised contact with the children. The visit ended with Amy and her 

grandmother getting into a heated argument. On July 10, 2013, the Department of Protective and

Family Services (the Department) determined that the increasing domestic violence, Amy’s 
8

continued drug use, and the failure of Amy and her grandmother to adhere to the safety plan by 

allowing people who are known illegal drug users with criminal histories to visit and reside in 

the home posed a risk of harm to the children. So, the Department removed the children from 

the home pursuant to the emergency provisions of the Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE 

ANN. § 262.104 (West 2014). The same day the Department filed a petition seeking temporary 

managing conservatorship of the children. The trial court entered emergency temporary orders 

giving the Department temporary managing conservatorship and setting a full adversary hearing 

July 22, 2013. 

On July 22, 2013, a full adversary hearing was held, and Amy appeared in person and 

through her attorney. After the hearing, the trial court entered temporary orders in which it 

found, inter alia, (1) that there was a danger to the physical health or safety of the children 

caused by an act or failure to act of the person entitled to possession, (2) that it was contrary to 

the welfare of the children to remain in the home, and (3) that there was a substantial risk of 

continuing danger if the children remained in the home. The trial court also entered orders that 

established specific actions that Amy needed to take to obtain the return of the children. These 

actions included (1) submitting to a psychological or psychosocial evaluation and following all 

recommendations of the evaluation; (2) attending counseling sessions until the counselor 

determined no further sessions were necessary; (3) attending domestic violence counseling 

sessions until the counselor determined no further sessions were necessary; (4) attending and 

successfully completing parenting classes; (5) submitting to an alcohol and drug assessment and 

following all recommendations; (6) submitting to drug tests as requested by the Department or 
9

ordered by the court; (7) obtaining and maintaining a stable home and income; and 

(8) complying with each requirement of the Department’s service plan. The Department’s 

service plan included all of the court-ordered services and also required her to maintain a stable 

home and employment for six months, complete an anger management course, and participate in 

Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholics Anonymous meetings at least three times a week and 

provide documentation of attendance to the Department. 

As Amy correctly asserts, Section 161.001(1)(O) requires that the removal of the children 

under Chapter 262 of the Texas Family Code be for “abuse or neglect.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 161.001(1)(O). The Texas Supreme Court has recently concluded that, under Chapter 262 and 

this subsection, abuse or neglect “necessarily includes the risk or threats of the environment in 

which the child is placed.” E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 248. As the court recognized, the definitions 

of abuse and neglect under Chapter 261 “inform” the meaning of abuse and neglect under 

Chapter 262. Id. Under Chapter 261, “abuse” includes “the current use by a person of a 

controlled substance . . . in a manner or to the extent that the use results in physical, mental or 

emotional injury to a child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.001(1)(I) (West 2014). “Neglect” 

includes “placing a child in or failing to remove a child from a situation that a reasonable person 

would realize requires judgment or actions beyond the child’s level of maturity, physical 

condition, or mental abilities and that results in . . . a substantial risk of immediate harm to the 

child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.001(4)(B)(i) (West 2014). Further, Section 262.104 allows 

the emergency removal of a child when “on information furnished by another that has been 

corroborated by personal knowledge of facts and all of which taken together would lead a person 
10

of ordinary prudence and caution to believe that there is an immediate danger to the physical 

health or safety of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.104(a)(2).

In this case, there is abundant evidence that Amy’s continued substance abuse and her 

allowing other drug users and persons with criminal histories into the home created an 

environment that placed the children at risk of emotional and physical harm. Amy admitted as 

much at the final hearing. In addition, as set forth in the supporting affidavit and the testimony 

of Huffine, the increasing level of altercations between Amy and her grandmother, to the extent 

her grandmother expressed on more than one occasion the need to protect herself with firearms, 

would lead a person of ordinary prudence to believe there was an immediate danger to the 

children. Thus, considering this evidence, a reasonable fact-finder could have formed a firm 

belief or conviction that grounds existed to remove the children for abuse or neglect.

As noted earlier, Amy does not contest that she failed to comply with the provisions of 

the trial court’s order “that specifically established the actions necessary for [her] to obtain the 

return of [the children].” See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(O). It is also undisputed that 

the children were in the Department’s custody for over nine months. Further, the record 

conclusively establishes that the children were removed for abuse or neglect under Chapter 262 

of the Texas Family Code. Therefore, we find that the State established the conduct necessary to 

terminate Amy’s parental rights under Section 161.001(1)(O). Since we have found that the 

State established at least one of the predicate acts under Section 161.001(1), we need not 

consider Amy’s other alleged errors.
11

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Josh R. Morriss III

Chief Justice

Date Submitted: October 14, 2014

Date Decided: October 29, 2014