alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
FIT F COPY OFFICIAL NOTICE FROM COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS P.O. BOX 12308, CAPITOL STATION, AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711

10/14*015 COANO.12-12-00378-CR WALKER, KENNETH NEAL Tr. Ct. No. 241-0592-12 PD-1429-14 

### On this day, the Appellant's petition for discretionary review has been granted. The 

### original and ten copies ofthe appellant's briefmustbefiled with this Courtwithin 30 

### days. The State's briefis due 30 days afterthe timely filing ofthe appellant's brief. ORAL ARGUMENT WILL BE PERMITTED Abel Acosta, Clerk
12TH COURT OF APPEALS CLERK CATHY LUSK 1517 W. FRONT, ROOM 354 TYLER, TX 75701
* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Labor

###### Employment and Training Administration 

          - [TA-W-65,686] 

In accordance with Section 221 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, an investigation was initiated on March 26, 2009 in response to a petition filed by a United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural International Union, Region 2-B representative on behalf of workers of Pandora Manufacturing, LLC, Pandora, Ohio. 

The petitioner has requested that the petition be withdrawn. Consequently, the investigation has been terminated. 

Signed in Washington, DC, this 22nd day of April 2009. 

Richard Church, 

Certifying Officer, Division of Trade Adjustment Assistance. 

[FR Doc. E9-11864 Filed 5-20-09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4510-FN-P
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Baker, Benton and Overton Argued at Norfolk, Virginia

ALVIN JEROME PATTERSON MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 2733-95-1 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON NOVEMBER 26, 1996 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF YORK COUNTY Russell M. Carneal, Judge Designate Sydney K. L. West (Horne, West & McMurtrie, P.C., on brief), for appellant. Margaret Ann B. Walker, Assistant Attorney General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Alvin Jerome Patterson was convicted by a jury of shooting from a vehicle in violation of § 18.2-286.1, shooting at an occupied vehicle in violation of § 18.2-154, and attempted malicious wounding in violation of § 18.2-26. He contends on appeal that the trial court erred by refusing to admit into evidence certain letters that he claims impeach a witness for the Commonwealth. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. The two letters in question were written to Patterson by Cleo Harper, an eyewitness to the shooting. They were written after Patterson's arrest, and contain statements professing Harper's affection for Patterson. One letter makes reference to another woman with apparent interest in Patterson, but falls

* Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.- 2 - short of establishing any relationship between the two. Patterson claims that the letters show that he and Harper were in a relationship, and that Harper found out about this other woman, resulting in her motive to testify against him. The trial court's refusal to admit these letters, he argues, prevented him from properly impeaching a Commonwealth's witness. We disagree. The letters show no real bias by Harper against Patterson. Any claim of a jealous motive is supported by neither the content of the letters nor anything else in the record. The excluded letters would therefore add nothing to the evidence presented to the jury. Furthermore, although these two letters were not admitted, two other cards sent by Harper to Patterson were admitted. Harper also testified at trial as to her continual affection for Patterson while he was awaiting trial. Thus, if any error occurred, it was harmless. Find no reversible error, we affirm.

Affirmed

.
*

The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1507

___________

Francisco Sanchez-Rosales, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Western

* District of Missouri.

Mark Walterskirchen; Gooden; *

Bradford Snyder; James Saver; Chris * [UNPUBLISHED]

Chemesky, Doctors; Kelly Doe, *

Physician’s Assistant, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: July 7, 2004

Filed: July 9, 2004

___________

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, FAGG, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Federal inmate Francisco Sanchez-Rosales (Sanchez) appeals the district

court’s*

 preservice dismissal of Sanchez’s Bivens action. See Bivens v. Six Unknown

Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Having carefully reviewed the record, we

conclude dismissal was proper because Sanchez failed to state a constitutional claim
-2-

for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. See Moore v. Duffy, 255 F.3d

543, 545 (8th Cir. 2001). 

We note the district court assessed an initial partial appellate filing fee but did

not order collection of the fee’s balance. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the

district court, see 8th Cir. R. 47A(a), and instruct the district court to assess and

collect the balance of the appellate filing fee, see Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481,

484-85 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). 

______________________________
Consent of Independent Auditors





We consent to the incorporation by reference in the
Registration Statements listed below, of our report dated February 22, 2002,
with respect to the consolidated financial statements of NaPro BioTherapeutics,
Inc. included in the Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31,
2001.

> Form S-8 (No. 333-05561) pertaining to the 1993 Stock Option Plan and the
>     1994 Long-Term Performance Incentive Plan of NaPro BioTherapeutics, Inc.;
>   Form S-8 (No. 333-75551) pertaining to the 1994 Long-Term Performance
>     Incentive Plan and the 1998 Stock Incentive Plan of NaPro BioTherapeutics,
>     Inc.;Form S-8 (No. 333-52008) pertaining to the 1994 Long-Term Performance
>     Incentive Plan and the 1998 Stock Incentive Plan of NaPro BioTherapeutics,
>     Inc.;Form S-3 (No. 33-95522) and related Prospectus pertaining to 1,375,000
>     shares of common stock of NaPro BioTherapeutics, Inc.;Form S-3 (No. 333-29477) and related Prospectus pertaining to 1,600,000
>     shares of common stock of NaPro BioTherapeutics, Inc.;Form S-3 (No. 333-42419) and related Prospectus pertaining to 1,000,000
>     shares of common stock of NaPro BioTherapeutics, Inc.;Form S-3 (No. 33-78016) and related Prospectus pertaining to 360,000
>     shares of common stock, 180,000 warrants, and 1,005,000 other shares of
>     common stock by selling stockholders of NaPro BioTherapeutics, Inc.; andForm S-3 (No. 333-51070) and related Prospectus pertaining to the
>     registration of 2,213,334 shares of common stock of NaPro BioTherapeutics,
>     Inc.

/s/ Ernst & Young LLP

Denver, Colorado

April 1, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

DOUGLAS KESSLER,

Petitioner

v.

M. D. OVERMYER, SUPERINTENDENT 

OF SCI FOREST,

Respondent

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 99 WM 2017

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 5th day of January, 2018, the Application for Leave to File 

Original Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT

CHRISTOPHER R. MOORE, JR., ) a/k/a CHRISTOPHER RICO MOORE, JR., ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D18-1890 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ) Opinion filed August 30, 2019. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Nick Nazaretian, Judge. Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Pamela Izakowitz, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and David Llanes, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

SILBERMAN, VILLANTI, and SLEET, JJ., Concur.
EXHIBIT 23.2



[NSA Letterhead]



CONSENT OF NETHERLAND, SEWELL & ASSOCIATES, INC.



We hereby consent to the references in this Form 10-K of Plains Exploration & Production Company, as well as in the Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements included in such Form 10-K, to our reserve reports to the
interest of Plains Exploration & Production Company and its subsidiaries (collectively the Company), relating to the estimated quantities of certain of the Companys proved reserves of oil and gas and present values thereof for
certain periods.



NETHERLAND, SEWELL & ASSOCIATES, INC.By:

/s/    D. Bruce CoxD. Bruce Cox Vice President




Houston, Texas

March 11, 2004
## U NITED 

## S TATES 

## N AVY



## – M ARINE 

## C ORPS 

## C OURT OF 

## C RIMINAL 

## A PPEALS

_________________________ No

. 201 800012

_________________________ 

### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Appellee

v. 

### ETHAN A. AUGSBURGER Lance Corporal ( E

- 3 ) , U

. S

. Marine Corps

Appellant

_________________________ Appeal from the United States Navy

- Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

Military Judge: Lieutenant Colonel Forrest W. Hoover, USMC

. Convening Authority: C ommand ing Officer , Headquarters and Support Battalion, School of Infantry

- East, Training Command, Camp Lejeu ne, NC

. Staff Judge Advocate’s Recommendation: Major N icholas A. Martz, USMC

. For Appellant : Captain Scott F. Hallauer
, JAGC, USN

.

For Appellee: Brian K. Keller, Esq.

_________________________ Decided 2 2 Ma y 2018

_________________________ Before H UTCHISON , F ULTON , and G EIS , Appellate Military Judges

_________________________ After careful consideration of the record, submitted without assignment of error, we affirm the findings and sentence as approved by the convening authority. Art. 66(c), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c).
For the Court

R.H. TROIDL Clerk of Court
#### Sara J. BURNS, Petitioner—Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent—Appellee.

No. 08-70394.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*597Submitted April 15, 2009.*

Filed May 21, 2009.

John W. Sunnen, Esquire, Law Offices of John W. Sunnen, San Diego, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Richard Morrison, Esquire, John A. No-let, Richard Farber, Esquire, U.S. Department of Justice, Robert R. di Trolio, Esquire, Clerk, U.S. Tax Court, Donald L. Korb, Esquire, Chief Counsel, Washington, DC, for Respondent-Appellee.

Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, PREGERSON, Circuit Judge, and QUIST,** District Judge.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

The Honorable Gordon J. Quist, U.S. District Judge for the Western District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM ***

Sara J. Burns appeals the judgment of the Tax Court, which found that the final installment of a *qui tam*reward was in-cludable on her 1999 federal income tax return. Burns contends she did not actually or constructively receive the final installment because the Bankruptcy Court ordered that the funds be paid into her attorney’s client trust account pending the resolution of a creditor’s claim against her. Because Burns actually received the installment, we affirm the judgment of the Tax Court.

Burns had an undisputed right to the final installment, and the United States actually made that payment for her benefit. The Bankruptcy Court did not limit her right to receive payment; it limited her capacity to dispose of it as she wished. *598This sort of encumbrance does not prevent actual or constructive receipt. Constructive receipt is prevented by an encumbrance which stands between the payor and the payee and limits the payee’s right to receive the payment itself, not by one that restricts disposal of the payment after the fact. Even if Burns were prevented from disposing of that payment and were compelled to use it to pay her creditor, she “obtained the economic benefit of the income through its disbursement” to her attorney’s client trust account for eventual satisfaction of that debt. *Parkford v. Commissioner,*133 F.2d 249, 251 (9th Cir.1943); *see also Gale v. Commissioner,*T.C. Memo.2002-54, 2002 WL 273164 (2002) (holding that restriction placed on use of income by creditor does not delay receipt of income for tax purposes). Furthermore, to the extent Burns lacked dominion over the payment, she surrendered that dominion voluntarily when she decided to file for bankruptcy. A voluntary surrender of dominion does not prevent constructive receipt. *See Oliver v. United States,*193 F.Supp. 930, 933 (D.Ark.1961) (taxpayer cannot avoid treating proceeds as income by voluntarily putting himself under a legal disability).

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### State v. Gwynn

Case below: 182 N.C. App.-(20 March 2007)

No. 158P07

AG’s Motion for Temporary Stay (COA06-403)

1. Allowed 04/04/07
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                              32
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                    32
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                      32
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          1113929
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     750000
<COMMON>                                        291404
<OTHER-SE>                                     3116718
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                        32
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  8381
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (8381)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                  (8381)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (8381)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (.001)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued May 2, 2005

Decided May 16, 2005

Before

Hon. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

No. 04-2164

NOEL U. UDARBE,

Petitioner,

v.

ALBERTO R. GONZALES,

Respondent.

Petition for Review of

an Order of the Board of

Immigration Appeals

No. A38-052-399

O R D E R

Noel Udarbe, a native and citizen of the Philippines, has been a lawful permanent resident

of the United States since his arrival in 1982. In 2001, Udarbe pled guilty and was convicted of

battery in Indiana and sentenced to one year in jail. Finding that to be a conviction for an

aggravated felony, the INS charged him as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). In the

course of the removal proceedings, Udarbe admitted that he had been convicted but claimed that

his conviction should not qualify as an aggravated felony. He argued that removing him under

that provision violated his Fifth Amendment rights because if he had been convicted of the same

crime in Illinois, the maximum sentence would have been 364 days, meaning that he would not

have been convicted of a felony. 

The immigration judge found Udarbe removable. Udarbe appealed, again admitting his

conviction and sentence but repeating his equal protection argument. The Board of Immigration

Appeals dismissed Udarbe’s appeal, stating that it did not “have the authority to rule on the

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 04-2164 2

constitutionality of the Act . . . .” Udarbe filed a motion to reconsider, which the Board also

denied. Udarbe appeals that decision, arguing again that his constitutional rights were violated

and that the Board erred in determining that it did not have the authority to rule on his

constitutional claims.

Unfortunately for Udarbe, we don’t have the authority to examine the merits of his

constitutional argument, either. On July 19, 2004, we issued an order explaining that, because

Udarbe did not file a timely petition for review of the Board’s initial decision, this appeal is limited

to review of the Board’s April 6, 2004, denial of Udarbe’s motion to reconsider. In that order,

the Board stated simply that Udarbe “failed to show any particular errors of fact or law in our

prior decision,” noting that Udarbe instead simply repeated constitutional arguments the Board

had previously considered.

In this appeal, Udarbe does not dispute the Board’s contention that he failed to present

any new facts or evidence in his motion for reconsideration. Therefore, we find no error in the

Board’s order denying Udarbe’s motion for reconsideration. And, as we explained in our July 19

order, our review is limited to that decision, so we do not have jurisdiction to consider Udarbe’s

claim that the Board erred in its initial decision not to consider Udarbe’s constitutional arguments. 

The petition to review the denial of the petition for reconsideration is therefore DENIED.
#### CHAMPION SPARK PLUG CO. v. REICH et al.

No. 4471.

District Court, W. D. Missouri, W. D.

Dec. 16, 1947.

*588P. L. Edwards, of Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiff.

Charles V. Garnett, of Kansas City, Mo., for Louis C. and Lois E. Reich.

REEVES, District Judge.

The plaintiff has filed its motion to produce and at the same time it seeks a ruling on defendant’s refusal to answer questions on cross examination December 3rd last. With these the plaintiff filed supporting memorandum. The defendant has not filed a memorandum in opposition to either of the requests or motions submitted by the plaintiff.

Under Rule 34, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, upon showing good cause, any party is entitled, upon notice, to the production for the purpose of inspection and copying or photographing of designated documents and records of the other party.. The motion and the supporting affidavits show that the plaintiff is entitled in this case to inspect the records mentioned in the motion. This litigation has taken a wide range, and for many reasons, including the counterclaim of the defendant, the records should be before the court or at least counsel should have an opportunity to inspect them and copy or photograph them, if that be desired. Defendant can suffer no harm or damage because of this ruling. Moreover, as indicated, under Rule 34, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff is entitled to such an order as a matter of right.

On the question of the defendant’s refusal to answer questions, the record has been examined. The plaintiff presented a report of rating by Dun & Bradstreet covering the defendant and his business. The question was asked whether he agreed with the contents of the statement or whether the facts included were true. There is no reason why defendant should not have answered that question. It is-the right of a cross-examiner to find out from a witness whether the facts stated either in signed or unsigned statements are true, if pertinent, and if they relate to him or his business. Unquestionably, the rating made by Dun & Bradstreet of the defendant would be a matter about which inquiry could be made of the defendant. Such ratings are relied upon by those engaged in commercial pursuits and as the court is advised, in many instances information given by Dun & Bradstreet and other commercial agencies is information obtained from tho person or corporation about which the report is made. No ruling is needed whether the document would be competent evidence if the defendant should deny the facts stated therein. However, on that question it could be offered in the deposition subject to objection, and then the court could rule seasonably upon the objection.

Upon both reason and authority the plaintiff is entitled to have the records produced as set forth in its motion, and, moreover, it is entitled to continue its cross-examination of the defendant and have him answer the questions propounded. An order will be made accordingly.