[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-11977

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DEMETRIUS LAMAR JACKSON, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket Nos. 4:19-cr-00099-LGW-CLR-1,

4:19-cr-00049-LGW-CLR-1

USCA11 Case: 21-11977 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 07/12/2023 Page: 1 of 10
2 Opinion of the Court 21-11977

____________________

Before WILSON, JORDAN, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Demetrius Jackson appeals from his convictions for discharging and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a 

crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)–(ii); 

conspiracy to use and carry a firearm during and in relation to a 

crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o); carjacking, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119; attempted carjacking, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 2119; and interference with commerce by robbery, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). He argues that the district court 

abused its discretion in denying his motions to substitute counsel 

and in denying his motion to continue his sentencing hearing for a 

psychological evaluation to determine competency. 

The government, in turn, has filed a motion to dismiss the 

appeal pursuant to an appeal waiver that a panel of our Court carried with the case. After careful review, we affirm.1

I.

We review the denial of a motion for new counsel under an

abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 

1314, 1343 (11th Cir. 1997). “The district court may be reversed 

only if its decision is arbitrary or unreasonable.” United States v. 

1 Additionally, the government’s motion to dismiss the appeal pursuant to an 

appeal waiver is DENIED as MOOT. 

USCA11 Case: 21-11977 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 07/12/2023 Page: 2 of 10
21-11977 Opinion of the Court 3

Buckles, 843 F.2d 469, 471 (11th Cir. 1988). A defendant has a right 

to counsel under the Sixth Amendment; however, except for good 

cause, he does not have an unqualified right to counsel of his choice 

or the right to demand different counsel. United States v. Garey, 540 

F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc). “Good cause in this context means a fundamental problem, such as a conflict of interest, a 

complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A “general loss of confidence or trust” in 

counsel by itself does not constitute good cause. United States v. 

Joyner, 899 F.3d 1199, 1205–06 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, a defendant’s unilateral 

refusal to communicate with appointed counsel is not good cause. 

United States v. Amede, 977 F.3d 1086, 1106 (11th Cir. 2020).

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jackson’s motions for new counsel. Jackson maintains that his 

attorney, Henifin, frequently used inaccessible legal language to 

convey important concepts relevant to the proceeding. As a result, 

Jackson claims that he had difficulty comprehending critical elements of the process, such as sentencing procedures. But a review 

of the record fails to show an irreconcilable conflict or breakdown 

in communication. Henifin and Jackson met twenty times and had 

significant discussions during twelve of those meetings. Although 

Henifin believed there was a breakdown in communication, any 

breakdown was a result of Jackson’s threats and his refusal to speak 

to Henifin. We have addressed a defendant’s refusal to speak with 

USCA11 Case: 21-11977 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 07/12/2023 Page: 3 of 10
4 Opinion of the Court 21-11977

counsel before; Jackson’s actions do not constitute good cause. See 

id. at 1104–06.

Although Jackson did not think Henifin advocated zealously, the record shows that Henifin obtained a plea agreement 

that dismissed twenty charges, leaving Jackson to plead guilty to 6

counts. Further, Jackson’s lack of confidence in Henifin, by itself,

does not constitute good cause. See Joyner, 899 F.3d at 1205–06.

Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jackson’s motions for new counsel.

II.

We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a continuance for abuse of discretion. United States v. Chalker, 966 F.3d 

1177, 1193 (11th Cir. 2020). A district court’s competency determination is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Hogan, 986 F.2d 

1364, 1372 (11th Cir. 1993). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous 

only when we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a 

mistake has been committed.” Id. 

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits 

the government from proceeding against a defendant while he is 

incompetent. United States v. Cometa, 966 F.3d 1285, 1291 (11th Cir. 

2020). At any point before sentencing, the defendant may file a 

motion for a hearing to determine his mental competency, and 

“[t]he court shall grant the motion . . . if there is reasonable cause 

to believe that the defendant . . . is unable to understand the nature 

and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist 

properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). Absent a bona fide 

USCA11 Case: 21-11977 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 07/12/2023 Page: 4 of 10
21-11977 Opinion of the Court 5

doubt as to a defendant’s competency, the motion may be denied. 

Cometa, 966 F.3d at 1291.

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jackson’s motion for a continuance of his sentencing because 

there was no bona fide doubt as to his competency. The district

court noted that Jackson assisted in his defense by asking perceptive 

questions. Additionally, Jackson’s apology to a victim and verbal 

acknowledgement that he was going to prison showed Jackson’s

understanding of the nature and consequences of the proceedings 

against him. 

Although the district court was informed that Jackson attempted to commit suicide at his sentencing, a paramedic assessed 

that Jackson did not show any signs of distress and was alert and 

responsive. Additionally, the district court noted that Jackson was 

alert and actively interacting in the proceedings before it ruled on 

his motions to continue and for a psychological evaluation. Further, the record reflects that Jackson previously delayed the case 

after slamming his hand in a door before his change of plea hearing. 

Jackson does not point to anything in the record that undermines 

our confidence in the district court’s decision. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Jackson’s motion for continuance.

AFFIRMED.

USCA11 Case: 21-11977 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 07/12/2023 Page: 5 of 10
1 JORDAN, J., Dissenting 21-11977

JORDAN, Circuit Judge, Dissenting.

With respect, I dissent. In my view, the district court abused 

its discretion in denying a continuance and a psychiatric evaluation 

of Mr. Jackson following his suicide attempt on the day of sentencing. 

Right before his sentencing hearing, Mr. Jackson tried to 

hang himself. Upon learning of the suicide attempt, Mr. Jackson’s 

counsel understandably moved for a continuance of the sentencing 

hearing and for a psychiatric evaluation of Mr. Jackson. The district 

court denied these motions after hearing from a paramedic and a 

deputy U.S. marshal. 

The first problem is that the paramedic only saw Mr. Jackson—who did not say anything—for just 5 minutes. The paramedic expressly stated that without Mr. Jackson answering questions, “it was very hard for him to be able to properly assess him.” 

D.E. 66 at 9. 

Moreover, no one conducted a mental evaluation or assessment of Mr. Jackson. And although there was a video camera in 

Mr. Jackson’s holding cell, the deputy U.S. marshal did not know if 

the camera was recording, did not have an opportunity to review 

any recording, and did not talk to anyone who may have had an 

opportunity to review the camera. See id. at 15–16. This is not 

surprising given the quick progression of events—at 12:05 p.m., the 

proceedings were called to order; shortly thereafter, a deputy U.S. 

marshal advised the district court that deputies and some inmates 

had just intervened in Mr. Jackson’s attempted suicide attempt; at 

USCA11 Case: 21-11977 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 07/12/2023 Page: 6 of 10
21-11977 JORDAN, J., Dissenting 2

12:18 p.m., the district court ordered a recess; and by 1:26 p.m. the 

proceedings had resumed. 

At the sentencing hearing that followed, Mr. Jackson expressed remorse for his actions during his allocution. He apologized to the testifying victim, to her family, and to the district court. 

He said that he wished all of the victims were there “because I really want to tell everybody one by one I apologize.” Id. at 54. Mr. 

Jackson explained that it was as if he “was walking around without 

a brain, like my brain was empty, that was somebody telling me to 

do something. I’m just moving. I just was a body.” Id. He 

acknowledged that he “did wrong” and stated he was learning from 

this situation that “it’s more [h]onor to do right than do wrong.” 

Id.at 53. He also told his mother that it was not her fault, and said 

he was not a bad person, not a “throwaway.” Id. at 54, 56–57. 

After Mr. Jackson’s allocution, the district court began to 

pronounce the sentence. Before the district court could finish, 

however, Mr. Jackson “made a rush toward the prosecutor’s table, 

and the [deputy U.S.] marshals descended and were able to pin 

him” and he was “subdued and taken back to the holding area in 

the courthouse.” Id. at 61. The transcript reads like this: 

Marshal: Get in here. 

Marshal: Stop. Stop. 

The Defendant: Kill me. 

Marshal: We need help in here. 

Marshal: Breathe. 

The Defendant: Kill me. (Unintelligible). Kill me. 

(Unintelligible). 

USCA11 Case: 21-11977 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 07/12/2023 Page: 7 of 10
3 JORDAN, J., Dissenting 21-11977

Id. at 59. 

The district court then took another recess. That same afternoon, at 4:19 p.m., the district court resumed proceedings, and 

Mr. Jackson appeared—according to the district court—“secured in 

a chair” and “behaving well.” Id. at 62. As the district court continued to pronounce the sentence, Mr. Jackson began interrupting 

with assertions in stark contrast to his previous statement apologizing to the victims and the district court:

The Defendant: I ain’t even go hard. So imagine if 

ain’t had no safety on my gun. 

The Court: Marshal, if you’ll –

The Defendant: Imagine if I really put thought and 

tried to hurt people. If you going to kill me, give me 

the death penalty. Don’t play with me, bro. Y’all tying me down, sentence me, kill me. 

... 

The Defendant: I mean, I could have went a hundred 

times harder. 

...

The Defendant: I could have went a million times 

harder. You lucky – you lucky you wasn’t in that car 

wash or something.

Id. at 63–65. 

A lot happened on the day of the sentencing hearing. Mr. 

Jackson attempted to commit suicide and saw a paramedic for only 

5 minutes. His counsel’s motions for a continuance and a psychiatric evaluation were denied. The sentencing hearing went forward that day as scheduled, and Mr. Jackson provided a remorseful 

USCA11 Case: 21-11977 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 07/12/2023 Page: 8 of 10
21-11977 JORDAN, J., Dissenting 4

statement—apologizing to victims, his family, and the district 

court. But shortly after hearing his sentence, he made a rush toward the prosecutor’s table, was pinned down, and taken out of the 

courtroom after saying “kill me.” He returned to the courtroom 

for the remainder of his sentencing hearing, during which he began 

to make aggressive statements that contradicted his previous apologies. 

A look at Mr. Jackson’s presentence investigation report provides a backdrop to the events that transpired that day, confirming 

that a continuance of the sentencing hearing was needed. According to the report, Mr. Jackson indicated that he had in the past made 

multiple attempts to overdose by ingesting copious amounts of 

pills and that, as a child, he was diagnosed with depression, anxiety, 

and bipolar disorder. See D.E. 67 at 25. The report also states that 

the medical staff at the Emanuel County Jail confirmed that Mr. 

Jackson was being treated for the noted mental health conditions. 

See id. 

A suicide attempt, regardless of its root cause, is a drastic act. 

It warrants a serious evaluation of the person who tried to end his 

life. Maybe, as the district court believed, Mr. Jackson understood 

what he was doing and was able to still participate rationally and 

understand the proceedings. See D.E. 66 at 19–22, 61. But maybe 

his mind wasn’t right. Only a psychiatric evaluation—performed 

after a continuance—could have provided an answer entitled to a 

degree of confidence. See Bailey v. Spears, 847 F.2d 695, 696 (11th 

Cir. 1988) (finding that the circumstances, including bizarre 

USCA11 Case: 21-11977 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 07/12/2023 Page: 9 of 10
5 JORDAN, J., Dissenting 21-11977

behavior and a suicide attempt in the jail, “raise[d] sufficient doubts 

regarding [the defendant’s] mental capacity as to justify further inquiry by a competent medical expert”). See also Wojtowicz v. United 

States, 550 F.2d 786, 790 (2d Cir. 1977) (“If the suicide attempt is 

found to have occurred, then it will become necessary for the court 

to order an examination to determine whether appellant was competent to be sentenced.”). 

USCA11 Case: 21-11977 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 07/12/2023 Page: 10 of 10