This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-0314

Shannon Hollie, petitioner,

Appellant,

vs.

Lucinda E. Jesson,

Commissioner of Department of Human Services, et al.,

Respondents.

Filed September 15, 2014

Affirmed

Schellhas, Judge

Carlton County District Court

File No. 90-CV-13-2210

Shannon D. Hollie, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Anthony R. Noss, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, 

Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and 

Rodenberg, Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

SCHELLHAS, Judge

Raising issues concerning conditional release and predatory-offender registration, 

appellant challenges the district court’s summary denial of his habeas-corpus petition. We 

affirm.
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FACTS

In November 1989, appellant Shannon Hollie pleaded guilty to second- and thirddegree criminal sexual conduct, and he received two concurrent sentences of 30 months’ 

imprisonment. In September 1993, a jury found Hollie guilty of first-degree attempted 

murder and first-degree burglary, and he received a sentence of 240 months’

imprisonment. Hollie challenged his 1993 conviction, arguing that his burglary 

conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence and that the district court erred by 

admitting prior-conviction evidence. This court affirmed in an order opinion. State v. 

Hollie, No. C5-93-2584 (Minn. App. Sept. 22, 1994). Hollie filed postconviction-relief 

petitions in January 2002, January 2006, and August 2007, and the district court denied 

each petition.

In February 2009, the district court indeterminately committed Hollie to the 

Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) as a Sexual Psychopathic Personality (SPP) 

and Sexually Dangerous Person (SDP). This court affirmed Hollie’s commitment. In re 

Civil Commitment of Hollie, No. A09-0579, 2009 WL 2596071, at *1 (Minn. App. 

Aug. 25, 2009), review denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 2009), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 916 (2010).

In January 2010, Hollie filed a fourth postconviction-relief petition, arguing that 

his 1989 conviction was impermissibly considered as a factor in (1) “enhanc[ing]” his 

ten-year conditional-release period and (2) subjecting him to predatory-offender 

registration. The district court denied the petition, and this court affirmed in an order 

opinion. Hollie v. State, No. A10-1369 (Minn. App. Apr. 1, 2011), review denied (Minn. 

June 14, 2011).
3

In October 2011, Hollie petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district 

court. The federal court construed the petition as challenging Hollie’s 1989 and 1993 

convictions and sentences, including a ten-year conditional-release term that “was part of 

[his] 1993 sentence.” Hollie v. Jesson, CIV. 11-3147 PJS/JJG, 2011 WL 6122315, at *1–

2 (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, CIV. 11-3147 

PJS/JJG, 2011 WL 6122306 (D. Minn. Dec. 8, 2011). Concerning Hollie’s 1989 

conviction and sentence and conditional-release challenge, the court denied Hollie relief 

on the basis that any “collateral consequence[]” that he might have been experiencing 

from that conviction and sentence “[did] not cause him to . . . be ‘in custody’ for his 1989 

case for purposes of § 2254(a).” Id. at *3. Concerning Hollie’s ten-year conditionalrelease term imposed in connection with his 1993 conviction and sentence, the court 

concluded that, if he had not yet completed the conditional-release term, for federal 

habeas purposes, he was still considered to be in custody for that case. Id. But the court 

summarily dismissed Hollie’s petition without prejudice because it was his second 

federal habeas-corpus petition and he failed to seek pre-authorization from the Eighth

Circuit Court of Appeals before filing it. Id. at *3–4.

In October 2013, Hollie petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in Minnesota state 

court and filed a supporting affidavit. Respondent Minnesota Commissioner of Human 

Services opposed the petition, and Hollie filed a reply. The district court summarily 

denied Hollie’s petition.

This appeal follows.
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D E C I S I O N

The district court denied Hollie’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, reasoning in 

part that Hollie failed to show that he was being detained illegally; his challenges to his 

conditional-release term and registration requirement are not constitutional attacks on his 

civil commitment; he may not use the habeas-corpus process to collaterally attack his 

sentence; and the prohibition against ex-post-facto laws does not apply to Hollie’s 

registration requirement because the requirement is not punitive. Hollie argues that the 

district court erred by summarily denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Appellate courts may affirm a petition’s denial when, “on its face, [it fails to] present[] a 

case for issuing a writ of habeas corpus.” State ex rel. Nelson v. Rigg, 259 Minn. 375, 

375, 107 N.W.2d 378, 379 (1961).

A writ of habeas corpus is a statutory civil remedy available “to obtain relief from 

[unlawful] imprisonment or restraint.” Minn. Stat. § 589.01 (2012). It is an 

“extraordinary remedy.” State ex rel. Rajala v. Rigg, 257 Minn. 372, 381, 101 N.W.2d 

608, 614 (1960) (quotation omitted). “Committed persons may challenge the legality of 

their commitment through habeas corpus.” Joelson v. O’Keefe, 594 N.W.2d 905, 908 

(Minn. App. 1999), review denied (Minn. July 28, 1999); see Minn. Stat. § 253B.23, 

subd. 5 (2012) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to abridge the right of any 

person to the writ of habeas corpus.”). “But the only issues the district court will consider 

are constitutional and jurisdictional challenges.” Joelson, 594 N.W.2d at 908; see also 

Beaulieu v. Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs., 798 N.W.2d 542, 547−48 (Minn. App. 2011)

(stating that “the supreme court regards habeas as a remedy only for a jurisdictional 
5

defect or a constitutional violation” and that “[t]he supreme court has refrained from 

expanding the scope of the writ of habeas corpus to encompass statutory violations that 

give rise to unlawful restraint”), aff’d, 825 N.W.2d 716 (Minn. 2013).

The petitioner “bears the burden of proof of showing the illegality of his 

detention.” Breeding v. Swenson, 240 Minn. 93, 97, 60 N.W.2d 4, 7 (1953). The district 

court need not hold an evidentiary hearing unless the “petition alleges any facts which, if 

proved, would entitle the petitioner to relief.” State ex rel. Roy v. Tahash, 277 Minn. 238, 

245, 152 N.W.2d 301, 306 (1967). “[H]abeas corpus may not be used as a substitute for a 

writ of error or appeal or as a cover for a collateral attack upon a judgment of a 

competent tribunal which had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person of the 

defendant.” State ex rel. Thomas v. Rigg, 255 Minn. 227, 234, 96 N.W.2d 252, 257 

(1959). “[A]ppellants are not entitled to obtain review of an issue previously raised.” 

Joelson, 594 N.W.2d at 908. 

Construing Hollie’s petition in light of his affidavit and reply, Hollie argues that 

his conditional-release term and predatory-offender-registration requirement violate his 

due-process rights because they violate his constitutional rights to be free from ex-postfacto laws. Gleaning what we can from the scant record before us, the district court’s 

2010 order and our 2010 order opinion suggest that Hollie is presently subject to a tenyear conditional-release term and a predatory-offender-registration requirement due to his 

1989 criminal-sexual-conduct convictions and his 1993 first-degree attempted-murder 

and first-degree-burglary convictions.
6

We conclude that Hollie’s claims are procedurally barred because he could have 

raised them through other legal means, specifically his prior postconviction-relief

petitions. In fact, in affirming the district court’s denial of Hollie’s fourth postconvictionrelief petition in our April 2011 order opinion, we concluded that Hollie’s failure to raise 

his claims in his third petition was “inexcusable.” Hollie, No. A10-1369; see State ex rel. 

Butler v. Swenson, 243 Minn. 24, 29, 66 N.W.2d 1, 4 (1954) (“Questions which should 

be . . . reviewed through some other regular legal procedure have no place in a habeas 

corpus proceeding.”); see also Kelsey v. State, 283 N.W.2d 892, 893–94 (Minn. 1979) 

(disapproving of “attempt . . . to use habeas corpus as a means of obtaining review of trial 

errors,” reasoning that “[d]irect appeal and the postconviction remedy . . . are available 

for that purpose” and, therefore, “the need for another means of raising the claim of trial 

error is . . . not apparent”).

Hollie argues that we should not affirm the district court on the ground that his 

claims are procedurally barred because the district court did not rely on it. We reject 

Hollie’s argument. “We may affirm the district court on any ground, including one not 

relied on by the district court.” State v. Fellegy, 819 N.W.2d 700, 707 (Minn. App. 2012), 

review denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 2012); see Kafka v. O’Malley, 221 Minn. 490, 499, 22 

N.W.2d 845, 849 (1946) (noting that a “decision in [respondent’s] favor may be 

predicated upon any ground appearing as a matter of law in the record”). Hollie asks us to 

review his arguments in the interest of justice. We “may review any . . . matter as the 

interest of justice may require.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04. But Hollie raised identical 

claims in his fourth postconviction-relief petition, and, when we affirmed the district 
7

court’s summary denial of it, we reasoned that he “failed to ‘assert any sufficient reason 

why [it] is in the interests of justice to hear his highly untimely petition.’” Hollie, No. 

A10-1369. Likewise, we now observe no sufficient reason to review the summary denial 

of Hollie’s procedurally barred habeas-corpus petition.

Affirmed.