UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. JASON CHRISTOPHER LUJAN, Defendant - Appellant. No. 18-6030 (D.C. Nos. 5:16-CV-00201-M and 5:10-CR-00053-M-1) (W.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER DENYING A CERTIFIC ATE OF APPEALABILITY *

________________ _________________ Before BRISCOE , MATHESON , and EID , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Jason Christopher Lujan petit ions this court for a Ce rtificate of Appealability (COA) on his 28 U.S.C. § 225 5 motion, which alleges th at the district court erroneously enhanced his sentence under th e Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). We deny the COA.
I In June 2010, Lujan pled guilty to: (1) be ing a felon in possession of a firearm, and (2) conspiracy to distri bute controlled substances. Th e plea included a waiver of Lujan’s right to pursue a direct appeal or collateral attack , except in limited circumstances. The probation office prepar ed a presentence investigation report,

* This order is not binding precedent, ex cept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and colla teral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

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Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 which stated that Lujan qualified for an enhanced sentence under the ACCA. Lujan objected to the ACCA enhancement. The district court overruled Lujan’s objection and imposed a sentence of 324 months’ imprisonment on both counts, with the sentences running concurrently. Lu jan did not take a direct appeal. On February 29, 2016, Lujan filed this § 2255 motion. He argued that, in light of Johnson v. United States , 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), the di strict court erred when it enhanced his sentence under the ACCA. The district court denied the motion, holding that Lujan had at least four serious drug offenses that “are not affected by the Johnson case.” ROA at 119. The district court denied a COA on the Johnson issue, and Lujan now seeks a COA from this court.
II To obtain a COA, Lujan must make “a s ubstantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S. C. § 2253(c)(2). A substantial showing means that “reasonable jurists could deba te whether (or, for that ma tter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the is sues presented were adequate to deserve encourag ement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quotation omitt ed). In assessing whether Lujan meets this standard, we liberally construe his pro se pleadings. See Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Even under this view, we conclude that Lujan is not entitled to a
COA. Lujan’s § 2255 motion rests on his argument that the district court erroneously enhanced his sentence under the ACCA. The ACCA provides that a person who3 violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and who has three prior conv ictions for a violent felony or a serious drug offense is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). In essence, Lujan argues he did not have at least three convictions that were either violent felonies or serious drug offenses. The district court concluded that Lujan ha d at least four seri ous drug offenses. ROA at 119. Specifically, the district court listed the following convictions: (1) Conspiracy to distribute [ phencyclidine] . . . Case No. CF-1994-2013 (Oklahoma County District Court), sentenced to ten years [ ’ ] imprisonment; (2) Possession of [a controlled dangerous substance] with intent . . . Case No. CF-2 003-3368 (Oklahoma County District Court), sentenced to five years’ imprisonment; (3) Possession of [a controlled dangerous substance] with intent . . . Case No. CF-2 003-3368 (Oklahoma County District Court, sentenced to five years’ imprisonment; and (4) Possession of [a controlled dangerous substance] with intent, Case No. CF-2003-5134 (Oklahoma County District Court), sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. ROA at 118–19; see also id. at 104. 1
The district court concluded that these four convictions were all “serious drug offense[s],” which Congress defined as: an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substan ce (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 802)), for

1 The convictions were imposed under Ok la. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-401 (1994) and Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-415 (2003). As rele vant here, both statut es carried maximum punishments of 10 years or more in prison.4 which a maximum term of im prisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law[.] 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) (i nternal citations omitted). Given that Lujan had at least three “serious drug o ffense” convictions, as defi ned by § 924(e)(2)(A), the district court held that it di d not err in previously concl uding that Lujan was eligible for the ACCA enhancement. We hold that the district court’s conclusion is not debatable and does not deserve further encouragement. See Slack , 529 U.S. at 484. We thus deny Lujan’s petition for a COA.
III We therefore DENY Lujan’s motion for a COA a nd dismiss this matter.

Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe Circuit Judge