UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4789

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

SHEIK NAIEEM TRICE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Glen E. Conrad, Chief

District Judge. (7:13-cr-00034-GEC-1)

Submitted: June 29, 2015 Decided: August 4, 2015

Before KEENAN, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Wayne D. Inge, LAW OFFICE OF WAYNE D. INGE, Roanoke, Virginia, 

for Appellant. Anthony P. Giorno, Acting United States Attorney, 

Ashley B. Neese, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Sheik Naieem Trice was convicted of conspiracy to possess 

with intent to distribute more than 100 grams of heroin, 21 

U.S.C. § 846 (2012), and possession with intent to distribute 

heroin, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He was sentenced to 151 months 

on each count, to run concurrently. Trice now appeals, raising 

three issues. We affirm.

I

Trice contends that the district court erred when it denied 

his motion to suppress evidence seized from a residence pursuant 

to a search warrant. “In reviewing the denial of a motion to 

suppress, we review the district court’s factual findings for 

clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” United States 

v. Green, 740 F.3d 275, 277 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 

207 (2014). If the district court denied the motion to 

suppress, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the Government. United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 534 

(4th Cir. 2013). 

To comport with the Fourth Amendment, a magistrate issuing 

a search warrant must find probable cause based on “a practical, 

common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set 

forth in the affidavit [supporting the warrant,] . . . there is 

a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will 

be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
3

213, 238 (1983). “The probable-cause standard is incapable of 

precise definition or quantification into percentages because it 

deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the 

circumstances.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). 

“For that reason, in reviewing the sufficiency of a supporting 

affidavit, we avoid applying hypertechnical scrutiny.” Owens v. 

Lott, 372 F.3d 267, 274 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). We accord great deference to the magistrate’s 

probable cause determination. United States v. Clyburn, 24 F.3d 

613, 617 (4th Cir. 1994). 

In the affidavit submitted in support of the search 

warrant, Detective Kelly Jennings stated that he received 

information from a confidential informant (CI) that Trice was 

“in possession of heroin, available for sale, and was staying at 

the address to be searched, with Morgan Nicole Sander . . . [,] 

the main tenant of the residence.” Jennings stated that the CI 

gave him Sander’s name and address and identified her vehicle 

and its license plate number. Jennings corroborated this 

information by researching DMV records, showing a photograph of 

Sander to the CI, and observing Sander at the residence in the 

vehicle described by the CI. Jennings also observed a male 

matching the CI’s description of Trice in Sander’s vehicle.

The CI informed Jennings that Trice would be conducting a 

heroin transaction at a certain location at a specific time. 
4

Trice showed up as forecast and entered a vehicle that arrived 

at the location. When officers confronted Trice, no narcotics 

were found. However, Trice was arrested for attempted robbery. 

Jennings then met with the CI, who had recorded a phone 

conversation with Sander regarding Trice’s arrest. Jennings 

stated in the affidavit that he listened to the phone call, in 

which Sander stated that she was afraid to return to her 

residence because “all that shit is there.” Jennings said that 

he believed this was a reference to heroin that Trice had stored 

at Sander’s residence. 

We conclude that the affidavit established probable cause 

to believe that heroin would be located at the Sander residence. 

Jennings corroborated the CI’s information about Sander--

specifically, where she lived and what car she drove. 

Further, a practical and common-sense interpretation of the 

recorded conversation between the CI and Sander reasonably would 

lead to the conclusion that heroin would be found at the Sander 

residence, where Trice, a heroin dealer, was staying.

II

Prior to trial, the Government filed a notice stating its 

intention to introduce as Fed. R. Crim. P. 404(b) evidence two 

of Trice’s prior drug convictions: a 2003 conviction for

possession with intent to distribute marijuana; and a 2012 

conviction for conspiracy to distribute heroin. Trice filed a 
5

motion in limine to exclude the evidence. After argument, the 

court excluded the evidence of the 2003 conviction because it 

was remote in time and involved marijuana--not heroin. The 

court denied the motion as to the heroin conviction.

Trice claims that the district court’s ruling was erroneous 

insofar as it related to the 2012 heroin conviction. “A 

district court’s determination of the admissibility of evidence 

under [Rule] 404(b) is reviewed for . . . abuse of discretion.” 

United States v. Penniegraft, 641 F.3d 566, 574 (4th Cir. 2011).

Rule 404(b) prohibits the admission of evidence of prior 

bad acts solely to prove action in conformity therewith. Such 

evidence may be admissible, however, for other purposes, such as 

“‘proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.’” 

United States v. Hodge, 354 F.3d 305, 311-12 (4th Cir. 2004) 

(quoting Rule 404(b)). For such evidence to be admissible under 

the Rule, it must be “(1) relevant to an issue other than the 

general character of the defendant; (2) necessary to prove an 

element of the charged offense; and (3) reliable.” Id. 

“Evidence sought to be admitted under Rule 404(b) must also 

satisfy” Fed. R. Evid. 403. United States v. Siegel, 536 F.3d 

306, 319 (4th Cir. 2008). “Rule 403 only requires suppression 

of evidence that results in unfair prejudice--prejudice that 

damages an opponent for reasons other that its probative 
6

value, . . . and only when that unfair prejudice substantially 

outweighs the probative value of the evidence.” United 

States v. Mohr, 318 F.3d 613, 619-20 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal 

quotation marks and alteration omitted).

We hold that the district court properly permitted 

introduction of the 2012 conviction. The evidence was relevant 

to an issue other than character because it tended to show that 

Trice, as a convicted drug dealer, had knowledge of the drug 

trade. The evidence was necessary to show intent and lack of 

mistake. Further, the evidence was reliable, as it consisted of 

a copy of a certified judgment from a New Jersey state court. 

Finally, the evidence, presented as a stipulation at the 

beginning of a trial where there was abundant evidence of 

Trice’s drug dealing, was not overly prejudicial.

III

Trice contends that he was improperly found at sentencing 

to be a career offender. Having reviewed the record, including 

the presentence investigation report and the sentencing 

transcript, we are convinced that Trice had the requisite prior 

felony convictions and otherwise qualified as a career offender. 

See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) (2013). The district court properly 

relied on certified judgments from New Jersey state courts 

reflecting Trice’s prior felony drug convictions. We discern no 

error in the court’s conclusion that Trice was a career 
7

offender. See United States v. McDowell, 745 F.3d 115, 120 (4th 

Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 942 (2015) (stating 

standard of review). 

IV

We affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED