In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 00-1137

Sokaogon Chippewa Community, Mole Lake Band

of Lake Superior Chippewa; Lac Courte Oreilles

Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians

of Wisconsin, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

Bruce E. Babbitt, Secretary, United States

Department of the Interior, Michael J. Anderson,

Deputy Assistant Secretary, United States

Department of the Interior, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees,

Appeal of St. Croix Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin,

Proposed Intervenor-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 95-C-0659-C--Barbara B. Crabb, Judge.

Argued April 11, 2000--Decided June 6, 2000

 Before Manion, Diane P. Wood, and Evans, Circuit

Judges.

 Diane P. Wood, Circuit Judge. The lucky winners

at blackjack, baccarat, twenty-one, and the slot

machines are not the only ones who see the

prospect of great wealth flowing from casinos.

Even more so (and even more reliably), wealth

comes to those who own and operate gambling

establishments. Casino gambling has become a

major enterprise for many Native American groups,

as Congress has paved the way for their entry

into that business. This case pits one group of

Indian tribes who hope to open a new gambling

facility against another tribe that currently

runs another gambling facility nearby. The narrow

question before us is whether the district court

erred when it refused to permit the St. Croix

Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin ("the St. Croix")

to intervene, either of right or by permission,

in litigation between the Sokaogon Chippewa

Community Mole Lake Band of Lake Superior

Chippewa ("the Sokaogon"), the Lac Courte
Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians

("the LCO"), and the Red Cliff Band of Lake

Superior Chippewa Indians ("the Red Cliff"), and

the U.S. Department of the Interior. We conclude

that it did not and we therefore affirm the

district court’s decision.

I

 The story began with the 1994 decision of the

Sokaogon, the Red Cliff, and the LCO to form a

partnership under the name "Four Feathers," for

the purpose of acquiring a struggling greyhound

racing track outside of Hudson, Wisconsin, and

converting the track into a casino gaming

facility. (The fourth "feather" was Fred

Havenick, a private businessman with a financial

interest in the greyhound track.) Hoping to take

the property in trust, the Four Feathers

partnership submitted a joint application to the

Department of Interior under the Indian Gaming

Regulatory Act ("IGRA"), 25 U.S.C. sec.sec. 2701

et seq. The St. Croix, which has its reservation

in northwest Wisconsin, opposed and continues to

oppose the proposed casino gaming facility. It

predicts that the Four Feathers casino will have

a detrimental impact on the gaming revenues it

derives from the two casino gaming facilities it

currently operates (one in Turtle Lake and the

other in Danbury, Wisconsin), and that the loss

of revenue will in turn harm the quality of life

on its reservation. 

 Under Section 5 of the Indian Reorganization

Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. sec. 465, the Secretary of

the Interior has broad authority to acquire

property in trust for Indian tribes./1 Using a

type of double-negative, IGRA restricts this

broad grant of authority by prohibiting the

acquisition of trust land for gaming purposes,

but then sec. 2719(b) (1)(A) of the Act

establishes an exception to the exception. In

order to be able to acquire land in trust for

gaming purposes, tribes must show that "[1] a

gaming establishment on newly acquired lands

would be in the best interest of the Indian tribe

and its members, and [2] [it] would not be

detrimental to the surrounding community." 25

U.S.C. sec. 2719(b)(1)(A). To determine whether

applicant tribes have satisfied this test, the

IGRA requires the Secretary to consult with "the

Indian tribe and appropriate State, and local

officials, including officials of other nearby

Indian tribes." Id. Even if the Secretary decides

to grant the application, there is still one more

step in the process. The Governor of the state in

which the proposed gaming activity will be

conducted must also concur in the Secretary’s

determination, id., and only then can the

facility open.
 On March 4, 1994, Four Feathers filed an

application with the Department of the Interior’s

Minneapolis Area Office asking the Department to

take into trust the Hudson greyhound racing

track, so that Four Feathers could convert it

into a casino gaming facility. Under Department

of Interior internal procedures, the Department’s

Area Office is responsible for making the initial

determination of whether an applicant tribe has

met the requirements of sec. 2719(b). See

Checklist for Acquisitions for Gaming Purposes.

The Minneapolis Area Office accordingly consulted

with municipalities, citizens, and others in the

communities surrounding the site of the proposed

casino gaming facility. The St. Croix urged the

Area Office to recommend denial of the

application because of the negative effect the

proposed casino would have on the revenues of the

St. Croix’s existing casinos. In a report dated

November 14, 1994, the Minneapolis Office advised

the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") that in its

view the applicant tribes (that is, the Four

Feathers) had satisfied the requirements of IGRA

sec. 2719 and that their application should be

approved.

 At that point, at least in hindsight, things

took a significant detour. Instead of ruling on

the basis of the record that had been compiled,

BIA officials agreed in early 1995 to meet with

federal elected officials from Minnesota and

officials from several Indian tribes, including

the St. Croix. These officials expressed their

concern about the impact of the proposed new

casino on revenues earned by existing Indian

casinos operating in the Hudson, Wisconsin area.

As a result of the meeting, BIA agreed to extend

the comment period for the Four Feathers

application until April 30, 1995. The St. Croix

and several others interested in the proposed

casino project submitted comments by the new

deadline.

 On July 14, 1995, Interior denied the Four

Feathers application. The letter informing Four

Feathers of the decision indicated that it had

failed to demonstrate that the new casino would

not have a detrimental impact on the surrounding

community. Outraged by Interior’s apparent

about-face in response to ex parte political

pressure, Four Feathers filed this suit under the

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. sec.sec.

701 et seq., on September 15, 1995. Four

Feathers’s complaint alleged that Interior’s

denial of its application was arbitrary and

capricious and violated applicable law,

regulations, and internal policies and

procedures, and it asked that the decision be

vacated and the application remanded to Interior
for reconsideration. In time, these allegations

of impropriety created a political firestorm that

included Congressional hearings and the

appointment of an Independent Counsel to

investigate alleged misdeeds of White House and

Department of the Interior officials. Once the

Independent Counsel was appointed, the district

court stayed the proceedings until the completion

of the investigation.

 There matters stood in the litigation until

March 12, 1999, when the Department filed with

the court a letter it had received from the

Independent Counsel’s Office stating that the

Office supported mediation or settlement talks to

resolve the civil suit. The parties took up the

suggestion, and in early 1999, they selected a

mediator. At that point, the existence of the

settlement discussions became a matter of record;

thereafter, newspaper articles about the progress

of the case appeared on occasion. Just before the

negotiations drew to a close, the St. Croix filed

on November 26, 1999, an emergency motion to

intervene in the action as a party defendant.

Five days later, with the motion still pending,

the parties filed with the district court an

executed settlement agreement with a stipulation

and proposed order of dismissal.

 In the proposed Settlement Agreement, Interior

agrees to withdraw its July 14, 1995, decision

and to pick up where it had left off with its

administrative review of the application. The

Settlement Agreement sets out certain procedures

that are to be followed during the renewed

administrative review, including the following:

The determination on the issue of detriment to

the surrounding community under 25 U.S.C. sec.

2719(b) will be based upon facts set forth in the

administrative record as it existed on July 14,

1995, as supplemented only by: (1) any additional

information submitted as a part of consultations

between the plaintiff Tribes and Interior as

provided for herein; and (2) the supplemental

documentation submitted in accordance with the

provisions of paragraph 10 of this Settlement

Agreement.

* * *

The mere fact of competition by the proposed

casino with casinos of other Tribes shall not be

determinative in Interior’s decisionmaking.

 The district court denied the motion on

December 6, and, in the same order, terminated

the litigation by executing a Stipulation of

Dismissal. The court then denied St. Croix’s

motion for reconsideration on January 3, 2000.
II

 Although in a broader sense this has the look

and feel of an interlocutory appeal, it is not

from the point of view of the putative

intervenor, the St. Croix. As to it, the district

court’s ruling rejecting its effort to intervene

was a final judgment, and its appeal is properly

before us under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1291. See Nissei

Sangyo America, Ltd. v. United States, 31 F.3d

435, 438 (7th Cir. 1994). Because Interior is now

reconsidering the Four Feathers application, some

might wonder why the St. Croix suit is not moot.

The reason it is not, in our opinion, is because

Interior is reconsidering the application under

the procedures it agreed to follow in the

Settlement Agreement. It is precisely that

agreement and those procedures that are the

target of the St. Croix attack; had Interior

begun a fresh proceeding with respect to this

license, the St. Croix would have been satisfied

and the case would have ended. We must therefore

consider the merits of the two theories under

which the St. Croix sought to become part of the

Four Feathers litigation. 

 A. Intervention as of right

 The St. Croix first claim that it was entitled

to intervene of right, under Fed. R. Civ. P.

24(a). Insofar as this assertion rests on the

nature of the interest the tribe asserts in the

litigation, our review is de novo. People Who

Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 68 F.3d 172, 175

(7th Cir. 1995). Even applications under Rule

24(a) must, however, be timely, and we review a

district court’s decision that a motion to

intervene was untimely only for abuse of

discretion. Id. 

 Apart from the timeliness requirement, to which

we turn later, Rule 24 establishes three

requirements for someone seeking to intervene of

right: (1) the applicant must claim an interest

relating to the property or transaction which is

the subject of the action, (2) the applicant must

be so situated that the disposition of the action

may as a practical matter impair or impede the

applicant’s ability to protect that interest, and

(3) existing parties must not be adequate

representatives of the applicant’s interest. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a); 7C Wright, Miller & Kane,

sec. 1908 (2d ed. 1986). In addition, at some

fundamental level the proposed intervenor must

have a stake in the litigation. Some disagreement

remains among the circuits about how Article III

standing rules intersect with the requirements

for Rule 24 intervention. Compare, e.g., Ruiz v.

Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 830 (5th Cir. 1998)
(holding Article III standing not required for

intervention), cert. denied 526 U.S. 1158 (1999),

with Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th

Cir. 1996) (holding Article III standing required

for intervention); see also Rio Grande Pipeline

Co. v. FERC, 178 F.3d 533, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1999)

(describing circuit split and citing cases). This

remains a question that the Supreme Court has not

resolved. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54,

68-69 (1986); see generally 7C Wright, Miller &

Kane, sec. 1908 (1999 supp.). From a pragmatic

standpoint, this court has observed that "[a]ny

interest of such magnitude [as to support Rule

24(a) intervention of right] is sufficient to

satisfy the Article III standing requirement as

well." Transamerica Ins. Co. v. South, 125 F.3d

392, 396 n.4 (7th Cir. 1997). But see United

States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 859

(7th Cir. 1985) (stating, before the Supreme

Court tightened up the requirements for Article

III standing in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555 (1992), that intervention as of

right requires an interest greater than that

required for Article III standing). Because it is

enough here to decide whether the St. Croix has

satisfied the requirements of the rule, we do not

explore further what the outer boundaries of

standing to intervene might be. 

 Intervention of right will not be allowed

unless all requirements of the Rule are met. Wade

v. Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182, 185 n.4 (7th Cir.

1982). In the lay sense of the term there can be

little doubt that the St. Croix tribe is

"interested" in the outcome of the Department’s

consideration of the Four Feathers application.

Approval of the application will introduce a

competitor in the greater Twin Cities casino

gambling market, potentially leading to a

decrease in the profits of the St. Croix’s

casinos. Denial of the application will leave the

St. Croix’s casinos free of competition (at least

until another competitor decides to enter the

market). But not all interests give rise to a

right to sue, and the question here is whether

the St. Croix has a legally protectible interest

in fending off this unwelcome competition. If it

does have such an interest, then for purposes of

the second criterion we can assume that its

interest will be impeded as a practical matter.

Furthermore, we can assume here that none of the

present parties to the litigation is an adequate

representative for the St. Croix’s interest (even

though the government points out that in a

broader sense it represents the long-term

interests of all Native American groups). The

petition to intervene of right thus turns on the

first of these criteria: whether the St. Croix

has successfully alleged an interest in the

transaction that is the subject of the pending
lawsuit.

 The "subject of the pending lawsuit," however,

is not the merit of the Four Feathers

application. From its inception, this lawsuit has

focused instead on the procedures the Department

used in making its 1995 determination. Like most

APA cases, it involves a claim that the

Department did not follow the prescribed

decisionmaking procedures in arriving at its

final decision. Indeed, in areas like this one,

where the agency is granted broad discretionary

authority, see 25 U.S.C. sec. 465 (authorizing

Secretary to acquire lands "in his discretion");

25 C.F.R. sec. 151.3(a) (providing Secretary

"may" acquire land), practically the only

cognizable complaint can be one directed to the

question whether the agency followed the

procedural constraints on the exercise of that

discretion, as prescribed by statute and

regulation. However hard it may be for the St.

Croix to show that it has an interest in the

ultimate outcome of the application process, here

it faces the even tougher job of showing that it

has a right to complain about the procedures the

agency is using. 

 The Four Feathers complaint asked for two

alternative remedies: either the grant of its

application or the vacation of the 1995 denial

and remand to the Department for further

consideration. The district court correctly

recognized that it could not compel the Secretary

to grant or deny the application, given the

discretionary nature of the decision. The most

the court could do was (in keeping with Four

Feathers’s second request for relief) to evaluate

the legality of the decisionmaking procedures

used and, if they deviated from those prescribed

by statute, declare the decision arbitrary and

capricious and send the issue back to the

Secretary for reconsideration under the

appropriate procedures. 

 The St. Croix is asserting only an indirect

interest in the outcome of this suit. If the

procedures Interior followed in 1995 were proper,

or if a different set of procedures had resulted

from the settlement, then perhaps it might be

able to defeat or to delay significantly the Four

Feathers casino. At the end of the day, however,

it recognizes that its interest in the new casino

lies behind all the procedural maneuvering. With

that in mind, it argues that three different

interests support its right to intervene. 

 First, the St. Croix contends that if the Four

Feathers application is granted, its own casino

operations will become less profitable. That

interest, however, does not resemble any that the
law normally protects. It is reminiscent instead

of the unsuccessful claim Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat made

in an antitrust challenge to Brunswick

Corporation’s acquisition of a competing bowling

alley. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,

Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). Pueblo reasoned that

it was injured because the existence of

competition would lead to lower prices. The Court

did not take issue with that basic economic

proposition, but it did dismiss Pueblo’s claim on

the ground that it had failed to allege the kind

of injury for which the antitrust laws provide

redress. Id. at 487-89. Although the IGRA

requires the Secretary to consider the economic

impact of proposed gaming facilities on the

surrounding communities, it is hard to find

anything in that provision that suggests an

affirmative right for nearby tribes to be free

from economic competition. 

 We need not resolve the question whether this

interest is protectible, however, because there

is a deeper flaw with the St. Croix’s argument.

As the Secretary points out in his brief, any

detrimental impact from the proposed Four

Feathers casino on the St. Croix reservation’s

economy is pure speculation at this point. The

renewed administrative process required by the

Settlement Agreement has barely had time to

begin, and it is anyone’s guess what the

Secretary’s final decision will be. Moreover,

even if the Secretary approves the application,

the casino cannot be built until the Governor of

Wisconsin independently gives his approval. See

25 U.S.C. sec. 2719(b) (1)(A). Four Feathers must

then succeed in financing and building the casino

as well as gaining proper permits and licenses.

Finally, the Four Feathers casino must be

competitive. The St. Croix asks us to assume that

if and when the Four Feathers casino is built it

will necessarily destroy the St. Croix’s gaming

business. But as all businesspeople are acutely

aware, in a competitive market, success is never

sure. Maybe the Four Feathers casino will

dominate, or maybe it will be a flop. Perhaps

people will like the geographical advantage of

the Four Feathers casino, which would be an easy

drive from the Twin Cities, but for some a more

bucolic getaway may be preferable. It is far too

early to tell. Even if the St. Croix had some

interest in the location of its competitors

(rather like the interests asserted in various

automobile dealer location statutes, see, e.g.,

Conn. Gen. Stat. sec. 42-133dd; 10 Me. Rev. Stat.

Ann. sec. 1174-A), any effect on that interest

from the Four Feathers project is too speculative

to support intervention in this suit. 

 Second, the St. Croix asserts a generalized

interest in the legality of the procedures used
by the Department to conduct its review. That is,

the St. Croix contends that the review procedures

laid out in the Settlement Agreement are

unlawful, because they do not require the

Department to perform the environmental

assessments required under the National

Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. sec.

4321 et seq. In asserting this interest, the

tribe claims the common interest of all citizens

in ensuring that their government agencies follow

the law. As countless cases have held, however,

such a generalized interest is insufficient to

support standing, let alone intervention. If it

did, the federal courts would be required to

allow anyone with an interest--however broad or

universal--to intervene in any lawsuit in which

the government is a party. To claim such an

interest, the St. Croix must demonstrate (or at

least claim) that it specifically would be

adversely affected in some way, shape, or form,

by the Department’s alleged failure to follow

applicable environmental statutes. This is not an

impossible task. For example, if the failure to

go through environmental procedures would have a

detrimental impact on the St. Croix’s water

supply, the tribe would have a sufficiently

specific interest for it to be cognizable. See

Hill v. Boy, 144 F.3d 1446, 1449-50 (11th Cir.

1998); Dubois v. United States Department of

Agriculture, 102 F.3d 1273, 1282-83 (1st Cir.

1996). But the St. Croix has alleged no such

particularized interest. More importantly, the

St. Croix does not argue that the Department’s

decision-making process in 1995 ignored

applicable environmental regulations or failed to

take the proposed casino’s environmental impact

into account. Instead, the tribe challenges only

the legality of the procedures adopted by the

parties in the Settlement Agreement, ignoring the

fact that the Agreement specifically preserves

its right to participate in the new NEPA process,

at which point the tribe will be able to call to

the Department’s attention any current

environmental issues or eventually to challenge

any failure to follow the statute.

 Last, the St. Croix alleges that the Settlement

Agreement violates the consultation procedures

laid out in the IGRA. The St. Croix contends

that, by agreeing to turn the clock back to 1995

and base the decision to grant or deny the

application entirely on the record as it existed

at that time, the Settlement Agreement violates

the tribe’s right to provide comments on the

casino project. The interest the St. Croix

asserts is not encompassed in this lawsuit,

however, because it does not contend that it was

unlawfully blocked from providing comments in

1995. Rather, its complaint is purely forwardlooking. 
 The St. Croix wants to intervene because it

does not like the Settlement Agreement. The tribe

believes that the terms of the Settlement

Agreement violate statutes and regulations and

unlawfully cut it out of the reconsideration of

the Four Feathers application. The St. Croix,

however, cannot use alleged legal problems with

the Settlement Agreement to bootstrap itself into

this litigation. That the St. Croix waited until

settlement was imminent strongly suggests that

the tribe was not interested in intervening in

the litigation but in blocking a settlement

between the parties--or, at a minimum, this

settlement. If the St. Croix wanted to

participate in the litigation, it should have

moved to intervene when the suit was filed, or

shortly thereafter. Likewise, if the St. Croix

was concerned about settlement negotiations not

taking its interests into account, it should have

moved to intervene at such a time when it would

have been able to participate in them. As it now

stands, intervention by the St. Croix serves no

conceivable purpose other than to block a

settlement agreement that it does not like. 

 The St. Croix’s final argument is that if we do

not allow it to intervene in this litigation, it

will be forever barred from challenging the

Settlement Agreement. The St. Croix contends that

the district court’s approval of the Settlement

Agreement is equivalent to a judicial

determination that the terms of the Settlement

Agreement are lawful-- that they comply with all

applicable statutes and regulations. The district

court’s approval of the Settlement Agreement,

however, is only binding between the parties to

it. If either party does not live up to its end

of the bargain, the other can ask the court to

enforce the Agreement’s terms. Others--like the

St. Croix--who are not parties to the Settlement

Agreement are not bound by its terms and are free

to challenge any administrative decisions that

emerge from the process. In essence, the St.

Croix believes that the Department and Four

Feathers have managed to resolve their dispute by

contracting around the rights and interests of

the St. Croix. This may or may not be true. If

the Settlement Agreement is unlawful, as the St.

Croix claims it is, it can bring a suit under the

APA challenging as arbitrary and capricious the

Secretary’s ultimate decision (assuming, of

course, it is then able to demonstrate the

necessary adverse interest). 

 B. Permissive intervention

 Permissive intervention is allowed under Rule

24(b), once again upon timely application, "when

an applicant’s claim or defense and the main

action have a question of law or fact in common."
Permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) is

wholly discretionary and will be reversed only

for abuse of discretion. Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d

1265, 1272 (7th Cir. 1985). The district court

denied St. Croix’s motion to intervene under Rule

24(b) for a reason that applied with equal force

to the motion under Rule 24(a); in each instance,

the court found the motion untimely. 

 "The purpose of the [timeliness] requirement is

to prevent a tardy intervenor from derailing a

lawsuit within sight of the terminal. As soon as

a prospective intervenor knows or has reason to

know that his interests might be adversely

affected by the outcome of the litigation he must

move promptly to intervene." United States v.

South Bend Community Sch. Corp., 710 F.2d 394,

396 (7th Cir. 1983), quoted in United States v.

City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1263 (7th Cir.

1989). We consider the following factors to

determine whether a motion is timely: (1) the

length of time the intervenor knew or should have

known of his interest in the case; (2) the

prejudice caused to the original parties by the

delay; (3) the prejudice to the intervenor if the

motion is denied; (4) any other unusual

circumstances. Ragsdale v. Turnock, 941 F.2d 501,

504 (7th Cir. 1991), citing South v. Rowe, 759

F.2d 610, 612 (7th Cir. 1985).

 In the district court and here on appeal, the

St. Croix argues that its motion was timely--

despite being filed five years after the initial

complaint--because it could not have expected the

outcome of the Settlement Agreement: first, that

the denial of the application would be vacated,

and second, that any settlement agreement would

be unlawful. That is, the St. Croix asserts that

it did not know its interests could be impaired

by the litigation until after it received the

Settlement Agreement.

 The district court was well within the bounds

of reason to find these arguments unpersuasive.

From the moment Four Feathers filed its initial

complaint, the St. Croix knew that there were

only two possible outcomes of the litigation (and

any settlement talks): either Four Feathers would

cease trying to convince Interior to reconsider

its decision or Interior would agree to

reconsider its decision. The district court did

no more than rely on the obvious when it found

that the St. Croix had ample notice (five years)

that settlement was possible and ample

opportunity to request permission to intervene

before a settlement was reached. The St. Croix’s

case is therefore nothing like the one faced by

this court in City of Chicago, supra, where the

white female police officers who wanted to

intervene could not have anticipated that the new

procedures would discriminate against them. See
870 F.2d at 1263. The St. Croix has known all

along that its interests are directly pitted

against those of Four Feathers. If the St. Croix

wanted a voice in the litigation, it should have

asked the district court to allow it to intervene

much sooner. Had the St. Croix been a party all

along, of course, it would have had a seat at the

settlement table.

 Relatedly, the district court found that

Interior and Four Feathers would be prejudiced by

St. Croix’s late motion to intervene, because the

parties had spent substantial time (nearly six

months), effort, and money in settlement

negotiations. To allow a tardy intervenor to

block the settlement agreement after all that

effort would result in the parties’ combined

efforts being wasted completely. The St. Croix

does not contest that the parties’ interests

would not be prejudiced by intervention at this

late date. Instead, the St. Croix focuses

exclusively on how the denial of its motion to

intervene would prejudice its own interests. This

is not, however, a one-sided equation, and the

district court would have been wrong to treat it

as such. Instead, the court correctly weighed the

interests on both sides and reasonably concluded

that the equities favored the settling parties.

On this point as well, the fact that the St.

Croix will have an opportunity to challenge any

eventual decision after it is made also weighs

against a finding of prejudice.

 C. Sanctions

 Finally, Four Feathers has moved that sanctions

be imposed against the St. Croix for its costs

and attorneys fees incurred in conjunction with

responding to the St. Croix’s motion for a stay

pending appeal. Although we have ruled against

the St. Croix in this opinion, this is not an

automatic warrant for sanctions. (It does mean,

however, that costs on appeal will be taxed

against the St. Croix. See Fed. R. App. P.

39(a)(2).) We decline to find that the appeal was

frivolous or in bad faith, see Jansen v. Aaron

Process Equip. Co., Inc., 207 F.3d 1001, 1005

(7th Cir. 2000); Perry v. Pogemiller, 16 F.3d

138, 139-40 (7th Cir. 1994), and we therefore

deny the motion for sanctions.

 The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

/1 Section 465 provides: 

The Secretary of the Interior is hereby

authorized, in his discretion, to acquire,
through purchase, relinquishment, gift, exchange,

or assignment, any interest in lands, water

rights, or surface rights to lands, within or

without existing reservations, including trust or

otherwise restricted allotments, whether the

allottee be living or deceased, for the purpose

of providing land for Indians. 

25 U.S.C. sec. 465.

 The implementing regulations provide that the

Secretary may acquire land for a tribe in trust

status:

(1) when the property is located within the

exterior boundaries of the tribe’s reservation or

adjacent thereto, or within a tribal

consolidation area; or, (2) when the tribe

already owns an interest in the land or, (3) when

the Secretary determines that the acquisition of

the land is necessary to facilitate tribal

self-determination, economic development, or

Indian housing.

25 C.F.R. sec. 151.3(a), authorized by 25 U.S.C.

sec. 465.