Rethinking Time: Adopting a 

Mindset for Interpreting Threats 

and Imagining Opportunities

Adrian Wolfberg, Ph.D.

U.S. intelligence analysts sometimes mirror-image their own sense of 

time—how they relate to the past, present, and future—onto actors of 

national security interest, creating misunderstandings that can skew 

judgments. This Research Short offers a conceptual framework of 

temporal complexity that analysts can use to consider how these actors 

perceive their place in time and, thus, to better understand the actors’

mindsets; the context within which they operate, including their 

differing cultures; and the factors involved in their decisionmaking.

RESEARCH SHORT

CATALYST Designed to spark positive 

conversations on the future of the IC

December 14, 2021

What this is:

Research Shorts fuse two 

research cultures, blending 

intelligence information with 

academic insights on topics of 

interest to the IC. Shorts are 

intended to constructively 

start and add to the IC's 

conversations—not to finish 

them. NIU, the sole fully 

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publishes the Shorts.

What this is not:

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opinions expressed are solely 

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U.S. Government agency.

IMAGES FROM SHUTTERSTOCK
2

Experience of Time

Borrowing from the discipline of geography, an individual’s, group’s, or government’s physical, 

cultural, and social environment can be metaphorically described as itslandscape. Unlike the more 

visible aspects of one’s landscape, the temporal aspect is largely internal and subjective (i.e., how 

one thinks about time and how time enters into one’s value system),

1 and therefore, it is unseen.

As a result, time has been largely overlooked in understanding how actors think and behave.2

IC analysts and others who inform U.S. policymaking can run afoul in applying the concept of time 

to their assessments of national security-related actors. A lessons-learned study of the 2003-04

analytic support to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) showed that quite a few analysts mirrorimaged their sense of history and time onto adversaries. As a direct result of assuming that the 

foreign actors also viewed time as linear and made their decisions based on an always-movingforward concept of linear time (like a clock), the analysts’ assessments often exhibited errors in 

judgment about adversary actions. A master’s level course for senior officers and government 

civilians at a senior service college similarly made clear that the U.S. students had a very different 

view of the role of time than did their foreign military officer counterparts. Again, the U.S. students 

reflected a linear sense of cause and effect in evaluating the motivations and decisions of Russian, 

Chinese, and Middle Eastern state and nonstate actors, often leading to errors in judgment. 

Social scientists from the fields of anthropology,3 organizational science,4 policy science,5

political science,6 psychology, 7 research methods,8 and sociology, 9 as well as intelligence 

professionals,

10 have offered perspectives on how intelligence analysts can better understand 

the complexity of how actors think, behave, and make decisions. Few of their studies, however, 

have discussed an actor’s experience of time or how the intelligence analyst’s experience of 

time shapes perceptions of the mindset and behavior of state or nonstate actors.11 This Research 

Short draws on academic research regarding concepts of time to fill that gap. It also offers a 

new framework for IC analysts and managers to develop a deeper understanding of the 

relationships that actors of national security concern—and IC analysts themselves—have with 

time and to use this understanding to strengthen their assessments and the analytic process.

Temporal Complexity: A Mindset for Thinking About Time 

What is time? The conventional Western view is that time is objective and one-dimensional: it 

is physical and linear, and it is experienced the same way by everyone.12 However, drawing 

from behavioral and social science, time is understood to also be subjective: time is a social 

phenomenon ingrained in specific contexts, and it varies by person, group, and society.

13 Its

effects influence an analyst’s understanding of the adversary as well as the process of analysis.

Viewing time as subjective adds richness to the description of actor mindsets, behaviors, and 

contexts, known as “temporal complexity,” and therefore, potentially yields a more accurate 

understanding of a situation, event, or interaction.

14 “Temporal” refers to how we think about 

and experience time, and how we relate to and interact with time.15 “Complexity” takes into 

account multiple outcomes, the multiple ways to achieve these outcomes, the conflicting 
3

interactions among ways to achieve multiple outcomes, and the uncertain and ambiguous 

connections among the various ways and outcomes.16, 17 Figure 1 summarizes the ways that 

time can be perceived, as gleaned from different academic perspectives.

Considering these perspectives as interpretative lenses benefits the work of intelligence 

analysts by applying temporal complexity to assessing and anticipating the threats posed by 

actors of national security concern or identifying opportunities to shape the responses of other 

actors. To illustrate, from the psychological perspective, taking time sensitivity (i.e., the actor’s 

perceived time constraints) into account can strengthen an IC analyst’s assessment of the 

timing, scale, and scope of a strategic threat. For example, while the American sees time as an 

expensive commodity that should not be wasted, the Chinese are more likely to take the 

historically long view and see an abundance of available time to consider all options. Time flow

(i.e., whether and to what degree the present 

stands alone or connected to the past and/or

into the future), from the social science 

perspective, can shed light on an analyst’s 

assessment of what and how events from 

various time perspectives motivate the actor. 

For example, how will the Greek-Turkish

dispute over the definition of an exclusive 

economic zone (EEZ) be resolved when 

Greece relies on its interpretation of the 1982 

United Nations Convention on the Law of the 

Sea (UNCLOS), which creates separate EEZs 

around each Greek island in the Aegean Sea, 

while Turkey refuses to be bound by the 

modern constraints of UN law and adheres to 

the traditional division of the Aegean Sea into 

two equal parts? The organizational science 

perspective offers conceptions of time (i.e., views about how time passes) as a way to better 

understand analyst’s assessments of a culture. For example, while developed Western societies 

tend to be driven by the regularity of clock time, remote and developing societies may understand 

time according to interpretations in nature, traditions, and their local context. (For definitions of 

each temporal complexity element featured in Figure 1, please see the Appendix.)

Framework for Applying Temporal Complexity

To facilitate adding temporal complexity to the IC analytic toolkit, the following framework (see 

Figure 2) offers a set of temporal concepts (e.g., “temporal boundary” in cell 1), based on the 

dimensions of objective and purpose. Because these concepts are insensitive to specific cultures 

and societies, they can be used for any objective or purpose. The objective dimension reflects the 

actors’ focus, perception, and understanding. An actor’s focus aids the analyst in recognizing 

Figure 1. Temporal Complexity
4

what changes in the actor’s environment 

may have captured the actor’s attention

because they affect the stability or pace 

of change in that environment. An 

actor’s perception encompasses the 

mental or emotional images, such as a

shared perspective of time, that influence

the actor’s decisions and courses of 

action. An actor’s understanding helps 

the analyst interpret the meaning the

actor attaches to that mental or emotional 

image and, therefore, how the image

guides the actor’s behavior.

The purpose dimension provides a

choice in applying the framework: (1) to 

support the accuracy and completeness 

of the intelligence product that assesses

the actors’ intent and readiness to take actions of national security interest (cells 1-3), or (2) to 

examine how analysts think and to strengthen the intelligence analysis process (cells 4-6). The 

concepts identified in cells 1-6 are not all-inclusive, but they suggest how a framework for 

temporal complexity can be helpful to analysts for not only understanding threats, but also for 

thinking about opportunities for collection, policy, and operations.

Strengthening an Analytic Product

The concepts of temporal boundary and temporal boundary conditions (cell 1) provide insight 

into an actor’s focus (e.g., the information or events to which the actor is paying attention) and 

can help analysts provide warning of pending events and their likely impact.

• Temporal boundaries can help analysts measure the degree to which select events and 

cultural norms will fuel change—and the speed and duration of that change—in their 

target actor’s environment.

18 Changes—such as regime change—made through social or 

political events can happen more quickly than changes spawned by planned policy or 

technology advances. Changes influenced by cultural or geographical patterns take a 

longer time. 

• Temporal boundary conditions can help set the range for evaluating, from an actor’s 

perspective, to what degree the target environment is stable or in flux.19 One way this 

can be detected is by observing the flow of information or exercise of control within a 

group or organization. For example, when a disruption to leadership takes place, 

detecting top-down flow of control would indicate organizational stability and the 

leadership change is likely to take hold quickly, whereas detecting a bottom-up flow 

of suggestions would indicate instability and a longer period of leadership disarray.

Figure 2. Framework for Applying Temporal Complexity
5

The concepts of temporal zone and temporal boundary zone (cell 2) provide insight into an 

actor’s perceptions and can help analysts gauge the degree to which shared perspectives will 

influence the decisions made and actions taken by actors of national security concern. 

• A temporal zone is the shared concept of time among groups of individuals.20 The bond 

between two people or among a group of people will be strong if the individuals have 

the same conception of time but will be weak when their conception of time is 

dissimilar. For example, members of the Arctic Council—the eight countries of 

Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States, 

as well as the six Indigenous Peoples’ organizations granted permanent participant 

status—have perceptions of time that vary along a spectrum from transactional to 

relational and value-based. Although climate change would appear to force all parties 

to action, understanding the members’ relative positions on time can inform analytic 

judgments on the prospect of diffusing tension and fostering agreement on specific 

development plans for the Arctic region. 

• A temporal boundary zone pertains to an individual21 and demarcates what that person 

perceives at any given time as the external environment, which has no effect on the 

individual, from what is exclusively within the psychological environment of the 

individual. Understanding the psychological or sociological context of the actor’s 

placement in time can foster specific and relevant analysis of the actor’s needs,

motivations, and goals that informs national security policy. In contrast, the OIF lessonslearned study, cited above, showed how analysts struggled in interpreting the difference 

between intent—planning for the future—and capability—existing in the present—when

developing their assessment of a possible Iraqi nuclear weapon program.

The concepts of temporal structures and temporal boundary objects (cell 3) provide insight 

into an actor’s understanding of the meaning and value of shared images or events and can help 

analysts assess and even anticipate the actor’s behavior.”

• Temporal structures are typically recurring activities that societies or organizations

create that can have a direct effect on guiding and shaping behavior.22 Such activities 

include calendar cycles, seasonal events, holidays, meetings, and collective memories. 

If a holiday, for example, was very important to an actor, then the occurrence of or the 

meaning infused in that holiday would have a strong influence on the actor’s decisions 

and behavior. During the NATO ABLE ARCHER exercise held in late 1983, Soviet 

misinterpretation almost led to nuclear war when the Soviet Union weighed several 

Allied-added elements, including a new form of coded communications, more heavily 

than the annual nature of this command post exercise and judged the United States was 

preparing a nuclear first strike.

• Temporal boundary objects are used in communicating between two or more 

individuals to achieve a common understanding.

23 This understanding can be reached 

because the objects are flexible enough for individuals to grasp their meaning within 

their own preexisting terms yet they also allow room for expanding that preexisting 
6

construct. These objects can be tangible (e.g., a whiteboard, a map, a piece of software 

or hardware) or intangible (e.g., metaphors, music, spoken words, symbols). Temporal 

boundary objects allow individuals occupying different temporal zones—or holding 

different concepts of time, as noted above—to understand each other. An adversary’s 

war planning process is an example of a temporal boundary object because the process

allows the various members of the adversary’s group to coordinate the sequence of 

events in the war plan. Analysts can evaluate the adversary’s war readiness by 

observing the degree of coordinated activity and, by extension, a shared concept of 

time within the adversary’s military. A lack of coordination in a sequence of events 

would suggest that members of the adversary’s military hold different conceptions of 

time and, therefore, execution of their war plan may be at risk. 

Strengthening the Analytic Process

In self-reflexively examining how analysts think, with an eye to strengthening the intelligence 

analysis process, the concept of temporal availability (cell 4) provides insight into the 

environmental factors affecting an analyst24—along a spectrum from tight to loose. Tightness 

imposes stringent deadlines, whereas looseness provides an openness to allow for reflection 

and deliberateness. Not having enough time will more than likely result in a shallow 

understanding of a complex problem and weak analysis compounded by inadequate imagining 

of risks and opportunities. When assigning tasks, IC managers may weigh the issue’s urgency 

against the degree of temporal availability needed for the analysts to deliver a thoughtful 

assessment, and analysts may advocate with managers and policymakers for the needed time.

The issue of not having enough time and its negative effects on analytic production is a 

ubiquitous and well-documented concern of analysts.25

The concept of temporal timeline (cell 5) provides insight into how analysts coming from 

different perspectives, different levels of understanding, and different missions can reveal their 

assumptions about the state or nonstate actors they are assessing.

26 Timelines incentivize 

dialogue, allowing analysts to understand and negotiate their different understandings of how 

time affects a situation, event, or activity. Collaborating analysts can ask: what assumptions 

are being considered by each participating analyst of the historical causes, the description of 

the situation in the present, and the implications for the future? Such a timeline approach can 

motivate analysts to productively explore their differences and move toward a shared 

understanding. In a real-world example, a group of analysts—tasked to assess the effects of a 

large, NATO-planned exercise on a U.S. adversary—began by examining the relationship 

between the United States and this adversarial country over time. Visualizing the events 

displayed along a timeline enabled the analysts to solicit each other’s assumptions, which led 

them to determine which events were significant and, therefore, answer the question 

commanders asked: will the exercise incite the adversary? The answer was no.

The concept of temporal learning (cell 6) provides insight into how time—including duration, 

timing, and continuum—affects an analyst’s ability to learn within the timeline constraints of the 

analytic process.

27 Duration involves an understanding of how processes develop over time, 
7

especially time for learning activities like experimentation and reflection. Timing involves 

temporal proximity, the time difference between thinking about something and doing something;

crisis situations frequently yield short temporal proximity, whereas routine situations, where time 

is not a limiting factor, usually foster long temporal proximity. Continuum is the placement of 

an analyst’s experience along the spectrum of the past, present, and future; no given point exists 

solely within the past, present, or future because any moment in the present extends from the past 

and anticipates the future. Analysts may challenge themselves by asking: to what degree am I

drawing from my understanding of the actor’s past—and my own past—in trying to make sense 

of the present motivations and activities of this actor of national security concern, and how valid 

are these interpretations? When assigning tasks, IC managers may factor an issue’s complexity 

into their deadlines. Given the relative ease in identifying activity levels of people, vehicles, and 

other physical objects at a diplomatic or military facility, short proximity is more appropriate for 

concrete, measurable problems like “what is the purpose of that facility?” A long proximity is 

more likely to be needed for abstract concepts, such as “emergence.” Emergence is a process that 

originates in a complex, novel situation—such as the 2011 Arab Spring—and terminates with 

the interaction of multiple behavioral factors. The traditional analytic frameworks of trend

analysis or forecasting are inadequate for interpreting emergent behavior, which is creating

something new for the first time and hence requires imagination and time to mull over the 

situation and explore risks and opportunities.

Outlook: Adopting a Mindset

The phenomenon of time has been largely overlooked by scholars and intelligence practitioners as 

an analytical lens for understanding behavior. Adopting a mindset of temporal complexity may be 

new to some IC analysts, but it more accurately reflects the breadth and depth of human behavior 

and therefore provides the opportunity to better assess that behavior.28 This Research Short argues 

for the adoption of a temporal complexity mindset. It identifies a total of nine concepts, six of which

can be used to augment an analyst’s understanding of the intent and behavior of state and nonstate

actors of national security concern, thereby strengthening the analysts’ ability to anticipate threats 

and to conceptualize risks and opportunities into products that better inform U.S. policymaking. 

The remaining three concepts can improve self-awareness among the intelligence analysts 

themselves, fostering insights that can improve the analytic process.

Adrian Wolfberg, Ph.D., is a senior research fellow in NIU’s Caracristi Institute for Intelligence Research. 

His research focuses on knowledge transfer, decisionmaking, decision conflict, organizational learning, 

creativity, organizational and temporal boundaries, and boundary crossing.

If you have comments, questions, or a suggestion for a Research Short topic or article, please contact 

the NIU Office of Research at NIU_OOR@dodiis.mil.
8

Appendix: Elements of Temporal Complexity

The author’s empirical research on the emergence of insight in intelligence analysts inspired the 

searching, extracting, and organizing of social science literature on existing temporal phenomena, 

which form the basis of this theoretical essay and the design of a new framework for intelligence 

analysts’ use. The phenomenon of time has been studied in social science disciplines since 

the mid-20th century. Although many studies have focused on the effects of efficiency in

management- and organization-related activities following post-World War II industrialization, 

relatively few have taken the perspective of how we self-reflexively experience time and how we 

retrospectively and prospectively make sense of time. The lenses of psychology, social science, 

and organizational science offer insights into this subjective view of how actors experience time.

Psychological Perspective

From a psychological perspective, temporal complexity can be experienced in four ways: timerelated factor, time-sensitive process, causation, and context.29 Time-related factor is how an 

individual perceives the urgency of time, the pressure of time, the pressure of work-family timerelated tensions, or the time-related dynamics as part of a group or organization, and how one 

divides up the past, present, and future. Time-sensitive process is the pattern or structure of timeconstrained activities, which vary from simple to complex structures and from single to multiple 

activities. Causation is the determining connection between actions and events through time. 

Context refers to the factors within an individual’s environment that affect that individual’s 

behavior at certain times and vary across history, economic group, organization, and society.

Social Science Perspective

From a social science perspective incorporating ideas from anthropology, psychology, and 

sociology, temporal complexity can be experienced in five ways: nature of time, how time is 

experienced, time flow, structure of time, and anchoring of time.30 The nature of time is the 

difference between experiencing time as dependent or independent of events and objects. How 

time is experienced can be viewed objectively—through an external measuring device like a 

clock—or subjectively—through the interpretation we assign to events and objects. Time flow is 

whether time is perceived as every moment is new, as moments repeat (e.g., cycles of events), or 

as punctuated time (e.g., repetitive events occur but infrequently). The structure of time is 

whether time is perceived as discrete and equal-duration units, a continuous flow that cannot be 

broken into units, or discrete units but whose length varies based on one’s experience. Anchoring 

of time is time perceived as a reference point in the past, present, or future. 

Organizational Science Perspective

From an organizational science perspective, temporal complexity can be experienced in three 

ways: conceptions of time, mapping activities to time, and actors relating to time. 31

Conceptions of time include the type of time: clock time (quantifiable, regular, and precise); 

cyclical time (repeats); nature of time (objective or subjective); and nature of cycle (length of 
9

time cycles, be it a person’s life or a person’s daily activity). Conceptions of time also include 

the social construction of time. Many Western societies experience time as linear, while others 

experience time as nonlinear. Mapping activities to time involves how time is associated with 

events. For example, for a specific event, we can focus on how long the activity lasts, and the 

rate at which the event takes place. Or something may happen during the event that changes 

the event’s effects on individuals, groups, or society. Alternatively, multiple events could be 

held by a group or organization for which the sequence of activities or the degree to which the 

events are synchronized is important. Actors relating to time includes how actors perceive time 

and how actors interact with time; these actors can be individuals, groups, organizations, or 

societies, and their perceptions might include how time passes, how time drags on, time in 

retrospect, and the newness of a particular moment in time. 
10

Endnotes

1 Barbara Adam, “The Temporal Gaze: The Challenge for Social Theory in the Context of GM Food,” British 

Journal of Sociology 51, no. 1 (2000): 125-42, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2000.00125.x.

2 Sabine Sonnentag, “Time in Organizational Research: Catching Up on a Long Neglected Topic in Order to Improve 

Theory,” Organizational Psychology Review 2, no 2 (2021): 361-68, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F2041386612442079.

3 For example, David Abramson, “Blurring the Boundaries between Anthropology and Intelligence Analysis,” in 

Anthropologists in the Security Scape, ed. Robert Albro et al. (New York: Routledge, 2016), 58-62; and David W. 

Kriebel, “Anthropological Theory and Intelligence,” Global Security and Intelligence Studies 1, no. 1 (2015): 55-

93, https://www.academia.edu/download/43836368/global-security-and-intelligence-studies-volume-1-number-1-

fall-2015.pdf#page=56.

4 For example, John A. Gentry, “Managers of Analysts: The Other Half of Intelligence Analysis,” Intelligence and 

National Security 31, no. 2 (2016): 154-77, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.961244; and Joseph Soeters, 

Management and Military Studies (New York: Routledge, 2020), 1-10.

5 For example, Stephen Coulthart, “What’s the Problem? Frameworks and Methods from Policy Analysis for 

Analyzing Complex Problems,” Intelligence and National Security 32, no. 5 (2017): 636-48,

https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2017.1310983; and Karen L. Petersen, “Three Concepts of Intelligence 

Communication: Awareness, Advice, or Co-Production?,” Intelligence and National Security 34, no. 3 (2019): 

317-28, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2019.1553371.

6 For example, Eric J. Dahl, “Getting Beyond Analysis by Anecdote: Improving Intelligence Analysis Through the 

Use of Case Studies,” Intelligence and National Security 32, no. 5 (2017): 563-78, https://doi.org/10.1080/

02684527.2017.1310967; and Richard J. Aldrich, “Strategic Culture as a Constraint: Intelligence Analysis, 

Memory and Organizational Learning in the Social Sciences and History,” Intelligence and National Security 32, 

no. 5 (2017): 625-35, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2017.1310977.

7 For example, Mandeep K. Dhami et al., “Improving Intelligence Analysis with Decision Science,” Perspectives on 

Psychological Science 10, no. 6 (2015): 753-57, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1745691615598511; and Stoney A. 

Trent et al., “Reading Intent and Other Cognitive Challenges in Intelligence Analysis,” in Advanced Decision 

Architectures for the Warfighter: Foundations and Technology, eds. Patricia McDermott and Laurel Allender 

(Adelphi, MD: Partners of the Army Research Lab, 2009), 307-21. 

8 For example, Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Ithaca, 

NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), 156-96; Kiron K. Skinner, “Qualitative Analysis for the Intelligence 

Community,” in Intelligence Analysis: Behavioral and Social Scientific Foundations, eds. Baruch Fischhoff and 

Cherie Chauvin (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2011), 101-10; and Patrick F. Walsh, 

“Improving Strategic Intelligence Analytical Practice through Qualitative Social Research,” Intelligence and 

National Security 32, no. 5 (2017): 548-62, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2017.1310948.

9 For example, Titus van de Kerke and Constant Hijzen, “Secrecy, Evidence, and Fear: Exploring the Construction of 

Intelligence Power with Actor-Network Theory (ANT),” Intelligence and National Security 36, no. 4 (2021): 527-

40, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2021.1893074; and Jeffrey Tang, “How Do We Know” What Intelligence 

Analysis Can Learn from the Sociology of Science,” Intelligence and National Security 32, no. 5 (2017): 663-74,

https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2017.1311473.

10 For example, Josh Kerbel and Anthony Olcott, “Synthesizing with Clients, Not Analyzing for Customers,” Studies in 

Intelligence 54, no. 4 (2010): 11-27, https://www.cia.gov/static/348826ddda4ef2b3786266010cb1881b/Synthesizingwith-Clients.pdf; David T. Moore and Robert R. Hoffman, “Data-Frame Theory of Sensemaking as a Best Model for 

Intelligence,” American Intelligence Journal 29, no. 2 (2011): 146-58, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26201963; and 

Dennis C. Wilder, “An Educated Consumer is our Best Customer,” Studies in Intelligence 55, no. 2 (2011): 23-31,

https://www.cia.gov/static/8f0c235341c125d127d8c595f71bfe82/An-Educated-Consumer.pdf.

11 For example, Michael Landon-Murray, “Putting a Little More ‘Time’ into Strategic Intelligence Analysis,” 

International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 30, no. 4 (2017): 785-809,

https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2017.1297118.

12 Adam, “The Temporal Gaze;” and Jonathon R.B. Halbesleben et al., “Awareness of Temporal Complexity in 

Leadership of Creativity and Innovation: A Competency-Based Model,” The Leadership Quarterly 14, no. 4-5 

(2003): 433-54, https://doi.org/10.1016/S1048-9843(03)00046-8.
11

13 Adam, “The Temporal Gaze;” and Halbesleben et al., “Awareness of Temporal Complexity.”

14 Adam, “The Temporal Gaze.” 

15 Kieran Conboy, Denis Dennehy, and Mairead O’Connor, “‘Big Time’: An Examination of Temporal 

Complexity and Business Value in Analytics,” Information & Management 57, no. 1 (2020): 1-13,

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.im.2018.05.010.

16 Donald J. Campbell, “Task Complexity: A Review and Analysis,” Academy of Management Review 13, no. 1 

(1988): 40-52, https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1988.4306775.

17 Adam, “The Temporal Gaze.” 

18 Stewart Ranson, Bob Hinings, and Royston Greenwood, “The Structuring of Organizational Structures,” 

Administrative Science Quarterly 25, no. 1 (1980): 1-17, https://doi.org/10.2307/2392223.

19 Steve W.J. Kozlowski and Katherine J. Klein, “A Multilevel Approach to Theory and Research in Organizations: 

Contextual, Temporal, and Emergent Processes,” in Multilevel Theory, Research, and Methods in Organizations: 

Foundations, Extensions, and New Directions, eds. Katherine J. Klein and Steve W.J. Kozlowski (San Francisco, 

CA: Jossey-Bass, 2000), 3-90.

20 Deborah G. Ancona, Gerardo A. Okhuysen, and Leslie A. Perlow, “Taking Time to Integrate Temporal Research,” 

Academy of Management Review 26, no. 4 (2001): 512-29, https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2001.5393887.

21 Kurt Lewin, “Defining the ‘Field at a Given Time,’” Psychological Review 50, no. 3 (1943): 292-310,

https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/h0062738.

22 Wanda J. Orlikowski and JoAnne Yates, “It’s About Time: Temporal Structuring in Organizations,” Organization 

Science 13, no. 6 (2002): 684-700, https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.13.6.684.501.

23 Susan L. Star and James R. Griesemer, “Institutional Ecology, ‘Translations’ and Boundary Objects: Amateurs and 

Professionals in Berkeley’s Museum of Vertebrate Zoology,” Social Studies of Science 19, no. 3 (1989): 387-420,

https://doi.org/10.1177%2F030631289019003001.

24 Giovanni E. Corazza and Todd Lubart, “Intelligence and Creativity: Mapping Constructs on the Space-Time 

Continuum,” Journal of Intelligence 9, no. 1 (2021): 1-27, https://doi.org/10.3390/jintelligence9010001.

25 Adrian Wolfberg, “How Information Overload and Equivocality Affect Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts: 

Implications for Learning and Knowledge Production,” Journal of Intelligence & Analysis 23, no. 1 (2017): 17-35,

https://seniorfellowsandfriends.org/?download_id=baae28e55d846de814b2c625265dd0a8; and Adrian Wolfberg 

and Nancy M. Dixon, “Learning Through Dialogue During Intelligence Assessments: A Translation of Theory into 

Practice,” Engaged Management ReView 4, no. 2 (2021): 15-24, https://doi.org/10.28953/2375-8643.1068.

26 Elaine K. Yakura, “Charting Time: Timelines as Temporal Boundary Objects,” Academy of Management Journal 

45, no. 5 (2002): 956-70, https://doi.org/10.5465/3069324.

27 Hans Berends and Elena Antonacopoulou, “Time and Organizational Learning: A Review and Agenda for Future 

Research,” International Journal of Management Reviews 16, no. 4 (2013): 437-53, https://doi.org/10.1111/ijmr.12029.

28 Adam, “The Temporal Gaze;” Campbell, “Task Complexity;” and Conboy, Dennehy, and O’Connor, “Big Time.” 

29 Sonnentag, “Time in Organizational Research.” 

30 Elaine Mosakowski and P. Christopher Earley, “A Selective Review of Time Assumptions in Strategy Research,” 

Academy of Management Review 25, no. 4 (2000): 796-812, https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2000.3707728.

31 Ancona, Okhuysen, and Perlow, “Taking Time to Integrate Temporal Research.”