Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04-1508-CR-1125 | March 11, 2016 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Thomas C. Allen

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Angela N. Sanchez

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Sanchez K. Williams,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

March 11, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

02A04-1508-CR-1125

Appeal from the Allen Superior 

Court

The Honorable Frances C. Gull, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

02D06-1504-MR-2

Baker, Judge.
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[1] Sanchez Williams appeals his convictions for Murder,1enhanced by the use of a 

firearm,2 and Robbery, a Level 5 felony.

3

 He argues that the trial court’s 

redaction of a deposition violated the doctrine of completeness. Finding that 

the trial court committed no error—and that even if the trial court did err, it was 

harmless—we affirm.

Facts

[2] Twenty-one-year-old Moath Nassir was murdered on December 29, 2014, in 

front of the convenience store he owned and operated in Fort Wayne. He and 

Williams knew each other—Williams would occasionally walk in the store, 

“look at the camera, stick his middle [finger] up, snatch something, and run out 

the door.” Tr. 430. Williams also sometimes sold stolen electronics to Nassir. 

Two weeks before December 29, Nassir kicked Williams out of the store for 

stealing.

[3] The video surveillance cameras recorded a man in a black hoodie and white 

tennis shoes walking near the store around 8 p.m. on December 29. Jacquease 

Jeanty, who Williams encountered near the store, later identified Williams as 

that man. Williams told Jeanty that he wanted to steal a hoodie from the store, 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.

2

Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11.

3

I.C. § 35-42-5-1.
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but Jeanty declined to participate. Jeanty was continuing toward his house 

when he heard a single gunshot a few minutes later.

[4] A few moments after the surveillance cameras recorded Williams and Jeanty 

walking near the entrance to the store, the cameras recorded Williams and 

Nassir running out of the alley on the side of the store. The tape captured a 

struggle in which Williams climbed on top of Nassir and punched and kicked 

him several times. At some point during the fight, Williams shot Nassir in the 

stomach. Later ballistics evidence confirmed that the bullet was fired from 

within a few inches of Nassir’s body. Nassir bled to death from the wound.

[5] Around 9 p.m., Williams showed up at his friend’s house. He entered, but 

exited a few minutes later to vomit outside. Henry Sweeney was at that house, 

and would later testify that Williams said, “sh*t went bad” and “he tried to 

fight and I shot him.” Tr. 232. Williams had told Sweeney before that he 

thought Nassir’s store would be easy to rob. Williams also showed Sweeney an

iPhone and cash that he said he took from Nassir.

[6] Williams also told Paul Manuel, a former employee of Nassir, that he killed 

Nassir. Williams showed Manuel the iPhone, and Manuel observed that 

Nassir’s pictures were still on the phone. Williams also showed Manuel some 

injuries that Williams sustained in his fight with Nassir.

[7] A DNA analysis disclosed Williams’s DNA on Nassir’s sweater. When the 

police searched Williams’s residence, they found white tennis shoes, a black 

jacket, and Nassir’s identification documents.
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[8] In January 2015, Manuel told the police what Williams had told him. On April 

12, 2015, the State charged Williams with murder, felony murder, robbery, and 

alleged an enhancement due to Williams’s use of a firearm.

[9] At trial, Manuel failed to appear, and the trial court ruled that his deposition 

testimony would be read into the record. Counsel for Williams objected, 

arguing that the admission of the deposition would violate Williams’s right to 

confront and cross-examine,4 and that if it were admitted, it should be admitted 

in its entirety with no redactions. The trial court eventually sided with the 

State, allowing the following redactions: Manuel’s two prior felony convictions, 

which were over twenty years old; some details regarding the stolen electronics 

Williams would occasionally sell to Nassir; and the circumstances surrounding 

Manuel’s initial statement to the police (he was in the back of a police car).

[10] On June 26, 2015, the jury found Williams guilty as charged. The trial court 

vacated the felony murder conviction, and sentenced Williams to sixty-five 

years for murder—enhanced by twenty years for the use of a firearm—and six 

years for the robbery, to be served consecutively. Williams now appeals.

 

4 Counsel for Williams was present at the deposition, and, although Williams was not present himself, 

counsel for Williams did not request that Williams be present. Williams does not assert on appeal that the 

admission of this deposition violated his right to confront and cross-examine.
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Discussion and Decision

[11] Williams has one argument on appeal: he argues that the omission of the 

redacted portions of Manuel’s deposition was reversible error. The admission 

or exclusion of evidence is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court, 

and we will reverse only upon an abuse of that discretion. Greenboam v. State, 

766 N.E.2d 1247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). An abuse of discretion occurs where the 

decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.

[12] We first find that the trial court did not err by admitting the redacted version of 

Manuel’s deposition into evidence. Indiana Evidence Rule 106 provides that 

“[i]f a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse 

party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part—or any other 

writing or recorded statement—that in fairness ought to be considered at the 

same time.” However, “a court need not admit the remainder of the statement, 

or portions thereof, that are neither explanatory nor relevant to the portions 

already introduced.” Lieberenz v. State, 717 N.E.2d 1242, 1248 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1999).

[13] Here, the portions redacted did not add context to Manuel’s statement. The 

redactions included (1) prior convictions that, because of their age, would not 

have been admissible if Manuel had testified in person, (2) prejudicial 

information regarding irrelevant illegal activities the victim and Williams were

allegedly involved in, and (3) the location of Manuel when he first spoke with 
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police. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion to find that 

fairness did not require the inclusion of this information.

[14] But even if we were to assume that these portions of the deposition should have 

been admitted, the error would clearly be harmless. An error is harmless if its 

probable impact on the jury, in light of all of the evidence in the case, is 

sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties. Griffin 

v. State, 664 N.E.2d 373, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).

[15] In this case, the State presented the following evidence of Williams’s guilt: a 

surveillance tape of the murder, a witness who identified Williams as the person 

on the tape, multiple witnesses to whom Williams confessed, multiple witnesses 

to whom Williams stated his intent to rob the store, multiple witnesses who saw 

the victim’s phone in Williams’s possession, Williams’s extensive history of 

previous robberies of the store, Williams’s DNA on the victim, the exact 

matching outfit of clothes of the person caught on tape found in Williams’s 

residence, and the victim’s identification papers found in Williams’s possession. 

We cannot believe that the inclusion of three redacted portions of one witness’s 

testimony, on matters tangentially related to the case, could have possibly 

swayed the jury’s mind.

[16] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.