UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4380

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LEON BESSANT, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, 

Jr., District Judge. (1:09-cr-00136-WO-1)

Submitted: February 3, 2011 Decided: March 3, 2011

Before MOTZ, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

George E. Crump, III, Rockingham, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Randall Stuart Galyon, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 

Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Leon Bessant, Jr., appeals from his conviction and 

sixty-month sentence following a guilty plea to two counts of 

distribution of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A.

§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (West 1999 & Supp. 2010). On appeal, 

Bessant’s counsel has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Counsel states that there are 

no meritorious issues for appeal, but questions whether the 

district court complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting 

Bessant’s guilty plea and whether the district court erred in 

sentencing Bessant. Bessant was advised of his right to file a 

pro se brief, but has not done so. We affirm.

Bessant first questions whether the district court 

complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, by sufficiently informing

Bessant that he faced a mandatory minimum sentence of five 

years’ imprisonment on both counts. Because Bessant did not 

move in the district court to withdraw his guilty plea, we 

review any error in the Rule 11 hearing for plain error. United 

States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). 

Our review of the appellate record convinces us that 

the district court fully complied with the mandates of Rule 11 

in accepting Bessant’s guilty plea. In doing so, the district 

court properly informed Bessant of the nature of the charges and 

penalties he faced, explicitly stating that he faced a term of 
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imprisonment of not less than five years. Moreover, the 

district court ensured that the guilty plea was knowing and 

voluntary and supported by a factual basis. See United 

States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991). 

We therefore affirm his conviction.

Bessant also questions whether the district court 

erred in imposing sentence. This court reviews a sentence for 

reasonableness, applying an abuse of discretion standard. 

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also United 

States v. Llamas, 599 F.3d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 2010). This 

review requires appellate consideration of both the procedural 

and substantive reasonableness of a sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 

51.

In determining procedural reasonableness, we consider 

whether the district court properly calculated the defendant’s 

advisory Guidelines range, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

(2006) factors, analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, 

and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. Bessant 

specifically questions whether the district court erred in 

calculating his criminal history category by including a state 

conviction that occurred after the conduct, but before 

imposition of sentence, in the present case. Although Bessant’s 

sentence for the state narcotics conviction was imposed in 2007, 

after the commencement of the instant offense, it is nonetheless 
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a “prior sentence” because it was for conduct unrelated to the 

instant offense and was imposed prior to the January 7, 2010 

sentencing for the instant offense. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 

Manual § 4A1.2, cmt. n.1 (2008). Bessant’s criminal history 

category thus was properly calculated.

Because the record reveals no procedural error in 

Bessant’s sentencing, we conclude that the sentence is 

procedurally reasonable. In addition, Bessant’s sentence 

pursuant to the statutory mandatory minimum is per se 

substantively reasonable. United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 

210, 224 (4th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, we affirm Bessant’s 

sentence as reasonable. 

We have examined the entire record in accordance with 

the requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious issues 

for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. This court requires that counsel inform Bessant, in 

writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

United States for further review. If Bessant requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition 

would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for 

leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must 

state that a copy thereof was served on Bessant. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
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adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED