alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER

Appellate case name: In the Interest of L.M.N. aka L.N., D.Y.L.N., J. L .L.N., aka J.L.L. , Child ren

Appellate case number: 01

- 1 8

- 00 4 13

- CV

Trial court case number: 201 5

- 0 121 7 J

Trial court: 3 1 5 th District Court of Harris County

Appellant, A

. L

. , has filed a motion for an extension of time to file h is brief. The motion is granted

. Appellant A.L

. ’s brief is due to be filed with this Court no later than Wednesday , August 1 , 201 8

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 28.4( a), 38.6(d).

Th is appeal involve s the termination of the parent

- child relationship . A ccordingly

, this Court is required to bring the appeal to final disposition within 180 days of May 23

, 201 8

, the date the first notice of appe al w as filed

, so far as reasonably possible. See T EX

. R. J UD

. A DMIN

. 6.2, reprinted in T EX

. G OV ’ T

. C ODE A NN

. , tit. 2, su btit. F app. ( Vernon 201 3 ). Accordingly, no further extensions will be granted.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Terry Jennings

 Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: July 24 , 2018
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2483 

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on cyanuric chloride. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 29, 2009 

Mr. GRAHAM introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on cyanuric 

chloride. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. CYANURIC CHLORIDE. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Heading 9902.22.45 of the Har5 monized Tariff Schedule of the United States (relating to 

6 cyanuric chloride) is amended by striking ‘‘12/31/2009’’ 

7 and inserting ‘‘12/31/2011’’. 

8 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

9 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2483 IS

1 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

2 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Annual Report of American Consolidated
Management Group, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the period ending
December 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date hereof (the "Report"), I, Ed Rensi, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and result of
                  operations of the Company.

/s/ Ed Rensi
---------------------------
Ed Rensi
Chief Executive Officer
July 26, 2006
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDEN TIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRE CEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Supreme Court

James W. Trexler, Petitioner,

v.

The Associated Press, Barri ngton Broadcasting South Carolina Corp., Raycom TV Broadcasting, Inc., The Spartanburg Herald Journal , Inc., and The Pacific & Southern Co., Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2015-001368

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT O F APPEALS

Appeal from Richland County Joseph M. Strickland, Sp ecial Circuit Court Judge

Memorandum Opinion No. 2016-MO-030 Heard September 7, 2016 – Filed October 19, 2016

DISMISSED AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED

William H. Johnson, of Law Offices of William H. Johnson, LLC, of Manning; W. Westbrook Wills, III, ofFolly Beach; and Matthew D. Ha mrick, of Charleston, all for Petitioner.

Jerry Jay Bender, of Baker, Ravenel & Bender, LLP, of Columbia, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: We granted a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeal s' decision in Trexler v. The Associated Press , Op. No. 2015-UP-201 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Apr. 15, 2015). After careful consideration of the Appen dix and briefs, the writ of certiorari is

DISMISSED AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED.

PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTRED GE, JJ., and Acting Justice J. Mark Hayes, II, concur.
*

The opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 46(d).

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-6608

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

WILLIE MARION BUTLER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Anderson. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District

Judge. (8:07-cv-70000-HMH; 8:04-cr-00940-HMH)

Submitted: November 20, 2007 Decided: November 28, 2007

Before NIEMEYER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.*

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Willie Marion Butler, Appellant Pro Se. Alan Lance Crick,

Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Willie Marion Butler seeks to appeal the district court’s

order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. The

order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A

certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any

assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is

debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by

the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Butler has not

made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
EXHIBIT 31.2**CERTIFICATION**I, Hervé Duchesne de Lamotte, certify that:1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of IDM Pharma, Inc.;2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact oromit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport;3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintainingdisclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) forthe registrant and have:     a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating tothe registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;     b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and     c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materiallyaffected or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):     a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and     b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.Dated: August 14, 2006       /s/ Hervé Duchesne de Lamotte Hervé Duchesne de Lamotte    Acting Principal Financial and Accounting Officer
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

May 21, 2012 

d0514 

Order 

 

May 21, 2012 

143839(66) 

AARON RICHARD, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 143839 

 COA: 297353 

Wayne CC: 10-000273-CZ 

SCHNEIDERMAN & SHERMAN, P.C., 

Defendant-Appellee, 

and 

GMAC MORTGAGE, and MORTGAGE 

ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, 

INC., 

 Defendants-Appellants. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s January 30, 

2012 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was 

entered erroneously.
EXHIBIT 32.1 EARTHWORKS ENTERTAINMENT, INC.

     Certification of Principal Executive Officer Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350
                 (Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)

I, William H. Campbell,  Chief  Financial  Officer of Earthworks  Entertainment,
Inc. (the "Registrant"),  certify that to the best of my knowledge, based upon a
review of the  Quarterly  Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended  December 31,
2003 of the Registrant (the "Report"):

           (1) The  Report  fully  complies  with the  requirements  of  Section
           13(a)[15(d)] of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

           (2) The information  contained in the Report fairly presents,  in all
           material respects,  the financial condition and results of operations
           of the Registrant.


Dated: February 5, 2004                    /s/ WILLIAM H. CAMPBELL
                                           -----------------------
                                           William H. Campbell
                                           Acting Chief Financial Officer
#### Cheryl A. Warren, Respondent, v Walmart Stores, Inc., Appellant, et al., Defendant.

[963 NYS2d 150]

*733In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Walmart Stores, Inc., appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Marber, J.), entered March 12, 2012, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion of the defendant Walmart Stores, Inc., for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it is granted.

The plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries when she slipped and fell on a bleach spill in an aisle of a Walmart store in the Sunrise Mall in Massapequa on October 25, 2008. The plaintiff commenced the instant action against Walmart Stores, Inc. (hereinafter Walmart), among others. Walmart moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. The Supreme Court denied the motion.

A defendant who moves for summary judgment in a slip-and-fall case has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that it neither created the allegedly hazardous condition nor had actual or constructive notice of its existence for a sufficient length of time to discover and remedy it *(see Knack v Red Lobster 286, N & D Rests., Inc.,*98 AD3d 473, 473 [2012]; *Amendola v City of New York,*89 AD3d 775 [2011]; *Alami v 215 E. 68th St., L.P.,*88 AD3d 924, 924-925 [2011]; *Schiano v Mijul, Inc.,*79 AD3d 726 [2010]; *Walsh v Super Value, Inc.,*76 AD3d 371, 375 [2010]; *Gambino v City of New York,*60 AD3d 627 [2009]). “To meet its initial burden on the issue of. . . constructive notice, the defendant must offer some evidence as to when the area in question was last cleaned or inspected relative to the time when the plaintiff fell” *(Birnbaum v New York Racing Assn., Inc.,*57 AD3d 598, 598-599 [2008]; *see Mei Xiao Guo v Quong Big Realty Corp.,*81 AD3d 610, 611 [2011]).

In support of its motion, Walmart relied upon, inter alia, the affidavit of an employee, along with surveillance footage, which established that Walmart did not create the allegedly dangerous condition, or have actual or constructive notice of the bleach spill prior to the accident. Therefore, Walmart established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law *(see Knack v Red Lobster 286, N & D Rests., Inc.,*98 AD3d at 473). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Walmart created or had actual or constructive notice of the spill prior to the accident *(id.*at 474).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted *734Walmart’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Mastro, J.E, Austin, Roman and Cohen, JJ., concur.
#### John SALTARIKOS, Plaintiff, v. CHARTER MANUFACTURING CO., INC., d/b/a Charter Wire Corporation, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 88-C-1328.

United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin.

Jan. 8, 1992.

*421Thomas Nelson, Milwaukee, Wis., for plaintiff.

Fred Groiss, Quarles & Brady, Milwaukee, Wis., for defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

TERENCE T. EVANS, Chief Judge.

This case, set for trial today, raises the troubling question of whether the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is to be applied retroactively. Strange as it may seem, the act which was signed into law by President Bush on November 21,1991, is silent on the important question of whether or not the law is to have retroactive effect. To my knowledge, no federal courts in Wisconsin have addressed the issue of retroactivity. The issue, however, has been addressed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. It recently declared in no uncertain terms that the law is not to be given retroactive effect. A few federal courts around the country have reached conflicting conclusions regarding retroactivity. Against this rather uncertain landscape, I conclude that the law is to be applied retroactively. Accordingly, my September 11, 1990, decision which dismissed, without objection, a portion of this case is VACATED. The section 1981 claim of Mr. Saltarikos is resurrected.

I am mindful of the controversy created by the issue of retroactivity. See the attached article from the December 31, 1991, edition of *The New York Times.*But it seems to me that remedial legislation such as the Civil Rights Act has historically been construed broadly by the judiciary. No one would dispute the fact that the purpose of the law is to broaden the rights of persons claiming that they have been the victim of discrimination. It makes no sense to broaden those rights on one hand and then deny the wider effect of the law to people who have pending cases or have been the victims of discriminatory conduct prior to November of 1991.

It would be particularly harsh to deny retroactivity in this case. When it was filed on December 9, 1988, Mr. Saltarikos’ complaint included a section 1981 claim. Then on June 15, 1989, the Supreme Court decided *Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,*491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989), which cast considerable doubt on the validity of section 1981 claims. However, in a decision filed September 11, 1990, I declined to dismiss the claim unless and until the scope of *Patterson*became clearer. That happened on July 2, 1990, when the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued *McNight v. General Motors Corp.,*908 F.2d 104 (7th Cir.1990). Subsequently, on September 11, 1990, with no objection from him, I dismissed Mr. Saltarikos’ section 1981 claim.

Now Congress has spoken with the clear intent to correct what it thought was the Supreme Court’s erroneous view of certain aspects of the law on civil rights. Section 1981 claims are revived under the 1991 law. To deny Mr. Saltarikos retroactivity under these circumstances would be unjust.

Accordingly, Mr. Saltarikos may present his section 1981 claim to the jury today.

SO ORDERED.

*422
#### In the Matter of Roman Santiago, Appellant, v Brian Fischer, as Commissioner of Corrections and Community Supervision, et al., Respondents.

[963 NYS2d 460]

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Platkin, J.), entered November 15, 2011 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner’s application, in a combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, to review two determinations of the Central Office Review Committee denying his grievances.

During his incarceration, petitioner practiced the Native American religious faith and possessed religious items used in such practice. However, after he was transferred to Green Haven Correctional Facility in Dutchess County, he was no longer permitted to practice this faith nor to possess related religious items unless he submitted proof of his Native American ancestry. He filed two grievances as a result. They were both denied by the Central Office Review Committee (hereinafter CORC), which found that proof of petitioner’s Native American ancestry was required in order for him to be reinstated to the Native American religious program or to have related religious items returned to him. Petitioner commenced this combined CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action to, among other things, challenge CORC’s determinations denying his grievances. Following joinder of issue, Supreme Court dismissed the petition and this appeal ensued.

It has been recognized that correction officials may impose restrictions on the religious practices of inmates provided that such restrictions are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests *(see Jackson v Mann,*196 F3d 316, 320 [1999]; *Fair v Smith,*93 AD3d 964, 966 [2012], *appeal dismissed*19 NY3d 874 [2012]). Respondents candidly concede, and we agree, that CORC failed to articulate or otherwise identify any legitimate penological interest reasonably served by the documentation requirement. Consequently, we conclude that the determinations at issue are arbitrary, capricious and without a rational basis (see *Matter of Green v Fischer,*96 AD3d 1247, 1248 [2012], *lv denied*20 NY3d 855 [2013]; *compare Matter of Patel v Fischer,*67 AD3d 1193, 1193-1194 [2009], *lv denied*14 NY3d 703 [2010]; *Matter of Keesh v Smith,*59 AD3d 798, 798-799 [2009]). *1224In view of this, we reverse the judgment, annul the determinations and remit the matter to CORC to set forth the penological interests justifying the imposition of the documentation requirement under the circumstances presented *(see Matter of Green v Fischer,*96 AD3d at 1248). We have considered petitioner’s remaining contentions and find them to be unpersuasive.

Rose, J.E, Lahtinen, Stein and Egan Jr., JJ., concur.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, without costs, determinations annulled, and matter remitted to the Central Office Review Committee for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court’s decision.
**Exhibit 99.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION OFCHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER**

 

Furnished solely under Section 906 ofthe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and notfiled as part of the Report on Form 10-Q forthe quarterly period ended March 31, 2003.

 

I, Kenneth R. Posner, herebycertify that:

 

1)              Theaccompanying Report of Angelo and Maxie’s, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the quarterlyperiod ended March 31, 2003 fully complies with the requirements of Section13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934  and

2)              Theinformation contained in such Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of Angelo and Maxie’s, Inc.

 

 
| /s/ KENNETH  R. POSNER                 |   |
|----------------------------------------|--------|
| Kenneth R.  Posner                     |
| President  and Chief Executive Officer |
| Dated:  May 9, 2003               |

 

 

A signed originalof this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Angeloand Maxie’s, Inc. and will be retained by Angelo and Maxie’s, Inc. andfurnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

 

----
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME OF WOLVERINE TUBE, INC. FOR THE SIX
MONTHS ENDED JUNE 28, 1997, AND THE CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET OF
WOLVERINE TUBE, INC. AT JUNE 28, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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