MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Ruth A. Johnson

Marion County Public Defender

Indianapolis, Indiana

Hilary B. Ricks

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Deputy Attorney General

Katherine M. Cooper

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

John Johnson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

September 8, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1511-CR-2001

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court.

The Honorable Sheila A. Carlisle, 

Judge.

Cause No. 49G03-1504-F1-012180

Garrard, Judge

[1] Following a jury trial, John Johnson was found guilty of attempted murder as a 

Level 1 felony. Finding that no error occurred below, we affirm.

[2] The facts most favorable to the verdict are as follows. After midnight, on April 

4, 2015, Latwron Stephens went to a bar in downtown Indianapolis to celebrate 

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his birthday. He was accompanied by his girlfriend, his brother, his uncle, and 

a friend. Johnson and his girlfriend also were at the bar. Approximately ten or 

fifteen minutes after Latwron and his group arrived, Johnson walked past the 

group and gave the men in the group “dirty looks.” Tr. p. 195. Approximately 

ten minutes later, Johnson returned and he and Latwron confronted each other. 

Latwron’s brother was standing beside him at the time. Latwron asked 

Johnson, “What’s your problem?” Id. at 197. Johnson replied, “You don’t 

want none of this, little homie.” Id. Johnson then brandished a gun and shot 

Latwron several times. As Latwron turned and attempted to run away, 

Johnson shot Latwron several more times. Latwron, who was shot a total of 

nine times, fell to the floor. Witnesses testified that Latwron did not have a 

weapon in his possession. Johnson then left the bar. Latwron survived his 

wounds and was able to identify Johnson from a photo array as the shooter.

[3] Three days after the shooting incident, Johnson and his girlfriend voluntarily 

appeared at the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) 

headquarters. Both provided taped statements regarding the incident.1

 Johnson 

was arrested and eventually charged with attempted murder as a Level 1 

felony.2

1 The taped statements were not introduced as exhibits during Johnson’s trial and are not included in the 

record on appeal.

2 Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1) (2014) (Murder), Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1 (2014) (Attempt).

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[4] Johnson’s defense at trial was that he was acting in self-defense. At trial, 

Johnson tendered pattern jury instructions on self-defense and the mistake of 

fact defense. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on the mistake of fact 

defense. Following the jury trial, Johnson was found guilty as charged.

[5] Johnson now appeals arguing the prosecutor committed misconduct in the form 

of a Doyle violation, and the trial court erroneously refused Johnson’s tendered 

instruction on the mistake of fact defense.

1. 

[6] Although not specifically framed as such, Johnson’s first claim, as set forth in 

his Appellant’s brief, is that the prosecutor violated the rule set out in Doyle v. 

Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976). In Doyle, the United 

States Supreme Court held that using a defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda

silence to impeach an exculpatory story told for the first time at trial, violates 

the defendant’s rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Id. at 618-619, 96 S. Ct. at 2245, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 98. “The key to 

Doyle is that it protects the defendant from being found guilty simply on the 

basis of a legitimate choice to remain silent.” Trice v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1180, 

1183-84 (Ind. 2002). 

[7] “Where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, he ‘ordinarily bears the burden of 

showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used 

by the state for impeachment purposes.’” Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a)

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n.47 (3d ed. 2007)). To determine whether a Doyle violation denied a defendant 

a fair trial, we must examine five factors: (1) the use to which the prosecution 

puts the post-Miranda silence; (2) who elected to pursue the line of questioning; 

(3) the quantum of other evidence indicative of guilt; (4) the intensity and 

frequency of the reference; and (5) the availability to the trial court judge of an 

opportunity to grant a motion for mistrial or to give curative instructions. 

Barton v. State, 936 N.E.2d 842, 852-53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.

[8] During Johnson’s jury trial, IMPD Officer Timothy Fogarty testified for the 

State. On cross-examination, Johnson’s counsel asked the officer certain 

questions regarding Johnson’s taped statement to the police. The following 

took place: 

[Defense Counsel:] And Mr. Johnson spoke with you, but he 

exercised his right not to speak about the case without an attorney; is that 

right? 

[Officer Fogarty:] Yes, sir.

[Defense Counsel:] But you did ask him if he could tell you 

where the weapon was? 

[Officer Fogarty:] That question was asked. 

[Defense Counsel:] And without asking for an attorney, he told you 

where you could find the weapon? 

[Officer Fogarty:] Yes, sir.

Tr. pp. 413-14 (emphasis added). On re-direct examination, the prosecutor 

asked the following questions of Officer Fogarty:

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[Prosecutor:] . . . And when he did talk to you, did he ever say 

anything about seeing another gun there? 

[Officer Fogarty:] No, sir. 

[Prosecutor:] Or being concerned about a gun there? 

[Officer Fogarty:] No, sir. 

[Prosecutor:] Even mention another gun?

Tr. pp. 425-26. Defense counsel objected on grounds that Johnson “[had] 

exercised his right not to speak to counsel. He cannot be punished or made to 

look bad because he exercised his constitutional right, which is what [the 

prosecutor] is attempting to do at this point.” Tr. p. 426. After discussion 

between the trial court, defense counsel, and the prosecutor, the prosecutor 

decided not to pursue the line of questioning. The trial court did not rule on 

defense counsel’s objection.

[9] On appeal, Johnson claims the prosecutor’s line of questioning amounted to a 

Doyle violation.

3

 The State, however, argues no Doyle violation occurred 

because Johnson failed to present evidence regarding when he was Mirandized. 

In his reply brief, Johnson appears to agree with the State’s argument and 

concede this fact, stating “[t]he State is correct that Johnson’s argument does 

not actually fall under Doyle . . . because [Officer] Fogarty did not testify that 

3 Johnson frames this issue in part as a violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 

However, a Doyle violation is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibition 

against fundamental unfairness. See Sobolewski v. State, 889 N.E.2d 849, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. 

denied.

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Johnson had been Mirandized prior to asserting his right to terminate the 

interview.” Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 5. Although Johnson failed to present 

evidence as to when he was Mirandized, we will presume, based upon Officer 

Fogarty’s testimony at trial, that Johnson was Mirandized at some point. 

Nevertheless, without evidence indicating when Johnson was Mirandized, we 

cannot find that a Doyle violation occurred. We, therefore, find no error. 

2.

[10] Johnson next claims the trial court erred when it refused his tendered pattern 

jury instruction on the mistake of fact defense. When reviewing the refusal of a 

tendered instruction, we must determine whether the instruction correctly states 

the law, whether the evidence supports giving the instruction, and whether the 

substance of the instruction is covered by the other instructions given. Miller v. 

Ryan, 706 N.E.2d 244, 248 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. It is error to 

refuse an instruction if there is evidence in the record to support the theory set 

forth in the instruction; however, the trial court has considerable discretion in 

determining which issues have been raised by the trial evidence and in 

determining the form in which instructions will be given. Id. 

[11] Indiana Code section 35-41-3-7 (1977) governs the mistake of fact defense and 

provides: “It is a defense that the person who engaged in the prohibited 

conduct was reasonably mistaken about a matter of fact, if the mistake negates 

the culpability required for commission of the offense.” “‘[I]n order for mistake 

of fact to be a valid defense, three elements must be satisfied: (1) the mistake 

must be honest and reasonable; (2) the mistake must be about a matter of fact; 

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and (3) the mistake must negate the culpability required to commit the crime.’” 

Nolan v. State, 863 N.E.2d 398, 404 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Giles v. State, 

699 N.E.2d 294, 300 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)), trans. denied. In reviewing whether 

the evidence was such as to require a mistake of fact instruction, we consider 

whether the evidence relevant to that defense could, if believed by the jury, have 

created a reasonable doubt in the jury’s mind that the accused acted with the 

requisite mental state. See Stoner v. State, 442 N.E.2d 983, 985 (Ind. 1982).

[12] The information here charged that Johnson 

. . . did attempt to commit the crime of Murder, which is to 

intentionally kill another human being, namely: [Latwron] 

Stephens, by engaging in conduct, that is: shooting a deadly 

weapon, that is: a handgun, at and against the person of 

[Latwron] Stephens with the specific intent to kill [Latwron] 

Stephens, which conduct constituted a substantial step toward 

the commission of said crime of Murder . . . .

Appellant’s App. p. 27. Johnson tendered the following pattern jury instruction 

on the mistake of fact defense: 

It is an issue whether the Defendant mistakenly committed the 

acts charged.

It is a defense that the Defendant was reasonably mistaken about 

a matter of fact if the mistake prevented the Defendant from:

[Intentionally/Knowingly/Recklessly] committing the acts 

charged

(Or)

[Committing the acts charged with specific intent to (specify 

specific intention for crime)].

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The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the Defendant was not reasonably mistaken.

Id. at 100. The instruction was refused by the trial court.

[13] In support of his argument that the trial court erred in refusing the mistake of 

fact instruction, Johnson cites Hoskins v. State, 563 N.E.2d 571 (Ind. 1990), and 

attempts to distinguish his case from Hoskins. In Hoskins, the defendant, who

was charged with attempted murder, challenged the trial court’s refusal of his 

instruction on mistake of fact. Hoskins argued on appeal that the acts of the 

three victims gave him the mistaken belief that one of the victims had a gun and 

that he was in more danger than he actually was. Our Supreme Court found 

that the evidence did not support a mistake of fact defense but only served as 

evidence to support self-defense. Id. at 576. 

[14] Hoskins’ charging information contained a “knowing” mens rea, and not the 

mens rea of specific intent to kill.4

 Johnson points out that unlike Hoskins’ 

charging information, his charging information included the proper mens rea. 

Thus, according to Johnson, 

[a] mistaken belief that one (1) of the two (2) persons standing 

less than two (2) feet in front of him [(that is, Latwron’s brother)] 

was pulling out a gun to follow through on [Latwron’s verbal 

4 In 1991, our Supreme Court reaffirmed that attempted murder instructions must include the required mens 

rea of specific intent to kill. See Spradlin v. State, 569 N.E.2d 948, 950 (Ind. 1991) (holding that to convict a 

defendant of attempted murder, the defendant must have intended to kill the victim at the time the defendant 

took a substantial step toward committing murder).

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threat that he was going] to kill [Johnson] very likely would have 

created doubt in the [jurors’] minds that Johnson specifically 

intended to kill [Latwron] when he fired at him. . . . 

[E]rroneously thinking that his life was in, or about to be in, 

danger, he was entitled to fire first and ask questions later.

Appellant’s Br. p. 18. 

[15] Johnson does not argue on appeal that, had the facts been as he believed them 

to be, his act of shooting Latwron would not have been criminal. See Payne v. 

State, 854 N.E.2d 7, 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (“[T]he mistake of fact defense is 

available where the defendant, acting under a reasonable and honest mistake 

concerning a fact or facts commits an act which, if the facts were as the 

defendant believed them to be, would not be criminal.”). Instead, Johnson’s 

argument is that he may have intentionally engaged in the prohibited conduct 

because he mistakenly believed he was acting in self-defense. The differing 

mens reas do not convince us that Johnson’s case is different from that of 

Hoskins. We find that, like Hoskins, the evidence Johnson offered to support 

his mistake of fact defense was actually evidence that supported his claim of 

self-defense. See Hoskins, 563 N.E.2d at 576 (“Rather, the evidence offered by 

appellant in support of his mistake of fact theory was actually evidence of 

justification supporting the predicate to his claim of self-defense.”) Because the 

evidence in this case does not support the giving of a mistake of fact defense 

instruction, the trial court did not err in refusing Johnson’s tendered instruction.

[16] Affirmed.

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[17] Baker, J., and Najam, J., concur.

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