alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>          5
<MULTIPLIER>       1

<S>                                                <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                       9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                   DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                        SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                                         50,789
<SECURITIES>                                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                                                       0
<ALLOWANCES>                                                        0
<INVENTORY>                                                         0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                               50,789
<PP&E>                                                              0
<DEPRECIATION>                                                      0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                                 50,789
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                          80,500
<BONDS>                                                             0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                               0
<PREFERRED>                                                         0
<COMMON>                                                   52,044,501
<OTHER-SE>                                                          0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                                   50,789
<SALES>                                                             0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                                    0
<CGS>                                                               0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                                  33,295
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                                    0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                                885
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                               (34,180)
<INCOME-TAX>                                                        0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                           (34,180)
<DISCONTINUED>                                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                     0
<CHANGES>                                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                                  (34,180)
<EPS-BASIC>                                                       0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                                       0




</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                         421,335
<SECURITIES>                                   2,876,528
<RECEIVABLES>                                  0
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    18,849,466
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               19,270,801
<PP&E>                                         1,450,408
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (404,615)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 24,822,040
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          20,963,997
<BONDS>                                        992,411
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    1,300,010
<COMMON>                                       14,706
<OTHER-SE>                                     1,550,916
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   24,822,040
<SALES>                                        11,199,579
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               12,357,733
<CGS>                                          2,369,259
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  11,007,649
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               110,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             1,356,381
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                1,455,084
<INCOME-TAX>                                   509,279
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            945,805
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                (509,279)
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   1,455,084
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  .52
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  .30
        


</TABLE>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA EASTERN DISTRICT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Respondent

v. WILLIAM JACKSON, Petitioner : : : : : : : : : : : No. 382 EAL 2014 Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER PER CURIAM AND NOW , this 26th day of December, 2014, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED
.
**EXHIBIT 23.01**
**CONSENT OF ERNST & YOUNGLLP,****INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTINGFIRM**
     We consent to the incorporation by reference inthe Registration Statements (Form S-3 Nos. 33-93580,333-34460, 333-57176, 333-76750, 333-87934, 333-102937,333-106953, 333-108825 and 333-115706) and in the relatedProspectus and the Registration Statements (Form S-8 Nos.33-79222, 333-27671, 333-46949, 333-84317, 333-52298, 333-74092,333-85856, 333-87016, 333-105555 and 333-117671) of MartekBiosciences Corporation of our report datedDecember  9, 2004, except for the last paragraph ofNote 16, as to which the date is January 4, 2005, withrespect to the consolidated financial statements and schedule ofMartek Biosciences Corporation included in its Annual Report(Form  10-K) for the year ended October 31, 2004.
 /s/ Ernst & Young LLP    
McLean, VirginiaJanuary 12, 2005
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                       3,936,372
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                2,302,870
<ALLOWANCES>                                    97,276
<INVENTORY>                                  2,482,825
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             8,863,020
<PP&E>                                       3,281,588
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,551,033
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              12,777,242
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        5,379,201
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                         26
<COMMON>                                       284,771
<OTHER-SE>                                   6,998,394
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                12,777,242
<SALES>                                     10,130,324
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            10,130,324
<CGS>                                        4,082,500
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                4,082,500
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            11,333,882
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              19,420
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                414,095
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            414,095
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   414,095
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .01
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .01
        

</TABLE>
#### In the Matter of Stephen Pump, Petitioner, v Brian Fischer, Commissioner, New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, Respondent.

[976 NYS2d 911]

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department by order of the Supreme Court, Wyoming County [Mark H. Dadd, A.J.], entered June 10, 2013) to review a determination of respondent. The determination found after a tier II hearing that petitioner had violated an inmate rule.

It is hereby ordered that said proceeding is unanimously dismissed without costs as moot *(see Matter of Free v Coombe,*234 AD2d 996 [1996]). Present — Smith, J.P., Fahey, Garni, Valentino and Whalen, JJ.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

January 8, 2016

jam 

# Order

Clerk January 8, 2016

1 52969 ( 31 )

PERRY ELZELLO COLEMAN

, Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v SC: 1 52969

COA: 327458

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Defendant

- Appellee.

___________________________________

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion to waive fees is considered and it is

DENIED because MCL 600.2963 requires that a prisoner pursuing a civil action be liable

for filing fees.

Within 21 days of the certification of this order, plaintiff shall pa y to the Clerk of

the Court the f iling fee of $ 3 7 5 .00 in its entirety because the prisoner account statement

shows a balance equal to or in excess of this amount . Additionally

, plaintiff shall submit

a copy of this order with the payment, and shall refile the copy of the pleadings which

is being returned with this order. Failure to comply with this order shall result in the

appeal not being filed in this Court.

T he Clerk of the Court shall furnish two copies of this order to plaintiff and return

plaintif f’s pleadings with this order.
1 Tommy G. Thompson has been appointed to serve as Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, and is substituted as appellee pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c). 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 02-1937

___________ Julius E. Wright, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the Eastern * District of Arkansas. Tommy G. Thompson, 1 Secretary of the * Department of Health and Human * [UNPUBLISHED] Services * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: February 21, 2003 Filed: March 10, 2003

___________ Before HANSEN, Chief Judge, MELLOY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Julius Wright, an African American, brought this employment-discrimination suit against the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), alleging that he was denied employment at the Food and Drug Administration’s National Center for Toxicological Research (NCTR) because of his race. The district2 The Honorable Susan Webber Wright, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. -2- court 2granted HHS’s motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. The court also denied Wright’s motion for reconsideration. Wright appeals. Having carefully reviewed the record de novo, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. We agree with the district court that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case because Wright failed to exhaust his administrative remedies: he waited three years to file a discrimination complaint with the FDA’s Equal Employment Opportunity Office, see 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1) (2002) (employment discrimination complaints against federal agencies must be brought within 45 days of discriminatory personnel action), and we agree with the district court that there was no basis to equitably toll the deadline for filing a complaint, see Shempert v. Harwick Chem. Corp. , 151 F.3d 793, 797-98 (8th Cir. 1998) (equitable tolling is inappropriate when plaintiff fails to exercise reasonable diligence), cert. denied , 525 U.S. 1139 (1999). Even if Wright had filed a timely charge, we would agree with the district court’s alternative conclusion that summary judgment was proper because Wright didnot produce any admissible evidence establishing that NCTR’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring Wright--the Office of Personnel Management, not NCTR, reviewed all of the applications and determined Wright did not qualify for the position--was a pretext for racial discrimination. See Luciano v. Monfort, Inc. , 259 F.3d 906, 910 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming grant of summary judgment where plaintiff offered no probative evidence that reason for termination was pretext for race discrimination). Accordingly, we affirm.-3- A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### MOORMAN v. SIMON.

No. 4667.

United States District Court W. D. Missouri, W. D.

June 16, 1947.

*329R. S. McKenzie and James L. Williams, both of Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiff.

Norman S. Howell and Gene J. Mac-Elhern, both of Kansas City, Mo., for defendant.

REEVES, District Judge.

In interrogatories numbered 5, 8 and 15, the plaintiff asks for an opinion on the part of the defendant as to the speed at which he was traveling at the time of the collision. It is the rule announced by numerous authorities that matters of opinion are not appropriate subjects of interrogatories. See Holtzoff on New Federal Procedure and the Courts, p. 90; also Canuso v. City of Niagara Falls, D.C., 4 F.R.D. 362; Hercules Powder Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., D.C., 3 F.R.D. 328.

Interrogatory number 16 seeks the intention of the defendant as to what he was intending to do at the time of the collision. This, too, would call for an opinion, and, moreover, it is immaterial and irrelevant to the issues tendered by the plaintiff in his complaint.

The same is true with respect to interrogatory number 17, wherein the plaintiff asks of the defendant: “At the time of this collision what was your destination and where had you started from, and what time of day had you started?” It seems clear that the defendant would not be required to answer a question so irrelevant and immaterial.

Interrogatory Number 21 and Number 22 seek the names of witnesses to be called by the defendant. It is discretionary with the court whether a party should be required to disclose the names of his witnesses. F. & M. Skirt Co. v. Wimpfheimer & Bro., D.C., 25 F.Supp. 898. While ordinarily a party may by indirection find out the names of witnesses by interrogatories, yet in this case the plaintiff is just as familiar with the events that transpired at the time, and is in as good position as the defendant to know or find out who the witnesses were. It seems an unnecessary burden to require the defendant in a case of this kind to furnish the names of his witnesses to the plaintiff.

Accordingly, the objections made by the defendant should be sustained, and it will be so ordered.
S. Con. Res. 103 Agreed to June 22, 2006

One Hundred Ninth Congress

of the

United States of America

AT THE SECOND SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday,

the third day of January, two thousand and six

Concurrent Resolution

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That, in the enrollment of the bill H.R. 889, the Clerk of

the House of Representatives shall make the following corrections:

(1) In the table of contents in section 2, strike the item

relating to section 414 and insert the following:

‘‘Sec. 414. Navigational safety of certain facilities.’’.

(2) Strike section 414 and insert the following:

‘‘SEC. 414. NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY OF CERTAIN FACILITIES.

‘‘(a) CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVES.—In reviewing a lease,

easement, or right-of-way for an offshore wind energy facility in

Nantucket Sound under section 8(p) of the Outer Continental Shelf

Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1337(p)), not later than 60 days before the

date established by the Secretary of the Interior for publication

of a draft environmental impact statement, the Commandant of

the Coast Guard shall specify the reasonable terms and conditions

the Commandant determines to be necessary to provide for navigational safety with respect to the proposed lease, easement, or rightof-way and each alternative to the proposed lease, easement, or

right-of-way considered by the Secretary.

‘‘(b) INCLUSION OF NECESSARY TERMS AND CONDITIONS.—In

granting a lease, easement, or right-of-way for an offshore wind

energy facility in Nantucket Sound under section 8(p) of the Outer

Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1337(p)), the Secretary

shall incorporate in the lease, easement, or right-of-way reasonable

terms and conditions the Commandant determines to be necessary

to provide for navigational safety.’’.

Attest:

Secretary of the Senate.

Attest:

Clerk of the House of Representatives.
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 100 (Wednesday, May 27, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 25282-25283]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-12279]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 72-71-EA; ASLBP No. 09-888-03-EA-BD01]


Detroit Edison Company; Corrected Notice of Establishment of 
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

    On May 15, 2009, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel issued 
a notice of Establishment of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board for 
Detroit Edison Company, Fermi Power Plant (Independent Spent Fuel 
Storage Installation), which incorrectly identified the docket number 
as 72-7-EA. The correct docket number is 72-71-EA. All other 
information given in the original Board Establishment Notice remains 
the same, and is repeated below.
    Pursuant to delegation by the Commission dated December 29, 1972 
(37 FR 28,710), and the Commission's regulations, see 10 CFR 2.106, 
2.300, 2.313(a), and 2.318, notice is hereby given that an Atomic 
Safety and Licensing Board (Board) is being

[[Page 25283]]

established to preside over the following proceeding: Detroit Edison 
Company, Fermi Power Plant, (Independent Spent Fuel Storage 
Installation).
    This proceeding concerns a Petition to Intervene dated May 7, 2009 
from Beyond Nuclear, et al., that was submitted in response to an April 
17, 2009 notice issued by the NRC Staff that provided the Issuance of 
Order for Implementation of Additional Security Measures and 
Fingerprinting for Unescorted Access to Detroit Edison Company (74 FR 
17,890).
    The Board is comprised of the following administrative judges:

Ronald M. Spritzer, Chair, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
Michael F. Kennedy, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
Randall J. Charbeneau, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

    All correspondence, documents, and other materials shall be filed 
in accordance with the NRC E-Filing Rule, which the NRC promulgated in 
August 2007 (72 FR 49,139).

    Issued at Rockville, Maryland, this 20th day of May 2009.
E. Roy Hawkens,
Chief Administrative Judge, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel.
[FR Doc. E9-12279 Filed 5-26-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
#### Harold SMITH, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Alberto R. GONZALES; Harley G. Lappin; Richard Holt; John J. Lamanna, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 06-6326.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Oct. 31, 2006.

Decided: Nov. 3, 2006.

Harold Smith, Appellant Pro Se.

Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Harold Smith, a federal prisoner, seeks to appeal the district court’s order affirming the magistrate judge’s order denying Smith’s motion for appointment of counsel in his action filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000). This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000), and certain interlocutory *309and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2000); Fed.R.CivJP. 54(b); *Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,*387 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). The order Smith seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.* Smith’s motion for leave to perpetuate testimony pending appeal is denied. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*

*

 To the extent that Smith seeks to challenge the magistrate judge’s order denying Smith’s motion to stay his case pending his transfer to another facility, he failed to appeal this order to the district court and therefore has waived further review. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a).
#### DOTTENHEIM et al. v. EMERSON ELECTRIC MFG. CO.

Civ. No. 7072.

District Court,, E. D. New York.

April 17, 1947.

Milton Pollack, of New York City, for plaintiff Lawrence B. Dottenheim.

Crawford & Parsons, of New York City, for defendant.

GALSTON, District Judge.

Pursuant to Rule 39, Sec. a (1,2), of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S. C.A. following section 723c, the defendant has moved to set aside the plaintiffs’ demand for a jury trial.

It appears from the amended complaint that the plaintiff Dottenheim is a stockholder of the defendant. It is alleged that W. Stuart Symington was president of the corporation, and that he purchased 20,000 shares of the common stock of the defendant and sold them at a profit of $57,872. It is therefore alleged that under the provisions of Sec. 16(b) of the Security and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p (b), that profit inured to and was recoverable by the defendant. Symington failed to pay the profit to the defendant and the corporation, with notice and knowledge of *344the facts, failed to demand the profit from him.

As a stockholder, Dottenheim investigated the matter for the purpose of determining whether the transactions were within the framework of the statute. To that end, Dottenheim employed an attorney, Morton Frederick, and as a result of the facts ascertained, the defendant was requested to commence suit against^ Symington. It is alleged that in consequence thereof, Symington paid to the defendant the aforesaid profits.

Dottenheim, in this cause of action, seeks to recover the reasonable value of the services of the said attorney, which he alleges is not less than $14,468.

The defendant contends that the cause of action thus alleged seeks relief which could be granted only by a court of equity, and that therefore the plaintiff is not entitled to a trial by jury.

There is no provision in the statute under consideration with respect to reimbursement of a stockholder for expenses which were incurred by him in the circumstances set forth in this suit.

The defendant had previously made a motion to dismiss the complaint before another judge of the court. The motion was granted as to the second cause of action (which related to an assignment by Frederick to the plaintiff Sylvia Raizman of his claim against the defendant). Judge Inch wrote: “It is well established that as a prerequisite to a recovery upon implied contract, the plaintiff must allege and prove, either an express contract of hire * * * or the existence of circumstances from which * * * an agreement may be inferred.”

It seems perfectly clear from a reading of the complaint that plaintiffs’ cause of action is of an equitable nature. If it had arisen before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it certainly could not have been tried on the jury side of the court. Our rules of civil procedure neither enlarged nor diminished the pre-existing law as to the right of a trial by jury.

The motion is granted. Settle order.