COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judge Bray, Senior Judges Baker and Overton*

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

ROBERT M. McCOMBS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION**

v. Record No. 0341-98-1 PER CURIAM 

 FEBRUARY 2, 1999 

ROSEMARY M. McCOMBS 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

A. Bonwill Shockley, Judge 

 Reeves W. Mahoney (Timothy M. Richardson; 

Huff, Poole & Mahoney, P.C., on briefs), for 

appellant. 

 Kenneth W. Stolle (Bennett & Stolle, P.C., on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Relying upon the terms of a "Stipulation Agreement" with his 

former wife, Rosemary M. McCombs (wife), Robert M. McCombs 

(husband) moved the trial court to deny wife earnings which 

accrued on her undistributed share of husband's "retirement 

accounts" after the agreed valuation date. The court determined 

that the agreement allotted wife a settled share of the subject 

accounts "based on a valuation date of January 1, 1994,"1

together with "the dividends and any interest on [wife's] portion 

 

 *Judge Overton participated in the hearing and decision of 

this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on 

January 31, 1999 and thereafter by his designation as a senior 

judge pursuant to Code § 17.1-401, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.01:1. 

 **Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication. 

 1Contrary to the recitation in the disputed order, the 

agreement provides, "as valued on January 1, 1994." 
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. . . [which] shall accrue from [that date] forward." Husband 

appeals, contending that the ruling departs from the terms of the 

agreement. We agree, and reverse the order. 

 When called upon to construe property settlement agreements, 

"our threshold inquiry is whether their terms are ambiguous." 

Smith v. Smith, 3 Va. App. 510, 513, 351 S.E.2d 593, 595 (1986). 

 "[A]mbiguity exists when [the] language admits of being 

understood in more than one way or refers to two or more things 

at the same time." Id. (citations omitted). Although the 

parties to an agreement "may advance different interpretations of 

the provisions . . ., this 'does not necessarily imply the 

existence of ambiguity where there otherwise is none.'" Douglas 

v. Hammett, 28 Va. App. 517, 523, 507 S.E.2d 98, 101 (1998) 

(citation omitted). 

 Absent ambiguity, the rights of the parties are determined 

by the language of the agreement, applied consistent with 

"ordinary meaning" and without judicial revision. Smith, 3 Va. 

App. at 514, 351 S.E.2d at 595. The "meaning and effect" of an 

unambiguous agreement "are questions of law to be determined by 

the court," and "we are not bound by [a] trial court's 

construction of . . . contract provisions . . . in issue." 

Tiffany v. Tiffany, 1 Va. App. 11, 15, 332 S.E.2d 796, 799 

(1985). 

 Here, at the outset, we find no ambiguity in those 

provisions of the agreement in issue. The language expressly 
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provides for the transfer of "[f]ifty percent (50%) of husband's 

retirement accounts . . . as valued on January 1, 1994," to 

wife.2

 "[S]egregat[ion] in a separate account . . . for wife" 

was to occur "as soon as possible after entry of a final divorce 

decree and . . . [Q.D.R.O.] prepared by wife's counsel." Such 

language clearly manifests the intent of the parties that wife 

later receive one-half of the aggregate value of the subject 

accounts as determined on January 1, 1994, a date which preceded 

the agreement by nearly two years, without mention of 

subsequently accrued earnings. 

 The parties, therefore, did not contemplate the inclusion of 

dividends and interest on wife's share. They simply agreed upon 

an uncomplicated formula which permitted each to 

contemporaneously and precisely determine their respective 

benefits and burdens relative to the accounts, thereby promoting 

a mutually acceptable and expeditious resolution of differences. 

 Accordingly, we reverse the disputed order and remand the 

proceedings to the trial court for further disposition consistent 

 2 Retirement Accounts: As an obligation which 

shall not be dischargeable in bankruptcy, 

Wife shall receive Fifty percent (50%) of 

Husband's retirement accounts at Eastern 

Virginia Medical School . . . as valued on 

January 1, 1994 which shall be "rolled over" 

or separated or segregated into a separate 

account or accounts for Wife as soon as 

possible after entry of a final divorce 

decree and a Qualified Domestic Relations 

Order ("Q.R.D.O.") prepared by Wife's counsel 

and endorsed by Husband's counsel. 
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with this opinion. 

 Reversed and remanded.