IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Shanyse Rushemeza, : CASES CONSOLIDATED

 Petitioner :

 :

 v. : Nos. 1586 C.D. 2022

: 1587 C.D. 2022

Unemployment Compensation : 1588 C.D. 2022

Board of Review, : 1589 C.D. 2022

 Respondent :

: Submitted: June 4, 2024

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE WOLF FILED: July 8, 2024

Shanyse Rushemeza (Claimant) petitions for review from four identical 

decisions of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board), affirming 

a Referee’s determinations finding her ineligible for benefits under Section 402(b) 

of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law).1 For the reasons that follow, we 

affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Claimant was employed by Fulton Bank NA from September 2018 

through March 12, 2021, as a full-time repossession administrator at a rate of pay of 

$18.75 per hour. She was earning approximately $36,000 annually. Claimant 

1 Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §

802(b) (relating to leaving work without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature).
2

resides with her husband who earns approximately $38,000 annually. Certified 

Record (C.R.) at 83, Referee’s Finding of Fact (F.F.) Nos. 1, 3-4.

After her last day of work on March 12, 2021, Claimant went on 

maternity leave with a scheduled return date of May 4, 2021. Prior to her scheduled 

return date, Claimant researched daycare centers and found the most reasonable 

option to be approximately $200 per week. Claimant did not return to work after the 

expiration of her maternity leave; rather, she resigned due to the cost of childcare. 

C.R. at 82, F.F. Nos. 2, 5-6. 

Claimant then filed for unemployment compensation benefits. 

Claimant continued to search for work after her separation. She remained able and 

available for work from home and was also available to work during weeknights and 

on weekends when her husband was available to watch their child. C.R. at 82, F.F. 

Nos. 7-9. 

Following a review and investigation of Claimant’s claim for 

unemployment compensation benefits, the UC Service Center found her ineligible. 

Claimant appealed and a hearing was held before a Referee. Employer did not attend 

the hearing. C.R. at 83, Referee’s Decision at 2. 

The Referee denied benefits pursuant to Section 402(b) of the Law. 

The Referee acknowledged that lack of childcare may, in some cases, give rise to a 

necessitous and compelling reason for voluntary separation from employment; 

however, in this case, given the combined incomes of Claimant and her husband, the 

Referee determined that the issue was not a lack of childcare, but rather Claimant’s 

belief that she was unable to afford childcare. Based on the totality of the credible 

evidence presented, the Referee determined that Claimant was not in a more 

favorable financial situation as a result of resigning; rather, “[C]laimant made a 
3

personal choice to not . . . place her child in daycare.” C.R. at 84, Referee’s Decision 

at 3. Thus, the Referee held that Claimant did not establish a necessitous and 

compelling reason for her separation from employment. Id.2

For the compensable weeks ending June 5, 2021, through November 

27, 2021, Claimant received regular unemployment compensation benefits in the 

amount of $10,088. For compensable weeks ending June 5, 2021 through September 

4, 2021, Claimant received federal pandemic unemployment compensation benefits 

in the amount of $4,200. C.R. at 82, F.F. Nos. 10-11. The Referee held that 

Claimant had a nonfault overpayment for the unemployment compensation benefits 

and a nonfraud overpayment for federal pandemic unemployment compensation 

benefits. 

Claimant appealed and the Board affirmed, adopting and incorporating 

the Referee’s findings and conclusions. Claimant filed petitions for review to this 

Court. By order dated April 27, 2023, this Court granted the Board’s motions to 

consolidate Claimant’s appeals.

ISSUE

On appeal,3 Claimant challenges the Board’s determination that she did 

not have a necessitous and compelling reason for her voluntary separation under 

Section 402(b) of the Law. 

2 The Referee further held that Claimant was able and available for work pursuant to Section 

401(d)(1) of the Law, 43 P.S. § 801(d)(1) (pertaining to whether a claimant is able and available 

for suitable work). This portion of the Referee’s ruling is not in dispute. 

3 Our review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether an 

error of law was committed, or whether the necessary factual findings are supported by substantial 

evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 704.
4

DISCUSSION

In an unemployment compensation case, the Board’s findings of fact 

are binding on appeal if the findings, after reviewing the record as a whole, 

are supported by substantial evidence. Brandt v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of 

Rev., 643 A.2d 78, 79 (Pa. 1994). Substantial evidence has been defined by this 

Court as “relevant evidence upon which a reasonable mind could base a 

conclusion.” Johnson v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 502 A.2d 738, 740 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1986). We examine the evidence and testimony in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party, giving that party the benefit of any inferences 

logically and reasonably drawn from the evidence. Id. The critical consideration in 

assessing the Board’s findings is not whether evidence exists in the record 

that could support a contrary finding, but rather, whether there is evidence to support 

the findings the Board made. Rodriguez v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 174 

A.3d 1158, 1163 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). 

Under Section 402(b) of the Law, an employee is ineligible for 

unemployment benefits for any week “[i]n which his unemployment is due to 

voluntarily leaving work without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature.” In 

a voluntary quit case, the claimant has the burden of proving the right to 

unemployment compensation benefits. St. Clair Hosp. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. 

of Rev., 154 A.3d 401, 404 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (en banc). Although the Law does 

not define the term “necessitous and compelling,” case law has discussed it. An 

employee who claims to have left employment for a necessitous and compelling 

reason must prove that: (1) circumstances existed which produced real and 

substantial pressure to terminate employment; (2) such circumstances would compel 

a reasonable person to act in the same manner; (3) the claimant acted with ordinary 
5

common sense; and (4) the claimant made a reasonable effort to preserve her 

employment. Fitzgerald v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 714 A.2d 1126, 1129 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). 

The inability of a parent to care for a child may constitute a necessitous 

and compelling reason for terminating employment. See Truitt v. Unemployment 

Comp. Bd. of Rev., 589 A.2d 208, 210 (Pa. 1991); Shaffer v. Unemployment Comp. 

Bd. of Rev., 928 A.2d 391, 394 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007); Gantner v. Unemployment 

Comp. Bd. of Rev., 723 A.2d 272, 274 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). In order to prove a 

necessitous and compelling reason to quit, a claimant must establish that she 

exhausted all other alternative childcare arrangements, such as making a concerted 

effort to find another babysitter or locate a daycare center. Shaffer. 

Here, Claimant notes that she and her husband make a combined 

$74,000 annually while the cost of daycare (at the least expensive daycare center 

that Claimant could find) would total over $10,000 annually. Claimant contends 

that case law appears to reflect that the standard applied in these situations is whether 

childcare expenses would total more than what an employee earns. Claimant asserts 

this is an unreasonable standard and that, for public policy reasons, this Court should 

set a lesser standard. “[Claimant] advocates for this Honorable Court to adopt the 

standard of it being a necessitous and compelling reason to terminate employment 

where the least expensive childcare available would cost more than 25% of an 

employee’s gross salary . . . .” Claimant’s Brief at 11. 

In response, the Board contends that Claimant failed to show that her 

decision to resign due to the cost of childcare constituted a necessitous and 

compelling reason to quit. The Board correctly held that, considering Claimant and 
6

her husband’s combined income, preserving her employment would not have created 

circumstances that necessitated Claimant to voluntarily quit employment. 

The Board notes that by quitting her employment, Claimant lost nearly 

50% of her total household income whereas, if she had continued to work, the cost 

of childcare (at $200 per week) would have amounted to only approximately 14% 

of her total household income. Board’s Brief at 7. Claimant was not in a more 

favorable financial situation as a result of resigning; rather, Claimant made a 

personal choice to not pay to place her child in daycare. Id. The facts of this case 

are similar to those presented in Elmolla v. Unemployment Compensation Board of 

Review (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 811 C.D. 2014, filed January 23, 2015) (holding that the 

claimant failed to establish an inability to afford childcare and that quitting merely 

removed the childcare expense), slip op. at 6.

4

 Furthermore, the Board argues, 

Claimant’s recommendation for a 25% threshold is arbitrary and unsupported by the 

Law. 

Based on our review of the record, we cannot say that the Board erred 

in concluding that Claimant failed to establish a necessitous and compelling reason 

for her separation from employment. Admittedly, the cost of childcare is 

burdensome, and we empathize with Claimant’s situation. Nevertheless, the record 

is devoid of any evidence establishing that Claimant was unable to afford childcare. 

Instead, Claimant asks this Court to issue an arbitrary, across-the-board

standard that if a claimant’s childcare expenses total more than 25% of the claimant’s

salary, they have a necessitous and compelling reason to leave employment. 

4 Unreported memorandum opinions of this Court filed after January 15, 2008, may be cited 

for their persuasive value pursuant to Rule 126(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, Pa. R.A.P. 126(b), and Section 414(a) of the Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 

210 Pa. Code §69.414(a). 
7

Obviously, this Court is in no position to establish policy and make such a ruling.

Claimant’s efforts in this regard would be better focused on the Legislature.

As the Board aptly observed, Claimant’s decision to quit her 

employment and reduce her family’s household income in half did not improve her 

family’s financial situation. Indeed, like the claimant in Elmolla, Claimant’s 

decision to quit her employment in this case simply removed the potential childcare 

expense. Without more, we must conclude that Claimant has not met her burden of 

showing a necessitous and compelling reason to leave her employment. 

Accordingly, the order of the Board is affirmed. 

_____________________________________

MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Shanyse Rushemeza, : CASES CONSOLIDATED

 Petitioner :

 :

 v. : Nos. 1586 C.D. 2022

: 1587 C.D. 2022

: 1588 C.D. 2022

Unemployment Compensation : 1589 C.D. 2022

Board of Review, :

 Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 8th day of July, 2024, the Unemployment 

Compensation Board of Review’s orders dated December 13, 2022 are AFFIRMED.

_____________________________________

MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge