Filed 11/9/21 P. v. Garcia CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

YADIRA GARCIA,

Defendant and Appellant.

F081650

(Super. Ct. No. MCR032569)

OPINION

THE COURT*

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Madera County. Mitchell C. 

Rigby, Judge.

Conness A. Thompson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant

and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and Paul E. 

O’Connor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOoo-

* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Detjen, J. and Smith, J.
2.

Defendant Yadira Garcia was found not guilty by reason of insanity of battery of a 

nonconfined person while in prison in 2009. Between 2009 and 2012 she was committed 

to the State Department of State Hospitals-Patton (Patton State Hospital); she was 

released to an outpatient program between 2012 and 2015; and in 2015 she was again 

committed to Patton State Hospital where her commitment was extended by the trial 

court for two years in 2016 and again in 2018. In 2020, a jury found that defendant 

represented a substantial risk of physical harm to others as a result of her mental disease, 

defect, or disorder, and the trial court extended her commitment at Patton State Hospital 

for two years. Defendant appeals that order, contending that the evidence presented at 

trial was insufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict. The People disagree. We affirm.

PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

On July 23, 2008, the Madera County District Attorney filed a complaint charging 

defendant with battery on a nonconfined person while confined in state prison (Pen. 

Code, § 4501.5;1 count 1). 

On January 7, 2009, defendant pled guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. 

After entry of the pleas, the trial court took evidence and found defendant not guilty by 

reason of insanity. 

On January 28, 2009, the trial court committed defendant to the custody of Patton 

State Hospital for treatment (§ 1026) for a term not to exceed four years. 

On March 21, 2012, the trial court ordered that defendant be released to outpatient 

treatment through the Central California Conditional Release Program (CONREP). Her 

release to CONREP was extended three times—on April 24, 2013, on March 26, 2014, 

and again on May 13, 2015. 

On September 16, 2015, the trial court found that defendant violated the rules of 

CONREP. The court further concluded that she continued to suffer from a mental 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3.

disease, defect, or disorder that caused her to pose a substantial risk of harm to herself 

and the public and therefore committed her to Patton State Hospital. Her commitment 

was extended for two years pursuant to section 1026.5, subdivision (b), on May 11, 2016, 

and again on May 2, 2018. 

On December 27, 2019, the People filed a petition pursuant to section 1026.5, 

subdivision (b), to extend defendant’s commitment for two additional years. On July 16, 

2020, a jury found that defendant posed a substantial risk of harm to others as a result of 

a mental disease, defect, or disorder. The jury further found not true that defendant no 

longer posed a substantial danger of physical harm to others because she was taking 

medicine that controlled her mental condition and that she would continue to take that 

medicine in an unsupervised environment. On the same date, the trial court extended 

defendant’s commitment at Patton State Hospital for two years. 

On August 27, 2020, defendant filed a notice of appeal. 

FACTUAL SUMMARY2

Dr. Kerry Hannifin

Hannifin was a forensic psychologist at Patton State Hospital. Her job duties 

included diagnosis, treatment, and risk assessment of patients at Patton State Hospital. 

She prepared a section 1026.5 extension report recommending that defendant’s 

commitment to Patton State Hospital be extended for two years. Before she prepared her 

report, she communicated with defendant’s treatment team, and reviewed several months 

of defendant’s treatment records, hospital records regarding any incidents defendant had 

been involved in, and emergency medication administrations. She further considered 

defendant’s diagnosis, the reason for the diagnosis, defendant’s understanding of her 

diagnosis and symptoms, her prescribed medication, defendant’s feelings regarding her 

2 The facts relevant to this appeal are those presented at the trial regarding the 

People’s December 29, 2019 petition to extend defendant’s commitment.
4.

need for medication, her current treatments, defendant’s understanding of and 

participation in her treatments, her history of violence over the past year, her 

understanding of her triggers, and her plan to cope with symptoms moving forward.

Hannifin understood that defendant was originally committed to Patton State 

Hospital because of a mental health episode while she was in prison. She opined that 

defendant continued to suffer from schizoaffective disorder, depressive type; and 

substance abuse disorder, including use of alcohol, opioids, and methamphetamine. 

Persons with schizoaffective disorder display symptoms that can include hallucinations 

and delusions. Persons with schizoaffective disorder, depressive type, also exhibit 

depression symptoms which might include sadness, withdrawn or isolative behavior, or 

flat affect, self-harm, suicidal tendencies, and lack of motivation. Defendant’s 

hallucinations and delusions were “no longer ... prominent symptom[s], meaning that 

they seem[ed] to be very well controlled with her medication ....” However, defendant 

continued to display symptoms of depression, including flat affect, and withdrawn and 

isolative behavior. Defendant previously expressed to Hannifin that she had difficulty 

abstaining from substance abuse when not committed, which exacerbated her symptoms. 

She also previously described to Hannifin having previously suffered from depression, 

delusions, and auditory hallucinations. When suffering from those symptoms, defendant 

engaged in violent behavior. 

Recently, defendant had been compliant with her prescribed medication, causing 

her hallucinations and delusions to stabilize; had not engaged in any acts of violence in 

the previous year; had not requested any emergency medication in the previous year; had 

attended 97 percent of her treatment groups; and had started work on a relapse prevention 

plan. However, based on her review of defendant’s medical records and her examination 

of defendant, Hannifin concluded that defendant continued to exhibit symptoms of 

depression. 
5.

Hannifin concluded that defendant continued to pose a substantial risk of physical 

harm to others as a result of her mental disease, defect, or disorder. She posed a risk 

because she continued to exhibit symptoms of her psychiatric disorder, primarily 

depressive disorder, but she did “not fully recognize that she ha[d] those symptoms.” 

Hannifin explained that long-term control of psychiatric symptoms required more than 

medication—it required defendant to have some insight into her condition. Defendant 

identified her diagnoses as schizophrenia and depression; symptoms as auditory 

hallucinations; triggers as loud noises, seeing people using drugs and alcohol, “ ‘old 

neighborhoods, [and] old friends’ ”; she identified her warning signs for decompensation

as “ ‘not taking [her] med[ication], not eating and not sleeping’ ”; she identified her 

coping skills as listening to “ ‘music, drawing, talking to family or friends, crocheting, 

and anything crafty’ ”; she agreed that she needed to be on her medication because it 

stabilized her. However, when asked about her depressive symptoms, defendant stated 

that she last experienced symptoms six months ago. Although defendant had insight into 

her schizoaffective disorder and had made progress with respect to those symptoms, 

because of her complete lack of insight into her depressive symptoms, Hannifin opined 

defendant would be unable to recognize and cope with her symptoms in the community 

which would likely lead to her psychological decompensation or substance abuse. She 

opined that defendant required additional treatment for her depressive symptoms. 

On cross-examination, Hannifin testified that defendant’s uncontrolled depressive 

symptoms made her a danger to others. Whether defendant actively interacted with 

others at the hospital, whether defendant appeared to be withdrawn, and whether 

defendant had recently engaged in dangerous behavior were all relevant to her 

determination that defendant continued to have depressive symptoms. But even if 

defendant sometimes engaged with others, was not completely withdrawn, and had not 

recently exhibited dangerous behavior, it would not undermine Hannifin’s conclusion 

that defendant exhibited depressive symptoms into which she had no insight. 
6.

Defendant

Defendant acknowledged that she has schizoaffective disorder, depressive type. 

She testified that “[she] hear[d] voices, ... sometimes [she] s[aw] things, and ... [she had] 

depression.” When she got depressed, she would “isolate [her]self[] and [did not] want to 

get out of bed.” While defendant agreed with the diagnoses, she testified that she had not 

heard voices in five years, had not seen visual hallucinations in 11 years, and her 

depression was stable. The last time defendant had visual or auditory hallucinations she 

was taking her prescribed medication, but it was a different medication. Defendant 

testified that she was committed to Patton State Hospital when her CONREP release was 

revoked because of her drug use. She used drugs in that instance because she was 

involved in an unhealthy romantic relationship. Defendant’s previous unhealthy 

relationships shared the common feature of having been with gang members. She 

decided that going forward she would only enter into relationships with “somebody more 

stable[;] somebody with a job[;] somebody more sophisticated.” She recognized that any 

relationship would need to be with someone who would support her in being sober. In 

addition to the change in her romantic relationship goals, defendant also regularly talked 

to her family, participated in programs at the hospital, participated in the “work 

government,” and went to her “groups” to help keep her stable. Defendant’s family 

learned that she had a mental illness and had become very supportive. Her family knew 

the resources available to her and knew how important it was that she take her 

medication. Defendant believed that her family would support her if she was released 

from Patton State Hospital. 

Defendant acknowledged that she previously had difficulty controlling her 

behavior. However, she stated that she could control her symptoms because she had 

acquired skills and tools to do so at the group sessions at Patton State Hospital. She had 

practiced the skills in her years at the hospital and she had decided that she was ready to 

go take care of her mother. Defendant was also prescribed medication for her 
7.

schizoaffective disorder and depression. She took the medication twice every day. She 

understood that she needed to take her medication twice every day for the rest of her life. 

Defendant knew how to address her depression symptoms. When she felt herself 

starting to get depressed, she needed to force herself to get out of bed and seek out 

someone for help or talk to a family member. She also used her coping skills—listening 

to music, drawing, exercising, taking a walk, talking to staff, and helping in “work 

government.” The last time defendant was engaged in any kind of violence was in 2016 

when she got into a fight with another patient at the hospital. The last time defendant 

used illegal drugs was in 2017. Since then, she became involved in narcotics and alcohol 

treatment programs. 

DISCUSSION

The jury found that defendant’s mental illness caused her to represent a substantial 

danger of physical harm to others. (See § 1026.5, subd. (b)(1).) The jury further found 

not true that defendant no longer posed a substantial danger of physical harm to others 

because she was taking medication that controlled her mental condition and that she 

would continue to take that medicine in an unsupervised environment. Defendant 

contends that the jury’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence. The People 

disagree, as do we.

1. Legal Framework

In a proceeding pursuant to section 1026.5, if the People prove that a defendant, 

“by reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder represents a substantial danger of 

physical harm to others,” the defendant will be recommitted for an additional period of

two years from the date of termination of the previous commitment. (§ 1026.5, 

subd. (b)(1), (8).) Proof that a defendant “represents a substantial danger of physical 

harm to others” under section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(1) requires proof that the defendant 

has “had serious difficulty controlling his potentially dangerous behavior.” (People v. 

Zapisek (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1159 (Zapisek); People v. Bowers (2006) 145 
8.

Cal.App.4th 870, 878.) “ ‘ “ ‘In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a 

section 1026.5 extension, we apply the test used to review a judgment of conviction; 

therefore, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the extension order to 

determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the requirements of 

section 1026.5[, subdivision] (b)(1) beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” ’ ” (Zapisek, at 

p. 1165.) We do not reweigh the evidence or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. 

(People v. Mohamed (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 515, 521.)

“ ‘ “ ‘Whether a defendant “by reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder 

represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others” under section 1026.5 is a 

question of fact to be resolved with the assistance of expert testimony.’ ... [Citation.]” 

[Citation.] A single psychiatric opinion that an individual is dangerous because of a 

mental disorder constitutes substantial evidence to support an extension of the 

defendant’s commitment under section 1026.5.’ ” (Zapisek, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1165.) “However, ‘expert medical opinion evidence that is based upon a “ ‘guess, 

surmise or conjecture, rather than relevant, probative facts, cannot constitute substantial 

evidence.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Redus (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 998, 1011.)

2. Analysis

The parties are in agreement that the evidence supported the conclusion that 

defendant had a mental disorder. Defendant’s argument is instead focused on whether 

the evidence was sufficient to show that she posed a “substantial danger of physical harm 

to others” (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(1)) and had “a serious difficulty controlling [her] 

potentially dangerous behavior” (Zapisek, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 1159). 

Defendant argues that no evidence was presented to show that her mental disorder 

caused her to have serious difficulty controlling her behavior. Instead, she contends that 

Hannifin “hypothesized that if [defendant] [was] depressed and her depressive symptoms 

were not controlled then that in-and-of-itself would make [her] a danger to the 

community.” We disagree with defendant’s characterization of the evidence. 
9.

Hannifin testified that defendant’s schizoaffective disorder, depressive type has a 

psychotic component and a mood component. Based on her review of defendant’s 

medical records and her examination of defendant, defendant exhibited depressive 

symptoms (the mood component) but had a complete lack of insight into those 

symptoms. She explained that because of defendant’s complete lack of insight into her 

depressive symptoms—which was required for long-term control of her symptoms—she 

would be unable to recognize and cope with her symptoms in the community which 

would likely lead to her psychological decompensation or substance abuse. When 

defendant’s symptoms were uncontrolled in the past, she engaged in violent behavior. 

Indeed, defendant testified that she had difficulty in the past controlling her behavior. 

From that evidence, in the light most favorable to the jury’s finding, a jury could 

reasonably have concluded that defendant, by reason of her mental disease, defect, or 

disorder, had serious difficulty controlling her dangerous behavior, and represented a 

substantial danger of physical harm to others; and that the danger was not controlled by 

medication.

We find defendant’s arguments that Hannifin’s conclusions were based on 

speculation or conjecture to be unpersuasive. Hannifin reviewed defendant’s medical 

records and examined her, described defendant’s depressive symptoms that put her at risk 

of decompensation or drug use, and explained that her lack of insight into those 

symptoms would prevent long-term control of her symptoms and behaviors. Hannifin’s 

opinion of defendant’s dangerousness as a result of her mental condition was a prediction 

based on her review of defendant’s history and records, examination of defendant, and 

professional training and experience. That was sufficient to support the jury’s finding. 

That Hannifin did not predict the exact mechanism by which defendant’s decompensation

and drug use might occur did not render her opinion speculative. 

We also find defendant’s argument that defendant’s depressive symptoms were 

inadequate to render her unable to control her dangerous behavior to be unpersuasive. 
10.

Defendant invites us to conclude that because defendant did not presently suffer from the 

psychotic portion of schizoaffective disorder, depressive type—only the mood portion—

that she was not unable to control her symptoms or dangerous behavior. (Cf. Zapisek, 

supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1165–1168 [evidence that defendant experienced psychotic 

symptoms and had assaultive behaviors was sufficient to support an extension pursuant to 

section 1026.5]; People v. Bowers, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 879 [same].) While 

demonstrating that a defendant suffers from psychotic symptoms like hallucinations and 

delusions that cause a defendant to be dangerous are one way to prove that extension of 

commitment is required pursuant to section 1026.5, it is not the only path. (See, e.g., 

People v. Williams (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 861, 872–874; People v. Kendrid (2012) 205 

Cal.App.4th 1360, 1364–1365, 1370.) Moreover, we are not permitted to discount or 

reweigh Hannifin’s opinion that defendant’s depressive symptoms and lack of insight 

into them posed a substantial risk of defendant’s decompensation, drug use, and harm to 

others. (Williams, at p. 874; People v. Mercer (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 463, 466–467.)

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.