[Cite as State v. Christian, 2017-Ohio-8249.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

MONTGOMERY COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

EVA CHRISTIAN 

Defendant-Appellant

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C.A. CASE NO. 27236 

T.C. NO. 11-CR-563 

(Criminal Appeal from 

 Common Pleas Court) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the ___20th __ day of _____October_____, 2017. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

HEATHER N. JANS, Atty. Reg. No. 0084470, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 301 W. 

Third Street, 5th floor, Dayton, Ohio 45422 

 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

BROCK A. SCHOENLEIN, Atty. Reg. No. 0084707, 371 W. First Street, Second Floor, 

Dayton, Ohio 45402 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

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DONOVAN, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Eva Christian appeals a decision of the Montgomery 

County Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division, resentencing her to nine years in 

prison. Christian filed a timely notice of appeal on August 25, 2016. 

{¶ 2} We set forth the history of the case in State v. Christian, 2d Dist. Montgomery 

No. 25256, 2014-Ohio-2672 (hereinafter ”Christian I”), and repeat it herein in pertinent 
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part: 

In March 2011, Christian was indicted as follows: Count One, 

insurance fraud (related to her home), in an amount greater than or equal 

to $5,000 but less than $100,000; Count Two, insurance fraud (related to 

the restaurant), in an amount greater than $100,000; Count Three, making 

false alarm (related to the burglary at her home), resulting in economic harm 

of more than $5,000 but less than $100,000; and Count Four, making false 

alarm (related to the vandalism and fire at the restaurant), with economic 

harm of $500 or more but less than $5,000. In June 2011, an additional 

count of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity (Count Five) was added by 

a separate indictment. Christian filed a motion to suppress evidence, which 

was overruled following a hearing. The matter was tried to a jury over 

several days in May 2012. The jury found Christian guilty on all counts. 

 The trial court sentenced Christian to 18 months and 36 months, 

respectively, on counts one and two of insurance fraud; it sentenced her to 

18 and 12 months, respectively, on counts three and four, making false 

alarms. The court sentenced Christian to nine years on the count of 

engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. The court ordered that counts one 

through four were to be served consecutively to each other but concurrently 

with count five, for an aggregate term of nine years. The trial court ordered 

Christian to pay restitution as follows: $51,751.96 to Cincinnati Insurance, 

$21,485.29 to Erie Insurance; $8,647.33 to the Montgomery County 

Sheriff's Department; and $2,748.77 to the Miami Township Fire 
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Department. The court also ordered Christian to pay court costs and to 

forfeit her house, due to its use in her offense of engaging in a pattern of 

corrupt activity. It informed Christian that she would be subject to postrelease control for five years on Count Five and that she may be subject to 

post-release control for three years on all of the other offenses. 

Id. at ¶ 21, 22. 

{¶ 3} In Christian I, we reversed Christian’s conviction for engaging in a pattern of 

corrupt activity. Additionally, we modified Christian’s convictions for insurance fraud 

(Count II) and making false alarms (Count III) to reflect lower degrees of the offenses 

pursuant to H.B. 86. Thereafter, we remanded the matter to the trial court for 

resentencing on Counts II and III. The State appealed our decision to the Ohio Supreme 

Court, which reversed and remanded on the basis of its decision in State v. Beverly, 143 

Ohio St.3d 258, 2015-Ohio-219, 37 N.E.3d 116. State v. Christian, 143 Ohio St.3d 417, 

2015-Ohio-3374, 38 N.E.3d 888. 

{¶ 4} In State v. Christian, 2016-Ohio-516, 56 N.E.3d 391 (2d Dist.) (hereinafter 

”Christian II”), we stated the following in pertinent part: 

In our prior Opinion [Christian I], we reversed Christian’s conviction 

for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, finding that it was supported by 

insufficient evidence. Specifically, we held that there was insufficient 

evidence that Christian had engaged in an “enterprise” with the two 

individuals who helped her stage the events that gave rise to her convictions 

for insurance fraud; the existence of such an “enterprise” is one element of 

the offense of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. We relied on our 
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holding in State v. Beverly, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2011 CA 64, 2013-Ohio-1365, 

which held that, in order to establish the “enterprise,” there must be some 

evidence of “(1) an ongoing organization, formal or informal; (2) with 

associates that function as a continuing unit; and (3) with a structure 

separate and apart, or distinct, from the pattern of corrupt activity.” Christian 

at ¶ 74, quoting Beverly at ¶ 26. We found that the “structure” of the efforts 

of Christian and her associates did not go beyond Christian’s efforts to stage 

crimes to defraud her insurance companies, and thus that the organization 

did not have “a structure separate and apart, or distinct, from the pattern of 

corrupt activity.” Christian at ¶ 76-79. 

 The State appealed from our judgment reversing Christian’s 

conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. The State also asked 

us to certify a conflict between our holding and several holdings of other 

courts of appeals, and we did certify that Christian was in conflict with one 

of those cases. State v. Christian, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25256, Decision 

& Entry, August 24, 2014. 

**** 

 The Supreme Court decided Beverly in January 2015. State v. 

Beverly, 143 Ohio St.3d 258, 2015-Ohio-219, 37 N.E.3d 116. It held that 

“[n]othing in R.C. Chapter 2923 [which includes R.C. 2923.32, defining the 

offense of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity] implicitly or explicitly 

states that an enterprise and a pattern of corrupt activity must be proven 

with separate evidence.” Id. at ¶ 8. The court further stated that, with respect 
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to proof of the existence of an enterprise and of the associated pattern of 

corrupt activity, one does not necessarily establish the other, but “logically, 

evidence that proves one of the elements can sometimes prove the other, 

even though it doesn’t necessarily do so.” Id. at ¶ 10. 

 In so holding, the Court rejected this court's holding in Beverly that 

there was insufficient evidence that the defendants were involved in any 

type of ongoing organization, functioning as a continuing unit, with a 

structure separate and apart from the pattern of corrupt activity. The 

Supreme Court also, sua sponte, rejected any argument that the conviction 

was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

 Subsequently, the Supreme Court vacated our judgment in Christian 

[I] and remanded for us to “consider the evidence of an enterprise in light 

of” its decision in Beverly. State v. Christian, 143 Ohio St.3d 417, 2015-

Ohio-3374, 38 N.E.3d 888, ¶ 1. ***. 

Christian II at ¶¶ 2-8. 

{¶ 5} On remand, we held in light of the Ohio Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 

statutory definition of an “enterprise” for purposes of engaging in a pattern of corrupt 

activity, as set forth in Beverly, Christian’s conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt 

activity was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of 

the evidence. Therefore, we reinstated Christian’s prior conviction of that offense, but 

we modified it from a felony of the first degree to a felony of the second degree, due to 

our prior judgment (Christian I) that the underlying offense was a felony of the fourth 

degree, rather than a felony of the third degree. Finally, we remanded the matter to the 
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trial court for resentencing on Counts II, III, and V. Christian II at ¶¶ 36, 37. 

{¶ 6} Thereafter, a hearing was held before the trial court on July 27, 2016, at 

which Christian was resentenced as follows: 

Count I, Insurance Fraud (Fourth Degree Felony): Eighteen months; 

Count II, Insurance Fraud (Reduced to a Fourth Degree Felony): Twelve 

months; 

Count III, Making False Alarms (Reduced to a Misdemeanor of the First 

Degree): 180 days; 

Count IV, Making False Alarms (Fifth Degree Felony): Twelve months; and 

Count V: Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity (Reduced to a Second 

Degree Felony): Eight years. 

The trial court ordered Count I to be served consecutively to Count IV; Count II 

was to be served consecutively to Count V; Count III was ordered to be served 

concurrently to Counts I, II, IV, and V; and Counts II and V were to be served 

concurrently with Counts I and IV, for an aggregate sentence of nine years. 

Significantly, nine years in prison is the same sentence Christian received when 

she was originally sentenced on June 19, 2012. 

{¶ 7} We note that on July 27, 2016, the trial court issued a “Supplemental 

Termination Entry” which consisted of a form in which the court simply checked off its 

reasons for ordering consecutive prison terms pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). 

Thereafter, on August 5, 2016, the trial court issued a termination entry in which it outlined 

the terms of Christian’s resentencing. The termination entry, however, did not contain 

the language pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) regarding its findings in support of its 
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imposition of consecutive sentences.1

{¶ 8} Christian’s appeal is now properly before this Court. 

{¶ 9} Christian’s sole assignment of error is as follows: 

{¶ 10} “THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RESENTENCING 

CHRISTIAN WHEN IT MADE NEW FACTUAL FINDINGS UPON RESENTENCING 

THAT CONTRADICTED THOSE MADE AT THE ORIGINAL SENTENCING, AND WHEN 

NO NEW FACTS HAD BEEN PRESENTED.” 

{¶ 11} In her sole assignment, Christian contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion at her resentencing because no new facts were presented since her original 

sentencing which warranted the imposition of consecutive sentences. We need not 

address Christian’s sole assignment, however, because we find, based on the record in 

the instant case, that the trial court erred by increasing a sentence that had been 

completed at the time of resentencing. 2 Specifically, we find that by the time that 

Christian was resentenced following our remand in Christian II, over four years had 

lapsed. By virtue of the remand in Christian II, Christian’s sentence to be served on the 

predicate offenses, Counts I, II, III, IV, totals not more than three and one-half years. In 

her original termination entry, the trial court ordered that Counts I – IV were to be served 

consecutively to one another but concurrently with Count V, for an aggregate sentence 

 

1 We note that on September 29, 2016, well after Christian filed notice of appeal with this 

Court, the trial court apparently became aware of the omission and issued a nunc pro 

tunc termination entry wherein it included the language pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) 

explaining it findings in support of consecutive sentences. 

2 On August 1, 2017, we issued an order to the parties to be prepared to address at oral 

argument, on Tuesday, August 22, 2017, the issue of whether Christian completed her 

sentence on Count II prior to her resentencing on July 27, 2016. 
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of nine years. 

{¶ 12} Before the imposition of H.B. 86, Christian’s sentences were as follows: 

Count I (Eighteen months); Count II (Thirty-Six months); Count III (Eighteen months); 

Count IV (Twelve months); and Count V (Nine years). Counts I – IV total eighty-four 

months or seven years in prison. After the imposition of H.B. 86, Christian’s sentences 

for Counts I – V were reduced by operation of law and the trial court resentenced as 

follows: 

Count I, Insurance Fraud (Fourth Degree Felony): Eighteen months; 

Count II, Insurance Fraud (Reduced to a Fourth Degree Felony): Twelve 

months; 

Count III, Making False Alarms (Reduced to a Misdemeanor of the First 

Degree): Six months [180 days]; 

Count IV, Making False Alarms (Fifth Degree Felony): Twelve months; and 

Count V, Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity (Reduced to a Second 

Degree Felony): Eight years. 

{¶ 13} As previously noted, the trial court originally ordered Counts I – IV to be 

served consecutively to one another but concurrently to Count V. After the passage and 

implementation of H.B. 86, Christian’s total sentence for Counts I – IV, served 

consecutively with one another, with the exception of Count III, a misdemeanor, is three 

and one-half years. Thus, at the time of her resentencing on July 27, 2016, Christian 

had already served over four years in prison, thereby satisfying each of her sentences 

imposed for Counts I – IV. 

{¶ 14} The Fourth District Court of Appeals addressed a similar issue in State v. 
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Mockbee, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 14CA3601, 2015-Ohio-3469. In Mockbee, the defendant 

received concurrent and consecutive sentences at his initial sentencing. Following a 

reversal and remand for resentencing, the trial court imposed entirely consecutive 

sentences. Id. at ¶ 4–9. The Fourth District initially affirmed but later allowed the 

defendant to re-open his appeal to raise the issue of whether the trial court erred by 

changing sentences from concurrent to consecutive where the defendant had completed 

them prior to resentencing. Id. at ¶ 10–13. The Fourth District relied primarily on State 

v. Holdcroft, 137 Ohio St.3d 526, 2013-Ohio-5014, 1 N.E.3d 382, which involved an 

attempt to impose post-release control where the defendant already had completed his 

prison term for the offense but still remained in prison for other offenses. The Fourth 

District also cited this court's opinion in State v. Powell, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24433, 

2014-Ohio-3842, which addressed the order of service for consecutive sentences and 

construed ambiguity in favor of the defendant. In particular, the Mockbee court 

reasoned: 

At the time Mockbee was resentenced, his original sentences for 

Counts 8, 9, and 10 were for 18 months or less, and they were ordered to 

be served concurrently to each other and to his Count 12 conviction. In 

addition, Mockbee's original sentences for Counts 4 and 7 were also less 

than 18 months, but they were ordered to be served consecutively to each 

other for an aggregate term of 30 months—and concurrent to the other 

counts—including Counts 8, 9, 10, and 12. 

“[W]hen a defendant is sentenced to concurrent terms, * * * the 

sentences are served simultaneously.” State v. Fugate, 117 Ohio St.3d 261, 
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2008-Ohio-856, 883 N.E.2d 440, ¶ 22. By the time he was resentenced, 

Mockbee had already served his original sentences for his convictions on 

Counts 8, 9, and 10, which had been ordered to be served concurrently to 

each other and to his convictions on Counts 4, 7, and 12. Therefore, the 

trial court lacked jurisdiction to resentence him on Counts 8, 9, and 10 and 

to order that they be served consecutively to each other because his original 

sentences for those convictions had already been served. Holdcraft [sic], 

137 Ohio St.3d 526, 2013-Ohio-5014, 1 N.E.3d 382, ¶ 19. 

For Counts 4 (12 months) and 7 (18 months), which the trial court 

ordered to be served consecutively in its original sentencing entry, the 

aggregate 30–month term had not expired at resentencing. In Holdcroft, the 

court held that for consecutive sentences, the defendant served the 

lengthier sentence first (i.e., Holdcroft served his ten-year sentence for 

aggravated arson before his five-year sentence for arson). See also State 

v. Powell, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24433, 2014–Ohio–3842, ¶ 28 (noting 

the general absence of authority for the order in which a defendant serves 

his or her sentences when consecutive sentences are imposed on multiple 

counts, but observing that the court should construe any ambiguity in 

sentencing entry in favor of the defendant). The state relies on Ohio 

Adm.Code 5120–2–03.1(F) to argue that Counts 4 and 7 are treated as an 

aggregate 30–month sentence so that Mockbee had not served his 

sentence for either of them at resentencing. However, that provision 

specifies only the aggregate sentence to be served when consecutive 
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sentences are imposed; it does not specify a rule as to which of the 

individual sentences ordered to be served consecutive to each other is 

served first. Applying Holdcroft here, Mockbee served his original 18–month 

sentence for Count 7 first and that sentence expired by the time the trial 

court resentenced him. Therefore, the trial court lacked authority to 

resentence Mockbee on that count as well. 

Consequently, we conclude that the trial court erred by resentencing 

Mockbee on Counts 7, 8, 9, and 10 because his original sentences for those 

convictions had been completely served by him by that time. Because 

resentencing on these convictions was clearly and convincingly contrary to 

law, we sustain Mockbee's sole assignment of error on reopening. 

Mockbee at ¶ 31-34. 

{¶ 15} In the instant case, we note that in the original termination entry and every 

subsequent entry issued by the trial court, each count has always been listed in order, 

namely Count I, Count II, Count III, Count IV, and Count V. Therefore, absent any 

additional direction from the trial court, it is clear that the order in which the sentences are 

to be served should follow that particular sequence. Moreover, Counts I – IV are 

predicate offenses to Count V, so it is logical that the predicate offenses were to be served 

prior to Count V. Prior to resentencing, the trial court originally ordered that Counts I - 

IV were to be served consecutively to each other but concurrently with Count V. 

Therefore, at the very least, the sentences imposed for Counts I – IV were being served 

at the same time as the sentence imposed for Count V. Thus, by the time of 

resentencing, Christian had already served the original term imposed for Counts I – IV. 
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{¶ 16} We also note that although the Supreme Court’s specific holding in 

Holdcroft is limited to post-release control, the general rule that the court discussed to 

reach that holding is not. Significantly, the Supreme Court recognized that “[n]either this 

court’s jurisprudence nor Ohio’s criminal-sentencing statutes allow a trial court to 

resentence a defendant for an offense when the defendant has already completed the 

prison sanction for that offense.” Holdcroft at ¶ 19. Under these circumstances, “[i]t is 

irrelevant whether the defendant is still in prison for other offenses.” Id.; see also Holdcroft

at ¶ 16, citing State v. Raber, 134 Ohio St.3d 350, 2012-Ohio-5636, 982 N.E.2d 684 

(“Directly pertinent to the issue here, we held that Raber—who had served the imposed 

sentence of incarceration—had a legitimate expectation of finality in his sentence and the 

trial court was precluded from imposing additional punishment upon him”). 

{¶ 17} Conversely, the State cites State v. Martin–Williams, 5th Dist. Stark No. 

2014CA86, 2015–Ohio–780, in which the court of appeals recently declined to 

extend Holdcroft to a case in which the resentencing occurred after a remand for the 

limited purpose of the trial court making the statutory findings required to support its 

imposition of consecutive sentences. Martin–Williams, however, is distinguishable from 

the instant case. At Christian’s resentencing hearing, the trial court modified a sentence 

for Count II, a predicate offense that was already completed, altering it from concurrent 

to consecutive to Count V, the corrupt activity conviction. Similar to Mockbee, the instant 

case “does not involve resentencing to include findings to support previously imposed 

consecutive sentences, i.e., the sentences were not altered or the aggregate time of the 

pertinent offenses increased in Martin–Williams.” Mockbee at ¶ 30. 

{¶ 18} In further support of its argument that we should not extend Holdcroft to the 
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instant case, the State cites State v. Shabazz, 2017-Ohio-2984, ____ N.E.3d ____ 

(8th Dist.). In Shabazz, the trial court initially ordered the defendant's offenses to be 

served consecutively, and he did not challenge the imposition of consecutive sentences 

in his direct appeal. Similar to Martin-Williams, the imposition of a consecutive sentence 

at Shabazz's resentencing hearing did not increase his aggregate sentence for the counts 

addressed. Shabazz does not involve a situation such as in the instant case where the 

trial court initially imposed concurrent sentences and only upon a remand for 

resentencing, attempted to impose, for the first time, a consecutive sentence where one 

of the originally concurrent sentences had been completed. See Mockbee at ¶ 30. 

Accordingly, both Martin-Williams and Shabazz are distinguishable from the instant case. 

{¶ 19} In State v. Metcalf, 2016-Ohio-4923, 68 N.E.3d 371 (8th Dist.), the court 

found that correction of post-release control and sex offender classification sentencing 

errors are to be treated similarly. Id. at ¶ 20-21. Metcalf involved a defendant who was 

convicted of a sexually-oriented offense giving rise to a Tier III sex offender classification. 

Metcalf was not notified of the sex offender classification at the sentencing hearing and 

the sentencing entry made no mention of a sex offender classification. Metcalf was 

sentenced to consecutive prison terms for the sexually-oriented offense and an unrelated 

post-release control violation. The mistake was discovered after Metcalf had completed 

the sentence for the sexually-oriented offense but while he remained imprisoned on the 

post-release control violation. Metcalf was brought before the sentencing court and 

advised of the imposition of the Tier III sex offender classification, and a new sentencing 

entry was journalized to reflect the Tier III sex offender classification. 

{¶ 20} Relying upon Holdcroft, the Eighth District reversed the imposition of the 
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sex offender classification because Metcalf had completed the sentence for the sexuallyoriented offense by the time the sex offender classification was imposed. The court noted 

that Holdcroft involved post-release control, as opposed to sex offender classification, 

and stated as follows: 

Although we recognize that Holdcroft involved the imposition of postrelease control, as opposed to the sexual offender classification at issue 

here, we note that the general rules and principles relied upon by the court 

were not limited to the issue of post-release control. 

Metcalf at ¶ 20. 

{¶ 21} Most recently in State v. Beverly, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2015-CA-71, 2017-

Ohio-7093, the appellant argued in an application to reopen his appeal that he had 

completed two eighteen–month prison terms for receiving stolen property (counts II and 

V) and a twelve–month prison term for receiving stolen property (count III) prior to the 

resentencing at which the trial court ordered these sentences to be served consecutively 

to all others. Id. at ¶ 7. The appellant argued that the trial court lacked authority to make 

this change. Id. Relying on Mockbee, we found that there was a genuine issue as to 

whether appellate counsel provided prejudicially deficient representation by failing to 

challenge his resentencing on counts for which he at least potentially already had 

completed his sentence. Id. 

{¶ 22} The State cites State v. Huber, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98206, 2012-Ohio6139, for the proposition that sentences that have been vacated on appeal are void 

sentences, and therefore, could not have been completed. Specifically, the State argues 

that because Counts II, III, and V were vacated in Christian II, the sentences for those 
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counts were void, and Christian could not have completed a sentence (Count II, twelve 

months) that did not exist. 

{¶ 23} In Huber, the defendant was originally convicted of kidnapping, attempted 

felonious assault, and two counts of aggravated robbery, all with repeat violent offender 

and notice of prior conviction specifications. The trial court sentenced Huber to an 

aggregate 15 years in prison. The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed Huber's 

convictions, but held that the trial court erred by sentencing him to six-years on each of 

the aggravated robbery counts and merging them. Rather, the court of appeals held that 

the trial court should have merged the counts and only issued one sentence. See Huber, 

2012-Ohio-6139, at ¶ 5. The court further held that Huber's aggravated robbery 

conviction did not merge with his kidnapping or attempted felonious assault convictions. 

Id. The court also affirmed the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences, but 

determined that the trial court erred by not advising Huber of the consequences of 

violating the terms of his post-release control. Id. The case was remanded for 

resentencing. Id. 

{¶ 24} Upon remand, the State elected to proceed on the first count of aggravated 

robbery. The trial court merged the second count of aggravated robbery into the first 

count of aggravated robbery, and imposed a prison term of six years for the merged 

aggravated robbery offense. The trial court noted that Huber's sentence for kidnapping 

and attempted felonious assault remained the same, as well as the court's order that the 

aggravated robbery, kidnapping, and attempted felonious assault prison terms be served 

consecutive to one another. Thus, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 15 

years in prison. Id. at ¶ 6. 
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{¶ 25} Thereafter, Huber again appealed, arguing that the trial court should have 

conducted a de novo sentencing hearing on all of the offenses for which he was convicted. 

The court of appeals found that the effect of Huber’s prior appeal resulted in certain counts 

being vacated, and he was entitled to de novo sentencing on those counts only. Huber at 

¶ 22. The court of appeals stated as follows: 

The significance of this court's vacation of part of Huber's sentence 

is that upon remand Huber did not have a sentence for aggravated 

robbery or post-release control. As part of Huber's de novo sentencing 

hearing, the state had to elect which aggravated robbery offense it was 

going to proceed on, which it did. The trial court then merged the 

aggravated robbery offenses and sentenced Huber to six years in prison for 

aggravated robbery. The trial court then noted that Huber's sentence for 

attempted felonious assault and kidnapping remained the same, as well as 

the consecutive portion of Huber's original sentence, for an aggregate 15 

years in prison. 

Id. at ¶ 23 (Emphasis in the original). 

{¶ 26} However, Huber, unlike Christian, had not completed any of the individual 

sentences originally imposed for his multiple offenses at the time he was resentenced. 

At issue in Huber was whether the trial court was required to conduct a de novo 

sentencing hearing with respect to sentences which had been vacated on appeal and its 

authority to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences. As previously stated, the 

instant case involves a situation where the trial court attempted to impose, for the first 

time, a consecutive sentence on a count where the original sentence has been served. 
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Huber is clearly distinguishable from the instant case. 

{¶ 27} The voiding of an original conviction does not render time served under that 

conviction a nullity. We reject the conceptual fiction that a complete but voided sentence 

has no legal existence. Otherwise, years served on such counts would be subject to 

being twice served. Furthermore, we cannot embrace a sentence nullity argument which 

offends the double jeopardy clause. See generally North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 

711, 716-717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), overruled on other grounds, 

Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989). The U.S. and 

Ohio Constitutions require that punishment already exacted must be fully credited in 

imposing sentence upon reversal and remand. 

{¶ 28} In light of the foregoing analysis, we find that Count II, which the trial court 

had ordered to be served concurrently in its original sentencing entry to Count V, had 

been completed and served by the time Christian was resentenced on July 27, 2016. 

Thus, the trial court could not order that Count II’s twelve month sentence, which had 

already been served, be served after completion of the modified eight year term in Count 

V. In sum, the trial court is instructed to resentence Christian on Count II to reflect that 

it is concurrent with Count V for an aggregate term of eight years. 

{¶ 29} Thus, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. 

{¶ 30} The judgment of the trial court having been reversed, we need not address 

the argument in Christian’s assigned error regarding the lack of new facts as it is rendered 

moot by the foregoing analysis. Therefore, this matter is remanded to the trial court for 

resentencing proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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FROELICH, J. and TUCKER, J., concur. 

Copies mailed to: 

Heather N. Jans 

Brock A. Schoenlein 

Hon. Barbara P. Gorman