1

Filed 3/30/17 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

A.T.
, Petitioner,

v. TH E SUPERIOR COURT OF SOLAN O COUNTY, Respondent;
THE PEOPLE
, Real Party in Interest. A149772
(Solan o County Super. Ct. No. J43654 )

THE COURT : 1

Petitioner A.T. filed a writ petition asking us to direct the juvenile court to vacate
its November 3, 2016 order denying her request to be released to her mother ’s custody pending the disposition of criminal charges . The petition alleges the court improperly considered her refusal to accept a “package

- deal” plea bargain, as well as the suitability
of the Vallejo neighborhood where her mother lives in a two

- bedroom apartment , in deciding to detain her

. The Attorney General urges us to dismiss A.T.’s petition as moot, noting the girl was released on November 1 0 , 2016, upon pleading guilty to a misdemeanor, after serving 16 days in custody.
We exercise our inhere nt jurisdiction to resolve the issues presented by this writ petition because they a re of broad public interest, likely to recur
, generally “ encounte red

. . . at a level of ‘low visibility ’ in the criminal process

. . . and involve[] asserted errors

1 Before Klin e, P.J., Richman, J., and Stewart , J.2

. . . not ordinarily reviewable on appeal. ” ( In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 24

- 26 ( William M. ) ; see also In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394 , 1403

- 1404 ; In re Raymond G. (1991) 230 Cal.App. 3d 964, 967. ) Further, we note that, after pleading guilty, A.T. filed a motion to withdraw her November 9, 2016 plea of guilty

. That motion is still pending , in accordance with a stay we issued on Decembe r 23, 2016

. This opinion is intended to guide the juvenile court in considering A .T. ’s motion to withdraw her plea.
BACKGROUND
A.T. is enrolled in high school in Fairfield, California, where her attendanc e is regular, and she earns passing grades. She has no prior delinquent history. On October 24, 2016, she was riding with another minor in a car driven by her brother
, who is also a
minor with no delinquent history

. Police stopped the car because it s registration had expire d

. When they learned that n o one inside the vehicle possessed a valid driver’s license, they arrested her brother for driving without a license. While performing an inventory search in preparation f or the vehicle to be towed, officers found a s mall handgun wrapped in a shirt inside a backpack that was i n side the trunk

. At that point
, A.T. and the other minor were arrested

. A.T. waived her Miranda rights, and told police that her brother had found th e gun early that morning, and shown it to her. She said t hey had agre ed to wrap it up and put it inside her backpack, and to leave it inside the trunk of the car to show later to their father

. The father of her brother ’s girlfriend subsequently reported the gun was stolen from him

. By a petition filed October 25, 2016
, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code
section 602 , subdivision (a)
, 2 A .T. was charged with grand theft (c ount 1) ; possession of a firearm by a minor (c ount 2) ; and carrying a loaded/stolen firearm (c ount 3)

. 3 At her arraignment on October 26, 2016 , A.T. denied ea ch charge. Despite her youth, lack o f prior delinquent history, solid ties to the community, and positive parental support, the

2 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

3 The record indicates that brother was cha rged with an additional crime, c ount 4, presumably related to his driving without a license.3

juvenile court rejected the probation department’s recommendation that she be conditionally released to her mother subject to home supervision

. On November 3, 2016, after A.T. had spent 10 days in custody, the court held a
readiness conference and a hearing on the prosecutor’ s motion to join her case with that
of her brother

. A.T. objected to joinder , explaining that she belie ved her brother would provide exculpatory testimony if he had the opportunity to testify at her separate trial. He also objected to joinder

. After hearing argument, the juvenile court joined the two

matt ers over the minors’ objections.
The court then i nquired whether the parties had made any p rogress toward resolving the cases. The prosecutor responded that she had offered the minors a

“ package deal
, ” whereby A.T. would plead guilty to c ount 3, as a misdemeanor, and
brother would plead guilty to c ount 3 , as a misdemeanor, as well as c ount 4
, and both
minors would receive formal probation. A.T.’s b rother wanted to take the deal, but she
did not. The court indicated it was willing to acce pt her brother ’s plea, and to let A.T.’s case go forward . The pro secutor insisted, however, that the plea offer depended on both minors’ admitting the charges.
A.T. then renewed her request to be release d from detention to the custody of her mother, who was present in court. 4 At the court’s prompting
, A .T.’s mother pr ovided her
address

. The court then ask ed, “What’s at [that address]? What is the building?”
A.T.’s mother sai d , “Well,

. . . they have a lot of storefronts, but

. . . . ”
The court agreed , “ Yes, they do. It’s downtown Vallejo, right.”
A.T.’s mother then said, “Yes, sir. It’s nice. It’s quiet. I mean, the building is quiet. It’s not a lot of drama in there. I don’t know what else to say. I have the only

two

- bedroom in there.”

4 The record reflects that A.T.’s father was the custodial parent

. At the time of the hearing, however, he had recently separa ted from his wife, A.T.’s stepmother . While he looked for a new apartment, he had been sleeping at h is place of business, while A.T. lived with an aunt

. A.T.’s father and mother were both present at the hearing, along with

a family friend, Mrs. Nelson, who also offered to take custody of the minors pending disposition of the charges.4

T he court responde d , “I don’t know what to say either. Okay? I’m extremely familiar with Vallejo. I grew up in Vallejo. I’ve got a pretty good feel of what’s happening in downtown Vallejo. ” After further discussion, the court announced, “ I’ll be frank with you, I’m disappointed that we’re not able to find some reso lution of this today

. . . . I’d like to have you come back and give this one more try on another readiness conference. ” C ounsel for
A .T. then asked to pass the matter, and the court obliged, saying, “Anything to see if we can find a resolution, yes. We’ ll pass these cases briefly.” After a lunch recess, the court re

- called the cases. At the afternoon hearing
, counsel for A.T. informed the court that she had looked up A.T.’s mother’s address on Google Maps
, and confirmed it appeared to be a residentia l apartment complex above a
business located on the first floor.
The court stated, “Well, I believe that there’s a residential unit. That’s not the only reason that I’ve denied the custodial status be changed .” The court exp lained its

concern for A.T.’s safety
, and stated it was not going t o cha nge it s mind about keeping
her detained at that point

. The court then inquired once more if it needed to set the matters for a contest, or whether some resolution had been reached.
Her b rother ’s cou nsel indicated that his client’s position remained the same. A.T.’s counsel asked the court to clarify its concerns for A.T.’s safety due to her mother’s neighborhood. The court respond ed, “Well, it’s downtown Val l ejo

. . . about two blocks away from th e Marina apartments, which are

— have some notoriety about the nature of the criminal activity that takes place there. I know this area very, very well. Okay?”
Counsel for A.T. reiterated that her client was a 14

- year

- old child with no prior
record and t hat she need ed to be home with her mother. At that point, counsel stated that A.T. was prepared to resolve her case for a misdemeanor, in accordance with the offered plea bargain. She went on to respond to the court’s comments about downtown Vallejo,

not ing that families who are poor cannot afford to live wherev er they choose. Counsel5

stat ed that downtown Vallejo is where A.T.’s mother could afford to live, and A.T. had been to the apartment before without in cident. While explaining that it did not hav e enough information to decide whether going
to her mother’s home would be in A.T.’s best interest , the court stated, “ Okay, I’ll tell you what I’d be willing to do with [A.T.]: I’d be willing to grant her probation officer
discretion to release her to her mother’s home pending t he disposition hearing. Okay? And I take it that would be over [the prosecutor’s] objecti on, right?” The prosecut or affirmed her objection , and the court reiterat ed its willing ness to grant A.T.’s probation officer discretio n to release her to h er mother on home

supe rvision.
In the midst of her brother ’s admission colloquy, however, A.T. interrupted through counsel to inform the court that, if the court were to grant A.T .’s release, then
A.T. would prefer to ho ld off on mak ing an admission. Counsel expressed concern that the girl intended to admit to the charges only to expedite her release from custody. The court responded that it did not want A.T. to do that. Counsel informed the court that A.T. was prepared to waiv e time, if the court was still inclined to grant the probation depar tment discretion to release her

. The court then indicated it was no longer willing to grant the probation department
discretion to release A .T.
, saying, “Let’s just set it for contest, and you can all think about this carefully

. . . . I’m not in the habit of somehow coercing minors to admit to things
that they don’t

— that they’re not voluntarily doing. I don’t feel comfortable with that. ” The prosecutor confirm ed that she would accept only a global resolution , and the court respond ed, “And if we can’t get a resolution for [ A.T. ] , then we’re just g oing to set
it for a contest?” The prosecutor agreed, and the court set the contest for November 15
, 2016
, stating once more that it w ould not release A.T. “[g]iven the nature of these charges

. ” On November 9, 2016, after she had spent 15 days in custody , at a scheduled readiness conference, A.T. asked once more to be released from detention . The juvenile6

court denied that request ag ain , and then again denied A.T. ’s next request that the probation department be granted discretion to release her.
I mmediately after that
, A.T. changed her plea to admit c ount 3 of the petition. Only then, after she admitte d a misdemeanor allegation, d id the trial court gi ve the probation department discretion to release her. A.T. filed her pe tition for writ of mandate
on the same day. The following day
, she wa s released to home supervision , having spent
16 days in custody

. On December 2, 2016, the Attorney General filed a letter brief urging the
mootness of A.T.’s petition, and, on December 13 , A.T. filed a reply, in which she stated
that she had filed a motion to withdraw her admission in the juvenile court on December 12. On December 23, we issue d an order staying all further proceedings related to A.T.’s prosecution, including the scheduled hearing on her motion to withdraw her guilty plea, pending our r esolution of this writ petition.
The record reveal s beyond a doubt that the juvenile court de tained A.T. for 15 days in order to pressure her to accept a plea bargain

. It also shows that when it denied her request for release on November 3, 2016, the juvenile court gave improper weight to
it s own assessment of the suitability of A.T.’s mother’s n eighborho od

. GOVERNING PRINCIPLES It is the declared pur pose o f our J uvenile Court L aw “to provide for the protection and safety of the public and each minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and to preserve and strengthen the minor’s family ties whenever possible, removing the minor from the custody of his or her parents only when necessary for his or her welfare or for the safety and protection of the public

. ” ( § 202 , subd. (a) .)
To this en d, section 635 directs that , after holding a det ention hearing
, “ the court
sh all make its order releasing the minor from custody,” “unless it appears

. . . that it is a matter of immediate and urgent necessity for the p rotection of the minor or reasonably necessary for the protection of the person or p roperty of another that he or she be
detained or that the minor is likely to flee to avoid the jur isdiction of the court [

. ] ” ( § 635
, italics added .) “By requiring that the minor be released unless the case [falls] within one7

of the specified categories, the Legislature indicated its intention that detention be the exception, not the rule.” ( William M.
, supra , 3 Cal. 3d at p . 26.) “[T]he determination whether to detain a minor following a warrantless arrest for criminal activity is a complex one, requiring consideration of various factors personal to the minor and [her] family situation [citation] , and the application of several important statutory presumptions favoring the minor’s earl y release to a parent, guardian or responsible relative

. . . . ” ( Alfredo A. v. Superior Court (1994) 6 Cal. 4th 1212, 1222.) “The basic predicate of the Juvenile Court Law is that each juvenile be treated as an individual.” ( William M.
, supra , 3 Cal. 3d at p. 31.) “ ‘ [ T ] he Juvenile Court Law protects the minor’s rig ht to an individualized detention hearing, in which the court may not dispose of cases by mechanical rules on a categorical basis. ’ ” ( In re Bianca S. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1275, quoting William M. , at p. 19 .) “[S] ection 636 contains alternative grounds for detention. Hence, the juvenile court must at least specify the ground which the facts support. [Citation.] In the absence of such findings the reviewing court may well be faced with great difficulty in determining the factual bas is for dete ntion.” ( William M.
, supra , 3 Cal. 3d at p. 27
, fn. 19.) “The nature of the charged offense cannot in itself constitute the basis for
detention

. [Citations

. ] ” ( William M.
, supra , 3 Cal. 3d at p

. 30.) Further, “[t]he juvenile court, of course, may not assume guilt if the minor denies responsibility for the alleged
offense. [Citations.] Nor may the juvenile court condition the juvenile’s release upon [her] waiver of [the] privilege against self

- incrimi nation. [Citations.]” ( Id

. at p. 29,
fn. 23; People v. Superior Court ( Felmann ) (1976) 59 Cal.App. 3d 270, 276 [a court may not treat a defendant more harshly because s he exercises her right to trial ]

. ) “[ T ] o punish a person for exerci sing a constitution al right is ‘ a due process violation of the most basic

sort. ’ ” ( In re Lewallen (1979) 23 Cal. 3d 274, 278
, quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978) 434 U.S. 357, 363 [ t rial courts may not chill the exercise of the constitutional right to trial by jury ]

. )8

I n adult criminal courts, ou r Supreme Co urt has observed, package

- deal plea bargains pose a particular danger of coercing guilty pleas because “[e] xtraneou s factors
not related to the c ase

. . . may be brought into play. ” ( In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal. 3d 277
, 287 ( Ibarra ) .) “ Because such considerations do not bear any direct relation to whether the defendant himself is guilty, special scrutiny must be employ ed to ensure a voluntary plea.” ( Id. at p. 287.) For this reason, we are charged with examining “ ‘ t he totality of
the circumstances whenever a plea is taken pursuant to a “package

- deal” bargain. ’ ” ( People v. Sandoval (2 006) 140 Cal.App.4th 111, 125, quoting Ibarra , at p. 288. )

“ ‘ “ [T]he voluntariness of a plea bargain which contemplates special conc essions to
another

— especially a sibling or a loved one

— bears particular scrutiny by a trial or reviewing court conscious of the psychological pressures upon a n accused such a
situation creates. ” ’ ” ( Sandoval
, at p. 125, quoting Ibarra , at p. 289.)
ANALYSIS
1. A.T. Was Under Pressure To P lead G uilty Our Supreme Court has recognized that serious concerns arise when co defendants are presented with package

- deal plea barga ins. (See Ibarra
, supra , 34 Cal. 3d, 277 .) We
believe t hese concerns are greatly mag nified when the co defendants are minors

. Indeed, given “[t]he basic predicate of the Juvenile Court Law

. . . that each juvenile be treated as an individual” ( William M.
, supra , 3 Cal.3d at p . 31 ), we question whether package

- deal plea offers have any place at all in juvenile court. In the case before us, reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we have little trouble concluding that A.T. was under pressure to plead guilty based on “considerations

. . . bear[ing] no direct relation to whether” she was guilty in fact. ( Ibarra
, supra , 34
Cal. 3d at p. 287 .) From the day she was arrested , A.T. indicated that : S he was innocent
of the ch arges against her; she wanted to go to trial; and she expected her brother’s truthful testimony, if permitted, would exonerate her. T he prosecutor’s insistence on a package plea deal , however, virtually guarante ed that A.T.’s defense would never come to light

.9

First, t he record suggests that the offer was of benef it t o her brother , but not to
A.T

. He wanted to accept the bargain. As the Supreme C ourt recognized in Ibarra , this
circumstance in itself may place pressure on an innocent sibling to plead guilty. ( Ibarra
, supra , 34 Cal. 3d at p. 289 [ “ ‘ [ t ]he voluntariness of a plea bargain which contemplates special concessions to another

— especially a sibling or a loved one

— bears particular scrutiny by a trial or reviewing court ’ ” ] .)
Even if she withstood the pressure to go along with her brother
, A.T. would have
had to ref use the deal in ligh t of the court’s ord er joining their case s. B y declining the plea offer, A.T. could have force d her brother to go to trial
, but she could not have f orce d
him to take the stand at their joint trial and give the self

- incriminating testimony most likely to e xonerate her. In fact, t he court’s joinder order further weighted the scale in
favor of A.T.’ s pleading guilty by creating a risk that her brother would testify against her
at trial

. T he package nature of the plea offer also ensured that her brother could not bargain for immunity in exchange for g iving truthful testimony at A.T.’s trial.
Worse , as the November 3, 2016 hearing progresse d , it became increasingly
apparent that pleading guilty was the only way A.T.

— who by th en had spent 10 days in

cus tody

— had a ny chance of being released

. Indeed, A.T.’s counsel informed the court
that her client was tempted to plead guilty only because she perceiv ed that doing so
would allow her to go home. T his percept ion was entirely justified. While asserting he did not want her “to admit to things that [she was] not voluntarily doing
, ” the juvenile

cour t judge appeared to do exactly that: On November 3, 2016, w hen A.T.’s counsel told
him she was prepared to accept a plea bargain, h e indicated he would grant the probation department discretion to release her to her mother on home supervision. But when he learned that A.T. no longer accept ed the offer, the judge changed his mind, announcing he would not grant the probation department such discretion. Similarly, o n November 9, 2016, after A.T. had spent 15 days in custody, the juvenile court again denied her request to be released. It was only moments later, after she changed her mind and pleaded guilty
, that the court changed its mind and authorized the probatio n dep artment to release her. On this record, we are compelled to conclu de10

that A.T , a 14

- year

- old girl who had never been incarcerated or otherwise removed from her parents’ custody, was being penalized for exercising her constitutional right to go to
tri al. Under these circumsta nces, her ultimate relinquishment of that rig ht is less surprising than the fact she refused for more than two weeks.
2. The C ourt Failed to Consider A.T.’s C a se On Its Individual M

erits
As we have said , the court must make an indi vidualized and evidence

- based

assessment of a juvenile defendant ’ s fitness for release base d upon the criteria set for th in
Welfare and Institutions C ode section 63 5. T he court must also specify the facts supporting its determination , keeping in mind that, “the intendments [of the Juvenile Court Law] are all against detention, and it may not be ordered unless there is clear proof of the ‘urgent necessity’ which sections 635 and 636 require.” ( In re Dennis H. (1971) 19 Cal. App. 3d 350 , 354, fn. o mitted , citing William M.
, supra , 3 Cal. 3d at p p . 25

- 31 .)
T he court justified detaining A.T. by pointing to the seriousne ss of the charges against her , b ut, as we have said, “[t]he nature of the charged offense cannot in itself
constitute the basis for detention.” ( William M.
, supra , 3 Cal. 3d at p. 30.) T he available
evidence suggested A.T.’s involvement , if any, in stealing or carrying the gun was minimal . In fact
, the prosecutor was willing to dismiss the three serious charges against
her in return for her plea to a lon e misdemeanor

. T he court also relied on its personal view that A.T.’s mother lived in a n unsafe neighbo rhood

. While the Juvenile Court Law “ provide [s] ample authority for the
detention of ch ildren for their own protection ” ( William M.
, supra , 3 Cal. 3d at p. 26,
fn. 17), the determination that a child needs this sort of protection must be fact

- based . In pursuit of the needed facts , the court must “h ear relevant evidence the minor [or]

. . . her
parent

. . . desires to present

. ” (§ 635

. ) Here, t he court heard testimony from A.T.’s mother that her “building is quiet [and] [i]t’s not a lot of drama in there

. ” But i nstead of deferring to this uncontradicted evidence, t he court detained A.T. based upon it s own subjective and categorical opinion s about downtown Vallejo

. In doing so, t he court
denied A.T. the “ elementary requirements of individ ualized justice and due process

. ” ( William M. , at p. 31.)11

We note further that the court’s stated rationales for detain ing A.T. ring hol low in light of its willingness to send her home after she admitted the charges. A.T. was surely no less dangerous to the public, and her mother’s neighborhood no safer
, after she pleaded guilty than before

. CONCLUSION “The decision to take a minor away from [her] home, [her] parents, and [her] friends is fraught with

. . . grave consequences

. . . . ” ( William M.
, supra , 3 Cal. 3d at

p p. 30

- 31 , fn. omitted .) It is for this reason “[ t ] he Legislature has indicated that ch ildren should be released except under certain specific conditions of ‘immediat e and urgent necessity.’ ” ( I

bi d. ) T he record before us reveals no such necessity

. The court is directed to consider A.T. ’s motion to withdraw the plea of guilty she entered on November 9, 2016 , in light of the foregoing . This court’s December 23, 2016 order temporarily staying proceedings in the juvenile court is vacated. To expedite proceedings in the juvenile court , this decisio n shall be final as to this court five days after its filing. ( Cal. Rules of C ourt, rule 

### 8.490(b)(2)(A)

. )12

Trial Court: Solano County Superior Court

Trial Ju dge: Hon. D. Scott Daniels

Attorneys for Petitioner: Solano County Alternate Public Defender Michi ko K. Yamamoto
Damian Carl Douglass Spieckerman Deputy Public Defender
Attorneys for Respondent: Office of the Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Attorney General of California

Joan Killeen Deputy Attorney General