UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

YOLANDA VIZCARRA CALDERON , Plaintiff,

v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ,

Defendant. Case No. 17-cv-1458 (CRC)

MEMORANDUM OPINION Since June 2013, Yolanda Vizcarra Calderon and Ranfiel Castaned a Sanchez have sought visas to enter the United St ates. Pederson Decl. ¶ 15. But th eir requests have been denied on the ground that there is reason to sus pect their invol vement in mon ey laundering and drug trafficking. Id. ¶ 21. 1 Seeking to learn the basis for the government’s suspicions, b oth Vizcarra Calderon and Castaneda Sanchez f iled a series of requests under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). Id. ¶ 3. As relevant h ere, Vizcarra Calderon filed a request with the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) f or any records about her. Myrick D ecl., Ex. A. When the DEA reported that its search yielde d no responsive records, she fil ed suit against th e Department of Justice, the DEA’s parent agency, under FOIA. 2 The Department has now moved for summary judgment. Finding that the Depa rtment has conducted an adequat e search for rec ords, the Court will grant its motion.

1 Nothing in this opinion should be c onstrued to express a view on whether Vizcarra Calderon or Castaneda Sanchez ha s any involvement in money laun dering or drug trafficking. Both have consistently asserte d their innocence on all fronts.

2 Castaneda Sanchez filed a sim ilar FOIA request and has brought suit against the DEA in a separate civil action.2 Summary judgment may be granted when the moving party establish es that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to ju dgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In FOIA cases, summary judgment is the appropri ate mechanism for determining whether an agency has discharg ed its obligations. See, e.g., J udicial Watch, Inc. v. CFPB, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2014). The Court may rely on declaration s or affidavits provided by agency personnel that are “rela tively detailed and non-concluso ry” when ruling on summary judgment. SafeCard Services, Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). Such affidavits are “accorded a presumption of good faith.” Id. Under FOIA, an agency is obligated to conduct an adequate searc h for records responsive to a valid request. Rodrigu ez v. Dep’t of Def., 236 F. Supp. 3 d 26, 34 (D.D.C. 2017). Courts apply a “reasonableness” test t o determine whether a search was adequate, and reasonableness is determined generally by the methods and not the fruits of a sea rch. Id. The agency bears the burden of proving that its sear ch was reasonable. Id. To do s o, the agency “must show that it made a good faith effort to conduct a search for the requested records, using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the information requested.” Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990). In making this showing, the agency may rely on affidavits that detail “what records were sear ched, by whom, and through what p rocess.” Steinberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 23 F.3d 548, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The Department has provided such an affidavit here. Katherine Myrick, the Chief of the FOIA Management Section at the DEA’s headquarters in Arlington, Virginia submitted a sworn affidavit on behalf of the Depar tment. See generally Myrick De cl. According to Myrick, she performed a search of the DEA’s N arcotics and Dangerous Drugs I nformation System (“NADDIS”), the data index system for the DEA’s Investigative R eporting and Filing System3 (“IRFS”). Id. ¶¶ 7, 15–16. The IRFS contains “all administrat ive, general, and criminal investigative files compile d by DEA.” Id. ¶ 6. My rick attests that she performed multiple queries on NADDIS, including varia tions of Vizcarra Calderon’s name and identifying numbers such as her date of birth. I d. ¶¶ 15–16. The Myrick Declarati on is sufficiently detailed to carry the Department’s burden of demons trating it conducted a search reasonably calculated to turn up any responsive records. Vizcarra Calderon raises two ma in arguments in response, but ne ither is persuasive. First, she argues the search was inadequate because the Departm ent did not search the DEA’s Tijuana and Guadalajara, Mexico field offices despite a reasona ble inference that any responsive records might be found there. Citing the decision in McLaughli n v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 530 F. Supp. 2d 210, 213 (D.D.C 2008), she argue s that this failure to search every location where records might be reasonably found m akes the search deficient. But unlike in McLaughlin, where the government did not “refute[] [plaintiffs’] suggestion that it failed to search an obvious location,” 530 F. Supp. 2d at 213, here the Department has prov ided assurances that it did in fact search the Tijuana and Guadalaja ra field offices. According to a supplemental declaration filed by Myrick, “[a] search of IRFS us ing NADDIS is a worldwide sear ch for DEA records, including records maintained a t field offices.” Myrick First S upplemental Decl. ¶ 8. In other words, Myrick has attested that any information that existed at the Tijuana and Guadalajara field offices would have been located vi a her search of NADDIS. Vizc arra Calderon provides no basis upon which to conclude that the Supplemental Myrick Decla ration does not accurately describe the scope of NADDIS. T hus, the Department has justifi ed that it searched in all the logical places where respons ive records would have been found.4 Second, Vizcarra Calderon suggests that the search was inadequa te because it yielded no records even though she was inf ormed by a government official t hat a “case” related to drug trafficking allegations against her exists. But “it is long se ttled that the fail ure of an agency to turn up one specific document in i ts search does not alone rend er a search inadequate.” Iturralde v. Comptroller of Currency, 315 F.3d 311, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Nor is it even certain that any existing “case” against Vizcarra Calderon is one involving the DEA. As the Department aptly points out, many agencies—includin g state agencies—have authori ty to investigate drug trafficking. It is certainly possible th at any investigation i nto alleged drug trafficking involves a different law enforcement agenc y. At this juncture, Vizcarra C alderon does little more than speculate that the DEA had an ope n investigation into her alleg ed involvement in drug trafficking. “Mere speculati on that as yet uncovered documents may exist does not undermine the finding that the agency conduc ted a reasonable search for t hem.” SafeCard Services, 926 F.2d at 1201. In light of the Myrick Declaratio ns, the Court concludes that t he Department has carried its burden to demonstrate it c onducted an adequate search. The Court will therefore grant the Department’s Motion for Summar y Judgment. A separate Order sha ll accompany this memorandum opinion. 3

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge Date: March 6, 2018

3 Vizacarra Calderon also brought a claim under the Administrati ve Procedure Act. However, in her opposition she withdraws this claim. See Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 6–7.