alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 31.2**

**CERTIFICATION**

I, Michele Nakazawa, Chief Financial Officer of Telos Corporation, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Telos Corporation; 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to makethe statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flowsof the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I areresponsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) forthe registrant and we have: 

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in whichthis report is being prepared; 

b) Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal controlover financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally acceptedaccounting principles; 

c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financialreporting, to the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors: 

a) All significant deficiencies andmaterial weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

Date: August 20, 2007
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jan Poznanski, Appellant.

[962 NYS2d 639]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (Robbins, J.), rendered July 16, 2007, convicting him of burglary in the first degree (two counts), upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence, including a direction that the defendant pay restitution in the sum of $570.50.

*776Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by vacating the sentence imposed; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed, and the matter is remitted to the County Court, Nassau County, for further proceedings in accordance herewith.

The defendant challenges the factual sufficiency of his plea allocution. Contrary to the People’s contention, the defendant’s waiver of his right to appeal was not valid *(see People v Bradshaw,*18 NY3d 257, 264 [2011]; *People v Lopez,*6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]) and, therefore, the purported waiver does not bar review of the defendant’s claim. Nevertheless, the defendant’s challenge to the factual sufficiency of his plea allocution is unpreserved for appellate review *{see People v Toxey,*86 NY2d 725, 726 [1995]; *People v Jones,*73 AD3d 1386, 1387 [2010]; *People v Williams,*70 AD3d 1059, 1060 [2010]; *People v Kelly,*50 AD3d 921 [2008]). Moreover, contrary to the defendant’s contention, the narrow “rare case” exception to the preservation rule does not apply herein *{see People v Lopez,*71 NY2d 662, 666 [1988]; *People v Morgan,*84 AD3d 1594 [2011]).

However, the County Court improperly directed the defendant to pay restitution in the sum of $570.50. Although a court is free to reserve the right to order restitution as part of a plea agreement, the plea minutes do not indicate that a plea of guilty was negotiated with terms that included restitution. Accordingly, at sentencing, the defendant should have been “given an opportunity either to withdraw his plea or to accept the enhanced sentence that included both restitution and a prison sentence” *{People v Ortega,*61 AD3d 705, 706 [2009]; *see People v Suarez,*103 AD3d 673 [2013]; *People v Esquivel,*100 AD3d 652 [2012], *lv denied*20 NY3d 1011 [2013]; *People v Gibson,*88 AD3d 1012 [2011]; *People v Kegel,*55 AD3d 625 [2008]; *People v Henderson,*44 AD3d 873, 874 [2007]) or for the court to impose the agreed-upon sentence.

Accordingly, we vacate the sentence imposed, and remit the matter to the County Court, Nassau County, to allow the County Court to (1) impose the sentence promised to the defendant at the plea proceeding, (2) afford the defendant the opportunity to accept the previously imposed sentence, including the direction that he pay restitution in the sum of $570.50, or (3), in the absence of either of those results, permit the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty *{see People v Sosa-Rodriguez,*63 AD3d 861, 863 [2009]).

In light of our determination, we need not address the defendant’s remaining contention, raised in his pro se supplemental brief.

Mastro, J.E, Rivera, Chambers and Miller, JJ., concur.
#### GREENSPON v. PARKE, DAVIS & CO.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

Sept. 16, 1948.

*486Bartlett, Eyre, Keel & Weymouth, of New York City, for plaintiff.

Emery, Vamey, Whittemore & Dix, of New York City, for defendant.

RIFKIND, District Judge.

Issue in this case was joined on January 17, 1947; laches was pleaded as a defense. Defendant now moves for summary judgment on affidavits supporting the plea. I cannot say that the defense is established beyond the “slightest doubt”. Hence, summary judgment must be denied.

Alternatively, defendant moves for a separate trial of the issue of laches. Rule 42(b), Federal Rules Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., authorizes such a procedure. 28 U.S.C.A. § 398,1 cited by defendant is no longer part of the Code. Such a motion raises issues of convenience for court and litigants. Had such a motion been made promptly after the joinder of issue I would •have regarded it more favorably. It might have saved considerable effort on part of all concerned. At this late date, after interrogatories have been answered, depositions taken and the case is almost ready for trial, I see no sufficient advantage in such a piecemeal trial of the issues of the case. It is not a sufficient answer to this that defendant’s motion is founded upon the evidence uncovered in the pre-trial proceedings. Substantially, all of the evidence defendant relies on for its motion for summary judgment consists of written correspondence. In any event, the alternative motion does not call for such evidentiarysupport.

The alternative motion is, therefore, likewise denied.

1

 Judicial Code of 1911, § 274b, added by Act March 3, 1915, ch. 90, 38 Stat. 956, omitted from the 1948 Judicial Code.
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

July 29, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

135908 & (16) Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Stephen J. Markman, Plaintiff-Appellee, Justices 

v SC: 135908 

 COA: 281631 

Ingham CC: 00-076224-FH

MICHAEL ERNEST TROFATTER,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 3, 2008 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has 

failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). The 

motion for appeal bond is DENIED. 

p0721 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

July 29, 2008 

 Clerk
---

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER ANDCHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION
1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
OF 2002

I, Howard Thomson, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial
Officer of Terrace Ventures Inc. (the Company), hereby certify pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

| | (i)  | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the Company, for
      the fiscal quarter ended January 31, 2008, and to which this certification
      is attached as Exhibit 32.1 (the Report) fully complies with the
      requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
      1934, as amended; and
| | ---- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
| | (ii) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents,
      in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
      operations of the Company.                                                                                                                                                            

| | By:    | /s/ Howard Thomson                                       
| | ------ | ---------------------------------------------------------
| |        |                                                          
| | Name:  | HOWARD THOMSON                                           
| |        |                                                          
| | Title: | Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial
      Officer
| |       
| | Date:  | March 18, 2008                                           

A signed original of this written statement required by
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to the
Registrant and will be retained by the Registrant and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

This certification accompanies the Form 10-QSB to which it
relates, is not deemed filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is
not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Registrant under the
Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (whether made
before or after the date of the Form 10-QSB), irrespective of any general
incorporation language contained in such filing.

---
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of State

          - [Public Notice 6633]

Based upon a review of the Administrative Record assembled in this matter pursuant to Section 219(a)(4)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)(4)(C)) (“INA”), and in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, I conclude that the circumstances that were the basis for the 2003 re-designation of the aforementioned organizations as foreign terrorist organizations have not changed in such a manner as to warrant revocation of the designation and that the national security of the United States does not warrant a revocation of the designations.

Therefore, I hereby determine that the designations of the aforementioned organizations as foreign terrorist organizations, pursuant to Section 219 of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1189), shall be maintained.

                    This determination shall be published in the                     **Federal Register**                    .                

Dated: May 13 2009.

James B. Steinberg,

Deputy Secretary of State, Department of State. 

[FR Doc. E9-12145 Filed 5-22-09; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4710-10-P
109TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. CON. RES. 39

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Whereas the Purple Heart is the oldest military decoration in

the world in present use;

Whereas the Purple Heart is awarded in the name of the

President of the United States to members of the Armed

Forces who are wounded in conflict with an enemy force

or are wounded while held by an enemy force as prisoners

of war, and posthumously to the next of kin of members

of the Armed Forces who are killed in conflict with an

enemy force or who die of a wound received in conflict

with an enemy force;

Whereas the Purple Heart was established on August 7,

1782, during the Revolutionary War, when General

George Washington issued an order establishing the Honorary Badge of Distinction, otherwise known as the

Badge of Military Merit;

Whereas the award of the Purple Heart ceased with the end

of the Revolutionary War, but was revived in 1932, the

200th anniversary of George Washington’s birth, out of

respect for his memory and military achievements; and

Whereas National Purple Heart Recognition Day is a fitting

tribute to George Washington and to the more than

1,535,000 recipients of the Purple Heart, approximately

550,000 of whom are still living: Now, therefore, be it
 †

2

SCON 39 ES

1 Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives

2 concurring), That Congress—

3 (1) supports the goals and ideals of National

4 Purple Heart Recognition Day;

5 (2) encourages all people of the United States

6 to learn about the history of the Purple Heart and

7 to honor its recipients; and

8 (3) requests that the President issue a procla9 mation calling on the people of the United States to

10 conduct appropriate ceremonies, activities, and pro11 grams to demonstrate support for people who have

12 been awarded the Purple Heart.

Passed the Senate July 28, 2005.

Attest:

Secretary.
109TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. CON. RES. 39

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

To express the sense of Congress on the Purple

Heart.
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-40887

Summary Calendar

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Matthew Sells, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:19-CR-139-1

Before Clement, Southwick, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Matthew Sells, federal prisoner # 28879-078, seeks to proceed in 

forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal from the denial of his motion for 

compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 8, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 21-40887 Document: 00516386731 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/08/2022
No. 21-40887

2

To proceed IFP, the litigant must demonstrate both financial 

eligibility and a nonfrivolous issue for appeal. See Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 

562, 586 (5th Cir. 1982). Because Sells’s arguments are not frivolous and he 

qualifies financially, we GRANT his motion to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(1); Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983). However, 

we dispense with further briefing because although his arguments are not 

frivolous, the record shows that there was no abuse of discretion. See Baugh 

v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). 

A district court may modify a defendant’s sentence, after considering 

the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, if “extraordinary and compelling 

reasons warrant such a reduction” and “a reduction is consistent with 

applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A). We review a district court’s decision denying 

compassionate release for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Chambliss, 

948 F.3d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 2020). 

While Sells asserts that he is at a heightened risk of severe illness from 

COVID-19 because he suffers from asthma, diabetes, and hypertension, 

these conditions, when coupled with the fact that his medical conditions are 

well managed with medication and monitoring, are not extraordinary and 

compelling reasons warranting a reduced sentence. See United States v. 

Rodriguez, 27 F.4th 1097, 1100-01 (5th Cir. 2022). Moreover, even if he 

demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons in support of a reduced 

sentence, the district court properly considered the relevant § 3553(a) 

factors. See Chambliss, 948 F.3d at 693. 

Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision 

denying the motion for compassionate release. 

Case: 21-40887 Document: 00516386731 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/08/2022
#### Robert L. SCHULZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, and Anthony Roundtree, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 06-0075-cv.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Nov. 14, 2006.

Robert L. Schulz, pro se.

Kenneth W. Rosenberg, Attorney, Tax Division, United States Department of Justice (Eileen J. O’Connor, Assistant Attorney General, Richard Farber, Attorney, Tax Division, United States Department of Justice, on the brief, Rosylnn R. Mauskopf, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, of counsel), Washington, DC, for Appellees.

PRESENT: WILFRED FEINBERG, PIERRE N. LEVAL and JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Robert L. Schulz appeals the dismissal of his petition to quash an IRS third-party subpoena pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(2), and of his request for injunctive relief against the defendants named in this action. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, the issues on appeal and the procedural history.

Upon a review of the record, we conclude that the District Court did not err in dismissing Schulz’s petition to quash because it was not timely filed, and in dismissing his request for injunctive relief on the basis of the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a). Because Schulz does not claim that equitable tolling principles should apply to his case, we intimate no view on whether equitable tolling would be available under Section 7609(b)(2) in an appropriate case. *See, e.g., United States v. Brockamp,*519 U.S. 347, 117 S.Ct. 849, 136 L.Ed.2d 818 (1997); *Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs,*498 U.S. 89, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990).

We have considered all of Schulz’s arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.
#### Bryan *against*Seely.

Fees of electors °r £raai sa,u*'

THE COURT

said, that the *electors*of the *grand assize,*on

a writ of right, were entitled to the same fees for attending the court, &c., as the sheriff, which, in *November*term, 1803, were fixed at 3 dollars *per*diem, for going to, and returning from^ the supreme court.
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 202 (Wednesday, October 21, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 54083-54084]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-25215]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

National Labor Relations Board


Appointments of Individuals To Serve as Members of Performance 
Review Board

    5 U.S.C. 4314(c)(4) requires that appointments of individuals to 
serve as members of Performance Review Boards be published in the 
Federal Register. Therefore, in compliance with this requirement, 
notice is hereby given that the individuals whose names and position 
titles appear below have been appointed to serve as members of 
Performance Review Boards in the National Labor Relations Board for the 
rating year beginning October 1, 2008 and ending September 30, 2009.

Name and Title

William B Cowen, Solicitor;
Gloria J. Joseph, Director of Administration;
Barry J. Kearney, Associate General Counsel, Advice;
Gary W. Shinners, Deputy Chief Counsel to Board Member;
Richard A. Siegel, Associate General Counsel, Operations Management;
Lafe E. Solomon, Director, Office of Representation Appeals;

[[Page 54084]]

John H. Ferguson, Associate General Counsel, Enforcement Litigation 
(Alternate);
Kathleen Nixon, Deputy Chief Counsel to Board Member (Alternate).

    Washington, DC, by Direction of the Board.

    Dated: October 15, 2009.
Lester A. Heltzer,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. E9-25215 Filed 10-20-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7545-01-P
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-6094

PETER LENOX ALLEN,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

SEAWALL SMITH, Warden,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Frederic N. Smalkin, District Judge. (CA98-2363-S)

Submitted: April 29, 1999 Decided: May 5, 1999

Before WILLIAMS, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Peter Lenox Allen, Appellant Pro Se. John Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, Ann Norman Bosse, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF

MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
* Although the district court’s order is marked as “filed” on

December 30, 1998, the district court’s records show that it was

entered on the docket sheet on January 4, 1999. Pursuant to Rules

58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the

date that the order was physically entered on the docket sheet that

we take as the effective date of the district court’s decision.

Wilson v. Murray, 806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1986).

2

PER CURIAM:

Peter Lenox Allen seeks to appeal the district court’s order

denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West

1994 & Supp. 1998). We have reviewed the record and the district

court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny

a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See Allen v. Smith, No. CA-98-2363-S

(D. Md. Jan. 4, 1999).* We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

DISMISSED