Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1163 | October 23, 2019 Page 1 of 14

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Mark F. James

South Bend, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Frances Barrow

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In Termination of the ParentChild Relationship of:

K.I.N.G., (Minor Child), 

 And

V.G. (Father), 

Appellant-Respondent, 

v. 

Indiana Department of Child 

Services, 

Appellee-Petitioner

October 23, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JT-1163 

Appeal from the St. Joseph Probate 

Court

The Honorable Jason A. 

Cichowicz, Judge

The Honorable Graham Polando, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

71J01-1806-JT-105 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1163 | October 23, 2019 Page 2 of 14

Altice, Judge. 

Case Summary

[1] V.G. (Father) appeals from the involuntary termination of his parental rights to 

his daughter, K.G. (Child). He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting the termination order. 1

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History2

[3] Child was born to Mother and Father on January 5, 2017. The family struggled 

with chronic housing instability and had been timed out at multiple homeless 

shelters. On August 16, 2017, they were put out of a motel in which they were 

staying for nonpayment. Mother and Father then allegedly slept in the woods 

with Child for two days, which resulted in a report of child neglect to the 

Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) on August 18, 2017.

[4] Krysten Saxton, an assessment worker with DCS, investigated the report that 

same day. Mother and Father acknowledged that they had nowhere to live and 

were both unemployed. Saxton observed that Child was dirty and “had a foul 

1 K.G.’s mother’s rights were also terminated, but P.L. (Mother) does not participate in this appeal. 

Accordingly, our focus will be on the evidence related to Father and his relationship with Child.

2 We feel compelled to observe that the paltry statement of facts section provided by appellate counsel in 

Father’s brief is wholly inadequate. The deficiency is glaring and unacceptable. Counsel is directed to 

review the requirements of Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(6) before filing another brief with this court. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1163 | October 23, 2019 Page 3 of 14

smell.” Transcript at 53. Upon changing Child’s diaper, Saxton discovered 

Child had a “very severe ... diaper rash that resembled a chemical burn.” Id. 

Saxton detained Child on an emergency basis and sought medical care for her. 

Child was placed in foster care and has never been returned to Mother or 

Father’s care.

[5] On August 21, 2017, DCS filed a petition alleging Child to be a child in need of 

services (CHINS) due to parents being homeless and unable to properly care for 

her. That same day, Father submitted to a random drug screen that returned 

positive for THC. Thereafter, on September 7, 2017, the trial court adjudicated 

Child a CHINS. Pursuant to the dispositional order issued October 5, 2017, 

Father was ordered to notify the family case manager (FCM) of changes in 

address and of any arrests or criminal charges, enroll in programs 

recommended by DCS service providers and keep all appointments, maintain 

suitable, safe, and stable housing, maintain stable income, participate in 

homebased case management, obtain a psychological parenting assessment, 

and attend all scheduled visits with Child. Further, to address Father’s illegal 

drug use, the court ordered him to complete a substance abuse assessment, 

follow treatment recommendations, and submit to random drug screens.

[6] Bridget Bramlett has been the FCM assigned in this case since August 24, 2017. 

Throughout the CHINS proceedings Father did not maintain contact with 

FCM Bramlett. She was able to talk with him only once, when she stopped in 

during a supervised visit in December 2017. At that point, Father provided her 

with an updated address, but he moved other times during the proceedings and 
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did not notify FCM Bramlett. Father also failed to inform her of arrest 

warrants issued out of Marion County and St. Joseph County. Regarding the 

latter, Father was charged in November 2017 with two counts of child 

molesting (with his niece and nephew as victims) and arrested on those charges 

on January 4, 2018. He has been incarcerated ever since and ultimately pled 

guilty in March 2018 to both counts. Father received a ten-year sentence with 

six years suspended and has a current release date in October 2020.

[7] Prior to his incarceration, Father made some progress with services. Father 

participated in a substance abuse assessment with Emily Sussman on October 

16, 2017. He tested positive for THC on that date and admitted to being a 

regular marijuana user since a young age. Sussman recommended that Father 

participate in a modified intensive outpatient program, but Father never 

enrolled in the program despite two different opportunities. Additionally, 

Father initially worked with a homemaker services provider to open a bank 

account, maintain part-time employment,3 and start budgeting. This referral, 

however, was closed after Father missed too many sessions with the service 

provider. FCM Bramlett described Father’s participation in homebased 

services as “[v]ery sporadic[].” Id. at 69.

[8] Father was inconsistent with supervised visitation from the start, attending only 

about three visits over the first two months. The visitation supervisor during 

3 According to Father, between September 2017 and early January 2018, he worked about eight hours per 

week at Goodwill and four to six hours per week for Little Caesars.
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this time, Sheila Thiabat, testified that Father generally did not attend, but 

when he did, he spent a lot of time on his phone not interacting with Child. 

Mother and Father also argued during at least one of these visits, causing 

Thiabat to cut the visit short. By early November, Mother and Father had to 

have separate visits with Child to avoid conflict, and a new visitation supervisor 

took over for Child’s visits with Father. In November and December, Father 

attended only about half of the scheduled visits, and he did not come prepared

with adequate supplies for Child, such as baby formula, diapers, and wipes. 

Father testified that he missed visits because he was “preoccupied” and working 

about fourteen hours per week. Id. at 167. Father has not seen Child since his 

arrest in January 2018.

[9] FCM Bramlett went to speak with Father at the county jail before he was 

transported to prison. Father indicated that “his goal after he was done with 

prison was that he was going to get out and stay with a friend and then attempt 

to get his daughter back.” Id. at 69. FCM Bramlett attempted to obtain 

services for Father in prison but found that he was ineligible or that service 

providers were unavailable to come to the prison.

[10] On April 5, 2018, the trial court modified the dispositional decree to provide for 

concurrent plans of reunification and adoption. Following a hearing on August 

16, 2018, the trial court changed the plan to adoption, which was recommended 

by the CASA and DCS.
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[11] In the meantime, on June 19, 2018, DCS filed a petition for the involuntary 

termination of the parent-child relationship between Child and Father and 

Mother. An amended petition was then filed on August 15, 2018. Evidence 

was heard in the termination hearing on December 4, 5, and 11, 2018.

[12] DCS presented evidence, as set out above, showing that Father made no real 

progress with services in the months before his incarceration. He did not obtain 

stable housing, he was employed on only a very part-time basis, he did not stay 

in contact with the FCM, he never took a psychological parenting assessment, 

he was inconsistent with and unprepared for supervised visits, sporadic with 

homemaker services, and, though he completed a substance abuse assessment 

early in the CHINS case, he never followed up with treatment 

recommendations. Since being incarcerated, he has not seen Child or made 

any progress with services and is not scheduled to be released from prison for at 

least another year. Additionally, Father has now been convicted of molesting 

both his niece (committed in 2016) and nephew (committed in 2012 or 2013).

[13] FCM Bramlett and the CASA both testified that termination of parental rights 

was in Child’s best interests. The CASA opined that Mother and Father were 

unable to provide for Child’s basic needs and emotional support. The CASA 

explained that early in the CHINS case Child was “very withdrawn”, would 

not interact with caregivers, and cried if not left alone. Id. at 123. Similarly, 

FCM Bramlett testified that, in addition to her physical ailments, Child came 

into foster care at nearly eight months old with “a general ... fear [of] the 

people around her.” Id. at 71. After being in the foster mother’s care for over a 
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year at the time of the termination hearing, however, Child was active and 

thriving both emotionally and physically. Child had a “very strong bond” with 

her foster mother, who expressed a desire to adopt Child. Id. 

[14] On February 9, 2019, the trial court issued the termination order from which 

Father now belatedly appeals after obtaining leave from this court. Additional 

information will be provided below as needed.

Discussion & Decision

[15] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 

(Ind. 2016). Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences 

most favorable to the judgment. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2004), trans. denied. In deference to the trial court’s unique position to assess 

the evidence, we will set aside its judgment terminating a parent-child 

relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. In light of the applicable clear and convincing 

evidence standard, we review to determine whether the evidence clearly and 

convincingly supports the findings and whether the findings clearly and 

convincingly support the judgment. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d at 628.

[16] We recognize that the traditional right of parents to “establish a home and raise 

their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution.” In re M.B., 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. 

Although parental rights are of constitutional dimension, the law provides for 
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the termination of these rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet 

their parental responsibilities. In re R.H., 892 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2008). In addition, a court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those 

of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding the termination. In

re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). The purpose of terminating 

parental rights is not to punish the parents, but to protect their children. Id.

[17] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur in Indiana, DCS 

is required to allege and prove by clear and convincing evidence, that one of the 

following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement 

outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the 

child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services[.]

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B); Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2. Among other things, 

DCS must also allege and prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

termination is in the best interests of the child. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(C); I.C. § 

31-37-14-2.

[18] On appeal, Father asserts that DCS failed to present clear and convincing 

evidence that the conditions resulting in Child’s removal would not be 
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remedied, that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to 

Child’s well-being, and that termination is in Child’s best interests. We will 

address each of these in turn, as needed.

[19] Father first contends that DCS failed to present clear and convincing evidence 

that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Child’s 

removal or continued placement outside Father’s care will not be remedied. In 

deciding whether a reasonable probability exists that conditions will not be 

remedied, the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for his child at the 

time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed

conditions. In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. 

The court must also evaluate the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to 

determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or 

deprivation of the child. Id. The court may consider evidence of the parent’s 

prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to 

provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment. A.F. v. Marion 

Cty. Office of Family & Children, 762 N.E.2d 1244, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), 

trans. denied. “A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and 

to cooperate with those providing social services, in conjunction with 

unchanged conditions, support a finding that there exists no reasonable 

probability that the conditions will change.” In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 210. 

“Also, the failure to exercise the right to visit one’s children demonstrates a 

‘lack of commitment to complete the actions necessary to preserve [the] parentchild relationship.’” Lang v. Starke Cty. Office of Family & Children, 861 N.E.2d 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1163 | October 23, 2019 Page 10 of 14

366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting In re A.L.H., 774 N.E.2d 896, 900 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2002)), trans. denied.

[20] The record establishes that the reasons for Child’s removal and continued 

placement outside Father’s care centered on his unstable lifestyle and inability 

to properly care for Child. At the time of removal, Father (as well as Mother) 

was unemployed and homeless. The family had suffered from chronic housing 

instability for some time and had been timed out of shelters. In addition to 

having no home, Father failed to provide other basic care for Child. At seven

months old, Child was suffering from severe, untreated diaper rash and was 

smelly, dirty, and underweight. Shortly after Child’s removal, DCS also 

discovered that Father had a history of regular marijuana use. In the 

dispositional order, the court attempted to address these issues by ordering 

services to help Father regarding parenting, housing, employment, and living 

free of illegal substances.

[21] Father made little progress over the life of the CHINS case and did not 

maintain contact with the FCM. Before his incarceration, Father never 

obtained suitable housing, instead moving between the homes of his two 

brothers. While he did work two jobs for several months, his own testimony 

reveals that they totaled only about fourteen hours of work per week. Father 

acknowledged that in the months leading up to his incarceration, he “never 

really got around to” taking a psychological parenting assessment and missed 

supervised visits because he was “preoccupied.” Id. at 162, 167. In addition to 

missing more than half of the scheduled visits with Child, Father would come 
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unprepared and spend much of the visit looking at his phone. Father was 

unsuccessfully discharged from homebased services on more than one occasion 

and, although he completed a substance abuse assessment, he never followed 

up with treatment recommendations despite multiple opportunities.

[22] Father has been incarcerated since January 2018, around Child’s first birthday. 

He has not seen her since his incarceration for child molesting and will not be 

released until October 2020, when Child will be nearly four years old. Father 

has not enrolled in any programs while incarcerated to address the reasons for 

Child’s removal from his care.

[23] In sum, Father was in no better position to parent Child at the time of the 

termination hearing than he was when Child was removed from his care. He 

did not display any ability to secure adequate housing, he failed to stay in 

contact with and cooperate with DCS to complete court-ordered services, and 

he did not consistently engage in supervised visits with Child. Father put forth 

minimal effort toward regaining custody of Child in the months leading up to 

his incarceration and none thereafter. The evidence and the court’s findings of 

fact overwhelmingly establish a reasonable probability that the conditions 

resulting in Child’s removal and continued placement outside Father’s care will 

not be remedied. Cf. K.E. v. Indiana Dep’t of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 649 

(Ind. 2015) (reversing termination order where incarcerated father made 

“substantial efforts ... to improve his life by learning to become a better parent, 

establishing a relationship with [his children], and attending substance abuse 

classes” and “there [was] seemingly nothing else that [he] could have been 
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doing to demonstrate his dedication to obtaining reunification”); In re R.J., 829 

N.E.2d 1032, 1038 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (reversing termination order where 

father “obtained steady employment and a one bedroom apartment, completed 

parenting classes, substance abuse counseling, and psychological evaluations, 

and maintained regular visitation” and there was “no indication of [his]

unwillingness to cooperate with the OFC or that he failed to promptly complete 

any of the OFC’s programs”).

[24] I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive. Therefore, having upheld 

the trial court’s conclusion under I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i), we need not 

review the trial court’s determination that continuation of the parent-child 

relationship would pose a threat to Child’s well-being. 

[25] Finally, Father asserts, with little to no analysis, that the evidence was 

insufficient to support the trial court’s determination that termination was in 

Child’s best interests. In making this best-interests determination, the trial court 

is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the 

totality of the evidence. In re J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 

The court must subordinate the interest of the parent to those of the child and

need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parentchild relationship. McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 

185, 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Our Supreme Court has explained that 

“[p]ermanency is a central consideration in determining the best interests of a 

child.” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009). “Moreover, we have 

previously held that the recommendations of the case manager and court-
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appointed advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the 

conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by 

clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests.” 

In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d at 236. 

[26] Here, both the CASA and the FCM opined that termination was in Child’s best 

interests. In making this same conclusion, the trial court observed: 

The Child herself presents persuasive evidence of her own best 

interests. Upon placement in foster care, the Child was 

abnormally quiet, failing even to babble. The Child did not want 

to be touched, and was underweight. This weight-related 

condition was likely due to Mother’s inability to feed the child 

age-appropriate foods, a deficiency she demonstrated during the 

rare occasions when visits did occur. And finally, and most 

notably, there was, as above, the “chemical burn”-type diaper 

rash.

After being in her current foster home, the Child is now an 

appropriate weight, and is “running around playing now.”

Appendix at 79. Child is indeed thriving in the home of her foster mother, with 

whom she has lived since August 21, 2017. Child has not seen Father since 

January 2018, when she was one year old, and he will not be out of prison until 

she is nearly four years old. Under the circumstances, especially considering 

that the conditions resulting in removal are not likely to be remedied by Father, 

termination of parental rights is in Child’s best interests. 

Judgment affirmed.
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Brown, J. and Tavitas, J., concur.