# FILED
October 12, 1998 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE,

AT JACKSON

_______________________________________________________ ) JAMIE HAM

ILTON and wife ) Obion County Circuit Court BONNIE HAMILTON , ) No. 7-719 ) Plaintiffs/Appella

nts. )

) VS. ) C.A. No. 02A01-9712-CV-00324 ) GARY COOK, KEN DYKES, ANDY ) TWEED, WADE HENDRON, FRANK ) EVANS, TE NNESSEE W ILDLIFE ) RESOURCES AGENCY, TENNESSEE ) WILDLIFE RESOURCES ) COMMISSION, HAROLD H URST, ) BRIAN THOMPSON, LARRY ) THURSTON, JEFF M

ARTIN, and ) PAUL BROWN , ) ) Defendants/App

ellees. ) )

______________________________________________________________________________ From the Cir cui t Co urt of O bio n Co unt y at U nio n Ci ty. Honorable William B. Acree, Jr., Judge

Vincent A. Sikora , THE SIKORA LAW FIRM, Piney Flats, Tennessee Attorney fo

r Plaintiffs/Appe

llants. John Knox Walkup, Attorney General and Reporter Elizabeth P. McCarter, Senior Counsel Attorneys f

or Defendants/A

ppellees.

OPINION FIL

ED: AFFIRMED IN P

ART, REVERSED IN PA RT AND REMANDED FARMER, J. CRAWFORD, P.

J., W.S. : (Concurs) HIGHERS, J. : (Concurs)1 Exhibit 1 consisted of a warranty deed describing the Hamiltons’ property in Obion Cou nty. Plaintiffs Jamie and Bonnie Hamilton, husband and wife, appeal the trial court’s final judgment dismissing their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants/Appellees TennesseeWildlife Reso urce s Agency and Tennessee Wildlife Resources Commission and dismissing their civil rights claim against other Defendants/Appellees who are employ ees of the Tennes see Wildli fe Resources Agency. We affirm in part and r everse in part the trial court’s judgment.
I. Procedural History

The Hamiltons instituted

this action in Aug

ust 1997 by filing a four-count complaint against the Defendants

in the Circuit Court for Obion County. The Hamiltons’ complaint contained the following fa

ctual allegatio

ns:

1. Plaintiffs, Jamie Hamilton and Bonnie Hamilton, are citizens and residents of Obion County, Tennessee, and are the owners of the property sho wn atExhibit 1 1 (hereafter referred to as Property). 2. Defendant

Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency (hereafter TWRA) is a state governmental agency c reated pursuan

t to T.C.A. sec. 70-1-301. At all times relevant

Defendants Ken

Dykes, Gary Cook, Andy Tweed, Wade Hen dro n, and Frank Evans were employeesof TWRA as signed to Obion County from the Jackson, Tennessee, office of TWRA, and were acting under color of state law. Defendant

Cook is TWRA Region 1 assistant supervisor. Defendant Dykes is the TWRA area law enforcement supervisor. Defendants T weed, Hendron and Evan s are TWRA Wildlife O fficers in th e Reelfoot Lak

e District. 3. Defendant Tennessee Wil dlife Resources Commissio n (her eafter Commission) is an inde pendent and sepa

rate, state administrative board of conservation for g ame , fish and wildlife established by T.C.A. sec. 70-1-201. 4. [The Hamiltons’] Proper ty ad joins and underlie

s a portion of the southeaste

rn si de of R eel foo t Lak e in Obi on C oun ty. Their Property line extends about 100 yards in

to the Lake. The Lake, at o rdi nary l ow p ool lev el, cov ers abo ut 1 0 acr es o f th eir Pro pert y. 5. On or about November 16, 1996, Plaintiff Jamie Hamilton set duck d ec oys in Reelfo ot Lake, and s

ecured a prope

rly permitted boat with

a duck blind on it, to a light pole placed by [the Hamiltons] without objection almost 30 years earlier in Reel f oot Lake , wh ich pol e is loc ate d a s hor t di sta nce f rom the Pro pert y.2 Exhibit 2 consisted of an application pa

cket for a 1997 Re

elfoot Lakes

hore Use Permit.
3 Although the language of the Hamiltons’ complaint was not entirely c lear, at the hearing on the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, counsel for the Hamiltons explained that count 1 was “against the individual officers” only, whereas counts 2, 3, and 4 w ere “against the state.” 6. Shortly

after the b oat and decoys were placed, they were left unattended

by [the Hamiltons]. Then, without consent or a warrant, TWRA agents

(Defendants Tweed, Hendron and Evans), at the direction of Defendants Cook and Dykes, searched and

seized the boat and decoys, and took them to the TWRA hea dquarte rs at Reelfoot WMA. [The Hami

lton s] are informed an

d believe said Defendants

knew [the Hamiltons] w ere rip arian s and acted with callous and reckless disregard f or the ir rights. The items were returned to [ the Ham ilt ons ] ab out 10 d ays later, and their seizure and publicit yof it by Defendants, directly and pr oximately caused [the Hamiltons] damage to their property rights and business, and mental anguish. [The Hamiltons] fully intend to utilize their property to hunt and fish. So it is probable tha t such searches a

nd seizures will r

e occur. 7. Defendants TWRA and the Commission have establisheda “Reelfoot

Lakeshore U

se Permit’ program as shown by Exhibit 2. The permit

is subject to the list of ‘ CONDITI ONS’ shown in Exhibit 2. 2 [The Hamiltons] refu se to obtain any such

permit since it deprives them of property rights and thei r righ t to travel. Defendants

are without authority over navigation on Reelfoot Lake, butintend to en force th eir illegal per mit requirements w

hich will damage and inju

re [the Hamiltons’] p

roperty ri ghts. 8. Defendant

Commission allows the usage of State of Tennesse e facilities as access points to Reelfoot Lake by nonriparians. This has caused Reelfoot Lake to bec ome crow ded and congested, and increased litter and pollution. Non-riparians hunt and fish above [the Hamiltons’] lake be d property.

Such activities, directly a nd proximately

damage [the Ham

iltons’] property

rights. 9. [The Hamilt ons] intend to extend their dock farther into Reelfoot L

ake on t he Property. [The Hamiltons] are informed andbelieve Defend

ant TWRA will prohibit such actions an d the individual Defendants will d estroy the s

tructure once bu

ilt. Defendants have

no authority

over the placement or construction of a dock by [the Hamiltons] on the Property in Reelfoot La ke. 10. [Th e Hamiltons] are entitled to a declarator y judgment, pursuant to T.C.A. sec. 29-14-101 et seq. , declaring the acts of Defendants

invalid, unlawful, and in deprivation of t hose rights, privileges and immunities secured to [the Hamiltons] bythe United States Constitution and laws of Tennessee.

Count1 of the Hamiltons’ complain t a sserted a claim for damages against the individual Defendants unde r 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the ir seizure of the H

amiltons’ boat, duck blind, and decoys. The Hamiltons ’ remaining three counts asserted claims for declaratory and injunctive relief a gainst TWRA and the Commission. 3 Specifically, the Hamiltons ’ complaint sough t4 See T.R.C.P. 12.02(6).
5 See T.R.C.P. 12.02(1). (1) an order declaring that enforcement of the permit program violated the Hamiltons’ constitutional rights a nd enjoining TWRA and the Commission from enforcing the permit program against the Hamiltons; (2) an order declaring that TWRA and the Commission violate d the Hamiltons’ constitutional rights by allowing non-riparians to access and use Ree lfootLake and pro

hibiting said Defendants

from granting

access to Reelfo

ot Lake to non-

riparians; and (3) an order declaring that TWRA and t he Commis sion violated the Hamiltons’ rights to Reelfoot Lake as riparians and enjoining said Defendants from interfering with any a ctions of the Hamiltons to extend their dock
on their lake bed property. In seeking declaratory relief, the Hamiltons cited 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and T.C.A. § 29-14-101 et seq .

In response, the Defendants filed an answer and a motion to dismiss asserting, inter alia , that the Hamiltons’ complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, 4 that the trial court lack ed subject matter jurisdiction 5 over the Hamiltons’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief

because the Hamiltons had not exhausted all available administrative remedies, that the Hamiltons’ claims a

gainst the Defe

ndants were barred by the doc tri ne o f so vere ign i mmu nit y, and tha t th e Ham ilt ons ’ cl aim for dam ages agai nst the ind ivi dua l De fend ant s wa s ba rred by t h e doc tri ne o f qu ali fie d im mun ity.

Prior to the heari ng o n the Defe ndants’ motion to dismiss, the Hamiltons filed a motion to amend their complaint to assert a s ection 1983 c laim against five additional TWRA offi cers, including Harold Hurst, Brian Thompson, Larry Thurston, Jeff Martin, and Paul Brow n . The proposed amendm ent spe cified that each of these officers was being sued in his individual capa cit y.

The hearing on the Defendants’ motion to dismiss took place on November 7, 1997. At th e conclusion of the parties’ arguments, the trial court took a short recess and then orall y announced

its ruling from the bench. After g ranting the Ham

iltons’ motion to ame

nd their complaint, the trial court announced that it was granting the Defe ndants’ motion to dismiss theamended complain t for the following

reasons:

First of all, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Secondly, as matter of law [the Hamiltons] have no ownership interest in and to Reelfoot Lake. Three, there is no allegation of any constitutional right of [the Hamilton s] which was violate d by the def

endants which wou

ld entitle [the Hamiltons] to maintain their suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Four, the individual defend ants were , acc ord ing t o th e way I read the complaint, ac

ting in their

official capac

ities. The TWRA and the . . . Tennessee Wildlife Resources Commission are state agencies. Sovereign immuni ty pro hibit[s] this suit against the agency, the commission, and the

individual defend

ants. Fin all y, anyissue concerning these regulations must be pursuedthrough the admin istrative proced

ures act. This wa

s not don e and this issue cannot be decided in this Court.
After the hearing at which the trial court orally announced its ruling dismissing the Hamiltons’ complaint, the Ham iltons filed a notic

e of nonsuit in whic

h they attem

pted to voluntarily dism iss their complaint wit hout prejudice pu

rsuant to rule 41.0 1 of the Tennesse e Rule s of Civi l Procedure. The Defendants then filed a motion to strike the Hamiltons’ notice.

The trial court ru led that the Hamiltons no longer had the right to take a voluntary nonsuit because the trial court already had determined the c

aseupon its merits. Accordingly, the trial court entered a written order granting the Defendants’ motion and striking the Hamiltons’ notice of nonsuit. The trial court also ent ered a f inal order dismissing the Hamiltons’ complaint and reiterating the reasons for dismissal which were announced orally by the trial court at the heari ng.

On appeal, the Hamiltons have presented the following issues for this court’s review:

1. Whether

the action was vol

untarily dism

i ssed as a matter of right upon [the Hamiltons’] fi ling of their Notice of Nonsuit. 2. Whether

the acti o n should have been dismissed as a matter of the trial court

’s discretion upon

[the Hamil

tons’] fi ling of their Notice of N

onsuit. 3. Whether

the court lacked jurisdiction be cause [the Hamiltons] did not exha

ust their administra

tive remedies.4. Whether the Complaint sta

tes a claim upon which relief can be granted. 5. Whether [the Hamiltons] esta blished a constitutionall

y protected ownership interest in Reelfoot Lake and the lake bed. 6. Whether

the individual Def

endants were sued in thei

r official capac

ities. 7. Whether

all Defendants

were protected

by sovereign imm uni ty. 8. Whether

[the Hamiltons] alleged that the Defendants’ acts violated clearly established constitutional rights.

II. The Hamiltons’ Notic e of Nonsuit

Before addressing themerits of the Hamiltons’ complaint, we first must decide the issue of whether the Hamiltons had the right to take a voluntary

nonsuit after the

trial court orall

y announced

its ruling dismissing the Hamiltons’ complaint but before t he c ourt entered its written order of dismissal. As pertinent, rule 41.01 provides that

Subject to the provisions of Rule 23.05 or Rule 66 or any statute, and except when a motion for s um mary judgm ent made by a

n adverse party is pending, the plaintiff shall have the right to take a voluntary nonsuit to dismiss an action without prejudice by filing a written notice of dismissal at any time before the trial of a cause and serving a copy of the notice upon all parties, and if a party has not alre ad y been served with a summons and complaint, the plaintiff shall also serve a copy of the complaint on that party; or by an oral notice of dismissal made in open court dur ing th e trial of a cause; or in jury trials at any time before the jury retir es to consider its verdict and prior to the ruling of the court sustaining a motion for a directed verdict.
T.R.C.P. 41.01(1).

In interpreting th

e foregoing r

ule, the courts of

this state have held that, in non-jury
c ases, the plaintiff has the r ight to take a volu

ntary dismiss

al “until the matte

r has been finall

y submitted to the trial judge for decision.” Weedman v. Searcy , 781 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Tenn. 1989); accord Harris v. Harris , No. 01A01-9511-CV-00518, 1996 WL 225702, at *5 (Tenn. App. May 3, 1996); Willbanks v. Trousdale Coun ty Bd. of Educ. , 1986 WL 1663, at *3 (Tenn. App. Feb. 7, 1986). Once the case f

inally has be

en submitted to

the trial court fo

r a determination

on the merits,however, the plaintiff no longer can take a voluntary dismissal as a ma tter of right. Id
.

In accordance with the foregoing authorities, we conclude that the Hamiltons no lo nger had the righ t to take a voluntary dismissal when they filed their notice of nonsuit. At that point, the Defendants’ motion to dismis s already had been submitted to the trial court for a determination on the merits and, in fact, the trial court had ruled on the Defendants’ motion by announcing that it was dismissing the Hamiltons’ complaint. Under thes e c ircumstances, the Hamiltons lost the ab

ility to take a

voluntary di

smissal as a matter

of right.

On appeal, the Hamiltons contend that, even if they lost the right to take a voluntary dismissal, the trial court, in the exerc ise of its discretio

n, still had the auth

ority to gr ant their request for a voluntary

dismissal. The Hami

ltons further con

tend that the trial

court abused its discretio n when it struck thei

r notice of nonsuit

. This court previously has held that, where the right to take a voluntary dismissal is in the discretion of the trial court, the general rule is that the trial court should grant a vo l untary dismissal, “absent some showing of plain legal prejudice to the defendant.” O live r v. Hydro-Vac Servs. Inc. , 873 S.W. 2d 694, 696 (Tenn. App. 1993) (quo ting Price v. Boyle Inv. Co. , 1990 WL 60659, at *3 (Tenn. App. May 11, 1990), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 11, 1990)). On the other hand, the trial court sho

uld not grant a no

nsuit if doing so wo

uld “deprive the d

efendant of some right that became vested during the pendency of the case.” Oliver v. Hydro-V ac Servs. , 873 S.W.2d at 696 (quo ting Anderson v. Smith , 521 S.W.2d 787, 790 (Tenn. 1975)).

Th is cou rt has made clear that the possibility of the defendant being subjected to a secondlawsuit does not

constitute sufficient legal prejudice to preclude the plaintiff from receiving
a voluntary nonsuit. Oliver v. Hydro-V ac Servs. , 873 S.W.2d at 696. In construin g the federal counterpart

to rule 41.01, ho wever, one court has found sufficient prejudice to exist where the defendant successfully has demonstrated a valid defense, such as the statute of limitations, to the plaintiff’s claims. See Metropolitan Fed. Bank v. W.R. Grace & Co. , 999 F.2d 1257, 1262-63 (8th Cir. 19 93). Another court has found sufficient prejudice to exist where the plaintiff moves for a voluntary dismissal after pa

rti cip ating in a hearing where the trial judge expresses an adverse opinionon the merits of the plaintiff’s claim. See Piedmont Interstate Fair Ass’n v. Bean , 209 F.2d 942, 947-48 (4th Cir. 1954).

We conclude that similar prejudicewould result to the D efendants in the p

resent case if the Hamiltons were permitted to takea voluntary dismissal. At the poin

t they filed t

heir notice of nonsuit, the Hamiltons had participated in a hearing on the Defendants’ motion to dismiss at which the Defendant s demonstra ted valid defenses to a majority of the Hamiltons’ claims for relief. Moreover, the trial court already had issued its oral ruling dismissing all claims against the Defendants.We hold that, under t hese circumstan

ces, the trial co

urt did not abuse

its discretion in refusing to permit the Hamiltons to take a voluntary dismissal. Although the present case involves
a non-jury proceeding, we consider it to be somewhat analogous to the situation in a jury proceeding where the plaintiff attempts to take a voluntary non suit afterthe trial court orally has granted the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. Such a pr

actice is forbidden by

both the rule and o

ur case law. See German v. Nichopoulos , 577 S.W.2d 197, 201 (Tenn. App. 1978); T.R.C.P. 41.01(1).

III. The Hamiltons’ Claims for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

Against TWRA and the Commission

Counts 2, 3, and 4 of the Hamiltons’ complaint asserted causes of acti on for declaratory

and injunctive relief ag ainst th e TWRA and the Commission pursuant to both section 1983 and Tennessee’ s Declaratory Judgment Act. We co nclude that the tr

ial court proper

ly dismissed the Hamiltons’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief to the extent thatthese claims may have been brought pursuant to section 1983. As pertinent, section 1983 provides that

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,

or causes t

o be subjected, any citizen of the United States or

other pe rson within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rig

hts, privileges,

or immunit

ies se cured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in

an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redr ess, . . . .

42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 1998). A state is not a “person” as that term is used in section 1983 and, thus, may not be sued under the statute. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police , 491 U.S. 58,64 (1989). Accor dingly, we

hold that section 19 83 did not authorize t he Hamiltons to

bring these claims against the TWRA and the Commission. Id . at 66.

We also conclude that Tennessee’s Declaratory Judgment Act, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-14-101 et seq. , did not authorize the Hamiltons’ claims for declaratory relief against TWRA and the Commission. Section 29-14-102(a) “ gives courts

of record the power to render declar

atory judg ments ‘ within their respectiv e jurisdictions .’” Spencer v. Cardwell , 937 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Tenn. Ap p. 1996) (emphasi

s in o rigi nal ). C iti ng th e rul e of s ove rei gn im mun ity, however, the courts of this st ate have held tha

t this statute does not au

thorize suits

for declaratory relief against the State of Tennessee or any of its officers. Id .; see also L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Bracey , 817 S.W.2d 292, 297 (Tenn. 1991); Northe rn Tele com, Inc. v. Taylor , 781 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Tenn. 19 89), c ert. denied , 496 U.S. 905 (1990) ; Watson v. Department of Correction , No. 01A01-9707-CH-00360, 1998 WL 4707, at *2 (Tenn. App. Jan. 9, 1998), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 26, 1998).

Under the rule of sovereign immunity, “no suit against the State may be sustained absent express authorization from the Legislature.” Spencer v. Cardwell , 937 S.W.2d at 423 (citing Coffman v. City of Pulaski , 422 S.W.2d 429 (Tenn. 1967)). This rule is both cons tituti onal and sta tut ory. Spencer v. Cardwell , 937 S.W.2d at 423. Th e Tennes see Constitution provides that “[s]uits may be brou

ght against the

Statein such a manner and in such courts as the Legislature may by law direct.” Tenn. Const. art. I, § 17. Additionally, the Tennessee Code Annotated provides that
No court in the state shall have any power, jurisdiction, or au thority to entertain any suit against the state, or against any officer of the state acting by authority of the state, w ith aview to reach the

state, its tre asu ry, funds, or pro pert y, and all such suits shall be dismissed as to the state or such officers, on motion, plea, or demurrer of the law officer of the state, or counsel employed for the state.
T.C.A. § 20-13-102(a) (1994).

In interpreting the foregoing statute, the supreme court and this court have

held that section 20-13-10 2(a) prohibits the c ourts of this state from entertaining a declaratory judgme nt action6 We note that “[t]he Uniform Administrative Procedures Act provides the jurisdictional

prerequisites for seeking review of an agency’s actions through a declaratory judgment proceeding.” Davis v. Sundquist , 947 S.W.2d 155, 156 (Tenn. App. 1997). In the present case, the Hamiltons appear to have satisfied none of these jurisdictional prerequisites. See T.C.A. §§ 4-5-223 to -225 (1991 & Supp. 1997). against the state o r a state off icer. Quoti ng Hill v. Beeler , 286 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tenn. 1956), these courts have reasoned

that, inasmuch as the Declaratory Judgment Act does not permit the filing of
a suit against the s

tate, no authority

exists for filing a dec

laratory ju

dgment action ag

ainst the state and, in fact, section 20-13-102(a) expressly prohibits such an action. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Bracey , 817 S.W.2d at 297; Northern Teleco m, Inc. v. Taylor , 781 S.W.2d at 840; Spencer v. Cardwell , 937 S.W.2d at 424.

In Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Taylor , for example, our supreme court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of an action for declaratory relief wher e the plaintiff wa s seeking an order declaring that the Commissioner of Revenue “was authorized to refund the taxes in question or, in the alternative, that the commissioner’s re fusal to consider

the refund depr

ive[d] the plaintiff o

f its rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Tayl or , 781 S .W.2 d at 83 8. In Spencer v. Cardwell , this court

affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of an action for declaratory r elief
w here t he plaintiff was seeking an order declaring that the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department

of Mental Health and

Mental Retardation had violated theplaintiff’s due pr ocess rights
as a result of his termination as a civil service employee. Spencer v. Cardwell , 937 S.W.2d at 422.

We similarly conclude that the Hamiltons’ claims f

or declaratory

relief were pr

operly dismissed in this case. I

n their various claims for declaratory relief, the Hamiltons requested order s declaring that the actions of the TWRA and the Commission violated their rights under the United States Constitution and section 1983. In accordance with the foregoing authorities, we hold that such claims may not be maintained pursuant to

Tennessee’s De

claratory Judgment Act. 6 We also hold that the Hamiltons’ claims for injunctive relief must fail, inasmuch as these claims were predicated
on the trial court first issuing an order declaring the parties’ res

pective rights i

n this case. See Hold Stitch Fabric Mach. Co. v. May Hosiery Mills , 195 S.W.2d 18, 24 (Tenn.), cert. denied , 329 U.S. 759 (1946).IV. The Hamiltons’ Se ction 1983 Claim Against the I ndividual Defendants

We reach a differ

ent result with re

gard to the Hamiltons’ section 1983 claim against the individual Defendants as set forth in Count I. In dismissing this claim, the trial court ruled that all of the individual TWRA employees n

amed in the compla

int were acting

in their “official capacities”

and, thus, the suit agains t th em w as b arre d by t he d oct rin e of s ove rei gn im mun ity. Altern ati vel y, the trial court reasoned that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted

andthat the Hamiltons failed to allege that the individual Defendants’ acts violated any clearly establ ished cons titution al righ ts under section 1983. We conclude that none of the foregoingreasons provided a valid basis for dismissing the Hamiltons’ section 1983 claim again

st the individual Def

endants.

Our su p reme court recently set forth the standard to be applied by a court in ruling
on a motion to dismiss a complaint pursua nt to rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee

Rules of Civil Procedure:

A m otion to dismiss for failure to state a claim up on whic h

relief can be granted tests the

sufficiency

of the complaint. T

he basis for the motion is that the a lleg ations contained i n the complaint, considered

alone and taken as true, are insufficien t to state a claim as a matter of law. The motionad mits the truth of all relevant and material allegations, but asserts that such facts do not constitute a cause of actio n. In resolving the issues in this appeal, we are required to construe the complaint liberal ly in the plaintiff’s favor and take the allegations of the complaint as true.

Pursell v. First Am. Nat’l Bank , 937 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tenn. 1996).

In their complaint, the Hamiltons claimed that the individual Defenda nts searched an d seized their boat, duck blind, and decoys in violation of thei rrights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth

Amendments to the UnitedStates Constitution. T he Fourth Amendme

nt, as applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, grants persons the right “to be secure in t heir persons, hous es, p apers, and eff ects, against un

reasonable sea

rches and seizure

s.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A seizure of property occurs “ w hen ‘there i s some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory i

nterestsin that property.’” Bonds v. Cox , 20 F.3d 697, 701 (6th Cir. 1994)7 The parties have directed this court’s attention to the case of State ex rel. Cates v . West Tennessee Land Co. , 158 S.W. 746, 752-53 (Tenn. 1913), in which our supreme court discussed the rights of property owners whose lands became submerg ed when Reelfoot Lake was created by an earth

quake in 1810. We no

te, however, tha

t the Hamiltons’ co

mplaint asserts tha

t their boat, duck blind, a

nd decoys w

ere placed in Re

elfoot Lake “

a short distance f

rom” their prope

rty rather than in the portion of the lake which “covers” their property . We further note that the Hamiltons have a property interest in their boat, duck blind, and decoy s which is independent of any property rights whic

h they might assert as riparians of Reelfoot La ke. Accordingly, our resolution of the Hamiltons’ section 1983 claim against the individual Defendants does not require this cour

t to resolve the na

ture or extent of the

Hamiltons’ asser

ted riparian rig

hts to Reelfoot Lake.

8 Inasmuch as t

hese allegatio

ns were sufficie

nt to state a substan

tive due process c

laim under the Fourth Amendment, as opposed to merely a procedural due process claim, the availability of any state law remedie s did not provide a ground to dismiss the Hamiltons’ section 1983 claim. See Davis v. Bayless , 70 F.3d at 375; cf. Dean v. Campbell , No. 02A01-9704-CV-00077, 1997 WL 401960, at *1 (Tenn. App. July 17, 1997). (quoting Soldal v. C

ook County , 5 06 U.S. 56, 61 (1992)). The Fourth Amendment’s protection against seizures of property applies even “in a context in which privacy or liberty interests are not implicated.” Bonds v. Cox , 20 F.3d at 702.

Here, the Hamiltons alleged that they placed som e dec oys and a properly permitted boat containin g a duck blind in Reelfoot Lake near their property ; that, without their consent or a warrant, the individual Defendants searched and sei zed the boa t an d de coys in violation of the F ourth andFourteenth Amendments; and that these Defendants retained t h e items for approximately ten days before returning them to the Hamiltons. Based on these allegations, we con clude that the Hamiltons have asserted a violation of their Fourth Amendm ent rights and that they have stated a claim under sect ion 1983. 7 See Bonds v. Cox , 20 F.3d at 702; see also Davis v. Bayless , 70 F.3d 367, 375 (5th Cir. 1995); 8 Fuller v. Vines , 36 F.3d 65, 68 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied , 514 U.S. 1017 (1995); Rose v. Town of Jackson’s Gap , 952 F. Supp. 757, 764 (M.D. Ala. 1996).

We also conclude that the law does not support th e trial court’s ruling that the individual Defendants wer e sued in their official, a

s opposed to their

individual, capacities. Just as section 1983 does n

ot authori ze a suit against the state, the statute also does not authorize suits for damages against state

officials in their official capacities. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). The rationale for this rule is that state officers sued for dam ages in the ir official capacities are

not “persons” wit

hin the me aning of section 1983 because such officers “assume the identity of the government that employs them.” Hafer v. Melo , 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991).In an official-ca pacity suit,

the real party

in interest is the g

overnmental enti

t y and not the named official. Id . at 25. As the United States Supreme Court has explained,

[A] suit against a sta

te official in his

or her official c

apacity is n

ot a suit against the off

icial but rather i

s a suit against theofficial’s office. Brandon v. Holt , 469 U.S. 464, 471, 105 S. Ct. 873, 877, 83 L. Ed. 2d 878 (1985). As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.
Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police , 491 U.S. at 71.

Moreover, in dis ting uishing between official-capa

city suits and

personal-capa

city suits, the Supreme Court has explained:

Personal-capa

city suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law. . . . Official-capa

city suits, in contrast,

“generally

represent only

another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”
Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 1 59, 165 (19 85) (quoti ng Monell v. New York City Dep’t

of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). Thus, official-capacity suits are best understood as referring “to the capacity in which the state officer is sued, not the capacity in which the offi cer inflicts the alleged injury.” Hafer v. Melo , 502 U.S. at 26. For example, when a sta

te official sued i

n his official capacity dies or

leaves office during the pendency of the a ction, “the officer’s successor is automatically

substituted as a pa

rty.” T.R.C.P. 25.04(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1).

In light of the Supreme Court’s discussions of this issue, we reject the argumen t advancedb y the Defendants in this case that the individual Defendants were sued in their off icial rather than their person

al capacities. A

ccording to

the complaint’s allegations, each of the individual Defendants

personally participated to some degree in the wr on gful seizure of t

he Hamiltons’ pro pert y. The caption of the Hamiltons’ complaint listed each of the individual Defendants by

name withoutreference to t

he various of

fices these indiv

iduals held. The c

omplaint sought $1,

000 in compensatory

damages and

$10,000 in punitive d

amages from “

each” of the individual

Defendants. Moreover, the Hamiltons’ amended complaint named five additional TWRA officers and assertedthat

each was being sued in his individual cap acity. We conclude that the complaint’s language, when viewed in its entir

ety, was suf

ficient to notify

the in d ividual Defendants that the Hamiltons
were seeking to

recover damag

es from the individu

al Defendants di

rectly rather than from the state. See, e.g. , Pelfrey v. Chambers , 43 F.3d 1034, 1038 (6th Cir.), cert. denied , 515 U.S. 1116 (1995); cf. Wells v. Brown , 891 F.2d 591, 593-94 (6th Cir. 1989) (dismissing section 1983 actio n where complaint identified indiv

i dual defendants’ official titles and failed to specify that plaintiffs were seeking to hold individual defendants personally liable for damages). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in dismissing the Hamiltons’ section 1983 claim against theindividual Defen dants on the ground tha

t they were

sued only in th

eir official ca

pacities.

Al though the individual Defendants in this case were not entitled to a dismissal of the action against them based on the official-capacity def ense, havi ng be en sued in their personal capacities,

they were entitled to assert personal immunity def enses, suchas objectively reasonable relianceon existing law or the defens e of quali fied immunity. Hafer v. Melo , 502 U.S. at 25; Hard in v. Straub , 954 F.2d 1193, 1201 (6th Cir. 1992). One court has described the de fense o f qualified immunity

as follows:
Quali fie d immunity shields police officers “from suit for damages if ‘a reasonable officer could h ave believed [the act ion] to be lawful, in

light of clearly established law and the information the officers possessed.’” [ Hunter v. Bryant , 502 U.S. 2

24, 227 (19

91)], quoting Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 641, 10 7 S. Ct. 3034, 3040, 97 L. Ed. 2d

523 (1987). The availability of immunity depends noton an officer’ s su bjective good faith but rather on an objective reasonablenes s standard. Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982). Frequently the general rule, such as the right to be free from unreasonable seizures, is well-established; the crucial qu estion is w hether the law was clear in relation to the specific f acts c onfronting the police officer. Maxwell v. City of Indianapolis , 998 F.2d 431, 436 (7th Cir. 1993).

Scott v. Glumac , 3 F.3d 163, 164 (7th C ir. 1993). Under t

he qualified immuni

ty defense, a police officer or other law enforcement officer may be shielded from l

iability if he can demonstrate that he reasonably

reliedon a state law, rule, regulation, or policy authorizing the seizure of the plaintiff’s property under the facts of the case. See, e.g. , Allen v. Cou ghlin , 64 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that prison officials who seized newspaper clippings from in

mate’s incoming

personal mail in violation of his Fir

st Amendment rights were

entitled to rely on prison policy prohibiting receiptof newspapers from any source other than publisher or appr oved distributor).

On appeal, the Defendants contend that the tr

ial court’s dismissa

l of the Hamiltons’ section 1983 claim should be affirmed on thealt erna tiv e gro und of q ual ifi ed i mmu nit y. Sp eci fic all y, the individual Defendants cont end that th ey were entitled to rely on TWRA Rule 1660-1-2-.02, which authorized the removal of unregistered or unnumber ed fl oating waterfowl blinds from the Reelfoot Wildlife Manage

ment Area “at th

e dis cretion of the area manager or a designee of [TWRA].” Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 16 60-1-2-.02(3)(

c) (as revised i

n July 1996). We r

eject this argument, however, beca

use the pleading

s fail to establish th

at the individual D

efenda nts were entitled to this defense as a matter of law.

The Hamiltons ’ complain t indicate s that thei r boat was be ing u sed as part of a floating waterfowl (duck) blind. Under t he applicable TWRA ru

le, TWRA officers

were authorized

to
remove the floating waterfowl blind from Reelfoot Lake, at the discretion

of the area manager or a designeeof TWRA, provided that the floating waterfowl blind was either un registere d or unnumbered. Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1660-1-2-.02(3)(c) (as revised in July 1996). Although the Defendants’ answer asserts that the waterfowl blind was unregistered, the Hamiltons’ complaint fails to contain any allegations relative to this fact, except fo r the assertio

n that the boat itself was “properly permitted.” Inasmuch as the complaint is silent on the factual issue of whether or not the waterfowl b lind was registe red, we conclud

e that a genuine

issue of material

fact exists as to

th e availability

of the defense of qua

lified i mmunity and that this issue more properly would be addressed by a motion for summary judgment

or other appropriate proceeding. See Dominque v.9 In Dominque v. Telb , the court indicated that, at least in federal court, the plaintiff has

the burden of go

ing forward onc

e the defendant

properly r

aises the issue of

qualified immunity by way of affirmative de

fense, motion to dismiss, or motion for summary judgment. Dominque v. Telb , 831 F.2d at 677. The court also recognized, however, that factual ambiguities may prevent the trial court from deciding this issue on a motion to dismiss. The court explained:

If the compla

int itself is ambigu

ous in its factual a

llegations, and i

f that ambiguity

results in a deter

mination that under

one set of facts the plaintiff’s federal rights were violated and in another they were not, then presumably the district court can so hold, and the matter may then either be appealed or proceed on to the discover y stage, after which it mig

ht be possible to re

solve the issue by

appropriate motion for summary

judgment. Dominque v. Telb , 831 F.2d at 677. The present dispute appears to be such a case. Telb , 831 F.2d 673, 677 (6th Cir. 1987). 9

V. Conclusion

That portion of the tria

l court’s judgme

nt dismissing the Hamiltons’ section 1983 claim against the individual Defendants is reversed, and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consi stent with t his op inio n. In all other respects, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. In light of o ur resolution of this appeal, w e pretermit any

issues not specific

ally addre ssed in this opinion. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the individual Defendants, for which execution may issue if n eces sar y.

____________________________________ FARMER

, J.

______________________________ CRAWFORD, P.J., W.S. (Conc urs)

______________________________ HIGHERS, J. (Conc

urs)