Docket No. 107816.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

ROLAND W. BURRIS et al., Petitioners, v. JESSE WHITE,

Secretary of State, Respondent.

Opinion filed January 9, 2009.

JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Chief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride,

Garman and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION

The issue presented by this original action for mandamus is

whether Jesse White, the Secretary of State of the State of Illinois, is

required by section 5(1) of the Secretary of State Act (15 ILCS

305/5(1) (West 2006)) to countersign and affix the seal of the state to

the document issued by Governor Rod R. Blagojevich on December

31, 2008, certifying the Governor’s appointment of Roland Burris to

the United States Senate. For the reasons that follow, we hold that

section 5(1) of the Secretary of State Act (15 ILCS 305/5(1) (West

2006)) is inapplicable to the Burris appointment, and that no further

action is required by any officer of this state to make that appointment

valid. We further hold that the only ministerial act required of the

Secretary of State in this case is that he register the appointment in

accordance with section 5(2) of the Secretary of State Act (15 ILCS

305/5(2) (West 2006)). The Secretary of State having performed that

responsibility on December 31, 2008, the writ of mandamus is
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denied. 

Background

Following the November 4, 2008, general election, a majority of

the members of the Electoral College voted in favor of Barack H.

Obama for the office of President of the United States. See U.S.

Const., amend. XII. At the time of the general election, Presidentelect Obama was the junior United States Senator from Illinois. In

anticipation of assuming the Presidency, President-elect Obama

resigned his Senate seat, leaving that post vacant.

The seventeenth amendment to the United States Constitution

provides that

“[w]hen vacancies happen in the representation of any

State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall

issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That

the legislature of any State may empower the executive

thereof to make temporary appointment until the people fill

the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.” U.S.

Const., amend. XVII.

Pursuant to the power conferred on it by this amendment, the

Illinois General Assembly empowered its executive, i.e., the

Governor, to make temporary appointments for the office of United

States Senator. It has done so through enactment of section 25–8 of

the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/25–8 (West 2006)). That statute

provides that “[w]hen a vacancy shall occur in the office of United

States Senator from this state, the Governor shall make temporary

appointment to fill such vacancy until the next election of

representatives in Congress.” 10 ILCS 5/25–8 (West 2006).

In accordance with the authority conferred on him by section 25–8

(10 ILCS 5/25–8 (West 2006)), Rod R. Blagojevich, the Governor of

Illinois, appointed Roland Burris to temporarily fill the United States

Senate seat previously held by President-elect Obama. The Governor

made that appointment by letter dated December 30, 2008. The

following day, December 31, 2008, the Governor executed a

document entitled “certificate of appointment,” which was addressed

to the President of the Senate of the United States. In that document,

the Governor certified that he was appointing Mr. Burris to represent

Illinois in the United States Senate until the vacancy caused by
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President-elect Obama’s resignation “is filled by election as provided

by law.” The certificate was on a preprinted form and included, below

the Governor’s signature, a space for the signature of “Jesse White,

Secretary of State.” The space for the Secretary of State’s signature

was left blank.

The form used by the Governor was apparently based on

“recommended forms” contained in Rule II of the Standing Rules of

the United States Senate. As their name indicates, these forms are

merely recommended. State officials are not required to adopt them,

but “they may use [them] if they see fit.” Standing Rule II, United

States Senate, Committee on Rule & Administration.

The Illinois Constitution sets forth the Secretary of State’s duties.

It provides that 

“The Secretary of State shall maintain the official records

of the acts of the General Assembly and such official records

of the Executive Branch as provided by law. Such official

records shall be available for inspection by the public. He

shall keep the Great Seal of the State of Illinois and perform

other duties that may be prescribed by law.” Ill. Const. 1970,

art. V, §16.

Consistent with this provision, the General Assembly provided,

by law, that 

“[i]t shall be the duty of the Secretary of State:

1. To countersign and affix the seal of state to all

commissions required by law to be issued by the Governor.

2. To make a register of all appointments by the Governor,

specifying the person appointed, the office conferred, the date

of the appointment, the date when bond or oath is taken and

the date filed. If [State] Senate confirmation is required, the

date of the confirmation shall be included in the register.” 15

ILCS 305/5 (West 2006). 

These duties are set forth in section 5 of the Secretary of State Act (15

ILCS 305/5 (West 2006)). Section 5 includes additional provisions,

but none pertain to the present discussion.

On December 31, 2008, the same day the certificate of

appointment was signed by the Governor, the appointment was duly

registered by the Secretary of State’s office pursuant to section 5(2)
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of the Secretary of State Act (15 ILCS 35/5(2) (West 2006)). That

same day, the Secretary of State’s senior legal advisor sent a letter to

Mr. Burris’ attorneys confirming that the appointment had been

registered. The letter directly tracked the language used in section

5(2) and specifically cited to that provision. There is no dispute that

the Secretary of State did not also sign and affix the state seal to the

Governor’s certificate of appointment or his appointment letter dated

December 30, 2008. 

On January 2, 2009, Mr. Burris, joined by two registered voters

(hereinafter Petitioners), filed a motion pursuant to Supreme Court

Rule 381(a) (188 Ill. 2d R. 381(a)) seeking leave to file a complaint

for mandamus in our court. The motion invoked our original

jurisdiction under article VI, section 4(a), of the Illinois Constitution

of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(a)) and sought an order

compelling the Secretary of State to countersign and affix the seal of

the state to his appointment papers under section 5(1) of the Secretary

of State Act (15 ILCS 305/5(1) (West 2006)). In a separate motion to

“accelerate consideration of their motion for leave to file a complaint

for writ of mandamus and to accelerate consideration of [their]

complaint for writ of mandamus,” Mr. Burris and the other two

Petitioners alleged that prompt resolution of the matter is required

because without the Secretary of State’s signature and the seal of the

State, his appointment would not be recognized by the United States

Senate, and the people of the State of Illinois would not be fully

represented in the Senate when the new United States Congress

convened on January 6, 2009.

In a supplemental memorandum which we allowed Mr. Burris to

file, he advised the court that on January 5, 2009, the chief of staff to

the Governor hand-delivered Mr. Burris’ certificate of appointment

to the secretary of the United States Senate. While the secretary

retained the certificate, she declined to enter it into the Senate’s

certificate book. The following day, when the Senate convened, Mr.

Burris appeared at the Capitol Building to be sworn in as a United

States Senator. He was not permitted to do so and was barred from

the Senate floor on the grounds the Secretary of State had not

countersigned or affixed the state seal to Mr. Burris’ appointment

papers. 

Pursuant to the rules of this court, the Secretary of State had until
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January 7, 2009, to respond to Petitioners’ motions. The Secretary of

State filed a timely response, and by separate order, we granted

Petitioners’ request for accelerated consideration of the motion for

leave to file a complaint for writ of mandamus. We also allowed

Petitioners’ request for accelerated consideration of the mandamus

complaint itself. Because resolution of this case turns on questions of

law which the parties have carefully examined and forcefully argued

in the materials already submitted to us, additional argument is

unnecessary. The numerous memoranda of law submitted by the

parties’ shall stand as their briefs, and we shall proceed to the merits

without oral argument.

Analysis

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to enforce, as a matter of

right, “the performance of official duties by a public officer where no

exercise of discretion on his part is involved.” Noyola v. Board of

Education, 179 Ill. 2d 121, 133 (1997), quoting Madden v. Cronson,

114 Ill. 2d 504, 514 (1986). To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, a

party must establish a clear right to relief, a clear duty of the public

official to act, and a clear authority in the public official to comply

with the writ. People ex rel. Madigan v. Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d 457, 465

(2004). We agree with the Secretary of State that Petitioners in this

case cannot satisfy that burden.

Petitioners’ claim is predicated on the Secretary of State’s failure

to countersign and affix the state seal to the documents appointing

Mr. Burris to the Senate. According to Petitioners, the Secretary owes

such a duty under section 5(1) of the Secretary of State Act (15 ILCS

305/5(1) (West 2006)). Under the express terms of that statute,

however, the duty to sign and affix the state seal only pertains to

“commissions required by law to be issued by the governor.” There

are situations in Illinois law where officer holders are specifically

required to obtain gubernatorial “commissions.”These include county

clerks (55 ILCS 5/2–2006 West 2006)), members of the boards of

county commissions (55 ILCS 5/2–4001 (West 2006)), coroners (55

ILCS 5/3–3001 (West 2006)), sheriffs (55 ILCS 5/3–6001 (West

2006)), clerks of the courts (705 ILCS 105/3 (West 2006)), and

commissioned officers in the Illinois State Guard (20 ILCS 1805/37

(West 2006)). No provision of Illinois law, however, requires a
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commission to be issued by the Governor in case of appointments to

fill vacancies to the United States Senate. 

The relationship between “commissions” and the Governor’s

appointment powers was considered in an Attorney General opinion

issued in 1978 at then Governor Thompson’s request. The opinion

states:

“To constitute an appointment to office, there must be

some open, unequivocal act of appointment on the part of the

appointing authority empowered to make it. (Molnar v. City

of Aurora (1976), 38 Ill. App. 3d 580, 583; 63 Am. Jur. 2d

Public Officers and Employees §99.) An appointment to

office is made and is complete when the last act required of

the appointing authority vested with the appointing power has

been performed. People v. Lower (1911), 251 Ill. 527, 529.

***

While the appointment of an officer is usually evidenced

by a commission, it is not essential to the validity of the

appointment that a commission be issued to the officer.

(Fekete v. City of East St. Louis (1924), 315 Ill. 58, 60.) The

commission is not the appointment; it is merely the written

evidence of the appointment. (63 Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers

and Employees §114.) Where the issuance of a commission

is not made by law a necessary part of the appointment, the

appointment is complete when the appointing officer makes

his choice. 67 C.J.S. Officers §36.” 1978 Ill. Att’y Gen. Op.

138, 139.

While Attorney General opinions are not binding on the courts, a

well-reasoned opinion of the Attorney General is entitled to

considerable weight, especially in a matter of first impression in

Illinois. Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d

391, 399 (1994). We think this opinion, grounded as it is on

precedent from our own court, is entitled to such weight and

accurately characterizes Illinois law. 

Because gubernatorial appointments only require issuance of an

actual commission when the governing law so provides and because

no provision of law makes issuance of a commission necessary for

the validity of a gubernatorial appointee to a United States Senate
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vacancy, no commission was required by law to effectuate the

appointment of Mr. Burris to the United States Senate. And because

the Secretary of State’s “sign and seal” duty is triggered only in cases

where commissions are required by law, it necessarily follows that the

Secretary of State had no duty to sign and seal the certificate of

appointment issued by the Governor in this case. Under section 5(2)

of the Secretary of State Act (15 ILCS 305/5(2) (West 2006)), the

Secretary of State’s sole duty was to register the appointment, which

he has done.

Our research has disclosed but one reported decision pertaining

to refusal by the Secretary of State to countersign and affix the seal

to a commission for a gubernatorial appointment. It is People ex rel.

Ewign v. Forquer, 1 Ill. 104 (1825). That case involved the

Governor’s attempt to make an appointment to the post of paymastergeneral in the state militia. Mandamus was ultimately denied for

reasons unrelated to the questions before us today, and nothing in the

court’s decision is in any way inconsistent with the analysis we have

just set forth. Although the opinion does not give a useful citation to

the governing statute, the law in question was a precursor to the

Military Code of Illinois (20 ILCS 1805/1 et seq. (West 2006)), and

while the current Code no longer addresses the specific post of

paymaster-general, that post would have fallen within the category of

positions for which gubernatorial commissions are, in fact, required.

For the reasons just explained, a United States Senate vacancy is not

such a position.

The suggestion has been made that the General Assembly

intended the term “commission” to be used in a more general sense

to encompass any appointments by the Governor. Historical analysis

of Illinois law will not support such a construction. The “sign and

seal” duty contained in section 5 of the Secretary of State Act has

antecedents in earlier statutes. For example, a version of the law was

in effect in 1874, and it also contained a “sign and seal” duty for

commissions. Significantly, however, it differed from the current law

in that the registration requirement, now set forth in subsection (2) of

section 5, was also directed specifically to commissions. That is no

longer the case. Public Act 86–398 amended the statute in 1989.

Present law clearly differentiates between “commissions” under

subsection (1) of section 5 and the more general “appointments”
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contained in subsection (2) of section 5. Under established rules of

statutory construction, we must assume that the General Assembly

made that distinction for a reason, and the reason is apparent: under

present law, commissions are no longer necessary in every case to

make a gubernatorial appointment valid. Where commissions are

required by law, the “sign and seal” duty applies. Where, as here, no

commission is required, there is only a duty to register the

appointment. 

As noted in the Attorney General opinion cited above, the only

purpose a signature and seal could serve in this case is an evidentiary

one. It would confirm that the appointment had, in fact, been made.

At this point, however, there is no question at all that the Governor

did, in fact, make the appointment. If there was ever any question

about that on the part of the United States Senate, it should have been

removed when the Governor’s envoy appeared at the Senate with a

copy of the certificate of appointment in hand. 

In their pleadings, Petitioners suggest that the United States

Senate has taken the view that the Governor’s signed, hand-delivered

certificate of appointment is insufficient to meet the requirements of

the Senate’s own internal rules. We note, however, that nothing in the

published rules of the Senate, including Rule II, appears to require

that Senate appointments made by state executives pursuant to the

seventeenth amendment must be signed and sealed by the state’s

secretary of state. Moreover, no explanation has been given as to how

any rule of the Senate, whether it be formal or merely a matter of

tradition, could supercede the authority to fill vacancies conferred on

the states by the federal constitution. Under these circumstances, the

Senate’s actions cannot serve as the predicate for a mandamus action

against the Secretary of State. The only issue before us is whether the

Secretary of State, an official of this state, failed to perform an act

required of him by the law of Illinois. He did not.

Petitioners argue, in the alternative, that the Secretary of State had

a mandatory duty under certain acts of Congress to sign and affix the

seal of this state to Mr. Burris’ appointment as Senator. This

argument is wholly without merit. The provisions invoked by

Petitioners, 2 U.S.C. sections 1a and 1b, apply, by their terms, to

situations where a vacancy is filled by election. The situation here

involves the filling of a vacancy through appointment.
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There is one final point we feel constrained to mention. While the

Secretary of State has no duty under Illinois law to sign and affix the

state seal to the certificate of appointment issued by the Governor, he

does have a duty under section 5(4) of the Secretary of State Act (15

ILCS 305/5(4) (West 2006)) 

“to give any person requiring the same paying the lawful fees

therefor, a copy of any law, act, resolution, record or paper in

his office, and attach thereto his certificate, under the seal of

the state.”

The registration of the appointment of Mr. Burris made by the

Secretary of State is a “record or paper” within the meaning of this

statute. A copy of it is available from the Secretary of State to anyone

who requests it. For payment of the normal fee charged by the

Secretary of State in accordance with this statute, Petitioners could

obtain a certified copy bearing the state’s seal. Because such relief is

possible, no order by this court is necessary or appropriate. See

People ex rel. Devine v. Stralka, 226 Ill. 2d 445, 450 (2007) (for

mandamus to issue, the petitioner must be without any other adequate

remedy).

Conclusion

Because the Secretary of State had no duty under section 5(1) of

the Secretary of State Act (15 ILCS 305/5(1) (West 2006)) to sign and

affix the state seal to the document issued by the Governor appointing

Roland Burris to the United States Senate, Petitioners are not entitled

to an order from this court requiring the Secretary to perform those

Acts. Under the Secretary of State Act, the Secretary’s sole

responsibility was to register the appointment (15 ILCS 305/5(2)

(West 2006)), which he did. No further action is required by the

Secretary of State or any other official to make the Governor’s

appointment of Roland Burris to the United States Senate valid under

Illinois law. Moreover, to the extent that additional proof of the

validity of the appointment is necessary, Illinois law provides a

mechanism for obtaining it without the need for judicial intervention.

For the foregoing reasons, petitioners’ request for issuance of a

writ of mandamus is denied. Mandate to issue forthwith.
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Writ denied.