IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 97-CT-00196-SCT

EARNEST SYKES

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/02/96

TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LEE J. HOWARD

COURT FROM WHICH

APPEALED:

CLAY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: PRO SE

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

BY: DEIRDRE McCRORY

DISTRICT ATTORNEY: FORREST ALLGOOD

NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST CONVICTION RELIEF

DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND

REMANDED - 3/30/2000

MOTION FOR REHEARING

FILED:

MANDATE ISSUED: 4/20/2000

EN BANC.

PITTMAN, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Earnest Sykes, an inmate at the Mississippi State Penitentiary, filed a pro se motion for post-conviction

relief in the Clay County Circuit Court. The circuit court found that the action was barred as a successive

motion. The Court of Appeals of Mississippi determined on Sykes's appeal that the motion was not barred

as a second filing. Instead, the Court of Appeals held that Sykes's motion was time-barred by the threeyear statute of limitations for post-conviction relief under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2)(Supp. 1999).

Sykes v. State, No. 97-CA-00196-COA (Miss. Ct. App. March 9, 1999). For the reasons set forth

below, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case

remanded to the Clay County Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. At issue is a statute of limitations, and the relevant facts are limited to the occurrence of significant

events. The chronology of these events is as follows:
CHRONOLOGY

DATE EVENT REMARKS

4/14/1993 Guilty plea. Sykes pleads guilty to sale of cocaine and judgment is entered on the same

date. Sykes was sentenced as an habitual offender to thirty years in prison

without benefit of parole.

The 3-year period for filing PCR would have run on 4/14/1996, a Sunday.

Therefore, Sykes's deadline was 4/15/1996.

4/12/1996

(Friday)

Sykes mails his

motion for PCR.

Sykes sought post-conviction relief by his pro se motion mailed from the state

penitentiary at Parchman. We are dependent on Sykes's certificate of service

as proof that he deposited this document in the prison mail system on

4/12/1996. It appears clear, however, he would have deposited the motion

on or before 4/15/1996 for it to be received by mail in the trial court on

4/16/1996.

4/16/1996 Sykes's motion

is stamped filed

in the trial court.

7/2/1996 The motion is

dismissed by the

trial court.

The trial court interpreted the motion as a successive motion. Sykes appeals.

3/9/1999 The Court of

Appeals

dismisses

the PCR

motion.

The Court of Appeals held that the motion was not a successive filing, but

was time barred per M.C.A. § 99-39-5(2), because it was not stamped

"filed" within three years of entry of judgment on the guilty plea.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

¶3. We granted Sykes's petition to address an issue of first impression: whether Sykes's motion for postconviction relief was timely filed under the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act

("UPCCRA"), codified as Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-1 et seq. (1994 & Supp. 1999).

DISCUSSION OF THE LAW

The Standard of Review

¶4. Before the Court is the interpretation and construction of a statute of limitations. This Court employs a

de novo standard of review of questions of law. Ellis v. Anderson Tully Co., 727 So.2d 716, 718

(Miss. 1998).

The Statutes and Procedural Rules

¶5. Actions under the UPCCRA are civil actions. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-7 (1994). The Mississippi

Rules of Civil Procedure apply to such proceedings, except where the act provides otherwise. Milam v.
State, 578 So.2d 272, 273 (Miss. 1991).

¶6. The motion for post-conviction relief in this case relates to a judgment upon a guilty plea. The

UPCCRA requires, under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2), that motions must be "made" within three (3)

years after entry of the judgment of conviction upon a guilty plea. The motion is to be "filed" as an original

civil action in the trial court under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-7. Rule 5(e) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil

Procedure provides that filing is accomplished by delivery to the clerk of the court, or to the judge if the

judge should so allow. Rule 5(e) allows filing to be accomplished by electronic means, and M.R.C.P. 77(a)

provides that the courts are "always open" for the purposes of filing.

Analysis

¶7. This Court recognizes that the legislature has the prerogative to fix reasonable periods for actions for

post-conviction relief. Cole v. State, 608 So.2d 1313, 1317-18 (Miss. 1992). We have held, for

example, that the three-year statute of limitations does not violate the constitutional protection of habeas

corpus. Cole, 608 So.2d at 1319. The issue here is not the power of the legislature to provide such

limitations, but the interpretation of statutes and court rules within the framework of a legislative act which

impacts on the exercise of constitutional rights.

¶8. There are well-established principles which apply to statutory interpretation and construction. If a

statute is not ambiguous, the court should apply the plain meaning of the statute. Ultimately, however, this

Court's goal is to discern the legislative intent. Mississippi Power Co. v. Jones, 369 So.2d 1381, 1388

(Miss. 1979).

¶9. We have before us a statute, adopted after the effective date of the Mississippi Rules of Civil

Procedure, which states that a motion for post-conviction relief must be "made" within three years. The

statute which creates this three-year period is in the nature of a statute of repose. Cole, 608 So.2d at

1317. This Court has long viewed statutes of repose with disfavor, and, in the event of any ambiguity, we

place upon such statutes a reasonable construction which will favor the preservation of the action. Gentry

v. Wallace, 606 So.2d 1117, 1122 (Miss. 1992).

¶10. There is nothing in the UPCCRA which necessitates that we interpret the act's time limitation to require

that a pro se prisoner must have his motion stamped "filed" in court within three years. If it were so, pro se

prisoners would be subject to more disadvantages than are reasonably necessary in the administration of the

criminal justice system. Unlike others, the pro se prisoner cannot personally deliver his papers to the court.

He will likewise be without access to a fax machine and other means of rapid delivery to our "always open"

courts.

¶11. These impediments, and the other obstacles which face the pro se prisoner, influence our decision.

Such concerns, however, do not compel the result reached here. Instead, our decision is based upon what

we believe to be the overriding intent and purpose of the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral

Relief Act. The act is clearly intended to guide and assist the judiciary in its duty to provide an orderly

means of administering the post-conviction claims of a growing prison population. That duty is incumbent

upon the judiciary of this state. The duty also falls upon the judiciary of the federal courts, as the courts of

last resort in the system for post-conviction relief. To that end, our UPCCRA and the federal AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 et seq. (Supp. III 1997)

("AEDPA"), have each put time limitations on the exercise of post-conviction remedies.
¶12. In 1988, the United States Supreme Court adopted a "prison mailbox rule" for appeals within the

federal system. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988). The

Houston decision was subsequently incorporated into Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure

and has since been applied by the federal courts to various types of pleadings. Under the prison mailbox

rule, a pleading is deemed timely if it is deposited in the prison mail system within the time required. The

Fifth Circuit has adopted the prison mailbox rule for filings under the AEDPA. Spotville v. Cain, 149 F.3d

374, 378 (5th Cir. 1998).

¶13. This Court has previously considered adoption of the prison mailbox rule within the context of a direct

appeal in a criminal case. Benbow v. State, 614 So.2d 398 (Miss. 1993). Such appeals are, or course,

subject to the rules of this Court. We decided then to defer any decision on a prison mailbox rule to another

day, because it is within the inherent power of this Court to suspend its own rules under what is now

M.R.A.P. 2(c).

¶14. The time has come to adopt the prison mailbox rule, insofar as the initial pleadings made under the

UPCCRA. We hold that a pro se prisoner's motion for post-conviction relief is delivered for filing under the

UPCCRA and the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure when the prisoner delivers the papers to prison

authorities for mailing. Prison authorities may initiate such procedures as are necessary to document reliably

the date of such delivery, by means of a prison mail log of legal mail or other expeditious means.

Henceforth, an inmate's certificate of service will not suffice as proof.

CONCLUSION

¶15. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed insofar as it holds that Sykes's motion is not a

successive motion. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed insofar as it holds that Sykes's motion

is time barred. Likewise, the judgment of the Clay County Circuit Court is reversed, and this case is

remanded to the Clay County Circuit Court for a decision on the merits of Sykes's motion for postconviction collateral relief.

¶16. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.

PRATHER, C.J., BANKS, P.J., McRAE, MILLS AND WALLER, JJ., CONCUR. SMITH,

J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY COBB, J. DIAZ, J.,

NOT PARTICIPATING.

SMITH, JUSTICE, DISSENTING:

¶17. I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision that Sykes's motion is indeed time barred. This Court has

previously declined to adopt or reject the pro se prisoner mail box rule. Benbow v. State, 614 So. 2d

398, 402 (Miss. 1993). There, the Court discussed the adoption of the pro se prisoner mail box rule by the

United States Supreme Court in Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L. Ed. 2d 245

(1988), but noted that seven of the eight state jurisdictions to consider the issue had declined to adopt that

view for the reason that, "[i]n the federal system, there is a well developed procedure for determining the

time and date on which mail is received. To the contrary, in most state systems, the mail is simply deposited

in a common institutional mailbox with no record kept of who sent the information or at what time."

Benbow, 614 So. 2d at 402. Nothing has changed in this regard since 1993. The majority has simply

ignored these differences in the state and federal prison mail systems noted in this Court's recent decision
and now required that the Mississippi Department of Corrections, and possibly counties and cities, assume

responsibility for developing a prison mail system which will obviously depart from the normal, lawful,

logical and routine course of conduct, an aimless digression, if you will. I would thus affirm the trial court

and the Court of Appeals.

¶18. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

COBB, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.