MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2020 ME	47

Docket: Aro-19-265

Argued: December 5,	2019

Decided: April	14,	2020

Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	and HUMPHREY,	JJ.*

TODD	E.	MATHIESEN

v.

KARIE	ANN	(MATHIESEN)	MICHAUD

GORMAN,	J.

[¶1]	 Todd	E.	Mathiesen	appeals	from	a	judgment	of	divorce	between	the	

parties	entered	by	 the	District	Court	(Fort	Kent,	Soucy,	J.).		Mathiesen	argues	

that	the	court	erred	in	denying	his motion	for	recusal.		We	affirm	the	judgment.		

I.	 BACKGROUND

[¶2]	 	 The	 following	 facts	 are	 undisputed.	 Mathiesen	 and	 Karie	 Ann	

(Mathiesen)	 Michaud	 were	 married	 on	 August	 9,	 2014, and	 have	 one	 child

together.

1		On	June	10,	2018,	Mathiesen	twice	slapped Michaud across	the	face

and	was	arrested	on	a	charge	of	domestic	violence	assault.		

 * Although	 Justice	 Alexander	 participated	 in	 the	 appeal,	 he retired	 before	 this	 opinion	 was	

certified.

1		Michaud also	has children	from	previous	relationships.		
2

[¶3]		On	June	18,	2018,	Mathiesen	filed	a	complaint	for	divorce.		The	court	

held	a	three-day	final	hearing	in	2019.		At	that	hearing,	the	parties’ primary	area	

of	 contention	 was	 the	 allocation	 of	 parental	 rights	 and	 responsibilities	

concerning	their	child.	

[¶4]		On	April	12,	2019, after	the	close	of	evidence,	but	before	the	court	

reached	a	decision	in	the	divorce	matter,	Mathiesen	verbally	confronted	one	of	

Michaud’s	 relatives at	 the	 child’s elementary	 school.	 	 Michaud’s	 relative	

recorded	 the	 incident	 on	 her	 phone	 and provided the	 recording to	 law	

enforcement	officials.		On	May	8,	2019,	nearly	one	month	later,	Mathiesen	was	

arrested	and	charged	with	tampering	with	a	witness	and	violating	conditions	

of	release.		See 17-A M.R.S.	§	454 (1)(B) (2018);	15	M.R.S.	§	1092(1)(2018).	

[¶5]	 	 On	 May	 10,	 2019,	 the	 judge who	 had	 the	 divorce	 case	 under	

advisement	emailed the	parties’ divorce	attorneys	that	Mathiesen	“appears	in	

this	morning’s	in-custody	list,	facing	charges	of	Tampering	with	a	Witness	and	

VCR.”	 	 Later	 that	 day,	 the	 judge	 presided	 over	 Mathiesen’s	 arraignment;	

Mathiesen	was	represented	by	the	attorney	who	represented	him	in	the	divorce	

proceedings.	 Ten	 days	later,	Mathiesen	moved	 to	 reopen	 the	 evidence—not	

regarding	his	arrest,	but	regarding	other	matters.	
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[¶6]		On	May	29,	2019,	 the	court	held	a	conference to	discuss	with	the	

parties	 Mathiesen’s	 new	 criminal	 charges	 and	 his pending	 motion.	 	 At	 that	

conference,	the	judge stated,	

[T]here’s	 an	 issue	 about	 information	 that	 the	 Court	 has	 in	

connection	with	new	pending	charges	against	Mr.	Mathiesen.		I	was	

doing	 [in-]custodies	 a	 couple	 of	 weeks	 ago	 on	 a	 Friday	 and	

Mr. Mathiesen	appeared	in	front	of	me	from	the	Aroostook	County	

Jail,	having	been	charged	with	a	Class	B	tampering	with	a	witness	

and	 some	other	charges.		And	in	 the	course	of	preparing	 for	 that	

initial	 appearance,	 I	 reviewed	 affidavits	in	 the	 police	 report	 that	

outlined	some	of	the	behavior	that	formed	the	basis	for	the	State’s	

charges.		

And	 I	 thought	 it	 important	 that	 having	 taken	 in	 that	

information,	 that	 the	 pertinent	 portion	 of	it	 be	made	 part	 of	 the	

record	in	the	divorce	proceeding,	because	I	was,	at	that	time,	ready	

to	decide	or	had	decided	the	divorce	case	and	this	is	material	new	

information.		

The	judge explained	 that	he understood	 that	Mathiesen’s	behavior	had	been	

recorded	 and	 that,	 although	 he had	 not	 seen	 the	 recording,	 he had	 read	

affidavits	containing	transcriptions	of	the	recording.	 The	judge	acknowledged	

that	the	affidavits	described	troubling	behavior	by	Mathiesen:

Now,	after	that	I	became	aware	of	a	charge	brought	against	

Mr.	 Mathiesen—what	 we’ve	 been	 talking	 about	 here—that	

includes	a	recorded	video	that	I	have	not	seen	but	portions	of	which	

were	quoted	verbatim	reportedly	in	a	probable	cause	affidavit	and	

a	police	report.		And	I	have	to	say	if	true,	that	changes	my	thinking	

in	the	case.		And	it	will	result	in	a	different	decision	than	the	one	I	

was	prepared	to	issue	before	I	heard	that.		I	can’t	unthink	that.		I	

can’t	unring	that.	
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Now,	judges	do	that	all	the	time	with	respect	to	some	kind	of	

evidence,	but	I	don’t	think	I	can	do	it	in	this	case.		And	so	I	have	to	

find	a	way,	in	fairness	to	Mr.	Mathiesen,	to	put	this	on	the	record.		

Later	during the	colloquy,	counsel	for	Mathiesen	volunteered,	as	an	alternative	

option,	that	the	judge	recuse	himself.		The	judge responded,

I	would	but	frankly,	we	have	months	of	litigation	in	this,	and	

the	better	way	is	for	me	to	acknowledge	on	the	record,	as	I	have,	

the	evidence	that	came	to	me	inadvertently.		I	didn’t	seek	it	out.		It	

came	to	me	in	the	course	of	doing	my	work	.	.	.	.

The	best	way	is	to	put	that	information	on	the	record	in	some	

meaningful	 way	 with	 an	 opportunity	 for	 Mr.	 Mathiesen,	 through	

our	due	 process,	 to	 respond	 to	it	in	 a	 fair	way.		Otherwise	we’re	

abandoning	 a	 huge	 allocation	 of	 resource	 here,	 and	 I	 don’t	 think	

that’s	appropriate.		

At	the	conclusion	of	that	conference,	the	court	granted	Mathiesen’s	motion	to	

reopen	the	evidence.

[¶7]		Michaud	 filed	 her	 own	motion	 to	 reopen	 the	 evidence	 on	 June	 3,	

2019, and	both	motions	were	then	set	for	hearing	on	June	13,	2019.	On	the	date	

of	the	hearing,	Mathiesen	filed	a	motion	for	recusal.2		At	that	hearing,	the	court	

orally	denied the motion	for	recusal:		

Now,	the	fact	that	the	Court	is	privy	to	the	allegations made,	is	just	

an	 [un]avoidable	 fact	 of	 the	 practice	 that	 we	 have here	 in	 the	

District	Court.	 So	our	duty	in	a	situation	like that,	I	don’t	think	is	to	

recuse,	having	 stumbled	across	evidence	 that	has	bearing on	 the	

case.	 I	 think	 our	duty	is	 to be	candid	with	 the	parties	 regarding	

 2 For	reasons	we	cannot	discern,	this	motion	was	never	docketed.	
5

whether	or	not	it	is material	in	some	nature.	 And	if	it	is,	to	give	the	

parties	an opportunity	to	address	it,	fairly,	openly	in	court,	which	

is what	we’re	here	to	do	today.

[¶8]		On	June	17,	2019,	the	court	issued	a	divorce	judgment	that,	among	

other	 things,	 awarded primary	 physical	 residence	 of	 the	 parties’ child	 to	

Michaud.		Mathiesen	timely	appealed.		See M.R.	App.	P.	2B(c)(1).	

II.	 DISCUSSION

[¶9] On	 appeal,	 Mathiesen argues	 only	 that the	 court	 abused	 its	

discretion in	denying	his	motion	for	recusal.		We	review decisions	on	motions	

to	recuse	for	an	abuse	of	discretion.		In	re	J.R.,	2013	ME	58,	¶ 16,	69 A.3d	406.

[¶10] Pursuant	 to	 the	 Maine	 Code	 of	 Judicial	 Conduct,	 a	 judge	 must	

recuse	in	a	matter	if	the	judge’s “impartiality	might	reasonably	be	questioned,”	

including if	“[t]he judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a 

party’s lawyer, or the judge has personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in 

the proceeding when the personal knowledge that would form the basis for 

disqualification has been gained outside the regular course of present or prior judicial 

proceedings.”	 	 M.	 Code	 Jud.	 Conduct	 R. 2.11(A)(1)(2017);	 see Robertson	 v.	

Gerakaris,	 2015	ME	 83,	 ¶ 10,	 119	 A.3d	 739.	 	In	 this	 case,	 the	 judge	 received	

information	concerning	Mathiesen’s	new	criminal	charges	through	the	regular	

course	of	in-custody	initial	appearances.		As	we have	explained,	“information	
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gained	or	opinions	formed	by	a	trial	judge	based	on	events	or	facts	presented	

in	the	same	or	other	judicial	proceedings do	not	constitute	a	basis	for	recusal	

except	 in	 the	 extraordinary	 circumstances	 that	 demonstrate	 a	 deep-seated	

favoritism or	antagonism	that	would	make	fair	judgment	impossible.”		State	v.	

Boyce,	1998	ME	219,	¶ 8,	718	 A.2d	1097 (quotation	marks	 omitted);	State	v.	

Bard,	2018	ME	38,	¶ 43,	181	A.3d	187.		

[¶11]		Perhaps	recognizing	 that	 the	judge’s	receipt	of	new	information	

from	 this	 subsequent	 judicial	 proceeding	 did	 not	 require	 his	 recusal	 in	 the	

divorce	 proceeding,	 cf.	 State	 v.	 Rameau,	 685	 A.2d	 761,	 763	 (Me.	 1996)

(“Generally,	knowledge	gained	in	a	prior	proceeding	is	not	a	sufficient	ground	

to	recuse	a	judge	in	a	subsequent matter.”), Mathiesen	nonetheless	contends

that	he	was	denied	an	impartial	judge.	 That	argument	is	wholly	unpersuasive,	

as	there	is	no evidence	of	judicial	bias	or	prejudice	in	this case.		

[¶12]		This	judge	did	precisely	what	judges	should do.		He	heard	 three	

days	 of	 a	 highly	 contentious	 divorce	 proceeding	 and, while	 he	 had	 that	 case	

under	 advisement,	 he	 continued	 to	 do	 his	 job.	 In	 the	 course	 of	 that	 job,	 he	

learned	that	he	would	be	presiding	over	Mathiesen’s arraignment and	realized	

that	Mathiesen	was one	of	the	parties	from	his	recently-heard	divorce	case.		The	

judge prepared for	the	arraignment	by	reviewing	the	documents	accompanying	
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the	 criminal	 complaint	 against	 Mathiesen	 and	 then	 took	 the	 extra	 step	 of	

alerting	the	parties’ attorneys	that	Mathiesen would	soon	be	in	court	on	new	

criminal	charges.		

[¶13] District	Court	judges	in	Maine	are	“general	practitioners.”		They	

are	called	upon	to	hear	juvenile,	civil,	family,	and	criminal	cases—sometimes	

all	 in	 one	 day.	 	 Especially	 in	 Maine’s	 less-populated	 counties,	 a	 judge	 will	

frequently	 be	 called	 upon	 to	 adjudicate	 one	 case	 and	 then	 oversee	 a	 related	

criminal	matter	involving	a	party	 to	 that	case.		 If	 the	handling	 of	 the	second	

case—or	anything	else—does	cause	a	judge	to	develop	some	bias	or prejudice,	

we	expect	that	judge	to	recuse. See	State	v.	Marden,	673	A.2d	1304,	1308	(Me.	

1996) (“No	 judge	 should	 preside	 in	 a	 case	 in	 which	 he	 is	 not	 wholly	 free,	

disinterested,	impartial	 and	independent.” (quotation	 marks	 omitted)).	 But,	

“[a]bsent	a	showing	that	the	trial	judge . . . could	not	be	impartial,	or	reasonably	

be	seen	to	be	impartial,	because	of	particular	information	he	had	learned	in	the	

criminal	matter,	[a party’s]	mere	belief	that	[the]	judge	might	not	be	completely	

impartial	is	insufficient	to	warrant	recusal.”		In	re	Children	of	Crystal	G.,	2019	

ME	 9,	 ¶ 4,	 200	 A.3d	 267 (third	 alteration	 in	 original)	 (quotation	 marks	

omitted);	see	DeCambra	v.	Carson,	2008	ME	127,	¶ 8,	953	A.2d	1163 (explaining	
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that	 a	 judge’s	 knowledge	 concerning	 a	 party,	 but	 stemming	 from	 another	

criminal	matter,	is	not	enough	to	compel	recusal).		

[¶14] Here,	 the	 judge	 promptly	 alerted	 the	 parties	 of	 his	 inadvertent	

receipt	of	new	evidence,	placed the	matter	on	 the	record,	acknowledged	 that	

the	information	about	Mathiesen—if	accurate—was	damaging	to	Mathiesen’s	

demand	 that	 he	 be	 granted	 sole	 parental	 rights	 and	 responsibilities	 for	 the	

parties’ child,	thoughtfully	considered	Mathiesen’s	motion	to	recuse, and	then	

denied	 the	 motion. After	 denying	 that	 motion,	 as	 due	 process	 requires,	the	

judge	 provided	 Mathiesen	 with	 an	 opportunity	 to	 be	 heard	 regarding	 his	

behavior	that	led	to	the	arraignment.	 Mathiesen did	not,	and	could	not,	dispute	

the	 video	 depiction	 of	 his	 abhorrent	 and	 out-of-control	 confrontation	 of	 a	

family	member.		Nonetheless,	the	court	provided	Mathiesen	with	an	unfettered	

opportunity	to	address	that new	evidence	at the hearing.

3		

[¶15] Given	 the	 circumstances	 presented	 in	 this	 case,	 the	 judge’s	

decision	not	to	recuse	himself	was	entirely	proper,	and	we	affirm	the	judgment.

The	entry	is:

Judgment	affirmed.		

 3 Moreover,	 once	 the	 judge determined	 that	 he	 was not	 required	 to	 recuse	 himself,	 he	 was	

duty-bound	 to	 oversee	 the	 proceedings.	 	 See Schafer v.	 Schafer,	 2019 ME	101,	 ¶ 7,	210 A.3d	842

(pronouncing	that	“[w]hen	there	is	no	reasonable	basis	for	a	recusal,	a	judge	is	as	much	obligated not	

to	recuse	when	it	is	not	necessary	as	the	judge	is	obligated	to	recuse	when	it	is	necessary”).
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John	 W.	 Tebbetts,	 Esq. (orally),	 Tebbetts	 Law	 Office,	 LLC,	 Presque	 Isle,	 for	

appellant	Todd	Mathiesen

Alan	 F.	Harding,	Esq. (orally),	Hardings	 Law	Office,	Presque	 Isle,	 for	appellee	

Karie	Ann	Mathiesen

Fort	Kent	District	Court	docket	number	FM-2018-39

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY