2002 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

3-29-2002

Shea v. Comm Social Security

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 01-2477

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Recommended Citation

"Shea v. Comm Social Security" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 225.

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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 

 

 No. 01-2477 

 

 

 GERALD SHEA, 

 Appellant 

 v. 

 *LARRY G. MASSANARI, ACTING 

 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 

 

 *(Pursuant to F.R.A. P. 43(c)) 

 

 Appeal from the United States District Court 

 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

 (D.C. Civil Action No. 00-cv-04485) 

 District Judge: Honorable Jan E. DuBois 

 

 

 Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

 January 18, 2002 

 

 Before: ALITO and ROTH, Circuit Judges 

 SCHWARZER*, District Judge 

 

 (Opinion filed March 28, 2002) 

 

 * Honorable William W Schwarzer, Senior District Judge for the Northern District 

of California, sitting by designation. 

 

 

 OPINION 

 

ROTH, Circuit Judge: 

 Appellant Gerald Shea brought an action in the United States District Court for 

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging that he was wrongfully denied Disability 

Insurance Benefits by the Commissioner of Social Security under 20 C.F.R. 404.1520. 

The District Court affirmed the decision of the Commissioner. Shea appeals, arguing 

that the Commissioner’s decision to deny him Disability Insurance Benefits was not 

supported by substantial evidence. The parties are familiar with the underlying facts and 

history and we shall not repeat them here. 

 The District Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 405(g). We have 

appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291. Our review of the District Court 

Order is limited to determining whether the District Court properly found that there is 

substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision. See 42 U.S.C. 405(g) and 
Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F. 3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence has been 

defined as more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance. It means such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate. Id. (citing Richardson 

v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). We find that the Commissioner’s decision was 

supported by substantial evidence. 

 In determining such a claim for Disability Insurance Benefits, the Commissioner 

follows a five-step analysis. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520. In following the five-step 

analysis, the Commissioner considers: (1) whether the claimant is engaging in substantial 

gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant is suffering from a severe impairment; (3) 

whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals the requirements of a listed 

impairment; (4) whether the claimant has the inability to return to his past work; and (5) 

if not, whether the claimant can perform any other work available in the national 

economy. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520 (a)-(f). At steps one through four, the burden of 

proof is on the claimant whereas at step five the burden of proof shifts to the 

Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520 (f). The inquiry at issue for purposes of this 

case is step five. 

 Shea argues that the Commissioner did not rely on substantial evidence at "step 

five" to determine that he was found not to be disabled within the meaning of the Social 

Security Act because he was capable of performing a significant number of jobs in the 

national economy. He contends that in making this decision, the ALJ’s reliance on the 

medical-vocational rules was improper under Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F. 3d 259 (3d. Cir. 

2000) because the ALJ only relied on Dr. Mandel’s exertional restrictions of his exam 

findings of Shea and not his nonexertional restrictions. In Sykes, we held that "grids 

cannot automatically establish that there are jobs in the national economy when a 

claimant has severe exertional and nonexertional impairments." Id. at 267. We agree 

with the District Court that the ALJ only determined that Shea had exertional 

impairments and not any nonexertional impairments. Thus, Sykes does not apply and the 

ALJ’s reliance on the grids in the instant matter was wholly appropriate. 

 Shea also argues that the Commissioner’s analysis is flawed at "step five" because 

he found Shea not to be illiterate. To be found illiterate under the Code, the claimant 

must have the inability to read or write. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1564(b)(1). By Shea’s own 

admissions to Dr. Cooperstein and the ALJ, the District Court found that Shea is not 

illiterate. We also agree with this determination. 

 For the above reasons, we will deny Shea’s petition to review the judgment of the 

Commissioner. 

_____________________________ 

TO THE CLERK: 

 Please file the foregoing Opinion. 

 By the Court, 

 /s/ Jane R. Roth 

 Circuit Judge