NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

GEIRY L. MATHIS,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT A. MCDONALD, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2016-1226

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 14-314, Judge Mary J. Schoelen.

______________________ 

Decided: April 12, 2016

______________________ 

GEIRY L. MATHIS, Home, PA, pro se.

JESSICA COLE, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by 

BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., MARTIN 

F. HOCKEY JR.; BRIAN D. GRIFFIN, MEGHAN ALPHONSO, 

Office of General Counsel, United States Department of 

Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC. 

______________________ 
2 MATHIS V. MCDONALD

Before PROST, Chief Judge, LOURIE and TARANTO, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Geiry L. Mathis (“Mathis”) appeals from a decision of 

the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 

(the “Veterans Court”) remanding certain of his claims to 

the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (the “Board”) and affirming the Board’s rejection of other claims. See Mathis v. 

McDonald, No. 14-0314, 2015 WL 5255331 (Vet. App. 

Sept. 10, 2015); see also Resp’t’s App. (“R.A.”) 1–23. For 

the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and dismiss in 

part. 

BACKGROUND

Mathis served on active duty in the U.S. Army from 

June 1968 to September 1969, and suffered a gunshot 

wound to the left side of his head during combat in the 

Republic of Vietnam. Mathis’s attempts to receive disability benefits for that injury are chronicled in his three 

prior appeals to this Court, see Mathis v. McDonald, 625 

F. App’x 539 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Mathis v. Shinseki, 484 

F. App’x 565 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Mathis v. Shinseki, 494 

F. App’x 78 (Fed. Cir. 2012); accordingly, we only detail

the history relating to the present appeal. 

 In May 1989, the Board issued a decision denying 

Mathis a disability rating in excess of 10% for tinnitus 

with headaches. R.A. 6. Mathis moved to revise that 

rating in March 2007 on the basis of clear and unmistakable error (“CUE”). R.A. 7. Mathis alleged that the Board 

should have rated his tinnitus and headaches separately, 

that the Board should also have given him a rating for 

tinnitus in each ear, and that the VA committed malfeasance in denying his claims. R.A. 7.

The Board denied those claims in 2007, but the Veterans Court vacated and remanded the Board’s decision 
MATHIS V. MCDONALD 3

because the Board did not separately address each allegation of CUE, and the court did not agree with the Board’s 

conclusion that Mathis simply disputed the manner in 

which the Board weighed the evidence. R.A. 7. In 2010, 

the Board again dismissed Mathis’s CUE claims as disputing the Board’s weighing of the evidence. R.A. 8. The 

Veterans Court again vacated the Board’s dismissal of 

Mathis’s CUE claims and remanded, again determining 

that the Board had not adequately explained why 

Mathis’s claims amounted to no more than a dispute over 

the weighing of evidence. R.A. 9. 

Mathis also sought benefits for post-traumatic stress 

disorder (“PTSD”) in a parallel line of cases. In November 

1987, and again in May 1989, the Board denied service 

connection for PTSD, concluding that the necessary 

symptoms were not shown by the medical evidence. R.A. 

6. In July 1995, the regional office (“RO”) reopened 

Mathis’s claim and awarded service connection for PTSD, 

with a 100% disability rating effective January 31, 1994, 

later made effective as of January 20, 1991. R.A. 6–7. 

Mathis has since alleged that he made claims for service 

connection for PTSD in 1983 and 1985, and that those 

claims remain unadjudicated. R.A. 7–8. 

In December 2013, the two lines of cases converged in 

a Board decision finding no CUE in the two 1989 decisions. Specifically, the Board found that there was no 

CUE in denying a rating in excess of 10% for tinnitus 

with headaches, not assigning two separate ratings for 

bilateral tinnitus, not assigning a separate rating for 

headaches, and denying earlier service connection for 

PTSD. R.A. 9. 

The Veterans Court reversed the Board’s finding that 

there was no CUE in not giving Mathis a separate rating 

for headaches, but remanded to the Board for the determination whether correct application of the governing 

regulations would have changed the outcome. R.A. 13. 
4 MATHIS V. MCDONALD

The Veterans Court also determined that the Board failed 

to address Mathis’s allegations of malfeasance, despite 

those allegations having been “twice remanded . . . for the 

Board to adjudicate.” R.A. 14–15. Therefore, the Veterans Court again remanded the claim for the Board’s 

consideration. R.A. 15. The Veterans Court affirmed, 

however, the Board’s determinations that the 1989 governing regulations did not provide for a separate rating 

for tinnitus for each ear, that Mathis was awarded the 

maximum disability rating for tinnitus, that there was no 

CUE in the Board’s 1989 denial of service connection for 

PTSD, and that the 1983 and 1985 PTSD claims were not 

unadjudicated because they were subsumed in Mathis’s 

adjudicated 1987 claim. R.A. 15–21.

Mathis timely appealed, seeking to invoke our jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 7292. 

DISCUSSION

Our jurisdiction to review decisions of the Veterans 

Court is limited by statute. We may review a Veterans 

Court decision with respect to the validity of a decision on 

a rule of law or the validity or interpretation of any statute or regulation that was relied upon by the Veterans 

Court in making its decision. Id. § 7292(a). Unless a

constitutional issue is presented, we have no jurisdiction 

to review questions of fact or the application of a law or 

regulation to a particular set of facts. Id. § 7292(d)(2). 

We begin with the issue decided by the Veterans 

Court adverse to Mathis and involving the interpretation

of a regulation. The Veterans Court determined that the 

regulations in 1989 provided a maximum of 10% disability 

rating for tinnitus, and that there was no legal basis on 

which to award separate ratings for tinnitus in each ear. 

R.A. 15. We see no error in the interpretation made by 

the Veterans Court. Indeed, we have already upheld the 

Secretary’s interpretation of the regulations as providing 

a single rating for tinnitus, and a maximum disability
MATHIS V. MCDONALD 5

rating of 10%. Smith v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1344, 1450–

51 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 

Mathis next argues that the Veterans Court erred in 

finding that the Board’s denial of his 1987 PTSD claims 

adjudicated his 1983 and 1985 claims because the 1983 

and 1985 claims were different from the 1987 claims. 

Appellant’s Br. 3. This argument does not challenge the 

interpretation of a regulation or statute, however, and 

instead challenges the manner in which the Veterans 

Court applied established law to the facts of his 1983, 

1985, and 1987 PTSD claims. Accordingly, that issue is 

beyond our jurisdiction. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). 

Moreover, Mathis’s disagreement with the Veteran’s 

Court’s affirmance of the 1989 denial of service connection 

for PTSD merely challenges the application of law to 

facts, and similarly is beyond our jurisdiction. 

Mathis also argues that the Veterans Court misinterpreted 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.105(a), 4.1, 4.2, and 4.7, which are 

respectively directed to the effect of a reversed Board 

decision, the requirements for a disability rating, the 

interpretation of examination reports, and the impact of 

two possible ratings for the same disability. Review of his 

allegations, however, reveals that Mathis is in fact challenging the manner in which the Board or the Veterans 

Court applied those regulations to the facts of his case. 

Livingston v. Derwinski, 959 F.2d 224, 225 (Fed. Cir.

1992) (“[T]he mere recitation of a basis for jurisdiction by 

party or a court[ ] is not controlling; we must look to the 

true nature of the action.”). Accordingly, those issues are 

also outside of our jurisdiction. See 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7292(d)(2). 

Mathis also appears to be frustrated with the Veterans Court’s decision to remand his headache and malfeasance claims to the Board for further proceedings, and 

asks us to instead reverse the Board so that his case does 

not undergo further proceedings on remand. Appellant’s 
6 MATHIS V. MCDONALD

Br. 7–8. Mathis’s frustration is understandable, as his 

claims have been remanded to the Board several times 

before, only to be inadequately addressed. His malfeasance allegation, for example, is being remanded to the 

Board for the third time. Nevertheless, this court only 

reviews remand orders where (1) there is a clear and final 

decision on a legal issue that (a) is separate from the 

remand proceedings, (b) will directly govern the remand 

proceedings or, (c) if reversed by this court, would render 

the remand proceedings unnecessary; (2) the resolution of 

the legal issues adversely affects the party seeking review; and (3) there is a substantial risk that a remand 

would moot the issue. Williams v. Principi, 275 F.3d 

1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Mathis has not made the 

required showing, and so we cannot disturb the remand 

order. 

Mathis also raises numerous other arguments neither 

presented to nor decided by the Veterans Court. For 

example, Mathis argues that there was CUE in a 1979 

rating decision and that other previous PTSD claims are 

unadjudicated; he also asks us to order the Secretary to 

adjudicate a total disability individual unemployability 

claim. Some or all of these arguments involve claims not 

presented to the Board in the matters before the Veterans 

Court, and hence outside that court’s jurisdiction. See 

Ledford v. West, 136 F.3d 776, 779 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In 

any event, we generally do not consider issues neither 

presented to nor decided by the Veterans Court, Forshey 

v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1355–58 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en 

banc), superseded on other grounds by statute, Veterans 

Benefits Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-330, § 402, 116 Stat. 

2820, 2832, and we see no reason to depart from that 

practice here. 

Finally, Mathis also alleges that his constitutional 

rights were violated by inadequate medical exams and by 

his PTSD claims not being adequately addressed. The 

Veterans Court found that most of Mathis’s constitutional 
MATHIS V. MCDONALD 7

allegations were “mere assertions of constitutional impropriety without legal support.” R.A. 21. The Veterans 

Court only addressed Mathis’s argument that his due 

process rights were violated by the failure to adjudicate 

the 1983 and 1985 PTSD claims, finding that there was 

no violation because the claims were addressed in the 

1987 decision. We agree that there was no due process 

violation as to the 1983 and 1985 PTSD claims because 

they were subsumed in and therefore adjudicated by the 

Board’s 1987 decision. Moreover, Mathis’s attempts to 

characterize his arguments “as constitutional in nature 

does not confer upon us jurisdiction that we otherwise 

lack.” Helfer v. West, 174 F.3d 1332, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 

1999). 

CONCLUSION

We have considered Mathis’s remaining arguments, 

but find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons,

this appeal is affirmed in part and dismissed in part. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART