IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2013 WY 2

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2012

January 9, 2013

IN THE INTEREST OF NC and AM,

Minor Children,

SC and FC, III,

Appellants

(Respondents),

v.

STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT

OF FAMILY SERVICES,

Appellee

(Petitioner).

S-12-0139

Appeal from the District Court of Park County

The Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge

Representing Appellants:

Timothy A. Eagler of Hallman, Eagler & Hunt, P.C., Greybull, WY and Jessica 

Loeper, Powell, WY.

Representing Appellee:

Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy 

Attorney General; Jill E. Kucera, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Jared 

Crecelius, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Guardian ad Litem:

Dan S. Wilde, Guardian ad Litem Program, Cheyenne, WY.

Before KITE, C.J., HILL, VOIGT, BURKE, and DAVIS, JJ.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. 

Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building,

Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be

made before final publication in the permanent volume.
1

HILL, Justice.

[¶1] This appeal arises from the district court’s exercise of juvenile jurisdiction over 

neglect petitions filed on two Texas children whose maternal grandmother brought them 

to Wyoming after the children had been abused in Texas by their mother’s boyfriend. 

The district court adjudicated the children as neglected, and the children’s mother and her 

boyfriend appeal, contending that the district court did not have subject matter 

jurisdiction.

[¶2] Because this case is an interstate child custody dispute, we hold that the district 

court erred in exercising jurisdiction pursuant to Wyoming’s Child Protection Act. The 

district court had jurisdiction to respond to the immediate threat to the children, but that 

jurisdiction was as defined and limited by the temporary emergency jurisdiction 

provisions of Wyoming’s Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 

(UCCJEA). We thus affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings 

consistent with the direction herein.

ISSUE

[¶3] The children’s mother and her boyfriend state the issue on appeal as follows:

The issue before the Court is whether the juvenile 

court was correct in determining that it possessed the requisite 

subject matter jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter in 

controversy.

FACTS

[¶4] In April 2011, SC (Mother) was living in the Dallas, Texas area with her two girls, 

NC and AM, and her boyfriend, FC, III (FC). At that time, NC was four years old, and 

AM was three years old. On the 14th or 15th of April 2011, Mother contacted her 

mother, SR (Grandmother), who lives in Cody, Wyoming, and reported that her 

boyfriend, FC, had bitten her two children. Mother also took photographs of the girls’ 

injuries using her cell phone and forwarded those to Grandmother.

[¶5] Mother told Grandmother that she was going to report the abuse to law 

enforcement, take the children to a physician, and then move in with her sister, who also 

lived in the Dallas, Texas area. When Mother and the children moved in with Mother’s 

sister, Mother’s sister observed the bite marks on NC and AM. She described them as 

follows:

A. My sister ended up showing to me, and my 

fiancé ended up taking pictures off my cell phone. There
2

were several bite marks on [NC], deep bite marks, on her arm

from her shoulder blades, the butt cheeks, the sides of the

hips. [AM] had a couple on her, not as much as [NC] did, but

[AM] had a few.

Q. [AM] had a few what?

A. Bite marks or bruises. She had a couple on her

shoulder as well, on her left arm.

[¶6] At some point, Mother reconciled with FC, and she and the children moved back 

in with him. In July 2011, Grandmother traveled to Texas to check on Mother and the 

children. She testified to her reasons for the trip and what she observed.

A. Well, I went down because I was worried about

the girls, and [SC] wouldn’t tell me what the doctor said. 

And she just kept saying, well, the doctor was going to call 

the police. And she didn’t have any answers, so I went down 

and stayed for a week.

* * *

Q. When you got down there in July, did you

observe the girls at all?

A. Yes.

* * *

Q. What did you notice at that time?

A. The bruises – [NC] had bruises on both arms 

and on her bottom. And [AM] still had the bruises on her –

along her chest or, you know, her side.

[¶7] After a week in Texas, Grandmother went back to Wyoming, but with plans to 

return to pick up Mother and the children after Mother worked the two-week notice 

period she was required to give her employer. Grandmother explained:

A. I came back home with plans to return.

Q. So did you have plans to return? What

prompted those plans?

A. [SC] told me that he was increasingly abusive 

to the girls and to her. She said she knew she’d never get her 

life straightened out or be in a better situation as long as she 

was with [FC]. And she said, “Would you come and get 

me?”

[¶8] Grandmother returned to Texas two weeks later, but when she arrived, Mother told 

her that she had decided to stay in Texas and try to work things out with her boyfriend. 

Mother, however, allowed Grandmother to take the two children back with her to
3

Wyoming, with the understanding that Mother would come to Wyoming to retrieve the

children.

[¶9] Shortly after returning to Wyoming, Grandmother contacted the Wyoming 

Department of Family Services (DFS), hoping “to find some way to protect the girls.” 

DFS, in turn, contacted the Cody Police Department. Detective Juliet Vibe of the Cody 

Police Department investigated the allegations of abuse and interviewed the children. In 

her Affidavit of Probable Cause, Detective Vibe reported that neither law enforcement 

nor a family services agency in Texas had requested assistance from Wyoming. 

Detective Vibe’s affidavit also detailed the discussion she had with Texas law 

enforcement concerning the abuse allegations.

On September 14, 2011, I spoke with Detective

Smeltzec of the Balch Springs, Police Department. Detective

Smeltzec advised that he interviewed both [SC] and her

boyfriend, identified as [FC] about the marks. Both [SC] and

[FC] stated that the bite marks were from an unnamed nine

(9) year old boy who used to live next door to them.

Detective Smeltzec did not find their statements credible, but

did not have enough information to proceed with a criminal

investigation. Detective Smeltzec emailed me a copy of his

report. I offered to interview the girls for Detective Smeltzec,

but he advised that it would not be necessary for the case.

[¶10] Following Detective Vibe’s investigation, on October 4, 2011, the Park County 

Attorney’s Office (the State) filed separate juvenile petitions on each of the girls alleging 

that each child was a neglected child as defined by Wyoming statute. The petitions also 

requested a shelter care hearing, and on October 26, 2011, the district court held an initial 

appearance and shelter care hearing.

[¶11] At the shelter care hearing, a number of individuals participated by telephone from 

Texas: Mother; Mother’s boyfriend, FC; Mother’s Texas attorney, Mario Herrera; and 

the children’s purported biological father, Raul M. During the hearing, Mr. Herrera 

advised the district court of pending custody proceedings in Texas, and he contested the 

court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

MR. HERRERA: Your Honor, I’m sorry to 

interrupt. The biggest issue, I think, before you even get to 

the merits on the case, is the fact of the venue and the 

jurisdictional issue. The fact is that there’s been two petitions 

to the Court trying to terminate – or terminate the parental 

rights of both the parties. Both children are subject to these. 

They were filed prior to any proceedings occurring in this
4

case, so continuing jurisdiction has been established with

Texas.

[¶12] The State acknowledged that a current custody case was pending in Texas, but it 

disputed that those proceedings should affect the district court’s jurisdiction to rule on the 

juvenile petitions before it. In responding to those arguments, Mr. Herrera further 

described the Texas proceedings.

MR. HERRERA: * * *

The two pending suits are going to directly affect each

other. So even if – one way or the another (sic), we’re going 

to have to respect and consolidate these into one case and one 

suit. And that’s why we need to establish what’s going to be 

the proper jurisdiction. And just considering all the other 

facts, the allegations were in Texas, there was already an 

investigation started in Texas, there was a suit filed in Texas. 

The children – the jurisdiction – even just the residence 

requirement, other than this allegation being made in 

Wyoming, there’s no other – the children are still residents of 

Texas as of now.

* * * *

MR. HERRERA: Your Honor, the only – the only 

point I’d like to bring up is that although both the guardian ad 

litem and the State were making arguments that jurisdiction is 

not going to affect the custody, that it has nothing to do with

the civil matter, the fact is the recommendation goes exactly 

to the heart of what the petitions in Texas are for. They’re for 

custody. They’re for visitation, possession and access. They 

are exactly what is being addressed in Texas. And being 

named the biological father, all those issues are going to be 

resolved within this proceeding.

Additionally, the fact that the father was incarcerated 

is the only reason he hasn’t been properly served. If he 

discloses and gives a proper address of where his residence is, 

we will have him served and he will be included in the parties 

and we’ll get to the heart of the DNA analysis on the children. 

And especially because all parties are residents of Texas, we 

would be able to resolve all that.

So, I just wanted to just make that last point, Your

Honor, that although they were saying that the juvenile

proceedings can go ahead and go and be heard without being

affect – without affecting the civil proceedings, in this case it
5

can’t, because it’s exactly what the recommendation is. It

goes against any orders of the Court.

Now, we are in the midst of filing the petitions. We’ve 

been having issues in serving the parties because we haven’t 

had any contact with them. But once the parties are served, 

we can do an immediate temporary order and address all of 

this. And CPS can get involved, and all the proper parties can 

be involved, and we can get to the heart of the matter and the 

heart of the allegations here where the allegations are alleged.

[¶13] During the shelter care hearing, the district court did not address the tension 

between the Wyoming and Texas jurisdictions, and its only reference to the Texas 

proceeding was in the following exchange with the children’s purported biological father:

[RAUL M.]: Your Honor, this is [Raul M.]. I heard 

briefly that you weren’t sure – sorry. I wasn’t sure who was 

speaking about me, speaking about my children. And I 

understand they’re young, and I’ve been gone for a few years 

from their life, but how do I go about working myself back 

into their life? Because I’m – I’m right now getting myself 

financially ready, and I’m getting ready, and I was hoping to 

get them for Christmas. They are my daughters. The 

biological issue – I’m sure [SC] would agree, but [AM] was 

my biological daughter. The only reason I didn’t sign the 

birth certificate is because I was incarcerated at the time.

THE COURT: I’m not going to get into that today. I 

think you just heard Mr. Herrera say that if he has your 

address, he will serve you so you can be part of that process 

down there and you can get all that sorted out.

[¶14] Acting pursuant to its jurisdiction under the Wyoming Child Protection Act, Wyo.

Stat. Ann. § 14-3-401, et seq. (LexisNexis 2011), the district court accepted the State’s 

recommendation regarding shelter care, and on November 29, 2011, the court entered an 

Order on Initial Appearance and Shelter Care Hearing for each petition. The orders 

directed that each child was to be placed in the legal and physical custody of DFS, with 

physical placement with Grandmother.

[¶15] SC and FC applied for and were granted separate court-appointed attorneys. On 

December 16, 2011, SC and FC filed a joint motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. With respect to subject matter jurisdiction, 

the motion argued for dismissal because the alleged abuse of the children occurred 

outside Wyoming and SC and FC reside outside Wyoming. The motion did not reference 

the pending Texas custody proceedings.
6

[¶16] On December 19, 2011, the district court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss 

and denied the motion. In denying the motion, the court explained:

With respect to Wyoming being bound by Texas, I 

would agree with Mr. Struemke’s position, we are not. But 

it’s – it is an unusual case, and there is not a clear guideline 

from the Supreme Court. And I think in a case like that, the 

juvenile court is always going to be cautious and err on the 

side of the best interests of the children.

If this were a case where we had a Texas judge 

contacting me and saying, “Judge, we think this needs to be 

appropriately heard in the state of Texas” because of 

whatever that court might determine, then it would be a 

different situation. We don’t have that.

And this may not be the home state, but this Court can

still exercise jurisdiction when it is determined that it is

appropriate and, again, in the best interests of the children. 

So I understand that it’s a close call, but I think this Court is 

always going to err on the side [of] the children.

[¶17] On January 3, 2012, the district court held an adjudication hearing. SC and FC 

participated by telephone from Texas and also appeared through their appointed 

Wyoming attorneys. Raul M. also participated by telephone from Texas, as did Steven 

C., who was SC’s former spouse and also claimed a paternal relationship with the 

children. Following the evidentiary adjudication hearing, the court entered findings that 

the children had been abused by FC and neglected by SC, and it adjudicated each child as 

a neglected child. The court then ordered that the children remain placed with 

Grandmother.

[¶18] On April 6, 2012, SC and FC timely filed their notice of appeal from the 

adjudication orders. On April 10, 2012, following a February 6, 2012 hearing, the district 

court entered an Order of Disposition for each child. In those orders, the court stated, in 

part:

THE COURT reviewed the file in this matter and the

Predispositional Study prepared by the Department of Family

Services and the Court having heard comments of the parties,

those present, and counsel regarding recommendations for

disposition, and the Court being otherwise fully [informed]

finds it would be contrary to the welfare and the best interest

of the minor to be returned to the legal and physical custody

of the home; reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the
7

minor from the home were made but due to the out-of-state 

location of the minor’s mother and her boyfriend needing to 

complete recommendation of the Department of Family 

Services, it has been determined that the least restrictive 

alternative and most therapeutic placement is for the minor to 

be in the legal and physical custody of the Department of 

Family Services, with physical placement with her maternal 

grandmother[.]

[¶19] The dispositional orders directed both SC and FC to participate in a number of 

DFS-approved counseling and instructional services. The orders also directed that DNA 

testing be performed on the children, and on Raul M. and Steven C., to establish 

paternity. In the event that paternity were established for Raul M. or Steven C., the order 

directed the established father to undergo specified substance abuse and psychological 

evaluations and any recommended counseling based on the results of those evaluations.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶20] On appeal, Mother and FC do not contest the district court’s exercise of personal 

jurisdiction over them, or the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s neglect 

adjudication. Mother and FC limit their challenge on appeal to the court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction to act on the juvenile petitions in this matter. This Court has said as follows 

concerning our review of subject matter jurisdiction:

We conduct a de novo review of jurisdictional questions 

pursuant to “the inherent power, and the duty, to address 

jurisdictional defects on appeal....” Gookin v. State Farm 

Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 826 P.2d 229, 232 (Wyo. 1992). If a 

lower court acts without jurisdiction, “this court will notice 

the defect and have jurisdiction on appeal, not on the merits, 

but merely for the purpose of correcting the error of the lower 

court in maintaining the suit.” Gookin, at 232.

NMC v. JLW ex rel. NAW, 2004 WY 56, ¶ 9, 90 P.3d 93, 96 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting 

Pawlowski v. Pawlowski, 925 P.2d 240, 242 (Wyo. 1996)); see also Prickett v. Prickett, 

2007 WY 153, ¶ 9, 167 P.3d 661, 663 (Wyo. 2007); Steele v. Neeman, 6 P.3d 649, 653 

(Wyo. 2000).

DISCUSSION

[¶21] As indicated above, the district court exercised jurisdiction over the two neglect 

petitions pursuant to its juvenile court authority under Wyoming’s Child Protection Act. 

The question we must answer is whether the court properly acted pursuant to its authority 

under that Act, or alternatively whether the court should have acted pursuant to its
8

authority under Wyoming’s Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act

(UCCJEA), Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 20-5-201, et seq (LexisNexis 2011).

[¶22] We note at the outset of our discussion, that Mother and FC object to

consideration of the UCCJEA on appeal because the district court’s jurisdiction under the 

Act is a new issue that was not raised before the district court and was asserted for the 

first time on appeal by the guardian ad litem. Mother and FC are correct that this Court 

normally does not address issues raised for the first time on appeal. Nodine v. Jackson 

Hole Mt. Resort Corp., 2012 WY 72, ¶ 19, 277 P.3d 112, 117, n.2 (Wyo. 2012). “We 

recognize two exceptions to that rule, however, and will consider the issue if it raises 

jurisdictional questions or if it is of such a fundamental nature that it must be 

considered.” Id. Because application of the UCCJEA is a jurisdictional question, we will 

address it.

A. Applicability of UCCJEA

[¶23] The UCCJEA is the successor to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 

(UCCJA). The dominant objective of the act is “to eliminate the simultaneous exercise 

of jurisdiction over custody disputes by more than one state.” People ex rel. M.C., 94 

P.3d 1220, 1223 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004). The UCCJEA’s predecessor shared this same 

goal, and in applying that act, this Court explained the importance of adhering to its 

jurisdictional mandates:

The uniform act was intended to help avoid conflict and

competition among jurisdictions and instead focus on the

well-being of affected children. Additionally, the uniform act

promotes cooperation and communication among states to

determine which jurisdiction can most effectively determine

the best interests of the child.

NMC, ¶ 11, 90 P.3d at 96. 

[¶24] While our Court has not expressly stated that jurisdiction over interstate child 

custody determinations must be exercised in accordance with the uniform act, that 

conclusion is implicit in our consistent application of the UCCJEA or its predecessor in 

such cases. See, e.g., Prickett, ¶ 10, 167 P.3d at 663; NMC, ¶ 11, 90 P.3d at 96; Steele, 6 

P.3d at 655-656; Weller v. Weller, 960 P.2d 493, 494-495 (Wyo. 1998); State ex rel. 

Griffin v. District Court, 831 P.2d 233, 238 (Wyo. 1992). Other courts have been more 

explicit in holding that the UCCJEA dictates jurisdiction in multi-state child custody 

determinations. See, e.g., Beauregard v. White, 972 A.2d 619, 626 (R.I. 2009) (“[T]he 

UCCJEA * * * provides rules for determining the proper forum in child-custody

proceedings that involve jurisdictional conflicts.”); In re Jorge G., 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 552,

557 (Cal. App. 2

nd Dist. 2008) (“The Act is the exclusive method of determining the
9

proper forum in custody disputes involving other jurisdictions and governs juvenile

dependency proceedings.”); Feria v. Soto, 990 So. 2d 418, 421 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) 

(“The UCCJEA establishes the criteria for deciding which state’s courts have subjectmatter jurisdiction to make a child-custody decision in an interstate custody dispute.”); 

Devine v. Martens, 263 S.W.3d 515, 520 (Ark. 2007) (“We have recognized that the 

UCCJEA is the exclusive method for determining the proper state for jurisdictional 

purposes in proceedings involving matters of child custody that involve other 

jurisdictions.”).

[¶25] We now expressly state what is implicit in our consistent approach to multi-state 

child custody determinations: When a Wyoming court is presented with a child custody 

issue that implicates more than one state, the UCCJEA governs the Wyoming court’s 

subject matter jurisdiction. The question remains in this case whether the juvenile 

neglect petitions on which the district court ruled are the types of custody determinations 

governed by the UCCJEA. Based on the Act’s plain language, we answer this question 

in the affirmative.

[¶26] The UCCJEA defines a “child custody determination” to include any court order 

“providing for the legal custody, physical custody or visitation with respect to a child,”

including a temporary order. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-5-202(a)(iii). The Act defines a 

“child custody proceeding” to include a proceeding for neglect, abuse or protection from 

domestic violence. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-5-202(a)(iv). The petitions before the district 

court in this matter were neglect petitions seeking temporary custody orders to protect the 

children, and because the children were Texas residents visiting Wyoming, two state 

jurisdictions were implicated. The district court thus had before it an interstate child 

custody proceeding, and the court’s jurisdiction was governed by the UCCJEA. As one 

North Carolina court summarized:

The UCCJEA, formerly UCCJA, is a jurisdictional statute 

relating to child custody disputes and expressly includes 

proceedings in abuse, dependency, and/or neglect. See In re 

Van Kooten, 126 N.C.App. 764, 768, 487 S.E.2d 160, 162–63 

(1997). The jurisdictional requirements of the UCCJEA must 

be satisfied for a court to have authority to adjudicate abuse, 

neglect, and dependency petitions filed pursuant to our 

Juvenile Code, see id. at 764, 487 S.E.2d at 163, even though 

the Juvenile Code provides that the district courts of North 

Carolina have “‘exclusive, original jurisdiction over any case 

involving a juvenile who is alleged to be ... abused, neglected, 

or dependent.’” In re Malone, 129 N.C. App. 338, 342, 498 

S.E.2d 836, 838 (1998) (alteration in original) (citation 

omitted). See also In re Van Kooten at 768, 487 S.E.2d at 

162.
10

In re Brode, 566 S.E.2d 858, 860 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); see also NMC, ¶¶ 14-15, 90 P.3d 

at 97 (applying UCCJA in review of Wyoming court’s jurisdiction over child custody 

where father brought child from child’s home state of Texas to Wyoming and alleged 

neglect by mother after her prescription medication overdose in Texas).

[¶27] Having determined that the UCCJEA is the applicable law, we turn then to the 

jurisdictional requirements of the UCCJEA.

B. UCCJEA Jurisdictional Requirements

[¶28] The UCCJEA expresses a “fundamental jurisdictional concept ‘that the child’s 

‘home state’ should have preeminent authority to determine custody and visitation and 

that authority should be respected elsewhere.’” NMC, ¶ 13, 90 P.3d at 97 (quoting 

Bruner v. Tadlock, 338 Ark. 34, 991 S.W.2d 600, 604 (1999) (citing Robert A. Leflar, 

American Conflicts of Law § 243 (4th ed.1986)). A child’s home state is “the state in 

which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six (6) 

consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody 

proceeding.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-5-202(a)(vii).

[¶29] A Wyoming court has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination if 

it is the home state on the date of the commencement of the custody proceeding, or was 

the home state of the child within six months before commencement of the proceeding 

and the child is absent from the state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to 

live in the state. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-5-301(a)(i). Otherwise, a Wyoming court has 

initial jurisdiction only if there is no other home state as defined by the UCCJEA, or the 

home state declines jurisdiction, and

(A) The child and the child’s parents, or the child and 

at least one (1) parent or a person acting as a parent, have a 

significant connection with this state other than mere physical 

presence; and

(B) Substantial evidence is available in this state 

concerning the child’s care, protection, training and personal 

relationships.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-5-301(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2011).

[¶30] From the record, it is clear in this case that Texas, not Wyoming, has initial 

custody jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. The children did not live in Wyoming for the 

six months preceding the filing of the juvenile neglect petition—they arrived in Wyoming 

in August 2011, and the neglect petitions were filed in October 2011. Additionally, the 

children lived in Texas until Grandmother brought them to Wyoming for a visit; Mother
11

lives in Texas; both purported fathers live in Texas; and a custody proceeding was

pending in Texas when the children were brought to Wyoming.

1

[¶31] Texas is the children’s home state for purposes of the UCCJEA, and Texas has 

exercised initial child custody jurisdiction. Once a home state exercises its initial child 

custody jurisdiction, that state’s jurisdiction is continuing and exclusive, unless it 

declines jurisdiction or the child is present in another state and it is necessary for the 

other state to exercise emergency jurisdiction for the child’s protection. Wyo. Stat. Ann. 

§§ 20-5-302(a) and 20-5-304(a). Nothing in the record suggests that the Texas court has 

declined or otherwise ceded its custody jurisdiction. The district court thus did not have 

initial child custody jurisdiction, and its exercise of jurisdiction was proper only if it were 

acting pursuant to the UCCJEA emergency jurisdiction provisions.

[¶32] The question we must address then is whether the district court had jurisdiction 

over the juvenile petitions pursuant to the UCCJEA provisions governing emergency 

jurisdiction.

C. UCCJEA Emergency Jurisdiction

[¶33] The UCCJEA authorizes a court to exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction as 

follows:

A court of this state has temporary emergency

jurisdiction if the child is present in this state and the child

has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to 

protect the child because the child, the child’s sibling or a 

parent of the child is subjected to or threatened with 

mistreatment or abuse.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-5-304(a) (LexisNexis 2011).

[¶34] Based on this provision’s plain terms, the only requirements for a state to exercise 

emergency jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJEA are that the child be present in the state 

and that the child be subjected to or threatened with abuse. A Wyoming court’s exercise 

of emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA does not depend on findings that the child 

is a resident of Wyoming or that the mistreatment, abuse or other conduct endangering 

the child occurred in Wyoming. See NMC, ¶¶ 3-4, 14-15, 90 P.3d at 94-95, 97 

(recognizing Wyoming court’s temporary emergency jurisdiction where child was 

 

1 Although the record contains no documents from the Texas custody proceeding, Mother’s Texas

attorney informed the district court of the proceeding and described it as a custody proceeding, and the

State acknowledged there was a pending Texas custody proceeding.
12

present in Wyoming but acts endangering child occurred in home state of Texas). As

another court observed:

In fact, temporary emergency jurisdiction will typically be 

invoked in just this type of case, in which a child is visiting 

from another state and an in-state relative becomes aware that 

the child may be at risk of mistreatment or abuse if she 

returns home. See, e.g., [Micah M. v. Arizona Dept. of 

Economic Security (May 13, 2008), Ariz.App. Div. 2, No. 2 

CA-JV 2008-0006, at *3]; MacDougall v. Acres (1998), 427 

Mass. 363, 693 N.E.2d 663.

In re MB, 2010 WL 3328018 at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010).

[¶35] There is no question that the children, NC and AM, were present in Wyoming 

when the State filed the neglect petitions over which the district court exercised 

jurisdiction. The only question is whether the record supports a finding that the children 

were at risk of mistreatment or abuse if they were returned to their home in Texas.

[¶36] The UCCJEA does not define the terms mistreatment or abuse. Other states have 

observed that a court exercising emergency jurisdiction is acting in its capacity as parens 

patriae to protect a child within that state’s borders. In the interest of M.G.M., 163 

S.W.3d 191, 197 (Tex. App. 2005); In re State ex rel. M.C., 94 P.3d 1220, 1224 (Colo.

Ct. App. 2004); Tammie J.C. v. Robert T.R. (In re Thomas J.R.), 663 N.W.2d 734, 744

(Wis. 2003). We agree with this observation, and in this capacity, we believe it makes

the most sense to apply Wyoming law in defining what constitutes abuse for purposes of

determining emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. See Kalman v. Fuste, 52 A.3d

1010, 1019-20 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (applying Maryland law to define “abuse” 

under the UCCJEA); Scott v. Somers, 2007 WL 241067 n.3 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007) 

(applying Connecticut law to define “abuse” under the UCCJEA).

[¶37] Wyoming law defines the term “abuse” to include the infliction of physical harm, 

including “skin bruising if greater in magnitude than minor bruising associated with 

reasonable corporal punishment.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-202(a)(ii)(B). Applying this 

definition, we turn to the evidence of abuse presented in this case.

[¶38] At the shelter care hearing, the district court had before it the investigating 

detective’s Affidavit of Probable Cause. In that affidavit, Detective Vibe attested to her 

interviews of NC and AM, during which the children told her that Mother’s boyfriend 

had bitten them. She also attested to the photographs of the children’s injuries, which she 

had received from Grandmother, showing “significant bruising on one of the girl’s 

buttocks and one of the girl’s arms” and “teeth marks with severe bruising.” Following 

the shelter care hearing, the district court found that because of the abuse allegations
13

against Mother’s boyfriend, it would be contrary to the children’s best interests and

welfare if they were returned to Mother’s custody, and the court ordered the children to 

be placed in Grandmother’s custody.

[¶39] Approximately two months later, the district court held an adjudication hearing, 

which it conducted as a full evidentiary hearing. The evidence admitted during that 

hearing included: photographs of the children’s bite wounds; the testimony of Mother’s 

sister describing the children’s bite wounds; a physician’s testimony verifying that the 

wounds were bites inflicted by a teenage to adult-sized mouth; Mother’s statements 

identifying her boyfriend as the perpetrator of the abuse; Mother’s statement that FC 

“was increasingly abusive to the girls and to her;” Detective Vibe’s testimony that during 

her interviews of the children, they identified Mother’s boyfriend as the perpetrator of the 

abuse; and the testimony of Detective Vibe and Grandmother that the children were 

afraid of Mother’s boyfriend.

[¶40] After taking evidence at the adjudication hearing, the court found that Mother’s 

boyfriend had abused the children and Mother had neglected the children. Based on 

those findings, the court again concluded that it would be contrary to the children’s best 

interests and welfare if they were returned to Mother’s custody.

[¶41] We conclude that the district court had before it sufficient evidence to warrant 

emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. See Saavedra v. Schmidt, 96 S.W.3d 533, 

544 (Tex. App. 2002) (“[T]he possibility that allegations of immediate harm might be 

true is sufficient for a court to assume temporary emergency jurisdiction in the best 

interests of the child under the UCCJEA.”). The evidence showed that the children had 

been abused while living in the Texas home Mother shared with her boyfriend, and the 

court had no evidence before it showing that steps had been taken to prevent a recurrence 

or continuation of that abuse. As the Alabama Court of Appeals found in a similar 

circumstance:

In light of the mother’s failure to produce evidence that the 

child would no longer be exposed to potential abuse by her 

boyfriend, the trial court did not exceed its discretion when it 

concluded from the evidence presented, or the lack thereof, 

that the threat of mistreatment or abuse of the child continued 

to exist. Therefore, the trial court properly exercised 

temporary emergency jurisdiction in the instant case.

Feria, 990 So.2d at 422; see also In re Jaheim B., 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 504, 508 (Cal. App.

4

th Dist. 2008) (emergency jurisdiction appropriate “as long as the reasons underlying the 

dependency exist”); In re Nada R., 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 493, 500 (Cal. App. 4

th Dist. 2001)

(“If the risk of harm creating the emergency is ongoing, then the court should be afforded 

jurisdiction to prevent such harm. That appears to be the case here.”).
14

[¶42] Having concluded that the district court had temporary emergency jurisdiction to

enter an order for the protection of NC and AM, we next review whether the court’s 

exercise of that jurisdiction was in compliance with the limitations the UCCJEA places 

on such jurisdiction.

D. Limitations on UCCJEA Emergency Jurisdiction

[¶43] Emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA is temporary and limited. NMC, ¶ 14, 

90 P.3d at 97. It does not include the authority to make permanent custody 

determinations. In re State ex rel. M.C., 94 P.3d at 1225; In re Brode, 566 S.E.2d at 860-

861; In re C.T., 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 897, 904 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). Instead, if a custody 

proceeding is pending in another state, the UCCJEA imposes the following limitations 

and requirements on a court’s exercise of emergency jurisdiction:

(c) If there is a previous child custody determination

that is entitled to be enforced under this act, or a child custody 

proceeding has been commenced in a court of a state having 

jurisdiction under a provision of law from that state that is in 

substantial conformity with W.S. 20-5-301 through 20-5-303, 

any order issued by a court of this state under this section 

shall specify in the order a period that the court considers 

adequate to allow the person seeking an order to obtain an 

order from the state having jurisdiction under a provision of 

law from that state that is in substantial conformity with 

W.S. 20-5-301 through 20-5-303. The order issued in this 

state remains in effect until an order is obtained from the 

other state within the period specified or the period expires.

(d) A court of this state which has been asked to 

make a child custody determination under this section, upon 

being informed that a child custody proceeding has been 

commenced in, or a child custody determination has been 

made by, a court of another state having jurisdiction under 

a provision of law from that state that is in substantial 

conformity with W.S. 20-5-301 through 20-5-303, shall 

immediately communicate with the other court. A court of 

this state which is exercising jurisdiction pursuant to W.S. 20-

5-301 through 20-5-303, upon being informed that a child 

custody proceeding has been commenced in, or a child 

custody determination has been made by, a court of another 

state under a statute similar to this section shall immediately 

communicate with the court of that state to resolve the 
15

emergency, protect the safety of the parties and the child and

determine a period for the duration of the temporary order.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-5-304 (LexisNexis 2011) (emphasis added).

[¶44] We conclude that the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction in this matter and the 

orders it entered were not in conformity with the UCCJEA’s requirements and 

limitations. The district court proceeded with this action as if it were ruling on typical 

neglect petitions, an approach which is contrary to the above-quoted limitations on the 

court’s authority. As one California case explains:

“When a petition contains allegations of an emergency 

situation, a court may properly issue an interim custody order 

to protect the child pending a hearing.” (In re Joseph D., 

supra, 19 Cal.App.4th 678, 688-689, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 574.)

The possibility that the allegations of immediate harm might 

be true [is] sufficient for the juvenile court to assume 

emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJA. (Id., at p. 688, 23 

Cal.Rptr.2d 574.) Moreover, after issuing an interim custody 

order, it is proper for the juvenile court to conduct a plenary 

hearing to determine if an emergency exists. (Id., at p. 689, 

23 Cal.Rptr.2d 574.)

* * * *

In the instant case, the juvenile court proceeded with this

matter as though it were a typical dependency proceeding. At

the November 6 hearing, the juvenile court sustained the

amended petition on the basis appellant physically and

emotionally abused Christopher. Accordingly, we deem the

adjudication findings of November 6 to be the juvenile 

court’s determination after a plenary hearing that an 

emergency actually existed. Furthermore, we conclude 

sufficient grounds existed for the court to have assumed 

emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.

Under the UCCJEA, the only jurisdiction the juvenile court 

had was to find an emergency existed. Thus, the juvenile 

court was without jurisdiction to enter adjudication and 

disposition orders. Pursuant to the UCCJEA, prior to 

proceeding to the disposition, the juvenile court should have 

contacted the Alabama Court which issued the original 

custody order, informed the Alabama Court of the juvenile
16

court’s findings, and deferred jurisdiction to the Alabama

Court. (In re Joseph D., supra, 19 Cal.App.4th 678, 693, 23

Cal.Rptr.2d 574.).

In re Christopher C., 2002 WL 80290 at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).

[¶45] The district court was presented with petitions alleging abuse of NC and AM. 

Pursuant to its emergency jurisdiction, and based on its preliminary finding of abuse, the 

district court had authority to order protective custody for NC and AM. To the extent 

that the court’s shelter care orders resulted in a preliminary finding of abuse and 

protective custody based on that finding, and the adjudication orders resulted in an 

evidentiary finding of abuse and protective custody based on that finding, we conclude 

that the district court acted consistent with its emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. 

To the extent that the district court’s orders went beyond addressing the immediate 

emergency before the court, we conclude that the court acted outside its jurisdiction. 

That is, to the extent the district court adjudicated the children as neglected and entered 

orders, including its dispositional order, directing Mother, her boyfriend, and the two 

purported fathers to submit to testing, evaluations and counseling and psychological 

services, the court exceeded its emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. See In re 

State ex rel. M.C., 94 P.3d at 1225 (“[E]xercise of temporary emergency jurisdiction may 

not last until the trial court can enter an adjudicatory order finding a child dependent and 

neglected.”).

[¶46] We remand for entry of orders that comply with the UCCJEA provisions 

governing a court’s exercise of emergency jurisdiction. First, the district court shall 

immediately contact the Texas court that has concurrent jurisdiction over the children’s 

custody. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-5-304(d). In that regard, we anticipate the district court 

will find a receptive audience with the Texas court. Texas has adopted the UCCJEA and 

has expressed a commitment to cooperating with its sister states to reach informed 

custody decisions.

Once a court assumes temporary emergency jurisdiction, it 

has a duty to communicate with the other state that has 

asserted custody jurisdiction and to retain a record of those 

communications. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 152.110(f), 

.204(d). This mandatory duty of cooperation between the 

courts of different states is the hallmark of the UCCJEA; it is 

this cooperation that is intended to lead to an informed 

decision on custody. Joseph D., 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 583

(quoting Fry v. Ball, 190 Colo. 128, 544 P.2d 402, 407 

(1975); Guardianship of Donaldson, 178 Cal. App. 3d 477, 

223 Cal. Rptr. 707, 714 (1986)). One of the reasons for 

consulting with the other state’s court is to determine the 
17

duration of the temporary order. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 

152.204(d); In re C. T., 100 Cal. App. 4th 101, 121 Cal. Rptr.

2d 897, 906 (2002); see also Patricia M. Hoff, The ABC’s of 

the UCCJEA: Interstate Child–Custody Practice Under the 

New Act, 32 Fam. L.Q. 267, 284 (1998). The court exercising 

exclusive continuing jurisdiction has the reciprocal duty to 

communicate with the court exercising emergency 

jurisdiction. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.204(d); see also

Hoff, supra, at 284.

Saavedra, 96 S.W.3d at 545.

[¶47] Following communication with the Texas court, the district court shall issue 

amended protective custody orders, which orders shall specify that they are temporary in 

nature and shall specify an expiration date, based on the Texas court’s indication of when 

it is able to assume jurisdiction of the abuse and neglect allegations. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 

20-5-304(c); see also Beauregard, 972 A.2d at 631 (order cannot be of indeterminate 

longevity and must specify that it is a temporary order); In re Brode, 566 S.E.2d at 861-

862 (court erred in issuing order “void of any language to indicate that it is temporary in 

nature”); In re M.G.M., 163 S.W.3d at 197 (“[A]ny order issued under emergency 

circumstances must be temporary in nature, and the order must specify a period that the 

court considers adequate to obtain an order from the state with jurisdiction.”). The orders 

shall be limited in scope to only those terms necessary to provide the children emergency 

protection from abuse.

[¶48] Our conclusion as to those aspects of the orders that exceeded the district court’s 

emergency jurisdiction versus those that were a proper exercise of the court’s jurisdiction 

is illustrated by the following Texas court holding:

To sum up, we find that the trial court had temporary

emergency jurisdiction under section 152.204(a) to enter a 

temporary protective order limited in scope to provisions that 

would ensure the physical safety of Corinne and the children. 

Having learned of the pending divorce proceeding in 

Michigan, and having determined from the face of Corinne’s 

application and affidavit that Michigan was the home state of 

the children under the provisions of Chapter 152, the trial 

court was limited in taking any further action with regard to 

the temporary protective order until it communicated with the 

Michigan court in which the divorce proceeding was pending. 

See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 152.204(c), 152.206(b) (Vernon 

2002). Failing to communicate with the appropriate 

Michigan court was error.
18

It was also error to include in the July 30, 2003, protective 

order any conditions directed to Matthew that were not 

reasonably related to emergency protection from family 

violence, such as (1) conditions referring to “property 

mutually owned or leased by the parties,” (2) the awarding of 

child support payments of $199.69 to Corinne, and (3) the 

completion of a “battering intervention and prevention 

program” and the reporting of said completion to the trial 

court. As to these three provisions, the trial court exceeded 

the scope of its temporary jurisdiction and said provisions are 

therefore void. The remaining provisions reasonably relating 

to the protection of Corinne and the children from family 

violence continue in full force and effect as they were a 

product of the trial court’s temporary jurisdiction under 

section 152.204(a).

In re M.G.M., 163 S.W.3d at 199-200.

CONCLUSION

[¶49] The neglect petitions filed with the district court in this case presented the court 

with an interstate child custody dispute, and the district court thus erred in exercising 

jurisdiction pursuant to Wyoming’s Child Protection Act. Because the district court had 

emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to respond to the immediate threat to NC and 

AM, we affirm the district court’s findings that the children were abused and that Mother 

had not protected the children from that abuse. We likewise affirm the district court’s 

entry of protective custody orders based on those findings. We vacate the remainder of 

the court’s orders, including its formal adjudications of abuse and neglect, and its orders 

of disposition. We thus affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings 

consistent with the direction herein.