DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

RAUL MEDINA, JR.,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D19-3891

[January 20, 2021]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Michael I. Rothschild, Judge; L.T. Case No. FMCE 

19-011212 (44).

Raul Medina, Jr., Hollywood, pro se.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and William H. Stafford III, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appellee.

NUTT, JAMES, Associate Judge.

Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of a petition to change his 

name to Raoul Medina Sir Bey. Because the trial court failed to set forth 

a proper factual basis for denying the petition in its order, we reverse.

In his petition, Appellant disclosed that he had a criminal history and 

that, in 1997, he had been given a ten-year prison sentence. The petition 

also included a preprinted statement affirming that Appellant’s civil rights 

were either not suspended or had been restored. After a final hearing, the 

petition was denied because of Appellant’s “multiple convictions for 1st

degree felonies” and, presumably therefore, “[i]t would be against public 

policy to permit the name change.”

Our review is for an abuse of discretion. See In re Zimmer, 207 So. 3d 

1006, 1007 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). Because there is no transcript of the 

final hearing, our review is also limited to errors appearing on the face of 

the trial court’s order. See Monacelli v. Gonzalez, 883 So. 2d 361, 362 

(Fla. 4th DCA 2004).
2

The requirements for a sufficient name change petition are plainly set 

forth by statute. See § 68.07, Fla. Stat. (2019). “Ordinarily, a facially 

sufficient petition for name change should be granted in the absence of 

evidence of a wrongful or fraudulent purpose.” Hoyos v. Singletary, 639 

So. 2d 631, 631 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Thus, when a facially sufficient 

petition is denied, the trial court must set forth a proper factual basis for 

doing so in its order. In re Zimmer, 207 So. 3d at 1007; Barton v. Cir. Ct. 

of Nineteenth Jud. Cir., 659 So. 2d 1262, 1263 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). 

Applying these standards, the trial court erred in denying the facially 

sufficient petition without providing a proper factual basis for determining 

whether the name change was sought for a wrongful or fraudulent purpose 

or otherwise would have been inconsistent with the law. Merely indicating 

that Appellant had a criminal history is not a proper basis for denying the 

petition. In Zimmer, for example, it was found to be an abuse of discretion 

to deny a name change simply because of the petitioner’s “criminal history 

and unpaid creditor’s judgments.” 207 So. 3d at 1007 (holding that 

“[s]imply indicating [the petitioner] has prior convictions and is a judgment 

debtor does not establish that he is seeking the name change for an 

‘ulterior or illegal purpose’”); see also Barton, 659 So. 2d at 1263 (trial 

court abused its discretion in finding the name change was sought “for an 

ulterior purpose” without providing a factual basis for concluding that the 

purpose was wrongful or fraudulent). Like the trial courts in Zimmer and 

Barton, the trial court in this case failed to provide the required grounds 

for denial. The trial court also applied an improper, generalized “against 

the public interest” test.

We therefore reverse and remand to the lower court for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. If the petition is to be denied, 

the lower court must set forth a factual basis for concluding the name 

change would further a wrongful or fraudulent purpose or otherwise be 

inconsistent with the law.

Reversed and remanded.

GERBER and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.