IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
DENISE JACKSON , Petitioner ,

v.
LATONYA BETHEA , Respondent

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) C.A. No. 2023

- 0860

- LM

POST

- TRIAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Final Report: February 2 7 , 2024 Date Submitted: November 16, 2023
1. This final report makes post

- trial findings of fact and reaches
conclusions of law concerning Denise Jackson’s (“Petitioner”) contest of the will of
her stepfather , William Bethea (“Decedent”), claim ing that Decedent lack ed
testamentary capacity , or alternatively, that the will resulted from Latonya Bethea ’s (“Respondent”) exertion of undue influence causing the Decedent to replace
Petitioner as executor of his estate and name Respondent as the executor instead

. 2. Petitioner filed this action on August 22, 2023

. 1 In her petition, she
indicates she seeks to contest the will of William Clarence Bethea. The Petitioner was named the executor and was a beneficiary of the prior will, however in the will presented to the Register of Wills by Latonya Bethea, the Petitioner is no longer

1 D.I. 1.2 identified as the executor and is no longer a beneficiary. 2 Petitioner seeks to invalidate the 2022 Will, and have the 2009 Will probated , whereby she would serve
as the e xecutor of the Decedent’s e state and have a one

- third share in the residuary
of the estate.
3. The Court held a one

- day trial on November 16, 2023

. 3
FINDINGS OF FACT 4
4. The evidence presented at trial supports the following findings of fact:

a. William Clarence Bethea (the “Decedent”) and Phyllis Elizabeth
Bethea became legally married in 1993. 5 They both owned home s before getting married, but then sold the m to purchase a ho me together at 22 West Payne Lane in Camden, Delaware (the “House”)

. 6
b. When Phyllis and the Decedent were married, Phyllis had two children from previous relationships: Denise Jackson (“Petitioner”) and Dawn e Boykin. The Decedent also had children from a previous relationship, Latonya

2 D.I. 4 Exhibit A

. 3 D.I. 12.
4 The transcript of the trial held in this matter is cited as “Tr. at __”. The transcript has not been finalized and remains in draft form. Citations to the docket are referenced to the Docket Index number as “D.I._”.
5 Tr. 7:6

- 9.
6 T r. 37:11

- 18 ; the married couple purchased the home as Tenants by the Entirety (“TBE”).3 Bethea (“Respondent”) , Chantel Denise Bethea , and a son, William Clarence Jr. ( “Buzzy” ). 7

c. Phyllis executed a Will on January 7, 2009 (“Phyllis’ 2009 Will”)

. 8 The Decedent also exec uted a Will on January 7, 2009 (“Decedent’s 2009 Will”)

. 9
d. In Phyllis’s 2009 Will , she bequeathed her residuary estate to the Decedent, and if he predecease d her, subsequently in equal shares to Dawne Smash

Boykin, the P etitioner Denise Jackson , and the Respondent Latonya Bethea

. 10 Phyllis appointed the Decedent as her executor and P etitioner as the alternate

executor

. 11

e. In the Decedent’s 2009 Will , he bequeathed his residuary estate

to Phyllis and named Dawne Smash

- Boykin, P etitioner, and Respondent as the
remainder beneficiaries. 12 He appointed Phyllis as his executor in his 2009 Will and
named the P etitioner as the alternate executor

. 13 The Decedent’s 2009 Will

7 Tr. 26:3

- 13.
8 D.I. 1 Exhibit C.
9 Id.
10 Id. at ¶4.
11 Id. at ¶5.
12 D.I. 1 Exhibit C at ¶3(a)

- (b).
13 Id. at ¶5

.4 specifically disinherited two of his children, William Bethea, Jr. and Shantell
Bethea. 14
f. The Decedent was diagnosed with dementia in or around 2011 15
and suffered a car accident in or around the same year. 16 The parties were not able
to indicate exactly when, and by whom, the Decedent was first diagnosed with
dementia but Dawn e Boykin, Petitio ner’s sister, testified that his doctor’s at Dover
Air Force Base informed their mother that the Decedent was “starting to have
dementia” in 2011 17

. g. Phyllis died on April 17, 2013. 18
h. Wanting someone to live in the house with him, t he Decedent's daughter , Chantel moved to Delaware from New York with the intention of moving in with the Decedent, on September 23, 2014, but died the next day. 19
i. The Decedent’s son , William Clarence Jr. , died on October 31,
2014. 20

14 Id. at ¶2 and ¶7.
15 Tr. 39:10

- 16.
16 Tr. 13:3

- 11

. 17 Tr. 12:12

- 23

. 18 Tr. 11:14

- 21.
19 Tr. 62:10

- 63:2.
20 Tr. 61:31

- 62:7.5 j. Sometime after the death of his two c hildren, t he Decedent called the Respondent , his sole remaining biological child, in 2015 requesting her to stay
with him in Delaware and take care of him . So, in June of 2015, she moved from
California to Delaware to take care of him. 21
k. In 2017 , after one of the Decedent’s doctor’s appointments, the
Decedent’s Neurologist notified t he Respondent that the Decedent had dementia and
made her the emergency point of contact for his care. 22 Respondent agreed that the
Petitioner did previously make her a ware of the Decedent’s dementia diagnosis in 2011, but 2017 was when she first learned of it from a doctor. 23
l. The Decedent executed a new Will on March 21, 2022 ( the “2022 Will”). 24

m. Respondent was still living in Delaware with the Decedent at the
House at the time the 2022 Will was executed. 25 The Respondent testified that the
Decedent drove himself with the Respondent in his 2013 Chrysler 300 to execute

21 Tr. 61:21

– 62:2 ; Tr. 14:19

- 21.
22 Tr. 63:12

- 13.
23 Tr. 63:21

- 64:5.
24 D.I. 1 Exhibit D.
25 Tr. 51:23

– 53:22.6 the 2022 Will. 26 The 2022 Will was signed at Dover Air Force Base's legal office and prepared by Lieutenant Colonel T. Adam Newson, a Staff Judge Advocate

. 27

n. The Decedent named the Respondent as his only child in his 2022
Will. 28

o. The 2022 Will appoints Respondent as the Decedent’s executor
and nominates his niece , Tracy Lynette Jones, as alternate executor. 29

p. The 2022 Will give s the executor complete discretion in deciding which properties are to be used for debts, taxes, and other obligations. 30 It also bequeaths all the Decedent’s tangible personal property and real property to the Respondent

. 31

q. The 2022 Will bequeaths the Dece dent’s residuary estate to the Respondent , and subsequently to the Decedent’s niece, Tracy Lynette Jones. 32

r. The 2022 Will makes no mention of the Petitioner, or her sister,
Dawne Boykin , who were name d in the 2009 Will

. 33

26 Tr. 61:6

- 9.
27 Tr. 59:16

- 18 ; D.I. 1 Exhibit D.
28 D.I. 1, Exhibit D (the “2022 Will”).
29 D.I. 1, Exhibit D (the “2022 Will”).
30 Id. at ¶2.1.
31 Id. at ¶3.1

- 3.2.
32 D.I. 1 , Exhibit D (the “2022 Will”).
33 See I d.7 s. On February 25, 2023, Respondent found the Decedent on the floor in the House and called 911. As a result, Decedent was hospitalized at Bay Health Kent Campus for a week and was transferred to Eden Hill, 34 where he was hospitalized until he died on June 10, 2023. 35
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
5. The law presumes that a duly executed will is valid and that the testat or had the testamentary capacity to execute it. 36 Therefore, the person challenging the validity of such a will has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence
that the testat or either lacked the requisite testamentary capacity or was unduly influenced by another at the time the will was executed. 37

a. Lack of Capacity
. Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Decedent lacked capacity at the ti me the 2022 Will was created. Under Delaware law, “only a modest level of competence is required for an individual to possess the testamentary capacity to execute a will.” 38 Decedent’s will

was executed, in person, by a competent attorney with the Office of the Staff Judge

34 Tr. 48:16

- 21

. 35 Tr. 5:11

- 12.
36 In re Szewzcyk, 2001 WL 456448, at *3 (Del.Ch. April 26, 2001)

. 37 In re Melson, 711 A.2d 783, 786 (Del.1998) (citing Matter of Langmeier, 466 A.2d 386, 389 (Del.Ch.1983) ); In re Estate of West, 522 A.2d 1256, 1263 (Del.1987)

. 38 In re Estate of West , 522 A.2d 1256, 1263 (Del. Supr. 1987) (citations omitted).8 Advocate for the United States Air Force. Although Petitioner provided insight into Decedent’s medical state prior to and after the will was created, it falls short in
showin g that Decedent lacked the capacity to “be capable of exercising thought, reflection, and judgment,” 39 as required by Delaware law, at the time he executed
the 2022 Will.
b. Undue Influence
. Alternatively, the Petitioner argues that the Decedent was unduly in fluenced to effectuate the challenged transaction, the 2022
Will. The essential elements of undue influence are: (1) a susceptible testator; (2) the opportunity to exert influence; (3) a disposition to do so for an improper purpose; (4) the actual exertion of such influence; and, (5) a result demonstrating its effect. 40 It is the Petitioner’s burden to prove that the will was a product of undue influence. 41 The burden of proof is not met if the evidence supports two equally plausible explanations for a late change of beneficiary, one of which involves undue
influence. 42

c. Looking at the first element of a susceptible testator, t his Court
has found an individu al susceptible to undue influence where he had “a debilitating

39 Matter of Langmeier , 466 A.2d 386, 402 (Del. Ch. Ct. 1983).
40 In re Est. of W. , 522 A.2d 1256, 1264 (Del. 1987) (citing Nardo v. Nardo, Del.Supr., 209 A.2d 905, 912

– 13 (1965); Matter of Langmeier, 466 A.2d at 403

. )

. 41 In re Est. of Justison , 2005 WL 217035, at *9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2005).
42 Id.9 mental condition[,] . . . diminished capacity to take care of basic daily tasks, and [a] need to rely on the help of family members.” 43 Such is present here. Mr. Bethea, having been diagnosed w ith dementia, a debilitating mental condition, in 2011 began to insist on having a family member live with him after his wife passed away in 2013. Although Respondent testified that his dementia did not advance until the beginning of 2023, neither party di sputes that he had dementia prior to the creation
of the 2022 Will. Respondent also testified about an incident when the Decedent was no longer able to answer the home phone after he allowed a scammer to remote into his computer. 44 I do find that the Deced ent was a susceptible testator.
d. The element of whether the Respondent had the opportunity to exert influence is met here as the Respondent moved into the house with the
Decedent in June of 2015 and remained with him until his death. The Respondent’s

pres ence in Decedent's house provided an opportunity to exert influence

.

e. Undue influence also requires a showing that the Respondent had a disposition to exert the influence for an improper purpose. The disposition factor “may be satisfied where the alleged i nfluencer stood to benefit financially from such action under circumstances in which the alleged influencer’s continued ability to

43 In re Boyd , 2003 WL 21003272, at *6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 2003).
44 Tr. 65:5

- 15.10 support [herself] was dependent on the challenged transaction.” 45 Disposition does not require a finding of financial security or need. For example, in In re Henry, this
Court found the alleged influencer disposed to unduly influence a will change where
“she had been living in [the decedent]’s home since she was 11 years old and could
ha ve been forced to move” absent the contested change. 46 Here, the Respondent had been living with the Decedent since 2015 and had an interest in securing ownership for herself after leaving California to help the Decedent. Although Respondent
offered testi mony that she was not aware of the 2009 will until after the Decedent passed away, 47 Respondent was aware that the 2009 Will would give a share of the
house where she resided to the Petitioner and the Petitioner’s sister. I find that the
element of whether Respondent had the disposition to exert the influence for an improper purpose is met.
f. Next, u ndue influence requires a showing that the Respondent actually exerted undue influence. To prove actual exertion, I do not need to find knowingly wrongful conduct, rather I must look at the totality of the circumstances and inquire whether “undue influence is the more probable and plausible explanation

45 Ray v. Williams , 2020 WL 1542028, at *32 (internal quotation marks omitted).
46 In re Henry, 2021 WL 5816818, at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 2021).
47 I did not find this testimony credible as it conflicted with testimony where she admitted to discussing the 2009 will with the Petitioner and a New Jersey attorney prior to the Decedent’s death.11 for the acts, and conversely, [whether] any alternative explanations are improbable and implausible.” 48 This is where the Petitioner’s claim fails. Petitioner has not
established an actual exertion or that an alternative explanation is implausible

. The change from the 2009 Will to the 2022 Will could be for any reason, and I am not inclined to speculate. The Decedent specifically disinherited two of his children in
his 2009 Will so there is a precedent of removing people from the Will. In addition, Respondent credibly testified that the Decedent wanted to create a new will because she was there helping to take care of him. 49 For seven years, the Decedent and the Respondent lived together. She left California and moved to Delaware at his request. She helped around the house with cooking and cleanin g. They traveled together to New York, New Jersey, and Maryland.
6. Although it is clear the Respondent had the opportunity to exert influence, i n Conner v. Brown 50 , the court held that the mere opportunity to influence
is insufficient: ... [T]he fact that the proponent of a will had an opportunity, at the date of its execution, to exercise undue influence, raises no presumption that he did so; nor *1265 does the mere existence of confidential relations between the testator and beneficiar y; nor the alteration of an existing will arbitrarily and without reason; nor the mere fact that a testator disposes of his property unequally, or in

48 In re Boyd , 2003 WL 21003272, at *7.
49 Tr. 60

- 18

- 22.
50 Del .Super., 3 A.2d 64 (1938).12 a manner which may seem unreasonable; for a testator having capacity, and acting freely, may dispose of hi s property as he sees fit. 51

7. There is simply no evidence that Respondent actually exerted undue influence, causing the Decedent to change his will, rather than the possibility that Decedent decided to change his will on his own. Because the change from th e 2009 Will to the 2022 Will could be for any reason, and there is no evidence that Respondent actually exerted undue influence, the claim for undue influence fails.
8. For the reasons set forth above, I recommend judgment in favor of the Respondent and Petit ioner’s claims fail. This is a final report pursuant to Court of Chancery Rules 143 and 144. Exceptions may be taken within eleven days of the
date hereof. 52

/s/ Loren Mitchell Loren Mitchell Magistrate in Chancery

51 Id. at 71.
52 See Ct. Ch. R. 144(d)(1) (“In actions that are not summary in nature or in which the Court has not ordered expedited proceedings, any party taking exception shall file a notice of exceptions within eleven days of the date of the report.”).