United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 30, 2020*

Decided May 4, 2020

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 19-3454

LAMONTE A. EALY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BREA GRIFFIN, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 19-C-1630

William C. Griesbach,

Judge.

O R D E R

Lamonte Ealy, a Wisconsin prisoner, sued police officers, prosecutors, his 

defense attorneys, and others under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on events occurring before, 

during, and after his criminal trial. The district court dismissed the complaint at 

screening for failing to state a claim, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and we affirm.

* The district court dismissed the complaint in this case at screening before any 

defendant had appeared. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The appellees are not participating in 

this appeal. We agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the brief and

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 19-3454 Page 2

Ealy accuses nearly everyone involved with his criminal case of violating his 

constitutional rights. His arrest, he alleges, lacked probable cause because it was based 

on a witness’s lies to the police. Evidence obtained from his home under a search 

warrant supported by those lies, he continues, was illegally acquired by the police, 

improperly used by prosecutors, and should have been objected to by his lawyers. He

concludes that he was then wrongfully convicted based on insufficient evidence. Ealy 

seeks “injunctive relief” from his criminal judgment and damages from the defendants. 

The judge dismissed his complaint at screening as legally deficient. Regarding 

the police who arrested him and searched his home, the judge explained, Ealy did not 

allege that they knew that the information on which they relied was false. The judge 

reasoned that the prosecutors were immune from suit because Ealy’s allegations 

concerned only their prosecutorial duties. And his defense attorneys and witnesses at 

his trial were not state actors subject to liability under § 1983. Finally, for the remaining 

defendants, Ealy raised no allegations relevant to any of his claims. 

On appeal Ealy argues that his criminal convictions “can’t be upheld.” He 

protests that the jury’s verdicts were inconsistent and his punishment was 

impermissibly based on multiplicitous counts. But in so arguing Ealy is contesting the 

validity of his convictions and sentence, so his sole federal remedy is a petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus, not a § 1983 action. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489, 500 

(1973).

Ealy also argues that he adequately pleaded damages claims against the police 

for arresting him based on a witness’s lies and against his attorneys and state 

prosecutor for accepting those lies. These claims have insuperable fatal flaws. First, to 

the extent that Ealy alleges that the same witness’s “lies” that led to his arrest were also 

repeated at trial and necessarily produced his conviction, proof of these claims would 

necessarily imply the invalidity of his still-intact conviction and run afoul of Heck v. 

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). See Okoro v. Callaghan, 324 F.3d 488, 489–90 (7th Cir. 

2003). Second, police acquire probable cause to arrest when an eyewitness states that a 

crime occurred, just as Ealy alleges happened here, unless the police have good reason 

to doubt the veracity of the statement. Askew v. City of Chicago, 440 F.3d 894, 895–96

(7th Cir. 2006). But Ealy does not specify in his complaint any information known to the 

arresting officer that undermined the witness’s report. In his brief on appeal, he argues 

that the officer “knew or should have known” that the witness was lying because the 

officer “recklessly disregarded the truth and accurate information.” This is a legal 

conclusion that is still devoid of any factual information known to the officer. “While 
No. 19-3454 Page 3

legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by 

factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Finally, apart from the 

obstacle of Heck, the judge correctly observed that prosecutors are absolutely immune 

for prosecutorial decisions, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430–31 (1976), and (with 

exceptions not applicable here) defense attorneys are not state actors subject to suit 

under § 1983, Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).

This appeal counts as a second “strike” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

AFFIRMED