Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

(Re)defining Warning

Johnathan Proctor

This Research Short looks to reignite debate on how the IC defines 

warning and several terms associated with it in the context of intelligence. 

The term has been used inconsistently over time and across intelligence 

organizations, and past definitions have often presented limited views

of the concept. To ground the discussion, this Short will note problems 

arising from how the IC has defined the term across history and then 

identify key themes that distinguish warning as a distinct intelligence 

discipline. It will then propose two definitions of warning for 

consideration by intelligence practitioners and scholars as part of an 

ongoing research effort. 

RESEARCH SHORT

August 9, 2023

What this is: 

Research Shorts fuse two 

research cultures, blending 

intelligence information with 

academic insights on topics of 

interest to the IC. Shorts are 

intended to constructively 

start and add to the IC's 

conversations—not to finish 

them. NIU, the sole fully 

TS/SCI-cleared university, 

publishes the Shorts. 

What this is not: 

Research Shorts are not 

finished intelligence and are 

not IC-coordinated. The 

opinions expressed are solely 

those of the author and do not 

represent those of any U.S. 

Government agency.

IMAGE FROM SHUTTERSTOCK

CATALYST Designed to spark positive 

conversations on the future of the IC 

* ' NIU 

'.\.\TIO'.\!.\!. l'.\TLLI.ICL'.\U: 

L '.\ I \ . E R S I T Y 

Ann ( :aracristi InstituteFor lmdlig,nc, Rcs,ard1 

-

potUL o 

message 11 

anger 

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

(Re)defining Warning

Johnathan Proctor

This Research Short looks to reignite debate on how the IC defines 

warning and several terms associated with it in the context of intelligence. 

The term has been used inconsistently over time and across intelligence 

organizations, and past definitions have often presented limited views

of the concept. To ground the discussion, this Short will note problems 

arising from how the IC has defined the term across history and then 

identify key themes that distinguish warning as a distinct intelligence 

discipline. It will then propose two definitions of warning for 

consideration by intelligence practitioners and scholars as part of an 

ongoing research effort. 

RESEARCH SHORT

August 9, 2023

What this is: 

Research Shorts fuse two 

research cultures, blending 

intelligence information with 

academic insights on topics of 

interest to the IC. Shorts are 

intended to constructively 

start and add to the IC's 

conversations—not to finish 

them. NIU, the sole fully 

TS/SCI-cleared university, 

publishes the Shorts. 

What this is not: 

Research Shorts are not 

finished intelligence and are 

not IC-coordinated. The 

opinions expressed are solely 

those of the author and do not 

represent those of any U.S. 

Government agency.

IMAGE FROM SHUTTERSTOCK

CATALYST Designed to spark positive 

conversations on the future of the IC 

* ' NIU 

'.\.\TIO'.\!.\!. l'.\TLLI.ICL'.\U: 

L '.\ I \ . E R S I T Y 

Ann ( :aracristi InstituteFor lmdlig,nc, Rcs,ard1 

-

potUL o 

message 11 

anger 

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

(Re)defining Warning

Johnathan Proctor

This Research Short looks to reignite debate on how the IC defines 

warning and several terms associated with it in the context of intelligence. 

The term has been used inconsistently over time and across intelligence 

organizations, and past definitions have often presented limited views

of the concept. To ground the discussion, this Short will note problems 

arising from how the IC has defined the term across history and then 

identify key themes that distinguish warning as a distinct intelligence 

discipline. It will then propose two definitions of warning for 

consideration by intelligence practitioners and scholars as part of an 

ongoing research effort. 

RESEARCH SHORT

August 9, 2023

What this is: 

Research Shorts fuse two 

research cultures, blending 

intelligence information with 

academic insights on topics of 

interest to the IC. Shorts are 

intended to constructively 

start and add to the IC's 

conversations—not to finish 

them. NIU, the sole fully 

TS/SCI-cleared university, 

publishes the Shorts. 

What this is not: 

Research Shorts are not 

finished intelligence and are 

not IC-coordinated. The 

opinions expressed are solely 

those of the author and do not 

represent those of any U.S. 

Government agency.

IMAGE FROM SHUTTERSTOCK

CATALYST Designed to spark positive 

conversations on the future of the IC 

* ' NIU 

'.\.\TIO'.\!.\!. l'.\TLLI.ICL'.\U: 

L '.\ I \ . E R S I T Y 

Ann ( :aracristi InstituteFor lmdlig,nc, Rcs,ard1 

-

potUL o 

message 11 

anger 

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

(Re)defining Warning

Johnathan Proctor

This Research Short looks to reignite debate on how the IC defines 

warning and several terms associated with it in the context of intelligence. 

The term has been used inconsistently over time and across intelligence 

organizations, and past definitions have often presented limited views

of the concept. To ground the discussion, this Short will note problems 

arising from how the IC has defined the term across history and then 

identify key themes that distinguish warning as a distinct intelligence 

discipline. It will then propose two definitions of warning for 

consideration by intelligence practitioners and scholars as part of an 

ongoing research effort. 

RESEARCH SHORT

August 9, 2023

What this is: 

Research Shorts fuse two 

research cultures, blending 

intelligence information with 

academic insights on topics of 

interest to the IC. Shorts are 

intended to constructively 

start and add to the IC's 

conversations—not to finish 

them. NIU, the sole fully 

TS/SCI-cleared university, 

publishes the Shorts. 

What this is not: 

Research Shorts are not 

finished intelligence and are 

not IC-coordinated. The 

opinions expressed are solely 

those of the author and do not 

represent those of any U.S. 

Government agency.

IMAGE FROM SHUTTERSTOCK

CATALYST Designed to spark positive 

conversations on the future of the IC 

* ' NIU 

'.\.\TIO'.\!.\!. l'.\TLLI.ICL'.\U: 

L '.\ I \ . E R S I T Y 

Ann ( :aracristi InstituteFor lmdlig,nc, Rcs,ard1 

-

potUL o 

message 11 

anger 

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

(Re)defining Warning

Johnathan Proctor

This Research Short looks to reignite debate on how the IC defines 

warning and several terms associated with it in the context of intelligence. 

The term has been used inconsistently over time and across intelligence 

organizations, and past definitions have often presented limited views

of the concept. To ground the discussion, this Short will note problems 

arising from how the IC has defined the term across history and then 

identify key themes that distinguish warning as a distinct intelligence 

discipline. It will then propose two definitions of warning for 

consideration by intelligence practitioners and scholars as part of an 

ongoing research effort. 

RESEARCH SHORT

August 9, 2023

What this is: 

Research Shorts fuse two 

research cultures, blending 

intelligence information with 

academic insights on topics of 

interest to the IC. Shorts are 

intended to constructively 

start and add to the IC's 

conversations—not to finish 

them. NIU, the sole fully 

TS/SCI-cleared university, 

publishes the Shorts. 

What this is not: 

Research Shorts are not 

finished intelligence and are 

not IC-coordinated. The 

opinions expressed are solely 

those of the author and do not 

represent those of any U.S. 

Government agency.

IMAGE FROM SHUTTERSTOCK

CATALYST Designed to spark positive 

conversations on the future of the IC 

* ' NIU 

'.\.\TIO'.\!.\!. l'.\TLLI.ICL'.\U: 

L '.\ I \ . E R S I T Y 

Ann ( :aracristi InstituteFor lmdlig,nc, Rcs,ard1 

-

potUL o 

message 11 

anger 

"- lMa•-'-.;..I 

••.-1............. 4 .. ft 

What this is: 

Research Shorts fuse two 

research cultures, blending 

intelligence information with 

academic insights on topics of 

interest to the IC. Shorts are 

intended to constructively 

start and add to the IC's 

conversations-not to finish 

them. NIU, the sole fully 

TS/SCI-clea red u n iversity, 

publishes the Shorts. 

What this is not: 

Research Shorts are not 

finished intelligence and are 

not IC-coordinated. The 

opinions expressed are solely 

those of the author and do not 

represent those of any U.S. 

Government agency. 

CATALYST Designed to spark positive 

conversations on the future of the IC 

po1nt. Ul v l'-' 

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of danger 

threat, o� 

(Re )defining Warning 

Johnathan Proctor 

August 9, 2023 

This Research Short looks to reignite debate on how the IC defines 

warning and several terms associated with it in the context of intelligence. 

The term has been used inconsistently over time and across intelligence 

organizations, and past definitions have often presented limited views 

of the concept. To ground the discussion, this Short will note problems 

arising from how the IC has defined the term across history and then 

identify key themes that distinguish warning as a distinct intelligence 

discipline. It will then propose two definitions of warning for 

consideration by intelligence practitioners and scholars as part of an 

ongoing research effort. 
2

One of the IC’s core responsibilities is to provide warning, and 

the notion of intelligence failure is often associated with a failure 

to warn.1, 2 Although the IC has long recognized the need for a 

comprehensive definition of warning as a means to improve

performance, coming up with one has been challenging. A 

lexicon that is inconsistent, unclear, or contested can affect not

just intelligence production and organization, but also how 

decisionmakers perceive and evaluate warnings.3 For example, 

intelligence scholars have noted issues caused by multiple 

interpretations of the term “strategic,”4 which when applied to 

warning can affect interpretations of what a “strategic warning 

issue” is, what “strategic warning” entails, and who is responsible 

for it. Warning is more likely to be effective when there is a more 

universal understanding, on the part of both the IC and 

decisionmakers, of what warning entails. As part of the National 

Intelligence University fellowship program, this analysis 

proposes a solution to this issue by applying a Grounded Theory 

approach to the discipline of warning (see inset).

Historical Definitions of Warning— 

The Strategic/Tactical Dichotomy

Intelligence definitions of warning during the IC’s early years and 

throughout the Cold War equated the term warning with strategic 

warning, explicitly viewing strategic warning as a function of 

intelligence and tactical warning as a function of operational 

warfighters.

5 Warning—not using, but implying the qualifier 

strategic—was a notification the IC “might provide prior to an 

actual attack, and hopefully while preparations for the attack are 

still in progress,”6 while tactical warning was “a notification that 

the enemy has initiated hostilities,” which could occur “at any 

time from the launching of an attack until it reaches its target.”7

This framework made sense given that the overarching Cold War 

threat to U.S. national security was a massive nuclear strike by 

one or all elements of the Soviet nuclear triad. The intelligenceoperations divide and equating warning with strategic warning 

were laid out in the 1979 Director of Central Intelligence 

Directive 1/5, “National Intelligence Warning,” which defined

warning as a function of intelligence that “includes strategic, 

but not tactical warning.”8 This distinction continued beyond 

the Cold War, and at least one contemporary exploration of 

warning equates the term with strategic warning.9, 10, 11

GROUNDED THEORY

This Research Short presents preliminary 

findings from an exploration of warning

using Grounded Theory—an iterative, 

qualitative research methodology 

employed when the theory about a 

phenomenon is insufficient. This can 

be when relationships between or 

definitions of concepts are not 

elaborated fully, or when a fuller 

framework is needed to understand 

the phenomenon. 

For this research project’s first phase, 

the grounded theory practice of 

preliminary and axial coding was applied 

to key documents from the warning 

literature to create 227 coded entries 

and 169 unique codes sorted into 29 

categories across four broad concepts. 

These codes, categories, and concepts 

were then evaluated for their 

theoretical significance, which does 

not necessarily correlate to the number 

of times a code appears. Analyzing data 

with an emphasis on identifying codes, 

concepts, and ideas links the theory in 

ways that may not otherwise be 

apparent from a standard reading or 

analysis of an issue. 

KEY RESEARCH INSIGHTS

• Warning is more likely to be effective 

when there is a common understanding, 

by both intelligence officers and 

decisionmakers, of what it means.

• A core lexicon of warning must: account 

for the full scope of the mission, be 

timely, reduce surprise, be explicitly 

communicated, and persuade 

decisionmakers.

2

One of the IC’s core responsibilities is to provide warning, and 

the notion of intelligence failure is often associated with a failure 

to warn.1, 2 Although the IC has long recognized the need for a 

comprehensive definition of warning as a means to improve

performance, coming up with one has been challenging. A 

lexicon that is inconsistent, unclear, or contested can affect not

just intelligence production and organization, but also how 

decisionmakers perceive and evaluate warnings.3 For example, 

intelligence scholars have noted issues caused by multiple 

interpretations of the term “strategic,”4 which when applied to 

warning can affect interpretations of what a “strategic warning 

issue” is, what “strategic warning” entails, and who is responsible 

for it. Warning is more likely to be effective when there is a more 

universal understanding, on the part of both the IC and 

decisionmakers, of what warning entails. As part of the National 

Intelligence University fellowship program, this analysis 

proposes a solution to this issue by applying a Grounded Theory 

approach to the discipline of warning (see inset).

Historical Definitions of Warning— 

The Strategic/Tactical Dichotomy

Intelligence definitions of warning during the IC’s early years and 

throughout the Cold War equated the term warning with strategic 

warning, explicitly viewing strategic warning as a function of 

intelligence and tactical warning as a function of operational 

warfighters.

5 Warning—not using, but implying the qualifier 

strategic—was a notification the IC “might provide prior to an 

actual attack, and hopefully while preparations for the attack are 

still in progress,”6 while tactical warning was “a notification that 

the enemy has initiated hostilities,” which could occur “at any 

time from the launching of an attack until it reaches its target.”7

This framework made sense given that the overarching Cold War 

threat to U.S. national security was a massive nuclear strike by 

one or all elements of the Soviet nuclear triad. The intelligenceoperations divide and equating warning with strategic warning 

were laid out in the 1979 Director of Central Intelligence 

Directive 1/5, “National Intelligence Warning,” which defined

warning as a function of intelligence that “includes strategic, 

but not tactical warning.”8 This distinction continued beyond 

the Cold War, and at least one contemporary exploration of 

warning equates the term with strategic warning.9, 10, 11

GROUNDED THEORY

This Research Short presents preliminary 

findings from an exploration of warning

using Grounded Theory—an iterative, 

qualitative research methodology 

employed when the theory about a 

phenomenon is insufficient. This can 

be when relationships between or 

definitions of concepts are not 

elaborated fully, or when a fuller 

framework is needed to understand 

the phenomenon. 

For this research project’s first phase, 

the grounded theory practice of 

preliminary and axial coding was applied 

to key documents from the warning 

literature to create 227 coded entries 

and 169 unique codes sorted into 29 

categories across four broad concepts. 

These codes, categories, and concepts 

were then evaluated for their 

theoretical significance, which does 

not necessarily correlate to the number 

of times a code appears. Analyzing data 

with an emphasis on identifying codes, 

concepts, and ideas links the theory in 

ways that may not otherwise be 

apparent from a standard reading or 

analysis of an issue. 

KEY RESEARCH INSIGHTS

• Warning is more likely to be effective 

when there is a common understanding, 

by both intelligence officers and 

decisionmakers, of what it means.

• A core lexicon of warning must: account 

for the full scope of the mission, be 

timely, reduce surprise, be explicitly 

communicated, and persuade 

decisionmakers.

One of the IC's core responsibilities is to provide warning, and 

the notion of intelligence failure is often associated with a failure 

to warn. 1 • 2 Although the IC has long recognized the need for a 

comprehensive definition of warning as a means to improve 

performance, coming up with one has been challenging. A 

lexicon that is inconsistent, unclear, or contested can affect not 

just intelligence production and organization, but also how 

decisionmakers perceive and evaluate warnings.3 For example, 

intelligence scholars have noted issues caused by multiple 

interpretations of the term "strategic,"4 which when applied to 

warning can affect interpretations of what a "strategic warning 

issue" is, what "strategic warning" entails, and who is responsible 

for it. Warning is more likely to be effective when there is a more 

universal understanding, on the part of both the IC and 

decisionmakers, of what warning entails. As part of the National 

Intelligence University fellowship program, this analysis 

proposes a solution to this issue by applying a Grounded Theory 

approach to the discipline of warning (see inset). 

Historical Definitions of WarningThe Strategic/Tactical Dichotomy 

Intelligence definitions of warning during the IC' s early years and 

throughout the Cold War equated the term warning with strategic 

warning, explicitly viewing strategic warning as a function of 

intelligence and tactical warning as a function of operational 

wa,fzghters. 5 Warning not using, but implying the qualifier 

strategic-was a notification the IC "might provide prior to an 

actual attack, and hopefully while preparations for the attack are 

still in progress,"6 while tactical warning was "a notification that 

the enemy has initiated hostilities," which could occur "at any 

time from the launching of an attack until it reaches its target. "7 

This framework made sense given that the overarching Cold War 

threat to U.S. national security was a massive nuclear strike by 

one or all elements of the Soviet nuclear triad. The intelligenceoperations divide and equating warning with strategic warning 

were laid out in the 1979 Director of Central Intelligence 

Directive 1/5, "National Intelligence Warning," which defined 

warning as a function of intelligence that "includes strategic, 

but not tactical warning." 8 This distinction continued beyond 

the Cold War, and at least one contemporary exploration of 

warning equates the term with strategic warning.9 • 1 0 , 11 

t KEY RESEARCH INSIGHTS 

• Warning is more likely to be effective 

when there is a common understanding, 

by both intelligence officers and 

decisionmakers, of what it means. 

• A core lexicon of warning must: account 

for the full scope of the mission, be 

timely, reduce surprise, be explicitly 

communicated, and persuade 

decisionmakers. 

GROUNDED THEORY 

This Research Short presents preIiminary 

findings from an exploration of warning 

using Grounded Theory-an iterative, 

qualitative research methodology 

employed when the theory about a 

phenomenon is insufficient. This can 

be when relationships between or 

definitions of concepts are not 

elaborated fully, or when a fuller 

framework is needed to understand 

the phenomenon. 

For this research project's first phase, 

the grounded theory practice of 

preIiminary and axiaI coding was applied 

to key documents from the warning 

literature to create 227 coded entries 

and 169 unique codes sorted into 29 

categories across four broad concepts. 

These codes, categories, and concepts 

were then evaluated for their 

theoretical significance, which does 

not necessarily correlate to the number 

of times a code appears. Analyzing data 

with an emphasis on identifying codes, 

concepts, and ideas links the theory in 

ways that may not otherwise be 

apparent from a standard reading or 

analysis of an issue. 

2 
3

Throughout the scholarly and policy literature on warning, the term has seldom been defined 

without clearly differentiating between its strategic and tactical elements. That differentiation has

varied over time, however. Most interpretations, particularly those in DoD publications and

views, have made a temporal distinction, and over time the idea of “operational warning” has 

entered the DoD lexicon to try to create a middle ground—paralleling DoD’s concept of the three 

levels of war.12, 13, 14 More contemporary views ofstrategic warning have longer timelines—both 

specific ranges, such as “six months to two years,”15 and broader characterizations, such as 

“months to years”—while tactical warning is more immediate, described as occurring “days to 

weeks” from the realization of a threat.16 

Other interpretations define strategic warning as a broad assessment of the threat landscape 

and tactical warning as dealing with specific incidents,

17, 18 or they distinguish the two based 

on the availability of resources to deal with a threat.19 Still others differentiate strategic warning 

based on the scope, scale, or effects of the threat or the seniority of the intended recipient of 

the warning.20, 21

Historical Interpretations of Warning—Core Characteristics

In addition to the distinction between strategic and tactical warning, three major themes recur 

throughout warning definitions and writings: warning is (1) a communication, (2) the 

communication must be timely, and (3) it must be persuasive or convincing to reduce surprise 

and enable decisions. Cynthia Grabo, one of the earliest and most influential warning scholars, 

has said that “It is an axiom of warning that warning does not exist until it has been conveyed 

to the policymaker, and that he must know that he has been warned.” [emphasis added]22 Even 

after the Cold War, warning has been consistently emphasized as a communication,23, 24, 25 and 

the Defense Warning Network, in all four editions of its handbook since its inception in 2012,

defines warning as a “distinct” communication.26 

Warning must also be “timely”27, 28 or “given in sufficient time,”29 which means that warning 

must be delivered so as to allow decisionmakers the time to act to prevent or otherwise mitigate 

damage before a threat occurs. In a 2017 interview, former National Intelligence Officer for 

Warning John Bird said “warning that comes too late is not warning, it is entertainment.”30 The 

broader literature on warning, however, notes that warning too early can be equally problematic, 

leading to the “boy who cried wolf” phenomenon.31, 32, 33, 34 The emphasis on warning being 

neither too early nor too late is linked directly to the imperative to prevent surprise (i.e., don’t 

warn too late) and to prompt decisions (i.e., don’t warn so early that options or counteractions 

are not feasible or available). 

Warning is often described by the need to be convincing and persuasive in its presentation to 

reduce surprise and enable decisions and counteractions. 35 , 36 , 37 , 38 This view draws on an 

interpretation of surprise as “the sudden realization that one has been operating on the basis of an 

erroneous threat perception,”39 thus finding oneself unprepared in not having taken potentially 

preventative or preparatory measures. By apprising decisionmakers of the nature of a threat, 

Throughout the scholarly and policy literature on warning, the term has seldom been defined 

without clearly differentiating between its strategic and tactical elements. That differentiation has 

varied over time, however. Most interpretations, particularly those in DoD publications and 

views, have made a temporal distinction, and over time the idea of "operational warning" has 

entered the DoD lexicon to try to create a middle ground-paralleling DoD 's concept of the three 

levels of war. 12' 13, 14 More contemporary views of strategic warning have longer timelines both 

specific ranges, such as "six months to two years," 15 and broader characterizations, such as 

"months to years"-while tactical warning is more immediate, described as occurring "days to 

weeks" from the realization of a threat.16 

Other interpretations define strategic warning as a broad assessment of the threat landscape 

and tactical warning as dealing with specific incidents, 17, 18 or they distinguish the two based 

on the availability ofresources to deal with a threat.19 Still others differentiate strategic warning 

based on the scope, scale, or effects of the threat or the seniority of the intended recipient of 

the warning.20• 21 

Historical Interpretations of Warning-Core Characteristics 

In addition to the distinction between strategic and tactical warning, three major themes recur 

throughout warning definitions and writings: warning is (1) a communication, (2) the 

communication must be timely, and (3) it must be persuasive or convincing to reduce surprise 

and enable decisions. Cynthia Grabo, one of the earliest and most influential warning scholars, 

has said that "It is an axiom of warning that warning does not exist until it has been conveyed 

to the policymaker, and that he must know that he has been warned." [emphasis added]22 Even 

after the Cold War, warning has been consistently emphasized as a communication,23, 24, 25 and 

the Defense Warning Network, in all four editions of its handbook since its inception in 2012, 

defines warning as a "distinct" communication.26 

Warning must also be "timely"27' 28 or "given in sufficient time,"29 which means that warning 

must be delivered so as to allow decisionmakers the time to act to prevent or otherwise mitigate 

damage before a threat occurs. In a 2017 interview, former National Intelligence Officer for 

Warning John Bird said "warning that comes too late is not warning, it is entertainment."30 The 

broader literature on warning, however, notes that warning too early can be equally problematic, 

leading to the "boy who cried wolf' phenomenon.31' 32' 33, 34 The emphasis on warning being 

neither too early nor too late is linked directly to the imperative to prevent surprise (i.e., don't 

warn too late) and to prompt decisions (i.e., don't warn so early that options or counteractions 

are not feasible or available). 

Warning is often described by the need to be convincing and persuasive in its presentation to 

reduce surprise and enable decisions and counteractions.35' 36' 37 ' 38 This view draws on an 

interpretation of surprise as "the sudden realization that one has been operating on the basis of an 

erroneous threat perception,"39 thus finding oneself unprepared in not having taken potentially 

preventative or preparatory measures. By apprising decisionmakers of the nature of a threat, 

3 
4

intelligence enables them to take the actions needed to prevent or prepare for that threat, assuming 

the warning comes in time to make and then execute a decision. Persuasion is often used to 

contrast the purpose of warning with other intelligence pursuits, which seek primarily to inform.40

These Historical Definitions Are Problematic

Trends within warning definitions during the past 60 years provide valuable insight into the 

nature of the warning mission. They also contain, however, problematic elements that future 

lexicons would be wise to either reframe or remove.

The first problematic element is specifying timeframes. Although time and timing are vital to 

understanding and developing a full theory or framework on warning, the lexicon should not 

include specific timeframes—six months to two years41—generalized timeframes—months to 

years42—or vague terms such as “imminent.” Within the warning mission, time and timing are 

highly relative both in how individual problems play out and in what decisionmakers consider to 

be timely warning. Warning of and responding to a military attack may occur over a period of 

months, while warning about emerging technologies or demographic trends may involve 

decisions on research, investment, and budgeting that must be made and executed years in 

advance. This problem has become more pronounced as the breadth of national security threats 

has expanded to include cyber, disruptive technologies, malign influence, pandemics, and 

proliferation—which vary significantly in how quickly they mature and, therefore, the lead time 

needed for warning. Additionally, some threat responses might be made by individuals with 

delegated responsibility, while others may require time to gain consensus or negotiate. Rather 

than include specified timeframes in definitions or frameworks, practitioners of warning would 

be better served by exploring and understanding how time relates to specific threat scenarios or 

classes of threats (e.g., military attacks versus political instability, cyber attacks, or proliferation). 

At a minimum, knowing what constitutes timely warning requires understanding both how 

quickly the threat might develop and where the responding policymakers’ decision points are. 

The second problematic issue in the warning lexicon involves defining and differentiating

among strategic, tactical, and operational warning. For many reasons, strategic and tactical are 

best used as relative terms to provide direction in scoping analysis (i.e., “we need to think more 

strategically” or “we need to focus on more tactical decisions”) rather than absolute categories 

of time or threats. The terms can lead to fruitless debates over what counts as a strategic threat, 

for example, whether the 9/11 attacks or the Colonial Pipeline attack should be considered 

strategic threats.43, 44, 45

More important, differentiating between strategic and tactical warning has the potential to 

create unnecessary administrative and territorial arguments. Organizations can use these 

definitions and any timelines associated with them to lay claim to mission areas or to avoid 

inconvenient tasks. If we define strategic warning as involving issues that are six months to

two years from occurring, then it becomes possible to dismiss issues not assessed to fall inside 

that timeframe. Differentiating between strategic and tactical warning also establishes an 

intelligence enables them to take the actions needed to prevent or prepare for that threat, assuming 

the warning comes in time to make and then execute a decision. Persuasion is often used to 

contrast the purpose of warning with other intelligence pursuits, which seek primarily to inform.40 

These Historical Definitions Are Problematic 

Trends within warning definitions during the past 60 years provide valuable insight into the 

nature of the warning mission. They also contain, however, problematic elements that future 

lexicons would be wise to either reframe or remove. 

The first problematic element is specifying timeframes. Although time and timing are vital to 

understanding and developing a full theory or framework on warning, the lexicon should not 

include specific timeframes-six months to two years41-generalized timeframes months to 

years42-or vague terms such as "imminent." Within the warning mission, time and timing are 

highly relative both in how individual problems play out and in what decisionmakers consider to 

be timely warning. Warning of and responding to a military attack may occur over a period of 

months, while warning about emerging technologies or demographic trends may involve 

decisions on research, investment, and budgeting that must be made and executed years in 

advance. This problem has become more pronounced as the breadth of national security threats 

has expanded to include cyber, disruptive technologies, malign influence, pandemics, and 

proliferation which vary significantly in how quickly they mature and, therefore, the lead time 

needed for warning. Additionally, some threat responses might be made by individuals with 

delegated responsibility, while others may require time to gain consensus or negotiate. Rather 

than include specified timeframes in definitions or frameworks, practitioners of warning would 

be better served by exploring and understanding how time relates to specific threat scenarios or 

classes of threats (e.g., military attacks versus political instability, cyber attacks, or proliferation). 

At a minimum, knowing what constitutes timely warning requires understanding both how 

quickly the threat might develop and where the responding policymakers' decision points are. 

The second problematic issue in the warning lexicon involves defining and differentiating 

among strategic, tactical, and operational warning. For many reasons, strategic and tactical are 

best used as relative terms to provide direction in scoping analysis (i.e., "we need to think more 

strategically" or "we need to focus on more tactical decisions") rather than absolute categories 

of time or threats. The terms can lead to fruitless debates over what counts as a strategic threat, 

for example, whether the 9/11 attacks or the Colonial Pipeline attack should be considered 

strategic threats.43• 44• 4 5 

More important, differentiating between strategic and tactical warning has the potential to 

create unnecessary administrative and territorial arguments. Organizations can use these 

definitions and any timelines associated with them to lay claim to mission areas or to avoid 

inconvenient tasks. If we define strategic warning as involving issues that are six months to 

two years from occurring, then it becomes possible to dismiss issues not assessed to fall inside 

that timeframe. Differentiating between strategic and tactical warning also establishes an 

4 
5

artificial seam or gap between missions, as threats transition from long-term concerns to more 

immediate crises. The term strategic, in particular, can be used to imply importance or 

hierarchal dominance. This is especially pronounced when strategic warning is defined as 

providing warning to a nation’s most senior leadership,46, 47 or when it may be considered more 

important or useful than other types of warning.48 

When considered in its entirety, the IC has a responsibility to provide warning along the entire 

spectrum of threats, in both scope and time, to decisionmakers across the full spectrum of 

government and military functions. This means providing strategic warning to operational or 

tactical planning teams across the government, as well as providing tactical warning to national 

decisionmakers who need to make time-critical decisions.

Critical Elements for a Comprehensive Warning Lexicon

So, what should be included in a core warning lexicon? Grounded theory research argues it 

should be those concepts or elements that have key theoretical significance to warning. A 

preliminary grounded theory analysis of existing warning doctrine, policies, and literature

identifies at least five concepts significant enough to be included in a core lexicon:

1. The Complete Nature of the Warning Mission: Warning occurs across a broad 

spectrum and includes multiple implied tasks. Differentiating between strategic and 

tactical warning seeks to account for this notion, but those terms—as noted above— 

are not theoretically significant and can be potentially problematic. The theoretically 

important elements are the implied missions: identifying emerging threats, exploring 

future scenarios, prioritizing threats, and detecting when dormant or lower priority 

issues may begin to transition to crisis.

2. Warning Must Be Timely: Although specific timeframes are problematic, the notion 

that warning must be timely is critical to any lexicon. Warning must provide 

decisionmakers the space and time to orient and decide whether and how to act.

3. Warning Counters Surprise: The notion of surprise, including the traumatic 

psychological effects it can produce, is one of the most theoretically significant terms 

in warning. By focusing on reducing surprise, warning seeks to ensure that when a 

threat is realized, decisionmakers are not unprepared, having failed to take preventative 

or preparatory measures they otherwise would have.

4. Warning as an Explicit Communication: Collection and analysis are elements of 

successful warning, but warning cannot occur unless that information and analysis are 

explicitly communicated to a decisionmaker with the authority or capability, direct or 

indirect, to affect action.

5. The Need To Convince or Persuade Decisionmakers: Warning’s unique purpose is not 

simply to provide information or situational awareness, but even more to persuade, to 

convince, or to “make it stick.”49

artificial seam or gap between missions, as threats transition from long-term concerns to more 

immediate crises. The term strategic, in particular, can be used to imply importance or 

hierarchal dominance. This is especially pronounced when strategic warning is defined as 

providing warning to a nation's most senior leadership,46' 4 7 or when it may be considered more 

important or useful than other types of warning. 48 

When considered in its entirety, the IC has a responsibility to provide warning along the entire 

spectrum of threats, in both scope and time, to decisionmakers across the full spectrum of 

government and military functions. This means providing strategic warning to operational or 

tactical planning teams across the government, as well as providing tactical warning to national 

decisionmakers who need to make time-critical decisions. 

Critical Elements for a Comprehensive Warning Lexicon 

So, what should be included in a core warning lexicon? Grounded theory research argues it 

should be those concepts or elements that have key theoretical significance to warning. A 

preliminary grounded theory analysis of existing warning doctrine, policies, and literature 

identifies at least five concepts significant enough to be included in a core lexicon: 

1. The Complete Nature of the Warning Mission: Warning occurs across a broad 

spectrum and includes multiple implied tasks. Differentiating between strategic and 

tactical warning seeks to account for this notion, but those terms-as noted above-­

are not theoretically significant and can be potentially problematic. The theoretically 

important elements are the implied missions: identifying emerging threats, exploring 

future scenarios, prioritizing threats, and detecting when dormant or lower priority 

issues may begin to transition to crisis. 

2. Warning Must Be Timely: Although specific timeframes are problematic, the notion 

that warning must be timely is critical to any lexicon. Warning must provide 

decisionmakers the space and time to orient and decide whether and how to act. 

3. Warning Counters Surprise: The notion of surprise, including the traumatic 

psychological effects it can produce, is one of the most theoretically significant terms 

in warning. By focusing on reducing surprise, warning seeks to ensure that when a 

threat is realized, decisionmakers are not unprepared, having failed to take preventative 

or preparatory measures they otherwise would have. 

4. Warning as an Explicit Communication: Collection and analysis are elements of 

successful warning, but warning cannot occur unless that information and analysis are 

explicitly communicated to a decisionmaker with the authority or capability, direct or 

indirect, to affect action. 

5. The Need To Convince or Persuade Decisionmakers: Warning's unique purpose is not 

simply to provide information or situational awareness, but even more to persuade, to 

convince, or to "make it stick. "49 

5 
6

Proposed Core Definitions for the Warning Mission

It is difficult, if not impossible, to account for these five theoretically significant elements in a 

single definition, and so two core lexicon terms are proposed here: the definition of warning as 

a mission and the definition of warning as a communication.

Mission: Warning is the process through which the Intelligence Community 

identifies, characterizes, monitors, and persuasively communicates threats to 

national interests with sufficient time to enable policy, planning, allocation, or 

operational responses to minimize the incidence and effects of surprise. 

Communication: A warning is an explicit communication about a potentially 

adverse change in the threat environment and its associated risk to U.S. and 

allied interests so as to persuade or convince decisionmakers, or their principal 

advisers, of the nature of the threat and prompt an informed decision. 

Rather than detaching strategic from tactical warning, redefining warning as a mission 

incorporates the spectrum of implied warning missions (identifying, characterizing, and 

monitoring threats) into a single definition that covers both the emerging and enduring natures 

of threats across all timelines. This definition seeks to enumerate the variety of actions that can 

be taken in response to a warning and charges that the warning be timely to enable those actions. 

Some responses may be taken unilaterally, immediately, and with available assets, resources, and 

plans. Others may require building consensus to initiate planning, allocate resources, or develop 

a new project, plan, or capability—all of which may involve their own time-consuming processes. 

Defining warning as a mission emphasizes the objective of reducing surprise. Although this 

might appear to be a trivial inclusion, easily omitted with no impact to the definition, it is 

potentially the most important element in distinguishing warning from other routine 

intelligence functions. The imperative to reduce surprise reinforces two ideas. First, it reminds 

us that the threat landscape is always changing. Surprise can occur when we are unaware of 

emerging—and emergent—threats, or when benign threats turn malignant. This includes 

changes to the international threat environment that deviate from our analytic lines. Second, it 

reminds us that our understanding or analysis of the world may be fundamentally incorrect, 

requiring us to continually reevaluate our assumptions, challenge analytic lines, and explore 

alternative scenarios or interpretations. 

Defining warning as a communication emphasizes that the action must be explicit and targeted 

toward a decisionmaker to enable a response. The word targeted is intentional. Targeted 

communications are directed, possibly through an adviser or intermediary, at the specific 

individual or office with the responsibility and authority to take relevant action. This does not 

require new intelligence product lines or tools, but to be successful, warning cannot rely on the 

hope that a decisionmaker “gets the message” or that a product might serve “as a warning.”

Finally, this definition of warning as a communication specifically notes a change in the threat 

environment, implying the decisionmaker’s threat perception must likewise adapt, and it 

Proposed Core Definitions for the Warning Mission 

It is difficult, if not impossible, to account for these five theoretically significant elements in a 

single definition, and so two core lexicon terms are proposed here: the definition of warning as 

a mission and the definition of warning as a communication. 

Mission: Warning is the process through which the Intelligence Community 

identifies, characterizes, monitors, and persuasively communicates threats to 

national interests with sufficient time to enable policy, planning, allocation, or 

operational responses to minimize the incidence and effects of surprise. 

Communication: A warning is an explicit communication about a potentially 

adverse change in the threat environment and its associated risk to U.S. and 

allied interests so as to persuade or convince decisionmakers, or their principal 

advisers, of the nature of the threat and prompt an informed decision. 

Rather than detaching strategic from tactical warning, redefining warning as a m1ss10n 

incorporates the spectrum of implied warning missions (identifying, characterizing, and 

monitoring threats) into a single definition that covers both the emerging and enduring natures 

of threats across all timelines. This definition seeks to enumerate the variety of actions that can 

be taken in response to a warning and charges that the warning be timely to enable those actions. 

Some responses may be taken unilaterally, immediately, and with available assets, resources, and 

plans. Others may require building consensus to initiate planning, allocate resources, or develop 

a new project, plan, or capability all of which may involve their own time-consuming processes. 

Defining warning as a mission emphasizes the objective of reducing surprise. Although this 

might appear to be a trivial inclusion, easily omitted with no impact to the definition, it is 

potentially the most important element in distinguishing warning from other routine 

intelligence functions. The imperative to reduce surprise reinforces two ideas. First, it reminds 

us that the threat landscape is always changing. Surprise can occur when we are unaware of 

emerging-and emergent threats, or when benign threats turn malignant. This includes 

changes to the international threat environment that deviate from our analytic lines. Second, it 

reminds us that our understanding or analysis of the world may be fundamentally incorrect, 

requiring us to continually reevaluate our assumptions, challenge analytic lines, and explore 

alternative scenarios or interpretations. 

Defining warning as a communication emphasizes that the action must be explicit and targeted 

toward a decisionmaker to enable a response. The word targeted is intentional. Targeted 

communications are directed, possibly through an adviser or intermediary, at the specific 

individual or office with the responsibility and authority to take relevant action. This does not 

require new intelligence product lines or tools, but to be successful, warning cannot rely on the 

hope that a decisionmaker "gets the message" or that a product might serve "as a warning." 

Finally, this definition of warning as a communication specifically notes a change in the threat 

environment, implying the decisionmaker's threat perception must likewise adapt, and it 

6 
7

confronts the challenge inherent in updating those perceptions by noting that the 

communication must persuade or otherwise convince.

What these definitions do not do, unfortunately, is address the fundamental paradox implied 

between the need to convince or persuade and the fundamental tenet of the U.S. IC that it does 

not engage in policy prescription. Simply put, how forcefully should we work to convince 

decisionmakers, and if the decision made is not to act or to otherwise defer decision, then did 

the IC successfully warn? If success in warning means that an action is taken to preempt, 

prevent, or prepare for a threat, then does successfully warning imply that the IC is advocating 

for an action, even if not a specific course of action? A failure to effectively persuade a 

decisionmaker leaves the IC open to a retort reputedly issued by former National Security 

Advisor Henry Kissinger, “You warned me, but you didn’t convince me.”50 

A Call To Discussion and Debate

The definitions proposed here are based on a qualitative analysis of the intelligence and 

academic literature on warning in pursuit of a better theory or framework. Thus, this Research 

Short seeks to stimulate discussion and elicit feedback on these terms. Do these definitions fail 

to capture other core elements of warning? Is there a contradiction between the need to 

persuade and the IC’s objective nature? If so, what are the implications for the intersection 

between intelligence and policy regarding warning? Responses to this Catalyst will help shape 

ongoing NIU research and affect future findings and recommendations for the IC. 

Definitions do not provide a full framework of warning, they only capture a fraction of 

theoretically relevant concepts, terms, and relationships that exist in the broad warning mission. 

A future Research Short will propose a more comprehensive framework to differentiate between 

the components of the warning mission (i.e., identifying, characterizing, monitoring, and 

communicating threats) and how those components interact in today’s challenging operational 

environment with theoretically important concepts such as time, timing, and surprise.

In the meantime, the lexicon proposed here provides the IC with a refreshed starting point from 

which to reattack the challenge of creating a common IC framework. It is a necessary mission, 

even if it is one that is often viewed as a third rail, sacred cow, or boondoggle at best.

Johnathan Proctor is a senior research fellow at National Intelligence University. Previously, he worked 

on the Defense Warning Staff in the Directorate for Intelligence (JS J2) as the senior intelligence analyst 

for warning and mission manager for policy, tradecraft, and training, and also as an instructor for the 

Warning Analysis Course in the Academy for Defense Intelligence.

If you have comments, questions, or a suggestion for a Research Short topic or article, please contact 

the NIU Office of Research at Research@niu.odni.gov.

confronts the challenge inherent in updating those perceptions by noting that the 

communication must persuade or otherwise convince. 

What these definitions do not do, unfortunately, is address the fundamental paradox implied 

between the need to convince or persuade and the fundamental tenet of the U.S. IC that it does 

not engage in policy prescription. Simply put, how forcefully should we work to convince 

decisionmakers, and if the decision made is not to act or to otherwise defer decision, then did 

the IC successfully warn? If success in warning means that an action is taken to preempt, 

prevent, or prepare for a threat, then does successfully warning imply that the IC is advocating 

for an action, even if not a specific course of action? A failure to effectively persuade a 

decisionmaker leaves the IC open to a retort reputedly issued by former National Security 

Advisor Henry Kissinger, "You warned me, but you didn't convince me."50 

A Call To Discussion and Debate 

The definitions proposed here are based on a qualitative analysis of the intelligence and 

academic literature on warning in pursuit of a better theory or framework. Thus, this Research 

Short seeks to stimulate discussion and elicit feedback on these terms. Do these definitions fail 

to capture other core elements of warning? Is there a contradiction between the need to 

persuade and the IC's objective nature? If so, what are the implications for the intersection 

between intelligence and policy regarding warning? Responses to this Catalyst will help shape 

ongoing NIU research and affect future findings and recommendations for the IC. 

Definitions do not provide a full framework of warning, they only capture a fraction of 

theoretically relevant concepts, terms, and relationships that exist in the broad warning mission. 

A future Research Short will propose a more comprehensive framework to differentiate between 

the components of the warning mission (i.e., identifying, characterizing, monitoring, and 

communicating threats) and how those components interact in today's challenging operational 

environment with theoretically important concepts such as time, timing, and surprise. 

In the meantime, the lexicon proposed here provides the IC with a refreshed starting point from 

which to reattack the challenge of creating a common IC framework. It is a necessary mission, 

even if it is one that is often viewed as a third rail, sacred cow, or boondoggle at best. 

Johnathan Proctor is a senior research fellow at National Intelligence University. Previously, he worked 

on the Defense Warning Staff in the Directorate for Intelligence (JS J2) as the senior intelligence analyst 

for warning and mission manager for policy, tradecraft, and training, and also as an instructor for the 

Warning Analysis Course in the Academy for Defense Intelligence. 

If you have comments, questions, or a suggestion for a Research Short topic or article, please contact 

the NIU Office of Research at Research@niu.odni.gov. 

7 
8

Endnotes

1 John A. Gentry, “Intelligence Failure Reframed,” Political Science Quarterly 123, no. 2 (2008): 247-70.

2 Daniel F. Landers, “The Defense Warning System,” Defense Intelligence Journal 3 (1994): 21-32.

3 Department of Justice, National Commission on Forensic Science, Views of the Commission on Inconsistent 

Terminology (2015), https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/page/file/1004446/download. 

4 Josh Kerbel, “Stop Using ‘Strategic’ To Mean Everything Under the Sun,” Defense One, October 31, 2016, 

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/10/stop-using-strategic-mean-everything-under-sun/132790/.

5 Cynthia Grabo, Handbook of Warning Intelligence: Complete and Declassified Edition (Lanham, MD: Rowman 

and Littlefield, 2015), 11-12.

6 Euan G. Davis, “A Watchman for All Seasons,” Studies in Intelligence 13, no. 2 (1969): 37-42. 

7 Central Intelligence Agency, Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) No. 1/5, National Intelligence 

Warning, effective 23 May 1979, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/dcid1-5.html. 

8 Central Intelligence Agency, DCID No. 1/5, National Intelligence Warning. 

9 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) DOD Indications and Warning Systems Operations Manual, J2M-0177-

01-96, (January 1997): 106 (Classification of original source is SECRET. Classification of cited portion is 

UNCLASSIFIED).

10 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

(Washington, DC: 17 October 2007), https://dcsg9.army.mil/assets/docs/dod-terms.pdf. 

11 John Gentry and Joseph Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence: History, Challenges, and Prospects (Washington, 

DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019), 1-14.

12 Joint Military Intelligence College, Intelligence Warning Terminology, ed. by Russell Swenson (Washington, DC, 

October 2001), https://archive.org/stream/JMICInteligencelwarnterminology/JMIC_intelligencewarnterminology 

_djvu.txt; John W. Bodnar, Warning Analysis for the Information Age: Rethinking the Intelligence Process

(Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2003); Department of Defense, Department of Defense 

Directive (DoDD) 3115.16, The Defense Warning Network, December 5, 2013, 

https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/d3115_16.pdf. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 2.0, Department of Defense 

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: 17 October 2007), 

https://dcsg9.army.mil/assets/docs/dod-terms.pdf.

13 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, (2014) (Overall Classification is 

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY. Classification of cited portion is UNCLASSIFIED).

14 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 4th Ed., (2017) (Overall 

Classification is SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY. Classification of cited portion is UNCLASSIFIED). 

15 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 1-14.

16 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 4th Ed., (2017) (Overall 

Classification is SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY. Classification of cited portion is UNCLASSIFIED).

17 Jack Davis, “Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Strategic Warning,” Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence 

Analysis Occasional Papers 1, no. 1 (2002): 1-8, 

https://www.cia.gov/static/2c195241699da364e003c1a28d313182/Strategic-Warning-1.pdf. 

18 Jack Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis,” Sherman Kent Center for 

Analysis Occasional Papers 2, no. 1 (2003): 1-16, https://www.cia.gov/static/if-surprise-is-inevitable.pdf. 

19 Bodnar, Warning Analysis for the Information Age, ix.

20 Mark M. Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning: Where Are We Now,” Journal of Intelligence and Analysis, no. 2 

(2015): 1-10.

21 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 1-14.

22 Grabo, Handbook of Warning Intelligence, 11-12.

23 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) DoD Indications and Warning, 106. 

24 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

25 Joint Military Intelligence College, Intelligence Warning Terminology. 

26 Joint Military Intelligence College, Intelligence Warning Terminology; Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) 

Defense Warning Network Handbook, 1st – 4th editions, 2012-2017.

27 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.” 

8

Endnotes

1 John A. Gentry, “Intelligence Failure Reframed,” Political Science Quarterly 123, no. 2 (2008): 247-70.

2 Daniel F. Landers, “The Defense Warning System,” Defense Intelligence Journal 3 (1994): 21-32.

3 Department of Justice, National Commission on Forensic Science, Views of the Commission on Inconsistent 

Terminology (2015), https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/page/file/1004446/download. 

4 Josh Kerbel, “Stop Using ‘Strategic’ To Mean Everything Under the Sun,” Defense One, October 31, 2016, 

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/10/stop-using-strategic-mean-everything-under-sun/132790/.

5 Cynthia Grabo, Handbook of Warning Intelligence: Complete and Declassified Edition (Lanham, MD: Rowman 

and Littlefield, 2015), 11-12.

6 Euan G. Davis, “A Watchman for All Seasons,” Studies in Intelligence 13, no. 2 (1969): 37-42. 

7 Central Intelligence Agency, Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) No. 1/5, National Intelligence 

Warning, effective 23 May 1979, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/dcid1-5.html. 

8 Central Intelligence Agency, DCID No. 1/5, National Intelligence Warning. 

9 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) DOD Indications and Warning Systems Operations Manual, J2M-0177-

01-96, (January 1997): 106 (Classification of original source is SECRET. Classification of cited portion is 

UNCLASSIFIED).

10 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

(Washington, DC: 17 October 2007), https://dcsg9.army.mil/assets/docs/dod-terms.pdf. 

11 John Gentry and Joseph Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence: History, Challenges, and Prospects (Washington, 

DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019), 1-14.

12 Joint Military Intelligence College, Intelligence Warning Terminology, ed. by Russell Swenson (Washington, DC, 

October 2001), https://archive.org/stream/JMICInteligencelwarnterminology/JMIC_intelligencewarnterminology 

_djvu.txt; John W. Bodnar, Warning Analysis for the Information Age: Rethinking the Intelligence Process

(Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2003); Department of Defense, Department of Defense 

Directive (DoDD) 3115.16, The Defense Warning Network, December 5, 2013, 

https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/d3115_16.pdf. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 2.0, Department of Defense 

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: 17 October 2007), 

https://dcsg9.army.mil/assets/docs/dod-terms.pdf.

13 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, (2014) (Overall Classification is 

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY. Classification of cited portion is UNCLASSIFIED).

14 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 4th Ed., (2017) (Overall 

Classification is SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY. Classification of cited portion is UNCLASSIFIED). 

15 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 1-14.

16 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 4th Ed., (2017) (Overall 

Classification is SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY. Classification of cited portion is UNCLASSIFIED).

17 Jack Davis, “Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Strategic Warning,” Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence 

Analysis Occasional Papers 1, no. 1 (2002): 1-8, 

https://www.cia.gov/static/2c195241699da364e003c1a28d313182/Strategic-Warning-1.pdf. 

18 Jack Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis,” Sherman Kent Center for 

Analysis Occasional Papers 2, no. 1 (2003): 1-16, https://www.cia.gov/static/if-surprise-is-inevitable.pdf. 

19 Bodnar, Warning Analysis for the Information Age, ix.

20 Mark M. Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning: Where Are We Now,” Journal of Intelligence and Analysis, no. 2 

(2015): 1-10.

21 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 1-14.

22 Grabo, Handbook of Warning Intelligence, 11-12.

23 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) DoD Indications and Warning, 106. 

24 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

25 Joint Military Intelligence College, Intelligence Warning Terminology. 

26 Joint Military Intelligence College, Intelligence Warning Terminology; Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) 

Defense Warning Network Handbook, 1st – 4th editions, 2012-2017.

27 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.” 

Endnotes 

John A. Gentry, "Intelligence Failure Re framed," Political Science Quarterly 123, no. 2 (2008): 247-70. 

2 Daniel F. Landers, "The Defense Warning System," Defense Intelligence Journal 3 (1994): 21-32. 

3 Department of Justice, National Commission on Forensic Science, Views of the Commission on Inconsistent 

Terminology (2015), https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/page/file/ l 004446/download. 

4 Josh Kerbel, "Stop Using 'Strategic' To Mean Everything Under the Sun," Defense One, October 31, 2016, 

https ://www. defenseone. com/ideas/20 1 6/10/ stop-using- s trategic-mean-everything-under-sun/132 790/. 

5 Cynthia Grabo, Handbook of Warning Intelligence: Complete and Declassified Edition (Lanham, MD: Rowman 

and Littlefield, 2015), 11-12. 

6 Euan G. Davis, "A Watchman for All Seasons," Studies in Intelligence 13, no. 2 (1969): 37-42. 

7 Central Intelligence Agency, Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) No. 1/5, National Intelligence 

Warning, effective 23 May 1979, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/dcidl-5.html. 

8 Central Intelligence Agency, DCID No. 1/5, National Intelligence Warning. 

9 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) DOD Indications and Warning Systems Operations Manual, J2M-0 l 77-

0 l-96, (January 1997): 106 (Classification of original source is SECRET. Classification of cited portion is 

UNCLASSIFIED). 

10 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 

(Washington, DC: 17 October 2007), https://dcsg9.army.mil/assets/docs/dod-terms.pdf. 

11 John Gentry and Joseph Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence: History, Challenges, and Prospects (Washington, 

DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019), 1-14. 

12 Joint Military Intelligence College, Intelligence Warning Terminology, ed. by Russell Swenson (Washington, DC, 

October 2001 ), https://archive.org/stream/JMICinteligencelwamterminology/JMIC_intelligencewamterminology 

_djvu.txt; John W. Bodnar, Warning Analysis for the Information Age: Rethinking the Intelligence Process 

(Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2003); Department of Defense, Department of Defense 

Directive (DoDD) 3115.16, The Defense Warning Network, December 5, 2013, 

https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/d3 l l 5 _ l 6.pdf. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 2.0, Department of Defense 

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: 17 October 2007), 

https://dcsg9.army.mil/assets/docs/dod-terms.pdf. 

13 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, (2014) (Overall Classification is 

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY. Classification of cited portion is UNCLASSIFIED). 

14 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 4th Ed., (201 7) (Overall 

Classification is SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY. Classification of cited portion is UNCLASSIFIED). 

15 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 1-14. 

16 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 4th Ed., (201 7) (Overall 

Classification is SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY. Classification of cited portion is UNCLASSIFIED). 

17 Jack Davis, "Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Strategic Warning," Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence 

Analysis Occasional Papers 1, no. 1 (2002): 1-8, 

https://www.cia.gov/static/2c l95241699da364e003cl a28d3 l 3 l82/Strategic-Warning-l .pdf. 

18 Jack Davis, "Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis," Sherman Kent Center for 

Analysis Occasional Papers 2, no. 1 (2003): 1-16, https://www.cia.gov/static/if-surprise-is-inevitable.pdf. 

19 Bodnar, Warning Analysis for the Information Age, ix. 

20 Mark M. Lowenthal, "Strategic Early Warning: Where Are We Now," Journal of Intelligence and Analysis, no. 2 

(2015): 1-10. 

21 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 1-14. 

22 Grabo, Handbook of Warning Intelligence, 11-12. 

23 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) DoD Indications and Warning, 106. 

24 Davis, "Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable." 

25 Joint Military Intelligence College, Intelligence Warning Terminology. 

26 Joint Military Intelligence College, Intelligence Warning Terminology; Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) 

Defense Warning Network Handbook, 1st-4th editions, 2012-2017. 

27 Davis, "Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable." 

8 
9

28 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

29 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 1st – 4th editions, 2012-2017. 

30 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 18. 

31 Michael Handel, “The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise,” International Studies Quarterly 21, 

No 3 (1977): pp.461-502. 

32 Joint Military Intelligence College, Intelligence Warning Terminology. 

33 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.” 

34 Reginald V. Jones, “Scientific Intelligence,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 92 (1947): 352-60

35 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

36 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 1-14. 

37 Gentry, “Intelligence Failure Reframed.” 

38 Jones, “Scientific Intelligence.”

39 Ariel Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 1. 

40 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

41 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

42 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 4th Edition

43 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.”

44 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

45 John Gentry, “Cyber Intelligence: Strategic Warning is Possible,” International Journal of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence, August 2022, 2-3.

46 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

47 Central Intelligence Agency, DCID No. 1/5, National Intelligence Warning. 

48 Erik Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond 

(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 22.

49 Keith Clark, “On Warning,” Studies in Intelligence 9, no. 1 (1965): 15-21.

50 Roger George and James Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives, 2nd ed.

(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 366.

9

28 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

29 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 1st – 4th editions, 2012-2017. 

30 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 18. 

31 Michael Handel, “The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise,” International Studies Quarterly 21, 

No 3 (1977): pp.461-502. 

32 Joint Military Intelligence College, Intelligence Warning Terminology. 

33 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.” 

34 Reginald V. Jones, “Scientific Intelligence,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 92 (1947): 352-60

35 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

36 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 1-14. 

37 Gentry, “Intelligence Failure Reframed.” 

38 Jones, “Scientific Intelligence.”

39 Ariel Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 1. 

40 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

41 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

42 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 4th Edition

43 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.”

44 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

45 John Gentry, “Cyber Intelligence: Strategic Warning is Possible,” International Journal of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence, August 2022, 2-3.

46 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

47 Central Intelligence Agency, DCID No. 1/5, National Intelligence Warning. 

48 Erik Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond 

(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 22.

49 Keith Clark, “On Warning,” Studies in Intelligence 9, no. 1 (1965): 15-21.

50 Roger George and James Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives, 2nd ed.

(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 366.

9

28 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

29 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 1st – 4th editions, 2012-2017. 

30 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 18. 

31 Michael Handel, “The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise,” International Studies Quarterly 21, 

No 3 (1977): pp.461-502. 

32 Joint Military Intelligence College, Intelligence Warning Terminology. 

33 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.” 

34 Reginald V. Jones, “Scientific Intelligence,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 92 (1947): 352-60

35 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

36 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 1-14. 

37 Gentry, “Intelligence Failure Reframed.” 

38 Jones, “Scientific Intelligence.”

39 Ariel Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 1. 

40 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

41 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

42 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 4th Edition

43 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.”

44 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

45 John Gentry, “Cyber Intelligence: Strategic Warning is Possible,” International Journal of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence, August 2022, 2-3.

46 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

47 Central Intelligence Agency, DCID No. 1/5, National Intelligence Warning. 

48 Erik Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond 

(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 22.

49 Keith Clark, “On Warning,” Studies in Intelligence 9, no. 1 (1965): 15-21.

50 Roger George and James Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives, 2nd ed.

(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 366.

9

28 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

29 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 1st – 4th editions, 2012-2017. 

30 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 18. 

31 Michael Handel, “The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise,” International Studies Quarterly 21, 

No 3 (1977): pp.461-502. 

32 Joint Military Intelligence College, Intelligence Warning Terminology. 

33 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.” 

34 Reginald V. Jones, “Scientific Intelligence,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 92 (1947): 352-60

35 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

36 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 1-14. 

37 Gentry, “Intelligence Failure Reframed.” 

38 Jones, “Scientific Intelligence.”

39 Ariel Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 1. 

40 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

41 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

42 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 4th Edition

43 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.”

44 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

45 John Gentry, “Cyber Intelligence: Strategic Warning is Possible,” International Journal of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence, August 2022, 2-3.

46 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

47 Central Intelligence Agency, DCID No. 1/5, National Intelligence Warning. 

48 Erik Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond 

(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 22.

49 Keith Clark, “On Warning,” Studies in Intelligence 9, no. 1 (1965): 15-21.

50 Roger George and James Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives, 2nd ed.

(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 366.

9

28 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

29 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 1st – 4th editions, 2012-2017. 

30 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 18. 

31 Michael Handel, “The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise,” International Studies Quarterly 21, 

No 3 (1977): pp.461-502. 

32 Joint Military Intelligence College, Intelligence Warning Terminology. 

33 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.” 

34 Reginald V. Jones, “Scientific Intelligence,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 92 (1947): 352-60

35 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

36 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 1-14. 

37 Gentry, “Intelligence Failure Reframed.” 

38 Jones, “Scientific Intelligence.”

39 Ariel Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 1. 

40 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

41 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

42 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 4th Edition

43 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.”

44 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

45 John Gentry, “Cyber Intelligence: Strategic Warning is Possible,” International Journal of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence, August 2022, 2-3.

46 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

47 Central Intelligence Agency, DCID No. 1/5, National Intelligence Warning. 

48 Erik Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond 

(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 22.

49 Keith Clark, “On Warning,” Studies in Intelligence 9, no. 1 (1965): 15-21.

50 Roger George and James Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives, 2nd ed.

(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 366.

9

28 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

29 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 1st – 4th editions, 2012-2017. 

30 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 18. 

31 Michael Handel, “The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise,” International Studies Quarterly 21, 

No 3 (1977): pp.461-502. 

32 Joint Military Intelligence College, Intelligence Warning Terminology. 

33 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.” 

34 Reginald V. Jones, “Scientific Intelligence,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 92 (1947): 352-60

35 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

36 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 1-14. 

37 Gentry, “Intelligence Failure Reframed.” 

38 Jones, “Scientific Intelligence.”

39 Ariel Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 1. 

40 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

41 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

42 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 4th Edition

43 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.”

44 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

45 John Gentry, “Cyber Intelligence: Strategic Warning is Possible,” International Journal of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence, August 2022, 2-3.

46 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

47 Central Intelligence Agency, DCID No. 1/5, National Intelligence Warning. 

48 Erik Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond 

(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 22.

49 Keith Clark, “On Warning,” Studies in Intelligence 9, no. 1 (1965): 15-21.

50 Roger George and James Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives, 2nd ed.

(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 366.

9

28 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

29 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 1st – 4th editions, 2012-2017. 

30 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 18. 

31 Michael Handel, “The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise,” International Studies Quarterly 21, 

No 3 (1977): pp.461-502. 

32 Joint Military Intelligence College, Intelligence Warning Terminology. 

33 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.” 

34 Reginald V. Jones, “Scientific Intelligence,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 92 (1947): 352-60

35 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

36 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 1-14. 

37 Gentry, “Intelligence Failure Reframed.” 

38 Jones, “Scientific Intelligence.”

39 Ariel Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 1. 

40 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

41 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

42 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 4th Edition

43 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.”

44 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

45 John Gentry, “Cyber Intelligence: Strategic Warning is Possible,” International Journal of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence, August 2022, 2-3.

46 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

47 Central Intelligence Agency, DCID No. 1/5, National Intelligence Warning. 

48 Erik Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond 

(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 22.

49 Keith Clark, “On Warning,” Studies in Intelligence 9, no. 1 (1965): 15-21.

50 Roger George and James Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives, 2nd ed.

(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 366.

9

28 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

29 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 1st – 4th editions, 2012-2017. 

30 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 18. 

31 Michael Handel, “The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise,” International Studies Quarterly 21, 

No 3 (1977): pp.461-502. 

32 Joint Military Intelligence College, Intelligence Warning Terminology. 

33 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.” 

34 Reginald V. Jones, “Scientific Intelligence,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 92 (1947): 352-60

35 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

36 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 1-14. 

37 Gentry, “Intelligence Failure Reframed.” 

38 Jones, “Scientific Intelligence.”

39 Ariel Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 1. 

40 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

41 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

42 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 4th Edition

43 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.”

44 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

45 John Gentry, “Cyber Intelligence: Strategic Warning is Possible,” International Journal of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence, August 2022, 2-3.

46 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

47 Central Intelligence Agency, DCID No. 1/5, National Intelligence Warning. 

48 Erik Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond 

(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 22.

49 Keith Clark, “On Warning,” Studies in Intelligence 9, no. 1 (1965): 15-21.

50 Roger George and James Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives, 2nd ed.

(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 366.

9

28 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

29 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 1st – 4th editions, 2012-2017. 

30 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 18. 

31 Michael Handel, “The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise,” International Studies Quarterly 21, 

No 3 (1977): pp.461-502. 

32 Joint Military Intelligence College, Intelligence Warning Terminology. 

33 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.” 

34 Reginald V. Jones, “Scientific Intelligence,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 92 (1947): 352-60

35 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

36 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 1-14. 

37 Gentry, “Intelligence Failure Reframed.” 

38 Jones, “Scientific Intelligence.”

39 Ariel Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 1. 

40 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

41 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

42 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 4th Edition

43 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.”

44 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

45 John Gentry, “Cyber Intelligence: Strategic Warning is Possible,” International Journal of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence, August 2022, 2-3.

46 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

47 Central Intelligence Agency, DCID No. 1/5, National Intelligence Warning. 

48 Erik Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond 

(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 22.

49 Keith Clark, “On Warning,” Studies in Intelligence 9, no. 1 (1965): 15-21.

50 Roger George and James Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives, 2nd ed.

(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 366.

9

28 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

29 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 1st – 4th editions, 2012-2017. 

30 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 18. 

31 Michael Handel, “The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise,” International Studies Quarterly 21, 

No 3 (1977): pp.461-502. 

32 Joint Military Intelligence College, Intelligence Warning Terminology. 

33 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.” 

34 Reginald V. Jones, “Scientific Intelligence,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 92 (1947): 352-60

35 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

36 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 1-14. 

37 Gentry, “Intelligence Failure Reframed.” 

38 Jones, “Scientific Intelligence.”

39 Ariel Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 1. 

40 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

41 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

42 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 4th Edition

43 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.”

44 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

45 John Gentry, “Cyber Intelligence: Strategic Warning is Possible,” International Journal of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence, August 2022, 2-3.

46 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

47 Central Intelligence Agency, DCID No. 1/5, National Intelligence Warning. 

48 Erik Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond 

(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 22.

49 Keith Clark, “On Warning,” Studies in Intelligence 9, no. 1 (1965): 15-21.

50 Roger George and James Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives, 2nd ed.

(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 366.

9

28 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

29 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 1st – 4th editions, 2012-2017. 

30 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 18. 

31 Michael Handel, “The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise,” International Studies Quarterly 21, 

No 3 (1977): pp.461-502. 

32 Joint Military Intelligence College, Intelligence Warning Terminology. 

33 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.” 

34 Reginald V. Jones, “Scientific Intelligence,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 92 (1947): 352-60

35 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

36 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 1-14. 

37 Gentry, “Intelligence Failure Reframed.” 

38 Jones, “Scientific Intelligence.”

39 Ariel Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 1. 

40 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

41 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

42 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 4th Edition

43 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.”

44 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

45 John Gentry, “Cyber Intelligence: Strategic Warning is Possible,” International Journal of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence, August 2022, 2-3.

46 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

47 Central Intelligence Agency, DCID No. 1/5, National Intelligence Warning. 

48 Erik Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond 

(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 22.

49 Keith Clark, “On Warning,” Studies in Intelligence 9, no. 1 (1965): 15-21.

50 Roger George and James Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives, 2nd ed.

(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 366.

9

28 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

29 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 1st – 4th editions, 2012-2017. 

30 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 18. 

31 Michael Handel, “The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise,” International Studies Quarterly 21, 

No 3 (1977): pp.461-502. 

32 Joint Military Intelligence College, Intelligence Warning Terminology. 

33 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.” 

34 Reginald V. Jones, “Scientific Intelligence,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 92 (1947): 352-60

35 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

36 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 1-14. 

37 Gentry, “Intelligence Failure Reframed.” 

38 Jones, “Scientific Intelligence.”

39 Ariel Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 1. 

40 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

41 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

42 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 4th Edition

43 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.”

44 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

45 John Gentry, “Cyber Intelligence: Strategic Warning is Possible,” International Journal of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence, August 2022, 2-3.

46 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

47 Central Intelligence Agency, DCID No. 1/5, National Intelligence Warning. 

48 Erik Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond 

(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 22.

49 Keith Clark, “On Warning,” Studies in Intelligence 9, no. 1 (1965): 15-21.

50 Roger George and James Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives, 2nd ed.

(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 366.

9

28 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

29 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 1st – 4th editions, 2012-2017. 

30 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 18. 

31 Michael Handel, “The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise,” International Studies Quarterly 21, 

No 3 (1977): pp.461-502. 

32 Joint Military Intelligence College, Intelligence Warning Terminology. 

33 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.” 

34 Reginald V. Jones, “Scientific Intelligence,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 92 (1947): 352-60

35 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

36 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 1-14. 

37 Gentry, “Intelligence Failure Reframed.” 

38 Jones, “Scientific Intelligence.”

39 Ariel Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 1. 

40 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

41 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

42 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 4th Edition

43 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.”

44 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

45 John Gentry, “Cyber Intelligence: Strategic Warning is Possible,” International Journal of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence, August 2022, 2-3.

46 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

47 Central Intelligence Agency, DCID No. 1/5, National Intelligence Warning. 

48 Erik Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond 

(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 22.

49 Keith Clark, “On Warning,” Studies in Intelligence 9, no. 1 (1965): 15-21.

50 Roger George and James Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives, 2nd ed.

(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 366.

9

28 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

29 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 1st – 4th editions, 2012-2017. 

30 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 18. 

31 Michael Handel, “The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise,” International Studies Quarterly 21, 

No 3 (1977): pp.461-502. 

32 Joint Military Intelligence College, Intelligence Warning Terminology. 

33 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.” 

34 Reginald V. Jones, “Scientific Intelligence,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 92 (1947): 352-60

35 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

36 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 1-14. 

37 Gentry, “Intelligence Failure Reframed.” 

38 Jones, “Scientific Intelligence.”

39 Ariel Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 1. 

40 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

41 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

42 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 4th Edition

43 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.”

44 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

45 John Gentry, “Cyber Intelligence: Strategic Warning is Possible,” International Journal of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence, August 2022, 2-3.

46 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

47 Central Intelligence Agency, DCID No. 1/5, National Intelligence Warning. 

48 Erik Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond 

(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 22.

49 Keith Clark, “On Warning,” Studies in Intelligence 9, no. 1 (1965): 15-21.

50 Roger George and James Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives, 2nd ed.

(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 366.

9

28 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

29 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 1st – 4th editions, 2012-2017. 

30 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 18. 

31 Michael Handel, “The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise,” International Studies Quarterly 21, 

No 3 (1977): pp.461-502. 

32 Joint Military Intelligence College, Intelligence Warning Terminology. 

33 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.” 

34 Reginald V. Jones, “Scientific Intelligence,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 92 (1947): 352-60

35 Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable.”

36 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 1-14. 

37 Gentry, “Intelligence Failure Reframed.” 

38 Jones, “Scientific Intelligence.”

39 Ariel Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 1. 

40 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

41 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15.

42 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 4th Edition

43 Lowenthal, “Strategic Early Warning.”

44 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

45 John Gentry, “Cyber Intelligence: Strategic Warning is Possible,” International Journal of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence, August 2022, 2-3.

46 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

47 Central Intelligence Agency, DCID No. 1/5, National Intelligence Warning. 

48 Erik Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond 

(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 22.

49 Keith Clark, “On Warning,” Studies in Intelligence 9, no. 1 (1965): 15-21.

50 Roger George and James Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives, 2nd ed.

(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 366.

28 Davis, "Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable." 

29 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 1st-4th editions, 2012-2017. 

30 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 18. 

31 Michael Handel, "The Yorn Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise," International Studies Quarterly 21, 

No 3 (1977): pp .461-502. 

32 Joint Military Intelligence College, Intelligence Warning Terminology. 

33 Lowenthal, "Strategic Early Warning." 

34 Reginald V. Jones, "Scientific Intelligence," Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 92 (1947): 352-60 

35 Davis, "Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable." 

36 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 1-14. 

37 Gentry, "Intelligence Failure Reframed." 

38 Jones, "Scientific Intelligence." 

39 Ariel Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 1. 

40 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15. 

41 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 15. 

42 Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, (U) Defense Warning Network Handbook, 4th Edition 

43 Lowenthal, "Strategic Early Warning." 

44 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

45 John Gentry, "Cyber Intelligence: Strategic Warning is Possible," International Journal of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence, August 2022, 2-3. 

46 Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 12. 

47 Central Intelligence Agency, DCID No. 1/5, National Intelligence Warning. 

48 Erik Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond 

(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 22. 

49 Keith Clark, "On Warning," Studies in Intelligence 9, no. 1 (1965): 15-21. 

50 Roger George and James Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives, 2nd ed. 

(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 366. 

9