Filed 4/14/22 P. v. Hood CA2/2

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CEDRIC DESMOND HOOD,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B316651

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. TA071346)

THE COURT:

In 2003, a jury convicted Cedric Desmond Hood (defendant)

of one count of murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)).1 The jury 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 

unless otherwise indicated.
2

also found true the allegation that defendant personally and 

intentionally discharged a firearm which proximately caused 

great bodily injury and death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The trial 

court sentenced defendant to state prison for 50 years to life (25 

years for the murder plus 25 years for the firearm enhancement). 

As part of the sentencing, the court imposed a $9,000 restitution 

fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), ordered defendant to pay direct 

restitution to the victim’s family in the amount of $500 (§ 1202.4, 

subd. (f)), and imposed but stayed a $9,000 parole revocation fine 

(§ 1202.45).

On appeal, a prior panel of this division of the Court of 

Appeal affirmed the judgment. (People v. Hood (Oct. 19, 2004, 

B172478) [nonpub. opn.].) 

In October 2021, defendant filed a petition to dismiss the 

restitution and parole revocation fines pursuant to Assembly Bill 

No. 1869 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1869), which is a 

bill that added, amended or repealed various statutes related to 

fees imposed by the courts on convicted defendants.

The trial court summarily denied defendant’s motion. 

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. We appointed 

appellate counsel for defendant. Citing People v. Serrano (2012) 

211 Cal.App.4th 496 (Serrano), counsel filed an opening brief 

setting out the procedural history of this case, and a declaration 

indicating that counsel had “reviewed the entire record,” had 

found no “arguable issues to raise on appeal” and had informed 

defendant “of his right to file a supplemental brief.” 

Where appointed counsel finds no arguable issues in an 

appeal seeking postjudgment relief, the appellate court is not 

required to conduct an independent review for arguable issues.

(People v. Cole (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1023, 1039-1040 (Cole), 
3

review granted Oct. 14, 2020, S264278; see Serrano, supra, 211 

Cal.App.4th at p. 503.) However, we do review any contentions 

or arguments made if the defendant files his or her own 

supplemental brief or letter. (Cole, at p. 1040.)

We notified defendant of his counsel’s brief and gave him

leave to file, within 30 days, his own brief or letter setting forth 

any grounds for appeal, contentions, or arguments he might wish 

to have considered. To date, no such brief or letter has been filed.

Because neither defendant nor appellate counsel identified 

an issue warranting reversal, we may treat the appeal as 

abandoned. (Cole, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 1039.)

Although we have concluded, consistent with Cole, that 

dismissal is appropriate without more, we are mindful that our 

Supreme Court is currently deciding whether such a dismissal is 

appropriate or whether a further, independent examination of 

the record is instead required. (See People v. Delgadillo (Nov. 18, 

2020, B304441) [nonpub. opn.], review granted Feb. 17, 2021, 

S266305.) In an abundance of caution, we have independently 

examined the entire record and are satisfied that defendant’s 

appellate counsel has fully complied with their responsibilities 

and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 

Cal.3d 436, 441-443.)

The sole argument defendant made in his trial court filing 

was that Assembly Bill 1869 warranted the dismissal of his 

$9,000 restitution fine under section 1202.4, subdivision (b); the 

$500 of direct restitution award to the victim’s family; and the 

$9,000 parole revocation fine. This argument lacks merit. 

Assembly Bill 1869 enacted Penal Code section 1465.9; a year 

later, our Legislature amended that same section. As it reads 

now, section 1465.9 eliminates the “balance of any court-imposed 
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costs” against a convicted defendant under a variety of statutes,2

including the restitution statute but not including the imposition 

of a parole revocation fine. (§ 1465.9, subds. (a) & (b) italics 

added.) Even where it applies, section 1465.9’s relief is limited to 

“court-imposed costs”; it does not eliminate the restitution fine 

itself or an award of direct restitution to victims. In the

subsequently enacted amendment, our Legislature made explicit 

that its use of the term “court-imposed costs” in section 1465.9 

was meant solely to “eliminate the range of administrative fees

that agencies and courts are authorized to impose to fund 

elements of the criminal legal system and to eliminate all 

outstanding debt incurred as a result of the imposition of 

administrative fees.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 257, § 2, italics added.)

Consequently, neither the restitution fine nor direct restitution 

award are affected by Assembly Bill 1869.

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed.

——————————————————————————————

LUI , P. J., ASHMANN-GERST, J., HOFFSTADT, J.

2 Section 1465.9 does not include section 1202.45 which 

authorizes the imposition of a parole revocation fine. (§ 1465.9.)