alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 954 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 954

   To amend title 18, United States Code, to prohibit the sale of a 
  firearm to a person who has been convicted of a felony in a foreign 
                     court, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 28, 2005

  Mr. DeWine introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
               referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend title 18, United States Code, to prohibit the sale of a 
  firearm to a person who has been convicted of a felony in a foreign 
                     court, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Firearms Fairness and Security 
Act''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION OF FIREARM SALES TO PERSON CONVICTED OF A FELONY IN 
              A FOREIGN COURT.

    Section 922 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) in subsection (d), by amending paragraph (1) to read as 
        follows:
            ``(1) is under indictment for, or has been convicted--
                    ``(A) in any court within the United States, of a 
                crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding 1 
                year; or
                    ``(B) in any court outside the United States, of a 
                crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding 1 
                year (except for any crime involving the violation of 
                an antitrust law), if the conduct giving rise to the 
                conviction would be punishable in any court within the 
                United States by a term of imprisonment exceeding 1 
                year had such conduct occurred within the United 
                States;''; and
            (2) in subsection (g), by amending paragraph (1) to read as 
        follows:
            ``(1) who has been convicted--
                    ``(A) in any court within the United States, of a 
                crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding 1 
                year; or
                    ``(B) in any court outside the United States, of a 
                crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding 1 
                year (except for any crime involving the violation of 
                an antitrust law), if the conduct giving rise to the 
                conviction would be punishable in any court within the 
                United States by a term of imprisonment exceeding 1 
                year had such conduct occurred within the United 
                States;''.
                                 <all>
```
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Liza Biscette James, Appellant.

[976 NYS2d 386]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Patricia M. Nunez, J.), rendered September 9, 2011, as amended November 18, 2011, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of grand larceny in the third degree, two counts of forgery in the second degree and 10 counts of falsifying business records in the first degree, and sentencing her, as a second felony offender, to an aggregate term of 7 to 14 years, unanimously affirmed.

The court’s *Sandoval*ruling balanced the appropriate factors and was a proper exercise of discretion (see *People v Smith,*18 NY3d 588, 593-594 [2012]; *People v Hayes,*97 NY2d 203 [2002]; *People v Pavao,*59 NY2d 282, 292 [1983]). Although defendant’s two prior theft-related convictions had similarities to the present case, the prior cases involved highly dishonest behavior and thus were particularly relevant to defendant’s veracity. Accordingly, there is no basis for disturbing the court’s determination that the probative value of these convictions outweighed their prejudicial effect. Furthermore, the court made it clear that if defendant testified, these convictions would be admissible to impeach her credibility and for no other purpose.

We reject defendant’s argument that she is entitled to concurrent sentences as a matter of law, and we find no basis for reducing the sentence. Concur — Friedman, J.R, Acosta, Renwick, Manzanet-Daniels and Gische, JJ.
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 99-1809

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Hector Lizandro Rios-Ramirez, *

also known as "Musico," * [UNPUBLISHED]

also known as "Oscar," *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 19, 1999

Filed: November 4, 1999

___________

Before BOWMAN, LAY, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Hector Lizandro Rios-Ramirez ("Rios-Ramirez") was charged in a four count

indictment. Count One charged him with conspiring to distribute cocaine from May 12

through May 19, 1998, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(B); Counts Two

and Three charged him with distributing cocaine on May 12 and May 13, 1998, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C); and Count Four charged him

with distributing cocaine on May 19, 1998, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
1The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, Chief Judge of the United States District

Court for the District of Minnesota, presiding.

-2-

841(b)(1)(B). A jury trial was held.1 At trial Rios-Ramirez asserted an entrapment

defense, arguing that he was wrongfully induced by a government informant and that

he lacked the predisposition to engage in any of the illegal transactions. The trial court

instructed the jury on the entrapment defense. Rejecting this defense, the jury found

Rios-Ramirez guilty on all four counts. Rios-Ramirez was thereafter sentenced to a

term of seventy months imprisonment. The sole issue on appeal is the sufficiency of

the evidence for each of the four counts.

The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence is whether, in the light

most favorable to the government, and giving the government the benefit of all

reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, there is substantial

evidence to support the jury's verdict. United States v. Gaines, 969 F.2d 692, 696 (8th

Cir. 1992). We have carefully reviewed the record in this case and find that there is

substantial evidence that the government informant did not induce Rios-Ramirez to

commit the offenses and that there is substantial evidence supporting the government's

proof that Rios-Ramirez was predisposed to commit the charged offenses.

Additionally, the jury was instructed as to the entrapment defense and, after

deliberating and considering all of the evidence, properly rejected it. On the basis of

the record presented and the arguments made, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### State v. Dubose

Case below: 184 N.C. App.-(17 July 2007)

No. 424P07

Defs PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 (COA06-1376)

Denied 10/11/07
null

1.8808156
#### Joseph Mare, Respondent, v City of New York, Appellant, et al., Defendants.

[977 NYS2d 342]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant City of New York appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Plug, J.), dated March 5, 2012, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff was injured when he was struck by a vehicle at or near the intersection of Francis Lewis Boulevard and 172nd Street in Queens. The plaintiff commenced this action against, among others, the City of New York, alleging, inter alia, that the accident was caused by the unsafe design of the crosswalk and traffic signals at the subject intersection. The City moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, and the Supreme Court denied the motion.

The City failed to meet its prima facie burden of establishing its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. “In the area of *794traffic design engineering, a municipality will generally be accorded qualified immunity from liability arising out of its highway planning decisions” *(Turturro v City of New York,*77 AD3d 732, 735 [2010]; *see Kuhland v City of New York,*81 AD3d 786, 787 [2011]). *“A*governmental body may be liable for a traffic planning decision only when its study is ‘plainly inadequate or there is no reasonable basis for its . . . plan’ ” *(Affleck v Buckley,*96 NY2d 553, 556 [2001], quoting *Friedman v State of New York,*67 NY2d 271, 284 [1986]).

Here, the City failed to establish, prima facie, that there was a reasonable basis for its traffic plan at the subject intersection. In particular, the evidence presented by the City failed to establish that it undertook a study which entertained and passed on the very same question of risk that is at issue in this case *(see Weiss v Fote,*7 NY2d 579, 588 [I960]; *Kuhland v City of New York,*81 AD3d at 787), or that the design of the intersection and crosswalk was reasonably safe *(see Barone v County of Suffolk,*85 AD3d 836 [2011]; *McArthur v Muhammad,*46 AD3d 640 [2007]; *Scott v City of New York,*16 AD3d 485 [2005]). Since the City failed to satisfy its prima facie burden, its motion was properly denied without regard to the sufficiency of the opposition papers *(see Bresciani v County of Dutchess, N.Y.,*62 AD3d 639, 640 [2009]).

The City’s remaining contentions are either without merit or not properly before this Court. Rivera, J.E, Skelos, Chambers and Hall, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



         In connection with the Quarterly  Report of Cistera  Networks,  Inc. on
Form 10-QSB for the period  ending June 30, 2006,  as filed with the  Securities
and  Exchange  Commission  on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  I, Derek  Downs,
President  of the  Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section  1350,  as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the
best of my knowledge and belief:

         (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) the  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and result of  operations of the
Company.


/s/    Derek P. Downs
Derek P. Downs
President
(Principal Executive Officer)


August 22, 2006


A signed  original of this written  statement  required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the  electronic  version of this written  statement
has been  provided  to the  Company  and will be  retained  by the  Company  and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE INTERIM
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME FOR THE QUARTER ENDED MARCH 31, 1998 AND THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AS OF MARCH 31, 1998 AND QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY
BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                       1,381,774
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  420,598
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                      26,440,197
<DEPRECIATION>                              (2,853,523)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              25,940,254
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                      5,596,285
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                  20,166,202
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                25,940,254
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,104,000
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  118,069
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             130,751
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                767,333
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            767,333
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   767,333
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    24.43
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    24.43
        

</TABLE>
<PAGE>

                                    Exhibit 10.6
                                          
                              RICHEY ELECTRONICS, INC.


                                          
                                  October 1, 1998

Mr. Norbert W. St. John
7441 Lincoln Way
Garden Grove, CA 92642


               Re:  Employment Agreement
                    --------------------

Dear Norb:

          Reference is made to the Employment Agreement dated as of April 1,
1993, between you and Brajdas Corporation, as amended by the Addendum to
Employment Agreement dated as of February 21, 1995 between you and Richey
Electronics, Inc. (the "Company"), and as further amended by the Second Addendum
to Employment Agreement dated as of May 17, 1995 between you and the Company (as
so amended, the "Employment Agreement").

          The Company hereby notifies you pursuant to Section 2 of the
Employment Agreement that your employment under the Employment Agreement shall
terminate upon the expiration of the current Additional Two-Year Period (as
defined in the Employment Agreement) on April 6, 1999.

                              
                              Very truly yours,

                              /s/ Donald I. Zimmerman
                              -----------------------
                              Donald I. Zimmerman
                              Chairman of the Compensation
                              Committee

Receipt Acknowledged


/s/ Norbert W. St. John
-----------------------
Norbert W. St. John
**EXHIBIT 23.1****CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM****To the Board of Directors of Spatializer Audio Laboratories, Inc.:**We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements on Form S-8 (Nos.333-27453 and 333-41170) of Spatializer Audio Laboratories, Inc. of our report dated March 19,2006, related to the consolidated balance sheet of Spatializer Audio Laboratories, Inc. andsubsidiaries as of December 31, 2006 and the related consolidated statements of income,stockholders’ equity and cash flows for the year then ended, which report appears in the annualreport on Form 10-K of Spatializer Audio Laboratories, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2006./s/ RAMIREZ INTERNATIONAL
#### Angel Perez, Respondent, v GEICO Insurance Company, Appellant.

[964 NYS2d 222]

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Brandveen, J.), entered December 12, 2011, which denied its motion pursuant to CPLR 3012 (b) to dismiss the action for failure to serve a timely complaint, or, alternatively, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, or, alternatively, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (c) for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, that branch of the defendant’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3012 (b) to dismiss the action for failure to serve a timely complaint is granted, and the remaining branches of the motion are denied as academic.

“In order to avoid dismissal for failure to serve a complaint after a demand for the complaint has been made pursuant to CPLR 3012 (b), a plaintiff must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the delay in serving the complaint and a potentially meritorious cause of action” *(Perez-Faringer v Heilman,*79 AD3d 837, 838 [2010]; *Gibbons v Court Officers’ Benevolent Assn. of Nassau County,*78 AD3d 654 [2010]). Here, while the plaintiff provided a reasonable excuse for his delay in serving the complaint *(see Perez-Faringer v Heilman,*79 AD3d at 838; *Pristavec v Galligan,*32 AD3d 834 [2006]), he failed to establish that he had a potentially meritorious cause of action *(see Perez*
      *1026
      *Faringer v Heilman,*79 AD3d at 838; *Balgley v Cammarata,*299 AD2d 432 [2002]; *Chmielnik v Rosenberg,*269 AD2d 555 [2000]). The plaintiff’s allegations are patently insufficient to demonstrate a potentially meritorious cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract predicated upon his purported status as a third-party beneficiary to the subject insurance contract *(see Tilden Commercial Alliance v 2nd Edition Originals,*242 AD2d 702 [1997]; *cf. Green v Fox Is. Park Autobody,*255 AD2d 417, 419 [1998]; *Segall v Rapkin,*243 AD2d 624 [1997]). Further, the plaintiff has not alleged any material misrepresentation or misleading act or practice on the part of the defendant, such that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate potentially meritorious causes of action sounding in fraud and deceptive business practices *(see generally Eurycleia Partners, LP v Seward & Kissel, LLP,*12 NY3d 553, 559 [2009]; *Stutman v Chemical Bank,*95 NY2d 24, 29 [2000]; *County of Suffolk v Long Is. Power Auth.,*100 AD3d 944 [2012]; *Andre Strishak & Assoc. v Hewlett Packard Co.,*300 AD2d 608 [2002]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3012 (b) to dismiss the action, and denied, as academic, the remaining branches of the motion. Skelos, J.P., Leventhal, Austin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Afton C., a Child Alleged to be Neglected. Dutchess County Department of Social Services, Appellant; James C. et al., Respondents. (And Four Other Proceedings.)

Submitted February 7, 2011;

decided February 10, 2011

Motion by New York Civil Liberties Union for leave to appear amicus curiae on the appeal herein granted only to the extent that the proposed brief is accepted as filed. Two copies of the brief must be served and 24 copies filed within seven days.
#### In the Matter of Tina M. Cobane, Appellant, v Brian P. Cobane, Respondent.

Submitted November 29, 2010;

decided January 18, 2011

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution.

Judge Pigott taking no part.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-40062

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

GARY PAUL HOCKLESS,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:97-CR-86-1

- - - - - - - - - -

August 19, 1998

Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and JONES, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Court-appointed counsel for Gary Paul Hockless has filed a

brief as required by Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 

Our independent review of the brief, Hockless’s response, and the

record discloses no nonfrivolous issue. Accordingly, counsel is

excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS

DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.