IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

KENNETH S. BOBROW, 

Petitioner, 

v.

THE HONORABLE MICHAEL HERROD, 

Judge of the SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, 

in and for the County of MARICOPA, Respondent Judge, 

PAM CASE BOBROW, 

Real Party in Interest. 

No. 1 CA-SA 15-0280 

 

Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. FN2013-004259 

The Honorable Michael J. Herrod, Judge 

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF DENIED 

COUNSEL 

Fennemore Craig, PC, Phoenix 

By Alexander R. Arpad 

Counsel for Petitioner 

Dickinson Wright, PLLC, Phoenix 

By Steven D. Wolfson, Anne L. Tiffen 

Counsel for Real Party in Interest
BOBROW v. HON. HERROD/BOBROW 

Opinion of the Court 

2 

OPINION 

Presiding Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the opinion of the Court, in 

which Judge Maurice Portley and Judge Donn Kessler joined. 

O R O Z C O, Judge: 

¶1 Kenneth Bobrow (Husband) seeks special action relief from 

family court orders requiring that he post a supersedeas bond for $1,303,414 

pending his appeal of a decree of dissolution. For the following reasons, 

we accept jurisdiction, and deny relief. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 This special action arises from the June 2014 decree of 

dissolution (Decree) between Husband and Pam Case Bobrow (Wife). The 

Decree awarded Wife $1,174,072.90, plus interest for her marital interest in 

a house in Snowmass, Colorado (Snowmass Home), pursuant to the parties’ 

premarital agreement. The Decree ordered that Husband make a written 

election1 to either pay Wife the full amount in a lump sum or follow a tenyear payment plan. Under the payment plan, Husband would make an 

initial cash payment of $370,658.90 and execute a ten-year promissory note 

to Wife for the balance of the amount due, plus interest. The Decree also 

awarded Wife $129,341.10 as reimbursement for “ordinary and necessary” 

living expenses paid by Wife during the parties’ marriage. 

¶3 Husband filed an appeal and subsequently a Motion to Set 

Amount of Supersedeas Bond. He requested that the bond be set in the 

amount to be reimbursed to Wife for living expenses, plus eighteen 

monthly payments under the payment plan option, including offsets, for a 

total of $541,792.40. 

¶4 Wife filed a Cross-Motion for Clarification of the Decree 

regarding whether Husband timely elected the ten-year payment plan or 

the lump sum option. Unaware that this issue remained pending, the 

family court ruled on Husband’s Motion to Set Amount of Supersedeas 

Bond, stating: 

 

1 The Decree required Husband to make his written election within 

seven days.
BOBROW v. HON. HERROD/BOBROW 

Opinion of the Court 

3 

[T]he “total damages” which Rule 7(a),[]Ariz. R. Civ. App. 

Pro. [c]ontemplates for purposes of setting a Supersedeas 

Bond is $1,303,414.00. In calculating this amount, the Court 

uses the total amount Husband would be required to pay 

under [the lump sum option for the Snowmass Home] and 

does not determine whether Husband is entitled to any offsets 

for payments he made which are not addressed in the 

Decree.2

¶5 Subsequently, the family court ruled on the still-pending 

Cross-Motion for Clarification of the Decree. The court imposed the tenyear payment plan and ordered Husband to pay Wife the initial cash 

payment of $370,658.90 and to execute a ten-year promissory note for the 

balance, including interest. In light of that order, Husband filed a Motion 

to Clarify and Correct Supersedeas Bond Amount. He proposed that the 

supersedeas bond should be in the amount of $585,125.78.3 The court 

denied Husband’s proposal, reaffirming the prior bond amount and 

stating: 

[Husband] proposes to bond the $370,658.90 [initial cash 

payment], and commence paying the monthly payments 

under the ten year payment plan. 

Contrary to [Husband’s] argument, the total amount of 

damages awarded is $1,174,072.90. The purpose of the bond 

is to protect [Wife] from a change in financial condition of 

[Husband] pending appeal, and to assure that the total 

amount of damages will be available if [Husband] does not 

prevail on appeal. The execution of a promissory note is not 

the same as providing bond. [Husband’s] promise to pay on 

a monthly basis is not assured by the execution of the note 

and is not the equivalent of a bond. 

. . . 

 

2 The $1,303,414 supersedeas bond is the total value of the Snowmass 

Home ($1,174,072.90) plus the living expenses awarded to Wife 

($129,341.10). 

3 This figure was the initial cash payment of $370,658.90, plus interest, 

and Wife’s $129,341.10 reimbursement for living expenses, plus interest. 
BOBROW v. HON. HERROD/BOBROW 

Opinion of the Court 

4 

IT IS ORDERED affirming the Court’s prior order setting the 

bond amount. 

This special action followed. 

SPECIAL ACTION JURISDICTION 

¶6 Special action jurisdiction is appropriate because this is an 

issue of first impression, Husband does not have an equally plain, speedy, 

and adequate remedy by appeal and the issue is a challenge to a 

supersedeas bond. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a); City Ctr. Exec. Plaza, LLC 

v. Jantzen, 237 Ariz. 37, 39, ¶ 2 (App. 2015). Therefore, we accept 

jurisdiction. 

DISCUSSION

¶7 “We review the interpretation of statutes and court rules de 

novo.” Cranmer v. State, 204 Ariz. 299, 301, ¶ 8 (App. 2003). We analyze 

procedural rules using principles of statutory construction, id., and read 

those rules in conjunction with related statutes and harmonize them 

whenever possible. Thielking v. Kirschner, 176 Ariz. 154, 159 (App. 1993). 

“[W]e look to the plain language of the statute or rule as the best indicator 

of [the drafters’] intent. . . . If the language is clear and unambiguous, we 

give effect to that language and do not employ other methods of statutory 

construction.” Fragoso v. Fell, 210 Ariz. 427, 430, ¶ 7 (App. 2005). 

¶8 Husband agrees that Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) 

section 12-2108.A.1 (West 2015)4 applies and that the statute requires a bond 

based on “the total amount of damages awarded.” However, Husband 

argues that the family court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate 

damages in a dissolution decree; thus, amounts awarded under the Decree 

do not constitute damages and the statute does not set the amount of the 

supersedeas bond to be posted in an appeal of a dissolution decree. Instead, 

Husband contends that the statute only requires a bond for the amounts he 

currently owes under the Decree. 

¶9 Under A.R.S. § 12-2108.A.1, “[i]f a plaintiff in any civil action 

obtains a judgment under any legal theory, the amount of the bond that is 

necessary to stay execution during the course of all appeals . . . shall be set 

as . . . [t]he total amount of damages awarded.” The legislative history 

explains that for purposes of A.R.S. § 12-2108, “[c]ivil cases can involve . . . 

 

4 We cite the current version of applicable statutes when no revisions 

material to this decision have since occurred. 
BOBROW v. HON. HERROD/BOBROW 

Opinion of the Court 

5 

family law issues, such as divorce.” S.B. 1212 Fact Sheet, Ariz. 50th Leg., 

1st Reg. Sess., at 1 (2011). Therefore, the statute applies in dissolution cases. 

¶10 Both A.R.S. § 12-2108.A.1 and Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate 

Procedure 7(a)(4)(A) state that the bond must be the “total amount of 

damages awarded.” See A.R.S. § 12-2108.A.1 (the bond “shall be set as . . . 

[t]he total amount of damages awarded”); ARCAP 7(a)(4)(A) (the bond 

“must be . . . [t]he total amount of damages awarded”).5 Because the 

legislature used the word “damages,” we “construe that word according to 

its ‘peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law.’” City Ctr., 237 Ariz. at 

41, ¶ 13. 

¶11 Damages are defined as compensation for actual injury. Id. at 

42, ¶14. “[A]ctual damages are such compensation for the injury as would 

follow from the nature and character of the act and which return the injured 

party to pre-injury position.” Havasu Heights Ranch and Dev. Corp. v. Desert 

Valley Wood Prods., Inc., 179 Ariz. 456, 459 (1994) (citing United States Fid. & 

Guar. Co. v. Davis, 3 Ariz.App. 259, 263 (App. 1966)). 

¶12 Even though awards in divorce proceedings are not typically 

referred to as “damages,” setting the bond in the amount of the full award 

under the Decree is appropriate for multiple reasons. First, the legislature 

clearly intended for A.R.S § 12-2108.A.1 to apply to divorce cases, and we 

“give effect to the legislature’s intent.” See In re Marriage of Williams, 219 

Ariz. 546, 548, ¶ 10 (App. 2008). 

¶13 Second, the spirit and purpose of A.R.S. § 12-2108.A.1 and 

ARCAP 7(a)(4)(A) are served by setting the amount of the bond in the full 

amount of the award under the Decree. The purpose of a supersedeas bond 

is to preserve the status quo pending appeal. Porter v. Commercial Standard 

Ins. Co., 112 Ariz. 491, 493 (1975). Setting the bond for the full amount of 

the award under the Decree protects Wife from “the risk that . . . the funds 

will have been dissipated” during pendency of the appeal. See Freeman v. 

Wintroath Pumps-Div. of Worthington Corp., 13 Ariz.App. 182, 183 (App. 

1970). In addition, the bond “restrain[s] [Wife] and the [trial] court from 

taking affirmative action to enforce the judgment or decree.” Anderson v. 

Pickrell, 115 Ariz. 589, 590 (1977). Therefore, a bond in the full amount of 

 

5 Husband does not invoke the alternative bond amounts found at 

ARCAP 7(a)(4)(B) or (C), the exceptions found at ARCAP 7(a)(5) or the 

alternative amounts in A.R.S. § 12-2108.A.2 or 3. 
BOBROW v. HON. HERROD/BOBROW 

Opinion of the Court 

6 

the award under the Decree protects the interests of both parties during the 

appeal. 

¶14 Under A.R.S. § 12-2108.A.1, the trial court shall set the bond 

as the total amount of damages awarded, excluding punitive damages.6 

Husband contends that if the term “damages” is strictly interpreted, then 

the bond amount would be zero. Citing Everson v. Everson, 24 Ariz.App. 

239, 245 (App. 1975), Husband argues “[Wife] should be entitled to a bond 

for payments she is actually not receiving as a result of the stay during the 

appeal” or stated differently, Wife is only entitled to the sums due during 

the pendency of the appeal. We disagree and hold that the appropriate 

bond amount is not so limited. The full amount of damages awarded to 

Wife in this case is the total amount of living expenses plus the total amount 

due to her for the Snowmass Property. 

¶15 If Husband’s argument were correct and damages were never 

awarded in divorce proceedings, supersedeas bond amounts in family 

court proceedings would always be zero. Husband does not request that 

result here, and such a result would not comport with Arizona case law. 

See e.g., Anderson, 115 Ariz. at 590 (wife in divorce proceeding required to 

post supersedeas bond to stay judgment execution pending appeal); 

Everson, 24 Ariz.App. at 245 (supersedeas bond posted in divorce 

proceedings not disturbed on appeal). 

¶16 Husband also argues that, because the Decree requires that he 

make payments under a promissory note over ten years, the full amount of 

the award under the Decree is not immediately due and he should therefore 

only have to pay a bond for the “amounts actually due.” We disagree 

because the statute and rule are clear that the bond must be set as “[t]he total 

amount of damages awarded.” A.R.S. § 12-2108.A.1 (emphasis added); 

ARCAP 7(a)(4)(A) (emphasis added); see also Fragoso, 210 Ariz. at 430, ¶ 7 

(“If the [statutory] language is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to 

that language and do not employ other methods of statutory 

construction.”). 

 

6 Pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2108.A, the amount of the bond “shall be set 

as the lesser of . . . [t]he total amount of damages awarded excluding 

punitive damages[,] . . . [f]ifty per cent of the appellant’s net worth [or] 

[t]wenty-five million dollars.” In addition, A.R.S. § 12-2108.B and C grant 

the trial court discretion to increase or decrease the amount of the bond 

upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence. 
BOBROW v. HON. HERROD/BOBROW 

Opinion of the Court 

7 

¶17 Finally, Husband argues that the supersedeas bond reverses 

the Decree, apparently reasoning that posting a supersedeas bond in the 

full amount of the award is akin to imposing a lump sum judgment rather 

than the ten-year payment plan under the Decree. As explained above, the 

purpose and effect of the supersedeas bond is to maintain the status quo for 

both parties pending appeal, and therefore the bond does not 

“substantively accelerate the entire [award].” Furthermore, if Husband is 

successful on appeal, the bond is returned, leaving him in the same position 

he was in when the appeal began. 

¶18 Wife requests we award her attorney fees, but does not cite a 

rule or statute as a basis for the award. Therefore, we deny the request. 

Bank One, Arizona, N.A. v. Beauvais, 188 Ariz. 245, 251 (App. 1997). 

However, Wife is entitled to her costs, upon compliance with ARCAP 21. 

CONCLUSION

¶19 For the foregoing reasons, we accept jurisdiction but deny 

relief.