IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

TYREE JACKSON,

Defendant Below,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF DELAWARE,

Appellee.

§

§ No. 248, 2023

§

§ Court Below–Superior Court

§ of the State of Delaware

§ 

§ Cr. ID No. 1908012526 (N)

§ 

§ 

§

Submitted: January 30, 2024

Decided: April 22, 2024

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; LEGROW and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

ORDER

After consideration of the non-merit brief and motion to withdraw filed by the 

appellant’s counsel under Supreme Court Rule 26(c), the State’s response, and the 

Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that:

(1) In October 2019, appellant Tyree Jackson was charged by indictment 

with three counts of drug dealing, three counts of possession of a firearm during the 

commission of a felony, three counts of possession of a firearm by a person 

prohibited (“PFBPP”), six counts of endangering the welfare of a child, one count 

of aggravated possession, one count of possession of ammunition by a person 

prohibited, and one count of second-degree conspiracy. On February 24, 2020, 

Jackson pleaded guilty to one count of PFBPP. In exchange for his guilty plea, the 
2

State agreed not to file a habitual-offender petition and to dismiss the remaining 

charges. The Superior Court sentenced Jackson in accordance with the plea 

agreement to fifteen years of incarceration, suspended after the minimum-mandatory 

term of ten years for six months of Level IV probation followed by eighteen months 

of Level III probation. Jackson did not appeal his conviction or sentence.

(2) In December 2020, Jackson filed a pro se motion for postconviction 

relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. At Jackson’s request, the Superior 

Court appointed counsel to represent him. Postconviction counsel filed an amended 

motion for postconviction relief raising one claim: trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to move to suppress the evidence because Jackson’s initial detention was not 

supported by reasonable articulable suspicion.

1

 After expanding the record with 

briefing, an affidavit from trial counsel, oral argument, and supplemental briefing, 

the Superior Court denied Jackson’s motion.2 This appeal followed.

(3) On appeal, postconviction counsel has filed a brief and a motion to 

withdraw under Rule 26(c). Postconviction counsel asserts that, after a complete 

and careful examination of the record, he could not identify any arguably appealable 

issues. Postconviction counsel informed Jackson of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and 

provided him with a copy of the motion to withdraw and a draft of the accompanying 

1 At one point, Jackson told the court that he wished to proceed pro se to supplement counsel’s

amended motion, but he withdrew the request shortly thereafter.

2

State v. Jackson, 2023 WL 4104290 (Del. Super. June 20, 2023).
3

brief. Postconviction counsel also informed Jackson of his right to supplement his 

attorney’s presentation. Jackson has raised issues for the Court’s consideration, 

which postconviction counsel attached to the Rule 26(c) brief. The State has 

responded to the Rule 26(c) brief and has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s 

judgment.

(4) The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration of a 

motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold. First, 

the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious 

examination of the record and the law for claims that arguably could be raised on 

appeal. 3 Second, the Court must conduct its own review of the record and determine 

whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it 

can be decided without an adversary presentation.4

(5) The record reflects the following. On April 19, 2019, police were 

monitoring a city-owned surveillance camera in the area of the 200 block of North 

Harrison Street in Wilmington, Delaware. The area covered by the camera included 

208 North Harrison Street (“the residence”). The camera captured footage of a 

man—later identified as Malik Youngblood—engaging in suspected hand-to-hand 

3 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., 486 U.S. 429, 442 

(1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).

4 Penson, 488 U.S. at 81-82.
4

drug transactions in front of the residence.

5

 Another individual, later identified as 

Jackson, was also present. Around 11:24 a.m., Jackson and Youngblood scrambled 

quickly into the residence in response to seeing an individual with a handgun.6

Approximately one minute later, Jackson ran out of the residence and down North 

Harrison Street with a black handgun in plain view.7 After standing at the 

intersection of North Harrison Street and Second Street for a few moments, Jackson 

turned around and retreated into the residence.

8

 In response to these events, police 

officers responded and ordered the occupants of the residence to exit.

9

 Jackson 

complied, and an officer immediately detained him.

10

 After ascertaining Jackson’s 

identity and conducting a criminal background check, police learned that Jackson 

was a person prohibited from owning or possessing a firearm. Because witnesses

informed them that there were children still inside the residence, the officers

conducted a protective sweep of it, during which they observed marijuana plants in 

plain view. Police then obtained a search warrant for the residence and found 

additional drugs and three firearms (one loaded black 9mm Beretta handgun, one 

loaded black High Standard .357 magnum revolver, and one black Ruger .223 ranch 

5

Jackson, 2023 WL 410420, at *2.

6

Id.

7

Id.

8

Id.

9

Id. at *3.

10 The police also detained Youngblood, who exited the house with several children, when he 

emerged.
5

rifle). After waiving his Miranda rights, Jackson admitted that he had purchased a 

.357 magnum revolver earlier in the day.

(6) Jackson’s arguments that he has submitted for the Court’s consideration

may be fairly summarized as follows: trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

move to suppress the evidence obtained (i) pursuant to the search warrant issued for 

the residence; (ii) from the warrantless protective sweep of the residence; and (iii) 

through Jackson’s detention, which, he argues, was not based on reasonable 

articulable suspicion. In connection with these claims, Jackson also maintains that 

his guilty plea was coerced. After careful review, we find no merit to Jackson’s 

arguments.

(7) We review Jackson’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under 

the well-known two-part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington.

11

 In order to 

prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must (i) show 

that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and

(ii) demonstrate prejudice.12 Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard 

is deferential and our review of counsel’s representation is “subject to a strong 

presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable.”

13 “Objectively 

unreasonable performance is performance where no reasonable lawyer would have 

11 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

12 Id. at 688, 694.

13 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990).
6

conducted the defense as this lawyer did.”14 In the context of a guilty plea, the 

defendant establishes “prejudice” when he can show “that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would 

have insisted on going to trial.”15

(8) We review Jackson’s first two ineffective assistance of counsel claims

for plain error because they were not presented to the trial court in the first instance.16 

We find no plain error here. Because there is no evidence that Jackson had a 

reasonable expectation of privacy at the residence, he lacked standing to challenge 

the search warrant,

17 and trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a 

meritless motion to suppress. For the same reason, we also reject Jackson’s claim 

that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the evidence 

obtained during the protective sweep of the residence. 

14 Owens v. State, 301 A.3d 580, 588-89 (Del. 2023) (cleaned up).

15 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 60 (Del. 1988) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985)).

16 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8 (“Only questions fairly presented to the trial court may be presented for 

review; provided, however, that when the interests of justice so require, the Court may consider 

and determine any question not so presented.”).

17 See Wilson v. State, 2002 WL 31106354, at *1 (Del. Sept. 18, 2002) (“The fact that [the 

defendant] was alone in [the] home in the afternoon, wearing no shoes, establishes only that he 

was a casual guest. As such, he has no standing to contest the validity of the search.”). Jackson 

argued for the first time during oral argument in the Superior Court that he was an overnight guest 

at his codefendant’s home. Because he did not raise this claim in his amended motion for 

postconviction relief, trial counsel did not respond to it, and we do not know if Jackson told trial 

counsel that he was an overnight guest at the house. Trial counsel’s affidavit, which describes his 

efforts to mount a defense to Jackson’s charges, suggests, however, that he did not believe that 

Jackson had standing to challenge the sweep or the warrant.
7

(9) Turning to Jackson’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to 

move to suppress the evidence based on Jackson’s initial detention, trial counsel 

squarely addressed this claim in his affidavit. Although counsel agreed that he had 

originally opined—based on the limited testimony and evidence presented at 

Jackson’s preliminary hearing—that there were grounds for filing a meritorious 

motion to suppress, his opinion changed after reviewing “hours” of “extensive” 

video surveillance of the residence during the morning of August 19, 2019.18 

Specifically, trial counsel opined that he “did not reasonably believe that a 

suppression motion would have been successful in light of the multiple drug 

transactions that had been observed being conducted by Youngblood on the front 

porch of the residence in which Defendant Jackson was present with a handgun.”19 

Rather than file a frivolous suppression motion, trial counsel “focused on attempting 

to mitigate the difficult situation in which Defendant Jackson found himself ... given 

his eligibility for sentencing as a[] habitual offender.”

20

 We note that trial counsel 

successfully secured the State’s agreement to refrain from seeking habitual offender 

sentencing. In light of the evidence in the record, we cannot find that counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Moreover, 

Jackson has not shown that, but for trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress 

18 App. to Opening Br. at A423-24.

19 Id. at A424.

20 Id. at A424.
8

based on Jackson’s initial detention, there is a reasonable probability that he would 

have not availed himself of the plea agreement, but would have gone to trial on the 

eighteen-count indictment and faced sentencing as a habitual offender.

(10) Finally, we also review Jackson’s claim that his plea was coerced for 

plain error because it was not raised below. The record before the Court reflects that 

the plea provided a substantial benefit to Jackson—as noted, the State dismissed 

seventeen other charges in exchange for Jackson’s guilty plea to one count of 

PFBPP, and Jackson avoided being declared (and sentenced as) a habitual offender. 

Indeed, Jackson received the minimum-mandatory sentence for PFBPP. Under these 

circumstances and taking into consideration Jackson’s representations on the Truthin-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form as well as his sworn testimony during the guilty plea 

colloquy, Jackson’s claim of coercion is belied by the record.

21

(11) The Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that 

Jackson’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable 

issue. We are also satisfied that Jackson’s counsel has made a conscientious effort 

to examine the record and the law and has properly determined that Jackson could 

not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal.

21 See Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997) (“In the absence of clear and convincing 

evidence to the contrary, [a defendant] is bound by his answers on the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty 

Plea From and by his sworn testimony prior to the acceptance of the guilty plea.”).
9

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 

Court is AFFIRMED. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is moot.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths

Justice