Filed 1/28/ 21 In re J.C. CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re J.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B3 01596

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. DAVID C

., Defendant and Appellant. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. N o. 17LJJP00091A )

A PPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County

, Stephanie M. Davis

, Juvenile Court Referee

. A ffirmed. Keiter Appellate Law and Mitchell Keiter for Defendant
and Appellant

. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy

, Acting Assistant County Counsel, Navid Nakhjava ni , Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent

.

__________________2 David C

. , the father of six

- year

- old Josiah C

. , appeals from
the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26

. 1 David contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his request s for a continuance of the section 366.26 hearing and for a contested hearing on the parent

- child relationship exception to the termination of parental rights . David also con tends the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of
the Indian Child Welfar e Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) as it applies to Josiah’s mother, Karina R

. W e affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Dependency P roceedings

1. Original Petition On October 4, 2017, t he Department filed a petition on
behalf of then three

- year

- old Josiah under section 300, subdivision (b). In cou n t b

- 1, the Department alleged that Karina “has an extensive history of illicit drug abuse, including amphetamine, and [wa s ] a current abuser of methamphetamine and heroin, which render [Karina] incapable of providing regular care and supervision of [Josiah] .” The Department further alleged that Josiah “was a prior dependent of the Juvenile Court due to [Karina’s] illicit drug use and that the juvenile court had declared Josiah’s four siblings dependents of the Juvenile Court and received permanent placement services due to [Karina’s] illicit drug abuse.” In count b

- 2, the Department alleged that

1 Undesignated s tatutory references are to Welfare and Institution s C ode.3

David “ has a history of substance abuse, includi ng marijuana and alcohol, and is a current abuser of alcohol, which renders [David] incapable of providing regular care and supervision for [Josiah] .”
The Department also alleged that two of Josiah’s siblings

“ received permanent placement services due to [David’s]
substance abuse .” In count b

- 3, the Department alleged that Karina “left [Josiah] in the care of paternal grandmother, Maria [ C .] , without making an appropriate plan for [Josiah’s] ongoing care and supervision, including [Josiah’s] medical care. [Karina] previously left [Josiah] with the paternal grandmother without maintaining contact with the paternal grandmother and without returning to resume care of [Josiah]

. ” The Department alleged the parent’s actions endangered Josiah’s physical health and safety and placed Josiah “at risk of serious physical harm, damage, and danger. ” At the detention hearing on October 5, 2017 , the juvenile

court found a prima facie case for detaining and finding that
Josiah wa s a person described by section 300. T h e juvenile court
detain ed Josiah from David and Karina and placed Josiah with his paternal grandmother Maria, with whom Josiah had been living. Karina and David did not attend the hearing

. Karina’s whereabouts were unknown, and David was incarcerated. The juvenile court ordered the Department to conduct a due diligence
search regarding Karina. The juvenile court continue d the hearing so that David could attend. The juvenile court deferred making any findings pursuant to ICWA. At the continued hearing on October 17, 2017, David denied the allegations in the petition and confirmed he did not have Indian ancestry. The juvenile court found ICWA did not apply as to David

. The juvenile court deferred making an ICWA finding as to K arina4

because her whereabouts remained unknown. The juvenile court scheduled the jurisdiction hearing for November 28, 2017.

2. Prior Dependency Proceedings

The Department’s report s chronicled Karina’s and David’s history of prior dependency proceedings

. In October 2015, based on Karina’s use of illicit drugs during her pregnancy with Josiah and David’s history of domestic violence, t he juvenile court
declared Josiah a dependent of the court

. During this prior proceeding, David failed to maintain contact with the Department , while Karina made progress on her case plan. In October 2015, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over
Josiah with a section 362.4 custody order granting Karina sole legal and physic al custody of Josiah and David monitored
visitation

. Between 2009 and 2012 , the juvenile court sustained multiple dependency petitions on behalf of Josiah’s four siblings
based on David ’s and Karina’s illicit drug use, emotional abuse, general neglect and physical violence. Although the Department provided family reunification services

, including programs for drug rehabilitation and parenting education and individual counseling to address domestic violence

, Karina and David failed to reunify with the chil dren. After Karina waived her rights for reunification services regarding one of the four siblings

, 2 the juvenile court granted legal guardianship of that sibling to the maternal grandmother and terminated jurisdiction over that sibling i n April 2010

. During the period April 2012 to April 2015

,

2 David is not the father of this sibling, but David was identified as Karina’s “male companion” in the sustained petitions. David is the father of the other three siblings.5

the juvenile court terminated David’s and Karina’s parental rights to the three other siblings, and Cristal C.

, a paternal aunt
, and her husband Emmanuel R. adopted Josiah ’s three siblings

.

3. Amended Petition On November 27, 2017, the Department filed an amended petition

, adding an additional count under section 300, subdivision (b)

, and a count under subdivision (j). In t hese counts, the Department alleged that David “has a history of engaging in violent altercations.” In the presence of Josiah’s siblings, David “physically attacked [Karina]” on different occasions. In part because of David’s “unresolved history of engaging in violent altercations,” the juvenile court ordered permanent placement services for Josiah’s siblings. The Department further alleged that, i n November 2015, based on his convictions for causing an elder to suffer unjustified physical pain (Penal Code, § 368, subd. (c)), the criminal court issued a 10

- year restraining order against David protecting Maria and paternal grandfather Raymond C

. On July 24, 2017, the criminal cou r t found David in contempt of court for w illfully and knowingly violating the restraining order. (Pen

. Code, § 166, subd. (c)(1).) The Department alleged David’s “history of unresolved violence and [Ka r ina’s] failure to protect” endangered Josiah. According to the Department, despite the juven ile court’s custody order
under section 362.4 granting Karina sole legal and physical custody of Josiah and ordering monitored visitation for David,
Karina allowed David to have unmonitored visits with Josiah.

B. Jurisdiction Hearing

At the jurisdiction hearing on November 28, 2017, the juvenile court dismissed the original petition and deemed filed6

the amended petition. The juvenile court ordered the Department to provide David with a written schedule for
monitored visits

. The juvenile court continued the jurisdiction hearing to February 8, 2018. On November 28, 2017, David signed an agreement in which he agreed to visit Josiah every Friday from 10 :00 a

. m

. to 12 :00 noon, with a Department approved monitor present. From November 28, 201 7 to the continued jurisdiction hearing on February 8, 201 8
, David did not visit Josiah. David told the Department that he could not visit Josiah “because of his work schedule.” David also told the Department that “he has not begun any classes or programs , but does have old certificates
from 2015

- 2016 that he completed.” David “also mentioned he was attending AA classes.” The Department reported that Karina’s whereabouts were unknown. According to Maria, “the last thing she knows in regards to [Karina] is [she was ] in jail about three times.” At the jurisdiction hearing o n February 8, 2018, the juvenile court sustained all counts in the amended petition pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j) , and declared Josiah a dependent of the juvenile c ourt

. The juvenile court ordered the Department to submit a report regarding its due diligence search f

o r Karina. The juvenile court also ordered
Josiah to remain placed with Maria under the Department’s supervision. The juvenile court scheduled the disposition hearing for March 22, 2018. After several continuances, t he juvenile

court scheduled the disposition hearing f o r July 30, 2018.

C. Disposition Hearing

1. February 2018

- July 2018 On February 26, 2018, Davi d signed an agreement stating7

that he would visit Josiah every Monday from 9 :00 a.m. to 11 :00

a

. m

. at the Department’s Palmdale office. According to the Department, f

rom February 2018 through June 2018, David
visited Josiah on three occasions: February 2 6, April 30, and May 8, 2018

. David canceled four visits and

, o n 12 occasions, David did not show up for the visit and failed to cancel the visit

. David told the Department that “he has been really busy working” and that “sometimes doesn’t have enough money to see [Josiah].” When David visited with Josiah, the Department
observed that Josiah was excited to see [David]

, stat ing

, “I love my dad

. ” David and Josiah were affectionate and played together appropriately. In April 2018, David provided the Department with a certificate of completion for anger management classes dated
December 2014 and a “Progress L etter ” for “ domestic violence/anger management ” classes. The most recent
information show ed that David started a domestic violence

program o n February 2, 2018 and that he completed 10 out of 52 classes. In July 2018, David advised the Department that he would provide a certificate of completion once he completed the program, but he did not provide such a certificate. After the Department ask ed David when he was available to visit Josiah on July 11, 2018

, David visited Josiah on July 12, 2018. David apologized for not staying in contact with the Department. In accordance with section 361.5, subdivisions (10), (11),
and (13), the Department recommended that the juvenile court
not order reunification services for David or Karina and that the juvenile court schedule a selection and implementation hearing
under s ection 366.26.8 2. July 30, 2018 Hearing

At the disposition hearing on July 30, 2018, Josiah’s counsel submitted on the Department’s recommendation, adding : “Both Parents in this case have previously failed to reunify with other siblings and they went i nto permanent plans. [David]

, although he mentions some progress in domestic violence and some progress in parenting class, it doesn’t really seem like he’s made much further progress

. . . . [David’s] visitation with Josiah
is also not consistent. . . . O n quite a few of those visits [David]

was a no

- show or he cancelled the visit. Based on that, I am requesting that the court not offer reunification services and set a [section 366].26 hearing for Josiah.” T he juvenile court denied family reunification s ervices to Karina and David unde r section 361.5, subdivisions (b )(10)

, (11), and (13). In addition, because
Karina’s whereabouts remained unknown, the juvenile court also denied reunification services for Karina under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(1). The juvenile court found: “ T he few times when [David] has visited Josiah, they appear to be well bonded. [Josiah] has been
elated to see [David] and he is appropriate with [Josiah] . The
court does note that [David] works a lot of hours; that he’s only had about three visits since February 7 of this year and he has been unable to keep in touch with the social worker. [David has] been able to make progress on programs. The court notes . . . [David] had completed 10 of 52 domestic violence cla sses; however, it doesn’t appear that he has made sufficient progress to demonstrate to the court that he’s committed to reunifying, so the court is ordering [no reunification services] to [David].” T he juvenile court ordered Da vid’s monitored visits with Josiah to continue

. David did not attend the hearing. The juvenile court9

set the selection and implementation hearing (§ 366.26) for November 27, 2018.

D

. Selection and Implementation Hearing

1. August 2018

- October 2019 In December 2018, Karina contacted the Department and
stated that she wanted to visit Josiah. On December 21, 2018, representing herself, Karina filed a section 388 petition , stating,

“ I’m not perfect but I would like to be reunited with [Josiah].” The juvenile court, without holding a hearing, denied Karin a’s petition on January 2, 2019 because “the request does not state new evidence or a change of circumstances.” Th e section 388 petition was Karina’s only filing in the juvenile court.
Maria told the Department that she was not interested in adopting Josiah. In violation of the restraining order, Maria
allowed David in her home “ early in the morning and other
times

. ” Although t he Department report ed that David had “access to Josiah” in Maria’s home, the report did not provide any specific information. Cristal and Emmanuel, who had adopted Josiah’s three siblings, were committed to providing Josiah with a permanent home through adoption. They were “motivated to
ad opt [Josiah] to keep the siblings together.” The Department requested that the juvenile court vacate the existing “do not
remove order” for Josiah’s placement with Maria so that the Department could place Josiah with Cristal and Emmanuel

. On February 1, 2019, the Department removed Josiah from Maria’s
home and placed him with Cristal and Emmanuel

. After the juvenile court ordered notice by publication for Karina, the Department published notice of the section 366. 26 hearing.10 2. October 17, 2019 Hearing After several continuances to allow the Department to conduct further due diligence regarding Karina and perform permanency planning, the juvenile court held the selection and implementation hearing on October 17, 2019

. David’s counsel
made an or al request to continue the hearing. Counsel stated:

“ [David] has, in the last few moments, advised me and presented me with various certificates of completion for programs. I’m asking for a continuance to discuss the viability of a 388 with [David] . I’ m just receiving this information within the last five minutes. If the court proceeds today, it would be over my objection. ” After the Department ’s counsel and Josiah ’s counsel objected to the continuance request

, t he juvenile court denied
David’s reques t for a continuance because of the absence of good

cause. David’s counsel then requested a contested hearing. In response to the juvenile court ’s request for an offer of proof,
David ’s counsel stat ed

, “T he fact that since being released [from jail]

, [David] advised me that

. . . he has certificates of completion. He has completed a parenting program. He’s also made substantial progress in the domestic violence program. He
indicates to me that the care

- taker’s not allowed him to have

v isits.

. . . He does believe it would be in [Josiah’s] best interest to grant [David] a contested hearing to show that it would be in [Josiah’s] best interests to not sever his parental bond with [Josiah]

. ” Josiah’s counsel responded that David “ ha s not b een visiting” Josiah and that David, “if he wanted to have visits, he
could have contacted the social worker.” The juvenile court denied the request for a contested section 366.26 because David’s offer of proof did “ not meet the necessary criteria” and fa iled to11

discuss the “ specific issues ” to be addressed at the selection and implementation hearing. After finding that continued jurisdiction over Josiah was

necessary because the “conditions continue[d] to exist which justified jurisdiction under section 300
, t he juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that Josiah was adoptable. Finding that no exception to adoption applied and that it would
be detrimental f

o r Josiah to be returned to his parents , t he juvenile court terminated the parental r ights of David and
Karina

. The juvenile court transferred Josiah’s care, custody, and control to the Department for adoption planning and placement. The juvenile court designated Cristal and Emmanuel as the pro s pective adoptive parents and ordered adoption as the permanent plan.

E

. Karina’s Possible Indian Ancestry The Department’s efforts to locate Karina were
unsuccessful. In declaration s of due diligence filed on November 17, 2017, March 19, 2018

, March 20, 2019, and July 3, 2019, the Department summarized its efforts to loca te Karina. During the period November 2017 through April 2019, t he Department searched government agency databases

, including military, prison (state and federal), probation/parole, voter registration, postal service, child support, motor vehicle, and wel fare
databases. The Department also conducted internet and social
media searches. B ased on i t s investigation, on multiple occasions, the Department sent Karina various court documents
via certified mail to at least 15 different street addresses . The Department also re pe ated ly call ed at least nine different phone
numbers and sen t communications to several email addresses. Although Karina provided a mailing address and phone number12

on her section 388 petition in December 2018, the Department

was unable to contact her using that information.
In review ing the court files from the prior dependency proceedings

, t he Department located a court document from August 2013 that indicated “[Karina] may have Navajo [ancestry].” However, a ccording to the court records

, when the court ordered the adoptions of Josiah’s three siblings , the juvenile
court found that ICWA did not apply. During the se proceedings,
Karina also “ denied ” any Indian ancestry. The Department interviewed paternal fam ily members David, Maria and Cristal. David stated that Karina did not have Indian ancestry and that he “didn’t know ” any information about
Karina’s relatives. While Maria stated Karina’s children “ may have ” Indian ancestry, she had “no further informati on.” Maria
stated there was no Indian ancestry within her family. Cristal stated that “she is not a blood relation of [Karina]” and that she
did not have any “ information as to Indian [ ancestry ] for [Karina].” The Department attempted to contact Karina’s parents

. However, the Department was unsuccessful because i t could not obtain current contact information for them. The Department’s investigation did not identify any other relatives
for Karina. On the ICWA

- 030 form

, for Karina’s parents and
Karina under “Tribe or band

, ” the Department stated : “Navajo ; Unknown Location

, ” and for their “Tribal membership

, ” the Department stated: “Unknown .” The Department listed the full names for Karina’s parents, their dates of birth, a nd last known
addresses. On February 28, 2018, the Department sent via certified
mail the ICWA

- 030 form to
, and in March 2018 received certified mail receipts from, David ; the Secretary of the Interior ; the13

Western Regional Director, Bureau of Indian Aff airs ; the Southwest Regional Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs ; the Navajo Region, Bureau of Indian Affairs ; the Navajo Nation ; the
Colorado River Indian Tribes ; and the Ramah Navajo Tribe. The Navajo tribes, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Secretary of the Interior did not provide further information regarding Karina’s possible Indian ancestry or whether Josiah was an
Indian child. The Ramah Navajo T ribe stated they did not have

“ access to the entire Navajo Nation Census records and therefo re [ could ] not confirm or deny ” if Josiah or his parents were

“ enrolled or eligible members of the Navajo Nation. ” The Ramah Navajo T ribe stated that it would forward the notice to the

“ Navajo Nation ICWA Office. ” In a letter dated March 5, 2018,
the Bur eau of Indian Affairs, Navajo Regional Office stated, “The Notice(s) indicate[ ] that you have properly notified the Navajo Nation. Each tribe is responsible for determining whom they enroll.” (Boldface omitted.) In a letter dated March 14, 2018, the
Bu reau of Indian Affairs, Western Regional Office advised, “The Department notified the Navajo Tribes/Nation; therefore, no action or response is required.” (Boldface and underscoring omitted.) In a letter dated March 15 , 2018, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs , Southwest Regional office stated : “ Information indicates that the child’s tribal affiliation may be Navajo. The Notice indicates that the Navajo Nation and two affiliated tribes were
notified. Enclosed is contact information for tri bes affiliated with the Navajo N ation. The Bureau of Indian Affairs does not
research or determine tribal enrollment for tribes. No action is
taken .” After the Department filed all pertinent information a t a May 24, 2018 hearing, the juvenile court found that it “does not14

have a reason to know that [Josiah] is an Indian Child, as defined under ICWA, and does not order notice to any tribe or the [Bureau of Indian Affairs] . Parents are to keep the Department, their Attorney and the Court aware of any new information relating to possible ICWA status. ICWA

- 020, the Parental Notification of Indian Status is signed and filed.” 3

DISCUSSION

A. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discret ion in Denying David’s Request T o Continue the Hearing

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review The juvenile court has the power to “control all proceedings during the hearings with a view to the expeditious and effective ascertainment of the jurisdictional facts and the ascertainment of all information relative to the present condition and future welfare of the person upon whose behalf the petition is brought.” (§ 350, subd. (a)(1); see In re Emily D. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 438, 448.) As a general matter, “[c] ontinuance s are discouraged in dependency cases. ” ( In re Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th
594 , 604; accord

, In re Elijah V. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 576, 585.) “[T] he juvenile court has authority to grant brief, necessary
continuances that are not inconsistent wit h the child ’ s best interests, while giving ‘ substantial weight to a minor ’ s need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to

3 The Department’s reports state d that July 30, 2018 w as the date on which the juvenile court found that ICWA did not apply. Howe ver, the July 30, 2018 hearing transcript and minute order did not mention ICWA. A copy of the ICWA

- 020 form referenced in the May 24, 2018 minute order is not part of the record. An ICWA

- 020 form as to David, signed by David and filed on October 12, 201 7, is part of the record.15

provide children with stable environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary placements. ’ ” ( In re Abbigail A. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 83, 95; see § 352, subd. (a) (2) [“ [c] ontinuances shall be granted only upon a showing of good cause and only for that period of time shown to be necessary by the evidence presented at the hearing on the mo tion for the continuance” ] ; Cal.
R ule s of Court, r ule 5.550(a) (4) [ “[i] n order to obtain a continuance, written notice with supporting documents must be filed and served on all parties at least two court days before the date set for hearing, unless the cou rt finds good c ause for hearing
an oral motion” ].)

“ We review the juvenile court’s denial of a continuance for
abuse of discretion. ” ( In re D.Y. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1044, 1056; accord, In re Giovanni F.

, supra , 184 Cal.App.4th 594 ; In re Elijah V.

, su

pra , 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 585 ; In re A.B. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1366. )

2. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion David argues that the juvenile court erred in denying his request to continue the section 366.26 hearing so he could “consider the possibility of filing a section 388 petition.” David further argues, “If [he] had evidence that could support a section
388 petition, a comparable continuance would not have been contrary to Josiah’s interest.” The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying David’s request for a continuance. David had more than sufficient opportunity to bring to the juvenile cour t’s attention any information bearing on his ability to parent Josiah. After the Department filed the petition in October 2017, and the court denied David and Karina reunification services in July 2018, the16

juvenile court set the section 366.26 hearing fo r November 2018. After several continuances, the section 366.26 hearing took place in October 2019, almost one year later. Despite the passage of almost two years since the Department filed the petition, David only raised the “possibility” of filing a se ction 388 petition at the section 366.26 hearing. David did not explain why he waited until moments before the hearing to discuss a section 388 petition with his counsel. In support of the continuance request, David also failed to state that he was going to file a section 388 petition, that he had sufficient evidence to support such a petition, or that
a continuance was consistent with Josiah’s best interest s

. David’s possible section 388 petition failed to qualify as good cause necessary for a continuan ce. 4 Under these circumstances, the juvenile court acted well within its discretion in denying David’s request for a continuance
of the selection and implementation hearing.

B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying David a Contested H earing

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review “The section 366.26 hearing is a critical late stage in a dependency proceeding. The child has been under juvenile court jurisdiction for an extended period following the dispositional order, and the court h as held one or more review hearings to consider a return to parental custody. [Citation.] At the section 366.26 hearing, the focus shifts away from family reunification and toward the selection and implementation of a permanent

4 David contends he requested a three

- day continuance. However, according to the hearing transcript, David’s counsel did not specify a length of time for the continuance.17

plan for the child. [Cita tion.] .

. . If adoption is likely, the court is required to terminate parental rights, unless specified circumstances compel a finding that termination would be
detrimental to the child.” ( In re S.B. ( 2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 532 ;

see In re Noah G. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1299 [“‘ [w] henever the court finds “that it is likely the child will be adopted, the court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption.”’”].) “One exception to adoption is the beneficial parental relationship exception. This exception is set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) which states: ‘[T]he court shall terminate parental rights unless either of the following applies:

. . . . [¶] (B) The court finds a compelling reason for determining
that termination would be detrimental to the child due to one or
more of the followi ng circumstances: [¶] (i) The parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.’” ( In re Noah G., supra , 247 Cal.App. 4th at p. 1300 .) “Application of the beneficial parent

- child relationship exception consists of a two

prong analysis. [Citation.] The first prong inquires whether there has been regular visitation and contact between the parent
and child. [Citation.] The second asks whether there is a sufficiently strong bond between the parent and child that the
child would suffer detriment from its termination. [Citation.] [¶] The first prong is quantitative and relatively straightforward, asking whether visitation occurred regularly and often. [Citation.] [¶] In contrast, the second prong involves a qualitative, more nuanced analysis, and cannot be assessed by merely looking at whether an event, i.e. visitation, occurred. Rather, the second prong requires a paren t to prove that the bond18

between the parent and child is sufficiently strong that the child
would suffer detriment from its termination. [Citation.] In applying this exception, the court must take into account numerous variables, including but not limite d to (1) the age of the child, (2) the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, (3) the “‘positive’” or “‘negative’” effect of interaction between parent and child, and (4) the child’s unique needs.” ( In re Grace P. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 605, 612

- 613 .) “The [parent] has the burden of proving [his or] her relationship with the children would outweigh the well

- being they would gain in a permanent home with an adoptive parent. [Citations.] Evidence of frequent and loving contact is not enough to establish a beneficial parental relationship. [Citations.] The [parent] also must show [he or] she occupies a parental role in the children’s lives.” ( In re Noah G.

, supra , 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1300 ; see In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614,
621 [“ [n] o matter how loving and frequent the contact, and notwithstanding the existe nce of an ‘emotional bond’ with the child, ‘the parents must show that they occupy “a parental role” in the child’s life’”]; In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 55 7 [“‘ [w] here a biological parent .

. . is incapable of functioning in that role, the child should be given every opportunity to bond with an individual who will assume the role of a parent’”]; In re
Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4t h 567, 577 [severing the relationship between the parent and the child was not “detrimental to [the child] because the relationship was one of friends, not of parent and child”].) “Parents can request a contested hearing .

. . to present evidence support ing their claim that an exception to termination of parental rights exists.” ( In re Grace P.

, supra , 8 Cal.App.5th at19

p. 611 .) “A parent has a right to due process at a section 366.26 hearing resulting in the termination of parental rights, which includes a meaningful opportunity to be heard, present evidence,
and confront witnesses. However, these procedural rights are subject to evidentiary principles.

. . . Since due process does not authorize a par ent ‘to introduce irrelevant evidence, due process does not require a court to hold a contested hearing if it is not convinced the parent will present relevant evidence on the issue he or she seeks to contest.’ .

. . The parent’s offer of proof ‘must be

sp ecific, setting forth the actual evidence to be produced, not merely the facts or issues to be addressed and argued.’” ( Id. at pp. 611

- 612 ; see In re A.G. (2020 ) 58 Cal.App. 5th 973, 1006 [“ a parent asse rting an exception to adoption at a 366.26 hearing is not automatically entitled to a hearing, and the juvenile court may require him or her to make an offer of proof demonstrating that the parent will present specific evidence t o support the claimed excep tion”] ; M.T. v. Superior Court (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1180 [offer of proof permissible at section 366.26 hearing because parent had burden to show applicability of an exception to termination of parental rights]; In re
Thomas R. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 726, 732 [ “[p]recluding the parents from exploring and testing the sufficiency of the Department’s evidence is fundamentally different than requiring them to describe evidence they will offer to prove a point”]; In re
Tamika T. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 11 14 , 1122 [the “due process right to present evidence is limited to relevant evidence of significant probative value to the issue before the court” ( italics
omitted )] .) We review the juvenile court’s denial of a co ntested hearing
for abuse of discretion. ( In re Grace P., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at20

p. 611; In re A.B. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1420, 1434 ; Ingrid E. v

. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 751, 758

- 759 .)

2. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying a Contested Hearing

David contends the juvenile court abused its d iscretion by denying his request for a contested hearing on the applicatio n of the beneficial parent al relationship exception under section
366.26 , subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). The Department contends that David’s “offer of proof was insufficient to warrant a contested hearing.” The juvenile court reasonably concluded that David’s offer of proof was deficient. The juvenile court detained Josiah from David and ordered
David’s visitation with Josiah to be monitored at the Department’s office. After the criminal court issued a 10

- year restraining order against David protecting Maria in November 2015, David went to jail in part because he violated the restraining order in July 20 17. Nonetheless, David argues that he “continued to see” Josiah while David “ was living ” with Maria,

“ [t]hough this was not how [David] was supposed to have contact
with Josiah. ” However, aside from David’s violations of court orders, David’s offer of pr oof failed to mention that he had lived
with Maria and Josiah. Thus, David’s offer of proof did not set forth actual evidence as to how long David claimed that he lived with Josiah, how often David saw Josiah given David’s work schedule, or any other info rmation regarding their time together. Further, other than several brief references in the Department’s reports that Maria had allow ed David “access to Josiah ” in her home, there was no information regarding David’s contact with
Josiah in Maria’s home. T he evidence established that, from November 28, 2017 to the October 2019 section 366.26 hearing,21

David visited Josiah four times; with his last visit on July 12,
2018. In his offer of proof, David did not set forth evidence that
he had maintained regula r visitation and contact with Josiah. Rather, David sought to explain why he had not visited Josiah at least since February 1, 2019 when the Department removed Josiah from Maria’s home and placed him with Cristal and Emmanuel. David did not explain why h e was dealing with Cristal to arrange visits and not following the juvenile court’s order for monitored visitation at the Department’s office. In July 2019, when the Department reported that David “agreed” to call
the social worker “to schedule his visits ,” David did not mention that there was any impediment to his visitation. Because David failed to state with specificity the evidence he would produce in a contested hearing to meet the first requirement of the beneficial parent

- child relationship excepti on, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying David’s request for a contested hearing. ( In re A.G. , supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 1010 [“[a] parent’s failure to set forth specific evidence, especially with a record negating the parent’s reg ular visitation of the minor, will justify the denial of a hearing”]; see In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 6 3 6
, 647 [juvenile court’s decision may be based on “any or all of the component determinations” of the beneficial
parent

- child relationship] ; In re Marcelo B. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635, 643 [‘“[s]pordic visit ation is insufficient’”].)
F urther, David ’s offer of proof did not include evidence on the strength of h is bond with Josiah, the kind of role he assumed
in h is li f e (as a parent, friend, o r otherwise), whether Josiah
considered David his father, or how Josiah would suffer if the juvenile court terminated David’s parental rights. D avid’s vague22

and general reference to Josiah’s “best interest s ” gave no information about any impact of termina tion of David’s parental rights on Josiah

. The same is true for the statement that David had “ certificates of completion .” ( In re A.G. , supra , 58 Cal. App.5th at p . 1006 [“ [i] t may be readily concluded that, for example, an offer of proof containing the a ssertion of the fact that the parent had a close parent

- child bond with the minor

− without identification of a witness or witnesses who would so testify to
that fact

− would not be sufficient ”] ; see In re Tamika T.

, supra , 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 112 4 [“[t]he offer of proof must be specific, setting forth the actual evidence to be produced”]; cf. In re
Grace P.

, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 614 [father’s offer of proof was sufficient where he represented that he would testify “about the positive quality of his visitation, how he parented all three children during visits,” and how “the children considered him to be a father figure” and that his daughter wo uld testify “regarding how she enjoyed visits with [him], saw [him] as a parent, and would be sad if visitation with [him] ended”].)
Because he had the burden of proving the parent

- child relationship exception applied, David was obligated to state wi th specificity the evidence he would produce in a contested hearing. ( In re A.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 996 [“ [t] he burden is on the parent asserting the parental relationship exception to produce evidence establishing that exception ”]; In re Grace P.

, supra , 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 611 [“[i]f the parents have failed to reunify and the court has found the child likely to be adopted, the burden shifts to the parents to show exceptional circumstances
exi st such that termination would be detrimental to the child”];
In re Breanna S.

, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 646 [“[t]he parent has the burden of proving the statutory exception applies”];23

In re K.P.

, supra , 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 621 [same]; see In re
Cristel la C. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1372

- 1373 [“[u]nder [section 366.26] there is no requirement that an absence of benefit from continuing the [parent

- child] relationship be proved as an element of termination”].) The juvenile court acted within its discreti on in denying David’s request for a contested section 366.26 hearing. ( See generally In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 [“[i]n any custody determination, a primary consideration in determining the child’s best interests is the goal of assuring s tability and continuity”]; In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307 [once reunification efforts have been found unsuccessful, the court then must “concentrate its efforts .

. . on the child’s placement and
well

- being, rather than on a parent’s challenge to a custody order”] ; Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 250, 259 [when the child is adoptable and declining to apply one of the statutory exceptions would not cause detriment to the child, the
decision to terminate parental rights is “‘rel atively automatic’ ”].)

C. Substantial Evidence Support ed the Juvenile Court’s ICWA Finding s as to Karina

1. Applicable Law

a. ICWA i nquiry requirements
“ICWA established minimum standards for state courts to follow before removing Indian children from their families and placing them in foster care or adoptive homes.” ( In re D.S. (2020)
46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1048.) Under ICWA and the California law implem enting it, “‘Indian child’ means any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe

. ” (25 U.S.C.24

§ 19 03(4); see § 224.1, subd. (a) [adopting the federal definition] ; In re D.S. , at p. 1048 [“[a] n ‘ Indian child ’ is defined in the same

manner [under California law] as under federal law ”].) “ICWA itself does not impose a duty on courts or child
welfare a gencies to inquire as to whether a child in a dependency proceeding is an Indian child. [Citation.] Federal regulations implementing ICWA, however, require that state courts ‘ask each participant in an emergency or voluntary or involuntary child

custody proceeding whether the participant knows or has reason
to know that the child is an Indian child.’ [Citation.] The court must also ‘instruct the parties to inform the court if they subsequently receive information that provides reason to know
the child i s an Indian child.’” ( In re Austin J. (2020) 47
C al.App.5th 870, 882

- 883; see 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a).) In addition, “ICWA provides that states may provide ‘a higher standard of protection to the rights of the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian child than the rights provided under’
ICWA. (25 U.S.C. § 1921.) Under California law, the court and county c hild welfare department ‘have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child,’ who is the subject of a juvenile dependency petition, ‘is or may be an Indian child.’ (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see . . . Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a).) The
ch ild welfare department ’ s initial duty of inquiry includes ‘asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or
Indian custodian is domiciled.’ (§ 224.2, subd. (b).)” ( In re
A ustin J.

, supra , 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 883 ; accord

, In re T.G. (2020 ) 58 Cal.App.5th 275 ; In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558

,25

566; In re D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1049 .) 5 “California law also requires ‘further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child’ when ‘the court, social worker, or probation officer has reason to believe that an Indian child is involved [or, under Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4), “may be involved”] in a proceeding

. . . . ’ (§ 224.2, subd. (e). ” ) ( In re
Austin J.

, supra , 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 883 .) Former section 224.2, subdivision (e), which is applicable to this appeal, did not define “reason to believe.” ( In re Austin J. , at p. 883 [t he “ Legislature, which added the ‘reason to believe’ threshold for making a further inquiry in 2018, [had] not define [d] the phrase ” ].) 6 “W hen

5 Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature repeale d sections 224.2 and 224.3 and enacted new versions of those statutes. ( Assem. Bill No. 3176 (2017

- 2018 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2018, ch. 833, §§ 5, 7.) Although the juvenile court made the ICWA findings regarding Karina in May 2018, t he law in effect in Oct ober 2019 when the section 366.26 hearings were held applies to th is appeal. (See In re A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 303, 321 [“[s]ince Mother is appealing from the findings made at the September 6, 2019 s ection 366.26 hearing and not those in 2017 or 2018, the current ICWA statutes apply”]; see also Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1

, 10 [“ P roperly understood, Ashlee’s present appeal does not seek to challenge the juvenile court’s finding of ICWA’s inapplicability underlying the January 2012 dispositional order. It instead seeks to challenge the juvenile court’s finding of ICWA’s inapplicabi lity underlying the April 2013 order terminating her parental rights”].)

6 The Legislature, however, has since amended section 224.2, subdivision (e), effective September 18, 2020, to provide a definition. (Assem. Bill No. 2944 (2019

- 2020 Reg

. Sess. ) ; St ats. 2020, ch. 104, § 15

. ) As amended, the statute now provides:

“ There is reason to believe a child involved in a proceeding is an Indian child whenever the court, social worker, or probation26

that [‘reason to believe’] threshold is reached, the requisite ‘further inquiry’ ‘includes: (1) interv iewing the parents and extended family members; (2) contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs and State Department of Social Services; and (3) contacting tribes the child may be affiliated with, and anyone else, that might have information regarding the chil d ’ s membership or eligibility in a tribe.’” ( Ibid. ; see § 224.2, subd s

. (e)(2)(A)

- (C); former § 224.2, subd s

. (e)(1)

- (3).) “C ontact with a tribe shall, at a minimum, include telephone, facsimile, or
electronic mail contact to each tribe ’ s designated agen t for receipt
of notices under ” ICWA and “ shall include sharing information identified by the tribe as necessary for the tribe to make a membership or eligibility determination, as well as information
on the current status of the child and the case. ” ( § 2 24.2,
subd. (e)(2)(C) ; see former § 224.2, subd. (e)(3) )

. Notably, “ [t] he sharing of information with tribes at this inquiry stage is distinct

officer has information suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child is a member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe. Information suggesting membership or eligibility for membership includes, but is not limited to, information that indicates, but does not establish, the existence of one or more of the grounds for reason to know [that a child is an Indian child] enumerated in paragraphs (1) to (6), inclusive, of subdivision (d). ” ( § 224.2, subd.(e)(1).) E ffective January 1, 2020, California Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4)

, now provi des: “If the social worker .

. . or petitioner knows or has reason to know or believe that an Indian child is or may be involved, that person or entity must make further inquiry as soon as practicable .

. . . ” ( E mphasis added

. ) Notwithstanding these ame ndments, we refer in our opinion to section 242, subdivision (e), and California Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4) as they read in October 2019 when the section 366.26 hearing took place.27

from formal ICWA notice, which requires a ‘reason to
know’

― rather than a ‘reason to believe’

— that the child is an Indian child.” ( In re D.S.

, supra , 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1049 .)

b. ICWA n otice r equirements “In addition to the inquiry that is required in every dependency case from the outset and the ‘further inquiry’ required under California law when there is a ‘reason to believe’ an Indian child is [or may be] involved, a third step

— notice to
Indian tribes

— is required under ICWA and California law if and when ‘the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child
is involved.’” ( In re A ustin J.

, supra , 4 7 Cal.App.5th at pp. 883

- 884; see 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); § 224.3, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(b)(1) ; see also In re D.S.

, supra , 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1050 [“ If the inquiry establishes a reason to know an Indian child is involved, notice must b e provided to the pertinent
tribes. ”].)
A “ ‘ reason to know ’ exists under any of the following
circumstances: ‘ (1) A person having an interest in the child, including the child, an officer of the court, a tribe, an Indian organization, a public or private agency, or a member of the
child ’ s extended family informs the court that the child is an
Indian child [ ; ] [¶] (2) The residence or domicile of the child, the
child ’ s parents, or Indian custodian is on a reservation or in an Alaska Native village [ ; ] [¶] (3) Any participant in the proceeding, officer of the court, Indian tribe, Indian organization, or agency informs the court that it has discovered information indicating
that the child is an Indian child [ ; ] [¶] (4) The child who is the subject of the proce eding gives the court reason to know [ he or
she ] is an Indian child [ ; ] [¶] (5) The court is informed that the
child is or has be en a ward of a tribal court[;] and [¶] (6) The28

court is informed that either parent or the child possess an
identification card indicating membership or citizenship in an
Indian tribe. ’ (§ 224.2, subd. (d)

. ) ” ( In re D.S.

, supra , 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1049

- 1050 .) Notice to a tribe “ must include enough information for the
tribe to ‘c onduct a meaningful review of its records to det ermine
the child ’ s eligibility for membership .’ ” ( In re D.S.

, supra , 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1050 ; see In re Cheyanne F. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 571, 576 [“ [t] he purpose of the ICWA notice provisions is to enable the tribe or the [Bureau of Indian Affairs]

to investigate and determine whether the child is in fact an
Indian child ”].) This includes providing “ identifying information
for the child ’ s biological parents, grandparents, and great

grandparents, to the extent known .” ( In re D.S. , at p. 1050; see § 224.3, subd. (a)(5)(C). ) “ A determination by an Indian tribe that a child is or is not a member of, or eligible for membership in,
that tribe

. . . shall be conclusive. ” ( § 224.2, subd. (h).)
To summarize: A n initial “duty of inquir y applies to every ‘child for whom a petition under Section 300, 601, or 6 02 may be or has been filed’ (§ 224.2, subd. (a)),” the “duty of further inquiry applies when there is a ‘reason to believe that an Indian child is involved [or, under Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4), “ may be
involved ” ] in a proceeding’ (§ 224.2, subd. (e)),” and “the duty to provide notice to Indian tribes applies only when one knows or has a ‘reason to know

. . . an Indian child is involved.’” ( In re
A ustin J.

, supra , 47 Cal. App.5th at p. 884 ; see In re M.W. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 1034, 1047 [“ a ‘reason to believe’ the minor is an Indian child triggers requirements less rigorous than does a ‘reason to know’ ”].)29 2. Standard of Review Where, as here, the juvenile court finds ICW A does not apply to a child, 7 “[t]he finding implies tha t . . . social workers
and the court did not know or have a reason to know the children
were Indian children and that social workers had fulfilled their duty of inquiry. ” ( In re A ustin J.

, supra , 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 885 ;

see In re D.S.

, supra , 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1050 [“ [t] he juvenile court may

. . . make a finding that ICWA does not apply because the Agency ’ s further inquiry and due diligence was ‘ proper and adequate ’ but no ‘ reason to kn ow ’ whether the child is an Indian
child was discovered ”].) “ We review a court ’ s ICWA findings for
substantial evidence. [Citations.] ‘We must uphold the court ’ s orders and findings if any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports t hem, and we resolve all conflicts in favor of affirmance.’” ( In re A ustin J. , at p. 885.) The appellant “‘has the burden to show that the evidence was not sufficient to support the findings and orders.’” ( Ibid. )

3. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juv enile Court’s ICWA Finding David argues, “ D espite the duty of continuing inquiry, [the Department] did not inquire about [Karina’s] ancestry” when Karina “appeared” to file her section 388 petition. David also argues that the “[Department] continued to ci te the [incorrect] July [2018] hearing as resolving the issue.”

7 W e construe the juvenile court’s finding at the May 2018 hearing it did “not have a reason to know ” Josiah was an Indian child as a finding ICWA did not apply. (See In re D.S.

, supra , 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1050 .)30 David ’s argument that the Department failed to inquire when Karina appeared to file the section 388 petition in
December 2018 is incorrect

. T he Department’s due diligence efforts included inquiry regarding the address and telephone number Karina listed on her section 388 petition. The Department spoke with the mother of Karina’s former boyfriend, who resided at the address Karina provided. The former boyfriend’s mother st ated that, when Karina and her son “separated[, Karina] moved out of her house and has not been back since.” In addition, the Department twice called the telephone number Karina listed on her section 388 petition and left voicemail messages “requesting a call back.” Further, although David characterizes Karina as “appear[ing]” when she filed her petition, there was no appearance because the juvenile court denied Karina’s petition without a hearing. Karina did not attend a hearing in court. David fails t o identify what else the Department could have done to locate Karina or further investigate her possible Indian ancestry. During its investigation, the Department located a document from the prior dependency proceedings indicating that Karina “may have N avajo [ancestry],” and Maria told the Department that Karina’s “children may have Indian [ancestry].”
To the extent that this information constituted “reason to believe that an Indian child is [or may be] involved,” the Department
conducted a n adequate a nd proper “further inquiry” under section 224.2, subdivision (e). (See In re T.G., supra

, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 295 [ “ [a] dditional investigation may not develop further information establishing the need for ICWA notice, but it
is essential to the enforceme nt of the court’s and child protective agency’s ‘ affirmative and continuing duty to inquire ’ to construe31

broadly t he duty to make further inquiry ]; In re M.W. , supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 1044 [father’s statement he may have Indian ancestry even though he could not identify the tribe, “trigger[ed] the provisions of section 224.2, subdivision (e), which required the court and the Department to make further inquiry as soon as practicable”]; In re D.S.

, supra , 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1052 [aunt’s statement of pos sible Indian ancestry established a reason to believe the child was an Indian child and triggered a duty of further inquiry].) In addition to its extensive search for Karina, t he Department attempted to contact Karina’s parents using their
last known con tact information and searched databases for updated contact information. Despite its efforts, the Department
could not locate Karina’s relatives. The Department also
interviewed David, and Cristal, who adopted three of Karina’s
children. David stated that Karina did not have Indian ancestry.
Cristal had no relevant information. In accordance with section 224.2, subdivision (e), the Department sent the ICWA

- 030 form
via certified mail to three Navajo tribes , th r e e Regional Directors
of the Bur eau of Indian Affairs, and the Secretary of the Interior

,

n one responded that Karina had Indian ancestry or that Josiah
was an Indian child . The Department also learned that Karina, in the prior dependency proceedings involving Josiah’s siblings,
denied s he had Indian ancestry

, and the juvenile court found ICWA did not apply. In addition to reporting the results of its investigation to the juvenile court, the Department filed the notices, the receipts of notice and the responsive letters in court
before t he juvenile court made its May 2018 ICWA determination32

as to Karina. 8 To the extent required, the Department conducted an adequate and proper “ further inquiry ” under section 224.2, subdivision (e). (See In re D

. F. , supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 570 [“[b] a sed on the record before us, we find [the Department] made a good faith effort to gather information about the children’s membership status or eligibility. [The Department’s] inquiry obligation is ‘ not an absolute duty to ascertain or re fute Native American ancestry ’” ] ; In re D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1054 [“ the Agency followed the proper procedures in conducting its further inquiry, but the limited information provided by Aunt was too attenuated for the Agency to do anything further ”]

. )
Subs tantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding s that there was “no reason to know” that Josiah was an Indian child and that ICWA did not apply. ( In re D

. F. , supra , 55 Cal.App.5th at pp. 571

- 572 [“ DCFS’s further inquiry did not
result in a reason to know the children are Indian children. We conclude the court’s finding that ICWA does not apply to the
children is su pported by substantial evidence” ]; In re M.W.

, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 1048 [“ [t]he Department satisfied the
criteria set forth in section 224.2, subdivision (e) and the juvenile court’s finding that, based on the evidence provided, there was no
reason to know the minor was an Indian child and no further noticing was required, and its determination that the ICWA did not apply were sup ported by substantial evidence ”].)

8 The Department’s incorrect references in its report s that the juvenile court ma de this finding in July 2018 w ere irrelevant because the juvenile court had the results of the Department’s ICWA investigation at the May 2018 hearing.33 DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s October 17 , 2019 order is affirmed.

DILLON, J. *

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

SEGAL, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.