[Cite as State v. Page, 2016-Ohio-7326.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

CHAMPAIGN COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

JORDAN H. PAGE 

Defendant-Appellant

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C.A. CASE NO. 2015-CA-27 

T.C. NO. 12CR13 

(Criminal appeal from 

 Common Pleas Court) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the ___14th___ day of _____October_____, 2016. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

KEVIN TALEBI, Atty. Reg. No. 0069198, Prosecutor’s Office, 200 N. Main Street, Urbana, 

Ohio 43078 

 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

LORI R. CICERO, Atty. Reg. No. 0079508, 500 E. Fifth Street, Dayton, Ohio 45402 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

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DONOVAN, P.J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Jordan H. Page appeals a decision of the Champaign 

County Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division, revoking his community control for 

violations of his community control as a result of a positive marijuana test in a separate 

case in Franklin County, Ohio, Case No. 2011 CR 6511. The trial court sentenced Page 

to seventeen months in jail, to be served concurrently to the sentence he was serving 
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from Franklin County. Page’s appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and now seeks leave to 

withdraw as counsel. 

FACTS and PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶ 2} On January 5, 2012, Page was indicted in Champaign County Common 

Pleas Court for two counts of breaking and entering, in violation of R.C. 2911.13(A)(C), 

both felonies of the fifth degree; three counts of theft, in violation of R.C. 

2913.02(A)(1)(B)(2), all felonies of the fifth degree; one count of safecracking, in violation 

of R.C. 2911.31(A), a felony of the fourth degree; and criminal damaging, in violation of 

R.C. 2909.06(A), a misdemeanor of the second degree. 

{¶ 3} On April 17, 2012, Page pled guilty to one count each of breaking and 

entering, safecracking, and theft. In return for Page’s pleas, the State agreed to dismiss 

the remaining counts in the indictment. After accepting Page's guilty pleas, the trial court 

referred the matter for a presentence investigation report (“PSI”). 

{¶ 4} At the sentencing hearing held on June 25, 2012, the trial court sentenced 

Page to three years of community control sanctions. The trial court also ordered Page 

to complete the West Central Program, fined him $300.00, and ordered him to pay 

$2,500.00 in restitution. Thereafter, on June 5, 2014, an order was issued suspending 

Page’s community control, and a probable cause hearing was held before the trial court 

on November 19, 2014. On November 21, 2014, the trial court issued a journal entry 

extending Page’s community control until December 26, 2015. 

{¶ 5} On July 15, 2015, the Champaign County Probation Department filed a notice 

of supervision violation against Page. A revocation hearing was held before the trial 
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court on August 7, 2015. Specifically, Page tested positive for marijuana while under 

supervision in Franklin County and was found in violation of that court’s community control 

sanctions. The trial court in Franklin County revoked his community control and imposed 

sentence. Based on his rule violations in Franklin County (which violated the terms of 

Champaign County supervision as well), the trial court revoked Page’s community control 

and sentenced him to seventeen months in jail to be served concurrently to the sentence 

he was serving in Case No. 2011 CR 6511 in Franklin County. The trial court also noted 

that Page remains liable for the payment of any court costs, fines, restitution, and courtappointed legal fees that were imposed in his judgment entry of conviction when he was 

originally sentenced to community control in June of 2012. 

{¶ 6} Based on the belief that no prejudicial error occurred below and that any 

grounds for appeal would be frivolous, Page’s appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw 

pursuant to Anders, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493. 

ANDERS STANDARD 

{¶ 7} Anders outlines the procedure counsel must follow to withdraw as counsel 

due to the lack of any meritorious grounds for appeal. In Anders, the United States 

Supreme Court held that if appointed counsel, after a conscientious examination of the 

case, determines the appeal to be wholly frivolous, he or she should advise the court of 

that fact and request permission to withdraw. Anders at 744. This request, however, 

must be accompanied by a brief identifying anything in the record that could arguably 

support the appeal. Id. Further, counsel must also furnish the client with a copy of 

the brief, and allow the client sufficient time to file his or her own brief, pro se. Id.

{¶ 8} Once the appellant's counsel satisfies these requirements, this court must 
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fully examine the proceedings below to determine if any arguably meritorious issues 

exist. Id. If we determine that the appeal is wholly frivolous, we may grant counsel's 

request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal without violating constitutional requirements, 

or we may proceed to a decision on the merits if state law so requires. Id. 

{¶ 9} In this case, appointed counsel fully complied with the requirements 

of Anders, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493. Page has failed to file a pro 

se brief. 

{¶ 10} Page’s appointed counsel states in her Anders brief that she extensively 

reviewed the record, including the transcript of the proceedings, and concluded she could 

not make any meritorious arguments on Page's behalf. Nevertheless, counsel presents 

the following potential assignment of error as follows: 

{¶ 11} “MR. PAGE’S [SEVENTEEN] MONTH PRISON SENTENCE IS CLEARLY 

AND CONVINCINGLY CONTRARY TO LAW AND AN ABUSE OF THE TRIAL COURT’S 

DISCRETION.” 

{¶ 12} In his sole potential assignment, appointed counsel contends that the trial 

court’s decision to sentence Page to seventeen months in jail is contrary to law and an 

abuse of discretion. 

{¶ 13} A trial court has discretion to impose a prison sentence that is within the 

statutory range. State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54, 2006–Ohio–855, 846 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 37. 

But in exercising that discretion, the trial court must “carefully consider” the statutory 

sentencing guidelines set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, as well as the “statutes that 

are specific to the case itself.” Id. at ¶ 38. A reviewing court will reverse a sentence only 

if it determines “by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the 
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trial court's findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to 

law.” State v. Marcum, Ohio Sup. Ct. Slip Opinion No. 2016–Ohio–1002. Significantly, 

the Marcum court also held “that appellate courts may not apply the abuse-of-discretion 

standard in sentencing-term challenges.” Id. at ¶ 10. 

{¶ 14} In the case at bar, the trial court imposed a sentence within the permissible 

statutory range, and the trial court ordered the seventeen month sentence to run 

concurrently with the sentence that had been imposed in Franklin County. Further, this 

court has consistently recognized that a sentencing court complies with its mandatory 

duty to consider the sentencing factors of R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 if its sentencing 

entry states that it has considered those factors. State v. Battle, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2014 

CA 5, 2014–Ohio–4502, ¶ 15, citing State v. Miller, 2d Dist. Clark No. 09–CA–28, 2010–

Ohio–2138, ¶ 43. Here, the trial court's judgment entry of conviction not only indicates 

that it considered the sentencing factors contained in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12, 

but the trial court expressly stated as much in open court during the sentencing hearing. 

{¶ 15} In sum we are unable to find “by clear and convincing evidence that the 

record does not support the sentence,” Marcum at ¶ 23, and the sentence is 

not contrary to law. 

CONCLUSION 

{¶ 16} Pursuant to our responsibilities under Anders, we have conducted an 

independent review of the entire record, including the pre-sentence investigation 

report. Having done so, we agree with the assessment of appointed counsel that there 

are no arguably meritorious issues to present on appeal. 

{¶ 17} Therefore, no potential assignments of error with arguable merit having 
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been found, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

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FAIN, J. and HALL, J., concur. 

Copies mailed to: 

Kevin Talebi 

Lori R. Cicero 

Jordan H. Page 

Hon. Nick A. Selvaggio