alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Order entered May 9 , 2013

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 12

- 01 51 6

- CR No. 05

- 12

- 01 51 7

- CR

KELLY MACK LAMBETH , Appellant

V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 219th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No s . 219

- 80060

- 2012, 219

- 80495

- 2012



### O RDER

The Court REINSTATE S the appeals. On April 23, 2013, we ordered the trial court to make findings regarding why appellant’s
brief has not been filed. We ADOPT the findings that: (1) appe llant desires to pursue the appeals; (2) appellant is indigent and represented by court

- appointed counsel Tim Avery; (3) Mr. Avery explained the family matters caused the delay in filing appellant’s brief; and (4) Mr. Avery indicated he could file appellan t’s brief within forty

- five days of the May 2, 2013 hearing.
We ORDER appellant to file his brief by JUNE 14, 2013

. We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order, by electronic transmission, to counsel for all parties.
/s/ DAVID EVANS
JUSTICE
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II 

Calendar No. 661 

109TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 3994 

To extend the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 29, 2006 

Mr. REID introduced the following bill 

SEPTEMBER 30 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 29), 2006 

Read the first time 

NOVEMBER 13, 2006 

Read the second time and placed on the calendar 

A BILL 

To extend the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 Section 13(b) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act 

4 of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by striking 

5 ‘‘on September 29, 2006’’ and inserting ‘‘on November 17, 

6 2006’’. 


bajohnson on PROD1PC77 with BILLS
Calendar No. 661 

109TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 3994 

A BILL 

To extend the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 

1996. 

NOVEMBER 13, 2006 

Read the second time and placed on the calendar 


bajohnson on PROD1PC77 with BILLS
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATIONOF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICERPURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

I, Carlton H. Baab, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, asadopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, thatthe Quarterly Report of Raining Data Corporation on Form 10-QSB for thequarterly period ended September 30, 2006 fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of1934 and that information contained in such Form 10-QSB fairly presents inall material respects the financial condition and results of operations ofRaining Data Corporation.
|        |   | By:    |   | /s/ Carlton H. Baab                   |   |
|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------------------------------------|--------|
|   |   | Name:  |   | Carlton H. Baab                       |
|   |   | Title: |   | President and Chief Executive Officer |

I, Thomas Lim, certify,pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Reportof Raining Data Corporation on Form 10-QSB for the quarterly period endedSeptember 30, 2006 fully complies with the requirements ofSection 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and thatinformation contained in such Form 10-QSB fairly presents in all materialrespects the financial condition and results of operations of Raining DataCorporation.
|        |   | By:    |   | /s/ Thomas Lim          |   |
|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------------------------|--------|
|   |   | Name:  |   | Thomas Lim              |
|   |   | Title: |   | Chief Financial Officer |

 

----
*Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under

the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 95-50841

Summary Calendar

__________________

ANITA SANCHEZ,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant - Appellee.

______________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Texas

(94-CV-881)

______________________________________________

 April 30, 1996

Before SMITH, BENAVIDES and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:*

In this case for wrongful delay or denial of worker's

compensation benefits, Anita Sanchez appeals from a summary

judgment granted in favor of the insurer on limitations grounds.

We affirm.

Sanchez was injured on May 13, 1990. Liberty Mutual Life

Insurance Company denied payment of worker's compensation benefits

on August 23, 1990. Sanchez appealed and ultimately settled with
2

Liberty Mutual. On August 30, 1994, over four years after the

initial denial of coverage, Sanchez sued Liberty Mutual alleging:

1) breach of good faith and fair dealing, 2) negligence, 3) gross

negligence, 4) intentional infliction of emotional distress, 5)

violations of the Texas Insurance Code, and 6) violations of the

Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The district court granted

summary judgment to Liberty Mutual because all claims were barred

by the statute of limitations. 

We review a summary judgment under well-established standards.

Blakeney v. Lomas Info. Sys., Inc., 65 F.3d 482, 484 (5th Cir.

1995); see Sterling Property Management, Inc. v. Texas Commerce

Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 32 F.3d 964, 966 (5th Cir. 1994). We affirm for

the following reasons:

1. The good faith and fair dealing claim is controlled by a

two-year statute of limitations. Murray v. San Jacinto Agency,

Inc., 800 S.W.2d 826, 827 (Tex. 1990). Limitations on this claim

began to run when Liberty Mutual denied coverage. See id. at 828;

Davis v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 843 S.W.2d 777, 778 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 1992, no writ); see also Burton v. State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co., 869 F. Supp. 480, 484 (S.D. Tex. 1994), aff'd, 66

F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 1995). The claim is thus time-barred.

2. Similarly, the negligence, gross negligence, and

intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are governed by

a two-year limitations period. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §

16.003 (West 1986). These claims accrued when Sanchez was

allegedly injured. Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18, 19 (Tex.

1977). This occurred when Liberty Mutual denied coverage. Hence,
3

these tort claims are time-barred.

3. The statutory claims under the Insurance Code and

Deceptive Trade Practices Act are governed by a two-year

limitations period. Burton, 869 F. Supp. at 484. These claims

accrued on denial of coverage and are time-barred. See id.; Abe's

Colony Club v. C & W Underwriters, Inc., 852 S.W.2d 86, 91 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 1993, writ denied).

AFFIRMED.
## Contact Information

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November 2022

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#### MONTGOMERY WARD & CO., Inc., v. UNITED RETAIL, WHOLESALE & DEPARTMENT STORE EMPLOYEES OF AMERICA, CIO, et al.

No. 3471.

District Court, W. D. Missouri, W. D.

June 20, 1947.

John A. Barr, of Chicago, 111., and Elton L. Marshall, of Kansas City, Mo. (Watson, Ess, Groner, Barnett & Whittaker, of Kansas City, Mo., of counsel), for plaintiff.

Harry C. Clark, of Kansas City, Mo., for defendants.

REEVES, District Judge.

Sundry questions have been raised by the motion to dismiss. Some of these have been eliminated by the voluntary dismissal by plaintiff of its action against several named defendants. It is the theory of the plaintiff that this is an action authorized by Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, relating to class actions.

An examination of that rule does not support the contention of the plaintiff. It does not fall under either of the divisions outlined in the rule. It being a law action, any judgment recovered could not affect persons not named. It is a tort action triable to a jury.

It does not seek adjudication of claims which may affect specific property, nor is a common relief sought. The plaintiff asks judgment for tort becau'se of alleged libels. The complaint is in many counts because of alleged published libels at different times.

The case of Farmers Co-op. Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. Inc., 8 Cir., 133 F.2d 101, states applicable principles to the facts of this case. The court there construed Rule 23 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 133 F.2d loc. cit. 105. The case was considered by the Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, and after an exhaustive review and consideration of the questions involved the court reversed the trial judge merely because he ordered the complaint dismissed. It was the theory of the court that the plaintiffs could amend their complaint so as to state causes of action against the defendant. The same ruling should be made here. The petition ought not to be dismissed but the plaintiff should be granted time to amend its complaint, if it may so desire, so as to state a cause of action for libel against the individual defendants named, and such amended complaint should in no way be designated as a class action, nor should its language partake of the nature of a class action.

The decision in the case of Jackman v. Union Pacific R. Co., D.C., 4 F.R.D. 172*290rendered by the writer is not contrary to the ruling here. In that case the court permitted, as in the Farmers Co-op. Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. case, supra, an amendment of the complaint so as to bring in all of the parties purporting to be represented by him to the end that each member of the entire class would be in court.

The plaintiff will be granted until September 15, 1947, to file an amended complaint conformable to the views herein expressed, or otherwise its complaint will be dismissed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted form Supermarkets
General Holdings Corporation's Consolidated Statement of Operations for the 39
weeks ended November 2, 1996 and Consolidated Balance Sheet as of November 2,
1996 and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          FEB-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               NOV-02-1996
<CASH>                                          11,737
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   12,501
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (1,128)
<INVENTORY>                                    231,191
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               314,363
<PP&E>                                         995,394
<DEPRECIATION>                               (396,546)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,015,840
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          481,351
<BONDS>                                      1,222,736
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            10
<OTHER-SE>                                 (1,248,660)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,015,840
<SALES>                                      2,929,853
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,929,853
<CGS>                                        2,057,474
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,057,474
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 (271)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           (122,646)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (18,057)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     7,070
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (10,987)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  (997)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (11,984)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32.1

Officers Certification Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

(18 U.S.C 1350)

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Pioneer Drilling Company, a Texas corporation, (the Company) for the
quarter ended September 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, Wm. Stacy Locke, President and Chief Executive Officer, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, that, to the best of his knowledge:

(1) The Report is in full compliance with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                        |  |  |  |  |  |                                                      
|----------------------- |  |  |  |  |  | -----------------------------------------------------
|Dated: November 4, 2010 |  |  |  |  |  | /s/ Wm. Stacy Locke                                  
|                        |  |  |  |  |  | Wm. Stacy Locke President and
Chief Executive Officer
|                        |  |  |  |  |  |
#### Watts *against*Taylor.

in^an antic» of the penalty givj.“®ts?>&creThe to bánf

THE defendant was arrested and held to bail in an action of debt, brought t© recover the penalty, given by the 14th section of *“*the act concerning distresses, rents, &c., (sess. 36. eh. 63. 1' JST. *R. L.*434—437.,) which declares, that if any tenant, or lessee, shall remove and convey away, &c., his goods or chattels, from the demised premises, leaving the rent unpaid, &c., he shall forfeit and pay to the landlord or lessor, or his heirs or assigns, &c., double the value of the goods carried off or concealed, to be recovered in any action of debt, in any court of record.

The recorder of the city, of *Nezu-York*having ordered the defendant to be discharged on filing common bail,

Sedgmc/c, for the plaintiff,

now moved to vacate the order of the *recorder,*and that the defendant be- held to bail, tie cite¿. 2 *Term Rep.*154. 1 *Hen. Bl.*10.

*306*-Goodenow.]*contra,

contended', that this was an action on a pe= nal statute, in which, according to the settled- mié of practice in *thé English*courts, the defendantcould not. be held to bail. He cited *Tidd’s*Pr. *152. Yelv. 53 Gilb. C. P. 37.*

*Per Gurictni..*

This! is a motion to vacate; the order of the recorder of New-York, for discharging the defendant on common bail. The action is founded upon the 14th section of the statute ‘‘concerning distresses, fen,ts;. and reinóvaí of leases, (1 *R. L.*437.,) for remoying goods ffoin the demised premises, leaving, the-rerit unpaid, ' This, is not a popular action.. ¡The', penalty is-given to the landlord or lessor, and is double the value of the goods carried off. The right of action vests, in the party aggrieved,- ás soon ' as the grievance is committed. $.nd Gould, j., says, in the case of *Ward v. Snell, (1 Hen. Bl.*Rep. 13.,) an action .for shch penalty is . like An , action qua bond to re.cover a debt already due, and the plaintiff if he recovers in such case-, is entitled to costs. Tbe defendant:was properly held- td> rbail 'y and if there be any cOftipláirtt' with respect to .the amount, the; record,eifór A judge, at -his chambers, can mitigate the bail. .

Motion granted.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

DEC 16 1998

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

JONNIE MYERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN

SERVICES, sued as Department

of Human Services,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 97-5235

(D.C. No. 96-CV-684-H)

(N.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BRORBY , BRISCOE , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff Jonnie Myers appeals from the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to defendant on her claim of age discrimination, in violation of the Age
1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore

ordered submitted without oral argument.

-2-

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. 1

 We

review the district court’s decision de novo, applying the same legal standards

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See Kaul v. Stephan , 83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th

Cir. 1996). 

On appeal, Ms. Myers contends that she has raised triable questions of fact

by controverting defendant’s factual statements, alleges that defendant’s evidence

is flawed and unreliable, and complains that defendant’s production of records

was untimely and unhelpful. After careful review of the record on appeal

together with the parties’ briefs and the applicable law, we conclude that the

district court correctly decided this case. Therefore, for substantially the same

reasons contained in the district court’s order dated September 29, 1997, the

judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of

Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court

Carlos F. Lucero

Circuit Judge
#### Vivian Kleinerman et al., Respondents, v 245 East 87 Tenants Corp. et al., Appellants.

[963 NYS2d 187]

*493Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Milton A. Tingling, J.), entered August 27, 2012, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting such breach, injunction as against defendants other than the cooperative corporation insofar as it is related to relocating plaintiffs’ gas line, and unjust enrichment, and the claims for punitive damages and attorneys’ fees, unanimously modified, on the law, to grant the motion with respect to the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty as against the cooperative corporation and the injunction as against all defendants other than the cooperative corporation, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiffs, cooperative shareholders seeking to renovate their unit, allege that the cooperative corporation and its individual board members condoned the superintendent’s solicitation of kickbacks by improperly stopping certain renovations in the face of plaintiffs’ accusations against him. Issues of fact exist, including whether the board members had knowledge of the superintendent’s alleged conduct, whether the coop corporation stopped plaintiffs’ renovations in good faith based on the interests of the coop, and whether plaintiffs were accorded disparate treatment *(see Bryan v West 81 St. Owners Corp.,*186 AD2d 514, 515 [1st Dept 1992]). As to the unjust enrichment cause of action, there is an issue of fact whether the superintendent solicited kickbacks or merely accepted gratuitous payments. The punitive damages claim is viable in light of the tort cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty; a public wrong is not required *(see Bishop v 59 W. 12th St. Condominium,*66 AD3d 401 [1st Dept 2009]). Dismissal of the claim for attorneys’ fee would be premature under the circumstances.

However, a corporation does not owe a fiduciary duty to its shareholders *(see Fletcher v Dakota, Inc.,*99 AD3d 43, 54 [1st Dept 2012]; *Stalker v Stewart Tenants Corp.,*93 AD3d 550, 552 [1st Dept 2012]). As to the injunction cause of action, only the coop corporation, as the “Lessor,” is authorized under the proprietary lease to consent to plaintiffs’ proposed renovations *(see Weinreb v 37 Apts. Corp.,*97 AD3d 54, 57-58 [1st Dept 2012]).

We have considered defendants’ other contentions and find them unavailing.

Concur—Gonzalez, P.J., Friedman, AbdusSalaam, Román and Clark, JJ.
The District Court of the 20th Judicial District. County of Lake.

#### STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff, vs. ROBERT BROWNING, Defendant.

CAUSE NO. DC-2009-75 DECISION

On July 22, 2010, the defendant was sentenced for violation of the conditions of a suspended sentence, to a commitment to the Department of Corrections for a term of five (5) years, for the offense of Burglary, a Felony. The Court recommended the Defendant be considered for placement at Connections Corrections and pre-release programs if deemed appropriate by the Department of Corrections and earned by the Defendant’s successful completion of any treatment programs.

On November 4, 2010, the defendant’s application for review of that sentence was heard by the Sentence Review Division of the Montana Supreme *87Court.

The defendant was present and was represented by Eric Olson. The state was not represented.

Before hearing the application, the defendant was advised that the Sentence Review Division has the authority not only to reduce the sentence or affirm it, but also increase it. The defendant was further advised that there is no appeal from a decision of the Sentence Review Division. The defendant acknowledged that he understood this and stated that he wished to proceed.

Ride 17 of the Rules of the Sentence Review Division of the Supreme Court of Montana provides that “the sentence imposed by the District Court is presumed correct, and the sentence will not be reduced or increased unless it is deemed clearly inadequate or excessive.” (§46-18-904(3), MCA).

The Division finds that the reasons advanced for modification are insufficient to hold that the sentence imposed by the District Court is inadequate or excessive.

Therefore, it is the unanimous decision of the Sentence Review Division that the sentence shall be affirmed.

Done in open Court this 4th day of November, 2010.

DATED this 18th day of November, 2010.

Chairperson, Hon. Blair Jones, Member, Hon. Richard Simonton and Member, Hon. Ray Dayton.