COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Ha ley, Millette and Se nior Judge Coleman

DAWN BRANCH MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 2120-07-2 PER CURIAM FEBRUARY 12, 2008 PETERSBURG DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PETERSBURG Pamela S. Baskervill, Judge (John G. LaFratta, on brief), for appellant. (Joan M. O’Donnell; J. Wicker Traylor, Guardian ad litem for the infant child, on brief), for appellee.
Dawn Branch (hereinafter “mother”) contends the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights to her minor child, K.L. Mo ther argues the trial court erred by finding the evidence sufficient to terminate he r parental rights and to approve the goal of adoption. For the reasons stated herein, we su mmarily affirm the trial c ourt’s decision. Rule 5A:27. Background We view the evidence 1 in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of
Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991).

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.

1 The facts are drawn from the Statement of F acts filed with the trial court in lieu of a transcript pursuant to Rule 5A: 8. The parties stipulat ed to the evidence offered by the Petersburg Department of Social Services (“PDSS”) in its ca se-in-chief, and mother conceded the evidence was sufficient to make out a prima facie case warranting termination of her parental rights.- 2 - K.L. was born on October 25, 2006. Because she was born prematurely, she weighed only one pound and required intensive medical suppor t, including frequent feedings and an apnea monitor. K.L. remained in the hospital until February 20, 2007. She continued to require an apnea monitor upon her discharge and remained on the monitor at the time of the termination hearing on August 6, 2007. Shortly before K.L.’s release from the hospital, PDSS received a report that mother was unable to administer the child’s medication pr operly even though it ha d been “color-coded.” Mother could not operate the apnea monitor and, on one occasion, had failed to recognize K.L. was in respiratory distress. K.L. was placed in foster care pursuant to an emergency removal order on February 20, 2007. A few weeks later, the juvenile and domestic re lations district court ruled that K.L. was an abused child and approved the goal of adopti on. Mother appealed to the circuit court. Much of the evidence presented by PDSS at the termination hearing related to mother’s parenting history with K.L.’s older sibling, D. L. Mother’s parental rights to D.L. were terminated in 2006. Like K.L., the older child was born prematurely and required support such as frequent feedings and use of an apnea monito r. D.L. remained in the hospital nearly three months after her birth. Prior to her discharge, hospital staff provided mother with intensive training to care for the older child, incl uding proper use of the apnea monitor. While D.L. was in the hospital, mother fa iled to respond to the alarm of the apnea monitor on at least two occasions and appeared in capable of caring for the older child on a daily basis. PDSS met with mother to determine her ab ility to care for the olde r child and requested a psychological evaluation to determine what services , if any, were available to assist or enhance mother’s ability to care for D.L.- 3 - The psychological evaluation was complete d on July 20, 2005 by Dr. Greg Wolber. Mother’s overall scores on intelligence tests ad ministered by Dr. Wolber bordered on mental retardation and revealed her incapable of performing simple multiplication and division computations. Dr. Wolber concluded mother w ould “likely have difficulty with more complex aspects of daily living, i.e., handling a budget, planning meals and shopping for groceries, providing the correct medication, mixing formula, etc.” Dr. Wolber acknowledged she would likely be able to perform “some of these tasks” with supervision. If mo ther were to retain custody of her child, Dr. Wolber recommended an “int ense level of supervision not only to train her in appropriate childcare but also to continue to monitor an d assess her ability to parent.” In addition to training at the hospital a nd parenting classes, PDSS employee Gail Davis-Lee provided in-home supervised visita tion and individual parenting instruction upon D.L.’s release from the hospital in August 2005. Davis-Lee provided this instruction to mother twice a week for fourteen months, but observed little improvement in mother’s parenting skills. Based upon her observations, Davis-L ee did not believe the older child could be left safely in mother’s sole care. On or about October 4, 2006, moth er’s parental rights to the older child were terminated pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). The juveni le court found that mother suffered from a “combination of intellectual, cognitive, and ps ychiatric difficulties” wh ich required the older child’s continued placement in foster care and whic h available rehabilitative services could not eliminate. Mother countered the evidence regarding her capacity to parent K.L. with expert testimony from Dr. Penny L. Sprecher. Dr. Spre cher testified that mo ther was not mentally retarded and was able to function at the level of an eighteen year old. However, Dr. Sprecher’s report indicates that mother’s scores on the inte lligence tests administered to her “resulted in- 4 - Verbal, Performance and Full Scale scores within the [m]ild range of Mental Retardation.” Dr. Sprecher, whose report attribut es mother’s poor test scores to anxiety, concludes that mother “is probably functioning in the [b]o rderline range of intelligence.” While Dr. Sprecher’s report concluded that mother was “capable of caring for her self [sic] and . . . her young children,” she admitted at the termination hearing her conclusions were based upon information provided by mother and he r friend, Vicki Parham. Dr. Sprecher also acknowledged she had no information about the me dical needs of mother’s child and that she had not visited mother’s home or obs erved mother caring for any children. Vicki Parham testified that she visited mother four or five days each week and assisted her with her finances. Parham was the payee on the mother’s disability checks and paid mother’s rent and utilities bills with those funds. She stated that she transported mother to visit K.L. in the hospital several times and was willing to assist mother in caring for K.L. Parham admitted, however, she had applied for financial aid for K.L. after the child was placed in foster care, and produced three checks which were confiscated by the trial court. Mother testified she was capable of caring for K.L. and knew how to use the apnea monitor from instruction she had received at the hospital. She indicated she had been employed at a fast-food restaurant, but had left that job to care for her children. In addition to the evidence st ipulated in its case-in-chief, PDSS proffered testimony from Davis-Lee that K.L. had been placed in the same foster home where her si ster resided, and PDSS had no plans to move her. PDSS proffered through Davis-Lee that K.L. was happy and well-adjusted, but had medical needs which were more serious and required more intensive care than those of her older sister. The trial court concluded that “[b]oth childre n were placed in foster care due to the mother’s inability to comprehend their needs and to follow instructions for their care.” This- 5 - instruction included “training at MCV Hospital and Chippenham Hospital, parenting classes, individual parenting instructi on and a psychological evaluation to determine her level of functioning.” The trial court noted that “mother d[id] not mainta in employment or independent housing,” and relied on social security income fo r disability. Finally, th e trial court found that “mother ha[d] a combination of intellectual, cognitive and psychiatric difficulties which require[d] the child’s continued placement in fo ster care and which available rehabilitative services [could] not eliminate.” The trial court’s order found that termina tion was warranted under subsections (B)(2)(a), (C)(2), and (E) of Code § 16.1-283. This appeal followed. Analysis “Code § 16.1-283 embodies ‘the statutory sche me for the . . . termination of residual parental rights in this Commonwealth’ [which] . . . ‘provides de tailed procedures designed to protect the rights of the parent s and their child,’ ba lancing their interests while seeking to preserve the family.” Lecky v. Reed , 20 Va. App. 306, 311, 456 S.E.2d 538, 540 (1995) (citations omitted). The trial judge’s findings, “‘when based on evidence heard ore tenus , will not be disturbed on appeal unl ess plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463 (quoting Peple v. Peple , 5 Va. App. 414, 422, 364 S.E.2d 232, 237 (1988)). When considering termination of a parent’s residual rights to a child, “the paramount consideration of a trial court is the child’s best interests.” Id. “‘[T]ermination of [residual] parental rights is a grave, dras tic, and irreversible action.’” Helen W. v. Fairfax County Dep’t of
Human Dev. , 12 Va. App. 877, 883, 407 S.E.2d 25, 28-29 (1991) (quoting Lowe v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare of the City of Richmond , 231 Va. 272, 280, 343 S.E.2d 70, 72 (1986)). On review, “[a] trial court is presumed to have thoroughly wei ghed all the evidence, c onsidered the statutory- 6 - requirements, and made its determination based on the child’s best interests.” Farley v. Farley , 9 Va. App. 326, 329, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990). Code § 16.1-283 provides for the termination of residual parental ri ghts under carefully defined circumstances. Here, the trial court conc luded that the evidence warranted termination of mother’s residual parental ri ghts to K.L. on three alternativ e grounds. Without specifically referring to any of these sections, mother argues the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights because the evidence did not support its fi nding that she had mental limitations which could not be overcome. Specifically, mother c ontends the trial court erred by rejecting her expert’s testimony that she was capable of parenting K.L. We need not address whether the trial court erred in deciding termination was warranted under subsection (B)(2)(a), i.e., that mother’s mental condition rende red her incapable of providing the necessary care to K.L, because the record supports the trial court’s decision on subsection (E) grounds. Where a tr ial court’s judgment is made on alternative grounds, we need only consider whether any one of th e alternatives is sufficient to sustain the judgment of the trial court and, if we so find, need not address the other grounds. See Boone v. C. Arthur Weaver
Co. , 235 Va. 157, 161, 365 S.E.2d 764, 766 (1988). Subsection (E) of Code § 16.1-283 provides as follows: The residual parental rights of a pa rent or parents of a child who is in the custody of a local board or licensed child-placing agency may be terminated by the court if the court finds, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interests of the child and that (i) the residual parental rights of the parent regarding a sibling of the child have pr eviously been involuntarily terminated . . . . The evidence is undisputed that mother’s parental rights to her older child were terminated in October 2006. However, mother ma intains the evidence di d not support the trial court’s finding that termination was in K. L.’s best interests. We disagree.- 7 - Despite extensive training and prior experien ce with her first child, mother demonstrated an inability to operate K.L.’s apnea monitor and administer her medi cations properly. Through Davis-Lee, PDSS established that fourteen mont hs of individual trai ning had little effect on mother’s ability to address her first child’s need s. Davis-Lee’s observations were corroborated by mother’s subsequent failure to recognize that K.L. was in respiratory distress and by her inability to administer her child’s medications properly. K.L., who has more demanding medical needs than those of the sister with whom sh e is placed, is “happy a nd well-adjusted in her placement.” The record contains credible evidence to support the trial c ourt’s finding that termination is in the best interests of K.L. and that the requirements of Code § 16.1-283(E) 2 have been proven. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. Affirmed.

2 As subsection (E) does not impose an obliga tion on PDSS to provide services, we also reject mother’s argument that PDSS failed to fu lfill its obligation to provide all reasonable, appropriate, and available se rvices to perpetuate the parent-child relationship.