In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: January 17, 2024

S23Y0807. IN THE MATTER OF CHRISTOPHER RYAN 

BREAULT.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and 

recommendation of the State Disciplinary Review Board (“Review 

Board”), recommending that the Court adopt the recommendation of 

Special Master Daniel S. Reinhardt that Christopher Ryan Breault 

(State Bar No. 207142), a member of the State Bar of Georgia since 

2013, be suspended for a period of one month.1 The conduct 

underlying this matter occurred while Breault was litigating a 

personal injury case in the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Georgia, resulting in Breault being charged 

1 The Special Master recommended a suspension of 30 days, while the Review 

Board recommended a suspension of one month. Throughout this opinion, we refer to 

the recommended suspension as a one-month suspension, for consistency.
2

with violating Rules 1.1, 1.6 (a), 1.16 (a) (3), and 3.5 (d) of the 

Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”), found in Bar Rule 

4-102 (d). The maximum penalty for a single violation of Rules 1.1 

and 1.6 is disbarment, while the maximum penalty for a single 

violation of Rules 1.16 and 3.5 (d) is a public reprimand.

After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the 

Special Master failed to adequately analyze Breault’s conduct under 

the framework found in the American Bar Association Standards for 

Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”), a framework that 

though not controlling, is “generally instructive as to the question of 

punishment.” In the Matter of Cook, 311 Ga. 206, 213 (3) (a) (857 

SE2d 212) (2021). Thus, we decline to determine at this juncture 

whether a one-month suspension is an appropriate sanction for 

Breault’s conduct. We reject the recommendations below and 

remand the case to the Review Board, with direction to remand the 

case to a Special Master to conduct a full analysis of Breault’s 

conduct under the helpful ABA Standards and to issue a new 

recommendation consistent with this opinion. At this stage, we do 
3

not decide whether the Special Master and Review Board correctly 

concluded that Breault violated the provisions of the GRPC with 

which he was charged, nor do we decide Breault’s exceptions to these 

conclusions.

1. Procedural History

This matter was referred to the State Bar by a federal district 

court, which held a disciplinary hearing regarding the conduct of 

Breault and his co-counsel during the personal injury case. The 

district court issued a sealed order disciplining Breault and his cocounsel, and it sent the order to the State Bar. In subsequent orders, 

the district court granted the State Bar permission to disclose the 

sealed disciplinary order to individuals aiding in the investigation 

and potential prosecution of disciplinary matters involving Breault, 

and allowed the State Bar to access related pleadings, exhibits, 

transcripts, and orders from the district court proceedings. In 

pertinent part, the district court concluded in the sealed disciplinary 

order that Breault had violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.6, and 1.16 of the 

GRPC, and disciplined Breault by revoking his pro hac vice 
4

admission and ordering that he could reapply for admission to 

practice in the Southern District after six months, conditioned upon 

his completion of at least 30 continuing legal education credits in 

ethics.2

On January 11, 2019, the State Disciplinary Board found 

probable cause to file a formal complaint against Breault for 

violating Rules 1.1, 1.6, 1.16, and 3.5 (d).3 A formal complaint was 

filed on May 6, 2019, and a Special Master was appointed on May 7, 

2019.4 See Case No. S19B1185. On July 22, 2019, Breault filed a 

timely answer after being personally served with the notice of a 

finding of probable cause, the formal complaint, the petition for 

appointment of a Special Master, and the order appointing a Special 

2 The federal district court’s discipline only governed Breault’s ability to 

practice in that court. See In re Stubbs, 285 Ga. 702, 703-04 (681 SE2d 113) (2009) 

(“While the federal district court had authority to discipline or suspend [an attorney] 

from the practice of law in its court for misconduct or violation of its local rules . . . it 

has no authority to confer or revoke [the attorney’s] license to practice law.”

(emphasis added)). This Court has the exclusive authority to determine whether 

Breault should be disciplined under the GRPC. See Cook, 311 Ga. at 213 (3) (a) (“The 

level of punishment imposed rests in the sound discretion of this Court.”). 

3 Breault was also charged with violating Rule 1.3, but the State Bar later 

abandoned that charge.

4 This Court appointed Special Master Reinhardt on November 10, 2020, after 

the original special master was no longer able to continue performing his duties.
5

Master. During litigation, the Special Master entered a protective 

order in an attempt to maintain compliance with the then-sealed

district court orders. The Special Master held an evidentiary 

hearing on March 14, 2022, and entered his report and 

recommendation on October 17, 2022. Breault filed timely 

exceptions and requested review by the Review Board. The Review 

Board entered its report and recommendation on March 27, 2023, 

summarily adopting the Special Master’s findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, and rejecting all of Breault’s arguments.

5

2. The Special Master’s Report and Recommendation

(a) The Facts

The Special Master recounted that on October 14, 2015, a man 

from South Carolina was injured in an automobile accident in 

5 When the matter was filed in this Court, the State Bar initially sought 

permission from this Court to file certain portions of the disciplinary record under 

seal to maintain compliance with the sealed district court orders and protective 

orders entered by the Special Master. This Court denied that motion without 

prejudice because the Bar had provided no authority for filing those records under 

seal. The State Bar ultimately sought and received an order from the district court 

allowing it to file those records in this Court with the name of Breault’s co-counsel 

redacted therefrom. Accordingly, throughout this opinion, we refer to Breault’s cocounsel by his initials, C.M.
6

Savannah. The man and his wife hired a Georgia attorney, C.M., to 

represent them in the ensuing personal injury case. C.M. lacked 

experience in personal injury matters, so he associated a more 

experienced personal injury firm, which filed a lawsuit on behalf of 

the couple (collectively referred to as “clients,” individually referred 

to as “husband” and “wife”) in federal district court in Savannah in 

February 2016. C.M. formally appeared as counsel of record in 

September 2016. The personal injury firm completed the 

substantive work on the case, and the district court entered a 

pretrial order, setting trial to start on June 27, 2017. In May 2017, 

C.M. became dissatisfied with the personal injury firm because he 

believed that the husband had suffered a cognitive injury and 

thought that the personal injury firm had failed to fully develop 

evidence of damages. On the other hand, a partner from the personal 

injury firm believed that C.M. wanted to remove the firm from the 

case so that he could receive a larger percentage of any recoverable 

fee. With his clients’ permission, C.M. terminated the services of the 
7

personal injury firm, and the partner filed a motion to withdraw on 

behalf of the firm, which was granted in June 2017.

In May 2017, C.M. associated his former law school classmate, 

Breault, on the case. Breault assumed the role of lead counsel 

knowing that the case was set for trial in June and that he only had 

one month to develop additional evidence. He filed an appearance,

was admitted pro hac vice on June 5, 2017, and then immediately 

associated additional lawyers to assist with research, writing, and 

other legal work. Breault and C.M. decided that it was necessary to 

depose the husband’s treating physician. On May 24, Breault 

contacted the physician’s office and scheduled a deposition, which 

Breault later cancelled. On June 7, Breault and C.M. met with the 

physician at the physician’s office, where, unbeknownst to Breault 

and the physician, C.M. recorded their conversation. On June 20, 

Breault called the physician’s office manager about rescheduling the 

deposition for a date before the trial, indicating that he would have 

to subpoena the physician to appear in court if the deposition could 

not be scheduled. The physician agreed to give a deposition, which 
8

was set for June 23. Because of confusion arising from the 

scheduling of the deposition, defense counsel contacted the 

physician’s office and was told by the office manager that Breault 

had been threatening towards her. As a result, on June 21, the 

defendants filed a motion to revoke Breault’s pro hac vice admission 

(“Defendants’ Motion to Revoke”), arguing that he had violated 

provisions of the district court’s guidelines for courtroom conduct 

with respect to his interactions with the office manager.

On June 22, Breault and C.M. filed a response brief in which 

they incorporated portions of the recorded conversation they had 

with the physician and attached a transcript of the conversation as 

an exhibit.6 They also sent the audio recording of the conversation 

to the district court and defense counsel. It was undisputed that the 

transcript contained privileged information that Breault and C.M.

gained in their professional relationship with the clients. Yet, the 

lawyers did not obtain the clients’ permission to disclose that 

6 Breault testified at the disciplinary hearing before the Special Master

that C.M. and two other lawyers had agreed with Breault to include the 

transcript in their response to the Defendants’ Motion to Revoke. 
9

information by filing the transcript and the recording. Moreover,

Breault and C.M. indicated in their response brief that while they 

understood they were “tipping the ‘playing field’” in favor of the 

defendants by disclosing work product via the recording and 

transcript, they felt that “the esteem and confidence of [the district 

court] [were] more important.” Later at the disciplinary hearing 

before the Special Master, Breault admitted to making the 

disclosures public to make defense counsel look like “a disingenuous 

a**hole.” The district court denied the Defendants’ Motion to Revoke 

after a hearing, but specifically found that the disclosure of the 

conversation was unnecessary and damaging to the plaintiffs’ case. 

In other orders, the district court allowed Breault and C.M. to 

add as a witness the neuropsychologist that the physician had 

previously recommended, extended the time for discovery, and 

postponed trial until October 30, 2017. The district court also

ordered the parties to depose the neuropsychologist by mid-August 

to allow the defendants a fair opportunity to respond to his 

testimony. On July 20, Breault emailed defense counsel that the 
10

neuropsychologist’s deposition would occur on the morning of

August 14. On August 9, Breault responded to a defense inquiry 

about the neuropsychologist’s curriculum vitae, stating that the 

neuropsychologist could not appear for deposition on August 14. In 

reality, Breault had never confirmed the deposition date with the 

neuropsychologist. Breault advised defense counsel that he would 

file a request for more time to conduct the deposition, but he never 

did.

C.M. attempted to fire Breault on August 8, but he had not 

received the clients’ permission to effectuate the firing. On August 

16, 2017, C.M., with the clients’ permission, terminated Breault’s 

representation by letter, citing as a reason the difficulties with 

scheduling medical depositions. The Special Master noted that C.M.

had been in contact with a well-known plaintiff’s lawyer and that 

after Breault was terminated, that lawyer became lead counsel. 

Breault was upset by the termination, believed the real reason was 

to deprive him of a fee, and did not believe that the clients had 

approved the termination. On August 17, he appeared unannounced 
11

at the clients’ home in South Carolina to try to remain on the case. 

The wife texted C.M., who told Breault over the telephone to leave.

As Breault later stated in his response to another filing, he then told 

the husband to seek advice from a litigation funding company before 

leaving the clients’ home. After Breault left, the wife texted him

confirming that he had been terminated. After receiving the text, 

Breault invited the wife to attend a “focus group” that he had 

purportedly scheduled for August 23, and indicated to the wife that 

he would file a notice of withdrawal the next day, but Breault failed 

to file the notice.

Because of Breault’s failure to file a notice of withdrawal, on 

October 4, 2017, C.M. filed on behalf of the clients a motion to revoke 

Breault’s pro hac vice admission (“Plaintiffs’ Motion to Revoke”). In 

that motion and Breault’s response thereto, C.M. and Breault 

accused each other of misconduct. Breault also included in his 

response privileged work-product and communications between 

himself and the clients concerning the admissibility and credibility 

of potential evidence. It was undisputed that these communications
12

contained privileged information, which Breault disclosed by filing 

them with his response. 

Based on these filings, the district court held a disciplinary 

hearing on October 30, 2017, instead of starting the trial as 

scheduled. Breault filed a notice of withdrawal on the same day. In 

its ruling at the end of the hearing, the district court found that the 

disclosures that Breault and C.M. had made in response to the 

Defendants’ Motion to Revoke were damaging to their clients. 

According to the district court, these disclosures gave the defendants 

“a strategy for undermining the [plaintiffs’] case,” and defense 

counsel testified that the disclosures gave him valuable crossexamination material against the plaintiffs’ experts and suggested 

an easy roadmap to damage the clients’ case.

(b) Rules Violated

The State Bar argued that Breault violated Rule 1.17 by filing

a response to the Defendants’ Motion to Revoke that violated Rule 

7 Rule 1.1 imposes the duty of competence on a lawyer representing a client, 

meaning that “a lawyer shall not handle a matter which the lawyer knows or should 
13

1.6 (a),

8 and by advising the husband to seek advice from a litigation 

funding company. The Special Master rejected the first argument

because he viewed the requirement of competence in Rule 1.1 “more 

broadly” and observed that even if a single violation of Rule 1.6 could 

also constitute a violation of Rule 1.1, Breault’s background still 

qualified him to represent a client in a serious personal injury case 

arising from an automobile accident. The Special Master rejected 

the second argument because the State Bar had “not produced any 

expert opinion evidence” to support it.

Next, the Special Master noted that the State Bar had 

abandoned its claim that Breault had violated Rule 1.3,

9 and that 

the State Bar argued the misconduct underlying that alleged 

know to be beyond the lawyer’s level of competence without associating another 

lawyer who the original lawyer reasonably believes to be competent to handle the 

matter in question.”

8 Rule 1.6 (a) provides, in relevant part, that “[a] lawyer shall maintain in 

confidence all information gained in the professional relationship with a client, 

including information which . . . would likely be detrimental to the client, unless the 

client gives informed consent, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in 

order to carry out the representation[.]”

9 Rule 1.3 states: “A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness 

in representing a client. Reasonable diligence as used in this rule means that a lawyer 

shall not without just cause to the detriment of the client in effect willfully abandon 

or willfully disregard a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer.”
14

violation was part of a pattern of misconduct supporting a finding 

that Breault violated Rule 3.5 (d).10

The Special Master concluded that Breault violated Rule 

3.5 (d) because, by failing to timely withdraw, he “effectively rewrote the District Court’s schedule with respect to his client[s’]

case,” which was unfair to the clients. The Special Master stated

that Breault’s explanation about “his decision not to withdraw and 

whether and when he finally believed that his services had been 

terminated strains belief.”

11 Moreover, the Special Master found 

that Breault violated Rule 3.5 (d) by failing to schedule and take the 

neuropsychologist’s deposition by mid-August as ordered by the 

district court. At the disciplinary hearing, Breault had testified that 

the neuropsychologist was busy and nonresponsive. But if 

scheduling the deposition was difficult, the Special Master 

10 Rule 3.5 (d) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not, without regard to whether 

the lawyer represents a client in the matter . . . engage in conduct intended to disrupt 

a tribunal.”

11 Here, the Special Master referenced a transcript from the district court,

which does not appear to be in the record before this Court. It is unclear how Breault 

explained his actions to the district court.
15

explained, Breault could have issued a subpoena, contacted the 

district court, or filed a motion for an extension of the time for 

discovery – none of which occurred. Also, the Special Master found

that Breault disrupted the litigation process by giving “opposing 

counsel unequivocal factual information about the date and time of 

a scheduled deposition” even though Breault never got the 

neuropsychologist to firmly agree to that date. Finally, the Special 

Master pointed to Breault’s failure to seek an extension of time to 

take the deposition despite his promise to opposing counsel that he 

would do so.12

As for Rule 1.6 (a), the Special Master found a violation in two 

ways. First, the Special Master noted that Breault disclosed the 

transcript and recording of the conversation with the physician in 

response to the Defendants’ Motion to Revoke – which the 

defendants filed due to Breault’s phone interactions with the 

physician’s office manager. The Special Master noted that while

12 The Special Master does acknowledge that Breault could no longer 

reschedule a deposition after August 16 because that was the date on which he was 

terminated.
16

disclosing the recording helped Breault defeat the motion since the 

recording lacked evidence of Breault using aggressive tactics 

towards the physician, no one disputed that the recording contained 

privileged information. The Special Master also stated that he 

believed that if the physician had been deposed, “most of the facts 

disclosed in the recording would have been forthcoming based on 

[the physician’s] records alone.” Nonetheless, the Special Master 

reiterated that it was improper to disclose that information without 

the clients’ consent.

Breault contended that the disclosure was strategic because it 

changed the case from an orthopedic case to a case with a brain 

injury component. And, Breault pointed out, the district court 

denied the Defendants’ Motion to Revoke, and the decision to 

disclose the conversation was made by all of the clients’ attorneys, 

including C.M. The Special Master rejected this argument, 

reasoning that there were ways to defeat the motion without 

disclosing the privileged information in the transcript and 

recording, such as using redaction or asking the district court to 
17

conduct an in camera review. The Special Master found that Breault 

sought neither of these remedies and disclosed the information 

without his client’s permission. And, the Special Master indicated

that Breault’s testimony showed he had disclosed privileged 

information in order to show that defense counsel was a 

“disingenuous a**hole.”

Second, the Special Master found that Breault violated Rule 

1.6 by disclosing privileged information in response to Plaintiffs’ 

Motion to Revoke his pro hac vice status, which the plaintiffs filed 

after Breault failed to withdraw. The Special Master found that 

Breault’s disclosure of privileged information here was designed 

solely to further his own interests and did not benefit his former 

clients.

As for Rule 1.16 (a) (3),13 the Special Master found Breault in 

violation by failing to timely move to withdraw as he said he would. 

The Special Master recounted that C.M. delivered a termination 

13 Rule 1.16 (a) (3) provides that a lawyer “shall withdraw from the 

representation of a client if . . . the lawyer is discharged.”
18

letter to Breault on August 16; Breault appeared unannounced on 

August 17 at the house of the clients, who told him that they did 

intend to terminate his representation; and despite indicating that 

he would withdraw the next day on August 18, Breault failed to file 

a motion to withdraw until his disciplinary hearing before the 

district court on October 30.

(c) Recommendation of Discipline

In evaluating discipline, the Special Master did not analyze 

three components of the ABA Standards: (1) the duty violated, (2) 

the lawyer’s mental state, and (3) the actual or potential injury to 

the clients. See In the Matter of Morse, 265 Ga. 353, 354 (2) (456 

SE2d 52) (1995), superseded on other grounds by Rule as stated in 

Cook, 311 Ga. at 207-08 (1). Instead, he analyzed only the applicable 

aggravating and mitigating factors. In aggravation, the Special 

Master found that Breault had not acknowledged the wrongful 

nature of his conduct or the personal nature of his actions. The 

Special Master did not deem the case to involve a pattern of 

misconduct because “[a]lthough there are multiple offenses, they all 
19

arise in one representation.” In mitigation, the Special Master found 

that Breault had no prior disciplinary offenses and that he was 

inexperienced in the practice of law because he had only been 

practicing for four years when his misconduct occurred. The Special 

Master then indicated that he found the other aggravating and 

mitigating factors as listed in the ABA Standards to be inapplicable.

Throughout his report and recommendation, the Special Master also 

commented that: (1) the clients were not harmed financially and 

that Breault did not steal money from them, but that (2) Breault was 

angry about how C.M. treated him and how his work would go 

unrewarded, and he let his anger drive and cloud his actions.

14 The 

Special Master recommended that Breault be suspended from the 

practice of law for one month without conditions for reinstatement.

The Special Master did not cite any case law supporting a one-month 

suspension as the appropriate form of discipline. 

14 It is unclear whether the Special Master’s comments on anger and the lack 

of stealing and financial harm factored into his recommendation of discipline, and 

whether or where he intended them to fit into the ABA Standards analysis. However, 

we mention these comments because the next Special Master may or may not elect to 

analyze these comments on remand.
20

3. Review Board’s Report and Recommendation

Breault sought review by the Review Board, arguing that the 

Special Master erred by recommending a one-month suspension 

because clear and convincing evidence was not presented that 

Breault violated any provision of the GRPC. The State Bar 

responded that the Special Master’s recommendation of a onemonth suspension was appropriate.

The Review Board affirmed the Special Master’s factual 

findings, legal conclusions, and recommendation of discipline. First, 

it did not find clear error in the Special Master’s factual findings, 

and adopted those findings and incorporated them by reference.

Next, the Review Board did not find error in the Special Master’s 

conclusions of law and adopted them, stating that it weighed all of 

Breault’s arguments, including Breault’s argument that his conduct 

was excused by Rule 1.6 (b) (1) (iii).

15 According to the Review Board,

15 Rule 1.6 (b) (1) (iii) provides that a lawyer “may reveal information covered 

by paragraph (a) which the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to establish a 

claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the 

client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer 
21

Breault argued that Rule 1.6’s exceptions excused his disclosure of 

client confidential information and that his violation of Rule 1.6 

ultimately benefitted the client. The Review Board found these 

arguments unavailing, concluding that “[w]hether a violation of the 

Rules ultimately leads to a benefit to a client does not excuse the 

underlying violation,” particularly when Breault would not have 

violated Rule 1.6 if he had obtained informed consent from the 

clients before disclosing the privileged information. The Review 

Board observed that Breault used Comment 16 to Rule 1.616 to argue 

that unlimited disclosure is permitted any time a lawyer is accused 

of violating the law. The Review Board rejected this argument, too, 

based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in 

any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client [.]”

16 Comment 16 to Rule 1.6 provides, in relevant part:

Where a legal claim or disciplinary charge alleges . . . misconduct of the 

lawyer involving representation of the client, the lawyer may respond to 

the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to establish a 

defense. . . . In any event, disclosure should be no greater than the 

lawyer reasonably believes is necessary to vindicate innocence, the 

disclosure should be made in a manner which limits access to the 

information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it, 

and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be 

sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable.
22

reasoning that Breault had ways to respond to the motions to revoke

while reasonably safeguarding the clients’ privileged information.

The Review Board stated that it was adopting the Special 

Master’s analysis of the ABA Standards as to the duties violated, 

Breault’s mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by 

Breault’s misconduct,17 and the aggravating and mitigating 

factors.18 The Review Board recommended that this Court suspend 

Breault from the practice of law for one month with no conditions 

for reinstatement.

19

4. Analysis

“The primary purpose of a disciplinary action is to protect the 

public from attorneys who are not qualified to practice law due to 

17 The Review Board did not address the Special Master’s lack of analysis on

duty, mental state, and potential or actual injury.

18 The Review Board then discussed several aspects of Breault’s unprofessional 

conduct in the proceedings before it, but because much evidence of that alleged 

conduct is not in the disciplinary record and because the Board did not clearly tie its 

professionalism discussion to its recommendation of discipline, we do not consider it 

for the purposes of this opinion.

19 Though the Review Board mentioned the ABA Standards and case law on 

the factors that should be considered in determining an appropriate sanction, it did 

not cite any authority to support imposing a one-month suspension. 
23

incompetence or unprofessional conduct, but this Court is also 

concerned with the public’s confidence in the profession generally.” 

Cook, 311 Ga. at 213 (3) (a). The sanction imposed for disciplinary 

infractions should be one that is sufficient to penalize the offender 

for his wrongdoing, deter other attorneys from engaging in similar 

behavior, and inform the general public that the courts will 

maintain the ethics of the profession. See id. The ABA Standards 

are “generally instructive as to the question of punishment,” though

“they are not controlling.” Id. See also In the Matter of Hunt, 304 Ga. 

635, 640 (820 SE2d 716) (2018) (“[T]his Court relies on the [ABA 

Standards] for general guidance in determining the appropriate 

level of discipline”); In the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652, 653 (470 

SE2d 232) (1996) (“[W]e look to the American Bar Association’s 

standards for guidance in determining the appropriate sanction to 

impose.”). Ultimately, “the level of punishment imposed rests in the 

sound discretion of this Court.” Cook, 311 Ga. at 213 (3) (a).
24

(a) ABA Standards

To properly determine the appropriate sanction for attorney 

discipline, the Special Master “should look to the [ABA Standards] 

for guidance.” Morse, 265 Ga. at 354 (2) (remanding case to review 

panel to consider the disciplinary matter under the ABA Standards). 

As we have repeatedly indicated in our prior decisions, those 

standards offer several factors for consideration in imposing 

discipline: “the duty violated; the lawyer’s mental state; the actual 

or potential injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; and the 

existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.” Cook, 311 Ga. at 210 

(2). See also Morse, 265 Ga. at 354 (2); ABA Standards at II & 

III.C.3.0. 

Here, although the Special Master discussed aggravating and 

mitigating factors, he did not first analyze the duty violated, the 

lawyer’s mental state, and any actual or potential injury. Thus, we 

refrain at this point from deciding what sanctions are appropriate,

if any, and remand the case for a full analysis of the ABA Standards 
25

consistent with our discussion below. That analysis, in turn, may 

affect the recommendation of discipline.

(b) Duty Violated

The GRPC prescribes duties for attorneys authorized to 

practice law in Georgia. See e.g., Matter of Tuggle, 317 Ga. 255, 271

(6) (a) (892 SE2d 761) (2023) (concluding that an attorney “violated 

his duty of competence, as prescribed in Rule 1.1,” his “duty of 

diligence, as prescribed in Rule 1.3,” and “his duties upon 

termination of representation, as prescribed in Rule 1.16 (d)”

(emphasis added)); In re Skinner, 292 Ga. 640, 641 (740 SE2d 171)

(2013) (“Rule 1.6 of the [GRPC] requires a lawyer to maintain in 

confidence all information gained in the professional relationship 

with a client” subject to certain exceptions (emphasis added)).

The ABA Standards—though themselves not controlling, see 

Cook, 311 Ga. at 213 (3) (a)—assist the Court in its determination of 

sanctions by providing a non-exhaustive list of the duties explicitly 

or implicitly prescribed by the GRPC and by grouping those duties

into several categories: duties that a lawyer owes to his clients;
26

duties that he owes to the general public; duties he owes to the legal 

system; and duties he owes to the legal profession. See ABA 

Standards at II & III.C.4.0-7.0. On remand, the Special Master 

should consider which of these duties Breault may have violated by 

his violations, if any, of the GRPC. 

For example, the Special Master should consider the duty of 

loyalty owed by a lawyer to a client, which includes the duty to 

maintain client confidences. See Rule 1.6 (a); ABA Standards at II. 

Rule 1.6 safeguards these duties by requiring a lawyer to obtain 

informed consent before disclosing a client’s confidential 

information, subject to certain exceptions. These exceptions include 

Rule 1.6 (a), whereby a lawyer may disclose confidential client 

information that he is “impliedly authorized [to disclose] in order to 

carry out the representation,” and Rule 1.6 (b) (1) (iii), whereby a 

lawyer may disclose the client’s confidential information that he 

“reasonably believes [is] necessary” to defend himself against 

criminal or civil claims based on his representation of the client.
27

Here, the duty to maintain client confidences, as part of a duty 

of loyalty to a client, was implicated by Breault’s disclosure of 

confidential client-related information in response to two motions to 

revoke his pro hac vice status in the district court. Breault argued 

that he was impliedly authorized to disclose the information under 

Rule 1.6 (a), and that he reasonably believed that disclosing the 

information was necessary to defend himself against civil or 

criminal claims under Rule 1.6 (b) (1) (iii). On remand, the Special 

Master should explicitly address these Rule 1.6 exceptions in 

determining whether Breault violated Rule 1.6, and if he did, state 

whether in doing so Breault violated the duty to maintain client 

confidences and a duty of loyalty to the client.

The Special Master should also consider whether Breault 

violated a lawyer’s duty to the legal system. Here, Breault’s duty to 

the legal system to refrain from improper conduct was implicated by 

the Special Master’s conclusion that he violated Rule 3.5 (d) by 

disrupting the district court proceedings on two occasions. The 

Special Master should consider whether Breault violated this duty.
28

In addition, lawyers owe duties to the legal profession, 

including a duty to properly terminate representation of a client.

This duty was implicated by the Special Master’s conclusion that 

Breault violated Rule 1.16 (a) (3) when he failed to promptly 

withdraw from representing the clients. The Special Master should 

consider whether Breault violated this duty.

We recognize that sometimes it may be apparent, even without 

explicit explanation, which duty or duties were violated (and that a 

duty was violated) by a Rules violation. For example, a violation of 

Rule 1.6 (a)’s requirement that a lawyer “maintain in confidence all 

information gained in the professional relationship with a client

[subject to exceptions],” will, likely in every case, be a violation of 

the “duty” to maintain client confidences and “duty” of loyalty owed 

to the client. But even if so, it is often helpful for this Court’s 

determination of discipline when a Special Master explicitly uses the 

framework of duty—that is, when a Special Master, for every Rule 

that he or she deems violated, discusses whether that Rule violation 

entails a violation of a duty to the client, to the general public, to the 
29

legal system, to the legal profession, or to a combination thereof. 

Thus, to assist our determination of discipline, we ask the Special 

Master on remand—and encourage Special Masters in general—to 

use the framework of duty, even though the ABA Standards, again,

are not controlling. See Cook, 311 Ga. at 213 (3) (a).

(c) Mental State

The ABA Standards also provide helpful, albeit non-binding,

definitions of three mental states: intent, knowledge, and

negligence. See ABA Standards at III (Definitions); Tuggle, 317 Ga. 

at 273-74 (6) (b) (analyzing lawyer’s mental state through the 

categories of intent, knowledge, and negligence). A lawyer acts with 

intent—the most culpable mental state—when he acts with the 

“conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.”

ABA Standards at III. A lawyer acts with knowledge when he acts 

with “conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances 

of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to 

accomplish a particular result.” Id. And a lawyer acts with 

negligence—the “least culpable mental state”—when a lawyer “fails 
30

to be aware of a substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a 

result will follow, which failure is a deviation from the standard of 

care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation.” Id. at

II. 

Here, although the Special Master found that Breault’s actions 

were “clouded by anger,” he made no explicit findings as to Breault’s 

mental state as the ABA Standards define that term. That makes it 

difficult for this Court to determine appropriate discipline. Thus, to 

aid our determination of discipline in this case, the Special Master 

on remand should consider, based on the record, which mental 

state(s) Breault acted with when he committed the Rules violations, 

if any. Potential starting points in the record as to Breault’s mental 

state in relation to Rule 1.6 include Breault’s testimony at the 

disciplinary hearing that he “purposefully” filed the transcript of the 

conversation with the physician as part of a “brilliant grand 

strategy,” and his acknowledgement in his response to the 

Defendants’ Motion to Revoke that by making the disclosure, he was 

“tipping the ‘playing field’” in favor of the defendants.
31

(d) Potential or Actual Injury

An analysis of actual or potential injury to a client is a helpful 

factor for this Court to consider in ultimately determining what 

sanction is appropriate for a lawyer’s violations of the GRPC, so the 

Special Master should explicitly consider the actual or potential 

injury suffered by the client. The ABA Standards define “[p]otential 

injury” to include “harm to a client . . . that is reasonably foreseeable 

at the time of the lawyer’s misconduct and which, but for some 

intervening factor or event, would probably have resulted from the 

lawyer’s misconduct.” ABA Standards at III (Definitions). 

Here, the Special Master found that Breault’s clients were “not 

financially hurt,” that Breault “did not steal money,” that “no one 

raised the issue of improper disclosure” at various proceedings 

before the district court, and that if the physician had been deposed, 

most of the matters disclosed in the recording would have been 

“forthcoming” based only on the physician’s records. But the Special 

Master did not explicitly link any of these findings to a discussion of 

actual or potential injury, and the Review Board purported to adopt 
32

the Special Master’s findings on injury even though the Special 

Master had made no explicit findings.

However, the record contains evidence suggesting that

Breault’s disclosures in response to both of the motions to revoke,

may have resulted in actual or potential injury to his clients. For 

example, in its ruling on the Defendants’ Motion to Revoke, the 

district court found that Breault’s disclosures damaged the 

plaintiffs’ case, and that defense counsel testified that the recording 

of the conversation with the physician gave the defense valuable 

cross-examination material against the plaintiffs’ experts. And 

Breault’s response to the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Revoke could have 

damaged the clients’ case by disclosing information on the credibility

and admissibility of potential plaintiff evidence. On remand, taking 

into account facts such as these and the record as a whole, the 

Special Master should consider whether any of Breault’s misconduct 

caused actual or potential injury to the clients.
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(e) Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

After determining the appropriate sanction based on his 

findings as to duties violated, mental state, and injury, the Special 

Master should turn to the aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances to determine whether the balance of those factors 

warrants a departure from the appropriate sanction. See ABA 

Standards at II (“[A]fter making the initial determination as to the 

appropriate sanction, the court would then consider any relevant 

aggravating or mitigating factors.”). The ABA Standards define 

aggravation as “any considerations or factors that may justify an 

increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed,” and mitigation as 

“any considerations or factors that may justify a reduction in the 

degree of discipline to be imposed.” Id. at III.C.9.21 & C.9.31.

Here, the Special Master considered some aggravating and 

mitigating factors and found that in aggravation, Breault refused to 

acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct. See id. at III.C.9.22 

(g). The Special Master specifically declined to apply the 

aggravating factor of a pattern of misconduct. See id. at III.C.9.22 
34

(c). In mitigation, the Special Master found only that Breault did not 

have a prior disciplinary record and he was inexperienced in the 

practice of law. See id. at III.C.9.32 (a) & (f). 

On remand, the Special Master should reconsider the 

application and balance of aggravating and mitigating factors after 

and in light of his analysis of duty, mental state, and injury. See id. 

at II. In other words, the Special Master should first determine an 

appropriate sanction based on these three elements, and then 

determine what aggravating and mitigating factors exist and

whether their balance calls for an upward or downward departure 

from the appropriate sanction.

5. Conclusion

Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the Special 

Master erred by failing to conduct a full analysis of the ABA 

Standards before recommending that Breault receive a one-month 

suspension, and the Review Board erred by adopting the Special 

Master’s recommendation. We therefore reject the 

Recommendations of the Review Board and the Special Master and 
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remand to the Board, with direction that the Board remand this case 

to a Special Master, within ten business days of the publication of 

this opinion, for (1) a full analysis of the ABA Standards, including 

(a) the duties violated,20 (b) Breault’s mental state, (c) the potential 

or actual injury caused by Breault’s misconduct, and (d) any 

aggravating or mitigating factors that might justify an upward or 

downward departure from the appropriate sanction; and (2) in light 

of this analysis and the record, a new recommendation as to the 

appropriate discipline to be imposed, consistent with the framework 

outlined in this opinion. The Special Master is directed to submit an 

amended report and recommendation with additional findings of 

fact and conclusions of law, and a new recommendation, within 90 

days of the date of the Review Board’s order remanding the case.

After the Special Master submits the amended report and 

20 Before the Special Master assesses whether Breault violated the duty 

of loyalty and duty to maintain client confidences by violating Rule 1.6, the 

Special Master should first analyze the two exceptions to Rule 1.6 raised by 

Breault and mentioned earlier in this opinion, to determine whether Breault 

violated Rule 1.6 at all.
36

recommendation, both the State Bar and Breault may, if they so 

desire, file exceptions with the Review Board. 

Recommendation rejected and matter remanded with direction. 

All the Justices concur.