Filed 1/28/21 In re J.C. CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re J.C., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

B301596

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DAVID C.,

 Defendant and Appellant.

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 17LJJP00091A)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Stephanie M. Davis, Juvenile Court Referee. 

Affirmed.

Keiter Appellate Law and Mitchell Keiter for Defendant 

and Appellant.

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Acting 

Assistant County Counsel, Navid Nakhjavani, Principal Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________
2

David C., the father of six-year-old Josiah C., appeals from 

the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights under 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.

1 David contends

the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his requests

for a continuance of the section 366.26 hearing and for a 

contested hearing on the parent-child relationship exception to 

the termination of parental rights. David also contends the Los 

Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services 

(Department) failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of 

the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) as 

it applies to Josiah’s mother, Karina R. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Dependency Proceedings

1. Original Petition

On October 4, 2017, the Department filed a petition on 

behalf of then three-year-old Josiah under section 300, 

subdivision (b). In count b-1, the Department alleged that 

Karina “has an extensive history of illicit drug abuse, including 

amphetamine, and [was] a current abuser of methamphetamine 

and heroin, which render [Karina] incapable of providing regular 

care and supervision of [Josiah].” The Department further 

alleged that Josiah “was a prior dependent of the Juvenile Court 

due to [Karina’s] illicit drug use and that the juvenile court had 

declared Josiah’s four siblings dependents of the Juvenile Court 

and received permanent placement services due to [Karina’s] 

illicit drug abuse.” In count b-2, the Department alleged that 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
3

David “has a history of substance abuse, including marijuana and 

alcohol, and is a current abuser of alcohol, which renders [David]

incapable of providing regular care and supervision for [Josiah].” 

The Department also alleged that two of Josiah’s siblings 

“received permanent placement services due to [David’s] 

substance abuse.” In count b-3, the Department alleged that 

Karina “left [Josiah] in the care of paternal grandmother, Maria 

[C.], without making an appropriate plan for [Josiah’s] ongoing 

care and supervision, including [Josiah’s] medical care. [Karina]

previously left [Josiah] with the paternal grandmother without 

maintaining contact with the paternal grandmother and without 

returning to resume care of [Josiah].” The Department alleged 

the parent’s actions endangered Josiah’s physical health and 

safety and placed Josiah “at risk of serious physical harm, 

damage, and danger.” 

At the detention hearing on October 5, 2017, the juvenile 

court found a prima facie case for detaining and finding that 

Josiah was a person described by section 300. The juvenile court 

detained Josiah from David and Karina and placed Josiah with 

his paternal grandmother Maria, with whom Josiah had been 

living. Karina and David did not attend the hearing. Karina’s 

whereabouts were unknown, and David was incarcerated. The 

juvenile court ordered the Department to conduct a due diligence 

search regarding Karina. The juvenile court continued the 

hearing so that David could attend. The juvenile court deferred 

making any findings pursuant to ICWA. At the continued 

hearing on October 17, 2017, David denied the allegations in the 

petition and confirmed he did not have Indian ancestry. The 

juvenile court found ICWA did not apply as to David. The 

juvenile court deferred making an ICWA finding as to Karina
4

because her whereabouts remained unknown. The juvenile court 

scheduled the jurisdiction hearing for November 28, 2017. 

2. Prior Dependency Proceedings

The Department’s reports chronicled Karina’s and David’s 

history of prior dependency proceedings. In October 2015, based 

on Karina’s use of illicit drugs during her pregnancy with Josiah 

and David’s history of domestic violence, the juvenile court 

declared Josiah a dependent of the court. During this prior 

proceeding, David failed to maintain contact with the 

Department, while Karina made progress on her case plan. In 

October 2015, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over 

Josiah with a section 362.4 custody order granting Karina sole 

legal and physical custody of Josiah and David monitored 

visitation. 

Between 2009 and 2012, the juvenile court sustained 

multiple dependency petitions on behalf of Josiah’s four siblings

based on David’s and Karina’s illicit drug use, emotional abuse, 

general neglect and physical violence. Although the Department 

provided family reunification services, including programs for 

drug rehabilitation and parenting education and individual 

counseling to address domestic violence, Karina and David failed 

to reunify with the children. After Karina waived her rights for 

reunification services regarding one of the four siblings,

2 the 

juvenile court granted legal guardianship of that sibling to the 

maternal grandmother and terminated jurisdiction over that 

sibling in April 2010. During the period April 2012 to April 2015, 

2 David is not the father of this sibling, but David was 

identified as Karina’s “male companion” in the sustained 

petitions. David is the father of the other three siblings. 
5

the juvenile court terminated David’s and Karina’s parental 

rights to the three other siblings, and Cristal C., a paternal aunt,

and her husband Emmanuel R. adopted Josiah’s three siblings. 

3. Amended Petition

On November 27, 2017, the Department filed an amended 

petition, adding an additional count under section 300, 

subdivision (b), and a count under subdivision (j). In these 

counts, the Department alleged that David “has a history of 

engaging in violent altercations.” In the presence of Josiah’s 

siblings, David “physically attacked [Karina]” on different 

occasions. In part because of David’s “unresolved history of 

engaging in violent altercations,” the juvenile court ordered 

permanent placement services for Josiah’s siblings. The 

Department further alleged that, in November 2015, based on his 

convictions for causing an elder to suffer unjustified physical pain 

(Penal Code, § 368, subd. (c)), the criminal court issued a 10-year 

restraining order against David protecting Maria and paternal 

grandfather Raymond C. On July 24, 2017, the criminal court 

found David in contempt of court for willfully and knowingly 

violating the restraining order. (Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (c)(1).) 

The Department alleged David’s “history of unresolved violence 

and [Karina’s] failure to protect” endangered Josiah. According 

to the Department, despite the juvenile court’s custody order 

under section 362.4 granting Karina sole legal and physical 

custody of Josiah and ordering monitored visitation for David, 

Karina allowed David to have unmonitored visits with Josiah. 

B. Jurisdiction Hearing

At the jurisdiction hearing on November 28, 2017, the 

juvenile court dismissed the original petition and deemed filed 
6

the amended petition. The juvenile court ordered the 

Department to provide David with a written schedule for 

monitored visits. The juvenile court continued the jurisdiction 

hearing to February 8, 2018. On November 28, 2017, David 

signed an agreement in which he agreed to visit Josiah every 

Friday from 10:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon, with a Department 

approved monitor present.

From November 28, 2017 to the continued jurisdiction 

hearing on February 8, 2018, David did not visit Josiah. David

told the Department that he could not visit Josiah “because of his 

work schedule.” David also told the Department that “he has not 

begun any classes or programs, but does have old certificates 

from 2015-2016 that he completed.” David “also mentioned he 

was attending AA classes.” The Department reported that 

Karina’s whereabouts were unknown. According to Maria, “the 

last thing she knows in regards to [Karina] is [she was] in jail 

about three times.” 

At the jurisdiction hearing on February 8, 2018, the 

juvenile court sustained all counts in the amended petition 

pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j), and declared 

Josiah a dependent of the juvenile court. The juvenile court 

ordered the Department to submit a report regarding its due 

diligence search for Karina. The juvenile court also ordered 

Josiah to remain placed with Maria under the Department’s 

supervision. The juvenile court scheduled the disposition hearing 

for March 22, 2018. After several continuances, the juvenile 

court scheduled the disposition hearing for July 30, 2018.

C. Disposition Hearing

1. February 2018 - July 2018

On February 26, 2018, David signed an agreement stating 
7

that he would visit Josiah every Monday from 9:00 a.m. to 11:00

a.m. at the Department’s Palmdale office. According to the 

Department, from February 2018 through June 2018, David

visited Josiah on three occasions: February 26, April 30, and 

May 8, 2018. David canceled four visits and, on 12 occasions, 

David did not show up for the visit and failed to cancel the visit. 

David told the Department that “he has been really busy 

working” and that “sometimes doesn’t have enough money to see 

[Josiah].” When David visited with Josiah, the Department 

observed that Josiah was excited to see [David], stating, “I love 

my dad.” David and Josiah were affectionate and played together 

appropriately. 

In April 2018, David provided the Department with a 

certificate of completion for anger management classes dated 

December 2014 and a “Progress Letter” for “domestic 

violence/anger management” classes. The most recent 

information showed that David started a domestic violence 

program on February 2, 2018 and that he completed 10 out of 52 

classes. In July 2018, David advised the Department that he 

would provide a certificate of completion once he completed the 

program, but he did not provide such a certificate. After the 

Department asked David when he was available to visit Josiah

on July 11, 2018, David visited Josiah on July 12, 2018. David 

apologized for not staying in contact with the Department. 

In accordance with section 361.5, subdivisions (10), (11), 

and (13), the Department recommended that the juvenile court 

not order reunification services for David or Karina and that the 

juvenile court schedule a selection and implementation hearing 

under section 366.26. 
8

2. July 30, 2018 Hearing

At the disposition hearing on July 30, 2018, Josiah’s 

counsel submitted on the Department’s recommendation, adding:

“Both Parents in this case have previously failed to reunify with 

other siblings and they went into permanent plans. [David],

although he mentions some progress in domestic violence and 

some progress in parenting class, it doesn’t really seem like he’s 

made much further progress. . . . [David’s] visitation with Josiah 

is also not consistent. . . . On quite a few of those visits [David] 

was a no-show or he cancelled the visit. Based on that, I am 

requesting that the court not offer reunification services and set a 

[section 366].26 hearing for Josiah.” The juvenile court denied 

family reunification services to Karina and David under section 

361.5, subdivisions (b)(10), (11), and (13). In addition, because 

Karina’s whereabouts remained unknown, the juvenile court also 

denied reunification services for Karina under section 361.5, 

subdivision (b)(1). 

The juvenile court found: “The few times when [David] has 

visited Josiah, they appear to be well bonded. [Josiah] has been 

elated to see [David] and he is appropriate with [Josiah]. The 

court does note that [David] works a lot of hours; that he’s only 

had about three visits since February 7 of this year and he has 

been unable to keep in touch with the social worker. [David has]

been able to make progress on programs. The court notes . . . 

[David] had completed 10 of 52 domestic violence classes; 

however, it doesn’t appear that he has made sufficient progress to 

demonstrate to the court that he’s committed to reunifying, so the 

court is ordering [no reunification services] to [David].” The 

juvenile court ordered David’s monitored visits with Josiah to 

continue. David did not attend the hearing. The juvenile court 
9

set the selection and implementation hearing (§ 366.26) for 

November 27, 2018. 

D. Selection and Implementation Hearing

1. August 2018 - October 2019

In December 2018, Karina contacted the Department and 

stated that she wanted to visit Josiah. On December 21, 2018, 

representing herself, Karina filed a section 388 petition, stating, 

“I’m not perfect but I would like to be reunited with [Josiah].” 

The juvenile court, without holding a hearing, denied Karina’s 

petition on January 2, 2019 because “the request does not state 

new evidence or a change of circumstances.” The section 388

petition was Karina’s only filing in the juvenile court. 

Maria told the Department that she was not interested in 

adopting Josiah. In violation of the restraining order, Maria 

allowed David in her home “early in the morning and other 

times.” Although the Department reported that David had

“access to Josiah” in Maria’s home, the report did not provide any 

specific information. Cristal and Emmanuel, who had adopted 

Josiah’s three siblings, were committed to providing Josiah with 

a permanent home through adoption. They were “motivated to 

adopt [Josiah] to keep the siblings together.” The Department 

requested that the juvenile court vacate the existing “do not 

remove order” for Josiah’s placement with Maria so that the 

Department could place Josiah with Cristal and Emmanuel. On 

February 1, 2019, the Department removed Josiah from Maria’s 

home and placed him with Cristal and Emmanuel. After the 

juvenile court ordered notice by publication for Karina, the 

Department published notice of the section 366.26 hearing. 
10

2. October 17, 2019 Hearing

After several continuances to allow the Department to 

conduct further due diligence regarding Karina and perform 

permanency planning, the juvenile court held the selection and 

implementation hearing on October 17, 2019. David’s counsel 

made an oral request to continue the hearing. Counsel stated: 

“[David] has, in the last few moments, advised me and presented 

me with various certificates of completion for programs. I’m 

asking for a continuance to discuss the viability of a 388 with 

[David]. I’m just receiving this information within the last five 

minutes. If the court proceeds today, it would be over my 

objection.” After the Department’s counsel and Josiah’s counsel 

objected to the continuance request, the juvenile court denied 

David’s request for a continuance because of the absence of good 

cause. 

David’s counsel then requested a contested hearing. In 

response to the juvenile court’s request for an offer of proof, 

David’s counsel stated, “The fact that since being released [from 

jail], [David] advised me that . . . he has certificates of 

completion. He has completed a parenting program. He’s also 

made substantial progress in the domestic violence program. He 

indicates to me that the care-taker’s not allowed him to have 

visits. . . . He does believe it would be in [Josiah’s] best interest to 

grant [David] a contested hearing to show that it would be in 

[Josiah’s] best interests to not sever his parental bond with 

[Josiah].” Josiah’s counsel responded that David “has not been 

visiting” Josiah and that David, “if he wanted to have visits, he 

could have contacted the social worker.” The juvenile court 

denied the request for a contested section 366.26 because David’s 

offer of proof did “not meet the necessary criteria” and failed to 
11

discuss the “specific issues” to be addressed at the selection and 

implementation hearing. 

After finding that continued jurisdiction over Josiah was 

necessary because the “conditions continue[d] to exist which 

justified jurisdiction under section 300, the juvenile court found 

by clear and convincing evidence that Josiah was adoptable. 

Finding that no exception to adoption applied and that it would 

be detrimental for Josiah to be returned to his parents, the 

juvenile court terminated the parental rights of David and 

Karina. The juvenile court transferred Josiah’s care, custody, 

and control to the Department for adoption planning and 

placement. The juvenile court designated Cristal and Emmanuel 

as the prospective adoptive parents and ordered adoption as the 

permanent plan. 

E. Karina’s Possible Indian Ancestry 

The Department’s efforts to locate Karina were 

unsuccessful. In declarations of due diligence filed on November 

17, 2017, March 19, 2018, March 20, 2019, and July 3, 2019, the 

Department summarized its efforts to locate Karina. During the 

period November 2017 through April 2019, the Department 

searched government agency databases, including military, 

prison (state and federal), probation/parole, voter registration, 

postal service, child support, motor vehicle, and welfare 

databases. The Department also conducted internet and social 

media searches. Based on its investigation, on multiple 

occasions, the Department sent Karina various court documents 

via certified mail to at least 15 different street addresses. The 

Department also repeatedly called at least nine different phone 

numbers and sent communications to several email addresses. 

Although Karina provided a mailing address and phone number
12

on her section 388 petition in December 2018, the Department 

was unable to contact her using that information. 

In reviewing the court files from the prior dependency 

proceedings, the Department located a court document from 

August 2013 that indicated “[Karina] may have Navajo 

[ancestry].” However, according to the court records, when the 

court ordered the adoptions of Josiah’s three siblings, the juvenile 

court found that ICWA did not apply. During these proceedings, 

Karina also “denied” any Indian ancestry. 

The Department interviewed paternal family members 

David, Maria and Cristal. David stated that Karina did not have 

Indian ancestry and that he “didn’t know” any information about 

Karina’s relatives. While Maria stated Karina’s children “may 

have” Indian ancestry, she had “no further information.” Maria 

stated there was no Indian ancestry within her family. Cristal 

stated that “she is not a blood relation of [Karina]” and that she 

did not have any “information as to Indian [ancestry] for 

[Karina].” The Department attempted to contact Karina’s 

parents. However, the Department was unsuccessful because it 

could not obtain current contact information for them. The 

Department’s investigation did not identify any other relatives 

for Karina. On the ICWA-030 form, for Karina’s parents and 

Karina under “Tribe or band,” the Department stated: “Navajo; 

Unknown Location,” and for their “Tribal membership,” the 

Department stated: “Unknown.” The Department listed the full 

names for Karina’s parents, their dates of birth, and last known 

addresses. 

On February 28, 2018, the Department sent via certified 

mail the ICWA-030 form to, and in March 2018 received certified 

mail receipts from, David; the Secretary of the Interior; the 
13

Western Regional Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs; the 

Southwest Regional Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs; the 

Navajo Region, Bureau of Indian Affairs; the Navajo Nation; the 

Colorado River Indian Tribes; and the Ramah Navajo Tribe. The 

Navajo tribes, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Secretary of 

the Interior did not provide further information regarding 

Karina’s possible Indian ancestry or whether Josiah was an 

Indian child. The Ramah Navajo Tribe stated they did not have 

“access to the entire Navajo Nation Census records and therefore 

[could] not confirm or deny” if Josiah or his parents were 

“enrolled or eligible members of the Navajo Nation.” The Ramah 

Navajo Tribe stated that it would forward the notice to the 

“Navajo Nation ICWA Office.” In a letter dated March 5, 2018, 

the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Navajo Regional Office stated, “The 

Notice(s) indicate[ ] that you have properly notified the Navajo 

Nation. Each tribe is responsible for determining whom they 

enroll.” (Boldface omitted.) In a letter dated March 14, 2018, the 

Bureau of Indian Affairs, Western Regional Office advised, “The 

Department notified the Navajo Tribes/Nation; therefore, no 

action or response is required.” (Boldface and underscoring 

omitted.) In a letter dated March 15, 2018, the Bureau of Indian 

Affairs, Southwest Regional office stated: “Information indicates 

that the child’s tribal affiliation may be Navajo. The Notice 

indicates that the Navajo Nation and two affiliated tribes were 

notified. Enclosed is contact information for tribes affiliated with

the Navajo Nation. The Bureau of Indian Affairs does not 

research or determine tribal enrollment for tribes. No action is 

taken.” 

After the Department filed all pertinent information at a

May 24, 2018 hearing, the juvenile court found that it “does not 
14

have a reason to know that [Josiah] is an Indian Child, as defined 

under ICWA, and does not order notice to any tribe or the 

[Bureau of Indian Affairs]. Parents are to keep the Department, 

their Attorney and the Court aware of any new information 

relating to possible ICWA status. ICWA-020, the Parental 

Notification of Indian Status is signed and filed.”3 

DISCUSSION

A. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in 

Denying David’s Request To Continue the Hearing

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

The juvenile court has the power to “control all proceedings 

during the hearings with a view to the expeditious and effective 

ascertainment of the jurisdictional facts and the ascertainment of 

all information relative to the present condition and future 

welfare of the person upon whose behalf the petition is brought.” 

(§ 350, subd. (a)(1); see In re Emily D. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 

438, 448.) As a general matter, “[c]ontinuances are discouraged 

in dependency cases.” (In re Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 

594, 604; accord, In re Elijah V. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 576, 585.) 

“[T]he juvenile court has authority to grant brief, necessary 

continuances that are not inconsistent with the child’s best 

interests, while giving ‘substantial weight to a minor’s need for 

prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to 

3 The Department’s reports stated that July 30, 2018 was the 

date on which the juvenile court found that ICWA did not apply. 

However, the July 30, 2018 hearing transcript and minute order 

did not mention ICWA. A copy of the ICWA-020 form referenced 

in the May 24, 2018 minute order is not part of the record. An 

ICWA-020 form as to David, signed by David and filed on October 

12, 2017, is part of the record.
15

provide children with stable environments, and the damage to a 

minor of prolonged temporary placements.’” (In re Abbigail A.

(2016) 1 Cal.5th 83, 95; see § 352, subd. (a)(2) [“[c]ontinuances 

shall be granted only upon a showing of good cause and only for 

that period of time shown to be necessary by the evidence 

presented at the hearing on the motion for the continuance”]; Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 5.550(a)(4) [“[i]n order to obtain a 

continuance, written notice with supporting documents must be 

filed and served on all parties at least two court days before the 

date set for hearing, unless the court finds good cause for hearing 

an oral motion”].) 

“We review the juvenile court’s denial of a continuance for 

abuse of discretion.” (In re D.Y. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1044, 

1056; accord, In re Giovanni F., supra, 184 Cal.App.4th 594; In re 

Elijah V., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 585; In re A.B. (2014) 225 

Cal.App.4th 1358, 1366.) 

2. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its 

Discretion

David argues that the juvenile court erred in denying his 

request to continue the section 366.26 hearing so he could 

“consider the possibility of filing a section 388 petition.” David 

further argues, “If [he] had evidence that could support a section 

388 petition, a comparable continuance would not have been 

contrary to Josiah’s interest.” 

The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

David’s request for a continuance. David had more than 

sufficient opportunity to bring to the juvenile court’s attention 

any information bearing on his ability to parent Josiah. After the 

Department filed the petition in October 2017, and the court 

denied David and Karina reunification services in July 2018, the 
16

juvenile court set the section 366.26 hearing for November 2018. 

After several continuances, the section 366.26 hearing took place 

in October 2019, almost one year later. Despite the passage of 

almost two years since the Department filed the petition, David 

only raised the “possibility” of filing a section 388 petition at the 

section 366.26 hearing. David did not explain why he waited 

until moments before the hearing to discuss a section 388 petition 

with his counsel. In support of the continuance request, David 

also failed to state that he was going to file a section 388 petition, 

that he had sufficient evidence to support such a petition, or that 

a continuance was consistent with Josiah’s best interests. 

David’s possible section 388 petition failed to qualify as good 

cause necessary for a continuance.4

Under these circumstances, the juvenile court acted well 

within its discretion in denying David’s request for a continuance 

of the selection and implementation hearing.

B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in 

Denying David a Contested Hearing

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

“The section 366.26 hearing is a critical late stage in a 

dependency proceeding. The child has been under juvenile court 

jurisdiction for an extended period following the dispositional 

order, and the court has held one or more review hearings to 

consider a return to parental custody. [Citation.] At the section 

366.26 hearing, the focus shifts away from family reunification 

and toward the selection and implementation of a permanent 

4 David contends he requested a three-day continuance. 

However, according to the hearing transcript, David’s counsel did 

not specify a length of time for the continuance. 
17

plan for the child. [Citation.] . . . If adoption is likely, the court is 

required to terminate parental rights, unless specified 

circumstances compel a finding that termination would be 

detrimental to the child.” (In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 532; 

see In re Noah G. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1299

[“‘[w]henever the court finds “that it is likely the child will be 

adopted, the court shall terminate parental rights and order the 

child placed for adoption.”’”].)

“One exception to adoption is the beneficial parental 

relationship exception. This exception is set forth in section 

366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) which states: ‘[T]he court shall 

terminate parental rights unless either of the following applies: 

. . . . [¶] (B) The court finds a compelling reason for determining 

that termination would be detrimental to the child due to one or 

more of the following circumstances: [¶] (i) The parents have 

maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the 

child would benefit from continuing the relationship.’” (In re 

Noah G., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1300.) “Application of the 

beneficial parent-child relationship exception consists of a twoprong analysis. [Citation.] The first prong inquires whether 

there has been regular visitation and contact between the parent 

and child. [Citation.] The second asks whether there is a 

sufficiently strong bond between the parent and child that the 

child would suffer detriment from its termination. [Citation.] [¶] 

The first prong is quantitative and relatively straightforward, 

asking whether visitation occurred regularly and often. 

[Citation.] [¶] In contrast, the second prong involves a 

qualitative, more nuanced analysis, and cannot be assessed by 

merely looking at whether an event, i.e. visitation, occurred.

Rather, the second prong requires a parent to prove that the bond 
18

between the parent and child is sufficiently strong that the child 

would suffer detriment from its termination. [Citation.] In 

applying this exception, the court must take into account 

numerous variables, including but not limited to (1) the age of the 

child, (2) the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s 

custody, (3) the “‘positive’” or “‘negative’” effect of interaction 

between parent and child, and (4) the child’s unique needs.” 

(In re Grace P. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 605, 612-613.)

“The [parent] has the burden of proving [his or] her 

relationship with the children would outweigh the well-being 

they would gain in a permanent home with an adoptive parent.

[Citations.] Evidence of frequent and loving contact is not 

enough to establish a beneficial parental relationship. 

[Citations.] The [parent] also must show [he or] she occupies a 

parental role in the children’s lives.” (In re Noah G., supra, 247 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1300; see In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 

621 [“[n]o matter how loving and frequent the contact, and 

notwithstanding the existence of an ‘emotional bond’ with the 

child, ‘the parents must show that they occupy “a parental role” 

in the child’s life’”]; In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 557

[“‘[w]here a biological parent . . . is incapable of functioning in 

that role, the child should be given every opportunity to bond 

with an individual who will assume the role of a parent’”]; In re 

Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 577 [severing the 

relationship between the parent and the child was not 

“detrimental to [the child] because the relationship was one of 

friends, not of parent and child”].)

“Parents can request a contested hearing . . . to present 

evidence supporting their claim that an exception to termination 

of parental rights exists.” (In re Grace P., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at 
19

p. 611.) “A parent has a right to due process at a section 366.26 

hearing resulting in the termination of parental rights, which 

includes a meaningful opportunity to be heard, present evidence, 

and confront witnesses. However, these procedural rights are 

subject to evidentiary principles. . . . Since due process does not 

authorize a parent ‘to introduce irrelevant evidence, due process 

does not require a court to hold a contested hearing if it is not 

convinced the parent will present relevant evidence on the issue 

he or she seeks to contest.’ . . . The parent’s offer of proof ‘must be 

specific, setting forth the actual evidence to be produced, not 

merely the facts or issues to be addressed and argued.’” (Id. at 

pp. 611-612; see In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 973, 1006 [“a 

parent asserting an exception to adoption at a 366.26 hearing is 

not automatically entitled to a hearing, and the juvenile court 

may require him or her to make an offer of proof demonstrating 

that the parent will present specific evidence to support the 

claimed exception”]; M.T. v. Superior Court (2009) 178 

Cal.App.4th 1170, 1180 [offer of proof permissible at section 

366.26 hearing because parent had burden to show applicability 

of an exception to termination of parental rights]; In re 

Thomas R. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 726, 732 [“[p]recluding the 

parents from exploring and testing the sufficiency of the 

Department’s evidence is fundamentally different than requiring 

them to describe evidence they will offer to prove a point”]; In re 

Tamika T. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1122 [the “due process 

right to present evidence is limited to relevant evidence of 

significant probative value to the issue before the court” (italics 

omitted)].) 

We review the juvenile court’s denial of a contested hearing 

for abuse of discretion. (In re Grace P., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at 
20

p. 611; In re A.B. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1420, 1434; Ingrid E. v. 

Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 751, 758-759.)

2. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its 

Discretion in Denying a Contested Hearing

David contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by 

denying his request for a contested hearing on the application of 

the beneficial parental relationship exception under section 

366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). The Department contends that 

David’s “offer of proof was insufficient to warrant a contested 

hearing.” The juvenile court reasonably concluded that David’s 

offer of proof was deficient. 

The juvenile court detained Josiah from David and ordered 

David’s visitation with Josiah to be monitored at the 

Department’s office. After the criminal court issued a 10-year 

restraining order against David protecting Maria in November 

2015, David went to jail in part because he violated the 

restraining order in July 2017. Nonetheless, David argues that 

he “continued to see” Josiah while David “was living” with Maria, 

“[t]hough this was not how [David] was supposed to have contact 

with Josiah.” However, aside from David’s violations of court 

orders, David’s offer of proof failed to mention that he had lived 

with Maria and Josiah. Thus, David’s offer of proof did not set 

forth actual evidence as to how long David claimed that he lived 

with Josiah, how often David saw Josiah given David’s work 

schedule, or any other information regarding their time together.

Further, other than several brief references in the Department’s 

reports that Maria had allowed David “access to Josiah” in her 

home, there was no information regarding David’s contact with 

Josiah in Maria’s home. The evidence established that, from 

November 28, 2017 to the October 2019 section 366.26 hearing, 
21

David visited Josiah four times; with his last visit on July 12, 

2018. 

In his offer of proof, David did not set forth evidence that 

he had maintained regular visitation and contact with Josiah. 

Rather, David sought to explain why he had not visited Josiah at 

least since February 1, 2019 when the Department removed 

Josiah from Maria’s home and placed him with Cristal and 

Emmanuel. David did not explain why he was dealing with 

Cristal to arrange visits and not following the juvenile court’s 

order for monitored visitation at the Department’s office. In July 

2019, when the Department reported that David “agreed” to call 

the social worker “to schedule his visits,” David did not mention 

that there was any impediment to his visitation. Because David 

failed to state with specificity the evidence he would produce in a 

contested hearing to meet the first requirement of the beneficial 

parent-child relationship exception, the juvenile court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying David’s request for a contested 

hearing. (In re A.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 1010 [“[a] 

parent’s failure to set forth specific evidence, especially with a 

record negating the parent’s regular visitation of the minor, will 

justify the denial of a hearing”]; see In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 

Cal.App.5th 636, 647 [juvenile court’s decision may be based on 

“any or all of the component determinations” of the beneficial 

parent-child relationship]; In re Marcelo B. (2012) 209 

Cal.App.4th 635, 643 [‘“[s]pordic visitation is insufficient’”].)

Further, David’s offer of proof did not include evidence on 

the strength of his bond with Josiah, the kind of role he assumed 

in his life (as a parent, friend, or otherwise), whether Josiah 

considered David his father, or how Josiah would suffer if the 

juvenile court terminated David’s parental rights. David’s vague 
22

and general reference to Josiah’s “best interests” gave no 

information about any impact of termination of David’s parental 

rights on Josiah. The same is true for the statement that David 

had “certificates of completion.” (In re A.G., supra, 58

Cal.App.5th at p. 1006 [“[i]t may be readily concluded that, for 

example, an offer of proof containing the assertion of the fact that 

the parent had a close parent-child bond with the minor−without 

identification of a witness or witnesses who would so testify to 

that fact−would not be sufficient”]; see In re Tamika T., supra, 97 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1124 [“[t]he offer of proof must be specific, 

setting forth the actual evidence to be produced”]; cf. In re 

Grace P., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 614 [father’s offer of proof 

was sufficient where he represented that he would testify “about 

the positive quality of his visitation, how he parented all three 

children during visits,” and how “the children considered him to 

be a father figure” and that his daughter would testify “regarding 

how she enjoyed visits with [him], saw [him] as a parent, and 

would be sad if visitation with [him] ended”].) 

Because he had the burden of proving the parent-child 

relationship exception applied, David was obligated to state with 

specificity the evidence he would produce in a contested hearing. 

(In re A.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 996 [“[t]he burden is on 

the parent asserting the parental relationship exception to 

produce evidence establishing that exception”]; In re Grace P., 

supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 611 [“[i]f the parents have failed to 

reunify and the court has found the child likely to be adopted, the 

burden shifts to the parents to show exceptional circumstances 

exist such that termination would be detrimental to the child”]; 

In re Breanna S., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 646 [“[t]he parent 

has the burden of proving the statutory exception applies”]; 
23

In re K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 621 [same]; see In re 

Cristella C. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1372-1373 [“[u]nder 

[section 366.26] there is no requirement that an absence of 

benefit from continuing the [parent-child] relationship be proved 

as an element of termination”].)

The juvenile court acted within its discretion in denying 

David’s request for a contested section 366.26 hearing. (See 

generally In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 [“[i]n any 

custody determination, a primary consideration in determining 

the child’s best interests is the goal of assuring stability and 

continuity”]; In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307 [once 

reunification efforts have been found unsuccessful, the court then 

must “concentrate its efforts . . . on the child’s placement and 

well-being, rather than on a parent’s challenge to a custody 

order”]; Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 250, 

259 [when the child is adoptable and declining to apply one of the 

statutory exceptions would not cause detriment to the child, the 

decision to terminate parental rights is “‘relatively automatic’”].)

C. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile Court’s 

ICWA Findings as to Karina 

1. Applicable Law

a. ICWA inquiry requirements 

“ICWA established minimum standards for state courts to 

follow before removing Indian children from their families and 

placing them in foster care or adoptive homes.” (In re D.S. (2020) 

46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1048.) Under ICWA and the California law 

implementing it, “‘Indian child’ means any unmarried person who 

is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian 

tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is 

the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. 
24

§ 1903(4); see § 224.1, subd. (a) [adopting the federal definition]; 

In re D.S., at p. 1048 [“[a]n ‘Indian child’ is defined in the same 

manner [under California law] as under federal law”].) 

“ICWA itself does not impose a duty on courts or child 

welfare agencies to inquire as to whether a child in a dependency 

proceeding is an Indian child. [Citation.] Federal regulations 

implementing ICWA, however, require that state courts ‘ask each 

participant in an emergency or voluntary or involuntary childcustody proceeding whether the participant knows or has reason 

to know that the child is an Indian child.’ [Citation.] The court 

must also ‘instruct the parties to inform the court if they 

subsequently receive information that provides reason to know 

the child is an Indian child.’” (In re Austin J. (2020) 47

Cal.App.5th 870, 882-883; see 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a).)

In addition, “ICWA provides that states may provide ‘a 

higher standard of protection to the rights of the parent or Indian 

custodian of an Indian child than the rights provided under’ 

ICWA. (25 U.S.C. § 1921.) Under California law, the court and 

county child welfare department ‘have an affirmative and 

continuing duty to inquire whether a child,’ who is the subject of 

a juvenile dependency petition, ‘is or may be an Indian child.’ 

(§ 224.2, subd. (a); see . . . Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a).) The 

child welfare department’s initial duty of inquiry includes ‘asking 

the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended 

family members, others who have an interest in the child, and 

the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or 

may be, an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or 

Indian custodian is domiciled.’ (§ 224.2, subd. (b).)” (In re 

Austin J., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 883; accord, In re T.G. 

(2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275; In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 
25

566; In re D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1049.)5

“California law also requires ‘further inquiry regarding the 

possible Indian status of the child’ when ‘the court, social worker, 

or probation officer has reason to believe that an Indian child is 

involved [or, under Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4), “may be 

involved”] in a proceeding. . . . ’ (§ 224.2, subd. (e).”) (In re 

Austin J., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 883.) Former section 224.2, 

subdivision (e), which is applicable to this appeal, did not define 

“reason to believe.” (In re Austin J., at p. 883 [the “Legislature, 

which added the ‘reason to believe’ threshold for making a 

further inquiry in 2018, [had] not define[d] the phrase”].)6 “When 

5 Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature repealed sections 

224.2 and 224.3 and enacted new versions of those statutes. 

(Assem. Bill No. 3176 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2018, ch. 

833, §§ 5, 7.) Although the juvenile court made the ICWA 

findings regarding Karina in May 2018, the law in effect in 

October 2019 when the section 366.26 hearings were held applies 

to this appeal. (See In re A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 303, 321 

[“[s]ince Mother is appealing from the findings made at the 

September 6, 2019 section 366.26 hearing and not those in 2017 

or 2018, the current ICWA statutes apply”]; see also Isaiah W.

(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 10 [“Properly understood, Ashlee’s present 

appeal does not seek to challenge the juvenile court’s finding of 

ICWA’s inapplicability underlying the January 2012 dispositional 

order. It instead seeks to challenge the juvenile court’s finding of 

ICWA’s inapplicability underlying the April 2013 order 

terminating her parental rights”].)

6 The Legislature, however, has since amended section 224.2, 

subdivision (e), effective September 18, 2020, to provide a 

definition. (Assem. Bill No. 2944 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 

2020, ch. 104, § 15.) As amended, the statute now provides: 

“There is reason to believe a child involved in a proceeding is an 

Indian child whenever the court, social worker, or probation 
26

that [‘reason to believe’] threshold is reached, the requisite 

‘further inquiry’ ‘includes: (1) interviewing the parents and 

extended family members; (2) contacting the Bureau of Indian 

Affairs and State Department of Social Services; and 

(3) contacting tribes the child may be affiliated with, and anyone 

else, that might have information regarding the child’s 

membership or eligibility in a tribe.’” (Ibid.; see § 224.2, subds. 

(e)(2)(A)-(C); former § 224.2, subds. (e)(1)-(3).) “Contact with a 

tribe shall, at a minimum, include telephone, facsimile, or 

electronic mail contact to each tribe’s designated agent for receipt 

of notices under” ICWA and “shall include sharing information 

identified by the tribe as necessary for the tribe to make a 

membership or eligibility determination, as well as information 

on the current status of the child and the case.” (§ 224.2, 

subd. (e)(2)(C); see former § 224.2, subd. (e)(3)). Notably, “[t]he 

sharing of information with tribes at this inquiry stage is distinct 

officer has information suggesting that either the parent of the 

child or the child is a member or may be eligible for membership 

in an Indian tribe. Information suggesting membership or 

eligibility for membership includes, but is not limited to, 

information that indicates, but does not establish, the existence 

of one or more of the grounds for reason to know [that a child is 

an Indian child] enumerated in paragraphs (1) to (6), inclusive, of 

subdivision (d).” (§ 224.2, subd.(e)(1).) Effective January 1, 2020, 

California Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4), now provides: “If the 

social worker . . . or petitioner knows or has reason to know or 

believe that an Indian child is or may be involved, that person or 

entity must make further inquiry as soon as practicable . . . .” 

(Emphasis added.) Notwithstanding these amendments, we refer 

in our opinion to section 242, subdivision (e), and California 

Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4) as they read in October 2019 

when the section 366.26 hearing took place.
27

from formal ICWA notice, which requires a ‘reason to 

know’―rather than a ‘reason to believe’—that the child is an 

Indian child.” (In re D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1049.) 

b. ICWA notice requirements

“In addition to the inquiry that is required in every 

dependency case from the outset and the ‘further inquiry’ 

required under California law when there is a ‘reason to believe’ 

an Indian child is [or may be] involved, a third step—notice to 

Indian tribes—is required under ICWA and California law if and 

when ‘the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child 

is involved.’” (In re Austin J., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at pp. 883-

884; see 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); § 224.3, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 5.481(b)(1); see also In re D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 1050 [“If the inquiry establishes a reason to know an Indian 

child is involved, notice must be provided to the pertinent 

tribes.”].)

A “‘reason to know’ exists under any of the following 

circumstances: ‘(1) A person having an interest in the child, 

including the child, an officer of the court, a tribe, an Indian 

organization, a public or private agency, or a member of the 

child’s extended family informs the court that the child is an 

Indian child[;] [¶] (2) The residence or domicile of the child, the 

child’s parents, or Indian custodian is on a reservation or in an 

Alaska Native village[;] [¶] (3) Any participant in the proceeding, 

officer of the court, Indian tribe, Indian organization, or agency 

informs the court that it has discovered information indicating 

that the child is an Indian child[;] [¶] (4) The child who is the 

subject of the proceeding gives the court reason to know [he or 

she] is an Indian child[;] [¶] (5) The court is informed that the 

child is or has been a ward of a tribal court[;] and [¶] (6) The 
28

court is informed that either parent or the child possess an 

identification card indicating membership or citizenship in an 

Indian tribe.’ (§ 224.2, subd. (d).)” (In re D.S., supra, 

46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1049-1050.) 

Notice to a tribe “must include enough information for the 

tribe to ‘conduct a meaningful review of its records to determine 

the child’s eligibility for membership.’” (In re D.S., supra, 46

Cal.App.5th at p. 1050; see In re Cheyanne F. (2008) 164

Cal.App.4th 571, 576 [“[t]he purpose of the ICWA notice 

provisions is to enable the tribe or the [Bureau of Indian Affairs]

to investigate and determine whether the child is in fact an 

Indian child”].) This includes providing “identifying information 

for the child’s biological parents, grandparents, and greatgrandparents, to the extent known.” (In re D.S., at p. 1050; see 

§ 224.3, subd. (a)(5)(C).) “A determination by an Indian tribe that 

a child is or is not a member of, or eligible for membership in, 

that tribe . . . shall be conclusive.” (§ 224.2, subd. (h).) 

To summarize: An initial “duty of inquiry applies to every 

‘child for whom a petition under Section 300, 601, or 602 may be 

or has been filed’ (§ 224.2, subd. (a)),” the “duty of further inquiry 

applies when there is a ‘reason to believe that an Indian child is 

involved [or, under Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4), “may be

involved”] in a proceeding’ (§ 224.2, subd. (e)),” and “the duty to 

provide notice to Indian tribes applies only when one knows or 

has a ‘reason to know . . . an Indian child is involved.’” (In re 

Austin J., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 884; see In re M.W. (2020) 

49 Cal.App.5th 1034, 1047 [“a ‘reason to believe’ the minor is an 

Indian child triggers requirements less rigorous than does a 

‘reason to know’”].)
29

2. Standard of Review 

Where, as here, the juvenile court finds ICWA does not 

apply to a child,7 “[t]he finding implies that . . . social workers 

and the court did not know or have a reason to know the children 

were Indian children and that social workers had fulfilled their 

duty of inquiry.” (In re Austin J., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 885; 

see In re D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1050 [“[t]he juvenile 

court may . . . make a finding that ICWA does not apply because 

the Agency’s further inquiry and due diligence was ‘proper and 

adequate’ but no ‘reason to know’ whether the child is an Indian 

child was discovered”].) “We review a court’s ICWA findings for 

substantial evidence. [Citations.] ‘We must uphold the court’s 

orders and findings if any substantial evidence, contradicted or 

uncontradicted, supports them, and we resolve all conflicts in 

favor of affirmance.’” (In re Austin J., at p. 885.) The appellant 

“‘has the burden to show that the evidence was not sufficient to 

support the findings and orders.’” (Ibid.)

3. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile 

Court’s ICWA Finding

David argues, “Despite the duty of continuing inquiry, [the 

Department] did not inquire about [Karina’s] ancestry” when 

Karina “appeared” to file her section 388 petition. David also 

argues that the “[Department] continued to cite the [incorrect] 

July [2018] hearing as resolving the issue.” 

7 We construe the juvenile court’s finding at the May 2018 

hearing it did “not have a reason to know” Josiah was an Indian 

child as a finding ICWA did not apply. (See In re D.S., supra, 46 

Cal.App.5th at p. 1050.) 
30

David’s argument that the Department failed to inquire 

when Karina appeared to file the section 388 petition in 

December 2018 is incorrect. The Department’s due diligence 

efforts included inquiry regarding the address and telephone 

number Karina listed on her section 388 petition. The 

Department spoke with the mother of Karina’s former boyfriend, 

who resided at the address Karina provided. The former 

boyfriend’s mother stated that, when Karina and her son 

“separated[, Karina] moved out of her house and has not been 

back since.” In addition, the Department twice called the 

telephone number Karina listed on her section 388 petition and 

left voicemail messages “requesting a call back.” Further, 

although David characterizes Karina as “appear[ing]” when she 

filed her petition, there was no appearance because the juvenile 

court denied Karina’s petition without a hearing. Karina did not 

attend a hearing in court. David fails to identify what else the 

Department could have done to locate Karina or further 

investigate her possible Indian ancestry. 

During its investigation, the Department located a 

document from the prior dependency proceedings indicating that 

Karina “may have Navajo [ancestry],” and Maria told the 

Department that Karina’s “children may have Indian [ancestry].” 

To the extent that this information constituted “reason to believe 

that an Indian child is [or may be] involved,” the Department 

conducted an adequate and proper “further inquiry” under 

section 224.2, subdivision (e). (See In re T.G., supra, 58

Cal.App.5th at p. 295 [“[a]dditional investigation may not develop 

further information establishing the need for ICWA notice, but it 

is essential to the enforcement of the court’s and child protective 

agency’s ‘affirmative and continuing duty to inquire’ to construe 
31

broadly the duty to make further inquiry]; In re M.W., supra, 49 

Cal.App.5th at p. 1044 [father’s statement he may have Indian 

ancestry even though he could not identify the tribe, “trigger[ed] 

the provisions of section 224.2, subdivision (e), which required 

the court and the Department to make further inquiry as soon as 

practicable”]; In re D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1052 [aunt’s 

statement of possible Indian ancestry established a reason to 

believe the child was an Indian child and triggered a duty of 

further inquiry].) 

In addition to its extensive search for Karina, the 

Department attempted to contact Karina’s parents using their 

last known contact information and searched databases for 

updated contact information. Despite its efforts, the Department 

could not locate Karina’s relatives. The Department also 

interviewed David, and Cristal, who adopted three of Karina’s 

children. David stated that Karina did not have Indian ancestry. 

Cristal had no relevant information. In accordance with section 

224.2, subdivision (e), the Department sent the ICWA-030 form

via certified mail to three Navajo tribes, three Regional Directors 

of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Secretary of the Interior,

none responded that Karina had Indian ancestry or that Josiah 

was an Indian child. The Department also learned that Karina, 

in the prior dependency proceedings involving Josiah’s siblings, 

denied she had Indian ancestry, and the juvenile court found 

ICWA did not apply. In addition to reporting the results of its 

investigation to the juvenile court, the Department filed the 

notices, the receipts of notice and the responsive letters in court 

before the juvenile court made its May 2018 ICWA determination 
32

as to Karina.8 To the extent required, the Department conducted 

an adequate and proper “further inquiry” under section 224.2, 

subdivision (e). (See In re D.F., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 570 

[“[b]ased on the record before us, we find [the Department] made 

a good faith effort to gather information about the children’s 

membership status or eligibility. [The Department’s] inquiry 

obligation is ‘not an absolute duty to ascertain or refute Native 

American ancestry’”]; In re D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1054 

[“the Agency followed the proper procedures in conducting its 

further inquiry, but the limited information provided by Aunt 

was too attenuated for the Agency to do anything further”].)

Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s findings

that there was “no reason to know” that Josiah was an Indian 

child and that ICWA did not apply. (In re D.F., supra, 55 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 571-572 [“DCFS’s further inquiry did not 

result in a reason to know the children are Indian children. We 

conclude the court’s finding that ICWA does not apply to the 

children is supported by substantial evidence”]; In re M.W., 

supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 1048 [“[t]he Department satisfied the 

criteria set forth in section 224.2, subdivision (e) and the juvenile 

court’s finding that, based on the evidence provided, there was no 

reason to know the minor was an Indian child and no further 

noticing was required, and its determination that the ICWA did 

not apply were supported by substantial evidence”].) 

8 The Department’s incorrect references in its reports that 

the juvenile court made this finding in July 2018 were irrelevant 

because the juvenile court had the results of the Department’s 

ICWA investigation at the May 2018 hearing.
33

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s October 17, 2019 order is affirmed.

DILLON, J.*

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

SEGAL, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.