2011 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

9-28-2011

Mauricio Materon v. David Ebbert

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 11-2872

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Recommended Citation

"Mauricio Materon v. David Ebbert" (2011). 2011 Decisions. Paper 456.

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CLD-276 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 11-2872

___________

MAURICIO MATERON,

Appellant

v.

WARDEN DAVID EBBERT, Allenwood FCI

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 11-0648)

District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

August 25, 2011

Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: September 28, 2011)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

Pro se appellant Mauricio Materon appeals the District Court‟s order denying his 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons discussed 

below, we will summarily affirm the District Court‟s judgment. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 
2

I.O.P. 10.6.

Materon is a federal prisoner. On October 12, 2010, Officer Morales observed 

Materon speaking on a cellular phone in his cell. Officer Morales confiscated the phone, 

and Materon was charged with possession, manufacture, or introduction of a hazardous 

tool in violation of Code 108, 28 C.F.R. § 541.13, Table 3. After a hearing, the Unit 

Disciplinary Committee found Materon guilty of the Code 108 offense. The Discipline 

Hearing Officer (DHO) noted that Materon did not dispute that he had possessed a cell 

phone, and held that this constituted a violation of Code 108. More specifically, the 

DHO concluded that cell phones qualify as “hazardous tools” because they have “been 

used to arrange rendezvous for escapes” and “to arrange contraband introductions.” This 

interpretation, the DHO, stressed, was consistent with a memorandum issued by Warden 

Donna Zickefoose. Materon was sentenced to 30 days of disciplinary segregation, 

disallowance of 40 days of good conduct time, forfeiture of 540 days of non-vested good 

conduct time, and loss of various privileges. 

In April 2011, Materon filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the 

District Court. Materon claimed that the DHO had violated his due process rights by 

finding him guilty of the Code 108 offense. According to Materon, cell phones did not 

qualify as “hazardous tools” under 108; rather, his conduct was punishable under only 

Code 305, which prescribes less-severe penalties than Code 108. The District Court 

denied Materon‟s petition, and Materon filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.1

 

1 Challenges by federal prisoners to the loss of good time credits are properly brought under § 

2241, see Queen v. Miner, 530 F.3d 253, 254 n.2 (3d Cir. 2009), and a certificate of appealability 
3

Federal prisoners have a liberty interest in statutory good time credits. See Vega, 

493 F.3d at 317 n.4. When a prison disciplinary hearing may result in the loss of good 

time credits, the prisoner is entitled to “(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary 

charges; (2) an opportunity . . . to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his 

defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the 

reasons for the disciplinary action.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). In 

addition, the disciplinary decision must be supported by “some evidence” — that is, “any 

evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary 

board.” Id. at 455-56.

Materon presents a single argument — that Code 305, not Code 108, covers his 

offense. Code 108 prohibits “[p]ossession, manufacture, or introduction of a hazardous 

tool (Tools most likely to be used in an escape or escape attempt or to serve as weapons 

capable of doing serious bodily harm to others; or those hazardous to institutional 

security or personal safety; e.g., hack-saw blade).” 28 C.F.R. § 541.13, Table 3. Code 

305, meanwhile, prohibits “[p]ossession of anything not authorized for retention or 

receipt by the inmate, and not issued to him through regular channels.” Id.

We agree with the District Court that Materon‟s argument lacks merit. The DHO 

determined, in accordance with a memorandum issued by the warden, that cell phones 

were “hazardous tools” because they could be used to facilitate escape or to engage in 

 

is not required to appeal the denial of a federal prisoner‟s § 2241 petition, see Burkey v. 

Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2009). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(a). We exercise plenary review over the District Court‟s legal conclusions and 

apply a clearly erroneous standard to its findings of fact. Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 

314 (3d Cir. 2007).
4

other illegal activities, and thus represent “a threat to the security and orderly running of 

the institution.” Therefore, the DHO concluded, Materon‟s conduct was punishable 

under Code 108. This interpretation is consistent with the language of Code 108, and we 

thus discern no error in the DHO‟s analysis. See Chong v. Dist. Dir., INS, 264 F.3d 378, 

389 (3d Cir. 2001) (“An agency‟s interpretation of its own regulation is 

„controlling . . . unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.‟” 

(quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)). 

Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court‟s order denying 

Materon‟s § 2241 petition. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.