UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4005

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CHARLES MORANI KARGBO,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony J. Trenga, 

District Judge. (1:10-cr-00177-AJT-1)

Submitted: February 16, 2012 Decided: February 24, 2012

Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

J. Brian Donnelly, PRICE, PERKINS, LARKEN & DONNELLY, Virginia 

Beach, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States 

Attorney, Jonathan L. Fahey, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Charles Morani Kargbo appeals the district court’s 

judgment following his conviction by a federal jury of 

conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1951 (2006) (Count 1), attempted Hobbs Act robbery in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951, 2 (2006) (Count 3); and two 

counts of use and carry of a firearm during and in relation to a 

crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A), 2 

(2006) (Counts 4 and 6).∗

 We affirm.

Kargbo contends that his arrest was an unlawful 

seizure and therefore that the district court erred by not 

suppressing the statements he made to law enforcement officers 

at an interview following his arrest. We review the factual 

findings underlying a district court’s ruling on a motion to 

suppress for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. 

United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011). 

When evaluating the denial of a suppression motion, we construe 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. Id.

Kargbo was arrested without a warrant. “Police 

officers can make warrantless arrests as long as they act on the 

 ∗ The jury further found Kargbo guilty of another count of 

Hobbs Act robbery and use and carry of a firearm during and in 

relation to a crime of violence, but the district court granted 

Kargbo’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to those two 

counts.
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basis of probable cause.” United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 

1070, 1073 (4th Cir. 1993). Probable cause sufficient to 

support such a warrantless arrest is present when the

facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge 

that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or 

one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the 

circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, 

is committing, or is about to commit an offense. The 

evidence needed to establish probable cause is more 

than a mere suspicion, rumor, or strong reason to 

suspect but less than evidence sufficient to convict.

United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 1070, 1073-74 (4th Cir. 1993) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Such was the case here. Based on an eyewitness 

identification during one incident and striking similarities 

with incidents that occurred shortly thereafter, law enforcement 

had reason to believe that Kargbo had been involved in the 

commission of a string of both attempted and completed armed 

robberies at the time of his arrest. His warrantless arrest was 

supported by probable cause. Thus, we find no merit in Kargbo’s 

argument that his post-arrest statements were “fruit of the 

poisonous tree.”

Kargbo also claims error in the district court’s 

denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on Counts 3 and 

6. We review the denial of such a motion de novo. United 

States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 216 (4th Cir. 2006). A defendant 

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence faces a heavy 
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burden. United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 

1997). The verdict of a jury must be sustained “if, viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the 

verdict is supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Smith, 451 

F.3d at 216. Substantial evidence is “evidence that a 

reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and 

sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

We are mindful that “the jury, not the reviewing court, weighs 

the credibility of the evidence and resolves any conflicts in 

the evidence presented.” Beidler, 110 F.3d at 1067 (internal 

quotation marks and brackets omitted). “Reversal for 

insufficient evidence is reserved for the rare case where the 

prosecution’s failure is clear.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

A conspirator’s “acts in furtherance of the conspiracy 

are ‘attributable to the others for the purpose of holding them 

responsible for the substantive offense,’ when those acts are 

reasonably foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the 

unlawful agreement.” United States v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 549, 557 

n.16 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinkerton v. United States, 328 

U.S. 640, 647 (1946)). “The Pinkerton doctrine makes a person 

liable for substantive offenses committed by a co-conspirator 

when their commission is reasonably foreseeable and in 
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furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States v. Ashley, 606 

F.3d 135, 142-43 (4th Cir. 2010).

We find that the district court properly upheld the 

jury’s finding of guilt under a Pinkerton theory of conspirator 

liability. The attempted robbery at issue was within the scope 

of the conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable to Kargbo given the 

almost identical robbery of a similar business the previous day. 

The use of a gun was likewise foreseeable because the conspiracy 

involved the commission of armed robberies. Thus, we find no 

error.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.

AFFIRMED