United States Tax Court

160 T.C. No. 1

BLAKE M. ADAMS,

Petitioner

v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent

—————

Docket No. 1527-21P. Filed January 24, 2023.

—————

P had more than $1.2 million in unpaid, legally 

enforceable federal income tax liabilities for eight taxable 

years (relevant years). R attempted to collect those 

liabilities, but had little success. 

Ultimately, R certified to the Secretary of State that 

P had a “seriously delinquent tax debt” within the meaning 

of I.R.C. § 7345(b) for the relevant years. P filed a Petition

with this Court under I.R.C. § 7345(e)(1) to challenge the 

certification.

R filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 

maintaining that the certification was proper. 

P filed a competing Motion for Summary Judgment 

arguing that (1) the certification was erroneous because R 

has not shown that the tax liabilities for the relevant years 

have been properly assessed and (2) declining to renew P’s 

passport because of unpaid taxes is an unconstitutional

denial of P’s right to international travel. 

Held: To the extent P raises a substantive challenge 

to the liabilities underlying the I.R.C. § 7345 certification

(that is, to the extent he claims he owes no tax for the 

Served 01/24/23
2

relevant years), we lack jurisdiction to review the liabilities 

underlying the I.R.C. § 7345 certification.

Held, further, to the extent P raises a definitional

challenge based on the text of I.R.C. § 7345(b)(1)(A), P’s 

statutory argument fails because I.R.C. § 7345(b)(1)(A) 

requires that the unpaid, legally enforceable tax liability

underlying a seriously delinquent tax debt “has been 

assessed,” not that it “has been properly assessed,” and 

there is no dispute here that the underlying liabilities for 

the relevant years have been assessed.

Held, further, we lack jurisdiction to review the 

constitutionality of passport-related actions taken by the 

Secretary of State under the Fixing America’s Surface 

Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, § 32101, 129 Stat. 

1312, 1729–33 (2015).

Held, further, P is not entitled to summary 

judgment.

Held, further, R’s certification was not erroneous,

and R is entitled to summary judgment.

—————

Blake M. Adams, pro se.

Christina L. Holland and John S. Hitt, for respondent.

OPINION

TORO, Judge: In this passport case, petitioner, Blake M. Adams,

seeks review pursuant to section 7345(e)1 of the Commissioner of 

Internal Revenue’s certification to the Secretary of State that 

Mr. Adams has a “seriously delinquent tax debt” related to tax years 

2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 (relevant years).

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Internal 

Revenue Code, Title 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. or Code), in effect at all relevant times, and all 

Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
3

Now before the Court are competing Motions for Summary 

Judgment. As we explain below, we will grant the Commissioner’s 

Motion and deny Mr. Adams’s.

Background

The following facts are derived from the parties’ pleadings and 

Motion papers and the Declarations and Exhibits attached thereto as 

well as from Responses to the Court’s Order served October 4, 2022. 

They are stated solely for the purpose of ruling on the Motions before us 

and not as findings of fact in this case. See Rowen v. Commissioner, 156

T.C. 101, 103 (2021).

Mr. Adams failed to file federal income tax returns for the 

relevant years, and the Commissioner prepared a substitute for return 

under section 6020(b) for each year. In due course, the Commissioner 

assessed the tax shown in the substitutes for returns together with 

penalties and interest. In total, the Commissioner assessed more than 

$1.2 million in federal income tax, including interest and penalties, for 

the relevant years. But Mr. Adams did not pay the assessed amounts.

Aiming to collect Mr. Adams’s substantial outstanding liabilities, 

the Commissioner filed a notice of federal tax lien (NFTL) pursuant to 

section 6323(f) for each of the relevant years. As required by 

section 6320, the Commissioner notified Mr. Adams of the filing of the 

NFTLs and of his rights under section 6320, including the right to 

request a collection due process hearing. The dates of the NFTL filings 

and notices of the NFTL filings are as follows:

Year Date of NFTL Filing Date of Notice of NFTL

Filing 

2007

August 7, 2015 August 11, 2015

2009

2010

2011

2012

August 5, 2016 August 11, 2016

2013

2014 August 16, 2019 August 20, 2019

2015 December 13, 2019 December 17, 2019
4

Mr. Adams did not request a collection due process hearing for 

any of the relevant years. There is no dispute that the time for doing so 

has lapsed. I.R.C. § 6320(a)(2), (3)(B).2

The Commissioner’s collection efforts proved unsuccessful, and on 

March 16, 2020, the Commissioner certified to the Secretary of State 

that Mr. Adams had a “seriously delinquent tax debt,” which at the time 

of certification totaled $1,206,083.95 for the relevant years.3 Nearly 

nine months later, on January 4, 2021, Mr. Adams petitioned this Court

to review the Commissioner’s certification pursuant to 

section 7345(e)(1).

In time, the Commissioner moved for summary judgment, 

arguing that Mr. Adams had a seriously delinquent tax debt as of the 

time of the certification and that, therefore, the certification was correct 

and should be sustained. Mr. Adams responded with his own Motion for 

Summary Judgment. The Commissioner filed a Response to 

Mr. Adams’s Motion. Although we directed Mr. Adams to file a 

response, if any, to the Commissioner’s Motion, and extended the 

deadline for doing so twice, Mr. Adams did not file a response. 

Because the record did not establish whether the Secretary of 

State had taken any adverse action with respect to Mr. Adams’s 

passport, by Order served October 4, 2022, we directed the parties to file 

a status report advising the Court on this point. 

On October 17, 2022, the Commissioner filed a Status Report 

advising that (1) the State Department issued a passport to Mr. Adams 

on May 20, 2017, (2) the passport will expire on May 19, 2027, and 

(3) “the State Department did not advise that any adverse action had 

been taken” with respect to Mr. Adams’s passport. Resp’t’s Status 

Report 1. The Status Report also noted that counsel for the 

Commissioner spoke with Mr. Adams on October 17, 2022, and that 

Mr. Adams “did not dispute any of the above information but said that 

2 To facilitate the collection of the outstanding liabilities, the Commissioner 

also relied on a levy for each of the relevant years. Because consideration of the NFTLs 

suffices for resolving the case, we do not discuss the levies further. See also infra 

note 5.

3 The Commissioner certified Mr. Adams as an individual with a seriously 

delinquent tax debt for various of the relevant years on two other occasions, on July 30, 

2018, and November 18, 2019. Mr. Adams did not challenge those certifications, and 

we do not address them further. 
5

he had lost his passport and intended to apply for a new passport.” Id.

at 2. 

On November 14, 2022, after we extended the deadline for 

complying with the Court’s October 4 Order, Mr. Adams filed a Status 

Report advising that he had “scheduled an appointment with Miami 

Passport Agency OMNI Center for October 21, 2022, at 7:30 a.m. to 

apply for a passport.” Pet’r’s Status Report 1. Mr. Adams further 

indicated that he had received a letter dated October 21, 2022, from “the 

United States Department of State . . . denying issuance of a passport 

due to the Department of Treasury’s IRS certification of seriously 

delinquent tax de[b]t.” Id. at 2. Mr. Adams attached to the Status 

Report a copy of the letter he received from the Department of State. Id.

Ex. 1. In relevant part, the letter reads:

Thank you for your recent passport application. 

Unfortunately, you are ineligible to receive passport 

services because the Department of Treasury’s Internal 

Revenue Service (IRS) certified that you have a seriously 

delinquent tax debt.

. . . .

You must contact and make appropriate arrangements 

with the IRS within ninety (90) days from the date of this 

letter.

Once the Secretary of the Treasury has certified to the 

Secretary of State that you have satisfied the seriously 

delinquent tax debt, your name will be removed from the 

certified list. If satisfactory payment arrangements have 

not been made within 90 days of the date of this letter, your 

application will be denied. The Department of State cannot 

change, override, or appeal this policy.

Id.
6

Discussion

I. Background Law

A. Summary Judgment

The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite litigation and 

avoid costly, time-consuming, and unnecessary trials. Fla. Peach Corp. 

v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). 

Generally, in cases that are subject to a de novo scope of review, 

this Court may grant summary judgment when there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and a decision may be rendered as a 

matter of law. Rule 121(b); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 

518, 520 (1992), aff’d, 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994). In such cases, the 

moving party bears the burden of proving that summary judgment is 

warranted. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Espinoza 

v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 412, 416 (1982). And, in deciding whether to 

grant summary judgment in such cases, we construe factual materials 

and inferences drawn from them in the light most favorable to the 

adverse party. Sundstrand Corp., 98 T.C. at 520.

But, as we recognized in Van Bemmelen v. Commissioner, 155 

T.C. 64, 78 (2020), in cases in which the Court “must confine [itself] to

the administrative record to decide whether there has been an abuse of

discretion,” the ordinary “summary judgment standard is not generally

apt.” In those cases, “summary judgment serves as a mechanism for 

deciding, as a matter of law, whether the agency action is supported by 

the administrative record and is not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id. at 79.

Our Court has not yet decided the scope of review and the 

standard of review for cases arising under section 7345. As we observed 

in Rowen, 156 T.C. at 106, we need not consider them when “there is no 

dispute between the parties with respect to the evidence we should 

consider . . . [and when] our decision would be the same whether we 

reviewed the Commissioner’s certification de novo or for abuse of 

discretion.” The circumstances before us here are similar to those in 

Rowen. As to the scope of review, there is no material dispute between 

the parties regarding the evidence we should consider. As to the 

standard of review, our decision would be the same whether we reviewed 

the Commissioner’s certification de novo or for abuse of discretion. 

Therefore, we once again have no occasion to decide the scope of review 
7

and the standard of review for cases where the merits of the 

Commissioner’s certification pursuant to section 7345 are at issue.

For convenience, however, and following the parties’ lead, we use 

the terminology of the ordinary summary judgment standard in the 

discussion that follows.

B. Certifications of Seriously Delinquent Tax Debts

Congress enacted section 7345 as part of the Fixing America’s 

Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act), Pub. L. No. 114-94, § 32101(a), 

129 Stat. 1312, 1729 (2015). We provided a comprehensive description 

of FAST Act § 32101 and Code section 7345 in Rowen and need not 

repeat that discussion here. We focus instead on the portions of 

section 7345 relevant to the dispute before us.

If the Commissioner certifies that a taxpayer has “a seriously 

delinquent tax debt,” section 7345(a) provides that that certification 

shall be transmitted “to the Secretary of State for action with respect to 

denial, revocation, or limitation of [the taxpayer’s] passport.”4 The 

Commissioner is responsible for notifying the taxpayer of the 

certification. I.R.C. § 7345(d).

1. Definition of “Seriously Delinquent Tax Debt”

The term “seriously delinquent tax debt” is defined in 

section 7345(b). It generally means 

an unpaid, legally enforceable Federal tax liability of an 

individual—

(A) which has been assessed,

(B) which is greater than $50,000, and

(C) with respect to which—

4 Section 7345 outlines a two-step procedure whereby the Commissioner sends 

certification to the Secretary of the Treasury, who then transmits the certification to 

the Secretary of State. In practice, the IRS follows a one-step procedure whereby the 

Commissioner, as the Secretary’s delegate, transmits the certification directly to the 

State Department. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(11); Internal Revenue Manual 5.1.12.27.1, .6, 

.8 (Dec. 20, 2017).
8

(i) a notice of lien has been filed pursuant to 

section 6323 and the administrative rights under 

section 6320 with respect to such filing have been 

exhausted or have lapsed, or

(ii) a levy is made pursuant to section 6331.

I.R.C. § 7345(b)(1). The threshold amount described in subparagraph 

(B) is modified by subsection (f) to account for inflation. The threshold 

amount relevant here (i.e., the amount for the year when the section 

7345 certification was made) was $53,000. See Rev. Proc. 2019-44,

§ 3.59, 2019-47 I.R.B. 1093, 1103. 

The statute provides exceptions to this definition. For instance, 

a seriously delinquent tax debt does not include “a debt with respect to 

which collection is suspended . . . because a due process hearing under 

section 6330 is requested or pending,” or because relief from joint and 

several liability is sought pursuant to subsection (b), (c), or (f) of section 

6015. I.R.C. § 7345(b)(2)(B). Additionally, no “debt that is being paid in 

a timely manner pursuant to an [installment] agreement . . . under 

section 6159 or [a compromise agreement under section] 7122” is a 

seriously delinquent tax debt. I.R.C. § 7345(b)(2)(A).

If a certification is found to be erroneous or if the certified debt is 

fully satisfied or ceases to be seriously delinquent because of one of the 

exceptions, then the IRS must reverse its certification and notify the 

Secretary of State and the taxpayer. I.R.C. § 7345(c)(1), (d). “In the case 

of a certification found to be erroneous, such notification shall be made 

as soon as practicable after such finding.” I.R.C. § 7345(c)(2)(D).

2. Our Role in Reviewing Section 7345 Certifications

Section 7345(e)(1) permits a taxpayer who has been certified as 

having a seriously delinquent tax debt to petition this Court to 

determine “whether the certification was erroneous or whether the [IRS] 

has failed to reverse the certification.” Our jurisdiction in reviewing 

certifications of seriously delinquent tax debts is set forth in section 

7345(e)(1). If we find that a certification was erroneous, we “may order 

the Secretary [of the Treasury] to notify the Secretary of State that such 

certification was erroneous.” I.R.C. § 7345(e)(2). The statute specifies 

no other form of relief that we may grant. Ruesch v. Commissioner, 25 

F.4th 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2022), aff’g in part, vacating and remanding in part

154 T.C. 289 (2020).
9

II. Analysis

With this background in mind, we turn to the issues before us. 

The Commissioner asks that we sustain his certification, while Mr. 

Adams argues that (1) the certification was erroneous because the 

Commissioner has not shown that the tax liabilities for the relevant 

years were properly assessed and (2) declining to renew Mr. Adams’s

passport is an unconstitutional denial of his right to international 

travel. As described further below, we find in favor of the Commissioner

on all points.

A. The Commissioner’s Certification Was Not Erroneous.

The Commissioner maintains that Mr. Adams’s outstanding 

liabilities qualified as “seriously delinquent tax debt” as of the time of 

the Commissioner’s certification. Specifically, he contends that by then, 

the Commissioner had assessed more than $1.2 million in federal tax

liabilities, including penalties and interest, for the relevant years, 

meeting the requirements of section 7345(b)(1)(A) and (B) and (f).5 

Those liabilities remained unpaid and were legally enforceable. In 

addition, for each of the relevant years, the IRS had properly filed a 

notice of federal tax lien pursuant to section 6323, and Mr. Adams had 

allowed his collection due process rights under section 6320 to lapse, 

meeting the requirements of section 7345(b)(1)(C)(i). We agree with the 

Commissioner’s analysis. We therefore conclude that Mr. Adams’s 

certification was not erroneous and should be sustained. 

B. Mr. Adams’s Contrary Arguments Are Unavailing.

Mr. Adams makes two arguments as to why he believes the 

certification was erroneous. First, he argues that the Commissioner’s 

certification was erroneous because “[the Commissioner] has no 

admissible evidence that [the] Notices of Deficiency were created and 

mailed by certified mail to Petitioner’s last known address for any of the 

years at issue” and that he “as a matter of law has failed to prove that 

any of the taxes for years 2007 through 2015 were properly assessed on 

Petitioner.” Pet’r’s Mot. for Summ. J. 1, 5. Second, Mr. Adams argues 

that “[t]aking Petitioner’s passport over taxes is a clear denial of 

5 Mr. Adams does not argue (and the record does not show) that any of the 

exceptions to the definition of “seriously delinquent tax debt” in section 7345(b)(2) 

apply here, so we need not consider those exceptions further. 
10

petitioner’s right to international travel, which is unconstitutional.” Id.

at 5. Neither argument carries the day.

1. Mr. Adams’s First Argument

Mr. Adams’s first argument can be read in one of two ways. First, 

one might interpret it as raising a substantive challenge to the liabilities 

underlying the section 7345 certification. Second, one might interpret 

it simply as alleging that the statutory definition is not satisfied because 

the liabilities at issue here have not “been assessed.” 

Because Mr. Adams is representing himself, we construe his 

submissions liberally and will address each interpretation of his first 

argument. See Rule 31(d) (“All pleadings shall be so construed as to do 

substantial justice.”); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) 

(per curiam) (explaining that documents filed by pro se litigants are “to 

be liberally construed” (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 

(1976))); Gray v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 295, 298 (2012) (“All claims in 

a petition should be broadly construed so as to do substantial justice, 

and a petition filed by a pro se litigant should be liberally construed.”), 

supplemented by 140 T.C. 163 (2013). As we now explain, we find 

neither interpretation persuasive.

a. Substantive Challenge to the Liabilities 

Underlying the Section 7345 Certification

To the extent Mr. Adams intends to press a substantive challenge 

to the liabilities underlying the section 7345 certification, we face a 

threshold question: Does section 7345 authorize us to look behind the 

outstanding liabilities as of the time of the certification and consider 

issues that affect the determination of those liabilities? 

The Commissioner points out that this Court previously 

answered the question in the Commissioner’s favor in Ruesch, 154 T.C. 

at 297, holding that we do not have jurisdiction to redetermine the tax 

liabilities underlying the certification of a seriously delinquent tax debt. 

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated for 

mootness the portion of our order in Ruesch resolving the jurisdictional 

question. See Ruesch v. Commissioner, 25 F.4th at 71–72.6

6 The Second Circuit vacated the Ruesch order in part because, at the time we 

issued the order (and the opinion setting out our reasoning in support of the order), 
11

The view of the Supreme Court and virtually all the courts of 

appeals is that when a judgment is vacated, the vacatur deprives the 

underlying opinion of any precedential effect. See O’Connor v. 

Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 n.12 (1975) (“Of necessity our decision 

vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals deprives that court’s 

opinion of precedential effect . . . .” (citing United States v. Munsingwear, 

Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950))); U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall 

P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 25–29 (1994) (discussing the subject of vacatur); see 

also, e.g., Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. v. Consol. Utils. & Commc’ns, Inc., 846 

F.2d 803, 811 (1st Cir. 1988) (Vacatur on appeal “deprives the district 

court’s opinions of precedential effect.” (cleaned up)); Picard v. 

JPMorgan Chase & Co. (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC), 721 

F.3d 54, 68 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[V]acatur dissipates precedential force.”); 

1621 Route 22 W. Operating Co. v. NLRB, 825 F.3d 128, 141 n.6 (3d Cir. 

2016) (A vacated opinion “carries no precedential force.”); Hirschfeld v. 

ATF, 14 F.4th 322, 328 (4th Cir. 2021), cert. denied sub nom. Marshall 

v. ATF, 142 S. Ct. 1447 (2022); id. (Wynn, J., concurring in the result of 

the Orders of Dismissal and Vacatur) (“I write separately to emphasize 

that while, thanks to today’s technology, all vacated opinions remain 

available in the public sphere, they have no legal value. Once vacated, 

a prior opinion loses precedential value within this circuit.” (cleaned 

up)); Cent. Pines Land Co. v. United States, 274 F.3d 881, 893 n.57 (5th 

Cir. 2001) (describing “the important difference between [the] treatment 

of a panel opinion after vacatur by the Supreme Court and [the] 

treatment when a judgment is reversed on other grounds”); Amelkin v. 

McClure, 330 F.3d 822, 828 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The . . . reasoning in the 

vacated decision . . . does not operate as the law of the case.”); McCaster 

v. Darden Rests., Inc., 845 F.3d 794, 799 n.5 (7th Cir. 2017) (“A vacated 

panel opinion has no precedential force.”); Salitros v. Chrysler Corp., 306 

F.3d 562, 575 n.2 (8th Cir. 2002) (“A vacated decision is deprived of its 

precedential effect.”); Durning v. Citibank, N.A., 950 F.2d 1419, 1424 n.2 

(9th Cir. 1991) (“A decision may be reversed on other grounds, but a 

decision that has been vacated has no precedential authority 

whatsoever.”); United States v. Nacchio, 555 F.3d 1234, 1243 n.9 (10th 

Cir. 2009) (The holding of a vacated opinion “has no decisional 

significance” and is only “an historical artifact.”); McKiver v. Sec’y, Fla. 

the taxpayer had already received (from the IRS) the only relief she could under 

section 7345: the reversal of her section 7345 certification. The Second Circuit 

concluded that the question of mootness is an antecedent question to the question of 

jurisdiction. Ruesch v. Commissioner, 25 F.4th at 71–72. Here, by contrast, 

Mr. Adams’s section 7345 certification is still in effect, and whether we have 

jurisdiction to redetermine his underlying liabilities remains a live controversy.
12

Dep’t of Corr., 991 F.3d 1357, 1367 (11th Cir. 2021) (A “vacated opinion 

is officially gone and has no legal effect whatever, and none of the 

statements made therein has any remaining force.’” (cleaned up)), cert. 

denied sub nom. McKiver v. Inch, 142 S. Ct. 441 (2021).7

Although an opinion issued in connection with a vacated 

judgment retains no precedential effect, if the judgment is vacated for 

reasons unrelated to the opinion’s analysis of an issue, nothing 

precludes a future court from considering that analysis as persuasive 

authority. To illustrate, in Seminole Nursing Home, Inc. v. 

Commissioner, 12 F.4th 1150 (10th Cir. 2021), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2017-

102, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently accepted 

our Court’s reliance on a previous decision, Lindsay Manor Nursing 

Home, Inc. v. Commissioner, 148 T.C. 235 (2017), vacated on other 

grounds, 725 F. App’x 713 (10th Cir. 2018), that had been vacated by the 

Tenth Circuit for mootness. Explaining its rationale, the Tenth Circuit

stated: “[W]e vacated [the Tax Court’s] ruling only because the case had 

been moot at the time of the ruling . . . . It was hardly an abuse of 

discretion for the Tax Court to continue to adopt that court’s prior 

reasoning when no higher court had cast doubt on that reasoning.” 

Seminole Nursing Home, Inc. v. Commissioner, 12 F.4th at 1160.

Like the Tenth Circuit in Seminole Nursing Home, the Second 

Circuit in Ruesch cast no doubt on our Court’s substantive analysis of 

the underlying issue (i.e., our lack of jurisdiction to review the tax 

liabilities underlying a section 7345 certification). Instead, the Second 

Circuit simply held that the question was moot in that particular case. 

Accordingly, although our opinion in Ruesch was deprived of its 

precedential effect, it has not lost its persuasive value. See Seminole 

Nursing Home, Inc. v. Commissioner, 12 F.4th at 1160. And we see no 

reason to depart from it here. We therefore readopt our holding in 

Ruesch, concluding that we do not have jurisdiction to review the 

7 The D.C. Circuit’s view appears to be more nuanced. See Simon v. Republic 

of Hungary, 579 F. Supp. 3d 91, 137–38 (D.D.C. 2021) (summarizing D.C. Circuit 

precedent); cf. Coal. to End Permanent Cong. v. Runyon, 979 F.2d 219, 221 n.2 (D.C. 

Cir. 1992) (Silberman, J., dissenting from the per curiam disposition) (“Even a mooted 

decision that is not vacated still retains precedential value, since the very reason we 

vacate is to remove a decision’s precedential effect. See 13A C. Wright, A. Miller & E. 

Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 2d § 3533.10, at 442–43 (1984). And even a 

vacated opinion, while no longer the law of the case, still may carry ‘persuasive 

authority,’ see Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 646 n.10 (1979) (Powell, J., 

dissenting), and even some precedential value, see Action Alliance of Senior Citizens v. 

Sullivan, 930 F.2d 77, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1991).”).
13

liabilities underlying the certification of a seriously delinquent tax debt. 

See Ruesch, 154 T.C. at 295–98 (reasoning that the text of section 

7345(e)(1) contains no such jurisdictional grant).

As applied to this case, our conclusion means that we cannot 

redetermine the tax liabilities underlying Mr. Adams’s section 7345 

certification. We therefore decline to address the merits of his claim that 

he owes no tax for the relevant years.

b. Definitional Challenge to the Section 7345 

Certification

As already noted, one might also interpret Mr. Adams’s first 

argument not as contesting the merits of the underlying liabilities, but 

simply as alleging that the statutory definition is not satisfied because 

the liabilities at issue here have not “been assessed.” This argument 

merits closer consideration because whatever else the statute does or 

does not permit us to do, it seems plain that it requires us to consider 

whether the liabilities at issue were in fact assessed. An assessed 

liability must exist before a seriously delinquent tax debt may be found. 

See I.R.C. § 7345(b)(1)(A).

Section 6201(a)(1) directs the Secretary of the Treasury to “assess 

all taxes determined by the taxpayer or by the Secretary as to which 

returns or lists . . . are made.” An assessment is made when the IRS 

makes an entry in its books that the taxpayer owes tax. I.R.C. § 6203; 

Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 100 (2004); Baltic v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 

178, 183 (2007). 

There is no dispute here that the IRS assessed the amounts it 

thought Mr. Adams owed for the relevant tax years. Mr. Adams does 

not contend otherwise. Rather, Mr. Adams appears to argue that the 

assessments were improper because they failed to comply with certain 

procedural requirements, such as the rule in section 6213(a) that no 

assessment of a deficiency may be made until, among other things, a

notice of deficiency has been mailed to the taxpayer. And, in his view, 

without a proper assessment, there can be no seriously delinquent tax 

debt. 

The text of section 7345 refutes Mr. Adams’s argument. 

Section 7345 requires simply that the liability “has been assessed,” not 

that the liability “has been properly assessed.” The statute imposes no 

additional conditions besides mere assessment and includes no crossreferences to the procedural requirements on which Mr. Adams relies. 
14

Cf. Knight v. Commissioner, 552 U.S. 181, 188 (2008) (“The fact that 

[Congress] did not adopt [a] readily available and apparent alternative 

strongly supports rejecting [a] reading [that relies on the rejected 

alternative text].”). In short, once the existence of an assessment is 

shown (as has been done here), section 7345(b)(1)(A) is satisfied, and we 

have no authority to inquire further. 

Our reading of section 7345(b)(1)(A) is confirmed by the text of 

section 7345(b)(1)(C). Each clause of section 7345(b)(1)(C) contemplates 

that the filing of a notice of lien or the making of a levy must have been 

“pursuant to” a relevant Code provision (section 6323, in the case of 

liens, and section 6332, in the case of levies). By contrast, 

section 7345(b)(1)(A) contains no such “pursuant to” language to qualify 

the phrase “which has been assessed.” Courts assume that when 

Congress includes specific words in one provision and excludes them

from a neighboring provision, it does so intentionally. See, e.g., Loughrin 

v. United States, 573 U.S. 351, 358 (2014) (“We have often noted that 

when ‘Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute 

but omits it in another’—let alone in the very next provision—this Court 

‘presume[s]’ that Congress intended a difference in meaning.” (quoting 

Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))); Grajales v. 

Commissioner, 47 F.4th 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2022) (same), aff’g 156 T.C. 55

(2021). We therefore will not read the word “properly” into the text of 

section 7345(b)(1)(A), as Mr. Adams wishes for us to do.

Our conclusion is also consistent with the Code’s overall structure 

for assessments and collections. Before receiving the certification now 

before us, Mr. Adams had multiple opportunities to challenge the 

assessments of tax for the relevant years. For example, he could have 

challenged in our Court any notices of deficiency the IRS sent before 

making the assessments.8 See I.R.C. § 6213(a). Even if Mr. Adams did 

not receive notices of deficiency, he could have challenged the propriety 

of the assessments in collection due process proceedings for the relevant 

years. See I.R.C. §§ 6320(b)(1), (c), 6330(c)(1) and (2)(A). He was sent 

notices of his right to such proceedings both when the NFTLs were filed 

and when the IRS proposed to levy. And, if he had been dissatisfied with 

the outcome of those proceedings, he again could have sought further 

review in our Court. See I.R.C. §§ 6320(c), 6330(d)(1); see also, e.g.,

8 Mr. Adams does not appear to contend that he did not receive notices of 

deficiency for the relevant years. Instead, he appears to argue that the Commissioner 

failed to show that he sent them the proper way as provided under section 6212(a), 

which authorizes the Secretary to send notices “by certified mail or registered mail.”
15

Callahan v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 44, 50 (2008) (reviewing a 

taxpayer’s underlying liability de novo in a CDP case when the taxpayer 

had not received a notice of deficiency); Craig v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 

252, 261 (2002) (same). Given these prior opportunities for 

administrative and judicial review, it is entirely reasonable for 

section 7345(b)(1)(A) not to offer yet another avenue for challenging 

whether an assessment has been properly made, but to require only that 

the assessment has been made.

In view of the foregoing, we agree with the Commissioner that, as 

of the time the certification was made, Mr. Adams had a seriously 

delinquent tax debt and therefore the Commissioner’s certification was 

not erroneous. 

2. Mr. Adams’s Second Argument

As noted, Mr. Adams also argues that “[t]aking [his] passport 

over taxes is a clear denial of [his] right to international travel, which is 

unconstitutional.” Pet’r’s Mot. for Summ. J. 5. Mr. Adams recognizes

that in Rowen, 156 T.C. at 111, we rejected a claim that “[section] 7345 

is unconstitutional . . . because it prohibits international travel.” As we 

observed in Rowen:

[S]ection 7345 simply authorizes the Commissioner to 

certify the existence of a seriously delinquent tax debt 

based on the presence of certain tax-related facts (for 

example, an outstanding liability for an assessed tax in 

excess of a specified amount, the existence of a lien or levy, 

and the absence of proceedings before IRS Appeals). A 

provision other than section 7345 (FAST Act 

section 32101(e)) gives a different government actor (the 

Secretary of State) power to act with respect to a passport 

after receiving a certification made by the Commissioner. 

FAST Act section 32101(e) requires the Secretary of State 

to exercise his own judgment in determining whether to 

revoke a passport and whether to issue a new passport (or 

renew an existing one) for emergency or humanitarian 

reasons. In short, only the Secretary of State, not the

Commissioner, may revoke or deny a passport, and the 

Secretary of State’s authority does not derive from 

section 7345.
16

Id. at 113. Mr. Adams urges us to reconsider that holding. We decline 

to do so. 

To the extent Mr. Adams intends to raise a broader claim than 

that addressed in Rowen and to challenge on constitutional grounds the

authority the FAST Act gave the Secretary of State to deny or revoke 

the passports of individuals with seriously delinquent tax debts, see 

FAST Act § 32101(e), 129 Stat. at 1732, such a challenge must also fail, 

because we do not have jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of the 

Secretary of State’s passport-related actions under FAST Act 

§ 32101(e).9 

Our sole jurisdictional grant under the FAST Act lies in 

section 7345(e)(1). Under that section, after the Commissioner certifies 

that a taxpayer has a seriously delinquent tax debt, “the taxpayer may 

bring a civil action against the United States in a district court of the 

United States, or against the Commissioner in the Tax Court, to 

determine whether the certification was erroneous or whether the 

Commissioner has failed to reverse the certification.” In that action, “[i]f 

the court determines that such certification was erroneous, then the 

court may order the Secretary [of the Treasury] to notify the Secretary 

of State that such certification was erroneous.” I.R.C. § 7345(e)(2). 

The text of section 7345(e) focuses exclusively on the 

Commissioner’s actions certifying seriously delinquent tax debts and

authorizes our Court (and the district courts) to determine whether

those actions are erroneous. Section 7345(e)(1) makes no mention of the 

Secretary of State’s passport actions or FAST Act § 32101(e) and

provides no authority for us (or the district courts) to review those 

actions or to issue any orders to the Secretary of State with respect to 

passport actions.10 This is a meaningful omission and unlikely to be 

9 For cases involving challenges to adverse passport actions by the Secretary 

of State, see, for example, Franklin v. United States, 49 F.4th 429 (5th Cir. 2022),

Maehr v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 5 F.4th 1100 (10th Cir. 2021), and Jones v. Mnuchin, 529 

F. Supp. 3d 1370 (S.D. Ga. 2021). These cases illustrate the proper procedural route 

for challenging the constitutionality of the Secretary of State’s actions under the FAST 

Act, while also demonstrating that neither district courts nor the courts of appeals 

have been receptive to constitutional arguments similar to those Mr. Adams offers 

here.

10 The actions of the Secretary of State would be reviewable in district court 

under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706, and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 in 

an appropriate case. See, e.g., Maehr, 5 F.4th at 1106–07. See generally 14 Charles 
17

attributable to congressional oversight, as the text of section 7345 and 

the structure of FAST Act § 32101 confirm. 

As to the text, section 7345(a) expressly discusses three 

governmental actors—the Commissioner (who certifies a seriously 

delinquent tax debt), the Secretary of the Treasury (who transmits that 

certification to the Secretary of State), and the Secretary of State (who 

receives the certification “for action with respect to denial, revocation, 

or limitation of a passport pursuant to section 32101 of the FAST Act”). 

By contrast, section 7345(e)(1)—the provision authorizing judicial 

review—mentions only the Commissioner’s certification without 

reference to the Secretary of State or to any passport action. Similarly, 

the orders authorized under section 7345(e)(2) focus on the certification 

action, not any passport action. And the action in our Court is instituted 

“against the Commissioner,” not against the Secretary of State. I.R.C. 

§ 7345(e)(1). In our view, such precise drafting was intentional.

Turning next to the structure of FAST Act § 32101, as we 

observed in Rowen, 156 T.C. at 107–10, that provision contained seven 

operative subsections, four that amended the Code and provided rules 

for the Commissioner and the Secretary of the Treasury, and three that 

provided rules for the Secretary of State. Of relevance here, 

subsection (a) enacted section 7345 and the certification rules that 

govern the conduct of the Commissioner, while subsection (e) enacted 

the passport rules that govern the conduct of the Secretary of State in 

connection with that certification. The judicial review provision that 

authorizes our review here (section 7345(e)) was included in FAST Act 

§ 32101(a) and, as just explained, makes no reference to FAST Act 

§ 32101(e). In light of the structure of FAST Act § 32101, we have no 

reason to think that the text of section 7345(e) should mean something 

other than what it says. Indeed, given our Court’s historical 

specialization in tax matters and disputes involving the Commissioner, 

there is every reason to think it means exactly what it says.

In short, if Congress had intended to authorize us to review the 

passport actions of the Secretary of State under section 7345(e), it 

certainly knew how to say so. It did not take that step, and our Court 

exercises jurisdiction only over matters that Congress expressly 

authorizes us to consider. See I.R.C. § 7442; Estate of Young v. 

Commissioner, 81 T.C. 879, 881 (1983). We therefore conclude that we 

Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 3659, Westlaw (database updated April 2022).
18

do not have jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of the Secretary 

of State’s passport actions under section 32101 of the FAST Act.

III. Conclusion

In view of the foregoing, Mr. Adams’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment must be denied, and the Commissioner is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.

Accordingly,

An appropriate order and decision will be entered.