25396 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 101 / Thursday, May 28, 2009 / Rules and Regulations 

Alert Service Bulletin EC135–63A–013, 

Revision 02, dated September 12, 2008 

(ASB). If the measured maximum clearance 

is: 

(i) Less than or equal to 0.1 mm—install 

locking washers, tighten all screws, and remeasure the clearance by following 

paragraphs 3.B.(3) through 3.B.(7) of the ASB. 

(ii) More than 0.1 mm—determine the 

difference between the smallest and the 

largest clearance and: 

(A) If the difference is less than 0.4 mm— 

install locking washers, tighten all screws, 

and re-measure the clearance by following 

paragraphs 3.B.(2) through 3.B.(7) of the ASB. 

(B) If the difference is equal to or more 

than 0.4 mm—replace the transmission 

before further flight with an airworthy 

transmission that has been modified in 

accordance with paragraph 3.B. of the ASB. 

(iii) If the re-measured clearances obtained 

in accordance with paragraphs (e)(2)(i) or 

(e)(2)(ii)(A) of this AD are not less than or 

equal to 0.05 mm, replace the transmission 

with an airworthy transmission that has been 

modified in accordance with paragraph 3.B. 

of the ASB. 

(3) Reinstall the lower transmission cover 

and replenish the transmission oil. 

Note 2: If the transmission oil was drained 

into a clean container, it can be reused. Also, 

if the O-ring on the lower transmission cover 

is not damaged, it can be reused once. 

(f) After the effective date of this AD, 

install only main transmissions that have 

been modified in accordance with paragraph 

3.B.(3) of the ASB. 

Differences Between This AD and the MCAI 

AD 

(g) This AD does not require sending the 

main transmission to the manufacturer and 

does not refer to the transmission part 

numbers. Also, this AD uses the term ‘‘hours 

time-in-service’’, the MCAI AD uses the term 

‘‘flight cycles’’. 

Other Information 

(h) The Manager, Safety Management 

Group, FAA, ATTN: Chinh Vuong, Aviation 

Safety Engineer, FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate, 

Safety Management Group, Fort Worth, Texas 

76193–0111, telephone (817) 222–5116, fax 

(817) 222–5961 has the authority to approve 

AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the 

procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. 

Related Information 

(i) European Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA) MCAI Emergency AD No. 2008– 

0175–E, dated September 16, 2008, contains 

related information. 

Air Transport Association of America (ATA) 

Tracking Code 

(j) ATA Code 63: Main rotor drive. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(k) You must use the specified portions of 

Eurocopter Alert Service Bulletin EC135– 

63A–013, Revision 02, dated September 12, 

2008, to do the actions required. 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

this service information under 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact American Eurocopter 

Corporation, 2701 Forum Drive, Grand 

Prairie, TX 75053–4005, telephone (972) 

641–3460, fax (972) 641–3527, or at http:// 

www.eurocopter.com. 

(3) You may review copies at the FAA, 

Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest 

Region, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort 

Worth, Texas; or at the National Archives 

and Records Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at NARA, call (202) 741–6030, or go 

to: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/ 

cfr/ibr-locations.html. 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas on May 19, 

2009. 

Mark R. Schilling, 

Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E9–12319 Filed 5–27–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2009–0478; Directorate 

Identifier 2008–NM–133–AD; Amendment 

39–15917; AD 2009–11–07] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; British 

Aerospace Model HS 748 Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above. This AD results 

from mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) 

originated by an aviation authority of 

another country to identify and correct 

an unsafe condition on an aviation 

product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 

condition as: 

Resulting from the assessment of fuel tank 

wiring installations required by SFAR 88 

(Special Federal Aviation Regulation) and 

equivalent JAA/EASA (Joint Aviation 

Authorities/European Aviation Safety 

Agency) policy, BAE Systems (Operations) 

Limited has revised the HS.748 Aircraft 

Maintenance Manual (AMM), now at 

Revision 19, to introduce Chapter 05–10–00 

‘‘Critical Design Configuration Control 

Limitations (CDCCL)—Fuel System’’. The 

CDCCLs provide instructions to retain critical 

ignition source prevention features during 

configuration changes that may be caused by 

modification, repair or maintenance actions. 

The CDCCLs have been identified as 

requirements for continued airworthiness to 

address the risk of fuel vapour ignition 

sources remaining undetected. This 

condition, if not corrected, could result in a 

fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of 

the aircraft. 

* * * * * 

This AD requires actions that are 

intended to address the unsafe 

condition described in the MCAI. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective June 

12, 2009. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication, listed in the AD 

as of June 12, 2009. 

We must receive comments on this 

AD by June 29, 2009. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by 

any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–40, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The street address for 

the Docket Operations office (telephone 

(800) 647–5527) is in the ADDRESSES

section. Comments will be available in 

the AD docket shortly after receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dan 

Rodina, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; telephone 

(425) 227–2125; fax (425) 227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

The European Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA), which is the Technical Agent 

for the Member States of the European 

Community, has issued EASA 

Airworthiness Directive 2008–0125, 

dated July 2, 2008 (referred to after this 

as ‘‘the MCAI’’), to correct an unsafe 

condition for the specified products. 

The MCAI states: 

Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 101 / Thursday, May 28, 2009 / Rules and Regulations 25397 

Resulting from the assessment of fuel tank 

wiring installations required by SFAR 88 

(Special Federal Aviation Regulation) and 

equivalent JAA/EASA (Joint Aviation 

Authorities/European Aviation Safety 

Agency) policy, BAE Systems (Operations) 

Limited has revised the HS.748 Aircraft 

Maintenance Manual (AMM), now at 

Revision 19, to introduce Chapter 05–10–00 

‘‘Critical Design Configuration Control 

Limitations (CDCCL)—Fuel System’’. The 

CDCCLs provide instructions to retain critical 

ignition source prevention features during 

configuration changes that may be caused by 

modification, repair or maintenance actions. 

The CDCCLs have been identified as 

requirements for continued airworthiness to 

address the risk of fuel vapour ignition 

sources remaining undetected. This 

condition, if not corrected, could result in a 

fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of 

the aircraft. 

* * * * * 

The required action is revising the 

maintenance program to include the 

CDCCL data. CDCCLs are limitation 

requirements to preserve a critical 

ignition source prevention feature of the 

fuel tank system design that is necessary 

to prevent the occurrence of an unsafe 

condition. The purpose of a CDCCL is 

to provide instruction to retain the 

critical ignition source prevention 

feature during configuration change that 

may be caused by alterations, repairs, or 

maintenance actions. A CDCCL is not a 

periodic inspection. 

The FAA has examined the 

underlying safety issues involved in fuel 

tank explosions on several large 

transport airplanes, including the 

adequacy of existing regulations, the 

service history of airplanes subject to 

those regulations, and existing 

maintenance practices for fuel tank 

systems. As a result of those findings, 

we issued a regulation titled ‘‘Transport 

Airplane Fuel Tank System Design 

Review, Flammability Reduction and 

Maintenance and Inspection 

Requirements’’ (66 FR 23086, May 7, 

2001). In addition to new airworthiness 

standards for transport airplanes and 

new maintenance requirements, this 

rule included Special Federal Aviation 

Regulation No. 88 (‘‘SFAR 88,’’ 

Amendment 21–78, and subsequent 

Amendments 21–82 and 21–83). 

Among other actions, SFAR 88 

requires certain type design (i.e., type 

certificate (TC) and supplemental type 

certificate (STC)) holders to substantiate 

that their fuel tank systems can prevent 

ignition sources in the fuel tanks. This 

requirement applies to type design 

holders for large turbine-powered 

transport airplanes and for subsequent 

modifications to those airplanes. It 

requires them to perform design reviews 

and to develop design changes and 

maintenance procedures if their designs 

do not meet the new fuel tank safety 

standards. As explained in the preamble 

to the rule, we intended to adopt 

airworthiness directives to mandate any 

changes found necessary to address 

unsafe conditions identified as a result 

of these reviews. 

In evaluating these design reviews, we 

have established four criteria intended 

to define the unsafe conditions 

associated with fuel tank systems that 

require corrective actions. The 

percentage of operating time during 

which fuel tanks are exposed to 

flammable conditions is one of these 

criteria. The other three criteria address 

the failure types under evaluation: 

single failures, single failures in 

combination with a latent condition(s), 

and in-service failure experience. For all 

four criteria, the evaluations included 

consideration of previous actions taken 

that may mitigate the need for further 

action. 

The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) 

has issued a regulation that is similar to 

SFAR 88. (The JAA is an associated 

body of the European Civil Aviation 

Conference (ECAC) representing the 

civil aviation regulatory authorities of a 

number of European States who have 

agreed to co-operate in developing and 

implementing common safety regulatory 

standards and procedures.) Under this 

regulation, the JAA stated that all 

members of the ECAC that hold type 

certificates for transport category 

airplanes are required to conduct a 

design review against explosion risks. 

We have determined that the actions 

identified in this AD are necessary to 

reduce the potential of ignition sources 

inside fuel tanks, which, in combination 

with flammable fuel vapors, could result 

in fuel tank explosions and consequent 

loss of the airplane. 

You may obtain further information 

by examining the MCAI in the AD 

docket. 

Relevant Service Information 

BAE Systems (Operations) Limited 

has issued Subsection 05–10–00, 

‘‘Critical Design Configuration Control 

Limitations (CDCCL)—Fuel System,’’ of 

HS 748 Aircraft Maintenance Manual 

(AMM), Revision 19, dated January 15, 

2008. The actions described in the 

CDCCL are intended to correct the 

unsafe condition identified in the 

MCAI. 

FAA’s Determination and Requirements 

of This AD 

This product has been approved by 

the aviation authority of another 

country, and is approved for operation 

in the United States. Pursuant to our 

bilateral agreement with the State of 

Design Authority, we have been notified 

of the unsafe condition described in the 

MCAI and service information 

referenced above. We are issuing this 

AD because we evaluated all pertinent 

information and determined the unsafe 

condition exists and is likely to exist or 

develop on other products of the same 

type design. 

There are no products of this type 

currently registered in the United States. 

However, this rule is necessary to 

ensure that the described unsafe 

condition is addressed if any of these 

products are placed on the U.S. Register 

in the future. 

Differences Between the AD and the 

MCAI or Service Information 

We have reviewed the MCAI and 

related service information and, in 

general, agree with their substance. But 

we might have found it necessary to use 

different words from those in the MCAI 

to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. 

operators and is enforceable. In making 

these changes, we do not intend to differ 

substantively from the information 

provided in the MCAI and related 

service information. 

We might also have required different 

actions in this AD from those in the 

MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. 

Any such differences are highlighted in 

a NOTE within the AD. 

FAA’s Determination of the Effective 

Date 

Since there are currently no domestic 

operators of this product, notice and 

opportunity for public comment before 

issuing this AD are unnecessary. 

Comments Invited 

This AD is a final rule that involves 

requirements affecting flight safety, and 

we did not precede it by notice and 

opportunity for public comment. We 

invite you to send any written relevant 

data, views, or arguments about this AD. 

Send your comments to an address 

listed under the ADDRESSES section. 

Include ‘‘Docket No. FAA–2009–0478; 

Directorate Identifier 2008–NM–133– 

AD’’ at the beginning of your comments. 

We specifically invite comments on the 

overall regulatory, economic, 

environmental, and energy aspects of 

this AD. We will consider all comments 

received by the closing date and may 

amend this AD because of those 

comments. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http:// 

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information you provide. We 

will also post a report summarizing each 

25398 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 101 / Thursday, May 28, 2009 / Rules and Regulations 

substantive verbal contact we receive 

about this AD. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We determined that this AD will not 

have federalism implications under 

Executive Order 13132. This AD will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, on the relationship between 

the national government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify this AD: 

1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and 

3. Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

We prepared a regulatory evaluation 

of the estimated costs to comply with 

this AD and placed it in the AD docket. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

■ Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new AD: 

2009–11–07 BAE Systems (Operations) 

Limited (Formerly British Aerospace 

Regional Aircraft): Amendment 39– 

15917. Docket No. FAA–2009–0478; 

Directorate Identifier 2009–NM–133–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) 

becomes effective June 12, 2009. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to all BAE Systems 

(Operations) Limited Model HS 748 series 2A 

and series 2B airplanes, certificated in any 

category. 

Subject 

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 28: Fuel. 

Reason 

(e) The mandatory continued airworthiness 

information (MCAI) states: 

Resulting from the assessment of fuel tank 

wiring installations required by SFAR 88 

(Special Federal Aviation Regulation) and 

equivalent JAA/EASA (Joint Aviation 

Authorities/European Aviation Safety 

Agency) policy, BAE Systems (Operations) 

Limited has revised the HS.748 Aircraft 

Maintenance Manual (AMM), now at 

Revision 19, to introduce Chapter 05–10–00 

‘‘Critical Design Configuration Control 

Limitations (CDCCL)—Fuel System’’. The 

CDCCLs provide instructions to retain critical 

ignition source prevention features during 

configuration changes that may be caused by 

modification, repair or maintenance actions. 

The CDCCLs have been identified as 

requirements for continued airworthiness to 

address the risk of fuel vapour ignition 

sources remaining undetected. This 

condition, if not corrected, could result in a 

fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of 

the aircraft. 

* * * * * 

The required action is revising the 

maintenance program to include the CDCCL 

data. 

Actions and Compliance 

(f) Unless already done, within 3 months 

after the effective date of this AD, revise the 

maintenance program to incorporate the 

CDCCL information specified in Subsection 

05–10–00, ‘‘Critical Design Configuration 

Control Limitations (CDCCL)—Fuel System,’’ 

of BAE Systems (Operations) Limited HS 748 

Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM), 

Revision 19, dated January 15, 2008. 

Thereafter, no alternative CDCCL may be 

used unless approved as an alternative 

method of compliance in accordance with 

the procedures specified in paragraph (g)(1) 

of this AD. 

FAA AD Differences 

Note 1: This AD differs from the MCAI 

and/or service information as follows: No 

differences. 

Other FAA AD Provisions 

(g) The following provisions also apply to 

this AD: 

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs): The Manager, International 

Branch, ANM–116, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, FAA, has the authority to 

approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested 

using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. 

Send information to ATTN: Dan Rodina, 

Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, 

ANM–116, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; telephone (425) 

227–2125; fax (425) 227–1149. Before using 

any approved AMOC on any airplane to 

which the AMOC applies, notify your 

principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or 

principal avionics inspector (PAI), as 

appropriate, or lacking a principal inspector, 

your local Flight Standards District Office. 

(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement 

in this AD to obtain corrective actions from 

a manufacturer or other source, use these 

actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective 

actions are considered FAA-approved if they 

are approved by the State of Design Authority 

(or their delegated agent). You are required 

to assure the product is airworthy before it 

is returned to service. 

(3) Reporting Requirements: For any 

reporting requirement in this AD, under the 

provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, 

the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

has approved the information collection 

requirements and has assigned OMB Control 

Number 2120–0056. 

Related Information 

(h) Refer to Mandatory Continuing 

Airworthiness Information (MCAI) European 

Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) 

Airworthiness Directive 2008–0125, dated 

July 2, 2008, and Subsection 05–10–00, 

‘‘Critical Design Configuration Control 

Limitations (CDCCL)—Fuel system,’’ 

Revision 19, dated January 15, 2008, of BAE 

Systems (Operations) Limited HS 748 AMM, 

for related information. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(i) You must use Subsection 05–10–00, 

‘‘Critical Design Configuration Control 

Limitations (CDCCL)—Fuel System,’’ of BAE 

Systems (Operations) Limited HS 748 AMM, 

Revision 19, dated January 15, 2008, to do 

the actions required by this AD, unless the 

AD specifies otherwise. BAE Systems 

(Operations) Limited HS 748 AMM, Revision 

19, dated January 15, 2008, contains the 

following effective pages: 

Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 101 / Thursday, May 28, 2009 / Rules and Regulations 25399 

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

Page title/description Page number(s) Revision number Date shown on 

page(s) 

AMM Title Page ........................................................................................................... 1 19 January 15, 2008. 

Chapter 05 List of Effective Pages: 

1–2 * January 15, 2008. 

Subsection 05–10–00: 

1–2 * January 15, 2008. 

* Not shown. 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

this service information under 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact BAE Systems Regional 

Aircraft, 13850 McLearen Road, Herndon, 

Virginia 20171; telephone 703–736–1080; email raebusiness@baesystems.com; Internet 

http://www.baesystems.com/Businesses/ 

RegionalAircraft/index.htm. 

(3) You may review copies of the service 

information at the FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

425–227–1221 or 425–227–1152. 

(4) You may also review copies of the 

service information that is incorporated by 

reference at the National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at NARA, call 202–741–6030, or go 

to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/ 

code_of_federal_regulations/ 

ibr_locations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 15, 

2009. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E9–11997 Filed 5–27–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2009–0486; Directorate 

Identifier 2009–NM–064–AD; Amendment 

39–15919; AD 2009–11–09] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model 

A310 Airplanes and Airbus Model 

A300–600 Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above. This AD results 

from mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) 

originated by an aviation authority of 

another country to identify and correct 

an unsafe condition on an aviation 

product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 

condition as: 

An A300–600 operator reported a recent 

event which occurred during the take-off roll, 

where a SOGERMA co-pilot seat slid back 

uncommanded to the end position. The seat 

horizontal movement actuator was replaced 

on the affected co-pilot seat. At the following 

take-off roll the same event occurred, the copilot seat sliding back uncommanded again. 

* * * 

An unwanted movement of pilot or copilot seat in the horizontal direction is 

considered as potentially unsafe, especially 

during the take-off phase when the speed of 

the aeroplane is greater than 100 knots and 

until landing gear retraction. 

* * * * * 

Uncommanded movement of the pilot 

and co-pilot seats during takeoff or 

landing could interfere with the 

operation of the airplane and, as a 

result, could cause consequent loss of 

control of the airplane. This AD requires 

actions that are intended to address the 

unsafe condition described in the MCAI. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective June 

12, 2009. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain publications listed in the AD 

as of June 12, 2009. 

We must receive comments on this 

AD by June 29, 2009. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by 

any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–40, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The street address for 

the Docket Operations office (telephone 

(800) 647–5527) is in the ADDRESSES

section. Comments will be available in 

the AD docket shortly after receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dan 

Rodina, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; telephone 

(425) 227–2125; fax (425) 227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

The European Aviation Safety 

Agency, which is the aviation authority 

for the Technical Agent for the Member 

States of the European Community, has 

issued Airworthiness Directive 2009– 

0084, dated April 9, 2009 (referred to 

after this as ‘‘the MCAI’’), to correct an 

unsafe condition for the specified 

products. The MCAI states: 

An A300–600 operator reported a recent 

event which occurred during the take-off roll, 

where a SOGERMA co-pilot seat slid back 

uncommanded to the end position. The seat 

horizontal movement actuator was replaced 

on the affected co-pilot seat. At the following 

take-off roll the same event occurred, the copilot seat sliding back uncommanded again. 

Further to these events, the inspection 

carried out on the two removed actuators 

ARTUS Part Number (P/N) RT19H4FX, 

revealed that the clutch was broken inside 

the shaft, thus unlocking the seat horizontal 

movement. 

An unwanted movement of pilot or copilot seat in the horizontal direction is 

considered as potentially unsafe, especially 

during the take-off phase when the speed of 

the aeroplane is greater than 100 knots and 

until landing gear retraction. 

For the reasons described above and 

pending the development of a permanent 

solution, this AD requires the deactivation of 

the electrical powered SOGERMA pilot seats