UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4125

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MARCUS RICHARDSON, a/k/a Dank,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at New Bern. Louise W. Flanagan, 

District Judge. (5:11-cr-00121-FL-2)

Submitted: November 20, 2012 Decided: November 26, 2012

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and SHEDD and FLOYD, Circuit 

Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer 

P. May-Parker, Yvonne V. Watford-McKinney, Assistant United 

States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Marcus Richardson, who pled guilty without a plea 

agreement to one count of possession of a firearm by a felon, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 922(g)(1), 924 (West 2000 & Supp. 

2012), appeals his seventy-four-month upward variant sentence. 

Richardson argues on appeal that the district court erred when 

it imposed his sentence because he asserts that his prior 

criminal conduct was adequately considered in his criminal 

history score, and that the district court abused its discretion 

with regard to the extent of the variance from his Guidelines 

range. Finding no error, we affirm.

We review any criminal sentence, “whether inside, just 

outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range,” for 

reasonableness, “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion 

standard.” United States v. King, 673 F.3d 274, 283 (4th Cir.), 

cert. denied, ___ S. Ct. ____, 2012 WL 2154910 (2012); see Gall 

v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). When the district 

court imposes a departure or variant sentence, we consider 

“whether the sentencing court acted reasonably both with respect 

to its decision to impose such a sentence and with respect to 

the extent of the divergence from the sentencing range.” United 

States v. Hernandez–Villanueva, 473 F.3d 118, 123 (4th Cir. 

2007). The district court “has flexibility in fashioning a 

sentence outside of the Guidelines range,” and need only “‘set 
3

forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that it has 

considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis’” for 

its decision. United States v. Diosdado–Star, 630 F.3d 359, 364 

(4th Cir.) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 

(2007)) (alteration omitted), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2946 

(2011).

“The fact that the appellate court might reasonably 

have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is 

insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.” Gall, 

552 U.S. at 51. “This deference is due in part because the 

sentencing judge is in a superior position to find facts and 

judge their import and the judge sees and hears the evidence, 

makes credibility determinations, has full knowledge of the 

facts and gains insights not conveyed by the record.” Diosdado–

Star, 630 F.3d at 366 (internal quotation marks, brackets and 

citation omitted); see Rita, 551 U.S. at 357–58 (recognizing 

that the district court also “has access to, and greater 

familiarity with, the individual case and the individual 

defendant before [the court] than the Commission or the appeals 

court”).

Because the district court identified its reasons for 

the above-Guidelines sentence, which was based on the Sentencing 

Guidelines, the 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2012)

factors, and related to the particular facts of Richardson’s 
4

case, we conclude that Richardson’s sentence is reasonable. See

King, 673 F.3d at 284 (concluding that upward variant sentence 

was reasonable as it was adequately supported by reference to 

the § 3553(a) factors that “the court determined required the 

sentence ultimately imposed”); Diosdado–Star, 630 F.3d at 366–67

(holding that a more than six-year upward variant sentence was 

substantively reasonable because district court expressly relied 

on the § 3553(a) factors to support the variance).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED