alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Telos Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q/A for the period
ending June 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), we, John B. Wood and Michele Nakazawa, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer, respectively, of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to our knowledge:

(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



Date: December 16, 2008/s/ John B. WoodJohn B. WoodChief Executive OfficerDate: December 16, 2008/s/ Michele NakazawaMichele NakazawaChief Financial Officer
Amended and Restated Consulting Agreement



 Exhibit 10.1 
  
 October 11, 2004 
  
 Ta-Wei Chien 
  
 Separation Date and Consulting Period 
  
 Dear
Ta-Wei, 
  
 This amended and restated consulting agreement amends and supercedes
the prior consulting agreement between you and TiVo Inc. (the “Company”), dated August 3, 2004. The effective date of this amended and restated agreement is August 3, 2004. 
  
 Your employment with the Company will terminate on August 3, 2004 (the “Separation Date”). For the period commencing on the
Separation Date and ending nine (9) months later on May 2, 2005 (the “Consulting Period”), you agree to provide consulting services to the Company, on such dates and times as the Company may request and that are reasonably agreeable to
you, to complete the business that you had begun in the areas of manufacturing and licensing based on the scope of your duties during your term of employment with the Company. In order to compensate you as a non-employee consultant, your existing
stock options that would have vested according to their original vesting schedules during the Consulting Period will be accelerated and shall immediately vest as of your Separation Date and these stock options, along with your currently vested stock
options, shall remain exercisable during the Consulting Period. You will have the standard ninety (90) days from the date of the end of the Consulting Period to exercise your vested stock options before they terminate. 
  

			
	 /s/ Ta-Wei Chien

	 	 10/12/2004
 Date

	 Ta-Wei Chien
	 	 
		
	 /s/ David H. Courtney

	 	 10/11/2004
 Date

	 David H. Courtney
#### State v. Caldwell

Case below: 181 N.C. App. 808

No. 121P07

1. Def’s NOA Based Upon a Constitutional Question (COA05-1646)

2. AG’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal

3. Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. 7A-31

1. _

2. Allowed 06/27/07

3. Denied 06/27/07
1 The Honorable Jean C. Hamilton, Chief Judge, United States District Judge for

the Eastern District of Missouri.



## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 99-3888

___________ Forrest Mittendorf, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Missouri. James Purkett; Marilyn Schleappe; * Travis Grubbs, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: March 27, 2000 Filed: April 3, 2000

___________ Before McMILLIAN, HANSEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Missouri inmate Forrest Mittendorf appeals from the district court’s 1 28 U.S.C. § 1915A order dismissing without prejudice his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against the superintendent, a nurse supervisor, and a security aide at the Farmington Correctional-2-

Center. Having carefully reviewed the record, see Cooper v. Schriro , 189 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), we conclude dismissal was proper. First, Mr. Mittendorf--by claiming that the superintendent has falsely imprisoned him--has challenged the validity of his conviction or sentence, without alleging that either has been affected adversely. See Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (§ 1983 action should be dismissed if judgment would necessarily imply invalidity of conviction or sentence, unless conviction or sentence was reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question). Second, his bare allegations that he was assigned to rake leaves and move heavy furniture, and that he had been assignedto clean toilets, which led to the yard-work assignment, also do not state a viable constitutional claim. See Choate v. Lockhart , 7 F.3d 1370, 1373-74 (8th Cir. 1993). Third, Mr. Mittendorf appears to challenge the confiscation of money in his checking account, but this also does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Hudson v. Palmer , 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (intentional deprivation of property does not violate due process when meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available). Finally, we conclude the district court properly denied Mr. Mittendorf permission to add the State of Missouri as a defendant. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (state is not “person” under § 1983) ; Williams v. Missouri , 973 F.2d 599, 600 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (Missouri has not waived sovereign immunity for § 1983 claims). Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47A(a). A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### L. & C. Godfry *against*Vancott.

Id an action of debt on a boodj for tbe penal sum of 500 dollars, conditioned to abide the award of arbitrators, judgment In form being entered up for the plaintiff for the penalty, though the jury-assessed the damages to *thirteen*dollars only, the plaintiff was held entitled to recover his futt, *tostf,*

IN ERROR., to the court of common pleas of the county of *'Sullivan.*

The plaintiffs in error brought an action of debt in the court below against the defendant in error, on an arbitration bond for the penal sum of 500 dollars, conditioned to abide by, and perform, the award of the arbitrators named therein ; and assigned two several-breaches.’ The defendant pleaded *non est factum.*At the trial, the jury found a verdict on the issue, for the plaintiff, and assessed damages at six cents; and, on the first breach assigned, the jury assessed the damages at 12 dollars and 94 cents, and, on the second breach, at six cents; the damages, in all, amounting to 13 dollars and 6 cents. Judgment was entered up in form for the plaintiff, for the penalty of the bond. The defendant objected, that the damages recovered being less than 25 dollars, the plaintiff could not recover costs, but was bound to pay costs to the- defendant; and the plaintiffs insisted, that having recovered a judgment for 500 dollars of debt, they were entitled to full costs. But the court below decided that the plaintiffs were not entitled to costs, but must pay the defendant his costs, which should be set off against, and deducted from, the amount of the damages assessed by the jury. To this opinion of the court, the plaintiffs tendered a bill of exceptions, on which the writ of error was brought.

The cause, on the return of the writ of error and bill of ex* ceptions, was submitted to the court without argument.

*Per Curiam.*

This case comes before the court on a writ of error to the common pleas of *Sullivan*county; and the only-question presented for decision is, whether the plaintiff below was entitled to recover his costs, or was bound to pay costs to the defendant. The action was debt on the penalty of 500 dollars, in a bond, with a condition to abide by and perform the award of arbitrators. The damages assessed by the jury, under the breaches assigned, were under 25 dollars: the judgment, however, was entered for the penalty, and the court below decided that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover costs of the *346defendant. This was incorrect. The plaintiffs' Were entitled teJ .recpver cpsts; the judgmeht being upon the penalty.: The da'a mages assessed', together .with the costs, regulates the amount to be recovered on the execution; but the judgment; being in form,' Upon the penalty,, the. costs follow of course. The judgment is'the test’by ’Which;,the right .to: costs'is determined’this has "been the long and well-settled imle of construction given, to-the’ . statute relative to costs."- ,(2 *Johns. Cas.*206. 2 Caines, 10 *Johns. Rep.*219.) The judgment of .the court below ¿must,.' >‘accordingly,-be reversed. ' ■' . V" • . v--.

judgment réversédí
#### Michael RYTTING, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ray ALLEN, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 06-15858.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 13, 2009.*

Filed April 29, 2009.

Michael Rytting, Ely, NV, pro se.

Eddie S. Gulbenkian, Esq., Jill C. Da-vis, Esq., Office of the Nevada Attorney General, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendant-Appel-lee.

Before: GRABER, GOULD, and BEA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Michael Rytting, a Nevada state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Wyatt v. Terhune,*315 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir.2003). We affirm.

The district court properly determined that Rytting failed to exhaust prison grievance procedures prior to filing suit in federal court. *See Woodford v. Ngo,*548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); *McKinney v. Carey,*311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1200 (9th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (holding that exhaustion under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) must occur prior to commencement of the action). We construe the district court’s dismissal to be without prejudice. *See Wyatt,*315 F.3d at 1120.

In light of this disposition, we do not reach any alternate bases for dismissal relied upon by the district court.

Rytting’s pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS FILED 

February 7, 2013
 

RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK
 

TONYA J. COPPA, SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
 

OF WEST VIRGINIA 

Claimant Below, Petitioner 

vs.) No. 12-0996	 (BOR Appeal No. 2046863) 

(Claim No. 2008043437) 

WEST VIRGINIA OFFICE OF 

INSURANCE COMMISSIONER 

Commissioner Below, Respondent 

and 

PANHANDLE SUPPORT SERVICES, INC., 

Employer Below, Respondent 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Petitioner Tonya J. Coppa, by M. Jane Glauser, her attorney, appeals the decision of the 

West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Board of Review. Panhandle Support Services, Inc., by 

Lucinda Fluharty, its attorney, filed a timely response. 

This appeal arises from the Board of Review’s Final Order dated July 31, 2012, in which 

the Board affirmed a January 6, 2012, Order of the Workers’ Compensation Office of Judges. In 

its Order, the Office of Judges denied a request for attorney’s fees, finding that the claims 

administrator’s denial of a psychiatric consultation was not unreasonable. The Court has 

carefully reviewed the records, written arguments, and appendices contained in the briefs, and 

the case is mature for consideration. 

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these 

reasons, a memorandum decision is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. 

1
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 837 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 837

 To amend the Safe Drinking Water Act to clarify the definition of the 
                    term ``underground injection''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 18, 2005

  Mr. Inhofe introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
       referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Safe Drinking Water Act to clarify the definition of the 
                    term ``underground injection''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. HYDRAULIC FRACTURING.

    Section 1421(d) of the Safe Drinking Water Act (42 U.S.C. 300h(d)) 
is amended by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following:
            ``(1) Definition of underground injection.--
                    ``(A) In general.--The term `underground injection' 
                means the subsurface emplacement of fluids by well 
                injection.
                    ``(B) Exclusion.--The term `underground injection' 
                does not include--
                            ``(i) the underground injection of natural 
                        gas for purposes of storage; or
                            ``(ii) the underground injection of fluids 
                        or propping agents pursuant to hydraulic 
                        fracturing operations relating to oil or gas 
                        production activities.''.
                                 <all>
```
### THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13

- 20

- 00221

- CV

Roel Garcia v. Javier Prieto Gonzalez

On Appeal from the 398th District Court of Hidalgo County , Texas Trial Court Cause No. C

- 7372

- 14

- I

JUDGMENT THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered thi s cause on appeal, concludes the appeal should be dismissed . The Court orders the appeal DISMISSED in accordance with its opinion . Costs of the appeal are adjudged against appellant.
We further order this decision certified below for observance.
November 1 8, 2021
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#### State v. McMahan

Case below: 174 N.C. App. 586

No. 657P05

1. AG’s Motion for Temporary Stay (COA05-211)

2. AG’s Petition for Writ of Supersedeas

3. AG’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31

1. Allowed 360 N.C. 79

2. Allowed 12/19/06

3. Allowed 12/19/06
#### In re: David Lee SMITH, Petitioner.

No. 09-1090.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 23, 2009.

Decided: May 5, 2009.

David Lee Smith, Petitioner Pro Se.

Before MICHAEL, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

David Lee Smith petitions for a writ of mandamus seeking an order to direct the district court to review the denial of his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.2008) motion. We conclude that Smith is not entitled to mandamus relief.

Mandamus relief is available only when the petitioner has a clear right to the relief sought. *In re First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,*860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir.1988). Further, mandamus is a drastic remedy and should only be used in extraordinary circumstances. *Kerr v. United States Dist. Court,*426 U.S. 394, 402, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976); *In re Beard,*811 F.2d 818, 826 (4th Cir.1987).

Mandamus may not be used as substitute for appeal. *In re United Steelworkers,*595 F.2d 958, 960 (4th Cir.1979). The relief sought by Smith is not available by way of mandamus. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pau-peris, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED.*
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The District Court of the 3rd Judicial District. County of Powell.

#### STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff, vs. RYAN IRELAND, Defendant.

CAUSE NO. DC-09-65 DECISION

On March 9, 2010, the defendant was sentenced to one (1) year in the Montana State Prison for the offense of Assault With a Bodily Fluid, as specified in Section 45-5-214, MCA. This sentence shall run consecutively with the sentence in Cause No. DC-05-64, Custer County, Montana.

On May 7,2010, the defendant’s application for review of that sentence was heard by the Sentence Review Division of the Montana Supreme Court.

The defendant was present and was represented by Eric Olson. The state was represented by Jeanine Badanes.

Before hearing the application, the defendant was advised that the Sentence Review Division has the authority not only to reduce the sentence or affirm it, but also increase it. The defendant was further advised that there is no appeal from a decision of the Sentence Review Division. The defendant acknowledged that he understood this and stated that he wished to proceed.

Rule 17 of the Rules of the Sentence Review Division of the Supreme Court of Montana provides that “the sentence imposed by the District Court is presumed correct, and the sentence will not be reduced or increased unless it is deemed clearly inadequate or excessive.” (§46-18-904(3), MCA).

The Division finds that the reasons advanced for modification are insufficient to hold that the sentence imposed by the District Court is inadequate or excessive.

Therefore, it is the unanimous decision of the Sentence Review Division that the sentence shall be affirmed.

Done in open Court this 7th day of May, 2010.

DATED this 26th day of May, 2010.

Chairperson, Hon. Blair Jones, Member, Hon. Richard Simonton and Alternate Member, Hon. John Warner.
II 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 954 

To amend title 18, United States Code, to prohibit the sale of a firearm 

to a person who has been convicted of a felony in a foreign court, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

APRIL 28, 2005 

Mr. DEWINE introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend title 18, United States Code, to prohibit the sale 

of a firearm to a person who has been convicted of 

a felony in a foreign court, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Firearms Fairness and 

5 Security Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION OF FIREARM SALES TO PERSON CON7 VICTED OF A FELONY IN A FOREIGN COURT. 

8 Section 922 of title 18, United States Code, is 

9 amended— 
2 

•S 954 IS

1 (1) in subsection (d), by amending paragraph 

2 (1) to read as follows: 

3 ‘‘(1) is under indictment for, or has been con4 victed— 

5 ‘‘(A) in any court within the United 

6 States, of a crime punishable by a term of im7 prisonment exceeding 1 year; or 

8 ‘‘(B) in any court outside the United 

9 States, of a crime punishable by a term of im10 prisonment exceeding 1 year (except for any 

11 crime involving the violation of an antitrust 

12 law), if the conduct giving rise to the conviction 

13 would be punishable in any court within the 

14 United States by a term of imprisonment ex15 ceeding 1 year had such conduct occurred with16 in the United States;’’; and 

17 (2) in subsection (g), by amending paragraph 

18 (1) to read as follows: 

19 ‘‘(1) who has been convicted— 

20 ‘‘(A) in any court within the United 

21 States, of a crime punishable by a term of im22 prisonment exceeding 1 year; or 

23 ‘‘(B) in any court outside the United 

24 States, of a crime punishable by a term of im25 prisonment exceeding 1 year (except for any 
3 

•S 954 IS

1 crime involving the violation of an antitrust 

2 law), if the conduct giving rise to the conviction 

3 would be punishable in any court within the 

4 United States by a term of imprisonment ex5 ceeding 1 year had such conduct occurred with6 in the United States;’’. 

Æ