F OR P UB LIC AT ION



### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

U NI TED S T A T ES O F A M ERI CA ,

Plaintif f-Appellee ,

v.
T YMOND J. P R ES TON , Defendant-

Appellant

. No. 11-10511

D.C. No. 3:10-cr- 08026- GMS-1

ORDER AND AMENDED OPI

NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court for the D istrict of Arizona G. Murra y Snow, District J udg e, Presiding Argued and Submitted No ve mbe r 9 , 2 01 2— San F ra nc isc o, Ca lif

or nia
Filed F ebrua

ry 5, 2013 Amended F ebrua

ry 27, 2013

Be fore : J erome Fa

rris, John T. Noonan, and Jay S. B y be e , Ci rc uit

Judg e s.
Orde r; Op ini on by Judg e F arr is; Dissent by

J udg e Noona

nU NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 2

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es n o part of t he op i ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s * b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. SUMMAR

Y *

Crim inal L aw
T h e p an e l a f

f ir me d a c o n v ic ti o nf

o r a b u s iv e s e xu al contac t and re manded f

or rese ntencingin a ca se in which the dis tr ic t c ourt imp os e d a lif e tim e te rm of su

pe rv is ed rele a se and seve ral c onditions of supervised re lease

. The pa nel held that the d efendant’s c onfession wa s proper ly admitted. The pa n el wrote that the def endant’ s dim ini sh e d me nta l c a

pa c ity a lon e is no t e no ug h to re nd e r h is confe ssion involunt ary , and that the leng th, locati on, and continuity of the intervie w do not support a conc l u s ion of inv olu nta ri ne ss.
Th e pa nel he ld t

hat th e de fe nd ant v a lid ly wa ive d h is rig hts to a jury

trial and a

n i n d i ctm ent, and the district c ourt did not plainly err by acc epting the defe ndant ’s counsel’s waiver of his rig ht to confrontation. The pa nel re jected the defe n d ant’s contention that the distr i ct court abused its discretion in admitting expert te sti mony a bo ut t he DN A e vid e nc e us e d to imp lic a te him

. The panel held that the district cour t properly admitted the testimony of the victim’s grandmother and uncle under the excited utteranc e exception to the gene ral he arsa y exclusion. The p an e l h e ld

th a t t h e im p r o p e r a dmi s s io no f

an inv e sti g a tin g o ffi c e r’ s h e ars ay te sti mony

wa s c umu lativ e toU NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 3
admissi b l e testi mony

and ther efor e har

mless. The pane l reje cted the de fenda

nt’s argument that prosec utorial mis c on du c t mate ri a lly

a ff e c te d th e fa ir

ne ss o f t he tr ia l.
The p anel r ejec ted the def endant’ s sufficienc y -of- theevidenc e cha lleng e to the convic tion. The pa nel held that the district cour t’s imposit ion of a lifetime term o f supervised rele ase w as proc edura lly sound. Re gar d i n g s u

b s t an t i v e r ea s o n ab l en es s , t h e p an el co u l d n ot, on this recor d, hold that the district court abuse d its discretion, but sugg ested that the district c ourt, in i t s own discre tion, consider the prosec utor’s rec ommendation of an alt ernative
se nte nc e , whe re by the de fe nd ant, wh o is in h is e arl y tw e nti e s, may satisfy some requir ements to have the term shorte ned.

Th e pa nel dir e c te d th e dis tr ic t c ourt on re mand to
rec onsider a supe rvised re lease condition requiring ple thy smo g ra

phte sti ng a s to wh ic h th e dis tr ic t c ourt fa ile d to make the r equisite specif

ic finding s. The pa nel direc ted the district court to clarify a condition that th e de fe nd ant “s ha ll n ot p os se ss, vie w, or oth e rw ise us e any oth e r m a te ri a l th a t is se xua lly sti mul ating , s e xua lly
o ri en ted, or de emed to be ina ppropriate by

the probation office r and/or tr eatment pr ovider.” The pa nel reque sted that the district c ourt include a mens rea require ment in a condition prohibiting the de fenda nt from being“in the company

of . . . childre n under the ag e of 18 without prior approva l of [his ] probation of fice r.” The pa

nel
a lso ins tr uc te d th e dis tr ic t c ourt

to e xplai n adequ a te ly

its
re a so ns for im po sin g thi s c on dit ion , o r t o n arr owit appropr iately , g iven that the condition infringes on aU NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 4 signific ant liberty interest by prohibiting the def endant f rom associating , without the permission of his pr obatio n office r, with any children of

his own he may

have in the f

uture.

Ju d g e N o o n and is s e n te d b e c a u s e th e o n ly

e v id ence a g a ins t th e de fe nd ant is a

c oe rc e d c on fe ssi on . H e a lso wr ote that he would ban the pl ethy smogr aph procedure altog ether

.

CO UN SEL

Pr of e sso r K e ithSwi sh e r, Pho e n i x Ar i z o n a , f or the De fe nd antAp pe lla nt.
Michae l T. Morrissey , Assistant United States Atto rn ey for the District of Ar izona; Ann Birmi n gh am S chee l, Acting Un ite d St a te s A tto rn e y

fo r t he Di str ic t of Ar izon a ; K arl a Hotis Delord, Ac ting Deputy Appellate Chief for the District of Arizona; and B ridg et S. Ba de, Assistant Uni ted States Attorney , Phoenix , Arizona for the Appellee

.

OR DE R
Th e op ini on fi le d on F e br

ua ry 5, 20 13 is a

me nd e d a s f

oll ow s: On slip Opinion pag e 26, lines 7–10, rem o v e the following text : [ Preston failed to move for acquittal at the close of the evidenc e, so we reve rse only for plain e rror

. United States v. De lgado , 357 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2004).]

On s lip O p in io np a g e 2 6 , li n e 1 2 , c h an g e th e f o ll o w ing text : [ any ] t o [ any ]U NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 5 On slip Opinion pag e 26, line 1 4 , change the following te xt: [ Id. (citations and emphasis omitted).] to [ Jack son v. Vi rg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (19 7 9) (e mphasis in origina l); United States v. Atkinson , 990 F.2d 501 , 503 (9th Cir. 1993) (e n banc) .]

On s li p O p in io np a g e 2 7 , li n e 1 , c h an g e th e f o ll o w ing te xt: [r e a s o n a

b le ] t o [r a ti o n a l] On slip Opinion pag e 27, line 13, cha n ge t h e following te xt: [r e a s o n a

b le ] t o [r a ti o n a l]
On sl i p Opinion pag e 27, lines 13–14, cha ng e the fo llo wi ngte xt: [ Delgado , 357 F.3d at 1068.] to [ Jack son , 443 U.S. at 319.]

OP IN ION

FARRI S, Senior Circuit J udg e: Ty mond Presto n appea ls his conviction for Abusive Sex ual Contact in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 2244,
and c on te sts the po rt ion

of his se nte nc e imp os inga

lif e tim e te rm of su per vis e d r e le a se and

se ve ra l c on dit ion s o f h is supervised r elea se.
After a minor’ s alleg ations of sexual assault and an inv e s ti g a ti o n , Pr e s to nw a s in d ic te d f o r A g g r a v a te d

Se xual Abuse. Th e gover

nment later a g ree d to dismi ss the indic tme nt a

nd fi le d a n in fo rm a tio n c ha

rg ingPr e sto n w ith Abusive Sex ual Contact. Preston was c onvicted af ter a bench tr ia l.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 6

T hi s ca s e i nv ol ves a juve nil e v i ct i m whos e i dent i t y ha s been 1 p ro te c te d

. I.
At some time in the ev en i ng on Wednesday , September 23, 2009, TD , an eig ht-y ear -old boy , enter ed Ty mond 1 Preston’s hom e; P reston wa s eig hteen. TD and Preston we re neig hbors and r elatives, thoug h their fa milies were involved in a fe ud. What ha

ppened inside Preston’s house, as we ll as the exact time of the e vent, ar e disputed. Ac co rdi ng to the prosec ution, Pres t o n place d a condom on his penis and inserted it i nto TD’s anus for severa l seconds be fore TD ra n out the d oor and be g an to cr y . The de fense expresses doubt that th is a ssa

ult oc c ur re d. Whil e the inv e sti g a tin g a g e nts believed that the assault took place around 6: 3 0 p

. m ., the defe nse ar g ues that i t occur red earlier , if at all, re ly ing in pa rt
on a c le ri c a l e rr or ma de by

a ho sp ita l nu

rs e wh o w ro te

“ 16 :30 ” on

on e of he r r e po rt s but r e a lly

me ant t o w ri te “18:30”; she simply

confuse d the military

time conver sion.
After exit ing Pre ston’s house in tear s, TD joined his two y oung cousins. The thre e boy s entere d TD’s house at around 8:00 p.m., all crying a

nd visibly

ups et

. T D’s g randmother
a sk e d h im w hy

he wa s u ps e t and he re pli e d th at hi s “butt” hurt bec ause Pre ston had put h i s penis in his “butt.” TD’s g randf ather called t h e p o l ice to re port the incident, a nd the po lic e a dv ise d h im t o ta

ke TD to the ho sp ita l. On the wa y to the hospital, TD ref

used to sit “bec ause his butt wa s hurting.” At the h o s p i t al, an of

fice r ar rang ed for

TD’s fa mily to take him to the Safe Child Center at the Flag staff Me dical Center the following day

.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 7

TD me t w itha

fo re ns ic in tervie we r a

t th e Sa fe Chi ld Center, who g ave T D an oppor tunity t o communicate what had happe ned to him. TD repe ated his statement that “[Preston] put his penis in my butt a nd it hur ts.” When pr e s s e d f o r mo r e d e ta il s , T D to ld th e inte r v ie w e r a lo n g and
co n v o luted storyinvolving multiple assaults by Pres t on—including statements that Preston had e jaculate d
on to h is s hir

t and mouth, ne ith e r o f whic h w a s e vid e nc e d in TD ’s su bs e qu e nt e xami natio n—, polic e c ha se s, he lic op te rs , mo n s t e r t r u c k s , an d

o t h e r a p p ar e n t l y f a b r i c a t e d e v e nts

. No ta bly , th e sto ry inc lud e d TD’ s ac c ount of Pr e sto n s e xua lly assaulting TD’s sister, specific ally “[t] rying to f uck her butt,” and TD’s acc ount of his own use of throwingknives to attack Preston and “ robber s”—none of which is corr oborate d by additio n al evidenc e. Ac cordingto the fore nsic interviewe r, c hil dr e n c omm on ly

us e div ers ionary

te c hn iqu e s to a vo id pr ov idi ngde ta ils a

bo ut t he ir sex ual a ssa

ult , a nd the se techniques in c lude projec ting their victimiz ation onto another pe rs on and de sc ri bin g a c ts of a g g re ssi on a g a inst t heir attacke rs.
Whil e at the Saf

e Child Center, a nur se pra ctitioner conducte d a “he ad-to-toe ” medica l examination of TD

. TD told the nurse that “[ P re s ton] put his dick in my butt,” that P res ton pu

t on a “ dic k w e ari ng ,” wh ic h th e nurs e too k to
me an a c on do m, a

nd that th e c on dom “ g ot whit e stu ff on it. [P reston] threw it awa

y .” The nurse noted that TD had no body surfa ce injuries, complained of pain when she examined h i s an u s , an d

h ada “ n o rm al g e n i t al an d an al ex am , ” t h o u gh the nurse note d t hat a “ normal exam does not confirm nor neg ate the possibility

of abuse .”

Two ag ents beg an an investigation a nd drove to Preston’s house to interview him. The y approa ched Pre ston outside ofU NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 8 his home, told him that they we re there to discuss the
a l l e g a t i o n s o f

s e x u a l a s s a

u l t , an d e n g a g e d h i mi na f o rt ymin ute , ta pe -r e c or de d int e rv ie w. Othe r pe op le fa mil iar to Pr e sto n w e re ne arb y

duri ng th e int e rv ie w. Th e a g e nts inf or me d Pr e sto n th a t he wa s no t un de r arr e st a nd wa s f re e to le av e

. Pr e s to n a

p p e ar e d c a lm thr o u g h o u t th e inte r v iew and
seeme d to understand the agents’ que stions. Although the alleg ed assa

ult took place on Wednesda y , September 23, the ag ents variously

ref err ed to the date o f the incident as the 23rd, or F riday , or both. When asked if he was a t h o m e on Fr iday , Preston re p l i ed that he w as not at home a nd “wa s aro u n d d o w n to w n

. ” Pr e s to nw a s , in f a c t, n o t h o me that Fr iday . The a g ents used such ta ctics as telling Preston that “six people ove r there ” could plac e TD at Preston’s home on the day of the incide nt, telling him about other e vidence such as “f orensic e x ams [and] interviews” that could be used, and ask in g h im

if th is w a s a

“ o n e
- ti me th in g ” o r

if h e “ p r e y [ed]
on little ki ds.” Pr e sto n s til l de nie d h avin g do ne any thi ngto TD. Preston al s o claimed that he could not reme mber “F riday” because he suffere d from “short-term memory loss,” telling the a g ents, “sometimes I g o cra zy .” Preston cla imed, “I t’s just li ke I

have pr oblems wi th my

head, like a

tumor.” One o f t he ag ents asked him, “Y ou have a tumor? ” and Preston responde d, “Ye ah.” A n ag ent then as k ed if he wa s di s abled, and Preston asked the ag ent to explain what “disabled” means. The age nt expl ained what he meant by disabled—whe ther Preston was “n ot able to take c are of” himself or g et a job—and Preston replied that h e h ad been
remove d from school for his behavior a nd was not allowe d back.
The a g ents continued their que stioning and Pre ston kept deny ing the acc usations. One ag ent offe red Pre ston the chanc e “to sit in the [age nts’] vehic le and talk a bout it awayU NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 9
fr om .

. . e v e r

y b o dy
. ” P r e s t o nd e c l i n e d

. T h e y a g a in
re min de d Pr e sto n that he wa s n ot u nd e r a rr e st a nd wa s f re e to leave . They

told Preston that he seeme d like a “pr etty g ood du de ” and that if he fe lt sor ry , h e sh ou ld c on fe ss. Th e y a lso told Preston, “We don’t tell this to any body

. I t stay s with the folder, a nd it stay s with the U.S. Attorney ’s Off ice a nd that’s i t

. ” P r e s t o na dm i t t e d

t h a tT D c am e i n t o h i s h o u s e t h a td ay, but stil l insist ed that he “ didn’t do noth i n g” and sug g ested that so me on e wa s trying to “f ra me ” him . F ina lly , th e a g e nts ag ain informed him that their “pre viou s i nvestig ation”
reve aled that “ [s] omething did ha ppen,” a nd when they

asked if he us e d a c on do m, h e no dd e d his he a d an d s a id, “ Th a t’ s it

. J u s t ca me in, and it just happened.” The a g ents then aske d Preston a ser ies of questions about the e vent

. T o many of these que stions, li ke “H e pulled hi s pants down? And then
w h a td i d h e s ay ?” an d

“ Y o u ju s tun z i p p e d

y o u r z i p p e r ?” Preston would respond, “ Idon’t k n o w” and claim that he could not reme mber the e vents. The a g ents ask ed many leadingquestions, for example, “did he pull his pants down
or wh a t di d h e do ? ” and

“ did he put th e c on do m on

or did y ou? ” The ag ents asked Pre ston, “Did y ou just put y our—put y our penis in all the wa

y or jus t a l i t t l e bit? ” to which he
r e s p o n d e d , “ Ju s t a

li tt le bit.” He a dmi tte d th a t he put hi s penis in T D’s anus for “five , six seconds . . . then [TD] went out . .

. said, I ’m g oing to te ll on y ou, and then he just fucking started c ryi n g .” He also claimed that he did not ejaculate. When asked why

he did it, Preston claimed that h e did not have a sexual “urg e” to do it, an d that TD wa s the one who
came onto him; he claimed that T D was “ alway s saying . . . suck my dick . . . and he say s it to all t hese othe r kids, too.”
The a g ents then asked Preston if he was sorry for what he ha d d on e to T D. Whe n h e sai d th at he w a s, the a g e nts tol d him, “ [U] sually what we do is w e wr ite a stateme nt and likeU NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 10 if y ou wanted to sa

y y ou’re sorry

or something like that, y ou could . . . def

initely do that, and we can provide that to him.” The a g ents asked Pre ston if they could “just summarize what [P reston] . .

. told [them].” At this point, the ag ents rea liz ed that the alleg ed incident had not oc curr ed on Fr iday and
e r r o n e o u s l y c h an g e d

t h e d a y i n t h e i r

s u m m ar y t o T h u r s d ay, but corre ctly

stated that it was the 23r d of Sep tember. The ag ents wrote down a summary of the e vents. They

asked Pr e sto n to re pe a t hi s a c c ount and inc lud e d wh a t Pr e sto n c ou ld confirm ha

ppened and left out that which Preston claimed he
cou l d not remembe r. They explained that they

wer e “not g oing to put any

thing that [he didn’t] want [ them] t o put in,” and that they

wer e “g oing to have [him] sign [it] .” The y then g ave it to Pr e sto n to re a d ov e r and tol d him th at h e coul d “cha ng e any thing [he] want[ed] .” Preston then sig ned the statement wit hout making chang es and the ag ents left without pla c inghim

un de r a rr e st.

Pr e sto n w a s in iti a lly

charg e d b y

ind ic tme nt w ith Ag g rava ted Sexual Abuse, for whic h the mand at ory minimum prison sentenc e is thirty -y ear s. Neg otiations betwee n Preston, his attorney , and t h e g overnme nt led to an ag ree ment that Preston woul d waive his rig hts to a jury trial
and to a n indi ctmen t if

the g ov e rnme nt w ou ld r e du c e his char g e to the lesser

offe nse of Abusive S exual Cont act, whic h
car ries no maximum prison sentenc e, and would re commend that he re ceive no more than a fiftee n-y ear sentenc e. Preston and his attorney signe d and filed a waiver of indictment and
a wa iver of jur

y trial, both of which state d t h at P reston had been a dvised of his rig hts and ag ree d to w aive them in open court. Additionally , the distr i ct court c onducted a colloquy in open cour

t to determine whe ther Preston unde rsto o d the ri gh ts that he waive d. The judg e, with assura nces f romU NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 11

Pr e sto n’ s atto rn e y , c on c lud e d th a t Pr e sto n und e rs too d h is rig hts. The district judg e conduc ted a thre e-da y bench tr i al and at i ts c o n c lu s io n f

o u n d Pr e s to n g u il ty o f th e c h ar g e . The
co u rt relied on Pre ston’s confe ssion, DNA evidenc e take n from TD’ s underwe ar a

nd an expert witness’s a

naly sis of the DNA, TD ’s statements to his g randmother , and the testimony of TD ’s fo re ns ic int e rv ie we r a nd the nurs e wh o c on du c te d h is
m ed i ca l ex am i n at i o n

. T D d i d n o tt es t i fy

at t h e t ri al , t h o u gh his recor ded stateme nts were admitted by stipulation.

Th e c ou

rt se nte nc e d Pr e sto n to fi ft y -m on ths ’ imprisonment, a lifetime term of supe rvised re lease , and, inte r a lia , th e c on dit ion s th a t: (1 ) “ Yo u s ha ll att e nd

and pa rt ic ipate in plethy smogr aph testing ,” (2) “You shall not possess, view, or othe rwise use any other
mate ri a l th a t is s e xua lly

sti mul a tin g , s e xua lly oriented, or deeme d to be inappropr iate by the probation off

icer and/or tre atment provider ,” and (3 ) “Y ou shall not be in the company of or have contac t with children under the ag e of 18 without prior approva l of the pro b at ion office r.”

II.
Preston raises sever al issues in c halleng ing his conviction and sen t ence. Preston first ar g ues that his confe ssion was involuntary and thus imprope rly admitted at trial. Af ter examining the totality of the circ umstances, we c onclude that the c on fe ssi on

wa s p ro pe rl y

a dmi tte d. Pr e sto n a lsoU NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 12

c h a ll e n g e s th e v a li d it

y o f h is w a iv e r

o f h is r igh ts to a

jury trial, indictment, and conf rontati o n

. W e hold that Preston validly waived his rig hts to a jury trial and an indictment, a nd the district court did not plainly err b y accepting Preston’s counsel’s w aiver

of his rig ht to confrontation. We re j ect Preston’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting expert testimony about the DNAevidenc e used to impli cate him.
We hold that the district co urt proper ly admitted the testimony of TD’ s g randmother an d uncle unde r the e x cited utteranc e exception to the g ener al hea rsay exc lusion. The te sti mony of Of fi c e r B utl e r wa s n ot p ro pe rl y a dmi tte d at tr ia l, but its admiss ion was har mless error . We rej ec t Preston’s argument that prosec utorial misconduct mater ially aff ecte d the fa irness of the trial. Preston also argues that the trial cour t
re lie d o n in su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e . We r eje c t th e a rgume nt. Sin c e c e rt a in c on dit ion s of Pr e sto n’ s su

pe rv ise d r e le a se mus t be re manded to the district cour t for re consider at i o n, we do not rule on the que stion of the duration of the supe rvision.

III
. We reviewde no v o whether a conf ession was voluntary
an d fo r cl ea r erro r t

h e di s t ri ct co u rt ’s fa c t u a l f i n d i n gs underlying its dete rmination of voluntariness. United States v. Game z , 301 F.3d 1138, 1144 ( 9th Cir. 2002).

“Involuntary

or coe rce d confe ssions a re inadmissi ble at trial bec ause the ir admission is a vio l at i o n of a de fenda nt’s rig ht to due proce ss.” Br ow n v . H or e ll , 644 F.3d 969, 979 (9th Cir. 2011). “[C] ourts look to the totality of circ umstances to determine whether

a conf ession was voluntary .” W ithrow v. W illiams , 507 U.S. 680, 693 (1993). Fac tors to beU NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 13
considere d in this a n al y s i s include “the deg ree of police
coer cion; the leng th, location an d co ntinuity of the interrog ation; and the def endant’ s maturity , educa tion, phy sical condition, mental hea lth, and ag e.” Br own , 644 F.3d at 9 7 9 (c i t i n g W

ithrow , 507 U.S. at 693–94). Ultimately , the deter mination to be made is whe ther the “ suspect’s will was overbor ne.” Hayne

s v. W ashington , 37 3 U. S

. 503, 513–14 (1963). “[C] oerc ive police a ctivity is a nec essar y predic ate to the finding t h at a c onfession is not ‘voluntary .’” Colorado v. Con ne lly , 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). “Coerc i v e p o lice activity can be the re sult of either ‘phy sical intimida t ion or psy cholog ical pre ssure.’” Br own , 6 44 F.3d at 979 (quoting Town se nd v . S ain , 372 U. S

. 293, 307 (1963)) . Her e, the ag ents did not threaten Preston phy sically nor use a

ny improper inter

view tec hniques to appl y “psy cholog ical pressure .” Se e Br own , 644 F.3d at 979. The intervie w lasted about forty -minutes, took place outside of Preston’s
re sid e nc e , o the rs we re ne arb y , Pr e sto n w a s tol d mu lti ple times that he was not under arr est and wa s fre e to leave , Preston was not phy sically restra ined, and the a g ents did not
arr est Preston at the c oncl u sion of the interview . Preston’s
a sse rt ion that th e agent s’ of

fe r t o s pe ak in sid e the ir

ve hic le “subtly threatened his phy sical freedom” is unfounded; the ag ents offe red this opportuni ty to allow Preston to “talk about it away from . .

. ever

y body ,” Preston dec lined the offe r, and the ag ents reminded Pre ston im mediately there afte r that he
wa s n ot u nd e r a rr e st.
Th ere is no do ub t th a t th e a g e nts c on tin ue d to tr y to obtain a confession from Preston a fter he denied the inc ident with TD. Howe ver, a ccusin g a s u spect of ly ing “ does not automatically

rende r t h e questioning coer cive, a s anU NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 14
int e rr og a tor

c an le g iti mate ly

e xpre ss h is d isb e lie f a t a defe ndant’s story

in order to e licit further co m m ents or explanations.” Un ite d S

tates v . W olf , 8 13 F .2 d 97 0, 97 5 ( 9th Cir. 1987).
Nor is there any doubt that the ag ents confuse d the dates duri ngthe c ours e of

the int e rv ie w. Ho we ve r, th is wa s n ot a ploy to confuse Pre ston, bu t wa s a g enuine mistake on the part of the investigating a g en ts; the ag ents proper ly ref err ed to the incident as having oc curr ed on September 23 and eventua lly

tried to rec tify

the mistake duringtheir interview
w i t hP r e s t o n , t h o u g ho n c e a g a i nt h e y s t a t e d t h e w r o n g d ay. This mist ake did not appe ar to c onfuse Pre ston, who
c on tin ue d to de ny havin g be e n ho me on F ri da y but e ve ntu a lly acknow ledg ed the incide nt to which the ag ents wer e ref err ing. It would be illo gi ca l to ex pect Pre ston to corre ct the ag ents’ asse rted date of a n ev ent he claimed neve r occur red, and by the time he beg an to conf ess, diffe rentiating betwee n a Wednesda

y and a F riday

would not have be en at the fore front of his thoug hts.
The a g ents proce eded with their i nterview by using suc h ta c tic s a s te lli ng Pr e sto n that othe r ev ide nc e c ou ld i mpl ic a te him, making it se em as thoug h confe ssing c ould minim ize the
co n sequenc es of his cr ime, and askingPreston sug g estive questions. None of the se tac tics, howeve r, rises to a
c on sti tu ti on a l vi olatio n. Th e a g e nts did no t us e “ fa lse
e vid e nc e plo y s, ” a s im pli e d b y Pr e sto n. Th e ag e nts
re fe re nc e d w itn e sse s th a t c ould p la c e TD a t Pr e sto n’ s h ome on the day of the incide nt, interviews implicating Preston, and fore nsic examinations that co uld be conduc ted to deter mine wh at had occurr ed. The re were s e v e r a l p e o p l e w h o c ou ld place TD at Preston’s home on the day of the incide nt, the
a g e nts had

repor ts of the incident fr om other intervie ws, andU NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 15
a forensic ex amination of TD could be conduc ted, as it later
wa s

. E v en i f th i s ev i d en ce wa s m i s l ea d i n g, t h i s i s n o ten o u gh to amount to coerc ion. Se e Po lla rd v . G ala za , 290 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2002) (“ [ M ]i srepr esentations made by law enfor ceme nt in obtaining a statement, while re prehe ns ible, does not nec essar ily

constitute coer cive c onduct.”)

. Simi l ar l y , t h e a g e n t s ’ s t a t e m e n t s t o P r e s t o nt h a th is confe s s i o n could stay

betwee n them and the United States At torney , and that they

could possibly

g et help for

him if he confe ssed, wer e not imprope r. Ag ents may use su ch t actics to induce a c onfession. See United States v. C o l eman , 208 F.3d 786, 791 (9th Cir. 2000) (Ag ents’ promise that they could “tell the pr osecutor to g ive [ t he suspec t] littl e or no tim e ” did no t est a bli sh inv olu

nta ri ne ss)

. F ina lly , the a g e nts ’ use of sug g estive questions wa s n o t improper. I t is not
re as o n ab l e t o ex p ec ta p er s o ns u s p e ct edo f p er p et ra t i n g a serious cr ime to willingly provide a narr ative of his cr iminal action. See D oody v. R

yan , 649 F.3d 986, 1021 (9th Cir. 2011) (“ We rec og nize and acknow ledg e that poli ce of fice rs are e nti tle d to us e , a

nd do us e , a

va riety of te c hn iqu e s to int e rr og a te su sp e c ts. ” ); Cunningham v. C i t y of W enatche e , 34 5 F .3 d 80 2, 81 0 ( 9th

Cir . 2 00 3) (f

ind ingtha t “ c on tin uin gto question a suspect afte r t he suspect claims he is innocent doe s not constitute coerci on and is often ne cessa ry to achieve the truth,” and thoug h the questions may have “ u n s et tled” the
su sp e c t, “ me re e mot ion a lis m and c on fu sio n d o n ot i nv a lid a te confe ssions”). Pr es t o n ’s denial of some sug g estions by

the ag ents and his a cce ptance of others sug g ests that his will was not overborne by

the ag ents’ strate g y
. Preston also provided the ag ents with additional fac ts that were not sugg ested by their lea ding que stions; for example, his st atements re g arding how long he plac ed his penis i n TD’s a nus and TD’ s rea ction there afte r.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 16

F u rt h e r , t a c t i c s u s e d

t o o b t a i na

c o n f e s s i o n a r e o n l y a fac tor to be we i gh ed when examining the totality of the circ umstances. Br own , 644 F.3d at 979. The leng th, location, and continuity of the interview do not suppor t a conclusion of involuntariness.

Pr e s t o nc o n t e n d s t h a ta

f i n d i n g o f i n v o l u n t ar i n e s s is

“ ir re futable in l ig ht o f [h is] c ha ra c te ri sti c s, ” sp e c if

ic a lly his diminis hed mental capa city . The “ persona l char acte ristics of th e d e f e n d an t ar e c o n s ti tuti o n a ll y ir r e le v an t a b s e n t p r oof of
coer cion,” Derrick

v. Pe terson , 924 F.2d 813, 818 ( 9th Cir. 1 9 9 1 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Rohrbac h , 813 F.2d 142, 144 (8th Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation m arks omitted). Preston’s diminis hed mental c apac ity does not so heavily influence the tot a lity of c ir c ums tanc e s te st that a fi nd ingof inv olu nta ri ne ss is appropriate.
Preston has an I Q of 65, which means that he suff ers f rom mild mental retarda

tion. At k ins v . V irg ini a , 536 U.S. 304, 309 n.3 (2002) ( “‘Mild’ menta l retar dation i s t y pically used to d e sc ri be pe op le wi th a

n I Q l e ve l of

50 –5 5 to a

pp ro xima te ly 70.”). Preston argues that the a g ents should have known that he wa s d isa

ble d a nd take n p re c a

uti on ary ste ps duri ngthe ir int e rv ie w and , “ a t le a st, g iv en him Miranda war nings.” Preston prese nts a valid argument that the age nts should have ha d s ome ide a

that he su ff

e re d f ro m me nta l issu es, but

it could not have be en cl ea r t o the ag ents exactly what issues those wer e. Preston informe d th e ag ents that a “ tumor”
cause d “short-te rm memory loss,” and th at he ha d been
remove d from his high sc hool due to his behavior a nd not allowed back. Neither of these comments would gi v e the office rs re ason to believe that Preston could not compre hend their questions or would be susc eptible to improper influe nce. Additionally , Preston’s contention that the a g ents s h o u ld h a veU NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 17 provided him with Miranda war nings or require d a par ent or
a tto rn e y to b e pr e se nt a

re le g a lly ba se le ss

. Pr e sto n w a s n ot i n custody and makes no argument that he was. W ithrow v. W illiams , 5 07 U. S. 6 80 , 6 93 –9 4 ( 19 93 ) ( takin g int o consideration in it s due proc ess analy sis of voluntariness the

“ fa ilure of

po lic e to adv is e the de fe nd ant o f h is r ig hts to
re m ai ns i l en tan d

t o h av e c o u n s el p re s en td u ri n g cus t o dial interrogation .” (e mph a sis a dd e d) ); Derrick, 924 F.2d at 819 (“[N]o case .

. . requir[es] that a juvenile’s re lative be pr esent pr ior to a ny c on fe ssi on .” ). Mo re ov e r, Pr e sto n w a s n ot a juvenile. Finally , the bar

for f inding that a d efendant wa s coer ced in part due to his mental i mpairment i s not insignifica nt and appea rs to tur n larg ely on the leng th of the interr og ation. See, e.g. , Columbe v. Connec ticut , 367 U.S. 568, 620–26 (1973) (n oti ngthat me nta l in c a pa c ity was a re le va

nt f a c tor in deter mining that holding the defe ndant—a “ mental def ective

. . . with an intellige nce quotient of six ty -four ”—in ef

fec tive police custody

for f our nig hts and five da

y s, re fu sing to let the def endant spe ak with any

body other than his co- defe ndant and wife , and re peate dly questio ning the defe ndant culminating in a four -and- a-ha lf hour questioning afte r which he c on fe sse d, wa s c oe rc ive ); Doody v . Ryan , 6 4 9 F.3d 986, 1008 (9th Cir. 2011) (foc using on tim e as a n important fac tor in c on c lud ing t hat a

tw e lve -h our i nv e sti g a tio n o f a me nta lly imp a ir e d s us pe c t w a s c oe rc ive ); Com. of N. Mariana Islands
v

. M e n di o la , 976 F.2d 475, 485–86 ( 9th Cir. 1992) (dete rmining that the interrog ation of a cog nitively impaired defe ndant was coer cive when “[p] olice repe atedly i n formed M e n d i o l a t h a t h e w o u l d b e c h ar g e d o r r e l e a s e d w i t h i nt w e n t yfour h o u r s , th e y

inte r r o g a te d h im o nnu me r o u s o c c a s ions
w i t h o u ta f

f o r d i n g h i mt h e c o m f

o rto f f r i e n d s , f a m i l y, em p l o y er , o r a t t o rn ey , t h ey re p ea t ed l y

ac cu s edh i mo f l yi n g,U NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 18 and they i nstructed him to sign state ments he could not understand” ), overruled on othe r grounds by Georgev. Camacho , 1 19 F.3d 1393 ( 9th Cir. 1997). Finding unconstitutional coercion here , wher e the inter rog ation consisted of for

ty -five mi n u t es of que stioning in Preston’s own driveway , would signific antly broade n this Court’s
c oe rc ion jur isp ru de nc e , at lea st a s it imp a c ts tho se wi th cog nitive impairments.
Preston’s mental ca

pacity alone is not enoug h to render his confession involuntary . I n the abse nce of coer cive tac tics
or a c o e r c i v e a t m o s p h e r e d u r i n g t h e i n t e r

v i e w , m o r e is
r e q u i r e d t o s h o w t h a tP r e s t o n ’ s c o n f e s s i o nw a s i n v o l u n t ar

y.
IV.
We reviewde novo the district cour t’s acc eptanc e of a defe ndant’s wa iver of his rig hts to a j u ry t rial and a n indictment. United States v. Christensen , 1 8 F. 3d 822, 824 (9 th Cir . 1 99 4) ; see United States v. Fe rguson , 758 F.2d 843, 85 0– 51 (2 d Ci r. 19 85 ). “ I f t he de fe nd ant fai led to o bje c t to the admission of evidenc e under the Confro n t ation Clause, [t his Court] revie w[s] for plain e rror .” United States v. Hagege , 437 F.3d 943, 956 ( 9th Cir. 2006).

A. W aiv e r o f I ndic tment
A d e f e n d an t m

u s t k n o w in g ly , inte ll ig e n tl y , and
v oluntarily

waive his rig ht to an indictment. Ferguson , 758 F.2d at 850–51. Federa l Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b) allows a defenda

nt to waive his rig ht to an indictment and be
c ha rg e d by inf

or matio n if the de fe nd ant w a ive s th e ri g ht “ in
o p en co u rt an d af

t er b ei n g ad v i s ed o f t h e n at u re o f t h e c h ar ge and of [his] rig hts.” F ED

. R. C R IM

. P. 7(b).U NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 19
Preston’s waiver complied with Rule 7(b). Preston
wa i v edh i s r i g h t i no p en co u rt af t er t h e d i s t ri ct j u d ge asce rtained Preston’s understanding of the c onsequenc es, and Pr e s to n ’ s la

w y e r c o n f

ir me d th a t Pr e s to n u n d e r s to o d the waiv er . The judg e explained to Preston the diffe renc e be tw e e n a n in dic tme nt an d an inf

or matio n, inc lud ing the ro le of the g rand jury

in an indictment and the c onsequen ce s of
wa ivi ng his ri g ht to a g ra

nd jur y ind ic tme nt. Th e jud g e a lso asked Pre ston’s attorney

whether he had r eser

vati o n s about Preston’s under standing of his waiver , and the a ttorney stated, “I have no suc h rese rvations, judg e.” Pre ston’s attorney had consult ed with two mental health prof essionals, both of wh om c on fi rmed that w hil e Pr e sto n ma y have be e n s low

to understand the conce pts involved in the court proc eeding s, he
was c apable of under standing them, and the attorney spent
sever al hours with Preston explaining t o him the conc ept and conseque nces of

his waiver. Preston also argues that his waiver in exchang e for

a lesser se ntence constituted coer cion. Ther e i s , howeve r, no b a s i s i nl aw o r

f a c tf o r t h i s ar g u m e n t

. P r e s t o nk n o w i n g l y, intelligently , and voluntaril y waived his rig ht to an ind ic tme nt. B. Waiver of Jury Trial
A d e fe nd ant “ mus t be c omp e te nt to w a ive the jur y ri g ht, and the waiver must in fac t be voluntary , knowing , and i n t ellige nt.” Christ ensen , 1 8 F

. 3 d a t 8 2 4

. F e d e r a l Ru le of Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure 2 3( a ) a llo ws c ri min a l de fe nd ants to
wa ive the ir c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht t o a jur y tr ia l if the wa ive r i s made in writing and has the approva l of the g overnme nt and of the c ourt. F ED

. R. C R IM

. P. 23 (a ). Th is C ourt ha s a lso he ld that in “ c a se s whe re the de fe nd ant’ s men ta l or e mot ion a l st a teU NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 20
is a substantial i s s u e,” the district court must conduct “a n in-depth colloquy

whi ch reasonably

assure s the court that under the particula

r fa cts of the c ase, the s igne d waiver was voluntarily , knowing ly , and intellige ntly made.” Id. at 825–26. This must include telling the defe ndant: “(1) twelve members of the community compose a

jury ; (2) the de fenda

nt may take pa rt in jury selec tion; (3) jury

verdic ts m ust be unanimous; and (4) the court a lone decide s g uilt or innocence if the def endant wa ives a jury

trial.” Id. at 825. Preston complied with Fe dera l Rule of Criminal Procedur e 23(a ) by

waiving his rig ht to a jury trial in writing and with the appr oval of the g overnme nt and the cour t. The judge conducte d an in-de pth colloquy in which he discussed with Preston eac h of the four afor ementioned points, had Preston explain each, a

nd made sure that Preston under stood the m a l l

. P r e s t o n ’ s ar g u m e n t t h a t t h e c o u rt w a s r e qu i r e d to comply with Fede ral Rule of Criminal P roce dure Rule 11, which sets for

th nece ssary

proce dural steps for a de fenda nt
a c c e pti nga g uil ty ple a , ha s no le g a l ba sis be c a us e Pr e sto n d id not plead guilty . Preston’s waive r of hi s j u ry rig ht was
vo luntary , k

no wi ng , a nd int e lli g e nt. C. Waiver of Right t

o Confron tation “[T] he ac cused ma

y waive his rig ht to . . . c o n fr ontation
an d

. . . th e w a iv e r

o f th is r igh t m ay

b e a c c o mp li s h e d

b y the
accu sed’s c ounsel as a matter of tria l tactics or strateg y .” W ilson v. Gray , 3 45 F .2 d 2 82 , 2 86 (9 th C ir . 1 96 5) . A t tr ia l, Preston and his attorney ag ree d to admit TD’s rec orded statement in lieu o f h av i n g TD testify in person, and he argues that this stipulation violated hi s rig ht to confrontation. I t is clear that the trial counsel ’s s tipulation was a matter of trial strateg y . Preston’s attorne y opted to admit the rec ordedU NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 21
statements bec ause he was c on t en t with the information contained the rein a

nd conce rned tha t “childre n on the stand
. . . can sa

y any thin g and g o in any

direc tion.” The district court did not plainly err by acc epting this wa iver a nd admitting TD’ s rec orded s t at ements. See H agege , 437 F.3d at 956.

V.

Preston ar gues that the e x pert testimony of the DN A analy st at trial did not mee t the require ments of Rule 702 and should h ave been e x cluded a s unfairly prejudicia l under Fe dera l Rule of Evidence 403.

Preston’s asser

tio n that the DNA e vidence should have be e n e xclu de d und e r R ule 40 3 d e pe nds lar g e ly on his argument that the evidenc e wa s unreliable. H is argument fails. Rule 403 is inapplicable to bench t ri al s

. EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co. , 31 F. 3d 89 1, 89 8 ( 9th Cir . 1 99 4) ; Sc hu ltz v. Butche r , 24 F.3d 626, 632 ( 4th Cir. 1994).

Fe dera l Rule of Evidence 702 states that ex pert testimony must be “the product of reliable principles and me thods, and

. . . the expert [m ust ha

ve] r eliably

applied the pr inciples and
me th o d s to th e f

a c ts o f th e c a s e .” F ED

. R. E V ID

. 7 0 2

. We revie w the dis trict court’ s decision to admit expert opinion t est imony for a buse of discr etion. U n ite d S ta tes v. Redlightning , 624 F.3d 1090, 1110 (9th Cir. 2010). Whether a district cour

t abused its d i s cretion involves a two-step inquiry

. Id. “ First, we deter mine de novo wh ether

the district court identified the c orre ct leg al rule to a pply t o the relief reque sted. I f th e d i s t ri ct cour t did not identify

the
corr ect leg al rule , i t is an abuse of discretion. Second, w e deter mine if the district court’ s application of the corre ct leg alU NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 22

st an d ar d w a s i l l o g i c a l , i mp l a

u s i b l e , o r w i t h o u ts u

p p o rtin infere nces that may

be dra wn from t he fa cts in the rec ord.” Id. (interna l citations omit ted).
The district court proper ly applied Rule 702 to determine whether to admit the t estimony of t he DNA analy st. The trial judge fulfilled his “g ateke eper ” role pursuant to Da ub e rt and
a llo we d th e e xpe rt ’s te sti mony ba se d o n th e fo un datio n la id by the pr os e c uto r that e sta bli sh e d th e re le va

nc e and re lia bil ity of the testimony and the scientific method by which the DNA
was a naly zed; the DNA was subjected to a common proce dure f

or ana ly sis. See Daubert v. Me rrell Dow Pharm., Inc. , 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Preston made no objection to the expert’s test i m o n y at trial and ha s failed to ar ticulate any meaning ful rea son that her a naly si s is not reliable. F or example, Preston argues that t h e “ana ly st went below he r lab’s quality

threshold.” How ever , the expert explicitly stated that while the test conducte d may have fallen below the lab’ s “re porting threshold,” the a naly sts are “ allowed to go be low that le ve l to tr

y and e lim inate or

e xclu de so meone .” T his is exactly what the e x pert did. Preston’s other a rguments attack the ana ly st (1) for running “irre levant statistical hy potheses,” even thoug h the tests to which he r efe rs wer e not par t of the
ana ly st’ s r e po rt

and we re no t r e lie d o n b y

the dis tr ic t c ourt , and (2) for usinginappro p riate population statist ics, eve n though Pre ston’s expert ag ree d that these statis tics were proper to use in an ana ly sis.

P reston incor

rec tly asser ts that the district court “er roneously used t he D N A p o p u lati o ns tati s tics.” Specifica lly , Preston claims that the di s trict court misint erpr eted the D NA evide nce when it stated that “99.8% of the g e ne ra l Na

va jo po pu latio n c an be e xclu de d a s p os sib le contributors of suc h DNA.” The a n al y st testified that “99.8U NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 23

perc ent of Na

vajo contributors” taken f rom a “ population of randomly selec ted unrelated i ndividuals” could be eliminated as contributors to the DNA found in TD’ s underwe ar. Pr e sto n c la ims that “ the 99 .8 % statis tic su g g e sts on ly that th is perc entag e of r andomly

selec ted, unre lated Navajo Nati ve Americ ans is unlikely to ha ve the e x act same DNA pr ofile as Mr. Preston—the pres ence or abse nce of alleles at only

five loci woul d y ield a sig nificantly lower pe rce ntag e.” Pre ston, howeve r, has misinterpre ted t h e analy st’s statisti cs; the analy st eliminated 99.8% of the N avajo population base d on
an ana ly sis of the sample taken from TD’ s underwe ar a nd not based on an analy sis of P reston’s DNA, and Pre ston provides
no basi s f

or his c la im that ano the r t e st, wh ic h h e fa ils to descr ibe, “would y

ield a sig nificantly lower perce ntag e.” The distric t court did not abuse its discre tion in admitt ing the expert’s testimony

. I t a

pplied the corr ect rule, Rule 702, and did no t a

pp ly the ru le in a wa y that wa s “il log ic a l, implausible, or without support in in fe re n ces that may be drawn from the fac ts in the rec ord.” Redlightning , 624 F.3d at 1110.

VI.

We r eview a

district court’s a dmission of evidence for a n a bu se of dis c re tio n a

nd wi ll r e ve rs e on ly if

it i s mo re pr ob a

ble than not that the improper e vidence materia lly aff ecte d the verdic t. United St ates v. Dorsey , 67 7 F .3 d 94 4, 95 1, 95 4 ( 9th Cir. 2012)

. Alleg ed Confrontation Cl ause violations ar e re vie we d d e no vo and are su bje c t to ha

rm le ss er ro r a na ly sis

. Un ite d States v . B e rry , 683 F.3d 1015, 1020 ( 9th Cir. 2012).

Pr e s to n o b

je c ts to th e d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s a dmi s s io nof testimony from TD’ s g randmother

and uncle rec ounting what TD told them on the nig ht of the assault. He also cha lleng esU NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 24
the te sti mony

of Of f ic e r B utl e r, wh o inve sti g a te d th e inc ide nt,
rec ounting what TD and his g randpa rents told him about the assault.
The district cour

t did not abuse its discretion by admitting the statements of TD ’s uncle a nd g randmother

rec ounting what TD told them on t h e n ight of the assault. The excited utteran ce ex ception allows a court to admit a “ statement relating to a startling event or condition, ma de wh i l e the dec la r a n t w a s u n d e r

th e s tr e s s o f

e xc it e me n t t

h a t i t c a used.” F ED

. R. E V ID

. 803(2)

. Although Pre ston claims that the t i m i n g o f t h e e v e n t s p r e c l u d e s a dm i s s i o n o f t h e t e s t i m o n y, there is no conclusive evidence to establish when the a lleg ed assault occ urre d, and the e vidence shows that TD ra n from Preston’s house in tea

rs to his own home where he r eporte d the in ciden t to his re lativ e s w hil e sti ll c ry ingand vis ibl y up se t. T he dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t a bu se its dis cret io n. It di d not make a de cision that was “c lear ly ag ainst t h e logic and eff ect of the fa cts.” Rabkin v. Oregon Health Scie nces U niv. , 350 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2003)

. These statements did not violate the Confrontation Cl ause. Excit ed utt era nces a re nontestimonial. Leavitt v. Arave , 383 F.3d 809, 830 ( 9th Cir. 2004).
Preston does make a valid argument that the testimony of Offic er B utler wa s imp roperly admitted as hea

rsay and a violati o n of the Confrontation Cl ause. H oweve r, Off icer Butler ’s testimony

was c umulative to the testim o n y o f TD, TD’s gra ndmother and uncle, and TD’s for ensic intervie wer

. I n light of the other e videnc e av ail able, the a dmission of Offic er B utler’s testimony wa s h armless e rror

. See U nited States v. Gonzalez , 533 F.3d 1057, 1061–62 ( 9th Cir. 2008) (admission of hea

rsay reco u n t i ng victim’s rape story wasU NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 25
harmless error where victim also testified that the def endant had ra ped her).

VII.

I f def ense c ounsel fails to object to ac ts o f allege d prosec utorial mi s co n d u ct at trial, we revie w for pla in error

. United States v. W

right , 625 F.3d 583, 610 ( 9th Cir. 2010). To ob ta in r e ve rs a l, a

de fe nd ant m

us t e sta bli shbo th misconduct and pre

judice. Id

. Reg arding prejudice , t he question is whether it is more p robable than not that the misconduct materia lly

aff ecte d the fa irness of the tr ial. Id. at 613.
Preston makes seve ral a

rguments that the evidenc e wa s imp r o perly

argued: the prose cutor improper ly vouched f

or the te sti mony of

the DN A a

na ly st; the pr os e c uto r a

rgue d c hr on ic sexual a b u s e ; th e p r o s e c u to r in je c te d “ince ndiary considerations” into the case; a nd the pros ec u t or sug g ested that defe nse counsel manufa cture d evidenc e, commented on Pr e sto n’ s si le nc e , a

nd c a lle d Pr e sto n’ s m ot her a lia r. Th e se arguments lack mer it.

“Vouc hing c onsists of placing the pre sti ge of the g overnme nt be hind a witness throug h persona l assuranc es of the witness’s ver acity , or sug g es t i ng that information not prese nt ed to t he jury

supports the witness’s testimony .” United St ates v. W

eatherspoon , 410 F.3d 1142, 1146 ( 9th Cir. 2005) (inter

nal citation om i t t ed ). P reston is corr ect that the prosec utor stated that the DNA analy st ha d “no motive to do
any thi ngoth e r t

ha n to te ll the tr

uth .” Ho we ver, thi s f

a lls short of vouching

. The prosec utor did not make any persona l
ass ur anc e s o f v e ra c ity

no r d id h e make re fe re nc e to information not prese nted to the judge

. See W eatherspoon ,U NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 26

41 0 F .3 d at 11 46 (f

ind ingthat a pr os e c uto r i mpr op e rl y vo uc he d f or a wi tne ss wh e re the pr os e c uto r we nt be y on d h is state ment th at th e wi tne ss h a d n o r e a so n to lie and “ c le arl y urg ed that th e ex istence of leg al and pr ofessional
re pe rc us sio ns se rv e d to ens ur e the c re dib ili ty of the of fi c e rs ’ testimony ”). Preston argues that the prose cutor improper ly ref ere nced chronic sexual abuse that was “ not in evidence” and

“ unne c e ssa

ry to the c ha

rg e .” Ho we ve r, TD state d d ur inghis fo re ns ic int e rv ie w that Pr e sto n a ssa ult e d h im mult ipl e tim e s, and the i nfo rm a tio n w a s r e le va nt t o a n a na ly sis of

thi s interview.

I t is unne c e ssa

ry to ad dr e ss P re sto n’ s o the r a rgume nts

. Ev e n if mis c on du c t oc c ur re d, Pr e sto n ha s no t sh ow n th a t it is
mor e pr ob a

ble tha n n ot t hat it a ff e c te d th e fa ir

ne ss o f the tr ia l. Th is wa s a ben c h tri a l in wh ic h the jud g e wa s the tr ie r of fa c t. The risk of imprope rly

influencing

a ju d ge b y

placingthe prestig e of the g overnme nt in favor of or ag ainst a witness or
sw ayingthe jud g e wi th i mpr op e r e vid e nc e is fa r le ss tha n in a jury trial. See Dedmore v. United States , 322 F.2d 938, 946 (9 th C ir . 1 96 3) (“ [I ]t is to be pr e sume d, a bs e nt a sh ow ingto the contra ry , that the District J udg e conside red only materia l and compe tent evidenc e in arriving at his finding s of g uilt.”). Preston has fa iled to show misco nduct or that this alleg ed misconduct aff

ecte d the fa irness of the tr ial.

VIII.
Preston contends that the trial court had insuff icient
e vid e nc e to c on c lud e that he ha d the int e nt t o s e xua lly a bu se TD o r th a t th e a

b u s e a c tu a ll y o c c u r

r e d

. We mu s t v ie w the evidenc e “in the light m ost favor able to the prosec ution” andU NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 27
examine whether

“ anyrational trier

of fa ct could have found the e sse nti al ele me nts of the c ri me be y on d a

re a so na ble doubt.” J

ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 3 19 (1979) (e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) ; Unit ed S tates v. Atkinson , 990 F.2d 501, 503 (9th Cir. 1993) (e n banc)

. The g overnme nt had the burde n to prove be yond a
rea sonable doubt that Preston had the “int en t to abuse, humiliate, har as s , deg rade , or ar ouse or g ratify the sexual desire of any

person.” 18 U.S.C. § 2246(3).

“ [C]ir c ums tanti a l e vid e nc e a lon e c an be su ff ic ie nt t o demon s t rate a def

endant’ s g uilt.” United States v. Cordova Barajas , 360 F.3d 1037 , 1 0 4 1 (9th Cir. 2004). Preston’s argument that there was insufficient evidenc e to prove he had the re quisite intent depends larg ely on Preston’s own statement that he did not have a s exual “urg e” at the t ime of the assault. Other

evidenc e, howe ver , shows that Preston assaulted TD to gr atify

his sex ual des i re , including T D’s testimony that he viewed pornogra phy with Preston and that Preston ejac ulated af

ter the a ssault. Pre ston fails to show that, whe n v ie wi ngthe e vid e nc e in the li g ht m os t f a vo ra ble to the prosec ution, a rational trier of fac t c ould not have found the nec essar

y intent bey ond a re asonable doubt.

Pr e sto n a lso argue s th a t th e e videnc e is n ot s uf fi c ie nt t o prove t h at any

sexual contact occ urre d. Preston asser ts that the district court made its finding base d on a coer ced
c on fe ssi on , a

n unr e lia ble state me nt fr om T D, and unre lia ble DNA e vidence . Preston has fa iled to prove his as s er tions reg ardingthe re liability of the e vidence , and eve n if Preston has ca st doubt on t h e ab ility of any individual piece of evidenc e to establish g uilt conc lusively , he has failed to show that the evidenc e, take n on a whole a nd viewed in the lig ht most favora

ble to the prosec ution, could not convince aU NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 28
rational trier

of fa ct that the assa

u l t occur red. Jack

son , 443 U.S. at 319.

IX. The leng th of a ter

m of s u p ervised relea se is part of the sentenc e and is re v i ew ed for r easona bleness. United States
v . D an ie ls , 5 41 F .3 d 9 15 , 9 21 (9 th C ir . 2 00 8). We m us t consider ( 1) whether the district c ourt committed signific ant proce dural e rror , and then ( 2 ) the sente nce’ s substantive
rea sonab l eness. Id. Whe the r t he dis tr ic t c ourt

a de qu a te ly expl ained its rea sons for a se ntence is a proce dural issue, United States v. Cherer , 513 F.3d 1150, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008), revie wed de novo, United States v. Ham mond , 558 F.3d 1100, 11 03 (9 th C ir . 2 00 9) . I f t he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s sente nc e is proce durally

sound, we will revie w the subs t anti ve rea sonablene ss of the sentenc e for an abus e of discretion. United St ates v. Re

ssam , 679 F.3d 1069, 1086 (9th Cir. 2012).
The distri ct co u rt’s imposition of a lifetime term of supervised r elea se wa s proce durally sound. The re cord doe s no t s u pport Preston’s asse rtion that the court “ g ave no rea sons to just ify

a life se ntence .” The co u rt g ave ma ny rea sons including its review o f t he sente ncingfac tors, the nature of the off

ense, a nd Presto n ’s charac teristics. See Un ite d S tates v . Ca rty , 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (“ A wi thi n-Gui del in es sen ten ce ord in ari ly needs lit tle explanation.”).

Pr e sto n a lso arg ue s th a t th e se nte nc e is s ub sta nti ve ly
unre a so na

ble , a sse rt ingthat th e c ourt fa ile d to take int o a c c ount t he se nte nc ingfa c tor s p ro vid e d b y 18 U. S.C. § 3 55 3( a ). Se c tio n 3 55 3( a ) s tate s that th e co ur t mu st
c on sid e r:U NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 29
the natur e and

c ir c ums tanc e s o f t

he of fe ns e and the history and char acte ristics o f t he defe ndant

. . . [and] shall impose a se n t en ce sufficie nt, but not gre ater than nec ess ar y

. . . [1] to re fl e c t the se ri ou sn e ss o f t he of fe ns e , to promote re spect for

the law, an d to provide ju s t p u n is h me n t f

o r th e o f f e n s e ; [ 2 ] t o a f

f o rd adequate deter

renc e to cr iminal co n d u ct; [3] to protec t the public fr o m further crimes of the d e f e n d an t; an d

[4 ] t o p r o v id e the defe ndant with neede d . . . corr ectional treatment in the most effective ma nner.” 18 U.S.C. 3353(a).
The district cour

t made ex plicit ref

ere nce to section 3553(a )
an d t o o k t h es e f ac t o rs i n t o a c co u n td

u ri n g s en t en ci n g. P r e s t o nar g u e s t h a tt h e s e n t e n c e w a s “ g r e a t e r t h ann e c e s s ar

y” beca use his ag e, mental impairme nts, and lack of a prior
rec ord should nece ssitate a lesser sentenc e. The court
acc ounted for the se fa cts, and Preston’s argu m en t is not sufficie nt to show that the court abuse d its discretion. However, the pr osecution re commended a lifetime term of su pe rv ise d r e le a se be c a

us e “ the e xten t of

[Pre sto n’s] dy sfunction” wa s not clear at the time of the t ri al

. The prosec utor re as o n ed that “if [at] some later time it bec omes clea r that he ha s been rehabilitated . . . he ca n have that term of supervised rele ase shortened

. . . but at no time ca n Your Honor leng then the ter

m of su p er vised rele ase if you don’t avail y ourself today of the term of lifeti m e s u pervised rele ase.” We c annot, on this re cord, hold that the co u rt abused its discre tion, but we note that Pr es t o n is y oung and this can possibly

be a very

long se ntence . We theref ore sug g est that the district court, in its own discre tion, considerU NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 30 the prosecutor’s recommendation of an alternative se ntence , wher eby Preston may

s at i s fy some requir ements to have the term shortene d.

X. Preston failed to objec t to the conditi ons of his supervised rele ase. We ther efor e re vi ew his claims for plain er ror. United States v. Blinkinsop , 606 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 20 10 ). “ Pla in e rr or is (1 ) an e rr or that (2 ) is pla in, (3 ) a ff e c ts
su bs tant ia l r ig hts , a

nd (4 ) s e ri ou sly

a ff e c ts the fa ir

ne ss, integ rity or publ ic reputation of j udicial proceeding s.” Id. at 1114 n.2.
The district cour

t mus t p rovi de a de fenda nt with notice befor e imposing a

ny conditi o n o f super

vised rele ase not contemplated by

the SentencingGuidelines. United States v. Cope , 527 F.3d 944, 953 (9th Cir. 2008) . Preston is incorre ct in a rguin g that th e c ourt

fa ile d to pr ov ide no tic e of its imp os iti on

of ple thy smo g ra

phte sti ng , it s p ro hib iti on of his
us e of se xua lly e xplic it m a te ri a ls, and

its pro hi bi tio n o f h is be ingin t

he c omp any

of c hildren

. Ea c h is e xplic itl y mentioned in the pre sentenc ing r eport that Preston’s c ounsel
rec eived be fore sentenc i ng and this is sufficient to provide notice. See U

nited States v. Lopez , 2 58 F .3 d 1 05 3, 10 55 (9 th Cir. 2001) (notice of

depar ture f rom sentenc ing guidelines can be found in the pre sentenc e re port).
Preston also argues t hat t he court did not provide “ on-therec ord re asons for imposing ” plethy smogr aph testi n g. The dis tr ic t c ourt

failed to make sp e c if

ic fi nd ing s w ithre g ard

to this testing. The g overnme nt admits, as it must , that this was
err or. We requir e spec ific fa ctual fi n d i n g s befor e orde ring thi s te sti ngbe c a

us e ind ivi du als have a “ pa rt ic ula rl yU NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 31 signific ant liberty

interest in beingfre e fr om plethy smogr aph testing.” United States v. W eber , 451 F.3d 552, 568 (9th Cir. 2006). Given the signific ance of this inter est and the W eber court’s ma

ndate of a “thor oug h inquiry ” bef ore it c an be abrog ated, it is not enoug h to assume that the district cour t
w o u l d h av e o r d e r e d

t h e t e s t i n g h a d

i tc o n d u c t e d t h e i n qu i r

y. The g overnme nt has resolved not to pursue this condition and at oral arg ument th e g o v e r n me n t r e c o g n iz e d

and
a c kn ow le dg e d th e pr ob le m. I f upo n re mand the c ourt e le c ts to i mpo se ple thy smo g ra phtes ti ng , it

mus t c omp ly

wi th W eber in justi fying its imposition.

Pr e ston als o ar g ue s th a t th e c on dit ion of his re le a se forbiddingh is use of “se x ually oriented” or “ina

ppropriate ” materia ls is vague , such that “me n of common intellige nce mus t ne c e ssa

ri ly g ue ss at its me anin g and dif fe r t o it s application.” Un ite d S

tates v . S olte ro , 5 10 F .3 d 85 8, 86 6 ( 9th Cir. 2007). The g overnme nt argues that the de fi nitions for “sexually oriented” and “ina

ppropriate ” m aterials can be fo un d in th e pr ior

c on dit ion ’s re fe re nc e to 1 8 U .S. C. § 22 5 6 ( 2 )

. H o w e v e r , th e c o n te s te d p r o v is io ns tate s that Pr e sto n s ha ll n ot u se “ any oth e r m ate ri a l” —th is i s me ant t o e xpand on the mate ri a ls f

ro m th e pr ior c on dit ion

and thu s it s us e of § 22 56 (2 ) i s in a

pp lic a ble . T he se te rm s are no t c le arl y def i n ed, leaving Pre ston “to g uess about the intende d meani n g o f the terms of his super vised rele ase.” United States v. Sales , 476 F.3d 732, 737 ( 9th Cir. 2007). The g o v ernment admits, as it m ust, that the portion of the
c on dit ion prohibiti ngPr e sto n’ s u se of mate ri a ls “ de e me d to be inappr opriate by

the probation officer ” should be excised. To impose this condition, the district court must clar ify what materia l Preston is forbidden to use.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 32

F ina lly , Pr e sto n a

rgue s that the c on dit ion

pr oh ibi tin g him from being“in the compa ny of . . . children unde r the a g e of 18 with o u t p ri or appr oval of [his] probation off icer ” is not sufficie ntly

definite. Company , as a noun, is def ined as “ the quality or state of being a companion or associate of a nother.” W EB S TER ’ S D I C TI ONAR Y 461 (3d ed. 1976) . This Court has conclude d that the t er m “association,” when use d in simi lar supervised relea se conditions, is not vag ue bec ause me re incidental conta cts do not con stitut e “a ssociation.” So lte ro , 5 1 0 F. 3 d a t8 6 6 (c i t i n g Arciniega v. F reem an , 404 U.S. 4, 4 (1971))

. The phrase “in the company of,” likewi s e, i s not vague. Althoug h t h i s p h rase is sufficiently definite, a vagueness issue a

rises wit h reg ard to the latter por tion of the condition that sp ec i fi es that Preston may not be in the company of “c hildren under

the ag e o f 1 8

. ” I n So lte ro , a c on dit ion of

su pe rv ise d r e le a se pr oh ibi te d “ a sso c iat[io n] w ith any known member

of any criminal st ree t g ang .” 510 F.3d at 86 5. Th is C ourt

no te d th a t So lte ro ’s argume nt “ that he [wa s] expected to know of e very g angcurr ently

operating on the str e e ts, ” wa s und e rm ine d b y the fa c t th a t he c ou ld onl y violate “the condition if the g ang member h e associate[d]
w it h[w a s ] known to him to b e a g an g me mbe r.” Id. at 867 n.9 (interna l quotation and citatio n o m itted). Unlike the condition in So lte ro , Preston’s con d ition lacks a mens re a require ment, which mea

ns that Preston must know t he ag e of
e ve ry pe rs on wi th who m he c ome s in

c on ta c t to c omp ly

wi th this condition. For example, if , unbeknownst to Pre ston, one of his co-w orker s happens to be a mature- looking se ventee ny e ar- old , Pre sto n w ou ld b e in v iol a tio n o f t he te rm s o f h is rele ase. There fore , we r equest that the district c ourt, on
rema nd, include a me ns rea

require ment in this conditi on.
Th is su pe rv ise d re le a se c on dit ion a lso ra ise s a pr ob le m in light of this Court’s re cent de cision in Un ite d Sta tes v. W olfU NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 33
Chi ld

. 699 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2012). I n W olf Chi ld , th is Court invalidated a c ondition of supervised r el ea se that pr o h ib it e d a s e xu a l o f

f e n d e r f r o m b e in g “ in th e c o mp an y of any child under the ag e o f 18,” in par t beca use the Court d eter mined that the condition was ove rbroa d. Id. a t 1088. This Court opined that “such [a] broad pr ohibition[ ]” was not “re asonably

limi t ed t o the g oals of dete rre nce, pr otection of the public, or reh abilitation.” Id. at 1101–02. The c ourt fo c us e d o n the fa c ts that the c on dit ion wa s an im

pe dim e nt t o Wolf Chi ld’s ability to act as a “responsible father” and that i tp r o h i b i t e d

h i m f r o m“ b e i n g i nt h e c o mp an y o f an y ma le
c hil d und e r t

he a g e of 18 (w ith out pr ior

a pp roval fro m hi s probation off

icer ), including his nephews a nd cousins” eve n tho ug h “ the re [wa s] no e vid e nc e wh a tso e ve r that Wolf C hil d ha[d] any sexual int ere st in y oung boy s or i ndeed ma les of any ag e.” Id at 1101

. Her e, the district cour

t’s imposit ion of the condition was proce durally unsound. I n W olf Chi ld , this Court determined that the condition preve nting Wolf Chi ld from beingin the
c omp any of his tw o d a

ug hte rs or

fr om s ocial iz ing wi th h is
un de ra g e fi anc é e imp lic a te d “ pa rticul arl y sig nif ic ant l ibe rt

y interest[s] ,” and the ref

ore re quired that the district c ourt “support its decision to im p o s e the condition on the re cord with rec ord e vidence that the condition . . . [was] nece ssary to a c c omp lis h on e or mor e of the fa c tor s li st ed in § 3 58 3( d) (1 ) a

nd inv olv e [d] no g re a te r de pr ivatio n o f l ibe rt y tha n [w a s] r e a so na

bly ne c e ssa ry ,” and to a c c ompli shthi s, “the se ntencingcourt, at the t ime it impose[d] the re strictive condition,” had to “point to t he evide nce in the r ecor d on which it relie[d] and e x p l ai n h ow on the basis of that evidenc e the pa

rticular restriction [was] jus tified.” Id. at 10 92 (i nte rn a l c it ations and qu otatio n o mitte d) . Asim ila rl y signific ant liberty

interest is at st ake here

. Although Pre stonU NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 34
does not curr ently

have c hildren, he m ay

in the future, a

nd under the terms of his supervise d rele ase he could neve r associate with them without the p ermiss ion of his probation office r. The district c o u rt d id not follow the nece ssary pr oc e dure to i nf

ri ng e on this s ig nif

ic ant l ibe rt

y int e re st. Howeve r, unlike in W

olf Chi ld , wher e thi s Court determined that r e mand

wa s n ot a

pp ro pr iate be c a

us e “ the re c or d [w a s] sufficie nt to determine that ther e [was] no plausible ba sis for the impositi on of t hat part of t he condition,” a nd the condition was, ther efor e, substantively unrea sonable, fa cts exist in the
re c or d o f th is c a se that ma y jus tif y the imp os iti on

of thi s condition. See id. at 1096. I t is necessa ry on rema nd for the district court to explain adequate l y its reasons for

imposing this condition i n light of W olf Chi ld or, i f i t cannot, to narrow the condition appropr iately

. XI
. We REMAND for the district court to re co n s ider the plethy smogr aph testing require ment, to c larify the condition that Preston “shall not possess, view , or otherw ise use any other mate rial that is sexually stimul ating , sexually oriented, or dee med t o be inappr opriate by the probation officer

and/or tr e a tme nt p ro vid e r, ” to a dju st h is p ro batio n r e qu ir e me nts so that th e y are de fi nit e and

c e rt a in, and

to p ro vid e a de qu a te explanation for Preston’s conditions of super vised rele ase.
AF F IRM ED in pa r t, RE M AN DE D fo r r e se nt e nc ing

.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 35
NO ON AN , C i rc u i tJ u d ge, d i s s en t i n g:
The only evidenc e ag ainst the defe ndant is a co erc ed confe ssion. Iwill take up t h e elements of the g overnme nt’s
case in turn.

I. The Chil d’ s Ac c ount A temptation exis ts to refe r to the child’s story as “testimony .” The g overnme nt in its brief (e .g . p. 69) and the
ma jor ity in i ts o pin ion

(e .g . M a j. O p. a t 27 ) y

ie ld t o th is temptation. But the c hild’s story is not t es t i mony . The story
wa s n ot t old

un der o ath. Th e sto ry

wa s n ot s ub

je c t to c ro ssexamination. I t was only

an unsworn a

nd untested tale.
The district cour

t found a d o z en or more fa cts of the
c hil d’ s ta le we re “ ob vio us ly no t f a c tua l” :
-that Preston ca

me t o t h e child’s house and ha d thre a te ne d to kil l hi m th e pr e vio us da y ;

-t hat th e c hil d c a lle d 9 11 ;
-that Preston tried to stab the c h i l d wi th a kn if e ;
-that the c hild locked P re ston in the child’s be dr oo m w itha

ke y ;
-that Preston climbed out of the w indow and
on to t he ro of and jum pe d o ff ;

-t hat the c hil d wa s hid ing un de r a blank et so Pr e sto n c ou ld n ot s e e him ;U NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 36
-that Preston followed the child’s trac ks and fell into a water hole;
-that Preston then drove a monster truck off a cli ff and the po lic e fo llo we d h im w ith he lic op te rs and

c ars ;

-t hat th e c hil d thr e w kni ve s at Pr e sto n’ s h e art ;
-that Preston tried to ra

pe the c hild’s sis t er, but that he d i d not beca

use kittens scratched him ;
-that the c hild r an outside and killed a robber and almost killed Preston.

I n the farra g o of fantasy , no fac t identifies i tself as worthy of belief.
After examining the child, the f orensic e x aminer conclude d: [He] described eve nts that a re unsupported by the s u bsequent for ensic e x amination of the victim and hi s clothing. F or example, the victim indicated that during the cour se of the
a ssa ult Pr e sto n eja c ulate d in his mout h, on his lips, on his red shirt, and on his stom ach. T he fore nsic examination of the victi m an d the clothing he was we aringnever theless r evea led neither ev i dence of any semen nor the exis tence of any

red shirt. F or that matter the phy sical examination of the victim showe d no signs of trauma or

semen.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 37

I t is un d is p u te d

th a t t h e r e e xis ts n o p h y s ic a l e v id e n c e of sexual conta ct . The for ensic e x aminer, a key g overnme nt witness, found no semen a nd no trauma.

II. Inconclu sive DN

A Evidence The g overnme nt does n o t argue that there exis ts DNA evidenc e of se x ual contac t betwee n the child and Pre ston.

III . Co nf ession Al one Is N ot E noug h
A def endant c annot be c onvicted on a c onfession alone. I n United Sta te

s v . No rri s , 428 F.3d 907, 915 ( 9th Cir. 2005), this circuit fo u n d that the state must “introduce sufficie nt evidenc e to establish that the cr iminal conduct at the cor e of the offe nse has occ urre d.” Nor ris , 428 F.3d at 914-15 (citing United States v. Lopez-Alv arez , 970 F.2d 583, 592 (9 t h Cir. 1992)). Ac cording ly , this circuit reversed the defe ndant Norris’s c onviction for sexual molestation becau s e the “g overnme nt produce d no evidenc e to cor robo ra t e Nor

ris’s confe ssion that the core of the a ct, Norr is’s touching of T.V.’ s vulva with his penis, actually occur red.” Id.

He re , th e g ov e rnme nt has produc e d n o e vid e nc e to
corr oborate P re s t on’s conf ession that the “c ore of

the ac t” – sexual contact – “a ctually occur red.” Id.

IV . Fa ilureof

Conf ession t o Sa tis fy Sta tute

E v e nif w e w e r e to c o n s id e r

th e c o n f

e s s io nalone, vio latin g the law o f t

his c ir c uit , Pr e sto n’ s c on fe ssi on fa ils to
s a ti s f y th e s tatute

. T h e g o v e r

n me n t m u s t p r o v e b e y o nd a
re a so na ble do ub t th a t Pr e sto n w a s guil ty of “ kn ow ing ly
e n g a g [i n g ] i n a

b u s i v e s e xu a l c o n t a c t ” w i t h t h e “ i n t e nt t oU NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 38 abuse, humiliate, ha

rass, de g rade , or arouse or g ratify the sexual desire of a

ny person.” 18 U. S .C. §§ 2244, 2245(3). Pr e sto n’ s c on fe ssi on

sh ow s n o s uc h inte nt.

V . T h e C oer ced C on fes si on of T

h e Men ta ll

y R eta rd ed Y out h

Pr e sto n’ s “ c on fe ss io n” sh ou ld n ot b e c on sid e re d at a ll b e c a u s e i ti s i n v o l u n t ar

y. Ag ent Kra

us a n d I nv e s ti g a to r Secate ro questioned Pre ston on the front por ch of his house. Sec ater o told Preston that “ther e’s two ty

pes of pe ople.” The first ty pe wa s a “monster ,”
a “sexual predator,” the “ty pe to pr ey on littl e kids.” This ty pe was a “cold- hear

ted per son” for

whom they

“don’t show a

ny sy mpathy .” The second ty

pe, Kr aus and Secater o explained, was not a monster

but a “guy

that had a ba d day” who did a

“ on e tim e thi ng .” Th is se c on d ty pe c ou ld “ mov e on ,” be c a us e wh a t tr ans pir e d wa s “

jus t a mis un de rs tand ing .” Se c a te ro tol d Preston that the offic ers wa nted to know “whic h kind of person” he wa s

. He asked Preston, “Which ... per son are y o u ? A r e y o u t h a tty

p e w h e r e y o up r e y

o nl i t t l e k i d s ?” Preston said he wa s not.
After g iving Pre ston two criminal alternatives, Secatero and Kraus proceede d to ask P reston a series of que stions that fo rc e d h im t o c ho os e be tw e e n d ama g inga dmi ssi on s:
-“I s it b e c a

u s e [... ] y o u w an te d to h a v e sex [

... ] o r i s h e t h e o n e t h a tc am e o n t o y o u ?”

-“I s i t something where y ou forc ed the issue or is it something he w anted? ”

- “ D i d h e p u l l aw ay

o r d i d y o up u l l o u t ?”U NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 39

-“ Di d a ll o f your pen is g o in [or ] jus t a

little bit? ”

- “ D i d y o ud o i t a l o to r j u s tt h a to n e t i m e ?”

I n eac h case , Preston chose the less damag ing a dmission. At times, the loaded questions wer e more akin t o statements. To these, Preston was silent, said he didn’t know, or de nied the
c la ims . A g e nt K

ra us sa id, fo r i ns tance, “He pull e d h is p ants down? ” Preston said he didn’t know. Kra us said, “Did you pull your pants down too? ” Preston said, “No.” Kr au s said, “You just unzipped y our zipper? ” Preston wa s s ilent. Kraus said, “He pulled his pants up and I assume you zipped up, too.” Preston was silent. N e ar l y e v e r y detail was pla

nted by the of fi c e rs

. L oaded que stions are difficult for intelligent per sons. For a feeble mind, they

are near ly

impossibl e. Preston is eig hteen and has a brain “ like a five y ear

old.” He ha s an I Q of 65. Preston’s I Q place s him in t he ra ng e of me ntal reta

rdation. At k ins v . V irg ini a , 536 U.S. 304, 309 n.5, 318 ( 2002). When asked whether

he wa s “disabled,” Preston asked the offic ers to expl ain the wor d’s meaning . When expl ained the word’s meaning , Preston ag ree d that he pro b ab ly was disabled. See Morg an Cloud, W

ords W ithout Meaning : T

he Constituti on, Con fe ssi on s, an d M

e nta lly Re tar de d S us pe c ts , 6 9 U

. C H I. L. REV. 495, 511-13 (2002) (fin d i n g that mentally reta rded people do not understand their limitations and “fe el compelled to answ er a

question, even if the question exceeds [t heir] ability

to answer ”).

No one c an ser iously

argue that the pa

p er signe d by Preston wa s comprehended by Preston as a doc ument of g rave leg al import. K

raus told Pre ston that the paper wasU NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 40

me re ly a wa y to s ay “ so rr y ” to [the chi ld]: “D o you wa nt t o write a ny – usually what we do is we wr i te a state ment. I f, like, y ou wanted to say s orry or something like that. You could d e f in it e ly d o th a t. A n d

w e c anp r o v id e th at t o him.” Preston’s re sponse was hardly assent: “I ’ll just say

I ’m sorry fo r what I did , b ut t he y ’r e jus t trying to ac c us e me of that sh it. But fuck – Ime an , n o t l ik e th a t. ” I g n o r in g Pr e s to n ’s equivocation, Kraus assur ed Preston that the statem ent was “just a kind of summary .”
The “ summary ”—Preston’s c onfession—wa s a brief g athe ri ngof

de ta ils se le c te d b y

the of fi c e rs , c ull e d to the ir purposes, a

nd written by

their hand. The details they selec ted
wer e d e ta il s th e y

h a d f e d h im

. N o t o n c e d id

Pr e s to nr e v ise , c or re c t, o r c ounte r the off

ic e rs ’ d ic tatio n o f t

he state me nt. Ag ent Kra

us said, for instan ce , “You just unzipped y our zipper? ” Preston wa s silent. Kraus sa i d , “You pulled your pe nis out, a

nd y ou put a c on do m on ? ” P res ton

wa s si le nt. Eac h of these details was transfe rre d into the written
s t at em ent. Kra

us asked Pre ston, “Do y ou want me to put y ou ’r e so rr

y [...]? Ar e y ou

so rr y or no t so rr

y ? ” Pr e sto n c ho se the option that kinderg arte n teac hes as prope r. When Ag ent Kra us finished writing the statement, he sa id to Preston, “I ’m g oing to have you sign this.” Pre ston signed.
There is no evidence t h at P reston read what the office r wrote. It is difficult to descr ibe Preston’s choic e betwe en bad alternatives, actua l denials, and ambiguous sil en ce a s “a product of a

rational intellec t and a f ree wi l l , ” a nec essar

y condition f

or an admissible co nfession. Blackburn v

. Alabama , 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960).
The majority asser

ts that c oerc ion of

a mentally

impaired person “ appea

rs to t u rn larg ely

on the leng th of theU NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 41 interrog ati o n

. ” T h i s re ad i n g i s u n s u b s t an t i at ed

. No wh er e does
case law state suc h a rule . L eng th of an interr og ati o n is one fac tor; mental defic iency is an o t h er. A short interrog ation does not reduc e the r el evance of the def endant’ s mental capa city

. The ma jo r it y n o te s th a t t

h e inte r r o g a ti o no c c u r

r e d at Pr e s to n ’ s h o u s e w it

h o th e r s p r e s e n t. Y e t Pr e s ton was dis tin c tly vu lne ra ble at hi s ho us e

. B oth

of fi c e rs ha d a

rr ive d in
un mark e d v e hic le s, and

bo th w e re dr e sse d in

pla in cl oth e s. Preston had no prior r ecor d and had ne ver spoken t o police befor e. The off

icer s undoubtedly

chec ked his rec ord and kne w h e la c k e d e xp e r ie n c e w it h la w e n f o r c e me n t. T he office rs lear

ned quickly

that neither Pre sto n ’s mother nor fathe r was home. Preston himself was e ighte en y ear s old. The only others prese nt w ere two children. Questioning P reston, the offic ers r apidly

surmised his qu estionable menta l capac it y , as ki ng hi m p oi nt -bl ankif h e w as d is abl ed. By himself on his porch, Preston wa s vulnerable

. V I
. U nre li a b il it y o f Co nf es s io ns Fro m Ment

a ll y Re ta rded Pe op le

Con fe ssi on s f

ro m me nta lly

retarde d p e op le are pr on e to be fa lse.

Pr e sto n’s confe ssi on

is unr e lia

ble . Pr e sto n w a s r e a dy

to sign a confe ssion to a crime with the wrong date and did so. Th e po lic e of

fi c e rs tol d Pr e sto n, a t le a st fifteen times, that he had been home on Fr iday to c ommit the crime; the officers l at er ad m i t t edt h at t h ey

m ea n tt o s ay

W ed n es d ay

. A l t h o u gh Pr e sto n h a d a re g ula

r ro uti ne on

F ri da y s o f l e a vin ghis ho us e to se e his aunt, he w as so sug g estible that he a g ree d with the office rs that he ha d been home on Fr iday

. Preston’s statementU NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 42

me e ts th e te xtb o o k

c a s e o f a f a ls e c o n f e s s io n : P r e s to nw as g iven a f alse de tail of the cr ime, an d he ac cepte d it as an actua l fac t. (“One method for c heckingthe authenticity of a voluntary confe ssion, or one that seem s t o be the r esult of a ment al illness, is t o introduce some f ictitious aspects of the crime a nd test whether the suspect will a cce pt the m a s actua l fac ts rel ati ng to th e occu rren ce.” F. I NB AU , J. R E ID , J. B U C KLY , & B. J ANE , C RI M I N A L I N TE R R O G A TI O N S AND C ONF ES S I ONS , 349 (5th ed. 2011))

. As the off icer s dictated the state ment for Pre ston to sign, Preston was e ither sil en t or made unintellig ible sounds. The truth of what tra

nspired re mained unar

ticulat ed b y

him. As
re se arc he rs have fo un d, the “ te nd e nc y [of re tard e d pe op le ] to mask their disabili ties,” combined w ith the widesprea d ignor ance of mental re tardation, “make it difficult for police
and oth e rs to p ro pe rl y

int e rp re t th e re spon se s o f m e nta lly
r e ta r d e d p e r s o n s

. ” E u g e n e R. M il h iz er, Confessions Aft er Con ne lly : A n E

v ide nti ar y So lut ion for

Ex c lud ing Un re lia ble Confessions , 8 1 T EM P. L . RE V. 1, 15 (2 00 8). As a re su lt, police dete ctives ca

n “cr eate false confe ssions by pressuring the suspect to ac cept a

particula r ac count and sug g esting crime f acts to him, thereby

con t am i nating [hi s] narrative.” J ohn B. G ould & Richa

rd A. L eo, On e Hu nd

re d Yea rs L ate r: W rongful Convictions Aft er a Century of Rese arch , 100 J . C R IM

. L. & C R I MI NOL OGY 825, 849 (2010). Confessions from mentally reta r d e d s u s p e c ts , in particular y outh, are “per

se untrustworthy .” SeeWe ls hWh ite, False Con fe ssi on s a nd

theCon sti tut io n: Sa

fe gu ar ds Ag ain st Un tru stw or thy

Con fe ssi on s (1997), 32 H A RV

. C

. R

. - C

. L. R EV

. 10 5. I n a re c e nt s tud

y of the fi rs t 20 0 D NAe xone ra tio ns in the U.S., 35% of the f

alse c onfessors we re 18 y ear s or y oung e r a

nd /or ha d a de ve lop me nta l di sa

bil ity . Sa ul M

.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 43 Kassin et al., Police-I

nduced Confessions: Risk Fac tors and Rec ommendations , 34 L AW & H UM

. B EH AV . 3, 19-22 (2010)

. An oth e r s tud

y fo un d that 69% of the e xone rate d p e rs on s w ith
me nta l di sa

bil iti e s w e re wr on g ly

c on vic te d b e c a

us e of fa lse confe ssions. Id

. S e e als o Br andon L . Gar

rett, The Substance of False Confessions , 62 S TAN

. L. R EV . 1051, 1064 (2010) (“Me ntally

disabled individuals and juveniles ar e both g roups long known to be vulnera ble to coer cion and sug g est i o n .”); Gould at 8 47 (noting that “the de velopmentally disabled, cog nitively

impaired, juveniles—a ll of whom tend to be
unus ua lly su g g e sti ble and

c omp lia nt” —a re mor e lik e ly

to confe ss falsely

); Milhiz er at 14 (“Cer tain charac teristics
commo n amongmentally reta rded pe rsons make the m pa rt ic ula rl y pro ne to c on fe ss f

a lse ly . F or

e xamp le , me nta lly
re tard e d s us pe c ts a

re of te n mo tiv a te d b y

a str on g de sire to ple a se a uth or ity fi g ur e s, e ve n if to do s o r e qu ir e s th e m to lie and conf ess to a cr ime they

did not c ommit. They

also often lack the abi l i ty

to understand the na ture of police questioning.” ). The majority

writes that re cog nizi ng the cog nitive impairment of Preston and his susce ptibili ty to coer cion would “sig nificantly

broade n” this c ourt’s jurisprudenc e. The law is more c apac ious than the majority admits. I n Atkins , the Supreme Court dete rmined t h at , due to “c og nitive and be havio ra l im

pa ir me nts ,” inc lud ing“ the dim ini sh e d ab ili ty to understand an d

p ro ce s s i n fo rm at i o n , t o l ea rn fr o mex p er i en ce, to e ng a g e in l og ic a l r e a so nin g ,” me nta lly re tarded pe op le
c a te g or ic a lly

are a t r isk

of pr od uc ingfa lse c onfes sio ns

. Atkins , 536 U.S. at 320. I nd ee d , the Court noted the exoneration s o f m entally reta rded pe ople who had “unwittingly

confe ssed to cr i m es they did not commit.” Id

. See also Culombe v. Connecticut , 367 U.S. 568, 620 ( 1 9 7 3) ( h o l d i n g i n v o l u n t ar

y t h e c o n f e s s i o n e x t r a c t e d f

r o m a “ t h i rt y-U NI TED S T A T ES V

. P R ES TON 44
three -y ear -old mental def ective . . . with an intellige nce quotient of six ty -four ”); Com mo nwe alt h of t he No rth e rn Ma ria na Is lan ds v . M

e nd iol a , 975 F. 2d 475 ( 9th Cir. 1993) (finding confe ssio n inv o lu n ta r y o n th e b a s is that “conside ration of de fenda nt’s reduc ed ca

pacity is critical beca use it rende red him more susc eptible to subtle forms of
c oe rc ion ,” and

c iting th e lowint e lli g e nc e of de fe nd ants in R e c k v . P ate , 367 U.S. 433 (1961) and Paynev. Arkansas , 356 U.S. 560, 562, 567 (1958)).

*

Th e ma jor ity tho ug htf ull y a sk e d th e dis tr ic t c ourt to
rec onsider its order

approvingthe plethy smo g raph, but the majority does not ban i t . Ihave a lrea dy expressed in a
concur ring opinion a critique of this proc edure

. See Un ited States v. W

eber , 451 F.3d 552, 570–71 ( 9th Cir. 2 0 0 6 ). For the re asons stated in my

concur renc e in W

eber , Iwould ban this procedur e altog ether . Psy chiatric rese archers ha ve r e f e r r e d to my c r it ic is m w it

ha p p r o v a l. See , e.g. , Michae l Har low and Charles Scott, “Penile Plethy smogr aphy Testing for Convicted Sex Offe nders,” 35 J OUR

. O F THE A MER

. A C AD

. O F P SYCH

. AND T HE L AW (2007).