alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1995
<CASH>                                          45,504
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   56,770
<ALLOWANCES>                                    17,926
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                85,179
<PP&E>                                         288,877
<DEPRECIATION>                                 179,904
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 205,679
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          233,689
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                    710,000
<COMMON>                                        11,128
<OTHER-SE>                                   (550,341)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   205,679
<SALES>                                        446,369
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               447,555
<CGS>                                          360,408
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  555,296
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                3542
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (111,283)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (111,283)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.00
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.00
        

</TABLE>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Luis Parada, Appellant.

Submitted November 8, 2010;

decided November 17, 2010

Motion for assignment of counsel granted only to the extent that Glenn A. Garber, Esq., 350 Broadway, Suite 1207, New York, NY 10013 is assigned without fee to represent appellant *903on the appeal herein. Counsel may, however, apply for reimbursement of necessary disbursements incurred in connection with the assignment.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-1918

ERIC AWA AKENJI,

Petitioner,

versus

ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney General of the

United States,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration

Appeals. (A96-291-119)

Submitted: June 21, 2006 Decided: July 24, 2006

Before MICHAEL, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Patrick G. Tzeuton, Silver Spring, Maryland, for Petitioner. Rod

J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Tonya K. Kowitz, Assistant

United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Eric Awa Akenji, a native and citizen of Cameroon,

petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“Board”) affirming without opinion the immigration judge’s

order denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal,

and protection under the Convention Against Torture.

To obtain reversal of a determination denying eligibility

for relief, an alien “must show that the evidence he presented was

so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the

requisite fear of persecution.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S.

478, 483-84 (1992). We have reviewed the evidence of record and

conclude that Akenji fails to show that the evidence compels a

contrary result. Accordingly, we cannot grant the relief that he

seeks.

Additionally, we uphold the immigration judge’s denial of

Akenji’s request for withholding of removal. “Because the burden

of proof for withholding of removal is higher than for asylum--even

though the facts that must be proved are the same--an applicant who

is ineligible for asylum is necessarily ineligible for withholding

of removal under [8 U.S.C.] § 1231(b)(3).” Camara v. Ashcroft, 378

F.3d 361, 367 (4th Cir. 2004). Because Akenji fails to show that

he is eligible for asylum, he cannot meet the higher standard for

withholding of removal. 
- 3 -

We also find that Akenji fails to meet the standard for

relief under the Convention Against Torture. To obtain such

relief, an applicant must establish that “it is more likely than

not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed

country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (2004). We find

that Akenji fails to make the requisite showing.

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
Exhibit 23.2

Independent Auditors' Consent

Board of Directors DATA RACE, Inc.:

We consent to incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements (No.
333-63590, No. 333-57058, No. 333-38450, No. 333-77713, No. 333-72505, No.
333-24305 and No. 333-24303) on Form S-8 and in the Registration Statements (No.
333-57166, No. 333-41286, No. 333-94601, No. 333-83595, No. 333-71319, No.
333-62147, No. 333-53757, No. 333-42203 and No. 333-22605) on Form S-3 of DATA
RACE, Inc. of our report dated November 2, 2001, relating to the balance sheet
of DATA RACE, Inc. as of June 30, 2001, and the related statements of
operations, shareholders' equity and cash flows for the year then ended, which
report appears in the June 30, 2001 annual report on Form 10-K of DATA RACE,
Inc.



                                              LAZAR LEVINE & FELIX LLP

New York, NY 10018
December 11, 2001
#### Peter Casanas et al., Respondents, v Carlei Group, LLC, et al., Appellants.

[964 NYS2d 31]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Donna M. Mills, J.), entered December 27, 2012, which, inter alia, denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the action as against Richard Casanas, denied defendants’ motion to cancel a notice of pendency filed by plaintiffs, and granted plaintiffs’ cross motion to compel compliance with much of their first request for production of documents, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

In this declaratory judgment action concerning the lease for apartments 3W and 3C (the apartments) at 73 West 82nd Street in Manhattan (the building), the record shows that defendant Carlei Group LLC paid nothing to acquire the subject building from its former owner, Aleida Realty Corp. Aleida Casanas, the mother of defendant Richard Casanas and plaintiff Peter Casanas, signed the purported transfer of title for both Aleida Realty, the seller, and Carlei, the buyer. The record also shows that Aleida Casanas was immediately replaced as manager of Carlei by Richard Casanas, who has since had complete control of Carlei. Thus, plaintiffs joined Richard Casanas as a defendant to insure that he is collaterally estopped by the judgment in this case from further conveying the property or contesting the validity of their leases. To achieve that result, he must be a party *(see Gramatan Home Invs. Corp. v Lopez,*46 NY2d 481, 485-486 [1979]).

Since this action seeks a declaration of plaintiffs’ rights as lessees of the apartments, pursuant to a lease they allegedly executed on January 10, 1990 with then building owner Aleida Realty Corp., and will “affect . . . the possession, use or enjoyment of . . . real property” (CPLR 6501), the motion court properly sustained the notice of pendency *(see Lawlor v 543 Second Ave. LLC,*49 AD3d 449, 449 [1st Dept 2008]).

The rules governing the scope of discovery in New York are liberally construed *(see Anonymous v High School for Envtl. Studies,*32 AD3d 353, 358 [1st Dept 2006]), and here, the motion court did not abuse its discretion *(see 148 Magnolia, LLC v Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,*62 AD3d 486 [1st Dept 2009]) when it ordered compliance with plaintiffs’ discovery demands. *571The contested demands relate directly to the issues in this case: i.e., the purported transfer of title between Aleida Realty Corp. and Carlei; whether Carlei had authority to issue the notices to quit; the characterization of plaintiffs’ tenancy in insurance records involving a 2009 fire; documents bearing the true signatures of Aleida E Casanas and Carlos Casanas, since defendants claim that plaintiffs’ lease is a forgery; and communications with Richard Casanas, with whom plaintiffs claim a history of animus.

Concur—Tom, J.E, Sweeny, Saxe, Román and Feinman, JJ.
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION OFCHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**

**PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANTTO**

**SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, Carlton H. Baab, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, thatthe Quarterly Report of Raining Data Corporation on Form 10-QSB for thequarterly period ended June 30, 2003 fully complies with the requirements ofSection 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and thatinformation contained in such Form 10-QSB fairly presents in all materialrespects the financial condition and results of operations of Raining DataCorporation.

 
|   | By:    | /s/ Carlton H. Baab                   |   |
|--------|--------|---------------------------------------|--------|
|   | Name:  | Carlton H. Baab                       |
|   | Title: | President and Chief Executive Officer |

 

I, Brian C. Bezdek, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, thatthe Quarterly Report of Raining Data Corporation on Form 10-QSB for the quarterlyperiod ended June 30, 2003 fully complies with the requirements ofSection 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and thatinformation contained in such Form 10-QSB fairly presents in all materialrespects the financial condition and results of operations of Raining DataCorporation.

 
|   | By:    | /s/ Brian C. Bezdek      |   |
|--------|--------|--------------------------|--------|
|   | Name:  | Brian C. Bezdek          |
|   | Title: | Chief  Financial Officer |

 

----
<PAGE>

                                                                   Exhibit 99.1

                  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

           The undersigned executive officers of the registrant hereby certify
that this Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained herein fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the registrant.

                                                 Parkvale Financial Corporation

Dated:  November 12, 2002

                                                 By: /s/ Robert J. McCarthy, Jr.
                                                     ---------------------------
                                                 Robert J. McCarthy, Jr.
                                                 Director, President and
                                                 Chief Executive Officer


                                                 By: /s/ Timothy G. Rubritz
                                                     --------------------------
                                                 Timothy G. Rubritz
                                                 Vice President-Treasurer and
                                                 Chief Financial Officer




                                       20
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
UNAUDITED FORM 10-QSB FOR THE PERIOD ENDED MAY 31, 1995 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FORM 10-QSB AND THE ACCOMPANYING NOTES THERETO.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          NOV-30-1995
<PERIOD-START>                             DEC-01-1994
<PERIOD-END>                               MAY-31-1995
<CASH>                                             107
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      935
<ALLOWANCES>                                       144
<INVENTORY>                                      1,316
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 2,391
<PP&E>                                           1,829
<DEPRECIATION>                                     730
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   5,932
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            2,257
<BONDS>                                          7,108
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        17,071
<OTHER-SE>                                    (20,504)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     5,932
<SALES>                                          1,693
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 1,693
<CGS>                                            1,069
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    2,699
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   (1)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 392
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (1,397)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         1
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (1,398)
<DISCONTINUED>                                   (362)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (1,760)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.39)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.39)
        

</TABLE>
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 98 (Friday, May 22, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 24013]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-12007]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES


National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health; Decision 
To Evaluate a Petition To Designate a Class of Employees for the 
University of Rochester in Rochester, NY, To Be Included in the Special 
Exposure Cohort

AGENCY: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: HHS gives notice as required by 42 CFR 83.12(e) of a decision 
to evaluate a petition to designate a class of employees for the 
University of Rochester in Rochester, New York, to be included in the 
Special Exposure Cohort under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness 
Compensation Program Act of 2000. The initial proposed definition for 
the class being evaluated, subject to revision as warranted by the 
evaluation, is as follows:
    Facility: University of Rochester.
    Location: Rochester, New York.
    Job Titles and/or Job Duties: Laboratory Technicians who worked in 
the University of Rochester Atomic Energy Project laboratory building.
    Period of Employment: September 1, 1943 through June 19, 1945.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Larry Elliott, Director, Office of 
Compensation Analysis and Support, National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health (NIOSH), 4676 Columbia Parkway, MS C-46, Cincinnati, 
OH 45226, Telephone 513-533-6800 (this is not a toll-free number). 
Information requests can also be submitted by e-mail to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#b5faf6f4e6f5f6f1f69bf2fae3"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="450a060416050601066b020a13">[email protected]</span></a>.

Christine M. Branche,
Acting Director, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.
[FR Doc. E9-12007 Filed 5-21-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4163-19-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack, Chief Justice

David F. Viviano,

Chief Justice Pro Tem

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 August 8, 2019

Order 

Clerk

August 8, 2019

159884-9(67)

VITA S. SHANNON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

SC: 159884-9

v COA: 339944, 343213, 343886,

 344356, 344418 & 346344

Oakland CC: 2017-852916-DC

ARON L. RALSTON,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of defendant-appellee to extend the time 

for filing his answer is GRANTED. The answer will be accepted as timely filed if 

submitted on or before August 23, 2019.
#### Annin *against*Chase.

for triafagrS t¡e3by one Pd> thereby’conduauffidrat rauae® ar°?ecofldDS a” Where an adjournment bas been granted In a justice’s

IN ERROR, on *certiorari*to a justice’s court.

After issue was. joined in the court below, the defendant *m*error, who was the plaintiff below, applied for an adjournment, which was granted, and a day fixed on by the parties. On the adjourned day, the defendant below applied for a farther adjournment, and offered to swear that he had material witnesses absent; that he had subpoenaed them, and used due diligence, and expected to procure them, &c. But the justice decided, that as the parties had mutually agreed upon a day for' trial, they were now concluded; and refused, on that ground, to grant a further adjournment. Judgment was given in the court below for the defendant in error.

*Per Curiam.*

Injustice has been done. According to the cases of *Easton*v. *Coe,*(2 Johns. *Rep.*383.,). and *Powers*v. *Lockwood,*(9 *Johns. Rep.*133.,) the justice should not have refused a. second adjournment, on the ground assumed by him, no question being made as to security.

Judgment reversed.
#### Latoya Verdejo, Respondent, v New York City Housing Authority, Appellant.

[963 NYS2d 78]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Robert E. Torres, J.), entered on or about August 6, 2012, which denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

Plaintiff alleges that she was injured when she slipped and fell on a wet foliage condition located on defendant’s grounds. Defendant made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment as to this open and obvious condition, which was not inherently dangerous *{see Misir v Beach Haven Apt. No. 1, Inc.,*32 AD3d 1002 [2d Dept 2006]; *see also McGuire v 3901 Independence Owners, Inc.,*74 AD3d 434 [1st Dept 2010]). Defendant’s meteorologist stated that the wind was sufficient to create the foliage condition and that light rain, two hours earlier, accounted for the wetness of the leaves. Moreover, the supervisor of grounds at the subject development stated that the grounds crew took reasonable efforts to remove fallen foliage from the development’s extensive property, by patrolling the *451grounds daily. Under the circumstances, defendant established that it met its duty to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition (see *Basso v Miller,*40 NY2d 233, 241 [1976]), and that it lacked prior notice of any dangerous condition (see *Gordon v American Museum of Natural History,*67 NY2d 836 [1986]; *Busterna v Branch Off. Assoc.,*253 AD2d 837 [2d Dept 1998]).

Plaintiffs opposition fails to raise a triable issue of fact. Plaintiffs theory of liability, raised for the first time in opposition to the motion, that the slippery condition was caused by insufficient drainage for the sprinkler system, is precluded since it was not set forth in the notice of claim (see *Chieffet v New York City Tr. Auth.,*10 AD3d 526, 527 [1st Dept 2004]). In any event, the opinion of plaintiffs expert that the drainage was inadequate is speculative and insufficient to defeat the motion (see *generally Zuckerman v City of New York,*49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).

Concur—Tom, J.P, Andrias, Saxe, Abdus-Salaam and Gische, JJ.
# Fourth Court of Appeals **San Antonio, Texas**
MEMORANDUM OPINION
N o s . 04

- 19

- 00813

- CR & 04

- 19

- 00814

- CR Raymond Andrew DEBA , Appellant

v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee From the 227th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No s . 2005CR0716 & 2005CR0956 Honorable Philip A. Kazen, Jr., Judge Presiding
PER CURIAM Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Delivered and Filed: Jan uary 15, 2020
DIS MISSED
In each of these consolidated appeals, the trial court’s certification states that th e criminal case, “is a plea

- bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal.” Each certification further

state s , “[T]he defendant has waived the right of appeal.” Rule 25.2(a)(2) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides : In a plea bargain case

— that is, a case in which a defendant’s plea was guilty or nolo contendere and the punishment did not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant

— a defendant may appeal only: (A) those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial,04

- 19

- 00813

- CR & 04

- 19

- 00814

- CR

- 2

- (B) after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal, or (C) where the specific appeal is expressly authorized by statute.
T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25.2(a)(2). The clerk’s record in each appeal contains a written plea bargain , and
the records show that the punishment assessed in each case by the trial court d oes not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant. See id. The clerk’s
record in each case does not include a written motion filed and ruled upon before trial, nor does it indicate the trial court gave its permission to appeal

. See id. Appellant has not identified with this court any statute that expre ssly authorizes the specific appeal. See id. The trial court’s
certification s , therefore, appear to accurately reflect that th ese are plea

- bargain case s and appellant
does not have a right to appeal

. We must dismiss an appeal “if a certification that shows the defendant has the right of appeal has not been made part of the record.” T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25.2(d). We issued an order stating
th ese appeal s would be dismissed unless amended trial court certification s w ere made part of t he appellate record s by December 27 , 2019. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25.2(d); Dears v. State , 154 S.W.3d 610 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Daniels v. State ,110 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2003, no pet.). No such amended trial court certification s ha ve been fil ed. Accordingly, th e s e appeal s are dismissed pursuant to Rule 25.2(d).
PER CURIAM
DO NOT PUB L ISH