In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-19-00198-CV 

ODELIA LAURA CAUDILLO, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

 

DANIEL CAUDILLO, APPELLEE 

 

On Appeal from the 140th District Court 

Lubbock County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 2015-517,163; Honorable Jim Bob Darnell, Presiding 

 

April 24, 2020 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and DOSS, JJ. 

Daniel Caudillo and Odelia Laura Caudillo were divorced by a Final Decree of 

Divorce signed April 24, 2019. As part of the decree, Daniel was ordered to pay spousal 

maintenance in the amount of $400 per month, with the first payment being due 

retroactively on November 1, 2018, and each subsequent payment being due on the first 

day of each consecutive month until the earliest of one of several listed events occurred. 

Odelia argues the trial court abused its discretion by (1) changing the start date and 

duration of the court-ordered spousal maintenance and (2) determining she was eligible 
2

for spousal maintenance under section 8.054(a)(1)(C) instead of section 8.054(a)(2)(A) 

of the Texas Family Code. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the divorce decree

of the trial court. 

BACKGROUND

Daniel and Odelia married in 1977 and separated in 2015. On August 24, 2015, 

Daniel filed for divorce. Odelia counter-petitioned, requesting temporary spousal support 

and post-divorce spousal maintenance. A hearing regarding temporary orders was held 

before an associate judge. At the conclusion of that hearing, the associate judge ordered 

Daniel to pay to Odelia $700 per month in temporary spousal support. Daniel appealed 

that ruling to the district court. Following a full de novo hearing, the judge ordered Daniel 

to pay to Odelia $400 per month, beginning on November 15, 2015. Daniel did not begin 

paying at that time and Odelia filed a motion to enforce the order. Daniel began paying 

the temporary spousal support in April 2016. 

On October 15, 2018, the court held a contested hearing concerning the 

disposition of property in relation to Daniel and Odelia’s divorce. During that hearing, 

both parties testified. Odelia testified she was disabled. She told the court it affected her 

everyday life and her ability to obtain employment. She testified she began receiving 

social security disability benefits the previous year. She also testified “[t]here’s no way I 

can go back and get a job . . . [b]ecause I’m disabled. I got chronic arthritis, osteoarthritis. 

I can’t do anything physical that much.” She said, “I can’t lift, crawl, climb stairs, stoop, 

bend or—everything.” She testified that if she tries to do these things, it is “painful, very 

painful.” Odelia also testified about her income from her disability benefits, her retirement,

as well as her customary monthly expenses. She answered “No” when asked whether
3

she would be able to pay for all of the expenses without Daniel’s spousal support. She 

told the court her previous employment had been as a teacher but that she had not 

worked in that capacity for many years. 

Daniel answered affirmatively when asked whether he was aware that Odelia was

disabled. He also stated that he knew the federal government had determined she was

unable to work because of her disability. With regard to spousal maintenance, he said 

he “could live with what I’m giving her right now,” which was the $400 per month ordered 

after the de novo temporary hearing.

At the close of the hearing, the court asked for additional documentation and took 

the matter under advisement. On October 18, 2018, the judge sent an email to counsel

with an attachment entitled “Property Division.” That document included the statement, 

“Daniel will pay $400 per month beginning Nov[ember] 1, 2018.” The email was filed with 

the court on October 29, 2018. Odelia’s attorney did not receive notice of the October 18 

email until October 29 because the October 18 email was sent to an incorrect email 

address. Through email exchanges between October 18 and October 29, Daniel’s 

attorney and the judge discussed the duration of the spousal maintenance award. The 

judge responded to Daniel’s inquiry concerning the duration of the award, stating “10 yrs 

but would start when payments started under temporary orders.” Daniel had been 

ordered to pay temporary spousal support beginning in November 2015. The Final 

Decree of Divorce provided, however, that Daniel pay spousal maintenance in the amount 

of $400 per month, “with the first payment being due on November 01, 2018, and a like 

amount being due on the first (1st) day of each consecutive month thereafter until the 

earliest of one of the following events: (1) seven (7) years; (2) death of either [Daniel] or 
4

[Odelia]; (3) remarriage of Odelia [ ]; or (4) further orders of the Court affecting the spousal 

maintenance obligation . . . .” 

In early 2019, Odelia filed motions to enter judgment, requesting the trial court to 

sign her proposed Final Decree of Divorce, which contained a spousal maintenance 

provision that corresponded to the October 18 email, which included the memorandum 

stating that “Daniel will pay $400 per month beginning November 01, 2018.” According 

to Odelia’s interpretation, the email constituted a rendition of judgment providing for 

indefinite spousal maintenance. In April 2019, the trial court held a hearing on Odelia’s 

motion for judgment. At that hearing, Daniel’s counsel acknowledged the email 

conversation between himself and the judge but argued there was not a substantial 

change in the court’s ruling; rather, it was a mere clarification. Odelia argued the email

ruling left open the question of whether the court found she was disabled and also 

changed the beginning date of the spousal maintenance award. On April 24, 2019, the

trial court signed its Final Decree of Divorce, containing the spousal maintenance

provision described above.

Thereafter, on June 7, 2019, the trial court filed findings of fact and conclusions of 

law. The conclusions of law included the above-stated provision for spousal 

maintenance, with the exception of adding “or co-habitation” to the third contingency. The

trial court made no findings or conclusions that specifically contain the words “disabled”

or “disability” with reference to Odelia. Rather, the court made a more general finding 

that Odelia “will lack the ability to earn sufficient income to provide for [her] minimum 

reasonable needs on dissolution of the marriage.” The court further stated that, in 

determining the nature, amount, duration, and manner of payment of spousal 
5

maintenance, it had considered the “future earning potential of the parties” and the “ability 

of each party to meet their minimum reasonable needs.”

ANALYSIS

ISSUE ONE—MODIFICATION OF SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE ORDER

In her first issue, Odelia contends the October 18 email and attached 

memorandum constituted a rendition of judgment and the trial court erred because the 

Final Decree contained a provision that changed the start date and duration of spousal 

maintenance from that set forth in the email. We disagree.

Judgment is rendered when the trial court officially announces its decision in open 

court or by written memorandum filed with the clerk. S & A Rest. Corp. v. Leal, 892 

S.W.2d 855, 857-58 (Tex. 1995) (citations omitted). The judge’s intention to render 

judgment in the future cannot be a present rendition of judgment. Id. at 858 (citation

omitted). The rendition of judgment is “a present act, either by spoken word or signed 

memorandum, which decides the issues upon which the ruling is made.” Id. (citation 

omitted). A judgment is “‘signed’ when a judge actually signs a written order or decree; 

and, it is ‘entered’ when the clerk performs the task of entering it in the minutes of the 

court. Cook v. Cook, 243 S.W.3d 800, 804 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). 

Whether a trial court has rendered a judgment is a question of fact. Escobar v. Escobar,

711 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. 1986). 

Citing Cook, 243 S.W.3d at 804, Odelia begins her argument by saying “[t]he entry 

of judgment goes through three stages: rendition, signing, and entry.” Odelia argues the 

judge rendered his ruling when he signed, dated, and filed the memorandum entitled 
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“Property Division,” attached to his October 18 email which included the statement, 

“Daniel will pay $400 per month beginning Nov[ember] 1, 2018.” Because she considers 

this document to be the judgment rendered by the court, she contends the Final Decree

of Divorce later entered is incorrect because it contains different terms. We disagree.

The October 18 email to which the “Property Division” memorandum was attached 

stated as follows:

Attached is a copy of property/debt division in Caudillo case. Since Daniel

Caudillo filed divorce petition, Ben will prepare decree; provide copy to Terri 

and Megan for their review before e-filing. If anyone feels I left something 

out, let me know. 

This language does not indicate the judge’s intent to render a final appealable order at 

the time he sent the email. In fact, the judge invited changes by asking the parties to 

notify him if he “left something out.” In the area of family law, this is a common practice, 

where many of the “details” contained in a final decree of divorce are not orally 

pronounced, and the trial judge often exercises discretion when fine-tuning his ruling prior 

to formal rendition. Further, the mere filing of that email and memorandum did not alter

the judge’s intent or constitute the rendition of a ruling any more than the email itself did. 

The language of the email still indicated an intent to render a ruling at a later date, after 

the parties had reviewed the decree and had the opportunity to suggest changes or 

additions to the judge.

We also note Odelia’s argument that the judge changed his October 18 email 

“decision” from an indefinite spousal maintenance award to one that was limited to a 

period of seven years. Again, the mere fact that the email did not include the specific 

term of payments did not mean that the trial judge had rendered a decision that the 
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spousal maintenance payments would continue indefinitely. Similar to the other details 

to be included in the final order, the term of payments was a detail that remained within 

the discretion of the trial judge. 

As Odelia recognizes, a court may order maintenance to the spouse who is unable 

to earn sufficient income to provide for his or her minimum reasonable needs due to a 

physical or mental disability for as long as the spouse continues to satisfy the eligibility 

criteria prescribed by the applicable provision. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.054(b) (West

Supp. 2019). While Odelia seems to take from this statute that the district court was 

required to order spousal maintenance for that entire period, the unambiguous language

of the statute is discretionary in nature, setting forth that the court “may” make such an 

order. It does not say that the court “shall” or is otherwise mandated to order spousal 

maintenance for the entire period of disability. 

Odelia also complains that the judge improperly took into account the spousal 

support she received under the temporary orders when he reduced her spousal support 

to a period of seven years in the Final Decree. As support for her argument, she lists the 

factors set forth in section 8.052 of the Family Code, noting that none of them include 

support received under temporary orders as that support is to assist with needs during 

the pending suit. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.052. Again, the language of section 8.052 is

informative here. The beginning of that provision provides “[a] court that determines that 

a spouse is eligible to receive maintenance under this chapter shall determine the nature, 

amount, duration, and manner of periodic payments by considering all relevant factors, 

including. . . [eleven enumerated factors].” (Emphasis added). TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 

8.052. The use of the word “including” indicates that a judge should consider the eleven 
8

factors set forth in section 8.052, but it does not preclude a judge from considering other 

factors. The list is not exclusive. We thus do not find the trial court abused its discretion 

here by considering factors, if it did, not specifically enumerated in section 8.052 of the 

Family Code.

Lastly, we address Odelia’s argument that the Final Decree of Divorce does not 

conform to the October 29 email because the decree states Daniel is to pay spousal 

maintenance for a period of seven years commencing November 1, 2018, whereas the 

October 29 email itself did not specify any term of duration and the email chain regarding 

clarification of the court’s order provided for “10 yrs but would start when payments started 

under temporary orders.” The de novo temporary orders provided that spousal 

maintenance was to commence on November 15, 2015. Taking into consideration the 

temporary spousal maintenance payments that had already accrued, the number of 

spousal maintenance payments was the same. Either way, Daniel was obligated to make 

the same spousal maintenance payment ($400 per month), for the same number of 

months (November 2015 through November 2025).

1 As such, we cannot find the district 

court abused its discretion here either. Accordingly, we resolve Odelia’s first issue 

against her. 

ISSUE TWO—ELIGIBILITY FOR SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE

Via her second issue, Odelia contends the district court erred when it determined 

the duration of her spousal maintenance under section 8.054(a)(1)(C) of the Texas Family 

1 We acknowledge Odelia’s argument that Daniel did not actually pay the ordered temporary 

spousal maintenance in November 2015. Odelia filed a Motion for Enforcement after Daniel failed to make 

the payments. Daniel began making the payments on April 16, 2016. We do not find that the court abused 

its discretion in declining to alter the spousal maintenance award time period based on those events. 
9

Code, providing that a court may not order maintenance that remains in effect for more 

than ten years after the date of the order, if the spouses were married for thirty years or 

more, rather than section 8.054(a)(2)(A), which provides that the court shall limit the 

duration of a maintenance order to the “shortest reasonable period that allows the spouse 

seeking maintenance to earn sufficient income to provide for the spouse’s minimum 

reasonable needs, unless the ability of the spouse to provide for the spouse’s minimum 

reasonable needs is substantially or totally diminished because of: (A) physical or mental 

disability of the spouse seeking maintenance.” See TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. §

8.054(a)(1)(C); § 8.054(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2019). 

We review the trial court’s decision to award spousal maintenance under an abuse

of discretion standard of review. Diaz v. Diaz, 350 S.W.3d 251, 254 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio 2011, pet. denied). See also In re Marriage of Boyd, No. 07-14-00211-CV, 2015 

Tex. App. LEXIS 6452, at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo June 24, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) 

(citations omitted). Absent a clear abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court’s 

decision to award spousal maintenance. Amos v. Amos, 79 S.W.3d 747, 749 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). Under this standard of review, the proper inquiry is 

whether the trial court’s assessment of spousal maintenance was arbitrary or 

unreasonable. Garcia v. Garcia, 170 S.W.3d 644, 649 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no

pet.) (citations omitted). Consequently, we must “determine whether, based on the 

elicited evidence, the trial court made a reasonable decision. Stated inversely, we must 

conclude that the trial court’s decision was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.” Id.

The trial court may exercise its discretion to award spousal maintenance only if the 

party seeking maintenance meets specific statutory eligibility requirements. Roberts v. 
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Roberts, 531 S.W.3d 224, 227-29 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied) (citing 

Slicker v. Slicker, 464 S.W.3d 850, 859 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.)). Texas Family 

Code section 8.051(2)(A) provides that “in a suit for dissolution of a marriage” the trial 

court may order maintenance if the spouse seeking maintenance will lack sufficient 

property, on dissolution of the marriage, to provide for the spouse’s minimum reasonable 

needs and that spouse is “unable to earn sufficient income to provide for her minimum 

reasonable needs because of an incapacitating physical or mental disability.”

Once a trial court has determined that a spouse is eligible for spousal maintenance

pursuant to section 8.051(2)(A), the trial court may order maintenance for “as long as the 

spouse [seeking maintenance] continues to satisfy the eligibility criteria prescribed by 

[section 8.051(2)(A)].” See TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 8.054(b) (West Supp. 2019). 

Therefore, while Odelia is incorrect in her contention that the trial court had the authority 

to order spousal maintenance for more ten years pursuant to section 8.054(a)(2)(A), she 

would nonetheless be correct if she were contending the trial court had that authority 

pursuant to section 8.054(b). Roberts, 531 S.W.3d at 228. 

As fact finder, the trial court may reasonably infer an individual’s incapacity from 

circumstantial evidence or the competent testimony of a lay witness, including the 

testimony of the person seeking spousal maintenance. Roberts, 531 S.W.3d at 228

(citing Reina v. Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 611 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex. 1981) 

(no medical evidence of disability required in case decided under former workers’

compensation statute); Pickens v. Pickens, 62 S.W.3d 212, 215-16 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

2001, pet. denied)). A physical disability or incapacity does not need to be proven by 

medical evidence. Roberts, 531 S.W.3d at 228-29 (citing Reina, 611 S.W.2d at 417; 
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Pickens, 62 S.W.3d at 216; Galindo v. Galindo, 04-13-00325-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 

3775 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 9, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (upheld disability finding

based solely on testimony of party seeking spousal maintenance)). “In fact, the testimony 

of the injured party will support a finding of incapacity even if directly contradicted by

expert medical testimony.” Roberts, 531 S.W.3d at 228 (citing Pickens, 62 S.W.3d at 

216). There is “no authority directly addressing the quantum of evidence required to prove 

incapacity in a spousal maintenance action.” Roberts, 531 S.W.3d at 228-29 (citing

Galindo, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 3775, at *4 (quoting Pickens, 62 S.W.3d at 215); Smith 

v. Smith, 115 S.W.3d 303, 309 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)).

In the matter before us, Odelia told the court she began receiving social security 

disability the previous year. On appeal, her counsel discusses the difficulty of satisfying 

the burden to receive such benefits. Odelia testified before the district judge that “[t]here’s 

no way I can go back and get a job . . . [b]ecause I’m disabled. I got chronic arthritis, 

osteoarthritis. I can’t do anything physical that much.” She further testified saying, “I can’t 

lift, crawl, climb stairs, stoop, bend or—everything.” She testified that if she tries to do 

these things, it is “painful, very painful.” While Odelia did not testify about any efforts to 

obtain employment of any kind or explain why her disability prevented her from doing any 

type of work, such evidence was unnecessary since Daniel testified he was aware Odelia 

was disabled and he did not otherwise contest that issue.

On appeal, Odelia contrasts Galindo, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 3775, at *6-7 with 

Wiedenfeld v. Markgraf, 534 S.W.3d 14, 20 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied) 

to support her contention that the evidence she presented to the district court was 

sufficient to allow it to reasonably infer she was disabled. While we agree the court could 
12

have made such a finding, we do not agree it was required to make such a finding. 

Furthermore, even if the trial court determined Odelia was disabled, it was not required 

to order spousal support for an indefinite duration.

In Galindo, the wife testified she was diagnosed with a “neuromuscular disorder of 

the intestinal track” in 2000. Galindo, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 3775, at *6. She told the 

court it causes her to “get severe pain the upper gut area, and it is so bad that I just start 

vomiting and going to the bathroom and can’t move . . . I just have to go to the hospital.” 

Id. The wife further testified that in addition to the acute symptoms, she is “always in at 

least moderate pain and suffers from anxiety.” Id. In addition, she took medication which 

also impaired her abilities. Id. Given those facts, the appellate court concluded a fact 

finder could reasonably infer the wife’s incapacity from her testimony and the substance 

of her testimony was “such that she qualifies for spousal maintenance under section 

8.051(2)(A).” Id. at *7. Odelia encourages this court to find that the evidence in this case 

is similar to that presented in Galindo and to find that the trial court erred in its award in 

the Final Decree of Divorce.

Odelia contrasts her case with that in Wiedenfeld, 534 S.W.3d at 19, in which the 

former husband testified that during their marriage, he helped his wife obtain social 

security disability benefits based on her medical issues. He also testified he did not 

believe his former wife was unable to obtain or retain employment because she had 

worked near the end of their marriage. The former wife testified she received disability

benefits and described her various medical conditions which included “heart disease, 

diabetes, arthritis, memory problems, lupus, Sjogren’s disease, foot problems, and back 

problems.” Id. She stated she believed her medical conditions affected her ability to 
13

obtain and maintain employment because she did not believe an employer would be 

pleased if she had to call in sick because she was unable to function. Id. She did note 

she watched her roommate’s dogs when her roommate went out of town as a “side job.”

Id. In that situation, the appellate court concluded the trial court could have believed the 

former husband’s testimony and noted the former wife did not testify about any effort to 

obtain employment and did not dispute the fact that she had worked near the end of their

marriage. Odelia argues Wiedenfeld is distinguishable from her case because the former 

husband provided controverting testimony about the former wife’s disability, whereas 

Daniel did not. 

We agree with Odelia that she presented testimony somewhat similar to the 

testimony set forth in Galindo. Likewise, we agree that, unlike the former husband in 

Wiedenfeld, Daniel did not controvert Odelia’s assertion she was disabled. When asked 

whether he was aware that Ms. Caudillo was disabled, he responded, “Yes, ma’am.” He 

was then asked, “And you understand that on the basis of that disability that the federal 

government has determined that she can’t work?” He responded, “That’s what I’ve been 

told.” And, we agree Odelia also established she received social security disability 

benefits; whereas, unlike the former wife in Wiedenfeld, Odelia did not present any 

testimony concerning what efforts she had made to obtain any kind of employment and 

did not explain how or why her disability prohibited her from obtaining any type of gainful 

employment.

Considering the two cases cited to us by Odelia, and considering the record before 

us, we do not find the trial court abused its discretion. While we agree with Odelia that 

her testimony alone would have been sufficient to support a finding that she suffered from 
14

a disability, we do not agree with her position that the trial court was required to find she 

had such a disability. The trial court was free to determine the credibility of the witnesses

and the weight to be given their testimony, and it was within its discretion to conclude 

Odelia was not disabled to the degree that she required indefinite spousal maintenance 

payments from Daniel. See Wiedenfeld, 534 S.W.3d at 19 (the trial court is the sole judge 

of the credibility of the witnesses and can believe or disbelieve any witness’s testimony).

Odelia again contends the trial court erred when it substantially changed the 

decision disclosed in the October 18 email because all of the evidence presented at the 

final hearing was uncontroverted and supports a finding that she was disabled, making 

an award of spousal maintenance for an indefinite period of time proper. Again, Odelia’s 

argument presupposes that the October 18 email was the judge’s rendered ruling. As we 

discussed in our analysis of Odelia’s first issue, that is not the case. The trial judge was 

not required to find Odelia disabled, nor was he required to find that she was entitled to 

an award of spousal maintenance for an indefinite period of time even if she was. See 

O’Carolan v. Hopper, 414 S.W.3d 288, 308 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.) (“Extended 

maintenance is discretionary under the statute, even if a spouse is permanently 

disabled.”) (citation omitted).

For these same reasons, we do not agree the judge erred by failing to include a 

finding that Odelia was disabled. Odelia argues, citing In re S.R.O., 143 S.W.3d 237, 243 

(Tex. App. –Waco 2004, no pet.), that because the evidence supports a finding that she 

was disabled and because neither party notified the court that the finding on that element 

had been omitted, nor did they request a finding on that element, we must presume the 

trial court made a finding on that element in a way that supports its judgment. 
15

While the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law do not expressly include a 

finding that contains the word “disability” or “disabled,” the findings do include one that 

says “Odelia Laurie Caudillo was married to Daniel Caudillo for ten (10) years or longer 

and will lack the ability to earn sufficient income to provide for the spouse’s minimum 

reasonable needs on dissolution of the marriage.” This was among the factors 

considered and appears to include what the judge believed regarding Odelia’s disability

and its effect on her ability to work.

Odelia argues that the judge “must have either abused his discretion in awarding 

maintenance for an indefinite period of time, or he implicitly found [Odelia] is disabled 

such that his order complies with Texas Family Code § 8.054(a)(2).” We have already 

determined the judge did not award spousal maintenance for an indefinite period of time 

because the October 18 email was not a rendition of the trial court’s ruling. And, we have 

already determined the judge included a finding that encompassed his conclusion 

regarding Odelia’s disability and there is no reason to conclude the judge abused his 

discretion in making that finding or in including the spousal maintenance award in the 

Final Decree of Divorce. Accordingly, we overrule Odelia’s second issue.

CONCLUSION

Having resolved each of Odelia’s issues against her, we affirm the Final Decree of 

Divorce of the trial court.

Patrick A. Pirtle

 Justice