1994 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

12-6-1994

Edwards v. United States

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 94-3240

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Recommended Citation

"Edwards v. United States" (1994). 1994 Decisions. Paper 209.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994/209
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 

 

No. 94-3240 

 

RODERICK EDWARDS, 

 Appellant 

V. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

(D.C. Civil No. 93-00199J) 

 

Argued September 26, 1994 

Opinion filed: December 6, 1994 

Before: SCIRICA, NYGAARD AND McKEE, Circuit Judges

MARJORIE M. SMITH, ESQUIRE (Argued) 

Federal Defender Services 

The Legal Aid Society 

52 Duane Street 

10th Floor, Appeals Unit 

New York, NY 10007 

Attorney for Appellant 

FREDERICK W. THIEMAN, ESQUIRE 

United States Attorney 

BONNIE R. SCHLUETER, ESQUIRE (Argued) 

Assistant United States Attorney 

Office of United States Attorney 

633 United States Post Office & Courthouse 

Pittsburgh, PA 15219 

Attorneys for Appellee 
 

 OPINION OF THE COURT 

 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge

 Roderick Edwards appeals the district court's order 

denying his petition for habeas corpus relief. Edwards contends 

that the Bureau of Prisons improperly denied him sentence credit 

for the time he spent in home confinement on bond pending appeal. 

The district court denied his petition. The sole issue on appeal 

is whether his home confinement rises to the penal valence of 

"official detention" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), 

thus entitling him to credit against his sentence. We conclude 

that it does not and will affirm. 

I. 

 Edwards pleaded guilty to distribution and possession 

with intent to distribute cocaine base. The court then placed 

Edwards on pre-trial home detention pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 

3142(c) to ensure his appearance at trial and to protect the 

public. For a period of nine to ten months, Edwards was confined 

to his uncle's home under electronic monitoring and could not 

leave without permission of Pretrial Services. He was granted a 

number of "black out periods" to leave his uncle's apartment and 

attend church, church choir practice, attorney and court 

appointments. 

 Edwards was sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment, 

followed by five years supervised release. At sentencing, 

Edwards requested sentence credit for the nine to ten months he 

spent in home confinement, which the district court denied. 

 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed 

and held that sentencing courts have the authority to determine 
whether a form of confinement amounts to "official detention" and 

whether sentence credit should be granted under § 3585(b). 

United States v. Edwards, 960 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1992). Shortly 

thereafter, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Wilson, 112 

S.Ct 1351 (1992), held that § 3585(b) does not authorize a 

district court to award credit at sentencing and that the 

Attorney General, through the Bureau of Prisons, is to make the 

sentence credit determination for a defendant. Id. at 1354-1355. 

 In light of Wilson, Edwards filed a petition with the 

Bureau of Prisons, again raising the issue. The Bureau denied 

Edwards' petition for "prior custody credit." Having exhausted 

his administrative remedies, Edwards, now incarcerated at a 

federal corrections facility in Loretto, Pennsylvania, filed a 

petition for habeas corpus relief, raising the same denial of 

sentence credit issue. 

 The district court referred the case to a magistrate 

judge, who recommended that the district court find the 

restrictions on Edwards' freedom were not equal to official 

detention. The district court rejected Edwards' objections, and 

adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, except 

a portion of the report recommending that "residential 

confinement ... never [be considered] legally onerous enough to 

constitute official detention." Specifically, the district 

court's order stated that Edwards had "not been restrained to so 

significant a degree that it would constitute 'official 

detention' under the statute." 
 Edwards again argues that the time he spent in home 

confinement constitutes "official detention" as that term is used 

in 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), which provides in pertinent part: 

 Credit for prior custody - A 

defendant shall be given credit 

 toward the service of a term of 

imprisonment for any time he has 

spent in official detention prior 

to the date the sentence commences 

(1) as a result of the offense for 

which the sentence was imposed. . . 

 

The government does not dispute Edwards concerning the conditions 

of his home detention, but argues that the decision of the Bureau 

of Prisons, which found that Edwards' court-ordered, pre-trial 

residential segregation did not amount to "official detention," 

was reasonable under the statute and entitled to substantial 

deference. 

 Ordinarily, agency decisions are subject to limited 

review and can be overturned only if they are arbitrary, 

capricious or an abuse of discretion, especially when Congress 

has given the agency the authority to carry out a statute's 

purpose. National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. 

United States, 887 F.2d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 

495 U.S. 918 (1990). Moreover, an agency's interpretation of a 

statute that it is responsible for administering is entitled to 

substantial deference. Chevron U.S.A. v. National Resources 

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (1984). 

Here, as the Supreme Court noted in United States v. Wilson, 112 

S.Ct. 1351 (1992), the Attorney General, through the Bureau of 
Prisons, has long been trusted with the authority to calculate 

sentence credit for time previously served. Id. at 1355. 

Nevertheless, because the Bureau of Prisons' assessment of 

Edwards' home confinement was based on its "Program Statements1", 

mere internal guidelines rather than its published regulations, 

its interpretation is entitled to a minimal degree of deference. 

See Koray v. Sizer, 21 F.3d 558, 562 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing FLRA 

v. United States Dep't of Navy, 966 F.2d 747, 762 & n. 14 (3d 

Cir. 1992)(in banc)). 

 In Koray v. Sizer, 21 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 1994), we held 

that the time a detainee spends in a halfway house pursuant to 

court order may be "official detention" if the restrictions on a 

detainee's liberty were equivalent to "jail-type" confinement. 

Edwards asserts that his home confinement was so restrictive that 

it approached jail-type confinement, and that the Bureau of 

Prisons abused its discretion in finding that his confinement was 

not "official detention" under § 3585(b). 

 Edwards simply cannot carry his burden: the terms of 

his home confinement were just not sufficiently onerous to 

 

1. Before the Supreme Court decided Wilson, the Bureau of 

Prisons issued a policy statement on February 21, 1992 that made 

reference to sentence credit. The Bureau of Prisons Sentence 

Computation Manual CCCA Program Statement 5880.28 (February 21, 

1992) provides that, "[a] condition of bail or bond which is 

'highly restrictive', and that includes 'house arrest', 

'electronic monitoring' or 'home confinement' . . . is not 

considered as time in official detention." 

 However, "[t]he Bureau's interpretation is recorded in 

its 'Program Statements', which are merely internal agency 

guidelines and may be altered by the Bureau at will." Koray, 21 

F.3d at 562 (citing Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement

1121.02.1.2.1. (April 12, 1993)). 
approach jail-type incarceration, and, therefore, did not 

constitute official detention within the meaning of § 3585. 

Edwards minimizes the frequent "blackout" periods he was given 

where he was allowed to leave his uncle's apartment to attend 

church and social events. Although he was on electronically 

monitored release and could not leave his uncle's apartment 

without permission from Pretrial Services, Edwards was frequently 

allowed to leave the apartment. There is no evidence that there 

were any restrictions placed on the number of guests he could 

have at his uncle's home. There is no evidence that limitations 

were put on the frequency of his guests' visits. Finally, 

Edwards argues that he was not allowed to work while he was in 

home confinement, but no evidence was presented that Edwards had 

a job or had to refuse employment because of the confinement. 

 During the first five months of home confinement, 

Edwards was given permission to attend twenty-two social 

functions, and one personal outing. Further, from November 22, 

1990 to April 11, 1991, Edwards was given permanent blackout 

periods every Monday, Wednesday and Friday from 5:00 p.m. to 

10:00 p.m. for choir rehearsal, every Saturday from 11:00 a.m. to 

4:00 p.m. for choir meetings, and every Sunday from 9:00 a.m. to 

7:00 p.m. for church service and evening service. Moreover, 

during the last four months of his release, Edwards was permitted 

approximately thirty hours per week outside of his home 

confinement for church activities. Finally, his weekend blackout 

periods were extended on three occasions. 
 Edwards may argue and indeed prove that his home 

confinement deterred him and taught him a lesson, contained him 

and protected society, and even totally rehabilitated him. That, 

however, is beside the point. By Congress' scheme, it simply 

does not matter that the condition of Edwards' home confinement 

may have accomplished all this. The penologically uncertain, but 

nonetheless patent objective of offense-based sentencing under 

the Sentencing Reform Act is retributive and punitive. 

Congress has determined that the sinner must suffer. Edwards was 

placed on court-ordered, pretrial detention to ensure his 

appearance at trial, and the fairly modest nature of the 

restrictions placed on him reflects that purpose. His home 

confinement was not sufficiently jail-like to punish and he gets 

no credit. 

 II. 

 Edwards next argues that the Bureau of Prisons should 

have given him sentence credit because similarly situated 

sentenced persons confined under the same conditions receive 

sentence credit. This is not true. Edwards, convicted of 

distributing cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), 

could not even be sentenced to home detention. Section 5C1.1(f) 

explicitly states that if a defendant's "guideline range is more 

than ten months, the guidelines require that the minimum term be 

satisfied by a sentence of imprisonment." U.S.S.G. § 5C1.1(f) 

(1990). 

 Edwards' guideline range for violating § 841(a) is well 

above ten months. He pleaded guilty to distributing fifty grams 
or more of cocaine base, which carries a base level offense of 

sixteen under the Sentencing Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 

(1990). At a minimum, this would result in a twenty-one month 

sentence, and here when his criminal history and other charges 

were taken into account, Edwards received a 120-month sentence. 

Edwards bears no similarity to others sentenced to home 

confinement, because he simply could not have been given such a 

sentence. 

III. 

 In sum, we will affirm the district court's denial of 

Edwards' petition for habeas relief. The district court gave 

appropriate deference to the Bureau's conclusion, made the 

unassailable factual determination that Edwards' home confinement 

with electronic monitoring was not sufficiently restrictive to 

meet the Koray test, and properly concluded that his home 

confinement was not "official detention" under § 3585(b). We 

will affirm.