In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

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No. 02-3498

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

EDUARD S. RENESLACIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 01 CR 1091—James F. Holderman, Judge.

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ARGUED MAY 29, 2003—DECIDED NOVEMBER 12, 2003

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Before CUDAHY, EVANS, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Eduard Reneslacis was convicted after a jury trial for offering bribes to a public official

and for making materially false statements to a public

official. Reneslacis appeals, contending that the court

(1) improperly increased his offense level for offering money

to an official “holding a high-level decision-making or

sensitive position” and (2) incorrectly found that he had led

or organized the offense. We agree that the official whom

Reneslacis attempted to bribe—a district-adjudications

officer for the former Immigration and Naturalization

Service (INS)—held a sensitive position, but do not think
2 No. 02-3498

that Reneslacis led or organized a scheme to bribe him. We

therefore uphold the first adjustment but remand for

resentencing as to the second.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1998, federal officials started an investigation into the

illegal sale of resident-alien cards and other documents establishing the right of foreigners to reside permanently

in the United States. As part of the investigation, officials

opened “GS Golden Travel,” a store on the west side of

Chicago that was advertised as a travel agency but conducted no legitimate business. The store was wired with

surveillance equipment, and Clarence Robinson, a bonafide

district-adjudications officer, posed there as a corrupt official who for $5,000 would approve applications for lawful

permanent residency filed by immigrants who were ineligible for that status. 

To become a permanent resident, ordinarily applicants

must submit a sponsor’s petition along with medical records, fingerprints, a $220 fee, and other paperwork. The

applicant must then appear for an interview before a

district-adjudications officer, who may grant or deny the

application based upon criteria established by the INS (now

a defunct agency, though we can ignore that detail). If the

application is granted, the officer will affix a temporary

stamp to the applicant’s passport. Valid for one year, the

stamp serves as proof of permanent-residency status until

the applicant receives a resident-alien card (better known

as a green card).

Reneslacis had overstayed his tourist visa, and in April

1999 he met with Gregory Sienkiewicz, a convicted felon

who worked for the government by promoting Golden

Travel to his former associates. Sienkiewicz told Reneslacis
No. 02-3498 3

that his immigration problems could be solved for $5,000

and that through the travel agency he could obtain work

permits and social security cards for his friends. After

returning to Golden Travel a few weeks later to meet with

Robinson—who pointedly explained, “you know this is

illegal, what we’re doing right now”—Reneslacis accepted

the proposal and that August paid $5,000 for a stamp in his

passport signifying that he had successfully applied to

become a permanent resident.

After his initial meeting at Golden Travel, Reneslacis also

began referring potential customers to Robinson and

Sienkiewicz. In July 1999, he went to the travel agency

with a man named Przemek, who was interested in purchasing green cards and other paperwork for two of his

friends. A few months later Reneslacis arrived with another

man, Anguel, who wanted to buy permanent-residency

status for himself and his wife until he learned that

Robinson did not offer a “discount” for married couples and

would require full payment from them both. In March 2000,

Reneslacis took Yivgenia Korzun (and her translator) to see

Robinson because she allegedly needed help with an

application that had already been filed, and the following

November Reneslacis told Robinson that he knew someone

who would pay $25,000 to become a lawful permanent

resident. Reneslacis also sent two faxes to Golden Travel,

both of which were headed “2 New Clients” and contained

names, social security numbers, and dates of birth for

potential customers. 

Of all these people, the government presented evidence

that only Natalia Pavlikova—one of the clients listed in the

faxes—actually paid money to Robinson. She supplied

$12,000 to become a lawful permanent resident—$3,500 of

which was kicked back to Reneslacis. The jury nevertheless

found Reneslacis guilty on three bribery charges, concluding

that he had offered money in connection with himself and

Pavlikova as well as the unidentified client who was willing
4 No. 02-3498

to pay $25,000 for Robinson’s services. The jury also found

that Reneslacis lied to customs officials about where he had

obtained the stamp in his passport.

At sentencing, the district court heard testimony only

from Marilyn Roraff, a supervisor of district-adjudications

officers, including Robinson, in Chicago. She explained that

each of her officers annually handled more than 2,000

applications to become permanent residents—more than

half of which were granted. Roraff testified that this caseload allowed her to review only applications that were

denied (which in turn could be reviewed by an immigration

judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals). Applications

that were granted, she explained, crossed her desk “very

rarely.” She told the court that out of a hundred successful

applications at most one would be brought to her attention—and then only because of an allegation of fraud or

other misconduct warranting investigation.

Based on this testimony, and the Fourth Circuit’s decision

in United States v. Gary, No. 97-4718, 1998 WL 390855, at

*1 (4th Cir. June 22, 1998) (unpublished)— which held that

the lone district-adjudications officer in South Carolina

occupied “a high-level decision-making or sensitive position”

within the INS—the district court increased Reneslacis’s

offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(2)(B). The court also

adjusted upward after finding that Reneslacis had led a

scheme to bribe Robinson comprising of more than five

participants. Id. § 3B1.1(a). In a ruling that is not contested, the court found that Reneslacis lied at his trial and

imposed an additional adjustment for obstruction of justice.

Id. § 3C1.1.

II. ANALYSIS

A. U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(2)(B)

On appeal, Reneslacis first contends that the district

court improperly adjusted his offense level under U.S.S.G.
No. 02-3498 5

§ 2C1.1(b)(2)(B)—a provision of the sentencing guidelines

that we have not yet considered. The guideline provides for

an upward adjustment for attempting to influence important public officials: “If the offense involved a payment for

the purpose of influencing an elected official or any official

holding a high-level decision-making or sensitive position,

increase by 8 levels.” Covered officials include judges,

agency administrators, supervisory law enforcement officers, and anyone else with “similar levels of responsibility.”

Id., cmt. n.1.

The district court ruled that district-adjudications officers

like Robinson also deserve to be on this list, and the parties

at the outset contest what respect should be given to that

view. Because the adjustment requires “application of the

guidelines to the facts,” the district court’s conclusion is

entitled to “due deference.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e); Buford v.

United States, 532 U.S. 59, 63 (2001); United States v.

Gatling, 96 F.3d 1511, 1525-26 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The courts

of appeals have disagreed about how much deference (if

any) is “due,” taking a variety of approaches to the adjustment. Compare United States v. Mack, 159 F.3d 208, 220

(6th Cir. 1998) (factual question reviewed for clear error);

United States v. Toothman, 137 F.3d 1393, 1398 n.10 (9th

Cir. 1998) (same), with United States v. Paradies, 98 F.3d

1266, 1292 (11th Cir. 1996) (legal question reviewed de

novo), and United States v. Bynum, 327 F.3d 986, 993 (9th

Cir. 2003) (“interpretation” of the sentencing guidelines

reviewed de novo); United States v. Snell, 152 F.3d 345, 346

(5th Cir. 1998) (same). We do not need to resolve the issue

here. The result would be the same regardless of the

standard of review. See United States v. Purifoy, 326 F.3d

879, 880 (7th Cir. 2003). 

Reneslacis contends that the adjustment was improperly

imposed because Robinson’s position with the INS was

neither “high-level” nor entailed policymaking. He concedes
6 No. 02-3498

that Robinson had some discretionary responsibilities

within the agency but observes that this fact alone does not

justify the adjustment. See United States v. Stephenson, 895

F.2d 867, 878 (2d Cir. 1990). Positions to which the adjustment has been applied, Reneslacis insists, have additional

hallmarks of authority. Covered officials, for example,

typically supervise other employees, e.g., Gatling, 96 F.3d

at 1526 (head of Section 8 housing); United States v.

Matzkin, 14 F.3d 1014, 1021 (4th Cir. 1994) (supervisory

naval engineer), make public policy, see United States v.

Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961, 975-76 (D.C.

Cir. 1998) (Secretary of Agriculture), stand in the shoes of

a policymaker, United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1391

(5th Cir. 1995) (top aide to a U.S. senator), or influence

policymakers, United States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961, 970

(4th Cir. 1995) (attorney for the state’s lottery commission).

Reneslacis rightly observes that Robinson did not possess

any of these qualities. As a district-adjudications officer, he

occupied the first level of intake for applicants seeking to

change their immigration status. He did not supervise other

employees or establish immigration policy but instead made

decisions largely by checking applicants’ qualifications

against predetermined criteria. And although he was at

level 12 on the government’s pay scale, others in his

position started at level 5—the same level as office assistants, records keepers, and other support staff within the

agency.

But by focusing on Robinson’s spot in the hierarchy of

INS officials, Reneslacis has neglected a second ground for

imposing the adjustment. Section 2C1.1(b)(2)(B) refers not

only to “high-level” officials but also to officials who hold

“sensitive” positions. The Fifth Circuit accordingly has held

that bribing a juror in a criminal case warrants a sentencing bump. Snell, 152 F.3d at 346-48. Although jurors

serve for only brief periods and have no policymaking or
No. 02-3498 7

1 The Fourth Circuit permits citation to unpublished opinions

when no other decision “would serve as well.” 4th Cir. R. App. P.

36(c).

supervisory power, Snell explains that they nevertheless

have substantial influence over individual trials and “extraordinary responsibility” for the health of the country’s

legal system. Id. at 348.

Likewise, although Robinson did not have a particularly

lofty position within the INS, he did hold a sensitive post.

Because only a handful of his decisions were ever reviewed,

he had near total control over who could become a permanent resident and eventually a U.S. citizen. Several courts

have held that possessing unreviewed power over important

public decisions reflects a sensitive post—even if existing

rules dictate how those decisions should be made. E.g.,

Gatling, 96 F.3d at 1526; United States v. Lazarre, 14 F.3d

580, 582 (11th Cir. 1994). Given that Robinson also could

subpoena witnesses, take testimony, and perform other

quasi-judicial functions, see U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(2)(B), cmt.

n.1. (bribing a judge will support the adjustment), and that

one court has concluded in an unpublished opinion that

bribing a district-adjudications officer justifies a

§ 2C1.1(b)(2)(B) adjustment, Gary, 1998 WL 390855, at *1,1

we think that the district court acted properly here.

B. Aggravating Role

Reneslacis also challenges the district court’s adjustment

for his role in the offense. The sentencing guidelines authorize a four-level increase “[i]f the defendant was an

organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five

or more participants or was otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G.

§ 3B1.1(a). The government must establish that the ad-
8 No. 02-3498

justment is warranted by a preponderance of the evidence,

United States v. Noble, 246 F.3d 946, 953 (7th Cir. 2001),

and our review of the court’s ruling is only for clear error,

United States v. Souffront, 338 F.3d 809, 833 (7th Cir.

2003).

Like the parties, we begin with whether the bribery

operation at Golden Travel had five or more participants or

was “otherwise extensive.” All agree that Reneslacis and

Pavlikova participated because they both paid Robinson to

become permanent residents. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. n.1

(“participants” include anyone criminally responsible for

committing the offense regardless of whether they were

convicted); see also United States v. Fleischli, 305 F.3d 643,

659 (7th Cir. 2002). But finding three other culpable parties

is not as easy. Robinson and Sienkiewicz were working

undercover for the government, so they do not count.

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. n.1; see also United States v.

Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 679 (7th Cir. 2000). And there is no

evidence that Reneslacis referred anyone other than

Pavlikova to Golden Travel who actually gave Robinson

money.

Nevertheless, the district court could infer participation

by Przemek, Anguel, and the unidentified client who was

willing to pay $25,000. Although none of these people

handed over any cash, the record suggests that they expressed the ability and desire to pay, and no more is

required. United States v. Rasco, 853 F.2d 501, 505 (7th Cir.

1988). The recorded conversations of Przemek’s visit to

Golden Travel show that he wanted to know where to direct

“the moolah” for his friends—a sign that he was ready and

able to pay on their behalf. Anguel likewise was plainly

interested in bribing Robinson until he learned that he and

his wife would not receive a discount. See United States v.

Synowiec, 333 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 2003) (agreement over

the amount of a bribe is not essential); see also United
No. 02-3498 9

States v. Jacobs, 431 F.2d 754, 760 (2d Cir. 1970). And the

offer made by the unidentified client to pay $25,000 formed

one of the counts of conviction, which Reneslacis does not

challenge.

Still, we ultimately need not decide whether the numerosity requirement has been satisfied because the government has not shown that Reneslacis led or organized

anyone in the offense. To see this problem, it is important

to recognize that “leaders” and “organizers” may play

different roles. As the First Circuit has explained, leaders

ordinarily exercise control over subordinates in a hierarchy;

organizers, on the other hand, do not necessarily control

anyone but nonetheless influence the criminal activity by

coordinating its members. United States v. Tejada-Beltran,

50 F.3d 105, 112 (1st Cir. 1995); see also United States v.

Barnes, 117 F.3d 328, 337 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that

control over others or organizational responsibility is

required); United States v. Fones, 51 F.3d 663, 670 & n.5

(7th Cir. 1995) (same). 

There is no evidence that Reneslacis acted as a leader.

Everyone whom he brought to Golden Travel was his

customer, not a subordinate under his control. See United

States v. Mustread, 42 F.3d 1097, 1104-05 (7th Cir. 1994);

United States v. McGuire, 957 F.2d 310, 316 (7th Cir. 1992)

(customers are not “employees” or “subordinates”). True,

Reneslacis in one recorded conversation conceded that

“most of the clients come through someone else” and

Przemek, at least, went to Golden Travel on behalf of two

other people. But these facts do not show that the “someone

else” or Przemek worked for Reneslacis, and without

evidence that he had authority over another person involved in the offense, he cannot have been a leader.

That leaves the possibility that Reneslacis acted as an

organizer. This characterization would be plausible if the
10 No. 02-3498

government had demonstrated that Reneslacis was working

with others toward a common criminal objective. In TejadaBeltran, for example, the defendant smuggled immigrants

into the United States using a team of people who recruited

the clients, doctored their passports, and paid immigration

officials to look the other way when the clients passed

through customs. The First Circuit held that the adjustment was warranted because the defendant had formed

“diverse elements into a whole consisting of interdependent,

coordinated parts, geared for concerted action.” 50 F.3d at

113. 

Here, however, everyone whom Reneslacis worked with

had their own agenda. Each of his clients wanted immigration papers for themselves (or, in Przemek’s case, for two of

his friends), making it impossible to say that Reneslacis

was organizing them for concerted action. As Reneslacis

rightly observes, by referring immigrants who wanted to

become permanent residents to Golden Travel—with the

expectation that he would receive a portion of the bribes—

his role was the same as a broker in a drug case who is

compensated for referring an addict to a dealer. We have

held that narcotics brokers do not deserve a four-level adjustment under § 3B1.1(a). E.g., United States v. Schuh, 289

F.3d 968, 973 (7th Cir. 2002). There is no reason to treat

Reneslacis differently here.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the sentence is VACATED, and

the case is REMANDED for resentencing consistent with this

opinion.
No. 02-3498 11

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—11-12-03