1 

CONDITIONALLY GRANT and Opinion Filed September 23, 2020 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-20-00680-CV 

IN RE PRINCE OF PEACE CHRISTIAN SCHOOL, Relator 

Original Proceeding from the 471st Judicial District Court 

Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 471-06418-2019 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Chief Justice Burns, and Justices Myers and Evans 

Opinion by Chief Justice Burns 

This original proceeding arises from a suit filed by parents whose children 

were expelled from a religiously affiliated private school. Relator Prince of Peace 

Christian School contends the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine deprives the trial 

court of jurisdiction and thus the trial court abused its discretion in denying its plea 

to the jurisdiction. Because we conclude that any decision regarding the merits of 

this dispute would require judicial intrusion upon Prince of Peace’s entitlement to 

manage its internal affairs according to its own policies and beliefs, we conditionally 

grant the writ. 

 
 –2– 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

A. The School 

Prince of Peace, a private school, defines its mission as “provid[ing] a Christcentered, exemplary education, equipping children as disciples and leaders for 

service and success in the 21st century.” Although established and operated for more 

than 30 years by Prince of Peace Lutheran Church with which it shares a campus, in 

2012, the school became an independent 501(c)(3) non-profit entity. Like its 

mission statement, the school’s Articles of Incorporation define the purpose of the 

corporation as providing “a Christian education program that is centered upon 

Biblical principles.” Prince of Peace is accredited by secular organizations as well 

as Lutheran school organizations, which evaluate schools on the basis of their 

academic and spiritual qualities. 

As a separate entity, Prince of Peace has no privity or legal relationship with 

the Lutheran Church, but is a “Recognized Service Organization” (RSO), by which 

it seeks to carry out the Lutheran Church’s objectives, including providing a “Christcentered” education and providing a place for its teachers to “live out their faith in 

word and deed.” Many of its teachers and administrators are “Called” or 

 

1

 We derive the relevant jurisdictional facts from Parents’ Original Petition and the jurisdictional evidence 

submitted in response to the school’s plea to the jurisdiction. We recite the facts in some detail so as to 

enable reliance on the incidents in question, rather than generalized or hyperbolic descriptions of those 

incidents. 
 –3– 

“Commissioned” ministers,2

 having studied at synodical teaching institutions and 

received certifications for ministry by the faculty of those institutions or 

commissions from Lutheran Church congregations. According to the school’s 

policies, even teachers and staff who are not ministers or “Called” are expected to 

teach Christian values and embrace their roles “as missionaries” in “making 

disciples” of the school’s student body and their families. All of Prince of Peace’s 

students participate in weekly chapel and theology classes, and high school students 

must complete four theology class credits. Devotions or prayers begin each class, 

and all classes are taught from a Christian point of view. 

The school’s code of conduct found in its Parent/Student Handbooks outline 

the goals of the “Christ-centered” education Prince of Peace seeks to provide, as well 

as the school’s policies and disciplinary procedures governing its relationships with 

its students, their families, and its teachers and staff. Adherence to Lutheran faith 

principles, as reflected in scripture references, guides these goals and policies, and 

the Handbooks stress adherence to Christian principles and submission to the 

school’s decisions. For example, specific scripture references frame the school’s 

expectations of the relationship among its teachers, students and parents, such as 

“speaking the truth in love” (Ephesians 4:15), encouragement (1 Thess. 5:11), 

accountability (James 1:9), respect and trust (1 Thess. 5:12-13; Proverbs 3:56). 

 

2

 Headmaster Chris Hahn, High School Principal Dr. Jeremy Lower, and former Assistant High School 

Principal Paul Stark, whose conduct is at issue in this proceeding, are Called or Commissioned Ministers. 
 –4– 

Prince of Peace graduates are expected to demonstrate “principles of Christian 

leadership, based on integrity and service” and, “realize . . . that the policies and 

decisions affect many people and must be measured by Christian standards of 

justice, charity and empathy.” Faculty members are expected to create an orderly 

school environment, as well as to serve as “role models of love, forgiveness, and 

grace that are part of a maturing relationship with Jesus Christ.” 

The code of conduct also includes policies against bullying, harassment, 

smoking, and substance abuse, and outline the school’s expectations regarding 

conflict resolution, search and seizure and drug testing, and behavioral disorders. 

Each policy rests on Lutheran beliefs. All students and enrolled families agree to 

abide by Prince of Peace’s code of conduct and its tuition contract allows Prince of 

Peace the right to “remove a student at any time for any reason, including failure of 

the parent(s) to adhere to the policies, philosophies, and procedures of the school.” 

B. Prince of Peace’s discipline of Students and Parents’ complaints 

During their freshman and sophomore years of high school, B.O. and S.R. 

(collectively “Students”), were disciplined several times by High School Assistant 

Principal Stark and two different coaches. Parents assert Students were on a “watch 

list” created by Stark for problem students; Stark and other administrative employees 

treated Students unfairly and “treated other students more favorably” than they 

treated Students; and, Stark stalked Students, including frequently entering the 

restroom when Students were using it and using any urinal close to where Students 
 –5– 

were urinating. Parents contend, that Stark, through close and excessive supervision 

and discipline, sexually harassed Students.3

 Parents allege Students were 

traumatized by Stark’s behavior, and B.O. developed post-traumatic stress disorder, 

which rendered him unable to use the restroom in the presence of any other person. 

Although Stark justified his close supervision of Students by claiming they were 

likely vaping, Parents assert Students were never caught doing so. 

Near the end of Students’ freshman year, they and several other students were 

discovered by a coach in a locker room without permission. The coach also 

discovered a drawing of genitalia and a homophobic message on a dry-erase board 

about one of the students who was present. Parents contend the coach incorrectly 

assumed the message reflected bullying. They assert the message and drawing were 

a joke and the student who was the subject of the message and drawing was neither 

upset nor offended. 

All students who were discovered in the locker room were questioned in 

Stark’s office. Parents allege a secretary lied to the boys about surveillance in the 

locker room in an effort to solicit a confession. They assert the secretary’s efforts 

reveal discussion of “confidential discipline matters” among the office personnel 

and gossip about false accusations. Although Students denied writing the offending 

picture and message, Parents complain Students were threatened with a Saturday 

 

3

 Parents do not specifically define what conduct constituted “sexual harassment,” but the discussion of 

facts from their Petition demonstrates they rely on Prince of Peace employees’ following Students into the 

bathroom or observing Students’ entering and leaving the bathroom for this allegation. 
 –6– 

detention. The incident—which we discern from Parents’ pleadings as having been 

questioned in the school office rather than creating the homophobic drawing and 

message—was so upsetting that Students’ ability to study for their exams was 

impaired. B.O., who suffers from several learning disorders, “had such trouble 

thinking clearly as a result of the incident,” that he failed most of his final exams. 

S.R., likewise, had difficulty focusing on his studies and failed some of his exams. 

Further, Parents contend Stark failed to call Parents to discuss the incident as 

he had informed Students he would. Instead, Parents met with the principal, Dr. 

Lowe, about Stark’s “biased handling” of the incident, an “inappropriate” email 

from Stark, and his “ongoing harassment” of Students, his “obsessive stalking” of 

Students, as well as his “poor judgment and mismanagement of situations” involving 

Students. Although Dr. Lowe initially defended the “investigation and 

interrogations,” he eventually offered repeated apologies, admitted the 

administration’s response to the incident had been “overboard,” and acknowledged 

Stark needed training over the summer. Dr. Lowe also conceded neither B.O. nor 

S.R. had ever been in “serious trouble” with the school, but also noted that Students 

and the group with which they associated were known on campus as a “wolf pack,” 

which merited close supervision. Parents requested that Dr. Lowe prohibit Stark 

from disciplining Students without Parents’ presence. Dr. Lowe agreed he would 

“try to keep the boys from being alone with” Stark. 
 –7– 

Students returned to Prince of Peace for their sophomore year to even greater 

attention. Parents contend Stark enlisted additional faculty to harass Students, warn 

others that Students were “bad” and that associating with Students would end in 

trouble. One coach began following Students into the restroom as Stark had, and 

other unnamed faculty members stood outside of restrooms when Students entered. 

Shortly after the semester started, Stark confronted Students in the lunchroom 

after they had returned from the restroom and “within view of the entire cafeteria 

and within earshot of at least the students and faculty at nearby tables.” Stark 

accused Students of placing toilet paper on the bathroom floor,4

 and Parents allege 

Stark publicly humiliated Students to “perpetuate the myth” that they were discipline 

problems. 

The following day, a similar incident occurred, and Stark accused Students of 

clogging a toilet and leaving more toilet paper on the floor, which Students denied. 

Stark lectured Students and threatened to restrict their bathroom privileges. 

A few days later, a different coach called Students to the school office based 

on information from another student that Students were vaping on campus. Students 

had recently refused to sit with the student who reported the vaping, and Parents 

asserted that student was “motivated” to accuse B.O. Upon arriving at the office, 

 

4

 Parents initially describe the conduct at issue as “putting a roll of toilet paper” on the bathroom floor but 

later describe Stark’s belief that Students had been “throwing” toilet paper. 
 –8– 

B.O. admitted having a vape pod but said he had picked it up as trash in the school 

parking lot. 

After these incidents, two of the four parents met with Principal Dr. Lowe and 

Stark to report that Stark “continued to follow and harass” Students. Stark explained 

he believed Students had thrown toilet paper because of their laughter as they left 

the bathroom, but offered no justification for questioning Students in the cafeteria 

about the incident. Parents also confronted Stark about having observed Students in 

the bathroom, but Stark “showed no regard” for Students’ “discomfort” and did not 

apologize. In response to Parents’ inquiries about why Stark had been permitted to 

search B.O. before calling his mother,5

 Dr. Lowe explained that he had been out of 

town on the day of the incident. At this meeting, Parents asked for the “sexual 

harassment” to stop. 

About a month later, a different coach learned Students and others were 

vaping on campus during a football game. The group was taken to the gym by the 

coach and a police officer, and questioned and lectured about the dangers of vaping 

and the disciplinary consequences outlined in the Handbooks. Although the students 

were not searched, vaping paraphernalia was discovered in the possession of one 

student. 

 

5

 Our record does not disclose any incident during which Students were searched. 
 –9– 

Several months later, another teacher questioned a student group that included 

Students about spraying water in a bathroom using a broken hose. When others in 

the group suggested Students were responsible for the damage, B.O. admitted to 

spraying water. 

About a week later, Prince of Peace expelled both B.O. and S.R. and wrote 

each family a detailed letter. Prince of Peace explained it had fully investigated all 

allegations by Parents regarding unlawful or inappropriate conduct by its employees, 

including each of Parents’ complaints of “ongoing harassment, defamation and 

bullying,” public humiliation, and threats directed at Students by staff. The school 

wrote that all disciplinary actions it had taken regarding Students were reasonable 

and conformed to its policies and procedures. Prince of Peace alleged Parents’ 

“aggressive” and “unfounded” accusations were inconsistent with its Lutheran 

Christian philosophy, its goal of developing good home–school communications in 

furtherance of a “quality Christian education,” and resulted in the school’s inability 

to assist Parents in providing a Christian education for Students. Parents were 

informed: 

POPCS must be able to effectively communicate and work together

with parents in accordance with POPCS’ mission “to provide a 

Christian education program that is centered upon Biblical principles.” 

You have demanded that the administration of the high school not speak 

to your son or daughter without you present. You have demanded that 

Assistant Principal Stark not be involved in any investigation and/or 

meeting with your son. You have required POPCS to communicate 

with you through attorneys. Your demands contradict the normal

operating procedures and philosophies of POPCS. In addition, your 
 –10– 

threats of litigation and negative accusations against school personnel 

have resulted in both teachers and administrators being unable to 

perform their duties as it relates to your children and/or appropriately 

minister to your family. Further, you have publicly portrayed POPCS 

in a negative manner. Your actions clearly indicate that you can no 

longer adhere to the policies, philosophies and procedures of the school. 

As such, POPCS can no longer minister to your family and complete 

its mission. 

Parents filed suit alleging Prince of Peace breached its contract by (1) failing 

to operate the school in compliance with applicable state laws regarding the 

supervision and care of children, including by failing to report abuse or neglect 

which purportedly occurred when Stark sexually harassed Students; and (2) failing 

to employ qualified faculty to address bullying and harassment by the school’s staff. 

Parents also pleaded a negligence claim premised on Prince of Peace’s alleged 

failure to hire suitable employees and appropriately supervise those employees. 

Parents sought the value of their lost tuition payments, compensation for Students’ 

mental and physical anguish, and attorneys’ fees. 

Prince of Peace filed a plea to the jurisdiction, contending judicial resolution 

was prohibited by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. This mandamus proceeding 

followed the trial court’s denial of the plea. 

DISCUSSION 

A. Mandamus standards related to pleas to the jurisdiction 

Entitlement to mandamus relief requires a demonstration that the trial court 

clearly abused its discretion, and the absence of an adequate remedy by appeal. In 

re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). 
 –11– 

Although an appeal generally provides an adequate remedy for denial of a 

jurisdictional plea, In re Godwin, 293 S.W.3d 742, 747 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 

2009, orig. proceeding), where First Amendment rights are at issue an appeal does 

not suffice. Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 682 (Tex. 1996); In re Episcopal 

Sch. of Dallas, Inc., 556 S.W.3d 347, 352 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, orig. 

proceeding); see also Republican Party of Tex. v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86, 94 (Tex. 

1997) (orig. proceeding) (“mandamus jurisdiction may be properly invoked when 

First Amendment rights are at issue”). 

B. Procedure governing jurisdictional challenges 

A de novo review controls review of a plea to the jurisdiction premised on 

subject matter jurisdiction. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 

217, 226 (Tex. 2004). If the plea challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we 

employ the same procedure that governs a traditional summary judgment, by which 

the movant presents evidence demonstrating the absence of jurisdiction, with the 

burden then shifting to the opposing party to demonstrate a disputed material fact 

regarding jurisdiction. Id. In such circumstance, we necessarily consider evidence 

beyond the pleadings. Id. (“[I]f a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of 

jurisdictional facts, we consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties when 

necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised, as the trial court is required to 

do.”); In re Episcopal Sch. of Dallas, Inc., 556 S.W.3d at 352 (“If a plea to the 

jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, the trial court may 
 –12– 

consider evidence beyond the pleadings and must do so when necessary to resolve 

the jurisdictional issues raised.”). 

Although we do not decide any merits issues or resolve any questions of fact, 

if undisputed evidence implicates the merits as well as our jurisdictional inquiry, we 

must consider it. Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife, 133 S.W.3d at 226 (“In this case, 

we address a plea to the jurisdiction in which undisputed evidence implicates both 

the subject matter jurisdiction of the court and the merits of the case.”); see also Doe 

v. Archdiocese of Galveston-Houston, No. 01-18-01056-CV, 2020 WL 3820886, at 

*6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 7, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (relying on 

school’s jurisdictional evidence to demonstrate absence of jurisdiction without 

accepting truth of same evidence regarding merits of dispute); Becker v. Clardy, No. 

03-10-00376-CV, 2011 WL 6756999, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 22, 2011, pet. 

denied) (mem. op.) (relying on undisputed evidence regarding school’s resolution of 

claim against plaintiff in deciding jurisdictional question). 

Jurisdiction must exist for each claim. Thomas v. Long, 207 S.W.3d 334, 338–

39 (Tex. 2006) (“[I]t is proper for a trial court to dismiss claims over which it does 

not have subject matter jurisdiction but retain claims in the same case over which it 

has jurisdiction.”). Where the same facts govern jurisdiction over different claims, 

however, we need not address each claim separately. Shannon v. Mem’l Drive 

Presbyterian Church U.S., 476 S.W.3d 612, 620 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 
 –13– 

2015, pet. denied); see also City of Dallas v. Jones, No. 05-07-00831-CV, 2008 WL 

588997, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 5, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op). 

C. The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine 

Ecclesiastical abstention arises from the Free Exercise Clause of the First 

Amendment,6 and prohibits government action that “burdens the free exercise of 

religion.” Jennison v. Prasifka, 391 S.W.3d 660, 664-65 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, 

no pet.). In deciding whether ecclesiastical abstention applies, we look to the 

substance and effect of a plaintiff’s complaint to determine its “ecclesiastical 

implication not its emblemata.” Shannon, 476 S.W.3d at 622; In re Vida, No. 04-

14-00636-CV, 2015 WL 82717, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 7, 2015, orig. 

proceeding) (mem. op.) (“[I]n deciding whether a court should refrain from 

exercising jurisdiction under the doctrine, courts must consider the substance and 

nature of the claim and the effect of a judicial resolution.” emphasis original)). 

“[W]hether a judicial resolution will encroach on the institution’s governance and 

affairs” frames the “key inquiry.” In re Episcopal Sch. of Dallas, Inc., 556 S.W.3d 

at 356. Even if secular principles define and provide the elements of the claims 

asserted, determining civil liability may nonetheless impermissibly infringe on a 

faith-based organization’s right to “construe and administer church doctrine.” 

 

6

 “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 

thereof....” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 –14– 

Becker, 2011 WL 6756999, at *3 (quoting Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. 

Shubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex. 2008)). 

If otherwise applicable, religious organizations, including schools whose 

operation or curriculum depend on faith-based principles, fall within the doctrine’s 

protection. In re Episcopal Sch. of Dallas, Inc., 556 S.W.3d at 357 (Although school 

was undisputedly not a church, “the record establishes that it is nonetheless a faithbased institution enjoying First Amendment protection for the free exercise of 

religion.” internal quote omitted)); In re St. Thomas High Sch., 495 S.W.3d 500, 508 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, orig. proceeding) (rejecting contention that 

Catholic school, which was neither a church, nor owned by a church, was exempt 

from ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, because record demonstrated school’s 

purpose involved “substantial religious activity and purpose”); Patterson v. Sw. 

Baptist Theological Seminary, 858 S.W.2d 602, 605–06 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

1993, no writ) (dismissing wrongful termination suit against Baptist seminary not 

owned or operated by church); see also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 

Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 182 (2012) (applying ecclesiastical 

abstention to religious school, and describing the doctrine’s reach as prohibiting 

interference with decisions of “religious groups”). 

D. Ecclesiastical abstention precludes jurisdiction over Parents’ claims 

Parents allege the doctrine has no application because (1) Prince of Peace is 

not a faith-based entity; and (2) Parents’ claims do not rely on Students’ or any 
 –15– 

“employee’s adherence to religious standards or morals, or the implementation of 

religious beliefs.” Parents fail to raise a genuine question of material fact regarding 

either argument. 

1. Prince of Peace is a faith-based entity 

Parents contend Prince of Peace’s legally separate existence from the 

Lutheran Church, as well as its secular focus on a quality education, diversity, and 

its adherence to secular laws and accreditations, distinguish it from other “religious 

entities.” We observe, however, no meaningful distinction between Prince of Peace 

and any other school or entity which we or our sister courts have determined 

qualified as “faith-based” entities entitled to ecclesiastical abstention. See In re 

Episcopal Sch. of Dallas, Inc., 556 S.W.3d at 355–56 (facts demonstrated “that the 

school endeavors to imbue its students and staff with Christian principles and values 

even if those persons do not already subscribe to them”); In re St. Thomas High Sch., 

495 S.W.3d at 509–10 (Biblically–based mission, students’ mandated participation 

in church-related services and activities, and faith-based curriculum demonstrated 

school was a religious institution). That Prince of Peace also subjects itself to secular 

accreditation and strives to achieve metrics unrelated to religion, in no way 

diminishes the extensive evidence demonstrating its reliance on Biblical principles, 

Biblical doctrine, and faith-based measures guiding its operation and the education 

it seeks to provide. Parents failed to raise a question of fact regarding Prince of 
 –16– 

Peace’s qualification as a faith-based entity entitled to invoke the protection of 

ecclesiastical abstention. 

2. Ecclesiastical abstention precludes interference with a religious 

entity’s management of its internal affairs 

Parents assert their claims rest on secular duties and do not require evaluation 

of any religious doctrine or belief for resolution. Parents contend the claims are 

governed by general laws regarding reporting child abuse and contractual 

enforcement regarding the school’s promises to employ “faculty who, at minimum, 

refrain from harming students in their care, and its obligation to appropriately 

supervise employees so that they do not harass students without violating the 

principles of the First Amendment.” Parents also endeavor to distinguish four cases 

in which Texas appellate courts have applied ecclesiastical abstention to claims 

asserted against religious schools,7 and one between teachers at such a school.8

Neither argument persuades us. 

a. Judicial resolution would require interference with Prince of 

Peace’s internal affairs 

Parents first argue that unlike Becker and Archdiocese of Galveston-Houston, 

their claims are not premised on “violations of internal policies,” and are instead 

 

7 Archdiocese of Galveston-Houston, 2020 WL 3820886, at *5; In re Episcopal Sch. of Dallas, Inc., 556 

S.W.3d at 357; In re St. Thomas High Sch., 495 S.W.3d at 509; In re Vida, 2015 WL 82717, at *3. 

8 Becker, 2011 WL 6756999, at *5. 
 –17– 

grounded solely on secular obligations. Even if the argument correctly characterized 

Parents’ claims,9

 however, we would reject it. 

Application of ecclesiastical abstention does not require that Parents’ claims 

expressly depend on any Biblical principle, interpretation of Prince of Peace’s 

policies, or include an overt request for interference with Prince of Peace’s internal 

affairs. Shannon, 476 S.W.3d at 622 (substance and effect of a plaintiff’s complaint, 

rather than specific claims or support, inform evaluation of abstention). Resulting 

interference in internal affairs as the effect of judicially resolving a claim, even those 

not clearly grounded in a religious doctrine, requires abstention. Westbrook v. 

Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 395 (Tex. 2007) (“Government action may burden the free 

exercise of religion in two quite different ways: by interfering with an individual’s 

observance or practice of a particular faith . . . and by encroaching on the church’s 

ability to manage its internal affairs.” internal quotation and citation omitted)); 

Archdiocese of Galveston-Houston, 2020 WL 3820886, at *5 (“The key inquiry is 

whether a judicial resolution will encroach on the institution’s governance and 

affairs.”); In re Vida, 2015 WL 82717, at *3 (application of doctrine turns on “effect 

of judicial resolution,” not just “nature of the claims” asserted); see also Our Lady 

of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2060 (2020) (“The 

independence of religious institutions in matters of ‘faith and doctrine’ is closely 

 

9

 Parents allege Prince of Peace’s handbook and related materials promise a “certain educational 

environment,” “faculty who are expected to serve as role models,” recognize that “harassment and bullying 

negatively impact [students’] well-being and safety,” and include “set rules about behavior and discipline.” 
 –18– 

linked to independence in what we have termed ‘matters of church government.’”) 

internal quotation omitted)). 

Moreover, Parents’ efforts to frame the dispute as reliant only on secular 

duties ignores Prince of Peace’s controverting but undisputed jurisdictional 

evidence. We cannot divorce Parents’ contentions of abuse, harassment, and failure 

to report abuse, from Prince of Peace’s supervision and discipline of Students, its 

investigation of Parents’ complaints, and its ultimate expulsion of Students and their 

families. Resolution of Parents’ claims will require a trial court or jury to determine 

whether Prince of Peace’s policies, investigation, management of student and staff 

conduct, and employment and enrollment decisions satisfied contractual and 

common law duties regarding Students’ education and psychological well-being. 

Ecclesiastical abstention prohibits that judicial interference. See Archdiocese of 

Galveston-Houston, 2020 WL 3820886, at *5 (dismissing claims premised on 

school’s discipline process following family’s complaints that teacher bullied, 

harassed and abused young child); In re Episcopal Sch. of Dallas, Inc., 556 S.W.3d 

at 357 (dismissing claims premised on school’s discipline of student who smoked 

marijuana, used another student’s urine for drug test, etc.); In re St. Thomas High 

Sch., 495 S.W.3d at 509 (dismissing claims premised on school’s expulsion of 

family where parents characterized grading dispute and teachers’ failure to return 

parent’s call as sexual harassment); In re Vida, 2015 WL 82717, at *3 (dismissing 

claims premised on school’s refusal to promote five year–old to first grade in 
 –19– 

violation of its policy); Becker, 2011 WL 6756999, at *5 (dismissing libel and 

slander claims asserted by one teacher against another, premised in part, on school’s 

investigation and decision not to impose any discipline on defendant teacher, despite 

plaintiff’s decision to not sue school and her contention that school’s discipline was 

not challenged). 

The facts at issue in St. Thomas High School are particularly close. In that 

case, after a student and his teacher were unable to resolve a dispute about a grade, 

the student’s parents complained to the school. The parents accused two faculty 

members of “intimidating and harassing the student in response to legitimate 

concerns regarding testing procedures” and alleged one teacher had engaged in 

sexual harassment by telling the student the teacher did not return the student’s afterschool call because the teacher was preparing for a romantic evening celebrating his 

wedding anniversary. 495 S.W.3d at 503. The parents also alleged the teachers’ 

behavior violated the school’s goals in spiritually educating their son and demanded 

the school investigate “willful abuses of power and harassment” of their child. Id. 

Upon concluding its investigation and determining the parents’ accusations 

were baseless, the school also determined the parents’ behavior violated the school’s 

handbook in which the school outlined insults, threats, and abuses of teachers by 

parents as grounds for a student’s expulsion. Id. at 504. The parents sued and sought 

an injunction compelling their child’s re-enrollment. In response to the school’s plea 

to the jurisdiction, the parents argued neutral legal principles would govern their 
 –20– 

breach of contract claim, that asserted St. Thomas failed to provide the education 

promised. Id. at 509. The court rejected the argument because application of

ecclesiastical abstention does not focus on the presence or absence of an express 

dispute concerning religious doctrine. Id. Instead, the court concluded “spiritual 

standards and religious doctrine” permeated the school’s decision to expel the 

students, as well as the quality and type of education parents sought for their 

children, and governmental action would encroach on the school’s ability to manage 

its internal affairs. Id. at 510, 513. The parallels between St. Thomas and this dispute 

are compelling. 

We also reject Parents’ efforts to limit St. Thomas’ holding through their 

argument that since their claims forgo any reliance on expulsion or re-enrollment, 

their claims do not implicate membership in a religious organization. The argument 

ignores undisputed jurisdictional facts that Students’ expulsion precipitated this 

lawsuit and implicitly elevates one type of interference to the only type of 

interference justifying abstention. In making this argument, Parents seek to 

distinguish Archdiocese of Galveston-Houston, 2020 WL 3820886, and Episcopal 

School of Dallas, 556 S.W.3d at 347, and similarly assert that based on the focus on 

“enrollment or retention,” their claims are unlike those in St. Thomas High School, 

495 S.W.3d at 500, and Vida, 2015 WL 82717, at *3. But the reasons for the school’s 

actions in each case—its internal discipline and management of its affairs—rather 

than the result of that discipline warranted application of the doctrine. Archdiocese 
 –21– 

of Galveston-Houston, 2020 WL 3820886, at *6; In re Episcopal Sch. of Dallas,

Inc., 556 S.W.3d at 359 (“[R]esolving those [parents’] claims would require a court 

to pass judgment on the school’s internal affairs and governance—matters 

exclusively within the province of an ecclesiastical institution.”); In re St. Thomas 

High Sch., 495 S.W.3d at 509–10 (“[P]laintiffs’ exclusive focus on the presence or 

absence of an express dispute concerning religious doctrine demonstrates an unduly 

narrow conception of the applicable protections.”); In re Vida, 2015 WL 82717, at 

*3 (“[E]ven if the School’s age requirement was not required by Texas law, 

imposing civil tort liability on the superintendent of Catholic schools for enforcing 

a policy that established an age requirement would impinge upon the Diocese’s 

ability to manage its internal affairs by adopting policies regarding admission 

requirements for Catholic schools.” emphasis original)). The absence of an 

additional interference that would result from efforts to compel re-enrollment in no 

way diminishes the interference from judicial evaluation of efforts to hire, supervise, 

and discipline teachers and students in a manner Parents deem compliant with the 

school’s promises regarding Students’ education. 

We identify no meaningful distinction between any of these “school cases” 

and the one before us now. We conclude that, as in each of these preceding cases, 

ecclesiastical abstention prohibits judicial intervention in the dispute at hand. 

 
 –22– 

b. Cases evaluating intentional torts, physical injuries, or 

claims which explicitly exclude the basis for abstention 

provide no support for Parents

By our decision today we do not diminish any person’s obligation to report 

suspected abuse or imply that abstention would ever interfere with enforcement of a 

law requiring such reports by those vested with the duty and authority to enforce it.

10 An obligation to report an injury to a child cannot depend on whether faith-based 

principles inform the suspicions of the person alerted to potential abuse, or whether 

a criminal complaint premised on Family Code section 261.101 would otherwise 

interfere with First Amendment rights. See Op. Tex. Att’y Gen. No. JM-342 (1985) 

(requiring clergyman to report evidence of child abuse or neglect disclosed 

confidentially by parishioner does not violate Free Exercise Clause, because “[t]he 

freedom to believe is absolute, but the freedom to act is conduct subject to regulation 

for the protection of society.”). 

But here, Parents are asserting a breach of contract claim premised on the 

frequency, intrusiveness, and proximity of school administrators’ supervision in or 

near a restroom, and a school’s investigation regarding complaints about that 

supervision. Regardless of how Parents characterize the conduct about which they 

 

10 Although our decision today does not assess the merits of Parents’ claims, we question the existence of 

any breach of contract claim premised on failure to report abuse as required by Family Code § 261.101, 

because we see no causation between any alleged injury and the failure to report the conduct about which 

Parents complain, and because the statute creates no private cause of action. Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 

301, 306 (Tex. 1998) (rejecting Family Code § 261.101 as creating a duty in tort); Doe v. Apostolic 

Assembly of Faith in Christ Jesus, No. EP-19-CV-240-KC, 2020 WL 1684227, at *14 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 

2020) (Perry court rejected Family Code § 261.101 as creating duty and standard, “in any context” other 

than as a potential crime). 
 –23– 

complain, we are not presented with intentional torts, physical injuries, or crimes. 

Neither do the undisputed facts present threats to public health, safety, or general 

welfare, which are intolerable even if otherwise protected as a religious belief. 

Pleasant Glade Assembly of God, 264 S.W.3d at 12; Tilton, 925 S.W.2d at 677 

(ecclesiastical abstention will not apply to actions which violate social duties or are 

“subversive of good order.”) (quoting TEX. CONST. art. I, § 6 interp. commentary 

(Vernon 1984)); see also Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 404 (“Neither was his revelation 

an intentional tort that endangered Penley’s or the public’s health or safety.”); 

Becker, 2011 WL 6756999, at *5 (“[I]n determining whether the Doctrine applies to 

tort claims, the courts distinguish intentional torts that endanger public health and 

safety and that cause physical harm from torts that only cause intangible or emotional 

harms.”). Accordingly, our decision here does not speak to instances in which those 

facts exist. Likewise, we decline Parents’ invitation to equate the allegations here 

with those in Doe I v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Galveston-Houston, No. CV H05-1047, 2006 WL 8446968, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2006),11 or cases in which 

 

11 Claims against the church rested upon allegations that the “Archdiocese Defendants negligently: (1) 

investigated, hired, supervised, reassigned, and retained clerics known to have abused minors; (2) failed to 

warn parishioners that a cleric assigned to their parishes could be a threat to their children; (3) ignored 

warnings from medical professionals retained by various Church officials and organizations, directly or 

indirectly, that certain clerics posed a danger to children; (4) lied to victims who asked for information 

about abusers; (5) failed to provide medical professionals evaluating abusers who were clerics with the 

necessary facts and, in some cases, lying to the medical professionals about the clerics’ background or 

concealing material facts; (6) ignored warnings from others within the church and bishop’s conference who 

warned that certain clerics posed a threat to children; (7) failed to report the crimes committed by certain 

clerics to law enforcement and obstructed or interfering with law enforcement investigations concerning 

abusive clerics; (8) failed to alert members of parishes where abusive clerics had previously served that 

their children were exposed to known or suspected child molesters; (9) made decisions that valued the 
 –24– 

facts similar to Doe I are at issue. We also observe that other courts have applied 

abstention in the face of the same or similar claims as those raised by Parents where 

neither intentional conduct nor physical harm was alleged. Archdiocese of 

Galveston-Houston, 2020 WL 3820886, at *3 (dismissing claim that family’s 

expulsion was “an effort to conceal abuse”); In re Pleasant Glade Assembly of God,

991 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1993, no writ) (applying ecclesiastical 

abstention to negligence per se claim premised on violation of Family Code chapter 

261). 

Finally, cases in which the conduct at issue rested on a relationship outside of 

the one between the religious entity and the plaintiff fail to defeat application of 

abstention here. For instance, in both Hawkins v. Trinity Baptist Church, 30 S.W.3d 

446, 451–52 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2000, no pet.), and Sanders v. Casa View Baptist 

Church, 134 F.3d 331, 337–38 (5th Cir. 1998), the complained of conduct occurred 

in the context of marital counseling, which thus gave rise to a relationship and duties 

outside of the protected relationship between the church and its members. 

 

interests of abusive clerics and the Church’s desire to avoid scandal over the interests of children who had 

been abused by clerics; (10) used Church influence to alter the outcome of the criminal legal process relating 

to clerics who engaged in illegal sexual acts; (11) fostered an environment and culture that allowed child 

abuse to flourish and made it clear that there was no accountability for criminal sexual acts against children; 

(12) negligently destroyed documents about clerics’ child sexual abuse or illegally withheld them from 

authorities, victims’ families, and the public; and (13) failed to warn Church members about facts such as 

the ‘Beal deposition,’ ‘i.e., that priests have been ‘hitting’ on penitents, including children, since the 

inception of the private confession-box in the sixteenth century.’” Roman Catholic Diocese of GalvestonHouston, 2006 WL 8446968, at *9. 
 –25– 

Moreover, in Hawkins, the church’s potential liability arose from violations 

of the Sexual Exploitation by Mental Health Services Provider Act12 through the 

church’s negligent hiring or supervision of the minister whose conduct was at issue. 

Hawkins, 30 S.W.3d at 453. That statute expressly defined the minister’s challenged 

conduct as not including activities protected by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. 

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 81.001(7) (“‘Mental health services,’ as defined by 

this section, provided by a member of the clergy does not include religious, moral, 

and spiritual counseling, teaching, and instruction.”). The inquiry excluded by the 

statute—whether inquiry into Prince of Peace’s internal practices or religious beliefs 

with respect to its hiring and supervision of its administrators—is the precise 

question at issue here. Thus, these authorities lend no support to Parents’ position. 

CONCLUSION 

Parents’ claims are premised on allegations that Prince of Peace failed to hire 

qualified staff and appropriately supervise its staff’s interactions with Students, 

including by failing to report suspected abuse of Students by its staff. Defense of 

these claims rests on Prince of Peace’s internal and religiously-informed policies and 

code of conduct. Judicial resolution of the claims would thus require impermissible 

intrusion in Prince of Peace’s management of these matters. 

 

12 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 81.001–81.009. 
 –26– 

Accordingly, we conditionally grant mandamus relief. The writ will issue 

only if respondent fails to grant Prince of Peace’s plea to the jurisdiction. 

200680F.P05 

/Robert D. Burns, III/ 

ROBERT D. BURNS, III 

CHIEF JUSTICE