Honorable Frank Coffey Cpinion No. M-207 

Criminal District Attorney 

Tarrant County Re: Whether a County CommisPort Worth, Texas sioners Court, having levied 

taxes for each fund at a 

separate rate, may consolidate 

its jury fund, permanent improvement fund and general 

fund while maintaining separate 

and apart its road and bridge 

Dear Mr. Coffey: fund. 

By recent letter, accompanied by brief, you have 

requested an opinion from this office regarding the above 

stated question. We quote from your letter as follows: 

"The County Connnissioners of Tarrant 

County have consolidated the general fund, 

the jury fund, and the building or permanent 

improvement fund into a single fund pursuant 

to Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution 

as amended, but have failed to include the 

road and building fund in that consolidation. 

From this action has arisen the question of 

the constitutionality of combining less than 

all funds into a single fund as construed as 

mandatory by Article VIII, Section 9." 

\ Section 9 of Article VIII, Texas Constitution, as 

amended by the people of Texas on November 11, 1967, is quoted 

in part as follows: 

” 

. . . and no county, city or town shall 

levy a tax rate in excess of Eighty Cents (8Oc) 

on the One Hundred Dollars ($100) valuation in 

any one (1) year for general fund, permanent 

improvement fund, road and bridge fund and jury 

- 992 - 
. - 

Hon. Frank Coffey, page 2 (~-207) 

fund purposes: provided further that at the time 

the Convnissioners Court meets to levy the annual 

tax rate for each county it shall levy whatever 

tax rate may be needed for the four (4) constitutional purposes: namely, general fund, permanent 

improvement fund, road and bridge fund and Jury 

fund so long as the Court does not impair any (; 

outstanding bonds or other obligations and so 

long as the total of the foregoing tax levies 

does not exceed Eighty Cents (8OC) on the Gne 

Hundred Dollars ($100) valuation in any one (1) 

year. Gnee the Court has levied the annual tax 

rate, the same shall remain in force and effect 

'during that taxable year; . . . Any county may 

put all tax money collected by the county into 

one general fund, without regard to the purpose 

or source of each tax. . . ,* 

~Section 9 of Article VIII, Texas Constitution, was 

previously amended in 1956, at which time substantial changes 

were made by the people of Texas. Among other things, the 

1956 amendment remwed the specific tax limitation on the fundr 

in question here. The 1967 amendment to Section 9 made only 

one change by adding the following quoted language: "Any 

county may put all tax money collected by the county into one -'~- .' 

general fund, without regard to the purpose or source of each 

tax." 

The leading case on Section 9 of Article.VIII of 

the Texas Constitution, is Carroll v. Williams, 109 Tex. 155, 

202 S.W. 504 (1918),in which the Court held that the specific 

tax limitations in Section 9 on the various funds controlled 

not only the raising but also the application of all such funds 

and so prevents the expenditure of money raised for one purpose 

being used for another purpose. The Court stated at page 506: 

"Going to the real gist of the main issue 

before us, section 9 of article 8 of our state 

Constitution, supra, inhibits any and all 

transfers of tax money from one to another of 

the several classes of funds therein authorized, 

and, as a sequence, the expenditure, for one 

- 993 - 
- . 

Hon. Frank Coffey, page 3 (~-207) 

purpose therein defined, of tax money raised 

ostensibly for another such purpose. The immediate DurDose in so Drescribins a sewrate 

maximum tax rate for each of the classes of 

purDoses there enumerated is. no doubt. to 

limit accordinqlv, the amount of taxes which 

may be raised from the woDle bv taxation; 

decidedly for those several purposes or classes 

of purposes, respectively. But that is not all, 

The ultimate and oractical and obvious desian 

and DurDose and lesal effect is to inhibit 

excessive exDenditures for anv such DurDose or 

class of DurDoses. Bv necessarv imDlication 

said Drovisions of section 9 of article 8 were 

desisned. not merelv to limit the tax rate for 

certain therein desiqnated Durooses. but to 

require that anv and all monev raised bv 

taxation for anv such DurDose shall be aDDlied. 

faithfully to that particular DurDose, as needed 

therefor. and not to anv other DurDose or use 

whatsoever. Those constitutional provisions 

control, not only the raising, but also the 

application of all such funds: and such is 

the legal effect of articles 2242 and 7357, 

supra, when properly construed and applied. 

"True, the Constitution does not say, 

in so many words, that money raised by a county, 

city, or town, by taxation for one such purpose shall never be expended for any other 

purpose-- not even for another of the five 

general classes of purposes defined and approved in said section g--but that, we think, 

is its plain and certain meaning and legal 

effect. The very definitions of those several 

classes of purposes, and the declaration of 

authority to tax the people therefor, respectively, coupled as they are, in each instance, with 

a limitation of the tax rate for that class, must 

have been predicated upon the expectation and intent that, as a matter of common honesty and fair 

dealing, tax money taken from the people ostensibly 

-994- 
, 

Hon. Frank Coffey, page 4 (M-207) 

for one such specified purpose shall be expended, as 

needed, for that purpose alone, as well as that the 

tax rate for that particular class, in any one year. 

shall not exceed the prescribed maximbm. 

*Conversely, and upon a like course of reasoning, it must have been intended that expenditures for any such designated purpose shall never 

include tax money in excess of the proceeds of the 

maximum tax rate prescribed by the Constitution 

for that purpose. 

*Unless our above-stated conclusions are sound, 

7 ter w n 

tional limitations upon the said five separate 

designated tax rates specific: the limitatic )n upon 

the taxing power might as well have been couched 

ional provisions were designed to limit the 

application or expenditure of each such tax fund 

for the specific purpose or purposes for which, 

declaredly, it is raised, as well as to limit 

the tax rate therefor, the same result in the 

way of protecting the people against exorbitant 

taxes could have been attained more simply and 

more conveniently by making, in~said section 9 

of article 8, one general limitation upon the 

taxing power with reference to all five such 

classes of purposes, collectively, thereby 

leaving the governing body free to apply any 

and all such funds according to its own judgment, provided only that no portion thereof 

shall be applied to any extraneous purpose, 

not included by the terms of that section." 

(Emphasis added.) 

The Court, in construing Section 9 of Article VIII 

of the Texas Constitution, emphasizes the specific taxing limi, 

tion on the funds in question and construes such limitation as 

-995- 

, 
, 

Hon. Frank Coffey, page 5 (R-207) 

‘i 

having a double purpose. First the specific limitations limit 

the amount of tax to be raised for each fund, and secondly such 

limitations require that money raised for such a fund be applied 

for that use and no other. 

The 1956 and the 1967 amendments to Section 9 remove the specific taxing limitations upon the various funds, but 

retain the overall taxing limitation (8Oc on $100 valuation) upon 

the four funds; that is, the general fund, permanent improvement 

fund, road and bridge fund, and jury fund. The Court discusses 

this possibility (see quoted language underlined above, page 4) 

by concluding that an overall taxing limitation or an aggregate 

maximum tax rate applicable to all the funds would permit the 

governing bodie.s (counties, etc.) to apply the funds according 

to its own judgment as long as it used such funds for the specified purposes. 

Clearly, the 1956 amendment and the 1967 amendment 

to Section 9 have now placed one general limitation upon the 

taxing power with reference to the funds in question. The 1967 

amendment to Section 9 bestowing power upon any county to put 

all its tax money into one fund does not require that this be 

done, but instead confers the power subject to the good judgment 

of the Commissioners Court, so long as it does not impair outstanding bonds or obligations. Limited exercise of conferred 

power, as under the facts here, is well recognized by our 

Courts. cf. State v. Citv of Austin, 160 Tex. 348, 331 S.W.2d 

737, 743 (1960). 

The language authorizing any county to put all its 

,tax money from the four funds above mentioned into one general 

fund is discretionary since the word "may" conditions the authority. "The word 'may' ordinarily connotes discretion or 

permission." Ross v. Tide Water Oil Co., 136 Tex. 66, 145 S.W.Zd 

1089 (1941); Mitchell v. Hancock, 196 S.W. 694 (Tex.Civ.App. 1917, 

no writ): City of River Oaks v. Lake Worth Villaqe, 231 S.W.Zd 

768 (Tex.Civ.App. 1950, error ref. n.r.e.). Such language being 

discretionary, it seems clear that a county may use one general 

fund for its taxes, subject to its outstanding debts, or a county 

may use the four funds in question according to its own judgment, 

as discussed in Carroll v. Williams, supra. Therefore, it is 

our opinion that your County Commissioners may consolidate the 

general revenue fund, jury fund, and permanent improvement fund 

-996- 
. 

Hon. Frank Coffey, page 6 w-207) 

into one general fund and keep the road and bridge fund separate 

therefrom, without violating the provisions of Section 9 of 

Article VIII of the Texas Constitution. 

SUMMARY 

Section 9 of Article VIII of Vernon's Texas 

Constitution, as amended, will permit a county 

commissioners court, having levied taxes for 

each of the four funds in question at a separate 

rate, to consolidate its general fund, permanent 

improvement fund and jury fund into one general 

fund, while maintaining separate and apart its 

road and bridge fund. 

s very truly, 

z-wC. MARTIN 

General of Texas 

Prepared by James Clayton McCoy 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

Hawthorne Phillips, Chairman 

Kerns Taylor, Co-Chairman 

W. V. Geppert 

W. 0. Shultz 

Bill Allen 

Harold Kennedy 

A. J. CARUBBI, JR. 

Executive Assistant 

-997-