alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
The District Court of the 4th Judicial District. County of Missoula.

#### STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff, vs. THOR WESTERLAND, Defendant.

CAUSE NO. DC-2005-34 DECISION

On May 17, 2010, the defendant was sentenced for violation of the conditions of a suspended sentence, to a commitment to the Department of Corrections for a term of five (5) years, for the offense of Count I: Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a Fourth or Subsequent Offense, a Felony.

On November 4, 2010, the defendant’s application for review of that sentence was heard by the Sentence Review Division of the Montana Supreme Court.

The defendant was present and was represented by Jori Frakie. The state *105was not represented.

Before hearing the application, the defendant was advised that the Sentence Review Division has the authority not only to reduce the sentence or affirm it, but also increase it. The defendant was further advised that there is no appeal from a decision of the Sentence Review Division. The defendant acknowledged that he understood this and stated that he wished to proceed.

Rule 17 of the Rules of the Sentence Review Division of the Supreme Court of Montana provides that “the sentence imposed by the District Court is presumed correct, and the sentence will not be reduced or increased unless it is deemed clearly inadequate or excessive.” (§46-18-904(3), MCA).

The Division finds that the reasons advanced for modification are insufficient to hold that the sentence imposed by the District Court is inadequate or excessive.

Therefore, it is the unanimous decision of the Sentence Review Division that the sentence shall be affirmed.

Done in open Court this 4 th day of November, 2010.

DATED this 18th day of November, 2010.

Chairperson, Hon. Blair Jones, Member, Hon. Richard Simonton and Member, Hon. Ray Dayton.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Edwin Santiago, Appellant.

Submitted October 18, 2010;

decided October 21, 2010

*874Motion for assignment of counsel granted and Steven Banks, Esq., the Legal Aid Society, 199 Water Street, New York, NY 10038 assigned as counsel to the appellant on the appeal herein.
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###### National Credit Union Administration

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mary Rupp, Secretary of the Board, Telephone: 703-518-6304.

Mary Rupp,

Board Secretary.

[FR Doc. E9-11643 Filed 5-14-09; 4:15 pm]

BILLING CODE 7535-01-P
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Salvador Diaz, Appellant.

Decided June 25, 2009

Appeal dismissed, without costs, by the Court of Appeals, sua sponte, upon the ground that no substantial constitutional question is directly involved.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jason Vogt, Appellant.

[974 NYS2d 657]

*1026Rose, J.P.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Ulster County (McGinty, J.), rendered February 7, 2012, which resentenced defendant following his conviction of the crimes of sodomy in the first degree (three counts) and sexual abuse in the first degree (three counts).

In October 2000, defendant pleaded guilty to sodomy in the first degree (three counts), sexual abuse in the first degree (three counts), promoting a sexual performance by a child (five counts) and possessing a sexual performance by a child (six counts), and, as relevant here, he was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of *22Lk*years for the sodomy convictions and two years for the sexual abuse convictions. While he was serving his prison term, he was identified as a “designated person” within the meaning of Correction Law § 601-d (1) because his sentences for the sodomy and sexual abuse convictions did not include a mandatory period of postrelease supervision. In February 2012, with the People’s consent, County Court resentenced defendant on the sodomy and sexual abuse convictions pursuant to Penal Law § 70.85 to the originally imposed sentences with no period of postrelease supervision. Defendant appeals.

We affirm. Contrary to defendant’s contention, County Court did not err in resentencing him to the originally imposed sentences. In situations such as this, where defendant was sentenced to a determinate sentence but the mandatory term of postrelease supervision was not imposed and the case is again before the sentencing court pursuant to Correction Law § 601-d, the court may, upon the consent of the People, “re-impose the originally imposed determinate sentence of imprisonment without any term of postrelease supervision, which then shall be deemed a lawful sentence” (Penal Law § 70.85; *see People v Acevedo,*17 NY3d 297, 300 n [2011]). As to defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence on the sodomy convictions, inasmuch as the resentence was limited to correcting the failure to impose a mandatory term of postrelease supervision, County Court could not revisit the propriety of his original sentence upon resentencing and we have no authority to reduce the sentence in the interest of justice on this appeal *(see People v Lingle,*16 NY3d 621, 635 [2011]; *People v Howard,*96 AD3d 1701, 1702 [2012], *lv denied*19 NY3d 1103 [2012]; *People v Myrick,*84 AD3d 1272, 1272 [2011], *lv denied*17 NY3d 820 [2011]).

Stein, McCarthy and Gariy, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 18

- 1259

_____________________________
R AYNARD W ILDER , Appellant,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County

. Tatiana Salvador , Judge

. September 13, 2019

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

. R OBERTS , J AY , and M.K. T HOMAS , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________ Raynard Wilder, pro se
, Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee
, for Appellee.
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. Willie Williams, Appellant, v Robert A. Kirkpatrick, Superintendent, Wende Correctional Facility, et al., Respondents.

[974 NYS2d 739]

Appeal from a judgment (denominated memorandum and order) of the Supreme Court, Erie County (John L. Michalski, A.J.), dated June 12, 2012 in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78. The judgment denied the petition.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Petitioner commenced this habeas corpus proceeding alleging that he is entitled to immediate release from prison pursuant to Executive Law former § 259-j (3-a), which has since been replaced by Correction Law § 205 (4). According to petitioner, his sentence of 20 years to life should be terminated because, from 1994 to 1997, he had “three years of unrevoked presumptive release or parole” (§ 205 [4]). We reject that contention. As a threshold matter, we note that section 205 (4) applies only to prisoners serving sentences for qualifying drug felonies, and defendant is serving a sentence for attempted murder in the second degree. In any event, petitioner is not entitled to relief under the statute because he violated parole several times after his three years of unrevoked release and before the effective date of Executive Law § 259-j (3-a) (see *Matter of Rosario v New York State Div. of Parole,*84 AD3d 1665, 1666 [2011]; *People ex rel. Murphy v Ewald,*77 AD3d 778, 779 [2010], *Iv denied*16 NY3d 701 [2011]).

To the extent that the petition further alleged that petitioner was deprived of a final revocation hearing when his parole was revoked in 2009 upon his conviction of a new drug felony, we conclude that Supreme Court properly converted the habeas corpus petition to a CPLR article 78 petition and then denied the petition. “Upon petitioner’s conviction of a felony committed while under parole supervision, petitioner’s parole was *1328revoked by operation of law” *(People ex rel. Stevenson v Beaver,*309 AD2d 1171, 1172 [2003], *lv denied*1 NY3d 506 [2004]). Thus, contrary to petitioner’s contention, a parole revocation hearing was not required *(see*Executive Law § 259-i [3] [d] [iii]; *People ex rel. Harris v Sullivan, 74*NY2d 305, 308 [1989]; *People ex rel. Ward v Russi,*219 AD2d 862, 862 [1995], *lv denied*87 NY2d 803 [1995]). Present — Fahey, J.P, Peradotto, Lindley, Sconiers and Whalen, JJ.
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#### In the Matter of the Claim of Enni Yarleque, Appellant, v Sally Lou, Inc., et al., Respondents. Workers’ Compensation Board, Respondent.

Submitted June 7, 2010;

decided July 1, 2010

*771Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution.
Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




     In connection with the Annual Report of Berkeley Technology Limited on Form
10-K for the year ended December 31, 2005 as filed with the U.S.  Securities and
Exchange  Commission  (the "Report"),  I, Ian K.  Whitehead,  as Chief Financial
Officer of the registrant,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted
by ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

     (1)  The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations
          of the registrant.



Date:  March 30, 2006                            By:    /s/  Ian K. Whitehead

                                                        Ian K. Whitehead
                                                        Chief Financial Officer
#### Charlotte Kregg, as Guardian of Christopher M. Williams, Appellant, v Eileen Maldonado et al., Defendants, and American Suzuki Motor Corporation et al., Respondents.

[974 NYS2d 818]

— Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (John L. Michalski, A.J.), entered January 25, 2012. The order denied the cross motion of plaintiff to compel defendants American Suzuki Motor Corporation and Suzuki Motor Corporation of Japan to further respond to her notice to produce.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: The parties appear before us for a second time on a dispute over discovery *(see Kregg v Maldonado,*98 AD3d 1289 [2012]) in this action seeking damages for injuries sustained by Christopher M. Williams when he was driving a Suzuki motorcycle. Supreme Court properly denied plaintiffs cross motion to compel defendants American Suzuki Motor Corporation and Suzuki Motor Corporation of Japan to further respond to plaintiffs notice to produce. Plaintiffs “bare allegations of relevancy” with respect to the information sought are insufficient to entitle plaintiff to that relief *(Crazytown*
      *1292
      *Furniture v Brooklyn Union Gas Co.,*150 AD2d 420, 421 [1989]; *see Dempski v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,*249 AD2d 895, 896 [1998]). Present — Scudder, EJ., Centra, Garni, Lindley and Sconiers, JJ.
EXHIBIT 32.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of Q Lotus Holdings, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the period ended March 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Marckensie Theresias, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (15 U.S.C 78m or 78o(d)); and





(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





The foregoing statement is furnished pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 (as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) and for no other reason.





/s/ Marckensie TheresiasMarckensie TheresiasChief Financial OfficerJuly 14, 2011
#### Richards v. N.C. Tax Review Bd.

Case below: 183 N.C. App. — (5 June 2007)

No. 329P07

Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 (COA06-1364)

Denied 10/11/07
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE DECEMBER
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THE TWELVE-MONTH PERIOD THEN ENDED AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE
TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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<CASH>                                       2,717,027
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<RECEIVABLES>                              132,581,558
<ALLOWANCES>                                 2,732,000
<INVENTORY>                                 24,346,962
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<CGS>                                      279,984,344
<TOTAL-COSTS>                              279,984,344
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                           108,787,395
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           1,878,147
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<INCOME-TAX>                                 9,259,004
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</TABLE>
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 95 (Tuesday, May 19, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 23426]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-11480]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Institute on Deafness and Other Communication Disorders; 
Notice of Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended (5 U.S.C. App.), notice is hereby given of the following 
meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The contract proposals and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the contract proposals, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Institute on Deafness and Other 
Communication Disorders. Special Emphasis Panel. RFP Auditory Nerve.
    Date: June 4, 2009.
    Time: 11 a.m. to 12:30 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate contract proposals.
    Place: National Institutes of Health, 6120 Executive Blvd., 
Rockville, MD 20852. (Telephone Conference Call).
    Contact Person: Sheo Singh, PhD, Scientific Review Officer, 
Scientific Review Branch, Division of Extramural Activities, 
Executive Plaza South, Room 400C, 6120 Executive Blvd., Bethesda, MD 
20892. 301-496-8683. <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#72011b1c151a01321c1b1611165c1c1b1a5c151d04"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="74071d1a131c07341a1d1017105a1a1d1c5a131b02">[email protected]</span></a>.
    This notice is being published less than 15 days prior to the 
meeting due to the timing limitations imposed by the review and 
funding cycle.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.173, 
Biological Research Related to Deafness and Communicative Disorders, 
National Institutes of Health, HHS)

    Dated: May 11, 2009.
Jennifer Spaeth,
Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. E9-11480 Filed 5-18-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-M


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EXHIBIT 13.1



Certification of Chief Executive Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of International Barrier Technology Inc., a company organized under the British Columbia Company Act (the Company) on Form 20-F as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, Michael Huddy, President/CEO/Director of the Company, certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. (S) 1350, as adopted pursuant to (S) 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or

15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all

material respects, the financial condition and result of operations

of the Company.



/s/ Michael Huddy

Michael Huddy, President/CEO/Director





Date: March 17, 2005
#### Emilio SALAS-MORALES; et al., Petitioners, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 05-72917.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 4, 2006.*

Filed Dec. 8, 2006.

*696Martha L. Cordoba, Attorney at Law, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioners.

Edward A. Olsen, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: GOODWIN, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Lead petitioner, Emilio Salas-Morales, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence, *Nagoulko v. INS,*333 F.3d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir.2003), and we deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Salas-Morales’ treatment by members of section six of the Mexican presidential high command, including a kick to the knee during a soccer game and the pouring of hot water over his lap, does not rise to the level of past persecution. Persecution is “an extreme concept that does not include every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.” *See id.*at 1016.

Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s conclusion that Salas-Morales’ fear of future persecution on account of his former service in section seven of the Mexican presidential high command is not objectively reasonable because SalasMorales did not carry his burden of adducing “credible, direct, and specific evidence in the record, of facts that would support a reasonable fear of persecution.” *See Arriaga-Barrientos v. INS,*937 F.2d 411, 413 (9th Cir.1991); *see also Nagoulko,*333 F.3d at 1018 (possibility of future persecution in Ukraine too speculative). It cannot be said that the “evidence [Salas-Morales] presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” *See INS v. Elias-Zacarias,*502 U.S. 478, 483-84, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

**This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.