alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 39430

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

KILLEAN DOUGLAS TAYLOR,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 614

Filed: August 29, 2012

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 

OPINION AND SHALL NOT 

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Bingham County. Hon. Darren B. Simpson, District Judge. 

Order denying Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for reduction of 

sentence, affirmed.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Sarah E. Tompkins, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before GRATTON, Chief Judge; GUTIERREZ, Judge;

and MELANSON, Judge

PER CURIAM

Killean Douglas Taylor pled guilty to burglary. Idaho Code §§ 18-1401, 18-1403. The 

district court sentenced Taylor to a unified term of five years, with two years determinate, and 

retained jurisdiction. However, prior to the expiration of the period of retained jurisdiction the 

district court relinquished jurisdiction and executed Taylor’s original sentence. Taylor thereafter

filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion, which the district court denied. Taylor now appeals, 

contending the district court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35 motion.

A motion for reduction of sentence under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 is essentially a plea for 

leniency, addressed to the sound discretion of the court. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319, 

144 P.3d 23, 24 (2006); State v. Allbee, 115 Idaho 845, 846, 771 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct. App. 1989). In 
2

presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of 

new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the 

motion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). Upon review of the 

record, including the new information submitted with Taylor’s Rule 35 motion, we conclude no 

abuse of discretion has been shown. Therefore, the district court’s order denying Taylor’s 

Rule 35 motion is affirmed.
#### GALE et al. v. NATIONAL TRANSP. CO., Inc., et al.

District Court, S. D. New York.

Jan. 22, 1946.

Oliver J. Harper, of New York City, for plaintiffs.

James A. Doherty, of New York City, for defendants.

HULBERT, District Judge.

Defendants move, on affidavit and notice of motion, for an order for a physical examination of the plaintiff Catherine M. Gale, by Dr. B. Maurice Shure, a duly qualified physician, and for a further order directing the plaintiff Catherine M. Gale t0 submit t0 an oral examination by deposi^on on tbe f°^owing matters: The plaintiff’s Ph7sical condition immediately prior t0 and after the accident alleged in the complaint, _ including her care, treatment and activities to date; the manner in which the said injuries were sustained by her”; and further, that the plaintiff Catherine M. Gale, as part of the physical examination, submit to the taking of X-ray photographs of plaintiff’s torso, including the gastro-intestinal tract as well as her chest, and further that such order provide for an *238oral examination of the plaintiffs, as adverse ■ witnesses and parties.

The action is to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by reason of the negligence of the defendant’s chauffeur.

It would have been better practice if the defendant had served a notice of the taking of the deposition of plaintiffs in accordance with Rule 26 et seq., Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, and, in connection therewith, to have moved for a physical examination and the taking of X-ray photographs in accordance with Rule 35.

The plaintiff objects that she is a resident of Massachusetts and should not be required to come to New York to be examined, but she does not submit any facts to establish that she cannot do so. She also demands that the examination be made by a female physician, although it appears that the physician who has been treating her in connection with the injuries alleged in the complaint to have been sustained is a male. She also objects to the doctor designated by the defendant and urges the Court to appoint a disinterested person. No facts are shown which would prompt the Court to modify the request of the defendant in those respects.

Plaintiffs also object that the Notary Public before whom the examination proposed to be taken is associated with defendants’ attorney. That objection will be sustained.

Plaintiffs will be directed to appear on a day and at an hour designated in the order to be entered, at room 506 United States Court House, New York, N. Y., and may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action as provided in Rule 26, and provision may be inserted, at the election of the plaintiff Catherine M. Gale, in substantial compliance with Rule 35(b) (1) but subject to the conditions of subdivision (b) (2).

The taking of X-rays will not be directed at this time. The result of the examination may show they will not be needed, but if they are, arrangements can be made therefor on a further showing.' Settle order on notice.
654 S.E.2d 835

#### In the Matter of William Glenn ROGERS, Jr., Respondent.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Dec. 12, 2007.

ORDER

Respondent was suspended on December 10, 2007, for a period of sixty (60) days, retroactive to August 17, 2007. He has now filed an affidavit requesting reinstatement pursuant to Rule 32, of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement contained in Rule 413, SCACR.

The request is granted and he is hereby reinstated to the practice of law in this state.

JEAN H. TOAL, CHIEF JUSTICE.

s/ Daniel E. Shearouse

Clerk
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED March 17, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-41282 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus JAVIER VILLELA-ESPINOSA, Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

(5:04-CR-693-ALL) Before BARKSDALE, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Javier Villela-Espinosa appeals his conviction and sentence for illegal reentry following deportation. Villela claims the district court committed reversible error under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), by sentencing him pursuant to a mandatory application of the Sentencing Guidelines (Fanfan error). The Government concedes that Villela has preserved this issue for2

appeal. Such error is not structural. U nited States v. MartinezLugo , 411 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 2005). On the other hand, the Government has not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. See United States v. Walters , 418 F.3d 461, 463-64 (5th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, Villela ’s sentence is vacated, and this case is remanded for resentencing. Villela also asserts the “felony” and “aggravated felony” provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) and (b)(2) are unconstitutional in the light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Villela’s constitutional challenge is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998). Although Villela contends that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule it in the light of Apprendi , we have repeatedly rejected such assertions on the basis that Almendarez-Torres remains binding. See United States v. Garza-Lopez , 410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 298 (2005). Villela concedes his assertion is foreclosed in the light of Almendarez-Torres and circuit precedent; he raises it to preserve it for further review. CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING
#### Edward A. Diorio, Jr., Appellant, v City of New York et al., Appellants, and Harry M. Stevens, Inc., Respondent.

[609 NYS2d 304]

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants City of New York and Doubleday Sports, Inc., appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Price, J.), dated March 4, 1992, as, granted the plaintiffs motion to renew their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as it is asserted against them, vacated a decision of Justice Nahman dated November 11, 1991, granting that motion for summary judgment, and thereupon reinstated the plaintiffs cause of action against them, and the plaintiff separately appeals, as limited by his brief, from a judgment of the same court, entered August 10, 1992, which, *inter alia,*dismissed his complaint insofar as it is asserted against the defendant Harry M. Stevens, Inc.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from and the plaintiffs’ renewed motion is denied; and it is further,

Ordered that the judgment entered August 10, 1992, is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,

*626Ordered that the appellants are awarded one bill of costs, payable by the plaintiff.

We find that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in treating the plaintiff’s motion, denominated as one for reargument, as one for renewal of the motion of the defendants City of New York and Doubleday Sports, Inc., for summary judgment, and upon renewal, denying summary judgment to those defendants. The record indicates that the plaintiff was aware of the facts upon which the motion to renew was based at the time of the original motion for summary judgment and he offered no excuse as to why these facts were not supplied in the papers submitted in opposition to the original motion *(see, Caffee v Arnold,*104 AD2d 352). Accordingly, the motion was in the nature of reargument *(see, Huttner v McDaid,*151 AD2d 547; *Mackey v Mackey,*151 AD2d 554). Even if we were to conclude that the court properly exercised its discretion in effectively granting reargument, we would find that the original determination on the prior motion should have been adhered to because the plaintiff failed to allege that the Supreme Court overlooked or misapprehended facts, or misapplied any controlling principle of law *(see, Pro Brokerage v Home Ins. Co.,*99 AD2d 971).

The Supreme Court properly granted summary judgment to defendant Harry M. Stevens, Inc. It presented prima facie evidence of its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law and the plaintiff failed to present any evidence in admissible form to establish the existence of material issues of fact. Specifically, the plaintiff failed to present any evidence that the defendant Harry M. Stevens, Inc., had any duty to clean the exit ramps at Shea Stadium. Sullivan, J. P., Miller, Joy and Friedmann, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1


                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

The Board of Directors
Dynacq International, Inc.:

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statement on Form S-8, file number 333-72756, of our opinion dated November 26,
2001, relating to the financial statements of Dynacq International, Inc.
appearing in the Form 10-KSB for the year ended August 31, 2001.  We also
consent to the reference to our firm under the caption "Experts" in the
Registration Statement.


KenWood & Associates, P.C.

Houston, Texas
November 26, 2001
EXHIBIT 32.0

SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION OF THE

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF
FINANCIAL OFFICER

Each of Lawrence J. LeBon, III, Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer and John
LeBlanc, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Louisiana Bancorp, Inc. (the Company), hereby certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:



| | (1) | The Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2010 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C 78m(a) or 78o(d); and
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                     |  |     |  |                                                             
|-------------------- |  | --- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: March 29, 2011 |  | By: |  | /S/    LAWRENCE J. LEBON,
III                               
|                     |  |     |  | Lawrence J. LeBon, III                                      
|                     |  |     |  | Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer
|                     |  |    
|Date: March 29, 2011 |  | By: |  | /S/    JOHN
LEBLANC                                         
|                     |  |     |  | John LeBlanc                                                
|                     |  |     |  | Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer           



|Note: | A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been provided to Louisiana Bancorp, Inc. and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
|----- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 817 

To amend the Trade Act of 1974 to create a Special Trade Prosecutor 

to ensure compliance with trade agreements, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

APRIL 15, 2005 

Ms. STABENOW (for herself, Mr. GRAHAM, and Mr. BAYH) introduced the 

following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To amend the Trade Act of 1974 to create a Special Trade 

Prosecutor to ensure compliance with trade agreements, 

and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. CREATION OF SPECIAL TRADE PROSECUTOR. 

4 (a) ESTABLISHMENT OF POSITION.—Section 

5 141(b)(2) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 

6 2171(b)(2)) is amended to read as follows: 

7 ‘‘(2) There shall be in the Office 3 Deputy 

8 United States Trade Representatives, 1 Chief Agri9 cultural Negotiator, and 1 Special Trade Prosecutor. 

10 The 3 Deputy United States Trade Representatives, 
2 

•S 817 IS

1 the Chief Agricultural Negotiator, and the Special 

2 Trade Prosecutor shall be appointed by the Presi3 dent, by and with the advice and consent of the Sen4 ate. As an exercise of the rulemaking power of the 

5 Senate, any nomination of a Deputy United States 

6 Trade Representative, the Chief Agricultural Nego7 tiator, or the Special Trade Prosecutor submitted to 

8 the Senate for its advice and consent, and referred 

9 to a committee, shall be referred to the Committee 

10 on Finance. Each Deputy United States Trade Rep11 resentative, the Chief Agricultural Negotiator, and 

12 the Special Trade Prosecutor shall hold office at the 

13 pleasure of the President and shall have the rank of 

14 Ambassador.’’. 

15 (b) FUNCTIONS OF POSITION.—Section 141(c) of the 

16 Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2171(c)) is amended by 

17 adding at the end the following new paragraph: 

18 ‘‘(6) The principal function of the Special 

19 Trade Prosecutor shall be to ensure compliance with 

20 trade agreements relating to United States manufac21 tured goods and services. The Special Trade Pros22 ecutor shall have the authority to investigate and 

23 recommend prosecuting cases before the World 

24 Trade Organization and under trade agreements to 

25 which the United States is a party. The Special 
3 

•S 817 IS

1 Trade Prosecutor shall recommend administering 

2 United States trade laws relating to foreign govern3 ment barriers to United States goods and services. 

4 The Special Trade Prosecutor shall perform such 

5 other functions as the United States Trade Rep6 resentative may direct.’’. 

Æ
#### American Mortgage Co. of Scotland (Limited) *v.*Downing. (Two Cases.)

*(Circuit Court, D. Nebraska.*

1883.)

Note of decision holding agreement to pay attorney’s fees in mortgage foreclosure valid.

These cases came up for hearing before Justice Miller, of the supreme court of the United States, on motions to strike from the decrees the amounts allowed by the courts as attorney’s fees.

*O. J 'Phelps,*on behalf of Downing.

*Judge Hull*and *James M. Woolworth,*on behalf of the mortgage company.

Mr. Justice Miller,

in rendering the decision, remarked that, upon full review of the authorities, he was satisfied that the repeal of the Nebraska statute left the question as though no statute had ever been passed, and that, upon principle and authority, it was clear that parties were fully competent to make their own contracts, and there was nothing in the policy of the law which forbade them to agree to pay costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees, which they might cause the loaner of money, by reason of their own default.

In no case cited was a satisfactory reason given why'a provision in a mortgage to pay attorney fees should render the note non-negotiable, and it was absurd to say that it would render it usurious. Interest was allowed for the loan or forbearance of money, and it is quite evident when suit is begun to enforce the collection then forbearance ceases. Tlie attorney fee is provided, not for use of money for a day, week, month, or year, or any other time, but is an incident to reimburse the owner in recovering his loan.

In the course of his opinion, Judge Miller remarked that his sympathies were with the borrowing class, but he believed that a contract fairly and understandingly entered into should be enforced, and that the one by whose default £he expense was incurred should pay the bill.

Dundy, J., concurred.
Unassociated Document


    LOAN
      AGREEMENT

    (English
      Translation)

    


    This
      is
      an agreement between the following parties:

    


    
      	
              Party
                A:

            	
              Wennan
                Li

            
	 	 
	
              Party
                B:

            	
              Perfectenergy
                (Shanghai), Ltd.

            


    

    


    The
      parties hereto enter into this agreement voluntarily, after friendly
      negotiations, to enable Party B to borrow money from Party A, as
      follows:

    


    
      	 	
              1.

            	
              To
                address Party B’s cash flow issue, Party A agrees to loan Party B Two
                Million RMB.

            


    

    


    
      	 	
              2.

            	
              Party
                B agrees to borrow the money described above for cash flow, and agrees
                to
                pay Party A interest at the rate of 7.2% per
                annum.

            


    

    


    
      	 	
              3.

            	
              Funding
                method: Party A shall transfer the entire sum into Party B’s account, and
                the parties agree that interest shall begin on September 5,
                2006.

            


    

    


    
      	 	
              4.

            	
              Term
                of loan: September 5, 2006 to March 4, 2007. At the end of the term,
                Party
                B shall repay Party A the borrowed sum in one
                payment.

            


    

    


    
      	 	
              5.

            	
              Payment
                of interest: Party B shall pay Party A interest on a quarterly
                basis.

            


    

    


    
      	 	
              6.

            	
              The
                parties hereto agree to resolve any disputes amicably.
                

            


    

    


    
      	 	
              7.

            	
              This
                agreement will be in two originals, with each party holding one.
                This
                agreement will be effective upon the parties’ signatures and
                stamps.

            


    

    


    
      	
              Party
                A: Wennan Li

            	
              Party
                B: Perfectenergy (Shanghai), Ltd.

            
	 	 
	
              Signature:

            	
              Signature:

            
	 	 
	
              Seal:

            	
              Company
                Seal:

            
	 	 
	
              Date:
                9-5-2006
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     (This schedule  contains summary financial  information  extracted from (A)
Interim  Consolidated  Balance  Sheets,  Statements  of  Operations,  Change  in
Stockholders Equity and Cash Flows and is qualified in its entirety by reference
to such (B)  annual  report on Form 10-Q for the three  months  ended  March 31,
1997)
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                           3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                       DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                            MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                            0
<SECURITIES>                                      0
<RECEIVABLES>                                     0
<ALLOWANCES>                                      0
<INVENTORY>                                       0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                  0
<PP&E>                                            0
<DEPRECIATION>                                    0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                    0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        11,498
<BONDS>                                           0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                             0
<PREFERRED>                                       0
<COMMON>                                     36,493
<OTHER-SE>                                  (47,991)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                      0
<SALES>                                           0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                  0
<CGS>                                             0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                     0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                  0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   0
<INCOME-TAX>                                      0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               0
<DISCONTINUED>                                    0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                   0
<CHANGES>                                         0
<NET-INCOME>                                     (0)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0
        

</TABLE>