[Cite as In re Estate of Murphy v. Murphy, 2023-Ohio-3904.]

COURT OF APPEALS

COSHOCTON COUNTY, OHIO

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

IN RE: ESTATE OF SHAWN MURPHY : JUDGES:

: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J.

KOLT DAUGHERTY : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.

: Hon. Andrew J. King, J.

Appellant :

:

-vs- :

:

SHANNON D. MURPHY, : Case No. 23AP0006

ADMINISTRATOR :

:

 Appellee : O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common 

Pleas, Probate Division, Case No. 

20221129

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT: October 26, 2023

APPEARANCES:

For Appellant For Appellee

BRIAN W. BENBOW STEPHEN A. ECKINGER

265 Sunrise Center Drive 1611 North Main Street

Zanesville, OH 43701 Suite A
Coshocton County, Case No. 23AP0006 2

North Canton, OH 44720

King, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Kolt Daugherty, appeals the February 9, 2023 judgment entry of 

the Court of Common Pleas of Coshocton County, Ohio, Probate Division, denying his 

motion to intervene. Appellee is Shannon D. Murphy, Administrator ("Administrator"). We 

affirm the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 2} On July 22, 2022, Administrator filed an application to administer the Estate 

of Shawn Murphy ("decedent"). Administrator is decedent's brother, decedent's sole 

listed next of kin. Decedent did not leave a will.

{¶ 3} On October 26, 2022, Daugherty filed a motion to intervene under Civ.R. 

24(A)(2), claiming to be the natural son of decedent. A hearing was held on January 5, 

2023. By judgment entry filed February 9, 2023, the trial court denied the motion.

{¶ 4} Daugherty filed an appeal with the following assignment of error:

I

{¶ 5} "THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY DENYING 

APPELLANT'S MOTION TO INTERVENE WHEN APPELLANT HAD A RIGHT TO 

INTERVENE."

{¶ 6} "THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW BY NOT 

HOLDING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AS REQUIRED UNDER R.C. §2123.01 AND 

R.C. §2123.02."

{¶ 7} "THE TRIAL COURT, BY DENYING A HEARING, DENIED PROPOSED 

INTERVENOR/SON/APPELLANT DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER SECTION 16, 
Coshocton County, Case No. 23AP0006 3

ARTICLE I, OHIO CONSTITUTION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE 

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION."

I

{¶ 8} Daugherty listed all three issues under one assignment of error as he states 

they are interrelated. He claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to intervene. 

We disagree.

{¶ 9} Civ.R. 24 governs intervention. Daugherty moved for intervention under 

subsection (A)(2) which states the following:

(A) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be 

permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of this state confers 

an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an 

interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action 

and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a 

practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that 

interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by 

existing parties.

{¶ 10} In seeking intervention, Daugherty claimed the distribution of the entirety of 

the estate's proceeds would either go to him or Administrator, decedent's brother. 

Because Administrator serves as executor and personally stands to benefit from denying 

that Daugherty is a lawful heir, their interests are contrary. So, the issue on appeal is 

whether the "interest" claimed by Daugherty is sufficient under the rule.
Coshocton County, Case No. 23AP0006 4

{¶ 11} We begin our analysis by noting motions under Civ. R. 24(A) are reviewed 

under an abuse of discretion standard. Waynesburg Holdings, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank,

N.A., 2019-Ohio-4764, 149 N.E.3d 199, ¶ 42 (5th Dist.). "Abuse of discretion" means an 

attitude that is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Huffman v. Hair Surgeon, Inc.,

19 Ohio St.3d 83, 87, 482 N.E.2d 1248 (1985). Most instances of abuse of discretion will 

result in decisions that are simply unreasonable, rather than decisions that are 

unconscionable or arbitrary. AAAA Enterprises, Inc. v. River Place Community Urban 

Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). An unreasonable 

decision is one backed by no sound reasoning process which would support that decision. 

Id. "It is not enough that the reviewing court, were it deciding the issue de novo, would 

not have found that reasoning process to be persuasive, perhaps in view of countervailing 

reasoning processes that would support a contrary result." Id.

{¶ 12} The movant of a Civ.R. 24 motion bears the burden of proof and production.

Miller v. Miller, 2019-Ohio-1886, 135 N.E.3d 1271, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.), citing Grove Court 

Condominium Unit Owners' Association v. Hartman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94910, 

2011-Ohio-218, ¶ 14. To be successful, a movant must show the "interest" is a legally 

protectable interest. State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Department of Natural Resources, 130 

Ohio St.3d 30, 2011-Ohio-4612, 955 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 42. Although there is not an explicit 

test for determining whether a movant has a protected legal interest, the Supreme Court 

has held a movant's claim must be colorable. In re Schmidt, 25 Ohio St.3d 331, 336, 496 

N.E.2d 952 (1986). We note when evaluating a motion under Civ.R. 24, a trial court 

should liberally grant intervention. Merrill, supra; Rumpke Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. State, 

128 Ohio St.3d 41, 2010-Ohio-6037, 941 N.E.2d 1161. 
Coshocton County, Case No. 23AP0006 5

{¶ 13} In its February 9, 2023 judgment entry denying the motion to intervene, the 

trial court did not express any reasons for its denial: "The Court finds the Motion to 

Intervene not well taken, and it is denied."

{¶ 14} As the former stepson of decedent, Daugherty would have no colorable 

claim to the estate proceeds. But as the legal son of decedent, he would indeed have a 

legally protected claim. In order to possess a colorable claim to estate proceeds and 

therefore a right to intervene, Daugherty claims "paternity was established prior to the 

death of the decedent."

{¶ 15} Administrator responds by noting a parentage action under R.C. Chapter 

3111 was never filed and is now barred by the statute of limitations (R.C. 3111.05). We 

agree. A claim brought after the tolling of the statute of limitations is not a colorable claim. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this regard.

{¶ 16} Daugherty responds by arguing a statutory parentage action is not the only 

vehicle by which he can establish a colorable claim. He argues under the authority of 

Powell v. Williams, 2022-Ohio-526, 185 N.E.3d 595, ¶ 20, appeal not accepted, 167 Ohio 

St.3d 1408, 2022-Ohio-2047, 188 N.E.3d 1100, he can inherit because decedent married 

his mother and acknowledged him. There is no dispute that Daugherty's mother married 

decedent. But as the movant, Daugherty has the burden to establish a colorable claim in 

both law and fact that he was acknowledged by decedent.

{¶ 17} In an apparent effort to assist the trial court in determining whether 

Daugherty met that burden, a hearing was conducted at which his counsel could present 

evidence. During the January 5, 2023 hearing, the trial court heard from two witnesses, 

Loretta Murphy, Daugherty's mother, and Daugherty himself.
Coshocton County, Case No. 23AP0006 6

{¶ 18} Ms. Murphy testified when she gave birth to Daugherty in March 1985, she 

was married to Joe Daugherty. T. at 10. They divorced in 1987. T. at 13. In the 

dissolution/divorce document, Daugherty was listed as a child of the marriage; a child 

support order was issued at the time. T. at 19, 21. Joe did not pay child support for years 

until after "Wayne County support went after him." T. at 14, 21. She stated Joe never 

acknowledged Daugherty as his son. T. at 14. She testified she "cheated" on Joe with 

decedent. T. at 13. She married decedent in 1994, but they divorced in 1997. T. at 25. 

According to Ms. Murphy, decedent unofficially claimed Daugherty as his son; he 

attended Daugherty's life events and provided him with financial assistance. T. at 15-16. 

Genetic testing between Daugherty and decedent was never done because "[w]e never 

thought we had to." T. at 18. Ms. Murphy, Daugherty, or decedent never filed an action 

in juvenile court to determine the existence of a father and child relationship. T. at 22. A 

new birth certificate was never issued listing decedent as Daugherty's father, nor did 

decedent legally adopt Daugherty. Id. Ms. Murphy agreed there were no legal 

proceedings wherein decedent acknowledged paternity of Daugherty. T. at 22-23. She 

did not think legal proceedings were ever necessary because she and decedent "have 

39 years together * * * good and bad. And he was just always Kolt's dad." T. at 24. When 

asked if she had any doubt as to who Daugherty's father was, Ms. Murphy answered in 

the negative. T. at 19. However, at no time during her testimony did Ms. Murphy directly 

say decedent was Daugherty's father.

{¶ 19} Daugherty testified decedent was his father. T. at 26. When asked why he 

believed that, Daugherty replied: "That's a hard question to answer. I don't understand 

why he wouldn't be. To me, he has always been my father." Id. Decedent was there "for 
Coshocton County, Case No. 23AP0006 7

everything" in Daugherty's life, offering emotional and financial support. T. at 28. 

Daugherty stated he shared physical characteristics with decedent. T. at 27. Daugherty 

agreed there were no legal proceedings that established decedent as his father. T. at 40-

41.

{¶ 20} Prior to receiving the evidence, Daugherty's claim could have been thought 

of as contingent until paternity via acknowledgment was sufficiently established. The 

Sixth Circuit faced a similar situation in Purnell v. City of Akron, 925 F.2d 941, 947 (6th 

Cir.1991). In Purnell, individuals claiming to be the children of the decedent sought to 

intervene in a wrongful death action arising under federal law. Whether they could 

intervene turned on whether they could sufficiently establish paternity. The trial court 

denied the motion, but the Sixth Circuit reversed. In reversing, the Sixth Circuit held it 

may turn out later that they are not the decedent's children and thus would be without 

standing, but they could intervene in the matter until that time. Id. at 948.1

{¶ 21} Here, the trial court decided to give Daugherty the opportunity to present 

evidence related to paternity before ruling on the motion. We cannot say that was an 

error. At best, Daughtery established that he felt like he was the decedent's son. There 

was insufficient evidence to establish a colorable claim that he was acknowledged as the 

decedent's son. Daugherty argues he should have been allowed to intervene and then 

receive another evidentiary hearing. As illustrated by Purnell, that appears to have been 

a valid option for the trial court to consider. But if Daugherty cannot make a factual 

1We note under the federal rules, the appellate court reviews a motion to intervene de 

novo and standing is not required to grant intervention.
Coshocton County, Case No. 23AP0006 8

showing that he has a colorable claim after an evidentiary hearing, it follows that he would 

fare worse after a second hearing on a higher burden.

{¶ 22} The trial court had ample evidence before it to sustain its decision not to 

grant intervention; we cannot find the trial court abused its discretion. 

{¶ 23} The assignment of error is denied.

{¶ 24} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Coshocton County, Ohio, 

Probate Division, is hereby affirmed.

By King, J.

Delaney, P.J. and

Baldwin, J. concur.