Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JP-2652 | July 28, 2020 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Julianne L. Fox

Evansville, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Jonathan M. Young

Law Office of Jonathan M. Young, 

P.C.

Newburgh, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In re the Matter of the Paternity 

of: 

L.W. and M.W. (Minor Children)

Aaron Williams,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

Kayla Handy,

Appellee-Respondent,

July 28, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JP-2652

Appeal from the Vanderburgh 

Superior Court

The Honorable Sheila M. 

Corcoran, Senior Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

82D01-1607-JP-926

Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JP-2652 | July 28, 2020 Page 2 of 11

Case Summary and Issue

[1] Aaron Williams (“Father”) and Kayla Handy (“Mother”) have two minor 

children together. Following an incident in which Mother’s then-boyfriend, 

Shastin Handy, physically abused one of the children, the trial court granted

Father primary physical custody of the children with Mother having supervised 

visitation and prohibited any contact between the children and Handy. Mother 

subsequently filed a petition to modify parenting time. Following a hearing, the 

trial court issued an order granting Mother unsupervised parenting time and

allowing contact between the children and Handy, now Mother’s husband. 

Father appeals and presents one issue for our review: whether the trial court

abused its discretion in modifying Mother’s parenting time to allow contact 

between the children and Handy. Concluding the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 

[2] Mother and Father are the unwed biological parents of M.W., born July 7, 

2012, and L.W., born September 16, 2013 (“Children”). Mother and Handy 

share one child together and Handy has custody of his two children from 

another relationship. Mother originally had primary physical custody of 

Children and Father exercised parenting time. 

[3] In March 2017, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a 

report alleging that Handy physically abused M.W. Specifically, Handy had 
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spanked her as a form of corporal punishment leaving bruises on her bottom. 

As a result, DCS opened a child in need of services case (“CHINS”).

[4] On April 11, Father filed a Verified Petition for Emergency Change of 

Custody.

1

 In his petition, Father stated that Children had been placed with him 

temporarily through the CHINS matter, alleged that Handy physically abused

M.W., and requested emergency custody of Children and a protective order 

against Handy. At a hearing in May, the parties agreed that Father would have 

temporary custody of Children, with Mother’s parenting time to be supervised 

by an agreed-upon third party. Handy was prohibited from being present 

during Mother’s visitation. Ultimately, Handy admitted to the allegations and 

DCS closed the CHINS case on May 23. At some point after the incident, 

Mother and Handy were married.2

[5] On January 16, 2018, the trial court held a progress hearing and continued

Father’s temporary custody. On December 13, 2018, the trial court held a 

contested hearing on several pending motions and on January 28, 2019, the trial 

court issued an order granting Father primary physical custody of Children and 

Mother supervised visitation; ordering that Father discuss any major decisions 

regarding education, non-emergency medical care, and religious matters with 

1The trial court assigned separate cause numbers for each child in this paternity action: 82D06-1607-JP-926

for L.W. and 82D06-1607-JP-927 for M.W. The Chronological Case Summary and appealed order for each 

cause is identical. See Appellant’s Appendix, Volume II at 2-5, 6-28. A copy of Father’s petition for 

emergency custody was not included in the record. Pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 201, however, we 

have taken judicial notice of the record of the court below as necessary to inform our decision.

2 The record is unclear as to whether the two were married in December of 2017 or 2018.
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Mother, but allowing Father to make the final decision; permitting Mother to 

attend Children’s activities; and prohibiting Handy from being present or in 

contact with Children. See Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 36-37. 

[6] On April 17, Mother filed her Motion to Set Aside Entry and Request for 

Clarification and Verified Petition to Modify Parenting Time and Child 

Support. See id. at 29.3 Regarding her petition to modify parenting time, 

Mother alleged “Father will only agree to the paternal grandmother or the

maternal grandparents to act as a third-party supervisor. Due to the Father’s 

schedule and the schedules of the supervisors the Father will agree to 

supervising, [she] is not receiving her full allotment of parenting time.” Id. at 

30. As such, Mother requested that the court remove the supervision 

requirement and increase her parenting time. 

[7] The trial court held a hearing on Mother’s motion on August 12 and 28 and 

took the matter under advisement. On October 22, 2019, the trial court issued

an order granting Mother’s petition to modify parenting time, which stated, in 

relevant part:

[I]t is in the best interests of [Children] that Mother’s parenting 

time be modified. The Court finds that commencing on the date 

of this Order Mother shall have unsupervised parenting time with 

[Children] every other weekend beginning Friday after school 

day care until Sunday evening at 8:00 p.m. and every Wednesday 

3 Mother later clarified that her motion to set aside judgment sought relief from a child support order. See

Transcript of Evidence, Volume II at 32.
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after school day care until 8:00 p.m. . . . [Handy] may be present 

during such parenting time if personally supervised by Mother or 

by a third party agreed upon by the parents. No one shall use 

corporal discipline on [Children]. [Handy]’s supervised 

parenting time will be terminated sixty days from this Order.

Appealed Order at 1. Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision 

I. Standard of Review

[8] “In all parenting time controversies, courts must give foremost consideration to 

the best interests of the child.” Hazelett v. Hazelett, 119 N.E.3d 153, 161 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2019). When reviewing a parenting time issue, we give deference to 

the trial court’s determination and reverse only for an abuse of discretion. M.S. 

v. C.S., 938 N.E.2d 278, 285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). An abuse of discretion 

occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of 

the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court misinterpreted the 

law. Hatmaker v. Hatmaker, 998 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). “If there 

is a rational basis for the trial court’s determination, then no abuse of discretion 

will be found.” In re Paternity of C.H., 936 N.E.2d 1270, 1273 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2010), trans. denied. As such, “it is not enough on appeal that the evidence 

might support some other conclusion; rather, it must positively require the 

conclusion advanced by the appellant.” M.S., 938 N.E.2d at 285. We may not 

reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Downey v. 

Muffley, 767 N.E.2d 1014, 1017 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
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II. Parenting Time

[9] We begin by addressing Father’s argument that the trial court “modified legal 

custody without a proper request before the court and without [his] knowledge 

to litigate the issue.” Appellant’s Brief at 12. Specifically, he contends:

As a fit parent who has consistently made decisions in the best 

interests of his children, Father should be given deference in 

regard to any contact that [Handy] has with these children –

especially in light of the physical abuse that occurred by [Handy]. 

Father, who has sole legal custody did not agree to removing the 

no contact order, and he specifically requested to continue no 

contact with [Handy] who admittedly and unremorsefully 

physically abused one of these girls. Against Father’s wishes, the 

trial court granted third-party parenting time, specifically, 

“[Handy]’s supervised parenting time will be terminated sixty 

days from the date of this order.” 

Id. at 13 (record citations and emphasis omitted). Father’s assertions are 

incorrect. “Legal custody” refers to a parent’s authority and responsibility for 

making major decisions concerning his or her child’s upbringing, including 

education, health care, and religion. See Ind. Code § 31-9-2-67. And as the 

parent with sole legal custody, Father would be entitled to decide who his 

Children have contact with if the trial court had not weighed in by issuing a 

parenting time order. “A trial court is empowered to specify and enforce the 

visitation rights of the non-custodial parent pursuant to Indiana Code[,]”

Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758, 762 (Ind. 2013), and there is nothing to 

suggest that the trial court in this case did not have the right to weigh in on the 

matter. Mother filed a petition to modify parenting time and the trial court held 
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a hearing, heard the evidence, and rendered a decision. The trial court did not 

modify legal custody and its decision does not, in any way, impact Father’s 

own parenting time with Children.

[10] Similarly, we are unpersuaded by Father’s argument that the issue of the no 

contact provision in the parenting time order was not properly before the trial 

court and he did not have notice that the issue would be litigated at the hearing. 

See Appellant’s Br. at 13-14. Although Mother did not specifically request that 

the no contact order be removed in her motion to modify parenting time, it is 

clear from our review of the transcript that Mother asked that the restriction be 

lifted and the parties litigated this issue. See Tr., Vol. II at 28 (Mother’s 

attorney stating that “[t]he order is that [Handy] have no contact with [Children 

and w]e’re asking for a change in that order”). At the hearing, after the parties 

agreed to unsupervised parenting time for Mother, Father’s attorney stated, 

“The only issue still before this Court is whether [Handy] will be permitted to 

be [present during Mother’s parenting time] or not.” Id. at 108-09. And the 

trial court made it clear that it would be “determining parenting time and 

whether it’s supervised or unsupervised and whether [Handy] can be present or 

not present.” Id. at 109. It is apparent that this was an issue properly before the 

court and Father presented multiple witnesses for purposes of demonstrating 

that the no contact provision should remain in place. Therefore, Father’s 

argument fails.

[11] We now turn to the heart of this appeal, namely the removal of the contact 

order. Father does not challenge the trial court’s decision to allow Mother to 
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have unsupervised parenting time; he challenges the trial court’s order only to 

the extent it allows Handy to have contact with Children. Father contends

there was no rational basis for or any “evidence to support the removal of the 

no contact order or show the same to be in [C]hildren’s best interest.” 

Appellant’s Br. at 8. We disagree.

[12] Indiana Code section 31-17-4-2 governs the modification, denial, and restriction 

of parenting time and provides: “The court may modify an order granting or 

denying parenting time rights whenever modification would serve the best 

interests of the child. However, the court shall not restrict a parent’s[4] parenting 

time rights unless the court finds that the parenting time might endanger the 

child’s physical health or significantly impair the child’s emotional 

development.” “Even though the statute uses the word ‘might,’ this Court has 

previously interpreted the language to mean that a court may not restrict 

parenting time unless that parenting time ‘would’ endanger the child’s physical 

or emotional development.” Hatmaker, 998 N.E.2d at 761.

[13] Father argues that “[t]here is a rational basis for the no contact order which 

does not restrict Mother’s parenting time.” Appellant’s Br. at 11. However, the 

issue in this case is whether there is a rational basis for the trial court’s order 

effectively removing the no contact order, not an analysis of the previous 

parenting time order containing the no contact order. The order at issue 

4

“Parent” is defined as “a biological or an adoptive parent.” Ind. Code § 31-9-2-88(a).
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requires that contact between Handy and Children be supervised for sixty days

and allows unsupervised contact thereafter.

[14] Here, the trial court concluded that modification of its previous parenting time 

order, which required Mother’s parenting time to be supervised and prohibited 

any contact between Children and Handy, should be modified. The record 

shows that in March 2017, Handy spanked one of the Children as a form of 

corporal punishment. DCS intervened and opened a CHINS case, which 

caused the restriction to be implemented immediately after the incident. 

[15] At the time of the most recent hearing, the CHINS case had been closed for 

over two years. And since the incident, Handy has not had any contact with 

Children. Mother and Handy both testified that they have not used corporal 

punishment or any other form of inappropriate discipline with children in their 

household since the incident. See Tr., Vol. II at 28, 50, 54. Mother testified, 

“Our discipline, if the children get in trouble or anything, it is a time out or 

we’ll take away their Nintendo Switch or no movie at bedtime.” Id. at 25. 

When asked what she had learned by going through the CHINS process, she 

stated: “To be a lot more patient, that’s for sure. And that if the children are 

acting out or they get in trouble, it is best to just take a deep breath, reevaluate 

the situation and then handle it appropriately.” Id.

[16] In the event Handy were to use corporal punishment, Mother stated she “would 

immediately put a stop to it[,] would probably get a hold [sic] of authorities to 

handle the situation” and prevent it from escalating. Id. at 27. She further 
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testified that she and the children “wouldn’t be in the house or we would figure 

out ways to take steps to better [Handy.]” Id. 

[17] Mother does not believe it is in Children’s best interest for Handy to be 

prohibited from having contact with them. She explained, “In the beginning, [it 

was] possibly [in their best interest], but since it’s been so long, I feel like there 

should be no reason that they don’t have any contact” with him. Id. at 29. 

Handy also believes it is in Children’s best interests to have a relationship with

him. At the hearing, Handy was asked what he has done to educate himself 

since the incident. He responded, “I took part of a class that [DCS] ordered me 

to take, but it ended up interfering with my job. And I learned a few things 

from that.” Id. at 54. He learned how to handle various stressors in his life and 

as a result, he and Mother “changed [their] whole discipline technique.” Id. 

They do not “put [their] hands on the children” and instead, they discipline the 

children with time outs or not allowing them to go somewhere on the weekend 

or watch a movie at night. Id. 

[18] Ultimately, the record establishes that the incident occurred over two years ago. 

Since that time, Mother and Handy have gotten married, ceased all corporal 

punishment, learned how to handle stress, and have been able to appropriately 

discipline their children by taking away their Nintendo, placing them in time 

out, or not allowing them to do certain activities. It is clear the trial court found 

this evidence convincing, concluded modification of parenting time was in 

Children’s best interests, and modified parenting time accordingly. To illustrate 

there is no rational basis for the order, Father points to several witnesses, 
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primarily his family, who testified that it was not in Children’s best interests to 

have contact with Handy. Father’s argument, however, is merely a request for 

this court to reweigh the evidence in his favor, which we cannot do. See 

Downey, 767 N.E.2d at 1017. We afford great deference to the trial court’s 

decision as it was in the best possible position to evaluate the evidence and 

judge the credibility of the witnesses. See M.S., 938 N.E.2d at 285. Because our 

review of the record reveals a rational basis for the trial court’s parenting time 

decision, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion. 

Conclusion

[19] A rational basis supports the trial court’s parenting time order and therefore, the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, we affirm.

[20] Affirmed.

May, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.