ALD-084 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 15-2458

___________

JOSEPH DANIHEL,

 Appellant

v.

OFFICE OF PRESIDENT; US HUD; US SENATOR PA; 

US SENATOR PA; 1ST CONGRESSIONAL DIST; 

2ND CONGRESSIONAL DIST; 13TH CONGRESSIONAL DIST; 

COMMONWEALTH PA; GOVERNOR OFFICE PA; 

STATE SENATOR, 2ND DIST; MAYOR OFFICE; 

CITY OF PHILA; CITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT; 

6TH DISTRICT CITY COUNCIL; 7TH DISTRICT CITY COUNCIL; 

9TH DISTRICT CITY COUNCIL; DERECK GREEN; PHILA REDEVELOP AUTH; 

BRIAN ABERNATHY; MR. COORATO; MR. SCAFIDI; MS. SMYLER; 

MR. DUBROW; MR. GREENSBERGER; MS. RODRIGUEZ

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-14-cv-06880)

District Judge: Honorable Mark A. Kearney

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

December 17, 2015

Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges

(Filed: January 5, 2016)
2

___________

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

Joseph Danihel, proceeding pro se, seeks to appeal from five orders issued by the 

District Court in this civil rights action. For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss this 

appeal in part because Danihel’s challenge to two of those orders is time-barred. As for 

the remaining three orders, we will summarily affirm each of them.

I.

In March 2014, Danihel filed a pro se complaint in the District Court against a 

host of federal and state entities and officials. “Central to Danihel’s complaint [was] his 

allegation that the defendants ha[d] taken his property without paying proper 

compensation under the Fifth Amendment.” Danihel v. Office of the President of the 

U.S., 616 F. App’x 467, 470 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) [hereinafter Danihel I]. The 

defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). In September 2014, District Judge Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro 

granted those motions and closed the case. Danihel timely appealed, and we summarily 

affirmed that judgment in June 2015. See Danihel I, 616 F. App’x at 471-72. 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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While that appeal was pending, Danihel commenced the action at issue here, filing 

a second pro se complaint against the same defendants. Once again, the defendants 

moved to dismiss. On January 7, 2015, Judge Quiñones Alejandro granted those motions 

and closed the case. In doing so, she explained that 

[a] fair reading of Plaintiff’s second complaint reveals that 

Plaintiff seeks to litigate the same claims dismissed by this 

Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the previous 

action which is pending on appeal. Because Plaintiff’s 

complaint in this action suffers from the same jurisdictional 

defects as that filed in Danihel I, Plaintiff’s instant complaint 

is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

 

(Dist. Ct. Order docketed Jan. 7, 2015, at 2 n.2.)

Shortly thereafter, Danihel filed in the District Court documents titled “Writ of 

Error Quae Coram Nobis Residant” and “Motion for Contempt,” respectively. While 

those filings were pending, this case was reassigned from Judge Quiñones Alejandro to 

District Judge Mark A. Kearney. On February 13, 2015, Judge Kearney addressed the 

two new filings. Judge Kearney liberally construed the coram nobis filing as a motion for 

relief from the District Court’s January 7, 2015 judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 60,1and concluded that such relief was not warranted. Meanwhile, 

Judge Kearney denied the motion for contempt “as lacking any legal or factual basis 

other than disappointment in the Court’s rulings.” (Dist. Ct. Order docketed Feb. 13, 

2015.)

 

1

Judge Kearney took this approach because Rule 60(e) has abolished writs of coram 

nobis in federal civil actions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(e).
4

In the weeks that followed, Danihel filed two more “Motion[s] for Contempt,” as 

well as documents with the following titles: “Third Judicial Notice Filed Addendum 

Nunc Pro Tunc,” “Second Writ of Error Quae Coram Nobis Residant,” and “Notice of 

Reminder to Magistrate in This Court of Record.” In response, some of the defendants 

(referred to by the District Court as the “Congressional Defendants”) moved for an order 

to show cause why a filing injunction should not be imposed against Danihel. On March 

13, 2015, Judge Kearney denied Danihel’s various requests for relief and denied the 

motion for a show cause order without prejudice.2 Judge Kearney explained that “[i]f 

there was any doubt before, Plaintiff is now specifically notified that any further filing 

related to these claims in this Court will be grounds for the consideration of civil 

contempt, and the narrowly tailored injunction requested by the Congressional 

Defendants.” (Dist. Ct. Order docketed Mar. 13, 2015, at 2.)

Shortly thereafter, Danihel filed yet another “Motion for Contempt” and a 

document titled “Third Writ of Error Quae Coram Nobis Residant.” On April 2, 2015, 

Judge Kearney denied these requests for relief. Undeterred, Danihel submitted a host of 

new filings over the next two weeks, which caused the Congressional Defendants to 

renew their motion for a show cause order. On April 20, 2015, Judge Kearney ordered 

Danihel to show cause why the District Court “should not enter a narrow pre-filing 

injunction prohibiting him from making any further filings in this matter or commencing 

 

2

Judge Kearney once again liberally construed Danihel’s request for coram nobis relief 

as a Rule 60 motion.
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any new actions concerning the same subject matters without first receiving leave of this 

Court to do so.” (Dist. Ct. Order docketed Apr. 20, 2015.)

Danihel timely filed his response to the show cause order. Thereafter, on April 30, 

2015, Judge Kearney entered an order that denied five more motions from Danihel and 

imposed a filing injunction against him. The injunction order contained the following 

three provisions. First, the District Court Clerk was directed to “not accept any of 

Plaintiff’s further filings in this matter without prior approval of this Court.” (Dist. Ct. 

Order docketed Apr. 30, 2015, at 2.) Second, Danihel was “enjoined from commencing 

any new civil matters against the named Defendants that relate, or could relate, to the 

subject matter of this action without leave of Court.” (Id. (emphasis omitted).) If 

Danihel wished to file such an action, he would have to first certify that (a) “the claims 

being presented have never before been raised or disposed of on the merits by a federal 

court,” (b) “he believes the facts contained in the Complaint to be true,” and (c) “there is 

no reason why the claims are foreclosed by controlling law.” (Id.) Third, any future 

actions taken by Danihel “in violation of this Order notwithstanding his claim as a 

‘sovereign’ citizen, may result, upon petition, in a Rule to Show Cause as to why he 

should not be held in civil contempt and face sanctions and other penalties caused by his 

disregard for this Court.” (Id.)

On May 27, 2015, Danihel filed a notice of appeal, seeking to challenge Judge 

Quiñones Alejandro’s January 7th order and Judge Kearney’s February 13th, March 13th, 

April 2nd, and April 30th orders.
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II.

At the outset, we must determine which of the District Court’s orders are properly 

before us. Because some of the parties in this case are federal entities/officials, a 60-day 

appeal period governs here. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). This time limit, which 

generally begins to run when the order in question is “entered,” see id., is “mandatory and 

jurisdictional.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209 (2007) (quoting Griggs v. 

Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982) (per curiam)). Typically, an order 

is deemed “entered” when it is placed on the docket. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c). 

However, if the order does not satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a)’s separate 

document requirement, the order is not deemed “entered” until 150 days after it is 

docketed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c).

Here, Judge Quiñones Alejandro’s January 7th order did not satisfy the separate 

document requirement because it contained the reasons underlying her decision. See

LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 2007). 

Accordingly, that order was considered “entered” on Monday, June 8, 2015, thereby 

giving Danihel until August 7, 2015, to appeal from that order. Because he filed his 

notice of appeal before that deadline, his appeal is timely as to that order. The same 

cannot be said for his challenge to Judge Kearney’s February 13th and March 13th 

orders. Those post-judgment orders did not have to comply with the separate document 

requirement. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a). As a result, the deadlines for appealing from 

them were April 14, 2015, and May 12, 2015, respectively. Because Danihel did not file 
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his notice of appeal until May 27, 2015, his appeal is time-barred as to those two orders. 

However, his appeal is timely as to Judge Kearney’s April 2nd and April 30th orders, as 

the notice of appeal was filed within 60 days of these orders.

In light of the above, we will dismiss Danihel’s challenge to Judge Kearney’s 

February 13th and March 13th orders. We now turn to the merits of Danihel’s challenge 

to the three remaining orders.

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III.

We begin with Judge Quiñones Alejandro’s January 7th order, which dismissed 

Danihel’s second complaint. We review that decision under a plenary standard. See

Friedrich v. Davis, 767 F.3d 374, 377 (3d Cir. 2014). Judge Quiñones Alejandro 

determined that, because Danihel’s second complaint effectively reiterated the claims that 

he had raised in his first complaint, the second complaint was subject to dismissal for the 

same reasons as the first complaint.

We need not disturb Judge Quiñones Alejandro’s dismissal of Danihel’s second 

complaint. Although the causes of action listed in that pleading are labeled differently 

than those in the first complaint, the two complaints effectively make the same 

substantive arguments. See Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2007) 

(“We are not bound by the label attached by a party to characterize a claim and will look 

 

3 We have jurisdiction over these orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We may 

summarily affirm them if this appeal fails to present a substantial question, see 3d Cir.

I.O.P. 10.6, and we may do so on any basis supported by the record, see Murray v. 

Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
8

beyond the label to analyze the substance of a claim.”). We rejected those arguments in 

Danihel I, and we find no reason to take a different approach here. To the extent that 

Danihel’s second complaint could be construed as raising new claims that fall within the 

scope of the District Court’s jurisdiction, we conclude that any such claims are barred by 

the doctrine of claim preclusion because he could have raised them in his first complaint. 

See Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 476 (1998).

We now turn to Judge Kearney’s April 2, 2015 order, which denied Danihel’s 

“Third Writ of Error Quae Coram Nobis Residant” and one of Danihel’s many 

“Motion[s] for Contempt.” In support of this denial, Judge Kearney stated as follows:

Mr. Danihel has now filed at least three writs of error since 

the Honorable Nitza Quiñones Alejandro dismissed his case 

on January 7, 2015. In each of these motions Mr. Danihel 

challenges the authority of this Court to pass judgment on his 

various filings. His case has now been dismissed twice and 

Mr. Danihel is understandably upset that he cannot proceed in 

this Court. However, we have denied Mr. Danihel’s prior 

writs of error and Mr. Danihel has not adduced additional 

facts in his current motion to warrant a reversal of course.

(Dist. Ct. Order docketed Apr. 2, 2015 (citation omitted).) We find no error in this 

analysis, and we agree with Judge Kearney’s decision to deny these requests for relief.

Lastly, we consider Judge Kearney’s April 30th order, which denied five 

additional motions from Danihel — four more “Motion[s] for Contempt” and one titled 

“Motion to Comply” — and imposed the filing injunction against him. We see no reason 

to disturb Judge Kearney’s denial of those five motions, and we focus our discussion on 

the filing injunction.
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The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), permits district courts to issue filing 

injunctions “to preclude abusive, groundless and vexatious litigation.” Brow v. Farrelly, 

994 F.2d 1027, 1038 (3d Cir. 1993). However, to ensure a litigant’s right to due process 

and access to the courts, a district court must comply with the following three 

requirements. See id. First, filing injunctions are not appropriate “absent exigent 

circumstances, such as a litigant’s continuous abuse of the judicial process by filing 

meritless and repetitive actions.” Id. Second, “[i]f the circumstances warrant the 

imposition of an injunction, the District Court must give notice to the litigant to show 

cause why the proposed injunctive relief should not issue.” Id. Lastly, “the scope of the 

injunctive order must be narrowly tailored to fit the particular circumstances of the case 

before the District Court.” Id. We review a district court’s decision to impose a filing 

injunction for abuse of discretion. See Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329, 331 (3d 

Cir. 1990).

Judge Kearney did not abuse his discretion in imposing the filing injunction 

against Danihel, as each of the aforementioned requirements is satisfied. First, the filing 

injunction came in response to Danihel’s relentless barrage of meritless filings, the vast 

majority of which were submitted after his second complaint was dismissed. Second, 

Judge Kearney gave Danihel ample notice of the possibility of a filing injunction and 

afforded Danihel an opportunity to show cause why such an injunction should not be 

imposed. Finally, the filing injunction crafted by Judge Kearney is narrowly tailored. It 

applies only to a small subset of cases (the present case and new civil actions brought 
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against these same defendants that relate, or could relate, to the subject matter of this 

case) and it allows Danihel to seek the District Court’s permission to file actions that fall 

within that subset.

Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily 

affirm the District Court’s January 7, 2015, April 2, 2015, and April 30, 2015 orders.