07-9040-am In re Harry DeMell

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## UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2 3 

## FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 4 

### 5 August Term, 2009 6 7 

### 8 (Decided: December 21, 2009) 9 

### 10 Docket No. 07-9040-am 11 

### 12 13 14 15 16 17 1E In re Harry DeMell, 19 20 Attorney. 

### 21 22 

### 23 24 25 26 Before: Jacobs, Chief Judge, Cabranes, Pooler, Katzrnann, 27 Parker, Raggi, Wesley, Hall, Livingston, and Lynch, Circuit 28 Judges. 

## 29 30 31 This Court's Committee on Attorney Admissions and Grievances 32 ("the Committee") has recommended that Harry DeMell, an attorney 33 admitted to the bar of this Court, be publicly reprimanded. We 34 adopt the Committee's findings of fact, except as discussed below, 35 and adopt the Committee's recommendations concerning the 36 appropriate disciplinary measures. 37 38 Roger B. Adler, Esq., New York, 

### 39 N.Y., for Harry peMell. 40 41

### 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 

### PER CURIAM: In July 2007, this Court ordered Harry DeMell to show cause why he should not be referred to this Court's Committee on Attorney Admissions and Grievances ("the Committee") for investigation of the matters described in that order. In a subsequent order, filed in November 2007, the Court found DeMell's response to the July 2007 order unsatisfactory and referred him to the Committee for investigation and preparation of a report on whether he should be subject to disciplinary or other corrective

measures. During the Committee's proceedings, DeMell had the opportunity to address the matters discussed in the Court's referral order, to testify under oath at a hearing held on June 2, 2008, and to present a post-hearing brief and a subsequent supplementary letter. DeMell was represented in the proceedings by Roger B. Adler, Esq. Presiding over the hearing were Committee members Evan A. Davis, Esq. and Deirdre Daly, Esq. In January 2009, the Committee filed with the Court the record of the Committee's proceedings and its report and recommendations. Thereafter, the Court provided DeMell with a copy of the Committee's report, and DeMell filed a response, which contains a number of objections to the report. In its report, the Committee concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that DeMell had engaged in conduct "unbecoming a member of the bar" within the meaning of Federal 21 Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(c). Specifically, the Committee 2 found that DeMell had engaged in "conduct inimical to the 3 administration of justice," In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 645 4 (1985), and had neglected matters entrusted to him as a lawyer, 5 New York Disciplinary Rule 6-101 (A) (3), by (1) failing to timely 6 respond, or timely request an extension of time to respond, to a 7 motion to dismiss, resulting in prejudice; (2) failing to file 8 Form 

### CIA in a case, resulting in its dismissal; and (3) failing to 9 timely submit papers, or timely request an extension of time, in 10 several other cases. 1 See Report at 8. 11 The Committee also found that there were several aggravating 12 and mitigating factors. The following were found to be 13 aggravating factors: (1) there were multiple instances of 14 misconduct, establishing a pattern, although the Committee found 15 that the facts only fell "slightly on the side of aggravation," 16 

### ide at 9; (2) DeMell failed to demonstrate complete candor with 17 the Committee, 

### id.; (3) DeMell failed to demonstrate an adequate 18 commitment to corrective action, 

### ide at 9-10; and (4) the victims 19 of his misconduct were vulnerable, 

### ide at 10. The following were 20 found to be mitigating factors: (1) absence of a prior

I As of April 1, 2009, the disciplinary rules of the New York Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility were superseded by the New York Rules of Professional Conduct, which were promulgated as joint rules of the Appellate Divisions of the New York Supreme Court. Use of the new rules would not alter any of our conclusions. 3

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1 disciplinary record; (2) evidence of good character or reputation; 2 and (3) remorse, except insofar as he argued that he was not at 3 fault regarding one of the defaulted cases. Id. 

### at 10. 4 Based on its factual findings, the Committee .recommended that DeMell be publicly reprimanded for his misconduct, and required to 6 submit to the Committee periodic status reports concerning his 7 federal practice. 8 Upon due consideration of the Committee's report, the 9 underlying record, and DeMell's objections, we adopt the Committee's factual findings concerning DeMell's misconduct in 11 this Court, except as discussed below. We also adopt the 12 Committee's conclusion that DeMell's misconduct was sufficiently 13 serious that it warrants both a public reprimand and a requirement 14 that he submit the period reports described in the Committee's report. The following discussion is intended to supplement the 16 Committee's report in several respects, and to address DeMell's 17 objections to the report. 18 DeMell's Responsibility for the Default 

### 19 in Constantine v.**Gonza~es,** 06-4885-ag 

### 21 DeMell argues in his response to the Committee's report that 

### 22 he is being unfairly "scapegoat[ed]" for the petitioner's failure 23 in Constantine 

### to file an opposition to the government's motion to 24 dismiss. See 

### Response at 2. DeMell claims that, once the petitioner's new attorney informed DeMell that he was being 26 replaced, which occurred in late December 2006, he could take no 

### 4'1 further action in the case and the new attorney should have 2 remedied the default. 

### Id. at 2, 4; Post-Hearing Letter dated June 3 24, 2008. However, DeMell's objection ignores the Committee's 4 rationale for nding that DeMell engaged in misconduct in the 5 Constantine case: (a) the government served its motion on November 6 28 or 29, 2006; (b) under the applicable rule, oppos ion to the 7 motion was due, at the latest, by December 13, 2006; and (c) it is 8 undisputed that DeMell was the petitioner's counsel until late , 9 December 2006, but did not le any opposition papers or present 10 any reason for not doing so. See Report at 8. 11 DeMell may be correct that the petitioner's new attorney also 12 neglected the case, but that irrelevant to the Committee's 13 analysis. We are in complete agreement with the following 14 statement from the Committee's report: 15 a signi cant contributing cause of the failure to file 16 opposition papers a failure that DeMell concedes was 17 prejudicial to Constantine, Hearing Tr. 20:10-15 was 18 DeMell's failure to le a timely response or a timely 19 motion for an enlargement of time. When DeMell passed 20 on the le to [the new attorney] on or about January**~1** 10, 2007, he passed it on, either knowingly or**~2** negligently, with a substantial procedural default that 23 was brought about due to his own, and no one else's, 24 inaction. Whether [the new attorney] thereafter acted 25 with sufficient diligence to remedy that default ... 26 would not create a mitigating factor in DeMell's favor. 27 A failure of substitute counsel to remedy a problem does 28 not as an ethical matter excuse the misconduct of the 29 lawyer who created the problem in the first instance by 30 failing to le a timely opposition

. ... Finally, DeMell 31 as the departing lawyer failed to explicitly call the 32 existing problem to [the new attorney's] attention, 33 thereby contributing to the default. 34 Report at 8-9. DeMell's failure to address any aspect of the 5

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### 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Committee's rationale is mystifying. We can only speculate that he did not understand the Committee's report, he remains unaware of his ethical obligations, or he simply sought to distract attention from his own poor performance by focusing on another attorney's poor performance. In any event, he has not taken responsibility for his lack of action in the case. Production of Interview Notes 

### Prior to the Committee's June 2008 hearing in this matter, a Committee representative spoke by telephone to the attorney who had replaced DeMell in the Constantine 

### case and retained notes from that conversation. See 

### Hearing Tr. at 43-47; Report at 2, 9 n.2. DeMell's request for a copy of those notes was denied on the grounds that the Committee would not be relying on any statements made by the attorney in that conversation, and that any potentially exculpatory information was already available to DeMell. See 

### Report at 2; see also id. 

### at 9 n.2 (stating that Committee's recommendation is not based on any disputed fact resolved adversely to DeMell). In his response to the Committee's report, DeMell argues that the Committee's refusal to provide him with a copy of the interview notes "was fundamentally unfair and legally erroneous." Response at 2, 4. However, DeMell provides

no analysis or citation to authority in support of that argument. Under the rules governing the Committee's proceedings, an attorney who is the subject of a Committee investigation "has the

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25 1 right to examine all documents in the record, unless a protective 2 order is obtained from the Grievance Panel. n 

### Rule 7(c) of the 3 Rules of the Committee on Attorney Admissions and Grievances. 4 Additionally, we assume that due process requires the Committee to make available to the attorney under investigation all evidence 6 that will be used against the attorney and all evidence that is 7 either exculpatory or may lead to exculpatory evidence. In this 8 context, DeMell's argument is construed as an assertion that the 9 notes at issue were part of the record, could have led to exculpatory evidence, and therefore should have been turned over 11 in the absence of a protective order. It is not entirely clear 12 from the report whether the Committee applied the Rule 7(c) and 13 due process standards, but even if it did not, any possible error 14 would have been harmless. DeMell does not suggest that the new attorney had any 16 conceivable information relating to the relevant time period 17 immediately following the filing of the government's motion to 18 dismiss

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### i.e., the ten-day time period which DeMell should 19 have filed a response to that motion. Nor does DeMell suggest that he himself was unable to contact the new attorney directly, 21 or that the Committee's findings or recommendation were affected 2,2 in any way by his inability to review those notes. Since the 23 Committee's findings relating to the Constantine 

### case are based 24 entirely on DeMell's inaction prior to the involvement of the new attorney, and DeMell has failed to show that the failure to grant 7

### 1 access to the notes prejudiced him in any way, we reject DeMell's 2 objection to that aspect of the proceedings

. . 3 Vulnerable Clients as Aggravating Factor 

### 4 As noted above, the Committee found that the vulnerability of 5 DeMell's clients was an aggravating factor. See 

### Report at 10. 6 DeMell objects that this finding lacks a factual basis in the 7 record. See 

### Response at 4. 

### 8 An attorney who is the subject of disciplinary proceedings 9 must have adequate notice of, and adequate opportunity to address, 10 any aggravating factor at issue. Because the Committee report 11 does not make clear the factual basis for its finding that 12 DeMell's victims were vulnerable, or the nature of notice provided 13 to DeMell, we decline to adopt this aggravating factor. However, 14 as explained below, the absence of this aggravating factor does 15 not alter our conclusion. 2 16 Multiple Instances of Misconduct as Aggravating Factor 

### 17 In his response to the Committee's report, DeMell suggests 18 that the defaults discussed by the Committee were isolated 19 instances and neither systemic nor pervasive "over a career

2 

### For purposes of this decision, there is no need for us to express an opinion as to the meaning of the term "vulnerable." Nor is there a present need to catalog the various ways vulnerability can be proved or the various ways an attorney subject to investigation can be provided notice that client vulnerability is at issue. To avoid confusion and unnecessary burden, however, we note that, in appropriate cases, the necessary facts might be established through testimony of the attorney himself. 8

### 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 

### 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 spanning some three decades.n Response at 2, 4. We find that the Committee's report properly characterized the scope of DeMell's defaults as only falling "slightly on the side of aggravation.n Report at 9. Additionally, we note that DeMell's objection cuts both ways. While the number of defaults discussed by the Committee may not have been high, DeMell's many years of experience is an aggravating factor, since a reasonable attorney with thirty years experience (a) clearly would know that defaulting on a client's case leaves open the possibility of

severe prejudice and (b) should have office and calendaring practices in place to avoid defaults. See 

### ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions § 

### 9.22 (i) (1986, 1992) (listing "substantial experience in the practice of lawn as possible aggravating factor). Conclusions 

### Although we do not adopt the Committee's finding that DeMell's victims were vulnerable, we find that the final disposition recommended by the Committee remains warranted. We

are particularly disturbed by DeMell's failure to acknowledge, or

even address, his default in Constantine. 

### In that regard, DeMell's response to the Committee's report is similar to his response to this Court's July 2007 order, which commenced this proceeding. That earlier response was found unsatisfactory due to DeMell's failure to address important issues and to provide

9

### 1 important details that a reasonable person should have known were 2 highly relevant to our inquiry. Thus, it remains unclear whether 3 DeMell fully accepts the fact that he engaged in serious 4 misconduct and whether he is fully committed to mending his ways.**~5** 

### Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED that, except as 6 noted above, the Committee's findings and recommendations are 7 adopted by the Court, and DeMell is PUBLICLY REPRIMANDED for the 8 misconduct described in the Committee's report. It is further 9 ORDERED that DeMell submit to the Committee the periodic status 10 reports proposed in the Committee's report, in compliance with the 11 deadlines stated therein. 12 This order must be disclosed in any future disciplinary 13 proceeding or bar application, and if required by any bar or court 14 rule or order. Furthermore, the Clerk of Court is directed to 15 release this order to the public by posting it on this Court's web 16 site and providing copies to members of the public in the same 17 manner as all other published decisions of this Court. The text 18 of this Court's July and November 2007 orders and the Committee's 19 report are also to be released to the public, as appendices to the 20 present order. 21 The Clerk of Court also is directed to serve a copy of this 22 order on DeMell, this Court's Committee on Attorney Admissions and 23 Grievances, the attorney disciplinary committee for the New York 24 State Appellate Division, First Department, the attorney 25 disciplinary officials for the Executive Office of Immigration 10

### 1 Review, and all other courts and jurisdictions to which this Court 2 distributes disciplinary decisions in the ordinary course. 3 

### 4 APPENDIX 1 

### 5 Text of July 2007 order 6 

### 7 For the reasons that follow, Harry DeMe11 is ordered to show 8 cause why he should not be referred to this Court's Committee on 9 Admissions and Grievances for investigation the matters 10 described below and preparation of a report on whether he should 11 be subject to disciplinary or other corrective measures. See 12 Second Circuit Local Rule 46(h). 13 14 We have initiated this proceeding as a 15 allegations that were made in Constantine v. 

### 16 4885-ag (2d Cir.), an appeal in which DeMe11 17 attorney of record for the pet ioner. The 18 appeal indicates that the government filed a 19 petition on November 29, 2006, and served a result of certain Gonzales, 

### No. 06­ was the initial docket sheet for the

motion to dismiss the copy of the motion on 20 DeMell. See Constantine, 

### No. 06-4885-ag, motion led Nov. 29, 21 2007. However, DeMe11 did not file a response to the motion, or 22 any other document in the case, despite the fact that the motion 23 was not decided until February 20, 2007. See id., 

### order filed 24 Feb. 20, 2007. 25 26 In two motions filed on March 7, 2007, a new lawyer requested 27 that she be substituted as counsel of record for the petitioner ?8 and that the motion to dismiss be recalendared to allow the new 29 attorney time to prepare a response. See id., 

### motions filed Mar. 30 7, 2007. The new attorney stated that, in mid-January 2007, she 31 had been retained to represent the pet ioner, and that, in early 32 February 2007, she had been made aware that: DeMe11 had never 33 filed a motion for his substitution by new counsel; the motion to 34 dismiss was calendared for February 16, 2007; and no responding 35 papers had been led on behalf of the petitioner although the 36 petitioner had wanted a response filed. See id. 

### The new attorney 37 also stated that her attempt to contact DeMe11 had been 38 unsuccessful, and characterized DeMell's representation as 39 ineffective. 1 See id., 

### motion to substitute attorney. Although

J 

### DeMe11 represented the petitioner before the agency as well. See In 

### re Constantine, 

### A41-307-384 (BIA July 19, 2006) (order dismissing appeal from immigration judge, filed in Second 11

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1 

### the motion for substitution of counsel was granted, the motion for .2 

### recalendaring of the government's motion was denied. 

### See id., 3 

### orders filed Mar. 19 and 27, 2007. 4 A review of this Court's docket indicates that DeMell was 6 

### also counsel of record for the petitioner in 

### Halimi v. Ridge, No. 7 

### 05-5474-ag, an appeal that was dismissed for failure of the 8 

### petitioner's attorney to file Form CiA. 

### See Halimi, No. 05-5474­ 9 

### ag, order of dismissal filed Mar. 9, 2006. The Court's records indicate that a Court employee left a message for DeMell 11 

### concerning the overdue form on November 9, 2005 and spoke with 12 DeMell about the form on February 14, 2006. On the latter 13 occasion, the Court employee was told by DeMell that the form 14 would be "submitted asap.H However, because the form was not filed, the appeal was dismissed by order filed on March 9, 2006. 16 

### See id. The Court's records also show that, nine months later, a 17 motion for remand of the case was submitted. 

### See id., entry dated 18 Dec. 6, 2006. The motion was not filed, and no action was taken 19 on it, presumably due to the earlier dismissal and the lack of a motion to reinstate the appeal. 21 22 

### This Court's records also indicate that DeMell has failed to 23 timely file briefs or other documents in several other appeals, 24 although dismissal has not resulted. 

### See Second Circuit dockets in 03-4204 (late brief); 05-6088 (late supplemental brief); 06­ 26 0326 (failure to file documents in support of motion); 06-4742 27 (late brief)

.**~8** 

### 29 Upon due consideration of the matters described above, it is ORDERED that Harry DeMell show cause, by a detailed declaration, 31 made under penalty of perjury and filed within twenty-five days of 32 the filing date of this order, why he should not be referred to 33 

### this Court's Committee on Admissions and Grievances for 34 investigation and preparation of a report consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46, this Court's Local Rule 46(h), and 36 the Rules of the Committee on Admissions and Grievances. 37 38 FOR THE COURT: 

### 39 Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 41 By: 

### lsi 42**--~~ ~--~------------**  

### Michael Zachary 43 Supervisory Staff Attorney 44 Counsel to Grievance Panel 46

Circuit docket for 06-4885-ag on Oct. 24, 2006). 125

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45 1 APPENDIX 2 2 Text of November 2007 order 3 For the reasons that follow, Harry A. DeMe11 is referred to 4 this Court's Committee on Admissions and Grievances ("the Committee") for investigation of the matters described below and 6 preparation of a report on whether he should be subject to 7 disciplinary or other corrective measures. See Second Circuit 8 Local Rule 46(h). We express no opinion here as to an appropriate 9 disposition. The Committee may, of course, in the first instance, determine the appropriate scope of its investigation. 11 12 In July 2007, this panel ordered DeMe11 to show cause why he 13 should not be referred to the Committee for investigation of the 14 matters described in that order. See DeMell, 07-9040-am, order filed July 16, 2007. For the reasons discussed below, we find 16 DeMell's response to that order to be unsatisfactory. 17 18 For present purposes, familiarity with both the July 2007 19 order and DeMell's response is assumed, and we note in the following paragraphs only the matters which do not appear to be 21 adequately addressed in the response. Both the July 2007 order 22 and DeMell's response will be forwarded to the Committee with the 23 present order. 24 With respect to the allegations made in Constantine v. 26 Gonzales, No. 06-4885-ag, DeMe11 has addressed some, but not all, 27 of the pertinent issues. DeMe11 primarily argues that he was not 28 at fault when a timely response to the government's motion to 29 dismiss was not filed, and suggests that any fault lies with Constantine's subsequent attorney. See DeMe11 Resp., at**~~** 4-9. 31 The conflicting assertions as to which attorney was at fault would 32 require a credibility determination, which cannot be made based on 33 the papers currently before this panel. However, certain 34 important issues are not addressed in DeMell's response. Although DeMe11 states that Constantine and his family informed him that 36 they did not wish him to proceed and wished to substitute counsel, 37 DeMe11 does not indicate when this communication occurred. See 38 id., at**~** 5. DeMe11 further indicates that he was later called by 39 Constantine's subsequent counsel and that she took some time to fax him a substitution letter, but does not indicate when that 41 call occurred. Id. at**~~** 5-6. DeMe11 concedes that he may have 42 "failed to timely fi an answer or a substitution of counsel," 43 but does not indicate whether, and when, he was aware of the 44 motion to dismiss or what actions he took to protect his client's interests. Id., at**~** 9. 46

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.1 With respect to Halimi v. Ridge, No. 05-5474-ag, DeMell 2 alleges that the case had been transferred to this Court from a 3 district court pursuant to a government motion. Id., at**~** 10. 4 Although DeMell states that he did not oppose the transfer, he .5 also states, without explanation, that "[t]he appeal should have 

### 6 been dismissed by this Court in that [he] believe[d] that**~7** jurisdiction was lacking in the Court of Appeals." Id., at**~~** 

### lO8 

### ll. DeMell also alleges that he "[is] not sure who is responsible '9 for filing Form 

### C/A,H but will now do so if it is required "to close out this matter properly.H Id. at**~** 12. However, he does 11 not address the fact that this Court's docket indicates that a 12 Court employee twice contacted DeMell about the failure to file 13 Form 

### CiA, that DeMell informed the employee that it would be 14 "submitted asap,H and that the case was dismissed for failure to 15 do so. DeMell also fails to explain why it was reasonable to 16 allow the case to be dismissed on default, or why, if he believed 17 this Court lacked jurisdiction, he did not oppose the government's 18 request to transfer it to this Court, or request a transfer to a 19 proper court, rather than taking no action. 21 With respect to the cases in which DeMell failed to timely 22 file briefs or other documents, DeMell fails to provide an 23 explanation for why extensions of time were not sought prior to 24 the due dates for the filing of those documents. Id., at**~~** 13­ 25 20. See Second Circuit dockets in 03-4204-ag (late brief); 05­ 26 6088-ag (referred to as "05-6082 H in DeMell response) (late 27 supplemental brief); 06-0326-ag (failure to file documents in 28 support of motion); 06-4742-ag (late brief). DeMell's response 

### 29 with respect to Khoma v. Gonzales, No. 06-0326-ag, in fact, does not mention the untimeliness of the filing at all. 31 32 Finally, we note that DeMell also failed to timely file his 33 brief in Torres v. Gonzales, No. 07-1185-ag, and, instead, 

### 34 requested leave to file the brief two weeks late. See Torres, 35 No. 07-1185-ag, motion filed Aug. 1, 2007, order granting motion 36 filed Aug. 3, 2007. 37 38 Upon due consideration of the matters described above, it is 

## 39 ORDERED that Harry A. DeMell is referred to this Court's Committee on Admissions and Grievances for investigation and preparation of 41 a report, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46, this 42 Court's Local Rule 46(h), and the Rules of the Committee on 43 Admissions and Grievances. 

### 44 FOR THE COURT: 45 Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk**~6** 47 

### By:

__**~~_/s/** 

### __ ____________ 48 Michael Zachary 

### 49 Supervisory Staff Attorney Counsel to Grievance Panel 141 APPENDIX 3 

### 2 3 January 2009 Report of the Committee 

### 4 on Attorney Admissions and Grievances 5 6 .7 [Remainder of page intentionally blank; text of Appendix 3 commences on following page.]

15

### REPORT& 

### RECOMMENDATION Re: In re HarryDeMeJ) I07-9040-am]

I. Introduction By OrderdatedNovember7, 2007 (the "Referral Order"),the United States Courtof Appeals forthe Second Circuit ("the Court'')referred 

### Harry DeMeH to this Committee for investigation ofhis conductbefore the Court and preparationofa reporton whetherhe should be subject to disciplinary orothercorrective measures. DeMell has whathe characterizes as a "highvolume" immigrationpractice. The Referral Order raises a number ofinstances where DeMell failed to timely file briefs in cases before the Court and made applications to file a late briefonlyafter the deadline had passed. Inone $uch instance, Constantine v. GonzaJez, however, no briefinoppositionto the government's motion to dismiss was everfiled, which DeMell concedes resulted inprejudice to hisclient. Hecontends that substitutedcounsel should have filed the brief, butthe duedate for the briefhad already passed bythe time the possibilityofnew counsel cameto his attention. In view ofa numberof instances ofallowingdeadlinespass without arranging for an extension,and in light of aggravating and mitigating circumstances discussed below, the Committeeconcludes DeMel1's neglect ofthis matter isofsufficientmagnitude tojustifYa sanction. The Committeerecommends that DeMel1 bepublicly reprimanded for his conduct,and, as described more fully below,that he berequired, in connection withhis practice in any federal court in the Second Circuit orin any federal administrative agency whose action is subjectto the Second Circuit'sreview. to submitto the Committee sworn statements identifying underoath each and every instance during each offourreportingperiods described beJow inwhich (1) a submission is not filed or filed outoftime;or (2) an application is made for permission to make a late filing onJyafter the due date haspassed. Thefollowing constitutes the Committee'sreport 1and recommendation to impose discipline on DeMel!. 

### If. TheDisciplinary Proceeding OnMarch 5,2008. the Committee senta Notice ofReferral and Proceedingto DeMell (the "Notice"). TheNotice ordered, interalia, DeMeJl to showcause why the Committeeshould not recommend disciplinary and/orothercorrective action in connection with the matters contained in the Referral Order. A copyoftheReferral Orderand Committee'srules was attached to the Notice. OnMarch 12, DeMell'scounsel, Roger B. Adler, requested, as incoming counsel, an extension oftime to respond to the Notice, which was granted. On April ]2,2008, DeMell'scounsel submitted an unsworn response (UResponse") to the Notice. On April 23, 2008, the Committee sent a lettertoPankaj Malik. animmigration attorney who was subsequent counsel inthe Constantineappeal. statingthat it soughtto interview herin connection with its investigation ofcertain conduct ofDeMeIl. The Committee also requested tj'om Malik documents relating to the Constantineappeal, which were received on May 8, 2008. OnMay 19, 2008 the Committee interviewed Malik regarding the Constantine appeal. OnMay 20, 2008, the Committee senta letter to DeMeli requesting that he affinn under oath his Response and provide a description ofthe documents that were sent to Malik as incoming counsel. The Committee's May 20 letteralso infonned DeMell ofa hearingin this matter. In his May 28,2008 response, DeMell affirmed his Response and described the documents sent to Malik. OnMay 27 and May 29, 2008, the Committee infonned DeMell ofthe documents that might

### be referred to atthehearing, provided him the documents that had been furnished by Malik, and advised him thatthe Committee would not call any additional witnesses atthe hearing. OnJune 2, 2008, EvanDavis and Deirdre Daly ofthe Committee metwithDeMeU and his attorney for purposes ofconducting a hearing. Amin Kassam, then-Secretary ofthe Committee, and Andrew Dean, assisting the Committee, were also present. Atthe hearing, DeMell's attorney requested any Committee notesofthe Malik interview. OnJune 10,2008,the Committee denied DeMell'srequest for 

### its notes ofthe Malik interview, statingthat it would not be relying on any statementsmade by Malik to the Committee, and that tothe extent thatthere was any infonnation inMalik's statementsthat mightbe deemed exculpatory, suchinfonnation was already available to DeMell from the sequence ofevents retlected in the docket sheet and related documents, in addition to Malik's submissions, all ofwhich were provided to DeMell. OnJune 11,2008, DeMell objected to the Committee's decision not to provide him the notes of the Malik interview. DeMell waspennitted two weeks from the date ofreceipt ofthe hearing transcriptto submita post·hearing brief. OnJune 5, 2008, DeMell submitted a copy ofthe file that he 2affirmed to have sent to the Malik finn onoraboutJanuary 10,2007. On June 24, 2008, DeMell submitted a post-hearing brief. and on November 13,2008 DeMell submitteda post-hearing letter. 

### III. Backeround The following facts are taken from court records and from DeMelJ's written submissions and testimony. DeMell has practiced lawfor overthirtyyears since his graduation from law school. He is a memberofthe bar ofthe State ofNew York, the State ofFlorida, and the Districtof Columbia; the U.S. CourtofAppeals for the Second, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits; and the United States District Courts for the Eastern District ofNew York, Southern District ofNew York, Connecticut, Central District ofFlorida, andthe Southern District ofFlorida. DeMell has approximately 500 or 600 active cases. He has the assistance ofthree paralegals and one receptionist, and he uses a former immigrationjudge to assist him with some cases. He works on almostexclusivelyimmigration cases. He testified that the bulk ofhis practice is administrative and that he has only several federal districtorcircuitcourtimmigration cases activeat any time. I. TheCourt's Initial ShowCause Order As described in the Referral Order, the Courtordered DeMel! in July 2007 to showcause why he should not be referred to the Committeefor investigation ofthe matters described therein (the "Initial**O~der').** The Initial Orderstated that the proceeding was initiated in connectionwith allegations that were made against DeMeII in Constantine v. Gonzales, No. 06-4885-ag, an appeal in which DeMell was counsel ofrecord. In Constantine, the governmentfiled a motion to dismiss onNovember 29, 2006. and DeMe\l did not file aresponse to the motion. The motion to dismiss was ultimatelydecided on February20, 2007without benefit ofopposingpapers. The Initial Orderstated that a newattorneyin the case, Pankaj Malik, filed two motions on March 7, 2007, requesting that she be substituted as counsel and that the motion to dismiss be recalendared. Malik's papers stated that shehad beenretained bythe petitionerin mid-January 2007and that in early February 2007 shelearned that DeMeB had not filed amotion for substitution. that the motion was calendaredfor February 16,2007,and that DeMell had not filed a response. The Initial Orderalso raised the issue ofDeMell'sconduct in Halimi v. Ridge, No. 05· 5474-ag, an appeal that wasdismissed for failure ofpetitioner's attorneyto file Fonn CIA. A Courtemployeecontacted DeMel) twice about filing theFonn CIA. and onthe second occasion DeMel! stated that the fonn would be "submitted asap." The Fonn CIA was never submittedand the casewas dismissed. 3The Initial Order also indicated that DeMel! had failed to timely file briefs in four other matters, although dismissal had not resulted. 

### 2. DeMell's Response to theCourt'sInitial Order OnJuly 25, 2007, DeMellresponded tothe Court!s Initial Order (the "Initial Response"). With respect to the Constantine appeal, DeMell stated that petitioner's famiJy contacted him about obtaining substitute counsel, but he could not recall when such contact.occurred. He also stated that Malik contacted him about taking overthe appeal andthat "[sJhe assured methat she would take action to substitute herappearance." According to the lnitia! Response, onJanuary 10,2007

- either "days orweeks"after his initial conversation with Malik

- she sent him a substitution note, and he then sent Malik via Federal Express papersrelated to the appeaL The Initial Response stated that DeMel! '"in good faith passed on these papers to anotherlawyer who had informed methat shewas taking overthiscase and trusted in her actions." He also stated that "[iJt may be that I failed to timely file an answerora substitution ofcounsel. Iat all times assisted newcounsel and didwhatwas in my client's interests and within what Jbelieved were the laws andrules ofthis CoUrt." With respect to the Halimi case, DeMell stated that he was "not sure who is responsible for filing Form C-A. Ifyourofficedetermines that this needs to be done at this time in orderto close outthis matterproperly I will do so." DeMell also addressed each ofthe late tiledbriefs, which are discussed in more detail below. 

### 3. TheCourt's Referral Order The Referral Orderdescribed DeMelJ's Initial Response to the July 2007 order as "unsatisfactory." The Referral Order stated that important issues were not addressed in the Initial Response, suchas when DeMetlwascontacted by Constantine'snew counsel and when Constantine's family told him that they wishedto substitute counsel. In addition, DeMell failed to statewhat actions he took to protecthis client's interests, as he claimedto have done. Also, becauseDeMell suggestedthat fault in failure to respond to the motion to dismiss lied with Malik, the Referral Order stated that**~'conflicting** assertions as to which attorney was at fault would require a credibility determination, which cannot be made based on the papers currently before thispanel." ' With respect to the HaBmi case, the Referral Order stated that the Initial Response did not explain his failure to file the Form CIA in light ofthe fact that a Court employeetwice contacted him about filing the form. DeMelI also failed to explain why it was reasonable to allow the case to be dismissed on default, or why, ifthe Court lackedjurisdiction, he did not oppose the government's request to transfer it to the Second Circuit. 4With respect to DeMell's failure to timely file briefs or otherdocuments in other matters, the Referral Order stated that "DeMel! fails to provide an explanation for why extensions oftime were not sought prior to the due dates forthe flJing ofthose documents." IV. Lc&al Standard Underthe Rules ofthis Committee, "An attorney may be subject to disciplineorothercorrective measures for any act oromission that violates the ruJes of professional conduct orresponsibility ofthe state orother jurisdiction where the attorney maintainshis orherprincipal office, orthe rules ofprofessional conduct ofany other state or jurisdiction governing the attorney'sconduct. An attorney may also be subject to discipline or othercorrective measures for any failure to comply with a Federal RuleofAppellate Procedure, a LoeaJ Rule oftheCourt, an order orotherinstruction ofthe Court, ora rule ofprofessional conduct orresponsibility ofthe Court, or any otherconductunbecoming a memberofthe bar." Rules ofthe Committee on Admissions and Grievances, Rule 4. "Acourt ofappeals may discipline an attorney who practices before it for conduct unbecoming a memberofthe bar orfor failure to comply with any court rule." Fed. R. App. P. 46(c). "Conduct unbecoming a memberofthe bar" may include any conduct "contraryto professional standards that show[s] an unfitness to dischargecontinuingobligations to clients or courts, orconduct inimical to the administrationof justice." In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 645 (1985). For "[m]orespecific guidance,"theCourt may look to "caselaw, applicablecourtrules, and 'the lore ofthe profession,' as embodied incodesofprofessional conduct." Id. at 646 n.7. Courts have consistentlytreated neglect ofclientmatters and ineffective orincompetent representation as sanctionable conduct.**See,~,** Oadda v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d934, 940 (9th Cir. 2004); Amnesty Am. v. Town ofW. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 133 (2d Cir. 2004); Matterof Rabinowitz. 596N.Y.S.2d 398,402 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); United States v. Song, 902 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1990); MatterofKraft. 543 N.Y.S.2d 449 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); In reBithoney,486 F.2d 319 (l st Cir. 1973). Such conductis also sanctionable underthe applicable professional rules and standards. TheAmerican BarAssociation's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions call for a range ofsanctions from reprimand to disbarment for various fonns of"lackof diligence" and "lackofcompetence." ABA Standards §§ 4.4, 4.5. The DisciplinaryRules of NewYork's Lawyer's CodeofProfessional Responsibilityrequire that "[a11awyer shall not

... [nJeglect a legal matterentrusted to the lawyer," D.R. 6-101(A)(3); in addition, the Code's Ethical Canons require that the lawyershould represent his orherclient "zealously,"Canon 7-1, and thatheor she 

### "be punctual in fulfilling all professional commitments," Canon 7·38. 5

### "Anyfinding that an attorney has engaged in misconduct or is otherwise subject to corrective measures must be supported by clearand convincing evidence." Rules ofthe CommitteeonAdmissions and Grievances, Rule 7(h). Once misconduct has been established, in determining the sanction to be imposed, the Committee should generally consider: (a) the duty violated; (b) the lawyer's mental state; (c) the actual orpotential injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and (d) the existence ofaggravating ormitigating factors. See ABA Standards § 

### 3.0. This Committee may recommend to the Court's Grievance Panel a range ofsanctions, including disbarment, suspension, public orprivate reprimand, monetary sanction, removal from ru:Q 

### bono or Criminal Justice Act panels, referral to otherdisciplinary bodies, supervision by a special master, counseling ortreatment, or "such otherdisciplinaryorcorrective measures as the circumstances may warrant." Rules ofthe Committee on Admissions and Grievances, Rule 6. V. Alleged Misconduct 

### A.**~onstantine** v. Gonzalez 

### On October 24, 2006, DeMell submitted, on behalfofhis client Ricardo Constantine, a petition forreview ofa decision ofthe Board ofImmigration Appeals ("BIN')dated July 19, 2006. On November 29, 2006 the government moved to dismiss on two grounds: (I)

### the Court lackedjurisdiction as an earlierappeal ofthe matterhad been dismissed and transferred backto the District Court where the matter was still pending, and (2) the petition for review was untimelybecause it was filed more than 30 days afterthe BIA order. On January 26, 2007, the Constantine docket indicates anotice to counsel that the motion was returnable on February 16, 2007. No opposition papers were filed. On February 20, 2007the Court dismissed the appeal for lackof jurisdiction. I 

### DeMell acknowledges that Constantine was prejudiced by the failure to file opposition papers, Hearing Tr. 20: 1 0-15, but contends that the failure to file an oppositionwas not his fault because Constantine had retained newcOWlSel, Pankaj Malik, and DeMelI had forwarded the file to Malik on January 10,2007. Itis DeMeU's positionthat it was the responsibility ofnew counsel to file an opposition to the motion to dismiss. According to Malik, on or about December 29, 2006 Constantine soughtto have Malik represent him in connection with the appeal. On or aboutJanuary 8, 2008, Malik sent a letterto DeMell confirmingthe change ofcounsel and asking DeMell to send her Constantine's file. Initially, Malik did not recall having received any documents from DeMell, although she later confirmed that on orabout January 11, 2007, she received documents from DeMel!. Records

I The Court's opinion granting themotion appears to have misperceived the motion to be directed toa petition for habeas reliefwhen in fact itwas directed to apetition for review. The Court's opinion did not discuss the reason set fonh in the petition for reviewto explain the tiling more than 30 days after the administrativedecision, butrather, viewing it as a habeas application. relied onthe Court's lack of jurisdiction in that circumstance. In this regard, it did notgrant dismissal for lack of juriSdiction on theground urged by the government. 

### 6rrom Federal Express confinnthat Malik'sfinn signed for such a package from DeMell'sfinn onJanuary] 1, 2007. However, Malikclaimed that the documents shereceived did notconstitute the entire file and that there was nothing in the documents that reflected the existence ofthe motiontodismiss orthat

### it was calendared for February 16,2007. DeMeU disputed this and produced a copyofthe file purportedly sent to Malikthat included the government's motion to dismiss. The Committeecreditshis testimony on the ground that he would havenoreason not to producethe entire file to Malikand thatthere is a lack ofclarity in Malik's account ofwhatshe received. Malik filed a notice ofappearanceon behalfofConstantine on February5, 2007, but no motion for substitution ofcounsel was filed until March 7,2007. Malik claimed that DeMell was responsible for filing a motion to substitutecounsel; DeMell claimed thatit was Malik's responsibility. In view ofthe reasons the Committee believesjustify a sanction,the Committee does not decide thatissue and notes thatthe matterappears not to 

### be clearly addressed in the federal or local rules. Ina motionpaper dated February 15,2007,Malik moved to re-caJendar the return dateofthe motiontodismiss. butdue to the absence ofa motion for substitution of counsel, the motion tore-calendar was not docketed until March 7. 2007 upon filing ofthe motion for substitution ofcounsel. OnMarch 19, 2007 the motion for substitution ofcounsel was granted, and on March 27. 2007 the motion to re-calendar was denied. 

### B. Halimi v. Ridge In Halimi, DeMell conceded that he failed to file the FOnTI CIA, which is a pre-argument statement in an administrative matter. Hearing Tr. 24·27. The Committee asked DeMellwhyhe did not file the statementeven though the ClerkoftheCourt asked him to submitit, and he responded: "I wish I could be very specific but overworked, it fell throughthe cracks, and Ibelieve at the time I thought thecase was, as we say, going south. I should have filed it. There was somequestion as to whetherI had responsibility ortheAssistant U.S. Attorney, because it was a referral based on theirrequest, but I shouldhave filed it." HearingTr. 26; 18-25. 

## c. FilingofUntimely Briefs orPapers The Courtalso noted that DeMellfiled late briefs orother documents in Bugayongv. Ashcrosft (03-4204-ag), Gray v. Gonzales (05-6088-ag), Khoma v. Gonzalez (06-0326-ag), Matadinv. Gonzales (06-4742-ag), andTorres v. Gonzalez**(07~** I185-ag). In Bugayong. DeMell filed a brief, along with a motionto accept the late brief, nearly five months late. The Court granted the motion to file the late brief. DeMeU statedthat the briefwas initiallyrejected as a result of"improperfonnatting," and that he**~'didn't** realize [the brief] was that late." Hearing Tr. 28:22·23; 29: 1·7. In**Gra~.** DeMell filed a supplemental brief, along with a motion to acceptthe late supplemental brief, nearly one week late. The Court granted the motion to file the late brief. DeMell statedthat the briefwas late asthe result ofa recent SupremeCourtdecision that could 7have had some impact on case strategyand that he was "overworked." Hearing Tr. 30:20-23. In**Khom~** DeMell did not file a brief, but he explained that there were difficulties in obtainingthe BIA record, which is supported by the docket entries in the case, and that the client "disappeared." In Matadin, DeMell filed a briefapproximately ten days late. DeMell filed a motion for extension oftime the day afterthe briefwas due, which was subsequentlyapproved by the Court. On November 13,2008, DeMeU infonnedthe Committee that the Second Circuit ruJed favorably for his client in the Matadincase. Finally, in Torres, DeMelI filed a brief, along with a motion to accept the latebrief, approximatelytwo weeks late. The Court granted the motion to file the late brief. DeMell could not recaJl why he filed the brieflate. Hearing Tr. 34: 18-21. 

### VI. Disciplinary Action is Warranted Based oncJear and convincing evidence, the Committee finds that disciplinary action is warranted in thiscase based on "conductunbecoming a memberofthe bar." Fed. 

### R. App. P. 46(c). Specifically, DeMell has engagedin "conduct inimical to the administration of justice,"In re**Snyder~**472 U.S. 634, 645 (1985), and neglected a matter entrusted to a lawyer, DR-6­

. 101 (AX3), by(1) failing to timely respond, or timely request an extension oftime to respond, to

a motiontodismiss. resulting in prejudice; (2) failing to file Fonn CIA as directed by the Court; and (3) failing to timely submitpapers, ortimely request an extension oftime,in several other cases. The Committee notes that there is no dispute over any fact that serves

### as a basis for disciplinary action. Aspreviously noted, in Constantine the government's motion to dismiss was filed on November29,2007. Under Second Circuit

### Local Rule 27, opposition to this motion was due 7 days after service in person or 10 days after serviceby mail. Thus, from a timeweB before new counsel was retained and up to the time DeMell transmitted the file to MalikonJanuary 10, 2008, the filing ofan opposition would have required a motion to file a latebrief. TheCommittee concludesthata significant contributing cause ofthe failure to file oppositionpapers- a failure that DeMel1 concedes wasprejudicial to Constantine, Hearing Tr. 20:10-15

- was DeMell'sfailure to file a timely response or a timelymotion for anenlargement oftime. When DeMell passed onthe file to Malik onorabout January 

### to, 2007, he passediton, eitherknowinglyor negligently, with a substantial procedural defaultthat wasbrought aboutdue to hisown, and no one else's, inaction. WhetherMalik thereafter acted with sufficient diligence to remedythatdefault, and the Committeetends todoubt that she did, wouldnot create a mitigating factor inDeMeU's favor. A failure ofsubstitute counsel toremedy a problem does not as an ethical matterexcuse the misconductofthe lawyerwho created the problem in the first instance by failing to file a timely opposition. This is particularly the casewhere the misconduct ofnot meeting the deadline orarranging for an extension prior to the expirationofthedeadline is not an isolated incident. FinaUy, DeMell as the departing lawyer failed to explicitly caJ) the



### 8

### existing problem to Malik's attention, thereby contributing to the default. 2 

### There are both aggravating and mitigating circumstances here. See ABA Standards §§ 

### 9.22; 932. Apattern offailing to meet deadlines or failing to apply for an extension before the deadline has passed would be an aggravating circumstance, and 

### an isolated instance would be 

### a mitigating circumstances ABA

### Standard §9.22(c) ("apattern**ofmisconduct")~** 

### 9.22(d) ("multiple offenses''). The facts here fall slightly on the sideofaggravation. DeMell offeredno reasonable explanation for the failure to file Fonn CIA 

### in Halimi afterthe clerk asked him to do so, and that failure resulted in dismissal. [n the Court's Referral Order, several instances are cited where DeMell moved to file a late brief, which motion was in all cases granted. In answering questions about these late briefswhen examined by Committee members, DeMell testified to plausible reasons for filing a late briefin several ofthe cases. However, with respect to 

### Gray. DeMell explained that he was overworked - areason that could always be available to one conducting an understaffedpractice. In Bugayong and Torres, DeMelI failed to providea reasonable explanation for the filing ofalatebrief. In all instances themotions for pennissionto tile alate briefwas filed after the due date. There is another aggravating factor present in this case. In his dealings withthis Committee, DeMell has not been completely candid. ABA Standard §

### 9.22(f) ("submission of false evidence, false statements, or otherdeceptive practices during the disciplinary proceeding"). In his April 12, 2008 Response submitted to the Committee byhis counsel, his counsel stated, "The govenunent in amotion filed November 29, 2006moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. An 

### opposition briefwas filed with the Court (Exhibit B)." This statementwas misleading. The opposition briefattached as Exhibit Brelated to anearlier proceeding undera differentdocketnumber involving Constantine and notto themotion made on November29, 2006. At the request ofthe Committee, and in accordance with its rules providing that all factual statementsmustbe made under oath, DeMell submitted an affinnation on May 28, 2008 confinning the accuracyofaU statements made in hisApril 12, 2008 Response. It is an aggravatingfactor that his aftinnation confinned as correct a misleading statement. The Committee is also concerned about DeMell's lack ofadequate commitmentto corrective action. When asked what lessons he 

### had learned, DeMell stated that he was embarrassed and understood that his workwas "getting sloppy" by filing late briefs and that he would have to "clean up [his] act." Hearing Tr. 38:3-7. However, particularlyin view ofhis concession that he has a high-volume practice and is overworked, proper corrective action would include a concrete commitment to reduce caseIoad orbetter staffing in hispractice. He said that he planned to raise his "fees abit" and "chaseaway" afew clients and "give more attention to the onesthat remain", 

### iQ. at 38:20-39:8, but offered no specific target for reduction in caseload or

2DeMell soughtthe Committee's interview notes with Malik. whichrequest the Committee denied for the reasons stated above. Moreover, the Committee doesnotbase irs recommendation on the resolution ofanydisputed fact adverselytoDeMell. 

### 9spedfic commitmenttoenhanced staffing. The final aggravating factor isthe vulnerability ofhis victims. ABA Standard 

### § 9.22(h). Mitigating factors include (1) the absence ofa priordisciplinaryrecord; (2) characteror reputation; and(3) remorse. Withrespectto mitigating factor (1), DeMeli states that hehasno disciplinary record inthe First Department. With respect to factor (2). while DeMell did not present any character witnesses, he attached several documents tohis April 

### J2, 2008 submission showing that: he served as a lecturerforTheNassau Academy ofLaw PrograminJune 2005, May 2002. J994-]995, and 1996-1997; he received a certificate ofappreciation from the Nassau CountyBarAssociation'S SpeakersBureaufrom 2000·2001; and he served asChairofthe Immigration Law Committee ofthe BarAssociation ofNassauCountyin 1999-200I and 1995­ 1997. With respect to factor (3). DeMell statedthathe needed to "clean up [his] act"with respectto late briefs. However, he did not agree that he shared any fault for the dismissal in the Constantine case, which somewhatcuts against this as a mitigating factor. 

### VII. Recommendation A single instance ofconduct inimical to the administration of justice orneglect ofa matterentrusted to an attorney might notjustifyany sanction. but here there are a numberof instances ofmisconduct and neglect. Inaddition, conduct and neglect arising from a high volume practice is seriousbecause ofthe likelihood thatrepetitiveneglectwill resultto the detriment ofpresent and future clients. Where a lawyer engagesin practice at a sufficientlyhigh volume, negJect dueto overworkand inadequatecoverageisa riskknowingly assumed. And here, DeMell's actions prejudiced oneofhisclients. The aggravating factors are significant, and DeMell did notstate any concrete steps that he had taken to address hisconductotherthanincreasinghis fees. DeMell doesnothave a significant federal districtorcircuitcourtpractice, but there is a high incidence oflate briefs in the Second Circuit. Accordingly, DeMeH should bepubliclyreprimanded for hisfailures as setforth herein. (Adraft fonn ofreprimand is attached). Inaddition, he should be required, inconnection with his practice inany federal court inthe Second Circuitorin any federal administrative agency whose action is subject to the SecondCircuit'sreview, to submitto the Commineesworn statements identifying underoatheach

### and every instanceduringeach ofthe four reporting periods described belowin which (l)a submission isnot filedor

### filed out 0ftime; or (2) an applicationis made for pennission to make a late tiling onlyafterthedue date has passed. Itis expected that these reports will showno such instances absent exigentcircumstance, which circumstancesshould be attested to under oathintherespective report. In the event that a report is not timely

### filed or reveals deficiencies notjustified byexigent circumstance, the Committeemayrecommend the imposition ofadditional discipline. including 10

### but not limited to suspension from the Second Circuit, withouthearing furthertestimony. The following reporting periods and deadlines shaH be 

### observed. The report foreach reporting period shall be mailed to the Committee Secretary within ten (10) days ofthe end of thatreporting period. The first reporting period shall commence 10days afterthe Committee's recommendation is mailed to DeMell and shall end six months afterthe Second Circuitissues its orderofdispositionin this matter. Each ofthe three subsequent reporting periods shaU be

### for a reportingperiod commencing at the end ofthe priorreporting and ending slx months later. A total offour reports will beprepared and mailed to the Committee Secretary.

11