# United States Court of Appeals **For the Eighth Circuit**

___________________________ No. 13-1718

___________________________ United States of America, lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee , v. Cedric Dion Edwards, also known as Fat Ced, lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
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____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock

____________ Submitted: September 6, 2013 Filed: September 17, 2013 [Unpublished]

____________ Before LOKEN, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________ PER CURIAM. Cedric Edwards directly appeals after he pleaded guilty to a drug charge and the district court 1 imposed a within-Guidelines-range sentence. His counsel has moved

1 The Honorable James M. Moody, United St ates District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.to withdraw, and in a brief f iled under Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), he argues that the district court committed reve rsible error at sentencing. In a pro se supplemental brief, Edwards argues that he should not have been classified as a career offender, because one of the predicat e convictions, a 2010 controlled-substance offense, was not actually sustained because the charge was dismi ssed. Citing Alleyne v. United States , 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), he also argues that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated because his career-offender status was not alleged in the indictment. He suggests that his plea was unknowing, and also that counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Addressing the pro se arguments first, wenote that Edwards stipulated in his written plea agreement that he believed he was a career offender. He did not object to the presentence report’s st atement that the 2010 convicti on existed, and the district court was entitled to accept the stipulatedand unobjected-to fact as true. SeeUnited States v. Douglas , 646 F.3d 1134, 1137 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Early , 77 F.3d 242, 244 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). In any event, because Edwards did not raise the matter at sentencing, we review only for plain error, seeUnited States v. Troyer , 677 F.3d 356, 358 (8th Cir. 2012), and he fails to show an obvious error occurred. Edwards offers nothing more than his bald assertion to dispute the fact of his 2010 conviction. Edwards’s complaint that his sentence is unconstitutional because the indictment did not charge his career-offender status is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224 (1998), which remains good law. See Alleyne , 133 S. Ct. at 2160 n.1; see also United States v. Sohn , 567 F.3d 392, 394-96 (8th Cir. 2009). We decline to consider Edwards’s ineffective-assistance claims on direct review, see United States v. McAdory , 501 F.3d 868, 872-73 (8th Cir. 2007), and his suggestion that his gu ilty plea was unknowing is not cognizable because he made no attempt to withdraw his plea. United States v. VillarealAmarillas , 454 F.3d 925, 932 (8th Cir. 2006). -2-As to the Anders brief argument, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Edwards. See generally United States v. Feemster , 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc). Having independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court, and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

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