alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: Burton Lamar Turner v. The State of Texas

Appellate case number: 01-15-00858-CR

Trial court case number: 1448052

Trial court: 337th District Court of Harris County

On December 10, 2015, we issued an order, abating the appeal and directing the trial 

court to correct the certification of the defendant’s right to appeal. On January 5, 2016, a 

supplemental clerk’s record was filed, containing a certification indicating defendant has the 

right to appeal.

We reinstate the appeal on the active docket. Appellant’s brief is due 30 days from the 

date of this order.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Harvey Brown

 Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: January 12, 2016
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 23-3223

___________________________

James A. Daly

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant

v.

City of DeSoto, Missouri; Jeff McCreary

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees

 ____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

 ____________

 Submitted: June 24, 2024

Filed: June 27, 2024

 [Unpublished]

____________

Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

James Daly appeals following the district court’s1 adverse grant of summary

judgment on his claims against his former employer, the City of DeSoto (the City),

1The Honorable John A. Ross, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.
alleging that he was retaliated against during his time as a sergeant with the City’s

police department, which ultimately culminated in his termination. Upon careful

review, we conclude that summary judgment was proper. See Henry v. Johnson, 950

F.3d 1005, 1010 (8th Cir. 2020) (standard of review). As to the state-law retaliation

claim, we agree with the district court that “the record lacks any instance or

accumulation of events targeting Daly that a reasonable person objectively would

consider so abusive or severe as to constitute an actionable hostile work

environment.” See Watson v. Heartland Health Labs., Inc., 790 F.3d 856, 864 (8th

Cir. 2015); Thorn v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 305 F.3d 826, 831 (8th Cir. 2002). 

As to the First Amendment retaliation claim, we agree with the district court that

Daly’s termination was justified under the balancing test set out in Pickering v. Bd.

of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), particularly as the City provided sufficient evidence

that Daly’s speech disrupted the City’s operations. See Noon v. City of Platte Woods,

94 F.4th 759, 764 (8th Cir. 2024); Henry, 950 F.3d at 1012; Anzaldua v. Northeast

Ambulance & Fire Prot. Dist., 793 F.3d 822, 835 (8th Cir. 2015). To the extent Daly

also raised these claims against the chief of police in his official capacity, we

conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing such claims as redundant. 

See King v. City of Crestwood, 899 F.3d 643, 650 (8th Cir. 2018); Rumery v.

Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999). 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. 

______________________________

-2-
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<CAPTION>
<S>                                                    <C>
<ARTICLE>                                              5
<MULTIPLIER>                                           1000
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                          6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                      Dec-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                           Jun-30-1999
<CASH>                                                      42,800
<SECURITIES>                                                22,100
<RECEIVABLES>                                              333,800
<ALLOWANCES>                                                 8,100
<INVENTORY>                                                490,500
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                           989,000
<PP&E>                                                   6,109,800
<DEPRECIATION>                                           2,357,800
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                           5,961,600
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                      441,800
<BONDS>                                                  2,480,600
<COMMON>                                                   125,100
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                            0
<PREFERRED>                                                      0
<OTHER-SE>                                               1,855,500
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                             5,961,600
<SALES>                                                  1,534,800
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                         1,534,800
<CGS>                                                    1,141,200
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                            1,230,200
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                            19,200
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                                 0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                          92,800
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                            192,600
<INCOME-TAX>                                                72,200
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                        120,400
<DISCONTINUED>                                                   0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                  0
<CHANGES>                                                   (7,500)
<NET-INCOME>                                               112,900
<EPS-BASIC>                                                 0.99
<EPS-DILUTED>                                                 0.99

<FN>
<F1>
Earnings per share has been calculated in accordance with Statement  of
Financial  Accounting Standard No. 128, "Earnings Per Share,"  and  is,
therefore, stated on a basic and diluted basis.



</TABLE>
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: DJ Christopher Lowe v. The State of Texas

Appellate case number: 01-14-00158-CR

Trial court case number: 10-DCR-055397

Trial court: 400th Judicial District Court of Fort Bend County

Appellant’s court-appointed counsel filed a brief on December 18, 2014, 

concluding that the above-referenced appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 

U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). On January 8, 2015, because appellant’s 

counsel failed to file a motion to withdraw and the notice required with his Anders brief, 

we ordered counsel to send the required letter and file the motion and notice within 15 

days of the date of that order. On January 20, 2015, appellant, acting pro se, has filed the 

form motion requesting access to a copy of the record to prepare a response to counsel’s 

brief and requesting a 30-day extension of time to file his pro se Anders brief response. 

See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 315, 318–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

We grant the motion requesting the record and order the trial court clerk, no later 

than 10 days from the date of this order, to provide a copy of the record, including the 

clerk’s record, the reporter’s record, and any supplemental records, to the pro se

appellant. The trial court clerk shall further certify to this Court, within 15 days of the 

date of this order, the date upon which delivery of the record to the appellant is made. 

Finally, we grant appellant’s motion for an extension of time to file a pro se

Anders response. Appellant’s pro se response to his counsel’s Anders brief shall be filed

within 45 days of the date of this order.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Evelyn V. Keyes

  Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: January 27, 2015
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 96 (Wednesday, May 20, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 23683-23684]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-11762]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Foreign-Trade Zones Board

[Order No. 1621]


Grant of Authority for Subzone Status; Michelin North America, 
Inc. (Tire Warehousing and Distribution); San Bernardino, CA

    Pursuant to its authority under the Foreign-Trade Zones Act of 
June 18, 1934, as amended (19 U.S.C. 81a-81u), the Foreign-Trade 
Zones Board (the Board) adopts the following Order:

    Whereas, the Foreign-Trade Zones Act provides for ``* * * the 
establishment * * * of foreign-trade zones in ports of entry of the 
United States, to expedite and encourage foreign commerce, and for 
other purposes,'' and authorizes the Foreign-Trade Zones Board to grant 
to qualified corporations the privilege of establishing foreign-trade 
zones in or adjacent to U.S. Customs and Border Protection ports of 
entry;
    Whereas, the Board's regulations (15 CFR Part 400) provide for the 
establishment of special-purpose subzones when existing zone facilities 
cannot serve the specific use involved, and when the activity results 
in a significant public benefit and is in the public interest;
    Whereas, the Board of Harbor Commissioners of the Port of Long 
Beach, grantee of FTZ 50, has made application to the Board for 
authority to establish special-purpose subzone status at the tire and 
tire accessories warehousing and distribution facility of Michelin 
North America, Inc., located in San Bernardino, California (FTZ Docket 
38-2008, filed 5/28/2008);

[[Page 23684]]

    Whereas, notice inviting public comment has been given in the 
Federal Register (73 FR 31812, 6/4/2008); and,
    Whereas, the Board adopts the findings and recommendations of the 
examiner's report, and finds that the requirements of the FTZ Act and 
the Board's regulations are satisfied, and that approval of the 
application is in the public interest;
    Now, therefore, the Board hereby grants authority for subzone 
status for activity related to tire warehousing and distribution at the 
Michelin North America, Inc. facility located in San Bernardino, 
California (Subzone 50L), as described in the application and Federal 
Register notice, and subject to the FTZ Act and the Board's 
regulations, including Section 400.28.

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 7th day of May 2009.
Ronald K. Lorentzen,
Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Import Administration, 
Alternate Chairman, Foreign-Trade Zones Board.
    Attest: Andrew McGilvray, Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. E9-11762 Filed 5-19-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P
EXHIBIT 23.2
                           kpmg Moldova




To the Directors and Stockholders of
FPL Hancesti:


Consent of Independent Auditors


We  consent  to incorporation by reference in the registration
statement  No.  33-6867  on Form S-8 of  Developed  Technology
Resources Inc. of our report dated April 30, 1999 relating  to
the balance sheets of FPL Hancesti as of December 31, 1997 and
1998  and  the related statement of operations and cash  flows
for the year ended December 31, 1998, which report appears  in
the  December  31,  1998  annual  report  on  form  10-KSB  of
Developed Technology Resources Inc.

Our  report,  dated  April 30, 1999, contains  an  explanatory
paragraph  that states that the Company has suffered recurring
losses and has an accumulated deficit as at December 31, 1998.
These  matters, combined with the uncertainty due to the  year
2000  issue  and the current economic environment in  Moldova,
raise  substantial  doubt  about  the  Company's  ability   to
continue as a going concern. The financial statements  do  not
include any adjustments that might result from the outcome  of
this uncertainty.



/s/ KPMG Moldova



Chisinau, Republic of Moldova
April 30, 1999
EXHIBIT 10.1


 


Term Extensions to Xbox®
Publisher License Agreement


 


THQ Inc. (“Publisher”)
and Microsoft Licensing, GP have entered
into that certain Xbox® Publisher License Agreement dated on or about March 20,
2001 (the “PLA”).   The term of the PLA
is three years from the first commercial launch of the Xbox, which was November
15, 2001.  The PLA will therefore expire
by its own terms on November 15, 2004.  
The parties hereby extend the term of the PLA and all amendments,
addenda and supplemental agreements thereto with term expirations that tie to
the expiration of the PLA until March 1, 2005.


 


 


Acknowledged and Agreed to:


 


 


	
  MICROSOFT LICENSING, GP

  	
   

  	
  THQ INC.

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  By (sign)

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  By (sign)

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Name (Print)

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  Name (Print)

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Title

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  Title

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Date

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  Date
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 32.1



                     CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO:

                       18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
            SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Omagine, Inc. on Form
10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2009 (the "Report"), as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof, the undersigned certifies, pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

        (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of
section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and

        (2) The information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of Omagine, Inc.


/s/Frank J. Drohan
------------------
Frank J. Drohan
Chief Executive & Financial Officer


August 14, 2009

The originally executed copy of this certification will be
maintained at the Registrant's offices and will be made
available for inspection upon request.
<PAGE>


                                                                    Exhibit 99.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Grey Wolf, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the three month period ended March 31, 2003 (the
"Report"), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof, I, David W. Wehlmann, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

         2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.





/s/ David W. Wehlmann
----------------------------------------------------
David W. Wehlmann
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer


Date:    April 30, 2003
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

In re: JOHN H. BANKS, MARY BANKS, 

ELIZABETH S. ERRANT TRUST, EUGENE J. 

FRETT, individually and as trustee of the Victor J. 

Horvath and Frances B. Horvath Trust dated November 1995, CHERIE R. OKONSKI, CRAIG D. 

OKONSKI, ANDREW G. BODNAR, CHRISTINE M. 

ZAHL-BODNAR, EHRET MICHIGAN TRUST,

Petitioners

______________________

2020-124

______________________

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States 

Court of Federal Claims in Nos. 1:00-cv-00365-EMR, 1:00-

cv-00379-EMR, 1:00-cv-00380-EMR, 1:00-cv-00381-EMR, 

1:00-cv-00382-EMR, 1:00-cv-00383-EMR, 1:00-cv-00384-

EMR, 1:00-cv-00385-EMR, 1:00-cv-00386-EMR, 1:00-cv00387-EMR, 1:00-cv-00388-EMR, 1:00-cv-00389-EMR, 

1:00-cv-00390-EMR, 1:00-cv-00391-EMR, 1:00-cv-00392-

EMR, 1:00-cv-00393-EMR, 1:00-cv-00394-EMR, 1:00-cv00395-EMR, 1:00-cv-00396-EMR, 1:00-cv-00398-EMR, 

1:00-cv-00399-EMR, 1:00-cv-00400-EMR, 1:00-cv-00401-

EMR, 1:05-cv-01353-EMR, 1:05-cv-01381-EMR, 1:06-cv00072-EMR, 1:99-cv-04451-EMR, 1:99-cv-04452-EMR, 

1:99-cv-04453-EMR, 1:99-cv-04454-EMR, 1:99-cv-04455-

EMR, 1:99-cv-04456-EMR, 1:99-cv-04457-EMR, 1:99-cv04458-EMR, 1:99-cv-04459-EMR, 1:99-cv-44510-EMR, and 

1:99-cv-44511-EMR, Judge Eleni M. Roumel.

______________________

Case: 20-124 Document: 4 Page: 1 Filed: 04/10/2020
2 IN RE: BANKS

ON PETITION

______________________

Before REYNA, WALLACH, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

O R D E R

The parties in this longstanding litigation are currently engaged in alternative dispute resolution before the 

trial court. Plaintiffs John H. Banks et al. (collectively, 

“Banks”) now petition for a writ of mandamus asking this 

court “to order that its footnote 4 [in Banks v. United 

States, 721 Fed. App’x 928 (Fed. Cir. 2017),] be considered 

mandatory” and to direct the United States to indicate 

whether it agrees or disagrees with what appear to be 

Banks’ calculations regarding real estate lost by erosion. 

To prevail on a mandamus petition, a party must show: 

(1) it has a clear legal right to relief; (2) there are no adequate alternative legal channels through which it may obtain that relief; and (3) the grant of mandamus is 

appropriate under the circumstances. See Cheney v. U.S. 

Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 380–81 

(2004); Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 426 

U.S. 394, 403 (1976). Banks has not shown in the papers 

submitted that it has satisfied that standard at this time. 

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

The petition for writ of mandamus is denied.

April 10, 2020

Date

FOR THE COURT

/s/ Peter R. Marksteiner

Peter R. Marksteiner

Clerk of Court

s25

Case: 20-124 Document: 4 Page: 2 Filed: 04/10/2020
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Orlando Demetrius WHEAT, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 04-11101

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 24, 2006.

Delonia Anita Watson, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Peter Michael Fleury, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before JOLLY, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

In 2000, Orlando Demetrius Wheat was convicted pursuant to a guilty plea of being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced to 27 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Wheat appeals the sentence imposed following the revocation of his supervised release.

Citing *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), *Blakely v. Washington,*542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), and *United States v. Booker,*543 *582U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), Wheat complains that the 27-month term of imprisonment imposed for his conviction and the 14-month term of imprisonment imposed for his violation of supervised release exceeded in the aggregate the 33-month total term of imprisonment allowed under the United States Sentencing Guidelines for his initial conviction based on the facts alleged in his indictment and admitted by him. Wheat argues as a result that the district court was authorized to impose no more than a six-month term of imprisonment upon revocation of his supervised release unless the facts pertaining to his release violations were alleged in an indictment and found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Wheat contends that the alleged *Booker*violation in his case cannot be cured by application of *Booker’s*remedial advisory guidelines system because his initial sentence is final and because it would violate due process and ex post facto laws. Wheat’s arguments lack merit. *See United States v. Alfaro-Hernandez,*453 F.3d 280, 281-82 (5th Cir.2006); *United States v. Hinson,*429 F.3d 114, 116-19 (5th Cir. 2005), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1804, 164 L.Ed.2d 540 (2006).

The 14-month term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation of Wheat’s supervised release did not exceed the statutory maximum term of imprisonment that the district court could have imposed. *See*18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Accordingly, Wheat’s sentence upon revocation was neither “unreasonable” nor “plainly unreasonable.” *See Hinson,*429 F.3d at 120.

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
**Exhibit 31.2**

 

**CERTIFICATIONS**

 

I, Edward L. Williams, Interim Chief Financial Officer of Telos Corporation, certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Telos Corporation; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statementof a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

 

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of theregistrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

 

c) Disclosed in this report any change in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and 

 

5. The registrant’s othercertifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors: 

 

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses inthe design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involvesmanagement or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

Date: August 20, 2004