Ann Caracristi Institute

For Intelligence Research

A WORLD EMERGING 

FROM PANDEMIC

Implications for Intelligence and National Security

Edited by Stacey E. Pollard and Lawrence A. Kuznar
A WORLD EMERGING 

FROM PANDEMIC

Implications for Intelligence and National Security

Edited by Stacey E. Pollard and Lawrence A. Kuznar
The goal of the NI Press is to publish high quality, valuable, and timely 

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Acknowledgments

This volume sprang from a partnership between NIU and the Joint 

Staff Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) office. Authors explore 

the transformative influence of the COVID-19 pandemic on the intelligence enterprise, probing how that influence is shaping the present—

and will shape the future. 

Numerous people from both organizations worked to move the project 

from idea to reality. This book would not have been possible without the 

sponsorship of Manolis Priniotakis, NIU’s vice president for research 

and infrastructure, and CAPT (Ret) Todd Veazie, USN, the director of 

SMA. We thank all authors—who freely gave of their time, talent, and 

expertise. Finally, we thank the people from both organizations who are 

not mentioned by name, but contributed to this effort in innumerable 

ways, from early brainstorming sessions to final editing and publication. Without their efforts, this book would not have been possible. 

Ann Caracristi Institute

For Intelligence Research

5

CONTENTS

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  

Josh Kerbel

Introduction: The COVID-19 Pandemic and Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Stacey E. Pollard and Lawrence A. Kuznar

PART ONE: LOOKING IN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

COVID and Intelligence: Corrections, Overcorrections, 

and the Status Quo Ante . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Manolis Priniotakis

PART TWO: LOOKING OUT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Technology and Global Supply Chain Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Jason Schenker

Figure 1. E-Commerce Retailers as Percent of Retail Sales Surged in Q2 2020 . 

Figure 2. E-Commerce Retailers Showed Record Revenues in Q2 2020, 

Q1 2021 . 

COVID-19 and Inequality in Human Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Jon Hall, Carolina Rivera Vázquez, Heriberto Tapia, and Jacob Assa

Figure 1. Human Development Index . 

Figure 2. COVID-19’s Unprecedented Shock to Human Development . 

Figure 3. Short-term Effective Out-of-School Rate 

for Primary Education (Q2 2020) . 
6

A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

Figure 4. Countries Implementing Nonpharmaceutical 

Interventions (as of April 2020) . 

Figure 5. Cumulative COVID-19 Vaccination Doses Administered 

per 100 People . 

Figure 6. Female Labor Force Participation Rates in Mexico, 

Chile, and Colombia . 

The Long-term Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic on 

Political Instability and Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Cristina Bodea and Christian Houle

Latin America: Political Instability Gives Organized Crime 

a Window To Expand Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Jimena Blanco

Figure 1. Initial Pandemic Response Suppressed Protest Levels . .

Figure 2. Lockdown and Quarantine Measures Initially 

Reduced Civil Unrest . .

Islamic State Resurgence in the Era of COVID-19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

Stacey Pollard, Henry Baraket, Girish Ganesan, and Natalie Kim

Figure 1. Dramatic Rise in Attacks Claimed by ISIS in Iraq . .

Figure 2. Dramatic Rise in Attacks Claimed by ISIS in Syria . .

Transnational Crime During a Pandemic: How Criminals Are 

Capitalizing on the Chaos Caused by COVID-19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

Layla M. Hashemi, Sarah Meo, and Louise Shelley

A Postpandemic Outlook for Organized Criminal Activities:

Agility Across the Physical, Social, and Cyber Spaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

Jim Jones and Anthony Stefanidis

Figure 1. The Prepandemic Attack Surface . .

Figure 2. The Postpandemic Direct Attack Surface . .

Figure 3. The Postpandemic Indirect Attack Surface . .

Figure 4. A Taxonomy of Illicit Activities . .
7

Contents

COVID-19 and the Information Ecosystem: Lessons from Russian 

Malign Influence Campaigns for the Post-COVID-19 World . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

Kacper T. Gradon

PART THREE: LOOKING FORWARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

Beware a Virus Bearing Gifts: Can a “Great Leveler” 

Be Our Elites’ Best Friend? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231

Michael Vlahos

What Goes Around Comes Around? Historical Comparison 

of Impacts, Responses, and Long-term Effects of the 

1918 H1N1 vs. 2020 COVID-19 Pandemics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Lawrence A. Kuznar

Figure 1. U.S. 1918 H1N1 Pandemic Proportion of Deaths 

by Age Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

Figure 2. U.S. COVID-19 Pandemic Proportion of Deaths 

by Age Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250

COVID Had No Secrets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27

Josh Kerbel and Zachery Tyson Brown 

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285

Conclusion: A World System Changed by the 

COVID-19 Pandemic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28

Lawrence A. Kuznar and Stacey E. Pollard

Figure 1. World System During COVID-19 Pandemic: Relationships 

Among Social, Political, Cohesion, and Economic Variables . .

Figure 2. First- Through Third-Order Effects of the 

COVID-19 Pandemic: An Example . .

Figure 3. Direct, First-Order Relationships During the 

COVID-19 Pandemic . .
8

A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

Figure 4. First-, Second-, and Third-Order Impacts of the 

COVID-19 Pandemic on the World System . .

Figure 5. Disinformation Impacts on the World System During 

the COVID-19 Pandemic . .

Figure 6. Corruption’s Impact on Governance and Security 

During the COVID-19 Pandemic . .
9

FOREWORD

Josh Kerbel

This volume explores how the COVID-19 pandemic may reshape 

the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). Yet, it is not a volume 

about the COVID-19 pandemic. In the pages that follow, the COVID19 pandemic is a stand-in, a proxy, for a much larger challenge: complexity. Complexity, of course, predates COVID-19. It is something 

that has always been with us. However, if COVID-19 has taught us 

anything it ought to be that complexity—in myriad forms—is now the 

predominant security challenge confronting us. 

Complexity: What Does it Really Mean?

Before assessing how much strategic complexity concerns the IC—

not to mention how much it should—it is necessary to understand 

what it really means to say that the world is complex. For most 

national security practitioners (like most people in general) it seems 

to mean the obvious: that the world is a confusing, disordered, tangled, and convoluted place. And, indeed, all of those descriptions do 

apply to any genuinely complex system.

Adapted in part from the NIU Research Short: “Complexity, COVID, and the Failure 

of Strategic Incrementalism”
10

A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

However, using complexity as a mere synonym for those terms 

is to miss the more important—systemic—meaning of the term. 

Today’s global system is so highly interconnected and interdependent—orders of magnitude more so than the Cold War strategic 

environment that preceded it—that it is extraordinarily prone to a 

phenomenon known as “emergence.” Emergence is the organic (not 

centrally directed) generation and propagation of nonlinear (more 

than the sum of the parts) phenomena that are systemically disruptive and/or transformative. And it is the crux of complexity. It is precisely such emergent phenomena that are the truly vital issues when 

one describes the world as complex.

So, what are some examples of emergence in a global context? 

Well, they run the gamut of today’s most pressing strategic challenges: climate change, globalization, urbanization, economic/financial contagion, sweeping political/social movements, critical network 

failure, extremism, cyber threats, mass migration, technology preference/standardization, infectious propagation of lies, and, of course, 

pandemics. All of them are, first and foremost, functions of today’s 

extraordinary complexity.

And what of China and the increasingly prevalent strategic 

notion of renewed great power competition? Well, the same holds. 

Quite simply, China is ever more enmeshed in today’s global networks, and, thus, the key challenges it poses are more likely to be 

emergent rather than derived from some Cold War-like (i.e., linear, 

force-on-force) calculation of the country’s brute military capability. This is already evident in China’s obvious role in so many of the 

emergent global phenomena described above—most notably at the 

moment, the COVID-19 pandemic.

Extraordinary Complexity 

The nature of today’s complexity is revolutionary, as the COVID-19 

pandemic makes clear. Never in history has a pandemic been able 
11

Foreword

to emerge and spread with the speed, global scope, and impact of 

COVID-19. Due largely to comprehensive modern transportation 

links and commerce patterns, few parts of the world and few people 

are not physically accessible within 20 hours.1

 Most conspicuously, 

the post-Cold War world has not only seen the largest piece of previously disconnected territory—Russia—connect and integrate, but it 

has also seen, in China, the largest previously disconnected population do the same. 

Given this growth in interconnectivity and interdependence, it 

is no wonder that COVID-19 has been able to emerge and spread 

around the world in the exponential way it has. That emergent 

behavior—which would have been impossible during the Cold War 

because there just was not enough physical interconnectivity and 

interdependence—makes it hard to argue that the complexity of the 

post-Cold War era is not really different.

But even if one still somehow insists that the above does not 

represent anything fundamentally different, what about the virtual 

world’s complexity? COVID-19’s physical impact has been matched, 

and possibly exceeded, by its virtual reach. This is largely because it 

is only in the past 30 years that it has become possible for anyone—

not just governments, corporations, and/or the supremely wealthy—

to broadcast effectively. Today, the World Wide Web (born only in 

19892

) permits anyone’s ideas, fears, hopes, information, lies—you 

name it—to rapidly and widely propagate. Is it any wonder then that 

COVID-19 could be perceived in so many, often conflicting, ways 

in the public health sphere? Not to mention the pandemic’s having 

such immediate and extraordinary impact in domains beyond public health?

To illustrate this latter point, consider how quickly the COVID19 pandemic was able to bring the global economy to its knees. It 

took the Great Depression several years to reach its nadir. It took 

COVID-19 mere weeks to inflict similar economic carnage.3

 And 

because global Internet penetration is only at around 53.6 percent, 
12

A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

the ability for emergent phenomena to virtually appear, propagate, 

and disrupt is only going to grow.4

 All told, virtual interconnectivity 

and interdependence, as exemplified by COVID-19’s virtual transmission and amplification, give entirely new meaning and relevance 

to the expression “to go viral.” 

The Cold War’s Complicated Legacy: Ambivalence and Unpreparedness

The world on some level has always been complex. No one seriously 

disputes that fact. But neither is it disputable that the IC’s formative 

experience—even today—remains the Cold War. And the Cold War 

was not particularly complex; it was, in systems parlance, complicated.5

 That is to say, it was essentially a two-body problem and, therefore, lacked the highly interconnected and interdependent conditions 

that spawn nonlinear (emergent) phenomena. All told, the Cold War’s 

primacy in the eyes of the national security community eclipsed the 

complexity of the larger world. Even so, the complexity that did exist 

in the background—remember this was pre-World Wide Web—was 

simply lesser than that of today. 

This enduring prevalence of the Cold War’s complicated notions, 

and the ambivalence with regard to complexity that those notions have 

bequeathed, can be seen in how stunningly unprepared the broader 

national security community, including the IC, is for the complexity 

it now confronts. For evidence, one again need only look at COVID19. COVID-19 renders irrelevant most of the traditional security 

assumptions—military, intelligence, diplomatic—upon which the 

national security community stands. COVID-19 has no central head 

to be decapitated, shocked, or awed. It has no ships, tanks, planes, or 

satellites. It has no classified plans to be stolen. And it cannot be bargained with, threatened, or persuaded to stand down. 

At the time of this writing, COVID-19 has killed more than 200 

times the number of Americans killed on 9/11 and more than 250 

times the number killed at Pearl Harbor.6

 Moreover, many aspects of 
13

Foreword

our society have been profoundly—and probably permanently—disrupted. When it comes to national security in today’s world, things 

truly are very different.

The World’s Complexity Is Reshaping Itself, Not Receding

Given the above, it is no wonder that the national security community 

would look for reasons to question this reality. In its latest form, this 

doubt argues that increasing complexity—as manifested in globalization—probably has crested and that developments like onshoring 

(sometimes called reshoring), 3-D printing, the increasing availability of viable local energy sources (fracking, wind, etc.), resurgent 

nationalism, the United States-China trade war, etc. will now start 

unwinding the world’s interconnectivity and interdependence.7

 This 

line of argumentation has been misleadingly bolstered by COVID-19 

and the associated restrictions or constraints on physical movement 

that the pandemic has, at least temporarily, imparted.

It is certainly true that globalization has been evolving for some 

time, and COVID-19 will surely influence that process in various ways. 

However, the old, physical measures of how much stuff is shipped 

around the world are no longer the best barometer of globalization.8

Today, the global economy is increasingly digital (i.e., virtual), and 

consequently the traditional metrics of trade (value of shipped goods) 

no longer capture the, well, complexity of the modern supply chain.9

Furthermore, for whatever crimp on physical interconnectivity 

and interdependence the COVID-19 pandemic may have helped 

impose, its effect has been the exact opposite in virtual/digital terms. 

The COVID-19 pandemic has seen virtual interconnectivity and 

interdependence spike as impeded physical links have been compensated for or overcome by virtual ones.10 People will eventually 

go back to the office and school, but teleworking, online education, 

and other growing virtual connections are unlikely to shrink to prepandemic levels.11
14

A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

Speaking of telework, this experience has been particularly disorienting for the IC. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, anyone who 

had said the IC would soon face a situation where many officers 

need to work from home—because the systems they require (web 

cams, microphones, video-chat, etc.) to do their jobs are not available in the office—would have been laughed out of the room. And 

yet, here we are. 

All told, the world’s interconnectivity and interdependence are 

not so much going to unwind as take on new forms and patterns—

especially virtual. And these new manifestations must become primary drivers for how the national security community conceives 

itself, its roles, and its responsibilities. Nation-states and traditional 

military threats still matter. However, short of outright war (and 

maybe even then), their power probably will be determined more by 

their ability to manipulate the world’s interconnectivity and interdependence—networks: political, economic, social, and military—than 

by traditional military power.

Unprecedented Complexity Demands Unprecedented Changes

At the end of the day, the essential question that still needs to be asked 

is: why does it matter whether the IC and broader national security 

community truly believe in the fundamental nature of the change 

that today’s complexity—as embodied in the COVID-19 pandemic—

represents? Well, the answer is not that complex. It is actually quite 

simple: fundamental change demands fundamental changes.

Unfortunately, to look at the national security community’s 

changes—both proposed in assorted strategies and concrete in 

implementation—is to see mostly incremental initiatives aimed 

at improving, enhancing, upgrading, and reinforcing. Often these 

incremental changes get characterized in “powerful” terms—better!, 

stronger!, faster!, smarter!—that are practically Orwellian in that 

they aim to “give an appearance of solidity to pure wind.”12 As good 
15

Foreword

as they sound—who does not want to be better, stronger, faster, and 

smarter?—what these characterizations too often really mean is that 

the national security community is just going to keep on doing more 

of what it has been doing. But, just doing more of the same in this 

vastly more complex strategic landscape is not going to cut it. What is 

needed is something truly different.

It is often said that the first step in any effort to change is to 

acknowledge you have a problem. Perhaps, if there is a positive to 

be found in the tragedy that is the COVID-19 pandemic, it will be 

the understanding—for real—by the national security community, in 

general, and the IC, in particular, that the world’s complexity represents a strategic challenge that is fundamentally different and new. 

Additionally, maybe it will recognize just how unprepared its incremental strategies have undeniably left it. This volume can assist in 

catalyzing just such understanding and recognition. 

Endnotes

∂1 Bryan Walsh, “COVID-19: The History of Pandemics,” BBC Future, March 

25, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20200325-covid-19-the-historyof-pandemics

2 “A Short History of the Web,” CERN, https://home.cern/science/computing/

birth-web/short-history-web.

3 Nouriel Roubini, “The Coronavirus Has Delivered the Fastest, Deepest Economic Shock in History,” Guardian, March 25, 2020, https://www.theguardian.

com/business/2020/mar/25/coronavirus-pandemic-has-delivered-the-fastestdeepest-economic-shock-in-history.

4 “Percentage of Global Population Accessing the Internet from 2005 to 2019, by 

Market Maturity,” Statista, November 2019, https://www.statista.com/statistics/

209096/share-of-internet-users-in-the-total-world-population-since-2006/.

5 John M. Kamensky, Managing the Complicated vs. the Complex, Business 

of Government, http://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/John

Kamensky.pdf. 
16

A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

6 “Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count,” New York Times, accessed 

July 23, 2021, https://www.google.com/search?q=current+us+death+toll+covid.

7 Sara Silverstein, “Ian Bremmer Breaks Down Trump’s Response to the Coronavirus Crisis,” Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/ian-bremmerbreaks-down-trump-response-coronavirus-crisis-china-gzero-2020-3.

8 Shawn Donnan and Lauren Leatherby, “Globalization Isn’t Dying, It’s Just 

Evolving,” Bloomberg, July 23, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/

2019-globalization/.

9 Donnan and Leatherby, “Globalization Isn’t Dying.”

10 Adam Clark Estes, “Why the Internet (Probably) Won’t Break During the Coronavirus Pandemic,” Vox, March 25, 2020, https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/

3/25/21188391/internet-surge-traffic-coronavirus-pandemic.

11 Derek Thompson, “The Workforce Is About To Change Dramatically: Three 

Predictions for What the Future Might Look Like,” The Atlantic, August 6, 2020, 

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/08/just-small-shift-remotework-could-change-everything/614980/.

12 George Orwell, Politics and the English Language, http://www.public-library.uk/

ebooks/72/30.pdf.
17

INTRODUCTION: THE COVID-19 

PANDEMIC AND INTELLIGENCE

Stacey E. Pollard and Lawrence A. Kuznar

One year beyond the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic when 

lockdowns swept the world, cases of COVID-19 have exceeded 

185 million, more than 4 million people have died from the virus, and 

new variants present enduring challenges.1

 Quality of life everywhere 

has dramatically declined. The world economy is rocked, travel and 

supply lines are disrupted, and U.S. adversaries are leveraging the crisis 

to their advantage. The pandemic has created many challenges, and 

perhaps a few opportunities, for the national security of select countries. In short, the pandemic has impacted—and will undoubtedly 

continue to impact—the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) in how 

intelligence is fostered and conducted, as well as how pandemicassociated conditions interact with national security problem sets. The 

authors of this volume present evidence-based, qualitative, quantitative, and mixed-methods analyses so their projections can be tested 

against future conditions. They explore the many ways the pandemic 

is influencing the IC and the world in order to anticipate and prepare 

for the future. To that end, this book is organized in three sections: 

Looking In, Looking Out, and Looking Forward. 
18

A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

Looking In examines the impact of the pandemic on the IC itself. 

How have the pandemic/pandemic-associated outcomes affected the 

intelligence and broader national security communities, and how can 

we expect these effects to influence future national security enterprise 

work? What national security vulnerabilities have been exposed by 

pandemic-associated challenges, and how can this exposure inform 

and improve anticipation and responsiveness? 

Looking Out explores how the pandemic has changed the global 

national security environment in which analysts work. This section 

examines the pandemic’s impact on geopolitical forces and strategic 

competition, technology and especially supply chains, inequality, 

political unrest and instability, violent nonstate actors, and the information ecosystem. 

Looking Forward considers the future implications of the pandemic on the IC and the world in which it operates. This section 

begins with historical comparisons that provide baseline expectations of those effects. Then, the authors explore how they see the 

intelligence enterprise changing in relation to these effects and how 

lasting these changes might be. 

The perspective we advance in this volume is informed by the 

recognition that the world in which the IC operates, as well as the 

community itself, is part of a complex system. The system’s complexity 

comprises many elements: great powers, regional powers, developing 

nations, terrorist organizations, transnational criminal organizations, 

populations and ethnic groups, nongovernment organizations, intergovernmental organizations, civil society organizations, multinational 

corporations, small businesses, and so on. These many elements interact on many levels and often in nonlinear ways. Small events sometimes have disproportionate effects on a complex system, and the 

reverse is also true; sometimes the impacts of major events, such as 

the global COVID-19 pandemic, are dampened by negative feedback 

that tends to bring the system back to a steady state. The contributions 

in this volume explore what these complex effects might be, and we 
19

Introduction: The COVID-19 Pandemic and Intelligence

return to this framework in the conclusion to assess how the pandemic’s immediate effects, as identified by the authors, may play out in the 

complex world in which the IC is asked to operate. 

Looking In

This chapter examines the pandemic’s influence on IC enterprise operations and analysis. Manolis Priniotakis considers how the pandemic 

and pandemic-associated outcomes are affecting the intelligence and 

broader national security communities, as well as how we can expect 

these outcomes to influence future national security enterprise work. 

He argues that, even prior to the pandemic, the IC suffered from a 

myriad of weaknesses that went beyond basic organization or lines of 

reporting and broadened into fundamental questions about the validity of the work, the use of technology, and the overall posture of the IC 

across the full range of national security challenges facing the country. 

Priniotakis illustrates how the pandemic has exacerbated these problems and urges the nation’s decisionmakers to seize postpandemic 

reflection and recovery opportunities to implement balanced, cleareyed reforms that best serve the IC and U.S. national security. 

Looking Out

This section examines the impact of the pandemic on the world in 

which the IC operates. 

Jason Schenker examines the effect the pandemic has had on 

global supply chains and economic activity. Notably, the pandemic 

threw into relief issues of food insecurity as even well-off consumers 

in developed countries faced empty shelves and short food supplies, 

reminding us all of the fragility of the systems supporting our most 

basic needs. While the pandemic has been devastating to many small 

businesses, it has been a boon to e-commerce. Corporations often 

strive to keep inventories and their associated costs low, which is 
20

A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

efficient when supply chains are secure. However, the pandemic has 

challenged this business paradigm, especially in the case of medical supplies. The politically divisive response to economic disruption and lack of goods in the United States exposed a leverage point 

that adversaries could target in the future by combining a biological attack with social media disinformation, which has flourished 

during the pandemic. Schenker proposes a framework to identify 

and prioritize factors that impact national security in a crisis, such 

as the COVID-19 pandemic. This framework, with the acronym 

NOISE, focuses on necessities (food, water, power, shelter, safety), 

occupations, information, systems (financial, health, transportation, 

education), and external factors (international relations, military, 

supply chains, trade).

Jon Hall, Carolina Rivera Vázquez, Heriberto Tapia, and Jacob 

Assa examine the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on inequality 

through the lens of the UN Human Development Index (HDI), which 

evaluates the well-being and potential of a country’s population in 

terms of per capita GDP, life expectancy, and education. The authors 

point out that the pandemic has been detrimental to all dimensions 

of human development. Their modified version of the HDI, accounting for the adverse effects of school closures on well-being, shows 

the HDI for 2020 plummeted. Because the adverse effects of school 

closures are disproportionately felt by people of lower income, the 

pandemic is likely to exacerbate already growing levels of inequality, and long-term unemployment among youth seeking to enter the 

labor market may intensify these scarring effects. Hall et al. anticipate growing levels of inequality between and within countries, as 

well as inequality in terms of ethnicity and gender—all of which are 

expected to increase instability worldwide. 

Cristina Bodea and Christian Houle focus on how major crises, 

such as the COVID-19 pandemic, exacerbate global inequality. Globally, low-wage occupations have been disproportionately affected 

because they cannot be performed from home. Because racial and 
21

Introduction: The COVID-19 Pandemic and Intelligence

ethnic minorities are disproportionately employed in low-wage sectors, racial and ethnic inequality are probably increasing. The authors 

point out that the combination of inequality and ethnicity often 

feeds social instability. In addition, authoritarian leaders have used 

the pandemic to increase and centralize their power. The mixture 

of increased instability and authoritarianism threatens democratic 

institutions worldwide. For this reason, Bodea and Houle suggest it is 

more important than ever for countries to address inequality. 

Jimena Blanco focuses on inequality in Latin America. She notes 

that Latin America has limited capability to recover from the effects 

of the pandemic. Job loss and business closures have dramatically 

reduced government revenues by reducing tax receipts. The shrinking 

legitimate economy will push even more low-wage earners into the 

informal economy where they are exploited. Increased inequality will 

exacerbate discontent with governments and increase instability, and 

these trends will create an environment that is even more favorable for 

organized crime. This development, in turn, will weaken governments 

in the region and increase risks to U.S. national security through the 

illicit drug trade, which will further destabilize the region. 

Stacey Pollard, Henry Baraket, Girish Ganesan, and Natalie Kim 

examine how violent extremist organizations are exploiting insecurity stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic in the Middle East to 

undermine U.S.-supported counterterrorism efforts in the region. 

Specifically, Pollard et al. focus on how ISIS is capitalizing on social 

unrest and a rapidly deteriorating security environment—exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic—to reconstitute in permissive 

areas of Iraq and Syria. Their chapter analyzes ISIS’s pandemic-era 

ground and information operations through the lens of its state- and 

nation-making efforts to help analysts and decisionmakers better 

understand the imminence and scope of the threat. 

Layla Hashemi, Sarah Meo, and Louise Shelley’s chapter dovetails with Schenker’s analysis of supply chains and Blanco’s analysis of 

the rise of organized crime in Latin America. Hashemi et al. describe 
22

A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

how the pandemic’s adverse impact on supply chains has provided 

opportunities for organized crime to expand illicit trade. Furthermore, 

pandemic-related foreign aid and increased government inefficiency 

and corruption throughout the world have provided transnational criminal organizations with greater opportunities to expand their operations 

and siphon off legal funds. These developments have fueled increased 

human and drug trafficking, environmental and financial crimes, and 

trade in counterfeits, demonstrating how the COVID-19 crisis poses 

new and unprecedented threats to public health and human security. 

Jim Jones and Anthony Stefanidis analyze how the global pandemic and pandemic responses are affecting the activities of criminal organizations in the physical, social, and cyber domains. Their 

chapter assesses how the pandemic has interacted with the strength 

and agility of global criminal organizations. The authors also examine how pandemic-adapted criminal activity and other factors create 

investigative opportunities including increased data and exposure 

through risky operations, both of which enable deeper understanding of underlying criminal organization structure and enhance our 

ability to disrupt and dismantle criminal organizations.

Kacper Gradon analyzes Russian information operations in 

Western democracies, focusing his research on Russia’s disinformation campaign in Poland. He argues that the pandemic has provided Russia a perfect opportunity to exercise its well-honed use 

of disinformation and deception to weaken Western democracies. 

Furthermore, Gradon warns that Russia is using Eastern European 

countries as a test bed before launching new malign influence tactics and techniques worldwide. He draws attention to infodemics, the 

spread of disinformation about a pandemic in parallel to the spread 

of the disease agent. Russia has emerged as the primary purveyor of 

disinformation in the current infodemic, seeking to discredit Western powers and their responses to the pandemic—all in an effort to 

weaken alliances within NATO and to sow political division within 

Western democracies. Gradon proposes countering Russia’s efforts 
23

Introduction: The COVID-19 Pandemic and Intelligence

by establishing a transatlantic research center for intelligence sharing 

and media literacy training.

Looking Forward

Perhaps ironically, this section begins by looking backward and examines how previous pandemics affected the security of nations in ways 

that can inform today’s IC about challenges the community is facing. 

Michael Vlahos reflects on the profound impacts of plagues on 

ancient Roman and medieval societies, concluding that pandemics are 

not harbingers of change, but accelerators of changes already underway and weakeners of already eroding institutions. Most adversely 

affected by major pandemics have been the elites, whose centralized 

power proves ephemeral, leading to loss of unitary power and social 

fragmentation. The Roman Empire was already in decline from the 

top down when the Justinian Plagues (7th century) probably accelerated this decline; central Roman elites lost power to outside, “barbarian” groups who emulated Roman civilization and divided the empire 

among themselves. The Black Plague (14th century) accelerated transformations of European society from the bottom up; as Europe experienced prosperity and growth, the rising expectations of its peasant 

and mercantile classes created simmering resentment against the 

feudal system. The plague depopulated urban centers of power and 

created an intense demand for now-scarce peasant labor, leading to 

the feudal system’s breakdown and rising power for the peasantry and 

merchants who laid the foundations for modern Europe. 

Lawrence Kuznar compares the underlying conditions and consequences of the 1918 H1N1 flu (Spanish Flu) pandemic to those of 

the COVID-19 pandemic. The 1918 pandemic came on the heels of 

a devastating world war, followed by an economic boom as nations 

rebuilt—for which there is no parallel in the early 21st century. Significant demographic differences also exist: the 1918 pandemic disproportionately infected and killed people of prime working age, 
24

A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has primarily killed the elderly. 

Consequently, the 1918 pandemic reduced the global labor force, creating a favorable market for labor; however, the COVID-19 pandemic 

has created no similar boon for working-age people, exacerbating 

inequality as described by Hall et al., Bodea and Houle, and Blanco. 

One potentially disturbing long-term parallel may hold between the 

1918 and COVID-19 pandemics: the disenfranchisement of specific 

sectors of society that eventually emerged as full-scale and violent 

challenges to the status quo. The effects of the 1918 pandemic hit 

German working-class veterans particularly hard; the COVID-19 

pandemic has similarly disadvantaged conservative working-class 

people and, if the inevitable recovery passes them by, it may plant the 

seeds for greater challenges to national security in the future. 

Finally, Josh Kerbel and Zachery Tyson Brown take a hard look 

at the IC, arguing that the community still operates, intellectually, 

from within an increasingly obsolete, 20th century paradigm of what 

constitutes national security. This paradigm is predicated on the idea 

of information scarcity, and it views the world largely in terms of 

“threats to” instead of “risks from”—for example, from the vulnerabilities built into our open system of government, or from the severe 

social, political, and economic knock-on effects of a brutal pandemic 

that has claimed half a million American lives. Although the authors 

conclude there are no simple solutions to this challenge, they discuss 

six broad areas of reform “the Intelligence Community must consider 

if it hopes to survive and thrive through an era in which change is the 

only constant, and more surprise the only certainty.” 

Endnotes

∂1 World Health Organization, WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard 

(Overview), accessed on July 8, 2021, https://covid19.who.int/.
PART ONE

LOOKING IN

27

COVID AND INTELLIGENCE: 

CORRECTIONS, OVERCORRECTIONS, 

AND THE STATUS QUO ANTE

Manolis Priniotakis

As the U.S. national security community emerges from the trauma of 

the COVID-19 pandemic, it must resist the urge to simply return to 

old ways of doing business. No systematic effort, however, appears to 

be underway to reassess the IC’s long-held priorities, policies, and procedures in light of the pandemic experience. A self-examination would 

allow the IC to adjust priorities to address issues not usually seen as 

core to U.S. national security—demographics, economics, energy, environment, religion, and public health. It would also support the modernization of personnel practices to encourage more flexible work options 

that could promote a distributed, yet still secure, workforce and open 

the door to employees without full clearances. A blue-ribbon panel—

something that once seemed a certainty—may never convene, and the 

IC should conduct its own introspective review of its practices to remain 

competitive and prepare for the next crisis. Documenting the lessons 

and outcomes would enable the IC to emerge from the pandemic with a 

useful playbook for similar future scenarios. 
28

A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

Introduction

Starting in January 2020, the United States experienced with the 

COVID-19 pandemic a traumatic episode that will have lasting 

effects on the popular consciousness and U.S. national security—or 

at least it should. For the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and the 

broader Federal government, the pandemic emptied offices, changed 

priorities, and even called into question the nature and definition of 

national security. The pandemic—the worst health crisis to hit the 

world in more than a century1, 2

—crippled the international movement of people, inhibited global trade, and raised serious questions 

about many governments’ ability to deal with such a crisis.3, 4, 5

 As of 

the fall of 2021, Western governments had enacted widespread vaccination programs, but developing countries were hit with the nasty 

brunt of the third and fourth waves of the virus, followed by additional waves washing over the unvaccinated in even those countries 

with high vaccination rates. More than a year into the COVID-19 

global crisis, India set a record for most cases in a single country on 

a single day.6

 Even with the speedy introduction of vaccines, the pandemic will remain a factor in international interactions by individuals, companies, and governments for years to come.

Throughout 2020, public discussion of the pandemic’s impact 

on national intelligence largely centered on the idea that the world 

had changed somehow, that the IC must adjust to a new reality, and 

that a commission would be created to understand how this specific 

event was missed.7

 During that complicated year, IC agencies wrestled not only with altered ways of operating but also with how to 

address new thematic topics. Social distancing requirements, space 

constraints, school closures, and other dependent care responsibilities forced agencies to bend on personnel practices, and a public 

debate ensued about the utility of the IC analyzing such global phenomena as a worldwide pandemic. There was discussion of a “New 

Normal.” (Unfortunately, there has been little public disclosure of 
29

COVID and Intelligence

how individual agencies adjusted their activities to accommodate for 

social distancing and reduced capacity or even updated their areas of 

focus. This chapter relies on the author’s knowledge of how IC agencies responded in general.) 

As of May 2021, IC agencies are moving forward with a broad 

“return” to full operations—or at least they are trying to get back to 

“normal.” They are emerging from shift work or week on/week off 

schedules, with most employees who had worked from home since 

March 2020 returning to the office. The “New Normal” predicted to 

emerge is looking a lot like the “Old Normal.” A real danger exists 

if the “New Normal” ends up simply being a return to old ways of 

doing business or if the IC treats the past 18 months as an anomaly 

to be observed with interest but no serious attempt to understand its 

lessons. Some agencies are capturing “lessons learned,” but no systematic effort appears to be underway to understand the priorities, 

policies, and procedures challenged by the COVID-19 experience.

Even with more than 600,000 deaths in the United States alone, 

billions in economic damage, loss of prestige, and mental and physical effects on individuals that are hard to define, let alone on which 

to place a value—the virus could have been worse. It could have been 

more deadly, spread more easily in children, or ravaged the developing world—or at least hit it earlier. The virus could have been more 

resistant to vaccine development and, perhaps most concerning of 

all, it could have hit at time of war or been an intentional act by an 

adversarial state or nonstate actor that got lucky. 

Hallway conversations about the impact of COVID-19 on intelligence have ranged from the need for extreme change to the sentiment 

that disease monitoring and prevention are not “our job.” The reality 

lies somewhere in between. If the IC can adapt and take the lessons 

of COVID-19 seriously—changing its focus and how it operates while 

understanding the limits of intelligence’s role—it may emerge from the 

pandemic with a useful playbook for similar future scenarios. Experts 

predict this pandemic is unlikely to be the last and the next could be 
30

A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

more damaging.8, 9 How can the IC prepare for the “big one” if COVID19 was not it? The answer lies in adjusting priorities to address topics 

often seen as not core to U.S. national security and to modernize personnel policies and practices to remain competitive and agile. 

The Pandemic Arrives in the United States: A Quick Recap

At the time of this writing, it has been almost a year and a half since 

early public awareness of the pandemic. The interim has seen an 

assault on the Capitol and a high-profile and challenging withdrawal 

of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, in addition to ongoing contentious 

partisan political quarreling in the United States that has influenced 

and been influenced by perceptions of the ongoing pandemic. 

It is easy to forget how uncertain life looked in March 2020. Offices 

emptied out, friends and strangers became health threats, and grocery 

stores transformed from simple sources of food to lifelines staffed by 

“front-line workers.” Within the U.S. Government, people who had spent 

their careers believing themselves to be essential discovered overnight 

that their work was expendable—at least during a global pandemic.10

Although the world was more than two months into the experience, it was not until mid-March that the IC—as well as all Federal 

agencies—began to respond in earnest to what had already developed 

into as a clear a health threat to humanity as anything seen in a century. Questions about transmission abounded, and public and private 

institutions and companies responded with varying degrees of severity to protect the safety of their citizens and employees. 

It is worth reviewing the sequence of relevant events.

• Dec. 31, 2019: Chinese officials reported to the World Health 

Organization (WHO) that they were treating dozens of pneumonia cases of unknown etiology.11

• Jan. 7, 2020: Chinese researchers identified the cause as a new 

type of virus.12
31

COVID and Intelligence

• Jan. 11, 2020: China reported its first virus-related death.13

• Jan. 13, 2020: Thailand reported its first case, the second country to detect the virus’s presence.14

• Jan. 20, 2020: The WHO issued its first situation report on the 

“Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV).”15

• Jan. 21, 2020: Health officials in Olympia, Washington, reported 

the first known case in the United States.16

• Jan. 28, 2020: U.S. President Trump received an intelligence 

briefing on the virus, the contents of which are disputed but later 

portrayed by the White House as having been “downplayed.”17, 18

• Jan. 30, 2020: The WHO declared a global health emergency.19

• Jan. 31, 2020: The U.S. Government restricted travel from 

China into the United States; U.S. citizens overseas began to 

return to avoid being caught overseas.20, 21

• Feb. 14, 2020: France reported Europe’s first death.22

• Feb. 19, 2020: Iran reported two cases, the first known emergence in the Middle East.23

• Feb. 26, 2020: Brazil reported the first cases in Latin America.24

• Feb. 29, 2020: The first death in the United States occurred in 

Seattle.25

• Mar. 15, 2020: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommended reducing the size of gatherings. The 

Office of Personnel Management (OPM) changed the operating status for the Federal Government from “Open” to “Open 

with maximum telework flexibility to all current telework eligible employees, pursuant to direction from agency heads.”26

With that OPM order, the world—at least, the world of IC 

employees—changed. As agencies began looking for ways to reduce 

the office density to allow for social distancing, they had to determine which employees were “mission essential” and which could 

go home, possibly to telework. Local governments in the National 

Capital Region, as elsewhere, established a phased approach, with 
32

A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

severe restrictions on the movement of individuals, adding pressure 

to the definition of “essential.”27, 28, 29 Federal employees required in 

the workplace received letters allowing them to pass through possible 

local law enforcement stops to get to the office.

All government agencies had longstanding continuity of operations plans in place to handle related situations but not for the scale or 

duration they now faced. However, IC agencies, with few employees 

deemed “telework eligible” based on mission requirements, began to 

release employees to stay home. Remote system access was available 

to some—but far from all—employees. As schools closed, dependent 

care became a serious concern, especially for families with small children. Employees faced the prospect of drawing down annual leave 

to adjust to the new situation but were not sure how long they could 

hold out. New definitions for “high risk” began circulating. The world 

had changed, and IC officers were having discussions about opensource information and use of home systems in ways that almost all 

would have once found unimaginable. And nobody knew how long 

any of these measures would last.

But Was It an Intelligence Failure?

For years, multiple directors of national intelligence—echoing health 

experts—had been warning, in public, of the possibility that a pandemic or epidemic could have tremendous impact on U.S. national 

security.30 But when one finally hit, the U.S. Administration appeared 

unprepared. Does this mean the failure to anticipate the COVID-19 

pandemic was an intelligence failure? Given the complexity of the 

role of intelligence in anticipating and responding to such an event, it 

is not a simple question, but the answer is a qualified “Yes.”

The public discussion of the IC’s role in predicting the onslaught 

of the virus began early in the pandemic and continues to the date 

of publication.31, 32 This necessary discussion may consume internal 

attention in the coming months and perhaps even years, but it is likely 
33

COVID and Intelligence

to be addressed in terms of warning intelligence, the role of nonstate 

actors and nontraditional threats, and the resources devoted to the 

range of topics that have traditionally been binned into “global issues.” 

Early in the pandemic, Foreign Policy published an article by 

Micah Zenko, a professor of political science at Brandeis, with the 

provocative title: “The Coronavirus Is the Worst Intelligence Failure in U.S. History.” The headline, likely the work of editors rather 

than the author, did not actually match the thrust of the argument.33

Zenko did not make the case for an intelligence failure, as traditionally understood by the definition advanced by Abram Shulsky and 

Gary Schmitt in Silent Warfare: “Any misunderstanding of a situation that leads a government or its military forces to take actions 

that are inappropriate and counterproductive to its own interests.”34

Zenko, instead, described a policy failure, making the argument 

that decisionmakers did not sufficiently act on what they may have 

heard from the IC, as Zenko understood it from media reporting. He 

quoted Henry Kissinger’s famous, although perhaps apocryphal, line 

in response to having received unwelcome intelligence: “You warned 

me, but you didn’t convince me.”35

Given the impact of the virus on key facets of U.S. society—including mass casualties, economic devastation, and a crisis of confidence 

in U.S. institutions—it is hard to consider the IC’s performance to be 

anything other than a failure, albeit one with an important caveat. That 

the IC warned President Trump is not in doubt.36 Yet at various levels, 

a systemic gap developed over years in collections mechanisms and 

analytic functions, as well as in the IC’s ability to convince relevant 

policymakers they should act against their political inclinations to take 

undefined actions. That manifestation appears to have been clear early 

in the pandemic. The twist is that the failure to inform policy during 

the early stages of the pandemic was an intelligence failure in which the 

IC performed reasonably well, given the resources and attention paid 

to this kind of amorphous and global challenge. Shameful efforts to pin 

the blame on individual IC officers occurred early in the pandemic.37
34

A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

One sense in which it was a failure was that the virus caused unanticipated and massive economic and political effects. The pandemic 

damaged U.S. prestige; put the Trump Administration in the position to not succeed in meeting the demands the virus put on the government; and highlighted the need for good information to support 

administrative competence. Under Shulsky and Schmitt’s definition, it 

is reasonable to assess that the Administration took actions that were 

“inappropriate and counterproductive to its own interests” in ways that 

intelligence could have better informed its decisions. The IC must share 

some portion of the blame but need not shoulder all or even most of 

it. Neither does the intelligence fault lie exclusively with the Trump 

Administration. Instead, it lies with many administrations in many 

ways over decades. It is a failure with origins that predate the careers of 

today’s officers, compounded over time by a misallocation of resources.

Before the pandemic, the IC was already facing a reckoning. As 

Amy Zegart and Michael Morell argued in Foreign Policy in 2019, 

technology advances—especially in biotechnology, nanotechnology, 

quantum computing, and artificial intelligence—were narrowing the 

United States’ advantage over its near peers, in addition to allowing 

lesser powers to make gains. The changing media landscape had 

facilitated the spread of disinformation faster than any U.S. ability 

to respond. Zegart and Morell called for an overhaul of the IC, “a 

broad-based intelligence-community-wide effort with input from 

technology companies, civil society, and academia. A blue-ribbon 

commission, instituted and overseen by Congress, could drive this 

change.” They also criticized an employment system designed for a 

different time, for when people spent their careers at one agency.38

In the wake of a disruption as severe as the pandemic, it is easy 

to say that the IC is “doing it all wrong.” Although it is an easy but 

unhelpful position, the accusation unfortunately has some truth. 

From assigning collections and analytic resources to recruiting and 

managing a 21st century workforce, it may very well be possible that 

we are “doing it all wrong.” The IC’s track record, viewed objectively, is 
35

COVID and Intelligence

not great when it has really mattered: counterterrorism and counterproliferation. From 9/11 to challenges anticipating multiple nuclear 

developments reaching back to the early days of the Cold War, the 

record is spotty, at best. Anticipating a foreign-originated pandemic 

that reached our shores via routine international travel? The weaknesses built into the system left the IC with almost no chance. 

The Rise of “Global Issues”

The pandemic highlighted a longstanding problem for the modern 

IC. Founded at the onset of the Cold War and in many ways still 

organized to confront the Soviet Union, the IC has generally emphasized “traditional” national security challenges over other, perhaps 

esoteric, topics.39, 40 Support for the White House and Departments 

of State and Defense has played to the IC’s strengths on military and 

diplomatic concerns, the areas easiest to justify for collections and 

analysis and the easiest on which to recruit staff—especially under 

well-intentioned mandates to adhere to veterans’ preference in hiring. 

The pandemic sheds long-overdue sunlight onto “global issues”—a 

set of topics often shunted aside or relegated to second-tier or thirdtier status by the traditional focus on diplomatic or military topics 

under Combat Support Agency requirements, compounded by cultural forces in agencies that trace origins to military organizations.41

The pandemic revealed weaknesses on one of these “nontraditional” topics. Global issues generally include demographics, economics, energy, environment, religion, and, of note, global public 

health. These are not areas traditionally associated with national security, but they unquestionably represent concerns that can very quickly 

consume U.S. attention and overwhelm its resources. These issues 

also impact the lives of people in foreign countries at an immediate 

level and dictate how those people interact with their governments. 

In addition, they are not new to the national security infrastructure; 

they just feel that way. Reaching back to the very earliest days of the 
36

A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

modern IC, understanding these topics has been core to policymakers’ broader understanding of adversaries and allies. For example, 

CIA’s economic analysis of the Soviet Union was the key proxy for 

understanding its military capabilities, and an understanding of the 

religious dynamics in Vietnam underpinned U.S. policy there.42, 43

The focus on combat support, WMD, and regional studies, especially focused on political issues, has not surprisingly crowded out 

resources for these other fields. The traditional topics play to recruitment tendencies and the organizing function of most intelligenceconsuming agencies, such as the National Security Council, 

Department of State, and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy. Each of these elements possesses functional directorates or 

groups, but the prestige lies with the regional offices, which are staffed 

by officers who have studied or served in the countries they oversee. 

Global issues have been pushed to the corners of IC organizations, but a better grasp of these topics would offer policymakers a 

broader understanding of how the world works and how countries 

operate. Some large IC agencies’ efforts during the past decade to 

reorganize into “mission centers” integrated intelligence disciplines 

but left them siloed by topic, which will undercut their capacity to 

harness computing power’s ability to find connections across fields, 

regions, and topics. Global issues represent the fundamental relationships between governments and the governed worldwide. They 

address how capitals interact with their populations and how populations interact with the rest of the world. Just as our oceans no 

longer serve as protective barriers, the virus has demonstrated that 

no boundary can protect or insulate a country from the ravages of a 

pandemic that travels on the back of a globalized economy.44

The Annual Threat Assessment (ATA) statements from a succession of directors of national intelligence and other IC leaders reflect a 

growing recognition that national security threats go beyond the traditional military dangers of terrorist organizations and near-peer adversaries. These assessments enumerate such diverse concerns as cyber, 
37

COVID and Intelligence

disease, novel technology developments, and other assorted 21st century worries.45 For many years, the ATAs have pointed to the looming 

danger of an epidemic or even global pandemic, and observers have 

used those inclusions to argue that the IC did its job.46 The Trump 

Administration’s return to great power competition carried with it an 

implicit need to focus on more traditional markers of foreign power, 

such as order-of-battle analysis, even if the Chinese threat looks vastly 

different than the Soviet danger during the Cold War era.47

In an op-ed in April 2020, longtime CIA senior official Michael 

Morell and former NSA lawyer Glenn Gerstell called for a broader 

definition of national security, arguing that “the consequences of 

nonmilitary and political threats—such as economic, health or climate disruptions—are significant and must be assigned a high priority.” The pandemic emphasized the importance of these other aspects, 

especially nondefense applications of science and technology development.48 According to former intelligence officer Norman Roule, 

“The COVID-19 and 2003 SARS outbreaks underscore the importance of knowing of outbreaks as soon as they occur as well as how 

leaders in those countries respond.”49 There are several organizations 

within the U.S. Government, to include at the CDC and DoD, with 

responsibility for doing this detection work, but the IC and DoD 

intelligence components have a role as well. 

COVID-19 has also revealed new avenues for investigation and 

analysis on new areas of geopolitical competition. In particular, the 

use of medical equipment and assistance to advance diplomatic objectives. Despite the limited introduction of vaccines in late 2020 and 

their spread in 2021, the virus will remain a part of the international 

landscape for the foreseeable future. Poorer countries still struggle to 

gain access to vaccines and to administer them on a broad basis, and 

questions remain about the durability of the first wave of inoculations. 

Vaccine-focused politics highlight new areas of competition, especially related to the global supply chain.50, 51, 52 For instance, Canada’s 

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has publicly lamented his country’s 
38

A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

vulnerability to global vaccine supply fluctuations because of an earlier decision to eliminate its domestic vaccine production capacity.53

The targeting of vaccine producers has been another new aspect of 

global competition under COVID conditions. Although many countries have long been willing to undertake economic espionage against 

the United States or other competitor states, the willingness to attempt 

cyber penetrations of these firms is a new phenomenon.54 Even the 

U.S. distribution of vaccines by the Biden Administration came with 

messaging, as it emphasized the role of COVAX, an international 

effort aimed at reaching poorer countries with vaccines, but also set 

aside a quarter of its donated vaccines to “regional priorities and other 

recipients,” according to the White House press release.55

The pandemic also revealed the fragility and resilience of economies. It highlighted and probably exacerbated the economic divides 

between wealthier and poorer countries and among populations 

within these countries. Food supply, medicine supply chain, and public policies in foreign countries have existed beyond the definition of 

U.S. national security, as it is generally understood. The political and 

economic impact of the crisis on poorer countries may be among the 

most prominent of the virus’s lasting global effects. It took time, but 

reports of the virus hitting the developing world began as a trickle 

and turned into a flood. For as much success as China appeared to 

have in combatting the disease, Brazil, India, and many others have 

struggled.56, 57 It is easy to foresee the health care systems and general 

financial resources of many governments struggling to recover. Some 

were pushed to a breaking point even with numbers in the low hundreds of cases.58 The unfortunate reality is that it will take years for 

the poorest countries in the world to vaccinate their populations, and 

the process will be complicated by variants and decisions related to 

boosters for already-vaccinated individuals.

The medium- and long-term consequences will be severe. International financial institutions stepped in to support needy countries.59,

60 Some governments have severely restricted civil liberties to try to 
39

COVID and Intelligence

contain transmission, and a subset of them may be tempted to retain 

those limits.61, 62, 63 If impacts are severe, death counts grow, government 

responses fail, and dependencies on foreign aid grows. Such trends 

would give the virus the potential to impact regional alignments and 

the political and economic trajectories of some vulnerable countries 

for years to come, exacerbating transnational economic disparities, 

even at the lower, pandemic-era levels in industrialized countries.

The political and economic impacts on these countries may be 

among the most prominent of the virus’s lasting global effects, but 

there are opportunities to learn. This period has provided the data for 

a decade of comparative studies of how societies and governments 

respond to a crisis. An enterprising researcher could examine any country’s response to the COVID-19 crisis to uncover useful information 

about government leadership performance; effectiveness of lockdowns, 

restrictions or other policies; economic decisionmaking; performance 

of emergency services; use of the security services; public and private 

healthcare responses; media coverage and government treatment of 

the media; popular reaction to and compliance with restrictions; relationships with neighbors and international organizations; changes in 

supply chains and illicit markets; and many other COVID-19 related 

effects. This approach would be useful for understanding the diversity 

of responses by country: size, region, wealth, political system, access 

to foreign markets, relative isolation, level of industrialization, ethnic 

homogeneity, infrastructure connectivity, island vs. landlocked vs. littoral, and military capacity—among other attributes. Resulting analyses could reveal useful insights into each country’s strategic culture, 

ability to plan, and emergency response capabilities. 

COVID-19 will have lasting impacts. States could still fail and 

adversaries strengthen, especially if countries at the forefront of vaccine development are unwilling to share their largesse or do not act 

on President Biden’s May 2021 advocacy for patent relinquishment 

by pharmaceutical companies holding related intellectual property.64

Most poor countries are going to continue to suffer from the virus 
40

A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

until international organizations or wealthy donors provide them 

with the vaccines, professionals, and supply chains needed to inoculate their populations, through international efforts such as COVAX.65

Even then, questions will linger about the length of coverage these 

initial variants provide and dangers related to viral mutations.66

The IC will need to reorient resources to understand all of these 

trends. IC managers may argue that global issues are not “the IC’s 

job” and agencies should continue to focus on those areas—military 

and diplomatic issues—where they possess a comparative advantage. 

That approach leaves global issues to Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, 

Health and Human Services, Treasury, and other subject-specific Cabinet agencies, to include those that do not possess intelligence elements. 

The Naval Postgraduate School’s Erik Dahl argues that the IC should 

focus its efforts on approaches where the IC has a comparative advantage: namely, clandestine reporting.67 This argument suggests that value 

on these topics exists outside clandestine channels and runs counter to 

the developing view that the IC must pay more heed to open-source 

information.68 But is it the job of the modern U.S. Intelligence Community to cover these topics? Is it worth the time and effort to reorient 

collections and analysis resources away from traditional strengths to 

these “global” or “emerging” issues? Put another way: Are threats to 

international order a threat to U.S. national security? As an analogue, 

the longstanding debate over the use of intelligence resources to cover 

climate change spilled into the public in 2019, to include a high-profile 

resignation of a climate analyst at the Department of State’s Bureau of 

Intelligence and Research.69 While multiple organizations across multiple non-intelligence agencies focus on nontraditional intelligence 

topics, the ability to fuse all sources of information to inform national 

security leaders sets the IC apart from its counterparts.

The IC’s purpose is to help policymakers understand the world as 

it is, not as they would like to see it or even binned by regional divides, 

especially with the prospects of further pandemics a likelihood. To 

make this work, the IC will need to break down the attitudes that have 
41

COVID and Intelligence

relegated these “global issues” to second-class status and to properly 

cover them—rather than downgrade their offices and minimize their 

budgets. Some elements, such as DoD’s National Center for Medical 

Intelligence and the Biodefense Knowledge Center at the Department 

of Energy’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, exist to tackle 

important aspects of global public health from a national security perspective, but these are modest and dispersed efforts. A serious attempt 

will challenge decades of practices and require hiring more hydrologists, epidemiologists, and others with technical backgrounds into both 

analytic and collections roles, as well as retaining them by empowering them to layer their expertise onto information that only the IC 

possesses. It may mean hiring individuals who only work with open 

sources and may not require the same level of security clearance as traditional IC officers—and then figuring out how to work with them.

Of course, such an approach does not mean an abandonment of 

support to military operations. Joshua Rovner has argued that the lesson of the pandemic should be the opposite of tackling more “global 

issues” and that the IC should instead retrench and recenter around 

secret information.70 The bulk of DoD IC resources will remain 

focused on these topics under any circumstance, and it should. A 

review of other priorities, as captured by the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), however, is possible even though the NIPF 

has limited utility. A real response would lead to a broader overhaul of 

recruitment practices and the array of analytic resources.71

Workforce Policies

Beyond substantive considerations, the other area where the pandemic experience will have an impact is workforce management. 

In a sense, the U.S. population was lucky that the pandemic did not 

occur before Federal Communications Commission reforms, begun 

in 2009, encouraged the nationwide expansion of broadband.72

Access to high-speed and reliable Internet connections enabled many 
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industries to continue to operate and school-age children to experience some sense of educational normalcy. Federal agencies had been 

pursuing expanded telework before this expansion, and the Telework 

Enhancement Act of 2010 pushed that approach further.73 For many 

Federal employees, telecommuting for some portion of their week has 

been common. Other trends in government also supported broader 

U.S. Government readiness, such as actions in the early 2010s to promote increased use of video teleconferences and virtual meetings 

after the public uproar over the excessive spending at a General Services Administration conference in Las Vegas in 2010.74

The IC had moved inconsistently on these policies for obvious security motivations but also for cultural reasons. The mantra 

attributed to former White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emmanuel of 

“never letting a crisis go to waste” argues for the IC to use the lessons 

of this experience to accelerate reforms needed to modernize the IC’s 

operating methods and institutionalize some of the personnel flexibilities that will allow it to compete for and retain the staff necessary 

to carry out those changes. 

The term “Before Time” has passed from science fiction into the 

pandemic-related lexicon.75 For the IC, the “Before Time” was one 

of minimal flexibility and inconsistent policies. At the outset, few IC 

entities had measures to manage people working in unusual circumstances. The decision on whether to bring people into workplaces 

affected every public and private institution in the world. Security 

requirements and the need to maintain continuity on several aspects 

of the work compounded the question for the IC. How many had 

working telework and related security policies in place? How many 

were up to the job of managing a workforce during a pandemic? On 

March 15, 2020, when it became clear that the pandemic would be 

more serious than first understood, government workers all over the 

country found themselves going from lobbying for telework to being 

mandated to work remotely, which—in most cases—meant: “from 

home.”76 IC officers pride themselves in being adaptive, and under 
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COVID and Intelligence

these circumstances, they had to be. The pandemic forced a recognition that although IC work is different, it is not immune to external 

influences. As the pandemic played out during 2020, some IC leaders’ internal statements demonstrated sensitivity to and awareness 

of the pressures on individuals and families. Others demonstrated 

less sensitivity. In addition, agencies were uneven in providing masks 

and other PPE and in their cleaning protocols. Some moved early 

to offer flexible leave options to support caregiving, while others 

granted extensive Weather and Safety Leave to help employees manage their suddenly complicated home lives. Some took advantage of 

the CARES Act, while others were slow to act.

There has also been an element of guilt and even martyrdom, 

leading to condescension, resentment, and shame. Some IC employees felt pressure in the office, and others experienced feelings of inadequacy and even guilt over not being present. Others appear to have 

lorded their office access over others deemed non-mission essential. 

While employees have faced being identified as nonessential before—

whenever the government has shut down over lapses of appropriations or political disagreements over the debt limit, most recently in 

2018-19—the pandemic brought this reality into starker relief. Some 

agencies’ claimed abilities to maintain high levels of productivity have 

raised uncomfortable questions about their previous productivity if a 

global pandemic did not demonstrably undercut their performance. 

For some Federal employees, the pandemic requirements comported with their regular practices or available options. For most IC 

officers and other national security professionals, however, it did not. 

In fact, the idea of working in nonsecure spaces is anathema to the 

intelligence ethos, even with the increase in open-source work during 

the past 20 years. Reasons for that attitude are rooted in managers’ 

reluctance to lose sight of their employees and legitimate concerns 

about security. The outset of the pandemic prompted a diversity of 

responses to the need to reduce the number of people in offices to 

minimize transmission at a time when the mechanics of the virus were 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

not well understood. Agencies able to transition work to telework status did so, while others simply removed people from the office. 

Two RAND reports produced for the National GeospatialIntelligence Agency (NGA) in 2018 illuminated the challenges: 

“Understanding Government Telework: An Examination of Research 

Literature and Practices from Government Agencies” and “Moving to 

the Unclassified: How the Intelligence Community Can Work from 

Unclassified Facilities.”77, 78 These studies considered what work could 

occur remotely. As the preface to the second volume reads, RAND 

“assisted the [NGA] in understanding how to operate in unclassified 

environments, including outside Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs).”79 The first volume, a survey of the literature on 

telework, offers insights on such topics as recruitment, performance, 

and costs/benefits—particularly related to generational change. The 

report cites studies suggesting upward of 20-25 percent of workers, 

enabled by expanded broadband access and improvements in collaborative tools, already teleworked for some period (as of 2016) and 

“80-90 percent want to telework 2-3 days per week to balance independent and collaborative work responsibilities.”80 The costs and benefits discussions cover those for the employer and employee, as well 

as the environment. Most costs and benefits—especially those related 

to commuting times and real estate savings—are hard to quantify in 

any case but even more so during a pandemic response.

Of course, that is where the pandemic took the IC. RAND broke 

the challenges into six categories: policy, legal, technology, security, 

financial, and cultural, with specific analysis of emergency response 

and Continuity of Operations (COOP) activities. The papers provided insights and recommendations on how to prepare employees 

to shift their activities out of SCIFs. On emergency response, the 

operative commentary relative to the pandemic was:

• “[E]mployees [must] understand the job functions they are 

allowed to conduct remotely and have access to the data and 
45

COVID and Intelligence

systems they need to conduct those functions, as well as to 

the collaboration tools to remain in communication with their 

own colleagues and with other offices.”81

• “Agencies should ... adopt clear, detailed, and easily understood security classification guides; implement policies on 

how to digitally access and handle CUI [controlled unclassified information]; and implement policies about how to handle and secure hard copies of CUI.”82

• “In preparing for a COOP event, how should agencies balance 

the risk-mitigation benefits of dispersing employees across 

geographic locations and across the power grid and other critical infrastructure against the benefits created by the hardened 

systems that agencies may have available on-site?”83

The pandemic of 2020 represented such an extreme crisis. Information garnered from informal discussions across the IC indicates 

some agencies adjusted better than others. Training was uneven 

across IC elements, as were human resources measures, with agencyspecific requirements probably accounting for the bulk of the differences. Some made unclassified systems available to employees; others 

did or could not, especially in the absence of widespread distribution 

of government-furnished equipment.

There may also be good news. The second RAND paper suggests: “[I]f agencies create systems and processes for employees to 

work remotely and identify unclassified functions that could occur 

entirely off-site, they could increase the pool of talent available for 

recruitment by allowing employees to work in other parts of the 

country or by attracting employees who may meet skill and capability requirements but not necessarily meet security clearance requirements.”84 Of course, some parts of the IC workforce cannot and will 

not ever transition from working in nonsecure spaces; others operate in the field. But some agencies may find the RAND assessment 

to be true.
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

When this current crisis dissipates sufficiently to assess agencylevel performance, it will be worthwhile to conduct thorough studies on how each agency responded. Plenty of lessons will be learned 

across a range of U.S. Government activities, but, for the IC, this 

question will be among the most important. It is not yet clear what 

lasting impacts the pandemic will have on the nature of work in the 

contemporary U.S. economy, but learning those lessons is imperative, as all other employers seeking to hire knowledge-economy 

workers have taken note.85, 86 They are the IC’s competition for 

future employees.

The pandemic opened new possibilities for improved work practices and highlighted procedural and security shortcomings. The 

key lessons include the need for more flexible and alternative work 

schedules and the possibility of increased unclassified work. Provided security can address systems accessibility, these steps could 

allow greater worker flexibility; allow for a distributed workforce; 

and help with recruitment by opening the door to more employees without full clearances. Such an evolution could decrease costs, 

reduce the number of employees who wash out during the clearance 

process, and create opportunities for recruiting workers with specific 

skill sets. Such measures could be the key to recruiting the technical 

workforce needed to cover current and emerging global issues.

Implementing new approaches will not be easy, but it cannot happen slowly. The pool of people from which the IC will draw its workforce of the future was already transforming before the pandemic and 

has now probably become accustomed to a new employment paradigm. Some companies are saying they are never going back to the 

office in the same way as before, and smaller cities are offering cash 

and tax incentives to compete for individuals who can work remotely 

but may want a more relaxed or lower-cost standard of living. 

IC officers have gotten a taste of the possible during this period. 

While most employees longed to return to the office and some could 

do little or nothing outside of it, much of the IC continued to operate 
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COVID and Intelligence

with some level of effectiveness under pandemic conditions. It is 

probable that employees will expect a different experience after this 

year of workplace flexibility. Having some agencies return to their 

previous approaches while others retain some pandemic-era practices is likely to spark an intra-IC competition for talent, with those 

agencies willing to adopt greater workplace flexibility poaching from 

those that do not. In addition, the IC should not underestimate the 

competition for talent with a private sector learning from the pandemic. Amazon’s arrival in the National Capital Region will be worth 

watching.87 A portion of IC officers may expect, at a bare minimum, 

some semblance of the flexibility that their colleagues departing to 

the private sector possess. Savvy IC professionals could use that flexibility as leverage in hiring negotiations across agencies.

Some IC agencies will attract people based on the allure of intelligence work alone. These individuals have a focus on national security 

and will be willing to take what conditions they can get. Inequities 

in salary and workplace flexibility that exist across the agencies 

demonstrate that some people are willing to overlook those considerations to enter the IC. That tendency may not persist, or at least 

not at previous levels. For the marginal employee interested in IC 

work but not necessarily committed to it, whose marketable skills 

attract higher salaries and more benefits, workplace flexibility could 

be more important than ever. Generational change and evolving attitudes about work may decrease the size of the pool of people focused 

on IC work in the years to come.

Overreactions and the Status Quo Ante

Since its arrival, the pandemic has sparked discussion about a “New 

Normal” across all activities: schools, businesses, and government.88, 

89 In theory, the “New Normal” described operating procedures that 

retained some of the adjustments of the pandemic workplace, paired 

with whatever possibilities vaccination introduced. While some 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

desire to merely “return to normal”—reality, at least for some time, 

will require keeping elements of the practices that emerged during 

the pandemic, to include consciousness of spacing and possibly 

even mask usage in parts of the country with high infection rates. 

Some companies see opportunity in reducing their real estate costs 

through a distributed workforce.90, 91 Others, however, are taking a 

harder line—most notably, Morgan Stanley, whose CEO has mandated that all employees return to the office by September and whose 

chief counsel said that firms that want the investment giant’s business 

need to be operating from the office.92, 93

Within the IC, there appears to be a desire to return to how 

things were before the pandemic hit: to the status quo ante. The “New 

Normal” need not be the “Old Normal” with a little more flexibility 

and the ability to do required training remotely. OPM has articulated a need to “promote a different vision of work in the federal government going forward.”94 The new COVID-19 operating paradigm 

forced IC managers into the uncomfortable position of losing visibility into portions of their workforce. The private sector and other 

parts of the government came to terms with telework years ago, but 

this episode forced a remote approach on national security organizations to an extent never imagined or before experienced. The pandemic should spur a reassessment of subject-matter priorities and 

workforce practices.

At same time, the danger exists that the IC will engage in 

another longstanding tendency: over-correcting to respond to the 

latest threat. The U.S. Government has long taken drastic responses 

to real or perceived poor intelligence practices or performance, to 

include establishing the Director of Central Intelligence after Pearl 

Harbor; lowering risk appetite after the Church and Pike Committee 

hearings in the 1970s; focusing on terrorism post-9/11; standing up 

the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in response to 9/11 

and the Iraq WMD misstep in 2003; and imposing restrictions after 

Edward Snowden’s unauthorized disclosures. A drastic correction 
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COVID and Intelligence

occurred after Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf ‘s famous criticisms that 

intelligence had not provided sufficient support to the invasion of 

Iraq in 1991, which led to a focus across agencies on support to military operations. The DoD-based intelligence agencies, which make 

up the bulk of intelligence budgets, developed into “combat support 

agencies,” with a primary function to aid military operations. This 

focus transitioned with little difficulty to counterterrorism operations after 9/11, likely causing the IC to lose sight of other trends 

developing during these years.95

The IC was already hurtling toward a reckoning for the reasons 

described by Morell and Zegart.96 Those concerns went beyond basic 

organization or lines of reporting and into fundamental questions 

about the validity of the work, the use of technology, and the overall 

posture the Community had taken across the range of national security challenges facing the country. None of those questions have gone 

away. Instead, they have just become more acute and more difficult, 

especially given possible decreased post-COVID funding profiles.

It will be necessary to resist the temptation to return to status 

quo ante. The virus will have an impact on many activities including 

how office spaces are organized and organizations’ ability to carry 

out their mission remotely. This important debate is underway and 

will continue, as it should. From a substantive or subject matter perspective, another debate will occur, largely focused on priorities. 

There was a disruption, and the question now is how severe. It will 

be tempting to treat it as a blip, but also to treat it as a complete break 

from the past. Neither approach will best serve IC professionals or 

the IC mission.

A COVID-19 Commission?

For its 2019 publication Preface to Strategy, Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory put together an august panel of former 

senior national security officials, spanning multiple organizations, 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

administrations, and fields to examine the preconditions for a new 

national security strategy. Led by former Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig, the report was not a national security strategy or even 

a roadmap for a strategy but instead an in-depth treatment of the 

underlying realities of U.S. national security conditions and perceptions. The “prelude” of the title spoke to a fundamental review 

of how national security thinkers and decisionmakers understand 

the strengths, weaknesses, and even basic conditions that underpin 

U.S. planning, the views adversaries hold of the United States, and 

even our biases. The report asked national security experts to do the 

uncomfortable work of looking inward before looking outward. The 

bottom-line assessment: the attributes we once thought protected us 

from danger—our economic might, scientific and technical supremacy, and geographic isolation—are no longer the dependable buffers 

we once thought. The authors argued that the United States required 

a reset on how it looked at itself.97 That review is even more valid than 

ever, given the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the attack on 

the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. 

Similarly, the 2020 pandemic created a need for the IC to undertake a course of introspection on par with resets in the 1940s, 1970s, 

and 2000s. The self-examination would address the fundamentals of 

IC work, going beyond any in IC history—even those that resulted 

from unauthorized disclosures, revelations of wrongdoing, or even 

high-profile intelligence failures that contributed to policy or military 

mistakes or disasters. The pandemic has raised basic questions about 

the broad mission of the IC down to every single member: Do we 

need this person to do their job, and, if so, when, and where?

Although most IC agencies will do some level of “lessons 

learned” analysis, such a comprehensive review is likely to be difficult for the IC to do on its own, and a Congressional review could 

end up overly politicized, given the sharp divides in Congress and 

country over the pandemic. As argued by Zegart and Morell, the 

IC was due for a large-scale review even before the pandemic.98
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COVID and Intelligence

COVID-19 may have just accelerated the IC substantive and workforce trends already underway.

The United States experienced multiple traumas in the 20 years 

before the COVID-19 pandemic: the 9/11 terrorist attacks and subsequent Afghanistan invasion; the 2003 Iraq invasion; the 2008 global 

financial crisis; and foreign interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential 

election. Others, like the H1N1 flu in 2009, could enter that list, but 

these four had widespread national security implications and affected 

the average American, albeit in the case of Iraq, in a more diffuse way 

than the other three. The first even changed the way people traveled 

and, combined with the invasion of Iraq and the nuclear issues that 

served as predicates for it, led to an overhaul of the country’s national 

security infrastructure. The 2016 Russian election interference is perhaps too recent—and controversial—to have truly been understood 

to be the “Cyber 9/11” or “Cyber Pearl Harbor” it was.

Dahl calls COVID-19 a warning failure, either through the failure to warn or for policymakers to heed the warning.99 He compared the pandemic to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. Roule took 

a different path, comparing the IC’s path to responding to the 

virus to the actions taken in reaction to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001.100 Neither of these comparisons, however, is apt. 

Each involved systemic failure and an inability to piece together the 

necessary clues to warn military and policy leaders, but both fell 

squarely within the common understanding of the role and mission of intelligence: violent adversaries seeking to harm the United 

States. Both involved an elusive but defined enemy operating with 

a set of strategic goals, and both led to reorganizations of the U.S. 

intelligence effort to identify and share the markers that could have 

avoided the catastrophes.

The twin traumas of 9/11 and Iraq led to such a review, which 

suggested major changes, many of which were implemented—but 

not all. The global financial crisis, which had widespread and massive domestic and foreign impacts, resulted in a collective national 
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security shrug. No one questioned that Pearl Harbor or 9/11 fell 

squarely in the IC’s job jar. But a global economic meltdown with its 

roots in the U.S. housing market? That was harder to understand as 

falling in the IC’s purview. Unfortunately, it is possible that the pandemic will be seen the same way. The Biden administration’s mandate 

that the IC review the intelligence on the origins of the pandemic 

offered a glimmer of hope, but its narrow focus will limit its impact.101

In 2020, it appeared that a national coronavirus review commission was inevitable, on par with the 9/11 and Iraq WMD commissions. The entire national security community and broader Federal 

government had failed to develop the information necessary to identify and proactively avert an impending disaster. Pandemic fatigue 

and the attack on the U.S. Capitol in January 2021 eroded any sense of 

urgency for a comprehensive COVID review. Aside from low-profile 

Congressional hearings into the virus and its handling by the Federal 

Government, a blue-ribbon panel—something that once seemed a 

certainty—may never convene. In its absence, there would be utility 

in the IC conducting its own introspective review of policies, practices, and priorities to remain competitive and prepare for the next 

crisis—and documenting the lessons and outcomes. There is an open 

question as to whether the IC has learned enough to be ready for the 

next pandemic. A mental playbook now exists, but it will only be useAbout the Author

ful if the next crisis hits while today’s officers are on the job.

∂Manolis Priniotakis is Vice President for Research and Infrastructure 

at the National Intelligence University (NIU). Previously, he served 

with the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence as chief of staff. His research has focused on economics 

intelligence and intelligence integration. 
53

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Endnotes

1 J. Feehan, “Is COVID-19 the Worst Pandemic?,” Maturitas, February 6, 2021, 

doi: 10.1016/j.maturitas.2021.02.001, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/

PMC7866842/. 

2 Marie Rosenthal, “Fauci: COVID-19 Worst Pandemic in 100 Years,” Infectious Disease Special Edition, Octber 21, 2020, https://www.idse.net/Covid-19/

Article/10-20/Fauci--COVID-19-Worst-Pandemic-in-100-Years/60937. 

3 “The Coronavirus Effect on Global Economic Sentiment,” McKinsey & Company, 

April 30, 2021, https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-andcorporate-finance/our-insights/the-coronavirus-effect-on-global-economicsentiment. 

4 Lora Jones et al., “Coronavirus: How the Pandemic Has Changed the World 

Economy,” BBC.com, January 24, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/business51706225. 

5 “The COVID-19 Pandemic and Trade-Related Developments in LDCs,” World 

Trade Organization, June 8, 2020, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid

19_e/ldcs_report_e.pdf. 

6 Shashank Bengali, “India Sets a Record for Daily Infections,” New York Times, 

April 22, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/22/world/india-coronavirusrecord.html. 

7 Erik Dahl, “Was the Coronavirus Outbreak an Intelligence Failure?,” Government Executive, June 16, 2020, https://www.govexec.com/defense/2020/06/

was-coronavirus-outbreak-intelligence-failure/166179/. 

8 David Murdoch, “The Next Once-a-Century Pandemic Is Coming Sooner Than 

You Think—But COVID-19 Can Help Us Get Ready,” The Conversation, June 

14, 2020, https://theconversation.com/the-next-once-a-century-pandemic-iscoming-sooner-than-you-think-but-covid-19-can-help-us-get-ready-139976. 

9 Gabriel Wainer et al., “Coronavirus: How New Simulations Can Predict the 

Spread of Future Pandemics,” The Conversation, March 26, 2020, https://news

room.carleton.ca/story/new-simulations-predict-future-pandemics/. 

10 Nicole Ogyrsko, “Federal Agencies in DC Open but With ‘Maximum Telework’ 

Flexibilities, OMB Says,” Federal News Network, March 15, 2020, https://federal

newsnetwork.com/workforce/2020/03/federal-agencies-in-dc-open-but-undermaximum-telework-flexibilities-omb-says/. 

11 “Pneumonia of Unknown Cause—China,” World Health Organization, January 

5, 2020, https://www.who.int/csr/don/05-january-2020-pneumonia-of-unkowncause-china/en/. 
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12 Natasha Khan, “New Virus Discovered by Chinese Scientists Investigating Pneumonia Outbreak,” Wall Street Journal, January 8, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/

articles/new-virus-discovered-by-chinese-scientists-investigating-pneumoniaoutbreak-11578485668. 

13 Amy Qin and Javier Hernandez, “China Reports First Death From New Virus,” 

New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/10/world/asia/china-viruswuhan-death.html. 

14 “Novel Coronavirus—Thailand (ex China),” World Health Organization, January 14, 2020, https://www.who.int/csr/don/14-january-2020-novel-coronavirusthailand-ex-china/en/. 

15 “Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV)—Situation Report 1,” World Health Organization, January 20, 2020, https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronavi

ruse/situation-reports/20200121-sitrep-1-2019-ncov.pdf?sfvrsn=20a99c10_4. 

16 “First Travel-related Case of 2019 Novel Coronavirus Detected in United States,” 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, January 21, 2020, https://www.cdc.

gov/media/releases/2020/p0121-novel-coronavirus-travel-case.html. 

17 Ayesha Rascoe and Colin Dwyer, “Trump Received Intelligence Briefings on 

Coronavirus Twice in January,” NPR.org, May 2, 2020, https://www.npr.org/

sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/05/02/849619486/trump-receivedintelligence-briefings-on-coronavirus-twice-in-january. 

18 Bill Gertz, “White House: Intelligence Agencies Missed Early Signs of Coronavirus Pandemic,” Washington Times, June 9, 2020, https://www.washing

tontimes.com/news/2020/jun/9/robert-obrien-us-intelligence-botched-earlydonald/. 

19 “Statement on the Second Meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) 

Emergency Committee Regarding the Outbreak of Novel Coronavirus (2019-

nCoV),” World Health Organization, January 30, 2020, https://www.who.int/

news/item/30-01-2020-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-internationalhealth-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-ofnovel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov). 

20 Erica Werner et al., “Trump Administration Announces Mandatory Quarantines in Response to Coronavirus,” Washington Post, January 31, 2020, https://

www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2020/01/31/trump-weighs-tighter-chinatravel-restrictions-response-coronavirus/. 

21 Vivian Lin et al., “‘Scared and Panicked’: Travelers Rush To Avoid Virus Quarantine,” New York Times, February 2, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/02/

us/coronavirus-airports.html. 
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22 Elian Peltier, “France Confirms First Death in Europe From Coronavirus,” New 

York Times, February 15, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/15/world/

europe/france-coronarivus-death.html. 

23 Lisa Schnirring, “China’s COVID-19 Death Toll Tops 2,000; Iran Reports First 

Cases,” Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, University of Minnesota, February 19, 2020, https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2020/

02/chinas-covid-19-death-toll-tops-2000-iran-reports-first-cases. 

24 Lisandra Paraguassu and Carolina Mandl, “Brazil Confirms First Coronavirus Case in Latin America,” Reuters.com, February 26, 2020, https://www

.reuters.com/article/us-china-health-brazil/brazil-confirms-first-coronaviruscase-in-latin-america-idUSKCN20K1EU. 

25 Nicole Acevdo and Minyvonne Burke, “Washington State Man Becomes First 

U.S. Death from Coronavirus,” NBCNews.com, February 29, 2020, https://

www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/1st-coronavirus-death-u-s-officials-say-n1

145931. 

26 Office of Personnel Management Tweet, March 15, 2020, https://twitter.com/

USOPM/status/1239359767904235521. 

27 “Mayor Bowser Issues Stay-at-Home Order,” Executive Office of the Mayor, 

March 30, 2020, https://mayor.dc.gov/release/mayor-bowser-issues-stayhome-order. 

28 “Executive Order Number Fifty-Five (2020),” Office of the Governor of the 

Commonwealth of Virginia, March 30, 2020, https://www.governor.virginia.

gov/media/governorvirginiagov/executive-actions/EO-55-Temporary-Stay-atHome-Order-Due-to-Novel-Coronavirus-(COVID-19).pdf. 

29 Kate Amara and Greg Ng, “Maryland Governor Issues Stay-at-Home Order 

Amid Coronavirus Pandemic,” WBALTV.com, March 31, 2020, https://www.

wbaltv.com/article/coronavirus-pandemic-maryland-stay-home-directive/

31977340. 

30 James Clapper, “Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the 

US Intelligence Community,” 10, Senate Armed Services Committee, February 26, 2015, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ Unclassified_2015_ATA_

SFR_-_SASC_FINAL.pdf. 

31 Nahal Toosi, “Coronavirus Rattles America’s National Security Priesthood,” 

Politico.com, March 28, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/28/

coronavirus-rattles-national-security-priesthood-152988. 

32 David B. Rivkin and George S. Beebe, “Before this Pandemic Ends, Intel Agencies Should Prepare for a World of Threats,” TheHill.com, March 31, 2020, 
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https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/490160-before-this-pandemicends-intel-agencies-should-prepare-for-a-world-of-threats. 

33 Micah Zenko, “The Coronavirus Is the Worst Intelligence Failure in U.S. History,” Foreign Policy, March 25, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/25/

coronavirus-worst-intelligence-failure-us-history-covid-19/. 

34 Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt, Silent Warfare (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 

Inc.), 63.

35 Zenko, “The Coronavirus Is the Worst Intelligence Failure in U.S. History.”

36 Rascoe and Dwyer, “Trump Received Intelligence Briefings on Coronavirus 

Twice in January.”

37 Gertz, “White House: Intelligence Agencies Missed Early Signs of Coronavirus 

Pandemic.”

38 Amy Zegart and Michael Morell, “Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: Why U.S. Intelligence Agencies Must Adapt or Fail,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2019, https://

www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-04-16/spies-lies-and-algorithms. 

39 Russ Travers, “The Coming Intelligence Failure,” Studies in Intelligence 10, no. Y, 

36-43. https://www.cia.gov/static/b907a844d9a2a03760f35afca91b06c2/comingintelligence-failure.pdf. 

40 Josh Kerbel, “Coming to Terms with Anticipatory Intelligence,” Warontherocks

.com, August 13, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/coming-to-termswith-anticipatory-intelligence/. 

41 Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes (New York: Anchor Books).

42 Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett, Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA’s 

Analysis of the Soviet Union (Langley, VA: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 

2003).

43 “The Buddhists in South Vietnam,” CIA, June 28, 1963, https://www.cia.gov/

readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-00927A004100030002-4.pdf. 

44 Joel Achenbach et al., “A Viral Tsunami: How the Underestimated Coronavirus 

Took Over the World,” Washington Post, March 9, 2021, https://www.washington

post.com/health/2021/03/09/coronavirus-spread-world/. 

45 “Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence, April 9, 2021, https://www.dni.gov/files/

ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2021-Unclassified-Report.pdf. 

46 Norman Roule, “Our Response to 9/11 Gave Us Lessons for COVID-19,” The

CipherBrief.com, April 6, 2020, https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/china/

our-response-to-9-11-gave-us-lessons-for-covid-19. 

47 “Description of the National Military Strategy 2018,” Department of Defense, 

Directorate for Strategy, Plans, and Policy (J-5) The Joint Staff, 2018, https://
57

COVID and Intelligence

www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/ UNCLASS_2018_National_

Military_Strategy_Description.pdf. 

48 Glenn S. Gerstell and Michael Morell, “Four Ways U.S. Intelligence Efforts 

Should Change in the Wake of the Coronavirus Pandemic,” Washington Post, 

May 17, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ 2020/04/07/fourways-us-intelligence-efforts-should-change-wake-coronavirus-pandemic/. 

49 Roule, “Our Response to 9/11 Gave Us Lessons for COVID-19.”

50 Andreas Fuchs et al., “China Sent Masks, Gloves and Gowns to Many U.S. 

States. Here’s Who Benefited,” Washington Post, January 29, 2021, https://www.

washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/29/china-sent-masks-gloves-gowns-manyus-states-heres-who-benefited/. 

51 Rachel Sadoff, “COVID-19 and the Politicization of Personal Protective Equipment,” Harvard Political Review, May 21, 2020, https://harvardpolitics.com/

politicization-ppe/. 

52 Sam Meredith, “As Russia and China Seek To Boost Their Global Influence, Analysts Warn Vaccine Diplomacy Is Here To Stay,” CNBC.com, February 17, 2021, 

https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/17/covid-vaccine-diplomacy-russia-chinaseek-to-boost-global-influence.html. 

53 Paula Newton, “Shutout by Allies, Canada Will Produce its Own Vaccines by the 

End of 2021,” CNN.com, February 3, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/02/

americas/canada-coronavirus-vaccines/index.html. 

54 Gordon Corera, “Hackers Targeted COVID-19 Vaccine Supply ‘Cold Chain,’” BBC.

com, December 3, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-55165552#:~:

text=Coronavirus%3A%20Hackers%20targeted%20%20Covid%20vaccine%20

supply%20'cold%20chain',-Gordon%20Corera&text=%20The%20intern

ational%20%20vaccine%20supply%20chain,the%20right%20temperature%20

during%20transportation. 

55 “FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Announces Allocation Plan for 

55 Million Doses To Be Shared Globally,” The White House, June 21, 2021, 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/21/

fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-announces-allocation-plan-for-55-

million-doses-to-be-shared-globally/. 

56 Talha Burki, “China’s Successful Control of COVID-19,” The Lancet 20, no. 11 

(November 1, 2020): 1240-41, , https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(20)30800-8. 

57 Lisa Schnirring, “India, Brazil Grapple With Massive COVID-19 Surges,” 

Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, University of Minnesota, 

April 15, 2021, https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2021/04/indiabrazil-grapple-massive-covid-19-surges. 
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58 “What Will Be the Impact of the Covid-19 Pandemic on Healthcare Systems?,” 

Deloitte.com, https://www2.deloitte.com/fr/fr/pages/covid-insights/articles/

impact-covid19-healthcare-systems.html. 

59 “The World Bank Group’s Response to the COVID-19 (coronavirus) Pandemic,” The World Bank, https://www.worldbank.org/en/who-we-are/news/

coronavirus-covid19. 

60 “The IMF’s Response to COVID-19,” The International Monetary Fund, https://

www.imf.org/en/About/FAQ/imf-response-to-covid-19. 

61 “Hungary’s Orban Seeks Continued Emergency Powers For COVID-19 

Response,” RFERL.org, February 15, 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/hungaryorban-emergency-powers-coronavirus/31103780.html. 

62 Ron Synovitz, “COVID-19 Crackdowns, Expanded Authoritarianism, and The 

Post-Pandemic World,” RFERL.org. December 30, 2020, https://www.rferl.

org/a/authoritarianism-crackdowns-covid-human-rights-coronavirus/31026

181.html. 

63 Thomas Carothers and David Wong, “Authoritarian Weaknesses and the Pandemic,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 11, 2020, https://

carnegieendowment.org/2020/08/11/authoritarian-weaknesses-and-pandemicpub-82452. 

64 Thomas Kaplan et al., “Taking ‘Extraordinary Measures,’ Biden Backs Suspending Patents on Vaccines,” New York Times, May 5, 2021, https://www.nytimes

.com/2021/05/05/us/politics/biden-covid-vaccine-patents.html. 

65 “Covax: How Will Covid Vaccines Be Shared Around the World?,” BBC.com, 

May 3, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-55795297. 

66 Noah Higgins-Dunn, “The U.K. Has Identified a New Covid-19 Strain that 

Spreads More Quickly. Here’s What They Know,” CNBC.com, December 19, 

2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/19/the-uk-has-identified-a-new-covid19-strain-that-spreads-more-quickly-heres-what-they-know.html. 

67 Dahl, “Was the Coronavirus Outbreak an Intelligence Failure?”

68 Daniil Davydoff, “The Cult of the Search in Open-source Intelligence,” Security, November 24, 2020, https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/94003-

the-cult-of-the-search-in-open-source-intelligence. 

69 Timothy Puko and Warren P. Strobel, “State Department Analyst Resigns After 

White House Blocked Climate Change Testimony,” Wall Street Journal, July 10, 

2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-department-analyst-resigns-after-whitehouse-blocks-climate-change-testimony-11562780573. 

70 Joshua Rovner, “Think Small: Why the Intelligence Community Should Do Less 

about New Threats,” War on the Rocks, June 16, 2021, https://warontherocks.
59

COVID and Intelligence

com/2021/06/think-small-why-the-intelligence-community-should-do-lessabout-new-threats/. 

71 “Intelligence Community Directive Number 204: Roles and Responsibilities for 

the National Intelligence Priorities Framework,” The Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence, September 13, 2007, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/

ICD/ICD_204.pdf. 

72 “National Broadband Plan,” Federal Communications Commission, March 17, 

2010, https://www.fcc.gov/general/national-broadband-plan. 

73 “Telework Enhancement Act,” Telework.gov, https://www.telework.gov/

guidance-legislation/telework-legislation/telework-enhancement-act/. 

74 Alexander Abad-Santos, “GSA Threw an $800,000 Party and All You Got Was 

the Bill,” The Atlantic, April 3, 2012, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/

archive/2012/04/gsa-threw-800000-party-and-all-you-got-was-bill/329797/. 

75 Ben Zimmer, “‘The Before Time:’ A Sci-Fi Idea That Has Made Its Way to Real 

Life,” Wall Street Journal, June 19, 2021.

76 OPM, Tweet.

77 Cortney Weinbaum et al., “Understanding Government Telework: An Examination of Research Literature and Practices from Government Agencies,” 2018, 

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2023.html. 

78 Cortney Weinbaum et al., “Moving to the Unclassified: How the Intelligence 

Community Can Work from Unclassified Facilities,” April 23, 2018. https://

www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2024.html. 

79 Weinbaum, “Moving to the Unclassified,” iii.

80 Weinbaum, “Understanding Government Telework,” 8.

81 Weinbaum, “Moving to the Unclassified,” 3.

82 Weinbaum, “Moving to the Unclassified,” xi.

83 Weinbaum, “Moving to the Unclassified,” 48.

84 Weinbaum, “Moving to the Unclassified,” x.

85 “THE YEAR THAT (SORT OF) WASN’T: Five Lessons Employers Learned 

During the COVID-19 Pandemic and What They Mean for the Future,” JDSupra

.com, March 16, 2021, https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-year-that-sort-ofwasn-t-five-7957856/. 

86 Kathy Gurchiek, “Workplace Lessons Learned During the Pandemic,” SHRM.

org, March 29, 2021, https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-news/pages/

workplace-lessons-learned-during-covid19.aspx. 

87 Fredrick Kunkle, “Amazon Unveils Helix Building as Heart of Campus in Arlington,” February 2, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2021/02/

02/amazon-arlingon-headquarters-helix/. 
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88 “Life After the COVID-19 Vaccine: Envisioning the ‘New Normal,’” UChicago News, April 1, 2021, https://news.uchicago.edu/story/life-after-covid-19-

vaccine-envisioning-new-normal. 

89 Janna Anderson et al., “Experts Say the ‘New Normal’ in 2025 Will Be Far More 

Tech-Driven, Presenting More Big Challenges,” Pew Research Center, February 18, 

2021. https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2021/02/18/ experts-say-the-newnormal-in-2025-will-be-far-more-tech-driven-presenting-more-big-challenges/. 

90 Charles S. Gascon and Jacob Haas, “The Impact of COVID-19 on the Residential 

Real Estate Market,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, October 6, 2020, https://

www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/fourth-quarter-2020/

impact-covid-residential-real-estate-market. 

91 Brodie Boland et al., “Reimagining the Office and Work Life After COVID-19,” 

McKinsey & Company, June 8, 2020, https://www.mckinsey.com/businessfunctions/organization/our-insights/reimagining-the-office-and-work-life-aftercovid-19#. 

92 Paul R. La Monca, “Morgan Stanley CEO to NY Workers: Be Back in the 

Office by September or Else,” CNN.com, June 23, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/

2021/06/16/investing/morgan-stanley-ceo-return-to-office/index.html. 

93 Brian Baxter and Ruiqi Chen, “Tech Legal Leaders Veer from Morgan Stanley Return-to-Work Order,” Bloomberg Law, https://news.bloomberglaw.com/

business-and-practice/tech-legal-leaders-veer-from-morgan-stanley-returnto-work-order.

94 Natalie Alms, “OPM Official: No Going Back to Pre-COVID Status Quo,” FCW.

com, March 24, 2021, https://fcw.com/articles/2021/03/24/opm-post-covidno-going-back.aspx. 

95 David P. Oakley, Subordinating Intelligence: The DOD/CIA Post-Cold War Relationship (Frankfurt, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2019).

96 Zegart & Morell, “Spies, Lies, and Algorithms.”

97 Richard Danzig et al., A Preface to Strategy: The Foundations of American 

National Security, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory. 2018. https://

www.jhuapl.edu/Content/documents/PrefaceToStrategy.pdf. 

98 Zegart and Morell, “Spies, Lies, and Algorithms.”

99 Dahl, “Was the Coronavirus Outbreak an Intelligence Failure?”

100 Roule, “Our Response to 9/11 Gave Us Lessons for COVID-19.”

101 Michael Shear et al., “Biden Orders Intelligence Inquiry Into Origins of Virus,” 

New York Times, May 26, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/26/us/politics/

biden-coronavirus-origins.html. 
PART TWO

LOOKING OUT

63

TECHNOLOGY AND GLOBAL 

SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY

Jason Schenker

Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, references to supply chain security 

most commonly evoked associations with national defense. During 

the darkest moments of the pandemic, however, Americans saw widespread images of sparse grocery store shelves, where paper products, 

fresh fruits and vegetables, meat, and other goods were in short supply. E-commerce technologies supported social and economic stability 

through the worst of the pandemic, but broader supply chain risks 

were exposed. In the post-pandemic period, supply chain is likely to 

remain a concern for consumers and policymakers, as well as military strategists. Reflecting the increasing technological complexities of 

supply chains in the decade ahead, the national security approach to 

protecting U.S. supply chains—especially of critical goods like pharmaceuticals, high-technology goods, aircraft parts, rare earth minerals, 

and materiel—will need to be multifaceted and embrace futures thinking. Identifying new ways to use technology to bridge economic and 

social stability gaps presents tremendous opportunities for the future 

of national security.
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Open Secrets and Overlooked Risks

Maintaining a secure supply chain has often been a deciding factor 

in maintaining operational advantage in conflict. Supply chain security is also critical for economic health and social stability, especially 

maintaining access to food. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the 

importance of supply chain was something the civilian population 

blissfully ignored. The pandemic, however, opened the aperture in 

many ways, revealing open secrets and overlooked risks to our society, economy, and security. Supply chain vulnerability has continued 

to color the path forward as the period of mass vaccination began. For 

national security, the COVID-19 pandemic exposed the importance 

of being vigilant with our borders. And it highlighted the risks of 

overly lean supply chains, as well as the potential downside of being 

dependent on the global supply chain for critical goods like medical 

supplies, medical devices, basic necessities, and personal protective 

equipment (PPE), including gloves and masks.

Four Meals Away From Anarchy

Although food insecurity and shortages are persistent concerns and 

risks for many countries around the world at any point in time, it is 

uncommon for this to be a concern in the most developed Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries like the United States. But the COVID-19 pandemic, shutdown, 

and recession changed that. Images of stores without paper products 

or with limited selections of food were reminiscent for many Americans who lived through parts of the Cold War of the widespread 

images seen during the death throes of the Soviet Union. 

Despite the relative abundance of agricultural production in the 

United States, which is one of the world’s biggest net exporters of agricultural products, resilience issues and risks related to the food and 

agricultural supply chain have remained top of mind for many Americans. Media stories of meat shortages and other limited supplies were 
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widespread during the spring 2020 surge of COVID-19. And while 

some might decry these as overblown, in truth, our entire economy 

and society were probably a lot closer to the edge than we would like 

to admit to ourselves. The British Security Service MI5 has long held 

the motto that society is “four meals away from anarchy.”1

 During the 

COVID-19 pandemic and shutdown, it seemed at times that we were 

not too far off this mark. Additionally, now that these risks have been 

exposed, they could be exploited again in the future as global power 

competition and conflict threaten to become more contentious. 

Supply Chain as a National Security Risk

Maintaining a secure supply chain is inherently difficult when the 

goods come from a country that is far away. Generally low levels of 

inventory as well as long, lean supply chains revealed risks to national 

security in the United States in 2020. The corporate playbook for 

most companies has been to keep inventories and supply chains lean. 

That works well during times of supply chain stability, but lean inventories coupled with geographic distance became an issue for supply 

chain security during the COVID-19 pandemic. This was especially 

critical for medical devices and PPE. 

Trade risks were already a national security issue related to metals for materiel in the United States, which was the impetus behind 

the implementation of the U.S. Section 232 tariffs on aluminum and 

steel. Additionally, the Section 301 tariffs highlighted risks to U.S. 

national security from Chinese threats to U.S. intellectual property. 

Due to the COVID-19 crisis, PPE and medical devices may now very 

well end up on lists of essential goods as well. There may even be a 

bipartisan political push to secure supply chains for critical medical 

devices, PPE equipment, and pharmaceuticals to prevent the loss of 

American lives in the future—and to minimize the potential disruption or devastation of the American economy in the event of another 

pandemic. After all, one of the big reasons it was necessary to slow the 
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spread of COVID-19 in the United States and “flatten the curve” was 

because there were not enough ventilators, gloves, masks, or other 

equipment to handle a pandemic. If we could ensure greater stability 

in the supply chain for PPE and medical devices, we may be better 

able to protect the economy and the American people in the future.

Psychological and Existential Risks

The COVID-19 outbreak revealed that the United States can be 

exploited in a pandemic-type event in myriad ways. Making the 

economy of the United States seem reminiscent of the Soviet Union’s 

financial state during the last days of the Cold War is no small feat. 

It also exposed U.S. supply chain vulnerabilities and revealed that, 

if the United States had been solely targeted, it would have significantly threatened national security and the ability of the United 

States to project influence globally. In general, COVID-19 revealed 

that a pandemic-level biological attack on the United States would 

be beyond economically devastating. Plus, the vulnerability of the 

American public to media and social media messaging and potential manipulation was also revealed. Devastatingly hot buttons of 

bias that parts of the public clung to included anchoring bias, confirmation bias, and false consensus bias—even when related to something fundamental, like wearing a mask. With poignant and punchy 

memes, parts of the civilian population were influenced into action—

or inaction—in the face of the deadliest pandemic in a century. The 

social media activity and public response to COVID-19 highlight the 

at-risk status of the American public to future psychological operations (PSYOPS) in a post-truth world dominated by the mass adoption of subjectivist truth.

A most worrisome scenario would be if adversaries of the United 

States were to intentionally pair a biological attack with widespread 

social media and traditional media disinformation. Such a plan would 

be designed to cause maximum disruption, political destabilization, 
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and economic devastation, and it would likely be successful for at 

least a brief time. These kinds of risks may sound extreme. But the 

COVID-19 pandemic was an extreme situation, and, as a pandemic 

and public health crisis, it may not be singular in the decades ahead. 

Plus, the powers of the world—great and small—have seen how a pandemic plays out. For those countries and entities that seek recognition, 

power, or chaos, COVID-19 offers a glimpse into the scale of instability that can be rapidly created in the world by a pandemic that could 

have been much worse. 

NOISE Framework

Following the outbreak of COVID-19, The Futurist Institute was 

approached by the Strategic Foresight and Futures Branch of the U.S. 

Air Force Warfighting Integration Capability (AFWIC) to help frame 

the importance of the COVID-19 pandemic for national security.2

Our response to that request was to create the NOISE framework, 

which examines some of the most important factors that contribute 

to national security and political stability. Our framework includes 

five critical factors:

Necessities—Food, Water, Power, Shelter, Safety

Occupations—Jobs, Vocations, Hobbies

Information—Access to Accurate, Complete Information

Systems—Financial, Health Care, Transportation, Education

External—International Relations, Military, Supply Chain, Trade

The first items The Futurist Institute included are the necessities 

of food, water, power, shelter, and safety. After all, the most important 

driver of most governmental policy and social change is what economists often call the economics of the stomach. In short, if people lack 

access to food or other basic necessities, there are significant risks of 

political instability. This is why supply chain is so critical—and why 
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it became such a critical topic in 2020. If necessity factors are stable, 

then a country or economy is likely to remain on an even keel. In the 

most recent experience of the COVID-19 pandemic, concerns about 

safety and food emerged. But man does not live by bread alone, and 

the other components of the NOISE framework are also necessary for 

stability in the face of significant risks and upheaval. Maintaining the 

U.S. supply chain and basic services as well as utilities (like power and 

water) was critical, as was sustaining safety and access to food. 

Second are occupations. These made the list because of the notion 

that people—at the population level—need things to do. Can people 

be retired and do essentially nothing? Yes, of course. But as a nation, 

people need jobs, vocations, and hobbies. They just need to be doing 

something. The need for this stabilizing force is tied to the proverbial 

notion that “idle hands are the devil’s workshop.” Occupational risks 

and instability became critical during the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak, as people were forced to shelter in place. Some people could 

still work, but others were concerned about their jobs. This is why 

the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act 

in the United States, as well as other forms of fiscal stimulus at home 

and abroad, has been so important. After all, even if people could not 

work, they needed to know their chance of still having jobs would be 

high after the pandemic. Yet, even with fiscal and monetary policy 

stimulus, the U.S. labor market suffered significantly. 

To put the job situation in perspective, in 1933—the worst year 

of the Great Depression in the United States—there were around 12.8 

million unemployed people.3

 In the 62 weeks from March 14, 2020, 

to May 15, 2021, there were almost 82.5 million initial filings for 

unemployment benefits in the United States.4

 Although the ranks of 

jobless Americans in the worst weeks of 2020 were at record levels, 

the number of unemployed might have been much higher if it were 

not for the CARES Act and the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP). 

Furthermore, even though the worst of the pandemic’s job losses and 

economic devastation were seen in the second quarter of 2020, high 
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Technology and Global Supply Chain Security

levels of joblessness were sustained throughout 2020 and well into 

2021. Even for the week ending May 1, 2021, there were still almost 16 

million Americans claiming unemployment benefits across all categories, including for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) as well 

as Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Compensation (PEUC).5

The third element of stability The Futurist Institute identified 

is information. Real information, rather than opinion, is critical 

for maintaining order and keeping people calm and their interests 

aligned. The topic of information included sharing accurate and complete information. The risks here include misinformation, disinformation, opinion presented as fact, and subjectivist truth when the 

truth is, in fact, objective. This is part of the PSYOPS risk noted above. 

Systems are fourth on the list. National security depends on the 

proper functioning of several critical social and economic systems, 

including the financial system, the health care system, the transportation system, and the education system. All of these were disrupted 

or at risk of being disrupted during the most severe outbreaks of the 

COVID-19 pandemic.

The fifth and final element of national security stability The Futurist Institute identified is external. This factor includes international relations, the existence of and ability to deploy the military, the global supply 

chain, and trade. When most people consider national security risks, 

this is the category they think of first. There is a simple reason for that: 

they take the other four categories for granted. If COVID-19 showed us 

anything, it is that almost every aspect of society believed to be stable 

can be rapidly destabilized. Fortunately, some of these core elements, 

like international relations and the military, were relatively undisrupted 

by the COVID-19 pandemic. But global supply chains and trade were 

disturbed, which had second order impacts on systems, occupations, 

and necessities. Plus, supply chain disruptions also exposed information elements of the framework to misinformation and disinformation.

When considering the NOISE framework, it is easy to see how 

the COVID-19 pandemic has actually threatened all of these different 
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pillars of national security and political stability in one way or another—

and how supply chain disruptions and uncertainty fed that instability 

risk. The risks posed by COVID-19 justified, in large part, the unprecedented levels of fiscal and monetary policy stimulus enacted globally. 

Of course, there will also be a legacy of record high global government 

debt and ballooned central bank balance sheets as a result of those necessary actions. The long-term implications of those dynamics remain 

to be seen, but one thing is clear: the COVID-19 pandemic threatened 

to push U.S. national security, the global economy, supply chains, and 

society as we know it to the brink. This time, we held the line because of 

significant and swift action. Next time, we may not be as lucky. And we 

may not have the same ability to issue as much debt or enact as much 

monetary policy accommodation as we did in 2020. For these reasons, 

shoring up risks could prove critical—especially because the next incidence of pandemic or plague might not be an accident. 

Listening for NOISE

As for the minimization of risk to national security, it will be critical 

to control for and support those elements in the NOISE framework 

that represent the fundamental building blocks of stability. That is 

where the risks are, and only if those levers of stability are firmly in 

place can the risks to national security and society be minimized. 

This is just as true now as it was in the first days of the COVID-19 

pandemic. And it will remain true whenever the next public health 

crisis rears its ugly head. 

Manufacturing and National Security

In addition to broad-based national security risks that the COVID19 pandemic revealed, The Futurist Institute also identified risks 

that have specific implications for national security industries. This 

includes the potential for disruptions to national security vendors, 
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Technology and Global Supply Chain Security

including the airplane manufacturers and airplane parts manufacturers that were economically devastated by challenging economic 

and business conditions engendered by a massive slowdown in air 

travel. Although this risk was a critical second-order impact of the 

COVID-19 pandemic, it is of primary importance for national security entities. Looking ahead, national security organizations will need 

to more aggressively monitor economic and business risks of critical 

vendors. This is just as true for large vendors as it is for startups that 

provide essential materiel to the defense industry. How the government addresses these risks in the future is up for debate, but one thing 

seems certain: Even if national security vendors are not too big to fail, 

they may be too important to fail.

Technology as a Critical Lever

At times in 2020, when the greatest number of Americans were forced 

to shelter in place or quarantine, the most visible part of the supply 

chain—e-commerce retail—helped keep the economy functioning. 

The applications and offerings for retail goods, restaurant food, and 

grocery delivery, which had been expanding for years, found their 

moment in the sun and kept people supplied with necessities—even 

if, at times, an almost overburdened system required scheduling food 

delivery several weeks in advance. In the face of COVID-19 challenges, 

the food and grocery parts of the e-commerce supply chain grew significantly. In fact, e-commerce as a sector expanded rapidly in 2020. In 

the second quarter of 2020, U.S. e-commerce retailers accounted for 

15.7 percent of all retail sales. This was up from 11.4 percent in the first 

quarter of 2020 and up from the 10.7 percent average for all of 2019.6

In dollar terms, U.S. e-commerce retail revenue was $203.8 billion in the second quarter of 2020, up almost 32 percent from $154.6 

billion in the first quarter.7

 The host of convenience-oriented applications and services helped keep the economy, and society more broadly, 

from falling apart. It was lucky to have had so much technology as a 
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lever at a time when reducing human contact was critical. There is no 

previous time in human history when this would have been possible 

to this degree. The technology available just one decade earlier would 

have left economies and societies much more exposed to COVID-19 

transmission, economic uncertainty, and social disorder. Interestingly, e-commerce technologies that kept goods flowing to consumers during 2020 were not born in the pandemic. In fact, e-commerce 

retailers have been gaining market share of retail sales in the United 

States for more than two decades, as can be seen in Figure 1. 

Figure 1. E-Commerce Retailers as Percent of Retail Sales Surged in Q2 202

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, E-Commerce Retail Sales as a Percent of Total Sales [ECOMPCTSA], retrieved 

from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, accessed on May 21, 2021, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/

series/ECOMPCTSA.

Although COVID-19 was not the origin of these technologies, 

it was an accelerant that ushered in a period of semi-forced digital transformation, making e-commerce less of a convenience and 

more of a necessity. As pandemic concerns and restrictions generally 

eased in the United States in the third quarter of 2020, the percent 
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Technology and Global Supply Chain Security

of e-commerce retail fell to 13.8 percent. It declined a bit further in 

the fourth quarter of 2020 to 13.6 percent. In dollar terms, however, 

U.S. e-commerce retailers pulled in $201.4 billion in retail sales in the 

third quarter, which was only down slightly from the $203.8 billion 

in the second quarter—but up immensely from the first quarter of 

2020.8

 It was also significantly greater than in any quarter of 2019. 

Part of the reason the percentage declined, of course, was that non-ecommerce retail saw improvements in the third and fourth quarters 

of 2020. This is why you can see declines in U.S. e-commerce retail 

as a percent of all retail in the third and fourth quarters of 2020 in 

Figure 1, as well as the more modest declines in e-commerce retailer 

dollars for those same quarters in Figure 2. 

Figure 2. E-Commerce Retailers Showed Record Revenues in Q2 2020, Q1 202

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, E-Commerce Retail Sales [ECOMSA], retrieved from FRED, Federal 

Reserve Bank of St. Louis, accessed on May 21, 2021, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/ECOMSA.

These dynamics offer some insight into the near-term future of 

e-commerce. Many analysts and pundits have referred to 2020 as a 

new normal. That makes 2019 the old normal. But what will the future 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

hold for the balance of 2021 and beyond? Many industries, including supply chain, will not go back to the old normal of 2019. In true 

Hegelian fashion, the Weltgeist is likely to propel us forward into a 

world that is a synthesis of both new and old. I expect we will follow 

a middle path forward to a new, new normal.

For supply chain, this means e-commerce percentages of total 

retail sales in coming quarters may be lower than those seen in the 

second quarter of 2020. But e-commerce percentages of total retail 

sales are still likely to exceed the e-commerce activity of 2019. Plus, 

U.S. e-commerce dollar levels are poised to remain strong and rise 

further to new highs. In fact, e-commerce spending in the first quarter of 2021 hit a new record level that eclipsed the previous peak in 

the second quarter of 2020.

These dynamics of the new, new normal are also likely to impact 

various industries and sectors that experienced significant changes in 

2020, including remote work, online education, telehealth, real estate, 

and travel. Another lasting impact of the new, new normal is likely to 

be people’s situational awareness of supply chain. It will hopefully be 

a very long time before people wait up in the middle of the night for 

the clock to strike midnight and food delivery slots to open up for a 

date three weeks in the future. But the memories of food insecurity 

during the COVID-19 pandemic are likely to cast a long shadow over 

consumer behaviors for many years. In fact, consumers may continue 

to remember the importance of supply chain and e-commerce technologies, even when these are no longer top-of-mind concerns in a 

post-pandemic world. 

Disruptive Impacts on Supply Chains

While e-commerce and technology are levers of opportunity for 

supply chain, enhanced security will also be increasingly critical in 

the next decade—especially for supply chains. Security issues could 

pose a number of disruptive impacts. Supply chains are likely to 
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Technology and Global Supply Chain Security

be disrupted by transportation hijacking, hacking, and cyber ransom. Alternatively, on-site machinery, flying warehouse drones, or 

even entire fleets of autonomous trucks could be hacked and held 

for cyber ransom. And, of course, customer data could be stolen, 

and financial accounts could be hacked. In truth, there are myriad 

risks from different kinds of security threats. There are also growing 

counterfeiting risks.

Cybersecurity risks are likely to be detected, either by software 

or because of a ransomware demand. But the big security risk posed 

by counterfeiting technology is likely to remain intentionally difficult 

to identify. Plus, over the next decade, counterfeit goods are likely 

to become increasingly more difficult to detect. The most vulnerable 

goods to this kind of risk are military goods, dual-use technology 

goods, pharmaceuticals, and high-value consumer technology goods, 

putting national security risks in play as well as financial and business 

risks. Many technologies are likely to be deployed over the next 10 

years to ensure the integrity of the supply chain, including blockchain 

as a more comprehensive and permanent record as well as other new 

kinds of physical marking and virtual technologies. Marking goods 

is a way to prevent counterfeiting and to protect intellectual property. Although likely to be used initially for goods of high technological, high intellectual property, or military value, marking goods will 

become increasingly important for many parts of the supply chain as 

the transition continues to an intellectual capital economy.

There are a number of value-adds from securely marking goods 

at the beginning of the supply chain and testing them throughout—

and at the end of—the supply chain. These value-adds include ensuring the vendor of goods can be verified, the intermediary location of 

goods can be verified, and the end customers can verify that they have 

received genuine goods. Even simply deploying this technology may 

reduce counterfeiting and hijacking of goods shipments—especially 

if markings are a critical part of verifying the authenticity by end 

consumers. In practical terms, nanotechnology markings, which are 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

invisible to the naked eye, could be placed on inverted delta parts for 

airplanes and verified by the customer. Blockchain technology could 

also be integrated with marking technology to verify the supply chain 

parties involved in every physical transaction of the goods throughout their chain of custody. As with other blockchain technology use 

cases, the integrated use of securely marking goods and blockchain 

will be most valuable for protecting individual consumers and for 

providing greater transparency for high-value supply chain goods. 

Unfortunately, marking goods and using blockchain will not mitigate or solve all supply chain risks. After all, drones could be increasingly used for hijacking with little risk to the individuals involved, 

and supply chain security technologies will not protect the intellectual capital value chain. Plus, there are still risks posed by the people 

in any system. No one technology is likely to be sufficient.

Better Mousetrap, Better Mouse

Even though we may think that supply chains are secure or imagine 

new technologies like blockchain to be a panacea, there are still risks. 

Perhaps most importantly, from a cybersecurity standpoint, will be the 

impact of quantum computing as a means to crack encryptions and 

wreak havoc. If blockchain and current forms of cryptography are the 

better mousetrap, quantum computing threatens to be a better mouse. 

Nothing will be safe. Most disconcertingly, China has been taking a 

significant lead in quantum computing technology for years and made 

tremendous technological strides during 2020. It is a race we cannot 

afford to lose—because of risks posed not just to supply chains and the 

cybersecurity of corporations, but also to national security encryption. 

Anticipating Future Threats

The risks to supply chain during 2020 were all too clear—as were 

the benefits of e-commerce technologies that supported societal and 
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Technology and Global Supply Chain Security

economic stability. Looking to the decade ahead, the technologies 

that guide and threaten our supply chains will become increasingly 

complex. Opportunities and risks will be even greater with increased 

complexity. This means that the solution to securing U.S. supply 

chains—especially of critical goods like pharmaceuticals, hightechnology goods, aircraft parts, rare earth minerals, and materiel—

will also need to be multifaceted and complex. There will not be one 

silver bullet solution that gets us to—or at least temporarily keeps us 

living in—a more secure world. 

Necessary and sufficient conditions for secure supply chains 

require a leveling up. Tracking numbers is not enough. Blockchain 

is not enough. Securely marking goods with nanotechnology is not 

enough. The future approach to supply chain security will require 

a broad array of technologies that incorporate and integrate higher 

volumes of data, real-time imagery, and documentation. This is especially true as the greatest risks to the supply chain remain people who 

could be compromised. Yes, blockchain can provide records that 

allow for potentially easier forensic accounting and examination. But 

all that really does is provide a list of the usual suspects to round up 

if something goes awry. Blockchain cannot prevent the supply chain 

from being compromised in real time. And I suspect that the main 

sources of compromise in the future will be the same as they have 

been in the past. These are best represented by the acronym MICE: 

money, ideology, compromise, or ego. Furthermore, blockchains 

could prove to be significantly less resilient in the face of Chinese 

quantum supremacy. 

In the same way that passwords and logins for sensitive and 

financial accounts are moving to two-way authorization systems, 

there is likely to be a greater need for a multi-pronged approach to 

mitigate the risks across the supply chain. A digital record as well 

as visual imagery, coupled with invisible, inviolable markings, could 

help ensure authenticity of goods. In a post-COVID-19 world, this 

is critical enough for vaccines. But it will also be increasingly critical 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

for technological goods—especially if there is an eventual bifurcation 

of global supply chains as the great power competition between the 

United States and China heats up in the decade ahead and beyond. 

The notion to consider here is that if man can make it, he can break 

it. This represents the two sides of each technology coin: the upside 

opportunity and the downside risk. An example of this idea is how 

industrial drones that may transport pipelines to remote oil pads can 

also be used to hijack shipments of exotic fruits, auto parts, or cobalt. 

This concept is the origin of my final recommendation regarding the 

future of supply chain. To deal with increasingly complex dynamics, 

the approach to future supply chain security, from a national security perspective, needs to be one that embraces futures thinking. It is 

important for national security professionals to approach the challenges of the future in a way that recognizes the trends of the past and 

the data of the present, as well as the myriad future outcomes that 

could be driven by emerging technologies—and by those that are yet 

to be discovered. 

This analytic process involves examining trends and data, as well 

as identifying fundamental truths and recognizing that “this time” is 

never different. In the supply chain world, this means that long-term 

economic and societal stability will continue to hinge on access to food 

and goods as well as the associated public belief in the security and 

surety of those supply chains. Additionally, there is a need to recognize 

that we live in a Rousseauian world of limited resources. This means 

there will be incentives for disruption of a system that favors legacy 

participants. The United States faces tremendous challenges, but—in a 

decade—we may find something surprising. We may find that China’s 

supply chains are being disrupted even more than our own. 

The best thing we can do now to prepare for the future is to 

understand the levers of risk and opportunity that will determine the 

future. COVID-19 is a salient example of how supply chain systems 

can be exposed and contribute to uncertainty. But COVID-19 has 

also revealed the opportunities of e-commerce, underscoring the 
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Technology and Global Supply Chain Security

value proposition and potential for technology to support economic 

operations and social order at a time of human distraction, disorder, and suffering. Finding more ways to use technology to bridge 

potential social and economic stability gaps represents a tremendous 

opportunity for national security, and I expect it will be increasingly 

important in the future.

About the Author

∂Jason Schenker is chairman of The Futurist Institute and president of 

Prestige Economics. He has written over 30 books and created over 45 

online courses on emerging technologies, finance, supply chain, leadership, and the economy. Bloomberg News has ranked Mr. Schenker 

the number-one forecaster in the world in 26 categories since 2011, 

including for his forecasts of the euro, Russian ruble, Chinese yuan, 

industrial metals prices, and oil prices. Mr. Schenker has earned three 

master’s degrees and over a dozen academic certificates and professional designations.

Endnotes

1 Will Iredale and Jack Grimston, “Britain ‘Four Meals Away from Anarchy,’” Sunday Times, October 10, 2004, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/britain-fourmeals-away-from-anarchy-fc9kfgc0w92. 

2 Jason Schenker, “The Future Nexus of Supply Chains and National Security,” 

Global Futures Report: Alternative Futures of Geopolitical Competition in a PostCOVID-19 World, Air Force Warfighting Integration Capability (AFWIC), June 

2020, http://www.futuristinstitute.org/pentagon-report/.

3 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Labor Force, Employment and Unemployment, 

1929-39: Estimating Methods,” Monthly Labor Review, July 1948, https://www.bls.

gov/opub/mlr/1948/article/pdf/labor-force-employment-and-unemployment1929-39-estimating-methods.pdf.
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4 U.S. Employment and Training Administration, Initial Claims [ICSA], retrieved 

from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, accessed on May 21, 2021, 

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/ICSA.

5 U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims, May 20, 

2021, accessed on May 21, 2021, https://www.dol.gov/ui/data.pdf.

6 U.S. Census Bureau, E-Commerce Retail Sales as a Percent of Total Sales [ECOMPCTSA], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, accessed on 

May 21, 2021, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/ECOMPCTSA.

7 U.S. Census Bureau, E-Commerce Retail Sales [ECOMSA], retrieved from 

FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, accessed on May 21, 2021, https://

fred.stlouisfed.org/series/ECOMSA.

8 U.S. Census Bureau, E-Commerce Retail Sales [ECOMSA].
81

COVID-19 AND INEQUALITY 

IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Jon Hall, Carolina Rivera Vázquez, 

Heriberto Tapia, and Jacob Assa

This chapter considers what COVID-19 might mean for global inequality. 

The pandemic’s effects are exacting a toll on health, education, employment, and income—as well as trust. COVID-19 is a wedge, pushing existing inequalities wider and creating new ones.

Considering global inequality raises the question “inequality of 

what?” Not surprisingly, in a chapter from the Human Development 

Report Office of the United Nations Development Program, we will 

consider inequalities in human development. 

The Human Development Approach: What, Why, and How

The Human Development Approach—now more than 30 years old—

was born in part to challenge thinking that saw economic growth as 

synonymous with increases in well-being and progress.

For the latter half of the 20th century there was “an implicit 

assumption that economic growth was synonymous with progress: 

an assumption that a growing gross domestic product (GDP) meant 

life must be getting better. But now the world recognizes that it isn’t 
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quite as simple as that.”1 Yet GDP was never designed to be used as a 

proxy for wellbeing. Simon Kuznets, one of the fathers of the system 

of national accounts, showed remarkable prescience in 1934, writing to the U.S. Congress that “the welfare of a nation can scarcely be 

inferred from a measurement of national income.”2

The 2009 report by the French government’s Commission on 

the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress 

provides a detailed discussion on the limitations of GDP as a measure of wellbeing.3

 For an eloquent summary, however, we know 

nothing better than Senator Robert Kennedy’s 1968 address to the 

University of Kansas:

Too much and too long, we seem to have surrendered community excellence and community values in the mere accumulation of material things. Our gross national product ... 

if we should judge America by that—counts air pollution 

and cigarette advertising, and ambulances to clear our highways of carnage. It counts special locks for our doors and 

the jails for those who break them. It counts the destruction of our redwoods and the loss of our natural wonder in 

chaotic sprawl. It counts napalm and the cost of a nuclear 

warhead, and armored cars for police who fight riots in our 

streets. It counts Whitman’s rifle and Speck’s knife, and the 

television programs which glorify violence in order to sell 

toys to our children.

Yet the gross national product does not allow for the 

health of our children, the quality of their education, or the 

joy of their play. It does not include the beauty of our poetry 

or the strength of our marriages; the intelligence of our public debate or the integrity of our public officials. It measures 

neither our wit nor our courage; neither our wisdom nor our 

learning; neither our compassion nor our devotion to our 

country; it measures everything, in short, except that which 
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COVID-19 and Inequality in Human Development

makes life worthwhile. And it tells us everything about America except why we are proud that we are Americans.4

The human development approach, report, and index were introduced in part to respond concerns like those of Senator’s Kennedy. 

As Amartya Sen, one of the creators of the Human Development 

Approach, has said, “Human development, as an approach, is concerned 

with what I take to be the basic development idea: namely, advancing 

the richness of human life, rather than the richness of the economy in 

which human beings live, which is only a part of it.”5

 (See box.)

WHAT IS HUMAN DEVELOPMENT ABOUT?

Source: UN Development Program (UNDP), “About Human Development,” 

Human Development Reports (“About” tab), accessed January 21, 2021, 

http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev.

The first Human Development Report, published in 1990 by the 

United Nations Development Program, introduced a new approach 

for advancing human well-being, which centers on:

People: Human development focuses on improving the lives 

people lead rather than assuming that economic growth will lead, 

automatically, to greater well-being for all. Income growth is seen as 

a means to development, rather than an end in itself.

Opportunities: Human development is about giving people 

more freedom to live lives they value. In effect this means developing people’s abilities and giving them a chance to use them. For 

example, educating a girl would build her skills, but it is of little use 

if she is denied access to jobs or does not have the right skills for 

the local labor market. Three foundations for human development 

are to live a long, healthy, and creative life; to be knowledgeable; 

and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of 

living. Many other things are important, too, especially in helping 

to create the right conditions for human development. Once the 
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basics of human development are achieved, they open up opportunities for progress in other aspects of life.

Choice: Human development is, fundamentally, about more 

choice. It is about providing people with opportunities, not insisting 

that they make use of them. No one can guarantee human happiness, and the choices people make are their own concern. The process of development—human development—should at least create 

an environment for people, individually and collectively, to develop 

to their full potential and to have a reasonable chance of leading 

productive and creative lives that they value. 

Measurement is an important facet of quantifying and promoting human development thinking. Human Development Reports, 

since the first in 1990, has published the Human Development Index 

(HDI) that ranks all the world’s countries by their level of human 

development (see Figure 1). Even so, the report authors have always 

recognized that the concept of human development is much broader 

than the HDI, making it impossible to come up with a comprehensive 

measure, or even a comprehensive set of indicators, because many 

dimensions of human development are non-quantifiable.

That said, the dimensions of human development include:

• Education, Health, and Command over Resources: Particularly income and nutrition. 

• Participation and Freedom: Particularly empowerment, gender equality, and civil and political rights.

• Human Security: In daily life against chronic threats, such as 

hunger, and abrupt disruptions including joblessness, famine, 

conflict, crime, etc.

• Equity: In the distribution of all of the above.

• Sustainability: For future generations in ecological, economic, 

and social terms.
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COVID-19 and Inequality in Human Development

And so, when considering the impact of COVID-19 on inequality, we will consider its impact on many facets of human development. All of these elements are important and, when taken together, 

paint a much more detailed picture of life than would be presented 

using a narrower focus on income inequality.

Figure 1. Human Development Inde

Source: UN Development Program, “About Human Development: Measuring Human Development,” Human 

Development Reports (“About” tab), accessed January 21, 2021, http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev. 

COVID-19 and Its Impact on the Primary Pillars of Human Development 

The COVID-19 pandemic has hit all the key dimensions of human 

development. By late January 2021, it has caused within one year more 

than 2 million confirmed direct deaths, surpassing the annual deaths 

caused by malaria, HIV/AIDS, interpersonal violence, conflict, and 
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international terrorism combined.6 In addition, the crisis is expected to 

have broad indirect health impacts, including the likely increase in child 

and maternal mortality across low- and middle-income countries.7

The United Nations (UN) has called the COVID-19 pandemic 

“the greatest test that we have faced since the formation of the United 

Nations.”8

 This pandemic is, the UN argues, more than a health emergency: it is a systemic crisis that is affecting economies and societies in 

unprecedented ways.9

Shocks emanating from nature are part of human life. Most countries have made tremendous progress in dealing with relatively frequent 

shocks, thanks to continuous learning and preparedness through policies and social norms. However, the ability to respond to very rare or new 

shocks is much lower and more unequally distributed. The 2019 Human 

Development Report highlighted that among the new generation of capabilities needed for 21st century challenges is resilience to low-frequency, 

high-impact shocks.10 The COVID-19 pandemic is an example that 

shows, all too clearly, the effects of a large-scale shock emerging from 

ecological systems under pressure from humanity.11 COVID-19 has hit 

a world wealthier than ever but facing deep divides in human development that affect our vulnerability to—and preparedness for—such crises. 

It is too early for a comprehensive assessment of the consequences 

of COVID-19 on human development (as we write in early 2021, daily 

deaths were higher than at any point during 2020). The likely impacts 

on people’s capabilities can be simulated, however, using a version 

of the HDI that is more sensitive to the effects of COVID-19. This 

adjusted index retains the standard HDI dimensions but modifies the 

education indicators to reflect the effects of school closures and other 

COVID-related impacts on education.

During 2020 the capabilities accounted for in the HDI—health, 

education, and income—were all severely affected: 

• Income: Global gross national product per capita is estimated 

to have fallen more than 5 percent in 2020.12
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COVID-19 and Inequality in Human Development

• Education: Whether students are actively engaged in education 

depends on physical and virtual access to learning. The disruption in education has been unprecedented. During 2020 schools 

closed in most countries at some point, affecting more than 1.4 

billion young people—around 86 percent of the world’s student population—in April 2020 at the peak of school closures.13

While some have had the opportunity to keep learning remotely, 

mainly thanks to Internet access, others have experienced an 

almost complete loss of formal learning throughout 2020.

• Health: Two million direct deaths from COVID-19 and a 

still-undetermined number of indirect deaths have affected 

life expectancy at birth for 2020. Adjusted UN figures14 provide a conservative estimate of the potential effects of COVID19 on health.15 Under this simulated and optimistic scenario,16

global life expectancy at birth in 2020 is assumed be around 

its level in 2019.17

Figure 2. COVID-19’s Unprecedented Shock to Human Developmen

Source: Human Development Report Office. Simulations based on data, accessed on December 11, 

2020, from the International Telecommunications Union (https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/

stat/default.aspx), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Institute for 

Statistics (https://en.unesco.org/covid19/educationresponse), and the World Health Organization/ACAPS 

(https://www.acaps.org/covid-19-government-measures-dataset). 
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Taken together, these factors yield a COVID-19-adjusted HDI 

that projects a steep decline in human development worldwide in 

2020, led by a massive setback in effective education. The index’s 

decline (under conservative assumptions) is equivalent to erasing 

all progress in global human development over the past seven years, 

which is unprecedented (see Figure 2). If conditions in school access 

are restored, measured capabilities related to education will tend to 

bounce back, although with long-term costs in learning; the income 

dimension will follow the path of the post-crisis economic recovery. 

This is a staggering outcome for school children, with long-term 

consequences for their potential development. The extent to which formal schooling is substituted with learning at home—through parental 

involvement, own initiative, and Internet availability—is a function 

of household means and support.18 As the 2019 Human Development 

Report has argued, parents’ education shapes children’s learning.19

Public education is meant to be an equalizer—it can help break 

the intergenerational transmission of inequality. Quality education, 

regardless of parental education, is meant to provide equal opportunity for everyone. But, by disrupting schooling, the pandemic is 

taking that equalizer away from hundreds of millions of children, 

making it harder for them to break the intergenerational transfer of 

disadvantage. 

In many countries, schools and universities have moved their 

courses and learning online. Yet access to technology is unequal20

because, while there is convergence in access to basic technologies 

such as mobile phones, digital gaps between and within countries are 

widening in areas like access to computers, Internet, and broadband. 

These are all examples of what the Human Development Report in 

2019 defined as “enhanced capabilities” (or the new necessities for life 

in the 21st century).21 The interaction of the pandemic with inequality in these enhanced capabilities means that many countries lack the 

option to move courses and schoolwork online (see box). 
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COVID-19 and Inequality in Human Development

OUT OF SCHOOL DURING COVID-19

With widespread school closures during 2020, technology was used 

to continue the learning process. This positive development from the 

technological revolution has supported the resilience of education 

for some in the face of shocks. 

After accounting for those still learning from home, what was 

the effective out-of-school rate during the peak of school closures 

in April 2020? Adjusting the percentage of primary school-age children facing school closures to account for those in households with 

Internet access sheds some light, yielding an optimistic estimate of 

the out-of-school rate that assumes every child with Internet access 

can continue learning. Assuming Internet access ensures continued 

learning also provides an optimistic estimate of inequalities between 

countries because it does not account for differences that will arise 

according to how wealthy countries are, whether broadband is widespread, and so on. 

The effective out-of-school rate jumped substantially everywhere in 2020 (even under optimistic assumptions). For primary 

education, the out-of-school rate was highest in low human development countries,22 rising to 86 percent of primary school-age 

children, an increase of 59 percentage points. This was followed by 

medium human development countries (74 percent, an increase 

of 68 percentage points—the largest reversal) and high human 

development countries (47 percent, an increase of 41 percentage 

points). Only in very high human development countries have most 

primary school-age children been able—potentially at least—to 

continue structured learning, with an effective out-of-school rate of 

20 percent (an increase of 19 percentage points).23

Overall, this dramatic increase in out-of-school rates represents 

the largest reversal of this indicator in history, which is opening new 

gaps in human development. Being out of school—even for a limited 

amount of time—is expected to inflict long-term scarring on learning, earning potential, and well-being.
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

Figure 3. Short-term Effective Out-of-School Rate for Primary Education

(Q2 2020)

Short-term eective out-of-school rate for primary education, 

second quarter of 2020 (% of primary school—age children)

Negative eect

of COVID-19 

closure = 59.4

26.5

85.9

74.2

40.6

6.7 6.3

46.9

59.6

50.1

20.0

18.6

1.4 9.5

67.5

Low Medium High Very high World

Base, before COVID-19 closure Eective, during COVID-19 closure

6.7 6.3

26.5

The short-term effective out-of-school rate for primary education has jumped substantially for all human development groups (during peak of school closures in April 2020).

Notes: Data account for 86 percent of students in primary school–age children worldwide. 

The effective out-of-school rate has several caveats. First, a different indicator could be 

used to reflect access to online learning. Second, the rate does not account for other 

factors such as access to a device, least of all a personal device. Overall, this measure 

provides a rough estimate of the disruptive impacts of school closure.

Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data, accessed on 

May 6, 2020, from the International Telecommunications Union (https://www.itu.int/en/

ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 

Cultural Organization Institute for Statistics (https://en.unesco.org/covid19/education

response), and the World Health Organization/ACAPS (https://www.acaps.org/covid-19-

government-measures-dataset). 

COVID-19 and Its Other Effects on Inequality 

The COVID-19 crisis is a systemic human development crisis, and its 

effects go far beyond its impacts on health, education, and income. 

The pandemic’s effects on inequality have been diverse, not least 

because some of the consequences of COVID-19 have had a greater 

impact on people who were already disadvantaged. 
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COVID-19 and Inequality in Human Development

Inequality in the Response 

During the first months of the pandemic, without vaccine or therapeutics, most of the measures to slow the spread of COVID-19 were 

nonpharmaceutical interventions. The strategy of reducing contagion 

aimed not just to protect the most vulnerable populations, but also to 

avoid strain on health care systems. Even countries with plenty of 

hospital beds became overwhelmed during the pandemic’s peaks,24

so reducing virus transmission was important. In general, developed 

countries were faster to react (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. Countries Implementing Nonpharmaceutical Interventions (as of April 2020

Lockdowns

18 19

Number of countries implementing each type of measure, 

by human development group

42 42

56 53

59

36 36

31

27

School Closures Movement Restrictions

40

Human development group

Low Medium High Very high

Most countries around the globe have implemented nonpharmaceutical interventions to slow the spread 

of COVID-19. Measures that included both internal restrictions (domestic travel, checkpoints, curfews, 

and monitoring) and external restrictions (border closures, international flight suspensions, and visa 

restrictions or additional requirements on arrival) have been the most widespread, affecting more than 

7 billion people in 183 countries by mid-April 2020. Measures related to movement and travel have 

affected tourism and other services, as well as global supply chains. By mid-April 2020, more than 1.4 

billion children ages 5–17 in 147 countries (or 86 percent of children worldwide) were out of school.

Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from “COVID-19 Government 

Measures,” Report #5, Assessment Capabilities Project (ACAPS), May 1, 2020, accessed May 6, 2020, 

https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20200501_acaps_covid19_government_

measures_report_update.pdf. 
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And now, in January 2021, discussion is quickly moving to the implications of unequal access to COVID-19 vaccine and how this might 

ratchet up those inequalities that have been exacerbated by COVID-19. 

It is still too early to know whether and how this might change and what 

it might mean for inequality, but alarm bells are ringing. 

More developed countries have secured access to most of the 

vaccine doses. The Duke Global Health Innovation Center estimated 

that, as of January 20, 2021, high-income nations had secured 4.2 billion doses. On the other hand, more populous, lower income countries had secured orders for only 680 million doses.25

Figure 5. Cumulative COVID-19 Vaccination Doses Administered per 100 Peopl

Jan 1, 2021 Jan 15 Jan 25 Feb 4 Feb 14 Mar 3, 2021

0

20

40

60

80

Israel

United Arab 

Emirates

Indonesia

Mexico

Bangladesh

World

China

Russia

Brazil

European Union

Chile

United States

United Kingdom

Note: Single doses are counted, which may not equal the total number of people vaccinated, depending 

on a vaccine’s specific dose regime (e.g., some vaccines call for an individual to receive multiple doses).

Source: Coronavirus (COVID-19) Vaccinations, Our World in Data, accessed March 4, 2021, https://

ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations. 

Vaccination rates between countries also vary enormously. 

Although data should be interpreted with caution, in part because 

some vaccines require two doses and others one dose, the scale of 
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COVID-19 and Inequality in Human Development

difference in vaccinating one’s population is stark. As of January 

20, 2021, Israel had administered a total number of doses equal to 

almost one-third of its population, while Brazil’s total was fewer than 

1/1000th of the Brazilian population (see Figure 5).26

The international community is already raising the alarm about 

the longer term effects of such high levels of inequality. In late January, 

the World Health Organization’s Independent Panel for Pandemic 

Preparedness and Response noted that the response has deepened 

inequalities and that “inequitable access to vaccines is amongst the 

most glaring examples of inequality exacerbated by the pandemic.”27 The panel’s co-chair, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, said that “the vaccine roll-out is currently favoring wealthy countries. A world where 

high-income countries receive universal coverage while low-income 

countries are expected to accept only twenty per cent in the foreseeable future is on the wrong footing—both for justice and for pandemic control. This failure must be remedied.”28

Labor and Poverty Impacts

Social distancing and the pause in much nonessential business have 

disrupted work. The International Labor Organization estimates that 

in the second quarter of 2020, working hours fell by the equivalent 

of 495 million full-time workers.29 Employment was hit through two 

channels: a contraction in labor demand from reduced human activity and the financial effects of the global recession, and a short-term 

drop in labor supply from the suspension of nonessential business.30

How to respond remains a matter of debate. The usual macroeconomic tools of stimulating consumption and encouraging economic 

activity are difficult to apply when public health policies are also 

looking to slow the spread of COVID-19 by reducing human interaction and, as a result, economic activity. 

These effects are intertwined with varying propagation patterns. 

Very high human development countries, for the most part, suffered 

the health shock first and responded with strong health systems and 
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supportive monetary and fiscal policies. By September 2020, $12 trillion had been devoted to finance emergency fiscal programs, most of 

them—around $10 trillion —in the G20 economies.31

But, as the pandemic spread more widely, countries less able 

to cope with a health crisis were hit. And this hit happened during 

what had now become a global economic collapse with rising uncertainty, including in health security, food security, and job security.32

The number of people living in extreme poverty is estimated by the 

World Bank to have increased by 88-115 million in 2020.33 As a result 

of the pandemic, 1 billion people could be living in extreme poverty by 2030. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization estimates 

the number of undernourished people increased from 688 million in 

2019 to 780-829 million in 2020.34

Within countries, the pandemic is exposing the disadvantages 

already faced by low-income groups—and magnifying fissures. For 

instance, in the United States, employment for people earning less 

than $27,000 a year decreased by 35 percent in April 2020, but by 

only 13 percent for those earning over $60,000 a year.35 Employment 

had rebounded by fall 2020 for the latter group but not the former.36

Social distancing directives in the workplace also have dramatically unequal implications. People with higher incomes are more 

likely to be able to work from home, and so continue to both earn 

and stay healthy.37 People in low-income groups are more likely to 

be in “essential” occupations—those that require workers to come 

to the workplace and risk exposure to infection.38 A study based on 

data from mobile devices in the United States shows that people in 

wealthier groups are staying home more than those in low-income 

groups. In those metro areas with the bigger disparities between rich 

and poor, people in high-income neighborhoods stopped moving 

right after official guidance. People in lower income neighborhoods 

reduced movement as well, but later and only partially.39

Additionally, economic crises threaten health and health system 

performance. Financial pressure hinders access to health services 
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COVID-19 and Inequality in Human Development

while the need for health services grows. Negative health effects disproportionately affect groups already vulnerable to shocks, such as 

the unemployed.40 Mental health problems have also increased.41

Patterns of Morbidity by Ethnicity

COVID-19 has been an x-ray exposing how inequalities exacerbate 

shocks—and vice versa. Consider the two countries with the most 

confirmed COVID-19 deaths at the time of writing: the United States 

and Brazil. In the United States, black/African American people and 

Hispanic/Latino people are nearly three times as likely as white people to test positive for COVID-19 and five times as likely to be hospitalized.42 In Brazil, being of mixed ethnicity has been the second 

most important risk factor—after age—for death among hospitalized 

COVID-19 patients.43

Across Latin America, the pandemic has spread rapidly across 

rural indigenous communities, home to nearly 42 million people, 80 

percent of them in Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru.44, 45 In Peru, 

75–80 percent of the population in villages within the indigenous 

communities of Caimito, Pucacuro, and Cantagallo have been infected.46 In Mexico, indigenous people who contract COVID-19 have a 

higher risk of pneumonia, hospitalization, and death than others.47

Gender Inequalities 

Across many social, economic, and political areas, women and girls 

are disproportionately affected by the crisis.48 Although the COVID19 crisis affects everyone, women and girls face specific and often 

disproportionate risks due to deeply entrenched inequalities, social 

norms, and unequal power relations. 

Women are also more often on the frontline of the COVID-19 

response, putting them at a higher risk of exposure to the virus. They 

make up 70 percent of the workers in the health and social services 

sector globally,49 and they constitute most health facility service 

staff.50 Across the very high, high, and medium human development 
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country groups, women make up more than 85 percent of nursing 

personnel and almost half of doctors for all countries except those 

with low human development.51

Women’s health is also being hurt by the reallocation of resources 

and priorities away from areas such as sexual and reproductive health 

services.52 This redirection could lead to an increase in maternal mortality and morbidity, adolescent pregnancies, and HIV and sexually 

transmitted diseases, as seen during previous health crises like the 

Ebola and Zika virus outbreaks.53 Simulations by the UN Population 

Fund show that, if COVID-19 lockdowns shut reproductive health services for six months in low- and middle-income countries, 47 million 

women are expected to lose regular access to modern contraceptives, 

leading to an expected additional 7 million unintended pregnancies.54

The pandemic’s economic impacts have left no country or 

population unscathed, and women are, again, disproportionately 

affected.55 Women generally have less capacity than men to absorb 

economic shocks because they have lower earnings, savings, and job 

security. Women are also overrepresented in the informal sector: 740 

million women worldwide, and over 70 percent of women in informal employment in developing economies.56 Due to the nature of this 

work, women are less likely to have paid sick leave, protection against 

dismissals, and other workers’ rights if they are affected by the crisis. 

Widespread lockdowns around the world mean many women 

and girls are being asked to stay home and isolate in a space that is 

supposed to be safe but often is not, increasing the risk they will go 

hungry or suffer gender-based violence. Already toxic social norms, 

combined with increased economic and social stress from the pandemic, have driven an increase in gender-based violence, with many 

women in lockdown with their abusers.57 Meanwhile services to support survivors are disrupted or inaccessible. 

Globally, women spend an average of 3.2 more hours a day on 

unpaid care and domestic work than men.58 With quarantine measures, the workload in caring for children, the sick, and the elderly, as 
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COVID-19 and Inequality in Human Development

well as household tasks, will likely increase. Furthermore, the gradual 

reopening will pose additional challenges for women as it could push 

them more permanently out of the labor force or into part-time jobs 

while increasing their responsibilities at home. This pressure intensifies for single mothers.59 This burden, combined with the lockdowns, 

has reduced the female labor force participation rate in Mexico, Chile, 

and Colombia by 10 percentage points, erasing decades of progress 

(see Figure 6). 

Figure 6. Female Labor Force Participation Rates in Mexico, Chile, and Colombia Female labour force participation rate (%

30

40

50

60

199219951998200120042007201020132016

Feb 2018

May 2018

Aug 2018

Nov 2018

Feb 2019

May 2019

Aug 2019

Nov 2019

Feb 2020

May 2020

Aug 2020

Nov 2020

1992–2017 2018–2020

Mexico Chile Colombia

The COVID-19 pandemic has erased decades of progress in the female labor force participation rates 

in Mexico, Chile, and Colombia.

Note: Refers to the population ages 15 and older. 

Source: Yearly data for 1992–2017 from the International Labor Organization’s ILOSTAT database, 

https://ilostat.ilo.org/; monthly data for 2018–2020 from Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and 

Geography, https://en.www.inegi.org.mx/, National Survey of Occupation and Employment, https://

en.www.inegi.org.mx/programas/enoe/15ymas/, and Telephone Survey of Occupation and Employment, https://www.opportimes.com/tag/telephone-survey-of-occupation-and-employment/, and from 

the ILOSTAT database for Colombia and Chile, https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/country-profiles/.
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Education is crucial to allowing women to increase their ability 

to make decisions and act on them. School closures and lockdowns, 

however, mean that as many as 10 million girls at the secondary-school 

level could be out of school due to the crisis. 60 And remember that, 

for many girls in low-income countries, access to education was 

already a challenge before the outbreak.61

Longer Term Impacts of COVID-19 on Inequality

Looking even further beyond the crisis, it becomes more difficult to 

predict the impact of the pandemic on inequalities. But the forecast 

is not rosy.

First, there might be scarring effects particularly among young 

people. Education shutdowns or long-term unemployment when 

first entering the labor market, for example, might hurt people for 

the rest of their lives. 

Second, inequalities in some of the less tangible aspects of life, such 

as trust in institutions and in each other, have also widened between 

and within countries.62 A Pew Research poll from mid-2020 found 

that, while 72 percent of Danes felt their country was more united 

following the virus’s spread, only 18 percent of Americans did.63

The loss of trust will be felt in many areas, from governance to 

mental health: 

• In the United States, the impact of the pandemic on people’s 

emotions—including depression—appears to have been worse 

among those who have little trust in others.64

• Inequalities in trust also impact our ability to manage shocks 

in the future: “trust in government by citizens and businesses 

is essential for effective and efficient policy making both in 

good times and bad.”65

• As the UNDP’s 2020 Human Development Report points out, 

“social and planetary imbalances interact in a vicious cycle,” 

each exacerbating the other. Climate change, among other 
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COVID-19 and Inequality in Human Development

dangerous planetary changes, will only make global inequality 

worse, and yet collective action on climate change becomes 

more difficult against a backdrop of social fragmentation.66

Even before the COVID-19 pandemic struck, the 2019 Human 

Development Report had showcased remaining gaps in traditional 

areas of inequality along with widening gaps in new domains.67 For 

example, while life expectancy at birth has been slowly converging (meaning that inequality in this indicator has been declining) 

between countries, life expectancy at 70—an enhanced capability—

has been diverging rapidly. Similarly, inter-country inequality in primary education has decreased, but inequality in tertiary education 

(also an enhanced capability) has increased. 

Notwithstanding the pandemic, climate change and technological transformation have exacerbated these growth trends in 

enhanced-capability inequality, as the most vulnerable populations 

are often the most severely impacted by shocks. Climate change, in 

particular, is slowing economic progress and sharpening inequalities, 

as explored in the 2020 Human Development Report.

68 For example, 

per capita income in most countries would have been higher if not 

for climate change, especially in low-income countries where income 

would have been nearly one-third higher.69 Indeed, income inequality among countries is estimated to be 25 percent higher due to climate change.70

The impact of planetary change also depends on specific context. Countries with higher social vulnerability (e.g., larger inequalities in human development, greater empowerment gaps for women, 

and a higher proportion of children projected by 2030) face greater 

ecological risks (e.g., resource scarcity and natural disasters). Intergenerational inequalities in the present are linked to inequality 

and environmental damage across generations, including through 

procedural (legal) and distributional (economic) inequalities.71

Moreover, current inequalities in empowerment are a root cause of 
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environmental threats to future generations. Horizontal inequalities 

can particularly exacerbate intergenerational inequalities and environmental degradation.

Some of the public policy responses to the pandemic have aimed at 

a green recovery, but these have mostly been pursued by high-income 

countries.72 Furthermore, some low-carbon investments could further 

widen inequalities within countries. For example, high-speed trains 

can benefit urban rather than rural populations, while green credit 

facilities or R&D subsidies can favor the formal over the informal segments of an economy.73

Conclusion

The effects of COVID-19 are unprecedented in their impact on 

inequality. The effects are real and significant between countries, 

within countries, and across almost any aspect of human development you might consider: from the health of people to the health 

of our planet’s climate; in education, employment, and income; and 

from our trust in each other to inequality between men and women.

Moreover, in many cases, an individual’s place in the pyramid of 

existing inequalities has played a role in determining the direct and 

indirect impacts of the pandemic. In the United States, for example, 

“Black and Latino Americans have experienced a disproportionate 

burden of COVID-19 morbidity and mortality, reflecting persistent 

structural inequalities that increase risk of exposure to COVID-19 

and mortality risk for those infected.”74

And so COVID-19 is a wedge pushing existing inequalities even 

wider and creating new ones. New types of inequality in “enhanced” 

aspects of human development (e.g., access to broadband Internet) are proving particularly important in determining how people 

weather the COVID-19 storm. 

This chapter has touched on just some of these areas to convey 

the sweeping scale of the challenge. Much of the data are preliminary, 
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COVID-19 and Inequality in Human Development

and it would be courageous to try to put more precision on what has 

happened—and will happen—to inequality in light of COVID-19. 

We can be certain that inequality is set to worsen around the 

world because of COVID-19. And we can be sure that inequality—at 

all levels of geography—will have an important influence on national 

security. We saw the impact of growing inequality in 2019 with social 

unrest in several countries. But the future is not set in stone. As 

always, every country has a choice in determining where its people 

will head, as we try to “build back better” from the pandemic.

About the Authors

∂Jon Hall, a policy specialist in the Human Development Report 

Office of the UN Development Program (UNDP), has been thinking 

about how to quantify—and influence—national development since 

2000. His 2002 work for the Australian Bureau of Statistics on Measuring Australia’s Progress won a national award as the “smartest” 

social project of the year. Mr. Hall led a project at the Organization 

for Economic Cooperation and Development promoting these ideas 

(2005-09), and since 2012 he has been working on strengthening 

national human development reporting. In 2013 he was one of ten 

“global opinion leaders” to meet with German Chancellor Angela 

Merkel. He holds a master’s degree in applied statistics and econometrics and another in public service administration.

Carolina Rivera Vázquez is an economist, currently working for the 

Human Development Report Office at UNDP. Her research focuses 

on gender inequalities and social justice. She previously worked as a 

public policy specialist for UNDP Mexico’s Country Office, on the 

analysis and mapping of indicators and public policies on human 

development, poverty, and governance at the local level. Ms. Rivera 
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Vázquez has applied her skills in policy analysis, strategy design, and 

model development with the Organization of American States, the 

Central Bank of Mexico, and international development organizations including the Center for Effective Global Action and the Bixby 

Center for Global Reproductive Health. She holds a master’s degree 

in public policy from the University of California, Berkeley.

Heriberto Tapia is the research and strategic partnership advisor at the 

Human Development Report Office at UNDP, where he has been part 

of the research team since 2014. Previously, he served in the Executive 

Office of UNDP and in the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Dr. Tapia has been a lecturer in universities 

throughout the United States and Chile. He holds a Ph.D. in economics 

from Columbia University, as well as a master’s degree in economics 

and a commercial engineering degree from the University of Chile.

Jacob Assa has worked at the United Nations for 22 years, most 

recently as an economist and co-author of the UNDP Human Development Reports, Inequality in Human Development (2019) and The Next 

Frontier: Human Development and the Anthropocene (2020). Dr. Assa 

has published on inequality and growth, financialization, peacebuilding 

and development, and the political economy of national accounting in 

journals including Ecological Economics and New Political Economy. He 

holds a Ph.D. in economics from the New School for Social Research 

and his doctoral dissertation, The Financialization of GDP: Implications 

for Economic Theory and Policy, has been published by Routledge. 

Endnotes

1 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Statistics, 

Knowledge and Policy 2007: Measuring and Fostering the Progress of Societies, 

book preface (Paris, France: OECD, 2008).

2 Simon Kuznets, “National Income, 1929-1932,” National Bureau of Economic 

Research, Bulletin 49 (June 7, 1934), findings first provided in U.S. Senate 
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Document 124, 73rd Congress, 2nd Session, https://www.nber.org/system/files/

chapters/c2258/c2258.pdf.

3 Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, and Jean-Paul Fitoussi, Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, commissioned by the Government of France, 2010, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/

documents/8131721/8131772/Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi-Commission-report.pdf.

4 Robert F. Kennedy, “Remarks at the University of Kansas, March 18, 1968,” John 

F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, transcribed from original recording in Lawrence, Kansas (March 18, 1968), https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/

about-jfk/the-kennedy-family/robert-f-kennedy/robert-f-kennedy-speeches/

remarks-at-the-university-of-kansas-march-18-1968.

5 “Amartya Sen: A More Human Theory of Development,” Interview with Amartya Sen, Asia Society, December 6, 2004, https://asiasociety.org/amartya-senmore-human-theory-development.

6 Global Burden of Disease 2019, Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 

(IHME), University of Washington, October 2020 (published in The Lancet), 

http://www.healthdata.org/gbd/gbd-2019-resources.

7 Timothy Roberton et al., “Early Estimates of the Indirect Effects of the COVID19 Pandemic on Maternal and Child Mortality in Low-Income and MiddleIncome Countries: A Modelling Study,” The Lancet Global Health 8, no. 5 

(May 12, 2020): E901-E908, https://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/langlo/

PIIS2214-109X(20)30229-1.pdf.

8 “UN Launches COVID-19 Plan That Could ‘Defeat the Virus and Build a Better World,’” UN News, March 31, 2020, https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/

03/1060702. The United Nations has called for the magnitude of the response 

to match the scale of the crisis, with a framework for immediate socioeconomic 

responses that presents a roadmap to suppress the various transmissions, control the pandemic, safeguard people’s lives, and learn from the crisis to build 

back better.

9 “UN launches COVID-19 plan,” UN News.

10 UNDP, Human Development Report 2019—Beyond Income, Beyond Averages, 

Beyond Today: Inequalities in Human Development in the 21st Century (New 

York: UNDP, 2019), http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2019.pdf.

11 E. S. Brondizio, J. Settele, S. Díaz, and H. T. Ngo, eds., Global Assessment Report 

on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (Bonn, Germany: Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), 2019), 

https://ipbes.net/global-assessment. Even though the specific anthropogenic 

origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus is under study, it represents a manifestation 
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of a risk scientist have been warning of for years, a result of human pressure 

on the planet. Zoonotic diseases are substantial threats to human health, with 

vector-borne diseases accounting for approximately 17 percent of all infectious 

diseases and causing an estimated 700,000 deaths a year globally. 

12 International Monetary Fund (IMF), “Policies for the Recovery,“ Fiscal Monitor, October 14, 2020, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/

Issues/2020/10/27/Fiscal-Monitor-October-2020-Policies-for-the-Recovery49642. Based on projections of gross domestic product per capita for 2020, 

prepared by the International Monetary Fund in October 2020 as part of the 

World Economic Outlook.

13 Human Development Group calculations based on data by mid-April 2020 from 

“COVID-19 Government Measures,” Report #5, Assessment Capabilities Project (ACAPS), May 1, 2020, accessed May 6, 2020, https://www.acaps.org/sites/

acaps/files/products/files/20200501_acaps_covid19_government_measures_

report_update.pdf; and WHO 2020 ACAPS (Assessment Capacities Project) and 

WHO (World Health Organization) 2020, May 6, 2020 (https://www.acaps.org/

covid-19-government-measures-dataset). In data recorded by the United Nations 

Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the number 

of countries affected is even larger, around 180, reflecting that more countries 

have enacted local closures. UNESCO, COVID-19 Educational Disruption and 

Response, April 2020 (updated global map of school closures now available at 

UNESCO, Education: From disruption to recovery, https://en.unesco.org/covid19/

educationresponse).

14 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), Population Division, 2019 Revision of World Population Prospects, 2019, https://population.un.

org/wpp/#:~:text=The%202019%20Revision%20of%20World%20Population%

20Prospects%20is,and%20Social%20Affairs%20of%20the%20United%20

Nations%20Secretariat.

15 Roberton et al., “Early Estimates of the Indirect Effects of the COVID19 Pandemic on Maternal and Child Mortality.” Based on Roberton et al.’s 

low-impact scenario, one of three they constructed for infant and maternal 

mortality linked to disrupted health services and increase in malnutrition 

in low- and middle-income countries. The low-impact scenario assumes 

small reductions in health services due to demand and supply factors (e.g., 

movement restrictions, fear of infection, economic pressure, reallocation of 

resources to the pandemic response) and a 10 percent increase in wasting 

prevalence. For global estimates of child mortality under different scenarios, 

see also Oliver Fiala, “Using Data to Support the Most Vulnerable Children,” 
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Save the Children, April 12, 2020, https://www.savethechildren.net/blog/

using-data-support-most-vulnerable-children.

16 Studies on the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic over life expectancy are 

emerging, for example, Elizabeth Arias et al., “Provisional Life Expectancy 

Estimates for January through June 2020,” NVSS Vital Statistics Rapid Release, 

Report 10 (February 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/vsrr/VSRR10-

508.pdf; Francesco Bianchi et al., “The Long-term Impact of the COVID-19 

Unemployment Shock on Life Expectancy and Mortality Rates,” National 

Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper 28304, December 2020, 

https://www.nber.org/papers/w28304; Simone Ghislandi et al., “News from the 

Front: Excess Mortality and Life Expectancy in Two Major Epicentres of the 

COVID-19 Pandemic in Italy,” preprint posted posted May 13, 2020, https://

www.medrxiv.org/content/medrxiv/early/2020/05/13/2020.04.29.20084335.

full.pdf; Guillaume Marois et al., “Assessing the Potential Impact of COVID19 on Life Expectancy,” Plos One, September 17, 2020, https://journals.plos.

org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0238678; and Sergi Trias-Llimós 

and Usama Bilal, “Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Life Expectancy in 

Madrid (Spain),” Journal of Public Health 42, no. 3 (September 2020): 635-36, 

https://academic.oup.com/jpubhealth/article/42/3/635/5857763?login=true. 

Nevertheless, there is still no consensus on a robust global effect, and, in this 

context, the conservative choice of adjustment to life expectancy gives robustness to the main message of the sharp drop in human development.

17 UNDESA, 2019 Revision of World Population Prospects. The authors’ adjustment is rather conservative and based on available information as of mid-May 

2020. The adjustment implicitly assumes the deployment of policies to minimize the disruption of COVID-19 on essential health services (see Roberton et 

al, “Early Estimates of the Indirect Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic”). The 

authors’ adjustment also does not consider other sources of excess mortality 

such as increased HIV, tuberculosis, or malaria (see Alexandra B. Hogan et al., 

“The Potential Impact of the COVID-19 Epidemic on HIV, TB and Malaria in 

Low- and Middle-Income Countries,” MRC Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis, Imperial College London, Report 19 (May 1, 2020), https://www.

imperial.ac.uk/mrc-global-infectious-disease-analysis/covid-19/report-19-

hiv-tb-malaria/). There might be, on the other hand, some reduction in mortality coming from other causes linked to lower economic activity in developed 

countries (see Joan Ballester et al., “Effect of the Great Recession on Regional 

Mortality Trends in Europe,” Nature Communications 10, no. 679 (February 8, 

2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-019-08539-w/).
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18 Families with means are conversant with a vast landscape of online learning 

resources, including Khan Academy, Coursera, massive open online courses, 

online visits to museums, and so on.

19 UNDP, Human Development Report 2019. In the United States, children of professional parents are exposed to more than three times as many words as children in households that receive welfare benefits. 

20 UNDP, Human Development Report 2019.

21 UNDP, Human Development Report 2019. 

22 The 2014 Human Development Report introduced a system of fixed cutoff 

points for the four categories of human development achievements. The cutoff 

points (COP) are the HDI values calculated using the quartiles (q) from the 

distributions of the component indicators averaged over 2004–13: Very high 

human development 0.800 and above, High human development 0.700–0.799, 

Medium human development 0.550–0.699, and Low human development 

Below 0.550. To find more information please consult our Technical Notes 

(http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/hdr-technical-notes).

23 Authors’ calculations based on data, accessed on May 6, 2020, from the International Telecommunications Union (https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/

Pages/stat/default.aspx), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 

Organization Institute for Statistics (https://en.unesco.org/covid19/education

response), and the World Health Organization/ACAPS (https://www.acaps.org/

covid-19-government-measures-dataset). 

24 Lars Jensen and George Gray Molina, “COVID-19 and Health System Vulnerabilities in the Poorest Developing Countries,” UNDP Transitions Series, June 2020, 

https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/transitions-series/

covid-19-and-health-system-vulnerabilities-in-the-poorest-develo.html.

25 “Mapping COVID-19 Vaccine Pre-purchases Across the Globe,” Duke Global 

Health Innovation Center, 2020 data, accessed on January 20, 2021, https://

launchandscalefaster.org/COVID-19.

26 Coronavirus (COVID-19) Vaccinations, Our World in Data, accessed January 

20, 2021, https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations. 

27 “Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response Urges Countries 

to Take Proven Measures Now to Mitigate COVID-19 Pandemic,” Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response, News Release, January 

18, 2021, https://mailchi.mp/ipppr/the-independent-panel-analysing-timelineof-pandemic-who-recommendations-9671838.

28 “Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response Urges Countries 

to Take Proven Measures.” 
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29 International Labor Organization (ILO), ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the World 

of Work, sixth edition, September 23, 2020, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/

public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms_755910.pdf.

30 Veronica Guerrieri et al., “Macroeconomic Implications of COVID-19: Can Negative Supply Shocks Cause Demand Shortages?,” NBER Working Paper 26918, 

April 2020, https://www.nber.org/papers/w26918. See the analytical model analyzing the case of the interlinks between these shocks—the transmission from a 

short-term supply shock to a deeper demand shock.

31 IMF, “Policies for the Recovery.“ 

32 UN Sustainable Development Group (UNSDG), Shared Responsibility, Global 

Solidarity: Responding to the Socio-Economic Impacts of COVID-19, March 

2020, https://unsdg.un.org/resources/shared-responsibility-global-solidarityresponding-socio-economic-impacts-covid-19.

33 The World Bank, “COVID-19 To Add as Many as 150 Million Extreme Poor 

by 2021,” Press Release, October 7, 2020, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/

press-release/2020/10/07/covid-19-to-add-as-many-as-150-million-extremepoor-by-2021; Andy Sumner, Chris Hoy, and Eduardo Ortiz-Juarez, “Estimates 

of the Impact of COVID-19 on Global Poverty,” United Nations University 

World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), WIDER 

Working Paper 2020/43 (April 2020), https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/

files/Publications/Working-paper/PDF/wp2020-43.pdf: Under more pessimistic 

scenarios—assuming that household income per capita could fall 5-20 percent—

extreme poverty could increase by 80-420 million.

34 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), The State of 

Food Security and Nutrition in the World: Transforming Food Systems for Affordable Healthy Diets (Rome, Italy: FAO, 2020), http://www.fao.org/documents/

card/en/c/ca9692en.

35 Opportunity Insights, Economic Tracker (Economic Impacts of COVID-19 

Across the United States), Harvard University, accessed on March 30, 2020, 

https://tracker.opportunityinsights.org.

36 Opportunity Insights, Economic Tracker.

37 Jonathan I. Dingel and Brent Neiman, “How Many Jobs Can be Done at Home?,” 

NBER Working Paper 26948, April 2020, https://www.nber.org/system/files/

working_papers/w26948/revisions/w26948.rev0.pdf. See the description of the 

breakdown in the United States.

38 Elizabeth Ananat and Anna Gassman-Pines, “Snapshot of the COVID Crisis 

Impact on Working Families,” The ECONOFACT Network, March 30, 2020, 

https://perma.cc/LX9Z-VB7J.
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39 Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Denise Lu, and Gabriel J.X. Dance, “Location Data 

Says It All: Staying at Home During Coronavirus Is a Luxury,” New York Times, 

June 11, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/03/us/coronavirusstay-home-rich-poor.html.

40 Sarah Thomson et al., Economic Crisis, Health Systems and Health in Europe: 

Impact and Implications for Policy (Copenhagen, Denmark: WHO, 2015), https://

www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/257579/Economic-crisis-healthsystems-Europe-impact-implications-policy.pdf.

41 For instance, there is evidence of higher suicide rates in developed countries. 

(see Shu-Sen Chang et al., “Impact of 2008 Global Economic Crisis on Suicide: 

Time Trend Study in 54 Countries,” The British Medical Journal (BMJ), September 17, 2013, https://www.bmj.com/content/347/bmj.f5239; Aaron Reeves 

et al., “Increase in State Suicide Rates in the USA During Economic Recession,” 

The Lancet 380, no. 9856 (November 24, 2012), https://www.thelancet.com/

journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(12)61910-2/fulltext.

42 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) COVID-19 Response 

Team, “Geographic Differences in COVID-19 Cases, Deaths, and Incidence—

United States, February 12–April 7, 2020,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly 

Report 69, no. 15 (April 17, 2020): 465-71, https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/

volumes/69/wr/mm6915e4.htm#suggestedcitation; Samantha Artiga, Bradley 

Corallo, and Olivia Pham, “Racial Disparities in COVID-19: Key Findings from 

Available Data and Analysis,” Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF), August 17, 

2020, https://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/issue-brief/racialdisparities-covid-19-key-findings-available-data-analysis/; Lily Rubin-Miller et 

al., “COVID-19 Racial Disparities in Testing, Infection, Hospitalization, and 

Death: Analysis of Epic Patient Data,” KFF, September 16, 2020, https://www.

kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/covid-19-racial-disparities-testinginfection-hospitalization-death-analysis-epic-patient-data/.

43 Pedro Baqui et al., “Ethnic and Regional Variations in Hospital Mortality from 

COVID-19 in Brazil: A Cross-Sectional Observational Study,” The Lancet 

Global Health 8, no. 8 (August 1, 2020): E1018-E1026, https://www.thelancet.

com/journals/langlo/article/PIIS2214-109X(20)30285-0/fulltext.

44 Most of the countries in the region do not have official disaggregated data by 

ethnicity, but some rough estimates are presented according to regions, states, 

or municipalities that have higher representation of indigenous peoples. (see 

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and Red de 

Investigaciones sobre Indígenas Urbanos (RISIU), “Contribución Continental 

al Informe del Relator Especial sobre los derechos de los pueblos indígenas” 
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COVID-19 and Inequality in Human Development

[Continental Contribution to the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 

Rights of Indigenous Peoples], Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales 

(CLACSO), 2020, https://www.clacso.org/contribucion-continental-al-informedel-relator-especial-sobre-los-derechos-de-los-pueblos-indigenas/.)

45 Sebastian Iglesias-Osores and Johnny Leandro Saavedra-Camacho, “COVID19 en comunidades indígenas del Perú: casos y accesibilidad a servicios de 

salud” [COVID-19 in Indigenous Communities of Peru: Cases and Accessibility to Health Services], An Fac med. 81, no. 2 (May 2020): 250-51, https://

www.researchgate.net/publication/341611755_COVID-19_en_comunidades_

indigenas_selvaticas; Sergio Meneses-Navarro et al., “The Challenges Facing 

Indigenous Communities in Latin America as They Confront the COVID-19 

Pandemic,” International Journal for Equity in Health 19, no. 63 (May 7, 2020), 

https://equityhealthj.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12939-020-01178-4.

46 Jess Cherofsky, “Abandoned by Government, Peru’s Indigenous Peoples Lead 

Powerful COVID-19 Response,” Cultural Survival, September 3, 2020, https://

www.culturalsurvival.org/news/abandoned-government-perus-indigenouspeoples-lead-powerful-covid-19-response; Guillermo and Gina Somra, “In This 

Indigenous Village, Two Nurses Care for Hundreds of COVID-19 Patients,” 

CNN, Galdos June 23, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/23/americas/

peru-coronavirus-caimito-nurse-intl/index.html; Emerson Mucushua and Elmer 

Huerta, “Coronavirus: Unos 600 habitantes de Pucacuro en Loreto tienen síntomas de COVID-19, informó el Apu de la comunidad” [Coronavirus: About 

600 Inhabitants of Pucacuro in Loreto Have Symptoms of COVID-19, Community Apu Reported], RPP Podcast, May 25, 2020, https://rpp.pe/peru/

actualidad/coronavirus-unos-600-habitantes-de-pacacuro-en-loreto-tienensintomas-de-covid-19-informo-apu-de-la-comunidad-noticia-1268259. 

47 Luis Ortiz-Hernández and Miguel A. Pérez-Sastré, “Inequidades sociales en la 

progresión de la COVID-19 en población mexica” [Social Inequalities in the 

Progression of COVID-19 in the Mexican Population], Revista Panamericana de 

Salud Pública, September 25, 2020, https://iris.paho.org/handle/10665.2/52680.

48 United Nations, Policy Brief: The Impact of COVID-19 on Women, April 9, 2020, 

accessed on May 21, 2021, https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/policy_brief_

on_covid_impact_on_women_9_april_2020.pdf; Carolina Rivera et al., “Gender 

Inequality and the Covid-19 Crisis: A Human Development Perspective,” UNDP 

Human Development Working Paper, 2020, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/

gender-inequality-and-covid-19-crisis-human-development-perspective.

49 Mathieu Boniol et al., Gender Equity in the Health Workforce: Analysis of 104 

Countries, WHO Health Workforce Working Paper 1, March 2019, https://apps.
110

A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/311314/WHO-HIS-HWF-Gender-WP1-

2019.1-eng.pdf.

50 UN Secretariat, The Impact of COVID-19 on Women, UN Secretary-General Policy Brief (published by UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment 

of Women (UN Women) and UN Secretariat), April 9, 2020, https://www.un

women.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/

2020/policy-brief-the-impact-of-covid-19-on-women-en.pdf?la=en&vs=1406. 

51 Carolina Rivera et al., “Gender Inequality and the Covid-19 Crisis: A Human 

Development Perspective.” 

52 UN Population Fund (UNFPA), COVID-19: A Gender Lens—Protecting Sexual 

and Reproductive Health and Rights, and Promoting Gender Equality, Technical Brief, March 2020, https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-pdf/

COVID-19_A_Gender_Lens_Guidance_Note.pdf.

53 Clare Wenham, Julia Smith, and Rosemary Morgan, “COVID-19: The Gendered 

Impacts of the Outbreak,” The Lancet 395, no. 10227 (March 14, 2020): 846-48, 

https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)30526-2/

fulltext.

54 UNFPA, Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Family Planning and Ending 

Gender-based Violence, Female Genital Mutilation and Child Marriage, Interim 

Technical Note, April 2020, https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resourcepdf/COVID-19_impact_brief_for_UNFPA_24_April_2020_1.pdf.

55 UNDP, COVID-19 and Human Development: Assessing the Crisis, Envisioning 

the Recovery, 2020 Human Development Perspectives (New York: UNDP, 2020), 

http://www.hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/covid-19_and_human_develop

ment_0.pdf.

56 UN Secretariat, The Impact of COVID-19 on Women; ILO, The COVID-19 response: 

Getting Gender equality Right for a Better Future for Women at Work, Policy Brief, 

May 2020, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---gender/

documents/publication/wcms_744374.pdf.

57 UNDP, Gender-based Violence and COVID-19, May 11, 2020, ttps://www.

undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/womens-empowerment/genderbased-violence-and-covid-19.html.

58 ILO, Care Work and Care Jobs for the Future of Decent Work (Geneva, Switzerland: ILO, 2018), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---

dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_633135.pdf.

59 Patricia Cohen and Tiffany Hsu, “Pandemic Could Scar a Generation of Working Mothers,” New York Times, June 3, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/

06/03/business/economy/coronavirus-working-women.html.
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COVID-19 and Inequality in Human Development

60 Malala Fund, Girls’ Education and COVID-19: What Past Shocks Can Teach Us 

About Mitigating the Impact of Pandemics, April 6, 2020, https://malala.org/

newsroom/archive/malala-fund-releases-report-girls-education-covid-19.

61 Robert Jenkins and Rebecca Winthrop, “5 Actions to Help Bring the Most

Marginalized Girls Back to School after COVID-19,” Brookings Institution, 

May 15, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/education-plus-development/

2020/05/15/5-actions-to-help-bring-the-most-marginalized-girls-back-to-sch

ool-after-covid-19/.

62 For an interesting take on trust, see David Brooks, “America Is Having a Moral 

Convulsion,” The Atlantic, October 5, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/

archive/2020/10/collapsing-levels-trust-are-devastating-america/616581/.

63 Kat Devlin and Aidan Connaughton, “Most Approve of National Response to 

COVID-19 in 14 Advanced Economies,” Pew Research Center, August 27, 2020, 

https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/08/27/most-approve-of-nationalresponse-to-covid-19-in-14-advanced-economies/.

64 Lee Rainie and Andrew Perrin, “The State of Americans’ Trust in Each Other

Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Pew Research Center, April 6, 2020, https://

www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/04/06/the-state-of-americans-trust-ineach-other-amid-the-covid-19-pandemic/.

65 OECD, “Trust in Government, Policy Effectiveness and the Governance Agenda,” 

in Government at a Glance 2013 (Paris, France: OECD Publishing, 2013), 

https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/gov_glance-2013-6-en.pdf?expires=

1611255840&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=35AB33F535615E06340F5

A5ADE3CE479.

66 UNDP, Human Development Report 2020—The Next Frontier: Human Development and the Anthropocene (New York: UNDP, 2020), http://www.hdr.undp.

org/sites/default/files/hdr2020.pdf.

67 UNDP, Human Development Report 2019.

68 UNDP, Human Development Report 2020.

69 Noah S. Diffenbaugh and Marshall Burke, “Global Warming Has Increased 

Global Economic Inequality,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of 

the United States of America 116, no. 20 (May 14, 2019): 9808-13, https://www.

pnas.org/content/116/20/9808.

70 Diffenbaugh and Burke, “Global Warming Has Increased Global Economic 

Inequality.”

71 Melissa Leach et al., “Equity and Sustainability in the Anthropocene: A 

Social–ecological Systems Perspective on Their Intertwined Futures,” Global 

Sustainability, vol. 1 (2018), https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/global-
112

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sustainability/article/equity-and-sustainability-in-the-anthropocene-a-socialeco

logical-systems-perspective-on-their-intertwined-futures/F6DCBE05CA3F6

820A10C0DF193BB29E7.

72 IMF, “Policy Responses to COVID-19,” Policy Tracker, accessed on November 

18, 2020, https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responsesto-COVID-19. 

73 UNDP, Human Development Report 2020: 215.

74 Theresa Andrasfay and Noreen Goldman, “Reductions in 2020 US Life Expectancy Due to COVID-19 and the Disproportionate Impact on the Black and Latino 

Populations,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States 

of America 118, no. 5 (February 2, 2021), https://www.pnas.org/content/118/5/

e2014746118. 
113

THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF THE 

COVID-19 PANDEMIC ON POLITICAL 

INSTABILITY AND DEMOCRACY

Cristina Bodea and Christian Houle

The COVID-19 pandemic has already contributed to political unrest 

and the deterioration of democracy worldwide. In multiple countries, 

leaders immediately used the exigencies of a health emergency to centralize power and reduce democratic freedoms. We argue that, beyond 

this direct, and perhaps short-term effect, the pandemic is likely to have 

long-term indirect consequences arising from its effects on the economy. 

Studies show that economic crises often increase economic inequality. 

Ample evidence suggests this has been particularly true about this pandemic, notably because most low-wage occupations cannot be done 

from home. Moreover, racial and ethnic minorities have suffered greater 

harm, which has increased inequality between racial/ethnic groups. 

Research also has demonstrated that inequality, particularly when it 

overlaps with race/ethnicity, is a leading determinant of political instability and democratic deterioration. Thus, this pandemic is likely to 

increase instability and harm democracy worldwide, and the impact is 

likely to be long-lasting, because inequality is highly sticky within countries over time—only changing in response to major events, such as wars. 
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We conclude by pointing to potential policies that could help preserve 

political stability and democracy; primarily that inequality should be 

squarely addressed as policymakers design their economic aid packages. 

The COVID-19 Pandemic, Economic Inequality, and Democracy

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has already contributed to political unrest and the deterioration of democracy in multiple countries, 

including Bolivia, Brazil,1

 Hungary, India, Israel, the Philippines, and

Thailand.2

 In these countries, leaders immediately used the exigencies of a health emergency to centralize power and reduce democratic 

freedoms. Even in the United States, the pandemic directly reduced 

the quality of democracy despite high voter turnout. The 2020 election cycle was characterized by closed polling stations,3

 long lines, 

and delays in counting ballots,4

 and many officials allowed accusations of election fraud to escalate. The immediate effects of the pandemic are concerning for the stability of democracy worldwide. Yet, 

arguably once the health crisis subsides with the help of vaccination, 

democracies—those countries with multiple veto players and diverse 

civil societies—may be able to take corrective actions that reverse the 

direct restrictive measures that tackled the pandemic.

We argue that, in the long term, the pandemic’s consequences 

for democratic freedoms and political stability are likely to come 

from its impact on countries’ economies. In particular, we assess that 

the global economic crisis is poised to generate additional income 

inequality and reduce social mobility, which in turn will potentially increase people’s support for authoritarian values and reduce 

access to political representation. These are causal pathways that 

our research shows can lead to the breakdown of democracy. These 

effects should be equally if not more concerning because income and 

wealth inequities historically tend to be difficult to dislodge or need 

major events, like high mobilization wars or the Great Depression, to 

be tackled effectively.5
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The Long-term Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic

The pandemic has also given license to authoritarian countries to 

further restrict dissent, under the cover of enforcing social distancing 

rules needed to quell the virus. For example, China and Russia have 

doubled down on controlling their populations through the ever more 

intrusive use of artificial intelligence and social media.6

 Iran and Pakistan have ceded more civilian control to their militaries,7

 which they 

are using to control the pandemic. And other lower capacity authoritarian countries like Algeria and Uganda have violently repressed antigovernment protests and jailed or beaten opposition leaders.8

State of Inequality Pre-Pandemic/COVID and Immediately 

Recognizable Unequal Outcomes

Already sharp economic inequities had been increasing in many 

countries even before the coronavirus pandemic hit.9 In the United 

States, class and racial divides were stark. In 2016, about 1 percent of 

income earners received 20 percent of U.S. pretax national income, 

while the bottom 50 percent of earners received only 12 percent.10

Moreover, the median black household income was half that of the 

median white household,11 while the median white family’s net worth 

was about 10 times that of black families.12 Similarly, inequality also 

had been high and rising in other large countries—like Brazil, China, 

India, and Russia—and across smaller countries in Sub-Saharan 

Africa and Latin America. 

The direct pandemic effects—lockdowns, the shift to working 

from home, and illness—and the resulting pandemic-induced global 

economic crisis are likely to exacerbate the disparity in income between 

low- and high-wage earners.13 Low-wage earners deemed essential 

may have preserved their salaries, but most low-wage jobs deemed 

nonessential—like in the hospitality industry—cannot be done from 

home. Moreover, the pandemic added to the burden of home care, 

which falls disproportionally on women, eroding their ability to earn 
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wages.14, 15, 16, 17, 18 Thus, the poor, the uneducated, women, and—to the 

extent that poverty overlaps with race—people of color will experience downward social mobility. Already news reports from the United 

States raise the alarm that the super-rich are benefiting from the pandemic itself and the economic policies put in place in response, while 

the combined health and economic shock of the pandemic is disproportionately affecting black households.19, 20, 21, 22, 23 

Emerging research on the COVID-19 economic shock shows an 

increase in economic disparities along class lines. Studies show that 

low-income individuals in Germany and the United Kingdom24, 25

and lower wage workers in Spain26 experienced significantly larger 

income losses and that, across countries, government transfers mitigated this trend. The health-related lockdowns are also expected to 

increase income inequality along social and cultural lines.27, 28 On the 

whole, the World Bank estimates that because of the coronavirus 88 

million more people worldwide will live in extreme poverty in 2020.29

Additionally, research shows that at the onset of the pandemic, the 

incomes of the poor in many countries had not yet recovered from 

the most recent 2008 financial crisis.30

Economic Crisis and Inequality 

Our work using cross-country data analysis shows that concerns 

about the long-term inequality effects of the economic crisis provoked by the pandemic are warranted. Looking at 66 countries 

between 1960 and 2010, we show that economic crises are drivers of 

income inequality.31 We look at diverse forms of economic crises—

banking, currency, debt, inflation, and stock market—to show that, 

with the exception of stock market slumps, all crises tend to increase 

inequality, measured with Gini coefficients.*

 The effects of economic 

* A Gini coefficient is a statistical measure of the degree of variation or inequality 

represented in a set of values, used especially in analyzing income inequality. 
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The Long-term Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic

crises play out in the long run, and, thus, the political consequences 

of a major financial crisis, like that of 2008 or the ongoing economic 

slump linked to the pandemic, have yet to be fully realized. 

The mechanisms behind our findings have ample empirical support. Most directly, the unemployment spikes and lower economic 

growth that characterize economic crises more severely affect lowskill, low-income individuals.32, 33, 34 Such unemployment spells can 

be expected to further erode human capital and re-employment 

wages—especially if prolonged. Indirectly, workers have less bargaining power in an economic crisis; even unionized labor may agree to 

wage restraints to restore firms’ profitability and avoid massive layoffs resulting from bankruptcies.35, 36 In the aftermath of crises, different constituencies vie for and receive state support, and the policy 

responses to crises can increase inequality.37 Thus, large companies 

or banks are more likely to access government bailouts while individuals or small businesses, due to their large numbers and lack of 

organization, will miss out on government support. To the contrary, 

most individuals and small businesses will suffer if, and when, governments use austerity measures that reduce spending in response 

to resource constraints. Directly, one study shows that fiscal consolidation increases income inequality especially through its effect on 

employment and wages.38, 39

The Consequences of Economic Inequality

Our research on the political implications of economic inequality 

and a survey of related literature suggest two likely political consequences of the increase in economic inequality engendered by 

the COVID-19 pandemic. First, we can expect inequality to affect 

diverse forms of political unrest, ranging from riots and antigovernment demonstrations to full-blown civil wars. Second, we expect 

inequality to erode democracy worldwide and even perhaps threaten 

the survival of many democratic regimes. 
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Economic Inequality and Political Instability

Most of the large body of literature on the effect of inequality on 

political unrest focuses on a country’s overall inequality level, often 

called vertical inequality: that is, the inequality among the country’s citizens, regardless of their cultural (ethnic or religious) group. 

This is often measured using Gini coefficients. Some also use capital 

shares as an indicator of inequality between the social classes. Capital shares measure the proportion of created wealth that accrues to 

the owner of capital, as opposed to the laborers. Most authors find 

that vertical inequality and interclass inequality fuel diverse forms of 

political unrest, such as antigovernment demonstrations, riots, and 

even small-scale popular rebellions.40, 41 Countries with lower levels 

of social mobility also are more likely to experience social unrest.42

Inequality and downward social mobility create grievances, which in 

turn encourage citizens to voice their discontentment.43, 44, 45, 46 

The evidence on the effect of a country’s overall inequality level 

and interclass inequality on large-scale levels of political unrest, most 

notably civil wars, is more ambiguous. Although some researchers 

find that vertical and interclass inequality fosters civil wars,47, 48 others find it has little effect.49, 50, 51, 52 Strong evidence suggests, however, 

that horizontal inequality—the inequality between culturally defined 

groups such as ethnic or religious groups—does breed civil wars.53, 

54, 55 The rationale is that most civil wars are fought between culturally defined groups, such as ethnic or religious groups. Therefore, 

according to this literature, it is inequality between such groups that 

matters for civil wars, not the overall level of inequality or interclass 

inequality. While these authors focus on civil wars, we also find that 

horizontal inequality increases the probability that a country experiences a coup d’état, particularly when inequality within culturally 

defined groups is low.56 When inequality between groups is high but 

inequality within a group is low, each group’s members have very distinct preferences, which can motivate a group to mobilize and, for 

example, stage a coup.
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The Long-term Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic

In short, the previous literature suggests that the rise in inequality and reduction in social mobility caused by the coronavirus will, 

at a minimum, foster low-level civil unrest worldwide. Horizontal 

inequality has arguably already contributed to the protests associated with the Black Lives Matter movement. As explained above, the 

COVID-19 pandemic has had more impact on some groups than on 

others. In the United States, for example, racial minorities have experienced greater economic harm, which has increased racial inequality. If inequality between culturally defined groups increases in other 

countries, we could also witness an increase in the number of civil 

wars across the world. 

Economic Inequality and Democratic Stability

An established body of literature has investigated the effect of economic inequality and social mobility on democratic stability and 

survival. Most authors find inequality and low social mobility 

destabilize already established democracies.57, 58 Moreover, other 

authors find that inequality’s effect is particularly strong when it 

follows ethnic lines.59 That is, democracies are particularly unstable 

when they combine high levels of between-ethnic group inequality 

with low levels of within-ethnic group inequality. 

A number of mechanisms drive the relationship between 

inequality and social mobility, on the one hand, and democratic 

stability, on the other. First, as explained above, inequality and 

downward social mobility foster political unrest. Political unrest 

often, in turn, leads to authoritarian responses by governments, 

as exemplified by the clearing of peaceful protesters in Lafayette 

Square in Washington, DC, on June 1, 2020.60 More broadly, political instability erodes the public trust necessary to maintain a viable democracy and creates opportunities for governments to adopt 

oppressive measures. 

Second, inequality also fosters distributional conflicts, which, in 

turn, destabilize democracy.61, 62, 63 According to Meltzer and Richard’s 
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classical model,64 which they based on the median voter theorem,†

inequality increases taxation and redistribution in democracies. 

Inequality increases the gap between the preferences of the masses 

and the economic elites over economic policies. For example, at high 

levels of inequality, the masses may want to adopt poor-friendly policies, such as redistribution or public education/health care, while the 

economic elites may oppose such policies and the increased taxation 

they imply. Because the economic elite makes up only a minority of 

any country’s population, democracy’s majority rule suggests the 

masses will get to set their preferred tax rate and economic policies. Increased inequality, therefore, increases the incentive for the 

economic elite to overthrow democracy and impose their preferred 

policies. Distributional conflicts between social classes and culturally 

defined groups have played a central role in many democratic breakdowns, including the military coup in Chile in 1973.65 

Third, and perhaps most significant, research suggests people who live in high inequality countries or experience downward 

mobility are less likely to support democracy and are more like to 

espouse authoritarian values.66, 67, 68 For example, in analyzing survey 

data from Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, Houle and Miller 

found that individuals who have experienced downward mobility are 

less likely to exhibit strong attachments to democracy.69 Krieckhaus 

et al. arrive at similar conclusions when they investigate the attitudes 

of individuals who live in democracies with high levels of inequality.70

Public support for democracy is crucial to its establishment and 

consolidation, as recognized as far back as Alexis de Tocqueville (1835)71

and John Stuart Mill (1861).72 According to Mattes and Bratton, “[n]o 

matter how well or badly international aid donors and academic think 

tanks rate the extent of democracy in a country, this form of regime 

will only consolidate if ordinary people believe that democracy is being 

† The median voter theorem shows that, under majority rule, the policy adopted will be 

the one favored by the voter situated at the median of the policy preference spectrum.
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The Long-term Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic

supplied.”73 Popular support for democracy is particularly important in 

the current historical context. In recent years, multiple democracies, in 

countries such as Hungary, Turkey, and Venezuela, collapsed because 

leaders and parties voted into office through free and fair elections 

simply have refused to leave.74 Although democratic breakdowns traditionally have been caused by elites through coups d’état, they are now 

increasingly driven by populist leaders and parties that adopt anti-elite 

rhetoric.75 These actors directly depend on the support of the masses 

both to gain office and to consolidate power, for example, through referenda. Thus, decreased support for democracy will encourage voters 

to choose candidates with weak democratic credentials, which could 

lead to the erosion or even breakdown of democracy. 

In sum, the coronavirus induced rise in inequality is likely to harm 

democracy worldwide by breeding political instability, fostering distributional conflicts, and weakening support for democratic norms. 

The fact that the coronavirus has increased inequality between culturally defined groups suggests that its adverse effect on democracy may 

be particularly pronounced. 

How Can We Turn the Tide?

The COVID-19 pandemic has already weakened democracy in Brazil, 

Ethiopia, Hungary, Russia, Tanzania, Uganda, and other countries. We 

argue that, even after the health situation has stabilized, the coronavirus 

is likely to exert long-term damage to democracy and political stability 

worldwide. This is because the COVID-19 pandemic will also have an 

indirect effect: the economic crisis it caused has led to an increase in 

inequality, which according to the literature is likely to increase political 

unrest and destabilize democracies, even in the long run. Inequality is 

notoriously sticky within countries over time.76 Once large-scale events 

like the coronavirus pandemic affect inequality, it tends to remain stable.77 Therefore, the coronavirus is likely to have lasting adverse effects 

on political unrest and democratic stability worldwide.
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

This suggests that inequality should be squarely addressed as policymakers design their economic aid packages. For example, European 

countries’ efforts to mitigate the consequences of the crisis have succeed in reducing unemployment more than those of the United States.78

If democracy and political stability are to be preserved, it is paramount 

that additional resources are dedicated to improving opportunity for 

those at the bottom of the income distribution. This includes expanding access to education and increasing the progressivity of taxation. 

About the Authors

∂Cristina Bodea is an associate professor of political science at Michigan 

State University and an editor of the British Journal of Political Science.

Christian Houle is an associate professor in the department of political science at Michigan State University. He specializes in the study of 

regime change, economic inequality, and political conflict

Endnotes

1 Simon Romero, Letícia Casado and Manuela Andreoni, “Threat of Military 

Action Rattles Brazil as Virus Deaths Surge,” New York Times, June 10, 2020, 

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/10/world/americas/bolsonaro-coup-corona

virus-brazil.html.

2 Selem Gebrekidan, “For Autocrats, and Others, Coronavirus Is a Chance To 

Grab Even More Power,” New York Times, March 30, 2020, https://www.nytimes

.com/2020/03/30/world/europe/coronavirus-governments-power.html. 

3 “‘It Was Very Chaotic’: Long Lines, Voting Machine Issues Plague Georgia Primaries,” National Public Radio, June 9, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/06/09/

873054620/long-lines-voting-machine-issues-plague-georgia-primary. 

4 Zak Hudak, “Pennsylvania’s Mail-in Votes Still Weren’t all Tallied After One Week—

Officials Fear Elections ‘Nightmare’ in November,” CBS News, June 30, 2020, 
123

The Long-term Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/pennsylvania-general-election-fears-primaryresults-delay-mail-in-votes/. 

5 Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage, Taxing the Rich: A History of Fiscal Fairness in the United States and Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 

2016).

6 Frances Brown, Saskia Brechenmacher, and Thomas Carothers, “How Will 

the Coronavirus Reshape Democracy and Governance Globally?,” Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace, April 6, 2020, https://carnegieendowment

.org/2020/04/06/how-will-coronavirus-reshape-democracy-and-governanceglobally-pub-81470. 

7 Brown, Brechenmacher, and Carothers, “How Will the Coronavirus Reshape 

Democracy?” 

8 Abdi Latif Dahir, “Jailed, Exiled and Silenced: Smothering East Africa’s Political Opposition,” New York Times, November 27, 2020, https://www.nytimes

.com/2020/11/27/world/africa/Africa-leaders-suppression.html. 

9 Facundo Alvaredo et al., World Inequality Report (Boston: Harvard University 

Press, 2018).

10 Alvaredo et al., World Inequality Report.

11 Moritz Kuhn, Moritz Schularick, and Ulrike I. Steins, “Income and Wealth 

Inequality in America, 1949–2016,” Journal of Political Economy 128, no. 9 (2020): 

3469-3519.

12 Bradley Hardy and Trevon Logan, “Racial Economic Inequality Amid the 

COVID-19 Crisis,” Brookings Essay 2020-17, Brookings Institution, August 

2020.

13 Abby Vesoulis, “Coronavirus May Disproportionately Hurt the Poor—And 

That’s Bad for Everyone,” Time, March 11, 2020, https://time.com/5800930/

how-coronavirus-will-hurt-the-poor/. 

14 Ian Goldin and Robert Muggah, “COVID-19 Is Increasing Multiple Kinds of 

Inequality. Here’s What We Can Do About It,” World Economic Forum, October 9, 2020, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/10/covid-19-is-increasingmultiple-kinds-of-inequality-here-s-what-we-can-do-about-it/.

15 Robert Joyce and Xiaowei Xu, “Sector Shutdowns During the Coronavirus Crisis: Which Workers Are Most Exposed?” Institute for Fiscal Studies, April 6, 

2020, https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/14791.

16 Nicole Bateman and Martha Ross, “Why Has COVID-19 Been Especially 

Harmful for Working Women?,” Brookings Institution, October 2020, https://

www.brookings.edu/essay/why-has-covid-19-been-especially-harmful-forworking-women/ .
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

17 Goldin and Muggah, “COVID-19 Is Increasing Multiple Kinds of Inequality.”

18 Abi Adams-Prassl et al., “Inequality in the Impact of the Coronavirus Shock: 

Evidence From Real Time Surveys,” Journal of Public Economics 189 (2020).

19 Charlie Cooper, “The Next Pandemic: Rising Inequality,” Politico, April 28, 2020, 

https://www.politico.eu/article/the-next-pandemic-rising-inequality-corona

virus-covid19-economic-turmoil-lockdowns/. 

20 Chuck Collins, “Billionaires Are Getting Even Richer from the Pandemic. 

Enough is Enough,” CNN, May 11, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/28/

perspectives/inequality-coronavirus-billionaires/index.html. 

21 Jeff Stein and Peter Whoriskey, “The US Plans to Lend $500 Billion to Large 

Companies. It Won’t Require Them To Preserve Jobs or Limit Executive Pay,” 

Washington Post, April 28, 2020, https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/

the-us-plans-to-lend-500-billion-to-large-companies-it-won-t-require-themto-preserve-jobs-or-limit-executive-pay/ar-BB13khDm. 

22 Hardy and Logan, “Racial Economic Inequality Amid the COVID-19 Crisis.” 

23 Similar outcomes have been shown to exist in Brazil. Pedro Baqui et al., “Ethnic and Regional Variations in Hospital Mortality From COVID-19 in Brazil: A Cross-sectional Observational Study,” Lancet Global Health 8 (2020): 

1018-26.

24 Sinem Hacioglu, Diego R. Känzig, and Paolo Surico, “The Distributional 

Impact of the Pandemic,” Discussion Paper 15101, Center for Economic Policy 

Research, July 26, 2020.

25 Hajo Holst, Agnes Fessler, and Steffen Niehoff, “Covid-19, Social Class and 

Work Experience in Germany: Inequalities in Work-related Health and Economic Risks,” European Societies, October 2020.

26 Oriol Aspachs et al., “Measuring Income Inequality and the Impact of 

the Welfare State during COVID-19: Evidence from Bank Data,” VOXEU, 

September 22, 2020, https://voxeu.org/article/income-inequality-and-welfarestate-during-covid-19.

27 Richard Blundell et al., “COVID‐19 and Inequalities,” Fiscal Studies 41, no. 2 

(June 27, 2020): 291-319.

28 Rachel Gisselquist and Anustup Kundu, “Horizontal Inequality, COVID-19, 

and Lockdown Readiness. Evidence from India,” World Institute for Development Economic Research, WIDER Working Paper 2020/156. 

29 Christoph Lakner et al., “Updated Estimates of the Impact of COVID-19

on Global Poverty: The Effect of New Data,” World Bank Blog, October 7, 2020, 

https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/updated-estimates-impact-covid-19-

global-poverty-effect-new-data?token=d3c7288f257b662e819adb237c06033e.
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The Long-term Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic

30 Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, “Top Incomes and the Great Recession: 

Recent Evolutions and Policy Implications,” IMF Economic Review 61 (3): 

2013.

31 Cristina Bodea, Christian Houle, and Hyunwoo Kim, “Do Financial Crises 

Increase Income Inequality?,” Conference Paper, European Political Science 

Association, June 20-22, 2019, Belfast, Ireland. 

32 Emmanuele Baldacci, Luiz de Mello, and Gabriela Inchauste, “Financial Crises, 

Poverty, and Income Distribution,” International Monetary Fund, IMF Working Paper, 02/4, 2002.

33 Michael Bordo and Christopher Meissner, “Does Inequality Lead to a Financial Crisis?,” Journal of International Money and Finance 31, no. 8 (2012): 

2147–61.

34 Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries 

of Financial Folly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).

35 Ishac Diwan et al., “Debt as Sweat: Labor, Financial Crises, and the Globalization of Capital,” World Bank Working Paper, January 2001.

36 Arjun Jayadev, “Capital Account Openness and the Labor Share of Income,” 

Cambridge Journal of Economics 31, no. 3 (2007): 423-43.

37 Atif Mian, Amir Sufi, and Francesco Trebbi, “Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in the Aftermath of Financial Crises,” American Economic 

Journal: Macroeconomics 6, no. 2 (2014): 1-28.

38 Lawrence Ball et al., “The Distributional Effects of Fiscal Consolidation,” Working Papers, International Monetary Fund, January 13, 2013.

39 Using a series of experiments, Evelyne Hübscher, Thomas Sattler, and Markus 

Wagner show that voters across Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the United 

Kingdom electorally punish the political parties that enact the spending cuts 

associated with austerity measures. “Voter Responses to Fiscal Austerity,” British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming.

40 Henrikas Bartusevicius, “The Inequality–Conflict Nexus Re-examined: Income, 

Education, and Popular Rebellions,” Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 1 (January 

2014): 35-50.

41 Christian Houle, “Why Class Inequality Breeds Coups but not Civil Wars,” Journal of Peace Research 53, no. 5 (September 2016): 680-95.

42 Christian Houle. “Social Mobility and Political Instability,” Journal of Conflict 

Resolution 63, no. 1 (2019): 85-111.

43 James Davies, “Toward a Theory of Revolution,” American Sociological Review

27, no. 1 (February 1962): 5-19.

44 Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970).
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45 Manus Midlarsky, “Rulers and the Ruled: Patterned Inequality and the Onset 

of Mass Political Violence,” American Political Science Review 82, no. 2 (June 

1988): 491-509.

46 Edward Muller, “Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political 

Violence,” American Sociological Review 50, no. 1 (February 1985): 47-61.

47 Joerg Baten and Christina Mumme, “Does Inequality Lead to Civil Wars? A 

Global Long-term Study Using Anthropometric Indicators (1816–1999),” European Journal of Political Economy 32, C (2013): 56-79.

48 Carles Boix, “Economic Roots of Civil Wars and Revolutions in the Contemporary World,” World Politics 60, no. 3 (April 2008): 390-437.

49 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars,” Oxford 

Economic Papers 56, no. 4 (2004): 563-95. 

50 Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner, “Beyond Greed and Grievances: Feasibility and Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 61, no. 1 (2009): 1-27.

51 James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75-90.

52 Houle, “Why Class Inequality Breeds Coups but not Civil Wars.” 

53 Lars-Erik Cederman, Nils Weidmann, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Horizontal Inequalities and Ethno-nationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison,” 

American Political Science Review 105, no. 3 (2011): 478-95.

54 Joshua Gubler and Joel Selway, “Horizontal Inequality, Crosscutting Cleavages 

and Civil War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 2 (2012): 206-32.

55 Gudrun Østby, “Polarization, Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Civil Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 2 (2008): 143-62.

56 Christian Houle and Cristina Bodea, “Ethnic Inequality and Coups in SubSaharan Africa,” Journal of Peace Research 54, no. 3 (2017): 382-96. 

57 Carles Boix, Democracy and Redistribution (Cambridge: Cambridge University 

Press, 2003).

58 Christian Houle, “Inequality and Democracy: Why Inequality Harms Consolidation but Does Not Affect Democratization,” World Politics 61, no. 4 (2009): 589-622.

59 Christian Houle, “Ethnic Inequality and the Dismantling of Democracy: A 

Global Analysis,” World Politics 67, no. 3 (2015): 469-505.

60 Matt Flegenheimer, “What Democracy Scholars Thought of Trump’s Bible Photo 

Op,” New York Times, June 2, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/02/us/

politics/trump-holds-bible-photo.html.

61 Daren Acemoglu and James Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and 

Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press 2006).

62 Boix, Democracy and Redistribution.
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63 Houle, “Inequality and Democracy.”

64 Allan Meltzer and Scott Richard, “A Rational Theory of the Size of Government,” Journal of Political Economy 89, no. 5 (1981): 914-27.

65 Houle, “Why Class Inequality Breeds Coups but not Civil Wars.”

66 R. Anderson, “Support for Democracy in Cross-National Perspective,” Research 

in Social Stratification and Mobility 30 (2012): 389-402.

67 T. L. Karl, “Economic Inequality and Democratic Instability,” Journal of Democracy 11 (2000): 149-56.

68 Christian Houle, “Does Economic Inequality Breed Political Inequality?,” 

Democratization 25, no. 8 (2018): 1500-18.

69 Christian Houle and Michael Miller, “Social Mobility and Democratic Attitudes: Evidence from Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa,” Comparative 

Political Studies 52, no. 11 (2019): 1610-47.

70 J. Krieckhaus et al., “Economic Inequality and Democratic Support,” Journal of 

Politics 76 (2014): 139-51.

71 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York. Library of America, 

[1835] 2004).

72 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (Prometheus 

Books, [1861] 1991).

73 R. Mattes and M. Bratton, “Learning About Democracy in Africa,” American 

Journal of Political Science 51 (2007): 192-217. 

74 Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracy Dies (New York: Crown 

Publishing, 2018).

75 William Galston, “The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy,” Journal of 

Democracy 29, no. 2 (2018): 5-19.

76 Klaus Deininger and Lyn Squire, “A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality,” World Bank Economic Review 10, no. 3 (1996): 565-91. 

77 Scheve and Stasavage, Taxing the Rich.

78 Anke Hassel and Kathleen Thelen, “Europe Has Kept Down Pandemic Unemployment—and the US Hasn’t. Here’s Why,” Washington Post, April 24, 2020, 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/04/24/europe-has-kept-downpandemic-unemployment-us-hasnt-heres-why.

129

LATIN AMERICA: 

POLITICAL INSTABILITY GIVES 

ORGANIZED CRIME A WINDOW 

TO EXPAND CONTROL

Jimena Blanco

The COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare Latin America’s structural deficiencies and exacerbated pre-existing economic and social inequalities, 

which threaten to increase security risks in a slow, post-pandemic recovery scenario. As governments struggle to address the rise in unemployment and informality, poverty and inequality will remain major drivers 

of social unrest and political discontent. In this context, traditional political structures will struggle to contain violence and criminality, with 

organized crime looking to exploit the situation to entrench its illegal economic activities among the most vulnerable segments of the population. 

COVID-19 Enables a Vicious, Downward Cycle

Latin America experienced the second biggest pandemic-induced economic contraction of any region in 2020, just behind the Euro-zone,1

and the Verisk Maplecroft Recovery Capacity Index—which measures 

more than a dozen factors that determine a region’s ability to recover 
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from the crisis2—puts Latin America below all but Africa in recovery 

capability. Falling tax receipts will cripple governments’ ability to address 

spiraling demands from already impoverished workers, who are likely 

to be pushed into even lower-paid, unstable, and informal jobs.3

 Structural hurdles will slow post-pandemic reconstruction, and the inability 

to deliver effective health, economic, and social responses to the pandemic is likely to push social discontent into civil unrest, which in turn 

will erode leaders’ ability to stem regional violence and increasing criminality. This context can exacerbate a key threat to U.S. national security interests by strengthening criminal gangs. Before the pandemic, 

Latin America had ten cities with the world’s highest murder rates, 

with much of the violence narcotics-related.4

 Drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and gangs5

 will exploit the region’s endemic institutional 

weaknesses to expand their activities. The pandemic has provided an 

opportunity to increase their social control within rural and vulnerable 

communities, pushing up security risks across large territories.  

The Pressure Cooker Could Explode in 2021

Several compounding structural factors will weigh heavily on Latin 

America’s ability to recover from the COVID-19 crisis; the region’s 

inherently high civil unrest risk is among the most significant. As 

the socioeconomic fallout from COVID-19 mounts, global protesters’ ranks are likely to swell during the next two years, and unrest 

will sweep across developed, emerging, and frontier markets alike. 

According to data from Verisk Maplecroft’s Civil Unrest Index projections, 75 countries are likely to experience an increase in protests 

by late 2022. Of these, 34—predominantly in Europe and the Americas—are likely to see a particularly significant deterioration, defined 

as a projected decrease of 0.5 or more on the Civil Unrest Index score.6

The surge in instability will take place against a backdrop of a 

painful post-pandemic economic recovery, which is likely to inflame 

existing public dissatisfaction with governments. Europe and the 
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Latin America: Political Instability Gives Organized Crime a Window

Americas dominate the list of 34 countries that are expected to see 

a significant increase in the risk of business disruption from protests 

in 2021. As the pandemic began to spread across the globe in March 

2020, most Latin American countries adopted lockdown or quarantine measures to contain the spread. The number of protests initially 

fell during this period. As Figure 1 shows, those that did occur were 

mainly motivated by the direct impact of COVID-19—such as food 

insecurity, job losses, or frustration over lockdowns.

Figure 1. Initial Pandemic Response Suppressed Protest Level

Incidents recorded during this period were primarily related to the direct impact of COVID-19, such as 

access to food and healthcare, and job losses

However, the quarantines only put the lid back on the pressure 

cooker while turning up the heat under it. Once restrictions were 

lifted, protests quickly resumed as longstanding grievances resurfaced and, in some cases, were worsened by the pandemic. Simply 

put, anger over preexisting socioeconomic issues, rising unemployment, government missteps in coronavirus response, and other problems exploded once the initial shock of the pandemic subsided. In 

some cases, like Argentina, the protracted nature of lockdown measures was, in itself, a driver of mass mobilization.
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Initially, governments’ emergency spending helped quell demonstrations, but those measures largely came to an end, or were reduced, in 

2021. The belt-tightening is affecting food and fuel subsidies—a textbook 

catalyst of unrest. Argentina, projected to experience the eighth most 

significant rise in unrest risk by August 2022, is one of the countries most 

exposed to protests driven by government aid withdrawal. Meanwhile, 

in Brazil, growing political polarization and the massive economic and 

health toll of the COVID-19 pandemic are expected to deepen the risk 

of protests from both sides of the political divide. Figure 2 shows that 

the total number of demonstrations in Latin America climbed steadily 

in the third and fourth quarters of 2020. By year-end, the region was 

back to pre-pandemic levels of unrest. With most countries still applying 

some restrictive measures as they go through the second wave, the outbreak’s complete economic shock is yet to be felt. The number of protests 

is likely to continue to rise during the coming months.

Figure 2. Lockdown and Quarantine Measures Initially Reduced Civil Unres

Unrest Erodes Political Stability Before Crucial Elections

Rising political instability will dominate Latin America in the early 

2020s. In addition to increasing the potential for supply chain disruption, the region’s civil unrest risk makes for a more volatile political 
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Latin America: Political Instability Gives Organized Crime a Window

landscape, undermining elected governments’ stability across the 

region. The outbreak of COVID-19 did not start the fire. Still, it has 

undoubtedly aggravated the underlying socioeconomic tension that 

provoked mass street protests across the region in 2019, which in turn 

eroded political stability—a trend that intensified in 2020.

Verisk Maplecroft’s Political Stability Index indicates that 77 

percent of the 26 countries in the Americas included in the dataset 

are likely to see an increase in political instability during the Index’s 

two-year timeframe.7

 The Index, which measures the stability of a 

country’s executive authority to implement laws and policy priorities, 

considers the executive’s risk of being challenged by other institutions 

or the public and the risk of disruption arising from the civil unrest. 

For example, in Mexico and Argentina, Presidents Andrés Manuel 

López Obrador and Alberto Fernández saw their approval ratings 

nosedive between March and December 2020.8, 9 A key concern for 

future governability is whether this drop will translate into larger 

demonstrations and poor performances at the ballot box for their 

respective coalitions in the 2021 midterms.

At the executive level, the main threat to stability in 2021 will be 

along the Pacific coastline of South America. Protests were already 

ticking up well before the pandemic hit, indicating heavy public disillusionment with elected officials embroiled in serious corruption 

scandals. Chile, Ecuador, and Peru all experienced extended social 

unrest and political instability in 2019 and 2020, which threatened or 

succeeded in toppling the governments. Chile and Peru have seen the 

most unstable cabinets in a generation, and the ministerial revolving 

doors have all but eliminated the effective implementation of government policies. Governments from Santiago to Quito remain on 

the back foot as the pandemic has further eroded public support for 

high-profile presidents and emboldened legislatures and other institutions to challenge these executives. In Peru, the legislative branch 

forced a change in the executive in November 2020, which triggered 

mass mobilizations that caused another change in government. 
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Verisk Maplecroft’s Political Stability Index identifies the most significant risk of further deterioration in Peru, where the revolving political door has seen three presidents serving since the election in 2016. 

That year, Peru experienced the most challenging election and transition since the country’s return to democracy. The Index projects, with 

a 75.9 percent probability, that the country’s stability score will worsen 

during the next two years. The collapse of traditional national parties 

under the weight of corruption scandals has created a fragmented 

political scene that resulted in a wide-open and unpredictable second 

round runoff between far-right and far-left candidates. Peru’s glut of 

small populist regional parties have benefitted from the economic crisis 

and social discontent, with each gaining solid support. Although Peruvians traditionally place a very high value on macroeconomic stability 

at the ballot box, the 2021 presidential contest could propel an untested 

radical newcomer—rather than the typical moderate—over the line.

In Ecuador, the outcome has been only marginally better, and 

political stability will be on a knife-edge during the next two years. 

The presidential election pit the radical left against the traditional 

right, with the latter returned to office after 15 years in opposition. 

And although the more business friendly candidate, Guillermo Lasso, 

emerged victorious, the unicameral National Assembly will remain 

very polarized, threatening to derail policy implementation. The 

return of the government’s traditional right means policy continuity 

with the pro-business reforms of the outgoing President, center-left 

Lenin Moreno. However, it also means a continuation of the current 

International Monetary Fund-supported austerity program and public 

sector reform agenda. In the context of a very depressed economy and 

a restive, potentially uncooperative National Assembly, this intensifies 

the risk of widespread popular discontent under a new government.

Last, Chile is caught up in an electoral Iron Man race that will 

see voters heading to the ballot box no less than four times in 2021 

to vote on constitutional reform and municipal and general elections. 

With Chile’s Political Stability Index score having already deteriorated 
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Latin America: Political Instability Gives Organized Crime a Window

dramatically after the 2019 unrest, Verisk Maplecroft’s current forecast sees a 47.9 percent risk of further deterioration in the next two 

years.10 It is not clear that the constitutional reform process, launched 

in response to the 2019 crisis, will fully resolve the demands of Chile’s 

restive population. With this reform process running concurrently 

with the local and general election calendar, Chile is at elevated risk of 

further outbreaks of social unrest during 2021, which promises to be 

another politically heated year for the country. The country’s political 

class has no ‘Plan B’ to address public demands. If the constitutional 

reform process fails to meet expectations, the two traditional political 

coalitions, which have alternated in power since the return to democracy in 1990, would be further discredited. In this scenario, an outsider 

candidate in 2021 could represent an attractive break with the status 

quo for many voters, potentially hindering Chile’s ability to recover the 

policy stability that has characterised the country for decades.

Organized Crime Will Seek To Fill the Shoes of Discredited Elites

As Latin American populations grow increasingly disillusioned with 

political leaders at both the local and national levels, political instability risks will rise, and the widespread backlash against government 

authorities will provide opportunities for criminal groups to infiltrate the political system and to control territory, production, and 

distribution networks. The pandemic had an unexpected impact on 

the profitability of DTO activity. The containment measures implemented across the region included border closures and enhanced 

screenings by transit and customs authorities, severely disrupting the 

licit supply chains that drug traffickers rely on to ship narcotics. The 

resulting decrease in drug supply caused street prices to rise, which, in 

turn, triggered a spike in violent competition within local consumer 

markets that fuelled preexisting turf wars.11 For example, despite a 

general fall in common criminality, homicides in Mexico remained 

stable in 2020 in part because of DTO competition in central and 
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northwestern Mexico. Colombia experienced a significant increase 

in mass killings in September and October, especially in the south, 

where DTOs and other nonstate armed groups battle for control of 

the production and transshipment of cocaine.12  

The changing drug trafficking patterns complicate law enforcement, suggesting the problem of more diversified methods will long 

outlast the pandemic. Disruption has forced DTOs to use more 

sophisticated transshipment methods, as the pandemic disruption 

coincided with a decrease in the supply of chemical precursors needed 

to produce synthetic drugs. DTOs have responded by expanding 

their presence in maritime routes, which enabled them to respond to 

increased demand from the United States and maintain profits.

DTOs and smaller criminal organizations have capitalized on 

the pandemic to tighten territorial control and capture the state’s 

role. The pandemic provided an opportunity to broaden a strategy 

already used in remote rural areas. Indeed, criminal groups violently 

enforced lockdown measures and provided relief to communities. In 

Mexico, for instance, the Jalisco Nueva Generación Cartel, Los Viagras, the Gulf Cartel, and the Sinaloa Cartel delivered branded packages of food and personal protective equipment.13

Tackling Poverty and Inequality Key to Defusing Criminal Expansion

The COVID-19 crisis hit the Americas at a time when social tension 

was already building. The unrest that erupted in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Ecuador in 2019 and early 2020 

remained at high levels in many countries during 2020. Peru joined 

the list of the jurisdictions where protests included fatalities and allegations of human rights violations by the security forces. Albeit less 

disruptive, demonstrations also remained at 2019 levels in Brazil and 

increased in Argentina and Mexico. The pandemic’s impact—and that 

of the response strategies that have accompanied it—have only made 

the social discontent underlying this unrest all the worse.
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Latin America: Political Instability Gives Organized Crime a Window

The Recovery Capacity Index shows that Latin America is the 

world’s least economically dynamic region after Africa, constraining 

the region’s ability to rebound. Most countries are highly dependent 

on primary commodity exports. Weaker global demand and the 

pandemic-related disruption to local and international supply chains 

have heavily damaged these exports, which have dropped sharply 

across the board.

Given all of this, the pandemic threatens to reverse a decade or 

more of gains against poverty. In most countries, unemployment 

has spiked, pushing more people into informal jobs and outside the 

social safety net. The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that the average unemployment rate in Latin America, which 

it put at 8.1 percent at the beginning of 2020, could increase by as 

much as five percentage points by year-end.14 This is a conservative 

estimate, considering that unemployment levels have already reached 

much higher rates in several countries. In Colombia, for instance, 

unemployment in May 2020 had reached 21.4 percent, more than 

double the 10.5 percent in May 2019. Although the rate had since 

come down to 14.7 percent in October 2020, that is still four percentage points above the 2019 rate.15 The second wave of COVID-19 is 

proving devastating for slowly recovering employment. 

Although exacerbated by COVID-19 and its inflicted economic 

malaise, protests continue to be primarily driven by domestic structural issues, such as socioeconomic inequality, the rising cost of living, and the rise in nativism and populism. Indeed, 2020 is unlikely 

to be an outlier—but rather a harbinger of things to come, not just 

within the next two years but also for much of the coming decade. 

In the most vulnerable countries, the ranks of protesters marching against longstanding grievances are likely to continue to swell, 

with millions of newly unemployed, underpaid, and underfed citizens posing a risk to domestic stability, a scenario with few parallels 

in recent decades. Organized criminal groups in the region will seek 

to exploit this situation as an opportunity to increase their power by 
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expanding recruitment and seeking to co-opt the political system at 

the local level and influence national politics. 

The pandemic has opened opportunities to deepen and expand 

illicit activities, which are likely to lead to stronger, localized criminal 

cells. This will sustain high levels of violence and increase common 

criminality, particularly in vulnerable communities. The pandemic’s 

economic fallout is likely to bolster the role of organized crime as the 

employment needs of remote localities increase. The decline of living 

standards in rural areas will increase the availability of recruits for 

organized crime groups. The strong presence of criminal organizations will increase violence around common crimes.

During the next two years, governments in Latin America will 

need to ensure continued support, through economic growth and 

formal employment, to vulnerable communities. Failure to do so 

will exacerbate popular discontent with political elites, undermining political stability and increasing the risk of ‘outsider’ candidates 

seizing power. Across the region, local gangs, drug trafficking, and 

organized crime groups would have the opportunity to grow stronger. The depressed economic and political landscape would open a 

two-track opportunity to increase operational capacity, territorial 

control, and formal institutions’ capture. Law-abiding citizens taking to the streets to denounce political elites’ failure to meet their 

needs may find the result is not what they bargained for. 

About the Author

∂Jimena Blanco leads Verisk Maplecroft’s Americas research team 

and is its expert on Brazil and the Southern Cone. She provides 

advice to multinational companies and multilateral institutions on 

political risk in Latin America and has conducted Human Rights 

Impact Assessments for extractive companies. She participates in 
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Latin America: Political Instability Gives Organized Crime a Window

diplomatic, academic, and business forums, addressing regional and 

country-specific concerns and regularly contributes to major television, radio, and print outlets. Previously, Ms. Blanco edited several 

publications at Latin News and wrote extensively on Latin America, 

covering political, economic, and security issues. She contributed 

to the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ special dossier, 

“The Farc Files: Ecuador, Venezuela and the Secret Archive of ‘Raúl 

Reyes.” She studied history and political science at Randolph-Macon 

Woman’s College and obtained a master’s degree in Latin American 

Studies from the Institute for the Study of the Americas, University 

of London. 

Endnotes

1 “Latest World Economic Outlook Growth Projections,” International Monetary 

Fund, World Economic Outlook, October 2020, accessed December 1, 2020, 

https://www.imf.org/-/media/Images/IMF/Publications/WEO/2020/October/

English/weo-map-oct-20-social-eng.ashx.

2 Verisk Maplecroft, Recovery Capacity Index, accessed December 1, 2020, 

https://www.maplecroft.com/. 

3 “Social Panorama of Latin America 2019,” United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), December 2019, 

accessed December 1, 2020, https://www.cepal.org/en/publications/44989-

social-panorama-latin-america-2019. 

4 Verisk Maplecroft, Crime Index, accessed December 1, 2020, https://www.

maplecroft.com/. 

5 World Drug Report 2020, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, accessed 

December 1, 2020, https://wdr.unodc.org/wdr2020/.

6 Verisk Maplecroft, Civil Unrest Index Projections, accessed December 22, 2020, 

https://www.maplecroft.com/.

7 Verisk Maplecroft, Political Stability Index Projections, accessed December 22, 

2020, https://www.maplecroft.com/.

8 Consulta Mitofsky, “#AMLOTrackingPoll Aprobación de AMLO, 23 de noviembre,” El Economista, accessed December 1, 2020, https://www.eleconomista.

com.mx/politica/AMLOTrackingPoll-Aprobacion-de-AMLO-23-de--noviem

bre-20201123-0018.html.
140

A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

9 Management and Fit, Infobae, “Mas del 50 percent de los argentinos desaprueban la gestión de Alberto Fernández y crece la imagen positiva de Horacio Rodríguez Larreta,” accessed December 3, 2020, https://www.infobae.com/

politica/2020/11/22/mas-del-50-de-los-argentinos-desaprueba-la-gestion-dealberto-fernandez-y-crece-la-imagen-positiva-de-horacio-rodriguez-larreta/. 

10 Verisk Maplecroft, Political Stability Index Projections, accessed December 22, 

2020, https://www.maplecroft.com/.

11 “Covid-19 Causes Some Illegal Drug Prices To Surge, as Supplies Were Disrupted Worldwide,” UN News, May 7, 2020, https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/

05/1063512.

12 “Colombia Sees Surge in Mass Killings in 2020: UN,” Al Jazeera, October 2, 2020, 

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/2/colombia-sees-surge-in-masskillings-in-2020-un#:~:text=The%20United%20Nations%20reports%20a,

American%20country%20in%20recent%20months.&text=Colombia%20

has%20recorded%20at%20least,the%20United%20Nations%20has%20said. 

13 “Narcos Aprovechan coronavirus en México para repartir despensas y pelear 

territorio,” Infobae, April 20, 2020, https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/

2020/04/20/narcos-aprovechan-coronavirus-en-mexico-para-repartir-despensasy-pelear-territorio/.

14 “Sharp Rise in Unemployment in Latin America and the Caribbean Leaves 

Millions Without Income,” International Labor Organisation, International 

Labour Organization, July 1, 2020, https://www.ilo.org/caribbean/news

room/WCMS_749692/lang--en/index.htm#:~:text=of%20COVID%2D19-

,ILO%3A%20Sharp%20rise%20in%20unemployment%20in%20Latin%20

America%20and%20the,record%20of%2041%20million%20people. 

15 “Mercado Laboral, Visor de datos,” Colombia National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE), accessed December 1, 2020, https://sitios.dane.gov.

co/visor-geih/#/visor.
141

ISLAMIC STATE RESURGENCE 

IN THE ERA OF COVID-19

Stacey Pollard, Henry Baraket, 

Girish Ganesan, and Natalie Kim

One year after U.S.-led coalition operations liberated ISIS-held territories in Iraq and Syria and killed ISIS-core leader Abu Bakr 

al-Baghdadi, ISIS is resurging. Taking a page from its old playbook, 

the organization is capitalizing on social unrest and a rapidly deteriorating security environment—exacerbated by the COVID-19 

pandemic—to reconstitute in permissive areas of Iraq and Syria. 

This chapter examines ISIS’s pandemic-era ground and information 

operations through the lens of its state- and nation-making efforts to 

help analysts and decisionmakers better understand the imminence 

and scope of the threat. We find that ISIS is rapidly overcoming U.S.-

supported counterterrorism gains and, without direct pressure to 

reverse these advances, ISIS is poised for recovery. 

Background: Analytic Oversight and the 2014 Ascent of ISIS

In June 2014, U.S. and partner intelligence and national security 

strategists were taken by strategic surprise when ISIS exploited state 

and nation failures in Iraq and Syria to establish the so-called Islamic 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

Caliphate. This area, which stretched for more than 280,000 square 

kilometers from Aleppo, Syria, to Diyala, Iraq, was home to more 

than 10 million people.1

 Although the deterioration of the operational environments in Iraq and Syria had previously raised analytic 

concerns about the fragility of and failure to rebuild these countries, 

analysts missed the opportunities these conditions provided a violent extremist organization (VEO) with transnational state-making 

and nation-making ambitions.2

 That is, in contrast to the ambitions 

of traditional insurgent groups, which aimed to simply disrupt or 

overthrow an established government and win over local populations through state- and nation-building, ISIS’s intent was to attempt 

nation-state making by redrawing territorial boundaries and reinventing national identities.3

The swift ascent of ISIS during the summer of 2014 can be 

attributed to the organization’s ability to accomplish what no other 

Sunni insurgent group had—the establishment of an Islamic state 

rooted in a defensible territory that transcended internationally recognized state borders.4

 Unlike the Taliban, which conquered and 

established a primitive military-religious emirate, or al-Qaida, which 

managed its global terror franchise network from safe havens in Sudan, 

Afghanistan, and Pakistan, ISIS built a transnational proto-state that 

supplanted the region’s state system and performed all of the roles of 

a nation-state despite lacking international recognition and access to 

legitimate economies.5

 By exploiting conditions of state collapse in 

Iraq and Syria, ISIS created a new state and nation from the ashes of 

old ones.6

 This unforeseen development made ISIS the most resilient 

and formidable insurgent force operating in Iraq and Syria and arguably within the largely Salafi-jihadi world.7

Leading researchers’ analysis of artifacts from the organization’s 

2014-era state- and nation-making project reveals ISIS’s comprehensive approach to becoming a full-fledged state. That state had a military apparatus conducting kinetic and nonkinetic operations and 

an institutionalized—albeit ruthless and totalitarian—government 
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Islamic State Resurgence in the Era of COVID-19

overseeing taxation, a petroleum based economy, a health care system, social services, and a rigid, ISIS ideology-indoctrinating education curriculum.8, 9, 10 In 2015, the U.S. Congressional Research 

Service reported that ISIS had a $2 billion budget which it used 

to pay for military operations, salaries, infrastructure repairs, and 

social services.11

DEFINITIONS:

State failure occurs when a government fails to deliver political goods 

to citizens on a scale that undermines the legitimacy and existence 

of the state. These political goods include security, a legal system 

to adjudicate disputes, provision of economic and communication 

infrastructures, some form of social services, and opportunities to 

participate in the political process.12

Nation failure occurs when cultural projections of nationhood are no 

longer convincing and the population lacks consensus on cultural traditions, customs, symbols, rituals, and historical experiences, which 

allows competing, often mutually exclusive, nationalisms to emerge 

that seek to replace the former common identity.13

ISIS’s Model for Nation-state Making

According to counterterrorism scholars, the ground and information 

operations ISIS undertook to create its nation-state entailed capturing and defending territory; extracting revenue to finance its institutions and war efforts; building systems of government to sustain 

these gains; and cultivating a shared sense of citizenship within this 

establishment.14, 15 The literature indicates the most crucial initial 

aspect of nation-state making is the task of capturing and defending 

territory and then exercising a monopoly of force in that area. ISIS’s 

ability to monopolize force depends on four interrelated factors: the 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

permissive regional environment; organizational prowess (gained as 

a result of military competition); strategic selection of targets (both 

territorial and political); and ideological uniformity and motivation.16

Horizon Scan: ISIS’s Prospects for Recapturing Territory 

and Reclaiming a National Identity

In 2019, the U.S. Operation INHERENT RESOLVE-led coalition significantly degraded ISIS’s military capabilities and liberated former ISISheld territories in Iraq and Syria, dismantling the physical caliphate, 

minimizing its ability to extract revenue, and eliminating its system of 

government. However, the transnational organization, although decentralized and globally dispersed, is loyal to new ISIS-core leader, Abu 

Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, and the caliphate’s national identity 

remains intact. This study considers prospects for ISIS to reclaim territory in Iraq and Syria and restore its national identity within established 

borders. We weigh pandemic-era conditions in Iraq and Syria and current ISIS ground and information operations against the criteria necessary for ISIS to regain a monopoly of force to help analysts and decision 

makers better understand the imminence and scope of the threat. These 

criteria include a permissive regional environment; organizational 

prowess; strategic selection of targets; and ideological uniformity and 

motivation—adding to the last the reassertion of shared citizenship. 

Permissive Conditions: Insecurity Exacerbated 

by Pandemic in Iraq and Syria

Pandemic-accelerated U.S. and coalition drawdowns and diversions of forces are creating security vacuums in Iraq and Syria. Iraq’s 

fractured security forces are overwhelmed by popular unrest, Iranian attacks against the United States and U.S. targets in Iraq, and 

clashes between Iranian-backed militias and Iraqi forces. In Syria, 

the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Defense Forces (SDF), backed by the 
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Islamic State Resurgence in the Era of COVID-19

U.S.-led coalition, are beset by Turkish incursions in the north and are 

battling regime-affiliated and violent extremist challengers Syria-wide. 

As a result, they are struggling in some areas to provide security to 

local populations belonging to other ethnic and sectarian groups that 

dispute the SDF’s legitimacy.

Iraq: A Disintegrating Social Contract

Iraq’s early attempts to contain COVID-19 failed largely because Iraqi 

disillusionment with the government made it difficult to implement 

and enforce protocols.17 As a result, Iraq has had more than 500,000 

cases and 12,411 deaths, although these numbers and their context 

are difficult to confirm because the Iraqi government forbids medical 

personnel from publicly discussing the situation.18

October 1, 2019, marked the start of a massive Iraqi resistance 

movement led predominantly by young Shia men demanding better 

employment opportunities, increased essential services, accountability 

for state security forces, and an end to political corruption influenced 

by foreign powers, especially Iran.19 The protesters have denounced the 

country’s sectarian divides and enjoyed broad, pan-sectarian support 

across Iraq.20 Unarmed, they have waved Iraqi flags and called for a 

united and nonsectarian Iraq, in contrast to elements of the Iraqi security forces that exacerbate sectarian divides and fly the flags of poorly 

regulated, often Iranian-linked militia groups.21 Violent clashes between 

Iraqi security forces and protestors have prompted demonstrators to 

see the Iraqi forces as an extension of the corrupt government.22

Declining oil prices and pandemic-associated economic losses 

are crippling the economy, throwing millions of Iraqis into poverty. 

The World Bank estimates the incomes of 5.5 million more Iraqis 

now fall below the poverty line as both crises continue.23 The United 

Nations estimates roughly 300,000 people live in crowded camps 

without access to healthcare—risking a severe COVID-19 outbreak 

and humanitarian crisis.24 These abysmal conditions are intensifying distrust between the Iraqi people and Prime Minister Mustafa 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

Al-Kadhimi’s newly formed government, further eroding the country’s already disintegrating social contract. 

Syria: Unprepared for COVID-19 Challenges 

The number of COVID-19 cases and deaths in Syria is unknown 

because the government requires all information to be channeled 

through the Ministry of Health, which the government tightly controls. However, on October 8, 2020, Syria Relief, the UK-based Syrian advocacy NGO, citing independently gathered data, declared 

COVID-19 an emergency in Syria. Syria Relief ’s Head of Advocacy, 

Charles Lawley, called on the international community to provide aid. 

The destruction of hospitals and medical facilities during Syria’s civil war has depleted the medical infrastructure and equipment 

needed to cope with the pandemic. Approximately 40 percent of Syria’s healthcare facilities have been destroyed, and roughly two million 

displaced people live in overcrowded camps25 where self-isolation 

is nearly impossible and proper sanitation and hygiene are hard to 

maintain. The risk of an outbreak is high, and the camps lack the 

healthcare capacity to manage the virus and treat patients.26

Syria is unprepared to cope with the challenges of the pandemic, 

and President Bashar al-Assad is not receiving his usual assistance 

from Iran, Russia, and China. The ten shipments of aid received collectively from China and Russia have provided Syria with only a fraction 

of what it needs.27 Instead, Syria has relied on aid from oil-rich nations 

such as Kuwait, which donated $4 million to UNICEF’s COVID-19 

response in Syria in mid-November.28 Measures adopted in March 

to hinder the spread of the virus created economic turmoil and civil 

unrest. Food prices sky-rocketed, and people with the means began 

panic buying. The value of the Syrian pound dropped while the cost 

of living increased beyond 100 percent.29 At a time when the monthly 

median state salary in Syria equals only $97, masks cost nearly $4, hand 

sanitizer is almost $6, and oxygen cylinders can cost nearly $300.30 The 

economic crisis is creating animosity toward the government even in 
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Islamic State Resurgence in the Era of COVID-19

regime strongholds like Damascus, where rare civilian protests are 

taking place. Syrian people are also finding ways to get around Syria’s 

restricted information environment by airing their grievances with 

the government’s handling of the crisis on social media. 

COMPARING PERMISSIVE CONDITIONS

2014 Era

ISIS evolved from its progenitor 

organization the Islamic State of 

Iraq (ISI) by capitalizing on postArab Spring regional destabilization, insecurity stemming from 

the U.S. military withdrawal from 

Iraq, and spillover effects of the 

Syrian civil war.

• The sectarian conflict 

between Sunni and Shia 

groupings in Iraq allowed 

ISIS to offer an alternative 

to the increasingly Shia 

dominated government. 

• As the uprisings across the 

Arab world erupted, ISIS 

infiltrated Syria, exploiting 

longstanding animosities 

between the Sunni majority and President Assad’s 

repressive Shia-Alawite 

minority regime and offering stability relative to the 

chaos of the Civil War.

COVID-19

The spread of COVID-19 has 

allowed ISIS to exploit insecurity, 

weak governance, and social 

unrest in Iraq and Syria.

• The Iraqi Security Force’s 

violent reaction to Iraqi 

protestors demonstrating 

against Iranian influence 

is aggravating sectarian 

tension.

• Pandemic-associated 

security vacuums and the 

fraying social fabric in both 

countries allow ISIS to move 

between western Iraq and 

central Syria and restore 

access to critical infrastructure and networks. 

• ISIS is increasing kinetic 

attacks and information 

operations to exacerbate 

ethno-sectarianism, discredit both governments, 

and hasten Iraqi and Syrian 

state and nation failure. 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

ISIS Ground Operations To Reclaim Caliphate 

In August, the United Nations estimated approximately 10,000 active 

ISIS militants were operating in Iraq and Syria, a level equivalent to 

2012 and roughly a third of their estimated 31,500 presence in 2014.31, 32

Although ISIS has lost its monopoly of force in areas it once held, fighters 

are hunkered down and regrouping in Iraq’s north-central region along 

a rugged, rural belt stretching across the provinces of Kirkuk, Salahudidin, and Diyala—including territories in dispute between Baghdad 

and the Kurdish Regional Government.33 The COVID-19-associated 

suspension of Iraqi and SDF patrols and intelligence collection in former ISIS hotspots in western Iraq and central Syria is allowing ISIS to 

reinfiltrate old stomping grounds where disaffection with government 

and U.S.-supported forces is growing.34

Figure 1. Dramatic Rise in Attacks Claimed by ISIS in Iraq

Attacks claimed by IS in Iraq in 2020

January February March April

Source: Islamic State propaganda 

90

100

110

120

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Source: BBC Monitoring, based on data gathered from IS media outlets. Mina al-Lami, “Jihadists See COVID-19 as an Opportunity,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology, June 2020, 

https://gnet-research.org/2020/06/01/jihadists-see-covid-19-as-an-opportunity/.
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Islamic State Resurgence in the Era of COVID-19

Over-burdened security forces in both countries and the 

November 2020 reopening of the Iraq-Syria border allow ISIS to 

move more freely and reengage in illicit cross-border activity, carry 

out more sophisticated attacks, conduct prison breaks, and negotiate 

the release of ISIS fighters and families from prisons.35 The increase 

in ISIS attacks in Iraq and Syria since the pandemic began demonstrates the organization’s commitment to hastening instability to 

advance its objectives.36

Figure 1 shows a dramatic spike in guerilla-style ISIS IED detonations from about 40 in January 2020 to more than 110 in April 

2020 under ISIS’s declared “battle of attrition” against Iraqi security 

forces.37 Among these were waves of seven IEDs detonated simultaneously on February 22 and March 12 near military and police 

installations, intensifying pressure on Iraqi security forces.38, 39

During Ramadan, between late April and late May 2020, ISIS claimed 

responsibility for at least 269 attacks in Iraq, including shootings, 

raids, ambushes of security forces, roadside bombs, and killing of 

informants. In August 2020, ISIS fighters crossed into Syria and 

killed four members of the SDF.40

Figure 2 shows that beginning in March 2020, ISIS attacks in 

Aleppo, Deir Ez Zor, Hama, Homs, and Raqqa have doubled or 

more since 2019.41 In early March, ISIS and pro-regime Syrian forces 

clashed over control of a road connecting Raqqa to Homs province. 

Homs has had the greatest number of ISIS attacks since the summer of 2020; just in November these attacked included the gruesome slaying of 10 shepherds and the burning of their camp, the 

capture of a large Syrian Arab Army outpost, and an attack on a joint 

Syrian-Russian station.42 Perhaps most significantly, overwhelmed 

SDF units in mid-November 2020 released ISIS leaders and families from Syria’s overcrowded prisons, including former ISIS leader 

of public relations, Abd al-Hamid al-Dairi; 515 ISIS family members without tribal guarantees to prevent them from rejoining ISIS; 

and 23 former ISIS fighters under tribal guarantees.43 From early 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

to mid-December 2020, ISIS assassinated a Syrian mayor, killed 

at least 29 pro-Syrian regime fighters, and injured 25 more across 

Deir ez-Zour, Hama, and Homs provinces, demonstrating resurgent organizational prowess and increasingly sophisticated attacks 

against opponent forces and territorial targets.

Figure 2. Dramatic Rise in Attacks Claimed by ISIS in Syri

January

February

March

April

May

June

July

August

September

October

November

January

February

March

April

May

June

July

August

September

October

December

November

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

Number of ISIS Attacks by Province

Number of attacks in Deir EZ Zor Number of attacks in Homs Number of attacks in Raqqa

Number of attacks in Hama Number of attacks in SE Aleppo

Source: Gregory Waters, “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency in November 2020,” December 1, 

2020, https://www.counterextremism.com/blog/isis-redux-central-syria-insurgency-november-2020.

ISIS Information Operations To Restore ISIS National Identity 

The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic has revived ISIS-core information operations as the organization attempts to capitalize on 

deteriorating conditions to advance its nation-rebuilding ambitions. 

ISIS is using insurgent operators and various media platforms to 

amplify pandemic-exacerbated insecurity in Iraq and Syria; erode 

Iraqi’s and Syrian’s sense of citizenship; galvanize ideological uniformity and motivation among its ranks; and reclaim ISIS national 
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Islamic State Resurgence in the Era of COVID-19

identity. These operations—consisting of word-of-mouth influence 

activities, propaganda material, social media campaigns, and ISIS 

publications—promote and reinvigorate existing ISIS narratives, 

which are experiencing increased power and currency as a result of 

the pandemic’s erosion of material, political, and ideological conditions in the region, while also renewing a commitment to action 

among its followers. ISIS online recruitment has also been reenergized, emphasizing an increased sense of urgency, and the group 

is well-funded, with reserves estimated at between $50 million and 

$300 million.44

Reinforcing and Advancing Ideological Narratives

ISIS’s narration of the unfolding pandemic has been consistent with 

the group’s broader ideological underpinnings. ISIS labeled the 

COVID-19 outbreak “God’s wrath” as early as February 2020, when 

an editorial in Issue #220 of the Islamic State newspaper Al-Naba 

sought to provide a divine explanation for the virus.45, 46 Around that 

time, the publication also claimed that the virus originated from 

China’s mistreatment of its Uyghur Muslim population and that 

Iran’s outbreak was an exemplary punishment from God for Shia 

Muslim idolatry.47

Notably, ISIS has developed its usual “divine wrath” narrative 

that claims its enemies—including the Iraqi and Syrian governments, 

the United States, and other Western countries—are vulnerable and 

weak.48 For instance, an editorial titled “The Crusaders’ Worst Nightmare” in Issue #227 of Al-Naba describes Western countries as fearful 

ISIS’s fighters will escalate their military operations against the West’s 

apostate helpers in Muslim countries or repeat past terror attacks 

when these countries’ security and medical institutions have reached 

the limits of their capacity in some areas.49, 50 The editorial describes 

the West as incapable of handling new burdens as it struggles to care 

for its populations and mitigate economic recession, claiming that 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

during this time the “Crusader” powers cannot coordinate with their 

allies and fear that other enemies—presumably Russia and China—

could realize gains at their collective expense.51, 52

Open Calls to Action

Despite some operational challenges and mobility restrictions resulting from the pandemic, ISIS remains committed to tangible action, 

unlike other extremist groups who have focused on idealist messaging 

and gaining popular support.53 Although ISIS has advised travel cautions to avoid contracting the virus, various media outlets have used 

COVID-19 as a rallying cry, urging followers to attack security forces, 

work toward the release of detainees, and make financial contributions. For example, the “Crusaders” editorial implored ISIS supporters to liberate Muslim captives from prisons and camps and show no 

mercy to the “infidels” and “apostates” in their moment of crisis, but 

instead to attack and weaken them to render them less able to harm 

Muslims. The editorial also asks supporters to bear in mind that the 

calamity befalling the West and its allies will soon prevent them from 

resisting ISIS’s resurgence. The editorial ends by reminding readers 

that the best way to avoid God’s punishment—including coronavirus—is through obedience to Him, and that the act of obedience most 

beloved to God is “jihad” and “inflicting pain on His enemies.”54, 55

These directives have exacerbated security threats, particularly in 

SDF-controlled camps and prisons where COVID-19 adds urgency 

to the situation. Detainees in camps housing thousands of ISIS families have turned to online messaging and social media platforms 

to share grievances and openly call for support, as was the case in 

al-Hawl camp, where social media campaigns were launched to raise 

money for the families of detainees.56 ISIS operators are also reaching 

into camps, prisons, and other deteriorating areas, taking advantage 

of instability caused by the pandemic to seek out vulnerable recruits 

and reindoctrinate former followers.57
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Islamic State Resurgence in the Era of COVID-19

ISIS State- and Nation-making in the COVID-19 Era

Although still in the nascent stages of resurgence, ISIS appears to be 

poised for recovery given the release of ISIS leaders, fighters, and families from camps and prisons; the increasingly permissive conditions in 

Iraq and Syria; and the lack of direct pressure to stop the organization. 

All indications suggest analysts can expect progressively permissive 

conditions; increasingly sophisticated and targeted attacks; an expanding, ideologically unified militant force; and thus, a growing capacity to 

reclaim territory, populations, and resources. In the past, ISIS’s success 

in nation-making was based on dogmatic compliance to its principles, 

adhering to the notions of religious imperative and divine inevitability.58 ISIS media’s framing of COVID-19 as “divine punishment” builds 

on this established national identity, and the organization is likely to 

reap the ideological gains. By portraying enemy nations as weak and 

vulnerable, ISIS may be able to energize its followers, posing security 

threats now and in the future.59 Furthermore, the calls to action in SDFrun camps serve to unite followers under a common cause, “cultivating 

a shared sense of citizenship within this establishment.”60

In addition to reclaiming its national identity, ISIS has the potential to bolster its real and perceived state-making capacity through 

numerous competitive advantages brought to light by the virus. Crucial to ISIS’s ascent in the region were the state failures of Iraq and 

Syria, and ISIS media’s portrayal of COVID-19 now exposes many of 

the same economic, social, and sectarian crises that originally led to 

the group’s rise to power. The influx of media surrounding the situation of ISIS detainees also “underscores the narrative that coalition 

forces are not focused on or able to take care of the people.”61 Such 

narratives provide powerful mechanisms for furthering ISIS’s political foothold in the region.

Although ISIS’s current approach to nation- and state-making 

is similar to its previous efforts, the effects of COVID-19 deepen the 

grievances on which the organization’s influence depends.62 Experts 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

also postulate that the deleterious psychological effects of the pandemic, 

such as increased isolation and feelings of uncertainty, may create circumstances especially amenable to ideological radicalization—potentially enhancing ISIS’s appeal and broadening the caliphate’s citizenry.

∂ 63

About the Authors

Dr. Stacey Pollard is the director of the Ann Caracristi Institute for 

Intelligence Research and Center for Designing Intelligence Research 

at National Intelligence University. She specializes in conflict and 

instability in the Middle East and North Africa and has extensive 

field research experience in Iraq and Syria.

Henry Baraket is pursuing an M.S. in national security studies at 

New Jersey City University, with interests in research, political philosophy, and advancing liberty. He has lived in the Middle East, where 

he earned a B.A. in political science and international affairs. Girish 

Ganesan, a Rutgers University sophomore majoring in computer 

science and mathematics, is interested in applying quantitative and 

statistical techniques to natural and social sciences problems. Natalie 

Kim, a senior at Rutgers University majoring in electrical engineering and mathematics, is interested in applying quantitative and technological tools to problems in the social sciences.

Endnotes

1 Cameron Glen et al., “Timeline: The Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic 

State,” Wilson Center, October 28, 2019, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/

timeline-rise-and-spread-the-islamic-state.

2 Stacey E. Pollard, David Poplack, and Kevin Casey, “Understanding the Islamic 

State’s Competitive Advantages: Remaking State and Nationhood in the Middle East and North Africa,” Terrorism and Political Violence (2015): 1045-1065, 
155

Islamic State Resurgence in the Era of COVID-19

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2015.1108310

?journalCode=ftpv20.

3 Pollard, Poplack, and Casey, “Understanding the Islamic State’s Competitive 

Advantages.”

4 Pollard, Poplack, and Casey, “Understanding the Islamic State’s Competitive 

Advantages.”

5 Pollard, Poplack, and Casey, “Understanding the Islamic State’s Competitive 

Advantages.”

6 Pollard, Poplack, and Casey, “Understanding the Islamic State’s Competitive 

Advantages.”

7 Pollard, Poplack, and Casey, “Understanding the Islamic State’s Competitive 

Advantages.”

8 Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, “Archive of Islamic State Administrative Documents,” 

Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi (blog on pundicity.com), January 27, 2015, http://www.

aymennjawad.org/2015/01/archive-of-islamic- state-administrative-documents. 

9 Charles Lister, “Profiling the Islamic State,” Brookings Institution, November 

2014.

10 Researchers such as Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, Shadi Hamid, Kenneth Pollack, 

Charles Lister, and Graeme Wood (among many others) have published prolifically on the Islamic State.

11 Carla E. Humud, Robert Pirog, and Liana Rosen, “Islamic State Financing and 

U.S. Policy Approaches,” Congressional Research Service, 2015.

12 R.I. Rotberg, “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators,” in State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, ed. R. I. Rotberg 

(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003).

13 Armin von Bogdandy et al., “State-Building, Nation-Building, and Constitutional Politics in Post-Conflict Situations: Conceptual Clarifications and an 

Appraisal of Different Approaches,” in Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations 

Law, Volume 9, ed. A. Bogdandy and R. Wolfrum (Leiden, the Netherlands: 

Koninklijke Brill NV, 2005), 579–613. 

14 Pollard, Poplack, and Casey, “Understanding the Islamic State’s Competitive 

Advantages.”

15 This model combines Charles Tilly’s early criteria for state making, in Charles 

Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State 

Back In, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), with his later work on the role of 

nationalism in state making in, “The State of Nationalism,” Critical Review 10 

(1996): 299–306.
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

16 Pollard, Poplack, and Casey, “Understanding the Islamic State’s Competitive 

Advantages.”

17 Abbas Abboud Salem, “Iraq Faces Coronavirus with Empty Coffers and a 

Crumbling Health System,” Washington Institute, August 13, 2020, https://

www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/iraq-coronavirus-corona-covidcovid19-health.

18 “Iraq Has Confirmed Thousands More COVID-19 Cases than Reported, Medics 

Say,” Reuters, April 2, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-corona

virus-iraq/iraq-has-confirmed-thousands-more-covid-19-cases-than-reportedmedics-say-idUSKBN21K2GQ.

19 Katherine Lawlor and Ketti Davison, “Iraq is Fragile, Not Hopeless: How Iraq’s 

Fragility Undermines Regional Stability,” Institute for the Study of War, December 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20is%20

Fragile%2C%20Not%20Hopeless.pdf.

20 Lawlor and Davison, “Iraq is Fragile.”

21 Katherine Lawlor and Brandon Wallace, “Anti-U.S. Protests in Baghdad: 

Interim Summary,” Institute for the Study of War: Blogspot, January 24, 2020, 

iswresearch.blogspot.com/2020/01/anti-us-protests-inbaghdad-interim.

html.

22 Mina al-Lami, “Jihadists See COVID-19 as an Opportunity,” Global Network 

on Extremism & Technology, June 2020, https://gnet-research.org/2020/06/01/

jihadists-see-covid-19-as-an-opportunity/.

23 Ashraf Al-Saeed and Nabeel Darweesh, “COVID-19 and Low Oil Prices Push 

Millions of Iraqis into Poverty,” World Bank, November 11, 2020, https://www.

worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/11/11/new-world-bank-reportcalls-for-urgent-fiscal-stimulus-and-economic-reforms-to-help-the-poor-andthe-most-vulnerable-in-iraq.

24 Andres Gonzalez, “Coronavirus Threatens Iraq with New Humanitarian 

Crisis,” Oxfam International, 2020, https://www.oxfam.org/en/coronavirusthreatens-iraq-new-humanitarian-crisis.

25 “Syria Relief Declare COVID-19 Emergency in Syria—Syrian Arab Republic,” 

ReliefWeb, October 8, 2020, https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/

syria-relief-declare-covid-19-emergency-syria.

26 “COVID-19 in Northwest Syria: Taking Risks Simply to Survive—Syrian 

Arab Republic,” ReliefWeb, November 10, 2020, https://reliefweb.int/report/

syrian-arab-republic/covid-19-northwest-syria-taking-risks-simply-survive.

27 Sarah Dadouch, “Coronavirus Is out of Control in Syria, No Matter What 

the Government Says,” Washington Post, September 25, 2020, https://www
157

Islamic State Resurgence in the Era of COVID-19

.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/syria-coronavirus-outbreak-doctors/

2020/09/24/95d9323a-fcea-11ea-b0e4-350e4e60cc91_story.html.

28 “Kuwait Fund Contributes US $4 Million Supporting UNICEF’s COVID-19 

Response in Syria—Syrian Arab Republic,” ReliefWeb, November 15, 2020, 

https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/kuwait-fund-contributesus4-million-supporting-unicef-s-covid-19.

29 Mehmet Ozalp, “In War-Torn Syria, the Coronavirus Pandemic Has Brought 

Its People to the Brink of Starvation,” The Conversation, September 25, 2020, 

https://theconversation.com/in-war-torn-syria-the-coronavirus-pandemichas-brought-its-people-to-the-brink-of-starvation-144794.

30 Danny Makki, “Syria Is Facing a COVID-19 Catastrophe,” Middle East Institute, November 2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/syria-facing-covid19-catastrophe.

31 Edith M. Lederer, “Over 10,000 Islamic State Fighters Active in Iraq, Syria as 

Attacks ‘Significantly’ Increase: UN,” Associated Press, August 25, 2020, https://

www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2020/08/25/over-10000-islamicstate-fighters-active-in-iraq-syria-as-attacks-significantly-increase-un/.

32 Jim Sciutto, Jamie Crawford, and Chelsea J. Carter, “ISIS Can ‘Muster’ Between 

20,000 and 31,500 Fighters, CIA Says,” CNN, September 12, 2014, https://www.

cnn.com/2014/09/11/world/meast/isis-syria-iraq/index.html.

33 Sam Heller, “When Measuring ISIS’s ‘Resurgence,’ Use the Right Standard,” 

International Crisis Group, May 13, 2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middleeast-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/when-measuring-isiss-resur

gence-use-right-standard.

34 Heller, “When Measuring ISIS’s ‘Resurgence.’”

35 Elizabeth Dent, “US Policy and the Resurgence of ISIS in Iraq and Syria,” Middle East Institute, October 2020. https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/2020-

10/US%20Policy%20and%20the%20Resurgence%20of%20ISIS%20in%20

Iraq%20and%20Syria%20%20.pdf.

36 Dent, “US Policy and the Resurgence of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.”

37 al-Lami, “Jihadists See COVID-19 as an Opportunity.” 

38 Brandon Wallace, “Iraq Situation Report: February 20-25, 2020,” Institute of the 

Study of War, March 2, 2020.

39 Katherine Lawlor and Brandon Wallace, “Iraq Situation Update: March 11-17, 

2020,” Institute for the Study of War, March 20, 2020, www.understandingwar.

org/backgrounder/iraq-situation-update-march-11-17-2020.

40 “Iraq: Extremism & Counter-Extremism,” Counter-Extremism Project, December 1, 2020, https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/iraq.
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41 Gregory Waters, “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency in November 

2020,” December 1, 2020, https://www.counterextremism.com/blog/isis-reduxcentral-syria-insurgency-november-2020.

42 Michael Land and Nada Atieh, “Syria Situation Report: March 4-17, 2020, Institute for the Study of War,” March 20, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/

backgrounder/syria-situation-report-march-4-17-2020.

43 Andrew Greco, “Syria Situation Report: November 11-December 1, 2020,” 

Institute for the Study of War, December 3, 2020, http://www.understand

ingwar.org/backgrounder/syria-situation-report-november-11-december-1-

2020.

44 Sean W. O’Donnell, Stephen Akard, and Ann Calvaresi Barr, Operation Inherent Resolve (Washington: U.S. Federal Government, 2020), 18, https://media.

defense.gov/2020/Aug/04/2002469838/-1/-1/1/LEAD%20INSPECTOR%20

GENERAL%20FOR%20OPERATION%20INHERENT%20RESOLVE%20

APRIL%201,%202020%20-%20JUNE%2030,%202020.PDF.PDF. 

45 Mohamed Mokhtar Qandil, “Terrorism and Coronavirus: Hyperbole, Idealism, and Ignorance,” The Washington Institute, April 28, 2020, https://www.

washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/Terrorism-Extremism-CoronavirusISIS-Al-Qaeda-Resurgence-COVID-19.

46 Al-Naba Newsletter #220, February 26, 2020, https://jihadology.net/2020/02/06/

new-issue-of-the-islamic-states-newsletter-al-naba-220/.

47 Mohamed Mokhtar Qandil, “Terrorism and Coronavirus.”

48 Tova C. Norlen, “The Impact of COVID-19 on Salafi-Jihadi Terrorism,” Connections 19, no. 2, The Security Impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic (2020), 11-24, 

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26937606.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ad4b

2886ef0eedb2d9447af3ca01ba3c9.

49 Al-Naba Newsletter #227, March 26, 2020, https://jihadology.net/wp-content/

uploads/_pda/2020/03/The-Islamic-State-al-Naba%CC%84%E2%80%99-News

letter-227.pdf.

50 “Contending with ISIS in the Time of Coronavirus,” International Crisis 

Group, March 31, 2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/contending-isistime-coronavirus.

51 Al-Naba Newsletter #227. 

52 “Contending with ISIS in the Time of Coronavirus,” International Crisis 

Groups.

53 Qandil, “Terrorism and Coronavirus: Hyperbole, Idealism, and Ignorance.”

54 Al-Naba Newsletter #227.

55 “Contending with ISIS in the Time of Coronavirus,” International Crisis Group.
159

Islamic State Resurgence in the Era of COVID-19

56 “Twenty-sixth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team 

submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), AlQaida and associated individuals and entities,” United Nations Security Council, July 23, 2020, https://undocs.org/S/2020/717.

57 Ilan Berman, “ISIS Is Using the COVID Distraction to Rearm and Regroup,” USA 

Today, August 28, 2020, https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/08/28/

isis-did-not-disappear-and-now-its-poised-rise-again-amidst-instabilitycolumn/5644397002/.

58 Pollard, Poplack, and Casey, “Understanding the Islamic State’s Competitive 

Advantages.”

59 “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism 

and Countering Violent Extremism,” United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, June 2020, https://www.un.org/

sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/CTED-Paper%E2%80%93-The-impactof-the-COVID-19-pandemic-on-counter-terrorism-and-countering-violentextremism.pdf.

60 Pollard, Poplack, and Casey, “Understanding the Islamic State’s Competitive 

Advantages.”

61 Audrey Alexander, “The Security Threat COVID-19 Poses to the Northern Syria 

Detention Camps Holding Islamic State Members,” CTC Sentinel, Special Issue: 

COVID-19 and Counterterrorism 13, no. 6, (June 2020), https://ctc.usma.edu/

the-security-threat-covid-19-poses-to-the-northern-syria-detention-campsholding-islamic-state-members/.

62 “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Terrorism.”

63 Gary Ackerman and Hayley Peterson, “Terrorism and COVID-19: Actual and 

Potential Impacts,” Perspectives on Terrorism 14, no. 3 (June 2020): 59-73.

161

TRANSNATIONAL CRIME DURING 

A PANDEMIC: HOW CRIMINALS 

ARE CAPITALIZING ON THE CHAOS 

CAUSED BY COVID-19

Layla M. Hashemi, Sarah Meo, and Louise Shelley

The COVID-19 pandemic has dramatically escalated criminal activity from violent exploitation of youth to complex financial scams. 

Much of this activity is linked to the increasing dependency on online 

platforms, social media, and cellphones. This chapter examines the 

impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on transnational crimes, including 

human and drug trafficking, environmental and financial crimes, and 

trade in counterfeits. It demonstrates how the COVID-19 crisis poses 

new and unprecedented threats to public health and human security. 

Creative criminals have capitalized on the chaos caused by COVID19 to expand their illicit activities. For example, drug traffickers are 

This research was supported by NSF grant # 1837881, EAGER: ISN: A New MultiLayered Network Approach for Improving the Detection of Human Trafficking and 

NSF grant #2039779, D-ISN: TRACK 1: Collaborative Research: An Interdisciplinary 

Approach to Understanding, Modeling, and Disrupting Drug and Counterfeit Illicit 

Supply Chain.
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

employing new techniques and initiating new trade routes and delivery 

strategies. Online exploitation has grown significantly during the pandemic as young people become victims of child sexual exploitation and 

senior citizens are targeted by financial scammers. Criminals exploit 

timber and other natural resources as these environmental products 

are inadequately protected during COVID-19. The drastic increase in 

the volume of the online activity surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic 

makes it difficult to combat these transnational crimes and requires 

new strategies and tactics.

Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic has been much more than a health crisis. 

In addition to killing millions of the more than 180 million infected 

worldwide,1

 it has caused significant economic and social harm and 

poses new and unprecedented threats to public health and human 

security. The global economy declined more than 4 percent in 2020,2

and international trade by much more. As a result, in October 2020, 

the World Bank predicted “that between 71 million and 100 million 

people will be pushed into extreme poverty this year, erasing almost 

all progress made in the last five years in the fight against extreme 

poverty.”3

 Women have suffered disproportionate harm from the 

pandemic, which has set back economic advances they had made in 

the United States and globally.4, 5 This impoverishment has increased 

human trafficking and sexual exploitation of women, particularly 

online. Social connections also have eroded as many, especially the 

elderly, have become isolated. The increased use of online services 

and communications has been pronounced globally. School closures, 

in particular, have resulted in youth spending more time online, 

making them more vulnerable to recruitment by criminals. 

The challenges of online criminal activity, evident before the 

COVID-19 pandemic, have accelerated in 2020 and 2021. Criminals 

have capitalized on health vulnerabilities, isolation, and economic 
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Transnational Crime During a Pandemic

hardship to make significant profits during this challenging period. 

Massive amounts of fraudulent equipment and medical supplies such 

as counterfeit masks have entered supply chains, which has possibly 

compounded the death rate as individuals are not adequately protected by masks or are treated by personnel with inferior or substandard counterfeit respirators.6, 7 Isolation has increased vulnerability to 

frauds. Scams and the illegal recruitment of money mules and youth 

for child sexual exploitation online have grown during the pandemic.

In addition to pandemic’s impacts on transnational crimes, 

including human and drug trafficking, this chapter will focus on environmental and financial crimes, as well as the trade in counterfeits. 

At the March 2021 United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention 

and Criminal Justice, speakers highlighted the need for continued 

international cooperation in combating cybercrime and environmental crime.8

 Natural resources have been particularly hard hit as 

tourism has declined, reducing a major revenue source in Africa 

and complicating guardianship of forests from illicit timber cutters. 

Many regions have noted a growth in environmental crime and in 

trade in counterfeits, which based on customs seizures had already 

represented more than $500 billion annually in business before the 

pandemic. In 2016, trade in counterfeit and pirated goods was 3.3 

percent of world trade9

 and represented the most significant illicit 

trade component.10

Growth of Online Fraud (COVID-19 Payments) 

As the pandemic has pushed large parts of society onto their phones, 

tablets, and laptops, online fraud has grown rapidly. In its COVID-19 

Cybercrime Analysis Report, INTERPOL noted a sharp rise in online 

scams and cybercrimes, including phishing, disruptive technology, 

data harvesting, malware, malicious domains, and pandemic-related 

misinformation schemes, all of which capitalize on the uncertainty 

of the pandemic.11 Many organizations hastily moved to a “work 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

from home” system without the cybersecurity needed to protect 

their remote working environments, which provided ample opportunity for cybercriminals to obtain sensitive user data.12 Similarly, 

banking Internet technology systems were unequipped to handle the 

public’s newfound dependency on remote banking. Money exchange 

apps allow for fraudulent transactions, the theft of personally identifiable information (PII) through cyberattacks, and human error.13

Populations with less technical experience and capabilities, including 

elderly and low-income individuals, are particularly susceptible to 

these cybercrimes. 

Cybercriminals are using phishing emails and misinformation 

schemes to capitalize on the fear surrounding the pandemic.14 The FBI 

has issued warnings against scam emails that claim to provide information on pandemic-related payments such as stimulus checks, airline carrier refunds, and charitable donations but are actually aimed 

at gaining responders’ PII.15, 16 Cybercriminals operating both on the 

dark and open webs have also used fear of the virus and confusion 

surrounding vaccine distribution in phishing campaigns advertising 

for individuals to personally pay for vaccines or to pay to get on a waiting list for a vaccine. There were also unsubstantiated claims of FDA 

approved vaccines advertised online.17 Fake forms offering vaccines 

have been sent to large organizations and .edu email addresses to steal 

email credentials and intellectual property.18 Similarly, criminals are 

conducting fraudulent phone scams to gather PII from the growing 

pool of teleworkers and exploit an increasingly isolated population.19

Cybercriminals worldwide are also using malicious domains that 

masquerade as authoritative bodies, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), to fool 

users, often in conjunction with disruptive malware.20 INTERPOL 

reported a dramatic increase in the registration of malicious domains 

using keywords such as “COVID” and “Corona,” with a large portion 

of these newly registered domains claiming to provide COVID-19 

updates and statistics.21 A corporate partner of INTERPOL “detected 
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Transnational Crime During a Pandemic

a 569 percent growth in malicious registrations” between February 

and March 2020.22 An article in the Journal of the American Medical 

Association called misinformation a “serious threat to public health” 

that “likely accelerated the spread of COVID-19,” making these 

fraudulent domains even more distressing.23

Widespread unemployment has provided cybercriminals a significant opportunity to target both individuals and government relief 

programs. Within the United States, the unprecedented influx of 

unemployment claims has opened the doors for illicit actors to defraud 

COVID-19 relief programs or gain fraudulent unemployment insurance.24 One Seattle software developer, for example, was charged with 

wire fraud after attempting to defraud COVID-19 relief programs of 

more than $550,000.25 Another scam involved buying and selling PII 

on the dark web to submit fraudulent relief applications.26 By selling these “fraud kits” to Internet users with less experience stealing 

PII data, cybercriminals can further monetize the pandemic.27 In a 

recent article on dark web marketplaces, experts found that of 788 

COVID-19-specific listings, 99 fell under the category of “guides on 

scamming” that offered “manuals on how to earn money exploiting 

flaws in COVID-19 related government relief funds” and manipulating online banking and delivery systems.28 These occurrences began 

in March 2020 and became more frequent after the introduction of 

the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act 

and the extension of the Small Business Association loan program, 

until finally beginning to fall in September.29

With rising unemployment during COVID-19, criminals use 

work-from-home, employment, and romance scams to launder stolen funds. The use of money mules—individuals who transfer illicit 

profits on a criminal’s behalf—has increased during the pandemic. 

Using money mules to move funds through bank transfers and cash 

transactions is intended to obfuscate the money trail and avoid 

detection by law enforcement investigations.30 In Northern Virginia, 

for example, criminals used school emails and the Nextdoor app to 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

target several George Mason University students at the beginning 

of the pandemic—offering fake jobs paying hundreds of dollars 

per week for minimal remote “work.”31 From January 2020 to early 

August 2021, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission recorded almost 

348,000 fraud reports worth more than $519 million in fraud loss. 

The top categories were online shopping and vacation/travel,32 which 

illustrates transnational criminals’ interest in capitalizing on the high 

levels of isolation caused by the pandemic. 

The rise in unemployment also enables the spread of malware 

such as info-stealers and more sophisticated banking Trojan horses. 

According to the Organized Crime Corruption and Reporting Project (OCCRP), in conjunction with the cybersecurity firm Check Point, 

malware is being dispersed through employment-related documents 

such as curriculum vitae (CV) and medical leave forms. The number 

of malicious CV files doubled in just two months in 2020.33 According 

to INTERPOL data, a significant number of disruptive malware campaigns are now targeting larger institutions such as government agencies and the healthcare industry rather than individuals and smaller 

companies.34 In March 2020, the second largest hospital in the Czech 

Republic suffered a ransomware attack that blocked the sharing of 

medical information between departments until a “ransom” had been 

paid. Since then, many other hospitals have been targeted.35, 36 The same 

month, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services website 

was the target of a denial-of-service attack and subsequently crashed.37

As recently as December 2020, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued a notice urging financial institutions to stay alert 

to potential fraud concerning the COVID-19 vaccine, indicating that 

vaccine research has been the target of certain known ransomware.38

Trends in the Drug Trade

Trends in the drug trade have fluctuated in response to the COVID-19 

outbreak and countries’ subsequent containment measures. Country 
167

Transnational Crime During a Pandemic

lockdowns and movement restrictions initially disrupted global drug 

supply chains, and widespread flight cancellations placed considerable stress on those working as drug mules.39 However, traffickers 

proved resilient and quickly adapted to the “shock” of the pandemic 

by shifting routes, production, and distribution and using the dark 

web for certain substances.40, 41, 42

Across various regions, border closures and restrictions on land, 

air, and maritime travel initially interrupted drug traffickers. Mexican production of fentanyl and methamphetamines was temporarily 

curtailed by a lack of necessary precursor chemicals from China.43

Evidence suggests, however, that production was reinstated quickly; 

fentanyl seizures in Mexico increased 465 percent between January 

and mid-September of 2020 compared to the first three quarters 

of 2019. 44, *

 In northern Central America, the cancellation of commercial flights hindered the delivery of synthetic drugs and cocaine, 

typically transported in small quantities by drug mules.45 Countries 

in North Africa and the Middle East experienced a similar interference in the drug trade, reporting a reduction in seizures following 

the initial COVID-19 restrictions and instances of rising wholesale 

and retail prices.46 In Europe, social distancing measures sharply curtailed trade on the distribution level, while shortages and stockpiling 

of cannabis resin and herbal cannabis pushed retail prices higher.47

Similarly, the street price of marijuana increased 55 percent from 

March to May in New York City.48

Drug cartels and organized crime groups, however, adapted 

quickly to the shifting conditions of the drug trade. The MS-13 and 

18th Street gangs quickly began to emphasize the marijuana retail 

* The COVID-19 production fluctuations did not ease the U.S. “fentanyl epidemic” 

because of stockpiling by drug traffickers and domestic illegal production. U.S. 

fentanyl-related deaths increased at the start of the pandemic. Louise Shelley, “Fentanyl, COVID-19, and Public Health,” World Medical & Health Policy 12, no. 4 (July 

2020): 390-91, 393. https://doi.org/10.1002/wmh3.355.
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

market and synthetic drugs being processed in northern Central 

America, capitalizing on drug production in Guatemala and Honduras.49 According to the OCCRP, the cocaine industry in Colombia 

also fared well during the lockdown, courtesy of large stockpiles of 

cocaine that had been warehoused before the pandemic.50 Reports 

also indicate a strong cocaine market in Honduras where authorities had confiscated more of the drug by late September 2020 than 

in all of 2019.51

Restrictive measures related to COVID-19 have had a considerable impact on drug trafficking routes. In late May 2020, the OCCRP 

reported Colombian cocaine smugglers, who could no longer use preferred maritime methods like speedboats and fishing vessels because 

of COVID-19 restrictions, had developed approximately six new 

or revived land routes through Panama.52 Adaptation has also been 

noted in the transit countries of Honduras and Guatemala, where 

an increase in coca cultivation camps has been detected, suggesting 

that the countries may be developing as production locations.53 New 

strategies have also been adopted in North Africa, where reports suggest traffickers are relying more on maritime and overland routes that 

avoid control points.54

Reported innovations in drug distribution methods include the 

increased use of darknet markets for small quantities of cannabis.55

The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction’s 

analysis of online drug markets during an early phase of COVID19 lockdowns†

 shows a rise from January to March of 2020 in dark 

web activity and encrypted use of messenger services to sell cannabis 

products.56 Experts indicate that dark web markets for cocaine and 

cannabis are typically more significant at the distribution level than 

with wholesale production and supply.57 The OCCRP, however, has 

reported examples of “coronasales” where large quantities of drugs 

are sold to dealers at a discount via the dark web.58 For street-level 

† The observational window of the study closed at the end of March 2020.
169

Transnational Crime During a Pandemic

distribution in Europe and North America, dealers facilitated their 

business mainly through WhatsApp, coordinating “no contact 

drops” and door-to-door deliveries, using or masquerading as essential workers.59, 60

Human Trafficking and Child Pornography 

The spread of COVID-19 has exacerbated the underlying circumstances which contribute to human trafficking and has motivated an 

enormous increase in online child sexual abuse material (CSAM). 

Rising unemployment and global economic insecurity have increased 

the vulnerability of groups already disproportionately exploited in 

human trafficking—including women, migrants, refugees, domestic 

workers, and children.61 This phenomenon occurs on a global scale, 

putting vulnerable populations at risk in the United States and less 

developed countries.

Lockdowns and pandemic containment measures have heightened the exposure to trafficking for women and girls in households with domestic violence and for domestic workers who may 

be trapped in quarantine with their abusers. The significant global 

increase in domestic abuse observed in relation to social distancing—which UN Women, an organization dedicated to gender equality, describes as a “shadow pandemic”—only intensifies the danger 

of intimate partner trafficking victims.62 Similarly, abuse victims 

may be exposed to exploitation while attempting to escape their 

situation, as domestic abuse is a commonly recognized push factor 

toward trafficking.63

The socio-economic footprint of COVID-19 and its restriction 

measures have isolated victims within patterns of abuse and separated survivors from vital rehabilitation aid. Many services typically 

offered by anti-trafficking NGOs, such as victim rescue missions, 

shelters, counseling, and legal assistance, have been cancelled or limited because of economic instability and COVID-19 restrictions.64
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

Similarly, the need for law enforcement and criminal justice agencies to prioritize pandemic restrictions has reduced antitrafficking 

operations and created delays in the court system for survivors 

awaiting justice.65 

Many survivors who have escaped their traffickers are at considerable risk of returning to the sex trafficking cycle because they lack 

income and support services.66 Polaris, an NGO dedicated to ending 

human trafficking, has also noted a growing trend toward sextortion. 

Landlords capitalize on their tenants’ financial hardship by pressing 

for sexual acts in exchange for rent.67 While speaking at a July 2020 

forum on sextortion, organized in part by the Partnership for Transparency, Dr. Ortrun Merkle noted that sextortion is a global phenomenon and emphasized the increased vulnerability of migrant women 

with disabilities, traveling with small children, and in the LGBTQ 

community.68 Transactional sex has been reported extensively, along 

with other potentially dangerous activities imposed on women and 

girls, such as becoming drug couriers.69 

Within the sector of migrant smuggling, several reports suggest border closures and mobility restrictions have created a greater 

dependency on smugglers, who, in turn, have increased transportation fees.70 In a survey of migrants conducted by the Mixed Migration Centre in July 2020, most respondents said smugglers had begun 

using more dangerous routes after the spread of COVID-19.71 This 

response was widespread in Malaysia, Nigeria, and Tunisia, where 

more than 70 percent of respondents reported more dangerous routes 

were being used.72

The health crisis has further complicated the already perilous 

migrant route across the Mediterranean Sea. Several public and private search and rescue missions were suspended in 2020, and vessels 

carrying migrants were required to remain offshore while quarantining—elongating a dangerous and painful journey.73 Evidence provided by the UN Office of Drugs and Crime shows that smugglers 

are abandoning migrants in transit countries, compounding their 
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Transnational Crime During a Pandemic

exposure to violence, trafficking, and COVID-19.74 Additionally, 

health policies that require the forced return of migrant laborers 

can endanger children who may be separated from their parents or 

stranded if not given proper aid.75 By June 2020, 1,359 migrant children—many unaccompanied—had been returned to Ethiopia from 

various countries in Africa and the Middle East, where mandatory 

quarantine required them to be held at the borders for 14 days with 

social workers and medical professionals.76

Migrants working under government-regulated mass labor contracts that were terminated because of the pandemic found themselves stranded in their countries of former employment and left with 

no ability to return home.77 In the Gulf Cooperation Council states, 

hundreds of thousands of workers from Pakistan and India were left 

jobless after the pandemic outbreak, with only a minority succeeding 

in receiving government-sponsored flights to return to their home 

countries.78 According to an October 2020 press release, the International Organization for Migration estimated that, as of July 2020, at 

least 2.75 million migrants were stranded worldwide, with many left 

in inhumane conditions without basic hygiene or necessary distancing protection against the virus.79

Increased travel restrictions and lockdowns have intensified the 

demand for child pornography,80 and school closures and the shift 

to online learning have increased the opportunity for online child 

exploitation. Both domestically and internationally, social distancing 

and the conversion of schools and workplaces to virtual environments 

have drastically increased time spent online, leaving school-age children particularly vulnerable to recruitment, grooming, and sextortion 

from online predators.81 These children may be pressured to livestream 

sexual material by online predators or by family members attempting to 

offset financial difficulties caused by COVID-19.82 Professionals working in Northern Virginia communities tell of older men approaching 

young girls during the lockdown on popular social media apps such as 

Instagram, Lemon, Snapchat, Tinder, Twitter, and YOLO.83, 84
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Children are further victimized by the drastic increase in the 

production and circulation of online CSAM observed throughout the 

pandemic. During the first nine months of 2020, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children “experienced a 98.66 percent 

increase in online enticement reports” compared to the same period 

in 2019.85 A September 2020 INTERPOL report addressing the issue 

of CSAM as a global phenomenon indicated a substantial increase 

in CSAM being shared on peer-to-peer networks, social media platforms, and messaging applications, as well as continued discussion 

of CSAM on dark web fora.86 National and international agencies 

report uninvited participants sharing CSAM on videoconferencing 

platforms, such as Zoom—simultaneously victimizing the material’s 

subject and potentially victimizing other participants on the call.87, 88

In a tragic extension of this explosion of online CSAM, in February 

2021, two FBI agents were fatally shot during an investigation into 

a Florida-based suspect of violent crimes against children, the first 

agents to be shot and killed while on duty since 2008.89

Environmental Crime 

The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have undercut wildlife conservation efforts.90 Ecotourism, which provides significant funding 

for conservation activities, has declined massively.91 TRAFFIC, an 

NGO devoted to combating wildlife crime, reported in 2020 that 

damage to the economy and migration from urban to rural spaces 

are “increasing pressure on already stressed wildlife areas.”92 Widespread job loss and a lack of surveillance of restricted wildlife areas 

have boosted food and trade poaching.93

The situation is aggravated by governmental corruption related 

to the COVID-19 response contributing to environmental crimes, 

such as illegal logging, deforestation, and poaching.94 Despite restrictive lockdown measures, illegal logging and deforestation continue 

to flourish in parts of Africa and the Amazon rainforest. In Brazil, 
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Transnational Crime During a Pandemic

the Igarapé Institute estimates that “70 percent of timber products 

from the Amazon come from illegal operations.”95, 96 The Environmental Investigation Agency has reported that 80 percent of lumber 

production in Peru is illegal or illicit.97, 98 Rather than being curtailed 

by three months of COVID-19 restrictions, Peruvian timber exports 

grew by 25 percent in July 2020.99

Public and private corruption facilitate the illicit timber trade, 

and both are bolstered by the pandemic’s creation of insecure economic and regulatory environments.100 In Peru, privately produced 

fake harvest permits—called forest inventories—have long been corruptly approved by public officials.101, 102 Under the pretense of “reactivating” the economy, several regional authorities in Brazil, Peru, and 

elsewhere have pushed for relaxing timber trade regulations, opening the door to further deforestation and corruption.103 Similarly, in 

Mozambique, which has experienced significant deforestation and 

related labor abuses, donors’ main concerns regarding COVID-19 

related corruption have centered on public PPE procurement and 

donor assistance rather than preventing deforestation.104

Evidence suggests poaching for subsistence purposes—for food 

and trade—has increased to offset economic distress caused by the 

pandemic.105 As detailed in a recent Targeting Natural Resource Corruption (TNRC) panel, roughly 90 percent of African tour operators have suffered a 75 percent decline in bookings.106 Rural residents 

who depend on tourism supply chains in many regions are being 

driven to poaching: the Uganda Wildlife Authority reported that 

poaching cases in Africa between February and June 2020 were double the number recorded in 2019.107 During India’s lockdown period, 

the poaching of ungulates, which are typically hunted for their meat, 

also doubled, rising from 22 percent of total reported poaching cases 

pre-lockdown (February/March) to 44 percent during lockdown 

(March-May).108

The impact of COVID-19 on the future of the legal and illegal 

wildlife trade remains unclear. In certain regions, such as Central 
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Africa, illicit wildlife trafficking has continued with little resistance. 

Uganda, for example, continues to serve as both a source and transit country, facilitating trafficking between the Democratic Republic 

of the Congo and Kenya.109 Nevertheless, the pandemic has raised 

global concern about wildlife trade in general, as significant evidence points to the live animal markets (“wet markets”) in Wuhan, 

China, as the original COVID-19 transmission source between 

animal and human.110, 111 Pandemic-induced fear and stigma surrounding wildlife food products did manifest in specific areas: in 

March 2020, a survey conducted in Hong Kong, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam “suggested that the vast majority of respondents 

(84 percent) would be unlikely or very unlikely to engage in future 

consumption of wildlife products.”112 Experts contend, however, 

that not only will COVID-19 not bring about the end of the illegal 

wildlife trade, but the trade itself must be regulated to help prevent 

future pandemics.113, 114 Unfortunately, during COVID-19, those 

trying to safeguard natural resources are restricted because of lockdowns or targeted by illicit traders. This problem has been especially 

problematic for indigenous people who are on the frontline of protecting trees and wildlife.115 They have suffered disproportionately 

from COVD-19 while simultaneously being targeted by poachers 

and illegal loggers.116

Corruption, Counterfeits, and Threats to Public Health

The pandemic has created windows of opportunity for corrupt networks that facilitate money laundering, counterfeiting, and other 

transnational crimes. The shutdown and resulting economic stagnation led to the implementation of financial management systems, such as cash transfers, that involved several corruption risks 

especially in developing countries where levels of corruption are 

high.117 In contexts where the rule of law is weak and there is little transparency and accountability, corrupt government officials 
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Transnational Crime During a Pandemic

can misappropriate emergency aid funds.118 The urgency surrounding the pandemic has impeded proper oversight and due diligence 

regarding international financial flows. 

We’re not just fighting an epidemic; we’re fighting an infodemic. 

Fake news spreads faster and more easily than this virus, 

and is just as dangerous.

— TEDROS ADHANOM GHEBREYESUS, WHO DIRECTOR-GENERAL, 

AT MUNICH SECURITY CONFERENCE 2020119

As noted by the World Health Organization (WHO) and other 

intergovernmental organizations, a massive “infodemic”—or overabundance of information—has accompanied the COVID-19 pandemic. Similar to the virus, medical misinformation and disinformation 

spread rapidly, threatening national health and security. This flood of 

information, both accurate and false, impedes individuals’ ability to 

obtain trustworthy guidance critical to preventing the spread of the 

virus and protecting public health. In some cases, this public information mismanagement fomented distrust of governments and medical 

professionals and hindered efforts to stop the virus’s spread. In other 

cases, medical misinformation and rumors of false cures proved deadly. 

For instance, in Iran, false claims that drinking methanol can cure the 

coronavirus led to more than 500 deaths; dozens went blind, and thousands were hospitalized. The Iranian government and traditional media 

outlets initially denied that COVID-19 was present to influence voter 

turnout during national elections in February 2020. Once public information was made available, much of it was unreliable.120

Much of the misinformation and disinformation surrounding 

COVID-19 involved promoting unverified treatments and cures for 

the virus. Former U.S. President Donald Trump’s Twitter account was 
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suspended in mid-2020 after he shared a video of a doctor falsely 

claiming the antimalarial drug hydroxychloroquine could cure the 

coronavirus. According to an observational medical study, “From 

March 1 to April 30, 2020, Donald J Trump made 11 tweets about 

unproven therapies and mentioned these therapies 65 times in White 

House briefings, especially touting hydroxychloroquine and chloroquine.”121 Consumers’ rush to purchase hydroxychloroquine led to 

the medication being unavailable for treating the diseases for which it 

has been approved, such as malaria and the autoimmune conditions 

lupus and rheumatoid arthritis.122 On June 15, the U.S. Food and Drug 

Administration (FDA) revoked the emergency use authorization for 

hydroxychloroquine and chloroquine in treating COVID-19, based 

on evidence that the medicines did not decrease the likelihood of 

death or speed recovery.123 This points to the urgent need for effective 

public education and media outreach to ensure individuals do not 

fall prey to medical misinformation that could exacerbate the virus’s 

spread. To inform the public and prevent the purchasing of counterfeits of sought-after products such as respirators or face masks, the 

FDA, CDC, and others have conducted extensive media and educational outreach efforts and released guidelines raising awareness of 

the rapid increase in counterfeit PPE. 

Shortages of PPE and medical supplies encouraged the counterfeiting of COVID-19 related products, including respirators (N95 

masks), ventilators, and other medical supplies, such as gloves, gowns, 

and sanitizing products. Shortages of toilet paper, paper towels, and 

cleaning supplies led to price gouging. In response, U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) 

launched Operation Stolen Promise in April 2020 to combat COVID19 related fraud and other criminal activity.124 Under Operation Stolen 

Promise, HSI formed partnerships with government, law enforcement, and private companies to strengthen global supply chain security and protect the American public from victimization. In May, HIS 

reported that “HSI and CBP have collaborated to seize 494 shipments 
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Transnational Crime During a Pandemic

of mislabeled, fraudulent, unauthorized, or prohibited COVID-19 

test kits, treatment kits, homeopathic remedies, purported antiviral 

products and personal protective equipment (PPE).”125

In addition to the proliferation of counterfeit goods, vendors used 

fraud, price gouging, and other crimes to exploit rising demand. In 

some cases, criminals defrauded consumers and companies through 

the nondelivery of products.126 In late March-early April 2020, a New 

Jersey car dealer tried to sell “7 million of the 3M-branded masks to 

New York City’s Office of Citywide Procurement for about 500 percent 

above the typical list price.” He was also accused of offering to sell “3 

million Mexican-made N99 face masks to Florida’s Division of Emergency Management for $5.46 million, a more than 500 percent markup.”127 As a result, he was charged with wire fraud and two conspiracy 

charges, including Conspiracy to Violate the Defense Production Act.128

Terrorists and other criminal organizations also took advantage of 

the ongoing supply shortages surrounding the pandemic. In the summer of 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice shut down an ISIS-affiliated 

scam involving the attempted sale of 100,000 fake N95 masks and counterfeit PPE through websites and social media accounts. According to 

the website Facemaskcenter.com, the masks were manufactured in Turkey but were certified by the U.S. FDA or other U.S. agencies. The website also claimed it had been operating since 1996 as “the original online 

personal protective equipment supplier and was the first of its kind,” 

even though it was only established in late February 2020.129

Counterfeiting concerns surrounding COVID-19 are not limited to medical supplies. To be effective, COVID-19 vaccines must 

be distributed by approved and licensed manufacturers and properly administered by medical professionals. Concerns have arisen 

that illegitimate or counterfeit vaccines will be sold on the open and 

dark webs. Even though licensed vaccines are not being sold online, 

advertisements for COVID-19 vaccines have been found before they 

were publicly available on the dark web and encrypted messaging 

platforms such as Telegram for “as much as US $150 per dose.”130
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Counterfeit vaccines are offered on darknet markets alongside ads 

for weapons, narcotics, and other illicit goods, such as counterfeit 

currency, demonstrating the convergence of illicit trade in medical 

products and other forms of transnational crime. 131

Conclusion

Criminals are often highly flexible and innovative. Although it is hard 

to identify beneficiaries of the COVID-19 pandemic, criminals and 

their corrupt associates have certainly been able to profit in this difficult time. This is particularly evident for those engaged in fraud and 

financial crime against the vulnerable, as well as for those who operated effectively online and through social media. The damage caused 

by criminal elements is not confined to the virtual world; it is occurring in the real world as well. Environmental destruction proliferates, 

individuals can still access narcotics, and the large-scale distribution 

of counterfeit PPE through existing supply chains is exacerbating the 

costs and morbidity of COVID-19.

The isolation required to prevent the spread of COVID-19 has 

inhibited the response to this growth in criminality. Moreover, the sheer 

volume of online trade in child sexual images and counterfeit medical 

products, as well as other forms of cybercrime, strains a law enforcement system more accustomed to on-the-ground investigations than the 

investigative techniques required to address this new criminality. The 

large-scale data analytics and artificial intelligence needed to address 

these phenomena are not adequately applied by law enforcement. Methods only now in development need to be applied with alacrity.

The growth of life-threatening criminality under COVID-19 

shows that traditional response methods are not adequate. To address 

this activity, we need a whole-of-society perspective that requires the 

cooperation of civil society, corporations, journalists, governments, 

and international bodies.132 Only by identifying rapidly changing 

criminality and encouraging collaboration between different sectors 
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Transnational Crime During a Pandemic

of society can we hope to stem the crime that devastates our health, 

social fiber, economic well-being, and the sustainability of our planet.

About the Authors

∂Dr. Layla M. Hashemi is a researcher and data analyst at the George 

Mason University (GMU) Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) focusing on international supply chains, 

cybercrime, and illicit trade. She currently is analyzing the supply 

chains of counterfeit PPE, fentanyl, and pharmaceuticals for the 

National Science Foundation project Disrupting Operations of Illicit 

Supply Networks (D-ISN). She earned her Ph.D. in public policy at 

GMU’s Schar School and her master’s in international relations and 

comparative politics at New York University with a concentration in 

Middle Eastern and Islamic studies.

Sarah Meo is pursuing a Ph.D. in public policy at GMU. She completed a Fulbright scholarship in Palermo, Sicily, working with the 

anti-mafia organization Fondazione Falcone. Her research focuses on 

transnational crime and corruption, mafia-type criminal organizations, and human trafficking in Europe. Currently she is working with 

Dr. Louise Shelley on an National Science Foundation-funded project analyzing human trafficking supply chains in the United States.

Dr. Louise Shelley is the Omer L. and Nancy Hirst Endowed Chair and 

a University Professor at GMU. Within the Schar School of Policy and 

Government, she founded and directs the TraCCC. She specializes in 

transnational crime, corruption, illicit financial flows, and money laundering. As an inaugural Andrew Carnegie Fellow, she wrote her most 

recent book, Dark Commerce: How a New Illicit Economy is Threatening 

our Future (Princeton University Press, 2018), on illicit trade. 
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Endnotes

1 “Coronavirus World Map: Tracking the Global Outbreak,” New York Times, 

accessed February 5, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/world/

coronavirus-maps.html.

2 “World Bank Expects Global Economy to Expand by 4 Percent in 2021,” UN 

News, January 5, 2021, https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/01/1081392.

3 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “UN/DESA Policy 

Brief #86: The Long-Term Impact of COVID-19 on Poverty,” October 15, 2020, 

https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/publication/un-desa-policybrief-86-the-long-term-impact-of-covid-19-on-poverty/. 

4 Pallavi Gogoi, “Stuck-At-Home Moms: The Pandemic’s Devastating Toll on 

Women,” npr.org, October 28, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/10/28/928253674/

stuck-at-home-moms-the-pandemics-devastating-toll-on-women.

5 “COVID-19 and Its Economic Toll on Women: The Story behind the Numbers,” UN Women, September 16, 2020, https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/

stories/2020/9/feature-covid-19-economic-impacts-on-women.

6 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “ICE, CBP Seize More Than 100,000 

Counterfeit Surgical Masks Intended for Hospital Workers,” December 9, 2020, 

https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-cbp-seize-more-100000-counterfeitsurgical-masks-intended-hospital-workers.

7 “3M PPE How To Identify Fraudulent Offers, Counterfeit Products and Price 

Gouging,” 3M: PPE Safety, accessed February 2021, https://www.3m.com/3M/

en_US/worker-health-safety-us/covid19/covid-fraud/. 

8 United Nations, General Assembly, Fourteenth United Nations Congress on 

Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (Draft Report), A/CONF.234/L.2/Add.5, 

(March 2021), https://undocs.org/A/CONF.234/L.2/ADD.5.

9 OECD and European Union Intellectual Property Office, Trends in Trade in 

Counterfeit and Pirated Goods (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2019), https://doi.org/

10.1787/g2g9f533-en.

10 Channing May, “Transnational Crime and the Developing World,” Global 

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11 INTERPOL, COVID-19 Cybercrime Analysis Report, INTERPOL General 

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12 INTERPOL, COVID-19 Cybercrime Analysis Report, 4.
181

Transnational Crime During a Pandemic

13 Prem Mahadevan, “Cybercrime Threats during the Covid-19 Pandemic,” 

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, April 2020, https://

globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Cybercrime-Threats-duringthe-Covid-19-pandemic.pdf. 

14 Mahadevan, “Cybercrime Threats during the Covid-19 Pandemic,” 7.

15 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Sees Rise in Fraud Schemes Related to 

the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic,” FBI Alert I-032020-PSA, March 

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16 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Warns of Potential Charity Fraud 

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17 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Federal Agencies Warn of Emerging Fraud 

Schemes Related to COVID-19 Vaccines,” Press Release, December 21, 2020, 

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18 Lindsey O’Donnell, “COVID-19 Vaccine Cyberattacks Steal Credentials, 

Spread Zebrocy Malware,” Threat Post. December 9, 2020, https://threatpost.

com/covid-19-vaccine-cyberattacks-credentials-zebrocy/162072/.

19 Mahadevan, “Cybercrime Threats during the Covid-19 Pandemic,” 14.

20 Mahadevan, “Cybercrime Threats during the Covid-19 Pandemic,” 7.

21 INTERPOL, COVID-19 Cybercrime Analysis Report, 10.

22 INTERPOL, COVID-19 Cybercrime Analysis Report, 11.

23 Raina M. Merchant, Eugenia C. South, and Nicole Lurie, “Public Health Messaging in an Era of Social Media,” Journal of the American Medical Association 

325, no. 3 (January 2021), doi:10.1001/jama.2020.24514. 

24 Financial Crimes Enforcement Center, “FinCEN Advisory on Unemployment 

Insurance Fraud During the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic,” 

October 13, 2020, https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/Advisory%20

Unemployment%20Insurance%20COVID%2019%20508%20Final.pdf. 

25 Department of Justice, “Seattle Software Developer Pleads Guilty to Wire Fraud 

for COVID-Relief Fraud Scheme,” October 22, 2020, https://www.justice.

gov/opa/pr/seattle-software-developer-pleads-guilty-wire-fraud-covid-relieffraud-scheme. 

26 Dan Patterson, “Exposing the Dark Web Coronavirus Scammers,” TechRepublic, June 15, 2020, https://www.techrepublic.com/article/exposing-the-darkweb-coronavirus-scammers/. 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

27 Patterson, “Exposing the Dark Web Coronavirus Scammers.”

28 Alberto Bracci et al., “Dark Web Marketplaces and COVID-19: Before the Vaccine,” EPJ Data Science 10, no.6 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1140/epjds/s13688-

021-00259-w.

29 Bracci et al., “Dark Web Marketplaces and COVID-19: Before the Vaccine.”

30 Scott Peddle, “Money Mules Moving Illicit Proceeds from COVID-19-Related 

Crimes,” CUInsight, December 9, 2020, https://www.cuinsight.com/moneymules-moving-illicit-proceeds-from-covid-19-related-crimes.html.

31 CINA, “The Effects of the COVID-19 Response on Criminal Network Activity and 

Investigations,” George Mason University, Criminal Investigations and Network 

Analysis Center, June 2020, https://cina.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/

Covid-White-Paper_FINAL.pdf.

32 Federal Trade Commission, “FTC COVID-19 and Stimulus Reports,” Tableau Public, August 5, 2021. https://public.tableau.com/profile/federal.trade.

commission#!/vizhome/COVID-19andStimulusReports/FraudLosses. 

33 Zdravko Ljubas, “IT Specialists Warn of Malware Increase During COVID19,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (CCRP), June 10, 

2020, https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/12509-it-specialists-warn-of-malwareincrease-during-covid-19. 

34 INTERPOL, COVID-19 Cybercrime Analysis Report, 9-10.

35 Mahadevan, “Cybercrime Threats during the Covid-19 Pandemic,” 1.

36 Albin Sybera, “The Human Factor: Experts Warn of Czech Hospitals’ Cyber Vulnerability,” Balkan Insight, December 9, 2020, https://balkaninsight.com/2020/

12/09/the-human-factor-experts-warn-of-czech-hospitals-cyber-vulnerability/.

37 Mahadevan, “Cybercrime Threats during the Covid-19 Pandemic,” 11.

38 Financial Crimes Enforcement Center, “FinCEN Asks Financial Institutions 

to Stay Alert to COVID-19 Vaccine-Related Scams and Cyberattacks,” December 28, 2020, https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/COVID-19%20

Vaccine%20Notice%20508.pdf.

39 Tuesday Reitano and Mark Shaw, Criminal Contagion: How Mafias, Gangsters 

and Scammers Profit From a Pandemic (London: C Hurst & Co).

40 International Crisis Group, “Virus-Proof Violence: Crime and COVID-19 in 

Mexico and the Northern Triangle,” Latin America Report N. 83, 7–8, https://

d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/083-virus-proof-violence.pdf.

41 Lucia Bird et al., “Transformative Technologies: How Digital Is Changing 

the Landscape of Organized Crime,” Global Initiative Against Transnational 

Organized Crime, June 2020, 5, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/up

loads/2020/06/Transformative-Technologies-WEB.pdf. 
183

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42 Reitano and Shaw, Criminal Contagion, 71.

43 International Crisis Group, “Virus-Proof Violence,” 4-5.

44 Reitano and Shaw, Criminal Contagion, 69.

45 International Crisis Group, “Virus-Proof Violence,” 4.

46 European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, “Impact of COVID19 on Drug Markets, Drug Use, Drug-Related Harms and Responses in South 

European Neighbourhood Policy Area,” December 2020, 2, https://www.emcdda.

europa.eu/system/files/publications/13481/EU4MD_Trendspotter_South_

ENP_FINAL_21122020.pdf.

47 European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, “EU Drug Markets: Impact of COVID 19,” November 30, 2020, 7, https://data.europa.eu/doi/

10.2810/19284. 

48 Parker Asmann, Chris Dalby, and Seth Robbins, “Six Ways Coronavirus Is 

Impacting Organized Crime in the Americas,” InSight Crime, May 4, 2020,

https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/coronavirus-organized-crimelatin-america/. 

49 International Crisis Group, “Virus-Proof Violence,” 7.

50 Cecilia Anesi et al., “What Lockdown? World’s Cocaine Traffickers Sniff at 

Movement Restrictions,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, 

May 20, 2020, https://www.occrp.org/en/coronavirus/what-lockdown-worldscocaine-traffickers-sniff-at-movement-restrictions. 

51 International Crisis Group, “Virus-Proof Violence,” 7-8.

52 Anesi et al., “What Lockdown?”

53 International Crisis Group, “Virus-Proof Violence,” 8.

54 European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, “Impact of 

COVID-19 on Drug Markets,” 8.

55 European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, “EU Drug Markets: Impact of COVID 19,” 8.

56 European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, “COVID-19 

and Drugs: Drug Supply via Darknet Markets,” May 2020, 3, https://www.

emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/13042/EMCDDA-report_

COVID19-darknet-final.pdf. 

57 Lucia Bird, “Smuggling in the Time of COVID-19: The Impact of the Pandemic on Human-Smuggling Dynamics and Migrant-Protection Risks,” Global 

Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, April 2020, 5, https://

globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/GIATOC-Policy-Brief-003-

Smuggling-COVID-28Apr0930-proof-4.pdf.

58 Anesi et al., “What Lockdown?”
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59 Anesi et al., “What Lockdown?”

60 Reitano and Shaw, Criminal Contagion, 20, 79.

61 Livia Wagner and Thi Hoang, “Aggravating Circumstances: How Coronavirus 

Impacts Human Trafficking,” Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized 

Crime, May 2020, 2, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/

Aggravating-circumstances-How-coronavirus-impacts-human-traffickingGITOC-1.pdf.

62 “UN Women Raises Awareness of the Shadow Pandemic of Violence Against 

Women During COVID-19,” UN Women, May 27, 2020, https://www.un

women.org/en/news/stories/2020/5/press-release-the-shadow-pandemic-ofviolence-against-women-during-covid-19. 

63 “Guidance Addressing Emerging Human Trafficking Trends and Consequences 

of the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Organization for Security and Cooperation in 

Europe, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, and UN Women, 

July 30, 2020. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/a/458434_1.pdf. 

64 Wagner and Hoang, “Aggravating Circumstances,” ii. 

65 Wagner and Hoang, “Aggravating Circumstances,” ii.

66 Christina Bain and Louise Shelley, “The Evolution of Human Trafficking During 

the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 13, 2020, 

https://www.cfr.org/blog/evolution-human-trafficking-during-covid-19-

pandemic 

67 “Sex Trafficking Is Still Happening—and May Be More Violent Than Ever,” 

Polaris, April 17, 2020, https://polarisproject.org/blog/2020/04/sex-traffickingis-still-happening-and-may-be-more-violent-than-ever/. 

68 Ortrun Merkle et al., “SEXTORTION: A Crucial Global HumanitarianCorruption Challenge,” Partnership for Transparency, July 1, 2020, https://www

.ptfund.org/acf-sextortion/.

69 Reitano and Shaw, Criminal Contagion, 60.

70 “Impact of COVID-19 on Migrant Smuggling,” Mixed Migration Centre, 1, 

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/126_Covid_Snapshot_

Global_smuggling.pdf. 

71 “Impact of COVID-19 on Migrant Smuggling,” 5.

72 “Impact of COVID-19 on Migrant Smuggling,” 1.

73 Bird, “Smuggling in the Time of COVID-19,” 17-18.

74 “Impact of the COVID Crisis on Migrant Smuggling,” United Nations Office 

on Drugs and Crime, September 10, 2020, www.unodc.org/unodc/en/front

page/2020/September/impact-of-the-covid-crisis-on-the-crime-of-migrantsmuggling.html. 
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75 International Labour Organization and UNICEF, COVID-19 and Child Labour: 

A Time of Crises, A Time to Act, 13, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/

public/---ed_norm/---ipec/documents/publication/wcms_747421.pdf. 

76 International Labour Organization and UNICEF, COVID-19 and Child Labour, 13.

77 Reitano and Shaw, Criminal Contagion, 57-58.

78 Reitano and Shaw, Criminal Contagion, 58.

79 “Immediate Action Required to Address Needs, Vulnerabilities of 2.75m 

Stranded Migrants,” United Nations International Organization for Migration, October 9, 2020, https://www.iom.int/news/immediate-action-requiredaddress-needs-vulnerabilities-275m-stranded-migrants.

80 Financial Action Task Force, “COVID-19-related Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing—Risks and Policy Responses,” (Paris: FAFT/OECD), 8, https://

www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/COVID-19-AML-CFT.pdf. 

81 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “School Closings Due to COVID-19 Present 

Potential for Increased Risk of Child Exploitation,” Press Release, March 23, 

2020, https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/school-closings-due-tocovid-19-present-potential-for-increased-risk-of-child-exploitation. 

82 Wagner and Hoang, “Aggravating Circumstances,” 6.

83 CINA, “The Effects of the COVID-19 Response on Criminal Network Activity 

and Investigations,” 5.

84 Bain and Shelley, “The Evolution of Human Trafficking.”

85 Brenna O’Donnell, “COVID-19 and Missing & Exploited Children,” National 

Center for Missing and Exploited Children, October 20, 2020, https://www.

missingkids.org/blog/2020/covid-19-and-missing-and-exploited-children. 

86 INTERPOL, “Threats and Trends: Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: 

COVID-19,” 9-11, https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2020/

INTERPOL-report-highlights-impact-of-COVID-19-on-child-sexual-abuse. 

87 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Warns of Child Sexual Abuse Material 

Being Displayed During Zoom Meetings,” Press Release, May 20, 2020, https://

www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-warns-of-child-sexual-abusematerial-being-displayed-during-zoom-meetings. 

88 INTERPOL, “Threats and Trends,” 12.

89 Patricia Mazzei et al., “2 F.B.I. Agents Killed in Shooting in Florida,” New York 

Times, February 2, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/02/us/fbi-shootingsunrise-florida.html.

90 Saket Badola, “Indian Wildlife Amidst the COVID-19 Pandemic: An Analysis 

of Poaching and Illegal Wildlife Trade,” Traffic, 4, https://www.traffic.org/site/

assets/files/12885/wildlife-amidst-covid-19-india-web.pdf. 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

91 Badola, “Indian Wildlife Amidst the COVID-19 Pandemic,” 4.

92 Badola, “Indian Wildlife Amidst the COVID-19 Pandemic,” 4.

93 Badola, “Indian Wildlife Amidst the COVID-19 Pandemic,” 4.

94 Duan Biggs et al., “The COVID-19 Pandemic, Corruption, and the SocioEconomic Impacts on Local Communities,” Targeting Natural Resource Corruption (TNRC) (blog), December 14, 2020, https://www.worldwildlife.org/

pages/tnrc-blog-the-covid-19-pandemic-corruption-and-the-socio-economicimpacts-on-local-communities.

95 Brodie Ferguson, Julia Sekula, and Ilona Szabo, “Technology Solutions for 

Supply Chain Traceability in the Brazilian Amazon: Opportunities for the 

Financial Sector,” Igarapé Institute, https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/up

loads/2020/07/2020-07-29-AE-48_Amazonia-Technology-Solutions.pdf.

96 “Understanding How Corruption Is Accelerating Illegal Logging and Deforestation during the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Targeting Natural Resource Corruption (TNRC) (blog), September 2020, https://www.worldwildlife.org/pages/

tnrc-blog-understanding-how-corruption-is-accelerating-illegal-logging-anddeforestation-during-the-covid-19-pandemic.

97 “Understanding How Corruption.”

98 Julia Urrunaga et al., “How Fraud and Corruption in Peru’s Concession System Are 

Destroying the Future of Its Forests,” Environmental Investigation Agency, https://

content.eia-global.org/assets/2012/04/The_Laundering_Machine_ENG.pdf. 

99 “Understanding How Corruption.” 

100 “Understanding How Corruption.”

101 “Understanding How Corruption.” 

102 Urrunaga et al., “How Fraud and Corruption,” 53.

103 “Understanding How Corruption.” 

104 “Understanding How Corruption.” 

105 Biggs et al., “The COVID-19 Pandemic.”

106 Biggs et al., “The COVID-19 Pandemic.”

107 Biggs et al., “The COVID-19 Pandemic.”

108 Badola, “Indian Wildlife Amidst the COVID-19 Pandemic,” 8.

109 Mohamed Daghar, “Uganda’s Illegal Wildlife Traders Undeterred by COVID-19 

Restrictions,” Institute for Security Studies, January 25, 2021, https://issafrica.org/

iss-today/ugandas-illegal-wildlife-traders-undeterred-by-covid-19-restrictions.

110 Reitano and Shaw, Criminal Contagion, 97.

111 A. Alonso Aguirre et al., “Illicit Wildlife Trade, Wet Markets, and COVID‐19: 

Preventing Future Pandemics,” World Medical & Health Policy 12, no. 3 (September 2020): 256-65. https://doi.org/10.1002/wmh3.348. 
187

Transnational Crime During a Pandemic

112 Reitano and Shaw, Criminal Contagion, 100. 

113 Reitano and Shaw, Criminal Contagion, 112.

114 Peter Lindsey et al., “Conserving Africa’s Wildlife and Wildlands through the 

COVID-19 Crisis and Beyond,” Nature Ecology & Evolution 4 (2020): 1300–10, 

https://doi.org/10.1038/s41559-020-1275-6.

115 Ben Leather et al., “Risks to Indigenous and Other Land and Environmental 

Defenders Heightened During COVID,” International Land Coalition, August 

7, 2020, https://www.landcoalition.org/en/newsroom/case-study-indigenouspeoples-and-land-and-environment-defenders-face-risks-due-covid-19/.

116 “COVID-19 and Indigenous Peoples: United Nations For Indigenous Peoples,” 

UN/DESA, https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/covid19.html/.

117 Inge Amundsen, “Covid-19, Cash Transfers, and Corruption,” U4Brief, Chr. 

Michelsen Institute (CMI), 7, https://beta.u4.no/publications/covid-19-cashtransfers-and-corruption.pdf 

118 Financial Action Task Force, “COVID-19-related Money Laundering,” 9.

119 Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, “Munich Security Conference Speech,” February 15, 2020, https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/munichsecurity-conference. 

120 Mohammad Delirrad and Ali Banagozar Mohammadi, “New Methanol Poisoning Outbreaks in Iran Following COVID-19 Pandemic,” Alcohol and Alcoholism

55, no. 4 (July 2020): 347–48, https://doi.org/10.1093/alcalc/agaa036.

121 Kacper Niburski and Oskar Niburski, “Impact of Trump’s Promotion of 

Unproven COVID-19 Treatments on Social Media and Subsequent Internet 

Trends: Observational Study,” Journal of Medical Internet Research 22, no. 11 

(2020), https://doi.org/10.2196/20044.

122 Lianna Matt McLernon, “COVID-Related Shortages of Malarial, Other Drugs 

Spotlighted,” Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, November 11, 

2020, https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2020/11/covid-relatedshortages-malarial-other-drugs-spotlighted. 

123 “Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA Revokes Emergency Use Authorization for Chloroquine and Hydroxychloroquine,” Food and Drug Administration, 

Office of the Commissioner, June 16, 2020, https://www.fda.gov/news-events/

press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-fda-revokes-emergencyuse-authorization-chloroquine-and.

124 “ICE HSI Launches Operation Stolen Promise,” U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, April 15, 2020, https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-hsilaunches-operation-stolen-promise.
188

A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

125 “Operation Stolen Promise: 4 Central Pillars,” U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, webpage, https://www.ice.gov/stolenpromise/pillars.

126 Knight Holl et al., “FinCEN Warns of Scams Relating to PPE and Other Medical Goods During COVID-19 Pandemic,” Lexology, July 30, 2020, https://www.

lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=22f409d6-b2ff-4935-a2fe-f0c6fe855aa2. 

127 Jonathan Stempel, “Used Car Dealer Charged with Price Gouging New York 

City on 3M’s N95 Masks,” Reuters, May 26, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/

article/us-health-coronavirus-3m-charges-idUSKBN2322Q1.

128 Department of Justice, “United States of America vs Ronald Romano,” https://

www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/press-release/file/1278731/download.

129 David Choi, “Fake Face Masks Were Being Sold on This Website with Links 

to ISIS,” Business Insider, August 29, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/

fake-face-mask-website-isis-2020-8. 

130 Tina Bellon, “A COVID-19 Shot for $150? Online Scams Surge as Slow Vaccine 

Rollout Frustrates,” Reuters, January 5, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/

health-coronavirus-vaccine-scams-idINKBN29A1BI. 

131 Bellon, “A COVID-19 Shot for $150?”

132 Louise I. Shelley, Dirty Entanglements; Corruption, Crime and Terrorism (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 336-38.
189

A POSTPANDEMIC OUTLOOK FOR 

ORGANIZED CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES:

AGILITY ACROSS THE PHYSICAL, 

SOCIAL, AND CYBER SPACES

Jim Jones and Anthony Stefanidis

The global COVID-19 pandemic and response affected every aspect of 

our society, including the activities of criminal organizations. In this 

chapter, we discuss several examples of criminal organization agility during the pandemic, drawn from the physical, social, and cyber 

domains. We assess that criminal organizations are emerging from 

the pandemic stronger than before, the pandemic presents a unique 

opportunity to study criminal organization agility, and criminal 

organizations are more exposed after their pandemic-driven adjustments. We also assess that this adjusted criminal activity and other 

factors, including risky operations that expose discoverable data, create investigative opportunities that will enable a deeper understanding of criminal organization structure and will enhance our ability 

to disrupt and dismantle the organizations behind a broad range of 

illegal activity.
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

COVID-19 Disrupts Illicit Business

The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the global economy were 

substantial and broad reaching. Harvard economists David Cutler 

and Larry Summers estimated in 2020 that the combined financial 

cost of pandemic-related lost output, as well as current and longterm health expenses, amounted to $16 trillion in the United States 

alone,1

 making this the biggest economic crisis since the Great 

Depression. With the illicit economy accounting for a not insignificant part of the global economy—estimates put it at 5-10 percent 

of the global GDP2

—it was expected that this subset too would be 

affected by the pandemic. 

In addition to upending everyday life worldwide, pandemicrelated disruptions affected numerous activities that are integral 

parts of the operations of transnational criminal organizations. For 

example. restrictions on travel, border closings, and worldwide lockdowns temporarily obstructed the global illicit drug supply chain.3

As a result, the movement of drugs into and throughout the United 

States was temporarily disrupted, lowering the availability and raising the price of illicit drugs like heroin and fentanyl during the first 

half of 2020.4

But the disruptive effects of COVID-19 on illicit activities were 

complex and multifaceted. Human smuggling cartel operations, for 

example, were impacted by the COVID-19-induced restrictions on 

nonessential travel across the United States-Mexico border. U.S. 

Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) data suggest a massive drop in 

apprehensions of families from the Northern Triangle—comprising 

Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador—that attempted to cross the 

Southwest border into the United States in mid-2020 compared to a 

year earlier.5

 At the same time, however, the economic crisis in the 

United States resulted in a significant drop in remittances sent by 

migrant workers to their families back home in Mexico. This put these 

families in financial hardship and drove higher migration patterns 
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A Postpandemic Outlook for Organized Criminal Activities

from Mexico to the United States, with the result of an actual increase 

in the number of Mexican families apprehended while crossing the 

border.6

 So, while the pandemic created obstacles for some manifestations of organized criminal activities, it also created opportunities. 

In this chapter, we focus on the agility demonstrated by criminal networks around the world during the COVID-19 crisis, as they 

diversified their operational portfolio to take advantage of the opportunities emerging during the pandemic. We do so by examining illicit 

activities that relate to the trade of substandard health supplies and 

certain cybercrime activities that capitalize on the Zoom-dominated 

workplace environment that characterized the initial 12-month 

pandemic period. These representative examples of the agility and 

resourcefulness displayed by these organizations support an argument that we should be viewing such organizations as functional networks in pursuit of opportunities, rather than rigid structures that 

are exclusively pursuing specific types of operations. 

Illicit Activities Adapting to the Pandemic

The sensationalistic means and broad societal impact of illicit activities tend to dominate attention when we try to understand and 

respond to such activities. However, studying them under the light of 

economics principles provides additional insight on goals and methods, especially regarding organized illegal entities like cartels.7, 8

In that context, the disruptive effects of the pandemic tested the 

adaptability of illicit businesses. Businesses adapt for two reasons: to 

respond to changes in their business environment or to reshape existing environments9, 10 in an effort to identify and capitalize on emerging market opportunities.11 And illicit business pursued both. 

Taking Advantage of a New Business Environment

The pandemic changed the business environment by making medical 

supplies a scarce and, therefore, highly profitable commodity. Events 
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in the early stages of the pandemic were indicative of individual illicit 

entrepreneurship, rather than organized efforts.

The World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic on March 11, 2020, and the United States declared a national 

emergency under the Stafford and National Emergencies Acts on 

March 13, followed on March 23 by Executive Order 13910, to prevent hoarding of health and medical resources, and eventually by 

the establishment of a Department of Justice (DOJ) COVID-19 

Hoarding and Price Gouging Task Force.12

Despite these government efforts to anticipate such activities, 

medical supply scams were already underway. As early as April 1, 

2020, the DOJ and the Department of Health and Human Services 

seized hundreds of thousands of masks (N95 and surgical) and 

other medical equipment from a price gouger in Brooklyn who was 

selling this equipment to doctors and nurses at prices as much as 

700 percent above market price.13 Comparable activities were concurrently evolving in cyberspace. As early as March 22, the DOJ 

filed an action against a website that was engaging in wire fraud 

and stealing credit card information by promising to ship COVID19 vaccines,14 a good eight months before the first announcement 

of such a vaccine was made. Numerous other scam websites started 

popping up offering nonexistent or counterfeit N95 masks, nonexistent COVID-19 tests, and other fraudulent COVID-19-related 

items.15 While early efforts focused on stealing credit card information, an actual global industry emerged to produce and disseminate counterfeit personal protective equipment (PPE). From 

Turkey to Romania, counterfeit PPE goods were seized at their 

point of production or intercepted by CBP agents as the items were 

shipped to the United States. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime 

summarized, in a 2020 report, the wide global footprint spread 

by the illicit production and distribution of substandard and falsified medical products, spanning all continents and thousands 

of websites.16
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A Postpandemic Outlook for Organized Criminal Activities

Reshaping Business Environments

Concurrently with illicit activities taking advantage of emerging 

business opportunities, criminal organizations saw the pandemic as 

a unique opportunity to strengthen their position within local communities. In a unique take on brand management, the Sinaloa Cartel invited BBC journalists to a safehouse to record the cartel packing 

tuna, rice, and toilet paper for Mexico’s poor.17 The packages, marked 

with the name of “El Chapo” Guzmán, were distributed publicly, some 

directly by the cartel and others through “El Chapo 701,” the brand of 

Guzman’s daughter Alejandrina. Although donating money to local 

communities was not unknown to the Sinaloa Cartel under El Chapo, 

even more brutal cartels, like the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación, 

quite remarkably joined this practice.18 This narco-philanthropy serves 

a direct purpose: to offer these cartels community leverage, potentially 

strengthening their status as a local authority that rivals state authority. 

Cybercrime’s Evolution During COVID-19 

Cybercriminal adaptation to the pandemic environment occurred 

in two distinct stages. First, email and web-based scams immediately 

pivoted to pandemic-related goods and services.19 As noted previously, 

nonexistent test kits, PPE, and vaccines were all used as the basis for 

financial fraud and ruses for data collection as soon as these items or 

anticipated developments received attention in the public space. Considering the minimal cost to adapt existing scams to these new areas, and 

the well-established cybercriminal tendency and ability to adopt the fear 

of the day,20 this is not surprising. The second adaptation stage included 

criminal activity that took some time to ramp up, either because of infrastructure or capability requirements, as in the case of counterfeit goods, 

or because the actions themselves took time, as in the case of computer 

system and network compromise. The subject of this section is this last 

activity: the circumstances, activities, and implications of cybercriminal 

system and network compromise during the pandemic.
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

Exploitation Targets

Prior to the pandemic, enterprise networks were in something of a 

steady-state environment. Broadly speaking, these systems had reasonably robust technical countermeasures in place to secure their 

digital assets against external attackers and to secure communications 

between themselves and business partners, and less-secure home 

users were somewhat isolated from enterprise networks, as suggested 

in Figure 1. Attackers (red in Figures 1-3) faced solid defenses at 

the enterprise perimeter and gained nothing against the enterprise 

by attacking home users. This is not to say that these enterprise systems had zero risk or that they were not being actively and sometimes successfully attacked via phishing and other means. Rather, the 

enterprise ecosystem had reached a sort of equilibrium where most 

had reasonable protections in place and were generally not viewed as 

low-hanging fruit by the cyber attacker community.

Figure 1. The Prepandemic Attack Surfac

Perhaps only in retrospect can we make the statements above, as 

it is only by comparison to the current state of affairs that the prepandemic security posture of our enterprise systems looks good. The 

pandemic response drove a rushed, unplanned, and inconsistently 

executed move to provide enterprise-wide, remote access with tools 

Network members

Network attackers

Secure

Communications

Network A Network B

Home Network
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A Postpandemic Outlook for Organized Criminal Activities

and technology that were not initially up to the task, performed by 

personnel often lacking the necessary skills and training to securely 

implement these inadequate tools and technology, and allowed a 

sense of urgency to bypass the best practices in risk assessment and 

risk management.21

This “rush-to-remote” increased the direct attack surface of nearly 

every system and network in the enterprise ecosystem. Even if implemented properly, instituting enterprise-wide remote access created 

multiple new attack vectors into a given network.22, 23 If any errors 

were made, then these errors compounded the number of additional 

vectors, increasing even further the enterprise’s risk exposure. Once 

in a network, attackers had increased access to the enterprise’s partners as well (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. The Postpandemic Direct Attack Surfac

To make matters worse, previously unconnected home users 

quickly became remote workers with privileged access to the enterprise network (see Figure 3). Where business partners had previously 

been screened to assess and ensure their cyber security posture—

often enforced contractually—enterprises suddenly opened their 

entire networks to multiple endpoints with utterly unknown security postures and compromise states.24 The typical home network 

Network members

Network attackers

Secure

Communications

Network A Network B
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has multiple unmanaged devices on a single unpartitioned internal 

network with minimal physical security, mixed personal and professional accounts and devices, no controls limiting the introduction 

and removal of portable digital devices, no personnel security, no formal patch management process, no active monitoring, and uncertain 

network perimeter security.

Figure 3. The Postpandemic Indirect Attack Surfac

In the prepandemic cyber world, business partners were often 

walled off to a limited section of the enterprise network, and they 

and other remote users underwent additional monitoring to detect 

misuse or system compromise. Walling off was not possible when 

the entire workforce became remote: as a group, they required 

access to the entire enterprise. Establishing individual user system 

and network permissions is unwieldy even when given plenty of 

time, and time was not a luxury that enterprise IT teams and risk 

managers had at the start of the pandemic. Furthermore, the best 

practice of increased monitoring for remote users—whether business partners or workforce—does not scale. In short, the increase 

in direct and indirect attack surfaces meant the prepandemic 

enterprise fortress became an open city with effectively no walls, 

moats, or gates.

Network members

Network attackers

Secure

Communications

Network A Network B

Home Network
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A Postpandemic Outlook for Organized Criminal Activities

From an attacker’s point of view, home users who were of limited value as targets before the pandemic abruptly became easy 

gateways to enterprise targets of considerable value. Attackers 

could monitor the network endpoints of traffic on a shared medium 

(e.g., neighborhood, public WiFi, etc.) and establish likely individual-employer relationships even without access to the encrypted network traffic contents. If an attacker wanted to be a bit more direct 

about a target, a moderate amount of effort using open sources 

could identify the home locations of at least some employees from 

almost any organization.

Postpandemic Considerations

Unfortunately, the risk posed by the rushed implementation of 

remote access is not limited to the pandemic timeframe. Considering 

the challenges faced by IT teams to implement remote access at the 

pandemic lockdown’s outset, it is too much to hope that all steps taken 

were thoroughly documented so that they could be fully undone after 

the lockdown was lifted. These unintentional residual configurations, 

combined with the set of capabilities deliberately left in place,25 present an undesirable departure from the prepandemic security posture 

of enterprise networks and systems. For those organizations desiring to retain work-from-home capabilities for their employees and 

contractors, much work remains to secure these endpoints and the 

systems they access. 

Additionally, networks and systems were compromised during 

the lockdown,26 and not all of these compromises are yet known or 

addressed. Over time, we expect to discover these compromises as 

they are leveraged by the attackers, or discovered by threat-hunting 

and remediation teams. As we learn more about recent and ongoing 

ransomware attacks, we may find that some of these attacks were 

facilitated by the circumstances of the lockdown and remote access. 

The Colonial Pipeline hack, for example, was reportedly initiated 

via a compromised VPN account.27 The password for this account 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

was subsequently found connected to an unrelated breach on the 

Dark Web, raising the possibility that the same password may have 

been re-used on multiple systems and this was how the attackers 

compromised the account.28 Prepandemic, not as many users had 

VPN accounts, and these accounts were more tightly controlled and 

monitored; however, in the resource-challenged pandemic times, it 

appears that an account was not fully disabled and VPN access was 

not carefully monitored, enabling the successful attack.

Other Considerations

Fortunately, not all implications of the lockdown-driven, enterprise 

access changes are bad from a cybercrime investigation point of view. 

Cybercrime actors were more active during the pandemic lockdown, 

for example, performing reconnaissance activities against a greater 

number of targets. Expanding the target set increased not only the 

likelihood that cybercriminals might hit a honeypot, but the likelihood that investigators might discover this activity through routine 

detection, and in both cases gain a richer dataset for correlation and 

analysis. This richer dataset has increased our ability to discover and 

understand cybercriminal activities and infrastructure, both key 

aspects of preventing and mitigating attacks. Additionally, multiple 

non-cybercriminal organizations and others entered the cyberattack space with weak operational security and without the requisite 

skills, tools, and tactics. Returning to the Colonial Pipeline example, 

the attackers represented a loose coalition of at least two different 

cybercriminal groups, one writing the ransomware tool and another 

executing the attack. The ransom, paid in Bitcoin, was transferred 

through multiple Bitcoin wallets in the days after the attack, but a 

sizeable portion (about 85 percent) wound up in a wallet that the 

FBI was able to seize.29 While not exactly a rookie mistake, transferring significant funds through a public ledger cryptocurrency and to 

an insecure account reveals the inexperience of at least some of the 

attackers. Put simply, amateurs make mistakes, and sometimes these 
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A Postpandemic Outlook for Organized Criminal Activities

amateurs are connected to more sophisticated actors, making both of 

interest to analysts and investigators.

Outlook: Challenges and Opportunities

One way to describe the universe of illicit activities is through the taxonomy presented in Figure 4. The light-colored top boxes represent the 

aggregate of what we know about actors and operations, whereas the 

bottom darker boxes represent what is still unknown to us. One of the 

major challenges that criminal investigations face is that, while we have 

reasonable estimates for the size of the top boxes, our understanding of 

the size of the bottom two boxes is obviously miniscule. Furthermore, 

this taxonomy is characterized by the connections among its components. Some of these connections are known: we have an understanding of connections between known actors and operations (solid blue 

arrow). But some of the connections are only suspected: we suspect 

the connections between known actors and unknown actors and operations (blue-outlined arrow), but we do not know their full extent. 

The pandemic affected the connections of this taxonomy in 

two ways. First, it broadened the previously unknown connections 

by adding novel links between known actors and unknown actors/

unknown operations (red-outlined arrow). At the same time, we 

gained additional clarity on these connections, as some of them were 

revealed through apprehensions (solid red arrow). 

Seen through an investigative lens, these developments have 

advanced our understanding by revealing new actors and operations, such as small-time opportunistic criminals engaged in price 

gouging or other illicit activities. Although these new insights are not 

expected to have lasting or substantial effects, the connections established during the pandemic between known actors and unknown 

actors/unknown operations can be viewed as both challenges and 

opportunities. Challenges because these previously known and 

unknown actors may be empowered, as may be the case when they 
200

A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

enjoy heightened support by local communities, or they may form 

more complex networks, with more sophisticated operational modi 

operandi and capabilities that were up to now untapped. At the same 

time, as some of these organized criminal networks may have stepped 

beyond their traditional operation spaces, we may gain additional 

opportunities to study them and advance our understanding of their 

structure and membership. 

Figure 4. A Taxonomy of Illicit Activitie

Returning to the question of criminal organization agility that we 

posed in this chapter’s introduction, we find:

• The cartels and other criminal organizations are strengthened 

and emboldened in the aftermath of the pandemic. Many staterun institutions were weakened during the pandemic, both 

in terms of actual weakness (e.g., budgets, staffing, infrastructure) and in terms of public trust. This damage will take 

years to repair, and, in the interim, criminal organizations will 

continue to step in and exploit the current voids. Similarly, 

cybercriminals learned much during the pandemic and will 

use these new skills going forward; they also built a significant 

backlog of compromised systems for later exploitation.

Known Actors

Unknown Actors

Known Operations

Unknown Operations

Types of Connections

known

suspected

observed during COVID, 

previously unknown

suspected growth 

fostered by COVID

suspected size, could be

larger or smaller
201

A Postpandemic Outlook for Organized Criminal Activities

• The pandemic offered, and still does offer, a unique opportunity to study the agility of criminal organizations. First impressions suggest that these actors are remarkably resilient and 

adaptable. On the other hand, the new activities and associated indicators have not been invisible. Ongoing and future 

research and analysis promise a better understanding of how 

these adaptations occur, what data and indicators we might 

collect and develop, and how we might detect and disrupt 

such activities in their early stages.

• Criminal organization structure is more exposed than it was 

prepandemic. As these organizations moved into new areas of 

activity, sometimes unprepared and ill-equipped to do so, we 

have found abundant data to support analysis and discovery of 

criminal network activity and structure. Analysis of these new 

areas will lead to connections, discovery, and understanding 

of previously stealthy activities, facilitating disruption and dismantling of the underlying criminal organizations behind the 

activities rather than simply addressing criminal activities in a 

About the Authors

surface and piecemeal fashion.

∂Jim Jones has been a cyber security and digital forensics practitioner, 

researcher, and educator for over 25 years in industry, government, and 

academia. Currently the director and digital forensics lead for George 

Mason University’s DHS Center of Excellence for Criminal Investigations and Network Analysis (CINA), Dr. Jones’ research focuses on 

the extraction, analysis, and manipulation of full and partial digital 

artifacts to support criminal investigations and intelligence analysis. 

Research sponsors have included the Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency, the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

(IARPA), and the National Science Foundation (NSF). He has a bachelor's degree in systems engineering, a master's in mathematical sciences, and a Ph.D. in computational sciences and informatics.

Anthony Stefanidis is a Professor of Computer Science and a Special 

Advisor to the President for Research Partnerships at the College of 

William & Mary. He is also a member of the Academic Advisory Board 

of the CINA Center of Excellence. His areas of academic expertise 

include the geosocial analysis of social media and crowdsourced content, network analysis, and the analysis of digital imagery and video, 

and he has authored over 100 journal and conference publications on 

these topics. Research sponsors for his activities include DHS, IARPA, 

NSF, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration. Dr. Stefanidis holds Ph.D. and 

master's degrees from The Ohio State University, and a Dipl. Eng, from 

the National Technical University of Athens, Greece.

Endnotes

1 David M. Cutler and Lawrence H. Summers, “The COVID-19 Pandemic and 

the $16 Trillion Virus,” JAMA 324, no. 15 (2020): 1495-96, https://jamanetwork.

com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2771764.

2 World Economic Forum, “State of the Illicit Economy,” Briefing Papers (2015), 

http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_State_of_the_Illicit_Economy_2015_2.

pdf.

3 United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “COVID-19 and the 

Drug Supply Chain: From Production and Trafficking to Use,” Research Brief 

(2020), https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/covid/Covid-19-

and-drug-supply-chain-Mai2020.pdf.

4 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, “2020 National Drug Threat Assessment,” DEA-DCT-DIR-008-21, March 2, 2021, https://www.dea.gov/sites/

default/files/2021-02/DIR-008-21%202020%20National%20Drug%20Threat%

20Assessment_WEB.pdf.

5 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Border Patrol Southwest Border 

Apprehensions by Sector: Southwest Border Family Unit Encounters by Country, 
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A Postpandemic Outlook for Organized Criminal Activities

accessed on June 15, 2021, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwestland-border-encounters/usbp-sw-border-apprehensions.

6 John Gramlich, “Migrant Apprehensions at US-Mexico Border Are Surging 

Again,” Pew Research Center, March 15, 2021, https://pewrsr.ch/3fjlGDO.

7 Alexis Jacquemin and Margaret E. Slade, “Cartels, Collusion, and Horizontal 

Merger,” Chapter 7 of Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 1 (Amsterdam: 

North Holland Publishing Co., 1989), 415-73.

8 John M. Connor and Robert H. Lande, “Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: 

Crime Pays,” Cardozo Law Review, 34 (November 2012): 427, file:///C:/Users/

Owner/Downloads/SSRN-id1917657.pdf.

9 John Child, “Strategic Choice in the Analysis of Action, Structure, Organizations and Environment: Retrospect and Prospect,” Organization Studies 18, no. 

1 (January 1997): 43-76.

10 Matti Tuominen, Arto Rajala, and Kristian Möller, “How Does Adaptability 

Drive Firm Innovativeness?,” Journal of Business Research 57, no. 5 (May 2004): 

495-506.

11 Balaji S. Chakravarthy, “Adaptation: A Promising Metaphor for Strategic 

Management,” The Academy of Management Review 7, no. 1 (January 1982): 

35-44.

12 Marissa Rydzewski, “Price Gouging During a Pandemic: The Federal Government’s Response,” DttP: Documents to the People 48, no. 4 (2020): 33-38, https://

journals.ala.org/index.php/dttp/article/view/7480/10332.

13 Alexander Mallin, “Medical Supplies Seized From Alleged Price Gouger to be 

Distributed to Hospitals,” ABC News, April 2, 2020, https://abcnews.go.com/

Politics/medical-supplies-seized-alleged-price-gouger-distributed-hospitals/

story?id=69938363.

14 U.S. Department of Justice, “Justice Department Files Its First Enforcement 

Action Against COVID-19 Fraud: Federal Court Issues Temporary Restraining 

Order Against Website Offering Fraudulent Coronavirus Vaccine,” Press Release, 

March 22, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-files-its-firstenforcement-action-against-covid-19-fraud.

15 Matt Binder, “Coronavirus Sparks Black Market Filled with Fake and Stolen N95 

Face Masks,” Mashable, April 10, 2020, https://mashable.com/article/coronavirusface-mask-scams/.

16 UNODC, “COVID-19-related Trafficking of Medical Products as a Threat to 

Public Health,” Research Brief (2020), https://www.unodc.org/documents/

data-and-analysis/covid/COVID-19_research_brief_trafficking_medical_pro

ducts.pdf.
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17 “Coronavirus: How Mexican Cartels Are Taking Advantage of Pandemic,” 

BBC News, July 10, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-latin-america53343599.

18 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Mexican Cartels Are Providing COVID-19 Assistance. 

Why That’s Not Surprising,” The Brookings Institution, April 27, 2020, https://

www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/04/27/mexican-cartels-areproviding-covid-19-assistance-why-thats-not-surprising/.

19 INTERPOL, Cybercrime: COVID-19 Impact, General Secretariat Report, August 

2020, https://www.interpol.int/en/content/download/15526/file/COVID-19%20

Cybercrime%20Analysis%20Report-%20August%202020.pdf.

20 Harjinder Singh Lallie et al., “Cyber Security in the Age of COVID-19: A Timeline 

and Analysis of Cyber-crime and Cyber-attacks during the Pandemic,” Computers 

& Security 105 (June 2021), file:///C:/Users/Owner/Downloads/2006.11929.pdf.

21 Cedric Nabe, “Impact of COVID-19 on Cybersecurity,” Deloitte, accessed on June 

7, 2021, https://www2.deloitte.com/ch/en/pages/risk/articles/impact-covidcybersecurity.html.

22 Danny Bradbury, “Criminals Exploit Pandemic with Brute-Force RDP Attacks,” 

InfoSecurity, June 29, 2020, https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/

pandemic-bruteforce-rdp-attacks/.

23 Kelly Sheridan, “RDP Attacks Persist Near Record Levels in 2021,” DARKReading, March 17, 2021, https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/

rdp-attacks-persist-near-record-levels-in-2021/d/d-id/1340444.

24 Jim Boehm et al., “Cybersecurity Tactics for the Coronavirus Pandemic,” 

McKinsey & Company, March 2020, https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/

McKinsey/Business%20Functions/Risk/Our%20Insights/Cybersecurity%20

tactics%20for%20the%20coronavirus%20pandemic/Cybersecurity-tactics-forthe-coronavirus-pandemic-vF.ashx.

25 PulseSecure, “New Research Indicates 84% of Businesses Will Likely Increase 

Work-from-home Capacity Beyond Pandemic Despite Security Concerns,” 

Intrado Global Newswire, May 27, 2020, https://www.globenewswire.com/

news-release/2020/05/27/2039222/0/en/New-Research-Indicates-84-ofBusinesses-Will-Likely-Increase-Work-from-home-Capacity-Beyond-PandemicDespite-Security-Concerns.html.

26 Arielle Waldman, “10 of the Biggest Cyber Attacks of 2020,” TechTarget, 

January 5, 2021, https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/252494362/10-ofthe-biggest-cyber-attacks.

27 Stephanie Kelly and Jessica Resnick-ault, “One Password Allowed Hackers To 

Disrupt Colonial Pipeline, CEO Tells Senators,” Reuters, June 8, 2021, https://
205

A Postpandemic Outlook for Organized Criminal Activities

www.reuters.com/business/colonial-pipeline-ceo-tells-senate-cyber-defenseswere-compromised-ahead-hack-2021-06-08/.

28 William Turton and Kartikay Mehrotra, “Hackers Breached Colonial Pipeline Using Compromised Password,” Bloomberg. June 4, 2021, https://www

.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-04/hackers-breached-colonial-pipelineusing-compromised-password.

29 David Uberti, “How the FBI Got Colonial Pipeline’s Ransom Money Back,” Wall 

Street Journal, June 11, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-the-fbi-gotcolonial-pipelines-ransom-money-back-11623403981#:~:text=on%20May%20

8%20paid%20roughly,Investigation%20followed%20the%20digital%20money.

&text=On%20Monday%2C%20the%20Justice%20Department,million%20

of%20Colonial’s%20initial%20ransom.

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COVID-19 AND THE 

INFORMATION ECOSYSTEM: 

LESSONS FROM RUSSIAN MALIGN 

INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS FOR 

THE POST-COVID-19 WORLD

Kacper T. Gradon

Actors who utilize disinformation campaigns and fake news propagation 

to achieve their strategic political objectives have leveraged COVID-19 to 

distribute harmful narratives and messaging faster and wider than before 

the pandemic. The Russian Federation is notably exercising “infodemics” (information overflow) during the ongoing global health emergency, 

contributing to the Kremlin’s asymmetric warfare strategy of weaponizing malign influence tactics to attack adversaries, particularly the United 

States and its European Union and NATO allies. Asymmetric warfare is 

part of a wider concept of total war (New Generation Warfare) endorsed 

by Russia’s leadership. Neoimperial Russia utilizes information warfare—based on disinformation, propaganda, and deception—in an effort 

to correct the imbalance between itself and the West by weakening government legitimacy and trust in democratic values in the eyes of target 

states’ populations. Central and Eastern European countries have become 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

Russia’s test field for new propaganda methods used to incite internal tensions and unrest, so their experiences and field intelligence could be used 

as a forewarning for the United States and Western Europe, enabling the 

NATO partners to prepare for malign influence tactics, techniques, and 

procedures. Actionable recommendations to prevent, interdict, and mitigate Russian disinformation include establishing a transatlantic research 

center for intelligence sharing and media literacy training.

Intertwined Pandemics

COVID-19 disease caused by the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus came to 

the world’s attention in December 2019 when, after originating in the 

Chinese city of Wuhan, the malady quickly spread to other parts of the 

world.1

 The scale and range of this health disaster reached proportions 

unparalleled in the 102 years since the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic, 

not necessarily in terms of mortality rates, but definitely in the scale of 

triggering scientific, economic, and political responses at an unprecedented level. By the end of August 2021, the growing emergency had 

affected all continents, countries, and territories of the world, apart from 

a handful of isolated Pacific Island nations, and the virus had infected 

over 214 million people and claimed the lives of over 4.4 million.2

 The 

mounting health crisis brought economic chaos—depressing financial, 

industrial, and entrepreneurial activity; raising unemployment rates; 

and destroying decades of developmental gains worldwide.3

As the world was being ravaged by the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, 

another epidemic emerged as a hallmark of 2020: an astonishing data 

overflow, bringing to the global audience massive amounts of information referring both to COVID-19 itself and to the health, social, 

and economic problems the disease has exacerbated.4

 The sheer 

volume of data—both accurate and incorrect—that was produced, 

consumed, and proliferated daily made finding reliable and trustworthy sources extremely difficult. The propagation of deceptive or 

misleading information is certainly not a new phenomenon. The U.S. 
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COVID-19 and the Information Ecosystem

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has reported on hazards 

associated with the propagation of false and misleading information 

during earlier disasters and emergencies.5

 Most recently, social media 

magnified disinformation during the Ebola epidemic in the Democratic Republic of Congo, stimulating fear and disorder.6

 However, 

the increase in dissemination and reproduction of distorted and misinforming storylines has become much more prevalent during the 

ongoing health crisis than ever before.7

The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic and the increase in misinformation 

and disinformation narratives developed simultaneously and quickly 

became heavily intertwined.8

 Crucially, the information and messaging 

overload began to capitalize on, and eventually to parasitize, the health 

emergency. Various actors and interest groups—operating on the local, 

regional, national, and international levels—leveraged this messaging.9

State actors, primarily Russia (on which this chapter is focused) and 

China, used their disinformation campaigns rooted in the pandemic 

crisis as tools of their geopolitical strategies.10 Nonstate actors around 

the world—including terrorist organizations, violent extremists, and 

organized criminal groups—exploited the COVID-19 pandemic to 

achieve their goals that include, quite similarly to state actors, undermining public trust in democratic governments and their agencies.11

Coming to Terms with Infodemics

The World Health Organization (WHO) observed the information 

overflow and associated potential problems in the early stages of 

the SARS-CoV-2 crisis. In March 2020, the WHO adopted the term 

“infodemics” to label the phenomenon. “Infodemics” was first used by 

foreign policy scholar David Rothkopf, who noticed during the 2003 

SARS epidemic that narratives and ideas about SARS spread through 

populations in a way strikingly similar to the disease itself.12 The WHO 

now uses the term to describe and address the excessive amounts 

of information about a disease that can spread misinformation, 
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disinformation, malinformation, and rumors during a health emergency and that can hamper an effective public health response by fostering confusion and distrust among people (see box).13

DEFINING THE TERMS OF INFODEMICS

The WHO Conference of Infodemiology in 2020 called for agreement 

on the terms of infodemics, which are frequently used as synonyms 

although they describe different problem sets. Scholars and experts 

specializing in this field shared the WHO’s concern,14 and the following 

definitions are now generally accepted in infodemics management:15

• Disinformation is false information that is deliberately created or disseminated with the express purpose to cause 

harm; the producers of disinformation typically have political, 

financial, psychological, or social motivations. 

• Misinformation is information that is false but not intended to 

cause harm; for example, individuals who do not know that a 

piece of information is false may spread it on social media in 

an attempt to be helpful. 

• Malinformation is genuine information that is shared to cause 

harm; this includes private or revealing information that is 

spread to harm individuals or their reputations. 

• Propaganda is true or false information spread to persuade 

an audience, but it often has a political connotation and is 

usually connected to information produced by governments.

Public health professionals and infodemiology experts are 

increasingly rejecting the popular catch phrase of “fake news.” This 

common term was coined to describe the use of disinformation and 

misinformation in news reporting and further to label manipulative 

online information,16 but it has now been deployed as a disinformation 

and misinformation tactic by political actors attempting to discredit 

news reporting and reported facts they dislike.17 Some authorities, 
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COVID-19 and the Information Ecosystem

Besides the general impact of infodemics on public health systems and on the response of national and supranational agencies and 

institutions responsible for disease prevention and control, disinformation and misinformation can have direct and profound influence on the behavior of individual persons. Dubious, suspicious, or 

conflicting information may lead to dangerous decisions related to 

individual health, which may diminish the society-wide success of 

countermeasures employed by governments.19

Russia Emerges as a Leading Purveyor of Infodemics

The COVID-19 pandemic has created several opportunities for Russia 

to weaponize its malign influence tactics to attack the Kremlin’s adversaries, especially the United States and its European Union (EU) and 

NATO allies. Anxieties arising from the SARS-CoV-2 crisis, combined 

with contemporary over-reliance on social media and electronic sources 

of information, have made people particularly vulnerable to disinformation, and Russia has recognized the benefits of leveraging conspiracy 

theories, malinformation, misinformation, and disinformation about 

COVID-19.20 Regardless of the suffering the pandemic has brought 

to Russia, the Kremlin hastily seized the opportunity in 2020 to utilize the worldwide health emergency for its strategic objectives abroad. 

The disinformation tactics employed by Russia during the COVID-19 

crisis bring invaluable data that will support designing intelligence and 

counterintelligence strategies as the world emerges from the pandemic.

such as the UK government, do not use the term, stressing that “fake 

news” is a poorly defined and misleading expression that conflates a 

variety of false information, from genuine error to foreign interference 

in democratic processes; instead, the United Kingdom endorses using 

the term “disinformation.”18
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Evil Empire Strikes Back

The U.S. State Department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC) 

has been tracking narratives promoted by Russian, Chinese, and 

Iranian-sponsored sites and different platforms related to COVID-19 

since January 2020, leading U.S. Special Envoy and GEC coordinator Lea Gabrielle to criticize Russia for capitalizing on the chaos and 

uncertainty that health scares and pandemics engender by applying 

the known Russian tactic of perpetuating disinformation.21 According to the GEC’s August 2020 special report, Russia’s disinformation 

and propaganda ecosystem is the collection of official, proxy, and 

unattributed communication channels and platforms that Russia 

uses to create and amplify false narratives. The Kremlin bears direct 

responsibility for cultivating these tactics and platforms as part of its 

approach to using information as a weapon. It invests massively in 

its propaganda channels, its intelligence services, and its proxies to 

conduct malicious cyber activity to support disinformation efforts, 

and it leverages outlets that masquerade as news sites or research 

institutions to spread false and misleading narratives.22 Key entities 

involved in Russia’s influence campaign related to COVID-19 include 

RIA Novosti, RT (formerly Russia Today), Sputnik News, the intelligence services, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of 

Defense, as well as trolls, bots, and fake accounts.23

Throughout the COVID-19 crisis, the key targets of the Kremlin’s disinformation messaging have been the EU, NATO, the United 

States, Ukraine, the WHO, Bill Gates, and George Soros.24 As 

observed by the Polish Institute for International Affairs, the pandemic has become an opportunity for both Russia and China to 

conduct disinformation campaigns that include overt and covert propaganda directed at the EU, NATO, and the United States.25 Among 

the main aims of the pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns around 

the COVID-19 pandemic are to discredit the EU and expose it as a 

failed project, and to strengthen the legitimacy of the authoritarian 

Russian state and enhance its position in the international arena.26
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COVID-19 and the Information Ecosystem

Polluting discourse from multinational and nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, and individuals associated with these entities27

is designed to instigate chaos. In its practice of this information, or 

asymmetric, warfare, Russia is applying technical advances to a longstanding strategic playbook (see box).

INFODEMICS AND RUSSIAN NEOIMPERIALISM

The Russian Federation is the direct descendant of the Soviet 

Union, and Russian political warfare practitioners have inherited the 

USSR’s political warfare theories and practices.28 As intelligence 

scholars have noted, Soviet KGB operations included subversion, 

media manipulation, propaganda, forgeries, political repression, 

political assassinations, agents of influence, the establishment of 

opposition parties and criminal organizations, antiwar movements 

and front organizations, and proxy paramilitary operations.29 These 

activities bear a striking resemblance to the current practices of 

the Russian Federation’s Federal Security Service (FSB), including 

such “soft power” exercises as worldwide disinformation campaigns, 

foreign political meddling, and the establishment of networks of 

influence abroad.30

The foreign policy of the Russian Federation, particularly under 

Vladimir Putin, is often referred to as imperial or neoimperial, using 

force as a tool to spread influence and dominate other political 

actors.31 Russia’s aggressiveness toward its immediate neighbors and 

areas considered to be within its zone of influence—such as Ukraine, 

Georgia, or the Baltic States—stems, according to some scholars, 

from Western efforts to extend NATO affiliation to former members 

of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.32 Putin’s 

response—territorial expansion, aggressive nationalist ideology, and 

confrontation with the West33—is largely predefined by the state’s 

imperial traditions, memories, and fears that the Kremlin may irretrievably lose control over lands that were once Russian, as assessed 

in European scholar Ostap Kushnir’s thorough study of Russian neoimperialism.34, 35 These strategies, based on spreading internal fears 
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of external, encroaching threat, are a continuation of longstanding 

policies of Soviet and Russian leaders to “rally-round-the-flag” in 

order to gain domestic popularity and support.36

Moscow’s use of information warfare—based on disinformation, 

propaganda, and deception37—to correct the imbalance between 

Russia and the West38 also serves the purpose of the Russian military’s so-called Gerasimov’s Doctrine.39, 40 Chief of the General Staff 

Valery Gerasimov proposed in 2013 that asymmetric methods be 

used to weaken government legitimacy in the eyes of a target state’s 

population.41, 42 These activities, short of kinetic warfare along a 

spectrum of conflict, pursue alternative battlefields, where U.S. and 

Western dominance is less relevant; target the population; and attack 

the decisionmaking process of the target state.43 Such an approach 

is part of the wider concept of total war (New Generation Warfare–

NGW), endorsed by Russia’s leadership. NGW is a concept for fighting total war in Europe, simultaneously across all fronts—political, 

economic, informational, and cyber—through fear and intimidation, 

but without launching a large-scale attack.44 Increasing fear and 

intimidation can also be fueled by Russia’s military capabilities: 

its nuclear and conventional capabilities and its application of the 

anti-access and area denial (A2AD) approach in “strategic outposts” 

such as the Kola Peninsula, Kaliningrad Oblast, or Crimea.45

Not So Quiet on the Eastern Front

As part of Russia’s active, worldwide propaganda operation, the 

Kremlin engages in a persistent campaign in the Central and Eastern European countries, seeking to recapture influence over territory 

considered by Russia to be its rightful buffer zone from NATO and 

the EU.46 This is especially true during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, as social unrest and fear are easily exploitable foundations for 

disinformation campaigns. The Kremlin disseminates its narratives 

to Russian speakers in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, and neighboring countries through a variety of means, including traditional 

and social media.47 Poland has become a “petri dish” for Russia and 
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COVID-19 and the Information Ecosystem

China to try out their disinformation tactics, including their trolls 

and bots, according to the U.S. Ambassador.48 The Polish Internal 

Security Agency warns that Russia has been using and will continue 

to use all available methods to influence the political situation in the 

region, including operations against democratic elections and processes, to achieve Russian geopolitical aims that include pushing U.S. 

influence out of Europe, undermining the integrity and efficiency of 

NATO, and weakening the coherence of the EU—effectively leading 

to the “neutralization” of Central and Eastern Europe.49

Central and Eastern Europe, therefore, have become Russia’s test 

field for new propaganda methods before they are employed in Western 

Europe and the United States, and the regions of the Eastern Partnership 

(consisting of the EU countries and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine), the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), and Visegrad Group countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 

and Hungary) are special targets for information warfare.50 According 

to Col. Zdzislaw Sliwa of the Baltic Defense College, Lithuania, Latvia, 

and Estonia are on the cyber frontline of Russian propaganda targeting 

Russian-speaking minorities and disinformation tactics that he calls the 

“dirty news laundering”—making these countries an invaluable source 

of experience and intelligence for the NATO alliance.51 As Central and 

Eastern European countries, especially those that were part of the former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union, are often the first to be targeted by 

Russian active measures, their experiences and field intelligence could 

be used as a forewarning, enabling the NATO partners to prepare for 

malign influence tactics, techniques, and procedures being recalibrated 

for Russia’s use against Western Europe and the United States.52

Some Men Just Want to Watch the World Burn

Some of the Russian Federation’s disinformation activities focus on 

disadvantaged populations abroad in order to leverage frustration, 

according to a European Parliament study,53 that is fueled by economic 

crisis and resulting social inequalities.54 This economic crisis, amplified 
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and exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, is being exploited by 

Russian disinformation strategies to instigate riots and mass protests 

abroad.55 During the early months of the COVID-19 crisis, according 

to a Central and Eastern European think tank, the Russian agency RIA 

Novosti sought to instigate socioeconomic fear and unrest in the West 

by publishing disinformation narratives that claimed the EU and the 

United States were bracing themselves for hunger riots as an outcome 

of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic.56 Russia backs and finances, directly or 

indirectly, various and sometimes competing protest groups in foreign 

countries, such as the Occupy movement.57 It also reportedly controlled 

social media activities that amplified the “yellow vests” movement in 

France, enabling the protests to become more threatening to the French 

government.58 Confirmed to have meddled in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, when Russian trolls posing as Americans made payments 

to genuine activists in the United States to fund protest movements on 

socially divisive issues,59 Russia has continued during the COVID-19 

crisis to organize conflicting demonstrations. The St. Petersburg-based 

Internet Research Agency (IRA), which specializes in creating and disseminating false information on social media,60 uses ads designed to 

exacerbate racial tensions and related problems including police brutality, violence against police, white supremacy, and immigration61 to 

fan mutual suspicion on both sides of a conflict.62 

Russia is seemingly unable to have direct, concrete, and immediate 

influence on election results or the policies of individual governments 

or transnational organizations of the Western world. It does, however, 

employ political lobbying and corruption schemes. The most notable 

targets of such approaches are high-level European politicians—e.g., 

German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, Finnish Prime Minister Paavo 

Lipponen, and Chancellor of Austria Wolfgang Schüssel—who have 

been offered top management positions in Kremlin-dependent companies, such as Gazprom, Rosneft, and Lukoil, after they retired from 

office.63 Apart from targeting the leadership of Western European 

nations, Russia finds it less expensive and more convenient to resort 
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COVID-19 and the Information Ecosystem

to raising chaos, unrest, and disorder, which are the key features of 

influence groups linked to it. The Kremlin’s actions are not about supporting pro-Russian circles, but about a modernized version of the 

“Divide et Impera” (divide and rule) principle. According to Lt. Col. 

Geir Hagen Karlsen, director for Strategic Communication at the Norwegian Command and Staff College, influence activities directed at 

the populations of Europe aim to disrupt and create distrust, and the 

“divide and rule” approach means to create as many cleavages at as 

many levels as possible; Russia, as a large power, could then more easily 

deal with a multi-fragmented Europe. Karlsen highlights three levels 

of the “divide and rule” approach: first, at the European level, attacking NATO and the EU; second, at the interstate level, creating division 

and distrust between nations; and third, at the intrastate level, creating 

division internally among various groups in individual countries.64

Russia will continue to use disinformation and malinformation 

during the COVID-19 crisis and its aftermath, as the world struggles to emerge from the pandemic. The Kremlin will run its information campaigns through a variety of venues including social media, 

state-controlled news, pseudo-science, and official statements to disseminate lies and distortions.65 Such actions will not disintegrate the 

United States or the EU and will not allow Russian-controlled puppets to hijack the governments: what matters is to amplify the chaos 

and to weaken the public trust in and the legitimacy of democratic 

systems, as the weaker the government’s legitimacy, the weaker the 

state.66 The immediate effects of disinformation and misinformation 

on affected societies are increased feelings of fear, anxiety, uncertainty, and anger, leading to the disruption of social fabric and further 

exacerbation of ongoing chaos.67

Protecting the Home Front 

Preventing, interdicting, and mitigating disinformation is likely to be 

one of the top concerns of the United States and its Western allies 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

as they face the challenge of asymmetric warfare employed by the 

Russian Federation and other hostile states, especially in the postCOVID-19 era. As indicated earlier, foreign meddling to sow discord, 

increase tensions, and exacerbate societal divisions within a population is one of the most serious risks to the social fabric. If the public loses trust in democratic values and the systems of government 

based on them, that would lead to chaos and anarchy and open the 

gates for fringe and radical political parties, violent extremism and 

terrorism, and finally social and economic unrest. Destroying or at 

least undermining democratic standards and suppressing civil societies are the ultimate goals of authoritarian rulers. Russia has been in 

the vanguard of a relentless campaign against liberal values and has 

moved persistently to export authoritarian ideas and techniques to 

other societies.68 Putin’s strategy, as summarized by President Joseph 

Biden and the head of the Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and 

Global Engagement Michael Carpenter, is to take the fight beyond 

Russia’s borders to attack what it perceives as the greatest external 

threat to its survival: Western democracy. By attacking the West, the 

Kremlin shifts attention away from corruption and economic malaise 

at home, activates nationalist passions to stifle internal dissent, and 

keeps Western democracies on the defensive and preoccupied with 

internal divisions, allowing Moscow to consolidate its power at home 

and exert untrammeled influence over its “near abroad.”69

Saving democratic values and protecting Western societies from 

conflict and discord amplified by disinformation calls for swiftly 

applied preventive measures. The fundamental approach to countering disinformation at the societal level is to invest in education, raising 

awareness of the threats induced by disinformation. Such awareness 

can be achieved by inspiring media literacy training, beginning at 

middle or junior high school level. It can also be reinforced by supporting and funding fact-checking initiatives.70 As noted earlier, in 

order to protect the home front, the same strategies should be applied 

in the countries that are on the forefront of Russian disinformation 
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COVID-19 and the Information Ecosystem

campaigns. Isolationism is not a solution, as allowing the Kremlin to 

undermine young democracies would eventually lead to the reversal 

of the post-Cold War order.

At the governmental level (both nationally and internationally 

among Western allies), it is also essential to appraise the opportunities 

for the use of artificial intelligence, data science, and machine learning 

to aid and assist responsible government agencies, health care providers, news media of all types, and civil society organizations to process 

and analyze information, in order to deliver reliable and actionable 

information to stakeholders and decisionmakers. Such an approach 

requires collaborative action on a global scale because crises such as 

the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic are borderless and cannot be tackled by individual nations, regardless of their wealth and power. The 

implementation and enforcement of integrated preventive procedures 

necessitate the internationalization of infodemic management.71

Finally, from the perspective of the intelligence services of the 

United States and its Western partners, it is crucial to learn from 

the experiences of the nations being first affected by the Kremlin’s 

information warfare. As highlighted earlier, these countries are the 

training grounds for the malign influence tactics and techniques that 

Russia later uses elsewhere, primarily in the Western world. Western intelligence services might consider the benefits of establishing a 

dedicated research center that would cooperate closely with affiliated 

academic and intelligence partners in the former Warsaw Pact countries, which are most severely affected by the Russian disinformation 

campaigns. As retired U.S. Department of Homeland Security official 

Wesley Moy and the author have proposed, this group would include 

the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, and Poland. The practitioners 

and experts representing government agencies and intelligence services of all countries involved would partner with a transatlantic alliance of scholars specializing in the domain of Russian influence and 

disinformation activities. Such a research center would be unique 

in fostering the study of Russian disinformation in real time and in 
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the authentic field of asymmetric warfare operations. The know-how 

gained could then be adjusted to the American setting and tested in 

wargaming exercises, allowing for the design of proactive, sound, and 

empirically-based policies for the prevention, mitigation, and interdiction of foreign malign operations in the United States.

∂ 72

About the Author

Kacper T. Gradon, Ph.D., is the Honorary Senior Research Fellow at 

University College London (UCL) and a visiting professor in UCL’s 

Department of Security and Crime Science. He is also the Visiting 

Fulbright Professor at the University of Colorado Boulder–Prevention 

Science Center and Associate Professor in the Department of Cybersecurity at Warsaw University of Technology. His research expertise 

includes multiple homicide and other criminal analysis and counterterrorism. Dr. Gradon has published on the application of open-source 

intelligence, as well as digital and Internet forensics and analysis, to 

forecasting and combating cyber-enabled crime and terrorism, including malign foreign influence and disinformation campaigns. He is a 

trained World Health Organization Infodemic Manager.

Endnotes

1 Zhangkai J. Cheng and Jing Shan, “2019 Novel Coronavirus: Where We Are and 

What We Know,” Infection 48, no. 2 (April 2020): 155-63, doi:10.1007/s15010-

020-01401-y, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32072569/.

2 Center for Systems Science and Engineering, COVID-19 Dashboard, Johns 

Hopkins University, https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html. 

3 United Nations, “Describing COVID-19 Pandemic as Wake-Up Call, Dress 

Rehearsal for Future Challenges, Secretary-General Opens Annual General 

Assembly Debate with Vision for Solidarity,” Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 

September 22, 2020, https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/ga12268.doc.htm.
221

COVID-19 and the Information Ecosystem

4 Taher S. Valika, Sarah E. Maurrasse, and Lara Reichert, “A Second Pandemic? 

Perspective on Information Overload in the COVID-19 Era,” Otolaryngology—Head and Neck Surgery 163, no. 5 (November 2020): 931-33, doi:10

.1177/0194599820935850, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32513072/.

5 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Countering False Information on Social 

Media in Disasters and Emergencies, Social Media Working Group for Emergency Services and Disaster Management Report, March 28, 2018, https://

www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/SMWG_Countering-False-InfoSocial-Media-Disasters-Emergencies_Mar2018-508.pdf.

6 Kathryn E. Bouskill and Elta Smith, “Global Health and Security: Threats and 

Opportunities,” RAND Perspective, December 2019, https://www.rand.org/

pubs/perspectives/PE332.html.

7 Jennifer Rose, “The Mortal Coil of Covid-19, Fake News, and Negative Epistemic Postdigital Inculcation,” Postdigital Science and Education 2 (October 

2020): 812-29. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42438-020-00192-7.

8 Fabio Tagliabue, Luca Galassi, and Pierpaolo Mariani, “The ‘Pandemic’ of 

Disinformation in COVID-19,” SN Comprehensive Clinical Medicine, August 

1, 2020, 1-3, doi:10.1007/s42399-020-00439-1, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.

gov/32838179/.

9 Wesley Moy and Kacper Gradon, “COVID-19 Effects and Russian Disinformation Campaigns,” Homeland Security Affairs 16, no. 8 (December 2020), https://

www.hsaj.org/articles/16533.

10 Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Covid-19 Disinformation & Social 

Media Manipulation, October 27, 2020, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/covid19-disinformation.

11 United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, Stop the 

Virus of Disinformation: The Risk of Malicious Use of Social Media During 

COVID-19 and the Technology Options To Fight It, November 2020, http://www.

unicri.it/sites/default/files/2020-11/SM%20misuse.pdf.

12 David J. Rothkopf, “When the Buzz Bites Back,” Washington Post, May 11, 2003, 

B01.

13 World Health Organization, Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Situation Report–45, March 5, 2020, https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/

coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200305-sitrep-45-covid-19.pdf.

14 Lejla Turcilo and Mladen Obrenovic, “Misinformation, Disinformation, Malinformation: Causes, Trends, and Their Influence on Democracy,” Heinrich Böll 

Foundation Companion to Democracy #3, August 2020, https://hk.boell.org/

sites/default/files/importedFiles/2020/11/04/200825_E-Paper3_ENG.pdf.
222

A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

15 Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan, “Information Disorder: Towards an 

Interdisciplinary Framework for Research and Policy-Making,” Council of 

Europe Report, September 27, 2017, https://rm.coe.int/information-disordertoward-an-interdisciplinary-framework-for-researc/168076277c.

16 Adam Kucharski, The Rules of Contagion: Why Things Spread–and Why They 

Stop (New York: Basic Books, 2020).

17 Elinor Carmi et al., “Data Citizenship: Rethinking Data Literacy in the Age of 

Disinformation, Misinformation, and Malinformation,” Internet Policy Review

9, no. 2 (May 28, 2020), DOI: 10.14763/2020.2.1481, https://policyreview.info/

pdf/policyreview-2020-2-1481.pdf.

18 UK House of Commons, Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Disinformation and ‘fake news,’ Final Report: Eighth Report of Session 2017–19, 

February 14, 2019, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/

cmcumeds/1791/1791.pdf.

19 Matteo Cinelli et al., “The COVID-19 Social Media Infodemic,” Nature Scientific Reports 10, no. 16598 (October 6, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1038/

s41598-020-73510-5.

20 Moy and Gradon, “COVID-19 Effects and Russian Disinformation 

Campaigns.” 

21 U.S. Department of State, “Briefing on Disinformation and Propaganda Related 

to COVID-19,” Special Briefing by Lea Gabrielle, Special Envoy and Coordinator of the Global Engagement Center, March 27, 2020, https://www.state.

gov/briefing-with-special-envoy-lea-gabrielle-global-engagement-center-ondisinformation-and-propaganda-related-to-covid-19/.

22 U.S. Department of State, GEC Special Report: August 2020. Pillars of Russia’s 

Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem, August 2020, https://www.state.gov/

wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Pillars-of-Russia%E2%80%99s-Disinformationand-Propaganda-Ecosystem_08-04-20.pdf.

23 Polish Government Information Services, “Polska na celowniku dezinformacji” 

[Poland in the crosshairs of disinformation], Report of the Minister-Coordinator for Special Services, Government of the Republic of Poland, 2020, https://

www.gov.pl/web/sluzby-specjalne/polska-na-celowniku-dezinformacji. 

24 Ray Serrato and Jake Wallis, “Covid-19 and the Reach of pro-Kremlin Messaging,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute Covid-19 Disinformation & Social Media 

Manipulation Reports, Issue 215, October 8, 2020, https://s3-ap-southeast-2.

amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2020-10/Pro%20Kremlin%20messaging.pdf.

25 Agnieszka Legucka and Marcin Przychodniak, “Dezinformacja Chin i Rosji

podczas pandemii Covid-19” [Disinformation by China and Russia during
223

COVID-19 and the Information Ecosystem

Covid-19 pandemic], Polish Institute for International Affairs Bulletin, No. 86, 

April 21, 2020 https://pism.pl/publikacje/Dezinformacja_Chin_i_Rosji_w_

trakcie_pandemii_COVID19. 

26 Julia Baer-Bader, “EU Response to Disinformation from Russia on COVID-19: 

Three Lessons,” German Council on Foreign Relations–DGAP Commentary, 

No. 18, June 3, 2020, https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/eu-responsedisinformation-russia-covid-19

27 Tad A. Schnaufer, “Redefining Hybrid Warfare: Russia’s Nonlinear War against 

the West,” Journal of Strategic Security 10, no. 1 (2017): 17–31, https://doi.org/

10.5038/1944-0472.10.1.1538.

28 Jeffrey V. Dickey et al., “Russian Political Warfare: Origin, Evolution and Application” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2015), https://www.

hsdl.org/?view&did=811550.

29 Dickey et al., “Russian Political Warfare.”

30 Orysia Lutsevych, “Agents of the Russian World: Proxy Groups in the Contested Neighbourhood,” Chatham House: The Royal Institute of International 

Affairs Report, April 2016, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/

publications/research/2016-04-14-agents-russian-world-lutsevych.pdf.

31 Jurji Temirow, “Neoimperializm, Rosja i zagrozenie pustki” [Neo-imperialism, Russia and the threat of emptiness], Obserwator Miedzynarodowy (PL) 

5, August 2020, http://obserwatormiedzynarodowy.pl/2020/08/05/prof-jurijtemirow-neoimperializm-rosja-i-zagrozenie-pustki-analiza/.

32 Andrew Natsios, “Introduction: Putin’s New Russia: Fragile State or Revisionist Power?,” South Central Review 35, no. 1 (Spring 2018): 1-21, DOI: 10.1353/

scr.2018.0000, https://muse.jhu.edu/issue/38271.

33 Natsios, “Introduction: Putin’s New Russia.”

34 Ostap Kushnir, Ukraine and Russian Neo-Imperialism: The Divergent Break

(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2018).

35 Marcel Van Herpen, “Confronting Russia’s New Imperialism: The Different Fates 

of Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states,” Barcelona Centre for International 

Affairs Monografias, November 2017, https://www.cidob.org/en/articulos/

monografias/war_in_peacetime_russia_s_strategy_on_nato_s_eastern_and_

southern_flanks/confronting_russia_s_new_imperialism_the_different_fates_

of_ukraine_belarus_and_the_baltic_states.

36 Anna Yudina, “The Rally `round The Flag Effect In Russia: How An International Crisis Turns Regime Opponents Into Regime Supporters” (unpublished 

dissertation, University of North Carolina, 2015), https://doi.org/10.17615/

h5pg-4d29.
224

A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

37 U.S. Army Special Operations Command, “Little Green Men”: A Primer on 

Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013–2014, 2016, https://

www.jhuapl.edu/Content/documents/ARIS_LittleGreenMen.pdf.

38 Alina Polyakova, “Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-driven Asymmetric 

Warfare,” Brookings Series: A Blueprint for the Future of AI: 2018-2019, November 15, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weakrussia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/.

39 Moy and Gradon, “COVID-19 Effects and Russian Disinformation Campaigns.” 

40 Ofer Fridman, “On the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’: Why the West Fails to Beat Russia 

to the Punch,” PRISM 8, no. 2 (2019): 100-12, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/

68/Documents/prism/prism_8-2/PRISM_8-2_Fridman.pdf.

41 Tad A. Schnaufer, “Redefining Hybrid Warfare: Russia’s Nonlinear War against 

the West,” Journal of Strategic Security 10, no. 1 (2017): 17–31, https://scholar

commons.usf.edu/jss/vol10/iss1/3/.

42 Charles K. Bartles, “Russia’s Indirect and Asymmetric Methods as a Response to 

the New Western Way of War,” Special Operations Journal 2, no. 1 (June 1, 2016), 

DOI: 10.1080/23296151.2016.1134964, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/

10.1080/23296151.2016.1134964.

43 Schnaufer, “Redefining Hybrid Warfare: Russia’s Nonlinear War against the 

West.”

44 Martin N. Murphy, “Understanding Russia’s Concept for Total War in Europe,” 

The Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 184, September 12, 2016, http://

report.heritage.org/sr184.

45 Guillaume Lasconjarias and Jeffrey A. Larsen, ed., NATO’s Response to Hybrid 

Threats (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2015).

46 John Walcott and Warren Strobel, “Russia Has ‘Playbook’ for Covert Influence 

in Eastern Europe: Study,” Reuters, October 13, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/

article/us-russia-security-usa-idUSKCN12D13Q.

47 Todd C. Helmus et al., Russian Social Media Influence: Understanding Russian 

Propaganda in Eastern Europe (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2237.html.

48 Matt Apuzzo, “Pressured by China, E.U. Softens Report on Covid-19 Disinformation,” New York Times, May 1, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/24/

world/europe/disinformation-china-eu-coronavirus.html.

49 Michal Wojnowski, “Presidential Elections as a State Destabilization Tool in the 

Theory and Practice of the Russian Info-psychological Operations in the 20th 

and 21st Century,” Internal Security Review, 21/19, 2019, 311-33, http://www

.abw.gov.pl/download/1/2892/MWojnowski-ENG.pdf.
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COVID-19 and the Information Ecosystem

50 Olga Chyzhova (Coordinator), Disinformation Resilience in Central and Eastern Europe, Ukrainian Prism–The Foreign Policy Council (Kyiv), 2018, http://

prismua.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/DRI_CEE_2018.pdf.

51 Zdzislaw Sliwa, “Podcast: Cyberbezpieczeństwo, to też walka z ‘praniem 

brudnych informacji’” [Podcast: cybersecurity is also combating ‘dirty information laundering’], Nowa Europa Wschodnia (New Eastern Europe), December 19, 2020, https://new.org.pl/#944,podcast_s2e8_litwa_lotwa_estonia_i_

cyberbezpieczenstwo.

52 Moy and Gradon, “COVID-19 Effects and Russian Disinformation 

Campaigns.”

53 Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Directorate 

General for Internal Policies of the Union, Disinformation and Propaganda–

Impact on the Functioning of the Rule of Law in the EU and Its Member States

(Commissioned by European Parliament), PE 608.864, February 2019, 30, 

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/608864/IPOL

_STU(2019)608864_EN.pdf.

54 Brooke Rogers, “The Economic Downturn: A Boon for Home-grown Terrorists?,” NATO Review Magazine, July 27, 2012. https://www.nato.int/docu/

review/articles/2012/07/27/the-economic-downturn-a-boon-for-home-grownterrorists/index.html.

55 Jolanta Darczewska, “Srodki aktywne jako rosyjska agresja hybrydowa w retrospekcji. Wybrane problem” [Active measures as Russian hybrid warfare in 

retrospect. selected problems], Przeglad Bezpieczenstwa Wewnetrznego ABW

(Internal Security Review), 18/18, 2018, 45, file:///C:/Users/Owner/Downloads/

2__PBW18_J__Darczewska.pdf.

56 Michal Szkaradek and Wojciech Przybylski, “Hunger Riots in Europe? The 

Kremlin in Action: Russian Disinformation through the European Parliament, 

Visegrad Insight Report, May 12, 2020, https://visegradinsight.eu/hunger-riotsin-europe-the-kremlin-in-action/.

57 Micah White, “Troll Lives Matter? Russian Infiltration of the Black Lives Matters Movement,” in Troll Factories: Russia’s Web Brigades, ed., A. Karpen (New 

York, NY: Greenhaven Publishing, 2019).

58 Matthew Dalton, “France Probes Any Moscow Role in Yellow-Vest Movement,” Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/

france-probes-any-moscow-role-in-yellow-vest-movement-11544826863.

59 Shaun Walker, “Russian Troll Factory Paid US Activists To Help Fund Protests 

During Elections,” Guardian, October 17, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/

world/2017/oct/17/russian-troll-factory-activists-protests-us-election.
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60 Josephine Lukito, “Coordinating a Multi-Platform Disinformation Campaign: Internet Research Agency Activity on Three U.S. Social Media Platforms, 2015 to 2017,” Political Communication 37, no. 2 (2020): 238-55, DOI: 

10.1080/10584609.2019.1661889, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.10

80/10584609.2019.1661889.

61 April Glaser, “Russian Trolls Were Obsessed With Black Lives Matter,” Slate, May 

11, 2018, https://slate.com/technology/2018/05/russian-trolls-are-obsessedwith-black-lives-matter.html. 

62 Nick Penzenstadler, Brad Heath, and Jessica Guynn, “We Read Every One of the 

3,517 Facebook Ads Bought by Russians. Here’s What We Found,” USA Today,

May 11, 2018. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/05/11/what-wefound-facebook-ads-russians-accused-election-meddling/602319002/.

63 Grzegorz Kuczynski, “Follow the Petro-roubles: European Officials Go Into 

Russian Business,” Warsaw Institute News, March 25, 2019, https://warsaw

institute.org/follow-petro-roubles-european-officials-go-russian-business.

64 Geir Hagen Karlsen, “Divide and Rule: Ten Lessons about Russian Political 

Influence Activities in Europe,” Palgrave Communications 5, no. 19 (February 

8, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0227-8.

65 Sergey Sukhankin, “Covid-19 as a Tool of Information Confrontation: Russia’s 

Approach,” School of Public Policy Publications (University of Calgary) 13, no. 

3 (April 2020): 1-9, https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/

COVID-19-Tool-of-Information-Sukhankin.pdf.

66 Piotr Panek, “Amerykanin, Rusek i Covid” [American, Russian and Covid], 

Niedowiary Blog Szalonych Naukowcow, December 17, 2020, https://naukowy.

blog.polityka.pl/2020/12/17/amerykanin-rusek-i-covid/.

67 Kacper Gradon, “Crime in the Time of the Plague: Fake News Pandemic and the 

Challenges to Law-Enforcement and Intelligence Community,” Society Register

4, no. 2, (April 2020), DOI: 10.14746/sr.2020.4.2.10, https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/340489268_CRIME_IN_THE_TIME_OF_THE_PLAGUE_

FAKE_NEWS_PANDEMIC_AND_THE_CHALLENGES_TO_LAWENFORCEMENT_AND_INTELLIGENCE_COMMUNITY.

68 Arch Puddington, “Breaking Down Democracy. Goals, Strategies, and Methods 

of Modern Authoritarians,” Freedom House Special Report, June 2017, https://

freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/June2017_FH_Report_Breaking_Down_

Democracy.pdf.

69 Joseph R. Biden, Jr. and Michael Carpenter, “How to Stand up to the Kremlin: 

Defending Democracy against Its Enemies,” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 1 (January/
227

COVID-19 and the Information Ecosystem

February 2018), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2017-12-05/

how-stand-kremlin

70 Lorant Gyori, “Countering Fake News. We Must Wake Up Before It Gets Too 

Late: A CASE STUDY from Hungary,” Visegrad Insight Report, May 31, 2019, 

https://visegradinsight.eu/countering-fake-news/.

71 Kacper Gradon et al., “Countering Misinformation: A Multidisciplinary Approach,” Big Data & Society (Studying the COVID-19 Infodemic at Scale Special

Issue), May 5, 2021, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/205395172

11013848.

72 Moy and Gradon, “COVID-19 Effects and Russian Disinformation Campaigns.” 

PART THREE

LOOKING 

FORWARD

231

BEWARE A VIRUS BEARING GIFTS: 

CAN A “GREAT LEVELER” 

BE OUR ELITES’ BEST FRIEND?

Michael Vlahos

The great coronavirus pandemic is seen everywhere as world shaking 

and world changing. That it is. Yet it should be seen not as a grand historical force, but rather as a force enabler. COVID-19 does not leave earthshattering wreckage in its wake. Rather, it removes popular residual 

restraints so that ruling elites may wreck—and thus reshape—our world 

as they will. Past great upheavals were authentic, multivalent events, 

where plague, climate change, migrations, and war transformed our 

human landscape—often for the better. This handcrafted upheaval, in 

contrast, collars our deepest memories of old terrors—through the urgent 

press of continuous emergency—to lock in an elite-bespoke world order, 

forever. Hence, while antecedent world calamities had the power to bring 

elites and their oppression down, this elite-curated event has deployed 

calamity to ensure the elites’ globe-girdling command of humanity. 

“Great Leveler” refers to Walter Scheidel’s book, The Great Leveler: Violence and the 

History of Inequality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), which charted 

the crucial role violent shocks have played in human history in reducing inequality 

around the world.
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When COVID-19 began to spread, elite wisdom promptly 

declared the world transformed. As early as mid-March 2020, 

Politico Magazine published a wise man survey entitled, “Coronavirus 

Will Change the World Permanently. Here’s How.,”1

 in which dozens 

of “smart, macro thinkers” weighed in on the profound changes to 

come. Yet of the 34 predictions in the Politico piece, only two have 

stood the test of a single year.*

 The sampling size of this exercise helps 

us appreciate the poverty of elite analysis: the forecasts fail because 

they are entirely unconnected to history.

History is quite clear about how pandemics effect “Big Change.”

• A pandemic is not the bearer of change but rather its helpful 

midwife. 

• A pandemic’s arrival in a near-crisis world system will help 

push that system over the edge.

• Pandemic intervention most strongly impacts weakened or 

brittle elites.

These factors are history’s yardsticks for pandemics and world 

change—not the plague’s relative severity in terms of human death 

tolls. Change flows from how the epidemic interacts with the dynamics of a society or larger system already under intense pressure. Let’s 

take a look.

After 10,000 centuries of evolution, the last remaining human 

species has developed a peak value proposition which, for the past 

50 of those centuries, we have called “civilization.” This competitive 

advantage is a vision of human society as a matrix of cities linked 

to a spoke-and-hub network, which has been built out worldwide. 

This human constellation concentrates people into dense communities, with each city connected to the entire mesh. These city networks 

* The two prescient readings in the Politico article were “The Inequality Gap Will 

Widen,” and “Expect a Political Uprising.”
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Beware a Virus Bearing Gifts: Can a “Great Leveler” Be Our Elites’ Best Friend?

have been the germinator and driver of human cultural evolution and 

a continuum of change. 

We describe the history of civilization as relentlessly positive 

and draw our progress on an ever-ascending—even soaring—curve. 

But civilization’s bounty has its downsides, too—both cultural and 

material. The cultural downside inheres in society’s continual tendency to move toward segmented, stratified, and unequal development, which in practical terms operates as a limit on the success 

and relative life expectancy of governing regimes and their constitutional paradigms. Civilization’s material downside concerns the 

collective physiology of cities’ and networks’ health. Since the beginning, dense human communities have created fertile petri dishes for 

culturing disease. Moreover, the networks connecting these communities have served as a primary and efficient pathway for disease 

spread. This proclivity toward pathogenesis and epidemy, in practical terms, has operated as a historically recurring limit to physical 

growth of the world-city matrix.

Pandemic’s Destruction 

At their most severe, pandemic episodes can intersect with a weakening of ruling paradigms to disrupt the integrity of the current global-city matrix and trigger an abrupt discontinuity in civilization itself. 

During civilization’s 50 centuries, just two pandemic episodes—the 

Justinianic Plague (541–49) and the Black Death (1346–53)—were 

vast enough to disrupt the world-city matrix. In each episode, civilization survived, presenting an uneven topology of subsidence, but the 

world-city matrix broke into smaller, more self-referent networks.2

The first such dynamic pandemic, the Justinianic Plague saw the 

initial visitation of Yersinia pestis—the same bacteria that caused the 

Black Death eight centuries later. It killed between 30 percent and 

60 percent of the Greco-Roman population, and its impact was felt 

across the Greco-Roman world.3

 The Roman (Byzantine) effort to 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

reintegrate the Mediterranean world system came to a sudden end as 

the plague depressed intra-Mediterranean trade and the amount of 

currency in circulation. Rome’s superpower authority and that of the 

Sassanians in neighboring Persia were gravely weakened.

During the second and more familiar great pandemic, the Black 

Death, Yersinia pestis again killed as much as 60 percent of the population across Europe, Eurasia, and North Africa.4

 The Mongol Khanate (1206–1368) and its “world network” across Eurasia collapsed, 

and the Byzantine Empire (395–1453) was also dealt a death blow. 

War continued, but armies and navies shrank dramatically.

Even with these huge death tolls, both events reveal an ability 

to maintain political and economic continuity. The life patterns of 

society were unbroken—even in the face of 6 out of 10 mortality. 

What such notable world calamities tell us is that it takes an awful 

lot to disrupt human civilization’s world matrix, and even when that 

matrix is disrupted, the effects are impermanent and evanescent. The 

larger significance of mini apocalypse is not in the direct damage 

and disruption of the plague episode in itself, but rather in the additive impetus of the plague dynamic on other human things. In other 

words, the power of pandemic lies in its capacity to push dynamic 

changes in civilization already underway or to unleash forces so pent 

up that only an exogenous force might intervene. The Chart shows 

plague’s influence long after the pestilence has departed. 

The statuses of the human communities of Late Antiquity and the 

High Middle Ages seem to be in total contrast. The Greco-RomanSassanian world was already coming apart in the 6th century; hence, 

the Justinianic Plague provided the fissiparous force to accelerate its 

breakup. In contrast, when the Black Death hit, 14th century human 

society was rich and living large. Yet the deeply intertwined world 

of the High Middle Ages also came apart, even though its marquee 

societies were rich and powerful. 

What the networked world societies of Late Antiquity and the 

High Middle Ages shared was an elite architecture of rule that was 
235

Beware a Virus Bearing Gifts: Can a “Great Leveler” Be Our Elites’ Best Friend?

highly corrupt and under pressure from below. Yet what are “elites,” or 

the “ruling class,” or even “aristocracy?” Simply, elites are the secret of 

the success of the world of cities (i.e., civilization) and, just as surely, the 

core source of their failure. Millennia ago, elites grew into leadership 

among emerging, late-Neolithic (or Chalcolithic) communities, the 

proto-city-states of early civilization. Elites became a new, necessary, 

and yet ineradicable institution in the new human society—groomed 

to lead and yet insatiable of privilege. Their capacity to inspire or 

oppress would become the heart of civilizational success, and failure.

PANDEMIC’S VAST AND LONG-LASTING IMPACT

For the Greco-RomanSassanian World of the 6th 

and 7th Centuries: 

Trade declined. In the year 530, 

Italy imported 35 percent of 

its wine; by 560, that level had 

fallen to 10 percent.

Circulation of coins collapsed 

between 550 and 600, first in 

the West, then in the East. 

Waves of plague reduced 

Egypt’s population from 30 

million in 540 to 10 million 

in 700.

After 600, Sassanian, then 

Arab and Slav, invaders overran 

the Balkans and Levant.

The world system remained 

segmented into three separate 

culture areas for 500 years.

For the Eurasian World of the 

14th and 15th Centuries:

The Mongol network’s 

collapse and the Ottoman 

Empire’s rise cut Europe off 

from Eurasia a second time.

Social mobility in the West 

surged, and new aristocratic 

lineages emerged. 

Serfdom broke down; labor 

was suddenly in high demand, 

and technology became a valued good as labor costs rose.

England’s prepandemic population, estimated at 4 million 

in 1348, did not reach that 

level again until at least 1700.

Europe broke out of isolation, 

building out a global oceanic 

network.
236

A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

Here is the oppression scorecard:

In Late Antiquity, concentrations of wealth, counterpoised with 

the grinding misery of the people, became unsustainable.5

 Elites 

had become stratified in both East and West. For example, in 450, 

three senators each had wealth equal to that of the imperial Roman 

state. In contrast, perhaps 20 percent of the population was enslaved, 

with many more millions in colony serfdom.6

 Desperate, wholesale 

migrations from governed spaces had created autonomous, insurgent spaces the size of modern Belgium or even Hungary. Germanic 

invaders were often welcomed because they ended hated taxes. 

In the High Middle Ages, population had maxed out and had 

been exploited to its productive limit. Feudal society was a tyranny. 

The supply of serfs exceeded demand, and a corrupt Church owned 

the majority of the region’s assets. 

... Leads to Transformat

The evidence leaves no doubt. The collapse of the Western Roman 

state between 450 and 550 and the near collapse, and then reconstitution, of a new Byzantine state (550–700) brought great benefit and 

relief to the people of the Mediterranean world. The tripartite successor subsystems—Latin West, Greek East, and Arab Levant—saw 

declines in trade, urbanization, and literacy, although less so in the 

Levant. But—bottom line—people were more free.7

As early modern Europe emerged from succeeding waves of 

Black Death, the people were freed from serfdom. They could command much higher wages, and free men could aspire to landed gentry status.8

 Kings, who depended on such free men to flesh out their 

armies, found they could only make war if they had the money to hire 

professional soldier companies or raise volunteer “free companies” 

from yeomen with the promise of advancement to gentry status for 

their captains and lieutenants.9

 Technology was now highly prized as 

a means to offset lost labor, and its advances—the powered loom, the 
237

Beware a Virus Bearing Gifts: Can a “Great Leveler” Be Our Elites’ Best Friend?

polder-draining windmill, the three-masted ship, working muskets, 

and the printing press—shocked the established power structure. In 

this new world, reformation of both Church and establishment was 

now “just a shot away.”10 In other words, the two great Yersinia pestis

pandemics broke up long-established social and political patterns in 

civilization, as well as rending wealth-building networks for trade 

and cultural mixing—and this was good. 

Why was it good? Those long-established social and political 

patterns were—to be polite—perhaps too hard and too fixed. By 

541 and by 1346, civilization had reached the point where regular 

people had zero chance of upward mobility and, thus, zero hope of 

social advancement and economic betterment. Moreover, the wealthbuilding networks of the system had become a wired racket for the 

elite. The anointed aristocratic caste (making up perhaps 1 percent of 

the population) and its accompanying privileged servant class (adding another 9 percent) got ever richer and richer, while an increasingly excluded and oppressed 90 percent of the population would 

forever have no voice, no outlet, and no hope.11, 12

Above all, remember that these Yersinia pestis events were existential—at least to those who lived through or died in them. Such is 

not the nature of today’s COVID-19 pandemic. The current pandemic 

ranks ninth on Wikipedia’s list of Major Epidemics and Pandemics by 

Death Toll—which might be argued, is a perfectly modern exercise in 

misdirection, as it ignores the overall explosion of the world’s population.13 This sleight of hand makes it possible to represent the coronavirus’s death toll of 3.7 million (as of June 2021)14 as something as close to 

an existential event as great plagues of times past. COVID-19 and the 

tragic “HIV/AIDS pandemic”—which ranks number 4, with a death 

toll of 35 million—set against a world population of 7.8 billion15 cannot 

be compared to the Black Death or the Justinianic Plague, where perhaps half of humanity perished. Have 4 billion people died of AIDS? 

In practical terms, although existential pandemics threaten the 

very life of society, for elites the pandemics threaten what they value 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

most—their accumulated wealth and right to rule. Stratified and 

unjust elite orders, no matter what their titular authority, are actually quite brittle. The Roman order of Late Antiquity and the “Latin” 

church order of the High Middle Ages initially survived as ruling 

institutions, yet in several generations they had either collapsed or 

radically reformed. Today’s Western elites eerily mirror the 1+9 percent aristocratic and privileged servant demography of Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages described above, yet our grandee class may 

actually be wealthier and their regimes even more sclerotic than their 

ancient and medieval antecedents.16 They have done their best to turn 

COVID-19 into a wealth and regime building opportunity by comparing the coronavirus directly to the great plagues and giving it inconsistent significance. Placing the pandemic so high in the hierarchy of 

human calamity has served as an elite dispensation: A wide-open call 

to arms for Western aristocracies to consolidate and expand their hold 

on increasingly restive societies.

The long national shutdowns have wiped away constraints on the 

state, creating, in effect, a clean slate for new constitutional norms. 

Moreover, asserted as precedent with instant standing, these new 

norms will constitute a major expansion of state power. For example, drawn-out, draconian Blue state lockdowns have established a 

strong precedent for open-ended state emergency powers. Summarily invoked and enforced like martial law, rule-by-fiat now has the 

constitutional standing to drive future “Green New Deal” reordering 

and regulation of society.

Expanded state ruling and its enforcement implicitly mean 

expanded privileges and protections for preferred groups. The time 

of lockdown has also amplified wealth concentration. High-skilled, 

high-paying virtual jobs ensure that elite income is untouched, while 

the great working class shift to tomorrow’s labor market—the “gig 

economy”—is correspondingly accelerated.17 New analysis shows 

that, in terms of the 1 percent, wealth concentration in the United 

States is double that of the Roman Empire.18
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Beware a Virus Bearing Gifts: Can a “Great Leveler” Be Our Elites’ Best Friend?

Which brings us back full circle to the Politico piece. The 34 contributors—with one exception—presented COVID-19 as a route to a 

better world: an “expert”-ruled “reformed society” emphasizing “virtual reality” but also “a healthier digital lifestyle,” state “family care,” 

more science, less religion, “big government” inspiring a new citizen solidarity, leading to “new trust in institutions, “universal basic 

income” but also, state “restraints on mass consumption,” and surely 

including a Green New Deal (curbing wanton desires like “driving 

cars, eating meat, and burning electricity”).

The impressionistic vision from this wide-ranging, uncoordinated 

sampling is unusually consistent in presenting the elite worldview. It also 

generally harmonizes with the sweeping “future of humanity” assessments from the 2020 World Economic Forum in Davos.19 The grandly 

styled “Great Reset”20 has been relentlessly advertised, to the point where 

it is now a standard meme among rightwing insurgents. Yet among the 

American 1+9 percent, it is hailed.†, 21 Hence, in historical contrast to the 

great pandemics, COVID-19 has been adroitly appropriated by ruling 

classes to consolidate power but just as critically, to rework the constitutional terms of the relationship between state and elites and the people.

Yet there is a correlation between COVID-19 and its existential 

plague ancestors. Like in Late Antiquity and the High Middle Ages, 

the people are restive under elite “management” regimes. Moreover, 

COVID lockdowns have intensified gathering rebellion: See intense 

clashes with mounted police, for example, in New South Wales—or 

massive street protests in France over vaccine passports—or the bitter 

recall campaign against California Governor Gavin Newsom because 

of his lockdown policies.

† Continuity and cohesion are consistent with very distinct ruling elites. We still 

celebrate the iconic mindset of the ancien régime, for example. Arguably, elite solidarity today, under the panopticon of social media, is even more monolithic and 

entrenched. Twitter demography strongly skews elite—80 percent of users are affluent 

millennials—and this class groupthink is more often not self-conscious.
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

So what was at first a strategic opportunity for Western elites may, 

in the end, generate a more clamoring insurgency, building on frustration and collective anger already boiling among those left behind. 

Those for whom the rewards once dangled by an ever-richer world 

are now visibly, painfully, withdrawn, with no end in sight.

Robert Frost wrote in 1915: “Two roads diverged in a yellow wood 

...” We Americans want to believe that “The Road Not Taken” is a 

“paean to triumphant self-assertion (‘I took the road less traveled by’),” 

but, as David Orr makes clear “the road he will later call less traveled is 

actually the road equally traveled. The two roads are interchangeable.”22

Americans are constantly confronted with the existential prospect 

of choosing between two unalterably opposed paths—with equally 

all-or-nothing outcomes—and yet, at Frost’s fundamental level, there 

is no choice. Both paths lead to the same place. An elite class that 

once served this nation so well and for so long is failing us. Whatever 

happens—revolt, revolution, overthrow and eventual renewal—this is 

what lies ahead. This is our predestined future. 

The plague did not cause this, nor did it bring us here—it simply 

made the revelation. Pandemic urgency and emergency ruthlessly 

stripped away the restless, seething heart that inevitably bursts with 

the recognition of a sacred vision betrayed; and assuredly, also, the 

About the Author

unclothed, narcissistic ruling class that led us here.

∂Michael Vlahos is a writer and author of the book Fighting Identity: 

Sacred War and World Change. Over several decades, he has taught 

war and strategy at Johns Hopkins University, the Naval War College, 

and Centro de Estudios Superiores Navales (CDMX). He is a weekly 

contributor to The John Batchelor Show. Follow him on Twitter @

Michalis_Vlahos, and on his blog, anewcivilwar.com 
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Beware a Virus Bearing Gifts: Can a “Great Leveler” Be Our Elites’ Best Friend?

Endnotes

1 “Coronavirus Will Change the World Permanently. Here’s How.,” Politico, March 

19, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/03/19/coronaviruseffect-economy-life-society-analysis-covid-135579.”

2 Michael Vlahos, TEDx talk, World Crisis? Again? What the Past Tells Us About 

Things To Come, TEDx talk, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MsNjl7n20WU.

3 William Rosen, Justinian’s Flea: Plague, Empire, and the Birth of Europe (New 

York: Viking Press, 2007).

4 William H. McNeill, Plagues and Peoples (New York: Anchor Books, 1976).

5 Chris Wickham, Framing the Early Middle Ages: Europe and the Mediterranean, 

400-800 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). See Chapter 4: “Aristocracies,” 153-259.

6 Hannah Basta, “Slaves, Coloni, and Status Confusion in the Late Roman 

Empire,” Journal of the National Collegiate Honors Council, Online Archive, 

2017, 558.

7 Peter S. Wells, Barbarians to Angels: The Dark Ages Reconsidered (New York: 

W.W. Norton, 2008).

8 David Routt, “The Economic Impact of the Black Death,” Economic History 

Association, EH.net, https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-economic-impact-of-theblack-death/.

9 Anne Curry, “English Armies in the Fifteenth Century,” in Anne Curry and 

Michael Hughes, Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War

(Woodbridge, UK: The Boydell Press, 1994).

10 Steven Ozment, The Age of Reform, 1250-1550: An Intellectual and Religious 

History of Late Medieval and Reformation Europe (New Haven: Yale University 

Press, 1980).

11 Wickham, Framing the Early Middle Ages. 

12 Wells, Barbarians to Angels.

13 “List of Epidemics,” Wikipedia, last modified June 16, 2021, https://en.wiki

pedia.org/wiki/List_of_epidemics. 

14 “List of Epidemics,” Wikipedia.

15 “List of Epidemics,” Wikipedia.

16 Walter Scheidel and Steven J. Friesen, “The Size of the Economy and the Distribution of Income in the Roman Empire,” Journal of Roman Studies 99 (November 2009): 61-91.

17 Rani Molla and Emily Stewart, “America’s Deeply Unequal Economic Recovery, 

Explained in 7 Charts,” Vox, February 5, 2021. 
242

A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

18 Branko Milanovic, Peter H. Lindert, and Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Ancient Inequality,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 13550, October 

2007, www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w13550/w13550,pdf.

19 Klaus Schwab, “Now Is the Time for a ‘Great Reset,’” World Economic Forum, 

June 3, 2020.

20 “The Great Reset,” Time, January 25, 2021, https://time.com/collection/greatreset/5933167/davos-agenda-solutions/.

21 Justin Haskins, “Introducing the ‘Great Reset,” World Leaders’ Radical Plan To 

Transform the Economy,” The Hill, June, 25, 2020, https://thehill.com/opinion/

energy-environment/504499-introducing-the-great-reset-world-leaders-radicalplan-to.

22 David Orr, “The Most Misread Poem in America,” The Paris Review, September 

11, 2015.
243

WHAT GOES AROUND COMES 

AROUND? HISTORICAL COMPARISON 

OF IMPACTS, RESPONSES, 

AND LONG-TERM EFFECTS 

OF THE 1918 H1N1 VS

2020 COVID-19 PANDEMICS

Lawrence A. Kuznar

Comparison of the 2020 COVID-19 and 1918 H1N1 flu pandemics provides an opportunity for a disciplined examination of the conditions and 

the short- and long-term effects of a pandemic on the world and U.S. 

national security. Taking into account the different geopolitical, epidemiological, and social contexts of these two periods, this comparison leads to 

several projections. Because the underlying conditions for pandemic (e.g., 

population growth, urbanization, interconnected trade and travel) persist, 

future pandemics are inevitable; continued vigilance and preparation are 

necessary. China and Russia will try to leverage the pandemic against the 

United States, but the United States has an opportunity to assume a leadership role in combatting the pandemic. U.S. and global economic recovery 

is likely, although an increase in real wages and standard of living—typical after a pandemic—is not expected. Current inequalities are likely to 
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increase due to differential unemployment between service industries and 

manufacturing, on the one hand, and higher-paid, white collar industries 

where people can continue to work from home. The politicization of the 

pandemic in some Western democracies is likely to be exacerbated by 

growing inequality along social divisions. Therefore, the COVID-19 pandemic presents the danger of political instability and weakening Western 

democracies in competition against their autocratic rivals. 

Many expert opinions have been offered regarding the impact of 

the COVID-19 pandemic on the world and U.S. national security, but disciplined, data-based assessments are needed. Disciplined 

historical assessment moves beyond speculation and toward a sounder 

evaluation of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. No two historical 

periods are the same; however, by accounting for key factors in historical 

context, similar conditions and effects can be isolated from those that 

might be specific to a particular time and place.1, 2, 3 This chapter provides 

a systematic consideration of the pre-existing contexts, the active disease 

agents, government and population responses, and ultimate effects of 

the 1918 H1N1 and 2020 COVID-19 pandemics. The first step in 

understanding these pandemics is an examination of these separate 

factors (see Table). However, these factors interact in complex biological, demographic, social, economic, and geopolitical contexts,4

 and the 

interactive effects will be considered in this comparative analysis. 

Table. Comparison of 1918 H1N1 and 2020 COVID-19 Pandemics

Factor 1918 H1N1 2020 COVID-19

The Preexisting Context

Global War Effort World War I – widespread 

devastation

Global War on Terror – 

localized devastation

Great Power 

Competition

Yes Yes
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What Goes Around Comes Around? 

Factor 1918 H1N1 2020 COVID-19

The Preexisting Context

Global Political 

Disruptions

Communist revolution in 

Russia

Color revolutions, Arab 

Spring, global jihad, political divisiveness

Economic 

Conditions

War economy, post-war 

boom

Economic boom, pandemic 

recession

The Virus

Origin Kansas – pigs? China – bats? pangolins? 

Possible lab leak?

Contagiousness Highly contagious Highly contagious

The Disease

Death Rate 50-100M global, 550K 

United States, U.S. rate 0.7 

percent

4.2M global, 611K United 

States, U.S. rate 0.18 percent, as of July 28, 2021

Demographic 

Impact

Killed very young, prime 

labor force, elderly

Killed elderly

The Economic Effects

GDP Contraction of 6 percent Contraction of 5.2 percent

Unemployment Little impact, may have 

decreased

Major short-term increase

Inequality Mostly impacted poor, 

minorities

Mostly impacted poor, 

minorities

The Response

National 

Government

None – response left to 

local municipalities; their 

responses mixed

Mixed – mixed messaging 

on nonpharmaceutical 

interventions (NPIs)

Local Government Varied – shutdown to 

nothing

Varied levels of shutdown

Population 

Compliance

Varied – evidence suggests 

that compliance waned, 

contributing to new waves

Varied – urban populations 

most responsive, rural 

populations rejected NPIs, 

eventually compliance 

waned
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

Factor 1918 H1N1 2020 COVID-19

The Social Effects

Politics Fueled nationalism 

eventually

Highly politicized, fueled 

nationalism immediately

Urbanization No clear impact Minimal impact 

The Preexisting Context

Global War. The 1918 pandemic was profoundly facilitated by World 

War I. The disease most likely began at a U.S. army training camp in 

Kansas as U.S. troops began staging to enter WWI.5, 6 From there, 

massive global troop movements spread the virus. Malnourished, 

war-weary Europe was defenseless against infection since immune 

systems were challenged by the conditions of war.7

 Since the war was 

global, the disease rapidly spread to the vulnerable, starving populations in India, Africa, and East Asia. In contrast to 1918, today’s world 

is much healthier and, therefore, more resilient against pandemic.

Global conflict, in recent times, has been primarily centered on 

non-state violent extremist organizations, and these small wars have 

spawned other regional conflicts—especially in Afghanistan, Syria, 

Somalia, and Nigeria—that great powers have leveraged against one 

another.8, 9, 10 Although some observers have warned that these vulnerable populations could be key nodes in the spread of the virus,11 measures taken in refugee camps have so far prevented massive outbreaks 

that spread to other populations;12 developed countries have been more 

impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Large troop movements have 

not accompanied these wars, especially since the drawdown of U.S. and 

NATO forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the world is a much 

more accessible place today because of modern transportation, especially air transportation and globalized commerce.13 Modern transportation presents an analogue to the massive troop transports of WWI 

and will be more persistent. Recent studies of the spread of COVID-19 
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What Goes Around Comes Around? 

have identified travel as the primary factor in deaths, far above contributing factors such as comorbidity (e.g., diabetes, heart disease, obesity, 

high blood pressure, alcohol use), poverty, and lack of insurance.14, 15

Great Power Competition. WWI was the product of great power 

competition that spiraled out of control.16 Great power competition 

exists today, although the strategies employed by the United States, 

Russia, and China are aimed at avoiding open conflict rather than falling into it.17 18, 19 Today’s great power competition is probably more relevant because it has hampered information exchange and cooperation 

among the powers to combat the pandemic worldwide. The hacking of 

Western pharmaceutical companies by Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and 

North Korean entities is evidence of the absence of this cooperation.20

Global Political Disruptions. In both 1918 and 2020, there have 

been important political disruptions. Communist revolution erupted 

in Russia in 1917-18 and eventually spread worldwide. The Arab 

Spring and color revolutions, as well as global Jihadist movements and 

Hong Kong’s democracy movement, have recently challenged existing 

orders. However, as noted above, these do not appear to have impacted 

the 2020 pandemic globally. 

Economic Conditions. Despite the devastation of WWI, wartime economies generated wealth for many.21 Major wars are often 

followed by major economic booms because of the need to rebuild 

from the destruction.22, 23, 24 In 2020, the world was largely experiencing an economic recovery from the 2008 global recession.25 While the 

great recession represented a devastating loss of wealth, it did not create war-like devastation from which people needed to rebuild. The 

post-COVID era cannot, therefore, experience a post-war boom.

The Virus

Origin. The origins of both diseases are still uncertain. Points of origin 

for the 1918 H1N1 included had dense populations of people and pigs 

and who was the vector for whom remains uncertain.26, 27 The recency 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

of COVID-19 makes pinpointing its origin especially challenging.28

Leading theories point to resident bat populations and exotic pangolins that were traded in meat markets in Wuhan, China, although 

enough questions persist that the World Health Organization has 

requested information from the Chinese government and President 

Biden has asked the Intelligence Community to investigate.29, 30

Contagiousness. Both 1918 H1N1 and COVID-19 have had the 

same reproductive rate, or R0 (R-naught), which is the average number of people an infected person infects. If the R0 is less than one, 

the disease will eventually go extinct, but, if it is greater than one, the 

disease will spread. Both diseases appear to have R0s between 2 and 

3, which is very high (regular influenza has an R0 of 1.3) and leads to 

extremely rapid spread.31

The Disease

Morbidity and Mortality. Morbidity refers to ill health effects. The 

first question in morbidity is, “Of those infected, who gets sick?” In 

1918, the answer was variable. Some populations, such as AfricanAmericans, experienced very few illnesses after exposure.32, 33, 34 Other 

populations, including Italians and indigenous Inuit of Alaska, experienced extremely high illness rates.35, 36, 37, 38 The causes ranged from 

genetic immunity to pre-existing health conditions and population 

density. The leading factors in COVID-19 morbidity and mortality 

appear to be similarly variable: age (elderly), sex (males are more susceptible), and comorbidity (having pre-existing health conditions) 

make one susceptible to the disease.39, 40, 41

The 1918 epidemic killed an estimated 50-100 million (2 percent) 

of the world’s population at that time and at least 550,000 (approximately 0.5 percent) of the U.S. population.42, 43 At the date of this 

writing (July 28, 2021), COVID-19 has claimed 4.2 million lives 

worldwide and over 611,000 in the United States, or only 0.05 percent and 0.18 percent of the world and U.S. populations, respectively. 
249

What Goes Around Comes Around? 

Although the mortality rate of 1918 H1N1 varied dramatically worldwide,44, 45, 46, 47, 48 the likelihood an infected person would die was 2.5 

percent, compared to 1 percent for COVID-19 and 0.1 percent for 

normal influenza.49, 50 Therefore, COVID-19 is likely to have a much 

lesser demographic impact on the world population than the 1918 

H1N1 pandemic, but ten times the impact of normal influenza. 

Demographic Impact. Both pandemics have had unusual demographic impacts. Most epidemics attack those with the weakest immune 

systems, the very young and the very old, producing a U-shaped distribution of mortality by age. The 1918 pandemic was notable in that it 

not only attacked the very young and very old but curiously also killed 

those in the prime of their lives, the most economically productive people between 15 and 44.51, 52, 53, 54, 55 As depicted in Figure 1, the curve 

assumed a W-shape, with peaks for the very young and old, and a lower 

peak in the middle for those in their economic prime.56 In terms of 

economic impact, explored further below, the 1918 H1N1 pandemic 

decreased the labor force relative to industry needs and dependents. 

Figure 1. U.S. 1918 H1N1 Pandemic Proportion of Deaths by Age Catego

Age Category

Proportion of Deaths

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

Under 1-4 5-14 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75-84 85+

1 year

Source: Data used to create this figure from Jeffrey Luk, Peter Gross, and William W. Thompsen, 

“Observations on Mortality during the 1918 Influenza Pandemic,” Clinical Infectious Diseases 33 

(2001), 1375-78, https://academic.oup.com/cid/article/33/8/1375/347461.
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

COVID-19 also has a unique demographic profile, disproportionately killing the very elderly and having the least impact on the 

very young, producing an unusual J-shaped death curve, as depicted 

in Figure 2.57, 58 However, COVID-19 appears to be spread particularly by asymptomatic people; therefore, the young play a key role 

in transmitting the virus to the elderly, as supported by statistical 

analyses.59 By implication, COVID-19 has not altered the supply of 

productive labor, will not impact the demographic profile of the next 

generation (because it has not killed the young), and largely has eliminated the least economically productive. Unlike 1918, the labor force 

will emerge much the same as before the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Figure 2. U.S. COVID-19 Pandemic Proportion of Deaths by Age Categor

Age Category

Proportion of Deaths

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

Under 1-4 5-14 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75-84 85+

1 year

Source: Data used to create this figure from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) data 

portal, accessed August 12, 2021, https://data.cdc.gov/NCHS/Provisional-COVID-19-Deaths-by-Sexand-Age/9bhg-hcku/data.

Economic Effects

GDP. Both pandemics have had very similar short-term impacts on 

the global economy. Economists estimate that the global economy 

contracted 6 percent in 1918-19.60 Similarly, the World Bank estimates 
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What Goes Around Comes Around? 

that COVID-19’s impact on the world economy will be about 5.2 percent.61 As nearly every country experienced a loss of GDP in 2020, 

the U.S. GDP had dropped 6 percent as of that May.62 One nation 

appears to have benefitted; China claimed a 1-percent increase in 

GDP in 2020.63 Nonetheless, because the overall world economy was 

structurally strong before the pandemic, there should be a sound 

basis for economic recovery once the pandemic subsides.64, 65

Unemployment. Both pandemics created unemployment as 

economies slowed down. In 1918, the losses were temporary, and 

jobs were rapidly regained as the pandemic subsided, creating a 

V-shaped recovery in which a steep decline was followed by a rapid 

recovery.66 Unemployment was further reduced because of post-war 

reconstruction.67 Furthermore, because the disease disproportionately attacked the prime labor force, reducing the supply of labor 

in relation to demand, real wages increased 68, 69, 70—an effect reproduced in pandemics throughout history.71 The combination of a labor 

market favorable to workers and the post-war boom ushered in the 

“Roaring 20s”72, 73 age of prosperity. 

The COVID-19 pandemic has created job loss worldwide, due 

to a combination of government shutdowns and fears that have held 

people back from purchasing select consumer goods and services.74, 75

Job loss has reduced incomes and further weakened economies, leading to a vicious cycle of job loss.76 The United States witnessed the 

greatest increase in unemployment—11 percent above its recent 

norm—compared to other developed economies experiencing a 

1-percent increase on average.77 The U.S. Bureau of Labor statistics 

has designated the industries most hurt by the pandemic—including 

restaurants and bars, travel and transportation, entertainment, personal services (dentists, daycare providers, barbers), retail sensitive 

to shutdown (department stores and car dealers), and manufacturing 

sensitive to shutdown (aircraft and car manufacturing)—which constitute 20.4 percent of the labor force.78 What we cannot know now is 

how employment will be impacted through the rest of this pandemic 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

and what its recovery will look like. Because there will be demand 

for the goods and services of impacted industries after the pandemic, 

they probably will recover.79 However, the closing of so many small 

businesses leaves in doubt how many will be replaced and could 

further endanger the return of some jobs. As of the writing of this 

chapter (July 28, 2021), the U.S. economy is rebounding, although 

workers have been reluctant to return to work, forcing employers to 

raise wages and increase benefits, reminiscent of the 1918 epidemic. 

However, Federal pandemic benefits are soon to end, potentially forcing workers back into the labor market. Whether increases in wages 

will persist remains to be seen.

Inequality. Addressing inequality from the 1918 pandemic is 

complicated. In the short run in the United States, manufacturing 

jobs were most jeopardized, as well as jobs that employed African 

Americans, and so inequality increased between poor and wealthy, 

and white and black.80 However, a major migration of African 

Americans to northern industrial cities occurred during WWI that 

opened opportunities and a standard of living not possible for them 

in the rural south. During the “Roaring 20s,” blacks experienced the 

“Harlem Renaissance.”81 Global post-war economic developments 

probably erased some temporary inequalities brought on by the 

pandemic,82, 83, 84, 85 but some pockets apparently did not recover and 

experienced a permanent loss of social status. For instance, the Treaty 

of Versailles imposed crushing demands on Germany that particularly impacted working-class German veterans, fueling the rise of the 

Nazi Party.86, 87 A related unforeseen impact of the pandemic was that 

U.S. President Woodrow Wilson contracted H1N1 and consequently 

missed the treaty negotiations, where he had intended to push for a 

less punitive settlement with the Germans that might have lessened 

the resentments of the German working class. 

Because the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic has disproportionately 

impacted low-wage jobs held by people with little savings, combined 

with the uncertainty of a post-pandemic wage hike, an increase in 
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What Goes Around Comes Around? 

inequality should be expected. Although unemployment rose only 

1 percent above normal in the developed countries hardest hit by 

the pandemic, reducing the likelihood that inequality will be widespread globally,88 the unemployment spike in the United States of 11 

percent leaves a much larger proportion of the population vulnerable to permanent wealth loss. 

The Response

Government Response. In 1918, national governments were limited 

in what they could do to respond to the pandemic,89 due in part to 

being at war and/or in a state of political turmoil. The U.S. Government response in 1918 was largely nonexistent, apparently because 

of a combination of cultural factors: Americans did not like to be 

told what to do, libertarian values (no government intervention in 

personal freedoms) prevailed, and once President Woodrow Wilson committed to the war effort, he was unwilling to pull back, even 

though the epidemic had begun.90

The involvement of national and state-level governments worldwide differs between 1918 and 2020. For many countries, the response 

to the COVID-19 pandemic has been a national concern and nationwide policies have been implemented.91, 92, 93 China, due to its authoritarian control and a generally compliant population, has been able to 

institute strict lockdowns in specific areas to localize and contain the 

disease’s spread.94, 95 Consequently, China appears to have suffered the 

least impact from the virus despite having been the pandemic’s point 

of origin. Democracies have had a more difficult time controlling the 

spread of the virus, although some countries, like Italy, imposed rather 

strict lockdowns. In contrast to most countries, Sweden consciously 

chose no lockdowns, hoping that the spread of the virus among the 

young would create herd immunity in the population, allowing the 

government to concentrate care on the most vulnerable. Sweden’s 

strategy was not entirely effective; as of July 28, 2021, it had the 38th 
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highest per capita death rate (142/100,000) of any country, although 

it was lower than the United States (ranked 22nd at 186/100,000), the 

United Kingdom (ranked 20th at 194/100,000), and first-ranked Peru 

(602/100,000).96

The U.S. Federal Government response to the COVID-19 pandemic has been mixed. The Trump administration vacillated between 

acknowledging the pandemic, while blaming adversary China, and 

downplaying the seriousness of the threat, while sending mixed messages regarding nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs).97 One Federal 

response that has been sustained—and may save the nation and world 

from the pandemic—was Operation Warp Speed, the unprecedented 

push to support pharmaceutical companies to produce a vaccine. 

Local Response. In 1918, most of the responsibility for the 

pandemic response fell to local governments, mostly municipalities, in the United States. Their reactions varied from no action 

to strictly imposed lockdowns in major cities, such as San Francisco and New York.98, 99, 100 New York in particular took a proactive role. Bars and restaurants were closed, many businesses shut 

down, clinics were opened, and curfews were imposed. Famously, 

schools remained open because the living conditions of poorer 

children were cramped and unsanitary and school provided them 

with a clean environment where their health could be monitored. 

This saved children’s lives and provided city officials with a means 

to monitor the pandemic’s spread. In contrast, Philadelphia had lax 

restrictions, and the mayor insisted on holding a victory parade 

to welcome home troops, which created a superspreading event 

and led to many deaths; Philadelphia consequently had the highest death rate in the country.101, 102 Similarly mixed responses and 

results were seen around the world.103, 104

Local responses have also been important, but varied, in the 2020 

COVID-19 pandemic. Perhaps the most obvious and widespread 

manifestation of local control in the United States is the decision 

of local school boards to keep schools open or close them.105 Local 
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What Goes Around Comes Around? 

municipalities have also been free to institute their own restrictions, 

although there have been cases where local and state-level policies 

have conflicted. One case in point was the Georgia governor’s lawsuit 

against the city of Atlanta over its mask mandate.106

Population Compliance. Compliance with NPIs was mixed 

worldwide during the 1918 pandemic. This appears mainly due to a 

general reluctance to wear masks and take other precautions, as well 

as pandemic fatigue; people became less compliant as the pandemic 

dragged on and they tired of the restrictions.107, 108 In a few cases, 

organized resistance occurred; the Anti-Mask League of San Francisco was a formal organization that lobbied against restrictions.109

Similar fatigue is evident worldwide in the COVID-19 pandemic, 

spawning a new wave.110, 111, 112 A key difference in compliance in 2020, 

compared to 1918, was the explicit politicization of NPIs. Germany 

has seen organized protests and riots by mask opponents, although the 

politicization of NPIs has been most obvious in the United States. As 

President Trump at first rejected, and then later reluctantly advised, 

that the population wear masks,113 his supporters took this as a signal 

that mask-wearing was undesirable. Their reluctance to wear masks 

was compounded by the initially lesser impact of the pandemic but 

greater impact of job loss from shutdowns in rural areas.114 Unfortunately, the disease has spread in rural areas, which had been hard-hit in 

the pandemic’s follow-on waves. The United States has experienced the 

most divisive impact of the pandemic, with people killing one another 

over mask disputes, violent protests and takeovers of state capitals, and 

organized militias plotting to kidnap and execute governors.115, 116

The Social Effects

Accounting for the social effects of pandemic is trickier because they 

are not direct; they constitute second- and third-order effects that 

are more difficult to trace and to support. Nonetheless, pandemics 

impact the broader social fabric—in some cases, for decades.
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Political Impacts. The 1918 pandemic was not explicitly politicized the way COVID-19 has been, but historians argue that it did 

have profound political impacts. Some historians assert that the 

1918 pandemic brought WWI to an end,117, 118 because the disease 

spread rapidly in the cramped conditions of the trenches and military camps, weakening armies to the point where continued combat 

was no longer reasonable. If true, this would constitute an immediate, first-order effect of the disease on global politics. Economists 

and historians have also pointed out that, especially in Germany, 

those who were most impacted by the pandemic were among those 

passed by in the post-war economic boom.119 One study points out 

a strong correlation between cities with economic losses that undercut social services and economic development and those with strong 

support for the Nazi party in the 1920s. The Great Depression exacerbated their grievances, leading to the meteoric rise of the Nazi 

party in 1930s German politics and its eventual takeover of Germany.120 Such a delayed effect is clearly mediated by many other variables and constitutes an indirect but profound impact on a nation’s 

complex political system. 

It is too early to know what the political impacts of COVID-19 

will be. Some pundits argue that COVID-19 is likely to strengthen 

China’s influence in the world at the expense of the United States. 

They assert that China’s seemingly more effective mitigation of the 

pandemic, combined with a diplomatic charm offensive of providing aid to developing and even Western countries, will increase 

China’s prestige and influence.121, 122 These efforts are marred, however, by blame for China’s initially slow response, allowing the 

pandemic to erupt in the first place, and by faulty materiel aid.123

Russia has also attempted its own diplomatic charm offensive by 

sending aid, which also was faulty, and by announcing the first vaccine, whose effectiveness is in doubt. China’s and Russia’s attempts 

to leverage the pandemic to compete with U.S. influence appear 

mixed at best. 
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What Goes Around Comes Around? 

A more indirect impact on global politics that worries some policy makers is the appearance that more authoritarian governments 

were more effective at containing the virus, which might erode confidence in democratic systems more generally.124 Whether this will 

happen remains to be seen; given the levels of noncompliance with 

NPI controls in democratic countries, their populations may not be 

sold on a promise that an authoritarian and controlling government 

would be more competent and preferable.

The 2020 pandemic has impacted domestic politics, most notably 

in the United States. The pandemic hit during what was a contentious 

election year. Some analysts argue that COVID-19 decided the election, given President Trump’s high disapproval ratings for his handling of the pandemic.125 The pandemic was indisputably a crucial 

issue that exacerbated political divisions; Democrats and Republicans 

were split on their views about the virus.126 Expanding this level of 

divisiveness is an explicit goal of both Russia and China;127, 128, 129 the 

virus has helped do their work for them. 

Urban-Rural Migration. The 1918 pandemic did not appear to 

cause any major migratory shifts, and the same appears to be true of 

2020. Media have sounded an alarm over a mass exodus from urban 

centers to escape COVID-19 that threatens to hollow out cities;130, 131

however, a comprehensive analysis of U.S. real estate sales has found 

no evidence of a general urban exodus.132 Virtually all city markets 

have remained stable. Only the particularly expensive urban centers 

of Manhattan and San Francisco have seen highly paid white-collar 

workers who can work remotely liquidate their urban real estate for 

more suburban locales.133

Implications

Because the pandemic is a complex phenomenon impacting complex 

systems, single points of comparison provide limited insight into the 

current COVID-19 pandemic. However, taking these points together 
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and considering their interactive effects can lead to some cautious 

projections. 

The global war on terror and its many manifestations have not 

created the widespread devastation and disruption that WWI did. 

Therefore, there is no reason to expect a postwar reconstructive 

boom to help the world bounce back from the COVID-19 recession. 

Because the world economy was experiencing strong growth before 

the pandemic and was structurally sound, however, the conditions 

for a rapid recovery exist.

Both 1918 and 2020 were periods of great power competition, and 

one would expect each power (i.e., the United States, China, Russia) 

to look for opportunities to leverage the pandemic to its advantage. 

China and Russia have tried to position themselves as humanitarian aid providers, but in reality, the aid they have provided is limited 

and has been faulty. The United States has not been seen as a leader 

in the fight against the pandemic, but—with the largest economy, 

most robust medical research infrastructure, and strongest potential 

international reach (diplomatically and logistically)—should the U.S. 

Government choose, it could assume the role of leader in the fight 

against the pandemic. Therefore, the great powers may muddle along 

in their competition over this issue, or the United States could take a 

leadership role. 

Other forms of social disruption neither have been much 

impacted by nor have they impacted geopolitics. The only potentially disruptive change is the pandemic leading to further political 

divisions within major democratic powers, namely the United States 

and Germany, which would weaken these democracies at home and 

diminish their ability to counter challenges from China and Russia. 

In 1918, the global movement of armies created the ideal vectors 

for disease spread. European populations were under nutritional and 

other stresses and had large armies packed in close, unsanitary conditions, creating fertile ground for pandemic once the disease reached 

them. In 2020, populations were arguably far healthier, but global 
259

What Goes Around Comes Around? 

trade and ease of travel presented risk conditions for the spread of 

disease. As travel restrictions relax, a key underlying facilitator of 

pandemic will return. Another key factor is continued population 

growth and expanding urbanism, which will put potential animal 

vectors in contact with dense human populations, allowing future 

pandemics to erupt.134, 135 If governments wish to maintain vigilance 

against these threats, they must sustain advance warning systems, 

which have already been developed and can be upgraded through 

artificial intelligence and machine learning.136

While the 1918 pandemic disproportionately struck the most 

productive part of the labor force, the 2020 pandemic has decimated 

the least productive, the elderly. Therefore, no disruptions in current 

or future labor forces are expected with the COVID-19 pandemic, 

and there will be no change in the demand and supply of labor that 

could lead to wage and wealth increases for the working class, as has 

been typical for most pandemics. The continued balance between the 

supply and demand for labor may bode well for businesses and, if 

they experience a comeback, they could provide greater employment 

opportunities for laborers.

The expected post-pandemic recovery may exacerbate preexisting inequalities. Pandemic unemployment has disproportionately impacted low-wage service and manufacturing sectors of the 

economy. These jobs should come back, but the economic losses 

these laborers experienced will not be recovered without the typical 

wage hike that accompanies pandemic recoveries. Furthermore, people in white-collar industries have been much more likely to remain 

employed and consequently experience no loss in wealth. The net 

effect is likely to be a further shift in wealth to well-educated, upperclass sectors of society and greater inequality, which is associated with 

increased homicide,137, 138, 139 social unrest, and political instability.140, 

141, 142, 143 Unforeseen economic booms (e.g., a new Internet or technology bubble) could counteract this prognosis for greater instability, 

but such booms are still to be determined.
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In conclusion, the post-COVID pandemic world is unlikely to be 

radically different from the pre-COVID world. Great power competition will continue, and the global economy should recover given its 

previous strong structural base. However, some changes are expected 

to persist and, given the complex nature of the systems they impact, 

have the potential to spiral out of control and cause major disturbances 

if not monitored and mitigated. The logistical conditions (e.g., population growth, urbanization, trade, and travel) for the eruption of 

pandemic remain. There will be another, and this future pandemic is 

likely to exacerbate existing urban/rural, education, and class divides; 

inequality is likely to increase, as will the grievances that inequality 

often generates. The politicization of the pandemic in Western democracies has already interacted with social divisions, potentially weakening democratic resistance against challenges from authoritarian 

states such as China and Russia. In this future scenario, the world may 

muddle along with its current competitions and conflicts or divisions 

in Western democracies could metastasize into weakness and internal 

About the Author

divisions upon which competing world powers could seize. 

∂Dr. Lawrence A. Kuznar is currently Chief Cultural Sciences Officer, 

National Security Innovations, Inc. and Emeritus Professor of Anthropology, Purdue University-Fort Wayne. He focuses on anthropological research relevant to U.S. national security. Dr. Kuznar’s research 

includes applications of complexity theory, advanced statistical and 

geographical modeling of social instability, and discourse analysis of 

adversaries including state and non-state actors. He recently published 

a statistical model in Humanities and Social Science Communications

that highlights differences in how the COVID-19 pandemic was experienced in rural versus urban America.
261

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112 Benjamin van Rooj et al., “Compliance with COVID-19 Mitigation Measures 

in the United States,” Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 

2020-21, September 3, 2020, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_

id=3582626.

113 Christakis, Apollo’s Arrow.

114 Kuznar, “A Tale of Two Pandemics.”

115 Julia Jones, “Inside the Plot to Kidnap Gov. Whitmer,” CNN News (2020), published electronically October 11, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/11/us/

michigan-whitmer-plot/index.html.

116 Kuznar, “Power in the Post-Pandemic Economy.”

117 Spinney, Pale Rider.

118 Taubenberger and Morens, “1918 Influenza: The Mother of All Pandemics.” 

119 Spinney, Pale Rider.

120 Bickle, “Pandemics Change Cities.”

121 Ingram, “Pandemic Propaganda and the Global Democracy Crisis.”

122 Kahl and Berengaut. “Aftershocks.”

123 Kahl and Berengaut. “Aftershocks.”

124 Ingram, “Pandemic Propaganda and the Global Democracy Crisis.”

What Goes Around Comes Around? 
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125 Aaron Bycoffe, Christopher Groskopf, and Dhrumil Mehta, “How Americans 

View the Coronavirus Crisis And Trump’s Response,” FiveThirtyEight, November 25, 2020, https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/coronavirus-polls/.

126 Kuznar, “A Tale of Two Pandemics.”

127 Media Ajir and Bethany Vaillant, “Russian Information Warfare: Implications 

for Deterrence Theory,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 12, no. 3, (Fall 2018): 70-89, 

https://www.jstor.org/stable/26481910?refreqid=excelsior%3Aacef920003f394

c3a7e75f6b31628f78&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.

128 U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community.”

129 Kahl and Berengaut. “Aftershocks.”

130 Sarah Marsh, “Escape to the Country: How Covid Is Driving an Exodus from 

Britain’s Cities,” Guardian, September 26, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/

world/2020/sep/26/escape-country-covid-exodus-britain-cities-pandemicurban-green-space. 

131 Kevin Stankiewicz, ‘‘‘Shark Tank’ Investor Herjavec: We’re about To See Biggest 

Exodus from Cities in 50 Years,” CNBC News, July 9, 2020, https://www.cnbc.

com/2020/07/09/shark-tank-investor-herjavec-were-about-to-see-biggestexodus-from-cities-in-50-years.html.

132 Zillow Research, Zillow 2020 Urban-Suburban Market Report, August 12, 2020, 

https://www.zillow.com/research/2020-urb-suburb-market-report-27712/.

133 Kuznar, “The COVID-19 Pandemic: Gray Rhinos, Complexity, Prediction, and 

National Security.”

134 Christakis, Apollo’s Arrow.

135 Kuznar, “The COVID-19 Pandemic: Gray Rhinos, Complexity, Prediction, and 

National Security.”

136 Philippe Barboza et al., “Evaluation of Epidemic Intelligence Systems Integrated in the Early Alerting and Reporting Project for the Detection of A/H5N1 

Influenza Events,” PLoS ONE 8, no. 3 (March 2013), https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/235886353_Evaluation_of_Epidemic_Intelligence_Systems_

Integrated_in_the_Early_Alerting_and_Reporting_Project_for_the_Detection_

of_AH5N1_Influenza_Events.

137 Martin Daly, Killing the Competition: Economic Inequality and Homicide (New 

York, Transaction Publishers, 2016).

138 Lawrence A. Kuznar, “Migration: The Relationship between Inequality, Risk 

Sensitivity and Violence,” in The Age of Disruption: How Power Shifts Create 

More Conflict, ed. Gina Ligon, Robert Jones and Mariah Yager (Arlington, 
269

Virginia: Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Periodic Publication, OSD/

ASD (R&E)/RSD/RRTO, 2019).

139 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Study on Homicide: Homicide, Development and the Sustainable Development Goals, United Nations 

(Austria), July 2019, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/

gsh/Booklet_4.pdf.

140 Christian Houle, “Why Class Inequality Breeds Coups but not Civil Wars,” Journal 

of Peace Research 53, no. 5 (July 27, 2016), 680-95, doi: 10.1177/0022343316652187, 

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343316652187.

141 Lawrence A. Kuznar, Eric C. Kuznar, and Weston Aviles, Statistical Modeling of 

Risk and Political Instability in the Influence Environment (Arlington, Virginia, 

Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Periodic Publication, OSD/ASD (R&E)/

RSD/RRTO, 2019), https://nsiteam.com/statistical-modeling-of-risk-and-politicalinstability-in-the-influence-environment-an-nsi-aggrieved-populations-analysis/.

142 Gudrun Østby, “Polarization, Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Civil Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 2 (March 1, 2008), 143-62, https://www.

prio.org/Publications/Publication/?x=182..

143 Peter Turchin, “Dynamics of Political Instability in the United States, 1780–

2010,” Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 4 (July 9, 2012): 577-91, http://petert

urchin.com/PDF/Turchin_JPR2012.pdf.

What Goes Around Comes Around? 

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Josh Kerbel and Zachery Tyson Brown 

The world has been fundamentally transformed since 1947, the year 

the modern Intelligence Community was founded. Why then has the 

IC stayed much the same across the intervening decades? As constituted, the IC is optimized for an era of strategic competition that has 

long since passed and is not coming back. The truth is that the community will need more than new technology and fresh talent to rebuild 

itself for 21st-century national security challenges. It will also need 

to reexamine the assumptions that underwrite the business of intelligence itself and to be prepared for a structural overhaul that in our 

judgment is long overdue.

The coronavirus pandemic should be a wake-up call for the IC. Not 

only has it been the most significant crisis of the 21st century in 

terms of its staggering death toll, it has also wrought significant social, 

political, and economic consequences both here at home and around the 

world.1

 The collective sigh of relief as intelligence officers and the customers they support slowly get “back to normal” is almost audible. But 

the IC should not celebrate. The pandemic is emblematic of the very type 

of challenge that the IC is certain to face more of—a type that the community is woefully ill-suited to address in both form and function.
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Intelligence has a history; it also has a future. Its history exhibits 

faults of understanding, of organization, of administration and 

planning. We can rest on our laurels and wait for future disasters 

to shock us into sporadic correction. Or we can study the lessons 

of experience and implement those lessons now.

– GEORGE S. PETTEE, 19462

The coronavirus, you see, had no secrets that could be stolen. It 

sent no signals that could be intercepted. It provided none of the indicators intelligence officers traditionally look for that might have given 

warning of the pandemic’s advent. Although it is true that the IC had 

long reported that the likelihood of a global outbreak was increasing, 

the IC remains unable to provide specific, “actionable” information 

about such outbreaks because they are, in a word, emergent.

What Do We Mean by That? 

The generation of emergent phenomena, or emergence for short, is 

a process to which highly interconnected and interdependent systems—like today’s strategic environment—are particularly prone. 

Emergence often seemingly comes out of nowhere and is difficult, if 

not impossible, to predict. That said, conditions for emergence have 

usually been building for some time, and, thus, it is often possible 

to anticipate it. Examples of emergence include the Arab Spring and 

the current spread of a novel respiratory infection that has sidelined 

much of the world for the past year. 

The pandemic is not the last emergent crisis we will face in this 

turbulent era. It almost certainly is not even the last pandemic—and 

the next one could be even more lethal.3

 These sorts of issues will, we 

believe, define this new era of strategic competition, and the IC must 

adapt if it hopes to keep up. 
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Allow Us To Explain

Since the IC’s modern establishment nearly three-quarters of a century ago, generations of American intelligence officers have diligently 

provided the nation’s political and military leaders with the secret 

information they needed to make better decisions. Today’s officers, 

however, are increasingly challenged to do so within a competitive 

environment that is remarkably dissimilar to the one the IC was created to address.

Established in 1947, the IC initially had two purposes. The first, 

and initially most salient, was the prevention of another surprise attack 

on the scale of Pearl Harbor.4

 The second, which eclipsed all other concerns after 1949, was the need to observe and understand the Soviet 

Union, in sober recognition of the existential threat posed by atomic 

war. Secretary of State George C. Marshall said at the time that “The 

whole world of the future hangs on a proper judgment.”5

Because the Soviet Union was a closed system, the nascent IC had 

to pierce the veil of Stalin’s Iron Curtain to catch a glimpse of what was 

going on behind it. Because the Soviet Union was rigidly hierarchical, the IC had to learn to understand its top-down decisionmaking 

process—one different in many ways from the distributed centers of 

power that engaged in the consensus building that intelligence officers 

were familiar with at home.

The United States and its allies built a veritable armature of information acquisition during the decades of the Cold War: a technical 

collection architecture that eventually grew to cover the world with 

spy planes, satellites, and listening posts. The IC also built up a cadre 

of officers who spent their entire careers building deep expertise on 

every aspect of the Soviet adversary, from the makeup of Soviet tank 

divisions and the personality dossiers of its commanders to net annual 

potato harvests and myriad other specialties.6

This enormous investment of time and resources made a lot of 

sense within the context of the Cold War, where nations faced the 
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constant threat of nuclear annihilation. Back then, useful information about the Soviet adversary was a scarce commodity, and the IC 

was quite often its only possible purveyor. Additionally, the pressing 

need to understand the inner workings of the vast and complicated 

command system that was the Soviet hierarchy meant dividing intelligence officers into reductive branches, and that made a lot of sense, 

too. Because these intelligence officers had often exclusive access 

to the fruits of the expensive collection machine, their views were 

always respected, if not always adopted.7

The IC helped shape and was shaped by the Cold War crucible. 

Its culture and forms were adapted to the purpose of stealing secrets 

from an obsessively secretive adversary and the compelling need to 

understand that adversary’s decisionmaking processes. Over time, 

the forms themselves came to be held almost in reverence, as if they 

had intrinsic value and were not simply means to an end. The complicated structure of the Soviet problem set drove a particularly reductive and deductive approach to thinking, one that would dominate 

the IC’s mental models long after the Soviet Union’s demise.

The combination of information acquisition and reductive analytical thinking served the IC remarkably well during the Cold War, 

despite several noteworthy failures, lapses, and scandals. By the latter years of the conflict, the IC had developed extensive, expansive, 

and granular knowledge of the Soviet Union’s military and economic 

capabilities—a fact that, according to one former Director of Central Intelligence, did much to prevent the sort of miscalculation that 

might have destroyed the world.8

That said, it is important to neither dismiss nor downplay the 

very real intelligence failures that did occur—the most notable of 

which was perhaps anticipating the collapse of the Soviet Union 

itself.9

 These failures were harbingers of the onset of a new era of persistent unpredictability for which the IC was ill-prepared. 

When Mikhail Gorbachev officially dissolved the Soviet Union 

on Christmas Day, 1991, a geopolitical glacier that had shaped the 
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contours of the global order for the better part of a century suddenly 

melted away, unleashing a torrent of change in its wake. That flood 

quickly inundated the political landscape of the so-called “post-Soviet 

space,” washing away the old and leaving a morass of debris in its wake. 

Even in the still nominally communist People’s Republic of 

China, Deng Xiaoping’s more open economic reforms had taken 

root, swiftly overpowering a reactionary freeze in the wake of the 

1989 Tiananmen massacre. China’s rapid transformation earned it 

World Trade Organization membership in 2001 and fostered its deep 

integration into the world’s economy. It has become a leading geopolitical actor and a true peer of the United States across the full spectrum of national power. By some measures, it has even surpassed the 

United States, for example as the world’s leading economic power.10

These changes have not been limited to the former Soviet Union 

or its Chinese protégé. Throughout the 1990s, once separate and distinct actors and elements across the globe began to connect with one 

another using new information and communications technologies, 

forming and reforming new networks of trade and influence almost 

overnight. The two-body problem of the Cold War period had suddenly transformed into a confusing and chaotic morass of overlapping issues, threats, and compounding risks. 

Put simply, the world the IC is tasked with helping our nation’s 

leaders better understand no longer resembles the one for which it 

was created. That world was slower-paced, having operated at the 

speed of the carbon copy and ambassador’s cable. It was less connected and more easily divided into issues and regions. Power in that 

world was more concentrated, most often in the hands of a relatively 

small number of societal elites who could be easily identified and 

targeted for intelligence collection. In that world, America squared 

off against the Soviet Union, a monolithic and hierarchical adversary. Our leaders’ principal challenge was a decided lack of information about that complicated adversary—a problem the IC was 

invented to solve.
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Today, in sharp contrast, the speed of relevance is often measured in hours, if not minutes. Instead of unitary sovereign states 

with clearly demarcated borders and easy distinctions between foreign and domestic power, our modern world is one of overlapping 

webs of influence that run over, under, and through states, institutions, political parties, and even individuals. Security issues that were 

once separate now regularly brush up against one another or even 

at times seem to converge. Because people, from Silicon Valley to 

Central Asia’s Ferghana Valley, are more mobile and more connected 

than ever before, power is far more evenly distributed than in the 

past, and significant issues can arise from many more sources across 

a vast influence network. Instead of being confronted by a monolithic 

superpower like the Soviet Union, today the United States is challenged by a diverse array of greater and lesser threats—some conventional, others quite novel. This threat spectrum is compounded by a 

parallel matrix of systemic vulnerabilities, some of which we have let 

accrue to the point where they pose existential risks by themselves. 

Instead of thirsting for information, today’s national security leaders 

are drowning in it.

Simply Put, Today’s World Is More Complex 

Complexity is a loaded word, one whose power has been diluted from 

overuse. It is often—incorrectly—used as a synonym for complicated. 

Both derive from Latin but are subtly distinct. The Latin verb plicare

means to fold. Complicare is to fold together. The Latin past participle 

plexus can mean to weave, braid, or entwine. Therefore, complication 

denotes layers, one atop another, while complexity implies merging 

individual strands into a single, braided, or woven whole.11 A given 

system’s complexity is, in short, measured by the level of interconnectedness of the elements within that system.12 That connectivity, 

over time, can give rise to the emergence of new behavior: that is, 

novel phenomena that are more than simply the sum of their parts.13
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In a simpler world, analysis—the reduction of systems into their 

constituent pieces to examine how they work—could be used to make 

reasonable predictions. The fatal flaw of analysis, however, is that it 

often ignores how the pieces, once deconstructed, fit back together 

within the larger whole. It also tends to ignore that those “wholes” are 

themselves parts of other, larger wholes out there in the real world. 

Thus, as the world has grown more complex through the advent of 

greater interconnectedness, once separate pieces have become more 

integrated, and once predictable outcomes have become less linear. 

In practical terms, this means the world that the IC was invented to 

understand has grown less amenable to the entire idea of collection, 

analysis, and prediction—and ultimately, has become more dangerous.

Yet despite the fundamental changes in the external environment that the IC exists to comprehend, our internal organizational 

and intellectual frameworks have remained remarkably consistent. 

Yes, we have made plenty of individual, incremental reforms—creating, merging, and splitting agencies, for instance, and dramatically improving our ability to gather secrets from all over the world 

through the growth of the enormous technical collection architecture 

described above. Yes, to be fair, intelligence officers have significantly 

improved the drafting and delivery of finished analysis—most notably with reforms implemented as part of the Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which established the Director of 

National Intelligence and codified standards for analytic writing.14

But for all these helpful improvements, the IC today still looks—and 

thinks—much as it did in 1970, if not 1950.

It is still organizationally optimized to deal with closed, hierarchical 

systems like the Soviet Union, when very few of the convoluted threats 

we face today resemble that of the communist behemoth. Beholden 

to an antiquated planning process that Robert McNamara bequeathed 

it in 1962,15 it struggles to respond quickly to rapidly changing user 

requirements. Intellectually, it still operates from within an increasingly 

obsolete 20th century paradigm of what constitutes national security. 
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One that is predicated on the idea of information scarcity and views 

the world largely in terms of threats to instead of risks from—from, for 

example, the vulnerabilities built into our open system of government 

or from the severe social, political, and economic knock-on effects of a 

brutal pandemic that has claimed a half million American lives.

No simple solutions exist for the challenges outlined above. There 

are, however, a few broad areas of reform the IC must consider as part 

of any effort to set the conditions for the requisite changes demanded 

by an era in which change is the only constant, and more surprise the 

only certainty.

First, IC leaders must recognize that the reductive analytic scaffolding we cling to is particularly unsuited to the sort of complex, 

systemic, and emergent challenges the United States is unfortunately 

certain to face in the 21st century. Instead of placing undue value on 

deep niche expertise that invariably creates information silos, the IC 

will need to develop a cadre with the creativity and synthetic thinking 

skills that facilitate much broader approaches to issues, emphasizing 

the anticipation of systemic possibilities.

Next, IC leaders must recognize that, very often, little can be 

gleaned from classified collection techniques that is not already 

openly available. Since its outset, the IC has been seduced by the characteristically American conceit that it will one day be able to know all 

the world’s secret information and accomplishing this would prevent 

surprises. But even if it were possible to collect every bit of information relevant to national security in the 21st century (it is not), it 

would not serve policymakers as well as some intelligence planners 

might think. Although we tend to find the things we look for, we are 

surprised when the things we are not looking for find us instead. 

Human susceptibility to cognitive errors, such as availability bias 

and the observer expectancy effect, means that we arrange for classified collection against the problems we already know about and are 

convinced those problems exist even when we fail to find the needle in the haystack. We are then surprised by exogenous events that 
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did not appear from where we were looking. In other words, the IC’s 

expensive collection apparatus is often largely impotent against the 

emergent complex issues we have been describing and can, at times, 

even make our challenge more difficult.

Thankfully, the information revolution has spawned freely accessible sources of every sort imaginable in the public domain—from hundreds of new publications in any language to crowd-sourced videos and 

photographs that provide access that intelligence collection managers 

could once only dream about. The real value of open-source information is not in the perspective of any of these individual sources, however, but in the aggregate—numerous sources all looking at the same 

issue or event. The IC would be worse than remiss, it would be negligent, if it did not seriously consider the value of triangulating this multitude of perspectives to make our own view of reality more accurate.

Third, IC leaders must take a hard look at organizational transformation. Although the old saw tells us that culture eats strategy, 

structure creates culture. The IC will never be able to change its cognitive framework or break its addiction to classified collection along 

the lines described above if it does not also evolve organizationally. 

Presently, the IC remains a funhouse mirror reflection of the closed, 

hierarchical system it was designed to combat—the Soviet Union. 

That made sense for an era in which classified information was the 

price of admission and reductive analytic thinking prevailed. But in 

an open age of rapidly evolving networks, such structures are not 

neutral, they are actively harmful. Closed, hierarchical structures, 

with their sharply drawn boundaries and bins, compel the very analytic thinking that is simply no match for the rapidly morphing, complex networks with which they must contend. Until the IC becomes a 

truly open network that can think synthetically, it will struggle with 

the complexity of a century that really is just beginning.

Fourth, IC leaders must address an era of rapidly advancing technology. We are not technologists, so we will not pretend to have a 

comprehensive understanding of the digital tools that come online 
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each month. But as analysts and leaders of analysts, we do know that 

if the IC hopes to succeed in the 21st century, it must be able to adopt 

these new tools quickly and combine existing tools in new ways to 

let analysts do new things. Too often, the community’s leaders have 

thought only in terms of using new capabilities to do the same things 

it has always done, only a little bit faster and a little more efficiently. 

We question the utility of such an incremental approach. A much 

larger discussion must be held about what the IC should do differently—holistically and synthetically. Then, IC leaders must seek out 

technologies that will help to realize that vision. To be sure, doing the 

same old things better and faster has appeal, but it is important that 

the IC not let marginally improving the old things it is already good at 

impede creating something entirely new and fundamentally different. 

Fifth, the IC needs to break free from some of its historical inhibitions—limitations that may have once made sense but no longer 

do in a world that bears little resemblance to the one for which the 

community was created. Two of these limitations stand out to us—

the IC’s historical prohibition against examining the actions of the 

United States itself and the more unspoken, but nonetheless binding 

prohibition against becoming too close to the policymakers intelligence officers support. 

In the first case, borders are increasingly irrelevant in the complex, integrated world we have been describing. Prohibiting analysts 

from examining the actions (or inactions) of one of that world’s most 

significant actors results in analyses with little resemblance to what 

is a messy reality. In the second, this same reticence prevents intelligence officers from helping policymakers understand that they are 

themselves contributing to the creation of the world the IC is meant 

to help them navigate. 

Last, the IC should take a good hard look at its measures of success. Metrics are ultimately incentives. What we measure is usually 

constrained by what is measurable, such as the number of classified 

reports used in an analytic paper, for instance. What we measure also 
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sends a message about what we value, both to our own people and to 

the consumers of intelligence we seek to help. 

Consequently, those metrics drive what the workforce works on, 

and when it comes to intelligence, that means production. And so, 

the community produces—a lot. Indeed, an argument can be made 

that the IC produces so much for so many (and really for no one at 

the same time) that the net result is not clarity or understanding but 

obscuration and confusion, so much dust thrown in the eyes of the 

policymaking class.

Here is a final point worth consideration. It is very easy for successful institutions—particularly those with storied legacies like the IC’s—

to believe that because they have been successful in the past, they will 

continue to be successful in the future. As long as they keep getting 

better at doing the things they have always done, this line of thinking 

goes, they will maintain and even expand their history of accomplishment. Blinded by their very success, they mistakenly conflate their way 

of doing things with the way of doing things. They inadvertently create the conditions for their decline as newer and nimbler competitors 

arise to meet the challenges of a world that is itself always changing.16

We hear echoes of this confident mantra almost everywhere as 

we move around the IC, particularly in discussions about hastening 

the adoption of artificial intelligence. All too often, these discussions 

focus on leveraging machine learning to make existing processes a 

little bit faster, a little bit smarter, a little bit more efficient.

The bad news is that getting even better at things the IC is already 

quite good at is not enough in a changed world. Today, past pedigree 

counts for little, and past accomplishment is no guarantor of future 

success. The good news is that the IC is well-positioned to begin doing 

new things that new technologies now permit, if only it can muster 

the collective will to do so. Intelligence officers are sharp, diligent, and 

famously dedicated to their mission. They have performed admirably 

all over the world—often in austere conditions, and not infrequently 

under fire. Several of them have paid the ultimate price in defense of 
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their country. But the community simply cannot afford to rest on its 

laurels, making incremental advances here and there. As former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence Sue Gordon once put it, 

“We’ve never been as good as we are now, but we have to be better.”

∂ 17

About the Authors

Josh Kerbel is a member of the research faculty at the National Intelligence University where he also serves as co-director of the Center 

for Anticipatory Intelligence and Adaptive Influence.

Zachery Tyson Brown is a former defense intelligence officer and 

independent researcher who writes about the changing strategic environment and the future of the art and profession of intelligence.

Endnotes

1 David M. Cutler and Lawrence H. Summers, “The Covid-19 Pandemic and 

the $16 Trillion Virus,” Journal of the American Medical Association 324, no. 15 

(October 12, 2020): 1495-96, https://dx.doi.org/10.1001%2Fjama.2020.19759.

2 George S. Pettee, The Future of American Strategic Intelligence (Washington, 

DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), 24.

3 Mike May, “Tomorrow’s Biggest Microbial Threats,” Nature Medicine 27 (2021): 

358-59, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-021-01264-2.

4 “Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack,” Notable Senate Investigations (Washington DC, U.S. Senate Historical Office), June 20, 1946, 

https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/investigations/pearl-harbor.

htm.

5 George C. Marshall, “Marshall Plan Speech” (speech, Harvard University, 

Cambridge, MA, June 5, 1947), http://marshallfoundation.org/marshall/themarshall-plan/marshall-plan-speech/.

6 Final Report, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to 

Intelligence Activities, Senate, Ninety Fourth Congress, Second Session, April 29, 
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1976, (Washington: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1976), 347-48, https://

www.intelligence.senate.gov/resources/intelligence-related-commissions.

7 Carmen A. Medina, “What To Do When Traditional Models Fail,” Studies in 

Intelligence 46, no. 3 (2002): 4. 

8 Robert Michael Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 562.

9 Elaine Sciolino, “Director Admits CIA Fell Short in Predicting Soviet Collapse,” 

New York Times, May 21, 1992, https://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/21/world/

director-admits-cia-fell-short-in-predicting-the-soviet-collapse.html.

10 World Economic Outlook, October 2020: A Long and Difficult Ascent, International Monetary Fund, October 2020, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/

WEO/Issues/2020/09/30/world-economic-outlook-october-2020.

11 Murray Gell-Mann, “Complexity at Large: Let’s Call it Plectics,” Complexity 

1, no. 5 (May 1996): 3-5, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/cplx.613

0010502/epdf.

12 Valerie Strauss, “The Difference Between Complex and Complicated and Why 

it Matters,” Washington Post, August 8, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.

com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2014/08/08/the-difference-between-complex-andcomplicated-and-why-it-matters-in-school-reform/?utm_term=.e11e43aa3b9e.

13 Melanie Mitchell, Complexity: A Guided Tour (New York: Oxford University 

Press, 2009). 

14 Intelligence Community Directive 203: Analytic Standards, Office of the Director 

of National Intelligence, January 2, 2015, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/

ICD/ICD%20203%20Analytic%20Standards.pdf.

15 Matthew Fay, “Pentagon Planning and the Problem of Predictability,” The 

Niskanen Center, May 27, 2015, https://www.niskanencenter.org/pentagonplanning-and-the-problem-of-predictability/.

16 Jim Collins, “Five Stages of Decline,” in How the Mighty Fall (New York: HarperCollins, 2011), https://www.jimcollins.com/concepts/five-stages-of-decline.

html#:~:text=We%20found%20that%20great%20companies,Capitulation%20

to%20Irrelevance%20or%20Death.

17 Sue Gordon, “DNI Coats and PDDNI Gordon Announce Transformation, 

Posturing the ODNI To Drive the IC Forward,” Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence, News Release No. 12-18, March 18, 2018, https://www

.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/item/1855-dni-coats-andpddni-gordon-announce-transformation-posturing-the-odni-to-drive-theintelligence-community-forward.

CONCLUSION

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CONCLUSION: 

A WORLD SYSTEM CHANGED BY 

THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

Lawrence A. Kuznar and Stacey E. Pollard

Insights offered in this volume’s chapters represent a complex system 

of relationships between the COVID-19 pandemic and factors influencing U.S. intelligence and national security. We use these insights to 

construct a network of influences from which we derive second- and 

third-order cascading effects. The results of our analysis corroborate 

the contributing authors’ research findings and illuminate the interconnectedness and compounding nature of the relationships examined 

throughout the volume. The model indicates that several destabilizing 

social, economic, and political factors stemming directly from the pandemic have coalesced to exacerbate each other, deepen existing threats 

to human security, and yield new ones. This dynamic has been accelerated and intensified by floods of disinformation. Governance and 

security—indeed, the social contract—have been put to the test, making nations including the United States and U.S. partners more vulnerable to adversarial threats and creating permissive environments in 

which illicit economies and transnational criminal, as well as terrorist, 

organizations can thrive. Finally, the model indicates that, while pandemic-associated problems are fracturing domestic and international 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

political cohesion, some pandemic-associated solutions are strengthening aspects of global economic cooperation and interdependence. This 

fragile and yet interdependent system represents the state of play as the 

world emerges from pandemic.

A Holistic View: Understanding the Changed World System

The authors of this volume provide illuminating perspectives on a 

broad range of influences the COVID-19 pandemic is having on variables critical to U.S. intelligence and national security. While clearly 

each of these analyses is valuable on its own, the variables they examine interact in complex ways. Therefore, this study seeks to maximize 

the full value of the authors’ insights and expertise by examining 

them holistically from a complex system perspective. 

Methodology

Our analysis pools together key variables examined by each author, 

maps them to Fragile States Index (FSI) indicators,*

 where appropriate, and analyzes the variables’ relationships to the pandemic and to 

each other, creating a holistic picture of the pandemic’s short- and 

long-term impacts and implications for intelligence and national 

security. In our review of the contributed chapters, we identify 25 

variables that the authors proposed as related to the COVID-19 pandemic and their relationships to FSI indicator categories (see Table). 

* The Fragile States Index (FSI) comprises measures of social cohesion, economic 

health, political stability, and social well-being based on quantitative and qualitative 

indicators. The FSI is a broadly accepted and widely used measure of state fragility. 

Many of the variables discussed by the volume authors map to key variables of the 

FSI, providing a link to the broader literature on conflict assessment. (Source: The 

Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index, https://fragilestatesindex.org/indicators/)
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Conclusion: A World System Changed by the COVID-19 Pandemic

Table. Variables Related to COVID-19 Pandemic and Fragile States Index

(FSI) Indicators

FSI Indicator FSI Variable Category Variable Chapter

Social Demographic 

Pressures

Food and Water Scarcity

Life Expectancy

Hall et al., Hashemi et al.

Hall et al.

Refugees and 

Internally 

Displaced People

Displacement Blanco, Hashemi et al., 

Pollard et al.

Political Public Services Essential Services

Education

Supply Chains

Disinformation

Crime

Tax Revenue

Blanco, Hall et al., Pollard 

et al.

Hall et al.

Schenker, Hashemi et al., 

Jones and Stefanidis

Kerbel and Tyson Brown, 

Gradon, Pollard et al., 

Priniotakis, Schenker, 

Jones and Stefanidis

Blanco, Hashemi et al., 

Pollard et al., Jones 

and Stefanidis

Blanco

State Legitimacy Governmental 

Effectiveness

Illicit Economy and 

Transnational Crime 

Organizations (TCOs)

Global Terrorism

Corruption

Democratic Decline 

Kerbel and Tyson Brown, 

Kuznar, Hashemi et al., 

Pollard et al., Priniotakis, 

Vlahos

Blanco, Hashemi et al., 

Jones and Stefanidis

Pollard et al.

Blanco, Hashemi et al.

Bodea and Houle, Kuznar

Human Rights and 

Rule of Law

Unequal Protection/

Treatment

Blanco, Bodea and Houle, 

Hall et al., Kuznar, 

Hashemi et al.

Cohesion Fragmentation 

of Elites

Fragmentation Vlahos

Group Grievance Racial and Ethnic Division

Powerlessness/Grievance

Bodea and Houle, Pollard 

et al.

Blanco, Kuznar, Vlahos

Security Apparatus Security and Citizenry Blanco, Kerbel and Tyson 

Brown, Kuznar, Hashemi 

et al., Pollard et al., 

Priniotakis, Vlahos
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

FSI Indicator FSI Variable Category Variable Chapter

Economic Uneven Economic 

Development

Economic Inequality Blanco, Bodea and Houle, 

Hall et al., Kuznar, 

Hashemi et al., Vlahos

Poverty and Economic 

Decline

GDP

Economic Globalization

Small Businesses

E-commerce

Unemployment

Blanco, Hall et al., Pollard 

et al.

Schenker

Schenker

Schenker

Blanco, Bodea and Houle, 

Hashemi et al., Schenker

Source: FSI Indicators and Variable Categories are from The Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index, 

https://fragilestatesindex.org/indicators/; the volume editors have derived the Variables from the 

chapters prepared by their co-authors.

Our interpretation of the authors’ statements regarding the causal 

relationship between the pandemic and these variables, as well as the 

variables’ relationships to each other, enables us to produce a network 

of influences among all the variables. The network is represented by 

a matrix of direct (first-order) relationships between each of the variables, in which a negative relationship receives a -1, a positive relationship, 1, and no relationship, 0. The connections between variables 

were not weighted, even though some variables are likely to have a 

stronger impact than others. We extracted as much information as we 

felt we responsibly could from the authors’ works and tried not to infer 

more than was reasonable. Also, the analysis is static in that it assumes 

that the first-order effects do not change with time. History shows us 

that this probably is not the case, as noted by Kuznar and Vlahos. 

As the pandemic subsides and economies recover, the second-order 

effects in these variables are likely to change. An analysis like this, 

therefore, is best suited for identifying unforeseen nth order effects in 

a system as it currently exists. Finally, the assumptions of our model 

should not be taken as authoritative or final. Further work with the 

experts who contributed to this volume and a fuller consideration of 

the relationships among these variables are necessary. 
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Conclusion: A World System Changed by the COVID-19 Pandemic

Nonetheless, our study provides preliminary results and serves as 

an example of how such a technique can provide intelligence analysts 

and national security end users with insights into the systemic effects 

of a pandemic—or any shock on a complex system—and expectations 

that can be tested with further data collection. Bearing in mind the 

limitations, our findings appear to confirm some of the higher-order 

effects anticipated by the authors and other researchers assessing the 

pandemic’s effects. The network we created for this chapter is best 

understood as a world system that has existed during the COVID-19 

pandemic. A world without the pandemic, or under a different shock 

(e.g., global economic collapse), might look different.

Figure 1. World System During COVID-19 Pandemic: Relationships Among Social,

Political, Cohesion, and Economic Variables 

Source: The variables are color-coded based on the FSI indicators from The Fund for Peace, 

Fragile States Index, https://fragilestatesindex.org/indicators/; the volume editors have derived 

the variables from the chapters prepared by their co-authors.

Note: This network of COVID-19’s effects on each variable examined by the authors of 

this book, as well as the variables’ effects on each other, conveys the complexity of the pandemic’s impact on the world system (as captured by the FSI of social, political, cohesion, and 

economic indicators).

Economic

Globalization

E-commerce

Life Expectancy

Tax Revenue

COVID-19

GDP

Displacement

Unemployment

Unequal

Protection

Small Supply Chains Businesses

Disinformation

Food and 

Water Scarcity

Corruption

Fragmentation

Governmental

E­ectiveness

Essential

Services

Crime

Powerlessness

Grievance

Education

Global

Terrorism

Political

Stability

Economic

Inequality

Security and

Citizenry

Racial and

Ethnic Division

Democratic

Decline

Illicit Economy

and TCOs

Variables

social

political

cohesion

economic

Relationships

decreasing 

effect

increasing 

effect
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

Figure 2. First- Through Third-Order Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic: An Exampl

Source: The variables are color-coded based on the FSI indicators from The Fund for Peace, Fragile 

States Index, https://fragilestatesindex.org/indicators/; the volume editors have derived the variables 

from the chapters prepared by their co-authors.

Note: Although governmental effectiveness promotes security among the citizenry, the overall effect 

in this model is negative—or diminishing—because the fragmentation of elites has damaged governmental effectiveness.

Once the network is created (see Figure 1), the direct and indirect 

effects of one variable on the others can be traced. For instance, the 

model indicates that the COVID-19 pandemic has directly encouraged 

fragmentation among elites who are vying for political power, which 

in turn has generated a second-order effect (i.e., an effect two steps 

away from the initial variable) of diminishing governmental effectiveness. Because governmental effectiveness increases security, its diminishment has a third-order effect of decreasing security (see Figure 2). 

Another advantage of this network approach is that recursive effects 

of variables can be captured. For instance, the COVID-19 pandemic 

is not modeled as having an effect on itself.†

 However, through the 

† While pandemics initially cause their own increasing effect, they eventually become 

self-limiting as the proportion of infected and deceased individuals in a population 

increases, leaving the pathogen with fewer targets of infection.

+

+

−

= Net negative effect

COVID-19 Governmental

Eectiveness

Fragmentation

Security and

Citizenry

Variables

political

cohesion

Relationships

decreasing 

effect

increasing 

effect
293

Conclusion: A World System Changed by the COVID-19 Pandemic

myriad 9,638 first, second, and third pathways that affect the COVID19 pandemic, 46 recursively impact the pandemic itself with a net 

positive effect, causing it to increase. As an example, a second-order 

pathway that increases disinformation leads in turn to rejection of 

non-pharmaceutical interventions (masks, hygiene, social distancing), 

which then leads to further pandemic spread.

Because many thousands of pathways can be traced throughout the model, understanding the indirect effects of the connections 

among the variables and identifying the drivers requires an analytical 

approach that measures the degree to which a particular variable is 

related to the others. One straightforward approach involves matrix 

multiplication. Second-order relationships are calculated by multiplying the matrix of first-order relationships by itself; third-order 

relationships are calculated by multiplying the matrix by itself three 

times.1, 2, ‡ The full number of ways one variable can impact another 

is obtained by adding the products that result from multiplying 

these matrices. The ways to traverse a network increase rapidly as 

one considers higher and higher orders. For instance, there is only 

one direct connection between the COVID-19 pandemic and security and citizenry, but there are 717 third-order connections in the 

model. Still, it is unlikely that distant third-order effects are 717 times 

stronger than a first-order effect because an effect usually decays with 

distance in a network. Downscaling the effects of each higher-order 

relation accounts for the typical decay of influence. To account for the 

diminished effect of one variable on another with its distance in the 

network, we scaled each order by its largest number of connections 

between two variables (e.g., the 717 third-order connections between 

COVID-19 and security and citizenry were scaled down to -1.784).

‡ We found that the relative impact of variables on one another did not appreciably 

change after accounting for third-order relations. Therefore, this study limited the 

estimation to first- through third-order effects.
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

COVID-19’s Impact on the World System

Our examination of two uses of the FSI model yields the following 

measures of the pandemic’s effects. First, we present what the model 

shows about the degree to which the pandemic impacts key variables. 

In the next section, we explore the impact of specific factors that the 

United States’ adversaries are leveraging to gain enhanced influence 

from the pandemic. 

First-order Effects

The direct, first-order effects are those that immediately impact other 

variables in the system. The first-order effects of the COVID-19 pandemic implied by the model are depicted in Figure 3. 

Figure 3. Direct, First-Order Relationships During the COVID-19 Pandemi

COVID-19

Governmental

Eectiveness

Fragmentation Essential

Services

Security and

Citizenry

Unemployment

Education

Food and 

Water Scarcity

Disinformation

Small

Businesses

Economic

Globalization

E-commerce Life

Expectancy

Supply Chains

Variables

social

political

cohesion

economic

Relationships

decreasing 

effect

increasing 

effect

Source: The variables are color-coded based on the FSI indicators from The Fund for Peace, Fragile 

States Index, https://fragilestatesindex.org/indicators/; the volume editors have derived the variables 

from the chapters prepared by their co-authors.

As discussed by Hall et al. and Hashemi et al., the pandemic has 

directly jeopardized survival, access to basic needs, and education. As 

Schenker shows, it has disrupted vital supply chains, rendered some 
295

Conclusion: A World System Changed by the COVID-19 Pandemic

segments of the workforce unemployed, and taken a toll on small 

businesses, which are less resilient than big businesses and corporations. According to Blanco, Kuznar, Kerbel and Tyson Brown, Hashemi et al., Pollard et al., Priniotakis, and Vlahos, challenges stemming 

from pandemics fragment nations’ elites and erode the relationship 

between governments and their citizenry in regions examined by the 

authors. Simultaneously, as laid out comprehensively by Gradon and 

also touched on by Kerbel and Tyson Brown, Pollard et al., Priniotakis, 

Schenker, and Jones and Stefanidis, adversaries of the United States 

and its partners launched information operations campaigns aimed at 

undermining and discrediting the democratic governments’ COVID19 responses, causing disaffection and sowing chaos and doubt. These 

campaigns pumped disinformation and conspiracy theories about 

the pandemic into the information environment, which spread like a 

global wildfire amid the tinder of worldwide fear and confusion.

Exploring economic variables, Schenker illustrates how ecommerce has boomed as people in developed countries have transitioned to the virtual environment to do business, find entertainment, 

and shop to satisfy even basic needs. Kuznar demonstrates a feedback loop between the pandemic and economic globalization: travel 

associated with economic globalization was the primary driver of the 

pandemic’s spread,3

 while the pandemic intensified economic interdependence for scarce resources, stressing the international supply 

chains upon which economic globalization depends.

First- through Third-order Effects

As shown in Figure 4, the combined first- through third-order effects 

of the pandemic depict how its influence has percolated through the 

system. Blanco, Hall et al., Kuznar, Kerbel and Tyson Brown, Hashemi et al., Pollard et al., Priniotakis, and Vlahos show how pandemics 

can challenge and erode the quality of governance, particularly government effectiveness and the provision of essential services. Blanco, 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

Bodea and Houle, Hall et al., Kuznar, and Hashemi et al. illustrate 

how the cascading effects of the COVID-19 pandemic are serving to 

undermine the rule of law, especially equal protection of populations 

under law, and are fostering democratic decline by allowing corruption to grow. As characterized by Blanco, Bodea and Houle, Hall et 

al., Kuznar, Hashemi et al., Pollard et al., Jones and Stefanidis, and 

Vlahos, ripple effects of pandemics take a toll on GDP everywhere, 

Figure 4. First-, Second-, and Third-Order Impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic

on the World System

-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4

Security and Citizenry

Tax Revenue

Supply Chains

Information Environment/Disinformation

Crime

Education

Essential Services

Unequal Protection

Terrorism

Governmental Eectiveness

Corruption

Democratic Decline

Illicit Economy and TCOs

Fragmentation

Displacement

Economic Inequality

Economic Globalization

E-commerce

Small Businesses

Unemployment

GDP

Powerlessness/Grievance

Racial and Ethnic Division

Life Expectancy

Food and Water Scarcity

COVID-19 Pandemic

COVID-19 Pandemic 1st, 2nd & 3rd Order Eects Scaled

Note: In this figure, the COVID-19 pandemic (red bar) has imposed first- through third-order effects 

throughout the world system, leading to the rise or decline of variables associated with national security (or 

FSI indicators). These combined effects have generated (as illustrated by blue bars) the greatest decline in 

the security of citizens around the globe (-4.1) and the greatest rise in citizenry powerlessness (+3.7).
297

Conclusion: A World System Changed by the COVID-19 Pandemic

exacerbating structural inequalities, incentivizing crime, and deepening poverty and economic decline—especially among the world’s 

most vulnerable populations. Their work demonstrates this is particularly true in countries that were already fragile or unstable before 

the pandemic began. Finally, as the various works of Blanco, Bodea 

and Houle, Hall et al., Kuznar, Hashemi et al., Pollard et al., Jones and 

Stefanidis, and Vlahos show, forced displacement and group grievances—stoked by inflamed racial and ethnic rivalries, as well as the 

growing powerlessness of underprotected groups—create permissive 

environments in which illicit economies and transnational criminal, 

as well as terrorist, organizations can thrive. These combined effects 

have most undermined the security of citizens around the globe, as 

illustrated by the greatest decline (-4) in Figure 4.

A variable’s effect usually diminishes with distance in a network, 

and downscaling the effects of each higher-order relation can account 

for this typical decay of influence. In this bar chart, each order is 

scaled by its largest number of connections between two variables.

Influence of Specific Variables on the World System

This section focuses on the potential influence of specific factors that 

adversaries of the United States and its partners might leverage and provides measures of the threat potential that these factors have on other 

variables in the world system. Our application of the FSI model demonstrates that every variable, even COVID-19, is influenced to some degree 

by other variables, although some are less impacted (e.g., COVID-19) 

and some are impacted by many others (e.g., food and water scarcity, 

essential services, economic inequality, governmental effectiveness). 

Variables introduced from outside the system (e.g., COVID-19) have 

few leverage points for control and are poor candidates for levers of 

control. Similarly, variables that are caused by a blend of other variables 

are difficult to leverage because orchestrating the confluence of many 

variables for a desired effect is tricky. Variables in the “sweet spot” for 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

control should have a tractable set of impact variables that an actor 

can more easily manipulate to influence the system. This characteristic 

probably leads the adversaries of the United States and its partners to 

focus their influence operations primarily on two correlated variables 

with tractable sets of impacts: disinformation and corruption.4, 5 

Disinformation

Kacper Gradon’s chapter makes the case that Russia is a primary purveyor of disinformation in an “infodemic” characterized by spreading disinformation and trying to discredit Western powers and their 

responses to the pandemic—all in an effort to weaken alliances within 

NATO and to sow political division within Western democracies. 

According to the model, the pandemic has triggered a spike in disinformation (see Figure 4), an observation shared by other analysts.6, 7

The enduring and strong first- through third-order effects of disinformation on the world system during the COVID-19 pandemic are 

shown in Figure 5. 

A variable’s effect usually diminishes with distance in a network, 

and downscaling the effects of each higher-order relation can account 

for this typical decay of influence. In this bar chart, each order is 

scaled by its largest number of connections between two variables.

The variables most influenced by disinformation include governmental effectiveness and the illicit economy and TCOs. Governmental ineffectiveness and disruptions in the provision of essential 

services foster democratic decline. These factors also fuel crime, 

inequality, powerlessness, and displacement, eroding governmental 

capacity and creating insecurity. Moreover, disinformation has an 

inherently self-perpetuating effect, exhibiting classic positive feedback within the system. In other words, disinformation begets more 

disinformation in the system and, therefore, is a particularly pernicious and destabilizing weapon of war. This model illuminates how 

disinformation campaigns, especially from Russia and China, represent a critical threat to the United States.
299

Conclusion: A World System Changed by the COVID-19 Pandemic

Figure 5. Disinformation Impacts on the World System During the COVID-19 Pandemi

-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5

Security and Citizenry

Tax Revenue

Supply Chains

Information Environment/Disinformation

Crime

Education

Essential Services

Unequal Protection

Terrorism

Governmental Eectiveness

Corruption

Democratic Decline

Illicit Economy and TCOs

Fragmentation

Displacement

Economic Inequality

Economic Globalization

E-commerce

Small Businesses

Unemployment

GDP

Powerlessness/Grievance

Racial and Ethnic Division

Life Expectancy

Food and Water Scarcity

COVID-19 Pandemic

Disinformation Eects in the COVID-19 Pandemic System Scaled

Information Environment: Relative 1st, 2nd & 3rd Order

Note: In this figure, the variable of disinformation (red bar) has exacerbated the first- through 

third-order effects of the COVID-19 pandemic throughout the world system, generating (as illustrated 

by blue bars) the greatest decline in security (-6) and the greatest rise in citizenry powerlessness 

(+4.9) and illicit economic activity (+4.6).

Corruption, Security, and COVID-19

As shown by the model and examined in each of the contributions 

to this volume, the pandemic’s most damaging effects have been on 

security and the citizenry’s well-being, with correspondingly intensified perceptions of powerlessness and racial and ethnic divisions. 

Examining these relationships more closely, the model indicates that 

corruption has the most salient adverse effect on security; therefore, 

the impacts of corruption throughout the world system are explored 
300

A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

here (see Figure 6). A number of studies beyond the scope of this volume show how adversaries of the United States, particularly Russia 

and China, exploit corruption to advance their national interests.8, 9

Figure 6. Corruption’s Impact on Governance and Security During the

COVID-19 Pandemic

-8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Security and Citizenry

Tax Revenue

Supply Chains

Information Environment/Disinformation

Crime

Education

Essential Services

Unequal Protection

Terrorism

Governmental Eectiveness

Corruption

Democratic Decline

Illicit Economy and TCOs

Fragmentation

Displacement

Economic Inequality

Economic Globalization

E-commerce

Small Businesses

Unemployment

GDP

Powerlessness/Grievance

Racial and Ethnic Division

Life Expectancy

Food and Water Scarcity

COVID-19 Pandemic

Note: In this figure, the variable of corruption (red bar) has exacerbated the first- through thirdorder effects of the COVID-19 pandemic throughout the world system, generating (as illustrated by 

blue bars) the greatest decline in security (-7.4), as well as the governance variables of essential 

services (-5.7) and governmental effectiveness (-4.8), and the greatest rise in citizenry powerlessness (+6.4).

A variable’s effect usually diminishes with distance in a network, and downscaling the effects of 

each higher-order relation can account for this typical decay of influence. In this bar chart, each 

order is scaled by its largest number of connections between two variables.
301

Conclusion: A World System Changed by the COVID-19 Pandemic

Similar to disinformation, corruption has a negative influence on 

governance—including the provision of essential services and governmental effectiveness—fostering democratic decline. When combined with corruption, as described in depth by Hashemi et al., these 

factors lead to unequal protection, increased crime, and a growth in 

the illicit economy and transnational criminal organizations. Corruption also has a strong influence on feelings of powerlessness, driving 

racial and ethnic divisions and, most of all, eroding a nation’s ability 

to secure its citizenry. The highly disruptive influence of corruption 

on political stability in this model mirrors the results of recent empirical studies demonstrating a similarly strong and negative impact of 

corruption on political systems.10

Conclusions and Outlook

The model of the world system during the COVID-19 pandemic, 

developed and analyzed in this chapter, illuminates the dynamic 

and interactive multiplicity of temporary and enduring challenges 

that U.S. and U.S. partner intelligence and national security establishments have experienced by failing to adequately anticipate the 

COVID-19 pandemic and its associated outcomes. At the time of 

this writing, the pandemic is reproducing and perpetuating deadlier 

variants of the virus—including the Delta variant, which is sweeping unprotected regions of the world—regions where domestic and 

international political and public health arenas are fraught with turmoil and infodemic-related distrust and where the vaccine is most 

needed to stop the spread. The COVID-19 pandemic has weakened 

governmental and civil institutions, as well as social cohesion, leaving 

governments less capable of countering obstacles such as economic 

decline and criminal activity and challenges from non-state violent 

actors and illegitimate political rivals.

The pandemic has exacerbated and exposed the vulnerabilities of relatively resilient, advanced industrialized, institutionalized 
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

democracies, such as the United States. In less stable regions and 

conflict zones of the developing world—such as the Middle East, 

Latin America, and the Caribbean, in particular, where human insecurity was already a problem—the delicate fiber of the state-society 

relationship is fraying, unraveling, and, in some cases, disintegrating. 

In Tunisia—the Arab Spring’s only success story—the lethality of the 

Delta variant is overwhelming the health care system, heaping pressure on the country’s nascent democracy, which has already resulted 

in fragmentation.11 In Lebanon, pandemic-related economic collapse 

threatens the survival of the Arabic-speaking Levant’s last cosmopolitan hub as the region’s only semidemocracy crumbles.12 In Iraq and 

Syria, amid the worst human displacement crisis in modern history, 

the pandemic has hastened and exacerbated state and security failure. As observed by Pollard et al., terrorist organizations, as well as 

other illegitimate and non-state groups, are filling these governance 

and security gaps, staking out territory and violently competing for a 

monopoly of force and influence over helpless populations. 

In Latin America and the Caribbean, failure to mitigate pandemicassociated economic shocks is exacerbating popular discontent with 

political elites, undermining political stability, and increasing the 

risk of outsider or illegitimate actors seizing power. Local gangs, as 

well as drug trafficking and organized crime groups, are supplanting legitimate officials and elites, as noted by Blanco. This model of 

the breakdown of formal state institutions and disintegration of the 

social contract is most clearly playing out in Haiti where the pandemic has put that country’s already weak political, economic, and 

social institutions to the test, grinding public services in many areas 

to a halt. Working-class neighborhoods have descended into zones of 

lawlessness as public institutions have been abandoned, and the lives 

of ordinary people have become subject to the will of well-armed 

gangs. The political crisis deepened in July 2021, when armed mercenaries assassinated Haitian president Jovenel Moise at his home in 

the night, leaving the government in disarray, with no parliament or 
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Conclusion: A World System Changed by the COVID-19 Pandemic

president, a dispute over who is the prime minister, and a weak police 

force.13 Gangs now control more than half of the capital of Port-auPrince. Kidnappings and political assassinations are rampant. Tens of 

thousands of people are fleeing their homes due to gang violence and 

arson amid skyrocketing inflation, blackouts, and food, water, and 

fuel shortages. COVID-19 is surging in Haiti, which has yet to begin 

a vaccination program, and there is no privacy or social distancing in 

shelters set up by domestic and international aid workers.14

These trends, in some cases intensified and made more calamitous 

by increasingly lethal variants of the COVID-19 virus, are emergent 

in regions unexplored in this volume, particularly vulnerable areas of 

Africa and Asia. At the same time, some pandemic-associated solutions are strengthening aspects of global economic cooperation and 

interdependence. As Schenker illustrates, the pandemic has forced 

long overdue technological transitions, including vastly improved and 

greatly interconnected global e-commerce, as well as virtual environments within which to do business, find entertainment, and shop to 

satisfy even basic needs. This fragile and yet interdependent system 

represents the state of play as the world emerges from pandemic. 

Endnotes

1 Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and 

Applications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

2 For an application to international affairs, see Allison Astorino-Courtois, “The 

Cognitive Structure of Decision Making and the Course of Arab-Israeli Relations 1970-1978,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 39, no. 3 (1995): 419-38.

3 Lawrence A. Kuznar, “A Tale of Two Pandemics: Evolutionary Psychology, 

Urbanism, and the Biology of Disease Spread Deepen Sociopolitical Divides 

in the U.S.,” Humanities and Social Science Communications 8, no. 42 (February 

2021): 1-6, doi:10.1057/s41599-021-00719-8.

4 Kacper T. Gradon et al., “Countering Misinformation: A Multidisciplinary 

Approach,” Big Data & Society, January-June, 2021, 1-14, doi:10.1177/205395

17211013848.
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A WORLD EMERGING FROM PANDEMIC

5 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World

(Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2021), https://

www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/GlobalTrends_2040.pdf.

6 Jason Blazakis et al., Quantifying the Q Conspiracy: A Data-driven Approach 

to Understanding the Threat Posed by QAnon (London: Soufan Center, 2021), 

https://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/TSC-White-Paper_

QAnon_16April2021-final-1.pdf.

7 Peter W. Singer and Eric B. Johnson, “The Need to Inoculate Military Servicemembers against Information Threats: The Case for Digital Literacy 

Training for the Force,” War on the Rocks, February 1, 2021, https://waronthe

rocks.com/2021/02/we-need-to-inoculate-military-servicemembers-againstinformation-threats-the-case-for-digital-literacy-training/.

8 Heather A. Conley et al., The Kremlin Playbook: Understanding Russian Influence 

in Central and Eastern Europe (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016).

9 Hans Binnendijk and Sarah Kirchberger, The China Plan: A Transatlantic 

Blueprint for Strategic Competition (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2021), 

https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep30709.

10 Lawrence A. Kuznar and Jeffery Day, Hunting Gray Rhinos and Black Swans: 

Statistical and Machine Learning Models of Political Stability and Terrorism

(Arlington, Virginia: Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Periodic Publication, OSD/ASD (R&E)/RSD/RRTO, 2020), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/

AD1097405.

11 Vivian Yee, “Tunisia’s Democracy Verges on Collapse as President Moves to 

Take Control,” New York Times, July 27, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/

07/26/world/middleeast/tunisia-government-dismissed-protests.html.

12 Mona Yacoubian, “As Lebanon Melts Down, Can it Avert Total Collapse?” 

United States Institute for Peace, March 5, 2021, https://www.usip.org/pub

lications/2021/03/lebanon-melts-down-can-it-avert-total-collapse.

13 Danica Coto and Evens Sanon, “Gangs Add to Haiti’s Post-Assassination Chaos,” 

Los Angeles Times, July 12, 2021, https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/

2021-07-12/haiti-gangs-complicate-recovery-effort-assassination. 

14 Caitlin Hu, “Fear Stalks Haitians as Their Murdered President Is Buried and 

Gangs Terrorize the Capital,” CNN World, July 23, 2021, https://www.cnn.

com/2021/07/23/americas/haiti-moise-kidnappings-refugees-insecurity-intlcmd/index.html. 
COVID has changed—and will continue to change—the fragile yet interrelated world system that intelligence analysts study as they grapple with 

threats to U.S. national security. A truly complex phenomenon, the pandemic 

has challenged the workings of the U.S. Intelligence Community itself, as 

well as influencing the national security problem sets the IC confronts. 

Faced with this fundamentally altered world, the authors present evidencebased, qualitative, quantitative, and mixed-methods analyses on the impacts 

of COVID-19 on our national security. They anticipate and prepare for a 

future beyond the pandemic. 

Dr. Stacey Pollard is the director of the Ann Caracristi Institute for Intelligence 

Research at National Intelligence University. She specializes in conflict and 

instability in the Middle East and North Africa and has extensive field research 

experience in Iraq and Syria. Dr. Lawrence A. Kuznar is chief cultural sciences 

officer at National Security Innovations, Inc. and emeritus professor of anthropology at Purdue University-Fort Wayne. His research includes applications of 

complexity theory.

HOW HAS THE PANDEMIC 

TRANSFORMED THE IC?