This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn . Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (201 4 ). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15
- 0517 Mackenzie Leigh Meier, petitioner,

Appellant,

vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent. Filed November 23 , 2015 Affirmed Stauber , Judge Dakota County District Court File No. 19HA

- CR

- 11

- 2982 Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Katie Conners, Special Assistant State Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minneso ta; and James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Chip Granger, Assistant County Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent) Considered and decided by Stauber , Presiding Judge; Kirk , Judge; and Willis , Judge

. 

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.2 U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N STAUBER , Judge Appellant challenges the summary denial of her petition for postconviction relief, arguing that (1) the district court abused its discretion by concluding that her petition was time

- barred; (2) she should be permitted to withdraw her guilty plea based on newly discovered evidence, a Brady viola tion, due

- process violations, manifest injustice, and ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) she is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. We affirm. FACTS In September 2011, appellant Mackenzie Meier was charged with possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree. The complaint alleged that during a routine traffic stop, a Hastings police officer heard the sound of breaking glass after he observed appellant throw “an object out the passenger side window of the vehicle.” The complaint also alleged that the officer later retrieved a glass pipe that was tested and determined to contain .09 grams of methamphetamine. On September 26, 2011, appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree. The district court stayed adjudication of the matter and placed appellant on probation for three years. But after appellant violated the terms of her probation, the district cour t filed an amended order on October 3, 2012, revoking the stay of adjudication and sentencing appellant to a stay of imposition under Minn. Stat. § 609.135 (2014).3

In July 2012, the St. Paul Police Department Crime Laboratory (SPPDCL) came under public sc rutiny and was the subject of a Frye

- Mack hearing in an unrelated Dakota County District Court case. Independent reviews of the SPPDCL indicated problems in the laboratory protocols and testing procedures. In light of the problems at the SPPDCL, appellan t filed a postconviction petition on July 18, 2014, arguing that she should be allowed to withdraw her guilty plea or be granted an evidentiary hearing because (1) the deficient SPPDCL testing is newly discovered evidence; (2) the state violated Brady v.
M aryland by not dis closing the deficient testing ; (3) the state violated appellant’s due

process rights by using unreliable scientific evidence to obtain the guilty plea; (4) appellant’s guilty plea was not accurate, voluntary, or intelligent; and (5) she r eceived ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant claimed that although her petition was filed more than two years after her sentence, her petition was timely because it met the newly discovered evidence and the interests

- of

- justice exceptions to the s tatutory two

- year time bar. The district court denied appellant’s petition without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that the petition is time

- barred and fails on the merits. This appeal followed. D E C I S I O N An appellate court reviews a summary de nial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Powers v. State , 695 N.W.2d 371, 374 (Minn. 2005)

. “A postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Nicks , 831 N.W.2d 493, 503 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted).4 I. Appellant challenges the district court’s conclusion that her postconviction petition is time

- barred. A petition for postconviction relief must be filed within two years of the later of “(1) the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed; or (2) an appellate court’s disposition of petitioner’s direct appeal. ” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2014). But, r ecently, our supreme court hel d that “[w]hen an offender receives a stay of adjudication under Minn. Stat. § 152.18, subd. 1 (2014), there is no judgment of conviction or sentence that triggers the 2

- year statute of limitations in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)(1).” Dupey v. State , 868 N.W.2d 36, 37 (Minn. 2015). Instead, the section 590.01 time

- bar is triggered “only after the stay [is] revoked,” the offender is sentenced, and the district court enters a judgment of conviction. Id. at 41. Here, because appellant received a stay o f adjudication after pleading guilty on September 26, 2011, the section 590.01 time

- bar was not triggered on that date. Rather , under Dupey , the two

- year time

- bar began to run on October 3, 2012, when the stay of adjudication was revoked and the district court sentenced appellant to a stay of imposition un der Minn. Stat. § 609.135 . Because appellant filed her postconviction petition on July 18, 2014, less than two years after the district court revoked the stay of adjudication and stayed imposition of app ellant’ s sentence, the district court erred by concluding that appellant’s postconviction petition was time

- bar r ed under section 590.01.
II.
A ppellant argues that the “deficiencies” at the SPPDC “should allow her to withdraw her plea based on” (1) a manif est injustice; (2) ineffective assistance of5

counsel ; (3) newly discovered evidence; (4) a Brady violation; and (5) a due

- process violation. But “[a] guilty plea by a counseled defendant has traditionally operated

. . . as a waiver of all non

-

jurisdictiona l defects arising prior to the entry of the plea.” State v. Ford , 397 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Minn. 1986). “ When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea .” State v. Jeffries , 806 N.W.2d 56, 64 (Minn. 2011). Because appellant had counsel and entered a guilty plea, she waived all non -

jurisdictional arguments in her postconviction petition. Therefore, the only substantive arguments raised by appellant that were not waived by her guilty plea consist of her manifest

- injustice and ineffective

- assistance

- of

- counsel claims. A. Manifest injustice
A court must a llow a defendant to withdraw her guilty plea when “necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15 .05, subd. 1. A manifest injustice occurs if a guilty plea is not valid because it is not accurate, volun tary, and intelligent. Perkins v. State , 559 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Minn. 1997)

. Appellant argues that her guilty plea was not (1) accurate; (2) voluntary; or (3 ) intelligent. 1. Accurate For a guilty plea to be accurate, a proper factual basis must be esta blished. State v. Ecker , 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). Here, appellant pleaded guilty to fifth

- degree possession of a controlled substance. Appellant’s signed plea petition demonstrates that she was not making any claim that she was innocent. She a lso admitted at the plea6

hearing that she possessed the glass pipe containing methamphetamine and that she knew the substance in the pipe was methamphetamine. These facts meet the accuracy requirement. 2. Voluntary
A ple a is voluntary if the defendant ’ s will was not overborne at the time s he pleaded guilty in response to improper pressures or promises. See State v. Farnsworth , 738 N.W.2d 364, 374

- 75 (Minn. 2007)

. Appellant argues that her plea was involuntary because the test results from the SPPDCL improperly pressured her to plead guilty. We disagree. Appellant never requested to investigate the SPPDCL reports, nor did she dispute that the substance in her po ssession was methamphetamine. Moreover, appellant acknowledged at the plea hearing that no one was forcing her to plead guilty, and that she had not been promised anything outside the parameters of the plea agreement. Thus, appellant is unable to demonst rate that she was improperly pressured or coerced into pleading guilty. 3. Intelligent A plea is intelligent if a defendant understands “the charges against him, the rights he [was] waiving, and the consequences of his plea.” State v. Raleigh , 778 N.W.2 d 90, 96 (Minn. 2010). Appellant claims that her plea was unintelligent because she did not know about the testing deficiencies at the SPPDCL, she did not understand the scope of her right to challenge the evidence, and did not know that she was waiving t his right by pleading guilty. But at the plea hearing, appellant acknowledged the charges against her and that she was pleading guilty to fifth degree possession of methamphetamine, a7

controlled substance. Appellant also stated that her attorney informed her of the rights she was waiving and that she would not have any other opportunity to object to the evidence presented by the state. Therefore, the record reflects that appellant understood the charges against her, the rights she was waiving, and the co nsequences of her guilty plea. Because appellant’s guilty plea was accurate, voluntary, and intelligent, she is not entitled to withdraw her plea.
B. Ineffective assistance of counsel To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellan t must demo nstrate “(1) that [her] counsel’ s representation ‘fell below an objec tive standard of reasonableness’ ; and (2) ‘there is a reasonable pr obability that, but for counsel’ s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been differe nt.’ ” Nissalke
v. State , 861 N.W.2d 88, 94 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 , 2068 (1984))

. An attorney provides reasonable assistance when he exercises the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would exercise under the circumstances. Dukes v. State , 621 N.W.2d 246, 252 (Minn. 2001)

. Appellant contends that her “ attorney did not act reasonably in light of all the circumstances because the attorney did not demand an d review the underl ying [SPPDCL] file in her case.” But this court re jected an identical argument in Roberts v. State , 856 N.W.2d 287, 293 (Minn. App. 2014), review denied (Minn. Jan. 28, 2015). As in Roberts , there is nothing in the record indicating that appellant ever questioned the validity of the test results. A ppellant also has failed to cite any evidence that would have8

given her attorney a reason to believe that the substance in her pipe was not methamphetamine and, therefore, to question the v ali dity of the SPPDCL test results. Moreover, a ppellant has not shown that a reasonably competent defense attorney exercising customary skills and diligence in a controlled

- substance case would have demanded the SPPDCL file bef ore the discovery of the SPP DCL’ s deficiencies. Se e State v. Vang , 847 N.W.2d 248, 267 (Minn. 2014) (stating that the reasonab leness of counsel’ s conduct is judged in view of the facts at the time of the conduct). And finally, appellant’s claim that her trial counsel was ineffectiv e for failing to investigate the test results is considered a part of trial strategy, which this court generally does not review.
See Opsahl v. State , 677 N.W.2d 414, 421 (Minn. 2004) (stating that “[t] he extent of counsel’ s investigation is considered a par t of trial strategy,” which is generally not reviewable)

. Therefore, appellant is unable to establish that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
III. Finally, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her petition without an evidentiary hearing. We disagree. When a petition for postconviction relief is filed, “the court shall promptly set an early hearing on the petition and response thereto, and promptly determine the issues” “[u]nless the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2014) ; see Erickson v. State , 842 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Minn. 2014). The threshold standard for an evidentiary hearing is l ower than that for a new trial; “[a]ny doubts about whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing should be resolved in9

favor of the defendant seeking relief.” Nicks , 831 N.W.2d at 504

. The district court’ s decision on whether to hold an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Riley v. State , 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012)

. Here, appellant never challenged the lab results or claimed that the substance in the glass pipe was not methamphetamine. Instead, she pleaded guilty to the charged offense, admitting that the substance she possessed was methamphetamine. Appellant has also failed to make any connection between the problems at the SPPDCL and the testing of the evidence in her case. Accordingly, appellant cannot demonstrate th at the district court abused its discretion in denying her request for an evidentiary hearing. Affirmed.