COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-16-00200-CR

WHISKEY WILLIAMS APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM THE 362ND DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. F-2013-1198-D

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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I. INTRODUCTION

In three issues, Appellant Whiskey Williams appeals the trial court’s 

judgment adjudicating him guilty of manslaughter and sentencing him to thirteen 

years’ confinement. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.04 (West 2011). We will 

affirm.

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Williams was indicted for manslaughter after he struck Edron Slaughter in

the head with a loaded firearm causing the firearm to discharge, hitting and killing 

Ashley Walters. Williams pleaded guilty to manslaughter and received a fiveyear term of deferred adjudication community supervision. The State later filed a 

motion to proceed with an adjudication of guilt, alleging that Williams had violated 

the following conditions of his community supervision:

(a) Commit no offense against the laws of this State or of any other 

state or of the United States;

. . . .

(s) . . . complete 200 hours of Community Service Restitution at a 

community service project or projects for an organization or 

organizations approved by the judge and designated by the Denton 

County Supervision Department to be completed at a rate of not less 

than four hours per week starting by but not later than 60 days from 

the date of community supervision;

(t) Submit to testing for alcohol or drug usage at the request of a 

community supervision officer. Pay the cost for these tests within 

thirty (30) days of giving the specimen;

(u) Within sixty (60) days, . . . complete a drug/alcohol evaluation 

through an agency which offers such services and approved by 

his/her community supervision officer and provide written proof of 

compliance to the supervision officer within 10 days of completion. If 

treatment is deemed necessary, the defendant shall abide by any 

and all treatment directives, comply with the rules and regulations of 

the approved agency, pay all costs incurred for such services. 

Continue in said treatment until successfully completed as stated by 

the counselor with the agreement of his/her community supervision 

officer; [and]

. . . . 
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(cc) [Attend] Individual counseling, no less than three (3) sessions 

specifically addressing the offense. 

Williams’s probation officer, Christy Martin, testified at the hearing on the 

State’s motion to proceed to adjudication. Martin testified that Williams did not 

complete the community service hours required by condition (s) of his community 

supervision. She testified that Williams failed to perform the required four hours 

of weekly community service for the months of July, September, October, and 

November of 2014, as well as for the month of January 2015. Martin also 

testified that Williams did not submit to testing for drug usage as required by 

condition (t) of his community supervision. She testified that Williams did not 

submit to drug testing that she requested on October 10, October 31, November 

13, December 18, and December 30, 2014. Martin also testified that Williams 

failed to timely submit to the drug/alcohol evaluation required by condition (u) of 

his community supervision. She further testified that Williams failed to attend the 

three counseling sessions specifically addressing the manslaughter offense as 

required by condition (cc) of his community supervision. 

The State also presented evidence regarding Williams’s alleged violation 

of condition (a) of his community supervision—that he commit no offense against 

the laws of Texas or any other state. Terry Brooks testified that he was a deputy 

with the Kerr County Sheriff’s Department and a former officer of the Denton 

Police Department. Deputy Brooks testified that on January 12, 2015—while 

working as a Denton police officer—he conducted a traffic stop on Williams. 
4

During the stop, Deputy Brooks observed Williams pull into a parking lot, and he 

saw a clear bag fly out of the window of Williams’s vehicle. Williams was the sole 

occupant of the stopped vehicle. Deputy Brooks testified that he walked over to 

the bag and saw that it contained “a green, leafy substance consistent with 

marijuana” and that based on the smell and appearance of the substance, in his 

opinion, the bag contained marijuana. 

Officer Craig Fitzgerald of the Denton Police Department testified that he 

was with Deputy Brooks during Williams’s traffic stop and that he picked up the 

bag that came from Williams’s vehicle. Officer Fitzgerald testified that the bag 

contained “a green, leafy substance [he] believed to be marijuana” and that, in 

his opinion, the contents of the bag contained marijuana. He further testified that 

the marijuana collected during the traffic stop weighed one ounce. 

Detective Jeffrey Laughlin of the Denton Police Department testified that 

on December 30, 2014, he set up a controlled buy for narcotics between Williams

and a confidential informant. Detective Laughlin testified that he outfitted the 

informant with a live wire so that he could hear the narcotics transaction taking 

place, and he verified prior to the transaction that there was no contraband on 

the informant or in the informant’s vehicle. He testified that he set up 

surveillance on the location of the transaction, and he observed Williams arrive in 

a vehicle. Detective Laughlin then observed the informant exit his vehicle and 

get into Williams’s vehicle, and Detective Laughlin heard a conversation between 

Williams and the informant in which Williams sold marijuana to the informant. 
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Detective Laughlin then observed the informant get back into his vehicle, and he 

followed the informant to a nearby location where he was handed a bag 

containing what he recognized to be marijuana. The marijuana collected from 

the controlled buy weighed fourteen grams. 

After the parties rested their respective cases-in-chief, Williams’s counsel 

brought to the trial court’s attention the fact that Williams had not entered a plea 

to the State’s motion. Williams then waived the reading of the motion and 

entered a plea of not true to the allegations contained in the State’s motion. The 

trial court then found the State’s allegations (a-1), (a-2), (s), (t-4), (t-6), (t-8), 

(t-11), (t-12), (u), and (cc) to be true. After a subsequent punishment hearing, 

Williams was adjudicated guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to thirteen years’

confinement. 

III. WILLIAMS’S COMPLAINT THAT THE TRIAL COURT 

HEARD TESTIMONY BEFORE HE ENTERED HIS PLEA

In his first issue, Williams argues that his due-process rights were violated 

because the trial court heard testimony before he entered his plea. He contends 

that this circumstance brings into doubt whether he was fully aware of the 

allegations against him and whether he was properly able to defend himself, but 

he cites nothing in the record indicating that he was confused by or unaware of 

the allegations. Citing Detrich v. State, 545 S.W.2d 835, 837 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1977), Williams candidly acknowledges that “the current status of the law 

provides that due process was afforded [him] even though his plea came after 
6

the evidence was submitted,” but he “submits that this current status ought to be 

reexamined.” 

In Detrich, the court of criminal appeals held that due process does not 

require that a plea be entered in a probation revocation hearing. 545 S.W.2d at

837. Other Texas courts, including our own, have followed Detrich and extended 

its holding to situations involving motions to proceed with an adjudication of guilt. 

See, e.g., Moore v. State, No. 14-14-00350-CR, 2015 WL 4141100, at *3 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 9, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication) (“[T]here is no requirement that a defendant on community 

supervision enter a plea to the allegations in the motion to adjudicate.”); Licerio v. 

State, No. 13-04-00211-CR, 2005 WL 2560228, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 

Oct. 13, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[W]e conclude 

there was no error in the trial court’s failure to elicit a plea from appellant 

regarding the violations of community supervision.”); Anthony v. State, 962 

S.W.2d 242, 246 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.) (“[D]ue process does not 

even require appellant be given the right to enter a plea to an alleged community 

supervision violation.”).

Because the court of criminal appeals and this court have held that due 

process does not require a defendant to enter a plea to the allegations contained 

in a State’s motion to adjudicate and because Williams has not raised any 

convincing reasons for us to reexamine those holdings, we decline Williams’s 

invitation to reexamine precedent on this issue, and we hold that there was no 
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error here when Williams’s plea was entered after testimony was presented. See 

Detrich, 545 S.W.2d at 837; Moore, 2015 WL 4141100, at *3; Licerio, 2005 WL 

2560228, at *2; Anthony, 962 S.W.2d at 246.

We overrule Williams’s first issue.

IV. WILLIAMS’S COMPLAINT REGARDING EVIDENCE OF 

POSSESSION AND DELIVERY OF MARIJUANA

In his second and third issues, Williams challenges the trial court’s finding 

that he violated condition (a) of his community supervision by possessing and 

delivering marijuana. His second issue contends that there was no credible 

evidence that he possessed and delivered marijuana, and his third issue 

contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney 

asked Officer Fitzgerald if a lab had confirmed that the substance taken from the 

January 12, 2015 traffic stop was marijuana. While he challenges the trial court’s 

finding that he violated condition (a), Williams does not challenge the trial court’s 

findings that he violated conditions (s), (t), (u), and (cc).

A. Standard of Review

A trial court’s determination on a motion to adjudicate is reviewable in the 

same manner as the determination on a motion to revoke community 

supervision. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 5(b) (West Supp. 

2016). We review an order revoking community supervision under an 

abuse-of-discretion standard. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2006); Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). In a 
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revocation proceeding, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 

that the defendant violated the terms and conditions of community supervision. 

Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The trial court is 

the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their 

testimony, and we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial 

court’s ruling. Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493; Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172, 

174 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). If the State fails to meet its burden of 

proof, the trial court abuses its discretion in revoking community supervision. 

Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493–94. 

Proof by a preponderance of the evidence of any one of the alleged 

violations of the conditions of community supervision is sufficient to support a 

revocation order. Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel 

Op.] 1980); Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 

1980). Consequently, when there is one sufficient ground, we do not need to 

address the other contentions. See Sanchez, 603 S.W.2d at 871; Long v. State, 

No. 02-12-00090-CR, 2013 WL 1337975, at *2 n.7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 

4, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

B. The Evidence is Sufficient to Support a Finding that Williams

Violated the Conditions of His Community Supervision

Here, Williams only challenges the trial court’s finding that he possessed 

and delivered marijuana. His second and third issues do not challenge the trial 

court’s findings that he violated conditions (s), (t), (u), and (cc). The State 
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presented testimony from Williams’s probation officer to support the allegation 

that Williams had violated these conditions of his community supervision. His 

probation officer testified (1) that he failed to perform required community service 

for the months of July, September, October, and November of 2014, as well as 

for the month of January 2015; (2) that he did not submit to drug testing that she 

requested on October 10, October 31, November 13, December 18, and 

December 30, 2014; (3) that he failed to timely submit to drug/alcohol evaluation;

and (4) that he failed to attend counseling sessions. 

Based on this evidence, the trial court could have found by a 

preponderance of the evidence that Williams violated a condition of his 

community supervision. Because any one of these violations could have 

provided a legally sufficient basis for the trial court to adjudicate guilt, we need 

not address the merits of Williams’s second and third issues. See Moore, 605 

S.W.2d at 926; Sanchez, 603 S.W.2d at 871; Pope v. State, No. 06-16-00128-

CR, 2017 WL 378765, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Jan. 27, 2017, no pet.) 

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Because Pope does not challenge all 

of the trial court’s violation findings, we must conclude a preponderance of the 

evidence supported the trial court’s findings with respect to those unchallenged 

violations.”); Chamberlain v. State, No. 02-10-00447-CR, 2011 WL 5009859, at 

*2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 20, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication) (holding court need not address appellant’s arguments as to one 
10

violation of community supervision when appellant did not challenge four other 

violations).

We therefore overrule Williams’s second and third issues.

V. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Williams’s three issues, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

SUE WALKER

JUSTICE

PANEL: WALKER, KERR, and PITTMAN, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: April 27, 2017