UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-1805

MICHAEL FIELD, JR.,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL BERMAN; WAYNE LEE; FRED MALEK; JOHN MORITZ; THOMAS 

A. WOODLEY; THOMAS J. WOODLEY,

Defendants – Appellees,

and

ERIC JOWETT; SUSAN MCFARLANE, personal representative of 

the estate of Willis McFarlane, deceased; JAMES WILKINSON,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior

District Judge. (1:12-cv-00130-CMH-TCB)

Argued: March 21, 2013 Decided: June 3, 2013

Before GREGORY and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: William Ryan Snow, CRENSHAW, WARE & MARTIN, PLC, 

Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Jeffrey Warren Harab, Chevy 

Chase, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Alyssa Carducci 
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Embree, CRENSHAW, WARE & MARTIN, PLC, Norfolk, Virginia, for 

Appellant. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Appellant Michael Field, Jr. (Field) appeals from the 

district court’s dismissal of his complaint in the present civil 

action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. We affirm.

I.

Count I of Field’s complaint in the present civil action

seeks a declaration that, pursuant to a March 28, 2005 order of 

sale entered by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 

Eastern District of Virginia in In re: AutoMall Online, Inc., 

Case No. 05-10036 (the Bankruptcy Court’s Order of Sale), he 

purchased and exclusively owns all claims that were or could 

have been at issue in the case captioned Baker v. Field, 

CL05001284; CH04001230, filed and adjudicated in the Circuit 

Court for the City of Alexandria, Virginia (the Virginia State 

Court Case), and were reduced to the final judgment entered in 

such case on March 17, 2006, in the amount of $1,432,581.00 (the 

Money Judgment).

Count II of Field’s complaint seeks a declaration that all 

efforts by Appellees Michael Berman, Wayne Lee, Fred Malek, John 

Moritz, Thomas A. Woodley, and Thomas J. Woodley (Appellees), 

and any of their respective successors or assigns, “to enforce 

any judgment obtained on any of the claims at issue in the 
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[Virginia] State Court Case are void and of no effect.” (J.A. 

18).

Count III of Field’s complaint seeks to enjoin Appellees 

from engaging in any action to enforce the Money Judgment.

Count IV seeks a declaration that the acts of Appellees in 

obtaining dismissal in the Virginia State Court Case of Field 

and codefendant Field Auto City, Inc.’s counterclaims for breach 

of fiduciary duty, theft of trade secrets, unjust enrichment, 

and forgery, as alleged in Field and Field Auto City, Inc.’s 

pleading filed on February 5, 2005 (the Counterclaims), are void 

and of no effect.

Count V seeks a declaration that the acts of Appellees in 

obtaining dismissal of the Counterclaims and in settling 

derivative claims on behalf of AutoMall Online, Inc. against 

Allen Outlaw, another codefendant in the Virginia State Court 

Case, violated the automatic stay in In re: AutoMall Online, 

Inc., Case No. 05-10036.

Count VI alternatively seeks a declaration that, under 

Virginia law, Appellees’ settlement with Allen Outlaw reduces 

the Money Judgment to zero.

On Appellees’ motion, the district court dismissed all 

counts in Field’s complaint in the present action for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction based upon its application of the
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Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1 Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1). In the 

alternative, the district court dismissed Counts I through V for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted based 

upon the doctrine of res judicata. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

Field noted this timely appeal in which he challenges the 

district court’s dismissal of all counts.

For reasons that follow, we affirm the dismissal of Counts 

I, IV, and V pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) (Rule 12(b)(6)), the dismissal of Counts II and III

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) (Rule 

12(b)(1)), and the dismissal of Count VI pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367(c)(3).

II.

We review the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of a claim in a 

complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), de novo, “focus[ing] only on 

the legal sufficiency of the complaint,” Giarratano v. Johnson, 

521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008), and “accepting as true the 

well-pled facts in the complaint and viewing them in the light 

 1 The doctrine derives its name from the following two 

Supreme Court cases: District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. 

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 

263 U.S. 413 (1923).
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most favorable to the plaintiff,” Brockington v. Boykins, 637 

F.3d 503, 505 (4th Cir. 2011). In addition to considering the 

complaint itself, we must consider any documents attached to the 

complaint as exhibits, Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c), “documents 

incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of 

which a court may take judicial notice,” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor 

Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must 

contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). That is to say, the factual 

allegations must “be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level,” id. at 555, “permit[ting] the court to infer 

more than the mere possibility of misconduct” based upon “its 

judicial experience and common sense,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

Based upon our de novo review, we affirm the dismissal of 

Counts I, IV, and V pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

A. Counts I and IV.

The district court properly concluded that, at the Rule 

12(b)(6) stage, the doctrine of res judicata precludes Counts I 

and IV. Title 28, United States Code, § 1738, commonly known in 

jurisprudence as the full faith and credit statute, “requires 

federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to state court 
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judgments that those judgments would be given in the court of 

the State from which the judgments emerged.” Kremer v. Chemical 

Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 (1982); accord Marrese v. 

American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 

(1985); Genesys Data Techs., Inc. v. Genesys Pacific Techs., 

Inc., 204 F.3d 124, 127 (4th Cir. 2000). Therefore, the full 

faith and credit statute “does not allow federal courts to 

employ their own rules of res judicata in determining the effect 

of state judgments. Rather, it goes beyond the common law and 

commands a federal court to accept the rules chosen by the State 

from which the judgment is taken.” Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481-82.

1. Count I. 

Count I of Field’s complaint in the present action seeks a 

declaration that, pursuant to the Bankruptcy Court’s Order of 

Sale, he purchased and exclusively owns all claims that were or 

could have been at issue in the Virginia State Court Case, 

including the one resulting in the Money Judgment. In this 

count, Field in effect seeks a declaration that he—not the 

Appellees—owns the Money Judgment. Critical to our review of 

Count I’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is Exhibit 14 to Field’s 

complaint in the present action. Exhibit 14 is a court order 

entitled “ORDER VACATING RELEASE OF JUDGMENT AND REINSTATING 

JUDGMENT,” entered in the Virginia State Court Case on September 

28, 2011, in which the court squarely decides that Field was not 
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the holder of the underlying claim reduced to the Money Judgment 

and is not the owner of such judgment. (J.A. 145).

Under applicable Virginia rules of res judicata, 

“relitigation of the same cause of action, or any part thereof, 

which could have been litigated between the same parties and

their privies” is precluded. Davis v. Mashall Homes, Inc., 576 

S.E.2d 504, 506 (Va. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In Count I, Field seeks to re-litigate his claim of ownership of

the claim underlying the Money Judgment and his claim of 

ownership of the Money Judgment itself. The doctrine of res 

judicata under Virginia law prevents such re-litigation, and 

therefore, Count I does not contain “enough facts to state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 570.

Moreover, we reject Field’s contention that the district 

court erred in dismissing Count I based upon the doctrine of res 

judicata without the defense of res judicata appearing on the 

face of his complaint and without permitting him to conduct 

discovery or present evidence to address the defense. As we 

have explained, the facts implicating the defense of res 

judicata appear on the face of Field’s complaint and Exhibit 14 

to such complaint. Accordingly, the district court properly 

addressed the defense at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.
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For the reasons stated, we hold the district court properly 

dismissed Count I pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and we affirm on 

this basis.2

2. Count IV.

Count IV asks the district court to declare that the acts 

of Appellees in seeking and obtaining dismissal of the 

Counterclaims for lack of standing are void and of no effect in 

light of the Bankruptcy Court’s Order of Sale. The doctrine of 

res judicata under Virginia law precludes this count as well. 

Exhibit 9 to Field’s complaint in the present action is an 

order in the Virginia State Court Case in which the Virginia 

state court dismissed the Counterclaims for lack of standing on 

Appellees’ motion to dismiss. When this exhibit is considered 

in conjunction with Exhibits 4 and 8 to Field’s complaint in the 

present action, the undeniable conclusion is that the Virginia 

state court did not dismiss the Counterclaims for lack of 

standing in the sense that Field now claims. Exhibit 8 shows

that Appellees had argued that because the Counterclaims alleged 

injury to AutoMall Online, Inc. and not to Field or Field Auto 

City, Inc. individually, Field and Field Auto City, Inc. could 

not maintain them individually as direct claims, which Exhibit 4

 2 Given this disposition, we need not and do not reach the 

district court’s alternative basis for dismissing Count I under 

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 
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to Field’s complaint in the present action shows is how Field 

and Field Auto City, Inc. had pled them. Moreover, Field failed 

to mount an appellate challenge to the dismissal of the 

Counterclaims when he had the opportunity to do so. In sum, 

Count IV of Field’s complaint in the present action does nothing 

more than seek to re-litigate the Virginia state court’s 

dismissal of the Counterclaims. Considering the face of the 

complaint in the present action and its attached exhibits, 

applicable Virginia rules of res judicata preclude such action. 

Davis, 576 S.E.2d at 506.

Moreover, we reject Field’s contention that the district 

court erred in dismissing Count IV based upon the doctrine of 

res judicata without the defense of res judicata appearing on 

the face of his complaint and without permitting him to conduct 

discovery or present evidence to address the defense. As we 

have explained, the facts implicating the defense of res 

judicata appear on the face of Field’s complaint and Exhibits 4, 

8, and 9 to such complaint. Accordingly, the district court 

properly addressed the defense at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.
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For the reasons stated, we hold the district court properly 

dismissed Count IV pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and we affirm on 

this basis.3

B. Count V.

The portion of Count V seeking a declaration that the acts 

of Appellees in obtaining dismissal of the Counterclaims 

violated the automatic stay in In re: AutoMall Online, Inc., 

Case No. 05-10036, fails to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted, and therefore, Rule 12(b)(6) required its dismissal. 

Thorough review of the complaint and the exhibits attached 

thereto show, on their face, that Appellees’ actions in seeking

dismissal of the Counterclaims did not violate the automatic 

stay in In re: AutoMall Online, Inc., Case No. 05-10036. 

Accordingly, we affirm the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the 

portion of Count V seeking a declaration that the acts of 

Appellees in obtaining dismissal of the Counterclaims violated 

the automatic stay in In re: AutoMall Online, Inc., Case No. 05-

10036.

The portion of Count V, in which Field seeks a declaration 

that settlement of their derivative claims on behalf of AutoMall 

Online, Inc. against Allen Outlaw violated the automatic stay,

 3 Given this disposition, we need not and do not reach the 

district court’s alternative basis for dismissing Count IV under 

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
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also fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The actions taken by Appellees in 

settling (or purporting to settle) derivative claims on behalf 

of AutoMall Online, Inc. against Allen Outlaw took place prior 

to AutoMall Online, Inc. filing for bankruptcy and any actions 

taken after that time relating to settling with Allen Outlaw 

took place after Field had purchased the derivative claims in 

bankruptcy from the bankruptcy estate, thus making such claims 

no longer subject to the automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. 

§ 362(c)(1) (“the stay of an act against property of the estate 

under subsection (a) of this section continues until such 

property is no longer property of the estate . . .”). 

Accordingly, we affirm the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the 

portion of Count V in which Field seeks a declaration that 

settlement of their derivative claims on behalf of AutoMall 

Online, Inc. against Allen Outlaw violated the automatic stay.4

III.

We review the Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal of a claim in a 

complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. 

 4 Having affirmed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) 

dismissal of Count V, we need not and do not reach the district 

court’s alternative basis for dismissing Count V under the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
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Pitt Cnty. v. Hotels.com, L.P., 553 F.3d 308, 311 (4th Cir.

2009). Any claim barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is 

“properly dismissed for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.” 

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 

(2005). “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . is confined to cases

. . . brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries 

caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district 

court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review 

and rejection of those judgments.” Id. Notably, in the context 

of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the term “state-court judgments” 

is used in its broadest sense to include all final decisions of 

state judicial proceedings. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 (“the 

form of the proceeding is not significant”; rather, “[i]t is the 

nature and effect which is controlling”) (internal quotation 

marks omitted); Doe v. Florida Bar, 630 F.3d 1336, 1340-41 (11th 

Cir. 2011) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred federal court action 

asserting as-applied due process challenge to Florida bar rules 

requiring confidential peer review as part of process for 

recertification as specialist with Florida state bar; plaintiff 

had appealed through available state channels provided by state 

bar rules, arguing due process challenge on the merits along the 

way, and Florida Supreme Court issued brief order denying 

petition for review).
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Based upon our de novo review, we affirm the district 

court’s Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal of Counts II and III for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

Without a doubt, the district court could not have adjudicated 

Counts II and III in the present action without also reviewing 

the propriety of the Supreme Court of Virginia’s denial of 

Field’s petition for review of the final judgment entered 

against him in the Virginia State Court Case on March 17, 2006, 

and reviewing the Supreme Court of Virginia’s denial of Field’s 

motion to vacate such judgment. Thus, Field’s position on 

appeal that he does not seek to overturn any final decision of a 

state court in Counts II and III; but rather only seeks a 

declaration that he owns the final judgment entered in the 

Virginia State Court Case on March 17, 2006, is spurious.

Furthermore, we reject Field’s contention that the district 

court erred in dismissing Counts II and III based upon the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine without, as he alleges, the 

applicability of Rooker-Feldman appearing on the face of his 

complaint and without permitting him to conduct discovery or 

present evidence at an evidentiary hearing. The district court 

properly resolved the jurisdictional issues on the extensive 

record before it, which included, inter alia, Field’s complaint, 

fourteen exhibits attached thereto, and other relevant documents 

from the parties’ long litigation history. Field has made no 
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showing that he was prejudiced by his inability to conduct 

discovery or have an evidentiary hearing before the district 

court dismissed Counts II and III. Accordingly, the district 

court properly addressed the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine at the Rule 12(b)(1) stage.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the district court’s Rule 

12(b)(1) dismissal of Counts II and III for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.5

IV.

Because Count VI alleges a state law claim and all of the 

claims over which the district court had original jurisdiction 

were properly dismissed, we affirm dismissal of Count VI on the 

basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). See id. (district court may 

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law 

claim when district court has dismissed all other claims over 

which it had original jurisdiction).

 5 Having affirmed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(1) 

dismissal of Counts II and III, we need not and do not reach the 

district court’s alternative basis for dismissing these counts 

based upon the doctrine of res judicata.
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V.

In conclusion, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of 

all counts in the present action in toto.

AFFIRMED