RESEARCH MONOGRAPH

In Pursuit of Insight 

The Everyday Work of 

Intelligence Analysts Who Solve 

Real World Novel Problems

Adrian Wolfberg, Ph.D.

Research Fellow, National Intelligence University, 2020-21

The views expressed in this research monograph are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Intelligence University, Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence, or any other U.S. Government agency.

RESEARCH

FELLOWSHIP

Ann Caracristi Institute

For Intelligence Research
In Pursuit of Insight 

The Everyday Work of 

Intelligence Analysts Who Solve 

Real World Novel Problems

Adrian Wolfberg, Ph.D.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE UNIVERSITY

PUBLISHED SPRING 2022

ABSTRACT 3

Abstract

The Intelligence Community (IC) has identified insight as a desirable outcome of its intelligence assessments, 

but the community does not understand the insight process well enough to consistently achieve such an 

outcome. This gap of knowledge places intelligence analysts and managers in a double bind and reduces their 

ability and motivation to comply with policymakers’ calls for insightful assessments. Theoretically, insight and 

creativity have been studied under very specific conditions: in controlled laboratory experiments, interviews, 

or historical reviews of either individuals who work in full-time creative positions that produce recognized 

creative outcomes, like Nobel Prize winners, or those who experience critical incidents. Little, if any, research 

has considered professionals not in full-time creative positions—e.g., intelligence analysts who apply analytical knowledge—who periodically are insightful. To fill these practitioner and theoretical gaps, a qualitative, 

interview-based study was conducted to understand how insight emerged in 36 intelligence analysts who solved 

novel problems. The findings identified a four-phase process: a triggering phase consisting of unpredictability, 

problem finding, problem type, and conflicting representations; an emergence phase consisting of internalized 

tensions, priming, and dwell time; an insight phase; and an after-insight phase consisting of resistance, mitigation, and solutions. The process produced four archetypes of insight outcomes across the emotion-cognition 

and individual-social dimensions: understanding of novel problems; effective communication of complexity 

with others; self-reflection and greater awareness; and navigation of organizational politics and agendas. Individuals who experienced insights developed long-term, compelling emotional and cognitive benefits. 

Key Findings

A study of 36 intelligence analysts who have experienced insight revealed four archetypes of insight across 

the emotion-cognition and individual-social spectrums, suggesting that each type contributes in key ways 

to solving novel problems. Whereas the academic literature has primarily considered insight a cognitive, 

solitary act, this study provides evidence that emotionally based insight has just as much problem-solving 

power as cognitively based insight, in both individual and social contexts. 

Analysts do not have a single, “aha” insight. They have multiple insights that build upon one another until 

the final insight is achieved. Although this finding reinforces previous research, the implications for managers of intelligence analysts are profound: do not assume that the first or initial insight is the final one and 

let analysts continue mulling over their novel problems.

The analysts in this study often spent years thinking about a novel problem until they reached a solution, 

while they also worked on competing tasks that took time and effort. Expecting analysts to solve a novel problem upon command within minutes or hours or even days may be an unrealistic management expectation.
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 4

Solving novel problems invites multiple approaches and answers, which implies that competition and 

collaboration within and across organizations for ideas are natural and desired processes when facing novel 

problems. An organization that considers its main focus to be routine problem-solving may unintentionally discourage these valuable and necessary competitive or collaborative behaviors, instead viewing them 

as inefficient.

This study points to powerful emotional and cognitive long-term benefits for individuals experiencing 

insight, and these benefits have positively shaped professional development and personal lives, suggesting 

that organizations should require a creativity climate for dealing with novel problems. Insight is more than 

nice-to-have; insight is a critical and necessary organizational and individual competency.

Analysts learn from insights early in their tenure and in new assignments, and their organizations gain new 

ways of thinking fostered by such insights. Managers should foster early tenure experiences with insight—

encouraging analysts to explore the unknown before the analysts adjust to organizational norms as they 

advance in tenure. Creating time and space for insight is especially important in hierarchical organizations, 

like those in the IC, which tend to emphasize order and control and so face a particularly complex challenge from the unpredictable nature of insight.

Although the insight literature has discussed unpredictability as part of the actual insight after problem-solving 

had begun, this study showed unpredictability occurring as the analysts initiated the entire insight process. This 

raises questions for further study about how individuals prepare themselves for journeys into the unknown, 

which is required for solving novel problems, and how managers leverage such opportunities.

Although the psychological literature defines priming as memories intentionally signaled in one’s past that 

specifically target a desired response in one’s future, in this study of intelligence analysts, the signaling 

occurred in the analyst’s present, drawing upon memories unintentionally created in that person’s past 

experience. This finding suggests that having a stockpile of diverse lifetime experiences and knowledge 

upon which to draw would facilitate a robust capability that can be exploited when the unpredictable need 

arises in an individual’s present to solve novel problems. 

The nonlinear relationship among internalized tensions, priming, and insights suggests that adopting a 

mindset of temporal complexity—viewing time as a subjective, experiential phenomenon composed of 

multiple perspectives—can inform the analyst that the present does not stand alone: the path of the present 

has been shaped by the past, and the future does not mysteriously appear out of nowhere.

The irony is that, although one of the main functions of intelligence is the reduction of uncertainty, an organization’s lack of understanding of the insight process actually increases uncertainty. By prioritizing insight and 

fostering a climate that enables the insight and creativity processes, however, organizations—including those 

within the IC—can over time reduce uncertainty about the potential and actual effects from novel problems.
Co

Contents

Introduction. 

Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  

Research Question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Purpose Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Relevance to the Intelligence Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Literature Review. .

Introduction of Foundational Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Novel Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Emotion-Cognition Connection..

Information Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Insight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Definitions of Insight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Phenomena Related to Insight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Types of Insight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Overview of Theories of Insight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Two Key Information Processing Theories of Insight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Creativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Definitions of Creativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Phenomena Related to Creativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Types of Creativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Information Processing Theories of Creativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 6

Two Key Information Processing Theories of Creativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Antecedent Conditions Affecting Creativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Research Methodology. .

Conceptual Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Key Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Research Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Conducting Phenomenological Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Selection of Qualitative Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Data Collection Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Sample Selection Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Phase One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Phase Two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Phase Three . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

How Interviews Were Conducted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Interviewee Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Analytic Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Characterization of Insight Stories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Qualitative Data Coding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Findings. .

Insight Trigger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Unpredictability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Problem Finding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Problem Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Conflicting Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Emergence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Internalized Tensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Priming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Dwell Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Co

Insight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

After Insight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Resistance and Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Sustained Benefit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Emotion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Cognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Conclusion and Implications. .

Insight Antecedents: Triggering Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Unpredictability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Problem Finding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Problem Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Conflicting Representations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Insight Emergence: The Insight Journey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Connectedness Between Emergent Factors and Insight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Archetypes of Insight Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Dwell Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Insight Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Short-Term Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Long-Term Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Endnotes. .

In

Introduction

Contrary to what we usually believe, ...the best moments in our lives, are not the passive, receptive, 

relaxing times—although such experiences can also be enjoyable, if we have worked hard to attain 

them. The best moments usually occur when a person’s body or mind is stretched to its limits in a 

voluntary effort to accomplish something difficult and worthwhile.

—Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience

Problem

Organizations across the public, private, and nonprofit sectors use intelligence assessments to protect themselves against external threats and to leverage opportunities. Individuals who produce such assessments are 

called intelligence analysts. Intelligence analysts create narratives that make judgments about a threat or an 

opportunity, and they interpret such effects on the organization so that decisionmakers may consider whether 

and how to act.1

 Such intelligence analysts are individuals whose everyday tasks frequently bring them faceto-face with novel problems.

Novel problems are typically the highest stake and highest risk challenges to organizations. Since the world 

is filled with uncertainty and ambiguity, such assessments can be critical to an organization’s success. In the 

national security arena, intelligence analysts have an especially challenging time because foreign adversaries—who pose threats but may also offer mitigating opportunities—neither transparently nor willingly provide all the information needed for analysts to do their jobs. The same challenges exist for law enforcement 

and competitive business intelligence, although the threats their adversaries pose are different. Failure to 

provide effective assessments can harm not only intelligence organizations but also the customers they serve.

No wonder that U.S. national security consumers of intelligence assessments have emphasized the need for 

insight, especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the erroneous conclusion that Iraq had 

a nuclear program.2

 These two intelligence failures called into question the very intelligence capabilities of the 

United States.3

 Placing a priority on insight reflects the value proposition that consumers do not want to be surprised; they want to be told something they do not already know, and they will access useful information from 

other sources such as the media, think tanks, private intelligence companies, academia, and political advisers. 

Over time, the lessons-learned studies from these two intelligence failures, as well as other studies, resulted 

in a series of policies focused on the need for analysts to produce insightful products. Executive Order 
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 10

12333 on United States Intelligence Activities, as amended in 2008, added the word “insightful” into a 

sentence that sets the expectations for analytic performance: “Special emphasis shall be given to the production of timely, accurate and insightful reports, responsive to decision makers....” 4, *

 The 2019 National 

Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America states the IC’s mission is to provide “...insightful, 

objective, and relevant intelligence....”5

 Intelligence Community Directive 203 on “Analytic Standards,” of 

January 2, 2015, was crafted, in part, to address “insight”: “Analytic products should provide information 

and insight on issues relevant to the customers of U.S. intelligence....”6

 The ODNI’s “Rating Scale for 

Evaluating Analytic Tradecraft Standards,” of November 6, 2015, required insight to be demonstrated in 

judging the quality of underlying sources, data, and methodologies; customer relevance and implications; 

and incorporation of effective visual information.7

To date, however, no one in the IC has explained the insight process or how one knows whether one is insightful.

Research Question

To understand the emergence of insight within intelligence analysts—individuals who do not work in a 

full-time creative profession—the following research question is posed: how does insight emerge in individuals who do not work in full-time creative professions when they are solving novel problems?

Scope 

Focusing this exploratory study solely on the insight process, however, would limit our understanding of 

this phenomenon, and consequently reduce its utility in helping the IC achieve the desired policy outcome. Insight is embedded within the broader phenomenon of creativity,8

 which is a process that both 

includes insight and takes place within the individual’s social and organizational environment.9

 Hence, 

this study of how insight emerges is conducted through the broader lens of a creativity framework as it 

manifests itself through the intelligence analyst’s efforts to solve novel problems. 

Intelligence analysis is primarily a solitary act embedded within a social context; it starts within the individual and that person’s reflection on a problem or issue.10 As a result, an examination of insight and creativity 

begins squarely in the realm of individual learning. Although the phenomena of insight and creativity can 

be framed at the organizational level of analysis through the lenses of leadership, rewards, networks, and 

team composition and processes, to name a few, the unit of analysis that ultimately initiates these phenomena is the individual.11

Individual learning involves shifts in mental models.12 A mental model is an individual’s cognitive representation of some aspect of the world,13 and a shift, therefore, allows an individual to see the world differently. 

Novelty requires such shifts. As an individual learns, not only do that person’s cognitive structures improve 

* Italicization of the words “insight” and “insightful” are the author’s, when used in quoted sections of policy.
Int

over time,14 but also the capabilities of the organization to which that person belongs may be enhanced.15

Hence, insight is one of the reasons individual learning is so important to an organization. 

Although the focal point of this exploratory research is the individual who is not in a full-time creative profession, interesting research into well-known individuals who are in creative professions has had a major role 

in shaping what is known about individual insight and creativity,16 and will be tapped. That research includes 

interviews, for example, with Nobel Prize winners and a retrospective analysis of Charles Darwin, who solved 

novel problems. As observed in these studies, insight emerges in solving novel problems, with emergence 

being the “cooperative interaction that produces ... effects” that would not otherwise come into existence.17

Purpose Statement

The purpose of this study is twofold. First and most importantly, it can help improve the internal capability 

of intelligence analysts and their organizations, and second, by doing so, it can help intelligence organizations comply with their customer mandate to be insightful in analytic products. Application of this study’s 

lessons to the recruitment and selection of new analysts might become a tertiary benefit.18

Relevance to the Intelligence Community

IC policy that requires analysts to create insightful products implies a known process for producing insight. 

However, this phenomenon is not empirically understood by intelligence analysts, managers, and leadership.19 Not understanding the process for promoting insight prevents intelligence agencies from enabling 

effective strategies to meet that goal, and it places working-level analysts producing intelligence assessments 

and those supervising them in a double bind.20 The first bind is the implication that, if analysts are not 

insightful, they will be held accountable for not complying with the IC objective. The second bind is 

the tendency for analytic managers to focus on legitimate deadlines and task quantities, leading them to 

press working-level analysts or their first-level supervisors to provide quick assessments—implicitly at the 

expense of insight. The mixed messages of this double bind phenomenon can muddle an analyst’s motivation for delivering an insightful product.21

The first step in overcoming this double bind—and in guiding individual analysts and their intelligence 

organizations toward insightful assessments—is to realize that insight is a psychological and a socialpsychological phenomenon. Intelligence agencies can gain valuable lessons on insight by looking beyond 

intelligence, history, and national security studies—their traditional purview—and exploring the disciplines of psychology and social psychology in order to reflect upon themselves and their practices.22 From 

the psychological and social-psychological perspective, the IC can better understand what insight really is 

within its domain and how the insight process can manifest itself in knowledge production by intelligence 

analysts.23 Such reflection may also help address the IC’s legitimate emphasis on error mitigation, which has 

overshadowed the newfound focus on insight24—for logic would argue that insightful assessments should 

reduce intelligence failures. 

Liter

Literature Review

The literature review begins with an introduction of foundational concepts, which include what a problem is, 

what a novel problem is, the emotion-cognition connection involved in solving problems, and the adoption of 

an information-processing approach as a theoretical framework. Next discussed are various aspects of insight: 

definitions of insight, phenomena related to insight, types of insight, overview of insight theories, and two key 

information-processing theories of insight. The literature review continues with a discussion of relevant aspects 

of creativity: definitions of creativity, phenomena related to creativity, types of creativity, overview of theories 

of creativity, two key information-processing theories of creativity, and antecedent conditions affecting creativity. This section informs the Conceptual Framework, discussed after the Literature Review, with a literature-based framework on insight that provides a starting point for the study of insight in intelligence analysts. 

Introduction of Foundational Concepts

Problems

Insight can occur when an individual tackles a problem. A problem is the cognitive and/or emotional attention one experiences when one’s wants, needs, or desires remain unrealized.25 Attention is the “noticing, 

encoding, interpreting, and focusing of time and effort,”26 and it is shaped by routines and bounded rationality.27 What an individual pays attention to depends on their context or situation.28 Because individuals 

live with bounded rationality, their heedful and selective attention must constantly select pieces of available 

information while ignoring others.29 The challenges for individuals are to be self-aware about what catches 

their attention, to prioritize their attention, and to identify distraction-reducing mitigation mechanisms.30

Problems, therefore, are inherently difficult tasks.

Novel Problems

Individuals who solve novel problems provide a unique real-world opportunity to inquire into the process of 

insight.31 Because novel problems have not been experienced previously by the individual, that person will have 

little to no prior understanding or established processes to apply to solving those particular problems. One 

example of a novel problem faced by an IC analyst was figuring out the nature and purpose of what the analyst 

had come to consider a suspicious facility, which neither the analyst nor the analyst’s community had previously 

identified as a security threat. In contrast, non-novel problems are solved through established analytic reasoning 
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 14

processes, in which the problem-solving effort largely belongs to memory and the retrieval of techniques and procedures.32 Novel problems are the most challenging type and much more difficult to solve than known problems. 

Emotion-Cognition Connection

Emotion and cognition are interactive—a connection observed when individuals engage in solving problems, 

as studied by U.S. neuroscientist Antonio Damasio.33 Emotions include motivations, passion, intentionality, 

feelings, courage, risk-taking, altruism, openness, and surprise.34 Cognition includes attention, decisionmaking, categorization, patterns, comprehension, reasoning, and inferences.35 Certain phenomena can have both 

emotional and cognitive qualities, for example, intuition and trust.36 All cognitive processes have an emotional component.37

As Damasio describes, the interaction between emotion and cognition guides how decisions are made.38

The mechanism for this connection has the label somatic markers, which influence the individual’s attention 

to the desired decision. If a bad outcome is anticipated, then the individual experiences an unpleasant gut 

feeling, which serves as an alarm to avoid the perceived bad choice; if a good outcome is anticipated, then 

the individual experiences an incentive toward embracing the perceived good choice.39 These markers are 

influenced by past experience and, as a result, individuals make judgments that are influenced by their 

emotional anticipation.40 The somatic markers can be conscious, in which case the individual can be deliberate in making a decision; however, the markers can also be unconscious.41

Information Processing

Solving a problem is the effort involved in transforming the unrealized state to the desired state.42 Information processing is an effective way to investigate this transformation43 because it is the study of how individuals take in, consider, synthesize, and use information to accomplish a task.44 Although insight is often 

confused with creativity, insight is a critical information-processing component of the creativity process.45

The literature on insight, therefore, is discussed next, followed by a discussion of the creativity literature.

Insight

Definitions of Insight 

Insight is both an outcome and a process. Colloquially, the word insight, which comes from the Old Dutch, 

means seeing inside.

46 As an outcome, insightful ideas shed light on the inner nature of a person, thing, 

or situation47—leading policy customers to cherish insightful knowledge products. Insightful ideas might 

include an unrecognized fundamental truth, a new view about the world that challenges the old view, or an 

observation that yields a deep understanding or reveals hidden motivations that influence an individual’s 

feelings, behaviors, and actions.48 Insights can occur, therefore, in either the emotional or cognitive domains.
Liter

As a process, insight can be defined as the cognitive process in which an individual approaches a cognitive 

conflict and overcomes the conflict to see anew.49 Internal and external factors that affect cognition include 

time, restructuring, reorientation, level of difficulty, and degree of cognitive fixation.50 Scholars have framed 

the influence of these factors in various ways—a psychological experience, a problem-solving sequence, a type 

of problem, and a problem-solving process—and what is common within each way is a shift in thought and/

or emotion.51 For example, insight can be defined as a cognitive process in which “...a nonobvious revision 

to a person’s mental model of a dynamic system results in a new set of beliefs that are more accurate, comprehensive, and useful.”52

The primary focus of this study is on revealing the process of insight within the intelligence analyst. This study 

defines insight, in general, as the experiential process whereby an individual’s cognitive and/or emotional 

features—whether internally or externally initiated—produce a shift in an individual’s understanding of a 

problem. The study defines insight as an outcome in which new knowledge is created—i.e., knowledge that 

comes into existence for the first time—for the knowledge producer and/or consumer. To reveal the details of 

the insight process during an analyst’s problem-solving effort, an informational processing approach is used.53

Phenomena Related to Insight

Three process-related phenomena are related to insight: imagination, intuition, and priming. Imagination 

is sometimes considered the same as insight, but they are two distinct, yet related, phenomena. Imagination 

is the capacity for generating and exploring alternate possibilities that are not currently present in the mind 

of the individual, and therefore, it is an important but not necessary component of insight.54 Imagination 

operates in the background, allowing the individual to manipulate ideas that may not presently be considered real; it engages the individual’s emotions and motivations and plays a role in making inferences.55 If 

imagination is viewed as a capacity, then insight is the activation of that capacity through the manipulation 

of ideas and emotions in pursuit of problem-solving.56 Imagination may not result in insight, but insight is 

unlikely to happen without imagination.

Colloquially, intuition refers to the feelings that individuals have in their guts, the vibes they sense, or their 

mental hunches about something.57 Intuition involves a sense of vague and unstated, or implied, knowledge, whereas insight eventually—or sometimes quickly—appears to an individual and results in clarity 

of focus.58 Intuition has the following characteristics: (1) the process is unconscious—i.e., automatically 

occurring in the mind with limited or no ability to reconstruct; (2) one’s perceptions of the environment 

are associated unconsciously with cognitive patterns; and (3) the associations manifest themselves quickly 

and result in an emotionally charged belief.59 From an information-processing perspective, intuition could 

occur as part of the insight process—but not necessarily. 

U.S. social psychologists John Bargh and Tanya Chartrand have introduced a phenomenon related to 

insight that guides thinking, called priming.60 Priming is defined as an internal mental process that mediates, in a hidden manner, the environment’s effect on the individual’s thinking process. As observed in 

laboratory experiments, conceptual priming applies an idea or concept from one’s past experience to exert 
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 16

an influence on a different present context. The individual is not aware of this influence because priming, 

like intuition, is unconscious. Priming has usually been researched in laboratory experimental conditions, 

but it is assumed to occur in real-life situations.61 Involuntary recollections of oneself take place in daily 

life, triggered by something happening in the individual’s present circumstance.62 The stronger the emotional impact from the past experience, the longer the priming effect will last into the future.63 Emotional 

experience—defined as the conscious awareness of past meaningful objects, events, or states—guides (i.e., 

primes) an individual’s action in the present.64 U.S. information systems and neuroscience scholar Richard 

Minas and his colleagues have recently conducted the first study to show empirically that priming improves 

the generation of ideas associated with insight and creativity.65

Types of Insight

An empirical study by Hungarian-American psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and R. Keith Sawyer has revealed two types of insight processes: short- and long-term insight.66 In short-term insight, the 

individual conceptualizes a problem, which has been considered previously in a similar context, and the 

necessary resources are available to find a solution. Long-term insight occurs when the individual has 

difficulty conceptualizing the problem, perhaps because it has never been previously formulated, or, if it 

had, its formulation was imprecise or left ambiguous. Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer, therefore, call shortterm insight part of a “presented problem-solving” process, while long-term insight is part of a “discovered 

problem-finding” process.67

In Gary Klein and Andrea Jarosz’s empirical study of real-world incidents involving insight from individuals in a variety of domains, the U.S. psychologists found many aspects of the insight process.68 For 

Klein and Jarosz, an incident means a specific event has occurred in which individuals they have studied 

retroactively gained a new understanding of what caused the specific event, of new relationships among the 

event’s elements, or of new ways to achieve some outcome.69 Some insights result from individuals making 

connections among different data or filling a data gap; identifying contradictions in their thinking, disregarding a contradiction, or further exploring it; being skeptical or being open-minded; receiving new data 

or reorganizing their thinking without new data; and having time to let the problem sit (i.e., incubate) or 

struggle with an impasse. 

Overview of Theories of Insight

Cognitive neuroscientists Sebastien Hélie and Ron Sun’s review of the literature divides insight processing 

theories into four categories.70 First, constraint theory assumes that many restrictions exist on freedom of 

thinking, action, and movement surrounding a problem, and that an individual’s cognitive limitations 

make it very difficult to overcome these constraints. When the constraints are overcome, the individual 

experiences a forceful cognitive and emotional experience. Second, fixation theory assumes that restrictions 

surrounding the problem exist, as in constraint theory, but not all of the constraints are known to the 

individual. Individuals who attempt to solve the problem may incorrectly identify a particular constraint 
Liter

as part of the problem—when it is not—and thereby limit the search for a solution. An individual’s experience of insight occurs when these incorrectly identified restrictions are no longer considered to be constraints. As a result, the individual can consider a wider set of possible solutions.

Third, associationistic theory does not require an impasse or a constraint to be present during the problem-solving process in order to achieve an insight. Individuals solve problems by using a parallel search 

process in which they associate different pieces of knowledge relevant to the problem. Fourth, evolutionary 

theory, based on Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection, posits three principles: possible solutions 

are generated through blind variation, that is, variation without a controlling consciousness identifying 

the possible solutions; a solution is evaluated and selected; and a solution is retained. In this theory, the 

generation of possible solutions and the selection of a solution is unconscious, and only when the solution 

is selected does the individual become conscious of it. 

Cognitive scientist Stellan Ohlsson’s review of the literature yields three processes through which insight 

is produced.71 The first is combination, in which cognitions are combined, either unconsciously or consciously, leading to a new idea or mental model. The second process is accumulation, which is the iterative 

movement via small steps away from what and how the individual initially understands the problem and 

then toward the unknown. These small steps occur through a long sequence of thought decisions. Accumulation can occur in two ways: (1) an evolutionary type of variation and selection takes place when the 

individual decides that a direction in thinking is not productive and either gives up or persists in searching 

for a solution, or (2) heuristic search, in which the individual builds upon knowledge gained in past efforts 

to solve a problem and applies that learning forward. If the problem is new and unknown, then individuals do not initially have heuristics at their disposal and so the search for solutions may be random. If the 

problem is known, then heuristics facilitate the solution search steps. The third process is restructuring, in 

which every entity—whether conceptual, physical, or event—is an individual’s interpretation. Restructuring theories include: representation of change as a result of the insight; the change process that produces 

the restrictions; and the triggers for the change process. 

Two Key Information Processing Theories of Insight

Ohlsson72 and Klein73 both provide end-to-end information processing-related theories of insight. Figure 1 

depicts these two theories of insight and identifies which stage is the emergence factor prior to insight. For 

Ohlsson, the emergence factor is restructuring, and for Klein, it is changing the narrative. These factors are 

discussed in more detail below.

Ohlsson conceives of insight as a six-stage process, with each stage exhibited across three types of human activity: computational, phenomenological, and behavioral.74 Stage 1 is problem representation, i.e., individuals 

perceive a problem. Problem representation, from an information processing perspective, includes four cognitive components: how individuals initially understand the problem; what they assume will be the final outcome; what they consider to be at their cognitive disposal to progress from their initial understanding to the 

final outcome; and what they consider to be the constraints operating within the situation.75 Computationally, 
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 18

individuals cognitively represent the problem, in a process called encoding. Phenomenologically, they understand what the problem is. Behaviorally, they use various sensory methods to access information.

Figure 1. Two Key Information Processing Theories of Insight

Stages of Insight

(Ohlsson, 1992, 2018)

Triple Path Model

of Insight

(Klein, 2013)

Problem

Change Narrative:

Rebuild, add, 

or subtract

interpretation

Understanding

(Insight)

* Changed from “impasse”

 (Ohlsson, 2018)

Contradiction

Connection

Creative

Desperation

Begin to

Solve

Cognitive

Conflict* Restructure PartialInsight

Full

Insight

Emergence factor

Author’s figure based on the following sources: Stellan Ohlsson, “Information-Processing Explanations of Insight and Related Phenomena,” 

in Advances in the Psychology of Thinking, ed. Mark T. Keane and Kenneth J. Gilhooly (Hempstead, UK: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), 

1-44; Stellan Ohlsson, “The Dialectic between Routine and Creative Cognition,” in Insight: On the Origins of New Ideas, ed. Frederic VelleeTourangeau (New York: Routledge, 2018), 8-29; and Gary Klein, Seeing What Others Don’t: The Remarkable Ways We Gain Insights (New 

York: Public Affairs, 2013).

Stage 2 is problem-solving. Computationally, individuals consider approaches to solving the problem. 

Phenomenologically, they implement these approaches. Behaviorally, the actions taken for each approach 

either work or not, and—when an action does not work—the individuals attempt another action.

Stage 3 is the impasse, which occurs when individuals represent the problem in a particular way but do not 

have access to the knowledge required to solve the problem. Computationally, individuals search for new ways 

to represent the problem. Phenomenologically, they draw a blank, halting the attempted solution approach. 

Behaviorally, therefore, no activity is evident. After first presenting his stages of insight in 1992, however, 

Ohlsson revised his description of Stage 3 from impasse to cognitive conflict, reflecting what had become 

the dominant view of psychologists.76 Similar to U.S. social psychologist Leon Festinger’s theory of cognitive 

dissonance,77 Ohlsson’s view of cognitive conflict has come to represent the difference between knowledge 

gained in the past from knowledge acquired in the present. Ohlsson points out that laboratory experiments 

focusing on single attempts at solving a problem validate this idea of cognitive conflict as a trigger condition 

for insight.78 Nonetheless, in everyday, real-life insight situations, he suggests that such triggering can emerge 

from similarities between past and present experiences, as well as from conflicting experiences.79

Stage 4—which is restructuring, or re-representing, the initially conceived problem—overcomes impasses 

(or cognitive conflicts). Computationally, restructuring is accomplished in at least one of three ways: elaboration, re-encoding, or constraint relaxation. Other ways of restructuring are possible.80 Elaboration is 
Liter

the intensification of an individual’s attention to a problem. For example, the individual detects—through 

more careful analysis—aspects of the problem not previously considered, or the individual recalls—from 

long-term memory—information that was not initially considered when the original problem was represented. In re-encoding, the individual dismisses some or all of the original representation of the problem, 

and instead contemplates one or more less considered and analyzed representations. Constraint relaxation 

reduces the restrictions—usually those associated with the anticipated solution—that the individual has 

self-imposed during the initial problem representation, which ensured the problem would not be solved. 

Phenomenologically, the individual perceives the problem in a different way. Behaviorally, no activity is 

evident because the restructuring occurs within the individual.

Stage 5 is partial insight, or the act of breaking through an impasse (or cognitive conflict). Individuals 

encounter multiple impasses and partial insights with complex problems, and their cognitive limitations 

affect the type and number of partial insights they reach.81 Computationally, partial insight occurs when 

the restructuring overcomes the impasse. Phenomenologically, partial insight is the individual’s recognition 

of a new or different solution. Behaviorally, the individual saying or thinking “aha” (or something to that 

effect) signals partial insight.

Stage 6 is full insight, reached when the individual transforms partial insight into an understanding of 

the problem’s complete solution. Computationally, the individual discovers the connection (or pathway) 

between partial insight and the solution to the problem. Phenomenologically, the individual formulates 

a narrative that allows a full understanding of the solution. Behaviorally, the individual takes actions or 

makes decisions to carry out the solution.

Klein offers a second information processing-related insight theory: the Triple Path model of insight.82 This 

model consists of three strategies to achieve insight or, as Klein calls it, understanding: the contradiction 

path, the creative desperation path, and the connection path.83 Four steps propel the individual along the 

course of these alternative strategies, or paths: the motivation, the trigger, the activity, and the outcome. 

The contradiction path begins with the individual’s motivation to question the status quo and to rethink 

what others accept as the correct choice. The trigger is the individual’s recognition of one or more contradictions in a situation, which the individual concludes are inconsistencies that need to be resolved. These 

inconsistencies are resolved through an activity involving what Klein calls anchors and stories.84 Stories are 

narratives that individuals use to communicate how the specifics of an event or situation are to be interpreted 

and organized so they make sense. Such framing involves sharing an individual’s views about a situation, 

steering others to relevant information about the situation, and constraining the dimensions of the situation 

to be evaluated.85 Klein’s research suggests that stories typically are built upon three to four anchors, i.e., the 

individual’s foundational viewpoints about the situation. On the contradiction path, the activity involves 

identifying a weak anchor, which can be manipulated or interpreted differently. By detecting the inherent 

flexibility of a weak anchor and effectively building upon that flexibility, the individual is able to revise the 

story and create a new narrative that resolves the inconsistency. The outcome of the contradiction path is the 

change in how the individual cognitively understands a given or future situation. The contradiction path (as 

well as the other two paths), therefore, occur within an individual and have a cognitive component. 
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 20

The creative desperation path begins with a completely different motivation: the need to avoid or evade 

a bad set of circumstances. The trigger is overcoming an impasse in order for the individual to avoid the 

poor conditions. The activity involves identifying and eliminating one or more invalid, weak anchors. By 

replacing a weak anchor, or viewpoint, the individual constructs a new story about the situation, providing 

the escape necessary to avoid the bad set of circumstances. The outcome, in principle, offers the same kinds 

of possibilities as the contradiction path.

The connection path begins with a different type of motivation than the contradiction or creative desperation paths. Instead of facing a negative situation where the individual has to get out of a messy situation, 

the motivation for the connection path is positive. The individual perceives one or more new implications 

about a situation, i.e., one or more new or different consequences. The trigger is the realization of new connections between ideas or the awareness of chance occurrences. The activity involves creating or adopting a 

new anchor, typically acquired from new information. On the connection path, new anchors are combined 

with the existing set of anchors to add to the story, whereas in the contradiction and creative desperation 

paths, the existing weak anchors are either revised or replaced. The outcome, in principle, is the same as the 

other paths: a change in how the individual understands a situation.

Creativity

Definitions of Creativity

Colloquially, creativity is the process of coming up with something new. From a scholarly perspective, 

particularly in the field of psychology, much has been written about creativity.86 For example, during the 

first decade of this century, over 10,000 papers were written about creativity from the perspectives of cognitive, developmental, clinical, social, and industrial psychology.87 Psychologists have formulated various 

definitions, some by combining attributes across these perspectives. For example, Robert Sternberg considers creativity to be a multifaceted construct consisting of intelligence (as in the capacity for knowing 

and understanding), cognitive style, and personality,88 while Klein and his colleagues view creativity as an 

iterative process.89 From an information processing perspective, creativity is the invention of something 

that is new, but newness is not sufficient; it is also necessary to be useful.90

Phenomena Related to Creativity

Creativity has often been confused with two related phenomena: sensemaking and innovation.91 The general consensus among researchers has been that sensemaking is a process that individuals use to understand 

ambiguous or confusing situations.92 Sensemaking is about interpreting what has already happened within 

an individual’s perception of the world. The individual attempts to make connections within the situational 

context to understand its implications and then direct their actions.93 Since creativity is an iterative process, it is not surprising to find that sensemaking may involve creativity, and creativity may involve sensemaking.94 However, the two phenomena are different and are experienced in a temporally reversed order: 
Liter

creativity is a forward-looking process in which the individual begins with a problem and attempts to solve 

it, whereas sensemaking is a backward-looking process in which the individual begins with a confusing 

situation and retrospectively interprets it in order to understand the situation.95

Creativity and innovation are also related, but different, phenomena. Creativity is the process of coming up 

with a new idea, whereas innovation is the application or implementation of the new idea into a process, 

procedure, or rule.96 Creativity is typically associated with the individual, while innovation is conceptualized as a social or organizational process.97 The research on innovation within organizations focuses on four 

factors: innovation characteristics (e.g., perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, complexity, etc.); social 

factors (e.g., norms, peers, critical mass, etc.); organizational factors (e.g., management support, empowering leadership, policies and practices, participation in decisionmaking, implementation climate, etc.); and 

individual factors (e.g., demographics, learning orientation, personal innovativeness, etc.).98

Types of Creativity

James Kaufman and Ronald Beghetto, U.S. professors of educational psychology, have categorized creativity according to the activities of four types of individuals: “big creativity,” “professional creativity,” “little 

creativity,” and “mini-creativity.”99 Big creativity is the activity of individuals in creative professions who are 

recognized for changing how people think about the world; such individuals include Nobel Prize and Pulitzer Prize winners. Professional creativity is the activity of individuals who do creative things professionally 

but have not revolutionized their professions. Such individuals are engaged on a daily basis with creative 

endeavors and include those in the fine arts, entertainment, design, and the sciences. Little creativity is the 

activity of individuals who are not in an everyday creative profession but who are engaged creatively by 

periodically activating dispositions and behaviors that are unconventional and demonstrate inquisitiveness, 

imagination, and freedom of thought. Mini-creativity is the activity displayed in the classroom, specifically 

in elementary, junior high, and high school students. Among these four types, little creativity is most 

applicable to individuals in the everyday workplace who do not have the full-time responsibility of being 

exclusively creative,100 and arguably would include intelligence analysts. 

Theories of creativity can be categorized by what is being described as creative—e.g., a person, a process, or a 

product or similar outcome of creativity—while also considering the external factors that foster or thwart creativity.101 Focusing on a person’s skills and abilities could involve studying personality and motivation. Examining the creative process could call for a multistage perspective, discussed in more detail below. For example, 

Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer have used a systems theory approach that studies the interactions among the 

individual, experts and others in the field, and the rules and processes of the domain or discipline that all those 

involved occupy.102 With regard to creative products, however, U.S. cognitive psychologist Mark Runco points 

out that studying creative outcomes—such as written narratives, art works, scientific discoveries, and architectural designs—frequently tells researchers less about creativity and more about productivity.103 Hence, from a 

scholarly perspective, it is more beneficial to focus on the creativity process than on creative products. External 

factors to be considered, since they foster or thwart creativity, include the influences of culture, the organization, friends, and family, as well as the interactions between the individual and these external influences.
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 22

Information Processing Theories of Creativity

The information processing approach for explaining the process of individual creativity began with British 

social psychologist Graham Wallas in the early 20th century and his writings have remained influential.104

In his book, The Art of Thought, Wallas outlined a four-stage model of creativity: preparation, incubation, 

illumination, and verification.105 Preparation centers around the conscious use of science and mathematics 

to study a problem. Incubation involves two facets: (1) the individual does not consciously think about 

the problem to be solved, and (2) the unconscious plays a role in mulling over the problem. Illumination 

follows incubation, as an unexpected flash of insight; indeed, illumination is the same phenomenon as 

insight.106 Verification resembles preparation in that it involves the conscious and deliberate use of science 

and mathematics to ensure the problem has been resolved. 

Follow-on two- and three-stage models of creativity have evolved from Wallas’s initial concept. Two-stage 

models include a first stage of ideation and a second stage of combinations emerging into consciousness, 

where insight occurs.107 Three-stage models include an additional stage of evaluation or elaboration, in 

which the insight is further developed into knowledge that is communicated.108 U.S. psychologist Donald 

T. Campbell influenced the development of three-stage models in the mid-20th century through his Darwinian theory of human creativity.109

In their literature review of multistage individual creativity models, however, Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer 

have found these models generally consist of Wallas’s four stages, albeit with slightly different labels for 

the third and fourth stages.110 The first stage is the preparation activity, which is inspired by an external 

pressure or internal motivation and requires the individual to cognitively study or analyze the topic. This 

cognitive activity lays the groundwork for the subconscious—that part of the mind not currently the focus 

of an individual’s attention, but still available to influence the conscious mind—to participate. The second 

stage is the incubation, where mental activity below the level of consciousness is at work. The third stage 

is insight, where the subconscious merges or selects ideas that arise into consciousness. The fourth stage is 

the conscious analysis and evaluation of the insight for its value in solving a problem. This evaluation is 

transformed into language that allows the solution and knowledge to be shared with others. 

Two Key Information Processing Theories of Creativity

British organizational behavior scholar Eugene Sadler-Smith expands the Wallas model into a leading 

information processing theory of creativity,111 while Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer offer a second theory,112

which they label “problem finding” and which introduces a social component to the process (discussed 

in detail below). Both theories provide information processing-related, end-to-end staged models. Both 

include an emergence factor just prior to insight. Figure 2 depicts these two theories of creativity, featuring 

the emergence factors of intimation and incubation, respectively.

In the first theory, Sadler-Smith suggests that Wallas actually introduced a five-stage information processing 

model because Wallas discussed a fifth element, which he called intimation, in his 1926 book, The Art of 
Liter

Thought.

113 However, Wallas did not include Intimation in his four-stage model for reasons not known: “...

the four stages of Preparation, Incubation, Illumination, and the Verification of the final result can generally 

be distinguished from each other.”114 In Sadler-Smith’s reconceptualization of the Wallas model, the fivestage model includes the original four stages and adds intimation between incubation and illumination.115

Figure 2. Two Information Processing Theories of Creativity

Sadler-Smith’s (2015)

Expansion of Wallas (1926)

Csikszentmihalyi &

Sawyer (1995)

“Problem Finding”

Preparation

Insight Elaboration

and Evaluation

1 A domain is the culture, policies, processes, rules, and procedures that influence whether an individual’s idea is acceptable.

2 A field is the collection of persons who have a voice in whether the new idea should be accepted because they operate within the individual’s environment.

Preparation

Interaction from

different domains1

Interaction with

different fields2

Incubation Intimation

Incubation

Illumination

(Insight) Verification

Emergence factor

Author’s figure based on the following sources: Eugene Sadler-Smith, “Wallas’ Four-Stage Model of the Creative Process: More than Meets 

the Eye,” Creativity Research Journal 27, no. 4 (2015): 342-52, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10400419.2015.10872

77; Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and Keith Sawyer, “Creative Insight: The Social Dimension of a Solitary Moment,” in The Nature of Insight, ed. 

Robert J. Sternberg and Janet E. Davidson (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 329-63. 

Intimation happens just prior to insight and is described by Wallas as a feeling of a growing or emerging 

series of connections moving toward consciousness—an experience that occurs between the unconscious 

and the conscious.116 Wallas has further stated that intimations include not only a cognitive component 

but also an emotional influence that could either initiate the intimation or contribute to its path.117 SadlerSmith suggests that intimation is similar to intuition,118 which has an emotional component.119 Intimations, 

therefore, occur within an individual, have both emotional and cognitive components, and serve as the 

emergence factor that leads to insight.

In developing the second theory, Csikszentmihalyi was influenced by two schools of thought—biological 

ecosystem (i.e., based on evolution) and symbolic interactionism (i.e., based on the symbolic meaning that 

people develop and build upon in the process of social interaction)—which led him to conceptualize the 

process of creativity through an information systems perspective.120 The core extension of this perspective 

is that individuals operate within a social context, which influences individual creativity.121 This social perspective considers the individual, as well as two kinds of social factors within the individual’s environment. 

One social factor is the field, or the set of other persons who work in the same discipline or domain as 
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 24

the individual and make statements about whether the new idea should be included in the discipline or 

domain. Csikszentmihalyi calls these persons “the gatekeepers.”122 The other social factor is the discipline 

itself, with its culture, policies, processes, rules, and procedures that influence whether the individual’s new 

idea is acceptable. Csikszentmihalyi calls this factor “the domain.”123 The individual, field, and domain 

interact through an iterative process.124

From these concepts, Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer have created a socially-embedded theory of creativity 

in individuals involving four stages: preparation, incubation, insight, and evaluation/elaboration. Their 

research indicates that two parallel versions of this four-stage theory are in operation, depending upon the 

nature of the first and last stages of the creativity process. If the problem is well-known in the preparation 

stage to the individual and to other persons within their discipline or domain, then the insight will more 

easily and quickly be found. Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer give the label of “presented problem-solving 

process” to this short-term framework, for the kind of everyday, routine types of problems one encounters 

and for which applying known procedures leads to a solution.125

If the problem is ambiguous and not well-framed by the individual or others in their domain, then the 

formulation of the problem will be grasped only during the insight stage. Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer 

give the label of “discovered problem-finding process” to this long-term framework, for those more revolutionary, paradigm-changing problems.126 The conceptual boundary between these two problem processes 

is not black and white, and each involves many feedback loops.127 As a result, these two processes represent 

the extreme ends of a creative problem-solving spectrum, with many additional processing permutations 

possible between them. 

Returning to Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer’s presented problem-solving process, the individual is faced in 

the preparation stage with a fairly straightforward conceptualization of a problem or challenge.128 During 

the incubation stage (i.e., the filtering mechanism from the conscious into the subconscious), the individual steps away from the problem—consciously creating idle time—and allows the subconscious self to 

mull over the problem; the individual cannot avoid the influence of the social and cultural environment 

encompassing other persons and policies, rules, procedures, and processes within the individual’s discipline 

or domain. The complexity of the incubation stage is relatively minimal in the presented problem-solving 

process because fewer types of information are needed from others and fewer deviations from the norms of 

the domain exist. In the insight stage, the individual sees a solution, typically within the framework of the 

discipline or domain, and the insight is more incremental than revolutionary. The evaluation stage involves 

reverse filtering from the subconscious into the conscious mind of the individual, and it is influenced by 

others in the field and the policies, rules, procedures, and processes within the domain. The solution is then 

applied in a fairly straightforward manner, with little resistance.

In Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer’s discovered problem-finding process, where the nature of the problem is 

unclear or uncertain, the individual experiences cognitive dissonance or intellectual discomfort, as well as 

emotional anxiety, because the framing of the problem does not fit within the views of others and because 

the policies, rules, procedures, and processes of the domain do not address it, at least not completely.129

During the incubation stage, the individual relies more intensely upon idle time and the subconscious, 
Liter

as well as upon a greater diversity of new information and persons associated with different disciplines or 

domains. Incubation in the discovered problem-finding process, therefore, involves more complex and 

uncertain interactions with the individual’s social environment and a more challenging cognitive component than it does in the presented problem-solving process.

Incubation also plays a key role in the four-stage Wallas model and Sadler-Smith’s five-stage reconceptualization of the Wallas model, as well as Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer’s information processing model.130 The 

incubation stage is considered a critical step in the creativity (and insight) process in all three models. Both 

Wallas and the team of Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer have described incubation as an opportunity to be 

free from thinking about the problem at hand and, during that free time, nothing else distracts the individual.131 As Wallas has suggested, unconscious—but important—mental events occur during incubation.132

Continuing with Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer’s theory, the insight stage of the discovered problem-finding 

process arrives when the individual sees the formulation of the problem—in stark contrast to seeing the 

solution, as is the case in the insight stage of the presented problem-solving process.133 The last stage, elaboration and evaluation, is also more complex in the discovered problem-finding process than it is within the 

presented problem-solving process, because the individual faces communication and language challenges. 

The individual, both within oneself and in interactions with others, often finds it difficult to formulate a 

sufficiently clear narrative so that all in the field or domain understand the insight. Once accepted, however, 

the solution is implemented. Problem finding has been empirically shown to be correlated with creativity.134

Antecedent Conditions Affecting Creativity

At the individual level of analysis, Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer suggest that, for creativity to occur, the 

following attributes must exist within an individual: an extensive familiarity with the knowledge domain; 

significant experience within the field associated with that knowledge domain; the ability to focus attention 

on various aspects of the domain that are known, or suspected, to have an unresolved issue; the ability to 

absorb knowledge that relates to the unresolved issue; the ability to allow other kinds of information from 

different domains to subconsciously mingle with knowledge within the individual’s domain expertise relevant to the unresolved issue; the ability to sense new problem representations and solutions as a result of this 

interaction; and the ability to formulate the insight into language that makes the insight understandable and 

agreed upon by others in the field.135 U.S. psychiatrist Albert Rothenberg has added the following factors: 

the motivation to create something new; an interest in both finding the problem and solving it; a willingness 

to deviate from the accepted knowledge of those in the field; a certain forcefulness in one’s stance; openness 

to learning and a high degree of curiosity; willingness to take risks; and courage and passion.136

At the leadership level of analysis, Scott Isaksen and Hans Akkermans, European scholars with the Creative Problem Solving Group, have identified nine dimensions that leaders can directly influence to foster 

a creative climate.137 First, support for a challenging and involving environment promotes higher levels of 

employee engagement, commitment, and motivation. Second, freedom is reflected in the degree of independence allowed by managers, as measured by employee autonomy and individual ability to maneuver 
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 26

independently. Third, trust and openness foster emotional safety in relationships, ensuring individuals feel 

safe to share ideas and be honest. Fourth, idea-time recognizes that time should be available for individuals 

to talk about new ideas. Fifth, playfulness and humor provide a relaxed atmosphere and lower stress. Sixth, 

leaders can lower personal and emotional conflict, which unchecked can lead to disruptive behavior. Seventh, idea support, particularly in the treatment of new ideas, encourages individuals to listen as ideas are 

discussed in a professional and attentive manner. Eighth, welcomed debate between points of view allows 

a diversity of voices to be heard and to contribute. Ninth, a tolerance for risk-taking helps individuals feel 

comfortable putting forward new ideas in an environment with uncertainty and ambiguity.

At the organizational level of analysis, Runco has identified the following behaviors that organizations can 

foster to support creativity: respect for new ideas; reduction of bureaucratic red tape; not setting policy and 

process constraints that would inhibit creativity; providing sufficient freedom of intellectual movement of 

employees; having access to resources, if necessary, to explore new ideas; having an appropriate culture that 

fosters originality; and providing constructive and developmental feedback to employees.138 British organizational psychologist Neil Anderson and his colleagues have reported research indicating the importance 

of an organization’s structure in supporting creativity; that is, organizations that are decentralized, are not 

mired in a culture committed to organizational and resource power over others, and do not have overly 

constraining formal processes and procedures foster greater creativity in their workforce.139

U.S. organizational behavior scholar James March has identified three ways that organizations promote 

creativity in individuals. First, the organization is not overly controlling in its attitude toward individuals 

investigating new ideas.140 This slack, as March called it, desensitizes the organization’s fear of failure and 

management’s inclination to heavily influence and judge the initiation of a new idea.141 Second, managers 

jointly develop new ideas with employees. In this way, not only the employee benefits, but the manager 

also learns to be more supportive of new and/or risky ideas. Third, managers support the new ideas of their 

employees, even in the face of competitive or conflicting ideas from others in the organization. 

From an information processing perspective, environmental factors within the IC’s organizations affect the 

individual intelligence analyst’s ability to be creative. The reflective learning conditions cited by Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer, in which individuals are not overwhelmed by information overload, the number 

of tasks, or shortness of deadlines, could fuel the intelligence analyst’s ability to think deliberately about a 

complex and, as perceived, ambiguous or unresolvable task at hand.142 Largely inwardly focused—where 

the individual’s imagination, mindfulness, and inventiveness emerge—reflective learning supports the solving of complex, wicked problems.143 Well-respected national security experts have stated that high overload 

and high equivocality environments are typical for individuals in some information-rich national security 

and law enforcement contexts.144 Their observations suggest that reflective learning and creativity are not 

likely to occur in contexts where analysts are overloaded with tasks or in a crisis situation where ambiguity 

is combined with time pressure. The above Literature Review, however, offers a framework for examining 

instances of insight in the IC environment, as will be discussed in the next section. 
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Research Methodology

Conceptual Framework

The key information processing theories of insight and creativity, discussed above in the Literature Review, 

provide a useful conceptual framework for studying insight in the IC. Taken together, Klein, Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer, Sadler-Smith, and Ohlsson have identified at least four emergence factors leading to 

insight: changing the narrative via anchors and stories,145 incubation,146 intimation,147 and restructuring.148

These four factors express themselves in different ways: taking place either solely within the individual or 

within the social environment as well as the individual, and including either solely the cognitive component or both emotional and cognitive components of the individual. We can, therefore, place these four 

factors along two dimensions: the dimension from whence insight emerges (i.e., the emotion-cognition 

continuum) and the dimension with whom insight emerges (i.e., the individual-social continuum). These 

four factors and the two dimensions are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: Emergent Factors from the Information Processing Literature on Insight

Emergent 

Factor Source Description Emotion/Cognition Dimension

Individual/Social 

Dimension

Change 

Narrative

Klein (2013) The individual resolves 

inconsistency in ideas, 

concepts, etc. by changing

the narrative—the story that 

the individual creates to 

communicate meaning—

which, in turn, can change 

viewpoints about a situation

The individual changes the 

way the situation is framed 

by adding, subtracting, 

manipulating, etc. the

story’s anchors

Cognition Individual
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 28

Emergent 

Factor Source Description Emotion/Cognition Dimension

Individual/Social 

Dimension

Incubation Csikszentmihalyi 

& Sawyer (1995)

The individual relies on access to 

idle time and the subconscious, 

as well as the diversity of new 

ideas, concepts, etc. from the

problem’s own or different 

disciplines. The new ideas

emerge both from within the 

individual and from other persons 

in those disciplines

Cognition Individual and 

Social

Intimation Sadler-Smith 

(2015); Wallas 

(1926)

The individual senses a 

growing or emerging series 

of connections among ideas, 

concepts, etc. moving from the

unconscious (i.e., incubatio

stage) toward consciousness (i.e.

illumination/insight stage). These

connections may be emotionally 

stimulated or an emotional 

response may be stimulated 

by the series of connections 

of ideas, concepts, etc

Emotion and 

Cognition

Individual

Restructuring Ohlsson (1992, 

2018)

The individual re-represents the 

initially conceived problem and 

that re-representation is used 

to overcome cognitive conflict

The individual can restructure 

the problem by paying more 

attention to the problem, by 

considering some less considered 

representation, and/or by relaxing 

a self-imposed constraint

Cognition Individual

Sources: Gary Klein, Seeing What Others Don’t: The Remarkable Ways We Gain Insights (New York: Public Affairs, 2013), 27-28; Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and Keith Sawyer, “Creative Insight: The Social Dimension of a Solitary Moment,” in The Nature of Insight, ed. Robert J. Sternberg 

and Janet E. Davidson (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 329-63; Eugene Sadler-Smith, “Wallas’ Four-Stage Model of the Creative Process: 

More than Meets the Eye,” Creativity Research Journal 27, no. 4 (2015): 342-52, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10400419

.2015.1087277; Graham Wallas, The Art of Thought (London: J. Cape, 1926), 79-107; Stellan Ohlsson, “Information-Processing Explanations 

of Insight and Related Phenomena,” in Advances in the Psychology of Thinking, ed. Mark T. Keane and Kenneth J. Gilhooly (Hempstead, UK: 

Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), 1-44; and Stellan Ohlsson, “The Dialectic between Routine and Creative Cognition,” in Insight: On the Origins of 

New Ideas, ed. Frederic Vellee-Tourangeau (New York: Routledge, 2018), 8-29.

Figure 3 further illustrates where the four emergence factors are located within the two dimensions. Both 

restructuring and changing the narrative via anchors and stories reside at the intersection of cognition and 

the individual, as shown in cell 1. Incubation is also cognitive but spans across the individual and the social, 

as shown in cells 1 and 2. Intimation spans across emotion and cognition, and resides within the individual, 

as shown in cells 1 and 3.
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Figure 3. Framing the Information Processing Literature: Two Dimensions of Insight Emergence

From Whence Insight Emerges

With Whom Insight Emerges

Individual’s Social

Environment

Individual

Emotion Cognition

4 2

3 1

Restructure

(Ohlsson, 1992, 2018)

Change Narrative

(Klein, 2013)

Intimation

(Sadler-Smith 2015; Wallas, 1926)

Incubation

(Csikszentmihalyi & Sawyer, 1995)

Author’s figure based on the following sources: Gary Klein, Seeing What Others Don’t: The Remarkable Ways We Gain Insights (New 

York: Public Affairs, 2013), 27-28; Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and Keith Sawyer, “Creative Insight: The Social Dimension of a Solitary 

Moment,” in The Nature of Insight, ed. Robert J. Sternberg and Janet E. Davidson (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 329-63; Eugene 

Sadler-Smith, “Wallas’ Four-Stage Model of the Creative Process: More than Meets the Eye,” Creativity Research Journal 27, no. 4 

(2015): 342-52, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10400419.2015.1087277; Graham Wallas, The Art of Thought 

(London: J. Cape, 1926), 79-107; Stellan Ohlsson, “Information-Processing Explanations of Insight and Related Phenomena,” in 

Advances in the Psychology of Thinking, ed. Mark T. Keane and Kenneth J. Gilhooly (Hempstead, UK: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), 

1-44; and Stellan Ohlsson, “The Dialectic between Routine and Creative Cognition,” in Insight: On the Origins of New Ideas, ed. Frederic 

Vellee-Tourangeau (New York: Routledge, 2018), 8-29.

This section includes a discussion of methodological considerations, the selected methodology, sample 

selection strategy, data collection, and data analysis. The approach taken is primarily phenomenological. 

The particular method applied is qualitative, using interviews and grounded theory for data analysis. 

Key Questions

The fundamental question is how to study insight—in laboratory or real-life conditions—with the key 

corollary of how to focus the study so the lessons learned are applicable to the IC. There are at least three 

disciplinary approaches to study insight: how insight is measured under laboratory conditions; how it is 

experienced in real-life conditions; and what is known from historical accounts of specific individuals who 

have experienced insight. 

Most cognitive psychologists studying insight have relied on experimental methods conducted under controlled laboratory conditions. These studies have often constructed the experiment so that the insight activity takes seconds or minutes.149 The participants in such laboratory experiments have almost always been 

college students, and the activity in which they have engaged is some kind of puzzle.150 Researchers attempt 

to remove all possible intervening variables and focus on just one isolated aspect of insight in which the 
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 30

subject of the experiment has had no preparation.151 When priming has been included in the experiment, 

its effect is measured in seconds or minutes.152 These constraints have led Swedish psychologist Eva Lund 

to observe that insight is hard to study experimentally.153

Social psychologists and organizational scientists, in contrast, view insight as occurring within an ecology of 

factors that exist only in real-life situations and are influenced by other people, things in their environment, 

an individual’s perceptions, the varying intensities of factors in the environment, and the narratives that 

individuals construct.154 Timing in real-life situations is much longer than seconds or minutes; the effect of 

priming, for example, is assumed to span hours or days or longer.155 One method problem with researching 

insight and creativity in real life is the difficulty of predicting their appearance and, because of the time lags 

involved, of determining that the end result has constituted an insight.156

Historical accounts of insight and creativity have been collected through the stories that specific kinds of people tell about their lived experience.157 Rothenberg has interviewed Nobel Prize-winning scientists about the 

creative process that led to their recognition.158 Klein and Jarosz have primarily read accounts and had conversations with other researchers about individuals who were involved in critical incidents.159 Csikszentmihalyi 

and Sawyer have interviewed individuals recognized for their creative contributions in various fields spanning 

science, art, business, politics, and the social sciences.160 Human development scholar Kevin Dunbar has interviewed scientists from laboratories known for making creative discoveries. Each of these qualitative research 

efforts has had the advantage of an external measure that recognized the individual’s insight and creativity.161

For example, Nobel Prize winners are carefully selected by an independent group based on the recipient’s 

creative contribution. Although a Nobel Prize winner is thus a perfect candidate to interview to learn about 

the creativity experience, the available and limited historical research has not been representative of the intelligence analyst environment.162 Hence, a different approach—one applicable to intelligence analysts—is needed.

Research Design

Phenomenology informs a new approach that is applicable to intelligence. The unit of analysis for a phenomenologist is not the individual, per se; rather, it is how a phenomenon reveals itself in an individual’s life.163 A 

phenomenologist is interested in how a phenomenon emerges and evolves. The goal of this phenomenological effort is to “...uncover and describe the structures, [and] the internal meaning structures...” of the insight 

process as experienced by the individual.164 A phenomenological investigative approach to understanding 

insight emergence is recommended because the unpredictable nature of insight emergence makes it hard to 

observe as it occurs.165

Of the two main phenomenological approaches—bracketing and bridling—bracketing is the attempt to 

remove the researcher’s knowledge about the phenomenon under study. Bridling leaves the researcher open to 

factoring in preexisting knowledge, and this openness allows the researcher’s understanding of the phenomenon to evolve during the study.166 Bridling is the more accepted and current approach used by researchers.167

This study adopts the bridling approach because the topic of insight in intelligence analysts is not empirically 

understood in its context and, therefore, requires an open and thoughtful mind to understand its manifestation. 
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Conducting Phenomenological Research 

The use of a phenomenological approach has been recommended for the study of national security issues.168

Introducing phenomenology-based research into the world of U.S. intelligence analysts and their decisionmaking customers, however, presents unique challenges. The primary one is conducting unclassified interviews with individuals who live and work in a classified environment. To address that challenge in this 

study, analysts were informed prior to being interviewed that their involvement required them to obfuscate 

anything classified. Instead of revealing a country or a foreign adversary, the interviewee would say “Country 

X” or “a senior decisionmaker in that country,” respectively. In addition, details about the interviewees—e.g., 

their names, names of individuals with whom they interact, names of places where they work, and names of 

organizations mentioned by them in their stories—were anonymized because they were irrelevant; the focal 

point was the phenomenon, not the identities of the actors and their locations in time and space. 

Three prior phenomenological research studies conducted by this author have informed this project. Each of 

these prior studies focused on how intelligence analysts and their customers process intelligence information 

within complex national security contexts, all through unclassified interviews. The first study encompassed 

the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) briefers and their interactions with the nation’s most senior policymakers 

who receive the PDB.169 Interviews of PDB briefers showed they provide creative, sense-giving support to 

the most senior policymakers in the United States through meta-information.170 Meta-information is a phenomenon that provides value-added information to help policymakers link the intelligence from the PDB 

to their decision cycles. The second study involved interviewing active duty and retired three- and fourstar Army combat-arms generals who commanded large formations in Iraq and Afghanistan.171 The study 

examined how these generals consumed strategic intelligence, mostly from the Defense Intelligence Agency 

(DIA) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and found this strategic intelligence provided information 

that at times contradicted the generals’ understanding of the on-the-ground world in which they operated. 

This discontinuity triggered the phenomenon of creative problem-solving that engaged the generals in a 

self-learning, critical thinking, and social engagement strategy to resolve the contradictions, which they did.

The third study involved the phenomenon of how intelligence analysts learn, i.e., how their mental models 

change amid the effects of overload and equivocality in their everyday analytic tasks of informing policy 

decisionmakers. This study found these effects produce four learning archetypes—collaborative, focused, 

survival, and reflective—which affect the knowledge analysts produce and deliver to intelligence consumers.172 In collaborative learning, there is parity and joint co-discovery between the two worlds of analysis and 

policy. This expands knowledge for both although their depth of understanding is constrained to the degree 

that each world can absorb the unique dimensions of the other as well as its own. In focused learning, the 

analyst successfully mitigates impediments to paying attention to their task at hand, and thereby achieves 

greater, in-depth cognitive focus on their area of specialization. In survival learning, the analyst operates in 

a chaotic environment, must act quickly, and lacks awareness of the full extent of factors affecting the environment—all leading the analyst to employ methods that reduce disorder at the cost of in-depth cognitive 

understanding and that draw upon what they already know. In reflective learning, the analyst uses time to 

think introspectively—conducive to being innovative and solving complex, novel problems—and creates 

new meaning amid ambiguity. 
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 32

Collectively, the three phenomenological studies described above provided experience and expertise in dealing with individuals who willingly share unclassified personal stories about themselves and their experiences 

within a national security context. The participants in these research studies judged it valuable to pursue 

such research for the benefit of national security, their profession, and the professional development of 

members in their community. 

Selection of Qualitative Method 

How insight and creativity emerge and are sustained within intelligence analysts probably involves a novel 

and complex social setting, which has important implications for determining a research methodology.173 A 

naturalistic inquiry is needed to reach a deep and rich understanding of the contextual differences within and 

between individuals. The pursuit of this type of knowledge justifies the use of an idiographic qualitative research 

method, in which descriptions of and revelations about a phenomenon—such as insight—may be discovered.174

Although a variety of analytic methods are available, phenomenology and grounded theory use the analysis 

of experiences that are gleaned through interviews with individuals focused on the phenomenon. Grounded 

theory is a pragmatic, but not prescriptive, process175 that allows the researcher to make inferences based on 

abductive reasoning, moving iteratively from data to theorizing and back to data.176 In addition to the three 

studies mentioned, grounded theory has been applied previously as a research tool in national security and 

intelligence studies.177 For example, Israeli military intelligence officer Eran Zohar has used grounded theory 

to understand the operational readiness of the Taliban in Afghanistan.178

Data Collection Strategy

Sample Selection Strategy

No formal recognition system—no award like the Nobel Prize—has been designed specifically to recognize 

insight or creativity in intelligence analysts. Identifying individuals to interview about their insight experiences, therefore, required an alternative approach involving informal recognition. Using a three-phase selection strategy, which was both homogeneous and purposeful,179 individuals who had experienced the study’s 

key phenomenon—insight—and who occupied the same domain—intelligence analysis in the national security sector—were identified. Figure 4 summarizes the three phases involved in the sample selection strategy. 

Figure 4. Three-phase Sample Selection Strategy

Identify intelligence organizations 

not focused on crises

Phase One

Contact senior executives 

known to value creativity in those 

organizations, asking them to identify 

analysts they judge are creative and 

willing to be interviewed

Phase Two

Gain concurrence of recommended

analysts and interview them about

their experiences

Phase Three
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Phase One

As noted above, insight and creativity within intelligence analysts who are engaged full-time in solving 

novel problems can flourish in reflective learning work environments.180 Hence, the first phase of studyparticipant selection focused attention on those contexts in which insight and creativity may most likely 

occur. One such environment is found where analysts are not crafting high-demand, quick-turnover daily 

production, as typically occurs in a war zone or when assigned to a crisis account. Candidates could be 

based at an intelligence agency headquarters—assigned, for example, to functional topics such as climate 

change and the urbanization of populations—or in the intelligence directorate of a combatant command 

not engaged in hostilities. A second prospective environment includes organizations focused on scientific 

endeavors. Scientific and technical intelligence centers—including the Air Force’s National Air and Space 

Intelligence Center, the Army’s National Ground Intelligence Center, the Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence, and DIA’s Missile and Space Intelligence Center and National Center for Medical Intelligence—or 

the science-based National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) could be good sources of insight study 

candidates. A third set of prospective candidates could be drawn from the strategic intelligence function 

at CIA or DIA, while a fourth could comprise analysts participating in training and education programs, 

including students who attend the National Intelligence University. 

Phase Two

The second phase involved making contact with current senior executives and senior analytic managers in 

the intelligence analysis field who are known for appreciating the value of insight and creativity. A snowball 

approach was used to search for such executives and managers,181 drawing on the author’s personal network 

within the first three types of work environments described in Phase One. The goal of Phase Two was for 

these executives to facilitate the identification of analysts or working-level managers of analysts whom they 

judged to be creative; the analysts would then be asked about their specific insights. 

To start, the executives and senior managers were provided either a verbal or written summary of the characteristics of a creative person, based on the six major elements that Sternberg identified in his article on 

“A Three-Facet Model of Creativity.”182 These elements combine attributes of intelligence, cognitive style, 

and personal motivation. First, the individual is not bound by conventionality and may be characterized 

as a free spirit or as unorthodox. Second, the individual is able to intellectually integrate disparate types of 

information, i.e., is known to make connections between ideas, can articulate differences between ideas, 

and is able to consider old or existing ideas and information and combine them in new ways. Third, the 

individual appreciates beauty and imagination. Fourth, the individual is intellectually flexible, as demonstrated by being skilled at making decisions after weighing pros and cons, but also able to revise those 

decisions and pursue alternate approaches. Fifth, the individual has a keen sense of inquiry, revealed by 

freely and regularly questioning norms and assumptions, and, when arriving at an alternate view, not 

backing down in the face of peer or management pressure. Sixth, the individual has determination, is 

enthusiastic, and is motived intrinsically by personal goals. 
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 34

Phase Three

This third phase involved contacting those intelligence analysts identified by the executives and senior 

managers in the second phase The estimated minimum sample size for phenomenological and grounded 

theory research designs is not overly prescriptive,183 with the number of interviewees recommended to 

make analytic generalizations being between 20 and 50.184 The executives and senior managers collectively 

provided the names and email addresses of 42 intelligence analysts, but only after the intelligence analysts 

were advised of the research project and agreed to be interviewed. Of the 42, one analyst denied having 

agreed to participate. Of the 41 analysts remaining, 37 agreed to be interviewed after learning the types of 

questions to be asked. However, one of the interviews was not used because the insight described was not 

work-related, resulting in 36 usable interviews. All analysts consented to a verbal consent form. 

How Interviews Were Conducted

The 36 interviews were conducted over a three-month period between November 2020 and January 2021. 

Prior to the interviews, analysts were asked to have in mind a specific cognitive and/or emotional insight 

experience while solving a problem that was novel to them. Insight was defined for them as their recognition that they had achieved a deeper understanding about a topic than they previously had, leading them 

to understand the topic, the world, and/or themselves differently. At the interview, analysts were told that 

the questions to be asked would explore in depth their selected insight experiences. 

The interviews, which averaged 60 minutes, used a semi-structured interview guide, with very little deviation. Analysts were asked to describe what type of intelligence analyst they were, to identify an insight 

that would be the subject of the interview, how they thought about the problem prior to the insight, what 

happened between the time they thought about the problem and when the insight occurred, how long the 

problem occupied their attention, what led them to an insight and what was the insight, what happened 

after the insight, and if there was anything else not already addressed that they wished to say. Follow-on, 

probing questions were posed, as needed. Collectively, the answers to the interview questions were referred 

to as the analyst’s “insight story.” 

The interviews were conducted virtually, primarily because of the physical distancing constraints imposed 

by the COVID-19 pandemic. Of the 36 interviews, 11 were conducted using the interviewee’s office 

phone, 12 using the interviewee’s cell phone, and 13 using the Microsoft Teams teleconference application in either audio-only or combined audio-video mode. Respondents were guaranteed anonymity and 

confidentiality for themselves as well as any correlation to or identification of other individuals, groups, 

organizations, countries, etc., that they mentioned in the interview.

Based on the author’s experience in three previous research studies mentioned above, this study continued 

the past practice of not recording interviews. People in the intelligence business are more prone to speak 

freely and comfortably when no verbatim record of their interview is made. Instead, the author wrote down 

information from the interviews in a notebook, following a strategy involving four interactions with the 
Resea

interview data: listening to the analyst’s words, deciding what to write down,185 writing in the notebook, 

and transcribing the interview data onto the computer. Should this fourth stage identify points missed, all 

interviewees had agreed to respond to follow-up questions.

Interviewee Demographics

Of the 36 interviewees, 18 were assigned to one of four intelligence agencies: CIA, DIA, NGA, and ODNI. 

Five were assigned to the Executive Department’s intelligence offices of Treasury and Energy. Thirteen 

were assigned to intelligence directorates (with the “J2” functional designation for a headquarters that 

is composed of “joint,” multi-service elements consisting of land, air, and naval forces) within combatant commands and the Joint Staff: Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), European Command (EUCOM), 

Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(JCS). During their interviews, some analysts selected an experience—their insight story—from a previous assignment at an organization different than their current affiliation. Table 2 provides more details.

Table 2: Analysts’ Organizations at Time of Interviews and Insight Experiences

Organizational Type Intelligence Entity Organization Assigned 

When Interviewed

Organization Assigned 

During Insight Story

Intelligence agency

CIA 2 2

DIA 8 8

NGA 2 0

ODNI 6 6

Department’s intelligence 

office

Energy 3 3

Treasury 2 1

Combatant command 

intelligence directorate

CYBERCOM/J2 3 2

EUCOM/J2 2 2

SOUTHCOM/J2 2 4

STRATCOM/J2 5 3

JCS/J2 1 2

Uniformed services 

intelligence unit

U.S. Air Force 0

U.S. Army 0

U.S. Coast Guard 0

TOTAL 36 36

The average years of analytical experience of the intelligence analysts interviewed was close to 15 years, with 

a standard deviation of about 8.5 years. See Table 3 for details. 
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 36

The analysts had a varied history in terms of their work 

experience. Four of the 36 analysts were uniformed services 

members. All others were civilian intelligence analysts, and, 

for many, their current government intelligence job was the 

only type of related work experience they had. Nine civilian intelligence analysts, however, had previously held private sector jobs, while six had prior military service, almost 

always in an intelligence capacity. Five of the civilian intelligence analysts had both prior private sector and prior military experience. 

With regard to education, 34 of the 36 analysts interviewed 

had at least a bachelor’s degree, and two had an associate’s 

degree. The discipline in which most (13) had majored was 

international relations or political science, while other social 

sciences (3), engineering (5), the humanities (5), management (3), physical science (3), and economics (2) were 

represented in the single digits. Of the 34 with a bachelor’s 

degree, 28 held one or more graduate degrees, of which 25 

were at the master’s level, and three at the doctoral level. 

International relations or political science was the dominant 

graduate program. See Table 4 for details.

The intelligence analyst’s career fields during their insight 

experience covered a broad range of specialty areas spanning 

analytic applications, analytic tradecraft, financial analysis, 

infrastructure analysis, international politics, military forces, 

public health, scientific and technical (S&T) analysis, S&T 

applications, and strategic warning. Some of these terms 

require explanation. Analytic applications are activities used 

to support analysis, and they require expertise in big data, 

databases, geospatial information systems, network analysis, 

red teams, and exercises. Analytic tradecraft applies to conceptual clarity and foreign culture effects. S&T applications 

refer to the English translations of foreign media that are 

transmitted through various technical means and are used 

by intelligence analysts for their assessments. While translation, per se, may not be considered analytical, 

for purposes of this study, it was. See Table 5 for details.

The gender distribution of the 36 interviewees was 31-percent female (11) and 69-percent male (25). According to official 2019 data, the percentage of women in the IC was 39.3 percent, but that percentage included 

disciplines other than intelligence analysis.186 The same report noted that women were underrepresented in 

Table 3: Interviewees’ Years of Analytical 

Experience

Years of Experience as 

Intelligence Analyst

Number of 

Analysts

0-3 years 6

4-6 years 2

7-9 years 4

10-12 years 6

13-15 years 4

16-18 years 4

19-21 years 3

22-24 years 2

25-27 years 1

28-30 years 0

31-33 years 1

34-36 years 2

37-39 years 1

TOTAL 36

Table 4: Interviewees’ Graduate Education

Graduate Degree - 

Discipline

Number of 

Analysts 

Humanities 4

International relations/

Political science

10

Management 4

Policy 2

Science/engineering 3

Social science – other 1

Strategic intelligence 4

TOTAL 28
Resea

some agencies’ intelligence occupations, including both analysts and collectors. Although this study interviewed only 

analysts, the proportion of women participants appears to 

be somewhat representative of women working in the IC.

Analytic Strategy

Characterization of Insight Stories

Information about the analyst’s insight story was collected 

through the interview questions, as described above. The 

insight experiences took place over time because they started 

when the problem was identified and ended with the reaction 

to the insight. Although the analysts were invited to describe 

whatever insight experience they wanted to share, they 

tended to select insight experiences from early in their analytic careers or early in a new assignment within their career. 

Table 6 provides details on when insight stories occurred in 

the interviewees’ careers. Regardless of the experience’s vintage, the analysts had remarkably vivid recollections of their 

insight stories. Almost all analysts interviewed recalled wordfor-word conversations and the smallest details of events in 

their insight story. While scholarly evidence suggests that 

memory recall degrades over time,187 more recent evidence 

indicates that the emotional intensity of an experience in 

one’s past is correlated to its vividness, and as a result, the 

accurate recallability of the experience.188 

Qualitative Data Coding

Narrative is used in qualitative research to shed light on 

how a phenomenon develops.189 In this study, the phenomenon was insight, and interviews provided the narratives 

about insight. Within these narratives, elements of interest 

included, but were not limited to, ideas, people, transactions, context, outcomes, process, emotions, and so on. 

These elements occurred in strings of words within the interviewees’ narratives, and this author’s interpretation of these 

strings was called a code.190 Codes are researcher-generated words or phrases that capture the essence of a 

narrative’s segment. Codes can be used for pattern detection, process identification, categorizations, theory 

Table 5: Interviewees’ Mission Areas 

During Insight Experience

Mission Areas During 

Insight Experience

Number of 

Analysts

Analytic applications 7

Analytic tradecraft 3

Financial analysis 3

Infrastructure analysis 1

International politics 5

Military forces 8

Public health 1

S&T analysis 4

S&T applications 3

Strategic warning 1

TOTAL 36

Table 6: Timing of Insight Stories in 

Analysts’ Careers

Point in Intelligence 

Analyst’s Career of 

Insight Story

Number of 

Analysts

0-3 years 15

4-6 years 5

7-9 years 4

10-12 years 3

13-15 years 2

16-18 years 2

19-21 years 2

22-24 years 1

25-27 years 1

28-30 years 0

31-33 years 0

34-36 years 0

37-39 years 1

TOTAL 36
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 38

building, and other purposes. Coding is 

a multistep, iterative process resulting in 

an assertion or theory.191 Figure 5 summarizes this process, which is further 

explained below.

The first step in qualitative data coding 

is to interpret the actual words, phrases, 

sentences, and/or paragraphs in a narrative. There are many approaches to this 

first step.192 For example, the actual word 

used by the subject could be a code, 

known as “in vivo.” Most interpretation 

methods focus, however, on the researcher’s specific interest or set of interests in striving to understand the phenomenon—in this case, insight—and 

so can be based on a research question. These research interests can include processes, descriptions, values, 

emotions, or attributes—to name a few—and they may be combined as the researcher deems fit.

The second step consolidates the codes identified in the first step into categories, which are drawn directly 

from the codes. For example, the codes of “ballpoint pen,” “pencil,” and “marker” could logically be consolidated into the category of “writing instruments.” The third step identifies the categories’ theoretical 

meanings, called themes or concepts. These meanings can be drawn from existing literature, and they represent the structure of an experience. A theme is not in the narrative, like its code or category; rather, it is a 

characterization the researcher assigns based on the research question.193 A theme provides the meaning of a 

code or category in an effort to understand some aspect of the phenomenon within the analyst’s experience 

and, therefore, it is an abstraction that gives shape to the focal elements being researched.194

These series of coding steps result in an assertion or theory about the research topic. In this study of insight 

in the IC, drawing on 36 interviews, the following interpretative elements were generated: 1,421 codes, 

66 categories, 11 themes, and four assertions. Excel spreadsheets were used to manage the iterative coding 

process. The 11 themes that identified aspects of insight were: unpredictability, problem finding, problem 

type, conflicting representations, internalized tensions, priming, insight, dwell time, resistance and mitigation, solution, and sustained benefit. The four assertions drawn from these themes were: insight emerges 

within an individual; insight emerges within an individual’s social environment; insight emerges from a 

cognition stance; and insight emerges from an emotional stance. In the next section, Findings, each theme 

will have an associated evidence table consisting of the theme (and sub-theme, when appropriate), the category, the code, and the sentence from the interview that serves as the evidence. 

Figure 5. Coding Framework

Code

Code

Code

Category

Code

Code

Code

Category

Theme

Theme Assertion/

Theory

Theme

Author’s figure, derived from the following source: Johnny Saldaña, The Coding 

Manual for Qualitative Researchers (Los Angeles: Sage Publications), 1-40. 
Fin

Findings

Analysis of the author’s interviews with the intelligence analysts revealed an insight process shared by each 

analyst that was almost identical regardless of their many demographic differences. The coding analysis process created 11 themes, as noted above, and these themes were organized into four proximal phases and one 

distal phase. Insight trigger, emergence, insight, and after insight are the proximal phases associated with 

insight within a creativity framework—somewhat similar to the information processing theories of creativity 

laid out by Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer (see Figure 2 above)—and sustained benefit is a distal phase, standing outside of time from the proximal phases.

The “insight trigger” phase includes unpredictability, problem finding, problem type, and conflicting representations. Internalized tensions, priming, and dwell time fall into the crucial “emergence phase.” The “insight 

phase” naturally includes insight, while the “after insight” phase comprises resistance and mitigation, and solution. The “sustained benefit phase” is not part of the information processing framework of insight and creativity; rather, this phase represents the analyst’s distal reflection of the insight’s beneficial impact and meaning to 

themselves and the contribution they felt they made to their mission. Figure 6 displays the 11 findings divided 

into four phases plus a sustained benefit phase, and these phases and themes are discussed below in more detail. 

Figure 6. IC Analysts’ Insight Process

Unpredictability

Problem

Finding

Problem

Type

Internalized

Tensions

Conflicting

Representations

Priming

Insight

Resistance

and Mitigation

Solution

Sustained

Benefit

Dwell

Time

Phases

Insight Trigger

Emergence

Insight

After Insight

Sustained Benefit
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 40

Insight Trigger

Introduction

The “insight trigger” phase begins with an initiating event that, seemingly by chance, brings the analyst’s 

attention to a particular problem to address; alternatively, after already working on the problem, a random 

event contributes to focusing the analyst’s attention more intently on the problem. Once the novel problem 

surfaces in the analyst’s attention, the strategy shifts a problem-solving to a problem-finding process—that 

is, as described by Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer, the strategy best suited to problems that have not been 

addressed or solved previously and issues that, by their very nature, have no single answer. In the last part 

of this phase, analysts discover that other individuals almost always represent the problem very differently, 

culminating in a triggering motivation to resolve these conflicting representations of the problem. Table 7 

summarizes each factor within the “insight trigger” phase, which will be discussed below.

Table 7: Summary of Insight Trigger Factors

Insight Trigger

Unpredictability Problem Finding Problem Type Conflicting Representation

Travel for Work Check Assumptions Prediction Analyst’s View

Attend a Conference How Things Relate Mystery Others’ Views

Attend a Meeting Overcome Roadblocks

An Office Task Sensemaking

Personal Life

Unpredictability

At some point within the “before insight” stage, almost every analyst reported experiencing a source of 

unpredictability, without which the insight story would not have materialized or, at least, have progressed 

the way it did. The sources of unpredictability were events in which the problem surfaced unexpectedly or 

without planning. These sources included traveling for work (i.e., temporary duty, or TDY), a conference 

or other meeting convened locally, an office task assigned by the analyst’s supervisor or more senior manager, and some aspect of the analyst’s personal life. 

As an example of unpredictability while traveling for work, an analyst who worked at headquarters visited a 

field site for a specific purpose. At the field site, the analyst was unexpectedly shown an analytical tool used for 

a different purpose than the analyst needed, and was then able to rethink how such a tool could help with the 

problem the analyst had been thinking about occasionally, but without making any progress. At a conference, 

an analyst met specialists who discussed a material’s dual-purpose, which triggered the analyst to pursue the 

path that led to the analyst’s insight. A junior analyst, who was a last-minute replacement for a senior analytic 

leader at a Pentagon meeting comprised of other senior analytic leaders from various intelligence agencies, 
Fin

spoke up at the meeting and fueled the start of their novel problem-solving and insight. Because of COVID19 workplace occupancy limitations, an analyst was assigned to the midnight shift where, freed of the usual 

distractions and interruptions, the analyst was afforded the time and space to arrive at an insight. It should 

be noted that the free time was not equivalent to Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer’s concept of incubation—i.e., 

not consciously considering the problem—because the time was used to actively think about the problem. 

As an example of drawing on personal life, an analyst listened to a podcast on the way to and from work, and 

information in the podcast led to the analyst’s work-related insight. More examples of unpredictability and 

other insight triggers, as described by the interviewed analysts, are available from the author upon request.

Problem Finding

Analysts described their encounter with the novel problem as one in which they had to figure out how to 

solve the problem. As discussed in the Literature Review, problem-solving is a straightforward process in 

which the problem has been defined for the analyst, the process can be repeated with similar problems, 

and there is an agreed-upon way of solving the problem. The analysts interviewed for this study were not 

faced with problem solving. All the analysts interviewed used problem-finding processes, which are applied 

when the nature of the problem is unclear and/or uncertain, and the framing of the problem does not fit 

with the views of others.

Based on how the analysts described the nature of the uncertainty in their problem finding, their uncertainties can be placed into four broad categories: check assumptions, how things relate, overcome roadblock, 

and sensemaking. The uncertainties in the check assumptions category raised questions about how analysts 

were thinking about a topic. For example, one analyst had initially framed the approach to an issue in one 

way, but began to wonder if a different framing would be better after being exposed to another way. The 

uncertainties in the how things relate category raised questions about possibly relevant factors not previously considered. As an example, an analyst who focused on a foreign country from a political perspective 

wondered if other facets of governing or society would be considered relevant to understanding the activity 

being assessed. The uncertainties of overcome roadblock category raised questions about how to overcome 

externally- or internally-imposed constraints. For example, an analyst had a lot of information to convey 

about a complex topic yet was constrained by space and time limitations. Finally, the uncertainties of the 

sensemaking category raised questions about figuring out an activity when the situation was not clear. As an 

example, an analyst could see that something different was happening between two countries but was not 

sure what was driving the change or how it was emerging.

Problem Type 

Some analysts described specific problems they had not previously experienced, solved, or made significant progress toward solving. These problems were organized into two types: predictions and mysteries. 

Prediction problems were about understanding something that was going to happen or might happen in 

the future. Prediction problems typically sought to answer how or under what conditions will something 
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 42

happen questions about the future. For example, how would an adversary fight? Mystery problems, on the 

other hand, occurred in the present, but they were full of ambiguities and lacked sufficient information to 

solve.195 Mystery problems typically sought to answer why, how, or where questions about something happening in the present. For example, where were the weapons that the adversary was hiding? In both types 

of novel problems, there was no single approach or a priori answer.196

Conflicting Representation

As discussed in the Literature Review, problem representation refers to how the individual understands the 

problem and what approach should be used to solve it. Since the problems that the interviewed analysts 

faced were novel, the analyst’s framing of these problems typically did not fit with the views of others. For 

example, in a prediction problem of “how to find mobile missiles after they leave base,” the analyst represented the problem as conceptual, meaning a different paradigm was needed in order to develop a strategy 

for answering the problem. Others represented the problem as resource dependent, meaning answering the 

problem (i.e., finding the missiles) was dependent on existing collection resources. The analyst’s representation conceived of the prediction problem as constrained by ideas, while the others’ representation conceived 

of the prediction problem as constrained by physical resources. 

For a mystery problem, such as “why are enemies improving their military cooperation,” an analyst framed 

the problem by focusing on the details of what was actually happening at that time, whereas others focused 

on patterns established through historical events. This focus on details in the present led the analyst to see 

evidence that the two countries were establishing closer relations, which the others could not see due to their 

focus on historical patterns. 

For every analyst interviewed, regardless of whether the problem was a prediction or mystery type, how the analyst represented the problem was always different from how it was represented by others. These conflicting representations triggered an awareness that cognitive differences existed in the analyst’s efforts to solve a problem. 

Emergence

Introduction

The “emergence” phase begins after the individual represents the novel problem and starts to work on the 

problem, becoming aware of internal tensions. Tension is the inconsistency between pairs of things that, 

by themselves, are motivating factors for reducing the inconsistencies.197 As an example, an organization 

may create a tension in an employee by requiring its employees to comply with policies and procedures in 

order to produce standardized processes or outcomes while, at the same time, demanding its employees be 

innovative in order to change the status quo. For the employee, this tension between the status quo and 

change will motivate the employee to find a solution that reduces the negative effect of this tension. The 

emergence phase concludes prior to the insight.
Fin

During the study interviews, analysts reflected on experiences that had occurred prior to the novel problems on which they were working. They felt these prior experiences had meaningful aspects that guided 

their navigation toward resolving the tensions of which they became aware as they worked through their 

novel problems. Analysts did not say, however, that they were conscious of the meaning of these past experiences while working on their problems. Although these past experiences were unrelated to the problem at 

hand, an aspect of these past experiences brought forth a combination of emotional and cognitive meaning 

that informed how the analysts thought in the present about moving through the internalized tensions they 

faced. This informing of the present by the past is called priming.198

Internalized Tensions

Each of the analysts interviewed discussed their awareness of multiple internal tensions in the course of 

working on their problems. The analysts discerned a total of 11 types of tensions, which could be associated with either the cognition or emotion dimension (i.e., the dimensions from which insight emerges, 

as noted earlier). Cognitively related tensions occurred in abstractions like the analysts’ thoughts and 

ideas. Emotionally related tensions occurred as a result of the analysts’ actions and perceived observations 

of reactions. The 11 types of internalized tensions the analysts experienced could then be further subdivided into either the individual or social dimension (i.e., the dimensions with whom insight emerges). 

Tensions occurring at the individual level of analysis (e.g., self-related) fell into the individual dimension, 

whereas tensions occurring at the organizational level of analysis (e.g., structure and behavior) fell into 

the social dimension. 

The analysts experienced six types of cognitively related tensions—framing, interpretation, method, theory, 

understanding, and function—of which the first five occurred at the individual level and the last occurred 

at the social level. Analysts experienced five types of emotionally related tensions—articulation of self, 

expectation of self, integrity of self, bureaucracy, and communication with others—of which the first three 

occurred at the individual level and the last two at the social level. Table 8 briefly describes the 11 types 

of internalized tensions experienced by the analysts and where they are placed within the two dimensions. 

In the cognition category at the individual level, framing involves the individual’s recognition of the specific differences between the way one formulates a concept or system to study a problem and the way(s) 

others do. Recall in the “before insight” phase, problem representation was different between the analyst 

and others; in this “emergence” phase, however, the analysts are able to articulate their understanding in 

comparison to how others have framed the problem. As an example, an analyst differentiated between 

having been trained to view international relations from a state actor perspective while others’ views had 

been informed by their training from a constructivist perspective. Interpretation involves the differences 

in meaning and implications that the analyst and others associate with a problem. For example, an analyst 

felt a particular novel problem was an important one, whereas others, while acknowledging the problem, 

felt it was not important. Method involves differences in procedure for accomplishing or approaching a 

problem. For example, an analyst felt that exploring a diversity of ways to represent a problem would 

lead to the most accurate assessment of a problem, but others believed that having a standardized process 
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 44

of representing a problem would be best. Theory involves having been exposed in the past to a theory or 

concept but not being able to extrapolate or apply that concept to a current, real-world situation. For 

example, an analyst was exposed in school to the idea that diversity of perspectives was important but 

was not able to internalize that idea then or apply it until much later. Understanding involves differences 

in what and how data can be developed into knowledge. For example, although an analyst agreed with 

others that large data sets were valuable, that analyst judged the data sets’ value would lessen without an 

understanding of the context surrounding the data or its usage.

Table 8: Internalized Tension Types Within Each Dimension

Internalized Tension

Dimension Dimension Name Description

Cognition

Individual

Framing Recognition of the different ways analysts and others 

formulate a concept or system in order to study a problem

Interpretation The differences in meaning and implications associated 

with a problem

Method The differences in procedure for accomplishing or 

approaching a problem

Theory

Being exposed in the past to a theory or concept but not 

being able to extrapolate or apply it to a real-world situation 

in the present

Understanding The differences in what and how data can be developed 

into knowledge

Social Function Recognition of the differences in how organizational structure, 

process, and/or mission affect views of the problem

Emotion

Individual

Articulation of Self

The differences in the realization that one’s language, 

whether spoken or written, plays an important role in the 

analytic domain

Expectation of Self Recognition that differences in one’s assumptions, values, 

conclusions, etc. have an impact on one’s thinkin

Integrity of Self Recognition of the difference between right and wrong

Social

Bureaucracy Recognition of the different influences that an 

organization’s uniformity and control can have

Communication 

with Others

The differences surrounding communication of analysis 

with others in one’s environment

In the cognition category at the social level, function involves the individual’s recognition of the differences 

in how organizational structure, process, and/or mission affect the views of the problem held by oneself and 

others within one’s social environment. As an example, an analyst who was skilled in the subject matter and 

its process was faced with a technologist at work who was responsible for creating a technology solution for 

the analyst but had no knowledge of the subject matter or its process.
Fin

In the emotion category at the individual level, articulation of self refers to differences in the realization that 

one’s language, whether spoken or written, plays an important role in the analytic domain. For example, 

one analyst reported being able to think divergently before beginning to write an assessment, but once writing began, the thought process turned convergent. Expectation of self involves the individual’s recognition 

that differences in one’s assumptions, values, conclusions, etc. have an impact on one’s own thinking and 

feelings. For example, an analyst professed, as an American, to support cultural assimilation, and could not 

understand how immigrants to America do not want to assimilate. Integrity of self encompasses the individual’s recognition of the differences between right and wrong. For example, an analyst argued to pursue an 

analytic course of action against what that person thought was an appropriate problem, but others said that 

course of action could not be pursued. 

In the emotion category at the social level, bureaucracy involves the individual’s recognition of the different 

ways an organization’s uniformity and control can influence one’s feelings about oneself. For example, an 

analyst felt that revealing a unique methodology in a detailed, transparent way to others at work would 

answer skeptical concerns, while also realizing this would expose a vulnerability that could lead to the 

analyst being discredited in a production system that valued standard product lines. Communicate with 

others refers to differences surrounding the communication of analysis or an analytic product with others, 

and the pressures imposed on the analyst by the social environment. For example, an analyst felt pressure 

from work colleagues to deliver a product by a certain time, while feeling at the same time that it was more 

important to spend whatever time was needed to work on the novel problem. More examples of internalized tensions and other elements of the emergence phase, as described by the interviewed analysts, are 

available from the author upon request.

Priming

Every analyst interviewed reflected on past experiences unrelated to the novel problem they subsequently 

faced, and how these past experiences impacted their progress toward insight. The analysts recounted, on 

average, two or three priming sources from their past that helped them reach insight on their novel problems, leading to the identification in this study of five priming sources: past education experience, past 

family experience, period of residence in a foreign country, past mentor or leader discussion, and past work 

experience. From these sources, the analysts identified seven concepts—or primings—that they felt guided 

their thinking. Like the internalized tensions discussed above, these priming concepts can be organized 

within the cognition and emotion dimensions, then subdivided within the individual and social dimensions.

The analysts experienced five types of cognitively related primings—attending to causality, dealing with 

ambiguity, importance of details, problem strategies, and experiences with mission factors—of which the 

first four occurred at the individual level and the last occurred at the social level. They also identified two 

types of emotionally related primings—having multiple perspectives and awareness of cultural difference—

of which the first occurred at the individual level and the second at the social level. Table 9 briefly describes 

the seven priming concepts and summarizes the analysts’ experience by linking each concept to one or 

more of the five priming sources with triple XXXs. The concepts are discussed in more detail below. 
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 46

Table 9: Priming Concepts and Their Sources Within Each Dimension

Priming

Dimension Dimension Concept/ Source Description Past Education Experience Past Family Experience Period of Residence in Foreign Country Past Mentor or Leader Discussion Past Work Experience 

Cognition

Individual

Attending to Causality

Experience of inquiring, observing, and interpreting cause and effect relationships

XXX XXX

Dealing with Ambiguity

Realization that the human elements in the world, whether internal to an organization or not, are neither binary nor always clear

XXX

Importance of Details

Recognition that in order to understand what is happening, one must look into the foundational elements that drive or contribute to what one sees on the surface

XXX XXX

Problem Strategies

Experience with the importance of having an approach and a methodology to solve a problem

XXX XXX

Social

Experiences with Mission Factors

Knowledge about an organization’s mission and levels of decisionmaking

XXX

Emotion

Individual

Having Multiple Perspectives

Experience of openness, of being able to understand others’ perspectives, as well as one’s own thinking

XXX XXX XXX XXX

Social

Awareness of Cultural Differences

Recognition that multiple cultures may exist within any environment and common attributes may exist across such differences

XXX
Fin

In the cognition category at the individual level, attending to causality involves the individual’s experience 

of inquiring about, observing, and interpreting cause and effect in cognitive relationships. For example, 

when in graduate school, an analyst had studied how environmental factors could trigger outcomes in 

non-environmental (e.g., social or political) situations. Another analyst, whose father taught the game of 

chess, learned as a teenager to always think of the opponent’s next move. Dealing with ambiguity involves 

the individual’s realization that the meaning or purpose of human behavior can be ambiguous because 

that behavior—whether within one’s own organization (i.e., internal) or in the external environment—is 

neither binary (i.e., not black or white) nor always clear (i.e., uncertain and vague). For example, an analyst 

had learned from private sector experience that what is licit can also be used for illicit purposes, so one never 

really knows for sure what is legitimate. Importance of details refers to the individual’s recognition that, to 

understand what is happening, one must look into the foundational elements that drive or contribute to 

what one sees on the surface. As an example, an analyst’s past engineering education supplied the concepts 

and details to think about what it takes to build something. Another analyst’s past work experience provided a deep understanding of the value of databases and how their details can help reduce uncertainty. 

Problem strategies involve the experience that analysts have gained with the importance of having a cognitive 

approach and a methodology to solve a problem. For example, a civilian analyst’s past work experience in 

the military taught the analyst that the first idea that comes into one’s mind may not be the best idea, so it 

behooves one to think and reflect on that original idea. Another analyst’s past education in social science 

provided the flexibility to seek out their own sources and approach to solve problems, because there is no 

one methodology in social science.

In the cognition category at the social level, experiences with mission factors encompasses conceptual knowledge about an organization’s mission and levels of decisionmaking. As an example, a civilian analyst who 

had served in the military understood the needs of decisionmakers, such as mission planners and operators, 

and the role they saw for intelligence.

In the emotion category at the individual level, having multiple perspectives refers to the individual’s experience of openness, which fuels the ability to understand others’ perspectives in addition to one’s own 

thinking and feeling. For example, analysts who have lived in foreign countries reported having gained 

an understanding of local cultural nuances, which gave them insight into how and why people in those 

countries behave the way they do. An analyst’s graduate school education in anthropology taught the value 

of culture, language, and history in understanding a country and its people. An analyst listened to a senior 

general officer speak about “network” as broader than the analyst’s limited perspective, which expanded 

the analyst’s view of what is possible. An analyst’s family experience of playing games, specifically action 

video games, included taking on different roles, and this game-playing engrained how and why people have 

different perspectives.

In the emotion category at the social level, awareness of cultural differences involves the recognition that 

multiple cultures may exist within one’s environment and that people of other cultures can share common 

feelings, beliefs, norms, familial relationships, etc., amid their differences. As an example, an analyst who 

had lived in a foreign country realized that, even though the same language is spoken in several countries, 

the cultures in those countries can be very different.
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 48

Dwell Time

Dwell time refers to two timeframes for measuring analyst engagement with the problem at hand: duration 

and proportion. Duration marks the amount of time during which the analysts held the totality of their novel 

problems in mind, from problem initiation to solution. The duration of the analysts’ insight stories averaged 

almost 16 months, with a standard deviation of about 10 months. There were two outliers: at a 24-hour and 

at a 5-year duration. The vast majority 

of the insight experiences took between 

one to two years to complete. See Figure 

7 for the duration distribution across the 

36 analysts’ insight stories.

The second measure is the proportion of 

time the analysts spent focused on their 

novel problems during the total duration of their insight stories. During their 

insight experiences, most analysts were 

occupied with other tasks and problems, 

which meant they could not devote fulltime attention to their insight story problems. Although proportion data were not 

systematically collected during the study, 

some analysts reported that, on certain occasions, they were able to spend all their work time on an aspect of 

their insight story. A few analysts stated that they thought about their insight story while away from work and 

occupied with tasks at home or during errands. 

Insight

The “insight phase” comes with the realization that one has reached a unique understanding for the first 

time, and it is the terminus of the emergent phase. Every analyst reported multiple insights related to 

the novel problem tackled, with most describing a series of at least three insights in which the latter two 

built upon the first one. The analysts’ descriptions can be organized into five types of insights: attending to details, seeing patterns, explaining complexity, personal assumptions, and organizational dynamics. 

Three are cognitively related insights—attending to details, seeing patterns, and explaining complexity—of 

which the first two occur at the individual level and the last occurs at the social level. The two remaining 

types are emotionally related insights—personal assumptions and organizational dynamics—of which the 

first occurs at the individual level and the second at the social level. Table 10 provides a brief description of 

these five insight types, organized within the cognition-emotion and individual-social dimensions. 

The attending to details category of insight involves the individual’s recognition, through a series of insights, 

that understanding a novel activity requires one to focus on the details of what is happening instead of 

Figure 7. Duration in Years of Analyst’s Insight Story

1

0

2

3

4

5

6

0 5 10 15 20 25

Analyst 1 through 36

Duration In Years

30 35 40
Fin

relying on the conclusions of others. For example, one analyst’s first insight was that focusing on the logistical trail of an adversary informed the analyst about how that adversary would fight. This led to the second 

insight that framing the problem in a work breakdown structure provided a comprehensive approach for 

investigating the logistical trail, followed by the third insight of how data supported the analyst’s understanding of the actual logistical trail. 

Table 10: Types of Insight Within Each Dimension

Dimension Dimension Type Description

Cognition

Individual

Attending to Details Recognition that understanding novel activity requires a 

focus on the details of what is happening

Seeing Patterns

Realization that it is hard to recognize a new pattern, 

especially when others do not recognize that pattern as 

visible or correct

Social Explaining Complexity Explaining developments and making causal linkages for 

the consumption of consumers

Emotion

Individual Personal 

Assumptions

Taking the perspective of others to understand how others 

think and why one’s own perspective is similar or different

Social Organizational 

Dynamics

Becoming aware of the organizational politics and agendas 

of an organization, which may make “speaking truth to 

power” difficult

The seeing patterns category of insight refers to the realization that it can be hard to recognize a new pattern 

between activities or events exists, especially when others do not acknowledge that pattern as visible or correct. For example, an analyst’s first insight was that paying attention to new information created the sense 

that something different was happening. This fueled the recognition that anomalies meant a new pattern 

may be emerging (second insight), then the realization that seeing patterns gave the analyst confidence in 

this judgment (third insight). Both attending to details and seeing patterns are cognitive and experienced 

at the individual level.

The explaining complexity category of insight encompasses explaining developments and making causal 

linkages for the consumption of intelligence consumers. For example, an analyst’s first insight was that 

visually correlating disparate activities was a helpful way to frame and understand the larger picture. From 

this came the second insight that attention was not being paid to the treaties established between countries due to a focus on military threats, and the third insight that small things—such as a treaty, according 

to the analyst—can have a large, strategic impact. Explaining complexity is cognitive and experienced at 

the social level.

The personal assumptions category of insight involves adopting others’ perspectives in order to understand 

what others think and why one’s own perspective is similar or different. For example, an analyst recognized 

the great importance of identity in understanding the people of a foreign country (first insight), followed 
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 50

by the realization that Americans might not understand the logic behind the decisions made by people from a foreign country, leading to American frustration (second insight). The analyst concluded that 

understanding a foreign country’s culture and history was critical to understanding its people’s behavior 

(third insight). Personal assumptions are largely emotional and experienced at the individual level.

The organizational dynamics category of insight refers to becoming aware of the organizational politics and 

agendas of the analyst’s organization, which may make “speaking truth to power”—or sharing unwelcome 

assessments with those more senior—difficult. For example, by using proxy—or indirect—information, 

one analyst determined developments about an adversarial group (first insight). However, the analyst’s leadership was quick to dismiss the analyst’s methodology and intelligence assessment (second insight), leading 

to pressures imposed by the analyst’s organization that impaired the analytic process (third insight). Organizational dynamics are largely emotional and experienced at the social level. More examples of the five 

categories of insight, as described by the interviewed analysts, are available from the author upon request.

After Insight

The “after insight” phase, which follows the analyst’s insights, includes resistance and mitigation, and solution. Not all analysts experienced resistance to their insights, but most did. The reasons for resistance can 

be grouped into four categories: experts do not agree, leadership concerns, organizational politics, and too 

much work required. All analysts arrived at solutions or made progress toward a solution to the problem 

they initially addressed. Four categories of solutions reached by the analysts can be discerned: conceptual, 

event-related, international politics, and weapons-related. 

Resistance and Mitigation

Some analysts experienced resistance to their insights because other analysts, who were considered experts 

on the topic, did not believe the analysts’ insights; the experts were loath to change their assessments of the 

problem. For example, in one analyst’s encounter, the experts were firm that nothing was changing when 

faced with the analyst’s insight that a new trend was emerging. The analyst mitigated this resistance by providing details that justified the trend-change insight. See Table 11 for brief descriptions of the four reasons 

for resistance experienced by the analysts in this study.

Other analysts experienced resistance from leadership concerns about the organizational mission, responsibility, and reputation, which were expressed directly to the analyst. For example, leadership in an organization that expected high-confidence assessments judged one analyst’s insight-based assessment to have too 

low a confidence level to be accepted. The analyst mitigated leadership resistance by explaining the fairly 

unique methodology used in a readily understandable way.

A third reason for resistance to analyst insight was organizational politics and agendas due to either vertical hierarchical tensions or horizontal competition, which were acknowledged by many members of the 
Fin

organization as a norm. For example, one analyst focused on a problem and experienced insights only to 

be confronted by analysts from another part of the organization claiming the analyst’s division did not 

have responsibility for the issue. The analyst mitigated this resistance by seeking the support of leadership 

who defended the analyst’s details and logical approach to the other division’s leadership. 

Table 11: Reasons for Resistance

Reasons for Resistance Description

Experts do not agree Other analysts who are considered experts about a topic do not believe an 

analyst’s insight because these experts firmly believe their assessment 

remains true

Leadership concerns A leader’s concerns about the organizational mission, responsibility, and 

reputation are expressed directly by the leader to the analyst

Organizational politics The organizational politics and agendas due to either vertical hierarchical 

tensions or horizontal competition, acknowledged by many members of the 

organization as a norm

Too much work required Reaction by others that the insight’s consequences would create too much work 

for them

A fourth source of resistance to analyst insight came from other analysts or managers who thought that 

the consequences of the analyst’s insight would create too much work for them. For example, insight 

led an analyst to propose a different problem-solving model that would require software and hardware 

development, as well as an increase in staffing of skilled professionals. The analyst mitigated resistance to 

investing in the new model by seeking outside support from other IC agencies. In this case, even though 

the analyst wrote proposals for the other agencies, the model was not fully funded. More examples of the 

four categories of resistance and respective mitigation efforts, as described by the analysts interviewed for 

this study, are available from the author upon request.

Solution

As noted above, the insights reached by the interviewed analysts fueled four types of solutions: conceptual, event-related, international politics, and weapons-related. Examples of conceptual solutions 

include using fiction for imagining the future and producing a guidebook to help team members understand a difficult concept. Event-related solutions include assessments that particular events would or 

would not occur or that the significance of these events was high or low. Countries establishing new 

or deeper relationships provide an example of the international politics type of solution. Examples of 

weapons-related solutions include locating weapons or developing fresh approaches to locate weapons. 

More examples of the four categories of solutions, as shared by the analysts, are available from the 

author upon request.
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 52

Sustained Benefit

During the study interviews, the analysts discussed the benefits they still enjoyed from their past insight 

experiences, reflecting on how today they viewed their experiences from an emotional and cognitive perspective, and from an individual and social perspective. Emotional benefits refer to the long-term effects 

of the insight experience on individual emotional maturity and on one’s development operating in a social 

environment. Cognitive benefits, on the other hand, are the long-term effects of the insight experience on 

one’s intellectual capacity and on one’s contributions to others within the organization.

Many of these benefits have been life- or career-long, and almost all reflect insight experiences that occurred 

years before this study. Collectively, the analysts described seven emotional benefits that can be divided 

between the individual level—i.e., challenge myself, confidence in myself, effect of emotion, integrity, 

openness, and personal satisfaction—and the social level—i.e., dialogue triggers my thinking. The seven 

cognitive benefits described by the analysts can also be divided between the individual level—i.e., career 

effect, new realizations, and a systems approach—and the social level—i.e., asking big questions, knowledge of constraints, customer relations, and ideas: knowing where they originate. Table 12 briefly describes 

these beneficial impacts, organized within the emotion-cognition and individual-social dimensions, with 

examples provided further below.

Emotion

At the individual level, analysts reflected in the interviews on how their insight experience has benefited 

their personal development as intelligence analysts. The challenge myself benefit reflects personal growth in 

no longer being afraid to question or confront oneself or others. For example, an analyst has grown better 

able to challenge others without fear of retribution for thinking differently about a topic. The confidence 

in myself benefit captures how the insight experience has given the analyst a certain power over their circumstances. As an example, an analyst has grown more self-assured through resolving issues. The effect of 

emotion benefit describes the recognition that emotion seeps into discourse, even when such discourse is 

expected to be based on reason. One analyst has realized that, in analytic debates, emotionally based attitudes can arise from personality traits or conflicts or from the perceived need to defend one’s reputation.

The integrity benefit relates to upholding principles on which one acts and behaves, instead of operating 

from a transactional perspective. From the insight experience, an analyst has learned that one must stand 

up for one’s judgments even when confirmation of one’s position does not come until years later. The 

openness benefit reflects the mental flexibility derived from diverse experiences, fostering the ability to hold 

multiple views while considering the value of each view. For example, one analyst embodied this benefit 

through experience in the military, government, and private sector. This diversity of experience has granted 

the analyst different lenses through which to understand how people can frame issues in multiple ways. 

The personal satisfaction benefit addresses the analyst’s belief that one’s insight experience has been a major 

contributing factor to having a fulfilling professional life as an analyst. One analyst described the insight 

experience as providing an understanding at a deep and emotional level of the significance of one’s work. 
Fin

Table 12: Sustained Benefits from Insight Experience

Sustained Benefit from Insight Experience

Dimension Dimension Specific Impact Description 

Emotion

Individual

Challenge myself Not being afraid to question and/or confront oneself 

or others

Confidence in myself The insight experience has given one a certain power 

over one’s circumstances

Effects of emotion Recognition that emotion seeps into discourse, even when 

such discourse is expected to be based on reason

Integrity

Upholding principles on which one’s self and others 

can act and behave, instead of operating from a 

transactional perspective

Openness

Mental flexibility derived from a diversity of experience 

and the ability to hold multiple views and consider the 

value of each

Personal satisfaction

Belief that one’s insight experience gives one an 

understanding at a deep and emotional level about the 

significance of what one does

Social Dialogue triggers my 

thinking

When in conversation with others, listening to others can 

cause one’s own thinking to evolve

Cognition

Individual

Career effect Realization that the insight experience has had a direct 

causal influence on the trajectory of one’s career

New realizations

Recognition of activities, values, or behaviors that 

have become fully or vividly internalized in oneself, 

whereas prior to the insight experience, they were only 

abstract notions

Systems approach

The consideration of as many factors as possible—

including space and time, as well as causes and effects—

when trying to understand a situation. Synonyms for this

benefit are full spectrum approach, work breakdown 

structure approach, and new assessment approach

Social

Asking big questions

How a specific question on one’s mind can be transformed 

and asked so that it has value and meaning for everyone 

in a given environment

Knowledge of 

constraints

A positive factor through the realization that, although 

individuals, groups, or an organization can constrain one’s 

ability to explain a complex situation in understandable 

terms, having an outsider explain the situation can help

Customer relations

Experience of interacting with customers outside of the 

intelligence-producing domain, including policymakers, 

operational commanders, and planners

Ideas: Knowing where 

they originate

One’s expanded awareness that external factors may 

facilitate or thwart new ideas, and that one’s self is not 

the only source of new ideas
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 54

At the social level, the dialogue triggers my thinking benefit involves the awareness that listening to others, 

when in conversation with them, can cause one’s own thinking to evolve. For example, an analyst reported 

that listening to other perspectives has helped to make new connections in the analyst’s mind. 

Cognition

At the individual level, the career effect benefit is the analyst’s realization that the insight experience has 

had a direct causal influence on the trajectory of the analyst’s career. For example, an analyst reflected 

that a 10-year-old insight experience has been the most impactful situation in the analyst’s career. The 

new realizations benefit involves the recognition of activities, values, or behaviors that have become fully 

or vividly internalized in oneself, whereas prior to the insight experience, they were abstract notions. For 

example, an analyst has come to a deep understanding that intelligence and national security efforts are the 

price of freedom, even when these efforts have horrible personal consequences. The analysts described the 

systems approach benefit in a number of ways, including such synonyms as full spectrum approach, work 

breakdown structure approach, and net assessment approach. The analysts consistently cited the need to 

consider as many factors as possible—such as time and space, as well as causes and effects—when trying to 

understand a situation. An analyst, who had more or less taken available information at face value prior to 

the insight experience, has adopted the practice of looking to see what else is going on beyond the obvious. 

At the social level, the asking big questions benefit refers to how a specific question on an analyst’s mind can 

be reframed by the analyst so that it has value and meaning for everyone within the analyst’s organization. 

As an example, an analyst who typically reports on the locations of military units has introduced broader 

questions about why and how these military units are behaving as detected. The knowledge of constraints

benefit may initially appear to be negative, but the analysts reflected upon it as a positive gain from their 

insight experience. One analyst, for example, came to realize that the group had constrained its own ability 

to explain a complex situation in terms that anyone could understand; however, if someone from outside 

the group was introduced to the situation, that person could help explain it. The customer relations benefit 

involves the experience of interacting with customers outside of the intelligence-producing domain, e.g., 

policymakers, operational commanders, and planners. For example, one interviewee had thought of an 

analyst as analogous to a delivery person, but the insight experience has led this person to realize how much 

power analysts have even though hierarchically or by seniority, they formally do not. The ideas: knowing 

where they come from benefit encompasses the analyst’s expanded awareness of factors that may facilitate 

or thwart new ideas, and that one’s self is not the only source of new ideas. For an example of the former, 

one analyst experienced insight arising from the ability to reduce and, in some circumstances, eliminate 

ambiguities in the environment and subject matter. The analyst has realized that only through clarity can 

insight be achieved. More examples of the 14 types of emotional and cognitive benefits as a result of the 

analysts’ insight experiences are available from the author upon request. 
Coclu

Conclusion and Implications

The results of this study of 36 intelligence analysts, recognized by their supervisors as having achieved 

insight at some point in their careers, illustrate the commonalities and differences of their insight experiences—both with one another and with the insight standards outlined in the Literature Review. This section will briefly compare the IC analysts’ insight journeys, drawing on the phases shown earlier in Figure 

6, with the literature’s concepts and models. Although there are similarities between this study and the 

literature’s key information processing theories of insight and creativity, shown in Figures 1 and 2, there 

are major differences. This section will close with the implications of this study for fostering insight in the 

Intelligence Community. 

Insight Antecedents: Triggering Factors

Unpredictability

Interestingly, the insight stories of the 36 intelligence analysts interviewed for this study showed a distinction from the literature’s description of the phases of insight at the very start of the process. Although 

unpredictability has been discussed in the creativity literature as part of the actual insight or discovery, 

unpredictability instead occurred during the opening phase of problem initiation in the IC analyst study 

and sheds light on the notorious difficulty of predicting insight.199 For example, Ohlsson describes the 

difficulties in predicting insight as linked to not knowing one or more of the following: the experience or 

knowledge already available to the individual; the nature of the individual’s cognitive processes; what sort 

of rules the individual has used to interpret and understand aspects about the situation under consideration, i.e., problem representation; what is in the individual’s long-term memory and the pathways that 

connect such memories to consciousness; what strategy the individual is using when initially encountering 

the problem; what mental or affective capabilities the individual has for changing the problem representation; and the individual’s ability to extrapolate from the insight into the future, where the final solution is 

realized.200 This list of gaps does not include unpredictability during the problem initiation phase.

To some degree, however, being able to take advantage of unpredictability is consistent with the writings 

of Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer and with Sadler-Smith’s expansion of Wallas on “preparation” within the 

creative process.201 If one interprets preparation more broadly than subject matter expertise, then one can 

extend the phenomenon of preparation to include being open to taking advantage of unpredictability and 

chance, as the IC analysts were during the insight trigger phase of their insight journeys. 
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 56

Problem Finding

Looking at the problems that triggered the IC analysts’ insight journeys, their complex, novel problems 

put their journeys closer to those of the eminent scientists featured in many of the literature accounts 

than might have been anticipated. As earlier recounted, Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer describe their 

theory of creativity—which includes insight—through two problem strategy paths.202 The “presented 

problem-solving process,” where the problem is well-known and the solution can be easily and quickly 

found, is more common with everyday sort of problems. The “discovered problem-finding process,” 

where the problem itself is ambiguous and not well framed, is more common with revolutionary scientific achievements. The novel problems encountered in this study were not easy and did not fall into 

the category of a presented problem-solving type; all the analysts used the more complex discovered 

problem-finding process.

Both theories of creativity offered by Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer and by Wallas, as reinterpreted by 

Sadler-Smith, have been based on modeling the behavior of individuals that produced revolutionary 

insights like Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution or, in modern day analogies, Nobel Prize and Pulitzer 

Prize winners.203 Intelligence analysts do not fit into that category, however, because intelligence analysis is 

not a career field with the full-time professional expectation of producing creative outcomes. Nonetheless, 

intelligence analysts periodically engage in creative activity and, therefore, fall into Kaufman and Beghetto’s 

“little creativity” category of individuals—not in an everyday creative profession, but periodically engaging 

creatively by demonstrating inquisitiveness, imagination, and freedom of thought.204 This study, therefore, 

provides an understanding of how people—not in the full-time creativity business—are insightful and 

creative because they are motivated by confronting high-stake risks to national security.

Problem Type

Because the IC analysts in this study adopted a problem-finding process for novel problems, they were 

focused on problems for which uncertainty prevailed and there were no single or easy answers, i.e., the 

problems of predicting the future and of explaining mysteries in the present. Although uncertainty 

cannot be eliminated when predicting the future, it may be reduced when solving mysteries about the 

present if more information becomes available to explain the present developments. As suggested by 

Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer and by Wallas, as reinterpreted by Sadler-Smith, one of the factors that 

contributes to the persistence of uncertainty is the volume of information collected and used for intelligence purposes.205 No one can know everything, no one can know when the facts needed will be known, 

and no one can predict how or when to separate the “nuggets” from the chaff.206 In other words, novel 

problems invite multiple answers. Competition of ideas and solutions is a natural consequence when 

facing novelty. 

Not only are the analysts who tackle novel problems also facing inherently the most challenging types of 

problems dealing with uncertainty—predictions and mysteries—these same analysts are the most in need 

of achieving insight. Certainly, policymakers have argued this, in part, in their calls for analytic insight. 
Coclu

As discussed at the beginning of this monograph, the need for insight makes it incumbent upon the IC 

to learn how to enable the insight process—arguably through the cognition-emotion mechanism first 

described by Damasio.207

Conflicting Representations

The intelligence analysts in this study experienced a more nuanced plurality of encounters with inconsistencies—i.e., the differing representations of a problem that can trigger movement toward insight—than 

as outlined in the Literature Review. In both Ohlsson’s and Klein’s theories of insight, as earlier discussed, 

contradictions or cognitive conflict figure prominently in the triggering event that propels one toward 

insight.208 Ohlsson equates cognitive conflict with Festinger’s cognitive dissonance, the individual experience of internal inconsistency that serves as a motivator to resolve that inconsistency.209 Klein also refers 

to contradictions as inconsistencies an individual initially faces that serve as one of three triggers toward 

resolving, or gaining insight about, the problem.210

The IC analysts first encountered inconsistency in a direct and active fashion, experiencing first-hand the 

inconsistency between their view and others’ views. After the analysts represented their novel problems 

and proposed ways to approach the problems to others in their social environment, these others responded 

with different representations of the novel problems, showing they were typically not experiencing these 

problems in the same fresh way as the analysts. For the analyst, this first interaction was the motivational 

trigger to move forward toward insight, in the spirit of Ohlsson’s and Klein’s theories.

The analysts’ second set of inconsistency encounters went beyond Ohlsson and Klein, however, as these 

encounters came after problem representation and can be categorized as indirect, passive, perceptual, and 

individual experiences. Rather than serving as triggers in the general sense of Ohlsson and Klein,211 these 

inconsistencies—called internalized tensions in this monograph’s Findings—initiated the emergence stage 

of insight. Unlike the motivating triggers of cognitive conflict or contradiction mentioned by Ohlsson and 

Klein, which focus on the specific problem being addressed by the individual, internalized tensions represent a diverse set of perceptions located within the individual that extends beyond the initial conflicting 

representations of others. Internalized tensions may also be peripheral to the actual problem that one is 

attempting to solve and to one’s environment.

Insight Emergence: The Insight Journey

The insight journey is a process that, once triggered, begins with the emergent factors of internalized tensions and priming, and then transitions into insight. This study of 36 intelligence analysts who have experienced insight illustrates the relationship between the proximal antecedents of internalized tensions and 

priming and the insight itself. Figure 8 identifies these three phenomena within the creativity framework 

earlier derived from analysis of the insight process shared by the 36 analysts interviewed (see Figure 6. IC 

Analysts’ Insight Process). The study also suggests a set of archetypes of insight outcomes, which can serve 
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 58

as pathways for IC analysts to follow in their quest for insight and for managers of IC analysts to foster, and 

which are discussed below and shown in Figure 9, Archetypes of Insight Outcomes.

Figure 8. Focal Areas Surrounding Insight

Unpredictability

Problem

Finding

Problem

Type

Conflicting

Representations

Priming Resistance

and 

Mitigation

Solution

Sustained

Benefit

Dwell

Time

Phases

Insight Trigger

Emergence

Insight

After Insight

Sustained Benefit

Focal Area

Internalized

Tensions

Insight

Connectedness Between Emergent Factors and Insight

As reported in the Findings, the analysts interviewed for this study were all aware of internalized tensions, 

or inconsistencies. The tensions with which they grappled have been classified into a typology of 11 tension categories and organized across the four intersections of the emotion-cognition and individual-social 

dimensions (see Table 8. Internalized Tension Types Within Each Dimension). Although the set of tension 

categories in this study’s typology is not comprehensive, it probably is representative of what IC analysts 

experience because these analysts share common work environments in national security intelligence organizations and common professional skills.

As noted above in the discussion of the conflicting representation trigger, the literature review revealed no 

mention of tensions beyond the initial trigger phase—probably because the literature conceptualizations 

were derived mainly from analyzing either individuals in “big creativity” professions or critical incidents.212

In the big creativity professions, creative individuals (e.g., Nobel Prize winners) are recognized as the source 

of novelty because they demonstrate unique expertise in a specific subject matter and their expertise provides the foundation for exploring creative solutions. In critical incidents, the activity is not normal (i.e., 

extreme), and the response to the incident is sensemaking (i.e., a backward-looking understanding of what 

has happened). Intelligence analysts, however, are not full-time creative professionals; their insight stories 

reveal their lack of expertise at the start of their journeys to solve a novel problem; and their approaches to 

novel problems are forward-looking. 
Coclu

Priming, or past experience that is unrelated to the novel problem yet impacts the individual’s progress in the 

present toward insight, both corresponds to and moves beyond the literature reviewed. Unlike the other emergent factor of internalized tensions, priming is unique to the individual and so is not a collective experience; 

nonetheless, this study’s findings suggest that priming is responsive to internalized tensions. For example, one 

of the analysts interviewed recounted his experience of internalized tension as the expectation—called “expectation of self”—that men do not cry in patriarchal-based societies; however, both he and men in another 

society cried during a particular somber event. The analyst’s priming drew on his past education and family 

experiences that led him to understand that similarities can occur among differences—called “multiple perspectives”—which is a mark of openness. This priming effect on internalized tensions led the analyst to see that the 

reverse relationship—differences can occur among similarities—also held. He ultimately arrived at a profound 

personal insight that transformed his interpretation of the battlefield: good people can do bad things if their 

needs are not met. This insight had an immediate positive effect by improving his understanding of complex 

behaviors in a foreign land, which deepened his analysis and value to operational decisionmakers in the field.

This interaction between internalized tensions and priming is consistent with Bargh and Chartrand’s research, 

as well as work by U.S. cognitive psychologist John Mace, which shows that memories from one’s past can 

mediate the present.213 The connectedness of priming and internalized tensions as emergent factors is also 

consistent with Damasio’s and Frijda’s research that emotionally meaningful memories guide an individual’s 

decision in the present;214 with Wallas’s and Sadler-Smith’s research on the intimations phenomenon, which is 

the mechanism that connects emotions with cognition;215 and with Minas et al.’s empirical results that priming supports insight and creativity.216

This study expands beyond the literature by contributing analysis of the role priming plays as an emergent 

factor in insight for everyday workers. Priming has previously been researched as a demand signal in the 

individual’s past that has an effect on that individual’s future, but the findings of this study suggest that the 

opposite can occur—that is, the demand signal causes an individual in the present to search for a past priming experience in that individual’s memory. Having a stockpile of diverse experiences and knowledge from 

which to draw memories, as intelligence analysts and others not in full-time creative positions generally 

have, facilitates a robust priming capacity that can be exploited when the unpredictable need arises in the 

present to solve a novel problem. 

Regarding the manifestation of insight from the emergent factors of internalized tensions and priming, the 

study findings again both supported and expanded upon the literature. The IC analysts’ reported experience of multiple insights, building upon previous insights, demonstrates Ohlsson’s idea that individuals 

move through partial insights into a final insight.217 The implications in practice are extremely important if 

the IC is to facilitate insightful analysis, as an initial “insight” should be considered only the first of more 

to come. Do not assume the analyst is finished after solving a problem with a first insight.

The study findings also indicate that insights span across all four intersections of the emotion-cognition 

and individual-social dimensions. More importantly, whereas the literature describes the “insight” stage 

as an individual phenomenon only,218 this study reveals that insight can occur as both an individual and a 

social phenomenon.
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 60

Archetypes of Insight Outcomes

The study’s findings on the interconnectedness of internalized tensions, priming, and insight suggest a set 

of four unique archetypes of insight outcomes when solving novel problems, shown in Figure 9, which 

can serve as pathways for IC analysts to follow in their quest for insight. The four archetypes, discussed 

in greater detail below, are understanding of novel problems, effective communication of complexity with 

others, self-reflection and greater awareness, and navigation of organizational politics and agendas. Displayed within each archetype are discrete types of emergent factors (i.e., internalized tensions and priming) 

and their resultant insight(s), drawn from the IC analysts’ insight stories. The archetypes are arrayed across 

the intersections of the emotion-cognition and individual-social dimensions, based on differing approaches 

to the problems and insight outcomes. 

Figure 9. Archetypes of Insight Outcomes With Whom Insight Emerges

Individual’s Social

Environment

Individual

From Whence Insight Emerges

Navigation of Organizational Politics 

and Agendas

Effective Communication of Complexity 

With Others

Self-Reflection and Greater Awareness Understanding of Novel Problems

Internalized Tension

• Bureaucracy

• Communicate with others

Priming

• Cultural differences

Insight

• Organizational dynamics

Internalized Tension

• Function

Priming

• Mission factors

Insight

• Explaining complexity

Internalized Tension

• Articulation of self

• Expectation of self

• Integrity of self

Priming

• Multiple perspectives

Insight

• Personal assumptions

Internalized Tension

• Framing

• Interpretation

• Method

• Theory

• Understanding

Priming

• Attending to causality

• Dealing with ambiguity

• Importance of details

• Problem strategies

Insight

• Attending to details

• Seeing patterns

Emotion Cognition

4 2

3 1

In cell 1, the cognition-individual connection among internalized tensions, priming, and insight suggests 

an outcome in which the individual gains a deeper understanding of the novel problem at hand. The internalized tensions of framing, interpretation, method, theory, and understanding are cognitive ways in which the 

individual may have considered the problem. The priming types of attending to causality, dealing with ambiguity, importance of details, and problem strategies are concepts that the individual may have brought forward 
Coclu

from past experience and that appear to contribute to resolving tensions. The insight categories of attending 

to details and seeing patterns fit into the individual’s conceptualization of solving the novel problem.

In cell 2, the cognition-social connection suggests an outcome in which the individual effectively communicates complex ideas with others in the individual’s organization or external to the organization. The 

internalized tension of function is the individual’s conceptualization of how mission-related tasks and organizational missions fit into solving the problem. The priming of mission factors from past experiences 

appears to provide knowledge about how organizations function. The insight category of explaining complexity fits into the individual’s challenge of translating the novel problem’s complexity to an audience that 

is not entrenched in the details as the individual is.

In cell 3, the emotion-individual connection suggests a type of insight outcome that has the character of 

self-reflection resulting in greater self-awareness. The tensions of articulation of self, expectation of self, and 

integrity of self are individual and affective-related experiences (i.e., feelings and emotions). The priming 

of multiple perspectives from a diversity of past experiences appears to give the individual self-awareness 

about one’s relationship to others and also openness to considering other viewpoints. The insight of personal assumptions represents the individual’s awareness of, and reflection on, one’s assumptions about the 

novel problem.

In cell 4, the emotion-social connection suggests an outcome in which the individual is able to navigate 

politics and agendas across cultures, whether the culture is that of the individual’s employing organization 

and related organizations, or the culture of people in the world whom the individual’s organization studies 

from a mission perspective. The tensions of bureaucracy and communicate with others are the individual’s 

affective-related experiences within the organizational space. The priming of cultural differences refers to the 

individual’s past experiences of living in foreign countries, providing the individual with an understanding 

of the different ways in which other cultures operate. The insight of organizational dynamics represents the 

recognition gained on the politics and agendas that fuel the way organizations operate.

Dwell Time

As was the case with insight antecedents, or triggers, the time that the interviewed analysts spent focused 

on their novel problems differed from the literature’s descriptions of dwell time. In theories of creativity 

by Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer and by Wallas, as reinterpreted by Sadler-Smith, incubation is seen as 

an important emergent factor for insight. For “little creativity” professionals (e.g., intelligence analysts), 

however, incubation was not in evidence in this study. In general, experimental studies on incubation have 

produced ambiguous and inconsistent results.219 An experiment on incubation conducted by Australian 

psychologist Sophie Ellwood and colleagues concluded that taking a break from work does not uniformly 

contribute to insight, and the contribution depends on what type of work is accomplished when taking a 

break from the topic problem.220 The most significant time-related discovery from the IC analysts’ insight 

experiences was their overall duration, as shown earlier in Figure 7 (Duration in Years of Analyst’s Insight 

Story). The long timelines over which the analysts worked on their novel problems suggest that analysts 
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 62

using a problem-finding approach where high levels of uncertainty prevail—e.g., prediction and mysteries—cannot be expected to produce insightful solutions or observations in short timeframes of minutes, 

hours, or days, which is consistent with Isaksen and Akkermans’ findings.221 This is especially true when 

multitasking on other problems competes for the analyst’s attention. 

Insight Aftermath

Short-Term Effects

The shift from insight emergence, to insight, and to insight aftermath reflects the change from viewing 

insight as a process to insight becoming a product. Consistent with Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer’s theory 

of creativity, the last step is the elaboration stage: the time when insight is formulated into a knowledge 

product that others hear or read. These products are usually narratives, presented in a discussion or briefing 

with visual effects, or in a written document. 

Most of the analysts interviewed for this study experienced resistance to the insights in their knowledge 

products. As already discussed, most—though not all—challenges were resolved to the satisfaction of the 

analysts because they had, in effect, become experts on the topic they addressed during their dwell time 

spent paying attention to the problem. Analysts “knew their stuff” by the end of their insight journeys, and 

it was just a matter of defending their process leading up to their insight outcomes. 

The insight aftermath is where customers (e.g., policymakers) join the process, by viewing the product and 

generating the need for insightful products. For the customers, insight products are the focal point, and 

that customer framing has focused the IC’s attention on the product.222 Such attention to insight as an outcome is laudable, but—without understanding the process of insight, as well as the organizational climate 

that leads to insightful products—it is equivalent to paying attention to symptoms without understanding 

their source. Understanding the insight process within the IC environment is needed to enable an implementation strategy that will lead to more consistently delivered insightful products. 

Long-Term Effects

The long-term effects of the analyst’s insight experience—the emotional and cognitive benefits mentioned 

in Table 12 (Sustained Benefits from Insight Experience)—provide further motivation for the IC to take a 

proactive stance for greater understanding of the insight process. From an emotional perspective, for example, the benefit of openness (i.e., an individual’s mental flexibility) cannot be understated. National security 

specialist Uri Bar-Joseph and social psychologist Arie Kruglanski have discussed open-mindedness as an 

important antecedent to the consideration of alternative interpretations or hypotheses.223 When analysts are 

not open-minded, intelligence failures can occur. In his lessons-learned study of intelligence failures from 

the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq weapons of mass destruction case, U.S. political scientist Robert Jervis 

has concluded that a lack of openness contributed to the following problems: inferences being taken for 
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granted; over- and under-emphasis on specific parts of evidence; new information that supported the existing viewpoint inadvertently reinforcing that viewpoint; and the challenge of understanding how inferences 

are based on assumptions that are difficult, if not impossible, to disprove.224 

From a cognitive perspective, the benefits that the analysts gained from their insight experience went 

beyond themselves and extended to the organization. For example, their experiences with intelligence 

customers shifted the focus from the analyst and production to how the organization could best meet the 

needs of the customer.225 Learning this lesson typically can only be accomplished by experiencing the analyst-customer interaction; the concept is difficult to internalize if consumed only as a theory.

Implications

At least 12 implications can be drawn from this study on insight in individuals who are not in full-time 

creative professions—e.g., intelligence analysts—who often deal with novel problems. These implications 

provide a foundation on which to build future research into the insight process as experienced by IC analysts and to develop recommendations for the IC to adopt that would foster the pursuit of insight and the 

production of insightful analysis.

First, because of unpredictability at the beginning of the process, the resultant inability to predict if and 

when an individual will experience insight also raises the question of whether and to what degree an individual can be tasked with initiating the insight process, with the expectation of significant results. The study 

made it clear that analysts must be mentally prepared and emotionally brave to be able to exploit such 

unpredictable opportunities. If order and control are valued by an organization that also seeks insightful 

analysis, then leaders could create the time and space for the uncontrollable nature of insight to emerge 

because its initiation falls within the realm of unpredictability.226

Second, regarding the role of leadership in organizations where order and control are emphasized, asking 

or telling employees and first-line supervisors to change in order to create time and space for insight—

without the leaders themselves changing—might fail to achieve the goal of becoming a creative organization.227 Leaders who interact with employees on a daily basis influence their perceptions, feelings, and 

performance,228 and the leadership role in enabling insightful work cannot be overstated. Leaders not only 

have direct influence over their organizational climate, they also have important indirect influences over 

management practices, policies and procedures, and mission and strategy—to name a few.229

Third, the problems faced were novel to the analysts, they were ambiguous, and their solutions were not 

known to the analysts or others. Rather than applying the problem-solving process—for well-known problems with easily found solutions—individuals who face a novel problem should adopt the problem-finding 

process. In addition, analysts should not be constrained by the existing literature’s theoretical frameworks 

for creativity, which do not fit the process for individuals who are not in full-time creative professions. 

Most intelligence analysts, like most knowledge producers, jump from one problem to the next, and their 

ability to control their focus on a novel problem is often in the hands of others, whether through customer 
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 64

demands or management priorities or both. This study has upended the idea that insight can only occur by 

prepared minds;230 in fact, as seen in Table 6 (Timing of Insight Stories in Analysts’ Careers), many insight 

stories came early in an analyst’s tenure when the analyst had the least amount of knowledge.

Fourth, the plethora of insight stories from experiences early in the analysts’ careers or assignments suggests the importance of experiencing insight early—perhaps when one is more open—rather than hoping 

it occurs later. March observes a learning tension between doing things the organization does on a regular 

basis (i.e., its recognized capabilities) and doing new and different things, which he describes as the difference between exploiting what is known and exploring the unknown.231 If analysts do not get an early taste 

of exploring the unknown, then as they advance in tenure, they will likely “...adjust to an organizational 

code before the code can learn from them.”232 In other words, without the early experience of insight while 

still a new organizational member, analysts may become less likely to take risks as they enter the unknown, 

reducing the likelihood of being insightful as they mature in tenure.

Fifth, as a result, insight is not just nice to have or needed because policy says so. Insight is a fundamental 

and critical success factor for the IC writ large. Incorporating insight and creativity into the analytic process 

is not optional. This study of 36 IC analysts’ insight experiences strongly suggests that framing and solving 

novel problems of prediction and mystery types requires insight. One can argue these are the most important 

types of problems that intelligence analysts and agencies should solve.233 The need for insight makes it even 

more imperative to understand how insight emerges and from whence it emerges, as suggested by this study.

Sixth, the study shows resistance to be a common phenomenon in the IC environment. Conflicting representations are the cognitive differences espoused by others when analysts offer their views on novel problems. 

These cognitive conflicts—whether antecedent or consequent—are good for the analyst and the organization 

to debate because they are an organic source of opportunity and learning about novel problems. While intellectual debate may rattle organizational politics and agendas, it behooves managers and analysts alike to resist 

avoiding or squashing them and to recognize the important role of dialogue, trust, and psychological safety.234

Seventh, the three phenomena of internalized tensions, priming, and insight (see Figure 8. Focal Areas Surrounding Insight) are experienced and connected through time—albeit in a nonlinear fashion—and are indicative of the phenomenon of temporal complexity.235 The internalized tensions experienced in the present draw 

upon primed feelings and concepts from the past, which then contribute to insight in the analyst’s immediate 

future (as part of the effort to solve a novel problem). This connection across time is manifested organically 

within the individual. Hopefully, this internal connection can provide a useful scaffold on which analysts can 

frame their understanding of novel problems they are trying to solve. The idea that the present is linked with 

the past, which then guides one’s approach into the future, does not suggest, however, that the future is predetermined. Rather, analysts should appreciate the following: the present does not stand alone as its path has been 

shaped by the past; history does not stand alone as it shapes the present; and the future does not mysteriously 

appear out of nowhere, setting aside the existence of unpredictable or random factors in any specific present. 

Eighth, as noted in the Literature Review, various scholars have recommended that individuals, leadership, 

and organizations need a creativity climate to foster creativity and, by implication, to be insightful. This 
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study’s findings point to powerful emotional and cognitive benefits achieved as a consequence of pursuing 

insight. The question for future research is how can a community or organization design an approach to 

enable insight and creativity that achieves the kinds of powerful benefits revealed in this study? 

Ninth, many public and private academic institutions provide undergraduate and graduate education programs in intelligence analysis, and their graduates seek employment as analysts in intelligence agencies. 

Some of these programs have a formal academic linkage with the IC’s National Intelligence University 

through the Intelligence Community Centers for Academic Excellence (IC CAE). Familiarizing faculty 

members from these IC CAE programs, as well as non-members, on the process of insight as it relates to 

intelligence analysis might help these faculty identify students whom they would recommend for recruitment into intelligence agencies.

Tenth, further regarding recruitment, the benefits of an insight experience, as outlined in Table 12 (Sustained Benefits from Insight Experience), provide a variety of possible indicators that recruiters could use 

to evaluate candidates for entry into the intelligence analysis field. Similarly, attributes that are associated 

with insight triggers such as problem-finding behaviors (see Table 7. Summary of Insight Trigger Factors)—including checking assumptions, understanding how things relate, how to overcome roadblocks, 

and proficiency with sensemaking—can provide additional indicators of a prospective candidate’s potential 

to pursue successful insight journeys and make valuable contributions to the organization.

Eleventh, an individual or organization pursuing insight is not limited to the four archetypes of insight outcomes outlined in Figure 9. These archetypes not only may occur separately or combined within an individual tackling any one novel problem, but also can manifest in various ways across different individuals in 

separate or combined fashions. The latter suggests the potential for members of a team that is collectively 

focused on a novel problem to combine insights. Because each individual in a team may participate in the 

insight process and exhibit one or more insight outcome archetypes, managing team insight and team creativity will be a complex leadership task. For example, the leader of a team striving to solve a novel problem 

would be wise to select team members who contribute different perspectives.236

Last, the IC needs to shift its policy orientation to achieving insight outcomes. Not only will the internal intelligence analytical process suffer until it does, but also there is the danger that a persistent lack of 

understanding of the insight process will only foster uncertainty in customers.237 The irony is that, while 

one of the main functions of intelligence is to reduce uncertainty,238 the lack of understanding of the insight 

process by the IC actually increases uncertainty. The IC needs to improve its understanding of the insight 

and creativity processes, with the long-term goal of fostering a climate that enables such processes. 

Limitations

Ideally, a study of individual insight experiences among those not working in full-time creative professions 

would include observations of real-life conditions in the field, but many challenges make that approach 

impractical for a time-constrained research project. Where such a field approach has been successful,239 the 
IN PURSUIT OF INSIGHT: THE EVERYDAY WORK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 66

focal point was a team or project, not an individual, and the insight effort studied was known in advance 

and focused on efforts generating creative solutions to novel problems. The work environment of intelligence analysts does not afford foreknowledge of when an individual insight journey will begin.

As a result, the author selected a retrospective approach based on interviews regarding past experiences 

with insight for this study. Keeping in mind that this method may have limitations such as memory recall 

and accuracy, the phenomenological approach used here meets the spirit of Wallas’s and Sadler-Smith’s recommendations to examine many individuals in order to gain deeper access into the process of insight and 

creativity. Admittedly, this study completed far fewer interviews than the hundreds Wallas recommended.240 The key difference, however, is that Wallas (1926) and his successors focused on the experiences of 

well-known and recognized insightful and creative thinkers. This study has focused instead on the everyday 

working person, whose insight experiences have not been well-studied.

With regard to the theorized incubation phenomenon, discussed in the Literature Review, most analysts 

interviewed did not have the luxury of thinking about the problem continuously throughout their insight 

story without the interruptions of other tasks, whether on-duty or off-duty. Moreover, data were not systematically collected on their off-duty thought patterns or on their experiences at work when tackling a 

different problem and then reengaging with the original problem. 

As far as generalization, which is always a key question in qualitative studies, the findings should be generalizable 

to populations with similar analytic tasks. Even though the following populations have different contexts, they 

share equivalent analytic tasks and so this study could serve as motivation for future research on related analytic groups: law enforcement intelligence, military intelligence, and business competitive intelligence. Another 

area for future research would be to compare analysts having insightful experiences and analysts who are not 

successful because insight did not emerge. Such a study may provide additional factors on barriers to insight. 

Conclusion

This study has asked the question: how does insight emerge when solving novel problems? The findings 

show that insight emerges within a creativity process consisting of four phases. The first phase is the triggering of the insight process, which includes the existence of unpredictability; the application of a problem-finding approach instead of the more simplistic problem-solving approach; a focus on prediction- and 

mystery-type novel problems; and the eventual intellectual disagreement of different representations of the 

novel problem. The second phase is the emergence of internalized tensions in the present, which are mediated by priming (i.e., past, and typically unrelated, experiences that have emotional and cognitive meaning 

and that help resolve the tensions). The third phase is the insight itself, usually accompanied by multiple 

follow-on insights. The fourth phase occurs after the insight when the solution is presented to others, resistance is usually experienced, and mitigation is attempted. 

Insight leads to insightful outcomes, and this study identifies four archetypes of insight outcome resulting from the insight process. These archetypes are framed by the emotion-cognition and individual-social 
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dimensions, as shown in Figure 9 (Archetypes of Insight Outcomes). The four outcomes are an understanding of novel problems; effective communication of complexity with others, self-reflection and greater 

awareness, and navigation of organizational politics and agendas. Additionally, experiencing insight provides 

powerful long-term emotional and cognitive benefits.

This study uses a phenomenological methodology because little, if any, research has been conducted on 

everyday workers like intelligence analysts who, at times, must be creative because they face novel problems. These novel problems can have existential consequences. Because little is known about how this 

population engages in insight and creativity, and because decisionmakers expect this population to be 

insightful and creative, a focus on the phenomena of insight and creativity is appropriate. The study focuses 

on the individual level of analysis because intelligence analysis begins with the individual paying attention 

to a problem, and much of the information processing-related existing literature focuses on the individual. 

This study clearly illustrates emergence as the connection between internalized tensions, priming, and 

insights, but it also raises questions about the mechanisms that causally connect these phenomena. Future 

research may investigate more deeply the relationship between internalized tensions in the present and 

priming experiences from the past, and how the priming experience serves as a mechanism to facilitate resolution of tensions and move the individual toward a new perspective on a novel problem. Additionally, the 

connection between emotion and cognition in solving novel problems—especially by everyday professionals not working in full-time creative work—is evident in this study, more so than in the existing literature. 

Future research may inquire into that connection.

End

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