Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 82A04-1609-CR-1980 | April 25, 2017 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Scott Barnhart

Brooke Smith

Keffer Barnhart, LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Michael Gene Worden

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Dugniqio Forest,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 25, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

82A04-1609-CR-1980

Appeal from the Vanderburgh 

Superior Court

The Honorable Robert J. Pigman, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

82D03-1501-F2-566

Barnes, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 82A04-1609-CR-1980 | April 25, 2017 Page 2 of 9

Case Summary

[1] Dugniqio Forest appeals his conviction and sentence for Level 4 felony 

possession of cocaine. We affirm.

Issues

[2] Forest raises two issues, which we restate as:

I. whether the trial court properly granted the 

State’s request for a continuance pursuant 

to Indiana Trial Rule 4(D); and

II. whether his eleven-year sentence is 

inappropriate.

Facts

[3] In January 2015, Forest was incarcerated in the Vanderburgh County Jail when 

16.23 grams of cocaine were discovered in his cell in a box of cheese crackers. 

The State charged him with Level 2 felony dealing in cocaine and Level 5 

felony trafficking with an inmate. On January 28, 2015, an initial hearing was 

held, and Forest requested a speedy trial. A trial date of March 26, 2015, was 

set. However, on March 20, 2015, Forest requested a continuance of the trial 

because a hold had been placed on him by federal authorities due to pending 

federal gun charges. The trial court vacated the March 2015 trial date. 

[4] On January 26, 2016, Forest renewed his request for a speedy trial, and the trial 

court set the trial date for March 28, 2016. On March 15, 2016, the State filed a 

motion requesting DNA samples and fingerprinting from Forest. The State 
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also requested a continuance of the trial pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 4(D). 

The trial court granted the State’s request over Forest’s objection.1 At an April 

15, 2016 hearing, Forest suggested a trial date of June 5, 2016. The trial court, 

however, set the trial for May 23, 2016, and Forest did not object. On May 20, 

2016, the trial was rescheduled for June 2, 2016. A jury found Forest guilty 

only of the lesser-included offense of Level 4 felony possession of cocaine. The 

trial court sentenced Forest to eleven years in the Department of Correction to 

be served concurrent with his federal sentence. Forest now appeals.

Analysis

I. Criminal Rule 4(D)

[5] Forest argues that the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion for a 

continuance pursuant to Indiana Criminal Rule 4(D). Both the U.S. and 

Indiana Constitutions protect the right of an accused to a speedy trial. U.S. 

Const. amend. VI; Ind. Const. art. 1, § 12. “The speedy-trial right is a 

fundamental principle of constitutional law that has been zealously guarded by 

our courts.” Cundiff v. State, 967 N.E.2d 1026, 1027 (Ind. 2012) (internal 

quotations omitted). Indiana Criminal Rule 4 generally implements the 

constitutional right of an accused to a speedy trial and provides:

If any defendant held in jail on an indictment or an affidavit shall 

move for an early trial, he shall be discharged if not brought to 

trial within seventy (70) calendar days from the date of such 

 

1 We were not provided with a transcript of the March 15, 2016 hearing.
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motion, except where a continuance within said period is had on 

his motion, or the delay is otherwise caused by his act, or where 

there was not sufficient time to try him during such seventy (70) 

calendar days because of the congestion of the court calendar. 

Provided, however, that in the last-mentioned circumstance, the 

prosecuting attorney shall file a timely motion for continuance as 

set forth in subdivision (A) of this rule. Provided further, that a 

trial court may take note of congestion or an emergency without 

the necessity of a motion, and upon so finding may order a 

continuance. Any continuance granted due to a congested 

calendar or emergency shall be reduced to an order, which order 

shall also set the case for trial within a reasonable time.

Ind. Crim. R. 4(B)(1). In Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1038-39 (Ind. 2013), 

our supreme court explained:

Criminal Rule 4(B) presents at least three hurdles at the trial 

court level: First, when a criminal defendant files a motion for a 

speedy trial, the trial court must set the defendant’s case for trial 

within seventy days—which might require, to an extent we 

discuss below—a re-prioritization of its current caseload. 

Second, if the trial court finds it cannot accomplish this 

prioritization and bring the defendant to trial within seventy days 

because of court congestion, it may order a continuance—and 

that finding of congestion is then subject to challenge by way of 

the defendant’s motion for discharge. And third, if the trial court 

orders such a continuance, it still must keep sight of the 

defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial—and Rule 4(B) 

therefore permits the continuance only to the extent that the 

defendant proceeds to trial within a reasonable time after the 

close of the seventy-day window.

[6] Indiana Criminal Rule 4(D), which extends the seventy-day speedy trial 

deadline under certain circumstances, provides:
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If when application is made for discharge of a defendant under 

this rule, the court be satisfied that there is evidence for the state, 

which cannot then be had, that reasonable effort has been made 

to procure the same and there is just ground to believe that such 

evidence can be had within ninety (90) days, the cause may be 

continued, and the prisoner remanded or admitted to bail; and if 

he be not brought to trial by the state within such additional 

ninety (90) days, he shall then be discharged.

[7] Any exigent circumstances may warrant a reasonable delay beyond the 

limitations of Criminal Rule 4. Otte v. State, 967 N.E.2d 540, 545 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2012), trans. denied. “The reasonableness of such delay must be judged in the 

context of the particular case.” Id. “‘Rule 4(D) does not mandate the evidence 

be essential or unique, only that it be unavailable and that the State be entitled 

to present it.’” Wilhelmus v. State, 824 N.E.2d 405, 413 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) 

(quoting Smith v. State, 502 N.E.2d 485, 488 (Ind. 1987)). We review the trial 

court’s decision to grant an extension under Rule 4(D) for an abuse of 

discretion. Smith v. State, 982 N.E.2d 393, 401 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[8] We first address the State’s argument that Forest waived this issue. According 

to the State, Forest did not object to the trial date set during the April 5, 2016 

hearing and did not reassert his objection to the State’s continuance. The State 

also notes that Forest never filed a motion for discharge. We recently addressed 

the conflict in cases dealing with waiver in Criminal Rule 4 arguments. See 

Miller v. State, No. 28A04-1603-CR-634, slip op. at 12-14, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2017). We noted some cases have found waiver when the defendant 

failed to make a motion for discharge, but some cases have found that an 
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objection to the scheduling of a trial date outside the Rule 4 limits was 

sufficient. Id. Similarly, here, Forest did not file a motion for discharge and did 

not object at the time the trial court reset the trial date. He did, however, object 

to the granting of the State’s motion for a continuance pursuant to Rule 4(D). 

Given the current conflicting state of affairs on this question, we will err on the 

side of addressing Forest’s claim of error on the merits. 

[9] Forest withdrew his first motion for a speedy trial and did not renew his speedy 

trial motion until January 26, 2016. On March 4, 2016, the State requested that 

the Indiana State Police test the baggie and the box of cheese crackers for DNA 

and fingerprint evidence. The State Police Laboratory informed the State that it 

would need a minimum of forty-five days to complete its analysis. Shortly 

thereafter, the State filed its motion for a continuance pursuant to Rule 4(D). 

Forest argues that the State should have tested the evidence in the year while he 

was under federal hold and that the State did not request the testing until Forest 

indicated he would challenge the State’s case based on lack of testing. 

[10] In support of his argument, Forest relies on Chambers v. State, 848 N.E.2d 298, 

305 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. In that case, the evidence at issue was a 

lab report that the prosecution did not have in its possession but which had 

been completed six days before the State moved to continue the trial. We 

found that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the motion for 

continuance because the evidence was, in fact, available and the State failed to 

make a reasonable effort to procure it. Here, however, the DNA and 

fingerprint reports were not available at the time of the State’s motion for a 
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continuance. Further, given the withdrawal of his earlier speedy trial request 

and the year-long delay in the case due to federal charges against Forest, we 

cannot say the State’s failure to test the evidence at an earlier time was 

unreasonable. At the time of the State’s motion, the DNA and fingerprint 

evidence was unavailable, and the State was entitled to present it. We cannot 

say that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the State’s motion for a 

continuance, and Forest’s Rule 4 rights were not violated. 

II. Inappropriate Sentence

[11] Forest argues that his eleven-year sentence is inappropriate and that an advisory 

sentence of six years is warranted in this case. Appellate Rule 7(B) provides 

that we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration 

of the trial court’s decision, we find that the sentence is inappropriate in light of 

the nature of the offenses and the character of the offender. When considering 

whether a sentence is inappropriate, we need not be “extremely” deferential to 

a trial court’s sentencing decision. Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2007). Still, we must give due consideration to that decision. Id. We 

also understand and recognize the unique perspective a trial court brings to its 

sentencing decisions. Id. Under this rule, the burden is on the defendant to 

persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence is inappropriate. Childress 

v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). 

[12] The principal role of Rule 7(B) review “should be to attempt to leaven the 

outliers, and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged 

with improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived 
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‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 

2008). We “should focus on the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than 

the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the 

sentence on any individual count.” Id. When reviewing the appropriateness of 

a sentence under Rule 7(B), we may consider all aspects of the penal 

consequences imposed by the trial court in sentencing the defendant, including 

whether a portion of the sentence was suspended. Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 

1023, 1025 (Ind. 2010). 

[13] The nature of the offense is that, while incarcerated, Forest possessed 16.23 

grams of cocaine in his jail cell. The fact that he possessed such a significant 

amount of the drugs in jail is egregious. As for Forest’s character, although he 

was only twenty-one years old, he had an extensive criminal history including a 

2016 federal conviction for felon in possession of a weapon, 2016 misdemeanor 

convictions for battery and resisting law enforcement, two 2014 misdemeanor 

convictions for resisting law enforcement, a 2013 felony conviction for 

possession of cocaine/methamphetamine or a schedule I or II narcotic drug, a 

2013 misdemeanor conviction for operating a motor vehicle without ever 

receiving a license, a 2013 felony conviction for receiving stolen property, and a 

2012 misdemeanor conviction for battery resulting in bodily injury. He also 

had several juvenile adjudications and had been placed in the Indiana Boys 

School. Although Forest alleges that he has been diagnosed with ADHD and 

bipolar disorder, there is no evidence in the record to indicate his diagnosis or 

demonstrate how the alleged diagnosis impacted his actions. Given the large 
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amount of cocaine that Forest possessed and his criminal history, we cannot 

say the sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. 

Conclusion

[14] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the State’s motion for a 

continuance, and Forest’s sentence is not inappropriate. We affirm.

[15] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Robb, J., concur.