## In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07

- 19

- 00198

- CV
ODELIA LAURA CAUDILLO, APPELLANT

V. DANIEL CAUDILLO, APPELLEE On Appeal from the 140th District Court Lubbock County, Texas Trial Court No. 2015

- 517,163 ; Honorable Jim Bob Darnell, Presiding April 24 , 2020 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and DOSS, J J
.
Daniel Caudi llo and Odelia Laura Caudillo were d ivorced by a Final Decree of Divorce signed April 24, 2019. As part of the decree, Daniel was ordered to pay s pousal main tenanc e in the amount of $400 per month , with the first payment being due retroactively on N o ve mber 1, 2018 , and each subseq uent payment being due on the first day of each consecutive month un til the earliest of on e of several listed event s occurred

. Ode l ia arg ues the trial court abused its discretion by (1) chan ging th e start date and duration of the court
- ordered spousa l maintenance and (2) determining she was eligible2

for s pousal maint enance under section 8.0 54(a)(1 )(C) instead of sect ion 8.054(a)(2)(A ) of the Texas Family Code. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the divo rce decree of the trial court

.
B ACKGROUND Dani el and Odelia married in 1977 and se parated in 2015. On August 24, 201 5, Daniel filed for divorce. Odelia counter

- petitione d, reque sting temporary s pousal support and pos t
- divorce spousal maintenance. A hearing regarding temporary orders was held before an as sociate judge. At the conclusion of th at hearing, the associate judge ordered Daniel to pay to Odelia $700 pe r month i n tempor ary s pousal suppor t. Daniel appealed that ru ling to the district court. Following a full de novo hearing, th e ju d ge ord ered Daniel to pay to Odelia $400 per mo nth, be ginning on November 15, 2015. Dan iel did not begin paying at t hat time and Odelia filed a motion to enforce the order. Daniel began paying the temporary spousal support in April 2016.
On October 15, 2018, the court he ld a conte sted hearing concerning the disposition of property in relation to Daniel and Odelia ’ s divorce. During that hear ing, b ot h parties te stified. Odelia testified she was disabled. She told the cour t it affected her

eve ryday life and her ability to obtain employment. She testified she began receiv i ng

s ocial s ecurity disability benefits the pr evious y e ar . She also tes tifi ed “ [t ]here ’ s no way I
can go back and get a job

. . . [b]ecause I ’ m disabled. I got chronic arthritis, os teoar thritis. I c an ’ t do anything physical that much. ” She said, “ I can ’ t lift, crawl, climb stairs, stoop, bend or

— everyth ing. ” Sh e testifie d that if she tries to do th ese things, it is “ painful, very painful. ” Odel ia also testified about her income from h er disability benefits , her retirement , as well as her customary monthly expenses. She answered “ No ” when a sked whet her3

sh e woul d be able t o pay for all o f the expenses without Daniel ’ s spous al support. She
to ld the court her previous employment had been as a teacher but that she had not worked in that capacity for many years.

Daniel answered affirmati vel y when ask ed wh ether he was aware that Od elia was di sabled. He also stated that he kn ew the federal government had determined sh e wa s unable to work because of her disability

. With re gard to spousal maint enance, h e said he “ could l ive with what I ’ m giving her right now , ” which was the $400 per month o r dered after the de novo temporary hearing

.
At the close of the hearing , the court ask ed for additional documentation and took the matt er under advisement. On October 1 8, 2018, the judge sent an e mail to counsel with an attachment entit led “ Prope r ty Division. ” T hat document incl uded the statement,

“ Daniel will pay $400 per month beginning Nov [ember] 1, 201 8. ” The email was filed with the court on October 29, 2018. Odelia ’ s attorney did not receive notice of the Oc tober 18 email u ntil O ctober 29 b ecause the October 1 8 email was sent to an incorrect email address

. Through e mail exchan ges betwe en October 18 and October 29, Daniel ’ s attorney and the judge discussed the d uration of the spousal maintenance award. The judge responded to Dani el ’ s inquiry conc erning the duration of the award , stating “ 10 yrs but would start when payments star ted under temporary orders

. ” Daniel had been ordered to pay temporary spous al support be ginning i n N ovember 2015. The Final Dec ree of Divorce provided , however, that D aniel pay spousal maintenan ce in t he amount of $400 per month, “ with the fir st payment being due on November 0 1, 2018 , and a like amount being due on the first ( 1st ) day of each conse cutive mo nth thereafter until the earliest of one of th e followin g even ts : (1) seven (7) years ; (2 ) death of either [Daniel] or4

[Odelia]; (3) remar riage of Odelia [ ]; or (4) further orders of the Court affecting the spousal maintenance o bligation . . .

. ”
In early 2019, Ode lia filed motions to enter judgme nt, reque sting th e trial court to sign her proposed Final Decree of Divorce, which contained a spousal maintenan ce provi sion that corresponde d to the October 18 e m ail , which includ ed the memorandum
stat ing that “ Daniel will pay $400 per month beginning Nov ember 0 1, 201 8

. ” According to Odelia ’ s interpretation , the em ail constituted a rendition of judgme nt provid ing for indefinite spousal m ainte nance

. In April 2019, t he trial court held a h earing on Odelia ’ s motion for judgment

. At th at hearing, Daniel ’ s counsel acknowle dg ed the email conversation between himself and the judge but argue d there was not a substanti al change in the court ’ s ruling ; rather, it w a s a mere clarification. Odelia a rgued the email ruling left open the question of w hether the cour t found she was d isa bled and als o changed the beginning date of the spousal maintenan ce award

. O n April 24, 201 9 , t he trial court signed its Final Decree of Divorce , contain ing the sp ousal maintenance provision described above.

The reaft er, on June 7, 201 9, the trial cour t filed fi ndings of fact a nd con clusions of law. The conclusio ns of law include d the above

- stated provision for spous al maintena nce , w ith the exception of adding “ or co - habitation ” to the third contingency

. The trial court made no fi ndin gs or conclusio ns that specifically contain the words “ disabl ed ”

or “ disability ” with reference to Odelia . R ather, t he court made a more general finding that Ode lia “ will lack the ability to earn sufficient income to provide for [her] minimum reasonable n eeds on dissoluti on of the marri age. ” The court further state d that , in determining the nature, amount, duration , and manner of payment of s pousal5

maintenance , it had cons idered the “ fu ture earning potential of the parties ” and the “ ability

o f each party to meet their min imum reasonable needs. ”

A NALYSI S I SSUE O NE — M ODIFICATION OF S POUSAL M AINTENANCE O RDER In her f irst issue, Odelia contends the October 1 8 email and attached

m emorandum constituted a rendition of judgmen t and the trial court erred because the Final Decree contained a provision that changed the start date and duration of spousal mainten ance from that set forth in the email

. We disagree.
Judgment is rendered when the trial court officially announces its decision in ope n court or by written memorandum filed with the clerk. S & A Rest. Corp. v. Leal , 892 S.W.2d 855, 857

- 58 (Tex. 1995) (citations omitte d). The judge ’ s intention to render judgment in the future cannot be a present rendition of judgment. Id. at 858 (citation omitted). The rendi tion of judgment is “ a present act, either by spoken word or signed memorand um, which decides the issues upon whi ch the ruling i s made. ” Id. (citation omitted). A judgment is “ ‘ signed ’ when a judge actually signs a written order or d ecree; and, it is ‘ en tered ’ when the c lerk performs the task of entering it in the minutes of the

cour t. Cook v. Cook

, 243 S.W.3d 800, 804 (Tex. App.

— For t Worth 2007, no pet.)

. Whether a trial court has rendered a jud g ment is a question of fact. Escobar v. E scobar , 711 S.W. 2d 230, 232 (Tex. 1986).
Citing Cook

, 243 S.W.3d at 804 , Odelia begins her argu ment by saying “ [t ]he entry of judgment goes through three sta ges : rendition, signing, and entry. ” Odelia argues the judge ren dered his ruling when he signed, dated, and file d the memorandum e ntitled6

“ Property Division , ” attached to his October 18 e mail w hich included the statement, “Daniel will pay $400 pe r month beginning Nov [ember] 1, 2018.” Because she considers this docum ent to be the judgment rendered by the court, she contend s the Final Decre e of Divorce later entered is incorrect because it contains different terms. We disagree.

T he October 18 email to whic h the “ Property Division ” memorandum was attached stated as fo llows: Attached is a copy of property/debt division in Caudillo ca se. Sinc e Danie l Caudillo filed divo r ce petiti on, Ben will pre pare decree; provide copy to Terri and M e gan f or their rev iew before e

- fili ng. If anyone feels I left something out, let me know.
This language does not indicate the judge ’ s intent to rend e r a final appeal able order at th e time he sent the email

. In fact, the judge invited changes b y ask ing the parties to notify him if he “ le ft som ething out. ” In the area of family law, t hi s is a common practice , where many of the “ details ” contained in a final decree of divorce are not orally pronounced , and the trial judge ofte n exercises discretion when fine

- tun ing his ruling prior
to f ormal rendition. Fu r the r , the mere f iling of that email and memorandum did no t alter th e judg e ’ s intent or constitute the rendition of a ruling any more than t he email itself did. The language of the email still indicated an intent to r ender a ruling at a later date, after the partie s had re viewed the decree and had the o pportunity to suggest changes or additions to the judge.

We also no te Ode lia ’ s argument that the judge changed his October 18 email

“ decision ” from a n indefinite spousa l maintenance awar d to one that was limited to a period of seven yea rs

. Again, the mere fact that the email did not include the specific term of payments did not me an that the trial judge had rendered a decision that the7

spousal maintenance payments w ould continue indefinitely. Similar to the other detail s to be included in the final order, the term of payments wa s a detail that remained w ithin the discret ion of the tr ial judge.

As O delia reco gnizes, a cou rt may order maintenance to the spouse who is unable
to e arn sufficient income to provide for his or her minimum reasona bl e needs due to a physic al or mental disability for as long as th e spous e continue s to satisfy the eligibility criteria prescribed by the applicable provision. T EX

. F AM

. C ODE A NN

. § 8.054(b) (West Supp. 2019)

. While Ode lia seems to take from this statute that the district court was

r equired to order spousal mainte nance for that entire period , the unam biguous language of the statu te is discr etionary in nature, setting forth that the court “ may ” make su ch an order. It does not say that the court “ shall ” or is otherwise mandated to order spousal mainte nance for th e entire period of disabi lity

.
Odelia also complains that the judge improperly took into account the spousal support she received under the temporary orders when he redu ced her sp ousal support to a period of seven years in the Fi nal Decree . As support fo r her a rgument, she list s the fact ors set forth in section 8.05 2 of the Family Code, not ing that none of the m include support received u nder te mporary orders as th at support is to assist with needs during the pending suit. T EX

. F AM

. C ODE A NN

. § 8.052

. Ag ain, t h e lan guage of sec tion 8.052 is informative here. Th e be ginning of that provision provi des “ [a] court that determines that
a spous e is eligi ble to receive maintenanc e under this chapter shall determine the na ture, amount, duration, and manner of per iodic p ayments by cons id ering all re levant factors, including

. . . [eleven enumerated factors]

. ” (Emphasis added). T EX

. F AM

. C ODE A NN . § 8.052. The use of the wor d “ including ” indic ates that a judge should consider the elev en8

factors set forth in section 8.052 , but it does not preclud e a judge from considering other factors. The list is no t excl usive. We thus do not find the trial court abused i ts discretion here by considering factors , if it did, not specifically enumerated in section 8.052 of the Family Cod e.
Lastly, we add ress Ode lia ’ s argument t hat the Fi nal Decree of Divorce does not conform to the October 29 email b ecause the decree states Daniel is to pay spousal mai ntenance for a peri od of seven years commen cing November 1, 2018, whereas the Oc tober 29 email itself did not specify any term of duration and the email chain regarding clarification of the court ’ s orde r provided for “ 10 yrs but would start when payments started under temporary orders. ” The de novo temporary orders provided that spousal

ma intenance was to commence on November 15, 2015

. Taking into consideration t he
tem porary spousal mainte nance pa yments that had alrea dy accrued, the number of spousal maintenance payments was the same. Either way, Daniel was obligated to make the same spousa l m aintenance pay ment ($400 per month), for the same number of months (N ovember 2015 through November 2025 )

. 1 As such, w e can not find the dis trict court abused its disc retion here eithe r. Accordingly, w e resolve Odelia ’ s first issue against her.

I SSU E T WO — E LIGIBILITY F OR S POUSA L M AINTENANCE Via her second issue, Odelia contends the district court erred when it determin ed the duration of her spousal maint enance under s ection 8.054(a)(1)(C) of the Te x as Family

1 We acknowledge Ode l i a ’ s argument that Daniel did not act u ally pay the o r dered temporary spousal maintenance in November 2015. Ode lia filed a Motion for Enforcement after Daniel failed t o make the payments. Daniel began mak ing the payments o n April 16, 2016. We do not find that the court abused its discretion in decli nin g to alter the spousal maint enance award time period based on those ev ents.9

Code , pro viding that a court may not order maintenance that rema ins in effect for more than ten ye ars after the date of the order, if the spouses were married for thirty years or

more , rather than section 8.05 4(a)(2) ( A) , which provid es that the court shall limit the duration of a mainten ance order to the “ shortest reason abl e period that allows the spouse seeking maintenance to earn sufficient income to pr ovide for the spouse’s minimum reasonable needs, unless the abi lity of the spouse to provide for the spouse’s minimum reasonable needs is substant ially or totally diminis hed because of: (A) physical or mental disability of the spouse seeking maintenance

. ” See T EX

. F AM

. C ODE

. A NN

. § 8.054(a)(1)(C); § 8.054(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2019 )

.
We review the trial court ’ s decision to award spousal maintenan ce under an abuse of discretion standard of review. Diaz v. Diaz , 350 S.W.3d 251, 254 (Tex. App.

— San Ant onio 2011, pet. denied)

. See also In re Marriage of Boyd , No. 07

- 14

- 00211

- CV, 2015 T ex. App. LEXIS 6452, at * 4 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo June 24, 2015, no p et.) (me m. op.) ( citations omitted). Absent a clear abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the tr ial court ’ s decision to awa rd spousal ma intenance. Amos v. Amos , 79 S.W.3d 747, 749 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). Under this standard of revie w, the pr oper inq uiry is whether the trial court ’ s assessment of spousal maintenance was arbitrar y or

unre asonable. Gar

cia v. Ga rcia , 170 S.W. 3d 644, 649 (Tex. App.

— El P aso 2005, no pet.) (ci tations omitted). Conseq uently, we must “ determine whether, bas ed on the elicite d evidence, the trial court made a reasonable decision. Stated inversely, we must conclude that the trial court ’ s decision was n either arbitrary n or unreasonable. ” Id.

The tr ial court may exercise its discretion to award spousal maintena nce only if the
p arty seeking maintenance meets specific statutory eligibility requirements. Roberts v.10

Robe rts , 531 S.W.3d 224, 227

- 29 (Tex. Ap p. — San Antonio 2017 , pet. denied ) (citing Slicke r v. Slicker

, 464 S.W.3d 850, 859 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2015, no pe t. ) ). Texas Fami ly Code s ection 8.051 (2) (A) provides that “ in a suit for dissolution of a marria ge ” the tria l court may order maintenance if the spou se seeking maintenance will lack sufficient property , on dissolution of the marriage , to provide for the s pouse ’ s minimum r easonable needs and th at spouse is “ unab le to earn sufficient income to provide for her minimum reasonable needs because of an incapacitating physical or mental disability. ”
Once a trial court has determined that a spouse is eligible for spousal maintenan ce pursuant to sec tion 8.051(2)(A) , the trial court may order maintenance for “ as long as the
spo use [seeking maintenance] continues to satisfy the eligibility criteria presc ribed by [section 8.051(2)(A)]. ” See T EX

. F AM

. C ODE

. A NN

. § 8.05 4( b) (West Supp. 2019 )

. The refore, while Odelia i s incorrect in her contention that the trial court had the authority to order spousal maintenance for mo re ten years pursuant to sect ion 8.05 4(a)(2) ( A) , she would nonetheless be corre ct if she were contendi ng the trial cour t had th at authority pursuant to sect ion 8.054(b). Roberts , 531 S.W.3d at 228

.
As fact finde r, the tria l court may rea sonably infer an individual ’ s incapacity from circumstantia l evidence or the competent testimony of a lay witness , in cluding the testi mony of the person seeking spousal maintenance

. Roberts , 531 S.W.3d at 228 (citing R eina v. Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 611 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex. 1981) (no medical evidence of disability required in case d ecided under former w orkers ’ compensat io n statute); Pickens v. Pickens , 62 S.W.3d 212, 215

- 16 (Tex. App.

— Dallas
2 001, pet. denied) )

. A physical disability or incapacity does not need to be proven b y medical evidence. Roberts , 531 S.W.3d at 228

- 29 (citing Reina , 611 S.W.2d at 417;11

Pickens , 62 S.W. 3d at 216; Galindo v. Galindo , 04

- 13

- 00325

- CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 3775 (Tex. App

. — San Antonio Apr. 9, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (upheld disability finding based solely on testimony of party seeking spousal maintenance )). “ In fact, the testimony of the injured party will s upport a finding of incapacity even if directly cont radicted by expert medical testimony. ” Rober ts , 531 S.W.3d at 228 (citing Pickens , 62 S.W.3d at 216 )

. There is “ n o authority directly addressing the quantum of e vidence required to prove incapacity in a spousal maintenance action. ” Roberts , 531 S.W.3d a t 228

- 29 (c iti ng Galindo , 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 3775, at * 4 (quoting Pickens , 62 S.W .3d at 2 15 ) ; Smith v. Smith , 115 S.W.3d 303, 309 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi 2003 , no pet.))

.
In t he matter before us , Odel ia told the court she began receiv ing s ocial s ecurity disabil it y the previous year. On appeal, her counsel discusses the diff iculty of satisfying the burden to receive such benefits. Odelia testified before the di strict judge that “[t]here’s no way I can go back and get a job

. . . [b]ecause I’m disabled. I got chronic ar thritis, osteoarthritis. I can’t do an ything physical that muc h.” She further testifie d saying , “I ca n’t lift, crawl, climb stai rs, stoop, bend or

— ev erything.” She t esti fied that if she tries to do these things, it is “painful, very painful.” While Odelia did not testify about any efforts to

o btain emplo yment of any kind or explain why her disability prevented her from doing any type of work , such ev idence was unne ce ssary since Daniel testified he was aware Od el ia was disabled and he did not otherwise contest that issue

. On appeal, Odelia contrasts Galindo , 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 3775 , at *6

- 7 with Wiedenfeld v. Markgraf , 534 S.W. 3d 14, 20 (Tex. A pp. — Sa n Antonio 2017, p et. denied) to support her contention that the evidence she presented to the district co ur t was sufficient to allow it to reas onably infer she wa s disable d. Whil e we agree the court could12

have made such a finding , we d o not agree it was r equired to make s uch a finding

. Furthermore, even if the trial court determined Odelia was disabled , it was not required
to order spousal support for an indefinite duration

.
In Galindo , the wife testified she was diagnosed with a “ neuromuscular disord er of the inte stinal track ” in 2000. Galin do , 2014 Tex. App. L EXIS 3775, at *6. She told the court it causes her to “ get seve re pain the upper gut area , and it is so bad that I just s tart

vo miting and going to the bathroom and can ’ t move

. . . I just have t o go to the hospi tal. ” Id. The wife further testified that in addit ion to the acute symptom s, she is “ always in at least moderate pain and suffers from anxiety. ” Id. In addition, s he t ook medication which also impair ed her abili t ies. Id. Given those facts, the appell ate court concluded a fact finde r could reasonably infer the wife ’ s incapacity from her testimo ny and the substance of her testimony was “ such that she qu alifi es for spousal maintenance under section 8. 051(2)(A). ” Id. at *7. Odelia en cou r ag es this court to find that the evidence in this case is similar to tha t presented in Galindo and to find that the trial court erre d in its award in the Final Decree of Divorce

.
Odelia contrasts her case w i th that in Wiedenfeld , 534 S.W.3d at 19, in whic h the former husb and testified that during their marriage, he hel ped his wife o bt ain social security disability bene fits based on her m edical is sues . He also testified he did not belie ve his former wife was unable to obtain or retain employment because sh e had work ed near the end of their marriage. The fo rmer wife testified she rec eive d disability benefits and descr ibed her v arious medical con ditions wh ich included “ heart disease, diabetes, arthri tis, me mo ry problems, lupus, Sjogren ’ s disease, foot proble ms, and back
pro b lems. ” Id. She stated she believed her me dical conditions affec ted her abilit y to13

obtain and maintain employment because she d i d n ot believe an employer would be pleased if she had to call in sick because she was unable to function. Id. She did note sh e watched her roommate ’ s dogs when her roommate went out of town a s a “ sid e job. ” Id. In that situation, the appellate court concluded the trial court could have bel i eved the former husband ’ s testimony and noted the former wife d id not te stify about any e ffort to

o btain employ ment and did not d ispute the fact that she had worked near the end of their marriage. Odelia ar gues Wiedenfeld is disting uishable from her case because the fo rmer husband provided controverting testimony about the fo rmer wife ’ s disab ility , whereas Daniel did not

. We agree with Odelia that she presented testimony somewhat similar to the testimony set forth in G alindo. Likewise, w e agree that , unlike the former husband in Wiedenfeld, Daniel did not controvert Odelia ’ s assertion sh e w a s disabled. When asked whet her he was a ware that Ms. Caudillo wa s disa bled , h e responded, “ Yes, ma ’ am. ” He was then asked, “ And y ou understand that on the basis of that disability that the fed eral government has determined that she can ’ t work? ” H e respo nded, “ That ’ s what I ’ ve been told. ” And, we agree Odelia also established she received social security disability benefits ; whereas , unlike the former wife in Wiedenfeld, Odelia d i d not present any testimony concerning what effo rts she had mad e to obtain any kind of employment and did not expl ain how or why her disability pro hibited her from obtaining any type of gainful employme nt.
Considering the two cases cited to us by O de lia , and conside ring the record before us, we do not f ind the trial cou rt a bused its discretion

. While we agree with Od e lia that her testimony alone w ould have been suf ficient to support a finding that she suffered from14

a disability , we do not agree with her position that the tr ial court was required to find she had such a d isability

. The trial court was free to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, and it was within its discretion to conclude O delia was not disabled to the degree that she required indefin ite s pousal ma intenan ce payments from Daniel. See Wi edenfeld , 534 S.W.3d at 19 ( the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility o f the witnesses and can believe or disbelieve any witness ’s tes timony ).

O delia again contends the trial court erred when it s ub stantially chan ged the decision disclosed in the October 18 email because all of the evidence presented at the final hearing was u ncontro verted and supports a finding that she wa s d isabled, maki ng

an award of spousal maintenance for an indefinite period o f time proper. Again, Odelia ’ s argument presuppos es that the October 18 email was the judge ’ s rendered ruling. As we discussed in our analysis of Odelia ’ s first issue, that is not the case. T he trial judge was not required to find Odelia disabled , nor was he required t o find that she was entitled to an award of spousal maintenance for an indefinite p eriod of time even if she was

. See O’Carolan v. Hopper , 414 S.W.3d 288, 308 (Tex. App.

—Austin 2013, no pet.) (“Extended maintenance is discretionary under the statute, even if a spouse is permanent ly disabled.”) (citation omitted).

For the se same reason s, we do not agree the judge erred by failing to i nclude a finding that Odelia was disabled. Odelia argues , citing In r e S.R.O

. , 1 43 S.W.3d 237, 243 (Tex. App.

– Waco 2004, no pet .), that because the evidence supports a finding that she was disabled and because neither party notified the c ourt that the finding o n that element had been omitted , nor did they request a fi nding on that element, we must presume the tria l court made a fi ndin g on that element in a way that supports its judgment.15

Whil e the F

inding s of Fact and Concl usions of Law do not expressly includ e a finding that contains the word “ disability ” or “ disabled , ” the findings do include o ne that
says “ Ode lia Laur ie Caudil lo was married to Daniel Caudillo for ten (1 0) years o r longer and will lack the ability to ea rn su fficient income to provide for the spouse ’ s minimum reasonabl e needs on dissolution of the marri age. ” This was among the f actors considered an d appears to i nclude what the judge believed regardi ng Odelia ’ s disability and its effect on her ability to wor k.
Odelia argues that the judge “ must have either abused his di scretion in awarding main tenance for an indefinite period of t ime, or he implic it ly found [Odeli a] is disabled such that his order complies with Texas Family Code § 8.054(a)(2). ” We have alrea dy determined the judge did not a ward spousal maintenance for a n ind efinite period of ti me because the October 18 e mail was n ot a rendition of the trial court ’ s ruling

. And, we have already determined the judge in cluded a finding that e ncompassed his con c lusion regarding Ode lia ’ s disability and there is no reason to conclude the jud ge abused his discretion in making that fi nding or in including the spousal main t enance award in the Final Decree of Divorce

. Accordingly, w e overrule Odelia ’ s second issue.

C ONCLUSION Having resolved each of Odelia ’ s issues against her, we affirm the Final Decree of Divorce of the trial court

.

Patrick A. Pirtle Justice