PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

__________

No. 16-3333

__________

LUIS JAVIER MENDOZA-ORDONEZ,

 Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Respondent

__________

On Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

(Agency No. A202-144-002)

Immigration Judge: Roxanne Hladylowycz

___________

Argued May 9, 2017

BEFORE: AMBRO, RESTREPO, 

and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
2

(Filed: August 23, 2017)

Joseph A. Brophy, Esq. [Argued]

Brophy & Lenahan

18 Campus Boulevard, Suite 100

Newtown Square, PA 19073

Counsel for Petitioner

Dana M. Camilleri, Esq.

Jessica Dawgert, Esq.

Sabatino F. Leo, Esq. [Argued]

United States Department of Justice

Office of Immigration Litigation

P.O. Box 878

Ben Franklin Station

Washington, DC 20044

Counsel for Respondent

__________

OPINION OF THE COURT

__________

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.

I.

Luis Javier Mendoza-Ordonez, a citizen of the 

Republic of Honduras, crossed the United States border 

without inspection on two occasions. After his first entry

Customs and Border Patrol officers (CBP) detained him and 
3

the Government returned him to Honduras under an expedited 

removal. When CBP detained him after his second entry

Mendoza requested asylum and, alternatively, asked the 

Government to withhold his removal from the United States 

because he feared for his life if returned to Honduras.1

 He 

was placed into a “withholding only” proceeding and after a 

hearing the Immigration Judge denied his requests and 

ordered his removal. He appealed to the Board of 

Immigration Appeals (BIA) asserting, primarily, that the 

Immigration Judge ignored key evidence.

Mendoza now petitions us to review the BIA’s order 

that dismissed his appeal. He contends that substantial 

evidence supporting his request for withholding of removal 

compels a conclusion that is contrary to that of the BIA. He 

also maintains that the BIA applied the wrong legal standard 

when it reviewed this claim. Finally he argues he is eligible 

for asylum. We will reverse the decision of the BIA and 

grant Mendoza’s petition for withholding of removal. We 

will deny the petition as to his request for asylum.

II.

A.

 1 Mendoza requested withholding of removal under both the 

Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 

§1231(b)(3)(A), and the Convention Against Torture (CAT), 

8 C.F.R .§ 208.18. Of these, his petition for review raises 

only the denial of his request for withholding of removal 

under the INA. 
4

Mendoza was born in Honduras in 1989, the son of 

Edith Dalila Mendoza Ordonez and Manuel Ulises Martinez 

Gonzalez.

2

 Mendoza’s father (Martinez) was politically 

active in the Liberal Party. He routinely spoke out against the 

National Party and its elected officials in the Honduran 

government. After unsuccessfully running for mayor of 

Apacilagua, Martinez won an election to serve as a council 

member for the municipality. He remained a vocal opponent 

of the National Party, accusing it of corruption. 

Tragically, on January 1, 2000, a National Party 

activist named Gerardo Valladares assassinated Martinez and 

wounded Martinez’s wife. Valladares was convicted of 

murder, imprisoned and released.

3

 In 2002, Mendoza’s uncle 

(Jose Avilio Martinez Gonzalez) also ran for mayor as a 

Liberal Party candidate; he, too, was assassinated. The man 

who killed him, Dimas Amador, was—like Valladares—a 

National Party activist.

4

 Amador was convicted of this crime.

 2 The petitioner refers to his father as Manuel Luis MartinezGonzales. Martinez was married to another woman, named 

Bessy Magdalena Sanchez Rodriguez, when Mendoza was 

born. A birth certificate and Sanchez’s testimony on the 

telephone established that Martinez was Mendoza’s father.

3 Sanchez testified that Valladares received only a six-month 

prison sentence. The BIA agreed with the Immigration Judge 

that this was insufficient evidence to substantiate the length of

his prison term.

4 Mendoza did not mention his uncle’s assassination when he 

crossed the United States border from Mexico in either 2014

or 2015. Nonetheless, the Immigration Judge found his 

testimony on this event credible.
5

Throughout his childhood Mendoza attended Party 

functions with his father. In spite of the murders of his father 

and uncle, Mendoza’s interest in politics persisted. He served 

as president of the local Liberal Party’s youth division, gave 

speeches supporting the Party between 2008 and 2014, and 

worked for the Party during the national election in 2013.

5

On September 7, 2014, Hector Giron approached 

Mendoza on behalf of Valladares (the assassin of Mendoza’s 

father) and threatened him with the same fate as his father if 

he did not stop speaking out against the National Party. 

Mendoza reported this incident on the following day to Judge

Miriam Umanzor Aguilar, who told him that she would 

investigate. Mendoza noted that Umanzor is a National Party 

member and the niece of the Apacilagua mayor (the same 

woman who defeated his father in the mayoral election). So

when Mendoza heard nothing from Judge Umanzor in the two 

weeks following the filing of his complaint, he was convinced 

that the Judge would not take action. He left Apacilagua and 

stayed with one of his sisters in Tegucigalpa. 

In October 2014, he applied for—but was denied—a 

visa to the United States. Nonetheless, Mendoza crossed the 

United States border from Mexico without inspection on 

November 27, 2014. CBP agents detained and interviewed 

him on his reasons for crossing.

6

 On December 3, 2014, the 

 5 Mendoza’s friend (Oman Reuben Ouela Rodriguez)

testified that Mendoza was politically active.

6 Aspects of this interview are disputed by Mendoza, but 

given his admission that he is not eligible for asylum (see 

infra note 11) and the unchallenged conclusion that 
6

Department of Homeland Security executed an expedited 

removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and returned him to 

Honduras.

Again, Mendoza lived with a sister in Tegucigalpa. He 

remained hidden there for four months, still fearing for his 

safety. On April 17, 2015, Mendoza traveled to Apacilagua 

to visit his ailing grandfather. The next day Valladares and 

other National Party members approached him. Valladares 

put a gun to Mendoza’s head and told him that he would kill 

him if he continued to speak out against the National Party.

7

 

On April 20, 2015, Mendoza filed a complaint with Judge 

Umanzor about this new threat. When, on April 22, 2015,

Mendoza heard nothing from the Judge about his complaint,

he returned to his sister’s house in Tegucigalpa and went back 

into hiding. He testified that he feared even walking the 

streets.

Mendoza attempted to re-enter the United States again 

in May 2015, but Mexican authorities detained and returned 

him to Honduras. He went back to his sister’s house and 

remained in hiding until June 5, 2015. He then embarked on 

his last attempt to cross the United States border from 

Mexico. He re-entered the United States in July 2015. CBP 

detained him approximately six days after he crossed.

 

Mendoza’s claims of politically motivated death threats are 

credible, these issues are not relevant to our deliberation.

7 Rodriguez and Sanchez witnessed this and testified about it. 

Rodriguez also validated that the threat was grounded in 

Mendoza’s actions on behalf of the Liberal Party. 
7

The Department of Homeland Security determined that 

Mendoza was subject to removal and served him with a 

Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate the Prior Removal 

Order on July 28, 2015. On September 1, 2015, an asylum 

officer interviewed him to determine if he had credible fear of 

persecution in Honduras. It was determined that Mendoza’s

claims warranted further review, and he was referred to the 

Immigration Court for a “withholding only” proceeding.

B.

The Immigration Judge concluded that, although

Mendoza’s testimony credibly established that he received 

death threats for his political opinions, he still did not meet 

his burden of proof for withholding of removal because he 

failed to prove that the Honduran government was unwilling 

or unable to protect him from those threats. The Immigration 

Judge decided alternatively that the government had proven

that the periods of time in which Mendoza lived with his 

sisters proved that he could safely relocate in Honduras. The 

order pretermitted his claim for withholding of removal under 

the INA,

8 and his asylum claim.9 It also denied his 

 8 The Immigration Judge did not deny, but instead 

pretermitted (invalidated), Mendoza’s claim for withholding 

of removal under the INA. The BIA ruled that this was error, 

but it determined that the error was harmless given that the 

Immigration Judge reviewed the merits of Mendoza’s claim 

for withholding of removal. However, the BIA did not 

explain its decision. Because we will grant Mendoza’s 

petition for review on his withholding of removal claim 

arising from the INA, we clarify that, as we recently held, 8 

C.F.R. § 1208.31 does not bar withholding of removal for 
8

withholding of removal claim under the Convention Against 

Torture.10

Mendoza filed a timely direct appeal, claiming that the 

Immigration Judge erred by: deciding that he was ineligible 

for withholding of removal; concluding that he failed to prove 

the Honduran government was unwilling or unable to protect 

him; ruling that he could safely relocate in Honduras; 

deciding that he should be placed in a “withholding only” 

proceeding; and finally, declaring that he was ineligible for 

asylum. The BIA dismissed his appeal. Mendoza filed this 

petition for review.

III.

A.

Mendoza sought our review of the BIA’s dismissal of 

his asylum claim. But he now concedes that our recent 

decision controls the analysis and forecloses his request for 

asylum. See Cazun v. Attorney General of the United States,

 

aliens who are under a reinstated removal order. Cazun v. 

Attorney General of the United States, 856 F.3d 249, 264 (3d 

Cir. 2017).

9 Upon his second entry into the United States without 

inspection, the Government reinstated his prior removal 

order. The Immigration Judge explained in her opinion that 

this rendered Mendoza ineligible for asylum. 8 C.F.R. §

1208.31. We discuss this in more detail later (see infra note 

11).

10 8 C.F.R. § 208.18.
9

856 F.3d 249, 260 (3d Cir. 2017).11 The remaining action 

that Mendoza requests from the government arises from the 

INA, which says: “[T]he Attorney General may not remove 

an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the 

alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that country 

because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership 

in a particular social group or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. §

1231(b)(3)(A). An alien who applies for withholding of 

removal must prove that ‘“it is more likely than not that [his] 

life or freedom would be threatened on account of . . . 

political opinion.’” Ordonez–Tevalan v. Attorney General of 

the United States, 837 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2016)( quoting 

Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 726 (3d Cir. 2003)); 8 

C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1).

12 Mendoza contends that the BIA 

erred by ruling that he failed to prove this.

 11 At oral argument, Mendoza conceded that our recent 

decision controls the outcome on his asylum claim (Cazun,

856 F.3d 249), and tacitly recognized the propriety of the 

decision to adjudicate his case in a “withholding only” 

proceeding. Mendoza argued, as did the petitioner in Cazun, 

that, in light of 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a), the BIA unreasonably 

interpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) as barring asylum relief to 

those under a reinstatement of a removal order. However, we 

ruled that “[i]t was reasonable for the agency to conclude that 

the statutory reinstatement bar foreclosing ‘any relief under 

this chapter’ means just what it says: no asylum relief is 

available to those subject to reinstated removal orders.” 

Cazun, 856 F.3d at 260. Our holding in Cazun controls the 

issue raised by Mendoza, and for this reason, we will deny his 

petition for review on this claim.

12 Mendoza did not challenge the BIA’s decision denying his 

claim for withholding of removal under the Convention 
10

We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of 

removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). When, as in this instance, 

the BIA provides its own reasoned decision (rather than 

merely adopting the immigration judge’s opinion) we review 

the BIA’s decision as the final decision. Nelson v. Attorney 

General of the United States, 685 F.3d 318, 321 (3d Cir. 

2012). Nonetheless, “to the extent the BIA deferred to or 

adopted the [immigration judge’s] reasoning” on particular 

issues, we may consider both opinions on those points. Id. 

We are empowered to review the BIA’s legal conclusions 

under a de novo standard of review. Borges v. Gonzales, 402 

F.3d 398, 404 (3d Cir.2005). But we must regard all 

determinations about facts grounding the final order as 

“conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be 

compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 

1252(b)(4)(B). Factual findings include statements about the 

events and circumstances in the country grounding an alien’s 

claim that he or she suffered persecution. Kaplun v. Attorney 

General of the United States, 602 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 

2010).

13

Mendoza alleges the BIA made two errors. First, he 

contends the entire record compels a result contrary to BIA’s 

finding that he failed to produce sufficient evidence to 

support his request for withholding of removal. He also 

 

Against Torture, nor did he object to the BIA’s denial of his 

withholding of removal claim under the INA that was based 

on his membership in a social group.

13 The determination of whether the events and circumstances 

alleged rise to the level of persecution is a legal determination 

that the BIA decides de novo. Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 270.
11

claims that the BIA applied the wrong standard of review 

when it analyzed his argument that the Immigration Judge 

ignored key evidence. We will address this latter issue first.

B.

The BIA is required to examine challenges to the 

immigration judge’s factual findings for clear error. 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.1(d)(3)(i). Clear error is commonly defined as “an 

obvious, plain, gross, significant, or manifest error or 

miscalculation.” Concrete Pipe and Products of California, 

Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern 

California, 508 U.S. 602, 653 (1993).

In his petition for review Mendoza says that the BIA 

failed to use the clear error standard when it reviewed his 

appeal. The Government agrees that clear error review 

applies, and points out that the BIA correctly referred to it 

early in its opinion. This is true, but later in its discussion of 

the country reports, the BIA also said:

[Mendoza] did not establish that 

this evidence is sufficient to 

impact the outcome of the case. . . 

. See Matter of Coelho, 20 I&N 

Dec. 464 (BIA 1992)( holding 

that an alien seeking to reopen or 

remand proceedings bears a heavy 

burden of proving that the new 

evidence offered would likely

change the result of the alien’s 

case).
12

The BIA’s error is readily apparent. It should have been 

examining, in the context of a direct appeal: whether the 

Immigration Judge failed to review and weigh the country 

reports that were in the record; and, if she did ignore the 

reports, whether this error undermined her factual finding 

about the Honduran government’s willingness and ability to 

protect Mendoza from death threats. Instead, mistakenly

applying the standard for a motion to remand or reopen, the 

BIA deliberated on: whether these reports were significant

enough to warrant consideration as new evidence (as though 

they were not already part of the record); and whether the 

reports provided a sufficient basis to reopen the case.

14

Yet, even though we are confident the BIA made a 

mistake, we are less certain about the impact it had on its 

decision. Because the BIA’s discussion of the reports is so 

brief, we do not know exactly how it analyzed them. It is also 

impossible to gauge whether its treatment of the reports as 

new evidence prejudiced its assessment of them in any way. 

For these reasons we cannot assess the precise impact that the 

BIA’s error had on its conclusion. Nonetheless, we do not 

need to pursue this issue further because, when the entire 

record is considered, we are certain Mendoza’s substantial 

evidence claim has merit.

C.

 14 Matter of Coelho addresses a motion to remand that sought 

the consideration of new evidence. It followed its practice of 

regarding the motion as if it was a motion to reopen. Matter 

of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 471.
13

Our review for substantial evidence does not merely 

rest on our discovery of alternative theories or findings that 

could be supported by the record. Rather, it requires that we 

examine the entire record to decide whether this body of 

evidence would compel a reasonable factfinder to make a 

determination contrary to that made by the BIA. He Chun 

Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 223 (3d Cir. 2004).15

We begin by noting that the BIA accepted the 

Immigration Judge’s credibility determinations on key facts 

in Mendoza’s petition. The BIA did not disturb the 

Immigration Judge’s conclusion that Mendoza received two 

death threats in 2014 and 2015. It accepts that these threats 

originated with the same man who killed his father in 2000. 

The BIA did not express any problems with the notion that 

the threats were due to Mendoza’s political activity. And it

agrees that Mendoza made complaints to Honduran 

authorities and that nothing resulted from them.16 But since 

the death threats directed at Mendoza did not come from 

someone within the government, the BIA properly focused on 

whether Mendoza had shown that the Honduran government 

was unwilling or unable to protect him from the threats. Lie 

v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 537 (3d Cir. 2005). It ultimately 

 15 ‘“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla and is 

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.’” Senathirajah v. 

Immigration & Naturalization Service, 157 F.3d 210, 216 (3d 

Cir. 1998)( quoting Turcios v. Immigration & Naturalization 

Service, 821 F.2d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1987)).

16The BIA stated that “the Immigration Judge properly ‘found 

that’ nothing resulted from the applicant filing two 

complaints. . . .”
14

ruled that he did not provide enough evidence on this

essential piece of his case and therefore he did not prove his 

eligibility for withholding of removal.

To prove his eligibility, Mendoza gave the 

Immigration Judge evidence about the death threats, the 

political affiliation of Valladares and Judge Umanzor, and 

country condition reports from a variety of sources. But the 

Immigration Judge never acknowledged the reports. 

Moreover, although the BIA made a ruling based on its 

review of the reports, it did not explain what was in them. 

Therefore, we will address what we found in our review that 

was relevant to Mendoza’s petition.

A 2013 article from Rights Action states that, after the 

National Party came into power in 2009, violence related to 

the electoral process in Honduras steadily rose. It also saw an 

increase in the number of politically motivated deaths. It 

commented that violence had been directed at Liberal Party 

members. A.R. 336. A 2013 State Department Human 

Rights Report described the 2013 elections as credible but 

concluded that the justice system suffers from “institutional 

weakness,” subjecting it to corruption and intimidation. It 

referred to a number of instances in which military or police

officials who were suspected of violating human rights were 

not prosecuted. A.R. 375. A 2014 State Department Human 

Rights Report discussed government efforts to combat 

corruption, but it also highlighted significant institutional and 

societal challenges that hampered the success of its efforts. 

A.R. 421. It noted particular “concern regarding corruption 

in the judiciary and security forces.” A.R. 420. A 2015 

Human Rights Watch report said that the system for selecting 

judges in Honduras had many irregularities, and it reasoned 
15

from this that the system generally lacked the protections 

necessary to guard against political interference. A.R. 326. 

Finally, a Freedom House report from 2015 stated that 

roughly 80% of the crimes occurring in the country are never 

reported, and that police actually investigate only 4% of 

crimes that are reported. A.R. 332. All of the reports

included discussion of widespread corruption and violence in 

Honduras, and described an environment in which civil rights 

protections are eroding.

Since the BIA did not discuss the substance of these

reports, we look to other aspects of its opinion to understand 

why, even with this evidence, it ruled that Mendoza did not 

carry his burden of proof. Three aspects of its decision were 

prominent. 

First, the BIA referenced the convictions of Valladares 

in 2000 and Amidor in 2002 (the men who assassinated 

Mendoza’s father and uncle) ostensibly to show that the 

Honduran government does investigate and prosecute 

politically motivated violence. The BIA obliquely 

acknowledged that this evidence pre-dated (by over a decade) 

the death threats Mendoza received. However, it implied that 

Mendoza failed to show that conditions in the country had 

grown worse in that period of time.

17

 17 The BIA did not explicitly state that Mendoza failed to 

prove a change in conditions in Honduras. Instead, as part of 

its discussion rejecting Mendoza’s assertion that Valladares 

had received a short prison sentence, it said: “[W]e conclude 

that the applicant did not submit sufficient testimonial or 

documentary evidence to establish that the length of time that 

his alleged persecutor was imprisoned and the passage of 
16

 

In response to Mendoza’s Petition for Review, the 

Government defended the BIA’s assessment of the 

relationship between the convictions (of Valladares and 

Amidor) and the country reports with a different line of 

reasoning. It brushed aside the country condition reports as 

nothing more than Mendoza’s misguided attempt to 

“override” evidence of the convictions of Valladares and 

Amidor. Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918, 922 (8th Cir. 

2005) (“To whatever extent these materials show that there is 

a general problem of gang violence . . . we do not believe 

they can override the evidence in this case that police 

conducted a thorough investigation. . . .”); Matter of 

McMullen, 17 I. & N. Dec. 542, 546 (BIA 1980) (“We do not 

give much weight to those articles submitted by the [alien] 

which are of a general nature and do not in any way relate to 

the [alien] himself.”). The implication is that, in the face of 

direct evidence of convictions, country condition reports have 

little weight.

A second aspect of the BIA’s decision we regarded as 

important was its perspective on the fact that Mendoza’s 

assertion of past persecution relies on an inference of political 

corruption that is grounded in the Honduran government’s 

 

time since his imprisonment establishes that the government 

of Honduras is unable or unwilling to protect him.” In 

context, we understand this to express the BIA’s conclusion 

that Mendoza failed to prove that the political and legal 

environment in Honduras (which, it implies, enabled the 

conviction of his father’s assassin) had deteriorated.
17

inaction on his complaints.18 The BIA dismissed Mendoza’s 

inference as pure speculation by concluding generally that the 

evidence does not support the notion that the Honduran 

government was unwilling or unable to protect him. It also 

specified that even the “background evidence” (a reference to 

the country condition reports) does not change this outcome. 

The BIA underscored its assessment that evidence supporting 

Mendoza’s inference is weak by proffering, albeit in an offhand manner, an alternative inference drawn from the 

Honduran government’s inaction on his complaints that the 

government’s inaction was due to Mendoza’s impatience.

19

The Government defended the BIA’s reasoning by 

referencing precedent in which we ruled that the Honduran 

government’s failure to act on complaints of threats did not 

necessarily show that it had been unwilling or unable to 

respond to an alien’s complaints of violence and threats by 

 18 The Government asserts that the Immigration Judge made a 

finding that Mendoza failed to prove the Honduran 

government did not act. In fact, the Immigration Judge 

equivocated, saying she “hesitates to make the same 

assumption [as Mendoza did] that the courts were not going 

to do anything.” She said nothing further on this. Our 

analysis is grounded in the BIA’s conclusion that “nothing 

resulted” from Mendoza’s complaints.

19 It said that “although nothing resulted from the applicant 

filing two complaints against the man who threatened him[,] 

the applicant waited only a short period of time after filing the 

complaints before assuming that nothing would be done about 

the complaints. . . .” The BIA also said it was Mendoza’s 

impatience—demonstrated by him leaving Apacilagua two 

weeks after the first complaint and two days after the second 

complaint—that prevented any investigation from occurring.
18

gangs. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney General of the 

United States, 663 F.3d 582, 610 (3d Cir. 2011). That case,

which focused on gang violence, relied on 2005 country 

reports that documented the Honduran government’s reform 

efforts, such as new security patrols, and anti-gang 

legislation. Id. We concluded that those reports weakened 

the alien’s attempt to use inaction on his complaints as a basis 

to infer the government’s unwillingness or inability to protect 

him. We noted that, lacking strong supporting evidence,

numerous reasonable inferences could be made from the 

Honduran government’s inaction that would not support the 

alien’s claims. Id.

The third, and final aspect of the decision that was of 

particular interest to us was the BIA’s judgment that it did not

need to address an alternative decision by the Immigration 

Judge.20 The Immigration Judge decided on alternative 

 20 We may address rulings by the Immigration Judge “to the 

extent the BIA deferred to or adopted the [immigration 

judge’s] reasoning” on a particular issue. Nelson, 685 F.3d at 

321. Here the BIA found no need to rule on the Immigration 

Judge’s decision that the Government carried its burden of 

proving that Mendoza could safely relocate. It did so because 

it agreed with the Immigration Judge’s underlying reasoning 

that the record was insufficient to ground the prerequisite 

finding that the Honduran government was unwilling or 

unable to protect Mendoza. This obviated the need for a 

determination that Mendoza could safely relocate because the 

BIA’s ruling implicitly determined this. Our review 

encompassed the entire record that was before the 

Immigration Judge and the BIA. Moreover, our findings on 

this record (arising from other issues, see infra) 
19

grounds that, even if Mendoza had established past 

persecution, the government nonetheless met its burden of 

proof to show that he could safely relocate to Honduras. (8 

C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(3)(ii)). The Immigration Judge was 

convinced that, since Mendoza lived with his sisters for a 

period of time after the death threats without any incident, 

this was sufficient evidence to show that safe relocation was 

possible. She noted, however, that her finding also was 

grounded in her assessment that Mendoza failed to 

substantiate his claim that he was fearful after the death 

threats or that he needed to go into hiding when he was 

staying with his sisters. The BIA’s ruling that Mendoza did 

not prove the Honduran government’s unwillingness or 

inability to protect him implicitly adopts this reasoning, 

which obviated the need for an explicit ruling that Mendoza 

could safely relocate there.

Although these three aspects of the decision give us an 

idea of how the BIA viewed Mendoza’s petition, we 

nonetheless are baffled by its assessment that the country 

reports were unimportant to the outcome of the case. To the 

contrary, we regard the evidence in these reports as a critical 

piece of the record.

The BIA raised up the convictions of Valladares and 

Amidor as affirmative evidence of a properly functioning 

justice system that contradicts Mendoza’s claims. Although 

evidence of country conditions around the time of those

 

fundamentally contradict the Immigration Judge’s reasoning 

and ruling, and they also eliminate any basis for the BIA’s 

implicit ruling that Mendoza can safely relocate. Therefore, 

we may review the Immigration Judge’s ruling on this issue.
20

convictions is not in this record, the reports Mendoza 

submitted give us a substantive understanding of conditions 

in Honduras when he received the death threats: widespread 

human rights abuses; unchecked politically motivated 

violence; and a poorly functioning justice system, vulnerable 

to corruption, that failed to reign in the violence. As a result, 

we are convinced that convictions occurring more than a 

decade before the death threats have little value in the context 

of the entire record. The convictions do not contradict or 

even diminish evidence portraying fundamentally different 

country conditions at the time of the threats.

21 Therefore, we 

conclude that—in light of this entire record—the BIA’s 

reliance on the convictions of Valladares and Amidor to form 

conclusions about country conditions at the time of the death 

threats was not reasonably grounded in the record and is not 

owed our deference.

Similarly, the BIA implies that—like ValdiviezoGaldamez—the record is too weak to support an inference 

that the justice system is corrupt and biased. However, 

Mendoza grounded his inference by testifying that Valladares 

and Umanzor belong to the National Party, and by testifying 

that Umanzor is the niece of the woman who was a political 

opponent of Mendoza’s father. This testimony was not 

challenged. He then pointed to the country reports. One 

report noted that only a small fraction of crimes brought to 

the government are ever investigated. A second report

discussed a justice system that is systemically vulnerable to 

 21 Unlike Menjivar, these reports were not general in nature, 

but rather provided analysis that gave close support to the 

claims Mendoza made about problems with the Honduran 

justice system. Menjivar, 416 F.3d at 922.
21

political influence and corruption. Finally, another report 

documented that the Honduran government failed to 

prosecute officials who were known to have committed 

human rights violations. This was only a small part of the 

country condition evidence presented that supported his 

claims. These country reports demonstrate that Mendoza’s 

experience (threats of violence that receive no government 

response or investigation) was by no means an isolated case. 

All of this provides a compelling grounding for his inference 

that the inaction on his complaints was due to the shared 

political affiliations of the perpetrator and the Judge, and a 

justice system that allows and enables such corruption by 

political influence.22

Finally, as to the Immigration Judge’s observation, 

implicitly endorsed by the BIA, that Mendoza did not 

legitimate his fear or his need to go into hiding, we regard this 

conclusion as contrary to the record. As we have already 

stated, after establishing that he faced death threats, Mendoza 

provided evidence of a systemic problem with the justice 

system that was not unique to Apacilagua. The reports made 

clear that politically motivated violence, virtually 

unrestrained, was a reality that afflicted the entire country. 

 22 As for the BIA’s alternative inference regarding Mendoza’s 

impatience, we generally defer to inferences made by the 

immigration judge or BIA. But deference is not owed when 

the inference is not reasonably grounded in the record “as a 

whole.” Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir.

2003). In this instance, there is absolutely nothing in the 

record to support the BIA’s theory that impatience explains 

the government’s inaction. It is, therefore, not entitled to our 

deference.
22

Therefore, in the context of the entire record, Mendoza’s fear 

and his need to go into hiding have been amply and

compellingly substantiated.

Throughout this review of the BIA’s decision, we have 

been aware that the deferential “substantial evidence” 

standard of review establishes a high bar for disturbing the 

factual conclusions of the BIA. Moreover, we know that—

even when we come across evidence in the record that would 

compel a different finding—“the proper course, except in rare 

circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional 

investigation or explanation.” Florida Power & Light Co. v. 

Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985). This would ordinarily be 

the case particularly where, as here, the BIA’s analysis of key 

evidence is scant. Nonetheless, there are a few instances in 

which ‘“application of the correct legal principles to the 

record could lead only to the same conclusion’” and in these 

rare cases ‘“there is no need to require agency 

reconsideration.’” Kang v. Attorney General of the United 

States, 611 F.3d 157, 168 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Zabala v. 

Astrue, 595 F.3d 402, 409 (2d Cir. 2010) (alterations 

omitted)). This is such a case.

In this instance, we are convinced that evidence of the 

politically motivated death threats, the inaction on Mendoza’s 

complaints, a perpetrator and judge who shared a political 

affiliation in opposition to that of Mendoza, and evidence of a 

politically corrupt justice system that failed to reign in 

politically motivated violence in Honduras compels two 

findings: first, the Honduran government was unwilling or 

unable to protect Mendoza from death threats; and, second,

Mendoza could not safely relocate in Honduras. These 

findings, in turn, lead only to one reasonable conclusion: ‘“it 
23

is more likely than not that [Mendoza’s] life or freedom 

would be threatened [in Honduras] on account of . . . political 

opinion.’” Ordonez–Tevalan, 837 F.3d at 341 (quoting 

Amanfi, 328 F.3d at 726); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1). For this 

reason, we conclude that this case is one of those rare 

instances in which remand is not necessary. The record 

compels a conclusion that withholding of removal should be 

granted, and we will do so.

IV.

For all of these reasons, we will reverse the BIA’s 

decision and grant Luis Mendoza Ordonez’s petition for 

withholding of removal, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 

1231(b)(3)(A). We will deny the petition for review on the 

request for asylum.