NUMBER 13-13-00182-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

RAYMOND BROUSSARD JR., Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 94th District Court

of Nueces County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Garza and Perkes

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Garza

A jury convicted appellant, Raymond Broussard Jr., of robbery, a second-degree 

felony, and assessed punishment at eight years’ imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. See 

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02 (a)(1), (b) (West 2011). By a single issue, appellant 

challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.
2

I. BACKGROUND

Curtis Manning, the alleged robbery victim, testified that he was home at his 

apartment in Corpus Christi, Texas, late in the evening on September 23, 2011. A 

woman he had met and exchanged phone numbers with the day before, “Cici” (later 

identified as Cecilia Jensen), called and said that she would come by later. Manning 

was outside when she arrived. Jensen, who was driving the vehicle, exited and quickly 

entered Manning’s apartment, followed by two other men, later identified as appellant 

and Ricky Perales. Jensen opened Manning’s refrigerator and handed cans of Coke to 

appellant and Perales. Manning told them to leave his house. Perales hit him in the 

head with his fist or a Coke can. At some point, a third passenger, later identified as 

Charles Harris, entered the apartment, and all three men beat Manning. The men took 

$70 in cash out of Manning’s pocket. After Jensen and the men left, Manning called 

911 and described the vehicle and a partial license plate number to the dispatcher. 

Appellant, Harris, and Perales were tried together for robbery.1 Jensen pleaded 

guilty to robbery before the trial. At trial, however, she testified that she did not commit 

robbery and that she had pleaded guilty only because her lawyer pressured her to do 

so.2 

Jensen testified that she had known appellant for several months and that he 

lived with her in a motel room that she has rented. Jensen stated that she is a 

prostitute, that she had known Manning for several years, and that he had been a 

customer on about eight occasions. On the day of the incident, Jensen and Perales 

were using crack cocaine most of the day. Jensen went to Manning’s apartment 

 

1

The jury found Perales guilty, but found Harris not guilty.

2

The trial judge appointed another lawyer to represent Jensen during Broussard’s trial. 
3

because he owed her several hundred dollars. Appellant, Perales, and Harris went with 

her, but she did not tell them where she was going or why. There was no plan to rob 

anyone. Jensen stated that Manning had been using crack that day; that, when she 

arrived at his apartment, Manning “got all crazy” and became aggressive; and that what 

happened after that is “a blur.” 

Jensen and the others drove away from Manning’s apartment. They were 

stopped by the police shortly thereafter based on Manning’s description of the vehicle. 

Manning identified the vehicle’s occupants as the robbers.

Perales testified that he knows Jensen and has seen her prostituting in the 

neighborhood. Jensen picked him up on the night of the incident to give him a ride to 

his sister’s home. Perales stated that he, Harris, and appellant were in the vehicle 

when Jensen stopped at Manning’s apartment. Appellant and Jensen went inside, but 

Perales and Harris waited outside. The apartment door was open. Perales saw 

Manning pull out a $50 bill and then Manning appeared to become aggressive and 

pushed Jensen. Appellant and Harris tried to calm Manning down. Manning “kind of 

went down, like fell down.” Manning gave Jensen a $50 bill and a $20 bill. They left the 

apartment, with Jensen driving the vehicle. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

The court of criminal appeals has held that there is “no meaningful distinction 

between the Jackson v. Virginia legal sufficiency standard and the Clewis factualsufficiency standard” and that the Jackson standard “is the only standard that a 

reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support 

each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a 
4

reasonable doubt.” Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902–03, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2010) (plurality op.) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Accordingly, 

we review claims of evidentiary insufficiency under “a rigorous and proper application of 

the Jackson standard of review.” Id. at 906–07, 912. Under the Jackson standard, “the 

relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; see Brooks, 323 S.W.3d 

at 898–99 (characterizing the Jackson standard as: “Considering all of the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the verdict, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt.”). The fact-finder is the exclusive judge of the credibility of 

witnesses and of the weight to be given to their testimony. Anderson v. State, 322 

S.W.3d 401, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (citing Lancon v. 

State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). Reconciliation of conflicts in the 

evidence is within the fact-finder's exclusive province. Id. (citing Wyatt v. State, 23 

S.W.3d 18, 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). We must resolve any inconsistencies in the 

testimony in favor of the verdict. Id. (citing Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2000)). 

Sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as 

defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.W2d 234, 240 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Such a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is 

authorized by the indictment, and does not necessarily increase the State’s burden of 

proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes 

the particular offense for which the defendant was tried. Id. 
5

Here, the State was required to prove that appellant: (1) in the course of 

committing theft as defined in chapter 31 of the penal code, and (2) with intent to obtain 

or maintain control of the property, (3) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly (4) caused 

bodily injury to Manning. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02(a)(1); Sorrells v. State, 

343 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The phrase “in the course of committing 

theft” is defined by section 29.01 of the penal code to mean “conduct that occurs in an 

attempt to commit, during the commission, or in immediate flight after the attempt or 

commission of theft.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.01 (West 2011); Sorrells, 343 

S.W.3d at 155–56. A person commits theft under chapter 31 if he unlawfully 

appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of the property. See TEX. PENAL 

CODE ANN. § 31.03(a) (West Supp. 2011); Sorrells, 343 S.W.3d at 156. 

III. DISCUSSION 

The State argues that appellant’s issue is inadequately briefed and presents 

nothing for review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1; Gallegos v. State, 76 S.W.3d 224, 228 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. ref’d). 

Except for stating the applicable standard of review, appellant’s argument, in its 

entirety, is as follows: 

Circumstantially, it appears as though Mr. Curtiss [sic] was a willing 

client of the prostitute Cecilia Jensen involved in this case. Curtiss’s [sic] 

credibility was damaged by the circumstances surrounding his 

involvement in this case. The fact that he apparently was a customer of 

this prostitute who, coincidentally, knew exactly where he lived, combined 

with his coincidentally standing outside at the same time that the prostitute 

was returning to his house to collect money, reeks of untruthfulness. The 

$70 that Curtiss [sic] verified was taken from him obviously was payment 

for her prostitution services. The totality of the circumstances indicates 

that Curtiss [sic] did indeed utilize the services of a prostitute. It cannot be 

ascertained from the witnesses presented at trial what exactly the 

circumstances were that led to whatever dispute happened.
6

Because of the dearth of credible witnesses presented against the 

defendant, the jury’s finding that defendant did commit the offense of 

aggravated robbery was erroneous due to legally sufficient evidence 

presented at trial. A new trial is required.[3]

Appellant’s brief contains no citations to the record, does not discuss the 

elements of the offense, does not identify the specific element challenged, and does not 

discuss how the State’s evidence is insufficient. The jury was charged on the law of 

parties, but appellant’s brief does not mention or discuss the law of parties. See TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 7.01, 7.02 (West 2011). Accordingly, we conclude that appellant’s 

issue is inadequately briefed and presents nothing for review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1;

Gallegos, 76 S.W.3d at 228; see also Pierce v. State, No. 10-09-00320-CR, 2010 WL 

2683052, at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco July 7, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication) (“At the very least, [appellant’s brief] must direct the Court to an element or 

elements of the offense that is being challenged.”); Camacho v. State, No. 08-06-

00090-CR, 2008 WL 882640, at *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso April 3, 2008, no pet.) (not 

designated for publication) (finding issue inadequately briefed where evidence was not 

discussed, there were no citations to the record, and no argument pointing out how the 

evidence was insufficient or what element of the offense was insufficiently proven).

Nevertheless, in our sole discretion, we have reviewed the record under the 

appropriate standards. We conclude the evidence is sufficient to support appellant’s 

conviction. The jury, as fact-finder, is the exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses 

and of the weight to be given to their testimony. Anderson, 322 S.W.3d at 405. It is the 

jury’s exclusive province to reconcile conflicts in the evidence. Id. The jury could have 

 

3

An appellate court finding that evidence is insufficient mandates that the appellant be acquitted. 

Benavidez v. State, 323 S.W.3d 179, 181 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). 
7

believed Manning’s testimony and disbelieved any conflicting testimony. See id. Giving 

proper deference to the jury's role as fact-finder and viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the verdict, see id., we conclude the evidence is sufficient to support 

appellant’s conviction. We overrule appellant’s sole issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

________________________

DORI CONTRERAS GARZA

Justice

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the

15th day of August, 2013.