Measuring the Influence of China’s 

Belt and Road Initiative

MAJ Alex Oliver (NIU MSSI 2020) and Dr. Adam Jungdahl

The prevailing narrative among observers in academic, policy, and 

intelligence circles is that China’s effort to expand its international 

influence through aggressive outward foreign direct investment, 

including under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), will diminish U.S. 

global diplomatic power. By measuring China’s geopolitical influence 

longitudinally—through alignment in United Nations General 

Assembly voting and affinity expressed in foreign public opinion 

polling over time—this study finds that China’s relative influence

appears to be in decline. This raises the possibility that the IC may 

overestimate the importance of China’s foreign direct investment 

initiatives, including the BRI.

RESEARCH SHORT

CONTRARIAN Alternative viewpoints informed 

by academic research

February 16, 2021

What this is:

This report is the product 

of academic research. As the 

IC’s university, NIU is uniquely 

positioned to use academic 

approaches to research—and 

report on—subjects of interest 

to the community.

What this is not:

This is not finished intelligence. 

The opinions expressed in this 

report are solely the author’s 

and not those of the National 

Intelligence University, 

Defense Intelligence Agency, 

Department of Defense, or any 

other U.S. Government agency.

IMAGE FROM SHUTTERSTOCK
2

What Is the Belt and Road Initiative?

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an expansive foreign and economic policy of the 

Chinese Communist Party that includes several massive, government-directed foreign

investment programs. The initiative is designed to strengthen the Chinese economy by 

fostering trade and securing access to raw materials, while enhancing China’s international 

image and diplomatic influence abroad.1 Since BRI kicked off in 2013, the government has 

invested more than $200 billion in BRI projects across some 70 countries.

2 Investments made 

under BRI now account for roughly half 

of China’s annual outbound foreign 

direct investment (OFDI) expenditures 

(see Figure 1).

The U.S. intelligence and policymaking 

communities have monitored BRI’s 

progress warily, fearing that Beijing’s 

aggressive OFDI activity challenges

U.S. interests globally. Critical to 

understanding the magnitude of this

challenge is the measurement of how 

BRI investments correlate with changes 

in China’s influence abroad. This first 

look reveals that, despite large increases 

in China-origin OFDI, there was an 

overall decline in support for Chinese positions at the United Nations General Assembly and 

in international public opinion from 2005 to 2018 (the most recent data available).3, 4

BRI’s Geopolitical Aims and Measuring Achievement

Although BRI is largely focused on fueling China’s strategic economic growth—three of its five 

major goals (“facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, [and] financial integration”) are economic 

in nature (see box)—the official plan also cites two explicitly geopolitical aims: “policy 

coordination... and people-to-people bonds.” 5 Policy coordination is inherently political in 

nature because it requires intergovernmental negotiation—an activity performed by politicians

and driven by motivations other than market forces. Improving people-to-people bonds is also a 

political goal because cultural ties and affinities are not considered in the calculation of pure 

economic utility. One might argue, however, that considering these factors is bound to create 

economic inefficiency. Several anecdotal cases illustrate this point, including BRI-funded 

projects that are designed to support the policy’s geopolitical goals: construction of clearly 

unprofitable oil pipelines (e.g., the proposed Gwadar, Pakistan–Xinjiang, China oil pipeline) or 

investment in port facilities with murky economic but strategic security benefits (e.g., the 

Hambantota port in Sri Lanka).

6 Indeed, some scholars argue that the principal purposes of BRI 

are cultural diffusion and increasing affinity for China, rather than investment return.

7

Figure 1. China: Comparison of OFDI Spending Total and BRI Investment, 

2005-18

Source: Derek Scissors, “Chinese Investment Dataset—China Global Investment Tracker (CGIT),” American 

Enterprise Institute, last modified January 18, 2019, accessed September 16, 2019, http://www.aei.org/

china-globalinvestment-tracker/.
3

Measuring the Geopolitical Success...

“Policy coordination” occurs when governments agree to align 

their respective national policies to achieve mutual benefit. 

Measuring these agreements directly is challenging because 

each bilateral agreement is unique in scope and scale; simply 

counting the number of agreements between countries would 

be misleading. The United Nations General Assembly 

(UNGA) is a near-universal and annual forum in which 

countries express policy preferences through voting on UNGA 

resolutions. Because these votes are comparable in kind and

the enduring nature of the UNGA means there is consistent 

data over time, UNGA resolution voting results provide a 

reasonable mechanism for measuring political affinity and 

policy coordination between China and other countries.

“People-to-people” bonds are straightforward theoretically, if 

more challenging practically, to measure. Bonds, or shared 

emotions or feelings, are observed by analyzing the sentiments 

of a host population about China. Practically speaking, polling 

the opinions of a representative sample of people in a host 

country, preferably over time, can measure the growth or 

decline in their affinity for China. Because the Pew Research 

Center’s “Global Trends and Attitudes” survey has conducted 

polling about attitudes toward China across 34 countries for the 

last 17 years, and reflects the most complete publicly available 

topline favorability dataset, these survey results have been used 

in this study.

16, 17 The 34 countries from which the Pew Global 

Trends and Attitudes data are collected are not necessarily a 

representative sample of all countries. On average these 

countries skew wealthier and freer than a global average, which 

presents an important limitation to our analysis, as the target 

countries for BRI skew poorer and less free than a global 

average. Nonetheless, this dataset provides the best data 

available to the authors in so far as it contains the largest sample 

of countries, applies uniform and rigorous sampling techniques, 

and is available across the time period under examination.

... of 15 Years of Growing Chinese OFDI

In pursuit of these goals, BRI increased OFDI by statecontrolled and private Chinese enterprises by 45 percent 

between 2013 and late 2015, compared to the 13-year period before BRI was introduced18—and 

the program’s value is likely to reach more than a trillion dollars by 2027.19 Because BRI is 

MEETING CHINA’S GOALS FOR 

STRATEGIC ECONOMIC GROWTH

The main economic aims of BRI are:

• To improve transportation 

infrastructure to decrease the cost 

of getting Chinese goods to existing 

markets (efficiency-seeking).

• To build new transportation 

infrastructure to allow access for 

Chinese goods to enter new markets 

(market-seeking).

• To gain access for Chinese companies 

to new sources of raw materials and 

human resources (resource-seeking 

and strategic asset-seeking).8

These aims are shaped by external needs 

(“pull factors”) and domestic constraints 

(“push factors”). The most pressing of 

China’s external needs is to secure access 

to a growing share of the world’s energy

reserves in order to sustain overall 

economic growth at predictable costs.9

New transportation networks, built under 

the auspices of BRI, provide diversified 

means to access energy over terrestrial and 

maritime routes, but these networks also 

provide a means for China to expand the 

circulation of its currency, the renminbi, 

which is also important for Chinese 

economic power.10, 11, 12, 13 From the 

perspective of domestic push factors, 

China’s principal drivers of growth during 

the past 20 years—manufacturing and 

domestic construction—are diminishing.14

Chinese labor has become more expensive, 

driving up the cost of production. 

Ultimately, China needs access to new 

markets to sustain growth.15 
4

relatively new, however, the available data on the policy’s results are still meager. To mitigate 

the limited availability of longitudinal data, this study broadens the period examined from 

2005 to 2018, including the seven years prior to, and five years since, the announcement of 

BRI. The American Enterprise Institute’s Chinese Global Investment Tracker (CGIT)

provides the most comprehensive, objective, and publicly available compilation of Chinese 

OFDI.

20 Consisting of more than 1,500 cases (investment projects) from 2005 to spring 2019, 

the CGIT harvests data from corporate sources—typically, the parties involved in these OFDI 

transactions. It also annotates those cases announced under BRI. According to the CGIT 

curator, this practice makes the data more transparent than those provided by China’s Ministry 

of Finance and Commerce, which publishes topline monthly investment outflows but without 

case-level data to support them.

21 The values of both BRI and non-BRI OFDI investments are 

included in our analysis. Although this combination complicates our ability to attribute these 

findings to the BRI policy specifically, rather than OFDI in totality, our findings have direct 

implications on the feasibility of BRI.

Impact of Economic Inducements on “Policy Coordination

and People-to-People Bonds”

Using Chinese OFDI data from the CGIT,22 UNGA voting records,23 and foreign public opinion 

polling24 to measure how OFDI spending is influencing foreign government behavior and public 

sentiment toward China leads to three key findings. First, foreign countries’ willingness to vote 

with China in the UNGA declined overall from 2005 to 2018 (see Figure 2). This decline was 

Figure 2. Change in UNGA Voting Coincidence, 2005-18

Source: Erik Voeten, Anton Strezhnev, and Michael Bailey, “United Nations General Assembly Voting Data,” Harvard Dataverse, 2009, 

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/LEJUQZ.
5

consistent across countries that received 

high and low amounts of Chinese OFDI 

(relative to GDP). Although countries with 

high Chinese OFDI were more likely to 

take the same position as China in UNGA 

voting overall, their willingness to do so 

declined at roughly the same rate as 

countries that received little or no Chinese 

OFDI (see Figure 3). For example, in 2005 

the average voting coincidence rate 

(percent of the time a country voted with 

China) among countries with high Chinese 

OFDI was 80.9 percent, compared to 70.6 

percent among low or no Chinese OFDI 

countries. By 2018 the average voting 

coincidence rate had dropped to 72.9 

percent and 64.9 percent, respectively. 

Second, the significant increase in Chinese 

OFDI—rising from $19.1 billion/year in 

2005 to $198 billion/year in 2018, at which 

time about $122 billion was in BRI 25—

did not improve public opinion of China 

among recipient countries. Indeed, a pattern 

of decline in foreign public opinion of 

China over time appears across countries 

receiving high or low amounts of Chinese 

OFDI. Like the UNGA voting patterns 

discussed above, countries receiving large 

amounts of Chinese OFDI generally had 

higher initial opinions of China compared 

to those countries receiving little Chinese 

OFDI. However, both groups experienced 

a similar decline in pro-China sentiment. 

For example, among countries receiving high levels of Chinese OFDI, public opinion of China 

declined from 61.5 percent in 2005 to 52.4 percent in 2018 (see Figure 3). For those countries 

receiving low to no Chinese OFDI, public opinion fell from 55.1 percent to 44.1 percent.

This study considered the possibility that changes to China’s political influence resulting from 

OFDI may take some time to manifest. A test of the relationship between OFDI and both 

measures of influence, lagged at annual intervals from one to six years, yielded no consistent 

and meaningful evidence of association. This suggests there are no delayed onset positive 

effects for China.

Sources: Derek Scissors, “Chinese Investment Dataset—China Global Investment Tracker (CGIT),” 

American Enterprise Institute, last modified January 18, 2019, accessed September 16, 2019, 

http://www.aei.org/china-globalinvestment-tracker/; Erik Voeten, Anton Strezhnev, and Michael Bailey, 

“United Nations General Assembly Voting Data,” Harvard Dataverse, 2009, https://doi.org/10.7910/

DVN/LEJUQZ; Pew Research Center, “International Methodology—Pew Research Center International 

Surveys,” Pew Research Center Methods, https://www.pewresearch.org/methods/interactives/

international-methodology/.

Figure 3. Measuring Policy Coordination and Affinity Relative 

to Chinese OFDI
6

Third, countries that support China at the UNGA have, in general, a more favorable public 

opinion toward China, suggesting some level of congruence between popular opinions about 

China and foreign government policy preferences (see Figure 4). There are some notable 

exceptions to this trend, such as in Japan where average favorability toward China hovers 

around 20 percent but voting coincidence in the UNGA hovers around 60 percent. Similarly, 

in the United States and Israel, public opinion toward China is more neutral (roughly 40 and 

50 percent), but at the UNGA both countries take the same voting position as China only about 

20 percent of the time. The disconnect between popular and elite affinity in these cases suggests 

other omitted variables (e.g., historical grievances, alliances and rivalries, strategic calculations, 

etc.) may be at play. (For more on this study’s findings regarding UNGA voting coincidence 

and popular affinity for China as a result of economic inducements, please see the Appendix.)

Figure 4. China: Comparing UNGA Voting Coincidence and Popular Affinity, 2005-18

Implications

Among U.S. policymakers, analysts, and academics there is a common concern about the rise 

of China and its implications for U.S. foreign policy. A key argument in this debate is that 

China’s growing economic clout and its willingness to pursue renminbi-diplomacy through 

OFDI will draw countries out of the American sphere of influence and reduce U.S. diplomatic 

and political power in international affairs. The results of this study challenge the notion that 

Chinese OFDI, and the BRI specifically, are enhancing China’s reputation abroad or improving 

China’s success in achieving its aims at the UN. To the contrary, this study finds a relatively 

steady decline in foreign public opinion of China, as well as an overall decline in other 

countries’ willingness to vote with China in the UNGA—even as Chinese outflows of capital 

Sources: Erik Voeten, Anton Strezhnev, and Michael Bailey, “United Nations General Assembly Voting Data,” Harvard Dataverse, 2009, 

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/LEJUQZ; Pew Research Center, “International Methodology—Pew Research Center International Surveys,” 

Pew Research Center Methods, https://www.pewresearch.org/methods/interactives/international-methodology/.
7

have skyrocketed—and these trends are consistent regardless of the quantity of Chinese 

investment a country receives. These findings cast doubt on the utility of using instruments of 

economic power alone to generate political influence.

Although the data presented here ends in 2018, the negative trend in foreign opinions of China

appears to have accelerated during the COVID-19 pandemic. A Pew Research Center report 

released in October 2020 found that unfavorable views of China had risen by an average of 12

percent since 2019.26 The report indicates that Beijing’s handling of the coronavirus outbreak 

has fueled widespread criticism and a sharp decline in public affinity, particularly in the IndoPacific countries of Japan, South Korea, and Australia.27 Among the countries surveyed, the 

level of negative opinions of China had “reached their highest points since the [Pew Research] 

Center began polling on this topic more than a decade ago.”28

Finally, it is important to note that while Beijing may not be succeeding in changing opinions 

at the national level, it may be achieving more localized behavior and opinion change around 

specific investment sites. Further research should focus on developing a more granular 

understanding of sentiment toward China at the provincial and municipality levels, particularly 

in areas surrounding major China-funded construction projects. Additionally, as more data 

become available, researchers should monitor the current downtrend to see if it holds into the 

coming decade.

MAJ Alex Oliver, NIU MSSI 2020, currently serves as a program manager at the Defense Innovation 

Unit, where he focuses on autonomy and artificial intelligence. This Research Short evolved from MAJ

Oliver’s thesis research at NIU’s College of Strategic Intelligence.

Dr. Adam Jungdahl is a research faculty member and co-director of the Data Science Intelligence 

Center at NIU. His research focuses on the proliferation of emerging technologies and the application 

of social science and machine learning methods to intelligence topics. 

If you have comments, questions, or a suggestion for a Research Short topic or article, please contact 

the NIU Office of Research at NIU_OOR@dodiis.mil.
8

Appendix

Economic Inducements

China’s expanding OFDI under BRI appears from this study to be falling short in meeting the 

geopolitical goals of enhancing China’s international image and diplomatic influence abroad, 

as well as IC and policymaker concerns about challenging U.S. interests globally. 

UNGA Voting Coincidence

This study’s results differ from previous investigations that have focused largely on the impact 

of trade flows on political outcomes, measured in various ways including overall UNGA voting 

convergence and voting on specific high visibility issues, such as Taiwanese sovereignty. In 

general, the findings of these earlier studies, such as an examination of China’s commercial 

relations with Africa and Latin America spanning 1992 to 2006,29 , 30 have supported the 

theoretical proposition that economic power translates into political influence, particularly as 

smaller states recalculate their interests to align with the larger trading partner.31

This study’s finding—that China’s ability to convert economic power into geopolitical influence 

is limited—most likely rests on factors beyond economics and politics. 32 A principal 

confounding factor for China in gaining geopolitical influence is the deeply held concern among 

foreign leaders, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, about China as a security threat.33 The 

degree to which suspicion of Beijing spreads globally—and becomes reflected in declining 

influence over UNGA voting patterns—may well depend upon China’s conduct in the course of 

implementing BRI at the local level and the impact this has on declining popular affinity.34, 35 

Popular Affinity

Several assumptions underpinning prevailing theory about public opinion of foreign 

governments are that “citizen opinions are ‘rational,’ in the sense that they are relatively stable, 

coherent, and plausibly related to world events”36 and that people will be generally pleased by 

the prospect of OFDI entering their country; however, a priori attitudes about the donor country 

may influence perceptions about foreign aid.37 Some forms of economic activity are found to 

improve an investor country’s image more than others, such as support to public health 

programs or aid administered by third parties, which is viewed less suspiciously.38, 39 Opinions 

also can vary within countries along socio-economic and political cleavages,40, 41 with some 

evidence pointing to education as a critical factor influencing perceptions of Chinese aid.42 
9

Endnotes

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Transformation and Development, ed. Anja Mihr (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1007/

978-3-030-42775-7_5.

2 Michele Ruta et al., Belt and Road Economics: Opportunities and Risks of Transport Corridors, The World Bank, 

June 18, 2019, 4, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/publication/belt-and-road-economicsopportunities-and-risks-of-transport-corridors#:~:text=Belt%20and%20Road%20Economics%3A%20

Opportunities%20and%20Risks%20of,and%20manage%20the%20risks%20of%20participating%20in%20BRI.

3 Soo Yeon Kim and Bruce Russett, “The New Politics of Voting Alignments in the United Nations General 

Assembly,” International Organization 50, no. 4 (Autumn 1996): 629-52, accessed February 2, 2021,

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2704240.

4 Benjamin E. Goldsmith and Yusaku Horiuchi, “In Search of Soft Power: Does Foreign Public Opinion Matter for 

US Foreign Policy?,” World Politics 64, no. 3 (July 2012): 555-85, accessed February 2, 2021, http://www.jstor

.org/stable/41682889.

5 National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China, Vision and Actions on Jointly 

Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, March 28, 2015, accessed November 19, 

2019, https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease_8232/201503/t20150330_1193900.html.

6 Jeremy Garlick, “Deconstructing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Pipe Dreams Versus Geopolitical 

Realities,” Journal of Contemporary China 27, no. 112 (July 2018): 519–33, 

http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a2h&AN=130206546&site=ehost-live; Romi Jain, 

“China’s Economic Expansion in South Asia,” Indian Journal of Asian Affairs 31, no. 1/2 (June-December 2018): 

21–36, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26608821.

7 Lina Benabdallah, “Contesting the International Order by Integrating It: The Case of China’s Belt and Road 

Initiative,” Third World Quarterly 40, no. 1 (January 2019): 92–108, 

http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=135460624&site=ehost-live; Muhammad Asif 

and Yang Ling, “Belt and Road Initiative: A Spirit of Chinese Cultural Thought,” International Journal of Business 

and Management 13, no. 12 (November 10, 2018): 9, https://journalofresearch.us/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/40-

53.pdf#:~:text=Recommended%20citation%3A%20Muhammad%20Asif%2C%20Prof.%20Yang%20Bo%20Ling.,

that%20will%20be%20particularly%20helpful%20to%20face%20contemporary.

8 Joshua Eisenman, “Contextualizing China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” written testimony for the U.S. China 

Economic and Security Review Commission, submitted on January 19, 2018, accessed September 8, 2019, 

https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Eisenman_USCC%20Testimony_20180119.pdf.

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2005): 27, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20031703; David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power

(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), 162, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/dialibraryebooks/detail.action?docID=1113182.

10 Shambaugh, China Goes Global, 162.

11 Shambaugh, China Goes Global, 164.

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and Chinese Experience,” Emerging Markets Review 38 (March 1, 2019): 90-91, 

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1566014117304855.

13 Eric Helleiner and Jonathan Kirshner, Great Wall of Money: Power and Politics in China’s International Monetary 

Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 114, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/dialibraryebooks/detail.action?docID=3138652.

14 Andy Brown, “Regional Report: China’s Construction Industry,” KHL, September 3, 2019, accessed April 15, 

2020, https://www.khl.com/international-construction/regional-report-chinas-construction-industry/139933.article.

15 Eisenman, “Contextualizing China’s Belt and Road Initiative.”

16 Laura Silver, “People Around the Globe Are Divided in Their Opinions of China,” Pew Research Center, 

December 5, 2019, accessed December 29, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/12/05/peoplearound-the-globe-are-divided-in-their-opinionsof-china/.
10

17 Pew Research Center, “International Methodology—Pew Research Center International Surveys,” Pew Research 

Center Methods, last modified January 8, 2019, accessed January 2, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/methods/

interactives/international-methodology/.

18 Shu Yu, Xingwang Qian, and Taoxiong Liu, “Belt and Road Initiative and Chinese Firms’ Outward Foreign Direct 

Investment,” Emerging Markets Review 41 (December 1, 2019): 3, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/

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11

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