Russia’s New Arctic Policy 2035: 

Implications for Great Power Tension 

Over the Northern Sea Route

Julian R. Meade

Russia’s new Arctic policy principles illustrate the significance of the 

Northern Sea Route (NSR) to Moscow’s Arctic national interests and 

could lead to increased great power tension over the NSR. Russia 

and other states—including the United States—dispute whether the 

NSR traverses international waters or Russia’s internal waters. This

Research Short analyzes the policy principles underlying Russia’s new 

15-year Arctic strategy and its implications for the NSR and great

power tension.

RESEARCH SHORT

INSIGHT Sharing academic research July 21, 2020

What this is:

This report is the product 

of academic research. As the 

IC’s university, NIU is uniquely 

positioned to use academic 

approaches to research—and 

report on—subjects of interest 

to the community.

What this is not:

This is not finished intelligence. 

The opinions expressed in this 

report are solely the author’s 

and not those of the National 

Intelligence University, 

Defense Intelligence Agency, 

Department of Defense, or 

any other U.S. Government 

agency.

IMAGE FROM SHUTTERSTOCK
2

Russia’s New Arctic Policy 2035

On March 5, 2020, President Vladimir Putin approved the policy principles in Russia’s new, 15-

year Arctic strategy, Basic Principles of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic 

Zone Until 2035 (referred to as the Arctic Policy 2035 in this Research Short).2 These policy 

principles define Moscow’s goals and actions 

for implementing state policy in the Arctic 

Zone of the Russian Federation (or Arctic

zone) through 2035. Eclipsed by the COVID19 global pandemic and Putin’s announced 

plans to revamp the Russian constitution, Arctic 

Policy 2035 has received little attention. The 

full document was not translated into English, 

further limiting its exposure. 3 Nevertheless, 

Arctic Policy 2035 provides important insights 

into Moscow’s view of, and plans for, its Arctic 

zone—and potential implications for the 

Northern Sea Route (NSR). Running generally 

parallel to Russia’s vast Arctic coastline, the 

NSR is the strategic backbone of Russia’s 

economic future and vital to Arctic maritime 

shipping. Moscow published these policy 

principles “at a time [when] tensions between 

Russia and its Arctic neighbors are increasing 

and just ahead of Russia chairing the Arctic 

Council in 2021.”4 (See box.)

Arctic Policy 2035 

National Interests

The Kremlin identifies six national interests 

at stake in Arctic Policy 2035. (See table.) 

This includes two new national interests since 

Moscow’s previous Arctic strategy in 2008. 

This paper assesses the impact of three of 

Russia’s declared interests that increase the 

potential for great power tension over the 

NSR: protecting sovereignty and territorial 

integrity, developing the Russian Arctic as 

a strategic resource base, and developing 

the NSR as a globally competitive national 

transport corridor. 

The Arctic Council is the premier intergovernmental forum 

for promoting cooperation in the Arctic region. It is a policy 

recommending—not policymaking—entity. It is explicitly 

prohibited from addressing military security issues.

The council consists of eight member states: Canada, 

Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the 

United States. It also has a number of nonstate permanent 

participants who represent the Arctic region’s indigenous 

peoples, as well as several state and nonstate actors who 

have observer status on the council, including China. The 

Arctic Council’s chairmanship rotates among the eight 

member states every two years.1

Figure 1. Arctic Region Showing the Northern Sea Route and 

Other Arctic Shipping Routes

Source: “Map of the Arctic region showing shipping routes Northeast Passage, Northern 

Sea Route, and Northwest Passage, and bathymetry” by Susie Harder, 2009, Arctic Council -

Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report, https://web.archive.org/web/2014110102

1336/http:/www.arctic.noaa.gov/detect/documents/AMSA_2009_Report_2nd_print.pdf. 

Wikimedia Commons.
3

Source: Basic Principles of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic Zone Until 2035, (Arctic Policy 2035), Government of the Russian 

Federation, March 5, 2020.

Protecting Russia’s Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity

Russia has a national interest in the Arctic for “ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity 

of the Russian Federation [emphasis added].”5 This is a new Arctic national interest, one that 

clearly raises the Arctic’s profile as a Russian national priority. This is not surprising because 

the Kremlin has often emphasized the Arctic’s increasing importance to the state. Nevertheless, 

Arctic Policy 2035 clearly ties Russian sovereignty and territorial integrity to the Arctic. 

Responsibility for ensuring Russia’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity falls upon the 

Russian military. The main military security goals of the new Arctic policy are “prevention of 

the use of military force against Russia, protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity,”6

along with increasing Russia’s combat fighting capabilities in the Arctic.7 This reinforces a 

continuation of Russia’s Arctic policy development that Moscow has expressed over several 

years and in numerous actions, such as the ongoing military modernization program along 

Russia’s Arctic coastline.

Arctic Policy 2035 explicitly introduces the concepts of sovereignty and territorial integrity, 

which align with Russia’s claim that it exercises sovereign control over the NSR, a claim the 

United States and many other states dispute. Russia has increasingly tightened control over 

foreign vessel traffic transiting the NSR. Last year Moscow implemented regulations imposing 

“new limitations for foreign warships transiting the [NSR],”8 months after a French Navy 

supply ship transited the sea route without Russian permission.9 The United States opposes 

such restrictions as contrary to international law and importantly, “the U.S. Navy regularly 

contests them as part of its broader Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) program.”10

The Arctic’s security environment is becoming increasingly complex, uncertain, and 

concerning to the United States. One dynamic contributing to uncertainty in the region is the 

status of the NSR. The United States considers Russia’s self-proclaimed right to regulate 

vessels entering and transiting the NSR excessive. 11 Washington is also concerned that 

Moscow has “repeatedly threatened to use force against vessels that fail to abide by Russian 

regulations”12 in the NSR. Russia’s claimed sovereignty over the NSR threatens U.S. national 

RUSSIA’S MAIN NATIONAL INTERESTS IN ITS ARCTIC POLICY 2035 

(ADOPTED IN 2020)

• To ensure Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. [NEW]

• To preserve the Arctic as a world territory, with stable and mutually beneficial partnerships.

• To guarantee high living standards and prosperity for people of the Russian Arctic zone. [NEW]

• To develop the Russian Arctic as a strategic resource base and its rational use to accelerate

national economic growth.

• To develop the NSR as a competitive national transport line of the Russian Federation in the

global market.

• To protect the Arctic environment, the primordial homeland, and the traditional way of life of the

indigenous minorities in the Russian Arctic.
4

security by turning the Arctic region into “a 

potential corridor for strategic competition.”13

The best way to prevent this is for the United 

States to guarantee freedom of navigation 

through the NSR. This is precisely what 

Washington says it will do. The 2019 DoD

Arctic strategy states the United States, “[w]hen 

necessary and appropriate...will challenge 

excessive maritime claims in the Arctic.” 14

The time will come when it is necessary and 

appropriate to ensure the NSR remains an

international waterway and not Russia’s internal 

waters. The ability to conduct FONOPs is an 

essential element of preserving freedom of the 

seas, which is a longstanding U.S. national 

security interest. U.S. interest in ensuring freedom of the seas conflicts with Russia’s stated 

right to control access to the NSR and could serve as a flashpoint for great power tension 

between Moscow and Washington. 

The Russian Arctic as a Strategic Resource Base for National Economic Growth

Arctic Policy 2035 identifies a second Russian Arctic national interest with implications for 

the NSR: “development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation as a strategic resource 

base and its rational use with the objective of accelerating economic growth of the Russian 

Federation [emphasis added].”15 Russia’s ability to promote, foster, and exploit strategic 

natural resource development in the Arctic is critical to the country’s national security and 

economic well-being. Russia’s Arctic zone already produces 10 percent of the country’s gross 

domestic product and 20 percent of its exports.

16 Led by Arctic Policy 2035, Moscow has 

clearly “enhanced the role of its Arctic areas within both its domestic and foreign policy.”17

For example, this past February and just prior to releasing its new Arctic policy, the Russian 

government renamed its Ministry for the Development of the Russia Far East to the Ministry 

for the Development of the Russian Far East and the Arctic.

18 

Russia’s ambitious plans to transform the Arctic into a strategic resource base and economic 

engine are tempered by the speed and duration of ice melt in the Arctic Ocean and particularly 

along the NSR. The faster the ice melts throughout the Arctic, presumably the easier it becomes 

to locate and extract the region’s natural resources and reap the economic benefits.

The rapidly warming Arctic also has significant negative consequences, as recent events 

indicate. In June 2020, a fuel reservoir in Russia’s Siberia region collapsed, causing one of the

worst oil spills ever within the Arctic Circle. Preliminary reports suggest melting permafrost 

was the primary cause of the disaster.19 This occurred the same month the Russian Siberian 

town of Verkhoyansk recorded a temperature of 100 degrees Fahrenheit, an all-time high 

temperature in the Arctic Circle. 20 Rapid warming in the polar north could undermine 

Figure 2. Russian Northern Fleet submarines and vessels

Source: Wikimedia Commons, Mil.ru, http://мультимедиа.минобороны.рф/multimedia/

photo/gallery.htm? id=59002
5

Moscow’s ability to fully develop the infrastructure to enhance the Russian Arctic zone’s 

strategic resource base, as well as protect the region’s environment and traditional ways of life.

The NSR as a Globally Competitive National Transport Corridor

Arctic Policy 2035 lays out a third Russian Arctic national interest important to the NSR: 

“development of the Northern Sea Route as a competitive national transport line of the Russian 

Federation in the global market [emphasis added].”21 The NSR is the most important entity in 

the Arctic to Russia. Internally, the NSR serves as the connective tissue between Russia’s 

beleaguered and often neglected Arctic landmass and the economic potential that infrastructure 

development might bring to this vast northern coast. Although only two million Russians live in 

the Arctic region, the region makes up approximately one-third of Russia’s landmass. 22

Externally, the NSR links Russia’s economic viability in the Arctic to the rest of the world. 

Moscow is counting on the NSR to become a competitive international shipping route between 

East Asia and Europe, drastically reducing transit times.23 For example, a cargo vessel going 

from London to Yokohama, Japan, on a southerly route via the Suez Canal travels approximately 

11,400 nautical miles; the distance between the same two cities along the NSR would be 

approximately 7,200 nautical miles—37 percent shorter.24 Russia seeks to benefit economically 

through a well-developed support infrastructure network strung along its Arctic coastline.

Developing the NSR is so critical to Russia that the Arctic policy principles identify “failure 

to meet deadlines for the establishment of infrastructure of the Northern Sea Route”25 as one 

of seven threats to Russian national security in the Arctic. (See Appendix.) 

However, the NSR is currently nowhere close to becoming a significant maritime corridor. It 

handles three categories of shipping traffic: “domestic traffic, resource export traffic, and 

transit traffic.”26 Most of the NSR’s traffic is domestic and resource export traffic that primarily 

serves Russia’s domestic needs. However, transit traffic is the most important traffic type for 

developing the NSR into a viable global shipping route.27 Until Russia significantly increases 

NSR transit traffic, Moscow will not be able to successfully “attest to [the route’s] utility and 

value”28 to the international community. Russian President Putin acknowledges this problem 

and issued a directive in 2018 to increase Arctic shipping to 80 million tons per year by 2024.29

Russia’s NSR infrastructure development plan also seeks to address this concern. However, 

even the figure Putin decrees is still far below what shipping industry analysts say is needed to 

make Arctic shipping competitive.

Implications for the NSR and Great Power Competition

Moscow considers the United States and its NATO allies a threat to Russia’s Arctic plans and 

interests, including in the NSR. Likewise, the West is increasingly concerned about Russia’s 

intentions in the Arctic region, particularly in the context of rapid climate change that is altering 

the way militaries operate in the region. As a result, the United States and other NATO states 

have become more active in the Arctic region.
6

In March 2020, Norway, a NATO member state that shares a land border with Russia, conducted 

its COLD RESPONSE multinational exercise near Russia’s northern borders. Norway has held 

this biennial exercise since 2006 “to secure the Norwegian Armed Forces and allies' ability to 

conduct multinational joint exercises with a high-intensity combat scenario in demanding winter 

conditions.” 30 This year’s exercise was eventually curtailed due to the COVID-19 global 

pandemic but was conducted “in cooperation with NATO members and partners, (including the 

United States).”31 There were no indications Russia directly responded to this year’s COLD 

RESPONSE. Although Moscow has criticized the West for conducting military operations near 

Russia’s northern borders, the Russian military did conduct “a live-fire exercise”32 near the 

Norwegian-Russian border weeks before Norway initiated COLD RESPONSE.

In May 2020, the United States and United Kingdom conducted a joint naval exercise in the 

Barents Sea near Russian waters.33 This was no mere joint military exercise. It marked “the 

first U.S. exercise in the Barents Sea since the mid-1990s”34 and was designed “to assert 

freedom of navigation and demonstrate seamless integration among allies.”35 Washington and 

London gave Moscow prior notice of the FONOP to prevent any surprises, and Moscow 

responded by initiating its own naval exercise in the Barents Sea at the conclusion of the U.S.-

UK exercise.36 The joint FONOP signifies a “massive statement of intent”37 by Washington 

and London that the West is committed to policing the Arctic region’s international waters. 

The U.S.-UK joint exercise raises “a looming question [of] where future Arctic FONOPS might 

take place, given the stated disagreements between the US and Russia over navigation rights in 

the NSR.”38 One obvious location for future FONOPs in the Arctic is within the NSR. The 2018 

French naval supply ship transiting through the NSR establishes a foundation for future Arctic 

FONOPs. The question now becomes one of timing and risks. First, when would the United 

States or other NATO member states conduct FONOPs along the NSR? The level of sea ice 

along the route would be one factor in the timing. Furthermore, what risks would both the United 

States and other NATO member states and Russia be willing to accept over such operations? 

Russia’s increased securitization of the Arctic, coupled with the increasing U.S. power 

projection in the region, could lead to conflicting national security interests and clashes in the 

near future. The Kremlin indicates that it believes the Arctic can remain a region of cooperation 

rather than competition; however, Moscow will not hesitate to protect its Arctic national 

interests. For example, in June 2020, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov 

warned Russia “will not in any way stay quiet ... if someone ... would try to test our readiness 

to defend our interests of national security in [the Arctic].”39

Conclusion

Moscow’s ability to implement Arctic Policy 2035 and develop the NSR by the middle of the 

next decade will likewise shape its ability and willingness to defend its self-proclaimed 

sovereignty over the NSR. Russia can expect further pushback from Washington and its 

Western allies over the NSR—resistance that is likely to increase if the sea route becomes more 
7

geopolitically viable. Such developments could very well increase great power tension over 

the Arctic region generally and the NSR specifically.

The more significant the NSR becomes as an international transit route, the more important it 

becomes to Russia’s Arctic strategy and overall national interests. Likewise, an increasingly 

viable NSR will intensify the debate between Moscow’s contention that the NSR is within its

internal waters against Washington’s contention that it is in international waters. 

Julian R. Meade is an NIU assistant professor who is on a one-year NIU Research Fellowship. He is 

exploring Arctic geopolitical drivers and developing plausible, long-range scenarios on Arctic 

geopolitics out to 2050. He is a Ph.D. candidate, and his dissertation examines U.S. Arctic national 

interests and governance engagement.

If you have comments, questions, or a suggestion for a Research Short topic or article, please contact 

the NIU Office of Research at NIU_OOR@dodiis.mil. 
8

Appendix

Russia’s Identified National Security Threats to Its Arctic Zone

Source: Basic Principles of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic Zone Until 2035, (Arctic Policy 2035), Government of the Russian 

Federation, March 5, 2020.

1. Decreasing population in Russia’s Arctic zone.

2. Slow social, transport, information, and communication infrastructure development in Russia’s

Arctic land territory. 

3. Slow pace of geological study related to mineral and raw materials in the Russian Arctic.

4. Insufficient state support system for economic development in the Russian Arctic.

5. Failure to meet established deadlines for NSR infrastructure projects, icebreaker construction, and

emergency rescue and support fleets.

6. Slow pace for establishing land transportation means and aviation equipment for operating in

Arctic climate conditions.

7. Unpreparedness of environment monitoring systems in the Russian Arctic for ecological challenges.
9

Endnotes

1 The Arctic Council, https://arctic-council.org/en/. 

2 Basic Principles of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic Zone Until 2035 (Arctic Policy 2035), 

Government of the Russian Federation, March 5, 2020. 

3 The Kremlin published its Arctic policy principles in Russian on March 5, 2020. Per this author’s request, the 

National Virtual Translation Center fully translated this document (job ID# 179403) into English on May 19, 2020, 

www.nvtc.gov.

4 Ekaterina Klimenko, “Russia’s New Arctic Policy Document Signals Continuity Rather Than Change,” Stockholm 

International Peace Research Institute, April 6, 2020, https://sipri.org/commentary/essay/2020/russias-new-arcticpolicy-document-signals-continuity-rather-change. 

5 Arctic Policy 2035.

6 Arctic Policy 2035.

7 Arctic Policy 2035.

8 “Russia Tightens Control Over the Northern Sea Route,” Maritime Executive, March 8, 2019, 

https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/russia-tightens-control-over-northern-sea-route. 

9 “Russia Tightens Control Over the Northern Sea Route.”

10 “Russia Tightens Control Over the Northern Sea Route.”

11 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense Arctic Strategy, 4.

12 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense Arctic Strategy, 4.

13 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense Arctic Strategy, 5. 

14 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense Arctic Strategy, 13. 

15 Arctic Policy 2035. 

16 Klimenko, “Russia’s New Arctic Policy Document Signals Continuity Rather Than Change.” 

17 Marc Lanteigne, “The Best-Laid Plans? Russia’s New Arctic Strategies Face Many Hurdles,” Over the Circle, 

March 12, 2020, https://overthecircle.com/2020/03/12/the-best-laid-plans-russias-new-arctic-strategies-face-manyhurdles/. 

18 Lanteigne, “The Best-Laid Plans?” 

19 Evan Gershkovich, “In Siberian Oil Spill, Climate Change Is Seen as Major Factor,” Moscow Times, June 5, 2020, 

https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/06/05/in-siberian-fuel-spill-climate-change-is-seen-as-major-factor-a70494. 

20 “Arctic Temperatures Hit Record High in Russia Amid Heat Wave,” Moscow Times, June 22, 2020.

21 Arctic Policy 2035. 

22 M.G. Khublaryan, “Water Resources for Sustainable Development, With Particular Reference to Russia,” in Area 

Studies–Regional Sustainable Development: Russia, ed. Nicolay Pavlovich Laverov (Ramsey, Isle of Man: EOLSS 

Publishers Co Ltd., 2009), Chapter 3. 

23 George Soroka, “Putin’s Arctic Ambitions: Russia’s Economic Aspirations in the Far North,” Foreign Affairs, May 

5, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2016-05-05/putins-arctic-ambitions. 

24 Halvor Schøyen and Svein Bråthen, “The Northern Sea Route Versus the Suez Canal: Cases from Bulk Shipping,”

Journal of Transport Geography 19, no. 4 (July 2011): 977-83, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/ 

pii/S096669231100024X.

25 Arctic Policy 2035.

26 Yun Sun, “The Northern Sea Route: The Myth of Sino-Russian Cooperation,” The Stimson Center, December 5, 

2018, 5, https://www.stimson.org/2018/northern-sea-route/. 

27 Sun, “The Northern Sea Route,” 5.

28 Sun, “The Northern Sea Route,” 5.

29 Atle Staalesen, “Moscow Adopts 15-Year Grand Plan for Northern Sea Route,” Barents Observer, December 31, 

2019, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2019/12/moscow-adopts-15-year-grand-plan-northern-sea-route. 

30 “Cold Response 2020,” Norwegian Armed Forces, https://forsvaret.no/en/coldresponse. 

31 Lanteigne, “The Best-Laid Plans?”

32 Lanteigne, “The Best-Laid Plans?”

33 The Barents Sea is located at the western edge of the Northern Sea Route. The shipping lanes in the Barents Sea 

that connect to the NSR comprise the Northeast Passage. 
10

34 Jim Garamone, “U.S.-British Arctic Exercise Shows U.S. Concern for Region,” DOD News, May 7, 2020, 

https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2180254/us-british-arctic-exercise-shows-us-concern-forregion/. 

35 Garamone, “U.S.-British Arctic Exercise.”

36 Marc Lanteigne, “A Frigid FONOP? The US Navy (Re-) Enters the Barents Sea,” Over the Circle, May 11, 2020, 

https://overthecircle.com/2020/05/11/a-frigid-fonop-the-us-navy-re-enters-the-barents-sea/. 

37 Rt. Hon. Tobias Ellwood MP and Tone Skogen, “Enhancing Security in the High North” (Webcast, Center for 

Strategic and International Studies, June 4, 2020), https://www.csis.org/events/online-event-enhancing-securityhigh-north. 

38 Lanteigne, “A Frigid FONOP?” 

39 Sergey Ryabkov, “Virtual Meeting: U.S.-Russia Relations—A Conversation with Sergey Ryabkov,” Council on 

Foreign Relations, June 9, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/event/virtual-meeting-us-russia-relations-conversation-sergeyryabkov.