alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Earlene Jenkins, Appellant, v Rising Development-BPS, LLC, Respondent.

[964 NYS2d 97]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Mark Friedlander, J.), entered October 10, 2012, which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendant established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law in this action where plaintiff alleges that she fell on a patch of gray, bumpy ice, located under one to two inches of fresh snow on the sidewalk adjacent to defendant’s building. Defendant demonstrated that it lacked actual or constructive notice of the icy condition by submitting the testimony of its property manager who stated that she was present at the subject location the night before plaintiffs fall shortly after it began to snow; that she oversaw snow removal; and that when she left the location, there was no snow or ice on the sidewalk and salt had been applied *{see Herrera v E. 103rd St. & Lexington Ave. Realty Corp.,*95 AD3d 463 [1st Dept 2012]; *see also Disla v City of New York,*65 AD3d 949 [1st Dept 2009]).

*569Even assuming that the patch of ice upon which plaintiff allegedly fell preexisted the snowfall that occurred the night before the accident, plaintiffs opposition failed to raise a triable issue as to whether defendant had actual or constructive notice of the ice patch, or whether defendant’s snow and ice removal efforts created or exacerbated the defect. There is no evidence that defendant had actual notice of the condition and in order to impute constructive notice, there must be evidence that the condition was visible and apparent and existed for a sufficient period of time to allow defendant to discover and remedy it *(see Laster v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.,*251 AD2d 204 [1st Dept 1998], *lv denied*92 NY2d 812 [1998]). Plaintiff and her witnesses did not testify or aver that any patch of ice they saw the night before the accident was the same patch or in the same area where plaintiff fell *(see Meyers v Big Six Towers, Inc.,*85 AD3d 877 [2d Dept 2011]). Nor did plaintiff and her witnesses describe the size or thickness of the patch of ice, from which it might be inferred that it was visible and apparent, without pure speculation, especially given the property manager’s testimony that they had cleared the area and no snow or ice remained *(see Ravida v Stuyvesant Plaza, Inc.,*101 AD3d 1421 [3d Dept 2012]; *Wilson v Walgreen Drug Store,*42 AD3d 899 [4th Dept 2007]; *compare Rivas v New York City Hous. Auth.,*261 AD2d 148 [1st Dept 1999]).

Furthermore, the mere fact that defendant removed snow and ice prior to the commencement of the storm, the night before the accident, standing alone, does not raise a triable issue as to whether defendant created or exacerbated the alleged defect *(see Nadel v Cucinella,*299 AD2d 250 [1st Dept 2002]).

Concur—Tom, J.E, Sweeny, Saxe, Román and Feinman, JJ.
Document headings vary by document type but may contain
                    the following: the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document
the number of the CFR title and the number of each part
                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly
                      related to
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the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in
                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory
                      Actions See the
                    Document Drafting Handbook
                    for more details.
 Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration
 By Notice dated October 9, 2008 and published in the 
                    **Federal Register**
                     on October 17, 2008 (73 FR 61909), Noramco Inc., Division of Ortho McNeil, Inc., 500 Swedes Landing Road, Wilmington, Delaware 19801-4417, made application by renewal to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to be registered as a bulk manufacturer of the basic classes of controlled substances listed in schedules I and II: Drug
ScheduleCodeine-N-oxide (9053)
IDihydromorphine (9145)
IMorphine-N-oxide (9307)
IMethylphenidate (1724)
IICodeine (9050)
IIDihydrocodeine (9120)
IIOxycodone (9143)
IIHydromorphone (9150)
IIHydrocodone (9193)
IIMorphine (9300)
IIThebaine (9333)
IIOpium extracts (9610)
IIOpium fluid extract (9620)
IIOpium tincture (9630)
IIOpium, powdered (9639)
IIOpium, granulated (9640)
IIOxymorphone (9652)
II
 The company plans to bulk manufacture the above listed controlled substances for sale and distribution to manufacturers for product development and formulation. Drug code 1726 (methylphenidate) has been withdrawn from the application for registration as all manufacturing activity for methylphenidate can be conducted under drug code 1724 for the same substance. No comments or objections have been received. DEA has considered the factors in 21 U.S.C. 823(a) and determined that the registration of Noramco Inc. to manufacture the listed basic classes of controlled substances is consistent with the public interest at this time. DEA has investigated Noramco Inc. to ensure that the company's registration is consistent with the public interest. The investigation has included inspection and testing of the company's physical security systems, verification of the company's compliance with state and local laws, and a review of the company's background and history. Therefore, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 823, and in accordance with 21 CFR 1301.33, the above named company is granted registration as a bulk manufacturer of the basic classes of controlled substances listed. Dated: January 14, 2009. Joseph T. Rannazzisi, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration.


[FR Doc. E9-1196 Filed 1-21-09; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4410-09-P
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 21-2088

___________________________

United States of America,

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,

v.

Nathan Stone,

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.

 ____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Arkansas - Fayetteville

 ____________

 Submitted: February 22, 2022

Filed: February 28, 2022

[Unpublished]

____________

Before COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

Nathan Stone appeals the sentence imposed by the district court1 after he

pleaded guilty to a drug offense. Stone argues that the district court abused its

1The Honorable Timothy L. Brooks, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Arkansas.
discretion by imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence after giving insufficient

weight to mitigating factors such as his drug addiction and the nonviolent nature of

his offense.

We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse-ofdiscretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We conclude that

Stone’s sentence was not substantively unreasonable, as there is no indication that the

court overlooked a relevant factor, gave significant weight to an improper or

irrelevant factor, or committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the relevant

factors. See United States v. Pickar, 666 F.3d 1167, 1169 (8th Cir. 2012). The court

made an individualized assessment based on the facts presented in its consideration

of the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834,

849 (8th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, we affirm.

______________________________

-2-
#### Shaw, widow, *against*White.

The widow is entitled to dowerinlandsaiienlt)°

DOWER for lands, in *Granville,*in *Washington*county. 7 ° *J*The husband of the demandant,- being seised in fee of about 2,000 acres of land in *G.,*sold and conveyed them, in fee, in 1765, to *John*Lake, under whom the defendant acquired aregular title in fee. The husband died within two years after the deed to the his widow. At the time *180of the conveyance the premises- were new lands, „qnd ünimw pC0Ye¿. ¿ave beep since highly ■improved and. cultivated by. the defendant.

The questions raised for the consideration of the court, and submitted dn the'case; without argument,, were; 1, Whether; and what, ‘the demandant is entitled to recover ? 2.- How the recovery is to be regulated in relation to the improved value of . the premises,?.

*Per Curiam*

The rule by which the. recovery, in this case; is to be regulated, will1 be found laid down in the cases Of *Humphrey v.*Phinny, *(2*Jo*hns. Rep.*484.,) and *Dorchester v.*Coventry, (*11 Johns. Rep.*512.) The case is rather obscure astoi the precise question submitted to the • court. There Can' be no doubt the demandant is entitled , to; recqver; and, under the Statute relative to such eases, (1 N. *R. L.*60.,) thatreopver.y must be One third of the premises, .TM value,', as at the timé of the' conveyance by the husband, /The widow does not haye the benefit of the improvements:, or of the increased value or appreciation of the' land. The value, as ¡s suggested by the court, in *Humphrey*v. *P’hinny;,*must be ascertained, either by the sheriff oh the writ of seisin, or by a writ of. inquiry, founded on proper, suggestions.- The demandant must., accordingly, have judgment for one third of the premises, in value, as they were at the time Of the alienation by her husband.

Judgment accordingly.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
The schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the condensed
consolidated financial statements for the quarter ended December 28, 1996 and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                                            <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                  3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-27-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-28-1996
<CASH>                                          11,535
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   19,494
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,100
<INVENTORY>                                     38,193
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                70,362
<PP&E>                                          70,365
<DEPRECIATION>                                  26,367
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 116,548
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           87,529
<BONDS>                                          3,015
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         2,318
<OTHER-SE>                                      23,686
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   116,548
<SALES>                                         33,897
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                33,897
<CGS>                                           34,639
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   34,639
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 3,271
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    17
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,880
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (5,910)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (5,910)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (5,910)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.65)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.65)
        

</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32.1




CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER


AND PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


(SUBSECTIONS (A) AND (B) OF SECTION 1350, CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18,


UNITED STATES CODE)




Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), the undersigned officer New York Residential, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), does hereby certify, to such officer’s knowledge, that the Annual Report for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2009 (the “Form 10-K”) of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Dated: April 15, 2010
/s/ Robert KornsteinRobert Kornstein, Chief Executive Officer and Acting Chief Financial Officer




A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided by the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
INTER-TEL,  INCORPORATED AND SUBSIDIARIES  FINANCIAL DATA SCHEDULE (EXHIBIT 27).
THIS  SCHEDULE  CONTAINS  SUMMARY  FINANCIAL   INFORMATION  EXTRACTED  FROM  THE
INTER-TEL,  INCORPORATED  AND  SUBSIDIARIES  FINANCIAL  STATEMENTS  FOR THE NINE
MONTHS  ENDED  SEPTEMBER,  1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
</LEGEND>
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                          54,842
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   41,510
<ALLOWANCES>                                     4,351
<INVENTORY>                                     21,149
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               132,451
<PP&E>                                          51,235
<DEPRECIATION>                                  24,032
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 184,775
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           35,886
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       102,560
<OTHER-SE>                                      33,464
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   136,024
<SALES>                                        202,235
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               202,235
<CGS>                                          103,613
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  103,613
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  58
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  3,345
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,744
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,601
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,601
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.06
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.06
        

</TABLE>
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#### Laurence *against*Hopkins.

To take » deftatvte'onim'r must be a *pra*mise express, or implied.

And no promise *cromt*deSara11 íeDdant ufatlfs topáyanyuíto^ .tract iaw;eandrt(iathe any?thing,IdssaR

defendant ^ to suit,?-1 Wicfi' is Itmade userSf to take the case mitojthestatme

THIS was. an action- on- a joint and several promissory note, of which the defendant was one of the makers, dated the 7th of *October,*1803, payable to *E'benezer Whiling,*or order, four years- " ' alter date, for 152 dollars and 52 cents, and endorsed by th& Payee i° R>e plaintiff.. The defendant pleaded the general issue,, and *non assumpsit infra sex amios,*to wliich the plaintiff replied, The cause was- tried before *Mr.,Justice.Plait,*at the *'Scheneclar*in *November,*1815. ,

The plaintiff was nohsuited at the trial upon a variance between the note given its evidence, and the declaration. The in making up the ease, agreed to submit to the court the following testimony in relation to the defence, of the statute of limitations; which wds, that the defendant, in a conversation with one witness, stated, that he had been lately sued.upon a contract made with *Whiting;*and that, by the terms of the contract,hehad never considered himself-hold'en to pay any thing ; and that his' counsel had advised him that the contract could not be enforced- at law;, and that, in'a conversation with another witness, upon thei witness mentioning that he had attempted to settle, with the plaintiff, upoh. the note, and, had offered him twenty-five dollars on behalf of the- defendant, to- be in full of the note,, which the plaintiff refused to accept, the defendant replied,-that lie was sorry any,sueli offer had been made, as be -/never would pay pne cent on the note, as he-considered it an unjust debt.

The' case was submitted to the court without a-rguingnt.

*Per Curiam,*

The evidence is not sufficient to take .the case out of the statute of limitations. It neither shows an express or implied promise'to pay the debt.; but, on the contrary, it appears that the defendant uniformly .considered the demand as unjust from the,beginning, and that hé was- under no obligation to-pay it. To infer a promise to pay, ih direct apposition to the defend-1 ant’s denial of the justice and fairness of the debt, would be trifling with the statute. The proposition to give 25 dollars to settle the demand must be laid out of. the case, because that was a mere péáce-offering, and being rejected, it- cannot prejudice the defendant.

Judgment for the defendant,
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Randall L. Herrel, Sr., in my capacity as Chairman, President and Chief
Executive Officer of Ashworth, Inc. (the "Registrant"), do hereby certify in
accordance with 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

      1. the Quarterly Report of the Registrant, on Form 10-Q for the quarter
ended July 31, 2003 to which this certification is attached as an exhibit (the
"Report"), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      2. the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Registrant.



Dated: September 12, 2003        /s/ Randall L. Herrel, Sr.
       ------------------        -------------------------
                                 Randall L. Herrel, Sr.,
                                 Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v John P Daly, Appellant.

Submitted December 21, 2009;

decided January 12, 2010

Reported below, 57 AD3d 914.

Motion by defendant, insofar as it seeks to strike or redact the People’s brief and appendix, denied; motion, insofar as it seeks an extension of time to file a reply brief, granted, defendant’s reply brief to be served and filed on or before January 26, *9212010. Cross motion by the People to redact defendant’s brief denied.
#### Taylor v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.

Case below: 181 N.C. App. 343

No. 083P07

Pit’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 (COA06-321)

Denied 05/03/07

Hudson, J. Recused
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

JULIE RENEE PATRICK,

Appellant,

v.

BRENT WOLTMAN,

Appellee.

No. 4D22-2572

[July 20, 2023]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm 

Beach County; Cheryl A. Caracuzzo, Judge; L.T. Case No. 

502016DR004569.

Caryn A. Stevens and Eddie Stephens of Stephens & Stevens, PLLC, 

West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Grant J. Gisondo of Grant J. Gisondo, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, for 

appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

WARNER, DAMOORGIAN and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
1

The Honorable Charles B. Kornmann, United States District Judge for the

District of South Dakota. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2924

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of South Dakota.

Calvin Thomas Siems, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: July 7, 2005

Filed: July 29, 2005

___________

Before MELLOY, McMILLIAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Calvin Siems appeals the 88-month sentence the district court1

 imposed after

he pleaded guilty to distributing a mixture and substance containing

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Siems’s counsel has moved

to withdraw, and in a brief filed under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), he

argues that the district court abused its discretion in imposing an excessive sentence.

Siems has filed a pro se supplemental brief, arguing that in sentencing him, the

district court violated Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), by relying upon
-2-

drug quantities not charged in the indictment, admitted by him, or proved to a jury,

and that the court also miscalculated his criminal history category and improperly

considered his arrest record. In separately filed motions, Siems asks for new

appellate counsel, various record documents, and additional time to file another brief.

We consider only the challenge to the length of Siems’s sentence–i.e.,

counsel’s argument that Siems’s sentence is “excessive”--because in his written plea

agreement, Siems expressly waived the right to appeal his sentence on any basis

except for an “upward departure . . . from the [G]uideline range established by the

Court for the offense,” and the record demonstrates the waiver should be enforced.

See United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889-91 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,

540 U.S. 997 (2003).

 

The district court sentenced Siems after the Blakely decision but prior to the

United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738

(2005). The district court determined that the Guidelines were unconstitutional. As

a result, the district court did not make factual findings concerning the objections

lodged by the defendant to the presentence report. The district court did appear to

make certain assumptions concerning what the Guidelines might be, however, we

believe that under our court’s interpretation of the Booker decision, that the district

court was required to either make a determination of the Guideline range before

applying the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, or to explain why a Guideline determination

was impractical or impossible. United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997 (8th Cir. Iowa,

Apr. 13, 2005). Since we are not able to determine if there was an upward departure

from an appropriately determined Guideline range in this case, it is this court’s

determination that the appeal in this case does not violate the appeal waiver and the

case must be remanded for resentencing.

______________________________