alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 31.2**

**CERTIFICATION**

I, Michele Nakazawa, certify that: 

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Telos Corporation; 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material factnecessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in allmaterial respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls andprocedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have: 

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designedunder our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared; 

b) Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control overfinancial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally acceptedaccounting principles; 

c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting thatoccurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting; and 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based onour most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and to the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors: 

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financialreporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

 

40
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. John Perez, Appellant, v M. Hourihane, Respondent.

Decided September 21, 2010

Appeal dismissed, without costs, by the Court of Appeals, sua sponte, upon the ground that no substantial constitutional question is directly involved.
#### Brian Peters, Respondent, v The Kissling Interests, Inc., Appellant.

Submitted November 2, 2009;

decided December 17, 2009

Reported below, 63 AD3d 1519.

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE INTERIM
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF INCOME FOR THE THREE AND NINE MONTHS ENDED SEPTEMBER
30, 1997 AND THE CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1997 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                       1,280,689
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  378,489
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                      26,440,197
<DEPRECIATION>                             (2,617,384)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              25,642,103
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                      5,754,263
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                  19,739,804
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                25,642,103
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,250,192
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  320,985
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             336,240
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,409,831
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,409,831
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,409,831
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of Zoltek Companies, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K/A for the period ending September 30, 2012 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Andrew Whipple, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that:





|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------





|Date: July 1, 2013 | By: | /s/ ANDREW WHIPPLE      | 
|------------------ | --- | ----------------------- | 
|                   |     | Andrew Whipple          | 
|                   |     | Chief Financial Officer |
EX-4.11



 





Exhibit 4.11




CERTIFICATE OF TRUST



OF


CITIGROUP CAPITAL XXIX



     This Certificate of Trust is being executed as of November 15, 2007 for the purposes of
organizing a statutory trust pursuant to the Delaware Statutory Trust Act, 12 Del. C. §3801 et seq.
(the “Act”).



     The undersigned, the trustees of Citigroup Capital XXIX, hereby certify as follows:



     1. Name. The name of the statutory trust being formed hereby is “Citigroup Capital XXIX” (the
“Trust”).



     2. Delaware Trustee. The name and business address of the trustee of the Trust which has its
principal place of business in the State of Delaware are as follows:


The Bank of New York (Delaware)

100 White Clay Center

Route 273

P. O. Box 6995

Newark, DE 19711




     3. Effective. This Certificate of Trust shall be effective immediately upon filing in the
Office of the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware.



1









 





Dated: November 15, 2007




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	By:
	 	/s/ John Gerspach
	 	 
	 

	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	John Gerspach, as Regular Trustee
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	By:
	 	/s/ Eric L. Wentzel	 	 
	 

	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	Eric L. Wentzel, as Regular Trustee
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	By:
	 	/s/ Saul Rosen	 	 
	 

	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	Saul Rosen, as Regular Trustee
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	THE BANK OF NEW YORK (DELAWARE),
	 	 	as Delaware Trustee
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	By:
	 	/s/ Kristine K. Gullo	 	 
	 

	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	Name: Kristine K. Gullo
	 	 	Title: Vice President
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	CITIGROUP INC.,
	 	 	as Sponsor
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	By:
	 	/s/ Charles E. Wainhouse	 	 
	 

	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	Name: Charles E. Wainhouse
	 	 	Title: Vice President






2
#### The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v Raymond Clyde, Respondent.

Submitted June 28, 2010;

decided August 26, 2010

Motion for assignment of counsel granted and David P Elkovitch, Esq., 199 Genesee Street, Auburn, New York 13021 assigned as counsel to the respondent on the appeal herein.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

MEMORANDUM OPINION

N o. 04

- 22

- 00128

- CV

IN THE GUARDIANSHIP OF Martin L. ROBERTSON , an Incapacitated Person

From the County Court

, Kerr County, Texas

Trial Court No. G18

- 22

Honorable Robert Lee Kelly , Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Beth Watkins , Justice

Liza A. Rodriguez , Justice

Lori I. Valenzuela , Justice

Delivered and Filed: March 16, 2022

DISMISSED

Appellan t has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal. The motion contains a certificate of

service to appellee, who has not opposed the motion. Th erefore, we grant the motion and dismiss

the appeal. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.1(a)(1). Costs of the appeal are taxed against appellant.

PER CURIAM
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03
- 14
- 00789
- CR NO. 03
- 14
- 007 90
- CR NO. 03
- 14
- 007 91
- CR

George Henry Walker, Appellant

v. The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE 119TH DISTRICT COURT OF TOM GREEN COUNT Y NO. B
- 13
- 0883
- SB, HONORA BLE BEN WOODWARD, JU DGE PRESIDING

O R D E R F O R C L E R K T O P R O V I D E A P P E L L A T E R E C O R D TO A P P E L L A N T

PER CURIAM

Appellant’s court

- appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw supported by a brief concludin g that the instant appeal is frivolous and without merit. See Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Appellant’s counsel has certified to the Court that he provided copies of the motion and brief to appellant, advised appellant of his right to e xamine the appellate record and file a pro se response, and supplied appellant with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record. See Kelly v. State , 436 S.W.3d 313, 319

- 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Appellant has timely filed the motion requesti ng access to the appellate record with this Court.

Appellant’s pro se motion is granted. We hereby direct the clerk of the trial court to provide a copy of the reporter’s record and clerk’s record to appellant, and to provide writtenverification to thi s Court of the date and manner in which the appellate record was provided, on or

before May 18, 2015. See id. at 321.

It is ordered on May 6, 2015.

Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Goodwin and Field Do Not Publish
#### Ives *against*Ives.

An agreement to convey, containing words of bargain and salé *in.*prasenti, does not transfer the title.

An agreement' to sell land does not import a license to enter, but, at most, gives an implied permission to occupy as tenant at wM.

If a person having title to land enter with force, he is not liable to an action of trespass-.

THIS was an action of trespass, *guare clausum fregit,*for breaking atjd entering the dwelling house of the plaintiff, and tearing out the doors and windows, and pulling down the oven and chimney, of the house. The defendant pleaded, 1. Not guilty. 2 *Liberum tenementum. 3.*That the defendant committed the supposed trespass by the license of the plaintiff.

To the second plea, the plaintiff replied, that, by a certain agreement, in writing, the defendant bargained and sold the premises to the plaintiff, and thereby agreed to give him a good and lawful deed of the same j by virtue of which agreement, the *236plaintiff was possessed thereof, and continued possessed there- , nptil, &c. ' To the third plea, the. plaintiff• replied, *de inju~ ria suapropria* ■*

To the replication to. .the second plea there was a general demurrer, and,joinder in demurrer, which-',was, submitted.to the court without argument.'-,

*Per Curiam.*

According to the decision,s.in *Jackson, ex dem. Ludlow, v. Myers, (3Johns. Rep,*388.,) and *Jackson, ex dem. Green,*v. *Clark,*(3 *Johns. Rep.*424.,) the agreement, set forth in the plaintiff’s replication, although'containing, words of bargain and sale, *in prmenti,*impqrts, in law, nothing moré than an *agreement to convey,*as- an *executory*contract, and does not,, ipso *facto,*transfer,-th? title.'

By. the ■ decisions in *Suffern v. Townsend, (9 Johns. Rep.*35.,) *and Cooper*v. *Stower,*(9 *Johns. Rep.*331.,) a *contract to sell*does hot, in itself, contain , a license to enter; or, at most, it gives an implied permission to occupy-as *tenant at wif*merely.

It is also well settled, that the person having title,that is,. having a right to enter,, is not. liable, inan.action of trespass, for *entering with*force, although liable to *indictment*for a forcible entry. *Wilde*v. *Cantillon,*(1 *Johns. Cas.*123.) *Hyatt*v. *Wood,*(4 *Johns, Rep,*150.) The defendant is entitled to judgment.

Judgment for the defendant,
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                         154,453
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   32,956
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     71,036
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               450,757
<PP&E>                                       1,257,227
<DEPRECIATION>                               (555,966)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,270,964
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          910,698
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     59,297
<COMMON>                                        94,719
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,270,964
<SALES>                                         24,462
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                24,462
<CGS>                                           69,621
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   69,621
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               642,581
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              18,969
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (696,115)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (696,115)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (696,115)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.07)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.07)
        

</TABLE>
<PAGE>   1                                       EXHIBIT 4.11
                      AMENDMENT TO STOCK OPTION AGREEMENT

     THIS AMENDMENT TO STOCK OPTION AGREEMENT is made and entered into as
of the 19th day of August, 1996, between Reconditioned Systems, Inc., an
Arizona corporation (the "Company"), and Wayne R. Collignon ("Optionee").

RECITALS:

          A.   The Company and Optionee entered into a Stock Option
Agreement effective August 10, 1995 (the "Agreement") pursuant to which the
Company granted to Optionee the Option to purchase all or any part of up to
100,000 Shares at a purchase price of $2.75 per share.

          B.   Since the effective date of the Agreement, the Company's
Shares have been reverse split on a six-to-one basis.  Thus, the Option now
gives Optionee the right to purchase up to 16,666 Shares at a purchase
price of $16.50 per share.

          C.   The Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors of the
Company, pursuant to resolutions duly adopted at a meeting on August 19,
1996, has directed that the Option be repriced.

          D.   Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein
shall have the meanings assigned to them in the Agreement.

AGREEMENTS:

          1.   Paragraph 2 of the Agreement is amended to read in its
entirety as follows:

          "2.  Purchase Price.  The purchase price of the Shares
          acquired pursuant to the exercise of an Option shall be
          one dollar ($1.00) per Share, which equals the fair
          market value of the Shares on the date of this
          Amendment.  The purchase price shall be paid in the
          manner set forth in Paragraph 11."

          2.   Paragraph 3 of the Agreement is amended to read in its
entirety as follows:

          "3.  Vesting.  Optionee's right to acquire Shares
          pursuant to the exercise of the Option as provided
          herein shall be fully vested as of the date hereof;
          provided, however, that Optionee hereby agrees not to
          sell, assign, transfer, pledge, hypothecate or
          otherwise dispose of any Shares acquired upon exercise
          of this Option until August 19, 1997."

          3.   Subject to the approval of Norwest Business Credit, Inc., a
Minnesota corporation ("Norwest"), pursuant to that certain Credit and
Security Agreement dated as of February 26, 1996 between the Company and
Norwest, this Amendment shall be effective as of August 19, 1996.






                                      1











<PAGE>  2
          4.   All other terms and conditions of the Agreement shall remain
unchanged and in full force and effect.

          IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have duly executed this
Amendment.

COMPANY:                           OPTIONEE:

RECONDITIONED SYSTEMS, INC., 
an Arizona corporation


By /s/  Scott W. Ryan                               /s/  Wayne R. Collignon
   _____________________________                    _______________________
  Scott W. Ryan, Chairman                          Wayne R. Collignon
                                      2
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

JOSE ADRIAN MARTINEZ

,

Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

,

State

. §

§

§

§

§

§

§ No. 08

- 1 7

- 00253

- C R

Appeal from the

210 th District Court

of El Paso County , Texas

(TC# 20160D03012 )

O R D E R

The Court GRANTS the State ’ s third motion for extension of time within which to file the

b rief until January 30

, 201 9

. NO FURTHER MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO F ILE

THE STATE ’ S B R IEF WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT.

It is further ORDERED that the Hon. Jaime E. Esparza

, the State ’ s attorney, prepare the

State ’ s brief and forward the same to this Court on or before January 30 , 201 9

.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 17 th day of December

, 20 1 8

.

PER CURIAM

Before McClure , C.J., R odriguez and Palafox , JJ.
1 Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of

opinions that have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For the Fifth Circuit

___________________________

No. 95-10289 Summary Calendar

___________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

NOEL R. SCHMITZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court For the Northern District of Texas

(3:94-CR-00389)

____________________________________________________ December 20, 1995

Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 1

In this direct criminal appeal defendant Schmitz argues that

the district court erred in imposing a $2,000 fine for two reasons:

(1) he has no ability to pay the fine; (2) the court imposed a cost

of incarceration fine without first imposing a punitive fine.

United States v. Fair , 979 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir. 1992). Schmitz is

young, in good health and has a high school education. For the

past two years he worked as a warehouse supervisor earning $1,8002

per month. He, has ample future earning capacity to justify

imposition of this fine. U nited States v. O'Banion

, 943 F.2d 1422

5th Cir. 1991).

Our review of the record reveals that the defendant made no

contemporaneous objection to the fine on grounds that it represents

a cost of incarceration fine and no punitive fine had been imposed.

This fine was fair and reasonable and does not result in manifest

injustice. The district court did not commit plain error in

imposing this fine. We therefore affirm the district court's

sentence.

AFFIRMED.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Phillip WAINWRIGHT, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 08-15369

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

May 15, 2009.

Susan Hollis Rothstein-Youakim, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Phillip Wainwright, Jesup, GA, pro se.

Before BIRCH, HULL and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

James W. Smith, III, appointed counsel for Phillip Wainwright in this appeal from the district court’s denial of a motion to reduce Wainwright’s sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), has moved to withdraw from further representation of the appellant and filed a brief pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 *897S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Because independent examination of the entire record reveals no issues of arguable merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the district court’s denial of relief under § 3582(c)(2) is AFFIRMED.