PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

_____________ 

No. 18-3199 

_____________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

 v. 

REHELIO D. TRANT, 

 Appellant 

_____________ 

On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands 

District Court No. 3-18-cr-00004-001 

District Judge: The Honorable Curtis V. Gomez 

Argued April 8, 2019 

Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, JORDAN, and RENDELL, 

Circuit Judges

(Filed: May 15, 2019) 

Gretchen C.F. Shappert 

Sigrid M. Tejo-Sprotte [ARGUED] 

Office of United States Attorney 
2 

5500 Veterans Drive, Suite 260 

United States Courthouse 

St. Thomas, VI 00802 

 Counsel for Appellee 

Omodare B. Jupiter 

Office of the Federal Public Defender 

200 South Lamar Street 

Suite 200-N 

Jackson, MS 39201 

Melanie Turnbull [ARGUED] 

Gabriel J. Villegas 

Office of Federal Public Defender 

1336 Beltjen Road 

Suite 202, Tunick Building 

St. Thomas, VI 00802 

Counsel for Appellant 

________________ 

OPINION OF THE COURT 

________________ 

SMITH, Chief Judge. 

 One evening on St. Thomas, in the U.S. Virgin Islands 

(the V.I.), a minor dispute between two men over the use of a 

can opener escalated into each man menacingly showing the 

other his pistol. After law enforcement officers looked into 

these events, a federal grand jury charged one of them, Rehelio 

Trant, with being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm 
3 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Trant proceeded to trial 

and a jury found him guilty. On appeal, Trant argues that his 

conviction should be vacated because the District Court 

impermissibly allowed the Government to reopen its case-inchief and also made two evidentiary errors. Trant also 

contends that the record contains insufficient evidence to 

support his conviction. Concluding that none of Trant’s 

challenges have merit, we will affirm the judgment. 

I.1

In the fall of 2017, Rehelio Trant and Jimez Ashby had 

a heated encounter at a gas station in Bovoni, St. Thomas, that 

ended with each displaying his pistol to the other. Trant 

wanted to use a can opener inside the gas station, but Ashby 

was at a counter and in his way. Trant asked Ashby to move, 

but Ashby did not hear him. Trant then yelled his request in 

Ashby’s ear. Although Ashby complied, he admonished Trant 

for screaming at him. The encounter seemed to have ended 

when the two men shook hands and Trant exited the store. Yet 

Trant signaled Ashby to join him outside. When Ashby did so, 

a breeze blew hard enough against Trant that Ashby, standing 

less than a car’s length away, was able to see Trant’s waistband 

tighten and the imprint of a gun against his body. Ashby 

immediately brandished his firearm and backed away. Then

standing “a little more than a car length” from Ashby, Trant 

 

1

 Because Trant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting his conviction, we view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the Government and draw all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the jury’s guilty verdict. See United 

States v. Fountain, 792 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2015). 
4 

lifted up his shirt and revealed a gun in his waistband. (App. 

61.) Just then, a woman walked between the two men, and 

Trant left the gas station. Ashby quickly called the police to 

report the incident. 

Several months later, a federal grand jury charged Trant 

with one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 

Before trial, the Government and Trant stipulated that he had a 

prior felony conviction. In addition, Trant filed a motion in 

limine seeking the Court’s permission to inquire into “Ashby’s 

unlawful possession of two firearms for impeachment purposes 

which are probative of his character for untruthfulness.” (App. 

24–25.) The District Court deferred ruling on this motion until 

trial. 

At trial, the Government’s case included the testimony 

of Ashby and Sergeant Bernard Burke, the Supervisor of the 

Virgin Islands Police Department’s Firearms Unit. Ashby 

described his encounter with Trant, and added that the light 

“was good” when he saw both the imprint of a gun in Trant’s 

waistband and Trant lift his shirt to expose the gun. (App. 60, 

76–77.) On cross examination, Ashby testified that he knew 

the imprint in Trant’s waistband was of a gun and recalled 

telling the police that Trant’s firearm “look[ed] like a Glock”—

a gun that Ashby said resembled his own Glock pistol. (App. 

71.) Trant’s counsel attempted to ask Ashby three questions 

about the unlawfulness of his possession of a firearm at the 

time of the altercation with Trant, but the District Court 

sustained, apparently under Federal Rules of Evidence 608 and 
5 

609, the Government’s objections to these questions.2 The 

Government then called Sergeant Burke to testify that there are 

no firearm manufacturing facilities within the territorial 

boundaries of the V.I. After that, the Government rested its 

case. 

Next, Trant moved under Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 29(a) for a judgment of acquittal. The District 

Court, noting that the trial record lacked evidence that Trant 

was a convicted felon (a requirement for conviction under 18 

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), see United States v. Foster, 891 F.3d 93, 

111 (3d Cir. 2018)), asked the prosecutor about the missing 

evidence to support this “essential element.” (App. 84.) She 

responded that she had forgotten to move the admission of the 

stipulation of Trant’s prior felony conviction. The prosecutor 

then incorrectly asserted that she had “asked the Court prior to 

the jury coming in to address [the stipulation] and to inquire as 

to when that stipulation would be presented to the jury.” 3 

 

2

 The District Court did not reference any legal authority when 

ruling on the Government’s objections, but the Government 

cited Federal Rules of Evidence 608 and 609 when it raised 

two of its three objections that the Court sustained. 

3

 The record does not support the Government’s assertion that 

it had raised with the Court the admission of the stipulation. 

The prosecutor later acknowledged that she “did not tell the 

Court that the question [she] had about the stipulation was 

when to present it.” (App. 89.) The District Court “remind[ed] 

the parties to be cautious with your recollection[s] because it 

seems to me the [G]overnment’s recollection and recitation of 

what happened doesn’t comport with the record at all.” (App. 

91.) 
6 

(App. 85.) This left the Government with no alternative but to 

move to reopen its case-in-chief. In support of its motion, the 

prosecutor argued that the Court should grant the motion 

because Trant would not suffer any prejudice from the 

admission of the stipulation. Trant objected but offered no 

reason why the Court should deny the motion other than that 

“it’s too late” and “[t]he [G]overnment has rested.” (App. 88.) 

The District Court granted the Government’s motion to 

reopen. After the stipulation was admitted into evidence, the 

Government again rested. Trant, not presenting any evidence 

of his own, also rested. 

The jury found Trant guilty of violating § 922(g)(1), and 

Trant was later sentenced to 71 months’ imprisonment and 

three years of supervised release. Trant timely appealed. 

II. 

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3231 and 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a), and we have jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

III. 

 On appeal, Trant raises three issues. He contends that 

the District Court erred by granting the Government’s motion 

to reopen its case-in-chief and by restricting his cross 

examination of Ashby. Trant also asserts that the record lacks 

the necessary evidence to support his conviction. We reject 

each of his challenges. 
7 

A. 

 Trant argues that the District Court impermissibly 

granted the Government’s motion to reopen because the 

Government lacked a reasonable explanation for failing to 

present the stipulation during its case-in-chief. Trant adds that 

“the [G]overnment added insult to injury by misrepresenting 

what had occurred.” (Trant’s Br. at 21.) He further contends 

that our review of the District Court’s ruling should “end” with 

the Government’s inadequate justification for failing to move 

the stipulation into evidence because, he implies, a reasonable 

explanation was necessary for reopening. (Id. at 22.) 

Alternatively, Trant asserts that the Court abused its discretion 

by granting the motion because he was prejudiced by the 

reopening—i.e., he lost the opportunity to be acquitted based 

on the Government’s failure to prove that he is a convicted 

felon. 

1. 

There is scarce authority in our circuit on the standard 

governing this Court’s review of a ruling on a motion to reopen 

the Government’s case-in-chief during a criminal trial. We 

therefore take this opportunity to clarify and build upon our 

case law.4

 When considering a party’s motion to reopen its 

 

4

 In multiple decisions, both precedential and nonprecedential, we have stated that “[t]he question of whether the 

[G]overnment may augment the record at a suppression 

hearing after a remand following the conviction of the 

defendant is analogous to the question of whether the 

[G]overnment may reopen its case after resting.” United States 
8 

case at trial, “‘the district court’s primary focus should be on 

whether the party opposing reopening would be prejudiced if 

reopening is permitted.’” United States v. Coward, 296 F.3d 

176, 181 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Kithcart, 218 

F.3d 213, 220 (3d Cir. 2000)) (explaining how district courts 

should approach ruling on motions to reopen a suppression 

hearing). As in the suppression context, two principal 

considerations for the district court’s inquiry are the timing of 

the moving party’s request to reopen (whether, if the motion is 

granted, the opposing party will have a reasonable opportunity 

to rebut the moving party’s new evidence) and “the effect of 

the granting of the motion” (whether granting the motion will 

cause substantial disruption to the proceedings or result in the 

new evidence taking on “distorted importance”). Id. (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, district 

courts should assess the reasonableness of the moving party’s 

explanation for failing to introduce the desired evidence before 

resting and whether the new evidence is admissible and has 

probative value. See id. 

In adopting this standard, we join eight other circuits 

that have issued essentially the same guidance on how district 

courts should approach deciding motions to reopen at trial. 

 

v. Coward, 296 F.3d 176, 180 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. 

Kithcart, 218 F.3d 213, 219 (3d Cir. 2000) (same); United 

States v. Rey, 595 F. App’x 152, 154 (3d Cir. 2014) (same); 

United States v. Brown, 534 F. App’x 132, 136 (3d Cir. 2013) 

(same); see also United States v. Vastola, 915 F.2d 865, 876 

(3d Cir. 1990) (stating that ruling on a motion to reopen a 

suppression hearing after remand “is similar to ... ruling on a 

motion by the [G]overnment to reopen”). 
9 

See United States v. Martinez, 872 F.3d 293, 298–99 (5th Cir. 

2017); United States v. Orozco, 764 F.3d 997, 1001 (9th Cir. 

2014); United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 247–48 

(2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Nunez, 432 F.3d 573, 579 

(4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Byrd, 403 F.3d 1278, 1283–

88 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Peterson, 233 F.3d 101, 

106 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Blankenship, 775 F.2d 

735, 741 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Larson, 596 F.2d 

759, 778 (8th Cir. 1979). 

 Although we have announced the standard governing 

motions to reopen at trial by referring to our suppressionhearing case law, our statement that “‘courts should be 

extremely reluctant to grant reopenings,’” Coward, 296 F.3d 

at 180 (quoting Kithcart, 218 F.3d at 219 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted)), does not apply to a district court’s 

consideration of a motion to reopen at trial. Both Coward and 

Kithcart explained that this restraint on reopening applies to 

motions to reopen a suppression hearing. See id.; Kithcart, 218 

F.3d at 219–20. We conclude that any such caution against 

reopening the record in the trial context would constitute an 

anomalous constraint on a district court’s traditional and wellunderstood exercise of its discretion. See United States v. 

Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 167 n.21 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that 

district courts “have wide discretion in the management of their 

cases” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 

Coward and Kithcart recognize that “decisions to reopen 

proceedings are traditionally a discretionary matter for the 

district court.” Coward, 296 F.3d at 180 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted); Kithcart, 218 F.3d at 219. We 

will not, therefore, direct a district court to place a thumb on 

the scale by suggesting that reopening a trial record is 
10 

somehow disfavored, while at the same time giving lip service 

to our reliance upon the trial judge’s sound discretion. In our 

view, this would only confuse a trial judge’s inquiry into 

whether or not to reopen, as well as our eventual review for 

abuse of discretion. 

 We add that our cautionary warning against reopening 

suppression hearings upon remand is not warranted in the trial 

context for three additional reasons. First, in comparison to 

suppression hearings, trials present a greater need for district 

courts to be unconstrained in the exercise of their casemanagement discretion. Trials are fluid proceedings with a 

much wider horizon of evidence for district courts to consider 

than in suppression hearings, and courts enjoy broad discretion 

during trial precisely so that they can promptly and effectively 

respond to the varied and often unanticipated issues that may 

arise. Cf. Schiff, 602 F.3d at 176 (noting district courts have 

“broad discretion” to engage in case management during trial). 

Second and relatedly, suppression hearings usually present 

fewer and more narrow issues than arise at trial. That means 

that parties moving to reopen suppression hearings will 

generally have less justifiable reasons for failing to introduce 

the desired evidence into the record than parties moving to 

reopen at trial. As Coward noted, “[r]eopening is often 

permitted to supply some technical requirement ... or to supply 

some detail overlooked by inadvertence.” 296 F.3d at 182 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We believe 

that, as exemplified by this case, there are more opportunities 

for technical requirements or details to be overlooked during 

the often high pressure of a trial proceeding than in a 

suppression hearing where a jury is never present. Third, 

courts should not be distracted at trial by a suggestion that 
11 

reopening is disfavored, because deciding whether to allow the 

Government to reopen its case-in-chief will more often be 

outcome determinative (as in this case) than in the suppressionfollowing-remand context. In the latter situation, the 

Government may be able, through time and investigative 

resources, to obtain alternative evidence to present at trial. 

This higher likelihood of reopening at trial being outcome 

determinative makes it even more critical that a district court 

apply our reopening standard in a straightforward manner, 

focusing first on prejudice to the party opposing the motion, 

while also considering the nature and probative value of the 

new evidence. Quite simply, the purpose, procedure and 

pressures of a trial are way too different from the suppression 

hearing context to warrant application of a “one size fits all” 

approach to resolving a motion to reopen.5

 

2. 

With this standard now defined, we turn to Trant’s 

argument that the District Court impermissibly granted the 

Government’s motion to reopen its case-in-chief.6

 We agree 

 

5

 We do not consider here whether our statement in Coward

and Kithcart instructing district courts to exercise extreme 

reluctance to grant reopening in suppression hearings after 

remand is dicta and accordingly not binding, even in that 

context. It is enough to say that it is certainly not binding in 

the context of a trial. 

6

 We review the District Court’s ruling on the Government’s 

motion to reopen by applying a straightforward abuse of 

discretion standard. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine 

Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 331–32 (1971). 
12 

with Trant that the Government’s reason for failing to 

introduce the stipulation before resting (it “simply forgot” 

(Gov. Br. at 16)) is hardly compelling. But prejudice to the 

party objecting to reopening the trial record constitutes the 

primary consideration for a district court that must rule on a 

motion to reopen. The Court was not required to deny the 

motion solely because the Government’s explanation was 

weak. See United States v. Wrensford, 866 F.3d 76, 88 n.6 

(3d Cir. 2017) (“Reopening may ... be permitted to allow the 

presentation of evidence about a technical matter overlooked 

by inadvertence.” (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted)). 

We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 

discretion by granting the motion because Trant was not 

prejudiced by the Government’s reopening of its case-in-chief: 

the Government moved to reopen before Trant had the 

opportunity to present his evidence, thereby giving him the 

opportunity to respond and also limiting any disruption to the 

proceedings.7

 See Coward, 296 F.3d at 181 (“Where, as in this 

case, reopening is permitted after the [G]overnment has rested 

its case in chief, but before the defendant has presented any 

evidence, it is unlikely that prejudice sufficient to establish an 

abuse of discretion can be established.” (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted)). And importantly, the object of 

the motion to reopen was the admission of a stipulation—Trant 

 

7

 The District Court did not provide an explanation for 

granting the Government’s motion to reopen. We encourage 

district courts to articulate their reasons for a ruling on a motion 

to reopen at trial. 
13 

had agreed to it.8 See United States v. Smith, 751 F.3d 107, 

114 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that the nonmoving parties were 

not prejudiced by the District Court’s granting a motion to 

reopen the record on remand because they had notice of the 

evidence to be offered and an opportunity to rebut the 

evidence). Contrary to Trant’s assertion, prejudice in this 

context does not mean the loss of an opportunity for an 

unearned windfall. Prejudice results when a party experiences 

an unfair or unreasonable impairment of his defense. 

See Smith, 751 F.3d at 114; Coward, 296 F.3d at 181. Finally, 

we emphasize that the parties do not dispute that the stipulation 

was admissible and that it had significant probative value.9

 A 

trial should be a solemn exercise in a search for truth, not a 

game of “gotcha.” 

B. 

 Trant next contends that the District Court committed 

two errors by preventing him from cross examining Ashby 

about his unlawful possession of a firearm. First, Trant argues 

that the Court should have permitted him to question Ashby 

about this matter, suggesting it was probative of Ashby’s 

character for untruthfulness and necessary for the jury to 

evaluate Ashby’s credibility. Trant asserts that Ashby’s own 

illegal activity gave him a reason to lie about Trant’s gun 

possession. When Ashby called the police, Trant contends, he 

 

8

 The parties had filed on the District Court’s docket the 

stipulation that Trant had a prior felony conviction. 

9

 We add that the District Court appropriately handled the 

Government’s misrepresentation regarding the admission of 

the stipulation. 
14 

wanted officers to focus on Trant’s criminal activity and not 

his own. In support, Trant points to United States v. Estell, 539 

F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1976), for the proposition that “credibility 

may be attacked by showing specific instances of the witness’s 

prior misconduct, other than convictions, which bear on 

veracity.” Id. at 700. 

In implicitly applying Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), 

the District Court did not abuse its discretion by restricting 

Trant from asking Ashby about his unlawful possession of a 

firearm.10 Under this Rule, the District Court had the discretion 

to allow Trant on cross examination to question Ashby about 

specific instances of conduct if they were probative of his 

character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. See Fed. R. Evid. 

608(b); United States v. Williams, 464 F.3d 443, 448 (3d Cir. 

2006). The District Court permissibly halted Trant’s proposed 

questioning because Ashby’s illegal possession of a firearm 

did not have any bearing on his character for truthfulness or 

untruthfulness. As the Tenth Circuit has explained, “[t]here is 

a point which constitutes a prosecution of the witness for the 

offense inquired about rather than a testing of his credibility 

and when that point is reached the court acts properly in closing 

down the questioning, for there is no valid interest to be served 

 

10 We review the District Court’s ruling for abuse of discretion. 

See United States v. Georgiou, 777 F.3d 125, 143 (3d Cir. 

2015). The Government also objected to Trant’s proposed 

cross examination of Ashby under Federal Rule of Evidence 

609, but that Rule appears inapplicable here because, 

according to Trant, Ashby was not convicted of illegally 

possessing a firearm (for lacking a valid firearms license). 

See Fed. R. Evid. 609. 
15 

in shifting the emphasis from the accused person[] on trial to 

the witness.” Estell, 539 F.2d at 699–700. The Court did not 

err in preventing Trant from questioning Ashby about his 

unlawful possession of a firearm and thereby avoiding the 

concerns expressed in Estell. 

 Second, Trant argues that the District Court violated his 

rights under the Confrontation Clause, see U.S. Const. amend. 

VI, by not permitting him to cross examine Ashby about his 

unlawful possession of a firearm. His questions, Trant 

contends, would have demonstrated Ashby’s bias against Trant 

and his motivation to lie. Trant again suggests that because 

Ashby illegally had a gun during their encounter at the gas 

station, he had the motive to report Trant’s unlawful possession 

of a firearm to the police so as to distract law enforcement from 

his own criminal conduct. Notably, Trant does not assert that 

Ashby testified pursuant to any agreement with the 

Government. 

Trant failed to raise this argument below, so we review 

for plain error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731–

34 (1993).11 The District Court did not plainly err because if 

 

11 Under plain-error review, Trant must show that (1) an error 

occurred; (2) the error is “obvious”; and (3) the error “affected 

the outcome of the district court proceedings.” United States 

v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–34 (1993) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). If Trant makes these showings, we exercise 

our discretion to award relief when the error “seriously 

affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings.” Id. at 736 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 
16 

Trant had been permitted to pursue his proposed cross 

examination, the jury would not have had “a significantly 

different impression” of Ashby’s credibility. Delaware v. Van 

Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986); see also United States v. 

Chandler, 326 F.3d 210, 219 (3d Cir. 2003). Had the cross 

examination taken place, no reasonable jury could have 

believed that Ashby testified against Trant to avoid his own 

prosecution for illegally having a firearm. And how could 

they? It was Ashby himself who first called the police and 

reported to them that he had brandished his own firearm in the 

presence of Trant. Trant’s proposed cross examination would 

not have given “the jury the facts from which jurors ... could 

appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of” 

Ashby. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). And even if the restriction on cross 

examination was error, the implausible nature of Ashby’s 

having an ulterior motive for testifying hardly made it 

“obvious” that Trant had the right to ask Ashby about the 

latter’s illegal possession of a firearm. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. 

C. 

 Trant finally raises two arguments in support of his 

contention that the record lacks sufficient evidence to support 

his conviction. First, he asserts that Ashby’s testimony lacks 

adequate specificity for a rational factfinder to determine 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the object Ashby saw in Trant’s 

possession fit the definition of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 921(a)(3). Trant emphasizes that the object may not have 

been a firearm at all; alternatively, he suggests that “the object 

could have been an antique firearm which the statute 

specifically excludes as meeting the definition of a firearm.” 
17 

(Trant Br. at 14.) And during oral argument before us, Trant 

stressed that Ashby lacked the expertise and experience of a 

police officer in identifying firearms and that Ashby’s account 

lacked corroboration. 

Ashby’s testimony, however, provides sufficient 

evidence to satisfy the requirement for a § 922(g)(1) conviction 

that a defendant possess a firearm as defined in § 921(a)(3).12 

When reviewing a jury verdict to determine whether the 

evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the 

conviction, “we review the record in the light most favorable 

to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of 

fact could have found proof of guilt[ ] beyond a reasonable 

doubt. ... We must sustain the jury’s verdict if there is 

substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

government, to uphold the jury’s decision.” United States v. 

Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) 

(en banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Here, Ashby testified that he saw, with good lighting at the 

scene of the offense, the imprint of a gun in Trant’s waistband 

and Trant revealing “his gun in his waist.” (App. 61, 76–77.) 

Ashby further stated that he knew what he saw was a gun, 

describing it as a Glock that looked like one that he owned. 

When assessing this evidence in the light most favorable to the 

 

12 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) defines a firearm as “(A) any weapon 

(including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may 

readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an 

explosive; (B) the frame or receiver of any such weapon; 

(C) any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or (D) any 

destructive device. Such term does not include an antique 

firearm.” 
18 

Government, a rational trier of fact could determine beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Trant had a “weapon ... which will or is 

designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile 

by the action of an explosive.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)(A). 

Cf. United States v. Beverly, 99 F.3d 570, 573 (3d Cir. 1996) 

(concluding that the testimony of a witness, who saw a 

defendant’s gun twice at a “close” range, provided “sufficient 

evidence for a jury to conclude that the defendant utilized a 

firearm in the commission of his crime”). Furthermore, we 

reject Trant’s antique-firearm defense, see 18 U.S.C. 

§ 921(a)(3) (excluding “an antique firearm” from the definition 

of a firearm), because he did not raise this affirmative defense 

in the District Court, nor did he offer any evidence suggesting 

that the gun Ashby saw was an antique firearm, as required by 

United States v. Lawrence, 349 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2003). 

Finally, we have never required that a firearm conviction be 

supported by the testimony of at least two witnesses or by a 

witness with firearms expertise equal to that of a police officer. 

See Beverly, 99 F.3d at 571–73 (only a mailman testified to 

seeing the defendant’s firearm). 

 Second, Trant contends that the Government failed to 

prove that his firearm traveled in interstate commerce—a 

required showing for a conviction under § 922(g)(1). 

See Foster, 891 F.3d at 111. Sergeant Burke, Trant argues, 

could not have provided the necessary proof because “he was 

not given a gun to examine nor was he given the particular 

characteristics of [Trant’s] gun.” (Trant Br. at 15–16.) 

But Sergeant Burke’s testimony was that there were no 

firearm manufacturers in the Virgin Islands. That alone would 

justify a rational trier of fact in finding beyond a reasonable 
19 

doubt that Trant’s firearm traveled in interstate commerce. 

This Court has previously held that the testimony of Virgin 

Islands police officers can be sufficient to establish that, 

because particular goods were not manufactured in the Virgin 

Islands, their presence on the islands meant that they had been 

transported in interstate commerce. See United States v. 

Haywood, 363 F.3d 200, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2004); United States 

v. Lake, 150 F.3d 269, 273 (3d Cir. 1998). Those holdings are 

applicable here. Sergeant Burke’s testimony tracks that of 

Virgin Islands police officers in earlier cases in which we have 

deemed such testimony sufficient to establish that a particular 

good or product moved in interstate commerce. Given 

Sergeant Burke’s testimony, a rational trier of fact would not 

need to examine Trant’s gun or its characteristics to find 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the gun traveled in interstate 

commerce. See United States v. Buggs, 904 F.2d 1070, 1076 

(7th Cir. 1990) (“The fact that the gun was not produced at trial 

or that the witnesses did not have an opportunity to examine 

closely the weapon does not prevent conviction of a firearm 

offense.”). 

IV. 

We will affirm the judgment because sufficient 

evidence supports Trant’s conviction, and because the District 

Court did not err in either permitting the Government to reopen 

its case-in-chief or restricting Trant’s cross examination of 

Ashby.