In the United States Court of Federal Claims

BID PROTEST

No. 16-1114C

Filed Under Seal: September 21, 2016

Reissued for Publication: October 6, 2016*

LOCH HARBOUR GROUP, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

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28 U.S.C. § 1491(b); Pre-Award Bid 

Protest; Motion for a Preliminary 

Injunction, RCFC 65(a); Motion for a 

Temporary Restraining Order, RCFC 

65(b).

Christian B. Nagel, Counsel of Record, James J. Holt, McGuireWoods LLP, Tysons, 

VA, for plaintiff.

Zachary J. Sullivan, Trial Attorney, Elizabeth M. Hosford, Assistant Director, Robert E. 

Kirschman, Jr., Director, Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 

Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, 

DC, Aleia Barlow, Staff Attorney, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, 

DC, for defendant.

 

* This Memorandum Opinion and Order was originally filed under seal on September 21, 2016 (docket 

entry no. 25), pursuant to the Protective Order entered in this action on September 9, 2016 (docket entry 

no. 12). The parties were given an opportunity to advise the Court of their views with respect to what 

information, if any, should be redacted under the terms of the Protective Order. The parties filed a joint 

status report on October 6, 2016 notifying the Court that they do not believe any information should be 

redacted (docket entry no. 24). And so, the Court is reissuing its Opinion and Order dated September 21, 

2016 without redactions.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR A TEMPORARY 

RESTRAINING ORDER AND FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

GRIGGSBY, Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

In this pre-award bid protest matter, plaintiff, Loch Harbour Group, Inc. (“LHG”), 

protests a decision by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) to award a solesource contract to provide certain verification services for the agency’s Vets First Contracting 

Program to GCC Technologies, LLC (“GCC”), upon the grounds that the award violates the 

Competition in Contracting Act and that GCC is ineligible for award due to an organizational 

conflict of interest. LHG has filed motions for a temporary restraining order and for a

preliminary injunction, requesting that the Court enjoin the VA from awarding the contract until 

the Court resolves the merits of its bid protest. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 

DENIES LHG’s motions.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

A. Factual Background

In this pre-award bid protest matter, Loch Harbour Group, Inc. protests a decision by the 

United States Department of Veterans Affairs to award, on a sole-source basis, a contract for 

certain verification services to GCC Technologies, LLC, upon the grounds that the award 

violates the Competition in Contracting Act and that GCC is not eligible for award due to an 

organizational conflict of interest. See generally Am. Compl.; 41 U.S.C. § 3301. LHG has 

moved for a temporary restraining order and for a preliminary injunction, requesting that the 

Court enjoin the VA from awarding the contract until the Court has resolved the merits of its 

protest. Pl. Mot. for TRO at 1; Pl. Mot. for PI at 1.

 

1 The facts recited in this Memorandum Opinion and Order are taken from LHG’s amended complaint 

(“Am. Compl.”); LHG’s motion for a temporary restraining order (“Pl. Mot. for TRO”); LHG’s motion 

for a preliminary injunction (“Pl. Mot. for PI”); LHG’s memorandum in support of its motions for a 

temporary restraining order and for a preliminary injunction (“Pl. Memo.”); the government’s response to 

LHG’s motions (“Def. Resp.”); the Declaration of Julie Partridge (“Partridge Decl.”); and LHG’s reply in 

support of its motions for a temporary restraining order and for a preliminary injunction (“Pl. Reply”).

Except where otherwise noted, the facts cited herein are undisputed.
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1. The Vets First Program And The LHG Task Order

The United States Department of Veterans Affairs awards contracts to businesses owned 

by veterans and service-disabled veterans under the Vets First Contracting Program (“Vets First 

Program”). Am. Compl. at ¶ 10; Partridge Decl. ¶ 2. To identify veterans eligible to participate 

in the Vets First Program, the VA must verify that applicants seeking to participate in the 

program are either a veteran-owned small business or a service-disabled veteran-owned small 

business. Am. Compl. at ¶ 11. The VA’s Center for Verification and Evaluation (the “CVE”), 

an office within the agency’s Office of Small & Disadvantaged Business Utilization, is 

responsible for overseeing this verification process. Id.; Def. Resp. at 3. 

To perform the verification process, the VA contracts for support from private 

contractors. Am. Compl. at ¶ 13, Ex. 2; Partridge Decl. at ¶ 3. In this regard, in 2014, the VA 

awarded a task order to LHG to verify firms under the Vets First Program (“LHG Task Order”). 

Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 22-23. The LHG Task Order expired on September 13, 2016. Id. at ¶ 47; 

Partridge Decl. at ¶ 14. 

GCC currently performs customer service and examination services for the Vets First 

Program under a different task order. Am. Compl. at ¶ 48; Def. Resp. at 4. This task order will 

expire on or about September 26, 2016. Def. Resp. at 3 n.2, 4; Partridge Decl. at ¶ 4. 

2. The June 2016 Solicitation

On June 29, 2016, the VA issued a solicitation seeking proposals to oversee the Vets First 

Program’s verification process (the “June 2016 Solicitation”). Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 41-42; Def. 

Resp. at 4-5. It is undisputed that LHG was not eligible to compete for that contract as a prime 

contractor, because LHG did not meet the small business size standards for the North American 

Industry Classification System (“NAICS”) code applicable to the solicitation. Am. Compl. ¶ 41; 

Def. Resp. at 5. In response to a protest filed before the Government Accountability Office by 

another contractor, the VA canceled the June 2016 Solicitation on August 2, 2016. Id. at ¶ 43-

44; Partridge Decl. ¶ 9. 

3. The VA’s Proposed Sole-Source Award

After canceling the June 2016 Solicitation, the VA issued a justification and approval 

(“J&A”) for a proposed sole-source award of a contract to provide verification services for the 
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Vets First Program to GCC on August 18, 2016. Def. Resp. at 5; Partridge Decl. at Ex. 9. The 

J&A provides in part that, “the award [of the contract to support the Vets First Program] for the 

long-term effort has been delayed,” and “[i]n order to avoid a lapse of critical services, a sole 

source contract will be issued to one of the current incumbent contractors, GCC.” Partridge 

Decl. at Ex. 9. The J&A further states that “[t]he VA is currently in the planning phase of a 

requirement for a long-term, competitive contract for the same services.” Id.

To justify its proposed sole-source award a verification services contract to GCC, the VA 

relied upon the Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act of 2006, 38 

U.S.C. § 8127. Id. This Act allows the VA to award a contract to a veteran-owned small 

business using other than competitive procedures, if three conditions are met:

(1) such concern is determined to be a responsible source with respect to performance of 

such contract opportunity;

(2) the anticipated award price of the contract (including options) will exceeded the 

simplified acquisition threshold . . . but will not exceed $5,000,000; and

(3) in the estimation of the contracting officer, the contract award can be made at a fair 

and reasonable price that offers best value to the United States.

38 U.S.C. § 8127(c). The J&A explains that the decision to award the contract to GCC “meets 

all three of the requirements of 38 U.S.C. 8127(c)”. Id. Specifically, the J&A states that, in 

accordance with 38 U.S.C. § 8127(c), the contracting officer has determined that GCC is a 

responsible contractor; that the anticipated award price falls between the simplified acquisition 

threshold and $5,000,000; and that the contract award is to be made at a fair and reasonable price 

that offers the best value to the United States. Id. 

On September 7, 2016−a week prior to the expiration of the LHG Task Order−LHG

commenced this matter and sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to 

enjoin the VA from awarding the verification services contract to GCC. See generally Am. 

Compl.; Pl. Mot. for TRO; Pl. Mot. for PI. 

B. Procedural Background

On September 7, 2016, LHG filed the complaint in this matter. See generally Compl. On 

that same day, LHG filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, a motion for a preliminary 

injunction, and memorandum in support of its motion, requesting that the Court enjoin the VA 

from awarding a sole-source contract for verification services to GCC until the Court resolves 
5

the merits of this bid protest. See generally Pl. Mot. for TRO; Pl. Mot for PI; see also Pl. Memo. 

LHG attached the Declaration of Katerina Ehrlich Bonnevaux, the LHG project manager for the 

LHG Task Order, to its memorandum in support of its motions for a temporary restraining order 

and for a preliminary injunction. See Decl. of Katerina Ehrlich Bonnevaux.

On September 9, 2016, the government filed an unopposed motion for a protective order, 

and the Court issued a Protective Order on that date. See generally Mot. for Protective Order; 

Protective Order. Also on September 9, 2016, LHG filed an amended complaint, the

performance work statement for the LHG Task Order and a copy of the June 2016 Solicitation. 

See generally Am. Compl. On September 11, 2016, LHG filed a supplemental brief in support 

of its motions for injunctive relief. See generally Pl. Supp. Brief. On September 12, 2016, the 

government filed a response and opposition to LHG’s motions for a temporary restraining and 

for a preliminary injunction. See generally Def. Resp. The government also filed several 

documents as attachments to its response, including a Declaration of Julie Partridge, the 

contracting officer for the VA’s verification services contract, and the justification and approval 

of the sole-source award of that contract to GCC. See Partridge Decl.; Partridge Decl. at Ex. 9. 

On September 12, 2016, the Court held an initial status conference in this matter. On 

September 12, 2016, LHG filed a reply in support of its motions for a temporary restraining 

order and for a preliminary injunction. See generally Pl. Reply. On September 13, 2016, the 

Court held a hearing on LHG’s motions. During the hearing, the Court issued an oral decision 

denying LHG’s motions for a temporary restraining order and for a preliminary injunction. The 

Court’s rationale for denying LHG’s motions is set forth below.

III. JURISDICTION AND LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Bid Protest Jurisdiction And Standing

The Tucker Act grants the United States Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction to consider 

bid protests brought by “an interested party objecting to a solicitation by a Federal agency for 

bids or proposals for a proposed contract or to a proposed award or the award of a contract or 

any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a proposed 

procurement.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1). The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit has applied the Competition in Contracting Act’s definition of interested party in the 

context of bid protest matters. Am. Fed. of Gov. Employees, AFL-CIO v. United States, 258 F.3d 
6

1294, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3551. The Competition in Contracting Act 

defines the term “interested party” to mean an “actual or prospective bidder or offeror whose 

direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or failure to award the 

contract.” 31 U.S.C. § 3551(2). When the Court determines that a protestor is not an interested 

party, the protestor lacks standing to pursue a claim and the Court must dismiss the case. Rex 

Servs. Corp. v. United States, 448 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see Rule 12(b)(1) of the 

Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”). 

In addition, this Court reviews agency actions under the “arbitrary and capricious” 

standard in bid protest cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4) (adopting the standard of review set 

forth in the Administrative Procedure Act). And so, under the Administrative Procedure Act 

standard, an award may be set aside if “(1) the procurement official’s decision lacked a rational 

basis; or (2) the procurement procedure involved a violation of regulation or procedure.” 

Banknote Corp. of Am., Inc. v. United States, 365 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting 

Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 

2001)). In this regard, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained 

that:

When a challenge is brought on the first ground, the test is whether the contracting 

agency provided a coherent and reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion, 

and the disappointed bidder bears a “heavy burden” of showing that the award 

decision had no rational basis. When a challenge is brought on the second ground, 

the disappointed bidder must show a clear and prejudicial violation of applicable 

statutes or regulations.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

In reviewing an agency’s procurement decision, the Court should recognize that the 

agency’s decision is entitled to a “presumption of regularity.” Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, 

Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971), overruled on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 

U.S. 99 (1977) (citations omitted). In addition, the Court should not substitute its judgment for 

that of the agency. Cincom Sys., Inc. v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 663, 672 (1997). And so, 

“[t]he protestor must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency’s actions were 

either without a reasonable basis or in violation of applicable procurement law.” Info. Tech. & 

Apps. Corp. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 340, 346 (2001), aff’d, 316 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2003); 

see Gentex Corp. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 634, 648 (2003). 
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This standard “is highly deferential.” Advanced Data Concepts, Inc. v. United States,

216 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 2000). As long as there is “a reasonable basis for the agency’s 

action, the court should stay its hand even though it might, as an original proposition, have 

reached a different conclusion . . . .” Honeywell, Inc. v. United States, 870 F.2d 644, 648 (Fed. 

Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted). But, if “the agency entirely fail[s] to consider an 

important aspect of the problem [or] offer[s] an explanation for its decision that runs counter to 

the evidence before the agency,” then the resulting action lacks a rational basis and, therefore, is 

defined as “arbitrary and capricious.” Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc.-Birmingham v. United States,

586 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. 

Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Preliminary Injunctions And Temporary Restraining Orders, RCFC 65 

The Tucker Act authorizes this Court to “award any relief that the court considers proper, 

including . . . injunctive relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(2); see RCFC 65. However, “a preliminary 

injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the 

movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 

968, 972 (1997) (emphasis omitted) (internal citations omitted); Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., 

Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (The award of “a preliminary injunction is a drastic 

and extraordinary remedy that is not to be routinely granted.”). A temporary restraining order is 

similarly an “extraordinary and drastic remedy.” Jones Automation, Inc. v. United States, 92 

Fed. Cl. 368, 370 (2010) (citations omitted).

In deciding whether to grant emergency injunctive relief, the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Federal Circuit has directed that the Court consider four factors: (1) whether 

plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of the case; (2) whether plaintiff will suffer irreparable 

harm if the Court withholds injunctive relief; (3) whether the balance of hardships to the 

respective parties favors the grant of injunctive relief; and (4) whether it is in the public interest 

to grant injunctive relief. PGBA, LLC v. United States, 389 F.3d 1219, 1228-29 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 

FMC Corp. v. United States, 3 F.3d 424, 427 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Cincom, 37 Fed. Cl. at 268 (to 

obtain a temporary restraining order, plaintiff must show the following: “(1) plaintiff will suffer 

a specific irreparable injury if performance is not enjoined; (2) plaintiff is likely to succeed on 

the merits of its claim; (3) the harm to plaintiff outweighs any harm to defendant; and (4) 
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granting the requested relief serves the public interest”). “Although the factors are not applied 

mechanically, a movant must establish the existence of both of the first two factors to be entitled 

to a preliminary injunction,” or a temporary restraining order. Altana Pharma AG v. Teva 

Pharm. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 999, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Amazon.com, Inc. v. 

Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 

“No one factor, taken individually, is necessarily dispositive” and “the weakness of the 

showing regarding one factor may be overborne by the strength of the others.” FMC Corp., 3 

F.3d at 427. But, “the absence of an adequate showing with regard to any one factor may be 

sufficient, given the weight or lack of it assigned to the other factors, to justify the denial” of a 

motion for a preliminary injunction or for a temporary restraining order. Id.

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

In its motions for a temporary restraining order and for a preliminary injunction, LHG

requests that the Court enjoin the VA from awarding a sole-source contract to GCC to provide 

verification services for the Vets First Program until the Court resolves this bid protest. See 

generally Pl. Mot. for PI; Pl. Mot. for TRO; Pl. Memo. Specifically, LHG argues in its motions 

that the award of the contract to GCC violates the Competition in Contract Act by failing to 

employ a “full and open competition through the use of competitive procedures.” Am. Compl. at 

¶ 6; Pl. Memo. at 11, 17-18. LHG also argues that the sole-source award is improper because 

GCC is ineligible for the award due to an organizational conflict of interest. Pl. Memo. at 19-23.

The government opposes LHG’s motions and argues that the VA’s award decision is 

reasonable and lawful under the Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology 

Act. Def. Resp. at 10-11. For the reasons discussed below, the evidentiary record currently 

before the Court demonstrates that LHG is not entitled to the emergency injunctive relief that it 

seeks. And so, the Court DENIES LHG’s motions. RCFC 65.

A. LHG Has Not Demonstrated That It Has Standing To Pursue Its Claims

As an initial matter, the current record before the Court does not demonstrate that LHG

has standing to pursue this bid protest. It is well established that to demonstrate standing, LHG

must prove it is either an “actual or prospective bidder or offeror whose direct economic interest 

would be affected by the award of the contract or failure to award the contract.” Rex Servs. 
9

Corp., 448 F.3d at 1307. In this case, the current record does not demonstrate that LHG would 

be a prospective bidder if the VA were to solicit proposals for a contract to provide verification 

services for the Vets First Program. 

In this regard, it is undisputed that LHG is not a small business under the NAICS code 

that applied to the June 2016 Solicitation. Am. Compl. ¶ 41; Partridge Decl. at Ex. 5, 8. It is also 

undisputed that this same NAICS code apples to the sole-source award at issue in this dispute. 

Partridge Decl. at Ex. 9. Given this, it is reasonable to assume that this NAICS code would also 

apply to a new solicitation for this work and that LHG would be ineligible to compete for the 

award of that contract. And so, LHG has not demonstrated thus far in the litigation that it has 

standing to bring its bid protest.

B. LHG Has Not Shown That It Is Entitled To Injunctive Relief

Even if LHG could demonstrate that it has standing to pursue its claim, the current 

evidentiary record does not support LHG’s request for emergency injunctive relief. It is well 

established that temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are extraordinary and 

drastic remedies that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the 

burden of persuasion. Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 972. For this reason, the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that this Court must consider four factors when deciding 

whether to grant such emergency injunctive relief: (1) whether plaintiff is likely to succeed on 

the merits of the case; (2) whether plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the Court withholds 

injunctive relief; (3) whether the balance of hardships to the respective parties favors the grant of 

injunctive relief; and (4) whether it is in the public interest to grant injunctive relief. PGBA, 389 

F.3d at 1228-29; Cincom, 37 Fed. Cl. at 268 (applying the same four-factor test when 

determining whether to grant a motion for a temporary restraining order). 

In this case, LHG must establish the existence of both of the first two factors to be 

entitled to injunctive relief. Altana Pharma AG, 566 F.3d at 1005. LHG has not met its burden 

here.

1. LHG Is Unlikely To Succeed Upon The Merits Of Its Claims

First, LHG has not demonstrated a likelihood of success upon the merits of its claims. In 

the complaint, LHG alleges the VA had violated the Competition in Contracting Act by deciding 
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to make a sole-source award of the verification services contract to GCC. Am. Compl. at ¶ 6. 

But, the Competition in Contracting Act does not apply “in the case of procurement procedures 

otherwise expressly authorized by statute.” 41 U.S.C. § 3301(a). 

In this case, the current evidentiary record shows that, in awarding the subject contract to 

GCC, the VA relied upon the Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act, 

which provides the contracting officer with the authority to award a contract to a veteran-owned 

small business using other than competitive procedures under certain conditions. 38 U.S.C. 

§ 8127; Partridge Decl. at Ex. 9. In particular, the justification and approval for this sole-source 

award states that the proposed sole-source award to GCC “action meets all three of the 

requirements of” that act. Id. The J&A also demonstrates that the VA’s contracting officer 

determined that, GCC is a responsible contractor; the anticipated award price falls between the 

simplified acquisition threshold and $5,000,000; and that the contract award is to be made at a 

fair and reasonable price that offers the best value to the United States in accordance with the 

requirements of the Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act. Id. And 

so, the record evidence does not demonstrate that LHG is likely to succeed upon the merits of its 

CICA claim.

LHG also raises several arguments in its reply brief to suggest that the VA’s award 

decision does not comply with the Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology 

Act. Pl. Reply at 3-5. But, these arguments are not substantiated by the current evidentiary 

record. See Pl. Reply. And so, plaintiff has not shown that it has a substantial likelihood of 

success upon the merits of its claim. 

The merits of plaintiff’s organizational conflict of interest (“OCI”) claim are also called 

into question by the current evidentiary record. In the memorandum in support of LHG’s

motions for emergency injunctive relief, LHG argues that the Court should enjoin the award of 

the subject contract because GCC has an OCI based upon unequal access to information and 

biased ground rules. Pl. Memo. at 19-24. But, to prove an OCI, LHG must identify hard facts to 

support this claim. A mere inference or suspicion of an actual or apparent conflict is not enough. 

PAI Corp., 614 F.3d at 1352. LHG simply has not done so here. See generally Am. Compl.; Pl. 

Memo.; Pl. Reply. In fact, LHG provides no facts in its submissions to support its OCI claim. 
11

See generally Am. Compl.; Pl. Rep. And so, LHG has not shown that it has a substantial 

likelihood of success upon the merits of its OCI claim. 

2. The Remaining Factors Weigh Against Granting Injunctive Relief

The remaining factors that the Court considers in deciding LHG’s motions also weigh 

against granting emergency injunctive relief. Even if the Court were to assume that LHG will 

suffer irreparable harm absent emergency injunctive relief, the other factors that the Court must 

consider weigh against granting such relief.2 The balance of the hardships in this case weighs 

against granting emergency injunctive relief, because a delay of the award of the contract will 

result in increased costs and a disruption in critical services needed to support the Vets First 

Program. See Def. Resp. at 16-17. In addition, the public interest is best served by denying 

LHG’s request for injunctive relief, because a backlog in the verification process for this 

program could result if the Court enjoins award of the subject contract to GCC. And so, LHG

has not demonstrated that it is entitled to such relief. 

V. CONCLUSION

In sum, LHG has not met its heavy burden to show that it is entitled to emergency 

injunctive relief. Rather, the current evidentiary record indicates that LHG does not have a 

substantial likelihood of success upon the merits of its claims. And so, for the foregoing reasons,

the Court DENIES LHG’s motions for a temporary restraining order and for a preliminary 

injunction. 

Some of the information contained in this Memorandum Opinion and Order may be 

considered protected information subject to the Protective Order entered in this matter on 

September 9, 2016. This Memorandum Opinion and Order shall therefore be filed under seal. 

The parties shall review the Memorandum Opinion and Order to determine whether, in their 

view, any information should be redacted in accordance with the terms of the Protective Order 

prior to publication on the Court’s official website. 

 

2 LHG argues that it will suffer irreparable harm without emergency injunctive relief, because it will no 

longer be able to perform work under its task order and because LHG may lose some of its employees to 

GCC. See Pl. Memo. at 24; Pl. Supp. Brief at Ex. 1. But, such economic harm is generally insufficient to 

establish irreparable harm. See Minor Metals, Inc. v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 379, 381-82 (1997) 

(citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 710 F.2d 806, 810 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
The parties shall FILE a joint status report, on or before October 12, 2016, identifying 

the information, if any, that they contend should be redacted in this Memorandum Opinion and 

Order, together with an explanation of the basis for each proposed redaction.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Lydia Kay Griggsby 

LYDIA KAY GRIGGSBY

Judge