J-S92028-16 

NON -PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.M., A MINOR 1 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

APPEAL OF: L.M., FATHER 

No. 1041 WDA 2016 

Appeal from the Order June 13, 2016 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County 

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP -4 -DP- 0000047 -2015, NO. 117 -2015 

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., MOULTON, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED JANUARY 17, 2017 

L.M. ( "Father ") appeals from the June 13, 2016 decree entered in the 

Beaver County Court of Common Pleas terminating his parental rights to 

A.M. ( "Child "), born in May 2013. We affirm. 

Since shortly after Child's birth, Children and Youth Services ( "CYS ") 

had an active case regarding Child due to Mother's addiction to Vicodin and 

Father's homelessness. On May 29, 2014, CYS filed an emergency motion 

for protective custody of Child in Allegheny County. On May 30, 2014, Child 

was ordered to remain at the Families United ( "FUN ") foster home, and on 

June 2, 2014, Child was adjudicated dependent as to Mother. Because 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 
J-S92028-16 

neither parent was capable of caring for Child, Child was placed with 

Mother's aunt, M.E., and her partner, K.V. 

At the June 16, 2014 dependency hearing, Father, who was 

represented by counsel, failed to appear, and Child was adjudicated 

dependent as to Father.' The trial court found that Father's criminal history 

included 10 years' incarceration for involuntary deviate sexual intercourse 

and corruption of a minor. Father was classified as a Megan's Law offender 

and was required to attend sexual offender treatment to properly care for 

Child. Furthermore, the trial court found that Father had tested positive for 

tetrahydrocannabinol ( "THC ") on June 2, 2014. At the conclusion of the 

hearing, the trial court ordered Father to: become clean and sober; attend a 

drug and alcohol evaluation and recommended treatment and screenings; 

attend supervised visitations with Child once per week; attend sexual 

offender treatment; and obtain safe and appropriate housing. 

At the October 27, 2014 permanency review hearing, the trial court 

found that Father had voluntarily reduced his visits with Child to one hour 

per week, continued to refuse sexual offender treatment, and tested positive 

for THC. The next hearing was held on January 16, 2015, which Father did 

not attend. The trial court found no compliance with the permanency plan 

' Although generally a child is adjudicated dependent as to both 

parents at the same hearing, the trial court adjudicated child dependent as 

to Mother on June 2, 2014 based on a stipulation and deferred Father's 

contested adjudicatory hearing until June 16, 2014. 

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and found that Father had not attended visits with Child since November 24, 

2014. The next hearing was on April 10, 2015, which Father did attend. 

The trial court again found no compliance and asked Father why he was not 

addressing his goals. Father responded that he had "no time to run around." 

On August 24, 2015, the case was transferred to Beaver County 

because Mother had moved. On October 13, 2015, a permanency review 

hearing was held, which Father did not attend. Because Mother was making 

progress, the trial court reunified Child and Mother on this date. Three other 

permanency review hearings were held, none of which Father attended. On 

April 4, 2016, CYS filed a motion requesting Child be returned to foster care, 

because Mother had relapsed to drug and alcohol abuse, struggled with 

mental health issues, and was homeless. The trial court granted the motion. 

On May 3, 2016, the trial court held a permanency review and goal 

change hearing. This was the first hearing in Beaver County that Father 

attended. The trial court explained to Father that the matter was urgent 

because Child had been in placement for 17 of the last 22 months. The trial 

court continued the case until June 13, 2016 so that Father had time to 

complete his parenting evaluation and obtain a lawyer. At the June 13, 

2016 hearing, the trial court made the following findings: 

Father was provided the family service plan from Beaver 

County in February 2016. [It was substantially the same 

plan as the plan from Allegheny County.] He was informed 

numerous times of his right to counsel, but never 

completed an application to have a lawyer appointed until 

May 2016, the first time he appeared in court. From the 

inception of the case, both in Allegheny and Beaver 

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County, Father resisted any involvement from CYS, and 

refused to attend any evaluations or services. 

Among the tasks Father was to complete in the Family 

Service Plan were a parenting evaluation and sexual 

offender treatment. The parenting evaluation was part of 

the Family Service Plan since August 2015. Father never 

attended the evaluation and the initial referral was closed. 

The referral for a parenting evaluation was made again in 

May 2016, and the evaluation was scheduled for Father on 

two separate occasions. The case worker attributed the 

first missed appointment to a miscommunication, because 

when she went to pick up Father following the visit with 

the child, he was not there. He had gone home. 

Apparently, he claimed that he did not know whether he 

had a ride to the appointment, although the parenting 

evaluator confirmed with him the day before that she 

would be seeing him. The second appointment was 

cancelled because Father overslept. The appointment was 

scheduled for 12:30 p.m. and he was to be picked up in 

Monaca at 12:15 p.m. Father never called CYS or the 

evaluator to explain why he wasn't there on time. 

Parenting evaluations can take months to schedule. In 

this case, accommodations were made for Father to have 

two opportunities, in a very quick timeframe, to be able to 

complete the evaluation prior to the hearing, and he 

missed them both. 

It was expected that the parenting evaluation would reveal 

other services that might be necessary for the parents to 

complete. It is a well- rounded evaluation that talks about 

how the parent was raised as a child, marital history, drug 

and alcohol use[,] me[n]tal health, criminal history, etc. 

At the time of the hearing, however, Father still had not 

completed the parenting evaluation. 

Father was offered eight visits with [Child] since the last 

time he appeared in court on May 3, 2016. He missed five 

visits and attended three. 

Father claimed that he was not involved with the minor 

throughout the case because he was homeless for several 

months. Father was homeless for approximately the first 9 

months of this case, at which time he lived in his car. 

However, he admitted that he was back on his feet for the 

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past year, and still did not visit regularly or attend 

services. He has never had [Child] in his care, and for the 

past year, at least, has not had her at his home, even for a 

visit, unless Mother took her there during the brief period 

of reunification. 

See 1925(a) Opinion, 9/1/16, at 5 -7 ( "1925(a) Op. ") (unpaginated) 

(internal citations and footnotes omitted). 

On July 13, 2016, Father timely filed a notice of appeal. Father raises 

the following issue: 

Whether the trial court abused its discretion and /or erred 

as a matter of law in determining that the agency, [CYS], 

established by clear and convincing evidence that the 

parental rights of [Father] should be terminated pursuant 

to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511? 

Father's Br. at 4. 

We review a trial court's order terminating parental rights for an abuse 

of discretion. In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012). An 

abuse of discretion "does not result merely because the reviewing court 

might have reached a different conclusion. Instead, a decision may be 

reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill- will." Id. (internal 

citations omitted). 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained the reason for 

applying a particularly deferential standard to termination decisions: 

[U]nlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to 

make the fact -specific determinations on a cold record, 

where the trial judges are observing the parties during the 

relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. Therefore, even 

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where the facts could support an opposite result, as is 

often the case in dependency and termination cases, an 

appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the 

trial court and impose its own credibility determinations 

and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so 

long as the factual findings are supported by the record 

and the court's legal conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion. 

Id. at 826 -27 (internal citations omitted). At the same time, "[t]he burden 

of proof is on the party seeking termination to establish by clear and 

convincing evidence the existence of grounds for doing so." In re Z.P., 994 

A.2d 1108, 1116 (Pa.Super. 2010). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, which requires a bifurcated analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

The trial court found two grounds for termination of Father's parental 

rights, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(2) and (8). However, we need only agree 

with the trial court's determination as to one subsection of section 2511(a) 

in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en 

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banc). Thus, we will analyze the trial court's decision to terminate under 

section 2511(a)(2), which provides: 

(a) General rule. --The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds: 

* * * 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well -being and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied by the parent. 

23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(2). To terminate parental rights pursuant to section 

2511(a)(2), 

the following three elements must be met: (1) repeated 

and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the 

child to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for [her] physical or mental wellbeing; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal cannot or will not be remedied. 

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting 

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003)). 

Father contends that CYS did not present clear and convincing 

evidence to meet the elements for section 2511(a)(2). Father's Br. at 9. 

Father does not dispute that he failed to comply with the Family Service 

Plan; rather, he argues that he is now willing to comply. Id. at 9 -10. 

Father maintains that his failure to attend scheduled supervised visits was 

based on travel demands occasioned by the distance he lived from the 

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visitation site. Id. at 10. He further suggests that Child could live in his 

home with his two other children. Id. Finally, Father maintains that CYS 

has not proven that he is unwilling to remedy his neglect. Id. 

In its opinion, the trial court set forth its reasoning for finding grounds 

for termination under section 2511(a)(2): 

[F]rom the inception of this case . . . Father outright 

refused to attend sexual offenders' treatment. He believed 

the treatment was irrelevant and that he did not need to 

attend. He was informed at the time of the adjudication 

hearing, in June 2014, that his treatment was necessary. 

As of the final hearing on June 13, 2016, two years later, 

he had not begun treatment. His refusal to follow the 

family service plan has left [Child] without essential 

parental control necessary for her well- being. The court 

cannot place this child with Father, who has a conviction 

for involuntary deviant sexual intercourse with a minor, 

before he completes this treatment. For more than two 

years, the cause of the neglect or refusal to attend 

treatment was not be [sic] remedied by Father, and the 

court has no indication, other than Father's last minute 

promise to attend, that he will ever complete the 

treatment for necessary reunification. 

1925(a) Op. at 8 -9 (internal citation omitted). In addition, Father failed to 

attend the parenting evaluation, even though it was scheduled on more than 

one occasion and he was provided transportation. Id. at 5 -6. We conclude 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that section 

2511(a)(2) warrants termination of Father's parental rights.2 

2 We acknowledge that distance was an issue for Father; however, that 

was merely one factor in the trial court's determination. In terminating 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 

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We next turn to section 2511(b), which we have described as follows: 

Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has 

explained, Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding 

analysis and the term 'bond' is not defined in the Adoption Act. 

Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, 

if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered as 

part of our analysis. While a parent's emotional bond with his or 

her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best - interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be 

considered by the court when determining what is in the best 

interest of the child. 

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court 

can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, 

and should also consider the intangibles, such as the 

love, comfort, security, and stability the child might 

have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court 

stated that the trial court should consider the 

importance of continuity of relationships and whether 

any existing parent -child bond can be severed 

without detrimental effects on the child. 

C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219 (quoting In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 

(Pa.Super. 2011)) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 

Father claims that CYS failed to present clear and convincing evidence 

regarding the emotional bond between Father and Child and the effect of 

permanently severing the parental bond. Father's Br. at 11. Father states 

that he did not obtain counsel until May 2016 and did not have adequate 

time to review his case with counsel prior to the termination hearing. Id. 

(Footnote Continued) 

Father's parental rights, the trial court focused primarily on Father's failure 

to complete the parenting evaluation and the sexual offender treatment. 

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Father contends that after consulting with counsel, he made a reasonable 

request for time to comply with CYS and the Family Service Plan. Id. 

The trial court considered the developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare of the child. The trial court found that it could not entrust 

Child with Father without the required evaluation and treatment. 1925(a) 

Op. at 10. It further stated that Father had not been involved in Child's life 

and resisted any services for two years. Id. The trial court found that it 

was not in Child's best interest to remain without a permanent home, that 

Father had neglected his parental duties, and that termination of parental 

rights was appropriate to serve the needs of Child and provide permanency. 

Id. at 9 -10; Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights Decree, 6/13/16. 

Contrary to Father's contentions, the trial court did consider the effect 

on severing the parental bond, if any existed. The trial court stated, 

"[Father] has done very little to foster [a] relationship. From the very 

beginning of the case, he voluntarily reduced his visits to once a week for 

one hour." 1925(a) Op. at 7. The trial court went on to explain how 

Father's constant refusal to attend the parenting evaluation and sexual 

offender treatment indicated he was not taking the necessary steps for Child 

to be placed in his care. Id. at 9 -10. Finally, the trial court stated that 

"[Father's] bond with his daughter is not a strong one, due to his lack of 

visits. Severing the bond at this point will not have a negative impact on the 

child." Id. at 7. 

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As the trial court observed, Father had multiple opportunities to retain 

counsel and chose to wait until May of 2016 to do so. His conscious decision 

not to complete the parenting evaluation or sexual offender treatment for 

two years led to the termination of his parental rights. Father argues that all 

he is asking for is one opportunity to remain in his daughter's life, Father's 

Br. at 12, but he fails to acknowledge that he has been given, and 

squandered, many such opportunities. "[A] parent's vow to cooperate, after 

a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity of availability of 

services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous." In re 

A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa.Super. 2002). Child has been in placement 

for most of her life, and we agree with the trial court that she should not be 

left to linger until Father decides that this time he will truly comply. Child 

deserves permanency in a family that can provide her with the care and 

attention she needs. 

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding 

termination of Father's parental rights would best serve Child's 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare. 

Decree affirmed. 
J-S92028-16 

Judgment Entered. 

J seph D. Seletyn, 

Prothonotary 

Date: 1/17/2017 

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