Filed 4/7/20

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

NAASON JOAQUIN GARCIA,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS 

ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent;

THE PEOPLE,

Real Party in Interest.

 B302119

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA475856) 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. William C. Ryan 

and George Gonzales Lomeli, Judges. Petition granted.

Werksman Jackson & Quinn, Alan Jackson, Kelly C. Quinn, 

and Caleb Mason for Petitioner Naason Joaquin Garcia.

No appearance for Respondent.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan and Bridget Billeter, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest.

_______________________
2

Petitioner Naason Joaquin Garcia, an in-custody defendant 

on a no-bail hold, was arraigned on a multi-count felony complaint 

in June 2019. At that time, he waived his right to a speedy 

preliminary hearing. In July 2019, Garcia was arraigned on an 

amended complaint that added three additional counts; however, 

he did not waive the time limits for a preliminary hearing at that

arraignment. Following several continuances of his preliminary 

hearing, Garcia moved for the dismissal of the amended complaint

and his release from custody. The superior court denied the 

motion. In this petition for writ of mandate, Garcia argues his 

motion to dismiss should have been granted because the failure 

to hold a timely preliminary hearing violated the statutory time 

requirements of Penal Code section 859b and his constitutional 

right to a speedy trial. We conclude that, where an in-custody 

defendant is arraigned on an amended complaint, section 859b 

requires that the preliminary hearing be held within 10 court 

days of that arraignment unless there is a personal time waiver 

by the defendant or good cause for a continuance. Because the 

preliminary hearing for Garcia was not held within the 10-day 

period prescribed by section 859b and Garcia did not personally 

waive his right to a preliminary hearing within that time period, 

section 859b mandates dismissal of the amended complaint 

against him. We therefore grant the petition. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. Defendants Are Arraigned on the Original Complaint

And Enter 10-Day and 60-Day Time Waivers

On June 4, 2019, the California Attorney General’s Office 

filed a felony complaint against Garcia, Alondra Ocampo, and 
3

Susana Medina Oaxaca (collectively, defendants).

1 Garcia was 

charged with one count of lewd act upon a child (Pen. Code,2

§ 288, subd. (c)(1)), two counts of conspiracy to commit human 

trafficking (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)), three counts of forcible rape 

(§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), one count of statutory rape (§ 261.5, subd. 

(c)), four counts of forcible oral copulation (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)), two 

counts of oral copulation (§ 287, subd. (b)(1)), and one count of 

extortion (§ 518). 

On June 21, 2019, Garcia, Ocampo, and Oaxaca were each 

arraigned on the complaint and entered a plea of not guilty. At 

that time, each of the defendants also waived their right to a 

preliminary hearing within 10 court days and 60 calendar days 

of the arraignment. The court calendared August 2, 2019 as the 

date for setting the preliminary hearing. Bail was set at $50 

million for Garcia, $25 million for Ocampo, and $125,000 for 

Oaxaca. 

II. Defendants Are Arraigned on the Amended 

Complaint Without Entering New Time Waivers

On July 15, 2019, the Attorney General’s Office filed an 

amended complaint that added three counts against Garcia for 

possession of child pornography (§ 311.11, subd. (a)). On July 16, 

2019, Garcia, Ocampo, and Oaxaca were each arraigned on the 

amended complaint and entered not guilty pleas. The court 

1 A fourth defendant, Azalea Rangel Melendez, also was 

charged in the complaint, but she had not been apprehended 

by the authorities at the time the complaint was filed. 

2 Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory references 

are to the Penal Code.
4

ordered that Garcia be held without bail, and set bail at $25 

million for Ocampo.

3 During a discussion about outstanding 

discovery issues, the court noted that the next scheduled hearing 

was set for August 2, 2019. Garcia’s counsel advised the court 

that they were “comfortable waiting until August 2nd” for 

Garcia’s pending discovery motion to be heard. Without 

objection, the court ordered all three defendants back on 

August 2, stating that date would be “zero of 30.” The court did 

not ask the defendants to waive time, and none of them did so.

III. Defendants Enter Limited Time Waivers for the 

Preliminary Hearing to be Held No Later Than

September 23, 2019

On August 2, 2019, all parties appeared in court before Los 

Angeles Superior Court Judge Francis Bennett II. Given the 

numerous pending motions filed by the parties, the court stated 

that it was appropriate to find “a home for this case for all 

purposes.” One pending motion referenced by the court was 

Oaxaca’s motion to set the preliminary hearing “within the 

current time period over co-defendant’s objection.” During a 

discussion about scheduling, Oaxaca’s counsel informed the court 

that Oaxaca was willing to “table that motion” and to “waive 

time” if the preliminary hearing was set for August 23.4 Garcia’s 

3 Oaxaca previously had been released from custody on a 

$125,000 bond. 

4 During this discussion, the court noted that the 

“arraignment was [on] June 21st, 2019,” and that “60 days from 

that date is August 20th, 2019.” There was no mention of the 10-

day and 60-day time waivers entered by each defendant at the 

June 21 arraignment on the original complaint. Nor was there 

any discussion of the July 16 arraignment on the amended 
5

counsel confirmed that “[a]ll agree August 23rd works for all 

parties.” The court then inquired: “So just so I understand, 

there’s going to be an agreement for a time waiver from all 

parties with regard to this matter; is that correct?” All defense 

counsel answered in the affirmative. 

After stating that August 23, 2019 would be the “zero of 

30 date,” the court had the following exchange with Garcia:

The Court: Do you understand that you have a statutory 

right to a speedy preliminary hearing, that is within 10 court 

days and 60 calendar days of your arraignment. Do you 

understand that?

Defendant Garcia: Yes, sir.

The Court: And, presently, it’s my understanding that 

today is set for day zero of 30, which means that you would be 

going to preliminary hearing within 30 days of today. Do you 

agree to waive and give up those rights so that your matter 

can be continued to the date of August 23rd, 2019, with the 

understanding that your preliminary hearing would be held on 

that date or within 30 calendar days of that date? Do you agree 

to that?

Defendant Garcia: Yes, sir.

The court took the same 30-day time waivers from Ocampo and 

Oaxaca. 

complaint or the potential impact of that proceeding on the 

statutory time limits for holding the preliminary hearing. 
6

IV. The Preliminary Hearing Is Continued to a Date 

After September 23, 2019 Due to the Parties’

Discovery Dispute

On August 23, 2019, all parties appeared in court before 

Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Teresa Sullivan. During a 

discussion about the pending discovery motions, the court asked 

about the status of any outstanding discovery. In response to the 

People’s representation that discovery was being provided to the 

defense “on a rolling basis” because the investigation was 

ongoing, the court warned that “the defendants have the right to 

have their hearing with the evidence that the People have . . .

and if the People filed the case without the evidence that they 

needed, that’s not the defendants’ burden to bear.” The court also

inquired if an agreement had been reached on a date for the 

preliminary hearing. The People replied that defense counsel 

could not agree on a date. Without objection, the court set the 

preliminary hearing for September 19, 2019, and stated that date 

would be “26 of 30.”5

On September 13, 2019, the court held a hearing to address 

outstanding discovery issues. Defense counsel complained that 

the People were failing to comply with their discovery obligations 

by denying the defense proper access to the electronic devices 

that were seized from the defendants pursuant to search 

warrants and were currently being stored in Fresno, California.

The court ordered the People to provide the defense with full 

5 The court initially indicated that the September 19 date 

would be “28 of 30,” but then corrected this statement after 

Oaxaca’s counsel noted the error. 
7

access to all evidence in their possession on or before September 

16, 2019. 

On September 18, 2019, the parties returned to court over 

a dispute about the People’s compliance with the discovery order. 

Defense counsel asserted that, of the 61 electronic devices seized 

from the defendants, the People were continuing to deny access to 

18 devices. The court reiterated its prior order to the People “to

provide immediately to the defense all electronic evidence in your

possession.” The court also calendared “an order to show cause 

[regarding] contempt before this court tomorrow should there not 

be compliance once again.” 

On September 19, 2019, the date set for the preliminary 

hearing, the court found the People in contempt for their failure 

to comply with its discovery order. The court issued monetary 

sanctions against the two prosecuting attorneys. The court also 

ordered the People to bring all physical evidence in its possession 

to the courtroom the following day. The preliminary hearing was 

trailed to September 20, 2019. 

On September 20, 2019, the court found that the People 

had complied with its order to bring all of the physical evidence 

seized from the defendants to the courtroom that day. Based 

on such compliance, the court granted the People’s motion for 

reconsideration and withdrew the contempt finding and sanctions 

order. The court also ordered that the preliminary hearing be 

trailed to Monday, September 23, 2019, stating that was the 

“ten-of-ten date.”6 Garcia’s counsel argued that the defense still 

6 September 23, 2019 was actually the 30 of 30 date based on 

the limited time waivers entered by each of the defendants at the 

August 2, 2019 hearing.
8

did not have access to the substantive discovery because it was 

going to take a considerable amount of time to review all of the 

electronic data provided by the People that morning. In 

response, the court stated: “I understand that you are 

characterizing access a little differently, . . . and that has an 

appropriate place in an appropriate time. Right now, the People 

have complied with my order. The evidence is in front of me. 

You guys have to figure this out.” 

On September 23, 2019, all parties appeared for the 

preliminary hearing before Los Angeles Superior Court Judge 

George Lomeli. At the outset, Garcia’s counsel stated that Garcia

was “not in a position to make a readiness announcement, vis-avis the preliminary hearing” due to “some ongoing outstanding 

very significant discovery issues.” Garcia’s counsel then argued 

that the People were still not complying with their discovery 

obligations despite Judge Sullivan’s prior orders. While the 

People asserted that Judge Sullivan had found them to be in full 

compliance with her discovery order, Garcia’s counsel maintained 

that Judge Sullivan merely had found compliance with her 

contempt order and made no determination about discovery. The 

court stated that it would need to review the transcript of the 

September 20 hearing. 

With respect to the preliminary hearing, the court asked 

if Garcia was requesting a continuance based on his counsel’s

representation that they were not ready to proceed. In response, 

Garcia’s counsel stated: “I want to make sure the record is very 

clear. I did not make the representation that we’re not ready and 

I’m not implying or asking for a continuance. No. My client is 

sitting in jail on a no bail hold. He has a right to his legal and 

constitutional preliminary hearing today. Period. And he is not 
9

going to waive time and he is not asking for a continuance. He is 

not asking for a delay. If this court were to find that there is an 

issue that needs to be dealt with and needs to be discovered, then 

I would ask the court to impose that order and let’s take it from 

there, but he is not waiving time.” When the court inquired if 

there had been any previous time waivers, the People replied 

that there were “both 10 day and 60-day time waivers as to all 

three defendants.” Citing People v. Love (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 

276, the court stated that, once a waiver was made, it could not 

be withdrawn under section 859b. The People advised the court 

that they were ready to proceed with the preliminary hearing 

that day. Garcia’s counsel, however, reiterated that he was “not 

in a position to make a readiness announcement at this point.” 

Ocampo’s counsel joined in the arguments of Garcia’s counsel and 

stated that Ocampo was in the same position. 

The court ordered that the preliminary hearing be 

continued to September 26, 2019 so that it could review the

relevant transcripts to determine if the People had complied with 

the prior discovery order. After confirming his availability on 

that date, Garcia’s counsel stated: “I want to make sure . . . the 

court understand that us agreeing to come back to a date certain 

after today’s date is not an implicit or implied waiver by Mr. 

Garcia . . . for purposes of his speedy trial rights either 

statutorily under [section] 859b or constitutionally under the 

California or United States Constitution.” Garcia’s counsel added 

that “any continuance beyond today’s date would be over Mr. 

Garcia’s objection.” 
10

V. Defendants Move to Dismiss the Action Pursuant to

Section 859b

On September 25, 2019, Garcia and Ocampo filed a motion 

to dismiss the action against them and to order their immediate 

release from custody based on a violation of section 859b.7 They 

argued that their statutory right to a preliminary hearing within 

10 court days of their arraignment was violated because, when

they were arraigned on the amended complaint on July 16, 2019, 

they did not enter any time waivers at that arraignment, and the 

10-day period had expired. They further asserted that, even if 

they had entered a subsequent time waiver on August 2, 2019, 

that waiver was invalid because it was based on a promise that 

they had a right to a preliminary hearing within 30 calendar 

days of August 23, 2019, and that 30-day period also had expired. 

On September 26, 2019, the court denied the motion to 

dismiss. The court found that defendants had waived the 10-day 

and 60-day time limits for the preliminary hearing at their 

arraignment on the original complaint, and that the amendment 

to the complaint did not trigger a new 10-day or 60-day period 

under section 859b. The court also rejected the defendants’ 

argument that their subsequent 30-day waivers were invalid 

because the preliminary hearing was not held on or before 

September 23, 2019. The court noted that “the prosecution was 

prepared to conduct the defendants’ preliminary hearing within 

the 30-day time period” agreed to by the defendants; however, “as 

defense counsel for all defendants represented to this court on the 

7 Oaxaca joined her codefendants’ motion to dismiss, but did 

not request the additional remedy of immediate release since she 

was already out-of-custody on bail. 
11

date of September 23, that being the 30 of 30 date, they were not 

prepared to proceed . . . as they did not have sufficient discovery 

produced by the prosecution so as to allow their ability to go 

forward with the preliminary hearing.” The court found that

counsel’s representation that the defense required additional 

preparation time to review all of the discovery was “an implicit 

waiver by the defendants to proceed to preliminary hearing 

within the required time period.” In addition, the court found 

that, based on its review of the transcript from the September 20 

hearing, the People were in compliance with the prior discovery 

order, though the parties still needed to resolve certain details 

regarding discovery. At the request of Garcia’s counsel, the court 

ordered the proceedings stayed pending the defendants’ filing of a 

writ petition. 

VI. Garcia Files A Writ Petition In Superior Court

On October 7, 2019, Garcia filed a petition for writ of 

mandate or prohibition in Los Angeles County Superior Court, 

seeking dismissal of the amended complaint and immediate 

release from custody. In his petition, Garcia raised the same 

arguments regarding the alleged violation of his statutory right 

to a timely preliminary hearing under section 859b. He also 

asserted that the lengthy delay caused by the People’s lack of 

compliance with discovery violated his right to a speedy trial 

under the state and federal constitutions. 

On October 22, 2019, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge 

William Ryan denied Garcia’s writ petition. The court found that 

Garcia waived the statutory time requirements for a preliminary 

hearing at his arraignment on the original complaint, and that 

section 859b did not contemplate that an arraignment or plea on 
12

an amended complaint would trigger a new time period. The 

court also found that Garcia failed to show a violation of his 

constitutional right to a speedy trial because he provided valid 

time waivers on both June 21, 2019 and August 2, 2019, and he 

only thereafter asserted that he was unable to proceed despite 

the People’s readiness announcement. The court reasoned that if 

Garcia believed his prior waiver was made in error, “his failure to 

object to that time waiver until the instant petition takes away 

his right to object to that error.” 

VII. Garcia Files The Instant Writ Petition

On November 12, 2019, Garcia petitioned this court for 

a writ of mandate directing the superior court to dismiss the 

amended complaint against him and to order his release from 

custody. On November 26, 2019, after the People filed an 

informal opposition to the writ petition, we issued an order to 

show cause why the requested relief should not be granted. The 

People filed a return to the order to show cause on December 17, 

2019, and Garcia filed a reply on January 14, 2020.

DISCUSSION

In seeking writ relief, Garcia contends that his statutory 

and constitutional rights to a timely preliminary hearing were 

violated, requiring the dismissal of the amended complaint 

and his release from custody. Garcia specifically asserts that, 

under section 859b, his arraignment on the amended complaint 

triggered a new statutory time limit for holding the preliminary 

hearing, which he did not personally waive. Garcia also argues 

that the failure to timely hold a preliminary hearing due to the 
13

prosecution’s repeated discovery violations deprived him of his 

constitutional right to a speedy trial.

I. Standard of Review

To determine whether section 859b mandates dismissal of 

the amended complaint in this case, we must resolve a question 

of statutory interpretation. “‘Our role in construing a statute is 

to ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the 

purpose of the law. [Citation.] Because the statutory language is 

generally the most reliable indicator of that intent, we look first 

at the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary 

meaning. [Citation.] We do not, however, consider the statutory 

language in isolation, but rather examine the entire substance of 

the statute in order to determine the scope and purpose of the 

provision, construing its words in context and harmonizing its 

various parts. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Castillolopez

(2016) 63 Cal.4th 322, 329; see also Satele v. Superior Court

(2019) 7 Cal.5th 852, 858-859.) “‘If the statutory language is 

unambiguous, then its plain meaning controls.’” (People v. Ruiz

(2018) 4 Cal.5th 1100, 1106.) If, however, the language supports 

more than one reasonable construction, “we look to other indicia 

of legislative intent, bearing in mind the admonition that ‘[t]he 

meaning of a statute may not be determined from a single word 

or sentence’ [citation] and that apparent ‘ambiguities often may 

be resolved by examining the context in which the language 

appears and adopting the construction which best serves to 

harmonize the statute internally and with related statutes.’ 

[Citations.]” (People v. Pennington (2017) 3 Cal.5th 786, 795.) 

“Essential is whether our interpretation, as well as the 

consequences flowing therefrom, advances the Legislature’s 
14

intended purpose. [Citation.]” (People v. Hubbard (2016) 63 

Cal.4th 378, 386.)

II. Overview of Section 859b

Section 859b “governs the time within which a preliminary 

examination must be held.” (People v. Standish (2006) 38 Cal.4th 

858, 866.) In addition to establishing a statutory right of both the 

People and the defendant to a preliminary hearing at the earliest 

possible time (Ramos v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 

719, 727-728 (Ramos)), section 859b sets forth the time limits 

for conducting a preliminary hearing in a felony case and the 

consequences of failing to comply with those requirements 

(People v. Figueroa (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 665, 673). First, “the 

preliminary examination shall be held within 10 court days of 

the date the defendant is arraigned or pleads, whichever occurs 

later, or within 10 court days of the date criminal proceedings are 

reinstated” following a mental competency determination, unless 

both the defendant and the prosecution “waive that right or good 

cause for a continuance is found.” (§859b.) Second, whenever the 

defendant is in custody for 10 or more court days on the pending 

complaint, “the magistrate shall dismiss the complaint if the 

preliminary examination is set or continued beyond 10 court 

days from the time of the arraignment, plea, or reinstatement of 

criminal proceedings” unless (a) “the defendant personally waives 

his or her right to preliminary examination within the 10 court 

days,” or (b) “[t]he prosecution establishes good cause for a 

continuance beyond the 10-court-day period.” (Ibid.) Third,

regardless of whether the defendant is in custody, “[t]he 

magistrate shall dismiss the complaint if the preliminary 

examination is set or continued more than 60 days from the 
15

date of the arraignment, plea, or reinstatement of criminal 

proceedings . . . unless the defendant personally waives his or her 

right to a preliminary examination within the 60 days.” (Ibid.)8

8 Section 859b states in full: “At the time the defendant 

appears before the magistrate for arraignment, if the public 

offense is a felony to which the defendant has not pleaded guilty 

in accordance with Section 859a, the magistrate, immediately 

upon the appearance of counsel, or if none appears, after waiting 

a reasonable time therefor as provided in Section 859, shall set 

a time for the examination of the case and shall allow not less 

than two days, excluding Sundays and holidays, for the district 

attorney and the defendant to prepare for the examination. The 

magistrate shall also issue subpoenas, duly subscribed, for 

witnesses within the state, required either by the prosecution or 

the defense. [¶] Both the defendant and the people have the right 

to a preliminary examination at the earliest possible time, and 

unless both waive that right or good cause for a continuance 

is found as provided for in Section 1050, the preliminary 

examination shall be held within 10 court days of the date the 

defendant is arraigned or pleads, whichever occurs later, or 

within 10 court days of the date criminal proceedings are 

reinstated pursuant to Chapter 6 (commencing with Section 

1367) of Title 10 of Part 2. [¶] Whenever the defendant is in 

custody, the magistrate shall dismiss the complaint if the 

preliminary examination is set or continued beyond 10 court 

days from the time of the arraignment, plea, or reinstatement 

of criminal proceedings pursuant to Chapter 6 (commencing 

with Section 1367) of Title 10 of Part 2, and the defendant has 

remained in custody for 10 or more court days solely on that 

complaint, unless either of the following occur: [¶] (a) The 

defendant personally waives his or her right to preliminary 

examination within the 10 court days. [¶] (b) The prosecution 

establishes good cause for a continuance beyond the 10-courtday period. [¶] For purposes of this subdivision, “good cause” 

includes, but is not limited to, those cases involving allegations 

that a violation of one or more of the sections specified in 
16

As the California Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he 

language of section 859b is ‘plain and mandatory’ and creates 

an ‘absolute right in favor of persons in custody charged with 

felonies to have the preliminary examination commenced within 

10 court days . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Landrum v. Superior Court

(1981) 30 Cal.3d 1, 6, fn. omitted.) Accordingly, “the magistrate 

is required to dismiss the complaint if the court fails to adhere to 

the mandatory 10-court-day rule for incarcerated defendants or 

the 60-day rule for all defendants.” (People v. Figueroa, supra, 11 

Cal.App.5th at p. 674; see People v. Standish, supra, 38 Cal.4th

subdivision (a) of Section 11165.1 or in Section 11165.6 has 

occurred and the prosecuting attorney assigned to the case has 

another trial, preliminary hearing, or motion to suppress in 

progress in that court or another court. Any continuance under 

this paragraph shall be limited to a maximum of three additional

court days. [¶] If the preliminary examination is set or continued 

beyond the 10-court-day period, the defendant shall be released 

pursuant to Section 1318 unless: [¶] (1) The defendant requests 

the setting of continuance of the preliminary examination beyond 

the 10-court-day period. [¶] (2) The defendant is charged with 

a capital offense in a cause where the proof is evident and 

the presumption great. [¶] (3) A witness necessary for the 

preliminary examination is unavailable due to the actions of the 

defendant. [¶] (4) The illness of counsel. [¶] (5) The unexpected 

engagement of counsel in a jury trial. [¶] (6) Unforeseen conflicts 

of interest which require appointment of new counsel. [¶] The 

magistrate shall dismiss the complaint if the preliminary 

examination is set or continued more than 60 days from the 

date of the arraignment, plea, or reinstatement of criminal 

proceedings pursuant to Chapter 6 (commencing with Section 

1367) of Title 10 of Part 2, unless the defendant personally 

waives his or her right to a preliminary examination within 

the 60 days.”
17

at p. 870 [provisions of section 859b “are mandatory, rather than 

permissive”]; Ramos, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 729 [“[t]he 

Legislature’s use of the word ‘shall’ to describe the action to be 

taken by the magistrate means [section 859b] is absolute”].)

III. Section 859b Mandates Dismissal of the Amended 

Complaint Against Garcia

The principal question of law raised by this writ proceeding 

is: Does an in-custody defendant’s arraignment and plea on an 

amended complaint trigger a new 10-day period for holding a 

preliminary hearing under section 859b, thus mandating 

dismissal of the amended complaint unless the defendant 

personally waives that new 10-day time limit or the prosecution 

shows good cause for a continuance? 

Garcia argues that, based on the plain language of the 

statute, his July 16, 2019 arraignment and plea on the amended 

complaint was a triggering event, restarting the 10-day clock for 

holding a preliminary hearing under section 859b. Because he 

did not personally waive that new time limit, Garcia asserts he 

had a statutory right to the mandatory dismissal of the amended 

complaint and release from custody as of July 30, 2019, which 

was 10 court days after his July 16 arraignment. The People, 

on the other hand, contend that an arraignment or plea on an 

amended complaint is not a triggering event under section 859b 

because the filing of an amended complaint does not start a new 

criminal proceeding, but rather acts as a continuation of the 

previously filed charges. The People claim that, because Garcia 

personally waived the 10-day and 60-day time limits for the 

preliminary hearing at his June 21, 2019 arraignment on the 

original complaint and no new triggering event occurred, he is 

not entitled to dismissal of the amended complaint or release 
18

from custody. We conclude, based on the plain language of 

section 859b, the legislative purpose of the statute, and relevant

case law, Garcia’s arraignment and plea on the amended 

complaint was a triggering event under section 859b, which 

required the preliminary hearing be held within 10 court days of 

that arraignment and plea unless Garcia personally waived his 

right to a preliminary hearing within that 10-day period, or the 

prosecution established good cause for a continuance.

A. Garcia’s July 16, 2019 Arraignment and Plea 

on the Amended Complaint Triggered a New

Statutory Time Period for the Preliminary 

Hearing Under Section 859b

Section 859b expressly provides, absent a waiver or a 

showing of good cause for a continuance, the preliminary hearing 

“shall be held within 10 court days of the date the defendant is 

arraigned or pleads, whichever occurs later, or . . . the date

criminal proceedings are reinstated.” (§ 859b, 2d par.) When, 

as here, the defendant is in custody, the magistrate “shall 

dismiss the complaint” if the preliminary hearing is set more 

than “10 court days from the time of the arraignment, plea, or 

reinstatement of criminal proceedings,” unless the “defendant 

personally waives his or her right to preliminary examination 

within the 10 court days” or the “prosecution establishes good 

cause for a continuance.” (Id. at 3d par.) Accordingly, once an 

event enumerated in section 859b occurs, it triggers the 10-day 

time limit for holding the preliminary hearing. By its terms, the 

statute does not limit the triggering event of “arraignment” 

or “plea” to an arraignment or plea on an original complaint. 

Rather, the right to a preliminary hearing within the 10-day 

period is triggered whenever the defendant “is arraigned or 
19

pleads,” or “criminal proceedings are reinstated.” (Id. at 2d par.) 

Absent a personal waiver by the defendant or showing of good 

cause by the prosecution, the right to a mandatory dismissal of 

the complaint is triggered whenever the preliminary hearing is 

not held within 10 court days of “the arraignment, plea, or 

reinstatement of criminal proceedings.” (Id. at 3d par.) 

“‘The purpose of an arraignment or a rearraignment is to 

inform the accused of the charge against him and to give him 

fairly the opportunity to plead to it. . . .’ [Citation.]” (People v. 

Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 187; see also People v. Hodges (2009) 

174 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1104 [“The purpose of the arraignment is 

to inform the accused of the charge and give [him or] her an 

opportunity to plead to it either by plea or demurrer, or move to 

set it aside.”].) An arraignment generally consists of “reading 

the accusatory pleading to the defendant and delivering to the 

defendant a true copy thereof, . . . and asking the defendant 

whether the defendant pleads guilty or not guilty to the 

accusatory pleading.” (§ 988.) When an accusatory pleading, 

such as a complaint, is amended, the “defendant shall be required 

to plead to such amendment or amended pleading forthwith, or, 

at the time fixed for pleading, if the defendant has not yet 

pleaded and the trial or other proceeding shall continue as if the 

pleading had been originally filed as amended. . . .” (§ 1009.) An 

amended accusatory pleading therefore supersedes the original 

pleading, which has no further effect. (People v. Scott (2013) 221 

Cal.App.4th 525, 533 [“when a pleading is amended, the original 

pleading is thereby set aside and abandoned”]; People v. Mack 

(1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 574, 578 [“‘“an amendatory pleading 

supersedes the original one, which ceases to perform any function 

as a pleading”’”].) In addition, whenever an accusatory pleading 
20

is amended, the defendant should be arraigned on the amended 

pleading and asked to enter a plea to that new pleading. (See In 

re Mitchell (1961) 56 Cal.2d 667, 670 [noting “[t]here can be no 

doubt that [defendant] should have been rearraigned” on 

amended information that added prior felony conviction 

allegation, but concluding “the failure to do so, under the facts

here involved, was, at most, a mere irregularity” that did not 

deprive the court of jurisdiction]; People v. Hopkins (1974) 39 

Cal.App.3d 107, 119 [where prosecution amended information to 

add great-bodily-injury allegation, “a substantial right of the 

defendant . . . was prejudiced by the court’s failure to properly 

arraign him . . . on the information as amended”]; People v. 

Walker (1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 159, 164 [“Where an information is 

amended, regular and orderly procedure requires the defendant 

be rearraigned and required to plead thereto before trial.”].)

In this case, the People amended the original complaint 

to add three felony counts of possession of child pornography

against Garcia. On July 16, 2019, Garcia was arraigned on the 

amended complaint and entered a plea of not guilty to all counts. 

Under the plain language of section 859b, Garcia’s “arraignment” 

and “plea” on the amended complaint constituted a triggering 

event that entitled him to a preliminary hearing within 10 court 

days of that arraignment and plea, unless he personally waived 

his right to a preliminary hearing within that 10-day period. (§ 

859b.) Garcia did not enter a personal time waiver at any time

between July 16, 2019 (the date of his arraignment and plea on 

the amended complaint) and July 30, 2019 (the date the 10-day 

statutory period expired). Accordingly, as of July 31, 2019, the 

amended complaint was subject to mandatory dismissal. 
21

Construing Garcia’s arraignment and plea on the amended 

complaint as a new triggering event under section 859b is also 

consistent with the purpose of the statute. Section 859b “is 

one of a number of statutes ‘that are supplementary to and a 

construction of the constitutional right to a speedy trial.’” (People 

v. Standish, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 870.) “The fact that the 10-

court-day deadline applies only to persons in custody at the time 

of their arraignment or plea, whichever is later, has been held 

to ‘manifest[ ] a legislative policy to eliminate the possibility 

that persons charged with felonies might suffer prolonged 

incarceration without a judicial determination of probable cause 

merely because they are unable to post bond in order to gain 

their freedom.’ [Citation.]” (Landrum v. Superior Court, supra, 

30 Cal.3d at pp. 11-12.) Section 859b thus “reflects a clear 

legislative intention to prevent prolonged incarceration prior to 

a preliminary hearing.” (Id. at p. 12.) As Garcia points out, if an 

arraignment under section 859b means only an arraignment on 

the original complaint, then a defendant could enter a personal 

time waiver at that first arraignment with bail having been set, 

and later be placed on a no-bail hold as a result of a second 

arraignment on an amended complaint that added more serious 

charges. The defendant would then be subject to prolonged 

incarceration with no statutory mechanism for asserting his 

or her right to a timely preliminary hearing. 

The decision in Davis v. Superior Court (2017) 18 

Cal.App.5th 1061 (Davis) also supports the conclusion that there 

can be more than one triggering event under section 859b. In 

Davis, an in-custody defendant waived his right to a preliminary 

hearing within 10 court days and 60 days of entering a no guilty 

plea on a felony complaint. On the day set for the preliminary 
22

hearing, the superior court suspended the criminal proceedings 

for purposes of a mental competency determination. After the 

defendant was found competent to stand trial, the criminal 

proceedings were reinstated. Over the defendant’s objection, the 

court then reset the preliminary hearing for a date more than 10 

court days after reinstatement of the criminal proceedings. 

(Id. at p. 1064.) In granting the defendant’s petition for writ of 

mandate, the court of appeal held that section 859b required that 

the preliminary hearing be held within 10 court days of the date 

that criminal proceedings were reinstated, notwithstanding the 

personal time waiver made by the defendant prior to the 

suspension of those proceedings. (Id. at pp. 1066-1067.) 

As the Davis court explained: “[T]here are two categories of 

triggering events in this part of section 859b: one is arraignment 

and plea; the other is reinstatement of criminal proceedings. . . . 

[¶] Each of these two categories of triggering events entitles a 

defendant in custody to a preliminary hearing within 10 court 

days, absent a personal time waiver, and a dismissal of the 

complaint if the preliminary hearing does not occur. The words 

and structure of the statute lead us to conclude that, if criminal 

proceedings are suspended, the relevant personal time 

waiver is one made after criminal proceedings are reinstated.” 

(Id. at p. 1066, fn. omitted.) In construing the language of the 

statute, the court observed that section 859b “uses the present 

tense, not the past tense” in stating that the preliminary hearing 

can be held beyond the 10-day statutory period “if the defendant 

‘personally waives his or her right to preliminary examination.’” 

(Id. at p. 1067.) The court also noted that the statute refers to 

the 10-day period when a personal time waiver must occur as 
23

“‘the 10 court days,’” which logically could only refer to the 10 

court days after the triggering event of reinstatement. (Ibid.)

In reaching its holding, the Davis court rejected the 

People’s reliance on People v. Love, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th 276

(Love) to support their claim that the defendant was bound by his 

prior time waiver. In Love, an out-of-custody defendant waived 

her right to have a preliminary hearing within 10 court days and 

60 calendar days of her plea. She then failed to appear at the 

next scheduled hearing and a bench warrant was issued for her 

arrest. The defendant appeared in custody five months later, and 

over her objection, the superior court set the preliminary hearing 

for a date more than 10 court days after her reappearance. 

(Id. at pp. 280-282.) In concluding the defendant was not entitled 

to the dismissal of her complaint under section 859b, the court of 

appeal stated: “The Legislature has never codified a provision 

imposing a 10-court-day limit for defendants who, having 

previously waived time, find themselves in custody after a failure 

to appear. Nor has the Legislature created a provision for the 

withdrawal of properly entered waivers.” (Id. at p. 285.) In 

distinguishing Love, the Davis court noted the issue before it 

was “not whether a defendant may withdraw a validly entered 

personal time waiver for preliminary hearing in the abstract, or 

whether section 859b vitiates a validly entered personal time 

waiver.” (Davis, supra, at 18 Cal.App.5th p. 1068.) Rather, the 

issue was “whether section 859b requires a preliminary hearing 

to be held within 10 court days after reinstatement of criminal 

proceedings unless defendant personally waives his right to the 

examination within the 10 court days after criminal proceedings 

are reinstated.” (Ibid.) The Davis court concluded that it did.
24

In denying Garcia’s motion to dismiss, the superior court 

cited Love for the proposition that the Legislature has never 

codified a provision allowing for the withdrawal of a properly 

entered waiver of the right to a timely preliminary hearing. Like 

the Davis court, however, we conclude that the issue before us is 

not whether Garcia was entitled to withdraw the time waivers 

that he previously entered at his June 21, 2019 arraignment and 

plea on the original complaint. Indeed, Garcia never asked to 

withdraw those prior time waivers or argued that he could do so. 

Rather, the issue is whether, under section 859b, Garcia’s July 

16, 2019 arraignment and plea on the amended complaint was a 

new triggering event that required a preliminary hearing to be 

held within 10 court days absent Garcia’s personal time waiver. 

As the Davis court recognized, section 859b creates “categories 

of triggering events,” each of which entitles the defendant to a 

preliminary hearing within a 10-court-day period unless he or 

she personally waives that time limit. (Davis, supra, at 18 

Cal.App.5th p. 1066; see also People v. Figueroa, supra, 11 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 676-677 [describing arraignment, plea, and 

reinstatement of criminal proceedings as three separate and 

distinct triggering events under section 859b].) There is nothing 

in the plain language of the statute to suggest that a prior time 

waiver precludes a defendant from exercising his or her rights 

under section 859b after a new triggering event occurs. 

Here, Garcia had a statutory right to a preliminary hearing 

within 10 court days of his arraignment and plea on the amended 

complaint. Because Garcia did not personally waive that right 

and the preliminary hearing was not held within that 10-day

period, he was entitled to dismissal of the amended complaint 

under section 859b. (See, e.g., Landrum v. Superior Court, supra, 
25

30 Cal.3d at p. 6 [violation of the 10-day rule in section 859b 

“rendered the resulting commitment of the defendant illegal”]; 

Ramos, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 737 [“a defendant whose 

right to a preliminary hearing within 60 days of arraignment is 

violated is entitled to dismissal of the felony complaint”]; People 

v. Henderson (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 922, 931 [“[i]f the court fails 

to conduct the preliminary examination within the 10-day 

period, the in-custody defendant is entitled to a dismissal”]).

B. Garcia’s August 2, 2019 Limited Time Waiver 

Was Not a General Waiver of His Right to a 

Timely Preliminary Hearing

In opposing the writ petition, the People assert that, 

even if the July 16, 2019 arraignment and plea on the amended 

complaint restarted the 10-day requirement of section 859b, 

Garcia was not entitled to a dismissal because he subsequently 

entered a time waiver on August 2, 2019. Citing this court’s prior 

decision in Ramos, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th 719, the People argue 

that Garcia’s subsequent time waiver rendered moot any claim

that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. 

In Ramos, the defendant was arraigned on an amended 

felony complaint that charged her with murder and being an 

accessory after the fact. At the request of Ramos’s codefendants, 

the magistrate granted several continuances of the preliminary 

hearing to a date more than 60 days after the arraignment. 

Ramos objected to these continuances and later moved to dismiss 

the amended complaint because the preliminary hearing was not 

held within 60 days of her arraignment as required by section 

859b. (Ramos, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at pp. 723-724.) Following 

the denial of her motion to dismiss and a writ petition before the 

superior court, Ramos petitioned this court for a writ of mandate 
26

compelling the dismissal of the amended complaint against her. 

During the pendency of the writ proceedings, the preliminary 

hearing went forward and Ramos was held to answer only to 

the accessory-after-the-fact charge. (Id. at pp. 725-726.) Ramos

thereafter sought to withdraw her petition, and following oral 

argument, she also filed a waiver of her right to a preliminary 

hearing within the time limits of section 859b. (Id. at p. 723, fn. 

2.) We concluded that Ramos’s personal waiver of rights under 

section 859b “render[ed] moot her request for extraordinary writ 

relief.” (Id. at p. 727.) We nevertheless exercised our discretion 

to address the merits of her petition because it raised issues 

about the proper application of section 859b to multipledefendant cases that were likely to recur. (Id. at p. 723, fn. 2.) 

Ramos did not address the specific circumstances under 

which a defendant may enter a valid time waiver after the 10-day 

or 60-day period specified in section 859b has expired. However, 

assuming, without deciding, that a defendant may retroactively 

waive time under section 859b, Garcia’s waiver on August 2, 2019 

was not a general waiver of his right to a preliminary hearing

within the statutory 10-day and 60-day periods. Instead, Garcia 

entered a specific and limited time waiver in which he agreed 

to continue the preliminary hearing to a date on or before 

September 23, 2019. The record reflects that, after advising

Garcia that he had a “statutory right to a speedy preliminary 

hearing, that is within 10 court days and 60 calendar days of 

your arraignment,” Judge Bennett explained that, “presently, 

it’s my understanding that today is set for day zero of 30, 

which means that you would be going to preliminary hearing 

within 30 days of today.” Judge Bennett then asked Garcia: “Do

you agree to waive and give up those rights so that your matter 
27

can be continued to the date of August 23rd, 2019, with the 

understanding that your preliminary hearing would be held on 

that date or within 30 calendar days of that date?” Garcia 

answered in the affirmative. 

Accordingly, Garcia’s August 2, 2019 waiver was not, as 

the People assert, an “unqualified” waiver of the time limits in

section 859b. Rather, Garcia’s time waiver was expressly 

conditioned upon the preliminary hearing being held within 30 

calendar days of August 23, 2019. Thirty calendar days from 

August 23, 2019 was September 22, 2019, a Sunday. As a result, 

Monday, September 23, 2019 was the last day on which the 

preliminary hearing could be held based on Garcia’s limited 

waiver. The preliminary hearing did not go forward on that date, 

and thus, the specific condition that formed the basis for Garcia’s 

30-day time waiver was not satisfied. (Irving v. Superior Court

(1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 596, 599 [where defendant’s agreement to 

continue the preliminary hearing to a date more than 10 court 

days after his arraignment “was based upon a condition which 

was not met,” it could “not operate as a valid waiver” of his rights 

under section 859b].) Under these circumstances, Garcia’s 

agreement to continue the preliminary hearing to a date on or 

before September 23, 2019 did not constitute a general waiver of 

his statutory right to a timely preliminary hearing. 

C. At the September 23, 2019 Hearing, Garcia Did 

Not Waive His Right to a Timely Preliminary

Hearing, Nor Was There A Finding of Good 

Cause for a Continuance

In denying Garcia’s motion to dismiss, the superior court 

concluded that the preliminary hearing was not required to be 

held on September 23, 2019, the “30 of 30” date, because Garcia
28

“implicitly waived time” when his counsel advised the court that 

he could not make a readiness announcement on that date due to 

the parties’ ongoing discovery dispute. The court reasoned that, 

even though defense counsel expressly stated that the defendants 

were “not waiving time” at the September 23 hearing, “the court 

is quite certain that had the court deemed the defendants ready 

for preliminary hearing on that date that there would have been 

an objection that their clients’ constitutional rights were being 

violated as they had not had sufficient time to review all 

discovery they believe may be relevant to the case so as to allow 

for effective representation of the defendants.” The court thus

chose to “interpret” the statements of defense counsel that they 

required additional time to review all of the discovery materials

“as an implicit waiver by the defendants to proceed to 

preliminary hearing within the required time period.” 

Contrary to the superior court’s finding, however, section 

859b does not permit implicit time waivers. Rather, the statute 

provides that a defendant’s right to a preliminary hearing within 

the 10-day and 60-day periods must be “personally waive[d].” (§ 

859b.) The plain language of this provision means that defense 

counsel cannot, either expressly or impliedly, waive the statutory

time limits for holding a preliminary hearing on the defendant’s

behalf. (Irving v. Superior Court, supra, 93 Cal.App.3d at p. 600 

[“[a]ddition of the word ‘personally’ to the waiver provision” of 

section 859b “must be read as eliminating the right of counsel to 

waive the defendant’s right to speedy proceedings”].) Moreover, 

the waiver of the right to a timely preliminary hearing under 

section 859b must be clear, unambiguous, and consistent with the

requirements of the statute. As one appellate court observed in 

concluding there had been no valid waiver, “[t]he fact that, based 
29

upon the circumstances here, it may be a reasonable supposition 

that [defendant] would have waived that right is no substitute for 

the statute’s personal waiver requirement. [Citations.] Any 

contention that defendant impliedly waived his rights under 

section 859b must therefore be rejected.” (People v. Figueroa, 

supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 685, italics omitted.) 

At the September 23, 2019 hearing, Garcia’s counsel 

repeatedly asserted that Garcia did not wish to waive his rights 

under section 859b. When the superior court inquired if Garcia 

was seeking a continuance of the preliminary hearing, his 

counsel stated: “My client is sitting in jail on a no bail hold. He 

has a right to his legal and constitutional preliminary hearing 

today. Period. And he is not going waive time and he is not 

asking for a continuance. He is not asking for a delay.” When 

the court decided to continue the preliminary hearing to 

September 26, 2019, Garcia’s counsel reiterated that his client 

was not agreeing to any waiver of rights, stating: “[Our 

agreement] to come back at a date certain after today’s date is 

not an implicit or implied waiver by Mr. Garcia for any purpose 

. . . of his speedy trial rights. . . .” The superior court 

nevertheless found that Garcia had “implicitly waived time”

based solely on the statements of his counsel that the defense

was not prepared to announce its readiness for the preliminary 

hearing due to outstanding discovery issues. The right to a 

timely preliminary hearing under section 859b belonged to 

Garcia, not his attorney, and only Garcia could personally 

waive the 10-day and 60-day time limits of the statute. The 

court accordingly erred in finding that Garcia entered an 

implied time waiver at the September 23, 2019 hearing.
30

Under section 859b, whenever a defendant is in custody 

and does not personally waive time, the court must dismiss the 

complaint if the preliminary hearing is set or continued beyond 

the statutory 10-day period unless “the prosecution establishes 

good cause for a continuance” for up to three additional court 

days. (§ 859b, 3d par., subd. (b).)9 Where a continuance for good 

9 The good cause exception to the mandatory dismissal rule 

for an in-custody defendant who does not personally waive the 

10-day time limit was added to section 859b in 1981. (Stats. 

1980, ch. 938, § 1, p. 2965, eff. Jan. 1, 1981.) Prior to that

amendment, the statute provided, in relevant part: “Both the 

defendant and the [P]eople have the right to a preliminary 

examination at the earliest possible time, and unless both waive 

that right or good cause for a continuance is found as provided 

for in Section 1050, the preliminary examination shall be held 

within 10 court days of the date the defendant is arraigned 

or pleads, whichever occurs later. In no instance shall the 

preliminary examination be continued beyond 10 court days from 

such arraignment or plea whenever the defendant is in custody at 

the time of such arraignment or plea and the defendant does not 

personally waive his right to preliminary examination within 

such 10 court days.” (Stats. 1977, ch. 1152, § 1; eff. Jan. 1, 1978.)

The 1981 statute deleted the provision that “[i]n no 

instance shall the preliminary examination be continued 

beyond 10 court days” for an in-custody defendant who does

not personally waive time, and instead provided that, where 

the defendant is in custody, the magistrate “shall dismiss the 

complaint if the preliminary examination is set or continued 

beyond 10 court days from the time of the arraignment or plea”

unless “(a) [t]he defendant personally waives his or her right to 

preliminary examination within the 10 court days,” or “(b) [t]he 

prosecution establishes good cause for a continuance beyond 

the 10-court day period.” (Stats. 1980, ch. 938, § 1, p. 2965.) 
31

cause is granted, the defendant must be released on his or her 

own recognizance pursuant to section 1318 unless one of six 

enumerated exceptions to release applies. (Id., 5th par.) In this 

case, however, we need not decide whether the superior court 

could have continued the preliminary hearing to September 26, 

2019 based on a finding a good cause under section 859b, as there 

was neither a request for a continuance by any party, nor any 

attempt by the prosecution to establish good cause.

The record reflects that neither the prosecution nor the 

defense requested a continuance at the September 23, 2019 

hearing, or argued that there was good cause to grant one. To 

the contrary, the People announced they were ready to proceed 

with the preliminary hearing on that date. While Garcia’s 

counsel indicated the defense was not ready to proceed due to 

the prosecution’s non-compliance with discovery, he specifically 

stated that Garcia was not asking to continue the preliminary 

hearing, and that “any continuance beyond today’s date would be 

over Mr. Garcia’s objection.” The prosecution also expressed that 

The 1981 statute did not include a definition of good cause. 

In September 1987, however, section 859b was amended to state

that, for purposes of subdivision (b), good cause for a continuance 

includes, but is not limited to, cases alleging a violation of certain

statutes involving child sexual assault or child abuse where “the 

prosecuting attorney assigned to the case has another trial, 

preliminary hearing, or motion to suppress in progress in that 

court or another court.” (Stats. 1987, ch. 461, § 1, pp. 1699-1700.) 

The 1987 legislation also added the same definition of good cause 

to section 1050. (Stats. 1987, ch. 461, § 3, pp. 1701-1702.) Apart 

from a technical amendment made in 1989 to cross-reference the 

current versions of the applicable statutes (Stats. 1989, ch. 897, 

§ 26.5, pp. 3066-3067), section 859b’s definition of good cause 

adopted in September 1987 remains in effect. 
32

a continuance “would be over the People’s objection” to the extent 

it was based on a perceived lack of their “readiness to proceed to 

trial today.” 

In deciding to continue the preliminary hearing for three 

additional days notwithstanding these objections, the superior 

court never asked the prosecution to demonstrate the grounds for 

a finding of good cause, nor stated that it had found good cause 

for a continuance under section 859b. Rather, the court found

that the defendants were bound by the prior time waiver that 

they had made at the arraignment on the original complaint. 

Likewise, in denying Garcia’s motion to dismiss the amended 

complaint, the court found that Garcia was not entitled to a

dismissal under section 895b because he had entered both an 

express time waiver at the June 21, 2019 arraignment and an 

implied time waiver at the September 23, 2019 hearing. The 

court made no finding of good cause for a continuance. 

Absent a personal and express time waiver by Garcia, he 

was entitled to a preliminary hearing within the statutory period 

applicable to the amended complaint. Garcia did not personally 

waive the 10-day or 60-day time limits of section 859b at his July 

16, 2019 arraignment and plea on the amended complaint or at 

any time thereafter. Instead, Garcia entered a limited time 

waiver on August 2, 2019 that was expressly conditioned upon 

the preliminary hearing being held on or before September 23, 

2019. The preliminary hearing was not held within that time

period and Garcia did not personally and expressly enter an 

additional time waiver at the September 23, 2019 hearing. 
33

Under these circumstances, section 859b mandates that the 

amended complaint against Garcia be dismissed.10

DISPOSITION

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing 

respondent superior court to vacate its September 26, 2019 

order denying Garcia’s motion to dismiss and its October 22, 2019 

order denying Garcia’s petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, 

or other appropriate relief, and to thereafter enter a new and 

different order dismissing the amended complaint against him. 

ZELON, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

FEUER, J.

10 In light of this conclusion, we need not address Garcia’s 

argument that the failure to timely hold the preliminary hearing 

also violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial.