No. DA 06-0060 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

 

2006 MT 338N 

MIKE WRIGG, 

 Plaintiff and Appellant, 

 v. 

L&H, LLC, d/b/a COUNTRY INN & SUITES, 

and LONGHORN, LLC, 

 Defendants and Respondents. 

APPEAL FROM: The District Court of the First Judicial District, 

In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. CDV 2004-429, 

Honorable Thomas C. Honzel, Presiding Judge 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

 Bruce M. Spencer, Attorney at Law, Helena, Montana 

For Respondents: 

 William J. Gregoire and Robert J. Vermillion, Smith, Walsh, 

 Clarke & Gregoire, PLLP, Great Falls, Montana (L&H) 

 

 Leo S. Ward and Chad E. Adams, Browning, Kaleczyc, 

 Berry & Hoven, P.C., Helena, Montana (Longhorn) 

 

 

 Submitted on Briefs: October 19, 2006 

 Decided: December 19, 2006 

Filed: 

__________________________________________ 

Clerk 
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d)(v), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal 

Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, the following memorandum decision shall not be 

cited as precedent. It shall be filed as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme 

Court and shall be reported by case title, Supreme Court cause number and result to the 

State Reporter Publishing Company and West Group in the quarterly table of noncitable 

cases issued by this Court. 

¶2 Mike Wrigg (Wrigg) appeals from the order of the First Judicial District Court, 

Lewis and Clark County, granting L&H, LLC’s (L&H) motion to dismiss and granting 

Longhorn, LLC’s (Longhorn) motion for summary judgment. We affirm. 

¶3 Wrigg brought this premises liability action in district court attempting to recover 

damages for alleged personal injuries suffered outside a saloon owned and operated by 

Longhorn. Wrigg also brought similar negligence claims against L&H, the owner of the 

hotel and restaurant in which the Longhorn Saloon is located. The claims against L&H 

were dismissed pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)—the District Court held that Wrigg’s 

amended complaint failed to state a cause of action against L&H. Longhorn moved for 

summary judgment, and the court, finding that Wrigg failed to raise a genuine issue of 

material fact by offering nothing more than speculation or suspicion, granted Longhorn’s 

motion. Wrigg appeals. 

¶4 Wrigg argues that the District Court erred in dismissing L&H from the action. He 

contends that L&H had a duty to keep the premises safe and exercise ordinary care in 

doing so, and that it breached this duty. Wrigg also argues that the court erred in granting 

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summary judgment for Longhorn because genuine issues of material fact exist as to 

whether a bar patron who earlier started a bar fight and was not asked to leave later 

assaulted Wrigg outside the bar. 

¶5 L&H argues that Wrigg’s amended complaint did not state a claim upon which 

relief could be granted because it was essentially a liquor liability claim against the codefendants, Longhorn. L&H maintains that even if the court erred by dismissing L&H, it 

should not be reversed because the court came to the right conclusion, even if for the 

wrong reasons. Longhorn argues that the District Court’s grant of summary judgment 

should be affirmed on the merits. It contends that Wrigg does not know what the cause 

of his injury is, and failed to provide any evidence other than speculation and suspicion to 

support his theory he was assaulted by the patron who started an earlier disturbance. 

¶6 We review a grant of a motion to dismiss to determine if the district court’s 

interpretation of the law was correct. Boreen v. Christensen, 267 Mont. 405, 408, 884 

P.2d 761, 762 (1994). This Court will affirm dismissal of a complaint for failure to state 

a claim when the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim to entitle him 

to relief. Dennis v. Brown, 2005 Mont. 85, ¶ 5, 326 Mont. 422, ¶ 5, 110 P.3d 17, ¶ 5. 

¶7 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Roy v. Blackfoot Telephone 

Co-op., 2004 MT 316, ¶ 11, 324 Mont. 30, ¶ 11, 101 P.3d 301, ¶ 11. Our evaluation is 

the same as that of the trial court. Grimsrud v. Hagel, 2005 MT 194, ¶ 14, 328 Mont. 

142, ¶ 14, 119 P.3d 47, ¶ 14. “[T]he moving party must establish both the absence of a 

genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.” Grimsrud, 

¶ 14. “If this is accomplished, ‘the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to prove, 

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by more than mere denial and speculation, that a genuine issue does exist.’” Grimsrud, 

¶ 14. If the court determines that no genuine issues of fact exist, the court must then 

determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Grimsrud, ¶ 14. 

¶8 It is appropriate to decide this case pursuant to our Order of February 11, 2003, 

amending Section 1.3 of our 1996 Internal Operating Rules and providing for 

memorandum opinions. It is manifest on the face of the briefs and the record before us 

that the appeal is without merit. The legal issues are clearly controlled by settled 

Montana law which the District Court correctly interpreted, and the District Court’s grant 

of summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate as they proved the absence of 

genuine issues of material fact and that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

¶9 Affirmed. 

 /S/ JIM RICE 

We concur: 

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY 

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON 

/S/ PATRICIA COTTER 

/S/ BRIAN MORRIS 

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