SECOND DIVISION

								August 68, 2001

								(Nunc Pro Tunc June 28, 2002)

No. 1-00-3235

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 

		Plaintiff-Appellee,

				v.

ANTHONY JAY MAZAR, 

		Defendant-Appellant.	

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Appeal from the 

Circuit Court of

Cook County.

Honorable

J. Patrick Morse, 

Judge Presiding.

	PRESIDING JUSTICE BURKE delivered the opinion of the court:

	Defendant Anthony Jay Mazar appeals from the circuit court's sentencing

order on his convictions.  Following a jury trial, in which defendant appeared pro se, he was convicted of two counts of burglary and one count of aggravated possession of a stolen vehicle.  Defendant was subsequently sentenced to 13

years' imprisonment on each conviction, to run concurrently.  On appeal,

defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to appoint standby

counsel for him, he was denied his fundamental right to a fair trial because he

was forced to proceed to trial in prison clothing, and he was denied due process

because the trial court's admonishments with respect to how to preserve issues

for appeal misinformed him.  We affirm defendant's convictions, but remand this

cause with directions that the trial court advise defendant of his appeal rights

in conformity with current Supreme Court Rule 605(a) (145 Ill. 2d R. 605(a) (as

amended October 1, 2001)), and to allow defendant to file a motion challenging

his sentences.

	STATEMENT OF FACTS

	Defendant's convictions on two counts of burglary and one count of

aggravated possession of a stolen vehicle were based on a series of events that

occurred on June 3, 2000.  The trial court sentenced defendant to 13 years' imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently.  Because defendant does not

challenge his convictions, the facts of the offenses and events surrounding his

arrest are not set forth in detail.  Only those facts pertinent to the issues on

appeal are stated below.

	Prior to defendant's trial, on July 26, 2000, defendant elected to proceed pro se.  The trial court thoroughly admonished defendant with respect to the perils of doing so and specifically stated that it would not appoint standby

counsel.  Thereafter, defendant was admonished several more times about the

perils, but persisted in proceeding pro se.  On August 1, at another pretrial hearing, the trial court noted that defendant was dressed in jail clothes. 

Defendant stated that that was okay.  When told that he could be provided with

civilian clothing, defendant stated that that was a "nice offer.  I accept, if

it happens."  Again, on August 22, the issue of defendant's clothing arose.  At

that time, before a different judge, defendant indicated that another judge had

advised him that "they" would get him clothes, to which defendant had responded

that that was a generous offer and he would accept it if true.  The court then

requested that the public defender obtain civilian clothing for defendant, which

he agreed to do.

	On August 24, just prior to commencement of defendant's trial, defendant

requested appointment of standby counsel.  After indicating the problems inherent

with appointment of standby counsel, the court, relying on a United States

Supreme Court decision, declined defendant's "eleventh hour" request for

appointment of standby counsel.  At this time, defendant also objected to the

fact that he had to wear prison clothes.  Defendant had been provided a blue

shirt, a blue shirt coat, and a blue polka dot tie by the public defender's

office.  However, the public defender did not have pants to fit defendant and he

was wearing khaki pants issued by the Department of Corrections.  Apparently, the

prison markings on the pants were only visible if defendant stood.  The trial court indicated that neither it, the State, nor the public defender's office was

constitutionally required to supply defendant with civilian clothing.  The court

suggested that at the lunch break, prior to selection of the jury, that defendant

turn his pants inside out.  Defendant followed this suggestion and proceeded to

trial in this manner.

	After defendant was convicted, he filed a motion for a new trial,

contending, inter alia, that the jury had been tainted because he was a pro se defendant who had been required to wear "filthy prison garb trousers inside out

and flimsy heelless prison shoes," and that the trial court erred in denying his

request for standby counsel.  Following the parties' arguments, the trial court

denied defendant's motion, finding that appointment of standby counsel was not

appropriate.  With respect to defendant's attire, the trial court noted that the

public defender stated that it had no pants to fit defendant.  According to the

court, defendant had turned the pants inside out and they looked like Dockers,

which the trial court did not see as a "problem."  Lastly, the trial court stated

that it did not think there was "any problem with the jury knowing somebody was

in custody," and that defendant was "wearing civilian clothing."  This appeal

followed.

	ANALYSIS

	I.  Right to Appear Both Pro Se and 

	   With Representation of Counsel 

	A.  Constitutional Provision

	Defendant first contends that the Illinois Constitution, Article I, section

8, grants a defendant the right to simultaneously appear pro se and with the assistance of counsel.  According to defendant, the language of our

constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous.  Defendant maintains that

section 8 is not as limited as the corresponding right in the federal

constitution.  Defendant further argues that even if the two provisions were the same, we can construe Illinois' constitutional provisions independently as

providing more expansive rights.  Defendant asserts that this is an issue not

previously decided by any Illinois court.  Defendant further contends that a

harmless error analysis is not applicable here because he was denied a

fundamental right.  The State has failed to respond to defendant's constitutional

argument.

	Article I, section 8, of the Illinois Constitution provides:

			"In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have

the right to appear and defend in person and by

counsel."  Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8.

Contrary to defendant's argument, the issue of whether a defendant has a right

to both appear pro se and with assistance of counsel under section 8 has been addressed by this court.  In People v. Guthrie, 60 Ill. App. 3d 293, 376 N.E.2d 425 (1978), the defendant, on appeal, argued that the trial court's refusal to

allow him to proceed both pro se and with counsel violated, inter alia, section 8.  Guthrie, 60 Ill. App. 3d at 295.  The Guthrie court noted that it was making the first ruling by a court of review in the State on whether a criminal

defendant "has an absolute right arising from the Federal or State constitutions,

the statutes or common law to appear by counsel while at the same time conducting

portions of the defense himself."  Guthrie, 60 Ill. App. 3d at 295.  The Guthrie court then observed that the Illinois Supreme Court had previously stated:

		" 'An accused has either the right to have counsel act

for him or the right to act himself.  As pointed out in United States v. Mitchell, 2nd Cir. (1943), 137 F.2d 1006, it is obvious that both of those rights cannot be

exercised at the same time.' "  Guthrie, 60 Ill. App. 3d at 296, quoting People v. Ephraim, 411 Ill. 118, 122, 103 N.E.2d 363 (1952).

The Guthrie court then concluded that under the federal constitution, there was no right for a defendant to both appear pro se and with the assistance of counsel.  Guthrie, 60 Ill. App. 3d at 297.  With respect to Article I, section 8, of Illinois' constitution, the Guthrie court stated:

			"Although the Illinois constitutional mandate in

regard to personal representation and that by counsel is

in the conjunctive, we follow the dictum of Ephraim that neither the State constitution, its statutes nor the

common law require a trial court to permit a defendant

to proceed both in person and by counsel.  ***  We are

not persuaded that, even under optimum circumstances, a

defendant has any such right."  Guthrie, 60 Ill. App. 3d at 297.

See also People v. Lighthall, 175 Ill. App. 3d 700, 704-05, 530 N.E.2d 81 (1988) (citing Guthrie for the proposition that a defendant has no right to representation both pro se and by counsel); People v. Page, 152 Ill. App. 3d 957, 959, 505 N.E.2d 39 (1987) (stating that a defendant has no right, whether federal

or state, to combine representation pro se and by counsel, citing Guthrie).

	Since Guthrie, the Illinois Supreme Court, although not specifically addressing the issue under the Illinois Constitution, has refused to require

"hybrid" representation.  See, e.g., People v. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d 294, 333, 677 N.E.2d 875 (1997) (holding that denial of the defendant's request to act as

co-counsel did not violate his constitutional right of self-representation);

People v. Redd, 173 Ill. 2d 1, 39, 670 N.E.2d 583 (1996) (holding that the trial court did not err in refusing the pro se defendant's request to have standby counsel cross-examine a witness).  We believe that Guthrie is well-reasoned and see no reason to depart from its holding.  Accordingly, we find that defendant

had no right to simultaneous pro se representation and assistance of standby counsel under the Illinois Constitution.

	B.  Abuse of Discretion

	Alternatively, defendant maintains that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying his request for appointment of standby counsel because the

trial court's reasons for refusing to appoint standby counsel were unpersuasive. 

According to defendant, the following were the trial court's bases or reasons for

denying his request.  First, the trial court concluded that by granting a

defendant standby counsel, it often persuades the defendant to unwisely choose

to proceed pro se.  Defendant argues, however, that it is his right to make that choice, whether wise or unwise.  Second, the trial court found that appointment

of standby counsel undermines the defendant's right to a fair trial.  Defendant

argues that just the opposite is true because counsel is able to guide a

defendant.  Third, the trial court found that appointment of standby counsel

leads a defendant to claim ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. 

Defendant argues that the appellate court is well equipped to handle

nonmeritorious claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

	A trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to appoint standby

counsel for a defendant proceeding pro se.  People v. Williams, 277 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 1058, 661 N.E.2d 1186 (1996).  In deciding whether to appoint standby

counsel, the court should consider the following criteria: "(1) the nature and

gravity of the charge; (2) the expected factual and legal complexity of the

proceedings; and (3) the abilities and experience of the defendant."  Williams, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 1058, citing People v. Gibson, 136 Ill. 2d 362, 380, 556 N.E.2d 226 (1990).

	In the instant case, at a pretrial hearing on July 26, 2000, before Judge Joseph Romano, defendant was represented by counsel.  However, at this time,

defendant indicated that he desired to proceed pro se.  The trial court thoroughly admonished defendant with respect to the perils of pro se representation, including the fact that the court would not allow defendant to

change his mind later and that the trial court would not appoint standby counsel. 

Defendant nonetheless chose to proceed pro se.  At another pretrial conference on August 1, before Judge Gerald Rohrer, defendant was again admonished about the

perils of proceeding pro se.  On August 22, before Judge Patrick Morse, defendant was again asked if he was sure that he wanted to proceed pro se.  Defendant responded in the affirmative and stated that it was his sixth time representing

himself.  Defendant stated that he had two prior losses and "I am in desperate

need of a win."  At this time, defendant indicated that he had one pro se acquittal, two losses, one hung jury, and one mistrial.1  The court nonetheless offered defendant representation by counsel and he refused, stating that he was

more confident in speaking in his own defense than having another man fight for

him.

	On August 24, again before Judge Morse, just prior to the commencement of

jury selection, defendant requested standby counsel.  The trial court refused

this "eleventh hour" request.  The court first detailed the problems inherent in

such a hybrid representation as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975).  According to the court, defendant's case was relatively factually simple and

defendant possessed broad experience and, therefore, it was the court's belief

that the appointment of standby counsel would only muddy the waters and would not be appropriate.  The court stated that it had weighed the factors set forth in Williams and declined to appoint standby counsel.

	At the hearing on defendant's motion for a new trial, where defendant

argued that the trial court erred in not appointing standby counsel, the court

stated that it had warned defendant numerous times that it was ill-advised to

appear pro se.  The court noted that defendant had been very confident in his ability to try the case.  Additionally, the court pointed out that defendant had

more trial experience than many rookie assistant State's Attorneys.  According

to the court, there was nothing conceptually difficult about the case, defendant

was told standby counsel would not be appointed, and defendant did not need

standby counsel.

	Initially, we note that defendant does not argue that the trial court

abused its discretion based on the pertinent factors the trial court is required

to consider under Gibson and Williams; rather, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion based on its comments that appointment of standby counsel

was unwise, it may result in an unfair trial, and that defendants tend to argue

ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal.  However, these were not the trial

court's bases for denying defendant's request for standby counsel.  The trial

court was simply outlining the concerns and perils with appointment of standby

counsel as set forth by the United States Supreme Court.  These problems were

detailed again in Williams where the court clearly set forth the fact that there are particular concerns in appointing standby counsel and, generally, it is not

the prudent course of conduct.  Williams, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 1061.  The Williams court further noted that "no trial court in Illinois has been reversed for exerting its discretion to not appoint standby counsel, and this absence of reversals appears consistent with nationwide experience."  (Emphasis in

original.)  Williams, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 1061.  Similarly, this issue rarely arises on appeal.  Williams, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 1061.  In conclusion, the Williams court stated, "In our judgment, consistent with the views expressed by the supreme court in Gibson, the trial court's prudent course in most cases is not to appoint standby counsel, even if the pro se defendant specifically requests that appointment."  Williams, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 1061.

	The above case law emphasizes the problems with appointment of standby

counsel and confirms that the trial court's comments here to defendant were

proper.  Moreover, on August 24, when the trial court denied defendant's request

to appoint standby counsel, the court specifically stated that it had weighed the

Williams factors and would not appoint standby counsel based on those factors.  Accordingly, defendant's argument that the above three comments by the trial

court were the trial court's bases for its denial of appointment of standby

counsel has no merit.  The trial court properly and wisely made such comments to

defendant.

	In any event, substantively, we find that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion.  Defendant was admonished on at least four occasions by three

different judges prior to his trial as to the adverse consequences of

representing himself and that standby counsel would not be appointed.  Clearly,

he was aware of the trial court's position on this matter.  With respect to the

nature and gravity of the charges, while it is true that the charges were

serious, as were the sentencing consequences, defendant's case did not involve

the same gravity as would a capital case.  Defendant was subject to a maximum

term of 30 years' imprisonment.  Similarly, with respect to the factual and legal

complexity, although fingerprint, footprint, and glass identification testimony

was offered, the testimony and issues were not particularly complex and the

balance of the issues at trial were relatively simple.  Lastly, with respect to

defendant's abilities and experience, clearly defendant had represented himself in three prior cases, and in one obtained an acquittal.  In the two cases in

which he was ultimately convicted following a mistrial and a hung jury, one

involved a burglary/theft charge and the other an aggravated possession of a

motor vehicle charge.  As a result, defendant had experience with the exact type

of charges he was on trial for in the instant case.  Based on these factors, we

find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's

request for appointment of standby counsel.

	II.  Appearance in Prison Clothing

	Defendant next contends that he was denied his right to a fair trial

because he was forced to wear prison clothing during the trial.  According to

him, the relevant question is whether a reasonable juror would likely recognize

a part of a defendant's attire as being prison clothing.  Defendant maintains

that in the instant case, the trial court's observations confirmed the fact that

jurors could readily identify defendant's pants and shoes as prison clothing.2  Defendant argues that because he was representing himself, he was required to

stand and, therefore, the jury would have been able to observe the prison

identification markings on his clothing.  Defendant further argues that a

harmless error analysis does not apply because he was denied a fundamental right.

	The State responds that prison clothing is not inherently prejudicial.  It

further maintains that, in the instant case, defendant's clothing was suitable

because the jury could not see any of the markings on the clothing. 

Additionally, the State contends that if any error occurred, it was harmless

because the error did not contribute to defendant's conviction in light of the

overwhelming evidence against him.

	Under Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126, 130-31, 96 S. Ct. 1691, 1693 (1976), "the State cannot compel a defendant to stand trial

before a jury dressed in identifiable prison clothing."  People v. Wilder, 325 Ill. App. 3d 987, 996, 760 N.E.2d 496 (2001).  "However, the right not to be

tried in jail clothing is, like many other rights of criminal defendants, subject

to harmless-error analysis."  People v. Steinmetz, 287 Ill. App. 3d 1, 6-7, 678 N.E.2d 89 (1997), citing Estelle, 425 U.S. at 506, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 131-32, 96 S. Ct. at 1694.  See also People v. Medley, 111 Ill. App. 3d 444, 448, 444 N.E.2d 269 (1983) (finding that even if it was error to require the defendant to appear

in prison clothing, the error was harmless); People v. Wilkes, 108 Ill. App. 3d 460, 467-68, 438 N.E.2d 1385 (1982) (finding that requiring the defendant to wear

an orange jail uniform was harmless error).3  In determining whether requiring a defendant to wear identifiable prison clothing constitutes harmless error,

three approaches are applicable:

		" '(1) Focusing on the error to determine whether it

might have contributed to the conviction [citation]; (2)

Examining the other evidence in the case to see if

overwhelming evidence supports the conviction

[citation]; (3) Determining whether the error is merely

cumulative or duplicates properly admitted evidence

[citation.] '  [Citation]."  Wilkes, 108 Ill. App. 3d at 467.  

See also Medley, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 448.  Each approach need not be applied nor satisfied.  See Wilkes, 108 Ill. App. 3d at 467 (applying only the first and third approaches).

	In the instant case, defendant must first demonstrate that the clothing he was wearing was "identifiable prison clothing."  Although he relies on the trial

court's comment, we do not find this comment determinative.  The comment does not

demonstrate, with certainty, that the clothing was in fact identifiable as prison

attire.  The comment merely sets forth the trial court's opinion that, assuming

defendant's clothes were identifiable as prison clothing, there was no problem

with the jury seeing them.  Moreover, the court specifically stated that

defendant's pants looked like Dockers.  These are common men's pants worn every

day.  Clearly, if the pants looked liked Dockers to the trial court, the court

would not be under the belief, at the same time, that the pants were identifiable

prison clothing.  Thus, the trial court's comment does not support defendant's

argument.

	While there were no photographs taken of defendant's attire to aid us in

reviewing this issue (United States v. Forrest, 623 F.2d 1107, 1116 (5th Cir. 1980) (trial court ordered a photograph of the defendant upon his objection to

wearing prison clothing before the jury to facilitate review)), it would not

appear that defendant's pants or heelless shoes would identify defendant's outfit

as prison issued.  See Medley, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 448 (it was not error for the trial judge to require the defendant to appear before the jury in jail issued

clothes consisting of pale green pants and a pullover shirt similar to "scrubs"

because there was nothing to identify the outfit as jail issued).  Moreover, it

does not appear that the type of clothing worn by defendant was clothing unique

to prisons, particularly given the fact that defendant was wearing a dress shirt,

a tie, and a jacket.  See People v. Partee, 157 Ill. App. 3d 231, 254-55, 511 N.E.2d 1165 (1987) (prison issued jogging suit could not be considered

identifiable jail clothing--"It is not clothing unique to prison institutions"

and, therefore, the defendant could not demonstrate it was "identifiable prison

clothing").  Additionally, there were no markings on the inside-out pants to

identify them as prison clothing.  See Wilkes, 108 Ill. App. 3d at 467 (trial court erred in permitting the defendant to appear before the jury dressed in

bright orange coveralls with the word "Jail" stenciled across the back).  

	Although defendant's attire may have been a bit unusual, there is no

evidence that the jury saw his attire as prison clothing, nor is there any

evidence that defendant's attire adversely affected the jury.  We therefore find

that defendant was not denied his right to a fair trial because he was required

to appear in khaki colored pants turned inside out and with heelless shoes.  See

also Forrest, 623 F.2d at 1116 (finding there was no error in requiring the defendant to appear before the jury in khaki pants with a four digit black

laundry mark stenciled twice on the seat of the pants; the court noted that "it

[was] extremely unlikely that the laundry numbers, even assuming they were

noticed by the jurors, would have identified the otherwise plain khaki pants as

prison clothing" and noting that it was "confident that appellant's dress did not

'badge him as a criminal in the jury's eyes, as in the case of prison uniforms' 

[Citation.]"); United States v. Dawson, 563 F.2d 149, 150-51 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding that plain khaki clothing worn by the defendant did not mark him as a

prisoner; khaki shirt and pants "did not appear to be the usual prison garb"); Wright v. Texas, 415 F. Supp. 5, 7 (E.D. Tex. 1975) (finding that blue overalls worn by the defendant, although clearly distinguishing him from every one else

in the courtroom, were not the type of clothes "typical of and recognizable as

'jail clothes' "); Klingler v. Erickson, 328 F. Supp. 674, 676 (S.D. S.D. 1971) (finding that the defendant failed to demonstrate that any of the jurors knew he

was in fact in prison clothing where the defendant was wearing a prison issued

gray shirt, gray jacket and gray pants, and also finding that there was no

evidence that the jury was adversely affected by the defendant's attire).  Even

assuming there was error here, we conclude that it was harmless.  There is no

evidence that defendant's attire contributed to his conviction.  Moreover, the

evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming.

	III.  Appeal Admonishments

	Defendant lastly contends that the trial court's failure to admonish him

of the need to file a motion attacking his sentence in order to preserve

sentencing errors for appeal violated his due process rights.  According to

defendant, the admonishments he was given mirrored those set forth in Supreme

Court Rule 605(a) (145 Ill. 2d R. 605(a)), which defendant contends violate due

process because section 5-8-1(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730

ILCS 5/5-8-1(c) (West 1998)) mandates that a defendant file a motion attacking

his sentence in order to preserve any sentencing errors for review.  In the

instant case, as defendant argues, he was given incorrect information by the

trial court.  He was only advised to file a notice of appeal--he was not advised

of the need to file a motion attacking his sentence to preserve any sentencing

challenges for appeal.  Defendant analogizes this error to a trial court's

failure to properly admonish a defendant in guilty plea situations under Supreme

Court Rules 604(d) and 605(b).  Defendant argues that it is procedurally unfair

to misinform a defendant on how to perfect an appeal.  Defendant also asserts

that Rule 605(a) is unfair and denies due process.  Defendant asks that we remand

his case to allow him to file a motion to reconsider his sentence.

	The State contends that People v. Little, 318 Ill. App. 3d 75, 743 N.E.2d 594 (2001), is controlling on this issue where the court held that the same

admonishments given in the instant case were proper.

	In response, defendant argues that there is a distinction between the

situation in Little, involving "silence," and the situation here, involving misinformation.  According to defendant, Rule 605(a) affirmatively requires the

trial court to give defendants erroneous advice in violation of due process.

	At the time of defendant's sentencing, Rule 605(a) provided:

			"In all cases in which the defendant is found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment ***, except in

cases in which the judgment and sentence are entered on

a plea of guilty, the trial court shall, at the time of

imposing sentence ***, advise the defendant of his right

to appeal, of his right to request the clerk to prepare

and file a notice of appeal, and of his right, if

indigent, to be furnished, without cost to him, with a

transcript of the proceedings at his trial or hearing,

and, in cases in which the defendant has been convicted

of a felony or a Class A misdemeanor or convicted of a

lesser offense and sentenced to imprisonment ***, of his

right to have counsel appointed on appeal.  The trial

court shall also advise him that his right to appeal

will be preserved only if a notice of appeal is filed in

the trial court within 30 days from the date of the

sentence."  145 Ill. 2d R. 605(a).4

Section 5-8-1(c) of the Code provides:

			"A motion to reduce a sentence may be made, or the

court may reduce a sentence without motion, within 30

days after the sentence is imposed.  A defendant's

challenge to the correctness of a sentence or to any

aspect of the sentencing hearing shall be made by a

written motion filed within 30 days following the imposition of sentence."  730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(c) (West

1998).

	The Second District Appellate Court, in Little, addressed the precise argument defendant raises in the instant case--that Rule 605(a) denies a

defendant due process because it fails to inform a defendant of the need to file

a postsentencing motion to preserve any sentencing challenges as required by

section 5-8-1(c).  Little, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 77-78.  The Little court first set forth the requirements of Rule 605(a), exactly as detailed above, noting that

nothing in the rule required a trial court to advise a defendant of the

requirements of section 5-8-1(c).  Little, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 79.  The court then noted that the defendant relied upon cases involving guilty pleas and Rule

605(b) in support of his argument that fundamental fairness required a remand. 

Little, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 79.  The Little court rejected the defendant's suggestion to create an "admonishment exception" to the waiver rule for

defendants who were not admonished with respect to section 5-8-1(c)'s

requirements, as is made in guilty plea cases, stating:

		"We conclude that such an exception is unnecessary.  In

this case, defendant was neither told that a written

postsentencing motion was unnecessary nor misled about

which type of motion was required.  The trial court

fully complied with Rule 605(a) and did not mention the

motion requirement only because it is not included in

the rule.

			When the language of a supreme court rule is plain

and unambiguous, courts should not read into the rule

exceptions, limitations, or other conditions. 

[Citation.]  Because the plain language of Rule 605(a)

does not require a trial court to advise the defendant of the written motion requirement of section 5-8-1(c),

we will not read into the rule that additional

condition."  Little, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 79-80.

See also People v. Bailey, 311 Ill. App. 3d 265, 270, 724 N.E.2d 1032 (2000) (stating that "[a]lthough it is true that the trial court did not admonish the

defendant of his obligation to file a postsentencing motion in order to preserve

all sentencing issues for appeal, the trial court was not obligated to provide

such an admonishment under Supreme Court Rule 605"); People v. Kyles, 303 Ill. App. 3d 338, 353-54, 708 N.E.2d 391 (1998) (finding that "there is no duty upon

the court or the prosecutor to advise the defendant of the requirement to file

a post-trial or post-sentencing motion to preserve errors for appeal.  While the

trial court has such a duty when entering judgment on a defendant's plea of

guilty (155 Ill. 2d R. 605(b)), no such duty exists when judgment and sentence

are entered after the defendant has pled not guilty.  In the latter case, the

court need only advise the defendant of his rights regarding the taking of an

appeal").

	Clearly, these cases are directly on point and refute defendant's

contention in the instant case.  Moreover, there is no evidence that the factual

situation in Little is any different than the factual situation here.  Both defendants were admonished pursuant to Rule 605(a).  Thus, defendant's attempt

to distinguish Little is unpersuasive.  

	However, the instant case raises an additional issue because, as noted

above, Rule 605(a) has been amended.  Effective October 1, 2001, Rule 605(a)

requires the trial court to admonish a defendant, as follows:

			"(1) In all cases in which the defendant is found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment, probation or

conditional discharge, periodic imprisonment, or to pay a fine, or in which a sentence of probation or

conditional discharge has been revoked or the conditions

attached to such a sentence have been modified,

excluding cases in which the judgment and sentence are

entered on a plea of guilty, the trial court shall, at

the time of imposing sentence or modifying the

conditions of the sentence, advise the defendant of the

right to appeal, of the right to request the clerk to

prepare and file a notice of appeal, and of the right,

if indigent, to be furnished, without cost to the

defendant, with a transcript of the proceedings at the

trial or hearing.

			(2) In addition to the foregoing rights, in cases

in which the defendant has been convicted of a felony or

a Class A misdemeanor or convicted of a lesser offense

and sentenced to imprisonment, periodic imprisonment, or

to probation or conditional discharge conditioned upon

periodic imprisonment, or in which a sentence of

probation or conditional discharge has been revoked or

the conditions attached to such a sentence have been

modified and a sentence or condition of imprisonment or

periodic imprisonment imposed, the trial court shall

advise the defendant of the right to have counsel

appointed on appeal.

			(3) At the time of imposing sentence or modifying

the conditions of the sentence, the trial court shall also advise the defendant as follows:

				A. that the right to appeal the

judgment of conviction, excluding the

sentence imposed or modified, will be

preserved only if a notice of appeal is

filed in the trial court within thirty (30)

days from the date on which sentence is

imposed;

				B. that prior to taking an appeal, if

the defendant seeks to challenge the

correctness of the sentence, or any aspect

of the sentencing hearing, the defendant

must file in the trial court within 30 days

of the date on which  sentence is imposed a

written motion asking to have the trial

court reconsider the sentence imposed, or

consider any challenges to the sentencing

hearing, setting forth in the motion all

issues or claims of error regarding the

sentence imposed or the sentencing hearing;

				C. that any issue or claim of error

regarding the sentence imposed or any

aspect of the sentencing hearing not raised

in the written motion shall be deemed

waived;  and

				D. that in order to preserve the right to appeal following the disposition

of the motion to reconsider sentence, or

any challenges regarding the sentencing

hearing, the defendant must file a notice

of appeal in the trial court within 30 days

from the entry of the order disposing of

the defendant's motion to reconsider

sentence or order disposing of any

challenges to the sentencing hearing."  145 Ill. 2d R. 605(a) (as amended October 1,

2001).

	Based on our supreme court's rulings in guilty plea cases, we believe a

remand of this cause is proper in the instant case.  Instructive on this point

is the Fourth District case of People v. Leahy, 322 Ill. App. 3d 974, 751 N.E.2d 634 (2001).  In Leahy, the defendant entered into a negotiated guilty plea that included a recommended sentence cap of 31⁄2 years' imprisonment.  Leahy, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 974.  On January 17, 1999, the defendant was sentenced to 31⁄2 years'

imprisonment and, at this time, the trial court admonished him in conformity with

Rule 605(b) "as it then existed."  Leahy, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 974.  Specifically, "[t]he trial court advised the defendant that to perfect an appeal, he could file

either a motion to withdraw his plea or a motion to reconsider his sentence."  Leahy, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 974.  Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the trial court denied.  Leahy, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 974.  The Leahy court further noted that on November 1, 2000, Rule 605(b) was amended to provide two distinct forms of admonishments.  For those individuals

who had negotiated some aspect of their sentencing, the proper admonishment was

that the only way to perfect an appeal was to seek withdrawal of the guilty plea first (as would be required in Leahy).  Leahy, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 975.  For those defendants who had not negotiated any aspect of their sentencing, they

could either file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea or a motion to reconsider

sentence to perfect their appeal.  Leahy, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 975.  The Leahy court also noted that in between the various supreme court decisions on guilty

pleas and the proper admonishments required and the amendment of Rule 605(b),

many defendants had received incorrect advice, as in the case before the Leahy court.  Leahy, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 975.  In all but the Fourth District, the courts had held that under those circumstances, "fundamental fairness required

that such cases be remanded to the trial court for proper advice and the

opportunity to move to withdraw the plea, if defendants so chose."  Leahy, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 975.  The Fourth District, however, had previously held to the

contrary.  Leahy, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 976, citing People v. Jogi, 308 Ill. App. 3d 302, 719 N.E.2d 798 (1999).  

	The Leahy court further noted that the supreme court, on October 4, 2000, in a supervisory order, vacated Jogi and advised the appellate court to reconsider its decision in light of People v. Diaz, 192 Ill. 2d 211, 735 N.E.2d 605 (2000) (case in which the supreme court for the first time addressed the

disparity between Rule 605(b) and case law), and also ordered the Fourth District

to reconsider other similar cases.  Leahy, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 976.  On remand, the Fourth District again affirmed the trial court in Jogi, finding that Diaz was distinguishable since the relevant case law on negotiated guilty pleas had been

available to the defendant in Jogi, whereas the relevant case law had not been available to the defendant in Diaz.  Leahy, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 976.  The supreme court again allowed leave to appeal in Jogi and vacated the second appellate court decision, remanding the case directly to the trial court, with directions

that the trial court allow the defendant to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  Leahy, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 976-77.  The Leahy court, based on the supreme court's second supervisory order, found that fundamental fairness required

remands in all similar cases.  Accordingly, the Leahy court remanded the case before it to the trial court, with directions that the trial court admonish the

defendant in conformity with the present version of Rule 605(b) and allow him an

opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.  Leahy, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 977.  

	Thus, in Leahy, the supreme court rule in effect at the time of the Leahy defendant's direct appeal was the appropriate admonishment that the defendant was

to receive despite the fact that the admonishment was not in place at the time

of the defendant's sentencing.  Although the law with respect to negotiated and

nonnegotiated guilty pleas and what constitutes a negotiated guilty plea was

clearly in turmoil, and although Rule 605(b) was unclear and Rule 605(a) was

clear, the general equitable principles are nonetheless the same.  Here,

defendant was misinformed because the supreme court rule failed to include all

the admonishments necessary for a defendant to preserve issues for appeal. 

Defendant therefore lost the right to appeal his sentence challenges.  The

supreme court has subsequently amended Rule 605(a) and now mandates admonishments

with respect to postsentencing motions.  Fundamental fairness therefore requires

that defendant be allowed a remand for proper admonishments pursuant to the

current version of Rule 605(a) and in order to file a motion to reconsider

sentence.

	CONCLUSION

	For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook

County, but remand this cause with directions.

	Affirmed and remanded, with directions.

	GORDON and McBRIDE, JJ., concur.