Intelligence Integration War Stories 

Can Teach Inclusion

Julie Ferringer

This is the first in a series of Research Shorts that will explore how 

intelligence officers operationalize inclusion to advance the IC mission.

An inclusive culture can help integrate the unique talents of a diverse 

intelligence workforce, but the inclusion process is not well understood. 

The greatest knowledge gap is behavioral—what actions can intelligence 

officers take to include their colleagues and ensure they are an integral 

part of the mission? After the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 mandated the IC integrate across diverse 

job functions and organizational cultures, intelligence officers learned 

firsthand that subtle actions can include—or exclude—diverse team 

members. Their integration war stories can help the IC understand the 

small but high-impact behaviors that build inclusive intelligence teams.

RESEARCH SHORT

February 7, 2023

What this is:

Research Shorts fuse two 

research cultures, blending 

intelligence information with 

academic insights on topics of 

interest to the IC. Shorts are 

intended to constructively 

start and add to the IC's 

conversations—not to finish 

them. NIU, the sole fully 

TS/SCI-cleared university, 

publishes the Shorts.

What this is not:

Research Shorts are not 

finished intelligence and 

are not IC-coordinated. 

The opinions expressed are 

solely those of the author and 

do not represent those of any 

U.S. Government agency.

IMAGE FROM SHUTTERSTOCK

OPPORTUNITIES An exploration of solutions 

to challenges or problems
2

“Until physics says it’s impossible, we don’t count anything out.” 

That’s how one DoD leader scoped the debate over how to remove 1,300 metric tons of chemical 

weapons from an unstable Syria. 1 The operation, which a former NCTC Mission Manager 

described as the “Super Bowl of WMD,”2, 3 required collaboration across diverse agencies, 

programs, and nations.4, 5 It was a complicated mission with 

a tight deadline; a former State Department official described 

it as “exactly on the borderline of being technically feasible 

and utterly insane.” 6 During a multiagency meeting, 

someone suggested a wild, implausible solution: destroying 

the weapons at sea.7 A colleague countered, “That’s a really 

dumb idea,” and detailed why it would not work. 8, 9 The DoD 

leader stepped in and said, “Let’s flip all our assumptions, 

build every possible plan; until physics says it’s impossible, 

we don’t count anything out.”10, 11

The Interpersonal Demands of Intelligence Teamwork

Intelligence has always been about the everyday work of making connections—among diverse 

pieces of information and people. After 9/11, the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act (IRTPA) mandated the newly created Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence (ODNI) and the other Intelligence Community (IC) member agencies foster more 

deliberate intelligence integration: the melding of intelligence officers from different job 

functions, agencies, and organizational cultures into one organizationally diverse, highperforming team, unified in its mission to protect the United 

States. 12 Integration improved both among agencies (e.g., the 

colocation of different IC elements at the National Counterterrorism 

Center) and within agencies (e.g., the FBI’s embedding of 

intelligence analysts on operational teams and CIA’s move to 

integrated mission centers). 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 IRTPA pushed the IC to 

develop these stronger interpersonal connections in pursuit of better 

connections between disparate bits of information.17

The IC’s culture of integration—more a process than an end-state—

has evolved through trial and error, fighting and forgiveness, 

persistence, and a fierce commitment to the mission.18 The complexity 

of the 21st century threat environment19 demanded the IC integrate 

across boundaries, on a scale and at a pace without precedent.20 In 

answering this demand, intelligence officers learned the small 

behaviors that help (or hinder) diverse teams working together to 

protect the nation. Their integration war stories—tales of the 

interpersonal challenges and triumphs of team building—can serve as 

case studies in how intelligence teams create inclusive climates.

KEY RESEARCH INSIGHTS

• Diversity of function, experience,

demographics, or thinking can

boost performance potential by

adding to the team’s resources but

requires complex communication

across boundaries—a skill many 

diverse teams lack.

• Post-9/11 integration “war stories”

are an untapped resource for

overcoming these challenges.

By sharing their experiences,

intelligence officers can help the

IC understand the small behaviors

that build inclusive intelligence

teams and advance the mission.

War Story noun

: a story of personal experience involving 

conflict, hardship, absurdity, or adventure.

The experience might occur on an actual 

battlefield or anywhere people interact: 

at work, on an airplane, at a sporting 

event, or in a SCIF.
3

A recent National Intelligence University (NIU) study asked intelligence analysts about their 

experiences of being integrated into functionally diverse teams primarily composed of 

operational personnel. Although all team members supported the same overarching goal, the 

analysts’ routine tasks, training, and tradecraft often differed from those of their operational 

teammates, creating barriers to integration.

21 The analysts’ experiences reveal integration of 

diverse roles and mindsets does not always come naturally. Introducing diversity into teams 

with deeply embedded identities, cultures, and traditions can cause discomfort as team 

members accommodate—or resist—new ideas and methods.22, 23 The analysts recalled the 

challenges of building trust with colleagues from different tribes: some teams worked through 

the tension and developed strong partnerships; others struggled to find common ground. 

The Uncomfortable Truth About Diverse Teams

DNI Avril Haines recently stressed the strategic necessity of building an IC workforce “made 

up of people who think differently, see problems differently, and overcome challenges 

differently.”24 Diversity—be it of function, experience, demographics, or thinking*—can offer 

a competitive advantage by boosting the team’s available resources.

25 But research shows it is 

not enough to simply mix highly capable employees together and hope for the best.

26, 27 Henrik 

Bresman and Amy Edmondson note an “uncomfortable truth” about diversity and team 

performance.

28 Although diversity increases a team’s performance potential by adding to its

resources, this potential is not always realized because accessing those resources requires 

complex communication across boundaries—a skill many diverse teams lack. 29 

IC professionals observe this uncomfortable truth in their experiences with integration. An 

intelligence analyst working on a functionally diverse cyber team spoke about a team member 

who was “extremely knowledgeable, smart” but who withheld information, stifled debate, and 

was not open to his teammates’ ideas.30 By not sharing his knowledge, this cyber expert not 

only kept the team from benefiting from his unique skills, he also limited his access to the 

team’s resources: the perspectives, ideas, and questions that might have increased his 

performance. Eventually the smart-but-exclusionary cyber expert left the team. When asked if 

the lost expertise hurt the team’s effectiveness, the analyst said:

When he left, there was a knowledge gap and it freed people to get in the room and 

talk about ideas and propose ideas. The overall effectiveness may have dropped 

down a bit—he was a workhorse, he developed proprietary tools, knowledge ... but

he would own all of that; he wouldn’t share his tools with everybody. When he left, 

there was no one to go through [his data] so it was slower, but when the searches 

went through it was a more diverse set of information. There was a shift when he 

* In its Annual Demographic Report for Fiscal Year 2021, the ODNI defined diversity as “the full range of

experiences, perspectives, and affiliations that individuals share,” which include “characteristics such as

national origin, language, race, color, mental or physical abilities, ethnicity, age, religion, sex, sexual

orientation, gender identity or expression socioeconomic status, veteran status, and family structure.” (p. 5)
4

left; we saw it as “this is an opportunity,” and we made a rare arrest. In terms of 

teamwork, it felt better after the superstar left.

What made the team work once the superstar left? The analyst noted “a lot of mutual respect, 

people carved out their own interests. For example, I like big data; everyone would just allow 

me to work with that, and it was easier to do without him there.” A senior member of the team 

also took the lead on setting a new standard, telling her colleagues, “Everybody needs to find 

their own strengths, and everyone is going to have their own strategy, things are getting stale.” 

Well-Integrated Teams Foster Inclusive Climates

The atmosphere the cyber analyst describes in the above example is what researchers call an 

inclusive climate—one where everyone is treated with respect, shares information, and is 

valued for their unique strengths.31, 32 Lisa Nishii further defined an inclusive climate as an 

environment in which individuals—regardless of their identity group status—have access to 

resources and can connect across organizational boundaries so their ideas are integrated in 

collective problem-solving.33 Research has identified inclusion as the process that helps a 

diverse team integrate the unique talents of its members.

34 Building on this research, the IC 

defines inclusion as “a culture that connects each employee to the organization; encourages 

collaboration, flexibility, and fairness; and leverages diversity throughout the organization so 

that all individuals can participate and contribute to their full potential.”35

Researchers identify two requirements for someone to feel included. First, the person must 

have a sense of belonging—a fundamental human need described as the “sense of being 

connected to and accepted by others.”36, 37 Second, belonging must be combined with valuing 

someone’s uniqueness or authenticity.

38, 39 If intelligence officers’ belonging is contingent on 

their forsaking a key aspect of their work or personal identity, they will not feel included and 

will be unable to contribute their unique perspectives and ideas. 

Table 1. Inclusion Requires Both Belonging and Uniqueness/Authenticity

This table is adapted from Shore et al.40 and Jansen et al.41 

How, then, does inclusion take hold in diverse organizations? Inclusion scholars propose 

organizations create inclusive climates by ensuring integration of individual differences and 

Low Belonging High Belonging

High Uniqueness/

Authenticity

Differentiation: Individuals are not treated 

as insiders but are seen as having unique 

capabilities that are of value to the group.

Inclusion: Individuals are treated as insiders 

by the group and are valued for who they are 

and what they do.

Low Uniqueness/

Authenticity

Exclusion: Individuals are not seen as having 

unique value in the group and are not treated 

as insiders, but there are other individuals or 

groups who are insiders.

Assimilation: Individuals are treated as

group insiders only when they conform to 

the dominant culture and downplay their 

uniqueness/authenticity.
5

inclusion in decisionmaking.

42, 43 Robin Ely and David 

Thomas found the most inclusive climates are those 

that adopt an “integration-and-learning” approach that 

folds the diverse skills, experiences, and perspectives 

of the workforce into the organizational fabric.44 This 

integration-and-learning climate is especially relevant 

for intelligence agencies, which Amy Zegart observes 

“are in the information learning business.”45

If inclusion takes hold through integration, what does it 

mean to integrate? In his research on intergroup 

contact, J.W. Berry defined integration as a process of 

“mutual accommodation” where each group maintains 

some of its cultural identity while adapting to, and 

working with, the other group. 46 This continuous 

negotiation between groups enables the creation of 

a common identity that incorporates individual 

differences. 47 Berry distinguishes integration from alternative group processes: separation 

(differentiation), marginalization (exclusion), or assimilation, defined by inclusion scholars as 

“high belongingness and low uniqueness.”48, 49

Integration, like inclusion, honors both belonging and uniqueness. Imagine an NSA officer 

embedded in a CIA counterterrorism team who, like the cyber expert in the earlier example, 

has unique knowledge that can help the team mission. In this case, the officer makes every 

effort to share her knowledge but will be unable to truly integrate unless team members show 

her that she belongs (by including her in conversations) and that they value her unique 

perspectives (by expressing interest in her assessments and using them in decisionmaking). 

The team would not have to do anything dramatic to prevent her integration—they could 

simply forget to include her, keep her on the outskirts of team interaction, or expect her to

adopt their way of thinking. 

IC Reform Chose Integration

IRTPA deliberately chose integration—not assimilation—as its process for IC reform.50 The 

9/11 and WMD Commission Reports made clear that the U.S. Government did not want to 

sacrifice mission-critical expertise in its pursuit of unification and connection.51, 52 Former DNI 

Jim Clapper observed “it requires certain unique skill sets to conduct SIGINT, HUMINT, 

GEOINT, etc., and integration shouldn’t equate to homogenization.”53 To preserve the unique 

value brought by each IC element, IRTPA maintained the “confederated nature of the U.S.

intelligence system.” 54 Individual agencies also retained—not without controversy—

confederated teams when they integrated within organizations55, 56 by creating interdisciplinary 

teams comprising different functions (e.g., analysts, operations officers, data scientists, linguists) 

but maintaining each function’s distinct tradecraft standards and chain of command.57, 58
6

With no handbook for how to communicate across boundaries on suddenly diverse teams, 

intelligence officers learned to integrate through crisis-driven, on-the-job training. Over time, 

IC agencies developed leadership training and guidelines to facilitate integration. 59 For 

example, the FBI’s leadership competencies now include Building Teams and Collaboration, 

described as “inspires and fosters team commitment; motivates others to accomplish group 

goals; encourages an inclusive workplace where diversity and individual differences are valued; 

mediates concerns.”60 This competency aligns with emerging models of inclusive leadership,

61,

62, 63 but general categories do not always intuitively translate into practical action.64 A frontline leader might read this competency and ask how, exactly, do intelligence officers “inspire 

team commitment?” What specific actions “encourage an inclusive workplace?” The IC is not 

alone in this quandary. Donna Chrobot-Mason and Quinetta Roberson observe the biggest gap 

in understanding how to create an inclusive environment may be the specific behaviors 

associated with inclusive leadership. 65 How can the IC translate abstract inclusion 

competencies into practical actions intelligence officers can embed in their everyday work?

Integration War Stories as a Prologue to Inclusion 

Here is where integration war stories can help. Dr. Debora Pfaff, codirector of NIU’s Center 

for Truth, Trust, and Transparency, recently wrote of the IC’s need to “recast its story.”66

Integration war stories are one way the IC might increase transparency and collective learning 

on inclusion, both within the intelligence enterprise and with the outside world. In two decades 

of integration, intelligence officers developed a ground-level understanding of the behaviors 

that build connections between diverse groups of people. Stephanie LaRue, the IC’s Chief 

Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility Officer, observed about inclusion, “a lot of folks 

are doing this every day and they don’t even know it.”67

In telling their integration war stories, analysts describe decade-long communication 

campaigns and other efforts to connect with teammates who told them, “I don’t know what you 

do, I don’t need you.”68 They speak about using divergent approaches in a way that both honors

and overcomes differences. One analyst supervisor recalled a contentious discussion on a 

functionally diverse team: “it was a tough meeting, there were a lot of feels in the meeting” but 

“it was left in a good spot, with humor.”69 Another supervisor said her team members joke “uh 

oh, mom and dad are fighting” when she is sparring with her operational counterpart.70 They 

talk about coming together in a crisis and of inclusive behaviors passed down through 

organizational muscle memory. One analyst, new to the IC, said she started including linguists 

after her operational supervisor reminded her to keep them updated on her work, explaining 

that linguists provide valuable perspective and are an integral part of the operational process.71

They detail the subtle, everyday things their leaders do to show they belong. Over and over 

again they insist, “the little things matter.”72

This ground-level expertise is an untapped resource in the IC’s quest to create a more inclusive 

culture as integration is a natural prologue for inclusion. By telling their stories, intelligence 

officers can help the IC identify the behaviors that both prevent and promote the integration of 
7

diverse team members in support of the mission. These behaviors can be passed down 

informally, like the supervisor who reminded the new analyst to include linguists. They can 

also be embedded more formally in the IC’s leadership training, diversity programming, and 

lessons-learned presentations. Intelligence officers’ experiences with integration can show how 

sharing information is an act of interpersonal inclusion.73, 74 Their stories can inspire colleagues, 

shape the IC culture, and send the message: “This is the way we do things around here.”

While IRTPA primarily focused on integrating organizational diversity, it was also the first 

legislation to mandate the IC diversify its workforce more broadly to improve its capabilities.75 

When fully integrated, diversity—be it organizational, demographic, or experiential—offers a 

competitive advantage. It can help the IC collect information from diverse sources, build coalitions, 

and connect with communities at home and abroad.76 In the words of Jeff Fields, FBI leader and 

Intelligence Project Fellow with Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center, “Vladimir Putin and 

Xi Jinping can’t recruit from West Indian communities in Brooklyn, Korean communities in the 

San Francisco Bay area, Great Sioux Nation in South Dakota, or from coal mining enclaves in 

Appalachian West Virginia. America’s diversity has always been, and remains, an unmatched 

reservoir of creativity, talent, and innovation.”77, 78 Integration war stories can teach the IC how 

intelligence professionals include each other and truly integrate this diverse talent. 

***

Returning to the opening story about chemical weapons in Syria: in August 2014, the United 

States announced Syria’s declared stockpile of chemical weapons had been destroyed—a 

victory that required cooperation among many U.S. agencies, an international coalition, and a 

series of consecutive miracles.

79 , 80 , 81 One of those miracles was how disparate groups 

integrated diverse approaches to solve the problem. Members of the joint operation recalled 

how hard it was to develop trust among the groups—and how failing to include unique 

perspectives could have cost them the mission. In the end, the wild idea was the one that 

worked. Implementing what the arms control community called “Plan B,” the chemical 

weapons were moved to international waters and destroyed at sea.82, 83, 84 The colleague who 

initially dismissed the idea reflected, “if the [DoD leader] had not said, ‘Let’s flip every 

assumption and build every possible plan,’ there would have been no option.” 85, 86, 87 When 

the IC talks about inclusion, stories like this can show how it is done—and what is at stake.

Julie Ferringer is a research fellow at the National Intelligence University on detail from the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation. Her research explores the chemistry of inclusive intelligence teams and 

lessons learned from post-9/11 intelligence integration. 

If you have comments, questions, or a suggestion for a Research Short topic or article, please contact 

the NIU Office of Research at Research@niu.odni.gov.
8

Endnotes

1 Albert J. Mauroni, Eliminating Syria’s Chemical Weapons, U.S. Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons 

Studies Future Warfare Series No. 58 (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University, June 2017), 16-17. 

2 U.S. Government employee, “Joint Operation To Remove and Destroy Syria’s Declared Chemical Weapons in 

2013-2014,” panel discussion, Counterproliferation Certificate Program, National Intelligence University, 

Bethesda, MD, October 21, 2022.

3 Email between U.S. Government employees and author, October 27, 2022.

4 Brian Lessenberry, Intelligence Integration and the Syrian CW Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies

(CSIS) Commentary, February 18, 2015, https://www.csis.org/analysis/intelligence-integration-and-syrian-cw-threat.

5 Laura Holgate, “Destroying Syria’s Chemical Weapons: One Year Later,” CSIS Event, September 10, 2014, 

https://www.csis.org/events/destroying-syrias-chemical-weapons-one-year-later.

6 Kimberly Dozier, “How Pentagon Geeks and Russian Generals Plotted in Secret To Take Away Assad’s WMD,” 

The Daily Beast, February 20, 2016, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/02/20/how-pentagon-geeksrussian-generals-plotted-in-secret-to-take-away-assad-s-wmd.html.

7 Chi K. Cheung, “Cape Ray Diplomacy: How a U.S. Merchant Vessel Took Center Stage in Foreign Relations,” 

Interagency Journal 6, no. 2 (Spring 2015): 8-9, https://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/IAJ-6-2-

Spring-2015-8-16.pdf.

8 U.S. Government employee, “Joint Operation.”

9 Email between U.S. Government employee and author, October 27, 2022.

10 U.S. Government employee, “Joint Operation.”

11 Email between U.S. Government employee and author, October 27, 2022.

12 U.S. Congress, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public Law 108-458, 108th Congress 

(December 17, 2004), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-108publ458/pdf/PLAW-108publ458.pdf.

13 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Inside NCTC, accessed October 30, 2022, 20, InsideNCTC-2021.pdf 

(dni.gov).

14 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Federal Bureau of Investigation Strategic Plan 2004-2009 (Washington, DC: U.S. 

Department of Justice, 2004), https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/federal-bureau-investigationstrategic-plan-2004-2009.

15 Bruce Hoffman et al., The FBI: Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century, Report of the Congressionally-directed 

9/11 Review Commission to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, March 2015, p. 8, 

https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=763412.

16 Stephen Slick, “Measuring Change at the CIA,” Foreign Policy, May 4, 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/04/

measuring-change-at-the-cia/. 

17 U.S. Congress, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Title I (p. 15, pp. 25-26), Title II (p. 64).

18 Robert Cardillo, “A Cultural Evolution,” Studies in Intelligence 54, no. 3 (September 2010): 43-44.

19 Josh Kerbel, “Complexity, COVID, and the Failure of Strategic Incrementalism,” Research Short (Washington, 

DC: National Intelligence University Press, October 1, 2020).

20 Cardillo, “A Cultural Evolution,” 44.

21 Paul R. Lawrence and Jay W. Lorsch, “Differentiation and Integration in Complex Organizations,” Administrative 

Science Quarterly 12, no. 1 (1967): 10.

22 David Rock et al., “Diverse Teams Feel Less Comfortable–and That’s Why They Perform Better,” Harvard 

Business Review, September 22, 2016, https://hbr.org/2016/09/diverse-teams-feel-less-comfortable-and-thats-whythey-perform-better.

23 Rebecca Mitchell and Brendan Boyle, “Professional Diversity, Identity Salience and Team Innovation,” Journal of 

Organizational Behavior 36, no. 6 (August 2015): 886.

24 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “ODNI Releases Fiscal Year 2021 Intelligence Community Annual 

Demographic Report,” Press Release, October 6, 2022, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/

press-releases-2022/item/2331-odni-releases-fiscal-year-2021-intelligence-community-annual-demographic-report.

25 Daan van Knippenberg and Julija N. Mell, “Past, Present, and Potential Future of Team Diversity Research: From 

Compositional Diversity to Emergent Diversity,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 136 

(2016): 137.
9

26 Frances J. Milliken and Luis Martins, “Searching for Common Threads,” The Academy of Management Review 21, 

no. 2 (April 1996): 403.

27 David J. G. Dwertmann et al., “Disentangling the Fairness & Discrimination and Synergy Perspectives on Diversity 

Climate: Moving the Field Forward,” Journal of Management 42, no. 5 (2016): 1140.

28 Henrik Bresman and Amy C. Edmondson, "Exploring the Relationship Between Team Diversity, Psychological 

Safety and Team Performance: Evidence from Pharmaceutical Drug Development," Harvard Business School 

Working Paper, No. 22-055 (February 2022): 3, https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=61993.

29 Bresman and Edmondson, “Exploring the Relationship,” 3.

30 Interview with Intelligence Analyst, 2022.

31 Michalle Mor Barak et al., “What Leaders Say versus What They Do: Inclusive Leadership, Policy-Practice 

Decoupling, and the Anomaly of Climate for Inclusion,” Group & Organization Management 47, no. 4 (2021): 4.

32 Oscar Holmes et al., “A Meta-Analysis Integrating 25 Years of Diversity Climate Research,” Journal of 

Management 47, no. 6 (2021): 1361-62.

33 Lisa H. Nishii, “The Benefits of Climate for Inclusion for Gender-Diverse Groups,” Academy of Management 

Journal 56, no. 6 (2013): 1754.

34 Bernardo Ferdman, “The Practice of Inclusion in Diverse Organizations: Toward a Systemic and Inclusive 

Framework,” in Diversity at Work: The Practice of Inclusion, ed. Bernardo Ferdman and Barbara Deane (San 

Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2014), 5.

35 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Demographic Report: Hiring and Retention of Minorities, 

Women, and Persons with Disabilities in the United States Intelligence Community, Fiscal Year 2021, October 6, 

2022, 5.

36 Richard M. Ryan and Edward L. Deci, Self-Determination Theory: Basic Psychological Needs in Motivation, 

Development, and Wellness (New York: Guilford Press, 2017), 295.

37 Lynn M. Shore et al., “Inclusion and Diversity in Work Groups: A Review and Model for Future Research,” 

Journal of Management 37, no. 4 (2011): 1264.

38 Shore et. Al, “Inclusion and Diversity,” 1264-6.

39 Wiebren S. Jansen et al., “Inclusion: Conceptualization and Measurement,” European Journal of Social Psychology

44, no. 4 (2014): 371.

40 Shore et. al, “Inclusion and Diversity,” 1266.

41 Jansen et. al, “Inclusion: Conceptualization and Measurement,” 371.

42 Nishii, “The Benefits of Climate for Inclusion,” 1756-1757.

43 Tanachia Ashikali et al., “The Role of Inclusive Leadership in Supporting an Inclusive Climate in Diverse Public 

Sector Teams,” Review of Public Personnel Administration 41, no. 3 (2021): 500.

44 Robin J. Ely and David A. Thomas, “Cultural Diversity at Work: The Effects of Diversity Perspectives on Work 

Group Processes and Outcomes,” Administrative Science Quarterly 46, no. 2 (2001): 229.

45 Amy Zegart, “Implementing Change: Organizational Challenges,” in Intelligence Analysis: Behavioral and Social 

Scientific Foundations, ed. National Intelligence Council (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2011), 

314.

46 J.W. Berry, “Globalisation and Acculturation,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations 32, no. 4 (2008): 331.

47 John Berry, “Diversity and Equity,” Cross Cultural Management 23, no. 3 (2016): 426. 

48 Berry, “Globalisation and Acculturation,” 328.

49 Lynn M. Shore and Beth G. Chung, “Inclusive Leadership: How Leaders Sustain or Discourage Work Group 

Inclusion,” Group & Organization Management 47, no. 4 (2021): 3.

50 U.S. Congress, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.

51 Thomas H. Kean and Lee Hamilton, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on 

Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 

https://www.9-11commission.gov/report/.

52 Laurence H. Silberman and Charles S. Robb, The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 

Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005), 

https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-WMD.

53 Jim Clapper and Trey Brown, “Reflections on Integration in the Intelligence Community,” Studies in Intelligence

65, no. 3 (September 2021): 6.
10

54 “Intelligence Integration: A Congressional Oversight Perspective. Interview With Jon Rosenwasser,” Studies in 

Intelligence 65, no. 3 (September 2021): 22.

55 Jan W. Rivkin et al., Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2007-9-710-451, Harvard Business Review Case Studies 

(Boston, MA: Harvard Business School, May 9, 2010).

56 Slick, “Measuring Change at the CIA.”

57 Rivkin et al., Federal Bureau of Investigation.

58 Slick, “Measuring Change at the CIA.”

59 Center for the Study of Intelligence, "Factors That Drive Interagency Integration Forward: Why Initiatives Succeed

or Fail," Lessons Learned (June 2014). 

60 Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Leadership Competency Model (Washington, DC: FBI, 2017).

61 Donna Chrobot-Mason and Quinetta Roberson, “Inclusive Leadership” in Leadership: Theory and Practice, ed. 

Peter G. Northouse, 9th ed. (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2022), 322-351.

62 Quinetta Roberson and Jamie L. Perry, “Inclusive Leadership in Thought and Action: A Thematic Analysis,” 

Group & Organization Management 47, no. 4 (2022): 755–78.

63 Amy E. Randel et al., “Inclusive Leadership: Realizing Positive Outcomes Through Belongingness and Being 

Valued for Uniqueness,” Human Resource Management Review 28, no. 2 (2018): 190–203.

64 Barak et. al, "What Leaders Say,” 3.

65 Chrobot-Mason and Roberson, “Inclusive Leadership,” 335.

66 Debora Pfaff, “Flipping the Script: How Can the IC Recast Its Story?” Research Short (Washington, DC: National 

Intelligence University Press, 2022), accessed October 28, 2022. https://ni-u.edu/wp/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/

NIUShort_20220817_DNI_2022_03829.pdf.

67 Stephanie LaRue and Justin Doubleday, “An Interview With the IC’s Chief of Diversity, Equity, Inclusion 

and Accessibility,” Inside the IC with host Justin Doubleday, podcast, November 16, 2022, 34:48, 

https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/an-interview-with-the-ics-chief-of/id1609995902?i=1000586480013.

68 Interview with Intelligence Analyst, 2022.

69 Interview with Supervisory Intelligence Analyst, 2022.

70 Interview with Supervisory Intelligence Analyst, 2022.

71 Interview with Intelligence Analyst, 2022.

72 Interview with Supervisory Intelligence Analyst, 2022.

73 Juliet Bourke, "3 Ways to Be a More Inclusive Colleague," Harvard Business Review, December 13, 2021,

https://hbr.org/2021/12/3-small-ways-to-be-a-more-inclusive-colleague.

74 Juliet Bourke, "It's the Little Things: A Qualitative Study of the Nature and Role of Interpersonal Inclusion in 

Fostering Individual Performance in Project Teams," (Ph.D. diss., Brunel University London, October 5, 2021), 

https://bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/24512/1/FulltextThesis.pdf.

75 Michael Miner and Lindsay Temes, The Past, Present, and Future of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion in the American 

Intelligence Community (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School - Belfer Center for Science and International 

Affairs, April 2022), 7, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/DEI%20in%20the%20IC%

20-%20Michael%20Miner%20and%20Lindsay%20Temes.pdf; U.S. Congress, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act of 2004, Title I, Subtitle A, Sec. 1011, Sec. 102A, and Sec. 104A.

76 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Demographic Report: Hiring and Retention of Minorities, 

Women, and Persons with Disabilities in the United States Intelligence Community, Fiscal Year 2021.

77 Jeffrey Fields, “The Past, Present, and Future of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion in the American Intelligence 

Community,” panel discussion, Intelligence Project, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard 

University Kennedy School, April 13, 2022. 

78 Jeffrey Fields, email message to author, October 24, 2022.

79 President Barack Obama, Statement on the Elimination of Syria's Declared Chemical Weapons Stockpile

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, August 18, 2014), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/

DCPD-201400617/pdf/DCPD-201400617.pdf.

80 Julian Borger, “Syria Hands Over Final Weapons for Destruction,” The Guardian, June 23, 2014. 

81 Cheung, “Cape Ray Diplomacy: How a U.S. Merchant Vessel Took Center Stage in Foreign Relations,” 16.

82 President Barack Obama, Statement on the Elimination of Syria's Declared Chemical Weapons Stockpile.

83 Cheung, “Cape Ray Diplomacy,” 16.
11

84 Becky McMahon, “The Science of Disarming Syria’s Chemical Weapons,” Popular Science, August 20, 2014, 

https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a10874/the-science-of-disarming-syrias-chemical-weapons-16982565/.

85 Cheung, “Cape Ray Diplomacy,” 16.

86 U.S. Government employee, “Joint Operation.”

87 Email between U.S. Government employee and author, October 27, 2022.