Weighing Taiwan’s Economic TakeAways from Russia-Ukraine War 

Dr. Janice Hinton and Dr. Phuong Hoang

Asia watchers have been exploring what lessons Taiwan might take 

from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to bolster Taipei’s ability to deter 

or defend against a Chinese attack. They have focused on global 

political engagement and military preparedness. But what are the

economic steps Taipei might take to increase its global posture and 

encourage the world’s developed democracies to come to Taiwan’s 

defense? This Research Short will explore the economic tools Taipei 

might use to strengthen its global standing and their implications for 

the United States.

RESEARCH SHORT

INSIGHT Sharing academic research November 2, 2022

What this is:

Research Shorts fuse two 

research cultures, blending 

intelligence information with 

academic insights on topics of 

interest to the IC. Shorts are 

intended to constructively 

start and add to the IC's 

conversations—not to finish 

them. NIU, the sole fully 

TS/SCI-cleared university, 

publishes the Shorts.

What this is not:

Research Shorts are not 

finished intelligence and 

are not IC-coordinated. 

The opinions expressed are 

solely those of the author and 

do not represent those of any 

U.S. Government agency.

IMAGE FROM SHUTTERSTOCK
2

Looking Beyond Political and Military Lessons 

Taiwan joined the United States and other democracies in imposing robust economic sanctions 

on Moscow after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. Although largely symbolic (Russia and 

Taiwan account for just 0.75 percent of each other’s trade1, 2 ), Taipei’s sanctions covered 58 

high-tech commodities, some of which—like Russian-designed Elbrus chips made by the Taiwan 

Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC)—support the Russian military and security 

services.3 Taiwan also has donated more than $33 million in humanitarian relief to Ukraine and 

those neighbors absorbing Ukrainian refugees. 4 These actions have signaled Taiwan’s

commitment to a global community dedicated to democratic principles—a community that 

Taipei hopes would defend Taiwan and impose comparable sanctions on China if Beijing were 

to use military force against the island. Indeed, Taiwan Foreign Minister Joseph Wu explicitly 

linked these two messages in May when he expanded Russian sanctions to include Belarus.5

Yet Taipei may doubt the effectiveness of this messaging, as it studies how lessons from the 

Russia-Ukraine war would apply to a China-Taiwan conflict. The first is that countries willing 

to sanction Moscow may balk at comparable measures on Beijing, because China’s greater global 

commercial and financial clout6 would up the pain for both sanctioning countries and the global 

economy.7, 8 European leaders have shied away from certain measures against Russia so as not

to harm their own economies.9, 10 Opinion polls, as of spring 2022, reveal that majorities in only 

11 of the 53 countries support cutting economic ties to China if it were to invade Taiwan.

11 (see 

Appendix 1.) Taiwanese, themselves, note global fears about the impact of countermeasures 

China could impose, like using its monopoly position to withhold access to essential rare-earth 

metals. Taiwanese editorials are calling for Taipei to focus on political and military measures to 

deter forced unification.

12 Taiwan’s political status also could 

impede potential sanctions: while nations and intergovernmental 

organizations, such as the UN, almost universally recognize 

Ukraine as an independent state, only 14 countries grant Taiwan

that status.

13

Another lesson Taiwan has drawn from the Russia-Ukraine war 

is the need to develop the same spirit of resistance that

Ukrainians have shown, which has drawn international support 

to Kyiv’s defense. The Taiwan public’s confidence that the 

United States would defend Taiwan against a nuclear-armed 

aggressor dipped after the Russia-Ukraine war began and has 

only slowly rebounded in recent months. Surveys by National 

Chengchi University in Taiwan show 40 percent of respondents 

in March 2022 anticipated the United States would take military 

action, down from 57 percent in September 2021. However, the 

surveys also suggest the Taiwanese public’s willingness to fight 

correlates directly to its confidence in Taiwan’s own defensive 

capabilities, not to U.S. intervention (see Appendix 2). This spirit 

is prompting Taiwan to invest more in anti-access/area-denial 

KEY RESEARCH INSIGHTS

• Taiwan is posed to take economic, 

as well as much touted political and 

military, steps to boost its global 

standing and defenses against China. 

• In addition to developing specialized 

comparative advantage in industries 

beyond semiconductors and fortifying 

technical alliances abroad, Taipei is 

likely to press even harder for FTAs 

with the United States, the EU, and 

other democratic economies. 

• Future academic research could 

include indicators of Taiwan’s 

movement toward declared 

independence. China’s feared “gray 

rhino” event.
3

weapon systems, rethink conscription, accelerate robust reservist training, and expand civil 

defense preparedness.14, 15

In keeping with these lessons learned, many Asia watchers exploring how Taiwan can best 

deter or withstand a Chinese attack have focused on political engagement and military 

preparedness. They advise Taipei to increase its humanitarian assistance abroad to raise its 

global profile in the absence of UN representation or widespread diplomatic recognition and 

to strengthen asymmetric warfare strategy development and training. 16 But could adding

economic steps to this political-military mix inject “force multipliers” into its efforts to

persuade other countries, particularly the world’s democracies, to come to Taiwan’s defense?

This Research Short will explore several economic tools Taiwan could pursue to raise its global 

standing and garner international support if China were to try to wrest control over the island.

Using Economic Tools To Boost Taiwan’s Global Standing

Taiwan’s preeminence in the global semiconductor market has long been seen as a “silicon shield”

to deter attack by China and underpin U.S. readiness to defend the island.

17 China notably spared 

Taiwan’s semiconductor industry when Beijing imposed trade restrictions after U.S. Speaker of 

the House Nancy Pelosi visited the island in August 2022.

18 China and the United States—the 

world’s largest consumers of semiconductors—each consume about 25 percent of global supplies. 

Both depend on the most advanced logic chips (in nodes below 10 nanometers)—92 percent of 

which are made in Taiwan—for their cutting-edge electronic devices and weapon systems.

19

Clearly other factors drive the calculus Beijing and Washington bring to bear on Taiwan—

including cross-Strait unification as a legacy issue of President Xi and the Chinese Communist 

Party—but Taiwan’s critical role in the semiconductor supply chain suggests there are ways to 

build strategic advantage. Can Taiwan develop leading-edge capabilities in other advanced 

industries that could encourage trading partners to defend Taiwan to protect supply chains? 

Would Taipei consider “forward deploying” some of these capabilities to other countries to forge

“technical alliances” that would encourage support for Taiwan in time of conflict? What 

economic policy changes might Taipei make to reduce the island’s reliance on China, currently 

its largest trading partner?20

Developing and Retaining Talent

Taipei could take advantage of the public’s increasing sense of Taiwanese identity 21 to 

encourage its high-tech workers abroad to return home to contribute to the island’s future. A 

U.S.-educated Taiwanese, for example, returned home and founded TSMC to jumpstart the 

island’s semiconductor industry. Providing incentives to companies to offer more competitive 

salaries and benefits might stem the drain of domestic technology workers. As of 2019, Beijing

had poached nearly one-tenth of Taiwan’s semiconductor engineers and executives to develop 

China’s semiconductor industry.

22 The United States, wary of its dependence on Taiwanese 

semiconductors, is seeking to up its domestic semiconductor production,23 which could drain 

more workers from Taiwan’s high-tech talent pool.

24, 25 Taipei’s incentives could apply to 
4

other emerging high-tech industries as well and could be used to encourage more international 

talent to immigrate to expand Taiwan’s labor pool, particularly through its New Southbound 

Policy to enhance cooperation with Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Australia.

Long-term Efforts To Develop Specialized Comparative Advantage 

To ensure overseas partners are more invested in the island’s security, Taiwan could tap into 

its technically skilled workforce, reputation for research integrity, and government incentives 

to build specialized comparative advantage in industries beyond semiconductors. One initiative 

is the 5+2 Innovative Industries Plan—introduced by Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen to 

develop innovative technologies to establish Taiwan as the “Asian Silicon Valley”26—which 

could also deny overseas investment in, and tech transfer to, China’s industries.

• Data privacy, cybersecurity, and intellectual property protection. Taiwan’s 

strategic location and strong data and IP protection policies drew Microsoft and Google 

to the island,27, 28, 29 and Taipei could highlight its competitive advantage in data and IP 

protection to boost is allure as a regional data hub vis-à-vis China. International 

companies are increasingly leery of China’s legal ambiguities and its stiff cybersecurity 

and data regulations that compel companies to provide data access to the Chinese 

government.

30, 31 The European Commission has assessed that China’s inadequate IP 

protection and forced technology transfer pose “irreparable harm to European 

businesses,”32 and Beijing’s efforts to extend its legal framework to Hong Kong could 

lead to an exodus of tech firms located there,

33 many of whom would probably find 

Taiwan an attractive alternative.

• Artificial intelligence and the Internet of Things (IoT). Decades of semiconductor 

development have created a tech-centered culture and infrastructure on Taiwan, along 

with the hardware needed to store large amounts of data—helping Taipei become a 

major global AI hub.34 Taipei has an action plan to turn the island into a global AI 

center and has launched an AI hub to further AI incorporation into business 

operations.35, 36 Taiwan’s talent pool is ideal for AI and IoT development and has 

already drawn global tech companies to the island.37 Microsoft has been operating its 

Asia IoT program in Taiwan since 2016, and in 2019 selected Taiwan to develop the 

company’s global AI programs. 

• Biotechnology and precision medicine. Over the longer term, Taipei is working to 

become a global biomedical R&D hub.

38, 39 Its efforts to promote biotechnology have 

ensured the sector’s steady growth in Taiwan since 2011.40, 41 Taipei recently launched a 

Biomedical Industry Innovation Program and has helped create and integrate innovation 

clusters and research parks. The biotech industry, particularly precision medicine, is 

integrating big data and AI into healthcare processes, providing opportunities for Taipei 

to use its high-tech capabilities to expand the industry. Taiwan has established a niche in 

developing new cancer drugs. Further aligning its regulatory environment with those in 

other countries would allow the island to boost its comparative advantage.42
5

Establishing “Technical Alliances”

Taiwan already is taking discreet steps within its semiconductor industry to mitigate concerns 

about supply chain reliability, given globalization worries that emerged during the pandemic 

and more recent disruptions in global commodities trade (e.g., wheat, neon, oil, gas) created 

by the Russia-Ukraine war and related sanctions. As part of Taipei’s effort to build goodwill 

with leading trade and security partners, TSMC is constructing new chip factories in the United 

States and Japan—and potentially Germany and Singapore as well.43

Beyond offshoring specific manufacturing capabilities, Taipei might broaden and deepen its 

collaboration abroad to include high-tech R&D partnerships that could forge “technical 

alliances” and strengthen political, and possibly security, ties, even as these bonds remain short 

of diplomatic recognition or military alliance. Taipei could build on the Science and 

Technology Innovation Centers (STICs)—established under its New Southbound Policy to 

strengthen ties to ASEAN countries—by developing S&T parks across a broader global 

landscape. Of particular promise are partnerships with Central and Eastern Europe—regions

increasingly frustrated with China’s aggressive posture and unfilled economic promises under 

its Belt and Road Initiative.

44 The STICs pair experts from Taiwanese academic institutions 

with Indo-Pacific counterparts to conduct research in fields ranging from AI to sustainable 

energy.

45 S&T parks supported by Taipei and the host-country government could facilitate 

mutually beneficial business relationships between Taiwan’s techno-industrial giants and local 

innovators to improve Taipei’s economic competitive advantage vis-à-vis Beijing. These 

relationships might also foster political and security ties that lead host-country governments to 

exercise greater support for Taiwan during a cross-Strait conflict.

Reducing Economic Ties and Avoiding Boosting China’s Technology Growth

Expanding the geographical scope of Taipei’s New Southbound Policy would also help divert 

Taiwanese business investment from China and reduce Taiwan’s economic interdependence

on China, which asymmetrically favors Beijing.

46 Taiwan’s investment controls and incentives 

to move design and manufacturing capabilities 

from China back to Taiwan or to third countries 

have reduced Taiwanese foreign direct 

investment (FDI) in China from $14.4 billion to 

$5.9 billion between 2011 and 2021. 47 The 

share of Taiwan’s FDI that goes to China has 

dropped from 80 percent in 2011 to 31 percent 

in 2021 (see Figure 1).

48 The Russia-Ukraine 

war might also push Taipei to up its oversight 

of foreign acquisition made by the island’s

industries and services. Since 2018, Taiwan’s 

Evergreen shipping company has bought 44 

cargo vessels from the China State Shipbuilding 

Corporation (CSSC), which builds surface 

Figure 1. Taiwan's Decreasing FDI to China (2011-2021)

Source: Statista and author calculations

0

5

10

15

20

Taiwan’s Total FDI to China (USD billions)

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Taiwan’s FDI to China as a share of all outward FDI (%)

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Billions (USD)
6

combatants for China’s Navy at the same facility—suggesting CSSC’s commercial revenue 

supports Beijing’s naval modernization.

49 By shifting to other suppliers, Taiwan could reduce 

unintended subsidies to a threatening military force and strengthen trade relationships with 

prospective defenders.

Implications of Taipei’s Expectations for the US and IC

In addition to exploring new economic and technological means of building strategic advantage, 

Taiwan’s heightened concerns about U.S. and other countries’ readiness to come to the island’s 

defense appear to be propelling its efforts to join a range of multinational and bilateral 

economic accords that would bind Taiwan to global partners. Taipei will continue to press for 

membership in the U.S.-sponsored Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), 

inaugurated in May. The island was not included—despite its request and the recommendation 

of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, plus 250 members of the U.S. Congress—reportedly to 

quell some members’ concerns about overtly antagonizing China.50 Taiwan has just established 

a Ministry of Digital Development to promote digital economic governance and infrastructure 

development, and its National Development Council has pledged to continue shifting 

Taiwanese firms’ high-tech production from China to Southeast Asia, North America, and 

Europe to bolster global supply chains—both key IPEF pillars.51

Taiwan’s bid to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 

Partnership (CPTPP)—to lessen its economic dependence on China, integrate into the global 

economy, and mitigate its political and economic isolation—is complicated by China’s desire 

to also join. Australia’s parliamentary committee overseeing CPTPP’s expansion has endorsed

Taiwan’s ascension—citing the island’s pandemic management and importance as a security

and technology partner,

52 while not endorsing China’s bid. In July 2022, Japan said it would 

help Taiwan join CPTPP, and Canada welcomed a legislative delegation to discuss the island’s 

membership.

53, 54 CPTPP allows entry to “any State or separate customs territory,” so Taiwan’s 

political status does not present legal membership challenges, although Singapore supports

China’s entry, noting “political complications” with Taiwan’s.55, 56, 57

Although being included in multinational groups such as IPEF and CPTPP could strengthen 

Taiwan’s economic, political, and possibly even defense ties, bilateral free trade agreements 

(FTAs) would better ensure that “binding” effect—with the added benefit of expanded market 

access. Taipei is pressing to secure FTAs with the United States, EU, UK, Japan, and India. 58

59 60 Taipei has made it clear that it sees its talks this fall with Washington on the U.S-Taiwan 

Initiative on 21st Century Trade—mirroring IPEF’s planned cooperation—as a “building block” 

to signing a U.S.-Taiwan FTA.61 Although the EU is not engaged in FTA talks with Taipei, the 

bloc is Taiwan’s largest foreign investor and upgraded its economic cooperation with Taiwan 

to facilitate Taiwanese investment in the EU semiconductor industry, despite earlier hesitation 

over China’s potential reaction.62 Beijing’s coercive efforts to disrupt European supply chains 

to punish Lithuania for opening a representative office in Taiwan, along with Taipei’s support 

of Western sanctions on Russia, has further strained EU views of China and led to the German 
7

government to highlight in its coalition treaty, for the first time, the need to support the island’s 

membership in international organizations.

63 Beijing’s criticisms of Western sanctions and 

continued diplomatic and economic support for Moscow during the Ukraine war have shown

EU countries the similarities between the two authoritarian regimes, in contrast to Taiwan and 

other like-minded democracies.

Recognizing the United States’ global clout, Taipei will press Washington to urge the IPEF, 

CPTPP, EU, and individual nations to help integrate Taiwan into bilateral or broader economic 

partnerships. Allies are likely to take their cue from U.S. efforts to remain resolute against a 

possible “new normal” of Chinese coercive behavior and military intimidation.

64 Beijing’s 

actions, however, are leading some foreign businesses to question their presence on Taiwan—

especially after seeing assets in Russia seized after Russia invaded Ukraine.

65 Although not 

advocating Washington compel U.S. firms to keep their investments in Taiwan, the head of the 

U.S.-Taiwan Business Council supports a U.S.-Taiwan FTA as a “framework and template” 

other countries could model to insulate Taiwan’s economy.

66 Taiwan’s chief trade negotiator 

is urging that China’s “its harm to the global economic and trade order” included in U.S.-

Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade talks this fall.67

With the China-watcher community divided on Beijing’s unification timeline, U.S. 

policymakers and legislators will look to the IC to assess the urgency and effectiveness of 

Taiwan’s economic efforts. The draft Taiwan Policy Acct (TPA) before Congress, for example, 

calls on “federal agencies to brief Congress on all available economic, diplomatic, and other 

strategic measures to deter the use of force ... and progress on all coordination efforts.”68 Draft 

TPA provisions authorizing details for U.S. Federal agencies in Taiwanese Government or 

other relevant organizations and prohibiting restrictions on Federal agencies from interacting 

with Taiwanese counterparts, and interim NSC guidance advocating support for Taiwan, 

suggest a bipartisan appetite for deeper intelligence sharing between Washington and Taipei.69

The authors wrote this Short as part of the NIU Office of Research’s “Year of China” academic 

initiative. 

Janice Hinton, Ph.D., an editor at the National Intelligence University, served more than 30 years as 

an analyst and analytic manager on East Asian issues, and has worked and studied in China and Taiwan.

Phuong Hoang, Ph.D., is a research faculty member and co-director of the Center for Global Politics 

and Societies at NIU writes on geoeconomics, maritime/territorial disputes, and COVID-19 in the 

Indo-Pacific.

If you have comments, questions, or a suggestion for a Research Short topic or article, please contact 

the NIU Office of Research at Research@niu.odni.gov.
8

Appendix 1: International Public Support for Sanctions 

if China Invades Taiwan

Majorities in just 11 of 53 countries surveyed by Latana for the Democracy Perception Index

Report 2022 expressed support for breaking economic ties to China if Beijing invaded Taiwan.*

Four of these 11 are members of the Quad—an informal partnership of Australia, India, Japan, 

and the United States committed to supporting Indo-Pacific security. Russia, which issued a 

joint statement with China touting their “no limits” friendship just weeks before the Russian 

invasion of Ukraine, ranks at the bottom of this survey, with less than 10 percent endorsing 

sanctions against China in this scenario. Of note, only about 35 percent of Ukrainians polled 

supported severing economic ties to China (see Figure 3). 

Figure 2. Countries Supporting Ending Economic Ties with China if it Invades Taiwan 

* This was a survey of 52,785 respondents from 53 countries conducted between March 30-May 10, 2022. 

Participants in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong were excluded from the question, “If China started a military 

invasion of Taiwan, do you think your country should cut economic ties with China?”

Source: Latana, Democracy Perception Index Report 2022
9

Figure 3. Percentage of respondents who answered “Yes” to the question, ‘If China started a military 

invasion of Taiwan, do you think your country should cut economic ties with China?’ (Survey of 52,785 

respondents from 53 countries conducted between March 30 – May 10, 2022)

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%

Russia

Morocco

Algeria

Indonesia

Greece

Israel

Hungary

Egypt

Pakistan

Mexico

Thailand

Saudi Arabia

Nigeria

Malaysia

Turkey

Vietnam

Singapore

Kenya

Colombia

Romania

Chile

Iran

Philippines

Peru

South Africa

Ukraine

Switzerland

Italy

Belgium

Brazil

Argentina

France

Austria

Venezuela

Poland

Netherlands

Norway

Germany

South Korea

Portugal

Ireland

Spain

India

Sweden

Canada

United States

Japan

Australia

United Kingdom

Denmark
10

Appendix 2: Taiwanese Confidence in U.S. Defense and 

Willingness To Fight

In addition to the surveys taken by Taiwan’s National Chengchi University, a series of polling 

data collected by the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation showed an even greater drop in 

Taiwanese confidence that the United States would come to the island’s defense, dipping from 

65 percent in October 2021 to 34 percent around Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 

2022. The data also show, however, that confidence has slowly increased again as of May and 

June 2022, inching back up to about 40 percent (see Figures 4 and 5).

70

Figure 4. If the CCP invades Taiwan by force, do you believe the United States will send troops to defend 

Taiwan? (September 2020 – May 2022)

National Chengchi University’s March 2022 

survey also showed that the Taiwanese public’s 

willingness to fight against Chinese attack 

correlates to the public’s confidence in Taiwan’s 

own military preparedness rather than to U.S. 

intervention. Among survey respondents who 

expressed confidence in Taiwan’s self-defense 

capabilities, 90 percent were willing to fight 

against China, even if U.S. troops did not come to 

Taiwan’s defense, with those willing to fight rising 

to 95 percent if U.S. troops joined the combat. In 

contrast, among those who lacked confidence in 

Taiwan’s military proficiency, only 60 to 65 

percent of respondents (again differentiated by 

the perceived likelihood of U.S. defense) pledged 

to fight.71

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

I don't know

No, I don't believe the U.S. would send troops to defend Taiwan

Yes, I believe the U.S. would end troops to defend Taiwan

Sep 20

Oct 20

Nov 20

Dec 20

Jan 21

Feb 21

Mar 21

Apr 21

May 21

Jun 21

Jul 21

Aug 21

Sep 21

Oct 21

Nov 21

Dec 21

Jan 22

Feb 22

Mar 22

Apr 22

May 22

Jun 22

Source: Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation, June 2022 National Poll Summary Report

Figure 5. U.S. President Biden said he would use U.S. military 

force to defend Taiwan if it were invaded by China. Do you think 

his promise is credible? (June 2022, n=1,079)

Not credible

Credible

No opinion

Don't know

51% 40%

5% 4%
11

Endnotes

1 Taiwan Government, Ministry of Economic Affairs Bureau of Foreign Trade, “Taiwan-Russia Economic Relations,” 

last revised December 23, 2021, https://www.trade.gov.tw/english/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeID=2912&pid=655091&dl 

_DateRange=all&txt_SD=&Pageid=0; 

2 Russian Government, “Russian trade with Taiwan in 2021,” February 16, 2022, https://en.russian-trade.com/reports

-and-reviews/2022-02/russian-trade-with-taiwan-in-2021/.

3 “Taiwan Joins West in Russia Sanctions,” Taipei Times, February 26, 2022, 

https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front /archives/2022/02/26/2003773796; Jeanne Whalen, “Computer chip 

industry begins halting deliveries to Russia in response to U.S. sanctions,” Washington Post, February 25, 2022, 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/technol-ogy/2022/02/25/ukraine-russia-chips-sanctions-tsmc/; “Taiwan Tightens 

Russia Export Curbs, Details Tech Rules,” Channel News Asia (CNa), April 6, 2022, 

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/taiwan-tightens-russia-export-curbs-details-tech-rules-2612026; Ian Talley, 

“U.S. Says Export Controls Are Hurting Russia’s Battlefield Might,” Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2022, 

https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-05-10/card/u-s-says-export-controls-arehurting-russia-s-battlefield-might-gg2nFxV47SvlOJOiXtcd.

4 John Feng, “As China’s Xi Jinping Shuns Volodymyr Zelensky, Taiwan Engages With Ukraine, Newsweek, June 

21, 2022, https://www.newsweek.com/china-xi-jinping-ukraine-volodymyr-zelensky-taiwan-diplomacy-joseph-wu1717502; Ben Blanchard, “'From our Heart': Taiwan Rejects China's Criticism Over Ukraine Aid,” Reuters, April 

1. 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/from-our-heart-taiwan-rejects-chinas-criticism-over-ukraineaid-2022-04-01/; “Czech FM Thanks Taiwan for Ukrainian Aid,” Taipei Times, May 2, 2022, 

https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2022/05/02/2003777565; “Taiwan Collects $10.6 Million in 

Donations for Ukraine,” NHK News, March 8, 2022, https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20220308_23/.

5 Ben Blanchard, “Taiwan Says Hopes World Would Sanction China if It Invades,” Reuters, May 7, 2022, 

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-says-hopes-world-would-sanction-china-if-it-invades-2022-05-07/.

6 David Sacks, “What Is China Learning From Russia’s War in Ukraine?” Foreign Affairs online, May 16, 2022, 

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-16/what-china-learning-russias-war-ukraine.

7 Orlana Skylar Mastro and Derek Scissors, “Beijing is Used To Learning From Russian Failures,” Foreign Policy

online, April 18, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/18/china-russia-ukraine-taiwan-war/.

8 Devlin Barrett, “FBI Director Suggests China Bracing for Sanctions if It Invades Taiwan,” Washington Post, July 

6, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/07/06/china-taiwan-fbi-wray-sanctions/.

9 Robert Perkins and Stuart Elliott, “Germany’s Scholz Reiterates Opposition To Immediate EU Sanctions on 

Russian Energy Imports,” S&P Global Commodity Insights, March 23, 2022, 

https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/ en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/032322-germanys-scholzreiterates-opposition-to-immediate-eu-sanctions-on-russian-energy-imports.

10 Sam Meredith, “Hungary Says It’s Impossible for Europe To Ban Russian Gas Anytime Soon. Putin Agrees,” 

CNBC, June 10, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/06/10/russian-gas-ban-hungary-says-eu-cant-impose-a-gas-banon-russia.html.

11 Latana, “Democracy Perception Index 2022,” https://7049607.fs1.hubspotusercontent-na1.net/hubfs/7049607/ 

Democracy%20Perception%20Index%202022.pdf. For a detailed dataset of survey results see: https://docs.google. 

com/spreadsheets/d/1gdjTHqM_O2kDNyFgvLWVsCn4lFWzFRoMRUdTelXxTM4/edit#gid=1271546525.

12 “EDITORIAL: Would Sanctions Work Against China?” Taipei Times, May 11, 2022, https://www.taipeitimes.com 

/News/editorials/archives/2022/05/11/2003778029.

13 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), “Diplomatic Allies,” https://en.mofa.gov.tw/AlliesIndex

.aspx?n=1294&sms=1007.

14 “Ukraine and Taiwan: Parallels and Early Lessons Learned,” (webinar, Center for Strategic and International Studies

(CSIS) China Power Project, Washingtn D.C., March 22, 2022), https://www.csis.org/analysis/ukraine-and-taiwanparallels-and-early-lessons-learned; Michele A. Flournoy, “How To Prepare for the Next Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs

online, May 23, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-05-23/how-prepare-next-ukraine; Helen 

Davidson, “Taiwan May Extend Conscription as Ukraine Invasion Stokes China Fears,” The Guardian, March 24, 

2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/24/taiwan-may-extend-conscription-as-russia-ukraine-invasionstokes-china-fears; Eric Cheung and Wayne Chang, “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Sparks Concern in Taiwan Over 
12

Readiness for Conflict With China,” CNN, March 17, 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/17/asia/taiwan-militaryreservists-china-fears-intl-hnk/index.html; Matthew Strong, “Taiwan Prepares Civil Defense Handbook,” Taiwan 

News, March 4, 2022, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4462167.

15 Christian Shepherd, Vic Chang, and Pei Lin Wu, “Taiwan Hones Invasion Response Amid China’s Threats Over 

Pelosi Trip,” Washington Post, July 27, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/07/27/taiwan-chinamilitary-invasion-drill-nancy-pelosi/.

16 See, for example: “Taiwan’s Quest for International Space: Update on Pandemic Diplomacy and Beyond,” 

(webinar, George Washington University Sigur Center for Asian Studies, Washington D.C., May 19, 2022); 

“Ukraine and Taiwan: Parallels and Early Lessons Learned;” China Power Project; “Gray Zone Operations or 

Cross-Channel Invastion: How Should Taiwan Prioritize for Its Defense?” Global Taiwan Institute, online 

discussion, March 9, 2022, https://globaltaiwan.org/2022/02/march-9-gray-zone-operations-or-cross-channelinvasion-how-should-taiwan-prioritize-for-its-defense/; Brian Hioe, “Taiwan Watches the Ukraine Invasion and 

Asks: Are We Ready?” The Diplomat, March 15, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/taiwan-watches-theukraine-invasion-and-asks-are-we-ready/; Mastro and Scissors, “Beijing Is Used To Learning From Russian 

Failures,” Foreign Policy, April 18, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/18/china-russia-ukraine-taiwan-war/; 

Sacks, “What Is China Learning From Russia’s War in Ukraine?”

17 Craig Addison, Silicon Shield: Taiwan’s Protection Against Chinese Attack, (Irving, TX: Fusion Press, 2001);

Joyce Huang, “Can Taiwan’s Silicon Shield Protect It Against China’s Aggression?” Voice of America, May 10. 

2021, https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_can-taiwans-silicon-shield-protect-it-against-chinasaggression/6205660.html; Scott Kennedy, It’s Moving Time: Taiwanese Business Responds to Growing U.S.-

Taiwan Tensions.

18 “Why China is not sanctioning Taiwan’s key chip industry,” Al Jazeera, August 4, 2022, 

https://www.aljazeera.com/ economy/2022/8/4/why-china-is-not-sanctioning-taiwans-crucial-tech-industry.

19 Antonio Varas, et al., “Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era,” Boston 

Consulting Group and Semiconductor Industry Association, April 2021, 5, 12, 35, and 47, https://www.bcg.com/ 

publications/2021/strengthening-the-global-semiconductor-supply-chain; Yimou Lee, Norihiko Shirouzu, and 

David Lague, “Special Report: Taiwan chip industry emerges as battlefront in U.S.-China showdown,” Reuters, 

December 27, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/taiwan-china-chips/.

20 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, “Taiwan—Country Commercial Guide,” last 

updated September 13, 2021, https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/taiwan-market-overview.

21 National Chengchi University, Election Study Center, “Taiwanese / Chinese Identity (1992/06~2022/06), July 22, 

2022, https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7800&id=6961.

22 Kensaku Ihara, “Taiwan loses 3,000 chip engineers to ‘Made in China 2025’,” Nikkei Asia, December 3, 2019, 

https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/China-tech/Taiwan-loses-3-000-chip-engineers-to-Made-in-China-2025.

23 Iain Marlow, “US Dependence on Taiwan Chips Is ‘Untenable,’ Raimondo Says,” Bloomberg, July 21, 2022, 

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-22/us-dependence-on-taiwan-chips-is-untenable-raimondosays#xj4y7vzkg.

24 Che Pan, “US-China tech war: Will Taiwan chip engineers be key to success in the race for tech supremacy?” 

South China Morning Post, March 23, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/tech/tech-war/article/3171571/us-china-techwar-will-taiwan-chip-engineers-be-key-success-race-tech.

25 Cheng Ting-Fang and Lauly Li, “Chip Talent War: Taiwan Faces Critical Staffing Shortage,” Nikkei Asia, February 

18, 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Business-Spotlight/Chip-talent-war-Taiwan-faces-critical-staffingshortage.

26 Taiwan Executive Yuan, “5+2 Innovative Industries Plan,” https://english.ey.gov.tw/iip/B0C195AE54832FAD.

27 Property Rights Alliance, 2021 International Property Rights Index, 

https://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/compare/country?id=107,131.

28 Lauly Li and Cheng Ting-Fang, “Microsoft to build Taiwan data center amid US-China tech war,” Nikkei Asia, 

October 26, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Trade-war/Microsoft-to-build-Taiwan-data-center-amid-USChina-tech-war.

29 Yu Nakamura, “Google embraces Taiwan as Asia hub with third data center,” Nikkei Asia, September 4, 2020, 

https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Technology/Google-embraces-Taiwan-as-Asia-hub-with-third-data-center.
13

30 Ashley Feng, “We Can’t Tell if Chinese Firms Work for the Party,” Foreign Policy online, February 7, 2019, 

https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/07/we-cant-tell-if-chinese-firms-work-for-the-party/.

31 Daniel Rechtschaffen and Jessie Niu, “Navigating China’s Data Maze: How Regulations Affect U.S. Companies,”

The American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, May 2019, https://www.amchamshanghai.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/Viewpoint%20-%20Data%20%28May%202019%29.pdf.

32 European Commission, “Commission Staff Working Document: Report on the Protection and Enforcement of 

Intellectual Property Rights in Third Countries,” April 21, 2021, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2021

/april/tradoc_159553.pdf.

33 “Asia Industry Group Warns Privacy Law Changes May Force Tech Firms To Quit Hong Kong,” Reuters, July 5, 

2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/facebook-google-twitter-say-could-quit-hong-kong-over-proposeddata-laws-wsj-2021-07-05/.

34 Ralph Jennings, “How Taiwan Is Becoming A Top Destination For Artificial Intelligence In Asia,” Forbes online, 

September 29, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2018/09/29/how-taiwan-is-becoming-a-topdestination-for-artificial-intelligence-in-asia/?sh=550b0b2340a0.

35 “Taiwan Cabinet Approves Plan To Spur AI Industry Development,” Taiwan News, January 19, 2018, 

https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3345152.

36 Huang Tzu-ti, “Taiwan launches AI Hub to upgrade industries,” Taiwan News, October 2, 2019, https://www

.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3788889.

37 Ralph Jennings, “Why Microsoft Found It Easier To Expand AI And IoT In Taiwan,” Forbes online, June 28, 

2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2019/06/28/why-microsoft-is-expanding-ai-and-iot-in-taiwannot-in-china/?sh=265fad0077f8.

38 Taiwan Executive Yuan, “Biomedical Industry Innovation Program: Building Taiwan Into a World-class Center of 

Innovation Biomedical Research and Development,” October 28, 2020, https://english.ey.gov.tw/News3/

9E5540D592A5FECD/2e752915-7149-48e0-ae33-06fcb2e33bc3.

39 Taiwan Executive Yuan, “‘Precision Health’ Key to Taiwan’s Future as Global Biomedical Innovation,” August 

27, 2020, https://english.ey.gov.tw/Page/61BF20C3E89B856/933750a1-146a-463d-a35d-1bb985884f93.

40 PwC, Guide to Taiwan’s Health Industries, July 2022, https://www.pwc.tw/en/publications/assets/taiwan-healthindustries-guide.pdf.

41 Han Ting-ting, Wen Kuei-hsiang, and Evelyn Kao, “BIO Asia-Taiwan Opens in Taipei, Highlighting Biotech 

Trends,” Focus Taiwan, July 28, 2022, https://focustaiwan.tw/business/202207280018.

42 Timothy Ferry, “Will Biotech Be the Next Trillion NT Dollar Industry?” American Chamber of Commerce in 

Taiwan, September 26, 2019, https://topics.amcham.com.tw/2019/09/will-biotech-be-the-next-trillion-nt-dollarindustry/.

43 Jessie Shen, “TSMC Arizona Fab Nears Completion,” DigiTimes Asia, July 29. 2022, https://www.digitimes.com 

/news/a20220729VL200/tsmc.html; Yang Jie and Keith Zhai, “TSMC Looks To Build Multibillion-Dollar Chip 

Plant in Singapore,” Wall Street Journal, May 19, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/tsmc-looks-to-buildmultibillion-dollar-chip-plant-in-singapore-11652958840; “TSMC in Early Talks on Germany Plant,” Taipei 

Times, December 13, 2021, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2021/12/13/2003769478; Akihiro 

Komuro, “TSMC Plans Plant in Japan, Operation Set for 2024,” Power Systems Research, October 24, 2021, 

https://www.powersys.com /2021/10/tsmc-plans-plant-in-japan-operation-set-for-2024/.

44 “Comparing Economic Engagement: Taiwan and China in Eastern Europe,” (webinar, Stimson Center, Taiwan and 

Cross-Strait Relations Project, Washington, D.C., May 3, 2022, https://www.stimson.org/event/comparingeconomic-engagement-taiwan-and-china-in-eastern-europe/.

45 Taiwan Ministry of Science and Technology, New Southbound S&T Cooperation, “Science and Technology 

Innovation Center (STIC),” accessed May 24, 2022, https://nsstc.narlabs.org.tw/NSTC/en/STIC.aspx.

46 Bradley Martin, et al., Implications of a Coercive Quarantine of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China (Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2022), 23-24, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1279-1.html.

47 C. Textor, “Approved Outward FDI From Taiwan Into Mainland China 2011-2021,” Statista, March 1, 2022, 

https://www.statista.com/statistics/1292815/taiwan-approved-foreign-direct-investment-into-mainland-china/.

48 Shelley Rigger, The Tiger Leading the Dragon: How Taiwan Propelled China’s Economic Rise (Lanham, MD: 

Rowman & Littlefield, 2021), 177-95; Sophia Yang, “China’s Pro-unification 31 Measures for Taiwan Have Failed: 

Academia Sinica scholar,” Taiwan News, January 26, 2019, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3625988; 
14

author calculations using https://www.statista.com/statistics/863092/taiwan-value-of-outward-investment/ and 

https://www.statista.com/statistics/1292815/taiwan-approved-foreign-direct-investment-into-mainland-china/.

49 Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, and Joseph P. Bermudez, Jr., “In the Shadow of Warships: How Foreign 

Companies Help Modernize China’s Navy,” online interactive, (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and 

International Studies), accessed April 23, 2022, https://features.csis.org/china-shadow-warships/; Michael Martina, 

“China Shipbuilding for Taiwan Firm Likely Aiding Chinese Navy Build-up – U.S. Think Tank,” Reuters, April 7, 

2022, https://www.reuers.com/world/asia-pacific/china-shipbuilding-taiwan-firm-likely-aiding-chinese-navy-buildup-us-think-tank-2-22-04-07/

50 “Testimony: USTR – Fair and Resilient Trade Pillar of an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework 2022,” US-Taiwan 

Business Council, April 11, 2022, https://www.us-taiwan.org/resources/testimony-ustr-fiar-and-resilient-tradepillar-of-an-indo-pacific-economic-framework-2022/; “Unpacking the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework Launch,” 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 23, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/unpacking-indopacific-economic-framework-launch; Matthew Strong, “Taiwan Top trade Envoy Still Hopes for IPEF 

Membership,” Taiwan News, June 7, 2022, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4562625.

51 “Testimony: USTR – Fair and Resilient Trade Pillar of an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework 2022;” “Taiwan to 

boost supply chain role for IPEF bid,” Taipei Times, June 1, 2022, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz 

/archives/2022/06/01/2003779106; White House Briefing, “Statement on Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for 

Prosperity,” May 23, 2002, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/23/statementon-indo-pacific-economic-framework-for-prosperity.

52 Parliament of Australia, “Expanding the membership of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific 

Partnership,” February 2022, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Foreign_

Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/CPTPPMembership/Report.

53 “Japanese Envoy Pledges Continued Efforts To Help Taiwan Join CPTPP,” Focus Taiwan, July 31, 2022, 

https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202207310008.

54 Stephanie Chiang, “Taiwan Legislative Yuan CPTPP Initiative Delegation Arrives in Ottawa for Talks,” Taiwan 

News, July 31, 2022, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4612114.

55 Government of Canada, “Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership,” 

https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/texttexte/cptpp-ptpgp.aspx?lang=eng.

56 Krystal Chia and Shery Ahn, “Singapore Sees ‘Complications’ in Taiwan Bid to Join Trade Deal,” Bloomberg, 

November 17, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-18/singapore-sees-complications-intaiwan-bid-to-join-trade-deal.

57 Dylan Loh, “Singapore to join Biden Indo-Pacific pact, back China’s CPTPP entry: Lee,” Nikkei Asia, May 23, 

2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Interview/Singapore-to-join-Biden-Indo-Pacific-pact-back-China-sCPTPP-entry-Lee.

58 Graham Lanktree, “UK Risks Chinese Anger Over Trade Talks With Taiwan,” Politico, July 4, 2022, 

https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-discussion-taiwan-trade-cptpp-anger-china/.

59 “Japan Seeks To Resume Trade Talk Framework With Taiwan,” Focus Taiwan, February 18, 2022, 

https://focustaiwan.tw/business/202202180020.

60 Abhijit Mukhopadhyay, “India-Taiwan FTA in the Making,” Observer Research Foundation, May 30, 2022, 

https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-taiwan-fta-in-the-making/.

61 United States Trade Representative, “United States and Taiwan Commence Formal Negotiations on U.S.-Taiwan 

Initiative on 21st Century Trade,” press release, August 17, 2022, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/pressoffice/press-releases/2022/august/united-states-and-taiwan-commence-formal-negotiations-us-taiwan-initiative-21stcentury-trade; “US-Taiwan Trade Talks Kick Off in Long-Planned Counter to China,” Washington Post, August 18, 

2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-small-business/us-taiwan-trade-talks-kick-off-in-long-plannedcounter-to-china/2022/08/17/37f82604-1e98-11ed-9ce6-68253bd31864_story.html; Ben Blanchard, “U.S., Taiwan To 

Start Formal Trade Talks Under New Initiative, Reuters, August 18, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/us-taiwanstart-formal-trade-talks-under-new-initiative-2022-08-18/; United States Trade Representative, “United States and 

Taiwan Hold Inaugural Meeting of the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade,” press release, June 27, 2022, 

https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2022/june/united-states-and-taiwan-hold-inauguralmeeting-us-taiwan-initiative-21st-century-trade; Kao Shih-ching, “Taiwan and US To Launch Trade Talks,” Taipei 
15

Times, June 2, 2022, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2022/06/02/2003779204; Jeanny Kao and Ben 

Blanchard, “Taiwan Appeals To U.S. Not To Forget Its Desire for Free Trade Deal,” Reuters, June 7, 2022, 

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-appeals-us-not-forget-its-desire-free-trade-deal-2022-06-07/.

62 Finbarr Bermingham, “EU To Upgrade Trade Ties With Taiwan as China Warns Brussels ‘Not To Gamble on This 

Issue,’” South China Morning Post, May 18, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3178237/

eu-upgrade-trade-ties-taiwan.

63 Janka Oertel, “How COVID-19 and the War in Ukraine Could Change EU-Taiwan Relations,” Brookings

Instoitution, July 13, 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/07/13/how-covid-19-and-thewar-in-ukraine-could-change-eu-taiwanrelations/#:~:text=The%20European%20Union%20is%20Taiwan's,68%20billion%20dollars%20in%202021.

64 Christopher P. Twomey, “The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis Is Just Starting,” War on the Rocks, August 22, 2022, 

https://warontherocks.com/2022/08/the-fourth-taiwan-strait-crisis-is-just-starting/; Bonny Lin and Joel Wuthnow, 

“Pushing Back Against China’s New Normal in the Taiwan Strait,” War on the Rocks, August 16, 2022, 

https://warontherocks.com/2022/08/pushing-back-against-chinas-new-normal-in-the-taiwan-strait/; “Impact of the 

Pelosi Visit to Taiwan and China’s Military Exercises on Regional Stability,” (webinar, Stimson Center, 

Washington D.C., August 11, 2022), https://www.stimson.org/event/the-impact-of-the-pelosi-visit-to-taiwan/; Lily 

Kuo, “China’s Military Extends Its Drills Around Taiwan,” Washington Post, August 9, 2022, 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world /2022/08/08/Taiwan-china-military-exercises-pelosi/; Helen Davidson, 

“‘This Is About Striking Fear’: China’s Taiwan Drills the New Normal, Analysts Say,” The Guardian, August 9, 

2022, https://www.theguardian.com /world/2022/aug/10/china-taiwan-military-drills-the-new-normal-analysts-say; 

“Toward a Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis,” (webinar, Center for Strategic and International Studies and Brookings 

Institution, WQashington D.C., August 4, 2022), https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/220804_Fourth_Taiwan_Crisis.pdf?UicYdPZhJYJEaweFHaSjIJ5Te2tsKayC.

65 Phelim Kine, “U.S. Firms Eye Taiwan Exit on Chinese Invasion Risk,” Politico China Watcher, August 4, 2022, 

https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-china-watcher; Michelle Toh, “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Has 

Foreign Investors Fleeing Taiwan. Here’s Why,” CNN Business, March 23, 2022, https://www.cnn.com 

/2022/03/23/investing/taiwan-investment-jitters-russia-ukraine-intl-hnk/index.html.

66 Kine, “U.S. firms Eye Taiwan Exit on Chinese Invasion Risk.”

67 Blanchard, “U.S., Taiwan To Start Formal Trade Talks Under New Initiative.”

68 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Taiwan Policy Act of 2022, Sec. 211: Whole-of-Government 

Deterrence Measures To respond to the People’s Republic of China’s Force Against Taiwan, 117th Congress, 2d sess, 

2022, accessed October 1, 2022, https://www.foreing,senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ SBS%20Taiean%20Policy%20

Act%20FINAL520(i).pdf.

69 (U) U.S. Congress, Senate, “Taiwan Policy Act of 2022,” Sec. 607 and 703.

70 Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation, “June 2022 Public Opinion Poll,” https://www.tpof.org/wpcontent/uploads/2022/06/2022 年 6 月新聞發佈書面資料.pdf

71 Calculations based on cross-sectional analysis by Kuan-chen Lee (Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and 

Security Research) of National Chengchi University surveys on defense policy, conducted in September 2021 and 

March 2022 (1,080 participants with 2.98 percent margin of error and 95 percent confidence); Kuan-chen Lee, 

“Analyzing Stability and Change in Self-Defense Awareness Among the Taiwanese People Since the Russian 

Invasion of Ukraine,” Biweekly Defense and Security Report, Issue 52 (April 22, 2022): 9-16, 

https://indsr.org.tw/Content/Upload/files/biweekly/52/2_KuanChenLee.pdf; “Majority would go to war for 

Taiwan,” Taipei Times, May 1, 2022, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2022/05/01/2003777507.