1 Appell ant do es no t sep ara tely b rief h is federal and state const itut ional cl aims, and w e will therefore

not s epa rately a ddre ss the m. NO. 07-04-0561-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TE XAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL D SEPTEMBER 14, 2005

______________________________

ROEL ROB LEDO, Appellant
v. THE STA

TE OF TEX

AS, Appellee

_________________________________ FROM THE 287 TH DISTRICT COURT OF PARMER COUNTY; NO. 2652; HON. GORDON H. GREEN, PRESIDING

_______________________________

Opinion

_______________________________ Before QUINN, C.J., and REAVIS and CAMPBELL, JJ. Appella nt, Roel Robledo, appeals his convi ction for possessin g a con trolled substance. His sole issue concerns the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress. Suppression was warranted, in his view, because the methamphetamine was seized from the cab of his tractor trailer in violation of both thefederal and state constitutions. 1 That is, appellant

believes the officer impermissibly detained him after the purpose of the initial stop2

was effec

tuated an d that hi s consen t to searc h was in voluntar y. We affirm the judgment of the tri al court. Standard of Review We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion t o suppres s under th e standar d announced in Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. Cri m. App. 2002) and Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). It requires us to give almost total deference to the trial court’s findings of historical fact and review de novothe applicat ion of th e law to the fac

ts. Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d at 652-5 3. Applica tion of S tandard The onlywitness at the suppression hearing was Trooper Joel Rejino. He testified thataround m idnight he obser ved the tr

actor trai ler that a ppellan t dro ve pass him in the opposi t e direction. Peering through his rearview mirror, he noticed that the vehicle’s tail lightswere not il luminated. This caused the officer to turn his car around and follow the tractor trailer. While d oing so, he reali zed that t he tail l ights actuallywere illuminated but would fl icker on and off. Appellant

was eventually stopped and asked for his driver’s license and paperwork. So too did the trooper request appellant to accomp any him to the pat rol car. Both entered the vehicle. Rejino sat in the driver’s seat w hile appellant sat in the passeng er seat. There, the trooper examined the registration a nd insurance documents of the tractor trailer and decided to give appellant a warning ticket. After issu i ng the wr i tten warning, Rejino received a criminal history report from dispatch showing that appellant h ad no outstanding2 At another point , Rej ino t esti fi ed that he recei ved the cri minal h ist ory reportpri or t o iss uing t he wa rning . It was up to the trial co urt to res olve this inc ons istenc y. 3 warrantsbut was the subject of a prior drug conviction. 2 Within 10 to 30 secondsof issuing t he ci tation an d receivi ng the re port, the trooper re quested of appell ant permi ssion to search both his person and the tractor trailer. Appellant consented to both. It was during the searc h of the vehicle t hat the co ntrolled substance was di scovered

. Authority holds that as part of a traffic stop, an officer may 1) require the detainee to identify himself and produce a valid driver’s license and proof of

insurance and 2) detain the individ ual for aperiod of time reasonably sufficient to check for outstanding warrants. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54 , 63-64 (Tex. Crim. Ap p. 2004); Strauss v . State, 121 S.W.3d 486, 491 (Tex. App .–Amarillo 20 03, pet. ref’d). So too may he also ask the driver if he possesses illegal contraband and solicit voluntary consent to search the vehicle once the purpose of a traffic stop has be en effectu ated. Strauss v. State, 121 S.W.3 d at 491; James
v. State , 102 S.W.3d 162, 172-73 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d). Requ es t ing such consent is not an unlawful seizure, and neither probable cause no r r easonable suspicion is required for the officer to ask. James v . State, 102 S.W.3 d at 173. Nor must the officer tell the i ndividu al that he is fre e to leave after the purpose of the stop is completed. Vargas v. State, 18 S.W.3d 247, 252n.1 (Tex . App.–Wa co 2000, pet. ref’d ).

As previously mentioned, once Trooper Rejino issued the warning an d received the report from the dispatcher, he solicited the consent to search. By then the purpose of the stop had been effectuated; yet, only seconds had passed between the time consent was requested and the purpose effectuated. This is not a situatio n wherein appellant was4

detained for minutes or hours prior to broaching the matter of consent. In other words, the effectuation of the stop and the req uest for co nsent were rather contemporaneous here. Thus, we view the situa tio n as fall ing with in the scope of James and Strauss

and, conseque ntly, law

ful. As to the contention that his consent was involuntary, we note that to be of such ilk, itmust be th e product

of duress

or coerci on, expr

ess or imp lied. Rea s or v. Stat e, 12 S.W.3d 813, 817(Tex. Cr im. App. 2 000). Moreover , the evidence of record here does not lend itself to such a claim. First, the initial detentio n was quite lawful; so, it cannot be said th at appellant ’s acquiescence was part and parcel of il legal conduct on the part of the trooper. Second, no evidence was presented at the suppression hearing that illustrated the officer told appellant he had to consent or that if he did not

consent he would be arrested
or otherwis e detain ed. Nor i s there ev idence t hat the tr ooper imp licitly or explic itly threate ned appe llant verbally or through gesture. Indeed, but for conduct on the part of appellant

indicative of nervousness, the interaction between the two appeared routine for
a traffic stop. Finally, that the officer failed to inform appellant that he could exit the patrol
car and leave is alon e insuffi cient cri teria to i llustratecoercion; again, an officer does not have to tell t he indiv idual he may leave once th e purpose of the sto p is comp leted. Vargas v. State, 18 S.W.3d at 252 n.1. In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the motion to suppress. Accordingly, we overrule each of appellant’sissues and affirm the judgment of the trial court. Brian Quinn Chief Justice Publish.