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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

No. 123,280

In the Matter of DONNA L. HUFFMAN,

Respondent.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE

Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed May 27, 2022. Two-year suspension with 

possibility of probation after 90 days upon approval of a practice supervision plan.

Deborah L. Hughes, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and Gayle B. Larkin,

Disciplinary Administrator, was with her on the brief for petitioner.

Donna L. Huffman, respondent, argued the cause and was on the briefs pro se.

PER CURIAM: This is a contested attorney discipline proceeding against Donna L. 

Huffman, of Oskaloosa, who was admitted in 2010 to practice law in Kansas. After a 

five-day hearing, a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys unanimously 

concluded Huffman violated the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct while 

representing homeowners in multiple lawsuits over the mortgage on their residence. The 

panel determined her litigation tactics included filing multiple lawsuits containing 

frivolous claims, making what was characterized as "extensive and needless" discovery 

requests, and serially relitigating settled issues. A federal district court at one point 

imposed a $5,000 sanction against her. Ultimately, the homeowners were assessed nearly 

$290,000 in their lender's legal fees, which exceeded the mortgage principal. The lender's 

attorneys billed over $700,000 for their work.
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The panel unanimously found Huffman violated KRPC 1.1 (competence) (2022 

Kan. S. Ct. R. at 327); KRPC 3.1 (meritorious claims) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 390); 

KRPC 3.5 (impartiality and decorum of the tribunal) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 396); KRPC 

8.2 (judicial and legal officials) (Kan. S. Ct. R. at 432); and KRPC 8.4 (misconduct) 

(2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 434). A majority of the panel recommends published censure, 

while a dissenting panel member recommends a 90-day suspension. The Office of the 

Disciplinary Administrator recommends indefinite suspension. Huffman challenges some 

factual findings and conclusions of law and recommends a private admonition.

We hold clear and convincing evidence establishes attorney misconduct as to 

KRPC 1.1 (competence), KRPC 3.1 (meritorious claims), and KRPC 8.4 (misconduct). A

majority of the court rejects the panel's findings and conclusions as to KRPC 3.5 

(impartiality and decorum of the tribunal) and KRPC 8.2 (judicial and legal officials) as 

being unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. A minority of the court would have 

found these additional violations.

Based on the violations found, we suspend Huffman from practicing law in this 

state for a period of two years, while granting her the possibility for probation after 90 

days upon approval by the Disciplinary Administrator's office of a practice supervision

plan for the remaining suspension period, all to be followed by a reinstatement hearing

once she completes the two-year term. If a disagreement arises between Huffman and the 

Disciplinary Administrator's office over the practice supervision plan, either or both may 

file a motion with this court to resolve that dispute about the plan or compliance with its 

terms.
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal complaint on January 10, 2019, and 

an amended complaint on September 4, 2019, alleging various KRPC violations against 

Huffman. She filed an answer on February 19, 2019. The panel conducted hearings on 

November 6-8 and December 19-20, 2019. She appeared pro se. The panel issued a 71-

page final hearing report. It provides in relevant part:

"Findings of Fact

"Background Facts

"46. The hearing panel finds the following facts, by clear and convincing 

evidence:

"47. In 2008, R.B. obtained a variable rate loan in the amount of $184,222.00 

from Security National Mortgage Company to purchase a home and signed a promissory 

note to that effect. R.B. is listed as the only borrower and only he signed the note. 

However, the note was secured by a mortgage signed by both R.B. and his wife, S.B. 

Wells Fargo serviced the loan and eventually came to own the promissory note. R.B. and 

S.B. made regular monthly payments. 

"48. In May, 2009, R.B. applied with Wells Fargo to refinance the house. 

According to a computerized system of recording communications, employees of Wells 

Fargo made contact with R.B. as follows:

a. On May 15, 2009, C.M. completed the welcome call 

with R.B. 
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b. On May 17, 2009, the loan terms were changed to 

accommodate R.B.'s request, June 24, 2009, was listed as the anticipated 

closing date, and Wells Fargo approved R.B.'s credit. 

c. On May 20, 2009, C.M. left a message for R.B. to return 

the call to 'go over loan' information. 

d. On May 21, 2009, C.M. went over loan information with 

R.B. C.M. faxed documents to him so the documents could be returned 

quickly. 

e. On May 28, 2009, the loan terms were changed to 

accommodate R.B.'s request. The anticipated closing date remained June 

24, 2009. Also on May 28, 2009, C.M. requested additional 

documentation from R.B. 

f. On June 4, 2009, C.M. called R.B. regarding the 

additional documentation. On June 10, 2009, C.M. left a message for 

R.B. confirming receipt of the additional requested documentation. On 

June 18, 2009, the loan terms were changed to accommodate R.B.'s 

request and the anticipated closing date remained listed as June 24, 2009. 

g. On June 18, 2009, R.B. called Wells Fargo and left a 

message for C.M. R.B. was frustrated. J.D. told R.B. that the loan should 

be 'final approved' in time to close the following week. R.B. indicated 

that he is a truck driver, he would be home Wednesday, June 24, and he 

could sign either Wednesday, June 24 or Thursday, June 25. 

h. On June 19, 2009, C.M. called R.B. and left a message 

for him, confirming that she received his message. C.M. confirmed that 

she would call R.B. to schedule closing when the file was back. The loan 

terms were changed to accommodate R.B.'s request and the anticipated 

closing date remained listed as June 24, 2009. 
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i. On June 22, 2009, C.M. called R.B. and left a message 

that she needed R.B.'s W-2 and she would resubmit the file to get a 'clear 

to close.' On June 24, 2009, C.M. forwarded the file to get a 'clear to 

close.' On June 24, 2009, S.H. received a complete decision and the 

transaction was approved. That same day, C.M. entered a closing handoff date. 

j. On June 25, 2009, C.M. printed the note and the 

mortgage/deed. Additionally, C.M. twice sent the closing package to the 

settlement agent and twice the settlement agent downloaded the closing 

package. 

"49. R.B. did not sign the closing documents. The record does not establish 

why R.B. did not sign the closing documents or whether R.B. was provided with a 

specific time and location of closing.

"50. Even though the closing did not occur, the closing agent, 

Transcontinental Title Company, mistakenly informed Wells Fargo that the closing 

occurred.

"51. Wells Fargo executed a Certificate of Satisfaction on July 3, 2009, which 

provided that R.B. and S.B.'s 2008 mortgage had been released. Wells Fargo filed the 

Certificate of Satisfaction concerning the 2008 Mortgage with the Shawnee County 

Register of Deeds. Wells Fargo sent a letter of congratulations to R.B. and S.B. on July 6, 

2009, informing them of the loan payoff. 

"52. On July 13, 2009, C.M. noted that R.B. did not sign the closing 

documents, but that the loan had been funded by Wells Fargo as authorized by M.M. on 

June 30, 2009. C.M. also noted that she had been trying to contact R.B. to find out what 

happened. C.M. did not make any additional notes about contact with R.B. 
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"53. Over the course of four months, Wells Fargo sent R.B. statements with 

the lower monthly payment amount that would have been due had the closing actually 

occurred. 

"54. On October 27, 2009, Wells Fargo marked the refinance loan for deletion 

because closing never occurred. 

"55. On October 29, 2009, C.Y. of Wells Fargo wrote to R.B. and explained 

that the 2008 mortgage was paid off in error. C.Y. also informed R.B. that Wells Fargo 

would continue to hold its lien against the property and that payment would continue to 

be due under the 2008 mortgage. 

"56. On November 13, 2009, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems 

('MERS') executed a 'Caveat as to [the] Existence of a Mortgage Lien Due to Erroneous 

Release of Mortgage' ('Caveat'). This document, signed by L.S., essentially stated that the 

Certificate of Satisfaction had been executed in error and that R.B. and S.B. were still 

required to pay the 2008 mortgage as their debt was never fully paid. L.S. filed the 

Caveat with the Shawnee County Register of Deeds on November 20, 2010. 

"57. R.B. and S.B. continued to make the lower monthly payments that would 

have been due had the closing taken place. 

"Case No. 10-CV-4141

"58. On October 22, 2010, R.B. and S.B. sued MERS and L.S. for slander and 

disparagement of title, conversion, negligence, fraud and/or misrepresentation, and 

violations of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act ('KCPA') in Shawnee County District 

Court case number 10-C-1517. On November 16, 2010, the defendants removed the case 

to the United States District Court for the District of Kansas case number 10-CV-4141. 

"59. Wells Fargo declared the 2008 loan to be in default and on December 20, 

2010, commenced foreclosure proceedings in Shawnee County District Court case 
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number 10-C-1808. On January 6, 2011, Wells Fargo dismissed the foreclosure action 

because of the pending federal litigation. 

"60. On April 15, 2011, Wells Fargo moved to intervene in the federal suit. 

On August 3, 2011, the magistrate judge granted Wells Fargo's motion to intervene over 

the respondent's objection. On August 4, 2011, Wells Fargo filed its answer to the 

petition and counterclaims against R.B. and S.B. for a declaratory judgment regarding the 

Certificate and Caveat, equitable reinstatement of the 2008 mortgage, and foreclosure on 

the 2008 mortgage. 

"61. On December 30, 2011, the respondent filed a motion on behalf of R.B. 

and S.B. essentially requesting the court to reconsider the order allowing Wells Fargo to 

intervene. The district court denied the motion as untimely and because the issues raised 

were previously raised before the magistrate and properly rejected. 

"62. On December 30, 2011, the respondent also filed a motion on behalf of 

R.B. and S.B. to remand the case back to state court, arguing that the federal court lacked 

jurisdiction to hear claims involving MERS. On January 6, 2012, the respondent filed a 

motion on behalf of R.B. and S.B. to dismiss Wells Fargo's counterclaims. 

"63. The court denied the motion to remand and the motion to dismiss the 

counterclaims and cautioned the respondent against relitigating issues already resolved:

'The court will deny the Motion to Dismiss. Discovery in 

the action has not been completed, and the defendant is entitled 

to a full and fair opportunity to obtain evidence to support its 

claims. The Magistrate Judge determined in his Order permitting 

intervention that, while [R.B. and S.B.] may contend that Wells 

Fargo's interest is "speculative or non-existent," the defendant 

"ought to be allowed to show otherwise" at trial. Wells Fargo's 

counterclaims—which seek declaratory judgment, equitable 

reinstatement, and foreclosure—all satisfy the requirements of 
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Fed. R. Civ. Pr. 8 of "a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," and all of the 

claims advanced by Wells Fargo demonstrate a plausible and 

reasonable basis for potential relief.

'The court further finds that the plaintiffs' Motion to 

Remand, filed four months after the Order allowing intervention, 

should also be denied. First, it is again an attempt by the 

plaintiffs to circumvent Rule 7.3's fourteen-day timing 

requirement for motions for reconsideration. Accordingly, the 

motion is denied for the same reasons as stated in the court's 

denial of the previous "Motion . . . For Review."

'Further, the substance of the plaintiffs' jurisdictional 

challenges have been previously and properly rejected by Judge 

Waxse. The court has original jurisdiction to hear the action, as 

complete diversity exists among all the parties. Accordingly the 

plaintiffs' arguments relating to supplemental jurisdiction, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), are irrelevant. The plaintiffs 

have failed to articulate any potential claims which could divest 

the court of jurisdiction. The requisite amount in controversy is 

satisfied by the plaintiff's own claims alleging that the value of 

their house exceeded $75,000, as well as their explicit assertions 

during discovery that they seek compensatory and punitive 

damages far in excess of this amount. Finally, the state 

foreclosure property action was properly dismissed by Wells 

Fargo pursuant to K.S.A. 60-241(a)(1) and plaintiffs have failed 

to demonstrate how any hypothetical and hitherto unpled claims 

might invalidate the court's jurisdiction.

'The court notes that the defendants, in opposing the 

Motion to Remand, include a request for attorney fees as 

sanction against the plaintiffs for their repeated attempts to 
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relitigate issues previously decided by the court. In its discretion, 

the court denies the request for sanctions. In doing so, the court 

notes that the motions addressed herein were filed prior to the 

January 31, 2012 Order denying the plaintiffs' earlier attempt to 

circumvent Rule 7.3 [sic] However, plaintiffs are specifically 

admonished that any future attempts to relitigate issues already 

decided will likely result in the exercise of the court's inherent 

power to prevent such a waste of resources.'

"64. The parties conducted 'exhaustive' discovery. During discovery, the 

parties served each other with requests for admission. The magistrate judge overruled the 

defendant's objections to five requests for admission. The magistrate judge imposed a 

$1,000 sanction on defendant's counsel for advancing objections to the requests for 

admissions, concluding that the defendant's objections were not advanced in good faith, 

were merely 'boilerplate' objections, and the information was readily available to 

defendants. The defendants filed an objection to the imposition of sanctions. The district 

court overruled the magistrate's decision and stated:

'. . . This is not a case in which defendants have cavalierly 

advanced boilerplate objections to a plaintiff seeking targeted, 

relevant discovery. Rather, the plaintiffs have sought discovery 

through carpet bombing; the defendants' use of similar language 

in their objections provides no basis for sanctions.'

"65. On March 19, 2012, 17 months after initiating the suit, the respondent 

filed an amended petition, adding First American Title Insurance Company as a 

necessary party, related to its alleged role in the execution and recording of the caveat. 

The amended petition added an additional count for violations of the Real Estate 

Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) and violations of the Kansas Consumer Protection 

Act. 

"66. On April 24, 2012, First American Title Insurance Company filed a 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
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"67. On May 15, 2012, while First American Title Insurance Company's 

motion to dismiss the petition was pending and after extensive discovery between the 

plaintiffs and Wells Fargo, MERS, and L.S. had been completed, and without leave of 

court, the respondent filed a first amended petition against First American Title Insurance 

Company and a second amended petition against Wells Fargo, MERS, and L.S. 

"68. On May 17, 2012, Wells Fargo, MERS, and L.S. filed a motion to strike 

the second amended petition. 

"69. On May 29, 2012, Wells Fargo, MERS, and L.S. filed a motion for 

summary judgment on R.B. and S.B.'s claims as well as the defendants' counterclaims. 

Regarding the defendants' counterclaims, the defendants sought '(a) equitable 

reinstatement of the October, 2008 mortgage, (b) an equitable mortgage based on the 

terms of the proposed new loan, or (c) judgment on its claim of unjust enrichment against 

[R.B.].'

"70. In her opening statement, the respondent stated that Wells Fargo could 

have allowed R.B. and S.B. to sign the mortgage and give them what they promised in 

the refinance. Even though defendants were alternatively seeking 'an equitable mortgage 

based on the terms of the proposed new loan,' the respondent never offered to settle the 

case in that fashion. Counsel for Wells Fargo testified that had the respondent offered to 

settle the case by having R.B. and S.B. close on a loan with the terms of the refinance, 

counsel would have recommended to her client that the settlement offer be accepted. 

"71. To clearly understand the respondent's offers of settlement, during the 

hearing, the hearing panel asked the respondent to provide documentation of all 

settlement offers made in the underlying litigation. The respondent provided what has 

been admitted as Exhibit 66. According to Exhibit 66, on April 7, 2011, prior to when 

Wells Fargo entered the case, the respondent offered to settle the dispute with MERS and 

L.S. as follows:
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'The Kansas Consumer Protection Act violations for 

deceptive practices carries a $10,000.00 penalty as to [S.B.] and 

$20,000.00 as to [R.B.] as a civil statutory penalty for each 

deceptive misrepresentation and unconscionable act. Those are 

outlined in the pleading estimating 18 violations at $30,000.00

for a total of $540,000.00 or a daily penalty of $30,000.00 which 

would be 510 days for a total of $15,300,000.00, plus my 

attorney fees at $250.00 per hour and their expenses. 

'As you are aware, the issue of fraud and robo-signing 

has been an increasingly hot topic in the media. The public is 

very aware of the impacts of your clients' actions. There is no 

defense for the claims raised. Kansas is conservative but 

generally distrusting of large corporations. I feel that the claims 

of negligence and fraud will result in a backlash from the jury in 

a $500,000.00 to $1 million dollar award relating to the fraud, 

based on income.

'These claims can be combined.

'I have discussed the proposition of settlement with my 

client. [sic] They have authorized me to settle all claims against 

MERS and [L.S.] for significantly less at $750,000.00, 

contingent on a release of the documents in question. I feel this 

is a substantial reduction of value, not much more than the 

statutory remedies, costs, and attorney fees which take into 

account the reduction in time and further expenses relating to the 

hearing.'

"72. In Exhibit 66, the respondent also referenced an inference, an offer, and 

an acknowledgment regarding settlement between the plaintiffs and defendants, including 

Wells Fargo. However, the respondent failed to provide any evidence of the inference, 
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offer, and acknowledgment. Further, counsel for Wells Fargo denied that the respondent 

offered to settle the case with Wells Fargo. 

"73. The Honorable J. Thomas Marten testified during the hearing on the 

formal complaint. Judge Marten offered testimony on this subject: 

'No. Backing up to what I was saying early on is as one looks at 

this case, when everything else is cut away, [R.B. and S.B.] 

could have had their home, they could have had a lower 

payment. I think that they could have lived their lives in peace 

the few remaining years that they had, had they not been caught 

up in this vortex of—litigation. And I just found it sad because 

the [R.B. and S.B.], obviously, were good people. I think from 

some of the things I read in this case they lived in a mobile home 

for years and years that they bought on a contract for deed. They 

saved their money to buy this house. They went in to refinance 

the house, the refinancing was going to give them what they 

hoped to achieve, which was a slightly lower mortgage payment 

with a fixed rate mortgage, and somehow or another they end up, 

through a mistake that could have been corrected in 15 or 20 or 

30 minutes, they end up enduring years of litigation, losing their 

home through a foreclosure sale, ending up having to pay more

in terms of attorney's fees and costs than what the home was 

worth. And none of that, as I look at this, was necessary. I just—

it—it really saddens me.'

"74. On September 6, 2012, R.B. died.

"75. On September 11, 2012, the district court granted First American Title 

Insurance Company's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court held 

that the claims of title slander, fraud, conversion, and negligence as well as the RESPA 
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violations were barred by the statute of limitations. The district court found the remaining 

claims were conclusory assertions that failed to meet legal pleading requirements. 

"76. On October 4, 2012, in a memorandum and order which includes nearly 

30 pages of findings of fact, the court granted the defendants' motion for summary 

judgment. 

"77. The court noted that the plaintiffs had two theories of damages. On the 

one hand, R.B. and S.B. were seeking statutory damages in the amount of $20,000 per 

day each from Wells Fargo, MERS, and L.S., personally. As of the date of settlement 

conference in June, 2011, the amount of damages sought exceeded $49 million, 

$16,530,000 from each of the three defendants. Alternatively, R.B. and S.B. sought 

$1,290,000 because of '43 false statements, unconscionable acts, and/or deceptive 

practices' in the two-page Caveat.

"78. The court found that:

'Until the fact was brought to his attention at his 

deposition on March 28, 2012, [R.B.] was not aware he had filed 

suit against [L.S.]. [R.B.] testified that, in his mind, [L.S.] and 

Wells Fargo go hand-in-hand. Although he seeks $16 million 

personally from [L.S.], [R.B.] does not believe [L.S.] bore him 

any ill will.'

R.B. was unfamiliar with MERS. Additionally, the court noted that S.B. was unfamiliar 

with L.S. and MERS and did not know why she filed suit against L.S. and MERS. This is 

troubling to the hearing panel because while R.B. and S.B. thought they sued Wells 

Fargo, the respondent intentionally did not sue Wells Fargo and objected to Wells Fargo's 

motion to intervene.
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"79. In the order, the court also found that:

'. . . Wells Fargo's business records demonstrate that [C.M.] 

communicated with [R.B. and S.B.] on June 16 and 22, 

indicating that a closing would take place in June 2009. She 

discussed the specific dates of June 24th or June 25, 2009. 

Further it is uncontroverted that the same business records show 

that [C.M.] also telephoned or left messages with [R.B. and S.B.] 

on May 20, May 21, May 28, June 4, June 10, June 18, and June 

19, 2009.'

Despite the court's findings and the respondent's exhibits which establish the court's 

findings, the respondent has repeatedly asserted that R.B. and S.B. were not aware that 

they had to go to a closing and sign additional documents or that the closing was set for 

June 24, 2009. 

"80. In the order, the court separately considered each of the respondent's 

claims made on behalf of R.B. and S.B., as follows:

'Slander of title is the issuance of a false and malicious 

statement disparaging another person's title to real property and 

thereby damaging his interests. The requirement that the 

statement be malicious requires proof that the defendant did not 

act in good faith.

'[R.B. and S.B.'s] slander of title claim rests on the 

recording of [the] Caveat but that document could not slander 

their title for the simple reason that it was true—[R.B. and S.B.] 

had not satisfied their obligations on the prior loan, and that the 

prior mortgage had been released in error. Accordingly, Wells 

Fargo was simply reasserting its claim on the property in a 

manner consistent with Kansas law.
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'Nor was the Caveat malicious. In this context, 

maliciousness means doing a harmful act without an [sic] 

reasonable justification or excuse. [R.B. and S.B.] have produced 

no evidence that the defendants did not act in good faith in 

recording the Caveat, because Wells Fargo had a valid 

justification. . . . [R.B. and S.B.] have conceded that Wells Fargo 

retains some interest in the property, and thus it was not obliged 

to allow the record to continue to erroneously reflect that the 

property was unencumbered. By issuing the Caveat, the 

defendants advanced the public interest by warning third parties 

that the property was indeed subject to an existing and 

unsatisfied obligation.

'Finally, though, it must be stressed that such third 

parties are hypothetical only. That is, [R.B. and S.B.] have 

remained in the Property. They have not attempted to sell it, and 

have no plans to do so. Indeed, the Caveat was only discovered 

in the consequence of the present litigation. Accordingly, the 

plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they have been 

damaged in any way by the recording of the Caveat.

'Conversion under Kansas law is the unauthorized 

exercise of dominion and control [over] "goods or personal 

chattels belonging to another." A mortgage lien interest is not an 

interest that is capable of being converted. According, [sic] [R.B. 

and S.B.'s] claim that the defendants converted their "chain of 

title" fails to state a claim under Kansas law.

'[R.B. and S.B.'s] fraud claim asserts that the defendants 

committed fraud by recording [the] Caveat. Under Kansas law, 

fraud is "an untrue statement of fact, known to be untrue by the 

party making it, made with the intent to deceive or with reckless 
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disregard for the truth, upon which another party justifiably 

relies and acts to his or her detriment." Further, "[f]raud is never 

presumed and must be established by clear and convincing 

evidence." In the present case, [R.B. and S.B.'s] fraud claim fails 

because the Caveat represented a truthful statement (that [R.B. 

and S.B.] had not satisfied the underlying debt), and [R.B. and 

S.B.] never personally relied upon it (discovering only in the 

course of the present litigation), and did not do so to the 

detriment (since they have not attempted to sell their house and 

have failed to show that any third party has ever seen the 

document and acted against their interests[)].

'Next, [R.B. and S.B.'s] claim that the defendants acted 

negligently in recording the [C]aveat. The Court finds that this 

claim fails for the same reasons as [the] rest of [the] common 

law tort claims. The recording of the [C]aveat corrected the prior 

mistaken release of lien, and was an action authorized under 

Kansas law. As a result it did not breach any duty of due care 

owed to [R.B. and S.B.]. But the negligence claim also fails for a 

more fundamental reason. As lender and borrower, Wells Fargo 

and [R.B. and S.B.] had an adversarial relationship, and Wells 

Fargo was not obligated to act in [R.B. and S.B.'s] interest. 

Defendants MERS and [L.S.], acting as agents of Wells Fargo, 

similarly had no duty which was breached under the facts of the 

case.

'The KCPA prohibits deceptive practices in consumer 

transactions. A consumer transaction is "a sale, lease, assignment 

or other disposition for value of property or services within the 

state . . . to a consumer." In the present case, the communications 

between [R.B. and S.B.] and Wells Fargo were financial 

communications relating to a mortgage obligation, and thus do 

not fall within the scope of the KCPA. Further, [R.B. and S.B.] 
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failed to state a claim under the KCPA because they have shown 

no deceptive practice. The Caveat, as noted above, corrected the 

earlier erroneous release of the mortgage lien.

'Finally, [R.B. and S.B.] did not assert their RESPA 

claim until March, 2012, with their Amended Complaint. Such 

claims are subject to a one-year limitations period . . . Because 

[R.B. and S.B.'s] RESPA claim was brought more than one year 

after the closing of either the 2008 loan or the proposed new loan 

of 2009, the claim is time-barred.'

"81. In the same order, the district court granted Wells Fargo's equitable 

counterclaim for reinstatement of the 2008 mortgage loan. The court also granted the 

defendants' motion to strike the second amended petition filed by the respondent, 

concluding that:

'. . . given the extensive discovery conducted by the parties, 

coupled with the simultaneous and exhaustive briefing on 

dispositive motions, the defendants would be substantially 

prejudiced by such far-reaching changes to the plaintiffs' claims.'

"82. Following the entry of summary judgment, the defendants sought to 

recover expenses including attorney's fees in the amount of $289,096.00 and expenses in 

the amount of $9,204.15, as authorized by the mortgage. One of Wells Fargo's arguments 

in favor of the entry of attorney[']s fees was based on the exhaustive discovery 

propounded by the plaintiffs. The respondent made 318 discovery requests on the three 

defendants. 

"83. On November 29, 2012, the respondent filed a motion to strike the 

defendants' memorandum in support of the motion for attorney[']s fees. 
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"84. On March 26, 2013, the district court granted the defendant's motion for 

summary judgment on the counterclaim for foreclosure and the defendant's motion for 

attorney[']s fees. The court denied the plaintiff's motion to strike. The court ordered R.B. 

and S.B. to pay defendant's counsel $289,096.00 in attorneys' fees and $9,204.15 in costs:

'Considering all the relevant factors, the court finds the 

requested attorney fee award, although substantial, is justified. 

Notably, the award here is larger than the expected value of the 

underlying mortgage interest. However, this must be balanced 

against the voluntary actions of the plaintiffs who have caused 

the present action to metastasize beyond any reason. It was the 

plaintiffs who initiated the present action, bringing claims for 

damages against MERS and individually against [L.S.], one of 

Wells Fargo's employees, seeking a judgment of $16 million. 

Even though Wells Fargo was obviously a proper party to the 

action, plaintiffs vigorously sought to prevent its joining the 

case.'

"85. The sanction ordered by the court exceeds the principal sum of the 

mortgage by more than $100,000.00. The district court noted the 'barrage of discovery'

propounded by plaintiffs, and that the 'court [was] forced to admonish plaintiffs against 

the repetition of losing arguments.' At the hearing on this matter, Judge Marten 

explained:

'Well, so much of that just rests on the actions of the plaintiffs 

and the filings in the case, the positions that plaintiff took, which 

resulted in the expenditure of far more time on the part of the 

lawyers than one would expect in this kind of a case. . . . [The 

sanction was] reasonable given the amount of work that was 

generated by plaintiff's handling of this action.'
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"86. The respondent appealed the district court's orders to the United States 

Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. On February 24, 2014, the respondent filed her 

opening brief. In her statement of facts, the respondent failed to properly cite to the 

record on appeal. Additionally, rather than limit factual allegations to the statement of 

facts, the respondent included factual assertions throughout the brief. The vast majority of 

the respondent's factual assertions made in the argument portion of her brief did not 

include any citation to the record on appeal. Further, the respondent's brief is difficult to 

understand. 

"87. On April 28, 2014, S.B. died. As such, C.C., the administrator of S.B.'s 

estate, and B.B., the successor administrator for R.B.'s estate, became the named 

plaintiffs in R.B. and S.B.'s stead.

"88. A three-member panel of the Tenth Circuit held oral argument on 

October 1, 2014. During the oral argument, panel members stated that they were unable 

to understand the case after reading the respondent's brief. 

"89. At the conclusion of the argument, the court asked the parties to provide 

evidence under Fed. R. App. Pro. 28(j) regarding whether Wells Fargo communicated a 

closing date to R.B. 

'CIRCUIT JUDGE: Your time is up. Now, somebody is 

not telling us the truth.

'MS. HUFFMAN: I know. I have the truth right here, 

Your Honor. May I get these specific facts the specific page of 

exactly—

'CIRCUIT JUDGE: I would like you to submit that to 

us.

'MS. HUFFMAN: I will, Your Honor. 
20

'CIRCUIT JUDGE: And I would like you to answer the 

question of whether or not—or what evidence do you have that 

[R.B. and S.B.] were never contacted. To me it seems 

unbelievable. And it seems unbelievable that the caveat, which 

was filed because no new mortgage was ever executed. I don't

understand why you filed suit on that. And I'm extremely 

concerned about the way this case has been briefed.

'MS. HUFFMAN: And may I address those three issues 

to the Court in a written supplement?

'CIRCUIT JUDGE: Yes, you may.

'MS. HUFFMAN: I can do that also now. Can I give 

the—

'CIRCUIT JUDGE: No, you can do it in written—

'MS. HUFFMAN: That's fine. That's why I'm asking. I 

just wanted you to know I was able. So I will provide that 

written supplement to the Court. And should I go ahead and 

submit these uncontroverted facts or should I just that [sic] make 

them an attachment? 

'CIRCUIT JUDGE: Now, say that again.

'MS. HUFFMAN: Yes. Fact 220, no closing date was 

arranged by Wells or the title company.

'CIRCUIT JUDGE: Now, who is that—who is saying 

that,—
21

'MS. HUFFMAN: That was our fact and they're going 

to agree to it in a second. The actual evidence is from Wells. It's 

Exhibit 61. It's an e-mail between Kessler at the title company 

and Wells on the internal investigation of what happened. It 

wasn't set up. That's uncontroverted at Volume IV, page 702. 

The other couple very good ones and I'll—

'CIRCUIT JUDGE: Just a minute.

'MS. HUFFMAN: Yes.

'CIRCUIT JUDGE: Counsel, do you have any record 

evidence that Wells were—or [R.B. and S.B.] were given a date 

for closing?

'MS. DONNELLI: Your Honor, there was an 

anticipated given and correspondence went out.

'CIRCUIT JUDGE: Do you have evidence of that?

'MS. DONNELLI: Yes, there is evidence of that and I 

can provide the record cite to the Court. 

'CIRCUIT JUDGE: Would you please do it and send us 

a 28(j) letter. And you send us a 28(j) letter with anything you've 

got that supports the allegations that you have made in this case.

'MS. HUFFMAN: Yes, sir.

'CIRCUIT JUDGE: I'll be real honest with you, I've 

never seen a case as poorly put together as this one.'
22

Fed. R. App. Pro. 28(j) provides:

'Citation of Supplemental Authorities. If pertinent and significant 

authorities come to a party's attention after the party's brief has 

been filed—or after oral argument but before decision—a party 

may promptly advise the circuit clerk by letter, with a copy to all 

other parties, setting forth the citations. The letter must state the 

reasons for the supplemental citations, referring either to the 

page of the brief or to a point argued orally. The body of the 

letter must not exceed 350 words. Any response must be made 

promptly and must be similarly limited.'

"90. In response to the court's invitation to provide the evidence regarding 

whether Wells Fargo communicated a closing date to R.B., the respondent sent the court 

(five or) six letters with attachments. Many of the attachments were identical. 

"91. Generally, rather than directly address whether Wells Fargo 

communicated a closing date to R.B., the respondent provided confusing information on 

a variety of subjects. Two of the letters and attachments were identical—J3 and J7. The 

record is unclear whether the respondent sent both of those letters to the Tenth Circuit or 

whether the respondent inadvertently included two copies of the same letter and 

attachments in her exhibits in the instant case.

"92. Specifically, on October 15, 2014, the respondent sent the Tenth Circuit 

a letter and attachments. Included in the attachments was a copy of part of Wells Fargo's 

computerized system of recording communications found at Exhibit A-H53. In this letter 

to the Tenth Circuit, the respondent relied on certain pages of A-H53 to establish certain 

facts. However, the respondent failed to provide the Tenth Circuit with the portions of 

Exhibit A-H53 which established the communication between Wells Fargo and R.B. 

regarding closing. 
23

"93. Further, the respondent did not attempt to address the court's question 

about the communication of a closing date until her final post-argument letter to the 

court, dated October 27, 2014. In the body of the letter, the respondent failed to disclose 

the district court's findings regarding communications between Wells Fargo and R.B. 

regarding closing on the refinance. Additionally, the respondent failed to attach Exhibit 

A-H53, Wells Fargo's computerized system of recording communications which 

preserved the communications between Wells Fargo and R.B. regarding the status of the 

refinance and the tentative closing date. 

"94. In its written opinion, on November 12, 2014, the Tenth Circuit, 

addressing each of respondent's arguments on appeal, affirmed the district court. The 

Tenth Circuit concluded that the respondent either failed to establish any error or the 

respondent's arguments were supported by inadequate explanation or no legal support. 

"95. On December 1, 2014, the respondent petitioned the Tenth Circuit for 

rehearing en banc. On December 12, 2014, the Tenth Circuit denied the motion. 

"96. Wells Fargo paid its attorneys more than $600,000.00 to defend this suit.

"The Foreclosure Action

"97. As stated in ¶ 60 above, on December 20, 2010, Wells Fargo filed a 

mortgage foreclosure action against R.B. and S.B. in Shawnee County District Court 

Case 10-CV-1808. The petition was properly served on December 23, 2010. On January 

3, 2011, the respondent entered her appearance as counsel for R.B. and S.B. and 

requested a 14-day clerk's extension to answer or otherwise respond. 

"98. On January 6, 2011, Wells Fargo filed a Motion for Order of Dismissal, 

based on the litigation pending in federal court filed by R.B. and S.B. against MERS and 

L.S. At the time the motion was filed, the respondent had not filed an answer on behalf of 

R.B. and S.B. 
24

"99. On January 7, 2011, Wells Fargo's attorney emailed the respondent and 

informed her that the action was dismissed. The respondent confirmed receipt of the 

email by responding to it. 

"100. Even though the respondent knew the case was dismissed, on January 14, 

2011, the respondent filed an answer and counterclaim. The respondent alleged 

conversion and violations of the KCPA. The respondent also filed a response to Wells 

Fargo's motion to dismiss, alleging the district court had jurisdiction to hear the matter 

because R.B. and S.B. were granted an extension of time to file an answer. 

"101. On February 4, 2011, the respondent filed a motion to amend and an 

amended answer and counterclaim asserting claims for breach of contract, breach of the 

duty of good faith and fair dealing, violations of RESPA, violation of the Truth in 

Lending Act, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, slander of credit, conversion, fraud 

and misrepresentation, outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress, and 

violations of the KCPA. 

"102. After receiving the respondent's motion to amend and amended answer 

and counterclaim, counsel for Wells Fargo wrote to the court seeking information on the 

procedural status of the action. 

"103. The district court allowed both parties to provide arguments and 

authorities in support of their respective positions. Consequently, on March 4, 2011, the 

respondent filed a reply to the letter brief, alleging that R.B. and S.B.'s counterclaim was 

pled prior to the service of Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss. On March 19, 2012, the 

respondent filed a second motion to amend, seeking to amend the first amended answer 

and counterclaim. 

"104. On March 23, 2012, the court held a hearing on whether the court had a 

foreclosure action before it. The court ruled that the case was dismissed upon the filing of 

Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss. The court directed Wells Fargo to prepare a journal 

entry and send it to the respondent under a local 10-day rule. 
25

"105. Without waiting for the journal entry, on April 2, 2012, the respondent 

filed a premature notice of appeal. 

"106. On April 4, 2012, counsel for Wells Fargo submitted a proposed 

Administrative Order regarding the dismissal to the district court. On April 9, 2012, the 

court entered the order, memorializing its earlier ruling that the case was dismissed upon 

the filing of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss. 

"107. On May 1, 2012, the respondent filed a motion to set aside or amend the 

order entered April 9, 2012. In the motion, the respondent alleged that counsel for Wells 

Fargo engaged in misrepresentation or misconduct under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 60-

260(b)(3), by falsely representing that the respondent approved the order. The respondent 

sought sanctions. On June 25, 2012, the court denied the respondent's motion.

"108. On July 27, 2012, the respondent filed a notice of appeal. On July 19, 

2013, the Kansas Court of Appeals upheld the district court's orders. 

"Case No. 14-CV-4020

"109. On December 12, 2013, while the appeal in case 10-CV-4141 was 

pending in the Tenth Circuit, the respondent filed another lawsuit in Shawnee County 

District Court, case 13-CV-1416, alleging the same claims that were on appeal in 10-CV4141, against Wells Fargo Bank, Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, and the law firm 

representing Wells Fargo in the foreclosure action. The claims made against the law firm 

were premised entirely on its actions in seeking to protect Wells Fargo's mortgage 

interest in the property. 

"110. On March 25, 2014, the defendants removed the case to the United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, case number 14-CV-4020. 
26

"111. On April 14, 2014, Wells Fargo filed a motion to dismiss the petition 

based on res judicata. On May 5, 2014, the law firm defendant filed a motion to dismiss. 

The respondent sought and received multiple extensions of time to file a response to the 

motions to dismiss.

"112. Subsequently, on June 27, 2014, without leave of court, the respondent 

filed an amended petition, which advanced no new cause of action. The amended petition 

simply reworded a few of the allegations from the petition initially filed. Then, on June 

29, 2014, again without leave of court, the respondent filed a motion to substitute the 

amended petition with a second amended petition. Included with the motion was a 

declaration and the second amended petition. In the declaration, the respondent averred 

that:

'Upon further reflection and consideration[,] the 

concerns that I have relating to the previous harsh words as 

consistent reminders by quoting this Court and raised in nearly 

every case I am Counsel, I felt regret that I did not plead in 

accordance with my true belief that this was not the original 

Note and insert more of the problems which occurred by the late 

and ever changing production in [R.B. and S.B.] v [sic] MERS.'

"113. On September 12, 2014, the respondent filed a response to the two 

motions to dismiss which included a reply in support of the respondent's motion to amend 

the petition. 

"114. On December 30, 2014, the district court granted the motions to dismiss 

based on res judicata. The district court concluded that:

'[10-CV-4141] was litigated fully. The plaintiffs [sic] 

claims included fraud, slander of title, conversion of "chain of

title," breach of contract, anticipatory repudiation, negligence, 

detrimental reliance, unjust enrichment, violation of the Real 
27

Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) and of the Kansas 

Consumer Protection Act (KCPA). The docket in that action 

comprises 393 separate pleadings and other events. In its 

summary judgment Order, the court explicitly recognized the 

discovery in that action was "extensive" and the briefing 

"exhaustive." This is [an] understatement. Wells Fargo grounded 

its summary judgment motion on 159 paragraphs of factual 

contentions. The plaintiffs controverted many of these facts, and 

asserted a further 102 paragraphs. The court resolved all factual 

and legal issues in the case in a lengthy opinion. The court 

granted summary judgment on Wells Fargo's counterclaim after 

receiving additional factual allegations and legal argument[.]

'[14-CV-4020] repeats the allegations advanced [in the 

earlier case], again focusing on the inadvertent release of lien 

and Wells Fargo's attempt to correct the error. Accordingly, the 

court finds that plaintiffs' claims are subject to dismissal under 

the doctrine of res judicata, which precludes the relitigation of 

issues which were previously litigated.'

The court concluded that the claims were also time barred. In conclusion, the court noted:

'More fundamentally, the allegation is emblematic of the 

entire case, first presented in [10-CV-4141] and now here. The 

passing of [S.B.] is unfortunate, as is the passing of her husband 

before her. It is doubly unfortunate that [R.B. and S.B.'s] last 

years were marked by the meritless litigation urged on by their 

counsel. The present litigation, . . ., is both unfortunate and 

unnecessary.'

"115. On January 27, 2015, the respondent filed a motion to alter or amend the 

court's judgment dismissing the case, again seeking relief for claims which had been 
28

repeatedly dismissed. The respondent based her motion on Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56. Fed. R. 

Civ. Pro. 56 provides procedures for filing a motion for summary judgment; not motions 

to alter or amend a judgment. 

"116. In the motion to alter or amend the judgment, the respondent did not 

allege a mistake in the facts or a mistake in the law as required. The respondent failed to 

present any newly-discovered evidence which would support reconsideration. Rather, the 

respondent's motion to alter or amend the judgment, was 'a repetition of earlier arguments 

made' in 10-CV-4141 and 14-CV-4020. 

"117. Additionally, in the motion to alter or amend the judgment dismissing the 

case, the respondent accused the judge of wrongdoing, directly and by innuendo. 

Specifically, the respondent stated:

'. . . The Court has a belief of what has happened and tells a story 

but appears to rely on assumptions, not supported by the record, 

. . . [.]

. . . [.]

'. . . [T]he Court rulings in this case seem to turn a blind eye to 

those problems. 

. . . [.]

'. . . There can be no doubt there was a problem and that should 

not be ignored by this Court for judicial economy or to further 

protect Wells Fargo from the Plaintiffs who have not only a 

colorable claim, but a prima facie claim on some acts. 

. . . [.]
29

'The commentary punctuates the socio[-]economic 

disconnect of the Court with these clients and generally the 

middle class public, particularly of color, who cannot afford the 

fights and discovery obstruction of the banks. The Court in this 

case ignored the admission that Wells did not own FHA 

Mortgages and reinstated an FHA instrument just removing the 

FHA protections generally. [R.B. and S.B.] took that in stride 

even though the Court made observations that were offensive 

and just accepted the ever changing word and position of Wells 

Fargo. 

. . . [.]

'The Court is here to hear and decide cases but at every 

turn accepted Wells [sic] version over [R.B. and S.B.]. [R.B. and 

S.B.] knew they were likely to lose the house but they were 

entitled [to] the right to defend. Counsel can't look at individuals 

trying to defend and tell them it is a foregone conclusion. [R.B. 

and S.B.] are entitled [to] their day in Court. Being a man with a 

middleschool [sic] education from the Jim Crow South born to 

the cottonfields of Tennessee he was no stranger to being 

slighted and on the short end of the stick.

. . . [.]

'[R.B. and S.B.] and this Counsel have full respect of the Court 

thought [sic] frankly it appears that it may not run both ways.'

"118. On February 27, 2015, Wells Fargo filed a four-page response in 

opposition to the respondent's motion to alter or amend the judgment. 

"119. On March 10, 2015, the respondent filed a request for an extension of 

time to file a reply to Wells Fargo's response to her motion to alter or amend the court's 
30

judgment dismissing the case. The court denied the respondent's request for extension of 

time to file a reply. 

"120. Thereafter, on March 12, 2015, the respondent filed a five-page motion 

for reconsideration of the court's denial (of the respondent's motion for an extension of 

time to file a reply to Wells Fargo's response to the respondent's motion to alter or amend 

the court's judgment dismissing the case). 

a. In the motion, the respondent insinuated that the court found the 

respondent's advocacy 'distasteful.'

'There has been markedly different treatment between requests 

by this solo counsel and large firm counsel in both cases. An attorney 

with a firm of 50 or more local attorneys and multiple support staff is no 

questions asked, contrary to a disabled solo with no support staff 

providing more details to show cause still less favorable results.'

b. The respondent argued that 'a homeowner should be able to defend his 

homestead without the critical commentary of the Court or under apparent threat.'

The 'threat' that the respondent referenced is unclear to the hearing panel. 

c. In the motion, the respondent also referenced litigation filed by I. Dennis 

Hawver. The respondent implied that the judge was treating the parties 

differently because Mr. Hawver referenced the respondent in litigation.

'The differences might also be attributable to some hostility upon 

possible assumptions. Since this Counsel has recently found out that 

Your Honor has been sued and that somehow my name was provided as 

an example of something the party finds egregious it just casts doubts 

upon the case. I have not read a petition nor do I desire to do so however 

I am not a party and have not participated but know [sic] knowing Your 

Honor is in that case leaves unanswered questions and reservations.'
31

d. In her motion, the respondent quoted Friedrich Nietzsche, a German 

philosopher: 'All things are subject to interpretation. Whichever interpretation 

prevails at a given time is a function of power and not truth.' By including that 

quote in her motion, the respondent implied that the court made its decisions 

based on power not based on truth.

e. Finally, the respondent argued, 'I have no doubt that with a different 

judge [R.B. and S.B.] would have had a different result. As is true any day of the 

week in any of the courts.'

"121. The court denied the motion to reconsider and the motion to alter or 

amend. In denying the motion to reconsider (the motion for extension of time to file a 

reply to the defendants' response to the motion to alter or amend), the court stated, '[t]he 

suggestion that the court has not been accommodating to counsel or bears her any 

personal animosity is completely devoid of any rational basis in fact.'

"122. On August 12, 2014, Wells Fargo filed a motion for sanctions against the 

respondent. Prior to filing the motion to sanctions, counsel for Wells Fargo provided the 

respondent with a copy of the motion, and suggested that the respondent avoid the motion 

by dismissing the suit. The respondent refused to dismiss the lawsuit, comparing the 

litigation to Plessy v. Ferguson.

"123. After the motion for sanctions was filed, the respondent sought repeated 

extensions of time to respond to the motion. On December 22, 2014, the respondent filed 

a response. In the response, the respondent asserted:

'Counsel has extensive mortgage litigation experience 

and even more extensive mortgage industry experience. I have 

consistently sought to have the minimum required standing as 

the party in interest which is under the plain language of the 

statute the owner of the Mortgage, not the Note. Discovery 
32

obstruction and misrepresentations by Ms. Donnelli has [sic] 

been [R.B. and S.B.'s] problem.

'The idea that this Counsel should not be able to hail 

Wells Fargo into court when they knew they had an assignment 

presented to the Tenth Circuit that they failed to provide this 

Court and was known to be contrary to their consent orders and 

also triggered a statutory disclosure which was concealed is the 

motivation for the pleading not an actual articulated Rule 11 

violation. Rather protection and control from known additional 

acts even when there can be no doubt that the underlying claims 

were never disposed of in summary judgment as they were 

always part of another action. 

'Notably, the mantra of Wells that haunted [R.B. and 

S.B.] was attempted to beaddressed [sic] in the Rule 11 notice to 

Ms. Donnelli that sat under an unheard motion for a protective 

order for nearly a year.

'This Court in hindsight can see that the law moves 

favorably for the consumers. Wells is pleading in broad strokes 

but that is not what is required under Rule 11. There is no doubt 

that this specific counsel is a thorn in their side but that is no 

reason for the Court to be duped into allowing signing Counsel 

to stop litigation which is intended to protect consumers and is 

not only supported but definitely where the law has moved. 

. . . [.]

'An interesting perspective for the Court may be to read 

the story of [R.B. and S.B.'s case] using only what Wells 

specifically stated was "uncontroverted" [sic] Exhibit 9 from the 

first page until FN3 on the last page is comprised 100% of the 
33

facts in [R.B. and S.B.'s case] that the parties agreed, specifically 

Wells, agreed were uncontraverted. [sic] Exhibit 10 is a short list 

of the specific support for this statement. The objective facts are 

that we recognize this Court found [R.B.] a "sophisticated 

borrower" so it is a legal reality, but even a "sophisticated 

borrower" can maintain actions pled in this case which were 

always subjects of a different case and not included in the 

summary judgment.

'Even though the legal fact is [R.B.] was sophisticated 

this Counsel can maintain an objective knowledge that [R.B.] 

only had a middle school education in the Jim Crow south and 

was embarrassed in his deposition because he could barely read. 

Should it be now that every individual with a middleschool [sic] 

education is sophisticated and none may maintain actions? I 

don't think this Court intended on that proposition nor would I 

fail to plead for a client with a GED that they have defenses. Nor 

does Rule 11 expect this Counsel to do so. 

'The Court should at least be interested, if not have a 

duty, to look into the conduct of Wells, especially now with this 

"assignment" concealed from this Court during the last [case 

involved R.B. and S.B.] Do we let bully banks run the few 

borrower attorneys out of the courtroom or just the ones who 

have actual industry knowledge and can muster support from 

industry experts. The Court was never aprised, [sic] as the 

situation did not arise, that the "expert" for Wells clearly 

perjured himself during the deposition. [S.B.] was forced to 

watch this however her pure spirit provided express consent to 

release the deposition so that others facing him as an expert 

could benefit from what we had started. In the last instance that 

this Counsel is aware of the contact for that firm advised that he 

left the room in tears after being faced with that deposition. . . .
34

'An attorney should not be forced to ignore what they 

know or be afraid to approach the Court. I admit to being fearful, 

not that what I have pled is wrong or is not supported I have full 

faith that isn't the case, but rather from the harsh reprisals of this 

Court when impacting my reputation with the discovery 

comments which, again with every due respect, were not 

analyzed and contrary to what I expected as a mortgage 

professional for over 15 years prior to the pleading. 

'Given the opportunity to delve into the issues, this 

Counsel strongly believes the Court will come to the realization 

that Wells pulled the wool over his eyes. If that is not the case, it 

is still not a Rule 11 violation to plead these claims which were 

not resolved, which were under court process at a parallel time, 

and which were newly discovered. 

'When deceit abounds this Court cannot ignore that [R.B. 

and S.B.] may maintain a cause of action and should be allowed 

to prove the constructive fraud, [sic]

. . . [.]

'[R.B. and S.B.'s case] continues to discover issues and 

the Court should not be trampling on [R.B. and S.B.'s] graves or 

this Counsel by another harsh remedy without first doing an 

inquiry into these facts and new situations. The Court owes it to 

me to look me in the eyes before rendering more reputational 

damage. 

. . . [.]
35

'All jurists are generally aware that Plessy v. Ferguson

was our Supreme Court establishing well settled "separate but 

equal." It took about 70 years for attorneys to make the headway 

to what we all know as a truism, separate cannot be equal which 

was developed by a series of cases finally now well settled in 

Brown v. Board of Education.

. . . [.]

'Wells uses this motion to chill litigation and Counsel 

uses this motion to avoid inquiry on the issues known to those 

who have watched the national crisis and these facts develop 

over the last 3 years, a fast track of changes in newly emerging 

areas of law. 

'If the Court merely wants to stop litigation for any 

borrowers then the fastest way to do it is more sharp tongued 

commentary or granting this motion. However, this Counsel can 

be beat to the ground but eventually another will stand in my 

place. The Court can take sides now or judicially allow the case 

to proceed and facts to be developed. The issues were bigger 

than [R.B. and S.B.] and they are bigger than these two Counsel 

but no Court should stand by and not take a second look when 

more conflicting documents arise particularly when that specific 

assignment triggered statutory notice if not equitable notice and 

was concealed until presented to another Court for reliance 

which did or may have impacted the ultimate outcome of the 

case.'

"124. On March 18, 2015, the district court considered Wells Fargo's motion 

for sanctions.
36

'In determining whether to assess sanctions, the court 

takes note of the substantial award of attorney fees granted Wells 

Fargo in [10-CV-4141]. However, the award in [10-CV-4141] 

served no punitive purpose. The amount of fees was never 

directly challenged by the plaintiffs. Rather, the court stressed 

that the size of the award was directly proportional to the 

"unbounded aggressive strategy" employed by plaintiffs' actions 

in extensive and needless discovery and meritless legal 

argument. The court further noted that it had been explicitly 

forced to "admonish plaintiff against the repetition of losing 

arguments."

'Rather than taking these repeated admonitions to heart, 

counsel instituted [14-CV-4020], and has never presented any 

colorable rationale why the principle of res judicata would not 

apply. Moreover, none of the considerations recognized in other 

cases as mitigating against an award of sanctions is present here. 

The motion for sanctions is not directed at a pro se litigant, but at 

counsel. There was no intervening court decision which might 

arguable [sic] justify the filing of a second action. The court 

concludes that the filing of [14-CV-4020] was not objectively 

reasonable.

'Amount of Sanctions

'Plaintiffs' response to the Motion for Sanctions wholly 

fails to address the appropriate type or amount of sanctions to be 

imposed in light of the factors recognized in White. The 

response, moreover, fails to even acknowledge the elements of 

res judicata. Indeed, the response mentions the doctrine in a 

single passage, in its conclusion, with plaintiffs suggesting the 

doctrine is irrelevant in [14-CV-4020] because "the claims pled 

were not before the Court" previously in [10-CV-4141]. This 
37

misunderstands res judicata, which as noted in the court's earlier 

Order, applies to claims which were or could have been brought 

in the earlier action. . . . [P]laintiffs' claims in [14-CV-4020] "all 

related in time, space and origin to the relevant facts in [10-CV4141] complaint," and arise "out of the same transaction or series 

of connected transactions," and are consequently barred by res 

judicata.

'No amount of intemperate language can remedy this 

legal flaw. Indeed, counsel's hyperbolic language ("this Counsel 

can be beat to the ground but eventually another will stand in 

my place" and "[t]he issues in [14-CV-4020] were bigger than 

[R.B. and S.B.] and they are bigger than these two Counsel") 

raises the concern that even now counsel fails to understand 

[the] finality of the court's orders, thereby directly highlighting 

the need for some minimum sanction sufficient to deter [another 

lawsuit].'

Concluding that the time to end this litigation was well past, the court granted the motion 

for sanctions and enjoined the respondent from 'filing any future litigation on behalf of 

[R.B. and S.B.] or their estate representatives.'

"125. At the hearing on this matter, Judge Marten testified about the 

respondent's hyperbolic and intemperate language, the injunction, and the sanction 

imposed: 

'Q. You delayed that decision, but over on page 797, you 

raised a concern about what you consider to be 

intemperant [sic] and hyperbolic language. Would you 

explain that, please?
38

'A. Yes. The concerns that I see in—and if I might back up a 

little bit on this, too, one of the lessons that I learned 

pretty early on, and I had some great mentors in this 

respect, were if you take your eye off of what you're 

trying to accomplish, if you get distracted by opposing 

counsel, irritation with them or irritation with the judge, 

you lose your focus on what you're really trying to 

accomplish, and that does not serve your clients well. 

And, so, when I read comments like "this counsel can be 

beat to the ground, but eventually another will stand in 

my place," first of all, it was hard for me to understand 

why that kind of a statement would be made, given the 

conduct of opposing counsel in this case. And in my 

view, and I know it's only mine, but I bent over 

backward, I think, in this case to try to be fair to [R.B. 

and S.B.] and their counsel. And nothing that I said or 

did was intended to beat anybody to the ground at all.

'It was simply to point out, you know, you're 

practicing law, you're in court here, there are certain 

things you have to do, there are certain things that you 

shouldn't do, and keep these things in mind as we go 

along.

'And the finality of the court's orders was one of 

these things. I've told lawyers before, if you're in court to 

do anything or to prove anything other than your case to 

the trier of fact, you're in the wrong place. And there 

may have been some larger claim of conspiracy or some 

thought that Wells Fargo, and it certainly had its share of 

bad press over the past few years with some of the things 

that have happened there, but I never saw anything that 

smacked of anything other than utter good faith on the 
39

part of the defendants in this case. And, frankly, I think 

that [R.B. and S.B.], the parties probably—you know, I 

think most clients are influenced by their counsel, and I 

have no idea what Ms. Huffman was advising them as 

they went along, but it seemed to me, given their 

answers in depositions and so forth, that they were just 

kind of following a lead that was provided to them. And 

I think that the language about beating counsel to the 

ground and somebody else stepping up and taking place 

and that the case being much bigger than [R.B. and 

S.B.], well, for me the case was [R.B. and S.B.] they 

were dealing with and, again, trying to resolve the 

matter. So, I found the language intemperate and 

hyperbolic.

'Q. You indicated you were concerned about whether or not, 

even at that point, Ms. Huffman understood the finality 

of the orders?

'A. Yes.

'Q. So you took what probably is kind of an unusual action 

in this case in terms of a sanction?

'A. I think I have granted sanctions in two cases. One was 

very early on in my career and it was pretty mild. And, 

actually, I thought even this sanction that I imposed 

here, after I asked the Wells Fargo folks to provide their 

time and billing records and so forth to me, was much, 

much lower, obviously, than what they had requested in 

the way of—of sanctions. And, again, it was—I didn't 

want to punish anybody. I simply wanted to make the 

point that we have rules that have to be followed, and 
40

you can only ignore them so many times before it's 

obvious that the message is not getting through. 

'Q. Here you—on page 797 of Exhibit 42 you enjoined Ms. 

Huffman from filing any further litigation on behalf of 

[R.B. and S.B.] or their estate—

'A. Yes.

'Q. —representatives? And I think there was a request from 

Wells Fargo that you do that. 'Um, have you ever done 

that before, enjoining somebody from filing any further 

litigation?

'A. Only one other party, and it was a pro se filer who had 

significant mental health issues, and he was attempting 

to file things like packets of ketchup with the court. And 

he was somebody who would get on his meds and be 

fine, then he'd go off his meds thinking he was fine, and 

he would be back with a paper bag full of papers and 

other items that—that—but I think that this is the only 

other time that I have prohibited or enjoined someone 

from filing a case. And, of course, this was only on 

behalf of [R.B. and S.B.]. It didn't extend beyond that.'

"126. On April 17, 2015, prior to the date the district court determined the 

amount of sanctions, the respondent filed a notice of appeal, appealing eight orders 

entered by the district court to the Tenth Circuit. 

"127. Counsel for Wells Fargo sought $49,907.52 in attorney[']s fees and 

$461.24 in expenses. To ensure that the underlying conduct would not be repeated in the 

future, on June 18, 2015, the court assessed a $5,000 sanction against the respondent. The 

respondent paid the sanction. 
41

"128. In early February, 2016, the respondent attempted to file her opening 

brief. The Tenth Circuit rejected her brief because it was deficient. On February 11, 2016, 

the respondent filed her opening brief. Thereafter, the defendants' filed responsive briefs. 

"129. On March 2, 2017, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the grant 

of summary judgment and the award of sanctions, finding that the respondent's argument 

'made no sense and was hard to follow,' was 'unsupported by the record,' was 'meritless,'

and was 'woefully inadequate.'

"130. On March 16, 2017, respondent petitioned the Tenth Circuit for 

rehearing en banc. On March 28, 2017, the Tenth Circuit denied the motion. 

"131. Wells Fargo paid its attorneys more than $100,000.00 to defend this suit. 

"132. In 2012, Matthew Boddington filed a complaint with the disciplinary 

administrator's office. In Mr. Boddington's complaint, he made a reference to the 

litigation involving R.B. and S.B. Mr. Boddington, however, was not involved in R.B. 

and S.B.'s cases. 

"Conclusions of Law

"133. Based upon the findings of fact, the hearing panel unanimously 

concludes as a matter of law that the respondent violated KRPC 1.1 (competence), KRPC 

3.1 (meritorious claims), KRPC 3.3 (candor to the tribunal), KRPC 3.5 (impartiality and 

decorum of the tribunal), KRPC 8.2 (judicial and legal officials), and KRPC 8.4 

(professional misconduct), as detailed below.

"134. The hearing panel also concludes that the disciplinary administrator did 

not present clear and convincing evidence that the respondent violated KRPC 3.2 

(expediting litigation) and KRPC 3.4 (fairness to opposing counsel). The allegations that 

the respondent violated KRPC 3.2 and KRPC 3.4 are dismissed.
42

"135. The hearing panel concludes that the allegations that the respondent 

violated KRPC 3.3 (candor to the tribunal) for making false and disparaging statements 

regarding Judge Marten constitute violations of KRPC 3.5 (impartiality and decorum of 

the tribunal) rather than KRPC 3.3. Accordingly, the allegations that the respondent 

violated KRPC 3.3 are dismissed.

"136. Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 202 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 

'A certificate of a conviction of an attorney for any crime 

or of a civil judgment based on clear and convincing evidence 

shall be conclusive evidence of the commission of that crime or 

civil wrong in any disciplinary proceeding instituted against said 

attorney based upon the conviction or judgment. . . . All other 

civil judgments shall be prima facie evidence of the findings 

made therein and shall raise a presumption as to their validity. 

The burden shall be on the respondent to disprove the findings 

made in the civil judgment.'

The disciplinary administrator relies on orders, judgments, and opinions of the United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 

the Shawnee County District Court, and the Kansas Court of Appeals. Under Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 

202, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent failed to disprove the findings made in the 

civil judgments and, as a result, the hearing panel accepts the orders, judgments, and opinions 

entered into the underlying civil cases.

"KRPC 1.1

"137. Lawyers must provide competent representation to their clients. KRPC

1.1. 'Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 

preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.' Id. The hearing panel 

acknowledges that the respondent is experienced in the field of mortgage lending and 
43

represented her clients as a zealous advocate. However, the respondent's experience in 

mortgage lending, is not tantamount to competence as a mortgage litigator.

"138. The hearing panel concludes that the respondent failed to provide 

competent representation to R.B. and S.B. when she failed to offer to settle the case by 

seeking to have her clients close on a mortgage under the terms negotiated in 2009. 

"139. The hearing panel also concludes that the respondent lacked the ability to 

understand when she had a losing case. She failed to recognize how to resolve the case to 

her clients' benefit.

"140. Further the following instances, taken together also establish the 

respondent's lack of competence as a litigator: 

a. The respondent failed to timely file two motions: (1) a 

motion to reconsider the magistrate judge's order allowing removal to 

federal court and (2) a motion to reconsider the magistrate judge's order 

allowing Wells Fargo to intervene. The respondent filed the two motions 

more than four months after the order, rather than within 14 days as 

required by the court rules. 

b. The respondent alleged that the federal court lacked 

jurisdiction over MERS. The respondent failed to recognize that the 

requirements of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was satisfied. 

c. In 10-CV-4141, the respondent filed an amended 

petition without seeking leave of court to do so. Additionally, in 14-CV4020, the respondent filed an amended petition and a motion to substitute 

the amended petition with a second amended petition, again, without 

seeking leave of court to do so. 

d. The respondent failed to properly plead claims in a 

petition; rather, the respondent simply made conclusory assertions. 
44

e. The respondent included claims in her petitions and 

amended petitions that were well outside the statute of limitations. 

f. The respondent did not adequately explain to her clients 

who they filed suit against; or conversely, the respondent failed to file 

suit against the party which her clients intended her to sue. 

g. The respondent included claims for conversion in the 

petitions and amended petitions. Conversion is the unauthorized exercise 

of dominion and control of goods or personal chattels. The causes of 

action did not involve goods or personal chattels. 

h. Before the Tenth Circuit and in her representation of 

herself in the instant case, the respondent relied on and presented 

documents which she referred to as uncontroverted facts as evidence. 

The documents, however, appear to be the respondent's work-product 

rather. A summary of facts assembled by the respondent is not evidence 

of the facts. 

i. The respondent failed to provide Exhibit A-H53 in its 

entirety in response to the Tenth Circuit's request for evidence of 

communications between Wells Fargo and the plaintiffs regarding 

closing. 

j. The respondent filed an answer and counterclaim, a 

motion to amend, and an amended answer and counterclaim in a case 

which she knew had previously been dismissed. Further, after the parties 

briefed the issue for the court, the respondent filed a second motion to 

amend. 

k. The respondent twice filed a premature notice of appeal. 
45

l. The respondent filed the cause of action which later 

became 14-CV-4020 even though it was clearly barred by res judicata. 

Based on the respondent's filings, it is clear that she does not understand 

the legal principle of res judicata. 

m. The respondent filed a motion to alter or amend the 

judgment after the judge dismissed the case. The respondent based her 

motion on Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56 provides the 

procedures required to file a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. 

Pro. 56 is not relevant to consider in ruling on a motion to alter or amend 

the order granting a motion to dismiss. 

n. The respondent filed a motion to alter or amend a 

judgment, not because there was a mistake in the facts or law, but simply 

to get a second chance for a favorable ruling. Motions to alter or amend 

are proper only for occasions when there is a mistake in the facts or in 

the law or when there is newly discovered evidence. 

o. The respondent failed to properly cite to the record in 

her briefs before the Tenth Circuit. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit was 

unable to understand the respondent's arguments and the respondent's 

arguments 'made no sense and was hard to follow,' was 'unsupported by 

the record,' was 'meritless,' and was 'woefully inadequate.'

The hearing panel concludes that her failure to offer to settle the case by obtaining the refinance 

mortgage her clients sought and her failure to recognize that she had a losing case, coupled with 

the additionally specific instances where the respondent failed to provide R.B. and S.B. with 

competent representation, violate KRPC 1.1.

"KRPC 3.1

"141. Attorneys are prohibited from bringing or defending a proceeding unless 

there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous. KRPC 3.1. While 10-CV-4141 was on 
46

appeal with the Tenth Circuit, the respondent initiated another lawsuit in Shawnee 

County District Court based on the same set of facts. That case was removed to federal 

court and became 14-CV-4020. The district court held, and the hearing panel agrees, that 

it was not objectively reasonable for the respondent to bring what became 14-CV-4020. 

The hearing panel concludes that there was no basis to bring suit against Wells Fargo in 

Shawnee County District Court, in what later became 14-CV-4020.

"142. In the foreclosure case, the respondent filed an answer and counterclaim, 

a motion to amend, and an amended answer and counterclaim after the foreclosure case 

had been dismissed by the Shawnee County District Court. Then, after the parties briefed 

whether the action was still alive but before the court ruled, the respondent filed a second 

motion to amend the petition. The hearing panel concludes that there was no basis for 

filing the answer and counterclaim, the motion to amend, the amended answer and 

counterclaim, and the second motion to amend because the case had been dismissed.

"143. Additionally, throughout the litigation, the respondent repeatedly filed 

motions seeking reconsideration of matters which had been fully considered. The district 

court repeatedly admonished the respondent to refrain from doing so. Despite the district 

court's repeated admonitions, the respondent continued to relitigate matters which had 

been previously fully addressed. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent 

violated KRPC 3.1.

"KRPC 3.5 and KRPC 8.2

"144. KRPC 3.5 prohibits attorneys from engaging 'in undignified or 

discourteous conduct degrading to a tribunal.' KRPC 3.5(d). Additionally, '[a] lawyer 

shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as 

to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge.' KRPC 8.2(a).

"145. The respondent engaged in undignified and discourteous conduct 

degrading to a tribunal and the respondent made statement[s] that she knew to be false or 

with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of the statements when she made 

statements about Judge Marten that had no basis in fact. The hearing panel concludes that 
47

the degrading statements, detailed below, were made with reckless disregard to the truth 

or falsity of the statements, in violation of KRPC 3.5(d) and KRPC 8.2(a).

a. The respondent recklessly made false statements of material fact to 

the district court in her motion to alter or amend when she (1) falsely 

alleged that the judge relied on assumptions not supported by the 

record, (2) falsely accused the judge of turning a blind eye to 

problems in the case, (3) falsely accused the judge of making rulings 

based on judicial economy or to protect the defendants from the 

plaintiffs, (4) falsely accused the judge of racial discrimination, (5) 

falsely accused the judge of accepting the defendants' statements 

while discounting the plaintiffs' statements, and (6) falsely stating 

that the judge was putting R.B. on the short end of the stick.

b. The respondent also recklessly made false statements of material fact 

to the district court in her motion for reconsideration (of the court's 

denial of the respondent's motion for an extension of time to file a 

reply to Wells Fargo's response to the respondent's motion to alter or 

amend the court's judgment) when she (1) falsely accused the judge 

of treating her differently than opposing counsel when she is a solo 

disabled attorney, (2) falsely accused the judge of treating her 

differently than opposing counsel because Mr. Hawver referenced 

the respondent in litigation, (3) falsely implied that the court made its 

decisions based on power rather than truth, and (4) without a 

reasonable basis, speculated that her clients would have received 

different results with a different judge.

Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 3.5.

"KRPC 8.4

"146. 'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that 

is prejudicial to the administration of justice.' KRPC 8.4(d). The respondent engaged in 
48

conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice when she repeatedly 

attempted to relitigate issues fully considered. Judge Marten hit the nail on the head when 

he said:

'. . . I admire vigorous lawyers. I admire lawyers who are willing to go to the 

mat for their clients, and I have never penalized, ever, a lawyer for doing that. I 

think that's what they're supposed to do, but it also has to be done within the 

context of our system. 

'You know, I've often said that if everybody just kind of did what they 

were supposed to, we wouldn't need rules at all, . . . And a lot of these rules that 

we've put in place over the years are just as a result of either abuses or 

perceived abuses of the process. And it grieves me, frankly, to be here today 

with Ms. Huffman because I think that she honestly was doing the very, very 

best job that she could for [R.B. and S.B.], but I also think there's got to be a 

certain amount of judgment that's involved in the decisions that you make about 

when do you finally say, okay, I understand there's no place else to go with this. 

And that is not what happened in this case with Ms. Huffman. 

'And when you say these have been decided, the circuits affirmed it, 

don't bring anymore. And this, of course, was before the circuit affirmation, but 

don't bring anymore of these. We've been through that, they've been decided, 

let's move on to the next thing and advance the litigation. And when they—

when you have these kinds of discovery matters from [the first case] raised in a 

purported amended complaint in [the second case], it does fly in the face of the 

prior rulings, and the reconsideration motions, and all of the other things that 

we had looked at in relation to [the first case]. 

'So, yes, I—I—I consider that to be a violation of the earlier 

admonitions not to revisit these matters again, . . . I felt this was a violation of 

those orders.'
49

Ultimately, the court ordered the respondent to pay a sanction in the amount of $5,000 

and enjoined the respondent from filing . . . suit on behalf of the estates of R.B. and S.B. 

in the future. The hearing panel concludes that the respondent's conduct in this regard 

amounts to a violation of KRPC 8.4(d).

"147. Further, the respondent's false statements regarding the judge's integrity 

referenced in ¶ 145 above also amount to professional misconduct that is prejudicial to 

the administration of justice. Thus, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent 

violated KRPC 8.4(d).

"American Bar Association

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

"148. In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel 

considered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for 

Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors 

to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual 

injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating 

factors.

"149. Duty Violated. The respondent violated her duty to her clients by failing 

to provide competent representation. The respondent also violated her duty to the public, 

the legal system, and the legal professional [sic] by failing to maintain her personal 

integrity. Finally, the respondent violated her duty to the legal system and the legal 

profession by engaging in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice.

"150. Mental State. The respondent knowingly violated her duties to her 

clients, the public, the legal system, and legal profession. While the respondent engaged 

in knowing misconduct, it is important to know that the respondent engaged in the 

misconduct in a crusade to defend clients she believed were being crushed by a mortgage 

company; not in a scheme designed to benefit the respondent financially.
50

"151. Injury. As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent caused 

actual harm to her clients, to the legal system, and the legal profession. R.B. and S.B.'s 

final years were spent in unnecessary litigation. The respondent's misconduct resulted in 

a court order requiring R.B. and S.B. to pay nearly $300,000 in attorney[']s fees and 

expenses. The respondent filed unnecessary petitions seeking court review of the same 

issues over and over again resulting in the waste of judicial time and resources. Finally, 

the conduct of the respondent by including false statements regarding a federal judge in 

court documents brings disrepute to the legal profession.

"Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

"152. Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 

justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 

recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 

aggravating factors present:

a. A Pattern of Misconduct. The respondent engaged in a 

pattern of misconduct by failing to provide competent representation to 

R.B. and S.B. throughout the litigation. Additionally, the respondent 

engaged in a pattern of misconduct when she repeatedly asserted the 

same claims and repeatedly sought reconsideration of matters already 

ruled on despite multiple admonitions by the court. Finally, the 

respondent engaged in a pattern [of] reckless conduct regarding the 

discourteous statements made regarding the judge's integrity. As such, 

the hearing panel concludes that the respondent engaged in patterns of 

misconduct.

b. Multiple Offenses. The respondent committed multiple 

rule violations. The respondent violated KRPC 1.1 (competence), KRPC 

3.1 (meritorious claims), KRPC 3.5 (impartiality and decorum of the 

tribunal), KRPC 8.2 (judicial and legal officials), and KRPC 8.4 

(professional misconduct). Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that 

the respondent committed multiple offenses.
51

c. Refusal to Acknowledge Wrongful Nature of Conduct.

The respondent has refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of her 

conduct. In her closing argument, the respondent argued that she did not 

violate any rules. The respondent came close to admitting that she 

violated KRPC 8.2 when she stated in closing argument:

'. . . And I would say as to 8.2, I own it. Frankly, I don't 

think I made any false statements. I infer that someone 

believes that I've said that the Judge was biased against 

my client, . . .'

The hearing panel is concerned, that at this late date, the respondent just 

does not seem to 'get it.' She is either unwilling or unable to acknowledge 

that what she did [in] this case—repeatedly filing lawsuits when the 

issues had already been resolved and by making false and disparaging 

statements about a judge—violates the Kansas Rules of Professional 

Conduct. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent 

refused and continues to refuse to acknowledge the wrongful nature of 

her conduct.

d. Vulnerability of Victim. R.B. and S.B. were vulnerable to 

the respondent's misconduct. Much has been made regarding R.B. and 

S.B.'s level of sophistication. On the one hand, R.B. obtained a mortgage 

in 2008 and should have been familiar with what was required to 

refinance the mortgage six months later. On the other hand, R.B.'s 

education was limited to middle school and, it appears, prior to 2008, he 

had not obtained a mortgage. Regardless of whether R.B. and S.B. were 

sophisticated or not, they relied on the respondent. They believed that 

they had filed suit against Wells Fargo in 10-CV-4141, when they had 

not. The litigation approach was driven by the respondent, rather than by 

R.B. and S.B. Based on the respondent's approach to the litigation, R.B. 

and S.B. were ordered to pay nearly $300,000 in attorney[']s fees and 
52

expenses. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that R.B. and S.B. 

were vulnerable to the respondent's misconduct.

"153. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 

justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 

recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 

mitigating circumstances present:

a. Absence of a Prior Disciplinary Record. The respondent 

has not previously been disciplined.

b. Personal or Emotional Problems if Such Misfortunes 

Have Contributed to Violation of the Kansas Rules of Professional 

Conduct. In 2011, the respondent was in a serious car accident. As a 

result, she suffered a traumatic brain injury. The effects of the traumatic 

brain injury are ongoing. Additionally, as a result of the accident, the 

respondent suffers from depression. The ramifications of the accident 

contributed to her misconduct. The respondent summarized her 

difficulties in her argument regarding factors in mitigation:

'The meat of the discovery all occurred within a month 

after the accident, prior to being put on brain rest and before the 

first anniversary of the accident. Although I came up with 

significant legal theories on abstention doctrines and was 

learning through a first run on some of the mortgage transfer 

issues, I was struggling more than anyone (including myself) 

was aware. I'm sure I did re-run some arguments because even 

now I can be a bit circular, long-winded, and repetitive however 

that was much more in the past. The chart I made was not just 

for the court, it was to keep the claims straight for myself.'

c. Inexperience in the Practice of Law. The Kansas 

Supreme Court admitted the respondent to the practice of law in 2010. 
53

The respondent's misconduct began shortly after her admission to the 

practice of law. The respondent's inexperience in the practice of law 

mitigates her misconduct. Further, the respondent stated during the 

hearing that '[h]ow [she] handled [the cases] would not be how [she] 

would handle them now.'

d. Previous Good Character and Reputation in the 

Community Including Any Letters from Clients, Friends and Lawyers in 

Support of the Character and General Reputation of the Attorney. The 

respondent is a member of the bar of Oskaloosa, Kansas. The respondent 

presented evidence from S.B., Larry Rute, A.W. Pickel, David C. Kirk, 

Alexandria S. Belveal, and A.S., in support of her good character. 

Additionally, the respondent presented additional evidence of her good 

character.

e. Imposition of Other Penalties or Sanctions. The court 

sanctioned the respondent $5,000 in the second federal suit. The 

respondent paid the sanction. The hearing panel concludes that the 

respondent experienced another sanction for her misconduct.

"154. In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly 

examined and considered the following Standards:

'4.52 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer 

engages in an area of practice in which the lawyer knows he or she is not 

competent, and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

'4.53 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer:

'(a) demonstrates failure to understand relevant legal 

doctrines or procedures and causes injury or potential injury to a 

client; or [. . .]'
54

'5.11 Disbarment is generally appropriate when:

. . . [.]

'(b) a lawyer engages in any other intentional 

conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation 

that serious[ly] adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to 

practice.'

'5.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer 

knowingly engages in any other conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, 

deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer's 

fitness to practice law.

'6.12 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer 

knows that false statements or documents are being submitted to the 

court or that material information is improperly being withheld, and 

takes no remedial action, and causes injury or potential injury to a party 

to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially adverse effect 

on the legal proceeding.

'6.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is 

negligent either in determining whether statements or documents are 

false or in taking remedial action when material information is being 

withheld, and causes injury or potential injury to a party to the legal 

proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially adverse effect on the 

legal proceeding.

'6.21 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer 

knowingly violates a court order or rule with the intent to obtain a benefit 

for the lawyer or another, and causes serious injury or potentially serious 

injury to a party, or causes serious or potentially serious interference with 

a legal proceeding.
55

'6.22 Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly 

violates a court order or rule, and there is injury or potential injury to a 

client or a party, or interference or potential interference with a legal 

proceeding.'

'7.1 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer 

knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a 

professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, 

and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client, the public, or 

the legal system.

'7.2 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer 

knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a 

professional, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, 

or the legal system.'

"Recommendation of the Parties

"155. The disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent's 

license to practice law be indefinitely suspended.

"156. The respondent recommended that she receive a private admonition and 

'time served.' In her mitigation factors document, the respondent stated:

'Anything the panel feels I have done has been paid for 

in spades with over six years of the process which continues. I 

feel that it is time to show mercy and that any punishment has 

been served during this long process. I've been humiliated 

enough. I was sanctioned by the same Judge, who despite being 

aware of everything before the panel did not turn this conduct 

over. He felt $5,000.00 was sufficient and I paid it (not my 

clients of course).
56

'Additionally, the time itself is much harder on me 

because of my limits and the issues I deal with from the accident. 

I feel that I've suffered enough embarrassment and will always 

have the case thrown in my face as a favorite from select 

members of the lender's bar. There is certainly nothing more I 

can do about it now. I already buried my clients. By my 

recollection, I was told there is a time to stop by someone during 

the hearings. I am hopeful the panel can see fit to handle this in 

the same manner and let this stop now with some private 

admonishment as there is no more that I can do.'

"Recommendations of a Majority of the Hearing Panel

"157. Based upon the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the Standards 

listed above, a majority of the hearing panel recommends that the respondent be censured 

and the censure be published in the Kansas Reports.

"158. Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified by 

the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator."

One panel member dissented from the panel majority's discipline recommendation, 

arguing instead that Huffman should receive a 90-day suspension.

OBJECTION TO RESPONDENT'S RULE 6.09 LETTER

Just four days before oral argument, Huffman filed a letter of additional authority, 

citing as authority for this filing Supreme Court Rule 6.09 (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 40). 

But this rule prohibits submitting additional authority less than 14 days before oral 

argument. The only exception to the deadline is to address additional authority published 

or filed less than 14 days before oral argument. This exception does not apply. Also, 
57

Huffman's letter violated Supreme Court Rule 6.09(b), which limits letters of additional 

authority to 350 words.

The Disciplinary Administrator's office filed an objection to any consideration of 

this letter of additional authority. We sustain that objection.

RESPONDENT'S POST-HEARING MOTION FOR VIDEO PRESENTATION

After the hearing before this court, Huffman filed a "Motion to Allow Video 

Presentation of the Case Strategy with the Timeline" apparently to supplement her oral 

arguments relating to what she describes as "the strategy" of the underlying litigation

giving rise to the disciplinary complaint. She suggests this video supplementation should 

be viewed as a disability accommodation. She also appears to request an order "that time 

be taken to allow conference between both presenting Counsel as to some facts presented 

by [the] prosecution." The Disciplinary Administrator's office filed a response asking us 

to deny the motion, noting the court's appellate practice rules make no provision for 

supplementation in this fashion and further arguing supplementation is unnecessary. We 

agree with the Disciplinary Administrator's office.

Huffman's primary opportunity to present details relating to her litigation strategy

and its arguable impact on the disciplinary counts against her was before the panel. The 

record reflects she did that, and we have reviewed the record in its entirety. In addition, at 

oral arguments before this court, the court was free to explore with both counsel the role 

the underlying litigation had on the issues presented. Put simply, there is no need for 

supplementation of the oral arguments. We deny the motion.
58

DISCUSSION

In a disciplinary proceeding, the court considers the evidence, the panel's findings, 

and the parties' arguments and determines whether KRPC violations exist and, if they do, 

what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct must be established by clear and 

convincing evidence. In re Hodge, 307 Kan. 170, 209, 407 P.3d 613 (2017); Supreme 

Court Rule 226(a)(1)(A) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 281). Clear and convincing evidence is 

evidence that causes the fact-finder to believe that the truth of the facts asserted is highly 

probable. In re Murphy, 312 Kan. 203, 218, 473 P.3d 886 (2020).

A finding is considered admitted if exception is not taken. When exception is 

taken, the finding is typically not deemed admitted so the court must determine whether it 

is supported by clear and convincing evidence. Hodge, 307 Kan. at 209-10. If so, the 

finding will not be disturbed. The court does not reweigh conflicting evidence, assess 

witness credibility, or redetermine questions of fact when undertaking its factual analysis. 

In re Hawver, 300 Kan. 1023, 1038, 339 P.3d 573 (2014).

Huffman was given adequate notice of the formal complaint to which she filed an 

answer. She was also given adequate notice of the hearing before the panel and the 

hearing before this court. She appeared at both proceedings. She filed exceptions to the 

final hearing report. Regarding the portions of the panel report quoted above, Huffman 

took exception to:

• paragraphs 47-57, 59, 61, 63-65, 67, and 70-82 of the panel's factual 

findings, which span hearing report paragraphs 46-132;

• paragraphs 135-47 of the panel's legal conclusions, which span hearing 

report paragraphs 133-47; and
59

• paragraphs 152 and 153 of the panel's analysis of aggravating and 

mitigating factors, which span hearing report paragraphs 152-56.

Huffman made a general exception to the entire hearing report claiming that "no 

quotes in testimony from witnesses other than the prosecution appear" and "the lack of 

defense witnesses and exhibits being considered." Within her exceptions to the panel's 

analysis of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, she listed several general 

exceptions stating perceived deficiencies in that analysis. She also took exception to both 

the panel majority's discipline recommendation and to the dissenting opinion.

The Disciplinary Administrator's office argues Huffman waived any exceptions to 

paragraphs 88-132 of the panel report because she did not designate those exceptions 

with specificity. It also argues she failed to brief many exceptions, so they should be 

considered waived or abandoned. Finally, it notes several facts she argues without 

supporting record citations and urges us to presume all un-keyed facts lack support. We 

agree.

Huffman's failure to take exception to paragraphs 88-132 renders those factual 

statements admitted. A respondent must advance arguments in their brief to support any 

exceptions, or they are deemed waived or abandoned. Murphy, 312 Kan. at 219. The brief 

must also support the exceptions with appropriate record citations. See In re Bishop, 285 

Kan. 1097, 1106, 179 P.3d 1096 (2008) ("Here, although Bishop filed a brief, he does not 

advance his arguments or provide any citation to the record to support his exceptions. 

We, therefore, deem all exceptions abandoned except for the two he preserved in his 

brief."). That said, the panel's factual findings appear largely unchallenged in Huffman's 

opening brief. She seems focused on additional facts she believes the panel ignored in 

finding KRPC violations.
60

Keeping Huffman's exceptions in mind, we consider two overarching issues: (1) 

whether clear and convincing evidence supports the panel's conclusions that she violated 

KRPC 1.1, 3.1, 3.5, 8.2, and 8.4; and (2) the appropriate discipline.

Clear and convincing evidence supports some of the panel's conclusions.

A. The KRPC 1.1 violation

KRPC 1.1 requires that "[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a 

client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 

preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." The hearing panel concluded 

Huffman violated KRPC 1.1 in three ways: (1) she failed to seek settlement of her 

clients' claims for the terms of the un-consummated 2009 refinancing; (2) she failed to 

recognize how to resolve the case for her clients' benefit; and (3) she failed to understand

relevant legal concepts that in the panel's view collectively demonstrated her "lack of 

competence as a litigator" resulting in multiple deficiencies in her pleadings.

As to the first and second items, Huffman argues the panel disregarded her witness 

Larry Rute's testimony establishing "settlement is something [she] engages in," and the 

fact Wells Fargo never offered to settle on the terms the panel believed she should have 

sought. The Disciplinary Administrator's office counters that this testimony is irrelevant, 

noting Rute was unfamiliar with the litigation at issue. It also contends the arguments 

about Wells Fargo's failure are abandoned because they are not supported by authority or 

irrelevant because the burden always remained on Huffman to try to achieve her clients' 

goals. We agree with this characterization of Rute's testimony.

During his direct examination, Rute agreed with Huffman that he recalled her 

"attending a mediation with [him] and settling cases . . . ." He also said she understood 

concepts of best and worst-case scenarios and "bracketing" as they pertain to monetary 
61

settlement negotiations. But on cross-examination he admitted he had not read the 

complaint in this case and did not have any knowledge about the underlying mortgage 

litigation.

Nevertheless, a majority of the court holds the facts do not support a conclusion 

that Huffman violated KRPC 1.1 by not pursuing settlement on the 2009 refinancing 

terms or by otherwise failing to resolve the case for her clients' benefit. The panel's 

factual findings reflect Huffman offered to settle for $750,000 plus a release of R.B. and 

S.B.'s mortgage, based on her valuation of the KCPA and tort claims she pled in her 

petition. And Huffman argues her clients consented to an aggressive posture during 

settlement, and there is no testimony from them to the contrary.

In the legal malpractice context, it has been recognized that "the necessity for an 

attorney's use of ordinary skill and knowledge extends to the conduct of settlement 

negotiations." Rizzo v. Haines, 520 Pa. 484, 499, 555 A.2d 58 (1989). "Attorneys are 

supposed to know the likelihood of success for the types of cases they handle and they 

are supposed to know the range of possible awards in those cases." Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 

128 N.J. 250, 263, 607 A.2d 1298 (1992). But settlement negotiations are difficult to 

orchestrate to a mutually acceptable result, particularly within the constraints of the 

clients' willingness to compromise. The majority here concludes the facts fail to show by 

clear and convincing evidence that Huffman did not employ the requisite skill and 

knowledge in failing to resolve the mortgage litigation under the circumstances. A 

minority of the court would have found a violation. 

Moving to the panel's conclusion that the specific deficiencies it identified 

demonstrated Huffman's incompetence as a litigator, we hold they are supported by clear 

and convincing evidence. She argues the panel ignored evidence that she still had 

discovery requests pending when summary judgment was granted in the first federal 
62

lawsuit. And Issue I of her brief argues the panel erred by disregarding evidence of her 

attendance at a "Max Gardner Boot Camp" and use of discovery materials from that 

training, and her consultation with the Kansas Attorney General's Office on consumer 

protection issues.

In addition, in Issue III of her brief, she argues that "EMERGING AREA

SPECIFIC CASE LAW . . . DEVELOPMENTS THAT SUPPORT" her positions. And 

she notes the panel did not discuss her assertion that the foreclosure would not have 

occurred under new federal protections for homeowners enacted in 2014 or "discussed 

. . . what arguments [she] missed that could have saved [her clients'] home." She contends 

she unfortunately—but not unethically—lost on her theories concerning the "Torrens 

Land System of caveats" not being recognized by Kansas law and her theory that the 

KCPA applied to financial communications. She views discipline as "unjust" under these 

circumstances and claims she had no professional guidance about how to handle them

because she was the "first one[] through [the] wall" on the issues she raised.

But these arguments are irrelevant as to whether the activity the panel cited 

violated Rule 1.1 because it found her methods to be improper. And "[c]ompetent 

handling of a particular matter includes . . . use of methods and procedures meeting the 

standards of competent practitioners." KRPC 1.1, Comment 5 (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 

328); see, e.g., In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 727, 188 P.3d 1 (2008) ("The repeated failure 

to timely respond to discovery requests, court orders, and dispositive motions is clear 

evidence of incompetence."); In re Romious, 291 Kan. 300, 308, 312, 240 P.3d 945 

(2010) (KRPC 1.1 violated when attorney filed motion seeking judge's recusal that lacked 

factual allegations).

The panel's facts show Huffman did not competently handle the litigation. She

consistently filed late pleadings; failed to follow rules governing the pleadings 
63

amendment; failed to follow rules governing the form and content of appellate briefs; 

failed to abide by court admonishments to stop raising issues already resolved; failed to 

supply documents requested by the court; filed clearly meritless claims; did not 

understand the legal concept of res judicata; and made arguments to the Tenth Circuit 

Court of Appeals that were "woefully inadequate," were "meritless," "made no sense and 

[were] hard to follow," and were "unsupported by the record." And even if her underlying 

claims had merit, this conduct still violated KRPC 1.1.

B. The KRPC 3.1 violation

KRPC 3.1 provides,

"A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue 

therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good 

faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the 

defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in 

incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element 

of the case be established."

The panel referenced several reasons why it concluded Huffman violated KRPC 

3.1. Those were: she launched a new Shawnee County lawsuit based on the same facts as 

the case then pending on appeal in 10-CV-4141, which was ultimately removed to federal 

court and dismissed as res judicata; she filed responsive pleadings and amended 

responsive pleadings in Wells Fargo's Shawnee County foreclosure action after the court 

dismissed the case; and she repeatedly sought reconsideration of previously decided 

matters throughout the litigation despite the court's admonishments to stop. Substantial 

competent evidence supports these facts.
64

Huffman argues mainly that she had a good-faith belief in her claims' merits. She 

contends there was nothing harassing about defending a constitutionally protected 

homestead; that her position—apparently about robo-signing—tracked the positions of 

"49 Attorney Generals"; and that whether a position is meritorious should not be a "win 

or lose" determination. She also argues the panel ignored changes in the legal landscape 

during the litigation. And she broadly challenges the panel's citation to Kansas Supreme 

Court Rule 202 (2019 Kan. S. Ct. R. 239), repealed January 1, 2021, and replaced in part 

by Kansas Supreme Court Rule 220 (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 275). But she does not 

support her Rule 202 reference with pertinent authority.

Again, Huffman's focus in all these arguments is misplaced. 

"The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the 

client's cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal procedure. The law, both procedural and 

substantive, establishes the limits within which an advocate may proceed. However, the 

law is not always clear and never is static. Accordingly, in determining the proper scope 

of advocacy, account must be taken of the law's ambiguities and potential for change." 

KRPC 3.1, Comment 1 (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 390).

Huffman's arguments concentrate on what she views as shifting legal grounds 

underpinning her claims, but she does not address the crux of the panel's misconduct 

conclusion that her conduct was outside relevant procedural and substantive limits. For 

example, the panel concluded she violated KRPC 3.1 by filing a new Shawnee County 

lawsuit while the federal appeal was pending in the first case, which arose out of the 

same facts and largely raising the same claims. Huffman alludes to receiving 

"permission" from Shawnee County District Judge Franklin Theis to file this second suit 

but does not address the overriding problem that it was meritless because those claims 

were barred by res judicata. See Dennis, 286 Kan. at 732-33 (holding violation of KRPC 
65

3.1 established by clear and convincing evidence when rational fact-finder could 

conclude it was highly probable attorney filed a frivolous lawsuit).

And Huffman's focus on consumer protection issues and lender protection 

provides no cover for her decision to assert several other claims, for example, that MERS 

"converted" R.B. and S.B.'s "chain of title." Indeed, her frivolous motions alone supply 

an adequate basis for a KRPC 3.1 violation, even without considering the relative merits 

of the claims advanced in the underlying litigation. See In re Blume, 309 Kan. 1313, 

1322, 1334, 443 P.3d 305 (2019) (holding attorney violated KRPC 3.1 by filing a 

"frivolous motion to set aside" a judgment that "'contained "a tangled web of some 

irrelevant ramblings and vagaries"'").

We hold clear and convincing evidence supports the panel's conclusion that 

Huffman violated KRPC 3.1.

C. The KRPC 3.5(d) and 8.2(a) violations

Huffman next argues KRPC 3.5(d) is unconstitutionally vague and suggests its 

application, along with KRPC 8.2(a), infringes on her rights to free speech under the First 

Amendment to the United States Constitution and section 11 of the Kansas Constitution 

Bill of Rights. She also contends the evidence failed to prove she violated KRPC 3.5 and 

KRPC 8.2 because it did not establish her comments about Judge Marten were knowingly 

or recklessly false.

The vagueness challenge is easily disposed of. Our precedent is clear that a 

respondent in a disciplinary action must either raise an issue before the panel or explain 

why it is properly before the court if raised for the first time on appeal.
66

"[Kansas Supreme Court] Rule 6.02 sets out the requirements for filing an 

appellant's brief. In subparagraph (a)(5), it requires that '[i]f the issue was not raised 

below, there must be an explanation why the issue is properly before the court.' Although 

this rule applies to an 'appellant,' it is incorporated into disciplinary proceedings in this 

court through Kansas Supreme Court Rule 212 if a respondent has filed exceptions.

"Rule 212(e)(3) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 257) requires a disciplinary respondent to 

file a brief, sets forth the timeframe for doing so, and states: 'The briefs shall be of such 

number and form and be served in such manner as is provided by the rules relating to 

appeals in civil actions.' (Emphasis added.) Rule 6.02 specifies the form for Crandall's 

brief, and it required him to explain why the constitutional issue was properly before the 

court even though he had not raised it before the hearing panel. . . . 

"Our caselaw makes clear that respondents in disciplinary cases must comply 

with Rule 6.02. We could cite a long line of cases in which this court has enforced Rule 

6.02 when disciplinary respondents have filed briefs that do not comply with its 

requirements but note only a few to illustrate. See, e.g., Hawver, 300 Kan. at 1048 

('document attached to Hawver's brief is not properly before this court because it is not 

part of the record' as required by Rule 6.02[b]'); Dennis, 286 Kan. at 723 (faulting 

respondent's brief because it contained neither a statement of facts nor specific citations 

to the record on appeal as required by Rule 6.02[d] [2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 37])." In re 

Crandall, 308 Kan. 1526, 1541-42, 430 P.3d 902 (2018).

In Crandall, the court held the respondent in an attorney discipline proceeding 

abandoned his First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to KRPC 8.5 (2018 Kan. S. 

Ct. R. 382) and Kansas Supreme Court Rule 201 (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 233) when he 

failed to make the arguments before the panel and failed "to comply with Rule 

6.02(a)(5)'s requirement that he explain why [the court] should consider his constitutional 

arguments when they are raised for the first time in his brief in this court." 308 Kan. at 

1542.
67

Huffman's response brief does not challenge the Disciplinary Administrator's 

representation that she failed to raise the constitutional question before the panel. And her 

opening brief does not contain any explanation why the court should still consider the 

constitutional argument raised for the first time. Her response brief contains an 

explanation, but only by arguing she should not have to comply with the requirement.

Neither brief cites or discusses Rule 6.02 (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 35) or relevant caselaw.

As to the merits of the rule violations, under KRPC 3.5(d) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 

396), "[a] lawyer shall not . . . engage in undignified or discourteous conduct degrading 

to a tribunal." And under KRPC 8.2(a) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 432), "[a] lawyer shall not 

make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its 

truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge . . . ."

The panel concluded Huffman violated both rules when she recklessly made 

several false statements about Judge Marten in two motions asking him to reconsider his 

rulings. These statements included implying he had discriminated against her clients

based on race or socioeconomic status, implying he decided based on power rather than 

truth, and accusing him of treating her differently than opposing counsel. Huffman argues 

there is no evidence the statements were knowingly or recklessly false.

During Huffman's direct testimony, the panel's chairperson asked her to address 

the comments about Judge Marten. She testified that she did not "make any excuse" for 

them, that she "wrote what I wrote," and that she did not "intend it the way it came 

across." During cross-examination, the Disciplinary Administrator asked her whether she 

had "any basis" for writing that Judge Marten's "commentary punctuates the 

socioeconomic disconnect of the Court with these clients and generally the middle class 

public, particularly of color, who cannot afford the fights and discovery obstructions of 
68

the banks," "other than your clients were African American and didn't win." Her response 

illustrates she had no basis for asserting this:

"I—this didn't mean to be like a race statement. This, from my perspective, has 

been misunderstood. This is more political speech. And the KCPA issue is political. I 

mean, I've been involved in a hearing between the House Judiciary. We changed the law 

to address some of the things that came out in In Re—In Re Larkin. But access to the 

Court and this comment about urgings on from, you know, counsel, I think does

punctuate the fact that we do not have a system that gives equal advantage that, you 

know, we have this shortage. We have the middle class who can't afford these kind of

fights when you're dealing with these type of big banks. And I think that those things are 

even more important to minorities. 

"If I—you know, I thought about how it sounds like people are interpreting this, 

but I didn't play the race card. I didn't play the race card from my perspective on purpose,

because I don't—well, I mean. Wells Fargo got hit with NAACP, they have their issues, 

but this was about—they would have filed that caveat whether my clients were white or 

black. I mean, but people don't have access to this. People can't afford these discovery 

wars."

Later in cross-examination, she disavowed any belief Judge Marten was biased 

against R.B. and S.B. She testified:

"I—I think Judge Marten took the word of Wells Fargo, and I think the wool was 

pulled over his eyes. I do not believe that he would do anything that he didn't believe was 

true. And I think that goes back to the discovery and my urgings to tell the Court the 

truth. I do not think that Judge Marten harbored independent feelings against my client. 

And I do think that he was very frustrated by the idea that, you know, the case, 'um, was 

back. And I know in my heart that it would have been different if it had been in state 

court. I know what my venue was, I know what I was winning in front of that judge."
69

Taken together, her testimony demonstrates a serious lack of judgment in making 

these comments and statements. But we are also cognizant that judges and courts are not 

above criticism—even harsh criticism—by lawyers vigorously advocating sometimes 

unpopular causes on behalf of marginalized people. And balancing this against the 

equally important need for a decorous and orderly courtroom is an inexact endeavor at 

best. Given this, a majority of the court holds Huffman's statements do not rise to the 

heightened standard necessary to support the panel's conclusion that she violated KRPC 

3.5(d) and KRPC 8.2(a). In reaching that decision the majority considered and weighed 

as significant the fact Judge Marten himself did not take affront to Huffman's comments 

or invoke contempt at the time. A minority of the court would have found violations of 

these two rules.

D. The KRPC 8.4(d) violation

KRPC 8.4(d) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 434) provides, "It is professional misconduct 

for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." 

The panel found Huffman violated this rule by repeatedly relitigating previously decided 

issues and making false statements impugning Judge Marten's integrity.

Conduct requiring a court to unnecessarily consider frivolous issues obviously

delays the proceedings and causes the lawyers' clients to incur unnecessary legal fees and 

other expenses. Such conduct can support finding that the lawyer violated KRPC 8.4(d). 

See In re Shepherd, 310 Kan. 739, 746, 752, 448 P.3d 1049 (2019) (failure to file brief on 

behalf of client, resulting in "'unnecessary consideration by the court, the dismissal of the 

appeal, and delay with the appellate process'" deemed clear and convincing evidence that 

attorney violated KRPC 8.4[d]); In re Gordon, 258 Kan. 784, 791, 793, 908 P.2d 169 

(1995) (concluding violation of 8.4[d] supported by clear and convincing evidence when 

attorney failed to timely respond to discovery request resulting in sanctions and 
70

mishandled bankruptcy case resulting in unnecessary legal fees and other expenses to 

clients); Blume, 309 Kan. at 1323 (concluding clear and convincing evidence supported 

conclusion respondent violated 8.4[d] by filing a frivolous motion to alter or amend 

judgment); In re Grillot, 309 Kan. 253, 259, 263, 433 P.3d 671 (2019) (concluding the 

respondent engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice when he filed 

incomplete, inaccurate, and false accountings in a probate case).

Here, the conduct cited by the panel reflects Huffman wasted judicial resources by 

pursuing multiple frivolous motions and a frivolous lawsuit barred by res judicata. And 

she filed pleadings impugning Judge Marten's integrity. That conduct also resulted in her 

clients being ordered to pay attorney fees exceeding the mortgage loan principal, along 

with the clients' home being foreclosed.

Huffman challenges KRPC 8.4's constitutionality by incorporating her arguments 

against KRPC 3.5 and 8.2, discussed above. She asserts the KRPC 8.4 violation is 

founded on the same conduct forming the violations of those two rules, but does not 

argue what effect, if any, this assessment should have. She then argues: "The 

administration of justice was over, no false evidence was provided by Respondent." She 

suggests her conduct could not have prejudiced the administration of justice because 

"Wells [Fargo] continued to move forward." She also argues there was no pattern of 

misconduct because the litigation went on for years. And under headings styled

"CHILLING ADVOCACY & INTEGRITY," "RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WRITING 

WAS ACKNOWLEDGED," and "COUNSEL'S ETHICAL CONSTRUCT IN 

PRACTICE," she argues she has good character, and that she both acknowledged 

responsibility for the writings containing the comments about Judge Marten and 

apologized to him.
71

We hold the KRPC 8.4(d) violation is established by clear and convincing 

evidence. The panel's findings demonstrate Huffman serially relitigated claims that were 

either frivolous at their outset or made frivolous by prior decisions resolving them against 

her clients. The panel's findings also demonstrate her statements about Judge Marten 

tended to impugn his integrity, and by extension, that of the courts. Huffman's arguments 

about chilling advocacy, like many of her other arguments, incorrectly assume her 

conduct violated the rules only because she did not win. And her constitutional challenge 

to the rule as it applies to her commentary about Judge Marten is waived, as discussed 

above. Moreover, her apology and accepting responsibility for the comments does not 

negate the fact she made them.

APPROPRIATE DISCIPLINE

The question remaining is the appropriate discipline. The Disciplinary 

Administrator's office, panel majority, and dissenting panel member disagree about the 

recommended discipline. The panel majority recommended a public censure, and the 

dissenting panel member recommended a 90-day suspension. Although Huffman did not 

raise the discipline to be imposed as a separate issue in her brief, she argues in its closing 

paragraph, "[T]his Court should reject the panel's report and handle anything else 

necessary in private." The Disciplinary Administrator continues, as it did before the 

panel, to recommend indefinite suspension.

"In any given case, this court is not bound by the recommendations from the hearing 

panel or the Disciplinary Administrator. 'Each disciplinary sanction is based on the 

specific facts and circumstances of the violations and the aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances presented in the case.' 'Because each case is unique, past sanctions provide 

little guidance.' [Citations omitted.]" Hodge, 307 Kan. at 230.
72

The court generally looks to the American Bar Association Standards for 

Imposing Lawyer Sanctions to aid in determining discipline. That framework considers 

"four factors in determining punishment: (1) the ethical duty violated by the lawyer; (2) 

the lawyer's mental state; (3) the actual or potential injury resulting from the lawyer's 

misconduct; and (4) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors." 307 Kan. at 231.

Here, the panel found Huffman knowingly violated ethical duties owed to her 

clients, to the public, and to the legal profession. Her inadequate representation resulted 

in judgment against R.B. and S.B. for nearly $290,000 in Wells Fargo's legal fees. This 

amount was "larger than the expected value of the underlying mortgage interest." And it 

was amassed due to Huffman's "extensive and needless" discovery requests and other 

improper tactics which "caused the . . . action to metastasize beyond any reason." These 

tactics included "seeking court review of the same issues over and over again resulting in 

the waste of judicial time and resources." 

The panel also found several aggravating and mitigating factors. For aggravating 

factors, it concluded Huffman engaged in a pattern of misconduct throughout the R.B. 

and S.B. litigation and, in doing so, committed multiple offenses. In addition, the panel 

found R.B. and S.B. were vulnerable to Huffman's misconduct, noting they relied on 

Huffman and believed they had sued Wells Fargo when they had not, that Huffman drove 

the litigation approach, and that R.B. and S.B. were ultimately "ordered to pay nearly 

$300,000 in attorneys fees and expenses."

Equally troubling, the panel found Huffman "refused to acknowledge the wrongful 

nature of her conduct," arguing before the panel that she did not violate any rules. The 

hearing panel was
73

"concerned, that at this late date, the respondent just does not seem to 'get it.' She is either 

unwilling or unable to acknowledge that what she did [in] this case—repeatedly filing 

lawsuits when the issues had already been resolved and by making false and disparaging 

statements about a judge—violates the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct."

This perspective carried through to Huffman's briefings to this court. Her 

arguments, particularly concerning the Rule 1.1 and 3.1 violations, indicate she is under 

the misapprehension that discipline is being imposed simply because she was not 

successful in the litigation. And in arguing "[p]unishment is not warranted in this matter,"

Huffman contends her conduct was beneficial to the public at large, by stating: "The 

public has been helped by moving the law towards consumer protection and even 

advancing changes with the legislature to achieve more consistent results with the 

Courts." 

For mitigating factors, the panel found Huffman lacked a prior disciplinary record; 

a serious car accident resulting in a traumatic brain injury and depression contributed to 

the misconduct; she was inexperienced in the practice of law when the misconduct 

occurred; she presented evidence in support of her good character from several witnesses; 

and she had already paid $5,000 in federal court sanctions for some of the misconduct at 

issue.

Clear and convincing evidence supports the findings of violations of the 

professional rules of conduct as we note above. Huffman's multiple violations, pattern of 

misconduct, and injury to her clients are plainly demonstrated by the pleadings and orders 

filed in the underlying cases. The mitigating factors are likewise supported by the panel's 

cited evidence.

In making its discipline recommendation, the panel quoted the pertinent sections 

of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions for each of these types of 
74

misconduct. See ABA Standards 4.5 (lack of competence); 5.1 (failure to maintain 

personal integrity); 6.1 (false statements, fraud, and misrepresentation); 6.2 (abuse of the 

legal process); 7.0 (violations of duties owed as a professional).

But one ABA Standards provision the panel did not cite was from Standard 4.51, 

discussing when disbarment is appropriate when attorney shows lack of competence:

"4.51 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer's course of conduct 

demonstrates that the lawyer does not understand the most fundamental legal doctrines or 

procedures, and the lawyer's conduct causes injury or potential injury to a client."

And for misconduct involving abuse of legal process, the ABA standards provide,

"Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors 

set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases 

involving failure to expedite litigation or bring a meritorious claim, or failure to obey any 

obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion 

that no valid obligation exists." ABA Standards 6.2.

With regard to this, ABA Standards note: "Suspension is generally appropriate 

when a lawyer knows that he or she is violating a court order or rule, and causes injury or 

potential injury to a client or a party, or causes interference or potential interference with 

a legal proceeding." ABA Standard 6.22.

In addition, the court itself observes, as the Disciplinary Administrator did, that 

Huffman's brief here demonstrates continued professional failings. As the Disciplinary 

Administrator commented:

"Respondent's brief to this Court demonstrates she still lacks the competence 

required for appellate litigation—a factor this Court may consider in determining whether 
75

to impose discipline that provides more protection of the public and legal system than 

published censure. Cf., In re Anderson, 247 Kan. 208, 213, 795 P.2d 64 (1990) (in 

sanctions section of the opinion, the Court noted respondent's exceptions, brief, and oral 

argument did not comply with appellate rules). Respondent's brief fails to comply with 

virtually every rule of appellate briefing. It lacks coherent structure and is largely 

incomprehensible. Additionally, much of the brief is devoted to irrelevant arguments 

about the caveat, whether Wells Fargo owned the note, and the legal issue of whether the 

KCPA applied to financial communication, which demonstrates Respondent is still 

unable to identify and make pertinent legal arguments."

A majority of the court concludes suspension with a two-year term is the 

appropriate discipline. In arriving at this, the majority has considered the aggravating and 

mitigating circumstances described above, as well as the clear and convincing evidence 

supporting the panel's findings and conclusions. That said, the majority is amenable to 

staying the suspension after the first 90 days so long as Huffman adheres to a practice 

supervision plan approved by the Disciplinary Administrator's office that extends for the 

remaining suspension period. If Huffman and the Disciplinary Administrator's office

cannot agree on an appropriate plan of supervision either may file a motion with this 

court to resolve the dispute about this or compliance with the plan. The majority further 

holds that after successfully completing probation, or at the end of the suspension term, a 

reinstatement hearing will be necessary to ensure Huffman is capable of practicing law 

without further supervision. A minority of the court would have imposed a harsher 

discipline.

CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Donna L. Huffman be and she is hereby 

suspended from the practice of law in the state of Kansas in accordance with Supreme 
76

Court Rule 225(a)(3) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 281) for two years as of the date of this

opinion. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the above suspension will be stayed after the first 90 

days provided respondent enters into a practice supervision plan approved by the 

Disciplinary Administrator's office that extends for the remaining suspension period.

Approval of a probation plan by that office is required before any stay can commence.

Any dispute between respondent and the Disciplinary Administrator's office over the 

practice supervision plan or compliance with it will be resolved by this court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent shall comply with Supreme Court 

Rule 231 (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 292) (notice to clients, opposing counsel, and courts of 

record following suspension).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent comply with Supreme Court Rule 232 

(2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 293), including undergoing a reinstatement hearing after the twoyear suspension term ends. Additional conditions for reinstatement may be explored by 

the Disciplinary Administrator's office, a reinstatement panel, or the court during any

reinstatement process.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to 

respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports.