Filed 2/27/23 Golu v. Linges CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

DORIAN GOLU,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

STEPHEN LINGES,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D079328

 (Super. Ct. No. 37-2021-

00008530-CU-HR-EC)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Alana Robinson, Judge. Affirmed.

The Law Offices of Gastone Bebi and Gastone Bebi for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Mazur & Mazur and Janice R. Mazur for Plaintiff and Respondent.

INTRODUCTION

Dorian Golu and Stephen Linges live on the same street and, following 

a confrontation between the two of them, they each filed petitions for a civil 

harassment restraining order, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 
2

section 527.6.1 After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted Golu’s 

petition and denied Linges’s petition. On appeal, Linges challenges only the 

trial court’s order granting Golu’s petition. He asserts substantial evidence 

did not support the issuance of the restraining order, “irregularities” in the 

hearing deprived him of a fair hearing, and the related firearm prohibition 

violated his rights under the Second Amendment to the United States 

Constitution. We reject these contentions and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Golu petitioned for a civil harassment restraining order against Linges, 

seeking protection from Linges on behalf of himself and his teenage son, 

pursuant to section 527.6. Linges filed a timely response, and also his own 

petition for a restraining order against Golu. The trial court held an 

evidentiary hearing on both petitions, during which the parties called 

witnesses and presented the following evidence.2 

Golu and Linges are neighbors who live less than a quarter mile apart 

from each other on the same street. Their street is a two-lane road that has 

no sidewalks for pedestrians. One morning, Golu was driving his son to 

school, when he encountered a group of three individuals and their dogs on 

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil 

Procedure.

2 Because the evidentiary hearing was not reported, Linges filed a 

proposed settled statement as the record of the proceedings. Golu filed a 

response and requested changes to the proposed settled statement. The trial 

court then certified the settled statement with the changes requested by Golu 

as “an accurate summary of the testimony and other evidence that is relevant 

to the appellant’s reasons for appeal.” (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.137(b)(1).) Our summary of the evidence is taken from the settled 

statement.
3

the right side of the street. As he approached the group, Golu steered his car 

slightly away from them, towards the middle of the road, and onto the double 

yellow line. As he passed the group, he did not slow down. Members of the 

group estimated that Golu was driving 35 miles per hour.

After passing the group, Golu approached Linges, who was on the 

street approximately 30 yards beyond the group and on the edge of the road, 

facing Golu’s car. Golu did not slow down as he approached and passed 

Linges. As Golu passed Linges, Linges threw a glove at Golu’s car. It landed 

on Golu’s windshield and bounced off. Golu stopped his car in the middle of 

the road and got out. He intended to check for damage to his car, inspect the

glove, and ask Linges why he threw the glove. 

As Golu walked towards the rear of his car, Linges went to collect his 

glove. At this moment, Linges approached Golu aggressively, shouted at him, 

and began to push and jab Golu’s chest with his right hand. Golu backed up 

while blocking Linges’s blows, retreated to his car, and got his cell phone. 

Linges yelled that Golu “is ‘going to jail’ ” and that “ ‘next time it won’t be a 

glove.’ ” 

Golu called the police the same day and filed a report of the incident. 

Neither of the men were arrested. Golu provided the police with an audio 

and video recording of the incident from his car’s dash camera, which the 

trial court received into evidence and viewed.3

3 At the hearing, Linges asserted the video may have been edited and 

that there were different sets of video recordings, but Golu confirmed the 

video recordings he submitted to the court were the same ones he provided to 

opposing counsel. Linges also objected to the admission of the video

recordings on the grounds that “they were edited.” The trial court overruled 

his objection, and Linges does not challenge the evidentiary ruling on appeal.
4

At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court found Golu had proven 

by clear and convincing evidence that he was the victim of civil harassment, 

on two grounds. First, the court found Linges had engaged in an act of 

unlawful violence by throwing an object and hitting Golu’s moving car in the 

windshield. Second, the court found Linges made a credible threat of violence 

by jabbing his finger at Golu’s chest while advancing on Golu, and saying, 

“Next time it won’t be a glove[.]” The court determined that Linges was not 

excused from throwing an object at Golu’s moving car even if Golu was 

speeding. The court also found Golu had proven by clear and convincing 

evidence that great or irreparable harm would result if the restraining order 

was not granted, because the parties are neighbors who will likely encounter 

each other again and Linges still harbors a lot of hostility towards Golu. 

Accordingly, the trial court issued a five-year restraining order against 

Linges for the protection of both Golu and his son. The restraining order 

required Linges to not harass or contact Golu and his son, and to stay at least 

100 yards away from them. The court further ordered that Linges cannot 

own or possess any firearms and that he sell or relinquish to the police any 

firearm he possessed. 

The trial court found Linges had failed to meet his burden for the 

issuance of a restraining order against Golu, and denied his petition.

Linges then filed a motion for new trial and Golu filed a motion for 

attorney fees. At a subsequent hearing on the motions, the trial court denied 

Linges’s motion for a new trial and awarded Golu $4,700 in attorney fees. 

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Linges does not challenge the court’s finding that he failed 

to meet his burden for the issuance of a restraining order for his protection 
5

and the denial of his petition against Golu. He appeals only the trial court’s 

issuance of a restraining order against him. 

Here, Linges contends his appeal raises seven issues, specifically: (1) 

whether the facts are “legally sufficient” to constitute civil harassment within 

the meaning of section 527.6, which he asserts must be reviewed de novo; (2) 

whether Golu proved by clear and convincing evidence that Linges’s acts will 

be repeated in the future; (3) whether the trial court “improperly accept[ed] 

facts” he contends were “blatantly contradict[ed]” by the video evidence; (4) 

whether Golu established there was a credible threat of violence towards him 

or his son; (5) whether there was sufficient evidence to include Golu’s son as a 

protected party; and (6) whether “ ‘[i]rregularities’ ” in the proceedings denied 

him a fair trial; and (7) whether the court’s order infringes his Second 

Amendment right to bear firearms. We discuss, and reject, each of these 

contentions. 

I.

Principles of Appellate Review

We begin with the fundamental rule of appellate review that an

appealed judgment is presumed correct. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 

594, 608−609 (Jameson); Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) 

“ ‘All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as 

to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.’ ” 

(Denham, at p. 564.) If the judgment or order is correct on any theory, the 

appellate court will affirm it. (Estate of Beard (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 753, 

776–777.)

An appeal is not a second trial. The role of an appellate court is to 

determine whether any error occurred, and if so, whether there is prejudicial 

error, or put differently, error which affected the outcome of the proceeding. 
6

Absent a showing of error and prejudice, a reviewing court cannot remand a 

matter for a new hearing, even if the appellant believes he or she could 

prevail if given a second chance. (See Aguayo v. Amaro (2013) 213 

Cal.App.4th 1102, 1109; Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 

68, 106.)

Additionally, when reviewing an appellate record, we do not reweigh 

the evidence. (Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1, 12 (Curcio).) We are 

required to “resolve all factual conflicts and questions of credibility” in the 

prevailing party’s favor and uphold the trial court’s finding “if it is supported 

by substantial evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value.” 

(Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762 (Schild).) An appellate court 

“ ‘ “must presume that the record contains evidence to support every finding 

of fact[.]” ’ [Citations.] It is the appellant’s burden . . . to identify and 

establish deficiencies in the evidence. [Citation.] This burden is a ‘daunting’ 

one.” (Huong Que, Inc. v. Luu (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 400, 409.)

II.

The Trial Court’s Issuance of a Restraining Order Against Linges

Was Proper Under Section 527.6

A. Section 527.6

The parties sought restraining orders under section 527.6, which 

permits a court to issue a protective order against a person who has engaged 

in “harassment.” (§ 527.6, subd. (a); see R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 

181, 188−189.) “ ‘Harassment’ ” under this statute means “unlawful violence, 

a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct 

directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the 

person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3), italics 

added.) The purpose of section 527.6 “ ‘is to prevent future harm to the 
7

applicant by ordering the defendant to refrain from doing a particular act.’ ” 

(Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc.

(2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1266.) Thus, “[a]n injunction restraining future 

conduct is only authorized when it appears that harassment is likely to recur 

in the future.” (Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 496 

(Harris).)

Before issuing a protective order, a trial court must find clear and 

convincing evidence that unlawful harassment occurred and is likely to recur 

in the future. (§ 527.6, subd. (i).) A court’s findings whether this burden of 

proof has been met will be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence. 

(Harris, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 497.) In applying the substantial 

evidence test to a court’s findings reached under the clear-and-convincing 

burden of proof, we evaluate the evidence under a “heightened degree of 

certainty.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 997.) Under this 

rule, we must consider “whether the record as a whole contains substantial 

evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly 

probable that the fact was true.” (Id. at pp. 995–996, italics added.) In 

conducting this review, we apply the usual rules for evaluating the record. 

We must “view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party 

below and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the 

credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn 

reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Id. at p. 996.) 

B. Analysis

Linges’s first five contentions are essentially a single challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s issuance of a 

restraining order against him, a challenge we reject. We conclude the court’s 

findings and order were supported by substantial evidence. 
8

The trial court found that Linges engaged in unlawful harassment

based on evidence that Linges threw an object at Golu’s moving car and it hit 

the windshield. This fact was not disputed. Linges admitted he “flipped his 

leather glove at the vehicle in an attempt to ward the vehicle off.” Further 

still, the court stated that it reviewed the video evidence “multiple times,” 

and our review of the video evidence supports the court’s finding that Linges 

threw his glove at Golu’s moving car. The court found that “[w]hen an object 

unexpectedly hits a driver’s windshield, it is unpredictable how the driver 

will react. Therefore, the act of throwing an object at a moving car is very 

dangerous and an act of unlawful violence.” Substantial evidence supported 

the court’s finding of unlawful harassment, which includes unlawful violence 

and is defined as any assault or battery, sufficient for the issuance of a 

restraining order. (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(7).) 

The trial court also found clear and convincing evidence that Linges 

made a credible threat of violence against Golu based on evidence that Linges 

jabbed his finger at Golu’s chest while aggressively advancing towards Golu,

and saying, “ ‘Next time it won’t be a glove.’ ” Again, this fact was not 

disputed. Linges admitted he “walked towards” Golu and yelled at Golu, 

“ ‘next time it won’t be a glove.’ ” The court thus found “Golu proved by clear 

and convincing evidence that . . . Linges was the aggressor.” There was 

substantial evidence, including the video evidence, to support the court’s 

findings that Linges engaged in unlawful harassment, which includes a 

credible threat of violence and is defined as a knowing and willful statement 

that would place a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety, or the 

safety of his or her immediate family, and that serves no legitimate purpose. 

(§ 527.6, subd. (b)(2).)
9

Finally, the trial court found the evidence demonstrated these 

confrontations were likely to continue without a protective order. The court 

found the “[t]estimony was uncontroverted that the parties are neighbors” 

and concluded “it is likely the parties will encounter each other again.” The 

court also found “[t]he evidence at the hearing made clear that . . . Linges 

harbors a lot of hostility toward . . . Golu and even threatened him.” These 

facts are sufficient to support the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing 

evidence that great or irreparable harm would result if the restraining order 

was not granted. (§ 527.6, subd. (d).)

Linges’s arguments that the evidence was insufficient, including his 

claim the video evidence contradicts Golu’s version of the events, 

misunderstands our role in reviewing the trial court’s findings. We do not 

reweigh the evidence or the trial court’s credibility determinations. (Curcio, 

supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 12.) We are required to “resolve all factual 

conflicts and questions of credibility” in the prevailing party’s favor and 

uphold the trial court’s findings “if it is supported by substantial evidence 

which is reasonable, credible and of solid value.” (Schild, supra, 232 

Cal.App.3d at p. 762.) Thus, Linges’s discussion of his version of the facts 

does not establish a basis to reverse the court’s order. That is because 

“ ‘ “[w]e must accept as true all evidence . . . tending to establish the 

correctness of the trial court’s findings . . . , resolving every conflict in favor of 

the judgment.” ’ ” (Burquet v. Brumbaugh (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 

1140, 1143.) If substantial evidence supports the judgment⎯and we 

conclude it does⎯“reversal is not warranted even if facts exist[ed] that would 

support a contrary finding.” (Curcio, at p. 12.) 

Lastly, Linges asserts there was insufficient evidence to support the 

trial court’s inclusion of Golu’s son as a protected party. We disagree. In the 
10

court’s discretion, and on a showing of good cause, a restraining order issued 

under section 527.6 may include other named family or household members. 

(§ 527.6, subd. (c).) Here, it was not disputed that Golu’s son was in the car 

when Linges threw an object at it. Further still, the court’s findings that the 

parties will likely encounter each other again because they are neighbors also 

apply to Golu’s son. This is a sufficient showing of good cause to support the 

inclusion of Golu’s son as a protected party. (See Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 

5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1234 [inclusion of plaintiff’s son as protected person 

under section 527.6, subd. (c), was proper]; Thomas v. Quintero (2005) 126 

Cal.App.4th 635, 652 [trial court has discretion to issue a temporary 

restraining order that includes other named family or household members 

upon a showing of good cause].) 

III.

Linges’s Remaining Arguments Lack Merit

Linges contends there were “ ‘irregularities’ ” during the evidentiary 

hearing that denied him a fair trial. In his motion for a new trial, he asserted 

technical difficulties had occurred during the remote hearing, that he was 

unable to present video evidence using a “360-degree” feature, and that the 

court reviewed the video evidence outside the presence of counsel. The court 

determined that Linges failed to “state what prejudices he suffered or that 

the glitches affected the outcome of the hearing.” 

On appeal, Linges again fails to identify any specific prejudice he 

suffered from these purported irregularities. Here, “[o]ur duty to examine 

the entire cause arises when and only when the appellant has fulfilled his [or 

her] duty to tender a proper prejudice argument. Because of the need to 

consider the particulars of the given case, rather than the type of error, the 

appellant bears the duty of spelling out in his [or her] brief exactly how the 
11

error caused a miscarriage of justice.” (Paterno v. State of California (1999) 

74 Cal.App.4th 68, 105−106; accord Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 

Cal.4th 780, 800−802.) As we have discussed, it is a fundamental rule of 

appellate review that “a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be 

correct.” (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608−609.) A corollary of that rule 

is an issue is deemed waived where the appellant fails to support its claim by 

argument, discussion, analysis or citation to the record. (EnPalm, LLC v. 

Teitler (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 775.) Because Linges fails to articulate 

how the asserted error resulted in prejudice, we deem the argument waived. 

Finally, Linges asserts the trial court’s order prohibiting him from 

owning or possessing any firearms violated his Second Amendment right to 

bear arms. We disagree. In District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 

570 (Heller), the United States Supreme Court recognized and affirmed 

certain traditional limitations on the right to bear arms, even though it 

struck down the District of Columbia handguns ban. In Heller, the high 

court “identified an expressly nonexclusive list of ‘presumptively lawful 

regulatory measures,’ stating ‘nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast 

doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons 

and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive 

places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions 

and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.’ ” (People v. Delacy (2011) 

192 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1487–1488 (Delacy) [upholding constitutionality of 

former Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (c)(1), which prohibited possession of 

firearms by persons convicted of specified misdemeanors].) 

The Supreme Court’s most recent opinion addressing the Second 

Amendment, New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen (2022) 597 

U.S. ___ [142 S.Ct. 2111, 213 L.Ed.2d 387], does not disturb this list of 
12

“presumptively lawful regulatory measures” identified in Heller. Justice 

Alito explained in his concurring opinion that the Court’s holding in Bruen

“decides nothing about who may lawfully possess a firearm,” and nor has it 

“disturbed anything that [was] said in Heller . . . about restrictions that may 

be imposed on the possession or carrying of guns.” (Bruen, at p. 2157 (conc. 

opn. of Alito, J.).) Similarly, Justice Kavanaugh underscored in his 

concurring opinion that Supreme Court precedent, including Heller, has 

established “the Second Amendment ‘is neither a regulatory straightjacket 

nor a regulatory blank check. . . . Properly interpreted, the Second 

Amendment allows a ‘variety’ of gun regulations.” (Bruen, at p. 2162 (conc. 

opn. of Kavanaugh, J.) [citing Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 636].)

Section 527.6, subdivision (u)(1), provides, “A person subject to a 

protective order issued pursuant to this section shall not own, possess, 

purchase, receive, or attempt to purchase or receive a firearm or ammunition 

while the protective order is in effect.” Subdivision (u)(2) of section 527.6 

further provides, “The court shall order a person subject to a protective order 

issued pursuant to this section to relinquish any firearms the person owns or 

possesses pursuant to Section 527.9.” This statute is analogous to a 

prohibition on felon weapon possession, a type of restriction expressly listed 

by Heller as untouched by its holding. (See Delacy, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1489; see also United States v. Luedtke (E.D.Wis. 2008) 589 F.Supp.2d 

1018, 1021 [18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which criminalizes possession of firearms 

and ammunition by persons subject to a domestic violence injunction, is a 

regulation of the type “that pass[es] constitutional muster” as “traditionally 

permitted in this nation”].) 

Indeed, courts have found that “[r]educing domestic violence is a 

compelling government interest [citation], and [a] temporary prohibition, 
13

while the [restraining] order is outstanding, is narrowly tailored to that 

compelling interest.” (United States v. Knight (D.Me. 2008) 574 F.Supp.2d 

224, 226, fn. omitted [discussing constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)].) 

“[A]nger management issues may arise in domestic settings,” and a firearm 

restriction in such cases “is thus a temporary burden during a period when 

the subject of the order is adjudged to pose a particular risk of further abuse.” 

(United States v. Mahin (4th Cir. 2012) 668 F.3d 119, 125 [discussing 

constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)].)4 One Court of Appeal has 

recognized that a similar firearm restriction in the Domestic Violence 

4 We acknowledge the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently held 

that 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(8) is unconstitutional in light of Bruen. (United 

States v. Rahimi (5th Cir. Feb. 2, 2023, No. 21-11001) 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 

2693.) However, “decisions by the federal courts of appeals are not binding 

on us” (People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630, 668 [federal court of appeal 

decisions are not binding on California courts]), and we decline to follow it. 

In United States v. Jackson, the Western District of Oklahoma found 

“that the government’s reliance on general historical tradition is sufficient to 

satisfy its burden to justify the firearm regulation of [18 U.S.C.] § 922(g)(9).” 

(United States v. Jackson (W.D.Okla. Aug. 19, 2022, No. CR-22-59-D) 2022 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148911 [18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) concerns the prohibition of 

firearms to persons with a prior misdemeanor crime of domestic violence].) 

In reaching that conclusion, the district court explained, “the Supreme Court 

has repeatedly addressed the reach of [18 U.S.C.] § 922(g)(9) without 

questioning its constitutionality. Most recently, in Voisine v. United States

[(2016) 579 U.S. 686, 692]), the Court held that the statute applies to a 

misdemeanant who was convicted under an assault statute that encompasses 

‘reckless’ conduct. In that case, Justice Thomas opined in dissent that the 

majority’s construction of the statute rendered it unconstitutional, but no 

other justice joined this part of his opinion or endorsed this view. . . . Under 

the circumstances currently presented, where the effect of the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Bruen on longstanding criminal prohibitions such as [18 

U.S.C.] § 922(g) remains unclear, this Court declines to hold that [18 U.S.C.] 

§ 922(g)(9) violates the Second Amendment.” (Jackson, at p. *8.)
14

Prevention Act (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.) “is analogous to a prohibition on 

felon weapon possession, a type of restriction expressly listed by Heller as 

untouched by its holding.” (Altafulla v. Ervin (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 571, 

581.) The same reason extends here to the firearm restriction in section 

527.6.

In sum, we reject Linges’s constitutional claims. We conclude Linges

has failed to identify any basis on which we should reverse the trial court’s 

issuance of the restraining order against him.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Golu shall recover his costs on appeal. (Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)

DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.