PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 20-3563

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

EVENS CLAUDE, 

a/k/a E.; 

a/k/a Shawn Miranda,

 Appellant

_____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(District Court No.: 2-12-cr-00033-001) 

District Judge: Hon. Jan E. DuBois

_____________________________________ 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 

September 23, 2021 

(Filed October 27, 2021)

Before: JORDAN, PORTER, and RENDELL, Circuit 

Judges. 
2

Matthew M. Robinson

Robinson & Brandt

629 Main Street

Suite B

Covington, KY 41011

Counsel for Appellant

Jennifer Arbittier Williams

Robert A. Zauzmer

Andrea G. Foulkes

Office of the United States Attorney

615 Chestnut Street

Suite 1250

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Counsel for Appellee

_________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_________

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.

In this appeal we must decide whether a defendant may, 

in the absence of a government motion, obtain compassionate 

release based solely on his post-sentencing substantial 

assistance in investigating or prosecuting another person. We 

hold that a defendant may not. While Congress, in passing the 

First Step Act, altered, among other things, the procedure for 

obtaining compassionate release, it left Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 35(b), which governs reductions in 

sentences for such substantial assistance, unchanged. Thus, as 

it was before the First Step Act, a district court may reduce a 
3

defendant’s sentence based upon the defendant’s postsentencing substantial assistance only upon a government 

motion. 

Evens Claude filed a motion for compassionate release 

seeking a reduction in his sentence to time served based on his 

having allegedly provided post-sentencing substantial 

assistance in the Government’s pursuit of a drug and child 

pornography prosecution. Although Claude characterized his 

motion as a motion for compassionate release, the District 

Court concluded that because his motion centered on his 

purported substantial assistance to the Government, Claude 

was not eligible for relief unless the Government moved, under 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b), for a reduction on 

Claude’s behalf. As we agree, we will affirm the order of the 

District Court. 

I.

A jury found Claude guilty on two counts of bank fraud, 

six counts of access device fraud, eight counts of aggravated 

identity theft, and various currency offenses. On August 29, 

2014, he was sentenced to, among other things, 232 months’ 

imprisonment. 

In 2020, Claude filed six motions for compassionate 

release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), but this appeal 

involves only his sixth motion. In his sixth motion, he argued 

that the District Court should reduce his sentence to time 

served given certain “extraordinary and compelling 

circumstances” arising from his purported “substantial 

assistance to the D.E.A. of New Jersey.” Suppl. App. 9. 
4

Claude alleged that, four years earlier, he provided 

crucial assistance, which allowed the Government to “bust[] 

someone with multiple kilos of cocaine” and “locat[e] a cell 

phone that was part of a child pornography indictment.” Suppl. 

App. 9. Despite his alleged substantial assistance, however, 

the Government did not file a Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b) motion on 

his behalf. Instead, the Government filed a Rule 35(b) motion 

on behalf of another prisoner who, Claude insists, “provid[ed] 

absolutely nothing” to the Government. Suppl. App. 9. Thus, 

he argued that “someone else . . . reap[ed] the benefits” of his

efforts. Suppl. App. 9. As the Government’s Rule 35(b) 

motion to reduce the sentence of this other person was granted, 

what resulted, Claude argued, was a “gross disparity” between 

his sentence and that of the purportedly undeserving 

cooperator. Suppl. App. 9.

In response, the Government argued that Claude’s 

motion was inappropriate because only the Government is 

empowered to move for a reduction in Claude’s sentence based 

on post-sentencing substantial assistance. Nothing in the 

“compassionate release statute . . . override[s] this longstanding criminal procedural rule.” Suppl. App. 32. As the 

Government did not file such a motion on Claude’s behalf, 

Claude’s motion was fatally flawed. 

Beyond this threshold problem, the Government also 

noted that, contrary to Claude’s characterizations, his 

purported assistance was neither substantial nor welcomed in 

the first instance. The Government explained that Claude and 

his family members frequently contacted the Government 

seeking opportunities to cooperate in the hopes that he might 

obtain a reduced sentence. However, the Government 

uniformly rejected Claude’s overtures because any assistance 
5

he could have provided would very likely have been of little 

use given his “many years of fraud, manipulation, doubledealing, and false statements to the government and the Court.” 

Suppl. App. 29. And, in any event, Claude did not provide any 

helpful assistance. It was not Claude but another cooperator 

who initiated the investigation for which Claude takes credit. 

Ultimately, the District Court denied Claude’s motion. 

Agreeing with the Government, the District Court explained

that a “‘[r]eduction of sentence for post-sentencing cooperation 

requires a Rule 35 motion from the government’ and therefore 

cannot be raised by a defendant through a motion for 

compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A).” Suppl. App. 5 

(quoting Suppl. App. 32). Although Claude “d[id] not seek 

relief under Rule 35” the District Court noted, “his Motion 

[was] based on the proposition that substantial assistance may 

constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for a 

sentence reduction.” Suppl. App. 5. In effect, Claude, “under 

the guise of a motion for compassionate release,” unilaterally 

and impermissibly sought a reduction in sentence for his 

purported substantial assistance, which would have been

available only upon motion made by the Government on his 

behalf under Rule 35. Suppl. App. 6. 

In support of its conclusion, the District Court noted that 

while Congress, through the First Step Act, made substantial 

changes to the procedures applicable to motions for 

compassionate release based on extraordinary and compelling 

reasons, Congress made no changes to Rule 35, which governs 

reductions in sentence based on substantial assistance. Thus, 

the District Court concluded that the First Step Act left 

undisturbed the rule “that only the government may file a 

motion seeking a sentence reduction for substantial 
6

assistance.” Suppl. App. 6. Still, the District Court recognized 

that courts “may consider a defendant’s substantial assistance 

insofar as it is a relevant factor in each step of the 

compassionate release framework.” Suppl. App. 6. However, 

“substantial assistance is not itself an extraordinary and 

compelling reason warranting compassionate release under § 

3582(c)(1)(A)(i).” Suppl. App. 6 (citations omitted). Because 

Claude’s motion for compassionate release was grounded in 

his purported substantial assistance, the District Court 

concluded that he failed to present extraordinary and 

compelling reasons to justify his release. 

Claude timely appealed. 

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 

3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We [] 

review a district court’s decision to deny a compassionaterelease motion for abuse of discretion.” United States v. 

Andrews, 12 F.4th 255 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing United States v. 

Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020)). “However, . . . 

we exercise plenary review [when] we are presented with legal 

questions[.]” United States v. Birt, 966 F.3d 257, 259 n.2 (3d 

Cir. 2020) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. 

Thompson, 825 F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir. 2016)). As we are 

presented with a legal question in this case, our review is 

plenary. 

III. 

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) permits a sentencing court to 

modify a term of imprisonment once imposed in various 

circumstances. Section 3582 provides: 
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(c) The court may not modify a term 

of imprisonment once it has been 

imposed except that—

(1) in any case—

(A) the court, upon motion of the 

Director of the Bureau of Prisons, 

or upon motion of the defendant 

after the defendant has fully 

exhausted all administrative rights 

to appeal a failure of the Bureau of 

Prisons to bring a motion on the 

defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 

30 days from the receipt of such a 

request by the warden of the 

defendant’s facility, whichever is 

earlier, may reduce the term of 

imprisonment . . . , after 

considering the factors set forth in 

section 3553(a) . . . if it finds 

that—

(i) extraordinary and 

compelling reasons 

warrant such a 

reduction; [and] . . . 

(B) the court may modify an imposed 

term of imprisonment to the extent 

otherwise expressly permitted by 
8

statute or by Rule 35 of the Federal 

Rules of Criminal Procedure . . . . 

18 U.S.C. § 3582 (2018) (emphasis added). The emphasized 

portion of this language was added by Congress when it passed 

the First Step Act. The remainder of the quoted language, 

including § 3582(c)(1)(B), was left unchanged. 18 U.S.C. § 

3582 (2002), amended by First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 

115-391, § 603, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239. In sum, with the passage 

of the First Step Act, Congress changed the procedure relating 

to motions for compassionate release to permit a defendant to 

file a motion for compassionate release directly with the 

district court based on extraordinary and compelling reasons 

after exhausting his administrative process with the warden of 

the defendant’s facility. 18 U.S.C. § 3582. Congress, 

however, did not similarly change the procedure around 

motions for a reduction in sentence for substantial assistance 

under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b), which Congress itself first 

introduced when it passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.

Pub. L. No. 98–473, § 215(b), 98 Stat. 1837 (1984). 

Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b), the court may, “[u]pon 

the government’s motion” reduce a defendant’s sentence based 

on the defendant’s post-sentencing “substantial assistance in 

investigating or prosecuting another person.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 

35(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)(2) (setting forth the 

standard applicable to government motions to reduce a 

sentence based on substantial assistance if the motion is filed 

more than one year after sentencing). Rule 35 does not permit 

a defendant to move unilaterally for a reduction in sentence 

based on his substantial assistance. Indeed, the Government’s 

decision whether to file such motions based on substantial 

assistance is generally unreviewable “subject to constitutional 
9

limitations that district courts can enforce.” Wade v. United 

States, 504 U.S. 181, 185 (1992) (addressing government 

substantial assistance motions under analogous provisions in 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1). 

As Congress chose, in passing the First Step Act, to 

change the procedure relating to motions for compassionate 

release but chose not to change the procedure around motions 

for a reduction in sentence based on substantial assistance, we 

must give effect to and “respect that choice.” 14 Penn Plaza 

LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 260 (2009). 

Here, the District Court properly gave effect to 

Congress’s choice when it recognized that Claude could not 

satisfy the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” standard 

based solely on his purported substantial assistance to the 

Government. Suppl. App. 6. We discern no error in the 

District Court’s analysis. To permit a defendant to move 

unilaterally for “compassionate release” based on his own 

perceived substantial assistance would contravene Congress’s 

expressed intent as embodied in Rule 35 that the Government, 

subject to constitutional limitations, decides whether to move 

for a reduction in sentence based on such assistance. The 

decision to move for a reduction in sentence based on a 

defendant’s post-sentencing substantial assistance is reserved 

to the Government alone. Thus, a defendant may not move for 

a reduction in sentence based on his perceived substantial 

assistance merely by labeling what would otherwise be a Rule 

35 motion, a motion for compassionate release.

Our holding should not be interpreted to prohibit the 

consideration of substantial assistance by courts engaged in the

compassionate release analysis. Rather, as the District Court 
10

aptly noted, substantial assistance can be “a relevant factor.” 

Suppl. App. 6. It simply cannot be the only basis for a 

defendant’s claim that extraordinary and compelling reasons 

support his motion for compassionate release. 

IV.

For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s 

order denying Claude’s sixth motion for compassionate 

release.