UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4947

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JAMES ELBERT DANIELS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge. 

(4:11-cr-00540-RBH-1)

Submitted: April 3, 2012 Decided: April 11, 2012

Before WILKINSON, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael A. Meetze, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Florence, 

South Carolina, for Appellant. Arthur Bradley Parham, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

James Elbert Daniels appeals his conviction and 

thirty-month sentence following a conditional guilty plea, 

pursuant to a written plea agreement, to possession of a firearm 

by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) 

(2006). On appeal, Daniels’ counsel filed a brief pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there 

are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether 

the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress, the 

adequacy of the Rule 11 hearing, and the reasonableness of the 

sentence. Daniels was advised of his right to file a pro se 

supplemental brief but did not file one. Finding no error, we 

affirm. 

Daniels first questions whether the district court 

erred in denying his motion to suppress. In reviewing the 

denial of a motion to suppress, “we review the district court’s 

legal determinations de novo and its factual determinations for 

clear error.” United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586, 589 (4th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3374 (2010). When the district 

court has denied a suppression motion, “we construe the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the government.” Id. 

Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, a police officer 

may conduct a brief investigatory stop “when the officer has a 

reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is 
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afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing 

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). “In cases where an 

informant’s tip supplies part of the basis for reasonable 

suspicion, [the court] must ensure that the tip possesses 

sufficient indicia of reliability.” United States v. Perkins, 

363 F.3d 317, 323 (4th Cir. 2004). An anonymous tip can provide 

a basis for reasonable suspicion if the tipster provides 

substantial details and establishes a basis for his knowledge. 

United States v. Elston, 479 F.3d 314, 318 (4th Cir. 2007). 

Upon review, we conclude that the district court did not err in 

finding that the police had reasonable suspicion to effect the 

traffic stop, and in denying Daniels’ motion to suppress. 

Next, Daniels questions whether the district court 

complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 in accepting 

his guilty plea. Our review of the plea hearing reveals that 

the district court fully complied with Rule 11 in conducting the 

plea colloquy, and thus committed no plain error in accepting 

Daniels’ guilty plea. See United States v. General, 278 F.3d 

389, 393 (4th Cir. 2002) (providing standard of review); United 

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (detailing plain error 

standard). 

Finally, Daniels questions whether his sentence was 

procedurally and substantively reasonable. In reviewing a 

sentence, we must first ensure that the district court did not 
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commit any “significant procedural error,” such as failing to 

properly calculate the applicable Guidelines range, failing to 

consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, or failing to 

adequately explain the sentence. Gall v. United States, 552 

U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Once we have determined that there is no 

procedural error, we must then consider the substantive 

reasonableness of the sentence, “tak[ing] into account the 

totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 51. If the sentence 

imposed is within the appropriate Sentencing Guidelines range, 

we consider it presumptively reasonable. United States v. 

Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). The 

presumption may be rebutted by a showing “that the sentence is 

unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.” 

United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 

2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Upon review, we 

conclude that the district court committed no procedural or 

substantive error in sentencing Daniels to thirty months’ 

imprisonment, a sentence within the applicable Sentencing 

Guidelines range. See United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 577 

(4th Cir. 2010) (providing standard of review); Olano, 507 U.S. 

at 732.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 
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requires that counsel inform Daniels, in writing, of his right 

to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Daniels requests that a petition be filed, but 

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, 

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Daniels. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal conclusions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED