[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-11611

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

TRACIE MITCHEM-GREEN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

versus

MHM HEALTH PROFESSIONALS INC., 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:20-cv-00054-BJD-PDB

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-11611

Before WILSON, JORDAN, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Tracie Mitchem-Green, an African-American woman, filed 

a lawsuit in state court against her former employer, MHM Health 

Professionals, LLC, (“MHM”), f/k/a MHM Health Professionals, 

Inc., raising claims of race and sex discrimination and retaliation 

under Florida state law. MHM removed the action to federal court 

based on diversity jurisdiction and then moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. On appeal, Mitchem-Green 

contends that MHM treated her worse than similarly situated nonfemale, non-African-American employees, and retaliated against 

her for reporting allegations of inmate abuse. After careful review 

of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of MHM.

I.

We review summary-judgment decisions de novo, “viewing 

all evidence, and drawing all reasonable inferences, in favor of the 

non-moving party.” Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 

763, 767 (11th Cir. 2005). To defeat a summary-judgment motion, 

the plaintiff must show the record contains sufficient evidence for 

a reasonable jury to return a verdict in her favor. Chapman v. AI 

Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); see Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Henley v. Payne, 945 F.3d 1320, 1333 (11th Cir. 2019).

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II.

Mitchem-Green holds a doctoral degree in nursing. From 

January to September of 2017, she worked as an Advanced Registered Nurse Practitioner (“ARNP”) at Suwannee Correctional Institution. She was employed by MHM, a staffing subcontractor of 

Centurion of Florida, LLC, which provided medical care in Florida 

Department of Corrections (“FDOC”) facilities. 

During her employment, Mitchem-Green was the sole 

ARNP at Suwannee. Her job duties included the evaluation and 

treatment of inmate patients under the supervision of a physician 

and in conjunction with other medical staff. She worked with and 

was supervised by two medical doctors, Dr. Alexis Figueroa and 

Dr. Denis Vilchez, alongside various nursing staff. Medical services 

at Suwannee were overseen by Dr. Errol Campbell, the Regional 

Medical Director. The nurses, including Mitchem-Green, reported 

to the Director of Nursing. 

Undisputed evidence reflects that Mitchem-Green did not 

meet MHM’s expectations for productivity, time management, 

and following instructions. MHM expected Mitchem-Green to see 

up to thirty patients per day, spending no more than fifteen 

minutes with each patient, regardless of the severity or complexity 

of the patient’s particular health issues. Mitchem-Green regularly 

was well below that mark. For example, from July 18, 2017, 

through August 31, 2017, she averaged 4.23 patient encounters per 

day. MHM also expected Mitchem-Green to work where and 

when she was scheduled. But the record contains numerous 

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instances where MHM management discussed with MitchemGreen concerns that she was not working her scheduled hours, was 

not in her scheduled location, or was spending an inordinate 

amount of time with a particular inmate, causing prison staff to 

question whether the relationship was professionally appropriate. 

For instance, Mitchem-Green was observed on several occasions 

visiting that inmate outside normal workings hours. As a result of 

these concerns, Dr. Campbell instructed Mitchem-Green in early 

June 2017 to discontinue care of the patient at issue and restricted 

her access to the infirmary.

Mitchem-Green does not dispute she failed to meet MHM’s 

expectations for patient encounters, but she asserts that it was impossible to meet her workload without additional support. She 

says she was not provided reliable nursing assistance or an office 

like Dr. Figueroa and Dr. Vilchez, despite multiple requests. She 

also maintains that the amount of time she spent with patients was 

necessary to meet professional and constitutional standards. She 

states that the specific inmate at issue had many medical problems 

and so required additional time. And she contends that MHM’s 

issues with her performance and scheduling arose only after she 

began objecting to substandard patient care and inmate abuse. 

On July 11, 2017, Mitchem-Green was called to a meeting 

with MHM management and Warden Marvin Clemmons. During 

this meeting, the Warden raised several concerns about MitchemGreen’s performance and productivity. He advised that her 

productivity—seeing only three or four patients per day—was not 

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sufficient and was leading to missed appointments and complaints 

by inmates who were not being seen. The Warden also expressed 

concern that Mitchem-Green had violated safety protocols by failing to turn in her keys at the end of the workday. After the meeting, Mitchem-Green emailed the Warden, attributing her low 

productivity to the lack of nursing assistance and raising issues regarding substandard care of inmates. In response, the Warden advised that she “need[ed] to address any concerns . . . with nursing 

performance” with MHM. But, the Warden continued, if she “observed a procedural violation or safety concern, [she] should immediately prepare an incident report and forward [it] to [his] office for 

review.” 

Two weeks after this meeting, according to an email from 

Dr. Campbell to Mitchem-Green, Mitchem-Green’s productivity 

was still “very low.” Among other things, Dr. Campbell stated, “As 

discussed please adhere to the normal work hours during which 

patients can be seen. It is also required that you are present in the 

appropriate area assigned at the correct time to see patients. On 

multiple occasions, I have reviewed with you the need to improve 

your productivity which is very low. Please make every effort to 

improve the number of patients seen daily.” 

 On August 29, 2017, Mitchem-Green wrote a physician’s order to “notify OIC re: alleged staff abuse,” after an inmate alleged 

staff abuse. She did not submit an incident report, despite the Warden’s prior instruction to do so. Instead, two days later, on August 

31, she contacted the local Sheriff’s Office to report that inmates 

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were being abused and mistreated at Suwanee. Within hours of 

her report, Warden Clemmons revoked her access privileges to the 

prison and MHM suspended her at the Warden’s request. The 

Warden testified that the proper way to report inmate abuse was 

through an incident report, which would be forwarded to the Office of Inspector General. Dr. Campbell informed the Warden that 

he had investigated the allegations and found them to be without 

support. 

After being informed of her suspension, Mitchem-Green 

was escorted to her locker by Diane Parrish, MHM’s Health Services Administrator, to retrieve any personal items. In MitchemGreen’s locker, according to Parrish, were “a lot” of medical records for two particular inmates, including the inmate with whom 

Mitchem-Green was suspected of having an inappropriate relationship. Parrish testified it was “unheard of” to store medical records 

in a locker, while Dr. Campbell testified that the policy was “for 

medical records to be returned to the medical records department 

at the end of each day.” Mitchem-Green, for her part, testified that 

her locker was the most secure location she could store records because she lacked an office, and that she was not aware of any prohibition on keeping records in her secured locker. 

 MHM terminated Mitchem-Green’s employment on September 21, 2017. The termination paperwork reflects that 

Mitchem-Green was fired for violating policies relating to the storage of protected health information. Campbell testified the decision to terminate was also influenced by Mitchem-Green’s 

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consistently low productivity and her repeated failure to follow the 

directions of her supervisors. 

III.

We start with Mitchem-Green’s claims for race and sex discrimination. The Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”) prohibits an 

employer from discriminating against or discharging any individual 

because of that individual’s race or sex. Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a). 

Because the FCRA is modeled after Title VII, “claims brought under it are analyzed under the same framework.” Alvarez v. Royal 

Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1271 (11th Cir. 2010).

At bottom, Mitchem-Green bears the burden of presenting 

sufficient “circumstantial evidence that creates a triable issue concerning the employer’s discriminatory intent.” Smith v. LockheedMartin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011). To meet that burden, 

Mitchem-Green asserts that MHM “blatantly treated MitchemGreen differently than male non-black employees,” specifically Dr. 

Figueroa and Dr. Vilchez. She asserts that, in contrast to these two 

doctors, she lacked an office or a nursing assistant, she was excluded from certain meetings the doctors were invited to, and she 

was prevented from performing her duties in certain areas. 

When a plaintiff seeks to prove discrimination with evidence 

that a similarly situated employee outside her protected class was 

treated more favorably than herself, she must show that the comparator was “similarly situated in all material respects.” Lewis v. 

City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1226–27 (11th Cir. 2019) (en 

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banc). A valid comparator ordinarily is someone who engaged in 

the same basic conduct as the plaintiff, who was subject to the same 

employment policies and decisionmaker, and who shared the 

plaintiff’s employment or disciplinary history. Id. at 1227–28. 

Here, the district court properly granted summary judgment because the evidence, even in the light most favorable to 

Mitchem-Green, does not support a reasonable inference that her 

suspension and termination were motivated by her race or sex. 

Dr. Figueroa and Dr. Vilchez are not valid comparators. For 

starters, they held different positions with MHM than MitchemGreen. They are medical doctors; Mitchem-Green is not. While 

Mitchem-Green testified that the doctors performed many of the 

same job duties as she did, she acknowledged that the doctors had 

responsibilities she did not have. Chief among those was supervision of the nursing staff, including Mitchem-Green, an ARNP. According to Mitchem-Green’s job description, she “[w]ork[ed] under 

the supervision of a physician . . . and [was] responsible for assisting 

in the delivery of health care.” And the record contains numerous 

emails where Mitchem-Green acknowledged that Dr. Figueroa and 

Dr. Vilchez had supervisory authority over her. Given the doctors’

materially different positions and job duties, no inference of discrimination can be drawn from MHM’s decision to provide offices 

and nursing assistants to the doctors but not to Mitchem-Green, or 

to exclude her from certain provider meetings. 

Nor did Mitchem-Green present any evidence that the doctors engaged in any of the same conduct or misconduct that she 

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did, which led to restrictions on her job duties and her eventual 

suspension and termination. Undisputed record evidence reflects 

that, in the months preceding her termination, Mitchem-Green 

was repeatedly reproached for her low productivity and her failure 

to follow instructions as to where and when she was scheduled to 

work, that she was suspected of having an inappropriate relationship with an inmate, and that she kept medical records for that inmate in her locker after being barred by Dr. Campbell from providing care to the inmate. There is no evidence of even remotely comparable conduct by Dr. Figueroa and Dr. Vilchez. 

For these reasons, Mitchem-Green’s two proffered comparators are not similarly situated in all material respects. See Lewis, 

918 F.3d at 1226–28. And she presents no other evidence suggestive of discriminatory intent or pretext in MHM’s explanation of its 

actions. Accordingly, she has not created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether her suspension and termination were 

motivated by her race or sex. 

IV. 

Next, we consider the retaliation claims, which MitchemGreen brings under both the FCRA and Florida’s Whistleblower’s

Act (“FWA”). As relevant here, the FCRA prohibits employers 

from retaliating against employees for opposing practices made unlawful by the FCRA. Fla. Stat. § 760.10(7). The FWA prohibits 

employer retaliation for, among other things, “[o]bject[ing] to, or 

refus[ing] to participate in, any activity, policy, or practice of the 

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employer which is in violation of a law, rule, or regulation.” Fla. 

Stat. § 448.102. 

To set forth a claim of retaliation under both the FCRA and 

the FWA, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by showing that (i) she engaged in statutorily protected activity, (ii) she suffered a materially adverse action, and (iii) some causal relationship 

exists between the two events. Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 

Inc., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008); Rice-Lamar v. City of Fort 

Lauderdale, 853 So. 2d 1125, 1132–33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (applying Title VII elements to FWA claim).

If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, and 

the employer articulates a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the 

challenged employment action, then, under both the FCRA and 

FWA, the plaintiff must present evidence that the reason provided 

by the employer is a pretext for prohibited retaliatory conduct. 

Goldsmith, 513 F.3d at 1277; Chaudhry v. Adventist Health Sys. 

Sunbelt, Inc., 305 So. 3d 809, 813–14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020) (applying burden-shifting framework to FWA claim). A plaintiff may 

show pretext “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 

U.S. 248, 256 (1981). 

Here, even if we assume arguendo that Mitchem-Green established a prima facie claim of retaliation, we agree with the district court that she failed to create a triable issue of fact about 

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retaliation.1 MHM supplied legitimate reasons for suspending and 

firing her, and she failed to show either that these reasons were 

false or that retaliation was the real reason. See id. 

Mitchem-Green has not shown that the asserted reason for 

her suspension—her failure to follow FDOC policy in reporting the 

inmate abuse allegations—was false. The record shows that Warden Clemmons had previously instructed her to submit an incident 

report for any inmate-abuse allegations so that they could be reviewed and investigated. But Mitchem-Green ignored these instructions and did not file an incident report before reporting the 

allegations to the Sheriff’s Office. What’s more, that failure to follow instructions was not an isolated incident, but rather was consistent with a well-established pattern of similar conduct, such as 

repeatedly failing to work where and when she was scheduled. 

Likewise, Mitchem-Green has not established any basis in 

the record to suspect that MHM’s reasons for terminating her employment were a pretext for unlawful retaliation. She again claims 

that she was treated differently than similarly situated comparators. But that argument fails for the same reasons as it did for the 

discrimination claims, as we discussed above. She questions why 

MHM treated a secure locker differently than a secure office when 

1 Because we assume that Mitchem-Green established a prima facie case of 

retaliation, we need not consider her arguments that the district court erred at 

that stage of the analysis by finding that she did not engage in protected activity or show a causal connection between her activity and her suspension and 

termination.

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it comes to storage of medical records, but she fails to address that 

she possessed medical records for a patient whom she had been 

barred from treating, and therefore had no legitimate basis to possess the records at all. Nor is it “our role to second-guess the wisdom of an employer’s business decisions.” Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 

1266. More broadly, undisputed evidence reflects that MitchemGreen did not meet MHM’s expectations for productivity, time 

management, or following the instructions of supervisors. 

V. 

For these reasons, Mitchem-Green has not created a genuine 

issue of material fact regarding whether her suspension and termination were motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory animus. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to MHM.

AFFIRMED.

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