### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON Fe bru ary 1, 200 6 Se ss io n

ST A TE OF TE N N ES SE E v
. BRU CE WAR REN SC AR BOR OUG H

App e al b y pe r m iss ion fro mth e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Crim inal Cou rt for K nox Coun ty No. 75589 Mar y Beth Leibow itz, Judge

__________________________ No. E2004-01332-SC-R11- CD - F iled on Au gust 28, 2006

__________________________

AND



### STATE OF TENNESS EE v . MACK T. TRANSOU
App e al b y pe r m iss ion fro mth e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Circuit Court

for Madison County Nos. 02-359, 02-360 R oy B. Morgan, Jr., Judge

Nos. W2004-01475-SC-R 11-CD, W2003- 02966-SC-R11- CD - F iled on Au gust 28, 2006

We gr anted these appea ls to d et er m i n e wh ether the extraction of blood from a convicted and incar cer ated f

elon for D NA ana ly sis pursuant to Tennesse e’s DN A collec tion statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-321 ( 2003), is constitutional under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constit ution and article I , section 7 of the Tennesse e Constituti on. These thr ee c ases c ome bef ore us up on De fe nd a nt S c arb or ou g h’ s in te rl oc uto ry appeal fro m th e de nia l of his mot ionto s up pr e ss e vid e nc e a ndup on De fe nd a nt T rans ou ’s dir e c t app e a ls fr om his c on vic tio ns in t wo se pa rate c a se s. Transou a lso challeng es the suff iciency of the e vidence supporting his c onvictions of rape and
a g g r a v a t e d b u r g l ar y i n o n e o f h i s c a s e s a n d t h e s e n t e n c e s h e r e c e i v e d f o r th o s e o f

f e n s e s
. We conclude that the DNA c ollection statute is constituti onal as a pplied here . We furth er h o l d that Transou c onsented to having his blood drawn; t hat t he evidence is sufficie nt to support Transou’s convictions of ra

pe and a g g ravated burg lary ; and that his sentence s for those c rimes ar e valid. The judgme nts of the Court of Criminal Appea ls in all three ca ses ar e af firmed.-2-

Tenn. R. App . 9; Tenn. R. App. 11; Ju dgm ents of the Court of Crim inal Ap peals Aff irm ed

C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , C.J ., E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON , A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J R ., AND J ANI CE M. H OL DER , J J ., joined.

Mark E

. St e p h e n s , D is tric t P u b li c D e f e n d e r , a n d Jo h n H a ls te a d , A s s is tan t P u b li c D e f ender , Knoxvi lle, Tenne ssee, f

or the Appe llant, Bruc e Warre n Scarbor oug h. Mike Mosier (at trial on No. 02-359) and Richard L

. Finney (at trial on No. 02-360 and on appea l in both cases) , J ackson, Te nnessee , attorney s for the A ppellant, Mac k T. Tra nsou.
Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; Mi chae l E . M oo re , So lic ito r G e ne ra l; B re nt C

. Cherry , Assistant Attorney Gene ral; Randall E. Nichols, District Attorney Gene ral, a nd Kevin Allen, As sis ta nt D ist

ri c t A tto rn e y

(S c arb or ou g h) ; Jerry W oo dall, D ist ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, andJody

S. Pic k en s, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral (T ransou) , attorney s for the A ppellee, State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

F ACTUAL BACK GR OUND
Introduction

The a ppeals in these thr ee c ases we re c onsolidated for or al ar g ument beca use they involve related questions of law involving Tenne ssee Code A nnotated section 40-35-321 (2003) (“ the DNA
c oll e c tio n s tatut e ” ) w hic h p ro vid e s:

(d )( 1) Whe n a

c ou rt se nte nc e s a

pe rs on c on vic te d o f any fe lon y of fe ns e committed on or afte r Jul y 1, 1998, it shall orde r the per son to provide a biolog ical specimen f

or the purpose of DNAanaly sis a s define d in subsection (a) . I f the pe rson is n ot i nc arcerat ed a t th e tim e of se nte nc ing , th e or de r s ha ll r e qu ir e thepe rs on to report to the county

or district health department, w hich shall g ather the spec imen. I f the person is inc arc erated at the time of sente ncing , the orde r shall re quire the c hief administrat i v e office r of the institution of incarc eration to designate a qua lified person to g ather

t h e specimen. Thebiologica l specimen shall be f orwa rded by the approve d ag ency

or entity co l lecting such spec imen to the Tenne ssee bur eau of investigation which shall maintain it a s provided in § 38-6-113. T he court shall make the providing of such a

specimen a

condition of probation or c ommunitycorr ection if either is g rante d. We beg in by

revie wing briefly

the bac kg round of e ach c ase.T his C o urt i d en t i f i es the v i cti m s o f

sexu al o f

fen ses b y t he i r i nit i als. 1

I nt er l ocut ory appeal s t o re vi ew pr et r i al order s or r ul i ng s ar e g ene r al l y “ di s f avor ed, ” e s peci al l y i n c r i mi nal 2

ca s es
. St at e v
. G i l l ey , 173 S. W

. 3d 1, 5 ( T en n
. 2005)

. I n Sc ar bor ou g h ’ s c as e, t h e t r i al cou r t not ed t h at t h e s u ppr es s i on i ss ue i s d i spo si t i ve i n one of fo ur ot her cases pe nd i ng agai nst hi m and wo ul d f urt her ass i st t he t ri al co urt i n de t erm i ni ng
w h e t h e r e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t h i m i n t h e t h r e e o t h e r c a s e s s h o u l d be s u p p r e s s e d

. F u r t h e r , t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f t h e DNA
c o llec tio n sta tute is a m a tter o f f irst im p re ssio n b e fo re this C o u rt. In te rlo c u to ry a p p e a ls a re a p p ro p ria te w h e re the re is
a need to p revent ne ed l ess , e xp ensi ve, a nd p rotr act ed li t i gat i o n a nd a ne ed to d evel o p a uni fo rm b o d y of l aw. See T enn. R . A p p . P . 9 (a ) (2 ), (3 ). W e th e re fo re c o n c lud e th a t a n in te rlo c u to ry a p p e a l o f t h e d e n ia l o f S c a rb o ro u g h ’s m o tio n to supp res s i s p rop er. -3- Defendan t Scarborough

OnMa rc h 1 0, 19 99 , d e fe nd a nt B ru c e War re n Sc arb or ou g h ple a de d g uil ty in B lou nt C ou nty to committi ng ag g ravated burg lary , theft, and se x ual battery on Aug ust 25, 1998. Ag gra vated burg lary and sexual battery

are Class C and E felonies, respe ctively

. See id. §§ 39-14-403( b), 39-13- 505(c) . Scarbor oug h was inca rce rate d for his crimes and, on April 22, 1999, par ticipated in the priso n f a c ili ty ’s he a lthsc re e nin g fo r n e w i nmate s. Du ri ng thi s sc re e nin g , h e wa s r e qu e ste d to su bmi t a blo odsp e c ime n p ur su a nt t o th e DN A c oll e c tio n s tatut e fo r D NAa na ly sis , d e fi ne d a s “ thepr oc e ss throug h which deoxyribonucleic acid ( DNA ) i n a human biolog ical spec imen is analy zed and compar ed wi t h DN A from another biolog ical spec imen for identific ation purposes.” I d. § 40-35- 321(a) . Scarbor ou gh s i g ned a c onsent form for the blood draw and DNAanaly sis, and a blood specimen w as obtained. ADNA analy sis was per formed, and the re sults were submitted to the Fe dera l Bure au of Investig ation’s Combined DNA Index S y stem (CODI S).

I n J une 2002 the Tenne ssee Bure au of I nvestig ation reported that the DNAprofile obtaine d fr om the 19 99 sp e c ime n s ub mitte d b y Sc arb or ou g h matc he d t

h eD N Ap r o f

i le ob ta ine d f

ro m a sa mpl e of for ensic e vidence rec overe d during a phy sical examin at i o n co n ducted on J. S ., a woman w ho reported that she ha d been rape d in Knox Countyon Marc h 2, 1997. Following this match, a sea rch 1
war rant wa s obtained on J uly 8, 2002, and a second specimen of blood wa s taken fr om Scarboroug h. Analy sis of

the sec ond specimen c onfirmed that Sca rboroug h was the sour ce of the fore nsic evidenc e obtained during the examination of the 1997 rapevictim. Scarboroug h was subseque ntly char g ed
w i t h f o u r c o u n t s o f a g g r a v a t e d r ap e a g a i n s tJ

. S

. T h a tc a s e i s b e f o r e u s t o d a y.
Scarbor oug h fi l ed a m o t ion to suppress the evidenc e obtained a s a re sult of the blood specimen dr awn in 1999 pursuant to the DNA collec tion statute, asserting that the DNA c ollection statut e is u nc on sti tut ion a l be c aus e it v iol a te s h is f e de ra l a ndstate c on sti tut ion a l rights a g a ins t unrea sonable sea

rche s and seizures. The trial court denied the m otion on its merits but gr anted an interlocutory

appea l. The Court of Criminal Appea ls acc epted the interlocutory appea l and af

firmed the judg ment of the trial c ourt. Scarbor oug h then soug ht this C ourt’s re view, which w e g rante d. 2In M ay 2 0 0 2 , aft er T ran so u had b ee n rel ea sed f ro m p ris o n, he w as take n int o cu st o d y f o r q ue st i o ning b ec au se 3 hi s D N A prof

i l e, devel op ed f

r om t he 19 99 bl oo d draw and s ubmi t t ed t o C O D I S, ha d been mat che d t o evi dence obt ai ned d u rin g S . K .’s r a p e -kit e x a m ina tio n
. O n M a y 1 6 , 2 0 0 2 , T ra n so u su b m itt e d a n o the r b lo o d d ra w to L ie u te n a n t M ike H o lt. T hi s “ kn own s amp l e” was t hen mat che d t o f oren s i c evi dence i n bo t h t he S. K

. and C

. T

. r ape ca s es
. T r ans ou cont es t ed the va lid ity o f t h is M a y 2 0 0 2 se a rc h in the c o u rts b e lo w b u t d o e s n o t co n te st it b e fo re this C o u rt.
-4- Defendan t Transou

Def endant Mack Transou was convicted in 1999 of the Class E felony offe nse of driving a fter being decla

red a motor vehicle ha

bitual offende r. S ee id. §§ 55- 10-613(a ), 55-10- 616(b). The offe nse date was May 14, 1997. Transou was s ubsequently incar cer ated for his infrac tion. During intake proc essing at the prison, Transou signe d a conse nt form and subm itted to a blood draw. A DNA anal y sis wa s p e rf

orme d a ndthere su lts we resu bmi tte d to CO DI S. T rans ou ’s DN A p ro fi le
was ev entuallymatched to pr ofiles deve loped from f orensic e vidence obtained in two unsolved crimes: the r eporte d rape of S. K. in Dec ember 2001 and the r eporte d rape of C. T. in Marc h 2002. Tr a ns ou wa s su bs e qu e ntl y c ha rg e d w ithbo th s e ts o f o ffen ses
. I n b othc a se s h e fi le d a mot ionto suppress the e vidence obtained pursuant to the 1999 blood draw take n while he wa s in prison. The 3 motions were c onsolidated in the trial court for a sing le hea ring on J anuary

9, 2003. At the suppression hea

ring , Tere sa Patterson, a

licensed prac tical nurse, testified that she had been e mploy ed by

the Depa rtment of Corre ction to draw blood samples f rom inmates. She explained the proc edure :
The fir st thing we would do as they en t er ed int ake w ould be explain the proce du r e to a ll th e in mate s b e c au s e th e r e w a s a c o n s e n t f o r m to s ig n
. A fter the inmates sign the consent form, they would be broug ht into the lab room wherethe blo odwo uldbe dr a wn , la be le d at the same e xac t ti me , p a c ka g e d at th e e xac t same time and then sea led.

Ms. Patterson identified a consent form bearing he r sig nature dated Septembe r 7, 1999. This form also bea rs Transou’s name at the l ocation indi cating consent to a blood draw

. Ms. Patterson stated that inmates would occ as i o n al l y object to having their blood draw n and that ther e wa s an administrative proc edure in place to a ddress those objec tions.

Th e c on se nt f

orm date d Se pte mbe r 7 , 1 99 9, a ndbe ari ng Tr a ns ou ’s na me wa s a dmi tte d in to e vid e nc e . It is tit le d “ Con se nt f or DN A A na ly sis ” a ndpr ov ide s, in p e rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s:
I , Ma c k Tr a ns ou , un de rs ta nd that I a m be ing re qu e ste d to a llo w t he h e a lth profe ssional to collect a blood spec imen as re quired in statute TCA §40-35- 321,
c oll e c tio n o f bio log ic a l sp e c ime ns fo r DN A a na ly sis - pe rs on s c on vic te d of c e rt a in of fe ns e s - c on dit ionof

re le a se fr om i mpriso nme nt. TCA §40-35-321 pr o v ides that any person c onvicted of violating or attempting to violate §39-13-502 (Ag g ravated Rape), § 39-13-503 ( Rape), §39- 13--5-

504 (Ag g ravated Sexual Battery ), §39-15-505 (Sexual Battery ), §39-13- 522 (Rape of a Child), or §39- 15-302 (Incest), must provide a bi o logic al spec imen for the purpose of

DNA analy sis. Furthermor e, TCA §40-35-321 pr ovides that any person convicted of

any felony offe nse committed on or afte r J uly 1, 1998, must provide a bio log ic a l sp e c ime n f

or thepu rp os e of

DN A ana ly sis . T he bio log ic a l sp e c ime n w ill be for war ded to the Te nnes s ee Bu re au of I nvestig ation which shall maintain it as provided in §39-6- 113.

I f a pe rson convicte d of vi olating or attempting to violate §39- 13-502, §39- 13-503, §39-13-504, §39-13-505, §39-13-522, §39-15-302, or §40-35- 321 [si c], and committed to the custody of the c ommiss ioner of c orre ction for a term of imprisonment, does not provide a biolog ical specimen for the purpose of DNA analy sis before completion of the pe rson’s term of imprisonment, that per s o nmay not be re lease d on parole or otherw ise unless and unt i l s u ch per son provides such a specimen.

I f an inmate is convicted o f a disciplinary offe nse for

ref using to provide a biologica l specimen, he/she shall fo rf ei t the opportunity

to earn behavior

sentenc e cre dits unti l such time he/she provide s a biolog ical s p ec i m en. I f applica ble, previously

earned beha vior sentenc e cr edits shall not be forf eited. A per son ref

using to pr ov ide a bio log ic a l spe c ime n may a t a late r date pr ov idea sp e c ime n. F or

tho se persons re fusing to provide a specimen, a due proce ss hearing sha ll be provided by the disciplinary

board.

The c onsent form c ontains two alternative signature lines for the inmate: one f

o l l o wi ng the statement “B y

signing this Iacknow ledg e that I understand th e abovementioned” and the other following the statement “ I am re fusing to participate in the DNA testing proce ss.” Tr an sou’s sig natur e app e ars on thefi rs t of the se lin e s.
Transou te stified at the suppre ssion hearing about the circumstances sur rounding the blood draw :
You kn ow, we was kin d o f i n a ru sh wh e n w e we nt thr ou g h th e re . T he y jus t to ld
every body just go throug h these forms here and fi l l t h em out and sig n them. You know, I didn’t even take time to rea d, y ou know, what I was sig ning. Y ou just went throug h there . They

had som ething like six forms. We went throug h them and
s i g n e d t h e m , a n d t h e y S

they draw ed the blood.

Con c e rn ing his kn ow le dg e abo ut p art ic ipatio n inDN A t e sti ng , T rans ou a lso te sti fi e d, “ Te c hn ic a lly it was not require d when I went throug h. They

just started this back in 2000.”

Onc ro ss- e xami natio n, Tr a ns ou a dmi tte d h e ha d b e e n “ in andou t of ja il” mos t of his a du lt life. Consequently , he wa s “very well famili ar” with the criminal just ice sy stem. He wa s familiarT r ans ou does not cont es t t he s uf f i ci enc y of

t he evi dence s uppo r t i ng hi s co nv i ct i ons f or t he offens es comm i t t ed 4

a g a i n s t C

. T.

T ran so u c o nc ed es in his ap p l i ca t i o n for p erm i ssi o n to ap p ea l t o t his C o urt t ha t t he C o urt o f C rimina l A p p ea l s’ 5
sta te m e n t o f fa c ts is “su b sta n tially co rr e c t.”
-6- with the l aw library at t he prison and had done resear ch there, even filing moti ons on his own behalf. Transou ide ntified his signature on two motions he had filed with the court, and on a letter he had sent the court. He ac knowledg ed the importa n ce of rea ding doc uments befor e sig ning the m. He acknow ledg ed pre vious familia ri t y wi t h the Consent for DN A Analy sis form. He a cknowledg ed ha vin g sig ne d th e S ept embe r 1 99 9 Co ns e nt f or DN A A na ly sis fo rm , b ut c on te nd e d th a t hedidso in order to a void a disciplinary action.

Onre dir e c t, T rans ou ma int a ine d that he “w a sn ’t g ive n a c ho ic e ” abo ut w he the r t o s ub mit to the blood draw

. Connie Howar d testified that she is the state a dminist rator f or CODI S. She explained that CODI S is a loc al, state, and national databa se for DNA profiles develope d from fore nsic evidenc e c oll e c te d inc ri min a l in ve sti g a tio ns a ndfr om “ c on vic te d o ff e nd e r s a mpl e s. ” Acco rdi ng to M s. Howar d, a sample f

rom Tra nsou collecte d on September 7, 1999, w as submitted to CODI S.

The tr i al co u rt denied Tr ansou’s motion to suppress, ruling that at the time he sig ned the consent form Transou kne w the DNAcollection statute did not apply t o h i m , and that “w hen
c on sid e ri ng [Tr a ns ou ’s ] e du c a tio na l le ve l, h is f a mil iari ty wi th the c ri min a l ju sti c e sy ste m, andhis acknow ledg ment that he wa s familiar with the c onsent form he signe d on 9/7/ 9 9 , [Transou] intelligently , knowing ly , and voluntarily consente d to having his blood drawn.” Following the denial of hi s motions to suppress in both case s, Transou was tried be fore a jury in eac h one. In the ca se involving vic tim C . T., Transou was convicted of one count of ra pe and one count of sexual battery

. I n the case i nvolving victim S. K., Transou was convic ted of one count of rape and one c ount of ag g ravated burg lary . Be cause Transou c ontests the sufficie ncy of the e vidence supporting his c onvictions for the off enses c ommitt ed ag ainst S. K. , we se t forth the Court of 4 Cr imi na l A pp e a ls’ su mma ry of thepr oo f a dd uc e d at hi s tria l f or the se of fe ns e s: 5

I n th e e ar ly

h o u r s o f th e mo r n in g o n D e c e mb e r 2 3 , 2 0 0 1 , th e v ic ti m, [S

. K

. ], awoke to the s o u n d of [Transou] crashing throug h her be droom door. [Transou] g rabbe d her and though the victim foug ht to push him away , he succ eede d in raping he r. Whe n th e po lic e arrive d, the y fo un d th e vic tim vi si bly up se t a nde xtre me ly frig htened. Although the victim identified [Transou] at trial, on the morning of the
a ssa ult sh e wa s on ly able to g ive inv e sti g a tor s a g e ne ra l de sc ri pti onof

he r a ssailant, including his g ener al ag e, heig ht, w eig ht, r ace , and clothing . Police determined that [Transou] had broken in and f led t hroug h the vi ctim’s back door, as evidenced by the br ok e n g la ss, c ut s c re e n, a ndda ma g e to the do or its e lf . Inv e sti g a tor s w e reno t a ble to c oll e c t any us able fi ng e rp ri nts fr om the vic tim ’s ho me
. Th e vic tim wa s ta ke n to-7-

thee me rg e nc y

ro om, wh e re ph y sic ia ns pe rf orme d a n e xami natio n a ndse xua l a ssa ult kit. An e x amination of the sexual assault kit revea led the pre sence of semen. D NA from seme n collecte d as part of the sexual assault kit was compar ed with DNA fr om a sample of

[Transou’s] blood, and they matched. Ac cording to the c rime lab technician who testified at tria l, the probability that another

person be sides [Transou] would have the exact DNA profile i s one out of a number so larg e that it exceeds the
curr ent world population. Specifica lly , the crime la b technician testified that, base d on the statist i cs , n o person other than [Transou] could have be en the sourc e of the
semen c ollected during the phy sical examination of the victim.

Ba sed on this proof the jury convicted T ransou of

one coun t o f ra p e o f S

. K. and one count of ag g ravated burg lary . The trial c ourt subsequently sentenc ed Transou to c oncurr ent terms of six teen y ear s and fifte en y ear s of incar cer ation, respe ctively

. AN AL YSI S
I. Stand ard of Review We will uphold a trial court’s finding s of fac t in a hearing on a motion to suppress evidenc e unl es s the evidenc e pre ponderates otherwise . State v. Cox , 171 S.W .3d 174, 178 (Tenn. 2005)

. Questio n s re garding witness cre dibilit y , the weig ht and value of the evidenc e, and r esolution of conflicts in the evide nce a re matters entrusted to the t rial j udg e as the trier of fac t. State v. Carter, 16 S.W .3d 762, 765 (Tenn. 2000). The prevailing party is affor ded the strong est leg itimate view of the evidenc e and a ll reasona ble and leg itimate infere nces that may be dra wn there from. I d. Howeve r, this Court reviews de novo the trial court’s ap p l ication of the la w to the fa cts without
acc ording any

presumption of cor

rec tness to those conclusions. I d.
II. DNA Collec tion Statute

I n 1 99 4 th e Un ite d St a te s Co ng re ss empo we re d the F e de ra l Bu re au of Inv e sti g a tio n to c re a te a data base of DNA profiles, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132 (1995), commonly ref erred to a s the Combined DNA Index S y stem (CODI S). I n response , all fifty sta t es enac ted leg islation to collect biologica l specimens f

or the purpose of cr eating a DNAprofile of persons c onvicted of c erta in crimes, see United States v. Kincade , 379 F.3d 813, 848 ( 9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) ( Reinhardt, J., di ssenting) , and place d those DNA pr ofiles in the sea rcha ble CODI S database . See F eder al B ureau of Investig ation, NDI S Participants, available at htt p:/ /w ww .f bi/ g ov /hq /la b/c od is/ pa rt state s. htm

. Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 4 0 -3 5-321 sets forth the circ umstances in Te nnessee un de r wh ic h a con vic te d f e lonwi ll b e re qu ir e d to su bmi t a bio log ic a l sp e c ime n f

or DN A ana ly sis

. Sub se c tio n (b) pr ov ide s th a t a c ou rt se nte nc ing a

pe rs on c on vic te d o f c omm itt ing or a tte mpt ing to c omm it a g g ra vate d r ape , ra pe , a g g ra vate d se xua l batte ry , se xua l batte ry , r ape of a c hil d, or inc e st, “shall orde r the pe rson to provide a biologica l spe cimen for the pur pose of DN A ana ly sis.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-321( b). F urthermor e, per sons convicted of any fe lon y c omm itt e d o n o r a ft e r Jul yT en ne ssee C o d e A nn o t ated sec t i o n 3 8

- 6

- 1 1 3 (2 0 0 3 ) p ro vid es: 6 (a) A s used i n thi s secti o n, unless t he co ntex t o t he rw i se re q uires, “ D N A an alysi s”
means t he proces s t hr ough whi ch deoxy r i bo nu cl ei c aci d ( D N A ) i n a human bi ol ogi cal s peci men i s an al y zed an d com pare d wi t h D N A f r om an ot her bi ol ogi cal sp ec i m en fo r i d en t i f

i ca t i o n p urp o ses. (b) T he T enness ee b ureau o f i nvest i gat i o n s hal l de vel o p uni fo rm p roce d ures fo r t he
c o llec tio n a n d p re se rv a ti o n o f h u m a n b io lo g ic a l sp e c im e n s fo r D N A a n a lysis in
ca s es of a l l eg ed or s u s pec t ed v i ol at i on s of § 39- 13- 502, § 39- 13- 503, § 39- 13- 504, § 39

- 13

- 50 5, § 39

- 13

- 52 2 or § 39- 15

- 30 2. Law enf orce ment agen ci es an d m edi cal pers onnel wh o conduct ev i dent i ar y ex ami nat i ons s hal l us e t he un i form procedur es i n their i nv esti ga t i o n o f t he ab o ve o f

fen ses. ( c) T he bur eau s hal l adop t un i form procedur es t o m ai nt ai n, pre s er ve and a nal y ze hu man bi ol ogi cal s peci mens for D N A

. T he bur eau s hal l es t abl i s h a ce nt r al i zed sys t em t o cro ss- refere nc e d ata o b t aine d f ro m D N A an alysi s. (d ) T h e b u re a u sh a ll p e rfo rm D N A a n a lysis a n d m a k e d a ta o b ta in e d a v a ilab le to la w e n fo rc e m e n t o ff

ic ia ls in co n n e c tio n w ith a p p ro p ria te c rim ina l i n v e stiga tio n s in
w hich hum an b io l o gica l sp ec i m en s hav e b ee n re co ve red

. T he b ure au shall also
m a k e the d a ta a v a ilab le to the d istric t a tto rn e y g e n e ra l, a n d the su b je c t o f the d a ta in a n y su b se q u e n t cr im ina l p ro se c u tio n o f t h e su b je c t.

T he Fo urt h A m end m ent i s ap p l i cab l e t o t he Stat e o f T enness ee p urs uant t o t he Fo urt eent h A m end m ent of t he 7 U ni t ed Stat es Co nst i t ut i o n. M ap p v. O hi o , 36 7 U

. S. 64 3 , 65 5 (19 6 1 ).
-8- 1, 1998, are to be orde red by the t ri al co u rt upon sentenc ing to submit a biolog ical spec imen for DNA an al y sis. I d. at (d)( 1). These biologica l specimens ar e to be f orwa rded to the Te nnessee Bur eau of I nvestig ation “which shall maintain [t hem] a s provided in § 38-6-113.” I d. at (b), (c) , (d). 6 Scarbor oug h’s blood was dra wn, and his DNAprofi l e d evelope d, pursuant to these statutory provisions.
III. DNA Collec tion as Search

The State c ontends that t h e co l l ection of Scarboroug h’s blood for DN A ana ly sis and identification purpose s does not co nstitut e a se arc h under the Fourth Amendment to the United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n
. W e d i s a g r e e
. T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s S u p r e m e C o u rt r e c o g n i z e d i n S k i n n e r v
. R y. 7 L abor Executives’ As s n
. t h at the phy sical intrusion occa sioned by a blood dra w “infringe s an expectation of privac y .” 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989); see also State v. Bla ckwood, 713 S.W .2d 677, 679 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986) (re cog nizi ng that the wit hdraw al of blood for testing is subject to the
c on str a int s o f the F ou rt

h A me nd me nt) . Mor e ov e r, “ [t]he e ns uin g c he mic a l a na ly sis of thesa mpl e to obtain phy siologica l data is a further invasion of the tested [indivi dual’s] privacy interests.” Skinner, 489 U.S

. at 616. Scarbor oug h’s blood draw and its subsequent ana ly sis are both subjec t to the c on sti tut ion a l li mit a tio ns imp os e d b y theF ou rth A me nd me nt.-9- IV . TheF our th Am e ndm e nt
Th e F ou rth Am e nd me nt pr ov ide s that “ [t]he ri g ht o f the pe op le to b e se c ur e in the ir pe rs on s, houses, paper s, and eff

ects, ag ainst unrea sonable sear ches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” U. S. C O N ST . ame nd . IV. Th us , th e F ou rth A me nd me nt p e rm its re as on ab le sear ches. See Skinner, 48 9 U .S. a t 61 9 ( “ [T]heF ou rth A me nd me nt d oe s n ot p ro sc ri be a ll se arc he s a ndse izur e s, bu t on ly those that areunrea sonable.” ); Florida v. J imeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (“Thetouchstone of the F ou rth A me nd me nt i s reaso nab le ne ss. ” ). B y its ow n te rm s, theF ou rth A me nd me nt d e e ms rea sonable those se arc hes conduc ted pursuant to a war rant issued “ upon probable cause , supported b y o at h o r a ff

i rm at i o n , an d p ar t i cu l ar l y d es cr i b i n g t h e pl ac e to b e s ea rc h ed , an d t h e p er s o n s o r t h i n gs to b e se ize d. ” U. S. C O N ST . amend. IV. Under certain circ umstances, searc hes conduc ted without
a war rant but pur suant to individualized suspicion of criminal wrong doing are also co n s i d ere d
rea sonable. See , e.g ., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-27 (1968) ( upholding “ stop and frisk” se arc hes upon rea sonable suspi cion as a gene ral ex ception to t he wa rrant require ment); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) ( upholding se arc hes conducte d incident to a rre st as a g ener al exception to th e w arr a n t r e q u ir e me n t)

. Se ar c h e s p u r s u a n t t o th e D N A c o ll e c ti o n s tatu tear e u n d e rtaken, howeve r, with neither a war rant nor any individualiz ed suspicion. Thus, we must look for another ba sis up on wh ic h to a na ly ze the re a so na ble ne ss o f the se se arc he s.
The United States Supreme Court ha s emphasized “the long standing principle that ne ither
a wa rra n t n or proba

ble cause, nor, indee d, any measureof individualiz ed suspicion, is an indispensable compone nt of rea sonablene ss i n every circ umstance.” Nat’l Tr easury Employ ees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U .S. 656, 665 (1989); see also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624 (re cog nizi ng that “a show ing of individualiz ed suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below which a sear ch must be presumed unr easona

ble”) ; I llinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424 (2004) (acknow ledg ing that “spec ial law enf orce ment concerns will sometimes justi fy [seiz ures] without indi vidualized suspicion”). Rather, “ wher e the privacy interests i mplicated by the s ear ch ar e minimal, and wher e an importa nt g overnme ntal interest furthere d by the intrusion would be place d i n j eopardy by a re quirement of individualiz ed suspicion, a se arc h may be re asonable despite the a bsence of such suspicion.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.

DNA c ollection done automatica lly upon incar cer ation is by

definition perf

ormed without any individualiz ed suspi cion t hat t he inm ate has committed a specific crime. Yet all fifty states and thefe de ra l g ov e rn me nt h a ve e na c te d s omety pe of DN A c oll e c tio n s tatut e requi ri ng so me or a ll
c on vic te d f

e lon s to su bmi t a

bio log ic a l sampl e fo r DN A pr of ile a na ly sis a ndsto ra g e in a DN A d a ta ba nk

. Se e State v. Ra ine s, 85 7 A.2 d 19, 23 (M d. 20 04 ) ( c iti ng 42 U. S.C. §§ 14 13 1- 34 a ndMic he lle Hi bb e rt , DN

A D ata ba nk

s: Law E nfo rc e me nt’ s G re ate st S ur v e ill an c e Too l? , 34 Wake For est L . Rev. 76 7, 77 1 n .1 2 ( 19 99 ))

. Al tho ug h the Un ite d Stat e s Su pr e me Cou rt ha s y e t to op ineon thi s is su e , to date, a ll Fourth Amendme nt challeng es to these r eg imes have be en ultimately uns u cc es s fu l . See, e.g ., United States v. Conley , 453 F.3d 674, 680- 81 (6th Cir. 2006); United S tates v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 924- 25 (8th Cir. 2006); Nicholas v. Goor d, 430 F.3d 65 2 , 6 5 5 (2d Cir. 2005); United State s v . Sc zub e le k, 40 2 F .3 d 1 75 , 1 77 (3 d Ci r. 20 05 ); Pa dg e tt v . D on a ld, 40 1 F .3 d 1 27 3, 12 75 (1 1th Cir. 2005); Kincade , 379 F.3d at 832; Gree n v. Be rg e, 354 F.3d 675, 679 ( 7th Cir. 2004); Groce manSc arbo rough’ s co nvi ct i o n o f sexua l ba t t ery , T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 9

- 1 3

- 5 0 5 (a), al so b rought hi m wi t hi n t he 8
p urvi ew o f

t he D N A co l l ect i o n s t at ut e. I d

. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 3 2 1 (b).
-10- v. United States Dep’ t of J ustice, 354 F.3d 411, 413-14 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003); Velasque z v. W oods, 329 F.3d 420, 421 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curia m); Roe v. Marc otte, 193 F.3d 72, 79- 82 (2d Cir. 1999); Shaffe r v. Saff le, 148 F.3d 1180, 1181 (10th Cir. 1998); Schli ch er v . Peters, 103 F .3d 940, 943 (10th Cir. 1996); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1340 ( 10th Cir. 1996); Rise v. Ore g on, 59 F.3d 1556, 1562 (9th Cir. 1995); J ones v. Murray , 962 F.2d 302, 308 ( 4th Cir. 1992); Polst on v. State, 360 Ark. 317, __ S.W.3d __, 2005 WL 107132, at *5 (Ark. 2005); I n re the Appea l in Maricopa County J uvenile Ac tion Nos. J V512600 and JV-512797, 930 P.2d 496, 500-01 (Ariz. 1996); People v. Adams, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 170, 183-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); L .S. v. State, 805 So.2d 1004, 1006-07 (F l. D ist

. C t

. Ap p
. 2 0 0 1); People v. Calaha n, 649 N.E.2d 588, 592 (Ill. App. Ct. 1 9 9 5 ); S t ate v. Ma rtinez, 78 P.3d 769, 775 (K a n. 20 03 ); Ra ine s, 85 7 A .2 d at 21 ; L a nd ry v. Attorne y

Gen era l, 7 09 N. E. 2d10 85 , 1 09 2 ( Ma ss. 1999); Cooper v. Gammon, 943 S.W .2d 699, 705 (Mo. C t. App. 1997); Gaines v. State, 998 P.2d 166, 172 (Ne v. 2000) (pe r curiam); State v. Steele, 802 N.E.2d 1127, 1137 ( Ohio Ct. App. 2003); State ex rel. J uvenile Dep’ t v. O rozco, 878 P.2d 432, 435-36 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) ( in banc) ; Dial v. Vaug hn, 733 A.2d 1, 7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999); I n re D.L .C., 124 S.W .3d 354, 373 (Tex. App. 2003); J ohnson v. Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 769, 779 (Va

. 2000); State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1088 (Wash. 1993) (e n banc) ; Doles v. State, 994 P.2d 315, 319 (Wy o. 1999).

Th e c ou rt s c on sid e ri ng the se F ou rth A me nd me nt c ha lle ng e s h a ve no t be e n u na nim ou s in the ir a na ly sis , h ow e ve r. Som e ha ve fo un d the le g isl a tio n at issu e va lidun de r the tr a dit ion a l “ tot a lit y of the circumstance s” approach. See, e.g., Sczubelek, 402 F .3d at 184; Padg ett, 401 F.3d at 1280; Groc eman, 354 F .3d at 413; J ones, 962 F .2d at 307; Raines, 857 A.2d at 27; D oles, 994 P.2d at 319. Othe r c ou rt s h a ve up he ld the c ha lle ng e d le g isl a tio n a ft e r f ind ing that th e g ov e rn me nt’ s in te re st i n collecting the DNA is a

“spec ial need” bey ond the normal ne ed fo r l aw e nforc ement. See, e .g ., Nich o la s , 4 3 0 F

. 3 da t 6 7 2 ; B e r g e , 3 5 4 F

. 3 d a t 6 7 9 ; Kim le r , 3 3 5 F

. 3 d a t 1 1 4 6 ; O li v a s , 8 5 6 P. 2 d at 1086. Upon our re view of the se and othe r ca ses, we ha ve dete rmined that sea rche s of incar cer ated felons undertaken pur suant to Tennesse e’s DN A collec tion statute pass constitutional must er w hen they are rea sonable unde r all of t h e ci rc u m s tance s. We turn now to an examination of the circ umstances surr ounding the collection of a biologica l spe cimen fr om Scarboroug h pursuant to the DNA c ollection statute. V. Scarborough

Scarbor oug h’s blood was dra wn while he w as inca rce rate d following h i s convictions of felonies committed a fter J uly 1, 1998. The DN A collec tion statute require d Scarbor oug h to provide this biol og ical spec imen irrespe ctive of any consent he may have g rante d or withheld. Whil e we 8
rec og nize that prisoners “do not f orfe it a ll c onstitut ional protec tions by rea son of thei r c onviction and conf inement in prison,” B ell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979), prisoners do not enjoy the brea dth and depth of F ourth Amendment prote ction acc orded law-a biding citizens. See Padg ett, 401 F.3d at 1278 (re cog nizi ng that prisoners “do not enjoy the s ame Fourth Amendment rig hts as fre eT he exc ept i on t o t he r ul e of D N A bei ng i di osy ncr at i c a s t o each an d eve r y i ndi vi dual i s i n t he cas e of i dent i cal 9

s i bl i n g s
. Se e Sc zu bel ek , 402 F. 3d a t 181 n

. 2; Rai n es , 857 A. 2d a t 22 n

. 7.
-11- persons” ). Rather , “courts have re cog nized that prisoners comprise a sepa rate cate g ory

of per sons fo r p u rp o s e s o f th e [F o u rth ] A me n d me n t. ” I d

. a t 1 2 7 8

- 7 9 ; s e e a ls o Rain e s , 8 5 7 A.2d at 33 (re cog nizi ng that “inca

rce rate d persons have a sever ely diminis hed expectation of privacy ”). The United States Court of Appea ls for t h e Fi fth Circuit has g one so fa r as to dec lare bluntlythat “per sons incarc erated after conviction reta in no constitutional privacy interest ag ainst their cor

rec t identification.” G roce man, 354 F.3d at 413-14; see a lso Kincade , 379 F.3d at 837 n.32 (rec og nizi ng that “ [t]ho se wh o h a ve su ff e re d a law fu l con vic tio n lose a n inte re st in the ir ide nti ty to a de g re e we llre c og nize d a s su ff

ic ie nt t o e nti tle theg ov e rn me nt p e rm a ne ntl y t o maint a in a

ve ri fi ablere c or d o f the ir identity ; not merely

sporadica lly

to demand its produc tion under indepe ndently lawful c onditions”). Th e se c a se s mak e c le ar that Sc arb or ou g h’ s st a tus a s a n in c arc e ra te d f e lonre du c e d s ig nif

ic a ntl y his
e xpe c tatio n of priva c y un de r the F ou rth A me nd me nt. Sc arb or ou g h’ s in te re st i n k e e pin g private his biologica l identityis also lessened by the fa ct that Tenne ssee “ likely al re ad y h as a plethora of identify ing inf

ormation about [him] , in light of [his] status as convicted felon[].” Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 671.

Addit i o n ally , the intrusion occa sioned by a blood dra w “is not signif icant.” Skinner , 489 U.S. at 425 (citing Schmerbe r v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966)) ; see a lso W inston v. L ee, 470 U.S. 753, 762 (1985) (r ecog nizi ng that “blood tests do not constitute an unduly extensive imposi tion on an individual’s per sonal privac y an d bodily integ rity ”) ( citing Schme rber , 384 U.S. at 771) ( f o o t n o t e o m i t t e d )

. In t h e c o n t e x to f D N A a n a l ys i s , i tap p e ar s t h a tt h e i n tru s i o n o c c a s i o n e d b y a blood d ra w m ay even be come unne cessa ry as tec hnology

prog resse s and allows the biolog ical specimen to be obtained through measures requiring no phy sical invasion whatsoe ver. A s noted by J udg e Rake r in his c oncurring opinion in Raines, “[i] t is now possible to ‘e x trac t DNA by apply ing a sticky patch to the skin on an individual’s for earm for a moment to acquir e epidermal cells without puncturing the skin surfac e.’” 857 A.2d at 47 n.3 (quoting B. Q uarmby , The Cas e for Nat ion al D

NA I de n ti fi c a ti o n Cards , 2 0 0 3 Du ke L . & T ech. Re v. 2, 20 (2003)) (Raker , J ., concur ring ). We are mindful, however , that the DNA analy sis perf ormed after the collection of the biological specimen is a separ ate and distinct sea rch which “is potentially a far g reater intrusion than the initial ext rac tion of DNA , since the state analy zes DNA for i nformation and maintains DNA re cords indef initely .” Nicholas, 430 F .3d at 670. As noted by J udg e Gould in his c oncurring opinion in Kinca de, “D NA stores and r evea ls massive amounts of persona l, private data . . . and the advance of scienc e promises to make stored D NA only more re vealing in time.” 379 F.3d at 842 n
. 3 (G o u l d , J ., concur ring ). Howeve r, Tenne ssee’ s DNA collection statute specifie s that the bi ologic al s pecimen obtained from felons is to be ana ly zed “for identification purpose s.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-321( a). Thus, a s no te d b y ma ny c ou rt s b e fo reus , th e se c on d s e arc h s e rv e s a s a fo rm of “ fi ng e rp ri nti ng” so a s to provide a statistically prec ise method of i dentifying a s ingle individual: a method that the subject 9 cannot impug n by

altering his or her a

ppear ance
.-12-

We next consider the reg ime under w hich the blood spec imen was dra wn. As noted a bove, the F ou rth Ame nd me nt g e ne ra lly re qu ir e s a se arc h to be pr e c e de d b y

a wa rr a nt i ssu e d u po n p ro ba

ble
cause . This limi tation serves to protect our c itiz enry from the potential a

buses of unlimited discretion by

law enf orce ment ag ents and off

icer s. The blood dra w at issue in S car boroug h’s ca se, ho we ve r, wa s n ot the pr od uc t of a ny pa rt ic ula r l a w e nf or cem ent o ff

ic e r’ s in div idu a l de c isi on to int ru de up on his priva c y . Rathe r, thec ha lle ng e d dra w wa s the pr od uc t of a sta tut ory sc he me that is ai m ed atce rt ai n cl as s es o f c o n v i ct ed fe l o n s
. I f t h e s u b j ec th as b ee n co n v i ct ed o f co m m i t t i n g a specifie d crime, the subject is require d to provide a biolog ical spec imen for DN A ana ly sis. The statute allows for no disc retion as to who will be r equire d to pr ovide a specimen. N eutra l oversig ht to protect a g ainst overzea lous la w enfor ceme nt office rs exercising unfetter ed discre tion is t here fore not nece ssary . This statutory reg ime, which is “discre tion-less” i n its cover ag e, weighs in favor of there a so na

ble ne ss o f the se arc he s. Se e Vo n Raa b, 48 9 U .S. a t 66 7 ( op ini ng that w arr a nt t o o btain urine test of Customs employ ee w as not nec essary in part bec ause the sear ch re g ime involved no discretion by

office rs in the field).

Scarbor oug h’s blood was obtaine d not only wi t h o u t a wa rrant, it was obtained with no indiv i d u al i z ed s u s p i ci o n o f a n y p ar t i cu l arwr o n gd o i n g b y h i m
. Ho we v er , t h e D NA testi ng perf ormed pursuant to the DNAcollection statute is not aimed at discove ring incriminating evidenc e of particular crim in a l a c ti v ity b y th e d o n o r s
. Se e Rain e s , 8 5 7 A

. 2 d a t 2 9 n
. 1 1 ( n o ti n g th a t a D NA collection act does not r esult in g athering dir ect e vidence of a c rime). Rathe r, the instant sea rche s wer e undertaken to further establish Scarbor oug h’s i dentity

. See Berg e, 354 F .3d at 678 (noting that “[t] he primary purpose of the Wis consin DNA law

. . . is not to se arc h for ‘evide nce’ o f c ri m i n al
wr on g do ing

. . . [bu t] to ob ta in r e lia blepr oo f o f a

fe lon ’s ide nti ty ” ). Th e state ’s int e re st i n Scarbor oug h’s identity

was trig g ere d not by any individualiz ed suspicion that he ha d eng ag ed in any particula r c ri m i n al activity

prior to the blood dra w, but rathe r as incide ntal to his demonstrated willingness to commit certain felony offe nses. The c oncerns addre ssed by the g ener al re quirement of so me l e v e l o f

i n d i v i d u a l i z e d s u s p i c i o n w e r e t h e r e f o r e n o tp r e s e n td u r i n g t h e i n s t a n ts e ar c h e s. I ndeed, a s rec og nized by

M a r yla n d ’ s h ig hc o u r

t, “ [r ]e q u iring individualiz ed suspicion to obtain DNA for f uture use would neg ate the very purpose of the Act itself, c onsidering that the Act doe s not seek to obtain e vidence , but to merely identify persons.” Raines, 857 A.2d at 29; see also J ones, 962 F .2d at 306-07 (c oncluding that “the F ourth Amendment doe s not require an additional finding of individualiz ed suspicion bef ore blood c an be ta

ken fr om incarc erat ed felons for the pur pose of ide nti fying the m” ) ( fo otn oteomi tt ed) . A c c or din g ly , Sc arb or ou g h’ s rig hts un de r the F ou rth Amendment we re not violated simply beca use the instant blood draw was take n without any level of individualiz ed suspicion. We turn now to the g over n m ent’s int ere st in drawing Scarbor oug h’s blood and then
a na ly zing it. As se t fo rth abo ve , Sc arb or ou g h’ s blo od wa s dr a wn in or de r t o e sta bli sh his ide nti ty thr ou g h D NAa na ly sis . A s r e c og nize d b y theUn ite d St a te s Co urt of Ap pe a ls f or theF ou rth Ci rc uit , “[t] he g overnme ntal justification for this form of identific ation . . . relies on no a rg ument differ ent in kind from that traditionally advanc ed for taking fing erprints and photogr aphs, but with additional fo rc e be c aus e of the po te nti a lly g re a te r pr e c isi on of DN A s a mpl ing a ndmatc hin g me tho ds .” Jone s, 962 F.2d at 307. The g overnme nt’s interest in cor rec tly identify ing those who have broken its laws-13-

is o bv iou s:
It is a well rec og nized aspect of c riminal conduct that the pe rpetra tor wi ll take unusual steps to conce al not only his c onduct, but a lso his identity . Disg uises used while committing a crime may be supplemented or repla ced by chang ed name s, and
even c hang ed phy sical fe ature s. Traditional methods of identificati o n by photogr aphs, historical re cords, and fing erprints often prove ina dequate . The DN A, howe v er , i s claimed to be unique to eac h individual and cannot, within cur rent sc ie nti fi c kn ow le dg e , b e a lte re d. Th e ind ivi du a lit y of the DN A pr ov ide s a dr a matic
ne w t oo l f

or thela w e nf

or c e me nt e ff

ort to matc h sus pect s andc ri min a l c on du c t. Even a suspect with alter ed phy sical features cannot esca pe the matc h that his DNA mig ht m ake wi th a sa mpl e c on ta ine d in a DN A ba nk , or le ft a t th e sc e ne of

a c ri me wi thi n s a mpl e s o f b loo d, skin, se me n o r h a ir fo lli c le s.
I d. Moreove r, as r ecog nized by the United States Court of Appe als for the Third Circuit,
[a] DNA database promotes incre ased acc urac y in the investigation and prosec ution of c ri min a l c a se s. It w ill a id in solv ing c ri me s whe n the y oc c ur in the fu tur e . E qu a lly important, the DNA samp l es wi l l help to exculpate individuals who are serving
se nte nc e s o f imp ri so nme nt fo r c ri me s th e y didno t c omm it andwi ll h e lp t o e lim inate ind ivi du a ls f

ro m su sp e c t lis ts wh e n c ri me s oc c ur
. Whil e the pr e se nc e of [a f e lon ’s ] DN A in CO D I S may in c u lp a te h im in th e f u tu r e , it may a ls o e xo n e r a te him. The int e re st in a c c ur a te c ri min a l inv e sti g a tio ns a ndpr os e c uti on s is a c omp e lli ng int e re st that the [feder al] DNA Act c an re asonably be said to advance.
Sc zub e le k, 40 2 F .3 d at 18 5 (f oo tno te omi tte d) ; se e a lso Ra ine s, 85 7 A. 2da t 33 (“ Th e DN A p ro fi le thu s se rv e s th e pu rp os e of inc re a sin g thee ff

ic ie nc y a nd a c c ur a c y in ide nti fying ind ivi du a ls w ith in
a c e rt a in c la ss of c on vic te d crimi na ls. Th e pu rp os e is akin to that of a fin g e rp ri nt. ” ). We a g re e wi th the many courts that haveprec eded us that the g overnme nt’s interest in conduc ting these sear ches is weig hty , indeed

. See, e.g ., Raines, 857 A.2d at 31 ( rec og nizi ng “the c ompelling g overnme nt interest in identifying persons i nvolved with crimes” ); Nicholas, 430 F .3d at 669 (finding that “Ne w York ha s a strong g overnme ntal interest i n o b t ai ning ide ntify ing inf ormation from c onvicted offe nders and keeping a rec ord of such information”) ; Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 185 (re cog nizi ng that

“ [t]he int e re st in a c c ur a te c ri min a l inv e sti g a tio ns a nd pr os e c uti on s is a c omp e lli ng int e re st” ). Th is fac tor also weig hs in favor of t h e re as o nablene ss of sear ches c onducted pur suant to the DNA collection statute.

I n sum, our leg islature has put into plac e a method of more a ccur ately identify ing those who
c omm it andarec on vic te d o f f e lon ie s, the re by e na

bli ng la w e nf

or c e me nt pe rs on ne l to m or e qu ic kly
a nda c c ur a te ly

e xone rate theinn oc e nt and pro secu te th e pe rp e tr a tor s. Th e g ra vity of thepu bli c conce rn served by

the instant sear ches is theref ore sig nificant. Give n the heig htened a ccur acy of DNA analy sis c ompare d to mor e traditional methods of identification, such as fing erprint s and
e y e wi tne ss t e sti mon y , th e de g re e to wh ic h the DN A c oll e c tio n s tatut e a dv a nc e s th a t in te re st i s a lsoB ec au se w e u p ho l d t he i nstant searc he s und er a t o t ali t y o f t he circum st an ce s ap p ro ac h, we ne ed no t ad d ress 10

w h e the r th e y w o u ld sa tisf y a “sp e c ia l ne e d s” a n a lysis.
-14- signific ant. Additionally , Tenne ssee’ s DNA c ollection statute clea rly and unambig uously

specifie s who i s sub

je c t t o th e s e ar c h e s : th e r is k o f ar b it r ar y o r c ap r ic io u s s e ar c h e s is th e r e f o r e e li mi n a te d. Further, no measure of i ndividualiz ed suspicion is nece ssary beca use the sea

rche s are not aimed at
rec overing incriminating evidenc e of c ontemporane ous criminal cond u ct. Fina lly , we ha ve de te rm ine d that the c on vic te d fe lon s su bje c t to se a rc h pu rs ua nt to the statut e ha ve a si gnif ic a ntl y re du c e d e xpe c tatio n o f p ri vacy . Ac c or din g ly , w e a g re e wi th the hig h c ou rt of Ma ryla ndin i ts reje ction of a F ourth Amendment c halleng e to Maryland’s DNAcollection statute:

a se arc h li ke theon e auth orize d b y theAc t in thi s c a se , w ho se prima ry pu rp os e is t o ide nti fy ind ivi du a ls wi th le sse ne d e xpe c tatio ns of priva c y , is tot a lly dis tin g uis ha

ble fr om a se arc h of or din ary ind ivi du a ls f or thepu rp os e of

g a the ri ng e vid e nc e a g a ins t the m in or de r t o p ro se c utethe m f or theve ry c ri me s th a t th e se arc h r e ve a ls.
Raines, 857 A.2d at 33. Apply ing the totalityof the c ircumstance s test, we conc lude that the blood dra w from Scarbor oug h and its subsequent analy sis, both conducte d pursuant to T ennesse e’s DNA c ollection statute, wer e re asonable under a ll of the circ umstances and there fore did not violate Scarboroug h’s ri g hts un de r the F ou rth A me nd me nt. 10

VI. Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution

Simi larl y to the F ou rth A me nd me nt, theTe nn e sse e Con sti tut ionpr ov ide s: That the pe ople shall be sec ure in the ir persons, houses, paper s and possessions, from
unrea sonable sea

rche s and seizures; and that g ener al war rants, whe reby

an off icer may be commande d to searc h suspected pla ces, w ithout evidence of the fa ct committed, or to seize anyperson or persons not name d, whose off ence s are not particula rly described and supported by evidenc e, are dang erous to liberty and oug ht not to be g rante d.

T EN N

. C O N ST . a

rt . I , § 7. Th is C ou rt

ha s lo ng he ld that T enn ess ee’s con sti tut ion a l pr ov isi on is identical in intent and purpose with the United States Constit ution. Sneed v. State, 423 S.W .2d 857, 860 (Tenn. 1968) . For the same rea sons w e have determined the instant se arc hes did not c ontrave ne theF ou rth A me nd me nt, we c on c lud e the y didno t vi olate Sc arb or ou g h’ s rig hts a g a ins t un re a so na ble
sear ches and seizures under the Tenne ssee Constitution.

I n re s p o n s e t o S ca rb o ro u gh ’s m o t i o n t o s u p p re s s , t h e S t at e ar gu ed b el o w th atS ca rb o ro u gh consente d to the blood draw by signing a docume nt titl ed “Consent fo r DNA Analy sis.” Scarbor oug h contends that his conse nt was coerc ed bec ause he was thre atene d with disciplinaryT rans o u co nt end s b ef o re t hi s C o urt t hat t he t ri al c o urt “erred b y ret roac t i vel y a p p l y i ng a 19 9 9 s t at ut e requir i ng 11 b l o o d and D N A s am p l es t o be t aken f rom i nm at es. ” H o wever, t he reco rd i s cl ear t hat t he t ri al co urt d i d not ap p l y t he D N A c o llec tio n sta tute to T ra n so u a n d this c o n te n tio n is t h e re fo re w itho u t m e rit.

T h e o ff e n se fo r w h ic h h e w a s inc a rc e ra te d w a s c o m m itt e d b e fo re J u ly 1 , 1 9 9 8 , an d w a s n o t o n e o f t h e sp e c ifi c 12 qual i f y i ng offens es not ed i n t he D N A col l ect i on s t at ut e.

-15- action if he did not consent. Be cause we ha ve d et er mined that the State may leg itimately

compel the p rovision of a biolog ical spec imen from inca rce rate d felons pursuant to the DNA collec tion statut e , w e ne e d n ot a dd re ss w he the r S c arb or ou g h a lso c on se nte d to these arc he s. The judg ment of t he C ourt of C riminal Appeals is aff irmed i n all respe cts as to Scar boroug h.

VII. Transou A. Validity of

Blood Draw Although de fendant Transou’s c ases we re c onsolidated for or al ar g umen t with that of defe ndant Scar

boroug h based on his similar claims of the invalidity of the DN A collec tion statute,
we do no t r e ly

on that st a tut e in r e so lvi ng hi s case s. W he n h e su bmi tte d to a blo oddr a w i n September 1999, Transou did not fa ll wi thin the para meters of the DNA c ollection statute. 11 12 Rather, the trial court uphe ld the blood dr aw/sea rch on the basis that Transou c onsented to it. The Court of Criminal Appeals af fi rm ed t h e t ri al court. W e ag ree that the Transou case s are not g ov e rn e d by the sta

tut e a nd that he va lid ly c on se nte d to the blo od dr a w an d its s ub se qu e nt ana ly sis

. Whether an individual conse nts volunt ar i l y t o a sea rch othe rwise pr oscribed by either the state or f eder al constitutions is a question of f act to be d et ermined from the totality of the circ umstances. See Schneckloth v. B ustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973); Cox , 171 S.W .3d at 184. The c onsent must be “‘une quivocal, specific , intelligently g iven, and uncontaminated by duress or
coer cion.’” State v. Simps o n , 9 6 8 S.W .2d 776, 784 (Tenn. 1998) (quoting State v. Br own, 836 S.W .2d 530, 547 (Tenn. 1992) ). “Thepertinent que stion is this: whether the [individual’s] act of
c on se nti ng is the pr od uc t of a n e sse nti a lly fr e e a nd un c on str a ine d c ho ic e
. I f the [ind ivi du a l’ s] w ill
wa s o ve rb orne a ndhis o r her c apa c ity fo r s e lf -d e te rm inatio n c ri tic a lly

imp a ir e d, du e pr oc e ss i s of fe nd e d. ” Cox, 1 71 S.W. 3da t 18 5 ( c iti ng Sc hn e c klo th, 41 2 U .S. a t 22 5- 26 ). I n c on sid e ri ng thi s question, numerous fac tors come into play , including the time and place of the e ncounter ; whether the enc ounter oc curr ed in a se cluded or pu b l i c p l ac e; the number of office rs pre sent; whether hostili ty was pre sent; whether

wea pons weredisplay ed; whether c o nsent was r equeste d; and whethe r the individual initi ated the c ontact. See id. We may also consider

the individual’s persona l char acte ristics, including his or he r ag e, educ ation, intelligenc e , kn o w le d g e , ma turity , sophistication, experience , and prior contac t w ith law enfor ceme nt pe rsonnel. I d. The individual’s know ledg e of his or her right to re fuse c onsent is also an appr opriate c ircumstanceto consider. I d.

I n this case, Tr ansou wa s reque sted to submit to a blood dra w in conjunction with standardW e n ee d n ot de ci de i n t h i s c as e wh et h er t h e D epa r t men t of Cor r ec t i on ma y pr oper l y di s ci pl i n e an i n mat e for 13

re fus ing to p ro v id e a b io lo g ic a l sp e c im e n w h e re the inm a te is no t sub je c t t o the D N A c o llec tio n sta tute

. -16- intake proc edure s at the prison fa cility . During the intake pr ocedur e, Transou was one of a g roup of inmates addr essed simult aneously by medical personne l. There is no indication in the recor d that
e ith e r h os til ity

or we apo ns we repr e se nt. Tr a ns ou wa s v e rb a lly inf orme d th a t hec ou ld r e fu se to consent to the blood dra w.
I n addition to the verba l expl anation, T ra nsou was provide d with a written form on which he c o u l d i n d i c a t e h i s c o n s e n t o r r e f u s a l t o c o n s e n t

. T h i s f

o r m i n d i c a t e s t h a t o n l yinm a te s w ith
certain convictions are require d to provide a biolog ical spec imen for DN A ana ly sis. Transou had not been c onvicted of any of the pre dicate of

fense s. T h e fo rm al s o indicates that a n inmate who
re fu se s to pr ov idea

sp e c ime n ma y be su bje c t to dis c ipl ina ry a c tio n, bu t that th os e wh o r e fu se wi ll b e p ro v i d ed a d u e p ro ce s s h ea ri n g.
I n September 1999 Transou was forty y ear s old. Although he denied ha ving obtained a GE D, he admitted to being familiar with the prison’s law library to such an e x tent that he dra fted a nd filed le g a l pl e a din g s o n h is o wnbe ha lf

. He fu rthe r a dmi tte d to ha vin g sp e nt a c on sid e ra

blea mou nt o f h is adult life in custody , evincing a signific ant familiarity with the criminal justice sy stem. Wi th respec t to the blood draw at issue, Transou a dmitted during his testimony at the suppression hearing that he had pre vious familiarity

with the DNA consent form and that he w as aw are that the DNA c ollection statute did not apply

to him in S eptember

1999.

Transou ma intains that he was c oerc ed into s i gn i ng the conse nt form with the threat of disciplinary

action upon re fusal, re ndering his consent invalid. We disag ree
. As set forth a bove, the Con se nt f or DN A A na ly sis fo rm

pr ov ide s th a t an inmate wh o re fu se s to con se nt to a b loo d d ra w w ill b e s u b je c t to a h e ar in g b e f

o r e th e d is c ip li n ar y b o ar d

. I f th e b o ar d th e n c o n v ic ts th e inma te of a disciplinary

offe nse, “he/she shall forf eit the opportunity to e arn behavior sentenc e cr edits until such time he/she provides a

biologica l specimen.” Thus, an inmate who re fu s es t o consent to a blood draw f o r D N A a n a ly s is may

lo s e th e o p p o rtu n ity

f o r a n e ar li e r r e le a s e th a n o th e r w is e a n ti c ip a te d. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 41-21- 236 (setting forth the pr ovisions for t h e accrua l of inmate sentenc e reduc tion credits which r esult in the adjustment of an inmate’ s relea se elig ibilit y and sentence expiration dates).

Be fore that opportunity

l oss can oc cur, how ever , the inmate must first be convic ted of a disciplinary

offe nse. Transou was not subje ct to suc h a conviction bec ause he did not fall within the pu rv ie w o f the DN A c oll e c tio n statut e
. Th e De pa rt me nt o f C or

re c tio n h a d n o b a sis un de r that st a tut e upon which to demand that Transou provide a biologica l specimen. Transou knew that he did not fa ll w ith in the pu rv ie w o f the statut e . T he De pa rt me nt of Cor

re c tio n’ s “ thr e a t,” the re fo re , w a s e mpty as to Tra nsou. 13

The trial c ourt reje cted Tr ansou’s c ontention that he had been coer ced into conse nting to the blo oddr a w, imp lie dly fi nd ing Tr a ns ou ’s te sti mon y on thi s po int no t c re dib le . O n th e sp e c if ic fa c ts-17-

of thi s c a se , w e c on c lud e that Tr a ns ou ha s f a ile d to de mon str a te that th e pr oo f p re po nd e rate s a g a ins t the trial court’s finding s. Rather, the r ec o rd d em onstrates that Tr aunsou is both intelligent and k n o w l e d g e ab l e ab o u th i s r i g h t s
. H e i s f u rt h e r m o r e u n a f

r a i d t o a s s e rtt h e m
. T r a n s o u i n t e l l i g e n t l y, kno w in g ly , a n d v o lu n ta

r il y c o n s e n te d to h a v e h is b lo o d d r a w n a n d a n a ly ze d in Se p te mb er 1999. Acc ording ly , we hold that the t rial court did not err in ref using to suppress the evidenc e obtained a s a re sult of the September 1999 blood dra w to which Transou consented.
B. Su ff iciency of Convicting E vidence

As to victim S . K., Transou was convic ted of onecount of rape and one count of ag g ravated burg lary . Transou doe s not contend that these c rimes wer e not committed agai n s t t h e v i cti m, but contends that, without the DNAevidenc e, the pr oof is not sufficient to establish his identity as the perpe trator. When evaluating the suffic iency of the e vidence , we must determine whether “ any rational trier of fac t could have f

ound the essential e lements of t h e cr i me bey ond a re asonable doubt.” J acks o n v
. V ir g in ia , 4 4 3 U

. S. 3 0 7 , 3 1 9 ( 1 9 7 9 )

. I n ma k in g th is d e te r mi n a ti o n , w e a f f o r d the pr os e c uti on thestr on g e st l e g iti mate vie w o f the e vid e nc e a s w e ll as a ll r e a so na blea ndle g iti mate infere nces w hich may

be dra wn there from. State v. Bl and, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). Questions conce rning t h e cr ed ibilit y of the witnesse s, the weig ht to be g iven the evide nce, and fa c tua l issu e s ra ise d by the e vid e nc e are re so lve d by the trie r of fa c t. I d. B e c aus e a ve rd ic t of

g uil t remove s the presumption of innoce nce and i m poses a pr esumption of g uilt, the defendant upon c on vic tio n b e ars the bu rd e n of sh ow ing wh y the e vid e nc e is ins uf fi c ie nt to s up po rt

theve rd ic t. S tate v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 661 (Tenn. 2006); State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).

We have de termined that the D NA evide nce de veloped f rom Tra nsou’s September 1999 blood draw w as prope rly obtained. As a re s u l t o f t hat evidenc e, a c onclusive match w as made betwee n Transou’ s D NA and the DN A of S. K.’s ra pist. I n addition, at trial the victim identified Transou a s her attacker

afte r providing a g ener al desc ription of him. An investigating of fice r testified about a simil ar description g iven by the victim on the morning of the attack. We hold that th e e v i d e n c e o f T r a n s o u ’ s i d e n t i t y i n t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f t h e s e c r i m e s i s s u f f i c i e n t t o su pp or t hi s convictions. Tra nsou is entitled to no relief on this basis.
C. Se nt e nc ing

Tr a ns ou a lso app e a ls f

ro m th e se ntences he re c e ive d f or the se tw o c on vic tio ns , b ut o nly ins of ar a s p re se rv ing his app e llate ri g hts in the e ve nt the Uni te d St a te s Su pr e me Cou rt de c ide s to revie w this Court’s decision in State v. Gomez, 163 S.W .3d 632 (Tenn. 2005), petition f or ce rt. filed, 74 U.S.L .W. 3131 (U.S. Aug

. 15, 2005) (No. 05-296). In Gomez, we dete rmined that Tenne ssee’ s Criminal Sentencing Reform Ac t of 1989 does not violate the Six th A mendment to the United States Con sti tut iona s in te rp re te d b y theUn ite d St a te s Su pr e me Cou rt in B lake ly

v. Was hin g ton , 5 42 U. S. 296 (2004), and its proge ny . I d. at 661.-18-

For his rape c onviction, a Class B fe lony , see Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 503(b), Tr ansou wa s sentenc ed as a

Rang e I I offe nder to sixt ee n y ea rs
. S ee id. § 40-35-112(b)( 2). F or his ag g ravated b u r g l ar y c o n v i c t i o n , a C l a s s C f

e l o n y , s e e i d

. § 3 9

- 1 4

- 4 0 3 ( b ) , T r a n s o u w a s s e n t e n c e d a s a R a n g e III of fe nd e r t o a

c on c ur re nt t e rm of fi ft e e n y e ars . See i d. § 40 -3 5- 11 2( c )( 3) . In impo sin g the se sentenc es, the trial c ourt applied a single mitigating fac tor: that Transou’ s conduct did not cause or threaten serious bodily

injury . See id. § 40-35-113( 1). The trial court a lso applied two enha nceme nt fac tors: that Transou ha s a pre vious history of criminal convictions or criminal beha vior in addition to th o s e n ec es s ary

to establish the appropriate rang e, and T ransou ha s a pre vious historyof unwillingness to comply with the conditions of a sente nce involving rele ase in the c ommunity . See id. § 40-35-114(2) , (9).

Our revie w of the rec ord establishes that Transou’ s sentence s wereimposed in compliance wi th theSent enci ng Ac t. U nd e r G ome z, h is s e nte nc e s a rea lso in c omp lianc e wi th the Sixth Amendment. Transou is entitled to no r el i ef as t o h i s sentence s. Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the jud g me nt o f the Cou rt

of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls a s to Tr a ns ou in a ll r e sp e c ts.

CO NC LU SION We hold that the taking of a blood sample fr om a convicted and incar cer ated f elon pursuant to T ennesse e’s DNA collection statute is a sear ch, but that it does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the Un ite d St ate s Co ns titut io n or a rt ic le I , s e c tio n 7 of

theTe nn e sse e Con sti tut ionwh e n it is
re as o n ab l e under the totalityof the c ircumstance s. We further hold that the subse quent DNA analy sis performed upo n t h e biologica l specimen likewise pa sses constitutional must er. Acc ording ly , the trial court did not err in de ny ing defe ndant Scarbor oug h’s motion to suppress the evidenc e obtained pur suant to the bl ood draw he subm itted pursuant to t he DNAcollection statute.
We also hold that, while the DNA collection statute was not applica ble to defe ndant Transou based on the offe nse for

which he w as serving time in 1999, Transou validly consente d to the blood draw taken in September 1999. Acc ordin gly , the trial court in his cases did not err in deny ing Transou’ s motions to suppress the evidenc e obtained from the blood dr aw to w hich he c onsented. We further

hold that the evidenc e is sufficie nt to support Transou’ s convictions of the ra pe of S. K. and the a g g ravated burg lary of her residenc e, and that his sentences a re va lid. The judg ments of the Court of Criminal Appea ls in all three ca ses ar e af firmed. It appea

ring that Def endants Sca

rboroug h and Transou are indige nt, the costs of these c onsolidated appe als are taxed to the St ate of

Tenne ssee, f

or which e x ecution may

issue.

____________________________________ CO RN ELI A A . CLAR K, JUSTI CE