[Cite as Jabr v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2020-Ohio-6941.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Tareq Jabr, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 No. 20AP-235 

v. : (Ct. of Cl. No. 2019-01180JD)

Ohio Department of Job and Family : (ACCELERATED CALENDAR) 

Services et al., 

 : 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

 : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on December 29, 2020 

 

On brief: Tareq Jabr, pro se. Argued: Tareq Jabr. 

On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Michelle C. 

Brizes, for appellees. Argued: Michelle C. Brizes. 

 

APPEAL from the Court of Claims of Ohio 

KLATT, J. 

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Tareq Jabr, appeals a judgment of the Court of Claims of 

Ohio that granted the motion of defendants-appellees, the Ohio Department of Job and 

Family Services ("ODJFS") and the Ohio Attorney General (collectively "appellees"), to 

dismiss appellant's complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) and (6). Because the allegations 

in appellant's complaint conclusively demonstrate that his claims are barred by the 

collateral estoppel form of res judicata, we affirm. 
No. 20AP-235 2 

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On December 23, 2019, appellant, acting pro se, filed suit against the 

appellees in the Court of Claims. Although appellant's complaint is difficult to decipher, it 

appears appellant alleged that ODJFS issued an order in 2008 that wrongfully ordered him 

to pay child support, and that it wrongfully collected the child support by deducting the 

amounts due from his social security benefits. Appellant also alleged that the Ohio Attorney 

General did not prevent and/or remedy the unlawful enforcement of the child support 

order. Appellant attached the 2008 child support administrative order, as well as a 

September 3, 2019 addendum thereto, to the complaint. Appellant also attached to his 

complaint several account summaries relating to his child support obligation. Essentially, 

appellant alleged that appellees engaged in unspecified wrongful conduct and fraud in 

connection with the imposition and enforcement of his child support obligation that caused 

him personal injuries and financial loss. Appellant's complaint sought $3,000,000 in 

damages. 

{¶ 3} In response, appellees filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) 

and (6). In a judgment entered April 13, 2020, the Court of Claims granted appellees' 

motion. The Court of Claims concluded that appellant's claims were barred by the two-year 

statute of limitations contained in R.C. 2743.16(A) and that appellant had "neither brought 

a claim against the state nor one for monetary damages." (Apr. 13, 2020 Decision & Entry 

at 3.) Therefore, the Court of Claims concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction 

over appellant's claims. 

{¶ 4} Appellant now appeals. Appellant's brief does not contain clearly identified 

or enumerated assignments of error. Nevertheless, we interpret the following paragraphs 

of appellant's brief as his assignments of error: 

[1.] ILLEGAL DOCOMENTS, ON A PERSON THAT'S ON SSI. 

WHICH IS RULE NO. DEFS ARE IN VIOLATIONS OF U.S. 

CODE 1324C THRU A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 WHICH EXCEPTION 

C IS CONSTRUCTION D ENFORCEMENTS. THE ATTY. 

GENERALS JOB IS IN HIS CHARTER AND POWER TO 

INFORCEMENTS ON DEFS. ON ALL THERE WRONG 

DUEINGS. AGAINST OHIO JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES. 

DEFS, IN THIS CASE. 

[2.] WRONGFUL GARISHMENTS FROM MY SSI CHECKS 

TIL NOW ALLTHOUGH DEFS, GOT AN ORDER FROM GOV. 
No. 20AP-235 3 

OFFICE TO STOP, DEFS, WRONGFULLY GARISHED 13,000 

TO 26, 000 ILLEGALLY. DEFS, I STILL OWE A LITTLE 

OVER 3,000 WRONGFULLY. I TAREQ JABR NEVER GOT A 

PENNY FROM THE WRONGFUL GARISHMENTS.DEFS. 

TOKE LOT OF WRONGFUL ACTIONS ON A MAN ON SSI 

DISABILITY.I HAVE INJURIES PLUS, A NOT REGULAR 

HART BEAT NOW FROM DEFS ACTIONS.VIOMITING, 

STOMACH PILLS FOR LIFE NOW ,STREES PILLS ALSO. 

[3.] ALSO THERES A RELEASE AND ADAVIT THAT I AND 

EX JAMILA SIGNED IN FILLED IN 2004 THAT SHE 

DOESN'T WANT SUPPORT, FORGAVE ME FOREVER. 

JUDGE SIGNED IT WILL ATTACHED IN FOR PROOF, WITH 

BRIEF.ANY KIND OF RELEASE AND ADAVIT, ALL 

DOCMENTS BECOME NULL AND VOID, AND DEFS NEED 

TOO PAY ALL BACK SOPPORT TO TAREQ JABR, WHY ARE 

THY STILL CHARGING 50 MONTHLY ILLEGALLY.THIS 

CASE SHOULD BE ZERO SUPPORT ZERO ARREARS A.S 

.A P YOUR HONORS OF THE COURT. 

[4.] IT IS ILLEGAL TO TAKE GARISHMENTS FROM A 

PERSON ON SSI, AND HARD IN INFORCEMENTS ON 

TAREQ JABR YOUR HONORS NO PASSPORT FROM ALL 

ILLEGAL CASE HERE. 

(Sic passim.) 

{¶ 5} Appellant's assignments of error are interrelated, so we will address them 

together. None of the purported assignments of error addresses the legal basis for the Court 

of Claims grant of appellees' motion to dismiss. However, in the interest of justice, we 

interpret appellant's assignments of error as essentially alleging that the Court of Claims 

erred in granting appellees' motion to dismiss. For the following reasons, we disagree. 

Standard of Review

{¶ 6} Because the Court of Claims found that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction 

over appellant's claims, we begin by examining the application of Civ.R. 12(B)(1). Civ.R. 

12(B)(1) permits dismissal of a complaint where the trial court lacks jurisdiction over the 

subject matter of the litigation. The standard of review for a dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 

12(B)(1) is whether any cause of action cognizable by the forum has been raised in the 

complaint. Wash. Mut. Bank v. Beatley, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-1189, 2008-Ohio-1679, ¶ 8, 

citing Milhoan v. E. Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 157 Ohio App.3d 716, 2004-Ohio-3243, 
No. 20AP-235 4 

¶ 10 (10th Dist.); State ex rel. Bush v. Spurlock, 42 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1989). We review an 

appeal of a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. Id. 

Legal Analysis

{¶ 7} At the outset, we note that appellant previously brought an action in the Court 

of Claims against ODJFS that challenged the lawfulness of the same 2008 administrative 

child support order at issue here. In that case, the Court of Claims granted ODJFS' motion 

for judgment on the pleadings and appellant appealed. This court affirmed the decision 

based upon the Court of Claims' lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over appellant's 

challenge to the administrative child support order. Jabr v. Ohio Dept of Job & Family 

Servs., 10th Dist. No. 15AP-1141, 2016-Ohio-4775, ¶ 10. This court stated: 

Pursuant to R.C. 2743.02 and 2743.03, the Court of Claims has 

exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over civil actions against 

the state for money damages that sound in law. Measles v. 

Indus. Comm., 128 Ohio St.3d 458, 2011-Ohio-1523, ¶ 7. 

However, the Court of Claims' subject-matter jurisdiction does 

not encompass actions that include a prayer for money 

damages but, in actuality, seek review of an administrative 

order. Shampine v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 10th 

Dist. No. 11AP-123, 2011-Ohio-6057, ¶ 17-19; Chenault v. Ohio 

Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 194 Ohio App.3d 731, 2011-Ohio3554, ¶ 17-20 (10th Dist.); George v. Ohio Dept. of Human 

Servs., 10th Dist. No. 04AP-351, 2005-Ohio-2292, ¶ 35. An 

action in the Court of Claims is not a substitute for a statutorily 

created right of appeal of an administrative decision. George

at ¶ 35. Thus, when resolution of a claim would require the 

Court of Claims to review an administrative order that is 

subject to its own statutory appeals process, the 

characterization of the claim as a claim for damages does not 

render the claim justiciable in the Court of Claims. 

Id. at ¶ 10. 

{¶ 8} This court further noted that appellant's claim: 

revolve[d] around an administrative child support order. 

[Appellant] wants the Court of Claims to vacate that order, 

return the money paid under that order, and award damages 

for injuries he claims that he suffered due to that order's 

imposition and enforcement. The Court of Claims, however, is 

not the proper forum for Jabr's complaint. Jabr, instead, must 

pursue relief from the administrative child support order in the 

manner prescribed by the statutes governing such orders. [See

R.C. 3111.84.] 
No. 20AP-235 5 

Id. at ¶ 11. 

{¶ 9} Because Jabr's recourse for relief from the administrative child support order 

was with the Juvenile Division of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas and/or the 

Cuyahoga County Child Support Enforcement Agency, we concluded that the Court of 

Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Jabr's action. Id. at ¶ 12. Appellees cite to 

Jabr in arguing that the Court of Claims lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over appellant's 

claims in the case at bar. Our decision in Jabr also raises the question of whether 

appellant's claims are barred by res judicata. 

{¶ 10} "The doctrine of res judicata encompasses two related concepts (1) claim 

preclusion or estoppel by judgment – precluding parties from rearguing claims that were 

litigated in a prior suit – and issue preclusion or collateral estoppel – precluding parties 

from rearguing issues that were previously litigated." Davie v. Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am., 

8th Dist. No. 105261, 2017-Ohio-7721, ¶ 46. Because this court determined in Jabr that the 

Court of Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over appellant's previous challenge to 

the imposition and enforcement of the 2008 child support order, appellant's complaint in 

the case at bar implicates the doctrine of issue preclusion or collateral estoppel. "Issue 

preclusion applies where: (1) the party against whom estoppel is sought was a party or in 

privity with a party to the prior action; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits in the 

prior action after a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; (3) the issue was necessary 

to the final judgment in the prior action and (4) the issue in the prior action is identical to 

the issue in the subsequent action." Id. at ¶ 48. In addition, an issue that " 'was actually 

and directly at issue in a previous action, and was passed upon and determined by a court 

of competent jurisdiction, may not be drawn into question in a subsequent action between 

the same parties or their privies' regardless of whether the claims involved in the action 

were the same or different." Id. at ¶ 46, quoting Powell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 8th Dist. 

No. 101662, 2015-Ohio-2035, ¶ 13, quoting Fort Frye Teachers Assn., OEA/NEA v. State 

Emp. Relations Bd., 81 Ohio St.3d 392, 395 (1998). "Essentially, issue preclusion prevents 

the relitigation of facts and issues that the parties or their privies fully litigated in a previous 

case." State v. Harding, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-362, 2014-Ohio-1187, ¶ 18. 

{¶ 11} When subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim brought by the same parties or 

their privies has been actually and directly litigated, the doctrine of issue preclusion 
No. 20AP-235 6 

(collateral estoppel) prevents the relitigation of that jurisdictional issue in a subsequent 

action unless, subsequent to the initial dismissal, there are developments that cure the 

jurisdictional deficiency identified in the first suit. Id. at ¶ 19-21. As we explained in 

Harding: 

Thus, for example, if a court of common pleas decides that 

jurisdiction is properly before the Court of Claims of Ohio 

because the defendant in the action before it is a state agency, 

the doctrine of issue preclusion will bar relitigation of the 

defendant's agency status. In a subsequent action, the parties 

cannot again raise the issue underlying the jurisdictional 

determination—whether the defendant is a state agency or 

not. Consequently, a second, identical action brought in a 

court of common pleas will result in dismissal. See George v. 

State, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-4, 2010-Ohio-5262, ¶ 16 (holding 

that if a common pleas court dismisses an action because 

jurisdiction is properly before the Court of Claims, an 

identical action "refiled in the same forum * * * could only, by 

operation of [issue preclusion], be dismissed on the same 

grounds"). 

However, dismissal of a second action is not appropriate if, in 

the interim subsequent to the initial dismissal, there are 

developments that "cure" the jurisdictional deficiency 

identified in the first suit. Under the curable-defect doctrine, 

a party may bring a suit again " 'where a jurisdictional defect 

has been cured or loses its controlling force.' " Park Lake 

Resources Ltd. Liability Co. v. United States Dept. of 

Agriculture, 378 F.3d 1132, 1137 (10th Cir.2004), quoting 

Eaton v. Weaver Mfg. Co., 582 F.2d 1250, 1256 (10th 

Cir.1978). A post-dismissal cure forestalls the application of 

issue preclusion because it changes the facts or occurrences 

that a court must consider to decide whether it has 

jurisdiction. Where there has been a change of facts or 

occurrences since a decision was rendered, which would have 

been relevant to the resolution of a material issue involved in 

the earlier action, the doctrine of issue preclusion will not bar 

litigation of that issue in the later action. State ex rel. 

Westchester Estates, Inc. v. Bacon, 61 Ohio St. 2d 42, 399 

N.E.2d 81 (1980), paragraph two of the syllabus. 

(Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 20-21; see also Dunlop v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 

10th Dist. No. 19AP-58, 2019-Ohio-3632, ¶ 10-14 (res judicata barred relitigation of 

subject-matter jurisdiction in dispute over enforcement of a child support order); Goeller 
No. 20AP-235 7 

v. Moore, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-394, 2005-Ohio-292, ¶ 5 (challenge to trial court's subjectmatter jurisdiction in a child custody dispute barred by collateral estoppel when that issue 

was litigated by the same parties and decided in a previous habeas corpus action before 

the Supreme Court of Ohio). 

{¶ 12} In the case at bar, as in Jabr, appellant has challenged the imposition 

and enforcement of a child support order. ODJFS was a defendant in Jabr and is a 

defendant here. This court rendered a final judgment in Jabr finding that the Court of 

Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over such a challenge because Jabr was required 

to "pursue relief from the administrative child support order in the manner prescribed by 

the statutes governing such orders." Jabr, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-1141, 2016-Ohio-4775 at 

¶ 11. We can discern nothing in appellant's complaint that suggests this jurisdictional flaw 

has been remedied. Therefore, appellant's challenge to the imposition and enforcement of 

a child support order in the Court of Claims is barred by the collateral estoppel form of res 

judicata.1

{¶ 13} For this reason, we overrule appellant's assignments of error, and we 

affirm the judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio.2

Judgment affirmed.

BEATTY BLUNT and NELSON, JJ., concur. 

 

 

1 We recognize that the Court of Claims interpreted appellant's claims as equitable in nature, and for that 

reason concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Although we agree that the Court of Claims 

lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, we reach that conclusion based upon the final judgment in Jabr, not the 

rationale set forth by the Court of Claims. The Court of Claims' determination that appellant's claims are 

equitable in nature is questionable given the Supreme Court of Ohio's recent decision in Cirino v. Ohio Bur. 

of Workers' Comp., 153 Ohio St.3d 333, 2018-Ohio-2665. Where a trial court enters a legally correct 

judgment but articulates an incorrect rationale for doing so, a court of appeals nonetheless affirms as a 

matter of law because there has been no prejudice to the appealing party. State v. Roberts, 7th Dist. No. 14 

CO 0004, 2016-Ohio-4806, ¶ 23, citing App.R. 12(B). 

2 Because we affirm the judgment of the Court of Claims based upon our holding in Jabr that the Court of 

Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over appellant's claims, we decline to address the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) 

basis for the Court of Claims' decision.