## COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH NO. 02 - 16 - 00200 - CR

WHISKEY WILLIAMS APPELLANT V. THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

---------- FROM THE 362ND DISTR ICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. F

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### MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

---------- I. I NTRODUCTION In three issues, Appellant Whiskey Williams appeals the trial court’s judgment adjudicating him guilty of manslaughter and sentencing him to thirteen years’ confinement. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.04 (West 2011). We will affirm.

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.2 II. F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND Williams was ind icted for manslaughter after he struck Edron Slaughter in the head with a loaded firearm causing the firearm to discharge , hitting and killing Ashley Walters. Williams pleaded guilty to manslaughter and receiv ed a five

year term of deferred adjud ication c ommunity supervision. The State later filed a motion to procee d with an adjudication of guilt, alleging that Williams had violated the following conditions of his community supervision: (a) Commit no offense against the laws of this State or of any other state or of the United States;

. . . . (s) . . . c omplete 200 hours of Community Service Restitution at a community service project or projects for an organization or organizations approved by the judge and designated by the Denton County Supervision De partment to be completed at a rate of not less than four hours per week starting by but not later than 60 days from the date of community supervision; (t) Submit to testing for alcohol or drug usage at the request of a community supervision officer. Pay the cost for these tests within thirty (30) days of giving the specimen; (u ) Within sixty (60) days,

. . . complete a drug/alcohol evaluation through an agency which offers such services and approved by his/her community supervision officer and provide wr itten proof of compliance to the supervision officer within 10 days of completion. If treatment is deemed necessary, the defendant shall abide by any and all treatment directives, comply with the rules and regulations of the approved agency, pay all costs incurred for such services. Continue in said treatment until successfully completed as stated by the counselor with the agreement of his/her community supervision officer ; [and]

. . . .3

(cc) [Attend] I ndividual counseling, no less than three (3) sessi ons specifically addre ssing the offense. Williams’ s probation officer, Christy Martin, testified at the hearing on the State’s moti on to proceed to adjudication. Martin testified that Williams did not complete the community service hours required by co ndition (s) of his community supervision

. She testified that Williams failed to perform the required four hours of weekly community service for the months of July, September, October, and November of 2014, as well as for the month of January 2015. Martin also testified that Williams did not submit to testing for drug usage as required by condition (t) of his community supervision. She testified that Williams did not submit to drug testing that she requested on October 10, October 31, November 13, Decembe r 18 , and December 30, 2014. Martin also testified that Williams failed to timely submit to the drug/alcohol evaluation required by condition (u) of his community supervision. She further testified that Williams failed to attend the three counseling sess ions specifically addressing the manslaughter offense as required by condition (cc) of his community supervision. The State also presented evidence regarding Williams’s alleged violation of condition (a) of his community supervision

— that he commit no offe nse against the law s of Texas or any other state. Terry Brooks testified that he was a deputy with the Kerr County Sheriff’s Department and a former officer of the Denton Police Department. Deputy Brooks testified that on January 12, 2015

— while working a s a Denton police officer

— he conduct ed a traffic stop on Williams.4

During the stop, Deputy Brooks observed Williams pull in to a parking lot , and he saw a clear bag fly out of the window of Williams’ s vehicle

. Williams was the sole

oc cupant of the stopped vehicle. Deputy Brooks testified that he walked over to the bag and saw that it contained “a green, leafy substance consistent with marijuana” and that based on the smell and appearance of the substance, in his opinion, the bag contained marijuana. Off icer Craig Fitzgerald of the Denton Police Department testified that he was with Deputy Brooks during Williams’ s traffic stop and that he picked up the bag that came from Williams’s vehicle

. Officer Fitzgerald testified that the bag contained “a green, le afy substance [he] believed to be marijuana” and that, in his opinion, the contents o f the bag contained marijuana. He further testified that the marijuana collected during the traffic stop weighed one ounce. Detective Jeffrey Laughlin of the Denton Poli ce Department testified that on December 30, 2014, he set up a controlled buy for narcotics between Williams and a confidential informant. Detective Laughlin testified that he outfitted the informant with a live wire so that he could hear the narcotics tr ansaction taking place, and he verified prior to the transaction that there was no contraband on the informant or in the informant’s vehicle. He testified that he set up surveillance on the location of the transaction, and he observed Williams arrive in

a vehicle. Detective Laughlin then observed the informant exit his vehicle and get into Williams’s vehicle, and Detective Laughlin heard a conversation between Williams and the informant in which Williams so ld marijuana to the informant.5

Detective Laughli n then observed the informant get back into his vehicle, and he followed the informant to a nearby location where he was handed a bag containing what he recognized to be marijuana. The marijuana collected from the controll ed buy weighed fourteen grams.
A fter the parties rested their respective cases

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- chief, Williams’ s counsel brought to the trial court’s attention the fact that Williams had not entered a plea to the State’s motion. Williams then waived the reading of the motion and entered a plea of no t true to the allegations co ntained in the State’s motion. Th e trial court then found the State’s allegations (a

- 1), (a

- 2 ), (s), (t

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- 12), (u), and (cc) to be true. After a subsequent punishment hearing, Williams was adjudicate d guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to thirteen years’ confinement. III. W ILLIAMS ’ S C OMPLAINT THAT THE T RIAL C OURT

H EARD T ESTIMONY B EFORE H E E NTERED H IS P LEA In his first issue, Williams argues that his due

- process rights were violated because the trial court heard testimony before he entered his plea. He contends that this circumstance brings into doubt whether he was fully aware of the allegations against him and whether he was properly able to defend himself , but he cites nothing in the record i ndicating that he was confused by or unaware of the allegations

. Citing Detrich v. State , 545 S.W.2d 835, 837 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977), Williams candidly acknowledges that “the current status of the law provides that due process was afforded [him] even thou gh his plea came after6

the evidence was submitted,” but he “submits that this current s tatus ought to be reexamined.”
In Detrich , the court of criminal appeals held that due process does not require that a plea be entered in a probation revocation hearin g. 545 S.W.2d at 837. Other Texas courts, including our own, have followed Detrich and extended its holding to situations involving motions to proceed with an adjudication of guilt

. See , e.g. , Moore v. State , No. 14

- 14

- 00350

- CR, 2015 WL 4141100, at *3 (T ex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] July 9, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[T]here is no requirement that a defendant on community supervision enter a plea to the allegations in the motion to adjudicate.”) ; Licerio v. State , No. 1 3

- 04

- 00211

- CR, 2005 WL 2560228, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi Oct. 13, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[W]e conclude there was no error in the trial court’s failure to elicit a plea from appellant regarding the violations of c ommunity supervision.” ); Anthony v. State , 962 S.W.2d 242, 246 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 1998, no pet.) (“[D]ue process does not even require appellant be given the right to enter a plea to an alleged community supervision violation.”). Because the court of cr iminal appeals and this court have held that due process does not require a defendant to enter a plea to the allegations contained in a State’s motion to adjudicate and because Williams has not raised any convincing reasons for us to reexamine those holdin gs , we decline Williams’s invitation to reexamine precedent on this issue, and we hold that there was no7

error here when Williams’s plea was entered after testimony was presented. See Detrich , 545 S.W.2d at 837; Moore , 2015 WL 4141100, at *3; Licerio , 200 5 WL 2560228, at *2; Anthony , 962 S.W.2d at 246. We overrule Williams’s first issue.
IV
. W ILLIAMS ’ S C OMPLAINT R EGARDING E VIDENCE OF P OSSESSION AND D ELIVERY OF M ARIJUANA In his second and third issue s , Williams challenges the trial court’s finding that h e violated condition (a) of his community supervision by possessing and delivering marijuana

. His second issue contends that there was no credible evidence that he possessed and delivered marijuana , and his third issue contends that he received ineffectiv e assistance of counsel when his attorney asked Officer Fitzgerald if a lab had confirmed that the substance taken from the January 12, 2015 traffic stop was marijuana

. While he challenges the trial court’s finding that he violated condition (a), Williams does not challenge the trial court’s findings that he violated condition s (s), (t), (u), and (cc).
A. Standard of Review A trial court’s determination on a motion to adjudicate is reviewable in the same manner as the determination on a motion to revoke c ommunity supervision. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 5(b) (West Supp. 2016). We review an order revoking commu nity supervision under an abuse

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- discretion standard. Rickels v. State , 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 ( Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Cardona v. State , 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 ( Tex. Crim. App. 1984). In a8

revocation proceeding, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated the terms and conditions of community supervision. Cobb v. State , 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 ( Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, and we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court ’ s ruling. Cardona , 665 S.W.2d at 493; Garrett v . State , 619 S.W.2d 172,
174 ( Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). If the State fails to meet its burden of proof, the trial court abuses its discretion in revoking community supervision. Cardona , 665 S.W.2d at 493

– 94. Proof by a preponderance of the evi dence of any one of the alleged violations of the conditions of community supervision is sufficient to support a revocation order. Moore v. State , 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 ( Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Sanchez v. State , 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 ( Te x. Crim. Ap p. [Panel Op.] 1980). Consequently, when there is one sufficient ground, we do not need to address the other contentions. See Sanchez , 603 S.W.2d at 871; Long v. State , No. 02

- 12

- 00090

- CR, 2013 WL 1337975, at *2 n.7 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Apr. 4, 2013, pe t. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). B. The Evidence is Sufficient to Support a Finding that Williams Violated the Conditions of His Community Supervision Here, Williams only challenges the trial court’s finding that he possess ed and de livered marijuana. His second and third issues do not challenge the trial court’s finding s that he violated conditions (s), (t), (u), and (cc). The State9

presented testimony from Williams’ s probation officer to support the allegation that Williams had vi olated these conditions of his community supervision. His probation officer testified (1) that he failed to perform required community service for the months of July, September, October, and November of 2014, as well a s for the month of January 2015; (2) that he did not submit to drug testing that she requested on October 10, October 31, November 13, Dec ember 18, and December 30, 2014; (3) that he failed to timely su bmit to drug/alcohol evaluation; and (4) that he failed to attend counseling sessions. Ba sed on this evidence, the trial court could have found by a preponderance of the evidence that Williams violated a condition of his community supervision. Because any one of these violations could have provided a legally sufficient basis for the trial cou rt to adjudicate guilt , we need not address the merits of Williams’s second and third issues

. See Moore , 605 S.W.2d at 926; Sanchez , 603 S.W.2d at 871; Pope v. State , No. 06

- 16

- 00128

- CR, 2017 WL 378765, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Tex arkana Jan. 27, 2017, no pet. ) ( mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Because Pope does not challenge all of the trial court’s violation findings, we must conclude a preponderance of the evidence supported the trial court’s findings with respect to those unchallenged violations.”); Chamberlain v. State , No. 02

- 10

- 00447

- CR, 2011 WL 5009859, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Oct. 20, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designa ted for publication) (holding court need not address appellant’s arguments as to one10

violation of community supervision wh en appellant did not challenge four other violations). We therefore overrule Williams’s second and third issues. V. C ONCLUSION Having overruled Williams’ s three issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

SUE WALKER JUSTICE PANEL: WALKER, KERR, and PITTMAN, JJ. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b) DELIVERED: April 27, 2017