alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

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###### Department of Homeland Security

###### Federal Emergency Management Agency

          - [Internal Agency Docket No. FEMA-1831-DR] Docket ID FEMA-2008-0018

# AGENCY:

Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS.

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

This notice amends the notice of a major disaster declaration for the State of Florida (FEMA-1831-DR), dated April 21, 2009, and related determinations.

# DATES:

*Effective Date:*                         May 1, 2009.                    

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Peggy Miller, Disaster Assistance Directorate, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street, SW., Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646-3886.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

The notice of a major disaster declaration for the State of Florida is hereby amended to include the following areas among those areas determined to have been adversely affected by the event declared a major disaster by the President in his declaration of April 21, 2009.

Escambia, Franklin, Gadsden, Leon, and Wakulla Counties for Public Assistance.

(The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund; 97.032, Crisis Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services; 97.034, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance Grant; 97.048, Disaster Housing Assistance to Individuals and Households In Presidentially Declared Disaster Areas; 97.049, Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance—Disaster Housing Operations for Individuals and Households; 97.050, Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance to Individuals and Households—Other Needs; 97.036, Disaster Grants—Public Assistance (Presidentially Declared Disasters); 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant.)

Nancy Ward,

Acting Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

[FR Doc. E9-11502 Filed 5-15-09; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 9111-23-P
EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In  connection  with  the  Quarterly  Report  of BSD  Medical  Corporation  (the
"Company")  on Form 10-Q for the  quarterly  period ended  February 28, 2007, as
filed with the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on the date  hereof  (the
"Report"),  I, Hyrum A. Mead,  President  (Principal  Executive  Officer) of the
Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and result of  operations of the
Company.


                                         /s/ Hyrum A. Mead
                                         --------------------------------------
                                         Hyrum A. Mead
                                         President (Principal Executive Officer)
                                         April 16, 2007
#### Gurdeep SINGH, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 05-70770.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 23, 2006.*

*878Ashwani K. Bhakhri, Esq., Law Offices of Ashwani K. Bhakhri, Burlingame, CA, for Petitioner.

Ronald E. LeFevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, William C. Peachey, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: SKOPIL, BOOCHEVER, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.

*

This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Gurdeep Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming, without opinion, the immigration judge’s (IJ) order of removal and the IJ’s denial of Singh’s application for adjustment of status.

Singh first argues that the IJ erred in finding that he had failed to satisfy his burden of proving eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal based on an adverse credibility finding.1 We have jurisdiction to review the order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We review the adverse credibility finding under the substantial evidence standard and will uphold the decision unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion. *See Singh v. Ashcroft,*367 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir.2004).

Substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination. The IJ found that Singh’s testimony regarding material events was, in several instances, inconsistent, contradictory, incredible, and incomplete. *See Singh-Kaur v. INS,*183 F.3d 1147, 1152-53 (9th Cir.1999). Therefore, the BIA did not err in denying Singh’s application for asylum and withholding of removal.

Singh next argues that the IJ abused her discretion in denying Singh’s application for adjustment of status by failing to balance the equities and basing a decision solely on lack of credibility. We lack jurisdiction to review the discretionary determination of Singh’s entitlement to the relief of adjustment of status. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)®; *Bazua-Cota v. Gonzales,*466 F.3d 747 (9th Cir.2006).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

1

. Singh also argues that his testimony, when credited, establishes his eligibility for relief under the Convention Against Torture. Because Singh failed to raise this claim before the IJ or the BIA, we lack jurisdiction to review this issue. *See Barron v. Ashcroft,*358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir.2004).
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-12-00498-CR

Tyler Namon Payne

v.

The State of Texas

§

§

§

§

§

From the 396th District Court

of Tarrant County (1253994D)

August 8, 2013

Opinion by Justice Gardner

(nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that 

there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of 

the trial court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

By _________________________________

 Justice Anne Gardner
EXHIBIT 32.1
                                  ------------



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In  connection  with  the  Quarterly  Report  of BSD  Medical  Corporation  (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending November 30, 2004, as filed with
the Securities  and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  I,
Hyrum A. Mead, President (Principal Executive Officer) of the Company,  certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350,  as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1)  the Report fully complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a)
              or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)  the information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all
              material   respects,   the  financial   condition  and  result  of
              operations of the Company.


                                       /s/ Hyrum A. Mead
                                       -----------------
                                       Hyrum A. Mead
                                       President (Principal Executive Officer)
                                       April 14, 2005
# Fourth Court of Appeals **San Antonio, Texas** MEMORANDUM OPINION N o. 04

- 19

- 00760

- CV IN THE INTEREST OF K. E. H. , a C hild From the 454th Judicial District Court , Medina County, Texas Trial Court No. 03

- 10

- 16641

- CV Honorable Kelley Kimble , Judge Presiding PER CURIAM Sitting: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Irene Rios, Justice Beth Watkins, Justice Delivered and Filed: December 27, 2019 DIS MISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION Brian Griffin seeks to appeal the trial court’s September 18, 2019 order modifying Griffin’s child support obligation. Griffin’s notice of appeal was due October 18, 2019, thirty days after the order was signed, or a motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal was due fifteen days later. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 26.1, 26.3. Griffin mailed his notice of appeal to t he trial court clerk, where it was received and filed stamped October 25, 2019. The envelope containing the notice of appeal bears a postmark date of October 22, 2019. A document filed by mail is timely only if it is deposited in the mail on or before the last day for filing. T EX . R. C IV . P. 5; T EX . R. A PP . P. 9.2(b)(1)(C). Griffin did not file a motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal. A motion for extension of time is necessarily implied when an appellant, acting in good faith, files a notice of appeal beyond the time allowed by Rule 26.1 but within the fifteen

- day grace04

- 19

- 00760

- CV

- 2

- period provided by rule 26.3 for filing a motion for extension of time. See Verburgt v. Dorner , 959 S.W.2d 615, 615 (1997). However, the appellant must offer a reasonabl e explanation for failing to file the notice of appeal timely. See id. ; T EX . R. A PP . P. 26.3, 10.5(b)(1)(C)

. On November 8, 2019, we ordered Griffin to file a response by December 2, 2019, offering a reasonable explanation for failing to file the notice of appeal timely. We advised Griffin that a “reasonable explanation” is any plausible statement of circumstances indicating that failure to timely file was not deliberate or intentional, but was the result of inadvertence, mistake or mischance

. S ee Hone v. Hanafin , 104 S.W.3d 884, 886

- 87 (Tex. 2003)

. Our order also advised Griffin that if he failed to respond within the time provided, the appeal would be dismissed. Griffin has not filed a response to our November 8, 2019 order. We therefore dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. PER CURIAM
#### Luisa *V.*Torres, Appellant, v Louzoun Enterprises, Inc., Doing Business as Queensboro Toyota, Respondent.

[963 NYS2d 682]

In an action to recover damages for employment discrimination based on a hostile work environment, the plaintiff appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Butler, J.), dated April 16, 2012, which granted the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint, and (2) an order of the same court entered May 21, 2012, which denied her motion pursuant to CPLR 3025 for leave to amend the complaint.

Ordered that the orders are affirmed, with one bill of costs.

On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the complaint a liberal construction *(see*CPLR 3026), “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” *(Leon v Martinez,*84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; *see Nonnon v City of New York,*9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007]; *Sokol v Leader,*74 AD3d 1180, 1181 [2010]). Here, the plaintiff failed to allege a cognizable cause of action to recover damages for employment discrimination under the laws of either New York State or New York City *(see*Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107 [1] [a]). The plaintiff failed to allege that she was a member of a protected class and *946that adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination based on her membership in a protected class *(see Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind,*3 NY3d 295, 305 [2004]; *Ferrante v American Lung Assn.,*90 NY2d 623, 629 [1997]; *Lambert v Macy’s E., Inc.,*84 AD3d 744, 745 [2011]). Moreover, the facts in support of her allegations of a hostile work environment “fell short of [alleging] that the workplace [was] permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult . . . that [was] sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the [plaintiffs] employment and create an abusive working environment” *(Kamen v Berkeley Coop. Towers Section II Corp.,*98 AD3d 1086, 1087 [2012] [internal quotation marks omitted]; *see Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc.,*510 US 17, 21 [1993]; *Schenkman v New York Coll, of Health Professionals,*29 AD3d 671, 673 [2006]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint.

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiffs motion pursuant to CPLR 3025 for leave to amend the complaint, since the proposed amended complaint was patently devoid of merit *(see*CPLR 3025 [b]; *Martin v Southern Container Corp.,*92 AD3d 647, 649 [2012]; *Barker v Time Warner Cable, Inc.,*83 AD3d 750, 752 [2011]).

Skelos, J.P, Angiolillo, Roman and Cohen, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 8.1



Subsidiaries of Banco Latinoamericano de
Comercio Exterior, S.A.



|Name of Subsidiary                          |  | Jurisdiction of Incorporation
|------------------------------------------- |  | -----------------------------
|                                            |  |                              
|Bladex Holdings Inc.                        |  | United States                
|                                            |  |                              
|Bladex Representação Ltda.                  |  | Brazil                       
|                                            |  |                              
|Bladex Development Corp.                    |  | Panama                       
|                                            |  |                              
|BLX Soluciones, S.A. de C.V., SOFOM, E.N.R. |  | Mexico
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Melvin Reyes, Appellant.

[872 NYS2d 687]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Laura A. Ward, J.), rendered on or about October 26, 2007, unanimously affirmed. No opinion. Order filed. Concur—Tom, J.E, Andrias, Nardelli, Catterson and Moskowitz, JJ.
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, August 21, 2024. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, August 21, 2024 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A25I0004. SUJAN DASS v. GREGORY PINSON .
Upon consideration of the Application for Interlocutory Appeal, it is ordered that it be hereby GRANTED. The Appellant may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the date of this order. The Clerk of State Court is directed to include a copy of this order in the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals.
LC NUMBERS: 2021CV02079
#### Frederick Lawrence et al., Individually and on Behalf of Alexander A. Lawrence, an Infant, Plaintiff, and Marion Lawrence, Appellant, v Albany County Department for Children, Youth and Families, Respondent. (And Other Related Actions.)

Submitted July 27, 2009;

decided September 22, 2009

Reported below, 61 AD3d 1126.

On the Court’s own motion, appeal, insofar as taken from that part of the Appellate Division order that affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, dismissed, without costs, upon the ground that no appeal lies as of right from that part of the unanimous Appellate Division order absent the direct involvement of a substantial constitutional question; appeal otherwise dismissed, without costs, upon the ground that the remainder of the Appellate Division order does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution. Motion, insofar as it seeks leave to appeal from that part of the Appellate Division order that affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, denied; motion, insofar as it seeks leave to appeal from the remainder of the Appellate Division order, dismissed upon the ground that it does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution. Motion for poor person relief dismissed as academic.
EXHIBIT 10.2
 ALLIED HEALTHCARE INTERNATIONAL INC.
INDEMNITY AGREEMENT
 Allied
Healthcare International Inc. Company  Indemnitee
 RECITALS
  Board
 Section 722
  AGREEMENT
 NOW, THEREFORE
 Definitions
 Agent




---



##### 



Expenses provided, however
 Proceeding
 Subsidiary
 Agreement to Serve provided, however
 Mandatory Indemnification
 Third Party Actions
 - 2 -




---



##### 



Derivative Actions
 Exception for Amounts Covered by Insurance D&O Insurance
 Partial Indemnification
 Mandatory Advancement of Expenses
 - 3 -




---



##### 



Notice and Other Indemnification Procedures.
    Determination of Right to Indemnification.
  - 4 -




---



##### 



- 5 -




---



##### 



Exceptions
 Claims Initiated by Indemnitee
 Unauthorized Settlements
 Unlawful Indemnification
 Non-exclusivity
 General Provisions
 Interpretation of Agreement
 Severability
 - 6 -




---



##### 



Modification and Waiver
 Subrogation
 Counterparts
 Successors and Assigns
 Notice
 Governing Law
 Consent to Jurisdiction
  - 7 -




---



##### 



ALLIED HEALTHCARE INTERNATIONAL INC.By:Name:Title:245 Park AvenueNew York, New York 10167INDEMNITEEName:Address:
 - 8 -
The District Court of the 8th Judicial District. County of Cascade.

#### STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff, vs. CURTIS OLSON, Defendant.

CAUSE NO. ADC-93-041 DECISION

On June 4, 2010, the defendant was sentenced for violation of the conditions of a suspended sentenced to six (6) years in the Montana State Prison, for the offense of Theft, a Felony.

*95On November 4,2010, the defendant appeared before the Sentence Review Division of the Montana Supreme Court. Jeff Sutton, counsel for the defendant, was not present. The state was not represented.

Before hearing the Application for Review of Sentence, the Sentence Review Division informed the defendant that his attorney, Mr. Sutton contacted the Sentence Review Division on November 3,2010 and said that the defendant informed him that he wished to waive his sentence review hearing. The Sentence Review Division advised the defendant that once his Application for Review is waived, there will be no further chance for a review of this sentence. The defendant acknowledged that he understood this and stated that he did not wish to proceed.

Therefore, it is the unanimous decision of the Sentence Review Division that the Application for Review of Sentence shall be waived.

Done in open Court this 4th day of November, 2010.

DATED this 18th day of November, 2010.

Chairperson, Hon. Blair Jones, Member, Hon. Richard Simonton and Member, Hon. Ray Dayton.
#### Collins *v.*Williamson.

One wbo, at the instance of a vendee of land who was in possession under a bond for' titles with none of the purchase-money paid, bid off the land at a sheriff’s sale, under a parol agreement with the vendee, the defendant in execution, that he would buy in the land, advance the money, and take the sheriff’s conveyance to himself for the benefit of such vendee, and who, while the bidding was in progress, discouraged bidding by another by stating that he was bidding in behalf of the vendee, holds as trustee for the latter such title as he derived from the sheriff, and on being paid or tendered in due time the amount of his bid and all other money advanced by him in consequence of his purchase, with interest thereon, may be compelled by decree to convey the premises to said vendee by release or quitclaim deed.

July 23, 1894.

*Judgment reversed.*

Equitable petition. Before H. D. D. Twiggs, judge *pro hae vice.*Emanuel superior court. October term, 1893.

Collins bought laud of Henderson, paid part of the price, gave three notes for the balance, and went into possession. Henderson sold one of the notes to Camp, who sued it to judgment, and execution therefrom was. levied on the land. No deed to Collins was filed before the sale under the levy. At the instance of Collins, "Williamson consented to bid off the land at the sale, take a deed, and make Collins a deed when he paid Williamson his money back; it being also part of the agreement that Collins should pay off the balance of the original purchase price when the other notes matured. They attended the sale together. While the bidding was going on, Coleman made a bid and was asked by Williamson not to bid against him, as he was bidding off the land for Collins; and Coleman bid no more. Williamson bid off the land for $160, and the sheriff made him a deed. When the second purchase-money note fell due, Salter, to whom Henderson had transferred it, sued it to judgment. Henderson filed in the clerk’s office a deed to Collins; and Williamson paid off the *636
      *ji.fa.*and took up the papers. Collins' possession was never disturbed. ITe paid the balance of the purchase money as,agreed. He tendered to Williamson enough money to have more than reimbursed him for what he had paid out, and demanded a deed. Williamson said he would study about the matter, but did not claim that the land was his. He afterwards refused to make a deed to Collins, who brought his petition praying that, upon payment by him of the amount expended by Williamson, with interest, the sheriff's deed be cancelled, that peaceable possession be decreed, and that general relief be granted. A nonsuit was granted, on the ground that the agreement between the parties, being in parol, was within the statute of frauds.
**Exhibit 8.1****Subsidiaries of Videotron Ltd.**       **Jurisdiction of**   **Incorporation or** **Name of Subsidiary** **Organization**      CF Câble TV inc. / CF Cable TV Inc. Canada     Société d’édition et de Transcodage T.E. ltée Québec     Le SuperClub Vidéotron ltée Québec     Groupe de Divertissement SuperClub inc. Québec     SuperClub Vidéotron Canada inc. / SuperClub Videotron Canada Inc. Québec     Les Propriétés SuperClub inc. / SuperClub Properties Inc. Québec     Videotron US Inc. Delaware