### The Honorable Michael J. Melloy, Chief Judge, United States 1 

### District Court for the Northern District of Iowa. ___________ No. 95-2789

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Northern District of Iowa. Josef Hofmann, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: March 29, 1996 Filed: April 4, 1996

___________ Before McMILLIAN, WOLLMAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________
PER CURIAM. Josef Hofmann appeals his convictionfor being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and the resulting 120- monthsentence he received, following a jury trial before the distric t court. We affirm.

1
Hofmann argues that the district cou rt abused its discretion when it allowed the government to reject his proffered s tipulation as to his felon status, and instead o ffered Hofmann the choice of either stipulating that he had three prior felony convictions, or allowi ng the government to prove the three prior felonies. He argues that this court should overrule its precedent and adopt t he reasoning of United States v. Tavares , 21 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1994) (en banc), in which, Hofmann argues, the First Circuit held that the governm ent is required in a section 922(g) case to accept a defense stipulation as to a defendant's prior felony conviction.

### -2- We do not agree with Hofmann's reading of Tavares ; in any event , Hofman n's argument regarding the admission of his three prior felon y convictions is foreclosed by Eighth Circuit prec edent, which this panel is not free to overrule. See, e.g. , United States v. Garner , 32 F.3d 1305, 1311-12 (8th Cir. 1994) (government not bound by defendant's offer t o stipulate as to felony status in § 922(g) case, and may introduce evidence of mor e than one conviction; rejecting request to reconsider circui t precedent on felony-status issue), cert. denied , 115 S. Ct. 1366 (1995). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discr etion when it gave Hofmann the choice of stipulating to his prior felonies, or allowing the governmen t to prove them.

Counsel raises four additional issues pursuant to Anders v
. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). First, counsel argues the district court erroneously denied his motion to bifurcate the j ury's consideration of the "possession" element of the crime from the "felony" element. We rejec t this argument. See United States v. Milton , 52 F.3d 78, 80-81 (4th Cir.) (collecting cases and agreeing with five other circuits rejecting idea tha t "felon y" and "possession" elements of § 922(g) prosecution can b e considered separately by jury), cert. denied , 116 S. Ct. 222 (1995). Counsel aruges next that the distric t court abused its discretion in allowing the government to impeach Hofmann with evidence of a 199 4 marijuana-possession conviction. We disagree. Hofmann testified on direc t examination about the conviction, and the district court properly conducte d the balancing test required by Federal Rule of Evidence 609 before allowin g the gov ernment to impeach Hofmann. (Trial Tr. Vol. II at 242-44.) Se e Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1); United States v. Valencia , 61 F.3d 616, 618-1 9 (8th Cir. 1995).
Counsel also argues that the district court erred in determinin g that Hofmann's two prior burglary convictions were

### -3-

"crimes of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, thus triggering a base offens e level of 24. This argument also fails, as both of the prior convictions
were for burglarizing a dwelling. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 comment. (n.5 ) ("crime of violence" defined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 ); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1)(ii) ("crime of violence" includes "burglary of a dwelling"); United States v. Ghent , 29 F.3d 416, 417-18 (8th Cir. 1994).
Finally, counsel argues the district court erred in denying Hofmann an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. We c onclude that the court did not clearly err in denying the reduction, because Hofmann maintained a t trial t hat he did not knowingly possess the gun at issue. See U.S.S.G . § 3E1.1(a) & comment. (n.2) (adjustment not inte nded to apply to defendant who puts government to proof at trial by denying factual elements of guilt , thenadmits guilt and expresses remorse after conviction); United States
v. Furlow , 980 F.2d 476, 476 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (clear-erro r review), cert. denied , 113 S. Ct. 2353 (1993). We have carefully reviewed the recor d to determine whether any other nonfrivolous issues exist, in accordance with Pe nson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988), and have found no such issues.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.