alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-6183

ROGER KOONCE,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

CHARLES CREECY,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, District

Judge. (CA-97-255-HC-H)

Submitted: August 13, 1998 Decided: September 1, 1998

Before WIDENER and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and HALL, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Roger Koonce, Appellant Pro Se. Clarence Joe DelForge, III, OFFICE

OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CAROLINA, Raleigh, North Carolina,

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
* Those claims are that: (1) the trial court erroneously

denied his motion to dismiss the charges in light of the fact that

the evidence was insufficient to convict him; (2) he was denied the

right to present evidence in his own defense; (3) he effectively

entered a guilty plea involuntarily; (4) the prosecutor engaged in

misconduct; (5) his sentence was too high; and (6) his attorney

engaged in numerous instances of ineffective assistance of counsel.

2

PER CURIAM:

Roger Koonce seeks to appeal the district court’s order

denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West

1994 & Supp. 1998). We have reviewed the record and the district

court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny

a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We also

decline to consider Koonce’s claims which he raises for the first

time on appeal.* See Spencer v. Murray, 5 F.3d 758, 762 (4th Cir.

1993) (finding that habeas claims must be raised in the district

court to be considered on appeal). We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

DISMISSED
Directorship  Agreement between Hawker Belgium S.A. and Raymond R. Kubis



 Exhibit 10.17 
 Letter, dated April 1, 2007, amending the Directorship Agreement between Hawker Belgium S.A. and Raymond R. Kubis 
 April 1, 2007

 Mr. Raymond R. Kubis 

	c/o	 EnerSys 


	 	 2366 Bernville Road 


	  	 Reading, PA 19605 

 Dear Ray: 
 With reference to the Managing Directorship Agreement dated January 8, 2002, (as amended the “Directorship Agreement”), between you and
EnerSys S.A. (formerly known as Hawker Belgium S.A., and referred to herein as the “Company”), pursuant to which you are currently serving as Managing Director of the Company, we confirm that effective as of April 1, 2007 your annual
fixed gross emolument provided for in Subsection 2.1 of the Directorship Agreement has been increased to €334,000 (payable in twelve monthly installments of €27,833). Subsection 2.1 of the Directorship Agreement is hereby amended to
reflect such increase. 
 Except as expressly set forth herein, the Directorship Agreement shall remain in full force and effect. 

 

			
	S.P.R.L. EnerSys B.V.B.A.
		
	By:	 	  
		 	Nadine de Smet
		 	Managing Director


  

	
	Agreed to and accepted:
	
	   
	Raymond R. Kubis
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Walter SINISTERRA-BANGUER, also known as Walter Banguer Sinisterra, also known as Walter Robinson Sin-isterra-Banguer, also known as Walter Sinisterra Banguera, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-20113.

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Decided Oct. 25, 2006.

James Lee Turner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender, Michael L. Herman, Federal Public Defender’s Office Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before JOLLY, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Walter Sinisterra-Banguer appeals from his guilty-plea conviction and sentence for illegal reentry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Sinisterra-Banguer argues that the district court erred by imposing a 16-level adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) based upon his Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation. As Sinisterra-Banguer concedes, his argument is foreclosed. *See United States v. Valdez-Maltos,*443 F.3d 910, 911 (5th Cir.2006), *cert. denied,*2006 WL 2094539 (U.S. Oct.2, 2006) (No. 06-5473); *United States v. Garcia-Mendez,*420 F.3d 454, 456-57 (5th Cir.2005), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1398, 164 L.Ed.2d 100 (2006).

Sinisterra-Banguer also challenges, in light of *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the constitutionality of § 1326(b)’s treatment of prior felony and aggravated felony convictions as sentencing factors rather than elements of the offense that must be found by a jury.

Sinisterra-Banguer’s constitutional challenge to § 1326 is foreclosed by *Almenda-rez-Torres v. United States,*523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). Although he contends that *Almen-darez-Torres*was incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule *Almendarez-Torres*in light of *Apprendi,*we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the basis that *659
      *Almendarez-Torres*remains binding. *See United States v. Garza-Lopez,*410 F.3d 268, 276 *(5th Cir.), cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 298, 163 L.Ed.2d 260 (2005). Sinisterra-Banguer properly concedes that his argument is foreclosed in light of *Almendarez-Torres*and circuit precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for further review.

AFFIRMED.

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
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##### 



EXHIBIT 32.2 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 As of the date hereof, I, Kurt R. Kneip, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of Inter-Tel,
Incorporated on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended March 31, 2005 fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information
contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fairly presents in all material respects the
financial condition and results of operations of Inter-Tel, Incorporated. This written statement
is being furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission as an exhibit accompanying this report
and shall not be deemed filed pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. By:
    
    /s/ Kurt R. KneipName:
    
    Kurt R. KneipTitle:
    
    Chief Financial OfficerDated:
    
    May 10, 2005
 45
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: Erin McCain and Marc A. Townley v. Linda A. Lanier

Appellate case number: 01-21-00679-CV

Trial court case number: 2020-59696

Trial court: 151st District Court of Harris County

Appellee, Linda A. Lanier, has filed a “First Unopposed Motion for Extension of 

Time to File Appellee’s Brief.” Appellants, Erin McCain and Marc A. Townley, filed their 

appellants’ brief on February 3, 2022, making appellee’s brief initially due to be filed on 

or before February 23, 2022. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.6(b). On March 14, 2022, appellee 

was notified by the Clerk of this Court that the deadline for filing her appellee’s brief had 

expired, and that the appeal may be set for submission without an appellee’s brief unless 

she filed her brief, or a motion to extend time to file her brief, within ten days of the notice.

On March 22, 2022, appellee filed “unopposed” motion to extend the deadline, 

requesting an extension of eighty-days for filing her appellee’s brief, making her brief due 

no later than June 2, 2022. In the motion, counsel for appellee states that the extension is 

necessary “to be able to prepare a cogent and succinct brief.” 

As noted, appellee’s motion is titled as an “unopposed motion to extend time to file 

appellee’s brief.” However, the motion also includes a certificate of conference stating 

that counsel for appellee “attempted to confer . . . [with] [a]ppellants regarding this motion, 

but [he] was unable to reach Marc[] A. Townley after several attempts.”

Appellee’s motion is granted in part. Appellee’s brief is due to be filed within 

thirty days of the date of this order. Absent extraordinary circumstances, no further 

extensions will be granted, and the failure to file an appellee’s brief by the extended 

deadline may result in the Court setting the case “at-issue” and considering and deciding 

the case without an appellee’s brief. See TEX. R. APP. P. 10.5(b), 38.6(d).
It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: ____/s/ Amparo Guerra______

  Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: ___March 31, 2022____
* The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 04-1507

___________ Francisco Sanchez-Rosales, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the Western * District of Missouri. Mark Walterskirchen; Gooden; * Bradford Snyder; James Saver; Chris * [UNPUBLISHED] Chemesky, Doctors; Kelly Doe, * Physician’s Assistant, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: July 7, 2004 Filed: July 9, 2004

___________ Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, FAGG, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Federal inmate Francisco Sanchez-Rosales (Sanchez) appeals the district court’s * preservice dismissal of Sanchez’s Bivens action. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents , 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude dismissal was proper because Sanchez failed to state a constitutional claim-2- for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. See Moore v. Duffy , 255 F.3d 543, 545 (8th Cir. 2001). We note the district court assessed an initial partial appellate filing fee but did not order collection of the fee’s balance. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court, see 8th Cir. R. 47A(a), and instruct the district court to assess and collect the balance of the appellate filing fee, see Henderson v. Norris , 129 F.3d 481, 484-85 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).

______________________________
EXHIBIT 32

CERTIFICATION OF

THE TRUSTEE*

OF THE SAN JUAN BASIN ROYALTY TRUST

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 1350

In connection with the accompanying report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2013 and filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Lee
Ann Anderson, Vice President and Senior Trust Officer of Compass Bank, on behalf of Compass Bank, the Trustee of the San Juan Basin Royalty Trust (the Trust), not in its individual capacity but solely as Trustee of the Trust, hereby
certify that:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies in all material respects with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (as explained in Note 1
to the Trusts financial statements contained in the Report, in accordance with Securities and Exchange Commission Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 47, released September 16, 1982, the Trust prepares its financial statements in a manner
that differs from generally accepted accounting principles; such presentation is customary to other royalty trusts); and
| | -- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Trust.
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



COMPASS BANK, AS TRUSTEE OF THESAN JUAN BASIN ROYALTY TRUSTBy:

/s/ Lee Ann AndersonName:

Lee Ann AndersonTitle:

Vice President and Senior Trust OfficerDate: May 10, 2013




|* | The Trust has no executive officers.
|- | ------------------------------------
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 31.2

                                 CERTIFICATIONS

I, Charles E. Blue, certify that:

1.    I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Hanover Direct,
Inc.;

2.    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were
made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.    The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:

      (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

      (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

      (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most
recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an
annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting;
and

5.    The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

      (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

      (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.

                               /s/ Charles E. Blue
                      -------------------------------------
                                 Charles E. Blue
                            Senior Vice President and
                             Chief Financial Officer

Date: August 10, 2004
N OTE : This order is nonprecedential . 

# United States **Court of Appeals**  **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________ In re : JOHN H. BANKS, MA RY BANKS, ELIZABETH S. ERRANT TRUST, EUGENE J. FRETT, individually and as trustee of the Victor J.

Horvath and Frances B. Horvath Trust dated November 1995 , CHERIE R. OKONSKI, CRAIG D. OKONSKI, ANDREW G. B ODNAR, CHRISTINE M. ZAHL - BODNAR , EHRET MICHIGAN TRU ST, Petitioners

______________________ 2020 - 124

______________________ On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States Court of Federal Claims in No s . 1:00 - cv - 00365 - EMR, 1:00 - cv - 00379 - EMR, 1:00 - cv - 00380 - EMR, 1:00 - cv - 00381 - EMR, 1 :00 - cv - 00382 - EMR, 1:00 - cv - 00383 - EMR, 1:00 - cv - 00384 - EMR, 1:00 - cv - 00385 - EMR, 1:00 - cv - 00386 - EMR, 1:00 - cv 00387 - EMR, 1:00 - cv - 00388 - EMR, 1:00 - cv - 00389 - EMR, 1:00 - cv - 00390 - EMR, 1:00 - cv - 00391 - EMR, 1:00 - cv - 00392 - EMR, 1:00 - cv - 00393 - EMR, 1:00 - cv - 00394 - EMR, 1:00 - cv 00 395 - EMR, 1:00 - cv - 00396 - EMR, 1:00 - cv - 00398 - EMR, 1:00 - cv - 00399 - EMR, 1:00 - cv - 00400 - EMR, 1:00 - cv - 00401 - EMR, 1:05 - cv - 01353 - EMR, 1:05 - cv - 01381 - EMR, 1:06 - cv 00072 - EMR, 1:99 - cv - 04451 - EMR, 1:99 - cv - 04452 - EMR, 1:99 - cv - 04453 - EMR, 1:99 - cv - 04454 - EMR, 1:99 - cv - 04455 - EMR, 1:99 - cv - 04456 - EMR, 1:99 - cv - 04457 - EMR, 1:99 - cv 04458 - EMR, 1:99 - cv - 04459 - EMR, 1:99 - cv - 44510 - EMR, and 1:99 - cv - 44511 - EMR, Judge Eleni M. Roumel.

______________________ Case: 20-124 Document: 4 Page: 1 Filed: 04/10/2020IN RE : BANKS 2 ON PETITION

______________________ Before R EYNA , W ALLACH , and S TOLL , Circuit Judges. P ER C URIAM . O R D E R The parties in th is longstanding litigation are currently engaged in alternative dispute resolution before the trial court. Plaintiff s John H. Banks et al. (collectively, “Banks”) now petition for a writ of mandamus asking this court “to order that its footnote 4 [in Banks v. United States , 721 Fed. App’x 928 (Fed. Cir. 2017),] be considered mandatory” and to direct the United States to indicate whether it agrees or disagrees with what appear to be Banks’ calculations regard ing real estate lost by erosion. To prevail on a mandamus petition, a party must show:(1) it has a clear legal right to relief; (2) there are no adequate alternative legal channels through which it may obtain that relief; and (3) the grant of mandamus is appropriate under the circumstanc es. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia , 542 U.S. 367, 380

– 81 (2004); Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal. , 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976). Banks has not shown in the papers submitted that it has satisfied that standard at thi s time . Accordingly, I T I S O RDERED T HAT : The petition for writ of mandamus is denied. April 1 0 , 2020 Date F OR THE C OURT /s/ Peter R. Marksteiner Peter R. Marksteiner Clerk of Court s25 Case: 20-124 Document: 4 Page: 2 Filed: 04/10/2020
The District Court of the 4th Judicial District. County of Missoula.

#### STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff, vs. MICHAEL J. COLUCCIO, II, Defendant.

CAUSE NO. DC-07-279 DECISION

On November 26, 2007, the defendant was sentenced as follows: Count I: Thirty (30) years in the Montana State Prison, with fifteen (15) years suspended, for the offense of Vehicular Homicide While Under the Influence, a felony; Count II: Ten (10) days in the Missoula County Detention Center, for the offense of Failure to Carry Proof or Exhibit/Insurance in Vehicle, second offense, a misdemeanor; and Count III: One hundred eighty (180) days in the Missoula County Detention Center, with credit of 135 days served, for the offense of Driving a Motor Vehicle While Privilege to do so is Suspended, a misdemeanor. Counts I - III shall run consecutively with each other.

On May 6,2010, the defendant’s application for review of that sentence was heard by the Sentence Review Division of the Montana Supreme Court.

The defendant was present and was represented by Kara Docherty. The state was not represented.

Before hearing the application, the defendant was advised that the Sentence Review Division has the authority not only to reduce the sentence or affirm it, but also increase it. The defendant was further advised that there is no appeal from a decision of the Sentence Review Division. The defendant acknowledged that he understood this and stated that he wished to proceed.

Rule 17 of the Rules of the Sentence Review Division of the Supreme Court of Montana provides that “the sentence imposed by the District Court is presumed correct, and the sentence will not be reduced or increased unless it is deemed clearly inadequate or excessive.” (§46-18-904(3), MCA).

The Division finds that the reasons advanced for modification are insufficient to hold that the sentence imposed by the District Court is inadequate or excessive.

Therefore, it is the unanimous decision of the Sentence Review Division that the sentence shall be affirmed.

Done in open Court this 6 th day of May, 2010.

DATED this 26th day of May, 2010.

Chairperson, Hon. Blair Jones, Member, Hon. Richard Simonton and Member, Hon. Ray Dayton.
#### Carson v. Grassman

Case below: 182 N.C. App. 521

No. 223P07

Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 (COA06-862)

Denied 06/27/07
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Christian Tabb, Appellant.

Submitted September 21, 2009;

decided October 15, 2009

Reported below, 59 AD3d 1080.

*810Motion for assignment of counsel granted and David C. Schopp, Esq., Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo, Inc., 237 Main Street, Suite 1602, Buffalo, New York 14203 assigned as counsel to the appellant on the appeal herein.