PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

__________

No. 16

- 3333

__________

LUIS JAVIER MENDOZA

- ORDONEZ,
Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent

__________

On Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals

(Agency No. A202

- 144

- 002 ) Immigration Judge: Roxanne Hladylowycz

___________
Argued May 9, 2017

BEFORE: AMBRO

, RESTREPO

,

and NY GAARD

, Circuit Judges2 (Filed : August 23, 2017)

Joseph A. Brophy, Esq. [Argued] Brophy & Lenahan 18 Campus Boulevard, Suite 100 Newtown Square, PA 19073 Counsel for Petitioner

Dana M. Camilleri, Esq. Jessica Dawgert, Esq. Sabatino F. Leo, Esq. [Argu ed] United States Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation
P.O. Box 878
Ben Franklin Station Washington, DC 20044 Counsel for Respondent

__________

OPINION OF THE COURT

__________

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge

.

I.

Luis Javier Mendoza

- Ordonez , a citizen of the Republic of Honduras, crossed the United States border without inspection on two occasions. After his first e ntry Customs and Border Patrol officers (CBP) detained him and3 the Government returned him to Honduras under an expedit ed

remov al

. When CBP detained him after his second entry
Mendoza requested asylum and, alternatively, asked the
Government to withhold his removal from the United States
because he feared for his life if returned to Honduras. 1 He was placed into a “withholding o nly” proceeding and after a hearing t he Immigration Judge denied his requests and
ordered his removal . He appealed to the Board of
Immi gration Appeals (BIA) assert ing , primarily, that the Immigration Judge ignored key evidence

.

Men d oza now petitions us to review th e BIA ’s order that dismissed his appeal

. He contends that substantial
evidence supporting his request for withholding of removal compels a conclusion that is contr ary to that of the BIA. He
also maintains that the BIA applied the wrong legal standard
when it reviewed this claim

. Finally he argues he is eligible for asylum. We wil l reverse the decision of the BIA and grant Mendoza’s petition for withholding of removal

. We
will deny the petition as to his request for asylum

.

II.

A.

1 Mendoz a requested withholding of removal under both the Immigration and Naturalization Act ( INA), 8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3)(A) , and the Convention Against Torture (CAT),
8 C.F.R

. § 208.18 . Of these, his petition for review raises only the denial of his request for w ithholding of removal
under the INA.4 Mendoza was born in Honduras in 1989 , the son of
Edith Dalila Mendoza Ordonez and Manuel Ulises Martinez
Gonzalez

. 2 Mendoza’s father ( Martinez ) was politically
acti ve in the Liberal Party . H e routinely sp oke out against the National Party and its elected officia ls in the Honduran government

. A fte r unsuccessfully running for mayor of Apacilagua, Martinez won an election to serve as a council
member for the municipality

. H e remained a vocal opponent
of the Nationa l Party , accusing it of corruption

.

Tragically , o n January 1, 2000

, a National Party
activist named Gerar do Valladares assassinated Martinez and
wounded Martinez’s wife . Valladares was convicted of
murder

, imprisoned and released

. 3 In 2002, Mendoza’s uncle (Jose Avilio Martinez Gonzalez ) also ran fo r mayor as a Liberal Party candidate ; he , too, was assassinated . The man who killed him, Dimas Amador, was

— like Valladares

— a National Party activist

. 4 Amador was convicted of this crime

.

2 The petitioner refers to his father as Manuel Luis Martinez

Gonzales. Martinez was married to another woman, named Bessy Magdalena Sanchez Rodrigue z, when Mendoza was
born. A birth certificate and Sanchez’s testim ony on the telephone established that Martinez was Mendoza’s father.

3 Sanchez testified that Valladares received only a six

- month prison sentence. The BIA agreed with the Immigration Judge that this was insufficient evidence to substantiate the length of his prison term.

4 Mendoza did not mention his uncle’s assassination when he
crossed the U nited S tates border from Mexico in either 2014

or 2015. Nonetheless, the Immigration Judge found his testimony on this event credible.5 Throughout his childhood Mendoza attended Party
functions with hi s father . I n spite of the murders of his father
and uncle

, Mendoza’s interest in politics persisted. H e served

as president of the local Liberal Party’s youth division

, gave speeches supporting the Party between 2008 and 2014 , and
worked for the P arty du ring the national election in 2013

. 5

On September 7, 2014, Hector Giron approached
Mendoza on behalf of Valladares (the assassin of Mendoza’s father) and threatened him with the same fate as his father if he did not stop speaking o ut against the National Party

. Mendoza reported this incident on the following day to Judge
Mir iam Umanzor Aguilar, who told him that she would investigate. Mendoza noted that Umanzor is a National Part y member and the niece of the Apacilagua mayor (the same

wo ma n who defeated his father in the mayoral election). So

w hen Mendoza he ar d nothing from J udge Umanzor in the two weeks following the filing of his complaint, h e was convinced
that the J udge would not take action. He left Apacilagua and stay ed with one of his sister s in Tegucigalpa

.

I n October 2014, he applied for

— but was denied

— a visa to the U nited States. Nonetheless, Mendoza crossed the
United S tates border from Mexico without inspection on November 27, 2014

. CBP agents d etained and interviewed
him on his reason s for crossing

. 6 O n December 3, 2014, the

5 Mendoza’s frien d (Oman Reub en Ouela Rodriguez) testified that Mendoza was politically active.

6 Aspects of this interview are disputed by Mendoza, but given his admission that he is not eligible for asylum ( see infra note 11) and the unchallenged conclusion that6 Department of Homeland Security executed an expedited
removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and return ed him to Honduras.

Again, Mendoza lived with a sister in Tegucigalpa . He
remain ed hidden there for four month s , still fearin g for his safety

. O n April 1 7 , 2015

, Mendoza travel ed to Apacilagua
to visit his ailing grandfather. The next day Valladares and other National Party members approached him. Valladares put a gun to Mendoza’s head and told him that he woul d kill
him if he continued to speak out against the National Party

. 7 On April 20, 2015, Mendoza filed a complaint with Judge
Umanzor about th is new threat

. When

, on April 22, 2015

, Mendoza heard nothing fro m the J udge about his complaint

, he returned to his sister’s house in Tegucigalpa and went back into hiding

. H e testified that he feared even walking the

streets.

Mendoza attempted to re

- enter the Unite d Sta tes again in May 2015, but M exican authorities detained and returned
him to Honduras. He went back to his sister’s house and
remained in hiding until June 5, 2015 . He then embarked on his last attempt to cross the United States border from
Mexico . He re

- en tered the United States in July 2015

. CBP
det ained him approximately six days after he cro ssed.

Mendoza’s claims o f politically motivated death threats are credible, these issues are not relevant to our deliberation.

7 Rodriguez and Sanchez witnessed this and testified about it. Rodriguez also validated that the threat was grounded in
Mendoza’s actions on behalf of t he Liberal Party.7 The Department of Homeland Security determined that Mendoza was subject to removal and served him with a
Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate the Prior Removal
Order on July 28, 2015. O n September 1, 2015

, an asylum
officer interviewed him to de termine if he had credi ble fear of persecution in Honduras

. It was determined that Mendoza’s
claims warranted further review

, and he was referred to the
Immi gration Court for a “withholding only” proceeding.

B.

T he Immigration Judge concluded that , alth ough Mendoza’s testimony credibly established that he received
death threats for his political opinion s , he still did not meet his burden of proof for withholding of removal because he failed to prove that the Honduran government was unwilling
or unable to protect him from those threats

. The Immigration Judge decided alternatively that the gover nment had prov en that the periods o f time in which Mendoza lived with his
sisters proved that he could safely relocate in Honduras

. The
order pretermitted his clai m for withholding of removal under
the INA

, 8 and his asylum claim

. 9 It also denied his

8 The Immigration Judge did not deny, but instead pretermitted (invalidated), Mendoza’s claim for withholding
of removal under the INA. T he BIA ruled that this was error, but it determined that the error was harmless given that the
Imm igration J udge reviewed the merits of Mendoza’s claim for withholding of removal. However, t he BIA did not explain its decision. Because we will grant Mendoza’s petition for review on his withholding of removal claim arising from the INA, we clarify that , as we recently held, 8
C.F.R. § 1 208.31 does not bar withholding of removal for8 withholding of removal claim under the C on vention Against
Torture. 10

Mendoza filed a timely direct appeal

, claiming that the
I mmigration J udge erred by: deciding tha t he was ineligible for withholding of removal; conclud ing that he failed to prove
the Honduran government was un willing or unable to protect him ; ruling that he could safely relocate in Honduras ; deciding that he should be placed in a “withholding only”

p roceeding; and finally, declaring that he was ineligible for asylum

. T he BIA dismissed his appeal . Mendoza filed this petition for review.

III.

A.

Mendoza sought our review of the BIA’s dism issal of his asylum claim. But he now concedes that our rece nt dec ision controls the analysis and forecloses his request for asylum. See Cazun v. Attorney Gen eral of the United States,

aliens who are under a reinstated removal order. Cazun v. Attorney General of the United States , 856 F.3d 249, 264 (3d Cir. 2017).

9 Upon his second entry in to the United St ates without inspection, the Government reinstated his prior removal order. The Immigration Judge explained in her opinion that this rendered Mendoza ineligible for asylum. 8 C.F.R. §
1208.31 . We discuss this in more detail later (s ee infra note 11).

10 8 C.F.R. § 208.18.9 856 F.3d 249, 260 (3d Cir. 2017). 11 T he remaining action
that Mendoza requests from the government arises from the
I NA , which says : “[T]he Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the

a lien’ s life or freedom would be threatened in th at country because of the alien’ s race, religion, nationality, membership in a par ticular social group or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C . §
1231 (b)(3)(A) . An alien who applies for withholding of removal must prove that ‘“it is more likely than not that [his]
life or freedom would be threatened on account of . . . political opinion. ’ ” Ordonez

– Tevalan v. Att orney General of
the United States , 837 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2016) ( quoting Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 726 (3d Cir. 2003)); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)

. 12 Mendoza contends that the BIA erred by ruling that he failed to prove this

.

11 At oral argument, Mendoza conceded that our recent
decision controls the outcome on his asylum claim ( Cazun,
856 F.3d 249 ), and tacitly recognized the propriety of the decision to adjudicate his case in a “withholding only” proceeding. Mendoza argued, as did the petitioner in Cazun

, that, in light of 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)

, the BIA unreasonably interpre t ed 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) as barring asylum relief to
those under a reinstatement of a removal order. However, we
ruled that “[i]t was rea sonable for the agency to conclude that the statutory reinstatement bar foreclosing ‘any relief under this chapter’ means just what it says: no asylum relief is available to those subject to reinstated removal orders.” Cazu n , 856 F.3d at 260 . Our holding in Cazun controls the issue raised by Mendoza, and for this reason, we will deny his petition for review on this claim.

12 Mendoza d id not challenge the BIA’s decision denying his
claim for withholding of removal under the Convention10 W e have jurisdict ion to review the BIA’s final order of
removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). When, as in this instance

, the BIA provides its own reasoned decision (rather than merely adopt ing the immigration j udge’s opinion ) we review
the BIA’s decision as the final decision

. Nelson v. Attorney
Gen eral of the U nited S tates

, 685 F.3d 318, 3 21 (3d Cir. 2012)

. Nonetheless

, “to the extent the B IA deferred to or adopted the [immigration j udge’ s] reasoning” on particular issues, we may consider both opinions on those points

. Id.
We are empowered to review the BIA’ s legal conclusions
under a de novo standard of review. Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 404 (3d Cir.2005). But we must regard all
d eterminations about facts ground ing the final order as “conclusive unless any reason able adjudicator would be compelle d to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)

. F actual findings include statements about the
events and ci rcumstances in the country ground ing an alien’s claim that he or she suffered persecution

. Kaplun v. A ttorney General of the U nited States , 602 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2010)

. 13

Mendoza alleges the BIA made two errors. First, he
contends the entire record compels a result contrary to BIA’s finding that he failed to produce sufficient evidence to support h is request for withholding of removal. He also

Against Torture, nor d id he object to the BIA’s denial of his withholding of removal claim under the INA that was based on his membership in a social group.

13 The determination of whether the events and circumstances alleged rise to the level of persecution is a legal determina tion
that the BIA decides de novo. Kaplun , 602 F.3d at 270.11 claims that the BIA applied the wrong standard of review when it analyzed his argument that the Immigration Judge ignor ed key evidence. We will address th is lat t er issue first.

B

.

The BIA is required to ex amine challenge s to the immigration j udge’s factual findings for clear error . 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i). Clear error is commonly defined as “an obvious, plain, gross, significant, or manifest error or
miscalculation.” Concrete Pipe and Products of Cali fornia, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California , 508 U.S. 602, 653 (1993).

In his petition for review Mendoza says that the BIA
failed to use the clear error standard when it reviewed his appeal

. The Gover nment agrees that cl ear error review applies

, and points out that the BIA correctly referred to it early in its opinion

. This is t rue, but later in its discussion of the country reports, the BIA also said: [Mendoza] did not establish that
this evidence is sufficient to impac t the outcome of the case.

. .

. See Matter of Coelho , 20 I&N
Dec

. 464 (BIA 1992)( holding that an alien seeking to reopen or remand proceedings bears a heavy burden of proving that the new evidence offered would likely change the result of the alien’ s

cas e).12 The BIA’s error is readily apparent. It should have been examining

, in the context o f a direct appeal : w hether the
I mm igration Judge fail ed to review and weigh the country reports that were in the record ; and, i f she did ignore the reports, whether this error undermined her f actual finding
about the Honduran government’s willingness and ability to

pro tect Mendoza from death threats

. Instead, mistaken ly applying the standard for a motion to remand or reopen

, the
BIA deliberated on : w hether these rep orts were significant enough to warrant consideration as new evidence ( as though they were not already part of the record ) ; and whether the reports provided a sufficient basis to reopen the case

. 14

Yet, even though we are confident the BIA made a
mistake

, we are less certain about the impact it had on its
decision. B ecause the BIA’s discussion of the reports is so brief, we do not know exactly how it analyzed them. I t is also impossible to gauge whether its treatment of the reports as new evidence prejud iced its assessment of them in any way.
For these reasons we cannot assess the precise impact that the
BIA’s error had on its conclusion

. Nonetheless , we do not
need to pursue this issue further because, when the entire record is considered, we ar e certa in Mendoza’s substantial
evidence claim has merit

.

C

.

14 Matter of Coelho addresses a motion to remand that s ought
the consi deration of new evidence. It followed its practice of regard ing the motion as if it was a motion to reopen. Matter of Coelho , 20 I. & N. Dec. at 471

.13 Our review for substantial evidence does not merely rest on our discovery of alternative theories or findings that could be supported by the record. Rather, it requires that we
examine the entire rec ord to decide whether this body of
evidence would compel a reasonable factfinder to make a
determination contrary to that made by the BIA. He Chun Chen v. Ashcroft , 376 F.3d 215, 223 (3d Cir. 2004). 15

W e begin by not ing that the B IA accepted the Immigr ation Judge’s credibility determination s on key facts in Mendoza’s petition

. The BIA did not disturb the Immigration Judge’s conclusion that Mendoza received two
death threats in 2014 and 2015 . It accepts that these threats originated with the same man w ho killed hi s father in 2000.
The BIA did not express any problems with the notion that
the threats were due to Mendoza’s political activity

. And i t

agrees that Mendoza mad e complaints to Honduran
authorit ies and that nothing resulted from them. 16 But si nce
t he death threats directed at Mendoza did not come from someone within the government

, the BIA properly focused on
whether Mendoza had shown that the Honduran government

was un willing or unable to protect him from the threats

. Lie v. Ashcroft , 396 F.3 d 530, 537 (3d Cir. 2005)

. It ultimately

15 ‘ “ Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. ’ ” Senathirajah v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 157 F.3d 210, 216 (3d
Cir. 1998 ) ( quoting Turcios v. Immigration & Naturalization
Service , 821 F.2d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1987)).

16 T he BIA stated that “ the Immigration Judge properly ‘found
that’ nothing resulted from the applicant filing two complaints.

. . . ”14 ruled that he did not provide enough evide nce on this essential piece of his case and therefore he did not prove his eligibility for withholding of removal.

To prove his eligibility

, Mendoza gave the Immigration Judge evidence about the death threats, the political affiliation of Valladares a nd Judge U manzor , and country condition reports from a variety of sources . But the Immigration Judge never acknowledged the reports

. Moreover, a lthough the BIA made a ruling based on its review of the reports, it did not explain what was in them. Therefore, we will address what we found in our review that was relevant to Mendoza’s petition

.

A 2013 article from Rights Action states that

, after the
Nationa l Party came into p ower in 2009

, violence related to the electoral process in Honduras steadily rose. It also saw an
increase in the number of politically motivated deaths. It
commented that violence had been directed at Liberal Party
members. A.R. 336. A 2013 State Depa rtment Human Rights Report described the 2013 elections as credible but concluded that the justice system suffers from “institutional weakness,” subjecting it to corruption and intimidation. It referred to a number of instances in which military or police officials who were suspected of violating human rights were not prosecuted. A.R. 375. A 2014 State Department Human Rights Report discussed government efforts to combat corruption, but it also highlighted significant institutional and
societal challeng es that hampered the success of its efforts

. A.R. 421. It noted particular “concern regarding corruption in the judiciary and security forces.” A.R. 420. A 2015 Human Rights Watch report said that the system for selecting judges in Honduras had many ir regularities, and it reasoned15 from this that the system generally lacked the protections necessary to guard against political interference. A.R. 326. Finally, a Free dom House report from 2015 stated that roughly 80% of the crimes occurring in the country are never reported, and that police actually investigate only 4% of crimes that are reported. A.R. 332. All of the reports included discussion of widespread corruption and violence in Honduras, and described an environment in which civil rights protecti ons are eroding.

Since the BIA did not discuss the substance of the se reports, we look to other aspects of its opinion to understand why, even with this evidence, it ruled that Mendoza did not carry his burden of proof. Three aspects of its decision wer e prominent.

First, t he BIA referenced the convictions of Valladares
in 2000 and Amidor in 2002 ( the men who assassinated
Mendoza’s father and uncle ) ostensibly to show that the Honduran government does investigate and prosecute politic ally motivated v iolence. T he BIA obliquely acknowledged that this evidence pre

- dated (by over a decade)
the death threats M endoza received

. However, it implied that
Mendoza failed to show that conditions in the coun try had

grown worse in that period of time

. 17

17 The BIA di d not explicitly state that Mendoza failed to prove a change in conditions in Honduras. Instead, as part of its discussion rejecting Mendoza’s assertion that Valladares had received a short prison sentence, it said: “[W]e conclude that the applicant did not submit sufficient testimonial or documentary evidence to establish that the length of time that his alleged persecutor was imprisoned and the passage of16 In res ponse to Mendoza’s Petition for R eview, t he
Government defended the BIA’s assessment of the relationship between the convictions (of Valladares and Amidor) and the country reports with a different line of reasoning. It brushed aside the country condition reports as nothing more than Mendoza’s misguided attempt to
“override” evidence of the convictions of Valladares and
Amidor

. Menjivar v. Gonzales

, 416 F.3d 918, 922 (8th Cir. 2005) (“T o whatever extent these materials show that there is a general problem of gang violence

. . . we do not believe they can override the evidence in this case that police conducted a thorough investigation. . . .”) ; Matter of
McMullen , 17 I. & N. Dec. 542, 546 (BIA 1980) (“We do not give much weight to those articles submitted b y the [alien] which are of a general nature and do not in any way relate to the [alien] hi mself.”). The implication is that

, in the face of direct evidence of convictions, country condition reports have little weight.

A second aspect of the BIA’s decisi on we regarded as important was its perspective on the fact that Mendoza’s
assertion of past persecution relies on an inference of political corruption that is grounded in the Honduran government ’s

time since his imprisonment establishes that the government of Honduras is unable or unwilling to p rotect him. ” In context, we understand this to express the BIA’s conclusion that Mendoza failed to prove that the political and legal environment in Honduras (which, it implies, enabled the conviction of his father’s assassin) had deteriorated.17 inaction on his complaints. 18 T he BIA dismissed Mendoza’s inference as pure speculation by concluding generally that the
evidence does not support the notion that the Honduran government was unwilling or unable to protect him. It also specified that even the “background evidence” (a reference to the country cond ition reports) does not change this outcome. The BIA underscored its assessment that evidence supporting
Mendoza’s inference is weak by proffering , albeit in an off

hand manner, an alternative inference drawn from the Honduran government ’s inaction on his complaints that the government’s inaction was due to Mendoza’s impatience

. 19

The Government defended the BIA’s reasoning by referencing precedent in which w e ruled that the Honduran government’s failure to act on complaints of threats did not necessarily show that it had been unwil ling or unable to respond to an alien’s complaints of violence and threats by

18 The Gove rnment asserts that the Immigration Judge made a finding that Mendoza failed to prove the Honduran government did not act. In fact, the Immigration Judge equivocated, saying she “hesitates to make the same assumption [as Mendoza did] that the courts were not going to do anything.” She said nothing further on this. O ur analysis is grounded in the BIA’s conclusion that “nothing
resulted” from Mendoza’s complaints.

19 It said that “although nothing resulted from the applicant filing two complaints aga inst t he man who threatened him[,] the applicant waited only a short period of time after filing the complaints before assuming that nothing would be done about the complaints. . . .” The BIA also said it was Mendoza’s impatience

— demonstrated by him leaving Apa cilagua two weeks after the first complaint and two days after the second complaint

— that prevented any investigation from occurring.18 gangs. Valdiviezo

- Galdamez v. Attorney General of the United States, 663 F.3d 582, 610 (3d Cir. 2011). T hat case , which focused on gang violence, re lied on 2005 count ry reports that documented the Honduran government’s reform efforts, such as new security patrols, and anti

- gang legislation. Id. We concluded that t hose reports weakened the alien’s attempt to use inaction on his complaints as a basis to infer the government’s unwillingness or inability to protect
him. We noted that, l acking st rong supporting evidence

,
numerous reasonable inferences could be made from the Honduran government’s inaction that would not support the
alien’s claims. Id.

T he third, and final aspect of the decision that was of particular interest to us was the BIA’s judgment that it did not need to address an alternative decision by the Immigration Judge. 20 T he Immigration Judge decided on alternative

20 We may address ruling s by the Immigration Judge “to the
extent the BIA deferred to or adopted the [immigration judge’ s] r easoning” on a particular issue. Nelson, 685 F.3d a t 321. Here the BIA found no need to rule on the Immigration Judge’s decision that the Government carried its burden of proving that Mendoza could safely relocate. It did so because it agreed with the I mmigration Judge’s underlying reasoning that the record was insufficient to ground the prerequisite finding that the Honduran government was unwilling or unable to protect Mendoza. This obviated the need for a determination that Mendoza could safely reloc ate because the BIA’s ruling implicitly determined this. Our review encompassed the entire record that was before the Immigration Judge and the BIA. Moreover, our findings on this record (arising from other issues, see infra )19 grounds that

, even if Mendoza had established past persecution, the government nonetheless met its burden of proof to show that he could safely relocate to Honduras. (8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(3)(ii)). The Immigration Judge was
convinced that , since Mendoza lived with his sisters for a period of time after the death threats without any incident,
this was sufficient evidence to show that safe relocation was possible. She noted , however, that her finding also was
gro unded in her assessment that Mendoza fail ed to substantiate his cla im that he was fearful after the death
threats or that he needed to go into hiding when he was staying with his sisters. The BIA’s ruling that Mendoza did not prove the Honduran government’s unwillingness or inability to protect him implicitly adopts this reasoning, which obviated the need for an explicit ruling that Mendoza could safely relocate there.

Although these three aspects of the decision give us an idea of how the BIA viewed Mendoza’s petition, we
nonetheless are baffled by its assessment that the country reports were unimportant to the outcome of the case. T o the contrary, we regard the evidence in these reports as a critical piece of the record.

The BIA raised up the convictions of Valla dares and
Amidor as affirmative evidence of a properly functioning justice system that contradicts Mendoza’s claims . Al though evidence of country conditions around the time of th ose

fundamentally contradict the Immigration Judge’s reasoning and ruling, and they also eliminate any basis for the BIA’s implicit ruling that Mendoza can safely relocate. Therefore, we may review the Immigration Judge’s ruling on this issue.20 convictions is not in this record, t he reports Mendoza
submitted give us a substantive understanding of conditions
in Honduras when he received the death threats: widespread human rights abuses ; unchecked politically motivated
violence ; and a poorly functioning justice system

, vulnerable to corruption , that failed to reign in the violence

. As a result,

w e are convinced that c onv ictions occurring more than a
decade before the death threats have little value in the context
of the entire record . The convictions do not contradict or
even diminish evidence portray ing fundamentally different country conditions at the time of the threa ts

. 21 Therefore, w e conclude that

— in light of th is entire record

— the BIA’s
reliance on the convictions of Valladares and Amidor to form conclusions about country conditions at the time of the death

t hreats was not re asonably grounded in the record and is n ot owed our deference.

Similarly, the BIA implies that

— like Valdiviezo

Galdamez

— the record is too weak to support an inference that the justice system is corrupt and biased

. However, Mendoza ground ed his inference by testifying that Valladares
and Umanz or belong to the National Party, and by testifying
that Umanzor is the niece of the wo man who was a political opponent of Mendoza’s father. This testimony was not challenged. He then pointed to the country reports. One report noted that only a small fra ction of crimes brought to the government a re ever investigated. A second report discussed a justice system that is systemically vulnerable to

21 Unlike Menjivar

, these reports were not g eneral in nature, but rather provided analysis that gave close support to the claims Mendoza made about problems with the Honduran justice system. Menjivar

, 416 F.3d at 922

.21 political influence and corruption. Finally, a nother report documented that the Honduran government failed to

p rosecute officials who were known to have committed human rights violations. This was only a small part of the country condition evidence presented that supported his
claims

. T he se country reports demonstrat e that Mendoza’s experience ( threats of violenc e that receive no government response or investigation ) was by no means an i solated case.
All of t his provides a compelling grounding for his inference that the inaction on his complaint s was due to the shared political affiliations of the perpetrator and the Judge, and a justice system that allows and enables such corruption by political influence. 22 Finally, as to the Immigration Judge’s observation

, implicitly endorsed by the BIA, that Mend oza did not legitimate his fear or his need to go into hiding, w e regard this
conclusion as contrary to the record. As we have already
stated

, after establishing that he faced death threats, Mendoza provided evidence of a systemic problem with the justice system that was not unique to Apacilagua. The reports made
cle ar that politically motivated violence, virtually unrestrained, was a reality that afflicted the entire country.

22 As for the BIA’s alternative inference regarding Mendoza’s impatience, we gener ally defer to inferences made by the immigration judge or BIA . But deference is not owed when
the inference is not re asonably grounded in the record “as a
whole.” Tarrawally v. Ashcroft

, 338 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2003). In this instance, there is absol utely nothing in the record to support the BIA’s theory that impatience explains
the government’s inaction. It is, therefore, not entitled to our
deference.22 Therefore, in the context of the entire record, Mendoza’s fear and his need to go into hiding ha ve been amply and compellingly substantiated.

Throughout this review of the BIA’s decision, we have
been aware that t he deferential “substantial evidence” standard of review establishes a high bar for disturbing the
factual conclusions of the BIA. Moreover, we know that

—

even when we come across evi dence in the record that would compel a different finding

— “the proper course, except in rare
circumstanc es, is to remand to the agency for addition al investigation or explanation. ” Florida Power & Light Co. v.
Lorion , 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985). This would ordinarily be the case particularly where, as here, the BIA’s analysis of key
evidence is scant. Nonetheless, there are a few instances in
which ‘ “ application of the correct legal principles to the
record could lead on ly to the same conclusion’” and in th ese rare cases ‘“ there is no need to require agency
reconsideration. ’ ” Kang v. Attorney General of the United States, 611 F.3d 157, 168 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Zabala v.
Astrue , 595 F.3d 402, 409 (2d Cir. 2010) (alterations omitted)). This is such a case

.

In this instance, we are con vinced that evidence of the politically motivated death threats, the inaction on Mendoza’s complaints, a perpetrator and judge who shared a political affiliation in opposition to that of Mendoza, and evidence of a politicall y corrupt justice system that failed to reign in politically motivated violence in Honduras compels two findings: first, the Honduran government was unwilling or unable to protect Mendoza from death threats ; and , second,
Mendoza could not safely relocate in Honduras . T hese findings , in turn, lead only to one reasonable conclusion : ‘“it23 is more likely than not that [Mendoza’s] life or freedom
would be threaten ed [in Honduras] on accoun t of . . . political opinion.’” Ordonez

– Tevalan , 837 F.3d at 341 (quoti ng Amanfi, 328 F.3d at 726); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1) . For this

reason, we conclude that this case is one of those rare instances in which remand is not necessary. The record compels a conclusion that withholding of removal should be granted, and we will do so.

IV.

For all of these reasons

, we will reverse the BIA’s decision and grant Luis Mendoza Ordonez ’s petition for withholding of removal, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). We will deny the petition for review on the request for asylum

.