No. 88-45 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1988 

PATRICK D. VINION, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

-vsTHE WOOD YARD, INC., 

a Montana corporation, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Lincoln, 

The Honorable Robert Holter, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Warden, Christiansen, Johnson & Berg; Kelly M. Wills, 

Kalispell, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Douglas Law Firm; William Douglas, Libby, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: April 21, 1988 

Decided: May 19, 1988 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

This is an appeal from findings of fact, conclusions of 

law and judgment of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, 

Lincoln County, awarding the plaintiff/respondent Patrick D. 

Vinion (Vinion), $23,651 in damages. We affirm but remand to 

the District Court for revision of the amount awarded. 

The issues presented to the Court are as follows: 

1. Did the District Court err in awarding damages for 

reduced market value of Vinionls building and was the award 

based on substantial evidence? 

2. Did the District Court err by failing to deduct the 

salvage value of Vinionls jukebox and records when it awarded 

damages? 

On January 16, 1987, a truck belonging to 

defendantlappellant The Wood Yard, Inc. (Wood Yard), which 

was being operated by a Wood Yard employee, backed into a 

building owned by Vinion. The accident occurred as the truck 

was being positioned to unload a number of logs at the 

building owned by Vinion which is located next to U.S. 

Highway 2 in Libby, Montana. The logs dislodged as the truck 

hit the building and damage occurred to the cement block 

building and certain personal property of Vinion. 

A complaint was filed by Vinion on January 30, 1987. 

Wood Yard admitted damaging the building and the personal 

property but disputed the extent and amount of damage claimed 

by Vinion. The amount of damage Wood Yard admitted totalled 

$2,446. At trial, held October 27, 1987, a number of claims 

for damages were left for determination by the District 

Court. 

After hearing testimony from Vinion, a number of 

experts, and parties who had sold Vinion some of the personal 
property, along with two witnesses for Wood Yard, the 

District Court determined that Vinion was entitled to $600 

for replacement of the block walls; $18,500 for diminution in 

value of the building; $1,425 for damage to a jukebox and 

records; and $680 for the value of an unsalvageable damaged 

sofa. Wood Yard contends the District Court erred in the 

award of $18,500 for the diminution in value to the building 

and in failing to deduct $100 as salvageable value from the 

jukebox and record award. 

The standard for review in this case is clear that this 

Court will not reverse the District Court absent a showing 

that its determinations were clearly erroneous. Rule 52 (a) , 

M.R.Civ.P. On appeal, the findings of the trial court are 

presumed to be correct if supported by substantial evidence 

and we refuse to substitute our judgment for that of the 

District Court where the District Court is acting as the 

trier of fact and there is substantial evidence to support 

its decision. Department of Revenue v. New Life Fellowship 

of Montana, Inc. (Mont. 1985), 703 P.2d 860, 862, 42 St.Rep. 

1129; Robinson v. Schrade (Mont. 1985), 697 P.2d 923, 925, 42 

St.Rep. 401. 

The filed complaint requested $20,000 for the diminution 

of value of the building. Vinion first stated at trial that 

he believed $50,000 was a proper recovery but upon advice of 

his attorney stated he would accept $20,000. In its findings 

of fact, the District Court found the following: 

Diminution in value of building. 

Plaintiff's building is constructed of 

concrete blocks which typically after 

completion show some small cracks between 

the blocks because of settling. There 

were no such cracks in the walls which 

were affected by the collision. As a 

result of the collision, large portions 

of the south and west walls of the 

building were knocked down. When the 
support of these walls was taken away, 

three continuous cracks in the structure 

occurred in the immediate area of 

physical damage. These cracks started in 

the bottom portion of the walls and went 

to the second floor of the building, 

passing through bond beams. These cracks 

are unsightly and are inconsistent with 

the appearance of the remainder of the 

building. While the cracks are probably 

not of a nature to greatly affect the 

structural soundness of the building, 

they do affect its [aesthetics]. To 

prospective buyers of the building, they 

represent defects which will diminish the 

attractiveness, hence the value of the 

building. The building in its intact 

condition had a reasonable value on the 

local market of $185,000.00, and the 

damage to the building by Defendant 

reasonably reduces that value by 

$18,500.00. While the cracks can be 

cosmetically hidden, they represent a 

defect which cannot reasonably be removed 

and which, if cosmetically cured, would 

become a hidden defect in the building. 

Wood Yard argues the evidence presented at trial failed 

to conclusively establish that Vinion suffered an actual loss 

in the market value of the building and that Vinion failed to 

present evidence of the amount of damage with as much 

precision as possible. Wood Yard's initial argument rests on 

the claim that "a judgment for damages must be supported by 

substantial evidence that is not the product of mere guess or 

speculation." Lenz Construction Company v. Cameron (Mont. 

However, when there is strong evidence of the fact of 

damage, the defendant should not escape liability because the 

amount of damage cannot be proven with precision. Albers v. 

Bar ZF Ranch, Inc. (Mont. 19871, 747 P.2d 1347, 44 St-Rep2081; Jarussi v. Board of Trustees of School Dist. No. 26, 

Lake County (1983), 204 Mont. 131, 136-137, 664 P.2d 316, 
318. Jarussi, supra, is instructive in this case because it 

involved a jury award of damages based on the claimant's own 

testimony. Jarussi testified that he lost between $16,000 

and $17,000 when he was forced to hastily sell most of his 

personal property to move to Alaska for work. He also 

testified that his moving expenses were $2,901.50. The jury 

awarded $16,500 for losses on the sale of Jarussi's personal 

property and $2,900 for moving costs. This Court affirmed. 

Of significance is the fact that the defendant in Jarussi 

presented no evidence refuting Jarussi's claimed damages. 

In the case at bar, the damage award was based largely 

on the testimony of Vinion himself who claimed $20,000 was 

the minimum required to compensate him for diminution in 

value. The District Court awarded $18,500. Although 

Vinion's expert testified, he could not place a dollar value 

on the loss without further investigation. This is the 

gravamen of the second reasonable argument presented by Wood 

Yard that the best evidence available under the circumstances 

should be produced to support the plaintiff's claim. Sack v. 

A.V. Design, Inc. (Mont. 1984), 683 P.2d 1311, 1314, 41 

St.Rep. 1272. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the 

expert that Wood Yard produced also did not, or could not, 

dispute the dollar value expressed by Vinion. 

Wood Yard admitted that it caused the damages in this 

case. If it is reasonably certain that damages were 

sustained by the wrongful act or breach of the defendant, 

then reasonable damages rationally supported by the evidence 

will be upheld. Castillo v. Franks (Mont. 1984), 690 P.2d 

425, 431, 41 St.Rep. 2071. The District Court clearly set 

out the basis upon which it found diminution in value in this 

case and this basis was grounded on substantial credible 

evidence. 
It is undisputed that the owner of property may testify 

as to its value. Cremer v. Cremer Rodeo Land and Livestock 

Co. (Mont. 1981), P.2d 1199, 1202, 38 St.Rep. 574. Under the 

circumstances of this case, where Wood Yard did not offer any 

contrary amount to the actual figures presented by Vinion, we 

have no alternative than to affirm the District Court's 

award. The law requires only that the trier of fact exercise 

calm and reasonable judgment, and the amount of award rests 

of necessity in the sound discretion of the trier of fact. 

Johnson v. Murray (1982), 201 Mont. 495, 506, 656 P.2d 170, 

175. 

As to the failure on the part of the District Court to 

deduct from the reasonable value of the jukebox and records 

the $100 salvage value, we note that this appears to be a 

mere mathematical error. Vinion admits the error and we 

therefore remand to the District Court to enter a revised 

judgment reflecting the $100 salvage value. 

We affirm and remand for entry of a r 

We concur: