J-S31021-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

CHAD BRADLEY DICKSON,

Appellant No. 1240 MDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order entered July 3, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County,

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-40-CR-0000007-2010

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., ALLEN, and WECHT, JJ.:

MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED MAY 15, 2015

Chad Bradley Dickson (“Appellant”) appeals from the order denying his 

second petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”). 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. PCRA counsel has also filed a 

motion to withdraw. We grant PCRA counsel’s petition to withdraw and 

affirm the PCRA court’s order denying post-conviction relief.

The pertinent facts and procedural history have been summarized as 

follows:

On March 30, 2011, Appellant appeared before the trial 

court and entered a nolo contendere plea to one count of 

[forgery]. Within that plea, Appellant did not contest the 

charges that, sometime between November 2, 2007 and 

November 16, 2007, while an inmate at the Pennsylvania 

State Correctional Institution, Retreat (“SCI Retreat”), [he] 

created a counterfeit check in the amount of $4,900.00. 

Appellant was sentenced that same day.
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Additionally, during both his plea colloquy and 

sentencing hearing, testimony was presented regarding 

similar infractions perpetrated by Appellant, wherein [he] 

apparently used the typewriter within his cell to counterfeit 

materials. As a result, within discussions resulting in his 

sentence and plea agreement, the Commonwealth 

informed Appellant that, assuming that [he] would be 

sentenced to incarceration, the Commonwealth intended to 

request, either from the trial court or from the Department 

of Corrections, that Appellant not be permitted to use a 

typewriter within his cell. When the topic arose at 

sentencing, Superintendent McGrady explained to the trial 

court that, if Appellant were restricted to use of the 

typewriter in the [prison] library, as opposed to one in his 

cell, then department of corrections authorities would be 

able to monitor his use of the typewriter to the best of 

their ability. Authorities, however, would have no access 

or means to monitor Appellant’s use of a typewriter within 

his cell without having to do cell searches on a daily basis.

The trial court accepted Appellant’s plea as knowingly 

and voluntarily entered and sentenced him to 10 to 20 

months’ incarceration and [a consecutive twelve-month 

probationary term. At the conclusion of Appellant’s 

sentencing hearing, as a condition of his sentence, the trial 

court restricted Appellant to use of only the prison library 

typewriter].

Appellant then filed a counseled post-sentence motion 

and a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial 

court denied both motions.

Commonwealth v. Dickson, 60 A.3d 847 (Pa. Super. 2012), unpublished 

memorandum at 2-3 (citations and footnote omitted).

Appellant filed a timely appeal to this Court. On September 10, 2012, 

“[b]ecause we [held] that the portion of Appellant’s sentence restricting his 

right to use a typewriter while incarcerated [was] illegal, we [vacated] that 

portion of the sentence and [affirmed] the remaining aspects of the 
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judgment of sentence.” Dickson, unpublished memorandum at 1. Neither 

Appellant nor the Commonwealth filed a petition for allowance of appeal.

The PCRA court summarized the subsequent procedural history as 

follows:

[Appellant] filed a PCRA Petition on January 14, 2013, 

that was ultimately withdrawn by [Appellant] after 

consultation with his counsel, John Hakim, on September 

5, 2013. [Appellant also withdrew all ineffective assistance 

claims he had raised against trial counsel.] [Appellant] 

filed a second PCRA Petition on November 19, 2013. []

***

Thereafter, the Court issued [Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of 

intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition] on May 29, 2014. 

On July 2, 2014 the Court issued an Order, without hearing 

and after review of [Appellant’s] PCRA Petition, 

Memorandum of Law, and [Appellant’s] Response to the 

[Pa.R.Crim.P.] 907 Notice, and denied and dismissed the 

PCRA Petition.

Following the dismissal, [Appellant] filed a pro se 

Appeal to the PCRA dismissal on July 18, 2014. Attorney 

John Hakim was still counsel of record having previously 

represented [Appellant] for PCRA purposes. When he was 

advised of the Pro-Se appeal, he filed a Motion for 

Appointment of Appellate Counsel. The Court, having full 

knowledge of the Pro-Se Appeal and that the filing was 

actually hybrid representation in that [Appellant] continued 

to be represented by Attorney Hakim, issued an Order on 

August 1, 2014 and appointed [present counsel] to 

represent [Appellant] in all pending appellate matters. []

The Superior Court issued an Order dated August 22, 

2014, directing the Trial Court to conduct a [Grazier] 

Hearing and make a determination as to whether 

[Appellant] is entitled to and desires counsel on appeal. At 

the [Grazier] hearing, [present counsel] appeared and 

indicated to the Court that he was in possession of all 

materials and documents necessary to prepare and file the 

brief for the appeal. The Court conducted a colloquy [with 
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Appellant,] and reviewed the Remand Order with 

[Appellant] and assured [him] that his appellate rights 

remained intact and [Appellant] indicated he had the 

opportunity to speak with [present counsel] and was 

satisfied that he could adequately prepare the Appellate 

Brief in this matter. The Trial Court issued an Order on 

September 30, 2014, verifying that [Appellant] was 

represented in appellate matters and Ordered that 

[present counsel] file [] Appellant’s brief within twenty five 

(25) days.

PCRA Court Opinion, 9/30/14, at 1-3 (footnote omitted).

In lieu of an advocate’s brief, Appellant’s counsel has filed a purported 

“NO MERIT/TURNER FINLEY BRIEF” and a petition to withdraw pursuant 

to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). 

Thus, we will assess counsel’s assertion that Appellant’s appeal is frivolous 

under a Turner/Finley analysis. 

Our Supreme Court has explained:

These cases establish the procedure for withdrawal of 

court-appointed counsel in collateral attacks on criminal 

convictions. Independent review of the record by 

competent counsel is required before withdrawal is 

permitted. Such independent review requires proof of:

1) A “no-merit” letter by PCRA counsel detailing the 

nature and extent of his [or her] review;

2) A “no-merit” letter by PCRA counsel listing each issue 

the petitioner wished to have reviewed;

3) The PCRA counsel’s “explanation”, in the “no-merit” 

letter, of why the petitioner’s issues were meritless;

4) The PCRA court conducting its own independent 

review of the record; and
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5) The PCRA court agreeing with counsel that the 

petition was meritless.

Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 876 n.1, (Pa. 2009) (citations 

omitted). Here, counsel has complied with the mandates of Turner and 

Finley, as summarized in Pitts, supra.

1

 We therefore must determine 

whether we agree with counsel’s assessment of Appellant’s ineffectiveness 

claim.

This Court’s standard of review regarding an order dismissing a 

petition under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is 

supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. 

Commonwealth v. Halley, 870 A.2d 795, 799 n.2 (Pa. 2005). The PCRA 

court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the 

findings in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 

1166 (Pa. Super. 2001). Moreover, a PCRA court may decline to hold a 

hearing on the petition if the PCRA court determines that the petitioner’s 

claim is patently frivolous and is without a trace of support in either the 

record or from other evidence. Commonwealth v. Jordan, 772 A.2d 1011 

(Pa. Super. 2001).

____________________________________________

1

PCRA counsel attached a copy of his letter to Appellant to his petition to 

withdraw. See generally, Commonwealth v. Liebensperger, 904 A.2d 

40 (Pa. Super. 2006).
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PCRA counsel asserts that, because Appellant is no longer serving any 

portion of his sentence at issue, he is ineligible for PCRA relief. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543 (a)(1)(i). Our review of the record supports counsel’s 

conclusion. As stated by the PCRA court:

In reviewing the procedural history of the case at bar, it 

is abundantly clear that [Appellant’s] sentence of 

incarceration expired on November 30, 2012 and the 

additional one year probation expired on November 30, 

2013. [Appellant] filed the PCRA petition on November 19, 

2013. [Appellant’s] probation sentence expired eleven 

(11) days after he filed the PCRA. At the time that the 

court issued the [Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice], the sentence to 

the one (1) count of [forgery] had expired.

PCRA Court Opinion, 9/30/14, at 5. We agree.

As our Supreme Court has recently explained:

Eligibility for relief under the PCRA is dependent upon 

the petitioner currently serving a sentence of 

imprisonment, probation, or parole for the crime. 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(1)(i); [Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 

699 A.2d 718, 720, (Pa. 1997)] (holding that the plain 

language of this section requires the denial of relief for a 

petitioner who has finished serving his sentence).

Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754, 761-62. Moreover, “[t]he [PCRA] 

statute clearly contemplates that the petitioner will be serving a sentence at 

both the pleading and proof stages of the proceeding.” Ahlborn, 699 A.2d 

at 720. Thus, as soon as a PCRA petitioner has completed his or her 

sentence, he or she is no longer eligible for relief despite the pendency of his 

or her petition. See, e.g., Turner, 80 A.3d at 769 (holding PCRA 

petitioner’s eligibility for relief expired two days after she filed her PCRA 
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petition); Ahlborn, 699 A.2d at 719-20 (holding that petitioner was 

ineligible for PCRA relief when, following the filing of a PCRA petition and the 

scheduling of an evidentiary hearing, he was unconditionally released from 

prison).

Our review of the record supports the conclusion of both present 

counsel and the PCRA court that Appellant is no longer eligible for postconviction relief because he completed his sentence eleven days after he 

filed his PCRA petition. We therefore grant present counsel’s petition to 

withdraw, and affirm the PCRA court’s order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA 

petition.

Petition granted. Order affirmed.

 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/15/2015