PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 18-3199

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

REHELIO D. TRANT, Appellant

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On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands
District Court No. 3-18-cr-00004-001 District Judge: The Honorable Curtis V. Gomez

Argued April 8, 2019

Before: SMITH, Chief Judge , JORDAN, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges

(Filed: May 15, 2019)

Gretchen C.F. Shappert Sigrid M. Tejo-Sprotte [ARGUED] Office of United States Attorney2 5500 Veterans Drive, Suite 260
United States Courthouse St. Thomas, VI 00802 Counsel for Appellee

Omodare B. Jupiter
Office of the Federal Public Defender
200 South Lamar Street
Suite 200-N Jackson, MS 39201

Melanie Turnbull [ARGUED] Gabriel J. Villegas
Office of Federal Public Defender 1336 Beltjen Road Suite 202, Tunick Building St. Thomas, VI 00802 Counsel for Appellant

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OPINION OF THE COURT

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SMITH, Chief Judge.

One evening on St. Thomas, in the U.S. Virgin Islands (the V.I.), a minor dispute between two men over the use of a can opener escalated into each man menacingly showing the other his pistol. After law en forcement officers looked into these events, a federal grand jury charged one of them, Rehelio Trant, with being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm3 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922( g)(1). Trant proceeded to trial and a jury found him guilty. On appeal, Trant argues that his
conviction should be vacated because the District Courtimpermissibly allowed the Government to reopen its case-inchief and also made two evidentiary errors. Trant also
contends that the record cont ains insufficien t evidence to support his conviction. Conc luding that none of Trant’s challenges have merit, we will affirm the judgment.

I. 1

In the fall of 2017, Rehelio Trant and Jimez Ashby had a heated encounter at a gas sta tion in Bovoni, St. Thomas, that ended with each displaying his pistol to the other. Trant wanted to use a can opener insi de the gas station, but Ashby was at a counter and in his way. Trant asked Ashby to move, but Ashby did not hear him. Tr ant then yelled his request in Ashby’s ear. Although Ashby complied, he admonished Trant for screaming at him. The encounter seemed to have ended
when the two men shook hands a nd Trant exited the store. Yet Trant signaled Ashby to join hi m outside. When Ashby did so, a breeze blew hard enough against Trant that Ashby, standing less than a car’s length away, was able to see Trant’s waistband tighten and the imprint of a gun against his body. Ashby immediately brandished his fi rearm and backed away. Then standing “a little more than a car length” from Ashby, Trant

1 Because Trant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, we vi ew the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Government and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of th e jury’s guilty verdict. See United
States v. Fountain , 792 F.3d 310, 31 4 (3d Cir. 2015).4 lifted up his shirt and revealed a gun in his waistband. (App. 61.) Just then, a woman walk ed between the two men, and Trant left the gas station. As hby quickly called the police to report the incident.

Several months later, a federa l grand jury charged Trant with one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Before trial, the Government and Trant stipulated that he had a prior felony conviction. In ad dition, Trant filed a motion in limine seeking the Court’s permis sion to inquire into “Ashby’s unlawful possession of two firearms for impeachment purposes which are probative of his ch aracter for untruthfulness.” (App. 24–25.) The District Court de ferred ruling on this motion until
trial.

At trial, the Government’s case included the testimony of Ashby and Sergeant Bernard Burke, the Supervisor of the Virgin Islands Police Department’s Firearms Unit. Ashby
described his encounter with Tr ant, and added that the light “was good” when he saw both th e imprint of a gun in Trant’s
waistband and Trant lift his shirt to expose the gun. (App. 60, 76–77.) On cross examination, Ashby testified that he knew the imprint in Trant’s waistb and was of a gun and recalled telling the police that Trant’s firearm “look[ed] like a Glock”— a gun that Ashby said rese mbled his own Glock pistol. (App. 71.) Trant’s counsel attempted to ask Ashby three questions about the unlawfulness of his po ssession of a firearm at the
time of the altercation with Tr ant, but the District Court sustained, apparently under Federal Rules of Evidence 608 and5 609, the Government’s objec tions to these questions. 2 The Government then called Sergeant Burke to testify that there are no firearm manufacturing fac ilities within the territorial
boundaries of the V.I. After that, the Government rested its

case.

Next, Trant moved under Fe deral Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a) for a judgment of acquittal. The District Court, noting that the trial reco rd lacked eviden ce that Trant was a convicted felon (a requi rement for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), see United States v. Foster , 891 F.3d 93, 111 (3d Cir. 2018)), asked the prosecutor about the missing evidence to support this “essen tial element.” (App. 84.) She responded that she had forgotte n to move the admission of the stipulation of Trant’s prior felo ny conviction. The prosecutor then incorrectly assert ed that she had “asked the Court prior to the jury coming in to address [the stipulation] and to inquire as to when that stipulation woul d be presented to the jury.” 3

2 The District Court did not re ference any legal authority when ruling on the Government’s obj ections, but the Government
cited Federal Rules of Evidence 608 and 609 when it raised two of its three objections th at the Court sustained.

3 The record does not support th e Government’s assertion that
it had raised with the Court the admission of the stipulation. The prosecutor later acknowledged that she “did not tell the Court that the question [she] had about the stipulation was when to present it.” (App. 89.) The District Court “remind[ed] the parties to be cautious with your recollection[s] because it seems to me the [G]overnment’s recollection and recitation of what happened doesn’t comport with the record at all.” (App. 91.)6 (App. 85.) This left the Governme nt with no alternative but to move to reopen its case-in-chief. In support of its motion, the prosecutor argued that the Court should grant the motion because Trant would not suffer any prejudice from the admission of the stipulation. Trant objected but offered no reason why the Court should deny the motion other than that “it’s too late” and “[t]he [G]overnment has rested.” (App. 88.)

The District Court granted the Government’s motion to reopen. After the stipulation was admitted into evidence, the Government again rested. Trant, not presenting any evidence of his own, also rested.

The jury found Trant guilty of violating § 922(g)(1), and Trant was later sentenced to 71 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised rele ase. Trant timely appealed.

II.

The District Court had juri sdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a) , and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

III.

On appeal, Trant raises three issues. He contends that the District Court erred by gr anting the Government’s motion to reopen its case-in-chief and by restricting his cross examination of Ashby. Trant also asserts that the record lacks the necessary evid ence to support his co nviction. We reject each of his challenges.7 A.

Trant argues that the District Court impermissibly granted the Government’s mo tion to reopen because the
Government lacked a reasonabl e explanation for failing to present the stipulation during its case-in-chief. Trant adds that “the [G]overnment added insult to injury by mi srepresenting
what had occurred.” (Trant’s Br. at 21.) He further contends
that our review of the District Court’s ruling should “end” with the Government’s inadequate ju stification for failing to move the stipulation into evidence because, he implies, a reasonable explanation was necessary for reopening. ( Id. at 22.) Alternatively, Trant asserts that the Court abused its discretion by granting the motion because he was prejudiced by the reopening—i.e., he lost the oppo rtunity to be acquitted based on the Government’s failure to prove that he is a convicted
felon.

1.

There is scarce authority in our circuit on the standard governing this Court’s review of a ruling on a motion to reopen the Government’s case-in-chief during a criminal trial. We therefore take this opportunity to clarify and build upon our
case law. 4 When considering a part y’s motion to reopen its

4 In multiple decisions, both precedential and nonprecedential, we have stated that “[t]he question of whether the [G]overnment may augment the record at a suppression hearing after a remand following the conviction of the defendant is analogous to the question of whether the [G]overnment may reopen its case after resting.” United States8 case at trial, “‘the district court’s primary focus should be on whether the party opposing reopening would be prejudiced if reopening is permitted.’” United States v. Coward , 296 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Kithcart , 218 F.3d 213, 220 (3d Cir. 2000)) (e xplaining how district courts should approach ruling on motions to reopen a suppression hearing). As in the suppre ssion context, two principal
considerations for the district court’s inquiry are the timing of the moving party’s request to reopen (whether, if the motion is granted, the opposing party will have a reasonable opportunity to rebut the moving party’s new evidence) and “the effect of the granting of the motion” (whe ther granting the motion will cause substantial disruption to th e proceedings or result in the new evidence taking on “d istorted importance”). Id. (internal quotation marks and citation om itted). Moreover, district courts should assess the reasonableness of the moving party’s explanation for failing to introduc e the desired evidence before resting and whether the new evidence is admissible and has probative value. See id.

In adopting this standard, we join eight other circuits that have issued essentially th e same guidance on how district courts should approach deciding motions to reopen at trial.

v. Coward , 296 F.3d 176, 180 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v.
Kithcart , 218 F.3d 213, 219 (3d Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Rey , 595 F. App’x 152, 154 (3d Cir. 2014) (same);
United States v. Brown , 534 F. App’x 132, 136 (3d Cir. 2013) (same); see also United States v. Vastola , 915 F.2d 865, 876 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that ru ling on a motion to reopen a suppression hearing after remand “is similar to ... ruling on a motion by the [G]overnment to reopen”).9 See United States v. Martinez , 872 F.3d 293, 298–99 (5th Cir. 2017); United States v. Orozco , 764 F.3d 997, 1001 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Sabhnani

, 599 F.3d 215, 247–48 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Nunez , 432 F.3d 573, 579 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Byrd , 403 F.3d 1278, 1283– 88 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Peterson , 233 F.3d 101, 106 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Blankenship , 775 F.2d 735, 741 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Larson , 596 F.2d 759, 778 (8th Cir. 1979).

Although we have announced the standard governing motions to reopen at trial by referring to our suppressionhearing case law, our statemen t that “‘courts should be extremely reluctant to grant reopenings,’” Coward , 296 F.3d at 180 (quoting Kithcart , 218 F.3d at 219 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), does not apply to a district court’s consideration of a motion to reopen at trial. Both Coward and
Kithcart explained that this restraint on reopening applies to motions to reopen a suppression hearing. See id. ; Kithcart , 218
F.3d at 219–20. We conclude that any such caution against reopening the record in the tr ial context would constitute an
anomalous constraint on a district court’s traditional and wellunderstood exercise of its discretion. See United States v. Schiff , 602 F.3d 152, 167 n.21 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that district courts “have wide discretion in the management of their cases” (internal quotation mark s and citation omitted)).
Coward and Kithcart recognize that “decisions to reopen proceedings are traditionally a discretionary matter for the
district court.” Coward , 296 F.3d at 180 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Kithcart , 218 F.3d at 219. We will not, therefore, direct a district court to place a thumb on the scale by suggesting that re opening a trial record is10 somehow disfavored, while at th e same time giving lip service to our reliance upon the trial ju dge’s sound discretion. In our view, this would only confuse a trial judge’s inquiry into whether or not to reopen, as we ll as our eventual review for
abuse of discretion.

We add that our cautionary warning against reopening suppression hearings upon remand is not warranted in the trial
context for three additional reas ons. First, in comparison to suppression hearings, trials pres ent a greater need for district
courts to be unconstrained in the exercise of their casemanagement discretion. Trials are fluid proceedings with a
much wider horizon of evidence fo r district courts to consider than in suppression hearings, an d courts enjoy broad discretion during trial precisely so that th ey can promptly and effectively respond to the varied and often unanticipated issues that may
arise. Cf. Schiff , 602 F.3d at 176 (notin g district courts have “broad discretion” to engage in case management during trial). Second and relatedly, suppressi on hearings usually present
fewer and more narrow issues than arise at trial. That means that parties moving to reopen suppression hearings will generally have less justifiable reasons for failing to introduce
the desired evidence into the record than parties moving to reopen at trial. As Coward noted, “[r]eopening is often permitted to supply some technical requirement ... or to supply some detail overlooked by inadve rtence.” 296 F.3d at 182 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We believe that, as exemplified by this ca se, there are more opportunities for technical requirements or de tails to be overlooked during the often high pressure of a trial proceeding than in a suppression hearing where a jury is never present. Third,
courts should not be distracted at trial by a suggestion that11 reopening is disfavored, because deciding whether to allow the Government to reopen its case-i n-chief will more often be outcome determinative (as in this case) than in the suppressionfollowing-remand context. In the latter situation, the Government may be able, th rough time and investigative resources, to obtain alternative ev idence to present at trial. This higher likelihood of reope ning at trial being outcome
determinative makes it even more critical that a district court apply our reopening standard in a straightforward manner, focusing first on prejudice to the party opposing the motion, while also considering the natu re and probative value of the new evidence. Quite simply, the purpose, procedure and pressures of a trial are way to o different from the suppression hearing context to warrant applic ation of a “one size fits all” approach to resolving a motion to reopen. 5

2.

With this standard now defi ned, we turn to Trant’s argument that the District Court impermissibly granted the Government’s motion to reopen its case-in-chief. 6 We agree

5 We do not consider here whether our statement in Coward
and Kithcart instructing district cour ts to exercise extreme reluctance to grant reopening in suppression hearings after remand is dicta and accordingly not binding, even in that context. It is enough to say that it is certainly not binding in
the context of a trial.

6 We review the District C ourt’s ruling on the Government’s motion to reopen by applying a straightforward abuse of
discretion standard. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. , 401 U.S. 321, 331–32 (1971).12 with Trant that the Govern ment’s reason for failing to introduce the stipulation before resting (it “simply forgot” (Gov. Br. at 16)) is hardly compelling. But prejudice to the party objecting to reopening th e trial record constitutes the primary consideration for a distri ct court that must rule on a motion to reopen. The Court was not required to deny the motion solely because the Government’s explanation was
weak. See United States v. Wrensford , 866 F.3d 76, 88 n.6 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Reopening may ... be permitted to allow the presentation of evidence abou t a technical matter overlooked by inadvertence.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by granting the mo tion because Tr ant was not prejudiced by the Government’s reopening of its case-in-chief: the Government moved to reopen before Trant had the opportunity to present his ev idence, thereby giving him the opportunity to respond and also limiting any disruption to the proceedings. 7 See Coward , 296 F.3d at 181 (“Where, as in this case, reopening is permitted afte r the [G]overnment has rested its case in chief, but before the defendant has presented any evidence, it is unlikely that pr ejudice sufficient to establish an
abuse of discretion can be es tablished.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). An d importantly, the object of the motion to reopen was the admission of a stipulation —Trant

7 The District Court did not provide an explanation for granting the Government’s moti on to reopen. We encourage
district courts to articulate th eir reasons for a ruling on a motion to reopen at trial.13 had agreed to it. 8 See United States v. Smith , 751 F.3d 107, 114 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding th at the nonmoving parties were not prejudiced by the District Court’s granting a motion to reopen the record on remand be cause they had notice of the
evidence to be offered and an opportunity to rebut the evidence). Contrary to Trant’s assertion, prejudice in this
context does not mean the lo ss of an opportunity for an unearned windfall. Prejudice re sults when a party experiences an unfair or unreasonable impairment of his defense.
See Smith , 751 F.3d at 114; Coward , 296 F.3d at 181. Finally, we emphasize that the parties do not dispute that the stipulation was admissible and that it had significant probative value. 9 A
trial should be a solemn exercise in a search for truth, not a game of “gotcha.”

B.

Trant next contends that the District Court committed two errors by preventing hi m from cross examining Ashby about his unlawful possession of a firearm. First, Trant argues
that the Court should have permitted him to question Ashby about this matter, suggesting it was probative of Ashby’s
character for untruthfulness an d necessary for the jury to evaluate Ashby’s credibility. Tr ant asserts that Ashby’s own illegal activity gave him a reas on to lie about Trant’s gun possession. When Ashby called th e police, Trant contends, he

8 The parties had filed on the District Court’s docket the stipulation that Trant had a pr ior felony conviction.

9 We add that the District Court appropriately handled the Government’s misrepresentati on regarding the admission of the stipulation.14 wanted officers to focus on Tran t’s criminal activity and not his own. In support , Trant points to United States v. Estell , 539 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1976), for th e proposition that “credibility may be attacked by showing spec ific instances of the witness’s prior misconduct, other than convictions, which bear on veracity.” Id. at 700.

In implicitly applying Federa l Rule of Evidence 608(b),
the District Court did not abus e its discretion by restricting Trant from asking Ashby about his unlawful possession of a
firearm. 10 Under this Rule, the District Court had the discretion
to allow Trant on cross examin ation to question Ashby about specific instances of conduct if they were probative of his
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. See Fed. R. Evid. 608(b); United States v. Williams , 464 F.3d 443, 448 (3d Cir. 2006). The District Court perm issibly halted Trant’s proposed questioning because Ashby’s illegal possession of a firearm did not have any bearing on hi s character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness. As the Tenth Circ uit has explained, “[t]here is a point which constitutes a prosec ution of the witness for the offense inquired about rather th an a testing of his credibility and when that point is reached th e court acts properly in closing down the questioning, for there is no valid interest to be served

10 We review the District Court’s ruling for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Georgiou , 777 F.3d 125, 143 (3d Cir. 2015). The Government also objected to Trant’s proposed cross examination of Ashby unde r Federal Rule of Evidence 609, but that Rule appears inapplicable here because, according to Trant, Ashby was not convicted of illegally possessing a firearm (for lacking a valid firearms license).
See Fed. R. Evid. 609.15 in shifting the emphasis from th e accused person[] on trial to
the witness.” Estell , 539 F.2d at 699–700. The Court did not err in preventing Trant from questioning Ashby about his unlawful possession of a firearm and thereby avoiding the concerns expressed in Estell

.
Second, Trant argues that th e District Court violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause, see U.S. Const. amend. VI, by not permitting him to cr oss examine Ashby about his unlawful possession of a firear m. His questions, Trant contends, would have demonstrated Ashby’s bias against Trant
and his motivation to lie. Trant again suggests that because Ashby illegally had a gun during their encounter at the gas station, he had the motive to report Trant’s unlawful possession of a firearm to the police so as to distract law enforcement from
his own criminal conduct. Notably, Trant does not assert that Ashby testified pursuant to any agreement with the
Government.

Trant failed to raise this ar gument below, so we review for plain error. See United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 731– 34 (1993). 11 The District Court did not plainly err because if

11 Under plain-error review, Tran t must show that (1) an error occurred; (2) the error is “obviou s”; and (3) the error “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” United States
v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 732–34 (1 993) (internal quotation marks omitted). If Trant make s these showings, we exercise
our discretion to award relief when the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 736 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).16 Trant had been permitted to pursue his proposed cross examination, the jury would not have had “a significantly different impression” of Ashby’s credibility. Delaware v. Van
Arsdall , 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986); see also United States v.
Chandler , 326 F.3d 210, 219 (3d Cir. 2003). Had the cross examination taken place, no reasonable jury could have believed that Ashby testified ag ainst Trant to avoid his own prosecution for illegally having a firearm. And how could they? It was Ashby himself who first called the police and reported to them that he had br andished his own firearm in the presence of Trant. Trant’s pr oposed cross examination would not have given “the jury the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of” Ashby. Van Arsdall , 475 U.S. at 680 (int ernal quotation marks and citation omitted). And even if the restriction on cross examination was error, the implausible nature of Ashby’s having an ulterior motive for testifying hardly made it
“obvious” that Trant had the right to ask Ashby about the latter’s illegal possessi on of a firearm. Olano , 507 U.S. at 734.

C.

Trant finally raises two ar guments in support of his
contention that the record lacks sufficient eviden ce to support his conviction. First, he asse rts that Ashby’s testimony lacks adequate specificity for a ra tional factfinder to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that th e object Ashby saw in Trant’s possession fit the definition of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3). Trant emphasizes that the object may not have been a firearm at all; alternatively, he sugg ests that “the object could have been an antique firearm which the statute specifically excludes as meeting the definition of a firearm.”17 (Trant Br. at 14.) And during oral argument before us, Trant stressed that Ashby lacked th e expertise and experience of a police officer in identifying fi rearms and that Ashby’s account
lacked corroboration.

Ashby’s testimony, however, provides sufficient evidence to satisfy the requireme nt for a § 922(g)(1) conviction that a defendant possess a firear m as defined in § 921(a)(3). 12 When reviewing a jury verdic t to determine whether the evidence presented at trial wa s sufficient to support the conviction, “we review the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt[ ] beyond a reasonable
doubt. ... We must sustain the jury’s verdict if there is substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, to uphold the jury’s decision.” United States v.
Caraballo-R odriguez , 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (internal quotation ma rks and citations omitted). Here, Ashby testified that he saw, with good lighting at the scene of the offense, the imprin t of a gun in Trant’s waistband and Trant revealing “his gun in his waist.” ( App. 61, 76–77.) Ashby further stated that he knew what he saw was a gun, describing it as a Glock that look ed like one that he owned. When assessing this evidence in the light most favorable to the

12 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) define s a firearm as “(A) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; (B) the frame or receiver of any such weapon; (C) any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or (D) any destructive device. Such term does not include an antique
firearm.”18 Government, a rational trier of fact could determine beyond a
reasonable doubt that Trant had a “weapon ... which will or is designed to or may readily be co nverted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive. ” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)(A). Cf. United States v. Beverly , 99 F.3d 570, 573 (3d Cir. 1996) (concluding that the testimony of a witness, who saw a defendant’s gun twice at a “close” range, provided “sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the defendant utilized a
firearm in the commission of hi s crime”). Furthermore, we reject Trant’s antique-firearm defense, see 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) (excluding “an antique firearm” from the definition of a firearm), because he did not raise this affirmative defense in the District Court, nor did he offer any evidence suggesting that the gun Ashby saw was an antique firearm, as required by
United States v. Lawrence , 349 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2003). Finally, we have never required that a firearm conviction be supported by the testimony of at least two witnesses or by a witness with firearms expertise equa l to that of a police officer.
See Beverly , 99 F.3d at 571–73 (only a mailman testified to seeing the defendant’s firearm).

Second, Trant contends that the Government failed to prove that his firear m traveled in interstate commerce—a required showing for a conviction under § 922(g)(1).
See Foster , 891 F.3d at 111. Sergeant Burke, Trant argues, could not have provided the ne cessary proof because “he was not given a gun to examine nor was he given the particular characteristics of [Trant’s] gun.” (Trant Br. at 15–16.)

But Sergeant Burke’s testim ony was that there were no firearm manufacturers in the Virg in Islands. That alone would justify a rational trier of fact in finding beyond a reasonable19 doubt that Trant’s firearm travel ed in interstate commerce. This Court has previously held that the testimony of Virgin Islands police officers can be sufficient to establish that, because particular goods were not manufactured in the Virgin Islands, their presence on the isla nds meant that they had been transported in interstate commerce. See United States v. Haywood , 363 F.3d 200, 21 0–11 (3d Cir. 2004); United States
v. Lake , 150 F.3d 269, 273 (3d Cir. 1998). Those holdings are applicable here. Sergeant Bu rke’s testimony tracks that of Virgin Islands police officers in earlier cases in which we have deemed such testimony sufficient to establish that a particular good or product moved in interstate commerce. Given Sergeant Burke’s testimony, a rational trier of fact would not
need to examine Tran t’s gun or its characteristics to find beyond a reasonable doubt that th e gun traveled in interstate

commerce. See United States v. Buggs , 904 F.2d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir. 1990) (“The fact that th e gun was not produced at trial
or that the witnesses did not ha ve an opportunity to examine closely the weapon does not pr event conviction of a firearm offense.”).

IV.

We will affirm the judgment because sufficient evidence supports Trant’s convic tion, and because the District Court did not err in either pe rmitting the Government to reopen
its case-in-chief or restricti ng Trant’s cross examination of Ashby.