F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

J AI ME M ED R ANO and M ARI BE L M ED R ANO , husband and w ife,

Plain tif fs- Ap pe lla nts ,

v.
F LAG STA R B ANK , FSB , a F eder al Savin g s B ank ; E X O D U S F I NANC I AL C OR PO R ATI ON , a Ne vada c orporation fo rm e rl y kn own a s D oe 1; J ANE F O WLER KEL L EHER , formerly known a s D oe 2; S TR AT HA M M ON TE C I TO W EST , a California

corpor ation; S T RAT EG I C S AL ES AND M AR K ETI NG G R OUP , a California

corpor ation; J A N I S KI M RA N D A ZZO , in div idu a lly and re sponsible manag ing of fice r of Strateg ic Sales and Ma

rketing Gr ou p; F ERNANDO C O RDE RO , ind ivi du a lly

and re sp on sib le manag ing of

fice r of Exodus Financ ial Corporation; and D O RA S EN AI DA C O RDE RO ,

Defendants-A

ppellees , No. 11-55412

D.C. No. 2:10-cv-07285- J HN

- P LA

OPI NI ONM ED R ANO V
. F LAG STA R B ANK

2
and
P R OTOF UND M OR TGAGE C OR PO R ATI ON , a

Ca lif or nia corpor ation, Defendant

.

Appea l from the United States District Court fo r t he Ce ntra l D istri c t of

Ca lif or nia J acque line H. Nguyen, District Judge, Pre siding

Argued and Submitted No ve mbe r 6 , 2 01 2—Pa sa de na , Ca lif or nia
Filed De cembe r 11, 2012
Be fore : Susan P. Graber , Sandra S. Ikuta, and An dr e w D . Hur

wi tz, C ir c uit

Judg e s. Opinion by

J udg e Gr aberM ED R ANO V
. F LAG STA R B ANK 3

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es n o part of t he op i ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s * b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. SUMMAR

Y *

Real EstateSettlem ent P roce dures Act
The panel aff

irmed the dismiss al of a claim under the Real Estate Settlement Procedur es Ac t by borrowe rs see king dama g e s f

or a mor tg a g e -l oa n ser vic e r’ s f a ilureto r e sp on d to the ir inq uirie s. Adopting the Seventh Circuit’s g ene ra l approa ch, the pa ne l he ld that th e bo rr ow e rs ’ l e tte rs c ha lle ng ingthemonthl y pay mentdue on their loa

n wer e not “qua lified written reque sts” trig g ering the se rvice r’s duty to respond under

12 U.S.C. § 2605 because the letters did not see k inf o rm at ion relating to the servicing of the loan, but rathe r cha lleng ed the loa n’ s te rm s.

CO UN SEL
J erome Z amos, L aw Of

fice s o f J erome Z amos, Woodland Hi lls , Ca lif

or nia , f or Pla int if fs -A pp e lla nts

. Roland P. Rey

nolds a nd Frederick A. Haist, P al m er, L ombardi & Donohue L L P, L os Ang eles, California ; Dale A. Arakawa and L isa P. Gru en , Erickse n Arbuthnot, L os Ang eles, California ; and C arol L . Vallely , L aw Of fice of Caro l L . V a lle ly , V e rd

ug o Ci ty , Ca lif

or nia , f or De fe nd ants

Ap pe lle e s.M ED R ANO V
. F LAG STA R B ANK

4

B ef ore t he di s t r i ct cour t , P l ai nt i f f s al s o as s er t ed ot her f

eder al an d s t at e- 1 la w c la im s. P la intiff s a sse rte d tho se c la im s a g a in s t, i n a d d iti o n to Flags t ar, D ef

end ant s Exodu s Fi n an ci al Cor po rat i o n, Jane F o wl er K el l eher, S tra tha m M o n te c ito W e st, S tra te g ic S a le s a n d M a rk e ting G ro u p , Ja n is K im R a n d a z z o , F e rn a n d o C o rd e ro , an d D o ra S e n a id a C o rd e ro . W e ad d ress all claim s und er a p p ea l ex ce p t P l ainti f f s’ § 2 6 0 5 claim ag ainst Fl ags t ar i n a memo r andum di s po s i t i on f i l ed t hi s dat e. OP IN ION
GRABE R, Circuit J udg e: The Rea l Estate Settlement Procedur es Ac t (“RES PA”) provides an a ction for da mag es ag ainst mortga g e-loa n service rs who fa il t o re spond to certa in ty pes of inquiries fr o mb o rr o we rs
. P l ai nt i ff

s J ai m e an d

M ar ib el M edran o al l ege that D e fe nd ant F la g sta

r B ank , F SB , th e se rv ic e r o f t he ir ho me loan, violated 12 U.S.C. § 2605 beca use it did n o tre s p ond adequately

to t h re e letters in which they challeng ed the monthly p ay me nt d u e o nth e ir

lo an
. T h e d is tric t c o urt grante d Flag star’s motion to dismi ss the claim bec ause a se rv ic e r m

ust re c e ivea

va lid “ qu a lif ie d wri tte n r e qu e st” to incur the duty

to respond under § 2605, and it deter mined that the letters we re not qua lified written re quests that trig g ere d that statutory duty

. Reviewing de novo, Colony Cove Props., LLC v. City of Carson , 640 F.3d 948, 955 (9 t hCir.), c e rt. denied, 132 S. Ct . 456 (2011), wehold that the letters did not tr ig g e r t he statut or

y duty to r e sp on d a

nd the re fo rea ff

ir m. 1
In 2009, Plain t i ffs entered into a home loan agree ment and purc hased a house i n L os Ang eles County . The loan w as se c ur e d b y

a de e d of trus t and , at a ll t ime s r e le va nt t o th is action, wa s service d by

Flag star.M ED R ANO V
. F LAG STA R B ANK 5

Th e loa n do c ume nts pr ov ide d fo r an e sc ro w a c c ount i nto which P l ai n tiffs would make monthly pay ments to cover taxes, insurance, inter est, and princ ipal. In Februar y 2010, F la g sta r n oti fi e d Pl a int if

fs that th e e sc ro w a c c ount wo uld have insuff

icient funds over

the following12-month p eriod and that the y wo uld bere qu ir e d e ith e r t o in c re a se the ir mo nth l y p ay

m e nt f r o m $ 1 , 9 1 7

. 6 8 t o $ 2 , 6 7 6

. 0 8 or to contrib u t e a one -time lump sum of $4,938.53 to cover the d e f i c i e n c y. Plaintiffs retained a

lawyer who, betwee n Marc h 19, 2010 , an dAugust 10, 2010, sent three le tters disputing a ny obligation to make the incre ased pa y ments. The first letter , wh ic h w a s sent to F la g sta r d ir e c tly , a sse rt e d, in r e le va nt p art , that the loan docume n t s did not “acc urate ly ref lect . . . the proper pay ment schedule repr ese n t ed by the loan broke r.” The letter went on to explain that, when Plaintiffs bought the ho us e , th e br ok e r a ssu

re d the m that th e ir

maximummonthl y pay ments would not exceed $1,900. The letter de manded that Flag star “revise a ll documentation conce rningthe cur rent loan” to re flec t the “orig inal terms” o f the agree ment and l i m i tP l a i nt i f

f s ’ m o nth l y p aym e nt s a c c o r d i n g l y. The sec ond l et t er, which also was se nt to Flag star direc tly , made similar cla ims. It al s o told Flag star that Pla int if fs wo uld c ontin ue to m ake pa

y me nts o f o nly $1,917.68, as alleg edly

agree d, and that they

exp ec ted F la g sta r “ to a pp ly that amou

nt i n f ullsatis fa c tio n o f t

he ir obligation.”
T h e th i r d l e tt e r w e nt t o F l a g s t ar ’ s l e g a l c o un s e l

. It repe at ed the assertion that Fla g star’s de mand for inc rea sed pay ments was invalid, e ven though it was consistent with the loan and mortg ag e docume nts, b ec ause Pl aintiffs had be enM ED R ANO V
. F LAG STA R B ANK

6

D uri ng ora l ar gu ment , t he part i es di s put ed whe t her Fl ags t ar ha d 2
res p o nd ed t o t he l et t ers
. B ut b ecause t hat is sue was nei t her argued b ef o re t h e di s t r i ct c ou r t n or r ai s ed i n t he p ar t i es ’ a ppel l at e br i ef s , w e do n ot a d d re ss it he re
. S ee O ’G u i n n v. L o ve l o ckC o rr. C t r. , 502 F. 3d 1056, 1063 n. 3 (9t h Ci r
. 200 7) ( hol di ng t hat ar gu ment s not r ai s ed bef ore t he di s t r i ct c o u rt g e n e r a lly a re w a ive d ); Gr e e n wo o d v
. FA A , 2 8 F .3 d 9 7 1 , 9 7 7 (9 th C i r. 19 9 4 ) ( “W e revi ew o nl y i ss ues which ar e argued s p eci f i cal l y and di s t i nct l y i n a par t y ’ s openi ng bri ef

. ”)

. I ns t ead, we as s ume, f or pur po s es of t hi s appeal , t hat Fl ags t ar ’ s r es po ns es , i f an y , wer e i nadequa t e u nder § 2605. a dv ise d wh e n the y purc ha se d the ir ho me that th e ir

pa y me nts would not exceed $1,900 per month. Although F lag star re ceive d Plaintiffs’ letters, it made no chang es to their acc ount and—although the re cord is not clea r on thi s p oint—m ay

have fa ile d to re sp on d at a ll. 2
Pla int if fs c omm e nc e d this a c tio n in Cali fo rn ia sta te c ourt , alleg ing that Flag star violated state l aw
. After Plaintiffs added f eder al claims under

RESP A, Fla gs t ar removed the action to fe dera l court. The district c ourt di s m issed the fe de ra l c la ims and

re mand e d th e a c tio n to the st ate c ourt

. Pla int if fs tim e ly a pp e a l.
RESP A re quires the se rvice r o f a feder ally rela ted mor tg a g e loa n to pr ov idea ti mel y

writt e n r e sp on se to inq uirie s f ro m bo rrow e rs re g ard ingth e se rv ic ingof the ir loa ns . 1 2 U .S. C. § 26 05 (e )( 1) (A ), (e )( 2) . I f t he se rv ic e r f

a ils to respond prope rly

to such a reque st, the statute entitles the borrowe r to rec over actua l da mag es and, if there is a

“patter n or pr a c tic e of

no nc omp lia

nc e ,” statut or

y damag e s o f u

p to $1,000. Id. § 26 05 (f

). He re , F la g sta

r argue s th at, r e g ard le ssM ED R ANO V
. F LAG STA R B ANK 7

I f s ubj ect t o § 2 60 5(e) ’ s dut y t o re s po nd, Fl ags t ar woul d hav e been 3
re q u ire d t o a c k n o w le d g e re c e ip t o f t h e c o rr e sp o n d e n c e w ithin 2 0 d a ys an d, w i t h i n 60 da y s , ( 1) t o m ak e a ppr opr i at e cor r ec t i on s t o t h e ac cou n t , ( 2) t o exp l ai n why i t be l i eved t he acco unt t o be co rr ect , or (3) t o exp l ai n why t h e i n f or mat i on r equ es t ed wa s u n av ai l abl e or c ou l d n ot be obt ai n ed. 1 2 U

. S.C

. § 2 6 0 5 (e)( 1 )( A ), (e) (2). of ho w it r e sp on de d to Pla int if fs ’ l e tte rs , it is notliable under

3 the statute bec ause the letters we re not qua lified writt en reque sts and there fore did not require a response
. To dec ide whethe r Plaintiffs’ letters trig g ere d § 2605(e) ’s duty to respond, we beg in by

turningto the textof the statute, as we ll as its object and policy , to discern c ongres s i o n al intent. United States v. $493,850 in U.S. Currency , 518 F.3d 1159, 1166–67 (9th Cir. 2008). RESP A def ines a “ qualified writt e n r e qu e st” a s f

oll ow s: Fo r purpose s of this subsection, a qualified written reque st shall be a written corr espondenc e, other

than notice on a pay ment coup o n or other pa y ment medium su pp lie d b y these rv ic e r, that— (i) includes, or

o therwise e nables the service r to identify , the name andacc ount of the borrow er; a

nd (ii) includes a

statement of the rea sons for the belief

of the borrower , t o th e extent applicable , that the ac count is in error or provides suff

icient detail to the se rvice r reg ard i ngother infor

mation sought by

the borrowe r.M ED R ANO V
. F LAG STA R B ANK

8 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (1)( B)

. Under § 2605(e) (1)( A), a

service r mu s t r e s p o n d

to s u c ha

le tt e r if it r e qu e s ts o r

c h a ll e n g es “information relatingto the servicing of such loan.” Id. § 2605(e) (1)( A), (e )(2)

. Congr ess intended RESP A to serve consumer- protec tion purposes. The statute’s fi rs t section, which is entitled

“ Con gre ssi on a l f

ind ing s and purp os e ,” e xpre sse s Co ngre ss’ de te rm inatio n th at “ signif ic ant r e fo rm s in

therea l e state settlement proce ss are neede d to insur e that consumers throughout the Nation are provided w ith gr eate r and more timely information on the natur e and c osts of the settlement proce ss and ar e prote cted from unnece ssarily high se ttlement charg es ca

used by cer tain abusive pra ctices.” Id. § 2601(a) ; see also Sc huetz v. Banc One Mortg

. Co rp. , 292 F.3d 1004, 1008–09 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussingthe ena ctment and congressional purpose of R ESPA). Although the “settlement proce ss” targ eted by the statute wa s orig inally limit ed to the neg otiation and execution of mortg ag e contr acts, Gree npoint Mortg. Funding, Inc. v. Herrera ( In re He rrera) , 4 22 B .R. 698, 711 (B .A.P. 9th Ci r. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Home F unds Direct v . Monroy (

In re M onroy) , 6 50 F .3 d 1300 , 1 30 1 ( 9th Cir. 2011) (orde r), the sco pe of the statute’s provisions was expanded in 1990 to encompass loan se rvicing, P ub. L . No. 101-625, tit. IX, subtit. C, § 94 1 , 1 0 4 Stat. 4405 (1990). Acc ording ly , RESP A’s provisions re l atingto loan servicing proce dures should be “ construed liber ally” to servethe statute’s re medial purpose. He rre ra , 422 B.R. at 711–12.
We h ave ha d n o o c c a sio n to app ly th os e princ ipl e s to interpre tation of § 2605(e) , and fe w other c ourts have done so. In Catalan v. GMAC Mortgage Corp. , 62 9 F .3 d 67 6 ( 7th Cir. 2011), howeve r, the Seventh Circuit re cently considere d the scope of § 2605(e ). Specific al l y , in decidingwhether aM ED R ANO V
. F LAG STA R B ANK 9

qualified written reque st must i dentify specific rea sons for a borrowe r’s belief that his or her a ccount is in err or, the c ourt held:
RES PA d oe s n ot re qu ir e any ma g ic languag e bef

ore a service r must construe a writt e n c omm

un ic atio n from a b or

ro we r a s a qualif ie d wr it te n r e qu e s t and respond a c c or din g ly

. Th e langua g e of thepr ov isi on

is broad a nd clea r. To be a

qualified written re qu e st, a

writt e n c or

re sp on de nc e mus t rea sonably

identify the borrowe r and ac count and must “ include a statement of the re asons fo r the belief

of the borr ower , to th ee x tent ap pli c ab le , that the ac count is in error or provides sufficie nt detail to the service r reg arding other information sought by the bo rro wer. ” 12 U.S .C . § 26 05 (e) ( 1 )(B) (empha sis added). Any rea s o n ably

stated written re quest for acc ount information can be a qualified written reque st. To the extent that a borr ower

is able t o provide re asons for a belief that the account i s in err or, the borrower should provide them, but any reque st for inf or matio n ma de wi th s uf

fi c ie nt d eta il i s enough under RES PA to be a qualifie d written reque st and thus to trigg er the service r’s obligations to respond.
Catalan , 62 9 F .3 d at 68 7. We a gre e and a do pt the Seve nth Cir c uit ’s g e ne ra l a

pp ro a c h t o defin ingwh at qu a lif ie s a s a qu a lif ie d wri tte n r e qu e st that wi ll tr ig g e r § 26 05 (e )’ s duty to respond. The statute does not expl icitly requireany

“mag ic” wo rd s , an d an i nt e r

p r e t at i o n a c c o r d i n g t o wh i c h i t d id s oM ED R ANO V
. F LAG STA R B ANK

10

T he di s t r i ct cour t , l i ke m an y cour t s t hat ha ve addres s ed t he i s s ue, 4
con f l at ed t h e s t at u t or y a n al y s i s by de cl ar i n g t h att h e l et t er s w er e n ot qu al i f i ed wr i t t en r equ es t s be cau s e t h ey di d n ot r equ es t i n f or mat i on rela tin g t o servicing. S ec t i o n 2 6 0 5 (e)(1 )(B ), w hich d efi ne s wh at i s a q u a lif ie d w r it te n r e q u e st, d o e s n o t re fer to “info rm a tio n re la ting to

. . . s er vi ci ng
. ” I ns t ead, t hat r equi r ement der i ves f r om § 26 05 ( e) ( 1)( A ) , wh i ch requir es, as co nd i t i o ns f o r t ri ggeri ng t he d ut y t o respo nd , bo t h (1) t hat t he l et t er i s a qu al i f

i ed wr i t t en r equ es t a n d ( 2) t h at i t r equ es t s i n f or mat i on relat i ng t o ser vi ci ng. A l t ho ugh t hi s d i st i nct i o n m ay b e m eani ng le ss in
mos t c as es , w e cl ari f

y t h at t h i s opi n i on c on ce r n s t h e i n t er pr et at i on of § 26 0 5 (e)( 1 )( A ). implicitl y would be inconsistent with Congr ess’ intent that the statute ser

ve a br oad re medial purpose. Instead, unde r § 2605(e) , a borrower ’s writt en inqui ry require s a re sponse as lo n g as i t (1) re asonably

identifies the borr ower ’s name a nd acc ount, (2) either

states the borr ower ’s “r easons f or the belief . . . that the ac count is in error ” or “provides suff icient detail to the servic er r eg ardingother infor mat i o n sought by the borrow er,” and (3) seeks “information relatingto the servicingof [the] loan.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (1)( A)–(B ). 4
Nonethele ss, the third of those re qu i re ments—that the letter must reque st information relating to servicing —ensure s that the statutory

duty to respond does not arise with respec t to all inq uirie s o r c omp la int s f

ro m bo rr ow e rs to s e rv ic e rs. RES PA d e fi ne s th e ter

m “ se rv ic ing ” to e nc omp a ss o nly “re ceivingany schedule d periodic pay ments from a bor

rowe r pursuant to the ter

ms of any

loan, including a

mounts for escr ow ac counts . . . , and makingthe pay ments of principa l an d inte r e s t a

n d s u c ho th e r

p ay me nts

. ” Id. § 2605(i)(3)

. “Servic ing,”so defined, doe s not include the transa ctions and circ umstances surrounding a loan’s orig i n at ion—fac ts that would be re leva nt to a challeng e to the validity of an underlyi n g debt or the te rms of a loa n agree ment. SuchM ED R ANO V
. F LAG STA R B ANK 11

O ur hol di ng i s cons i s t ent wi t h t he deci s i ons o f m any d i s t r i ct co ur t s t hat 5 h a v e a d d re sse d the issu e
. See , e. g. , M enas he v

. B ank of N. Y. , 850 F. Su pp. 2 d 1 1 2 0 , 1 1 3 0 (D . H a w . 2 0 1 2 ) (no ting tha t re q u e sts re g a rd ing the va lid ity
o f l o an and m o rt gage d o c u m e nt s are not q ual i f i ed wri t t en reque st s) ; Je n sen v. Q u a l i t

y Lo a n S erv
. C o rp , 7 0 2 F . S u p p . 2 d 1 1 8 3 , 1 1 9 6 (E .D . C a l. 2 0 10 ) ( di s mi s s i ng a § 260 5(e) cl ai m f or f ai l ur e t o al l ege t hati nqui r i es re la te d to se rv ic ing ); Ri v e r a v
. BAC Home L o a n s S e r v i c i n g , L

. P. , 756 F. S u p p
. 2 d 1 1 9 3 , 1 1 9 9 (N .D . C a l. 2 0 1 0 ) (s a m e ); Si pe v
. Count r

ywi de Bank , 690 F. Su pp. 2d 1141, 1154 ( E. D

. Cal

. 2010) ( h ol di n g t h at a de man d f or r es ci s s i on of t he l oan agr eement do es not r el at e t o s er vi ci ng under § 2 6 0 5 (e )) ; C o n su m er S o lu tio n s R E O , L L C

. v. H i l l ery , 658 F. Su pp. 2d 1 0 0 2 , 1 0 1 4 (N .D

. C al. 2 0 0 9 ) (ho l d i ng t ha t a q ua l i f i ed writ t en req ue st m ust a d d re ss the s e rv ic ing o f th e lo a n , a n d n o t its va lid ity); Ch a mpl a i e v
. BA C H om e Loans Se r vi ci ng, LP , 706 F. Su pp. 2d 1029, 1043 ( E. D

. Cal

. 2009) (s a m e ); K een v. A m
. Hom e M ort g. Ser vi ci ng , I

nc. , 664 F. Su pp. 2d 1086, 1 0 9 7 (E .D . C a l. 2 0 0 9 ) (s a m e ); M orEq ui t y, Inc. v. Na eem , 118 F. Su pp. 2d 8 8 5 , 90 1 (N

. D

. Il l

. 20 0 0 ) ( same ). e ve nts prece dethe servic er’ s role in re ceivingthe borrow er’ s pa y me nts and

makin gpay

ment s to thebo rrow e r’ s c re dit or s. Perhaps f or that re ason, Congress dra fted the statute so as not to i nc lud e tho se matte rs
. Th e statut e thu s dis tin guis he s be tw e e n le tte rs that re late to borrowe rs’ disputes reg arding servicing , on the one ha nd, and tho se re g ardin g the bo rrow e r’ s c ontr a c tua l r e latio ns hip wi th t he le nd e r, on

theoth e r. Th at d is ti ncti on make s se ns e be c a us e on ly se rv ic e rs of loa

ns are su bje c t to § 2 60 5( e )’ s d

uty to respond—and the y

areunl i k ely

to have infor

mation re g ardingtho se loa

ns ’ o ri g inati on s. In s umm ary , w e ho ld that letters challeng ing only a loan’s validity or its terms are no t qu a lif

ie d wri tte n r e qu e sts that g iveri se to a duty to respond unde r § 2605(e ). 5 Turning t o Plaintiffs’ letters in this case, it is clea r that they constitute challeng es to the term s of the loan a ndM ED R ANO V
. F LAG STA R B ANK

12

Som e borr ower s mi s t ake nl y may r eques t mo di f i cat i on or cha l l eng e a 6 lo a n ’s va li d it y o r te rm s w h e n the y id e n tif y a p ro b le m in a se rv ic e r’s
a c co unt i ng. A s we have m ad e cl ear, R E SP A do es not requi re m a g ic
wo rds, and such l et t ers m ay t ri gger a d ut y t o res p o nd und er § 2 6 0 5 (e). H er e, t he l et t er s we re d r af t ed by coun s el ; we t her ef ore as s ume t hatt hey
m e a n w h a t t h e y sa y. mortg ag e docume nts a

n d a re not disputes re g ardingFlag star’s servicingof the loan. Thefirst letter state s tha t t h e loan documents did not “ac curately ref lect . . . the prope r pay

ment schedule repr esente d by th e loan broke r.” That assertion amounts to an alleg ation of fr aud or mistake during the closingof the loan a

nd th e drafting of

the re levant documentation. Thus, it conce rns onl y the l oan’s va lidity and te rm s, no t it s servicing

. L ikewise, in the second letter, Plaintiffs de m anded that Flag star “r evise a ll documentation conce rning the cur

rent loan”to refle ct the “origina l terms” of the agree ment. A re quest fo r modification of a loa n agree ment, like one for

resc ission, does not concer n the l o an ’s s erv i ci n g. Finally , the sole re quest in t h e third letter 6 is th at P la inti f

f s ’ mo nth ly

p ay me nt b e r e d

u c e d b e c a u s e the y we retol d, wh e n they pu rc ha se d th e ir ho me , th at th os e pa y me nts wo uld

no t e xce e d $ 1, 90 0. Ag a in, that de mand is a c ha lle ng e to t

he te rm s o f t

he loa n a nd mor tg a g e do c ume nts , premised on a

n asser tion that the exi sting documents do not acc urate ly

ref lect the true agree ment betwee n P l aint iffs and theorig inatin gle nd e r. B e c a us e thele tte r r e qu e sts m o d i fi cat i o no f th o s e d o cum en t s , i t i s n o tre l at edt o s erv i ci n g.
In sum, beca

use Plaintiffs’ letters to F lag star cha lleng ed the terms of their loan a

nd reque sted modification of va rious loan and mortg ag e documents, they wer e not qualified written re qu e sts re latin g to the se rv ic ing of Pla int if fs ’ l oa n. B e c a us e 12 U. S.C. § 2 60 5 d oe s n ot r e qu ir e a se rv ic e r t o r e sp on d toM ED R ANO V
. F LAG STA R B ANK 13

su c h r e qu e sts , th e dis tr ic t court c or re c tly dis mis se d Pl a int if

fs ’ c la im.
AF F IRM ED

.