UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4213

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

CEDRIC CAMERON CLARK, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:07-

cr-00281-RWT-1) 

Submitted: November 19, 2008 Decided: February 9, 2009 

Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Marc L. Resnick, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Rod J. 

Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Emily N. Glatfelter, Deborah 

A. Johnston, Assistant United States Attorneys, Greenbelt, 

Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Cedric Cameron Clark appeals his conviction by a jury 

of one count of possession of a firearm after having been 

convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of 

imprisonment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006). We 

affirm. 

 On appeal, Clark argues that the district court erred 

in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the 

evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict, and 

that the court erred in denying his motion for a new jury pool. 

The Government responds, arguing that Clark’s conviction should 

be affirmed. 

 This court reviews the district court’s denial of a 

motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. See United States v. 

Ryan-Webster, 353 F.3d 353, 359 (4th Cir. 2003). A defendant 

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence faces a heavy 

burden. United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 

1997). “[A]n appellate court’s reversal of a conviction on 

grounds of insufficient evidence should be confined to cases 

where the prosecution’s failure is clear.” United States v. 

Jones, 735 F.2d 785, 791 (4th Cir. 1984). 

 A jury’s verdict must be upheld on appeal if there is 

substantial evidence in the record to support it. Glasser v. 

United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). In determining whether 

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the evidence in the record is substantial, this court views the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and 

inquires whether there is evidence that a reasonable finder of 

fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a 

conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en 

banc). In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, this 

court does not review the credibility of the witnesses and 

assumes that the jury resolved all contradictions in the 

testimony in favor of the government. United States v. Romer, 

148 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 1998). 

 The elements of a violation of § 922(g)(1) are: “(1) 

the defendant previously had been convicted of a crime 

punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year; (2) the 

defendant knowingly possessed . . . the firearm; and (3) the 

possession was in or affecting commerce, because the firearm had 

traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.” United States v. 

Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc). Clark 

stipulated to a disqualifying prior conviction and does not 

contest the interstate or foreign commerce element. He argues 

the evidence did not show he exercised dominion or control over 

the firearm at any time. Our review of the record leads us to 

conclude that Clark’s argument is without merit and that his 

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reliance on United States v. Blue, 957 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1992), 

is misplaced. The evidence was sufficient. 

 Clark next argues that the district court erred in 

denying his motion for a new jury pool because African-Americans 

were underrepresented in the pool to the extent that the pool 

did not represent a fair cross-section of the community. 

In order to establish a prima facie violation of the 

fair cross-section requirement, the defendant must 

show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 

‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the 

representation of this group in venires from which 

juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in 

relation to the number of such persons in the 

community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is 

due to a systematic exclusion of the group in the 

jury-selection process. 

Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). The district court 

focused on the third element under Duren in denying Clark’s 

motion for a new panel. We conclude that the district court did 

not err in its decision. United States v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431 

(4th Cir. 1988). Clark’s motion before the district court and 

his argument on appeal fail to satisfy the requirements of Duren

to demonstrate a violation of the fair cross-section 

requirement. 

 Accordingly, we affirm Clark’s conviction. We deny 

his motion for appointment of new counsel. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

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adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED