2021 IL App (4th) 200569-U 

NOS. 4-20-0569, 4-20-0571 cons. 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re S.R., a Minor

(The People of the State of Illinois,

Petitioner-Appellee,

 v. (No. 4-20-0569) 

Shane R., 

Respondent-Appellant). 

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In re T.R., a Minor

(The People of the State of Illinois,

Petitioner-Appellee,

 v. (No. 4-20-0571) 

Shane R.,

Respondent-Appellant). 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Vermilion County 

No. 19JA9 

No. 19JA10

Honorable

Thomas M. O’Shaughnessy, 

Judge Presiding.

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

 

 JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court.

 Presiding Justice Knecht and Justice Steigmann concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court did not err in finding respondent unfit to parent his minor children or 

 in terminating respondent’s parental rights. 

¶ 2 On September 17, 2020, the trial court found respondent, Shane R., unfit to parent 

his minor children, S.R. (born November 25, 2015) and T.R. (born January 19, 2017). On October 

30, 2020, the court terminated respondent’s parental rights. Respondent appeals, arguing the trial 

court erred both in finding that he was an unfit person and in finding termination of his parental 

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 

FILED

April 5, 2021

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL
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rights was in the best interests of S.R. and T.R. We affirm. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On January 25, 2019, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging 

S.R. and T.R. were neglected, as that term is defined under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 

ILCS 405/2-3 (West 2018)), because their environment was injurious to their welfare as a result 

of their mother’s substance abuse (id. § 2-3(1)(b)) and because their mother failed to provide them 

proper and necessary support, education, and other remedial care required for their welfare (id. 

§ 2-3(1)(a)). The State additionally alleged it was in the best interests of the minors to be made 

wards of the court. A few days later, the trial court conducted a shelter care hearing and entered 

an order granting the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) temporary custody of 

the minors. Respondent was not present during the shelter care hearing. 

¶ 5 On March 5, 2019, Lutheran Social Services of Illinois (LSSI), an agency operating 

under contract with DCFS, filed a family service plan. Under the plan, respondent was required 

to, among other things, stay in contact with the minors’ caseworker and complete an integrated 

assessment, a substance abuse assessment, a parenting assessment, and a mental health evaluation. 

¶ 6 In August 2019, respondent appeared before the trial court in this matter in the 

custody of the Vermilion County sheriff. During this proceeding, the court informed respondent 

of the allegations contained in the State’s petition for adjudication of wardship, admonished him 

of his rights during termination proceedings, and appointed counsel to represent him. 

¶ 7 In September 2019, the trial court conducted an adjudicatory hearing. Respondent 

did not appear at this proceeding, but his counsel was present. At the conclusion of the hearing, 

the court found S.R. and T.R. were neglected on both grounds alleged by the State. Subsequently, 
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the court conducted a dispositional hearing, which respondent also failed to attend. At the end of 

the dispositional hearing, the court entered an order finding respondent unfit, unable, and unwilling 

to parent S.R. and T.R., making the minors wards of the court, and granting custody and 

guardianship of the minors to DCFS. Additionally, the court ordered that respondent cooperate 

with DCFS and comply with the terms of the LSSI service plan. 

¶ 8 On February 21, 2020, the State filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental 

rights. (We note the State also sought to terminate the parental rights of S.R. and T.R.’s mother 

and that, ultimately, her parental rights were terminated; however, she is not a party to this appeal, 

and we discuss the facts only as they relate to respondent.) In its petition, the State alleged 

respondent was an unfit parent in that he failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, 

or responsibility as to the minors’ welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2018)). The State further 

alleged it was in the best interests of S.R. and T.R. that respondent’s parental rights be terminated. 

¶ 9 On September 17, 2020, the trial court conducted a fitness hearing, which 

respondent attended. During the hearing, the court took judicial notice that respondent had been 

incarcerated in the Vermilion County jail from August 5, 2019, until August 30, 2019, was 

incarcerated again on December 27, 2019, and remained incarcerated on the date of the fitness 

hearing. The State presented testimony from Tori Zook, S.R. and T.R.’s caseworker through LSSI. 

Zook testified her first communication with respondent had been in August 2019 when he appeared 

in court. At that time, respondent informed Zook he had been unaware until that day that S.R. and 

T.R. were in foster care. Also during that communication, Zook provided respondent her contact 

information and instructed him to notify her when he was released from jail, but respondent failed 

to do so. Zook testified she was unable to communicate with respondent after he was released 
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because she did not have any contact information for him. Zook’s next communication with 

respondent was in January 2020 when she met with him in the Vermilion County jail and provided 

him materials to complete an integrated assessment. Although, in July 2020, respondent told Zook 

he had completed the integrated assessment, he never provided it to Zook, and due to restrictions 

implemented at the Vermilion County jail as a result of the coronavirus pandemic, Zook was 

unable to pick up the assessment from him. Zook additionally testified that under respondent’s 

service plan, he was required to complete a substance abuse assessment, a parenting assessment, 

and a mental health evaluation. Although Zook acknowledged the services respondent was 

required to complete were not available while he was in jail, she also testified respondent could 

have completed some of the services between August and December 2019 when he was not 

incarcerated. According to Zook, since DCFS had been granted custody of the minors in January 

2019, respondent had not had a visit with S.R. or T.R. However, he had spoken with them on the 

phone once while the minors were at the LSSI office and had sent them one letter. Zook further 

testified that “the only time [respondent had] participated in this case [was] while [he was] in jail” 

and that respondent’s participation was “limited to just coming to court [and] talking to [her].” 

¶ 10 Respondent testified on his own behalf. According to respondent, he first learned 

DCFS had removed S.R. and T.R. from their mother’s custody at the August 2019 court 

proceeding. Between January 2019 and August 2019, he would “video chat” with S.R. and T.R.

whenever their mother would call him with the children. Respondent testified that while he was 

incarcerated, he was unable to complete any of the recommended services, although he did 

complete the integrated assessment packet Zook had provided. Respondent also testified that, 

during his incarceration, he was not provided any opportunities for visits with S.R. or T.R., 
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although he had one phone call with them and had written them a letter. Additionally, respondent 

testified no one from DCFS contacted him after he was released from jail and he was unable to 

reach out to them because the sheriff had taken away the slip of paper on which Zook had written 

her contact information. On cross-examination, respondent acknowledged “the only time [he had] 

ever show[ed] up for court in this case [was] when [he was] in custody.” 

¶ 11 At the end of the fitness hearing, the trial court found respondent unfit, as alleged 

by the State. 

¶ 12 On October 30, 2020, the trial court conducted a best interest hearing. During the 

hearing, the State again called Zook to testify. According to Zook, S.R. and T.R. were placed with 

their maternal grandmother and her husband. S.R. was placed in that home in August 2019, and 

T.R. was placed there in October 2019. Zook testified S.R. and T.R. had “bonded” with their 

grandparents and were “safe and loved” in their grandparents’ home. Zook further testified the 

grandparents ensured S.R. and T.R. received “ongoing services,” such as therapy, and were willing 

to adopt S.R. and T.R. Zook concluded the grandparents’ home was “the best placement for both 

of the children.” Additionally, Zook testified respondent still had not had any visits with S.R. and 

T.R. and had not communicated with the minors except for the phone call and the letter about 

which she testified during the fitness hearing. 

¶ 13 Respondent again testified on his own behalf. According to respondent, he had 

never been offered visits with S.R. and T.R., had never been offered any services apart from the 

integrated assessment packet, and was never informed “what sorts of things were expected from 

[him] from DCFS.” Respondent further testified that he would have participated in visits with S.R. 

and T.R. if any had been offered, his children were important to him, and he “love[d] them to 
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death.” Respondent concluded he was willing to do “what [he could] to be able to be in [S.R. and 

T.R.’s] lives in whatever way [he could].” 

¶ 14 At the end of the best interest hearing, the trial court found termination of 

respondent’s parental rights was in the best interests of S.R. and T.R. 

¶ 15 This appeal followed.

¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 17 The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2018)) “delineates 

a two-step process in seeking termination of parental rights involuntarily.” In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d 

329, 337, 924 N.E.2d 961, 966 (2010). First, the court conducts a fitness hearing at which it must

determine, by “clear and convincing evidence, that [the] parent is an unfit person as defined in 

Section 1 of the Adoption Act [(750 ILCS 50/1 (West 2018))].” 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 

2018). Second, the court holds a separate hearing at which it must find termination of the parent’s 

rights is in the “best interest” of the minor. Id. 

¶ 18 Respondent first contends the trial court erred in finding that he was an unfit person

under section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2018)). As respondent 

correctly notes, a court’s finding of parental unfitness “will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is 

against the manifest weight of the evidence.” In re M.C., 2018 IL App (4th) 180144, ¶ 22, 110 

N.E.3d 346. A court’s finding that a parent is an unfit person is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence “only where the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent.” (Internal quotation marks 

omitted.) In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 21, 77 N.E.3d 69.

¶ 19 Under section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act, a parent may be found to be an unfit 

person by “[f]ail[ing] to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to 
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[his] child’s welfare.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2018). Because the language of section 1(D)(b) 

is in the disjunctive, a parent may be found to be unfit by failing to “maintain either interest, or 

concern, or responsibility; proof of all three is not required.” In re Richard H., 376 Ill. App. 3d 

162, 166, 875 N.E.2d 1198, 1202 (2007). 

¶ 20 “In determining whether a parent has shown a reasonable degree of interest, 

concern, or responsibility for a minor’s welfare, a court considers the parent’s efforts to visit and 

maintain contact with the child as well as other indicia, such as inquiries into the child’s welfare.” 

In re B’yata I., 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 31, 43 N.E.3d 139. A court may also consider the 

parent’s completion of his service plan. Id. The parent’s conduct must be examined “in the context 

of the circumstances in which that conduct occurred.” In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 278, 

562 N.E.2d 174, 185 (1990). If a parent is unable to participate in personal visits with his child, 

the court may consider his “letters, telephone calls, and gifts to the child or those caring for the 

child ***, depending upon the content, tone, and frequency of those contacts under the 

circumstances.” Id. at 279. Importantly, the court must “examine the parent’s efforts to 

communicate with and show interest in the child, not the success of those efforts.” Id. However, 

“a parent is not fit merely because [he] has demonstrated some interest or affection toward [his] 

child; rather, [his] interest, concern[,] and responsibility must be reasonable.” In re Jaron Z., 348 

Ill. App. 3d 239, 259, 810 N.E.2d 108, 125 (2004). 

¶ 21 Here, the evidence presented during the fitness hearing was sufficient to support 

the trial court’s finding that respondent failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, 

or responsibility as to S.R. and T.R.’s welfare. Respondent did not comply with the service plan: 

he failed to complete any requirements of that plan or to even engage in any recommended 
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services. Additionally, respondent was so uninformed about his children’s welfare that he did not 

know DCFS had been granted custody of S.R. and T.R. until seven months after the fact. 

Respondent was so disinterested in court proceedings related to S.R. and T.R. that he failed to 

appear for hearings unless he was in custody. Finally, the evidence at the fitness hearing showed 

that between August 2019 and the fitness hearing, respondent only communicated with S.R. and 

T.R. twice, once by letter and once on the phone. Nonetheless, respondent argues his failure to 

participate in visits with S.R. and T.R. and his failure to complete any services should be excused 

because he was incarcerated. However, the record shows respondent was not incarcerated between 

August 30, 2019, and December 27, 2019, and during that time failed to contact S.R. and T.R.’s

caseworker to inform her he had been released, to obtain a referral for services, or to request visits 

with the children. In light of this evidence, the court’s finding that respondent was an unfit person 

was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 22 Respondent also contends the trial court erred in finding termination of his parental 

rights was in the best interest of S.R. and of T.R. As with the court’s finding of unfitness, “[w]e 

will not reverse the trial court’s best-interest determination unless it was against the manifest 

weight of the evidence.” In re Jay H., 395 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1071, 918 N.E.2d 284, 291 (2009). 

The court’s decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence “only if the facts clearly 

demonstrate that the court should have reached the opposite result.” Id. 

¶ 23 During the best interest stage of termination proceedings, “the focus is properly 

placed on the child, not on the conduct of the parents.” In re T.A., 359 Ill. App. 3d 953, 959, 835 

N.E.2d 908, 912 (2005). “Although a parent’s conduct may be considered at [the best interest] 

stage, it is but one of many factors that the court considers in determining what is in the child’s 
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best interest.” Id. Section 1-3 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 lists other factors the trial court 

must consider in determining whether termination of a parent’s rights is in the minor’s best interest. 

705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018). Those factors, which must be considered in the context of 

the child’s age and developmental needs, are: (1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the 

development of the child’s identity; (3) the child’s background and ties; (4) the child’s sense of 

attachments; (5) the child’s wishes and long-term goals; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the 

child’s need for permanence; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks associated 

with substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the persons available to care for the child. Id.

¶ 24 The evidence presented at the best interest hearing was sufficient for the trial court 

to determine that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the best interests of S.R. and 

T.R. The minors’ caseworker testified S.R. and T.R. had been placed together in their 

grandparents’ home since October 2019, were “safe and loved” there, and had become “bonded” 

with their grandparents. S.R. and T.R.’s grandparents were caring for the minors “appropriately,” 

including by ensuring they received necessary therapy services. Additionally, S.R. and T.R.’s 

grandparents were willing to provide the minors permanence through adoption. By contrast,

respondent had not visited S.R. and T.R. since DCFS had taken custody of the minors and only 

communicated with the minors twice since August 2019. Accordingly, it cannot be said the trial 

court’s finding that the best interests of S.R. and T.R. would be served by termination of 

respondent’s parental rights was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 25 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 26 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

¶ 27 Affirmed.