IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA20-28

Filed: 31 December 2020

Orange County, No. 16 CVD 1322

VERED MADAR, Plaintiff,

v.

GIL MADAR, Defendant.

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 13 August 2019 by Judge Sherri 

T. Murrell in Orange County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 

September 2020.

Chapel Hill Family Law, by Brian C. Johnston, for plaintiff-appellee.

Tharrington Smith, LLP, by Steve Mansbery and Jeffrey R. Russell, for 

defendant-appellant.

BRYANT, Judge.

Defendant Gil Madar appeals from a trial court’s order for child support and 

alimony (“2019 Order”) wherein the trial court awarded alimony to plaintiff Vereo 

Madar and the parties were ordered to share responsibilities related to their son’s 

treatment. Where the trial court correctly determined that plaintiff was a dependent 

spouse and thus entitled to alimony, we affirm the trial court’s ruling. Where the 

trial court provided no explanation to support the amount and duration of its alimony 

award, we remand this matter for further findings on the amount and duration of its 
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alimony award. Where the trial court correctly determined the parties’ child support 

obligations, we affirm the trial court’s rulings. Where the trial court failed to address 

defendant’s claim for reimbursement of residential treatment enrollment costs 

associated with the parties’ minor child, we reverse and remand for additional 

findings.

On 16 September 1994, plaintiff and defendant married in Israel and had three 

children—all sons––over the course of their marriage. Each of the children suffered 

severe emotional issues at various times since 2013. Mental health issues and 

treatment regarding the youngest child (hereinafter “the minor child”) became the 

central part of the parties’ litigation and court orders, including the 2019 Order at 

issue on appeal. When the 2019 Order was entered, the two oldest children had 

reached the age of majority. 

In August 2008, the parties and their three children relocated to the United 

States and purchased a home in Chapel Hill. They resided in the home together until 

they separated on 10 September 2016. During the marriage, the parties acquired an

E-Trade investment account, which had a date-of-separation balance of $273,505; a 

401(k) retirement account in defendant’s name, which had a date-of-separation 

balance of $214,109.96; and a money market account, which had a date-of-separation 

balance of $95,254.24.
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On 30 September 2016, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking child custody, child 

support, postseparation support, alimony, attorney’s fees, and equitable distribution. 

Defendant filed an answer and counterclaims for child custody and equitable 

distribution. Pursuant to a resolution of the parties’ claims for equitable distribution, 

plaintiff received the home in Chapel Hill, and defendant received the E-Trade 

Investment account. The parties equally divided the sale proceeds of a condominium 

they shared in Israel, the money from defendant’s 401(k) retirement account, and the 

money market account.

In 2016, the minor child began having severe emotional issues. Plaintiff, who 

was last employed full-time in 2013, was his primary caregiver.

On 8 February 2017, the trial court entered an order for temporary child 

support and postseparation support. The order established defendant’s temporary 

child support obligation at $2,014.00 per month and his postseparation support 

obligation at $2,220.00 per month, based upon his monthly income at that time of 

$12,706.00. Defendant was ordered to pay all unreimbursed medical expenses for the 

minor child. 

In March 2017, the minor child was hospitalized for inpatient care at UNC 

School of Medicine due to his mental health issues. Approximately a year later, on 

20 March 2018, the trial court ordered psychological evaluations of plaintiff and 
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defendant to determine their fitness as custodial parents. Plaintiff was ordered to 

participate in reunification therapy and personal therapy. 

On 27 August 2018, the parties attended a hearing to determine temporary 

placement for the minor child, and the trial court ordered the parties to enroll him in 

an intensive therapeutic program at New Vision Wilderness Therapy in Wisconsin 

(hereinafter referred to as “New Vision Wisconsin”). The trial court also ordered the

parties to equally divide the program treatment costs. On 29 November 2018, the 

minor child was transferred to another treatment facility in Utah: Telos Residential 

Treatment Program (hereinafter referred to as “Telos”). The parties were ordered to 

comply with the treatment requirements at Telos, which included following a

visitation schedule and participating in family therapy. The parties incurred 

expenses related to the minor child’s enrollment at Telos. The minor child was still

residing at Telos when the trial court entered the 2019 Order. 

In 2019, the parties appeared for a hearing on the matter of child support and 

alimony before the Honorable Sherri T. Murrell, District Court Judge presiding. 

Following the hearing, the trial court entered the 2019 Order. Defendant appeals.

_________________________________________________________

On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred by (I) finding that plaintiff 

was entitled to an award of alimony and determining the amount defendant should 

pay, (II) concluding both parties have a duty to provide child support for the minor 
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child’s needs and failing to apply the proper guidelines for its child support 

determination, (III) ordering defendant to pay all of the minor child’s unreimbursed 

medical expenses, and (IV) failing to address defendant’s claim for reimbursement of 

the minor child’s cost of enrollment at Telos.

I 

Defendant first appeals from the portion of the order awarding plaintiff 

alimony. Specifically, defendant contends the trial court erred in its findings of fact 

that plaintiff was a dependent spouse and defendant a supporting spouse and 

concluding plaintiff was entitled to receive alimony. Additionally, defendant argues 

the trial court abused its discretion by ordering defendant to pay alimony without 

making the necessary findings to support the award. 

“As our statutes outline, alimony is comprised of two separate inquiries.” 

Barrett v. Barrett, 140 N.C. App. 369, 371, 536 S.E.2d 642, 644 (2000). The trial 

court’s first determination as to whether a party is entitled to alimony is reviewed de 

novo. Id. If the trial court determines that a party is entitled to alimony, then a 

second determination is made as to the amount of alimony to be awarded, which we 

review for abuse of discretion. Id.

Entitlement to alimony is governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-

16.3A(a) . . . . [A] party is entitled to alimony if three 

requirements are satisfied: (1) [] [the] party [seeking 

alimony] is a dependent spouse; (2) the other party is a 

supporting spouse; and (3) an award of alimony would be 

equitable under all the relevant factors. 
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Id. We address each argument in order.

Dependent Spouse

By statute, a “dependent spouse” is one “who is actually substantially 

dependent upon the other spouse for his or her maintenance and support or is 

substantially in need of maintenance and support from the other spouse.” N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 50-16.1A(2) (2019). 

A spouse is ‘actually substantially dependent’ if he or she 

is currently unable to meet his or her own maintenance and 

support. A spouse is ‘substantially in need of maintenance’ 

if he or she will be unable to meet his or her needs in the 

future, even if he or she is currently meeting those needs.

Barrett, 140 N.C. App. at 371, 536 S.E.2d at 644–45 (internal citation omitted). “[T]o 

properly find a spouse dependent[,] the court need only find that the spouse’s 

reasonable monthly expenses exceed her monthly income and that the party has no 

other means with which to meet those expenses.” Beaman v. Beaman, 77 N.C. App. 

717, 723, 336 S.E.2d 129, 132 (1985). 

In the instant case, the trial court made the following findings of fact:

46. Throughout their time as a married couple living in 

Israel, [p]laintiff earned substantially less than 

[d]efendant, receiving only a modest stipend during the 

approximately nine years while she was working on her 

Masters and Ph.D.

. . . .

48. Throughout their lives, [p]laintiff was the primary 

caretaker of the parties’ three sons, maintaining primary 
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responsibility for overseeing the boys’ health, development, 

education, and general welfare.

. . . .

52. In August 2008, [p]laintiff and [d]efendant and their 

three boys relocated to the United States for [p]laintiff’s 

post-doc position. . . .

. . . .

58. Plaintiff’s post-doc position . . . ended in 2009.

59. Following the end of her post-doc position . . . in 2009, 

[p]laintiff was unable to work for a period of approximately

eighteen months due to work restrictions with her H4B 

visa.

60. In 2010, [p]laintiff began working at UNC in a grantfunded position.

61. The grant funding for [p]laintiff’s position at UNC 

ended in 2013, and [p]laintiff’s position at UNC was 

terminated at this time.[1]

. . . .

68. Plaintiff assumed primary responsibility for managing 

the boys’ emotional issues and mental health needs, by, for 

example, transporting the boys to and from their many 

therapy appointments.

. . . .

71. As of the Hearing Dates, [p]laintiff’s unemployment 

has not been willful or the product of bad faith.

1 Although defendant contends on appeal that finding of fact 61 is not supported by 

the evidence, defendant concedes in his brief that plaintiff was terminated from her position 

at UNC and does not dispute that plaintiff had been unemployed since her termination. 

Plaintiff also concedes that her year of termination was in 2014, rather than 2013.
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. . . .

78. Plaintiff earned $0 in 2018; $0 in 2017; $4,800 in 2016; 

$0 in 2015; $6,750 in 2014; and $40,500 in 2013.

. . . .

91. As of the Hearing Dates, [p]laintiff’s reasonable fixed 

monthly expenses totaled $2,012, and [p]laintiff’s 

reasonable individual monthly expenses totaled $1,866, for 

total reasonable monthly expenses of $3,878.

Here, the trial court’s findings of fact demonstrate that prior to the parties’ 

separation and at the time of the hearing, plaintiff was unable to earn sufficient 

income to support her reasonable needs. As defendant does not except to most of the 

findings of fact, those findings are presumed to be supported by competent evidence 

and are binding on appeal. Hall v. Hall, 65 N.C. App. 797, 799, 310 S.E.2d 378, 380 

(1984). Plaintiff’s reasonable monthly expenses, which totaled $3,878, contributed to 

a deficit because she did not have monthly income due to her unemployment. 

Moreover, no evidence was presented as to any bad faith on plaintiff’s part. Thus,

the findings of fact were sufficient to support the trial court’s order that plaintiff was 

a dependent spouse.

Conversely, defendant does challenge some of the trial court’s findings of fact–

–also addressing plaintiff’s dependency––arguing the findings were not supported by 

competent evidence: 

63. With the loss of her job at UNC, [p]laintiff turned much 

of her attention towards tending to [childcare] needs.
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. . . .

70. Plaintiff has been diagnosed with Post Traumatic 

Stress Disorder

. . . . 

81. Plaintiff was unable to set aside any funds for her 

retirement during the parties’ separation.

. . . .

85. As of November 5, 2018, [p]laintiff had $45.40 

remaining from her aforementioned one-half share of the 

parties’ money market account.

. . . .

87. As of November 20, 2018, [p]laintiff had . . . 

approximately $30,000, remaining from her 

aforementioned share of the proceeds from the sale of the 

[condo in Israel]. 

We note that defendant’s challenge to findings of fact 63, 70, and 81 appear to 

reference plaintiff’s testimony at trial which was not included in the record.2 

“The unavailability of a verbatim transcript does not automatically constitute 

error. . . . [A] party must demonstrate that the missing recorded evidence resulted in 

prejudice.” State v. Quick, 179 N.C. App. 647, 651, 634 S.E.2d 915, 918 (2006).

[O]ur Supreme Court has held that the lack of a transcript 

does not prejudice the defendant when alternatives–such 

as a narrative of testimonial evidence compiled pursuant 

to Rule 9(c)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate 

Procedure–“are available that would fulfill the same 

2 Part of the transcript from the hearing is unavailable due to no fault of either party.
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functions as a transcript and provide the defendant with a 

meaningful appeal.”

State v. Hobbs, 190 N.C. App. 183, 186, 660 S.E.2d 168, 170 (2008) (quoting State v. 

Lawrence, 352 N.C. 1, 16, 530 S.E.2d 807, 817 (2000)). “Any dispute regarding the 

accuracy of a submitted narration of the evidence can be resolved by the trial court 

settling the record on appeal. . . . Overall, a record must have the evidence necessary 

for an understanding of all errors assigned.” Quick, 179 N.C. App. at 651, 634 S.E.2d 

at 918. 

Here, the trial court made the requisite findings of fact addressing plaintiff’s 

mental health condition, her work history, and her financial status based upon the 

testimony presented at trial. The proposed record on appeal, submitted by counsel 

for defendant, included a narration of the missing evidence stating the following: 

Plaintiff was called to testify. . . [and] [] was the only 

witness who testified that day. Plaintiff’s testimony 

consisted largely of background information about the 

parties and their children. Plaintiff testified about the 

parties’ date of marriage, date of separation, the children’s 

names and dates of birth, her education and work history, 

her mental health condition, [d]efendant’s work 

background, the parties’ living arrangements in Israel, 

their ability to save money while living in Israel, and the 

children’s medical, emotional, and mental health issues.

The narration of evidence clearly referenced the missing testimony, and we 

find the narration was an adequate alternative to a verbatim transcript. See In re 

Shackleford, 248 N.C. App. 357, 362, 789 S.E.2d 15, 19 (2016) (“[I]n virtually all of 

the cases in which we have held that an adequate alternative to a verbatim transcript 
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Opinion of the Court

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existed, the transcript of the proceeding at issue was only partially incomplete, and 

any gaps therein were capable of being filled.”); see also Hobbs, 190 N.C. App. at 187–

88, 660 S.E.2d at 171 (“Although our Courts have declined to find prejudice in cases 

in which a transcript is unavailable for only a portion of the trial proceedings, [an] 

appeal [can be] hindered by the total unavailability of either a transcript or an 

acceptable alternative for a majority of defendant’s trial.”).

Defendant has not demonstrated nor does he assert an argument that he was 

prejudiced by the missing verbatim transcript. Based on the narration of evidence 

provided by defendant, the excepted findings of fact appear to be supported by 

plaintiff’s testimony at trial. Absent evidence to the contrary, there is a presumption 

of regularity in the proceedings of a lower court. See R & L Const. of Mt. Airy, LLC 

v. Diaz, 240 N.C. App. 194, 197–98, 770 S.E.2d 698, 701 (2015); State v. Bass, 133 

N.C. App. 646, 649, 516 S.E.2d 156, 158 (1999). Here, where the unavailability of the 

transcript is due to no fault of either party, there is no basis for this Court to set aside 

the presumption of regularity and strike the trial court’s findings of fact. According, 

defendant’s argument on these points is overruled.

Additionally, having reviewed the record, we conclude the trial court’s findings

of fact, including 85 and 87, were supported by competent evidence, and thus, support 

the trial court’s determination that plaintiff is a dependent spouse under N.C.G.S. § 

50-16.1A(2). 
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Supporting Spouse

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.1A(5) provides that “ ‘[s]upporting spouse’ means a

spouse, whether husband or wife, upon whom the other spouse is actually

substantially dependent for maintenance and support or from whom such spouse is

substantially in need of maintenance and support.” N.C.G.S. § 50-16.3A(5). While

“evidence one spouse is dependent does not necessarily infer the other spouse is 

supporting,” Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 186, 261 S.E.2d 849, 857 (1980), this 

Court has stated, “[a] surplus of income over expenses is sufficient in and of itself to 

warrant a supporting spouse classification.” Barrett, 140 N.C. App. at 373, 536 S.E.2d 

at 645. 

Here, the trial court found that defendant’s net monthly income was $5,910.00 

per month, which net monthly income included a monthly 401(k) contribution of 

$960.69, and his total reasonable monthly expenses were $3,729; yielding a monthly 

surplus of $2,181. However, defendant challenges the trial court’s finding of fact 

regarding his monthly expenses, arguing the finding was not supported by the 

evidence. We disagree.

Prior to the hearing, defendant submitted an affidavit of financial standing 

indicating his fixed monthly expenses and individual monthly expenses; stating that

his fixed monthly expenses were $3,922, which included expenses for a parenting 

coordinator and education planner for the minor child totaling $1,556. Defendant 
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also stated that his individual monthly expenses were $9,613, which included $8,250 

for expenses related to the minor child’s enrollment at Telos. The trial court, using 

defendant’s affidavit, did not include in its calculation, expenses related to the minor 

child’s enrollment at Telos, the parenting coordinator, or the education planner. 

Similarly, the trial court also did not include those expenses in plaintiff’s monthly

expenses when finding plaintiff to be a dependent spouse. Absent consideration of 

the expenses associated with Telos, the evidence supports the trial court’s finding 

that defendant’s “reasonable fixed monthly expenses totaled $2,366,” and his 

“reasonable individual monthly expenses totaled $1,363, for total reasonable monthly 

expenses of $3,729.” 

Moreover, the trial court also made several unchallenged findings of facts as 

to defendant’s income and expenses:

72. Defendant lost his job at Qualcomm in August 2018 as 

a result of corporate restructuring. 

73. In August 2018, [d]efendant received a gross vacation 

payout in the amount of $21,414.75 in his final paycheck 

from Qualcomm. 

74. Defendant earned a total of $131,025.81 from

Qualcomm in 2018 through August 24.

75. Additionally, in September 2018, [d]efendant received 

a one-time gross severance payment from Qualcomm in the 

amount of $83,556.94
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76. Defendant earned an additional $24,326 from his 

employment with Channel One in 2018, for total earnings 

of $238,907 in 2018.

77. Defendant earned $196,176 in 2017; $178,100 in 2016; 

$173,302 in 2015; $341,883 in 2014; and $208,805 in 2013.

. . . .

79. Plaintiff and [d]efendant were able to save for 

retirement during their marriage; specifically, in 2013, 

[d]efendant contributed $13,125 to his 401(k); in 2014, 

[d]efendant contributed $13,125 to his 401(k); in 2015, 

[d]efendant contributed $13,533.08 to his 401(k) and 

$4,466.92 to his Roth 401(k); and, in 2016, [d]efendant 

contributed $13,594.56 to his 401(k) and $5,151.80 to his 

Roth 401(k).

80. Following the parties’ separation, [d]efendant

continued to save for retirement; specifically, in 2017, 

[d]efendant contributed $15,869.84 to his 401(k) and 

$1,639.44 to his Roth 401(k); and, in 2018, [d]efendant 

contributed $11,679.06 to his Qualcomm 401(k) and 

$1,769.24 to his Channel One 401(k).

Based on these findings, defendant’s income-expenses surplus adequately 

supports the trial court’s determination that defendant is a supporting spouse. 

Alimony Award

The amount of alimony to be awarded is within the trial judge’s sound 

discretion and is not reviewable on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Id.

at 371, 536 S.E.2d at 644. 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.3A, which governs alimony awards, states, in pertinent 

part:
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The court shall award alimony to the dependent spouse 

upon a finding that one spouse is a dependent spouse, that 

the other spouse is a supporting spouse, and that an award 

of alimony is equitable after considering all relevant 

factors. . . 

N.C.G.S. § 50-16.3A(a).

[I]n determining the amount, duration, and manner of 

payment of alimony, the court shall consider all relevant 

factors including, inter alia, the following: marital 

misconduct of either spouse; the relative earnings and 

earning capacities of the spouses; the ages of the spouses; 

the amount and sources of earned and unearned income of 

both spouses; the duration of the marriage; the extent to 

which the earning power, expenses, or financial obligations 

of a spouse are affected by the spouse’s serving as custodian 

of a minor child; the standard of living of the spouses 

during the marriage; the assets, liabilities, and debt service 

requirements of the spouses, including legal obligations of 

support; and the relative needs of the spouses.

Hartsell v. Hartsell, 189 N.C. App. 65, 69, 657 S.E.2d 724, 727 (2008). The parties’ 

needs and expenses for purposes of computing alimony should be measured in light 

of their accustomed standard of living during the marriage. Barrett, 140 N.C. App. 

at 372, 536 S.E.2d at 645. “While the court must consider the needs of the spouse 

seeking alimony in the context of the family unit’s accustomed standard of living, it 

also must determine that the supporting spouse has the financial capacity to provide 

the support needed therefor.” Whedon v. Whedon, 58 N.C. App. 524, 527, 294 S.E.2d 

29, 31 (1982). 

Here, as discussed supra, the trial court considered all the relevant factors and 

made findings of fact addressing, inter alia, each party’s earning capacity, respective 
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needs and expenses, and the accustomed standard of living during their marriage. In 

the order, the trial court found, based on all the evidence presented, that “[d]efendant

ha[d] the present ability to pay monthly alimony to [p]laintiff in the amount of $2,395, 

beginning February 1, 2019, and continuing for a period of eight years and seven 

months thereafter.” However, defendant argues the trial court failed to make the 

necessary findings setting forth its reasoning for the amount and duration of the 

alimony award. We agree.

While the trial court found that defendant had the ability to pay $2,395, the 

order did not expressly include findings to support its rationale for awarding plaintiff 

that specific amount. Additionally, the trial court provided no explanation to support 

the duration of its alimony award. Thus, we must remand this matter to the trial 

court for further findings on the trial court’s rationale for the amount and duration 

of its alimony award. See N.C.G.S. § 50-16.3A(c) (stating that the trial court “shall

set forth the reasons for its award or denial of alimony and, if making an award, the 

reasons for its amount, duration, and manner of payment.” (emphasis added)); see also 

Wise v. Wise, 264 N.C. App. 735, 749, 826 S.E.2d 788, 798 (2019); Hartsell, 189 N.C. 

App. at 76, 657 S.E.2d at 730.

II
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Defendant next appeals from the trial court’s child support determination. 

Defendant argues the trial court erred by concluding that both parties have a duty to 

provide support to their minor child for his expenses relating to Telos. We disagree.

“Child support orders entered by a trial court are accorded substantial 

deference by appellate courts and our review is limited to a determination of whether 

there was a clear abuse of discretion.” Mason v. Erwin, 157 N.C. App. 284, 287, 579 

S.E.2d 120, 122 (2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “To support such a 

reversal, an appellant must show that the trial court’s actions were manifestly 

unsupported by reason.” State v. Williams, 163 N.C. App. 353, 356, 593 S.E.2d 123, 

126 (2004).

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4(c) authorizes the trial court to order a child support 

award

in such amount as to meet the reasonable needs of the child 

for health, education, and maintenance, having due regard 

to the estates, earnings, conditions, accustomed standard 

of living of the child and the parties, the child care and 

homemaker contributions of each party, and other facts of 

the particular case.

N.C.G.S. § 50-13.4(c) (2019). Generally, both parents have an equal duty to provide 

support for their children. See Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 68, 326 S.E.2d 863, 867 

(1985) (“Today, the equal duty of both parents to support their children is the rule.”); 

see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4(b) (“In the absence of pleading and proof that the 

circumstances otherwise warrant, the father and mother shall be primarily liable for 
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Opinion of the Court

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the support of a minor child.”). However, while parents have an equal duty to support 

their children, “the equal duty to support does not necessarily mean the amount of 

child support is to be automatically divided equally between the parties. Rather, the 

amount of each parent’s obligation varies in accordance with their respective 

financial resources.” Plott, 313 N.C. at 68, 326 S.E.2d at 867.

“Child support payments are ordinarily determined based on a party’s actual 

income at the time the award is made.” Williams, 163 N.C. App. at 356, 593 S.E.2d 

at 126. “In determining the amount of a child support obligation, [t]he judge must 

evaluate the circumstances of each family and also consider certain statutory 

requirements[.]” Bowers v. Bowers, 141 N.C. App. 729, 731, 541 S.E.2d 508, 509 

(2001) (alterations in original) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

In the instant case, the trial court made the following findings of fact relating 

to the minor child’s reasonable needs and child care:

23. Plaintiff and [d]efendant each acknowledged that it was 

in [the minor child]’s best interest to be enrolled at Telos 

and that [the minor child] has benefitted substantially 

from his time at Telos.

24. The expenses incurred for [the minor child]’s benefit in 

connection with his enrollment at New Vision and Telos, as 

well as his transportation expenses incurred with Right 

Direction, psychological evaluation expenses incurred [], 

and [p]laintiff’s Telos Expenses, are extraordinary 

expenses, as defined by the North Carolina Child Support 

Guidelines.

. . . .
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97. Plaintiff has the present ability to pay 40% of the Dr. 

KKJ [e]xpenses, and [d]efendant has the present ability to 

pay 60% of the Dr. KKL[’s psychological evaluation 

e]xpenses.

98. Plaintiff has the present ability to pay 50% of the Dr. 

Zeisz [e]xpenses, and [d]efendant has the present ability to 

pay 50% of the Dr. KKL [e]xpenses.

99. Plaintiff has the present ability to pay 40% of the 

expenses associated with [minor child]’s enrollment at 

Telos, including expense account expenses, and 

[d]efendant has the present ability to pay 60% of expenses 

associated with [minor child]s enrollment at Telos, 

including expense account expenses.

100. Plaintiff has the present ability to pay 40% of the 

Right Direction [e]xpenses for Telos, and [d]efendant has 

the present ability to pay 60% of the Right Direction 

[e]xpenses for Telos.

101. Plaintiff has the present ability to pay 40% of 

[p]laintiff’s Telos [e]xpenses, and [d]efendant has the 

present ability to pay 60% [p]laintiff’s Telos [e]xpenses.

We note defendant does not take exception to the findings made by the trial 

court regarding his financial status at the time of the hearing in 2019. The trial court 

found that after the parties had separated, defendant earned $196,176 in 2017, and

$238,907 in 2018.

3 In addition to defendant’s ability to make substantial 

contributions to his retirement accounts in 2017 and 2018, the trial court found that 

defendant had assets in an E-Trade investment account with a date-of-separation 

3 The hearing for child support and alimony took place on 2 January, 8 February, and 

20 March 2019.
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balance of $273,505, one-half interest in a Qualcomm 401(k) account with a date-ofseparation balance of $214,109.96, and one-half interest in a money market account 

with a date-of-separation balance of $95,254.24. Additionally, defendant received 

$238,000 in 2018 from the sale of the parties’ condominium in Israel. At the time of 

the hearing, defendant had not spent any of the proceeds from the condominium sale. 

Those findings, which are binding on this Court, support the finding of fact and 

conclusion of law that defendant had the ability to pay child support.

Defendant also contends the trial court deviated from the Child Support 

Guidelines because the trial court concluded that defendant “ha[d] the ability to pay 

the child support ordered. The trial court did not make any findings of fact to support

this conclusion.” We also reject this argument. 

Although N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4 mandates a trial court use the presumptive 

guidelines when determining the amount of child support payments, the North 

Carolina Child Support Guidelines (the “Guidelines”), effective 1 January 2019,

provide that

extraordinary child-related expenses (including (1) 

expenses related to special or private elementary or 

secondary schools to meet a child’s particular education 

needs, and (2) expenses for transporting the child between 

the parent’s homes) may be added to the basic child support 

obligation and ordered paid by the parents in proportion to 

their respective incomes if the court determines the expenses 

are reasonable, necessary, and in the child’s best interest.

N.C. Child Support Guidelines 2019 Ann. R. N.C. 5 (emphasis added). 
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[D]etermination of what constitutes an extraordinary 

expense is . . . within the discretion of the trial court[.] 

Based upon the Guideline language above, the court may, 

in its discretion, make adjustments [in the Guideline 

amounts] for extraordinary expenses. However, 

incorporation of such adjustments into a child support 

award does not constitute deviation from the Guidelines, 

but rather is deemed a discretionary adjustment to the 

presumptive amounts set forth in the Guidelines. . . . 

[A]bsent a party’s request for deviation, the trial court is 

not required to set forth findings of fact related to the 

child’s needs and the non-custodial parent’s ability to pay 

extraordinary expenses.

Biggs v. Greer, 136 N.C. App. 294, 298, 524 S.E.2d 577, 581–82 (2000) (alteration in 

original) (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Here, the trial court’s findings of fact regarding expenses related to the minor 

child’s inpatient treatment, which included travel expenses and psychological 

evaluations, appropriately fall under the definition of extraordinary expenses in the 

Guidelines. The court properly exercised its discretion and determined that plaintiff 

had the ability to pay 40% of the minor’s expenses and defendant had the ability to 

pay 60% of the expenses.4 Ferguson v. Ferguson, 238 N.C. App. 257, 265, 768 S.E.2d 

30, 36 (2014) (“The trial court is vested with discretion to make adjustments to the 

guideline amounts for extraordinary expenses, and the determination of what 

constitutes such an expense is likewise within its sound discretion.” (citation and 

quotation marks omitted)).

4 Prior to the trial court’s order, the parties had already shared the responsibility of 

the minor child’s expenses and made payments towards his treatment.
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Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the trial court was not required to make 

specific findings regarding the child’s reasonable needs or the parents’ ability to 

provide support as the court’s “discretionary adjustment” did not constitute a 

deviation under the Guidelines. See Greer, 136 N.C. App. at 298, 524 S.E.2d at 582. 

In fact, the trial court’s finding––that plaintiff and defendant should be obligated to 

pay extraordinary child care expenses in varying proportions to meet the minor 

child’s needs––is consistent with the underlying assumption of the Guidelines that 

“child support is a shared parental obligation[.]” N.C. Child Support Guidelines 2019 

Ann. R. N.C. 5 (emphasis added). We see nothing in the record to indicate that either 

party requested a deviation from the Guidelines.

Therefore, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering both 

parties to provide the above-referenced support to their minor child. 

III

Defendant raises another argument regarding his child support obligation, 

contending the trial court erred by ordering him to pay all the minor child’s 

unreimbursed/uninsured medical expenses. We disagree.

Typically, “uninsured medical and dental expenses are to be apportioned 

between the parties in the discretion of the trial court. In other words, any decision 

by the court in this regard must be upheld absent a showing that it is manifestly 

unsupported by reason.” Lawrence v. Tise, 107 N.C. App. 140, 150, 419 S.E.2d 176, 
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183 (1992). The Guidelines include a provision referring to uninsured medical or 

dental expenses, stating: 

[t]he basic guideline support obligation includes $250 per 

child for the child’s annual uninsured medical and/or 

dental expenses. . . . [T]he court may order that uninsured 

health care costs in excess of $250 per year (including 

reasonable and necessary costs related to medical care, 

dental care, orthodontia, asthma treatments, physical 

therapy, treatment of chronic health problems, and 

counseling or psychiatric therapy for diagnosed mental 

disorders) incurred by a parent be paid by either parent or 

both parents in such proportion as the court deems 

appropriate.

N.C. Child Support Guidelines 2019 Ann. R. N.C. 5 (emphasis added). We note the 

Guidelines do not include mandatory language advising the trial court on the 

allocation of uninsured expenses between the parties. Instead, this Court has stated

that the trial court is vested with wide discretion in deciding the allocation of such 

expenses on a child’s behalf:

[T]he Child Support Guidelines . . . include a generalized, 

cursory instruction concerning how the court ‘may’ 

structure the responsibility for these uninsured expenses 

[which] does not in any way alter the trial court’s discretion 

to apportion these expenses, described and applied in Tise, 

107 N.C. App. at 150, 419 S.E.2d at 183. . . . [T]he Child 

Support Guidelines neither require the trial courts to 

follow a certain formula nor prescribe what the trial courts 

‘should’ or ‘must’ do in this regard[.] . . . Given the wide 

discretion afforded [to] our trial courts in matters 

concerning the allocation of uninsured medical or dental 

expenses, then, such decisions cannot be disturbed on 

appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.

Holland v. Holland, 169 N.C. App. 564, 571–72, 610 S.E.2d 231, 236–37 (2005). 
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Here, considering the disparity between the parties’ respective incomes, we 

find the trial court’s order requiring defendant to pay all medical expenses not 

covered by insurance on behalf of the minor child was not manifestly unsupported by 

reason so as to constitute an abuse of discretion. See Roberts v. McAllister, 174 N.C. 

App. 369, 381, 621 S.E.2d 191, 199 (2005) (“It is in the discretion of the trial court to 

determine a fair sharing arrangement for the uninsured medical expenses.”). 

We reject defendant’s contention that there was no competent evidence 

presented to show what the minor child’s expenses were and what they would cost 

defendant. In defendant’s affidavit of financial standing [] submitted to the trial 

court, he included $433 for the minor child’s “medical/dental bills not paid by 

insurance” in his total individual expense estimate. The court included this expense 

in its finding of defendant’s reasonable individual expenses and determined that 

defendant had a surplus in income to enable him to afford those expenses if they 

occur. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling. 

IV

Defendant finally argues the trial court erred by failing to address his claim 

for reimbursement of the minor’s cost of enrollment at Telos. We agree.

Here, defendant submitted evidence that he was charged the full amount of 

$5,250.00, relating to the minor child’s enrollment costs in Telos on 30 October 2018. 

The trial court found that plaintiff had the ability to pay “40% of the expenses 
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associated with the minor child’s enrollment at Telos.” Thus, pursuant to the trial 

court’s order, defendant contends plaintiff was required to reimburse him for 40% of 

this cost, totaling $2,100. 

Given the lack of findings by the trial court on this issue, we are unable to 

discern from the record how or whether the trial court considered defendant’s 

argument for reimbursement on his Telos’s costs. Thus, we reverse and remand for 

additional findings as to defendant’s claim for reimbursement. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.

Judges ZACHARY and ARROWOOD concur.