alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT
      32**








**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U. S. C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**








In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of WMS Industries, Inc. (“the Company”) on
      Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities
      and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (“the Report”), I, Brian R. Gamache,
      Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
      1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
      that:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








/s/
      Brian R. Gamache


Brian
      R.
      Gamache


Chief
      Executive Officer


November
      7, 2007
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gray M. DOTSON, also known as Big Daddy, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-30053.

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Decided Nov. 3, 2006.

Robert William Piedrahita, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Middle District of Louisiana, Baton Rouge, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Joseph Kelsey Scott, III, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Gray M. Dotson appeals from his conviction by guilty plea of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, making a false statement to a firearms dealer, possessing with intent to distribute methamphetamine, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense, and witness-tampering. Dotson contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Dotson’s motion to withdraw his plea. *See United States v. Grant,*117 F.3d 788, 789 (5th Cir.1997). The district court held a lengthy hearing on Dotson’s motion to withdraw and correctly determined that the factors enumerated in *United States v. Carr,*740 F.2d 339, 343-44 (5th Cir.1984), weighed against Dotson. Dotson’s motion to withdraw relied primarily on his assertion that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district court’s implicit factual findings based on the testimony of Dotson’s two attorneys are not clearly erroneous. *See United States v. Cuyler,*298 F.3d 387, 389 (5th Cir.2002). On those implicit factual findings, Dotson has failed to demonstrate that his attorneys’ performance was deficient or that his plea was involuntary because, but for counsel’s al*433leged errors, he would have pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial. *See Hill v. Lockhart,*474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985).

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
**EXHIBIT 23.1**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We consent to the incorporation by reference inRegistration Statements Nos. 333-140617, 333-136659, 333-46345 and 333-86487 on Forms S-4 and in Registration Statements Nos. 33-75444, 33-75442, 33-84398, 33-85624, 333-16719, 333-57171, 333-102544, 333-105307 and 333-116132 on Forms S-8 of ourreports dated March 13, 2009, relating to the consolidated financial statements of Sterling Bancshares, Inc. and subsidiaries, and the effectiveness of Sterling Bancshares Inc.’s internal control over financial reporting, appearing in thisAnnual Report on Form 10-K of Sterling Bancshares, Inc. and subsidiaries for the year ended December 31, 2008. 

/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP

Houston, Texas 

March 13, 2009
### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA DA 21

- 0067

_________________ STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v. MICHAEL DEAN ALBERT,

Defendant and Appellant. O R D E R

_________________ On June 30 , 2021 , this Court returned Appellant ’ s opening brief for failure to comply with M. R. App. P. 12 (1)(c) , (d), and (h) and ordered Appellant to correct the brief and file it no later than 20 days from the date of the Order. A ppellant has not filed a corrected brief in accordance with this Court’s Order. THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Appellant shall prepare, file , and serve the opening brief on appeal no later than September 8 , 2021 . Failure to file the brief within that time will result in dismissal of this appeal with prejudice and without further notice. The Clerk is directed to provide a copy of this Order to Appellant Michael Dean Albert personally and to all counsel of record

.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

August 19 2021

08/19/2021

Case Number: DA 21-0067
#### American Transit Insurance Company, Appellant, v Keyana Lucas et al., Defendants, and Sky Acupuncture, P.C., Respondent. American Transit Insurance Company, Appellant, v Tashuana Lucas et al., Defendants, and Sky Acupuncture, P.C., Respondent.

[974 NYS2d 388]

*424Orders, Supreme Court, New York County (Ellen M. Coin, J.), entered on or about February 26 and 28, 2013, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, in the respective actions regarding the injured claimants Keyana Lucas and Tashuana Lucas, denied plaintiffs motions for summary judgment seeking declarations of noncoverage for no-fault benefits as against defendant-respondent Sky Acupuncture, P.C., unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the motions granted, and it is declared that plaintiff owes no coverage obligation to Sky Acupuncture, P.C. for no-fault benefits for the injured claimants.

The failure to attend duly scheduled medical exams voids the policy ab initio (see *Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC,*82 AD3d 559, 560 [1st Dept 2011], *lv denied*17 NY3d 705 [2011]). Accordingly, when defendants’ assignors failed to appear for the requested medical exams, plaintiff had the right to deny all claims retroactively to the date of loss, regardless of whether the denials were timely issued *(see*Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-3.8 [c]; *Unitrin,*82 AD3d at 560).

“ ‘[A] properly executed affidavit of service raises a presumption that a proper mailing occurred, and a mere denial of receipt is not enough to rebut this presumption’ ” *(Matter of Ariel Servs., Inc. v New York City Envtl. Control Bd.,*89 AD3d 415, 415 [1st Dept 2011]). “The presumption may be created by either proof of actual mailing or proof of a standard office practice or procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed” *(Residential Holding Corp. v Scottsdale Ins. Co.,*286 AD2d 679, 680 [2d Dept 2001]).

Plaintiff submitted competent evidence that the notices scheduling the claimant’s medical examinations were mailed, as well as the failure to appear, based on the sworn affidavits of the scheduled examining physician and his employee *(see American Tr. Ins. Co. v Solorzano,*108 AD3d 449, 449 [1st Dept 2013]). Contrary to defendants’ contention, the affidavits were not conclusory, as they established personal knowledge, the employee’s role in the physician’s no-fault department, and the physician’s personal knowledge of the office procedures when a claimant failed to appear for a medical exam *(cf. First Help Acupuncture, P.C. v Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co.,*9 Misc 3d 1127[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51815[U] [Civ Ct, Kings County 2005], *affd*14 Misc 3d 142[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50365[U] [App Term, 2d Dept 2007]).

There is no requirement to demonstrate that the claims were *425timely disclaimed since the failure to attend medical exams was an absolute coverage defense *(see New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Country-Wide Ins. Co.,*17 NY3d 586, 593 [2011]; *Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co.,*82 AD3d at 560). Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Acosta, Saxe, Richter and Feinman, JJ.
##### 



EXHIBIT 32
 CERTIFICATION OF  THE TRUSTEE*  OF THE SAN JUAN BASIN ROYALTY TRUST  PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 1350
  1.
    
    The Report fully complies in all material respects with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (as explained in Note 1
to the Trusts financial statements contained in the Report, in accordance with
Securities and Exchange Commission Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 47, released September
16, 1982, the Trust prepares its financial statements in a manner that differs from
generally accepted accounting principles; such presentation is customary to other
royalty trusts); and2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Trust.
 TEXASBANK, AS TRUSTEE OF THE
SAN JUAN BASIN ROYALTY TRUSTBy:
    /s/ Lee Ann AndersonName:

    Lee Ann AndersonTitle:
    Vice President and Trust OfficerDate: August 9, 2005 
 * The Trust has no executive officers.
EXHIBIT
10.1




[CONTINENTAL
AIRLINES, INC. LETTERHEAD]














September
30, 2009









Mr.
Jeffery A. Smisek




Continental
Airlines, Inc.




1600
Smith HQSEO




Houston,
TX 77002









Dear
Jeff:




In light
of your election as successor Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the
Company, this letter is to clarify our mutual understanding of the
interpretation of the terms of the Employment Agreement entered into between you
and Continental Airlines, Inc. (the “Company”), effective October 15, 2007 (the
“Agreement”).




Effective
as of January 1, 2010, the positions referenced in paragraph 1.2 of the
Agreement shall be agreed to mean Chairman of the Board, President and Chief
Executive Officer of the Company, in lieu of your prior position as President
and Chief Operating Officer of the Company, and the duties referenced in that
paragraph shall be the duties associated with those new positions as of January
1, 2010.  The provisions of paragraph 2.3(i) of the Agreement shall be
interpreted in a manner consistent with your change in position and will be
deemed to reference the authority, duties and responsibilities of your new
positions as of January 1, 2010, and to a reporting structure to the Board of
Directors of the Company from and after that date.  For the avoidance
of doubt, you agree that you will not have a material diminution in authority or
duties for purposes of paragraph 2.3(i) solely as a result of (i) the election
by the Board of Directors of another officer to serve in the role of President,
provided that you continue to serve as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive
Officer, or (ii)
the election by the Board of Directors of another director to serve as Chairman
of the Board if such election is required by applicable law or the rules of the
principal securities exchange on which the Company's common stock is then
listed.




References
to “other than Company’s Chief Executive Officer” that were in the Agreement and
that will clearly no longer be applicable due to your position as Chief
Executive Officer are agreed to have no relevance from and after January 1,
2010.




By
signing below, you agree that this letter accurately reflects our mutual
interpretation of the terms of the Agreement and shall be deemed to constitute
an agreement of the parties with respect to its terms for purposes of paragraph
5.12 of the Agreement.




Very
truly yours,





CONTINENTAL
AIRLINES, INC.








By:        /s/ Jennifer L.
Vogel


Name:     Jennifer
L. Vogel


Title:
            Senior
      Vice President,


General
      Counsel, Secretary


and
      Chief Compliance Officer








APPROVED:








/s/ Charles
Yamarone


Charles
Yamarone


Chair,
Human Resources Committee







ACKNOWLEDGED
AND AGREED:




JEFFERY
A. SMISEK









/s/ Jeffery A.
Smisek
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 21

                   SUBSIDIARIES OF STERLING BANCSHARES, INC.

   The following is a list of the subsidiaries of Sterling Bancshares, Inc.:

<TABLE>
   <S>                                    <C>
   Sterling Bancorporation, Inc.          Sterling Bank
   A Delaware corporation                 A Texas state banking association
   PO Box 631                             15000 Northwest Freeway
   Wilmington, Delaware 19899             Houston, Texas 77040

   Sterling Bancshares Capital Trust I    Lone Star Bank
   A Delaware statutory business trust    A Texas state banking association
   15000 Northwest Freeway                12727 East Freeway
   Houston, Texas 77040                   Houston, Texas 77213

   Sterling Bancshares Capital Trust II   Community Bank
   A Delaware statutory business trust    A Texas state banking association
   15000 Northwest Freeway                20045 Katy Freeway
   Houston, Texas 77040                   Katy, Texas 77450

   Sterling Bancshares Capital Trust III
   A Delaware statutory business trust
   15000 Northwest Freeway
   Houston, Texas 77040

   CMCR Holding Company
   A Delaware corporation
   13100 Northwest Freeway
   Houston, Texas 77040
</TABLE>

   CMCR Holding Company is the parent company of Sterling Capital Mortgage
Company, an originator and servicer of one-to-four single family residential
mortgage loans. Sterling Capital Mortgage Company originates a significant
portion of its mortgage business through twenty-five subsidiary entities.


                                       70
EXHIBIT 32.1

                                  CERTIFICATION

      Each of the undersigned  hereby certifies,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section
1350,  as adopted  pursuant  to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,
that,  the  Annual  Report of Ramp  Corporation  on Form 10-K for the year ended
December 31, 2004,  fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information  contained
in  such  Report  fairly  presents,  in all  material  respects,  the  financial
condition  and  results  of  operations  of Ramp  Corporation  for  the  periods
presented.


Date: April 4, 2005                     By: /s/ Andrew Brown
                                            ------------------------------------
                                            Andrew Brown
                                            Chairman and Chief
                                            Executive Officer


Date: April 4, 2005                     By: /s/ Ron Munkittrick
                                            ------------------------------------
                                            Ron Munkittrick
                                            Executive Vice President and
                                            Chief Financial Officer
<PAGE>   1
                                  Exhibit 21.0
                        UROPLASTY, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES

                         Subsidiaries of the Registrant



The following are wholly owned subsidiaries of Uroplasty, Inc:


                                  Uroplasty BV
                                    Hofkamp 2
                                 6161 DC Geleen
                                 The Netherlands



                                  Bioplasty BV
                                    Hofkamp2
                                 6161 DC Geleen
                                 The Netherlands



                                 Uroplasty, Ltd
                         Unit 3, Woodside Business Park
                           Whitley Wood Lane, Reading
                               Berkdshire, RG2 8LW
                                 United Kingdom



                                 Uroplasty Corp.
                          5955 Airport Road, Suite 305
                              Missassauga, Ontario
                                 Canada L4V 1R9
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 20- 0 331 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. KYLE JORDAN MILLHOUSE ,

Defendant and Appellant.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including August 13 , 2021 , within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

July 7 2021

07/07/2021

Case Number: DA 20-0331
# Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed October 11, 2017.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D16-2898

Lower Tribunal No. 12-22426

________________



### Brenda Williams, et al.,

Appellants,

vs.



### Marye Johnson, et al.

, Appellees.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Thomas J.

Rebull

, Judge.

Law Offices of Robin Bresky, Daniel S. Weinger and Robin Bresky (Boca

Raton)

, for appellants.

Legal Services of Greater Miami, Inc., Jacqueline C. Ledón and Anna-Bo

Emmanuel

, for appellees.

Before EMAS, LOGUE and LINDSEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.Appellants Brenda Williams and Epiphany Community Development Corp.

appeal from the trial court’s entry of judgment in accordance with appellees’

motion for directed verdict in favor of appellees, Marye Johnson and

Comprehensive Outreach Programs, Inc. Upon our de novo review, we hold that

the trial court properly granted appellees’ motion and entered judgment in their

favor. Appellants sought damages on a theory of unjust enrichment. However,

given the existence of an express contract covering the same subject matter,

“claims arising out of that contractual relationship will not support a claim for

unjust enrichment.” Moynet v. Courtois

, 8 So. 3d 377, 379 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009),

disapproved of on other grounds, Bank of New York Mellon v. Condo. Ass’n of

La Mer Estates, Inc.

, 175 So. 3d 282 (Fla. 2015). See also Braham v. Branch

Banking and Trust Co.

, 170 So. 3d 844 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (citing Diamond “S”

Dev. Corp. v. Mercantile Bank

, 989 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) for the

proposition that plaintiff could not pursue unjust enrichment claim where express

contract existed concerning the same subject matter); Atlantis Estate Acquisitions,

Inc., v. DePierro

, 125 So. 3d 889 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); Kovtan v. Frederiksen

, 449

So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).

Affirmed.

2
Exhibit 32.1

Certification Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

As Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the periodic report of Dynacq Healthcare, Inc. (the
Company) on Form 10-K for the year ending August 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Chiu M. Chan, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

|                         |  |  |  |                                                                           
|------------------------ |  |  |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                         |  |  |  |                                                                           
|                         |  | 
|Dated: November 26, 2008 |  |  |  | /s/ Chiu M. Chan                                                          
|                         |  |  |  | Chiu M. Chan President and Chief Executive Officer Dynacq Healthcare, Inc.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Joseph Washington, Appellant.

[963 NYS2d 911]

Appeal from a *1452judgment of the Erie County Court (Thomas E Franczyk, J.), rendered April 13, 2010. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of attempted assault in the second degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of attempted assault in the second degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.05 [2]). Defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the CPL 400.21 notice is not preserved for our review (see *People v Pellegrino,*60 NY2d 636, 637 [1983]; *People v Butler,*96 AD3d 1367, 1368 [2012], *lv denied*20 NY3d 931 [2012]). In any event, “defendant waived strict compliance with that statute by admitting the prior felony conviction in open court” *(Butler,*96 AD3d at 1368; *see People v Guillory,*98 AD3d 835, 836 [2012], *lv denied*20 NY3d 932 [2012]; *People v Perez,*85 AD3d 1538, 1541 [2011]). Defendant further contends that the People failed to submit sufficient documentation establishing the period of defendant’s prior incarceration for purposes of the tolling provision of Penal Law § 70.06 (1) (b) (v). That contention is also unpreserved for our review *(cf. Butler,*96 AD3d at 1368; *see generally People v Samms,*95 NY2d 52, 57 [2000]), and we decline to exercise our power to review it as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice *(see*CPL 470.15 [3] [c]).

Present—Scudder, EJ., Centra, Carni, Sconiers and Martoche, JJ.
#### The Lowe Brothers Cracker Co. *v.*Ginn.

Where a person is sued in a justice’s court upon an acceptance mader not in his own name, but in the name of another, the summons-having a copy of the acceptance annexed and being addressed to him in his own name, “ doing business under the name and style of” the acceptor, the acceptance is admissible in evidence without *409proof of its execution, unless the defendant has filed a sworn plea, of *non est factum*within due time. The action being founded upon the acceptance, and the summons substantially alleging it to he his act and deed, sections 2851, 3454, 3472, 4149 of the code apply in principle. *Judgment reversed as to instructions given the magistrate.*

March 19, 1894.

Argued at the last term.

*Certiorari.*Before Judge Milner. Bartow superior-court. January term, 1893.

John *W.*Akin, for plaintiff.

Suit was brought in a justice’s court against “Luke C. Ginn, doing business under the name and style of *W.*H. Terrell,” on a draft in favor of the plaintiff, drawn on *W.*H. Terrell and accepted by him. No plea was filed until the third term, when L. C. Ginn pleaded that he-was not indebted to plaintiff on the contract sued on,, nor in any manner whatever, and that he did not undertake or assume this debt in writing or otherwise, and does not owe it. On plaintiff’s motion the court struck this plea, on the ground that it was not filed at the first term. Plaintiff offered in evidence the acceptance sued on, to which defendant objected on the ground that it was not signed by Ginn, aud that there was no proof showing that it was signed by Ginn or authorized by him. The objection was sustained and the paper excluded. No further evidence was offered, and the court rendered judgment against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant for cost. To these rulings plaintiff excepted by *certiorari;*ujion the hearing of which it was ordered that the same be sustained and the judgment below beset aside, and that the case be remanded to the justice’s court with instructions to dismiss the same unless plaintiff should prove the allegation in the summons, the court holding that plaintiff should show that defendant did business under the name and style of *W.*H. Terrell. To this ruling, and to the refusal to render final judgment against defendant on motion, plaintiff excepted.