J-S79002-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE 

ASSOCIATION

v.

SARA STRANIERI AND JOHN J. 

STRANIERI, III 

Appellants

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 641 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered March 12, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Civil Division at 

No(s): 16-CV-4848

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OLSON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED: MARCH 27, 2019

Appellants Sara Stranieri and John J. Stranieri, III, appeal, pro se, in 

this mortgage foreclosure action initiated by Appellee, Federal National 

Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”), from orders entered in the Lackawanna 

County Court of Common Pleas on March 12, 2018.1 We quash the appeal.

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1

 We note that the caption reflects that the appeal is from a single order; in 

actuality, it is from three orders filed the same day. On March 12, 2018, the 

trial court entered three orders, discussed infra. The first sustained the 

preliminary objections of Judge Julia Munley filed October 30, 2017, to 

Appellants’ “New Matter/Affirmative Defense/Counterclaim. The second 

sustained the preliminary objections of Fannie Mae filed November 21, 2017, 

to Appellants’ counterclaims. The third sustained the preliminary objections 

of the successor plaintiff to Fannie Mae, MTGLQ Investors, L.P. [“MTGLQ”], 

filed on October 27, 2017, to Appellants’ new matter and counterclaims.
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The trial court provided the following statement of the history of this 

case in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion,2in pertinent part:

1.) On August 29, 2016, a complaint in residential mortgage 

foreclosure was filed by [Fannie Mae] against both Stranieri

[Appellants]. Said complaint also contained a notice relative to 

the [c]ourt’s mortgage foreclosure diversion program. The

complaint noted both [Appellants] entered into a mortgage and a 

promissory note on March 18, 2006. Their realty encumbered was 

132 South Filmore Avenue, Scranton, Pennsylvania. [Fannie Mae] 

held the mortgage at the time suit was commenced.

2.) On September 22, 2016, the Lackawanna County Sheriff’s 

office filed returns of service indicating both Stranieri [Appellants] 

were (NF), meaning not found, on September 20, 2016 by the 

serving officers.

3.) On October 31, 2016, an order to allow service per Pa.R.C.P. 

430 was signed by Honorable Vito P. Geroulo.

4.) On November 7, 2016, [Fannie Mae] reinstated [its] 

complaint in residential mortgage foreclosure against both 

Stranieri [Appellants].

5.) On November 29, 2016, Sheriff’s return of service of the 

complaint in residential mortgage foreclosure showed both 

Stranieri [Appellants] were once again not found.

6.) Pursuant to [an] earlier order, the Sheriff’s return of service 

of December 7, 2016 indicated that the property located at 132 

Filmore Avenue, Scranton, Pennsylvania, Lackawanna County was 

posted and on December 19, 2016 this type of return of service 

was filed.

7.) On January 7, 2017, pro se [Appellants] filed preliminary 

objections to the residential mortgage foreclosure complaint and 

those were referred to the Court Administrator for assignment.

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2

 One of the myriad defects in Appellants’ Brief is their failure to attach the 

opinion of the trial court in violation of Pa.R.A.P. 2111(b).
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8.) On January 30, 201[7],

[3]

judgment in the amount of 

$94,106.51 was entered in favor of [Fannie Mae] and against both 

Stranieri [Appellants].

9.) On February 6, 2017, a Petition and Rule to Show Cause 

why the defective improper default judgment of [Fannie Mae] 

versus both Stranieri [Appellants] was signed by the Honorable 

James A. Gibbons with a rule returnable before the Honorable Julia 

Munley on March 7, 2017.

10.) On February 21, 2017, a petition for writ of execution in 

mortgage foreclosure was filed in the amount of $94,106.51.

11.) At some point, a briefing schedule and argument was 

ordered by the Honorable Julia Munley to hear Stranieri 

[Appellants’] preliminary objections noted above.[4]

12.) On September 8, 2017, Judge Munley denied the 

preliminary objections filed by the Stranieri [Appellants].

13.) On October 10, 2017, pro se [Appellants] filed answers to 

the mortgage foreclosure complaint along with new matter, 

affirmative defenses and counterclaims for wrongful foreclosure 

and fraud.

* * *

15.) On October 16, 2017, a substitution of successor Plaintiff 

was filed pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 2352(a). [Appellee MTGLQ] 

became substitute Plaintiff[] in place of [Fannie Mae] in both the 

foreclosure action as well as [the] Counterclaim Defendants.

16.) On October 27, 2017, preliminary objections of MTGLQ 

Investors, L.P. were filed-against the new matter, affirmative 

defenses and counterclaims of both Stranieri [Appellants] 

addressing wrongful foreclosure and fraud and naming the 

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3

 Our review of the record reveals that the trial court made a typographical 

error in referring to the date of the default judgment as January 30, 2018.

4

 The trial court failed to note that by order dated March 7, 2017, and filed 

March 8, 2017, the January 30, 2017 default judgment entered against 

Appellants was “vacated and stricken.” Order, 3/8/17.
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Honorable Julia Munley as a defendant for her denial of Stranieris’

preliminary objections.

* * *

21.) On March 12, 2018, after review of the pleadings and briefs 

and after entertaining oral arguments on all of the outstanding 

preliminary objections, this [c]ourt signed three (3) orders 

relative to the outstanding preliminary objections.

(a). The first order provided that the preliminary 

objections filed on behalf of Judge Munley were 

sustained. [Appellants] joined Judge Munley because 

they were unhappy that Judge Munley quite properly 

dismissed their earlier preliminary objections. 

[Appellants] then improperly joined Judge Munley as 

an additional defendant, thus forcing her to recuse 

herself. There was no basis in law or in fact with this

procedure. It was at its essence a dilatory spite move. 

To that extent, it worked because it bought 

[Appellants] additional time. [Appellants] defaulted 

on their mortgage and are totally lacking in a 

meritorious defense. The result is delay.

(b.) The next order was entered on behalf of original 

Defendant, [Fannie Mae,] to the counterclaim of 

[Appellants]. The counterclaims were totally devoid 

of merit and were essential in a rambling document 

lacking in conformity to the substantive law as well as 

to the procedural prerequisites[. Fannie Mae’s] 

preliminary objections were therefore sustained and 

[Appellants’] counterclaims were dismissed. 

Furthermore, [Fannie Mae] had already indirectly 

assigned their rights under the mortgage to MTGLQ . 

. . who are and have been the successor plaintiff to 

[Fannie Mae] and the true present Plaintiff in interest 

in this case.

(c.) The final order of March 12, 2018 was to address 

the preliminary objections of . . . MTGLQ . . . successor 

Plaintiff to [Fannie Mae]. The objections herein were 

in response to the new matter, affirmative defenses 

and counterclaims of [Appellants] Stranieri.
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Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 6/14/18, at 1–5. Appellants filed a notice of 

appeal to this Court on April 11, 2018. The trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a) but did not order Appellants to file a Rule 1925(b) statement.

Appellants raise the following issues in the Statement of Questions 

Involved in their brief:

Point I.

Whether a conflict of interest exists in this case, as Senior Judge 

Carmen D. Minora made a ruling in favor of his colleague and 

associate Julia K. Munley?

Point II.

Whether [Appellants] have the right of rescission of an agreement 

based upon misrepresentation, fraud, etc., under the Federal 

Reserve System?

Point III.

Whether the counterclaims come within the purview of federal 

subject matter jurisdiction and outside the judicial authority of the 

state court?

Point IV.

Whether the court committed harmful and palpable error when it 

dismissed the counterclaims against three (3) counterclaim 

defendants, specifically, [Fannie Mae], [MTGLQ], and Julia K. 

Munley?

Point V.

Whether the Lackawanna County Court Of Common Pleas is a

“Kangaroo Court” and a “Coram Non Judice?”

Point VI.

Whether Senior Judge Carmen D. Minora acted in a ministerial, 

administrative, and clerical capacity when he executed the three 

(3) orders dismissing the counterclaims with prejudice, the only 

subject matter of this case?

Appellants’ Brief at ix.
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We first note that Appellants’ Brief is a rambling, obscure, unintelligible 

stream of consciousness and Latin maxims that are unconnected and 

irrelevant to the case.5 Thus, we cannot discern the true nature of Appellants’ 

claims. Pa.R.A.P. 2101 (“Conformance with Requirements”) provides:

Briefs and reproduced records shall conform in all material

respects with the requirements of these rules as nearly as the

circumstances of the particular case will admit, otherwise they

may be suppressed, and, if the defects are in the brief or

reproduced record of the appellant and are substantial, the appeal

or other matter may be quashed or dismissed.

“Although this Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se

litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon the appellant. To the 

contrary, any person choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must, 

to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of expertise and legal training 

will be his undoing.” In re Ullman, 995 A.2d 1207, 1211–1212 (Pa. Super. 

2010). Accordingly, pro se litigants must comply with the procedural rules set 

forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Court. Commonwealth v. Tchirkow, 160 

A.3d 798, 804 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

The defects in Appellants’ brief and their failure to adequately develop 

arguments and support bald assertions impair our ability to conduct

meaningful judicial review of their claims. For this reason, we could find all of 

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5

 By way of example, we offer Appellants’ assertion that “[t]he lower 

court/tribunal while sitting within a municipal form of government under 

“Military Colors” is nothing less than a “Kangaroo Court.” Appellants’ Brief 

at 9.
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the issues waived. See Stimmler v. Chestnut Hill Hosp., 981 A.2d 145, 

153 n.9 (Pa. 2009) (argument portion of brief must contain “sufficient citation 

to the record and legal authority, together with analysis, to guide this Court 

in its review of the issue.”). Instead, however, we are compelled to agree 

with Fannie Mae and MTGLQ and quash the appeal because Appellants seek 

to appeal interlocutory trial court orders, and none of the exceptions by which 

this Court could properly consider the appeal apply.

It is well settled that an appeal may be taken from: (1) a final order or 

an order certified as a final order (Pa.R.A.P. 341); (2) an interlocutory order 

as of right (Pa.R.A.P. 311); (3) an interlocutory order by permission (Pa.R.A.P. 

312, 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b)); or (4) a collateral order (Pa.R.A.P. 313). See In 

re Estate of McAleer, 194 A.3d 587, 592 (Pa. Super. 2018) (discussing 

appealability of orders). Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341 defines 

final orders as follows:

(a) General rule. Except as prescribed in paragraphs (d) and 

(e) of this rule, an appeal may be taken as of right from any final 

order of a government unit or trial court.

(b) Definition of Final Order. A final order is any order that:

(1) disposes of all claims and of all parties; or

(2) RESCINDED[6]

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6

 Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(2) previously stated that final orders included “any order 

that is expressly defined as a final order by statute[.]” Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(2) 

(rescinded). Subsection (b)(2) was rescinded December 14, 2015, and 

replaced with Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(8), which became effective on April 1, 2016.
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(3) is entered as a final order pursuant to paragraph 

(c) of this rule.

(c) Determination of finality. When more than one claim for 

relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, 

cross-claim, or third-party claim or when multiple parties are 

involved, the trial court or other governmental unit may enter a 

final order as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims and 

parties only upon an express determination that an immediate 

appeal would facilitate resolution of the entire case. Such an order 

becomes appealable when entered. In the absence of such a 

determination and entry of a final order, any order or other 

form of decision that adjudicates fewer than all the claims 

and parties shall not constitute a final order. . . .

Pa.R.A.P. 341 (emphasis added). Thus, pursuant to Rule 341, an order is final 

if it disposes of all claims and all parties or if a statute expressly defines it as 

final. The orders entered March 12, 2018, from which the appeal lies,

dismissed Appellants’ counterclaims. As such, they did not terminate the 

underlying foreclosure action7 because the orders did not dispose of all claims 

and all parties. See United States Organizations for Bankruptcy 

Alternatives, Inc. v. Department of Banking, 26 A.3d 474, 480 (Pa. 

2011). (If order in question merely narrows scope of litigation and does not 

resolve the entirety of the parties’ eligibility for relief, the order is interlocutory

and not immediately appealable). This outcome comports with this Court’s 

long-standing and well-founded policy against piecemeal litigation. 

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7

 Indeed, subsequent to the instant appeal, MTGLQ filed a motion for 

summary judgment on August 16, 2018. See Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(6) (“After an 

appeal is taken . . . the trial court . . . may [p]roceed further in any matter in 

which a non-appealable interlocutory order has been entered, notwithstanding 

the filing of a notice of appeal.”).
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Pennsylvania Bankers Ass’n v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Banking, 948 

A.2d 790, 798–799 (Pa. 2008).

Further, the orders appealed cannot serve as a basis for an interlocutory 

appeal as of right. “[A]n order sustaining preliminary objections to new matter 

and counterclaim does not constitute a basis for an interlocutory appeal as of 

right” pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311. Continental Bank v. Andrew Bldg. Co., 

648 A.2d 551, 553–554 (Pa. Super. 1994). Neither an order overruling 

preliminary objections to a complaint, nor an order sustaining preliminary 

objections to new matter and counterclaims, are included in the list of 

interlocutory orders to which an appeal of right attaches.8

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8

 Pa.R.A.P. 311(a) provides, in pertinent part:

General rule.--An appeal may be taken as of right and without 

reference to Pa.R.A.P. 341(c) from:

(1) Affecting judgments.--An order refusing to open, vacate, or 

strike off a judgment. If orders opening, vacating, or striking off 

a judgment are sought in the alternative, no appeal may be filed 

until the court has disposed of each claim for relief.

(2) Attachments, etc.--An order confirming, modifying, dissolving, 

or refusing to confirm, modify or dissolve an attachment, 

custodianship, receivership, or similar matter affecting the 

possession or control of property, except for orders pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S. §§ 3323(f), 3505(a).

(3) Change of criminal venue or venire.--An order changing venue 

or venire in a criminal proceeding.
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Moreover, the March 12, 2018 orders are not appealable as collateral 

orders. Pa.R.A.P. 313 defines a collateral order as “an order separable from 

and collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is too 

important to be denied review and the question presented is such that if 

review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be 

irreparably lost.” Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). The instant orders cannot be considered 

as collateral orders because Appellants’ counterclaims do not “form separate 

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(4) Injunctions.--An order that grants or denies, modifies or 

refuses to modify, continues or refuses to continue, or dissolves 

or refuses to dissolve an injunction unless the order was entered:

(i) Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 3323(f), 3505(a); or

(ii) After a trial but before entry of the final order. 

Such order is immediately appealable, however, if the 

order enjoins conduct previously permitted or 

mandated or permits or mandates conduct not 

previously mandated or permitted, and is effective 

before entry of the final order.

(5) Peremptory judgment in mandamus.--An order granting 

peremptory judgment in mandamus.

(6) New trials.--An order in a civil action or proceeding awarding 

a new trial, or an order in a criminal proceeding awarding a new 

trial where the defendant claims that the proper disposition of the 

matter would be an absolute discharge or where the 

Commonwealth claims that the trial court committed an error of 

law.

(7) Partition.--An order directing partition.

(8) Other cases.--An order that is made final or appealable by 

statute or general rule, even though the order does not dispose of 

all claims and of all parties.
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cause[s] of action which [are] not so integrated [with] the claim at issue . . . 

that denial of an appeal from the trial court’s orders would result in the claimed 

right being irretrievably lost.” Continental, 648 A.2d at 555.

Finally, Pa.R.A.P. 312 provides for the appeal of an interlocutory order 

by permission. Appellants did not file a petition for permission to appeal nor 

did the trial court certify that the “order[s] involve[] a controlling question of 

law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that 

an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate 

termination of the matter[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b); Pa.R.A.P. 1311

(Interlocutory Appeals by Permission). Thus, the March 12, 2018 orders also 

are not appealable as interlocutory by permission.

Appeal quashed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 03/27/2019