2 0 1 9 

Semiannual Report

to Congress

Office of Inspector General

October 1, 2018 – March 31, 2019

Approved for public release, 21-888
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MESSAGE FROM THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

I am pleased to present this National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) Office of 

Inspector General (OIG) report for the period ending 31 March 2019. OIG conducted audit and 

inspection oversight, produced recommendations for improvements in agency programs, and 

pursued allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse.

Working closely with the NGA elements, we closed 16 of 101 (16 percent) audit and inspection 

recommendations during this period. Under the Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016, 

we continue to expand our metrics resulting from our recommendations to the Agency.

The Audit Division examined the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act program 

and provided oversight of the independent contract auditors’ work on NGA’s financial statement 

audits and evaluation of adherence to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act 

(FISMA). Recommendations from these projects focused on improving policies, procedures, and 

requirements compliance; internal controls; and process effectiveness and efficiency. We

continue to examine NGA’s crisis and event response to national security and natural disasters, 

support of US Strategic Command mission requirements, corrective action implementation, and

compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010.

The Inspections Division examined NGA’s insider threat case management and the GeospatialIntelligence (GEOINT) Services programs and conducted two intelligence oversight inspections. 

The division identified $72.7 million in waste and questioned another $8.5 million in spending 

with respect to GEOINT Services. The team continues to evaluate NGA’s acquisition 

procedures. It announced new inspections of NGA’s Outposts and GEOINT Standards. The IG

no longer conducts intelligence oversight (IO) inspections, and realigned OIG resources to more 

compelling requirements. OIG continues to investigate reported questionable intelligence 

activities and may conduct periodic IO inspections as deemed necessary.

The Investigations Division closed 75 cases this period, substantiating 19 (25 percent) of its 

cases involving time and attendance fraud, computer misuse, security, and travel, and recovered 

$160,172. The division continues to work on several investigations of senior officials. The Fraud 

Analytics Support Team used data analytics to pursue potential fraud in contracts, government 

purchase and travel cards and to identify potential misconduct.

I appreciate the ongoing support from the Director, senior leadership, and NGA workforce.

Cardell K. Richardson, Sr.

Inspector General
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CONTENTS

Overview 1

Resources and Organization 1

Counsel to the Inspector General 2

Audit 3

Inspections 3

Investigations 4

Summaries of Audits 5

Completed 5

Ongoing 7

Summaries of Inspections 11

Completed 11

Ongoing 13

Summaries of Investigations 16

Judicial Actions and Prosecutions 16

Cases Involving Senior Government Officials

(Substantiated) 16

Cases Involving Senior Government Officials 

(Unsubstantiated) 17

Whistleblower 18

Time and Attendance Fraud 19

Contractor Labor Mischarging 20

Computer Misuse 20

Other Noteworthy Investigations 21

Criminal Investigations 21
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Fraud Analytics Support Team 21

Completed 21

Ongoing 22

New 22

Appendix A. Status of Audit and Inspection

Recommendations 24

Table A-1. Open and Closed OIG

Recommendations as of 31 March 2018 24

Table A-2. OIG Recommendations for 

Corrective Action, Current Reporting Period 30

Table A-3. Recommendations for Corrective

Action Not Yet Completed, Reporting Periods

Before 1 April 2018 45

Table A-4. Financial Results from Reports 

Issued During Reporting Period 49

Table A-5. Status of Recommendations 

That Questioned Costs 50

Table A-6. Status of Recommendations That 

Funds Be Put to Better Use 51

Table A-7. Management Decisions Regarding 

OIG Recommendations in Reports Issued Before 

1 October 2017 51

Statutory Reporting 52

Information or Assistance Refused by NGA 52

Significant Revised Management Decisions 52

OIG Disagreement with Significant 

Management Decision 52

Compliance with Federal Financial 

Management Improvement Act of 1996 52
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Attempts to Interfere with the 

IG’s Independence 52

Public Disclosure 53

Peer Reviews 53

Appendix B. Investigative Metrics 54

Table B-1. Number of Cases Referred for 

Criminal or Civil Prosecution, During Reporting 

Period 54

Table B-2. Judicial Actions, During Reporting

Period 54

Table B-3. Criminal Prosecutions and Referrals,

During Reporting Period 54

Appendix C. Index of Reporting Requirements 55

Appendix D. Abbreviations 56
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1

OVERVIEW

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) is a Department of Defense combat-support 

agency and a member of the Intelligence Community (IC). The Agency receives guidance and 

oversight from DoD, Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence, and Congress. NGA provides geospatial 

intelligence—GEOINT—that supports US national 

security and defense, as well as humanitarian assistance 

and disaster relief. 

The mission of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) is to 

conduct independent and objective audits, inspections, and 

investigations to strengthen the effectiveness, efficiency, 

and integrity of NGA programs and operations. 

We undertake and perform our assessments of NGA’s worldwide programs and operations in 

accordance with the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and in compliance with the 

standards of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Council of the Inspectors 

General on Integrity and Efficiency. 

The OIG also serves as the principal NGA agent responsible for investigating potential violations 

of law, rule, or regulation, as well as incidents of gross mismanagement, gross misconduct, abuse 

of authority, and denial of due process. In addition, the OIG performs the NGA external liaison 

function for federal, state, and local Inspectors General and Congressional overseers on IGrelated matters. The OIG is the liaison to external law enforcement agencies, such as the FBI.

RESOURCES AND ORGANIZATION

The OIG is authorized 60 billets, and as of 31 March 2019, 52 employees were on board. The 

OIG staff is allocated among three core divisions—Audit, Inspections, and Investigations—and a 

support function—the Plans and Programs Division. A Counsel reports directly to the IG.

The Inspector General addressed independence concerns about NGA’s career service personnel 

management system by developing the NGA Human Capital Management Framework signed by 

the Director and the Inspector General in September 2017. The IG Career Service (IGCS), 

established 1 October 2017, achieved initial operating capability in April 2018 with the 

assignment of a dedicated IGCS Manager and achieved full operating capability in
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November 2018 with the employment of one additional staff member. The IGCS manager led 

implementation of the NGA Human Capital Management Framework, thus satisfying concerns 

about IG independence.

The IGCS completed the inaugural IG Career Resource Guide to manage internal talent 

management processes, such as hiring, career development, assignments, and promotions, 

thereby helping to ensure OIG independence regarding human capital management. 

Additionally, the IGCS conducted an extensive analysis of career development programs and 

practices across IC IGs (NGA, DIA, NSA, and NRO). The objective: to leverage best practices 

used at other IC OIGs to improve career development opportunities for personnel assigned to the 

NGA OIG.

Figure. OIG Organization Chart

(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

COUNSEL TO THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

The Counsel to the Inspector General is an in-house legal asset. Counsel provides legal advice 

directly to the IG, and provides legal assistance to all OIG elements. Counsel also represents the 

OIG in litigation arising out of or affecting OIG operations, manages the OIG legislative and 

regulatory review, and reviews all plans, investigations, and final reports

Inspector General

Deputy 

Inspector General

(Vacant since 28 Oct 2018)

Assistant

Inspector General

for Audit

Assistant

Inspector General 

for Inspections

Assistant 

Inspector General

for Investigations

Fraud Analytics 

Support Team

Assistant Inspector 

General for Plans 

and Programs

(Chief of Staff)

IG Career Service 

Manager Counsel
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for legal sufficiency. On behalf of the IG and OIG, the Counsel liaises with, among others, DoD 

and IC counsels, DoD IG, federal and state prosecutors, NGA’s Office of General Counsel, and 

other NGA components. 

AUDIT

The Audit Division is responsible for providing 

independent oversight and objective audits of NGA’s 

programs and operations, and promoting the 

effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability of NGA 

programs and operations. Audits are conducted in 

accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards and the Inspector General Act of 

1978, as amended. Audit findings and 

recommendations seek to reduce costs; improve 

overall performance; and eliminate fraud, waste, and abuse. The recommendations resulting from 

the projects offer insight for management, help improve internal controls, and ensure compliance 

with laws, regulation, and policy. 

INSPECTIONS

The Inspections Division has responsibility for the evaluation, review, and analysis of NGA’s 

programs and activities, including authorities, policies, procedures, and controls. The division

provides independent assessment of the reliability of information, compliance with regulations 

and policies, management of resources, and achievement of program results. This division 

identified $8.5 million in questioned costs and $72.7 million in waste during this reporting 

period. The identified costs were the result of ineffective leadership and oversight, NGA making 

investments without customer requirements, and inadequate program oversight.

In October 2018, NGA established the Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted, which 

as a part of its mission, subsumed Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted. 

With the stand-up of the Redacted, the Agency now has a mechanism to perform routine 

intelligence oversight (IO) inspections. The DoD mandated that NGA OIG Inspections Division 

conduct IO inspections from 2007 to 2010. On 7 October 2010, the NGA OIG became statutory,

and IO inspections became discretionary. OIG continued to perform IO inspections although we 

were no longer required to, since the IO inspection program yielded tangible benefits to the 

Agency, and no other entity existed to ensure mission oversight and compliance. Since the 

standup of the Redacted, the IG decided to divest of conducting IO inspections and align these 

OIG resources to other requirements to increase value to the Agency and taxpayers. The NGA 

OIG will continue to investigate reported questionable intelligence activities (QIAs) and the IG 

may conduct periodic IO inspections as deemed necessary.
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INVESTIGATIONS

The Investigations Division conducts independent administrative and criminal investigations of 

complaints and other information of possible violations of criminal and civil law. The division is 

the principal NGA agent for investigating potential violations of rule or regulation, as well as 

incidents of gross mismanagement, gross misconduct, abuse of authority, and denial of due 

process.

The division also incorporates the Fraud Analytics Support Team (FAST), which conducts an 

agency-wide fraud detection program using data mining and forensic analyses tools. FAST also 

identifies policy violations and weaknesses in internal and management controls. Systemic 

findings are referred to the Inspections Division or Audit Division for further analysis and 

review. This division recovered $160,172 for the first half of FY2019 and substantiated 

25 percent of its cases for the reporting period. The funds recovered involve time and attendance 

fraud, contractor labor mischarging, and contractor self-disclosure cases.

The division is included in the GAO Whistleblower in the IC review, which includes a review of 

the DIA, NRO, CIA, IC IG, NSA, and NGA processes and procedures in handling whistleblower 

complaints. The GAO review is ongoing.
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SUMMARIES OF AUDITS

COMPLETED

FY2018 Evaluation of the NGA Pursuant to the Federal Information Security 

Modernization Act, Report Nos. OIGA 19-01 (External Report) and 19-02 (Internal 

Report), issued 25 October 2018

Overview. OIGA contracted KPMG LLP, an independent public accounting firm, to perform the 

FY2018 evaluation required by FISMA. The overall objectives of the evaluation were to 

determine whether NGA’s overall information security program and practices were consistent 

with FISMA requirements, responded to the IG FISMA reporting metrics issued by the 

Department of Homeland Security and required by the Intelligence Community Inspector 

General (IC IG), and to determine whether NGA implemented recommendations from the 

FY2017 assessment. The evaluation included a sample of seven systems for testing to support 

the IG metrics. Two reports were issued in relation to the evaluation. KPMG issued the external

report to the IC IG and provided the results of the reporting metrics, and issued the internal 

report to NGA management that included the detailed findings and recommendations.

Findings. KPMG issued 13 findings. The auditors found that NGA is making progress to 

strengthen its information security program; however, NGA does not consistently implement and 

enforce security policies and procedures in accordance with current requirements. Until NGA 

consistently and effectively implements and enforces security requirements at the enterprise and 

system level, the Agency will continue to risk the confidentiality, integrity, availability, 

nonrepudiation, and authentication of its data.

Results. KPMG issued 39 recommendations. KPMG will follow up on the findings and evaluate 

the adequacy of corrective actions taken when it performs the FY2019 evaluation.

Independent Auditors’ Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2018 and 2017, 

Report No. OIGA 19-03, issued 9 November 2018

Overview. OIGA contracted KPMG LLP, an independent public accounting 

firm, to audit NGA’s FY2018 financial statements. The objective was to 

provide an opinion on whether NGA’s financial statements were presented 

fairly, in all material respects, in accordance with US generally accepted 

accounting principles. KPMG also considered NGA’s internal control over 

financial reporting and performed tests to determine whether NGA complied 

with applicable provisions of laws, regulations, and contracts.
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Findings. For certain material account balances and disclosures, NGA was unable to provide 

sufficient appropriate audit evidence for, or make representations to the facts and circumstances 

that support them. In addition, KPMG reported seven material weaknesses in internal control 

related to the procurement process; property, plant, and equipment; manual journal entries; the 

fund balance with Treasury reconciliation process; advances from others and revenue; entitylevel controls; and key financial and supporting systems, as well as a significant deficiency 

related to insufficient documentation for certain payroll transactions. KPMG also reported that 

NGA did not fully comply with the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of 1982, and that 

NGA’s financial management systems did not substantially comply with federal financial 

management systems requirements, applicable federal accounting standards, and the United 

States Government Standard General Ledger at the transaction level, as required under Section 

803(a) of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996.

During the audit engagement, KPMG also identified nine internal control deficiencies that were 

not considered significant deficiencies or material weaknesses but were important enough to 

merit management’s attention. These deficiencies were communicated to management in the 

Independent Auditors’ Management Letter for the FY2018 Financial Statement Audit 

Engagement (Report No. OIGA 19-04, issued 21 December 2018).

Results. The audit engagement resulted in a disclaimer of opinion on NGA’s FY2018 and 

FY2017 financial statements, as KPMG was unable to obtain sufficient, appropriate audit 

evidence on which to base an opinion. KPMG issued 52 accompanying recommendations (43 

with the auditors’ report and nine with the management letter). KPMG will follow up on the 

findings and evaluate the adequacy of corrective actions taken when it performs the FY2019 

financial statement audit.

Audit of NGA’s Management of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 

Program, Report No. OIGA 19-05, issued 1 March 2019

Overview. The audit objective was to determine whether NGA effectively and efficiently 

managed the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) program. Specifically, 

we were to determine whether the NGA acquisition workforce (AWF) complied with the 

DAWIA core certification requirements for training, education, and experience.

Findings. NGA was not fully compliant with DAWIA requirements and had uncertified 

personnel performing acquisition duties. We also found NGA management did not Redacted 

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted 

Redacted Redacted Redacted. Noncompliance with DAWIA requirements increases the risk that 

NGA will not be able to provide and sustain an expert AWF to meet its acquisition needs to

fulfill its mission. In addition, AWF training, education, experience, and certification reporting to 

DoD and Congress may not be accurate. Since NGA’s Defense Acquisition Workforce 
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Development Fund (DAWDF) is dependent on the accuracy of the DAWIA data reported to 

DoD, NGA’s future DAWDF could be at risk.

Results. The report contains three recommendations to improve the management of the DAWIA 

program. The recommendations focus on improving procedures to enforce compliance with 

DAWIA laws and regulations, developing introductory training for AWF members, and 

developing an automated process to efficiently and effectively track DAWIA training and 

certification requirements.

Audit of NGA’s Geodesy Products, Memorandum S-061-19/OIG, issued 4 March 2019

Overview. The audit objective was to evaluate the Office of Geomatics’s (SFN) ability to achieve 

current and future mission requirements.

Findings. OIGA observed that SFN Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted 

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted 

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted.

Results. OIGA worked with SFN to develop a set of program metrics for each SFN division. 

However, since a system was not in place to collect metric data, SFN was unable to develop and 

provide information required for the project in a timely manner. Without the necessary SFN 

program management information to analyze, OIGA was unable to obtain sufficient and 

competent evidence required by Government Auditing Standards to perform the audit. As such, 

OIGA issued a memorandum that communicated our observations and terminated the audit.

ONGOING

Audit of NGA’s Analysis Event Response for National Security and Natural Disasters, 

Project No. 17-A08

Overview. The objective of this audit is to determine whether Analysis component-related crisis 

and event response plans are in place and are executed and managed effectively. Specifically, the 

audit will determine whether the execution and management of those plans facilitate 

coordination among stakeholders, standardization of procedures where practical, and reduction in 

duplication of efforts, and determine whether the plans efficiently allocate available resources. 

Status. OIGA announced the project in May 2017, and plans to issue a report in May 2019.
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Audit of NGA’s Support of US Strategic Command Mission Requirements, 

Project No. 17-A11 

Overview. NGA supports US Strategic Command (US STRATCOM) by satisfying requirements, 

including providing reliable navigation and planning charts. The objective of this audit is to 

determine whether NGA is satisfying US STRATCOM requirements effectively and efficiently. 

Status. OIGA announced the project in August 2017, and plans to issue a report in May 2019.

Audit of NGA’s Corrective Action Implementation, Project No. 18-A04 

Overview. The objective of this audit is to determine whether NGA is following up on 

recommendations effectively and efficiently to correct findings identified through external cyber 

security reviews. Specifically, this audit will focus on whether NGA is correcting deficiencies 

identified during the Defense Information Systems Agency Command Cyber Readiness 

Inspection and Cybersecurity Service Provider inspections. In addition, we will determine 

whether NGA is using these inspection results to correct enterprise-wide deficiencies and 

improve cyber security readiness throughout the Agency. 

Status. OIGA announced the project in February 2018 and plans to issue a report in May 2019.

Assessment of NGA Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery 

Act of 2010, Project No. 19-A02

Overview. The objective of our assessment is to determine whether NGA is complying with the 

Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 for FY2018. 

Status. OIGA announced the project in December 2018 and issued its report on 23 April 2019.

The report concluded that NGA was compliant with IPERA for FY2018.

Audit of NGA’s Permanent Duty Travel, Project No. 19-A03

U) Overview. The objective of this audit is to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of 

NGA’s permanent duty travel program. Specifically, the audit will determine whether NGA 

complied with applicable laws and regulations governing reimbursement for permanent duty 

travel. 

Status. OIGA announced the project in March 2019 and plans to issue a report in January 2020.
9

FY2019 Federal Information Security Modernization Act Evaluation of the NGA 

Information Security Program, Project No. 19-A04

Overview. OIG contracted KPMG LLP, an independent public accounting firm, to perform the 

FY2019 evaluation required by the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA). 

The overall objectives of the evaluation are to assess NGA’s information security program in 

accordance with the IG FISMA reporting metrics issued by the Department of Homeland 

Security and to determine whether NGA implemented recommendations from the FY2018

assessment. The evaluation will include a sample of seven systems for testing to support the IG 

metrics.

Status. OIGA announced the project in February 2019 and plans to issue the final external 

metrics results to OMB in October 2019 and the detailed internal report to NGA management in 

November 2019.

Audit of the NGA Financial Statements for FY2019, Project No. 19-A05

Overview. OIG contracted KPMG LLP, an independent public accounting firm, to audit NGA’s 

FY2019 financial statements. The audit objective is to determine whether NGA’s financial 

statements are presented fairly, in all material respects, in accordance with US generally 

accepted accounting principles. To meet requirements for federal financial statement audits, 

KPMG is also assessing internal control over financial reporting and performing tests to 

determine whether NGA complied with applicable provisions of laws, regulations, and contracts.

KPMG is following up on the status of management’s corrective actions to address the findings 

and recommendations communicated in the Independent Auditors’ Report on the NGA Financial 

Statements for FYs 2018 and 2017 (Report No. OIGA 19-03), and the Independent Auditors’ 

Management Letter for the FY2018 Financial Statement Audit (Report No. OIGA 19-04).

Status. OIGA announced the project in February 2019. KPMG’s report will be issued no later 

than 15 November 2019. If necessary, a management letter will be issued by 31 December 2019. 
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Audit of NGA’s Funds Reprogramming Activity, Project No. 19-A07

Overview. OIG contracted KPMG LLP, an independent public accounting firm, to audit NGA’s 

funds reprogramming activity in conjunction with KPMG’s audit of NGA’s FY2019 financial 

statements. The audit objectives are to (1) assess NGA’s funds reprogramming activity for gaps 

in compliance with applicable laws, regulations, policies, and procedures; and (2) provide 

information on the root cause of reprogramming activity. 

Status. OIGA announced the project in February 2019. KPMG’s report is expected to be issued 

in September 2019.
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SUMMARIES OF INSPECTIONS

COMPLETED

Inspection of NGA’s Insider Threat Program Case Management, Report No. 

OIGE-19-01, issued February 2019

Overview. Executive Order 13587 directed structural reforms to improve the security of 

classified networks and the responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified information. In 

November 2012, the President issued the National Insider Threat Policy, which required agencies 

to implement an insider threat program within 180 days. OIG published a report in February 

2016 that assessed NGA’s compliance with executive branch, DoD, and IC requirements. The 

purpose of this inspection, announced in February 2017, was to evaluate NGA’s protection of 

employees’ civil liberties and the status of progress in following minimum required standards. 

The overall objective of the inspection was to assess the processes and procedures that the NGA 

Insider Threat Program uses to manage cases and comply with statute and DoD and IC policy.

Findings. Three findings detailed that (1) the Agency’s insider threat policies and procedures are 

not sufficient to ensure effective case management; (2) the insider threat program needs to 

improve heightened monitoring processes, coordination with privacy and civil liberties officials, 

and documentation of legal advice and concurrence on policies and operations to ensure privacy 

and civil liberties protections; and (3) the program does not comply with established policies and 

procedures in the oversight of audit logs and account management. We found that NGA’s insider 

threat policies and investigative operations are not aligned and their case management operations 

lack consistency. Process improvements are needed to minimize the risk of privacy and civil 

liberties violations against employees and ensure compliance with applicable laws. Specifically, 

NGA employees remain in heightened collection status beyond the approved date of termination. 

Furthermore, the Insider Threat Office does not coordinate with the privacy and civil liberties 

program office regarding developing and implementing insider threat processes and procedures, 

and coordination with the Office of General Counsel is largely informal.

Results. We made 10 recommendations designed to improve the NGA Insider Threat Program 

with respect to case management. The recommended improvements focused on consistent 

operations in executing data triage, analysis and follow-on actions, privacy and civil liberties 

protections, and more effective management oversight mechanisms.
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Inspection of GEOINT Services Initiative, Report No. OIGE-19-02, issued February 2019

Overview. The GEOINT Services initiative is NGA’s delivery of geospatial content and analytics 

through a cloud-based architecture. GEOINT services are web-based tools and data that allow 

customers to discover, access, exploit, and contribute geospatial capabilities, datasets, and best 

practices. During her tenure as NGA Deputy Director, The Honorable Sue Gordon stated,

“GEOINT Services isn’t an abstraction or an architecture, it’s about exposing what we know in a 

way that can be used by people who need it to do their job.” This inspection focused on NGA’s 

planning and implementation of the GEOINT Services initiative from a holistic agency 

perspective and as an IC service of common concern. The overall objective of the inspection was

to assess GEOINT Services implementation against customer requirements; agency goals, plans, 

and milestones; assigned responsibilities; and return on investment. The inspectors reviewed

policies relating to oversight guidance regarding Geospatial Platform as a Service (GPaaS) and 

the agency’s implementing guidance. In addition, we reviewed the management of the effort, 

including the requirements process, overlap with other portfolios and programs, and the 

budgetary effectiveness and efficiency of the program.

Findings. We found $72.7 million in waste and questioned another $8.5 million in spending. 

Four findings detailed the following: (1) GEOINT Services lacked effective leadership oversight 

and business management, resulting in $41 million in waste. NGA instilled a culture that valued 

continued research over fielding an operational deliverable and managed the initiative without 

enforcing rigor and standards. (2) NGA made investments without customer requirements and

without adequate program oversight, resulting in $31.7 million in waste and $8.5 million in 

questioned costs. (3) GEOINT Services demonstrated both time and cost savings by enabling the 

development and deployment of capabilities on the PaaS. GEOINT Services demonstrated

efficiencies and time savings in the development of the initiative’s PaaS. Also, the PaaS has 

enabled the modernization of antiquated processes, and (4) NGA fulfilled the intent of the 2014 

DNI GPaaS memorandum, but failed to finalize a memorandum of understanding with the Office 

of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and did not incorporate past efforts that could 

have made GEOINT Services more efficient.

Results. We made 10 recommendations to improve NGA’s implementation of GEOINT 

Services. The recommendations focus on addressing found waste and questioned costs by 

aligning the initiative with NGA’s requirements process, instituting additional contract oversight, 

and establishing a customer metrics solution to measure return on investment. We also 

recommend that the initiative comply with records management programs, DNI instructions, and 

DoD policies as detailed in the report.
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Intelligence Oversight Inspections

Overview. OIG provided oversight of NGA’s Intelligence Oversight Program. OIG conducted

intelligence oversight (IO) inspections of NGA offices to 

determine compliance with applicable policies and procedures. 

OIG also assessed whether personnel were familiar with 

procedures for recognizing and reporting questionable 

intelligence activities (QIAs) and significant or highly 

sensitive (S/HS) matters.

During the reporting period, we completed two IO inspections

involving the following components:

• NGA Operations Center, Report No. OIGE-IO-18-01, issued December 2018

• NGA Support Team to US Indo-Pacific Command, Report No. OIGE-IO-18-02, issued 

March 2019.

Findings and Results. We found no deficiencies rising to the level of a QIA or S/HSM and, in 

most cases, found employee knowledge, training, and program execution to be compliant with 

Agency and DoD guidance. In report OIGE-IO-19-02, we had one finding and made two

recommendations to assess whether NGA’s Intelligence Oversight training requirement was 

duplicative and properly enumerated in DoD policy.

The IG divested the OIG of the responsibility to conduct IOinspections and aligned these OIG 

resources to other requirements to increase value to the Agency and taxpayers. The OIG will 

continue to investigate reported QIAs and the IG may conduct periodic IO inspections as deemed 

necessary.

ONGOING

Inspection of NGA’s Acquisition Processes and Procedures (Phase III), 

Project No. II-18-02

Overview. This inspection is the third, and final, in a series of acquisition-function inspections. 

Since the NGA acquisition function is large and complex, a single comprehensive inspection 

would have taken too long. Some of the information could become outdated before the end of the 

inspection. Therefore, to provide the most relevant and timely assistance to NGA senior 

management, the inspection was divided into three phases, generally based on a 
14

framework established by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB). The overall objective of the inspection is to assess NGA’s 

acquisition policies and processes to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency’s 

acquisition program management and compliance with oversight requirements. 

Status. The final report is planned for publication in September 2019.

Inspection of Aeronautical Safety of Navigation, Project No. QL-18-02

Overview. NGA’s Source component supports DoD and civilian air safety of navigation 

worldwide with regularly updated paper and digital charts of the world’s airways and oceans, 

and publications of its runways. Through the science of geomatics, NGA can precisely georeference where things are on the earth. This inspection continues our evaluations of NGA’s 

safety of navigation missions but focuses on aeronautical vs. maritime as previous reports did. 

The overall objective of this inspection is to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the NGA 

Aeronautical Navigation mission.

Status. The final report is planned for publication in May 2019. 

Inspection of NGA’s Outposts, Project No. QL-19-01

Overview. The NGA Office of Ventures and Innovation has the strategic planning responsibility 

over the acquisition of systems and technology that advances a national leadership role in the 

imagery, imagery analysis, and geospatial information community. As part of the Office of 

Ventures and Innovation, NGA's Outposts create a presence at the point of origin for new 

technology to innovate and develop new solutions for NGA's current and future challenges. The 

Outposts (Silicon Valley, California, and Austin, Texas) state that they elicit, compile, and assess 

NGA technology requirements to enable cooperation and collaboration, and to develop a shared 

strategic vision with partners in industry and academia. They also assess commercial 

technologies against identified problem sets, for potential NGA investment. The Outposts team 

has also focused on fostering relationships with the academic community. The overall objective 

of the inspection is to evaluate the effectiveness of the NGA Outposts with respect to return on 

investment. 

Status. The final report is planned for publication in July 2019

Inspection of GEOINT Standards, Project No. II-19-01

Overview. NGA Director, as Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) Functional Manager (GFM), 

established the NSG GFM Standards Assessment program, which defines and implements NSG 

methods and processes to assess and assert information technology (IT) and National Security 

Systems (NSS) conformance with GEOINT data and service standards within the DoD and the

IC. During our 2019 annual planning process, we learned of potential negative impact resulting 

from NGA Career Services manpower initiatives and constrained contract funding for the 

GEOINT Standards program. Management raised concerns that the Career Services’ initiatives 
15

created a critical shortfall in qualified cadre to carry out its mission. In addition, we learned of 

concerns that possible reductions to the GEOINT standards-related contract funding may have 

negatively affected the mission. The overall objective of the inspection is to assess whether the 

GEOINT Standards program is organized, staffed, and resourced to fulfill its GFM 

responsibilities effectively.

Status. The final report is planned for publication in October 2019
16

SUMMARIES OF INVESTIGATIONS

The Investigations Division (OIGI) closed 75 cases during the reporting 

period; 19 were substantiated, or 25 percent of its cases for the reporting 

period. The division opened 72 cases and has 75 ongoing investigations.

JUDICIAL ACTIONS AND PROSECUTIONS

OIGI did not have any judicial actions during the reporting period. One case that has been 

reported in previous periods for federal prosecution to the United States Attorney’s Office for the 

Eastern District of Missouri involving contractor labor mischarging is pending.

CASES INVOLVING SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

(SUBSTANTIATED)

OIGI conducted six investigations of senior officials that resulted in substantiated allegations, 

which are summarized below. OIGI has 11 pending investigations on senior officials.

We provided the DoD OIG the required notification of these allegations and cases.

OIG Cases No. 17-071 and 17-084, closed January 2019

In two related cases, the OIGI investigated allegations that two senior managers retaliated against 

two employees: one for reporting sexual harassment and simple assault and one for reporting 

harassment. The OIG investigation substantiated the allegations that both senior officials 

retaliated against the employees. The senior officials were charged with “Failure to Follow 

Agency Policies and Procedures.” One senior official received a Letter of Reprimand; the other 

received a Letter of Caution. 

OIG Case No. 18-043, closed October 2018

The OIGI obtained information that an NGA Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service 

manager misused NGA computer systems by searching for, viewing, and storing inappropriate 

and sexually oriented material. The OIG investigation substantiated the allegation. The manager 

received a Letter of Reprimand from the former NGA director.
17

OIG Case No. 18-124, closed December 2018

The OIGI received a complaint that a senior manager treated employees disrespectfully and 

created a hostile work environment. The details of the complaint were referred to management 

for review and action. A management inquiry substantiated that the manager had created a 

hostile work environment. The senior manager was counseled regarding the manager’s 

communication style. 

OIG Case No. 18-125, closed January 2019

The OIGI received a complaint that an NGA component director created a hostile work 

environment and treated employees disrespectfully. A management inquiry was conducted to 

address the allegations. The inquiry substantiated the allegations that the director had created a 

hostile work environment and treated employees disrespectfully. The director received a Letter 

of Reprimand and a Letter of Requirements that mandated remedial training.

OIG Case No. 19-004, closed December 2018

The OIGI investigated allegations that a senior military officer at NGA created a hostile work 

environment and displayed a toxic leadership style. OIGI referred this matter to the officer’s 

management, who counseled the officer regarding the officer’s leadership style. OIGI also 

addressed the complainant’s reprisal allegation about the officer, which was not substantiated.

CASES INVOLVING SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 

(UNSUBSTANTIATED)

OIGI conducted eight investigations of senior officials in which allegations were not 

substantiated. The cases are summarized below. 

We provided the DoD OIG required notification of these allegations and cases.

OIG Case No. 17-087, closed February 2019

A senior government official retaliated against a subordinate employee; not substantiated.

OIG Case No. 18-032, closed January 2019

A senior government official misused position and wasted government funds; not substantiated.

.
18

OIG Case No. 18-078, closed January 2019

A senior government official denied due process; not substantiated.

OIG Case No. 18-079, closed January 2019

A senior government official denied due process; not substantiated.

OIG Case No. 18-094, closed November 2018

A senior government official committed acts that violated the Procurement Integrity Act; not 

substantiated.

OIG Case No. 19-012, closed March 2019

Senior government officials retaliated against a subordinate employee; not substantiated.

OIG Case No. 19-053, closed February 2019

A senior government official misused position and showed favoritism to a subordinate employee; 

not substantiated.

WHISTLEBLOWER RETALIATION

In addition to the whistleblower retaliation cases cited in cases involving senior officials, the 

OIG closed three whistleblower retaliation cases, which are summarized below.

OIG Case No. 18-103, closed February 2019

OIGI investigated allegations that NGA management retaliated against an employee, who no 

longer worked at NGA, for reporting fraud and waste in a leadership-training program while 

attending leadership training. The OIGI concluded that NGA management did not retaliate 

against the employee for making a protected communication. These findings were reported to the 

employee in writing. 

OIG Case No. 18-113, closed March 2019

OIGI investigated an allegation of retaliation against a Pay Band 4 analyst by a supervisor for 

reporting management issues to the NGA Ombudsman. The analyst received a Letter of 

Reprimand (LoR) for discourtesy, disrespectful conduct, and creating a disturbance. OIGI 

obtained documents that supported issuance of the LoR and, based on the timeline of events that 

OIGI produced, determined that a prima facie reprisal case did not exist. These findings were 

reported to the analyst.
19

OIG Case No. 18-131, closed February 2019

OIGI investigated allegations that Pay Band 5 supervisors retaliated against a subordinate 

employee for filing an EEO complaint by changing the employee’s position and duties. OIGI 

determined that the employee filed a complaint with NGA Office of Diversity, Inclusion, and 

Equal Employment Opportunity (ODE) that included the employee’s reprisal allegations. OIGI 

personnel advised the complainant that OIGI would not conduct an investigation of the same 

reprisal allegations that were being addressed in the EEO complaint, and that the complainant 

could return to the OIGI after the EEO complaint process concluded if there were still issues that 

should be addressed by OIGI.

TIME AND ATTENDANCE FRAUD

The OIGI conducted fewer time and attendance fraud investigations during this period than in 

the previous six-month period; however, the investigations accomplished were significant and 

resulted in the recovery of funds totaling $160,172 for time claimed for work not performed. The 

division continued to send many of the less substantial issues to management for corrective 

action, which also resulted in the recovery of $3,655. The following are summaries of three time 

and attendance fraud investigations that resulted in the terminations of employment, a 

suspension, and the recovery of funds totaling $156,517.

OIG Case No. 16-095, closed March 2019 

An OIGI proactive analysis of time and attendance reporting 

disclosed that a Pay Band 4 systems engineer misused NGA 

computer systems and committed time and attendance fraud. The 

investigation found that the systems engineer used NGA 

computer systems to conduct extensive personal business during 

work hours, falsely claimed 1,941 hours, valued at $134,468, that 

the employee did not work, falsified various official government 

forms, and made false statements. The employee resigned from 

NGA, effective 31 January 2019. Actions were taken to revoke 

the employee’s security clearance and to recover the value of the falsely claimed hours. The 

appropriate criminal referrals were made. 

OIG Case No. 17-083, closed October 2018 

OIGI received an allegation that a Pay Band 3 analyst was not accurately accounting for the 

hours worked. The analysis of time and attendance data showed that the analyst claimed 147 

hours, valued at $7,263, that were not worked. The analyst received a 14-day suspension without 

pay. NGA initiated action to recover $6,225, the value of the hours that were determined to be 

falsely reported, after the analyst was able to account for some additional hours worked.
20

OIG Case No. 18-023, closed January 2019 

OIGI investigated allegations that a Pay Band 4 staff officer committed time and attendance 

fraud when the staff officer used military leave on civilian timesheets and claimed reserve duty 

training credit by submitting Department of Army (DA) Form 1380, Record of Individual 

Performance of Reserve Duty Training, for duty that the staff officer did not perform. The 

investigation substantiated the allegations and developed evidence that the officer submitted 

false claims by knowingly and willfully submitting 17 claims for duty that the officer did not 

perform. The officer accrued 248 points that counted toward US Army Reserve retirement 

benefits. To perpetrate the fraud, the officer also used 258 hours of leave, valued at $15,824,

from the military leave bank. The officer conspired with another NGA employee, who is also a 

retired Army Reserve officer, to fraudulently sign the DA Form 1380 and numerous Officer 

Evaluation Reports to facilitate the fraud. The staff officer was terminated from NGA and 

required to reimburse the government for the hours that the officer recorded and received 

compensation but was absent from work. The co-conspirator received a letter of reprimand. The 

NGA OIG report of investigation was forwarded to the Department of Army Inspector General 

for any action it deemed appropriate. 

CONTRACTOR LABOR MISCHARGING

OIGI continued to address issues of contractor labor mischarging through outreach efforts with 

industry and a fraud survey provided to the NGA workforce. After evaluating the survey results, 

OIGI made improvements to the survey. OIGI continues to work one labor mischarging case in 

coordination with the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) and the Department of 

Justice (DOJ). OIGI has also received some contractor self-disclosure letters from NGA 

contractors. Recovery of funds on these disclosures is in process.

COMPUTER MISUSE

OIGI investigated acts of computer misuse by contractor and government personnel at NGA. The 

following are case summaries of two investigations of contractor 

employees using NGA computer systems excessively for personal 

use. Additional computer misuse cases are pending actions that will 

address the misuse. 

OIG Case No. 18-059, closed December 2018

OIGI investigated an allegation that a contractor employee was operating a personal business on 

government time and using NGA computer systems. After reporting evidence of this activity to 

the NGA Office of Contract Services and the contracting officer, OIGI was advised that the 

employee was terminated by his employer and that OCS reminded the NGA contracting 

company that NGA systems and time must be used for NGA business.
21

OIG Case No. 18-088, closed October 2018 

OIGI investigated an allegation that a deployed contractor employee repeatedly used NGA 

computer systems to support personal activities, not related to the employee’s NGA duties. The 

employee received counseling and was required to complete refresher training on cybersecurity 

and NGA's IT Acceptable Use Policy. 

OTHER NOTEWORTHY INVESTIGATIONS

OIGI has no noteworthy investigations to report for this reporting period.

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

During this period, OIGI worked on 10 investigations with the DCIS, other criminal 

investigative agencies, and DoJ attorneys. The issues included false claims, cost mischarging, 

conflict of interest, theft of government equipment, threats to Federal employees, and tax fraud.

FRAUD ANALYTICS SUPPORT TEAM 

The NGA OIG Fraud Analytics Support Team (FAST) performs two missions: (1) detect fraud, 

waste, and abuse through data analytics and (2) provide forensic analysis support to the Audits, 

Inspections, and Investigations divisions. FAST provides the basis for restitution and recovery of 

dollars lost due to fraud, waste, and abuse so that corrective actions can be taken to improve 

efficiency and cost effectiveness of NGA’s programs and operations. FAST is outsmarting fraud, 

waste, and abuse through data science.

COMPLETED

Government Travel Charge Card Analytics, Project No. F18-004

FAST reviewed Redacted transactions and found that Redacted NGA employees used travel 

cards to make $Redacted in purchases and obtain $Redacted in cash advances. FAST determined 

that 99.9% of NGA’s Government Travel Charge Card holders used their cards in accordance 

with NGA regulations and guidance.

The FAST review identified three NGA employees who misused their GTCCs, with costs of 

misuse ranging from $3,212 to more than $7,388. FAST referred these three misuse cases to 

management for action and to NGA’s Government Travel Charge Card Team for remedial 

action. OIG regularly reviews questionable GTCC transactions.
22

Proactive Military Time and Attendance Analysis, Project No. F19-001

NGA’s Office of the Director requested assistance with a manpower study of all military 

personnel at NGA. FAST used the Proactive Time and Attendance and Labor Mischarge

(PTALM) model and matched the names of the military members from PeopleSoft to identify 

potential abusers. The primary objective of the PTALM project is to detect false claims, and its 

secondary objective is to deter future false claims against the government. The analysis identified 

three military members with a significant shortfall for the previous 12-month period, and OIG 

referred them to management. Management chose not to pursue further because of the military 

members’ job duties and responsibilities requiring fieldwork outside of NGA facilities. The 

project was completed in January 2019.

ONGOING

Proactive Payroll Fraud Detection Model, Project No. F18-002

FAST reviewed NGA Payroll and developed a model that uses algorithms to detect NGA 

employees that are considered to be high risk for payroll fraud. The model resulted in the 

independent detection of an instance of potential nepotism and a potential conflict of interest. 

Additionally, the OIG model identified one instance of a deceased employee who passed in May 

2018 whose pay status was still active in August 2018. No fraud was found because DFAS and 

NGA Financial Management were settling the leave balance owed. No true instances of payroll 

fraud were found, and the model validated that the separation of duties and controls in place are 

sufficient to mitigate payroll fraud, such as ghost employees, at NGA. 

NEW

Resume Scoring Model, Project No. F19-002

NGA OIG developed a tool to automatically parse unstructured data from NGA resumes and 

promotion packages and rank them based on a customizable list of keywords through text 

analytics, natural language processing, and statistical analysis. This tool reduced the initial 

resume review process from 20 man-hours to approximately 30 minutes. 

Automated Document Highlighter, Project No. F19-003

NGA OIG developed an automated highlighting tool that aided in the review of a large number 

of resumes and promotion packages against a list of key words establishing the criteria for 

promotion. The script successfully ran through a customizable list of 114 key words in over 900 

pages of promotion packet materials in a matter of a few minutes. This reduced the manual 

review by 95 percent, allowing the reviewer to focus on context and content.
23

Government Purchase Card Analytics, Project No. F19-004

The US Government uses purchase cards as a financial management tool to purchase goods and 

services, reduce transaction costs, and provide an auditable electronic history of transactions to 

identify areas to further improve efficiencies and reduce waste, fraud, or abuse. The NGA OIG is 

conducting a forensic review of NGA’s Government Purchase Card (GPC) transactions for 

FY2018. We are analyzing Redacted transactions for instances of fraud, waste, or abuse. In 

previous reviews, FAST determined that the GPC program could strengthen internal controls to 

reduce the number of Split Payments (known requirements split solely to keep them under the 

micro-purchase threshold).

OIG Contract Fraud Survey, Project No. F19-005

The NGA OIG has developed an online survey tool that allows NGA employees to report 

potential contract fraud anonymously. The goal of this project is to detect fraudulent activities 

with the aid of NGA employee input and enable OIG to take necessary action to neutralize or 

mitigate fraud schemes once detected. Additionally, the OIG Contract Fraud Survey aims to 

increase fraud awareness among NGA personnel and leadership, improve the prosecution referral 

rate for cases involving criminal activity, and enhance NGA OIG proficiency and knowledge in 

procurement fraud investigations. The OIG Contract Fraud Survey is conducted semiannually. 

OIG received 61 survey replies for the period 1 October 2018 to 31 March 2019.

Proactive Contract Fraud Detection Model, Project No. F19-006

Contracts pose one of the highest risks for fraud at NGA. In response, FAST initiated a review of 

NGA contracts. The objective of this project is to identify high-risk contracts based on risk 

rankings derived from available data and outlier detection methods. Given that a majority of the 

contract data should not be fraudulent, the goal is to find the outliers in the data and identify 

contracts with potential fraud, waste, and abuse. High-risk contracts identified in the project will 

be referred to investigations or the audit division for further review. Completion of the Proactive 

Contract Fraud Detection Model is projected for October 2019. 

Proactive Time and Attendance and Labor Mischarge Model, Project No. F19-007

The NGA OIG determined that a large number of investigative cases involve employee time and 

attendance or contractor labor mischarges. The primary objective of the Proactive Time and 

Attendance and Labor Mischarge (PTALM) project is to detect false claims, and its secondary 

objective is to deter future false claims against the government. The model’s overall objective is 

to detect and deter time and attendance and contractor labor mischarges. Completion of the 

PTALM project is projected for October 2019.
24

APPENDIX A. STATUS OF AUDIT AND INSPECTION 

RECOMMENDATIONS

This appendix includes seven tables that present the status of recommendations according to 

various parameters.

Table A-1. Open and Closed OIG Recommendations as of 31 March 2019

This table provides the number of NGA OIG and DoD OIG audit and inspection 

recommendations issued to NGA management that were closed or remained open at the end of 

the reporting period. This table does not include recommendations from the Financial Statement 

Audit (52 open) and FISMA evaluation (39 open). Recommendations that closed prior to 

1 October 2018 are not included.

Recommendations

Report Title, Number, Date No. Closed No. Open

Audit of NGA’s Use of Administrative Leave, Report No. OIGA 

16-08, May 2016 0 1

Objective: To determine whether NGA policies and procedures ensured the proper use of administrative 

leave. 

Observations on NGA Purchases of Passenger Motor Vehicles, 

Report No. OIGA 16-11, September 2016 0 1

Objectives: Observations identified during a formal investigation to determine whether NGA violated the 

Antideficiency Act (ADA) when it purchased two canine vehicles in FY2013 using the Operation and 

Maintenance appropriation. While NGA did not violate the ADA when it purchased the vehicles, certain 

matters were of sufficient importance to communicate to management.

Audit of Foreign Travel, Report No. OIGA 16-13, September 

2016 0 1

Objective: To determine whether management of foreign temporary duty (TDY) travel was effective and 

efficient. Specifically, the OIG determined whether NGA travelers and approving officials complied with 

applicable laws and regulations governing reimbursement for foreign TDY travel.

Audit of NGA’s Disposal of Electronic Waste, Report 

No. OIGA17-06, March 2017 0 4

Objective: To determine whether NGA sanitized and disposed of e-waste in accordance with IC, DoD, 

and NGA policies and procedures. 

Audit of NGA’s Information Assurance Certification Program, 

Report No. OIGA17-09, June 2017 0 1
25

Recommendations

Report Title, Number, Date No. Closed No. Open

Objective: To determine whether the NGA workforce performing information assurance functions have 

met appropriate certification requirements in accordance with DoD and NGA policies and procedures.

Audit of NGA’s Oversight of Contractor Performance and 

Contract Payments, Report No. OIGA17-11, September 2017 2 0

Objective: To assess the effectiveness of oversight of contractor performance and payment, specifically, 

to determine, for contracts, whether (1) contractor officers’ representatives (CORs) and technical 

monitors were properly appointed in accordance with applicable policy; (2) an appropriate oversight plan 

was established; (3) CORs are reviewing contractor work on a timely basis and in accordance with the 

oversight plan; and (4) contract payments are adequately supported.

Audit of NGA’s Management of the Acquisition of the 

Consolidated Foundation Production Environment (CFPE), 

Report No. OIGA18-03, November 2017

1 0

Objective: To determine whether NGA effectively identified requirements and provided adequate contract 

and program oversight for the acquisition of the CFPE.

Audit of NGA’s Management of the Personnel Separation 

Process, Report No. OIGA18-05, April 2018 0 1

Objective: To determine whether NGA management implemented policies and procedures designed to 

provide reasonable assurance that logical and physical access to government information was secure from 

personnel who separated from NGA.

Audit of NGA’s Security Financial Disclosure Program, Report 

No. OIGA18-06, July 2018 0 8

Objective: To determine whether the NGA Security Financial Disclosure Program is effectively managed 

in accordance with applicable federal, DoD, and NGA policy and guidance.

Audit of NGA’s Personnel Security Clearance Process, Report 

No. OIGA18-07, August 2018 0 11

Objective: Part 1: To determine whether NGA has a consistent and effective risk-based approach to 

onboarding NGA employees and contractors who require background investigations, including controls 

for mitigating risk associated with onboarding prior to the full completion of background investigations. 

Part 2: To determine whether NGA has a backlog of background investigations, the reasons for the 

backlog, and the actions taken to reduce the backlog and improve the timeliness of background 

investigations.
26

Audit of NGA’s Management of the Defense Acquisition 

Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Program, Report No. 

OIGA19-05, March 2019

0 3

Objective: To determine whether NGA effectively and efficiently managed the DAWIA Program.

Inspection of the NGA Privacy Program and Privacy Protection 

Management, Report No. OIGE 15-01, November 2014 0 2

Objectives: To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of NGA’s Privacy Program, processes, and 

procedures. Specifically, we assessed (1) whether the Privacy Program was effectively organized, staffed, 

and trained to fulfill its responsibilities; (2) the risk of a privacy breach and existing mitigation efforts; (3) 

key factors in promoting and hindering the effective exercise of privacy protections; and (4) the 

completeness of required agency privacy documentation.

Inspection of NGA’s Acquisition Function, Phase I: 

Organizational Alignment and Leadership, Report No. OIGE 

16-02, November 2015

1 0

Objectives: To determine whether NGA developed and implemented the necessary governance structure, 

oversight, and review processes, as outlined in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) assessment 

guidelines, for entity-level reviews of the acquisition functions. The sub-objectives were to (1) determine 

whether NGA’s acquisition function is aligned with agency mission and needs; (2) evaluate the level of 

NGA leadership commitment; and (3) determine whether NGA’s defense acquisition management review 

and oversight processes are sufficient. 

Inspection of NGA’s Acquisition Function, Phase II: Human 

Capital, Report No. OIGE 16-03, November 2015 0 1

Objectives: To review NGA’s acquisition human capital policies and practices to evaluate whether NGA 

has developed and maintained a fully proficient acquisition workforce that is flexible and highly skilled 

across a range of management, technical, and business disciplines as outlined in OMB’s assessment 

guide. The sub-objectives were to determine (1) whether NGA is conducting effective strategic human 

capital planning and (2) whether NGA is effectively and efficiently acquiring, developing, and retaining 

acquisition talent.

Inspection of the CURATOR Program, Report No. OIGE 16-04, 

February 2016 0 3

Objectives: To determine compliance with its statement of capabilities. 
27

Review of the NGA Insider Threat Program, Report No. OIGE 

16-05, February 2016 0 2

Objectives: To determine whether NGA’s Insider Threat Program complies with executive branch, DoD, 

and IC requirements. The sub-objectives were aligned with the following six minimum standards 

established by the National Insider Threat Policy: (1) designation of senior official(s) and associated 

responsibilities; (2) information integration, analysis, and response; (3) insider-threat program personnel; 

(4) access the information; (5) monitoring user activity on networks; and (6) employee training and 

awareness. 

Review of NGA Safety of Navigation, Notice to Mariners, 

Report No. OIGE 16-06, May 2016 0 1

Objective: To assess the magnitude, primary causes, and impact of the backlog within NGA’s Safety of 

Navigation, Notice to Mariners Program.

Inspection of NGA’s Office of Small Business Programs, Report 

No. OIGE 16-07, June 2016 1 0

Objective: To assess the effectiveness of the NGA Office of Small Business Programs, as well as 

compliance with IC, DoD, and federal policies and directives.

Inspection of NGA Imagery Analyst Tradecraft Training, 

Report No. OIGE 17-02, February 2017 0 3

Objectives: To determine the extent to which NGA is training its IAs to exploit imagery by taking 

advantage of the full spectrum of geospatial phenomenologies and making use of traditional and 

nontraditional sources. Subobjectives were to (1) determine the extent to which IAs have been trained to 

exploit full-spectrum GEOINT; (2) determine the extent to which IAs are trained to the same tradecraft 

standards; and (3) assess the mechanisms by which new IA tradecraft content, regardless of origin, is 

integrated into NGA College learning solutions and curricula.

Inspection of InnoVision’s Research and Development and 

Technology Transition Outcomes, Report No. OIGE 17-03, 

March 2017

0 1

Objectives: To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the processes by which InnoVision selects and 

transitions new products, processes, and services to the agency. Subobjectives of this inspection were to 

(1) identify the R&D programs/projects InnoVision has been pursuing over the last 5 years; (2) for each 

of the above programs/projects, identify its source and the reason it was chosen; and (3) for each 

program/project, determine the outcome. (Was the project transitioned, did it enhance the mission, what 

capabilities were delivered, etc.?)
28

Inspection of NGA’s Strategic Workforce Planning Function, 

Report No. OIGE 17-04, June 2017 2 2

Objective: To assess the effectiveness of NGA’s strategic workforce planning function in meeting the 

requirement to have a future workforce that is capable of supporting DoD and IC missions. Consistent 

with Title 10, US Code, and DoD Instruction, the OIG used stages of the Office of Personnel 

Management’s workforce planning model as the baseline for the assessment and issued five subobjectives: (1) assess strategic direction; (2) assess effectiveness of workforce and skills-gap analysis; (3) 

assess action plan(s); (4) assess implementation of action plan(s); and (5) assess the effectiveness of 

monitoring, evaluation, and revision.

Inspection of Structured Observation Management (SOM), 

Report No. OIGE 18-01, November 2017 0 3

Objective: To assess SOM implementation against oversight requirements, agency plans and goals, 

milestones, and customer requirements. Sub-objectives of the inspection were: (1) determine the extent to 

which SOM has been implemented against the agency’s established plan; (b) determine if SOM is 

meeting customer needs; and (c) assess the implementation of the program with respect to established 

standards.

Inspection of NGA’s Office of Counterintelligence, Report 

No. OIGE 18-02, November 2017 3 3

Objective: To determine whether NGA’s counterintelligence program complies with DoD and IC policies 

and standards. The inspection also assessed the effectiveness, efficiency, and execution of 

counterintelligence processes and activities. Sub-objectives of the inspection were to: (1) determine 

whether the Office of Counterintelligence programs and activities comply with DoD and IC policies and 

standards; (b) assess the Office of Counterintelligence program and organizational structure; and (c) 

assess the Office of Counterintelligence for effectiveness and efficiency.

Inspection of NGA’s Medical Services, Report No. OIGE 18-05, 

August 2018 2 11

Objective: To assess the effectiveness, efficiency, and compliance with oversight requirements of NGA’s 

medical services, including the deployer program, during the period of 2014 to 2017.

Inspection of NGA’s Insider Threat Program Case 

Management, Report No. OIGE 19-01, February 2019 0 10

Objective: To assess the NGA Insider Threat Program's processes and procedures used for managing 

cases and complying with applicable laws, DoD, and IC policies.
29

Inspection of NGA’s GEOINT Services Initiative, Report No. 

OIGE 19-02, February 2019 0 10

Objective: To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the implementation of GEOINT Services against 

IC requirements; agency objectives, plans, and milestones; and assigned responsibilities. Specific subobjectives of the inspection were to determine the extent to which GEOINT Services: (1) has been 

implemented effectively and efficiently and (2) has fulfilled NGA's designated responsibilities of GPaaS

effectively and efficiently.

Intelligence Oversight Inspection of the NGA Support Team to 

US Indo-Pacific Command, Report No. OIGE IO-19-02, March 

2019

0 2

Objective: To determine whether the NGA organization is compliant with IO policies and procedures and 

to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of NGA’s overall IO Program and the organization’s IO 

Program.

An Assessment of Contractor Personnel Security Clearance 

Processes in the Four Defense Intelligence Agencies, Report No. 

DODIG-2014-060, April 2014

4 0

Objectives: To assess (1) how, or if, substantiated investigations of misconduct were reported to Agency 

Clearance Adjudication Facilities and to the DoD Consolidated Adjudication Facility; (2) if the referred 

investigations had been adjudicated; and (3) the results of those security adjudications.

TOTAL 16 85
30

Table A-2. OIG Recommendations for Corrective Action, Current Reporting Period

Report Title, Number, Date

Rec. 

Number Recommendation for Corrective Action

FY2018 Evaluation of the NGA

Pursuant to the Federal Information 

Security Modernization Act (FISMA)

Internal Report, Report No. OIGA 19-

02, issued 25 October 2018

01.01. Document an entity level POA&M lien to identify 

and track the completion of the requirements from 

M-15-13 and M-17-06 to determine the agency 

allocates appropriate oversight for completion.

01.02. Develop and approve a process for the 

enforcement of HTTPS and HSTS for all current 

and future public facing websites.

01.03. Implement the enforcement of HTTPS and HSTS 

on all public facing websites as required by policy.

02.01. Consistently implement the ICD 503 process for 

monitoring the internal control environment of 

external service providers, which may include:

• Obtaining and inspecting documentation 

that provides the BoE on the implementation and 

operating effectiveness of internal controls in 

place at external service providers;

• Performing analysis over any identified 

control deficiencies to evaluate risks; and

• Designing and implementing appropriate 

compensating controls to mitigate against 

identified risks.

03.01. Finalize and approve the NGA Privacy Program 

Directive and related Instructions to define the 

monitoring and reporting of potential PII incidents 

and privacy role-based training requirements.

A recommendation for corrective action is issued in response to a finding 

that a Federal standard is not being met; it is intended to bring the agency 

into compliance with the standard.
31

Report Title, Number, Date

Rec. 

Number Recommendation for Corrective Action

FY2018 Evaluation of the NGA 

Pursuant to FISMA Internal Report, 

Report No. OIGA 19-02, issued 25 

October 2018 (continued)

03.02. Enforce the Privacy Program Directive and related 

Instruction to ensure

a. Individuals with privacy responsibilities take 

required role-based privacy training; 

b. PTAs and PIAs are completed and approved 

within the risk management information system’s 

body of evidence for monitoring the risk to the 

environment.

c. All potential privacy incidents are consistently 

monitored and reported to appropriate individuals 

and parties.

04.01. Develop policies and procedures for security 

awareness and role-based training to identify the 

required trainings for persons with specialized 

responsibilities in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, 

and NIST guidance.

04.02. Provide and track role-based training for 

information security personnel in accordance with 

ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.

05.01. Develop and implement an organizational 

continuous monitoring strategy in accordance with 

ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.

05.02. Develop and implement a continuous monitoring 

policy and procedures in accordance with ODNI, 

CNSS, and NIST guidance.

05.03. Develop and implement information system 

continuous monitoring plans in accordance with 

ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.

05.04. Perform continuous monitoring over NGA IT 

security and performance metrics, and common 

and information system security controls in 

accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST 

guidance.

06.01. Establish notification, investigation, and reporting 

timelines for all defined incident categories and 

analyst groups.
32

Report Title, Number, Date

Rec. 

Number Recommendation for Corrective Action

FY2018 Evaluation of the NGA 

Pursuant to FISMA Internal Report, 

Report No. OIGA 19-02, issued 25 

October 2018 (continued)

06.02. Establish a training program for incident handlers 

to be trained within 30 working days of assuming 

an incident response role, when required by 

system changes or responsibility and annually 

thereafter.

07.01. Finalize cloud incident response procedures.

07.02. Finalize the implementation of cyber tools for all 

traffic routed into the agency, to include the cloud.

08.01. Establish SBUNet remote session timeout 

configuration settings in accordance with NIST 

guidance and NGA requirements.

09.01. Ensure information systems develop and maintain 

configuration management procedures and plans in 

accordance with the ODNI, CNSS, and NIST 

guidance.

09.02. Ensure information system owners maintain 

accurate listings of their hardware and software 

inventories in order to maintain an accurate 

configuration baseline.

09.03. Develop and implement processes to consistently 

authorize changes to information systems in 

accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST 

guidance.

09.04. Review the compliance baseline scans to ensure 

that the results Redacted Redacted Redacted are 

complete and accurate in accordance with ODNI, 

CNSS, and NIST guidance.

09.05. Remediate Redacted Redacted in accordance with 

ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.

10.01. Document Redacted Redacted Redacted to 

address weaknesses identified at a program level 

in accordance with NGA policy.
33

Report Title, Number, Date

Rec. 

Number Recommendation for Corrective Action

FY2018 Evaluation of the NGA 

Pursuant to FISMA Internal Report, 

Report No. OIGA 19-02, issued 25 

October 2018 (continued)

10.02. Develop and implement a process to ensure that 

Redacted Redacted address all requirements in 

accordance with policy and procedures.

11.01. Ensure all systems in production have Information 

System Contingency Plans (ISCPs) approved by 

all required parties.

11.02. Ensure information system personnel with 

contingency planning responsibilities participate in 

ISCP exercises and document after-actions reports 

and lessons learned per Security Plan 

Identification Number.

11.03. Ensure information system management 

establishes processes for all ISCP phases in 

accordance with NIST and Federal Continuity 

Directive (FCD) guidance, to include systems in 

the cloud. Additionally, establish processes for 

ensuring Redacted are performed in accordance 

with CNSS, NIST, NGA, and system guidance.

11.04. Identify, track, and oversee the implementation of 

system alternate processing sites in accordance 

with CNSS, NIST, and NGA guidance. Perform 

evaluations to determine whether management 

should implement alternate processes to enable the 

system to meet recovery objectives in the event of 

a disaster at the primary processing site, prior to 

the establishment of an alternate processing site.

11.05. Complete an agency-level business impact 

analysis in accordance with FCD requirements.

12.01. Develop risk assessment policy and procedures 

over mission and business processes in accordance 

with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.

12.02. Ensure security control assessments are completed 

for information systems in accordance with NGA 

policy.

12.03. Perform risk assessments on NGA information 

systems in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and 

NIST guidance.
34

Report Title, Number, Date

Rec. 

Number Recommendation for Corrective Action

FY2018 Evaluation of the NGA 

Pursuant to FISMA Internal Report, 

Report No. OIGA 19-02, issued 25 

October 2018 (continued)

12.04. Categorize and authorize all NGA information 

systems to operate in accordance with ODNI, 

CNSS, NIST, and NGA guidance.

12.05. Ensure its information systems’ security plans are 

updated and maintained to reflect the current 

environment, in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, 

and NIST guidance.

12.06. Ensure systems define the responsible entity for all 

required security controls and enhancements 

within security documentation.

13.1. Ensure information systems implement and 

document the Redacted Redacted Redacted 

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted 

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted 

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted 

Redacted Redacted in accordance with ODNI, 

CNSS, and NIST guidance.

13.2. Establish and implement a strategy for identity, 

credential, and access management.

POA&M 

03.01.

Continue to implement milestones needed to 

remediate the weakness identified within the 

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted 

Redacted.

RTS-L 

POA&M 

CM-6.1.01

Continue to implement milestones needed to 

remediate the weakness identified to implement an 

automated change control solution. Redacted 

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted.

Independent Auditors’ Report on the 

NGA Financial Statements for FYs 

2018 and 2017, Report No. OIGA 

19-03, issued 9 November 2018

1A. FM should enhance its standard operating 

procedures related to the dormant obligations 

review, and FM and OCS should continue to 

implement the dormant account review in 

accordance with NGA’s policy and the DoD 

Financial Management Regulation.

1B. FM and OCS should prioritize and allocate 

sufficient resources to completely and timely 

perform the dormant obligation review control 

and de-obligate invalid obligations.
35

Report Title, Number, Date

Rec. 

Number Recommendation for Corrective Action

Independent Auditors’ Report on the 

NGA Financial Statements for FYs 

2018 and 2017, Report No. OIGA 

19-03, issued 9 November 2018

(continued)

1C. As part of its dormant obligation review 

activities, FM and OCS should develop and 

implement a methodology for adjusting the 

year-end financial statements for dormant 

obligations that have been identified as invalid 

but have not been de-obligated.

1D. FM should work with OCS to complete an 

assessment to quantify the potential impact of 

expenditures on advance paid Military 

Interdepartmental Purchase Requests (MIPRs)

incurred outside the period of performance. 

Considering the results of this assessment, FM 

should draft, finalize, and implement standard 

procedures for advance paid MIPRs, including 

consideration of the period of performance in 

its advance liquidation process.

1E. FM should develop, document, and implement 

controls over the completeness of transactions 

by other reported to DFAS and determine if an 

additional undistributed adjustment accrual is 

necessary.

1F. FM and the Security and Installations 

component (SI) should continue to remediate 

capitalization issues identified in Material 

Weakness No. 2, while taking into 

consideration the effects on gross costs.

1G. FM and SI should enforce existing procedures 

in the Property, Plant, and Equipment (PP&E)

Work Activity General Ledger Account Code 

(WAG) Review User Guide and should 

complete their retrospective application of the 

Cost Capitalization Decision Matrix to preFY2015 contracts. 
36

Report Title, Number, Date

Rec. 

Number Recommendation for Corrective Action

Independent Auditors’ Report on the 

NGA Financial Statements for FYs 

2018 and 2017, Report No. OIGA 

19-03, issued 9 November 2018

(continued)

1H. FM, OCS, and the Component Acquisition 

Executive should clarify procedures related to 

contract creation and execution and invoice 

approval to address cost allocation between 

major programs and documentation of nonseverability and to revisit NGA contract 

language requiring the use of the oldest 

funding first.

2A. FM, SI, and NGA’s Chief Information Officer 

and IT Services component (CIO-T) should 

continue their efforts to remediate personal 

property deficiencies, including a review of 

software-in-development and construction-inprogress (CIP). As part of the review, 

management should reclassify completed 

projects from the software-in-development 

account to software and from CIP to the 

relevant in-service personal property account. 

Going forward, FM, SI, and CIO-T should 

develop and implement a process that allows 

completed assets to be placed in-service in the 

financial system in a timely manner.

2B. As part of the remediation efforts described in 

recommendation 2A., FM, SI, and CIO-T 

should develop and implement a process for 

summarizing software-in-development and 

personal property CIP by project to allow for 

better tracking and data analysis and more 

timely movement from in-development to inservice.

Independent Auditors’ Report on the 

NGA Financial Statements for FYs 

2018 and 2017, Report No. OIGA 

19-03, issued 9 November 2018

(continued)

2C. SI should work with CIO-T and FM to assess 

the feasibility of implementing system 

configuration changes to capture personnel 

costs incurred for software-in-development. 

As an alternative, SI should work with CIO-T 

and FM to develop and implement a standard 

methodology to allocate capitalizable 

Government personnel costs incurred during 

system development to software-indevelopment at the asset level.
37

Report Title, Number, Date

Rec. 

Number Recommendation for Corrective Action

2D. SI should continue to develop, document, and 

implement policies and procedures for 

accounting for personal property, including 

property held at off-site locations, as part of its 

corrective action plan. Such policies and 

procedures should include a floor-to-book 

inventory of capital assets, including personal 

property.

2E. SI, in coordination with FM, should develop, 

document, implement, and communicate a 

policy for identifying completed real property 

assets. The policy should include necessary 

approvals and requirements for completed 

assets to be placed in-service in the financial 

system in a timely manner.

2F. SI should enforce existing procedures in the 

Accountability Manual to timely review and 

dispose of assets that are no longer in-service.

2G. FM should enhance and implement its PP&E 

impairment monitoring policy to include all 

required components of Statement of Federal 

Financial Accounting Standards No. 10 and 

No. 44 and document the impairment analyses 

performed.

Independent Auditors’ Report on the 

NGA Financial Statements for FYs 

2018 and 2017, Report No. OIGA 

19-03, issued 9 November 2018

(continued)

2H. FM and SI should develop and implement 

corrective actions related to the identification 

of leased equipment and enhance its lease 

classification determination procedures to 

address data availability issues, unique 

assumptions made related to certain leases, 

and compliance with budgetary funding 

requirements.
38

Report Title, Number, Date

Rec. 

Number Recommendation for Corrective Action

3A. FM should perform an analysis of incorrectly 

prepared journal entries during FY2018 and 

identify the reasons for incorrect preparation 

and ineffective review. Using the results of 

this assessment, FM should develop and 

provide sufficient training to the preparers and 

reviewers of journal entries. Such training 

should be delivered periodically, including 

when new reviewers need to temporarily or 

permanently fill vacancies.

3B. FM should enhance FMD 014 to include clear 

definition of (1) approval documentation 

requirements, (2) segregation of duties 

requirements, and (3) the process to enter and 

approve entries in GEO-F.

3C. FM should consistently implement controls 

over the completeness and accuracy of 

information relied upon to record manual 

journal entries.

3D. FM should work with NRO to enable 

workflow configuration in GEO-F to enforce 

segregation of duties and maintain transaction 

histories, including preparer and reviewer 

history.

3E. FM should develop and implement posting 

logic in GEO-F to record transactions in 

accordance with the United States Standard 

General Ledger at the transaction level.
39

Report Title, Number, Date

Rec. 

Number Recommendation for Corrective Action

Independent Auditors’ Report on the 

NGA Financial Statements for FYs 

2018 and 2017, Report No. OIGA 

19-03, issued 9 November 2018

(continued)

4A. FM should continue to work with DFAS to 

correct reconciling differences between the 

Cash Management Report (CMR) and the 

Department of the Treasury’s GovernmentWide Accounting system to allow NGA 

management to rely on the CMR for the 

completeness and accuracy of NGA’s Fund 

Balance with Treasury (FBwT). As an 

alternative, FM should develop appropriate 

analyses and processes to support the 

completeness of NGA’s FBwT balance 

without relying on the DFAS CMR.

4B. FM should develop, implement, and document 

procedures for reconciling payroll 

disbursements to DFAS’ Cash Disbursement 

System or directly to Treasury each payroll 

cycle.

5A. FM should work with the necessary parties 

throughout the government to establish a noyear reimbursable fund such that the funding 

availability in NGA’s execution fund matches 

the funding availability associated with 

customer orders.

5B. FM should continue to accrue unbilled 

revenue as of year-end.

6A. Use the Audit Committee as a tool for 

monitoring audit finding remediation with 

various stakeholders (i.e., leadership within 

FM and across other relevant components), 

enforcing accountability for corrective action 

plans and timelines, and periodically 

communicating audit progress and challenges 

to the Director or Deputy Director.

6B. Update contingency plans and succession 

plans for roles key to maintaining effective 

internal controls.
40

Report Title, Number, Date

Rec. 

Number Recommendation for Corrective Action

Independent Auditors’ Report on the 

NGA Financial Statements for FYs 

2018 and 2017, Report No. OIGA 

19-03, issued 9 November 2018

(continued)

6C. Complete, document, and implement an 

internal control framework to address the 

GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the 

Federal Government requirements, including 

the development of an internal risk 

assessment.

6D. Develop or update, document, approve, and 

disseminate remaining end-to-end business 

processes and related financial management 

policies and procedures.

6E. Enforce requirements in the DoD Instruction 

1300.26 to complete DoD FM training 

requirements timely, and develop, document, 

and implement procedures for ensuring that 

compliance is monitored using complete and 

accurate reports.

6F. Update, approve, and disseminate formal 

security authorization documentation in 

compliance with NIST SP 800-53 guidance, as 

required by ICD 503.

6G. Perform and document annual reviews of 

security authorization documentation in 

compliance with NIST SP 800-53, as required 

by ICD 503.

6H. Update and disseminate formal POA&Ms in 

compliance with NGA policy.

6I. Update and implement policies and 

procedures for security awareness training in 

accordance with applicable guidance.

6J. Implement procedures to monitor and enforce 

the training compliance for system 

administrators.

Independent Auditors’ Report on the 

NGA Financial Statements for FYs 

2018 and 2017, Report No. OIGA 

19-03, issued 9 November 2018

(continued)

7A. Regarding access controls, develop, 

document, implement, and enforce consistent 

Redacted Redacted policies and procedures, 

including those related to Redacted Redacted 

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted 

Redacted Redacted.
41

Report Title, Number, Date

Rec. 

Number Recommendation for Corrective Action

7B. Regarding segregation of duties controls:

1. Develop, approve, and implement 

procedures to Redacted Redacted Redacted 

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted 

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted 

Redacted, approved deviations from policy 

should be documented.

2. Enforce Redacted Redacted Redacted 

Redacted Redacted Redacted, including 

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted 

Redacted.

3. Develop, approve, and implement 

procedures that address the Redacted 

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted 

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted 

Redacted.

7C. Regarding configuration management 

controls, Redacted Redacted Redacted 

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted 

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted 

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

Redacted, or document approved deviations 

from policy.

8A. To address the deficiencies noted above, we 

recommend that HD develops, documents, and 

implements procedures to maintain and make 

readily available supporting documentation 

for allowances and other pay types. The 

procedures should be available for new 

personnel with responsibility for maintaining 

and accessing such documentation.
42

Report Title, Number, Date

Rec. 

Number Recommendation for Corrective Action

Independent Auditors’ Report on the 

NGA Financial Statements for FYs 

2018 and 2017, Report No. OIGA 

19-03, issued 9 November 2018

(continued)

Recommendations to address instances of

noncompliance:

1. We recommend that Financial 

Management (FM) and the Office of Strategic 

Operations, and Chief Information Officer –

Information Technology Services Directorate 

revise NGA’s Federal Managers’ Financial 

Integrity Act of 1982 process to fully 

incorporate the Enterprise Risk Management

requirements of OMB Circular No. A-123. 

FM should also perform additional procedures 

to identify material weaknesses in NGA’s 

ICOFR environment.

2. We recommend that NGA implement the 

recommendations provided in Exhibit I and 

improve its processes to achieve compliance 

with the requirements of FFMIA section

803(a).
43

Report Title, Number, Date

Rec. 

Number Recommendation for Corrective Action

Audit of NGA’s Management of the 

Defense Acquisition Workforce 

Improvement Act Program, Report 

No. OIGA 19-05, issued March 1, 

2019

1 The NGA Component Acquisition Executive, 

in coordination with the Director of Human 

Development, and the component 

organizations with acquisition positions, 

develop additional procedures to monitor and 

enforce compliance with DAWIA 

requirements to ensure only qualified and 

credentialed personnel occupy AWF positions. 

The additional procedures should address, but 

not be limited to, the enforcement of:

• Inclusion of DAWIA requirements in 

AWF vacancy announcements. 

• Inclusion of the DAWIA requirements 

in AWF annual performance plans.

• Coordination between the DAWIA 

Program Management Office and Career 

Services Heads to ensure that when updates or 

changes are made to Career Services standard 

operating procedures, the procedures align 

with the established DAWIA procedures.

• Accountability for not complying with 

the requirements of the DAWIA.

Inspection of NGA’s Insider Threat 

Case Management, Report No. 

OIGE-19-01, February 2019

1 1. Update and publish NGAI 5200.1 and 

NGAI 5240.2 to ensure an authoritative basis 

for all SII activities.

4 Clarify and prominently post reporting 

requirements for personnel with access to 

classified information in accordance with 

Security Executive Agent Directive 3 and 

NGAM 5200.2.

9 In accordance with NIST 800.53A, establish 

and enforce procedures to review audit logs 

and report the disposition of those results to 

SII leadership.
44

Report Title, Number, Date

Rec. 

Number Recommendation for Corrective Action

Inspection of NGA’s GEOINT 

Services, Report No. OIGE-19-02, 

February 2019

2 Comply with DoDI 8410.01 by transitioning 

GEOINT Services’ unclassified environment 

to the .mil environment or by obtaining 

authorization/waiver from the NGA CIO.

3 For the geo-capability mission tools identified 

as wasteful or questioned costs (finding 2), 

determine whether NGA should continue 

investing in or cease these programs.

5 Comply with the NGA Records Management 

program for the GEOINT Services Office 

(TD).

8 For the geo-capability mission tools identified 

as wasteful (finding 3), determine whether 

NGA should continue investing in or cease 

these programs.
45

Table A-3. Recommendations for Corrective Action Not Yet Completed, Reporting Periods

Before 1 October 2018.

Report Title, Number, Date

Rec. 

Number

Recommendation for Corrective 

Action

Audit of NGA’s Information 

Assurance Certification Program, 

Report No. OIGA 17-09, 30 June 

2017

1 Comply with DoD 8570.01-M. If 

management chooses to accept the risk 

of not complying with DoD 8570.01-M, 

perform a comprehensive risk 

assessment, signed by the Chief 

Information Officer, that justifies not 

complying with DoD 8570.01-M 

requirements. The risk assessment 

should address the risks to the 

protection, detection, and reaction 

capabilities of NGA’s information 

systems and networks and any other 

information deemed necessary to 

support the assessment.

Audit of NGA’s Use of 

Administrative Leave, Report No. 

OIGA 16-08, 12 May 2016

1 Update NGA guidance relevant to 

administrative leave. Policies should: 

(1) Establish clear procedures for 

supervisors, managers, and key 

personnel to follow when taking 

actions that result in the placement of 

employees on administrative leave. 

(2) Establish oversight procedures for 

the approval of administrative leave, 

to assess the use of administrative 

leave, and to follow up when the 

improper use of administrative leave is 

identified.

(3) Address appropriate time limits for 

administrative leave, and ensure that 

the references to related NGA policies 

and procedures are consistent and 

accurate.

(4) Identify the responsible component

for official tracking of administrative 

leave.
46

Report Title, Number, Date

Rec. 

Number

Recommendation for Corrective 

Action

Audit of NGA’s Management of 

the Personnel Separation Process, 

Report No. OIGA18-05, issued 

18 April 2018

2 OIG recommends that the directorate 

designated in recommendation 1 

identify an office of primary 

responsibility to develop agency-wide 

personnel separation policy and 

procedures that define roles and 

responsibilities, including, but not 

limited to, procedures for: 

• Creating and maintaining 

documentation showing timely removal 

of logical and physical access.

• Monitoring the personnel separation 

process.

• Training personnel on the 

documentation of the separation 

process.

Audit of NGA’s Security Financial 

Disclosure Program, Report No. 

OIGA18-06, issued 12 July 2018

2 OIG recommends the Director, Security 

and Installations, Redacted Redacted 

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted 

Redacted Redacted. In developing the 

Security Financial Disclosure Program 

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted 

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted 

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted 

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted 

Redacted.

Inspection of NGA’s Medical 

Services, Report No. OIGE 18-05, 

August 2018

3 Consistent with the Economy Act, 

reassess whether inter-Agency support 

is available for medical services that 

would be advantageous to the 

government. For all such support, (1) 

ensure documentation in an ISSA (DD 

Form 1144) and (2) ensure the support 

is explained in relevant internal SOPs.
47

Report Title, Number, Date

Rec. 

Number

Recommendation for Corrective 

Action

Inspection of NGA’s Medical 

Services, Report No. OIGE 18-05, 

August 2018 (continued)

5 Implement a secure electronic transfer 

of NGA pre- and post-deployment 

health activity requirements to Defense 

Medical Surveillance System.

6 Ensure Human Development 

Component’s respective Primary 

Information Officer (PIO) and 

Information Officer (IO) responsible for 

all medical program records perform 

Records and Information Lifecycle 

Management requirements including 

updating the office file plan with the 

proper file series.

Inspection of Structured 

Observation Management, Report 

No. OIGE 18-01, November 2017

5 Develop and issue, across the NSG, 

SOM tradecraft standards that address: 

accuracy requirements with rules for 

capturing objects, observations, and 

judgements; a quality control process; 

and sourcing and data disclaimers 

consistent with ICDs 203 & 206.

Inspection of NGA’s Strategic 

Workforce Planning Function, 

Report No. OIGE 17-04, June 

2017

1 In accordance with statute and policies, 

develop and issue a strategic workforce 

plan that looks at a total workforce mix 

with an emphasis on critical skills and 

competencies needed to perform the 

agency’s evolving mission.

Inspection of the CURATOR 

Program, Report No. OIGE 16-04, 

25 February 2016

3 Identify and review data. 

Inspection of the NGA Privacy 

Program and Privacy Protection 

Management, Report No. 

OIGE 15-01, 5 November 2014

19 Establish a systematic process to ensure 

that all forms and other PII collection 

methods have accurate Privacy Act 

statements associated with them. Update 

and publish agency-level privacy policy 

with the statement procedures. Conduct 

periodic checks of the agency’s forms 

and e-mails to evaluate the use of 

Privacy Act statements.
48

Report Title, Number, Date

Rec. 

Number

Recommendation for Corrective 

Action

21 In accordance with previous 

recommendations, after establishing a 

method to identify IT systems that 

contain PII, ensure that IT system 

owners (program managers) complete 

Privacy Impact Assessments and submit 

them to the Senior Component Official 

for Privacy. Publish completed Privacy 

Impact Assessments on NGA’s 

webpages.
49

Table A-4. Financial Results from Reports Issued During Reporting Period

Report Title, Number, 

Date Issued Questioned Costs Unsupported Costs

Funds To Be Put 

to Better Use

FY2018 Evaluation of the 

NGA Pursuant to the Federal 

Information Security 

Modernization Act External 

Report, Report No. OIGA 

19-01, October 2018 $0 $0 $0

FY2018 Evaluation of the 

NGA Pursuant to the Federal 

Information Security 

Modernization Act Internal 

Report, Report No. OIGA 

19-02, October 2018 $0 $0 $0

Independent Auditors’ Report 

on the NGA Financial 

Statements for FYs 2018 and 

2017, Report No. OIGA 

19-03, November 2018 $0 $0 $0

Independent Auditors’ 

Management Letter for the 

FY2018 Financial Statement 

Audit Engagement, Report 

No. OIGA 19-04, 

December 2018 $0 $0 $0

Audit of NGA’s Management 

of the Defense Acquisition 

Workforce Improvement Act 

Program, Report No. OIGA 

19-05, March 2019 $0 $0 $0

Inspection of NGA’s Insider 

Threat Program Case 

Management, Report No. 

OIGE-19-01, February 2019 $0 $0 $0

Inspection of NGA’s 

GEOINT Services, Report 

No. OIGE-19-02, 

February 2019 $8,500,000 $0 $72,700,000

Total $8,500,000 $0 $72,700,000
50

Table A-5. Status of Recommendations That Questioned Costs

Recommendation Status

Number of 

Reports

Number of 

Recommendations

Questioned 

Costs

A. No management 

decision made by start of 

the reporting period 0 0 $0 

B. Issued during reporting 

period 1 1 $8,500,000 

Total A + B 1 1 $8,500,000

C. Management decision 

made during reporting 

period 

(i) Dollar value of 

recommendations that 

were agreed to (disallowed 

costs) 1 1 $8,500,000

(ii) Dollar value of 

recommendations that 

were not agreed to 

(allowed costs) 0 0 $0

D. Total remaining for 

management decision at 

end of reporting period

[(A + B) – C] 0 0 $0 
51

Table A-6. Status of Recommendations That Funds Be Put to Better Use

Recommendation Status

Number of 

Reports

Number of 

Recommendations

Funds To Be Put 

to Better Use

A. No management decision 

made by start of the reporting 

period 0 0 $0

B. Issued during reporting 

period 1 5 $72,700,000

Total A + B 1 5 $72,700,000

C. Management decision 

made during reporting period 

(i) Dollar value of 

recommendations that were 

agreed to (disallowed costs) 1 5 $72,700,000

(ii) Dollar value of 

recommendations that were 

not agreed to (allowed costs) 0 0 $0

D. Total remaining for 

management decision at end 

of reporting period

[(A + B) – C] 0 0 $0

Table A-7. Management Decisions Regarding OIG Recommendations in Reports Issued 

Before 1 October 2018

Unresolved as of 

30 September

2018

Reports with 

Unimplemented 

Recommendations

Number of 

Unimplemented 

Recommendations

Questioned 

Costs

Funds To 

Be Put to 

Better Use 

Audits 8 28 $0 $0

Inspections 11 32 $0 $0

Total 19 60 $0 $0
52

STATUTORY REPORTING

Information or Assistance Refused by NGA

Section 5(a)(5) of the Inspector General (IG) Act of 1978 requires IGs to promptly report to the 

head of the establishment if information requested is unreasonably refused or not provided. No 

such reports were needed or made during this reporting period.

Significant Revised Management Decisions

Section 5(a)(11) of the IG Act of 1978 requires IGs to describe and explain the reasons for any 

significant revised management decisions made during the reporting period. We are not aware of 

revisions to any significant management decisions during this reporting period.

OIG Disagreement with Significant Management Decisions

Section 5(a)(12) of the IG Act of 1978 requires IGs to provide information concerning any 

significant management decisions with which they disagree. During this reporting period, the IG 

had no instances of disagreement with significant management decisions.

Compliance with Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996

Section 5(a)(13) of the IG Act of 1978 requires IGs to provide information described under 

section 804(b) of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996. This information 

involves the instances and reasons when an agency has not met target dates within its 

remediation plan to bring financial management systems into compliance with the law. NGA has 

developed and implemented remediation plans to address areas causing noncompliance for 

financial management systems. NGA has met the intermediated target dates in the plans.

Attempts to Interfere with the IG’s Independence

Section 5(a)(21) of the IG Act of 1978, as amended by the IG Empowerment Act, requires IGs to 

provide detailed descriptions of any attempts by their establishments to interfere with their 

independence. We did not experience any attempts to interfere with our office’s independence 

during this reporting period.
53

Public Disclosure (Closed But Undisclosed Audits, Inspection, Investigations)

Section 5(a)(22) of the IG Act of 1978, as amended by the IG Empowerment Act, requires IGs to 

provide detailed descriptions of inspections, evaluations, audits, and investigations involving 

senior government employees that were closed during the reporting period without being 

publicly disclosed. Summaries of all such work are included in the appropriate sections of this 

report.

• Audits closed during this reporting period are described beginning on page 5.

• Inspections closed during this reporting period are described beginning on page 11.

• Investigations closed during this reporting period are described beginning on page 16.

Peer Reviews

Section 5(a)(14-16) of the IG Act requires IGs to report information about peer reviews that their 

offices have conducted or been subject to. No peer review of NGA OIG was conducted by 

another OIG during this reporting period.

The most recent external peer review of the NGA OIG Audit Division was 

performed by the National Security Agency’s OIG. In its report of 23 February 

2018, we received a rating of “pass” for our system of quality control in effect for 

the three-year period ending 30 September 2017. There are no outstanding 

recommendations from any peer reviews of the Audit Division.

The most recent peer review of the NGA OIG Inspections Division was 

completed by Central Intelligence Agency’s OIG on 19 September 2017. There 

were no findings or recommendations identified in the 2017 peer review.

NGA OIG conducted the onsite portion of a peer review of National Security 

Agency/Central Security Service’s OIG Inspections Division from 25 February to 

6 March 2019. The report writing and review process is ongoing and was not 

completed during this reporting period.
54

APPENDIX B. INVESTIGATIVE METRICS

Table B-1. Number of Cases Referred for Criminal or Civil Prosecution, 

During Reporting Period

Number of Cases

Type of Case Referred Accepted Declined

Criminal 0 0 0

Civil 0 0 0

Table B-2. Judicial Actions, During Reporting Period

Action Number

Indictments 0

Convictions 0

Years of incarceration 0

Years of supervised release 0

Years of probation 0

Table B-3. Criminal Prosecutions and Referrals, During Reporting Period

No. investigative reports issued 0

No. individuals referred to DoJ for criminal prosecution 0

No. individuals referred to state and local prosecuting 

authorities for criminal prosecution 0

No. indictments and criminal informations resulting from 

any prior referral to prosecuting authorities 0
55

APPENDIX C. INDEX OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Semiannual Reporting Requirement Page

§5(a)(1) Significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies 5–22

§5(a)(2) Recommendations for corrective action 30–48

§5(a)(3) Significant outstanding recommendations 24

§5(a)(4) Matters referred to prosecutorial authorities 16

§5(a)(5) Information or assistance refused 52

§5(a)(6) List of completed audit, inspection, and evaluation reports 5–13

§5(a)(7) Summaries of significant reports 5–13

§5(a)(8) Statistical table showing questioned costs 50

§5(a)(9) Statistical table showing recommendations that funds be put to better use 51

§5(a)(10) Summary of reports for which no management decision was made 51

§5(a)(11) Significant revised management decisions 52

§5(a)(12) Management decision disagreements 52

§5(a)(13) Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 52

§5(a)(14-16) Peer reviews 53

§5(a)(17-18) Investigations statistics and metrics 54

§5(a)(19) Investigations involving substantiated allegations against senior officials 16–17

§5(a)(20) Descriptions of whistleblower retaliation 18–19

§5(a)(21) Attempts to interfere with IG independence 52

§5(a)(22) Public disclosure 53
56

APPENDIX D. ABBREVIATIONS

ADA Antideficiency Act

CFPE Consolidated Foundation Production Environment

CIO-T Chief Information Officer and IT Services Component

CIP Construction-in-Progress

CNSS Committee on National Security Systems 

COR contracting officer's representative

DCIS Defense Criminal Investigative Service

DFAS Defense Finance and Accounting Service 

FAST Fraud Analytics Support Team

FISMA Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014

FM Financial Management Component

GEO-F GEOINT-Financials

GEOINT geospatial intelligence

GPC Government Purchase Card

IC Intelligence Community

IO intelligence oversight

IPERA Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act

IT information technology

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 

NRO National Reconnaissance Office

NSG National System for Geospatial Intelligence

OCS Office of Contract Services 

ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence

OIG Office of Inspector General

OMB Office of Management and Budget

PII Personally Identifiable Information

POA&M plan of action and milestones 

QIAs questionable intelligence activities

S/HS significant or highly sensitive matters

SI Security and Installations component

SOM Structured Observation Management

US STRATCOM US Strategic Command
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