[Cite as State v. Treadwell, 2020-Ohio-2736.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 19AP-304 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 18CR-4404)

Ronald L. Treadwell, : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on April 30, 2020 

 

On brief: Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Sheryl L. 

Prichard, for appellee. 

On brief: William T. Cramer, for appellant. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

BEATTY BLUNT, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Roger L. Treadwell, appeals from a judgment of the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas entered on April 10, 2019, sentencing him to serve 

11 years in prison following a guilty plea to trafficking in heroin in amounts in excess of one 

hundred grams. Before this court is a counseled brief filed pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Because we agree with appellant's counsel in his Anders

brief and with the response of plaintiff-appellee, State of Ohio, all of which indicate the 

record discloses no non-frivolous issues for appeal, and for the following reasons, we affirm. 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} On September 7, 2018, a Franklin County Grand Jury indicted appellant for 

possession of heroin and fentanyl and for trafficking in both illegal substances. All four 

counts included forfeiture and firearm specifications. Additionally, appellant was indicted 

with having a weapon while under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13. On September 14, 
No. 19AP-304 2 

2018, appellant pled "not guilty" to all counts of the indictment. However, in a hearing on 

April 10, 2019, appellant changed his plea to "guilty" on the count of trafficking in heroin 

with specification for forfeiture in exchange for dismissal of all other charges. 

{¶ 3} During the plea hearing, the prosecutor offered the following recitation of 

underlying facts: 

The incident that occurred on August 31st, 2018, involved a 

house on 318 South Wayne Avenue where Columbus police 

narcotics had focused their attention due to a number of fatal 

overdoses and other regular overdoses that occurred in that 

area. Shortly before that time, they had been given information 

from a number of different sources that it was believed to be 

that the people that had been overdosing had purchased 

fentanyl from 318 South Wayne. They did send in a confidential 

informant that made a purchase of $20's worth of heroin. That 

occurred on August 31st, 2018, at 2 p.m. 

The confidential informant indicated that they went into the 

back of the residence, went into the kitchen area and then into 

the front room. They were served a small amount of heroin by 

an individual they claim had shoulder length dreadlocks, or 

that was the person that let them inside. 

Shortly after that, within several hours, Columbus Police Intact 

executed a search warrant at 318 South Wayne Avenue. Inside 

of the residence were the four co-defendants in this case, 

including Mr. Treadwell, who was located in the kitchen. There 

were a number of items of paraphernalia, drug-traffickingrelated paraphernalia, three handguns, and about a thousand 

grams of a combination of fentanyl and heroin that were seized 

at that time. The fentanyl and heroin were laid out on a table in 

the front room. It appeared to be in the process of being 

packaged up into small pill capsules. 

Mr. Treadwell was taken to police headquarters where he was 

read his rights and asked if he would wish to make a statement. 

He indicated at that time he did not want to talk to the 

detectives. He wanted a lawyer present instead and was, 

therefore, arrested. 

The weight on the heroin came back to be a total of 943.145 

grams. The currency involved that was on the table and on a 

small table next to the main table in the front room totaled 

$9,187. The firearms were all tested and found to be operable. 
No. 19AP-304 3 

(Tr. at 4-6.) Upon inquiry by the trial court, the prosecutor further stated all the foregoing 

events occurred in Franklin County, Ohio. The defense offered no objections or exceptions 

to the facts as recited for the purposes of the plea hearing. 

{¶ 4} The trial court proceeded immediately to sentencing and sentenced appellant 

to 11 years of mandatory time at the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. 

Based on appellant's affidavit of indigency, the trial court waived fines and court costs. The 

trial court also advised appellant that he would be subject to 5 years of mandatory postrelease control upon his release from prison, and further advised appellant of the potential 

consequences for violating post-release control. Finally, the trial court advised appellant of 

his right to appeal as required by Crim.R. 32(B)(2). 

{¶ 5} Appellant timely appealed to this court and his appellate counsel filed an 

Anders brief on his behalf, certifying that, having conscientiously examined the record, he 

concluded the appeal was frivolous with no issues of arguable merit. He consequently 

sought and was granted leave to withdraw. Appellant was permitted time in which to file a 

supplemental pro se brief if he wished to bring to our attention errors he might have wanted 

to allege. Appellant has not done so. 

II. Potential Assignments of Error 

{¶ 6} Notwithstanding the Anders certification, counsel's brief suggests three 

potential assignments of error as follows: 

[1.] Appellant's guilty plea was not entered knowingly, 

intelligently, or voluntarily. 

[2.] Appellant's sentence was contrary to law and the record 

does not support the sentence. 

[3.] The mandatory maximum prison term was cruel and 

unusual punishment in violation of the state and federal 

constitutions. 

III. Discussion and Legal Analysis 

{¶ 7} Anders requires us to make "a full examination of all the proceedings," and 

then "to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous." Anders at 744. We have previously 

stated: 

Where a defendant does not file a pro se brief in response to an 

Anders brief, an appellate court will examine the potential 

assignment of error and the entire record below to determine if 
No. 19AP-304 4 

the appeal lacks merit. State v. Cooper, 10th Dist. No. 09AP511, 2009-Ohio-6275. "After fully examining the proceedings 

below, if we find only frivolous issues on appeal, we then may 

proceed to address the case on its merits without affording 

appellant the assistance of counsel." [State v.] Matthews[, 10th 

Dist. No. 11AP-532, 2012-Ohio-1154,] ¶ 10, citing Penson v. 

Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). However, if we conclude that 

there are nonfrivolous issues for appeal, we must afford 

appellant the assistance of counsel to address those issues. 

Anders at 744; Penson at 80. 

State v. A.H., 10th Dist. No. 16AP-487, 2017-Ohio-7680, ¶ 18. 

A. Guilty Plea 

{¶ 8} In his first potential assignment of error, appellant claims the trial court 

potentially violated Crim.R. 11 by accepting his guilty plea that was not knowingly, 

voluntarily, or intelligently made. We disagree. 

{¶ 9} A trial court must comply with Crim.R. 11 when it accepts a guilty plea. 

Among other requirements, the rule requires a trial court to determine the defendant is 

making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the 

maximum penalty involved, and to inform the defendant of and determine the defendant 

understands the effect of the plea of guilty. A trial court need only substantially comply 

with these non-constitutional requirements of Crim.R. 11. State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 

85, 2004-Ohio-4415, ¶ 12. Substantial compliance means, under the totality of the 

circumstances, the defendant objectively understands the implication of his plea and the 

rights he is waiving. State v. Jones, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-20, 2003-Ohio-4513, ¶ 7, citing 

State v. Carter, 60 Ohio St.2d 34, 38 (1979). 

{¶ 10} Here, a review of the plea allocution and colloquy reveals appellant was 

advised multiple times he would be subject to a mandatory maximum sentence of 11 years 

in prison. Specifically, the prosecutor stated twice a sentence of 11 years was mandatory. 

Further, the trial court stated appellant was "getting a flat 11"; appellant had to be sentenced 

to "11 years of mandatory prison time" and the court could not give him "a lower sentence 

in terms of years"; and "the sentence is a mandatory 11 years." (Tr. at 4, 9.) Further, 

appellant himself acknowledged his sentence was mandatory and he could not appeal the 

sentence. Under the totality of the foregoing circumstances, we find the trial court 
No. 19AP-304 5 

substantially complied with the requirements of Crim.R. 11 and appellant objectively 

understood the implication of his plea and the rights he was waiving. 

{¶ 11} Furthermore, even if the trial court had not substantially complied with 

Crim.R. 11, appellant must also demonstrate prejudice as a result. State v. Terrell, 10th 

Dist. No. 09AP-1003, 2010-Ohio-3026, ¶ 8. In order to establish prejudice in this context, 

appellant must show that he would not have entered his guilty plea but for the trial court's 

failure to comply with Crim.R. 11. Jones at ¶ 10. Appellant has not made such an argument, 

nor has he made such a showing. 

{¶ 12} Based on the foregoing, we find no defect in appellant's guilty plea or in the 

trial court's acceptance of it. 

B. Sentence Contrary to Law 

{¶ 13} In his second potential assignment of error, appellant claims the trial court 

potentially imposed a sentence that was contrary to law. Again, we disagree. 

{¶ 14} We review a trial court's felony sentence using the standard of review set forth 

in R.C. 2953.08. State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 22. "R.C. 

2953.08(G)(2)(a) compels appellate courts to modify or vacate sentences if they find by 

clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support any relevant findings under 

'division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or 

division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code.' " Id. The Ohio Supreme Court further 

noted in Marcum "some sentences do not require the findings that R.C. 2953.08(G) 

specifically addresses. Nevertheless, it is fully consistent for appellate courts to review 

those sentences that are imposed solely after consideration of the factors in R.C. 2929.11 

and 2929.12 under a standard that is equally deferential to the sentencing court." Id. at 

¶ 23. Thus, R.C. 2953.08 authorizes an appellate court to vacate or modify a sentence if 

(1) the court finds the sentence is "clearly and convincingly contrary to law," or (2) the court 

finds "by clear and convincing evidence that the record did not support the sentence." Id. 

at ¶ 7. 

{¶ 15} Here, the sentence was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law. First, 

the mandatory maximum term of 11 years was clearly required by law. The version of the 

trafficking statute in effect when appellant committed the offense of which he was convicted 

provided when the amount of heroin equals or exceeds one hundred grams, "the court shall 
No. 19AP-304 6 

impose as a mandatory prison term the maximum prison term prescribed for a felony of 

the first degree." R.C. 2925.03(C)(6)(g). Second, the trial court properly imposed 5 years 

of mandatory post-release control for a first-degree felony. In sentencing appellant to 11 

years in prison and giving notice after being released from prison he would be subject to a 

period of post-release control of 5 years the trial court imposed a legal sentence. 

{¶ 16} Furthermore, there is no evidence the record does not support the sentence, 

let alone "clear and convincing" evidence. Both the plea form signed by appellant and the 

plea colloquy evince that appellant repeatedly admitted trafficking in excess of one hundred 

grams of heroin. As such, the record clearly supports the mandatory maximum sentence 

required by R.C. 2925.03(C)(6)(g). 

{¶ 17} The trial court did not err in imposing the mandatory maximum sentence. 

C. Mandatory Maximum Sentence Cruel and Unusual Punishment 

{¶ 18} Finally, appellant asserts in his third potential assignment of error the 

mandatory maximum sentence might be cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the 

United States Constitution. We find no merit whatsoever to this argument. 

{¶ 19} " '[A]s a general rule, a sentence that falls within the terms of a valid statute 

cannot amount to a cruel and unusual punishment.' " State v. Hairston, 118 Ohio St.3d 

289, 2008-Ohio-2338, ¶ 21, quoting McDougle v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St.2d 68, 69 (1964). " 

'[C]ases in which cruel and unusual punishments have been found are limited to those 

involving sanctions which under the circumstances would be considered shocking to any 

reasonable person.' " State v. Weitbrecht, 86 Ohio St.3d 368, 371 (1999), quoting 

McDougle at 70. Furthermore, the penalty must be " 'so greatly disproportionate to the 

offense as to shock the sense of justice of the community.' " Hairston at ¶ 14, quoting 

Weitbrecht at 371. 

{¶ 20} Here, the11-year prison sentence imposed by the trial court was required by 

statute. R.C. 2925.03(C)(6)(g). Furthermore, we do not find an 11-year prison sentence 

imposed under the circumstances of this case would be considered shocking to any 

reasonable person or to the sense of justice of the community. Therefore, the sentence 

imposed by the trial court does not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against 

cruel and unusual punishments and the trial court did not err in imposing it. 
No. 19AP-304 7 

IV. Conclusion 

{¶ 21} Following our review of appellant's three potential assignments of error 

asserted in the Anders brief and our independent review of the record, we find that none of 

the potential assignments of error has merit. Further, we are unable to find any issues for 

review in this appeal that are not frivolous. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. 

Judgment affirmed. 

KLATT and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.