alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT
31.1





CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER CERTIFICATION





I, P.
Morgan McCune, Chief Executive Officer, certify that:





1. I have
reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Triple A Medical, Inc.





2. Based
on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual
report;





3. Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;





4. The
registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and we have:





a)
designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this annual report is being prepared;





b)
evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and





c)
disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal
quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and





5. The
registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent functions):





a) all
significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and
report financial information; and





b) any
fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who
have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial
reporting.








Date:
April 15, 2009





/s/ P. Morgan
McCune





P. Morgan
McCune


President
and Chief Executive Officer
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JOSH TAILOR, SR.,1

 Respondent Below, 

 Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES FOR 

CHILDREN, YOUTH AND THEIR 

FAMILIES,

 Petitioner Below, 

 Appellee.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 276, 2019

Court Below: Family Court 

of the State of Delaware

File No. 18-11-06TN

Petition No. 18-34790

Submitted: February 5, 2020

Decided: February 14, 2020

Corrected: February 17, 2020

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VAUGHN and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, 

Justices.

O R D E R

This 17th day of February 2020, the Court having considered this matter on 

the briefs filed by the parties has determined that the final judgment of the Family 

Court should be affirmed on the basis of and for the reasons assigned by the Family 

Court in its order dated May 30, 2019.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment of the 

Family Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ James T. Vaughn, Jr.

Justice

 

1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 7(d).
#### State v. Johnson

Case below: 180 N.C. App. 476

No. 004P07

Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. 7A-31 (COA05-1606)

Denied 05/03/07
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jessie Norberto GUERRA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 08-40655

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 30, 2009.

James Lee Turner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Randall Barrera, Law Office of Randall Barrera, Corpus Christi, TX, for Defendant-Appellant. '

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

*357PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Jessie Norberto Guerra has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Guerra has not filed a response. Our independent review of the record and counsel’s brief discloses no nonfrivolous issue for appeal. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### In the Matter of Kaylee O., an Infant. Chelsea E., Appellant, v Michael O. et al., Respondents.

[975 NYS2d 829]

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Erie County (Patricia A. Maxwell, J.), entered July 21, 2011 in a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law §§ 383-c and 384. The order dismissed the petition.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: As part of the judicial surrender of her parental rights to the subject child, petitioner entered into an agreement (agreement) providing for post-surrender visitation between her and the child. Petitioner commenced this proceeding to enforce the agreement, alleging that respondents improperly refused to permit such visitation. Following a hearing, Family Court dismissed the petition on the ground that further visitation between petitioner and the child is not in the child’s best interests.

We conclude that petitioner failed to establish that the agreement is enforceable, and thus the petition was properly dismissed. Petitioner contends that the agreement is enforceable pursuant to Social Services Law §§ 383-c and 384. We reject that contention. The Social Services Law unequivocally provides with respect to a post-surrender contact agreement that, *1274“[subsequent to the adoption of the child, enforcement of any agreement shall be in accordance with [Domestic Relations Law § 112-b]” (§ 383-c [2] [b]; *see*§ 384 [2] [b]). The Domestic Relations Law in turn provides in relevant part that such an agreement “shall not be legally enforceable after any adoption approved by a court pursuant to this article unless the court has entered an order pursuant to this section incorporating those terms and conditions into a court[-]ordered adoption agreement” (§ 112-b [6]; *see generally Matter of Andie B. [Lee*J.— *Hope C.],*102 AD3d 128, 129-130 [2012]). Here, petitioner failed to establish that the terms of the agreement were incorporated into the court-ordered adoption agreement.

In any event, “[p]ursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 112-b (4), ‘[t]he court shall not enforce an order [incorporating a post-surrender contact agreement] unless it finds that the enforcement is in the child[’s] best interests’ ” *(Matter of Kristian J.P. v Jeannette I.C.,*87 AD3d 1337, 1337 [2011]; *see Matter of Mya V.P. [Amber R.*— Laura *P.],*79 AD3d 1794, 1795-1796 [2010]). Here, in determining the issue of the child’s best interests, the court was entitled to accept the opinions of respondents’ experts and to credit the testimony of respondents over that of petitioner, and we afford great deference to the court’s determination of that issue, particularly following a hearing *(see Matter of Arianna M. [Brian M.],*105 AD3d 1401, 1401 [2013], *lv denied*21 NY3d 862 [2013]; *Matter of Triplett v Scott,*94 AD3d 1421, 1422 [2012]). We therefore reject petitioner’s further contention that the court’s determination concerning the child’s best interests is not supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record *(see generally Kristian J.P.,*87 AD3d at 1337-1338). Present — Smith, J.P., Fahey, Sconiers, Valentino and Whalen, JJ.
#### In the Matter of Francis M. Alessandro, a Judge of the New York City Civil Court, Bronx County, Petitioner. State Commission on Judicial Conduct, Respondent.

Submitted June 15, 2009;

decided June 25, 2009

Motion to enlarge the record denied.

Chief Judge Lippman taking no part.
Approvedforpublicrelease,NGA-U-2023-02416
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EXHIBIT 32





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED




PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In connection with the Annual Report of Southern Bella, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2009 as filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), the undersigned President, Principal Executive Officer, Principal Financial Officer, and Principal Accounting Officer of the Company certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that based on his knowledge and belief:  1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15 (d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and 2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/ Viola HeitzPresident, Principal Executive Officer, Principal Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EDDIE CAPLE

No. 437P05

ORDER

The Attorney General’s Petition for Discretionary Review is allowed for the limited purpose of (1) vacating that portion of the Court of Appeals opinion ordering remand to the trial court for resentencing and (2) remanding to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of *State v. Timothy Earl Blackwell,*361 N.C. 41, -S.E.2d-(2006). The Court of Appeals opinion remains undisturbed in all other respects. Justice Brady recused.

By Order of the Court in Conference, this 20th day of December, 2006.

s/Edmunds. J. For the Court
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 96-7754
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus CHORYA A. STATON, Defendant - Appellant.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Robert G. Doumar, Senior District Judge. (CR-93-49) Submitted: August 26, 1997 Decided: September 10, 1997 Before WILKINS, HAMILTON, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.Chorya A. Staton, Appellant Pro Se. Arenda L. Wright Allen, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: A jury convicted Chorya A. Staton of attempting to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of heroin with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1994). Staton appealed, arguing that his prosecution on the charges contained in the superseding indictment violated the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1994) ("Act"). We remanded the case to the district court with instructions to determine on what date it received a copy of the Supreme Court’s order denying Staton's petition for a writ of certiorari C a date critical to the speedy trial calculation. See United S tates v. Staton , No. 95- 5355, 1996 WL 465841 (4th Cir. Aug. 16, 1996) (unpublished). On remand, the district court determined that it received the Supreme Court's order on December 14 C the date on which it was filed C and that no violation of the Act occurred. Staton appeals from that order. Staton contends on appeal that the district court had noticeof the Supreme Court's denial of his petition for a writ of certiorari on October 18, thereby making his trial untimely under the Act. He failed to show, however, that the district court's factual finding that the court received n otice of the Supreme Court's denial on December 14 was clearly erroneous. Because Staton's trial began within the seventy-day period provided by the Act, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-3 tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

November 1, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 128884 & (84) Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, COUNTY OF CRAWFORD and COUNTY OF Justices 

KALKASKA,

Plaintiffs, 

v SC: 128884 

 COA: 254182 
 Otsego CC: 02-010014-CZ 

COUNTY OF OTSEGO,

Defendant-Appellee, 

and 

COHL STOKER TOSKEY & MCGLINCHEY PC
 

Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

By order of December 28, 2005, the application for leave to appeal the May 3, 

2005 judgment of the Court of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decision in 46th 

Circuit Trial Court v Crawford County (Docket No. 128878). On order of the Court, the 

case having been decided on July 28, 2006, 476 Mich 131 (2006), the application is again 

considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented 

should be reviewed by this Court. 

The miscellaneous motion is GRANTED. A public question being involved, and 

in light of the relationships between the parties, no costs are awarded. 

d1025 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

November 1, 2006 

 Clerk
#### Atkins v. Mortenson

Case below: 183 N.C. App.-(5 June 2007)

No. 415A07

1. Pit’s NOA Based Upon a Constitutional Question (COA06-854)

2. Def’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal

1. _

2. Allowed 10/11/07
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IN IT'S ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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<PAGE>   1

                                                                    EXHIBIT 21.1

                           NETWORKS ASSOCIATES, INC.
                 Consolidated Subsidiaries at December 31, 1999

 1. Network Associates Software Trading LLC, Hungary
 2. Network Associates, GmbH
 3. Network Associates, S.A.
 4. Network Associates, S.r.l.
 5. Network Associates A.G.
 6. Network Associates International, B.V.
 7. Network Associates Software Development GmbH
 8. Network Associates NA, Sweden
 9. Network Associates S.L. Spain
10. Network Associates International, Ltd.
11. Network Associates Canada Ltd.
12. Network Associates Combination Company, Inc
13. Network Associates Technology, Inc.
14. Network Associates Holding Company, Inc.
15. Network Associates K.K.
16. Network Associates Australia Pty, Ltd.
17. Network Associates (Hong Kong) Ltd.
18. Network Associates Software (Singapore) Pte Ltd.
19. Network Associates (NS) ULC
20. NA NetTools Holding Company, Inc.
21. Network General Barbados, Inc.
22. Network General Europe Holding B.V.
23. Network Associates Do Brazil Ltda
24. McAfee Software de Mexico S.A. de C.V.
25. Network General Canada, Ltd
26. Network Associates N.V.
27. McAfee Nederland
28. NetTools Company Ltd.
29. Network Associates Software Trading
30. McAfee.Com Corporation
31. NetTools Associates (Pty) Ltd
32. Dr Solomon Ltd
33. Solomon Software Ltd
34. Solomon Australia Pty Ltd
35. Solomon GmbH
36. Solomon AG
37. Dr Solomon's Software, Inc.
38. QA Information Security Holding AB
39. QA Information Security AB
40. QA Information Security OY
41. CSB Consulenza Software di Base S.r.l
#### Hamlet on Olde Oyster Bay Home Owners Association, Inc., et al., Appellants, v Holiday Organization, Inc., et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.

Submitted April 19, 2010;

decided June 29, 2010

On the Court’s own motion, appeal dismissed, without costs, upon the ground that the order appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution. Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the *743order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.