alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Environmental Protection Agency

          - [Docket No. EPA-RO4-SFUND-2009-0320, FRL-8907-8]

# AGENCY:

Environmental Protection Agency.

# ACTION:

Notice of settlement.

# SUMMARY:

Under Section 122(h)(1) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), the United States Environmental Protection Agency has entered into a settlement for reimbursement of past response costs concerning the Lilburn Mercury Spill Superfund Site located in Lilburn, Gwinnett County, Georgia for publication.

# DATES:

The Agency will consider public comments on the settlement until June 19, 2009. The Agency will consider all comments received and may modify or withdraw its consent to the settlement if comments received disclose facts or considerations which indicate that the settlement is inappropriate, improper, or inadequate.

# ADDRESSES:

Copies of the settlement are available from Ms. Paula V. Painter. Submit your comments, identified by Docket ID No. EPA-RO4-SFUND-2009-0320 or Site name Lilburn Mercury Spill Superfund Site by one of the following methods:
      -  http://www.regulations.gov : Follow the on-line instructions for submitting comments.                    
      -  http://www.epa.gov/​region4/​waste/​sf/​enforce.htm .                    
      - E-mail: Painter.Paula@epa.gov.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Paula V. Painter at 404/562-8887.

Dated: May 7, 2009.

Anita L. Davis,

Chief, Superfund Enforcement & Information Management Branch, Superfund Division. 

[FR Doc. E9-11829 Filed 5-19-09; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6560-50-P
#### In the Matter of Paul Ladanza, Respondent, v Bonnie J. Boeger, Appellant.

[872 NYS2d 473]

In a child support proceeding pursuant to' Family Court Act article 4, the mother appeals from an order of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Luft, J.), dated September 11, 2007, which denied her objections to stated portions of an order of the same court (Grier, S.M.), dated March 30, 2007, which, after a hearing, inter alia, directed her to pay child support in the sum of $753.20 per month and 20% of the college expenses of the parties’ son Jesse.

Ordered that the order dated September 11, *2007*is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying the mother’s objections and substituting therefor a provision sustaining the objections to the extent of directing that the mother’s child support obligation be reduced by any amounts she contributed, or may contribute in the future, toward room and board during those periods when the parties’ son Jesse lived, or may live in the future, away from home while attending college, and otherwise denying the objections; as so modified, the order dated September 11, 2007 is affirmed, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Family Court, Suffolk County, for a new determination of the amounts of the mother’s child support arrears, if any, in accordance herewith.

The Family Court properly directed the mother to pay 20% of the college expenses of the parties’ son Jesse. However, it was error to do so without directing that the mother’s child support obligation be reduced by any amounts she contributed, or may contribute in the future, toward room and board during those *734periods when Jesse lived, or may live in the future, away from home while attending college *(see Matter of Levy v Levy,*52 AD3d 717 [2008]; *Navin v Navin,*22 AD3d 474 [2005]; *Wortman v Wortman,*11 AD3d 604 [2004]; *Rohrs v Rohrs,*297 AD2d 317, 318 [2002]).

The mother’s remaining contentions are either without merit or improperly raised for the first time on appeal. Fisher, J.E, Angiolillo, Dickerson and Belen, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.1

Certification Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

As Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the periodic report of Dynacq Healthcare, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the year ending
August 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Chiu M. Chan, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully
complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



|                      |  |                                      
|--------------------- |  | -------------------------------------
|Dated: April 21, 2010 |  | /s/ Chiu M. Chan                     
|                      |  | Chiu M. Chan                         
|                      |  | President and Chief Executive Officer
|                      |  | Dynacq Healthcare, Inc.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1


                        CONSENT OF RONALD L. BORNHEUTTER

I, Ronald L. Bornhuetter, hereby agree to serve as a director of PennCorp
Financial Group, Inc., a Delaware Corporation ("PennCorp"), following the
merger (the "Merger") of Washington National Corporation, a Delaware
corporation, with and into PennCorp and consent to the use of my name in
Amendment No. 1 to PennCorp's Annual Report on Form 10-K/A, and in any further
amendments thereto or other filings with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, as the same appears therein under the caption "CLASS III DIRECTOR
APPOINTEES" with respect to my becoming a director of PennCorp following the
Merger.


                                                   /s/ Ronald L. Bornheutter  
                                                   ----------------------------
                                                   Ronald L. Bornheutter
                                                   Date:    April 30, 1997
**
**EXHIBIT 32**

**CERTIFICATION OF**

**THETRUSTEE***

**OF THE SAN JUAN BASIN ROYALTY TRUST**

**PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 1350**

In connection with the accompanying report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2023 andfiled with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Ross C. Durr, Senior Vice President and Mineral Interest Director of PNC Bank, National Association, on behalf of PNC Bank, National Association, theTrustee of the San Juan Basin Royalty Trust (the “Trust”),* not in its individual capacity but solely as Trustee of the Trust, hereby certify that: 

 
 1.
The Report fully complies in all material respects with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (as explained in Note 1 to the Trust’s financial statements contained in the Report, in accordance with the Securities and Exchange Commission Staff Accounting Bulletin Topic 12:E, FinancialStatements of Royalty Trusts, the Trust prepares its financial statements in a manner that differs from generally accepted accounting principles; such presentation is customary to other royalty trusts); and 

 
 2.
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of the Trust. 

 

PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE OF THE

SAN JUAN BASIN ROYALTY TRUST
By: /s/ Ross C. DurrName: Ross C. DurrTitle: 
Senior Vice President

and Mineral InterestDirector
Date: May 15, 2023
 
*
The Trust has no executive officers. 
**
## Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

Rodrick Deshon Arkeith Elliott , Appellant

No. 06

- 22

- 00070

- CR v.

The State of Texas , Appellee Appeal from the 124th District Court of Gregg County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 47765

- B ). M emorandum Opinion delivered by
Chief Justice Stevens

, Justice van Cleef and
Justice Morriss,* participating. * Chief Justice Morriss, III, Retired, Sitting by Assignment.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court
below. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We n ote that the appellant, Rodrick Deshon Arkeith Elliott , has adequately indicated his
inability to pay costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED JANUARY 9 , 2023 BY ORD ER OF THE COURT SCOTT E. STEVENS CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST: Debra K. Autrey , Clerk
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 99.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Grey Wolf, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the three month period ended March 31, 2003 (the
"Report"), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof, I, Thomas P. Richards, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

         2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.





/s/ Thomas P. Richards
-----------------------------------------------
Thomas P. Richards
Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer


Date:    April 30, 2003
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Khallin D. Bigby, Also Known as Ko, Also Known as Cali, Appellant.

[974 NYS2d 883]

— Appeal from a resentence of the Cayuga County Court (Thomas G. Leone, J.), rendered August 3, 2012. Defendant was resentenced upon his conviction of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree.

It is hereby ordered that the resentence so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Present — Scudder, EJ., Peradotto, Garni, Sconiers and Whalen, JJ.
# A-3

interpretation of the controlling law and did not reach the other issues colorably asserted. Accordingly, we

VACATE the portion of the order denying preliminary injunctive relief, REVERSE the portion of the order granting the motion to dismiss, AND REMAND this matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this order. 1 J. Parraguirre

Cherry cc: Hon. Jessie Elizabeth Walsh, District Judge Kerry P. Faughnan Wright, Finlay & Zak, LLP/Las Vegas Eighth District Court Clerk

1 The injunction imposed by our June 11, 2014, order is vacated.

SUPREME COURT OF 2 NEVADA «A 1947A ag?D 1 ' )
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-11-00900-CV

Gary BIESENBACH,

Appellant

v.

THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO,

Appellee

From the 73rd Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2009-CI-13675

Honorable Victor Negron, Judge Presiding

BEFORE JUSTICE ANGELINI, JUSTICE ALVAREZ, AND JUSTICE CHAPA

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

REVERSED, and the underlying cause is DISMISSED without prejudice to the rights of either 

party to appeal a final decision of the hearing examiner. It is ORDERED that the appellant, Gary 

Biesenbach, recover his costs of this appeal from the appellee, The City of San Antonio.

SIGNED July 17, 2013.

_____________________________

Karen Angelini, Justice
#### Malik Laique AHMAD, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 05-2629-ag.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Nov. 7, 2006.

Rakhvir Dhanoa (Denise K. Bonnaig, on the brief), New York, NY, for Petitioner.

Robin W. Morey, Assistant United States Attorney (Kathy S. Marks, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for Michael J. Garcia, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Respondent.

PRESENT: Hon. RICHARD J. CARDAMONE, Hon. ROGER J. MINER, and Hon. ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

Malik Laique Ahmad (“Ahmad”), through counsel, petitions for review of a BIA order dismissing his appeal from Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Joanna Bukzspan’s denial of his motion to reopen. *In re Ahmad, Malik Laique,*No. [ A XX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. May 2, 2005), *aff'g*No. [ A XX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 4, 2005). We *99assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

The BIA deemed Ahmad’s appeal withdrawn pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.4, which provides that “[departure from the United States of a person who is the subject of deportation proceedings subsequent to the taking of an appeal, but prior to a decision thereon, shall constitute a withdrawal of the appeal, and the initial decision in the case shall be final to the same extent as though no appeal had been taken.” It is unclear whether this regulation properly applies where an alien does not voluntarily depart but instead is deported. We need not reach this question, however, because far less ambiguous regulatory language states that Ahmad’s motion to reopen should have been deemed withdrawn. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) (“Any departure from the United States, *including the deportation or removal of a person who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings,*occurring after the filing of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall constitute a withdrawal of such motion.” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the motion is no longer pending, and we have no jurisdiction to consider its merits.1 Nor do we have jurisdiction to consider any of the earlier actions in this case.

Accordingly, the petition is DENIED.

1

. We need not decide whether a deportation that is not "legally executed” results in the withdrawal of a motion to reopen, *see Cardoso-Tlaseca v. Gonzales,*460 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir.2006), because there is nothing in the record to support the conclusion that Ahmad was unlawfully deported. It is undisputed that, having overstayed by more than six years his voluntary departure order, Ahmad was subject to deportation. At most, Ahmad has established that his deportation was executed at a time when he was eligible for (but not entitled to as a matter of right) adjustment of status. The fact that Ahmad had a motion to reopen pending in which he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel did not require that his deportation be delayed. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(f) (providing that the filing of a motion to reopen usually "shall not stay the execution of any decision made in the case”).
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
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<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAY-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JUN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-01-1997
<CASH>                                          12,868
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    6,866
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      9,672
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 2,204
<PP&E>                                          19,422
<DEPRECIATION>                                   9,120
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  52,053
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            7,506
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           656
<OTHER-SE>                                      42,839
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    52,053
<SALES>                                         30,914
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                30,914
<CGS>                                           23,796
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   36,524
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    60
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  41
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (5,082)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (1,626)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (3,456)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (3,456)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.79)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.79)
        

</TABLE>
#### THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES L. GOEWEY, Defendant-Appellant.

Fourth District

No. 4-02-0846

Opinion filed December 29, 2003.

Michael J. Pelletier and Colleen Morgan, both of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Frank McCartney, State’s Attorney, of Pittsfield (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Timothy J. Londrigan, all of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE COOK

delivered the opinion of the court:

On April 12, 2002, defendant, Charles Goewey, pleaded guilty to one charge of escape (720 ILCS 5/31 — 6(a) (West 2002)) and two *326charges of burglary (720 ILCS 5/19 — 1 (West 2002)). Prior to the plea, defendant and the State agreed that the sentences would run concurrently, but that they would have to run consecutively to the charge for possession of a controlled substance that was pending before another court. After the State recited the factual basis for the pleas, the trial court determined that the State presented an adequate factual basis and that the pleas were voluntary and understandingly and knowingly made.

On May 7, 2002, the trial court sentenced defendant to three six-year sentences for the escape and burglary counts. These sentences were to run concurrently to one another and consecutively to separate sentences of possession of a controlled substance and aggravated battery. After sentencing defendant, the court did not properly admonish him pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 605(c) (210 Ill. 2d R. 605(c)) regarding the actions necessary to preserve his right to appeal. Specifically, the trial court incorrectly indicated that if defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence within 30 days, that would be enough to preserve his right to appeal.

On May 22, 2002, defendant filed a *pro se*motion for reduction of sentence in all three cases. Counsel was appointed to represent defendant and a hearing was held on the motion on August 27, 2002. The trial court denied the motion. This appeal followed.

In this matter, the State concedes that defendant was improperly admonished pursuant to Rule 605(c). We must agree. A trial judge must strictly comply with the dictates of the rule, and fundamental fairness requires that when the trial court erroneously advises a negotiated-plea defendant that a motion to reconsider the sentence will preserve his right to appeal, the cause must be remanded to the trial court with instructions to correctly admonish the defendant and provide him with an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea. *People v. Diaz,*192 Ill. 2d 211, 226-27, 735 N.E.2d 605, 613 (2000).

Because the trial court failed to comply with the admonishment requirements of Supreme Court Rule 605(c), we remand the cause with directions to properly admonish defendant under Rule 605(c) and give him the opportunity to move to have his guilty plea withdrawn, should he so desire.

Remanded with directions.

APPLETON and McCULLOUGH, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Telos Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period
ending March 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), we, John B. Wood and Michele Nakazawa, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to our knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



Date: March 4, 2009/s/ John B. WoodJohn B. WoodChief Executive OfficerDate: March 4, 2009/s/ Michele NakazawaMichele NakazawaChief Financial Officer
July 23, 2015

JUDGMENT

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

ISMAEL TREVINO, Appellant

NO. 14-14-00262-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

________________________________

This cause was heard on the transcript of the record of the court below. 

Having considered the record, this Court holds that there was no error in the 

judgment. The Court orders the judgment AFFIRMED.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.