J-A07039-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MORRIS LEONAR MEDLEY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 982 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 14, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-40-SA-0000289-2022

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MORRIS LEONAR MEDLEY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 984 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 11, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-40-SA-0000290-2022

BEFORE: STABILE, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: APRIL 24, 2024

Appellant, Morris Leonar Medley, challenges the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County following his 

convictions for Driving Under DUI Suspension, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(i) 

and Evidence of Emission Inspection, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4706(c)(5). Appointed 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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counsel has filed an application to withdraw and an appellate brief pursuant 

to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and Commonwealth v. 

Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). After careful review, we affirm and grant 

counsel’s application to withdraw. 

On February 7, 2023, Appellant appeared with defense counsel for his 

scheduled bench trial on the above-referenced charges. Defense counsel, 

however, informed the trial court that because she could not put forth the 

defense theory that Appellant insisted be made, i.e., that his operation of a 

neighbor’s car constituted merely “traveling” on their neighborhood street and 

not “driving” for purposes of the statute, she was requesting the court’s 

permission to withdraw as counsel and be reappointed as standby counsel. 

N.T., 2/7/23, at 2. Appellant wished to have counsel, she explained, but given 

her refusal to make his chosen argument, he preferred to self-represent: 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, if I may, I have spoken with 

Mr. Medley, and I would be requesting permission to withdraw. 

I’d be happy to remain as stand-by counsel if the Court or if Mr. 

Medley would like me to.

Mr. Medley has patiently explained his defense to me. He has 

spoken with me on Friday and Monday. We also spoke this 

morning. He is articulate, he has put thought into it; however, it 

is a defense that I cannot make. In respect to his express interest, 

it’s the argument that he would like to proceed with.

In speaking with him, it’s not that he doesn’t want an attorney, 

he does; however, my understanding is that he would prefer to 

move forward without an attorney if that attorney cannot make 

the argument that he would like to make.

TRIAL COURT: Under the law?
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DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, Judge.

TRIAL COURT: Is that correct, sir?

DEFENDANT: Uh-huh. Yes.

TRIAL COURT: Motion to withdraw is granted. Counsel will 

remain as stand-by counsel.

And what that means, sir, is that if you have a question regarding 

procedure or any other matter as we go through the summary 

trial, you can ask the Court for permission to consult with yourstand-by counsel, Attorney Fernandes; do you understand that?

DEFENDANT: Yeah.

N.T., 2/7/23, at 2-3.

Thereafter, the trial court outlined the procedure that Appellant’s 

summary trial would follow. Specifically, the trial court explained Appellant 

had the right to cross-examine Commonwealth witnesses and examine 

Commonwealth exhibits, call defense witnesses and present evidence to 

support his defense, exercise his Fifth Amendment right not to testify, and 

offer a closing argument. N.T. at 3-4. 

Appellant confirmed that he had no questions regarding this procedure, 

and the trial court commenced the summary trial, which comprised the 

testimonies of the arresting Pennsylvania State Police corporal and Appellant, 

respectively. See N.T. at 4-11. Specifically, Corporal Pericci testified that he 

witnessed Appellant driving a vehicle bearing expired registration and 

inspection stickers. N.T. at 4. He initiated a traffic stop and verified that the 

inspection and emission stickers were expired. Id. During the stop, he also 

verified that Appellant’s driver’s license was suspended for DUI and that this 
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was Appellant’s first offense under Section 1543(b). N.T. at 5. The 

Commonwealth introduced into evidence a copy of Appellant’s certified driver 

history from the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation showing the 

Appellant’s driving privileges were suspended for DUI at the relevant time. 

N.T. at 6. Appellant testified that he was not driving, per se, but only moving 

a neighbor’s vehicle along the residential street at the time of the vehicle stop. 

N.T. at 6-11. At the conclusion of trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty

of both charges.

On June 14, 2023, the trial court imposed a sentence of 60 days’ 

incarceration and a fine of $500.00 plus court costs. Conflict counsel was 

appointed. On July 12, Appellant, through counsel, filed a notice of appeal, 

and the trial court ordered a concise statement of matters complained of on 

appeal. Both counsel and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Herein, appointed counsel has filed both an application to withdraw as 

counsel and an Anders brief in which asserts the present appeal is frivolous. 

“When faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court may not review the 

merits of any possible underlying issues without first examining counsel's 

request to withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa. 

Super. 2007). To withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must:

(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after 

making a conscientious examination of the record it has 

determined that the appeal would be frivolous;
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(2) file a brief referring to anything that might arguably support 

the appeal, but which does not resemble a “no merit” letter or 

amicus curiae brief; and

(3) furnish a copy of the brief to defendant and advise him of his 

right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se or raise any additional 

points that he deems worthy of the court's attention.

Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 751 (Pa. Super. 2005); 

Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1196 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citing

Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 594 (Pa. Super. 2010) (providing 

that counsel must inform client by letter of rights to proceed once counsel 

moves to withdraw and must append a copy of the letter to the petition). 

The Anders brief must comply with the following requirements:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record;

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably 

supports the appeal;

(3) set forth counsel's conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and

(4) state counsel's reasons for concluding that the appeal is 

frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. 

Appellate counsel has satisfied the technical requirements for 

withdrawing from representation, and we grant the application to withdraw.

Accordingly, we conduct “‘a full examination of the proceedings and make an 

independent judgment to decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly 

frivolous.’” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1249 (Pa. Super. 

2015) (quoting Santiago, 978 A.2d at 354 n.5). On review of the record, we 
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agree with counsel that there is no basis for Appellant’s sufficiency of the 

evidence claim, as evidence adduced at Appellant’s summary trial proved each 

element of the respective charges through both the testimony of Corporal 

Pericci and the admission of documentary evidence.

Finally, we conduct our simple review of the record to ascertain if, on its 

face, there are other issues of arguable merit overlooked by counsel. Yorgey, 

188 A.3d at 1196-97; Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa. 

Super. 2018) (en banc). 

Where, as here, a defendant wishes to represent themself, a hearing 

must be conducted to ascertain whether they understand: (1) their right to 

be represented by counsel; (2) that if they waived their right, they will still be 

bound by all normal procedural rules; and (3) that many rights and potential 

claims may be permanently lost if not timely asserted. Commonwealth v.

Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). Here, the record reflects that after engaging 

in an on-the-record discussion with defense counsel and a subsequent 

colloquy of Appellant, the trial court ascertained that Appellant understood 

both his rights and the consequences of his decision to proceed pro se with 

standby counsel. Accordingly, we discern no issue with Appellant’s knowing 

and voluntary decision to represent himself at his summary trial, nor do we 

find any other non-frivolous issue in the record.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Application to withdraw is granted. 
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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 04/24/2024