Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-798 | September 27, 2018 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Scott King

Russell W. Brown, Jr.

King, Brown & Murdaugh, LLC

Merrillville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Caroline G. Templeton

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Tyler Steffey,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

September 27, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-798

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court

The Honorable Salvador Vasquez, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

45G01-1603-F1-4

Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-798 | September 27, 2018 Page 2 of 10

Statement of the Case

[1] Tyler Steffey (“Steffey”) appeals his convictions, following a jury trial, for Level 

3 felony aggravated battery1 and Level 6 felony auto theft.2 Steffey argues that 

there was insufficient evidence to support both convictions. Finding that there 

was sufficient probative evidence and reasonable inferences for jurors to find 

Steffey guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm his convictions. 

Issue

Whether there was sufficient evidence to support Steffey’s convictions.

Facts

[2] During the afternoon of February 19, 2016, a friend of Steffey, Kendra Skinner 

(“Skinner”), drove her car and picked Steffey up at a gas station in Hammond, 

Indiana. After Skinner picked up Steffey, she drove to another gas station 

located in Gary to purchase cigarettes. During this second stop, Steffey 

proposed that he and Skinner rob a marijuana dealer. Once they agreed to

commit the robbery, Skinner drove to the apartment she shared with her sister, 

Brittany Sullivan (“Sullivan”), to obtain a gun that she had stolen a few days 

earlier. 

 

1

IND. CODE § 35-42-2-1.5. 

2

I.C. § 35-43-4-2.5(b)(1) (repealed, effective July 1, 2018). 
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[3] After retrieving the gun, Skinner and Steffey drove to a third gas station. Before 

Skinner went inside the gas station to buy cigarettes, Steffey leaned his seat 

back and told her not to tell anyone she was with him. Later, Steffey directed 

Skinner to drive to an alleyway behind a church at 10th Avenue and Chase 

Street in Gary to wait for the marijuana dealer they had planned to rob. 

Skinner parked her vehicle near a dumpster in the alleyway. Skinner was in the 

driver’s seat, and Steffey was in the front passenger seat.

[4] During the approximately hour and a half they waited, Skinner never saw 

anyone else in the area. Indeed, she had time to clean out her vehicle and place 

bags of clothing in the nearby dumpster. While waiting, Steffey possessed the 

gun, and he showed her how it worked. He showed her how to load a clip and 

where the safety was. “After he showed [her] the clips and the 9 mm and he 

put the clip in, the last thing [Skinner] remember[ed] was waking up on the 

ground” in the alleyway near the dumpster. (Tr. 123). Skinner saw her vehicle 

being driven down the alleyway but could not see who was driving. Skinner 

was shot twice, once on the right side of her head and once in the chest. She

crawled to a nearby house on Chase Street and asked for help. The homeowner 

called the police and Skinner was taken by ambulance to the hospital. 

[5] As a result of being shot, Skinner suffered injuries to her left abdominal area, a 

broken jaw that had to be wired shut for several months, a loss of hearing in her 

right ear, and a loss of her sense of smell. She also suffered from severe 

headaches and poor short-term memory. After arriving at the hospital, Skinner 

was unconscious for two days. When she woke up, she was unable to open her 
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mouth. Using a chalkboard, she wrote down the following: “Where is my 

car?”, “Does my sister know?”, and “Tyler Steffey.” (Tr. 79). Skinner wrote 

Steffey’s name because she knew “he did this to [her].” (Tr. 79). 

[6] Skinner’s sister, Sullivan, called Steffey and asked him what happened to her 

sister after learning she was in the hospital. Steffey responded that Skinner 

never picked him up. Sullivan called Steffey a second time, and he stated that 

Skinner had picked him up and dropped him off at his mother’s home. Sullivan 

called Steffey a third time, and he said he had never seen Skinner. 

[7] Two months later, on April 13, 2016, Skinner’s vehicle was found in an 

apartment complex. Inside the car, police found blood splatter on the front

windshield and dashboard. The driver’s side front window was shattered and 

there was a bullet hole in the driver’s seat. A spent bullet casing was also 

located inside the driver’s side front door. The police did not attempt to recover 

fingerprints because any number of people could have entered the vehicle 

between February and April. The police also did not perform DNA testing on 

any of the blood stains in the car because the information suggested that 

Skinner had been the only person injured.

[8] The State charged Steffey with: Level 1 felony attempted murder; Level 3 

felony aggravated battery; Level 5 felony battery with a deadly weapon; Level 5 

felony battery causing serious bodily injury; Level 6 felony auto theft; and Class 

A misdemeanor theft. A two-day jury trial began on October 3, 2017. Skinner, 

Sullivan, and the police testified to the facts above. There was a dispute 
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regarding what side of the head Skinner was shot on. The jury returned guilty 

verdicts on the aggravated battery and the felony auto theft charges, and it 

found Steffey not guilty on the remaining charges. 

[9] Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Steffey to twelve (12) years for the Level 3 

felony aggravated battery conviction and two (2) years for the Level 6 felony

auto theft conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served 

consecutively in the Department of Correction for an aggregate sentence of 

fourteen (14) years. Steffey now appeals. 

Decision

[10] On appeal, Steffey challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for both of his 

convictions. Our standard of review for sufficiency of evidence claims is well 

settled. We do not assess the credibility of the witnesses or reweigh the 

evidence in determining whether the evidence is sufficient. Drane v. State, 867 

N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We consider only the probative evidence and 

reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Id. (emphasis added). Reversal is 

appropriate only when no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the 

crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Thus, the evidence is not 

required to overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence and is sufficient 

if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict. Id. at 

147. 

 1. Aggravated Battery
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[11] In order to convict Steffey of aggravated battery, the State was required to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Steffey; (2) knowingly or intentionally; (3) 

inflicted injury on Skinner; (4) that created a substantial risk of death or caused

serious permanent disfigurement or protracted loss of impairment of a bodily 

member or organ. I.C. § 35-42-2-1.5. A person engages in conduct 

“knowingly” if he “is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-

41-2-2(b). A person engages in conduct “intentionally” if “it is his conscious 

objective to do so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(a).

[12] Steffey concedes that the injuries Skinner suffered created a substantial risk of 

death or caused serious permanent disfigurement or protracted loss of 

impairment of a bodily member or organ. Instead, he first argues that the 

“record is devoid of any direct evidence” that he inflicted injury on Skinner.3 

(Steffey’s Br. 10). Alternatively, Steffey argues that there was no evidence that 

he knowingly or intentionally inflicted injury on Skinner. 

[13] With regard to Steffey’s first argument, that the record is devoid of any direct 

evidence that he inflicted injury on Skinner, we note that a verdict may be 

sustained based upon circumstantial evidence alone if that circumstantial 

evidence supports a reasonable inference of guilt. Houston v. State, 730 N.E.2d 

1247, 1248 (Ind. 2000). Our review of the record shows that there was 

 

3

Steffey also argues that the State failed to present evidence that he possessed a motive to injure Skinner. 

The State was only required to prove the statutory elements of the offense, which do not include motive. See

Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 134 (Ind. 2016).
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sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a reasonable inference that Steffey 

inflicted injury on Skinner. Specifically, Skinner identified Steffey as the only 

other occupant in her vehicle. See Thompson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1307, 1311 

(Ind. 1996) (a conviction may rest solely on the uncorroborated testimony of a 

victim). She testified that Steffey was in possession of the gun immediately 

before she lost consciousness. Just before she was shot, Steffey showed Skinner 

how to load the clip, and he showed her the safety. Skinner did not see anyone 

else in the alleyway during the hour and a half that she and Steffey waited in 

the alleyway. Steffey’s argument that the record is devoid of any direct 

evidence that he inflicted injury on Skinner is nothing more than a request that 

we reweigh the evidence. This we will not do. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146. 

[14] Alternatively, Steffey argues that there was no evidence that he knowingly or 

intentionally inflicted injury on Skinner. Because intent is a mental function, 

absent an admission by the defendant, it must be determined from a 

consideration of the defendant’s conduct and the natural and usual 

consequences thereof. Metzler v. State, 540 N.E.2d 606, 609 (Ind. 1989). The 

trier of fact usually must resort to “reasonable inferences based upon an 

examination of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether, from the 

person’s conduct and the natural consequences that might be expected from 

that conduct, a showing or inference [of] the intent to commit that conduct 

exists.” Id. 

[15] The State presented evidence that: Skinner was seated in the driver’s seat, and 

Steffey in the front passenger seat; Steffey was the only person with Skinner as 
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they waited to rob a marijuana dealer; he possessed the a gun right before 

Skinner lost consciousness; Skinner was shot twice, once in the head and once 

in the chest; Skinner testified that she was shot on the right side of her face; 

there was blood spatter on the front windshield and across the dashboard; there 

was a bullet hole in the driver’s seat; and a spent bullet casing was located 

inside the driver’s side door. Sullivan also testified that Steffey gave conflicting 

accounts as to whether he saw Skinner at all on the day she was shot twice. She 

stated that she spoke to Steffey three times and that he denied seeing Skinner 

twice and admitted to being with her once. The cumulative effect of the 

evidence supports the reasonable inference that Steffey knowingly or 

intentionally shot Skinner. Thus, after consideration of the circumstantial 

evidence and Steffey’s conduct and the natural and usual consequences thereof, 

it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that the elements of Level 3 felony 

aggravated battery were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

 2. Auto Theft

[16] In order to convict Steffey of felony auto theft as charged, the State was 

required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Steffey; (2) knowingly; (3) 

exerted unauthorized control over the motor vehicle of Skinner; (4) with the 

intent to deprive her of its value or use. I.C. § 35-43-4-2.5(b)(1).

[17] Steffey argues that “the State did not present any evidence that [he] stole 

[Skinner’s] vehicle.” (Steffey’s Br. 11). Our review of the record shows that the 

State presented circumstantial evidence that Steffey was the person who exerted 
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unauthorized control over Skinner’s vehicle. Circumstantial evidence alone 

may support a theft conviction. Rogers v. State, 902 N.E.2d 871, 875 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2009). The question for an appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether a reasonable jury could draw inferences from 

circumstantial evidence that would establish the defendant’s guilt. Sidener v. 

State, 55 N.E.3d 380, 385 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). 

[18] The evidence presented at trial was that Skinner, who was seated in the driver’s

seat, and Steffey, who was in the front passenger seat, were the only occupants 

in her vehicle during the time they were waiting for the marijuana dealer. The 

State also presented evidence that Steffey was the only person in the vicinity 

with Skinner. See, e.g., Kindred v. State, 257 N.E.2d 667, 668 (Ind. 1970) (“[T]he 

fact that appellant was in the room alone at a time the evidence shows the cash 

register was opened and the fact that immediately thereafter the money was 

missing is sufficient upon which the trier of fact could find appellant had taken 

the money”). Skinner testified that she observed her vehicle being driven away 

after she regained consciousness on the ground. Additionally, she stated that 

she never gave anyone permission to drive her vehicle. The circumstantial 

evidence and inferences drawn therefrom support a reasonable inference that 

Steffey was the person who exerted unauthorized control over Skinner’s 

vehicle. Again, our role is not to reweigh the evidence; we determine whether 

sufficient probative evidence and reasonable inferences support a guilty verdict 

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146. 
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[19] Finding that the evidence was sufficient to prove Steffey committed aggravated 

battery and felony auto theft, we affirm his convictions. 

[20] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and Crone, J., concur.