alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 10-3617

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Appellee

v.

Custodio Garcia

lllllllllllllllllllll Appellant

____________

 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri

____________

 Submitted: September 18, 2012

 Filed: October 29, 2012

[Unpublished]

____________

Before GRUENDER, ARNOLD, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

Custodio Garcia appeals his sentence for a drug-trafficking offense, arguing that

the district court1

 should have applied the so-called "safety valve" provision, which

1

The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., Chief Judge of the United States

District Court for the Western District of Missouri.
allows a court to impose a prison sentence below the statutory minimum. See 18

U.S.C. § 3553(f). We affirm.

Mr. Garcia pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine,

cocaine, and marijuana, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, and to aiding and abetting

the possession of a firearm during that conspiracy, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The

district court denied Mr. Garcia’s request to apply the safety valve, finding that he

"possess[ed] a firearm ... in connection with the [conspiracy] offense." See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(f)(2). Mr. Garcia argues that his possession of the gun was not in connection

with the conspiracy offense but rather was "coincidental" or "entirely unrelated" to his

drug trafficking crime.

Mr. Garcia’s guilty plea is fatal to his contention. He pleaded guilty to violating

§ 924(c)(1)(A), which provides a statutory minimum sentence for persons who use or

carry a firearm "during and in relation to any ... drug trafficking crime" or who

possess a firearm "in furtherance of any such crime." We have held that "in relation

to," as used in this section, is "equivalent" to the "in connection with" formulation, as

used in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5), see United States v. Regans, 125 F.3d 685, 686 (8th

Cir. 1997), and we see no meaningful difference between the two formulations in the

circumstances before us. Though a defendant may also violate § 924(c)(1)(A) by

possessing a gun "in furtherance" of a drug-trafficking crime, possession "in relation

to" is subsumed within possession "in furtherance of," which requires a slightly higher

burden of proof. See United States v. Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796, 810 (8th Cir. 2006),

cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1042 (2006). We therefore conclude that Mr. Garcia, by

pleading guilty to the firearms offense, admitted that his possession of the gun was "in

relation to," and thus "in connection with" the drug offense, as that phrase is used in

§ 3553(f)(2), and his admission disqualified him from safety-valve relief.

Affirmed.

______________________________

-2-
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-30902

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

LAROY BLACKMORE,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

No. 3:08-CR-27-1

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Laroy Blackmore pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, of being

a felon in possession of a firearm. He appeals the denial of his motion to suppress a gun and marihuana that he argues were seized pursuant to his illegal

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

June 28, 2011

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

Case: 10-30902 Document: 00511522667 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/28/2011
No. 10-30902

arrest outside his truck. 

The parties dispute whether Blackmore was arrested outside his truck, or

was merely subjected to an investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1

(1968), when a police officer instructed him to get out of the truck and attempted

to handcuff him after smelling marihuana and noticing a marihuana cigar in the

car. It is irrelevant, however, whether Blackmore was illegally arrested at that

point, because, as the district court determined, subsequent events gave the police sufficient probable cause to arrest him.

Even where a defendant is subject to an illegal arrest, suppression of evidence is proper only where the evidence was “obtained ‘by exploitation of [the alleged] illegality’ rather than ‘by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged

of the primary taint.’” United States v. Ibarra-Sanchez, 199 F.3d 753, 761 (5th

Cir. 1999) (alteration in original) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.

471, 488 (1963)). Independent probable cause that develops after an illegal arrest is “a critical factor attenuating the taint of the initial illegal arrest.” United

States v. Cherry, 794 F.3d 201, 206 (5th Cir. 1986).

After he got out of the truck and while the officer was attempting to handcuff him, Blackmore broke free, Blackmore pulled out a weapon, and fled and

was arrested by other officers. The gun, which formed the basis of his conviction, and some marihuana were seized in conjunction with the arrest. Blackmore’s actions after he got out of the truck provided probable cause for his formal arrest and broke the causal link between any illegal arrest outside the truck

and the seizure of the evidence following his capture. See United States v. Sheppard, 901 F.2d 1230, 1235-36 & n.11 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that flight after assaulting officers broke the nexus between the challenged police conduct and the

evidence seized following the arrest); United States v. Nooks, 446 F.2d 1283,

1288 (5th Cir. 1971) (stating that illegal flight broke the nexus between the illegal arrest and the search subsequent to apprehension).

The judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED.

2

Case: 10-30902 Document: 00511522667 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/28/2011
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Willie Barbour, Appellant.

[975 NYS2d 164]

Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Sullivan, J.), dated February 15, 2011, which, upon a decision of the same court, also dated February 15, 2011, made after a hearing, designated him a level three sexually violent offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

In establishing a defendant’s risk level pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (Correction Law article 6-C), the People bear the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, the facts supporting the determinations sought *(see*Correction Law § 168-n [3]; *see also*Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 5 [2006]; *People v Finizio,*100 AD3d 977, 977 [2012]). “In assessing points, evidence may be derived from the defendant’s admissions, the victim’s statements, evaluative reports completed by the supervising probation officer, parole officer, or corrections counselor, case summaries prepared by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders ... or any other reliable source, including *814reliable hearsay” *(People v Crandall,*90 AD3d 628, 629 [2011]; *see*Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 5 [2006]; *see also People v Mingo,*12 NY3d 563, 571-572 [2009]).

The only points challenged by the defendant before the Supreme Court, and the only points he challenges here, are the 15 points assessed under risk factor 11, based on a history of drug or alcohol abuse. Contrary to the defendant’s contentions, the information contained in the presentence report was “reliable” within the meaning of Correction Law § 168-n (3) *(see People v Mingo,*12 NY3d at 574; *see also*Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, General Principles 11 7 at 5 [2006]). Furthermore, the People established the facts supporting the assessment of points under risk factor 11 by clear and convincing evidence *(see People v Boykin,*102 AD3d 937, 937 [2013]; *People v Finizio,*100 AD3d at 978; *People v Palmer,*91 AD3d 618, 618-619 [2012]). To the extent that the defendant’s testimony at the hearing was in conflict with statements attributed to him in the presentence report, we decline to disturb the Supreme Court’s credibility determination *(see People v Longtin,*54 AD3d 1110, 1111 [2008]; *see also People v Smith,*78 AD3d 917, 918-919 [2010]; *People v Peana,*68 AD3d 737, 737 [2009]). Rivera, J.P, Dillon, Roman and Miller, JJ., concur.
[913 NE2d 407, 885 NYS2d 21]

#### In the Matter of Thomas Anderson et al., Appellants, v Town of Chili Planning Board et al., Respondents.

Decided June 30, 2009

*902APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Hancock & Estabrook, LLP,*Syracuse *(Janet D. Callahan*of counsel), for appellants.

*Keith E. O’Toole,*Spencerport, for Town of Chili Planning Board, respondent.

*Ward Norris Heller & Reidy LLP,*Rochester *(Jeffrey J. Harridine*of counsel), for Metalico Rochester, Inc., respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.11 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.11), order reversed, with costs, respondent Planning Board’s determinations issuing a conditional use permit and a negative declaration annulled and matter remitted to Supreme Court, Monroe County, with directions to remand to the Planning Board for further proceedings for the reasons stated in the dissenting memorandum at the Appellate Division (59 AD3d 1017, 1019-1020 [2009]).

Concur: Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Shannon Williamson, Appellant.

[974 NYS2d 280]

— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Westchester County (Lorenzo, J.), rendered August 7, 2012, convicting her of grand larceny in the fourth degree, upon her plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, her attorney at the plea hearing provided her with meaningful representation *(see generally People v Benevento,*91 NY2d 708, 712 [1998]; *People v Baldi,*54 NY2d 137, 146-147 [1981]). Skelos, J.P., Dickerson, Lott and Austin, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 32.2

Certification Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

(Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code)

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United
States Code), I, Joyce M. Schuldt, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Pioneer Drilling Company, a Texas corporation (the Company), hereby certify, to my knowledge, that:



| | (1) | the Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2007 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                      |  |  |  |  |  |                                                                      
|--------------------- |  |  |  |  |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------
|                      |  |  | 
|Dated: August 2, 2007 |  |  |  |  |  | /s/ Joyce M. Schuldt                                                 
|                      |  |  |  |  |  | Joyce M. Schuldt Executive Vice President and Chief
Financial Officer
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-07-00613-CR

William Charles Taylor, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 331ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. D-1-DC-07-300708, HONORABLE BOB PERKINS, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

William Charles Taylor seeks to appeal his conviction for aggravated assault. The

trial court has certified that this is a plea bargain case and Taylor has no right of appeal. The appeal

is dismissed. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d).

__________________________________________

G. Alan Waldrop, Justice

Before Chief Justice Law, Justices Waldrop and Henson

Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction

Filed: November 13, 2007

Do Not Publish
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<RESTATED> 
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1994
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1995
<CASH>                                             319
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    1,578
<ALLOWANCES>                                       373
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 1,613
<PP&E>                                          10,585
<DEPRECIATION>                                   3,489
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   9,618
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            2,843
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           49,049
<PREFERRED>                                        438
<COMMON>                                           290
<OTHER-SE>                                    (48,787)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     9,618
<SALES>                                          1,091
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 1,264
<CGS>                                              562
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      562
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   596
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 150
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   (44)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (44)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                    118
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (4,415)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.17)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.17)
        

</TABLE>
#### In the Matter of Michael S. Hale, Appellant, v Donald Selsky, as Director of Special Housing and Inmate Disciplinary Programs, Respondent.

Decided March 31, 2009

Appeal dismissed, without costs, by the Court of Appeals, sua sponte, upon the ground that no appeal lies as of right from the unanimous judgment of the Appellate Division absent the direct involvement of a substantial constitutional question (CPLR 5601).
OPI

NI ON WI THDRAWN


## I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S

O F T E X A S NO. AP -76,972

EX P ARTE JUNIUS SERE AL, Appl icant
ON AP P LICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORP US CAUSE NO. 08CR2114 IN THE 405 DISTRICT COURT T H F ROM GALVEST ON COUNTY
Per curiam . O P I N I O N Pursuant to the provisi o n s o f Ar t icle 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e, the cler k of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habea s corpus. Ex parte Y oung , 418 S.W .2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and sentenc ed to thirty -two y ear s’ i m p ri sonment. The Four teenth Court of Appea ls aff

irmed his conviction. Sereal v. State , No. 14-10-00594- CR (Tex. App.–Houston [14 ] t h May 10, 2011). Applicant contends that his due proce ss rig hts wer e violated beca use a fore nsic scientist did not follow acc epted standards when analy zing evidenc e and there fore the results of his analy ses are unreliable
. The State and the trial court agree d that relief was war rante d befor e rema

nd, but the2

rec ord was insufficient to decide the case at that time. This Court rema nded the application to obtain
more information. Specifica lly , the Court neede d three additional piece s of information to resolve this c ase: (1) a copy of the Depa rtment of Public Saf

ety (DPS) repor

t Applicant was rely

ing on for his claim; (2) a deter

mination that the lab technicia n named in that repor

t was the only scientist that
wo rk ed o n t h i s sample; and (3) a finding as to whether the sample was destroy ed or could be rete sted. The tria l court has now provided this Court with a ll the information nece ssary to resolve this case on the me rits. The DPS repor t shows that the l ab technician who was solely responsible for testing the evidenc e in t h i s case is the scientist found to have committed misconduct, and the evidenc e in this case has been destroy ed and there fore cannot be retes t ed
. Applicant is there fore entitled to relief. Relief is g rante d. The judgme nt in Cause No. 0 8 C R 2 1 1 4 i n the 405 District Court of t h Galveston County is set aside, and Applicant is rema nded to the custody of the Sheriff of Galveston County
. The trial court shall issue any nece ssary bench war rant within 10 day s afte r the mandate of this Court i ssues. Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Depa rtment of Criminal Ju s ti ce- Correc tional I nstitut ions Division and Pardons and Paroles Division.

Filed: F ebrua

ry 27, 2013 Publis h 

## OPIN ION WITHD RAW

N
**EXHIBIT 12(a)  
COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF INCOME TOFIXED CHARGES
SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO. AND CONSOLIDATEDSUBSIDIARIES
   TwelveMonthsEndedJul 1,2000 SixMonthsEndedJul 1,2000    
Year Ended*(millions,except ratios)*(unaudited) (unaudited) 1999  1998  1997 1996 1995               Fixed Charges             Interest andamortization of debt discount and expense on all indebtedness$1,248 $ 626 $1,268 $1,423 $1,409 $1,365  $1,373               Add interestelement implicit in rentals132  71  133  144  147  121  119  1,380 697 1,401 1,567 1,556 1,486 1,492Interest Capitalized 4 2 5 5 3 5 4              Total fixedcharges $1,384 $ 699 $1,406 $1,572 $1,559 $1,491 $1,496              Income              Income fromcontinuing operations$1,599 $ 623 $1,453 $1,072 $1,188 $1,271  $1,025Deduct undistributednet income of unconsolidated companies(3)  5  (5)  11  13  8  9 1,602 618  1,458 1,061 1,175 1,263 1,016Add             Fixed charges(excluding interest capitalized)1,380 697 1,401 1,567 1,556 1,486 1,492Income taxes 975  372  904  766  912  834  703 Incomebefore fixed charges and income taxes$3,957$1,687$3,763$3,394$3,643$3,583$3,211             Ratio of incometo fixed charges2.862.412.682.16 2.342.402.15                            

**
<PAGE>   1
                                                                     EXHIBIT 12

                         PENNCORP FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.
              STATEMENT RE RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES AND
                     PREFERRED STOCK DIVIDEND REQUIREMENTS

              For the Years Ended December 31, 1996, 1995 and 1994


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                 1996       1995       1994
                                                               --------   --------   --------
<S>                                                            <C>        <C>        <C>     
Income before income taxes, undistributed earnings in
     unconsolidated affiliates and extraordinary charge ...    $123,699   $ 90,277   $ 58,581
 Adjustments to earnings:
     Fixed charges .........................................     21,333     23,236     20,650
     Interest capitalized ..................................         --         --         --
     Preferred stock dividend requirements
        of majority owned subsidiaries .....................         --         --         --
                                                               --------   --------   --------
Total earnings and fixed charges ...........................   $145,032   $113,513   $ 79,231
                                                               ========   ========   ========


Fixed charges:
     Interest expensed .....................................   $ 17,741   $ 18,729   $ 17,404
     Amortization of deferred debt costs and
          original issue discount ..........................      1,238      1,051        870
     Rental expense ........................................      2,354      3,456      2,376
                                                               --------   --------   --------
Total fixed charges ........................................   $ 21,333   $ 23,236   $ 20,650
                                                               ========   ========   ========

Preferred Stock Requirements:
    Preferred stock dividends ..............................   $ 14,646   $  6,540   $  1,151
    Gross up for taxes .....................................      7,710      3,174        582
                                                               --------   --------   --------
Total preferred stock requirements .........................   $ 22,356   $  9,714   $  1,733
                                                               ========   ========   ========


Ratio of earnings to fixed charges .........................      6.80x      4.89x      3.84x
                                                               ========   ========   ========


Combined ratio of earnings to fixed charges
  and preferred stock dividend requirements ................      3.32x      3.45x      3.54x
                                                               ========   ========   ========
</TABLE>
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

January 27, 2010 

s0120 

Order 

 

January 27, 2010 

139013 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 139013 

 COA: 281667 

Wayne CC: 07-006298-FC 

EUGENE ALEXANDER, JR., 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 28, 2009 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

 KELLY, C.J., and HATHAWAY, J., would hold this case in abeyance for Berghuis v 

Smith, cert gtd ___ US ___; 130 S Ct 48; 174 L Ed 2d 631 (September 30, 2009).