(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2018 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

TAGGART v. LORENZEN, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF 

BROWN, ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

No. 18–489. Argued April 24, 2019—Decided June 3, 2019 

Petitioner Bradley Taggart formerly owned an interest in an Oregon 

company. That company and two of its other owners, who are among

the respondents here, filed suit in Oregon state court, claiming that 

Taggart had breached the company’s operating agreement. Before 

trial, Taggart filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. At the conclusion of that proceeding, the Federal Bankruptcy Court issued a discharge order that released Taggart from liability

for most prebankruptcy debts. After the discharge order issued, the 

Oregon state court entered judgment against Taggart in the prebankruptcy suit and awarded attorney’s fees to respondents. Taggart 

returned to the Federal Bankruptcy Court, seeking civil contempt 

sanctions against respondents for collecting attorney’s fees in violation of the discharge order. The Bankruptcy Court ultimately held 

respondents in civil contempt. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel vacated the sanctions, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the panel’s decision. Applying a subjective standard, the Ninth Circuit concluded 

that a “creditor’s good faith belief” that the discharge order “does not 

apply to the creditor’s claim precludes a finding of contempt, even if

the creditor’s belief if unreasonable.” 888 F. 3d 438, 444. 

Held: A court may hold a creditor in civil contempt for violating a discharge order if there is no fair ground of doubt as to whether the 

order barred the creditor’s conduct. Pp. 4–11. 

(a) This conclusion rests on a longstanding interpretive principle:

When a statutory term is “ ‘obviously transplanted from another legal 

source,’ ” it “ ‘brings the old soil with it.’ ” Hall v. Hall, 584 U. S. ___, 

___. Here, the bankruptcy statutes specifying that a discharge order 

“operates as an injunction,” 11 U. S. C. §524(a)(2), and that a court 
 

 

 

 

 

2 TAGGART v. LORENZEN 

Syllabus 

may issue any “order” or “judgment” that is “necessary or appropriate” to “carry out” other bankruptcy provisions, §105(a), bring with

them the “old soil” that has long governed how courts enforce injunctions. In cases outside the bankruptcy context, this Court has said 

that civil contempt “should not be resorted to where there is [a] fair 

ground of doubt as to the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct.” 

California Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor, 113 U. S. 609, 618. 

This standard is generally an objective one. A party’s subjective belief that she was complying with an order ordinarily will not insulate

her from civil contempt if that belief was objectively unreasonable. 

Subjective intent, however, is not always irrelevant. Civil contempt 

sanctions may be warranted when a party acts in bad faith, and a 

party’s good faith may help to determine an appropriate sanction. 

These traditional civil contempt principles apply straightforwardly to

the bankruptcy discharge context. Under the fair ground of doubt 

standard, civil contempt may be appropriate when the creditor violates a discharge order based on an objectively unreasonable understanding of the discharge order or the statutes that govern its scope.

Pp. 5–7.

(b) The standard applied by the Ninth Circuit is inconsistent with

traditional civil contempt principles, under which parties cannot be 

insulated from a finding of civil contempt based on their subjective 

good faith. Taggart, meanwhile, argues for a standard that would 

operate much like a strict-liability standard. But his proposal often 

may lead creditors to seek advance determinations as to whether 

debts have been discharged, creating the risk of additional federal litigation, additional costs, and additional delays. His proposal, which 

follows the standard some courts have used to remedy violations of 

automatic stays, also ignores key differences in text and purpose between the statutes governing automatic stays and discharge orders. 

Pp. 7–11. 

888 F. 3d 438, vacated and remanded. 

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
 

 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 18–489 

BRADLEY WESTON TAGGART, PETITIONER v. 

SHELLEY A. LORENZEN, EXECUTOR OF THE 

ESTATE OF STUART BROWN, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

[June 3, 2019]

 JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. 

At the conclusion of a bankruptcy proceeding, a bankruptcy court typically enters an order releasing the debtor

from liability for most prebankruptcy debts. This order, 

known as a discharge order, bars creditors from attempting to collect any debt covered by the order. See 11 

U. S. C. §524(a)(2). The question presented here concerns 

the criteria for determining when a court may hold a 

creditor in civil contempt for attempting to collect a debt

that a discharge order has immunized from collection.

The Bankruptcy Court, in holding the creditors here in 

civil contempt, applied a standard that it described as 

akin to “strict liability” based on the standard’s expansive 

scope. In re Taggart, 522 B. R. 627, 632 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Ore.

2014). It held that civil contempt sanctions are permissible, irrespective of the creditor’s beliefs, so long as the 

creditor was “‘aware of the discharge’” order and “‘intended the actions which violate[d]’” it. Ibid. (quoting In 

re Hardy, 97 F. 3d 1384, 1390 (CA11 1996)). The Court of 

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed with 
 

2 TAGGART v. LORENZEN 

Opinion of the Court 

that standard. Applying a subjective standard instead, it

concluded that a court cannot hold a creditor in civil contempt if the creditor has a “good faith belief ” that the 

discharge order “does not apply to the creditor’s claim.” 

In re Taggart, 888 F. 3d 438, 444 (2018). That is so, the 

Court of Appeals held, “even if the creditor’s belief is 

unreasonable.” Ibid. 

We conclude that neither a standard akin to strict liability nor a purely subjective standard is appropriate. Rather, 

in our view, a court may hold a creditor in civil contempt for violating a discharge order if there is no fair 

ground of doubt as to whether the order barred the creditor’s conduct. In other words, civil contempt may be appropriate if there is no objectively reasonable basis for 

concluding that the creditor’s conduct might be lawful. 

I 

Bradley Taggart, the petitioner, formerly owned an 

interest in an Oregon company, Sherwood Park Business 

Center. That company, along with two of its other owners,

brought a lawsuit in Oregon state court, claiming that 

Taggart had breached the Business Center’s operating 

agreement. (We use the name “Sherwood” to refer to the

company, its two owners, and—in some instances—their 

former attorney, who is now represented by the executor of

his estate. The company, the two owners, and the executor are the respondents in this case.)

Before trial, Taggart filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 

7 of the Bankruptcy Code, which permits insolvent debtors

to discharge their debts by liquidating assets to pay creditors. See 11 U. S. C. §§704(a)(1), 726. Ultimately, the

Federal Bankruptcy Court wound up the proceeding and

issued an order granting him a discharge. Taggart’s

discharge order, like many such orders, goes no further 

than the statute: It simply says that the debtor “shall be

granted a discharge under §727.” App. 60; see United 
 

 

 

Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

States Courts, Order of Discharge: Official Form 318 (Dec.

2015), http:/ /www.uscourts.gov / sites / default / files /form _ 

b318_0.pdf (as last visited May 31, 2019). Section 727, the 

statute cited in the discharge order, states that a discharge relieves the debtor “from all debts that arose before 

the date of the order for relief,” “[e]xcept as provided in 

section 523.” §727(b). Section 523 then lists in detail the 

debts that are exempt from discharge. §§523(a)(1)–(19).

The words of the discharge order, though simple, have an 

important effect: A discharge order “operates as an injunction” that bars creditors from collecting any debt that has 

been discharged. §524(a)(2).

After the issuance of Taggart’s federal bankruptcy

discharge order, the Oregon state court proceeded to enter 

judgment against Taggart in the prebankruptcy suit 

involving Sherwood. Sherwood then filed a petition in

state court seeking attorney’s fees that were incurred after 

Taggart filed his bankruptcy petition. All parties agreed

that, under the Ninth Circuit’s decision in In re Ybarra, 

424 F. 3d 1018 (2005), a discharge order would normally

cover and thereby discharge postpetition attorney’s fees 

stemming from prepetition litigation (such as the Oregon

litigation) unless the discharged debtor “‘returned to the 

fray’” after filing for bankruptcy. Id., at 1027. Sherwood 

argued that Taggart had “returned to the fray” postpetition and therefore was liable for the postpetition attorney’s fees that Sherwood sought to collect. The state trial 

court agreed and held Taggart liable for roughly $45,000 

of Sherwood’s postpetition attorney’s fees.

At this point, Taggart returned to the Federal Bankruptcy Court. He argued that he had not returned to the 

state-court “fray” under Ybarra, and that the discharge

order therefore barred Sherwood from collecting postpetition attorney’s fees. Taggart added that the court should 

hold Sherwood in civil contempt because Sherwood had 

violated the discharge order. The Bankruptcy Court did 
 

 

4 TAGGART v. LORENZEN 

Opinion of the Court 

not agree. It concluded that Taggart had returned to the 

fray. Finding no violation of the discharge order, it refused to hold Sherwood in civil contempt. 

Taggart appealed, and the Federal District Court held

that Taggart had not returned to the fray. Hence, it concluded that Sherwood violated the discharge order by

trying to collect attorney’s fees. The District Court remanded the case to the Bankruptcy Court.

The Bankruptcy Court, noting the District Court’s decision, then held Sherwood in civil contempt. In doing so, it

applied a standard it likened to “strict liability.” 522 

B. R., at 632. The Bankruptcy Court held that civil contempt sanctions were appropriate because Sherwood had 

been “‘aware of the discharge’” order and “‘intended the 

actions which violate[d]’” it. Ibid. (quoting In re Hardy, 97 

F. 3d, at 1390). The court awarded Taggart approximately 

$105,000 in attorney’s fees and costs, $5,000 in damages

for emotional distress, and $2,000 in punitive damages. 

Sherwood appealed. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel 

vacated these sanctions, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed 

the panel’s decision. The Ninth Circuit applied a very

different standard than the Bankruptcy Court. It concluded that a “creditor’s good faith belief ” that the discharge order “does not apply to the creditor’s claim precludes a finding of contempt, even if the creditor’s belief is 

unreasonable.” 888 F. 3d, at 444. Because Sherwood had 

a “good faith belief ” that the discharge order “did not

apply” to Sherwood’s claims, the Court of Appeals held

that civil contempt sanctions were improper. Id., at 445. 

Taggart filed a petition for certiorari, asking us to decide 

whether “a creditor’s good-faith belief that the discharge 

injunction does not apply precludes a finding of civil contempt.” Pet. for Cert. I. We granted certiorari. 

II 

The question before us concerns the legal standard for 
 

Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

holding a creditor in civil contempt when the creditor 

attempts to collect a debt in violation of a bankruptcy

discharge order. Two Bankruptcy Code provisions aid our 

efforts to find an answer. The first, section 524, says that 

a discharge order “operates as an injunction against the 

commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset” a 

discharged debt. 11 U. S. C. §524(a)(2). The second, 

section 105, authorizes a court to “issue any order, process,

or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out 

the provisions of this title.” §105(a). 

In what circumstances do these provisions permit a

court to hold a creditor in civil contempt for violating a

discharge order? In our view, these provisions authorize a 

court to impose civil contempt sanctions when there is no

objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor’s conduct might be lawful under the discharge order. 

A 

Our conclusion rests on a longstanding interpretive

principle: When a statutory term is “‘obviously transplanted from another legal source,’” it “‘brings the old soil 

with it.’” Hall v. Hall, 584 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., 

at 13) (quoting Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the 

Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 537 (1947)); 

see Field v. Mans, 516 U. S. 59, 69–70 (1995) (applying 

that principle to the Bankruptcy Code). Here, the statutes 

specifying that a discharge order “operates as an injunction,” §524(a)(2), and that a court may issue any “order” or 

“judgment” that is “necessary or appropriate” to “carry

out” other bankruptcy provisions, §105(a), bring with them

the “old soil” that has long governed how courts enforce 

injunctions.

That “old soil” includes the “potent weapon” of civil 

contempt. Longshoremen v. Philadelphia Marine Trade 

Assn., 389 U. S. 64, 76 (1967). Under traditional princi-
 

 

6 TAGGART v. LORENZEN 

Opinion of the Court 

ples of equity practice, courts have long imposed civil

contempt sanctions to “coerce the defendant into compliance” with an injunction or “compensate the complainant 

for losses” stemming from the defendant’s noncompliance 

with an injunction. United States v. Mine Workers, 330 

U. S. 258, 303–304 (1947); see D. Dobbs & C. Roberts, Law 

of Remedies §2.8, p. 132 (3d ed. 2018); J. High, Law of 

Injunctions §1449, p. 940 (2d ed. 1880). 

The bankruptcy statutes, however, do not grant courts

unlimited authority to hold creditors in civil contempt.

Instead, as part of the “old soil” they bring with them, the

bankruptcy statutes incorporate the traditional standards

in equity practice for determining when a party may be 

held in civil contempt for violating an injunction.

In cases outside the bankruptcy context, we have said 

that civil contempt “should not be resorted to where there

is [a] fair ground of doubt as to the wrongfulness of the 

defendant’s conduct.” California Artificial Stone Paving 

Co. v. Molitor, 113 U. S. 609, 618 (1885) (emphasis added). 

This standard reflects the fact that civil contempt is a

“severe remedy,” ibid., and that principles of “basic fairness requir[e] that those enjoined receive explicit notice” of 

“what conduct is outlawed” before being held in civil contempt, Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U. S. 473, 476 (1974) (per 

curiam). See Longshoremen, supra, at 76 (noting that civil 

contempt usually is not appropriate unless “those who 

must obey” an order “will know what the court intends to

require and what it means to forbid”); 11A C. Wright,

A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 

§2960, pp. 430–431 (2013) (suggesting that civil contempt

may be improper if a party’s attempt at compliance was 

“reasonable”).

This standard is generally an objective one. We have 

explained before that a party’s subjective belief that she 

was complying with an order ordinarily will not insulate

her from civil contempt if that belief was objectively un-
 

 

Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

reasonable. As we said in McComb v. Jacksonville Paper 

Co., 336 U. S. 187 (1949), “[t]he absence of wilfulness does

not relieve from civil contempt.” Id., at 191. 

We have not held, however, that subjective intent is 

always irrelevant. Our cases suggest, for example, that

civil contempt sanctions may be warranted when a party 

acts in bad faith. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U. S. 

32, 50 (1991). Thus, in McComb, we explained that a

party’s “record of continuing and persistent violations” and 

“persistent contumacy” justified placing “the burden of any

uncertainty in the decree . . . on [the] shoulders” of the

party who violated the court order. 336 U. S., at 192–193. 

On the flip side of the coin, a party’s good faith, even

where it does not bar civil contempt, may help to determine an appropriate sanction. Cf. Young v. United States 

ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A., 481 U. S. 787, 801 (1987) 

(“[O]nly the least possible power adequate to the end 

proposed should be used in contempt cases” (quotation

altered)).

These traditional civil contempt principles apply

straightforwardly to the bankruptcy discharge context. 

The typical discharge order entered by a bankruptcy court

is not detailed. See supra, at 2–3. Congress, however, has 

carefully delineated which debts are exempt from discharge. See §§523(a)(1)–(19). Under the fair ground of

doubt standard, civil contempt therefore may be appropriate when the creditor violates a discharge order based on

an objectively unreasonable understanding of the discharge order or the statutes that govern its scope. 

B 

The Solicitor General, amicus here, agrees with the fair 

ground of doubt standard we adopt. Brief for United 

States as Amicus Curiae 13–15. And the respondents

stated at oral argument that it would be appropriate for 

courts to apply that standard in this context. Tr. of Oral 
 

 

8 TAGGART v. LORENZEN 

Opinion of the Court 

Arg. 43. The Ninth Circuit and petitioner Taggart, however, each believe that a different standard should apply.

As for the Ninth Circuit, the parties and the Solicitor

General agree that it adopted the wrong standard. So do 

we. The Ninth Circuit concluded that a “creditor’s good

faith belief ” that the discharge order “does not apply to

the creditor’s claim precludes a finding of contempt, even

if the creditor’s belief is unreasonable.” 888 F. 3d, at 444. 

But this standard is inconsistent with traditional civil 

contempt principles, under which parties cannot be insulated from a finding of civil contempt based on their subjective good faith. It also relies too heavily on difficult-toprove states of mind. And it may too often lead creditors 

who stand on shaky legal ground to collect discharged 

debts, forcing debtors back into litigation (with its accompanying costs) to protect the discharge that it was the very

purpose of the bankruptcy proceeding to provide.

Taggart, meanwhile, argues for a standard like the one

applied by the Bankruptcy Court. This standard would 

permit a finding of civil contempt if the creditor was aware 

of the discharge order and intended the actions that violated the order. Brief for Petitioner 19; cf. 522 B. R., at 

632 (applying a similar standard). Because most creditors 

are aware of discharge orders and intend the actions they

take to collect a debt, this standard would operate much

like a strict-liability standard. It would authorize civil 

contempt sanctions for a violation of a discharge order 

regardless of the creditor’s subjective beliefs about the 

scope of the discharge order, and regardless of whether 

there was a reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor’s conduct did not violate the order. Taggart argues 

that such a standard would help the debtor obtain the

“fresh start” that bankruptcy promises. He adds that a 

standard resembling strict liability would be fair to creditors because creditors who are unsure whether a debt has 

been discharged can head to federal bankruptcy court and 
 

Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

obtain an advance determination on that question before

trying to collect the debt. See Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 

4007(a).

We doubt, however, that advance determinations would 

provide a workable solution to a creditor’s potential dilemma. A standard resembling strict liability may lead 

risk-averse creditors to seek an advance determination in 

bankruptcy court even where there is only slight doubt as

to whether a debt has been discharged. And because 

discharge orders are written in general terms and operate

against a complex statutory backdrop, there will often be 

at least some doubt as to the scope of such orders. Taggart’s proposal thus may lead to frequent use of the advance determination procedure. Congress, however, expected that this procedure would be needed in only a small 

class of cases. See 11 U. S. C. §523(c)(1) (noting only three 

categories of debts for which creditors must obtain advance determinations). The widespread use of this procedure also would alter who decides whether a debt has been 

discharged, moving litigation out of state courts, which

have concurrent jurisdiction over such questions, and into 

federal courts. See 28 U. S. C. §1334(b); Advisory Committee’s 2010 Note on subd. (c)(1) of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8,

28 U. S. C. App., p. 776 (noting that “whether a claim was 

excepted from discharge” is “in most instances” not determined in bankruptcy court).

Taggart’s proposal would thereby risk additional federal 

litigation, additional costs, and additional delays. That 

result would interfere with “a chief purpose of the bankruptcy laws”: “‘to secure a prompt and effectual’” resolution of bankruptcy cases “‘within a limited period.’” 

Katchen v. Landy, 382 U. S. 323, 328 (1966) (quoting Ex 

parte Christy, 3 How. 292, 312 (1844)). These negative

consequences, especially the costs associated with the

added need to appear in federal proceedings, could work to 

the disadvantage of debtors as well as creditors. 
 

 

10 TAGGART v. LORENZEN 

Opinion of the Court 

Taggart also notes that lower courts often have used a 

standard akin to strict liability to remedy violations of automatic stays. See Brief for Petitioner 21. An automatic 

stay is entered at the outset of a bankruptcy proceeding.

The statutory provision that addresses the remedies for 

violations of automatic stays says that “an individual 

injured by any willful violation” of an automatic stay

“shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover 

punitive damages.” 11 U. S. C. §362(k)(1). This language,

however, differs from the more general language in section 

105(a). Supra, at 5. The purposes of automatic stays and 

discharge orders also differ: A stay aims to prevent damaging disruptions to the administration of a bankruptcy 

case in the short run, whereas a discharge is entered at 

the end of the case and seeks to bind creditors over a much 

longer period. These differences in language and purpose 

sufficiently undermine Taggart’s proposal to warrant its

rejection. (We note that the automatic stay provision uses 

the word “willful,” a word the law typically does not associate with strict liability but “‘whose construction is often 

dependent on the context in which it appears.’” Safeco 

Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U. S. 47, 57 (2007) (quoting Bryan v. United States, 524 U. S. 184, 191 (1998)). We 

need not, and do not, decide whether the word “willful” 

supports a standard akin to strict liability.) 

III 

We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in applying 

a subjective standard for civil contempt. Based on the 

traditional principles that govern civil contempt, the

proper standard is an objective one. A court may hold a 

creditor in civil contempt for violating a discharge order 

where there is not a “fair ground of doubt” as to whether 

the creditor’s conduct might be lawful under the discharge 

order. In our view, that standard strikes the “careful 
Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

balance between the interests of creditors and debtors” 

that the Bankruptcy Code often seeks to achieve. Clark v. 

Rameker, 573 U. S. 122, 129 (2014). 

Because the Court of Appeals did not apply the proper

standard, we vacate the judgment below and remand the 

case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered.