This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A15-0517

Mackenzie Leigh Meier, petitioner,

Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,

Respondent.

Filed November 23, 2015

Affirmed

Stauber, Judge

Dakota County District Court

File No. 19HA-CR-11-2982

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Katie Conners, Special Assistant 

State Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Chip Granger, Assistant County Attorney, 

Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Kirk, Judge; and Willis, 

Judge.



 

 

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to 

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

STAUBER, Judge

Appellant challenges the summary denial of her petition for postconviction relief, 

arguing that (1) the district court abused its discretion by concluding that her petition was 

time-barred; (2) she should be permitted to withdraw her guilty plea based on newly 

discovered evidence, a Brady violation, due-process violations, manifest injustice, and 

ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) she is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. We 

affirm. 

FACTS

In September 2011, appellant Mackenzie Meier was charged with possession of a 

controlled substance in the fifth degree. The complaint alleged that during a routine 

traffic stop, a Hastings police officer heard the sound of breaking glass after he observed

appellant throw “an object out the passenger side window of the vehicle.” The complaint 

also alleged that the officer later retrieved a glass pipe that was tested and determined to 

contain .09 grams of methamphetamine. 

On September 26, 2011, appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled 

substance in the fifth degree. The district court stayed adjudication of the matter and 

placed appellant on probation for three years. But after appellant violated the terms of 

her probation, the district court filed an amended order on October 3, 2012, revoking the 

stay of adjudication and sentencing appellant to a stay of imposition under Minn. Stat. 

§ 609.135 (2014).
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In July 2012, the St. Paul Police Department Crime Laboratory (SPPDCL) came 

under public scrutiny and was the subject of a Frye-Mack hearing in an unrelated Dakota 

County District Court case. Independent reviews of the SPPDCL indicated problems in 

the laboratory protocols and testing procedures. In light of the problems at the SPPDCL, 

appellant filed a postconviction petition on July 18, 2014, arguing that she should be 

allowed to withdraw her guilty plea or be granted an evidentiary hearing because (1) the 

deficient SPPDCL testing is newly discovered evidence; (2) the state violated Brady v. 

Maryland by not disclosing the deficient testing; (3) the state violated appellant’s dueprocess rights by using unreliable scientific evidence to obtain the guilty plea; 

(4) appellant’s guilty plea was not accurate, voluntary, or intelligent; and (5) she received 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant claimed that although her petition was filed 

more than two years after her sentence, her petition was timely because it met the newly 

discovered evidence and the interests-of-justice exceptions to the statutory two-year time 

bar. 

The district court denied appellant’s petition without an evidentiary hearing, 

concluding that the petition is time-barred and fails on the merits. This appeal followed.

D E C I S I O N

An appellate court reviews a summary denial of postconviction relief for an abuse 

of discretion. Powers v. State, 695 N.W.2d 371, 374 (Minn. 2005). “A postconviction 

court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or 

is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 503 (Minn. 

2013) (quotation omitted).
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I.

Appellant challenges the district court’s conclusion that her postconviction 

petition is time-barred. A petition for postconviction relief must be filed within two years 

of the later of “(1) the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is 

filed; or (2) an appellate court’s disposition of petitioner’s direct appeal.” Minn. Stat. 

§ 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2014). But, recently, our supreme court held that “[w]hen an 

offender receives a stay of adjudication under Minn. Stat. § 152.18, subd. 1 (2014), there 

is no judgment of conviction or sentence that triggers the 2-year statute of limitations in 

Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)(1).” Dupey v. State, 868 N.W.2d 36, 37 (Minn. 2015). 

Instead, the section 590.01 time-bar is triggered “only after the stay [is] revoked,” the 

offender is sentenced, and the district court enters a judgment of conviction. Id. at 41.

Here, because appellant received a stay of adjudication after pleading guilty on 

September 26, 2011, the section 590.01 time-bar was not triggered on that date. Rather,

under Dupey, the two-year time-bar began to run on October 3, 2012, when the stay of 

adjudication was revoked and the district court sentenced appellant to a stay of 

imposition under Minn. Stat. § 609.135. Because appellant filed her postconviction 

petition on July 18, 2014, less than two years after the district court revoked the stay of 

adjudication and stayed imposition of appellant’s sentence, the district court erred by 

concluding that appellant’s postconviction petition was time-barred under section 590.01.

II.

Appellant argues that the “deficiencies” at the SPPDC “should allow her to 

withdraw her plea based on” (1) a manifest injustice; (2) ineffective assistance of 
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counsel; (3) newly discovered evidence; (4) a Brady violation; and (5) a due-process 

violation. But “[a] guilty plea by a counseled defendant has traditionally operated . . . as 

a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects arising prior to the entry of the plea.” State v. 

Ford, 397 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Minn. 1986). “When a criminal defendant has solemnly 

admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he 

may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional 

rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” State v. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 

56, 64 (Minn. 2011). Because appellant had counsel and entered a guilty plea, she 

waived all non-jurisdictional arguments in her postconviction petition. Therefore, the

only substantive arguments raised by appellant that were not waived by her guilty plea 

consist of her manifest-injustice and ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. 

A. Manifest injustice

A court must allow a defendant to withdraw her guilty plea when “necessary to 

correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15 .05, subd. 1. A manifest injustice 

occurs if a guilty plea is not valid because it is not accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. 

Perkins v. State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Minn. 1997). Appellant argues that her guilty 

plea was not (1) accurate; (2) voluntary; or (3) intelligent.

1. Accurate 

For a guilty plea to be accurate, a proper factual basis must be established. State v. 

Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). Here, appellant pleaded guilty to fifth-degree 

possession of a controlled substance. Appellant’s signed plea petition demonstrates that 

she was not making any claim that she was innocent. She also admitted at the plea 
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hearing that she possessed the glass pipe containing methamphetamine and that she knew 

the substance in the pipe was methamphetamine. These facts meet the accuracy 

requirement. 

2. Voluntary

A plea is voluntary if the defendant’s will was not overborne at the time she 

pleaded guilty in response to improper pressures or promises. See State v. Farnsworth, 

738 N.W.2d 364, 374-75 (Minn. 2007). Appellant argues that her plea was involuntary 

because the test results from the SPPDCL improperly pressured her to plead guilty. We 

disagree. Appellant never requested to investigate the SPPDCL reports, nor did she 

dispute that the substance in her possession was methamphetamine. Moreover, appellant 

acknowledged at the plea hearing that no one was forcing her to plead guilty, and that she 

had not been promised anything outside the parameters of the plea agreement. Thus, 

appellant is unable to demonstrate that she was improperly pressured or coerced into 

pleading guilty.

3. Intelligent

A plea is intelligent if a defendant understands “the charges against him, the rights 

he [was] waiving, and the consequences of his plea.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 

96 (Minn. 2010). Appellant claims that her plea was unintelligent because she did not 

know about the testing deficiencies at the SPPDCL, she did not understand the scope of 

her right to challenge the evidence, and did not know that she was waiving this right by 

pleading guilty. But at the plea hearing, appellant acknowledged the charges against her 

and that she was pleading guilty to fifth degree possession of methamphetamine, a 
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controlled substance. Appellant also stated that her attorney informed her of the rights 

she was waiving and that she would not have any other opportunity to object to the 

evidence presented by the state. Therefore, the record reflects that appellant understood 

the charges against her, the rights she was waiving, and the consequences of her guilty 

plea. Because appellant’s guilty plea was accurate, voluntary, and intelligent, she is not 

entitled to withdraw her plea. 

B. Ineffective assistance of counsel

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must 

demonstrate “(1) that [her] counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness’; and (2) ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Nissalke 

v. State, 861 N.W.2d 88, 94 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 688, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984)). An attorney provides reasonable 

assistance when he exercises the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably 

competent attorney would exercise under the circumstances. Dukes v. State, 621 N.W.2d 

246, 252 (Minn. 2001).

Appellant contends that her “attorney did not act reasonably in light of all the 

circumstances because the attorney did not demand and review the underlying [SPPDCL] 

file in her case.” But this court rejected an identical argument in Roberts v. State, 856 

N.W.2d 287, 293 (Minn. App. 2014), review denied (Minn. Jan. 28, 2015). As in 

Roberts, there is nothing in the record indicating that appellant ever questioned the 

validity of the test results. Appellant also has failed to cite any evidence that would have 
8

given her attorney a reason to believe that the substance in her pipe was not 

methamphetamine and, therefore, to question the validity of the SPPDCL test results. 

Moreover, appellant has not shown that a reasonably competent defense attorney 

exercising customary skills and diligence in a controlled-substance case would have 

demanded the SPPDCL file before the discovery of the SPPDCL’s deficiencies. See 

State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248, 267 (Minn. 2014) (stating that the reasonableness of 

counsel’s conduct is judged in view of the facts at the time of the conduct). And finally,

appellant’s claim that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the test 

results is considered a part of trial strategy, which this court generally does not review. 

See Opsahl v. State, 677 N.W.2d 414, 421 (Minn. 2004) (stating that “[t]he extent of 

counsel’s investigation is considered a part of trial strategy,” which is generally not 

reviewable). Therefore, appellant is unable to establish that she was denied the effective 

assistance of counsel.

III.

Finally, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her 

petition without an evidentiary hearing. We disagree. When a petition for postconviction 

relief is filed, “the court shall promptly set an early hearing on the petition and response 

thereto, and promptly determine the issues” “[u]nless the petition and the files and 

records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” 

Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2014); see Erickson v. State, 842 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Minn. 

2014). The threshold standard for an evidentiary hearing is lower than that for a new 

trial; “[a]ny doubts about whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing should be resolved in 
9

favor of the defendant seeking relief.” Nicks, 831 N.W.2d at 504. The district court’s 

decision on whether to hold an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 

Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012).

Here, appellant never challenged the lab results or claimed that the substance in 

the glass pipe was not methamphetamine. Instead, she pleaded guilty to the charged 

offense, admitting that the substance she possessed was methamphetamine. Appellant 

has also failed to make any connection between the problems at the SPPDCL and the 

testing of the evidence in her case. Accordingly, appellant cannot demonstrate that the 

district court abused its discretion in denying her request for an evidentiary hearing.

Affirmed.