alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 35.3

SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT (Item 1123)

Homecomings Financial, LLC

RALI Series 2007-QS6 Trust (the Issuing Entity)

The undersigned, a duly authorized officer of Homecomings Financial, LLC, as servicer (the Servicer) pursuant to the applicable servicing agreement, does hereby certify that:

1. A review of the Servicers activities during the period from and including April 27, 2007 through and including September 24, 2007 and of the
Servicers performance under the applicable servicing agreement has been made under my supervision.

2. To the best of my knowledge, based on such
review, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the applicable servicing agreement in all material respects throughout such period.

IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has duly executed this Certificate this 24th day of March 2008.



|       |  |                     
|------ |  | --------------------
|By:    |  | /s/ Anthony N. Renzi
|Name:  |  | Anthony N. Renzi    
|Title: |  | Managing Director
Amendment No.2 to Master Security Agreement



 Exhibit 10.13 
  
 AMENDMENT NO. 2 
  
 THIS AMENDMENT NO. 2 is made as of the 18th day of August 2004, between General Electric Capital Corporation (“Secured Party”) and Xcyte
Therapies, Inc. (“Debtor”) in connection with that certain Master Security Agreement and Amendment, dated as of May 1, 2000 (“Agreement”). The terms of this Amendment No. 2 are hereby incorporated into the Agreement as though
fully set forth therein. Section references below refer to the section numbers of the Agreement. The Agreement is hereby amended to add the following events of default to Section 7(a): 
  
 “(xii) Debtor’s improper filing of an amendment or termination statement relating to a filed financing statement
describing the Collateral without the prior written consent of the Secured Party ; 
  
 (xiii) There is a material adverse change in the Debtor’s financial condition, which would materially impair the ability of Debtor to perform its material obligations hereunder, as determined solely, reasonably
and in good faith by Secured Party; 
  
 (xiv) Any Guarantor
revokes or attempts to revoke its guaranty of any of the Indebtedness or fails to observe or perform any material covenant, condition or agreement to be performed under any guaranty or other related document to which it is a party; 
  
 (xv) Debtor defaults under any other material obligation totaling at least
$500,000 for (A) borrowed money, (B) the deferred purchase price of property or (C) payments due under any lease agreement, unless Debtor cures any such defaults within 30 days; or 
  
 (xvi) At any time during the term of this Agreement Debtor sells all or substantially all of its assets without Secured
Party’s prior written consent. 
  
 TERMS USED, BUT NOT
OTHERWISE DEFINED HEREIN SHALL HAVE THE MEANINGS GIVEN TO THEM IN THE AGREEMENT. EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY AMENDED HEREBY, THE AGREEMENT SHALL REMAIN IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT. IF THERE IS ANY CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT AND THIS
AMENDMENT NO. 2, THEN THIS AMENDMENT NO. 2 SHALL CONTROL. 
  
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Amendment No. 2 simultaneously with the Agreement by signature of their respective authorized representative set forth below. 
  

									
	General Electric Capital Corporation	 	 	 	Xcyte Therapies, Inc.
					
	 By:
	 	 /s/ Diane Earle
	 	 	 	 By:
	 	 /s/ Kathi Cordova

	 Name:
	 	 Diane Earle
	 	 	 	 Name:
	 	 Kathi Cordova

	 Title:
	 	 Senior Vice President
	 	 	 	 Title:
	 	 Senior VP Finance & Treasurer
#### In the Matter of Jessey Andrews S. and Another, Infants. Benny William W., Appellant; Jewish Child Care Association of New York, Respondent.

[973 NYS2d 133]

*490Orders of disposition, Family Court, Bronx County (Sidney Gribetz, J.), entered on or about April 25, 2011, which, upon fact-finding determinations that respondent’s consent was not required for the adoption of the subject children and, in the alternative, that respondent permanently neglected the children, terminated respondent’s parental rights and committed the custody and guardianship of the children to the Commissioner of Social Services and petitioner agency for the purpose of adoption, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The record supports the court’s finding that respondent’s consent was not required for the adoption of the children *(see*Domestic Relations Law § 111 [1] [d], [e]; *Matter of Timothy M. [Timothy B.],*79 AD3d 595 [1st Dept 2010]). Respondent, who did not live with the children’s mother during the relevant period, admitted that he made no payment toward the support of the children. The small gifts and occasional meals he gave them are insufficient to constitute support *(see*Domestic Relations Law § 111 [1] [d] [i]).

The record also supports the court’s alternative finding that respondent permanently neglected the children by failing to plan for their future despite the agency’s diligent efforts to strengthen his relationship with them *(see*Social Services Law § 384-b [7] [a]; *Matter of Sheila G.,*61 NY2d 368 [1984]). The case worker testified that the agency made numerous referrals and that respondent refused them, saying that he had completed the services in the past in connection with proceedings to terminate his parental rights to his two other children. Moreover, respondent admitted that he failed to complete the service plan before the petitions were filed.

The record demonstrates that it is in the best interests of the children to be freed for adoption *(see*Family Ct Act § 631; *Matter of Michael B.,*80 NY2d 299 [1992]). While respondent has failed to address the problems that led to the children’s placement, the foster parents, who want to adopt the children, have provided them with a loving, supportive home in which their special needs are addressed. Concur — Tom, J.P., Sweeny, Saxe, Freedman and Clark, JJ.
EXHIBIT 31
 CERTIFICATION
      a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under my supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including any consolidated subsidiaries, is
made known to me by others within those entities, particularly during the period in
which this report is being prepared;b)
    
    Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such
internal control over financial reporting to be designed under my supervision, to
provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the
preparation of financial statements for external purposes;c)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report my conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report
based on such evaluation; andd)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter
(the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants
internal control over financial reporting; and
  a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation
of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely
affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
information; andb)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves persons who have a
significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.
  Date: November 9, 2011
    By:
    /s/ Lee Ann AndersonLee Ann AndersonVice President and Senior Trust Officer,
Compass Bank
II 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 68 

To amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to provide 100 percent 

reimbursement for medical assistance provided to a Native Hawaiian 

through a federally-qualified health center or a Native Hawaiian health 

care system. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 24, 2005 

Mr. INOUYE introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to provide 

100 percent reimbursement for medical assistance provided to a Native Hawaiian through a federally-qualified 

health center or a Native Hawaiian health care system. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Native Hawaiian Med5 icaid Coverage Act of 2005’’. 
2 

•S 68 IS

1 SEC. 2. 100 PERCENT FMAP FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE 

2 PROVIDED TO A NATIVE HAWAIIAN THROUGH 

3 A FEDERALLY-QUALIFIED HEALTH CENTER 

4 OR A NATIVE HAWAIIAN HEALTH CARE SYS5 TEM UNDER THE MEDICAID PROGRAM. 

6 (a) MEDICAID.—The third sentence of section 

7 1905(b) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1396d(b)) 

8 is amended by inserting ‘‘, and with respect to medical 

9 assistance provided to a Native Hawaiian (as defined in 

10 section 12 of the Native Hawaiian Health Care Improve11 ment Act) through a federally-qualified health center or 

12 a Native Hawaiian health care system (as so defined) 

13 whether directly, by referral, or under contract or other 

14 arrangement between a federally-qualified health center or 

15 a Native Hawaiian health care system and another health 

16 care provider’’ before the period. 

17 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

18 this section applies to medical assistance provided on or 

19 after the date of enactment of this Act. 

Æ
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 18

- 279

_____________________________
T REVIS P RINCE , Appellant,

v.

W ELLS F ARGO B ANK N.A. as trustee on behalf o f The Holders of the Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust Mortgage Loan Pass

- through Certificates Series 2007

- 1 , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County

. Donna M. Keim , Judge

. March 1, 2019

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

.
R OWE , B ILBREY , and W INSOR , JJ., concur

.2 _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________

James H. Cerveny, Gainesville ; and Niles B. Whitten, Gainesville, for Appellant.

Allison Morat of Bitman O’Brien & Morat, P LL C , Maitland
, for Appellee.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
UNAUDITED CONDENSED STATEMENTS OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND TRUST CORPUS OF SAN
JUAN BASIN ROYALTY TRUST AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1996, AND THE RELATED CONDENSED
STATEMENTS OF DISTRIBUTABLE INCOME AND CHANGES IN TRUST CORPUS FOR THE
THREE-MONTH PERIOD ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1996.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                      21,157,781
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            21,157,781
<PP&E>                                     133,275,528
<DEPRECIATION>                              68,159,170
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              86,274,139
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       21,157,781
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                  65,116,358
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                86,274,139
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            24,139,301
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,348,584
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             22,790,717
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         22,790,717
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                22,790,717
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER

Appellate case name: Erin McCain and Marc A. Townley v. Linda A. Lanier

Appellate case number: 01

- 21

- 00679

- CV

Trial court case number: 2020

- 59696

Trial court: 151st District Court of Harris County

Appellee, Linda A. Lanier, has filed a “First Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellee’s Brief.” Appellants, Erin McCain and Marc A. Townley, filed their appellants’ brief on February 3, 2022, making appelle e’s brief initially due to be filed on or before February 23, 202 2

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 38.6(b). On March 14, 2022, appellee was notified by the Clerk of this Court that the deadline for filing her appellee’s brief had expired , and that the appeal may be set for submission without an appellee’s brief unless she filed her brief, or a motion to extend time to file her brief, within ten days of the notice

. On March 22 , 2022, appellee filed “unopposed” motion to extend the deadline, requesting an extension of eighty

- days for filing her appellee’s brief, making her brief due
no later than June 2 , 2022. In the motion, counsel for appellee states that the extension i s
necessary “to be able to prepare a cogent and succinct brief

. ”

As noted, a ppellee’s motion is titled as an “unopposed motion to extend time to file appellee’s brief.” However, the motion also includes a certificate of conference stating that counsel for appellee “attempted to confer . . . [with] [a]ppellants regarding t his motion, but [he] was unable to reach Marc[] A. Townley after several attempts.”
Appellee’s motion is granted in part

. Appellee’s brief is due to be filed within thirty days of the date of this order

. Absent extraordinary circumstances, no further

ext ensions will be granted , and the failure to file an appellee’s brief by the extended deadline may result in the Court setting the case “at

- issue” and considering and deciding the case without an appellee’s brief. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 10.5(b), 38.6(d).It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: ____

/s/ Amparo Guerra

______  Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: ___ March 31, 2022

____
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 98-20741

Summary Calendar

_______________

In the Matter of: ROY BERT ROBINSON,

Debtor.

RICHARD HENRY PARKER, JR.,

Appellant,

VERSUS

DONALD M. LANCON, ROY BERT ROBINSON,

and

KATHLEEN ROBINSON,

Appellees.

******************************************

In the Matter of: RICHARD HENRY PARKER, JR.,

Debtor.

RICHARD HENRY PARKER, JR.,

Appellant,

VERSUS

DONALD M. LANCON, ROY BERT ROBINSON,

and

KATHLEEN ROBINSON,

Appellees.
 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

2

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(H-95-CV-5714)

_________________________

June 14, 1999

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Richard Parker appeals the district court's rejection of all

of his challenges to bankruptcy court orders. The first error

Parker allegesSSthe failure of the bankruptcy court to disqualify

an attorneySShe waived by failing to designate the issue in his

statement of issues submitted to the district court pursuant to

FED. R. BANKR. P. 8006. See Zimmermann v. Jenkins (In re GGM, P.C.),

165 F.3d 1026, 1031 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding “that, even if an

issue is argued in the bankruptcy court and ruled on by that court,

it is not preserved for appeal under Bankruptcy Rule 8006 unless

the appellant includes the issue in its statement of issues on

appeal.”).

Regarding the remaining issues, there is no reversible error,

and we affirm on the basis of the district court's thorough

opinion, which does a fine job of wading through the convoluted

morass of proceedings to resolve the fairly simple legal arguments.

It is time for this seemingly endless litigationSSover fifteen

years of related cases, involving several courts at both the state

and federal levelSSto be brought to conclusion. AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>


                                     EXHIBIT 11

                           DEGEORGE FINANCIAL CORPORATION

               STATEMENT REGARDING COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS


The Company is required, pursuant to FAS 128, to present basic and diluted
earnings (loss) per share.  Basic earnings (loss) per share is based on the
weighted average number of shares outstanding during the period.  Diluted
earnings (loss) per share amounts assume the conversion, exercise or issuance of
all potential common stock instruments, unless the effect is to reduce the loss
or increase the income per common share from continuing operations.

For the years ended December 31, 1997 and 1995, basic and diluted loss per
common share is based on 10,810,193 weighted average shares outstanding, as the
effect of common stock equivalents (i.e. weighted average effect of options
outstanding) was anti-dilutive.

Weighted average shares for the 1996 computation of earnings per share are as
follows:

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

<S>                                                         <C>
Weighted average shares outstanding - basic                 10,810,193
Weighted average effect of options outstanding                  12,924
                                                            ----------
Weighted average shares outstanding - diluted               10,823,117
                                                            ----------
                                                            ----------

</TABLE>


                                          107
#### Turner *v.*The Stewart Mercantile Company.

There being no plea of the non-joinder of another person as codefendant, nor of the statute of frauds, the evidence, though conflicting, warranted the verdict. Nor was there any error in charging the jury that if they believed defendant opened an account with plaintiff for Hood to buy the goods sued for, then it was the duty of the defendant to notify the plaintiff when to stop and sell no more; there being evidence on which to base the charge.

April 2, 1894.

Argued at the last term.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Action on account. Before Judge Hunt. Henry superior court. April term, 1893.

J. H. Wise and W. T. Dicken, for plaintiff in error.

E. J. Reagan, *contra.*

The suit was for the price of goods delivered to Hood, but for which plaintiff claimed Turner had agreed to pay, and which were sold on Turner’s credit. The verdict was for the plaintiff. Defendant moved for a new trial on the general grounds, and for error in the charge stated in the head-note. The motion was overruled. The evidence for plaintiff showed that in the spring defendant and Hood came together-to plaintiff’s store, and defendant told plaintiff to let Hood have the goods and that defendant “would see it paid.” The goods were sold on this statement and charged to Turner on the books. Hood had previously applied for credit and had been refused. Further sales were subsequently made to Hood and charged in the same way. In the summer defendant was informed by plaintiff of the state of the account, and told plaintiff not to let Hood go too far, or not to let him have more than he was obliged to have. In the autumn defendant denied liability for any goods other than those sold on the first day. The evidence for defendant tended to show that he did not authorize plaintiff' to sell goods on his account.
**Exhibit 31.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

 

**RULE 13a-14 OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934**

 

I, James W. Sullivan, certify that:

 

1.                                      I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of MoSys, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2012;

 

2.                                      Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3.                                      [Intentionally omitted]

 

4.                                      [Intentionally omitted]

 

5.                                      [Intentionally omitted]

 

 
| Date:   May 14, 2013                               |   |
|---------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                                                    |   |
| /s/   JAMES W. SULLIVAN                                 |   |
| James   W. Sullivan                                     |   |
| *Vice President of Finance and Chief Financial Officer* |   |

 

----
#### Knight v. Abbott Labs.

Case below: 177 N.C. App. 287

No. 399P01-2

Pit’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 (COA05-1061)

Denied 01/25/07

Timmons-Goodson, J., Recused
#### Durant *v.*The Western Union Telegraph Company. Rodgers *v.*The Western Union Telegraph Company.

The declaration in an action against a telegraph company to recover the statutory penalty for failing to deliver a message with due diligence is amendable so as to make it allege that the sendee, at the time of the sending of the message, resided in the town to which the message was directed, and within one mile of the defendant company’s office in that town. *Western Union Telegraph Company*v. *Smith,*93 *Ga.*035. *Judgment reversed.*

August 20, 1894.

Actions for penalty. Before Judge Smith. Wilcox superior court. September term, 1893.

Hal Lawson, for plaintiffs.

Gustin, Guerry & Hall, for defendant.
#### Foster v. Crandell

Case below: 181 N.C. App. 152

No. 073P07

1. Defs’ Motion for Temporary Stay (COA05-1140)

2. Defs’ Petition for Writ of Supersedeas

3. Defs’ PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31

1. Allowed 02/09/07 361 N.C. 352 Stay dissolved 08/23/07

2. Denied 08/23/07

3. Denied 08/23/07