UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-2194

ROBERT A. SNYDER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

CITIMORTGAGE, INCORPORATED; CITIFINANCIAL, INCORPORATED,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. James K. Bredar, District Judge. 

(1:13-cv-02084-JKB)

Submitted: February 25, 2014 Decided: March 6, 2014

Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Robert A. Snyder, Appellant Pro Se. Robert A. Scott, BALLARD 

SPAHR, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Robert A. Snyder appeals the district court’s order 

denying his motion to remand his quiet title action to state 

court, granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and dismissing 

his complaint for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). On appeal, Snyder contends 

that the district court erred in denying his motion to remand 

his case to the state court. We agree. 

“We review de novo questions of subject matter 

jurisdiction, including those relating to the propriety of 

removal.” Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 460 (4th Cir. 1999). 

“The burden of demonstrating jurisdiction resides with the party 

seeking removal.” Md. Stadium Auth. v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 

407 F.3d 255, 260 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). We “construe removal jurisdiction strictly”; thus, 

“if federal jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand to state court is 

necessary.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets 

omitted).

Here, Defendants did not establish the existence of 

diversity jurisdiction. Thus, we must be satisfied that 

Defendants established federal question jurisdiction, in 

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012), which confers on 

federal courts “original jurisdiction of all civil actions 

arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
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States.” A case may “arise under the laws of the United States 

if a well-pleaded complaint established that [the plaintiff’s] 

right to relief under state law requires resolution of a 

substantial question of federal law in dispute between the 

parties.” Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 

463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 

party seeking removal must therefore establish two elements: 

“(1) that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on 

a question of federal law, and (2) that the question of federal 

law is substantial.” Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 

816 (4th Cir. 2004). “A plaintiff’s right to relief for a given 

claim necessarily depends on a question of federal law only when 

every legal theory supporting the claim requires the resolution 

of a federal issue.” Id.; see Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic 

Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 153 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[I]f a claim is 

supported not only by a theory establishing federal subject

matter jurisdiction but also by an alternative theory which 

would not establish such jurisdiction, then federal subject 

matter jurisdiction does not exist.”). 

In this case, we conclude that Defendants failed to 

establish the existence of federal question jurisdiction. State 

law creates Snyder’s cause of action—an action to quiet title. 

Defendants point to the portion of Snyder’s complaint in which 

he alleges violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 
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the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act, and several 

other federal statutes, to support their claim of federal 

jurisdiction. Snyder does not, however, advance these alleged 

violations of federal law as individual causes of action for 

which he seeks relief. Moreover, Snyder’s state law quiet title 

action does not depend on a finding that Defendants violated 

federal law; Snyder advances many state law arguments in support 

of his claim to quiet title, any one of which, if valid, could 

support his action.

Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order and 

remand to the district court with instructions to remand 

Snyder’s action to the state court. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process. 

VACATED AND REMANDED