alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of New York State Office of Children and Family Services et al., Respondents, v Lauren Lanterman et al., Appellants.

Submitted January 11, 2010;

decided January 14, 2010

Reported below, 62 AD3d 1109.

Motion by New York State United Teachers for leave to file a brief amicus curiae on the appeal herein granted and the proposed brief is accepted as filed. Three copies of the brief must be served and an original and 24 copies filed within seven days.
EXHIBIT 32.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of BSD Medical Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended February 28, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Dennis P. Gauger, Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer) of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)           The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)           The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.


/s/ Dennis P. Gauger

Dennis P. Gauger

Chief Financial Officer

(Principal Accounting Officer)

April 14, 2011
#### Mayor & Council of Macon *v.*Macon Construction Co.

The municipal government of the city of Macon has no authority of law to levy and collect from a business corporation, having an office and doing business in the city, a tax upon the capital stock, as such, of the corporation itself. The authority given to the mayor and council by the act of December 11th, 1871, “ to levy and. collect a tax upon all property, real and personal, within the limits of the city; upon banking, insurance and other capital employed therein,” etc., authorizes the taxation by the city of all property a corporation may actually own and of all capital it may actually employ, within the limits of the city; but this power does not extend to the taxation of the capital stock of the corporation as a part of its property or assets, the stock being, so far as the corporation is concerned, a liability.

July 30, 1894.

Equitable petition. Before Judge Griggs. Bibbsuperior court. November term, 1893.

Dessau & Hodges, W. M. Wimberly and C. L. Bartlett, for plaintiff in error.

Gustin, Guerry *&*Hall, *contra.*

Lumpkin, Justice.

The only question in this case is whether or not, under that provision of the charter of Macon authorizing the mayor and council “ to levy and collect a tax upon all property, real and personal, within the limits of the city; upon banking, insurance and other capital employed therein,” the municipal government has a legal right to levy and collect from a business corporation, having an *202■office and doing business in the city, a tax upon its capital stock, as such.

There can be no doubt that, under the act of December 11, 1871, from which the above quotation is taken, the municipal government of the city of Macon may tax all the property owned by the Macon Construction ■Company, and all the capital that company may actually ■employ, within the limits of the city; but the capital stock of the company is neither property owned by it, nor capital which it employs. The stock issued by a ■corporation is not property owned by it. Such stock is in no sense assets, but on the contrary, is a liability. Stock in an incorporated company is held and owned by the stockholders. As to them, it is property, and may, or may not, be subject to municipal taxation; but relatively to the corporation itself, it is not property at .all. Neither a natural nor an artificial person can properly be said to own a *chose in action,*or written instrument of any sort, which merely evidences the fact that he or it is liable to or indebted to another.

*Judgment affirmed.*
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-5890

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

KEVIN M. BAUMGARDNER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern

District of West Virginia, at Wheeling. Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.,

Chief District Judge. (CR-95-3)

Submitted: July 30, 1996 Decided: September 11, 1996

Before HALL, HAMILTON, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Kevin D. Mills, MILLS & SCALES, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for

Appellant. William D. Wilmoth, United States Attorney, Lisa Grimes

Johnston, Assistant United States Attorney, Wheeling, West

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Kevin M. Baumgardner appeals from the district court's imposition of his sentence for bank robbery. Specifically, he contends: (1) that the district court committed clear error when it

refused to grant his request for a downward departure from the

Sentencing Guidelines; and (2) that as a matter of law passing a

note to a teller containing the statement, "I have a knife," is

insufficient to justify a three-point enhancement under U.S.S.G.

§ 2B3.1(b)(2)(E). We affirm.

Addressing Baumgardner's first claim, we note that a denial of

a motion for departure is not reviewable on appeal unless the district court mistakenly believed that it lacked the authority to

depart. United States v. Darby, 37 F.3d 1059, 1068 (4th Cir. 1994),

cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 63 U.S.L.W. 3787 (U.S. May 1, 1995)

(No. 94-7778). In the present case, the district court acknowledged

that in some factual situations a downward departure for the reason

requested might be warranted, but found that the facts were not

present in Baumgardner's case. Given this understanding of authority, this court cannot review the district court's refusal to

depart.

Turning to Baumgardner's remaining claim, we note that the

district court's application of the § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E) enhancement

was based on its finding that Baumgardner did in fact possess a

knife. Thus, we review for clear error. See United States v. Jones,

31 F.3d 1304, 1315 (4th Cir. 1994) (providing standard of review

for factual findings in Sentencing Guidelines application issues).
3

Finding none, we affirm the district court's three-point enhancement. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JAN-02-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUL-04-1998
<CASH>                                         661
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  783
<ALLOWANCES>                                   95
<INVENTORY>                                    1063
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               3024
<PP&E>                                         4824
<DEPRECIATION>                                 3993
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 7186
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          3234
<BONDS>                                        1854
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       128
<OTHER-SE>                                     (70)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   7186
<SALES>                                        3346
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               3346
<CGS>                                          2228
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  4010
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             151
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (666)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   7
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (673)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (282)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (.05)
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</TABLE>
EX-35.1
(logo) AVELO MORTGAGE


Annual Compliance Statement


Re: The Flow Servicing Agreement dated as of January 1, 2006 (the "Agreement"),
among Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company and Avelo Mortgage, LLC and GSAA Home
Equity Trust 2007-4.


1. A review has been completed of Avelo Mortgage, LLC's ("Avelo") servicing
activities and its performance under the servicing agreement during the period
from January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2007. This review was completed under
my supervision.

2. To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, Avelo has fulfilled all of
its obligations under the agreement in all material respects, except as
described in the item below:


Avelo acknowledges that for a period in 2007, bank accounts were not reconciled
in strict compliance with Reg. AB. To address this issue, Avelo added additional
staff to ensure timely reconciliations and compliance with Reg AB. As of the
date of the audit, all bank account reconciliations were current. No issues were
found or arose from the delay in reconciling the bank accounts.

Avelo also acknowledges that for a period in 2007, escrow funds were not
returned to the obligor within 30 calendar days of full repayment in compliance
with Reg. AB due to a system issue. A system enhancement erroneously affected
the refund check process. Once the issue was identified, the system was
corrected.

As of December 31, 2007, escrow fund refunds were returned to the obligor within
30 calendar days of full repayment, and no issues were found or arose from the
delay in returning the funds to the account holders.

I certify this information to be true and correct to the best of my ability.


/s/ David M. Altshuler
Name: David M. Altshuler
Title: Vice President and CFO
Date: March 10, 2008


Avelo Mortgage, LLC     250 E. John Carpenter Fwy       Irving, Texas 75062
[912 NE2d 1056, 884 NYS2d 677]

#### Bernadette Gotay, Respondent, v David Breitbart et al., Defendants, and Michael Handwerker et al., Appellants.

Decided June 25, 2009

*895APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Furman Kornfeld & Brennan LLP,*New York City (A. *Michael Furman*of counsel), for Michael Handwerker, appellant.

*Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP,*New York City *(Patrick J. Lawless*and *Richard E. Lerner*of counsel), for Handwerker Honschke and Marchelos and others, appellants.

*Gerald J. Mondora,*Rye Brook, for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.11 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.11), order reversed, with costs, motions for summary judgment by defendants-appellants granted and certified question answered in the negative. Plaintiffs legal malpractice claim was not brought within the applicable statute of limitations period, and defendants-appellants established as a matter of law that the continuous representation doctrine does not apply.

Concur: Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones. Taking no part: Chief Judge Lippman.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 November 25, 2013

h1118

Order 

Clerk

November 25, 2013

147204

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 147204

COA: 312465

Wayne CC: 09-010620-FH

DAVID ANTHONY ST. ANN,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 7, 2013 order of 

the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to 

meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
#### Jamillah K. Rasheed-Waters, Respondent, et al., Plaintiff, v Kawasaki Rail Car, Inc., Appellant, et al., Defendants.

Submitted August 17, 2009;

decided October 22, 2009

Reported below, 60 AD3d 1030.

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, April 27, 2021. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, April 27, 2021 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A21D0291. TRINA D. HIBBLER v. MATTHEW E. HOSEY.
Upon consideration of the Application for Discretionary Appeal, it is ordered that it be hereby GRANTED. The Appellant may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the date of this order. The Clerk of Superior Court is directed to include a copy of this order in the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals.
LC NUMBERS: 19a04056 11A06792
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the 
consolidated balance sheets and statements of income for Telos Corporation and
is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                                            <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                        6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                             757,000
<SECURITIES>                                             0   
<RECEIVABLES>                                   50,079,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,047,000
<INVENTORY>                                     15,673,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                69,548,000
<PP&E>                                          38,116,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                  21,580,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 105,748,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           36,682,000
<BONDS>                                         50,068,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           43,577,000
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                            78,000
<OTHER-SE>                                     (36,914,000)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   105,748,000
<SALES>                                         53,134,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               112,434,000
<CGS>                                           45,512,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   95,159,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                         0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,643,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   (173,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (173,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                      (173,000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                            0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                            0
        


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 31.1

CERTIFICATIONS

I, James Thorburn, certify that:

1.	I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of ZiLOG, Inc.;

2.	Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material factnecessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading withrespect to the period covered by this report;

3	Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in allmaterial respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented inthis report; 

4.	The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls andprocedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a)	Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designedunder our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is madeknown to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b)	Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report ourconclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report basedon such evaluation; and

(c)	Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant's most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internalcontrol over financial reporting; and

5.	The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control overfinancial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or person performing theequivalent functions): 

(a)	All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reportingwhich are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;and

(b)	Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in theregistrant's internal control over financial reporting.

  Date: August 14, 2006     By:    /s/ James M. Thorburn             James M. Thorburn *       Chairman and Chief Executive Officer*
II 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 478 

To designate the annex to the E. Barrett Prettyman Federal Building and 

United States Courthouse located at 333 Constitution Avenue Northwest 

in the District of Columbia as the ‘‘William B. Bryant Annex’’. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 1, 2005 

Mr. LEAHY introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Environment and Public Works 

A BILL 

To designate the annex to the E. Barrett Prettyman Federal 

Building and United States Courthouse located at 333 

Constitution Avenue Northwest in the District of Columbia as the ‘‘William B. Bryant Annex’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. DESIGNATION. 

4 The annex to the E. Barrett Prettyman Federal 

5 Building and United States Courthouse located at Con6 stitution Avenue Northwest in the District of Columbia 

7 shall be known and designated as the ‘‘William B. Bryant 

8 Annex’’. 
2 

•S 478 IS

1 SEC. 2. REFERENCES. 

2 Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 

3 paper, or other record of the United States to the annex 

4 referred to in section 1 shall be deemed to be a reference 

5 to the ‘‘William B. Bryant Annex’’. 

6 SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE. 

7 This Act takes effect on the date on which William 

8 B. Bryant, a senior judge for the United States District 

9 Court for the District of Columbia, relinquishes or other10 wise ceases to hold a position as a judge under article III 

11 of the Constitution. 

Æ
#### Hooks *v.*Booker.

There was no error in allowing the amendment to the petition, nor in refusing to grant a new trial. *Judgment affirmed.*

August 14, 1894.

Equitable petition. Before Judge Fish. Sumter superior court. May term, 1893.

Plaintiff purchased of defendant a house and lot, and took a deed. Defendant remained in possession, plaintiff claiming that this was under an agreement of rental. Afterwards defendant refused to surrender the premises, claiming possession in her own right; further claiming that the purchase money had not all been paid, and that she signed the deed in ignorance of its contents and purport, supposing it was a bond for title, and being thereto persuaded by her husband. Plaintiff contended that the whole Of the purchase price had been paid, and that defendant fully understood the deed when made; and brought this petition, alleging that defendant was insolvent, and was removing an outhouse, etc. The prayer was, for injunction and receiver; for decree declaring the premises to be plaintiff’s property, and requiring possession to be surrendered; for .recovery of rents; *713and for general relief. At the trial plaintiff was allowed, over objection, to amend the petition by striking the prayer for injunction and receiver, and adding a prayer that the premises he adjudged to be plaintiff’s property, that a writ of possession be granted, and that plaintiff recover a certain amount as rent. The objection was that this was adding a new cause of action. The evidence was conflicting. Plaintiff obtained a verdict for the property and for rent, and defendant’s motion for a new trial was overruled.

Hudson & Blalock, for plaintiff' in error.

Fort & Watson, contra.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 92-5838
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus VINCENT DEVITA, Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Chief District Judge. (CR-92-64-5) Submitted: January 23, 1996 Decided: March 13, 1996 Before NIEMEYER, HAMILTON, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Alexis C. Pearce, THARRINGTON, SMITH & HARGROVE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Margaret Person Currin, United States Attorney, David P. Folmar, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Vincent Devita entered a guilty plea to conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1988), and three counts of using or carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(1) (West Supp. 1995). He was sentenced to eighty-seven months imprisonment forconspiracy, sixty months imprisonment for one § 924(c)(1) violation, and twenty years imprisonment for the second § 924(c)(1) violat ion. The district court departed downward and did not sentence Devita for the third firearms offense. In his plea agreement, Devita expressly waived all appellate rights save his right to appeal the application of any sentencing enhancement provisions under § 924(c)(1). The sole question on appeal is whether that statute permits consecutive sentencing for multiple firearms offenses that are separate in time but charged in the same indictment. The parties now agree that Deal v. United States , ___ U.S. ___, 61 U.S.L.W. 4474 (U.S. May 17, 1993) (No. 91- 8199), which answered that question affirmatively, is dispositive in this case. In light of Deal , we are convinced that enhancement of Devita's sentence was proper.We therefore affirm the sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED