_______________________________ 

 

Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

Chief Justice: Justices: 

Clifford W. Taylor Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver Opinion Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED JUNE 25, 2008 

IRVING ALLISON, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v No. 133771 

AEW CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.L.P., 

d/b/a SUTTON PLACE APARTMENTS, 

 Defendant, 

and 

VILLAGE GREEN MANAGEMENT COMPANY 

and BFMSIT, II, 

 Defendants-Appellants. 

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 

MARKMAN, J. 

We granted leave to appeal to address the following questions: (1) whether 

parking lots in leased residential areas constitute “common areas” under MCL 

554.139(1)(a); (2) whether the natural accumulation of snow and ice is subject to 

the lessor’s duty set forth in MCL 554.139(1)(a) to keep premises and common 

areas “fit for the use intended by the parties”; and (3) whether the natural 
accumulation of snow and ice is subject to the lessor’s duty set forth in MCL 

554.139(1)(b) to “keep the premises in reasonable repair.” We answer the first 

two questions in the affirmative and the third question in the negative. Because 

we conclude that the duty set forth in MCL 554.139(1)(a) was not violated here 

because one to two inches of snow did not render the parking lot unfit for the use 

intended, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial 

court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Plaintiff fractured his ankle during a fall when he was walking on one to 

two inches of accumulated snow in the parking lot of his apartment complex. He 

then noticed ice on the ground where the snow had been displaced. Plaintiff filed 

suit against defendant AEW Capital Management, doing business as Sutton Place 

Apartments, alleging negligence and breach of the covenant to maintain and repair 

the premises, MCL 554.139(1). The trial court granted summary disposition to 

defendant, concluding that the danger was “open and obvious,” and directed that 

the pleadings be amended to replace AEW with the proper defendants, Village 

Green Management Company and BFMSIT, II. 

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the basis of Teufel 

v Watkins, 267 Mich App 425, 429 n 1; 705 NW2d 164 (2005), which held that 

MCL 554.139(1) does not control a lessor’s duty to remove snow and ice from a 

parking lot. Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued November 28, 2006 (Docket 

No. 269021). The panel expressed its disagreement with Teufel and sought a 

2
 
conflict resolution panel. Id. After this request was denied, the panel granted 

plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and vacated its initial opinion. Unpublished 

order, entered January 19, 2007 (Docket No. 269021). The panel then reversed 

the trial court’s grant of summary disposition, stating that Teufel did not constitute 

governing precedent because its holding regarding the inapplicability of MCL 

554.139(1) was only presented in a footnote. Allison v AEW Capital Mgt, LLP 

(On Reconsideration), 274 Mich App 663, 669-670; 736 NW2d 307 (2007). The 

panel also concluded that a parking lot constitutes a common area under MCL 

554.139(1)(a), that one of a parking lot’s intended uses entails persons walking on 

it, and that a parking lot covered with ice is not fit for that purpose. Id. at 670-671. 

Defendants filed an application for leave to appeal in this Court, and we granted 

leave to appeal. 480 Mich 894 (2007). 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

This Court reviews de novo the grant or denial of a summary disposition 

motion. Saffian v Simmons, 477 Mich 8, 12; 727 NW2d 132 (2007). Matters of 

statutory interpretation are also reviewed de novo. Id. Defendants moved for 

summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). A motion under MCR 

2.116(C)(8) should be granted if the pleadings fail to state a claim as a matter of 

law, and no factual development could justify recovery. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 

Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) 

should be granted if the evidence submitted by the parties “fails to establish a 

genuine issue regarding any material fact, [and] the moving party is entitled to 

3
 
 

judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 120; see also MCR 2.116(C)(10). There is a 

genuine issue of material fact when reasonable minds could differ on an issue after 

viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. West v Gen 

Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). 

III. ANALYSIS 

Plaintiff asserted two different causes of action in this case: (1) negligence 

and (2) breach of the covenants to keep the premises and common areas fit for 

their intended use and to keep the premises in reasonable repair, MCL 

554.139(1).1

 If defendants had a duty under MCL 554.139(1)(a) or (b) to remove 

snow and ice from the parking lot, then plaintiff could proceed on his second 

claim even if plaintiff’s negligence claim was barred by the “open and obvious” 

danger doctrine.2

 MCL 554.139 provides a specific protection to lessees and 

licensees of residential property in addition to any protection provided by the 

common law. The statutory protection under MCL 554.139(1) arises from the 

existence of a residential lease and consequently becomes a statutorily mandated 

1

 The merits of plaintiff’s negligence claim are not before this Court. 

2

 Under common-law negligence principles, a premises owner has a duty to 

exercise reasonable care to protect an invitee from an unreasonable risk of harm 

caused by a dangerous condition on the premises, but not when the condition is 

“open and obvious.” Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc, 464 Mich 512, 516; 629 NW2d 

384 (2001). However, a defendant cannot use the “open and obvious” danger 

doctrine to avoid liability when the defendant has a statutory duty to maintain the 

premises in accordance with MCL 554.139(1)(a) or (b). Woodbury v Bruckner, 

467 Mich 922 (2002); O’Donnell v Garasic, 259 Mich App 569, 581; 676 NW2d 

213 (2003). 

4
 
 

term of such lease. Therefore, a breach of the duty to maintain the premises under 

MCL 554.139(1)(a) or (b) would be construed as a breach of the terms of the lease 

between the parties and any remedy under the statute would consist exclusively of 

a contract remedy.3 

A. “COMMON AREAS” 

MCL 554.139 provides: 

(1) In every lease or license of residential premises, the lessor 

or licensor covenants: 

(a) That the premises and all common areas are fit for the use 

intended by the parties. 

(b) To keep the premises in reasonable repair during the term 

of the lease or license, and to comply with the applicable health and 

safety laws of the state and of the local unit of government where the 

premises are located, except when the disrepair or violation of the 

3

 Although the nature and extent of plaintiff’s remedy are not at issue in this 

case, we note that, typically, a plaintiff’s remedy for breach of contract is limited 

to damages that “arise naturally from the breach or those that were in the 

contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made.” Kewin v 

Massachusetts Mut Life Ins Co, 409 Mich 401, 414; 295 NW2d 50 (1980) (citation 

omitted). The purpose of this remedy is to “place the nonbreaching party in as 

good a position as if the contract had been fully performed.” Corl v Huron 

Castings, Inc, 450 Mich 620, 625; 544 NW2d 278 (1996). 

The dissent “would hold that a plaintiff who proves a claim under MCL 

554.139(1) is entitled to full damages for the injury,” citing the Second 

Restatement of Torts, § 357, which states that “‘[a] lessor of land is subject to 

liability for physical harm caused to his lessee . . . if the lessor, as such, has 

contracted by a covenant in the lease or otherwise to keep the land in repair. . . .’” 

Post at 8. This section of the Second Restatement of Torts applies to the tort of 

negligence. We reiterate that the merits of plaintiff’s negligence claim are not 

before this Court. In addition, as discussed infra, the covenant to repair, MCL 

554.139(1)(b), does not apply to common areas and would not impose a duty on 

the lessor to keep parking lots free from the natural accumulation of ice and snow. 

5
 
applicable health or safety laws has been caused by the tenant’s 

wilful or irresponsible conduct or lack of conduct. 

The primary goal of statutory interpretation is “to ascertain the legislative 

intent that may be reasonably inferred from the words expressed in the statute.” G 

C Timmis & Co v Guardian Alarm Co, 468 Mich 416, 420; 662 NW2d 710 

(2003). If the language of the statute is clear, we presume that the Legislature 

intended the meaning expressed. Id. If the statute does not define a word, we may 

consult dictionary definitions to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of the 

word. Koontz v Ameritech Services, Inc, 466 Mich 304, 312; 645 NW2d 34 

(2002). However, legal terms of art are to be construed according to their peculiar 

and appropriate meaning. MCL 8.3a. 

MCL 554.139 does not define the term “common areas.” However, 

Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed), p 275, defines “common area” as: “[i]n law of 

landlord-tenant, the portion of demised premises used in common by tenants over 

which landlord retains control (e.g. hallways, stairs) and hence for whose 

condition he is liable, as contrasted with areas of which tenant has exclusive 

possession.” This definition is in accord with the plain and ordinary meaning of 

the term. “Common” is defined as “belonging equally to, or shared alike by, two 

or more or all in question[.]” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary 

(1997). Therefore, in the context of leased residential property, “common areas” 

describes those areas of the property over which the lessor retains control that are 

shared by two or more, or all, of the tenants. A lessor’s duties regarding these 

6
 
areas arise from the control the lessor retains over them. See, e.g., Williams v 

Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc, 429 Mich 495, 499; 418 NW2d 381 (1988) (stating 

that “a landlord may be held liable for an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a 

dangerous condition in the areas of common use retained in his control such as 

lobbies, hallways, stairways, and elevators”). 

The issue in this case concerns whether parking lots within leased 

residential property constitute “common areas” within the meaning of the statute. 

The Court of Appeals answered in the affirmative, relying on Benton v Dart 

Properties, Inc, 270 Mich App 437; 715 NW2d 335 (2006), to conclude that 

parking lots constitute common areas. In Benton, supra at 442-443, the Court of 

Appeals held that sidewalks within an apartment complex constitute common 

areas under MCL 554.139(1)(a) because they are located within the complex, they 

are constructed and maintained by the lessor, and they are relied on by tenants to 

access their apartments and vehicles. In this case, the Court of Appeals adopted 

this reasoning to conclude that parking lots also constitute common areas because 

they are located within the complex, they are maintained by the lessor, and tenants 

must necessarily walk on parking lots to access their vehicles. Allison, supra at 

670. 

We agree that a parking lot within a leased residential property fits within 

the meaning of “common area” because it is accessed by two or more, or all, of the 

tenants and the lessor retains general control. Among other things, the lessor 

controls whether a parking lot is used by members of the public as well as by 

7
 
 

tenants, the circumstances under which non-tenants can access the lot, the number 

and size of vehicles that a tenant can park in the lot, the lot’s hours of operation, 

the means of identification of those entitled to park in the lot, and whether and 

how particular parking spaces will be allocated. Further, the lessor is responsible 

for the maintenance and security of the lot. Thus, we believe that parking lots 

within a leased residential property that are shared by two or more, or all, of the 

tenants constitute “common areas” under MCL 554.139(1)(a). 

B. LESSOR’S DUTY UNDER MCL 554.139(1)(a) 

Because a parking lot within a leased residential property is a common area 

under MCL 554.139(1)(a), the lessor effectively has a contractual duty to keep the 

parking lot “fit for the use intended by the parties.” The next question concerns 

whether this covenant encompasses the duty to keep the lot free from the natural 

accumulation of snow and ice. The Court of Appeals held: 

The intended use of a parking lot is to park cars and other 

motor vehicles; however, in order to access their vehicles and 

apartments, tenants must also necessarily walk on the parking lot. A 

second intended use of a parking lot, therefore, is walking on it. A 

parking lot covered with ice is not fit for this purpose. [Allison, 

supra at 670-671.] 

We agree that the intended use of a parking lot includes the parking of 

vehicles. A parking lot is constructed for the primary purpose of storing vehicles 

on the lot. “Fit” is defined as “adapted or suited; appropriate[.]” Random House 

Webster’s College Dictionary (1997). Therefore, a lessor has a duty to keep a 

parking lot adapted or suited for the parking of vehicles. A parking lot is generally 

8
 
considered suitable for the parking of vehicles as long as the tenants are able to 

park their vehicles in the lot and have reasonable access to their vehicles. A 

lessor’s obligation under MCL 554.139(1)(a) with regard to the accumulation of 

snow and ice concomitantly would commonly be to ensure that the entrance to, 

and the exit from, the lot is clear, that vehicles can access parking spaces, and that 

tenants have reasonable access to their parked vehicles. Fulfilling this obligation 

would allow the lot to be used as the parties intended it to be used. 

In this case, in construing the meaning of these terms in the contract, 

neither of the parties has indicated that the intended use of the parking lot was 

anything other than basic parking and reasonable access to such parking. 

Plaintiff’s allegation of unfitness was supported only by two facts: that the lot was 

covered with one to two inches of snow and that plaintiff fell. Under the facts 

presented in this record, we believe that there could not be reasonable differences 

of opinion regarding the fact that tenants were able to enter and exit the parking 

lot, to park their vehicles therein, and to access those vehicles. Accordingly, 

plaintiff has not established that tenants were unable to use the parking lot for its 

intended purpose, and his claim fails as a matter of law. 

While a lessor may have some duty under MCL 554.139(1)(a) with regard 

to the accumulation of snow and ice in a parking lot, it would be triggered only 

under much more exigent circumstances than those obtaining in this case. The 

statute does not require a lessor to maintain a lot in an ideal condition or in the 

most accessible condition possible, but merely requires the lessor to maintain it in 

9
 
 

 

 

a condition that renders it fit for use as a parking lot. Mere inconvenience of 

access, or the need to remove snow and ice from parked cars, will not defeat the 

characterization of a lot as being fit for its intended purposes. 

We recognize that tenants must walk across a parking lot in order to access 

their vehicles. However, plaintiff did not show that the condition of the parking 

lot in this case precluded access to his vehicle. The Court of Appeals erred in 

concluding that, under the facts presented, the parking lot in this case was unfit 

simply because it was covered in snow and ice.4 Allison, supra at 670-671. 

Further, we take issue with the suggestion of the Court of Appeals that a tenant 

traversing a parking lot, for any reason, might be able to take advantage of the 

covenant for fitness for the uses intended. A tenant using a common area for a 

purpose other than that for which the area is intended is not protected by the 

covenant for fitness, but would be afforded any protections provided by the 

common law. The statute does not require any level of fitness beyond what is 

necessary to allow tenants to use the parking lot as the parties intended. In 

addition, should this point need clarification, a non-tenant could never recover 

under the covenant for fitness because a lessor has no contractual relationship 

4

 The dissent concludes that “plaintiff has made a sufficient showing to 

survive summary disposition under § 139(1)(a)” on the basis that “fitness for use 

includes safety.” Post at 2-3. However, the dissent’s analysis focuses exclusively 

on premises liability law, the subject of plaintiff’s first claim, which, as stated 

earlier, is not before this Court. Perhaps most relevantly, we do not see walking 

across one to two inches of snow and ice as being as harrowing an experience as 

the dissent asserts. 

10
 
 

 

with-- and, therefore, no duty under the statute to-- a non-tenant.5

 Plaintiff has not 

shown that the lot in this case was unfit for its intended use, and the Court of 

Appeals erred in concluding otherwise. 

C. LESSOR’S DUTY UNDER MCL 554.139(1)(b) 

The final question concerns whether a lessor’s duty to repair under MCL 

554.139(1)(b) extends to snow and ice accumulation in a parking lot. We must 

distinguish the term “common areas” from the term “premises” if we are to give 

meaning to all the words of this statute. The lessor’s duty under MCL 

554.139(1)(a) applies to “the premises and all common areas,” while the lessor’s 

duty under MCL 554.139(1)(b) applies only to “the premises.” We must “avoid a 

construction that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.” 

Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare Sys, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d 686 (2001). 

“Premises” is defined as “a tract of land including its buildings” or “a 

building or part of a building together with its grounds or other appurtenances[.]” 

Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997). Such a definition would 

seem to include everything within the boundaries of the apartment complex, 

including the common areas. However, a statute can give special meaning to a 

5

 The dissent disagrees, citing the Second Restatement of Torts, § 357, 

which states that “‘[a] lessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused 

to his lessee and others upon the land with consent of the lessee . . . .’” Post at 9. 

Again, the dissent’s analysis would apply to premises liability law, under which a 

non-tenant guest would be entitled to the protections afforded a licensee under 

common-law principles. The dissent misapprehends what this case is about. 

11
 
 

 

word apart from its everyday use. Under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, a word 

is also given meaning in the context of the words around it. Koontz, supra at 318. 

In this statute, the Legislature specifically set the term “common areas” 

apart from the term “premises” by applying the first covenant to both terms and 

the second covenant only to “premises.” If we conclude that “premises” includes 

“common areas,” then the phrase “and all common areas” would be entirely 

superfluous. The only way to give meaning to the phrase “and all common areas” 

in this context is to conclude that “premises” does not encompass “common areas” 

and that the covenant to repair under MCL 554.139(1)(b) does not apply to 

“common areas.”6 

The exclusion of common areas from the covenant to repair imposed by the 

statute does not necessarily mean that the lessor is free of any duty to repair 

common areas, because these areas must still be kept “fit for the use intended by 

the parties.” The Legislature elected to impose two different duties on the lessor, 

one for “premises and all common areas” and one for only “premises,” and 

differentiated those duties through its choice of language, one covenant requiring 

6

 Even if common areas were covered by the covenant to keep the premises 

in reasonable repair, this covenant would not impose a duty on the lessor to keep 

parking lots free from the natural accumulation of snow and ice. “Repair” as a 

noun is defined as “the good condition resulting from continued maintenance and 

repairing.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997). “Repairing” 

involves “restor[ing] to a good or sound condition after decay or damage; 

mend[ing].” Id. Therefore, MCL 554.139(1)(b) refers to keeping the premises in 

a good condition as a result of restoring and mending damage to the property. 

There is nothing within the definition of “repair” that would include keeping a 

property free of snow and ice accumulation. 

12
 
“fitness” and the other requiring “reasonable repair.” Because both covenants 

imposed by the statute apply to premises, and only the covenant for fitness applies 

to common areas, we can reasonably infer that the Legislature intended to place a 

less onerous burden on the lessor with regard to common areas. Keeping common 

areas fit for their intended use may well require a lessor to perform maintenance 

and repairs to those areas, but may conceivably require repairs less extensive than 

those required by the second covenant. For example, if the lessor has a duty to 

repair a parking lot under MCL 554.139(1)(b), the lessor arguably may be required 

to fill a small pothole in the parking lot, even if that pothole did not affect the 

ability of the tenants to park in that lot. However, because the lessor does not have 

such a duty with regard to parking lots because they are common areas, the lessor 

would not necessarily be obligated to fill that pothole under the duties concerning 

fitness in MCL 554.139(1)(a). 

In Teufel, supra at 429 n 1, the Court of Appeals held: 

Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred when it failed to 

address his argument that [the lessor] had a statutory duty under 

MCL 554.139 to keep its premises and common areas in reasonable 

repair and fit for their intended uses, which negates the defense of 

open and obvious danger. Any error in the trial court’s failure to 

address this argument is harmless. The plain meaning of “reasonable 

repair” as used in MCL 554.139(1)(b) requires repair of a defect in 

the premises. Accumulation of snow and ice is not a defect in the 

premises. Thus, a lessor’s duty under MCL 554.139(1)(a) and (b) to 

keep its premises in reasonable repair and fit for its intended use 

does not extend to snow and ice removal. 

This is an accurate assessment of the requirement of “reasonable repair” in MCL 

554.139(1)(b). “Defect” is defined as “a fault or shortcoming; imperfection.” 

13
 
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997). Damage to the property 

would constitute an imperfection in the property that would require mending. 

Therefore, repairing a defect equates to keeping the premises in a good condition 

as a result of restoring and mending damage to the property. The accumulation of 

snow and ice does not constitute a defect in property, and, therefore, the lessor 

would have no duty under MCL 554.139(1)(b) with regard to snow and ice, except 

to the extent that such snow and ice caused damage to the property. 

This conclusion can be analogized to the government’s duty to maintain 

highways in reasonable repair under MCL 691.1402(1), the highway exception to 

governmental immunity. In Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm, 463 Mich 143, 

158; 615 NW2d 702 (2000), this Court held that the “highway exception waives 

the absolute immunity of governmental units with regard to defective highways 

under their jurisdiction.” To recover under MCL 691.1402(1), a plaintiff must 

demonstrate that a defect in the highway was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s 

injury. Haliw v Sterling Hts, 464 Mich 297, 309 n 9; 627 NW2d 581 (2001). In 

Haliw, this Court specifically excluded the accumulation of snow and ice from 

consideration as a defect. Id. More recently, in MacLachlan v Capital Area 

Transportation Auth, 474 Mich 1059 (2006), this Court held that an accumulation 

of snow in the roadway did not constitute a “defect in the roadway rendering it 

unsafe for public travel at all times.” 

We hold that the lessor’s duty to repair under MCL 554.139(1)(b) does not 

apply to common areas and, therefore, does not apply to parking lots. In addition, 

14
 
MCL 554.139(1)(b) requires the lessor to repair defects in the premises, and the 

accumulation of snow and ice is not a defect. A lessor has no duty under MCL 

554.139(1)(b) with regard to the natural accumulation of snow and ice. 

D. TEUFEL AS PRECEDENT 

The Court of Appeals on reconsideration stated that the holding in Teufel, 

supra at 429 n 1, was legally flawed for failing to distinguish, or even mention, 

O’Donnell v Garasic, 259 Mich App 569; 676 NW2d 213 (2003), and for failing 

to conduct a separate analysis of MCL 554.139(1)(a) and (b). Allison, supra at 

668-669. The Court proceeded to observe that it was not bound to follow the 

discussion of MCL 554.139(1)(a) and (b) in Teufel because, “[h]ad [the] Court in 

Teufel intended to create a rule of law regarding the availability of the open and 

obvious danger doctrine when a landlord has a statutory duty under MCL 

554.139(1)(a) and (b), it would have done so in the body of the opinion rather than 

in a footnote.” Id. at 669-670, citing Guerra v Garratt, 222 Mich App 285, 289-

292; 564 NW2d 121 (1997). 

The Court’s reference to Guerra was misplaced. Guerra did not state that 

language set forth in a footnote does not constitute binding precedent. Rather, in 

Guerra, the Court of Appeals was attempting to interpret whether certain language 

in Lemmerman v Fealk, 449 Mich 56, 77 n 15; 534 NW2d 695 (1995), was meant 

to limit the retroactivity of the opinion’s general holding or to create an exception 

to that holding. Guerra, supra at 291. The Court engaged in ordinary 

interpretative analysis, examining the circumstances and the context in order to 

15
 
 

properly give meaning to the language. The Court of Appeals concluded that, 

given the fact that Lemmerman repeatedly set forth its general holding without 

suggesting any exception and specifically made a statement incompatible with 

such an exception, this Court would have placed any such exception to the general 

holding, if it had been intended, in the body of the opinion. Id. at 291-292. 

Therefore, the Court of Appeals determined that the footnote pertained to the 

retroactivity of the holding, and did not create an exception to that holding. The 

statement in Guerra regarding the Lemmerman footnote was merely an analysis of 

the context of language within a footnote and not a holding that a discussion 

within a footnote cannot constitute binding precedent. 

The essential question is not whether the language in Teufel was contained 

within a footnote, but whether it created a “rule of law” for the purposes of MCR 

7.215(J)(1).7

 A statement that is dictum does not constitute binding precedent 

under MCR 7.215(J)(1). McNeil v Charlevoix Co, 275 Mich App 686, 702; 741 

NW2d 27 (2007). “[O]biter dictum” is defined as “1. an incidental remark or 

7

 MCR 7.215 provides: 

(J) Resolution of Conflicts in Court of Appeals Decisions. 

(1) Precedential Effect of Published Decisions. A panel of the 

Court of Appeals must follow the rule of law established by a prior 

published decision of the Court of Appeals issued on or after 

November 1, 1990, that has not been reversed or modified by the 

Supreme Court, or by a special panel of the Court of Appeals as 

provided in this rule. 

16
 
opinion. 2. a judicial opinion in a matter related but not essential to a case.” 

Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997). 

In Teufel, the plaintiff slipped and fell on ice in the parking lot of his 

apartment complex. Teufel, supra at 426. The Court of Appeals held that the trial 

court properly granted summary disposition to the defendant apartment complex 

on the basis of the “open and obvious” danger doctrine. Id. at 428-429. The 

language in the Teufel footnote was not dictum; rather, the footnote addressed an 

alternative argument raised by the plaintiff regarding the applicability of MCL 

554.139 and was, therefore, necessary to the disposition of the case. Thus, the 

language in the footnote constituted a rule of law, and the Court of Appeals was 

obligated to follow this rule under MCR 7.215(J)(1). 

The Court of Appeals’ concern that Teufel itself did not follow the 

precedent of O’Donnell was without merit. In O’Donnell, supra at 581, the Court 

of Appeals held that a defendant cannot use the “open and obvious” danger 

doctrine to avoid liability when the defendant has a statutory duty to maintain the 

premises in accordance with MCL 554.139(1)(a) and (b). However, the Teufel 

footnote held that MCL 554.139(1)(a) and (b) do not apply to snow and ice 

removal. Therefore, the “open and obvious” danger doctrine could avoid the 

defendants’ liability in Teufel, and there was no need to refer to, nor was there any 

inconsistency with, O’Donnell. 

Language set forth in a footnote can constitute binding precedent if the 

language creates a “rule of law” and is not merely dictum. Teufel, supra at 429 n 

17
 
1, created a rule of law that the Court of Appeals was bound to follow. MCR 

7.215(J)(1). However, to the extent that Teufel held that a lessor’s duty to 

maintain premises and common areas “fit for the use intended” under MCL 

554.139(1)(a) can never include snow and ice removal, we overrule Teufel. There 

are conceivable circumstances in which a lessor may have a duty to remove snow 

and ice under MCL 554.139(1)(a), such as when the accumulation is so substantial 

that tenants cannot park or access their vehicles in a parking lot. As we have 

already observed, such circumstances were not present in this case. The Court of 

Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in 

favor of defendants under the “open and obvious” danger doctrine. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

We hold that: (1) parking lots in leased residential areas constitute 

“common areas” under MCL 554.139(1)(a); (2) the natural accumulation of snow 

and ice is subject to the lessor’s duty established in MCL 554.139(1)(a), but that 

plaintiff has not shown the duty was violated here because the parking lot was 

apparently “fit for the use intended by the parties”; and (3) the natural 

accumulation of snow and ice is not subject to the lessor’s duty established in 

MCL 554.139(1)(b). Moreover, we believe that the Court of Appeals acted 

contrary to MCR 7.215(J)(1) in failing to follow the precedent set forth in Teufel 

and erred in holding that language contained in a footnote cannot be binding 

precedent. However, we overrule Teufel to the extent that it is inconsistent with 

our holding in this case. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals judgment 

18
 
and reinstate the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of 

defendants. 

Stephen J. Markman 

Clifford W. Taylor 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

19
 
 

 

v 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

IRVING ALLISON, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

No. 133771 

AEW CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.L.P., 

d/b/a SUTTON PLACE APARTMENTS, 

 Defendant, 

and 

VILLAGE GREEN MANAGEMENT 

COMPANY and BFMSIT, II, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

CORRIGAN, J. (concurring). 

I concur in the result and virtually all of the reasoning of the majority 

opinion. In particular, I agree that (1) sidewalks and parking lots in leased 

residential areas are “common areas” under MCL 554.139(1)(a); (2) the natural 

accumulation of ice and snow is not subject to the lessor’s duty under MCL 

554.139(1)(b) to “keep the premises in reasonable repair”; and (3) the Court of 

Appeals erred in concluding that language in the footnote in Teufel v Watkins, 267 

Mich App 425, 429 n 1; 705 NW2d 164 (2005), could not constitute binding 

precedent. 
My sole area of disagreement with the majority concerns its analysis of 

whether a lessor’s duty to keep the premises and common areas “fit for the use 

intended by the parties,” MCL 554.139(1)(a), obligates the lessor to remove 

natural accumulations of snow and ice. The majority correctly observes that the 

parking lot here was “fit for the use intended by the parties” where only one to two 

inches of snow had accumulated. Yet the majority goes on to state that in “more 

exigent circumstances” a natural accumulation of snow or ice could trigger the 

statutory duty. Not only is this conclusion unnecessary to the disposition of this 

case, but I believe it is founded on an erroneous analysis. 

MCL 554.139(1) provides in part: 

In every lease or license of residential premises, the lessor or 

licensor covenants: 

(a) That the premises and all common areas are fit for the use 

intended by the parties. 

The majority resorts to a lay dictionary to define “fit” as “adapted or suited; 

appropriate[.]” Ante at 8, citing Random House Webster’s College Dictionary 

(1997). The majority then concludes that in some unspecified “exigent 

circumstances,” ante at 9, a natural accumulation of ice or snow could render the 

parking lot unfit for its intended use. 

The majority’s analysis hinges on its implicit view that the duty to keep the 

parking lot itself fit extends to transient conditions such as natural accumulations 

of snow or ice. This assumption overlooks a fair reading of the statutory text 

limiting the duty of fitness to the physical structure of the premises and common 

2
 
 

areas.1

 My analysis of the statutory covenant and its legal background suggests 

that it is limited to structural defects. 

While a court may use a lay dictionary to define common words or phrases 

that lack a unique legal meaning, MCL 8.3a; People v Thompson, 477 Mich 146, 

151-152; 730 NW2d 708 (2007), I would not assume that the terms used in MCL 

554.139 lack an acquired legal meaning. Indeed, it appears that the statute 

codifies the implied warranty of habitability, and that this warranty does not 

protect against transient conditions such as ice or snow. 

The duties set forth in MCL 554.139 are directed at ensuring that the 

premises are habitable. The statute was enacted “‘to establish as a matter of law 

the landlord’s promissory duty to make the premises fit for habitation at the time 

of taking possession and throughout the term of period of tenancy.’” Rome v 

Walker, 38 Mich App 458, 462 n 3; 196 NW2d 850 (1972), quoting Schier, 

Draftsman: Formulation of Policy, 2 Prospectus, A Journal of Law Reform 227, 

233 (1968) (emphasis added). 

“At common law, a landlord generally had no duty to provide a habitable 

rental property.” 49 Am Jur 2d, Landlord and Tenant, § 447, p 455. See also 

Fisher v Thirkell, 21 Mich 1, 6-7 (1870). That traditional rule was abrogated as a 

1

 Notably, we have interpreted the highway exception to the governmental 

tort liability act, MCL 691.1402, in precisely this manner. See Nawrocki v 

Macomb Co Rd Comm, 463 Mich 143, 158; 615 NW2d 702 (2000); Haliw v 

Sterling Hts, 464 Mich 297; 627 NW2d 581 (2001) (holding that a natural 

accumulation of ice on a sidewalk did not implicate the highway exception 

because the plaintiff’s injury was not caused by a defect in the sidewalk itself). 

3
 
 

 

majority of jurisdictions adopted, either by common law or by express statutory 

provision, an implied warranty of habitability. 49 Am Jur 2d, Landlord and 

Tenant, § 447, p 455. 2 

“An implied warranty of habitability requires that a dwelling be fit for its 

intended use; that is, it should be habitable and fit for living.” 52 CJS, Landlord 

& Tenant, § 687, p 607 (emphasis added). The warranty is breached where a 

“defect” exists that is “of a nature and kind which will prevent the use of the 

dwelling for its intended purpose to provide premises fit for habitation by its 

dwellers.” 49 Am Jur 2d, Landlord and Tenant, § 450, p 459 (emphasis added). 

This implied warranty extends to common areas. See id., § 447, p 455. A 

reasonable inference arises from the language of MCL 554.139(1)(a) (“fit for the 

use intended by the parties”) that it codifies the implied warranty of habitability.3 

The warranty of habitability extends only to “significant, structural defects” 

that “render the premises uninhabitable in the eyes of a reasonable person.” 52 

CJS, Landlord & Tenant, § 687, p 607. The natural accumulation of ice or snow is 

not such a defect. Id. at 607 n 12; McAllister v Boston Housing Auth, 429 Mass 

2

 The recognition of this warranty arose in light of “the realities of the 

modern urban landlord-tenant relationship.” 52 CJS, Landlord & Tenant, § 687, p 

606. 

3

 See also Browder, The taming of a duty – the tort liability of landlords, 81 

Mich L R 99, 112 n 55 (1982) (listing MCL 554.139 as an example of legislation 

that “has consisted of the enactment or amendment of landlord and tenant codes 

and laws, almost all of which have created a new duty in landlords similar in 

scope to the implied warranty of habitability declared by some courts”) (emphasis 

added). 

4
 
 

300, 306; 708 NE2d 95 (1999). The warranty extends only to “significant defects 

in the property itself.” McAllister, supra at 305.4 

Therefore, in light of the legal background of the implied warranty of 

habitability and the codification of that warranty in MCL 554.139, I question the 

majority’s conclusion that the statutory duty applies to transitory conditions such 

as snow and ice accumulations. I would hold that the duty extends only to 

significant, structural defects that render the parking lot itself unfit for its intended 

use. 

In any event, the majority’s analysis of this issue is unnecessary to the 

disposition of this case. As the majority correctly concludes, the one to two inches 

of accumulated precipitation in this case did not render the parking lot unfit for its 

intended use. We thus need not speculate regarding whether a greater 

accumulation would, in some unspecified “exigent circumstances,” trigger the 

statutory duty. 

4

 In Gossman v Lambrecht, 54 Mich App 641, 645-646; 221 NW2d 424 

(1974), our Court of Appeals recognized that “Michigan, although not explicitly, 

has followed the Massachusetts rule. Under that view a landlord, absent a 

contract, has no duty to his tenant to remove from common passageways any 

natural accumulation of snow and ice.” The panel noted that “[a]dherents of the 

Massachusetts rule believe it better suited to northern climates where slippery 

conditions from ice and snow are natural, frequent and without fault of the 

landowner, unless he increases the hazard.” Id. at 646. Although MCL 554.139 

was not at issue in that case, the Gossman panel held that a section of the Housing 

Law, MCL 125.474, providing for the cleanliness of dwellings, required no more 

of a landowner than is required by the common law regarding the removal of snow 

and ice. Id. at 649. 

5
 
For these reasons, I cannot join the majority’s analysis in full. In all other 

respects, I concur in the reasoning and conclusions set forth in the majority 

opinion. 

Maura D. Corrigan 

6
 
 

v 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

IRVING ALLISON, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

No. 133771 

AEW CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.L.P., 

d/b/a SUTTON PLACE APARTMENTS, 

Defendant, 

and 

VILLAGE GREEN MANAGEMENT 

COMPANY and BFMSIT, II, 

 Defendants-Appellants. 

CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 

I agree with the majority’s conclusions under MCL 554.139(1)(a) that a 

parking lot is a common area, the intended use of a parking lot includes walking 

to and from parked vehicles, accumulations of ice and snow may be subject to a 

landlord’s duties under § 139(1)(a), and the “open and obvious danger” doctrine 

is inapplicable to the duty created by the statute.1 However, I disagree with the 

majority’s application of § 139(1)(a) in this case. While I tend to agree with the 

majority that one or two inches of snow would rarely make a parking lot unfit for 

1

 I also agree that placement in a footnote does not, of itself, affect the 

language’s precedential significance. 
 

its intended use under § 139(1)(a), I cannot categorically conclude that an 

accumulation of one or two inches of snow or ice can never make a parking lot 

unfit. Specifically, I cannot conclude that the parking lot in this case was fit for 

its use on the facts presented. Thus, I respectfully dissent. 

I believe that plaintiff has made a sufficient showing to survive summary 

disposition under § 139(1)(a). Section 139(1) provides that, in every lease or 

license of residential premises, a landlord has a duty to ensure that premises and 

common areas are fit for use, to keep the premises in reasonable repair, and to 

comply with health and safety laws. Review of a claim under § 139(1) requires a 

determination of where the claimed injury took place. If the injury occurred in a 

common area, § 139(1)(a) requires review of the parties’ intended use for the 

common area and the area’s fitness for that use. 

In this case, plaintiff was defendant’s tenant and suffered injury in 

defendant’s apartment complex parking lot. The parking lot was a common area. 

Its intended use included parking vehicles, which includes walking to and from 

the vehicle. Plaintiff was walking to his vehicle when he slipped and fell; 

therefore, he was using the parking lot as the parties intended when he was 

injured.2

 So the next question is whether the parking lot was fit for its intended 

use when plaintiff fell. 

2

 The majority states that “[a] tenant using a common area for a purpose 

other than that for which the area is intended is not protected by the covenant for 

fitness.” Ante at 10. I disagree. The statute does not require that the injury occur 

(. . . continued) 

2
 
 

 

The concept of fitness for use includes safety. The Second Restatement of 

Torts states: 

[A]n invitee enters upon an implied representation or 

assurance that the land has been prepared and made ready and safe 

for his reception. He is therefore entitled to expect that the possessor 

will exercise reasonable care to make the land safe for his entry, or 

for his use for the purposes of the invitation. [2 Restatement Torts, 

2d, § 343, comment b, p 216.] 

Specifically in landlord and tenant law, this Court has stated that “a landlord may 

be held liable for an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition 

in the areas of common use retained in his control . . . .” Williams v Cunningham 

Drug Stores, Inc, 429 Mich 495, 499; 418 NW2d 381 (1988). The Williams 

Court reasoned: 

The rationale behind imposing a duty to protect in these 

special relationships is based on control. In each situation one 

person entrusts himself to the control and protection of another, with 

a consequent loss of control to protect himself. The duty to protect 

is imposed upon the person in control because he is best able to 

provide a place of safety.” [Id. (emphasis added).] 

So § 139(1)(a), requiring fitness, imposes a duty on the landlord to ensure that 

common areas are safe for their intended use. Whether a common area is 

(continued . . .) 

while the common area is being used as intended. It requires the common area to 

be fit for the use intended. Thus, if the area is unfit for its intended use, an injured 

plaintiff may seek recovery for damages regardless of the use that plaintiff was 

making of the area when the injury occurred. 

3
 
 

sufficiently safe to be fit for its intended purpose depends on the condition of the 

area in question.3 

There appears to be some confusion about the condition of defendant’s 

parking lot at the time of plaintiff’s injury. The Court of Appeals described the 

condition as “[a] parking lot covered with ice,”4

 while the majority describes the 

condition as a lot with “one to two inches of accumulated snow.” Ante at 2. A 

two-inch sheet of ice ordinarily presents a very different degree of danger from 

that ordinarily presented by two inches of snow. Typically, the danger associated 

with snow becomes greater as the snow becomes deeper. But ice may be 

dangerous at almost any thickness. 

Plaintiff testified that when he left his apartment for work on the morning 

of March 13, 2003, the entire area was covered with “maybe an inch or two” of 

snow that had accumulated overnight. He stepped down the two stairs of his 

porch, walked down the sidewalk to the parking lot, and then began walking 

across the parking lot toward his car. After walking about 20 feet across the 

3

 The trial court did not inquire into the condition of the common area 

because it applied improper legal standards. The trial court believed that MCL 

554.139(1) did not apply to this case and the open and obvious danger doctrine did 

apply. Thus, the trial court only needed to know two facts: that plaintiff fell on ice 

or snow and the ice or snow was open and obvious. Plaintiff attempted to present 

more facts regarding the condition of the common area at the hearing on 

defendant’s motion for summary disposition, but the trial court rebuffed the effort. 

Inquiry into the condition of the common area was irrelevant to the legal standards 

applied by the trial court. 

4 Allison v AEW Capital Mgt, LLP (On Reconsideration), 274 Mich App 

663, 671; 736 NW2d 307 (2007). 

4
 
parking lot toward his car, plaintiff slipped and fell. In deposition testimony, 

plaintiff described how he fell: “I just take the step and then my foot falls or slips 

out from under me, and then I fell and then I—that’s basically it. My foot 

slipped. It was the ice that I slipped on.” When asked how he knew that he 

slipped on “ice versus snow,” plaintiff stated: “Well, because the way my foot 

slipped. It slipped and my leg just went from under me and then when I fell, I 

saw where my foot slipped, I saw ice.” So, according to the only evidence 

available to this Court, plaintiff slipped on ice in defendant’s parking lot. 

believe that a parking lot covered with ice is not fit for its intended use because it 

is not safe for walking. 

The majority states that “[m]ere inconvenience” does not make a common 

area unfit for its intended use. Ante at 10. But the ice-covered surface of 

defendant’s parking lot presented a much greater danger to plaintiff than mere 

inconvenience. Plaintiff’s fall on ice in defendant’s parking lot caused severe 

injury. Plaintiff’s fractured ankle required extensive surgery. Plaintiff was not 

able to return to work for three months following surgery. In deposition 

testimony two years after the injury, plaintiff stated, “I always have pain and 

restrictions . . . I have pain in my ankle every day.” Further, plaintiff is subject to 

ankle “re-sprains” three or four times a week. I would not call the condition 

plaintiff faced a mere inconvenience. And I would not call a common area that 

presented such a danger fit for its intended use. 

5
 

I 
 

The majority states that the parking lot was fit for its intended use because 

“tenants were able to enter and exit the parking lot, to park their vehicles therein, 

and to access those vehicles.” Ante at 9. I am unaware of any evidence to 

support this conclusion. The only fact established on this point is that plaintiff 

was not able to access his vehicle without injury. The majority concludes that the 

parking lot was fit for its intended use when plaintiff fell because “plaintiff did 

not show that the condition of the parking lot in this case precluded access to his 

vehicle.” Ante at 10. But, as mentioned, access to vehicles must be safe in order 

to be fit. Plaintiff could access his vehicle only by risking serious injury. 

A landlord’s duty to provide safe common areas does not preclude a 

tenant’s duty to take steps within his control to keep himself safe. The trial court 

intimated as much when it opined on the proper method of walking on ice: “I 

suggest that—I call it the Michigan shuffle, but you don’t necessarily walk; you 

do the skating.” Contrary to the apparent perception of the trial court, plaintiff 

testified in deposition that he took every reasonable precaution: he was wearing 

boots specifically made for walking on snow, he watched where he was going, 

and he proceeded with great care when crossing the parking lot. Despite his best 

efforts to attend to his safety by means within his control, he was injured. At this 

pretrial stage, I believe that plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of fact concerning 

whether the parking lot was unfit. Thus, summary disposition is inappropriate. 

If a plaintiff is able to show that a common area is not fit for its intended 

use, the reasonableness of the landlord’s actions to remedy the unfit condition 

6
 
should also be assessed. “[A] contract to keep the premises in safe condition 

subjects the lessor to liability only if he does not exercise reasonable care after he 

has had notice of the need of repairs. In any case his obligation is only one of 

reasonable care.” 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 357, comment d, pp 242-243. In 

this case, if the parking lot is found unfit, there is a valid question whether 

defendant exercised reasonable care to remedy the unfit condition. I would 

remand the case to the trial court for further inquiry into these matters under the 

proper legal standards. 

I would also state a clearer standard for a landlord’s liability regarding ice 

and snow than the majority provides to guide courts facing similar claims in the 

future. Because fitness for use requires a landlord to take measures to provide 

safe common areas, and because a landlord’s duty requires exercise of reasonable 

care, I would apply the standard of Quinlivan v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 

Inc, 395 Mich 244, 261; 235 NW2d 732 (1975): the duty owed by a landlord to a 

tenant regarding ice and snow requires that “reasonable measures be taken within 

a reasonable time after an accumulation of ice and snow to diminish the hazard of 

injury to the [tenant].” This standard arose in tort law, but it applies to fitness for 

use as well. It is faithful to the statute and readily applicable for courts in the 

future. 

I generally agree with the majority’s analysis (if not its application) of 

§ 139(1)(a), but I believe the majority has unnecessarily reached several issues. 

These matters are not necessary to the majority’s disposition of the case; thus, 

7
 
they are dicta. Nonetheless, I disagree with several of these extraneous 

conclusions. First, because the majority holds that defendant is entitled to 

summary disposition, there is no need to determine plaintiff’s potential remedy. 

However, I would hold that a plaintiff who proves a claim under MCL 

554.139(1) is entitled to full damages for the injury. The Second Restatement of 

Torts, § 357, states: 

A lessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to 

his lessee and others upon the land with the consent of the lessee or 

his sublessee by a condition of disrepair existing before or arising 

after the lessee has taken possession if 

(a) the lessor, as such, has contracted by a covenant in the lease or 

otherwise to keep the land in repair, and 

(b) the disrepair creates an unreasonable risk to persons upon the 

land which the performance of the lessor’s agreement would have 

prevented, and 

(c) the lessor fails to exercise reasonable care to perform his 

contract. [Id. at 241.] 

The comments to that section state that “the duty arises out of the 

existence of the contract to repair.” Id., comment d, p 242. The comments 

further state that “[t]he lessor’s duty under the rule stated in this Section is not 

merely contractual, although it is founded upon a contract. It is a tort duty.” Id., 

§ 357, comment c, p 242. There is no reason this liability should not apply under 

MCL 554.139(1). Indeed, it should apply because the statute’s very purpose is to 

provide safety in areas outside the tenant’s control. Williams, supra at 499 (“duty 

to protect is imposed upon the person in control because he is best able to provide 

a place of safety”). 

8
 
Also, because this case involves a tenant only, there is no reason to 

address a landlord’s liability to nontenants under § 139(1). However, I believe 

the majority incorrectly asserts that a nontenant could never recover under the 

covenant for fitness because a lessor has no contractual relationship with a 

nontenant. The Second Restatement of Torts, § 357, states that “[a] lessor of land 

is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his lessee and others upon the 

land with consent of the lessee . . . .” Id. at 241 (emphasis added). Additionally, I 

believe the intended use of a parking lot in an apartment complex will generally 

include, at minimum, parking (and walking) for a tenant’s guests. An apartment 

is a tenant’s home. It is likely that both parties to an apartment lease intend the 

parking lot to be used by guests as well as tenants. 

Finally, I believe that MCL 554.139(1)(b) may apply to common areas. 

Section 139(1)(b) contains two independent covenants. The first is “[t]o keep the 

premises in reasonable repair during the term of the lease.” The second is “to 

comply with the applicable health and safety laws of the state and of the local 

government.” The second is independent of the first and is not confined to the 

“premises.” Therefore, a landlord may be liable for an injury sustained in a 

common area due to a condition that does not comply with health and safety 

laws. I would direct the trial court to examine whether plaintiff has a claim under 

the second covenant of § 139(1)(b). 

The trial court in this case found that § 139(1) did not apply and the open 

and obvious danger doctrine did apply. The majority determines that § 139(1) 

9
 
applies and the open and obvious danger doctrine does not. I agree with that 

determination, but I would affirm the result of the Court of Appeals and remand 

this case to the trial court for further proceedings under the proper legal 

standards. 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Marilyn Kelly 

10