alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 35
                                   ----------


                       COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS SERVICING LP


                              OFFICERS' CERTIFICATE
                     ANNUAL STATEMENT OF THE MASTER SERVICER


                                   CWALT, INC.
                        ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2007-10CB
              MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2007-10CB


      The undersigned does hereby certify that the undersigned is an officer of
Countrywide GP, Inc., general partner of Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP
(the "Master Servicer"), and does hereby further certify pursuant to Section
3.16 of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement for the above-captioned Series (the
"Agreement") that:

(i) A review of the activities of the Master Servicer during the preceding
calendar year and of the performance of the Master Servicer under the Agreement
has been made under my supervision; and

(ii) To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer has
fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects
throughout such calendar year.




/s/ Craig Baingo                                      Dated: March 14, 2008
-----------------

Craig Baingo
Executive Vice President, Finance
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

STEPHEN WETHERINGTON,

Appellant,

v.

CITY OF CORAL SPRINGS,

Appellee.

No. 4D2023-0086

[December 7, 2023]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; John B. Bowman, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE18-015777.

William Robert Amlong and Jennifer E. Daley of The Amlong Firm, Fort 

Lauderdale, for appellant.

Chris J. Stearns and Jonathan H. Railey of Johnson, Anselmo, 

Murdoch, Burke, Piper & Hochman, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

GROSS, GERBER and CONNER, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
<PAGE>                                  
                                  
                                  EXHIBIT 15

                                  
To the Shareholders and Board of Directors
  of Sears, Roebuck and Co.

We have made a review, in accordance with standards established
by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, of
the unaudited interim financial information of Sears, Roebuck
and Co. for the three and nine-month periods ended September 28,
1996 and September 30, 1995, as indicated in our report dated
November 8, 1996; because we did not perform an audit, we
expressed no opinion on that information.

We are aware that our report referred to above, which is
included in your Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the
three-month period ended September 28, 1996, is incorporated by
reference in Registration Statement Nos. 2-64879, 2-80037,
33-18081, 33-23793, 33-41485, 33-43459, 33-45479, 33-55825,
33-58851, 333-8141 and 33-64345 of Sears, Roebuck and Co.;
Registration Nos. 33-64215 and 333-9817 of Sears, Roebuck and Co.
and Sears Roebuck Acceptance Corp.; Registration Statement Nos.
33-57205 and 333-11973 of Sears, Roebuck and Co. and The Savings
and Profit Sharing Fund of Sears Employees; Registration
Statement No. 33-44671 of Sears, Roebuck and Co. and Sears DC
Corp.; and Registration Statement No. 33-64775 of Sears, Roebuck
and Co. and Sears, Roebuck and Co. Deferred Compensation Plan.

We also are aware that the aforementioned report, pursuant to
Rule 436(c) under the Securities Act of 1933, is not considered
a part of the Registration Statement prepared or certified by an
accountant or a report prepared or certified by an accountant
within the meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of that Act.



Deloitte & Touche LLP

Chicago, Illinois
November 8, 1996
#### In the Matter of Leon Newman et al., Appellants, et al., Petitioner, v Eric R. Dinallo, Superintendent, Insurance Department of the State of New York, Respondent.

Submitted May 24, 2010;

decided June 29, 2010

Motion for reargument of motion for leave to appeal denied with $100 costs and necessary reproduction disbursements *[see*14 NY3d 708 (2010)].
#### State v. Blair

Case below: 181 N.C. App. 236

No. 081P07

1. Def’s NOA Based Upon a Constitutional Question (COA06-515)

2. AG’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal

3. Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31

1. _

2. Allowed 08/23/07

3. Denied 08/23/07
EXHIBIT 32.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SS. 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of Vertex Energy, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, Chris Carlson, Principal Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:





(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








March 31, 2011

/s/ Chris CarlsonChris CarlsonChief Financial Officer

(Principal Accounting Officer)
#### Michael Owens et al., Doing Business as Classic Entertainment, Respondents, v Isaac Freeman, Also Known as Fatman Scoop, Appellant.

Submitted October 5, 2009;

decided November 24, 2009

Reported below, 65 AD3d 731.

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.
#### LT Propco, LLC, Appellant, v Carousel Center Company, L.P, et al., Respondents. (And Other Actions.)

Submitted May 10, 2010;

decided June 29, 2010

Motion, insofar as it seeks leave to appeal as against defendant Carousel Center Company, L.P, dismissed as untimely; motion, insofar as it seeks leave to appeal as against defendant City of Syracuse Industrial Development Agency, denied.

Judge Pigott taking no part.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paul Anthony FULLER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-4426.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Sept. 27, 2006.

Decided: Oct. 23, 2006.

*472Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, William C. Ingram, Jr., First Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Michael A. DeFranco, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Paul Anthony Fuller entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2000). Fuller was sentenced to fifty-four months’ imprisonment. We find no error and affirm Fuller’s conviction.

On appeal, Fuller contends his predicate state conviction did not satisfy § 922(g)(1) as a matter of law. He reasons that, under North Carolina law, his maximum sentence was twelve months because no aggravating factors were either admitted or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. *See North Carolina v. Allen,*359 N.C. 425, 615 S.E.2d 256, 265 (2005) (holding, after *Blakely v. Washington,*542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), statutory maximum is the maximum a defendant can face in light of his criminal history and the facts found by a jury or admitted by defendant). However, as Fuller concedes, his argument is foreclosed by *United States v. Harp,*406 F.3d 242, 246-47 (4th Cir.2005), *cert. denied,*- U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 297, 163 L.Ed.2d 259 (2005), which holds that *United States v. Jones,*195 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 1999), is still viable after *Blakely*and *United States v. Booker,*543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), and reaffirms that a prior North Carolina conviction satisfies § 922(g)(1) if any defendant charged with that crime could receive a sentence in excess of one year. Thus, because it is undisputed that a sentence of over twelve months could be imposed on a defendant convicted of felony breaking and entering a motor vehicle in North Carolina, Fuller’s prior conviction was properly considered a predicate felony under § 922(g)(1).

Accordingly, we affirm Fuller’s conviction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 95 (Tuesday, May 19, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 23401]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-11569]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket Nos. ER09-88-002]


Southern Company Services, Inc.; Notice of Filing

May 12, 2009.
    Take notice that on April 23, 2009, the Southern Company Services, 
Inc., acting as agent for Alabama Power Company, Georgia Power Company, 
Gulf Power Company, Mississippi Power Company and Southern Power 
Company (collectively Southern Companies), filed tariff sheets to its 
Market Based Rate Tariff, to be effective April 23, 2009, pursuant to 
the Commission's, March 25, 2009, Order, Southern Co. Svcs., Inc., 126 
FERC ] 61,274 (2009) (March 25 Order).
    Any person desiring to intervene or to protest this filing must 
file in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules of 
Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211, 385.214). Protests will be 
considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate action to 
be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the 
proceeding. Any person wishing to become a party must file a notice of 
intervention or motion to intervene, as appropriate. Such notices, 
motions, or protests must be filed on or before the comment date. 
Anyone filing a motion to intervene or protest must serve a copy of 
that document on the Applicant and all the parties in this proceeding.
    The Commission encourages electronic submission of protests and 
interventions in lieu of paper using the ``eFiling'' link at http://www.ferc.gov. Persons unable to file electronically should submit an 
original and 14 copies of the protest or intervention to the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 
20426.
    This filing is accessible on-line at http://www.ferc.gov, using the 
``eLibrary'' link and is available for review in the Commission's 
Public Reference Room in Washington, DC. There is an ``eSubscription'' 
link on the Web site that enables subscribers to receive email 
notification when a document is added to a subscribed docket(s). For 
assistance with any FERC Online service, please e-mail 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#561013041519383a3f383305232626392422163033243578313920"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="a2e4e7f0e1edcccecbccc7f1d7d2d2cdd0d6e2c4c7d0c18cc5cdd4">[email protected]</span></a>, or call (866) 208-3676 (toll free). For 
TTY, call (202) 502-8659.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. Eastern Time on May 15, 2009.

Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. E9-11569 Filed 5-18-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


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</html>
#### FICUS FARM, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE-RISK MANAGEMENT AGENCY, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 08-15527.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

May 19, 2009.

Michael D. Martin, Martin Law Office, Lakeland, FL, William Kenneth Crispin, Law Office of William K. Crispin, Tavernier, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Lisette M. Reid, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S.D. Florida, Anne R. Schultz, Kathleen M. Salyer, Miami, FL, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before MARCUS and PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and EDENFIELD,* District Judge.

*

 Honorable B. Avant Edenfield, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Georgia, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Ficus Farm, Inc. (“Ficus Farm”), a nursery located in Loxahatchee Florida, appeals from the district court’s August 27, 2008, 2008 WL 4057741, order granting final summary judgment to United States Department of Agriculture-Risk Management Agency (“RMA”) et al. The *899suit arose out of an insurer’s decision not to indemnify Ficus Farm for part of its claimed nursery losses. Ficus Farm had claimed an insurance loss of palms, ferns, Jessamine and Veriegated Ginger plants due to excessive moisture following a series of storms in 2005. The RMA reviewed the insurer’s decision and upheld the insurer’s partial denial of Ficus Farm’s claim because the owner of Ficus Farm (1) had misrepresented material facts to the insurer; (2) had destroyed certain crops without the written permission of the insurer in violation of the policy; and (3) had failed to mitigate its losses.

The district court upheld the agency determination, concluding that there was substantial evidence to support each of the agency’s findings, and its conclusion. After thorough review, we affirm the final order of summary judgment based on the district court’s well-reasoned and thorough opinion.

AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>
<TABLE>

									     EXHIBIT 12(a)
				
				
							     COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF INCOME TO FIXED CHARGES
							   SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO. AND CONSOLIDATED SUBSIDIARIES
	     
<CAPTION>             
					       Twelve         Nine
					       Months         Months
					       Ended          Ended
					       Sept. 28,      Sept. 28,                         Year Ended
					       1996           1996
(millions, except ratios)                      (unaudited)    (unaudited)       1995      1994      1993      1992       1991
<S>                                             <C>            <C>               <C>      <C>        <C>       <C>       <C>
Fixed Charges                                                                                                    
  Interest and amortization of debt discount                                                            
   and expense on all indebtedness               $1,361         $1,013         $1,373    $1,279    $1,318    $1,389     $1,568
  
  Add interest element implicit in rentals          128             99            119       114       105       165        155
						  1,489          1,112          1,492     1,393     1,423     1,554      1,723
  Interest capitalized                                4              4              4         1         3        23         22
Total fixed charges                              $1,493         $1,116         $1,496    $1,394    $1,426    $1,577     $1,745  

Income (loss)                                                                                                    
  Income (loss) from continuing operations       $1,159           $704         $1,025      $857      $625   ($1,812)      $160
  Deduct undistributed net income (loss)                                                                                        
  of unconsolidated companies                        20             12              9        (7)        6        (4)       (11)
						  1,139            692          1,016       864       619   ( 1,808)       171
Add                                                                                                      
  Fixed charges (excluding interest capitalized)  1,489          1,112          1,492     1,393     1,423     1,554      1,723
  Income taxes (benefit)                            793            468            703       614       329   ( 1,039)       126
     Income (loss) before fixed charges and                                                                   
      income taxes                               $3,421         $2,272         $3,211    $2,871    $2,371   ($1,293)    $2,020
      
Ratio of income to fixed charges                   2.29           2.04           2.15      2.06      1.66      (A)        1.16

<FN>
(A) As a result of the loss for the year ended December 31, 1992, earnings did not cover fixed charges by $2,870 million. 
</FN>                                                                                                
</TABLE>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Peter Paragas, Appellant.

[872 NYS2d 506]

*876Appeal by the defendant from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Blumenfeld, J.), dated August 2, 2006, as, upon his conviction of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree, criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and upon granting that branch of his motion which was for resentencing pursuant to the Drug Law Reform Act of 2004 (L 2004, ch 738, § 23), denied that branch of his motion which was to reduce his conviction of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from.

The defendant moved for resentencing on the class A-I felony of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree pursuant to the Drug Law Reform Act of 2004 (L 2004, ch 738, § 23) and to have his conviction for the class A-I felony reduced to a class A-II felony based on the subsequent change in the weight requirement for first-degree possession under the Drug Law Reform Act *(see*L 2004, ch 738, §§ 21-22). The Supreme Court granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for resentencing pursuant to Drug Law Reform Act § 23 and imposed a determinate term of 12 years imprisonment with 5 years postrelease supervision, and denied that branch of his motion which was for a reduction of his conviction to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree.

On appeal, the defendant argues that his conviction should be reduced to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree under the amelioration doctrine of *People v Behlog*(74 NY2d 237 [1989]) because he was only convicted of possessing approximately five ounces of cocaine. Here, the amelioration doctrine does not apply, since the defendant’s criminal conduct, as well as his original sentence, imposed on June 24, 2003, preceded the enactment of the Drug Law Reform Act of 2004 *(see People v Utsey,*7 NY3d 398, 404 [2006]; *People v Walker,*81 NY2d 661, 667 [1993]; *People v Figueroa,*47 AD3d 524, 524 [2008]; *People v Joseph,*30 AD3d 248, 249 [2006]; *People v Abreu,*29 AD3d 336, 336 [2006]; *People v Quinones,*22 AD3d 218, 219 [2005]).

The defendant’s contention that his adjudication as a second felony offender at the original sentence violated his right to a jury trial is not reviewable by this Court on this appeal *(see*
      *877CPL 450.30 [3]; *People v Ferrufino,*33 AD3d 623 [20063; *People v DeSpirito,*27 AD3d 479, 479-480 [2006]). Spolzino, J.P., Covello, Angiolillo and Chambers, JJ., concur.
1 The HONORABLE HARRY F. BARNES, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Arkansas.



## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 00-3430

___________ Gloria Counter, * * Appellant, * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the v. * Western District of Arkansas. * Arkansas Department of Finance and * [UNPUBLISHED] Administration, et al., * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: July 5, 2001 Filed: July 9, 2001

___________ Before BOWMAN, BEAM, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Gloria Counter, who has worked as a revenue office cashier in Magnolia, Arkansas, since 1991, filed this action against the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administrationand two supervisory employees, claiming defendants singled her out for harsher discipline and punishment than her coworkers on the basis of her race, and in retaliation for her pursuit of her rights. The district court 1 granted defendants summary-2-

judgment as to Counter’s retaliation claim, finding no evidence of a causal connection between any alleged adverse employment action and Counter’s protected activity. Following a jury trial on the race discrimination claim, the district court granted defendants judgment

in accordance with the jury’s verdict. Counter appeals, and we affirm. Having carefully reviewed the record and Counter’s arguments on appeal, we conclude (1) the grant of summary judgment on Counter’s retaliation claim was proper because there was no evidence that the supervisors who perpetrated the alleged adverse employment actions were aware of Counter’s EEOC claims, see Barge v. AnheuserBusch , Inc. , 87 F.3d 256, 259-60 (8th Cir. 1996); (2) Counter failed to preserve her claim of instructional error, and there was no plain error, see Kehoe v. AnheuserBusch, Inc. , 96 F.3d 1095, 1104 (8th Cir. 1996); (3) there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict on the issue of race discrimination, see Smith , 151 F.3d at 818 (standard of review); and (4) Counter was not entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief absent undisputed evidence, or a jury finding, that race was a motivating factor in defendants’ actions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g); Browning v. President Riverboat Casino-Missouri , 139 F.3d 631, 634 (8th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### Newton *v.*The State.

On an indictment for using opprobrious words tending to cause a breach of the peace, it is no defence that the accused had been told by his wife, or by her and another person, that the individual to whom the opprobrious words were addressed had insulted her or used insulting language in speaking to her, there being no evidence other than these declarations that any insult had in fact been given or any insulting language used to the wife.

June 4, 1894.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Indictment for using opprobrious words. Before Judge Turneull. Oity court of Floyd county. December term, 1893.

The testimony showed, that two women (one of them ■defendant’s wife) passed a witness, who asked them *594where they got the apples they were eating. They replied, in the orchard. Witness then asked defendant’s wife, if defendant “ got his fruit by moonlight,” meaning no reference to her condition, but joking about defendant stealing fruit. A day or two afterwards, defendant asked witness why he had insulted his wife, and witness replied he was only joking with her. Defendant thereupon cursed and abused him, using the words laid in the indictment. In his statement defendant claimed that his wife informed him that the witness had insulted her by an improper proposal; and further, that she was pregnant when the insult was given. The court was requested to charge the jury, that if defendant acted upon the belief that her statement to him was true, he had a right to believe her, and then it would be a question for the jury whether the words used to her justified the use of the language set out in the indictment. Upon the denial of this request error was assigned.

George A. H. Harris, for plaintiff in error.

W. J. Nunnally, solicitor-general, *contra.*