The Honor able Solomon Oliver, Jr., United St ates District Judge f or the Nor

thern District * of Ohio, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 09a0017n.06 Filed: January

9, 2009 No. 07-5466
UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,
v. FRANKLI N L . KE LL OGG, Defendan t-Appellant. / ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE EA STER

N D ISTRIC T OF TEN NE SSEE

BEFORE: CLAY and KETHLE DG E, Circuit Judges; and O LIVER, District Judge. * CLAY, Circ uit Jud ge. Def endant F ranklin L . Kellog g (“K ellog g ”) a ppeals fr om a district court orde r convic ting him of be ing a felon in possession of a f irea rm and ammuniti on in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )(1) , possession with intent to di stribute coca ine hy drochloride in violation of 21 U. S.C. § 8 41 (a )(1) an d p os se ssi on of a fi re arm in f ur the ra nc e of a dr ugtr a ff ic kin g c ri me in vio la tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 92 4( c ). Spe c if ic a lly , K e llo gg conte nd s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in denying his motion to suppress his statements to investigators; abused its discretion in admitting
e viden c e of

a pr e vio us arm e d r ob be ry ; and a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

a dmi tti ngan in -c ourt

wi tne ssNo. 07-5466

2 identification. F or the following rea sons, we RE VE RSE in pa rt and AF F IRM in part the judgment of the district cour

t, and REMAND the ca se to the district court f or a ne w trial. BACK GR OUND I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound On Octobe r 12, 2005, a team of Unit ed S tates Mar shals and two dete ctives with the Mar ion County Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment soug ht to ex ecute a fe dera l arre st warr ant for Ke l l og g at a duplex located at 111 Old J asper Hig hway in South P ittsburgh, Te n n es s ee (t he “duple x ”). K ellog g was wanted f or violating the t erms of his supervised relea se on a pr ior bank robbe ry conviction, and wa s also suspecte d of a r ece nt armed ba nk robber y in G untersville, Alabama . Kellog g had bee n staying with Tiffany

Hucka bee ( “Huc kabee ”), a

“fr iend of a

n associate , ” fo r three or four nights. (Joint Appendix (“J .A.”) at 367.) Thr ee othe r adults and Huc kabee ’s two childre n wer e also staying in the duplex whil e Ke lloggwas ther e. Fr om the parkinglot o u t s i de the duplex, one of the de tectives c alled Huc kabee on the telephone a

nd informed her that they had a war rant for Kellog g ’s ar

rest. Huc kabee responde d that Kellog g told he r that “he had nothing[.]” (J.A. at 345.) The detec tive instructed Hucka bee and the oth e r r e sid e nts to c ome ou t of the du ple x fir st, and

fo r K e llo g g to followthe m out. T he mars ha ls
secur ed Ke llogg , place d him in handcuffs a nd took him int o custody

when he came out as instructed. The mar shals sear ched him and f ound approximately

$1,000 on his person. Th e mars ha ls c on ta c te d F e de ra l B ur e a u o f I nv e sti g a tio n ( “ F B I ” ) S pe c ia l A g e nts Ja m e s Me lia (“ Mel ia” ) and Stanle y

Ruf fi n ( “ Ruf fi n” ), wh o w e re he lpi ngF B Ia g e nts in A la bama inv e sti g a te Kellog g ’s involvement in the Gunter sville r obbery
. When Me lia and Ruffin a rrived at the scene ofNo. 07-5466

3 th e arres t at app rox im ate ly 7: 00 p. m. , t he m ars hal s i nfo rm ed M eli a th at t hey hadcon du cte d a s ecur ity
swee p of t he duplex and had discovere d drug s in one of its bedrooms. Melia spoke with Huc kabee and obtained he r conse nt to searc h the duplex. Melia then approach ed Ke llogg , told Kelloggthat h e w an t e d

p e r m i s s i o nt o s e ar c h t h e r e s i d e n c e an d p r e s e n t e d

h i m w i t h a

c o n s e n tf o r m t o s e ar c h
. In response , Kellog g told him t hat his consent wa s not nece ssary , that any thing illeg al in the apa

rtment
wa s h i s , and that he did not wa nt Huckabe e to be blame d for whatever might be f

ound. Kell o gg
ne ve rt he le ss s ig ne d th e c on se nt f or m. P ri or to c on du c tin g the se arc h, the a g e nts a sk e d Kel log g if he ha d a gun on the pr e mis e s, and

if he ha d a ny dr ug s o r d ru g pa ra ph e rn a lia . K e llo g g tol d th e a g e nts wher e powder coca ine, marijuana , cash a nd a g un could be f

ound in the residenc e. Melia a lso asked Kellog g if the ca sh drawe r from the Guntersville bank robber y was in the duplex. Kellog g responde d that the dra

wer was not in the re sidence beca use he “go t ri d o f i t in Alabama.” (J.A. at 81) The
a g e n t s r e c o v e r e d

f r o m t h e r e s i d e n c e a

n u mb e r o f i t e m s r e l a t e d t o t h e A l a b a m a b an k r o b b e r y, including a

wristwatch, a

New Y ork Ya

nkees ba seball ca

p, and tennis shoes that matche d the g ener al descr iption of the robber ’s clothes a nd a shoe pr int taken from the c ounter of the robbed ba nk. Ag ents also re cover ed two pac kag es of powder coca ine, dig ital scales a

nd other drugpara

pherna lia, a nine- milli meter pistol and six ty dollars in cash. Following the sea

rch, Me lia and Ruffin tra

nsp o r te d Kellog g to the FB Ioffice in Chattanoog a, Te nn e sse e , f

or fu rt he r q ue sti on ing . K e llo g g sig ne d a fo rm wa ivi nghis Miranda rig hts at
a pp ro xima te ly 7:2 0 p. m., tho ug h it is un c le ar wh e the r thi s o c c ur re d b e fo re or

a ft e r h e le ft

wi th M e lia and Ruffin.No. 07-5466

4 At the FB Ioffice , Melia and Ruff i n q u estioned Ke lloggabout the Gunter sville robbery
. Du ring the questioning , Kellog g stated that he kne w he wa s in “major trouble” beca use he w as
c a ug ht w itha

g un and dr ug s. Re g ard ingthe ba

nk ro bb e ry , K e llo g g tol d th e m th a t “ y ou c an c los e it on me.” Me lia asked K ellog g if the fire arm found at the dupl ex was the same one used during the Guntersville robbe ry . Acc ording to Melia, Kellog g “told me that if we had ballistic te sting on it that the g un wo uld ma tc h th e g un

that w a s fir e d in the ba

nk ro bb e ry .” (J.A . at 83 -8 4. ) M e lia and Ruf fi n also asked K ellog g about the $1,000 they found whe n sear ching him. Kelloggsta t ed that “it was proce eds fr om something e lse” a nd that he did not want to discuss it. (J .A. at 86.) On Dec ember

13, 2005, a g rand jury

sitti ng in the Easter

n District of Tenne ssee issued a three -count indictment ag ainst Kellog g . Count one alleg ed that Ke lloggwas a fe lon in possession of a f irea rm, count two alleg ed that Ke lloggpossessed coc aine with intent to distribute, and count three alleg ed that Ke lloggpossessed a f irea rm in further ance of a dr

ug traff icking crime. II. Suppr e ssi on H e ar ing Prior to trial, Kellog g moved to suppress the statements he made outside the duplex and at the FB Ioffice . A suppression hea ring was he ld before a mag istrate judg e and K ellog g , Melia and Ruffin testified. Ke llo g g te sti fi e d th a t a t th e tim e of the arr e st h e wa s “ on

thr e e [of] what y ou

wo uld c a ll Xana x es, footb al l s , t h e s t ree t name is . . . blue footballs.” ( J .A. at 108.) K ellog g testified that he
c ou ld no t ha

ve c on se nte d to the se arc h o f h is r e sid e nc e or wa ive d h is r ig hts be c a

us e “ Iwa sn ’t

in m y rig ht frame of mind to waive my rig hts.” (J.A. at 109.) Kellog g also contende d that he did not make
any state me nts re g ard ingthe own ers hip or loc a tio n o f d

ru g s, we a po ns or any of the oth e r i te msNo. 07-5466

5 seized during the sea

rch of his residenc e; he had only overhe ard the marshals discussing items that
we re re cover ed duringthe protec tive swee p and re lay ed that information to Melia. Moreover , Kellog g testified that he f elt coer ced into sig ning the consent to s ea rc h form bec ause he wanted Hu c ka be e and he r c hil dr e n to be a

ble to re tur

n to t he ir ho me . A c c or din g to K e llo g g , M e lia re a d h im the Miranda rig hts w aiver form and handed it to him to sign during the car ride to the FB Ioffice
. Melia t estified that he brought consent to searc h and Miranda ri gh t s wa i v er fo rm s t o Ke l l o gg

“ jus t a bo ut i mme diate ly ” a ft e r a rr ivi nga t th e dupl ex , and a t th a t ti me re a d K e llo g g his Miranda rig hts. (J .A. at 92) Me lia stated that althoug h Kellog g signe d the consent to searc h form, he ma y not have sig ned the Miranda waiver u n t i l “l at er . . . possibl y in the car [.] ” (J.A. at 92-93.) On
re dir e c t, Me lia s ta te d th a t he wo uld ne ve r q ue sti on a su sp e c t in

c us tod y be fo re he wa ive d h is Miranda ri gh t s , an d ad d ed t h at h e be l i ev ed , “a ft er re v i ew i n g t h es e t h i n gs , ” t h at h e h adKe l l o gg s i gn both forms befor e askinghim any qu es t i o n s . (J.A. at 164.) Melia testified that Ke lloggdid not requ est an at to rney

or i nv ok e hi s right to rem ain si len t at any ti me d uri ng th e in ter vi ew at th e FBI office
. Ruffin testified that he a nd Melia questioned Ke lloggabou t t h e l ocation of dr ug s and
wea pons in the duplex “bec ause of safe ty [.] ” (J.A. at 146.) He state d that he and Me lia executed the Miranda rig hts waiver f orm afte r Ke lloggsigne d the consent to se arc h form and the sea rch w as conducte d, though he could not rec all whether Kellog g signe d the waiver befor e they depar ted for the FB Ioffice
. Following the hea

ring , the mag istrate judg e issued a r eport a nd recommendation denying Kellog g ’s motion to suppress. United States v. Kellogg , No. 05 Cr. 148, 2006 WL 3196902 (E.D.No. 07-5466

6 Tenn. Nov. 1, 2006) . The magistrate j udg e did not find Kellog g cre dible, reje cting his testimony that he was intox icated when he signe d the conse nt to searc h and Miranda waiver forms. Id. at *6. The mag istrate judge found that Kellog g had not re ceive d a Miranda war ning pr ior to the ag ents asking fo r c on se nt t o s e arc h, bu t th a t Ke llo g g ’s ri g hts we re no t viol a te d at th a t ti me be c a us e the re qu e st t o
sear ch wa s “not an interr og ation.” Id. at *8. The mag istrate judge found that whether Kellog g was inf or me d o f a nd wa ive d h is ri g hts pr ior to dil vu lg ing the loc a tio n o f c on tr a ba nd and oth e r i te ms i n the duplex was unclea

r fr om the rec ord, but that those statements we re ne verthe less admissible under the public safe ty

exception established in New Y ork v. Q uarles , 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984). Id. The mag istrate judg e found that Kellog g signe d the Miranda waiver form prior to the questioning at the FB Ioffice in Chattanoog a. Id. at *11. The mag istrate judge ’s denial of the motion to s uppress wa s
su bs e qu e ntl y

a do pte d b y the dis tr ic t c ourt and Ke llo g g pr oc e e de d to tr ia l on a ll thr e e c ounts a g a ins t him. Id. at *1. III. Trial Prior to Melia

te s ti f y in g a t t r ia l, th e d is tr ic t c o u rt g r an te d K e ll o g g ’ s mo ti o nto exclude mention of Kellog g ’s allege d role in t he Gunter sville bank robber y , and to limit M elia to re fer ence s t h a t h e w a s i n v e s t i g a t i n g K e l l o g g ’ s r o l e i n “ an o t h e r c r i m e . ” ( J
. A
. a t1 9 9

- 2 0 0
. ) D u r i n g h i s t e s t i m o n y, Melia rec ounted his inter action with K ellog g outside the duplex and Kellog g ’s statements re g arding the location of the g un, drug s, drug para pherna lia and ca sh in the duplex . Melia also testified that
a t th e F B Iof

fi c e in C hatta

no og a , K e llo g g ha d “ sa id that if I did fo re ns ic te sti ngon the g un it w ou ld
m at ch t h e s h o tt h at wa s fi re d d u ri n g t h e o t h er

cr i m e I was i n v es t i gat i n g. ” (J
. A. at 2 3 1 -3 2
. ) Ke l l o gg moved for a

mistrial, arg uing that Melia’s testimony was unfa irly

prejudicia l; the court denie d theNo. 07-5466

7 motion. After other

witnesses testified a

bout the g un having been ma nufac tured in Arka

nsas and about the drug s found at the r esidenc e, the g overnme nt rested. Kellog g testified i n his own def ense. H e denie d telling Me lia outside the duplex about the location of c ontraba

nd, stating that “I

told [the ag ents] what I hear d as far as the office rs when they fo u n d [ t h e i t em s ] , b u tI

d i d n o tt el l h i m t h o s e th i n gs we re m i n e, o r t h at Ih adfi rs t -h an d kn o wl ed ge of those thing s, items.” (J.A. at 379.) A l ittle later, he stated that Melia “ never questioned me a

bout whether the g un was mine or not, all he wanted to do was wr ap this up, and let’s g et g one.” ( J .A. at 379-80.) He explained the discrepa ncy betwee n his acc ount and Melia’s by stating, “I ’m not going to call Mr. Melia a

liar, I respe ct hi s position, but what they are doing, they are stretching the truth.” (J.A. at 379.) Kellog g testified that he knew better than to posse ss the illega l items that Melia was
a ttr ibutin g to h im: [L ]adies an d gentl emen, dur ing those eig ht-and-a -half y ear s that Idone in prison, possession of a fir ear

m, possession of coca ine, possession of any drug para pherna lia, or any wea

pon para pherna lia, even a bullet, posse ssion of those items c ould amount to a term substantially

beca use I ’m a two ti me offe nder, this would be a third strike, so Idid not want to put my self in a situation to g o to prison for the rest of my life. (J.A. at 381.) At the close of his direct testimony , Kellog g cate g ori ca l l y denied a ll of the cha rg es ag ainst him. Following a cross-e x amination wher ein Kellog g continued to dispute Melia’s a ccount of eve nts and deny

owner ship of the items found in the duplex, the defense rested. Af te r t he jur y wa s e xcu se d, the g ov e rnme nt p ro ff e re d e vid e nc e re g ard in g the Gunte rs vil le b ank robbery , including the testimony of the F BI

ag ent investig ating the robbe ry , photogr aphs of Kellog g at the robbe ry

wea ring clothing items found at the duplex, and the shoe print on the ba nk counter matching shoes found at the duplex. Ke l loggobjected to the g overnme nt’s evidenc e,No. 07-5466

8 arguing that the g overnme nt’s photogr aphic e vidence could not be authe nticated a nd that the evidenc e wa s unfairly

prejudicia l. I n response , the g overnme nt stated that it woul d call the bank teller wor king dur ing the robber

y to authenticate the photog raphs. The district court ruled that the proff ere d tes timony

and evide nce w as admissible. The c ourt noted that Ke llogghad cr eate d a
cre dibilit y

issue in claiming that he did not possess the firea rm or make statements to that eff ect, a nd that the photog raphs we re a lso r eleva nt to the interstate nexus of the fire arm. The court c oncluded that the evidenc e would not be unfa irly prejudicia l, and that Kellog g “by his own testimony

has made the bank r obbery

evidenc e more critica l to the gove rnment’s case .” (J.A. at 426- 27.) The district jud g e state d h e wo uld g ive a lim iti ng ins tr uc tio n to th e jur

y tha t th e ba nk ro bb e ry e vid e nc e sh ou ld not be consider ed as e vidence that the def endant is g uilty

of the c rimes cha

rg ed in this case. Prior to the bank teller ’s t estimony , Kellog g ’s counsel conducte d a voir dire e x amination of her outside of t he jury ’s pre sence . During voir dire, the ba nk teller testified that she did not see the man who robbe d her in the c ourtroom, eve n though Kellog g was sitting in the c ourtroom at the time. On direc t examination, t he bank te ller testified that on Octobe r 4, 2005, while wor king at the Colonial Bank in Gunter sville, she was he ld up at g unpoint by a “ta ll black man” of

“medium complexion” wear ing a

striped shirt and Ne w York Yanke es baseball cap. (J.A. at 439, 452, 456.) She stated that the robbe r hande d her a note, and she “looked up at his f ace [.] ” (J.A. at 445.) She testified t hat when she t old him she di d not have the money in the front area wher e the teller s were , the robber threatened her and aske d her if “ she wa nt[ ed] to die.” (J.A. at 454.) She testified that the robber ’s g un was “ big a

nd kind of square d off a

nd dark in color.” (J.A. at 447.) She stated that the robber stepped onto the ba

nk counter

and “f ired the gun into the ceiling ” bec ause he g ot frustrate dNo. 07-5466

9 with the amount of time it was taking her t o g ive hi m money from the c ash dra

wer , at which point she g ave him the entire cash draw er. (J.A. at 446-47.) The g overnme nt presente d the teller w ith a
numbe r o f phot og ra

ph s f ro m th e ba

nk ro bb e ry , a

nd sh e te sti fi e d th a t th e ph oto g ra ph s a c c ur a te ly depicted the bank and the events she de scribed in he r testimony . When the prosec utor asked if one of the m en i n the photog raphs wa s the robber , she stated: “It is. And Ido rec og nize the man. I ’m sorry . He just, he ha d a hat on, but I do rec og nize the man. He’ s s i t t ing at the table over there .” (J.A
. a t 45 0. ) On c ro ss- e xami natio n, de fe ns e c ouns e l c ha lle ng e d he r re g ard ing he r pr ior i nab ility to i de nti fy

Ke llo g g a s the ba

nk ro bb e r; the te lle r re sp on de d tha t dur ing vo ir dir e sh e “ wa sn ’t

re a lly looking that c losely .” (J.A. at 459-60.) Another g overnme nt witness, the FB Iag ent who had inve stigated the b an krobber y , then testified that the bank r obber w ore shoe s that had “zig zag lines in the shoe print along with a circ ular honey comb print,” a

nd that shoes found at the duplex were “ consistent with w hat I saw of the print.” (J.A. at 466-67.) He a lso testified that three da y s after the bank ro b b ery , FB Iag ents found
a mmunit ion

ma tc hin g the g un

fi re d in the ro bb e ry

in a c ar i n G un te rs vi ll e th at w a s r e g ist e re d in Kellog g ’s name. The g overnme nt rec alled Melia, w ho testified that when he questio n ed Ke l l og g about the bank robbe ry

at the F BI office , Kellog g said that he “did it” a nd used the robbe ry

money to buy a ca r, among other thing s. (J .A. at 478.) Me lia also testified that Kellog g admitted to w ear ing the New York Ya nkees ba seball hat a

nd the wristwatc h that wer e found in the duple x while committing the robber y . Finally , he re stated his prior testimony that Kellog g admitted the g un found at the duplex was the gun he used dur ing the robber y .No. 07-5466

10 At the close of evidence, Kellog g moved for an acquittal, and the court de nied the motion. Kellog g timely

appea ls his conviction. DI SCU SSIO N I. M ot ion to Suppr e ss A. Stand ard of Review I n revie wing a district cour t’s suppression deter

mination, we revie w finding s of fac t f or cle ar
e rr or , a nd le g a l c on c lus ion s de novo
. United States v. Hudson , 405 F.3d 425, 431 (6th Cir. 2005). Whe re a dis tr ic t c ourt

de nie s a mot io n to su pp re ss, “ we c on sid e r t he e vid e nc e in t

he lig ht m os t favor able to the g overnme nt.” United States v. Carter , 378 F.3d 584, 587 (6th Cir. 2004) (e n banc)
. B. Ana lys is

“ Th e F if th Ame ndme nt g ua

ra nte e s tha t ‘ no pe rs on

. . . s ha ll b e c omp e lle d in

a c ri min a l c a se to be a witness a g ainst himself.’” New Y ork v. Q uarles , 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984). In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supre me Court e x tended the protec tion a g ainst compulsoryselfincrimination to indivi duals in police custody
. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654. “As a g ener al rule, w hen
a defe ndant is in custody , law officia ls must g ive hi m ap p ro priate Miranda war nings be fore interrog ation beg ins; o t h er wi se, any statements re sulting fr om the police interr og ation will be inadmissible unless the defe ndant clea rly and intellige ntly

waived his rig hts.” Un ite d S tat e s v . C l a rk, 982 F.2d 965, 967- 68 (6th Cir. 1993). Custody and interr og ation are there fore the two “pr ere quisites to the t rig g ering of Fifth Amendment privileg es.” United States v. Latouf , 1 32 F .3 d 3 20 , 3 30 (6 th Cir. 1997). For

a def endant’ s statements during a custodial interrog ation to be admissible, theNo. 07-5466

11 g ov e rnme nt m

us t de mon str a te by

a pr e po nd eran ce of th e e vid e nc e that th e de fe nd ant w a ive d h is Miranda rig hts prior to questioning. Un ite d S tat es v . Ni c ho ls , 512 F.3d 789, 798 (6 t h C ir. 2008). 1. K e llo gg ’s Int ox ic at ion Cl aim Kellog g contends that he was unde r the influence of Xana x at the time he wa s questioned by of fi c e rs and that he the re fo re c ou ld n ot c on se nt t o a wa ive r o f h is ri g hts a t any po int duri nghis int e ra c tio n w ithpo lic e , e ith e r in sig nin g the c on se nt t o s e arc h f or m, o r i n s ig nin g his wa ive r o f r ig hts fo rm on the wa y to C hatta no og a . “ Ev ide nc e that a de fe nd ant s uf fe re d, a t th e re le va

nt t ime , f ro m a condition or defic iency

that impaired his c og nitive or volitional capac ity is never, by

itself, sufficie nt to w arr ant t

he c on c lus ion

tha t hi s c onfes si on was inv olu nta ry fo r p ur po se s o f d

ue pr oc e ss; so me element of

police coe rcion is alwa

y s nece ssary .” United States v. Newman , 889 F.2d 88, 94 ( 6th Cir. 19 89 ). Ke llo g g ha s n ot p re se nte d e vid e nc e re futin g the te sti mony of Me lia and Ruf fi n– wh o b oth sa id that he wa s c oh e re nt a

nd a pp ro pr ia te ly

re sp on siv e –o r e vid e nc e that Me li a a n d R u f f i n c oe rc e d h im i nto waiving his rights at any point. Thus, the district c ourt’s reje ction of Ke llogg ’s intox ication claim wa s not clear ly

err oneous. 2. K e llo gg ’s Re spo nse to Co nse nt to Se ar c h Re que st Kel lo gg con te nd s th a t, b e c a us e Me lia and Ruf fi n d id n ot i nf

or m hi m of his Miranda r i g h ts prior to asking for his conse nt to searc h the duplex, his statement that any thing illeg al in the apa

rtment was his, and that Huc kabee should not be blamed, should have be en suppre ssed. “A s u s p ec ti s i ncu s t o dy

fo r p u r p o s es o f r ec ei v i n g Miranda protec tion if there ha s been a ‘for mal ar rest or r estraint of move ment.’” Ma so n v . M itc he ll , 320 F.3d 604, 631 ( 6th Cir. 2003) (q u o t i n g Oregon v . Mathiason , 4 29 U. S. 4 92 , 4 95 (1 97 7) ). I t is un dis pu te d th a t K e llo g g wa s inNo. 07-5466

The de fenda

nt in the cited ca se is not the defe ndant appe aling this action. 1 12 custody for pur poses of the Miranda inquiry when Me lia soug ht Kellog g ’s conse nt t o sear ch the duplex. I nterrog ation is defined as “express questioni ng . . . [and] any words or a ctions on the part of police . . . that the police should know are rea sonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Rh od

e Is lan d v. In nis , 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). A simple reque st to searc h cannot be
rea sonably expected to e licit a ny thing more than a “y es” or “no,” and thus is not an i n terrog ation. United States v. Kellogg , 20 2 F
. Ap p’ x 9 6, 10 3 (6 th Cir . 2 00 6) ; see also United St ates v. Glenna , 1 87 8 F .2 d 9 67 , 9 71 (7 th C ir . 1 98 9) (“ [A]ltho ug h th e dis tr ic t c ourt be lie ve d th a t th e of

fi c e rs ’ r e qu e st for c onsent
. . . was ‘rea sonably likely to evoke an i ncriminating response ’ and theref ore r an af oul of Miranda, e ve ry

fe de ra l c ir c uit

c ourt tha t ha s a dd re sse d th e qu e sti on has rea c he d th e op po sit e conclusion.”) (citation omitted) (c ollecting case s). W hether the ag ents “interr og ated” Kellog g is an issue of fact t his Court revie ws for c lear err or. United States v. Sangineto-M iranda , 859 F.2d 1501, 1512 (6th Cir. 1988). After introducing himself and Ruffin to K ellog g , Melia immediately reque ste d Ke l logg ’s consent to sea

rch the duplex and asked Ke lloggto sign the c onsent form. The se re q u es t s did not constitute an “inter

ro gat i on,” bec ause the y

wer e not “r easona

bly likely to elicit an incriminating response from [Kellog g ].” Se e Cla rk, 982 F.2d at 968 (internal quotation s and citation omitted). Ra the r, a s th e ma g istrate jud g e c or re c tly ob se rv e d, Me lia

sh ou ld h a ve re a so na

bly e xpe c te d a

“ y e s” or “no” from Ke lloggin response to those que stions
. Kellogg , 2006 WL 3196902, at *8. Acc ording ly , beca

use the district cour

t did not err in f

inding that Ke lloggwas not “inter rog ated” forNo. 07-5466

13 purposes of Miranda , it properly denied Ke llogg ’s m o t i o n t o suppress his statement taking
re sp on sib ili ty

fo r a ny thi ngill e g a l in

the a pa rtme nt. 3. Statem ents Confi rm ing Contraban d in Ke llogg’s Residence Unlike his reque st f

or consent to se arc h, Melia’s questions to Kellog g reg ardingthe exist ence and location of the g un used duringthe robbe ry an d the ca sh box taken f rom the bank dur ing the rob b e r y c o n s ti tute d

anin te r r o g a ti o n . A r e a s o n a

b le o f f ic e r w o u ld kn o w th a t s u c h qu e s ti o n s w e re likely to e licit an incriminating response . Se e In nis , 446 U. S. at 301
. Thus , c on sis te nt w iththe F if th Amendment, off

icer s were require d to inform Kellog g of his co n s t i t u t i o nal rig hts and to obtain a waiver of those rig hts in order for the incriminating statements to be admitted at tria l. Melia and Ruffin both te stified that they could not rec all whether

Kellog g signe d the Miranda
wa ive r f or m pr ior to t he ir de pa rt ur e fo r C hatta

no og a . More ov e r, the ma g istra te jud g e no te d th a t, althoug h Melia testified that he gen er al l y rea ds arr ested suspec ts their Miranda rig hts before questioning the m, he did not testify t h at h e co nsidered his que stions reg ardingthe location of
c o n tr a b an d in th e h o u s e to b e “ qu e s tioning .” K el l o gg , 2006 WL 3196902, at *8. B a se d o n th is
re c or d, the ma g istrate jud g e ’s fi nd ing that it wa s “ not

clea r as to whe ther Ke lloggwas g iven a Miranda war

ning a n d waived his rights” pr ior to the interrog ation was not cle arly err oneous (empha sis suppli ed). B eca use t he gover

nment has failed to demonstrate by the pre pondera

nce of the
e vid e nc e that K e llo g g wa ive d h is Miranda rig hts before this questioning beg an, se e Nic ho ls , 512 F.3d at 798, this Court finds that Kellog g ’s statements identifying the location of c ontraba nd and robbe ry evidenc e in the duplex m ust be suppresse d, absent a n applicable exception. Cla rk, 982 F.2d at 967- 68.No. 07-5466

14 As t h e magistrate judge noted, “ther e is a ‘public sa fety ’ exception to the requir ement that Miranda war

nings be g iven befor e a suspect’s a nswers ma

y be admitted into evidenc e.” Quarles , 467 U. S. at 65 5. Th e “ pu

bli c saf ety ” exc e pti on

a pp lie s to “ a

sit uatio n in wh ic h p oli c e of

fi c e rs a sk questions rea sonably prompted by a concer n for public safe ty .” Id. at 656. This Court evaluates the
rea sonablene ss of an off

icer ’s belief

that either the public or law enfor ceme nt of fice rs wer e in dang er de novo
. United States v. W illiams , 483 F.3d 425, 428 ( 6th Cir. 2007). I n deter mini n g t h e applicability

of the public saf

ety exception, this C ourt consider s fac tors including “ the known history and chara cter istics of t he suspect, the known facts and c ircumstance s of the a lleg ed cr ime, and the f acts and circ umstances c onfronted by the offic er w hen he unde rtake s the ar rest.” Id. at 428. Howe ver,

“ [f]o r a n o ff ic e r t o h a ve a

re a so na ble be lie f t

hat he [or the pu bli c ] is i n d ang e r, a t a minimum , he must have r eason to be lieve (1) that the def endan t m i gh t have ( or re c e ntl y have ha d) a

we a po n, and (2 ) t hat so meo ne oth e r t

ha n p oli c e mig ht g a in acc ess to the wea

pon and inflict har

m with it. The public safety exception is applied if and on ly if bo th o f t ho se tw o c on dit ion s a

re satis fi e d a

nd no oth e r c on te xt-s pe c if

ic evidenc e re buts the infere nce that the office r re asonably could have p e r c eived a

threat to public safety .” Id. I n W illiams , wher e an arr esting office r believed a gun to be in the def endant’ s room, this Court noted that “if one wer e to be lieve that [t he defe ndant] wa s seate d outside of his room and handc uffe d when an office r questioned him
. . . then t he officer s could not have had an objectively rea sonable fe ar for their safe ty and the public safe ty exception w ould not a pply .” Id. at 429. See also United States

v . B ra thw ait e , 458 F.3d 376, 382 n.8 (5th Cir. 2006) (rejec ting application of public saf ety exception wher e police se cure d the suspect a nd his co-re sidents, conducted two se cur i ty swee ps and g ained control over

the re sidence ).No. 07-5466

15 The public saf

ety exception does not apply

to the questioning of

Kellog g about the contr aband and robbe ry

evidenc e in the duplex. T h e s u s p icion that Kellog g had re cently committed a bank robber y at g unpoint was enoug h to satisfy the first prong of the W illiams standard, i.e ., that he mig ht have had a we apon in the duplex. However , since the a rre sting off

icer s had just ordere d all of the occupa nts out of th e d u p l ex , handcuf fed K ellog g and conduc ted a se curity swee p of the re sidence , there was no re ason to believe that a wea pon would be immediately acc essible to individuals other than pol ice. Thus, the i mmediate dange r t o the officers or the public was insuff icient to justify

the office rs’ failure to inform Kellogg of hi s rig hts prior to eliciting inc riminating state ments reg arding t h e i t em s in the duplex. See W illiams , 4 8 3 F
. 3 d

a t 4 2 9 ( f in d in g o f f ic e r ’ s kn o w le d g e o f

th e v io lent crime de fenda

nt was alleg ed to have just committed insufficient to justify a belief that the offic er or the public was in da

ng er)
. Moreove r, in addition to asking K ellog g wher e the g un was, Melia a lso asked for the location of drug s and evidenc e from the bank robber y , neither of which could have be en dire cted at alleviating the imm e diate da

ng e r o f t he sit uatio n. Ce rt ain ly , th os e qu e sti on s w e re “ de sig ne d s ole ly to e lic it t es t i m o nial evidenc e fr om a suspect,” Quarles , 4 6 7 U
. S. a t 6 5 8

- 5 9 , an d f u r th e r u n d e r

mi ne the g overnme nt’s argument that the offic ers a cted out of sa fety conce rns alone. This Court therefor e finds that Ke llogg ’s statements conc erningthe location of c ontraba nd and bank r obbery

evidenc e in the dupl ex violated hi s Fifth Amendment rig hts, and the district court
err ed in deny

ing K ellog g ’s motion to suppress those statements. II. Evid ence of G untersville BankRobbery A. Stand ard of ReviewNo. 07-5466

16 “A tria l court’s Rule 403 deter mination is revie wed for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Foster , 376 F.3d 577, 592 ( 6th Cir. 2004). “A district cour t abuses its discretion whe n it applies the incorrect l egal standa

rd, misapplies the cor

rec t leg al standar d, or re lies upon clea rly err oneous findi n gs of fa ct.” United States v. Pugh , 405 F.3d 390, 397 ( 6th Cir. 2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted). This Court may reve rse the district c ourt’s decision “only if [i t is] firmly convince d that a mi stake ha s been ma de.” Id. Th is Court re vie ws the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s e xer c ise of dis c re tio n “ in the lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to i ts p ro po nent, maximizin g its pr ob a tiv e va lue and min imi zingits prejudicia l effe ct.” Un ite d S tat es v . Zi pk in , 729 F.2d 384, 389 ( 6th Cir. 1984). B. Ana lys is

“ Rul e 40 3 g ov e rn s wh e the r e vid e nc e that is re le va nt un de r F e de ra l Ru le of

Ev ide nc e 40 1 is admissible.” United States v. Cave r , 470 F.3d 220, 240 (6th Cir. 2006). “Althoug h rele vant, evidenc e may be ex cluded if its probative value i s substantially outweig hed by the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury , or by considera

tions of undue delay , waste of time,
or needle ss pr esentation of cumulative evidenc e.” Fe d. R. Evid. 403. The district c ourt has “ver y broad” discretion in weig hing the evidenc e under Rule 403. Caver , 470 F.3d at 240. “The term ‘unfa ir prejudice ,’ as to a criminal defe ndant, speaks to the capa city of some conc ededly

rele vant evid en ce t o l u re the fac tfinder into dec laring g uilt on a gr ound differ ent from pr oof spec ific to the offe nse cha

rg ed.” Old Chief v. United States , 5 1 9 U.S. 172, 180 (1997) (c itation omit ted). Un fa ir prejudice “re fer s to the evidence which tends to sug g est [a] decision on an improper basis.” Caver , 470 F.3d at 240. Such an improper ba sis is “commonly , though not ne cessa rily , an emotional one.” Old Chief , 519 U.S. at 180.No. 07-5466

17 On e fa c tor in t

he “ Rul e 40 3 b a lanc ingis the a va ila bil ity of oth e r m e ans of

pr oo f, wh ic h w ou ld reduc e the ne ed for

the potentially

confusingevidenc e.” U n it e d S ta te s v . M e r riweather , 78 F.3d 1070, 1077 (6th Cir.1996). “Anothe r consider ation .
. . is whether the ‘re verbe rating clang ’” of the prejudicia l nature of

the evidenc e will “drow n [t he] weake r sound” of t h e p robative va lue of the evidenc e. Id. (q u o t i n g Shepard v. U nited States , 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933)). The district court initi ally

deter mined that the only

admissible testimony

conce rning the bank robber y was Melia’s statement that he was called to the duplex bec ause h e w as i n vestig ating Kellog g ’s role in “ another crime.” The g overnme nt a rg ues that Kellog g ’s testimony opened the door to the more detailed testimony on the bank robber y by challeng ing Melia’s cre dibilit y and by putting his ow n cre dibilit y at issue. Howeve r, maxi miz ing the probative value of the evidenc e of the ba nk robber y and minimiz ing its pre

judicial nature , se e Zip k

in , 729 F.2d at 38 9 , this Court believes the district court abuse d its discretion in allowing the go v er n m en t t o prese nt as much evide nce of the robber y as it did. As a pre liminary

matter, a lthough the g overnme nt c ontends the testimony of the ba nk teller and the F BI

ag ent investigat i n g t h e b ank robbe ry wer e nec essar

y to rebut Ke llogg ’s testimony , the g overnme nt introduced pre judicial testimony

conce rning the robbe ry befor e Kellog g even took the stand. During Melia’s direc t testimony , he stated that Kellog g had told him that forensic te sting of the g un found at the dupl ex would match the shot “fire d during the other c rime I was investig ating .” This statement was hig hly prejudicia l, as it informed the jury that Kellog g may have been involved in a re cent shooting ; the fac t that a shot had bee n fired was of littl e to no probative value in proving that Kellog g possessed the gun in the duplex.No. 07-5466

18 During his testimony , Kellog g acc used Melia, in c laiming that Kellog g admitted the g un and drug s were his, of “stretc hing the truth,” and d en i ed that Melia had e ver que stioned him about the g un. Certainly , the g overnme nt was entitled to rebut that testimony by allowing Melia t o testify as to some of the details of his inter rog ation of Kellog g in the FB I office that contra d i ct ed Ke l l o g g ’s
acc ount. Howeve r, the c ourt went too fa r in allowing a leng thy

narr ative of the bank ro b b er y to be prese nted at trial. The bank teller testified in g reat detail about the course of the robbe ry –including that the robbe r pointed a gun at her , threatened to kill her, and jumped onto the c ounter to for ce he r to hand over

the money . Moreove r, the jury was presented with strong evidenc e that Ke lloggwas the bank robbe r: the teller, w ho had clo s el y i ntera cted with the ba nk robber , identified Ke lloggas the robber ; the FBI a gen t who had investig ated the r obbery testified that the robbe r’s Ya nkees hat and wristwatch were found at the duple x , as we re shoe s matching a shoe pr int the robber ha d left on the bank counte r; the FB I ag ent also testified that ammunition matching the shot f ired duringthe robbe ry was found in Ke llogg ’s ca r in Gunter s v i l l e; an dMelia testified that Ke lloggconfe ssed to the bank robber y at the FB I office
. The unmistakable conclusion to dr aw from all of this testimony was that Kellog g , on trial for gun and drug possession, had menacing ly robbed a bank at g unpoint just a fe w day s ear lier. While this ev i d ence may have be en somewhat probative a s to whether the g un found
a t th e du ple x wa s K e llo g g ’s and

wh e the r i t ha d tr a ve le d in int e rs ta te c om mer c e , it

wa s unf a ir ly prejudicia l beca

use of its “improper

basis:” to convince the j ury that Kellog g was a bank robbe r, on the loose and da

ng erous. See Cav er , 470 F.3d at 240. I n our vi ew, the evidenc e of the bank r obbery lik e ly “ dr ow n[e d] [th e ] we a ke r s ound ” of Ke llo g g ’s g un po sse ssi on , and c ou ld have le d the jur y toNo. 07-5466

19 convict him based on a

crime f or which he was not char g ed. See M erriweather , 7 8 F .3 d at 10 77 ; Ol d Chief , 519 U.S. at 180. Fur ther, the g overnme nt presente d plenty of ot her evidence proving Kellog g ’s pos session of the g un–including its discover y at the duplex whe re he was staying and his state ment to Melia at the FB Ioffice that the g un was the same one fired during the other crime–a nd also prese nted unre butted testimony that the g un had been manufa cture d in A rkansa s. Thus, to the extent that the ba nk robber y evidenc e was admitted simply to r ebut Kellog g ’s asser tion that he did not possess the gun, or to prove that the g un had traveled in interstate commerc e, it wa s larg ely unnece ssary . See M

erriweather , 78 F.3d at 1077. “A lim iting ins truction will minimi ze to some deg ree the prejudicial nature of other c riminal acts; it is not, howeve r, a sure- fire panac ea for the prejudice resulting from nee dless admission of such evidenc e.” United States v. Hay wood , 280 F.3d 715, 724 (6th Cir. 2002) . Although the district court instructed the jury

not to consider the ba

nk robber y as evide nce of

Kellog g ’s g uilt for the cr imes
c ha rg e d, the sh e e r w e ig ht o f the e vid e nc e that wa s intr od uc e d re g ard ing the ro bb e ry wo uld have lik e ly undermined that instruction in the mind of a rea sonable juror
. Acc ording ly , this Court finds t hat the district cour t abused its discretion in admitting so much evidenc e of the bank robbe ry . The district cour t must conduct a newtrial to remedy its error. III. Identif

ication of Kellogg as Gunter sville Ban k Robb er A . St a nd a r d o f R e v ie w This Court reviews the a dmission of in-court identification testimony for a buse of discr etion. Un ite d S tat es v . H ill , 967 F.2d 226, 230 ( 6th Cir. 1992).No. 07-5466

20 B. Ana lys is The introduction of a

n u nr e li a b le id e nti f ic a ti on of a de fenda

nt ob ta ine d thro ug h im

pe rm iss ibl y sug g estive proc edure s violates the def endant’ s rig ht to due proce ss. Mo or e v . I lli no is , 434 U.S. 220, 22 7 ( 19 77 ). To de te rm ine wh e ther iden tif ic a tio n e vid e nc e is a dmi ssi ble , th is C ourt mus t f ir st a sk whether the “identification proce dure was impermissibly sug g estive.” Un ite d Sta te s v . H ill , 967 F.2d 22 6, 23 0 ( 6th

Cir . 1 99 2) . Shou ld the ide nti fi c a tio n pro c e dure be fo un d impe rm iss ibl y su g g e sti ve , th is Court must determine “whe ther, unde r the totali t y o f t he cir cumstance s, the testimony was
never theless re liable.” Id. An ana ly sis o f fi v e fac tors guides the re liability deter mination: (1) the witness’ opportunity to vie w the suspect at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ deg ree of attention; (3) the a ccur acy of t he witness’ prior description of the suspec t; (4) the leve l of ce rtainty display ed by the witness during the c o n fr o n tation; and (5) the le ng th of time betwee n the cr ime and the confr ontation. Ne il v . B igge rs , 4 09 U. S. 188, 1 99 (1 97 2) ; se e Hi ll , 967 F.2d 226, 232 ( applying Bigger fac tors to witness’ in-cour t identif i cation). “Ag ainst these fa ctors is to be we ighe d the
corr upting e ffe ct of the sug g estive identification its elf.” Ma ns on v . B ra thw ait e , 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). How ever , “[a]s l ong as there is not a substantial likelihood of mis identification, it is the function of the jur

y to de termine the ultimate we ight to be g iven to the identification.” United States v. Causey , 834 F.2d 1277, 1285 ( 6th Cir. 1987) (quotation marks and c itations omi tted). The ba nk teller’s in-court i dentification of Kelloggwas not in response to any question from the prosecutor, who never asked her to i dentify the robbe r and ha d only

asked he r whe ther or not the bank robbe r wa s v i s i b l e in one of the photos he w as showing her. A ccor dingly , while the bank teller’s sudde n ability

to identify the bank robber in the courtroom might ra ise a c redibility issue, theNo. 07-5466

21 identification does not appea r t o have de rived fr om any sug g estive pr oc e du re , and ther efor e did not violate Kellog g ’s due pr ocess r ights. Se e Hi ll , 96 7 F .2 d at 23 0; Causey , 834 F.2d at 1286 (“The prior failure of the witness to identify the def endant g oes only to the weig ht to be ac corde d testimony , not its admissi bility .”). Moreove r, eve n if the prose cutor’s que s t i o n i n g o f the ba nk teller c ould be consider ed
su g g e sti ve , th e ide nti fi c a tion seem e d to be re lia ble e no ug h th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt did no t a bu se its discretion by

allowing it. The bank teller , as the e mploy ee w ho had to listen and re spond to the
ro bb e r’ s d e mand s, ha d ampl e op po rt un ity to v ie w the ro bb e r a

nd pa y c los e a tte nti on

to him a t th e tim e of robbe ry . She testified that s h e “looked up at his fac e” w hen he ha nded her a robbe ry

note, and exchang ed seve ral wor ds with him before ha nding him the c ash drawer
. At trial, she demonstrated a deta iled memory

of the robbe ry

befor e see ing the photos of the robbe ry sce n e, describing the robber ’s g un, his clothing a nd his movements in detail. Whil e her prior desc ription of the robbe r–that he wa s a tall black ma

n with “medium complexion”–was somewhat va g ue, its acc urac y had not bee n questioned. She did not expres s an y d oubt that Kellog g was the r obber, r epeating twice that she
rec og nized him s itting in the courtroom. There fore , althoug h signific ant time had ela psed since the robber y , the other Bigger fac tors tend t o support the re liability of the identifica

tion. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the identific ation. CO NC LU SION For the fore g oing r easons, we RE VE RSE in part and AF F IRM in part the judg ment of the district court, and REMAND the ca se to the district court with instructions to provide Ke llogga new tr ia l.No. 07-5466

22No. 07-5466

23 KETHL E DG E , C i rcuit Judge, dissenting . Irespe ctfully disag ree with the majority ’s conclusion that the district cour t’s admission of evidenc e re g ardingKellog g ’s involvement in a bank robber y require s a newtrial in this case. The core i s s u e at t rial wa s whether the g un found at the duplex belonged to Ke llogg . He took the stand to de ny that fac t, and to im pug n g ener ally the
cre dibilit y

of the g overnme nt’s lead witness, F BI Ag ent Melia. Ha

ving done so, it wa s fair g ame f or th e gover nment to rebut Ke llogg ’s testimony with proof that Ke lloggused the same g un in a bank
ro bb e ry on ly a fe w d ay s b e fo re the g un

wa s f ound
. Vi rt

ua lly a ll o f t he e vid e nc e c ite d b y

the ma jor ity
wa s a dmi tte d f

or pr e c ise ly thi s p urp os e. Th at evi de nc e did no t me re ly

sh owthat K e llo g g wa s a da ng e ro us man; i t in ste a d a ll b ut c e rtainl y e sta bli sh e d th a t thegu n wa s h is . Which is t o say , the evidenc e wa s highly

rele vant to the basic f

actua l dispute in the case. I t is a ta ll o rd e r, the n, fo r t

his c ourt to s ay that th e dis tr ic t c ourt

a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in admitting that evide nce. That is pa rticularly true g iven that—in an abunda nce of caution—the district
c o u rti n i t i a l l y exc luded mos t of the e vid e nc e no w c ite d b y the ma jor ity
. Th a t e vid e nc e on ly c a me in wh e n K e llo g g c ho se to t

hr ow do wn the g a

un tle t in his ow n tes tim on y —a g a in, c on c e rn ing the ba sic fac tual dispute in the case . Ido not think the gove rnment wa s require d to sit on evide nce that proved Ke l l o gg wr o n g. All that said, I rec og nize that this case is a close one . The g overnme nt’s evidenc e on re buttal
was more colorful than ne cessa ry to prove that Ke lloggused th e g un in the prior robbe ry . But on balanc e, I think the admission of the cited evide nce f ell within the discre t i o n af fo rd ed the dist rict court. I there fore respe ctfully

dissent.