Present: Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 

Millette, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 

KENNETH L. SINGLETON 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 082270 JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 

 November 5, 2009 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

GORDON ANDREW ZEDD 

v. Record No. 090012 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 In these appeals, we consider whether the evidence was 

sufficient to convict two attorneys for contempt of court in 

violation of Code § 18.2-456. In Singleton v. Commonwealth, 

Kenneth L. Singleton was found guilty of criminal contempt for 

failing to appear for a scheduled trial of his client and for 

excusing his client from appearing at the trial without the 

court’s approval. In Zedd v. Commonwealth, Gordon Andrew Zedd 

was found guilty of criminal contempt for excusing his client 

from appearing for a scheduled trial without the court’s 

approval. 

BACKGROUND 

I. Singleton v. Commonwealth

 Darrell P. Simpson retained attorney Kenneth L. Singleton 

to represent him in an appeal of a misdemeanor conviction for 
driving under the influence. The matter was originally set 

for trial on August 30, 2007 in the Circuit Court of the City 

of Norfolk. 

 Prior to trial, Singleton contacted the prosecutor 

assigned to the case regarding a continuance. The prosecutor 

and Singleton agreed to a continuance of the case to September 

27, 2007. The prosecutor then prepared a continuance order 

and “called off” his witness in the case. On August 28, 2007, 

the prosecutor and Singleton met and signed the continuance 

order. Thereafter at Singleton’s direction, his office 

informed Simpson that he did not need to appear in court for 

his original trial date. 

 On August 30, 2007, the prosecutor appeared in the 

circuit court and requested entry of the continuance order. 

The court rejected the order in light of the fact that neither 

Singleton nor his client was present. 

 Singleton, Simpson, and the prosecutor subsequently 

appeared before the circuit court on September 12, 2007 for a 

bond hearing.1 At that time, the court asked Singleton: “What 

authority do you have to excuse a person from court?” 

Singleton answered by indicating that the parties had agreed 

 1

 While the record is not clear, apparently Simpson was 

arrested for failing to appear on August 30, 2007, and was 

subsequently released on bond by a magistrate prior to the 

bond hearing set for September 12, 2007. 

2
on a date to continue the case. The court asked again: “What 

authority do you have to excuse someone from court without a 

judge entering an order?” Singleton answered: “None, Your 

Honor.” The court then found Singleton in contempt of court, 

fining him $250. 

 In his defense, Singleton explained: “I know I have no 

authority as a judge to excuse anyone from court, but as an 

officer of the court, I did believe, in good faith, that after 

speaking with the Commonwealth[’s] Attorney, we had agreed on 

a date.” The circuit court replied: “You do understand that 

nothing you talk about between counsel is an order until a 

judge says it’s an order, right?” Singleton responded that he 

had signed the continuance order and that he was unaware the 

continuance order was not entered. The court concluded the 

hearing with an admonition that Singleton should never excuse 

a client from appearing on a scheduled trial date without 

knowing that a judge has in fact given approval for a 

continuance. 

 The circuit court entered a final order on September 13, 

2007, finding Singleton guilty of contempt of court pursuant 

to Code § 18.2-456. In the final order, the court handwrote the 

following after the contempt charge: “[i]ntentional 

[i]nterference with [the] administration of justice by willfully 

& knowingly failing to appear for a court appearance without 

3
prior court approval and further, advising his client not to 

appear resulting in an arrest warrant being issued for the 

client’s arrest.” 

 On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Singleton argued the 

evidence was insufficient to find him guilty of contempt 

because there was no evidence of contemptuous intent. 

Singleton also argued that the trial court denied him due 

process by erroneously employing summary, rather than plenary, 

contempt procedures. 

 In a published opinion, a three-judge panel of the Court 

of Appeals affirmed Singleton’s conviction, holding that by 

not appearing on the original trial date and advising his 

client not to appear on that date, Singleton undermined the 

trial court’s authority to control the court’s docket and 

schedule criminal cases for trial. Singleton v. Commonwealth, 

52 Va. App. 665, 671, 667 S.E.2d 23, 26 (2008). The Court of 

Appeals also held that Singleton was precluded from raising 

for the first time on appeal the argument that he should have 

received the procedural protections associated with plenary 

contempt. Id. at 672-73, 667 S.E.2d at 26. We awarded 

Singleton an appeal. 

II. Zedd v. Commonwealth

 Kiwani Scott retained attorney Gordon Andrew Zedd to 

represent her in an appeal of a misdemeanor conviction for 

4
reckless driving. The matter was originally set for trial on 

October 2, 2007 in the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk. 

 The day before the trial, Zedd contacted the prosecutor 

assigned to the case in order to request a continuance because 

of a scheduling conflict. The prosecutor agreed to continue 

the case to November 6, 2007 because its key witness, the 

state trooper who had charged Scott, was unavailable to attend 

the trial. Subsequently, Zedd contacted Scott and told her 

that she did not need to appear in court the next day. 

 Zedd and the prosecutor appeared in the circuit court the 

following day and submitted a joint continuance order to the 

court. The court questioned Zedd about the whereabouts of his 

client. Zedd stated that he had excused his client. In 

response to the court’s questions for why he had excused his 

client, Zedd noted the unavailability of the state trooper and 

the Commonwealth’s inability to proceed. Additionally, the 

prosecutor highlighted to the court that this was a joint 

continuance motion due to a mutual inability to proceed.2 

 At the conclusion of the proceedings on October 2, 2007, 

the circuit court issued a bench warrant charging Zedd with 

contempt of court. Pursuant to that warrant, Zedd was 

arrested and processed. On February 28, 2008, the court 

 2

 It is unclear from the limited record before us what 

action the circuit court took with regard to the requested 

continuance. 

5
entered a final order finding Zedd guilty of contempt of court 

pursuant to Code § 18.2-456 and imposing a fine of $50. 

 On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Zedd argued the 

evidence was insufficient to find him guilty of contempt 

because there was no evidence of contemptuous intent. Zedd 

also argued that the trial court denied him due process by 

erroneously employing summary, rather than plenary, contempt 

procedures. In addition, Zedd attempted to distinguish his 

case from Singleton’s case, noting that unlike Singleton, he 

had appeared on the scheduled trial date. 

 The Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion held that 

Zedd’s appearance in court on the scheduled trial date was 

insufficient to distinguish his case from Singleton’s case. 

Accordingly, for the reasons stated in Singleton, 52 Va. App. 

at 672-73, 667 S.E.2d at 26, the Court of Appeals affirmed 

Zedd’s conviction. Zedd v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2621-07-1 

(December 2, 2008). We awarded Zedd an appeal. 

DISCUSSION 

 The dispositive issue in these appeals is whether there 

was sufficient evidence to convict Singleton and Zedd of 

contempt of court. The applicable standard of appellate 

review is well established. Where the sufficiency of the 

evidence is challenged after conviction, we review the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

6
according it the benefit of all reasonable inferences fairly 

deducible therefrom. Dowden v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 459, 

461, 536 S.E.2d 437, 438 (2000). As a result, we will reverse 

a judgment of the circuit court only upon a showing that it is 

plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Viney v. 

Commonwealth, 269 Va. 296, 299, 609 S.E.2d 26, 28 (2005). 

Both Singleton and Zedd were convicted of contempt of 

court in violation of Code § 18.2-456, which states in 

relevant part: 

The courts and judges may issue attachments for 

contempt, and punish them summarily, only in the 

cases following: 

(1) Misbehavior in the presence of the court, or 

so near thereto as to obstruct or interrupt the 

administration of justice; 

. . . . 

(4) Misbehavior of an officer of the court in his 

official character; 

(5) Disobedience or resistance of an officer of the 

court, . . . to any lawful process, judgment, decree 

or order of the court. 

 We have long recognized that “[a]ll courts in this 

Commonwealth have the power to impose penalties for 

contemptuous conduct.” Gilman v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 222, 

227, 657 S.E.2d 474, 476 (2008). Moreover, “[a] court’s 

authority to punish contemptuous conduct is exercised to 

preserve the power of the court and to vindicate the court’s 

7
dignity.” Id. Thus, in criminal contempt proceedings, it is 

essential to consider whether the accused intended to 

undermine this authority. See Potts v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 

855, 859, 36 S.E.2d 529, 530 (1946) (“any act which is 

calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct the court in the 

administration of justice is contempt”) (emphasis added). In 

the present appeals, it is not contended that the conduct of 

these attorneys invoked the application of Code § 18.2-456(4) 

or (5). Therefore, we must decide whether the evidence was 

sufficient to establish that Singleton and Zedd intended “to 

obstruct or interrupt the administration of justice.” Code 

§ 18.2-456(1). 

 For more than a century, Virginia courts have required 

the element of intent in order to sustain a criminal contempt 

conviction. See Carter v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 791, 802-03, 

32 S.E. 780, 780 (1899); Wise v. Commonwealth, 97 Va. 779, 

781-82, 34 S.E. 453, 453-54 (1899); Wells v. Commonwealth, 62 

Va. (21 Gratt.) 500, 509 (1871); accord Robinson v. 

Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 137, 143, 583 S.E.2d 60, 63 (2003) 

(finding intent a necessary element of criminal contempt); 

Carter v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 392, 397, 345 S.E.2d 5, 8 

(1986) (same). For purposes of resolving the present appeals, 

we find a review of our prior precedents instructive. 

8
 In Wells, an attorney erroneously advised his client to 

seek an injunction from a federal district court, sitting as a 

court in bankruptcy, to enjoin state circuit court 

proceedings. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) at 505. When the attorney 

was cited for contempt of court for interfering with a state 

court proceeding, he filed an affidavit indicating it was his 

good faith belief that his client did have such a right under 

the law, and he intended no disrespect to the state court. 

Id. at 506. This Court held that, although he may have erred 

in judgment, the attorney could not be held in contempt 

because “he was acting in good faith, for what he believed to 

be the interest of his client, and not from disrespect to the 

court.” Id. at 509. 

 In Wise, an attorney had scheduled a case for trial in a 

court in the City of Richmond at 10:00 a.m. with the 

reasonable expectation that he would finish the case in time 

to begin a second case scheduled at 11:00 a.m. in Henrico 

County. 97 Va. at 780, 34 S.E. at 453. When it became 

apparent that he would be late for his second case, the 

attorney telephoned the Commonwealth’s Attorney of Henrico 

County and asked him to inform the judge that he was 

unavoidably detained in the trial of the case in the Richmond 

court. Id. The attorney then returned to the courtroom in 

the Richmond court and requested a continuance of the trial. 

9
Id. The judge refused to interrupt the trial to permit the 

attorney to go immediately to the court in Henrico County. 

Id. Upon his late arrival, the court in Henrico County 

imposed a fine upon the attorney for contempt of court. Id.

at 780-81, 34 S.E. at 453. We reversed the contempt 

conviction, holding there could be no contempt when “[t]here 

is nothing in the facts stated to give color to the suspicion 

that, in what he did, [the attorney] intended the slightest 

contempt of, or disrespect to, the lawful authority of the 

[court in Henrico County].” Id. at 781, 34 S.E. at 453 

(emphasis added). We further stated that the court in Henrico 

County could have continued the case or proceeded without the 

attorney “but it could not punish for a contempt of court when 

it is manifest that no contempt of its authority was 

intended.” Id. at 782, 34 S.E. at 454 (emphasis added). 

 Finally, in Carter, we considered whether the defendant 

had the requisite intent for criminal contempt because he sent 

a telegram to his attorney for use in court falsely stating 

that he was ill and could not appear for a scheduled trial.3 

96 Va. at 802, 32 S.E. at 780. Carter contended that he did 

not make the statement for the purpose of obtaining a 

continuance and that no disrespect to the court was intended. 

 3

 Carter was convicted under a criminal contempt statute 

identical to modern-day Code § 18.2-456. See Carter, 96 Va. 

at 803, 32 S.E. at 780. 

10
Id. We affirmed Carter’s conviction, however, holding that 

“[t]he effort to obtain a continuance . . . by means of a 

statement as to health which he knew to be false tended 

directly to impede and obstruct the administration of 

justice.” Id. We went on to note that lack of intent is a 

defense to criminal contempt: 

It is true that with respect to conduct or language 

where the intent with which a thing is said or done 

gives color and character to the act or words, a 

disclaimer of any purpose to be guilty of a contempt 

or to destroy or impair the authority due to the 

court, is a good defence; but this is true only of 

language or acts of doubtful import, and which may 

reasonably bear two constructions. In the case 

before us there could have been but one motive, and 

that to influence the action of the court with 

respect to a case before it by means of a statement 

known and admitted to be false. 

Id. at 802-03, 32 S.E. at 781 (internal citation omitted). 

 In the appeals presently before us, nothing in either 

record suggests an intent on the part of the two attorneys “to 

obstruct or interrupt the administration of justice” as 

required by Code § 18.2-456(1). In Singleton’s case, the 

prosecutor agreed to a continuance of the case and released 

his witness, making it impossible for the Commonwealth to 

proceed to trial on the original trial date. Similarly, in 

Zedd’s case, the prosecutor agreed to a continuance because 

the Commonwealth’s key witness was unavailable to appear and 

testify on the original trial date. Unquestionably, 

11
Singleton’s absence on the scheduled trial date and his 

release of his client is entirely consistent with his asserted 

good faith belief that the circuit court would grant the 

mutually requested continuance because of the Commonwealth’s 

inability to proceed to trial on the scheduled trial date. 

Likewise, the evidence is entirely consistent with Zedd’s 

assertion that he excused his client from appearing on the 

scheduled trial date on the reasonable expectation that the 

court would grant the mutually requested continuance because 

of the Commonwealth’s inability to proceed to trial without 

its necessary witness. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence 

was insufficient to establish that Singleton or Zedd intended 

“to obstruct or interrupt the administration of justice.” In 

the absence of such intent, we further hold that the evidence 

is insufficient to sustain their convictions for criminal 

contempt under Code § 18.2-456(1). Accordingly, the Court of 

Appeals erred in finding the evidence sufficient to convict 

Singleton and Zedd of contempt of court. 

 In reaching our resolutions of these appeals, we are not 

unmindful of the trial court’s “inherent authority to 

administer cases on its docket.” Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 

258 Va. 347, 361, 519 S.E.2d 602, 608 (1999). Certainly, 

whether a continuance should be granted rests within the sound 

discretion of the trial court. Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 248 

12
Va. 501, 508, 450 S.E.2d 146, 151 (1994). In that regard, we 

take this opportunity to stress that criminal defense 

attorneys and as well attorneys for the Commonwealth, in the 

absence of an established contrary policy by a particular 

trial court, should not follow a practice of agreeing to a 

continuance of a pending case under circumstances that 

essentially limit, as a practical matter, the trial court’s 

ability to exercise its discretion whether to grant a 

continuance. When critical witnesses are excused prior to the 

granting of a continuance by the trial court, the discretion 

of the trial court to grant a continuance under such 

circumstances is severely limited. Experience teaches that 

when continuances are requested in a timely fashion and for 

the reasons typified by the circumstances in the present 

cases, the trial courts will routinely ensure that by granting 

a continuance both parties will be afforded a trial on the 

merits of a particular case. Undoubtedly, the better practice 

would dictate that until the trial court enters a continuance 

order, the defense attorney should appear in court on the date 

scheduled for trial with his or her client and request the 

continuance. Similarly, the attorney for the Commonwealth 

should appear in court and not excuse its witnesses in 

anticipation that the trial court will grant a mutual request 

for a continuance. In short, in the absence of the entry of a 

13
continuance order prior to the scheduled trial date, attorneys 

should not presume that a continuance will be granted. 

CONCLUSION 

 For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 

Court of Appeals sustaining Singleton’s conviction of contempt 

of court in violation of Code § 18.2-456, and will vacate that 

conviction. We will also reverse the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals sustaining Zedd’s conviction of contempt of court in 

violation of Code § 18.2-456, and will vacate that conviction.4

Record No. 082270 - Reversed and vacated. 

Record No. 090012 - Reversed and vacated. 

 4

 In light of our resolution of these appeals on the 

sufficiency of the evidence issue, we need not address the 

remaining issue raised. 

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