COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Frank, Kelsey and Senior Judge Willis 

Argued by teleconference 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2204-02-3 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

 FEBRUARY 4, 2003 

MICHAEL JAMES RIGNEY 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY 

B. A. Davis, III, Judge Designate 

 Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General 

(Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Henry G. Crider for appellee. 

 On appeal from the trial court's suppression of Michael James 

Rigney's statements, the Commonwealth argues that Rigney was not 

in custody when interrogated and, thus, the officer was not 

required to advise him of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). We reverse the trial court's 

suppression of Rigney's statements and remand the case for trial, 

if the Commonwealth be so advised. 

BACKGROUND

 Deputy Sheriff H. Gatewood received a Crimestoppers tip 

that Rigney, a convicted felon, possessed firearms in his home. 

Having confirmed that Rigney had been convicted of a felony, 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.
Gatewood went to Rigney's home wearing his uniform and holstered 

weapon. Rigney's wife invited Gatewood in. Upon entering the 

home, Gatewood saw a gun cabinet containing firearms. Rigney's 

wife awakened Rigney and told him the deputy wanted to speak to 

him. Gatewood told Rigney of the complaint and stated he needed 

to speak with him about it and would record the conversation. 

Rigney agreed, and they sat at Rigney's kitchen table. Rigney 

admitted being a convicted felon and possessing one firearm in 

the gun cabinet and another that his brother had in his truck. 

Rigney acknowledged that he was not allowed to possess firearms. 

Gatewood told Rigney he would not arrest him then, but that an 

indictment would likely follow. After seizing the weapons, 

Gatewood left the home. 

ANALYSIS

When a motion to suppress is reviewed on 

appeal, the burden is on the appellant to 

show that the ruling, when the evidence is 

considered in the light most favorable to 

the [prevailing party below], constituted 

reversible error. We review the trial 

court's findings of historical fact only for 

"clear error," but we review de novo the 

trial court's application of defined legal 

standards, such as "reasonable suspicion" 

and "custodial interrogation," to the 

particular facts of a case. 

Ford v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 249, 255, 503 S.E.2d 803, 805 

(1998) (citations omitted). "'[P]olice officers are not 

required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they 

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question,' and Miranda warnings are not required when the 

interviewee's freedom has not been so restricted as to render 

him or her 'in custody.'" Harris v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 

554, 564, 500 S.E.2d 257, 261-62 (1998) (citation omitted). 

Custodial interrogation is defined as 

"questioning initiated by law enforcement 

officers after a person has been taken into 

custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom 

of action in any significant way." The 

totality of the circumstances viewed from 

the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the 

suspect's position must be considered when 

determining whether the suspect is in 

custody when questioned. "It is only when a 

suspect's freedom of movement is curtailed 

to a degree associated with formal arrest 

that the suspect is entitled to the full 

protection of Miranda." 

Taylor v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 260, 267, 391 S.E.2d 592, 

596 (1990) (citations omitted). 

 Gatewood's assertion that he suspected Rigney was a 

convicted felon in possession of firearms did not transform the 

conversation into a custodial interrogation. "The Miranda

warnings are not required merely because . . . the investigation 

has centered on the person being questioned." Kauffmann v. 

Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 400, 404-05, 383 S.E.2d 279, 281 (1989) 

(citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)). 

Among the circumstances to be considered 

when making the determination of whether a 

suspect was "in custody" are (1) the manner 

in which the individual is summoned by the 

police, (2) the familiarity or neutrality of 

the surroundings, (3) the number of officers 

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present, (4) the degree of physical 

restraint, (5) the duration and character of 

the interrogation, and (6) the extent to 

which the officers' beliefs concerning the 

potential culpability of the individual 

being questioned were manifested to the 

individual. No single factor is dispositive 

of the issue. 

Harris, 27 Va. App. at 565, 500 S.E.2d at 262 (citations 

omitted). 

 Gatewood was invited into Rigney's home by Rigney's wife. 

He announced his purpose and sat at the kitchen table with 

Rigney to discuss his investigation. Although Gatewood was 

armed, he never drew his weapon or otherwise threatened Rigney. 

He told Rigney he was not going to arrest him and, despite 

Rigney's confession and the presence of the firearms, left the 

home without arresting him. Rigney's freedom of movement was 

not curtailed to any degree associated with arrest. Under these 

circumstances, a reasonable person would not have felt compelled 

to speak with the officer or unable to ask him to leave the 

home. 

 Rigney's reliance on Wass v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 27, 

359 S.E.2d 836 (1987), is misplaced. In Wass, the law 

enforcement presence, in number, character and action, resembled 

a military operation and was so overwhelming that no reasonable 

person would have felt free to resist any demand made on him. 

Id. at 34, 359 S.E.2d at 840. Here, Rigney met one deputy 

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sheriff, in his own home, seated at his own kitchen table, a 

familiar and neutral place. The encounter consisted of a calm 

discussion about the allegation, with no show of force or any 

physical restraint. Thus, the encounter was consensual, not 

custodial, and Miranda warnings were not required. 

 The trial court erred by granting the motion to suppress 

Rigney's statements. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of 

the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings, 

should the Commonwealth be so advised. 

 Reversed and remanded.

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