State of New York

Supreme Court, Appellate Division

Third Judicial Department

Decided and Entered: April 14, 2016 106863 

________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF

NEW YORK,

Respondent,

v MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MUJAHID SMITH,

Appellant.

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Calendar Date: February 18, 2016

Before: Peters, P.J., Garry, Rose and Devine, JJ.

__________

Torrance L. Schmitz, Vestal, for appellant.

Palmer J. Pelella, Special Prosecutor, Binghamton, for

respondent.

__________

Devine, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Broome County

(Smith, J.), rendered May 21, 2014, convicting defendant

following a nonjury trial of the crimes of criminal possession of

a forged instrument in the second degree and conspiracy in the

fifth degree.

In August 2012, Brittany Krisko attempted to negotiate a

fake check drawn on the account of a local charity. The ensuing

investigation suggested that defendant and his significant other,

Shanika Cooper, were behind the check-cashing scheme. Defendant

was accordingly charged in an indictment with criminal possession

of a forged instrument in the second degree and conspiracy in the

fifth degree and, following a bench trial, he was convicted as

charged. County Court sentenced him, as a second felony
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offender, to an aggregate prison term of 3 to 6 years. Defendant

now appeals, and we affirm.

Defendant first points out that he "may not be convicted of

any offense upon the testimony of an accomplice unsupported by

corroborative evidence tending to connect . . . defendant with

the commission of such offense" and argues that the testimony of

two purported accomplices, Krisko and Yvonne Scott, was

insufficiently corroborated (CPL 60.22 [1]; see People v Sage, 23

NY3d 16, 23 [2014]).1 Assuming without deciding that both women

were shown to be accomplices (see People v Sage, 23 NY3d at 23-

24), the corroboration requirement is not demanding and does not

require compelling proof of defendant's guilt (see People v

Reome, 15 NY3d 188, 191-192 [2010]; People v Godallah, 132 AD3d

1146, 1149 [2015]). Instead, the People need only come forward

with evidence that "tends to connect . . . defendant with the

commission of the crime in such a way as may reasonably satisfy

the [trier of fact] that the accomplice[s] [are] telling the

truth" (People v Reome, 15 NY3d at 192 [internal quotation marks

and citation omitted]).

Scott and Krisko have family connections and lived in the

same house at the time of the offense. Scott was friendly with

Cooper who, in turn, had worked for the charity. Cooper asked

Krisko to cash the check because she had a bank account, and

Krisko agreed to do so upon the understanding that she and Scott

would receive money in return for her assistance. Krisko, Scott,

Cooper and defendant then drove to the bank together. It was in

the car that Krisko first saw the check, which was made out to

Oraine Dawkins for $4,800 and was apparently endorsed by him. 

Defendant told Krisko that Dawkins was a friend of his and that

the check came from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, a

story that made Krisko nervous when she realized that the check

was drawn on the charity's account. Krisko watched defendant

write under the endorsement and make the check payable to her,

1 County Court rejected defendant's contentions in this

regard, but it is unclear whether the court determined that one

or both of the witnesses were not accomplices, or that the People

had satisfied the corroboration requirement.
-3- 106863 

after which she endorsed the check herself and went into the bank

to deposit it. She then exchanged telephone numbers with

defendant so that she could contact him when the check cleared. 

The two spoke by telephone the next day, and Krisko reported that

defendant "sounded irritated" that the check had not cleared yet. 

Krisko and Scott were contacted by a detective in the employ of

the Broome County Sheriff's Office after it became clear that the

check was fake. At the detective's request, one of the women

called the number provided by defendant, told the man who

answered that they had the money, and arranged a meeting at a

nearby store. Krisko and Scott went to the store at the

appointed time and saw a man who, from a distance, appeared to be

defendant. They left the store and alerted investigators, who

briefly detained the man before confirming that he was not

defendant.

The People submitted a variety of proof beyond the

testimony of Krisko and Scott that tended to connect defendant to

the charged offenses and gave reason to believe that their

accounts were accurate. For example, shortly before the events

at issue, the charity had issued Cooper a check with the account

information contained on the forged check, and that check had

never been cashed. Defendant made statements to investigators,

admitted into evidence, in which he confirmed that he had

traveled to the bank with the three other women on the day in

question. The detective who dealt with Krisko and Scott

testified and detailed the events surrounding the meeting at the

store.2 Dawkins also testified at the trial, stating that he had

never seen the check before and had not signed it. Dawkins

stated that he had been incarcerated for several years and knew

defendant from when they were jailed together in 2009, and denied

knowing Cooper. He further provided a motive for defendant to

2 The detective was out of the country at the time of trial

and, upon the People's successful application, underwent a

conditional examination prior to trial (see CPL art 660). 

Inasmuch as defendant consented to the conditional examination of

the detective, he will not now be heard to complain of it (see

e.g. People v Rhodes, 91 AD3d 1185, 1187 [2012], lv denied 19

NY3d 966 [2012]).
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falsely implicate him in the forgery scheme, namely, that the two

had a falling out and were no longer on speaking terms. In our

view, the foregoing "sufficiently connected defendant to the

commission of the crimes to satisfy the corroboration requirement

of CPL 60.22 (1)" (People v Giguere, 261 AD2d 941, 941 [1999], lv

denied 93 NY2d 1018 [1999]; see People v Shelby, 111 AD2d 1038,

1039 [1985], lv denied 66 NY2d 618 [1985]).

Defendant lastly argues that the verdict was against the

weight of the evidence and, as such, we "independently 'weigh

conflicting testimony, review any rational inferences that may be

drawn from the evidence and evaluate the strength of such

conclusions' . . . , and endeavor to determine 'whether [County

Court] was justified in finding the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt'" (People v Simmons, 135 AD3d 1193, 1195 [2016],

quoting People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348 [2007]). The check

was indisputably forged, and defendant only asserts that the

People failed to demonstrate that he was aware of that fact. 

That being said, defendant took the lead in convincing Krisko to

cash a forged check, and his girlfriend had recently obtained the

account information replicated on that check. The forged check

was made out to and purportedly signed by an incarcerated man

whom defendant knew and disliked, and defendant thereafter acted

as the point of contact for the efforts to collect the proceeds. 

"Guilty knowledge of forgery may be shown circumstantially by

conduct and events" and, according deference to the determination

of County Court that the foregoing proof was credible, we find

that the verdict was supported by the weight of the evidence

(People v Johnson, 65 NY2d 556, 561 [1985]; see People v Rebollo,

107 AD3d 1059, 1060-1061 [2013]; People v Martinez, 105 AD2d 873,

874 [1984]).

Peters, P.J., Garry and Rose, JJ., concur.
-5- 106863 

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger

Clerk of the Court