Filed 1/7/16 P. v. The North River Insurance Co. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

THE NORTH RIVER INSURANCE 

CO. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

B260899

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. SJ3990)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

David R. Fields, Judge. Dismissed.

Jefferson T. Stamp for Defendants and Appellants.

Office of the County Counsel, Ruben Baeza, Jr., Assistant County Counsel and 

Jessica C. Rivas, Senior Associate County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______________________________________
2

This is an appeal from a summary judgment pursuant to Penal Code1

section 1306, subdivision (a), following the forfeiture of a bail bond. We dismiss the 

appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 24, 2012, The North River Insurance Company (surety) through its 

agent Bad Boy Bail Bonds (collectively, appellants) issued a bail bond in the amount of 

$30,000 securing the appearance of Juan Rodriguez in People v. Rodriguez, Superior 

Court case no. PA073799-01. The bond secured Rodriguez’s appearance throughout 

the pendency of the criminal case, including for pronouncement of judgment or grant of 

probation. The bond also stated that if forfeiture of the bond is ordered by the trial 

court, “judgment may be summarily made and entered forthwith” against the surety for 

$30,000.

On June 14, 2012, Rodriguez appeared at his arraignment and requested and 

received a 60-day continuance of the arraignment to allow him to hire private counsel. 

The court then ordered Rodriguez to appear at the continued arraignment on August 13, 

2012.

Although Rodriguez’s newly-hired private attorney appeared at the August 13, 

2012 arraignment, Rodriguez failed to appear and the court ordered the bond forfeited. 

In compliance with the provisions of section 1305, the court mailed notice of the bond 

forfeiture to appellants on August 14, 2012. The court granted several requests by the 

appellants to extend the 180-day appearance period set forth in section 1305. After 

appellants eventually concluded Rodriguez could not be located, the court entered 

summary judgment on the bond on November 19, 2014.2 The court mailed notice of 

entry of judgment to appellants on November 20, 2014. Appellants timely filed a notice 

of appeal on December 17, 2014.

 1

All subsequent code references are to the Penal Code.

2

None of the parties challenges the court’s authority to order multiple extensions 

of the 180-day appearance period under section 1305.4. We express no opinion 

regarding the propriety of those orders.
3

After an initial review of the briefs and the record in this appeal, we issued 

a letter pursuant to Government Code section 68081, directing the parties to address an 

issue not raised in the appellate briefs: whether appellants properly appeal the summary 

judgment since they do not contend that the court failed to comply with section 1305 or 

1306.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment on a bail bond is a consent judgment and ordinarily is not 

appealable; however, in the limited circumstance where the judgment is not entered 

according to the terms of the consent phrase stated on the bail bond, the judgment is 

appealable. (See, e.g., People v. Wilshire Ins. Co. (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 216, 219 

(Wilshire); People v. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1, 9, 

fn. 4.) In this case, the following consent language appears on the bail bond: “If the 

forfeiture of this bond be ordered by the Court, judgment may be summarily made and 

entered forthwith against the said THE NORTH RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY for 

the amount of its undertaking herein as provided by Sections 1305 and 1306 of the 

Penal Code.”

“It is well established in the case law that Penal Code sections 1305 and 1306 are 

subject to precise and strict construction.” (County of Los Angeles v. Surety Ins. Co.

(1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 58, 62.) Section 1305 relates primarily to bond forfeiture. 

Among other things, section 1305 provides that in all cases in which the bond exceeds 

$400, the clerk of the court must mail notice of the bond forfeiture to the surety and the 

bail agent within 30 days of forfeiture and at the addresses printed on the bond. 

(§ 1305, subd. (b).) That section also expressly provides that the surety is “released of 

all obligations under the bond” if the court fails to comply with the statute’s notice 

requirements. (§ 1305, subd. (b)(1)-(3).) Our courts have also held that strict 

compliance with statutory notice requirements is critical. For example, section 1305, 

subdivision (a), requires the court to announce the bond forfeiture “in open court,” and 

our courts have held that the failure to do so will invalidate the bond forfeiture. (People 

v. National Automobile & Casualty Ins. Co. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 277, 288-291.)
4

Section 1306, by contrast, relates to the entry of judgment. For example, 

section 1306, subdivision (a), gives the court authority to enter summary judgment 

following bond forfeiture. Subdivision (c) requires the court to enter that judgment 

within 90 days after the date upon which judgment may first be entered, and further 

provides that after 90 days, “right to [enter judgment] expires and the bail is 

exonerated.” (§ 1306, subd. (c); see County of Los Angeles v. American Bankers Ins. 

Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 792, 796.) In short, because the law disfavors forfeitures, 

the procedural duties set out in sections 1305 and 1306 are jurisdictional prescriptions 

and are strictly construed in favor of the surety. (See Wilshire, supra, 46 Cal.App.3d at 

pp. 219-220.) Failure to adhere to the requirements set forth in sections 1305 and 1306 

renders any subsequently entered judgment void. (Id. at p. 221.)

Here, appellants challenge the summary judgment based upon their contention 

that the court improperly granted a continuance of the arraignment in the underlying 

criminal action--a matter wholly unrelated to the court’s compliance with sections 1305 

and 1306. Accordingly, this appeal does not fit within the limited exception to the 

general rule that a summary judgment on a bail bond is not appealable.

Even if the summary judgment is appealable, there is no merit to appellants’

contention that the court lost jurisdiction over the bail bond because it had no authority 

to continue the arraignment for two months to allow Rodriguez to obtain private 

counsel. As noted by the People, trial courts have broad discretion in granting 

continuances. (People v. Garcia (2011) 52 Cal.4th 706, 758.) In light of the fact that 

Rodriguez appeared in person at his initial arraignment hearing, was charged with 

non-violent drug offenses, and was able to post a $30,000 bail bond, the court did not 

abuse its discretion in continuing the arraignment for two months to allow him to retain 

private counsel. (See People v. Courts (1985) 37 Cal.3d 784 [court erred in depriving 

defendant of his right to counsel of his choice where defendant was diligent in his 

efforts to secure counsel of his own choosing and apprised the lower court of his wishes 

at the earliest possible time, and where a continuance would not have significantly 
5

inconvenienced the lower court or parties].) Accordingly, the court did not lose 

jurisdiction over the bail bond by continuing the arraignment.

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed. Respondent shall recover costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

LAVIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

EDMON, P. J.

ALDRICH, J.