If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

January 27, 2022

v No. 355619

St. Clair Circuit Court

EDWARD LEE GREEN, JR., LC No. 19-002542-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: SAWYER, P.J., and SERVITTO and RICK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals as of right his jury-trial convictions for two counts of first-degree home 

invasion, MCL 750.110a(2). On appeal, defendant argues that he should be granted a retrial 

because 1) his trial was tainted by prosecutorial misconduct and 2) his trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance. Additionally, defendant, in a Standard 4 Brief, argues that there was

insufficient evidence to support his convictions. We disagree and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

This appeal arises from two convictions of home invasion. The first conviction involved 

an alleged home invasion that occurred on July 22, 2019, at the home of George Mayer. Mayer 

stated that he was awoken that morning at around 4:30 a.m. when his dog started growling “as if 

she heard something outside,” but he then went back to sleep.

St. Clair County Sherriff’s Department Deputy Chris Roehl, received a call early the same 

morning concerning a suspicious car left running in someone’s driveway. Upon arriving at the 

residence of the caller, Deputy Roehl discovered a silver Chrysler 300 belonging to defendant 

sitting in the driveway with the lights on, the driver’s-side door open, and the engine running. No 

keys were inside the car and no one else was around. Deputy Roehl stated that the homeowner 

who called about the car did not know whose it was or how it got there.

In the back seat of defendant’s car, Deputy Roehl found a black fanny pack containing 

Mayer’s identification, credit cards, and checks. According to Mayer, he had left the fanny pack 

on the armrest of his couch in his living room—roughly an arm’s-length away from his front 
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door—when he went to bed the night before. Mayer testified that he had closed and locked his 

door before he went to sleep. When Deputy Roehl arrived at Mayer’s home to return the fanny 

pack later in the morning of July 22, 2019, it was also discovered that Mayer’s screen door had 

been cut open at some point during the night before. Mayer testified that his screen was not cut 

when he went to bed on July 21, 2019.

Deputy Roehl also received a second call on the morning of July 22, 2019, regarding a 

suspicious person in the yard of Autumn LaCroix, whose home was across the street from 

defendant’s abandoned vehicle. LaCroix testified that shortly after 5:00 a.m. that morning, after 

her boyfriend left for work, she was alerted by her home security system1of movement near her 

garage. Live security footage from outside of her house showed someone in the driveway looking 

through LaCroix’s living room window. LaCroix then activated a loud alarm through the security 

system, at which point she saw the person outside run away from her home and across her front 

yard.

Defendant was eventually located later that morning by St. Clair County Sherriff’s 

Department Deputy Gil Sanchez. Defendant was found walking alone on a nature trail and wearing 

all black, which Deputy Sanchez described as “a little bit out of the ordinary for people exercising 

or hiking on the trail”. Deputy Roehl noted that the clothing was similar to the clothing worn by 

the suspicious person in LaCroix’s security footage. When Deputy Sanchez asked defendant about 

the abandoned vehicle, defendant admitted it was his vehicle, but he stated that his brother had 

borrowed the car and defendant asserted he had been with his girlfriend the night before.

Defendant’s second conviction also involved an alleged home invasion, this one occurring 

between August 2 and 3, 2019, at the home of Leigh Jewell. Jewell testified that, on the evening 

of August 2, 2019, she went to sleep at approximately 11:30 p.m., leaving her purse on the kitchen 

table overnight. The next morning, she discovered that the purse was missing. According to 

Jewell, the windows and doors were all closed when she went to bed, but the kitchen window near 

the purse was left unlocked and could be opened from outside. Jewell stated that the purse 

contained, among other valuables, a silver coin that once belonged to her grandfather. Jewell 

eventually filed a police report regarding the missing property.

St. Clair County Sherriff’s Department Detective Chris Schwartzkopf was charge of 

investigating the case. He testified that he discovered that defendant pawned a coin matching the 

coin Jewell described, and Jewell confirmed that it was indeed the coin from her purse. With this 

information, defendant was arrested for both the July 2019 and August 2019 home invasions.

After the arrest, Detective Schwartzkopf interviewed defendant regarding these incidents. During 

the interview, defendant stated that an unidentified man named Robert had instructed him to park 

in the driveway where his car was found on July 22, 2019, and that person left Mayer’s fanny pack 

in the vehicle. Defendant stated that he did not know this individual, but that defendant offered to 

give him a ride from a nearby gas station in exchange for $20. According to defendant, this all 

 

1 LaCroix’s home security system had two outdoor cameras, one by the front door and another on 

the garage, and the system alerted her phone when motion was detected outside.
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occurred after he ended his shift at a restaurant at around 2:00 a.m. However, evidence at trial 

indicated that defendant’s employment actually ended in early June 2019, well before this incident.

When asked about his connection to the August 2-3, 2019 home invasion, defendant stated 

that, on August 3, 2019, he agreed to drive a girl he just met that same day to the pawn shop. 

Defendant said the girl’s name was Melody, but he did not know her last name, nor could he 

provide any additional identifying information. According to defendant, Melody was the one 

attempting to pawn Jewell’s silver coin, and he only put his information down for the transaction 

because Melody did not have the required identification.

Detective Schwartzkopf also testified about a recorded jail phone call between defendant 

and his girlfriend that took place shortly after the interview, which was admitted at trial. During 

this call, defendant mentioned that he went to the pawn shop. Then they discussed how defendant 

was doing and what he expected was going to happen. Defendant repeatedly stated that “it is what 

it is,” but stressed his view that the evidence in his case only established that he possessed stolen 

property, not home invasion.

A pawn shop employee also identified defendant as the person who pawned the silver coin. 

She was unsure whether anyone else accompanied him. Furthermore, trial testimony also 

established the locations of and relative distance between these events. Specifically, the location 

where defendant’s vehicle was found and LaCroix’s home was approximately 3 1⁄2 miles from 

Mayer’s home, Mayer’s home was approximately 4 miles from Jewell’s home, and the trail where 

defendant was found after the first home invasion was approximately 4 miles from defendant’s 

abandoned car and LaCroix’s home. The jury ultimately convicted defendant on both counts of 

home invasion.

II. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

Defendant first argues that his convictions should be reversed and he should be retried 

because the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by appealing to the sympathy of the jury and 

attempting to shift the burden of proof.2 We disagree.

Claims of prosecutorial misconduct generally require showing that the defendant was 

denied a fair and impartial trial. People v Solloway, 316 Mich App 174, 201; 891 NW2d 255 

(2016). Defendants are “entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one,” and this Court must review the 

alleged misconduct in context. Id. However, because defendant did not properly preserve his

claims of prosecutorial misconduct, our review is limited to “plain error affecting the defendant’s 

 

2 This Court stated in People v Jackson, 313 Mich App 409, 425 n 4; 884 NW2d 297 (2015):

[A]lthough the term “prosecutorial misconduct” has become a term of art often used 

to describe any error committed by the prosecution, claims of inadvertent error by 

the prosecution are “better and more fairly presented as claims of ‘prosecutorial 

error,’ with only the most extreme cases rising to the level of “prosecutorial 

misconduct.” [Cleaned up.]

For clarity and consistency’s sake, and because it has become a term of art, we will utilize the term 

“prosecutorial misconduct.”
-4-

substantial rights.” Id. at 202. This requires a defendant to show prejudice, i.e., “that the error 

affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings.” Id. In addition, “[r]eversal is warranted 

only when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or

when an error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings.” People v Randolph, 502 Mich 1, 10; 917 NW2d 249 (2018) (cleaned up).

A prosecutor may not appeal to the jury’s sympathy for the victim. People v Dobek, 274 

Mich App 58, 80; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). Furthermore, “[a] prosecutor may not imply in closing 

argument that the defendant must prove something or present a reasonable explanation for 

damaging evidence because such an argument tends to shift the burden of proof.” People v Fyda, 

288 Mich App 446, 463-464, 793 NW2d 712 (2010). For the same reason, a prosecutor also cannot 

comment on a defendant’s failure to present evidence. Id. at 464. However, a prosecutor is 

permitted to argue that inculpatory evidence is undisputed by the defendant and that evidence is 

uncontested, even if the defendant is the only person capable of countering that evidence. Id.

Here, defendant asserts that the prosecutor impermissibly appealed to the jury’s sympathy

by repeatedly highlighting the sentimental value of the coin that defendant allegedly stole. 

Defendant emphasizes the following questioning between the prosecutor and Jewell, in particular:

Q. And then there were things of sentimental value to you?

A. My silver coin that I got from my grandmother when my grandfather 

passed away and one thing that my grandmother gave me two weeks before she 

died.

* * *

Q. All right. So looking with me to [sic] Exhibit 10, tell me whose coin 

this was originally?

A. It was my grandfather’s.

Q. Okay. And how did it come to you?

A. After my grandfather passed away, I helped, I was helping my 

grandmother clean out his dresser drawers and that and we came across it and she 

gave it to me.

Q. Okay. And do you know the significance of why your grandfather had 

it?

A. My aunt and I are assuming that he had the coin set aside from his other 

silver because that was the year that he got out of World War II.

* * *

Q. Okay. And so what year is the coin?
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A. 1945.

Q. Okay. And can you describe it? What, like what kind of coin is it?

A. Walking Liberty, silver.

Q. So, it’s a silver, is it a dollar, a silver dollar?

A. Nope, 50 cent piece. I’m sorry.

Q. Okay. And we call it walking Liberty because it has the Lady Liberty 

on the front side and the eagle on the rear; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And what does your boyfriend Ray do with coins?

A. Oh, he saves the silver too and polishes it up knowing that he’s not 

supposed to, but we were sitting one night and I had him shine it up for me so I 

could give it to my son.

Q. Okay. So explain what your plans were for this coin.

A. To give it to my oldest son that met my grandfather when he was a small 

child.

Q. Okay. And when you say he polished it up even though you’re not 

supposed to. What do you mean?

A. You polish silver you lose the value of the silver.

Q. Okay. But you, did you see him polish it?

A. Oh, yeah, I sat right there and watched him.

Q. Okay. And what, what does he use to polish coins?

A. Polishing cloth.

Q. Okay. And some kind of chemical or—

A. Something, I don’t remember what it was.

Q. Okay. Like a silver polish?

A. Yes, a silver polish.

Q. Does that change the finish in some way?
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A. Yes, it shines it.

Q. Okay.

A. Very shiny.

Q. And do you know why you’re not supposed to, why it decreases the 

value?

A. I don’t remember.

Q. Okay.

A. I don’t, I just wanted it shiny.

Q. Okay. All right, so do you know for sure that this coin was in your purse 

on that day, August 2nd and 3rd?

A. Yes, I do.

* * *

Q. Okay. And how did you get the coin back?

A. I had to pay $3 to get it back.

Q. So are you still able to pass it on to your son?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Did you get the sentimental object from your grandmother or any 

other contents of your purse back?

A. No.

According to defendant, the only evidentiary purpose for discussing the coin was to 

establish its unique qualities—primarily its uncharacteristic shine. Defendant asserts that, while 

the testimony relating to the coin’s shine was appropriate for identification, the remaining 

testimony was unnecessary and merely designed to evoke sympathy for the victim.

We conclude that this testimony did not amount to an improper attempt by the prosecutor 

to evoke the jury’s sympathy. While overly emphasizing the sentimentality of stolen property can

in some instances constitute improper argument, here the prosecutor’s explicit comments about 

the coin’s sentimental value were limited and not a blatant appeal to jurors’ sympathies. Compare 

People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 591-592; 629 NW2d 411 (2001) (isolated commentary that 

“[the defendant] did something to [the victim] that no one should do to any other human being” 

and that “[h]e treated her in a way that no animal should be treated” was not improper and “was

not so inflammatory as to prejudice” the defendant), with People v Dalessandro, 165 Mich App 

569, 581; 419 NW2d 609 (1988), (concluding that it was improper for the prosecutor to constantly
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refer to “the poor innocent baby” because such statements “were obviously intended to elicit just 

that emotional response” and evoke jurors’ sympathies).

Additionally, much of this allegedly faulty questioning, specifically that relating to the 

coin’s shine, type, and year, was required to properly identify the coin and clearly not intended to 

evoke jurors’ sympathies. Regardless of whether the more general questioning concerning the 

coin’s background may have incidentally invited sympathy, we conclude that this was for the 

proper purpose of identifying the coin and Jewell’s credibility on the matter.

Furthermore, this alleged misconduct did not prejudice defendant. The trial court below 

specifically instructed the jurors that “[y]ou must not let sympathy or prejudice influence your 

decision,” and “jurors are presumed to follow their instructions.” People v Stevens, 498 Mich 162, 

177; 869 NW2d 233 (2015) (cleaned up). Thus, without some additional evidence showing that 

the jury was in fact influenced by sympathy for the victim, we cannot conclude that the 

prosecutor’s questioning actually affected the outcome below. Additionally, Jewell’s responses 

make clear that the coin was returned, undermining any contention that the questioning was even 

capable of eliciting the jury’s sympathy. Under these circumstances, defendant was not prejudiced 

by the questioning, and reversal is thus unwarranted on the basis of this line of inquiry.

Defendant also claims that the prosecutor improperly attempted to shift the burden of proof 

in both questioning and closing arguments. Defendant specifically highlights the following 

exchange at trial between the prosecutor and Schwartzkopf regarding defendant’s phone call with 

his girlfriend:

Q. At any time during this recording talking to his girlfriend . . . does 

[defendant] tell her that he did not break into those houses?

A. No.

Q. Did he tell her that you have the wrong guy he did not commit the home 

invasions?

A. No.

Defendant also notes the following statements by the prosecutor during closing arguments:

And now the phone call. The phone call to the girlfriend. An hour after he 

finishes meeting with the detective he calls his girlfriend. What do people do when 

they are wrongfully accused? They say, boy, you have the wrong guy. I did not 

do this. This is a travesty. This is terrible. I was wrongfully accused, but he’s 

relaxed. He’s talking to his girlfriend that he trusts. Does he say that? Not one 

time. He says they locked my ass up. Wow, that would be a time to be upset about 

being wrongfully accused. They locked my ass up. Hey, it is what it is. Those 

things that went to the pawn shop I used my I.D. for, they came back on me. Hey, 

it is what it is. Not that stupid Melody girl I wished I’d never met her, but, hey, it 

is what it is. She says, how you doing? He says, I’m all right. Not I’m angry, I’m 

wrongfully accused, this is ridiculous, but does it make sense to cry over spilled 

milk? It is what it is. I got to deal with it.
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* * *

[L]isten not only to what he said when he lied to Deputy Sanchez, when he lied to 

the detective and the things that he admits basically to his girlfriend. Think about 

what he does not say. The Defendant traumatized a lot of people with these home 

invasions and what he does not say to the detective is I didn’t do it. What he does 

not say to his girlfriend is I didn’t do it. Why doesn’t he say that? Because he did 

it.

Relying on Fyda, defendant argues that these questions and statements essentially placed a burden 

on defendant to affirmatively proclaim his innocence.

We disagree that these questions and comments effectively forced defendant to 

affirmatively proclaim his innocence or amounted to improper shifting the burden of proof.3 

Viewed in context, the prosecutor was not attempting to elicit a proclamation of innocence from 

defendant. Rather, the prosecutor highlighted, based on the evidence admitted at trial, defendant’s 

failure to speak where a reasonable person would have done so. In the phone call, defendant

asserted that the police only had evidence that he was in possession of stolen property, and that 

they did not have any evidence that he committed a home invasion. The prosecutor merely 

highlighted defendant’s silence as additional evidence from which the jury could infer defendant’s 

guilt, which was a reasonable inference to be made from the evidence. Therefore, the real issue 

here is not whether the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof, but whether or not 

defendant’s silence could actually be used as substantive evidence of guilt.

Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a defendant’s “post-arrest, 

post-Miranda[4]silence” cannot be used as direct evidence of the defendant’s guilt. People v 

Shafier, 483 Mich 205, 213-214; 768 NW2d 305 (2009); see US Const, Am V. However, it is 

permissible to use a defendant’s silence as substantive evidence when these constitutional rights 

are not implicated. See People v McReavy, 436 Mich 197, 203; 462 NW2d 1 (1990) (“The 

admission for substantive purposes of evidence of the defendant’s demeanor and statements made 

during custodial interrogation after a valid waiver of his Fifth Amendment privilege against 

compelled self-incrimination and prior to invoking the right to remain silent is neither error of 

constitutional dimension nor a violation of the Michigan Rules of Evidence.”); People v Rice (On 

Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 437; 597 NW2d 843 (1999) (concluding that the prosecutor did not 

engage in “improper commentary on constitutionally protected silence” when the prosecutor 

offered evidence regarding the defendant’s nonverbal conduct and silence that occurred after the 

defendant waived his Fifth Amendment rights). Accordingly, the prosecutor did not engage in 

improper conduct by offering this evidence because defendant had waived his rights.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that defendant waived his Fifth Amendment right to 

silence when he voluntarily responded to questioning after being given Miranda warnings during 

 

3 We note that portions of the recorded interview and phone call were admitted into evidence and 

played for the jury during trial. Defendant does not argue that this evidence was inadmissible.

4 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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the interview with Detective Schwartzkopf. Furthermore, even discounting defendant’s waiver, 

his right to silence would not extend to the phone call with his girlfriend because he was not subject 

to custodial interrogation at the time. See Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 444; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 

L Ed 2d 694 (1966) (a defendant’s Miranda rights are only implicated when he or she is subjected

to a custodial interrogation, which means “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after 

a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 

significant way”) (emphasis added); People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 11; 551 NW2d 355 (1996) 

(“Miranda protects defendants against governmental coercion leading them to surrender rights 

protected by the Fifth Amendment; it goes no further than that.”) (cleaned up; emphasis added).

Here, although he was in custody at the time, defendant’s silence occurred after he waived 

his right to silence and during a conversation with his girlfriend—not under questioning from law 

enforcement officers. Applying the aforementioned legal principles to these facts, it was 

constitutionally proper for the prosecutor to rely on defendant’s silence and lack of denials as 

substantive evidence of guilt. Therefore, no prosecutorial misconduct occurred.

Additionally, even assuming arguendo that these questions and comments did constitute 

an improper attempt to shift the burden of proof, there was no prejudice to defendant. As noted, 

jurors are presumed to follow their instructions. See Stevens, 498 Mich at 177. In this case, the 

trial court instructed the jury that defendant was entitled to the presumption of innocence, that the 

burden of proof was solely on the prosecutor, and that the lawyers’ statements, questions to the 

witnesses, and arguments were not evidence. Therefore, defendant has not established that he is 

entitled to reversal.

III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Defendant next argues that his convictions should be reversed and he be retried because 

his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. We disagree.

Whether a defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel presents a mixed 

question of fact and constitutional law. People v Heft, 299 Mich App 69, 80; 829 NW2d 266 

(2012). Because defendant did not properly preserve his claim of ineffective assistance, our review

islimited to the existing record. People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 456; 678 NW2d 631 (2004).

To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that “counsel’s 

performance was deficient and that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” 

Fyda, 288 Mich App at 450. “A counsel’s performance was deficient if it fell below an objective 

standard of professional reasonableness.” Id. To establish prejudice, the defendant must show “it 

is reasonably probable that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Id.

Defendant argues that his trial counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s alleged 

misconduct deprived him of a fair trial and thus constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Defendant stresses that there was no strategic purpose for defense counsel not to object to the 

numerous instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct discussed earlier.

As discussed, no misconduct occurred that would have warranted an objection by defense 

counsel. “Failing to advance a meritless argument or raise a futile objection does not constitute 
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ineffective assistance of counsel.” People v Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192, 201; 793 NW2d 120 

(2010). However, even if the comments were improper, defendant has not overcome the strong 

presumption that counsel’s decision to not object was a matter of trial strategy. See Strickland v 

Washington, 466 US 668, 689; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984) (“[A] court must indulge a 

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, 

the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.”) (cleaned up).

Nonetheless, even assuming that trial counsel’s performance was deficient, defendant has 

not established that he suffered prejudice as a result. As discussed, jurors are presumed to follow 

their instructions and the judge properly instructed the jury about both relying on sympathy for the 

victim and the prosecutor’s burden of proof. Therefore, the prosecutor’s alleged improper 

questions are presumptively not harmful. See Stevens, 498 Mich at 177; see also People v Reed, 

449 Mich 375, 401; 535 NW2d 496 (1995) (“Given the well-established proposition that jurors 

are presumed to follow the law, an alleged misstatement of the law by the prosecutor is 

presumptively not harmful, since the trial judge instructed the jury properly.”). Furthermore, 

defendant has also failed to establish a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, 

“the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Fyda, 288 Mich App at 450. As 

discussed below, the remaining evidence, although largely circumstantial, was more than sufficient 

for the jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, defendant’s claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel must fail.

IV. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE

Lastly, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions of 

first-degree home invasion. We disagree.

“This Court reviews de novo challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence.” Solloway, 316 

Mich App 174 at 180. A reviewing court “must determine whether the evidence was sufficient to 

justify a rational trier of fact’s conclusion that the evidence proved the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. The evidence is viewed “in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution . . . .” People v Blevins, 314 Mich App 339, 357; 886 NW2d 456 (2016). 

“Circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences that arise from that evidence can constitute 

satisfactory proof of the elements of the crime.” Id. Further, “[a]ll conflicts in the evidence must 

be resolved in favor of the prosecution.” Solloway, 316 Mich App 174 at 180-181.

To support a conviction of first-degree home invasion, a prosecutor must establish the 

following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(1) the defendant either breaks and enters a dwelling or enters a dwelling without 

permission; (2) the defendant either intends when entering to commit a felony, 

larceny, or assault in the dwelling or at any time while entering, present in, or 

exiting the dwelling actually commits a felony, larceny, or assault; and (3) while 

the defendant is entering, present in, or exiting the dwelling, either (a) the defendant 

is armed with a dangerous weapon, or (b) another person is lawfully present in the 

dwelling. [People v Bush, 315 Mich App 237, 244; 890 NW2d 370 (2016); see 

also MCL 750.110a(2).]
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Defendant argues that the record lacks any evidence placing him at either Mayer’s or 

Jewell’s homes during the alleged home invasions, thus negating the first element of home 

invasion. Defendant asserts that the evidence, at most, only shows that he was in possession of 

stolen property, but not that he was the individual who took the items from the victims’ respective 

houses. We disagree.

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable juror could 

find that each element of defendant’s crimes were established beyond a reasonable doubt. First, it 

is undisputed that both Mayer and Jewell were present in their homes when the alleged home 

invasions and underlying thefts occurred. Moreover, both individuals were also missing property 

that was taken from inside their homes, with Mayer’s screen door actually cut open for access and 

Jewell’s purse sitting near a closed but unlocked window. Although no witnesses definitively 

placed defendant at the scene of the two home invasions, sufficient circumstantial evidence existed 

for jurors to infer this fact.

Critically, the two home invasions occurred in the same general area approximately 4 miles 

apart, and defendant was discovered walking a trail near the location of the first home invasion 

later that morning. Defendant’s car was also discovered, with Mayer’s stolen property inside,

across the street from where a suspicious person matching defendant’s description was seen casing 

houses. Additionally, evidence established that defendant was the individual who pawned Jewell’s 

stolen coin at the pawn shop. Furthermore, defendant’s purported explanations for these 

circumstances were inconsistent to say the least. Defendant initially told officers that his brother 

was using his car at the time of the first alleged home invasion. However, when he was later 

questioned by a detective, he changed his story and placed blame on an unknown individual named 

Robert. Similarly, defendant alleged that he was only on record for pawning Jewell’s coin because 

the actual thief, “Melody,” lacked proper identification. But there is no evidence that this person 

even existed apart from defendant’s statements, and he could not provide a last name or any 

identifying information. Finally, defendant claimed he had been working late at a local restaurant 

on the evening of the first home invasion, but the record reveals that defendant’s employment at 

this restaurant had stopped well before this incident. Accordingly, a reasonable juror could have 

reasonably rejected defendant’s inconsistent and vague explanations.

From this evidence, it was reasonable for jurors to infer that defendant was responsible for 

breaking and entering and stealing from both Mayer’s and Jewell’s homes. Therefore, we conclude 

that there was sufficient evidence to “justify a rational trier of fact’s conclusion that the evidence 

proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Solloway, 316 Mich App 

174 at 180.

Affirmed.

/s/ David H. Sawyer 

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto 

/s/ Michelle M. Rick