**_______________________________** Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice: Justices: Clifford W. Taylor Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly 

# Opinion

Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman

**FILED DECEMBER 28, 2005 DEBRA LEA MILLER,**  **Plaintiff-Appellee,**

**v No. 127767**  **JOHN THOMAS MILLER, Defendant-Appellant.** 

**PER CURIAM. This case presents the question whether the domestic**  **relations arbitration act (DRAA) 1**  **requires a formal hearing during arbitration comparable to that which occurs in**  **traditional trial proceedings. We conclude that it does**

**not. Also at issue is whether a court order to which the**  **parties have stipulated in writing can satisfy the act’s requirement of a written agreement to arbitrate. We**  **conclude that it can. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which ruled to the contrary on** 

**1 MCL 600.5070**  et seq **. both issues, and we reinstate the arbitration award and the**  **judgment of divorce.**

**T HE**  **F ACTUAL AND**  **P ROCEDURAL**  **H ISTORY**  **Plaintiff filed for divorce in January 2001. After failed settlement conferences in the circuit court, on**  **December 4, 2001, both parties stipulated in writing to entry of an order sending all issues in the case to binding**  **arbitration. The arbitrator put the parties in separate rooms**  **during the arbitration proceedings. He shuttled between them, gathering the necessary information and hearing the**  **respective arguments. Both parties agreed to this procedure.**  **At the end of the day, plaintiff asked the arbitrator for additional sessions. He denied the request, expressly**  **noting in his written award that plaintiff had failed to raise anything new to justify further proceedings. When**  **plaintiff made a second request, the arbitrator gave her three days to provide an outline of what she would present**  **at the additional proceedings. She supplied, instead, voluminous material. Rather than schedule more hearings,**  **the arbitrator reviewed plaintiff’s material, modified the award, and issued the final binding arbitration award.** 

**2 Plaintiff filed a motion in court to set aside the**  **arbitration award on the basis that the arbitrator had failed to conduct a “hearing” as required by the DRAA. She**  **also claimed that no arbitration agreement existed. The court rejected plaintiff’s claims and entered a judgment of**  **divorce. In a split published decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court and**  **vacated the arbitration award. It held that the DRAA required a formal hearing and that none occurred during the**  **arbitration.** Miller v Miller **, 264 Mich App 497; 691 NW2d 788 (2004).** 

**T HE**  **A PPROPRIATE**  **S TANDARD OF**  **R EVIEW**  **The two issues on appeal are matters of statutory interpretation that we review de novo.**  People v Kimble **, 470 Mich 305, 308-309; 684 NW2d 669 (2004). When**  **interpreting a statute, our goal is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent as determined from a review of the**  **language of the statute.** People v Koonce **, 466 Mich 515, 518; 648 NW2d 153 (2002).**  **Defendant asks us to review the Court of Appeals decision not to enforce the arbitration award. We review**  **such decisions de novo to determine whether the arbitrators exceeded their powers. See**  Gordon Sel-Way **,** Inc v Spence Bros, Inc **, 438 Mich 488, 496-497; 475 NW2d 704 (1991).**

**3 Arbitrators exceed their powers whenever they act beyond**  **the material terms of the contract from which they draw their authority or in contravention of controlling law.**  DAIIE v Gavin **, 416 Mich 407, 433-434; 331 NW2d 418 (1982).**

**W**

**HAT C**  **ONSTITUTES A H**  **EARING UNDER THE DRAA**  **MCL 600.5081 is the statutory provision that governs vacation and modification of arbitration awards under the**  **DRAA. MCL 600.5081(2) provides: If a party applies under this section, the**  **court shall vacate an award under any of the following circumstances:**  **(a) The award was procured by corruption,**  **fraud, or other undue means. (b)**  **There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, corruption of**  **an arbitrator, or misconduct prejudicing a party’s rights.**  **(c) The arbitrator exceeded his or her**  **powers. (d)**  **The arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing on a showing of sufficient cause, refused**  **to hear evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing to prejudice**  **substantially a party’s rights. The Court of Appeals concluded that the arbitrator**  **violated MCL 600.5081(2)(d). It reasoned that the informality of the hearing prejudiced plaintiff’s rights.**  **The question is whether, in proceedings under the DRAA, the statute precludes hearings being conducted as the hearing**  **was conducted in this case.**

**4 In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals**  **majority relied primarily on MCL 600.5074(1), which provides:**  **An arbitrator appointed under this chapter** shall hear **and make an award on each issue submitted for arbitration under the arbitration**  **agreement subject to the provisions of the agreement. [Emphasis added.]**  **The DRAA does not define the term “hear” or “hearing.” Moreover, it sets no procedural requirements for**  **arbitration. Rather, it specifically eschews them. For example, MCL 600.5077 requires, with certain exceptions,**  **that the arbitrator not make an official record of most arbitration proceedings.**  **2 This purposeful requirement of**  **little or no record shows that the Legislature intended not to require specific procedures in arbitration proceedings.** 

**2 MCL 600.5077 provides:**  **(1) Except as provided by this section,**  **court rule, or the arbitration agreement, a record shall not be made of an arbitration**  **hearing under this chapter. If a record is not required, an arbitrator may make a record to be**  **used only by the arbitrator to aid in reaching the decision. The parties may provide in the**  **arbitration agreement that a record be made of those portions of a hearing related to 1 or more**  **issues subject to arbitration. (2)**  **A record shall be made of that portion of a hearing that concerns child support,**  **custody, or parenting time in the same manner required by the Michigan court rules for the**  **record of a witness’s testimony in a deposition.**

**5 Without a record, reviewing courts cannot assess what**  **procedures have been followed. The Legislature’s failure to provide specific**  **arbitration procedures is consistent also with tradition. Historically, judicial review of arbitration awards is**  **highly limited.** Gavin **, 416 Mich 433-434. This Court has characterized arbitration procedures as “informal and**  **sometimes unorthodox . . . .”** Id **. at 429. Consequently, courts should not speculate why an arbitrator ruled in one**  **particular manner.** Id **. Rather than employ the formality required in courts,**  **parties in arbitration are able to shape the parameters and procedures of the proceeding. The DRAA requires that they**  **first sign an agreement for binding arbitration delineating the powers and duties of the arbitrator. MCL**  **600.5072(1)(e). The act also contemplates that the parties will**  **discuss with the arbitrator the scope of the issues and how information necessary for their resolution will be**  **produced. MCL 600.5076. The act contemplates that the parties will decide what is best for their case. Nowhere**  **in the DRAA are procedural formalities imposed that restrict this freedom.** 

**6 This Court has consistently held that arbitration is a**  **matter of contract. “It is the agreement that dictates the authority of the arbitrators[.]”**  Rowry v Univ of Michigan **, 441 Mich 1, 10; 490 NW2d 305 (1992). In this case, the**  **Court of Appeals decision infringes on the parties’ recognized freedom to contract for binding arbitration.**  **It restricts the parties’ freedom to decide how the arbitration hearing should be conducted.**  **3 Plaintiff**  **presents no convincing argument that the Legislature intended all DRAA hearings to approximate traditional court**  **hearings. We know of none. 4**  **It is inappropriate for a court to read into a statute something that was not** 

**3 The language in US Const, art I, § 3, cl 6, stating**  **that the Senate shall “** try **all Impeachments,” does not constitute an “implied limitation on the method by which**  **the Senate might proceed in trying impeachments,”** Nixon v United States, **506 US 224, 230; 113 S Ct 732; 122 L Ed 2d 1 (1993). Similarly, the language in MCL 600.5074(1),**  **stating that the arbitrator “shall** hear **and make an award on each issue submitted for arbitration,” does not**  **constitute an implied limitation on the method by which the arbitrator might proceed in**  hearing **the issues. (Emphasis added.)** 

**4 Court of Appeals Judge Kirsten Frank Kelly correctly**  **noted in her dissent: “[A]lthough the majority refers to the process [used in this arbitration] as mediation, the**  **process was still binding; binding mediation is equivalent to arbitration and subject to the same judicial limitations**  **on review.** Frain v Frain **, 213 Mich App 509, 511-513; 540 NW2d 741 (1995).”**  Miller **, 264 Mich App 517-518.**

**7 intended.**  AFSCME v Detroit **, 468 Mich 388, 412; 662 NW2d 695 (2003).**  **Significantly, in this case, the parties specifically agreed to allow the arbitrator to conduct the hearing in**  **two separate rooms. If the parties and the arbitrator thought that this was the best way to hold their hearing,**  **they were at liberty to make that agreement. Because it is the agreement of the parties that dictates arbitration, the**  **Court of Appeals should not have altered the agreement.** Rowry **, 441 Mich 10.**

**T HE**  **S UFFICIENCY OF THE**  **P ARTIES**  **’ W RITTEN**  **A RBITRATION**  **A GREEMENT**  **Plaintiff argued below that no written arbitration agreement existed in this case. Defendant disagreed.**  **Although the Court of Appeals majority did not reach this issue directly, it listed as alternative grounds for**  **possible relief that the stipulated order did not constitute a written arbitration agreement.**  Miller **, 264 Mich App 507 n 12. We disagree.**  **As we noted earlier, the DRAA requires a written arbitration agreement setting out the subject of the**  **arbitration and the arbitrator’s powers. MCL 600.5071 and MCL 600.5072(1)(e). Here, the parties entered into a**  **written agreement satisfying these requirements when they**

**8 stipulated to entry of the particularized order for binding**  **arbitration that the court in due course entered. The order lists the issues for arbitration. It**  **clearly delineates the arbitrator’s powers and duties. Accordingly, it is sufficient to satisfy the requirements**  **of MCL 600.5071 and MCL 600.5072(1)(e). 5**  **Nothing in the DRAA mandates that there be an agreement separate from the stipulated order. This is**  **consistent with the informal and sometimes unorthodox nature of arbitration.**  Gavin **, 416 Mich 429. As long as the parties agree to some document that meets the minimal**  **requirements of MCL 600.5071 and MCL 600.5072(1)(e), the agreement is sufficient. Therefore, we reverse the** 

**5 In addition, but not relevant here, the parties must**  **satisfy MCL 600.5072(1)(a) to (d), which provide: The court shall not order a party to**  **participate in arbitration unless each party to the domestic relations matter acknowledges, in**  **writing or on the record, that he or she has been informed in plain language of all of the**  **following: (a)**  **Arbitration is voluntary. (b)**  **Arbitration is binding and the right of appeal is limited.**  **(c) Arbitration is not recommended for cases**  **involving domestic violence. (d)**  **Arbitration may not be appropriate in all cases.** 

**9 decision of the Court of Appeals that reached the contrary**  **conclusion.**
**C ONCLUSION**  **We hold that the domestic relations arbitration act does not require that the formality of a hearing in**  **arbitration proceedings approximate that of a hearing in court. Arbitration is by its nature informal. The**  **appropriate structure for an arbitration hearing is best decided by the parties and the arbitrator. A procedure by**  **which the arbitrator shuttles between the parties in separate rooms questioning and listening to them satisfies**  **the act’s requirement of a hearing. We also hold that no written agreement beyond the**  **order for binding arbitration is required (1) if the parties stipulate to entry of the order and the order meets**  **the criteria of MCL 600.5071 and MCL 600.5072(1)(e), and (2)**  **if the parties satisfy MCL 600.5072(1)(a) to (d) on the record.**  **Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals**  **and reinstate**  **the arbitration**  **award and**  **the judgment of divorce.**  **Clifford W. Taylor Elizabeth A. Weaver**  **Marilyn Kelly**  **Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr.**  **Stephen J. Markman**

**10 _______________________________**  **v S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N** 
**SUPREME COURT**

**DEBRA LEA MILLER, Plaintiff-Appellee,** 

**No. 127767**  **JOHN THOMAS MILLER, Defendant-Appellant.** 

**CAVANAGH, J.** (concurring) **. I concur in the result reached by the majority for the**  **reasons set forth in** Renny v Port Huron Hosp **, 427 Mich 415, 437; 398 NW2d 327 (1986).**  **Michael F. Cavanagh 1**