Approved for public release, 19-290

I am pleased to present this National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)

Office of Inspector General (OIG) report summarizing our work for the reporting

period ending 30 September 2018. OIG conducted audit and inspection oversight, produced

recommendations for improvements in a wide variety of agency programs, and pursued

allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse.

This year we mark the 40th anniversary of the Inspector General Act and the creation of the

original 12 Offices of Inspector General. Our office was created in 1980. Since that time, we

have been part of a community that has grown to include 73 statutory Inspectors General who

collectively oversee the operations of nearly every aspect of the Federal government. Every six

months we provide Congress with a report detailing our independent oversight of NGA during

the reporting period. This report is our 17th semiannual report since we became a statutory OIG

in October 2010. Prior to October 2010, we submitted reports through the Department of

Defense Inspector General. In the years to come, we look forward to continuing our efforts to

provide independent and effective oversight of NGA and working with the Council of Inspectors

General on Integrity and Efficiency on important issues that cut across our government.

Working closely with the NGA components and offices, we closed 53 of 129 (42 percent) audit

and inspection recommendations during this period. Under the Inspector General Empowerment

Act of 2016, we will continue to expand our collection of metrics (see appendix A, page 22)

resulting from our recommendations to the Agency.

The Audit Division examined the NGA’s management of the personnel separation process, the 

security financial disclosure program, and the personnel security clearance process. The

recommendations focus on improving compliance with policies, procedures, and requirements;

internal controls; and effectiveness and efficiency in these processes. The government auditors

provided oversight of the independent contract auditors’ work on the NGA financial statement

audits and the annual evaluation of NGA pursuant to the Federal Information Security

Modernization Act.

The Inspections Division reexamined NGA’s privacy program, which resulted in a repeat

recommendation to establish an independent program that protects the privacy and civil liberties

of US persons and has oversight over agency components. In August 2018, NGA created a new

mission oversight and compliance office that reports to NGA’s executive director. A review of

NGA’s Medical Services resulted in 14 recommendations designed to improve and increase

effectiveness and efficiency in those services.

MESSAGE FROM THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
The Investigations Division closed 90 cases this period, substantiating 30 (30 percent) of its

cases involving time and attendance fraud, computer misuse, security, and travel and recovered

$294,227. The division continues to work on several investigations of senior officials. The

division’s Forensic Analysis Support Team increasingly uses data analytics to pursue potential

fraud in contracts, government purchase and travel cards, and to identify potential misconduct.

I appreciate the ongoing support from the Director, senior leadership, and NGA workforce.
i

Overview 1

Resources and Organization 1

Counsel to the Inspector General 2

Audit 3

Inspections 3

Investigations 3

Summaries of Audits 5

Completed 5

Ongoing 7

Summaries of Inspections 10

Completed 10

Ongoing 13

Summaries of Investigations 15

Judicial Actions and Prosecutions 15

Cases Involving Senior Government Officials

(Substantiated) 15

Cases Involving Senior Government Officials

(Unsubstantiated) 16

Whistleblower 16

Time and Attendance Fraud 17

Contractor Labor Mischarging 19

Computer Misuse 19

Other Noteworthy Investigations 20

Criminal Investigations 21

CONTENTS
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Forensic Analysis Support Team 21

Completed 21

Ongoing 21

Appendix A. Status of Audit and Inspection

Recommendations 22

Table A-1. Open and Closed OIG 22

Recommendations as of 31 March 2018

Table A-2. OIG Recommendations for 30

Corrective Action, Current Reporting Period

Table A-3. Recommendations for Corrective 32

Action Not Yet Completed, Reporting Periods

Before 1 April 2018

Table A-4. Financial Results from Reports 47

Issued During Reporting Period

Table A-5. Status of Recommendations 48

That Questioned Costs

Table A-6. Status of Recommendations That 49

Funds Be Put to Better Use

Table A-7. Management Decisions Regarding 49

OIG Recommendations in Reports Issued Before

1 October 2017

Statutory Reporting 50

Information or Assistance Refused by NGA 50

Significant Revised Management Decisions 50

OIG Disagreement with Significant

Management Decision 50
iii

Compliance with Federal Financial

Management Improvement Act of 1996 50

Attempts to Interfere with the

IG’s Independence 50

Public Disclosure 51

Peer Reviews 51

Appendix B. Investigative Metrics 52

Table B-1. Number of Cases Referred for 52

Criminal or Civil Prosecution, During Reporting

Period

Table B-2. Judicial Actions, During Reporting 52

Period

Table B-3. Criminal Prosecutions and Referrals, 52

During Reporting Period

Appendix C. Index of Reporting Requirements 53

Appendix D. Abbreviations 54
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1

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) is a Department of Defense

combat-support agency and a member of the Intelligence Community (IC). The Agency receives

guidance and oversight from DoD, Office of the Director

of National Intelligence, and Congress. NGA provides

geospatial intelligence—GEOINT—that supports US

national security and defense, as well as humanitarian

assistance and disaster relief.

The mission of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) is 

to conduct independent and objective audits, inspections,

and investigations to strengthen the effectiveness,

efficiency, and integrity of NGA programs and

operations.

Our assessments of NGA’s worldwide programs and operations are undertaken and performed

in accordance with the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and in compliance with the

standards of the Government Accountability Office and the Council of the Inspectors General

on Integrity and Efficiency.

The OIG also serves as the principal NGA agent responsible for investigating potential

violations of law, rule, or regulation, as well as incidents of gross mismanagement, gross

misconduct, abuse of authority, and denial of due process. In addition, the OIG performs the

NGA external liaison function for Federal, state, and local Inspectors General and congressional

overseers on IG-related matters. The OIG is the liaison to external law enforcement agencies,

such as the FBI.

The OIG is authorized 60 billets, and as of 30 September 2018, 54 employees were on board.

The OIG staff is allocated among three core divisions—Audit, Inspections, and Investigations—

and a support function—the Plans and Programs Division. A Counsel reports directly to the IG.

The Inspector General addressed independence concerns about NGA’s career service personnel

management system by developing the NGA Human Capital Management Framework signed

by the Director and the Inspector General in September 2017. The IG Career Service (IGCS)

was established 1 October 2017. The IG Career Service achieved initial operating capability in 

April, with the assignment of a dedicated IG Career Service Manager. The Deputy Inspector

General was assigned an additional part-time duty to be the Career Service Head.

OVERVIEW

RESOURCES AND ORGANIZATION
2

The IG Career Service will achieve full operating capability in November 2018 with the

employment of one additional staff member. The IGCS allows the NGA Inspector General to

manage internal talent management procsses, such as hiring, career development, assignments,

and promotions, thereby helping to ensure OIG independence regarding human capital

management.

Figure. OIG Organization Chart

The Counsel to the Inspector General (IG) is an in-house legal asset. Counsel provides legal

advice directly to the IG and Deputy IG, and provides legal assistance to all Office of Inspector

General (OIG) divisions. Counsel also represents the OIG in litigation arising out of or affecting

OIG operations, manages the OIG legislative and regulatory review, and reviews all plans,

investigations, and final reports for legal sufficiency. In addition, Counsel liaises, on behalf of

the IG and OIG, with, among others, DoD and Intelligence Community (IC) counsels, DoD IG,

federal and state prosecutors, NGA’s Office of General Counsel, and other components of NGA.

A new Counsel came on board in July from the US General Services Administration OIG’s

Counsel’s office where Counsel was a Senior Assistant Counsel.

COUNSEL TO THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
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The Audit Division is responsible for providing

independent oversight and objective audits of NGA’s

programs and operations, and promoting the

efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of NGA

programs and operations. Audits are conducted in

accordance with generally accepted government

auditing standards and the Inspector General Act of

1978, as amended. Audit findings and

recommendations seek to reduce costs; improve

overall performance; and eliminate fraud, waste, and abuse. The recommendations resulting from

the projects offer insight for management, help improve internal controls, and ensure compliance

with laws, regulation, and policy.

The Inspections Division has responsibility for the evaluation, review, and analysis of NGA’s

programs and activities, including authorities, policies, procedures, and controls. The division 

provides independent assessment of the reliability of information, compliance with regulations

and policies, management of resources, and achievement of program results. Intelligence 

oversight inspections, conducted in accordance with executive orders, particularly Executive 

Order 12333, are also a responsibility.

The Investigations Division conducts independent investigations of complaints and other

information of possible violations of criminal and civil law. The division is the principal NGA

agent for investigating potential violations of rule or regulation, as well as incidents of gross

mismanagement, gross misconduct, abuse of authority, and denial of due process.

The division also incorporates the Forensic Analysis Support Team (FAST), which conducts an

agency-wide fraud detection program using data mining and forensic analyses tools. FAST also

identifies policy violations and weaknesses in internal and management controls. Systemic

findings are referred to the Inspections Division or Audit Division for further analysis and

review. This division recovered $294,227 for the second half of FY2018 and substantiated 30

percent of its cases for the reporting period. The funds recovered involve time and attendance

fraud, contractor labor mischarging, and contractor self-disclosure cases.

AUDIT

INSPECTIONS

INVESTIGATIONS
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The division is a member of the newly formed Intelligence Community Inspector General Forum

Whistleblower Working Group. The group provides a venue for IC OIGs to identify and discuss 

whistleblower issues, share best practices, and develop solutions to better enable our respective

whistleblower programs. The division participated in the initial meeting held in March 2018 

where topics of discussion included issues concerning the new statutory IC contractor

whistleblower protections; whistleblower outreach opportunities; and providing an open forum to

discuss issues, trends, and best practices.

The division is also included in the GAO Whistleblower in the IC review, which includes a review 

of the DIA, NRO, CIA, ICIG, NSA, and NGA processes and procedures in handling

whistleblower complaints.
5

Audit of NGA’s Management of the Personnel Separation Process, Report No.

OIGA18-05, issued 18 April 2018

Overview. The objective of this audit was to determine whether NGA management implemented

policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that logical and physical

access to government information was secure from personnel who separated from NGA.

Specifically, we reviewed the separation process for civilian and contractor personnel at NCE

and NCW for the period of 1 May 2016 through 30 April 2017.

Findings. We found that NGA has not established formal personnel

separation policy and procedures to provide reasonable assurance that logical

and physical access to government information is secure from personnel who

separate from NGA. Specifically, management did not adequately document

and monitor the removal of logical and physical access for all personnel

evaluated in the audit. As a result, NGA systems, facilities, and information

are vulnerable to unauthorized access and misuse.

Results. The report contains two recommendations. The recommendations focus on designating

a component to manage NGA’s personnel separation process and for that component to identify

an office of primary responsibility to develop an agency-wide personnel separation policy and

procedures that define roles and responsibilities.

Audit of NGA’s Security Financial Disclosure Program, Report No. OIGA18-06, issued 12 

July 2018

Overview. The objective of this audit was to determine whether the NGA Security Financial

Disclosure Program is effectively managed in accordance with applicable Federal, DoD, and

NGA policy and guidance.

Findings. We found that

. We also observed that the Security

Financial Disclosure Program is not on track to achieve its goal of full coverage of NGA

designated personnel by 2020.

SUMMARIES OF AUDITS

COMPLETED
6

Results. The report contains nine recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the NGA 

Security Financial Disclosure Program. The recommendations focus on improvements in 

internal control, implementation of software that will enhance program effectiveness and

efficiency, and a requirement for all designated personnel to file by the 2020 filing season.

Audit of NGA’s Personnel Security Clearance Process, Report No. OIGA18-07, issued 9 

August 2018

Overview. The objective of this audit had two parts. The first part was to

determine whether NGA has a consistent and effective risk-based approach

to onboarding NGA employees and contractors who require background

investigations, including controls for mitigating risk associated with

onboarding prior to the full completion of background investigations. The

second part was to determine whether NGA has a backlog of background

investigations, the reasons for the backlog, and the actions taken to reduce the backlog and

improve the timeliness of background investigations.

Findings. NGA did not administer or properly track polygraphs for all contractors that 

onboarded in fiscal years 2016–2017. Specifically, NGA did not (1) administer the polygraphs,

(2) update PeopleSoft for individuals whose polygraphs were accepted via reciprocity, or (3)

update PeopleSoft until the individual successfully passed the polygraph. Not administering

polygraphs on contractors on a timely basis and properly recording polygraph information in 

PeopleSoft to effectively identify and track individuals in need of a polygraph examination

Additionally, while NGA made improvements to meet the Intelligence Reform and

Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) timeliness goals for initiating background investigations and

adjudicating security clearances, it did not meet IRTPA timeliness goals for the Investigation

phase of the security clearance process for fiscal years 2016–2017. In addition, as of January

2018, NGA had 384 open cases (80 initial security clearances and 304 periodic reinvestigations)

that already exceeded the IRTPA end-to-end timeliness goals, an indication that timeliness issues

persist. The untimeliness of processing security clearances delays the onboarding process of

applicants, potentially causing NGA to lose qualified individuals to other employment offers,

and

are not processed timely.

Results. The report contains 11 recommendations to improve compliance with polygraph

requirements and to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the personnel security clearance

process.
7

Audit of the Emergency Management Test, Training, and Exercise Program at NCE,

Memorandum U//FOUO-230-18/OIG, issued 11 September 2018

Overview. The audit objective was to determine whether NGA has developed and implemented

an effective emergency management test, training, and exercise (EM) program at NCE in 

accordance with applicable Department of Homeland Security, DoD, and NGA policy and

guidance.

Findings. We observed during our audit planning that the

We also noted that the

for the period under review of 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2017.

Results. Our observations were largely attributable to circumstances that have changed or are

changing and would result in recommendations that management is aware of and working to

address. As such, we issued a memorandum that communicated our observations and terminated

the audit, because completing the audit at that time would have represented an inefficient use of

OIG resources and provided minimal value to the Agency.

Audit of NGA’s Analysis Event Response for National Security and Natural Disasters,

Project No. 17-A08

Overview. The objective of this audit is to determine whether Analysis component-related crisis

and event response plans are in place and are executed and managed effectively. Specifically,

the audit will determine whether the execution and management of those plans facilitate

coordination among stakeholders, standardization of procedures where practical, and reduction

in duplication of efforts, and determine whether the plans efficiently allocate available

resources.

Status. OIGA announced the project in May 2017, and plans to issue a report in January

2019.

Audit of NGA’s Support of US Strategic Command Mission Requirements,

Project No. 17-A11

Overview. NGA supports US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) by satisfying requirements,

including providing reliable navigation and planning charts. The objective of this audit is to 

determine whether NGA is satisfying STRATCOM requirements effectively and efficiently.

ONGOING
8

Status. OIGA announced the project in August 2017, and plans to issue a report in December 

2018.

FY2018 Federal Information Security Modernization Act Evaluation of the NGA

Information Security Program, Project No. 18-A02

Overview. OIG engaged KPMG LLP, an independent public accounting firm, to perform the

FY2018 evaluation required by the FY2018 Federal Information Security

Modernization Act (FISMA). The overall objectives of the

evaluation are to assess NGA’s information security program in

accordance with the IG FISMA reporting metrics issued by the

Department of Homeland Security and determine whether NGA

implemented recommendations from the FY2017 assessment. The

evaluation will include a sample of seven systems for testing to

support the IG metrics.

Status. OIGA announced the project in January 2018 and plans to issue the final external metrics

report to the ICIG in October 2018, and the detailed internal report to NGA management in 

November 2018.

Audit of the NGA Financial Statements for FY2018, Project No. 18-A03

Overview. OIGA engaged KPMG LLP, an independent public accounting firm, to audit NGA’s

FY2018 financial statements. The audit objective is to determine whether NGA’s financial

statements are presented fairly, in all material respects, in accordance with US generally

accepted accounting principles. To meet requirements for federal financial statement audits,

KPMG is also assessing internal control over financial reporting and performing tests to

determine whether NGA complied with applicable provisions of laws, regulations, and contracts.

KPMG is following up on the status of management’s corrective actions to address the findings

and recommendations communicated in the Independent Auditors’ Report on the NGA Financial

Statements for FYs 2017 and 2016 (Report No. OIGA 18-02), and the Independent Auditors’

Management Letter for the FY 2017 Financial Statement Audit (Report No. OIGA 18-04).

Status. The project was announced in January 2018. KPMG’s report will be issued no later than 

15 November 2018. If necessary, a management letter will be issued by 31 December 2018.

Audit of NGA’s Corrective Action Implementation, Project No. 18-A04

Overview. The objective of this audit is to determine whether NGA is effectively and

efficiently following up on recommendations to correct findings identified through external

cyber security reviews. Specifically, this audit will focus on whether NGA is correcting
9

deficiencies identified during the Defense Information Systems Agency Command Cyber

Readiness Inspection and Cybersecurity Service Provider inspections. In addition, we will

determine whether NGA is using these inspection results to correct enterprise-wide deficiencies

and improve cyber security readiness throughout the Agency.

Status. OIGA announced the project in February 2018 and plans to issue a report in

January 2019.

Audit of NGA’s Management of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act

(DAWIA) Program, Project No. 18-A05

Overview. The objective of this audit aims to determine whether NGA is effectively and

efficiently managing the DAWIA Program. Specifically, OIG will determine whether the NGA

acquisition workforce was in compliance with the DAWIA core certification requirements for

training, education, and experience for the period 1 January 2017 through 31 December 2017.

Status. OIGA announced the project in March 2018 and plans to issue a report in January

2019.

Audit of NGA’s Geodesy Products, Project No. 18-A07

Overview. The objective of this audit is to determine whether the NGA Office of Geomatics is 

effectively achieving Federal, DoD, and National System for Geospatial Intelligence

requirements for delivery of timely, relevant, and accurate geodesy products.

Status. OIGA announced the project in June 2018, and plans to issue a report in August

2019.
10

Follow-up Inspection of NGA’s Privacy Program, Report No. OIGE-18-04, Issued July

2018.

Overview. Follow-up inspections assess actions taken by management to correct deficiencies

found during prior inspections. They are designed to assess whether corrective actions are

effective and complete; are producing desired results; are not causing new problems; and are

economical, efficient, practical, and feasible. The overall

objective of the review is to assess the status of open

recommendations from the FY2015 inspection of the agency’s

Privacy Program. That inspection found the following:

(1) The NGA Privacy Program had been hindered by

long-term leadership and resource deficiencies;

(2) The program needed to improve privacy training awareness, work force

communication, and incident management;

(3) The Agency did not adequately secure privacy information and;

(4) NGA did not comply with major privacy legislation such as the Privacy Act and

E-Government Act.

OIGE’s report contained 22 recommendations designed to improve the NGA Privacy Program,

at the start of the follow-up three remained open (appendix A).

Findings. NGA closed 20 of 22 recommendations identified in the Inspection of the NGA Privacy

Program and Privacy Protection Management Report (OIGE 15-01). That report contained 22 

recommendations designed to improve the NGA Privacy Program and focus on the organization,

staffing, training, and expertise required to operate an effective program. At the start of this followup inspection, three recommendations remained open. Recommendation 20 (evaluating and updating

the e-mail classification tool with a privacy module) was closed during the inspection; the two

remaining open recommendations include managing Privacy Act statements on NGA forms; and

publishing completed Privacy Impact Assessments on NGA’s webpages. These recommendations

remain valid and necessary to improve the privacy program. In addition, we found that the NGA

Privacy Program continues to be hindered by long-term organization and resource deficiencies,

which impede its ability to provide effective and efficient mission-related privacy and civil

liberties protections, a repeat finding from the 2014-2015 inspection.

SUMMARIES OF INSPECTIONS

COMPLETED
11

Results. We recommended that NGA establish an independent program that protects the Privacy

and Civil Liberties of US Persons regardless of the data type (mission-related or administrative).

This program should be placed to have oversight over the components, and should not be 

subordinate to them. This was a repeat recommendation from the previous report. In response,

NGA created a new Mission Oversight and Compliance office in August 2018. The new office 

reports to the executive director of the Agency.

Inspection of NGA’s Medical Services, Report No. OIGE-18-05, Issued August 2018.

Overview. This inspection was initiated because of senior leaders’ concerns regarding the

effectiveness of the deployer program and medical and psychological issues experienced by

returning deployers. Between 2003 and 2015, NGA deployed more than 3,700 employees and

contractors worldwide to areas such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Djibouti, and Colombia. While

deployment can be a great professional opportunity, the experience can also be life changing and

stressful. In response to increased demands and stresses experienced by the deploying workforce,

NGA developed the Deployment Psychological Services Program in 2008 to provide

consultation, screening, and support services to personnel as they readjust to life and duties at

home. The overall objective of the inspection was to assess the effectiveness, efficiency, and

compliance with oversight requirements of NGA’s medical services, including the deployer

program, during the period of 2014 to 2017.

Findings. Three findings detailed that NGA’s Medical Services (1) has deficiencies in the areas

of organizational structure (including personnel management and support agreements),

communication, and records management; (2) lacks an established deployer resiliency program;

and (3) has medical contracts that do not comply with standards. More specifically, we found

that the Medical Advisor’s organizational placement marginalizes the position and hinders

NGA’s clinical services. In addition, communication failures caused confusion among medical

staff. We found that deployers’ medical records were missing, and assessed that medical records

do not comply with oversight requirements, placing the Agency at risk of financial penalties.

NGA lacks an established deployer resiliency program. Remaining resiliency services are not

available to all deployers, are not documented, and underuse the Employee Assistance Program.

Finally, we found that NGA’s medical contracts do not comply with standards. For instance,

performance work statements for NGA’s Medical Services contract provides insufficient

guidance, and contracts lack medical liability protection clauses.

Results. We made 14 recommendations and two considerations designed to increase the

effectiveness, efficiency, and improvement of NGA’s Medical Services. For example, we

recommended that HD determine appropriate staff composition of government employees

(Psychologists and EAP counselors) needed to conduct inherently governmental functions. NGA

needs to coordinate pre- and post-deployment health activities with the Secretaries of the
12

Military Departments and implement secure electronic transfer of deployment health activities to

the appropriate oversight officials, and consider performing psychological assessment for

OCONUS deployments lasting less than 30 days.

Intelligence Oversight Inspections

Overview. OIGE provides oversight of NGA’s Intelligence 

Oversight Program. OIGE performs this function by

conducting intelligence oversight (IO) inspections of NGA

offices to determine compliance with applicable policies and

procedures. OIGE also assesses whether personnel are

familiar with procedures for recognizing and reporting

questionable intelligence activities (QIAs) and significant or

highly sensitive (S/HS) matters.

We completed five IO inspections during the reporting period. The inspected components are

as follows:

 Office of Special Programs, Report No. OIGE-1O-18-01, issued April 2018.

 Open IT Solutions Office, Report No. OIGE-IO-18-02, issued June 2018.

 NGA Support Team to US Central Command, Report No. OIGE-IO-18-03, issued

August 2018.

 NGA Support Team to US Special Operations Command, Report No. OIGE-IO-18-04,

issued August 2018.

 Source Aeronautical Navigation, Report No. OIGE-IO-18-05, issued August 2018.

 Source Operations Group, Project No. IO-18-05, issued September 2018.

Findings and Results. We found no deficiencies rising to the level of a QIA or S/HSM and, in 

most cases, found employee knowledge, training, and program execution to be compliant with

Agency and DoD guidance. In report OIGE-IO-18-02, we had one finding and made one

recommendation to improve employee understanding of QIAs and S/HSMs; we asked the

program office to provide specialized IO training to address and ensure employee proficiency.
13

Inspection of NGA’s Insider Threat Program Case Management, Project No. II-17-02

Overview. Executive Order 13587 directed structural reforms to improve the security of

classified networks and the responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified information. In

November 2012, the President issued the National Insider Threat Policy, which required agencies

to implement an insider threat program within 180 days. OIGE published a report in February

2016 that assessed NGA’s compliance with executive branch, DoD, and IC requirements. The

purpose of this inspection, announced in February 2017, is to evaluate NGA’s protection of

employees’ civil liberties and the status of progress in following minimum required standards.

The overall objective of the inspection is to assess the processes and procedures that the NGA

Insider Threat Program uses to manage cases and comply with statute and DoD and IC policy.

Status. This inspection was delayed in June 2017 due to the personnel resource demands of a

Congressionally directed action and was resumed in January 2018. The final report is planned for

November 2018.

Inspection of GEOINT Services, Project No. II-18-01

Overview. The GEOINT Services (GS) initiative is NGA’s delivery of geospatial content and

analytics through a cloud-based architecture. GEOINT services are web-based tools and data that

allow customers to discover, access, exploit, and contribute geospatial capabilities, datasets, and

best practices. During her tenure as NGA Deputy Director, Sue Gordon stated, “GEOINT

Services isn’t an abstraction or an architecture, it’s about exposing what we know in a way that

can be used by people who need it to do their job.” This inspection will focus on NGA’s

planning and implementation of the GEOINT Services initiative from a holistic agency

perspective and as an IC service of common concern. The overall objective of the inspection is to

assess GEOINT Services implementation against customer requirements; agency goals, plans,

and milestones; assigned responsibilities; and return on investment. The inspectors will review

policies relating to oversight guidance regarding Geospatial Platform as a Service and the

agency’s implementing guidance. In addition, we will review the management of the effort,

including the requirements process, overlap with other portfolios and programs, and the

budgetary effectiveness and efficiency of the program.

Status. The final report is planned for publication in November 2018.

ONGOING
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Inspection of NGA’s Acquisition Processes and Procedures (Phase III), Project No. II18-02

Overview. This inspection is the third, and final, in a series of acquisition-function inspections.

Since the NGA acquisition function is large and complex, a single comprehensive inspection

would have taken too long. Some of the information could become outdated before the end of

the inspection. Therefore, to provide the most relevant and timely assistance to NGA senior

management, the inspection was divided into three phases, generally based on a framework

established by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Office of Management

and Budget (OMB). The overall objective of the inspection is to assess NGA’s acquisition

policies and processes to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency’s

acquisition program management and compliance with oversight requirements.

Status. The final report is planned for publication in September 2019.

Inspection of Aeronautical Safety of Navigation, Project No. QL-18-0

Overview. NGA’s Source component supports DoD and civilian air Safety of Navigation

worldwide with regularly updated paper and digital charts of the world’s airways and oceans,

and publications of its runways. Through the science of geomatics, NGA can precisely georeference where things are on the earth. This inspection continues our evaluations of NGA’s

safety of navigation missions but focuses on aeronautical vs. maritime as previous reports did.

The overall objective of this inspection is to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the NGA

Aeronautical Navigation mission.

Status. The final report is planned for publication in January 2019.
15

The Investigations Division (OIGI) closed 90 cases during the reporting period;

30 were substantiated, or 30 percent of its cases for the reporting period. The

division opened 70 cases and has 77 ongoing investigations.

OIGI did not have any judicial actions during the reporting period. One case that was referred in a

previous reporting period for federal prosecution to the United States Attorney’s Office for the 

Eastern District of Missouri involving contractor labor mischarging is pending.

OIGI conducted three investigations of senior officials that resulted in substantiated

allegations, which are summarized below. OIGI has 16 pending investigations on senior

officials.

OIG Case No. 15-100, closed April 2018.

OIGI investigated an allegation that senior managers in the Analysis component allowed an

NGA employee to be reassigned to an overseas location without properly documented

approvals. The investigation found that senior managers did not abide by NGA Instruction

1400.5R7, Civilian Employees Overseas Employment, which states that an assignment

agreement documenting the overseas tour must be completed for each overseas assignment.

The investigative results were reported to the appropriate management chain for action.

OIG Case No. 15-139, closed August 2018

OIGI investigated an allegation that a Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service (DISES)

program advisor requested and received education benefits without going through proper

procedures. The investigation substantiated this allegation and found that the advisor committed

agency funds without proper authority. OIG found no evidence that the advisor knowingly

violated regulations and policies, but acted on the advice of superiors. The superiors’ actions

were fully addressed in other cases that were completed in earlier periods. The advisor was

orally admonished.

SUMMARIES OF INVESTIGATIONS

JUDICIAL ACTIONS AND PROSECUTIONS

CASES INVOLVING SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

(SUBSTANTIATED)
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OIG Case No. 18-013, closed June 2018

OIGI investigated allegations that a senior military officer working at NGA misused position 

and authority by requesting that subordinate employees retrieve and deliver personal items to 

the officer. The investigation developed sufficient evidence to establish that the officer asked a

senior staff member to conduct a personal errand for the officer and authorized other staff

members to conduct similar personal errands. The advisor’s NGA supervisor directed the

officer to cease these activities, and the investigative results were also reported to the officer’s

military service Inspector General.

OIG Case No. 18-026, closed June 2018

Senior government officials took actions against a subordinate employee that violated the

Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act; not substantiated.

OIG Case No. 18-107, closed September 2018

Senior government officials retaliated against a subordinate employee; not substantiated.

OIG Case No. 18-075, closed September 2018

Senior government officials retaliated against a subordinate employee; not substantiated.

OIG Case No. 18-051, closed August 2018

Senior government officials committed gross mismanagement by approving excessive training;

not substantiated.

There are four closed whistleblower cases to report this period, which are summarized below.

OIG Case No. 17-115, closed April 2018.

OIGI investigated allegations that two Pay Band 5 supervisors in the Security and Installations

(SI) component retaliated against a subordinate employee by providing the employee a negative 

and inaccurate performance assessment for promotion consideration after

CASES INVOLVING SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

(UNSUBSTANTIATED)

WHISTLEBLOWER
17

the employee reported inappropriate activities of SI personnel to the NGA Office of Inspector

General. The OIGI investigation concluded, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the

supervisors did not retaliate against the employee for making a protected communication. These

findings were reported to the subordinate employee.

OIG Case No. 18-030, closed July 2018

OIGI investigated an allegation of retaliation against a Pay Band 3 counterintelligence (CI)

officer by his supervisors for reporting management issues to management and the NGA Office 

of Inspector General. The officer was removed as the lead on a case inquiry, and received a

Letter of Reprimand (LoR) for the manner of communication used with fellow employees. OIGI

obtained documents that supported issuance of the LoR and, based on the timeline of events that 

OIGI produced, determined that a prima facie reprisal case did not exist. These findings were 

reported to the CI officer.

OIG Case No. 18-051, closed September 2018

OIGI investigated allegations that a Pay Band (PB) 5 supervisor in the Information Technology

Services component experienced unfavorable personnel actions for making protected disclosures 

to the NGA Office of Inspector General, management, and the NGA Office of Diversity

Management and Equal Employment (ODE). OIGI communications with the PB 5 supervisor 

disclosed that the employee’s reprisal allegations had already been included in a formal equal

employment opportunity (EEO) complaint with ODE and were being addressed in that venue.

OIGI personnel advised the complainant that OIGI would not conduct an investigation of the 

same reprisal allegations that were being addressed in the EEO complaint, and that the

complainant could return to the OIGI after the EEO complaint process concluded if there were

still issues that should be addressed by OIGI.

OIG Case No. 18-075, closed September 2018

OIG investigated an allegation that supervisors retaliated against a Pay Band 4 analyst when 

they assigned duties of a recently departed employee to the analyst and told the analyst not to 

support the analyst’s customer. During the investigation, OIGI interviewed the analyst. The

analyst did not believe that the assignment of new duties was reprisal, and continued to support 

the cited customer with the supervisors’ knowledge. No further investigation was required.

The OIGI conducted more time and attendance fraud investigations during this period than in 

the previous six-month period, and the investigations accomplished were significant and

resulted in the recovery of funds totaling $125,293.23 for time claimed for work

TIME AND ATTENDANCE FRAUD
18

not performed. The division continued to send many of the less substantial issues to management

for corrective action, which also resulted in the recovery of funds. The following are summaries

of four time and attendance fraud investigations that resulted in the termination of employment, a

significant suspension, and the recovery of funds totaling $105,249.65.

OIG Case No. 17-055, closed July 2018

A supervisor alleged that a Pay Band 3 analyst in the Analysis

component misused NGA computer systems and committed time

and attendance fraud. The investigation found that the analyst

used NGA computer systems to shop on several online sites, and

falsely claimed 198 hours that the employee did not work,

valued at $9,153.47. Employment was terminated in June 2018 

after the analyst failed to respond to proposed adverse actions

and refused to come to work.

OIG Case No. 17-012, closed September 2018

An OIGI proactive analysis of time and attendance reporting disclosed that a Pay Band 3 human

resource specialist in the Human Development component was not accurately accounting for the

hours worked. The analysis showed that the specialist claimed 647 hours that were not worked, 

valued at $29,301.93. The specialist received a 30-day suspension without pay. NGA is initiating

action to recover the value that was falsely reported.

OIG Case No. 17-033, closed July 2018

A supervisor reported that a Pay Band 4 analyst in the Analysis component was not accurately

accounting for the hours the analyst worked. An analysis of time and attendance reporting and

the OIG investigation found that the employee claimed 604 hours on time sheets that were not 

worked, valued at $35,184.84. The analyst resigned from NGA before any adverse action could

be proposed. Further review of his time sheets revealed that he owed the government

$29,054.48, vice $35,184.84; debt collection actions have been initiated.

OIG Case No. 17-097, closed August 2018

An OIGI proactive analysis of time and attendance reporting disclosed that a Pay Band 4 budget 

analyst in the Financial Management component was not accurately accounting for the hours

worked. The analysis showed that the analyst claimed 639 hours that were not worked valued at

$37,739.67. The analyst’s employment was terminated in July 2018, and NGA has initiated

action to recover the value that was falsely reported.
19

OIGI continued to address issues of contractor labor mischarging through outreach efforts with 

industry and a fraud survey that has been provided to the

NGA workforce. Having evaluated the survey results, OIGI is

improving the survey instrument. OIGI closed significant contractor

labor mischarging cases during this period, recovering a total of

$168,934. Below are summaries of two cases in which recoveries of

funds totaling $54,292.70 have been coordinated with NGA

contractors. Another case continues to be worked in coordination

with the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) and the US Attorney’s Office in St.

Louis, Missouri.

OIG Case No. 17-111, closed July 2018

An NGA contractor reported that an employee working on a contract at NGA improperly

charged NGA for 365.65 hours that were not worked. The employee was terminated and OIGI

obtained proof of reimbursement to NGA for $43,951.13.

OIG Case No. 18-067, closed July 2018

An NGA contractor reported that an employee working on a contract at NGA improperly

charged NGA for 78.9 hours that were not worked. The employee was terminated and OIGI

obtained proof of reimbursement to NGA for $10,341.57.

OIGI investigated acts of computer misuse by contractor and government personnel at NGA. The

following case summaries depict investigations of using NGA computer systems for an excessive

amount of personal use. One involves a contractor employee and the other a government

employee.

OIG Case No. 17-054, closed August 2018

OIGI investigated an allegation that a contractor employee in the Financial Management

component repeatedly used NGA computer systems to support a personal business, using email

and creating documents not related to NGA business on government time. The investigation also

found that the employee used government phones to operate a personal business. The employee 

resigned before the NGA Office of Contract Services or the employer could take any action.

CONTRACTOR LABOR MISCHARGING

COMPUTER MISUSE
20

OIG Case No. 18-040, closed May 2018

A computer network audit disclosed that a government researcher detailed from another

government agency to NGA’s Research component repeatedly used NGA computer systems to 

conduct activities related to personal businesses and engage in inappropriate conversations using

a personal email account. The researcher failed to report many outside business activities to 

NGA. The researcher ended the detail to NGA and resigned from Federal service before any

adverse actions were proposed.

OIG Case No. 15-103, closed May 2018

OIGI investigated allegations that a Pay Band 4 research and development scientist in the

Research component engaged in activities that presented a conflict of interest when executing

acquisition-related duties, misused the position to benefit a personal friend, accepted gifts from

a prohibited source and failed to disclose it, and used a personal email account to conduct

official government business. OIGI substantiated all the allegations and coordinated the

investigation with the Defense Criminal Investigative Service and appropriate Department of

Justice attorneys for possible criminal and civil actions. DoJ declined to take any action. The

researcher left NGA before any administrative action could be proposed.

OIG Case No. 15-150, closed August 2018

OIGI investigated allegations that a Pay Band 5 systems engineer in the Analysis component 

misused the position to endorse contractor businesses at NGA, misused government resources to 

communicate with contractors regarding potential contracts, and failed to make all appropriate

disclosures on ethics forms. The investigation found sufficient evidence that the engineer

misused the position, and that the assistance provided to two contractors gave the appearance of 

a conflict of interest. The investigation also substantiated that the engineer did not disclose 

reportable information on the Office of Government Ethics Form 450. The systems engineer

received a Letter of Caution on 30 August 2018 for these violations.

OIG Case No. 16-078, closed May 2018

OIGI investigated allegations that a Pay Band 5 supervisory analyst in the Analysis component

misused the position and government resources to operate a personal vanpool business and 

procure ridership, and failed to report this outside enterprise. The investigation substantiated all

the allegations and identified that the analyst had received $8,405 in Mass Transit Benefits that

were not allowed. The analyst was removed from Federal service in April 2018, and actions

were initiated to recover the $8,405.

OTHER NOTEWORTHY INVESTIGATIONS
21

During this period, OIGI worked on seven investigations with the DCIS and other criminal

investigative agencies. The issues included false claims, cost mischarging, conflict of interest,

theft of government equipment, threats to Federal employees, and tax fraud.

FAST uses data forensics to uncover potential fraud in contracts, procurements, and financial

transactions. The team also identifies policy violations and weaknesses in internal and

management controls. Part of the Investigations Division, FAST comprises a forensic auditor and

three forensic data analysts.

FAST has no completed projects to report for this reporting period.

OIG Contract Fraud Survey, Project No. F18-001

NGA OIG has developed an online survey tool, which allows NGA employees to report

potential contract fraud anonymously. The goal of this project is to detect fraudulent activities

with the aid of NGA employee input and enable OIG to take necessary action to neutralize or 

mitigate fraud schemes once detected. Additionally, the OIG Contract Fraud Survey aims to 

increase fraud awareness among NGA personnel and leadership, improve the prosecutor referral

rate for cases involving criminal activity, and enhance NGA OIG proficiency and knowledge in 

Procurement Fraud investigations. OIG conducts the OIG Contract Fraud Survey annually.

Proactive Payroll Fraud Detection Model, Project No. F18-002

FAST has selected to review NGA Payroll and is developing a model to algorithmically detect

NGA employees that are considered high risk for payroll fraud. High-risk individuals will be 

referred to investigations for further review. The Proactive Payroll Fraud Detection Model is 

projected to be completed December 2018.

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

FORENSIC ANALYSIS SUPPORT TEAM

COMPLETED

ONGOING
22

This appendix includes seven tables that present the status of recommendations according to

various parameters.

Table A-1. Open and Closed OIG Recommendations as of 30 September 2018

This table provides the number of NGA OIG and DoD OIG audit and inspection

recommendations issued to NGA management that were closed or remained open at the end of

the reporting period. This table does not include recommendations from the Financial Statement

Audit and FISMA evaluation. Recommendations that closed prior to 1 April 2018 are not

included.

Objectives: To assess whether NGA had adequate controls over the use of removable media

devices and data transfer activities. Specifically, to determine whether NGA’s removable

media and data transfer activities complied with the requirements in the Office of the

Secretary of Defense memorandum, Insider Threat Mitigation, 12 July 2013, and the ODNI

memorandum, Oversight of Privileged Users with the Intelligence Community, 25 July 2013.

Objectives: To assess whether NGA used the Official Representative Funds and

Confidential Military Purpose funds for their intended purposes and to determine whether

NGA management had adequate controls to manage the funds.

Objective: To determine whether NGA policies and procedures ensured the proper use of

administrative leave.

APPENDIX A. STATUS OF AUDIT AND INSPECTION

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations

Report Title, Number, Date

Review of NGA’s Management of Removable Media Devices

and Data Transfer Activities, Report No. OIGA 14-05, August

2014

No. Closed No. Open

5 0

Review of NGA’s Management of the Emergency and

Extraordinary Expenses Funds, Report No. OIGA 15-04,

January 2015

1 0

Audit of NGA’s Use of Administrative Leave, Report No.

OIGA 16-08, May 2016 0 1
23

Objectives: Observations identified during a formal investigation to determine whether

NGA violated the Antideficiency Act (ADA) when it purchased two canine vehicles in

FY 2013 using the Operation and Maintenance appropriation. While NGA did not violate the

ADA when it purchased the vehicles, certain matters were of sufficient importance to

communicate to management.

Objective: To determine whether management of foreign temporary duty (TDY) travel was

effective and efficient. Specifically, the OIG determined whether NGA travelers and

approving officials complied with applicable laws and regulations governing reimbursement

for foreign TDY travel.

Objective: To determine whether NGA sanitized and disposed of e-waste in accordance with

IC, DoD, and NGA policies and procedures.

Objective: To determine whether the NGA workforce performing information assurance 

functions have met appropriate certification requirements in accordance with DoD and NGA

policies and procedures.

Objective: To assess the effectiveness of oversight of contractor performance and payment,

specifically, to determine, for contracts, whether (1) contractor officers’ representatives

(CORs) and technical monitors (TMs) were properly appointed in accordance with 

applicable policy; (2) an appropriate oversight plan was established; (3) CORs are reviewing

contractor work on a timely basis and in accordance with the oversight plan; and

(4) contract payments are adequately supported.

Recommendations

Report Title, Number, Date No. Closed No. Open

Observations on NGA Purchases of Passenger Motor

Vehicles, Report No. OIGA 16-11, September 2016 0 1

Audit of Foreign Travel, Report No. OIGA 16-13, September

2016 1 1

Audit of NGA’s Disposal of Electronic Waste, Report No.

OIGA17-06, March 2017 0 4

Audit of NGA’s Information Assurance Certification

Program, Report No. OIGA17-09, June 2017 0 1

Audit of NGA’s Oversight of Contractor Performance and

Contract Payments, Report No. OIGA17-11, September 2017 8 2
24

Objective: To determine whether NGA effectively identified requirements and provided

adequate contract and program oversight for the acquisition of the CFPE.

Objective: To determine whether NGA management implemented policies and procedures

designed to provide reasonable assurance that logical and physical access to government

information was secure from personnel who separated from NGA.

Objective: To determine whether the NGA Security Financial Disclosure Program is

effectively managed in accordance with applicable Federal, DoD, and NGA policy and

guidance.

Objective: Part 1: To determine whether NGA has a consistent and effective risk-based

approach to onboarding NGA employees and contractors who require background

investigations, including controls for mitigating risk associated with onboarding prior to the

full completion of background investigations. Part 2: To determine whether NGA has a

backlog of background investigations, the reasons for the backlog, and the actions taken to

reduce the backlog and improve the timeliness of background investigations.

Objectives: To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of NGA’s Privacy Program, processes,

and procedures. Specifically, we assessed (1) whether the Privacy Program was effectively

organized, staffed, and trained to fulfill its responsibilities; (2) the risk of a privacy breach

and existing mitigation efforts; (3) key factors in promoting and hindering the effective

exercise of privacy protections; and (4) the completeness of required agency privacy

documentation.

Recommendations

Report Title, Number, Date No. Closed No. Open

Audit of NGA’s Management of the Acquisition of the

Consolidated Foundation Production Environment (CFPE),

Report No. OIGA18-03, November 2017

1 1

Audit of NGA’s Management of the Personnel Separation

Process, Report No. OIGA18-05, April 2018 1 1

Audit of NGA’s Security Financial Disclosure Program,

Report No. OIGA18-06, July 2018 1 8

Audit of NGA’s Personnel Security Clearance Process,

Report No. OIGA18-07, August 2018 0 11

Inspection of the NGA Privacy Program and Privacy

Protection Management, Report No. OIGE 15-01, November

2014

1 2
25

Objectives: To determine whether NGA has developed and implemented an effective IdAM

Program. The subobjectives included determining whether the program is effective for

managing user identities and access controls.

Objective: To assess how agency information technology user accounts are created,

activated, changed, suspended, terminated, or inactivated.

Objectives: To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the NSG Needs Process. The

subobjectives were to determine whether the NSG Needs Process is in compliance with

governing policies, procedures, rules, and regulations, and to evaluate the performance of

NGA’s management, coordination, and monitoring activities of the NSG needs.

Objectives: To determine whether NGA developed and implemented the necessary

governance structure, oversight, and review processes, as outlined in the Office of

Management and Budget (OMB) assessment guidelines, for entity-level reviews of the

acquisition functions. The subobjectives were to (1) determine whether NGA’s acquisition

function is aligned with agency mission and needs; (2) evaluate the level of NGA leadership

commitment; and (3) determine whether NGA’s defense acquisition management review and

oversight processes are sufficient.

Recommendations

Report Title, Number, Date No. Closed No. Open

Inspection of NGA’s Identity and Access Management

(IdAM) Program, Report No. OIGE 15-02, March 2015 4 0

Inspection of NGA’s Process for Managing Information

Systems User Accounts, Report No. OIGE 15-03, March 2015 4 0

Inspection of the National System for Geospatial Intelligence

Needs Process, Report No. OIGE 15-05, May 2015 1 0

Inspection of NGA’s Acquisition Function, Phase I:

Organizational Alignment and Leadership, Report No. OIGE 16-

02, November 2015

0 1
26

Objectives: To review NGA’s acquisition human capital policies and practices to evaluate

whether NGA has developed and maintained a fully proficient acquisition workforce that is

flexible and highly skilled across a range of management, technical, and business disciplines

as outlined in OMB’s assessment guide. The subobjectives were to determine (1) whether

NGA is conducting effective strategic human capital planning and (2) whether NGA is

effectively and efficiently acquiring, developing, and retaining acquisition talent.

Objectives: To determine compliance with its statement of capabilities.

*This recommendation was reopened.

Objectives: To determine whether NGA’s Insider Threat Program complies with executive 

branch, DoD, and IC requirements. The subobjectives were aligned with the following six

minimum standards established by the National Insider Threat Policy: (1) designation of

senior official(s) and associated responsibilities; (2) information integration, analysis, and

response; (3) insider-threat program personnel; (4) access the information; (5) monitoring

user activity on networks; and (6) employee training and awareness.

Objective: To assess the magnitude, primary causes, and impact of the backlog within

NGA’s Safety of Navigation, Notice to Mariners Program.

Objective: To assess the effectiveness of the NGA Office of Small Business Programs, as

well as compliance with IC, DoD, and Federal policies and directives

Recommendations

Report Title, Number, Date No. Closed No. Open

Inspection of NGA’s Acquisition Function, Phase II: Human

Capital, Report No. OIGE 16-03, November 2015 8 1*

Inspection of the CURATOR Program, Report No. OIGE 16-

04, February 2016 0 3

Review of the NGA Insider Threat Program, Report No.

OIGE 16-05, February 2016 1 2

Review of NGA Safety of Navigation, Notice to Mariners,

Report No. OIGE 16-06, May 2016 1 1

Inspection of NGA’s Office of Small Business Programs,

Report No. OIGE 16-07, June 2016 1 1
27

Objective: To determine whether the NGA organization is compliant with IO policies and

procedures and to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of NGA’s overall IO program and

the organization’s IO Program.

Objectives: To determine the extent to which NGA is training its IAs to exploit imagery by

taking advantage of the full spectrum of geospatial phenomenologies and making use of

traditional and nontraditional sources. Subobjectives were to (1) determine the extent to

which IAs have been trained to exploit full-spectrum GEOINT; (2) determine the extent to

which IAs are trained to the same tradecraft standards; and (3) assess the mechanisms by

which new IA tradecraft content, regardless of origin, is integrated into NGA College

learning solutions and curricula.

Objectives: To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the processes by which InnoVision

selects and transitions new products, processes, and services to the agency. Subobjectives of 

this inspection were to (1) identify the R&D programs/projects InnoVision has been

pursuing over the last 5 years; (2) for each of the above programs/projects, identify its source 

and the reason it was chosen; and (3) for each program/project, determine the outcome. (Was

the project transitioned, did it enhance the mission, what capabilities were delivered, etc.?)

Objective: To assess the effectiveness of NGA’s strategic workforce planning function in

meeting the requirement to have a future workforce that is capable of supporting DoD and IC

missions. Consistent with Title 10, US Code, and DoD Instruction, the OIG used stages of the

Office of Personnel Management’s workforce planning model as the baseline for the

assessment and issued five subobjectives: (1) assess strategic direction; (2) assess

effectiveness of workforce and skills-gap analysis; (3) assess action plan(s); (4) assess

implementation of action plan(s); and (5) assess the effectiveness of monitoring, evaluation,

and revision.

Recommendations

Report Title, Number, Date No. Closed No. Open

Intelligence Oversight Inspection of the Office of Customer

Engagement and the Office of Design, Xperience Component,

Report No. OIGE IO-16-03, July 2016

2 0

Inspection of NGA Imagery Analyst Tradecraft Training,

Report No. OIGE 17-02, February 2017 2 3

Inspection of InnoVision’s Research and Development and

Technology Transition Outcomes, Report No. OIGE 17-03,

March 2017

2 1

Inspection of NGA’s Strategic Workforce Planning Function,

Report No. OIGE 17-04, June 2017 1 4
28

Objective: To assess SOM implementation against oversight requirements, agency plans

and goals, milestones, and customer requirements. Sub-objectives of the inspection were: (1)

determine the extent to which SOM has been implemented against the agency’s established

plan; (b) determine if SOM is meeting customer needs; and (c) assess the implementation of

the program with respect to established standards.

Objective: To determine whether NGA’s counterintelligence program complies with DoD

and IC policies and standards. The inspection also assessed the effectiveness, efficiency, and

execution of counterintelligence processes and activities. Sub-objectives of the inspection

were to: (1) determine whether the Office of Counterintelligence programs and activities

comply with DoD and IC policies and standards; (b) assess the Office of Counterintelligence

program and organizational structure; and (c) assess the Office of Counterintelligence for

effectiveness and efficiency.

Objective: To determine whether the NGA organization is compliant with IO policies and

procedures and to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of NGA’s overall IO program and

the organization’s IO Program.

Objective: To assess the status of open recommendations from the 2014 OIG Report

(OIGE-15-01) and to evaluate whether program improvements have been sustained.

Objective: To assess the effectiveness, efficiency, and compliance with oversight

requirements of NGA’s medical services, including the deployer program, during the period

of 2014 to 2017.

Recommendations

Report Title, Number, Date No. Closed No. Open

Inspection of Structured Observation Management (SOM),

Report No. OIGE 18-01, November 2017 4 3

Inspection of NGA’s Office of Counterintelligence, Report

No. OIGE 18-02, November 2017 0 6

Intelligence Oversight Inspection of Open IT Solutions

Office, Report No. OIGE-IO-18-02, June 2018. 1 0

Follow-up Inspection of the NGA Privacy Program,

Report No. OIGE-18-04, July 2018. 1 0

Inspection of NGA’s Medical Services 1 13
29

Objectives: To assess (1) how, or if, substantiated investigations of misconduct were

reported to Agency Clearance Adjudication Facilities and to the DoD Consolidated

Adjudication Facility; (2) if the referred investigations had been adjudicated; and (3) the

results of those security adjudications.

Recommendations

Report Title, Number, Date No. Closed No. Open

An Assessment of Contractor Personnel Security

Clearance Processes in the Four Defense Intelligence

Agencies, Report No. DODIG-2014-060, April 2014

0 4
30

Table A-2. OIG Recommendations for Corrective Action, Current Reporting Period

Inspection of NGA’s Medical

Services, Report No. OIGE 18-05,

August 2018

3 Consistent with the Economy Act, reassess

whether inter-Agency support is available for 

medical services that would be advantageous

to the government. For all such support, (1)

ensure documentation in an ISSA (DD Form 

1144) and (2) ensure the support is explained 

in relevant internal SOPs.

5 Implement a secure electronic transfer of

NGA pre- and post-deployment health activity

requirements to Defense Medical Surveillance

System.

6 Ensure Human Development Component’s 

respective Primary Information Officer (PIO)

and Information Officer (IO) responsible for

all medical program records perform Records 

and Information Lifecycle Management

requirements including updating the office

file plan with the proper file series.

13 Correct all nonpersonal service contracts

covering medical professionals to make them

compliant with 48 CFR Subpart 37.403.

A recommendation for corrective action is issued in response to a finding

that a Federal standard is not being met; it is intended to bring the agency

into compliance with the standard.

Report Title, Number, Date Recommendation for Corrective Action

Rec.

Number
31

Audit of NGA’s Management of the 

Personnel Separation Process,

Report No. OIGA18-05, issued

18 April 2018

2 OIG recommends that the component

designated in recommendation 1 identify an

office of primary responsibility to develop

agency-wide personnel separation policy and

procedures that define roles and

responsibilities, including, but not limited to,

procedures for: ·

 Creating and maintaining documentation

showing

 Monitoring the personnel separation

process.

 Training personnel on the documentation

of the separation process.

Audit of NGA’s Security

Financial Disclosure Program,

Report No. OIGA18-06, issued 12

July 2018

2 OIG recommends the Director, Security

and Installations, the

Security Financial Disclosure Program

. In developing

the Security Financial Disclosure Program

Report Title, Number, Date Recommendation for Corrective Action

Rec.

Number
32

Table A-3. Recommendations for Corrective Action Not Yet Completed, Reporting

Periods Before 1 April 2018.

FY 2017 Evaluation of the National

Geospatial- Intelligence Agency

Pursuant to the Federal Information

Security Modernization Act

(FISMA) Internal Report, Report

No. OIGA 18-01, 7 November 2017

1.1. Develop and implement an

organizational continuous monitoring

strategy in accordance with ODNI,

CNSS, and NIST guidance.

1.2. Develop and implement a continuous

monitoring policy and procedures in 

accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and

NIST guidance.

1.3. Develop and implement information

system continuous monitoring plans in

accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and

NIST guidance.

1.4. Perform continuous monitoring over

NGA IT security and performance

metrics, and common and information

system security controls in accordance

with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.

2.1. Develop policies and procedures for

security awareness and role-based

training in accordance with ODNI,

CNSS, and NIST guidance.

2.2. Provide and track role-based

training for information security

personnel in accordance with ODNI,

CNSS, and NIST guidance.

03.01. Develop notification, investigation,

and reporting timelines for all defined

incident categories.

4.1. Finalize cloud incident response

procedures.

Report Title, Number, Date

Recommendation for Corrective

Number Action
33

Rec.

Number

Recommendation for Corrective

Report Title, Number, Date Action

FY 2017 FISMA, Internal Report,

OIGA 18-01, 7 November 2017 

(continued)

4.2. Finalize the development and

implementation of cyber tools for all

traffic routed into the agency, to include

the cloud.

05.01. Develop and implement a process to 

ensure that POA&Ms

address all requirements in accordance

with policy and procedures.

6.1. Develop an organizational risk

management strategy in accordance

with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.

6.2. Develop risk assessment policy and

procedures over mission and business

processes in accordance with ODNI,

CNSS, and NIST guidance.

6.3. Perform risk assessments on NGA

mission and business processes and

NGA information systems in

accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and

NIST guidance.

6.4. Define the required frequency for

security control assessments in

accordance with CNSS, and NIST

guidance and implement security

control assessments in accordance with

policy.

6.5. Categorize and authorize all NGA

information systems to operate in

accordance with ODNI, CNSS, NIST,

and NGA guidance.

6.6. Ensure its information systems’

security plans are updated and

maintained to reflect the current

environment, in accordance with ODNI,

CNSS, and NIST guidance.
34

Rec.

Number

Recommendation for Corrective

Report Title, Number, Date Action

FY 2017 FISMA, Internal Report, 

OIGA 18-01, 7 November 2017 

(continued)

7.1. Ensure all systems in production

have approved ITDRs.

7.2. Ensure system personnel take action to 

address the findings identified in ITDR

exercises.

7.3. Document and implement procedures

for assessing continued operations in a

service continuity event for systems

operating in the cloud environment.

7.4. Ensure information system

management establish processes for

ensuring backups are performed in

accordance with ODNI, CNSS, NIST,

and NGA guidance.

7.5. Identify, track, and oversee the

implementation of system alternate

processing sites in accordance with

ODNI, CNSS, NIST, and NGA

guidance. Perform evaluations to

determine whether management should

implement alternate processes to enable

the system to meet recovery objectives

in the event of a disaster at the primary

processing site, prior to the

establishment of an alternate processing

site.

8.1. Document an entity level POA&M lien

to identify and track the completion the 

requirements of OMB M-15-13 to

ensure the agency allocates appropriate

oversight for completion.

8.2. Develop and approve a process for the 

enforcement of HTTPS and HSTS for

all current and future public facing

websites.
35

Rec.

Number

Recommendation for Corrective

Report Title, Number, Date Action

FY 2017 FISMA, Internal Report,

OIGA 18-01, 7 November 2017 

(continued)

8.3. Implement the enforcement of

HTTPS and HSTS on all public facing

websites as required by policy.

9.1. Develop a formal identity and

access management policy in

accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and

NIST guidance.

9.2. Implement an identity and access

management program over information

systems in accordance with ODNI,

CNSS, and NIST guidance.

9.3. Ensure information systems describe

implementation of NIST Access

Control family controls, such as account

types, access authorization, segregation

of duties, and access recertification in 

security documentation in accordance

with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.

10.1. Ensure information systems develop and

maintain configuration management

procedures and plans in accordance with

the ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.

10.2. Ensure information system owners

maintain accurate listings of their

hardware and software inventories in

order to maintain an accurate

configuration baseline.

10.3. Develop and implement processes to 

consistently authorize changes to

information systems in accordance with

ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.

10.4. Perform vulnerability scans in

accordance with ODNI, CNSS, NIST,

and NGA guidance.
36

Rec.

Number

Recommendation for Corrective

Report Title, Number, Date Action

FY 2017 FISMA, Internal Report,

OIGA 18-01, 7 November 2017 

(continued)

10.5. Remediate vulnerabilities in

accordance with ODNI, CNSS, NIST,

and NGA guidance.

Independent Auditors’ Report on the 

NGA Financial Statements for FYs

2017 and 2016, Report No. OIGA 

18-02, 9 November 2017

1A. FM and OCS should complete the

design of and implement its tri-annual

review, to include a reconciliation to the

general ledger and measures to quantify

the results of the review.

1B. FM and OCS should complete planned

corrective actions to identify and deobligate stale or invalid paid and

unpaid UDOs.

1C. FM and OCS should identify

reasonable methods of

1D. FM and OCS should improve standard

operating procedures (SOP) to include

enhanced contract creation and

execution controls (e.g., contract

approval and three-way match between

the obligation, the invoice, and the

receiving report) and should establish

monitoring controls to enforce such

procedures.

1E. FM should work with OCS to complete

an assessment to quantify the potential 

impact of expenditures on advance paid

MIPRs incurred outside the period of

performance. Additionally, FM should 

draft, finalize, and implement the SOP 

for advance paid MIPRs, to include

consideration of the period of

performance in its advance liquidation 

process.

, and develop and

implement procedures

.
37

Rec.

Number

Recommendation for Corrective

Report Title, Number, Date Action

Independent Auditors’ Report on the 

NGA Financial Statements for FYs

2017 and 2016, Report No. OIGA 

18-02, 9 November 2017

1F. FM should formally and completely

document its criteria and procedures for

performing and reviewing the accounts

payable accrual look-back analysis into

an SOP, including allocation between

federal and nonfederal attributes,

determination of invoices to be included

in or excluded from the analysis, and

more detailed supervisor review

requirements.

1G.

1H. FM should develop, document, and

implement controls over the

completeness and presentation of TBOs

reported to DFAS and determine if an

additional UDA accrual is necessary.

1I. FM and the Security &

Installations component (SI) should

continue to remediate

1J. FM should complete

implementation of configuration

changes to GEO-F posting logic to

properly record refunds of prior year

paid obligations.
38

Rec.

Number

Recommendation for Corrective

Report Title, Number, Date Action

Independent Auditors’ Report on the 

NGA Financial Statements for FYs

2017 and 2016, Report No. OIGA 

18-02, 9 November 2017

2A FM, SI, and the Chief Information

Officer and IT Services component

(CIO-T) should continue their efforts to

remediate personal property

deficiencies, including a review of

personal property CIP and IUS in

development costs. As part of its

review, management should place

completed assets into service. Going

forward, FM and SI should develop and

implement a process that allows for

in-use assets to be placed in-service in a

timely manner.

2B. SI should work with CIO-T and FM to 

assess the feasibility of implementing

system configuration changes to capture

personnel costs incurred for IUS in

development. As an alternative, SI

should work with CIO-T and FM to

develop and implement a standard

methodology to allocate capitalizable

Government personnel costs incurred

during system development to IUS in

development at the asset level.

2C. FM, SI, and CIO-T should work to

develop and implement a process for

summarizing personal property CIP and

IUS in development costs by asset to

allow for tracking and data analysis and

timely movement to in-service PP&E

accounts.

2D. FM and SI should ensure that NGA’s

continued PP&E remediation efforts

include a floor-to-book inventory of

IUS, CAP, and GFP.
39

Rec.

Number

Recommendation for Corrective

Report Title, Number, Date Action

Independent Auditors’ Report on the 

NGA Financial Statements for FYs

2017 and 2016, Report No. OIGA 

18-02, 9 November 2017

(continued)

2E. SI, in coordination with FM, should

develop and implement a policy for

identifying completed CIP and IUS in

development assets. The policy should

define the point at which an asset is

“complete” for financial reporting

purposes to ensure timely asset and

depreciation recognition.

2F. FM should enhance and implement its 

PP&E impairment monitoring policy to 

include all required components of

SFFAS No. 10 and SFFAS No. 44 and

document the impairment analyses

performed.

2G. FM and SI should develop and

implement corrective actions related to

the identification of leased equipment,

assessment of equipment leases as

capital or operating leases, and inclusion

of these leases in the lease note

disclosure.

3A. FM should develop, implement, and

document a monitoring control to

ensure adherence to NGA’s journal

entry review and approval policy.

3B. FM should develop and implement

system-enforced segregation of duties

controls over journal entry preparation

and approval. Such controls should

include expanded use of the GEO-F

journal entry approval role to enforce

review thresholds.

3C FM should configure GEO-F to

restrict journal entry approvers from

changing journal vouchers prior to

approval, or to require that modified

entries are routed through the preparer

to re-submit.
40

Rec.

Number

Recommendation for Corrective

Report Title, Number, Date Action

Independent Auditors’ Report on the 

NGA Financial Statements for FYs

2017 and 2016, Report No. OIGA 

18-02, 9 November 2017

(continued)

3D. FM should ensure that adequate

training and other resources, such as

desktop guides, policies, or quick

reference cards, are provided to

personnel with journal entry preparation

or approval responsibilities. Such

training and resources should be

provided timely upon the assumption of

such responsibilities (i.e., prior to the

month or quarter-end journal entry

preparation timeline).

3E. FM should enhance policy to include

3F. FM should identify relevant

information relied upon in its business

processes and work with other key

components, as appropriate, to design,

document, and implement internal

controls over the completeness and

accuracy of such information.

3G. FM should develop and implement

posting logic in GEO-F to record

transactions in accordance with the

USSGL at the transaction level.

4A. FM should continue to work with

DFAS and the Office of the Secretary of

Defense to establish a Plan of Action

and Milestones for reliance on DFAS’s

FBWT reconciliation. As an alternative,

FM management should develop

appropriate analyses and processes to

support the completeness and accuracy

of NGA’s FBWT without relying on the

CMR report.
41

Rec.

Number

Recommendation for Corrective

Report Title, Number, Date Action

(U) Independent Auditors’ Report on

the NGA Financial Statements for

FYs 2017 and 2016, Report No.

OIGA 18-02, 9 November 2017

(continued)

4B. FM should continue to work with

DFAS to obtain appropriate

documentation to support legacy

transactions.

5A. We recommend that FM consistently

follow recently implemented procedures

to recognize all customer orders.

6A. Regarding access controls:

1. Develop, document,

implement, and enforce consistent

2. Enforce

policy, or document approved

deviations from policy.
42

Rec.

Number

Recommendation for Corrective

Report Title, Number, Date Action

6B. Regarding segregation of duties

controls:

1. Develop, approve, and implement

procedures to

approved deviations from policy should

be documented.

Independent Auditors’ Report on the 

NGA Financial Statements for FYs

2017 and 2016, Report No. OIGA 

18-02, 9 November 2017

(continued)

6C. Regarding

,

2. Enforce
43

Rec.

Number

Recommendation for Corrective

Report Title, Number, Date Action

7A. To address the FM-related

deficiencies noted above, FM, in

coordination with the relevant Key

Components, should:

1. Complete, document, and

implement an

2. Develop or update, document,

approve, and disseminate

3. Update, approve, and

disseminate a

in compliance with the relevant

standards.

7B. To address the other information

technology-related deficiencies noted

above, CIO-T and the Office of

Contract Services should:

1. Complete, approve, and disseminate

in 

compliance with applicable guidance.

Independent Auditors’ Report on the 

NGA Financial Statements for FYs

2017 and 2016, Report No. OIGA 

18-02, 9 November 2017

(continued)

7B. 2. Perform and document

compliance with

NIST SP 800-53.

3. Update and disseminate

in compliance with

NGA policy.

.
44

Rec.

Number

Recommendation for Corrective

Report Title, Number, Date Action

4. Update and implement policies

and procedures for

in accordance with

applicable guidance.

5. Develop and implement

procedures to monitor and enforce the

7B. Recommendations to address instances

of noncompliance:

1. We recommend that Financial

Management and the Office of Strategic

Operations revise NGA’s FMFIA

process to incorporate the ERM

requirements of OMB Circular No. A

123. Additionally, FM should perform

additional procedures to identify

material weaknesses in NGA’s ICOFR

environment.

2. We recommend that NGA

implement the recommendations

provided in Exhibits I and II and

improve its processes to ensure

compliance with the requirements of

FFMIA section 803(a) in FY 2018.

.
45

Rec.

Number

Recommendation for Corrective

Report Title, Number, Date Action

Audit of NGA’s Information

Assurance Certification Program,

Report No. OIGA 17-09, 30 June

2017

1 Comply with DoD 8570.01-

M. If management chooses to accept the

risk of not complying with DoD

8570.01-M, perform a comprehensive

risk assessment, signed by the Chief

Information Officer, that justifies not

complying with DoD 8570.01-M

requirements. The risk assessment

should address the risks to the

protection, detection, and reaction

capabilities of NGA’s information

systems and networks and any other

information deemed necessary to

support the assessment.

Audit of NGA’s Use of

Administrative Leave, Report No.

OIGA 16-08, 12 May 2016

1 Update NGA guidance relevant to 

administrative leave. Policies should:

(1) Establish clear procedures for

supervisors, managers, and key

personnel to follow when taking

actions that result in the placement of

employees on administrative leave.

(2) Establish oversight procedures for

the approval of administrative leave,

to assess the use of administrative

leave, and to follow up when the

improper use of administrative leave is

identified.

(3) Address appropriate time limits for

administrative leave, and ensure that

the references to related NGA policies

and procedures are consistent and

accurate.

(4) Identify the responsible component

for official tracking of administrative

leave.
46

Rec.

Number

Recommendation for Corrective

Report Title, Number, Date Action

Inspection of Structured

Observation Management, Report

No. OIGE 18-01, November 2017

5 Develop and issue, across the NSG,

SOM tradecraft standards that address:

accuracy requirements with rules for

capturing objects, observations, and

judgements; a quality control process;

and sourcing and data disclaimers

consistent with ICDs 203 & 206.

Inspection of NGA’s Strategic

Workforce Planning Function,

Report No. OIGE 17-04, June

2017

1 In accordance with statute and

policies, develop and issue a strategic

workforce plan that looks at a total

workforce mix with an emphasis on

critical skills and competencies needed

to perform the agency’s evolving

mission.

3 Establish a resourced activity to

update the NGA leader competency

model to reflect requirements defined

within ICD 610, ICS 610-3, ICS 610-4

Inspection of the CURATOR

Program, Report No. OIGE 16-04,

25 February 2016

3 Identify and review data.

Inspection of NGA’s Acquisition

Function, Phase I: Organizational

Alignment and Leadership,

Report No. OIGE 16- 02, 10 

November 2015

2 Ensure that NGA policy and

guidance effectively promote a

strategic, integrated, and agency-wide

approach to the acquisition function.

Inspection of the NGA Privacy

Program and Privacy Protection

Management, Report No.

OIGE 15-01, 5 November 2014

19 Establish a systematic process to

ensure that all forms and other PII

collection methods have accurate

Privacy Act statements associated with

them. Update and publish agency-level

privacy policy with the statement

procedures. Conduct periodic checks of

the agency’s forms and e-mails to

evaluate the use of Privacy Act

statements.
47

Rec.

Number

Recommendation for Corrective

Report Title, Number, Date Action

Inspection of the NGA Privacy

Program and Privacy Protection

Management, Report No.

OIGE 15-01, 5 November 2014

(continued)

21 In accordance with previous

recommendations, after establishing a

method to identify IT systems that

contain PII, ensure that IT system

owners (program managers) complete

Privacy Impact Assessments and submit

them to the Senior Component Official

for Privacy. Publish completed Privacy

Impact Assessments on NGA’s

webpages.
48

Table A-4. Financial Results from Reports Issued During Reporting Period

Report Title, Number,

Date Issued

Questioned

Costs

Unsupported

Costs

Funds To Be Put

to Better Use

Audit of NGA’s Management

of the Personnel Separation

Process, Report No. OIGA18-05,

18 April 2018 $0 0 $0

Audit of NGA’s Security

Financial Disclosure Program,

Report No. OIGA18-06, 12 July

2018 $0 $0 $0

Audit of NGA’s Personnel

Security Clearance Process,

Report No. OIGA18-07, 9 August

2018 $0 $0 $0

Audit of the Emergency

Management Test, Training, and

Exercise Program at NCE,

Memorandum

U-230-18/OIG,

11 September 2018 $0 $0 $0

Total $0 $0 $0
49

Table A-5. Status of Recommendations That Questioned Costs

A. No management

decision made by start of

the reporting period 2 2 $109,600,000

B. Issued during reporting

period 0 0 $ 0

Total A + B 2 2 $109,600,000

C. Management decision

made during reporting

period

(i) Dollar value of

recommendations that

were agreed to (disallowed

costs) 2 2 $109,600,000

(ii) Dollar value of

recommendations that

were not agreed to

(allowed costs) 0 0 $0

D. Total remaining for

management decision at

end of reporting period

[(A + B) – C] 0 0 $0

Recommendation Status

Number of

Reports

Number of

Recommendations

Questioned

Costs
50

Table A-6. Status of Recommendations That Funds Be Put to Better Use

A. No management decision

made by start of the reporting

period 0 0 $0

B. Issued during reporting

period 0 0 $0

Total A + B 0 0 $0

C. Management decision

made during reporting period 0 0 $0

(i) Dollar value of

recommendations that were

agreed to (disallowed costs) 0 0 $0

(ii) Dollar value of

recommendations that were

not agreed to (allowed costs) 0 0 $0

D. Total remaining for

management decision at end

of reporting period

[(A + B) – C] 0 0 $0

Table A-7. Management Decisions Regarding OIG Recommendations in Reports Issued 

Before 1 April 2018

Unresolved as of Reports with Number of Funds To

30 September Unimplemented Unimplemented Questioned Be Put to

2018 Recommendations Recommendations Costs Better Use

Audits 10 91 $82,700,000 $112,200,200

Inspections 12 28 $109,600,000 $0

Total 22 119 $192,300,000 $112,200,000

Recommendation Status

Number of

Reports

Number of Funds To Be Put

Recommendations to Better Use
51

Information or Assistance Refused by NGA

Section 5(a)(5) of the Inspector General (IG) Act of 1978 requires IGs to promptly report to the

head of the establishment if information requested is unreasonably refused or not provided. No

such reports were needed or made during this reporting period.

Significant Revised Management Decisions

Section 5(a)(11) of the IG Act of 1978 requires IGs to describe and explain the reasons for any

significant revised management decisions made during the reporting period. We are not aware of

revisions to any significant management decisions during this reporting period.

OIG Disagreement with Significant Management Decisions

Section 5(a)(12) of the IG Act of 1978 requires IGs to provide information concerning any

significant management decisions with which they disagree. During this reporting period, the IG

had no instances of disagreement with significant management decisions.

Compliance with Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996

Section 5(a)(13) of the IG Act of 1978 requires IGs to provide information described under

section 804(b) of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996. This information

involves the instances and reasons when an agency has not met target dates within its

remediation plan to bring financial management systems into compliance with the law. NGA has

developed and implemented radiation plans to address areas causing noncompliance for financial

management systems. NGA has met the intermediated target dates in the plans.

Attempts to Interfere with the IG’s Independence

Section 5(a)(21) of the IG Act of 1978, as amended by the IG Empowerment Act, requires IGs to

provide detailed descriptions of any attempts by their establishments to interfere with their

independence. We did not experience any attempts to interfere with our office’s independence

during this reporting period.

STATUTORY REPORTING
52

Public Disclosure (Closed But Undisclosed Audits, Inspection, Investigations)

Section 5(a)(22) of the IG Act of 1978, as amended by the IG Empowerment Act, requires IGs to

provide detailed descriptions of inspections, evaluations, audits, and investigations involving

senior government employees that were closed during the reporting period without being

publicly disclosed. Summaries of all such work are included in the appropriate sections of this

report.

 Audits closed during this reporting period are described beginning on page 5.

 Inspections closed during this reporting period are described beginning on page 10.

 Investigations closed during this reporting period are described beginning on page 15.

Peer Reviews

Section 5(a)(14-16) of the IG Act require IGs to report information about peer reviews that their

offices have conducted or been subject to. No peer review of NGA OIG was conducted by

another OIG during this reporting period.

The most recent external peer review of the NGA OIG Audit Division was performed by the

National Security Agency OIG. In its report of 23 February 2018, we received a rating of “pass”

for our system of quality control in effect for the three-year period ending 30 September 2017.

There are no outstanding recommendations from any peer reviews of the Audit Division.

NGA OIG did not conduct any external peer reviews of another OIG during the reporting

period.
53

Table B-1. Number of Cases Referred for Criminal or Civil Prosecution,

During Reporting Period

Criminal 0 0 0

Civil 0 0 0

Table B-2. Judicial Actions, During Reporting Period

Action Number

Indictments 0

Convictions 0

Years of incarceration 0

Years of supervised release 0

Years of probation 0

Table B-3. Criminal Prosecutions and Referrals, During Reporting Perioda

No. investigative reports issued 11

No. individuals referred to DoJ for criminal prosecution 0

No. individuals referred to state and local prosecuting

authorities for criminal prosecution 1

No. indictments and criminal informations resulting from

any prior referral to prosecuting authorities 0

a. NGA OIG issued no criminal investigative reports; however, NGA OIG did issue 11 administrative reports of

investigation from 1 April 2018 to 30 September 2018.

APPENDIX B. INVESTIGATIVE METRICS

Type of Case

Number of Cases

Referred Accepted Declined
54

APPENDIX C. INDEX OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Semiannual Reporting Requirement Page

§5(a)(1) Significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies 5–20 

§5(a)(2) Recommendations for corrective action 30–46 

§5(a)(3) Significant outstanding recommendations 22 

§5(a)(4) Matters referred to prosecutorial authorities 15 

§5(a)(5) Information or assistance refused 50 

§5(a)(6) List of completed audit, inspection, and evaluation reports 5–14 

§5(a)(7) Summaries of significant reports 5–14 

§5(a)(8) Statistical table showing questioned costs 48 

§5(a)(9) Statistical table showing recommendations that funds be put to better use 49 

§5(a)(10) Summary of reports for which no management decision was made 49 

§5(a)(11) Significant revised management decisions 50 

§5(a)(12) Management decision disagreements 50 

§5(a)(13) Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 50 

§5(a)(14-16) Peer reviews 51 

§5(a)(17-18) Investigations statistics and metrics 52 

§5(a)(19) Investigations involving substantiated allegations against senior officials 15–16 

§5(a)(20) Descriptions of whistleblower retaliation 16–17 

§5(a)(21) Attempts to interfere with IG independence 50 

§5(a)(22) Public disclosure 51 
55

ADA Antideficiency Act

CAE Component Acquisition Executive

CDA Congressionally directed action

CFPE Consolidated Foundation Production Environment

CI Counterintelligence

CIO-T Chief Information Officer and IT Services Component

CIGIE Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency

CIP Construction-in-Progress

CNSS Committee on National Security Systems

COR contracting officer's representative

CTTA Certified TEMPEST Technical Authority

DCIS Defense Criminal Investigative Service

DFAS Defense Finance and Accounting Service

DISES Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service

DoD OGC DoD Office of General Counsel

FAST Forensic Analysis Support Team

FISMA Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014

FM Financial Management Component

GEO-F GEOINT-Financials

GEOINT geospatial intelligence

GPC Government Purchase Card

GS GEOINT Services

IC Intelligence Community

IO intelligence oversight

IPERA Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act

IT information technology

ITC Interim Transition Capability

MDCO Military Department CI Organization

MFT Multifunctional Team

MI Military Intelligence

MOA Memorandum of Agreement

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

NAS NSG Application Schema

NCE NGA Campus East

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology

NRO National Reconnaissance Office

NSG National System for Geospatial Intelligence

APPENDIX D. ABBREVIATIONS
56

NtM Notice to Mariners

OCS Office of Contract Services

ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence

OIG Office of Inspector General

OMB Office of Management and Budget

OUSD(C) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

PII Personally Identifiable Information

POA&M plan of action and milestones

QIAs questionable intelligence activities

S/HS significant or highly sensitive matters

SCIF Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility

SI Security and Installations component

SIC Office of Counterintelligence

SIS Office of Security

SOM Structured Observation Management

SoN Safety of Navigation

TM technical monitor

US STRATCOM US Strategic Command
57

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