Filed 3/30/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

MILLION SEIFU et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

LYFT, INC.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B301774

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC712959)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Susan Bryant-Deason, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part with 

directions.

Horvitz & Levy, Andrea L. Russi, Peder Batalden, Felix Shafir; Keker, 

Van Nest & Peters, R. James Slaughter, Jo W. Golub, Erin E. Meyer and 

Morgan E. Sharma for Defendant and Appellant.

Lichten & Liss-Riordan, Shannon Liss-Riordan for Plaintiff and 

Respondent Million Seifu.
2

Respondent Million Seifu is a former driver for appellant Lyft, Inc. In 

2018, he filed suit against Lyft under the Private Attorneys General Act of 

2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.).1 He alleged that Lyft misclassified 

him and other drivers as independent contractors rather than employees, 

thereby violating multiple provisions of the Labor Code. Lyft moved to 

compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision in the “Terms of 

Service” (TOS) that it required its drivers to accept in order to offer rides 

through Lyft’s smartphone application.

The trial court denied the motion, finding the PAGA waiver in the 

arbitration provision unenforceable under then-controlling California law. 

Lyft appealed, and in June 2021 we affirmed the denial of Lyft’s motion to 

compel arbitration.

Lyft petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of 

certiorari. In June 2022, the Court granted Lyft’s petition, vacated the 

judgment, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Viking 

River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. ___ [142 S.Ct. 1906, 213 

L.Ed.2d 179] (Viking River). We recalled the remittitur, vacated our prior 

decision, and requested supplemental briefing from the parties on the 

application of Viking River to this case.

Seifu concedes that under Viking River his claim for civil penalties 

based on alleged Labor Code violations he personally suffered (his individual 

PAGA claim) is subject to arbitration. We agree, and therefore reverse the 

denial of that portion of Lyft’s motion to compel arbitration. 

The crux of the parties’ dispute here is the fate of Seifu’s remaining 

claims for civil penalties based on alleged Labor Code violations suffered by 

other employees (his non-individual PAGA claims). Lyft argues that Seifu 

lacks standing to litigate the non-individual claims once his individual claims 

are sent to arbitration, and the former claims therefore must be dismissed. 

Seifu counters that, as a matter of state law, he retains standing to pursue 

the non-individual PAGA claims in court.

1 All further statutory references are to the Labor Code unless otherwise 

indicated.
3

We conclude that we are not bound by the analysis of PAGA standing 

set forth in Viking River. As Justice Sotomayor recognized in her concurring 

opinion, PAGA standing is a matter of state law that must be decided by 

California courts. Until we have guidance from the California Supreme 

Court, our review of PAGA and relevant state decisional authority leads us to 

conclude that a plaintiff is not stripped of standing to pursue non-individual 

PAGA claims simply because his or her individual PAGA claim is compelled 

to arbitration. 

We therefore reverse in part and affirm in part the trial court’s order 

denying Lyft’s motion to compel arbitration. We remand the matter to the 

trial court with directions to: (1) enter an order compelling Seifu to arbitrate 

his individual PAGA claim; and (2) conduct further proceedings regarding 

Seifu’s non-individual claims consistent with this opinion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Lyft utilizes a smartphone application (app) that connects drivers with 

riders seeking transportation services. In order to use the Lyft technology 

platform and offer rides through the app, drivers must agree to the TOS, 

which states that it “contains provisions that govern how claims you and Lyft 

have against each other can be brought. . . . These provisions will, with 

limited exception, require you to submit claims you have against Lyft to 

binding and final arbitration on an individual basis, not as a plaintiff or class 

member in any class, group, representative action, or proceeding.” 

(Capitalization omitted.) 

The arbitration provision in the TOS provided, “You and Lyft mutually 

agree to waive our respective rights to resolution of disputes in a court of law 

by a judge or jury and agree to resolve any dispute by arbitration. . . . This 

agreement to arbitrate (‘Arbitration Agreement’) is governed by the Federal 

Arbitration Act and survives after the Agreement terminates or your 

relationship with Lyft ends. . . . Except as expressly provided . . . [¶] . . . all 

disputes and claims between us . . . shall be exclusively resolved by binding 

arbitration solely between you and Lyft.” (Capitalization omitted.) The 

agreement further stated, “This Arbitration Agreement is intended to require 

arbitration of every claim or dispute that can lawfully be arbitrated, except 
4

for those claims and disputes which by the terms of this Arbitration 

Agreement are expressly excluded from the requirement to arbitrate.” 

The arbitration provision also included a “Representative PAGA 

Waiver” stating, “Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement or 

the Arbitration Agreement, to the fullest extent permitted by law: (1) you 

and Lyft agree not to bring a representative action on behalf of others under 

the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), California Labor Code 

§ 2698 et seq., in any court or in arbitration, and (2) for any claim brought on 

a private attorney general basis, including under the California PAGA, both 

you and Lyft agree that any such dispute shall be resolved in arbitration on 

an individual basis only (i.e., to resolve whether you have personally been 

aggrieved or subject to any violations of law), and that such an action may 

not be used to resolve the claims or rights of other individuals in a single or 

collective proceeding (i.e., to resolve whether other individuals have been 

aggrieved or subject to any violations of law).” 

Drivers who did not wish to be bound by the arbitration provision could 

opt out in the 30-day period following their acceptance of the TOS. Those 

who did not exercise this option during that period were bound by the 

arbitration provision. 

Lyft updated the TOS periodically and required drivers to agree to the 

updated terms in order to continue offering rides through the Lyft platform. 

Seifu agreed to the updated TOS in July 2017 and April 2018; he did not opt 

out of the arbitration provision. 

Seifu filed a complaint against Lyft in July 2018, alleging a single 

PAGA claim on behalf of the state of California and other similarly situated 

individuals who worked as drivers for Lyft in California.

2 He alleged that 

Lyft willfully misclassified its drivers as independent contractors, resulting in 

numerous Labor Code violations. Seifu sought civil penalties under PAGA. 

2 Seifu later amended his complaint to add three other drivers as named 

plaintiffs, as well as additional claims. This appeal concerns only Seifu’s 

PAGA claim, the thirteenth cause of action in the operative Third Amended 

Complaint. 
5

Lyft petitioned to compel arbitration of Seifu’s PAGA claim and stay 

proceedings in the trial court pending arbitration, arguing that the PAGA 

waiver in the TOS was enforceable. Seifu opposed the petition to compel 

arbitration. He argued that the PAGA waiver was unenforceable under 

California law, relying on Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC

(2014) 59 Cal.4th 348 (Iskanian). 

Applying Iskanian, the trial court found that the PAGA waiver was 

unenforceable and therefore denied Lyft’s petition to compel arbitration. Lyft 

appealed. 

In our prior opinion, a different panel of this court affirmed the trial 

court’s decision. (Seifu v. Lyft, Inc. (June 1, 2021), B301774 [nonpub. opn.].) 

We concluded that pursuant to Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 383-384, 

“an employee’s right to bring a PAGA action is unwaivable,” and thus “where 

. . . an employment agreement compels the waiver of representative claims 

under the PAGA, it is contrary to public policy and unenforceable as a matter 

of state law.”

In June 2022, the United States Supreme Court decided Viking River, 

abrogating Iskanian in part and holding that an employer could enforce an 

agreement calling for arbitration of individual PAGA claims. That same 

month, the United States Supreme Court granted Lyft’s petition for writ of 

certiorari, vacated this court’s judgment, and remanded the case for further 

consideration in light of Viking River. We recalled the remittitur issued 

September 13, 2021, vacated our prior opinion, and directed the parties to file 

supplemental briefs addressing the effect of Viking River on the issues 

presented in this appeal. Both parties timely filed supplemental briefs. 

DISCUSSION

I. Governing Law

A. Standard of Review

Where, as here, the trial court’s order denying a motion to compel 

arbitration “rests solely on a decision of law,” we review that decision de 

novo. (Robertson v. Health Net of California, Inc. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 

1419, 1425.)

B. PAGA and Viking River
6

“California’s Labor Code contains a number of provisions designed to 

protect the health, safety, and compensation of workers. Employers who 

violate these statutes may be sued by employees for damages or statutory

penalties. [Citations.] . . . . Several Labor Code statutes provide for 

additional civil penalties, generally paid to the state unless otherwise 

provided. [Citation.] Before PAGA’s enactment, only the state could sue for 

civil penalties.” (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 

73, 80 (Kim), citing Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 378.) The Legislature 

enacted PAGA to allow aggrieved employees to act as private attorneys 

general and recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations. (Arias v. 

Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 980-981 (Arias); Villacres v. ABM 

Industries Inc. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 562, 578 (Villacres).) The 

Legislature’s declared purpose in enacting PAGA was “to supplement 

enforcement actions by public agencies, which lack adequate resources to 

bring all such actions themselves.” (Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 986.) 

PAGA deputizes an “aggrieved” employee to bring a lawsuit “on behalf 

of himself or herself and other current or former employees” to recover civil 

penalties for Labor Code violations that would otherwise be assessed and 

collected by the state. (§ 2699, subd. (a); Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 81.) An 

“aggrieved employee” for purposes of bringing a PAGA claim is defined under 

the statute as “any person who was employed by the alleged violator and 

against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed.” (§ 2699, 

subd. (c); see also Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 82.) Although an aggrieved 

employee is the named plaintiff in a PAGA action, an employee suing under 

PAGA “‘does so as the proxy or agent of the state’s labor law enforcement 

agencies.’” (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 81, quoting Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th 

at p. 986.) Thus, “[e]very PAGA claim is ‘a dispute between an employer and 

the state,’ [citations]” and “[r]elief under PAGA is designed primarily to 

benefit the general public, not the party bringing the action. [Citations.]”

(Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 81.)

In Iskanian, the California Supreme Court held that “an employee's 

right to bring a PAGA action is unwaivable.” (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at 

p. 383.) The court rejected the employer’s argument that the arbitration 

agreement was enforceable because it allowed an individual PAGA claim, 
7

barring only “representative” (i.e., non-individual) PAGA claims, concluding 

that an agreement waiving an employee’s right to bring representative PAGA 

claims was “contrary to public policy and unenforceable as a matter of state 

law.” (Id. at p. 384.)

In June 2022, the Supreme Court decided Viking River, addressing the 

extent to which the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts the Iskanian

rule barring PAGA waivers. The Viking River court explained that PAGA 

claims are “representative” in two ways: first, all PAGA claims are 

“representative” because a plaintiff brings a PAGA claim as an agent or proxy 

for the state. (Viking River, supra, 142 S.Ct. at p. 1916.) Second, some PAGA 

claims are “representative” because they are brought by employees to address 

violations suffered by other employees, as well as themselves. (Ibid.) In light 

of this distinction, the Supreme Court held that Iskanian’s “principal rule” 

prohibiting “wholesale” waivers of all PAGA claims was not preempted by the 

FAA. (Id. at pp. 1925-1926.) 

However, the “secondary rule” of Iskanian, prohibiting the separation 

of individual and non-individual PAGA claims, was preempted by the FAA. 

(Id. at p. 1925.) As the Court explained, Iskanian’s “prohibition on 

contractual division of PAGA actions into constituent claims unduly 

circumscribes the freedom of parties to determine ‘the issues subject to 

arbitration’ and ‘the rules by which they will arbitrate,’ [citation], and does so 

in a way that violates the fundamental principle that ‘arbitration is a matter 

of consent,’ [citation].” (Id. at p. 1923.) Accordingly, an arbitration 

agreement compelling individual claims to arbitration was enforceable as to 

the individual portion of a PAGA claim. (Id. at pp. 1924–1925 [“Viking was 

entitled to enforce the agreement insofar as it mandated arbitration of 

Moriana’s individual PAGA claim.”].)

The Viking River court then dismissed the plaintiff’s non-individual 

PAGA claims, reasoning that “PAGA provides no mechanism to enable a 

court to adjudicate non-individual PAGA claims once an individual claim has 

been committed to a separate proceeding.” (Viking River, supra, at p. 1925.)

The Court continued, “When an employee’s own dispute is pared away from a 

PAGA action, the employee is no different from a member of the general 

public, and PAGA does not allow such persons to maintain suit. See Kim, 9 
8

Cal.5th at 90 (‘PAGA’s standing requirement was meant to be a departure 

from the “general public” . . . standing originally allowed’ under other 

California statutes). As a result, [the plaintiff] lacks statutory standing to 

continue to maintain her non-individual claims in court, and the correct 

course is to dismiss her remaining claims.” (Ibid.)

II. Analysis

A. Individual PAGA claim

In light of Viking River, we first assess the portion of Lyft’s motion to 

compel arbitration of Seifu’s individual PAGA claim. The PAGA waiver in 

the TOS contained two parts. First, the agreement waived the parties’ right 

to bring PAGA claims “on behalf of others” in “any court or in arbitration.” 

Second, the agreement required any individual PAGA claims to be resolved in 

arbitration. For the purposes of the current appeal, the parties do not 

dispute that the first clause, constituting a wholesale waiver of Seifu’s right 

to bring non-individual PAGA claims in any forum, was unenforceable under 

Iskanian. (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 360 [“an arbitration agreement 

requiring an employee as a condition of employment to give up the right to 

bring representative PAGA actions in any forum is contrary to public 

policy”].) Nor do they dispute that Viking River left intact the portion of 

Iskanian’s rule “prevent[ing] parties from waiving representative standing to 

bring PAGA claims in a judicial or arbitral forum.” (Viking River, supra, 142 

S.Ct. at pp. 1916, 1924-1925, italics omitted.) As such, the first part of the 

PAGA waiver here is unenforceable under Iskanian and cannot bar Seifu 

from bringing non-individual PAGA claims.

In addition, Seifu does not dispute that Viking River allows division of 

his PAGA claim into individual and non-individual claims. Under the second 

clause in the PAGA waiver, Seifu concedes that he must submit his 

individual PAGA claim to arbitration. 

B. Non-individual PAGA claims

We now turn to the question of what becomes of Seifu’s non-individual 

PAGA claims, as they are not subject to arbitration. Seifu contends that he 

maintains standing to pursue those claims in court. Lyft asserts that Viking 

River compels the dismissal of the non-individual claims. As we explain, we 

agree with Seifu.
9

As an initial matter, we note that we are not bound by the United 

States Supreme Court’s interpretation of California law. (See Nunez v. 

Nevell Group, Inc. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 838, 847–848 [“Federal decisional 

authority does not bind the California Courts of Appeal on matters of state 

law.”]; Haynes v. EMC Mortg. Corp. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 329, 335 [same]; 

Howard Contracting, Inc. v. G.A. MacDonald Construction Co. (1998) 71 

Cal.App.4th 38, 52 [“[F]ederal decisional authority is neither binding nor 

controlling in matters involving state law”].) Indeed, in her concurrence in 

Viking River, Justice Sotomayor noted that she was joining in the Court’s 

opinion with the understanding that “if this Court’s understanding of state 

law is wrong, California courts . . . will have the last word” regarding a 

plaintiff’s standing under PAGA. (Viking River, supra, 142 S.Ct. at p. 1925 

[Sotomayor, J., concurring].) As such, we are not required to follow the 

Court’s interpretation of PAGA and its standing requirements in Viking 

River.3

We are not persuaded otherwise by Lyft’s contention that the Viking

River court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s non-individual PAGA claims for lack 

of standing was part of a “federal rule of decision to implement its mandate 

that the FAA applies to PAGA claims when a valid arbitration agreement 

exists.” Lyft’s attempt to fold the Supreme Court’s interpretation of standing 

requirements under PAGA, a state statute, into its federal preemption 

analysis is unavailing, particularly where the Court interpreted Kim and 

other California authority to reach its conclusion as to standing. By contrast, 

in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, the case relied upon 

by Lyft, the Court expressly announced a “federal rule” after finding that the 

standard of proof for libel under the relevant state law was constitutionally 

3 The California Supreme Court has yet to decide the issue. The court 

recently granted review in Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc., review granted 

July 20, 2022, S274671, to consider “[w]hether an aggrieved employee who 

has been compelled to arbitrate claims under [PAGA] that are ‘premised on 

Labor Code violations actually sustained by’ the aggrieved employee 

[citations] maintains statutory standing to pursue ‘PAGA claims arising out 

of events involving other employees’ [citation] in court or in any other forum 

the parties agree is suitable.”
10

deficient. (Id. at pp. 279, 283.) Lyft has identified no such constitutional 

concerns here.

We therefore independently assess the standing requirements for Seifu 

to continue to pursue his non-individual PAGA claim in court. As discussed 

above, PAGA provides that civil penalties recoverable by the state for Labor 

Code violations “may, as an alternative, be recovered through a civil action 

brought by an aggrieved employee on behalf of himself or herself and other 

current or former employees.” (§ 2699, subd. (a).) Our Supreme Court 

interpreted the plain language of PAGA to include “only two requirements for 

PAGA standing. The plaintiff must be an aggrieved employee, that is, 

someone ‘who was employed by the alleged violator’ and ‘against whom one or 

more of the alleged violations was committed.’” (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 

83-84.) “Considering the remedial nature of legislation meant to protect 

employees, we construe PAGA’s provisions broadly, in favor of this 

protection.” (Id. at p. 83, citations omitted.)

In Kim, the plaintiff alleged claims for damages based on his 

employer’s Labor Code violations, as well as a claim for civil penalties under 

PAGA. (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 82.) After the plaintiff settled his nonPAGA claims for individual relief, the defendant argued that the plaintiff lost 

standing to pursue the remaining PAGA claim because he had received 

redress for his own injuries and was therefore no longer “aggrieved” within 

the meaning of the statute. (Id. at p. 84.) The California Supreme Court 

rejected this argument, finding that “Kim became an aggrieved employee, 

and had PAGA standing, when one or more Labor Code violations were 

committed against him. (See § 2699(c).) Settlement did not nullify these 

violations.” (Ibid.)

The court continued, “An employee has PAGA standing if ‘one or more 

of the alleged violations was committed’ against him. (§ 2699(c).) This 

language indicates that PAGA standing is not inextricably linked to the 

plaintiff’s own injury. Employees who were subjected to at least one unlawful 

practice have standing to serve as PAGA representatives even if they did not 

personally experience each and every alleged violation. (§ 2699(c).) This 

expansive approach to standing serves the state’s interest in vigorous 
11

enforcement.” (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 85, citing Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th 

at pp. 980-981.)

We conclude that Seifu has satisfied the standing requirements under 

Kim to maintain his non-individual PAGA claims at this stage of the 

proceedings. Seifu’s operative complaint alleged that he was employed by 

Lyft and that one or more of Lyft’s alleged Labor Code violations was 

committed against him. He is therefore an “aggrieved” employee within the 

meaning of PAGA with standing to assert PAGA claims on behalf of himself 

and other employees. (See Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 84-85.) 

Further, the requirement that Seifu resolve his individual PAGA claim 

in a different forum—arbitration—does not strip him of this standing. (See 

Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 84; see also Johnson v. Maxim Healthcare 

Services, Inc. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 924, 930 (Johnson) [the fact that the 

plaintiff’s individual claim was time-barred did not “strip [the plaintiff] of her 

standing to pursue PAGA remedies”].) This interpretation is consistent with 

PAGA’s remedial purpose, because revoking an employee’s standing to 

pursue non-individual claims would “‘severely curtail[ ] PAGA’s availability 

to police Labor Code violations.’” (Johnson, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 930, 

quoting Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 86–87; see also Viking River, supra, 142 

S.Ct. at p. 1919, fn. omitted [“An arbitration agreement thus does not alter or 

abridge substantive rights; it merely changes how those rights will be 

processed. And so we have said that ‘“[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory 

claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; 

it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral . . . forum.”’”].)

We reject Lyft’s contention that, even apart from statutory standing, 

PAGA requires that “the non-individual PAGA claims must be adjudicated 

together with individual PAGA claims, or not at all.” The language of the 

statute contains no such requirement. “‘“Where the words of the statute are 

clear, we may not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not 

appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history.”’” (Kim, 

supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 85, quoting Ennabe v. Manosa (2014) 58 Cal.4th 697, 

719.) Similarly, the cases Lyft cites simply reiterate the principle that a 

“plaintiff asserting a PAGA claim may not bring the claim simply on his or 

her own behalf but must bring it as a representative action and include ‘other 
12

current or former employees.’” (Reyes v. Macy's, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 

1119, 1123; see also Huff v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. (2018) 23 

Cal.App.5th 745, 756 [“an employee seeking to recover Labor Code penalties 

[under PAGA] cannot do so in a purely individual capacity; the employee 

must bring the action on behalf of himself or herself and others”].) Seifu 

satisfied this requirement when he alleged his PAGA claim on behalf of 

himself and other employees. 

Lyft’s reliance on Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 

725 (Morehart) is similarly unavailing. Lyft contends that sending the 

individual PAGA claim to arbitration “amounts to a form of severance that 

yields two distinct actions in two distinct fora,” thereby ending Seifu’s 

standing to represent non-individual PAGA claims in court. Morehart 

involved an analysis of whether a judgment was appealable when it did not 

resolve all of the plaintiff’s causes of action, but the appellant nevertheless 

contended that the appealable claims had been severed from those still 

pending. (Morehart, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 731-732.) Morehart did not 

assess or apply severance principles to issues of standing or arbitration of 

PAGA claims. (Ibid.)

Finally, Lyft contends that if Seifu’s non-individual PAGA claims are 

not dismissed, they should be stayed pending the arbitration of the individual 

PAGA claims. Lyft urges us to direct the trial court to impose a stay 

pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4, which provides that

where the court orders arbitration “of a controversy which is an issue 

involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court of this State,” the 

court in which the action or proceeding is pending “shall, upon motion of a 

party . . ., stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration is had in 

accordance with the order to arbitrate or until such earlier time as the court 

specifies.”

Here, the trial court has not had the opportunity to rule on Lyft’s stay 

request, because it denied Lyft’s motion to compel arbitration outright. We 

therefore remand the matter for the trial court to determine in the first 

instance whether a stay of Seifu’s non-individual PAGA claims would be 

appropriate under the circumstances.

DISPOSITION
13

The order denying Lyft’s motion to compel arbitration is reversed in 

part and affirmed in part. The order is reversed as to Seifu’s individual 

PAGA claim. The order is affirmed as to Seifu’s non-individual PAGA claims. 

The matter is remanded with directions to the trial court to enter a new order 

requiring Seifu to arbitrate his individual PAGA claim and for further 

proceedings regarding Seifu’s non-individual PAGA claims consistent with 

this opinion. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

CURREY, ACTING, P.J.

STONE, J. *

 Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief 

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.