[Cite as State v. Brown, 2018-Ohio-899.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

HANCOCK COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 CASE NO. 5-17-19 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, 

 v. 

NATHAN S. BROWN, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Hancock County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. 2016-CR-335 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: March 12, 2018 

 

APPEARANCES: 

Ronald L. Frey for Appellant 

Steven M. Powell for Appellee 

 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Nathan S. Brown (“Brown”) appeals the 

judgment of the Hancock County Court of Common Pleas, alleging (1) that his 

convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence; (2) that his convictions were 

against the manifest weight of the evidence; (3) that the State violated his Fifth 

Amendment rights by failing to preserve evidence; and (4) that he was denied his 

right to the effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 

For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed. 

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶2} Jarrod T. Barger (“Jarrod”) lived in Findlay, Ohio with his brother, 

Michael Barger (“Michael”), and worked at a nearby Outback Steakhouse 

(“Outback”) with Brown. Tr. 249, 350. On January 10, 2016, Brown was working 

at Outback, and Jarrod, who had the day off from work, was at home. Ex. 33A. Tr. 

331, 342. Through text messages and phone calls, Jarrod and Brown were in contact 

with each other throughout the day. Ex. 33A. Tr. 331, 469. While the text messages 

did not mention any controlled substances by name, these texts contained several 

references to “white stuff,” “points,” and “injections.” Ex. 33A. Tr. 489, 491-492, 

496. At trial, Officer Fred Smith testified that these terms referenced cocaine and 

heroin. Tr. 489, 491-492. The text messages indicate that Brown coordinated a 

transaction with Jarrod in the afternoon and later arranged a meeting with Jarrod 

late in the evening near Outback. Ex. 33A. Michael later testified at trial that he 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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saw Jarrod leaving the house at around 10:30 P.M. as he (Michael) was going 

upstairs to bed. Tr. 334. Michael further testified that this was the last time that he 

saw Jarrod alive. Tr. 335. 

{¶3} On January 11, 2016, Michael was preparing to go to work and saw 

that the light was on in Jarrod’s room. Tr. 336. Michael entered the room to turn 

the light off and saw Jarrod “slouched over” on the floor. Tr. 336. Michael called 

911 after he determined that Jarrod was unresponsive. Tr. 336. The paramedics 

arrived shortly thereafter and pronounced Jarrod dead at 7:43 A.M. Tr. 313. The 

police investigating the scene discovered a hypodermic needle next to Jarrod and 

several other implements that are often associated with the administration of heroin. 

Tr. 385-386, 388-389. The police also found a folded piece of paper that contained 

roughly one-tenth of a gram of a powdery substance. Tr. 392, 573. Ex. 16, 17. This 

powdery substance was later tested and was found to contain a mixture of fentanyl 

and heroin. Tr. 575. Ex. 34, 36. An autopsy was performed on Jarrod, which 

determined that Jarrod died of a lethal dose of fentanyl. Tr. 510. Ex. 35. 

{¶4} Jarrod’s phone was on his bed when Michael entered Jarrod’s room 

on the morning of January 11, 2016. Tr. 341. Ex. 5, 18, 19, 33A. During their 

investigation, the police discovered the text messages between Jarrod and Brown. 

Tr. 456-457. Brown was listed as “Naythan Brown” in Jarrod’s contact list. Tr. 

478. Ex. 33A. The police then questioned Brown. Tr. 468. During this interview, 

Brown admitted that he texted with Jarrod on January 10, 2016. Tr. 468-469. On 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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December 13, 2016, Brown was charged with one count of corrupting another with 

drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.02(A)(3) and one count of involuntary manslaughter 

in violation of R.C. 2903.04(A). Doc. 1. 

{¶5} The trial commenced on March 29, 2017. Doc. 104. The State called 

Jarrod’s mother and sister as witnesses to identify a picture of Jarrod and discuss his 

history of substance abuse. Tr. 230, 262. Defense counsel did not cross examine 

either of these witnesses. Tr. 251, 273. The Defense challenged the admission of 

the text messages between Brown and Jarrod, arguing that the State could not 

authenticate the communications. Tr. 277, 296. The trial court, however, 

determined that the messages had been properly authenticated and admitted this 

evidence. Tr. 306, 472-473. The State then questioned Detective Fred Smith about 

the content of the text messages and the process by which the police obtained these 

communications. Tr. 456, 489. Detective Rodney Smith testified about the 

parameters that were established for the search of the phone. Tr. 442. The police 

downloaded the text messages, contact files, and phone logs from Jarrod’s phone, 

but did not retain all of the contents of the phone. Tr. 442-444. 

{¶6} The jury found Brown guilty of both criminal counts on March 29, 

2017. Doc. 53, 54. The trial court entered its sentencing order on June 12, 2017. 

Doc. 66. Brown filed his notice of appeal on July 5, 2017. Doc. 90. In this appeal, 

he raises the following assignments of error: 

 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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First Assignment of Error 

The trial court erred when it denied Mr. Brown’s motion for 

judgment of acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A). The State of 

Ohio failed to introduce sufficient evidence to sustain the 

convictions in this case. 

Second Assignment of Error 

The convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

Third Assignment of Error 

Mr. Brown’s right to due process, as guaranteed by the Fifth 

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America 

and made applicable to the states by and through the Fourteenth 

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, 

was violated when the State failed to preserve Mr. Jarrod 

Barger’s cellular telephone. 

Fourth Assignment of Error 

Mr. Brown was denied his fundamental right to effective 

assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to 

the Constitution of the United States of America and made 

applicable to the states by and through the Fourteenth 

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. 

For the sake of analytical clarity, we will consider appellant’s second assignment of 

error first. We will then consider his first, third, and fourth assignments of error. 

Second Assignment of Error 

{¶7} In the second assignment of error, appellant argues that his 

convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence. First, appellant argues 

that the State did not establish that Brown furnished Jarrod with fentanyl. Second, 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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appellant argues that any evidence that the State did provide suggesting that Brown 

provided Jarrod with fentanyl was contradicted by other evidence. 

Legal Standard 

{¶8} When “deciding whether a conviction is against the manifest weight 

of the evidence, an appellate court determines whether the state has appropriately 

carried its burden of persuasion.” State v. Blanton, 121 Ohio App.3d 162, 169, 699 

N.E.2d 136 (3d Dist.1997). “Unlike our review of the sufficiency of the evidence, 

an appellate court’s function when reviewing the weight of the evidence is to 

determine whether the greater amount of credible evidence supports the verdict.” 

State v. Plott, 2017-Ohio-38, 80 N.E.3d 1108, ¶ 73 (3d Dist.). “In a manifest weight 

analysis, ‘the appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ * * *.’” State v. Davis, 3d 

Dist. Seneca No. 13-16-30, 2017-Ohio-2916, ¶ 17, quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 

Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). 

On appeal, courts “must review the entire record, weigh the 

evidence and all of the reasonable inferences, consider the 

credibility of witnesses, and determine whether in resolving 

conflicts in the evidence, the factfinder ‘clearly lost its way and 

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction 

must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” 

Brentlinger, supra, at ¶ 36, quoting Thompkins at 387. 

{¶9} “A reviewing court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate 

discretion on matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the 

witnesses.” State v. Sullivan, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-17-09, 2017-Ohio-8937, ¶ 38, 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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quoting State v. Coleman, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-13-53, 2014-Ohio-5320, ¶ 7. “Only 

in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’ 

should an appellate court overturn the trial court's judgment.” State v. Little, 2016-

Ohio-8398, 78 N.E.3d 323, ¶ 27 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 

67, 2011-Ohio-6524, 960 N.E.2d 955, ¶ 119. 

{¶10} In this case, Brown was convicted of corrupting another with drugs in 

violation of R.C. 2925.02(A)(3). Thus, the State had to establish that Brown (1) 

knowingly (2) by any means, furnished to another (3) a controlled substance (4) and 

thereby caused serious physical harm to that person. R.C. 2925.02(A)(3). “A 

person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the 

person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain 

nature.” R.C. 2901.22(B). A controlled substance is “a drug, compound, mixture, 

preparation, or substance included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V.” R.C. 3719.01(C). 

See R.C. 2925.01(A), R.C. 3719.41. The offense of corrupting another with drugs 

is a felony of the second degree. R.C. 2925.02(C)(1)(a). 

{¶11} For a conviction of involuntary manslaughter, under R.C. 2903.04(A), 

the State had to establish that Brown (1) caused the death of another (2) as a 

proximate result (3) of the offender’s committing a felony. R.C. 2903.04(A). The 

“criminal intent of involuntary manslaughter is supplied by the criminal intent to do 

the underlying unlawful act of which the homicide is a consequence.” State v. 

Potee, 2017-Ohio-2926, --- N.E.3d ---, ¶ 32 (12th Dist.). State v. Mansfield, 2016-
Case No. 5-17-19 

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Ohio-8189, 69 N.E.3d 767, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.); State v. Grube, 2013-Ohio-692, 987 

N.E.2d 287, ¶ 39 (4th Dist.); State v. Lutman, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-97-1447, 1999 

WL 435196, *6 (June 30, 1999); State v. Losey, 23 Ohio App.3d 93, 491 N.E.2d 

379 (10th Dist.1985). Under R.C. 2903.04, the 

defendant will be held responsible for those foreseeable 

consequences which are known to be, or should be known to be, 

within the scope of the risk created by his conduct. Here, that 

means that death reasonably could be anticipated by an 

ordinarily prudent person as likely to result under these or 

similar circumstances. 

(Citations omitted.) State v. Shoemaker, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-06-12, 2006-Ohio5159, ¶ 65 (holding the victim’s “death, resulting from a morphine overdose, could 

have reasonably been anticipated by an ordinarily prudent person as likely to result 

from Shoemaker’s trafficking in morphine.”), quoting Losey at 94-95. 

Legal Analysis 

{¶12} At trial, Jarrod’s brother testified that he discovered Jarrod on the 

morning of January 11, 2016. Tr. 357-358. Shortly thereafter, when the police 

arrived at Jarrod’s house on January 11, 2016, the police observed Jarrod on his 

back, lying next to his bed in his room. Tr. 358, 386-387. Jarrod had a hypodermic 

needle next to his body. Tr. 339, 385-386. On the dresser, the police found a Q-tip, 

syringe caps, a lighter, and a spoon with drug residue on it. Tr. 388-389. Ex. 11, 

12. Deputy Thomas L. Miller (“Deputy Miller”) of the Hancock County Sheriff’s 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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Office testified that these were items frequently used in the administration of heroin. 

Tr. 388-392. 

{¶13} Miller discovered a piece of brown paper on the dresser that contained 

a brown, powdery substance. Tr. 391-392. Kelsey Degen (“Degen”), a forensic 

scientist at the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigations, tested this substance on 

March 31, 2016. Tr. 563. Degen testified that this substance weighed one tenth of 

a gram and was composed of heroin and fentanyl. Tr. 573, 575. Ex. 34, 36. Dr. 

Mark Fox (“Dr. Fox”), the county coroner, testified that fentanyl is being added to 

heroin, which is leading to overdose deaths. Tr. 318. He then testified that he has 

also seen overdose deaths after fentanyl was used by itself. Tr. 318. Dr. Fox 

identified Jarrod’s death certificate during his testimony, which showed that Jarrod 

was pronounced dead at 7:43 A.M. on January 11, 2016. Tr. 313-314. Ex. 34. 

{¶14} The police also discovered Suboxone on Jarrod’s dresser. Tr. 390, 

396. Ex. 12. Jarrod’s brother and sister testified that Jarrod had been prescribed 

Suboxone to help with his heroin addiction. Tr. 265, 329. Dr. Robert Fortney (“Dr. 

Fortney”), a toxicologist at the Lucas County Coroner’s Office, testified that 

Suboxone contains Buprenorphine and Naloxone. Tr. 552. Neither Buprenorphine 

nor Naloxone was listed in the toxicology report as being present in Jarrod’s system. 

Ex. 35. Dr. Fortney testified that these drugs would have been detected by the tests 

that he performed. Tr. 552. He also testified that Suboxone does not contain 

morphine. Tr. 551. The record does not indicate that any other drugs were found 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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in Jarrod’s room, though marijuana paraphernalia was discovered “tucked away” in 

a plastic container on the other side of Jarrod’s bed. Tr. 383, 396-397. 

{¶15} During their investigation, the police discovered Jarrod’s phone on his 

bed. Tr. 242, 267, 384-385. At trial, the phone was identified by his mother, sister, 

brother, and Deputy Tom Miller of the Hancock County Sheriff’s Office. Tr. 244, 

267, 344, 385. Michael testified that he had seen his brother texting from this phone 

throughout the day on January 10, 2016. Tr. 332. After examining the contents of 

the phone, the police discovered that Jarrod had been in contact with a person listed 

as “Naythan Brown” in Jarrod’s phone’s contact list. Tr. 246-247, 332, 478. 

{¶16} Officer Fred Smith testified that he then interviewed Brown, who 

admitted that he had spoken with Jarrod on the night of January 10, 2016 and had 

texted with him that day. Tr. 468. Brown was also able to recite the first few digits 

of Jarrod’s phone number. Tr. 469. At trial, the text messages were identified by 

Officer Fred Smith. Tr. 475-476. 

Time Type From To Duration of Call/Content of Text 

12:40 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod My bad I crashed 

12:48 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown It’s all good brotha 

12:48 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod Been at work since 11 just got my phone on 

trying to make a run when I get on break soon 

12:52 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown Well where u gettin it from 

12:53 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod Dude from yesterday unless drizzy has ima try 

him 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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12:55 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown Ok well as long as it’s good s--- I’m diwn 

12:56 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod Either ones dank lol 

12:56 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod Ima have to hurry tho whenever I get break 

what u thinking? 

12:56 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown Well yeah but that same dude had diff stuff 2 

days n a row 

12:58 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown I’ll take 80 my n-- 

12:58 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod I think the first was cuz its all be had left and 

alright soon as I hit break I’ll b with ya 

12:59 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown Ok. And I don’t have the cash all I got is my 

card. Is that cool bro? 

1:04 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod Idk when I’m getting break I’m not gunna ask 

u to ride n snow to get it I’ll make Ben take me 

1:06 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown I was gonna say in will if I absolutely need to 

1:07 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown But I’d really appreciate that 

1:08 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod That’s up to u I’m tryna find when I get break 

now...drizzy good 

1:11 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown Well if you would do it for me I’d rather do that 

bit like if I’m forced to go then I will. And f--- 

yeah! About time 

1:11 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown Do you have any cigs? 

1:13 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod Nooe 

1:13 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown Well if u buy me a pack I’ll buy u a pack too 

1:17 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod Say what 

1:18 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown If u buy me a pack with my card I’ll also buy u 

a pack 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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1:22 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod Ooo I gotcha now...yeah I can do that brotha 

1:27 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown Ight well shell doesn’t carry my brand of cigs. 

Do you know where u gotta meet drizz? The 

econo? 

1:28 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown Cause I want camel Turkish Royals but I’ll 

settle for L&Ms Turkish blends if I have to 

1:29 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod I’m not sure where he is yrt 

1:30 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown Ok well I guess depending on where he’s at, try 

n stop by something along the way. If shells 

the only place on the way then so be it 

1:37 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod Heard that i m getting notice when I go to break 

I’ll let you know asap 

1:39 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown Ight brotha sounds good 

2:04 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod Break now u home 

2:04 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown Yeasir 

2:07 

P.M. 

Call Brown Jarrod 1 Minute, 13 Seconds 

2:32 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown What’s up bra 

2:36 

P.M. 

Call Brown Jarrod 1 Minute, 13 Seconds 

2:39 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod That was fat an no cut at all I’m kinda testing 

Ben to see if he f---- around it was all tucked n 

the cigg 

2:40 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown Ok he should be here soon if he not f----- with 

it 

2:40 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod Exactly 

3:44 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod I think I almost like the white stuff better 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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3:54 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown Really? I’m not sure how I feel about it yet. 

But ingot digis last night and I’m prolly gonna 

weigh this n see what’s up $ 

4:00 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod Yeah I had to bust mine out to splt it down 

4:11 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown Yeah it just seemed a lil small than normal. I 

could be wrong tho so that’s why imma weigh 

it 

5:48 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod That s--- said .39 when it left my hands...so u 

did some then weighed it or what? 

6:04 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod He swears he didn’t touch it 

6:07 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown Yeah bro. Bit im tellingy you it was only a point 

point and a half that I did first 

6:08 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown Anymore and I’d be on the floor unconsious 

6:09 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod So the tooth fairy came in and nabbed it up huh 

6:09 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod So what was it total then with what u did and 

what was left cuz I said something to him and 

he got all defensive....how long did it take for 

him to get to u 

6:11 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown Prolly .23 total and it took him like 5 mins. 

6:14 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod Hmmmm...how was it packaged 

6:14 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown It seemed like it took him a lil longer than usual. 

And normally I can get like 4 to 5 shots out it 

but now I’m lucky I’m gonna get 4 

6:14 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod Sry I’m trying to figure this out man I’m rather 

pissed 

6:15 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown Lucky in gonna get 3**** sorry a little f----- up 

can’t rype 

6:17 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown It was in a black paper wrapped in my receipt 

in my cig cellophane under my debit csr!% 

6:18 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod Gunna get what? Ok well hmmn wtf 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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6:22 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown I’m lucky I’m gonna get 3 shots out of the thing 

7:34 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod O I hear ya buddy I’m sorry seriously I’m 

ripping him a new a-- 

Ex. 33A. 

{¶17} After the prosecution introduced this segment of the text messages, 

Detective Fred Smith testified that he believed “white stuff” referred to cocaine and 

that “points” refers to a quantity of drugs. Tr. 489, 491-492. In his experience, 

“points” was generally used as the measure of heroin as this is the drug that is sold 

in an amount that small. Tr. 491. He then testified that the number of shots 

referenced by Jarrod referred to the “usage dose that he’s going to use as far as an 

injection * * *.” Tr. 493. 

{¶18} He also testified that the “80” in this series of text messages referred 

to a sum of cash. Tr. 483. Jarrod’s mother testified at trial that she knew about 

Jarrod’s drug addiction. To help him, she would monitor his bank account and 

would watch for withdrawals of forty or eighty dollars because these were the 

amounts that he would withdraw if he wanted to purchase drugs. Tr. 249-250. 

Further, Detective Fred Smith testified that the Econo Lodge was a location in 

Findlay that was known for drug trafficking. Tr. 488. The rest of the text messages 

read as follows: 

7:35 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown If worse comes to worse can u get me more? 

Today is literally my last f----- day I swear to 

god 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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8:04 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod Whe. Brotha I’m bout off work 

8:07 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown Whenever convenient for you 

8:15 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod I’ll bet with you soon buddy 

8:25 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown Ok sweet 

8:46 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown So what’s up buddy 

8:50 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod Just got off work 

8:51 

P.M. 

Call Brown Jarrod 1 Minute, 13 Seconds 

8:55 

P.M. 

Call Brown Jarrod 0 Minutes, 15 Seconds 

9:07 

P.M. 

Call Brown Jarrod 0 Minutes, 19 Seconds 

9:18 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod We had to stop I f----- ralphed all over 

*** *** *** *** *** 

9:21 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod I keep puking all over..I feel bad and I nodded 

out at work my boss pulled me aside like 

whats up 

9:30 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown I kno u told me already bro. When u gonna be 

back 

9:35 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown ? 

9:36 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod Soon I’m sorry man 

9:42 

P.M. 

Call Jarrod Brown N/A 

9:42 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown How soon? 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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9:45 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod Ten mins 

9:51 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod These scales are f----- up dude 

*** *** *** *** *** 

9:56 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod I’m leaving....I watched my buddy weigh up 

the .7 I needed and this is telling me a half g 

just f--- it whatecer 

*** *** *** *** *** 

10:01 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown I’ll b outside. Where is u 

10:04 

P.M. 

Call Jarrod Brown 1 Minute, 15 Seconds 

10:07 

P.M. 

Call Jarrod Brown 0 Minutes, 29 Seconds 

10:08 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown Txt me when ur by outback 

10:18 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown ??? 

10:21 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod On way dude I’m.so f------ pissed off 

10:21 

P.M. 

Call Jarrod Brown 0 Minutes, 41 Seconds 

10:32 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod Passing g outbsck 

10:33 

P.M. 

Text Jarrod Brown Ok cook I’ll b down at the spot 

10:33 

P.M. 

Call Jarrod Brown 0 Minutes, 21 Seconds 

10:48 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod I’m sry brotha...I’m so stressed out trying to 

make sure i take care of everyone and not f--- 

anyone over and end up dicking myself..think 

im just too high 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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10:53 

P.M. 

Text Brown Jarrod I keep saying sorry to everyone and Ben ran 

out of gas..just fell like a f----- dumba-- 

Ex. 33A. As this segment of the text messages was introduced at trial, Detective 

Fred Smith testified that “a G is what they refer to for a gram.” Tr. 496. 

{¶19} Michael testified at trial that he was home “all day.” Tr. 332. He also 

testified that his house, where he and Jarrod lived at the time of Jarrod’s death, was 

in close proximity to Outback. Tr. 324. He also testified that Jarrod did not have a 

driver’s license and was “hanging out at the house” during the day on January 10, 

2016. Tr. 332. He testified that Jarrod would occasionally step outside into the 

garage to smoke a cigarette because the terms of their lease prohibited smoking 

inside the house. Tr. 333. He also said that Jarrod “had his cell phone on him at all 

times. * * * [W]hen I would see him out in the garage texting he would just be 

smoking a cigarette or texting.” Tr. 332-333. Michael then testified that he did not 

see anyone else come inside his house on January 10, 2016. Tr. 342. Michael 

testified that Jarrod left the house around “10:30-ish” P.M.1

 Tr. 334. Michael 

observed Jarrod “putting on his shoes, he had his coat on, he was putting on his 

shoes about to exit the garage door to go inside the garage and that was the last time 

I saw him.” Tr. 334. 

 

1

 On January 11, 2016, Michael told the police that he believed he went to bed at 11:00 P.M. on the night of 

January 10, 2016. Tr. 347. At trial, Michael stated that he usually went to bed in between 10:00 and 10:30 

P.M. Tr. 334. He testified that he saw Jarrod after he (Michael) got up to get a glass of water. Tr. 334. He 

also testified that he was unsure as to what time he went to bed on the night of January 10, 2016. Tr. 334. 

Since he usually went to bed around 10:00 P.M., he thought that he saw Jarrod leaving the house at around 

10:30 P.M. Tr. 334. 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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{¶20} Later at trial, Dr. Fortney testified that Jarrod had cocaine, morphine, 

and fentanyl in his system at the time of his death. Tr. 535-536, 537, 540. Ex. 35. 

However, the cocaine was not in Jarrod’s blood, indicating to Dr. Fortney that Jarrod 

used cocaine at some point on the day of his death; that he was not under the 

influence of cocaine at the time of his death; and that “[t]he cocaine was not used 

near the time of his death.” Tr. 540. Further, the level of morphine in Jarrod’s 

system was relatively low and was not the cause of death. Tr. 537. The morphine 

that was present in Jarrod’s system was consistent with heroin use and indicated that 

Jarrod had used either heroin or morphine within several hours of his death. Tr. 

537-538. Ex. 35. However, Dr. Fortney could not, based upon the results of these 

tests, conclude with medical certainty whether Jarrod had taken heroin or morphine. 

Tr. 538.

{¶21} The toxicology report indicated that Jarrod had eighteen nanograms 

of fentanyl per milliliter of his blood. Tr. 519, 547-548. At trial, Dr. Fortney 

testified that a level of five nanograms of fentanyl per milliliter of blood was fatal 

and that therapeutic range of fentanyl use was between one or two nanograms of 

fentanyl per milliliter of blood. Tr. 547-548. Based on the results in this report, he 

determined that the cause of death was the fentanyl, stating that “but for the fentanyl 

there would be no death.” Tr. 550. Dr. Fortney further testified that “the cause of 

death is respiratory depression but what caused the respiratory depression [was] the 

fentanyl.” Tr. 547. Dr. Fortney could not pinpoint the exact time of death, but he 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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was able to conclude that death occurred shortly after Jarrod introduced the fentanyl 

into his system. Tr. 549. He also testified that fentanyl is a Schedule II drug under 

Ohio law. Tr. 543. 

{¶22} Following our decision in State v. Kramer, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-

15-14, 2016-Ohio-2984, we conclude that neither of Brown’s convictions are 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. We find that competent, credible 

evidence exists as to all elements of each indicted charge. We do not find evidence 

in the record that indicates the jurors lost their way and made a decision that 

constitutes a manifest miscarriage of justice. The facts of this case do not present 

one of the exceptional circumstances in which a reversal of the jury’s verdict is 

warranted. Kramer at ¶ 56, citing State v. Haller, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-

Ohio-5233, ¶ 9. For these reasons, appellant’s second assignment of error is 

overruled. 

First Assignment of Error 

{¶23} In the first assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court 

erred by denying his Crim.R. 29 motion, arguing his convictions were based on 

insufficient evidence. First, appellant claims that the State failed to establish that 

Brown knowingly furnished Jarrod with fentanyl or that Brown knowingly caused 

physical harm to Jarrod. Second, appellant argues that his conviction for 

involuntary manslaughter should be reversed since the predicate crime—his 

conviction for corrupting another with drugs—was based on insufficient evidence. 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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In addressing appellant’s second assignment of error, we determined that the State 

presented evidence that substantiates each element of Brown’s convictions. Rather 

than repeat this evidence, we will reincorporate these previous evidentiary findings 

and will then address the arguments that are particular to appellant’s first assignment 

of error. 

Legal Standard 

{¶24} Crim.R. 29 reads, in its relevant part, as follows: 

(A) Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. The court on motion of a 

defendant or on its own motion, after the evidence on either side 

is closed, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or 

more offenses charged in the indictment, information, or 

complaint, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of 

such offense or offenses. 

Crim.R. 29(A). “An appellate court reviews a denial of a Crim.R. 29 motion for 

judgment of acquittal using the same standard that is used to review a sufficiency of 

the evidence claim. Sullivan at ¶ 11, quoting State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 

553, 651 N.E.2d 965 (1995). 

{¶25} “A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a 

conviction requires a court to determine whether the state has met its burden of 

production at trial.” State v. Brentlinger, 2017-Ohio-2588, --- N.E.3d ---, ¶ 21 (3d 

Dist.), quoting In re Swift, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 79610, 2002 WL 451226, 3 

(March 21, 2002). “The sufficiency of the evidence analysis addresses the question 

of whether adequate evidence was produced for the case to be considered by the 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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trier of fact and, thus, whether the evidence was “legally sufficient to support the 

verdict * * *.” State v. Campbell, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-17-23, 2017-Ohio-9251, ¶ 

13, quoting State v. Worthington, 3d Dist. Hardin No. 6-15-04, 2016-Ohio-530, ¶ 

12. 

{¶26} “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at 

trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average 

mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Pierce, 3d Dist. 

Seneca No. 13-16-36, 2017-Ohio-4223, ¶ 6, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 

259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state 

constitutional amendment on other grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 684 

N.E.2d 668 (1997), fn. 4. 

{¶27} “This analysis does not attempt to ‘resolve evidentiary conflicts nor 

assess the credibility of witnesses, as both are functions reserved for the trier of 

fact.’” Davis, supra, at ¶ 13, quoting State v. Eckard, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-15-45, 

2016-Ohio-5174, ¶ 9. Thus, sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law and a 

“test of adequacy rather than credibility or weight of the evidence.” State v. Berry, 

3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-12-03, 2013-Ohio-2380, ¶ 19. The standard for sufficiency 

of the evidence 

is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found that 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

Plott, supra, at ¶ 62. 

Corrupting Another with Drugs Legal Analysis 

{¶28} We begin this analysis by reincorporating the evidence discussed 

under the first assignment of error. In this case, appellant argues that the State failed 

to prove that he “knowingly furnished Fentanyl to [Jarrod].” (Emphasis added.) 

Appellant’s Brief, 11. Under R.C. 2925.02(A)(3), however, the statute only requires 

that the State establish that Brown “knowingly * * * furnished” Jarrod with a 

“controlled substance.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2925.02(A)(3). Thus, the State 

did not have to prove that Brown knew he was furnishing Jarrod with a controlled 

substance that contained fentanyl. State v. Edmonds, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

104528, 2017-Ohio-745, ¶ 39, 43; (holding that the evidence was sufficient where 

“the evidence demonstrated that [the defendant] sold [the victim] the drugs that 

caused his death.”); State v. Wells, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2016-02-009, 2017-

Ohio-420, ¶ 39. See State v. Ward, 3d Dist. Crawford No. 13-17-02, 2017-Ohio8518, ¶ 15, (holding that the State had to establish that the defendant knowingly sold 

a controlled substance in order to be convicted under R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) and did 

not have to prove that the defendant “had actual knowledge that the heroin he sold 

contained fentanyl.”), citing State v. Patterson, 69 Ohio St.2d 445, 447, 432 N.E.2d 

802 (1982), overruled in part on other grounds. State v. Veley, 6th Dist. Lucas No. 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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L-16-1038, 2017-Ohio-9064, ¶ 26 (holding “[i]t is also immaterial that it was not 

proven (though it was suggested) that appellant added the fentanyl to the heroin.”); 

Potee, supra, at ¶ 30 (holding the sufficiency analysis for convictions under R.C. 

2925.02(A)(3) and R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) “does not contemplate whether appellant 

knew the type and amount of the [controlled] substance.”). Based on applicable 

case law, we find that this particular argument is without merit. 

{¶29} The appellant also argues that the State did not establish that “Brown 

knowingly caused serious physical harm.” Appellant’s Brief, 16. If Brown had 

been charged under R.C. 2925.02(A)(2), this argument might have merit. R.C. 

2925.02(A)(2) reads, in its relevant part, as follows: “[n]o person shall knowingly * 

* * furnish to another * * * a controlled substance with purpose to cause serious 

physical harm to the other person.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2925.02(A)(2). 

However, R.C. 2925.02(A)(3), which is the statute under which Brown was charged, 

reads, in its relevant part, as follows: [n]o person shall knowingly * * * furnish to 

another * * * a controlled substance, and thereby cause serious physical harm.” 

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2925.02(A)(3). Thus, for convictions under R.C. 

2925.02(A)(3), the State does not need to prove that the defendant knowingly 

intended to cause serious physical harm. Rather, the State must prove that the 

defendant knowingly furnished another with drugs and that serious physical harm 

resulted from this intentional act. See State v. Rutherford, Darby, Jones, 9th Dist. 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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Summit Nos. 9521, 9522, and 9523, 1981 WL 3883, *10 (February 25, 1981). For 

this reason, this argument is without merit. 

Involuntary Manslaughter 

{¶30} In this case, Brown’s conviction for corrupting another with drugs is 

the predicate offense for his conviction of involuntary manslaughter. In this 

assignment of error, appellant challenged his involuntary manslaughter conviction 

on the grounds that its predicate conviction was not supported by sufficient 

evidence. Since we have found that Brown’s arguments against his conviction for 

corrupting another with drugs are without merit, his conviction for involuntary 

manslaughter has a properly supported predicate conviction and withstands the 

sufficiency of the evidence analysis. After reviewing the record in a light most 

favorable to the prosecution, we find that Brown’s convictions were based upon 

sufficient evidence. For this reason, his first assignment of error is overruled. 

Third Assignment of Error 

{¶31} In his third assignment of error, appellant challenges the decision of 

the police to not download all of the data on Jarrod’s cell phone as part of their 

investigation. In so doing, appellant claims that the police failed to preserve 

material exculpatory evidence in violation of Brown’s due process rights. 

Alternatively, appellant asserts that the police, in failing to download all of the 

contents of Jarrod’s phone, failed to preserve potentially useful evidence. 

 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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Legal Standard 

{¶32} The State has a duty to preserve and disclose material evidence that is 

favorable to the Defense. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 

L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). See Crim.R. 16(A). 

However, the state has no duty to gather such exculpatory 

evidence. Rather, when the state has failed to gather exculpatory 

evidence or to fully investigate the allegations, the defendant may 

either investigate the charge and collect the evidence himself, if 

such evidence is available, or he may point out the deficiencies in 

the state’s investigation at trial. 

(Citations omitted.) State v. Farris, 2d Dist. Clark No. Civ.A.2003 CA 77, 2004-

Ohio-5980, ¶ 20. The State’s failure to preserve evidence constitutes a due process 

violation in two main situations. State v. Cahill, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-01-19, 

2002-Ohio-4459, ¶ 13. 

{¶33} First, a due process violation exists where the State fails to preserve 

material exculpatory evidence. State v. Geeslin, 116 Ohio St.3d 252, 2007-Ohio5239, 878 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 7, citing State v. Johnston, 39 Ohio St.3d 48, 529 N.E.2d 898 

(1988). 

Evidence is constitutionally material when it possesses ‘an 

exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was 

destroyed, and [is] of such a nature that the defendant would be 

unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably 

available means.’ 

State v. Powell, 132 Ohio St.3d 233, 2012-Ohio-2577, 971 N.E.2d 865, ¶ 74, 

quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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(1984). The appellant need not establish that the State acted with bad faith in its 

failure to preserve material exculpatory evidence. State v. Parsons, 2017-Ohio1315, 88 N.E.3d 624, ¶ 79, citing Trombetta at 489. “The defendant bears the 

burden to show that the evidence was materially exculpatory.” Powell at ¶ 74. 

{¶34} Second, a due process violation exists where the State fails to preserve 

potentially useful evidence in bad faith. Powell at ¶ 77, citing Arizona v. 

Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). “[P]otentially 

useful evidence is evidence that if subjected to tests, the results of which, might 

have exonerated the defendant.” Parsons at ¶ 80, quoting State v. Frasure, 11th 

Dist. Ashtabula No. 2007-A-0033, 2008-Ohio-1504, ¶ 6. However, “unless a 

criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve 

potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.” 

Powell at ¶ 76. “Bad faith implies more than bad judgment or negligence, rather 

‘[i]t imports a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, conscious wrongdoing, breach of 

a known duty through some ulterior motive or ill will partaking of the nature of 

fraud.’” Parsons at ¶ 80, quoting Powell at ¶ 81. 

Material Exculpatory Evidence Analysis 

{¶35} On March 28, 2017, the State submitted an additional discovery 

disclosure. Doc. 51. This document had a phone examination report that showed 

that the State had downloaded all of the text messages, contacts, notes, multimedia 

messages, images, and phone logs that were on Jarrod’s phone. Doc. 51. This report 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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also showed that Jarrod’s e-mail communications and web browsing history were 

not downloaded as part of the police investigation. Doc. 51. At trial, only a small 

subset of this data—the text messages, phone logs, and contact information from 

January 10-11, 2016—was admitted into evidence. Ex. 33A. 

{¶36} On appeal, appellant argues that the phone was material to guilt and 

that all of the cell phone’s content should have been preserved. However, appellant 

does not demonstrate how the web browsing history and e-mail communications 

had an apparent exculpatory value at the time of this download. The fact that some 

of the contents of the phone—the text messages, phone logs, and contact lists—

were material to guilt or punishment does not establish that all of the contents of the 

phone were material to guilt or punishment. Moreover, appellant has failed to 

establish that the contents that were not downloaded were exculpatory. 

{¶37} Since appellant has not demonstrated on appeal how the web 

browsing history and e-mail communications had an apparent value as material 

exculpatory evidence, the assertion that the web browsing history and e-mail 

communications on Jarrod’s cell phone were material exculpatory evidence is 

speculative. State v. Brown, 2017-Ohio-8416, --- N.E.3d ---, ¶ 53 (2d Dist.) (holding 

“it is wholly speculative to assume that the part of the tapes not copied by the police 

showed any potentially exculpatory evidence.”). Thus, appellant has not carried the 

burden of establishing that the State failed to preserve material exculpatory evidence 

and, therefore, has not established that a due process violation occurred. 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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Potentially Useful Evidence Analysis 

{¶38} At trial, Detective Rodney Smith testified as to the parameters of the 

police investigation into Jarrod’s cell phone. Tr. 443, 445-446. The police stayed 

within these parameters and downloaded the information from the cell phone that 

was determined to be within scope of this investigation. Tr. 457-458. Doc. 51. The 

State then returned the cell phone to Jarrod’s family. Tr. 457-458. On appeal, 

appellant fails to identify facts in the record that show the State acted in bad faith 

during this process. Rather, appellant merely asserts that the State acted in bad faith. 

Thus, appellant has failed to carry the burden of establishing that the State acted in 

bad faith and of establishing that a due process violation occurred. For these 

reasons, appellant’s third assignment of error is overruled. 

Fourth Assignment of Error 

{¶39} In his fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that his trial counsel 

committed two errors that denied him his right to the effective assistance of counsel. 

First, appellant argues that Brown’s trial counsel failed to file a motion that would 

preserve all of the contents of Jarrod’s phone; failed to request access to Jarrod’s 

phone; and failed to file a motion to dismiss after discovering the police did not 

preserve all of the contents of Jarrod’s phone. Second, appellant argues that his trial 

counsel failed to cross examine several of the State’s witnesses and failed to use 

cross examination to present an alternate theory of this case. 

 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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Legal Standard 

{¶40} “In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court of the United States 

established a two-prong test for determining whether a criminal defendant was 

denied the effective assistance of counsel.” Davis, supra, at ¶ 35, citing Strickland 

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 

(1984). Under the first prong of the Strickland test, 

the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was 

deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so 

serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ 

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. 

State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 289, 714 N.E.3d 905 (1999), quoting 

Strickland at 687. “In order to show deficient performance, the defendant must 

prove that counsel’s performance fell below an objective level of reasonable 

representation.” State v. Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412, 2006-Ohio-2815, 848 

N.E.2d 810, ¶ 95. “Debatable strategic and tactical decisions may not form the basis 

of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, even if, in hindsight, it looks as if a 

better strategy had been available.” State v. Conley, 2015-Ohio-2553, 43 N.E.3d 

775, ¶ 56, citing State v. Cook, 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 524, 605 N.E.2d 70 (1992). “A 

reviewing court may not second-guess decisions of counsel which can be considered 

matters of trial strategy.” Conley at ¶ 56, citing State v. Smith, 17 Ohio St.3d 98, 

477 N.E.2d 1128 (1985). 

{¶41} To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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the defendant must show that the deficient performance 

prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s 

errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a 

trial whose result is reliable. 

Calhoun at 289, quoting Strickland at 687. “To show prejudice, the defendant must 

show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” State v. Bibbs, 2016-Ohio-8396, 78 N.E.3d 

343, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.), quoting Conway at ¶ 95. Appellate courts examine the record 

to determine “whether the accused, under all the circumstances, * * * had a fair trial 

and substantial justice was done.” State v. Rodriquez, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-16-

16, 2017-Ohio-1318, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Hester, 45 Ohio St.2d 71, 341 N.E.2d 304 

(1976), paragraph four of the syllabus. 

{¶42} “Under Ohio law, ‘a properly licensed attorney is presumed to carry 

out his duties in a competent manner.’” State v. Howton, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-16-

35, 2017-Ohio-4349, ¶ 34, quoting State v. Gee, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-92-9, 1993 

WL 270995 (July 22, 1993). For this reason, the petitioner has the burden of proving 

that counsel was ineffective at trial. Id. “The failure to prove either 1) a substantial 

violation or 2) prejudice caused by the violation makes it unnecessary for a court to 

consider the other prong of the test.” Walker at ¶ 20, citing State v. Anaya, 191 Ohio 

App.3d 602, 2010-Ohio-6045, 947 N.E.2d 212, ¶ 25. 

 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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Legal Analysis 

{¶43} We will first address the argument that the decision of trial counsel 

not to address the preservation of all of the contents of Jarrod’s cell phone. In this 

case, the Defense’s trial strategy was to challenge the admission of the text 

messages, raising an authentication issue at trial. Tr. 277, 290, 296, 306, 472-473, 

582-583. Doc. 47. The decision not to file a motion to preserve evidence is a matter 

of trial strategy. State v. Lupardus, 4th Dist. Washington No. 08CA31, 2008-Ohio5960, ¶ 26-28. Further, under the third assignment of error, appellant failed to 

demonstrate (1) that the contents of Jarrod’s phone that the State did not preserve 

constituted material exculpatory evidence or (2) that the State acted in bad faith in 

not preserving this potentially useful evidence. Id. at ¶ 29. Thus, the appellant 

cannot demonstrate how the outcome of the trial would have been different had his 

trial counsel chosen a different strategy. 

{¶44} We now turn to the trial counsel’s cross examination of the State’s 

witnesses. The decision of the trial counsel not to cross examine the mother and 

sister of the victim was a tactical decision. “The extent and scope of crossexamination clearly fall within the ambit of trial strategy, and debatable trial tactics 

do not establish ineffective assistance of counsel.” State v. Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 

54, 2004-Ohio-6235, 818 N.E.2d 229, ¶ 146. Further, appellant has not 

demonstrated how the decision of his trial counsel not to cross-examine several of 

the State’s witnesses prejudiced him in a manner that deprived him of a fair trial. 
Case No. 5-17-19 

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State v. Otte, 74 Ohio St.3d 555, 565, 660 N.E.2d 711, 721 (1996) (holding “[t]rial 

counsel need not cross-examine every witness; indeed, doing so can backfire.”). 

State v. Were, 118 Ohio St.3d 448, 2008-Ohio-2762, 890 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 216-217. 

{¶45} We now consider the allegation that trial counsel failed to present an 

alternative theory as to the source of the fentanyl during cross-examination. We 

note that appellant does not, on appeal, present what alternative theory should have 

been presented by trial counsel. State v. Howard, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97695, 

2012-Ohio-3459, ¶ 28-29. In the absence of evidence substantiating an alternate 

theory, appellant has not carried the burden of establishing how the outcome of his 

trial could have been different. After examining the record, we find that trial 

counsel’s decision fell within what can be considered reasonable trial strategy. State 

v. Brown, 38 Ohio St.3d 305, 319, 528 N.E.2d 523 (1988) (holding “[i]t is also 

recognized that a defendant is not deprived of effective assistance of counsel when 

counsel chooses, for strategical reasons, not to pursue every possible trial tactic.”). 

See State v. Smith, 4th Dist. Ross No. 09CA3128, 2011-Ohio-664, ¶ 30. 

{¶46} In each of the alleged deficiencies that he points to on appeal, 

appellant has failed to establish that the outcome of his trial would have changed 

had his trial counsel acted differently. Thus, the appellant has not carried the burden 

of establishing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. For this reason, the 

appellant’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.

 
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Conclusion 

{¶47} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars 

assigned and argued, the judgment of the Hancock County Court of Common Pleas 

is affirmed. 

Judgment Affirmed 

ZIMMERMAN and SHAW, J.J., concur. 

/hls