STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT 2021 CA 1405 1 DONALD T. BROWN, DDS VERSUS 

# UA DOUGLAS D. McGINITY McGINITY LAW FIRM LLC AND HANNAH CHOKR Judgment Rendered.

Appealed from the 22nd Judicial District Court 

### In and forthe Parish ofSt. Tammany

State of Louisiana Case No. 2016- 13910 

### The Honorable Ellen M.Creel,Judge Presiding

Thomas H. Huval Stefini W. Salles Covington, Louisiana and Neil H. Mixon Baton Rouge, Louisiana 

### FJUL 14 2022

Counsel for Plaintiff/ Appellee Donald T. Brown, DDS



### Kevin R.Tully Counsel for Defendant/Appellants H. Carter Marshall Douglas D. McGinity and McGinity Law New Orleans, Louisiana Firm, LLC

BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., LANIER,AND HESTER, JJ.LANIER, J. Defendants, Douglas D. 

### McGinity and 

### McGinity Law Firm, LLC 

### hereinafter sometimes collectively referred to as " McGinity"), seek this court's review of the district court's December 30, 

### 2020 judgment granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, Donald T. Brown, DDS. For the reasons that follow,we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Zienab Chokr, a/k/a Zara Chokr, was injured in an automobile accident on August 14, 2015. Zara was a minor at the time ofthe accident. Subsequent to the accident, Zara's mother, Nisrine Chokr, retained Douglas D. 

### McGinity and the McGinity Law Firm, LLC to represent Zara in connection with her claim for personal injuries. 

### According to the record, Mr. McGinity contacted Dr. Brown in December 2015 regarding potential treatment for Zara for a TMJ ( temporal 

### mandibularjoint) injury. 

### Zara was initially evaluated by Dr. Brown on December 10, 2015, at which time her mother was provided with a Predetermination Estimate 

### ofCosts for Treating TMJ Dysfunction (" the estimate"). The estimate set forth in detail the various phases of potential treatment and the estimated costs associated

with same. Ms. Chokr signed the estimate on December 10, 2015. On December 21, 

### 2015, Dr. Brown's office staff spoke with Mr. McGinity regarding the initial evaluation ofZara and faxedthe estimate to Mr.McGinity's office.

The estimate provided that the cost of "PHASE I - TMJ THERAPY" would 

### be approximately $5, 000.00 to $ 10,300.00 and would include diagnostic studies; a therapeutic upper and/or lower splint; physical modalities such as ultrasound 

### treatments, moist heat, and infrared therapy; and regular office visits for evaluation and adjustment of the splint. The estimate indicated that the total cost of Phase I

varies with each patient" and that "[ t]he more severe the condition, the longer it will take to alleviate the discomfort and restore normal function." It further

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### explained what the TMJ Diagnostic Study entailed and thatthe average cost ofthe

study is $3, 359.00. 

### With regard to payment, the estimate clearly specified that a deferred payment plan was available, with an initial payment of $ 1, 680.00 to begin treatment and monthly payments of $ 237.00 thereafter until the balance was paid in full. 

### The estimate provided furtherthat a monthly statement would be provided showing the balance due on the account. 

### According to the record, monthly 

### statements were sentto McGinity in 2016 forthe months ofApril - August. 

### On March 9, 2016, Mr. McGinity signed a Payment Agreement (" payment agreement") 

### with Dr. Brown's office in which Mr. McGinity, as the responsible party, agreed to use the deferred payment plan, with the initial payment of 

### 1, 680.00 being due by March 21, 2016, followed by the monthly payments of 237.00 beginning on April 21, 2016. 

### On that same date, Mr. McGinity also signed a Medical Reports & Doctor's Lien (" lien agreement"), in which he acknowledged that he was to "

### withhold such sums from any settlement,judgment, 

### orverdict,as may be necessary to adequately protect" Dr.Brown. Ms. Chokr signed the same lien agreement on March 21, 2016. Ms. Chokr 

### authorized Mr. McGinity to pay Dr. Brown directly from any settlement that may be paid as a result ofZara's injuries. However, Ms. Chokr also acknowledged that 

### she was personally and fully responsible to Dr. Brown for all of the invoices submitted by him for medical and dental services rendered to Zara and that 

### payment to Dr. Brown was not contingent upon any settlement that Zara may eventually receive. 

### Moreover, by signing the lien agreement, Ms. Chokr agreed that no distribution ofany settlement proceeds could be made to her or Zara until 

### Mr. McGinity had confirmed, in writing,that Dr. Brown's charges have been paid in full.

3On March 10, 2016, Mr. 

### McGinity's office paid the $ 1, 680.00 initial

payment as set forth in the estimate and the payment agreement. Zara's second 

### visitwith Dr. Brown was on March 21, 2016, which included a detailed series ofxrays and other computer diagnostics; on March 30, 2016, Zara received her
mandibular splint. 

### One monthly payment in the amount of $ 237.00 was made on Zara's account for April 2016. 

### On April 4, 2016, Dr.Brown provided Mr.McGinty with adetailed expert report outlining his findings and opinions regarding his treatment of Zara. Dr. 

### Brown continued to treat Zara with follow-up visits on April 4, 2016, April 11, 2016, April 28, 2016, and May 17, 2016. According to Dr. Brown's records, the charges for his treatment of Zara totaled $ 5, 694.00. No further payments were 

### made by Mr. McGinity or by Ms. Chokr afterthe $237.00 payment made in April 

### 2016, leaving a remaining balance on Zara's account of $ 3,777.00. According to Dr. Brown, he learned in late July 2016 that Mr.McGinity had 

### settled Zara's claims for personal injuries arising out of the August 14, 2015

accident. 

### Dr. Brown alleged that he was never advised ofthe settlement by either Mr. McGinity or Ms. Chokr. Written demand for payment was made on Mr. 

### McGinity on August 4, 2016, and on Ms. Chokr on August 24, 2016. After several unsuccessful attempts to collect the unpaid balance from Mr. 

### McGinity, Dr. Brown filed suit on open account pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2781 

### naming as defendants Mr. McGinity, McGinity Law Firm, LLC, and Ms. Chokr. Dr. Brown sought to recover the balance due on the account, $ 3, 777.00, plus 

### reasonable attorney fees, court costs, and interest.'

1 Dr. Brown subsequently filed a first supplemental and amending petition, further outlining his claims against McGinity and Ms. Chokr. 04

Mr. 

### McGinity and Ms. Chokr both answered Dr. Brown's petitions,



### generally denying the allegations set forth by Dr. Brown. Ms. Chokr further reconvened against Dr. Brown, 

### seeking damages for medical malpractice in connection with his treatment ofZara.2 

### Thereafter, Dr. Brown filed a motion for summaryjudgment asserting that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact in dispute and that he was entitled to summaryjudgment forthe contract amount due. Dr. Brown argued that there was no dispute that he provided medical treatment to Zara; that the treatment 

### was authorized by Ms. 

### Chokr; that payment of the charges was guaranteed by McGinity and Ms. Chokr; that the amount billed was on the low end of the 

### estimated fees; and that McGinity and Ms. Chokr had signed documents indicating their agreement that they were responsible forthe payment ofthe charges incurred 

### for Zara's treatment and that funds received from any settlement would not be distributed until Dr. Brown was paid in full. 

### McGinity opposed Dr. Brown's 

### motion for summaryjudgment. 

### Citing La. Civ. Code art. 1973, McGinity argued that any contract with Dr. Brown was too indeterminate and, thus, unenforceable because it is without cause. 

### Alternatively, McGinity urged that Dr. Brown's fees were unreasonable.3 

### Following a hearing on November 5, 2020, the district court granted Dr. 

### Brown's motion for summaryjudgment, renderingjudgment in favor ofDr. Brown and against Ms. 

### Chokr, Mr. McGinity, and McGinity Law Firm, LLC, jointly, severally, and in solido in the amount of $ 3, 777.00, plus court costs, interest, and 

### 2 As acknowledged by counsel at oral arguments before this court, Ms. Chokr's medical malpractice claim has been voluntarily dismissed. Mr. McGinity also filed a reconventional demand against Dr. Brown for defamation, which was dismissed without prejudice on motion of Mr.McGinity. 3 McGinity raised these same issues in a cross motion for summaryjudgment, which was denied by the district court. We note that McGinity was granted an appeal from the district court's denial ofits motion for summaryjudgment,which is the subject ofa related appeal also decided this date, Brown v. McGinity,2021- 1406 (La.App. 1 Cir. —/—/22) ( unpublished).
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### reasonable attorney fees.' The district court signed ajudgment in accordance with



### its findings on December 30, 2020, certifying thejudgment as final forpurposes of appeal pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 1915. 

### Ms. Chokr and McGinity each filed 

### a timely motion for new trial, which were both denied by the district court. This 

### appeal by McGinity followed, wherein the following assignments of error were

raised:1. 

### The District Court erred in granting appellee/plaintiff Dr. Brown's motion for summaryjudgment because the documents upon which Dr. Brown relied, including his Predetermination Estimate of Costs for Treating TMJ Dysfunction—

### setting for a range of cost estimate for six to eighteen months of Phase I TMJ treatment— was 

### too indeterminate to create an enforceable contract with McGinity or to require McGinity to pay Dr. Brown whatever he decided to charge Zara Chokr for each of her six visits over Zara's two, not six to eighteen, months of orthodontic treatment. 2. 

### The District Court erred in granting appellee/plaintiff Dr. Brown's motion for summary judgment based upon the Court's 

### observation thatthe balance Dr.Brown soughtto recover by summary judgment—$

### 3,777.00 out of a bill totaling $ 5, 694.00— fell " very much within the estimate of range of services" 

### for which McGinity agreed to guarantee payment. Dr. Brown's claimed $3, 777.00 balance does not evidence the fee Dr. Brown invoiced or claimed was 

### reasonable, that is, what was customary in the community for similar treatments. ... No evidence was presented on what fees were 

### customarily charged forthe orthodontic services Dr. Brown provided 

### Zara Chokr during her two months oftreatment by Dr. Brown in only six appointments. 3. The District Court erred granting Dr. Brown summary 

### judgment, awarding Dr. Brown the fee he claimed due while at the same time noting in the Court's Reasons forJudgmentthat "there exist genuine issues of material fact as to whether or not the charges ofthe dentist involved are reasonable." SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

### After an opportunity 

### for adequate discovery, a motion 

### for summary judgment shall be granted ifthe motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(A)(3). In reviewing a We note that because Ms. Chokr has not appealed the summaryjudgment rendered in favor of Dr. Brown, the December 30, 2020judgment is final as it pertains to Ms. Chokr. 101

### trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment, appellate courts review



### evidence de novo using the same criteria that govern the trial court's determination 

### of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Georgia-Pacific Consumer 

### Operations, LLC v. City of Baton Rouge, 2017- 1553 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 7/18/ 18), 255 So.3d 16, 22, writ denied, 2018- 1397 (La. 12/3/ 18), 257 So.3d 194. 

### The Code ofCivil Procedure places the initial burden ofproofon the party filing the motion for summaryjudgment, here Dr. Brown. See La. Code Civ. P.

art. 966(D)( 1). 

### Once the motion for summary judgment has been made and 

### properly supported,5 the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce factual support,through the use ofproperdocumentary evidence attached to its opposition, which establishes the existence ofa genuine issue ofmaterial fact orthat the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(D)( 1). If 

### the non-moving party fails to produce sufficient factual support in its opposition that proves the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, Article 966(D)( 1) 

### mandates the granting ofthe motion for summaryjudgment. See Babin v. WinnDixie Louisiana, Inc., 2000-0078 ( La. 6/30/00), 764 So.2d 37, 40 ( per curiam); 

### Jenkins v. Hernandez, 2019-0874 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/3/20), 305 So.3d 365, 371, writ denied, 2020-00835 ( La. 10/20/20), 303 So.3d 315. 

### In ruling on a motion for summaryjudgment, the trial court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. 

### Janney v. 

### Pearce, 2009-2103 ( La.App. 1 Cir. 5/7/ 10), 40 So.3d 285, 289, writ denied, 2010- 1356 ( La. 9/24/ 10), 45 So.3d 1078. Because it is the applicable substantive law

5 Generally, ifthe moving party will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion for summaryjudgment,the mover must only point outto the court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(D)( 1); see also La. Code Civ. P. art. 966, Comments - 2015, Comment 0). Here, however, Dr. Brown bears the burden ofproofat trial on his suit on open account.

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### that determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material can be

seen only in light ofthe substantive law applicable to the case. Georgia-Pacific Consumer Operations, LLC, 255 So.3d at 22. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2781( D) defines an open account as " any account for which a part or all of the balance is past due, whether or not the account reflects one or more transactions and whether or not at the time of 

### contracting the parties expected future transactions." An open account necessarily 

### involves an underlying agreement between the parties on which the debt is based. Advanced Leveling & 

### Concrete Solutions v. Lathan Company, Inc., 2020-0040 

### La. App. 1 Cir. 12/10/20), 316 So.3d 509, 513. If a debtor "

### fails to pay an open account within thirty days after the claimant sends written demand therefor 

### correctly setting forth the amount owed," the debtor "shall be liable to the claimant 

### for reasonable attorney fees ... when judgment on the claim is rendered in favor of the claimant." La. R.S. 9:2781( A). 

### In an action on an open account, a plaintiffbears the burden ofproving his demand by a preponderance of the evidence. Action Oilfield Services, Inc. v. 

### Energy Management Company, 2018- 1146 (La.App. 1 Cir.4/17/19), 276 So.3d 538, 542. 

### The plaintiffmust first prove the account by showing that the record of the account was kept in the course of business and by introducing supporting 

### testimony regarding its accuracy. Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie 

### case, the burden shifts to the debtor to prove the inaccuracy ofthe account or to prove that the debtor is entitled to certain credits. Louisiana Eggs, Inc. v. Gunter Farms, Inc.,

### 2001-0932 (La.App. 1 Cir.4/2/03), 844 So.2d 400, 402. The amount 

### due on an account is a question offact that may not be disturbed absent manifest

error. Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles v. Fagan, 95- 0811 ( 

### La.App. 1 Cir. 12/ 15/95), 665 So.2d 1316, 1320, writ denied, 96-0194 (La. 3/ 15/96), 669 So.2d 418.

EThe requirements for a valid contract are: ( 1) capacity; ( 2) consent; ( 3) a

lawful cause; and ( 4) a valid object. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1918, 1927, 1966, 1971; Hoskins v. State Through Division of Administration, Office of 

### Community Development, 2018- 1089 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/25/ 19), 273 So.3d 323, 328. 

### According to the Civil Code, " 

### The quantity ofa contractual object may be undetermined, provided it is determinable." La. Civ. Code art. 1973. 

### Generally, legal agreements have the effect of law upon the parties, and, as 

### they bind themselves, they shall be held to a full performance ofthe obligations flowing therefrom. See La. Civ. Code art. 1983; Waterworks District No. 1 of DeSoto Parish v. 

### Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 

### 2016-0744 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/17/ 17), 214 So.3d 1, 5, writ denied, 2017-0470 ( La. 5/ 12/ 17), 219 So.3d 1103. Interpretation of a contract is the determination ofthe
common intent of the parties. La. Civ. Code art. 2045. Thus, a contract between the parties is the law between them, and the courts are obligated to give legal effect 

### to such contracts according to the true intent of the parties. Hampton v. Hampton, Inc., 97- 1779 ( La. 

### App. 1 Cir. 6/29/98), 713 So.2d 1185, 1189. 

### Moreover, the parties are free to contract for any object that is lawful. La. Civ. Code art. 1971. " Freedom of contract" signifies that parties to an agreement have the right and power to fashion their own bargains. Louisiana Smoked Products, Inc. v. Savoie' s Sausage and Food Products, Inc., 96- 1716 ( La. 7/ l/97), 696 

### So.2d 1373, 1380; James Const. Group, L.L.C. v. State ex rel. Dept.ofTransp. and Development, 2007-0225 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/2/07), 977 So.2d 989, 998. 

### In support ofhis motion for summaryjudgment, Dr. Brown introduced his affidavitwith several exhibits attached thereto to showthatthe outstanding balance connected with his treatment of Zara constituted an open account within the 

### meaning ofLa. R.S. 9:2781. Dr. Brown submitted all ofthe documents signed by 

### McGinity and Ms. Chokr, clearly evidencing their intent to guarantee payment of

9Dr. Brown's fees associated with his treatment of Zara. Dr. Brown introduced



### copies ofthe ledgerforZara's account, which detailed all charges and payments to Zara's account during the time he treated her, as well as dates ofeach transaction. As further support for each charge on the account, Dr. Brown offered his 2014 Schedule of Fees, as well as copies ofclaim forms for each office visit. The 

### office visit claim forms provided a breakdown ofexactlywhatthe charges were for each day Zara was treated.' Dr. 

### Brown also submitted copies of the monthly statements that were sent to McGinity regarding Zara's account, as well as the 

### demand letters that he sent to McGinity and Ms. Chokr on August 4, 2016, and August24, 2016, respectively. Finally, Dr.Brown offered a copyofhis April 4, 2016, expert report, andthe affidavits of two of his orthodontist assistants. Both of Dr. Brown's orthodontist 

### assistants attested that they had spoken with Mr. McGinity multiple times afterthe 

### estimate was faxed to him and thatthey answered any questions Mr.McGinity had regarding Dr. Brown's payment policy. 

### They both added that at no time did either Mr. McGinity or Ms. 

### Chokr voice any objection to Dr. Brown's fees or to his treatment ofZara. In opposition to Dr. 

### Brown's motion for summary judgment, McGinity submitted the following exhibits: ( 1) Dr. Brown's medical records concerning his treatment of Zara, which, 

### in addition to documents already introduced by Dr. Brown, included handwritten office notes from the days he treated Zara; ( 2) excerpts of Dr. Brown's deposition; ( 3) 

### Dr. Brown's answers to some discovery requests, which included a detailed account of the services he provided to Zara at

each office visit; (

### 4) the affidavit ofJustin Ramsey, D.D.S., who opined that Dr. 

### Brown deviated from the standard of care in his treatment of Zara by failing to Dr. Brown indicated that the claim forms included diagnostic codes for each visit, which are used for filing with insurance companies. He added that these forms are generated for every patient, regardless oftheir insurance status.

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### present the fees in a transparent and understandable way, failing to discuss/inform

all possible treatment options, and failing to obtain the proper "informed" consent; 5) the affidavit of Ms. Chokr, wherein she attested that Dr. Brown had deceived 

### her and Zara regarding the medical treatment available forZara's TMJ injury; and 6) excerpts ofDr.Larry McMillen's deposition.7 After de novo review, we find that Dr. Brown satisfied his initial burden on 

### the motion for summaryjudgment. He offered prima facie evidence ofthe amount 

### due and owing onthe account, $3, 777.00, in connection with his treatment ofZara. According to the record, Dr.Brown treated Zara overthe course ofsix office visits. 

### Zara's treatment began with a lengthy office visit on March 21, 2016, for a complete diagnostic records examination," for which Zara's account was billed 3, 359.00. 

### As noted by the district court, Dr. Brown's estimate forthe diagnostic 

### testing and the amount actually charged to Zara's account were identical. Also 

### included in Zara's treatment plan was an orthotic splint that was designed to help 

### with the TMJ injury, for which Zara's account was billed $ 1, 614.00. These two charges account for $4,973. 00 of the total $ 5, 694.00 that Dr. Brown charged for his treatment ofZara. 

### The remaining amount, $ 721. 00, represents charges that accumulated over 

### the office visits that are detailed onthe claim forms submitted into evidence by Dr. Brown.' 

### The record is clear that the only payments made to Dr. Brown on Zara's

7 According to the record, Dr. McMillen was retained by Dr. Brown in connection with the medical malpractice case that had been filed against him. 8 The record reflects a total of five visits that account for the $ 721. 00 in charges on Zara's account. On March 30, 2016, there is a charge of $ 214.00 for "Anodyne, Infrared Therapy" and Neuromuscular, Re-education ( MFT)." Following a " Limited" office visit on April 4, 2016, Zara's account was charged $ 88. 00. On April 11, 2016, Zara's account was charged $243.00 for an " Extended" office visit that included " Range of Motion." Finally,on both April 28, 2016, and 

### May 17, 2016, Zara had an "Orthotic Check - Up" forwhich her accountwas charged $88.00 per visit. 11account were the initial down payment of $

### 1, 680.00 and one monthly payment of

237.00, leaving a balance due of $ 3,777.00.9 Dr. Brown also submitted copies ofthe estimate, payment agreement, and 

### lien agreement that were signed by the parties. These documents clearly provide the terms and conditions associated with his treatment of Zara, 

### including the parties who would bear responsibilityfor payment to Dr. Brown for his services, i.e., 

### McGinity and Ms. Chokr. The documents further provided that prior to the 

### distribution ofany settlement proceeds, McGinity would confirm, in writing, that Dr. Brown's charges had been paid in full. 

### Thus, the burden ofproofon the motion for summaryjudgment then shifted to McGinity. 

### McGinity argued that the estimate, payment agreement, and lien agreement were unclear and ambiguous. 

### McGinity further alleged that any obligation that may arise from these documents was too indeterminate to satisfy Article 1973. Thus, 

### McGinity maintained, the obligation was unenforceable because it was without cause. 

### Alternatively, McGinity claimed that even ifavalid contract is found to have existed between the parties, the fees charged by Dr. Brown were not reasonable. 

### The cases relied on by McGinity in support of the argument that the agreement with Dr. Brown was too indeterminate to be enforceable are all easily distinguished from the case before us now. In Louisiana Television 

### Broadcasting, L.L.C. v. Jay Inzenga & Jay'S Furniture Home Store, L.L.C., 2019-0430 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11115119), 2019 WL 6045223 ( unpublished), plaintiff 9 We note that Dr. Brown's ledger for Zara's account also reflects a charge and payment in the amount of $

550.00 dated March 31, 2016, for a " Diagnostic Report." However, this does not appear to be a payment towards the balance due and owing for the services rendered by Dr. Brown. The $ 550.00 charge does not appear on any of the aforementioned claim forms submitted into evidence by Dr. Brown,which provided abreakdown ofthe charges for each day Zara was treated. Thus, although not clear from the record, it appears that the $ 550.00 payment was for the April 4, 2016 expert report that was prepared by Dr. Brown at McGinity's request, not to be confused with the March 21, 2016 " diagnostic" testing and records appointment, for which Zara's account was billed $3, 359.00.

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## filed suitseekingtoenforce an agreementtopayallegedlycontained in severaltext

messages sent by defendant to plaintiff. On appeal, this court concluded that 

### although the parties may have understood that an outstanding balance existed, the offer to " give [ plaintiff] something toward the old bill;" to " give [ plaintiff] 

### something in the morning that we can live with in good faith;" or to " send plaintiff)something," 

### each individually,and all collectively,failedto establish the 

### amount of defendant's outstanding advertising balance. As such, there was an undeterminable sum, and any alleged agreement was without cause. Louisiana 

### Television Broadcasting, L.L.C., 2019 WL 6045223 at * 7. In Wegmann v. Tramontin, 2015- 0561 ( La. 

### App. 4 Cir. 1/ 13/ 16), 186 So.3d 236, writ denied, 2016-0276 ( La. 4/4/ 16), 190 So.3d 1209, the petition 

### alleged that Mr. Tramontin agreed to pay Ms. Wegmann an amount within the

range of $

3, 000,000.00 to $5, 000,000.00 and that residual amounts after "the first portion of the $ 3, 000,000.00" was tendered upon the sale of Ms. Wegmann's house, would be payable on an " as needed basis." Wegmann, 186 So.3d at 238. 

### The court found there was no way to determine where in this $ 3, 000,000.00 to 5,000,000.00 range the payments would fall, nor was it clear what constituted an as needed basis." Thus, the court concluded the alleged contract was for an undeterminable sum and therefore unenforceable. Wegmann, 186 So.3d at 240. 

### In TAC Amusement Co. v. Henry, 238 So.2d 398 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1970), the plaintiff agreed to " install, operate and maintain on said premises one or more coin operated music devices, and/or one or more legal coin operated amusement 

### devices with the number and type of such being within your ( plaintiffs) sole discretion and at your option." TAC Amusement Co., 238 So.2d at 399. The court held that " 

### both the quality and the quantity of the object of plaintiffs obligation was ... too indeterminate to meet the requirement of [La. Civ. Code art.]

131886 [( 1870) now Article 1973], and therefore defendant's obligation was

unenforceable because without cause." TAC Amusement Co., 238 So.2d at 400. 

### With regard to McGinity's argument that Dr. Brown failed to prove that his 

### fees were reasonable, we note that in additionto Dr. Brown'stestimony that all of the charges on Zara's account were reasonable and consistent with what he had 

### been charging for TMJ treatment since 2014, Dr. Brown submitted his 2014 

### Schedule of Fees showing that all of the fees charged to Zara's account were consistent with the amounts set forth therein. 

### McGinity failed to submit any evidence to contravene the reasonableness of Dr. Brown's fees. 

### McGinity relies 

### heavily on the deposition testimony of Dr. McMillen to support its argument that Dr. Brown's fees were unreasonable. However, we note that when asked his opinion on whether Dr. Brown's fees charged to Zara were reasonable for the treatment he rendered and the results he obtained, Dr. McMillen replied, " Yeah, I wouldn't know. 

### Ijust knowthat itwas documented exactly what he charged for." Following our exhaustive review ofthe record before us, we conclude that 

### McGinity failed to come forward with any evidence establishing that there is a genuine issue of material fact. 

### As previously noted, in the instant case, both the object of the contract and the amount due and owing to Dr. Brown on Zara's 

### account is easily determined. Both Mr. 

### McGinity and Ms. Chokr signed 

### documents, including the payment agreement and the lien agreement, indicating their understanding that they were responsible for the charges associated with Dr. Brown's treatment of Zara for TMJ. Dr. Brown submitted detailed records 

### regarding said treatment, including the diagnostic codes for each visit. Dr. Brown 

### also introduced, among other things, his rate sheet, the ledger for Zara's account, and the monthly statements and demand letters that were mailed to McGinity. The 

### record clearly establishes the amount due and owing on the account, $ 3, 777.00.

14i

### Accordingly, 

### we find no error in the district court's ruling granting summary

judgment in favor ofDr. Brown. DECREE 

### Forthe above and foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's December 

### 30, 2020judgment granting summaryjudgment in favorofDonald T. Brown, DDS and against Nisrine Chokr, Douglas D. McGinity, and McGinity Law Firm, LLC, jointly, severally, and in solido in the amount of $3, 777.00, plus court costs, 

### interest, and reasonable attorney fees. We assess all costs associated with this 

### appeal against appellants, Douglas D.McGinity, and McGinity Law Firm, LLC. AFFIRMED.

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