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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

 

UNPUBLISHED 

In re SHEFFIELD, Minors. June 13, 2017 

No. 335652 

Bay Circuit Court 

 Family Division 

LC No. 14-011708-NA 

 

Before: O’BRIEN, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and BOONSTRA, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Respondent appeals by right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her 

children KS, JS, and AS pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (the conditions that led to the 

adjudication continue to exist), (c)(ii) (other conditions exist that cause the children to come 

within the court’s jurisdiction), (g) (parent is unable to provide proper care and custody), and (j) 

(child is reasonably likely to be harmed if returned to the parent’s home). We affirm.1

I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 Petitioner filed a petition seeking the removal of the children from the home based on 

improper supervision, neglect, and the condition of the home. At a preliminary hearing, Janice 

White, a Child Protective Services (CPS) worker, testified that she had received a call that the 

police needed assistance at respondent’s home, where children were present without adult 

supervision. The house lacked running water, electricity, and working plumbing, and had rotten 

food and medications scattered throughout the home. The children were dirty and had not eaten 

that day; JS required emergency medical attention. A police officer contacted respondent by 

telephone, and respondent hung up on him. White testified that she spoke with respondent, who 

admitted that she had spent the day drinking with family and friends. White placed the children 

with respondent’s cousin. The trial court found probable cause to believe that the allegations of 

the petition were true, and authorized the petition. The trial court directed that the children be 

placed with a relative or in foster care, and that respondent be granted supervised parenting time. 

 

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 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the fathers of the minor children. They 

have not appealed the trial court’s decision, and are not parties to this appeal. Respondent is the 

mother of two other children who were placed with their fathers; the disposition of those children 

is not at issue in this appeal. 
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 Respondent pleaded to the allegations in the petition that the house had no electricity, 

running water, or functioning plumbing, and that medications, rotten food, and dirty diapers were 

strewn about the home. Respondent admitted that on August 3, 2014, she had left the children 

alone, spent the day drinking, and hung up on a police officer. Petitioner’s representative 

indicated at the adjudication hearing that the children had been placed in foster homes. 

 The trial court held a dispositional hearing on October 13, 2014. The trial court was 

informed that the children were in foster care, and that the older children were receiving 

counseling. Respondent was scheduled to undergo a substance abuse assessment and a 

psychological evaluation, was participating in parenting and budgeting classes, and was 

employed and attending college classes. Respondent had missed three parenting time sessions, 

and often did not bring necessary items, such as baby supplies, to the sessions. The trial court 

continued the children in foster care and directed respondent to comply with her treatment plan. 

 During the period from the adjudication in 2014 to the termination hearing in August of 

2016, respondent had 13 different addresses and 3 different telephone numbers. Respondent did 

not attend counseling and supervised parenting time on a consistent basis. Respondent was 

dismissed from a parenting class for non-compliance and failed to complete a second parenting 

class. During parenting time, respondent had difficulty interacting with all of the children at the 

same time and was not responsive to suggestions about parenting techniques. Respondent 

missed eight parenting time sessions in July 2015 because she was incarcerated. Respondent 

was frequently late to parenting time sessions. In February 2016, the trial court granted the 

children’s lawyer-guardian ad litem’s (LGAL) motion to suspend respondent’s parenting time 

because she had missed or canceled numerous visits and the missed visits caused the children to 

act out. Respondent was sporadically employed; at the time of termination she had obtained fulltime employment but had only been working for a week. 

 At the termination hearing, Tania Leachman, respondent’s case manager at Saginaw 

Psychological Services, testified that she worked with respondent from September 2015 until 

April 2016. Leachman testified that respondent presented herself and acted appropriately, but 

seemed to gain only minimal benefit from the services offered. Christine Church, a clinical 

social worker, testified that she was a therapist for KS and JS. When Church started working 

with JS, he was so impulsive and aggressive that he needed to be restrained at times. He had 

made progress, but his behavior deteriorated around the times he was scheduled to have a visit 

with respondent. Church testified that KS acted out violently when she started working with 

him, but that he had made significant progress. 

 Lorrie Foor, the foster mother for the children (who ultimately were all placed in the 

same foster home), testified that the children were doing relatively well in their placement. Foor 

stated that JS and KS were very aggressive when they came into her care, and that this behavior 

escalated when they visited with respondent. The children did not ask to see respondent. Foor 

and her husband were willing to adopt the children. 

 Britney McInnis, the children’s foster care worker, testified that respondent’s current 

housing was not appropriate for the children because respondent’s roommate had had her own 

parental rights terminated. McInnis stated that respondent’s parenting time sessions were 
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chaotic. McInnis stated that the children needed permanency and a sense of stability, and opined 

that respondent’s parental rights should be terminated. 

 Respondent testified that she had difficulty finding stable employment due to her criminal 

record, and had difficulty securing housing due to a lack of funds. Respondent stated that she 

had just obtained a job at a pickle plant. The job paid $11.25 an hour and offered health 

insurance. Respondent worked afternoons and evenings six to seven days a week. Respondent 

acknowledged that she did not like to take parenting advice, and preferred her own parenting 

methods. Respondent testified that she was currently participating in counseling. Respondent 

denied that she had told her children that they did not have to listen to their foster parents. 

Respondent stated that she knew of a 24-hour daycare facility where the children could stay 

while she was working. 

 Valeria Sheffield, respondent’s aunt, testified that she and respondent had a close 

relationship. Sheffield testified that respondent was a good parent. Sheffield was willing to 

assist respondent in caring for the children. 

 The trial court issued a written opinion and order terminating respondent’s parental 

rights. The trial court found that at the time the children were removed from respondent’s home, 

respondent had left the children alone and unsupervised, and that the home was environmentally 

unsafe. The trial court noted that respondent had been offered numerous services, but that her 

participation in those services was inconsistent. Respondent often was late for parenting time 

sessions or missed sessions altogether, and the children acted out and were severely distressed 

after visits. 

 The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) 

(conditions that led to adjudication still exist and there is no reasonable likelihood the conditions 

will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the children’s ages). The trial court noted 

that respondent’s home was unfit for the children at the time they were removed, and that 

respondent had had 13 different addresses during the pendency of the case and showed no ability 

to maintain stable housing. The trial court also terminated respondent’s parental rights under 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii) (other conditions exist that cause the children to come within the 

court’s jurisdiction). The trial court stated that respondent had failed to engage in or benefit 

from services, and had not demonstrated an ability or willingness to do so in the future. The trial 

court also terminated respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide 

proper care or custody). The trial court found that, respondent lacked parenting skills when the 

case began and that, although she had been given several opportunities to participate in parenting 

classes, her attendance was inconsistent and she did not demonstrate that she had benefitted from 

the classes. She was unable to advance beyond supervised visits. Finally, the trial court 

terminated respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) (children at risk of harm if 

returned to parent’s home). The trial court noted that respondent was unable to control the 

children during parenting time sessions, and often ignored the children to concentrate on her 

phone. 

 The trial court also found that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the best 

interests of the children, noting that respondent had mental health issues that were not addressed 

on a consistent basis, and that she could not maintain stable housing or employment. 
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Additionally, the children’s foster parents provided the children with love, guidance, and the 

necessities of life, and the children were bonded to their foster parents. The trial court stated that 

the children deserved stability and permanency. 

 This appeal followed. 

II. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION 

 Respondent argues that the trial court erred by finding that the statutory grounds for 

termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree. We review for 

clear error the trial court’s factual findings in order to terminate parental rights. MCR 3.977(K); 

In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 90; 763 NW2d 587 (2009). “ ‘A finding is “clearly erroneous” [if] 

although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’ ” Id. at 91, quoting In re Miller, 433 

Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). We must give due regard “to the special opportunity of 

the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.” In re Ellis, 294 

Mich App 30, 33; 817 NW2d 111 (2011). 

 The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), 

(c)(ii), (g), and (j), which permit termination under the following circumstances: 

 (c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this 

chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial 

dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either 

of the following: 

 (i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is 

no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable 

time considering the child’s age. 

 (ii) Other conditions exist that cause the child to come within the court’s 

jurisdiction, the parent has received recommendations to rectify those conditions, 

the conditions have not been rectified by the parent after the parent has received 

notice and a hearing and has been given a reasonable opportunity to rectify the 

conditions, and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be 

rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.

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 (g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or 

custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be 

able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the 

child’s age. 
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* * * 

 (j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of 

the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the 

home of the parent. 

 The original barrier to respondent regaining custody of her children was the unfit 

condition of her home. Thereafter, respondent failed to maintain stable housing and 

employment, failed to engage in counseling on a consistent basis, and missed or was late to 

numerous parenting time sessions. The evidence showed that respondent no longer lived in the 

home from which the children were removed. Indeed, respondent had 13 different addresses 

during the pendency of this case, and the home in which she was living at the time of the 

termination hearing was inappropriate for the children because respondent’s roommate had had 

her own parental rights terminated. The evidence that respondent had not been able to secure 

appropriate housing for the children after two years constituted clear and convincing evidence to 

terminate respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). In addition, respondent’s 

inability to maintain stable employment sufficient to support herself and the children, her failure 

to engage in counseling on a consistent basis, and her failure to consistently attend parenting 

time sessions constituted clear and convincing evidence to terminate her parental rights under 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii). 

 Compliance with a treatment plan is evidence of a parent’s ability to provide proper care 

and custody for a child. In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 214; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). A parent must not 

merely receive services, but must benefit from those services so that the trial court can conclude 

that the parent can provide proper care for the child. In re Gazella, 264 Mich App 668, 676-677; 

692 NW2d 708 (2005). In this case, the evidence shows that respondent did not benefit from 

services. She did not attend counseling on a consistent basis. She missed numerous parenting 

sessions, which caused the children to become upset and act out. In addition, respondent did not 

have stable housing that was appropriate for the children, and she had not demonstrated that she 

could maintain employment sufficient to support the children. At the time of the termination 

hearing, the children had been in foster care for two years, and no evidence showed that 

respondent would be able to provide proper care and custody for the children within a reasonable 

time considering their ages. Therefore, clear and convincing evidence supported the termination 

of respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). 

 Actual physical abuse need not be established to terminate parental rights under 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). The risk of emotional harm or neglect must be considered as well. In re 

Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 268; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). The evidence showed that at the time 

of the termination hearing, respondent had not yet secured appropriate housing for the children, 

and had obtained full-time employment only one week earlier. The evidence also showed that 

respondent resisted taking advice regarding parenting techniques, and was unable during 

parenting time to provide each child with appropriate attention; the parenting time sessions were 

described as “chaotic.” Clear and convincing evidence supported termination of respondent’s 

parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). 
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IV. BEST-INTEREST DETERMINATION 

 Respondent also argues that the trial court erred by finding that termination of her 

parental rights was in the children’s best interests. We disagree. We review for clear error the 

trial court’s factual findings in an order to terminate parental rights. See MCR 3.977(K); In re 

Rood, 483 Mich at 90. “[T]he preponderance of the evidence standard applies to the best-interest 

determination.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 83; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). 

 “If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that 

termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall order termination of 

parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not 

be made.” MCL 712A.19b(5). In determining a child’s best interests, the trial court may 

consider the child’s need for stability and permanency and whether the child is progressing in his 

or her current placement. In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 141; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). In 

addition, the trial court may consider the children’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting 

ability, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich 

App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). 

 At the time of the termination hearing, the children had been in foster care for two years, 

and were bonded to their foster parents, who were willing to adopt them. The children did not 

ask about respondent, and their behaviors worsened both after parenting time and after 

respondent missed scheduled visits. The evidence showed that respondent lacked stable housing 

and employment, and had not made consistent efforts to engage in counseling or to exercise 

parenting time. The children had needs, including continued counseling, that respondent could 

not meet. The trial court found that the children’s needs were being met by their foster parents, 

and that the children deserved permanence and stability, which respondent could not provide. 

The trial court did not clearly err by finding that the termination of respondent’s parental rights 

was in the children’s best interests. In re Rood, 483 Mich at 90. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien 

/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra 

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra