JIM MATTOX 

Attorney General 

Supreme Court Building 

P. 0. Box 1254 

Austin. TX. 78711. 254S 

512l4752501 

-rem SlWS74.1367 

T.IecopIer 5121475.0268 

714 Jackson. Suite 700 

Dallas. TX. 75202.4506 

21U7428SU 

4824 Alberta Ave., Suile 160 

El Paso. TX. 799052793 

915633-3464 

01 Texas. Suite 700 

HOUSTON, TX. 77002.3111 

71312235888 

606 Broadwey. Suite 312 

Lubbock. TX. 7S401-3479 

8061747~5238 

4309 N. Tenth. Suite B 

McAllen. TX. 7850%16R5 

5121662.4547 

200 Main Plaza Suite 400 

San Antonio. TX. 7S2C5.2797 

512l225.4191 

An Equal Opportunityl 

Affirmative Action Er”plovw 

The Attorney General of Texas 

Novimber 14, 1984 

lionorable Mike Drismll 

Harris County Attornley 

1001 Preston, Suite ~634 

Houston. Texas 770132 

opinion No. ~~-232 

Re: Eligibility for membership 

on the Harris County Bail Bond 

Board and related questions 

Dear Mr. Driscoll: 

You inquire about eligibility for membership on the Harris County 

Ball Bond Board and the finality of a judgment against a corporate 

surety. You first ask: 

Does an individual who is licensed as a bail 

bondsman by the Barr16 County Bail Bond Board and 

who is at,thotized to do business under an assumed 

name, forfeit his position as a member of the bail 

bond board by conveying to a third party the 

business under which assumed name he has 

previously operated, even though he is presently 

sitting aa a member of the bail bond board as a 

licensed bondsman, and is maintaining a bail bond 

license, and whose bonds the sheriff currently 

accepts, and whose collateral Is still valid? 

An individual described by your question do&s not forfeit his 

position as a me&x of the bail bond board by conveying to a third 

party a business which the individual previously operated under an 

assumed name. Article 2372p-3. section 5(b) (61, V.T.C.S., provides 

the following: 

(b) The County Bail Bond Board shall be 

composed zf the following persons: 

. . . . 

(6) a licensed bondsman, licensed in the 

county * gztected by other county licensees. . . . 

(EmphasiE, added). 

The statute’s only requirement for a member elected by other county 

licensees is that the member be a licensed bondsman who is licensed in 

the county. The xdividual in question continues to be a licensed 

p. 1041 
Honorable Hike Driscoll - Page 2 (JM-232) 

bondsman in Harris County. - Cf. Attorney General Opinion MW-321 

(1981). 

Your second question ir,quires vhether a corporation, if elected 

to the board, may designate as its representative a person vho is not 

himself a licensed bondsman. Article 2372p-3 defines the relevant 

terms: 

Sec. 2. In this Act: 

(1) 'Person' .aeans an individual or corporation. 

(2) 'Bondsman' :means any person who for hire 

or for any compensation deposits any cash or bonds 

or other securities, or executes as surety or 

cosurety any bond for other persons. (Emphasis 

added). 

Under these definitions, a bondsman is an individual or corporation which for hire or for s,ny compensation deposits any cash, bonds, 

or other securities or executes as surety or cosurety any bond for 

other persons. See also V.I.C.S. art. 2372p-3, S14A(a) (referring to 

a corporation as a "bail bowlsman"). Sections 3(b) and 3(d) of the 

act contain separate requirements of eligibility for the licensing of 

individuals and the 1icensin:I of corporations. 

Since a corporation is a person, it is a bondsman, and if a 

corporation is licensed in the county, we believe it is a licensed 

bondsman within the meaning of section S(b)(6). Thus, we conclude 

that a corporation licensed under the act is a legal entity which may 

be a member of a county ba:t:L bond board if elected by other county 

licensees. 

The Texas Business Corporation Act directs the board of directors 

to manage the business and affairs of a corporation. Tex. Bus. Corp. 

Act, art. 2.31. The act als,> provides that the officers and agents of 

a corporation shall perform duties in the management of the 

corporation vhich are provitied in the bylaws or which are determined 

and delegated by the board oE directors in accordance with the bylaws. 

Tex. Bus. Corp. Act, art. 2.42.B. Since a corporation functions 

through its directors, officers, and agents, we believe a corporation 

serving as a member of a bail bond board does so through the 

individual vho represents it on the board. The corporation is the 

board member. Its representative on the board is an authorized agent 

of the corporation and is not a member of the board in his individual 

capacity. We do not adliress the question of whether it is 

constitutionally permissible Ear a corporation to be elected and serve 

as a member of a board of this nature. With this caveat, we conclude 

that a licensed corporation say be a licensed bondsman and a member of 

a bail bond board and that such a corporation's authorized agent is 

the representative of the corporation and not the member of the board, 

p. 1042 
Honorable Mike Driscoll - Page 3 (m-232) 

regardless of whether the agent representing the corporation is a 

licensed bondsman. 

Your third question a;sks when a judgment against a corporate 

surety becomes final. Artj,cle 22.10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 

provides the following: 

When a forfeiture has been declared upon a bond, 

the court or cle,:k shall docket the case upon the 

scire facias or upon the civil docket, In the name 

of the State o:f Texas, as plaintiff, and the 

principal and his sureties, if any, as defendants; 

and the proceedi:rgs had therein shall be governed 

by the same rule:1 governing other civil suits. 

Article 22.14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads, in part. as 

follows: 

When, upon a trial of the issues presented, no 

sufficient cause is shown for the failure of the 

principal to appear, the judgment shall be made 

final against h:.m and his sureties, if any, for 

the ‘amount in which they are respectively 

bound. . . . 

Section 14A of article 2372p-3, however. includes the following 

requirements: 

(a) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, a 

corporation that: is in default on five or more 

bail bonds in ,L county may not act as a bail 

bondsman in that ,county. 

(b) The clerk of the court in which the 

corporation is in default on a bail bond shall 

deliver a written notice of the default to the 

sheriff, chief of police, or other appropriate 

peace officer in the county in which the bond is 

forfeited. 

(c) A corpox,ation is considered in default on 

a bail bond from the time the trial court enters 

its final judgs& on the scire facias until the 

judgment Is sa,?.sfied or set aside. (Emphasis 

added). 

Also, section 2 of article 17.11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 

states that 

any person who has signed as a surety on a bail 

bond and is in &fault thereon shall thereafter be 

disqualified to sign as a surety so long as he is 
Honorable Mike Driscoll - Page 4 (a-232) 

in default on said bond. It shall be the duty of 

the clerk of the court wherein such surety is in 

default on a bail bond, to notify In writing the 

sheriff. chief of uolice. or other peace officer, 

of such default. . A surety shall-be deemed in 

default from the time the trial court enters its 

final judgment oi the scire facias until such 

judgment is satil~iied or set aside. (Emphasis 

added). 

You indicate that your third question results from the fact that 

a corporate surety that is Ln default on five or more bail bonds in a 

county may not act as a t~a.11 bondsman in that county. Hence, we 

believe that the issue is not when the scire facias judgment against 

the surety is final but when the court enters its final judgment on 

the scire facias. See Burns v. Harris County Bail Bond Board, 663 --- 

S.W.Zd 615, 616 (Tex. App. -' Houston (1st Dist.] 1983. no writ). 

In 1978, the Texas Supreme Court said: 

Judges render judgment; clerks enter them on the 

minutes. Coleman v. Zap& 105 Tex. 491. 151 S.W. 

1040 (1912). The entry of a judgment is the 

clerk's record :Ln the minutes of the court. 

'Entered' is synoaymous with neither 'Signed' nor 

'Rendered.' Bostwick v. Bucklin, 144 Tex. 375, -- 

190 S.W.2d 818 (lM5); Polls v. Alford, 267 S.W.2d 

918 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1954. no writ). 

The day a judge signs an order is frequently, 

perhaps usually, efter the time the judgment is 

rendered and surely it is before the judgment is 

entered. 

Burrell v. Corneliu=. 570 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. 1978). A recent court 

of appeals case, holding that a judgment is rendered when the decision 

is officially announced, quaIced from Kittrell v. Fuller, 281 S.W. 575, 

576 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1926, writ ref'd). as follows: 

There is a distinction between the rendition of 

the judgment and its entry in the minutes of the 

Court; each representing a distinct occurrence of 

fact in the trial 'of a case. The judgment is that 

which the Court 'pronounces, and its rendition is 

the judicial act by which the Court settles and 

declares the decision of the law upon the matters 

at issue. The entry of the judgment is the 

ministerial act performed by the Clerk of the 

Court, and by means of which permanent evidence of 

the judicial act in rendering the judgment is made 

a record of the Court. 

p. 1044 

r 
lionorable Mike Driscoll - Pqge 5 (JM-232) 

Abarca v. Roadstar Corp. of America. 657 S.W.Zd 327. 328 (Tex. App. - 

Corpus Christi 1982. no vr:::). See also Morris v. State, 539 S.W.2d 

215 (Tex. Civ. App. - Rousc:on [Ist Dist.] 1976, no writ); Rosenfield 

V. Hull, 304 S.W.Zd 571 (:Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1957. vrit 

dism’ 

Morris V. State, mi at 216, held that the terin “entered” in 

article 5547-39a. V.T.C.S., providing that a person ordered committed 

could appeal an order of temporary hospitalization by filing written 

notice of appeal within :fiive days after the “order is entered,” 

referred to the ministeria:. act of the clerk in entering judgment In 

the minutes. Likewise, we wnclude that the statutes providing that a 

corporate surety is In default on a bail bond “from the time the trial 

court enters its final judgment on the scire facias” refers to the 

time at which the judgment is entered in the minutes of the court. Of 

course, once a trial court enters a final judgment of default, a 

corporate surety can presuwbly suspend the execution of the judgment 

pending -appeal by filing a supercedeas bond. Tex. R. Civ. P. 364(a). 

Like any judgment, a judgment revoking a license may be suspended vhen 

a supercedeas bond is filed. Tex. R. Civ. P. 364(e). Setting bond is 

ministerial and may be compelled by mandamus. Continental Oil Co. v. 

Lesher. 500 S.W.2d 183, 1315 (Tex. Civ. App. - liouston [lst Dist.] 

1973, no writ). An appellate court can review the bond for 

excessiveness. Tex. R. Civ. P. 365(b). 

SUMMARY 

An individual who continues to be a licensed 

bondsman in the county does not forfeit his 

position as a member of the ball bond board by 

conveying to a t,h,ird party a business which the 

individual previ,xlsly operated under an assumed 

name. A corporar:ion licensed in the county Is a 

licensed bondsman which may be a member of a 

county bail bond hoard if elected by other county 

licensees. Such a corporation’s representative on 

the board Is an agent of the corporation and is 

not a member of the board in his individual 

capacity. A corporate surety is in default on a 

bail bond from the time of entry of the scire 

facias judgment j,o, the minutes of the court. 

JIM MATTOX 

Attorney General of Texas 

TOM GREEN 

First Assistant Attorney Gweral 

t-l. 1045 
Hooorable Mike Drjscoll - Paga 6 (JM-232) 

DAVID R. RICHARDS 

Executive Assistant Attorney General 

RICK GILPIN 

Chairman, Opinion Committee 

Prepared by Nancy Sutton 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

Rick Gilpln, Chairman 

Colin Carl 

Susan Garrison 

Tony Guillory 

Jim Morllinger 

Nancy Sutton 

p. 1046