alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Eliseo Deleon, Petitioner, v Albert Prack, as Director of Special Housing and Inmate Disciplinary Programs, Respondent.

[975 NYS2d 701]

*1205Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Ulster County) to review a determination of the Commissioner of Corrections and Community Supervision which found petitioner guilty of violating a prison disciplinary rule.

A substance abuse program assistant overheard petitioner declare to other inmates that he was going to hit the assistant “over the head with a . . . chair” if he was kept in the program for a prolonged period of time. Petitioner was accordingly charged in a misbehavior report with violating various prison disciplinary rules, and was found guilty of creating a disturbance following a tier III disciplinary hearing. The determination was affirmed upon administrative appeal, and this CPLR article 78 proceeding ensued.

We confirm. The detailed misbehavior report and the testimony of the program assistant who authored it provide substantial evidence to support the determination of guilt *(see Matter of Phillips v Fischer,*79 AD3d 1492, 1492 [2010]; *Matter of Johnson v Selsky,*271 AD2d 770, 770-771 [2000], *lv dismissed and denied*95 NY2d 918 [2000]). Petitioner’s assertion that the misbehavior report was authored in retaliation for a grievance he had filed created a credibility issue for the Hearing Officer to resolve *(see Matter of Toliver v Commissioner of N.Y. State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision,*107 AD3d 1283, 1284 [2013]).

Petitioner’s remaining contentions, to the extent that they are properly preserved for our review, have been examined and found to lack merit.

Peters, PJ., Rose, Lahtinen and Spain, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
EXHIBIT 23.1

                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

The Board of Directors
PennCorp Financial Group, Inc.:

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements (No.
333-13285) on Form S-3 and (Nos. 333-48629, 333-48631 and 333-48637) on Form S-8
of PennCorp Financial Group, Inc. of our reports included herein relating to the
consolidated  balance sheets of PennCorp  Financial Group, Inc. and subsidiaries
as of December 31, 1999 and 1998,  and the related  consolidated  statements  of
operations and comprehensive income (loss), changes in shareholders' equity, and
cash flows for each of the years in the  three-year  period  ended  December 31,
1999,  and all related  schedules,  and to the  reference  to our firm under the
heading  "Experts"  in the  prospectus  related  to the  Form  S-3  registration
statement.

Our report dated April 10, 2000 contains an  explanatory  paragraph  that states
that PennCorp  Financial Group, Inc. filed a voluntary petition for relief under
chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.  PennCorp  Financial Group,  Inc.
has  filed  a  plan  of  reorganization   and  will  seek  confirmation  of  the
Recapitalization  Plan by the Bankruptcy Court. Should the recapitalization plan
not be  approved  by the  Bankruptcy  Court,  be delayed or not be  consummated,
PennCorp  Financial  Group,  Inc. may have to sell assets or  otherwise  realize
assets  and  liquidate  or settle  liabilities  for  amounts  other  than  those
reflected in the  consolidated  financial  statements  or related  notes.  These
factors raise substantial doubt about PennCorp  Financial Group,  Inc.'s ability
to continue as a going concern.  The 1999 consolidated  financial statements and
the  financial  statement  schedules do not include any  adjustments  that might
result from the outcome of these uncertainties.

                                    KPMG LLP




Dallas, Texas
April 10, 2000
II 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 70 

To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to remove the restriction 

that a clinical psychologist or clinical social worker provide services 

in a comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation facility to a patient only 

under the care of a physician. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 24, 2005 

Mr. INOUYE introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Armed Services 

FEBRUARY 17, 2005

Committee discharged; referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL

To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to remove 

the restriction that a clinical psychologist or clinical social worker provide services in a comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation facility to a patient only under 

the care of a physician.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Autonomy for Psy5 chologists and Social Workers Act of 2005’’. 
2

S 70 CDS 

1 SEC. 2. REMOVAL OF RESTRICTION THAT A CLINICAL PSY2 CHOLOGIST OR CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKER 

3 PROVIDE SERVICES IN A COMPREHENSIVE 

4 OUTPATIENT REHABILITATION FACILITY TO 

5 A PATIENT ONLY UNDER THE CARE OF A 

6 PHYSICIAN. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 1861(cc)(2)(E) of the So8 cial Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395x(cc)(2)(E)) is amended 

9 by striking ‘‘physician’’ and inserting ‘‘physician, except 

10 that a patient receiving qualified psychologist services (as 

11 defined in subsection (ii)) may be under the care of a clin12 ical psychologist with respect to such services to the extent 

13 permitted under State law and except that a patient re14 ceiving clinical social worker services (as defined in sub15 section (hh)(2)) may be under the care of a clinical social 

16 worker with respect to such services to the extent per17 mitted under State law’’. 

18 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

19 subsection (a) shall apply to services provided on or after 

20 January 1, 2006.

Æ
#### State v. Bradley

Case below: 179 N.C. App. 551

No. *559P06*

Def’s PDR Under G.S. 7A-31 (COA05-1440)

Denied 12/14/06
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Arthur Anthony BAXTER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-7298.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Oct. 17, 2006.

Decided: Oct. 24, 2006.

Arthur Anthony Baxter, Appellant Pro Se. Rita R. Valdrini, Acting United States Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Ap-pellee.

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Arthur Anthony Baxter seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed.

When the United States or its officer or agency is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed no more than sixty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order, Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(B), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” *Browder v. Dir., Dep’t ofCorr.,*434 U.S. 257, 264, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (quoting *United States v. Robinson,*361 U.S. 220, 229, 80 S.Ct. 282, 4 L.Ed.2d 259 (I960)).

The district court’s order was entered on the docket on August 14, 2001. The notice of appeal was filed on July 10, 2006.* Because Baxter failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*

*

 For the purpose of this appeal, we assume that the date appearing on the notice of appeal is the earliest date it could have been properly delivered to prison officials for mailing to the court. Fed. R.App. P. 4(c); *Houston v. Lack,*487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988).
#### Kirsten KULIK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MEDICAL IMAGING RESOURCES, INC.; John Vartanian; Dean Tan-galakis, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 08-1941.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

April 28, 2009.

BEFORE: DAUGHTREY, ROGERS, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Kirsten Kulik appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants Medical Imaging Resources, Inc. (“MIR”) and its principals, John Vartanian and Dean Tangalakis. Kulik brought this suit claiming gender and pregnancy discrimination under Title VII and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil *414Rights Act (“ELCRA”), and wage discrimination under the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”). After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, and hearing oral argument, this court determines that no jurisprudential purpose would be served by a panel opinion. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s decision for the reasons stated in Judge Friedman’s June 12, 2008, opinion and order, with the following exceptions.

In granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on Kulik’s Title VII and ELCRA claims, the district court found that Kulik failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination and that she failed to show that defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination were a pretext for illegal discrimination. We do not conclude as part of the prima facie analysis, however, that Kulik was not qualified for her position.

The district court’s Title VII and EL-CRA prima facie analysis arguably conflated the stages of the familiar *McDonnell Douglas*test by relying on defendants’ non-discriminatory reasons for discharging Kulik as grounds for finding her not qualified for the position at the prima facie stage. *Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo,*206 F.3d 651, 660-61 (6th Cir.2000). Instead, we consider Kulik’s objective qualifications, such as her education, experience in the relevant industry, and possession of the general skills required for this position. *Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc.,*317 F.3d 564, 576 (6th Cir.2003) (en banc). An evaluation of the *Wexler*criteria reveals elements that work for and against Kulik. At the prima facie stage, however, Kulik appears to have presented enough evidence to show that she was qualified for her position. “The prima fa-cie ’ requirement for making a Title VII claim ‘is not onerous,’ and poses ‘a burden easily met.’ ” *Cline,*206 F.3d at 660*(quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,*450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)).

Nonetheless, because the district court correctly found that Kulik had not presented evidence creating a genuine issue as to pretext, summary judgment was warranted.

AFFIRMED.
#### Town of Green Level v. Alamance Cty.

Case below: 184 N.C. App.-(17 July 2007)

No. 417P07

Defs PDR Under N.C.G.S. 7A-31 (COA06-1304)

Denied 11/08/07
EXHIBIT 32.1

                  CERTIFICATION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

      Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as created by Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of World Waste Technologies,
Inc. (the "Company") hereby certifies that based on his knowledge:

                  (i) the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of the Company for the
            fiscal year ended December 31, 2005 (the "Report") fully complies
            with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as
            applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

                  (ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents,
            in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
            operations of the Company as of and for the periods covered by this
            report.

Date: March 31, 2005                   /s/ Thomas L. Collins
                                       -----------------------------------------
                                       Name: Thomas L. Collins
                                       Title: Chief Executive Officer

      A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished
to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request. The
foregoing certification is being furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission as an exhibit to the Form 10-KSB and shall not be considered filed as
part of the Form 10-KSB.
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Exhibit 10.39  


 
  First Amendment to the
  Amended and Restated
  WH Holdings (Cayman Islands) Ltd. Stock Incentive Plan
  (as restated on November 5, 2003)    
    


        WHEREAS, Section 10 of the WH Holdings (Cayman Islands) Ltd. Stock Incentive Plan (the "Plan") provides that the Board of Directors may amend the
Plan at any time and from time to time; and 


        WHEREAS,
the Board of Directors desires to amend the Plan effective as of January 28, 2004 to provide that the repurchase price for shares purchased at fair market value shall
always be determined as of the date of repurchase; and 


        WHEREAS,
this amendment shall supersede the provisions of the Plan to the extent those provisions are inconsistent with the provisions of this amendment. 


        THEREFORE,
BE IT RESOLVED, that the Plan is hereby amended as follows: 


        Appendix A,
Section 15(d) of the Plan shall be amended in its entirety to read as follows: 



        (d)   Company's
Repurchase Option. At the discretion of the Board or the Committee, the Company may reserve to itself and/or its assignee(s) in the Option Agreement a right to
repurchase Shares held by an Optionee for a period of ninety (90) days beginning on the later of (i) the day after the six month anniversary of the day the Shares for which the Option is
exercised are acquired and (ii) the day of such Optionee's termination of employment from the Company for cash and/or cancellation of purchase money indebtedness, at: (A) the Fair Market
Value of such Shares on the repurchase date, provided, that such right to repurchase Shares terminates following an Initial Public Offering; or (B) the Optionee's exercise price, provided such
right to repurchase Shares at the exercise price lapses at the rate of at least twenty percent (20%) per year over five (5) years from the date of grant of the option. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, as permitted by California law, an Optionee who is an officer, director, manager or consultant of the Company or the Parent or a Subsidiary of the Company may be subject to additional or
greater restrictions. 












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First Amendment to the Amended and Restated WH Holdings (Cayman Islands) Ltd. Stock Incentive Plan (as restated on November 5, 2003)
EXHIBIT 32.1



SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION



In connection with the Annual Report of International Barrier Technology Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2012 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Michael Huddy, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



1.

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



Date: September 28, 2012



/s/ Michael Huddy

Michael Huddy

President and Chief Executive Officer

(Principal Executive Officer)





_______________________________________________________________________

This certification is being furnished as required by Rule 13a-14(b) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code, and shall not be deemed filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Exchange Act or otherwise subject to the liability of that Section.  This certification shall not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Exchange Act, except as otherwise stated in such filing.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with Quarterly Report of IRIS International, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the six months ended
June 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date thereof (the Report), I, César M. García, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                     |  |  |  |                        
|-------------------- |  |  |  | -----------------------
|Date: August 6, 2010 |  |  |  | /s/ César M. García    
|                     |  |  |  | César M. García        
|                     |  |  |  | Chief Executive Officer

This certification shall not be
deemed filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or the Exchange Act, or otherwise subject to the liability of Section 18 of the Exchange Act. Such certification shall not be deemed to be
incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Exchange Act, except to the extent that the Company specifically incorporates it by reference.
### STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

FILED 

### SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

February 7, 2013
RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS 

### TONYA J. COPPA,

OF WEST VIRGINIA 

### Claimant Below, Petitioner

vs.) No. 12-0996 (BOR Appeal No. 2046863) (Claim No. 2008043437)

WEST VIRGINIA OFFICE OF

INSURANCE COMMISSIONER Commissioner Below, Respondent

and

PANHANDLE SUPPORT SERVICES, INC., Employer Below, Respondent

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Tonya J. Coppa, by M. Jane Glauser, her attorney, appeals the decision of the West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Board of Review. Panhandle Support Services, Inc., by Lucinda Fluharty, its attorney, filed a timely response.

This appeal arises from the Board of Review’s Final Order dated July 31, 2012, in which the Board affirmed a January 6, 2012, Order of the Workers’ Compensation Office of Judges. In its Order, the Office of Judges denied a request for attorney’s fees, finding that the claims administrator’s denial of a psychiatric consultation was not unreasonable. The Court has carefully reviewed the records, written arguments, and appendices contained in the briefs, and

the case is mature for consideration.

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, a memorandum decision is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate

Procedure.

1
##### 



Exhibit 12.2
 Certification of the Principal Financial Officer of
Videotron ltd.
pursuant to section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F/A of the Company;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to
the period covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included
in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results
of operations and cash flows of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented in this
report;4.
    
    The Companys other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)
and 15d-15(e)) for the Company and have:
 a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the Company, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;b)
    
    [omitted pursuant to the guidance of Commission Releases
Nos.33-8238 (June 5, 2003) and 33-8618 (September 22, 2005)];c)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the Companys disclosure controls
and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; andd)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the Companys internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the
annual report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the Companys internal control over financial reporting; and
 5.
    
    The Companys other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the companys auditors and the
audit committee of the Companys board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):
 a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design
or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the Companys ability to record, process, summarize
and report financial information; andb)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the Companys internal control
over financial reporting.
  /s/ Yvan GingrasName: Yvan Gingras
Title: Executive Vice President, Finance andOperations, and Chief Financial Officer