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*********************************************** 
GAIL REINKE v. WALTER SING

(AC 36210)

Keller, Bright and Beach, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dissolved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court

opening the dissolution judgment and issuing certain financial orders.

After this court reversed the trial court’s judgment opening and modifying the dissolution judgment, the plaintiff, on the granting of certification, appealed to our Supreme Court, which reversed this court’s

judgment and remanded the case to this court with direction to consider

the merits of the plaintiff’s claims on appeal. On remand, held:

1. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court erred by

failing to find that the defendant committed fraud when he submitted

inaccurate financial affidavits to the court at the time of the original

dissolution judgment: although parties in a dissolution action have a

fiduciary-like duty to fully and frankly disclose their financial information, the plaintiff’s claim that once an underreporting of income and

assets was proven, the burden shifted to the defendant to prove fair

dealing by clear and convincing evidence was unavailing, as the plaintiff

did not ask the court to require the defendant to prove fair dealing by

clear and convincing evidence, nor did she allege or argue that the

defendant was in a fiduciary relationship with her or that he owed her

the duties that are owed to a beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship, she

failed to provide any authority to support her burden shifting analysis,

and our Supreme Court previously has rejected such a burden shifting

argument; moreover, the trial court’s finding that the plaintiff failed to

prove fraud was not clearly erroneous and was supported by sufficient

evidence in the record, including extensive testimony by the defendant

about the information he had provided on his financial affidavits in

which he attempted to demonstrate that his disclosures were made in

good faith, even if some of them were incorrect, which supported a

finding that the underreporting of income and assets that occurred was

not necessarily the result of fraud.

2. The trial court’s alimony award did not reflect an abuse of discretion:

nothing in the record suggested that the court, which had found that

an underreporting of income by the defendant in fact had occurred but

did not find that the defendant’s failure to fully disclose his assets and

income amounted to fraud, acted arbitrarily in rendering its new financial

orders, as the court stated that it considered the evidence and relevant

statutes, including the child support guidelines, it provided a remedy

to the plaintiff by altering the financial orders of the original dissolution

judgment in a variety of ways, including setting a new alimony award that

increased the plaintiff’s award by 11 percent and created a significant

arrearage in her favor, and it endeavored to craft new financial orders

that were consistent with the principles that governed the original

decree; moreover, the trial court, having found no wrongdoing by the

defendant and having expressly found that the plaintiff did not sustain

her burden of proving that the defendant acted fraudulently, was not

obligated to penalize the defendant by awarding the plaintiff greater

alimony or asset awards.

3. The plaintiff’s claim that the trial court erred with respect to its distribution

of five marital assets that came to light after the court opened the

judgment was unavailing; that court’s division of the assets at issue did

not appear to have been arbitrarily made or the product of mistake,

and was expressly based on the parties’ intent to divide martial assets

evenly, as reflected in their original stipulation, and in light of the court’s

finding that the plaintiff did not prove that the defendant acted in a

fraudulent manner, her claim that the court unfairly rewarded the defendant for wrongful conduct with respect to his financial affidavit necessarily failed.

4. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the trial court’s award of attorney’s

fees reflected an abuse of discretion; even if that court, in making its
original award of attorney’s fees, overlooked a certain affidavit of the

plaintiff’s attorney, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that reversible

error existed, as the court never stated that it would not consider the

subject affidavit, nor did it improperly refuse to consider awarding fees

allegedly incurred during a substantial portion of the litigation, the

court’s decision showed that it considered the reasonableness of the

fees generally but focused on the fact that the affidavits submitted by

the plaintiff’s attorneys set forth an amount of fees that was disproportionately high when compared to the results achieved, and the plaintiff

failed to provide any authority for her claim that, in light of the court’s

finding that the defendant had failed to disclose fully his income and

assets at the time of the original dissolution judgment, it was obligated

to award the plaintiff all of the fees she had incurred.

5. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court abused

its discretion by failing in its financial orders to promote full and frank

disclosure in financial affidavits and by failing to address adequately

the defendant’s omission of substantial income and assets from his

financial affidavits; that court, having found discrepancies in the defendant’s reporting of his income and assets, provided the plaintiff with a

proper remedy for the defendant’s failure to disclose assets and income

fully by altering the financial orders of the original dissolution judgment

in a variety of ways, and given that the court expressly found that the

plaintiff had not proven fraud, it was not obligated to provide the plaintiff

with any more favorable financial orders.

Argued September 11—officially released December 18, 2018

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other

relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk and tried to the court, Hon.

Dennis F. Harrigan, judge trial referee; judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain other relief

in accordance with the parties’ stipulation; thereafter,

the court, Shay, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion to

open the judgment and issued certain orders; subsequently, the court, Shay, J., issued a corrected memorandum of decision, and the plaintiff appealed to this

court; thereafter, the court, Shay, J., issued an articulation of its decision; subsequently, this court reversed

the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with

direction to deny the plaintiff’s motion to open; thereafter, the plaintiff filed a petition for certification to

appeal with our Supreme Court, which granted the petition and remanded the matter to this court to consider

the plaintiff’s claims. Affirmed.

Eric M. Higgins, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Reine C. Boyer, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

KELLER, J. This appeal returns to the Appellate Court

on remand from our Supreme Court for resolution of

the claims raised by the plaintiff, Gail Reinke. Reinke

v. Sing, 328 Conn. 376, 179 A.3d 769 (2018).1 The plaintiff

appeals from the judgment of the trial court after it

reissued several financial orders that were part of an

original judgment that dissolved her marriage to the

defendant, Walter Sing. The plaintiff claims that the

court erred (1) by failing to find that the defendant

committed fraud when he submitted inaccurate financial affidavits to the court at the time of the original

dissolution judgment, (2) with respect to its alimony

award, (3) with respect to its distribution of property,

(4) with respect to its award of attorney’s fees, and (5)

by failing in its financial orders to promote full and

frank disclosure in financial affidavits and by failing to

address adequately the defendant’s omission of substantial income and assets from the financial affidavits

that he filed at the time of the original dissolution judgment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Several facts are not in dispute. The parties were

married in 1989. On October, 2, 2007, their marriage was

dissolved by the trial court, Hon. Dennis F. Harrigan,

judge trial referee. At the time of this original dissolution judgment in 2007, the plaintiff was forty-seven

years of age and the defendant was fifty-six years of

age. The plaintiff, who holds a bachelor’s degree, was

a homemaker during the marriage, but occasionally

worked in a part-time capacity. The defendant, who

holds a degree in mathematics, worked steadily

throughout the marriage and, at the time of the dissolution proceedings, was a self-employed information technology consultant. There were two children of the

marriage. At the time of the original dissolution, the

parties’ son was seventeen years of age and their daughter was fourteen years of age. At the time of the subsequent judgment at issue in the present appeal, both

children had reached the age of majority.

The parties’ written ‘‘Stipulation for Judgment’’ was

incorporated by reference into the original judgment

of dissolution. Among the financial provisions in the

original decree, the defendant was ordered to pay the

plaintiff $3,333.33 in unallocated alimony and child support each month, beginning on October 1, 2007, subject

to de novo review at the request of either party beginning on October 1, 2016. Generally, the stipulation incorporated in the judgment reflected the parties’ intent to

divide their marital assets equally.

On May 4, 2010, the plaintiff filed a motion to open

the judgment of dissolution on the ground that the

defendant engaged in fraud during the original dissolution proceedings by failing to disclose in his financial

affidavit information concerning the extent of his
assets. According to the plaintiff, this resulted in an

undervaluation of the defendant’s assets by approximately $160,000. The plaintiff asked for the case to be

opened ‘‘for the purpose of complete discovery and an

equitable distribution of the parties’ entire marital

estate.’’

On September 28, 2010, by agreement of the parties,

the court, Shay, J., opened the original judgment of

dissolution for purposes of reassessing the financial

orders. In opening the judgment, the court did not make

any finding with respect to fraud, nor did the parties

stipulate that fraud had occurred. Thereafter, the parties engaged in extensive discovery for over two and

one half years.

On August 23, 2013, following a six day trial, the

court found that, at the time of the original dissolution

judgment in 2007, the defendant had underreported his

assets. In light of the underreporting that had occurred,

the court entered numerous financial orders that, in

several material ways, differed from those in the original judgment. In its memorandum of decision, the court

stated in relevant part: ‘‘[T]he evidence supports a finding that there are substantial discrepancies between

the [defendant’s] income as first reported at the time

of the original hearing and what actually should have

been reported. In fact, the stipulation of the parties was

based upon the assumption that the [defendant] had

gross income of $100,000, when, in fact, he was earning

twice that. . . . The [defendant] has filed multiple

financial affidavits over the course of the case, thus

presenting the court with the proverbial ‘moving target.’

In calculating the [defendant’s] net income, the court

has not factored in business expenses, since the [defendant] offered no credible evidence as to the amount of

[the] same. The court has, however, taken into consideration state and federal taxes, and his health insurance

premiums. Accordingly, the court calculates his net

weekly income as $2061. . . .

‘‘As to the marital estate, while the differences are

not as dramatic, nevertheless, they exist. A comparison

to investment accounts shows an underreporting of

$16,574 . . . or an 8.5 percent difference. The same

comparison with regard to retirement accounts yields

a more dramatic difference of $63,655 . . . or 62 percent. In addition, no life insurance was shown on the

corrected financial affidavit, where $250,000 term insurance insuring the [defendant’s] life was disclosed on

the original financial affidavit, and less debt is reported

on the corrected affidavit than on the original. Finally,

the [defendant] failed to disclose to the [plaintiff] that

he anticipated approximately $100,000 in income tax

refunds, which he ultimately did receive and put to his

own use.

‘‘The [plaintiff] testified at length about abusive

behavior by the [defendant], physical and mental,
throughout the course of the marriage. There is some

evidence to support her claims, however, much of it is

anecdotal. The family was further stressed by problems

concerning their son . . . .

‘‘A substantial number of the terms of the stipulation

for judgment have already been satisfied in part or in

full, including investment accounts, retirement

accounts, automobiles, and other personal property. On

the other hand, in addition to the omission of certain

assets, the evidence supports a finding that the [plaintiff’s] one-third interest in the condominium in Jersey

City, New Jersey, that is shared with the [defendant’s]

brother, and which was to be transferred to the [defendant] in the settlement in return for a $22,000 payment

to the [plaintiff], was undervalued. The evidence supports a valuation of her interest as $58,833. The [defendant] gave the [plaintiff] a check for $22,000, but, to

date, she has failed to deliver a deed of her interest

to him.

‘‘The principal remaining undivided marital asset is

the family home . . . currently occupied by the [defendant], which the parties have stipulated [has] a fair

market value of $1,565,000, against which there is combined mortgage debt of approximately $650,000. The

house is currently listed for sale.’’

In light of all of the circumstances, the court found

that the parties’ 2007 stipulation, which had been incorporated by reference in the original decree, was fair

and equitable and that, apart from the areas in which

it would be modified by the court, it was incorporated

into the new decree. The court stated that, in crafting

the final decree, it would take into account the partial

division of the marital estate that already had occurred

pursuant to the parties’ stipulation. The court found

that there were no exceptional intervening circumstances and, thus, it was appropriate to base its division

of the estate on its value as of the date of the original

judgment of dissolution.

Among the most significant ways in which the court

modified the original decree,2

it altered the defendant’s

alimony obligation by ordering him to pay the plaintiff

$4425 in alimony monthly beginning on October 1, 2007,

until May 31, 2010; $4000 in alimony monthly beginning

on June 1, 2010, until May 31, 2011; and $3500 in alimony

monthly beginning on June 1, 2011, until May 31, 2016.

The court specified that its award was nonmodifiable

with respect to its term and that the arrearage created

by its new order was to be paid to the plaintiff at the

rate of $500 per month until paid in full. The court did

not modify the defendant’s child support obligation. As

the parties agree, the court equally divided between

them those assets that it found had been undervalued

or not disclosed previously by the defendant. As an

award of attorney’s fees in connection with this case,

the court ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff
herself $20,000, her current counsel $10,000, and her

former counsel $10,000. This resulted in an award of

attorney’s fees totaling $40,000.

Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed. In 2015, when this

appeal was previously before this court, the trial court

was ordered, in relevant part, to articulate ‘‘whether it

found that there was no fraud or whether it simply was

not making an express finding regarding fraud. If the

latter, the court is ordered further to articulate whether

it found that there had been fraud as to the first judgment of dissolution.’’3

In its articulation of July 29, 2015,

the trial court stated in relevant part that it had granted

the plaintiff’s motion to open the judgment of dissolution ‘‘by agreement of the parties’’ and ‘‘[a]t that time,

[it] made no express finding of fraud. Although the

[defendant] did not voluntarily concede any fraudulent

dealings on his part, by agreeing to open the judgment,

he impliedly conceded the fact that the [plaintiff’s] allegations would, if proven, be a sufficient basis for opening the judgment of dissolution. . . . Moreover, the

[plaintiff] was never precluded from raising the issue

of fault at the time of the new hearing, which is, in fact,

just what she did. . . .

‘‘While the court found that the [defendant] had originally failed to fully disclose some of his assets and

understated his income, it made neither an express

finding that his failure to do so amounted to fraud, nor,

for that matter, that his behavior did not amount to

fraud. In short, under all the circumstances, the [plaintiff] failed to meet her burden to establish fraud to

the satisfaction of the court by clear and convincing

evidence. . . . Moreover, the court believes that a finding that fraud was not proven could be fairly implied

from a reading of the decision as a whole, in particular,

relative to its other specific findings and as to the relief

granted.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)4

This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth

as necessary in our analysis of the plaintiff’s claims.

I

First, we address the plaintiff’s claim that the court

erroneously failed to find that the defendant committed

fraud when he submitted inaccurate financial affidavits

to the court at the time of the original dissolution judgment.5 We disagree.

A

In the first subpart of the present claim, the plaintiff

asserts that the court improperly required her to bear

the burden of proving that the defendant had engaged

in fraud. She argues that, in light of the defendant’s

fiduciary-like obligation to make full and frank disclosures on his financial affidavits, the court should have

required the defendant to prove fair dealing by clear

and convincing evidence.
‘‘When a party contests the burden of proof applied

by the court, the standard of review is de novo because

the matter is a question of law.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Rollar Construction & Demolition,

Inc. v. Granite Rock Associates, LLC, 94 Conn. App.

125, 133, 891 A.2d 133 (2006).

To provide necessary context for the plaintiff’s argument, we set forth some basic legal principles concerning breach of fiduciary duty actions. ‘‘Once a [fiduciary]

relationship is found to exist, the burden of proving

fair dealing properly shifts to the fiduciary. . . . Furthermore, the standard of proof for establishing fair

dealing is not the ordinary standard of fair preponderance of the evidence, but requires proof either by clear

and convincing evidence, clear and satisfactory evidence or clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence.

. . . Proof of a fiduciary relationship, therefore, generally imposes a twofold burden on the fiduciary. First,

the burden of proof shifts to the fiduciary; and second,

the standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Papallo v. Lefebvre,

172 Conn. App. 746, 754, 161 A.3d 603 (2017); see also

Chioffi v. Martin, 181 Conn. App. 111, 137, 186 A.3d

15 (2018); Iacurci v. Sax, 139 Conn. App. 386, 394 n.2,

57 A.3d 736 (2012) (‘‘in cases involving claims of fraud,

self-dealing or conflict of interest, a fiduciary bears the

burden of proving fair dealing by clear and convincing

evidence’’), aff’d, 313 Conn. 786, 99 A.3d 1145 (2014).

The plaintiff does not direct our attention to any

portion of the record in which she explicitly asked the

court to require the defendant to prove fair dealing by

clear and convincing evidence or objected on the

ground that the court incorrectly had allocated the burden of proof to her. Nor does the plaintiff draw our

attention to any portion of the record in which she

explicitly argued before the court that the defendant,

consistently identified throughout the proceedings as

her spouse, was in a fiduciary relationship with her.

Our careful review of the relevant pleadings reflects

that the plaintiff did not plead that the defendant was

a fiduciary or that he owed her the duties that are owed

to a beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship.

At trial, the plaintiff, relying on Billington v. Billington, 220 Conn. 212, 595 A.2d 1377 (1991), stressed

that the defendant had an obligation to disclose fully

his income and assets in the financial affidavits that

he submitted to the court at the time of the original

dissolution judgment in 2007, that he failed to do so,

and that the plaintiff was entitled to recourse for his

failure in this regard. At the conclusion of the trial, the

plaintiff’s counsel argued that the marital relationship

was ‘‘quasi fiduciary in nature.’’

In parts II, III, IV, and V of this opinion, we address

the plaintiff’s claims that some of the court’s financial
orders reflected an abuse of discretion. Consistent with

the arguments advanced at trial, in those claims, the

plaintiff relies on Billington, in which our Supreme

Court abandoned the requirement that a party seeking

to open a dissolution judgment on the basis of fraud

must demonstrate that it exercised diligence in the original dissolution action in order to discover and expose

the fraud. Billington v. Billington, supra, 220 Conn.

218. The court’s discussion in Billington illuminates

the obligation borne by both parties in dissolution

actions to provide the court with an accurate financial

affidavit as required by Practice Book § 25-30. The court

explained in relevant part: ‘‘Our cases have uniformly

emphasized the need for full and frank disclosure in

that affidavit. A court is entitled to rely upon the truth

and accuracy of sworn statements required by [Practice

Book § 25-30 (formerly Practice Book § 463)], and a

misrepresentation of assets and income is a serious and

intolerable dereliction on the part of the affiant which

goes to the very heart of the judicial proceeding. . . .

These sworn statements have great significance in

domestic disputes in that they serve to facilitate the

process and avoid the necessity of testimony in public

by persons still married to each other regarding the

circumstances of their formerly private existence. . . .

Thus, the requirement of diligence in discovering fraud

is inconsistent with the requirement of full disclosure

because it imposes on the innocent injured party the

duty to discover that which the wrongdoer already is

legally obligated to disclose. . . .

‘‘This principle of complete disclosure is consistent

with the notion that the settlement of a marital dissolution case is not like the settlement of an accident case.

It stamps with finality the end of a marriage. . . .

Courts simply should not countenance either party to

such a unique human relationship dealing with each

other at arms’ length. Whatever honesty there may, or

should, have been during the marriage should at least

be required by the court at its end. . . .

‘‘We have recognized, furthermore, in the context of

an action based upon fraud, that the special relationship

between fiduciary and beneficiary compels full disclosure by the fiduciary. . . . Although marital parties are

not necessarily in the relationship of fiduciary to beneficiary, we believe that no less disclosure is required

of such parties when they come to court seeking to

terminate their marriage.

‘‘Finally, the principle of full and frank disclosure,

with which the diligence limitation is inconsistent, is

essential to our strong policy that the private settlement

of the financial affairs of estranged marital partners is

a goal that courts should support rather than undermine. . . . That goal requires, in turn, that reasonable

settlements have been knowingly agreed upon. . . .

Our support of that goal will be effective only if we
instill confidence in marital litigants that we require,

as a concomitant of the settlement process, such full

and frank disclosure from both sides, for then they will

be more willing to forego their combat and to settle

their dispute privately, secure in the knowledge that

they have all the essential information. . . . This principle will, in turn, decrease the need for extensive discovery, and will thereby help to preserve a greater

measure of the often sorely tried marital assets for

the support of all of the family members.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 219–22.

In arguing before this court that the trial court’s financial orders reflected an abuse of discretion, the plaintiff

does not rely solely on the foregoing rationale from

Billington, but she relies on other appellate decisions

that have followed Billington and, as the plaintiff correctly observes, unambiguously reaffirm our Supreme

Court’s ‘‘insistence on full and complete disclosure in

financial affidavits.’’ Specifically, as it relates to our

Supreme Court’s broad pronouncement that parties

have a duty to fully and completely disclose financial

information, the plaintiff refers to Reville v. Reville,

312 Conn. 428, 451–52, 93 A.3d 1076 (2014) (parties in

dissolution cases have duty to disclose assets even if

it is unclear whether such assets are subject to distribution), Ramin v. Ramin, 281 Conn. 324, 915 A.2d 790

(2007) (reversible error for trial court not to consider

motion for contempt brought against consistently noncompliant party in dissolution action), and Weinstein

v. Weinstein, 275 Conn. 671, 882 A.2d 53 (2005) (clearly

erroneous for trial court to have found that defendant

in dissolution action had not committed fraud by undervaluing business asset on financial affidavit).

The plaintiff relies on Billington for the proposition

that, once an underreporting of income and assets was

proven, the defendant bore the burden of proving fair

dealing by clear and convincing evidence. In Billington,

however, our Supreme Court did not state that parties

in a marital relationship are in a fiduciary relationship

or that a party in a marital dissolution proceeding bore

the burden of proving fair dealing by clear and convincing evidence. As set forth previously, the court in Billington, referring to the duty to disclose and not the

duty of proving fair dealing, stated that although parties

in a dissolution action are ‘‘not necessarily in the relationship of fiduciary to beneficiary . . . no less disclosure is required of such parties when they come to

court seeking to terminate their marriage.’’ Billington

v. Billington, supra, 220 Conn. 221.6

In arguing that a fiduciary relationship existed, the

plaintiff also relies on Ramin v. Ramin, supra, 281

Conn. 324, in which our Supreme Court once again

addressed the duty of disclosure between parties in

dissolution actions. In Ramin, our Supreme Court

addressed a claim that is distinguishable from the claim
presently before us. Specifically, the plaintiff in Ramin

claimed that the trial court had abused its discretion

by declining to rule on her motions for contempt and

for sanctions, which were based on the defendant’s

repeated failure to comply with the court’s discovery

orders. Id., 330. Thus, our Supreme Court in Ramin

did not have occasion to address the burden shifting

argument at issue here. Although, in the context of its

analysis, our Supreme Court reiterated that parties in

a dissolution action have a fiduciary-like obligation to

fully disclose financial information, it did not state

that such parties were in a fiduciary relationship or that

a party in a dissolution proceeding had a burden of

proving fair dealing by clear and convincing evidence.

Instead, as relevant, the court in Ramin stated that a

defendant who had ‘‘breached his fiduciary-like obligations of discovery to the plaintiff as ordered by the

court . . . should bear the burden of establishing that

his breach of that obligation did not harm the beneficiary of that obligation.’’ Id., 349–50.

The plaintiff also draws our attention to Dietter v.

Dietter, 54 Conn. App. 481, 737 A.2d 926, cert. denied,

252 Conn. 906, 743 A.2d 617 (1999), for the broad proposition that courts have shifted the burden of proving

fair dealing in ‘‘dissolution of marriage cases.’’ The

plaintiff’s reliance on Dietter is undermined by the fact

that it was not merely an appeal from a judgment in

a dissolution action. In Dietter, the plaintiff husband

brought a dissolution action against the defendant wife.

Id., 482. The defendant wife, however, brought a cross

complaint against the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s mother,

and the plaintiff’s brothers, wherein she alleged that

they fraudulently had transferred assets from a corporation in which she was a shareholder, thereby dissipating

the marital estate. Id., 482–83. On appeal, despite

obtaining a favorable judgment with respect to part of

her cross complaint, the defendant argued with respect

to the other part of her cross complaint that the trial

court improperly had allocated to her the burden of

proving that the transactions on which she relied

amounted to fraudulent transfers from the marital

estate. Id., 488.

It is important that the defendant in Dietter did not

claim that the plaintiff, in his capacity as her spouse,

owed her a fiduciary duty. Instead, she claimed that

the plaintiff, as an officer of a corporation of which

she was a shareholder, ‘‘owed her a fiduciary duty as

a shareholder’’ and that the court ‘‘should have allocated

the burden of proof to the plaintiff to establish fair and

equitable dealing by clear and convincing evidence.’’ Id.

In rejecting the defendant’s burden shifting claim,

this court in Dietter reasoned in relevant part: ‘‘The

second count of the defendant’s amended cross complaint alleged neither that the plaintiff owed her a fiduciary duty nor that the plaintiff breached a fiduciary
duty. Practice Book § 10-4 provides, however, that ‘[i]t

is unnecessary to allege any promise or duty which the

law implies from the facts pleaded.’ In the present case,

a fiduciary duty cannot be implied from the facts

pleaded because the second count of the amended cross

complaint identified the plaintiff neither as a fiduciary

nor as an officer or director of [the corporation at issue],

and did not set forth any facts from which a fiduciary

duty might be implied. . . . Because the second count

of the amended cross complaint is most accurately

described as claiming that the plaintiff, acting in his

capacity as a spouse and not as a fiduciary, fraudulently transferred assets from the marital estate, we

conclude that the trial court properly allocated the burden of proof on the second count of the amended cross

complaint to the defendant.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis added.) Id., 489–90.

In light of the foregoing analysis, Dietter cannot reasonably be interpreted to support the proposition that

a party in a marital dissolution action who has been

found to have underreported income or assets is a fiduciary or that such party, by virtue of their party status

in a dissolution action, bears the burden of proving

fair dealing by clear and convincing evidence. To the

contrary, this court in Dietter reasoned that, in the

absence of additional facts from which a fiduciary relationship reasonably may be inferred, an action brought

against a spouse is not the legal equivalent of an action

brought against a fiduciary.

The plaintiff does not draw our attention to any

authority that directly supports her burden shifting

argument, and we are not aware of any. To the contrary,

our Supreme Court, in Reville v. Reville, supra, 312

Conn. 467–71, rejected such a burden shifting argument.

In Reville, a plaintiff in a dissolution action claimed

under the plain error doctrine that ‘‘once it is established that a party to a dissolution action has failed to

list a substantial asset either on his or her financial

affidavit or in open court, the burden should shift to

that party to prove, by clear and convincing evidence,

either the absence of fraud or that the nondisclosure

was harmless.’’ Id., 467. Our Supreme Court rejected

this argument, noting that, under well settled appellate

precedent, the party asserting fraud as a basis of setting

aside financial orders in a dissolution judgment bears

the burden of proving fraud by clear and convincing

evidence. Id., 469.

As we have observed, our case law reflects that parties in a dissolution action are ‘‘[u]nlike civil litigants

who stand at arm’s length from one another . . . .’’

Duart v. Dept. of Correction, 303 Conn. 479, 501, 34

A.3d 343 (2012). For this reason, and because parties

in a dissolution action need information about each

other’s income and assets to pursue their cause of

action, our case law imposes a duty on parties in a
dissolution action to fully and frankly disclose their

financial information. Our decisional law, however, has

limited this fiduciary-like duty to disclosure and, in light

of that disclosure obligation, to proving the absence

of harm once proper disclosure has not occurred; our

courts have not expressly extended such an obligation

to prove with clear and convincing evidence that fair

dealing has occurred. Moreover, we are not persuaded

that Billington and its progeny should be interpreted

to suggest that it is necessary or appropriate to extend

this rationale so as to require a party in a dissolution

action who has been found to have underreported

income or assets to prove fair dealing with clear and

convincing evidence. In light of the foregoing, we reject

the plaintiff’s burden shifting argument.

B

In the second subpart of this claim, the plaintiff claims

that the court’s finding that she failed to prove fraud

was clearly erroneous. We disagree.

In support of this claim, the plaintiff argues in relevant part: ‘‘There was no evidence whatsoever that the

defendant’s numerous omissions of substantial income

and assets on his financial affidavit were the product

of fair dealing, and any conclusion that the defendant

engaged in fair dealing would be clearly erroneous in

light of the evidence at trial.’’ The plaintiff describes

the evidence of fraud to be ‘‘overwhelming’’ and relies

on the fact that the court’s findings reflect that it found

‘‘a clear pattern of nondisclosure of substantial income

and numerous valuable assets on three financial affidavits.’’ Moreover, the plaintiff argues, ‘‘[t]his pattern of

nondisclosure was accompanied by a sustained pattern

of affirmative efforts by the defendant to prevent the

plaintiff from discovering the true extent of the defendant’s income and his assets through discovery.’’ The

plaintiff analogizes the facts of the present case with

those in Weinstein v. Weinstein, supra, 275 Conn. 688–

95, in which our Supreme Court found error in a trial

court’s finding that fraud in a dissolution action had

not been proven.

As our Supreme Court in Billington observed, ‘‘[t]he

elements of a fraud action are: (1) a false representation

was made as a statement of fact; (2) the statement

was untrue and known to be so by its maker; (3) the

statement was made with the intent of inducing reliance

thereon; and (4) the other party relied on the statement

to his detriment.’’ Billington v. Billington, supra, 220

Conn. 217. As the plaintiff correctly acknowledges,

‘‘[t]he determination of the question of fraudulent intent

is clearly an issue of fact which must often be inferred

from surrounding circumstances. . . . Such a fact is,

then, not ordinarily proven by direct evidence, but

rather, by inference from other facts proven—the indicia or badges of fraud.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dietter v. Dietter, supra, 54 Conn. App. 487. Issues
of mental state generally, and issues of intent in particular, are inherently fact bound. Resolution of such issues

depends on the trier of fact’s assessment of relevant

facts, as well as any relevant testimony concerning the

events at issue. In a case such as the present case, in

which the party alleged to have acted fraudulently has

testified at length about his conduct, we would expect

the trier of fact’s firsthand observations of his testimony

to shed additional light on an assessment of his intent.

‘‘Appellate review of a trial court’s findings of fact is

governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review.

. . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there

is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when

although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing

court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Milazzo-Panico v.

Panico, 103 Conn. App. 464, 467–68, 929 A.2d 351 (2007).

The plaintiff seemingly argues that, in light of the

court’s finding that an underreporting of income and

assets occurred to the extent that it did, as well as

the fact that the parties engaged in discovery disputes

concerning the defendant’s finances, the court was obligated as a matter of law to find that fraud had occurred.

The plaintiff relies on Weinstein, yet does not draw our

attention to unmistakable evidence that suggests that

the defendant acted with a fraudulent intent, let alone

the type of ‘‘clear and convincing evidence’’ that compelled our Supreme Court to find that fraud had

occurred in that case. Weinstein v. Weinstein, supra,

275 Conn. 692–93 (determining that defendant’s own

testimony concerning valuation of asset at issue was

clear and convincing evidence that he knowingly misrepresented his worth in his financial affidavit).

At trial, following the granting of the motion to open

the judgment, the defendant testified extensively in an

attempt to refute the plaintiff’s argument that the evidence reflected wrongdoing on his part with respect to

the disclosure of financial information. The defendant

testified that he was self-represented at the time of the

original dissolution trial and, in great detail, testified

about the information that he provided on his financial

affidavits in 2007 and why he set forth some of the

inaccurate information about his income and assets. It

suffices to observe that, with respect to the contested

issue of fraud,7

the defendant attempted to demonstrate

that his disclosures were made in good faith, even if

some of them were incorrect because, for example, they

were made in haste or upon incomplete information.

Thereafter, at the conclusion of the trial, defense counsel argued that, contrary to the plaintiff’s arguments,

the defendant had not attempted ‘‘to hide, mislead, or

provide false information to the plaintiff with respect

to his financial situation in order to avoid financial

liability in the dissolution proceedings [in] 2007.’’ The
plaintiff makes no effort to refute the defendant’s highly

relevant testimony. Instead, she broadly relies on the

court’s finding that a significant underreporting of

assets and income had occurred and that the parties’

litigation was marked by discovery disputes concerning

the defendant’s finances.

The court, having had a firsthand opportunity to

observe the defendant and to evaluate his testimony,

found that an underreporting of income and assets had

occurred, but did not make findings that were consistent with the plaintiff’s argument that underreporting

was accompanied by a fraudulent intent. Far from there

being ‘‘no evidence whatsoever’’ that the defendant did

not intend to defraud, as the plaintiff argues, the record

contains evidence to support a finding that the underreporting of income and assets that occurred was not

necessarily the result of fraud. The defendant’s testimony, and the inferences that the court reasonably

could have drawn therefrom, support the court’s finding

and, absent the type of compelling evidence of fraud

that was presented in Weinstein, we are not persuaded

that a factual mistake was made by the trial court.

II

Second, the plaintiff claims that the court erred with

respect to its alimony award. The plaintiff argues that

the court’s award was improper because, in comparison

with the original award, it decreased the alimony term

and eliminated her right to seek an extension of the

alimony term. Also, the plaintiff argues that the amount

of the court’s alimony award undermined the requirement that parties in dissolution actions fully and frankly

disclose their income by way of financial affidavits.

We disagree.

The plaintiff argues that, although the court correctly

determined that there were substantial discrepancies

between what the defendant reported to be his selfemployment income at the time of the original dissolution judgment in 2007 and what his actual self-employment income was proven to be, the court failed to assess

accurately the extent of these discrepancies. As we

stated previously in this opinion, the court found that,

at the time of the original decree, the defendant failed

to disclose accurately his self-employment income on

his financial affidavit. The court observed that, in a

financial affidavit dated September 12, 2007, the defendant disclosed his weekly gross self-employment

income to be $2319. In a financial affidavit dated April

26, 2013, however, he disclosed his gross self-employment income (as of the time of the original dissolution

in 2007) to have been $3506. The court calculated the

defendant’s weekly gross income to have been $3506

and his weekly net income to have been $2061.8 The

court stated that the difference between what the defendant had reported in the September 12, 2007 affidavit

and what he reported in the April 26, 2013 affidavit was
$1187 ‘‘or 51 percent.’’

In discussing the extent to which the defendant

underreported his weekly gross self-employment

income at the time of the original decree, the plaintiff

argues that the court should have relied not on the

September 12, 2007 affidavit, but on the undisputed

evidence that, in his October 2, 2007 financial affidavit,

the defendant represented that such income was $1958,

and that he had led the court to believe that his income

from all sources was only $100,000 per year. The plaintiff argues that when the defendant’s actual self-employment gross income is compared with the selfemployment gross income that the defendant reported

on October 2, 2007, the date on which the court rendered its original judgment of dissolution, ‘‘the differential is 79 percent, not 51 percent.’’9

The plaintiff also draws our attention to evidence

that, even during the proceedings after the court

granted the plaintiff’s motion to open the judgment

which had been brought on the basis of fraud but was

granted in accordance with the parties’ stipulation, the

defendant continued to fail to disclose the extent of his

income in the years leading up to the dissolution in

2007. The plaintiff, referring to evidence presented to

the court as well as the defendant’s replies to interrogatories, argues that the defendant exhibited ‘‘a pervasive

pattern of misrepresenting his income on his financial

affidavits and sworn interrogatory responses, which

came to light only after the plaintiff obtained a commission to subpoena [an out-of-state employer of the defendant] over the defendant’s objection that [such

discovery] was a fishing expedition . . . .’’

The plaintiff argues that, in light of this factual background which, she asserts, reflected the defendant’s

malfeasance, the court’s orders concerning alimony

reflected an abuse of discretion. In relevant part, the

plaintiff argues: ‘‘Rather than promote and enforce the

obligation of full and frank disclosure in financial affidavits . . . [the] trial court’s judgment had the opposite

effect. . . . It rewarded, rather than redressed, the

defendant’s repeated and serious omissions of income

on his financial affidavit and his subsequent affirmative

attempts to prevent the plaintiff from discovering his

real income by obtaining the information directly from

[the defendant’s out-of-state employer].’’ The plaintiff,

relies heavily on Billington v. Billington, supra, 220

Conn. 212, and argues that the court’s ‘‘reduction of the

alimony term and elimination of the plaintiff’s right

to seek an extension of the alimony term cannot be

reconciled with [our] Supreme Court’s jurisprudence

concerning the misrepresentation of substantial assets

and income in a financial affidavit.’’ Furthermore, the

plaintiff argues that, in light of the evidence concerning

the defendant’s pattern of concealing his income, the

court abused its discretion in the amount of alimony
that it awarded her.10 The plaintiff argues: ‘‘Here, an 11

percent increase in alimony in the face of an approximately 80 percent underreporting of income simply cannot withstand scrutiny under [Billington v. Billington,

supra, 212,] and its progeny.’’ The plaintiff urges us to

conclude that the amount of the alimony award failed

‘‘adequately to redress the defendant’s fraudulent and

material misrepresentations on his financial affidavit,

which resulted in a substantial injustice to the plaintiff.’’

The plaintiff, challenging the propriety of the court’s

new alimony orders, expressly invokes our abuse of

discretion standard of review. ‘‘We review financial

awards in dissolution actions under an abuse of discretion standard. . . . In order to conclude that the trial

court abused its discretion, we must find that the court

either incorrectly applied the law or could not reasonably conclude as it did. . . . In determining whether a

trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic

relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action. . . .

‘‘The generally accepted purpose of . . . alimony is

to enable a spouse who is disadvantaged through

divorce to enjoy a standard of living commensurate

with the standard of living during marriage. . . . In

addition to the marital standard of living, the trial court

must also consider the factors in [General Statutes]

§ 46b-82 when awarding alimony. . . .

‘‘General Statutes § 46b-82 (a) provides in relevant

part that [i]n determining whether alimony shall be

awarded, and the duration and amount of the award,

the court shall consider the evidence presented by each

party and shall consider the length of the marriage, the

causes for the . . . dissolution of the marriage . . .

the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources

of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate and needs of each of the

parties and the [division of property made] pursuant to

[General Statutes §] 46b-81 . . . . The court is to consider these factors in making an award of alimony, but

it need not give each factor equal weight. . . . We note

also that [t]he trial court may place varying degrees of

importance on each criterion according to the factual

circumstances of each case. . . . There is no additional

requirement that the court specifically state how it

weighed the statutory criteria or explain in detail the

importance assigned to each statutory factor. . . .

[T]he record must indicate the basis for the trial court’s

award. . . . There must be sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the spouse should

receive time limited alimony for the particular duration

established. If the time period for the periodic alimony

is logically inconsistent with the facts found or the

evidence, it cannot stand.’’ (Citations omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Horey v. Horey, 172 Conn.

App. 735, 740–41, 161 A.3d 579 (2017); see also Hammel
v. Hammel, 158 Conn. App. 827, 835–36, 120 A.3d 1259

(2015) (financial orders in dissolution cases are entitled

to presumption of correctness when based on facts

and relevant statutory criteria but nonetheless warrant

reversal if they are shown to be logically inconsistent

or product of mistake).

In part I, we discussed the rationale set forth by our

Supreme Court in Billington. As discussed previously,

Billington highlights the obligation of dissolution litigants to fully and frankly disclose their assets in financial affidavits. Billington and its progeny make clear

that courts must insist on full and complete disclosure

and must not hesitate to take appropriate action in

the face of material misrepresentations on a party’s

financial affidavit.

In the present case, the court did not hesitate to act.

Acting on the agreement of the parties, the court opened

the original dissolution judgment. On the basis of the

new financial information brought before it, the court

entered new financial orders concerning, among other

things, alimony, property, and attorney’s fees. Although

the plaintiff introduced evidence that, in her view,

reflected that any underreporting of income or assets

by the defendant was the product of an attempt to

defraud her, the court did not make such a finding.

During the trial, the court made clear that it was not

ruling on a motion for contempt, but was evaluating

the defendant’s income and the marital estate after the

parties had agreed to open the judgment of dissolution

to permit the court to reconsider the financial orders

that were entered at the time of the original judgment

of dissolution. Nevertheless, the plaintiff submitted evidence and argued her claim that the defendant had

acted in a fraudulent manner at the time of the original

dissolution by submitting inaccurate financial affidavits, which the defendant contested.

After affording the parties an ample opportunity to

present relevant evidence, the court found that an

underreporting of income by the defendant, in fact, had

occurred. In an articulation of its decision, the court

stated ‘‘that the [defendant] had originally failed to fully

disclose some of his assets and [had] understated his

income, [but] it made neither an express finding that

his failure to do so amounted to fraud, nor, for that

matter, that his behavior did not amount to fraud.’’ The

court stated: ‘‘In short, under all the circumstances, the

[plaintiff] failed to meet her burden to establish fraud

to the satisfaction of the court by clear and convincing

evidence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Nothing in the record suggests that the court acted

arbitrarily in rendering its new financial orders. To the

contrary, the court stated that it considered the evidence and ‘‘General Statutes §§ 46b-56, 46b-56a, 46b56c, 46b-81, 46b-82, 46b-84, and 46b-215a, including the

Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines Regulations
. . . .’’ As we discussed previously in this opinion, the

court provided a remedy to the plaintiff for the defendant’s failure to disclose assets and income fully. It

altered the financial orders of the original dissolution

judgment in a variety of ways. It is undisputed that the

court set a new alimony award as of the date of the

original dissolution judgment in 2013, thereby increasing her award by 11 percent and creating a significant

arrearage in her favor. The court explained the manner

in which it calculated its new alimony award, and the

plaintiff does not claim error in the court’s methodology.

The plaintiff argues that the court was obligated to

increase the amount of alimony to a greater extent, and

she focuses on the fact that the court shortened the

alimony term by several months and made the award’s

term nonmodifiable. The plaintiff inherently suggests

in her arguments that the court was obligated to penalize the defendant for wrongdoing in his disclosure of

income and assets. Contrary to her characterization of

the defendant’s conduct as being part of a ‘‘pervasive

pattern of misrepresenting income,’’ the court did not

find any wrongdoing on the defendant’s part, and

expressly found that the plaintiff had failed to prove

fraud. The court did not couch its decision in terms of

wrongdoing by the defendant, but merely stated that

the defendant had not disclosed accurately his income

and assets at the time of the original judgment of dissolution. Although the plaintiff claims that the court

should have found that the defendant acted fraudulently, we rejected that claim in part I of this opinion.

The court unmistakably endeavored to craft new financial orders that were consistent with the principles that

governed the original decree, not to penalize the

defendant.

The case law on which the plaintiff relies requires the

court to take action when presented with an inaccurate

disclosure by a party in a dissolution action, yet the

plaintiff does not present this court with any authority

in support of her argument that in circumstances such

as those before us, in which fraud has not been proven,

the court is obligated to act in a punitive manner against

a party who has not accurately disclosed income or

assets. Stated otherwise, there is no precise mathematical formula that the court must follow in setting new

financial orders in such circumstances. Rather, its

award is subject to review for an abuse of discretion.

In the present case, in which the plaintiff argues that the

defendant should be penalized but has not succeeded

in demonstrating that fraud occurred, the plaintiff has

failed to demonstrate that the court’s alimony award

reflected an abuse of discretion.

III

Third, the plaintiff claims that the court erred with

respect to its distribution of five marital assets that
came to light after the court opened the judgment.

We disagree.

Among its many financial orders, the court ordered

the defendant to pay the plaintiff $106,042 within sixty

days. This amount included, among other things, the

plaintiff’s share of some of the marital assets that the

defendant either failed to disclose or undervalued at

the time of the original dissolution judgment. Additionally, the court ordered that qualified domestic relations

orders be prepared to equally distribute two retirement

accounts held by the defendant through his employer

or former employer. The court found that at the time

of the original dissolution judgment, the defendant had

not reported these accounts on his financial affidavit.

In the present claim, the plaintiff does not challenge

the court’s factual findings with respect to the parties’

marital assets, but claims that the court abused its discretion in its distribution of five specific marital assets.

Specifically, the plaintiff draws our attention to the

court’s orders concerning an ‘‘E-Trade account,’’ tax

refunds, a ‘‘UBM 401k’’ account, a ‘‘Fidelity 401k’’

account, and a ‘‘Morgan Stanley’’ account.

With respect to these five specific assets, the court

found in relevant part, as follows: ‘‘That the original

financial affidavit of the [defendant] as filed with the

court omitted two retirement accounts, to wit: a UBM

[401k] plan having a value of approximately $49,000 and

a Fidelity [401k] plan having a value of approximately

$16,000; that it is equitable and appropriate that the

[plaintiff] receive one half thereof, together with all

interest and gains accrued to the date of actual distribution by means of a Qualified Domestic Relations Order

. . . consistent with the intent of the parties to divide

the marital assets equally.’’ Additionally, the court

found: ‘‘That the evidence supports a finding that the

[defendant] has received state and federal income tax

refunds for the years 2004 through 2007 in the amount

of $104,163; that he failed to disclose this fact at the

time of the entry of the dissolution and the execution

of the stipulation for judgment; that he has applied said

sum to his own use; that there is no credible evidence

that he has filed amended returns for said years; and

that it is equitable and appropriate that the [plaintiff]

share equally in said sum.’’ In a written correction to

its memorandum of decision, the court awarded the

plaintiff $34,877, which it found was half of the value

of an E-Trade account held by the defendant that, the

plaintiff argued, had not been disclosed at the time of

the original dissolution judgment. The court expressly

declined to enter any orders distributing a Morgan Stanley account that the defendant did not disclose at the

time of the original dissolution judgment because, in

the court’s view, it was a ‘‘custodial account’’ and the

court ‘‘lacks jurisdiction’’ to enter orders to distribute

it.11
The plaintiff, referring to some of the evidence that

she presented at trial after the court opened the judgment, argues that the court’s decision to divide the

assets at issue equally between the parties reflected

an abuse of discretion. The plaintiff argues: ‘‘In short,

despite the clear evidence that the defendant had

engaged in a pattern and practice of failing to disclose

substantial assets, in addition to substantial income,

on his financial affidavit [at the time of the original

dissolution judgment], the trial court simply divided the

undisclosed assets—including [the] E-Trade [account]

and the large tax refunds—between the parties 50/50,

the same percentage split set forth in the original judgment for the accounts that the defendant disclosed.

Here again, the trial court’s judgment was an abuse of

discretion because it cannot reasonably be harmonized

with Billington and its progeny. If, after a retrial, the

percentage division of disclosed assets and undisclosed

assets is the same, why would a rational self-interested

actor engage in full and frank disclosure? He wouldn’t.

The rational course of action would [be] to conceal

assets, or at least some of them. One might not be

caught, and even if caught, the result will be no worse

than it would have been had full disclosure been made.’’

The plaintiff urges this court to conclude that, in light

of evidence that the defendant engaged in a ‘‘campaign’’

to prevent the plaintiff from obtaining information

about at least some of the marital assets at issue, the

court lacked the discretion to divide the assets in the

same proportion as those assets that had been fully

disclosed at the time of the original dissolution

judgment.

Similar to the claim presented in part II of this opinion, the plaintiff’s arguments in the present claim rest

on a factual premise that does not exist. The plaintiff

interprets the evidence presented at trial as clear and

unequivocal proof that the defendant’s failure to disclose income and assets was the product of fraud, and

that he attempted to conceal the assets from her up

and through the time of trial. Such a characterization

of the evidence was contested at trial. The plaintiff

attempted to persuade the court that the defendant

had concealed assets, misled the plaintiff, or knowingly

provided false information to defraud the plaintiff. The

court, however, did not find that such conduct had

occurred. Instead, the court found that the defendant

‘‘had originally failed to fully disclose some of his assets

and [had] understated his income’’ and the court ‘‘made

neither an express finding that his failure to do so

amounted to fraud, nor, for that matter, that his behavior did not amount to fraud.’’ In part I of this opinion,

we rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the court’s finding

that fraud had not been proven was clearly erroneous.

In part II of this opinion, we set forth the discretionary

standard of review that applies to a court’s financial
orders in a dissolution case. ‘‘That standard of review

reflects the sound policy that the trial court has the

unique opportunity to view the parties and their testimony, and is therefore in the best position to assess all

of the circumstances surrounding a dissolution action,

including such factors as the demeanor and the attitude

of the parties.’’ Casey v. Casey, 82 Conn. App. 378, 383,

844 A.2d 250 (2004). The court’s division of the assets

at issue does not appear to have been arbitrarily made

or the product of mistake, but was expressly based on

the parties’ intent to divide marital assets evenly, as

was reflected in their original stipulation. In light of the

court’s finding that the plaintiff did not prove that the

defendant acted in a fraudulent manner, the plaintiff’s

argument that the court unfairly rewarded the defendant for wrongful conduct with respect to his financial

affidavit is unpersuasive. We do not interpret the precedent on which the plaintiff relies, including Billington,

Weinstein, Ramin, or Reville, to have required the court

to divide the assets at issue differently, nor are we

persuaded that the court’s decision reasonably could

be interpreted as rewarding the defendant for his failure

to fully disclose one or more assets in a forthcoming

manner.

IV

Fourth, the plaintiff argues that the court erred with

respect to its award of attorney’s fees. We disagree.

In its memorandum of decision, the court stated that

it had reviewed an affidavit of counsel fees submitted

by the plaintiff’s previous attorney, Joseph T. O’Connor.

This affidavit for fees and disbursements totaling

$16,640.87 was dated September 29, 2011, and it covered

the period of November 11, 2009 through March 3, 2011.

The court also stated that it had reviewed an affidavit

of counsel fees submitted by the plaintiff’s attorney,

Eric Higgins. This affidavit for fees and disbursements

totaling $40,040.09 was dated May 10, 2012, and it covered the period of August 11, 2010 through May 9, 2012.

The court stated that it had found ‘‘said fees to be

reasonable under all the circumstances; and that it is

equitable and appropriate that the [defendant] pay a

portion thereof.’’ The court ordered the defendant to

pay $40,000 in attorney’s fees; $20,000 to be paid directly

to the plaintiff, $10,000 to be paid to O’Connor, and

$10,000 to be paid to Higgins.

In a motion to reargue filed by the plaintiff following

the court’s decision, she argued that it appeared that

the court had overlooked an affidavit of attorney’s fees

that the plaintiff’s attorney, Higgins, had submitted to

the court, absent objection, on the last day of the trial

on July 10, 2013.12 In its original decision, the court

expressly referred to Higgins’ prior affidavit, which covered Higgins’ services from August 11, 2010 through

May 9, 2012. In its corrected decision of September 27,

2013, the court expressly referred to Higgins’ affidavit
dated July 10, 2013, which covered the period of August

11, 2010 through July 10, 2013. The July 10, 2013 affidavit

set forth fees and disbursements in the amount of

$159,657.82.

In its corrected decision, the court modified its original decision in relevant part by stating that it had

reviewed the attorney’s fees affidavit submitted by

O’Connor and the attorney’s fees affidavit submitted by

Higgins, which covered the period of August 11, 2010

through July 10, 2013. The court stated: ‘‘[W]hile the

court finds said fees to be reasonable in light of the

services rendered . . . it further finds said fees to be

disproportionately high when compared to the results

achieved; and that it is equitable and appropriate that

the [defendant] pay a portion thereof.’’ The court

‘‘decline[d] to amend the relief already granted, which

it believe[d] to be fair under all the circumstances.’’13

The plaintiff argues that the court’s award reflected

an abuse of discretion because ‘‘the trial court did [not]

award a single dollar for fourteen months’ worth of

work’’ between May 10, 2012, and July 10, 2013. As the

plaintiff observes, this fourteen month period of time

encompassed discovery, trial preparation, and the trial

itself, which took place over six days. Moreover, the

plaintiff argues that a greater award of attorney’s fees

was required because the defendant engaged in ‘‘egregious litigation misconduct’’ and, under Ramin v.

Ramin, supra, 281 Conn. 354, it is appropriate that the

defendant bear the burden of increased fees that were

occasioned by his misconduct. The plaintiff observes

that, in Ramin, our Supreme Court stated: ‘‘Allowing

recovery for attorney’s fees incurred due to litigation

misconduct will discourage the recalcitrant marital litigant from evading his obligations of full and frank disclosure, and will encourage compliance with those

obligations. When a marital litigant who does play by the

rules has to expend her own funds to pay her attorneys

significant amounts of money to enforce discovery

orders against, and uncover assets hidden or transferred by, the other marital litigant who is flouting those

rules, and when other orders of the court have not

adequately addressed that wrongdoing by one party and

harm to the other, it is only fair that the wrongdoer

compensate the innocent injured party [for having] to

discover that which the wrongdoer already [was] legally

obligated to disclose.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 354–55.

The plaintiff also argues that the court did not address

adequately the defendant’s misconduct by means of its

other orders and that ‘‘the trial court’s failure to award

any attorneys’ fees whatsoever for the fourteen month

period of time leading up to and including a six day

trial was unreasonable, an abuse of the trial court’s

discretion, and an abdication of the trial court’s responsibility under Billington and its progeny to both redress
the defendant’s misconduct, deter others similarly situated from engaging in similar misconduct, and insure

that the consequences of the defendant’s misconduct

be borne by the defendant, not the innocent plaintiff.’’

Initially, we observe that the parties disagree with

respect to whether, when the court awarded attorney’s

fees in its original decision, it overlooked Higgins’ July

10, 2013 affidavit. The plaintiff draws our attention to

the fact that, in the court’s original decision, it did not

refer to Higgins’ July 10, 2013 affidavit, but it referred

to his May 10, 2012 affidavit. Also, the plaintiff draws

our attention to the fact that, in its corrected decision,

the court stated that it had reviewed the later affidavit

but ‘‘[d]eclined to amend the relief already granted.’’

From these facts, the plaintiff urges us to infer that

the court failed to consider Higgins’ later affidavit in

awarding attorney’s fees and, consequently, its $40,000

attorney’s fee award was based on only a portion of the

attorney’s fees incurred by the plaintiff in this matter.

It is a fundamental principle of appellate review that

‘‘our appellate courts do not presume error on the part

of the trial court. . . . Rather, we presume that the

trial court, in rendering its judgment . . . undertook

the proper analysis of the law and the facts.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Brett Stone

Painting & Maintenance, LLC v. New England Bank,

143 Conn. App. 671, 681, 72 A.3d 1121 (2013). ‘‘[T]he

trial court’s ruling is entitled to the reasonable presumption that it is correct unless the party challenging the

ruling has satisfied its burden demonstrating the contrary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kaczynski

v. Kaczynski, 294 Conn. 121, 129, 981 A.2d 1068 (2009).

The record is ambiguous with respect to whether, at

the time of the court’s original decision, it considered

Higgins’ July 10, 2013 affidavit of attorney’s fees. The

court’s explicit reference, in its original decision, to

its having reviewed O’Connor’s affidavit and Higgins’

affidavit of May 10, 2012, certainly suggests that, at that

time, the court improperly failed to consider Higgins’

affidavit of July 10, 2013. Yet, we recognize that, in

setting forth its award, the court was not obligated to

refer to all of the matters in the record on which it

relied, and its failure to refer to the later filed affidavit

in its original decision does not necessarily reflect that,

at that time, it overlooked it. We disagree with the

plaintiff that in the court’s corrected decision it shed

any light on whether it previously had overlooked the

July 10, 2013 affidavit. The corrected decision, however,

dispels any ambiguity with respect to whether the court

considered the July 10, 2013 affidavit in arriving at its

final judgment. There, the court unambiguously stated

that it had, in fact, considered the affidavit.

Even if we were to presume that the court overlooked

the July 10, 2013 affidavit in its initial decision, the

plaintiff must demonstrate that reversible error exists
in light of the court’s final decision. Our review of the

trial court’s judgment encompasses both its original and

corrected decisions. In neither its original nor corrected

decisions did the court state that it would not consider

the later affidavit or that it would not award fees for

Higgins’ representation up until July 10, 2013. Rather,

in its corrected decision, the court, relying on the later

affidavit, explained that it was ‘‘equitable and appropriate’’ under the circumstances for the defendant to

pay $40,000, which represented a portion of the fees

incurred by the plaintiff in this case because, in its view,

the remainder of the fees at issue, although ‘‘reasonable

in light of the services rendered’’ were ‘‘disproportionately high when compared with the results achieved.’’

Thus, we are not faced with a situation, as the plaintiff

suggests, in which the court improperly refused to consider awarding fees allegedly incurred during a substantial portion of the litigation.

The plaintiff does not draw our attention to any

authority in support of the proposition that, in light

of the court’s finding that the defendant had failed to

disclose fully his income and assets at the time of the

original dissolution judgment, it was obligated to award

the plaintiff all of the fees incurred by her. ‘‘The abuse

of discretion standard of review applies when reviewing

a trial court’s decision to [grant or] deny an award of

attorney’s fees. . . . Under the abuse of discretion

standard of review, [w]e will make every reasonable

presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling, and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion.

. . . [Thus, our] review of such rulings is limited to the

questions of whether the trial court correctly applied

the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it did.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Munro v. Munoz, 146 Conn. App. 853,

858, 81 A.3d 252 (2013).

‘‘Our Supreme Court consistently has noted that

[trial] courts have a general knowledge of what would

be reasonable compensation for services which are

fairly stated and described. . . . Because of this general knowledge, [t]he court [is] in a position to evaluate

the complexity of the issues presented and the skill with

which counsel had dealt with these issues.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rubenstein

v. Rubenstein, 107 Conn. App. 488, 503, 945 A.2d 1043,

cert. denied, 289 Conn. 948, 960 A.2d 1037 (2008). The

wide range of factors that a court properly may consider

in determining reasonable compensation to an attorney

are summarized in Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional

Conduct. O’Brien v. Seyer, 183 Conn. 199, 206, 439 A.2d

292 (1981); Esposito v. Esposito, 71 Conn. App. 744,

749–50, 804 A.2d 846 (2002). These factors include: ‘‘(1)

The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty

of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) The likelihood, if

made known to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment

by the lawyer; (3) The fee customarily charged in the

locality for similar legal services; (4) The amount

involved and the results obtained; (5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) The experience, reputation, and

ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services;

and (8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.’’ (Emphasis added.) Rules of Professional Conduct 1.5 (a); see

also Glastonbury v. Sakon, 184 Conn. App. 385, 393–94,

A.3d (2018) (setting forth factors).

Here, the court’s decision reflects that it considered

the reasonableness of the fees generally, but it focused

specifically on the fact that the plaintiff’s attorneys submitted affidavits for fees totaling $176,298.69, an

amount it found to be ‘‘disproportionately high when

compared to the results achieved . . . .’’ In light of the

precedent set forth previously, the court’s consideration of the results obtained by the plaintiff legally was

appropriate. The plaintiff does not challenge the court’s

determination that the fees were disproportionately

high when compared to the results actually obtained

by her but, once more, relies on her belief that the

defendant engaged in fraudulent conduct. She argues

that the court’s award reflected an abuse of discretion

because the defendant defrauded the plaintiff by failing

to disclose income and assets at the time of the original

judgment and up and until the time of trial engaged in

‘‘determined, concerted efforts to prevent the plaintiff

from learning the truth’’ about his assets.

Similar to the claims that we rejected in parts II and III

of this opinion, the defendant’s challenge to the court’s

award of attorney’s fees is flawed because it is based

on a factual premise that does not exist, namely, that

the defendant acted in a fraudulent manner with respect

to his disclosure of income and assets. Relying on our

previous analysis in this opinion, we observe that,

although the court agreed with the plaintiff that the

defendant underreported income and assets at the time

of the original dissolution judgment, the court expressly

found that the plaintiff did not sustain her burden of

proving that the defendant acted fraudulently with

respect to his financial affidavit. Although the plaintiff

attempts to analogize the facts of the present case to

those in Ramin, the court in the present case did not

find that the defendant engaged in egregious litigation

misconduct. The issue of whether the defendant acted

fraudulently in his financial disclosure and in connection with discovery in the present trial was hotly contested, but the court did not find that the plaintiff had

sustained her burden of proving fraud. The court found

that the defendant failed to fulfill his obligation to disclose fully his income and his assets, but did not attribute this failure to fraud. As a result of the failures in

disclosure, however, the court not only modified several
of its financial orders, but awarded the plaintiff $40,000

in attorney’s fees. The plaintiff challenges the court’s

exercise of its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees

but has failed to demonstrate that the court’s factual

finding concerning fraud was clearly erroneous.

We are not persuaded by the argument rejected by

the trial court that the defendant sought to defraud

and that the court erroneously failed to penalize the

defendant by awarding the plaintiff greater alimony and

asset awards. In light of the foregoing, we conclude

that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the

court’s award of attorney’s fees reflects an abuse of discretion.

V

Lastly, the plaintiff claims that the court erred by

failing in its financial orders to promote full and frank

disclosure in financial affidavits and by failing to

address adequately the defendant’s omission of substantial income and assets from his financial affidavits.

We disagree.

The plaintiff argues that even if the court’s individual

financial orders did not reflect an abuse of discretion,

the complete mosaic of the court’s orders ‘‘surely did.’’

According to the plaintiff, ‘‘the trial court’s inadequate

awards of alimony, property and attorney’s fees compounded to produce a result that was disproportionate

to the magnitude of the defendant’s numerous, substantial nondisclosures on the financial affidavit that he

submitted at the time of the original judgment, [and]

his recalcitrance in the discovery process . . . . In

their aggregate, the trial court’s orders constituted an

abuse of discretion because they plainly failed adequately to enforce the defendant’s duty to fully and

fairly disclose his assets on his financial affidavit.’’ The

plaintiff urges us to conclude that, under the circumstances, the court was obligated ‘‘adequately to redress

the defendant’s fraudulent and material misrepresentations in his financial affidavit’’ by providing her with

more favorable financial orders, but that it did not do so.

The present claim requires little discussion because,

similar to the claims addressed in parts II, III, and IV

of this opinion, it is based on the plaintiff’s characterization of the defendant’s conduct as fraudulent in nature.

The court found that discrepancies existed with respect

to the defendant’s assets and income, and it unambiguously provided the plaintiff with a remedy. As we have

stated previously, however, the court expressly found

that the plaintiff had not proven fraud, and the plaintiff

has failed to demonstrate that this critical factual finding was clearly erroneous. Having rejected the plaintiff’s

claims that the court’s alimony, property, and attorney’s

fees orders were improper when viewed in light of

alleged but not proven fraudulent conduct by the defendant, we likewise conclude that the plaintiff has failed
to prove that the court’s orders, when viewed in their

entirety, reflected an abuse of discretion on this ground.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1

In 2007, the parties’ marriage was dissolved, and the court entered financial orders. In 2010, the plaintiff brought a motion to open the judgment so

that the court could reconsider its financial orders. The plaintiff’s motion

to open was based on her allegation that, at the time that the court rendered

the original dissolution judgment, the defendant, Walter Sing, fraudulently

submitted inaccurate financial affidavits on which the court relied. In 2010,

the parties stipulated that the judgment could be opened so that the court

could reconsider the court’s financial orders, but that the opening would

not affect the actual dissolution of their marriage. The trial court, Shay, J.,

opened the original dissolution judgment for the purpose of reconsidering

its financial orders. In 2013, the plaintiff brought the present appeal from

the judgment rendered by the trial court after it reissued financial orders.

During the pendency of the present appeal, this court asked the parties

to submit supplemental briefs addressing the issue of whether, in the absence

of a finding of fraud on the part of the defendant, the trial court had subject

matter jurisdiction to open the original judgment of dissolution for the

purpose of revisiting its financial orders. The parties complied with this

order. In 2016, this court, having concluded that the trial court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction to grant the plaintiff’s motion to open the judgment of

dissolution, did not reach the merits of the claims raised by the plaintiff,

both in her principal and supplemental appellate briefs, but reversed the

judgment of the trial court and remanded the case to the trial court with

direction to dismiss the motion to open. Reinke v. Sing, 162 Conn. App.

674, 133 A.3d 510 (2016). In 2018, following a grant of certification to appeal,

our Supreme Court, concluding that the trial court properly exercised its

authority in opening the judgment, reversed this court’s judgment and

remanded the case to this court for consideration of the merits of the

plaintiff’s claims. Reinke v. Sing, supra, 328 Conn. 393.

2 The court, Shay, J., issued an initial decision in this matter on August

23, 2013, and, in response to a motion to reargue filed by the plaintiff, issued

a corrected decision on September 27, 2013, in which it modified some of

the findings and orders set forth in its initial decision.

3

In relevant part, this court’s order stated: ‘‘In the memorandum of decision dated August 23, 2013, the trial court stated that it granted the [plaintiff’s]

motion to open the judgment by agreement of the parties and ‘without a

finding of fraud.’ . . . [T]he court, Shay, J., is ordered to articulate, for

the purpose of determining the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, whether

it found that there was no fraud or whether it simply was not making an

express finding regarding fraud. If the latter, the court is ordered further

to articulate whether it found that there had been fraud as to the first

judgment of dissolution.’’

4 On August 13, 2015, following the trial court’s articulation, the plaintiff

filed an amended appeal that encompassed the articulation. Thereafter, the

plaintiff moved for permission to file a supplemental brief for the purpose

of claiming that, in its articulation, the trial court abused its discretion by

finding that she failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the

defendant committed fraud at the time of the original dissolution judgment.

This court granted the plaintiff’s motion. After the plaintiff filed her supplemental brief, the court granted the defendant permission to file a supplemental reply brief responding to the newly-raised claim of the plaintiff related

to the court’s finding that she had failed to sustain her burden of proving

that fraud had occurred. Thus, the claim and related arguments concerning

the plaintiff’s first claim in the present appeal are set forth in the parties

supplemental briefs.

5 Although the parties stipulated to open the original judgment of dissolution for the purpose of permitting the court to reconsider its financial orders,

and the court did not base its decision to open the judgment on the plaintiff’s

allegation that the defendant had acted in a fraudulent manner, we address

the plaintiff’s claim related to fraud because the parties litigated the issue

before the trial court, the parties have briefed the issue before this court,

and the issue of fraud is integral to the plaintiff’s remaining appellate claims,

which challenge the court’s financial orders and its award of attorney’s fees.

6

‘‘Moreover . . . [l]awyers who represent clients in matrimonial dissolutions have a special responsibility for full and fair disclosure, for a searching
dialogue, about all of the facts that materially affect the client’s rights and

interests.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Weinstein

v. Weinstein, supra, 275 Conn. 686–87.

7 The plaintiff observes that her claims of fraudulent nondisclosure

‘‘remained at the center of her case throughout the proceedings.’’

8 The court found that, as of October 2, 2007, the net income of the plaintiff

was zero.

9 Although the plaintiff correctly observes that the court did not refer to

the October 2, 2007 affidavit in its decision, the plaintiff has not demonstrated

that the court’s reliance on the September 12, 2007 affidavit likely affected

its judgment. Plainly, the court found that ‘‘substantial discrepancies’’ existed

between what the defendant reported at the time of the original judgment

and what it found to be the defendant’s income at the time of trial. The

plaintiff does not contest the ultimate findings made by the court concerning

the defendant’s income and assets in 2007, upon which it based its financial

orders. In light of the court’s finding with respect to fraud, we are not

persuaded that, had the court relied on the October 2, 2007 affidavit, such

reliance would have led to a different alimony award.

10 The plaintiff observes: ‘‘Under the original judgment, the total unallocated alimony and support throughout the base alimony term, exclusive of

any extension that the plaintiff might obtain, was $359,999.64. The total

awarded by the trial court [after opening the judgment] over the alimony

term was $399,600, an increase of just 11 percent.’’

11 The plaintiff does not dispute that this account ‘‘was established for

the benefit of [the defendant’s] children as well as the children of his sister

. . . .’’ Although the plaintiff lists this custodial account among the marital

assets on which she focuses in the present claim, she does not provide any

further analysis with respect to the account, let alone a challenge to the

jurisdictional ground on which the court expressly declined to enter any

orders with respect to the account. Because the plaintiff leaves unchallenged

the basis on which the court ruled, we will not disturb its ruling.

12 The transcript of the proceedings on July 10, 2013, reflects that, absent

objection, Higgins presented Judge Shay with an affidavit of attorney’s fees

on that date. When presented with the affidavit, Judge Shay replied: ‘‘[T]hat’s

fine. I’ll make sure we get that logged in.’’ The affidavit does not appear to

have been made part of the case file in its own right. Nonetheless, it appears

in the trial court file as an exhibit attached to the plaintiff’s motion to

reargue dated September 11, 2013.

13 Additionally, we note that, in January, 2012, after the court opened

the judgment, the plaintiff brought a motion for contempt and to compel

discovery against the defendant. The court granted this motion in part and

ordered the defendant to pay $1000 to the plaintiff for attorney’s fees incurred

by her in connection with the motion. In its original and corrected decisions,

the court ordered the defendant to pay this outstanding arrearage to the

plaintiff for attorney’s fees.