alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

REYNA ELIZABETH CEDILLOS DE 

GARAY; JAIRO ALEXANDER GARAY 

CEDILLOS,

Petitioners,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 22-1999

Agency Nos.

A209-983-608

A209-983-609

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted October 5, 2023

Las Vegas, Nevada

Before: RAWLINSON and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and PREGERSON,**

 District Judge.

Reyna Elizabeth Cedillos de Garay (Cedillos de Garay) and her minor son 

Jairo Alexander Garay Cedillos, natives and citizens of El Salvador, petition for 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Dean D. Pregerson, United States District Judge for 

the Central District of California, sitting by designation.

FILED

NOV 14 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

review of a decision from the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying their 

motion to reopen. “The BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen is reviewed for abuse 

of discretion, and this court defers to the BIA’s exercise of discretion unless it 

acted arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law. . . .” Reyes-Corado v. Garland, 

76 F.4th 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 2023) (citation, alteration, and internal quotation 

marks omitted). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we grant the 

petition. 

Petitioners’ removal proceedings commenced in 2017. Petitioners conceded

removability, and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection 

under the Convention Against Torture. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied the 

applications for relief, and the BIA dismissed Petitioners’ appeal. After 

Petitioners’ counsel failed to timely file a petition for review of the BIA’s decision, 

Petitioners filed a motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The 

BIA denied the motion on the grounds that Petitioners did not file a bar complaint 

as required by Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988). The Board 

relied on Matter of Melgar, 28 I. & N. Dec. 169, 170 (BIA 2020), reasoning that 

“where ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged against an attorney who 

continues to represent the same client, it is insufficient for counsel to simply accept 

responsibility for the error without advising disciplinary authorities.” 

We agree that generally a petitioner must satisfy the Lozada requirements to 
3

establish ineffective assistance of counsel. See Hernandez-Ortiz v. Garland, 32 

F.4th 794, 801 (9th Cir. 2022). However, we have not required strict compliance 

with the requirement to file a bar complaint absent evidence in the record of 

collusion between a petitioner and counsel. See Lo v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 934, 938 

(9th Cir. 2003). Because the record contains “no suggestion of collusion,” id., the

BIA abused its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to reopen by ruling 

contrary to our precedent. See Reyes-Corado, 76 F.4th at 1259 (defining abuse of 

discretion to include “act[ing] contrary to law”). 

PETITION GRANTED.
#### Hamlet at Willow Creek Development Co., LLC, et al., Respondents, v Northeast Land Development Corporation et al., Respondents, and Pav-Co Asphalt, Inc., et al., Appellants, et al., Defendant. Hamlet at Willow Creek Development Co., LLC, et al., Respondents, v Northeast Land Development Corporation et al., Respondents, and Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, Appellant, et al., Defendant.

Submitted November 2, 2009;

decided December 17, 2009

Reported below, 64 AD3d 85.

Motions for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-83,465-02

EX PARTE DAVID DERON JONES, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. 139216301010 IN THE 351 DISTRICT COURT ST

FROM HARRIS COUNTY

Per curiam.

O P I N I O N

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of possession of a

controlled substance by fraud and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. He did not appeal his

conviction. 

Applicant contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because she failed

to challenge the evidence and allowed him to plead guilty to an offense for which he was not

charged. See Avery v. State, 359 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). 
2

The trial court has determined that trial counsel's performance was deficient and that such

deficient performance prejudiced Applicant and the State agrees. This Court has recently decided

a case with similar facts and circumstances. Ex parte Lewis, WR-83,458-01 & WR-83,458-02, __

S.W.3d __ (Tex. Crim. App. Sep. 27, 2017). Relief is granted based on the analysis enumerated in

Lewis.

The judgment in Cause No. 321010351 in the 351 District Court of Harris County is set st

aside, and Applicant is remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Harris County to answer the charges

as set out in the indictment. The trial court shall issue any necessary bench warrant within 10 days

after the mandate of this Court issues.

Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Correctional

Institutions Division and Pardons and Paroles Division.

Delivered: November 1, 2017

Do not publish
<TABLE> <S> <C>




<ARTICLE> 5

<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
REGISTRANT'S FORM 10-Q FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1995 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
INCLUDED IN SUCH REPORT.
</LEGEND>

<CIK>   0000319192
<NAME>  JMB INCOME PROPERTIES, LTD. - VIII

       
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<SECURITIES>                                              0 
<RECEIVABLES>                                     1,510,887 
<ALLOWANCES>                                              0 
<INVENTORY>                                               0 
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 20,816,770 
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<SALES>                                           5,036,333 
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 30,318,851 
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                2,787,324 
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</TABLE>
#### In the Matter of Village of Chestnut Ridge et al., Respondents, et al., Petitioners/Plaintiffs, v Town of Ramapo et al., Respondents, and Scenic Development, LLC, Appellant.

Submitted February 9, 2009;

decided April 2, 2009

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine an action or proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution and is not an order of the type provided for in CPLR 5602 (a) (2).
EX-33.15
(logo) MIDLANDLOANSERVICES

Report on Assessment of Compliance with Regulation AB Servicing Criteria


Midland Loan Services, Inc. ("Midland"), an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of
The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc., is responsible for assessing compliance
with the applicable servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d) of Regulation
AB of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Regulation AB") relating to its
role in the servicing of commercial mortgage-backed securities transactions.

Midland has assessed its compliance with the applicable servicing criteria as of
and for the year ended December 31,2007. In making this assessment, Midland used
the criteria set forth by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") in Item
1122(d) of Regulation AB. The transactions covered by this report include
commercial mortgage-backed securities that were issued on or after January 1,
2006 and that were registered with the SEC pursuant to the Securities Act of
1933 (the "Platform").

Based on such assessment, Midland believes that, as of and for the year ended,
Midland has complied in all material respects with the servicing criteria set
forth in Item 1122(d) of Regulation AB relating to its role in the servicing of
commercial mortgage-backed securities transactions, except for servicing
criteria 1122(d)(1)(iii), 1122(d)(3)(i)((B), (C), and (D)), 1122(d)(3)(ii)
through (3)(iv), and 1122(d)(4)(xv), which Midland has determined as being
inapplicable to the activities it performs with respect to the commercial
mortgage-backed securities transactions being serviced (the "applicable
servicing criteria").

Deloitte & Touche LLP, an independent registered public accounting firm, has
issued an attestation report on Midland's assessment of compliance with the
applicable servicing criteria as of and for the year ended December 31, 2007.

MIDLAND LOAN SERVICES, INC.


/s/ Steven W. Smith
Steven W. Smith
President and
Chief Operating Officer

/s/ Vincent E. Beckett
Vincent E. Beckett
Executive Vice President
Chief Administrative Officer

/s/ Bradley J. Hauger
Bradley J. Hauger
Senior Vice President
Servicing Operations


Date: February 18, 2008


A Member of the PNC Financial Services Group

10851 Mastin P.O. Box 25965 Shawnee Mission Kansas 66225-5965

www.midlandls.com  913 253 9000 T  913 253 9709 F
109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 719 

To extend Corridor O of the Appalachian Development Highway System 

from its current southern terminus at I–68 near Cumberland to Corridor 

H, which stretches from Weston, West Virginia, to Strasburg, Virginia. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

APRIL 6, 2005 

Mr. SARBANES (for himself and Ms. MIKULSKI) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Environment and 

Public Works 

A BILL 

To extend Corridor O of the Appalachian Development Highway System from its current southern terminus at I– 

68 near Cumberland to Corridor H, which stretches from 

Weston, West Virginia, to Strasburg, Virginia. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. APPALACHIAN DEVELOPMENT HIGHWAY SYS4 TEM. 

5 Section 14501 of title 40, United States Code, is 

6 amended by striking subsection (a) and inserting the fol7 lowing: 

8 ‘‘(a) PURPOSE.— 
2 

1 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Transpor2 tation may assist in the construction of an Appa3 lachian development highway system and local access 

4 roads serving the Appalachian region to provide a 

5 highway system that, in conjunction with the Inter6 state System and other Federal-aid highways in the 

7 Appalachian region, will open an area with develop8 mental potential in which commerce and communica9 tion have been inhibited by lack of adequate access. 

10 ‘‘(2) LIMITATIONS.— 

11 ‘‘(A) CONSTRUCTION.—Construction on 

12 the development highway system described in 

13 paragraph (1) shall not be greater than 

3,1251 14 ⁄2 miles. 

15 ‘‘(B) LOCAL ACCESS ROADS.—There shall 

16 not be more than 1,400 miles of local access 

17 roads that— 

18 ‘‘(i) serve— 

19 ‘‘(I) specific recreational, residen20 tial, educational, commercial, indus21 trial; or 

22 ‘‘(II) similar facilities; or 

23 ‘‘(ii) facilitate a school consolidation 

24 program.’’. 
3 

1 SEC. 2. DESIGNATION OF ADDITION. 

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—There is designated as an addi3 tion to Corridor O in Maryland and West Virginia on the 

4 Appalachian Development Highway System a segment 

5 from Interstate Route 68 to Corridor H. 

6 (b) EXTENSION AND DEVELOPMENT.—The addition 

7 to Corridor O shall— 

(1) extend approximately 351 8 ⁄2 miles; and 

9 (2) be developed as a multilane freeway, with 

10 interchanges at appropriate crossroad locations. 

Æ
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

TRAVIS ANTHONY KELLEY,

 Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

 Appellee. 

'

'

'

'

'

'

No. 08-11-00045-CR

Appeal from

396th District Court

of Tarrant County, Texas

(TC # 1156916D)

O P I N I O N

Travis Anthony Kelley appeals his conviction of injury to an elderly person. Appellant 

waived his right to a jury trial and entered an open plea of guilty to the trial court. The court 

found Appellant guilty and assessed his punishment at imprisonment for a term of twenty-five 

years. We affirm. 

Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed a brief in which he has concluded that the 

appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493, reh. denied, 388 U.S. 924, 87 S.Ct. 

2094, 18 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of the record 

demonstrating why, in effect, there are no arguable grounds to be advanced. See High v. State, 

573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978); Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex.Crim.App. 1974); 

Jackson v. State, 485 S.W.2d 553 (Tex.Crim.App. 1972); Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137 

(Tex.Crim.App. 1969). Counsel delivered a copy of his brief to Appellant and advised Appellant 

of his right to examine the appellate record and file a pro se brief. No pro se brief has been filed.

The Court has carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief in its entirety, and agrees 
- 2 -

that the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. Further, we find nothing in the record that 

might arguably warrant an appeal. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

May 23, 2012 ________________________________________________

ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Chief Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rivera, and Antcliff, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Health and Human Services

In accordance with section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463), the President's Advisory Council for Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships announces the following meetings:

*Name:*                     President's Advisory Council for Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships Council meetings                

*Times and Dates:*                     Thursday, June 4th at 2 p.m. Eastern; and Tuesday, June 16th at 4 p.m. Eastern.                

*Place:*                     Meetings will be held via conference call.                

*Status:*                     Open to the public, limited only by the space available.                

*Purpose:*                     The Council brings together leaders and experts in fields related to the work of faith-based and neighborhood organizations in order to: Identify best practices and successful modes of delivering social services; evaluate the need for improvements in the implementation and coordination of public policies relating to faith-based and other neighborhood organizations; and make recommendations for changes in policies, programs, and practices.                

*Contact Person for Additional Information:*                     Mara Vanderslice, 202-205-2419,                     *mara.vanderslice@hhs.gov.*

*Supplementary Information:*                     The meetings will be held via conference call. There is limited capacity to join the call and will be listen-only mode. Please contact Mara Vanderslice for more information about how to join the call.                

*Agenda:*                     Topics to be discussed include updates from Council subcommittees on Reform of the Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships Office, Economic Recovery, Fatherhood and Healthy Families, Inter-religious Dialogue and Cooperation, Environment and Climate Change and Global Poverty and Development.                

Dated: May 13, 2009.

Mara Vanderslice,

Special Assistant.

[FR Doc. E9-11610 Filed 5-18-09; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4154-07-P
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Roger Allan ROWLEY, Appellant.

No. 08-3939.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: May 18, 2009.

Filed: May 26, 2009.

Daniel C. Tvedt, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Appellee.

John P. Messina, Assistant, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Des Moines, IA, for Appellant.

Roger Allan Rowley, Oklahoma City, OK, pro se.

Before RILEY, SMITH, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

*477PER CURIAM.

Roger Rowley (Rowley) brings this direct criminal appeal of the sentence the district court1 imposed upon revoking his supervised release. Counsel has moved to withdraw and has filed a brief under *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).

On November 26, 2008, the court revoked Rowley’s supervised release and sentenced him to 14 months imprisonment and 22 months of supervised release; the court entered judgment that same day. The notice of appeal, filed on December 12, 2008, was untimely by one day because it was not filed within 10 days of entry of judgment. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 4(b)(l)(A)(i). A district court may grant a defendant an additional 30 days in which to file a notice of appeal upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 4(b)(4).

Counsel’s motion is held in abeyance, and the case is remanded to the district court to determine whether the time for filing a notice of appeal should be extended under Rule 4(b)(4). *See United States v. Austin,*217 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir.2000); *United States v. Petty,*82 F.3d 809, 810 (8th Cir.1996) (per curiam). Upon making that determination, the district court shall return the case to this court for dismissal or further proceedings, as may be appropriate.

1

. The Honorable Linda R. Reade, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa.
**
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

**Certification Required by Rule 13a-14(b) or**

**Rule 15d-14(b) and Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Permian Basin Royalty Trust (the “Trust”) on Form 10-Q for thequarterly period ended June 30, 2022, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, not in its individual capacity but solely as the trustee of the Trust, certifies pursuantto 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to its knowledge: 

(1) The Report fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and 

(2) The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Trust. 

 
    
SIMMONS BANK, TRUSTEE FOR PERMIAN

BASIN ROYALTY TRUST
Date: August 15, 2022  
By:
 
/s/ RON E. HOOPER
   
Ron E. Hooper,

SVP Royalty Trust Management

Simmons Bank

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Permian Basin Royalty Trust andwill be retained by Permian Basin Royalty Trust and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request. 
**
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09 - 8165

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,

Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. WILLIAM LEE JONES, JR. ,

Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Sout hern District of West Virginia , at Charleston
. John T. Copenhaver, Jr. , District Judge. ( 2:02

- cr - 00019

- 1 )

Submitted : March 29 , 2010 Decided: April 7 , 2010

Before WILKINSON , MOTZ, and GREGORY , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion
. William Lee Jones, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. John J. Frail, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2

PER CURIAM:

William Lee Jones, Jr., appeal s a district court order denying his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2006). The district court found Jones was not eligible for a reduction because he was found responsible for more than 4.5 kilograms of crack cocaine. We affir m. We find the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jones’ s motion for a sentence reduction. See United States v.
Stewart , 595 F.3d 197, 200 (4th Cir. 2010) (stating standard of review). A review of the sentencing transcript shows that the sentencing court noted Jones was responsible for more th an 5.1 kilograms of crack cocaine. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order finding Jones was not eligible for a sentence reduction
. See United States v. Jones , No. 2:02

- cr - 00019

- 1 (S. D. W. Va. Nov. 2, 2009) (citing United States Sentencing Guidelines §§ 1B1.10, 2D1.1(c)(1) )
. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the d ecisional process.
AFFIRMED