United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 13-1718

___________________________

United States of America,

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

Cedric Dion Edwards, also known as Fat Ced,

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant.

____________

 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock

____________

 Submitted: September 6, 2013

Filed: September 17, 2013

[Unpublished]

____________

Before LOKEN, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

Cedric Edwards directly appeals after he pleaded guilty to a drug charge and the

district court1

 imposed a within-Guidelines-range sentence. His counsel has moved

1

The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas.
to withdraw, and in a brief filed under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), he

argues that the district court committed reversible error at sentencing. In a pro se

supplemental brief, Edwards argues that he should not have been classified as a career

offender, because one of the predicate convictions, a 2010 controlled-substance

offense, was not actually sustained because the charge was dismissed. Citing Alleyne

v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), he also argues that his Fifth and Sixth

Amendment rights were violated because his career-offender status was not alleged

in the indictment. He suggests that his plea was unknowing, and also that counsel

rendered ineffective assistance.

 

Addressing the pro se arguments first, we note that Edwards stipulated in his

written plea agreement that he believed he was a career offender. He did not object

to the presentence report’s statement that the 2010 conviction existed, and the district

court was entitled to accept the stipulated and unobjected-to fact as true. See United

States v. Douglas, 646 F.3d 1134, 1137 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Early, 77

F.3d 242, 244 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). In any event, because Edwards did not

raise the matter at sentencing, we review only for plain error, see United States v.

Troyer, 677 F.3d 356, 358 (8th Cir. 2012), and he fails to show an obvious error

occurred. Edwards offers nothing more than his bald assertion to dispute the fact of

his 2010 conviction. 

Edwards’s complaint that his sentence is unconstitutional because the

indictment did not charge his career-offender status is foreclosed by

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), which remains good law. 

See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2160 n.1; see also United States v. Sohn, 567 F.3d 392,

394-96 (8th Cir. 2009). We decline to consider Edwards’s ineffective-assistance

claims on direct review, see United States v. McAdory, 501 F.3d 868, 872-73 (8th Cir.

2007), and his suggestion that his guilty plea was unknowing is not cognizable

because he made no attempt to withdraw his plea. United States v. VillarealAmarillas, 454 F.3d 925, 932 (8th Cir. 2006).

-2-
As to the Anders brief argument, we find that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in sentencing Edwards. See generally United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d

455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc). Having independently reviewed the record under

Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court, and we grant

counsel’s motion to withdraw. 

______________________________

-3-