NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 18a0403n.06

Case No. 17-4150

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

TERRENCE MCNEIL,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF

OHIO

BEFORE: SILER, GRIFFIN, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges. 

SILER, Circuit Judge. Terrence McNeil maintained social media accounts where he 

pledged his support to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). On those accounts, McNeil 

reposted certain personal information, including names and addresses, of military men and women 

and encouraged others to harm those individuals. He pled guilty and was sentenced to a term of 

imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution. In this direct appeal, McNeil challenges the 

restitution he was ordered to pay. We AFFIRM. 

I.

McNeil maintained several online social media accounts, through which he declared his 

support for ISIL on numerous occasions. On September 24, 2015, he posted personal information 

of approximately 100 United States servicemen and women and encouraged others to “[k]ill them 
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in their own lands, behead them in their own homes, stab them to death as they walk their streets 

thinking they are safe . . . and kill them where you find them.” On September 29, 2015, McNeil 

reposted information of several additional military personnel that contained threats to injure them.

Another post on October 3, 2015, contained a threat to injure a specific serviceman, stating that 

the U.S. Navy Seal had killed Osama Bin Laden and naming that serviceman “as a number one 

target.” 

A federal grand jury first indicted McNeil in December 2015. In 2017, the grand jury 

returned a second superseding indictment, charging McNeil with various counts of communicating 

a threat in interstate commerce, soliciting a crime of violence, and publicizing restricted 

information, and aiding and abetting such crimes. 

Ultimately, the counts charging McNeil with publication of restricted information were 

dismissed, and he pled guilty to the remaining counts. The district court sentenced McNeil to 

twenty years of imprisonment. Upon the government’s request, the district court ordered McNeil 

to pay $6,048.99 in restitution. That amount was intended to cover “the expense of security 

measures incurred by five victims after September 24, 2015.” Specifically:

• “Benjamin” had home security expenses of $24.95 per month for 20 months 

(September 2015 through April 2017);

• “Daniel” had home security expenses of $48.37 per month for 22 months (September 

2015 through approximately August 2017); 

• “Wayne” purchased and installed stronger doors and steel locks at a cost of 

$1,764.01; 

• “Matthew” had home security expenses of $69.99 per month for 22 months (September 

2015 through approximately August 2017); and
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• “David” had home security expenses of $53.73 for 22 months (September 2015 through 

approximately August 2017). 

II.

“We review de novo the question whether restitution is permitted under the law.” United 

States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645, 654 (6th Cir. 2012). “If it is determined that restitution is 

permissible, then the amount of restitution is reviewed under the abuse-of-discretion standard.” Id. 

III.

McNeil argues that the district court erred by ordering him to pay restitution. The 

Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA) provides the framework for this case. See

18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A, 3664. “The MVRA requires a defendant to pay restitution to identifiable 

victims who have suffered either physical injuries or pecuniary losses as a result of certain criminal 

offenses.” United States v. Vandeberg, 201 F.3d 805, 812 (6th Cir. 2000). “Specifically, 

restitution is mandatory—regardless of a defendant’s financial situation—when a defendant is 

convicted of a crime of violence, an offense against property, or an offense related to tampering 

with consumer products.” Id. McNeil pled guilty to violating two statutes, including solicitation 

to commit a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). That offense falls within the definition 

of “crime of violence” under the MVRA. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(i); see also 18 U.S.C. 

§ 16. Therefore, restitution was mandatory in this case.

The questions, then, become whether the district court abused its discretion with the 

amount of restitution that it ordered McNeil to pay and whether McNeil’s conduct was the 

proximate cause for the victims’ losses. “In determining the amount of restitution, the 

[g]overnment must prove the losses by a preponderance of the evidence and the court must find 

that the defendant’s criminal conduct directly and proximately caused the actual or intended loss 
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to the victim.” United States v. Fowler, 819 F.3d 298, 307 (6th Cir. 2016). “While the district 

court need not make specific findings in calculating restitution, the information relied upon by the 

district court in reaching the final calculation must have sufficient indicia of reliability to support 

its probable accuracy.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

McNeil first contends that the district court erred by requiring him to pay for expenses that 

occurred prior to the conduct for which he was convicted. For example, McNeil claims that the 

government sought restitution on behalf of “Benjamin,” “Matthew,” and “David” for home 

security systems that were installed before September 2015 and for ongoing expenses that they 

would have occurred before that date. 

Although the individuals’1security systems may have been installed before September 

2015, McNeil was not ordered to pay for those costs. Instead, the district court categorically 

prohibited the government from seeking restitution for expenses that were incurred before 

McNeil’s conduct. And the government provided support for the amount each individual paid for 

his security system each month. Further, the government did not seek restitution for any monthly 

payments preceding McNeil’s postings in September 2015. Thus, this documentation has 

“sufficient indicia of reliability.” See id.

As to “Wayne,” the government supplied the district court with invoices from Lowe’s 

Home Improvement for additional security features he added to his home. The invoice does not 

contain a date for when the work was performed, but the government convincingly argues that 

“Wayne” would have had no need to provide greater security to his home before McNeil’s 

postings. On this basis, we find that this information is also sufficiently reliable. See id.

 

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“Benjamin,” “Daniel,” “Matthew,” and “David” each had security systems installed. 
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McNeil next argues that the district court failed to consider the factors set forth by the 

Supreme Court in Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 464 (2014), when ordering restitution. The 

district court rejected McNeil’s position, finding that “Paroline applies in the limited context of 

18 U.S.C. § 2259 offenses, including child pornography possession.” We have characterized 

Paroline in a similar matter, describing it as “a case involving restitution to victims of child 

pornography.” United States v. Sawyer, 825 F.3d 287, 295 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 386 

(2016). 

As a preliminary matter, McNeil has not pointed to any authority that Paroline and its line 

of cases should apply to this non-child-pornography case. Cf. id. (“Paroline’s concerns about the 

legal and administrative sensibility of adopting joint and several liability in child-pornography 

crimes simply do not translate to a case involving a finite conspiracy with five defendants who 

were acting in concert.”). 

Moreover, even if Paroline’s reasoning did apply here, the standard from that case is easily 

satisfied. After McNeil reposted the names and addresses of the various servicemen who are the 

victims in this case, they opted to either keep their security systems or to strengthen the security 

measures at their home. On those facts, the district court appropriately determined that “[t]he 

ongoing costs of maintaining a home security system during and after September 2015 are . . .

attributable to [McNeil].” 

Finally, the record supports the conclusion that the district court did not abuse its discretion 

by ordering McNeil to pay approximately $6,000 in restitution. Originally, the government sought 

more than $118,000 in restitution. The district court, however, subsequently required the 

government to provide “the specific amounts covering home security measures, relocation, and 

other expenses attributable to [] McNeil . . . .” After the government filed its notice of restitution 
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amount, McNeil filed his objections. The district court then considered McNeil’s objections and 

found that the government had carried its burden concerning the amount of restitution.

In this posture, the district court did not abuse its discretion because it readily considered 

the record before it, did not require McNeil to pay for expenses incurred before his conduct, and 

did not incorrectly apply the law. 

AFFIRMED.