alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

                                                                  EXHIBIT 10.30

                   AMENDMENT TO FULL RECOURSE PROMISSORY NOTE



         This amendment (the "AMENDMENT") is made effective the 3rd day of
May, 1999 to that certain Full Recourse Promissory Note between General
Surgical Innovations, Inc. (the "COMPANY") and Gregory D. Casciaro (the
"EMPLOYEE") dated May 5, 1995 (the "PROMISSORY NOTE").

         WHEREAS, the parties hereby desire to amend the Promissory Note to
extend the date on which the principal and interest is due and payable on the
Promissory Note from May 5th, 1999 until such date as is specified below;

         THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which
is hereby acknowledged and agreed, the parties agree to amend the first
paragraph of the Promissory Note to read in its entirety as follows:

         "At the times hereinafter stated, for value received, the
undersigned promises to pay to General Surgical Innovations, Inc., a
California corporation, (the "Company"), or order, at its principal office,
the principal sum of $20,000 with interest from the date hereof at a rate of
7.00% per annum, compounded semiannually, on the unpaid balance for such
principal sum. Such principal and interest shall be due and payable on the
earliest of (i) the date on which Employee ceases to be an employee of the
Company, (ii) the date on which such principal and interest is demanded by
the Company, or (iii) May 3rd of 2000."

         As amended hereby, all of the terms of the Promissory Note are
reaffirmed in their entirety.

                                             COMPANY

                                             GENERAL SURGICAL INNOVATIONS, INC.

                                             By: /s/ Mark Wan
                                                -------------------------------
                                             Name:
                                                  -----------------------------
                                             Title:
                                                   ----------------------------


                                             EMPLOYEE
                                             /s/ Gregory D. Casciaro
                                             ----------------------------------
                                             Gregory D. Casciaro
Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas

JUDGMENT

Kenneth Wayne Cook, Appellant

No. 06-14-00005-CR v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

Appeal from the 4th District Court of Rusk 

County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. CR13-029). 

Memorandum Opinion delivered by Justice 

Moseley, Chief Justice Morriss and Justice 

Carter participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find that the appeal should be dismissed 

for want of jurisdiction. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal.

We note that the appellant, Kenneth Wayne Cook, has adequately indicated his inability 

to pay costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED APRIL 3, 2014

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST:

Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION



PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



The undersigned, John B. Wood, the
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Telos Corporation (the Company), has executed this certification in connection with the filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for
the period ending September 30, 2003, (the Report). The undersigned hereby certifies that:



| | (1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                  |  |  |  |                                                                                          
|----------------- |  |  |  | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                  |  | 
|November 19, 2003 |  |  |  | /s/ JOHN B. WOOD                                                                         
|                  |  |  | 
|                  |  |  |  | John B. Wood, Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and Trustee (Principal Executive Officer)
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#### IDT Corp. et al., Appellants, v Tyco Group, S.A.R.L., et al., Respondents.

Submitted June 22, 2009;

decided June 30, 2009

Motion to strike portions of appellants’ reply brief denied.

Chief Judge Lippman taking no part.
(April 16, 2013)

#### In the Matter of Juanita Lowery, Respondent, v John B. Rhea, as Chairperson of the New York City Housing Authority, et al., Appellants, et al., Respondent.

[963 NYS2d 203]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Paul G. Feinman, J.), entered May 23, 2012, insofar as appealed from as *523limited by the briefs, granting the petition to annul the determination of respondent New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA), dated November 22, 2011, which found petitioner to be ineligible for an enhanced Section 8 voucher, to the extent of remanding the matter to NYCHA for reconsideration of petitioner’s application and for imposition of a lesser penalty, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the judgment vacated, the petition denied, and the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 dismissed.

The record shows that prior to filing her application for enhanced Section 8 benefits with NYCHA, petitioner had misrepresented her household income to a different government housing program administered by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development by failing to disclose more than $100,000 in income between 2005 and 2009 *(see*24 CFR 982.552 [c] [1] [iv]). Under NYCHA’s rules, persons who have misrepresented information affecting eligibility, income, etc., are ineligible for benefits for three years from the date they are declared ineligible. Thus, there was a rational basis for NYCHA’s determination that petitioner was ineligible for an enhanced Section 8 voucher *(see generally Matter of Muhammad v New York City Hous. Auth.,*81 AD3d 526 [1st Dept 2011]).

Furthermore, in reviewing the denial of Section 8 benefits as a penalty, as urged by petitioner, the denial of housing assistance does not shock our sense of fairness under the circumstances, especially in light of the “vital public interest underlying] the need to enforce income rules pertaining to public housing” *(see Matter of Perez v Rhea,*20 NY3d 399, 405 [2013]).

Concur—Gonzalez, EJ., Saxe, Richter and Abdus-Salaam, JJ.
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 867 Placed on Calendar Senate (PCS)]

                                                       Calendar No. 145
109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 867

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
    at 8200 South Vermont Avenue in Los Angeles, California, as the 
      ``Sergeant First Class John Marshall Post Office Building''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 21, 2005

Mrs. Feinstein introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

                             June 29, 2005

     Committee discharged and ordered to be placed on the calendar

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
    at 8200 South Vermont Avenue in Los Angeles, California, as the 
      ``Sergeant First Class John Marshall Post Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

    The facility of the United States Postal Service located at 8200 
South Vermont Avenue in Los Angeles, California, shall be known and 
designated as the ``Sergeant First Class John Marshall Post Office 
Building''.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

    Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other 
record of the United States to the facility referred to in section 1 
shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Sergeant First Class John 
Marshall Post Office Building''.
                                                       Calendar No. 145

109th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                                 S. 867

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
    at 8200 South Vermont Avenue in Los Angeles, California, as the 
      ``Sergeant First Class John Marshall Post Office Building''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                             June 29, 2005

     Committee discharged and ordered to be placed on the calendar
```
# FILED

June 26, 1998 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE MAY 1998 SE SSION

RONALD L. JONES, ) ) Appellant, ) No. 03C01-9710-CR-00428

) ) Hamilton County v. ) ) Honorable Rebecca J. Stern , Judge ) STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) (Post-Conviction) ) Appellee. )
For the Appellant : For the Appellee : Alan R. Beard John Knox Walkup 601 Chattanooga Bank Building Attorney General of Tennessee 615 Lindsey Street and Chattanooga, TN 37402 Clinton J. Morgan Assistant Attorney Gener al of Tennessee 425 Fifth Avenue North Nashville, TN 37243-0493 William H. Cox, III District Attorney General and David Denny Assistant District A

ttorney General 600 Market Street, Suite 310 Chattanooga, TN 37402
OPINION FILED:____________________

AFFIRMED Joseph M. Tipton Judge1 The pe ti ti on i s ti tl ed a “ MOTION TO CHA LLENGE T HE VALI DITY OF PRIOR S TATE CONV ICTIONS .” The trial court properly treated the peti tion as one for post-conviction relief. 2 O P I N I O N

The petitioner, Ronald L. Jones, appeals as of right from the Hami lton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-convic tion relief 1 on the ground that it wa s barred by the statute of li mitations. The petitioner contends that the petition was timely filed under the 1995 Post -Conviction Procedure Act. He argues that the application of the statute of limitations violates his due process rights because he was

unaware of developments in Tennes see law because he was incarcerated in a federal pr ison in Kansas. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner collaterall y challenges convi ctions he received in 1 984, 1986, 1989 and 1990 as a result of guilty pleas. The convictions were used to enh ance the defendant’s sentence for a conviction of a federal offense. The petition er filed his petition on December 30, 1996.

Under the post-conviction law applicable at the times of his convictions, the petitioner had three yea rs to file a post-convi ction petition from the date of the final action of the highest state appel late court to which an ap peal was taken. T.C.A. § 40- 30-102 (1990). The petition w as not filed within that period. Also, the 1995 PostConviction Act did not reinstate a filing perio d for which the former three-year postconviction statute of limi tations had already run. Carter v. State , 952 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Tenn. 1997). The petitioner’s claim that he was ignorant of the law does not excuse his late filing of the petiti on. See Brown v. State , 928 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Tenn. 1996) (“Ignorance of statute of limi tations is not an excuse for late filing, even w

hen the petitioner claims that he di d not learn of the statute’s enactment because he was incarcerated in another state.”).3 In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole , we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Joseph M. Tipton, Judge

CONCUR:

Joe G. Riley, Judge

Curwood Witt, Judge
<PAGE>
                                                                     Exhibit 21

                       SUBSIDIARIES OF HA-LO INDUSTRIES, INC.

The following is a list of all direct and indirect subsidiaries of the
registrant as of March 27, 1998.  The state or other jurisdiction of
incorporation or organization is indicated in parentheses following each
subsidiary's name.  The names of the divisions or other business units of each
subsidiary are indented and listed below the relevant subsidiary's name.

1132832 Ontario, Corp. (Ontario)
   1132831 Ontario, Corp. (Ontario)
   Creadis Group, Inc. (British Columbia)
Creative Concepts in Advertising, Inc. (Michigan)
Fletcher, Barnhardt & White (North Carolina)
Flow Plastics, Inc. (New York)
HMK International Holdings, Inc. (Netherlands)
    HA-LO Belgium, N.V. (Belgium)
      Bavelco, B.V.B.A. (Belgium)
HA-LO Sports, Inc. (Illinois)
Joking, Spa. (Italy)
Lees Keystone, Inc. (New York)
Market USA, Inc. (Illinois)
Marusa Marketing, Ltd. (Canada)
Wolff Marketing Group, Inc. (New York)
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 01-51052

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

LAFREDRICK DONTAI SMITH, also known as

LaFredrick Donta Smith,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. W-01-CR-38-ALL

--------------------

June 18, 2002

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS and, EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

LaFredrick Smith appeals his sentence following his guilty

plea to possession with the intent to distribute crack cocaine. 

He argues that the district court erred in denying him credit for

acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.

Challenges to the denial of a U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 reduction are

reviewed even more deferentially than a pure “clearly erroneous”

standard, United States v. Gonzales, 19 F.3d 982, 983 (5th Cir.
No. 01-51052

-2-

1994), and the defendant has the burden of proof, United States

v. Tremelling, 43 F.3d 148, 152 (5th Cir. 1995). We find that

the district court was aware that it had the discretion to award

Smith credit for acceptance of responsibility despite enhancing

his sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for obstructing

justice. We further hold that the district court did not err in

refusing to award Smith a U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 credit, because his

case was not an “extraordinary” one under which adjustments

pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 3C1.1 and 3E1.1 might apply. See

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n. 4).

AFFIRMED.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-6183

ROGER KOONCE, Petitioner - Appellant, versus CHARLES CREECY, Respondent - Appellee.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, District Judge. (CA-97-255-HC-H) Submitted: August 13, 1998 Decided: September 1, 1998 Before WIDENER and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and HALL, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Roger Koonce, Appellant Pro Se. Clarence Joe DelForge, III, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CAROLINA, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* Those claims are that: (1) the trial court erroneously denied his motion to dismiss the charges in light of the fact that the evidence was insufficient to convict him; (2) he was denied the right to present evidence in his own defense; (3) he effectively entered a guilty plea involuntarily; (4) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct; (5) his sentence was too high; and (6) his attorney engaged in numerous instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. 2 PER CURIAM: Roger Koonce seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We also decline to consider Koonce’s claims which he raises for the first time on appeal. * See Spencer v. Murray , 5 F.3d 758, 762 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding that habeas claims must be raised in the district court to be considered on appeal). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

T he pane l una ni m ous l yc onc l ude s thi s c a s e i s s ui t abl e f orde c i s i on ** w ith o u t o r a l ar g u m e n t. See F ed. R . A pp . P . 34 (a )( 2). NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS FOR T HE NI NTH CI RC UI T S HI QU AN YA N, P et i t i on er , v. E R I C H . H O L D E R , J r ., A tto rn e yG e n e r a l, R e s p o n d e n t. N o. 07- 74824 A ge nc yN o. A 097- 610- 531 ME MOR AN DU M *

O n P e t i t i on f

orR e vi e w of

a n O r de rof

the B o ar do f I m m ig r a tio n A p p e a ls S ubm i tt e d J anua ry10, 2011 ** B efo re: B E E Z E R , T A L L M A N , an dC A L L A H A N , C i rcu i tJu d g es. S hi qu an Y an, a nat i ve and ci t i ze n o f C hi na, pet i t i on s f or re vi ew of the B oard o f I m m ig ra ti o n A p p ea ls’ o rd erd ism issin g h is ap p ea l fro m an im m ig ra ti o n ju d g e’s ( “ I J ” ) de c i s i on de ny i ng hi s appl i c a t i on f ora s y l um , w i thhol di ng of r e m ova l , a nd re l i ef un der the C on vent i on A gai nstT orture ( “ C A T ”) . W e have j uri sdi ct i on un der 

# FI LED JAN 19 2 011 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS07- 74824 2 8 U .S .C . § 1 2 5 2 . W e r e v ie w f o rs ub s tan tia l e v id e n c e , L i v . A s h c r o ft , 378 F . 3d 959, 9 6 2 ( 9 th C i r . 2 0 0 4 ) , a n dwe d e n yth e p e t i t i o n f o rr e v i e w. S ubs t ant i a l e vi de nc e s upport s the a ge nc y ’ s a dve r s e c r e di bi l i tyf i ndi ng b ecau se Y an t est i fi edi n co n si st en t l y as t o w h eth er h e w as fi redfro m h i s j o b as a r e s u lt o f h is p r a c tic e o f

F a lu n G o n g , an da ls o a s to th e d ay s a n df r e q u e n c yo f

h is p r a c tic e . Se e id. Y an al so fai l edt o p ro v i d e co n si st en tex p l an at i o n s fo r th ese in c o n s is te n c ie s . See R i ve ra v. Mukasey , 50 8 F . 3d 12 71 , 12 75 (9th C i r. 20 07 ). S ub st ant i alevi dence al so supp ort s the IJ ’ s a dv er se cr edi bi l i ty det erm i nat i on base d o n th e I J ’s n e g a tiv e a s s e s s m e n t o f Y an ’s d e m e an o r . Se e S i n gh -Ka u rv . I NS , 183 F .3 d1 1 4 7 , 1 1 5 1 (9 th C ir. 1 9 9 9 ). In th e ab se n ce o f c re d ib le testim o n y, Y an ’s a s y lu m an dw ith h o ld in g o f r e m o v a l c la im s f

a il. Se e Fa ra h v . A s h c r o ft , 348 F . 3d 11 53 , 11 56 (9th C i r. 20 03 ). B e c aus e Y an’ s C A T c l a i m i s ba s e d on e vi de nc e the a ge nc yf ound not c r e di bl e , and he poi nt s t o no othe re vi de nc e tha ts how s i ti s m or e l i ke l ythan nothe w o u ldb e to rtu r e dif

r e tu rn e dto C h in a , h is C A T c la im a ls o f a ils . Se e id. a t1156- 57. P E T I T I ON F OR RE V I E W DE NI E D.
Zero Trust puts NGA at the tip of the security spear 

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NGA’s Journey

NGA’s Zero Trust (ZT) journey began with a technical baseline and the revealing “As-Is Assessment,” identifying 

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Who Do 

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ZERO TRUST

Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity

As part of the 

agency’s ongoing 

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cybersecurity, 

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Approved for public release, NGA-U-2023-02693