Conditional Grant and Opinion Filed October 13, 2023

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-23-00745-CV

IN RE: SAVING GRACE #2, LLC, Relator

Original Proceeding from the County Court at Law No. 1

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CC-22-02837-A

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Molberg, Goldstein, and Breedlove

Opinion by Justice Goldstein

In this original proceeding, relator Saving Grace #2, LLC seeks mandamus 

relief from the county court’s order staying execution of a writ of possession as to 

real party in interest Cleatrice Willform-Castillo in the underlying eviction 

proceeding. Saving Grace contends that (1) the county court’s stay order is void 

because the county court lacked plenary jurisdiction to issue it and (2) in any event, 

under section 24.007 of the Texas Property Code, the county court was barred from 

granting a stay when Willform-Castillo did not file a timely supersedeas bond. 

On August 16, 2023, we issued an order requesting a response to the petition. 

Willform-Castillo filed a response to which relator replied. After reviewing the 
–2–

parties’ briefs and the mandamus record, we have determined that Saving Grace is 

entitled to the relief it requests. Accordingly, we conditionally grant mandamus 

relief.

BACKGROUND

The underlying action is an eviction proceeding against Domancio Castillo 

and “all other occupants” of a certain property in Garland, Texas. Visiting Judge Ted 

Akin presided over an August 18, 2022, hearing in the county court.1 At the hearing, 

Willform-Castillo advised the county court that she was Castillo’s ex-wife and also 

an occupant. The visiting judge thus noted, “Well in that case both of them are 

defendants, so I’m going to let her stay in that room.” Willform-Castillo was able to 

cross-examine witnesses, submit evidence, and make arguments during the hearing. 

On September 1, 2022, the county court issued a final judgment finding that relator 

Saving Grace was entitled to possession of the property.

On September 14, 2022, Castillo filed a motion for emergency stay of the final 

judgment, claiming that he did not have sufficient funds to move. He also filed a 

notice of appeal2and a motion for a stay in this Court. This Court denied the stay on 

September 15, 2022, citing section 24.007 of the Texas Property Code. 

 

1 Visiting Judge Akin conducted the hearing and issued the final judgment. Presiding Judge of County 

Court at Law No. 1, the Hon. D’Metria Benson conducted the proceedings and issued orders relative to the 

stay that is the subject of this original proceeding.

2 Castillo v. Saving Grace #22 LLC, No. 05-22-00900-CV, 2023 WL 5274554, at *1 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Aug. 16, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Castillo’s appeal was dismissed for failure to file his appellate 

brief. 
–3–

On September 26, 2022, Saving Grace filed an objection to the emergencystay motion pending in the county court. Saving Grace argued that Castillo’s request 

for a stay was governed by section 24.007 of the Texas Property Code, which set 

forth that enforcement of an eviction judgment could be stayed only by the posting 

of a supersedeas bond within ten days of the date of the signing of the judgment. 

Because the ten-day deadline had expired on September 14, 2022, Saving Grace 

argued that the court was bound by law to deny the stay.

That same day, the county court held a hearing on the stay motion. At the 

hearing, Willform-Castillo acknowledged that she did not request a supersedeas 

bond within ten days of the judgment, claiming that she had been informed the bond 

would not be necessary because the eviction was not based on nonpayment of rent. 

She also argued that she received late notice of the judgment. The presiding judge 

took the motion under advisement.

On October 21, 2022, Willform-Castillo filed a motion to amend. In the 

motion, she advised the court that (1) she is “named as an occupant in the above 

entitled cause” and (2) Castillo has given her power of attorney to represent him in 

the proceeding.

On March 20, 2023, the Dallas County Clerk issued a writ of possession, 

commanding the sheriff or any constable of Dallas County to deliver possession of 

the premises from “Domancio Castillo and all other occupants” to Saving Grace. 
–4–

On May 4, 2023, Castillo filed a motion for emergency stay from writ of 

possession in the county court. In the motion, he advised the court that he would be 

in the hospital until May 15, 2023. He thus requested that the sheriff’s office wait 

until May 18, 2023, to execute the writ of possession.

According to the declaration of Saving Grace’s manager, the Dallas County 

Constable was prevented from executing the writ of possession on May 18, 2023. 

During the attempted eviction on May 18, “Cleatrice Willform-Castillo got the 

County Court on the telephone and the County Court instructed Deputy [Latoya] 

Harris and her associates to ‘stand down’ because a court hearing [on the second 

stay motion] was being scheduled for the next day.”

On the morning of May 19, 2023, Saving Grace filed an objection to the 

emergency motion for stay from writ of possession. Saving Grace averred that 

Castillo and Willform-Castillo did not file a supersedeas bond within ten days of 

signing the final judgment and that the appeals court had already denied Castillo’s 

request for a stay. Saving Grace also argued that the county court no longer had 

plenary jurisdiction over the matter because the final judgment had been entered nine 

months earlier and an appeal was now pending.

Later that day, at the hearing for the emergency motion, Willform-Castillo3

argued for the first time that, under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 510.3(c), Saving 

 

3 The record reflects that Patrice Castillo appeared at the hearing with no explanation or challenge as 

to whether Partrice is Cleatrice; therefore we proceed forward with Cleatrice as the real party in interest 

who attended the stay proceedings.
–5–

Grace was required to name as defendants all tenants obligated under the lease who 

were residing at the premises. She asserted that she was listed on the lease but the 

proceedings up until that point had been against only Castillo. She thus contended 

that the eviction was unenforceable against her because she was never named as a 

participant and, therefore, never able to give a defense.

After the hearing, the county court allowed the execution of the writ of 

possession to go forward only as to Castillo, but it ordered that the execution could

not go forward as to Willform-Castillo. 

This original proceeding followed. 

DISCUSSION

Asserting two issues, Saving Grace argues that (1) the county court’s order on 

the second stay motion is null and void because the county court lacked plenary 

jurisdiction to issue it4and (2) the county court violated section 24.007 of the Texas 

Property Code. Willform-Castillo filed a pro se response.5 We discern from the 

response that Willform-Castillo avers: (1) that there was no service of process in the 

eviction proceeding before Visiting Judge Akin, asserting a defect in parties; (2) that 

 

4 We need not reach Saving Grace’s sub-issue that the county court’s order interferes with this Court’s 

exclusive jurisdiction as our resolution of the primary issue is dispositive. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

5 We liberally construe pro se pleadings and briefs; however, we hold pro se litigants to the same 

standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure. 

Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978). To do otherwise would give a pro se 

litigant an unfair advantage over a litigant who is represented by counsel. Harris v. Showcase Chevrolet, 

231 S.W.3d 559, 561 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.). We note that Willform-Castillo did not 

authenticate the exhibits attached to her brief for consideration as part of the mandamus record. Cf. TEX. R.

APP. P. 52.7(a). Based upon our analysis and conclusions set forth below, the exhibits were not necessary 

to our consideration of the jurisdictional issue before us.
–6–

the judgment should be set aside and a new trial ordered because she was not served, 

which she contends was a violation of her right to due process; and (3) based upon 

statutory violations, that she was a victim of retaliation for reporting needed repairs, 

and whether the landlord can terminate a lease after tenant requests repairs, asserting 

breach of contract.

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy requiring the relator to show that (1) 

the trial court has clearly abused its discretion and (2) relator lacks an adequate 

appellate remedy. In re Copart, Inc., 619 S.W.3d 710, 713 (Tex. 2021) (per curiam) 

(orig. proceeding) (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 

(Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding)). If an order is void, however, the relator need not 

show it lacks an adequate appellate remedy, and mandamus relief is appropriate. In 

re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).

Generally, a trial court lacks power to act in a case after plenary power expires. 

In re Lopez, No. 05-22-00793-CV, 05-22-00794-CV, 2022 WL 17261156, at *3 

(Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 29, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). A judicial action 

taken after plenary power expires is void. State ex rel. Latty v. Owens, 907 S.W.2d 

484, 486 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam). By default, a trial court’s plenary power expires 

thirty days after the final judgment is signed. TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d). 

Here, the county court’s final judgment was signed on September 1, 2022. No 

appropriate motion to extend the trial court’s plenary jurisdiction was filed within 

30 days of the final judgment. Thus, the county court’s plenary jurisdiction expired 
–7–

on October 1, 2022. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d). The county court’s stay order was 

entered on May 19, 2023—well past that deadline. Because the county court may 

not issue a stay order after plenary power expires, see TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(f) 

(explaining the limited actions a court may take after plenary power expires), we 

conclude that the stay order issued seven months after plenary power expired is void. 

We next address Saving Grace’s second issue that the county court violated 

section 24.007 of the Texas Property Code. Section 24.007 of the Texas Property 

Code states:

24.007. APPEAL. A final judgment of a county court in an eviction suit 

may not be appealed on the issue of possession unless the premises in 

question are being used for residential purposes only. A judgment of a 

county court may not under any circumstances be stayed pending 

appeal unless, within 10 days of the signing of the judgment, the 

appellant files a supersedeas bond in an amount set by the county court.

TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.007. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 510.13 also states:

The writ of possession, or execution, or both, will be issued by the clerk 

of the county court according to the judgment rendered, and the same 

will be executed by the sheriff or constable, as in other cases. The 

judgment of the county court may not be stayed unless within 10 days 

from the judgment the appellant files a supersedeas bond in an amount 

set by the county court pursuant to Section 24.007 of the Texas Property 

Code.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.13. 

Here, it is undisputed that Willform-Castillo did not file a supersedeas bond 

within ten days of the judgment, or even thereafter. Accordingly, we conclude that 

the trial court abused its discretion by staying the writ of possession under these 

circumstances. See In re Invum Three, LLC, 530 S.W.3d 748, 750 (Tex. App.—
–8–

Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, orig. proceeding) (holding that trial court’s order staying 

writ of possession was clear abuse of discretion where defendant failed to file a 

supersedeas bond). Saving Grace also has no adequate remedy by appeal because 

the rules do not provide for a right to appeal from an order staying the execution of 

a writ of possession. Id. at 749. 

We address Willform-Castillo’s assertion that the writ of possession could not 

be enforced against her because she was not named in the petition and served with 

citation. We conclude on this record that Willform-Castillo’s argument lacks merit. 

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 510.3(c) states: 

If the eviction is based on a written residential lease, the plaintiff must 

name as defendants all tenants obligated under the lease residing at the 

premises whom plaintiff seeks to evict. No judgment or writ of 

possession may issue or be executed against a tenant obligated under a 

lease and residing at the premises who is not named in the petition and 

served with citation.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(c). The record does indicate that Willform-Castillo was on the 

original lease and that her name does not appear as a defendant on the petition for 

eviction.

However, under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120, a party’s appearance in 

open court has the same force and effect as if citation had been duly issued and 

served on the party as provided by law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 120; Brown v. Apex Realty, 

349 S.W.3d 162, 164–65 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. dism’d) (holding tenants 

waived service-of-process defects in eviction proceeding by appearing in trial court). 
–9–

The record reflects that Willform-Castillo appeared at the eviction hearing and 

that the county court recognized her as a defendant. “When a defendant is deemed 

to have answered and appeared in court, she waives all complaints as to defects in 

the service of process.” Montgomery v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. 05-08-00888-

CV, 2009 WL 2784587, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 2, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). 

We conclude that Willform-Castillo’s appearance constitutes a waiver of all 

complaints as to defects in the service of process, see Brown, 349 S.W.3d at 165, 

and that the county court improperly entered the stay.

Other than the lack-of-service arguments we addressed above, the remainder 

of Willform-Castillo’s response does not relate to the central issue in this mandamus 

proceeding—whether the trial court had jurisdiction to grant a stay of execution of 

the writ of possession as against Willform-Castillo. To the extent Willform-Castillo 

endeavors to challenge the purported default judgment6enforcement in the forcible 

detainer action, this is not a bill-of-review proceeding, and her argument has no 

bearing on the jurisdictional issue raised. Finally, to the extent Willform-Castillo 

complains that she was a victim of retaliation for reporting needed repairs and that 

the landlord breached its contract, this argument is inapposite because it goes to the 

merits of any timely perfected appeal and also has no bearing on the central issue of 

this mandamus proceeding. 

 

6 While the record reflects that the Final Judgment identifies only Castillo, it unquestionably was 

entered after a trial on the merits, a trial with the presence and participation of Willform-Castillo as an 

acknowledged defendant by the trial court and awarded possession of the subject property to Saving Grace.
–10–

CONCLUSION

We conditionally grant Saving Grace’s petition and direct the trial court to 

vacate its May 19, 2023, Order staying the writ of possession as to WillformCastillo. We are confident the trial court will vacate the order in accordance with 

this opinion, and the writ will issue only if the trial court fails to do so.

230745f.p05 /Bonnie Lee Goldstein//

BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN

JUSTICE