### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Assigned on

Briefs M arch 14, 2001 DANIEL B. TAYLOR v. DONAL CAMPBELL, ET AL 

### . Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County No. 00-C1844 Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr., Judge

No. M2000-02843-COA-R3-CV - Filed December 10, 2001

On July 3, 2000, Appellant filed his civil complaint based upon pu nish ment imposed for a disciplinary

infrac tion while

a prisone r at Turney

Center in Only, Tennessee . On July 18, 2000, the trial judge, sua sponte , dismissed the compl aint, and this appeal followed. We affirm the trial cou rt. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed
W IL LI AM B. C AIN , J., delive

red the o pinion of t

he court , in which B EN H. C ANTRE LL , P.J., M.S. and P ATRI CIA J. C OTTRELL , J., joined. Daniel B. Tay

lor, Only, Tennesse e, Pro Se.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral and Reporter; Terri Leig h Bernal, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appelle es, Donal Campbell, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Correction and Jack Morgan, Warden, Turney

Center.
OPINION
Daniel B. Tay lor, an inmate at Turney Center, sue d Donal Ca

mp bell, as Commissioner of Corrections of Tennessee, and Jack Warden, as Turney Center Prison Warden, complaining of a ur in al ys is drug scree n and seizure of funds from his trust account for pay ment of court costs. No process was issue d or serv ed on Def endants, and the tr

ial ju d ge, sua sponte , on July 18, 2000, dismissed the complaint and denied the attached a ppli cation for a temporary restraining order holding:
On May 23, 2000, the petitioner tested positive for THC as a result o f a urinaly sis drug sc

reening progra m. The court is of th

e opinion t

hat th e dru g screening process is an adm inistr ative procedure and does not, retrospec tively or otherwis e, violat

e Petitione

r’s cons titutional

rights.-2- Further, the imposi tio n of the penalty of loss of six (6) months visitation rights isrationa

l.
The complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to sta te a cause of action, and the trial court properl y di smissed the

complain t. The comp laint, af

ter alle ging th

e status o f the par

ties, rel ates:
7. The Plaintiff, at

all times relevant hereto, was and is an inmate of the Tennessee De pa rt me nt of Co rr ec ti on s, as si gn ed to th e T ur ne r C en te r i n O nl y, Tennessee.
8. Prior

to June 1, 2000, defendant Campbell, promulgated rules and regula ti ons w ithin the Department of Correction, pertaining to a Urinaly sis Drug Screeni ng Prog

ram, and the seizur

e of fund s as a dir

ect and p roximate r

esult of the same. 9. On May 23, 2000, at appr oximately 8:30 a.m. plaintiff field tested positive f or THC, a

nd the sam

e was se nt to the la

b for a c onfirmat

ion test.
10. On June 1, 2000, upon the results of the conf ir mation test from lab being positive f

or THC, he

was cha rged w ith drug

screen positive d

is ciplina ry infraction.
11. Plaintiff

explained to the disciplinar y heari ng officer that he shouldn’t have THC, in his s yst

em, beca use he did

n’t use dr ugs, de spite th e AE GIS Positive descri ptio n of ph ysical ev idenc e intr oduce d at th e disc ipli nary heari ng. 12. Disciplinary

hearing officer’s finding of fact a nd specific evidence relief upon to support those finding[s] were based upon the field test, and AGES LAB confirmation to establish guilt, despite Plaintiff’s statement that the results were from legally

prescribed medicine or second hand smoke.
13. The Plaintiff , at al l times relevant herein, have a statutory right to have a positive r

esult investig ated by

the depa rtment to d

etermine whether such res ult emanated from the p laintiff

’s use of leg ally

prescr ibed medi cine or w

hether it resulted from the u se of ille gal dru gs. 14. The allega

tions cont ained in n umbered parag raphs 1 through 14 are incorporated herein by

reference.
15. The defendan ts, Donal Campbell, and Jack Morgan, in their individual capacities under color of state law, have acted with repeated willful and delibera t e-3-

indifference

to the serious needs of the Plaintiff by allowing him to be found guilty of a p os it iv e d ru g s cr ee n b as ed up on th e l ab re su lt s o nl y. 16. Without first

conducting an investigation to determine whether or not the TDOC, positive result emanated f rom the us e of legally

prescribed medicine, or second h and smoke , rather than inte ntionally assuming

its relat ed to illeg al drug s. 17. That

these defendants should have suspected that the drug te st results were false.
18. These

defendants were personally invol ved in or had direct responsi bility for th e incident

that resu lted in Plaintiff’s f

alsely being f ound gui lty based upon the u se (si c) of ill egal dr ugs, los[s ] of visitati on for six (6 ) months, $22.50 fine for the lab test, and $4.00 for processing of the disciplinary infra

ction.
19. That

these defendants ha[ve] applied an amended drug screen policy and statute retro[s]pective manner to the Plaintiff.
20. Even though th

e Plaintif f is exempt f

rom asse ssment fees f

or cost, these defenda nts are r emoving funds fr om his inmat

e trust fund accoun

t for medi cal, disciplinary infractions, writ of execution/garnishment, and etc.
21. As a direct and proximate result of these defendants ac tions, the Plai ntiff expe rience d ext reme m ental anxi ety and su fferin g. Thereupon, Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages and a permane ntinjunction agains t his conviction for failing the drug scree n. These allegations challenge the intrinsic cor rectness of the disciplinary proceeding held by the Department of Corrections. Pursuant to a urinaly sis drug screening prog ram, he was randomly tested on May 23, 2000, and the f ield test was positive for THC. The test was sent to the lab for confirmation, which, on June 3, 2000, confirmed him as testing positive f or THC. He was charged with the drug screen positive disciplinary infraction. He raised no question of notice of th e procee dings but, rather , comp laine d that the he aring o fficer ’s fin dings of fact did not est

ablish guilt because the results were from legally prescribed medicine or second hand smoke. The facts alleged, taken as true, do not assert that the hearing offic er acted illegally , fraudul ently, ar bitrarily or exceeded its jurisdiction. Arnold v. Tennessee Bd. of Paroles , 956 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tenn. 1997).
In Sandin v. Conner , 515 US 472 (199 5 ), the United States Supreme Court held that there was no due process protection for in-prison infliction of punishment not imposing atypical a

nd significant

hardship on an inma

te in rela tion to the ordinary inc idents of prison life. Imposing of a $22.50 fine for a lab test, $4.00 for processing of a disciplinary infraction, and loss of visitation for six months does not rise to the dignity c ontemplated by the Sandin standard. Rimmer-Bey v. B rown ,-4-

62 F.3d 789, 790-91 (6th Cir. 1995) ; Rienholtz v. Campbe ll , 64 F.Supp.2nd 721, 728-29 (W.D. Tenn. 1999); Orellana v. Kyle , 65 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1995).
The Chancel lor acte d proper ly in dismissing the complaint, sua sponte , without waiting for service of process or the inevitable Tennessee Rule of C ivil Proc edure Rule 12 motion. Huckeby v. S pangle r , 521 S.W.2d 5 68, 571 (T enn. 1975 ); Cockrill v . Evere tt, 958 S.W.2d 133, 135 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997 ). Appel lant f urther as serts that his inmate trust fund account is exempted from execution or liability for court c o sts assessed against him in this cause. This position is without merit on the basis stated by this Court in David Palmer v. Tennessee Department of Correction , No. M2000-02 351-COA- R3-CV 2001 WL 1386091 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2001). In that ca se, this Court held: We have determined that throughout our

history the leg islature intended that costs of litiga

tion are to be the r

esponsibi lity

of the pe rson instit utin g the litigation unless relieved thereof by the judgment of

the cour t. This intent is ma

nifested again by the provision s of the 1978 legislation, part of which is the subject exemption statute, indicatin g that the legis lation is directed at defe ndant judg

ment debt

ors. Placing this determination with the e xplicit provision in the

pauper’ s oath

statute that merely suspends the payment of c osts until “taxed by the c ourt,” w e reach the conclusion that the legislative intent, as expressed by the ordinary

me aning of the langua ge used, is th at a per son wh o is al lowed to com mence a suit with out gi v ing security for the c osts is not reli eved of t he oblig ation to pay the costs by virtue of the exemption statute.
Id. at *4.
The judgment of the trial court is in all respects affirmed, and costs of the appeal are assessed agains t the appe

llant.
Th e c as e i s r em an de d t o t he tr ia l c ou rt fo r s uc h f ur th er pr oc ee di ng s a s m ay b e n ec es sa ry.

___________________________________ WILL IAM B. CAI

N, JUDGE