alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-6127

RICHARD DEAN MEARS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; JOHN HAHN,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District

Judge. (CA-95-1506-AM)

Submitted: May 16, 1996 Decided: June 5, 1996

Before RUSSELL, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Richard Dean Mears, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court's denial of a motion for

a temporary restraining order. We dismiss the appeal for lack of

jurisdiction because the order is not appealable. This court may

exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291

(1988), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292 (1988); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.

Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The order here appealed is neither

a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order.

We dismiss the appeal as interlocutory. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAY-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JUN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               AUG-31-1996
<CASH>                                          14,427
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    8,001
<ALLOWANCES>                                       116
<INVENTORY>                                     11,446
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                34,996
<PP&E>                                          19,114
<DEPRECIATION>                                   7,872
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  56,669
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            9,369
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           658
<OTHER-SE>                                      46,642
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    56,669
<SALES>                                         13,288
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                13,517
<CGS>                                            8,670
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   13,321
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  11
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    185
<INCOME-TAX>                                        83
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                102
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.02
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ELIZABETH HOPE NORTH,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.;

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC

REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 14

- 55509

D.C. No. 8:13

- cv

- 01347

- GW

- AGR

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 14, 2017 **

Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.

Elizabeth Hope North appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing her diversity action alleging state law claims related to foreclosure

proceedings

. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291

. We review for an

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

FEB 27 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 14

- 55509

abuse of discreti on a denial of leave to amend a complaint. Zucco Partners, LLC

v. Digimarc Corp. , 552 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing North’s action

without granting further leave to amend because further amendment would be

futile. See id. at 1007 ( explaining that a district court’s discretion to deny leave to

amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has failed to cure deficiencies by

previous amendments).

Appellees’ request for judicial notice , filed on December 4, 2014, is denied

as unnecessary.

AFFIRMED

.
<partyblock><br><br><div align="center"><b><font size="+1">Compas Medical, P.C., as Assignee of Nelson Cory, Appellant, <br><br>against<br><br>Citiwide Auto Leasing, Respondent.</font></b></div><br><br><p>The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for appellant.Palmieri, Castiglione &amp; Nightingale, P.C. (Michael S. Nightingale of counsel), for respondent.</p><p>Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Theresa M. Ciccotto, J.), entered January 29, 2016. The order granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.</p><p>ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.</p><p>In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the claims at issue had been untimely submitted (<i>see</i> 11 NYCRR 65-1.1). </p><p>Contrary to plaintiff's arguments, defendant's proof demonstrated that the claims at issue had been received more than four years after the services at issue had been provided, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in response, as the affidavit of plaintiff's principal does not state that the claims were sent to defendant, but rather to another entity.</p><p>Accordingly, the order is affirmed.</p><p>PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and ELLIOT, JJ., concur. </p><br>ENTER:<br>Paul Kenny<br>Chief Clerk<br>Decision Date: November 09, 2018<br><br><div align="center"><form method="LINK" action="../../slipidx/at_2_idxtable.shtml"><input type="submit" value="Return to Decision List"></form></div></partyblock>
Exhibit 4.4


PROMISSORY NOTE








$__________                                                                                                           January___,2011
   This Promissory Note ("Note") is issued as a component of a unit (the "Unit") sold pursuant to a Subscription Agreement (the "Agreement") circulated by DC Brands International, Inc., a Colorado corporation ("Maker").





1.           Interest.  Interest shall accrue on the outstanding principal balance at the rate of sixteen percent (16%) per annum from the date hereof.





2.           Payment.  First and second year interest will be paid on the anniversary date of  the investment. The entire unpaid balance and all remaining interest having accrued thereon of this Note shall become due and payable on the three-year anniversary of the date of issue.





3.           Prepayment.  Maker shall have the right to prepay the whole or any part of the unpaid principal of this Note at any time without the payment of any additional consideration therefor.





4.           Remedies:  All rights and remedies of Payee under this Note are cumulative and in addition to all other rights and remedies available at law or in equity, and all such rights and remedies may be exercised singly, successively and/or concurrently.  Failure to exercise any right or remedy shall not be deemed a waiver of such right or remedy.





5.           Waivers.  Maker hereby expressly waives presentment, protest and demand, notice of protest, demand and dishonor and nonpayment of this Note and all other notices and demands of every kind that would otherwise be available in connection with this Note.





6.           Partial Exercise.  No single or partial exercise of any power hereunder shall preclude other or further exercise thereof or the exercise of any other power hereunder.  No delay or omission on the part of Payee in exercising any right hereunder shall operate as a waiver of such right or of any other right hereunder.





7.           Governing Law and Forum.  This Note is to be governed by, and construed and enforced in accordance with, the internal laws, and not the laws pertaining to conflict or choice of laws, of the State of Colorado.





8.           Severability.  Every provision of this Note is intended to be severable.  In the event any term or provision is declared illegal, invalid or unenforceable for any reason whatsoever by a court of competent jurisdiction, such illegality, invalidity or unenforceability shall not affect the balance of the terms and provisions of this Note, which shall remain binding and enforceable.




DC Brands International, Inc.By:Name:Title:
EXHIBIT 32

CERTIFICATION OF

THE TRUSTEE*

OF THE SAN JUAN BASIN ROYALTY TRUST

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 1350

In connection with the accompanying report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2012 and filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I,
Lee Ann Anderson, Vice President and Senior Trust Officer of Compass Bank, on behalf of Compass Bank, the Trustee of the San Juan Basin Royalty Trust (the Trust), not in its individual capacity but solely as Trustee of the Trust, hereby
certify that:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies in all material respects with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (as
explained in Note 1 to the Trusts financial statements contained in the Report, in accordance with Securities and Exchange Commission Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 47, released September 16, 1982, the Trust prepares its financial
statements in a manner that differs from generally accepted accounting principles; such presentation is customary to other royalty trusts); and
| | -- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Trust.
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



COMPASS BANK, AS TRUSTEE OF THE SAN JUAN BASIN ROYALTY TRUSTBy:

/s/ Lee Ann AndersonName:      Lee Ann AndersonTitle:        Vice President and Senior Trust OfficerDate:   November 9, 2012


* The Trust has no executive officers.
EXHIBIT 32.1  SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION  In connection with the Annual Report of International Barrier Technology Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the fiscal period ended June 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Michael Huddy, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:  1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.  Date: October 7, 2010  /s/ Michael Huddy Michael Huddy President and Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer)   This certification is being furnished as required by Rule 13a-14(b) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code, and shall not be deemed filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Exchange Act or otherwise subject to the liability of that Section.  This certification shall not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Exchange Act, except as otherwise stated in such filing.
##### 



EXHIBIT 32 CERTIFICATION OF
THE TRUSTEE*
OF THE SAN JUAN BASIN ROYALTY TRUST
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 1350 In connection with the accompanying report on Form 10-Q for the quarter
ended March 31, 2004, and filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
the date hereof (the Report), I, Lee Ann Anderson, Vice President and Trust
Officer of TexasBank, on behalf of TexasBank, the Trustee of the San Juan Basin
Royalty Trust (the Trust), not in its individual capacity but solely as
Trustee of the Trust, hereby certify that:  1.
    
    The Report fully complies in all material respects with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (as explained in Note 1 to the Trusts financial
statements contained in the Report, in accordance with Securities
and Exchange Commission Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 47, released
September 16, 1982, the Trust prepares its financial statements in a
manner that differs from generally accepted accounting principles;
such presentation is customary to other royalty trusts); and2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Trust. TEXASBANK, AS TRUSTEE OF THE
SAN JUAN BASIN ROYALTY TRUSTBy:
    
    /s/ Lee Ann AndersonName:
    
    Lee Ann AndersonTitle:
    
    Vice President and Trust OfficerDate:
    
    May 10, 2004* The Trust has no
executive officers.
I 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 442 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 27, 2005 

Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

AN ACT 

To provide for the Secretary of Homeland Security to be 

included in the line of Presidential succession. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

S 442 RFH 

1 SECTION 1. SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY IN PRES2 IDENTIAL LINE OF SUCCESSION. 

3 Section 19(d)(1) of title 3, United States Code, is 

4 amended by inserting ‘‘Secretary of Homeland Security,’’ 

5 after ‘‘Attorney General,’’. 

Passed the Senate July 26, 2005. 

Attest: EMILY J. REYNOLDS, 

Secretary.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.2


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Annual Report of Allied Healthcare International
Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the period ending September 30, 2002 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Daniel A. Bergeron, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of
the Company, certify, pursuant to 18. U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to
ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company as at and for the year ended September 30, 2002.

Dated:  December 6, 2002
                                     /s/ Daniel A. Bergeron
                                     -------------------------------------------
                                     Daniel A. Bergeron
                                     Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
                                     of the Company
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-7120

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

WENLEY MCCLAREN, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. John Preston Bailey, 

Chief District Judge. (3:90-cr-00007-JPB-1) 

Submitted: March 17, 2009 Decided: March 20, 2009 

Before TRAXLER, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Brian Christopher Crockett, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. Paul Thomas 

Camilletti, Thomas Oliver Mucklow, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2 

PER CURIAM: 

Wenley McClaren appeals the district court’s order 

granting in part and denying in part his motion for reduction of 

sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2006). We have reviewed the 

record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm. 

United States v. McClaren, No. 3:90-cr-00007-JPB-1 (N.D.W. Va. 

June 30, 2008); see United States v. Dunphy, 551 F.3d 247 (4th 

Cir. 2009). We further deny McClaren’s motion to appoint 

counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED
#### Brian Siegel, Appellant, v Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York et al., Respondents.

[870 NYS2d 341]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (William A. Wetzel, J.), entered September 5, 2007, which denied the petition brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 seeking to annul the determination of respondents terminating petitioner’s employment as a tenured teacher and to restore petitioner to his position with back pay, interest and lost benefits as of the effective date of his termination, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The court properly held that respondents did not act arbi*475trarily and capriciously when rejecting petitioner’s belated request for a hearing pursuant to Education Law § 3020-a (2) (c) *(see e.g. Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County,*34 NY2d 222, 231 [1974]). Respondents had a rational basis for concluding that petitioner’s explanation that his mental condition which had particularly manifested itself in May and June 2006, the time when he was served with the notice of the charges against him, did not constitute a valid excuse for failing to timely request a hearing. The record reveals that petitioner was served with the charges personally and by mail, he had been represented by counsel during the investigation and had been told that charges were forthcoming, and, during the period in which he claimed he was too stressed to properly function, he was able to function by managing his day-to-day activities, including reporting to his assigned work location, and signing time sheets so he could be paid.

We have considered petitioner’s remaining arguments and find them unavailing. Concur—Andrias, J.P., Nardelli, Moskowitz, Renwick and Freedman, JJ.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LILIAN YANETH REYES ARTEAGA,

 Petitioner,

 v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

 Respondent.

No. 21-482

Agency No.

A216-213-044

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 18, 2023**

Before: SCHROEDER, RAWLINSON, and BADE, Circuit Judges. 

Lilian Yaneth Reyes Arteaga, a native and citizen of El Salvador, 

petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order 

dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying her 

applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the 

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not 

precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

AUG 8 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 21-482

§ 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. 

Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241 (9th Cir. 2020). We deny the 

petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Reyes 

Arteaga failed to establish she was or would be persecuted on account of a 

protected ground. See Ayala v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(even if membership in a particular social group is established, an applicant 

must still show that “persecution was or will be on account of his membership 

in such group”). Thus, Reyes Arteaga’s asylum claim fails. Because Reyes 

Arteaga failed to establish any nexus at all, she also failed to satisfy the standard 

for withholding of removal. See Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 359-

60 (9th Cir. 2017).

In light of this disposition, we need not reach Reyes Arteaga’s contention 

that she suffered harm that rose to the level of persecution. See Simeonov v. 

Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (courts and agencies are not 

required to decide issues unnecessary to the results they reach). 

We do not reach Reyes Arteaga’s contentions as to the cognizability of 

her proposed particular social groups because the BIA did not deny relief on 

this ground. See Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir. 

2011) (“In reviewing the decision of the BIA, we consider only the grounds

relied upon by that agency.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT protection 
3 21-482

because Reyes Arteaga failed to show it is more likely than not she will be 

tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to 

El Salvador. See Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009). 

The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues. 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.