(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2016 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

WATER SPLASH, INC. v. MENON 

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS,
 

FOURTEENTH DISTRICT
 

No. 16–254. Argued March 22, 2017—Decided May 22, 2017 

Petitioner Water Splash sued respondent Menon, a former employee, in

a Texas state court, alleging that she had begun working for a competitor while still employed by Water Splash. Because Menon resided in Canada, Water Splash obtained permission to effect service by

mail. After Menon declined to answer or otherwise enter an appearance, the trial court issued a default judgment for Water Splash.

That court subsequently denied Menon’s motion to set aside the 

judgment on the ground that she had not been properly served. On 

appeal, Menon argued that service by mail does not comport with the 

requirements of the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and

Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters (Hague 

Service Convention), which seeks to simplify, standardize, and generally improve the process of serving documents abroad, specifying

certain approved methods of service and preempting “inconsistent 

methods of service” wherever it applies, Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U. S. 694, 699. The Texas Court of Appeals agreed with Menon, holding that the Convention prohibited

service of process by mail. Article 10, the provision at issue, consists

of Articles 10(b) and 10(c), which plainly address permissible methods of “service,” and Article 10(a), which provides that the Convention will not interfere with “the freedom to send judicial documents, 

by postal channels, directly to persons abroad,” but does not expressly refer to “service.” 

Held: The Hague Service Convention does not prohibit service of process by mail. Pp. 4–12.

(a) This Court begins its analysis by looking to the treaty’s text and 

the context in which its words are used. See Schlunk, 486 U. S., at 

699. The key word in Article 10(a)—“send”—is a broad term, and 
 

 

 

 

2 WATER SPLASH, INC. v. MENON 

Syllabus 

there is no apparent reason why it would exclude the transmission of 

documents for the purpose of service. The structure of the Convention strongly counsels against such an exclusion. The Convention’s 

preamble and Article 1 limit the scope of the Convention to service of

documents abroad, and its full title includes the phrase “Service

Abroad.” This Court has also held that the scope of the Convention is 

limited to service of documents. Id., at 701. It would thus be quite 

strange if Article 10(a)—apparently alone among the Convention’s

provisions—concerned something other than service of documents.

Indeed, such a reading would render Article 10(a) superfluous. Article 10’s function is to ensure that, generally, the Convention “shall

not interfere” with the activities described in 10(a), 10(b), and 10(c). 

But since Article 1 already “eliminates [the] possibility” that the 

Convention would apply to any communications that “do not culminate in service,” id., at 701, in order for Article 10(a) to do any work, 

it must pertain to sending documents for the purposes of service. 

Menon’s attempt to avoid this superfluity problem by suggesting that

Article 10(a) applies not to service of process but only to the service of 

“post-answer judicial documents” lacks any plausible textual footing

in Article 10. If the drafters wished to limit Article 10(a) to a particular subset of documents, they could have said so—as they did, e.g., in 

Article 15, which refers to “a writ of summons or an equivalent document.” Instead, Article 10(a) uses the term “judicial documents”—

the same term featured in 10(b) and 10(c). And the ordinary meaning of the word “send” is broad enough to cover the transmission of 

any judicial documents. Accordingly, the text and structure of the

Convention indicate that Article 10(a) encompasses service by mail.

Pp. 4–6.

(b) The main counterargument—that Article 10(a)’s phrase “send

judicial documents” should mean something different than the phrase

“effect service of judicial documents” in Article 10(b) and Article 

10(c)—is unpersuasive. First, it must contend with the compelling 

structural considerations strongly suggesting that Article 10(a) pertains to service of documents. Second, reading the word “send” as a

broad concept that includes, but is not limited to, service is probably 

more plausible than interpreting the word to exclude service, and it 

does not create the same superfluity problem. Third, the French version of the Convention, which is “equally authentic” to the English

version, Schlunk, supra, at 699, uses the word “adresser,” which has 

consistently been understood to mean service or notice. At best, 

Menon’s argument creates an ambiguity as to Article 10(a)’s meaning. The Court thus turns to additional tools of treaty interpretation,

which comfortably resolve any lingering ambiguity in Water Splash’s

favor. Pp. 7–8. 
Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 3 

Syllabus 

(c) Three extratextual sources are especially helpful in ascertaining

Article 10(a)’s meaning. First, the Convention’s drafting history 

strongly suggests that the drafters understood that service by postal

channels was permissible. Second, in the half-century since the Convention was adopted, the Executive Branch has consistently maintained that the Hague Service Convention allows service by mail. 

Finally, other signatories to the Convention have consistently adopted Water Splash’s view. Pp. 8–12. 

(d) The fact that Article 10(a) encompasses service by mail does not

mean that it affirmatively authorizes such service. Rather, service 

by mail is permissible if the receiving state has not objected to service 

by mail and if such service is authorized under otherwise-applicable

law. Because the Court of Appeals concluded that the Convention 

prohibited service by mail, it did not consider whether Texas law authorizes the methods of service used by Water Splash. That and any

other remaining issues are left to be considered on remand to the extent they are properly preserved. P. 12. 

472 S. W. 3d 28, vacated and remanded. 

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except GORSUCH, J., who took no part in the consideration 

or decision of the case. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

 

 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 16–254 

WATER SPLASH, INC., PETITIONER v. TARA MENON 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 

TEXAS, FOURTEENTH DISTRICT
 

[May 22, 2017] 

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court. 

This case concerns the scope of the Convention on the

Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in 

Civil and Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965 (Hague

Service Convention), 20 U. S. T. 361, T. I. A. S. No. 6638.

The purpose of that multilateral treaty is to simplify,

standardize, and generally improve the process of serving 

documents abroad. Preamble, ibid.; see Volkswagenwerk 

Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U. S. 694, 698 (1988). 

To that end, the Hague Service Convention specifies certain approved methods of service and “pre-empts inconsistent methods of service” wherever it applies. Id., at 

699. Today we address a question that has divided the 

lower courts: whether the Convention prohibits service by

mail. We hold that it does not. 

I 

A 

Petitioner Water Splash is a corporation that produces

aquatic playground systems. Respondent Menon is a 

former employee of Water Splash. In 2013, Water Splash

sued Menon in state court in Texas, alleging that she had 

begun working for a competitor while still employed by 
 

2 WATER SPLASH, INC. v. MENON 

Opinion of the Court 

Water Splash. 472 S. W. 3d 28, 30 (Tex. App. 2015). 

Water Splash asserted several causes of action, including

unfair competition, conversion, and tortious interference

with business relations. Because Menon resided in Canada, Water Splash sought and obtained permission to effect 

service by mail. Ibid. After Menon declined to answer or 

otherwise enter an appearance, the trial court issued a

default judgment in favor of Water Splash. Menon moved 

to set aside the judgment on the ground that she had not 

been properly served, but the trial court denied the motion. Ibid. 

Menon appealed, arguing that service by mail does not 

“comport with the requirements of the Hague Service 

Convention.” Ibid. The Texas Court of Appeals majority

sided with Menon and held that the Convention prohibits 

service of process by mail. Id., at 32. Justice Christopher

dissented. Id., at 34. The Court of Appeals declined to

review the matter en banc, App. 95–96, and the Texas

Supreme Court denied discretionary review, id., at 97–98. 

The disagreement between the panel majority and 

Justice Christopher tracks a broader conflict among courts

as to whether the Convention permits service through

postal channels. Compare, e.g., Bankston v. Toyota Motor 

Corp., 889 F. 2d 172, 173–174 (CA8 1989) (holding that 

the Convention prohibits service by mail), and Nuovo 

Pignone, SpA v. Storman Asia M/V, 310 F. 3d 374, 385 

(CA5 2002) (same), with, e.g., Brockmeyer v. May, 383 

F. 3d 798, 802 (CA9 2004) (holding that the Convention 

allows service by mail), and Ackermann v. Levine, 788 

F. 2d 830, 838–840 (CA2 1986) (same). We granted certiorari to resolve that conflict. 580 U. S. ___ (2016). 

B 

The “primary innovation” of the Hague Service Convention—set out in Articles 2–7—is that it “requires each

state to establish a central authority to receive requests 
 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

for service of documents from other countries.” Schlunk, 

supra, at 698. When a central authority receives an appropriate request, it must serve the documents or arrange 

for their service, Art. 5, and then provide a certificate of 

service, Art. 6. 

Submitting a request to a central authority is not, however, the only method of service approved by the Convention. For example, Article 8 permits service through

diplomatic and consular agents; Article 11 provides that 

any two states can agree to methods of service not otherwise specified in the Convention; and Article 19 clarifies

that the Convention does not preempt any internal laws of 

its signatories that permit service from abroad via methods not otherwise allowed by the Convention. 

At issue in this case is Article 10 of the Convention, the 

English text of which reads as follows: 

“Provided the State of destination does not object, 

the present Convention shall not interfere with— 

“(a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by

postal channels, directly to persons abroad,

“(b) the freedom of judicial officers, officials or other

competent persons of the State of origin to effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial 

officers, officials or other competent persons of the 

State of destination, 

“(c) the freedom of any person interested in a judicial proceeding to effect service of judicial documents 

directly through the judicial officers, officials or other 

competent persons of the State of destination.” 20 

U. S. T., at 363. 

Articles 10(b) and 10(c), by their plain terms, address 

additional methods of service that are permitted by the

Convention (unless the receiving state objects). By contrast, Article 10(a) does not expressly refer to “service.”

The question in this case is whether, despite this textual 
 

4 WATER SPLASH, INC. v. MENON 

Opinion of the Court 

difference, the Article 10(a) phrase “send judicial documents” encompasses sending documents for the purposes 

of service. 

II
 

A 

In interpreting treaties, “we begin with the text of the

treaty and the context in which the written words are 

used.” Schlunk, 486 U. S., at 699 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). For present purposes, the key word in

Article 10(a) is “send.” This is a broad term,1 and there is 

no apparent reason why it would exclude the transmission

of documents for a particular purpose (namely, service). 

Moreover, the structure of the Hague Service Convention 

strongly counsels against such a reading. 

The key structural point is that the scope of the Convention is limited to service of documents. Several elements 

of the Convention indicate as much. First, the preamble 

states that the Convention is intended “to ensure that 

judicial and extrajudicial documents to be served abroad 

shall be brought to the notice of the addressee in sufficient 

time.” (Emphasis added.) And Article 1 defines the Convention’s scope by stating that the Convention “shall apply 

in all cases, in civil or commercial matters, where there is 

occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document 

for service abroad.” (Emphasis added.) Even the Convention’s full title reflects that the Convention concerns “Service Abroad.” 

We have also held as much. Schlunk, 486 U. S., at 701 

(stating that the Convention “applies only to documents

transmitted for service abroad”). As we explained, a preliminary draft of Article 1 was criticized “because it suggested that the Convention could apply to transmissions 

—————— 

1See Black’s Law Dictionary 1568 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “send,” in

part, as “[t]o cause to be moved or conveyed from a present location to

another place; esp., to deposit (a writing or notice) in the mail”). 
 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

abroad that do not culminate in service.” Ibid. The final 

version of Article 1, however, “eliminates this possibility.” 

Ibid. The wording of Article 1 makes clear that the Convention “applies only when there is both transmission of a 

document from the requesting state to the receiving state,

and service upon the person for whom it is intended.” 

Ibid. 

In short, the text of the Convention reveals, and we 

have explicitly held, that the scope of the Convention is

limited to service of documents. In light of that, it would 

be quite strange if Article 10(a)—apparently alone among

the Convention’s provisions—concerned something other 

than service of documents. 

Indeed, under that reading, Article 10(a) would be superfluous. The function of Article 10 is to ensure that, 

absent objection from the receiving state, the Convention 

“shall not interfere” with the activities described in 10(a), 

10(b) and 10(c). But Article 1 already “eliminates [the]

possibility” that the Convention would apply to any communications that “do not culminate in service,” id., at 701, 

so it is hard to imagine how the Convention could interfere 

with any non-service communications. Accordingly, in 

order for Article 10(a) to do any work, it must pertain to 

sending documents for the purposes of service.

Menon attempts to avoid this superfluity problem by

suggesting that Article 10(a) does refer to serving documents—but only some documents. Specifically, she makes

a distinction between two categories of service. According

to Menon, Article 10(a) does not apply to service of process

(which we have defined as “a formal delivery of documents 

that is legally sufficient to charge the defendant with 

notice of a pending action,” id., at 700)). But Article 10(a) 

does apply, Menon suggests, to the service of “post-answer 

judicial documents” (that is, any additional documents

which may have to be served later in the litigation). Brief 

for Respondent 30–31. The problem with this argument is 
 

 

6 WATER SPLASH, INC. v. MENON 

Opinion of the Court 

that it lacks any plausible textual footing in Article 10.2 

If the drafters wished to limit Article 10(a) to a particular subset of documents, they presumably would have said 

so—as they did, for example, in Article 15, which refers to

“a writ of summons or an equivalent document.” Instead, 

Article 10(a) uses the term “judicial documents”—the

same term that is featured in 10(b) and 10(c). Accordingly, the notion that Article 10(a) governs a different set of

documents than 10(b) or 10(c) is hard to fathom. And it 

certainly derives no support from the use of the word

“send,” whose ordinary meaning is broad enough to cover 

the transmission of any judicial documents (including

litigation-initiating documents). Nothing about the word

“send” suggests that Article 10(a) is narrower than 10(b)

and 10(c), let alone that Article 10(a) is somehow limited 

to “post-answer” documents. 

Ultimately, Menon wishes to read the phrase “send

judicial documents” as “serve a subset of judicial documents.” That is an entirely atextual reading, and Menon 

offers no sustained argument in support of it. Therefore, 

the only way to escape the conclusion that Article 10(a)

includes service of process is to assert that it does not 

cover service of documents at all—and, as shown above, 

that reading is structurally implausible and renders Article 10(a) superfluous. 

—————— 

2The argument also assumes that the scope of the Convention is not 

limited to service of process (otherwise, Article 10(a) would be superfluous even under Menon’s reading). Schlunk can be read to suggest that 

this assumption is wrong. 486 U. S., at 700–701; see 1 B. Ristau, 

International Judicial Assistance §4–1–4(2), p. 112 (1990 rev. ed.)

(Ristau) (stating that the English term “service” in the Convention 

“means the formal delivery of a legal document to the addressee in such

a manner as to legally charge him with notice of the institution of a 

legal proceeding”). For the purposes of this discussion, we will assume, 

arguendo, that Menon’s assumption is correct. 
 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

B 

The text and structure of the Hague Service Convention, 

then, strongly suggest that Article 10(a) pertains to service of documents. The only significant counterargument

is that, unlike many other provisions in the Convention, 

Article 10(a) does not include the word “service” or any of

its variants. The Article 10(a) phrase “send judicial documents,” the argument goes, should mean something different than the phrase “effect service of judicial documents” 

in the other two subparts of Article 10. 

This argument does not win the day for several reasons.

First, it must contend with the compelling structural 

considerations discussed above. See Air France v. Saks, 

470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985) (treaty interpretation must take

account of the “context in which the written words are 

used”); cf. University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center 

v. Nassar, 570 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 13) (“Just 

as Congress’ choice of words is presumed to be deliberate, 

so too are its structural choices”). 

Second, the argument fails on its own terms. Assume 

for a second that the word “send” must mean something

other than “serve.” That would not imply that Article

10(a) must exclude service. Instead, “send[ing]” could be a

broader concept that includes service but is not limited to 

it. That reading of the word “send” is probably more plausible than interpreting it to exclude service, and it does 

not create the same superfluity problem.3 

Third, it must be remembered that the French version of 

—————— 

3Another plausible explanation for the distinct terminology of Article 

10(a) is that it is the only provision in the Convention that specifically

contemplates direct service, without the use of an intermediary. See 

Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13 (“[I]n contrast to Article 

10(a), all other methods of service identified in the Convention require

the affirmative engagement of an intermediary to effect ‘service’ ”). The 

use of the word “send” may simply have been intended to reflect that

distinction. 
 

 

8 WATER SPLASH, INC. v. MENON 

Opinion of the Court 

the Convention is “equally authentic” to the English version. Schlunk, 486 U. S., at 699. Menon does not seriously engage with the Convention’s French text. But the 

word “adresser”—the French counterpart to the word

“send” in Article 10(a)—“has been consistently interpreted

as meaning service or notice.” Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law, Practical Handbook on the Operation of the 

Service Convention ¶279, p. 91 (4th ed. 2016). 

In short, the most that could possibly be said for this

argument is that it creates an ambiguity as to Article 

10(a)’s meaning. And when a treaty provision is ambiguous, the Court “may look beyond the written words to the

history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical 

construction adopted by the parties.” Schlunk, supra, at 

700 (internal quotation marks omitted). As discussed 

below, these traditional tools of treaty interpretation 

comfortably resolve any lingering ambiguity in Water

Splash’s favor. 

III 

Three extratextual sources are especially helpful in 

ascertaining Article 10(a)’s meaning: the Convention’s 

drafting history, the views of the Executive, and the views 

of other signatories.

Drafting history has often been used in treaty interpretation. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U. S. 491, 507 (2008); 

Saks, supra, at 400; see also Schlunk, supra, at 700 (analyzing the negotiating history of the Hague Service Convention). Here, the Convention’s drafting history strongly

suggests that Article 10(a) allows service through postal

channels. 

Philip W. Amram was the member of the United States

delegation who was most closely involved in the drafting of 

the Convention. See S. Exec. Rep. No. 6, 90th Cong., 1st 

Sess. 5 (App.) (1967) (S. Exec. Rep.) (statement of State 

Department Deputy Legal Adviser Richard D. Kearney). 
 

 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

A few months before the Convention was signed, he published an article describing and summarizing it. In that 

article, he stated that “Article 10 permits direct service by

mail . . . unless [the receiving] state objects to such service.” The Proposed International Convention on the

Service of Documents Abroad, 51 A. B. A. J. 650, 653 

(1965).4 

Along similar lines, the Rapporteur’s report on a draft

version of Article 10—which did not materially differ from

the final version—stated that the “provision of paragraph 

1 also permits service . . . by telegram” and that the drafters “did not accept the proposal that postal channels be 

limited to registered mail.” 1 Ristau §4–3–5(a), at 149. In 

other words, it was clearly understood that service by

postal channels was permissible, and the only question

was whether it should be limited to registered mail.

The Court also gives “great weight” to “the Executive

Branch’s interpretation of a treaty.” Abbott v. Abbott, 560 

U. S. 1, 15 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). In 

the half century since the Convention was adopted, the 

Executive has consistently maintained that the Hague 

Service Convention allows service by mail.

When President Johnson transmitted the Convention to 

the Senate for its advice and consent, he included a report

by Secretary of State Dean Rusk. That report stated that

“Article 10 permits direct service by mail . . . unless [the

receiving] state objects to such service.” Convention on 

the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters: Message From the

President of the United States, S. Exec. Doc. C, 90th 

Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1967). 

—————— 

4Two years later, Amram testified to the same effect before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. S. Exec. Rep., at 13 (stating that

service by central authority “is not obligatory,” and that other available

techniques included “direct service by mail”). 
 

10 WATER SPLASH, INC. v. MENON 

Opinion of the Court 

In 1989, the Eighth Circuit issued Bankston, the first 

Federal Court of Appeals decision holding that the Hague 

Service Convention prohibits service by mail. 889 F. 2d, at 

174. The State Department expressed its disagreement 

with Bankston in a letter addressed to the Administrative 

Office of the U. S. Courts and the National Center for 

State Courts. See Notice of Other Documents (1), United 

States Department of State Opinion Regarding the Bankston Case and Service by Mail to Japan Under the Hague 

Service Convention, 30 I. L. M. 260, 260–261 (1991) (excerpts of Mar. 14, 1990, letter). The letter stated that 

“Bankston is incorrect to the extent that it suggests that

the Hague Convention does not permit as a method of 

service of process the sending of a copy of a summons and 

complaint by registered mail to a defendant in a foreign

country.” Id., at 261. The State Department takes the 

same position on its website.5 

Finally, this Court has given “considerable weight” to

the views of other parties to a treaty. Abbott, 560 U. S., at 

16 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Lozano v. 

Montoya Alvarez, 572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 9)

(noting the importance of “read[ing] the treaty in a manner consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting parties” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And 

other signatories to the Convention have consistently

adopted Water Splash’s view. 

Multiple foreign courts have held that the Hague Ser­

—————— 

5Dept. of State, Legal Considerations: International Judicial Assistance: Service of Process (stating that “[s]ervice by registered . . . mail 

. . . is an option in many countries in the world,” but that it “should . . . 

not be used in the countries party to the Hague Service Convention that objected to the method described in Article 10(a) (postal

channels)”), online at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legalconsiderations/judicial/service-of-process.html (all Internet materials as 

last visited May 19, 2017). 
 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

vice Convention allows for service by mail.6 In addition, 

several of the Convention’s signatories have either objected, 

or declined to object, to service by mail under Article 

10, thereby acknowledging that Article 10 encompasses 

service by mail.7 Finally, several Special Commissions—

comprising numerous contracting States—have expressly 

stated that the Convention does not prohibit service by

mail.8 By contrast, Menon identifies no evidence that any 

—————— 

6See, e.g., Wang v. Lin, [2016] 132 O. R. 3d 48, 61 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. 

J.); Crystal Decisions (U. K.), Ltd. v. Vedatech Corp., EWHC (Ch) 1872

(2004), 2004 WL 1959749 ¶21 (High Court, Eng.); R. v. Re Recognition 

of an Italian Judgt., 2000 WL 33541696, ¶4 (D. F. Thes. 2000); Case C– 

412/97, ED Srl v. Italo Fenocchio, 1999 E. C. R. I–3845, 3877–3878, ¶6 

[2000] 3 C. M. L. R. 855; see also Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F. 3d 798, 802 

(CA9 2004) (noting that foreign courts are “essentially unanimous” in 

the view “that the meaning of ‘send’ in Article 10(a) includes ‘serve’ ”). 7Canada, for example, has stated that it “does not object to service by

postal channels.” By contrast, the Czech Republic has adopted Czechoslovakia’s position that “judicial documents may not be served . . . 

through postal channels.” Dutch Govt. Treaty Database: Convention on 

the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or

Commercial Matters: Parties With Reservations, Declarations 

and Objections, (entries for Canada and the Czech Republic) online at https://treatydatabase.overheid.nl/en/Verdrag/Details/004235_b; 

see also, e.g., ibid. (entries for Latvia, Australia, and Slovenia). In 

addition, some states have objected to all of the channels of transmission listed in Article 10, referring to them collectively with the term

“service.” See, e.g., ibid. (entries for Bulgaria, Hungary, Kuwait, and 

Turkey). 8Hague Conference on Private International Law, Conclusions and 

Recommendations Adopted by the Special Commission on the Practical

Operation of the Hague Apostille, Evidence and Service Conventions 

¶55, p. 11 (Oct. 28–Nov. 4, 2003) (“reaffirm[ing]” the Special Commission’s “clear understanding that the term ‘send’ in Article 10(a) is to be

understood as meaning ‘service’ through postal channels”), online at

https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/lse_concl_e.pdf; Hague Conference 

on Private International Law, Report on the Work of the Special

Commission of April 1989 on the Operation of the Hague Conventions

of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters and of 18 March 1970 

on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters ¶16, 
 

 

12 WATER SPLASH, INC. v. MENON 

Opinion of the Court 

signatory has ever rejected Water Splash’s view. 

* * * 

In short, the traditional tools of treaty interpretation

unmistakably demonstrate that Article 10(a) encompasses 

service by mail. To be clear, this does not mean that the 

Convention affirmatively authorizes service by mail. 

Article 10(a) simply provides that, as long as the receiving 

state does not object, the Convention does not “interfere

with . . . the freedom” to serve documents through postal

channels. In other words, in cases governed by the Hague

Service Convention, service by mail is permissible if two

conditions are met: first, the receiving state has not objected to service by mail; and second, service by mail is

authorized under otherwise-applicable law. See Brockmeyer, 383 F. 3d, at 803–804. 

Because the Court of Appeals concluded that the Convention prohibited service by mail outright, it had no 

occasion to consider whether Texas law authorizes the 

methods of service used by Water Splash. We leave that 

question, and any other remaining issues, to be considered

on remand to the extent they are properly preserved. 

For these reasons, we vacate the judgment of the Court

of Appeals, and we remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered.

 JUSTICE GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or 

decision of this case. 

—————— 

p. 5 (Apr. 1989) (criticizing “certain courts in the United States” which

“had concluded that service of process abroad by mail was not permitted under the Convention”), online at https://assets.hcch.net/upload/

scrpt89e_20.pdf; Report on the Work of the Special Commission on the

Operation of the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial 

and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 21–

25 1977, 17 I. L. M. 312, 326 (1978) (observing that “most of the States

made no objection to the service of judicial documents coming from

abroad directly by mail in their territory” (emphasis added)).