SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0565-19

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v. 

BYRON D. KEMP, a/k/a

BYRON D. KEMP, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant. 

________________________

Submitted February 28, 2022 – Decided March 8, 2022

Before Judges Fasciale and Vernoia.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Burlington County, Indictment No. 

18-11-1495.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Michael Denny, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, of counsel and on the brief). 

Scott A. Coffina, Burlington County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Alexis R. Agre, Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-0565-19

Defendant Byron D. Kemp appeared as a self-represented litigant during 

his jury trial on drug and weapons offenses. He appeals from his convictions 

for second-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance with the intent 

to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and 2C:35-5(b)(2); third-degree possession 

of a controlled dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); and fourth-degree 

possession of a controlled dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(3), and 

from the aggregate twelve-year sentence imposed by the court. He argues his 

conviction should be reversed because he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and 

intelligently waive his right to counsel, and he contends his sentence should be 

vacated because the State failed to timely move for an extended term. We 

reverse his conviction because the record does not support the court's

determination defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to 

counsel, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

Prior to his trial, defendant was represented by three different attorneys 

following his indictment on multiple drug and weapons offenses. Four weeks 

before the scheduled trial date, defendant informed the court he fired his thencounsel, he did not intend to hire new counsel, and he "wish[ed] to proceed on 

[his] own." 
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The court explained it was obligated to "make certain inquiries" of 

defendant before he could represent himself. The court asked defendant why he 

"want[ed] to represent [him]self?" and defendant replied, "I can't represent 

myself." The court asked defendant why he fired his counsel, and the court 

noted defendant had two prior attorneys who had represented him in the matter.

Defendant said he did "not wish to represent himself" but that he was dissatisfied 

with his counsel's failure to obtain discovery due from the State even though the 

trial was scheduled. 

The State informed the court all discovery materials in its possession had 

been provided to defendant's counsel, but then incongruously explained there 

was a recorded statement on a disc that had not been turned over and transcripts 

it planned to order and supply to defendant. When asked by the court if he 

wished to continue to have his counsel represent him if the State provided the 

outstanding discovery, defendant explained his "people do not wish to pay any 

more money" to the attorney and they refused to pay the balance of the retainer 

owed to the attorney. 

Defendant advised the court he did not want the services of the Office of 

the Public Defender "at this point," and the court explained it would not "provide 

an attorney for [defendant] on the morning of the trial." Defendant responded, 
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"That's understandable," and said all he was "seeking at this point" was the 

discovery in the case that was scheduled for trial and in another case pending

against him. 

The court and defendant had the following colloquy about whether 

defendant's receipt of the requested discovery would affect his decision to 

proceed without counsel.

THE COURT: Now, let's assume you have your 

discovery, do you want a public defender? 

DEFENDANT: No, I don't. 

THE COURT: Do you wish to represent yourself then? 

DEFENDANT: I wish to make my own presentment, to 

represent myself, I am myself.

The court then asked defendant additional questions and became

frustrated by what it characterized as defendant's "stonewalling."

THE COURT: How old are you, Mr. Kemp? 

DEFENDANT: I'm the oldest man on the planet, Your 

Honor. 

THE COURT: I don't think that answers the [c]ourt's 

question. How old are you? When were you born? 

DEFENDANT: (No response.)
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THE COURT: You can stonewall the [c]ourt, if you 

wish, Mr. Kemp, it makes no difference to this judge. 

But I'm telling you that, as a matter of advice, that if 

you're going to trial without an attorney, it can be a 

great burden for someone without a legal education. 

That's up to you. And whether you have an attorney or 

you don't really depends upon what you tell me. And if 

you stonewall the [c]ourt, you'll just simply go to trial 

on your own without the help or advice of anyone. So 

it's up to you. How old are you? 

DEFENDANT: I haven't had any help or advice thus 

far, Your Honor. This is the point I'm trying to make 

to the Court.

THE COURT: So the question is a simple one. How 

old are you? And you haven't answered it. How far did 

you go in school? 

DEFENDANT: Your Honor, this – that information is 

already available to the [c]ourt. You already have a 

record of all of that. 

THE COURT: Do you have any family to rely on to 

give you any advice?

DEFENDANT: I'm incarcerated, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: Do you speak to your family on the 

phone or your friends, anyone that you can rely on for 

advice? 

DEFENDANT: For advice?

THE COURT: Yes.

DEFENDANT: No. 
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The court also mentioned weapons charges in the indictment against 

defendant and the court inquired as to defendant's knowledge of the penalties.

THE COURT: You're charged with unlawful 

possession of a weapon, possession of a weapon or a 

firearm in a drug crime and you're charged with being 

a certain person not to possess a weapon. Which means 

all the State has to prove is that you had a weapon, that 

is a firearm, and that you had previously been convicted 

of a serious offense. Do you understand what those 

charges mean? 

DEFENDANT: No. 

THE COURT: Do you know what the penalty is if you 

are convicted on those charges?

DEFENDANT: No. 

Rather than explain the charges and their attendant penalties, the court 

ended its questioning of defendant and found he was "for whatever reason, 

stonewalling . . . and making it more difficult for the [c]ourt to afford him the 

best possible fair trial." The court relieved defendant's then-counsel of his 

representation of defendant and ordered the State to provide a complete copy of 

the discovery to defendant at a hearing the court scheduled for the following 

week. The court also adjourned the trial for one week. 

At a hearing the following week, the State provided defendant with 

discovery, and the court appointed standby counsel to assist defendant at trial. 
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The court also explained that it had attempted, at the prior hearing, to inform 

defendant "concerning the difficulties that [he] might have when representing 

himself," but it "never really got to the heart of the discussion because 

[defendant] essentially refused to answer any of the [c]ourt's questions." The 

court stated it "never got to the point of telling [defendant] that if he represented 

himself . . . he would not, in the event of a conviction, ever be able to contend 

that he suffered from ineffective assistance of counsel[,]" and noted it therefore 

made that point "clear at this time."

At the third and final pretrial hearing, the court again revisited defendant's 

decision to represent himself, noting it had previously endeavored to ask 

defendant questions related to the decision and it had found, based on 

defendant's responses, "it was apparent . . . the [c]ourt was going to be able to 

go no further in its attempt to determine if [defendant] was capable of 

representing himself." The court noted there were areas of inquiry pertinent to 

its decision whether to grant defendant's request to represent himself that it had 

not addressed, but the court found that "if the defendant is not going to respond 

there is no way that the [c]ourt has of knowing that." 

The court again asked defendant if he "desire[d]" to represent himself, and 

defendant said, "Yes, Your Honor." In response to the court's questioning, 
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defendant admitted he had been previously tried before a jury on other charges, 

and the court informed defendant he had a right to remain silent and that if he 

decided not to testify the jury would be instructed not to consider his silence as 

an admission of guilt. The court further instructed defendant that if he opted to 

testify at trial, he would be required to respond to questions about whether he 

had previously been convicted of a crime and he would not be permitted to assert 

his right to remain silent during cross examination by the State. 

When asked if he understood those rights, defendant expressed confusion 

about the purpose of the court's questioning. The court explained its purpose 

was to determine if defendant could properly represent himself at trial. In 

response, defendant noted he still did not have complete discovery, and the court 

thereafter addressed that issue.

Defendant represented himself at trial and on May 15, 2019, the jury found 

him guilty of second-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance with 

intent to distribute, third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance, 

and fourth-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance. The jury 

found defendant not guilty of the four remaining charges.

At a July 9, 2019 sentencing proceeding, defendant appeared with new 

counsel. The State moved orally for imposition of a discretionary extended term 
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sentence. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) (authorizing imposition of extended-term 

sentences for persistent offenders convicted of first, second, and third-degree 

offenses). The court directed the State to file a written motion and adjourned 

the sentencing. That same day, the State filed a motion for an extended-term 

sentence.

The following day, the court conducted a sentencing proceeding, and 

merged the third-degree conviction into the second-degree conviction, granted 

the State's motion for an extended-term sentence, and imposed a twelve-year 

prison sentence on the second-degree offense. The court also imposed a 

concurrent eighteen-month prison sentence on the fourth-degree offense.

Defendant appeals from his convictions and sentence. He offers the 

following arguments for our consideration:

POINT I 

THE COURT'S FINDING THAT DEFENDANT HAD 

WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL WHEN HE DID 

NOT WANT TO PROCEED PRO SE AND WAS NOT 

FULLY INFORMED ABOUT THE 

CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAIVER WAS ERROR. 

A. [Defendant] Did Not Voluntarily Waive His Right 

To Counsel.

B. Even If [Defendant] Had Wanted To Represent 

Himself, He Did Not Make A Knowing Waiver Of His 

Right To Counsel.
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POINT II 

WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE STATE'S MOTION FOR 

AN EXTENDED TERM WAS OUT OF TIME, AND 

THE DEFENDANT HAD NO MEANINGFUL 

OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO IT IN 

VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. 

II.

Defendant argues he is entitled to a reversal of his convictions because he 

did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his right to counsel. He 

claims he repeatedly informed the court he did not wish to represent himself 

and, for that reason, the court erred by finding he voluntarily waived his right to 

counsel. He also argues the court failed to adequately inform him about the 

implications of his decision to waive counsel and, as a result, his decision to 

waive his right to counsel was not made knowingly and intelligently.

We review a court's ruling on a defendant's request to waive the right to 

counsel and appear as a self-represented litigant for an abuse of discretion. State 

v. Outland, 245 N.J. 494, 507 (2021). A court abuses its discretion when its 

"decision [is] made without a rational explanation, inexplicably depart[s] from 

established policies, or rest[s] on an impermissible basis." United States v. 

Scurry, 193 N.J. 492, 504 (2008) (citing Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 

N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).
11 A-0565-19

"The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 

Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution both guarantee all defendants in 

criminal prosecutions the right to . . . the [effective] assistance of counsel." 

Outland, 245 N.J. at 505. A defendant also has a constitutional right "to 

represent oneself at trial, so long as the defendant has 'voluntarily and 

intelligently' waived the right to counsel." State v. Rose, 458 N.J. Super. 610, 

625 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975)). 

"Because the '[a]ssistance of counsel is essential to ensuring fairness and 

due process in criminal prosecutions,' relinquishing one's right to the benefits of 

representation of counsel can be allowed only when the court is satisfied the 

defendant understands 'the implications of the waiver [of counsel].'" Outland, 

245 N.J. at 505 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Crisafi, 128 N.J. 499, 

509 (1992)). To determine if a defendant has such an understanding, "the trial 

court must ascertain, in a so-called 'Faretta hearing,' whether the waiver is 

indeed knowing, voluntary, and intelligent after a searching inquiry that 

involves advising the defendant of the risks and pitfalls of self-representation." 

Rose, 458 N.J. Super. at 627. 

The purpose of the requisite searching inquiry "is not to ascertain whether

a defendant possesses technical legal knowledge," but rather it is to "apprise the
12 A-0565-19

defendant 'of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the 

record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with 

eyes open.'" Outland, 245 N.J. at 506 (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835). "[T]o 

ensure that a defendant's waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent," there are 

"topic areas that a trial court must explore with a defendant seeking to proceed 

pro se." Ibid.; see also State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553, 593-94 (2004); Crisafi, 

128 N.J. 510-12. 

A trial court is "require[d] . . . to inform a defendant asserting a right to 

self-representation of" the following:

(1) the nature of the charges, statutory defenses, and 

possible range of punishment; (2) the technical 

problems associated with self-representation and the 

risks if the defense is unsuccessful; (3) the necessity 

that defendant comply with the rules of criminal 

procedure and the rules of evidence; (4) the fact that the 

lack of knowledge of the law may impair defendant's 

ability to defend himself or herself; (5) the impact that 

the dual role of counsel and defendant may have; (6) 

the reality that it would be unwise not to accept the 

assistance of counsel; (7) the need for an open-ended 

discussion so that the defendant may express an 

understanding in his or her own words; (8) the fact that, 

if defendant proceeds pro se, he or she will be unable 

to assert an ineffective assistance of counsel claim; and 

(9) the ramifications that self-representation will have 

on the right to remain silent and the privilege against 

self-incrimination.

[State v. DuBois, 189 N.J. 454, 468-69 (2007).]
13 A-0565-19

A trial court should also "specifically advise the defendant[] that it would be 

unwise not to accept the assistance of counsel." Outland, 245 N.J. at 506 

(quoting Crisafi, 128 N.J. at 512).

Here, the court recognized its obligation to conduct a searing inquiry of 

defendant to ensure he fully understood the dangers and disadvantages of his 

decision to proceed as a self-represented litigant. The court endeavored to 

engage defendant in that inquiry during the first pretrial hearing but became 

frustrated by what it found was defendant's "stonewalling." Based on that 

finding, the court determined that any further questioning of defendant was

unnecessary, discontinued its efforts to further question defendant or apprise 

him about all the prescribed topics, and addressed only issues related to 

discovery production.

The court's reliance on its finding defendant had stonewalled during the 

first pretrial proceeded continued during the second and third proceedings. In 

those proceedings, the court found the stonewalling rendered it impossible to 

engage in a colloquy with defendant to apprise him about the topics necessary 

to ensure his decision to appear pro se at trial was made knowingly and 

intelligently. The court instead chose to simply inform defendant during the 

second pretrial proceeding that his decision to proceed without counsel would 
14 A-0565-19

bar him from filing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and, at the third 

pretrial proceeding, about his right to remain silent and some risks associated 

with a decision to testify at trial.

As a result of the court's finding defendant stonewalled in the first 

instance, and its concomitant decision to thereafter limit its colloquy with 

defendant about his decision to appear pro se at trial, the court did not inform 

defendant about numerous topics that must be addressed to ensure the record 

demonstrates he made a knowing and intelligent decision. See Outland, 245 

N.J. at 506; DuBois, 189 N.J. at 468-69. 

More particularly, the court did not inform defendant about: the nature of 

all the charges,1the statutory defenses to the charges, and the possible ranges of 

punishment, including defendant's exposure to an extended term sentence; any 

technical problems associated with self-representation and the risks if the 

defense is unsuccessful; the necessity that defendant comply with the applicable 

rules; the fact that defendant's lack of knowledge could impair his ability to 

defend himself; and the impact of defendant serving the dual role of counsel and 

defendant. Ibid. The court also did not inform defendant it would be unwise to 

1

 During the first pretrial proceeding, the court mentioned only the weapons 

charges against defendant, and did not identify the drug charges for which 

defendant was later convicted and sentenced.
15 A-0565-19

proceed without the assistance of counsel. Ibid. In other words, the court did 

not mention, address, or discuss many of the topics the Court has determined are 

essential to ensure a defendant's decision to proceed to trial pro se is made 

knowingly and intelligently.

We find the court erred by failing to fully address the requisite topics with 

defendant during the pretrial proceedings. That is because the court's decision 

to effectively end the process of reviewing the topics is founded on a premise—

defendant was stonewalling—not supported by the record. 

To be sure, defendant's answers to the court's initial questions about his 

age during the first pretrial proceeding were evasive, farcical, and nonresponsive. Its legitimate frustration with those answers, however, clearly 

distracted the court from completing the task of apprising defendant of the topics 

required to create the record necessary to support a finding he knowingly and 

voluntarily waived his right to counsel. See ibid.; see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 

835. 

As the record shows, defendant did not refuse to answer the court's 

questions about the topics pertinent to his decision to appear pro se. 

Immediately following defendant's nonresponsive answers to the questions 

about his age, defendant responded directly to inquiries about topics the Court 
16 A-0565-19

requires that a trial court review with a defendant intent upon appearing pro se. 

The court asked defendant whether he understood the weapons charges against 

him and if he was aware of the penalties if convicted. See DuBois, 189 N.J. at 

468 (requiring a court "inform a defendant . . . of . . . the nature of the 

charges . . . and possible range of punishment"). Defendant did not refuse to 

answer the questions, and he did not provide evasive answers to them. The 

court's finding to the contrary is undermined by the record. 

The court's determination it would not further question defendant or 

inform him about the prescribed topics because defendant stonewalled and 

refused to answer its questions is simply not supported by the evidence. 

Moreover, the court's apparent skepticism about the truth of defendant's 

responses to the questions about the weapons offenses and their attendant 

penalties did not relieve the court of its obligation to inform defendant about all 

the prescribed topics essential to the court's determination. 2 A defendant's 

perceived or actual recalcitrance does not excuse a court's failure to cover the 

2

 Indeed, the court recognized its obligation in the second and third pretrial 

proceedings by informing defendant concerning the unavailability of a 

subsequent ineffective assistance of counsel claim and issues related to his right 

to remain silent at trial, although without asking defendant any questions related

to those issues. But the court did not complete the required process by 

addressing the remaining topics.
17 A-0565-19

required topics with a defendant choosing to forego counsel because, at the end 

of the process, the court must make a finding the defendant knowingly and 

intelligently waived his right to counsel. 

Here, the court was required to review all the topics with defendant and 

should have advised defendant it was unwise to proceed without counsel.

Outland, 245 N.J. at 505-06. Depending on defendant's answers to the court's 

inquiries, whether responsive or not, the court should have made findings, 

including credibility findings, as to whether defendant knowingly and 

intelligently waived his right to counsel. See Reddish, 181 N.J. at 594-95 

(explaining a court must make credibility determinations concerning a 

defendant's statements during the inquiry required to determine if there is a 

knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel). To the extent defendant professed 

a lack of knowledge of information pertinent to a making a knowing and 

intelligent decision to waive counsel, the court should have supplemented that 

information instead of abandoning the process out of frustration. Lacking a 

record defendant was fully informed of the "dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation," Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, we are compelled to conclude there is 

insufficient evidence establishing defendant knowingly and intelligently waived 

his right to counsel, see Outland, 245 N.J. at 506 (explaining the purpose of the 
18 A-0565-19

court's colloquy concerning a defendant's decision to proceed without counsel 

is "so . . . the record will establish that [the defendant] knows what he is doing 

and his choice is made with eyes open" (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835)). 

Generally, a failure to inform a defendant concerning the topics required 

by the Court "would compel reversal of a conviction." Crisafi, 128 N.J. at 512. 

However, "in rare cases" where "the record indicates that the defendant actually 

understood the risks of proceeding pro se, a waiver" unaccompanied by 

information regarding the prescribed topics required by the Court, may be 

deemed valid. Id. at 513. The record must support a finding that despite the 

absence of a full explanation of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding 

pro se, the defendant fully "understands the consequences of the waiver." Id. at 

512. That did not happen here.

In Crisafi, the Court found the defendant presented "such a rare case" 

because "his background and experience support[ed] a conclusion that he knew 

the pitfalls of trying his own case." 128 N.J. at 513. The record showed the 

defendant was fifty-seven and had "extensive experience with the criminal 

justice system[,]" including having previously obtained, as a pro se defendant,

an acquittal from a jury "on a rape charge." Id. at 513-14. The defendant also 

had a college degree in business law, and he demonstrated during the pretrial 
19 A-0565-19

proceedings his knowledge of the charges against him, and, during trial, his 

knowledge of the maximum sentence to which he was exposed. Id. at 514-15. 

The record also established that through the assistance provided to defendant by

standby counsel during pretrial and trial proceedings, defendant was

"substantially informed" "about 'whatever pitfalls he face[d]'" as a pro se 

litigant. Id. at 517-18. 

The State does not argue this is a rare case where the court's failure to 

fully inform defendant concerning the issues pertinent to his decision to appear 

pro se permits a finding defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right 

to counsel. And the State does not point to any evidence establishing this is the 

rare case referenced by the Court in Crisafi. Id. at 513-14. Moreover, defendant 

is unlike the defendant in Crisafi. Defendant was thirty-one, and had only two 

prior criminal convictions, one of which was from many years ago when he was 

a juvenile tried as an adult. There is no evidence he previously represented 

himself at trial or otherwise; he is a high school graduate and does not have a 

college degree in law; and there is no record as to what advice, if any, he 

received from his prior counsel or standby counsel concerning the pitfalls of 

representing himself at trial. 
20 A-0565-19

Additionally, the record shows defendant said he did not fully understand 

the weapons charges against him and was unaware of the attendant penalties. 

And the court neither provided that information nor explained to defendant the 

drug charges against him or the penalties, including his exposure to the 

extended-term twelve-year sentence that was later imposed after he was 

convicted of the drug charges. See State v. Kordower, 229 N.J. Super. 566, 578 

(App. Div. 1989) (finding a court's colloquy with defendant supporting a finding 

defendant knowingly waived her right to counsel was inadequate because the 

court did not fully explain the serious nature of the charges, or the maximum 

sentence that she could receive).

We therefore find the court's failure to create the requisite record 

establishing defendant made his decision to waive counsel knowingly and 

intelligently requires the reversal of his conviction and a remand for a new trial. 

See Outland, 245 N.J. at 506. Prior to the trial on remand, the court shall 

determine anew whether defendant intends to proceed pro se or with counsel in 

accordance with the requirements explained by the United States Supreme Court 

in Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835-36, and most recently summarized by our Supreme 

Court in Outland, 245 N.J. at 505-07. See State v. Figueroa, 186 N.J. 589, 596 

(2006) (explaining a violation of the requirements of Faretta and Crisafi "is of 
21 A-0565-19

constitutional dimension" and therefore the "defendant must be returned to 

status quo ante and, hence, is entitled to exercise his constitutional rights 

anew").

It is therefore unnecessary to address in detail the merits of defendant's 

claim his conviction should also be reversed because his decision to waive 

counsel was not made voluntarily other than to note that, as an issue independent 

of his claim his decision was not made knowingly and intelligently, it is without 

sufficient merit to warrant a discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). 

We add only that defendant repeatedly informed the court that he wished to 

proceed without counsel, and his claim he was forced to make that decision 

because of frustration with his counsel's alleged failure to obtain discovery is 

undermined by the record. The court asked defendant if he would want an 

attorney if he was provided with all outstanding discovery, and defendant 

responded unequivocally he did not. 

For purposes of completeness, we also consider defendant's claim the 

court erred by granting the State's motion for an extended term because it was 

not filed within fourteen days of the return of the jury's verdict as required by 

Rule 3:21-4(e). Neither defendant, who addressed the court and made argument 

at sentencing, nor his counsel at the sentencing proceedings raised the issue of 
22 A-0565-19

the untimeliness of the State's application under the Rule. Defendant's counsel

sought an adjournment of sentencing because he had just been retained, but the 

request was founded solely on counsel's claimed unfamiliarity with the trial 

record. No adjournment was sought based on issues related to the timing of the 

filing of the State's motion for an extended term sentence.

At sentencing, counsel noted the State filed its motion for an extended 

term the previous day but he advised the court that nonetheless he was "prepared 

to address it." Counsel then addressed the merits of the motion, referred to the 

prior convictions upon which the State relied to support imposition of an 

extended term under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a), and argued the convictions did not 

warrant imposition of the extended-term sentence the State sought in its motion.

We decline to further address the merits of the argument because it was 

"not properly presented to the trial court" and does not "go to the jurisdiction of 

the trial court or concern matters of great public interest." State v. Robinson, 

200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009) (quoting Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 

(1973)). And, here, by failing to timely raise the issue before the trial court, 

defendant effectively precluded the State from addressing, and court from 

considering, whether there was good cause under Rule 3:21-4(e) permitting the 

otherwise untimely filing of the motion.
23 A-0565-19

Any arguments made on defendant's behalf we have not expressly 

addressed are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(2)

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.