IN THE COURT OF CRI MINAL APPEA LS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE DECE MB ER SES SION, 1996
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9510-CR-00299 ) Appell ee, ) ) ) KNOX CO UNTY VS. ) ) HON. RAY L. JENKI NS JOHN D. JOSLI N, ) JUDGE ) Ap pella nt. ) (Sec ond Deg ree M urder)

ON AP PEA L FROM THE J UDGMENT OF THE CRIMINAL COURT OF KNOX C OUNTY
FOR THE APP ELLA NT : FOR THE APPELLEE : HERBERT S. MONCI ER JOHN KNOX W ALKUP DAVID S. W IGLER Attor ney General and Reporter Suit e 775 Nati ons Bank Center 550 Main Avenue MIC HA EL J. FA HE Y, II Knoxvi ll e, TN 37902 Assist ant Attor ney General 450 James Robertson Par kway Nashvil le, TN 37243-0493 RAND ALL E. NICHOLS Dist ri ct Attor ney General ROBERT JOLLEY Assist ant Di str ictAtto rney Gener al City -CountyBuil ding Knoxvi ll e, TN 37902
OPINION FILED ________________________ CONVICTI ON AFFIRMED; SENTENCE MODIFI ED DAVI D H. WELLES, JUD GE1 Tenn . Code A nn. § 39-13-21 0(a). 2W e h av e lis ted the iss ue s in a d iffe re nt o rd er tha n th ey a re pre se nte d in the De fe nd an t’s bri ef. W e have chosen to address t he issue s in t he orderli sted here. -2- 

# OPINION

The Defend ant, John D. Josl in, appeals as of r ightpursuantto Rul e 3 of the Te nnessee Rules of Appel lat e Procedure . He was conv ict ed by a Knox Co unty jury of seco nd de gree m urder. 1 The tri al court sent enced him as a Range I standard off enderto twe nty-thre e yea rs with the D epa rtme nt of C orre ction . In this appeal, the Defendant rai ses the fol lowing i ssues: 2 1) W hetherthe t ri al court er red i n fai li ng to grant t he Defendant ’s moti o n forjud gm en t of a cq uitta l an d w he the r the evid en ce is su fficie nt to sus tain his co nvi cti on; 2) whether the j ury i nstructi on on self-def ense was erroneous; 3) whetherthe t ri al court er red by permitti ng the Def endant t o be impeached on cro ss -examina ti on wit h questi ons concern ing pretr ial prepa ration with his a ttorney; 4) whe ther the trial cou rt’s erroneo us evide ntiary rul ings depr iv ed the Defendant of hi s ri ght t o presentan eff ecti ve def ense; 5) whether the t rial court’ s demean or and conduct exhi bit ed a judi cial bias denyi ng t he Defe ndantdue process of l aw; 6) whetherthe assistantdistr ictatt orney gen eral committed prosecut ori al misconduct ; and, 7) whetherthe t ri al court er red in sentenci ng the Def endant t o twenty-t hree yea rs im priso nm ent. After carefully review ing the e xtensive rec ord, we con clu de tha t the De fen da nt’s issu es pr ovide no groun ds for the re versal of his c onviction. W e do, h owe ver, conc l ude thatthe t ri al court er red i n sentenci ng the Def endant t o twenty-t hree years imp rison m ent. A cco rding ly, we a ffirm th e Defen dant’ s convi cti on for second degree murder butmodifyhis s entence.3 Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-11- 611, - 612. -3- I. FA CTUA L BA CKGROUND

The rec ord in th is case is qui te l engthy . The t ri al commenced on June 26, 1995. Th e jury re turne d a ve rdict o n Ju ly 17, 1 995 . W e begin here wit h a bri ef sum ma ry of t he evi dence present ed, but w e will pro vide a ddition al pe rtinen t facts rel ated to s peci fi c i ssues as we add ress thos e issu es. There isno questi on that on Feb ruary 26, 1994, the Defendantshot and kil led t he vi cti m, Rodney Shepard. The prin cip al iss ue rais ed by th e p roo f ad du ce d a t trial was whet her t he Defendant acted i n self -def ense or def ense of a thi rd person. 3

A. Stat e’s Proof

At trial, the St ate pr esented t he test imony offourwit nesses to t he shooti ng. Ga ry Massengil l was r idi ng as a passenger with the victim in t he latter ’s t ruck on the morning ofFebruary26, 1994. Massengil l t esti fi ed thathe and the v ic tim were goi ng on a pl umbing serv ice ca ll in Powel l, Tennessee when theypassed the intersection ofCentral Avenue Pike and Call ahan Road. They were t ravel ing north on Central Avenue Pike . As t hey proc eeded through the i ntersec ti on , Ma sse ng ill saw a blu e and si lv ervan run the s top sign at the interse ction an d turn fro m Call ahan Road int o the l ane in whi ch he and t he vi cti m were dr iv ing
. Ma sse ng ill recognized the van as one belong ing to th e D efe nd an t. Ma sse ng ill test if ied furtherthatshort lyaft er t urni ng toward the t ruck, the van light ly bumped the victi m’s tr uck from behind. The vict im stopped the t ruck and ex it ed th e veh icle to i nvest iga te w hil e M ass eng ill rema ined in the tru ck. A cco rding to-4-

Masse ng ill, the va n an d the truck were app roxim ately tw enty fe et ap art. Masseng ill the n hea rd two g unsh ots in quick succe ssion follow ed by a third gunshota second later. W hen Masseng il l heard t he shots, he look ed in t he sidevi ew mirro r and saw th e vict im lying on the stre et w ith b loo d co m ing ou t of h is head. Massengil l t esti fi ed thatas the t hird shot was fi red, he saw the Defendant hanging o ut of t he dri ver’ s side window ofthe v an. Massengi ll then drove t he truckaway f rom the scene. The van follo we d so on afte r him . Ma sse ng ill tur ned off Central Avenue Pike aft er a short di stance, and the van conti nued down the road.

On cross- examinat ion, Massengil l admitted t hat t he vi cti m was his be st fri end. He also admitted thatthe vi ctim’s t ruckhad no r ear wi ndow so thatthe on ly w ay to see behind the veh icle was b y using the side-view m irro rs . Massengil l t esti fi ed thathe had been dri nking wi th t he vi cti m the prev ious ni ght and had already drunka s i xt een -o unc e be eron t he mo rn i ng o f F ebr uary 2 6. He stat ed thatthe bump from the van was so sli ght t hat i t l eftno marks on or damage to t he b um per of the truck. Ma ssen gill also adm itted that there w ere inconsi stenci es regar din g th e d ista nc e fro m the victim to th e ve hic les be twe en his ini ti al statements to pol ice off icers and his t esti mony on direct ex aminati on. From his be st re co llect ion , Ma sse ng ill state d tha t the victim was app roxim ately tw enty feetf r om h i s v eh i cl e a t t he t i me he was shot . Massengi ll test if ied furtherthatthe dista nce from the b ack of the truck to the doo r of the van w as tw enty fe et.
JudyAll en and her daught er, Michel le Fl att , wer e in anot hervehi cle atthe int ersect ion of Cent ral Avenue Pike and Call ahan Road at approxi mately1:00 p. m. on February 26, 1994. Fl attwas dri vi ng and All en was in t he front-5-

passengerseat. Both i ndiv idual s test if ied t hat t hey saw a bl ue and silv er van travel ing ea st o n C alla ha n R oa d in the r ight -hand l ane. The van swit ched lanes su dd en ly as itapproached the st op sign at the inters ectio n an d turn ed n orth (le ft) onto Central Avenue Pike witho ut sto ppin g. Alle n loo ked awa y for a m om ent. W hen she loo ked up agai n, she s aw the victim ’s tr uck and t he Defendant ’s v an stopped in t he nort hbound lanesof C en tral A ven ue Pik e a pp roxim ate ly five to six feetapart . The vi cti m was walki ng toward the v an wit h the t ips ofthe f ingers of his l efthand in h is pants pocketand his r ightarm swingi ng casual lyat hi s side
. W hen the v ict im reached t he f r on t bu mpe roft he v an , Al l en sa w two ar ms holdi ng a pist ol emerge from the dri ver’ s side window ofthe v an. She t hen heard a gunshota nd looked awayfora second, duri ng which t ime she heard another gun sho t. W hen she loo ked back atthe scene, she wit nessed the Defendantlean out of t he van’ s window and s h oot atthe v ict im as he l ay on t he ground besi de the van’ s window. On cross- examina tion, A ll en admitt ed that , based s olel y on herobservati on of the vi ctim’s act ions, she b elieved the re wa s g oi ng t o b e s ome type of f ightaft er t he vehi cles c ame to a st op in t he road.

Mic he lle Flatt t esti fi ed thatthe t ruck and t he van st opped approx im ate ly thr ee to f our f eet apart on Ce ntral A ven ue P ike. F latt, li ke All en, t esti fi ed thatthe victim walked back toward the van with the tips o f the fing ers of h is left h an d in his pants pocket and his r ight ar m swinging by his sid e. As t he vi cti m stepped past the f rontbumper of the van, F latt saw the Def endant putboth ar ms outsi de the van window. She then heard gunshots. Flatt echoed Al len’ s test imony t hat the Defendantlea ne d o ut o f the van ’s w ind ow an d sh ot a t the victim as he l ay on the s treet. O n cro ss-e xam ination , Flatt stat ed thatshe also be li eved t here was going to be som e type of fight a fter the truck and the va n ha d sto ppe d. Fla tt-6-

admitt ed that , shortl y afterthe shoo ting, she told p olice officers she cou ld n ot te ll whetherthe v an ha d h it the t ruck. Flatt al so admitt ed thatthe Def endant shotthe vi cti m as the l att er rea ched the dr iv er’ s side window ofthe v an.

Ph illip Murphy was t ravel i ng nort h on Central Avenue Pike near t he int ersect ion with Cal l ah an Roa d o n Fe br ua ry26 , 19 94
. On direct ex aminati on, Murph y testified that he s aw the Defe nda nt’s van bu mp the victim’s tru ck fro m behind. Acco rd ing t o M urp hy, th e vic tim exite d th e tru ck a nd exa m ine d h is bum per. The victi m then walked towar d the v an, t al kin g a nd ge stu ring with his hands. Murphy t esti fi ed thathe believe d ther e might be an alt ercat ion. As the
v ic tim approached t he van, Murphy saw ar ms emerge from the dr iv er’ s side wind ow. Th e victim was still six to eigh t feet a wa y at tha t time and , acc ordin g to Murp hy, his arm s and hand s were up in the a ir. Murp hy then heard two or m ore gun sho ts an d sa w the victim fall forwa rd on to the stree t.

On cross- examinat ion, Murphy admitted t hat he was a chi ldhood f ri end of the vi cti m. In f act, the v ict im ref erred indi vi duals t o Murphy’ s heati ng and cool ing business. Murp hy testified further tha t the victim ap pea red an gry and upset as he approached t he van. He also admitted t hat he had notactual lyseen the van bu mp the t ruck, but ratherhad seen t he tr uck jo l t. Murph y a ssum ed tha t there had bee n co nt actbetwee n t he v ehi cl es. He sta ted tha t he did not know whet her the vict im had suddenly hit his brakes. During cross- examinat ion, the Def endant produced a ta pe rec ord ing of a 91 1 ca ll ma de by M urp hy im med iat elyaft er t he shooti ng. On that t ape recording, Murphy makes no menti on of a bump between the vehi cles and stat es thathe could n ot det ermine whet her t he dri ver ofthe v an was black

or whi te.-7- Dr. John Nefftest if ied regardi ng the c aus e of th e victim ’s de ath. Th e vic tim had a sing le gu nsh ot wo und to the hea d. T he p ath of th e b ulle t ran rou gh ly paral lel to t he lev el ofthe v ict im’s ea rs and car ri ed itstraightthrough the brain. Dr. Ne ff testified fu rther th at ther e was no st ippl ing ass ociat ed wit h the wound. Sti ppli ng refers to the effec t of po wd er an d oth er bits of m ateria l in th e she ll casing act ua lly im pa ctin g th e w ou nd site w he n a we ap on is disch arged atclose range. He expla ined t hat t he lackof st ippl ing i ndi cated t hat t he shot was fi red f r om a t l ea stei gh t ee n t o twe nty- f ou ri nc he s a wa y f r om t he v i ct i m.

Two off icers wit h the K nox County Sher iff’ s Department , James Phil li ps and John W il son, test if ied t hat t hey arr iv ed at t he scene shortl y afterthe shoot ing. A f terspeaki ng wit h sever al wi tnesses, theylear ned thatthe sus pect had bee n dri vi ng a blue an d sil ver van. They t hen began to s earch t he neighbor hoods surr ounding the scene for such a vehicle. A s they w ere questi oning an i ndiv idual in the Heiskell Road area, the Defendant approach ed them on foot , i denti fi ed him se lfas Jo hn Jo slin, and sta ted that he own ed a b lue and silver va n. Bo th officers t estified that the D efend ant ap pea red distrau ght or in sh ock. O fficers accompanied hi m back to hi s resi dence.

Mike Lett, a dete ctive with the Knox County Sher iff’ s Department , t esti fi ed thathe we nt to the D efend ant’s reside nce o n the a fternoon of Feb ruary 26, 1994. Once he had arrived , the D efen dan t’s wife, S and ra Jo slin, info rm ed L ett of th e locat ion of a pi stol belongi ng to t hem. Lettrecov ered t he .38 c ali ber re vol ver fro m the ea ve of the ca rport at t he Defendant ’s home. The pist ol was notloaded at that t ime. Lettalso testified that p olice h ad ta ken me asu rem ents oft he cr i me-8-

scene. The re were blood s tains on Cen tra l A v enue Pike approxi matelyone hundred t hirty- sixfeetfrom the int ersect ion wi th Cal lahan Road.

Mike Up chu rch, a dete ctive w ith the K nox Co unty Sher iff’s De partm ent, test if ied concerni ng a conversati on he had wit h the Defend ant on August14, 1993. Th e D efe nd an t ha d co m pla in ed ab out harassing tel ephone cal ls and vandalism com m itt ed by an indi vi dual t he Defendantbeli eved t o be Rodney Shep ard, t he victim . Th e D efe nd an t as ke d U pc hu rch ab ou t the po ssib le penalt ies for s uc h o ffen se s an d th e p roo f req uire d. W he n in for med that t he off enses he wa s des cribing we re misde meanors punis hable byup to el even months and twenty-ni ne days i n jai l, the Def endant st ated t hat he did not be lieve thattyp e ofpun ishm ent “w ould both er M r. Sh epa rd at a ll.” Acco rding to Dete ctive Upchurch, the De fen da nt “s aid that h e gu ess ed h e’d jus t take care of it hisse lf.”

On cross- examinat ion, Up ch urc h co nfirm ed tha t the De fen da nt c alle d th eir offi ce on the Mondayaft er he had spok en with Up chu rch a nd ta lked with Lieut enant Johnson aboutthe t elephone c all s and vandal ism. I n addit ion, the Defendantcall ed yet again on a lat er dat e and spoke wi th Off icer Baird
. Upchurch testified further that he was a ware that t he Defendant also approached the distr ictattorn ey ge nera l’s office. Defense counsel produced a reportwri tt en by Detect iv e Lettwhich s tat ed thatUpchurch had i nfor med th e D efe nd an t in August of 1993 t hat, giv en the offenses t he Defendanthad d e scri bed and the lev el of h is pr oo f, “the y pro ba bly wouldn’ t do much t o the subj ect becaus e ofthis, that h e did n’t kno w w heth er he cou ld ge t a wa rran t or no t.”-9- B. Def ense Proof 1. Te sti mony ofthe Defendant The De fend ant te stified in his ow n be half a t tri al. He s tat ed thathe had met the v ict im in 198 8. The Def endant was ad ding a bedroom to his house at thatti me. The victim had posted homem ade signs throughout t he co m m un it y advert isi ng thathe did plumbing work. After r eading these signs , t he Defendant call ed the v ict im and event uall y hi red him to wor k on hisbedroom addit ion. The Defendanttestified that the victim d id good work at a re as on ab le p rice . Th is arrangementbegan a rel ati onship whi ch was i nit ial lyamicabl e. The Defendant oft en ask ed the victim to d o re pa irwork at hi s commercial rent al propert ies. The victim acc epte d the se jo bs a nd d id qu ality wo rk ac cord ing to the D efen dan t.

The Defendantand the v ict im became closer fr iends asti me passed, and the Defendantvi sit ed the v ict im’s ho me on Sam Til lery Road. He t esti fi ed that h e found t he li vi ng condit ions depl orabl e and thoughtthe v ict im and hi s fam il y deserve d better. The victi m informed him that he did not l ike his l iv ing condit ions either, an d th at th e n eig hborho od chil dren were harassi ng his c hil dren. The victim eventu ally asked the D efend ant if he wo uld buy a ho use on Dante Road and rentitto hi m. The Defendant ag reed.
Ap pa ren tly the Dant e Road home was in such a c ondit ion t hat itwould not qua lifyfor a l oan. The Defendant therefore sol d his ret irement stockin orde r to h ave the mon ey t o purchase t he home on Dante Road. He al so execut ed an opti on to al low t he vi cti m to purchase the h ome from him duri ng the next t hree years. Th e D efen dan t stated that th ey ha d ag reed that th e victim wou ld ren ova te the el ectr ical and heating syst ems so th at the Da nte R oad hom e wo uld q ualify-10-

fora loan. The victi m would then ge t a l oan and purchase the house f rom the De fend ant. Acc ordin g to th e D efen dan t, the victi m began s everal renovat ion proje cts on the ho us e, b ut d id n ot fin ish the m . Th e D efe nd an t loa ne d th e vic tim
m on ey to finish som e p roje cts , bu t to n o a vail.

The vi cti m eventual lyexpres sed a desi re t o move int o a large garage- type commercial buildi ng owned by the Defendant. The Defendant disc ov ered t hat this str uctur e was not approved as suit able f or habi tat ion. He inf ormed the victim thathis fam ily could not m ove into the buildin g an d, ac cord ing to the D efen dan t, the vi cti m became angry. The victim sud de nly be ca m e “u na vaila ble ” to d o re pa ir work at the Defendant’ s comm ercial properti es.

Th e vi cti m later

moved his t rai ler -home onto t he back hal f ofthe Dant e Road lot . He t hen request ed that th e D efe ndant gi ve hi m the halfof t he lot surr ounding the t rai ler . The Defendantinqui red of t he K nox CountyPlanni ng Comm issi on and was inf ormed thatthe l ot could n ot be spl itint o two r esident ial lots because ofa lack of square foot age. He t old t he vi cti m what he had l earned. The vi cti m became upset and sai d he was si mply goi ng to sel l t he tr ail erforone thousand doll ars ( $1,000) . The Def e ndant t old t he vi cti m that t he trail er was wo rth mu ch m ore money and wrot e hi m a check for two thousand f iv e hundred dollars ($2,500). The victi m later t ore that check i nto pieces.

The victim then began to complai n about hi s neighbors around the D ante Road home. He assert ed thathis c hil dren were being harassed. The Defendant heeded the victim ’s displ easure wi th hi s home and tol d him thatifhe complet ed the renovat ions t o getthe house int o sell ing condi ti on (such t hat it wou ld qu alify-11-

fora loan) , t he Defendantwould gi ve hi m any amount overthi rty -si x th ousand dollars ($36, 000) f or whi ch the home sol d. The Defendantalso offer ed to payfor the renovat ion mater ial s and for an indi vi dua l to h elp the v ict im complet e the repairs.

Soon afte r this off er, in Febr uary of 1992, t he Defendantlear ned thatthe victim had purchase d a nearbyhome on B rui n Roa d. The Defendantrecei ved a tel ephone cal l f rom one of t he vi cti m’s nei ghbors on Dant e Road info rm ing him thatthe v ict im was gutt ing t he Dante Road ho me as he mov ed out. The Defendantwent t o the Dant e Road home and dis covered thatthe v ict im was removing fixture s, d uc t wo rk, th e e xter na l air co nd ition er u nit, a nd oth er m ate rials fro m the Da nte Ro ad ho m e. W he n a ske d a bo ut th e a ir co nd ition er, th e vic tim told the Def endant t hat he was t aking t he unitaway f rom the Dan t e Ro ad ho me because itwas stol en. The Defenda nt tes tifi ed thathe did no thi ng about t he gutt ing of the ho use b ecau se he did not w ant an y tro uble f ro m th e v i ct i m. He then began to t alk t o the v ict im’s Dant e Road neighbors and le arned t hat t he She pard famil y had been harassing and threateni ng them. The neighbors also suspecte d the vi ct im of bei ng inv olv ed in se ll ing i ll egal dr ugs. The Defenda nt call ed the c ity police dep artm ent a nd le arne d tha t th e vic tim had a cri minal recor d. The Defendant t esti fi ed thathe was terrified to learn these t hings abou t t he v i ct i m.

On October28, 1992, the Def endant sol d the Da nte Ro ad ho m e to Ca rroll Votaw. Sho rtly thereafter, h e and his wif e recei ved a t elephone c all from the vi ct i m. The vi cti m was angry and v ulgar , cursing t he Defendantand sayi ng that he “was goin g to d estro y” the D efen dan t a nd e very thin g h e o wn ed . Th e vic tim-12-

went on to t hreat en to ki ll the Defendantand warned hi m thathe “betterkeep an eye ove r his shou lder.” Th e victim also state d tha t “he w as g oing to post si gns up in t he community dec lar ing al l aboutJohn Jos lin.” H e to ld th e D efe nd an t’s wife t hat the Defendant had raped someone in the 1940s.

The Defendanttest if ied t hat f rom thi s date unt il the dayof t he shooti ng, he recei ved numerous vul gar and harassing telephone call s, some of whi ch he was ab le to recor d on hi s answe ri ng machi ne. Inc lud ed i n th e cal ls we re t hrea ts to rape the Def endant’ s wif e and daughter . He al so dis covered damage to several pieces ofhis c omm erci al rental property l ocated t hroughoutthe community. The c all s and vandal ism were apparentl y cyc li cal, wit h sever al i nstances occurr ing overa shortperi od of t ime, us ually ove r a weekend, fol lowed bya peri od of no distur bances. Th e vic tim wo uld ofte n ca ll near t he ti me of the disco very o f acts of van dalism and tell the D efen dan t, “It ain’t ove r, S.O .B.; it ain’t ov er.”

The De fend ant s oon bec am e ver y frighte ned of th e vict im . He wo uld sometimes ask on e o f his adultsons to accompany hi m when he went to wor k on his commercial property. He test if ied t hat he call ed the pol ice se veral ti mes and lear ned that th ere w as little tha t co uld be done aboutthe harassing call s and vandalism unless he caught the perpet rator i n the act. The Defendan t also approached the l ocal t elephone c ompany to i nquir e whether ther e was a way to sto p o r “tra p” c alls co mi ng i nt o h i s p ho ne f r om a spe cific nu m ber. A cco rding to the Defendant ’s t es ti mony, he was t old t hat he coul d not “tra p” cal ls f rom the victim ’s number be ca us e i t wa s o ut si de hi s l oc al ex ch an ge . As t i me passed, the Defendantbec am e m ore a fraid, b oth forhim se lf an d fo r his fam ily. He an d h is-13-

wife eve ntu ally inst it uted st ri ct r ules regardi ng answeri ng the phone a nd the door ifhis c hil dren were home alone.
Ap pro xim ate ly one to two weeks be for e the shoot ing, one of t he De fen da nt’s neighbors disc overed a homemade sign posted n earthe De fen da nt’s home. The Defendantsoon di scover ed more signsand wri ti ng of the same nature on vari ous publi c sign s. The si gns and wri ti ng s co nta ined language such a s “bewar e John Josl in, ” often coupl ed wit h “John Jos li n the rapis t.” Some signs cont ained l anguage such as “John Josl in wi ll rape y ourwif e” or“John Jos li n wil l f uck you. ” Photo graphs ofthese s igns were introduce d at trial. The Defendant t esti fi ed thathe r ec og ni ze d t he v i ct i m’ s h an dw r i t i ng on so me ofthe signs. He believ ed th at the sign s ind icate d the victim was “com ing c lose r.” As a res ult, the p ostin g of th e sig ns s care d the De fend ant.

W ith regar d to t he day ofthe shoot ing, the Def endant t esti fi ed thathe a wakened ea rl y on Saturday, February26, i n orderto search for more signs before othe r peo ple b ega n to d rive in the neig hbo rhoo d. He took a l oaded pistol with him for prot ection purposes and drove thro ug h th e n eig hb orh oo d n ea r his home. For th e pa st twe lve yea rs, t he pisto l had usuall y been keptin a l ocked closetin his hou se. Th e Defendantfound more si gns thatmorning and reco gnized the Def endant’ s handwri ti ng on them. He also f ound vul gar wri ti ng on the garage door ofhis adu ltson’s place o f busi ness. He retur ned home late r thatmorning to getreadyto a tten d h is ad ole sce nt s on ’s ch urc h-te am ba ske tba ll game.-14- The De fen da nt’s daughter was feel ing i ll thatmorning and dec ided t o stay at ho me duri ng the bask etbal l game. The Def endant i nstr ucted hi s daughter not to ans we r the p hon e or c om e to th e do or wh ile they were gon e. W hen th e Defendantarrived at the gym nas ium , he a nd h is wife s pok e with th e you th minist erof t heir

church, Randy Singl eton, about t he probl ems they had been havi ng wit h the v ict im. Afterthe game, the D efen dan t and his w ife left qu ickly to check on thei r daught er. Their son was going to com e hom e sep arately a sh ort time later.
They approached t he int ersect ion ofCall ahan Road and Central Avenue Pike, tr avel ing easton Ca llah an in the left lane. T he D efend ant intend ed to turn left on Central Avenue Pike to getback to his home on Hei skell Road, whi ch was a shortdist ance nort h from the intersection ofCentral Avenue Pike and Call ahan. As he approached, he saw the v ict im’s t ruck atthe i ntersecti on heading n ort h on Central Av en ue Pi ke
. Be l i ev i ng t ha t t he v i ct i m wo uld turn w est (le ft) onto Ca llaha n R oad in ord er to g et to the i nterstat e, t he Defendantswit ched int o the ri ght lane ofCall ahan Road hoping to a void the v ict im. The Defendanttest if ied thatthe victim sa w him appro aching and “c reeped ” t hrough t he int ersect ion, giv ing him an “angry st are. ” Rather than t urni ng onto Cal lahan R oad as th e Defendanthad expect ed, the v ict im conti nued straightthrough the i ntersecti on, travel ing north on Cent ral Avenue Pike
.
The Defendantbecame worri ed tha t the vi cti m was going t o the De fen da nt’s ho me, wh i ch wa s i n t he di r ec t i on t he v i ct i m w as dr i vi ng. He therefore switch ed b ack into the left lane ofCall ahan Road and tur ned left atthe int ersec tio n so thathe was travel ing north on Cent ral Avenue Pike behind t he-15-

victim ’s truck
. He stat ed thathe stopped at t he int ersect ion, but t he stop s ign was setbac k a s hort d istan ce fro m the a ctua l interse ction of the road wa ys. The Defendanttest if ied t hat j ust afterhe tur ned int o the l ane fol lowi ng the v i ct i m’ s truck, the victim slam m ed on his b rak es an d ca m e to a sto p in the m idd le of t he road. The Defendan t sl amm ed on his bra kes to avoi d hitti ng the t ruck. At no time did he make contact wit h the vi ctim’s t ruck.

Accordi ng to the Defendant’ s testi mony, the vict im jumped out of his t ruck, slammed the door

and threw down a ciga ret te. He placed hi s hand i n his po cket and app roac hed the D efen dan t’s van . At t his poin t, the D efen dan t’s wife screamed, “ He’ s c omi ng to ki ll us, Joh n.” The Defendant reached into the console beside his s eat and pul led outthe . 38 cali ber re vol ver he had left there earl ierthatmorning. He “st uck itout t he window”and sai d, “ No, Rodney.”The Defendanttest if ied t hat t he vi cti m responded, “ I’ ll kil l y ou, motherfucker .” The Defendant then f ir ed a sho t in th e a irover t he vi cti m’s head. The vict im lunged forthe Def endant, reachi ng into his windo w an d tugg ing at the D efend ant’s arm or saf ety belt . The Defendantleaned bac k and fi red t he gun twi ce.

The victim fel l backfrom the van afterthe shots, butthe Def endant di d not know whe ther he had wo und ed th e victim . At this tim e, the De fend ant’s wife excl aimed, “My God, J ohn, here’s t he other one coming afterus.”The Defendant looked up to se e G ary M as se ng ill exit ing the vic ti m’s tr uck. Masseng il l ran around to th e d river ’s side of the t ruck and drove away. The Defendantfol lowed the truckbe ca us e it w as trave ling tow ard the ir ho m e. T he truc k ev en tua llytur ned off the road, and the Def endant proceeded to h is hous e. The Defendanttest if ied thathe was in a stat e of shoc k aft er t he shooti ng.-16- Once hom e, the De fend ant d id no t return the .3 8 ca liber p istol to its custom ary storage locat ion i nside t he house. Inst ead, he pl aced the revol ver on a ledg e in h is carp ort be cau se h e did not w ant h is da ugh ter to see him carryi ng the gun. He t hen told hi s wife t hat he was going to t he Sheriff ’s Offi ce to inform the author it ies ofwhat ha d h ap pe ne d. T he De fen da nt’s wife ask ed him to w ait and to cal l an attor ney bef ore goi ng. Since t hey did notknow any attor neys, they cal led the m inister of their chu rch, wh o gave them the na me of a lawye r. Th e minist ertol d them he was coming t o t h eirhome immediatel y. During t his t ime, the De fend ant n otice d th a t po lice o ffice rs w ere at th e h om e o f on e o f his neighbors. He decided t o approach t he off icers. Upon doing s o, he informed the officers of hi s name and the f act t hat he owned a blue an d sil ver van. Li eutenant Don Humphrey, whom the Def endant had k nown fora number of y ears, tol d the De fend ant, “If you know anything abou t this situation, yo u had bette r go ta lk to you an a ttorne y.”

On cross- examinat ion, the Def endant admitted thathe did no t consi der t he signs and vulga r writing s thre aten ing in a nd o f t hemse lv es. I nstead, he considered the m to b e m ore in the n ature of ha rass m ent ra ther th an th reats
. He did, however, beli eve t hem to be more of a t hreatwhen theybegan to be pos ted nearhis home. The Defendant was also c onfronted wit h a le tter w ritten to h im by the vic tim in w hich the vic tim m ade ma ny po sitive co m m ents about and showed a co nc ern for th e D efe nd an t an d h is famil y. The let terwas sup po se dly wri tt en in late 199 2 or e arl y 1993, aft er t he Defendanthad recei ved t he thr eateni ng tel ephone cal l con cerni ng his s ale ofthe Dant e Road home. The Defendanttes ti fi ed furtherthathe did no t r emem ber doi ng anyt hing t o the revol ver as he drov e away f rom the scene of t he shooti ng.-17- The ass istan t district att orney general also questi oned the D efendantabout whetherhe had rehearsed his test imony with hi s a tto rney aspartof hi s pret ri al preparati on for t he case. These questions, in turn , led to in quirie s into whether the Defendanthad been through a tr ial procedure befo re , referrin g to misdemeanorconv ict ions t hat t he Defendantrecei ved i n 1973. Thi s li ne of questi oning is c hall enged by t he De fend ant o n ap pea l. W e wil l r elat e addit ional facts rega rdi ng t hese qu est ion s as we ad dre ss th os e iss ue s late r in thi s opini on.

2. Cor robora ti ng Proof The Defendantpresent ed several wi tnesses to cor roborat e his t esti mony concerni ng the hi story between him and th e victim as w ell as the events l eading up to t he shooti ng. James McCreary, one of t he Defendant ’s nei ghbors, test if ied t hat he sa w a homemade sign posted o n a tel ephone pole approxi matelyone hundred fi fty yards away f rom the Def end ant’ s home. The sig n contai ned derog atory rem arks abo ut the De fend ant. MrCrearyremoved t he sign f rom the po le and took it to the D efen dan t. Th e D efen dan t bec am e visibly s hak en, u pse t, and nervouswhen he saw the sign. McCreary test if ied t hat t he Defendantthen t old hi m ab ou t the vulg ar a nd ha ras sin g te lep ho ne calls he an d h is fam ily me mb ers had recei ved f rom the victim . M cCrearyconsi dered t he sign to be thr eateni ng and s eeing i t i n his ne ighbor hood worri ed him. He l atersaw derog atory writing on s to p sig ns in t he neighbor hood. On cr oss-ex aminati on, McC reary admitt ed thathe had not seen the indi vi dual who had p osted t he sign on the t elephone pol e.

Lisa Sca rbro testified that sh e wo rked at the Po we ll Deli. Th at b uild ing is owned by t he Def enda nt a nd is ap pa ren tly lea se d to the op era tors of th e d eli.-18-

Sca rbro test if ied t hat she does not know t he Defendant . She conf ir med that she once saw vul garand derogat ory wr it ing refer ri ng to t he Defendanton an ext eri or wall of t he deli . On cros s-exami nati on, Scarbro admitt ed thatshe did not know wh o w rote on the wa ll.

Charles Edward W ri ght t esti fi ed thathe leas ed a buil ding f rom the De fend ant. One morning in 1992 he disc overed t hat t he ext eri or ai r condi ti oning un it had been knocked off i ts base. Itappeared t o W ri ght t hat t he unithad been struckby a ve hicl e. Wright lat er spoke wi th t he D efend an t ab ou t t he prob l ems with the v ict im. Wrighttest if ied t hat t he Defendantappeared to be f earf ul ofthe vi ct i m.
DudleyCo ck r um tes tified tha t he wa s th e m inist er a t the De fen da nt’s church. He had tal ked wit h the Def endant aboutt he prob l ems wi t h t he v i ct i m. Cockrum ad vise d th e D efe nd an t to s pe ak with the Sh eriff’s off ice. The Defendant told Cockrum thathe had al ready don e so. Cockr um testi fi ed furtherthatthe Defendantapp eared to be af rai d of t he sit uati on and seemed to f eel t rapped. Cockrum also c onfi rmed thathe recei ved a t elephone c all from the Def endant on Feb ruary 26 , 1994 , and g ave the Defe nda nt the na me of an attorn ey.

Ca rroll Vo taw te stified th at he purc has ed th e ho m e on Da nte Ro ad in Octoberof 1 992 after the vi cti m and hi s fa mil y had moved. Accordin g to Votaw , the house was i n ext remely poor condi ti on. Vot aw call ed the vict im to askabout inf ormati on on the f ixtur es and ductwork t hat had been removed from the home. He test if ied t hat the v ict im seemed more int erest ed in t he purchase agreement he had ma de w ith the D efen dan t. The victi m appeared to be very angr y wi th t he-19-

Defendant. Votaw t esti fi ed thatthe v ict im stat ed thatthe si tuat ion was far f rom sett led and that“he probablywould wi nd up ki ll ing t he son-of -a-bi tch. ” Votaw lat erspoke wi th t he Defendantabout t he sit uati on and stat ed thatthe Def endant was obvi ouslyscared. Accordi ng to Vot aw, t he Defendantbecame m ore and more fearful as ti me passed.

Ernest Greer t esti fi ed thathe was the D efen dan t’s unc le. Gr eer s pok e with the Defendantabout t he probl ems the la tt er was hav ing wi th t he vi cti m. Greer
co uld not rem em ber exa ctly when their conve rs a ti ons had occur red, but esti mated them to hav e taken pl ace si x to ten months befor e the shoot ing. Greer rel ated thatthe Def endant had s tat ed thatthe v ulgar graffi ti and sig ns were i n the sa me lan gu ag e a s th e h ara ssin g te lep ho ne call s he had received. On crossexaminat ion, the ass ist ant dist ri ct attor ney gener al ask ed Greerifhe real ized t he Defendanthad testified that the gra ffiti and s igns ap pea red on ly weeks before the sh oo ting , rath er th an six to t en months. Greer t hen stat ed thathe coul d not be sure about t he ti ming of t heir conversati ons beca use h e wa s eighty-thre e years old and c ould notremember everythi ng.

The De fend ant’s childre n als o te s ti fi ed at t ri al. Dean Josli n, t he De fen da nt’s son, testified that h e op erate d an auto m otive re pair g arag e ou t of a buil ding leased t o hi m by his f ather . Dean Josl in ar ri ved atthe garage one morning afte r his fat her had begun t o have problems wit h the v ict im and found thathis garage doorhad been severelydented by a ve hicl e. He f ound red pai nt matching the color

of the v icti m’s truckon the sc ene. He took measurements of the heightof t he dent and concl uded itcorr esponded to the hei ght of t he bumper o n the vi cti m’s tr uck. Dean Jos li n also t esti fi ed thata plat e glass window was-20-

broken twice dur ing t his t ime. On the morning ofSaturday , Febr uary 26, 1994, Dean Joslin disco vered vu lgar w riti ng ref erri ng to t he Defendanton the garage doo rs of hi s shop. Dean Josli n stat ed thathe had conversati ons wit h his father about the s ituation with th e victim . He testified that t he Def en da nt w as in constantfearof t he vi cti m. On cross- examinat ion, Dean Josli n admitt ed thatin his deposit ion f or a ci vi l case ari sing f rom the shoo ting, he st ated t hat t he Def en da ntwa s n ot“ sc ar ed t o d ea t h” oft he v i ct i m.

Daniel Charles Josli n, anot herson ofthe De fen da nt, e ch oe d D ea n Jo slin’s test imonya bout hi s fat her’ s mental stat e. He t esti fi ed thatthe Def endant was ter ri fi ed ofthe v ict im. Benj amin All en Josl in al so test if ied t hat the Def endant was scared ofthe victim . Be nja m in Alle n Jo slin s tate d th at h is fat he r sp ok e w ith h im about the vandali sm and harassing telephone calls. Those convers ati ons began approxi matelyone yearbefor e the shoot ing.

John IsaacJosli n and Geneva Rose Josl in, the adol escent c hil dren ofthe De fend ant, both t esti fi ed thattheyanswered harassing tele ph on e ca lls in which the vict im used vulgar and thr eatening language. They spoke wit h the Def endant about the tele ph on e ca lls theyrecei ved. They both t esti fi ed thatthe Def endant appeared to be sc ared. In f act, the ent ir e famil y was f earf ul and f eltli ke they were be in g stal ked. On cross-ex aminati on, John I saac Josl in admitted t hat he remembered receiving o nly seven or e ighthar as si ng ca l l s f r om t he v i ct i m. Ge neva Jos lin remem bered two call s dist inct ly , buttest if ied t hat she receiv ed mo re calls wh ich she simp ly could no t reme mb er.-21- Randy Sing leton , the yo uth m inister a t th e Defendant’ s church, test if ied thathe sa w t he Defen da ntan d h i s w i f e s ho r t l y be f or e a ba sk et ba l l ga me on the morning of Sat urday, February26, 1994. He cordi all y asked the Def endant how he was doing. Aft er an initial plea san t ans we r, the D efen dan t’s wife bega n to cry and the Def endant conf ided i n Singl eton t ha t they were notdoing wel l. The Defendanttold Sin gle ton t hat hi s famil y was bei ng persecut ed by a man. The Defendantrelat ed that t hey had received harassi ng telephone ca ll s and had discov ered de rog ato ry sig ns po ste d in their n eighbor hood. Si nglet on test if ied thatthe Defendant’s hands w ere s hak ing a s he reco unte d this in form ation . In Sin gle ton ’s opini on, t he Defend ant a ppeared very f right ened. On crosse xam inat ion, Sin gle ton ad m itted tha t the De fen da nt n eve r sp ec ifica lly told him t ha t he wa s f ea r f ul oft he v i ct i m.

The princi pal wit ness offered t o co r roborat e the Def endant’ s test imony about the events l eading up to the shooti ng was t he De fenda nt’s wife, San dra Josli n. Sandra Josl in t esti fi ed thatshe and her husband recei ved a t hreat ening tel epho ne call f rom the vic tim o n O ctob er 28 , 199 2, afte r the s ale o f the D ante Road hom e to C arro ll Vota w. From thatti me until the shooti ng, members of t he Jo slin famil y cont inued t o recei ve vul gar and t hreat ening t elephone c all s from the vi ct i m. According to Sandra Josli n, these cal ls i nclude d threa ts to rape h er, threa ts to rape Geneva Josl in, and threats t o kil l t he De fen da nt. A pp roxim ate ly a week be f ore t he shooti ng, one ofthei r nei ghbors brought t hem a homem ade sign co ntai ning derogatory, v ulgar wri ti ng ref erri ng to t he Defendant . The neighbor

had found t he sign posted on apole verynear their home. The close proxim ity of the sign to the ir hom e frightene d her a nd he r entire fam ily.-22- San dra Josli n confi rmed thaton the morni ng of Sat urday, February26, 1994, she and her husband attended their son’s church ba ske tba ll gam e. T he ir daughter

remained atho me b ec au se sh e wa s i l l
. On the retur n home from the game, her husband was dri vi ng thei r van a nd she was i n the fro nt pas senger seat. T hey w ere travel ing easton Call ahan Road approachi ng the i ntersecti on with Ce ntr a l Avenue Pike. The Defendant was dri vi ng in t he left l ane and int ended to tu rn le ft at the intersection , which w ould tak e them directly toward the irhome. As theyneared t he int er sec ti on, she s aw the v ict im’s t ruck. Her husband swit ched int o the r ightlane, whic h au tom atica lly turns s outh (right) o nto Central Avenue Pike , i n orderto avo id p as sin g clos e to t he vi cti m’s tr uck. The victim drove s lowly throu gh th e int ersect ion i n the di rect ion ofthei r home and star ed at them. Gi ven t hat t heir daughter

was at home al one, t his acti on alar med San dra Jos lin an d h er h us ba nd , pro m ptin g h er h us ba nd to sw itch lan es ag ain and turn le ft at the in terse ction , followin g the victim ’s truck as it pro cee ded north on Central Avenue Pike
.
After a shortdist ance, t he victi m suddenly sl amm ed on his brakes and ca me to a sto p in the roa d. T he De fen da nt s lam m ed on his b rak es to a void hitti ng the tru ck fro m beh ind. Ac co rdin g to Sa nd ra J os lin’s tes tim on y, the victim “j umped out of his truck and s tarted bo und ing bac k towa rd our ve hicle in a very mad rage. He ran hi s hand i n his po cketand conti nued toward ourveh ic le .”As the vi cti m continued towar d the v an, Sa nd ra J os lin exc laim ed , “H e’s go ing to kill us.” She hea rd he r hus ban d sa y, “ N o, Rod” and saw him st ick hi s rev olv er out ofth e va n’ s wi ndow. She h ear d t he v icti m say , “ I’ ll ki ll you moth er- -f ucke rs .”At that p oint, S and ra Jo slin du cke d do wn in he r sea t.-23- San dra Josli n then heard gunsho ts and l ooked up a moment lat er. She saw ano ther in dividu al exit the victim ’s truck
. S he said to her husband, “John, watch it; the re’s another one.”That individual go t back into the truck, ho weve r, and dr ov e aw ay . Th ey fo llowed the truck, hea ding tow ard the ir hom e. After a short dista nc e, th e tru ck tu rne d o ff the roa d a nd the y co ntin ue d to the irhouse
. San dra Josli n test if ied f urt her t hat, on the way home, t he Defendantremoved t he bul lets whi ch r emained in the rev olv er an d th rew t hem out o f hi s wi ndow.

On cros s-exa m ination , th e assis tantdistrict attorney m ade mu ch of S and ra Jo slin’s test imony t hat t he vi cti m said t he plura l “ motherf uckers”as he approached thei r van rat her t han the si ngular . The assi stantdist ri ct attor ney confronted her wi th a copyof a depos it ion gi ven f orthe ci vi l case ari sing f rom the shooti ng in whi ch she st ated t hat t he victim use d the sing ular form of t he word. After repeat ed inqui ri es by the pro secu tor, Sa nd ra J os lin te stifie d th at s he cou ld not be sure w hethe r the victim ha d use d the p lural or the sing ular.

3. C ha rac ter o f the Vict im The Defendantalso presented se veral wit nesses who t esti fi ed concerni ng the cha racte r of the victim . D ean Jos lin, one of t he Defendant ’s son s, t esti fi ed thathe came to know t he vi cti m through hi s fat her. The vi cti m even tual lywas hir ed to do plum bing work for D ean Jos lin. Dean Josli n came to know t he victim as t i me pa ssed, and the v ict im vi sit ed him at J osli n’s aut omotiv e repai r shop. Based on th eir rela ti on sh ip, D ea n Jo slin d eve lop ed the op inio n th at th e vic tim was an a ggre ssive , violen t pers on. D anie l Ch arles Jos lin, ano therone of t he D efe nd an t’s adult sons, also developed a rel ationshi p with t he vict im. He, li ke-24-

Dean Josli n, t esti fi ed thatthe v ict im was, i n his op ini on, an aggres siv e, v iol ent person.

Da vid Ril ey t esti fi ed thathe was a neighbor of t he vi cti m when he li ved on Sam Til lery Road, pr iorto t he vi cti m’s mov e to t he Dante Road home. Ril ey stat ed that , based on his kn owledge and obs ervat ions, the v ict im had a reput ati on as a vi olent , aggr essiv e person. On cross- examinat ion, Ril ey test if ied thathe did no t know t he Defendantan d had not t ol d th e D efe nd an t ab ou t his kn ow l ed ge oft he ch ar ac t eroft he v i ct i m.

I n one of t he more bizar re devel opments duri ng thi s tr ial , t he Defendant present ed the t esti mony of RobertFerguson. Ferguson was marr ied t o the victim ’s sist er-i n-l aw and came to know t he vi cti m in ear ly 1993. The f oll owing coll oquy occur red dur ing t he direct ex aminati on of Fer guson. Q. Did you he ar w ha t oth er p eo ple said about Rodney Shepard? A. I heard ot her peopl e say he was a li tt le bi t ofa hothead when he was dri nking. Q. W ell -- okay. I -- I di dn’t-- I j ust - - you h ave heard other pe op l e t al k a bo uthi m? A. Yes, sir. Q. Sir, do you hav e an opini on as to t he charact er ofRodney Sh epa rd for bei ng an aggressive person or bei ng a peace fu l person? A. I f eel l ike he wasa peaceful person 99 percent ofthe t ime. Q. W as there times w hen he wa s an a ggres sive pers on, sir? A. W hen he was dri nking, yeah. Q. Do you have an opini on, si r, forRodney Shepard’ s reput ati on forbeing a p eaceful person or a vi olentperson? A. I’ve heard him ma ke th reats abo ut oth er pe ople and to my self, but I’ve neve r kno wn him to ac tually co m m it a violen t act. Q. Do you have an opini on as to his re puta tion for bein g viole nt, sir? A. I don ’t feel like h e wa s violen t. Q. You don ’t? A. No.-25-

Laterduri ng the di rectexaminat ion, Ferguson was as ked to des cri be an inc ident which o ccurre d at t he Shepard home. Fer guson wit nessed the vi cti m talki ng about the Def endant and maki ng a tel eph one call t o the Defendant. Defense counsel questioned Ferguson as fol lows: Q. Ok ay. W hat, ifanyt hing, happened wit h regar d to John Josli n? A. That was the f irst t ime I ev er hear d John Josl in’ s name, was when I was t here. Q. How did i t come up? A. Something was sai d concerni ng signsthathad been hung up. An d R od ne y wa s dr ink ing , an d th en he m ad e a ph on e ca ll. Q. W ou ld you, p lease, tel l t he members of the jury who i t was Rodney sai d he was cal li ng? A. John Josl in. Q. W hat did he s ay as he made that phone call i n your presence and in t he presence o f t he people you speci fi ed? A. He was cus sing abo ut Jo hn J oslin rip ping him off. Q. Did he saywhat he was goi ng to do t o John Josl in? A. He was screaming and holl eri ng about Joh n Josl in. Q. Did he saywhat he was goi ng to do t o John Josl in? A. I don’trecall any specifi cs. Q. Do you re call him sayi ng to John Josli n “I ’m going to ki ll you, you so nofab itch”? A. I don’tknow ifhe was act uall y ta lki ng to John Josli n orit was befor e he answered t he phone. Q. Do you re call him sayin g tha t? A. Yes. Defense counsel then conf ront ed Ferguson wi th a w ri tt en s tat ement he had signed short lybef ore te sti fyi ng. Fer guson admit ted t hat, in t he stat ement, he stat ed tha t he be lieve d th e vic tim to h ave be en a vio lent, aggre ssiv e person duri ng his l if eti me.

Alt hough itappears t hat Fer guson’s test imony attr ial differ ed s om ewhat fro m his wr itten st atement and t hus sur pris ed de fen se cou ns el to a ce rtain degree, the direct examinati on was rather ordi nary. Atthe concl usio n of direct examinat ion, how ever, an odd tu rn of ev ents occ urred. Defense counse l request ed a jury-outheari ng, ap pa ren tly to aler t the trial c ourt th at he des ired to-26-

ask Ferguson ab ou t his k no wle dg e a bo ut s pe cific vi olentacts c omm itted bythe victim againstthird pe rso ns . Du ring this heari ng, Fer guson asked t o address t he tri al court . Fer guson stat ed that , dur ing t he days bef or e he testi fied, defense counsel asked hi m to p lace matt er s in a differ ent l ightwhen he was tes ti fyi ng. Ferguson also state d that he was “a sked to add mo re to i t t han what the tru th is.”

At that poi nt, def ense counsel asked thatthe wi tness be removed from the court room so thattheycould d iscus s the matt er. Once Fergus on had left t he co urt r oo m, defense c ounsel i nfor med the tr ial courtthathe had tape- recor ded his convers ati ons with F ergu son . Defense counsel exp lain ed tha t he ha d o rigin ally spoken with F ergu son ma ny m onth s ea rlier an d lea rned that, a cco rding to defense cou ns el, Fe rgu so n h ad witn es se d vio len t ac ts o f the victim and was of the opini on thatthe victim wa s a v iole nt, a gg res sive pe rso n. S ub se qu en t to th eir ini ti al conv ersat ion, Ferguson pleaded gui lty to a bank robber y char ge and was incarcerat ed in afede ral pe niten tiary. He was trans porte d to Tennessee at t he beginni ng of t he Defendant ’s t ri al i n orderto t esti fy for t he defense.

Prior to Fer guson’s test imony, defense c ounsel lear ned thatan assi stant United Stat es att orney had arran ged a conversati on between hi mself, Ferguson and the assistantdistr ictattorn ey ge nera l pros ecu ting the De fend ant. Defense counsel began to suspect t hat, i n his words, som ethin g “wa s am iss.” A s a re sult, defense cou nse l dec ided to rec ord th e conver sati ons he had wi th Fer guson. From hi s co m m en ts, it a pp ea rs th at d efe ns e co un se l be lieve d th e ta pe s w ou ld dem ons trate thathe had not pressured Ferguson in anyway nor suggest ed that4 See Tenn. R. Cri m. P. 26.2. -27-

Fe rgus on e xag gera te his t esti mony. He then off ered t he wri tt en stat ement and the tape recordi ngs as Jencks m ate rial. 4

At thi s point , t he a ssist ant di str ictatt orney gen eral request ed thathe be permitted t o revi ew the ori ginal tape recordi ngs alone. Defense counse l st ated thathe would make a copyof t he tapes butdid notwan t to give the o rigina ls to the prosecut or. Itappears t hat def ense counse l had co nfer red wi th Fer guson on ly a ha lf hou r befo re he testified
. Defense counsel stat ed thathe had not had t i me to copy the tapes ye t. It i s unc lear wh ether the re were any pri or meeti ngs between de fen se cou ns el a nd Ferguson ( otherthan t heir ori ginal conversati on several months earl ier) and whet her t hese mee ti ngs were r ecorded. The tri al court order ed defense c ounsel t o all ow the prosecutor to r evi ew the or igi nal t apes alone. Defense counsel ref used. The t ri al court t hen found t hat def ense counsel had viola ted Ru le 2 6.2 of th e T en ne sse e R ule s of Cr im in al Pro cedure. Acc ordingly, the trial c ourt ordered Fe rgu so n’s testi mony str icken fro m the record.

The ass istan t distr ict att orney ge ne ral, how ever, r eq ue ste d th at F erg us on ’s test imonynot be stricke n, but rather that he be al lowed to test ifythat def ense counsel had pres sure d him . Th e trial co urt ag reed . As a resu lt, on cross examinat ion, Ferguson stat ed thatde fen se cou ns el h ad pro m ise d th at h e “w ou ld be very well taken care of and com pen sated ” if he testified favorab ly. More over, defense counsel promised thathe wo uld file a letter seek ing a do wnw ard dep arture in Fe rgus on’s ban k rob bery sen tenc e. Ferguson testi fied t hat defense counsel ask ed h im “[t]o ma ke s tatem ents stro ng er c on ce rnin g th e st ate m en ts I’d-28-

made to him in the past, go into further deta il , more aggr essiv e detai l. Making them mo re tha n wh at the y wa s.”

Faced with thattest imony on cross- examinat ion, defense c ounsel s ought to a sk Fer guson o n red irectaboutdet ail s ofthe wri tt en st atementand wh ethe r theywere true o r whe ther th ey w ere e xag gera ted. A copy ofFerguson’ s sign ed, wri tt en state m ent h ad b een prov ided to the prosecutor at t he conclusion ofdirect examinat ion pursuant to Tennesse e Rule ofCrimina l Proc edure 26. 2. The prosecut orobject ed “t o r eferences to anythi ng because of Mr. Moncier’s [defense co un se l] acti ons dur ing th e rec ess .” Th e pro sec utor a ppe ars to be re ferring to defense counsel ’s de cisi on no t t o all ow him to revi ew the or igi nal t apes alone
. The tr ial courtsustai ned numer ous object ions bythe prosecutor , curtai li ng any redirect examina tion con ce rnin g F erg us on ’s w ritten sta tem en t an d w he the r his directtest imony was exaggera ted. Defense counse l was able t o ask Ferguson , “when I hav e tal ked to y ou on each occasi on, and incl ud ing the l unch recess before this, did I tell you to tell the truth?” Fe rguso n resp ond ed affirm atively.
4. Exp ert Te stim ony R ega rding the D efen dan t’s M enta l State The Defe nda nt also pre sente d expe rt testim ony rega rding his m enta l state thr ough Dr. Er ic Engum, a c li nical psychol ogist . Dr. Engum examined the Defendanton three separat e occasi ons aft er t he shooti ng at t he requestof t he De fen da nt’s treating ps ychiatrist, Dr. Ca theri ne G yu ri k. The t ri al court al lowed Dr. Engum to test ify regarding t he Defendant ’s st atements t o him whic h for med the ba sis for h is concl usions about mental stat e. As a result , Dr. Engum relat ed substant ial lythe same hist ory between the Def endant and t he vi cti m as well as-29-

the events l eading up to the shooti ng as the Defendant testi fied t o on direct examinat ion.

Based on wh at the D efend ant told him and th e re sults o f psychol ogical test ing, Dr. Engum for med an opini on concerni ng the personality characteri stics ofthe Def endant on Febr uary 26, 1994. Dr. Engum test if ied t hat t he Defendant had pass ive-aggre ssive an d narc issistic pers ona lity feat ures tha t wer e pervas iv e, long- standi ng and e xisted throu gho ut his adu lt li fe. More spec ifically, Dr. Engum test if ied thatpassi ve-aggres sive in div idual s tend t o be wit hdrawn and do not confron t problem s directly. The y are not dominantor asserti ve, but rathertend to all ow otherpeople t o make major deci sions. They als o tend t o be somewhat ineffective in soc ial sit uati ons. Nar ciss ist ic i ndiv idual s are t he ty pe of p eo ple who “pul l t hemselves up by thei r own boot straps.”They are sel f-made and t end not to be parti cular lywell -educat ed.

Dr. En gu m tes tified furth er c on ce rnin g st res s an d its e ffec t up on pe op le in general as well as on the De fend ant. Dr. Engum expl ained t hat st ress provokes ce rtain autonomic nervous syst em responses such as i ncreased heartrat e and rapi d, sha llow re spira tion. Ind ividua ls un der s tress bec om e ac utely s ens itive to vi sual and au dito ry stim uli, but t heir cognit iv e processesare l imit ed so thatthey do not reason in a logi cal, straightforward f ashion . Dr. En gum con clud ed th at, accepti ng the Def endant’ s accountof t he histo ry be twe en him and the v ict im and the eve nts im m edia tely prio r to the sho oting , the D efen dan t was und er ac ute str ess at t he ti me of the s hooti ng.-30- Dr
. Engum found that, given t he Defendant’s personali ty charact erist ics and the hist ory between him and the victim (ag ain, as relate d by the Defe nda nt), t he Defen da ntbe ca me incr ea sin gly s en sitize d to the thre at p os ed by th e vic tim as ti me passed. Dr. Engu m concl uded thatthe Def endant had perceiv ed the acti ons of t he vi cti m immediatel y pri or t o the shoot ing t o be a thre at to his safety.

On c ros s-exami nati on, Dr. Engum again admitted t hat hi s concl usions were based sol elyon what t he Defendanthad rel ated t o him and his di scussi ons with the Def endant’ s treati ng psychi atr ist , Dr. Gyuri k. Dr. Engum did no t co ns ult any of t he wit nesses t o the shoot ing presented by the St ate dur ing thei r case- inchie f, nam ely Ju dy A llen, M iche lle Flatt, Ph illip Murp hy or Ga ry Ma sse ngill. In addit ion, the f oll owing col loquytook pl ace: Q. Are you aware and did y ou take i t i nto accoun t i n your assessment of Mr. Jos lin’s percep tion of stress a nd fea r that Mr. Joslin ran into t he back of Mr. Shepard’s t ruck? A. I am awa re tha t he b um ped into it -- yes , sir. I am a ware that he bumped int o itwhen Mr. Shepard stopped. Q. Ok ay. W ho to ld you that? A. I believe Mr. Jos li n did, and I clearly rem em ber tha t when Mr. Moncier[ defe nse counsel] and I t alked in January, that t hat was a pointthatcame up. Q. So, Mr. Jos li n tol d you t hat he bumped i nto the back of Mr. Shepard’s truck? A. To t he be stofmyr ec ol l ec t i on , I be l i ev e t ha t t he r e w as so me contact between the two vehicles. On redi rectexaminat ion, however, Dr. Engum revi ewed the not es he had tak en as he int ervi ewed the Def endant and s tat ed thatther e was no i ndicat ion in t hose notes thatthe Def endant had bumped t he vi cti m’s tr uck. Dr . Engum test if ied that, on ref lect ion, he recei ved i nfor mation aboutthe bump from a meet ing wit h defense cou nse l after his intervie ws w ith the D efen dan t. Dr. Engum also rei ter ated tha t pa ssiv e-a gg res sive ind ividu als such as th e D efen dan t tend not to-31-

address issue s directl y butrat her wai t and h ope that the issu es will resolve themselves.

5. Te sti mony Offered t o Rebut t he Stat e’s Proof The De fend ant a lso p rese nte d the test imony ofJohn Hyde t o att ack the cred ibilityof t he test imony ofthe S tate’s w itnes ses to the shoot ing. Hyde tes ti fi ed that he is a t raffi c engineer , acci dent r econstr ucti onistand vi sual percepti on (si gh t dist ance) expert . Hyde ex amined the Def endant’ s van and t he vi cti m’s tr uck and conclude d thatther e had been no cont act between the veh icles . Hy de ba se d h is conclus ion on the l ack of s crat ches or marki ngs consi stentwit h contactbetween the ve hi cl es. He test if ied f urt her t hat an i ndiv idual stopped at t he int ersect ion of Call ahan Road and Central Avenue Pike would no t hav e been able t o see the fro nt of t he Defendant ’s v an or t he rearof t he vi cti m’s tr uck as sum ing th at the vehi cles were in the a ppro xima te po sitio n th at h ad be en tes tified to e arlie r in the Sta te’s cas e-in -ch ief. H yde ’s tes tim on y ap pa ren tly ref ers t o the posi ti ons ofJudy Allen , Mich elle F latt and Ph illip Murp hy an d the ir lines o f sight.

On cross- examinat ion, Hyde admitt ed thathe wa s an exp ert w itne ss p aid by the def ense and had notbeen at the sce ne d uring the s hoo ting. He test if ied thathe had not talke d wit h the S tate ’s w itne sse s to aid him in fo rm ing his opinions. He also admitted t hat he had not examined t he vi cti m’s tr uck “up c lose” but ratherfrom a sli ght di stance.-32- C. St ate’ s Rebutt al Pr oof

In rebuttal , t he Sta te present ed the t esti mony of Don Prov onsha. Provo n sha test if ied t hat he was an agent wi th t he Federal Bureau of Inves ti gati on. Provonsha stat ed thatdefense wi tne ss R obe rt Ferguson has a poorreputa tion for truth and veracity. On cro ss-examinati on, Provonsha ad mitt ed thatan assistantUnited States attorney hol ds so me sent encing c onsiderati on power over

a federal pr isoner

such as RobertFerguson.

Steve W orle y, an em plo yee of the Powell Telephone Exchange, also test if ied forthe St ate i n rebuttal . Worley st ated t hat the t elephone company had the tech nica l ability to tr ace cal ls t hroughoutKnoxvi ll e and the surrounding areas as of Novem ber 10, 1992. Worley t esti fi ed thathe had found no record of com plain ts from the De fen da nt a bo ut h ara ssin g te lep ho ne calls , nor had he fou nd any requ ests from the D efen dan t to tr ace cal ls. On cross- examinat ion, W orl ey a dmi tt ed thatthe area in whi ch the t elephone c ompany could “tra p” cal ls was smaller than t he “t race” area. W orl ey st ated t hat dur ing the relev ant t ime peri od, the company coul d not“t rap” c all s coming in f rom outside a local ized area such as from Kn oxv ille to P ow ell.
D. JuryVerdict

On May 18, 1994 , the Def endant was indi cted on one count offi rstdegree mu rder. At t ri al, he pleaded notguil ty a nd assert ed self -def ense and defense of a third p erso n. At th e co nclu sion of the proo f, the trial court charged t he jury on fi rst -degree mu rder, second degree murderand vol untary manslaught er. Aft er5 Tenn . R. Crim. P. 29(a). -33-

consider ing all o f t he evi dence, t he jury fo und the Def endant gui lty ofsecond deg ree m urder.

II . SUFFI CIE NCY OF THE EVI DENCE

In the f irst i ssue, t he Defendantchall enges the suff ici ency of t he convi cti ng evidence in thre e wa ys. Firs t, he argues thatthe ev idence was legal lyinsuffi cient to surv iv e his Rul e 29 motion forjudgment of acquittal 5 wit h respectto f i rstdegree murder. Second, he argues thatthe ev idence i s lega ll y insu fficient to supp ort his second-degree murder conv ict ion. Third, in t he event the evi dence is not s ufficien t to supp ort his s econd-degr ee murder conv ict ion, he argues t hat the evidence is also insu fficient to sup port a vol untary manslaught er conv ict ion. Acc ordingly, the Defenda nt cont ends thathis c onvi cti on must be rev ersed and the charges agains t hi m dismissed.

W hen an accused chal lenges t he suff ici ency ofthe convi cti ng evi dence, the standard is whet her, aft errevi ewing t he evi dence in the light m os t favo rab le to the pro se cu tion , an y ratio na l t rier of factcould h ave f ound the ess enti al elem ents ofthe cr ime beyond a rea son able dou bt. Ja cks on v. Vir gin ia , 4 43 U. S. 307, 319 (1 979). Questi ons concern ing t he credi bil ity ofthe wi tnesses, the weightand val ue to be gi ven t he evi dence, as well as all fact ual i ssues rai sed by the evi dence, are resol ved by t he tr ierof f act, not this co urt. State v. Pappas , 754 S.W .2d 620, 623 ( Tenn. Cri m. App. 1987) . Nor may t his co urtrewei gh o r reev alua te the e viden ce. State v. Cabbage , 571 S .W .2d 83 2, 835 (Ten n. 197 8).-34- A jury verd ict app rove d by th e trial jud ge a ccre dits th e Stat e’s wi tnesses and reso lves a ll conflicts in favo r of the State
. State v. Grace , 493 S. W .2d 474, 476 (Te nn. 1973). On app eal, the State is entitled to the stron ges t legitim ate vi ew oft he ev i de nc e a nd al l i nf er en ce s t he r ef r om. Cabbage , 571 S. W .2d at 835. Because a verdictofguil t r emoves the presumption o f i nnocence and r eplaces it with a p res um ptio n o f gu ilt, the acc us ed ha s th e b urd en in th is cou rt o f il lust rat ing why t he evi dence isinsuffi cientto supportthe v erdi ct retur ned by t he tri erof f act. Sta te v. T ug gle , 639 S.W .2d 9 13, 9 14 (T enn . 198 2); Grace , 493 S.W .2d at476.

The Defendantfirst contend s that the e vidence was ins ufficient to survive his Rule 29 motion for j udgment ofacquitt al wit h respect to t he indict ed offense of f irst- degree murder . Rul e 29 of t he Tennessee Rules ofCrim inal Proc edu re provi des, i n pert inentpart , t hat t he tr ial court“on moti on ofa de fend ant o r of its own motion s hall orderthe en tryof j udgment of ac quittal of one or more off enses charged in t he indi ctment or inf ormati on aft er t he evi dence on ei ther sid e is closed ifthe evi denc e is i nsuff ici ent t o sustai n a convi cti on of suc h off ense or offen ses .” Tenn. R. Cr im. P. 29(a ). The standard by whi ch tr ial court s deter mine and app ellate c ourts revi ew a motion for judgment of

acquittal is es senti all y th e sa me standa rd app lied whe n dete rmining the sufficienc y of the evide nce a fter a convi cti on. See Cabbage , 571 S.W .2d a t 836 ; State v. Thompson , 549 S. W .2d 943, 946 (Te nn. 1 977 ); State v. Anderson , 88 0 S
. W.2d 72 0, 72 6 ( Ten n. Cr i m. App. 1994) . Atthe t ime the moti on is made, the t ri al court must f avorthe S tate with the stro ng es t leg itim ate view of th e e vide nc e, in clu din g a ll rea so na ble inferences, and dis card anycou nterv ailing e viden ce. Thompson , 549 S. W .2d at 946 (c iti ng Jon es v. S tate , 533 S .W .2d 32 6, 329 (Ten n. Crim . App. 1 975 ));-35-

Anderson , 880 S.W.2d at 72 6. On appeal, the St ate i s again enti tl ed to t he strongest l egit imate v iew ofthe ev idence and any re asonable i nfer ences which
m ight b e dra wn from it. Cabbage , 571 S.W .2d a t 836 ; Thompson , 549 S. W .2d at 94 6; Anderson , 880 S. W .2d at726.

In the cas e sub judice , the re cord reve als tha t at the close of th e S tate ’s cas e-in-c hief, the Def endant moved f or j udgment of ac quittal on the ch arge of fi rst -degr ee murderas w ell as the oth er o ffen se s ra ise d b y the pro of, n am ely second-degree m urd er a nd volu nta ry m an sla ug hte r. T he trial c ourtde nied t he De fen da nt’s motion. The Defendant renewed his mot ion f or j udgment of ac quittal at t he clos e of al l proof, and the t ri al court agai n denied t he motion.

The prin cip al fo cu s of the De fen da nt’s arg um en t is on the Stat e’s burden to ne ga te th e D efe nd an t’s self - de f en se an d d ef en se ofa t hi r d p erso n c l ai ms beyond a reasonabl e doubt, as isrequi red underTennessee Cod e Annotat ed secti on 39-11- 201(a)( 3). The Defendantadm its thathe shot t he vi cti m and even thathe int ended to sh oo t the victim . He m ain tain s, h ow eve r, tha t he did so in self- defense and defense o f his wife , an d th at th e S tate faile d to ne ga te h is defense beyond a r easonable doubt. The Defendantargues t hat t he submissi on ofa fi rst -degree murder char ge to t he jury prej udiced hi m by increasing th e likeliho od o f a se con d-de gree mu rder con viction a s a “m iddle grou nd.”

In consi deri ng thi s iss ue, affor ding t he Stat e the strongest l egit imate v iew ofth e evid en ce an d th e in fere nc es the refro m as w ell as acc red iting the Sta te’s witnesses, we can only con clude th at there w as su fficient evidence to have s urvi ved the D efen dan t’s m otion for jud gm ent o f acq uittal with resp ect to first--36-

degree mu rd er . Th e S tate ’s pr oo f reve ale d th at th e D efe nd an t erra tica lly swit ched lanes a nd disregarded a stop s ign to pursu e the victim ’s truck. Ga ry Ma sse ng ill test if ied t hat the Def endant’ s van t hen bumped the v ict im’s t ruck f rom behind. The victi m exit ed his t ruck and approached the Def endant ’s van, ap pa ren tly in a m ann er su gge sting that h e wa s up set. As the St ate poi nted out at tri al, however, an indiv idual who had justbeen involv ed in acar acci dent might very well be expect ed to be s omewhat ups et. As the v ict im approached the v an, wit nesses for the State test if ied t hat t hey saw t he Defendantpointa pist ol out of his window and f ir e at t he vi cti m. Two witn esses st ated t ha t t he De fendant leaned bo dily out ofhis wi ndow and fi red a shotat t he vi cti m as he lay o n the g rou nd. Aft er t he shooti ng, t he Defendantdrove away from the scene and proceeded to his nea rby home. Once home, he plac ed the gu n in an ea ve o f his ca rpor t, although he normallykept the gun i nside his home. The State also present ed test imony t hat t he Defend ant, af terlear ning t hat t he harassment he had been recei vi ng from the vi cti m consti tut ed only a misdemeanor, s tat ed that he w ould “take care of it” him self.

The Defendant made his firstmotion for j udgment of ac quittal at the cl ose ofthe S tate’s c ase -in-ch ief. At tha t poin t, the D efen dan t’s theo ries o f selfdefense and defense of anot her were, as we mightexpect , somewhatnebulous because they had not been ful ly devel oped. The State’s p roo f alo ne , fully accredi ted, sugge sts t hat th e D efen dan t reac ted w ith frustra tion a nd a nge r to harassmentby the victim a nd his p ercep tion that the h ara ssment wo uld notbe resol ved or punished adequately t hrough normal channels. As a res ult, the Defendantpursued t he vi cti m on t he day ofthe shoot ing and c reat ed an opp ortun ityfor a c onfro ntatio n be twee n him self a nd t he vi cti m. At t hat-37-

c onfr ontat ion, the D efend ant sho t and killed the victim. W e believe thatther e was suf ficie nt e vide nc e d eve lop ed du ring the Sta te’s case -in-chief for a rat ional jurorto have found t he elements of f irst- degree murder, incl uding premeditat ion and deli berat ion, in spi te ofthe Def endant’ s int imati on of s elf -def ense and defense of a t hird person t heori es. Accordingl y, t he tr ial courtdid noterr i n de nyin g th e D efe nd an t’s m otio n fo r jud gm en t of a cq uitta l.

The Defendantrenewed hi s motion forjudgment of acquittal at t he close ofal l proo f
. Byt ha t t i me , t he Defend ant had pr esent ed wi tnes ses i n hi s own be ha lfto dev elop fully h is the orie s of self- de fen se an d d efe ns e o f an oth er. H is prooffocused on the rel ationsh ip b etwe en himsel f and t he vi cti m and on the victim ’s manner of approaching hi s van atthe sce ne ofthe shoot ing. As he devel oped histhe ori es wi th h is own witness es, how ever, the pro se cu tor w as ab le to ass ail the c redib ility of the the ories throu gh c ross -exa m inati on . The crossexaminat ion questioned the vol ume of harassing telephone call s a nd vul gar s igns as we ll as w heth er the De fend ant’s reac tion w as o ne o f ang er or o ne o f fear. It also questi oned the De fen da nt’s character izat ions ofthe ear lyrel ati onship asone ofm ag na nim ou s ge ne ros ity on his p art. In sho rt, the pro se cu tor’s cr ossex ami na tio n of th e D efe nd an t’s w itne sse s w as qu ite th oro ug h a nd vigo rou sly cha lleng ed th e cre dibility of the De fend ant’s proo f.

Affording the St ate t he strongest l egit imate v iewof t he evi dence and ta king into accountthe challeng e to the D efend ant’s cred ibility, we co nclude that there was suff ici ent ev idence s upport ing a f irst- degree murdercharge t o surv iv e the De fen da nt’s rene w ed m otion for jud gm ent o f acq uittal at th e clo se o f all proo f. Alt hough the Def endant had presented hi s fully- dev elop ed th eorie s of se lf--38-

defense and defense of anot her by the t ime of t he clos e of al l proof , the S tate had eff ecti vel y quest ioned t he credi bil ity ofthe theori es as theyhad been present ed. W e beli eve t hat ther e remained suffi cientevi dence for a rat ional juror to hav e found t he elements offi rst -degree murder, incl uding premeditat ion and deli berat ion, in spi te ofthe Def endant’ s proofin supp ortof hi s self -def ense and d efense of a t hird pe rso n th eo ries . Ac co rdin gly, th e tria l cou rt did no t err in de nyin g th e D efe nd an t’s re ne we d m otio n fo r jud gm en t of a cq uitta l.

The Defen dan t also con tend s tha t the e viden ce is le gally ins ufficien t to supp ort either

his convi ction f or second-degree murder or a convict ion for voluntary manslaught er. For t he reasons ou tl ined i n our di scussi on of t he De fen da nt’s chall enge to t he denial ofhis R ule 29 moti on for judgment of ac qu ittal, we beli eve t hat t he evidence wa s als o le ga lly su fficie nt to sup po rt his convi cti on forsecond-degree murder. Having resol ved t hat ther e was suff ici ent evidence to su ppo rt his co nviction , we n eed not a ddre ss th e D efe ndant ’s addit ional argument that t here was insuff ici ent evidence to support a conv ict ion forvol unta ry m ans laug hter in the e ven t that the re wa s insu fficient e viden ce to supp ort his s ec on d-d eg ree m urd er c on victio n. W e co nc lud e th at a ll thr ee ofthe De fend ant’s con tentio ns in the first iss ue o n ap pea l lack m erit.6W hether int enti onall y or

not, the t ri al court di d incor porat e some of the Defendant ’s proposed changes. These changes were di scussed duri ng argument and wer e not obj ected t o by t he Sta te. T he inc or po ra ted ch an ge s a re m ino r an d a re no t pe rtin en t to th e e rro r alle ge d o n a pp ea l. -39- I I I . SEL F- DEFE NSE J URY I NSTR UCTI ON

In the seco nd issu e, the D efend ant con tends that the trial court’s jury inst ruct ion on self -def ense was err oneous and t hat t he prosecut or’ s clos ing argument com pou nde d tha t error. T he Defendantargues t hat t he err oneous inst ruct ion misled the jury i nto bel iev ing tha t a u se of p hys ica l forc e b y the victim was requi red t o supporta clai m of self -def ense.

The pro of a dd uc ed at tria l ob viou sly raise d an issue of se lf-defe nse . The Defendantsubmitt ed a speci al j ury i nstr ucti on requeston thatissue . The De fen da nt’s speci al requestdiffer ed sli ghtl y from the patt ern j ury i nstr ucti on on self-d efe nse. Afte r he arin g a rgu m en t, the trial c ou rt de nie d th e D efe nd an t’s special reque st on se lf-defense , choos ing instea d to give the pattern jury inst ruct ion. 6

The port ion ofthe i nstr ucti on which t he Defendantchall enges occur red at the very b egin ning of the entire instru ction . Th e trial co urt’s ins tructio n on selfdefense began as follows:

Incl uded in the d efen dan t’s plea of no t guilty is his plea of se lfdefense. W hen a person i s assaul ted by t he use of for ce in suc h a way as to cr ea te in his m ind a re as on ab le b eli ef tha t h e is i n imminent and act ua l da ng er o f de ath or s erio us bodil y i njury, h e wil l be just if ied in usi ng force to def end himsel f ev en to t he ext ent ofkil li ng another human being. (em ph as is ad de d). T he self- de fen se jury in stru ctio n is quit e long and conti nues fortwo more pages i n the record. The instruction give n by the trial court mirrors7 Tenn. R. Cri m. P. 30. 8 The provi sions go verni ng self -defense are setfort h at Tennessee Code Annot ated sect ion 39-11-611 . As the statute ma kes c lear, a physical attack by the victi m is not a requireme nt to support a s elf -d ef en se cla im
. -40- the pa ttern jury in stru ctio n in all ways exc ept f or t he emphasized phras e abo ve and min or ch ang es s ugg este d by th e D efen dan t.

The De fendantcontends thatthe emphasi zed langua ge is er roneous i n thatitomits a rel evant phrase s ugg ested by the op tions un der the pattern jury instr uction i tself . The opening sentence of the pattern j ury i nstructi on reads:

W hen a person i s assaul ted, by t he [use offor ce] [attempted use of f orce] , i n suc h a wa y as to cr ea te in his m ind a re as on ab le beli efthathe i s in imminent and actual danger of[deat h] [ seri ous bo dily inj ury ], he wi ll be justified in [threa tenin g] [us ing] for ce to defend hi mself ev en to t he ext ent ofkil li ng another human being. T.P .I. -- Crim. 40. 06 (3d ed. ) (emphasi s added). The Defendant argues thatthe evidence present ed at t ri al was s uch thatboth “use of force” and “att empted use of f orce” were re quir ed.

The tr ial court ’s omis sion of “at tempt ed use of for ce” f rom the openi ng sentence of t he inst ruct ion is s omewhat curi ous. Dur ing a Rul e 30 heari ng 7 pri or to instructing the jury, the trial c ourt, the prosecutor and the Def endant al l agreed thatthe proof pr esented attr ial support ed the i nclusi on ofboth t he “use offor ce” and the “ att empted use offor ce” l anguage. I n consi deri ng the cont enti on, t he Defendantsuggested thatthe t ri al court al so defi ne “assaul t” forthe j ury i n order to clarify furth er th at p hys ica l forc e o r co nta ct b y the victim is not a prere quis ite t o a v al i d s el f - de f en se cl ai m. 8 The tri al court de clined to d efine “ass ault.” Afte r the tr ial courthad read the c harg e to the j ury, the Def endant renewed his s pecial re que sts and indica ted to the trial c ourt th at the self-d efen se in struc ti on wa s-41-

misleadi ng wit h regar d to phy sical for ce, parti cular lyin l ightof t he contentof t he pro se cu tor’s clos ing arg ument. The Defendantagain requested t hat t he tr ial court defi ne “assaul t” to ensure thatthe j ury understood t hat phy sical for ce or contactby t he vi cti m was not req uire d. T he trial c ou rt ag ain decli ned, st ati ng that “ass ault” is a term whic h “ne eds no fu rther d esc ription .”

The ini tial omission of “attempted use of force” is eve n m ore curi ous giv en thatboth p hrase s are used toget her l aterin t he inst ruct ion. As we stat ed above, the self- de fen se instr uc tio n is ratherlengt hy. The “att empted use offor ce” language is omitted from the ini ti al sent ence of t he inst ruct ion. Later in t he o peni ng paragr aph, howev er, the t ri al court used bot h opti ons as f oll ows: “ The
u se of f orce can onl y be t o the degree reasonabl y bel iev ed to be immediatel y nece ssary to prot ect againstthe oth er’s use or attempted use of unl awful f orce .” (Em ph as is added). In addi ti on, sev eral paragr aphs lat er i n the i nstr ucti on, t he tri al court used t he fol lowi ng language:

The threat or use of f orce againstanother is notjust if ied i f t he defendantprovok ed the deceased’s use or attempted use o f unlawf ul force , unl ess the defendantabando ned t he encounter or clear lycommunicated t o the deceas ed the int ent t o do so, a nd the dece ased neverthel ess conti nued or attempted t o use unlawf ul forc e aga inst the defe nda nt. (Em ph as is add ed). Thus, i t appears thatthe onl y si gnif icantdiffer ence between the patt ern i nstr ucti on and the inst ruct ion act uall y gi ven t o the j ury i s the omi ssion ofthe “ att empted use offor ce” l anguage from the openin g senten ce of t he inst ruct ion.

It is well-establishe d in Te nne ssee that the trial court has the dutyof gi vi ng a cor rec t an d co m ple te c ha rge of th e la w a pp licab le to t he fact s ofthe cas e and-42-

the defendanthas the r ightto hav e everyissue offactrai sed by t he evi dence and materi al to t he defense s ubmitt ed to the j ury upon proper inst ruct ions bythe t ri al cou rt. State v. Teel , 793 S. W .2d 236, 249 (Tenn. 199 0), cert. denied , 4 98 U. S. 1007, 111 S.Ct. 571, 112 L. Ed.2d 577 (1 990 ); State v. Bryant , 654 S. W .2d 389, 390 (Tenn. 198 3); State v. Thompson , 519 S.W .2d 789, 792 (Tenn. 1975) ( cit ing Poe v. State , 212 Te nn. 4 13, 3 70 S .W
. 2 d 488 (1963 )). In evaluating a jury charge, particular instruc tions m ust not b e con sidered in isolation, but rathe r i n the context ofthe o vera ll charg e. Sta te v. Bo lin , 678 S. W .2d 40, 43 (Tenn. 1 984) (ci ti ng Cupp v. Naught en , 414 U.S. 141, 146-47, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400, 38 L.Ed. 2d 368 (1973)). Thus, the charge must be vi ewed in i ts enti rety or considered as a whole. Otis v . Cambridge Mutual Fire Insurance Co. , 850 S. W .2d 439, 446 (Ten n. 199 2).

Citi ng these pr inci ples, the St ate ar gues thatthe omitted l anguage in t he presentcas e w as sligh t an d, c on sid ere d w ithin the cont ext ofthe ent ir e charge, d id no t r ender t he charge er roneous. The State po int s out t hat subseq uent language in t he ins tructi on incl uded both t he “use offor ce” phrase and the “at tempted use of force” phrase. The Stat e contends thatthe remainder ofthe self- defense jury i nstr ucti on adequatel y convey ed the essenti al conc epts ofthe defense.

We recognize thatsubsequent language in the t rial court’ s ins tru cti on includ ed b oth re levan t phra ses and corre ctly con veye d co nce pts governi ng the issue of se lf-de fen se . Ye t we can no t es ca pe the con clu sio n th at th e tria l cou rt’s inst ruct ion on self -def ense was erroneous. I t i s clea r t hat “ incons ist ent or contrad ictory instructions ‘do not ne utralize or validate each other, but are vitally-43-

erroneou s . . . . The parties are enti tl ed to a cl ear and con siste nt c ha rge , as we ll as a co rr ect one , that justice m ay be re ache d.’” State v. St ephenson , 878 S.W .2d 530, 555 (Tenn. 1994) (quot ing Citizens Street R ailroad C o. v. She phe rd , 107 Tenn. 444, 64 S.W. 710, 711 (1 901)). In Stephenson , ou r su prem e cou rt furt her explai ned the princi ple as fol lows: Inst ruct ions as a who l e must be consi stentand harmonious , not confl ict ing and cont radi ctory . . . . Where inst ruct ions gi ven t o the jury forthei r gui dance presentcont radi ctory and conf li cti ng rul es which are unex plai ned, and where f oll owing one woul d or mightlead to a differe nt r es ultthan woul d obtai n by f oll owing t he other , t he inst ruct ions are inh ere ntly d efe ctive . Th is is t rue al though one of t he in str ucti ons corre ctly state s the law a pplica ble to the fa cts o f th e c as e, since the cor rectinst ruct ion cannotcure t he err or i n the con tradic tory err one ous instru ction
. . . . Id. (quot ing A bbott v. American Honda Motor Co. Inc. , 682 S. W .2d 206, 209 (Ten n. App . 1984 )).
Applyi ng tho se pre ce pts to th e ch arg e in the case sub judice , i t i s clea r t hat the tr ial court ’s sel f-d efense i nstr ucti on was inc onsist ent i n part s and ther eby po ten tially mis lead ing. W e beli eve, ther efor e, t hat t he tr ial court ’s i nit ial omissi on ofthe “ att empted use offor ce” l anguage, an opti on suggest ed bythe pa ttern jury inst ruct ion it self , was erron eou s. The omitt ed language was rel evant and rai sed by the p roof a t trial. Accordi ngl y, we c onc lude that th e trial co urt’s failu re to incl ude the “attempted use o f f orce” language at the begi nning ofthe i nstr ucti on on se lf-defense was e rror.

The St at e a r gu es t ha t , ev en i f t he omi ss i on wa s e r r or , i t wa s a t mo s t harmless error. See Te nn. R . App . P. 36 (b); T enn . R. C rim. P . 5 2( a)
. Th e De fend ant, on the ot her hand, argues t hat t he err oneo us ins tru cti on was not harmless, pa rticu larly in l ightof t he prosecut or’ s clos ing argument regar ding t he-44-

issue cover ed by t he inst ruct ion. The Defendant c ontends t hat the pro se cu tor’s ar gument con cern ing s elf-de fens e an d the “use of forc e” co m pou nde d th e erroneou s instruction an d m isled the jury into be lieving th at a physi cal attack by t he v i ct i m wa s n ec es sa r y t o s us t ai n a se l f - de f en se cl ai m.

To support his argument, the Def endant quot ed ext ensiv elyfrom the pro se cu tor’s closi ng argument i n his br ief . The rel evant port ions ofthatargument are as fol lows: MR. JO LLE Y: And listen to wha t the jud ge’s instru ction on s elfdefense say s. It do es n’t st art w ith re as on ab le b elie fs
. Th e first words of t hat charge to y ou aft er i ncluded
. . . in th e d efe nd an t’s plea of no t guilty is his plea of se lf-defe nse , when a pe rs on is assault ed. Is i t walki ng back, wh eth er n orm ally o r bris kly wit h your hands, is thatan ass au lt? D id R od ne y Sh ep ard ass au lt an ybo dy in thatvehi cle bygoing bac k toward thatvehi cle? Only- - onl y, l adies and gentl eman, ifyou beli eve t he test imony ofJohn Joslin or S and ra Josli n, because nobody else hashim cl oser t han the f rontbumper ofthatcar- - t ruck- - van u nti l he i s ly ing t here on t he pav em ent. No bod y. The only people who do are John Jo slin and S and ra Josli n. And you re mem ber, we tal ked about t hat in openi ng, about the l eft ha nd t hrou gh t he wi nd owor t he r i gh t ar m g rabbi ng. W e talke d ab out th at. And why isthatnecessary ? Wh y does Sandra Josl in t ell us forthe f irst tim e ab out th e gra bbin g? B eca use you h ave to cre ate the defense. You have to ge t it within the term s of se lf-defe nse . . .

. You h ave to h ave . . . an ass au lt , and there i s none in thi s ca se . Th ere is none , becaus e the testim ony of Jo hn Jo slin and S and ra Jo slin as to thatpointis t otal lyincredibl e. I t i s unbeli evabl e. I t i s not support ed by anyt hing el se in t he record. Now, you go on, and t h e ins tructio n . . . then says . . . assaulted by t he use of force-- by t he use of force
. W ha t forc e d id Rodney Shepard use? He shuthis c ar door . He wal ked. Buthe did n’t use any f orce aga ins t anyb ody in that va n. H e did n’t do it. Absolut elynone. Assault ed by t he use offo rce . Aga in, un less you b elieve
. . . Joh n Jo slin an d S and ra Jo slin. . . . By the use of f orce in such a way as to cre ate in hi s mind a reasonabl e beli ef t hat he i s in i mm inentand actual -- i mm inentand actu al da nge r of de ath o r serio us b odily inju ry. ... And the Co urt w ill tell yo u w ha t im m inentmeans. Imminent means near at ha nd, on th e po int of ha ppe ning
. Th e C ou rt will te ll you wha t force me ans . Compulsion bythe use o f physi cal power or viol ence . I t doesn’ t ex istin t his ca se.-45- You kno w, wh ateve r you wan t to say abo ut the testi mony of Mic he lle Flattand Ju dy All en and Phil Murphy aboutwe thought there was goin g to b e a figh t, it does n’t exist. (em ph as is ad de d). T he De fen da nt o bje cte d se vera l tim es to th e p ros ec uto r’s argu m ent. All of t hese objecti ons were overrul ed by the tr ial court. In response to on e o f the De fen da nt’s objection s, the trial court stat ed, “ W ell , I ’l l i nstr uct t he jury as t o t he law. Overru led. ” I n addit ion, the Def endant not es thatat t he conclus ion of the self-de fense jury i nstr ucti on , t he tr ial courtdefi ned “f orce” as me aning “com puls ion b y the u se o f physical power or vi olence
. ” ( emp hasi s add ed).

The Defendantcert ainl y pres ents a c ompelli ng argument. As we point ed out above , howe ver, the self-de fense jury instruction is qu ite lengthy. Aside f rom the omission of t he “attempted use of f orce” language f rom the i nit ial sentence, the remainder

of the instruc tion was com plete an d corre ct. More speci fi call y, t he self- defense instru ction corre ctly focu sed the jur y’s inqu iry on th e D efe nda nt’ s state of mind an d the reasonabl eness ofhis bel ief s. The i nstr ucti on also all owed the jury to consi der t he hist ory between the Def endant and the v ict im. Fi nall y, t he “use of f orce” language was accom panied bythe “ att empted use offor ce” language i n subsequentphrases of the sel f-d efense i nstr ucti on.

After consi deri ng the ent ir e inst ruct ion and t he proo f i ntroduced at t ri al, we are con fide nt th at th e tria l co urt’s erron eous jury i nstr ucti on did notaff ect t he res ult of the trial. See Ten n. R. C rim. P. 52 (a). The trial court’s err or wa s harmless beyond a rea son able dou bt. See Ch ap m an v. C alifo rnia , 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed .2d 7 05 (1 967 ); State v. Bi gbee , 885 S.W.2d 797, 809 (Te nn. 1 994 ). Acc ordin gly, this iss ue is witho ut m erit.-46-

IV. CR OS S-E XAM INATIO N O F TH E D EF EN DAN T R EG ARD ING PR ET RIAL

PREPARATION WI TH HIS ATTORNEY
In the t hird issu e, t he Defendantchall en ges th e acti ons of bot h the t ri al court and the prosecutor regar ding cross-ex aminati on of the Defend ant con cern ing his p retria l pre pa ratio n w ith d efe ns e co un se l. Th es e q ue stio ns , in tur n, led to a dd ition al cr os s-e xam ina tion ge ne rally c on ce rnin g th e D efe nd an t’s prio r crim ina l rec ord . He cha llen ge s th is line of q ue stio nin g a s w ell.
During cross- examinat ion, the prosecutor asked t he Defendanthow many ti mes he had “satin a wi tness s tand and rehearsed” his testi mony with defense co un se l. The Def endan t se em ed un su re a s to the po int o f the pro se cu tor’s questi on. As a res ult, the p rose cuto r wen t on to rec ite d eta ils of th e D efe nd an t’s pret ri al prepar ati on, such as ot her attor neys pl ayi ng the roles ofjudge and distr ict attorney, apparent lyin an effort t o ref res h the Def endant’s memory. Defense counsel object ed to t his l ine ofquesti oning. The tri al court ov errul ed the o b ject ion. As partof hi s answer t o the prosecutor ’s ques ti ons, t he Defendant testi fied as f ollows: Q. Mr. Josli n, when y ou pract iced y our t esti mony, you s at i n a witne ss s tand like you ’re sitting in toda y or sim ilar, did yo u no t? A. Yes, sir. Q. And you h ad a judg e wh o wa s sitting next to you . D o you know now that his na me is Jona than C oop er? A. I did n’t kn ow his nam e. An d be fore, w hen you a ske d m e if I had sat i n a court room, I -- I di dn’tknow whatyou m ean t. I had not sat in a co urtroom . I went up -- I did g o to a little room with just -- Q. A wit ness st and? A. -- a sm all -- Q. Sm all courtroom -- A. -- ti ny l ittl e place, and I was si tt ing ata wit ness st and, and someone was supposed to hav e been representi ng a judge, and someone was supposed to hav e been representi ng somebody els e, and I was t o get f amili arwith wh at typ e o f pro ce du res I’d been going thr ough. I ’v e never been through nothi ng li ke that , an d I g ue ss it-47- was to keep me f rom being so nerv ous or somethi ng. I don’tknow why. (em pha sis add ed).

At thi s point , t he prosecut or req uested a ben ch confer en ce . Du ring this conference, the prosecutor alerted t he tr ial courtto hi s int enti on to askthe Defendantabou t misde meanor convi cti ons from 1973. Defense c ounsel object ed, assert ing t hat t he convi cti ons were t oo remote t o be admissi ble and that the St at e had not c omplied wi th t he provi sions of Rul es 608 or 609 of t he Te nn essee Rules ofEvidenc e. I n response, the prosecutor argued t hat t he Defendanthad made a sweeping clai m of good conduct , t hereby op ening t he doorto im pea chm ent w ithou t rega rd to s trict com plian ce w ith Rule 608. The tr ial courtevent uall y al lowed l imit ed questi oning ofthe D efend ant. Th e pros ecuto r, with the t ri al court’ s agreement, asked t he Defendantifhe had been t hroug h a bench tr ial in KnoxCounty General Sessions Court bef ore Judge Jewel l Watson on April 6, 197 3. Th e De fenda nt respo nde d affirma tively. Th e p ros ec uto r did not introduce copies of the Defendant’ s convict ions.

Faced with th is cros s-exa m inati on, defense c ounsel t ook two courses of acti on. Once the tr ial courthad deci ded to al lowthe quest ions regardi ng pret ri al preparat ion, defense c ounsel requested t hat t he tr ial courtgi v e a li miti ng inst ruct ion to the j ury. The request ed li miti ng instru ction read s in pe rtinen t part: It is qui te nat ural and p ropertha t a d efe nd an t will p rep are his test imonywith his atto rne y prio r to th e tria l. No atto rne y wo uld be gin a tr ial wit hout di scussi ng questi ons thatmay be asked ofhis c li ent duri ng the case and prepar ing hi s cli ent to testify. In the sam e wa y, the prosecutor typica ll y prepares his wit nesses f or t heir test imony pri orto trial. T he fac t tha t the atto rne ys h ave pre pa red the ir wit nesses for t rial is a proper f unct ion of t ri al couns el and i s to be expect ed.9 T he pre pa ra tion to w hic h th e p ro se cu tor ’s q ue stio nin g re fe rs wa s a pp ar en tly co nd uc ted in the pr esence of i ndiv idual s other than t he Defendant ’s attorn eys. As such, t he preparati on was not prote cted by the a ttorne y-client pr ivilege. See, e. g. , W eatherford v . Bursey , 429 U.S . 545 , 97 S .Ct. -48- The tr ial courtdenied t he request ed li miti ng inst ruc tion . De fen se cou ns el’s second course ofacti on was to r equ est p erm ission to ca ll an ex pert w itnes s to rebutthe prosecutor ’s ques ti oning oft he Defendantregar ding pretr ial prepa rat ion
. That wi tness, Thomas Dill ard, had pract iced c ri minal l aw extens ively, both as a prosecutor and as a defense attorney. D illard would h ave testi fied as f ollows:

It is my opi nion t hat i t i s common and expected practi ce for prosecut ing attor neys and defense at torneys a like to prepa re wit nesses fortest imonyin court room proceedings. W itnesse s are oft en unfamil iarwit h and ext remely nervous about courtro o m proceedings. These w itnesses are ofte n p lac ed at e as e b y this proce ss, and can m ore ac curately co mm unicate their testimo ny. As a pro sec utor, I have often t aken witne sse s into a n em pty cou rtr oom in adv ance of t heir test imony, and plac ed them on the witness stand t o go through the ir di rect examinat ion. I often had these wi t ne ss es un de r go a mo ckcros s e xa mi n ation , either with another att orney or

me as the cross-ex aminer. I hav e oft en fol lowed the sam e proc edu re as a defen se attorn ey. In my opini on, pr eparat ion of w itne sse s in th is manner is o ft en nece ssary and common practi ce, and s hould be ex pected of tho rou gh an d co m pe ten t co un se l. Th e tria l cou rt did no t pe rm it Dilla rd to tes tify at tria l.

On appeal, the Def endant f irst argues thatthe quest ions c oncer ni ng his pret ri al prepar ati on were irr eleva nt an d viola ted h is Sixth Am end m ent rig ht to cou nse l. Of cours e, ev idence whi ch is not r elev ant i s not admi ssibl e. Tenn . R
. Evid. 402. W e believe , howe ver, thatthe quest ions con ce rnin g th e D efe nd an t’s pret ri al prepar ati on were ofsome relevance. The prosecutor sought t o chall enge the credi bil ity ofthe Def endant’ s test imonyon direct ex aminati on byquesti oning him if he ha d reh ears ed h is testim ony “line by line.” Itappears t hat none of t he questi ons impl icat ed any mater ial prot ected bythe attor ney-cl ientpri vi lege. 9 In837 , 51 L .Ed.2 d 30 (197 7); Sims v. Banks of Comm erce & TrustCo. , 14 Tenn . App. 672 (1932 ). -49- ouropinion , the prose cutor’s inqu irydid h ave som e rele van ce. W e pointout t hat defense counsel had no obj ecti on to t he prosecut or’ s aski ng the Def endant i f he had “gon e over his t esti mony” wit h his attor neys. In f act, defense c oun se l sp ec ifica llyquesti oned the St ate’ s wit ness Judy Al len aboutwhethershe had met with the prosecutor

in preparat ion f or hertest imony attr ial . Acc ordi ngl y, we fi nd no error wit h the t ri al court’ s deci sion t ha t such questions were rel evant as a chall enge to the cred ibility of the D efen dan t. See Te nn. R . Evid. 4 0 1. Further more, we c ann ot co nclu de th at the preju dicial e ffect o f the quest ions sub stan tially outw eigh ed th eir pro bative value
. See Tenn. R. Evi d. 403.

The Defendantalso c ontends t hat the prosecutor ’s ques ti ons concern ing pret ri al prepar ati on vi olat ed his Si xth Amendm ent ri ght t o counsel . A pr osecutor vi olat es the def endant’ s ri ght t o counsel when, t hrough examinat ion ofa witness orargument t o the j ury, he or she s eeks to penali ze the def endant f or exercisi ng this con stitution al righ t. State v. Hines , 919 S.W .2d 5 73, 5 80 (T enn . 199 5), cert. denied , 117 S.Ct. 133, 136 L. Ed.2d 82 ( 1996) (cit ation omitt ed). I n the case sub judice , the prosecutor ’s cross-ex aminati on soughtto chall enge the credibi li ty o f the De fen da nt b y su gg es ting tha t his persuasi ve t esti mony on direct ex aminati on could hav e been bols ter ed by “ li ne by l ine”prepar ati on pri or t o tr ial . We do not believe that the p rosecut or’ s questi ons rose t o the l evel of penal izi ng the Defendantfor e xerc ising his r igh t to c ou ns el. In ou r view , the pro se cu tor’s questi oning was n ot i nten ded to attack t he Defendant ’s use of an attor ney but rat herto quest ion t he rel iabi li ty a nd persuasi veness ofhis c ompelli ng test imony which could h ave been ai ded by“l ine byli ne” p reparati on. As a r esul t, we-50-

conclude thatthe quest ions pos ed by t he prosecut or reg ardi ng pret ri al pre pa ratio n d id n ot vio late the De fen da nt’s righ t to c ou ns el.

The Defendantnextar gue s that , i f t he questi ons concern ing pretr ial preparat ion were pr oper, itwas error fo r the tria l cou rt both to refu se to giv e the li miti ng inst ruct ion and t o excl ude the ex perttest imony ofThomas Dil lard. Rul ings on the admi ssibi li ty o f ev idence and the propri ety and for m of cross examinat ion are ent rust ed to t he sound di scret ion of t he t rial cou rt. See, e. g. , Sta te v. Hutchi son , 898 S.W .2d 161 , 172 (Te nn. 1 994 ), cert . deni ed , 116 S.C t. 137, 133 L.Ed. 2d 84 (1995 ); St ate v. H arris , 839 S .W .2d 54 , 72 (Te nn. 19 92), cert. den ied , 507 U.S. 954, 113 S.Ct. 1368, 122 L.Ed.2d 746 (1993). Such rul ings wil l notbe rev ersed on appeal ab sen t an a bus e of th at disc retion
. See St ate v. Caughron , 855 S.W .2d 5 26, 5 41 (T enn . 199 3), cert . deni ed , 5 10 U. S. 579 , 114 S .Ct. 475 , 126 L .Ed.2d 426 (1 993 ).

In the cas e at bar , we concl ude thatby denyi ng both t he li miti ng inst ruct ion and the ex perttest imony, the t ri al j udge abused his di scret ion. Given the na ture ofthe cr oss-e xa minati on of t he Defendant , we bel iev e thatthe proff ered test imonyofTh om as D illard wa s rele van t. W e see no basi s for not al lowi ng the test imonyand, i n fact , t he tr ial judge offer ed n o re ason when he excl uded the testi mo ny. In our

vi ew, t he li miti ng inst ruct ion woul d have accompl ished t he sa me obje ctives as D illard’s tes timo ny. H ad th e trial co urt c hos en to gi ve t he li miti ng inst ruct ion but deni ed Dil lard’s t esti mony, we woul d not f ind an abuse of d is cret ion under t he fact s as the y devel oped in t his ca se. To denyboth t he li miti ng inst ruct ion and t he test imony wi thoutexpl aini ng a rat ional e forthe decisi on, howev er, was an abuse ofthe t ri al j udge’s di scret ion.10Some of the acti ons focused on b y t he prosecut or were t he Defendant ’s pl acement of the pist ol i n the eav e of hi s carport aft er t he shooti ng, hi s vague answers to i nit ial poli ce questi ons upon his app roach t o the nei ghbor’ s home, and the f act t hat he ha ppened to be carry ing t he revol ver on February

26, 1994when he had nottaken t he gun out side ofhis h ome for years. -51- Alt hough we beli eve t he tr ial court ’s act ions c onsti tut ed an a buse o f discreti on, we nevert heless conclude tha t t he er ror was harmless beyond a re aso na ble doubt. The prosecut or’ s questi ons concern ing pretr ial prepar ati on appeared to be i ntended t o chall enge the credibi li ty a nd pe rsuasi ven ess of t he Defendant’ s compell ing t esti mony on direct ex aminati on. Thi s chal lenge to t he De fend ant’ s cre dib ility, ho we ver, pa led in co m pa riso n to the pro se cu tor’s vi gorous cross- examinat ion regardi ng detai ls ofthe hi story between th e Defendantand the v ict im as wel l as t he even ts which oc curr ed on the dayof t he shooti ng. On cross- examinat ion, the prosecutor was able to portray the history between the Def endant and the v ict im in a differ ent l ightfrom that presented on directexaminat ion, eff ecti vel y suggest ing t hat t he Defendanthad tak en advant age of the victim m one tarily. Furtherm ore, the p rosec utor was abl e to ex amine and to emphasi ze cert ain act ions ofthe Def endant on t he day ofthe shooti ng f r om a mo re cri ti cal pe rspect iv e. 10 Given t he ri gorous cross-ex aminati on ofthe Def endant on other matters, we are confi dent t hat t he tr ial court ’s er rorwith regard to t he questi ons concern ing pretr ial pre pa ratio n d id n ot a ffec t the res ult of the tria l. See Ten n. R. C rim. P. 52 (a).

A s we detai led abov e, t he prosecut or’ s questi ons concern ing pretr ial preparat ion led to quest ions bas ed on the Def endant’ s pri orcri minal record. The De fe ndant also c hall enges the l att er quest ions on appeal, contendi ng thatthe assis tantdist ri ct attor ney gener al’ s acti ons in s eeking t o ask quest ions bas ed on-52-

his prio r crim inal rec ord const it uted prosecutor ial misconductand thatthe t ri al court’s de cision to allow such ques tions wa s error.

At tr ial , t he Defendantargued t hat his prior con victions we re too re m ote to be the basi s for

any quest ions on cross- examinat ion and thatthe St ate had f ail ed to comply with t he notice provi sions of ei therRule 608 or Rule 609 ofthe Tennessee Ru les o f Evide nce . The prosecut or t hen narrowed his i nquiry fo r t he tri al court , st ati ng thathe int ended to ask the Defendantonlyifhe had been thr ough a b en ch trial in 19 73 . In re sp on se to th e D efe nd an t’s ar gu m en t in fav or ofexcl usion, the prosecutor assert ed thatthe Def endant had made a sweepi ng cla im of good c onduct bystat ing “ I’ ve never been through not hin g like th at,” ther eby opening t he door t o questi ons about s pecif ic i nstances of con duct wit hout stri ct compli ance wit h Rule 608. The tri al court al lowed t he prosecut or’ s li mited questions.

After examini ng the recor d, we believ e that t he prosecutor’s crossexaminat ion ste m m ing from the De fen da nt’s pri or conv ict ions was improper and thatthe t ri al court er red i n admitt ing t he testi mony. W e will fi rstaddress t he tr ial co urt’s rul ing in t his matt er. Ini ti all y, we note t hat t he prosecut or di d notatt empt to introd uce cop ies o f the D efen dan t’s con victions purs uan t to R ule 609. Nor were the prosecutor ’s ques ti ons aimed ateli cit ing detai ls ofthe cr iminal behavi or thatwas the b asis for tho se c onv icti on s. Inste ad, th e pro sec utor s oug ht to impeach the Defendant ’s st atement t hat he “ had neverbeen through nothi ng like [t esti fyi ng at tria l]” by q ue stio nin g h im about whet her he had experi enced a tr ial proce dure in 197 3. A s such, the prosecutor stat ed thathe was in quir ing i nto a specif ic i nstance of

conduct pursuantto Rul e 608.-53- I t is clear

from the record thatthe St ate di d not provi de noti ce to t he Defendantrega rding its intended use of t he prior convi ctions i n accordance with eit herRule 608 or

Rule 609. Both r ules provi de thatifthe prosecuti on see ks to impeach the accused i n a cri minal prosecuti on, t he Stat e must gi ve t he accused rea so na ble writte n n otic e b efo re tria l. Tenn. R. E vid. 60 8(b) (3), 60 9(a) (3). In fact, at one p oi nt d urin g a rgu m en t from cou ns el co nc ern ing the pro se cu tor’s proposed q ue sti ons, t he tr ial courtspeci fi call y not ed thatthe St ate had not prov ided notice to the De fend ant.

In add iti on, the Defend ant’ s convi cti ons and the conduct i nquir ed int o by the prosecut oroccurred twenty-one y ears pr iorto hi s indi ctment f or t he present case. As a g ene ral rule, cond uct wh ich occ urred m ore than t en years befor e the commencem ent of t he prosecut ion is not adm issible. Ten n. R. E vid. 608(b )(2). Such conduct is commonly excl uded because i t i s vi ew ed a s too st ale t o be probat iv e. Se e g en era llyNeil P. Cohen et al. , Tennessee Law ofEviden ce § 608 .7 (3d ed. 1995) . St ale i nstances of conduct may neverthel ess be ad m issib le ifthe proponent of such evi dence giv es the adverse party suff ici ent advance notic e to a llow a fair op portu nity to cont est t he use of t he evi dence and th e tr ial court deter mines thatthe probat iv e val ue ofthe ev idence s ubstant ial lyoutwei ghs its prejudicial effect. T enn . R. Evid. 60 8(b)(2).

In the cas e at ba r, the trial court did notma ke a findin g that the p robative val ue of t he evi denc e substant ially o utw eig he d its p reju dic ial ef fec t. In fa ct, it app ears that the tria l court i gnored most ofthe procedure est abli shed for11 Rule 608( b) set s fort h the procedure t o be fol lowed by a tr ial courtin d eter mining t he adm issibility of sp ecific in stan ces of co ndu ct for im pea chm ent p urpo ses . Th e trial co urt did c ond uct a jury-ou t hea ring a t the re que st of th e D efe nda nt an d did n ote th e lack of no tice. T he trial c ourt d id not, ho we ve r, m ak e a find ing tha t the sp ec ific ins tan ce of c on du ct h ad pro ba tive va lue or t ha t a r ea so na ble fac tu al basi s exi st ed f or t he i nqui ry . Te nn. R. E vi d. 608( b)( 1). More ove r, th e t ri al court d id notmake any f indi ngs regar ding t he bal ance between probat ive val ue and prej udici al effect. Tenn. R. Ev id. 608(b)(2). -54- deter mining the a dm issibility of sp ecific ins tanc es o f con duc t. 11 Th e tri al j udge
m ere ly sta ted thathe woul d al low t he li mited questi ons proposed by t he pr osecutord uring t he jury- out hearing. W e point out that t he balancing test app licab le in t his si tuat ion ordinar il y res ult s in t he excl usion of evi denc e. Se e Cohen, Tennessee Law of Evidence § 608.7. In our vi ew, t he probat iv e val ue of the ev i den ce a s a cha l l eng e t o t he De f endant’ s credi bil ity i s sli ght. The prej udici al eff ect ofthe ev idence, how eve r, is sub stan tial, risking con veying to the jury that t he Defendant has a prior cr iminal record even though his stal e misdemeanorconv icti ons were in admiss ibl e. From our r evi ew ofthe rec ord, we believe thatthe probati ve val ue ofthe e viden ce d id no t su bs tan tially outwei gh its preju dicial e ffect.

Further more, we fi nd no m eri t i n the prosecutor ’s argument thatthe Defendantmade a sweepi ng claim of go od c ond uct w hich allow ed in quiry in to sp ec ific inst ances of conduct wi thoutstr ictcompli ance wit h Rule 608. W e agree thatifa wit ness makes a sweepi ng clai m of good conduct on direct ex aminati on, thatclai m may open th e do or to c ross -exa m ination witho ut pre trial notic e an d with a lowe r stan dard of pro bati ve nes s. See Ad visory C om m ission Co m m ents to Tenn. R. E vid. 60 8(b) ; see also State v. J ohnson , 670 S.W .2d 634, 636 (Tenn. Cr i m. Ap p. 19 84); cf. State v. Mi ll er , 674 S. W .2d 279, 284 (Tenn. 1984) (evi dence ofmere arre sts or

indi ctments i s ge nerally i nadmissi ble unl ess the accused-55-

somehow opens the door f orimpeachm ent, such as by t esti fyi ng thathe or she had never b een arrested ).

W e do not v iew t he Defendant ’s st atement t hat he “ had neverbeen thr ough nothi ng li ke that” as a sweepi ng clai m of goo d co ndu ct. The prosecut or asked the Defend ant a quest ion abouthis pretr ial prepar ati on. The cl ear impli cati on of t he Defe nda nt’s entire answer t o the prosecutor ’s ques ti on was that his attorn eys p repa red h im p rior to trial b eca use he h ad n ot experi en ced the sit uati on of t esti fyi ng in a hotly- contest ed murder t ri al. The Defendant was att empting to ex plai n the reaso ns for his p retrial prepara tion. W e do n ot believe thatthe De fen da nt’s sta tem en t ros e to the le vel o f a sweepi ng clai m of good conduct whic h wo uld a llow im pea chm ent wi th no pretr ial noti ce and a l ower stand ard of probati veness. As a resul t, the spec if ic i nstance of conduct inqui red into by the pros ecu tor did not m eet th e ad m issibility r equir ements of Rul e 608. We ther efor e concl ude thatthe t ri al cour t er red i n all owing the pro se cu tor’s inquiry.

We turn no w to the pro prie ty of th e p ros ec uto r’s con du ct in seeking to ask the Defendantquesti ons ari sing f rom his pr iorconvi cti ons. The pr osecutor reveal ed that h is kno wled ge o f the Defen dant’ s pri or conv ict ions c ame from Tennessee De partm ent o f Safe ty memoranda. The fi rstmemorandum, written on April 25, 1973, indi cates t hat t he Defendantwas “t ri ed in General Session s Co urt wit h the Hon. Judge Jewell W atson presidi ng and at t he concl usion of the tri al
. . . t he Ju dge t ook t he ca se un deradv is ement . Atthi s ti me, the Judge has not handed down a deci sion due to t he def ense fi li ng a motion thatthi s charge be qua she d as the o fficers w ho e ntere d th e Big T Truck Stop on t his oc casion-56-

had s igned a pape r t hat t hey were no t offi cers and t heref ore ent ered unde r a disg uise .” A second memorandum was written on May 30 , 1973. Itindi cated t hat the t ri al j udge had found the Defend ant gui lty as charged of r unning a hou se of prost it uti on and had s entenced him to a fifty do llar ($5 0) fine and a six-m onth suspended sent ence.

Because of t he lackof pretr ial noti ce, def ense counsel was unaware ofthe circumstances of eit her t he off enses or t he tr ial . Duri ng argument t o the t ri al court , defense co unsel s tat ed thathe did no t know i f t he Defendanthad even test if ied at t he 1973 tr ial . Defen se counsel request ed thatthe t ri al court ask t he Defendantifhe had tes tif ied i n 1973. He ar gued thatifthe Def endant had not test if ied in 1973, and t hus had not been through anyt hing l ike t esti fyi ng at t ri al before the present cas e, t hen the prosecutor ’s proposed quest ions had n o proba tive value
. The tri al court decl ined def ense counsel ’s request and all owed the prosecut or t o questi on the Def endant aboutthe 1 973 trial. The Defendant was late r ab le to procure certi fi ed copiesof hi s 1973 convi cti ons. Those copi es indica te thatthe De fen da nt p lea de d g uilty to the offe ns es wh ich com pris e h is 1973 misdem eanor convict ions.

Th is series ofevents cl early reveals the dangers a sso ciate d wit h rel yi ng on law enf orcement memoranda rat her t han off ici al court documents . The p rosec utor, rel yi ng on the Tennessee Department ofSafety memoran da , ap pa ren tly beli eved t hat t he Defend ant had undergone a bench tr ial in 1973 which resul ted i n cri minal convi cti ons. Certi fi ed copiesof the con victions indica te that the D efend ant did n ot have a tr ial but ratherpleaded guilty to t he offenses.12W e po int out th at Ph ilpott was filed a full year before the trial in the case at bar. -57- In addressi ng a simi lartyp e of l aw enforcement convi cti on inf ormati on, our su pr eme court st ated that N.C.I .C. “rap” sheets “are notadmissible as a sub stitute for certified copie s of cou rt convictions n or f or an y othe r purp ose .” Sta te v. Buck , 670 S .W .2 d 600, 607 (Tenn. 1984). The court noted t hat such repo rts are p ure h ears ay an d of d ubio us a ccu racy. Id. Like wis e, a pa ne l of th is Co urt admonished a prosecutor forusing s uch reports f or i mpeachment purposes. Sta te v. Ph ilpott , 882 S.W .2d 39 4, 403 -04 (T enn . Crim. A pp. 19 94). Inte res ting ly enough, t he prosec u toradmonished i n Ph ilpott i s t he sa me prosecut orwh o co nd uc ted this case. 12 W e view the informa tion contai ned in t he Tennessee De partm ent o f Safe ty memoranda as simil ar t o the i nfor mation from N.C .I .C. repo rts con dem ned in prior c ase s. To imp eac h the De fend ant w ith questi ons ari sing f rom these remote and sta le pr iorconvi cti ons based sol elyon inf ormati on garner ed from Tennessee Department ofSafety memoranda rat her than ex amining copi es ofthe act ual conv icti ons was , we believ e, im prop er. Cf. Ph ilpott , 882 S. W .2d at403-04.
Having concl uded both t hat t he prosecut or’ s condu ct w a s improper and thatthe trial c ourt erred in ad mitt ing t he test imony, we must now examine the effectof these errors on the Defendant’s t rial. W e note once again t hat t he De fen da nt’s conv icti ons we re no t i ntr oduced at t ri al nor were t hey even mentioned directl y. The prosecut or’ s questi ons abo ut whether the Defendant ha d experi enced a tr ial procedure in 1973 were obvi ouslyan att empt to chal lenge t he De fen da nt’s credi bil ity. This chal lenge cons ti tut ed onlytwo quest ions outof ne arly one hundred pages of cross-ex aminati on. As we st ated abov e, t he pro se cu tor’s cros s-exa m ination rega rding deta ils of t he hi story between the-58-

Defendantand the v ict im as wel l as t he event s which occurr ed on the day ofthe shooti ng was quite vigoro us. T he c halle nge to the D efen dan t’s cred ibilityposed by t he tw o qu estio ns c onc ernin g a 1 973 trial proc edu re pa led in c om paris on to the remainder

of t he prosecut or’ s cross -examina tio n of th e D efen dan t. Acc ordingly, we be lieve thatthe er rors wit h regar d to t he questi ons concern ing the 1973 trial proc edu re did not a ffect the resu lt of the tria l. See Ten n. R. Cr i m. P. 52 (a). T he th ird issu e is the refore witho ut m erit.

V. TRI AL COURT ’ S EVI DENT I AR Y RUL I NGS

In his fo u rth issue , t he Defendantargues t hat t ri al court made numerous erroneou s evide ntiary ru lings w hich dep rived h im o f his righ t to pre sent an effective defe nse . See U.S . Co nst. am end . VI, XIV , § 1. The Defendant makes clear that he i s not arguing t hat he was prevented from presenting a defense altogeth er. Rather, he contendsthatthe t ri al court’ s evi denti ary r uli ngs rest ri cted his proof i n such a way as t o depri ve hi m of “a meaningf ul opportuni ty to present a com plete defe nse .” Cran e v. Kentucky , 476 U. S. 683, 690-91, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 2146-47, 90 L.Ed. 2d 636 (1986) (quot ing Ca lifornia v. T rom betta , 4 67 U. S. 479, 485 , 104 S .Ct. 252 8, 253 2, 81 L .Ed.2d 413 (1 984 )).

A. Trial Court’s I nterference with I mpeachm ent of A dverse Wit nesses

The Defe nda nt conte nds tha t the trial court interf ered w ith h is i mp eachment of severa l State’s witnes ses. H e first alleges tha t the trial court imp rope rly restricte d his cros s-exa m ination of M iche lle Flatt and Phil li p Murphy concerni ng prior inc ons isten t statem ents . Both Flatt a n d Murphy had gi ven-59-

state m ents pri orto tria l wh ich we re s om ew ha t inco ns iste nt w ith p ortio ns of th eir t es t i mo ny on di rect exam ination. From our rea ding of the record , howe ver, d efense counsel thoroughlycross- examined bot h Flatt and Murphy regar din g the irpri or i nconsis tentstat ements. I n fact , def ense counsel was even per mitt ed to play an audiot ape of Murphy’s p ri or i nconsis tentstat ement. Thi s all egati on clea rly lacks me rit.

The De fend ant n ext alle ges that th e trial co urt im prop erly res tricte d his cros s-exa m ination of D etec tive M ike L ett. Defense counsel soughtto quest ion Lett about t he lackof a det ail ed poli ce inv esti gati on int o the hi story between the Defendantand the v ict im. He appar entl y hoped t o devel op proofof a bi as againstthe Def endant in t he poli ce inv esti gati on of the sho oting. Th e trial court rest ri cted this line of inqu iry, finding it irrelevan t. See Te nn. R . Evid. 4 01, 402. We agree wit h the t ri al courtthat , under the ci rcumstances of t his ca se, quest ions concerni ng a bias againstthe Defendant during t he police inv es ti gati on are of marginal relevanc e. More over, the Defe nda nt was perm itted to put on extensive proofconcerni ng the histo ry be twe en him se lfand the v ict im. Thi s all egati on has no m erit.

The Defendant also cha ll enges the prosecutor ’s mann er of object ing du rin g defense cou nse l’s cros s-exa m inati o n of St ate’ s wit nesses. The Defendant all eges that t he prosecutor i nterj ected frui tlessobject ions in an effort t o int errupt the cross-e xa m ina tio n of St ate’ s wit nesses and r ender i t di sjoi nted. W e agree thatthe conf ront ati on claus es ofthe st ate and federal cons ti tut ions guarantee a defendantan opport unity fo reffec tive cro ss-e xam ination
. See Sta te v. H ow ell , 868 S.W .2d 238, 252 (Te nn. 1 993 ), cert . deni ed , 510 U.S . 121 5, 11 4 S .Ct. 1339,-60-

127 L.Ed. 2d 687 (1994) (ci ti ng Delaware v . Fenst erer , 474 U. S. 15, 20, 106 S.C t. 292, 294, 88 L. Ed.2d 15, 19 (1985) ). Afte r rev iewi ng the record i n the cas e at bar, how eve r, we c an o nly co nclu de th at t he Defendant’ s cross -examina ti on of Sta te’s wit nesses was t horough and wel l- done. Further more, we di scern no indi cati on thatthe prosecutor int erj ected f rui tl ess obj ecti ons in h opes of minimiz ing the impact of th e Defendant ’s cross-ex aminati on. Thi s all egati on lac ks m erit a s w ell.

The Defendant’s fi nal ch all en ge in th is re ga rd c on ce rns the trial c ou rt’s rest ri cti on of hi s cross -examina ti on ofJud y Allen . Allen was the las t witne ss to testify o n Ju ne 27, 1995. Defense counse l cross-ex amined All en regarding sligh tly incons ist ent st atements gi ven duri ng a d eposit ion for th e re late d civ il case. Defense counsel had mispl aced his c opy ofthatdeposit ion, however, and used an unmarked copy dur ing hi s cross -examina ti on. All en was then examined by the prosecutor

on redi rectand, wi th t he concl usion of he r testimon y, court stoo d in re ces s for th e nig ht.

On the morni ng ofJune 28, 19 95 , the first w itne ss to be calle d w as Alle n’s dau ghter, Mich elle F latt. Just befor e Flatt was cal led, defense c ounsel request ed thatJudy Al len be recall ed. Def ense counsel expl ained t hat he ha d lo ca ted his copyof th e d ep os ition an d w ish ed to a sk h er a qu es tio n about anot her inconsist ency between the deposit ion and her test imony on di rectexaminat ion. The inconsist ency concerned which hand the vict im had in his pock et as he approached the Def endant’ s van. On direct ex aminati on, All en test if ied t hat t he victim ’s left h an d w as in his pocket. During the deposit ion, All en stat ed thatshe-61-

co uld not r emem ber which hand the vi ctim had in hi s pocket. The tri al co ur t denied t he Defendant ’s request t o recal l Al len.

Faced with th is ruling , t he Defend ant offer ed an alt ernat iv e to t he tr ial c ourt. The Defendant sugge sted t hat t hey admitint o evi dence the po rti on of Alle n’s deposit ion i n which s he stat ed thatshe was uns ure a s to which hand the victim had in hi s pocket . The Defendantargued t hat, as a pri or i ncon s ist ent stat ement off ered f or i mpeachment pur poses, Alle n’s sta tem ent wa s not he arsay. Th e trial co urt de nied the D efen dan t’s altern ative re que st.

The decisi on of whet her t o permita wit ness to be recal led i s entr usted to the sound discreti on ofthe t ri al court and wi ll not be reversed on appeal absent abuse. See Caughron , 855 S.W .2d a t 539 ; State v. Hartman , 703 S. W .2d 106, 116 (Te nn. 1 985 ), cert. denied , 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 3308, 92 L. Ed.2d 721 (1986 ); State v. J ohnson , 685 S. W .2d 301, 30 6 ( Ten n. Cr i m. App. 1984) (ci ti ng Lillard v. State , 528 S.W .2d 2 07 (T enn . Crim . App . 197 5)). In our vi ew, t he tr ial co urt’s ref usal to al low JudyAll en to be recall ed or t o all ow the i nconsis tent port ion of her deposit ion to be i ntroduced int o evidence consti tut ed an abuse of discreti on. W e see no good o r valid reason f or t he denial of bot h alt ernat iv es present ed to t he tr ial court . The rec ord i ndicat es thatJudyAll en resi ded in Knox Co unty at th e tim e o f the trial. S he tes tified in co urt o n th e d ay b efo re th e re ca ll requ est. He r dau ghte r testified on th e da y of th e re ca ll req ue st. It ce rtain ly appears t hat Al len woul d have been av ail able f orrecal l. In t he wake of t he tr ial co urt’s recal l r uli ng, t he Defendantpresent ed a reasonabl e, l imit ed alt ernat iv e. We believ e tha t the trial c ourt e rred in de nying both the re call req ues t and the Defendant’ s proposed al ter nati ve.-62- W e d o n ot, h ow eve r, be lieve tha t this erro r affe cte d th e re su lt of th e tria l. The De fen da nt a ttem pte d to rec all Jud y Allen in an effort to im pea ch h er with a prior incon sistent statem ent, thereb y assa iling her cred ibility. Defense counsel had already effect iv el y questi oned All en’s c redi bil ity th rough t he remainder of cross- examinat ion. W e a re s atis fied tha t an y err or in this r eg ard wa s ha rm les s. See Ten n. R. C rim. P. 52 (a).

B. Trial C ourt’s Exc lusion of the D efen dan t’s Ou t-of-Co urt Sta tem ents

Co nc ern ing his R elatio ns hip w ith th e V ictim
The De fen da nt c on ten ds tha t the trial c ou rt err on eo us ly exc lu ded e vidence ofhis out-of-c ourtstat ements concer ning hi s rel ati onship wi th t he vi cti m. Aft er his own t est imony , t he Defe ndantpres ente d sev eral wi tn esses who t esti fi ed concerni ng his state of m ind with reg ard to the vi ctim . On di rectexaminat ion, defense counsel sought to questi on these witnesses, principally fam ily mem bers o f th e Defendant , aboutwhat t he Defendanthad tol d them concern ing t he threa te ning an d h ara ssin g a ctio ns tak en by th e vic tim . Up on the pro se cu tor’s objecti ons, the t ri al c ourtdid notpermitthe wi tnesses to r ecount whatthe Defendanthad tol d them abo ut his re lations hip w ith the v ictim. Inst ead, t he tr ial court li mited thei r t esti mony to t heir observ ati ons of t he Defendant ’s st ate ofmind and the Def endant’ s stat ements to t hem actuall y expressing his st ate ofmind. See Ten n. R. E vid. 803(3 ).

The De fen da nt o ffere d th e tria l c our t two separat e arguments i n fav or of the ad mi ss i on oft es t i mon y f r om defense witn es se s ab ou t the De fen da nt’s state m ents to t hem regardi ng the t hreat ening and ha rassi ng conductof t he vi ct i m. The tri al court f ound both arguments unpersua siv e. The Defendant now-63-

rai ses both a rguments on appeal . He f irst argues thatsuch te sti mony was ad m issib le as a nonhears ay decl arat ion t o prove circumstanti al ly hi s stat e of mind. The Defendant as sert s thatthe t esti mony from def ense wit nesses about what he ha d told them conc erning th e victim’s co ndu ct was n ot offered to prove t he tr uth ofthe matt er asserted, namely t hat t he vi cti m had engaged i n thr eateni ng or harassing conduct. Inst ead, t he test imonywas o ffered to de mon st r at e c i r cu mst an t i al l y t he Defen da nt ’ s f ea roft he v i ct i m.

We beli eve t hat t he Defendanthas made a sound argu m ent. Given t hat the testimo ny fro m defe nse witne sse s ab out th e D efen dan t’s state m ents concerni ng the thr eatening and harassing conductwas not offer ed to prove t he truth of the ma tter as serte d, i t was not hearsay. Tenn. R. Evid. 801(c) . Such nonhearsaydeclarati ons have been deemed admissi ble where, as here, t hey were off ered t o prove c i r cu ms tantia lly the de clara nt’s sta te of m ind. See Caughron , 855 S.W .2d a t 537 ; State v. Cravens , 764 S .W.2d 7 54, 755 ( Tenn. 198 9); see ge ne rally Neil P. Cohen etal., Te nne sse e La w of E viden ce § 801 .7 (3d ed. 1 995 ). As a re sult , we concl ude thatthe t ri al court er red i n excl uding such testimo ny.

We believ e, ho we ver, tha t t he tr ial court ’s er ror was harmless beyond a rea so na ble do ub t. Th e D efe nd an t tes tifie d fu ll y abouthis relat ionshi p wit h the victim and the v ict im’s t hreat ening and hara ssin g co ndu ct. He also tes tified fully about his fearful stat e of mind wi th r egard t o the v ict im. More over, the defense wit nesses from whom the above t esti mony was soughtwere perm itted to te stify about thei r observati ons of t he Defendant ’s m en tal sta te. T he se witn es se s all confi rmed thatthe Defe nda nt was fearful of the victim. A ccord ingly, we be lieve-64-

thatthe D efen dan t was perm itted to in trodu ce a m ple e viden ce o f his sta te o f mind wi th r egard to t he vi cti m. Any addi ti onal t esti mony about nonhearsay declarati ons of t he De fen da nt o ffere d to pro ve c ircu m sta ntia lly his stat e of mind wo uld have bee n larg ely su perflu ous . W e can onl y concl ude thatthe ex clusi on ofthi s test imony di d not affectthe resultof t he trial. See Tenn . R
. Crim . P. 52(a).

The Defendant ’s sec ond argument i n fav or ofadmissi on of t he test imony charact eri zes the De fen da nt’s state m ents to defen se witn es se s ab ou t the victim ’s thr ea teni ng con duc t as p rior co nsis tent s tatem ents offere d to re but th e S tate ’ s cla im of r ecent f abri cati on. We agree thatpri or consi stentstat ements may be ad m issib le to rehabi li tat e a wit ness when i nsinuat ions of recen t fabrication ha ve been made or whe n de libera te false hoo d ha s be en im plied
. See State v. J ones , 215 Tenn. 206, 217-19, 385 S.W .2d 8 0, 85 (196 4); State v. Bent on , 759 S. W .2d 427, 433 (Tenn. Crim. App. 19 88). Such stat ements do notquali fy a s hearsay because theyare offer ed solel y to rehabi li tat e the credibi li ty o f a wit ness rat her than forthe t rut h of t he ma tters a sse rted in the s tatem ents
. See Tenn. R. Evi d. 801 (c); se e g en era llyCo he n, T en ne sse e L aw of E vide nc e § 80 1.8 ; Da vid L ou is Raybin, Tennessee Crimi nal Pr acti ce and Procedure § 27.234. Befor e pri or consis tentst at eme nt s b ec ome ad m issib le in th is regar d, howev er, the t esti mony ofthe wi tness musthave been ass ail ed or ser iousl y quest ioned t o the extentthat his o r her c redib ility need s reh abilitatio n. Benton , 759 S. W .2d at433-34.

In the cas e sub judice , t he pros ec ut or ’ s c r os s- ex ami nati on of t he Defendantwas vigoro us a nd c halle nge d his cred ibility. In fa ct, th e p ros ec uto r’s pri ncipal strate gy for a ttack ing th e D efe nda nt’ s proofwas to su ggest t hat t he Defendan t was “cr ea ting a d efe ns e.” In view of th e a ttac k on the De fen da nt’s-65-

credibility, we beli eve t hat t esti mony from defense wit nesses demonstrati ng that the De fen da nt h ad rela ted the sam e in cid ents of t hreat ening and ha rassi ng conduct on be ha lf of th e vic tim we ll befor e the shoot ing was admi ssibl e to rebut the prosecutor ’s i nsinuat ion ofrecentfabr icat ion or deli berat e fal sehood.

T he error i n excluding t his test imony, however, was harmless beyond a rea so na ble dou bt. Alth ou gh the pro se cu tor a ssa iled the De fen da nt’s cred ibility on cross-e xaminat ion , the prin cip al ch alle ng e to his c red ibility in volv ed his react ion to th e co nd uc t of th e vic tim rat her t han whether the conduct ofthe victim had actual lyoccurred. The Defendanttest if ied on di rectexamina tion th at t he victim ’s c onduct made him fearful of the vi ctim. The prosecutor’ s crosse x aminati on sug ges ted th at the De fend ant re acte d to th e victim ’s con duc t with angerand that th e D efen dan t’ s t esti mony thathe was fearful was not c redi ble. As we stat ed above, the def ense wit nesses whose t esti mony was li mited bythe tri al court ’s r uli ng were per mitt ed to t esti fy a bout t hei r ob servat ions of the De fen da nt’s mental s tat e, and theyall confi rmed thatthe Def endant was fearful ofthe vi ct i m. Any furthertest imony on t he partof t hose wit nesses concer ning what the De fend ant h ad to ld the m with re gard to the victim’s co ndu ct wou ld have been only m arginally relevan t and m erely su pe rflu ous to t he iss ue of t he cred ibilityofthe De fen da nt’s tes tim on y ab ou t his fe arfu l stat e o f m ind in react ion to the v ict im’s c onduct. Accordi ngly , we concl ude thatthe t ri al cou rt’s e rror in th is rega rd did not a ffect the resu lt of the tria l. See Ten n. R. C rim. P. 52 (a).-66- C. Tr ial Court’ s Excl usion ofEvi dence ofthe Vi cti m’s Thre ateni ng,

Vio lent Co nd uc t Aga inst Oth er In dividu als
The De fend ant next con tends t hat t he tr ial courterron eouslyexcl uded evidence of th e vic tim ’s violent and threaten ing con duct tow ard other i ndivi duals. Defense counsel sought t o questi on several wi tnesses about t heir observ ati on ofviolen t or thre aten ing c ond uct c om m itt ed by the v ict im agains t ot her indiv iduals. For insta nce, it app ears from the proffer of de fense witness Rob ert Fer guso n tha t he be ca m e in volv ed in a d isp ute with Ro dn ey S he pa rd a nd his brothe r, Jimmy Shepard, overthe compl eti on of pl umbing work ata bar owned by Ferguson. Shortl y th ereafter , Ferg u son be gan to receiv e thr eateni ng tel ephone call s from the vi cti m. In addi ti on, ac cordi ng to t he pro ffer o f Da vid Riley, Ro dney She pard committed several threat ening acts and made threa teni ng tel ephone calls to him after a disp ute a rose over Riley’s refus al to allow Sh epa rd to plac e his trailer on prop erty ow ned by R iley. T he Defendan t al so off ered a profferfrom J udy B ranstetter, w ho lived ac ross the street from Rod ney S hep ard on Da nte Ro ad . Ac co rdin g to Bra ns tette r’s proffer , a di spute arose between her brot her-i n-l aw and Rodney Sh epard. During a t elephone co nversat ion w ith Rodney Sh epa rd’s w ife, Bra nste tte r overheard Shepard shout ing i n the background to tel l Branstetter’ s b rot her-i n-l aw to “ meet me out i n the middl e of the s treet, a nd I w ill take ca re of it.”

The tr ial courtexcl uded all su ch tes tim on y, rulin g th at e vide nc e o f sp ec ific vi olentacts of

the v ict im agains t t hird pe rsons which were unknown to t he Defendantat t he ti me of the s hooti ng co uld only be inquired i nto on crossexaminat ion of t he vi cti m. The tri al j udge based his r uli ng on his int erpret ati on ofTe nne sse e R ule o f Evide nce 405 (a), Sta te v. Hil l , 885 S. W .2d 357 ( Tenn.-67-

Cr i m. App. 1994) , and Stat e v. Ray , 880 S .W .2d 70 0 (Te nn. C rim. Ap p. 199 3). Defense counsel point ed out t ha t, giv en thatthi s case i nvol ved a homici de, he co uld not cross-ex amine the v ict im, ask ing the t ri al court “ who are we suppose d to cross-e xam ine abo ut this?” Th e trial court sta ted sim ply, “W ell, I don ’t know .”

On app eal, as a t t ri al, the Def endant ass ert s thathe was not off eri ng evidence of th e vic tim ’s vio len t co nd uc t ag ain st o the r ind ividu als as subs tantive proofof th e vic tim ’s chara cter or to pro ve that th e victim acte d in a cco rdan ce w ith a cha rac ter tra it. Ins tea d, th e D efe nd an t m ain tain s that he was off ering such evidence to cor roborat e h is se lf -defense clai m that the vi ctim was the fi rst agg resso r. The Defendant contends that evi dence of the v icti m’s viol ent conduct toward others, even i f unknown t o the Def endant atthe ti me of the s hooti ng, was admissi ble f or t hat l imit ed purpose.

In cases inv olv ing a se lf -def ense is sue, we bel iev e thatTennessee law does permit t he introduction of ev idence of a victim’s violent con duct tow ard third persons, even i f t he defendantis unaware of t hat co nd uc t, un de r ce rtain circumstances. See State v. Ruane , 912 S.W .2d 766, 779-82 (Tenn. Cri m. App. 199 5). The adm issi bili ty ofsuch evi dence depends upon t he purpose for which it is offer ed. The t reat ment of proof offer ed as su bstan tive evi dence isdiffer ent from th at of proo f offered for co rrobora tive purpo ses o nly.

The tr eatment ofpr oof o f the v ict im’s v iol ent character off ered as subs tantive evi dence is governed generall y by Tennessee Rules of Evidence 404(a)( 2) and 405. Under these rul es, ev idence of the v ict im’s v iol ent character is adm issible but is lim ited to o pinio n tes timo ny or testi mony abou t the victim ’s-68-

reput ati on in t he com mu nity. Te nn. R . Evid. 4 05(a ); see also State v. Bar nes , 675 S.W .2d 195, 197 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984). Thus, t he defendantor ot her wit nesses m ay test ify on di rector cross-ex aminati on about t heir opini on of t he victim ’s viol ent character or the vi ctim’s reputati on for vi olence in t he com mu nity. Tenn. R. Evid. 405(a). Of course , viole nt acts committed by t he vict im against ind ividu als oth er th an the de fen da nt m ay c on tribu te to the victim ’s reput ati on for vi olence. This type oftest imony const it utes subs tant iv e evi dence ofthe victim ’s cha racte r trait for viole nce . See Ten n. R. E vid. 404(a )(2).

The princ iples g ove rning the a dm issibility of sp ecific vio lent a cts of the victim againstthird persons are somewhat more st ri ngent t han those go verni ng the adm issibility of o pinio n or re puta tion e viden ce. Ifthe defen dan t was a ware ofthe v ict im’s v iol ent conduct againstother indi vi duals atthe t ime of t he off ense, such proof i s admissible as s ubs tant iv e evi dence of t he defendant ’s st ate of mind. See Ruane , 912 S.W.2d at 779 ( cit ing Sta te v. H ill , 885 S. W .2d 357, 361 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)) . Because s uch evi dence isoff ered t o establ ish t he de fen da nt’s stat e of mind wi th r espect t o the vi cti m, the defendant ’s kno wledge ofthe spec if ic v iol ent act s ofthe victim aga inst oth ers is re quire d. See W il li ams v. Sta te , 565 S. W .2d 503 ( Tenn. 1978). Thus, t he defendantmay test ify about the victim ’s thr eateni ng or v iol ent conduct t oward ot her i ndiv idual s as long as the defendantwas aware ofthatconduct at t he ti me of the offense.
If, on th e oth er ha nd, th e de fendantwas unaware ofthe v ict im’s v iol ent conduct towar d others, t he evi dence obvi ouslyhas no beari ng on the de fen da nt’s state of mind and is n ot adm issible as su bstan tive proofon that iss ue. See Sta te
v. W est , 825 S. W .2d 695 , 6 97 ( Te nn . Cr im . Ap p. 1 99 2). S uc h e vide nc e is-69-

admissi ble, how eve r, for the limited purp ose of co rrob oratin g a s elf- defense cla im thatthe vic tim w as th e first ag gres sor. Ruane , 912 S.W .2d a t 781 . W e empha size tha t this evidenc e is corrob orative in na ture rat her t han substa nti ve. As such, i t i s not gov erned by Tennessee Rules ofEvidenc e 404 (a)(2) or 405. See Neil P. Cohen et al. , Tennessee Law ofEvidenc e § 404 .4 (Sup p. 199 6). Thus, individu als o ther th an th e de fe ndant may testify on director crossexaminat ion about t hreat ening or vi olentconduct of t he vi cti m, even t hough the defendanthad no knowl edge ofthatconduct at t he ti me of the offense, as long as the tes tim on y is o ffere d o nly to co rrob ora te th e d efe nd an t’s se lf-de fen se claim that th e victim was the first a ggre sso r. Ruane , 912 S. W .2d at781.

In the case sub judice , the Defendant sought t o question several defense wit nesses on direc t exam ination ab out thre ateni ng and vi olent conduct com mitt ed by the vi ctim against others. Th e D efe nd an t ha d n o kn ow led ge of th is conduct at the tim e of th e sh ootin g. H e the refore offere d the te st i mo ny on ly to c orrobo ra te his c lai m that t he vi cti m was the fi rstaggressor in t he alt ercat ion which led to t he sh ootin g. Given t hat t he evi dence was offer ed for li mited corrob orative purp oses, we concl ude thatthe t ri al court er red i n excl uding t he testim ony . See Ruane , 912 S. W .2d at779-781.

From our r evi ew of t he enti re rec ord, however, we beli eve t hat t he erro r in excl uding this te sti mony was harmless . I t i s tr ue thatthe Def endant was not permitted to i ntroduce test imony from several def ense witnesses a bou t t he victim ’s thr eateni ng and violen t con duc t towa rd oth ers. Yet t he Defendantwas permitted to pre sen t testimo ny fro m multipl e wit nesses t hat t he vi cti m had a reput ati on forvi olence i n the community. In addi ti on, t he Defendanthimsel f was-70-

permitted to test ify abo ut the victim’s thre atening and violen t condu ct toward others of whi ch he was aware a t t he ti me of the s hoo ti ng as proofof hi s fearful state of mind wi th r espect t o the v ict im. Further more, defen se witne sses Rob ert Ferguson an d C arro ll Votaw were pe rmitted to r elat e speci fi c threats made by t he victim againstthe Def endant in t heir presence ev en though t he Defendantwas una ware of those thre ats. W hil e itwas error f or t he tr ial courtto ex clude test imonyab out t he vi cti m’s speci fi c acts of v iol ence toward others off ered f or li mited corroborat iv e purposes, we ar e confi de nt tha t the jury had befo re it a com plete and accurat e descri pti on ofthe v i ol en t , ag gr es si ve na t ur e o f t he v i ct i m. Acc ordingly, we concl ude thatthe t ri al court’ s error di d notaff ect t he resul t ofthe trial. Tenn. R . Crim. P . 52(a).

D. Tri al Court’ s Exclusion ofEvidence t hat the Shepard Famil y was Acting in Con cert
The Defendantnextcont ends tha t t he tr ial courterron eouslyexcl uded evidence which w ould hav e support ed his t heory t hat t he Shepard f amilywas acti ng in conc ertto t hreat en and harass him and hi s famil y. The substance of most of thi s evidence was not d eve lope d at trial th roug h pro ffers. The Defendant did re quest handwr it ing ex emplars f rom the v ict im’s brother , Ji mm y Shepar d
. The Defendantwa s a pp ar en t l y se ek i ng ev i de nc e t o p r ov e t ha t Ji mmySh ep ard ’s wri ti ng was presenton some of t he derogat ory s igns and wri ti ngs found ne ar t he De fen da nt’s neighbor hood. The t ri al court deni ed the Def endant’ s requestfor Jimmy Shep ard’s handwrit ing exemplars.

The De fend ant a rgue s no w, as he a rgue d at trial, th at evid enc e of o t her She pard fam ily me m ber’s acting in con cert w ith the vic tim to threaten and harass-71-

him an d h is fam il y is rel evant to ex plai n the relat ionshi p between hi m and the victim as w ell as h is state of m ind w ith res pec t to the v ict im. I n addit ion, he ass erts thatsuch evi dence would have cor roborat ed proofof t he vi cti m’s vi olent and aggre ssive ch aracter.

The tri al courtexcluded evi dence thatthe Sh ep ard fam ily wa s ac ting in con cert, includ ing d eny ing th e D efen dan t’ s reque st for hand writing exem plars fro m Jimmy Shepard, on gro un ds tha t it was ir rel evant. Tenn. R. Evi d. 401, 402. Question s concerni ng the admissi bil ity ofevi dence restwit hin t he disc ret ion of the tr ial court , and we wi ll not i nterfer e wit h the exerc ise ofthatdiscreti on absent abuse. See, e. g. , Hutchi son , 898 S.W .2d a t 172 ; Hill , 885 S. W .2d at361 (ci tat ion om itted). W e ag ree w ith the tr ial court t hat evidence sup po rting the De fen da nt’s theory thatthe Shepard famil y was acti ng in co ncertwas largelyir rel evanteit her forcorroborat iv e purposes or to es ta blish th e D efen dan t’s state of m ind w ith respect to the victim. M oreove r, we are conf identthatthe Def endant presented a complete pict ure ofhis s tat e of mind a nd the character of t he vi cti m for the jury’s considerati on. From the record before us, we cannot c onclude t hat t he tr ial judge abus ed his d iscreti on in ex cludi ng thi s evi dence.

E. Tr ial Court’ s Excl usion ofExpertTesti mony ofDr. Engum

The De fend ant n ext co nten ds th at t he tr ial courterron eouslyexcl uded port ions ofthe ex pertpsychol ogical test imony offer ed through defense wit ness Dr. Eric E ngu m . Mo re sp ecifica lly, the trial co urt did not p erm it Dr. E ngu m to testify whethe r the De fenda nt’s narciss istic and pa ssive-ag gress ive pers ona lity traits were f ound in t he general populat ion. Addit ional ly , t he Defendantass erts-72-

thatDr. Engum was not permitt ed to test ifyas to the expect ed response to stress and fear ofindiv iduals wi th narci ssisti c and passive-aggressi ve personali ty types.

The Defendantcit es pri ncipal lytwo casesin supp ortofhis ar gum ent, Sta te
v . Merlin Eugene Shuck , C.C. A. No. 03C01-9 502-CR-00035, Cocke Cou nt y (Tenn. Crim . App ., Kno xville, Fe b. 1, 1 996 ), perm. t o appeal grant ed (Tenn. 1996) and State v. E dwa rd H. Jones , C.C. A. No. 03C01-9 301-CR-00024, Knox Co unty (Te nn. C rim. A pp., Knoxvi ll e, Sept . 15, 1994). In bot h Shuck and Jones , however , t he t r i al co urt ex cl ud ed an en t i r e c at eg ory ofps yc ho l og i ca l t es t i mo n y which was releva nt to a n im porta nt issu e at trial. Shuck , C. C.A. No. 03C01-9502- CR-00035, slip op . at 5; Jones , C.C. A. No. 03C01-9 301-CR-00024, sli p op. at26. In contras t, Dr. Eng um was a llowed in the prese nt case to offer a n ext ens ive depict ion ofthe De fen da nt’s psy ch olo gic al ch ara cte ristic s as we ll as hisopini on as to whether the De fend ant, giv en th os e p syc ho log ica l cha rac teris tics, pe rce iv e d the victim ’s acti ons as thr eateni ng. As a result , we f ind bot h Shuck and Jones to be dist ingui shable f rom the case sub judice
.
In the cas e at bar , Dr. Engum was permitt ed to t esti fy a t lengt h concerni ng the narcissi stic and pass ive -aggre ssive ps ycholog ical traits of the De fenda nt. Dr. Engum also t esti fi ed in d eta il con ce rnin g th e g en era l cha rac teris tics o f ind ividu als with tho se psy ch olo gic al tra its. T he trial c ou rt pe rm itted Dr . En gu m to o ffer h is opini on as to whet her t he Defendantwas suff eri ng from acute st ress atthe t i me ofthe shoot ing due to the histor y with the v ict im and as t o whether the Def endant percei ved the vic tim’s a ction s on the d ay of th e sh ootin g as a th rea t. Further more, on redi rect , Dr. Engum was permitt ed to t esti fy c oncerni ng the-73-

expect ed re s ponse of pas siv e indi vi duals s uch as t he Defendantto problem situat ions.

From our r evi ew of t he record, we beli eve t hat Dr. Engum was permitt ed to give a co m plete descri pti on of t he Defendant ’s psy chologi cal t rai ts and what role those traits pla yed in his p erce ption of an d rea ction to the victim
. In o ur v iew, any error

on the part ofthe t ri al cou rt in restric ting sp ecific q ues tions pos ed to Dr. Engum was ha rm les s an d d id n ot a ffec t the res ult o f the trial. Tenn. R. Cr im. P. 52(a).

F. Tri al Court’ s Exclusion ofExpert Handwriti ng and Psychologi cal

Testi mony f or Di scove ryViol ati ons
The Defend ant ne xt contends thatthe t ri al court er roneousl y excl uded expe rt tes tim on y on the ba sis o f disc ove ry vio latio ns. The Defendant i ntended t o ca ll Dr. Cathe rine G yurik and Lam ar Miller as e xpert witnes ses a t trial. Dr. G yurik wa s th e D efe nd an t’s tr eati ng psychi atr ist . Lamar Mi ll er was a handwr it ing expe rt who had compared t he derogat ory s igns and wri ti ngs to k nown examples ofthe v ict im’s ha ndwri ti ng. Because ne it her expert had prep a red a re port detai li ng thei r f indi ngs, t he Defendanthad not su bm itted the res ults of th eir an alys is to the State as p art of re cipro cal d isco very. See Tenn . R
. C ri m. P. 16(b)(1 )(B). As a resul t, the prosecut or obj ected t o thei r t esti mony when off ered at tr ial . The t ri al court ex cluded t he tes tim on y of b oth witn es se s on the ba sis of discoveryviol ations.

Even if we were to agree that the D efend ant ha d violated the discove ry provi sions of Tennessee Rul e of Cri minal Procedure 16, we be lieve thatthe t ri al-74-

judge abused hi s disc ret ion byexcl uding t he test imony ofthe ex pertwit nesses wit hout even c onside ring othe r poss ible rem edies. Initially w e note thatthe discove ry prov isions do n ot m and ate the ex clusi on of evid enc e in the wak e of a vi olat ion of tho se p rovisio ns. See Te nn. R . Crim . P. 16 (d)(2 ). In fact, o ur co urts have lon g h eld tha t evid en ce sho uld be exc lud ed on ly wh ere a vio latio n o f Ru le 16 resul ts i n actual prej udice t o a party and t hat prej udice c annot be eradicat ed b y a m ean s oth er tha n su ppre ssio n. State v. J ames , 688 S.W .2d 4 63, 46 6 (Tenn. Crim . App . 198 4); State v. Br il ey , 619 S. W .2d 149, 152 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981) ; Sta te v. Garland , 617 S.W .2d 1 76, 1 85-8 6 (T enn . Crim . App . 198 1). It app ears from the record i n the pr es ent c ase that th e S tate w as a wa re of b oth expe rt wi tnesses p ri or t o tr ial . Defen se counsel even consul ted wi th t he prosecut orbefore tr ial conce r ning requested s ubpoenas for handwri ti ng exem plars from Jimmy Shepard. W e do not b elieve that th e S tate suff ered act ual prejudice as a resul t ofthe purp ort ed di scov eryvi ola ti on. Furt hermor e, we believe thatother

m ea ns we re a vaila ble to t he tr ial courtto r esolv e the si tuat ion. In fact, the De fenda nt even offered to a llow the pro secu tor to interv iew the handwri ti ng expe rt duri ng a conti nuance. The t ri al court, however, did not consider

any a lterna tives to excl usi on. Accordin gly , we concl ude thatexcl usion ofthe De fen da nt’s exp ert e vide nc e w as no t ap pro pria te in this case and t he tr ial courterred in so rul ing.

In our vi ew, t he excl usion of th e testim ony of the Defe nda nt’s expe rt wit nesses was n everthe less ha rmles s error. Th e reco rd is unclea r as to wh at Dr. G yurik ’s testi mony would have been. The D efendant does c on cede thather test imonywou ld have been largelycumulati ve ofDr. Engum. He asserts t hat her test imonywo uld have been usef ul to r ebut t he fal se impress ion t hat Dr. Engum-75-

lear ned of t he all eged bump between t he v ehicles from the D efen dan t. It app ears thatDr. Engum rebutted t hat i mpression h im se lf on redirect e xaminat ion. We beli eve t hat Dr. Engum prov ided a t horough ex planat ion ofthe De fen da nt’s psychol ogical charact eri sti cs and thatDr. Gyur ik’ s test imony woul d have added little to Dr. Engum’s test imony. W e ther efor e concl ude thatthe ex clusi on of her testimo ny did no t affect the resu lt of the trial. Tenn. R . Crim. P . 52(a).

W ith regar d to t he experthandwri ti ng evi dence, i t appears thatLamar Mil lerwo uld ha ve te stif ied t hat some of the derogatory si gns and wri ti ng contai ned handwr it ing matchi ng known examples ofthe victim ’s ha ndw riting. In s pite of the exclu sion of the expe rt testim ony , the D efen dan t was perm itted to off erlay tes ti m ony fr om several wit nesses who st ated t hat t hey rec ognized t he victim ’s handwriti ng on the derogatory si gns and writi ngs. Fur therm ore, th e S tate did not s eriou sly co ntes t that tes timo ny. W e are conf identthatthe jury h ad am ple evidence befor e itto asse ss the s ource ofthe derog ato ry sig ns and writi ngs. Acc ordingly, we concl ude thatthe ex clusi on of t he experthandwri ti ng test imony did not a ffect the resu lt of the trial. Tenn. R . Crim. P . 52(a).

G. Tr ial Court’ s Excl usion ofExpertTesti mony ofAcci dent

Reconstr ucti onistforDiscoveryViol ati on
In a related iss ue, the D efend ant also conten ds that the trial court erro ne ou sly exclu ded the e xpe rt testim ony of a n a ccidentreconst ruct ioni st on t he ba sis of a d isco very vio lation. D uring the S tate’s c ase -in-ch ief, defense c ounsel cr oss-ex amined sever al wi tnesses wit h the ai d of a l arge , profess ionally-prep are d diagram of t he scene ofthe shoot ing. The prosecut or voi ced some concern t hat the diagram was “p roportion al” rather than “to scale.” As a resul t, itappears t hat-76-

duri ng the course of t he tr ial the Def endant employ ed an acci dent reco nstru ction ist, John Hyde , to rende r the diagram “to scal e.” W hen the Defendantcall ed Hyde to testi fy, the prosecu torobjec ted t o his renderi ng the diagram to scal e. The pros ecutor assert ed thathe had no t re ceived a report detai li ng the expert ’s f indi ngs. As a result , t he tr ial courtexcl uded any ofHy de ’s test imony ai med at plac ing t he diagram to scal e.
Rega rdless of o ur c on clu sio n a bo ut th e p rop riety o f the trial c ou rt’s excl usion of t he evi dence on the basi s of a di scovery vi olat ion, we do notbelieve thatthe Def endant has d emonstrat ed any prejudi ce resul ti ng from the trial c ou rt’s rul ing. In f act, the Def endant’ s bri ef does notall ege thathe was prej udiced i n any way. Moreover , t he tr ial courtpermitted Hyde to t esti fy t hat i n his ex pertopini on, an individu al stop ped at the inters ectio n wo uld n ot ha ve be en a ble to see the rear ofthe victim ’s truc k or the fron t of th e D efe nd an t’s va n if the sce ne were as i t had been descri bed duri ng the State ’s pro of. From o urr ev i ewoft he r ec ord, i t se ems thatthe i mportan ce of ren derin g the diag ram to sca le wo uld h ave bee n to suggest tha t the Sta te’s wit nesses t o the shoot ing wer e notin a pos it ion t o see the rear o f the tr uck orthe f rontof t he van. Accordi ngly , we can onl y concl ude thatthe excl usion of

thatport ion of Hyde’ s expert t esti mony aimed at renderi ng the diagram to scale d id not affect the result of the trial. Ten n. R. C rim. P. 52 (a).

H. Tri al Court’ s Exclusion ofExpert Test imony Concerning Pret rial Preparati on of Witnesses
The Defendantalso c ontends t hat t he tr ial court er roneousl y excl uded expe rt testim ony con cern ing p retrial pr epa ration of witn ess es. In re spo nse to the pros ecu to r’ s cross- examinat ion ofthe Def endant wi th r egard t o his pretr ial-77-

preparat ion, defense counsel sought to i ntroduce experttest imony f rom Thomas Dill ard. Dil lard, a seas oned prosecut oran d defe nse a ttorney, wo uld have test if ied thatpret ri al preparat ion o f wi tnes ses is com m on a nd e xpe cted . W e addressed the propri ety of t he tr ial court ’s r uli ng in t his regard as part ofthe third issu e o n a pp ea l.

I. Conclusi on Regardi ng Tri al Court’ s Evi denti aryRuli ngs

As we exp lain ed ab ove , the trial courtdi d make several erron eous eviden tiaryruling s du ring th e co urse of t his lengt hy t ri al. Aft er consi deri ng the entire record, howev er, we d o not be li eve t hat anyof t hese errors affect ed the verd ict. See Tenn. R. Cri m. P. 52(a) . Further more, we simplycannotconcl ude thatthe t ri al cour

t’ s erroneous evi denti ary r uli ngs depri ved t he Defenda nt of a meaningful opp ortun ity to pre sen t a co m plete and effec tive de fens e. In o ur v iew, the trial court’s errors were harmless beyo nd a reas ona ble d oub t. See Chapman , 386 U.S . at 24 , 87 S .Ct. at 8 28; Bigbee , 885 S.W .2d a t 809
. Th e fo urth issu e is there fore w ithou t me rit.

VI. TR IAL CO UR T’S D EM EAN OR AND JUD ICIAL B IAS

In the f ifth i ssue, t he Defendantargues t hat t he tr ial court ’s demeanor an d conduct denied hi m due process oflaw
. The Defendant c ontends t hat t he tr ial court did notdispl ay the requir ed object iv ity or ne utr ali ty d uri ng the course ofthe tri al and that t he lack o f obj ecti vi ty h ad a prej udici al effecton the credibi li ty o f defe ns e wit nesses and t he clai m of self -def ense. He poi nts t o numerous-78-

comments and evidenti ary rul ings which, he alleges, cum ulative ly dem ons trate a p r ej ud i ci al j ud i ci al bi as ag ai ns t hi m.

Canon 3(A) ofthe Code ofJudic ial Condu ct i ndicat es thata tr ial judge sh ou ld maintai n orderand decorum at tri al butshould be pati ent, digni fi ed and court eous to the l iti gants, j urors, wit nesses and l awyers. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10. The tr ial judge mustbe caref ul t o avoi d doing or say ing anythi ng thatmight prejudice the rig hts o f the p arties in the c ase . See Piqu e v. S tate , 480 S. W .2d 546, 550 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971). Furt he rm ore, the Tennessee Const it uti on sp ec ifica llyprohi bit s judgesfrom comm enti ng upon the c redi bil ity ofwit nesses orupon the ev idence i n the cas e. Tenn. Con st. art . VI, § 9. As a result , a t ri al judge mu st refrain from giving the jury an y impre ssi on as to h is or her f eeli ngs about t he evi dence or maki ng anycomment which mightrefl ect on or i nfluence the jury regarding t he weightor cr edibi li ty o f evide nce . See State v. Cazes , 875 S.W .2d 253 , 260 (Te nn. 1 994 ), cert. denied , 513 U.S. 1086, 115 S.Ct. 743, 130 L .Ed.2d 6 44 (1 995 ); State v. Suttl es , 767 S .W .2d 40 3, 406 -07 (T enn . 1989 ); Coll ins v. State , 220 Tenn. 275, 416 S. W .2d 766 (1967 ). As ou r supre me court has stat ed, “ a tr ial jud ge sho uld not exp ress a ny thou ght that w ould lea d the jury to inf erthathis opi nion was i n fav or oforaga inst a d efen dan t in a crim inal trial.” Sta te v. H arris , 839 S. W .2d 54, 66 (Te nn. 1 992 ), cert . deni ed , 507 U.S. 954, 113 S.C t. 1368, 12 2 L.Ed .2d 74 6 (199 3).13 W e note t hat, in a ddit ion to the t ranscri bed record, t he Defendantincl uded audi otaped port ions ofthe record perti nent t o thi s issue. W e have re vie wed those tapes as wel l as t he wri tt en re co rd to a rriv e a t ou r c on clu sio ns reg ar din g th is is su e o n a pp ea l. -79- A. Trial Co urt’s C om me nts

The Defendantchall enges several comment s made by the t ri al j udge duri ng the course of t he trial. 13 Among the chal lenged comments i s an ins tru cti on giv en by t he tr ial courtto def ense wit nesses on sev eral occasions. Duri ng crossexaminat ion of sev eral defense wi tnesses, the prosec utor objected t o the manner ofansweri ng his que sti ons. I n response t o the prosecutor ’s obj ecti ons, t he tr ial court ins tr uct ed t he wi tnes ses as f oll ows: “ W hen you ar e asked a quest ion, answer ye s or no, eit her one; then, ifyou have an expla natio n, you ma y give it. Ho weve r, do n ot volu ntee r any inform ati on be yo nd thatwhich ans wers t he que stion . If the atto rney wan ts m ore in form ation , he’ll as k for it.”

Ofcourse, the propr iety, s cope, manner and control ofexaminat ion of wit nes ses is ent rust ed to t he sound di scret ion ofthe t ri al court and wi ll not be int erf ered with absent an abuse ofthat d iscre tion. Hutchi son , 898 S. W .2d at172; H arris , 839 S. W .2d at 7 2. W e fin d n o e rror with reg ard to th e tria l cou rt’s inst ruct ion, nor do we f ind anyindi cati on of j udici al bi as aga inst the De fend ant. The instr uc tion s w ere giv en to defens e wit nesses upon t he prosecut or’ s objecti on to thei r manner ofrespondi ng on cros s-exa m ination
. No s imilar objec tions we re made by the Def endant and, thus, no simi larobject ions bythe D efend ant we re denied by t he tr ial court . We do not beli eve t ha t t he tr ial judge’ s inst ruct ion conveyed any i mpression f rom which t he jury coul d reasonabl y concl ude thathe did notfi nd the t esti mony of def ense wit nesses t o be credi ble.-80- The Defe nda nt challen ges a nothe r instruction given severa l t imes to defense wit nesses atthe request ofthe prosecutor . The t ri al court i nstr ucted lat erdefense wi tnesses as fol lows: “You are rem inde d tha t you m ay no t testify to a ma tter un less you h ave pers ona l kno wled ge o f that m att er.” No such inst ruct ion was ever requ este d by th e D efe ndant wi th r egard t o test imony f rom Sta te’s witne sse s. W e fi nd nothi ng improper in t he tr ial cou rt’s instru ction
. See Tenn. R. Evid. 6 02. T he clea r impo rt of the trial court’s instruction w as to en sure thatwit nesses understood t hat t heir test imony must be ba sed on thei r o wn knowledge rat her t han on what ot hers had t old t hem. Furt her more, we do not believe thatthe t ri al j udge’s i nstr ucti on convey ed any i mpression f rom which t he jury could reasonablyconcl ude thathe did no t f ind the t estimony of defense wit nesses t o be credi ble.

The Defendantch all enges numerous ot her comments made by t he tr ial court during examinati on of several defense wit nesses. W e do not f eel the need to exam ine thes e cha llenges one b y one. A s we s tated ab ove, the p ropri ety , scope, manner and control ofexaminat ion ofwit nesses i s entr usted t o the sound discreti on of t he tr ial courtand wil l notbe int erf ered wi th absentan abuse of that discreti on. Hutchi son , 898 S.W .2d a t 172 ; H arr is , 839 S.W .2d at 72. The vast
m ajority ofchalleng ed co mm ents w ere a sound exercise o f t he disc ret ion ofthe tri al court . We do not believe thatany ofthatvastmajori ty o f comments ref lect ed upon the c redib ility of defe nse witne sse s or th e D efen dan t’ s claim of se lfdefense.

After a caref ul revi ew of t he Defendant ’s al legat ions, we f ind o nlyone which has a si gnif icantdegree ofmerit . Duri ng the di rect examinat ion ofthe-81-

De fend ant, a ben ch co nferen ce oc curred in which th e tri al courtinst ruct ed defense cou nse l not to d elve in to the fact tha t the D efen dan t prayed wit h the you th minister

of his church about t he sit uati on wit h the vi cti m on the morning of the shooti ng. When direc t exa m in ati on resumed, def ense counsel asked t he Defendanta rel evant, open-ended, non-l eading ques ti on. The Defendant , not knowing what had been d iscus sed at t he bench conf erence, mentioned the fact thathe and his w if e had prayed wi th t he yout h minis ter . The pros ecutor im m ed iate ly object ed and stat ed, “ You r Ho nor, th is, ob viou sly, s ho ws . . . his tes ti mony is rehearsed .
. . .” The tri al j udge responded bycommenting, “Ye s , yes.”

We believe tha t the trial c ou rt’s response t o the prosecutor ’s obj ecti on was impro per. Th e p ros ec uto r’s o bje ctio n, ta ke n in context wit h other remarks made duri ng the t ri al, was a clear att empt to i mply t hat t he Defendant ’s t esti mony was not credi ble. The tri al j udge’s affi rmati ve res ponse convey ed an impressi on from w hic h the j ury c ould hav e reasonabl y concl uded thatthe t ri al j udge did notfi nd the Defendant to be a credibl e witness. In f act, thi s impress ion becomes cl earer when we consi der ot her re marks made by the t ri al court outof t he jury’ s heari ng when defense co unsel obj ec ted to b oth the pro se cu tor’s an d th e ju dg e’s com m ents and re que sted a c urative instru ction . I n dec lining to give a cu rative inst ruct ion, the trial c ourt s tated that t here was “ a strong suspi cion”thatthe De fen da nt’s test imony was rehearsed and, thus, ther e was “probable cau se” for the p rose cuto r’s com m ent.

We do n ot, ho we ver, be lieve th at the trial cou rt’s com m ent dep ri ved t he Defendantofhis c on stitu tion al rig ht to a fa irtri al. The improper com ment was a14Itappears t hat Massengi ll ’s cr iminal record incl uded convi cti ons for b urgl aryand recei vin g stol en property , al l f rom 1980. -82- sing le remark made duri ng the course of a t hree-weektr ial . The Defendan t’ s c red ibil itywas much m ore vigorously questi oned through effect ive crossexaminat ion. Co nsid ering the re cord in its ent irety , we are conf identthatthe t ri al co urt’s improper

remark di d not affectthe out come of the t rial. Se e Tenn . R
. Cr i m. P. 52 (a). T he e rror w as h arm less beyo nd a reas ona ble d oub t. S e e Chapman , 386 U.S . at 24 , 87 S .Ct. at 8 28; Bigbee , 885 S. W .2d at809.

B. Tr ial Court’ s Evi denti aryRuli ngs

The Defendantal so chall enges several ev ident iary rul ings made by t he tr ial court duri ng the course of t he tr ial , ar guing t hat t hey demonstrat e a judi cial bias which advers elyaff ected the credibi li ty o f hi s proofand depri ved him of a fair tria l. The fi rstofthese c hall enges concer ns the admi ssibi li ty o f cr iminal records. The Defendantcontends thatthe t ri al cou rt fav ored t he Stat e wit h regar d to t he a d m issibility of the cr iminal records of himself , the v icti m and S tate’ s witness G ary M as se ng ill.

We can fi nd no indi cati on of bi as in t he trial c ourt ’s r uli ngs regarding t he adm issibility of crim inal re cord s. In fac t, we p oint o ut tha t proo f of t h e De fen da nt’s cri minal record was neverint roduced attr ial . Massengi ll ’s cr iminal record was excluded because the convict ions we re f ourt een yearsold and t he Defendantdid not provi de adequate notice of hi s int enti on to use the ev idence. 14 See Tenn. R. Evi d. 609( b). In addi ti on, al though the Def endant was al lowed to testify as to his knowledge o f t he cri minal record ofthe v ict im, certi fi ed copies of-83-

the vi cti m’s convi cti ons were r uled ina dm issib le by t he tr ial court . Noti ng thatthe victim ’s convictions were for a dri ver’s li cense violat ion, publ ic drunkenness, and manufactur ing marijuana, t he tri al co ur t r uled t hat t he convi cti ons were not proba tive of t he vi cti m’s characterforviolen ce o r agg ress ivene ss. See State v. Furl ough , 797 S.W .2 d 631, 650 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990); Tenn. R. Evi d. 404 (a)(2). From our r evi ew of t he record, we can disce rn no evi dence of j udici al misconduct or bias wi th regard t o these ruli ngs.

As his s econd chal lenge, the Def endan t cont end s that the trial cou rt exhi bit ed bias ag ainst him by restricting him from m aking n eces sary pro ffers and by denying requests fo r j ury- out hear ings. The Defendant argues thatthe t ri al co urt’s language and manner of add ressi ng his requests ad versel y affect ed the credi bil ity ofhis proof. The record reveal s that , atti mes, the tr ial courtseemed somewhat fr ustrated atthe prosp ect o f conti nuouslysending the j ury outfor proffers and hea rings
. In f act, on one occ asio n the trial cou rt state d, “O h, I ha te to send thi s jury out . I am sor ry . Yo u wi ll have t o step out .” In hi s bri ef, the Defendantsets forth a l it any of ex changes between defense c ounsel and the t ri al court in whi ch the t ri al court i s somewhat gruff wi th def ense counsel . We do not feel the need t o li st t hose exchanges here.

We agree that a t rial judge must not a llow p erso nal irritatio ns to ruffle his orher j udici al demeanordurin g trial. Bro oks v. State , 187 Tenn. 67, 213 S. W .2d 7 (194 8), cert . deni ed , 340 U. S. 837, 71 S.Ct. 21 , 95 L.E d. 614 (1950 ). Alt hough the tr ial judge was sometimes curt wi th def ense counsel regar ding proff er and jury-outheari ng requ ests , we do notbeli eve t hat t he tr ial judge’ s language or rul ings exhi bit ed anybias or consti tut ed misconduct . We are confi dent t hat t he-84-

tri al cou rt’s demeanor did no t ad vers ely im pa ct th e cr ed ibility o f the De fen da nt’s proo f.

As his t hird chall enge, t he Defendantcontends thatthe trial court fav ored the State with regard to the scope of cross-examination ofcharacter wi tnesses. The De fend ant s oug ht to ca ll sever al ch arac ter witn ess es d uring his pr oof to testify rega rding his ch arac ter for tru thfuln ess . At a jury-ou t hear ing on t he sub ject, t he pros ecutor voi ced his int enti on to askthe Def endant’ s charact er wit nesses iftheyhad heard t hat t he Defendanthad left t he scene of t he shooti ng, had disca rded the bul let s remaini ng in t he gun, had placed the gun i n an eave of his carp ort, an d h ad initially den ied k now ledg e of th e sh ootin g wh en s pea king to police off icers. The t ri al court r uled t hat t he prosecut or’ s questi ons would be all owed on cros s-exa m ination
. As a re su lt, the De fen da nt d ec ide d n ot to call h is chara cter witnes ses to tes tify.

After the conc lusi on ofthe D efen dan t’s pro of, the State called F.B .I. Agent Don Pro vonsha t o testi fy i n rebuttal . Provonsha test ifi ed that defense wit ness Ro bert Ferguson had a po or rep utat ion f ortrut hfulness. On cross- examinat ion, defense counsel soughtto askProvonsha i f he had heard thatFerguson had signed a wri tt en st atementand whet her t hat fact wo uld ch an ge Pro von sh a’s testi mony. The trial court di d not permit def ense counsel’s questi ons.

We fi nd no evi dence ofjud icial b ias in th es e ru ling s. T he trial c ou rt’s rul ing with rega rd to c ross -exa m inati o n of t he Defendant ’s cha ract er wi tnesses was support ed by Tennessee Rule of Evidence 405(a) . Al though i t may have been error forthe t ri al court notto per mit t he Defendant ’s ques ti ons of Agent-85-

Provonsha, we disc ern no j udici al bi as in t he ru li ng. Further more, any error conc ern ing the re st ri ct ed q ues ti oni ng o f P ro vo nsh a wa s ha rml ess . Tenn . R
. Cr i m. P. 52(a ). The jurywas aware t hat Fer guson had signed a wri tt en stat ement fro m the que stion ing o f Ferg uso n him self. In fa ct, defense c ounsel emphasi zed the sign ificanc e of s ignin g the written sta t eme nt dur ing hi s examinat ion of Ferguson.

As his fourth cha llenge, the D efend ant con tends that the trial court fav ored the State reg arding th e exclus ion of evide nce a s a sa nction for d iscovery viol ations. See Tenn. R. Evi d. 16( d)(2) . The Defendantpoints ou t that the exp ert psychol ogical test imonyof Dr. Catheri ne Gyuri k on the D efen dan t’s m enta l state was excl uded on the bas is t hat t he Defendanthad not provi ded the Stat e wit h a report de tailin g G yurik ’s concl usions. In addi ti on, t he testimo ny of La ma r Miller, the Defendant ’s handwr it ing e xpert, on the su bject of wh ether the derog atory wri ti ng on t he si gns i ntroduced by t he Defe ndantmatche d known samples ofthe victim ’s handwri ti ng was als o excl uded on the ba sis thatthe Def endant had not provi de d the St ate wi th a reportdetai li ng Mil ler ’s con clusi ons. The Defenda nt argues thatthese rul ings are in sha rp co ntras t to the trial cou rt’s ruling s with regard to t he Defendant ’s pr iorconvi cti ons even t hough the t ri al courtfound t hat the Stat e had not provi ded the Defendantwit h noti ce of i ts i ntent ion to use t hat evid en ce at tria l.

We fi nd no evi dence of a judi cial bias i n these r uli ngs. As we d iscusse d above, we beli eve t hat t he tr ial court ’s ex clusi on of t he tes ti mon y ofthe De fen da nt’s experts on the basi s of di scovery vi olat ions was an abuse of d iscr eti on. W e do not b elieve , how eve r, that the trial cou rt’s erro rs refle ct a-86-

judi cial bi a s agains t t he Defendant . I n contrast t o the ex clusi on of t he De fen da nt’s proof , i t i s quit e cle ar t hat t he Stat e’s ques ti ons concern ing t he Defendant’ s pri or conv ict ions did notinv olv e a disc overyvi olat ion. Inst ead, t he tri al courtnoted t hat the S tate h ad fa iled to p rovide ade qua te no tice of its int enti on to use thatevi dence in vi olat ion ofRules 608 and 609 of t he Tennessee Rules of Evi dence. The trial ju dg e a llow ed the Sta te’s qu es tion s in spit e of t he notice vi olat ion becaus e he found t hat the Def endant had made a sw ee pin g cla im ofgoo d co ndu ct. Ag ain, a s we expla ined abo ve, we believ e tha t th e trial court erred in f indi ng thatthe Def endant had made a sweepi ng clai m of good con duc t. Yet we see no i ndicat ion t hat t he tr ial judge was biased againstthe Defendantor thathe fa vore d the State with regard to t he exclusion ofevidence as a sanct ion for di scovery vi olati ons.

As his fi ft h chall enge, t he Defendantargues t hat t he tr ial courtfav ored t he Sta te with re gard to the admis sion of p rior c on siste nt s tate m en ts to reb ut a claim ofrece nt fab rication . Th e D efen dan t poin ts out that the trial court oft en rest ri cted the testi mony of defense wit nesses rega rdi ng speci fi c detai ls t he Defendanthad told them concerni ng the harassment by t he v i ct i m. The tri al court al lowed defense witne sse s to tes tify abo ut the perc eived me ntal sta te of t he Defendant but did n ot allow them to testify a bou t the i nciden ts of ha rass m ent a nd th reats rel ated to t hem by the Defe ndant whi ch f or me d th e b as is for the De fen da nt’s mental st ate.

The Defendantcontras ts those r uli ngs wit h the t ri al court’ s all owance of questi ons to State’ s witness Gary Massengi ll on redi rectconcerni ng a stat ement he had giv en to pol ice officers . On cros s-exami nati on, def ense counsel-87-

questi oned Massen g ill about written statem ents he had g iven to po lice officers aft erthe sho otin g in an e ffort to im pea ch h is testim ony on d irect e xam ination
. It app ears thatthe sta tem en ts w ere act ua lly writte n b y po lice o ffice rs a s M as se ng ill ora llyrelate d his acc oun t of the sho oting to the m . On redire ct, th e prosecut or asked Massengil l whet her he had signed those st atements. Massengil l t esti fi ed thathe had not been asked to si gn them. The prosecutor also ask ed Ma sse ng ill whetherhe tol d those p olice offic ers t he same account t hat he t esti fi ed to on direct exam ination. Ma ssen gill respond ed affirm atively.

We note t hat al though defense c ounsel obj ected t o the l eading nat ure of some of the prosecutor’ s questions, he did not objectto the subst ance of these questi ons att r i al
. As we ex pl ai ne d a bo ve , i t ma y have bee n er ror for t he tr ial court t o r es t r i ctt he t es t i mo ny o f def ense wit nesses. W e do not, however, see any ind ica tion of d isp ara te tre atm en t or ju dic ial bia s against the De fen da nt in these ruli ngs.

As his sixth chal lenge, the Def endant argues thatthe t ri al court f avored the Sta te by denyi ng a cl osure of the cou rtroom for one o f his witness es to testify. Accordi ng to the witne ss’ pro ffer, he inten ded to testify c onc ernin g viole nt ac ts committed by t he v i ct i m againsthim. The proff er al so makes clear thatthe witness f eared r etal iat ion bythe Shepard famil y agai nst hi s famil y shoul d he testify. As a re sult, the De fenda nt requ ested that the tri al court excl ude spec tators and the media fro m the court room duri ng the wi tness’ test imony. The tri al cou rt denied t he Defendant ’s request f or a cl osure ofthe courtro om. The witness in ques ti on, Da vid R iley, d id e ven tua lly tes tify co nc ern ing his opini on of t he victi m’s characterforvi olence and aggressi veness. Before Ril ey t esti fi ed,15 The record reveal s thatthe mem bers of t he vi cti m’s imm ediat e famil y wer e subpoenaed by the Defendan t. Apparent ly , def ense counsel ori ginal ly int ended to call them as hosti le wi tnesses and questi on them about t he vi cti m’s all eged pri or vi olent acts. The tri al court even tual ly rul ed evi dence of the vi cti m’s viol ent act s again st i ndiv idual s other than t he Defendantinadmissi ble. Nevert heless, the family mem bers remained excluded from the courtroo m itsel f pursuan t t o Tennessee Rule of Eviden ce 615 and, accordi ng to t he Defendant , t hey cong regat ed near t he door t o the courtroo m thr ou gh ou t the tria l. -88- defense counsel expres sed concern thatthe witness would hav e to wal k past t he She pard f ami l y as he en t er ed t he co urt r oo m. 15 As a re sult, the trial court all owed Rile y to en ter thro ugh the b ack doo r of the cou rtroom so a s to avoi d any meeti ng with the S hep ard fam ily.
Initially, we observ e thatthe Defendantassert s thatthe cl osure r equested consti tut ed a parti al cl osure. We believ e that t he closure requested was a com plete closure in th at th e D efe nd an t so ug ht to ha ve a ll spe cta tors an d m ed ia excl uded from the court room , leav ing onl y th e att orneys, courtpersonnel , t he Defendantand the w itnes s. See St at e v . Sa ms , 8 02 S. W .2d 635, 640 ( Tenn. Cr i m. App. 1990). Given t hat the Shepard familymem bers w e re al ready excl uded from the court room pursuantto Tennessee Rul e of Evi dence 615, t he Defend an t’s requ est w as, in e ffect, an effort to c onc eal th e ver y iden tityof th e witness. The Defe nda nt argu es that the tri al j udge did notproper lyweigh t he app ropr iate int erest s in ar ri vi ng at his dec isi on to denythe cl osure. At a j ury- out heari ng on th e su bjec t, the trial co urt fou nd th at the facts setforth in th e a ffida vit ofthe wi tnes s conce rni ng possi ble retal iat ion bythe Shepard famil y di d not require closure and thata clos ure coul d not provi de the relie f req ue ste d, n am ely conceali ng the ident ity ofthe witn es s. T he trial c ou rt fou nd furth er th at th e p ub lic interest in open p roceedi ngs outwei ghed the fai r t ri al i nter ests advanced by t he De fend ant.-89- Our supreme courtdiscu ssed the proper de ter minati on of com plete clo sure requ ests in State v. Drake , 701 S. W .2d 604 (Tenn. 1985). The courtquoted with approval f rom a United States Supreme C ourt case as fol lows: [T]he party seeki ng to cl ose the heari ng must advance an overr idi ng interest thatis l ikel y to be prej udiced, the c losure must be no broa der th an n ece ssa ry to prot ect t hat i nter est, the t ri al court must consider

reasonable alt ernatives to closi ng the proce edi ng , an d it must make fi ndings ade quate t o supportthe cl osure. Id. at60 8 ( qu ot i ng f r om W aller v. G eorg ia , 467 U. S. 39, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 2216, 81 L.Ed .2d 3 1 (19 84)) ; acco rd Globe N ewspaperCo. v. Superi or Courtforthe Count y of N orfo lk , 457 U. S. 596, 606-07, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 2620- 21, 73 L. Ed.2d 248 (1982 ).

In the cas e sub judice , t he tr ial courtimpli cit lyfound t hat t he Defendanthad not ad van ce d a n o verr idin g in tere st like ly to b e pre judice d in the abs enc e of a com plete closu re. From our r evi ew of t he rec ord, we agree wi th t he impli citrul ing o f the t ri al court t hat t he Defendantdid notdemonstrat e an over ri ding i nter es t likely to be prejudi ced. Further more, we fi nd no evi dence of di sparat e tr eatment ofor j udici al bi as a gainst the Defe nda nt with rega rd to the trial cou rt’s closure rul ing.

In summary, as we di scussed abov e, the trial court certainly m ade errors duri ng the course of t his often content ious, thr ee-week t ri al. Given t he lengt h of the trial, the vo lum e of e viden ce a nd th e co m plexity of t he legal issue s inv olv ed, it is n o t sur pri sing t hat t here were some erroneous ev ident iary rul ings and impropercomm ents. Yetwe find no i ndicati on in those errors thatthe t ri al court exhi bit ed a bias againstthe Def endant. Inst ead, we can on lyconcl ude thatthe tri al court ’s demeanor an d rulin gs did n ot i mproperl y favor t he Stat e or hav e a-90-

prej udici al effec t on th e cre dibility of t he Defendant ’s proofin su pp ort o f his c laim of se lf-defe nse . Th is issu e is the refore witho ut m erit.

VI I. PROSECUT ORIA L MIS CONDUCT

In t he si xt h i ss ue , t he Defen da ntch al l en ge s n ume r ous acti ons of t he assis tantdist ri ct attor ney gener al whi ch he cont ends const it ut ed prosecut ori al
m isco ndu ct. In Ha rringto n v. S tate , 215 Tenn. 338, 385 S.W.2d 758 (1965) , our su pr eme courtset f ort h the t est t o be appli ed by an appel lat e courtin revi ewing inst ances of impro per co ndu ct. The relevant inq uiry is “whet her t he improper conduct could h ave affect ed the v erdi ct t o the prejudice of the de fenda nt.” Id. at 340, 385 S. W .2d at 759. In Judg e v. State , 539 S. W .2d 340 ( Tenn. Cri m. App. 197 6), this Cou rt noted five facto rs general lyaccepted as those to be cons ider ed in making the determinati on of whether i mproper conduct affected t he verdictto a defendant ’s prejudi ce. Those f actors are: 1. the conduct complaine d ofvi ewed in cont ext and in l ightofthe fact s and ci rcumstances of t he case; 2. the cur ative m ea su res un de rtak en by th e tria l court and the prosecut ion; 3. the int ent ofthe prosecutor in maki ng the i mproperstate m ent; 4. the cumulati ve effectof t he improper conduct and anyother errors in t he record; and, 5. the r elat iv e strength or weakness ofthe cas e. Id. at 34 4. The De fendant cit es many instances of conduct which he b elieve s to have been improper

and div ides them int o sever al cat egori es in hi s bri ef. Forthe sake ofcl ari ty , we will address the instan ces o f alleged m iscond uct as the y are categor ized in th e D efe nd an t’s br ief. W e w ill addr ess the effect of any e rrors after e xam ining all of the cate gorie s of m isco ndu ct raise d by th e D efen dan t.-91- A. Categories of Al leged Prosecutor ial Misconduct 1. M isrepre sen tative Re ma rks ab out th e De fend ant’s C laim o f SelfDefense The Defendant complains of several remarks mad e by t he prosecut or concerni ng his the ory o f self-de fens e. Forinst ance, t he Defendantassert s that the prose cutor mi srepre sente d the p roof ad duce d at trial by arguin g to the jury thatthe Def endant’ s van bumped the vi cti m’s tr uck. The Defen dant cont ends thatthe cl ear wei ght ofthe ev idence, incl uding t he tes tim on y of th e S tate ’s witnesses, indica tes th at the re wa s no con tact b etwe en th e veh icles. S ta t e’s witness Ga ry M as se ng ill, how eve r, did testify thatthe v an bumped the t ruck f rom behind. Massengil l, being a p assengerin t he tr uck, was the Stat e’s wi tness who was in the b est p osition to test ify aboutthe alleg ed bu m p. A ltho ug h th e S tate ’s otherwit nesses did notsee any cont act between the v ehicl es, we bel iev e thatthe pro se cu tor’s references to t he a ll eged bump were not i mproper gi ven Massengil l’ s test imony t hat such a bump had occurr ed.

The Defendantalso com pla ins of th e p ros ec uto r’s questi ons to Dr . Engum concerni ng the alle ge d bump. As we detai led abov e, Dr. Engum testi fi ed on cross- examinat ion tha t , t o the bestof hi s recol lect ion, he remembered being inf ormed about some cont act between the v ehicl es. Engum beli eved he had lear ned thi s informati on from the Defendantand clear lyremembered disc ussing it wit h defense c ounsel. On redirect, Engum revi ewed the not es he had t aken as he spo ke w ith the D efen dan t. Upon reviewing the not es, Engum testi fi ed thathe beli eved he had le arned abo ut t he a ll eged bump solel y from defense counsel rat herthan from the D efen dan t. On recross, t he prosecut or quest ioned Engum about the sl ightincons ist ency between his t esti mony on cross -examina ti on and-92-

on redire ct. The Defendant c ontends t hat t he prosecut or i mproperl y expl ored the inconsist ency in Engum’s test imony becau se En gu m ha d, o n re dire ct, m ere ly clar if ied a mistake he had made on cro ss- exa m ina tion du e to his n ot b ein g a ble to con sult his note s from intervie ws w ith the D efen dan t. W e believe , howe ver, thatthe pro se cu tor w as en titled to q ue stio n Engum about the c hange or “cl ari fi cati on” in hi s test imony, and we fi nd nothi ng im pro pe r in his que sti oning as detai led i n the record.

The De fen da nt n ext c om pla ins ofthe prosecutor ’s comment t hat t he defense was “putti ng up a bogus selfdefense t heory t hat has been constr ucted aft erthe fact .” These comm ents, how ever, we re made to the tri al court dur ing a jury-outheari ng. W e can fi nd no prej udice i nuri ng to t he Defendantas a res ult of these comments.

Somewhat similar c om me nts we re m ade by the pro secu tor to the jury durin g clo sing argu m ent: [ MR. JO LL EY :] An d le t’s ta lk ab ou t the bu m pin g. If yo u’re rea lly concerned about whathappened, woul dn’tyou bump the tr uck and letthem know you we re there? . . . You don ’t wave at them as th ey go byat t he stop s ign and t alk about being scared bythe gl are t hat they look at your eye s. No. T hat’s all hoku m-- MR. MONC IER: Objecti on. MR . JOL LEY : --that’s been ma de up -- MR. MONC IER: Objecti on. TH E C OU RT : Yes , Ge nera l, reph rase that. MR . JOL LEY : W e sug gest to yo u that that h as be en m ade up-- MR . MO NC IER : Ob ject. THE C OUR T: Overr uled. MR . JO LLE Y: --afte rwa rds to cove r self-d efen se. . . . The Defendantcon tends thatthese c omm ents cons ti tut ed prosecut ori al
m isco ndu ct. Of cou rse, it is improp er for a prosecut orto e xpre ss to the jury h is orherpersonal beli ef oropini on as to t he tr uth or fal sity oftest imonyor evi dence.16Th e D efe nda nt co m plains of oth er ins tanc es o f sim ilar langu age use d by the pros ecu tor. Fo r ins tan ce , on e s uc h c om pla int is dire cte d to wa rd the pro se cu tor ’s a rg um en t to th e ju ry, “I s ug ge st it didn’ t happen thatway. ” That remark was direct ed toward the Defen dant’ s test imony and proof t hat the vi cti m reached int o the v an befor e he was fat all y shot . Appl yi ng the same reasoni ng outl ined above, we do not b eli eve th at t hese remarks were an i mproper stat ement of personalbeli ef or op ini on conce rning the truth or fal sity of the Defend ant’s proof.

-93- See, e.g. , State v. Henl ey , 774 S.W .2d 9 08, 9 11 (T enn . 198 9), cert . deni ed , 497 U.S. 103 1, 11 0 S .Ct. 3291, 111 L.Ed .2d 8 00 (1 990 ); State v. Hicks , 618 S. W .2d 510, 517 (T enn . Crim. A pp. 19 81); see also David Loui s Raybin, Tennessee Criminal Pract ice and Procedure, § 29.31. Ten ness ee co urts have recogni zed, how ever, tha t the spe cific te rm ino lo gy used by th e p ros ec uto r is im po rtan t in deter mining wh ethersuch comments qual ify as misc ondu ct. Typ ically, comment s pref aced by “I thi nk” or“I submit”do no t co nsti tut e impermiss ibl e personal opinions. See Co ker v. S tate , 9 11 S. W .2d 357 , 368 (T enn . Crim. A pp. 19 95). In t he pr es en t ca se , t he pros ec ut or ’ s i ni t i al co mme nts we re object ed to bythe Defendantand were cor rec te d by t he tr ial court . We do not beli eve t hat t he pro se cu tor’s comments prefa ced by “ we suggest”were an i mproper pers onal com me nt upo n the truth o r falsity of the Defe nda nt’s self-defen se theo ry. 16

The Defendantalso co m pla ins ab ou t rem ark s co nc ern ing the victim ’s approach to the van. D uring closin g arg um ent, the prosecutor made the fol lowi ng comm ents: MR. JOLLEY: Int enti onal, premedit ated, deli berat e. Si tt ing and wait ing as Rod Shepard walked back to th e tru ck w ith h is ha nd s in the air, sho wing tha t he’s una rme d-- MR. MONC IER: Objecti on. MR . JOL LEY : --or his left hand in h is pock et-- THE C OUR T: Overr uled. MR. JOLLEY: -- swingi ng his ar m to his side, or h is rig ht h an d in his pocketup to the to p, a s M rs. Joslin says , or all the way in , as Mr. Joslin say s. The Defendantargues t hat t he pro se cu tor’s com m en ts a bo ut th e vic tim walki ng back to the van “with his h an ds in the air” is a mischaract erizat ion of t he evidence-94-

giv en thatStat e’s wi tnesses Judy Al len and M ich ell e Flatt t esti fi ed thatthe victim ’s left han d was in h i s pan ts pock et. State’s witne ss Ph illi p Mu rphy, how ever, testified that the victim’s h and s were not i n his po ckets, but ratherwere being used to g estur e to the De fen da nt. M ore ove r, we view the pro se cu tor’s remarks as attem pting to exp lain the differing testim ony and to su gge st tha t, no matterwhich t esti mony is acc redi ted, the resultof t he tr ial should be the same. From our re view, we c onclude t hat t he prosecut or’ s comments were not impro per.

2. R em ark s C on veying a Pe rso na l Be lief ab ou t the Cre dib ility and Gu ilt of t he Defenda nt The Defe nda nt next complai ns of several remarks by the prosecutor which he argues i mproperl y convey ed the prosecutor ’s personal beli efs regardi ng the cred ibilityofthe De fen da nt’s proo f an d th e gui ltof t he Defe ndanthimsel f. As we stat ed above, itis i mprope r f or a p rosecut or t o expres s to t he jury hi s or her personal beliefor opini on as to the t ruth or falsity of any t est imony orevidence orthe g uilt of the defe nda nt. Henley , 774 S.W .2d at911 ; Hicks , 618 S. W .2d at 517 ; Sn eed v. State , 546 S .W .2d 25 4, 261 (Ten n. Crim . App. 1 976 ).

Several of t he remarks compl ained o f bythe Def endant on appeal were, we be l iev e, ei thercured attr ial or were simplynot i mproper. For exampl e, t he Defendantcom pla ins of th e p ros ec uto r’s a ctio ns in “sl amm ing”down his hand or fi ngerwhile he was c riticizing defens e cou nsel for i nter ruptin g his argu m ent. Th ese a ctions w ere made during a jury-outheari ng though, and we can f ind no prejudice inur ing to t he Defendantas a resul t ofthem. I n addit ion, the Def endant complainsof a sarcasti c remark bythe prosecutor to t he Defendantduring cross--95-

examinat ion that“ [ t ] ha t ’ s g oo d t ha t y ou ca n t el l i t i n t he sa me wo rds tha t you said befor e, Mr. Jos li n.” The Defendant obj ected t o t h is rem ark, and the trial court sustai ned the obj ecti on and gave a curative instruc tion for the jury to disre gard the state m ent. In the absence of proof t o the cont rary , we must presume that t he jury followe d the trial cou rt’s cura tive instru ction
. See State v. Compt on , 64 2 S.W .2d 745, 7 46 (T enn . Crim. A pp. 19 82); Fra zier v. S tate , 566 S.W.2d 545, 551 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977) (cit ati ons omitt ed). Thus, we concl ude thatthe t ri al court’ s instr uction cured any er ror posed by the prosecutor’s remark.

Th ere were, howev er, several co mments made bythe pros ecut or whi ch we believe were improper in t hat t hey effect iv elyconveye d the prosecut or’ s personal belie fs aboutthe c redib ilityof t he Defendant ’s proof. The Defendant c omplains ofan objecti on made by the prosecutor in t he presence o f the jur y, s tat ing t hat the Defendant ’s response to a questi on on directexami nati on “o bvi ousl y sho ws his testi mony is rehearsed.” The State now conce des that t he pro se cu tor’s rem ark was improper and, giv en the cont ext of def ense counsel ’s ques ti on and the Defend ant’ s response, we agree.

The Defendantalso c omplains of anot her comment made by the prose cutor

duri ng the di rectexaminat ion ofthe Def endant. As the Def end an t began to testify about the events o f Octob er 28, 19 92, the d ay h e an d his wife so ld the Da nte Ro ad ho m e to Ca rroll V otaw and recei ved t he fi rstthr eateni ng tel ephone call from the v i ct i m, he ap pa ren tly be ca m e so m ew ha t em otio na l. Defense counsel ask ed th e D efen dan t to calm down and offer ed him a gl ass of water. At thatpoint, the prosecutor, referr ing to t he Defendant’s emotion al response, stat ed “YourHono r, the re’s n o rea son to be ups et by th is type of--.”-96-

We be lieve tha t, by m ak ing this com m ent, the pro se cu tor w as pe rso na lly commenting on the si nceri ty a nd credi bil ity ofthe Defendant’s test imony. Such
commen ts h ave been addr essed by Tennessee c ourt s before and have been condemned as bein g im prop er. See State v. Bates , 804 S. W .2d 868, 881 (Tenn. 199 1), cert . deni ed , 502 U .S. 841 , 112 S .Ct. 131 , 116 L .Ed.2d 98 (19 91).

In ad ditio n, th e D efe nd an t co m pla in s ab out a remark made by t he pros ecu tor du ring c losing argu m ent. MR. JOL LEY : Mr. Monciertal ks about wit nesses who weren’ t cal led. W ell, i f wi tnesses don’tknow anyt hing, theyhave no busi ness on th e stand, u nlike witnes ses, D r. I-am-no t-a -l iar En gu m, who change s his testim ony-- MR . MO NC IER : Objec tion, your H ono r. THE C OUR T: Overr uled. MR. JOLLEY: -- about whet her ornot Mr. Josli n tol d him thathe bum ped the veh icle after a con versation with Mr. M oncier. Ce rtain ly the prosecut or was ent it led t o comment on the change in D r. En gu m ’s testimo ny, just as defe nse cou nse l wou ld ha ve be en e ntitled to argu e to the jury thatDr. Engum had merelyclar if ied his pre viou s te stim on y afte r refr es hin g h is me mo ry by revi ewing his i ntervi ew notes. Ithas lon g been the law i n Tennessee, how ever, thata pros ecu tor sh ould refrain from inflam ing th e jury w ith intem pera te argu m ent. See, e.g. , State v. Sutton , 562 S.W .2d 8 20, 8 23 (T enn . 197 8); Ru sse ll
v. State , 532 S.W .2d 2 68, 2 71 (T enn . 197 6); see general ly Be rger v . Unit ed States , 2 95 U. S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed.2d 1314 (1935). Thus, we believe tha t the prose cutor’s m ann er of referring to th e witnes s was impro per.

3. Cr oss-e xaminat ion ofthe Defendant Conce rni ng Pret ri al Preparat ion w ith his Atto rn eys The Defendantnextcomplai ns of an e nti re l ine of que stioning o n the p art ofthe pros ecuto r. The q uestion s occu rred du ri ng cro ss-ex aminati on of t he17 See Tenn. R. Cri m. P. 26.2. -97-

Defendantand gen eral ly invo lved the De fen da nt’s pre trial p rep ara tion with his attorney s. The Def endan t raise d es sen tially the s am e issu e, bu t cha lleng ing b oth the pro se cu tor’s act ion s an d th e tria l cou rt’s ru ling s, a s his third issu e o n a pp ea l. We addressed t he issue in i ts ent ir ety, incl uding whet herthe prosecutor ’s act ions consti tut ed misconduct , when we di scussed t he Defendant ’s t hird issu e.

4. Remarks Acc using Defense Counsel of Sol ici ti ng Fals e Test imony thr ough RobertFerguson We de tail ed i n our di scussi on of t he fact s above t he unusual course of test imonyby def ense wit ness RobertFergus o n. Ferguson testi fied on di rect exa m ina tion tha t he be lieve d th e vic tim to have b een a pea ceful pe rson n inetynine perc ent of t he ti me. Durin g direct ex aminati on, howev er, Ferguson was confronted wit h a wri tt en stat ement he had gi ven t o defense c ounsel i n which he stat ed thatthe vict im was a violent, aggre ssive pe rson a nd tha t he ha d overh eard the victim thre ate nin g th e D efe nd an t. Alth ou gh Fe rgu so n’s ini ti al t esti mony may have su r pr i se d d ef en se co un se l t o s ome degree, direct ex aminati on was rat her ordinary.
During a jur y-ou t he arin g before cro ss-ex aminati on, Fer guson test if ied t hat defense counsel had u rge d h i m t o e xa gg er at e t he v i ol en t na t ur e o f t he v i ct i m. These sta tem en ts led de fen se cou ns el to reve al th at h e h ad tap e re co rde d h is convers ati ons wit h Ferguson. Afte r a cont roversy aboutwhetherthe prosecutor co uld revi ew those t apes alone , def ense counsel ref used to offerthe t ap es as Jencks m ate rial. 17 Th e tria l cou rt ord ere d F erg us on ’s test imony st ri cken, butthe prosecut orreque sted an alternative remedy. The tri al cou rt allo we d F erg us on ’s18 W e note that the Defend ant also challenges the trial court’ s evidentiary r ulings with regard to Fergu son’s t esti mony. W e addressed t he propr iety ofvari ous rul ings ofthe t ri al court concer ning Fe rg us on ’s te stim on y as pa rt o f th e fo ur th a nd fifth iss ue s o n a pp ea l. -98- test imonyto rem ain, b ut p erm itted t he prosecut or t o questi on him about the allegations that defen se co unse l had urg ed him to exag gerate his testimo ny.

Aft era tho roug h rev iew o f the p rose cuto r’s cro ss-e xam inati on of Ferguson , we fi nd nothi ng improper in t he ques t ioni ng. Fer guson himsel f brought up t he subjectduri ng a jury-outheari ng. Cert ainl y al legat ions of t hat natur e are ent it led to be expl ored by opposing c ounsel. The prosecut orask ed a se ries of sim ple questi ons int ended to al low Fer guson to e xpla in the type ofrequestmade by defense counsel wit h regar d to Fer guson’s expect ed test imonyat tri al. The Defendantcom pla ins spe cifica ll y abo ut a comment made by t he prosecut or duri ng the course of Ferguson’s test imony t hat def ense counsel was “making stuff out ofwhole cl oth. ” This remark occur red dur ing a jury-outheari ng though. A si milar r emark was m ade in the presence of t he jury, but the t rial co ur t inst ruct ed the jury to disr eg ard it. W e m us t pre su m e th at th e ju ry f ol lowed t he tri al cou rt’s cura tive instru ction
. See Compton , 642 S. W .2d at746 ; Frazi er , 566 S.W .2d at 551. The Defendan t als o complai ns about a remark made by t he prosecut orduri ng clos ing argument that“he [ Ferguson] tol d you t hat Mr. Moncier was tryi ng to gethim to l ie ab out i t and al l t hese thi ngs.”Defense counse l object ed, and the t ri al court i nstr ucted t he pros ecu tor no t to go in to tha t sub ject. From ou r rev iew , we be lieve tha t the pro se cu tor’s act ion s did no t co ns tit ut e m isco ndu ct. 18-99- 5. Remarks Acc using Defense Wit ness Dean Jos li n of Fabr icat ing Evidence The Defendantnextcomplai ns about comments made bythe prosecutor duri ng closi ng argument refer ri ng to Dean J osli n’s i denti fi cati on of an ex hibi t at trial. As we detailed above i n our discuss io n of t he fact s, Dean Josl in t esti fi ed thathe was one of the Defendant’ s sons. He operat ed an automoti ve repai r shop out of a com m erc ial b uil ding owne d byth e Def end antand re nt ed t o hi m. He arri ved there o ne da y and d iscovere d that the g arage door h ad be en se ve rel y dented by a vehicl e. He found red paintmatching the color of the v icti m’s truck and eventu ally cam e to be lieve that the vi cti m had b een responsi ble f or t he damage. He measured the hei ght ofthe dentand mea sured t he he ightof t he bumper of a truc k ide ntic al to the victim ’s tru ck. At tria l, the Def endant i ntr oduced a photograph ofDe an Jos lin measuring t he heightof t he bumper of t he matching truck. Dean Josli n then ident if ied a p ho tog rap h o f the De fen da nt’s truc k, e xhib it number fifty-six (56), which he test if ied was t aken aft er t he garage door damage incide nt.

I n a ll , t he test imony ofDean Josli n wit h regar d to ex hibi t number 56, incl uding cro ss-ex am ina tion , wa s re lative ly un eve ntfu l. It wa s su bs eq ue ntly d iscov ered durin g the testim ony of D anie l Joslin that, in e xhibit n um ber 5 6, th e li cense plat e of t he vi cti m’s tr uck had notbeen is sued unti l May of1994, afterthe shooti ng of th e vic tim . Th us , it appeared t hat Dean Josl in’ s ident if icat ion ofthe pho togr aph as havi ng been take n short lyaft er t he damage to hi s gar age wa s mistaken.-100- As a resu lt, the prosecutor commented to t he jury duri ng clos ing argument thatthe misi denti fi cati on was an indi cati on of bi as on the partof Dean Jos lin. W e believe thatalt hough the misi denti fi cati on did nothave gr eat probati ve val ue, t he prosecut orwas enti tl ed to sugges t t o the j ury t hat Dean Josli n’s mis ident if icat ion ofthe pict u re ref lect ed negati vel y on hi s credi bil ity. Accordi ngly , we concl ude that the p rose cuto r’s actio ns d id no t con stitute m isco ndu ct.

6. Remarks Acc using J ohn Isa ac Josl in and Geneva J osli n of Tes ti fy ing

Fa lsely ab ou t Te leph on e C alls fro m the Vict im The Defendantnextcomplai ns about t he prosecut or’ s cross -examina ti on ofJohn Isaac J os li n and Geneva Josl in, the adol escent c hil dren ofthe De fend ant. Both chil dren testi fied on di rectexaminat ion t hat t hey had recei ved thr eateni ng and vu l ga r t el ep ho ne ca l l s f ro m t he vi ct i m. On cross- examinat ion of John Isaac Josli n, t he prosecut or cal led attent ion t o the f act t hat John I saac Jo slin descri bed the f requencyof t he tel ephone call s in t he same language t hat the Defendanthad used when t esti fyi ng earlier. On c ross-e xam ination of G ene va Josli n, the pro se cu tor q ue stio ne d w he the r the witn es s ha d sp ok en with the victim enough to be able to ident ify hi s voi ce on the thr eateni ng call s. We find nothi ng improper in t he prosecutor’s cross-examinati on of these two wi tnesses.

7. Remarks Accusi ng Sandra Josli n of “Creat ing a Defense” The Defe nda nt next co mp lains of the p rosec utor’s cros s-e xam inat ion of defense witn es s S an dra Jos li n and hi s sub sequ ent arg um ent to the jury concerni ng that testimo ny. As w e m entione d abo ve in our reci tat ion of the f acts, San dra Jos lin, th e D efe nd an t’s w ife, te stifie d on dir ect ex aminati on thatas the victim approached their van, he shou ted “I’ll kil l you m other-fuc kers.” On cross--101-

examinat ion, the prosecut or conf ront ed Sandra Josl in wi th a deposi ti on in which she sta ted tha t the victim had used t he singul ar rat her t han the pl ural . Giv en this con flict, the p rose cuto r ask ed th e w it ness whether the v ict im had used t he singul aror th e p lura l. Sa nd ra J os lin wavered somewh at in answeri ng and, as a resu lt, the prosecutor asked heressenti all y th e same questi on numerous ti mes overthe Defendant ’s obj ecti on. Sandr a Josl in ev entual lytest if ied t hat she cou ld no t be sur e w he the r the victim ha d u se d th e sin gu lar o r plu ral.

Du ring closing argum ent to the jury, the prose cutor stres sed tha t Sand ra Josli n’s t esti mony had changed between the depositi on and directexaminat ion at trial. The prosecut or suggest ed thatshe had changed her test imony i n order t o a l l owt he Defen da ntt o rai se a d ef en se ofa t hi r d p erso n c l ai m.

We do not bel iev e thatquesti oning Sandra Josl in conc erni ng the change in he rt es t i mon y orsu gg es t i ng t o t he j ury du r i ng cl os i ng ar gu me nt a re ason for thatchange consti tut ed prosecut ori al misc onduct. Alt hough the t ri al courtmay have erred in al lowi ng the repeti ti ve “s ingul ar/ plural”questi ons, we f ind nothi ng imp rope r in the pros ecu tor’s co ndu ct.

8. Remarks Concerni ng the Bur den of Pr oof The Defendant ’s f inal all egati on of prosecutor ial misconductinv olv es remarks made by the prosecutor which the Def endant argues mis constr ued the burden of p roo f an d th e D efe nd an t’s co ns tit utio nal r ight s. Duri ng clos ing argu m ent, the p rose cuto r com m ente d on defe nse proo f of the victim ’s violen t, agg ressive cha rac ter a nd con du ct. T he pro se cu tor s po ke of th e D efe nd an t’s-102-

proofas innuendo and an attempt to constr uct a defense . He also made the foll owing remarks: MR. JOL LEY : Rod ney S hep ard is ent it led t o equal protect ion under the law. MR . MO NC IER : Objec tion, your H ono r. THE C OUR T: Overr uled. MR. JO LLE Y: R odn ey Shepard i s enti tl ed to a presumption o f innocenc e. MR . MO NC IER : Objec tion, your H ono r. MR . JOL LEY : Rod ney S hep ard is en titled-- THE C OUR T: Overr uled. MR . JO LLE Y: --to p roof b eyo nd a reas ona ble d oub t. MR . MO NC IER : Objec tion, your H ono r. THE CO URT: W el l, members ... of t he jury, I wil l i nstr uct as to the law. All ri ght, General, proceed. The De fend ant c onte nds th at the prosecutor ’s argument improper lyshifted t he burd en o f proo f and mis con strue d the con stitution al righ ts of the De fend ant.

We beli ev e th at t he prosecut or’ s ref erences t o equal protect ion, the presumpti on ofinnocence and p roof be yond a reas ona ble dou bt, in the con text in which t he remarks were made, were i mproper. In arguing t o the j ury, counsel may not miss tat e the law no r m ay c ou ns el a rgu e la w w hic h is not relat ed to t he facts of the cas e. See State v. Adki ns , 653 S.W .2d 7 08, 7 14 (T enn . 198 3); Gray
v. State , 191 Tenn. 526, 235 S.W .2d 2 0, 24 (195 0); State v. By erl ey , 658 S. W .2d 134, 140 (Te nn. C rim. A pp. 1 983 ); se e a ls o Dav id Loui s Raybin, Tennessee Criminal Pra ctice a nd P roce dure , § 29 .30. T he tria l judge , h owever, issue d a li miti ng inst ruct ion t o the j ury t hat he woul d inst ructthem as to t he law and he did, in fact, do so with rega rd to the p re su m ptio n of i nnocence and t he burden of proo f.-103- B. Eff ect of Pr osecutori al Misconduct

As we s et f or th abov e, t he rel evant inqui ry for rev iewi ng prosecut ori al misconduct is whet her t he i mprop er co ndu ct co uld h ave affec ted th e ver dict to the preju dice of the defe nda nt. Harri ngton , 215 Tenn. at 340, 385 S. W .2d at759. We ge ne rally c on sid er five fac tors in ma king that d eterm ination
. See Judge , 539 S.W .2d at344.

1. Co ndu ct Co mp lained of View ed in C onte xt and in Ligh t of the F acts

and Circumstances of t he Case In our di scussi on of t he cat egori es ofall eged mi scondu ct a bove, we conclude d that th ere w ere s eve ral insta nce s of prose cutor ial misconduct . The prosecut orimp rope rly state d his pers ona l beliefs regar ding t he credi bil ity ofthe De fen da nt’s proof . I n addit ion, the pros ecu tor m isstate d the law a s it relate s to the presumpti on o f i nnocence and t he burden ofproof . We m ust t ake note, how ever, thatthe record in th is ca se con tain s ne arly th ree tho us an d p ag es . It is also read il y appa rentfrom the recor d th at t his case wa s “f orcef ull y” t ri ed by counsel with some history of antagoni sm. Viewed in context , the prosecu to r’s improperconduct was sli ght and rel ati vel y i nfr equent. Moreover , gi ven t he sheer vo l ume of t he record, we do notbeli eve t hat anyundue emphasis was pl aced upon the inst ances of m isco ndu ct. Furthe rm ore , the pro se cu toria l m isco nd uc t did not pr event the Defend ant f rom present ing a t horough def ense.

2. Curative M easure s Take n by the Trial Cou rt S everal som ewh at imp roper re ma rks m ade by the pro secu tor w er e me t with cura tive instru ction s from the trial c ourt. A s we state d above, jur ies are-104-

presumed to follow suc h ins tructio ns. See Compton , 642 S.W .2d a t 746 ; Frazi er , 566 S.W .2d at551. We point out , t hough, t hat some i mproper comments on t he cred ibilityof t he Defe ndant ’s proo f whi ch we r e object ed to bydefense c ounsel were not m et with curat iv e inst ruct ions. The lack of a curati ve i nstr ucti on causes us so me concern, but t he number of i mproper remarks not cu red i s small . The prejudice suff ered bythe Defendant as a resultof these un cu r ed r ema r ks se ems ove rwh elm ed by th e a m ou nt o f pro of s et fo rth a t trial.

3. I ntentof t he Prosec utor As w e note d abo ve, it appea rs from the reco rd tha t the re is som e history ofan tag on ism be twe en the pro se cu tor a nd de fen se cou ns el. Itis qui te obv ious thatthis trial was “hard -fough t” by both a ttorneys. T here is not hing i n the record, how ever, to i ndicat e thatthe prosecutor acted i n bad fai th i n making the improper remarks. Rather, i t seems that the prosecu tor h ad momentary l apses of judgmenton a few oc casionsoverthe course of a t rial which last ed nearl y th ree weeks. W e recogni ze thatthe prosec utor made errors , butwe disc ern no impro per inten t on be half of the pro secu tor.

4. Cumulati ve Effect On ap pe al, th e D efe nd an t rais es sev era l is s ues other than prosecutor ial
m isco ndu ct. W e have di scussed t hose is sues i n ful l det ail earl ierin t his opi nion. Not surpr isi ngl y, o uranaly sis reveal ed other errors which occurr ed duri ng the course ofthe Def endant’ s three-week t ri al. W e are sat isf ied, however, thatthe cum ulative effectof the prosecutorial misc ond uct a nd the ot her er rors did not affect the ve rdict t o the prejudi ce of t he Defendant . Fr om our revi ew of t he extens ive reco rd in th is cas e, it plain ly app ears that this case was often-105-

contenti ous. Both t he Stat e and the Def endant presented co mpelli ng and persu asive evide nce and argu m ents . W e cannot es cape the con clu sio n th at th is case present ed a clas sic j ury ques ti on. The j ury resolv ed that questi on against the De fend ant. W e cannot c onclude thatthe er rors which oc curr ed duri ng tr ial cu m ula tively rose to a level influencing either the e vidence available to the jury or the jury’s re aso ning proc ess so a s to a ffect the ir verdic t.

5. Relat ive Strength orWeakness of the Case As we stat ed above, the evi dence adduced at tri al i n thi s case pr esented a cla ssic jury qu estio n. The State offer ed eyewi tness t esti mony demonstrat ing thatthe Defenda nt had shotthe v ict im and the manner in whi ch the al ter cati on had taken pl ace. The Defendantreadi lyadmitt ed thathe had shot the v ict im, but present ed proofin supp ortof a cl aim ofself- defense. The case essenti all y boi led down to a cr edib ilityjudgm ent by the jury. The jury res olv ed the cas e againstthe De fend ant. W hile it is true that there are i nconsis tenci es in t he test imony ofthe wit nesses forthe St ate and t here i s even t esti mony from State’ s witnesses which favors the Def endant, the same can be said ofthe Def endant’ s proof . Fr om our revi ew of t he record, we concl ude thatthe Stat e present ed a reasonabl y st rong case againstthe Def endant. The questi on of t he Defendant ’s gui ltwas, wi thout a doubt, hotl y cont ested attrial, but there wa s pers uasive evi dence present ed by the S tate to sup port th e jury’s verd ict.

C. Conclusion Regardi ng Prosecutori al Misconduct
Having examined t he inst ances of prosecutor ial misconductin l ightofthe Judge fact ors, we concl ude thatthe improper conduct of t he prosecut ordid not-106-

affec t the ve rdict to th e pre judice the D efen dan t. See Harri ngton , 215 Tenn. at 340 , 385 S.W .2d a t 759 . Acc ordin gly, the sixth iss ue o n ap pea l lacks me rit.

VI II . SENTENCI NG

In the sev en th iss ue , the De fen da nt c ha llen ge s th e tria l cou rt’s imposi ti on ofa twenty-t hree year , Range I sentence. The Defendant f irst compl ains t hat t he tri al cou rt’s sen tenc ing p roce dure was flawe d. He also argues thatthe trial court misappli ed the relev ant enhancementand miti gati ng fact ors. As a resul t, he contends t hat hi s sentenc e is ex cessi ve. W e agree.

W hen an accused chall enges the l ength, range, or t he manner of servi ce ofa sentence, thi s courthas a duty to conduct a de novo revi ew of t he sentence with a p res um ptio n th at th e d ete rm ina tion s m ad e b y the trial courtar e co rrect. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35 -401(d) . Thi s presumpti on is " con diti oned upon the affirmative showing i n the record t hat t he tr ial courtconsi dered t he sentenc ing pri ncipl es and all rel evant fact s and circum stan ces ." State v. Ashby , 823 S. W .2d 166 , 169 (T enn . 1991 ).

In conducti ng a de novo revi ew ofa sentenc e, t his co urtmust consi der: (a) the evi dence, i f any , r eceiv ed at t he tr ial and the s entenc ing heari ng; ( b) t he p resent ence repo rt; (c) the princ iples o f sen tenc ing a nd a rgum ents as to sentenci ng alt ernat iv es; ( d) t he nature and characteri sticsof the cr iminal conduct involved; (e) an y statutory miti gati ng or enhancement fact ors; (f ) any s tat ement thatthe def endant made on hi s own behalf ; and ( g) t he potent ial or lack o f-107-

potent ial for reh abilitatio n or tre atm ent. T enn . Co de A nn. §§ 40-35- 102, - 103, and -210 ; see Sta te v. Sm ith , 735 S .W .2d 85 9, 863 (Ten n. Crim . App. 1 987 ).

Ifour r evi ew ref lect s thatthe t ri al court f oll owed the st atut ory s entenci ng procedur e, imposed a lawf ul sentence aft er havi ng giv en due consi derat ion and properweightto t he fact ors and pr inci pals s et out under the sent encing l aw, and thatthe t ri al court' s fi ndings of factare adequat elysupport ed bythe record, then we may not modi fy t he se ntence ev en ifwe would hav e pref erred a differ ent resu lt. State v. Fl etcher , 805 S .W .2d 78 5, 789 (Ten n. Crim . App. 1 991 ).

In orderto a dd res s th is iss ue fully, w e m us t exa m ine the m an ne r in which the tr ial courtconducted the sent encing of the Def endant. The sentenci ng heari ng was origin ally set fo r Au gust 24, 1995. Shortl y bef ore t hat dat e, t he Defendantprepar ed and fi led a det ail ed, f ifteen- page sentenc ing memo r an du m. Incl uded wit h thi s memorandum were numerous letters of sup portfrom fri ends ofthe D efend ant an d m em bers of hi s community. The State ha d already f il ed a notice of t he enhancement f actors assert ed to be appl icabl e. Atthe begi nning ofthe Au gu st 2 4 se nte nc in g heari ng, a cont roversy ar ose overcert ain al leged court room conduct in t he wake of t he verdi ct. The trial court request ed addit ional inf ormati on and argument f rom both t he prosecut ion and the d efen se in orde r to deter mine whetherto cons ider t he allegati ons for sentenci ng purposes. As a resul t, the sent encing of the Def endant was c onti nued to a l aterdate.

On September 6, 1995, t he actual sentenci ng heari ng was conduct ed. Having weig hed th e all egati ons surrounding t he court room conduct a nd the argu m ents in f avor of and a ga instit s rel evance f or sent encing, the t ri al j udge-108-

stat ed thathe was not cons ider ing t he all egati ons to ar ri ve ata sentenc e forthe De fend ant. After r uling on t hose allegati ons, the trial c ourt im m edia tely be gan to announce the enhance ment fact ors deemed appli cable. The tr ial courtappli ed the fol lowing f our enhancem ent fact ors: (1) The Defendanthas a previous history of cr iminal convi cti ons orbehavi or i n add it ion t o those nec essaryto est abli sh the appropri ate range; (2) The Defendant employ ed or posses sed a fi rearm duri ng the commission ofthe offense; (3) The Defendant had no hesi tat ion ab ou t co mmi t t i ng a c r i me when the r isk t o human li fe was hi gh; and, (4) The cri me was comm itted under circumstances under which the p oten tial for bo dily injury to a victim was grea t. Tenn. Co de A nn. § 40-3 5-11 4(1) , ( 9), (1 0), (16). The tri al j udge stat ed thathe would gi ve greatweightto t he enhancement fact or deal ing wi th employ ment of a firearm. He gave little wei ght to t he remaining three f actors.

After the tr ial court had rul ed with regard t o enhancem ent fact ors, defense counsel int erj ected argu me nt co nce rning thos e fac tors. T he D efe ndant sub m itte d that the t ri al court had mis appli ed the f actors. The t ri al court ov errul ed th e De fen da nt’s argu m ents and , face d with continued argument by defense cou ns el, stat ed, “Letme fini sh thi s sentenci ng.” The Defendant voiced a desire to be hea rd on the su bject . Attha t p oint , t he tr ial courtexcl aimed, “You have been heard! ” The tr ial courtthen i nstr ucted def ense counsel to si t down.

After thatheated ex change , t he tr ial courtproceeded t o consi der t he miti gati ng f ac t ors p r op os ed byt he Defen da nti n t he se nt en ci ng me morandu m submitt ed to t he tr ial court . Those f actors were: (1) The Defendant act ed under st rong pr ovocat ion; (2) S ubstant ial grounds existtending t o excuse or just ify th e De fen da nt’s cri minal c onduct, though f ail ing t o establ ish a de fense;-109- (3) T he De fendantwas motivated bya desire to provi de nec ess ities for h is fam ily or him self; (4) The Defe nda nt was suffering from a m ental or p hys ical condit ion t hat si gnif icant lyreduced hi s culp abil ity fo r t he off ense; (5) The Defendant , al though gui lty ofthe cr ime, committed t he offense under such unusual circumstance s t hat it is u nlikely th at a sus taine d inte nt to vio late the law m otivate d his con duc t; (6) The D efendant acted under duress; (7) Th e De fenda nt has a good reputa tion in the co mm unity; (8) The community bel iev es that the Defendant po sse sse s th e fu ll potent ial forrehabi li tat ion; and, (9) The Defendant has no pri or ser ious c ri minal record. Tenn. Co de An n. § 40 -35 -11 3(2 ), (3) , (7), ( 8), (1 1), (1 2), (1 3). T he trial c ou rt’s rul ing wit h regar d to t he miti gati ng fact ors consi sted ofreadi ng the proposed fact oran d t he n s t at i ng , “ I ca n’ t f i nd t ha t
. ” Th e o nl y ext en de d c omm ents b y th e tri al judge regardi ng miti gati ng fact ors came i n response t o the Def endan t’ s assert ed non-statut ory miti gating f actors conce rni ng his rela tion sh ip w ith h is com m unity which w ere s upp orted by m ore th an tw enty le tters fro m com m unity mem bers. I [t he tr ial judg e] or dinar ily do n’t re ad lette rs, b ec au se the write r is not sub jecte d to c ross -exa m ination , althou gh I d id rea d th ese . I found itun usual t hat f iv e of t he letters were wr itten bythose who rentfrom the defendant . El even cont ained t he wor d -- descri bing Mr. Josli n’s behav ioras uncharacter ist ic, and twel ve used the words remorsef ul orregre t. Tw o sh ow ed th eir ab solu te unfa m iliarity with the duties of this C ourt by phrases s uch as i t’ s unfortunat e that so me one of hi s cali ber has been forced t o defend hi mself agai ns t these charges and he shoul d be complet elyexonerat ed. No argument concer ning t he miti gati ng fact ors was per mitt ed.

After rul ing on the mit igat ing f actors, t he tr ial cou rt as ke d th e D efe nd an t if he had anyth ing h e wis hed to sa y. De fens e co uns el po inted out t h at t he tr ial court had app aren tly alrea dy co m e to a co nclu sion with regar d to sent encing, and19 Second-degr ee murder is aclass A f elony . Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-210(b) . Thus, the app licable s ente ncin g ran ge fo r the D efe nda nt wa s fiftee n to tw enty-five years . Te nn. C ode Ann . § 40-35-112 (a)(1). -110- the Defendant chose not to sayanyt hing f urt her. The tri al court t hen imposed a twenty-t hree year , Range I sentence wit h the Depart ment of Correcti on. 19

On appeal, the Defendantfi rstchall enges the s ente ncin g pro ced ure its elf. We agre e th at t he manner in whi ch the t ri al court conduct ed the sent encing heari ng is troubli ng. The t ri al court made no eff ortto al low ei therthe St ate or the Defendantto pre sen t evide nce . See Ten n. Co de A nn. § 4 0-35-2 09(b). The tri al court seve rely li mited argument concerni ng the relev ant sent encing pr inci ples and, at one poi nt, fl atl y prohi bit ed defense c ounsel f rom argui ng. W e recognize thatthe Def endant had previ ouslysubmitt ed a detai led sent encing memorandum which incl uded ext ensive a rgum ent con cern ing the rel evant sentenci ng pri ncipl es . Ifthe hear ing became merel y repet it iv e of t he submitt ed memorandum, the tr ial judge cou ld have , as part ofhis di scret ion i n controll ing argument, l imit ed argument duri ng sentenc ing to material which ha d n ot b ee n co vere d a de qu ate ly by th e se nt enc i ng me mor and um. To fail to all ow for the pr esentati on of evidence and ar gument n earl y al toge ther was i mproper

in our v iew.

Given the t horough sent encing memorandum submitt ed by t he Defendant and t he e xte nsive rec ord in this ca se, how ever, we believe tha t we do have enough inf ormati on for an eff ecti ve rev iew ofthe Defenda nt’s cha llen ge to h is sentence. Initiall y, we note t hat we wi ll revi ew the Defendant ’s sen tence wi thout aff ordi ng the presumption o f cor rect ness to the t rial cou rt’ s ruling
. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40 -35- 401 (d); State v. Shel ton , 854 S. W .2d 116, 123 ( Ten n. Cr i m. App. 1992) ( ifthe t ri al court ap plies i nap prop riate fa ctors or oth erw ise fails to-111-

fol lowthe Sen tencing Refo rm A ct of 198 9, the pre sum ption of co rrectnes s falls). From our r evi ew of t he record, we cannot c onclude t hat t he tr ial courtconsi dered all of t he rel evant sentenci ng pri ncipl es appli cable t o thi s case. Aside f rom the procedural probl ems outli ned above, the t ri al court deni ed the De fen da nt’s proposed mitigat ing fact ors almost sum m arily. As we shall expl ain l ater , sev eral ofthos e fac tors m erited app lication . At th e v ery le as t, give n th e D efe nd an t’s detai led anal ysi s and supportofmi t i ga t i ng f ac t ors i n h i s me moran du m, the t ri al jud ge sho uld ha ve e xpla ine d h is re as on ing rath er th an issu e a cur so ry de nia l.

Aside from the complaint aboutsentencing procedure, the Defendant also chall enges the enhancement f actors appli ed by t he tr ial court . Fr om our revi ew ofthe re cord , we c onc lude that th e tr ial cour t properl y appl ied t he four enhancement fact ors. The record indi cates t hat t he Defendantdoes have pr ior misdemeanorcon victions
. As a resul t, the “ previ ous his tory ofcri minal convi cti ons or behav iorin ad dit ion to t hos e ne ces sary to esta blish th e ap prop riate range” fact or i s appli cable. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-114(1 ). Moreov e r, the record is clear

thatthe Def endant “ employed a fi rearm duri ng the commissi on of the off ense.”Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-114(9 ). The Defendant argues thatthe use ofa fi rearm i s inherent i n the offense ofsecond-degree murder and, as such, thatenhancement f actor is i nap plica ble
. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-114. That argu m ent h as b een rejec ted b y this C ourt o n se vera l occa sion s. See, e. g. , Sta te v. Butl er , 900 S. W .2d 305, 312 -13 (Tenn. Crim . App . 199 4); State v. Raines , 882 S .W .2d 37 6, 385 (Ten n. Crim . App. 1 994 ).

The Defendantalso c hall enges the ap pli cati on of t he two r emaining enhancement factors, thathe had “no hes it ati on about committi ng a cri me when-112-

the ri sk to hu man lif e was high”and thatthe “cri me was comm itted under circumstances underwhich t he potent ial for bodil y i njury was gr eat. ” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40 -3 5- 114 (1 0) and (1 6)
. He again argues thatthese factors are i nherent in the offe ns e o f se co nd -de gre e m urd er. T he De fen da nt’s argument i gnores t hat the proo f at trial de m ons trated that th er e w as an oth er in divid ua l, Ga ry M as se ng ill, in the d irection in wh ich the he fire d his pistol. B oth of t hese enhancement factors may be appli ed whe n there are i ndiv idual s other than t he vi cti m in the area and sub ject to in jury. See Stat e v. Ruane , 912 S. W .2d 766, 784 (Tenn. Cr i m. Ap p. 19 95); State v. Bi ngha m , 910 S. W .2d 448, 453 (Tenn. Crim. App. 199 5); St at e v . Si ms , 909 S.W .2d 4 6, 50 (Te nn. C rim. A pp. 1 995 ); State v. Makoka , 885 S .W .2d 36 6, 373 (Ten n. Crim . App. 1 994 ).

We tur n now to t he mitiga ti ng fact ors proposed by t he Defendantbut rej ected by t he tr ial court . Fr om our revi ew of t he facts ofthis case as t hey unf o lded att r i al , pa r t i cu l ar l y t he hi st ory be t we en t he Defen da ntan d t he v i ct i m, thr ee of t he mit iga ti ng f act ors propo sed bythe Defend ant seem in tertwi ne d. Those three facto rs are “the D efen dan t acte d un der s trong prov oca tion,” “subst anti al grou nds exi st t ending t o excuse or just ify th e Defendant ’s cr iminal conduct though f ail ing t o establ ish a de fense, ” and “ the Defendantcommitted the offense under such unusual c ir cumstances t hat i t i s unli kelythata susta ined int ent to v iol ate t he lawmotiv ated hi s conduct .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-3 5-113 (2), (3), (11). W e beli eve t hat the se thre e in tertw ine d m itiga ting fac tors are ap plica ble to som e deg ree given the history between t he Defendantand the v ict im and the all eged acti ons oft he v i ct i m, largelyunref uted bythe St ate, in t he months pri or to the shoot ing. Alt hough the jury rej ected t he Defendant ’s cl aim of se lf -def ense,20W e note that the tri al judge stated on the record that he o rdinaril y does not read letters su bm itted by d ef en da nts in s up po rt o f m itiga ting fac tor s. G ive n th at th e tr ial ju dg e s tate d th at h e d id read t his Defen dant’ s letters, we fi nd no error i n thi s regard in t he case sub judi ce . W e do, howeve r, suggest t hat t he tr ial judge shou ld read such l ett ers i n allcases. I f th e charact eri sti cs indi cate t hat such letters should be given li tt le wei ght, the t ri al j udge may make an appropri ate f indi ng, buthe should certa inl y endeavor t o consid er sent encing evi dence and argu ment presented by def endants, inc lud ing lette rs of s up po rt fr om m em be rs of t he ir co m m un ity. -113- the rela tion sh ip and his tory between the v ict im and the Defendantm os t ce rtain ly play ed a sig nif icantrol e in t he commission ofthi s off ense.

Likewi se, we b elieve that tw o of t he Defen dan t’s propos ed no n-statutory miti gati ng factors are ap plicable. T hose two factors are t hat t he Defendanthas a good reput ati on in hi s community an d the members ofhis com mu nity believe he po sse sse s the full pote ntial for re hab ilitation. T enn . Co de A nn. § 40-35 - 11 3(13). The Defe nda nt attache d m ore tha n twen ty letters of supp ort fro m mem ber s of h is co m m un ity to h is se nte nc ing m em ora nd um . Th e tria l c our t ap pa ren tly att ri buted som e type of de cep tive m otive to thos e letter s. W e fail to see any such deceit i n the letters. 20 In our vi ew, they express gen uine po sitive feeling s ab out th e D efen dan t.

We fi nd thatthe remaining mi ti gati ng fact ors proposed by t he Defendant are not appl icabl e. Forinst ance, the Defendantargues t hat he was moti vated by a desire to provi de necessi ti es for his familyor hi mself. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-11 3(7). More speci fi call y, t he Defendantcontended t hat he was motiv ated by a desire to provi de safety fo r hi s fam ily an d h im se lf. W e b elie ve th at th is arg um en t is substant ial lyencompassed byt he Defen da nt ’ s s el f - de f en se cl ai m, which was re jected b y the jury.-114- I n ad di t i on , t he Defen da ntar gu es t ha t he wa s s uff er i ng f r om a me nta l condit ion whi ch sig nif icant lyreduced hi s culp abil ity. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35 - 11 3(8). The Defendant poi nts t o Dr. Engum’s test imony det ail ing hi s passi veagg ressive and narc issistic p erso nality trai ts and what rol e those traits pla yed in his percept ion ofthe victim’s beh avior. W hile t hose psychological characteri stics mightverywell help t o expl ain t he Defendant ’s percepti on of t he vi cti m’s behavi or and his ow n rea ction to tha t beh avior, w e do not b elieve that th e D efe nda nt’s personal ity trait s sign if icant lyreduced hi s culp abil ity fo r t he off ense.

The Defenda nt a lso co ntends t hat he act ed under duress. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 113(12). The Defendant’ s content ion ignores the l anguage of t he remainderof t hat mit igat ing f actor . That stat utory mit igat ing factor, in its entirety, reads as follows : “The defen dan t acted u nde r duress or under t he dominati on of another person, eve n th ou gh the du res s or the do m ina tion of a no the r pe rso n is not sufficient to con stitute a defe nse to th e crim e.” Id. (emphasis added). In t he presentcase, we fi nd thatthe all eged threateni ng conduct of t he vict im against the Defendantand his famil y does not q ualify as “duress or domi nati on” wi thi n the me aning of this statutory m itigating factor.
Lastly, the Defendant argues that hi s lackof a prior seri ous crimina l record sh ou ld be consi dered i n miti gati on. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40 -35-113( 13 ). The Defendantcit es several cas es in s upp ortof hi s arg um ent. State v. Moss , 727 S.W .2d 229 (Te nn. 1 986 ); State v. Makoka , 885 S.W .2d 366 ( Tenn. Cri m. App. 199 4); Sta te v. Dykes , 80 3 S
. W.2d 25 0 ( Ten n. Cr i m. Ap p. 19 90); Sta te v. W illis , 735 S.W .2d 81 8 (T enn . C rim. A pp. 1 987 ); State v. J enkins , 733 S. W .2d 528 (Tenn. Cri m. Ap p. 1987) . Our reading ofthese c ases does notsupportthe-115-

De fen da nt’s contenti on. In each of t he cases, the def endant had no pri orcri minal record rat her t ha n no pri or seri ous crim inal re cord
. Moss , 727 S. W .2d at233 (i ndicat ing that , ot her t han traff ic offenses, the def endant had pr iorarres ts butno conviction s); Makoka , 885 S.W .2d a t 374 ; Dykes , 803 S.W .2d a t 258 ; W illis , 735 S.W .2d at 8 22; Je nkins , 733 S.W .2d a t 533 -34. W e ag ree th at the lack o f a cri minal hist ory may be consi dered as a mi ti gati ng fact or pursuantto Tennessee Code Annotat ed sec tion 4 0-35 -113 (13)
. Bingham , 910 S.W.2d at 453. Given t he De fen da nt’s prior

misdemea nor co nvic tio ns , ho we ver, we do no t find this miti gati ng fact or t o be appli cable i n his c ase.

W ith regard to the D efend ant’s pe rsona l history, we no te that he w as bo rn in Knoxvi ll e, Tennessee in 193 0 and was si xty -th ree years old atthe t ime of t he commission of t he off ense. Ot her t han the mis demeanor convi cti ons from 1973, he has no cri minal record. He was marri ed to his f irstwife for a pp roxim ate ly twenty-f ouryears and rai sed four chil dren to adu l th ood
. He is presentl y marri ed to his s econd wif e. They have b een ma rried for app roxima tely twenty-two years and have two ado lesc ent c hildre n. T he D efen dan t has alwa ys be en s elfemployed and was a successful, semi-retired businessm an at t he ti me of the off ense. Judging fro m the lett ers of supportsubmitted by t he Defendant, he is a well-liked an d resp ected me mb er of his ch urch a nd co mm unity.

After cons idering the entire rec ord in th is cas e a nd we igh ing the ap plica ble enhancement and mit iga ti ng f act ors, we concl ude thatthe tr ial court ’s i mpositi on of a twenty-t hree year sentence was excessi ve. W e beli eve t hat a sent ence of21 Th e D efe nda nt arg ues that he sho uld be clas sified a s an esp ecia lly mitigate d off end er. See T en n. C od e. A nn . § 4 0- 35 -1 09 (a ). B ec au se we ha ve fou nd en ha nc em en t fa cto rs ap plic ab le in his case, t he Defendantdoes not quali fyas an especi all y mit igat ed offend er. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 109 (a)(2 ); Stat e v. Braden , 867 S.W .2d 750, 763 (T enn. Crim . App. 1993). -116- sevent een yearsas a Range I standa rd offend er is mo re appropr iat e under t he circumstances ofthi s case. 21

I X. CONCL USI ON

We reco gniz e tha t thi s appea l presents a verydiffi cult , cl ose case. The Defendanthas ma de a num ber o f com pelling argu m ents . In fact, w e ag ree w ith the De fen da nt th at s eve ral e rror s oc cu rred du ring the cou rse of h is tria l. Yet, as we sta ted a bov e, t his ca se str ikes u s as one i nvol vi ng a cla ssicjury quest ion. From our r evi ew ofthe record, we do notbeli eve t hat t he err ors whi ch occurred duri ng the Def endant’ s tr ial unfai rl y affect ed the e viden ce a vailab le to the j ury or the cre dib il ity ofthe Defend ant’ s pr oof in s uch a wa y as to undermine our con fiden ce in the jur y’s verd ict.
Thus, forthe reasons setforth in t he disc ussion above, we concl ude that the Defendant ’s i ssues on appeal provi de no basi s for reversing hi s convi cti on. We do, however, fi nd that th e trial co urt erre d in se nten cing the D efen dan t. W e therefore affi rm his convict ion for second-degree murder but modify his sent ence to sevent een (17) years as a Range I st andard offenderwit h the Depart ment of Correct ion. Th is cas e is re m and ed to the trial c ourt s olely fo r entry o f a judgment consis tentwit h thi s opini on.-117- ____________________________________ DAVI D H. WELLES, JUD GE

CONCUR:

___________________________________ DAVI D G. HAY ES, JUD GE

___________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUD GE