alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT4.8

 

WARRANT AMENDMENT

 

         Medix Resources, Inc. (the “Company”), and the other party or parties (the “Party”), that sign this Warrant Amendment below, hereby agree, as of October 1, 2002, that the exercise period of the Company's 2002 Series A Warrants acquired by the Party earlier this year shall be adjusted as set forth below.

         

For good and valuable benefits to the undersigned, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned agree that the 2002 Series A Warrants held by the Party shall not become exercisable until July 1, 2003, and that the exercise period of such Warrants shall be extended to terminate on the close of business December 31, 2008.

         

         Otherwise, the terms of the 2002 Series A Warrants shall remain unchanged, and this Warrant Amendment shall be deemed to amend the terms of the Warrant certificate(s) evidencing such Warrants held by the Party to the extent set forth herein.  A copy of this Warrant Agreement shall be affixed to the Warrant Certificate(s) to evidence this amendment to the terms thereof. Otherwise, the terms hereof shall be governed by the terms of the Warrant Certificate(s) issued earlier.  

         

| MEDIX RESOURCES, INC.

 

By: ________________

Name:

Title:

 

{Entity Name}

 

By: __________________

      Name:

      Title:

 

 

 

          |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
# Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas

Se ptember 18, 2019

No. 04

- 19

- 00543

- CV

Elsa PRADO , Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Rolando Prado, Jr., Deceased, and as Next Friend of A.P., Minor; Elizabeth Prado; Rolando Prado; and Maria Prado

, Appellants

v.

LONESTAR RESOURCES, INC. ; Union Pacific Railroad Company; and Ezra Alderman Ranches, Inc., Appellees

From the 81st Judicial District Court, La Salle County, Texas

Trial Court No. 16

- 07

- 00095

- CVL Honorable Susan D. Reed, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

Sitting : Luz Elena D. C hapa, Justice

Iren e Rios, Ju stice Beth Watkins, Justice

Appellee’s motion to dismiss this appeal is denied.

W e note that both the motion to dismiss and the response state there were two summary judgment orders involving two separate defendants that were severed into two different trial court cause numbers. However, both severance orders in the clerk’s record, a July 2, 2019 order involving defendant Ezra Alde rman Ranches, Inc., and a June 11, 2019 order involving Lonestar Resources, Inc., show the claims against those two defendants were transferred to the same cause number, 16

- 07

- 00095

- CVL

- A. This appeal will therefore proceed as one appeal unless the parties demonstrate the appeals should proceed separately as appeals from two separate trial

court causes.

_________________________________ Luz Elena D. Chapa, JusticeIN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 18th day of September, 2019

.

___________________________________ K eith E. H ottle

, Clerk of Court
II 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 639 

To amend title 10, United States Code, to reduce the age for receipt of 

military retired pay for nonregular service from 60 years of age to 

55 years of age. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 16, 2005 

Mr. CORZINE (for himself, Mr. LAUTENBERG, Mrs. LINCOLN, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. 

REID, Mr. KERRY, Mr. JOHNSON, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. NELSON of Nebraska, and Mr. DAYTON) introduced the following bill; which was read 

twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services 

A BILL 

To amend title 10, United States Code, to reduce the age 

for receipt of military retired pay for nonregular service 

from 60 years of age to 55 years of age. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. REDUCTION IN AGE FOR RECEIPT OF MILITARY 

4 RETIRED PAY FOR NONREGULAR SERVICE. 

5 (a) REDUCTION IN AGE.—Section 12731(a)(1) of 

6 title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking ‘‘at 

7 least 60 years of age’’ and inserting ‘‘at least 55 years 

8 of age’’. 
2 

•S 639 IS 

1 (b) APPLICATION TO EXISTING PROVISIONS OF LAW

2 OR POLICY.—With respect to any provision of law, or of 

3 any policy, regulation, or directive of the executive branch, 

4 that refers to a member or former member of the uni5 formed services as being eligible for, or entitled to, retired 

6 pay under chapter 1223 of title 10, United States Code, 

7 but for the fact that the member or former member is 

8 under 60 years of age, such provision shall be carried out 

9 with respect to that member or former member by sub10 stituting for the reference to being 60 years of age a ref11 erence to the age in effect for qualification for such retired 

12 pay under section 12731(a) of title 10, United States 

13 Code, as amended by subsection (a). 

14 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

15 subsection (a) shall take effect on the first day of the first 

16 month beginning on or after the date of the enactment 

17 of this Act and shall apply to retired pay payable for that 

18 month and subsequent months. 

Æ
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ARRON THOMAS SIMMONS,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

SHASTA COUNTY DISTRICT

ATTORNEY; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 21

- 15697

D.C. No. 2:21

- cv

- 00242

- KJM

- AC

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Kimberly J. Mueller, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 14, 2021 * *

Before: WALLACE, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Arron Thomas Simmons appeals pro se from the

district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action challenging his

sentence as unconstitutional . We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. W e

review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

. Resnick v. Hayes , 213 F.3d

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

DEC 16 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 21

- 15697

443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Simmons’s action because a challenge

to the validity of a state court sentence must be done throug h habeas corpus, not a

§ 1983 action

. See Nettles v. Grounds , 830 F.3d 922, 933 (9th Cir. 2016) ( en banc )

(“[H]abeas corpus is the exclusive remedy to attack the legality of the conviction

or sentence . . . .”)

. The district court also properly determine d that Simmons’s

complaint was not suitable for conversion into a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus because Simmons had not exhausted his state court remedies.

Simmons’s motion for referral (Docket Entry No. 7) is denied.

AFFIRMED.
**Exhibit 31.2**

 

**CERTIFICATIONS**

 

I, Edward L. Williams, Interim Chief Financial Officer of Telos Corporation, certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Telos Corporation; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statementof a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

 

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of theregistrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

 

c) Disclosed in this report any change in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and 

 

5. The registrant’s othercertifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors: 

 

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses inthe design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involvesmanagement or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

Date: November 22, 2004
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack, Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh

Elizabeth M. Welch,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 March 24, 2021 t0317

Order 

Clerk

March 24, 2021

161271

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 161271

COA: 352365

Wayne CC: 19-001511-FH

DEBORAH TAITT,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 17, 2020 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded 

that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Saddiq Abdur-Rashid, Appellant.

Submitted December 21, 2009;

decided January 12, 2010

Reported below, 64 AD3d 1087.

Motion for assignment of counsel granted and Peter B. Meadow, Esq., PO Box 63, Woodbourne, New York 12788 assigned as counsel to the appellant on the appeal herein.
EXHIBIT 23.2

Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

MoSys, Inc.
Sunnyvale, California

We
hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (Nos. 333-64302, 333-104071,
333-118992, 333-123364, 333-132492, 333-141264, and 333-149756) of MoSys, Inc. of our report dated March 12, 2007, relating to
the consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedule of MoSys, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2006, which appears in this Form 10-K.

/s/
BDO Seidman, LLP

San
Francisco, California
March 13, 2009

---



QuickLinks
Order entered May 30, 2014

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-13-01700-CV

ORCA ASSETS, G.P., L.L.C., Appellant

V.

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., ET AL., Appellees

On Appeal from the 44th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-12-05303

ORDER

We GRANT appellant’s May 29, 2014 third motion for an extension of time to file a 

brief. Appellant shall file its brief on or before JUNE 16, 2014. We caution appellant that no 

further extension of time will be granted absent extraordinary circumstances.

/s/ ADA BROWN 

JUSTICE
Exhibit 31.2





CERTIFICATION





I, Joseph Talamo, certify that:





1.  I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q/A of Caladrius Biosciences, Inc.; and





2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.








Date: May 6, 2016





/s/ Joseph Talamo


Name: Joseph Talamo


Title: Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Caladrius Biosciences, Inc.





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 302 has been provided to Caladrius Biosciences, Inc. and will be retained by Caladrius Biosciences, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<RESTATED> 
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1996
<CASH>                                             137
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    1,547
<ALLOWANCES>                                       320
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 1,383
<PP&E>                                          11,756
<DEPRECIATION>                                   4,362
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   9,504
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            2,880
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           66,365
<PREFERRED>                                        465
<COMMON>                                           290
<OTHER-SE>                                    (66,648)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     9,504
<SALES>                                          1,188
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 1,466
<CGS>                                              564
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      564
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   888
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 153
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  (139)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              (139)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (4,827)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.19)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.19)
        

</TABLE>
II 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 685 

To amend title IV of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 

1974 to require the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, in the case 

of airline pilots who are required by regulation to retire at age 60, 

to compute the actuarial value of monthly benefits in the form of a 

life annuity commencing at age 60. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 17, 2005 

Mr. AKAKA introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 

A BILL 

To amend title IV of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to require the Pension Benefit Guaranty 

Corporation, in the case of airline pilots who are required 

by regulation to retire at age 60, to compute the actuarial value of monthly benefits in the form of a life 

annuity commencing at age 60. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Pension Benefit Guar5 anty Corporation Pilots Equitable Treatment Act’’. 
2 

•S 685 IS

1 SEC. 2. AGE REQUIREMENT FOR EMPLOYEES. 

2 (a) SINGLE-EMPLOYER PLAN BENEFITS GUARAN3 TEED.—Section 4022(b) of the Employee Retirement In4 come Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1322(b)) is amend5 ed in the flush matter following paragraph (3), by adding 

6 at the end the following: ‘‘If, at the time of termination 

7 of a plan under this title, regulations prescribed by the 

8 Federal Aviation Administration require an individual to 

9 separate from service as a commercial airline pilot after 

10 attaining any age before age 65, paragraph (3) shall be 

11 applied to an individual who is a participant in the plan 

12 by reason of such service by substituting such age for age 

13 65.’’. 

14 (b) MULTIEMPLOYER PLAN BENEFITS GUARAN15 TEED.—Section 4022B(a) of the Employee Retirement In16 come Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1322b(a)) is 

17 amended by adding at the end the following: ‘‘If, at the 

18 time of termination of a plan under this title, regulations 

19 prescribed by the Federal Aviation Administration require 

20 an individual to separate from service as a commercial air21 line pilot after attaining any age before age 65, this sub22 section shall be applied to an individual who is a partici23 pant in the plan by reason of such service by substituting 

24 such age for age 65.’’. 
3 

•S 685 IS

1 SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE. 

2 The amendments made by this Act shall apply to ben3 efits payable on or after the date of enactment of this Act. 

Æ
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SONYA WOLF, an individual; ROGER

CRAIG, in his capacity as Guardian ad

Litem for the Minor N. H.,

 Plaintiffs - Appellants,

 v.

CITY OF STOCKTON; SANDOVAL,

individually and in his in his official

capacity as police officer for the City of

Stockton; AZVERAND, individually and

in his official capacity as police officer for

the City of Stockton; DOES 1-20,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 10-15776

D.C. No. 2:08-cv-00964-FCDGGH

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Frank C. Damrell, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 13, 2011** 

San Francisco, California

FILED

JUL 01 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 *** The Honorable William Q. Hayes, United States District Judge for the

District of Southern California, sitting by designation.

2

Before: O’SCANNLAIN and BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and HAYES, District

Judge.*** 

Sonya Wolf and Roger Craig appeal from the district court’s grant of

summary judgment to the City of Stockton and to Officers Darren Sandoval and

Eric Azervand. As the facts are known to the parties, we repeat them only as

necessary to explain our decision.

The officers’ limited search of Wolf’s van was justified under the emergency

aid exception to the Fourth Amendment. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398,

403–04 (2006); United States v. Cervantes, 219 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Given the concerns of Nicholas’s father, the unusual living conditions inside the

van, and Wolf’s uncooperative and disruptive behavior, the officers had reasonable

grounds to believe that Nicholas was residing in a situation unsafe for a young

child, and thus that a potential emergency situation required further investigation. 

See United States v. Bradley, 321 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2003); White v. Pierce Cnty.,

797 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1986). The officers’ search of the van and interview with

Nicholas did not go beyond that which was necessary to determine that he was

safe. See Martin v. City of Oceanside, 360 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2004). 
3

Furthermore, the officers’ brief detention of Wolf during the interview with

Nicholas did not violate the Fourth Amendment. By her own admission, Wolf was

disrupting the officers’ attempts to speak with Nicholas. Because their

investigation of Nicholas’s welfare was valid under the Fourth Amendment, so too

was their reasonable decision temporarily to detain Wolf to facilitate such

investigation. Wolf remained within clear sight of Nicholas throughout the

interview, and her detention lasted no longer than necessary to facilitate the

officers’ investigation.

The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.
#### Harman Apgar *vs.*Degraw and Barcalow.

If a party against whom a judgment is rendered beforo a justice of the peace pays the judgment in the presence of the other party, and after-wards appeals, and brings the appeal to trial beforo the Pleas without notice to the appellee, and in his absence, and obtains a judgment in his favor, the judgment of the Pleas will bo sot aside in this court upon *certiorari.*

*Certiorari*to Hunterdon Pleas.

Argued before Justices Yredenbubgh and Wnelpley.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Vredenburgh, J.

Degraw and Barcalow sued Apgar before a justice, on a note of hand. Apgar appeared before the justice, admitted the signature to the note, and *528gave evidence in defence. The justice, on the 5 th of March, 1858, rendered judgment for the defendant with costs; whereupon the plaintiffs, without intimating any intention of appealing, paid the judgment in the presence of the defendant.

On the 1st of April following the plaintiffs took an appeal, which was tried before the Pleas in September term, 1858, in the absence of Apgar, and with no other proof than the certificate of the transcript, that the defendant had admitted the signature to the note on the trial below. Judgment was thereupon entered in the Pleas against Apgar for $73.50, the face of the note and interest.

This *oertiorcuri*is brought to reverse this judgment of the Pleas. Upon a rule to take testimony, Apgar has sworn that he had no notice or knowledge of the appeal until after its trial; that from the fact of Degraw’s and Barcalow’s paying the judgment at the trial below, he supposed the matter was closed, and that he believes he has a just and legal defence to the action.

The reason assigned for reversal is, that Apgar had no notice of the appeal, and that it was tried in his absence and without his knowledge.

The practice has been, in some parts of the state, that the appellee takes notice of the appeal at his peril. But this rule should go no further, at most, than where the appellant has done nothing to put the other party off his guard. In *Woodruff*v. *Carns, Penn. R.*506, Chief Justice Kirkpatrick says, “ The second reason is, that the defendant had no notice of tke appeal. Upon appeal the cause is heard upon its mérits, and it is essential to the administration of justice that the appellee should not only have notice, but also time to bring his witnesses and other evidence. I do not remember that the act expressly requires this, but it is a dictate of natural justice that ■ a man should not be condemned without a hearing; if the fact had been so, I should have been inclined to reverse on that account. In the case now before us not only had the *529appellee no notice, but the appellants, immediately upon the rendition of the judgment by the justice in the presence of the appellee, paid it. This was saying, in substance, that they did not intend to appeal, or at least it had a natural tendency to, and did in fact mislead the appellee.

The judgment of the Pleas must he reversed, and the cause remitted to that court to be proceeded in according to law.