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In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-18-00256-CR

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PHILLIP EUGENE JACKSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 9th District Court

Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 17-12-14785-CR

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Phillip Eugene Jackson appeals his conviction for evading arrest or 

detention with a vehicle, arguing that the evidence was not sufficient to support the 

deadly weapon finding. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.04(b)(2) (West 2016); Tex. 

Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42A.054 (West 2018).1 The jury found Jackson guilty of 

 1 We cite current versions of the statutes as amendments to the statutes made 

after Jackson’s offense do not affect our disposition.
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the offense of evading arrest or detention with a vehicle, found he was previously 

convicted of a prior felony offense, and assessed his punishment at confinement in 

the institutional division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for fifteen 

years.

Evidence at Trial

A grand jury indicted Jackson for 

. . . intentionally flee[ing] from Officer P. Caughman, a person 

the defendant knew was a peace officer attempting lawfully to arrest or 

detain the defendant, and the defendant used a vehicle while the 

defendant was in flight, 

And . . . that during the commission of the primary offense 

alleged above, the Defendant did then and there use or exhibit a deadly 

weapon, to wit: a motor vehicle[.]

Jackson pleaded “not guilty.”

Testimony of Officer Paul Caughman

Officer Paul Caughman testified at trial and explained that he was working 

patrol for the Conroe Police Department on December 2, 2017. According to 

Caughman, prior to the incident with Jackson, Caughman had been called to a 

disturbance call where “everybody at the house was intoxicated[]” and where he 

observed a silver Jetta in the driveway. Caughman testified that he told the people at 

the house not to drive because they were intoxicated. 
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Caughman testified that he saw the Jetta later, at about 3:25 in the morning, 

when “it was traveling at a high rate of speed[,]” going eighty-five miles per hour in 

a location where the posted speed limit was fifty-five. Caughman identified the 

defendant as the person driving the Jetta that night. Caughman explained that 

equipment in his patrol car tracks the speed of nearby vehicles, but only when the 

other vehicle’s speed is three-to-four miles per hour different than his. 

Caughman testified that he activated the lights and siren on his vehicle when 

pursuing Jackson onto Interstate 45. According to Caughman, he believed that 

Jackson was fleeing based on the way he accelerated getting onto the freeway and 

how he moved around vehicles to avoid Caughman. Caughman testified that on the 

freeway, his vehicle and Jackson’s vehicle reached a speed of approximately 130 

miles per hour, but that the equipment in his vehicle did not pick up Jackson’s speed 

because it was so close to his own, and the equipment picked up the speed of other 

vehicles the two passed on the road. Officer Caughman stated that Jackson’s rearfacing lights were turned off during at least part of the pursuit. According to 

Caughman, his pursuit of Jackson on Interstate 45 covered about fourteen miles. 

Ultimately, Jackson exited the freeway and coasted to a stop, at which time 

Caughman detained Jackson. Caughman testified that he observed a strong odor of 

alcohol on Jackson’s breath, Jackson was swaying and his eyes were glassy, and 
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Caughman believed Jackson was intoxicated. Caughman also testified that he 

observed a half case of beer in Jackson’s vehicle as well as “an illegal club.” 

Caughman testified that five or six additional police vehicles were involved 

in the pursuit of Jackson. In Caughman’s opinion, the vehicle Jackson drove while 

fleeing detention that night was used as a deadly weapon and was used in a manner 

that posed a danger to other people on the road. According to Caughman, the way 

Jackson used his vehicle that night was “very dangerous[]” to other people on the 

road because “[v]ehicles weigh a lot. Those speeds, they take a long time to stop. 

And the way he was swerving in and around vehicles, he could have hit any vehicle 

at any time and caused a major accident.” Caughman stated that Jackson was 

swerving and weaving in and around trucks, eighteen-wheelers, and passenger cars 

that night. 

Testimony of Officer William Robinson

Officer William Robinson, with the Conroe Police Department, also testified 

that he assisted Officer Caughman during a high-speed pursuit on December 2, 2017. 

Robinson testified that he followed Caughman and Jackson for about ten or eleven 

miles, and the vehicles reached speeds “[u]pwards of 130 miles per hour.” According 

to Robinson, Jackson made an improper turn when entering the freeway and made 

some “super unsafe lane changes between the 18-wheelers and civilian vehicles that 
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are just 60, 65 miles an hour, going twice their speed[.]” Robinson testified that, if 

Jackson had collided with another vehicle on the road at that speed, a “catastrophic 

wreck” would have resulted. Robinson further testified that, in responding to such a 

pursuit, an officer is in “[e]xtreme danger.” 

Testimony of Phillip Jackson

Jackson testified at trial and he agreed that he had been drinking and was 

intoxicated on December 2, 2017. Jackson denied that he intended to flee from the 

officers, and he also denied that he saw the lights on the police vehicles. Jackson 

testified that he did not know police officers were behind him. Jackson told the jury

that it was “kind of humiliating[]” for him to watch the video of the pursuit, and he 

agreed he drove down the freeway “like a maniac[]” that night. Jackson agreed he

was swerving all over the road and that he drove 130 miles per hour.

Other Evidence

State’s Exhibit 1 was admitted into evidence and published to the jury, which 

Caughman confirmed was a video of the pursuit recorded from his body camera and 

the dash camera in his vehicle. State’s Exhibit 6 was also admitted into evidence and 

published to the jury, and Robinson agreed that it was a video of the pursuit made 

from a camera in his vehicle.
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The jury found Jackson guilty of evading arrest and found Jackson used a 

deadly weapon in the commission of the offense. The jury assessed punishment at 

fifteen years in prison.

Issue on Appeal

Jackson argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a deadly-weapon 

finding because “no other people were actually endangered by [Jackson’s] driving.” 

Jackson argues that

Jackson did not come perilously close to striking any other vehicles. 

Officer Caughman did not say that Jackson nearly struck any other cars. 

No other cars had to take evasive action to avoid being hit by him. 

Traffic was light at 3:25 in the morning, and there was a concrete barrier 

between oncoming traffic. Jackson did not hit anyone, and no one was 

injured.

Jackson further argues that a hypothetical risk of harm to others is not sufficient to 

support a deadly-weapon finding. 

Standard of Review

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court considers 

all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether the 

jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson 

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2010). Appellate courts are required to determine whether any rational juror could 
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have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902 n.19. An appellate court is 

required to defer to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations because the jury 

is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given to their 

testimony. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 326; Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 525; Brooks, 

323 S.W.3d at 899. On appeal, we serve only to ensure the jury reached a rational 

verdict, and we may not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder. See King 

v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). In our review, we consider 

both direct and circumstantial evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be 

drawn from the evidence. Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2009); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

Applicable Law

Section 38.04(a) of the Texas Penal Code provides that “[a] person commits 

an offense if he intentionally flees from a person he knows is a peace officer or 

federal special investigator attempting lawfully to arrest or detain him.” Tex. Penal 

Code Ann. § 38.04(a). To establish a deadly-weapon finding, the State must 

establish that: (1) the object meets the statutory definition of a dangerous weapon; 

(2) the weapon was used or exhibited during the transaction from which the felony 

conviction was obtained; and (3) other people were actually endangered. Drichas v. 
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State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Brister v. State, 414 S.W.3d 

336, 342 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013), aff’d, 449 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2014). By statutory definition, a deadly weapon is “anything that in the manner of 

its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” Tex. 

Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(B) (West Supp. 2018). “‘An automobile can be a 

deadly weapon if it is driven so as to endanger lives.’” Brister, 414 S.W.3d at 342 

(quoting Cates v. State, 102 S.W.3d 735, 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). “A deadlyweapon finding is justified if a rational jury could have concluded that the appellant’s 

vehicle posed an actual danger of death or serious bodily injury.” Id. (citing Sierra 

v. State, 280 S.W.3d 250, 254, 256-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)). Whether a deadlyweapon finding is justified is a fact-specific inquiry, and we examine the record for 

evidence demonstrating that others were present when the reckless driving occurred. 

Id. at 343. 

While the evidence must show that the defendant was driving his vehicle in a 

way that placed others in actual danger, the State need not establish the motor vehicle 

caused a serious injury or death; instead, the evidence must show the defendant 

drove the vehicle in a way that made the vehicle capable of causing a serious bodily 

injury or death. Tucker v. State, 274 S.W.3d 688, 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see 

also Ex parte McKithan, 838 S.W.2d 560, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). The State 
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need not establish that the defendant specifically intended to use his motor vehicle 

as a deadly weapon. McCain v. State, 22 S.W.3d 497, 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 

Stated another way, the State can satisfy its burden by proving the defendant used 

the vehicle he was driving in a way that made the vehicle capable of causing a serious 

bodily injury or death to others. Moore v. State, 520 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2017).

Analysis

Both officers testified—and Jackson himself agreed—that Jackson was 

driving at about 130 miles per hour and that Jackson was weaving in and around 

other vehicles on the road. Jackson testified that he was driving “like a maniac.” 

Officer Robinson testified that in such a pursuit, officers are in extreme danger, and 

that a “catastrophic wreck” would have resulted had Jackson collided with another 

vehicle. Officer Caughman testified that, in his opinion, Jackson used his vehicle 

during the pursuit as a deadly weapon and in a manner that posed a danger to other 

people on the road. Additionally, the jury viewed the video footage contained in 

State’s Exhibits 1 and 6, which included footage depicting Jackson’s vehicle 

weaving in and around other vehicles during the high-speed pursuit. Based on the 

evidence presented at the trial, we conclude that a rational jury could have concluded 

that the appellant’s vehicle posed an actual danger of death or serious bodily injury
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to others. See Brister, 414 S.W.3d at 342 (citing Sierra, 280 S.W.3d at 254, 256-57).

The evidence established that Jackson drove in a dangerous manner, that Jackson 

was intoxicated, that Jackson drove at a high rate of speed, and that Jackson swerved 

in and out of traffic and that he drove around other vehicles at high speeds at the 

time. The jury could have reasonably concluded that under the facts Jackson created 

more than just a hypothetical danger to others on the road.

We find this case distinguishable from Clark v. State, No. 09-17-00401-CR, 

2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 2371 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 27, 2019, no pet. h.). In 

Clark, we concluded the evidence did not support a deadly-weapon finding in a case 

involving evading arrest or detention with a motor vehicle. Id. at **14-15. Clark 

drove about sixty miles per hour through a residential neighborhood where the speed 

limit was thirty miles per hour, drove erratically and recklessly, ran a stop sign, and 

ultimately wrecked his vehicle in a ditch. Id. at **2-4. Nevertheless, we explained 

that according to the record before us “there were no other motorists in his immediate 

vicinity[,]” the chase was “brief[,]” and the video evidence did not reveal any danger 

to the pursuing officer. Id. at **5, 14. In the case at bar, however, the evidence shows 

that Jackson weaved in and around other vehicles in his path while traveling at 

extremely high speeds of approximately 130 miles per hour, the officers testified 

that the pursuit of Jackson was dangerous, and the chase lasted for several minutes 
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and covered about fourteen miles on the freeway with numerous police vehicles in 

pursuit and with lights and sirens activated. Based on this record, the jury could have 

reasonably concluded that the risk of danger was not hypothetical.

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude 

that a rational finder of fact could find that Jackson used the vehicle he was driving 

as a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense of evading arrest or 

detention, and the evidence is legally sufficient to support the deadly-weapon 

finding. See Sierra, 280 S.W.3d at 256. We overrule Jackson’s issue.

AFFIRMED.

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 LEANNE JOHNSON

 Justice

Submitted on April 16, 2019

Opinion Delivered May 15, 2019

Do Not Publish

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.