alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 533 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 533

 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to clarify that a NADBank 
    guarantee is not considered a Federal guarantee for purposes of 
              determining the tax-exempt status of bonds.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 4, 2005

Mrs. Hutchison introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to clarify that a NADBank 
    guarantee is not considered a Federal guarantee for purposes of 
              determining the tax-exempt status of bonds.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CERTAIN GUARANTEES NOT CONSIDERED FEDERAL GUARANTEES FOR 
              PURPOSES OF DETERMINING TAX-EXEMPT STATUS OF BONDS.

    (a) In General.--Section 149(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986 (relating to certain insurance programs) is amended by 
inserting ``the North American Development Bank,'' after 
``Corporation,''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section shall apply 
with respect to any bond issued before, on, or after the date of the 
enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
<PAGE>


                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

               CERTIFICATION FURNISHED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF
                         THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Permian Basin Royalty Trust
(the "Trust") on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the
undersigned, not in its individual capacity but solely as the trustee of the
Trust, certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to its knowledge:

          (1)  the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
               or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

          (2)  the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
               material respects, the financial condition and results of
               operations of the Trust.




                                   BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., TRUSTEE FOR
                                   PERMIAN BASIN ROYALTY TRUST


August 13, 2003                    By: /s/ RON E. HOOPER
                                       -----------------------------------------
                                       Ron E. Hooper,
                                       Senior Vice President, Royalty Management
                                       Bank of America, N.A.


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Permian basin Royalty Trust and will be retained by Permian basin
Royalty Trust and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
staff upon request.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge. **

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision ***

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RICKY DARNELL HAMMONDS,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

M. MARTEL, Warden, CSP - New

Folsom; et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 08-17453

D.C. No. 2:06-CV-02397-CMK

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Craig Kellison, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**

Submitted December 15, 2009***

Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

Ricky Darnell Hammonds appeals pro se from the district court’s summary

judgment in favor of the defendants in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging

FILED

JAN 07 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

deliberate indifference to his safety. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291. We review de novo the district court’s summary judgment on the ground

of qualified immunity. Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 650 (9th Cir.

2001). We affirm.

Hammonds’ claims against defendants Vanderostyne and Kim are based

solely on allegations that they did not provide the Institution Classification

Committee (“ICC”)—defendants Martel, Vance, Dunlap, and Vasquez—with

information about his paranoia or problems. However, the record indicates that the

ICC was aware of and considered his mental health state. As to defendants Martel,

Vance, Dunlap, and Vasquez, Hammonds failed to raise a genuine issue of material

fact as to whether a reasonable official under the circumstances, after considering

“all pertinent information,” would have inferred that placing him in a double-cell

posed a substantial risk of serious harm. Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301

F.3d 1043, 1050–52 (9th Cir. 2002). Finally, the ICC did consider, among other

things, Hammonds’ mental health in determining whether he should be doublecelled, and to the extent further mental evaluation would have been appropriate,

such failure was, at best, negligence and “‘cannot be condemned as the infliction of

punishment.’” Id. at 1052 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 938 (1994)). 

Therefore, Hammonds failed to establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
3

Moreover, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Hammonds,

we hold that a reasonable prison official would not have known that Hammonds’

mental health history posed a “risk of serious harm [that] was so high” that placing

him in a double-cell violated clearly established constitutional rights. Id. at 1051. 

Thus, the district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants

on the ground of qualified immunity. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201–02

(2001).

AFFIRMED.
| 1.   | The      Annual Report for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2007 fully complies      with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange      Act of 1934; and |
|----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 2.   | The      information contained in the Annual Report for the fiscal year ended      December 31, 2007 fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial      condition and result of operations of the  Company. |
|----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|        | /s/ John      E. Lucas                                       |   |
|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|   |  John      E. Lucas                                          |   |
|   | PresidentChief      Executive OfficerChief      Financial Officer |   |
|   |  April 14, 2008                                              |   |
#### Arman GEVORGYAN; Alina Panosyan, Petitioners, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 05-72580.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 13, 2009.*

Filed April 27, 2009.

*508Artem M. Sarian, Esq., Glendale, CA, pro se.

Ronald E. Lefevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Heather E. Gange, Esq., DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice Environmental *&*Natural Resources Div., Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: GRABER, GOULD, and BEA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument and therefore we deny Gevorgyan’s request for oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Arman Gevorgyan and his wife, natives and citizens of Armenia, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing them appeal from an immi-

gration judge’s (“U”) decision denying their application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence, *Zehatye v. Gonzales,*453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir.2006), and we deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination based on the discrepancies in Gevorgyan’s account of his wife being hit by a car in his testimony and declaration and based on Gevorgyan’s explanation for the discrepancy that created an additional inconsistency, i.e., that his wife was actually not hit by the car. *See Kaur v. Gonzales,*418 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir.2005). Accordingly, Gevorgyan’s asylum claim fails.

Because Gevorgyan failed to satisfy the lower standard of proof for asylum, it necessarily follows that he failed to satisfy the more stringent standard for withholding of removal. *See Zehatye,*453 F.3d at 1190.

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Gevorgyan failed to establish it is more likely than not he would be tortured if returned to Armenia. *See Arteaga v. Mukasey,*511 F.3d 940, 948-49 (9th Cir.2007).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### Nasser KHALILI, Plaintiff, v. PAN AMERICAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION, Defendant.

No. A-111-69.

United States District Court D. Alaska.

Nov. 6, 1969.

James K. Tallman, Anchorage, Alaska, for plaintiff.

Theodore M. Pease, Jr., Anchorage, Alaska, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

VON DER HEYDT, District Judge.

Plaintiff has objected to defendant’s request for admission, which reads as follows:

“That the damages being sought by plaintiff exclusive of interest and costs exceeds $10,000.00.”

The basis of the objection is that the “fact” which defendant seeks to have admitted is “one of the ultimate issues to be tried * * * by the jury, that is, the amount of damages to be awarded.”

The cause originally was filed in the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, and was removed to this court upon de*23fendant’s petition, federal jurisdiction being predicated upon diversity of citizenship. The complaint, as filed in the Superior Court, alleges damages “in excess of $3,000.00”, the jurisdictional minimum of that court.

Obviously, the litigants are forum shopping. The State of Alaska, A.S. 09.20.100, authorizes return of a verdict in civil causes upon the concurrence of five-sixths of the jurors. A unanimous verdict is required in Federal court. Thus, plaintiff desires the advantage of the State court, and defendant the Federal.

Here, however, plaintiff has misconstrued his objection. He is not asked to admit the amount of damages to be awarded by the jury, a purely speculative opinion, but the amount he is seeking. The distinction is clear, and goes to the critical issue, of this court’s jurisdiction. If the amount of plaintiff’s claim is less than $10,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs, this court lacks jurisdiction of the cause, and it must be remanded to the State court.

While there is authority that a “disputed” fact is not the proper subject for such a request, the better rule is that it may be. See 2A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 832 (Supp.1968). Moore states flatly that the mere fact that a requested admission concerns a “controverted” fact does not make it improper. 4 Moore, Federal Practice § 36.04 at 2736 (1969). Where the admission of a central fact in dispute is requested, the request is frequently held improper. *Id. at 2737.*These are, however, facts central to the merits of the cause of action itself, such as requests to admit that defendant caused an accident, that a party did not provide or insure a particular automobile, that a decedent was within the scope of his employment when he died, or that a partnership existed. *Id.*at 2737 n. 55.

Since this court’s jurisdiction is a vital issue which must be determined at this stage of the proceeding, plaintiff’s objection will be overruled. *See*McGonigle v. Baxter, 27 F.R.D. 504 (E. D.Pa.1961).

Therefore, it is ordered:

1. That plaintiff’s objection to defendant’s request for admission is overruled.

2. That plaintiff reply to said request within ten days of the date of this memorandum and order.