[Cite as Williams v. Williams, 2016-Ohio-3344.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Malisia Williams [n.k.a. Knight], : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 No. 15AP-739 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 11DR-2257) 

David Williams, : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellee. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on June 9, 2016 

 

On brief: Manning Law Company, and Jamie C. Manning, 

for appellant. Argued: Jamie C. Manning. 

On brief: Law Office of Saia & Piatt, Inc., and Megan M. 

Beyland, for appellee. Argued: Megan M. Beyland. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, 

Division of Domestic Relations 

BROWN, J. 

{¶ 1} Malisia Williams, n.k.a. Knight, plaintiff-appellant ("mother"), appeals from 

a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic 

Relations, in which the trial court overruled her objections to a magistrate's decision. 

{¶ 2} In July 1995, mother and David Williams, defendant-appellee ("father"), 

married. One child was born during the marriage in May 2007. On June 7, 2011, mother 

filed a complaint for divorce. On January 31, 2012, the trial court entered an agreed 

shared parenting decree and an agreed judgment entry final decree of divorce. The 

shared parenting plan ordered a "2/2/3" schedule, in which the child was to live with 

mother two days of the week, with father the next two days, and then with mother the 
No. 15AP-739 2 

next three days, with the schedule switching the following week. The court also ordered 

father to pay mother child support of $425.00 per month, which was a downward 

deviation from the child support guidelines ("guidelines") amount of $540.16 per month. 

However, in practice, the parties exercised a week-on/week-off visitation schedule. 

{¶ 3} This case concerns a number of motions filed by each party, the specific 

grounds for which we will detail in more depth during our discussion of the assignments 

of error, as necessary. On August 7, 2013, mother filed a motion for contempt relating to 

father's failure to notify her of his intent to relocate. On October 8, 2013, father filed a 

motion for modification of the parties' shared parenting plan, which related to the parties' 

failure to follow the 2/2/3 schedule, and a motion for contempt related to mother's failure 

to refinance the marital home. On April 21, 2014, father filed a motion for attorney fees 

based on mother's conduct. On April 28, 2014, mother filed an amended motion for 

contempt. On June 4, 2014, mother filed a motion to terminate shared parenting plan 

and for reallocation of parental rights. On July 9, 2014, mother filed a motion for 

attorney fees, a motion to reallocate guardian ad litem ("GAL") fees, and a motion to 

extend the deadline to pay GAL fees. 

{¶ 4} Father remarried in mid-2013; mother remarried in mid-2014. 

{¶ 5} The above motions came for hearing before a magistrate over several days 

in July and August 2014. On March 19, 2015, the magistrate issued a decision, in which 

he ordered a week-on/week-off parenting schedule, recalculated child support, and 

deviated that new amount downward to $250.00 per month from the guidelines amount 

of $583.53, and found both parties in contempt on various issues but found they had 

purged their contempts prior to the writing of the decision. On April 2, 2015, mother filed 

objections to the magistrate's decision. 

{¶ 6} The court held a full hearing on mother's objections. On July 8, 2015, the 

trial court issued a decision and entry, in which it overruled mother's objections, except 

for her objection relating to the allocation of the payment of GAL fees, which the court 

sustained. Mother appeals the judgment of the trial court, asserting the following 

assignments of error: 

[I.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT APPLIED [R.C.] 

3119.79(A) AND 3119.22 AND RETROACTIVELY DEVIATED 
No. 15AP-739 3 

CHILD SUPPORT WHEN IT WAS NOT IN THE CHILD'S 

BEST INTEREST. 

[II.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO FIND 

THE DEFENDANT IN CONTEMPT OF COURT WHEN AS A 

PARTY TO A SHARED PARENTING PLAN, HE WITHHELD 

HIS ADDRESS FROM PLAINTIFF AND PROVIDED A 

FALSE ADDRESS. 

[III.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING [R.C.] 

3105.73 AND ORDERING ATTORNEY'S FEES IN FAVOR OF 

THE HIGHER WAGE EARNER TO THE DETRIMENT OF 

THE MINOR CHILD. 

{¶ 7} Mother argues in her first assignment of error that the trial court erred 

when it applied R.C. 3119.79(A) and 3119.22 and retroactively deviated child support. 

R.C. 3119.79(A), titled "Recalculation of amount by court upon request," provides: 

If an obligor or obligee under a child support order requests 

that the court modify the amount of support required to be 

paid pursuant to the child support order, the court shall 

recalculate the amount of support that would be required to 

be paid under the child support order in accordance with the 

schedule and the applicable worksheet through the line 

establishing the actual annual obligation. If that amount as 

recalculated is more than ten per cent greater than or more 

than ten per cent less than the amount of child support 

required to be paid pursuant to the existing child support 

order, the deviation from the recalculated amount that would 

be required to be paid under the schedule and the applicable 

worksheet shall be considered by the court as a change of 

circumstance substantial enough to require a modification of 

the child support amount. 

{¶ 8} R.C. 3119.22, entitled "Deviation from amount resulting from schedule and 

worksheet," provides: 

The court may order an amount of child support that deviates 

from the amount of child support that would otherwise result 

from the use of the basic child support schedule and the 

applicable worksheet, through the line establishing the actual 

annual obligation, if, after considering the factors and criteria 

set forth in section 3119.23 of the Revised Code, the court 

determines that the amount calculated pursuant to the basic 

child support schedule and the applicable worksheet, through 

the line establishing the actual annual obligation, would be 
No. 15AP-739 4 

unjust or inappropriate and would not be in the best interest 

of the child. 

If it deviates, the court must enter in the journal the amount 

of child support calculated pursuant to the basic child support 

schedule and the applicable worksheet, through the line 

establishing the actual annual obligation, its determination 

that that amount would be unjust or inappropriate and would 

not be in the best interest of the child, and findings of fact 

supporting that determination. 

{¶ 9} We first address mother's argument relating to the recalculation of the child 

support amount pursuant to R.C. 3119.79(A). In her objections to the magistrate's 

decision, mother argued that to determine a change in circumstances to modify child 

support under R.C. 3119.79(A), the magistrate improperly used the prior deviated child 

support amount of $425.00 instead of the prior undeviated guidelines amount of $540.16 

to determine whether a 10 percent difference existed with the recalculated guidelines 

amount of $583.53. Assuming this is the same argument she is raising in her first 

assignment of error, we find no error. R.C. 3119.79(A) clearly provides that to determine 

whether a 10 percent difference exists, the court must compare the recalculated guidelines 

amount—here, $583.53—to the "amount of child support required to be paid pursuant to 

the existing child support order"—here, $425.00. See Moore v. Moore, 5th Dist. No. 09 

CA 21, 2010-Ohio-2499 (court compared the existing deviated child support amount to 

the new guidelines amount to determine whether a 10 percent difference existed pursuant 

to R.C. 3119.79). Therefore, mother's argument is without merit. 

{¶ 10} Mother also seems to argue that the trial court deviated from the previously 

ordered child support amount of $425.00 instead of the recalculated guidelines amount 

of $583.53 in order to arrive at the current deviated amount of $250.00. However, after 

our review of the magistrate's decision, we fail to see why mother believes such. The 

magistrate's order indicates that father "shall pay child support of $250.00 per month, 

plus processing charge, which is a downward deviation from the child support 

guideline[s] worksheet." Thus, the trial court deviated from the recalculated child support 

guidelines worksheet and not the previously ordered support amount of $425.00. 

Therefore, this argument is without merit. 
No. 15AP-739 5 

{¶ 11} Mother next argues that the trial court erred when it found that it would be 

in the best interests of the child to deviate from the child support guidelines pursuant to 

R.C. 3119.22. Mother contends that the parties had equal parenting time with the child, 

and the trial court erroneously gave father "credit" for his overnight visitation once per 

week when she also receives additional parenting time once per week. Mother also points 

out that her income was reduced when she remarried because she stopped getting spousal 

support, and her earnings decreased when she changed employment to be able to spend 

more time with the child. She claims the income disparity between her and father is 

substantial, with her income being 50 percent less than father's income. 

{¶ 12} However, mother did not specifically raise this argument in her April 2, 

2015 objections to the magistrate's decision. Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv), entitled "Waiver of 

right to assign adoption by court as error on appeal," specifically states that "[e]xcept for a 

claim of plain error, a party shall not assign as error on appeal the court's adoption of any 

factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a finding of 

fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party has objected to that 

finding or conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)." Because mother did not raise 

this argument in her objections, she has waived it, except for plain error, which mother 

has not asserted on appeal. In the context of a civil appeal, "an appellate court only 

applies the plain-error doctrine if the asserted error 'seriously affects the basic fairness, 

integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of 

the underlying judicial process itself.' " Claffey v. Natl. City Bank, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-95, 

2011-Ohio-4926, ¶ 15, quoting Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 123 (1997). 

{¶ 13} Notwithstanding, even if we were to address this argument, we would find 

mother's argument unavailing. Absent an abuse of discretion, a trial court's 

determination regarding child support obligations will not be disturbed on appeal. Pauly 

v. Pauly, 80 Ohio St.3d 386, 390 (1997). Pursuant to R.C. 3119.22, a court may deviate 

from the guidelines amount if the court determines it would be unjust or inappropriate 

and not in the best interest of the child, after considering the factors in R.C. 3119.23. R.C. 

3119.23 provides, in pertinent part: 

The court may consider any of the following factors in 

determining whether to grant a deviation pursuant to section 

3119.22 of the Revised Code: 
No. 15AP-739 6 

(A) Special and unusual needs of the children; 

(B) Extraordinary obligations for minor children or 

obligations for handicapped children who are not stepchildren 

and who are not offspring from the marriage or relationship 

that is the basis of the immediate child support 

determination; 

(C) Other court-ordered payments; 

(D) Extended parenting time or extraordinary costs associated 

with parenting time, provided that this division does not 

authorize and shall not be construed as authorizing any 

deviation from the schedule and the applicable worksheet, 

through the line establishing the actual annual obligation, or 

any escrowing, impoundment, or withholding of child support 

because of a denial of or interference with a right of parenting 

time granted by court order; 

(E) The obligor obtaining additional employment after a child 

support order is issued in order to support a second family; 

(F) The financial resources and the earning ability of the 

child; 

(G) Disparity in income between parties or households; 

(H) Benefits that either parent receives from remarriage or 

sharing living expenses with another person; 

(I) The amount of federal, state, and local taxes actually paid 

or estimated to be paid by a parent or both of the parents; 

(J) Significant in-kind contributions from a parent, including, 

but not limited to, direct payment for lessons, sports 

equipment, schooling, or clothing; 

(K) The relative financial resources, other assets and 

resources, and needs of each parent; 

(L) The standard of living and circumstances of each parent 

and the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had 

the marriage continued or had the parents been married; 

(M) The physical and emotional condition and needs of the 

child; 
No. 15AP-739 7 

(N) The need and capacity of the child for an education and 

the educational opportunities that would have been available 

to the child had the circumstances requiring a court order for 

support not arisen; 

(O) The responsibility of each parent for the support of others; 

(P) Any other relevant factor. 

{¶ 14} R.C. 3119.24, which permits a deviation from the child support guidelines 

amount, provides: 

(A) 

(1) A court that issues a shared parenting order in accordance 

with section 3109.04 of the Revised Code shall order an 

amount of child support to be paid under the child support 

order that is calculated in accordance with the schedule and 

with the worksheet set forth in section 3119.022 of the 

Revised Code, through the line establishing the actual annual 

obligation, except that, if that amount would be unjust or 

inappropriate to the children or either parent and would not 

be in the best interest of the child because of the extraordinary 

circumstances of the parents or because of any other factors 

or criteria set forth in section 3119.23 of the Revised Code, the 

court may deviate from that amount. 

(2) The court shall consider extraordinary circumstances and 

other factors or criteria if it deviates from the amount 

described in division (A)(1) of this section and shall enter in 

the journal the amount described in division (A)(1) of this 

section its determination that the amount would be unjust or 

inappropriate and would not be in the best interest of the 

child, and findings of fact supporting its determination. 

(B) For the purposes of this section, "extraordinary 

circumstances of the parents" includes all of the following: 

(1) The amount of time the children spend with each parent; 

(2) The ability of each parent to maintain adequate housing 

for the children; 

(3) Each parent's expenses, including child care expenses, 

school tuition, medical expenses, dental expenses, and any 

other expenses the court considers relevant; 
No. 15AP-739 8 

(4) Any other circumstances the court considers relevant. 

{¶ 15} In the present case, with regard to mother's argument that the parties had 

equal parenting time with the child, mother is correct. However, equal parenting time is 

more than the standard visitation schedule. See Havens v. Havens, 10th Dist. No. 11AP708, 2012-Ohio-2867, ¶ 26 (the child support guidelines assume a standard visitation 

schedule with a 75/25 split of parenting time; therefore, extended parenting time 

contemplates anything over and above that standard visitation schedule). Although a trial 

court is not required to deviate a child support award when the parties share equal 

parenting time, see Pauly at 390, many courts have granted deviations to the calculated 

amount of child support based on equal parenting time. See, e.g., Misty R. v. Brian S., 

6th Dist. No. WD-02-029, 2003-Ohio-1413, ¶ 19-30 (deviated child support from the 

guidelines amount of $800 to $500 based on equal parenting time); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 

9th Dist. No. 23860, 2008-Ohio-3201, ¶ 8-10 (28 percent deviation based on evidence 

that husband's visitation time equaled 29 percent of the available time within a 

year);Wolford v. Wolford, 5th Dist. No. 04-COA-042, 2005-Ohio-1231 (the approximately 

equal time shared by each parent with the child, as well as other factors, supports a 

deviation of child support). Therefore, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

or commit plain error when it considered equal parenting time as a factor favoring a 

downward deviation of child support. 

{¶ 16} With regard to mother's argument that the trial court erroneously gave 

father "credit" for his overnight visitation once per week when she also receives additional 

parenting time once per week, mother failed to raise this specific objection in her April 2, 

2015 objections to the magistrate's decision; thus, mother has waived this issue. 

Notwithstanding this deficiency, we find no abuse of discretion. Although mother does 

receive additional overnight parenting time once per week on Tuesday evenings, the 

magistrate specifically noted father's additional overnight parenting time on Wednesday 

evenings to point out that he incurs the additional responsibility of transportation to and 

from the child's choir and dance activities on Wednesday evenings. We can find no plain 

error or abuse of discretion in this regard. 
No. 15AP-739 9 

{¶ 17} Mother also points out that her income was reduced when she remarried 

because she stopped receiving spousal support, and her earnings decreased when she 

changed employment to be able to spend more time with the child. She claims the income 

disparity between her and father is substantial, with her imputed income being 50 percent 

less than father's income. Again, mother did not raise these issues in her objections to the 

magistrate's decision. Regardless, we find these arguments unpersuasive. Mother's 

decision to remarry and forgo further spousal support payments was her personal 

decision. Likewise, mother's decision to quit her job and incur a decrease in income so 

that she could spend more time with the child was voluntary. The magistrate specifically 

found that mother quit her prior employment to work for her current husband, and that 

decision was solely voluntary, and also noted that mother did not receive spousal support 

due to her remarriage. We can find no abuse of discretion or plain error in the trial 

court's adoption of the magistrate's findings. For these reasons, we overrule mother's first 

assignment of error. 

{¶ 18} Mother argues in her second assignment of error that the trial court erred 

when it failed to find father in contempt of court when he withheld his address from 

mother and provided her a false address. We review the trial court's decision whether to 

find a party in contempt under an abuse of discretion standard. Williamson v. Cooke, 

10th Dist. No. 05AP-936, 2007-Ohio-493. The abuse of discretion standard is defined as 

" '[a]n appellate court's standard for reviewing a decision that is asserted to be grossly 

unsound, unreasonable, illegal, or unsupported by the evidence.' " State v. Gordon, 10th 

Dist. No. 10AP-1174, 2011-Ohio-4208, ¶ 20, quoting State v. Boles, 187 Ohio App.3d 345, 

2010-Ohio-278, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.). 

{¶ 19} Here, the parties' shared parenting plan required that, upon learning that 

either party will be moving, the party must immediately notify the other parent and 

provide the other parent with the moving date, new residence address, telephone number, 

and such other pertinent information necessary to effectuate a smooth transition for the 

child. Mother contends that father failed to notify her that he had moved and continued to 

violate the moving provision for over one year. 

{¶ 20} The magistrate found that father moved from his address in October 2012, 

initially lied to mother about his new residence, and did not file a correct relocation notice 
No. 15AP-739 10 

until September 26, 2013. The magistrate determined that father was guilty of contempt 

by failing to timely file his relocation notice. However, the magistrate found that father 

had purged his contempt by filing his relocation notice on September 26, 2013, 

approximately one and one-half months after mother filed her motion for contempt. 

{¶ 21} Here, mother's only arguments are that the court should not have found 

that father purged the contempt, as she was not made whole by the filing of the relocation 

notice, and father never directly gave her his new address. Initially, as father points out, in 

her contempt motion, mother requested only that the court find father in contempt for 

failing to give her and the court notice of his intent to move. Mother did not request that 

father be held in contempt for providing her a false address, as she presents in her 

assignment of error. Regardless, under any of these arguments, we cannot find the trial 

court abused its discretion when it adopted the magistrate's decision. Mother does not 

suggest what the remedy should have been or what specific harm she suffered that 

demands some other remedy. Therefore, we find this argument without merit and 

overrule mother's second assignment of error. 

{¶ 22} Mother argues in her third assignment of error that the trial court erred 

when it applied R.C. 3105.73 and ordered attorney fees in favor of father, the higher wage 

earner, to the detriment of the child. R.C. 3105.73(B) provides that "[i]n any post-decree 

motion or proceeding that arises out of an action for divorce, * * * the court may award all 

or part of reasonable attorney's fees and litigation expenses to either party if the court 

finds the award equitable." "In determining whether an award is equitable, the court may 

consider the parties' income, the conduct of the parties, and any other relevant factors the 

court deems appropriate, but it may not consider the parties' assets." A trial court's award 

of attorney fees related to a post-decree motion or proceeding will not be overturned 

absent an abuse of discretion. Epitropoulos v. Epitropoulos, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-877, 

2011-Ohio-3701, ¶ 42. 

{¶ 23} In Hummer v. Hummer, 10th Dist. No. 86AP-293 (Aug. 28, 1986), this 

court set forth a balancing test to be applied in evaluating the reasonableness of a request 

for attorney fees in a child support modification proceeding. This court indicated that the 

factors to be considered included: (1) the needs of the children, (2) the change in 

circumstances including increases in income, (3) the assets of the parties, (4) the ability or 
No. 15AP-739 11 

inability of each party to pay attorney fees, (5) the degree of increase in child support 

awarded, (6) the total amount of attorney fees, (7) the proportion of attorney fees caused 

by undue delay or resistance by either party in resolving the child support issue, and (8) 

the effect of payment of attorney fees on the custodial parent's ability to contribute a 

proportionate share of child support. 

{¶ 24} In support of granting father attorney fees, the trial court cited to the 

following conduct: (1) father incurred needless attorney fees when mother's attorney 

refused to continue the first hearing date due to a schedule conflict and necessitated 

father's attorney appearing in court to address the issue, (2) the magistrate ordered both 

parties to bring to a status conference stipulations or proposed stipulations, but mother's 

attorney failed to bring proposed stipulations, showed a lack of interest in having 

meaningful discussions regarding possible settlement or narrowing of the issues, and told 

the magistrate she did not bring the proposed stipulations because she thought the order 

was "stupid," (3) the magistrate ordered the parties to provide the other party, the GAL, 

and the court with their trial notebooks and exhibits, but mother's attorney filed the 

notebooks with the clerk of courts prior to trial, forcing father to file a motion to seal the 

record because the proposed exhibits had not yet been deemed admissible, (4) mother's 

attorney posted a message on social media the night prior to calling a witness at trial that 

suggested father's attorney had an ulterior motive for calling him as a witness, and 

(5) mother's testimony contradicted her stated goals and requests for relief. Thus, the 

magistrate found it equitable to award attorney fees of $1,500 to father. 

{¶ 25} In support of her assignment of error, mother asserts that father's income 

was $64,200 in 2014, and the trial court imputed $31,720 in income to her. With regard 

to Hummer factors (1), (3), and (6), mother contends that the award was not equitable 

because her income is less than half of father's income. With regard to Hummer factor 

(2), mother asserts that the only change in circumstances was her change in employment. 

Mother argues that father complained that mother's job was not flexible enough to spend 

time with the child, so when she remarried she began working for her new husband's 

business, which gave her more flexibility and time with the child. With regard to 

Hummer factor (5), mother asserts that there was no evidence of undue delay or 

resistance by mother, and the magistrate wrongly found her attorney had a bad attitude, 
No. 15AP-739 12 

lacked interest in discussing meaningful settlements or narrowing the issues, and had any 

ulterior motive relating to the alleged social media post. Mother contends that these 

perceptions were never proven and she should not be punished for the perceived conduct 

of her attorney. 

{¶ 26} We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding father 

attorney fees. Father sought attorney fees based on both mother's conduct and her 

attorney's conduct. Although mother's imputed income was less than half of father's 

income, we do not find this disparity precludes an award of attorney fees, given the other 

existing circumstances. Also, as we explained above, that mother took a significant pay 

cut to spend more time with the child was a voluntary decision on her part. What is 

apparent from the magistrate's decision is that the magistrate strongly believed that both 

mother and her attorney were engaging in behavior that was detrimental to progress in 

the case and discouraged settlement. The magistrate cited five instances of problematic 

behavior by mother and her attorney, and although mother attempts to frame these 

instances as mere "perceptions" by the magistrate without any real evidence, the 

examples given are not merely subjective observations. The conduct cited is supported by 

the record. The magistrate was best able to observe the actions, demeanor, and attitude of 

the parties and their counsel, and we see no reason to second guess the magistrate's 

assessments. We also note that, with regard to the social media post, the magistrate 

stated at trial that he did not see how the post was relevant to trial, and indicated in his 

decision that he did not give it much consideration. Therefore, we find no error in the 

award of attorney fees and overrule mother's third assignment of error. 

{¶ 27} Accordingly, we overrule mother's three assignments of error, and affirm 

the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic 

Relations. 

Judgment affirmed. 

TYACK and HORTON, JJ., concur. 

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