alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Ashworth *v.*East Tenn., Va. & Ga. Railway Co.

There was no error in granting á second new trial in this case.

March 19, 1894.

Argued at the last term.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Action for damages. Before Judge Henry. Eloyd superior court. March term, 1893.

The plaintiff sued the railway company for personal injuries sustained by him by being struck at night by its engine pulling a freight-train while he was on its track. He claimed to have been upon a street or road *716crossing; that the train ran against him without any signal or warning of its approach having been given; and that he was unable to see it before going upon the track, by reason of a train of freight-cars standing on a side-track next to the main line. The evidence ou the material issues was directly conflicting. The first trial resulted in a verdict of $6,500 for the plaintiff, which was set aside on defendant’s motion. At the second trial plaintiff had a verdict for $5,000, and he excepted to the grant of another new trial.

H. M. Wright, Nat. Harris and E. R. Harris, for plaintiff. McCutchen & Shumate and C. W. Underwood, for defendant.
##### 



EXHIBIT 99.3




---



##### 



(KPMG LOGO)KPMG LLP
    
    Telephone
    
    (514) 840-2100Chartered Accountants
    
    Fax
    
    (514) 840-21872000 McGill College Avenue
    
    Internet
    
    www.kpmg.caSuite 1900Montréal Québec H3A 3H8
 CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM
 
      KPMG LLP, a Canadian limited liability partnership is the Canadian member
firm of KPMG International, a Swiss cooperative.
EXHIBIT 32.2


STATEMENT OF CHIEF ACCOUNTING OFFICER
 PURSUANT TO SECTION 1350 OF TITLE 18 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE


Pursuant to Section 1350 of Title 18 of the United States Code, the undersigned, Sam H. Lindsey, Jr., chief accounting officer of Biofuels Power Corporation (the “Company”), hereby certifies that:
 
 The Company’s Form 10-K/A Annual Report for the year ended December 31, 2012 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) and Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 
 /s/ Sam H. Lindsey, Jr.,
 Sam H. Lindsey, Jr., Chief Accounting Officer
 Dated: December 30, 2013
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D18-1259

_____________________________

RAYNARD WILDER,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Tatiana Salvador, Judge.

September 13, 2019

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

ROBERTS, JAY, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________

Raynard Wilder, pro se, Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
#### Phillip Lamar BUSBY, Petitioner—Appellant, v. Joe McGRAPH, Warden, Respondent—Appellee.

No. 08-16098.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted April 15, 2009.

Filed April 30, 2009.

Marylou Elin Hillberg, Marylou Hill-berg, Attorney at Law, Sebastopol, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant.

*551Brian R. Means, Deputy Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, Laura Wetzel Simpton, Deputy Attorney General, Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for Respondent Appellee.

Before: REINHARDT, NOONAN, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

Phillip Lamar Busby appeals the denial of his habeas petition. Because the underlying state court decision was not “contrary to, or ... an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), we affirm.

The state court reasonably found that California Jury Instruction 2.15 did not create a “reasonable likelihood” that the jury misunderstood the government’s burden of proof. *Boyde v. California,*494 U.S. 370, 380, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990); *see generally Gibson v. Ortiz,*387 F.3d 812 (9th Cir.2004). Any ambiguity in the instruction was clarified by other instructions given to the jury. *See Estelle v. McGuire,*502 U.S. 62, 72, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991).

Likewise, the state court reasonably determined that the application of California Jury Instruction 2.15 to Busby’s assault charges did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under the particular facts of Busby’s case, the state court reasonably determined that it was more likely than not that Busby’s possession of the cellular phone resulted from his participation in the assaults. *See County Ct. of Ulster v. Allen, 442*U.S. 140, 163, 165, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979).

AFFIRMED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Exhibit 32.2

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Cubic Energy, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form  10-QSB  for the  period  ending  September  30,  2006 as  filed  with  the
Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  I, CFO,
certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Company.

Date: November 13, 2006                            Signature: /s/ James L. Busby
                                                             -------------------
                                                             James L. Busby, CFO
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 576 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 576

To restore the prohibition on the commercial sale and slaughter of wild 
                    free-roaming horses and burros.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 9, 2005

   Mr. Byrd introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
       referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To restore the prohibition on the commercial sale and slaughter of wild 
                    free-roaming horses and burros.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SALE OF WILD FREE-ROAMING HORSES AND BURROS.

    (a) Prohibition.--Section 3 of Public Law 92-195 (16 U.S.C. 1333) 
(as amended by section 142(a) of Public Law 108-447 (118 Stat. 3070)) 
is amended by striking subsection (e) and inserting the following:
    ``(e) Prohibition of Sale of Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros.--
No wild free-roaming horse or burro or the remains of a wild free-
roaming horse or burro may be sold or transferred for consideration for 
processing into commercial products.''.
    (b) Criminal Provisions.--Section 8(a)(4) of Public Law 92-195 (16 
U.S.C. 1338(a)(4)) (as amended by section 142(b) of Public Law 108-447 
(118 Stat. 3071)) is amended by striking ``except as provided in 
section 3(e),''.
                                 <all>
```
#### Anthony Tislon, Appellant, v State of New York, Respondent.

Decided December 17, 2009

Appeal transferred, without costs, by the Court of Appeals, sua sponte, to the Appellate Division, Second Department, upon the ground that a direct appeal does not lie when questions other than the constitutional validity of a statutory provision are involved (NY Const, art VI, § 3 [b] [2]; § 5 [b]; CPLR 5601 [b] [2]).
#### In the Matter of Jovany Henrius, Petitioner, v Alan L. Honorof et al., Respondents.

[975 NYS2d 356]

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 in the nature of prohibition, inter alia, to prohibit the respondent Alan L. Honorof, an Acting Justice of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, from proceeding to the trial of a criminal action entitled *People v Henrius,*pending in that court under indictment No. 775N-2011, and, in effect, in the nature of mandamus to compel him to grant the petitioner’s motion to suppress certain evidence.

Adjudged that the petition is denied and the proceeding is dismissed, without costs or disbursements.

“Because of its extraordinary nature, prohibition is available only where there is a clear legal right, and then only when a court — in cases where judicial authority is challenged — acts or threatens to act either without jurisdiction or in excess of its authorized powers” *(Matter of Holtzman v Goldman,*71 NY2d 564, 569 [1988]; *see Matter of Rush v Mordue,*68 NY2d 348, 352 [1986]). Similarly, the extraordinary remedy of mandamus will lie only to compel the performance of a ministerial act and only when there exists a clear legal right to the relief sought *(see Matter of Legal Aid Socy. of Sullivan County v Scheinman,*53 NY2d 12, 16 [1981]).

*829The petitioner has failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief sought. Dillon, J.E, Dickerson, Hall and Austin, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Richard J. Galasso, Appellant.

[963 NYS2d 919]

Judgment unanimously affirmed. Counsel’s motion to be relieved of assignment granted *(see People v Crawford,*71 AD2d 38 [1979]). (Appeal from Judgment of Erie County Court, Thomas P.

Franczyk, J.—Violation of Probation).

Present—Scudder, PJ., Centra, Carni, Sconiers and Martoche, JJ.
* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that th i s

opinion s h ould not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________________

No. 00-10360 Summary Calendar

_______________________

MARIA LUISA QUEVEDO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ARMY & AIR FORCE EXCHANGE SERVICE, (AAFES); BARRY D BATES, MG, Major General, USA Commander,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas

3:99-CV-2056-X

_________________________________________________________________ September 14, 2000

Before DAVIS, JONES, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Maria Luisa Qu evedo alleges that she was discriminated

against on the basis of her age and national origin by the Army Air

Force Exchange Service (AAFE S) and its commander, Major General

Barry D. Bates. The district court dismissed this action without

prejudice on the grounds that AAFES and General Barry are not

proper party defendants under the relevant federal laws, Title VII

and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Because neitherAAFES or General Barry is a proper defendant to this action, we

affirm the district court’s dismissal without prejudice.

T he AAFES is part of the federal government and is

classified as a non-appropriated fund instrumentality of the

United States. S ee AAFES v. Sheehan
, 456 U.S. 728, 102 S. Ct. 2118

(1982). As such, the AAFES shares in whatever immunity the

government may have against suit under the Constitution and

federal statutes.

By statute, the only proper party defendant in either a

Title VII action or an Age Discrimination in Employment action

brought against the United Stat es is the head of the agency in

which the alleged discriminatory acts occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e16(c); Honeycutt v. Long
, 861 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1988). AAFES is

an integral part of the Department of Defense and operates is

support of both the A rmy and Air Force. D ynes v. Army and Air

Force Exchange Service

, 720 F.2d 1495, 1496 (11th Cir. 1983).

Therefore, as noted by the district court, the only proper party

defendant in this action is the head of the Department of Defense,

Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen. See Honeycutt , 861 F.2d at

1349.

Ms. Quevedo failed to name Secretary of Cohen as a

defendant in her suit, leav ing the district court with no

alterna tive but to dismiss the case for lack of a proper party

defendant.Twenty-one days after the district court’s entry of its

order dismissing the case without pre judice, the PlaintiffAppellant filed a m otion seeking to change defendants from AAFES

and General Bates to Secretary Cohen. A pro se party is in no way

exempted from compliance with the relevant rules of procedure and

substantive law. Hulsey v. State of Texas , 929 F.2d 168, 171(5th

Cir. 1991). Because Ms. Quevedo’s motion to change defendants came

after the entry of a final judgment b y the district court it was

void and ineffective.

Affirmed.
#### Edward C. STEWART, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Nathaniel QUARTERMAN, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 05-51238

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 24, 2006.

Edward C. Stewart, Richmond, TX, pro se.

Before JOLLY, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Edward C. Stewart, Texas prisoner #905933, pleaded nolo contendere to ag*588gravated sexual assault of a child, an offense for which he received a 10-year sentence. Stewart filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 application to challenge this conviction and sentence in May 2001. Stewart filed another § 2254 application, which is the subject of the instant motion for a certificate of appealability (COA), in May 2005.

Stewart argues that the May 2005 application does not concern his conviction and that it is instead a challenge to the state’s failure to preserve DNA evidence and its refusal to permit DNA testing. However, given Stewart’s contention that DNA evidence was potentially exculpatory, we consider the May 2005 application to be a second or successive § 2254 application attacking the conviction. *See Cook v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Justice Transitional Planning Dep’t,*37 F.3d 166, 168 (5th Cir.1994).

Stewart has not obtained authorization from this court to file a second or successive § 2254 application. The May 2005 application was thus an unauthorized application that the district court was without jurisdiction to consider. *See United States v. Key,*205 F.3d 773, 774-75 (5th Cir.2000).

Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. *See id.*Stewart’s COA motion is denied as unnecessary. His motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) is also denied.

APPEAL DISMISSED; REQUEST FOR COA DENIED AS UNNECESSARY; IFP DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### In the Matter of Daniel D. and Another, Children Alleged to be Neglected. John D., Appellant; Commissioner of the Administration for Children’s Services, Respondent.

Submitted May 18, 2009;

decided June 30, 2009

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
                             Financial Data Schedule - Q3 1998     
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                        319379 
<NAME>                       PSC Inc.
<MULTIPLIER>                 1,000
<CURRENCY>                   US Dollars
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                  JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                    OCT-02-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                         1
<CASH>                              2,489
<SECURITIES>                            0
<RECEIVABLES>                      37,981
<ALLOWANCES>                        1,337
<INVENTORY>                        21,036
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                   63,671
<PP&E>                             35,185
<DEPRECIATION>                     17,126
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                    174,353
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>              46,309
<BONDS>                                 0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                   0
<PREFERRED>                             1
<COMMON>                              120
<OTHER-SE>                         40,721
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>      174,353
<SALES>                           158,312
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                  158,312
<CGS>                              92,293
<TOTAL-COSTS>                      46,183
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                        0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                        0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                  8,037
<INCOME-PRETAX>                    12,145
<INCOME-TAX>                        4,493
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                 7,652
<DISCONTINUED>                          0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                         0
<CHANGES>                               0
<NET-INCOME>                        7,652
<EPS-PRIMARY>                        0.66
<EPS-DILUTED>                        0.55
        

</TABLE>
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA F OURTH D ISTRICT

ALFONSO RAZZ , Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA , Appellee

.

No. 4D 16

- 2400

[February 7, 2018 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County ; Glenn D. Kelley , Judge; L.T. Case No. 50

- 2014

- CF

- 000570

- AXXX

- MB

.
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Tatjana Ostapoff, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Georgina Jimenez

- Orosa, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

P ER C URIAM

.
We deny appellant’s motion for rehearing and amended motion for rehearing , but withdraw our previously issued per curiam deci sion and substit ute the following in its place.

Affirmed. Taylor v. State , 114 So. 3d 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); contra Lewars v. State

, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D1 098 (Fla. 2d DCA May 12, 2017), review granted

, No. SC17

- 1002, 2017 WL 4022360 (Fla. Sept. 13, 2017)

.

G ERBER , C.J
., M AY and L EVINE , JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4011 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

109th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 4011

To amend the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization 
Act of 2003 to restore State authority to waive the application of the 
35-mile rule to permit the designation of a critical access hospital in 
                        Cass County, Minnesota.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 29, 2006

  Mr. Coleman introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization 
Act of 2003 to restore State authority to waive the application of the 
35-mile rule to permit the designation of a critical access hospital in 
                        Cass County, Minnesota.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. RESTORING STATE AUTHORITY TO WAIVE APPLICATION OF 35-MILE 
              RULE TO PERMIT DESIGNATION OF A CRITICAL ACCESS HOSPITAL 
              IN CASS COUNTY, MINNESOTA.

    Section 405(h) of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003 (Public Law 108-173; 117 Stat. 2269) is 
amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
            ``(3) Exception.--The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall 
        not apply to the certification by the State of Minnesota on or 
        after January 1, 2006, under section 1820(c)(2)(B)(i)(II) of 
        the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395i-4(c)(2)(B)(i)(II)) of 
        a hospital in Cass County, Minnesota, as a necessary provider 
        of health care services to residents in the area of the 
        hospital.''.
                                 <all>
```
#### In the Matter of Thomas Gregory, Appellant, v New York Executive Department, Division of Criminal Justice Services, Respondent, et al., Defendants.

[974 NYS2d 851]

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Kenneth R. Fisher, J.), entered May 24, 2012. The judgment granted the motion of defendant New York Executive Department, Division of Criminal Justice Services, Sean M. Byrne, Acting Commissioner for summary judgment declaring that plaintiff is required to register as a sex offender pursuant to Correction Law § 168-f.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Petitioner (hereafter, plaintiff) commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding, which was thereafter converted to a declaratory judgment action by Supreme Court, contending that he was not required to register as a sex offender pursuant to Correction Law § 168-f. On a prior appeal from an order in his SORA classification proceeding determining that he was a level one risk, this Court vacated plaintiffs risk level determination, concluding that the People’s 11-year delay in notifying him that he was required to register as a sex offender was “so outrageously arbitrary as to constitute [a] gross abuse of governmental authority” *(People v Gregory,*71 AD3d 1559, 1560 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Thereafter, defendant New York Executive Department, Division of Criminal Justice Services (Division) notified plaintiff that he was still required to register as a sex offender, and this action ensued. Plaintiff now appeals from a judgment that, inter alia, granted the Division’s motion for summary judgment declaring that he is required to register as a sex offender pursuant to Correction Law § 168-f. We affirm.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, this Court previously vacated only his risk level classification *(Gregory,*71 AD3d at *13741560). Our prior order thus eliminated the requirement of community notification *(see*Correction Law § 168-d [3]), but did not disturb plaintiff’s obligation to *register*as a sex *offender*with the Division *(see*§§ 168-f [2]; 168-i). Plaintiff was required to register as a sex offender as a result of his 1991 conviction *(see*§ 168-a [1]), and he remained obligated to register for a period of 20 years *(see §*168-h [1]; *see also People v Kindred,*71 AD3d 1418, 1418 [2010]).

In view of our determination, we do not address plaintiff’s remaining contentions. Present — Scudder, EJ., Centra, Garni, Lindley and Sconiers, JJ.