IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-10933

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

SAVILLE MCKNIGHT,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:13-CR-105-2

Before REAVLEY, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Saville McKnight pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with 

intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine. Due to the amount of cocaine 

and McKnight’s criminal history, his advisory guideline range would have been 

360 months to life, but the statutory maximum sentence was 480 months. See

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). At the initial sentencing, the court denied the 

Government’s motion for a downward departure based on McKnight’s 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 13, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 14-10933 Document: 00513113010 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/13/2015
No. 14-10933

2

assistance in prosecuting codefendant George Bagley. The district court 

sentenced McKnight to 480 months. The court noted McKnight’s extensive 

criminal history. It also reasoned that McKnight had already been adequately 

rewarded for his cooperation against Bagley because the Government did not 

charge him with the true amount of cocaine involved in the crime, which would 

have resulted in a maximum sentence of life in prison. See § 841(b)(1)(A). The 

Government agreed that McKnight’s cooperation was a factor in the decision 

to charge him under Section 841(b)(1)(B) rather than Section 841(b)(1)(A). 

McKnight’s direct appeal was voluntarily dismissed. United States v. 

McKnight, No. 13-10274 (5th Cir. Dec. 27, 2013).

Within a year, the Government moved for a sentence reduction under 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) based on McKnight’s assistance in 

the Illinois prosecution of Tremaine Allen. McKnight also offered information 

that he had assisted in the arrest or prosecution of Leland Deviner in Illinois, 

and Juan Carlos Martinez and Dialitza Ortiz in Texas. The district court 

declined to conduct a hearing, and it reduced McKnight’s 40-year sentence by 

two years. McKnight has appealed.

In his first contention, McKnight argues that the district court deprived 

him of due process of law by refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the 

Rule 35 motion. McKnight was not entitled to a hearing, so we review the 

denial of a hearing only for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Nerren, 

613 F.2d 572, 573 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Sanders, 438 F.2d 344, 345 

(5th Cir. 1971). The district court considered more than 1000 pages of 

documents before concluding that McKnight deserved no more than a 24-

month reduction in light of previous rewards for cooperation. McKnight offers 

only general assertions that a hearing was required so that he could correct 

the court’s oversights and errors. He does not show that any additional oral 

 Case: 14-10933 Document: 00513113010 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/13/2015
No. 14-10933

3

argument or specific presentation would have made any difference. McKnight 

fails to show that refusing to conduct a hearing was an abuse of discretion. See 

Nerren, 613 F.2d at 573; Sanders, 438 F.2d at 345.

Concerning the substance of the district court’s ruling, McKnight 

contends that the court erred by finding that he did not provide substantial 

assistance in the prosecutions of Deviner, Martinez, or Ortiz. We have yet to 

decide in a published decision the limits on our jurisdiction to review a district 

court’s discretionary ruling on a Rule 35(b) motion in light of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3742(a). We need not do so now because the district court’s factual finding

was not clearly erroneous in light of the extensive documentary record 

concerning the Allen case, and the lack of similar documentation concerning 

the cases of Diviner, Martinez, and Ortiz. See United States v. Nava, 624 F.3d 

226, 229 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Alexander, 602 F.3d 639, 641 (5th 

Cir. 2010). Neither does the district court’s decision amount to “illegality or a 

gross abuse of discretion.” Nerren, 613 F.2d at 573.

In his third claim, McKnight argues that the district court miscalculated 

the advisory guideline range as being 360 months to life when it was 360 to 

480 months. This issue concerns the initial guideline calculation. It was not 

raised on direct appeal, and the time for appealing that issue is past. See FED.

R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a) (providing that “other 

clear error” is correctable under Rule 35 within 14 days). In any event, this 

contention is meritless because the district court recognized that the correct 

range was 360 to 480 months, regardless of whether it thought McKnight 

should have been charged with a more serious crime.

In his final claim, McKnight argues that, by treating the “true” statutory 

maximum sentence as life, the district court deprived him of his right to a jury’s 

fact finding and effectively usurped the Government’s prosecutorial authority 

 Case: 14-10933 Document: 00513113010 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/13/2015
No. 14-10933

4

to charge him under Section 841(b)(1)(B). This claim about the initial 

sentencing calculation is arguably not cognizable in this appeal. Regardless, 

the district court merely noted that the Government could have charged a more 

serious offense but instead rewarded McKnight by charging a crime with a 

lower maximum sentence. Although the court may well have thought the 

maximum sentence should have been life, the court recognized that it was in 

fact 480 months.

The judgment is AFFIRMED.

 Case: 14-10933 Document: 00513113010 Page: 4 Date Filed: 07/13/2015