alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v German Alvarez, Appellant.

[870 NYS2d 797]

Appeals by the defendant from (1) a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Donnino, J.), rendered May 19, 2005, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence, and (2) a resentence of the same court imposed August 15, 2006 on the ground that the resentence was excessive.

Ordered that the judgment and the resentence are affirmed.

The defendant’s only contention raised on these appeals, that the resentence was excessive, is without merit *(see People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80 [1982]). Rivera, J.E, Florio, Angiolillo, McCarthy and Chambers, JJ., concur.
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<ARTICLE> 5
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This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Shelter
Properties II Limited Partnership 1997 First Quarter 10-QSB and is qualified in
its entirety by reference to such 10-QSB filing.
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<NAME> SHELTER PROPERTIES II LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
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I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 257 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to make residents of Puerto 

Rico eligible for the earned income tax credit. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 10, 2023 

Miss GONZA ́LEZ-COLO ́N (for herself, Mr. TORRES of New York, Mr. SOTO, 

and Mr. MOYLAN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to make 

residents of Puerto Rico eligible for the earned income 

tax credit. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Earned Income Tax 

5 Credit Equity for Puerto Rico Act of 2023’’. 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 257 IH

1 SEC. 2. PUERTO RICO RESIDENTS ELIGIBLE FOR EARNED 

2 INCOME TAX CREDIT. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 32 of the Internal Rev4 enue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the 

5 following new subsection: 

6 ‘‘(n) RESIDENTS OF PUERTO RICO.— 

7 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—In the case of residents of 

8 Puerto Rico— 

9 ‘‘(A) the United States shall be treated as 

10 including Puerto Rico for purposes of sub11 sections (c)(1)(A)(ii)(I) and (c)(3)(C), 

12 ‘‘(B) subsection (c)(1)(D) shall not apply 

13 to nonresident alien individuals who are resi14 dents of Puerto Rico, and 

15 ‘‘(C) adjusted gross income and gross in16 come shall be computed without regard to sec17 tion 933 for purposes of subsections (a)(2)(B) 

18 and (c)(2)(A)(i). 

19 ‘‘(2) LIMITATION.—The credit allowed under 

20 this section by reason of this subsection for any tax21 able year shall not exceed the amount, determined 

22 under regulations or other guidance promulgated by 

23 the Secretary, that a similarly situated taxpayer 

24 would receive if residing in a State.’’. 

25 (b) CHILD TAX CREDIT NOT REDUCED.—Subclause 

26 (II) of section 24(d)(1)(B)(ii) of such Code is amended 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB
3 

•HR 257 IH

1 by inserting before the period ‘‘(determined without re2 gard to section 32(n) in the case of residents of Puerto 

3 Rico)’’. 

4 (c) TERMINATION OF ANNUAL REIMBURSEMENT FOR

5 PUERTO RICO EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT.— 

6 (1) IN GENERAL.—Section 7530(a)(1) of such 

7 Code is amended by striking ‘‘calendar year 2021 

8 and each calendar year thereafter’’ and inserting 

9 ‘‘calendar years 2021, 2022, and 2023’’. 

10 (2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 

11 7530(a)(1)(B) of such Code is amended by striking 

12 ‘‘in the case of calendar years 2021 through 2025, 

13 the lesser of’’ and inserting ‘‘the lesser of’’. 

14 (d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made shall 

15 apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2023. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB
1 The Honorable Richard H. Battey, United St ates District Judge for the District of South Dakota. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 06-4058

___________ James E. Thompson, Sr., * * Appellant, * * v. * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the Tri-State Insurance of Minnesota; * District of South Dakota. Dakota Redi-Mix; Berkley * Administrators; Jerry Rachetto, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: October 12, 2007 Filed: October 18, 2007

___________ Before MURPHY, SMITH, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. James E. Thompson, Sr., appeals the district court’s 1 dismissal of his civil action without prejudice for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction. Upon careful review of the record, we conclude that Thompson established neither diversity jurisdiction nor federal-question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a)(1); 4:20 Communication, Inc. v. Paradigm Co. , 336 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2003) (party-2- invoking federal jurisdiction has burden to establish jurisdictional requirements). Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. We also deny Thompson’s pending motion.

_____________________________
EXHIBIT 32.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of Oldwebsites.com, Inc., (the “Company”) on 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­Richard Ivanovick, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








November 18, 2010
/s/ Richard IvanovickRichard IvanovickChief Financial Officer
#### In the Matter of James D.D. and Others, Infants. Yates County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Tamela F., Appellant.

[974 NYS2d 719]

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Yates County (W Patrick Falvey, J), entered March 23, 2012 in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10. The order, among other things, placed respondent and the subject minor children under the supervision of petitioner.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Respondent mother appeals from an order of disposition that brings up for review an order of fact-finding, in which Family Court determined that she neglected the children who are the subject of this proceeding. We affirm. To establish neglect, it was petitioner’s burden to “demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence ‘first, that [the] child[ren’s] physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired and second, that the actual or threatened harm to the child[ren] is a consequence of the failure of the parent ... to exercise a minimum degree of care in providing the child[ren] with proper supervision or guardianship’ ” *(Matter of Ilona H. [Elton H.],*93 AD3d 1165, 1166 [2012], quoting *Nicholson v Scoppetta,*3 NY3d 357, 368 [2004]; see Family Ct Act §§ 1012 [f] [i] [B]; 1046 [b] [i]). In determining whether petitioner met its burden, “[w]e must give great deference to [the court]’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses at the fact-finding hearing,” and we note that the court’s decision “ ‘will not be disturbed unless [it] lack[s] a sound and substantial basis in the record’ ” *(Ilona H.,*93 AD3d *1338at 1166). Here, we conclude that the court’s decision has a sound and substantial basis in the record. The undisputed evidence at the hearing established that the mother’s husband repeatedly misused alcohol to the point of intoxication *(see*§ 1046 [a] [iii]), and that the harm to the children was causally related to the mother’s failure to acknowledge, confront, and adequately address her husband’s alcohol abuse and associated aggressive behavior *(see Matter of Kimberly Z. [Jason Z.],*88 AD3d 1181, 1183, 1185 [2011]; *Matter of Ian DD.,*252 AD2d 669, 670 [1998]; *cf. Matter of Tomas E.*[appeal No. 2], 295 AD2d 1015, 1019 [2012]). Finally, the mother failed to preserve for our review her contention that the court erred in requesting an oral report from the Attorney for the Children and, in any event, any alleged error is harmless *(see Matter of Amy L.W. v Brendan K.H.,*37 AD3d 1060, 1061 [2007]). Present — Scudder, RJ., Peradotto, Garni, Sconiers and Whalen, JJ.
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#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Richard A. Said, Appellant.

(Appeal No. 1.)

[963 NYS2d 796]

*1393Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Deborah A. Haendiges, J.), rendered March 1, 2011. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal contempt in the first degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: In appeal Nos. 1 and 2, defendant appeals from judgments convicting him upon his pleas of guilty of criminal contempt in the first degree (Penal Law § 215.51 [b] [iii]; [c]). We conclude with respect to each appeal that defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because the brief inquiry made by Supreme Court was “insufficient to establish that the court ‘engage[d] the defendant in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to appeal was a knowing and voluntary choice’ ” *(People v*Brown, 296 AD2d 860, 860 [2002], *lv denied*98 NY2d 767 [2002]; *see People v Allen,*64 AD3d 1190, 1191 [2009], *lv denied*13 NY3d 794 [2009]). Also with respect to each appeal, we reject the contention of defendant that the court erred in denying his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The determination whether to permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea rests within the sound discretion of the court *(see People v Cantu,*202 AD2d 1033, 1033 [1994]), and here there was no abuse of discretion.

With respect to appeal No. 2, although defendant’s jurisdictional challenge to the superior court information (SCI) survives the plea and would in any event have survived a valid waiver of the right to appeal *(see People v Heinig,*21 AD3d 1297, 1297 [2005], *lv denied*6 NY3d 813 [2006]), we nevertheless reject that challenge. According to defendant, the SCI is jurisdiction-ally defective because he was not arraigned on the felony complaint charging criminal contempt in the first degree. The record, however, establishes that the court sat as a local criminal court for arraignment purposes and arraigned defendant on the felony complaint.

We reject defendant’s challenge to the severity of the sentence in each appeal. Defendant’s further contention that the court erred in setting a 15-year duration for the order of protection issued in connection with both judgments is not preserved for our review *(see People v Nieves,*2 NY3d 310, 315-317 [2004]), and is without merit in any event *(see*CPL 530.12 [former (5) (A) (ii)]). Defendant also failed to preserve for our review his contention that the court failed to take into account jail time credit to *1394which he is entitled in determining the duration of the order of protection *(see Nieves, 2*NY3d at 315-317), and we decline to exercise our power to review that contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice *(see*CPL 470.15 [3] [c]; *People v Jackson,*81 AD3d 1320, 1321 [2011], *lv denied*16 NY3d 896 [2011]).

Present—Centra, J.P, Fahey, Carni, Sconiers and Martoche, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Alvin Wilson, Appellant.

[972 NYS2d 915]

Appeal by the defend*931ant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kron, J.), rendered June 22, 2011, convicting him of grand larceny in the fourth degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. Assigned counsel has submitted a brief in accordance with *Anders v California*(386 US 738 [1967]), in which she moves for leave to withdraw as counsel for the appellant.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

We are satisfied with the sufficiency of the brief filed by the defendant’s assigned counsel pursuant to *Anders v California*(386 US 738 [1967]), and, upon an independent review of the record, we conclude that there are no nonfrivolous issues which could be raised on the appeal. Counsel’s application for leave to withdraw as counsel is, therefore, granted *(see Anders v California,*386 US 738 [1967]; *Matter of Giovanni S. [Jasmin A.],*89 AD3d 252 [2011]; *People v Paige,*54 AD2d 631 [1976]; *cf. People v Gonzalez,*47 NY2d 606 [1979]). Mastro, J.P., Balkin, Sgroi and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.
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EXHIBIT 99(a)



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350)

The undersigned, Alan J. Lacy, Chairman of the Board of Directors, President and Chief Executive Officer of Sears, Roebuck and Co. (the "Company"), has executed this certification in connection with the filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 29, 2002 (the "Report").

The undersigned hereby certifies that:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this certification as of the 9th day of August, 2002.

/s/ Alan J. Lacy                     Alan J. Lacy
Chairman of the Board of Directors,
President and Chief Executive Officer
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Deyon T. Roberts, Appellant.

[974 NYS2d 721]

Appeal from a judgment of the Erie County Court (Michael L. D’Amico, J.), rendered March 4, 2011. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of burglary in the second degree.

*1309It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of burglary in the second degree (Penal Law § 140.25 [2]). Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction because his motion to dismiss was not specifically directed at the ground advanced on appeal *(see People v Gray,*86 NY2d 10, 19 [1995]; *People v Ange,*37 AD3d 1143, 1144 [2007], *lv denied*9 NY3d 839 [2007]). Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged to the jury *(see People v Danielson,*9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence *(see generally People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). We note in particular that the jury’s credibility determinations are entitled to great deference “ ‘because those who see and hear the witnesses can assess their credibility and reliability in a manner that is far superior to that of reviewing judges who must rely on the printed record’ ” *(see Ange,*37 AD3d at 1144, quoting *People v Lane,*7 NY3d 888, 890 [2006]).

We reject defendant’s further contention that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel. Rather, we conclude that “the defense reflect[ed] a reasonable and legitimate strategy under the circumstances and evidence presented,” and thus it did “not fall to the level of ineffective assistance” *(People v Benevento,*91 NY2d 708, 712-713 [1998]; *see generally People v Baldi,*54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]).

Finally, we reject defendant’s contention that County Court erred in adjudicating him a persistent violent felony offender pursuant to CPL 400.16. Prior to his conviction herein for a class C violent felony offense *(see*Penal Law § 70.02 [1] [b]), defendant was convicted of two violent felony offenses, i.e., attempted robbery in the first degree in 1998 and attempted burglary in the first degree in 2002. Defendant is precluded from challenging the constitutionality of the 1998 conviction because he failed to challenge the constitutionality of that conviction in the 2002 proceedings *(see People v Wilson,*231 AD2d 912, 913 [1996], *lv denied*89 NY2d 868 [1996]). We have examined defendant’s remaining contention and conclude that it lacks merit. Present — Smith, J.P, Peradotto, Garni, Valentino and Whalen, JJ.
#### Bovis Lend Lease LMB Inc. et al., Appellants, v Garito Contracting, Inc., et al., Respondents.

Decided December 1, 2009

Reported below, 65 AD3d 872.

Appeal dismissed, without costs, by the Court of Appeals, sua sponte, upon the ground that the order appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 20-0082

CITY OF BILLINGS,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

KATRINA LYNN HOFMAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, 

and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including January 27, 2021, within which to prepare, file, 

and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

December 21 2020

12/21/2020

Case Number: DA 20-0082