alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                      DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                         APR-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                           JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                           0
<SECURITIES>                                     0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    0
<ALLOWANCES>                                     0
<INVENTORY>                                      0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 0
<PP&E>                                           0
<DEPRECIATION>                                   0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                      108,631
<BONDS>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            0
<PREFERRED>                                      0
<COMMON>                                         0
<OTHER-SE>                                 108,631
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     0
<SALES>                                          0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 0
<CGS>                                            0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  0
<INCOME-TAX>                                     0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              0
<DISCONTINUED>                                   0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  0
<CHANGES>                                        0
<NET-INCOME>                                     0
<EPS-BASIC>                                  (0.00)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                (0.00)



</TABLE>
##### 



(SUN LIFE RELEASE) Sun Life Financial declares quarterly dividend on Common and Preferred Shares Toronto  April 28, 2005 The Board of Directors of Sun Life Financial Inc. (NYSE, TSX:
SLF) today announced a quarterly shareholder dividend of 24 cents per common share, payable June
30, 2005, to shareholders of record at the close of business on May 25, 2005. This is the same
amount as paid in the previous quarter. The Board of Directors of Sun Life Financial Inc. also announced a quarterly dividend of $0.406678
per Class A Non-Cumulative Preferred Shares Series 1, payable June 30, 2005, to shareholders of
record at close of business on May 25, 2005. Sun Life Financial is a leading international financial services organization providing a diverse
range of wealth accumulation and protection products and services to individuals and corporate
customers. Tracing its roots back to 1865, Sun Life Financial and its partners today have
operations in key markets worldwide, including Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Hong
Kong, the Philippines, Japan, Indonesia, India, China and Bermuda. As of March 31, 2005, the Sun
Life Financial group of companies had total assets under management of CDN$366 billion. Sun Life Financial Inc. trades on the Toronto (TSX), New York (NYSE) and Philippine (PSE) stock
exchanges under ticker symbol SLF. Note to Editors: All figures in Canadian dollars. - 30 - Media Relations Contact:
    
    Investor Relations Contact:Susan Jantzi
Manager, Media Relations
Tel: 519-888-3160
susan.jantzi@sunlife.com
    
    Tom Reid
Vice-President, Investor Relations
Tel: 416-204-8163
investor.relations@sunlife.com
#### Central Railroad & Banking Co. *v.*Keller & Brother.

A written agreement of counsel entered upon a brief of evidence, the agreement being expressed in such terms as necessarily to imply a waiver of objection that the day fixed by order of the court for presenting the brief, having it approved and filing it, had already passed, together with subsequent co-operation with counsel for the movant and the presiding judge in having the brief corrected (the judge having approved it before correction with a reservation that it was subject to correction), will estop such counsel and his client from subsequently taking the position, for the first time, and insisting by a motion to dismiss the motion for a new trial, that the brief was presented, approved and filed too late because done after the time limited by the order had expired. *Judgment reversed.*

July 23, 1894.

Motion for a new trial. Before Judge Ealligant. Effingham superior court. May term, 1898.

*722A. R. Wright and A. C. Wright, for plaintiff in error.

H. B. Strange, *contra.*

After verdict for plaintiffs on May 9, defendant during the same term filed a motion for new trial. The grounds of the motion were approved, and an order passed allowing the motion to be heard and determined in vacation. On June 6, defendant presented a brief of the testimony to the judge for his revision and approval. Entered upon said brief was an agreement of counsel; counsel for plaintiff agreeing, “subject to make such corrections as are just and correct, in the hearing of the motion for new trial.” The judge approved the brief “ subject to correction at hearing,” and ordered it filed. It was filed on June 7. Thereafter the motion coming on for hearing, plaintiff moved to dismiss it on the ground that no order was taken at the May term, .authorizing the filing of a brief of the testimony during vacation^ and because the brief was not filed at the term. Previous to the filing of the motion to dismiss, plaintiff’s counsel suggested certain changes in the brief of evidence, which were accepted and agreed to by defendant’s counsel. The motion to dismiss was sustained.
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19

- 30544 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

–

Appellee ,

v.
TIMOTHY JACKSON VAN MOL , Defendant

– Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 1:18

- CR

- 330

- 1

Before OWEN, Chief Judge, and SOUTHWICK and WILLETT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Timothy Jackson Van Mol appeals the within

- guidelines 18

- month sentence imposed following his guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable be cause it was greater than necessary to achieve the goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

. He also contends that the district court erred by considering his bare arrest record . Although he

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED March 30, 2020 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 19-30544 Document: 00515364951 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/30/2020No. 19

- 30544

2 frames this in terms of substantive reasonableness, we have considered this issue in terms of procedural error. See United States v. Harris , 702 F.3d 226, 229 (5th Cir. 2012). We review Van Mol’s unpreserved challenge to the consideration of the bare arrest record for plain error. See Puckett v. United States , 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) ; United States v. Neal , 578 F.3d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 2009 ). Contrary to Van Mol’s assertions, the district court did not expressly refer to or rely on his bare arrest record at sentencing , nor did the probation officer recommend a variance or departure based on the bare arrest record. The court’s comments at sentencing of which Van Mol complains were at most ambiguous. Thus, any error was not clear or obvious. See Puckett , 556 U.S. at 135. With respect to substantive reasonableness, we a ssume that Van Mol preserved that issue by making the same arguments for a downward variance that he raises here , notwithstanding the lack of objection to reasonableness

. Cf. Holguin

- Hernandez v. United States , 140 S. Ct. 762, 766 (2020) . The record show s that the court listened to his mitigating arguments and considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Van Mol fails to overcome the presumption of reasonableness that applies to within

- guidelines sentences by showing that the sentence failed to account f or significant factors , gave weight to an improper factor, or represented a clear error of judgment in balancing the sentencing factors. See United States v. Rashad , 687 F.3d 637, 644 (5th Cir. 2012) ; United States v. Alonzo , 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006 )

. To the extent his argument regarding consideration of the bare arrest record implicates substantive reasonableness, it fails for the same reasons set out above.
T he judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Case: 19-30544 Document: 00515364951 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/30/2020
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 454 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 454

  To release to the State of Arkansas a reversionary interest in Camp 
                          Joseph T. Robinson.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           February 17, 2005

   Mr. Pryor introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
              referred to the Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To release to the State of Arkansas a reversionary interest in Camp 
                          Joseph T. Robinson.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. RELEASE OF REVERSIONARY INTEREST.

    The United States releases to the State of Arkansas the 
reversionary interest described in sections 2 and 3 of the Act entitled 
``An Act authorizing the transfer of part of Camp Joseph T. Robinson to 
the State of Arkansas'', approved June 30, 1950 (64 Stat. 311, chapter 
429), in and to the surface estate of the land constituting Camp Joseph 
T. Robinson, Arkansas, which lies east of the Batesville Pike county 
road, in sections 24, 25, and 36, township 3 north, range 12 west, 
Pulaski County, Arkansas.
                                 <all>
```
II 

109TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 4025 

To strengthen antitrust enforcement in the insurance industry. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 29, 2006 

Mr. SPECTER (for himself, Mr. LOTT, Mr. LEAHY, and Ms. LANDRIEU) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To strengthen antitrust enforcement in the insurance 

industry. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Insurance Industry 

5 Antitrust Enforcement Act of 2006’’. 

6 SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS. 

7 Section 2(b) of the Act of March 9, 1945 (15 U.S.C. 

8 1012(b)), commonly known as the McCarran-Ferguson 

9 Act, is amended by— 


hmoore on PROD1PC68 with HMBILLS
2 

•S 4025 IS

1 (1) inserting ‘‘section 5 of’’ after ‘‘Clayton Act, 

2 and’’; 

3 (2) inserting ‘‘as section 5 relates to unfair 

4 methods of competition,’’ after ‘‘Commission Act, as 

5 amended,’’; 

6 (3) striking ‘‘to the extent that’’ and all that 

7 follows through ‘‘law.’’ and inserting the following: 

8 ‘‘except to the extent— 

9 ‘‘(1) the conduct of a person engaged in the 

10 business of insurance is undertaken pursuant to a 

11 clearly articulated policy of a State that is actively 

12 supervised by that State; or 

13 ‘‘(2) the conduct involves a third party not en14 gaged in the business of insurance— 

15 ‘‘(A) that collects, compiles or disseminates 

16 aggregated historical loss data; 

17 ‘‘(B) that develops and disseminates stand18 ardized insurance policy forms, contracts 

19 addendums or language; or 

20 ‘‘(C) that— 

21 ‘‘(i) facilitates other joint conduct 

22 pursuant to guidelines issued by the Fed23 eral Trade Commission or existing law; 

24 and 

25 ‘‘(ii) does not include— 


hmoore on PROD1PC68 with HMBILLS
3 

•S 4025 IS

1 ‘‘(I) exchanging information 

2 among competitors relating to sales, 

3 profitability, prices, marketing, or dis4 tribution of any product, process, or 

5 service that is not reasonably required 

6 for the purposes enumerated in sub7 paragraph (A) or (B); 

8 ‘‘(II) entering into any agree9 ment or engaging in any other con10 duct that would allocate a market 

11 with a competitor; or 

12 ‘‘(III) entering into any agree13 ment or conspiracy that would set or 

14 restrain prices of any good or serv15 ice.’’; and 

16 (4) adding at the end the following: 

17 ‘‘Except as it relates to unfair methods of competition, 

18 the Federal Trade Commission Act shall be applicable to 

19 the business of insurance to the extent that such business 

20 is not regulated by State law.’’. 

Æ 


hmoore on PROD1PC68 with HMBILLS
FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

February 5, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TAJUAN CARVELL BROOKS,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 15-3199

(D.C. Nos. 5:15-CV-04848-JAR &

5:11-CR-40030-JAR-1)

(D. Kan.)

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

Before BRISCOE, GORSUCH, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.

Nearly two years after his federal conviction for felony drug and firearm

offenses became final, TaJuan Brooks filed a motion seeking to have his

conviction and sentence set aside. But as the district court recognized, a federal

habeas petitioner normally has only one year within which to seek collateral relief

like this. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). And while that deadline can be tolled for

equitable reasons, the district court found that the exceptional circumstances

required for such relief were absent and dismissed his case as untimely.

*

 This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of

the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its

persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Mr. Brooks now seeks to appeal that holding. To do so, he must first

obtain a certificate of appealability (COA) from this court. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(1)(B). And to do that, he must show that “jurists of reason would find

it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack

v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

This much Mr. Brooks hasn’t done. In his submission to this court, he puts

forward no argument whatsoever for why his motion was timely or why the

district court’s careful analysis and decision not to apply equitable tolling was in

error. Neither can we identify any flaws in the district court’s determination on

either score. Mr. Brooks’ motion to proceed in forma pauperis is denied, his

request for a COA is denied, and this appeal is dismissed. Mr. Brooks is

reminded of his obligation to pay the filing fee in full.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Neil M. Gorsuch

Circuit Judge

- 2 -
#### Dunn v. Canoy

Case below: 180 N.C. App. 30

No. 633P06

1. Max D. Ballinger’s NOA Based Upon a Constitutional Question (COA05-794)

2. Max D. Ballinger’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31

1. Dismissed *ex mero motu*05/03/07

2. Denied

Edmunds, J., Recused
Exhibit 15.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the incorporation
by reference in Amendment No. 1 to Registration Statement No. 333-177491 on Form F-3 of our reports dated February 13, 2012, relating to the consolidated financial statements of Capital Product Partners L.P. (the Partnership),
and the effectiveness of the Partnerships internal control over financial reporting, appearing in this Annual Report on Form 20-F of the Partnership for the year ended December 31, 2011.



|                                                  
|--------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Deloitte Hadjipavlou, Sofianos & Cambanis S.A.
|                                                  
|Athens, Greece                                    
|February 13, 2012
Exhibit 13.2

Certification Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350

As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the annual report on Form 20-F of Capital Product Partners L.P., a master limited partnership organized under the laws
of the Republic of The Marshall Islands (the Company), for the period ending December 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), each of the undersigned officers of the
Company certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that:

1.
the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. the information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated:
February 13, 2012



|       |  |                         
|------ |  | ------------------------
|By:    |  | /s/ Ioannis E. Lazaridis
|Name:  |  | Ioannis E. Lazaridis    
|Title: |  | Chief Financial Officer
#### In the Matter of Cassidy Sue R. Administration for Children’s Services et al., Respondents; Manuel (Emmanuel) R., Appellant, et al., Respondent.

Submitted March 9, 2009;

decided May 5, 2009

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution.
EXHIBIT
32.1





STATEMENT
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER


PURSUANT
TO SECTION 1350 OF TITLE 18 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE








Pursuant
to Section 1350 of Title 18 of the United States Code, the undersigned, Fred
O’Connor, Chief Executive Officer of Biofuels Power Corporation (the “Company”),
hereby certifies that:





The
Company’s Form 10-K Annual Report for the year ended December 31, 2007 (the
“Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








/s/ Fred
O’Connor


Fred
O’Connor, Chief Executive Officer


Dated:
April 29, 2008
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                           4,079
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   49,953
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,292
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                86,673
<PP&E>                                         244,921
<DEPRECIATION>                                 140,280
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 282,898
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           70,332
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           330
<OTHER-SE>                                    (44,991)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   282,898
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                81,046
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   69,388
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                10,353
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    66
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               6,510
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,305
<INCOME-TAX>                                       496
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                809
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       809
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.03
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.03
        

</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 420 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 420

            To make the repeal of the estate tax permanent.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           February 17, 2005

Mr. Kyl (for himself, Mr. Nelson of Florida, Mr. Allard, Mr. Allen, Mr. 
Burns, Mr. Inhofe, Mr. Talent, and Mr. Thune) introduced the following 
  bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
            To make the repeal of the estate tax permanent.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Death Tax Repeal Permanency Act of 
2005''.

SEC. 2. ESTATE TAX REPEAL MADE PERMANENT.

    Section 901 of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation 
Act of 2001 shall not apply to title V of such Act.
                                 <all>
```