JIM MATTOX Attorney General

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An Equal Opportunityl Affirmative Action Er”plovw 

# The Attorney General ofTexas

Novimber 14, 1984

lionorable

Mike Drismll Harris CountyAttornley 1001Preston, Suite ~634 Houston.Texas 770132 opinion No. ~~-232
Re: Eligibility formembership on the Harris County Bail Bond Board and related questions
Dear Mr. Driscoll:
You inquireabout eligibilityformembership on theHarris County Ball Bond Board and the finality of a judgment against a corporate surety. You first ask:

Does an individual who is licensed as a bail bondsman by the Barr16 County Bail Bond Board and who is at,thotized to do business under an assumed name, forfeithis position as a member **of** thebail bond board by conveying to a third party the business under which assumed name he has previously operated, even though he is presently sitting aa a member of the bail bond board as a licensedbondsman, and is maintaining a bail bond license, and whose bonds the sheriff currently accepts, andwhose collateral Is stillvalid?
An individual described by your question do&s not forfeit his position as a me&x of the bail bond board by conveying to a third party a business which the individual previously operated under an assumed name. Article 2372p-3. section 5(b)(61, V.T.C.S., provides the following:

**(b)** The County Bail Bond Board shall be composedzf the followingpersons:



### . . . . (6) a licensed bondsman, licensed in the county* gztectedby other county licensees.
. . . (EmphasiE,

added). The statute’s only requirement for a member elected by other county licensees is that thememberbe a licensedbondsmanwho is licensed in the county. The xdividual in question continues to be a licensed

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bondsman in Harris County. Cf. - Attorney General Opinion MW-321 (1981).
Your second question ir,quiresvhether a corporation, if elected to theboard, may designate as its representativea personvho is not himself a licensed bondsman. Article 2372p-3 defines the relevant terms: Sec. 2. In thisAct:

(1) 'Person' .aeans an individual or corporation. (2) 'Bondsman' :meansany person who for hire or for any compensationdeposits any cash or bonds or other securities, or executes as surety or cosurety any bond for other persons. (Emphasis added). Under these definitions, a bondsman is an individual or corporationwhich forhire or for s,nycompensationdeposits any cash, bonds, or other securities or executes as surety or cosurety any bond for other persons. See also V.I.C.S. art. 2372p-3, S14A(a) (referring to a corporation as a "bail bowlsman"). Sections 3(b) and 3(d) of the act contain separate requirements of eligibility for the licensing of individualsand the 1icensin:I of corporations. Since a corporation is a person, it is a bondsman, and if a corporation is licensed in the county, we believe it is a licensed bondsman within the meaning of section S(b)(6). Thus, we conclude thata corporation licensed under the act is a legal entity which may be a member of a county ba:t:L bond board if elected by other county licensees. The Texas Business CorporationAct directs theboard of directors to manage thebusiness and affairs of a corporation. Tex. Bus. Corp. Act, art. 2.31. The act als,> provides that the officers and agents of a corporation shall perform duties in the management of the corporationvhich are provitiedin the bylaws or which are determined and delegatedby theboard oE directors in accordancewith thebylaws. Tex. Bus. Corp. Act, art. 2.42.B. Since a corporation functions through its directors, officers, and agents,we believe a corporation serving as a member of a bail bond board does so through the individual vho represents it on the board. The corporation is the board member. Its representative on the board is an authorized agent of the corporationand is not a member of theboard in his individual capacity. We do **not** adliress the question of whether it is constitutionallypermissible Eara corporationtobe elected and serve as a member of a board of this nature. With this caveat,we conclude that a licensedcorporation saybe a licensedbondsman and a member of a bail bond board and that such a corporation'sauthorized agent is the representativeof the corporationand not themember of the board,

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regardless of whether the agent representing the corporation is a licensedbondsman.
Your third question a;skswhen a judgment against a corporate suretybecomes final. Artj,cle22.10 of the Code of CriminalProcedure provides the following:

When a forfeiturehas been declared upon a bond, the court or cle,:kshall docket the case upon the scire faciasor upon the civil docket, In thename of the State o:fTexas, as plaintiff, and the principal andhis sureties,if any, as defendants; and the proceedi:rgs had therein shall be governed by **the** same rule:1 governingother civil suits. Article 22.14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads, in part. as follows: When, upon a trial of the issues presented, no

sufficient cause is shown for the failure of the principal to appear, the judgment shall be made final against h:.mand his sureties, if any, for the ‘amount in which they are respectively bound.
. . . Section 14A of article 2372p-3, however. includes the following requirements:(a) Notwithstandingany law to the contrary, a

corporation that:is in default on five or more bail bonds in ,Lcounty may not act as a bail bondsman in that ,county. (b) The clerk of the court in which the corporation is in default on a bail bond shall deliver a written notice of the default to the sheriff, chief of police, or other appropriate peace officer in the county in which the bond is forfeited. (c) A corpox,ation is considered in default on a bail bond from the time the trial court enters its final judgs& on the scire facias until the judgment Is sa,?.sfiedor set aside. (Emphasis added). Also, section 2 of article 17.11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that

any person who has signed as a surety on a bail bond and is in &fault thereon shall thereafterbe disqualified to sign as a surety so longas he isHonorableMike Driscoll - Page 4 (a-232)

in default on said bond. It shallbe theduty of the clerk of the court wherein such surety is in default on a bail bond, to notify In writing the sheriff. chief of uolice. or **other** peace officer, of such default.
.**A** surety shall-be deemed in default from the time the trial court enters its final judgment oi the scire facias until such judgment is satil~iiedor set aside. (Emphasis added).
You indicate thatyour third question results from the fact that a corporate surety that is Lndefault on five ormore bail bonds in a county may not act as a t~a.11 bondsman in that county. Hence, we believe that the issue is not when the scire facias judgment against the surety is final but when the court enters its final judgment on the scire facias. See Burns v. Harris County Bail Bond Board, 663 --- S.W.Zd 615, 616 (Tex.App. -' Houston (1stDist.] 1983.no writ).
In 1978,theTexas Supreme Court said: Judges render judgment; clerks enter them on the minutes. Coleman v. Zap& 105Tex. 491. 151 S.W. 1040 (1912). The entry of a judgment is the clerk's record **:Ln** the minutes of the court. 'Entered'is synoaymouswith neither 'Signed'nor 'Rendered.' Bostwick v. Bucklin, 144 Tex. 375,

-- 190 S.W.2d 818 (lM5); Pollsv. Alford, 267 S.W.2d 918 (Tex.Civ. App. - San Antonio 1954.no writ). The day a judge signs an order is frequently, perhaps usually, efter the time the judgment is rendered and surely it is before the judgment is entered. Burrellv. Corneliu=.570 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. 1978). A recent court of appeals case,holding that a judgment is renderedwhen the decision is officiallyannounced,quaIcedfromKittrellv. Fuller, 281 S.W. 575, 576 (Tex.Civ.App. - Dallas 1926,writ ref'd).as follows:

There is a distinction between the rendition of the judgment and its **entry** in the minutes of the Court; each representing a distinct occurrence of fact in the trial 'of a case. The judgment is that which the Court 'pronounces,and its rendition is the judicial act by which the Court settles and declares the decision of the law upon thematters at issue. The entry of the judgment is the ministerial **act** performed by **the** Clerk of the Court,andby means of which permanentevidenceof the judicial act in renderingthe judgment ismade a recordof the **Court.**

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Abarca v. Roadstar Corp. of 657 S.W.Zd 327. 328 (Tex.App. - America. Corpus Christi 1982. no vr:::). See also Morris v. State, 539 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ. App. - Rousc:on[IstDist.] 1976, no writ); Rosenfield V. Hull, 304 S.W.Zd 571 (:Tex.Civ. App. - Texarkana 1957. vrit dism’Morris V. State,mi at 216, held that the terin“entered” in article 5547-39a.V.T.C.S., providing that a person ordered **committed** could appeal an order of temporaryhospitalizationby filing written notice of appeal within :fiive days after the “order is entered,” referred to the ministeria:.act of the clerk in entering judgment In theminutes. Likewise,we wnclude that the statutesproviding thata corporate surety is In default on a bail bond “from the time the trial court enters its final judgment on the scire facias” refers to the time at which the judgment isentered in theminutes of the court. Of course, once a trial court enters a final judgment of default, a corporate surety can presuwbly suspend the executionof the judgment pending-appealby filing a supercedeasbond. Tex. R. Civ. P. 364(a). Like any judgment,a judgment revokinga licensemaybe suspendedvhen a supercedeasbond is filed. Tex. R. Civ. P. 364(e). Settingbond is ministerial and may be compelledby mandamus. ContinentalOil Co. v. Lesher. 500 S.W.2d 183, 1315(Tex. Civ. App. - liouston[lst Dist.] 1973, no writ). An appellate court can review the bond for excessiveness. Tex. R. Civ. P. 365(b).
SUMMARY
An individual who continues to be a licensed bondsman in the county does not forfeit his position as a member of the ball bond board by conveying to a t,h,ird party a business which the individual previ,xlslyoperated under an assumed name. A corporar:ionlicensed in the county Is a licensed bondsman which may be a member of a county bail bond hoard if electedby other county licensees. Such a corporation’srepresentativeon the board Is an agent of the corporation and is not a member of the board **in** his individual capacity. **A** corporate surety is in default on a bail bond from the time of entry of the scire facias judgment j,o, theminutes of the court.

JIM MATTOX AttorneyGeneral of Texas

TOM GREEN FirstAssistantAttorney Gweral

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DAVID R. RICHARDS ExecutiveAssistant **Attorney** General
RICK GILPIN Chairman, Opinion Committee Preparedby Nancy Sutton AssistantAttorney General
APPROVED: OPINION COMMITTEE Rick Gilpln, Chairman Colin Carl Susan Garrison Tony Guillory Jim Morllinger Nancy Sutton

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