Docket No. 104558.



### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STA TE OF IL LINOIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF I LL INOI S, A ppelle e, v. ROBERT T. LUCA S, JR., Appell ant.

Opinion filed October 17, 2008.

JUS TIC E GARMAN de livered the judg ment of the

court, with opinion. Chief Justice Fitzgerald and

Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Karmeier, and Burke conc urred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

Following a j ur y tr ia l i n t he ci rc ui t c ou rt of Bu re au Co un ty, defenda nt, Robert T. Lucas, Jr., was convicted of driv ing while his driv er’s license was revoked (625 I LCS 5/6–303(d) (West 2004)), unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24–1.1(a ) (West 2004)), and

armed violence (720 IL CS 5/33A–2(a) (West 2004)). The appella te court affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences. 372 Ill. App. 3d 279.

BACKGROUND CountI of the indictment, charging defendant with driving while license revoked, subsequent offense, alleg ed that on May 1, 2005,-2- defendant drove hi s mo tor vehicle while his driver’s license was

r evoked, “said re

vocation having been en tered on Decemb er 27
, 1983, as a result of a convict ion of Driving While Under The Influence o f Alco hol, and the defen dant had b een pre

viously convicted of [driving

whil e license

revoked ] on Augus t 26, 1987 in Bureau County Cause Number 87–TR–2 9 61.” Count II of the indictmentcharged defendant with unlawf ul possession of

a weapon by a felon , based on defendant’s possession of a switchblade knife. CountIII charg ed defendant with arm ed vio lence, alleging that he, while armed wi

tha da ngero

us weapon, committe d driving while li ce ns e r ev ok ed , s ub se qu en t o ff en se , a Cl as s 4 fe lo ny. At defendant’s trial, the evidence showe d that Deputy Gar y Becket observed a car twice cross the c enter line of the street. Becket activated his emergency

lights, but the c ar di d not stop. Instead, the driver continue d driving

for a short distanc e, even tually pulling i nto the driveway

of a residence. A man Bec ket recognized

as defendant exitedthe car and ran ar ound to th e back of the house. When defendant did not obey Bec

ket’s shouted command to stop, Becket gave chase. Becket did not see defe ndant when he arrived

at the rear of the house. He knocked on the door of the house and Richar d Yuvan answered. Although Yuvan had infact all owed def

endant in to his house, he

told Becket that h e and his w ife, Susa n, were the only people in the house. At that point, Susan appeared and told B ec ket that def endant w as in the house and she want ed him out. Prior to entering the house, Becket ca lled for back-up. When Deputy Patrick Linder arrived, he and Becket went into t

h e house. Susantold the officers that defendant had locked himself in th e bathroom

. After the officers ordered de fendant out of the bathr oom, they heard the toilet flush. Then defendant emerg ed. The officers observed various i tems on the bat

hroom van

ity, including

money , cell phones, and a light er. The offi cers de clined de fendant ’s reque st to keep his lighter. When they examined the lighter, they discovered

that i t housed a spring-loaded switchblade knife. B ecket acknowledged that he had no direct evidence that the knife had been in de fendant’s car. However, Richard and Susan Yuvan testified that the knife was nottheirs, they

had neve

r seen it before, and

it was not in the bathroom before defenda nt arrive d at their

home that

night.-3- Defendant

presented no evidence. The jury convicted

him on all charg es. At the sentencing hearing, the State introduc ed into eviden ce a certified copy of def

endant’s driving abstract, showing that in 1983, defendant was convicted of driving under the infl u ence of alcohol. His driver’ s license

was revoked

later tha t ye ar. He w as convic

ted in 1987 of driving while license revoked. His license was reinstat ed in 1996. Defendant

was again convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol in 1997 and his license was revoked that same y ear. That revocation

remained in effect on the date of his arr est in the instant

case. Based u

pon this re cord, the

prosecu tor aske d the cir

cuit court to find that defenda

nt c ommitted th e offen se of dri ving whi le licens e revoked, subsequent offense. The prosecutor noted that defendant’s “prior reco rd was not pr

oved up to

the jury by o peration of I llinois law which prevents a jury from knowing about the prior convictions for driving While License Revoked. We’re asking the court to make that prope r findin g today

so we can proceed to sentencing on that offense.” The circ

uit court made the requested finding and sentenced d ef endant to concurrent terms of 30 y ears’ imprisonment on the armed violence conviction and 5 y ears ’ imprisonme

nt on the unlawful possession of a weapon conviction. Defens e counsel filed a posttrial motion and

a motion to reconsider sentence, both of which the circ uit court denied. Onappeal, defendant argued, inter alia , that driving while lic ense revoked, subsequent offense, cannot be used asa predicate felony

for

a charge of armed violence . He argued that the enhance ment of driving while licens e revok ed from a misdemeanor to a felony was intended for sentencing purposes only . The appellate court relied on the plain languag e of the armed violence statute in rejecting de fenda nt’s ar gu me nt , h ol di ng th at th e p hr as e “ an y fe lo ny”

en compassed

all felonies not specifically excluded by the stat

ute

. Defendant

also argued that the prosecution had f aile d to prove

him guilty of all the elements of driving while license revoke d, subsequent offense, noting that the State had not proved to the jury defe

ndant’s prior convicti on, which

elevate d his offe

nse to a felony . The app ellate court not ed that th e State

was prevented from presenting such proof to the jury by

section 111–3(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Procedure Code) (725 I LCS 5/111–3(c) (West 2004)), w hic h-4- provides that the fact of a prior conviction of the charg ed offense and the State’s intention to seek an enhanced sentence are not e lements of the offense

and may not be disc losed to th e jury durin g trial. Th e courtnoted tha

t this sect ion applie s only

when the classifi cati on o f the offense is to be raised dueto the prior conviction. In this case, the classifi cati on of d efenda nt’s offe nse was r

aised fr om a Class A mis demeanor

to a Class 4

felony by r eason of his prior c onvictio n

. Accordingly , section 111–3(c) applied. 372 Ill. App. 3d a t 285. We granted defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. 210 I ll. 2d R. 315.

ANA LYSIS Defendan t makes two arguments in this appeal: (1) he was improper ly convicted of armed violence b asedon driving while license revoked, subsequent offens e; and (2) his armed violence convictionand 30-y

ear pri son sente

nce viola te the pr oportiona te p enalties cla use of t he Il li noi s co nst it ut io n (Il l. Co nst . 19 70, art . I, §11). We a

ddress on ly the first a

rgumen t.

I The issue of whether the offense of driving w hile license revoked, subsequent

offense , may

serve a s a predi catefelony under the armed violence statute involves the interpretation of Illinois statutes, which is a question of law, which we review de novo . See People v. Caballero
, 228 Ill. 2d 79, 82 (2008). In a ddition, be cause the facts

are not in dis pute, the question of whether defendant’s g uilt of driving while li cense r evoked, subseque nt offen se, was e stablishe d is a question of law subject to de novo review. People v . Smith , 191 I ll. 2d 408, 411 (2000).

II Ini ti al ly, the State argues that defendant is estopped fr om challenging

his armed violence conviction on the ground

that driving while license

revoked , subsequent offe nse, can not b e a predica

te felony because he did not preserve this argument for review . Indeed, notes the State , defend

ant’s tr ial cou nsel affirmatively

agreed that-5- defendant did commit t

he offe nse of arme d violenc e. What the State is reall y arg

uing is that defendant invited the alleged er ror. The doctrine of invited error is som etimes referred to as “estoppel.” People v. Harvey , 211 Ill. 2d 368, 385 (2004). Under the doctrine of invited error, a def

endant“ ‘may not re quest to proceed in one

manner and then later contend on appeal that the course of action was inerror.’ ” Harvey
, 211 Ill. 2d at 385, quot ing People v. Carter , 208 Ill. 2d 30 9, 319 (2003). Here, the State’s only citation to the record references the sentencing hearing. Ther e, trial counsel did tell the judge that what defendant did constituted armed violence. However, the State does not point to anyplac e in t he record showing that defendant’s tr ia l c ou ns el ma de an y s u ch conc ession dur ing tria l. Theref ore, we reject t he State’ s argument. The State also argues that defendant forfe ited the issue that he

was wrongly

convicted of driving while license revoked, subse quent offense, for armed violence purpose s. We note thatthe State adm its it failed to raise the issue of f

orfeitur e in the appellate court. The doctrine of forfeiture applies to the State as well as to the def endant and the State may forf

eit anargument that

the defendant forfeited an issue by n ot proper ly preserving

it for review. People v. Williams , 193 Ill. 2d 306 , 34 7 (2 000 ). In addition, we note that one of defendant’s argume nts is that the State fa

iled to prove him

guilty of drivin g while license revoked, subsequent offense, bey ond a reasona

ble doubt. Suc h argume nts are not subject to the normal rules of forfeiture and may be raised for the first time on

appeal. People v. Walker

, 7 Ill. 2d 158, 160 (1955). Accordin

gly , we will a

ddress de fendant ’s arg

uments. The armed violence statute provides in pertinent part as follows: “(a) A person commits armed violence when, while a rme d with a dangerous weapon, he commits any felony def

ined by Illinois Law , except f

irst deg ree mur der, att empted f irst d egreemurder, intentiona l homicide

of an unb orn child
, predat or y criminal sexual assault of a child, aggrava ted criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnaping , aggravated battery of a c hild, home invasion, armed robbery , or aggravated

vehicula r hijack ing.” 7 20 IL

CS 5/33A–2( a) (West 2004).
Inthe 1980s, this cour

t i nterpre ted the language of the a rmed violence statute to exclude ce r tain types of felony offenses. At that-6- time, the statute provided

that a defendant committed armed violence when, “while a

rmed with a dang erous w eapo n, he commits any felony def in ed b y Illi noi s Law .” Il l. Rev . S tat . 19 79, ch. 38, par . 33 A–2 . In People v. Har on , 85 Ill. 2d 261 (1981), this court found that the Genera l Assembly

did not inte

nd the phr

ase “any felony ” to include

a predica te felony that was i

tself enhanced from a misdemeanor to a felony by the prese

nce of a weap on. The defendant there had been convicted of armed violence pr edicat ed on aggravated ba ttery. The battery off

ense was enhanced

due to the

defenda nt’s use of a dea dly weapon. This court found the armed violence charg e to be an impermissible double enhancement. Haron , 85 Ill. 2d at 278.
In People v. Alejos , 97 Ill. 2d 502 (1 983), t he defendant was convicted of arme d violenc e predic ated on vo luntary mansla ugh ter. This court agreed with the defenda nt that the legisla

ture did not intend armed violence to apply to voluntary manslaughter. The court noted that volun

tary manslaughter is an unpremeditated offense
, induced by sudden fea

r or duress and committed without time for pro per reflection. We looked to the purpose of the armed violen c e statute, which was “ ‘to r espond emphatically to the g rowing incidence of violent crime.’ ” Alejos
, 97 I ll. 2d at 507-08, quoting People v. Graham , 25 Ill. App. 3d 853, 858 (1975). We further noted that the “stif f punishme

nt” manda

ted by the arme d violenc e statute

was intended not only to punish the wrong doer and protect soc iety
, butalso to deter

the proscribed conduct, i.e. , carry ing a we apon whil e committing a felony. Alejos , 97 I ll. 2d at 5 09. Because voluntary

m a nslaughter

is committed on the spur of the moment and without deliberation, the statut

e canno t fulfill it s dete rre nce f unct ion. W e rejected the State’s argument that we could not depart from the plain langua ge of “any

felony ” in the statute, observing that a court may determine the inte

nt of the le gislatu

re not onl y from the language of the statute, but also from the reason and necessity for the statute, the evils to be remedied, and the objects and purposes to be

obta ined . We also noted the rule o f lenity and found its application to be appropr iate where the carry

ing of a weapon

is nota crimina

l offens e inall instances and the armed violence s tatute wo uld be unli kely to deter those who commit voluntary manslaug hter. Alejos
, 97 Ill. 2d at 512-13.-7- We addressed similar

argume nts in People v

. Fernett i , 104 Ill. 2d 19 (1984). Relying

on our decision

in Alejos , we held that application of the arme d violence statute to the offense of involuntary manslaughter

would not further the intent

of the statute. Involuntary manslaughter

is, by its very

nature, uninte nti onal. Thus, the deterrencepurpose of the armed violence statute would not be served by the inclusion of involuntary manslaughter within the phrase “any felony.” Fernetti , 104 Ill. 2d at 24-25.
D efendant

argues that, although driving while lice nse revoked
, subsequent

offense, is not an undeterrable of fense, it nonethe less should not be con sidered

a predic ate felony under

the armed violence statute because to do so would not serve the purposes of that statute. Defendant

notes tha

t the cond

uct prohi bited by th e dr iving wh

ile license revoked statute, i.e. , driving, is not made more dangerous by the presenc e of a we apon. Dr iving is le gal whe

n done by

the vast majority of licen sed drive

rs; defendant notes that the only difference among legal d

rivin g, misdemeano r driving while license revoked, and driving while license revoked, subsequent offense, is the state of the driver’s driving record. Defendant also argue s that the S tate fai led to pro ve him gu ilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of dr iving wh ile licen se revoked, subsequent offense. He n o tes that the State was, in fac t, precluded from doing so by se ction111–3(c) of the Procedure Code, which pr ovides: “Whenth e State seeks an enhanced sentence be cause of

a prior conviction, the char ge sha ll also sta te the inte ntion to seek an enhanced

sent ence and shall state such prior convictionso as to give notice to the defendant. However, the fact of such prior conviction and the State’s intention to seek

anenhanced sentence are not elements of

the offense and may notbe disclos edto the jury during t rial unle ss otherw

ise permitte d by

issues pr operly raised during such trial. For the purposes of this Section, “enhanc e d sentenc e” mean s a sentence which is in

creas ed by a prior

conviction from one classification

of offe nse to another higher

level classification of offense set forth in Section 5–5–1 of the ‘Unified Code of Corrections’, approved July 26, 1972, as amended; it does not include an increase in the sente nce app lied within the same-8- level of class ification

of offe nse.” 72 5 ILCS 5/111–3( c) (West 2004). The State argues that

the language of

the arme d violenc e statute is clear and unamb iguous. The statu te expres sly

excludes 10 felonies fromits operation. Any felonies not excluded may theref

ore serve as predica te felonie s. The Sta

te critic iz es defend ant’s reliance on Haron
, Alejos
, and Fernetti , all o f w hich predate the current version of the armed violence statute. With respect to defendant’s argument that he

was not proved guilty be y ond a re asonable

doubt of dr

iving wh ile license revoked , subse quent offense, the State notes that it was precluded from doing so at the trial by section 3–111(c) o f the Procedure Code. Nonetheless, the State believes that defe ndant was properl y convicted of driving while licens e revoked, subsequent offense, noting that section 6–303(d ) of the I llinois V ehicl e Code (625 IL CS 5/6–303(d) (West 2004)) provide s that any person convicted of a second violation of

driving while license

revoked shall be guilty of a Class

4 felony if the re

vocation or

suspension was for a violation of cer

tain enumerated

offense s. After careful consideration, we agree with defendant that driving while license

revoked , subsequent offe nse, may not serve

as a predicate felony

under the armed violence statute.
Due process requi re s that to sustain a conviction of a criminal offense, the State

must prove

a defen dant gu ilty bey ond a rea sonable doubtof the existence of ev ery element of the of fense. Jackson v. Virg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 316, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 571, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2787 (1979). To prove a defendant guilty of the offense of armed vi ol ence, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed a felony not excluded by the armed violence statute and that, while committing the felony , the defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon. I

n the instant case, therefore, the State was required to prove that defendant committed the offense of driving while license revoked at a time when his driver’s license had been previously revoke d due to a conviction for driving unde rthe influence of alcohol or drugs. The State, however, only proved defendant guilty of misdemea

nor driving while lic ense revoked

at his trial. The jury instructions confirm this. The jury wa s told that, to sustain the c h arge of armed violence, the State must prove (1) that defendant committed the offense of driving while license revoke d,-9- and (2) that w

hen defe ndant commit

ted the offense, he was knowi ngl y

car rying on or

about his person or was otherwise armed with a switchblade knife. The jury was further

told that to

sustain the charge of driving while license revoked, the State must prove (1) that def endant knowing ly d

rove a mo tor vehic le on a hig hway of this st ate, and (2) that at the time defendant drove a motor vehicle
, hi s driver’s license was revoked as provided by Illinois law

or by the law of another s tate. T he conduct described by this last instruction constitutes the offense of misdem eanor driving while license revoked, under section 6–303(a) of the Vehicle Code (625 I LCS 5/6–303(a) (West 2004 )), whic

h provide s in relevant part : “Any person who drives or

is in actual physical c ontrol of

a motor veh

icle on a ny h ighway of this State at

a time when suchperson’s driver’s license, permit or privilege to do so or the privileg e to obtai

n a drive r’s lice nse or permit

is revoked

or suspended

as provided by this Code or the law of another state, except as

may be speci fically

allowed by a

judic ia l driving permit, f

amily financi al responsibility

driving permit, proba tiona ry

license to drive, or a res tricted d riving p ermit issued pursuant to this Code or under the law of another state, shallbe guilt

y of a Class A mi s demean or.” 625 IL CS 5/6–303(a) (West 2004).
T he State, however, po ints out tha t section 6

–303(d) o f th e Vehicle Code describes the offense of driving while lic ense revoked, subsequent

offense, and provides that any person convicted of a second violation of that sectionis guilty of a Class 4 felony . The State

re lies on this provis ion to arg ue that de fendant

was prop erly convicted of drivin g while license revoked, subsequent offense. The S tate arg ues it was prevented by section 111–3(c) of the Procedure Code from presenting proof at defen dant’s tri al that he had a prior qualifying

convicti on and, th

us, that he was guilty

of a Cl as s 4 fe lo ny. To th e extent the State suggests that section 6–303(d) of the Vehicle Code provides an i ndep endent basis on which to convict defendant of the Cla ss 4 felon

y of driving while licens e revoked, subsequent

offense, we reject that arg ument. We observe that there

are no patter

n jury instructi ons for th e offen se of dri ving whi le licens e revoked, subse q uent offense. While at one time there were instructions defining

that offens e (I llinois Patt ern Jury Instr uctions,-10- Criminal, No. 23.41 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 4th)) and setting forth

the issues for that offense (I PI Criminal 4th No. 23.42), those instructions have been deleted. The com mittee comments to those instructions note the existence of section 3–111(c) of t he Procedure Code and state that the committee “no longer believes that instructions on this offense areappropriate because of its reliance on a defendant’s prior convictions.” Instead, section 6

–303(d) o f the Veh

icle Code, read

togethe r with

sec tion 3– 111(c) of the Procedure Code, provides the basis for enhanced sentenc ing of de fendant s who commi t driving whil e l icense revoked, subseque

nt offen se . N either section 3–111(c) nor section 6–3 0 3(d) operates independently . Section 3–111(c) sets forth the procedure that must be followed where the State seeks a more severe sentence due to a defendant’s prior convictions. Section 6–303(d) is the subst anti ve provision that allows the State to seek the enhanced sente ncing. We note that the leg i slature a mended se ction 3–11 1 in 1989 to add subsection (c). Pub. Act 86–96 4, §1, eff. July 1, 1990. Prior to this amendment, a defendant’s prior convictions for

driving while license

revoked and

driving under the influence of alcohol we re elements of the fe lony

offense of drivin

g while lic e nse revoked, subsequent

offense. See People v. Roby , 172 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 1062 (1988) (noting

that a pr ior driving under the influence of alcohol

o ffense, w hich results in the revocation of a person’s license, is an element of driving while license revoked, subsequent offense, and the trial cou rt must instruct the jury

as to all the eleme

nts of the offense charged). Now, with the addition of subsection (c), it is clear that the prior convictions are not elements of theoffense that the Sta

te must prove to the trier

of fact . There inlies the problem. Section 111–3(c) applies where the State seeks an enhanced se ntence due to a prior conviction. “Enhanced sentence” means a sentence that is increased by a prio r con viction from one classification of offense to another higher classi fica tion of offense. 725 ILCS 5/111–3(c) (West 2004). Section111–3(c ) prohibi t s the use a t trial of the fact of the prior convictionor the Sta

te’s in tent to seek an enhanced sentence. The y
are not elements of

the offense and may

not be disclosed to the ju ry. The existence of the prior conviction is used after a defendant’s convictionto in crease the cl assif icati on of t he crim e at sen tenci ng. People v. DiPace , 354 Ill. App. 3d 104, 114 (2004 ). Howev er, in this situation where the State wishes to prove defendant guilty of driving while license

revoked , subsequent offe nse, for the purpo se of usin

g-11- that offense as a predicate felo ny f or arme d violenc e purpose s, it cannot do so because of the constraints of section 111–3(c)

. A conflict exists among the armed violence statute, w hi ch requires the State to pr

ove a de fendant

guilty bey ond a rea sonable doubtof a predicate felony, section 6–303(d) of the Vehicle Cod e, whichmakes de fendant ’s driving while lic ens e revoked offense a Class 4 felony, and se ction 3–111(c) of the Procedure Code, which prevent s the State from proving defendant guilty of a felony where an offense such as driving while license revoked, subsequent of fense, is

so ug ht to be us ed as th e p re di ca te fe lo ny. Where statutes are in con flic t, a revi ewing c ourt has a duty to interpret the statu tes i n a manner that both avoids an inconsistency

and give s effect to each statute, where this is rea sonably possible. Barragan v. Casco Design Corp. , 216 Ill. 2d 435, 441-42 (200 5). We find that it is no t possible t

o give effect to all three statutes under the facts o f t hi s c as e. Th e s ta tu te s c an no t b e r ec on ci le d, as th ey ar e fundame ntally at odds with each other. The a rm ed violen

ce statu te requires that the State prove defen dan t committed a felony not excluded by the stat

ute ; althoug

h section 6–303(d)of the Ve

hicle Code mak es defendant’s offense a Class 4 felony , section 3–111(c) of the Proce dure Code

prevent s the State

from pro ving all

e l ements of that felony. We reje ct the State’s argumen t that i t was somehow excused by section 3–111(c)

from proving defe ndan t guilty bey ond a reasonable doubt of all elements of the pred icatefelony for a

rmed violence purp o ses. As we have sta ted, due p

rocess r equires that a defendan t be proved guilty

beyond a re asonable doubt of every element of an offense to secure a conviction of that offense. The jury here found de fendant

guilty of armed violence, based on misd emeanor

driving while license revoked. However, no s uc h offense exists in our criminal code. Nonethe less, citi ng Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 52 3 U.S. 224, 140 L. Ed. 2d 350, 118 S. Ct. 1219 (1998), and Apprendi v. New Jersey
, 530 U.S. 46 6, 147 L . Ed. 2d 435 , 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), the State argues that the United States Supreme Court has held that due process does not require the fact of a prior conviction to

be prove d to

a jury bey ond a reasonable doubt when the State is seekingto enhance a defendant’s sentence. Neither Almendarez-Torres nor Apprendiis applica ble here. Those cases involved the question of whether the defenda nts could be sentence d to p rison terms beyond the statutory maximum by t

he useof enhancing factors that wer e not present ed to-12- the jury and prove d beyond a reasonable doubt, but were determined by the trial judge

by a preponde

rance of the evidence. There was no question in either case that the defend ants wer e convicted of va

lid offense s; only their sentence s were in question. Her e, defendant’s prior convictions were not

used to enhanc e his sent

ence fr om a Class A misdemea

nor to a C la ss 4 f

el on y. The prior convictions were used for the purpose of

increasing the classification of defe ndant’s driving while license

revoked offense to a felony s o that it wo

uld suppor

t a convictionof armed violence. For the rea sons we have s tated, th is

was impermissibl e. We , therefore, conclude that under our c urrent statutory scheme, driving while license revoked, subsequent offense, may not serve as a predicate felony to suppo rt a cha rge of armed violence.
Due to our disp osition of t his case , it

is unnecessary

to reach the remaind er of the issues ra ised by defenda nt.

CONCLUSIO

N For the rea sons stated, we hold th at defe ndant wa s not prope

rly convicted of arme d violenc e base d up on driving while lic ense revoked, subsequent offense, and that said offense may

not serve as

a predica te felony under

the armed violence statute. Accordingly , we vacate defenda nt’s arme d violence co nviction. We affirm defendant’s convictionand sentence for unlawf ul po ss es si on of

a w ea po n b y a felon. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of driving while license revoked and that his sentence may properl y be enha nced due to his prior

convicti ons. Bec ause the circ uit court did not impose any sen tence o n the driving while license revoked conviction, we remand to that court for the purpose of imposing a s entenc e pursuant to section 111–3(c) of the Procedure Code.

Appellate court judgment reversed in part and a

ffirmed inpart; circuit court judgment vacated in part and a

ffirmed inpart; cause remanded.