97-523

 No. 97-523

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

 1998 MT 139

STATE OF MONTANA,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

 v.

MARCUS ANGELINE,

 Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Yellowstone,

 The Honorable Russell C. Fagg, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 Carrie Garber, Deputy Public Defender; Billings, Montana

 For Respondent:

 Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General; John Paulson, 

 Assistant Attorney General; Helena, Montana

 Dennis Paxinos, Yellowstone County Attorney; Shawn

 Cosgrove, Deputy County Attorney; Billings, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: May 14, 1998

 Decided: June 9, 1998

Filed:

 __________________________________________

 Clerk

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Justice Jim Regnier delivered the opinion of the Court.

¶1 Marcus Angeline appeals from the decision of the Thirteenth Judicial

District Court, Yellowstone County, denying his motion to suppress evidence

obtained as a result of an investigatory stop of his vehicle. We reverse and

remand.

¶2 The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in denying

Angeline's motion to suppress evidence, in which Angeline argued that Officer

Edgell did not have a particularized suspicion to justify an investigatory stop

of Angeline's vehicle. 

 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3 On August 31, 1996, Marcus Angeline was driving a 1981 Subaru

northbound on U.S. Highway 87 outside of Billings, Montana. As he

descended a long hill, he passed two vehicles. He completed the pass before

the highway began to curve to the west.

¶4 As Angeline was traveling north on Highway 87, Montana Highway

Patrol Officer Keith Edgell was heading southbound in the opposite lane

toward him. Officer Edgell initiated a traffic stop and informed Angeline that

he was stopped for suspicion of violating Montana's basic rule, § 61-8-303,

MCA. The traffic stop resulted in Angeline's arrest for driving while under the

influence of alcohol and two other offenses.

¶5 Later that day, Angeline was charged by complaint with violations of:

(1) § 61-8-401, MCA, driving while under the influence of alcohol, a

misdemeanor; (2) § 61-5-212, MCA, driving while license suspended or

revoked, a misdemeanor; and (3) § 61-6-301, MCA, failure to have liability

protection in effect, a misdemeanor. On September 3, 1996, Angeline

appeared in Yellowstone County Justice Court and entered pleas of not guilty

to all charged offenses. Angeline was found guilty following a bench trial

conducted in Justice Court. On March 20, 1997, Angeline appealed the Justice

Court decision to the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County.

¶6 On April 21, 1997, prior to trial in the District Court, Angeline filed a

motion to suppress any evidence obtained as a result of the investigatory stop

on August 31, 1996, on the grounds that Officer Edgell did not have a

particularized suspicion to initiate the stop. The State replied with a brief in

opposition to Angeline's motion on May 2, 1997. The District Court held a

hearing on the motion on June 24, 1997. On July 9, 1997, the District Court

filed its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order denying Angeline's

motion to suppress.

¶7 On July 22, 1997, the parties filed a plea agreement. Angeline entered

a plea of guilty pursuant to § 46-12-204(3), MCA, reserving his right to appeal

the District Court's adverse determination of his motion to suppress. The court

accepted the State's sentencing recommendation and sentenced Angeline to

concurrent terms of sixty days for driving while under the influence of alcohol,

six months for driving with a suspended or revoked license, and ten days for

driving without insurance. Under the sentence, all time was suspended except

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for two days to be served under house arrest. The court stayed imposition of

the sentence pending Angeline's appeal. 

¶8 On August 5, 1997, the District Court entered its written judgment. 

Also on that day, Angeline filed his notice of appeal, appealing from the

judgment of the District Court.

 DISCUSSION

¶9 Did the District Court err in denying Angeline's motion to suppress

evidence, in which Angeline argued that Officer Edgell did not have a

particularized suspicion to justify an investigatory stop of Angeline's vehicle?

¶10 The standard of review for a district court's denial of a motion to

suppress is whether the court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and

whether those findings were correctly applied as a matter of law. State v.

Pratt (Mont. 1997), 951 P.2d 37, 54 St. Rep. 1349 (citing State v. Flack

(1993), 260 Mont. 181, 185-88, 860 P.2d 89, 92-94.)

¶11 Angeline argues that the District Court erred by denying his motion to

suppress. Angeline contends that the court's findings and conclusions are

clearly erroneous because the prosecution failed to present any evidence at the

suppression hearing on June 24, 1997, regarding the investigatory stop of

Angeline's vehicle on August 31, 1996. Thus, without testimony from the

officer who initiated the traffic stop, Angeline argues the court's conclusion

that a legitimate investigatory stop of Angeline's vehicle occurred is

unsupported by any evidence. 

¶12 In response, the State argues the arresting officer's testimony is not

necessary to support the court's finding of a particularized suspicion sufficient

to justify the investigatory stop of Angeline's vehicle. Rather, the State

contends that its burden is met by merely presenting objective data supporting

an inference of wrongdoing and asserts that evidence may come from any

witness, not just the arresting officer. Thus, the State argues the officer's

testimony was not necessary in this case to support the court's finding that the

officer had a particularized suspicion to justify the stop.

¶13 At the beginning of the suppression hearing held on June 24, 1997, the

prosecution informed the court that Officer Edgell had not yet arrived. The

prosecutor assured the court that he had spoken to Edgell about the hearing

and that the officer appeared to be running late. Based on the prosecution's

belief that Edgell would appear, Angeline's counsel volunteered to proceed

first. Defense counsel called Angeline, who testified and was cross-examined

about the events leading up to the investigatory stop of his vehicle on

August 31, 1996. After the defense presented its argument, Edgell still had not

appeared. The prosecution called no witnesses to testify and presented no

evidence, including the officer's report, at the hearing.

¶14 Therefore, Angeline's testimony and a videotape that was made of the

stretch of road Angeline was driving on before he was stopped were the only

evidence before the District Court. At the hearing, Angeline testified that on

the day he was pulled over, conditions were bright and clear. He stated, and

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the videotape showed, that he was driving on a brand new freshly paved dry

road with wide shoulders on both sides. He stated that his car was in proper

working condition with new brakes and could not go over eighty-five miles per

hour. Before passing, he stated he had a three-mile open view of the road and

that there was no oncoming traffic for miles. He fully explained his actions

before, during, and after passing both vehicles on Highway 87 before being

pulled over by Officer Edgell. 

¶15 At the end of the hearing, the court made its initial ruling, denying the

motion to suppress. The court stated:

 The issue is whether there is a particularized suspicion

 such that the officer could pull you over, and I think under the

 facts of the case there was. I think 80 to 82, even on good

 roads, on a secondary road making a pass by a couple of cars

 before a corner, I will take your word you got in before the

 corner, is enough for an officer to say "I should pull over this

 person and talk to him and check out the car," and I think that he

 had the right to pull you over under the circumstances and under

 your testimony. I understand why you think you were driving

 safe. I don't think there was any chance of an accident, but I

 think there was particularized suspicion to at least pull you over

 and investigate further.

¶16 Angeline objected to this court's ruling, arguing that because there was

no direct testimony from the arresting officer, the State had not met its burden

of showing that the officer had a particularized suspicion to make the

investigatory stop of Angeline's vehicle. The court then backpedaled from its

initial ruling, stating, "I will take the matter under advisement, and state what

I just stated as an inclination rather than a ruling." The court ordered both

parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Also, the

court allowed Angeline to present case law on whether the State has an

obligation to present evidence in order to meet its burden.

¶17 The District Court adopted the State's proposed findings of fact and

conclusions of law on July 9, 1997, denying Angeline's motion to suppress. 

We note the following conclusions of law made by the District Court:

 13. The critical inquiry is not whether the court believes that a

 violation of Section 61-8-303, MCA, occurred beyond a reasonable doubt. 

 Rather, the critical inquiry is whether the objective facts as presented by

 defendant himself give rise to a particularized suspicion that a violation of

 Section 61-8-303, MCA, occurred. The court believes that driving a sixteen

 year old vehicle, down a long hill, upon a two-way secondary highway, while

 passing multiple vehicles at or over 80 MPH, and doing so just before

 negotiating a corner, are objective facts to support a reasonable belief in an

 observing law enforcement officer that defendant's driving was neither careful

 nor prudent.

 

 14. Regarding question (2), whether the State must come forward at

 hearing with a witness and provide contrary evidence, Section 46-13-302(2),

 MCA, is helpful. The operative language is: "If the (defendant's) motion states

 facts that, if true, would show that the evidence should be suppressed, the

 court shall hear the merits. . .". Obviously, based upon the plain language of

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 the statute, if the motion did not state facts that, if true, showed the 

evidence

 should be suppressed, the matter would not even be set for hearing. Clearly,

 because there would not be a hearing, the State would not be required to

 present witnesses. Because of defendant's failure to meet the initial burden,

 the issue would simply not be entertained by the court. In addition, Gopher

 states the initial inquiry is whether objective data is present upon which an

 experienced officer can make inferences. The objective data can come from

 any witness testimony, including the defendant.

 

 15. By analogizing to Section 46-13-302, MCA, and viewing all the

 evidence presented by defendant at hearing as true, because such facts still do

 not show that the evidence should be suppressed, the evidence should not be

 suppressed.

 

 16. Furthermore, through direct and cross-examination of defendant,

 sufficient facts were introduced into evidence to satisfy the State's Gopher

 burdens, First, through the defendant, the State demonstrated the existence of

 objective facts to give rise to a particularized suspicion of wrongdoing, i.e.

 violation of the Basic Rule. Secondly, through the testimony of defendant, it

 was made clear that the officer that stopped him had observed these "objective

 facts" and specifically informed defendant that he was being stopped due to

 suspicion of a Basic rule violation. Consequently, defendant's motion should

 be denied. 

 

¶18 We disagree with these conclusions of law made by the District Court. First, 

under

§ 46-13-302, MCA, if a defendant's motion to suppress "states facts that, if true 

would show

that the evidence should be suppressed, the court shall hear the merits of the 

motion." Thus,

the defendant must meet this initial burden in order for a court to hold a hearing 

and decide 

the motion on its merits. In his motion to suppress filed on April 21, 1997, 

Angeline met this

burden by alleging facts that, if true, might have led to the suppression of the 

evidence at

issue. The facts recited in Angeline's motion were essentially identical to his 

testimony at

the hearing. Angeline represented in his motion that he was going approximately 

eighty

miles per hour before being pulled over for the traffic stop. By deciding to hold a 

hearing

on Angeline's motion to suppress, the District Court agreed that Angeline's motion 

set forth

facts that, if true, would result in the suppression of any evidence obtained as a 

result

of the traffic stop.

¶19 In his motion to suppress, Angeline moved the District Court "to suppress any

evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop in this matter on the 

grounds . . . that the

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officer did not have a particularized suspicion to initiate the traffic stop under § 

46-5-401,

MCA." In Montana, the requirement of particularized suspicion was adopted in State 

v.

Gopher (1981), 193 Mont. 189, 631 P.2d 293, and is codified at § 46-5-401, MCA, which

provides:

 Investigative stop. In order to obtain or verify an account of the person's

 presence or conduct or to determine whether to arrest the person, a peace

 officer may stop any person or vehicle that is observed in circumstances that

 create a particularized suspicion that the person or occupant of the vehicle has

 committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.

¶20 In Gopher, this Court adopted the two-part test enunciated by the United States

Supreme Court in United States v. Cortez (1981), 449 U.S. 411, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. 

Ed. 2d

621, to evaluate whether the police have sufficient cause or a "particularized 

suspicion" to

stop a person. In asserting that a police officer had the particularized suspicion 

to make an

investigatory stop, the State has the burden to show: "(1) objective data from which 

an

experienced officer can make certain inferences; and (2) a resulting suspicion that 

the

occupant of a certain vehicle is or has been engaged in wrongdoing or was a witness 

to

criminal activity." Gopher, 193 Mont. at 194, 631 P.2d at 296.

¶21 Whether a particularized suspicion exists is a question of fact which depends 

on the

totality of circumstances. State v. Reynolds (1995), 272 Mont. 46, 899 P.2d 540. In

evaluating the totality of the circumstances, a court should consider the quantity, 

or content,

and quality, or degree of reliability, of the information available to the officer. 

Alabama v.

White (1990), 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 309.

¶22 Therefore, when a defendant has alleged in a motion to suppress that an officer 

did

not have a particularized suspicion to initiate a traffic stop and a district court 

believes 

that a hearing should be held on the merits of the motion, the burden shifts to the 

State. Then,

the State must prove that the police officer did have a particularized suspicion to 

make an

investigatory stop, as set forth in the manner proscribed in Gopher and its progeny.

¶23 Although this Court has not specifically stated that the testimony of the 

arresting

officer is required in proving particularized suspicion justifying an investigatory 

stop, 

we fail to see how the State can meet its burden of proving its existence without the

testimony of the arresting officer. Since Gopher, this Court has had occasion to 

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review the

testimony of the arresting officer in order to evaluate whether the State has met 

its burden

of proof regarding the existence of particularized suspicion. See, e.g., State v. 

Lee

(Mont. 1997), 938 P.2d 637,54 St. Rep. 401; Seyferth v. State, Department of 

Justice,

Motor Vehicle Division (1996),

277 Mont. 377, 922 P.2d 494; Reynolds, 272 Mont. at 51, 899 P.2d at 543. It is 

only from

the testimony of the arresting officer that one can learn what objective data was 

before the

officer that led him to make certain inferences, resulting in a "suspicion that the 

occupant of

a certain vehicle is or has been engaged in wrongdoing." Gopher, 193 Mont. at 194, 

631

P.2d at 296. Nothing in Gopher or its progeny suggests that a district court should 

speculate

on its own, based on the evidence presented from both parties, as to what an 

arresting officer

may have believed, inferred, or suspected before initiating an investigatory stop. 

A district

court's role is to consider the totality of the circumstances in order to determine 

whether the

State has met its burden in proving a particularized suspicion.

¶24 In this case, the State presented no evidence about what objective data led 

Officer

Edgell to infer or suspect that Angeline had been engaged in wrongdoing. Without the

testimony of Edgell, the parties and the District Court could only speculate as to 

the

objective data the officer observed before stopping Angeline. Without Edgell's 

testimony,

the court was left to engage in speculation in its findings and conclusions about 

what

inferences Edgell may have made based on what he may have observed before the

investigatory stop and the resulting suspicions that he may have had regarding 

whether

Angeline was engaged in criminal activity. Furthermore, there was no evidence 

presented

regarding Officer Edgell's experience and training that would allow one to evaluate 

his

observations, inferences, and resulting suspicions before initiating the stop of 

Angeline's

vehicle if he had, in fact, testified.

¶25 After a review of the transcript of the suppression hearing, we conclude that 

the

District Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law that Edgell had a 

particularized

suspicion for an investigatory stop of Angeline's vehicle are not supported by any 

credible

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evidence. The only evidence presented at hearing was the testimony of Angeline and 

the

videotape of the section of Highway 87 where he made the pass. Angeline's testimony 

alone,

although perhaps self-serving, does not lead one to conclude that Officer Edgell had 

a

particularized suspicion to initiate a stop of his vehicle.

¶26 Because the evidence presented at the hearing did not support the District 

Court's

findings of facts and conclusions of law that Officer Edgell had a particularized 

suspicion

that Angeline had committed, was committing, or was about to commit an offense, we

therefore hold that the investigatory stop of Angeline's vehicle was not justified. 

We reverse

and remand with instructions to enter an order of dismissal consistent with this 

opinion.

 /S/ JIM REGNIER 

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

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