This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 BOWERS ELECTRIC, INC., 2 ROBERT BOWERS and 3 RHB INVESTMENTS, LLC, 4 Plaintiffs-Appellees, 5

v. No. A-1-CA-35049 6 DAWN M. DAVIDE, 7 HOMES BY DAWN DAVIDE, INC., 8 and LA BELLA SPA AND SALON, LLC, 9 Defendants-Appellants. 10 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 11 Nancy J. Franchini, District Judge 12 Bingham, Hurst & Apodaca, P.C. 13 Lillian G. Apodaca 14 Albuquerque, NM 15 for Appellees 16 Alex Chisholm 17 Albuquerque, NM 18 for Appellants 19 MEMORANDUM OPINION 20 ZAMORA, Judge. 212 {1} Dawn M. Davide, Homes by Dawn Davi de, Inc., and La Bella Spa & Salon, 1 LLC (collectively, Defendants), appeal from a district court order denying their 2 motion to compel arbitration. Because the arbitration clause at issue only governs the 3 two signatories and is limited to the subject matter of the commercial lease agreement, 4 we conclude the district court was co rrect in denying Defendants’ motion, and 5 therefore affirm. 6 BACKGROUND 7 A. The Parties 8
{2} At its core, this case involves a series of failed business ventures between Dawn 9 M. Davide (Davide) and Robert Bowers (Bowers), both individually and between each 10 of their two respective businesses. Davideis a resident of Bernalillo County, New 11 Mexico. She is the sole shareholder of Homes by Dawn Davide, Inc., a New Mexico 12 corporation and the managing member of La Bella Spa & Salon, LLC, (the Spa), a 13 New Mexico limited liability company. Bo wers is also a resident of Bernalillo 14 County. He is the president of Bowers Electric, Inc., a licensed New Mexico 15 contractor and New Mexico corporation, and identifies as the owner of RHB 16 Investments, LLC, a New Mexico limited liability company. 17 B. The Agreements 183 {3} In March 2013 Homes by Dawn Davide , Inc. and RHB Investments, LLC 1 entered into a commercial lease agreement for 4,900 square feet of space located in 2 the Spa (the wine shop lease). Davide and Bowers served as signatories on the lease. 3 The intended purpose of this lease was essentially for RHB Investments, LLC to 4 operate a wine shop (selling wine by the bo ttle and glass, and wi ne accessories). This 5 wine shop lease contained an arbitration cl ause, stating that “any dispute between the 6 lessor and the lessee that cannot be settled by the parties shall be submitted to 7 arbitration for resolution according to th e rules of the American Arbitration 8 Association.” 9
{4} Besides the wine shop lease, it appears fro m the record that there could possibly 10 be four other alleged agreements to exis t between the parties. The other alleged 11 agreements include: 12 1. An undated commercial lease agreement for rental space between 13 Homes by Dawn Davide, Inc. and RHB Investments, LLC for 900 14 square feet of space near or inthe Spa. The space was previously 15 occupied by Homes by Dawn Davi de, Inc. The intended purpose 16 of the lease was for RHB Investments, LLC to run a retail shop 17 selling wine and wine-related products and also participate in the 18 Spa’s sponsored events. There is nothing in the record to show 19 this lease was ever signed by either party. 20 2. A personal loan from Bowers toDavide for $60,000. There is no 21 documentary evidence showing the ex istence of this loan in the 22 record. In his unattested affidavit, Bowers lists the loan and loan 23 amount. In her affidavit, Davide recognized a $58,000 loan, 24 partial repayment and resolution of the balance. 254 3. An electrical construction subcontract between Homes by Dawn 1 Davide, Inc. and Bowers Electric, Inc. totaling $43,784.35 for 2 electrical improvements to the Spa. There is no documentary 3 evidence showing the existence of this contract in the record. 4 Instead, there is a claim of lie n for the amount of the contract 5 which was filed in Bernalillo County. 6 4. An oral agreement between Plaintiffs and Davide for flooring 7 materials and storage space totaling $15,996.89. There is no 8 documentary evidence showing the existence of this contract in 9 the record. 10 C. Procedural History 11
{5} On February 6, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint, which 12 alleges the following six claims: 13 1. Bowers Electric, Inc. against all Defendants for breach of contract 14 for labor and materials provided for alterations to Defendants’ 15 property in the amount of $43,764.78; 16 2. Bowers Electric, Inc. against all Defendants under the theory of 17 quantum meruit for labor and materials to Defendants for 18 improvements of real property in the amount of $43,764.78; 19 3. Bowers Electric, Inc. against Davide and Homes by Dawn Davide, 20 Inc. for foreclosure on claim of lien in the amount of $43,764.78; 21 4. Bowers against Davide for breach of promissory note in the 22 amount of $21,000; 23 5. Plaintiffs against Davide and Homes by Dawn Davide, Inc. for 24 breach of contract for flooring materials and storage rental in the 25 amount of $15,996.89; 265 6. Bowers Electric, Inc. against all Defendants under the theory of 1 in quantum meruit for the flooring materials in the amount of 2 $8,196.89; 3
{6} On May 26, 2015, Defendant s filed a motion to compel arbitration and asked 4 the district court to order the parties to arb itrate all of the claims brought in Plaintiffs’ 5 amended complaint, pursuant to the wine shop lease. In their motion, Defendants 6 argued that all of Plaintiffs’ claims arose out of this commercial lease and were 7 therefore all subject to arbitration. They encouraged the district court to order the 8 entire matter to arbitration for purposes of judicial economy. 9
{7} The district court held a hearing on Defendants’ motion on August 20, 2015. 10 Defendants regularly referred to the wine shop lease as the “seminal document” and 11 argued that all of Plaintiffs’ claims flowed from it. In turn, Plaintiffs argued that the 12 wine shop agreement had nothing to do with their claims involving the electrical 13 subcontract, the promissory note, or the flooring material and storage agreements. 14
{8} The district court rejected Defendants’ position and found that according to the 15 complaint, many separate agreements were at issue, “reg ardless of whether they came 16 after the quote ‘seminal lease[,]’ ” thereby denying their motion to compel arbitration. 17 The district court left the door open for Defendants to re-file their motion if they 18 eventually had more facts to support their motion. Defendants appealed the district 19 court’s order. 206 D. Summary of Parties’ Arguments 1
{9} On appeal, Defendants contend that the arbitration clause in the wine shop lease 2 between Homes by Dawn Davide, Inc. and RHB Investments, LLC, is inclusive of any 3 dispute between all parties and is not limited to the subject matter of the lease 4 agreement. Because the arbitration clause inthis lease included the language that “any 5 dispute” between the parties would be submitted to arbitration, Defendants maintain 6 that this applies to all of the six claims Plaintiffs brought in their complaint. In 7 response, Plaintiffs directed this Court to the multiple alleged agreements that existed 8 between various separate parties concerning a promissory note, flooring material and 9 storage rental agreement, and an electricalcontract to make improvements to the 10 facilities at the Spa. They argue that Defendants cannot use an arbitration provision 11 from one lease agreement, the wine shop l ease, as a means to force different and 12 distinct parties to arbitrate issues specifically not included in the wine shop lease 13 agreement. 14 DISCUSSION 15 A. Standard of Review 16
{10} Whether the arbitration clause in the wine shop agreement was meant to extend 17 to any and all subsequent ag reements between the principles and their businesses—is 18 a pure question of law. “We apply a de novo standard of review to a district court’s 197 denial of a motion to compel arbitration.” Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M. , 2009- 1 NMSC-021, ¶ 11, 146 N.M. 256, 208 P.3d 901. When the resolution of an arbitration 2 issue involved the interpretati on of documentary evidence, we need not defer to the 3 trial court because we are in as good a position to interpret the contract. See California 4 Cas. Ins. Co. v. Garcia-Price , 2003-NMCA-044, ¶ 6, 133 N.M. 439, 63 P.3d 1159. 5 B. Arbitration and General Contract Law Principles 6
{11} Arbitration is a form of dispute resolution that is highly favored in New Mexico 7 because it “promotes both judicial efficien cy and conservation of resources by all 8 parties.” Santa Fe Technologies, Inc. v. Argus Networks, Inc. , 2002-NMCA-030, ¶ 51, 9 131 N.M. 772, 42 P.3d 1221. Our Supreme C ourt has held that “arbitration 10 agreements are contracts enforceableby the rules of contract law.” Horne v. Los 11 Alamos Nat’l. Sec., L.L.C. , 2013-NMSC-004, ¶ 16, 296 P.3d 478. As such, this Court 12 applies the principles of contract law to th e interpretation of an arbitration agreement. 13 See L.D. Miller Constr., Inc. v. Kirschenbaum , 2017-NMCA-030, ¶ 18, 392 P.3d 194. 14 As a general matter, “[w]e view the contract as a harmonious whole, give meaning to 15 every provision, and accord each part of the contract its significance in light of other 16 provisions.” Benz v. Town Ctr. Land, LLC, 2013-NMCA-111, ¶ 31, 314 P.3d 688 17 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) . “The purpose, meaning, and intent of 18 the parties to a contract is to be de duced from the language employed by them; and 198 where such language is not ambiguous, it is conclusive.” Id. (alteration, internal 1 quotation marks, and citation omitted). Theref ore, “we consider arbitration agreements 2 as a whole to determine how they should be interpreted.” Medina v. Holguin , 2008- 3 NMCA-161, ¶ 8, 145 N.M. 303, 197 P.3d 1085 (alterations, internal quotation marks, 4 and citation omitted). 5
{12} In interpreting any contract, our Court “effectuate[s] the intent of the parties by 6 adopting a reasonable construction of the us ual and customary meaning of the contract 7 language.” Smith & Marrs, Inc. v. Osborn , 2008-NMCA-043, ¶ 10, 143 N.M. 684, 8 180 P.3d 1183 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A]bsent any 9 ambiguity, the [district] court may not alter or fabricate a new agreement for the 10 parties.” CC Hous. Corp. v. Ryde r Truck Rental, Inc. , 1987-NMSC-117, ¶ 6, 106 N.M. 11 577, 746 P.2d 1109. 12
{13} When an arbitration clause is at issue, this Court’s “inquiry is whether the 13 parties have agreed to arb itrate the matter under dispute.” Santa Fe Technologies, Inc. , 14 2002-NMCA-030, ¶ 52. “When a reasonable re lationship between the subject matter 15 of the dispute and the underlying agreement exis ts, the dispute is within the arbitration 16 provision and should be arbitrated.” Id. 179 C. Interpretation of the Arbitration Clause 1
{14} The issue in this appeal is whether a single commercial lease agreement 2 between two legal entities containing an arbitration clause can be applied to 3 subsequent separate busine ss transactions, thereby requiring separate and different 4 legal entities and individuals to arbitrate all claims. 5
{15} Applying the principles of contract law and the plain meaning of the contract 6 language to the wine shop l ease, we conclude that th e agreement is unambiguous as 7 a matter of law. The agreement itself only c oncerned leasing 4900 square feet of space 8 for the intended purpose to de velop a wine shop at the Spa location. The arbitration 9 clause explicitly states that it is applicable to “any dispute between the lessor and the 10 lessee ,” or Homes by Dawn Davide, Inc. and RHB Investments, LLC. (Emphasis 11 added.) There is nothing in the lease that is evidence to support an agreement between 12 the parties agreeing that the arbitration clause was binding on any future or subsequent 13 business transactions involving Davide or Bowers individually, or their separately 14 controlled and managed entities. 15
{16} We conclude that the arbitration cl ause is not applicable to Bowers, 16 individually; Bowers Electric, Inc.; Davide, individually; or the Spa. See Horanburg 17 v. Felter, 2004-NMCA-121, ¶ 16, 136 N.M. 435, 99 P.3d 685 (“Generally, third 1810 parties who are not signatories to an arbitration agreement are not bound by the 1 agreement and are not subject to, and cannot compel, arbitration.”). 2
{17} Defendants relying on Santa Fe Technologies, Inc. also argue that: (1) because 3 Plaintiffs’ amended complaint raised claims that occurred after the signing of the wine 4 shop agreement, they were therefore anc illary to the wine shop agreement; and (2) 5 Plaintiffs’ claims were actually preemptiv e counterclaims to an alleged claim for 6 breach of contract by Davide. Defendants further argue that Santa Fe Technologies, 7 Inc. ’s “unlimited” language supports their arguments that subsequent agreements 8 between the related individuals and entities should be subj ect to the wine shop lease 9 arbitration clause. 2004-NMCA-030, ¶ 57. These arguments are unpersuasive. 10
{18} In Santa Fe Technologies, Inc. , this Court emphasized that the subject 11 agreement did not state in an “unlimited manner” that any disputes that may arise 12 between the parties in the future shall be subject to arbitration. Id. Rather, the subject 13 agreement included the language “[i]n the event of any breach, default, dispute, 14 controversy, or claim arising out of or relating tothis [a]greement.” Id. ¶ 53 15 (emphasis added). Defendant equates the language in the Santa Fe Technologies, Inc. 16 agreement with the language here—“any dis pute between the lessor and the lessee that 17 cannot be settled by the parties.” By equating the language in the two agreements, 18 Defendant is asking us to treat all the partie s in the various agreements as one and the 1911 same. We decline to apply such an excepti onally broad interpretation of the wine shop 1 lease arbitration clause. As a general rule , arbitration agreements “are drafted with 2 broad strokes and, as a result, require broad interpretation[;]” however, there still has 3 to be a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the four alleged 4 agreements and the wine shop agreement. Id. ¶¶ 52, 55. As the record stands now, we 5 see no such relationship. 6
{19} This Court has specifically stated that we “will not rewrite a contract for the 7 parties.” Id. ¶ 52. It is our duty to rely on “[t]he terms of the agreement [to] define the 8 scope of the jurisdiction, conditions, limitati ons and restrictions on the matters to be 9 arbitrated.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 10 CONCLUSION 11
{20} Accordingly, for the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm. 12
{21} IT IS SO ORDERED. 13

14 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 15 WE CONCUR: 16 17 STEPHEN G. FRENCH, Judge 18 19 EMIL J. KIEHNE, Judge 20