alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
II 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 45

To amend the Controlled Substances Act to lift the patient limitation on 

prescribing drug addiction treatments by medical practitioners in group 

practices, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 24, 2005

Mr. LEVIN (for himself, Mr. HATCH, and Mr. BIDEN) introduced the following 

bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 

A BILL

To amend the Controlled Substances Act to lift the patient 

limitation on prescribing drug addiction treatments by 

medical practitioners in group practices, and for other 

purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

•S 45 IS 

1 SECTION 1. MAINTENANCE OR DETOXIFICATION TREAT2 MENT WITH CERTAIN NARCOTIC DRUGS; 

3 ELIMINATION OF 30-PATIENT LIMIT FOR 

4 GROUP PRACTICES. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 303(g)(2)(B) of the Con6 trolled Substance Act (21 U.S.C. 823(g)(2)(B)) is amend7 ed by striking clause (iv). 

8 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 

9 303(g)(2)(B) of the Controlled Substance Act (21 U.S.C. 

10 823(g)(2)(B)) is amended in clause (iii) by striking ‘‘In 

11 any case’’ and all that follows through ‘‘the total’’ and 

12 inserting ‘‘The total’’. 

13 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section shall take effect 

14 on the date of enactment of this Act.

Æ
#### Diane P. Laskey, Respondent, v Douglas P. Laskey, Appellant.

[963 NYS2d 910]

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Niagara County (Frank Caruso, J.), entered March 12, 2012. The order, among other things, granted the motion of plaintiff for equitable distribution of defendant’s pension.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs *(see Burns v Burns,*84 NY2d 369, 376-377 [1994]).

Present—Smith, J.E, Peradotto, Lindley, Valentino and Whalen, JJ.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                   EXHIBIT 21.01

                               LIFE RE CORPORATION

                              LIST OF SUBSIDIARIES
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                      NAMES UNDER WHICH
NAME OF                                JURISDICTION OF                THE SUBSIDIARY
SUBSIDIARY                               INCORPORATION               DOES BUSINESS
----------                               -------------               -------------
<S>                                   <C>                       <C> 
TexasRe Life Insurance Company                    Texas         TexasRe Life Insurance Company

Life Reassurance Corporation                Connecticut         Life Reassurance Corporation
     of America                                                 of America
Reassure America Life Insurance                Illinois         Reassure America Life Insurance
     Company                                                    Company

Life Re International, Ltd.                     Bermuda         Life Re International, Ltd.

AML Acquisition Company                        Delaware         AML Acquisition Company

American Merchants Life Insurance              Illinois         American Merchants Life Insurance
     Company                                                         Company

Mission Life Insurance Company                    Texas         Mission Life Insurance Company

Capitol Bankers Life Insurance                 Michigan         Capitol Bankers Life Insurance
     Company                                                         Company

Assure America, Inc.                              Texas         Assure America, Inc.

Life Re Capital Trust I                        Delaware         Life Re Capital Trust I

Life Re Capital Trust II                       Delaware         Life Re Capital Trust II
</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                             450
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    7,599
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 8,635
<PP&E>                                          96,316
<DEPRECIATION>                                (36,561)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  68,982
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            4,278
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               92
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                      48,659
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    68,982
<SALES>                                         13,725
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                13,778
<CGS>                                            9,055
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   11,027
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 1,452
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 520
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,751
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,018
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,733
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,733
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.19
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.19
        

</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32.1








CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF


THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








The
certification set forth below is hereby made solely for the purpose of
satisfying the requirements of Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and
may not be relied upon or used for any other purposes.





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Access Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (the
“Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2008, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Jeffrey
B. Davis, Chief Executive Officer certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, that (1) the
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and (2) the information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of the Company.





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 or other document
authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the
Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff
upon request.





Signed at
the City of Dallas, in the State of Texas, this 14th day of August,
2008.





/s/ Jeffrey B.
Davis


Jeffrey
B. Davis


Chief
Executive Officer
**Exhibit 31.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONS**

 

RULE 13a-14 THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

 

I,Fu-Chieh Hsu, certify that:

 

1.     I have reviewed this Form 10-K of Monolithic SystemTechnology, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2003;

 

2.     Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain anyuntrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessaryto make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which suchstatements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport;

 

3.     Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and otherfinancial information included in this report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of theregistrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

 

4.     The registrant’s other certifying officer and I areresponsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures(as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrantand have:

 

(a)Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure thatmaterial information relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

(b)Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectivenessof the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period coveredby this report based on such evaluation; and

 

(c)Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscalquarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annualreport) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materiallyaffect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

 

5.     The registrant’s other certifying officer and I havedisclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control overfinancial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee ofthe registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):

 

(a)All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operationof internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and

 

(b)Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employeeswho have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.

 

Date:March 12, 2004

 

 
| /s/ Fu-Chieh Hsu                                     |   |
|------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Fu-Chieh Hsu                                         |
| *Chairman of the Board and  Chief Executive Officer* |

 

----
#### State v. Rogers

Case below: 180 N.C. App. 474

No. 028P07

1. Def’s NOA Based Upon a Constitutional Question (COA06-99)

2. Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31

1. Dismissed *ex mero motu*03/08/07

2. Denied 03/08/07
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Matthew HERRINGTON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 05-50891

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 27, 2006.

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Richard W. Alexander, Cantey & Hanger, Austin, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and KING and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Matthew Herrington appeals his conviction following a guilty plea for conspiracy *682to manufacture 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. He argues that retained trial counsel, Jorge Sanchez, rendered ineffective assistance because counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest and was absent during a critical stage of the proceedings. He contends that counsel failed to conduct discovery and failed to facilitate his timely cooperation with the Government and that as a result 1) he was improperly characterized as the leader of the conspiracy for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines, 2) he was unable to receive an additional one point reduction for acceptance of responsibility as did his co-defendants, and 3) he was deprived of the opportunity to enter into a timely plea agreement. He further argues that the district court failed to remedy the resulting harm at sentencing.

“We have undertaken to resolve claims of inadequate representation on direct appeal only in rare cases where the record allowed us to evaluate fairly the merits of the claim.” *United States v. Higdon,*832 F.2d 312, 314 (5th Cir.1987); *see Massaro v. United States,*538 U.S. 500, 504-05, 123 S.Ct. 1690, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003). This is not one of those rare cases. Without prejudice to Herrington’s right to file a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
IN THE MATTER OF PEGGY GONSALVES, )

an incapacitated and disabled person. ) No. SD36795

) FILED: December 29, 2020

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING OR TRANSFER 

(Before Rahmeyer, P.J., Scott, J., and Francis, J.)

PER CURIAM. Arika seeks rehearing or transfer, claiming a right to assert 

that Peggy’s appointed counsel was ineffective.

Our opinion’s note 6 observation still holds: Arika “fails to show how she

was aggrieved by anything of which she complains.” It would not harm Arika for 

anyone else’s lawyer to underperform, except perhaps to the extent their interests 

aligned, which Arika does not and could not claim here – her self-dealing was 

among the reasons Peggy needed and was granted the court’s protection. 

Standing “asks whether the persons seeking relief have a right to do so.” 

Farmer v. Kinder, 89 S.W.3d 447, 451 (Mo. banc 2002). We must find standing 

before reaching substantive issues, and cannot waive that requirement. Id. 

We deny rehearing or transfer.1

 

1 Arika also fleetingly argues that our references to Whittaker and Walker “as support 

for dismissing this appeal on the grounds that Arika lacks standing ... are contrary to our 

supreme court holding in [In re] Beyersdorfer[, 59 S.W.3d 523 (Mo. banc 2001)].” She 

is wrong. The Beyersdorfer appellant was a spouse. 59 S.W.3d at 524 & n.2. As such, 

he had § 472.160 standing that Arika does not and cannot claim. See Opinion, note 6.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Edmir Gega, Appellant.

[974 NYS2d 280]

— Application by the appellant for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate, on the ground of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a decision and order of this Court dated June 22, 2010 *(People v Gega,*74 AD3d 1229 [2010]), modifying a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, rendered May 16, 2006.

Ordered that the application is denied.

The appellant has failed to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel *(see Jones v Barnes,*463 US 745 [1983]; *People v Stultz,*2 NY3d 277 [2004]). Rivera, J.E, Balkin, Leventhal and Hall, JJ., concur.
#### Sheffield *v.*Oliver, judge.

Under section 299(f) of the code, a county solicitor is not entitled to any fee in a criminal case unless the same is actually tried. Consequently, where a warrant was sued out against one charged with a misdemeanor, which warrant was returned to the county court, and the solicitor thereupon prepared an accusation which the prosecutor in the warrant refused to sign, the latter was not liable to pay any costs to the solicitor, and the county judge was right in so adjudging.

April 16, 1894.

Argued at the last term.

Petition for *mandamus.*Before Judge Griggs. Early superior court. October term, 1893.

William D. Kiddoo, for plaintiff. E. H. Powell & Son and H. C. Sheffield, for defendant.

*Judgment affirmed.*
#### Flannagan, trustee, *v.*Forrest, sheriff, *et al.*

*A*mortgage made by a principal in a promissory note to his surety to indemnify the latter against loss on account of his suretyship, may be foreclosed after maturity of the note and payment thereof by the surety to the creditor, though the payment be made not in money or property but by executing a several promissory note which the creditor accepts in full payment of the joint note. Although the surety, if he so elected, might, under code, ($2176, 2177, have the right to be subrogated to the creditor’s status on the joint note, yet a foreclosure by him of the mortgage is a renunciation of that right, and the joint note is thus wholly extinguished not only as to the surety but as to his principal.

August 14, 1894.

*Judgment*reversed,.

Money rule. Before Judge Fish. Sumter superior court. November term, 1893.

Williford and Matthews gave a joint note to a bank. Williford executed to Matthews a mortgage on all his ■stock of goods to indemnify him against loss from having signed the note as surety. Matthews foreclosed the mortgage, alleging that since the note fell due he had, fully paid it to the bank, that Williford failed to pay it and was *686totally insolvent, and that the mortgaged property was all the property of Williford. The mortgage *fi. fa.*was transferred by Matthews to the bank, and by the bank to Flannagan, trustee. Other *fi. fas.*were levied on the property; and the money in the hands of the sheriff was claimed by numerous creditors’ of Williford. They attacked the validity of the lien claimed by Flannagan, on the ground that Matthews had sustained no loss and had not paid the note he signed as surety. It appeared that the bank sued him and Williford on the note; whereupon he gave to the bank his several note which was accepted by the bank as payment of the note sued on, and this joint note was marked with a receipt of full payment from him, and was turned over to him; the mortgage was transferred by him as before stated, and an order was taken in the suit that it proceed in the name of the bank for the use of Flannagan, trustee, against Williford. Judgment by default was taken against Williford. When Matthews gave his several note he thought he was solvent, but subsequent events proved he was not. He gave it with the understanding that the bank was to take bank stock as collateral. He never gave stock as collateral, but transferred the mortgage as collateral, after he gave the note. At the time he gave it, nothing was said about transferring the mortgage. He has never paid this note nor been sued on it, and has sustained no loss on account of his surety-ship on the joint note.

James Dodson & Son and W. *K.*Wheatley, for plaintiff in error. Fort & Watson, Guerry & Son, W. M. Hawkes, H. L. Maynard, E. A. Hawkins, J. A. Ansley and Clarke & Hooper, *contra.*

The coui’t ruled that the mortgage had no lien on the fund, and could not participate in the distribution. Flannagan excepted.
#### McDonald *v.*Williams.

After the lapse of twenty years or more from the laying off of a homestead under the act of 1868, where no disturbance of the beneficiaries within that period appears, all presumptions are in favor of the jurisdiction exercised by the ordinary, with respect to the residence and status of the applicant for homestead. And the like presumptions prevail as to the regularity of the proceeding, such as the necessary order directing the county surveyor to lay off the homestead, and the due administration of the statutory oath to the surveyor touching the correctness of the plat and the value of the property. In any collateral attack upon the homestead made after such a lapse of time, the burden of proving the want *516of jurisdiction, or the omission of any essential step in the proceeding is upon the party making the attack.

April 23, 1894.

Argued at the last term.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Levy and claim. Before Judge Bower. Calhoun superior court. June term, 1893.

Execution against the administrator of Joel Williams was levied on land which was claimed by M. C. Williams as agent for the minor children of Joel Williams. The case, was submitted to the judge upon the question whether the homestead of Joel Williams, on which the claim rested, was good or not, it not having expired, and said minors being original beneficiaries thereunder. The homestead papers were admitted in evidence, over objections that they did not show that the applicant was the head of a family, nor set forth any reason why he was entitled to a homestead ; that they did not show he was a resident of Calhoun county; that they showed no order of the ordinary to the surveyor to lay off a homestead, and the surveyor’s return did not show that this was done in accordance with such order, and his return was not properly sworn to. The homestead papers were as follows:

> “ Georgia, Calhoun county. The following is a description and schedule of the property claimed by Joel Williams to be exempt from levy and sale under the late homestead act of the State of Georgia: ” This is followed by an inventory of personalty and of realty, and the signature of Joel Williams. Indorsed: “Calhoun court of ordinary, at chambers, Eeb’y, 1869. Approved this 5th day of Eeb’y, 1869. Geo. W. Wooten, ordinary. Filed in office, 19th Jan’y, 1869.” Then follows a plat' with this statement: “The above plat is a representation of five hundred acres of land, no. 240 and 241 in the 4th district Calhoun county, Ga., valued at $1,500, as Joel Williams’ homestead, surveyed on the 29th Jan’y, 1869. John B. Davis, C. S.” And the fol*517lowing: « Georgia, Calhoun county. Before me carne John B. Davis, C. S., who on oath says that the above described real estate is correctly platted and laid off, to the best of his knowledge and belief is not worth more than fifteen hundred dollars in specie. J. B. Davis.” “ Sworn to and subscribed before me this Beb’y 5,1869. G. W. Wooten.” «Recorded March 13, 1869. W. G. Pierce, clerk.”

J. J. Beck and Hood & Moye, by Harrison & Peeples, for plaintiff.

J. L. Boynton, by M. J. Clarke, for claimant.