[Cite as State v. Irwin-Debraux, 2019-Ohio-5013.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

MONTGOMERY COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

ALYSSA IRWIN-DEBRAUX 

Defendant-Appellant 

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Appellate Case No. 28309 

Trial Court Case No. 2018-CR-3580 

(Criminal Appeal from 

Common Pleas Court) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 6th day of December, 2019. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by HEATHER N. JANS, Atty. Reg. No. 0084470, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, 

Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422

 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

MATTHEW M. SUELLENTROP, Atty. Reg. No. 0089655, 6 North Main Street, Suite 400, 

Dayton, Ohio 45402 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

TUCKER, J. 
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{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Alyssa Irwin-Debraux, appeals from her convictions for 

one count of grand theft of a motor vehicle, a fourth-degree felony pursuant to R.C. 

2913.02(A)(1) and (B)(5); one count of involuntary manslaughter, a first-degree felony 

pursuant to R.C. 2903.04(A) and (C); and one count of failure to comply with an order or 

a signal of a police officer, a third-degree felony pursuant to R.C. 2921.331(B) and 

(C)(5)(a). Raising two assignments of error, Irwin-Debraux argues that her sentences 

should be vacated because the trial court ordered her to serve three terms in prison 

consecutively without fulfilling the requirements of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); because the court 

failed to consider the purposes and principles of sentencing; and because the aggregate 

term of imprisonment imposed by the court constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 

{¶ 2} We find that the trial court erred by ordering Irwin-Debraux to serve terms in 

prison for grand theft of a motor vehicle and involuntary manslaughter in the absence of 

the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), but otherwise, we find that her arguments 

lack merit. Therefore, the case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing consistent 

with this opinion. In all other respects, Irwin-Debraux’s convictions are affirmed. 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 3} On September 11, 2018, Irwin-Debraux stole a 2009 Jeep Patriot and fled 

from the ensuing police pursuit. In her attempt to evade capture, she drove the vehicle 

at speeds ranging from 65 to 80 m.p.h. along State Route 741, at times crossing into the 

opposing lanes of traffic. 

{¶ 4} A motorist attempting to avoid a head-on collision with Irwin-Debraux instead 

collided with a vehicle being driven by Mary Taulbee. Taulbee’s vehicle spun through 
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an intersection and was struck by a police cruiser involved in the pursuit of Irwin-Debraux. 

Mary Taulbee died from the injuries she suffered. The officer, too, was injured, though 

he survived. 

{¶ 5} After the accident, Irwin-Debraux tested positive for the consumption of 

several illicit substances. She was 18 years of age at the time. 

{¶ 6} On September 24, 2018, a Montgomery County grand jury indicted IrwinDebraux on one count of grand theft of a motor vehicle. By way of a bill of information 

filed on December 20, 2018, she was charged with one count of failure to comply with an 

order or a signal of a police officer and one count of involuntary manslaughter; on the 

same date, she pleaded guilty as charged on all counts. 

{¶ 7} The trial court held a sentencing hearing on February 7, 2019, and on 

February 8, 2019, it filed a corresponding judgment entry of conviction. Irwin-Debraux 

timely filed her notice of appeal to this court on February 25, 2019. 

II. Analysis 

{¶ 8} For her first assignment of error, Irwin-Debraux contends that:

 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT MAKING THE REQUISITE FINDINGS 

PURSUANT TO R.C. §2929.14(C)[.] 

{¶ 9} Irwin-Debraux argues that the trial court erred by ordering that she serve her 

sentences consecutively, because the court did not comply with the requirements of R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4). Appellant’s Brief 4-5. As the State concedes, Irwin-Debraux’s 

argument has merit. See Appellee’s Brief 4-5. 

{¶ 10} Under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), where a defendant is convicted of more than one 

offense and is sentenced to a term of imprisonment for each of the offenses, the 
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sentencing “court may require [that the] offender * * * serve the * * * terms consecutively,” 

if the court finds that: (1) “consecutive service is necessary [either] to protect the public 

from future crime” or “to punish the offender” sufficiently; (2) consecutive service would 

not be “disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger 

the offender poses to the public”; and (3) one of the additional conditions listed in R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c) is applicable. (Emphasis added.) The “presumption in favor of 

concurrent sentences [pursuant to] R.C. 2929.41(A)” applies in the absence of the 

foregoing findings or a statutory mandate. See, e.g., R.C. 2913.02(B)(4) and 

2929.14(B)(2)(b)-(d); State v. Withrow, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2015-CA-24, 2016-Ohio-2884, 

¶ 29. 

{¶ 11} One such statutory mandate is set forth in R.C. 2921.331. Under R.C. 

2921.331(D), if “an offender is sentenced pursuant to [R.C. 2921.331](C)(4) or (5) * * * for 

a violation of [R.C. 2921.331](B) * * *,” and if the sentence includes “a prison term for [the] 

violation, [then] the offender shall serve [that] term consecutively to any other prison term 

or mandatory prison term imposed upon the offender.” Irwin-Debraux pleaded guilty to 

a violation of R.C. 2921.331(B), for which the trial court sentenced her to a term in prison 

of 18 months pursuant to R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a)(i)-(ii). See Bill of Information 1, Dec. 

20, 2018; Transcript of Proceedings 8:19-10:17, 11:21-11:25 and 14:14-16:14, Feb. 7, 

2019; Termination Entry 1, Feb. 8, 2019. R.C. 2921.331(D) thus obligated the court to 

order, as it did, that Irwin-Debraux serve her sentence for violating R.C. 2921.331(B) 

consecutively to her sentences for involuntary manslaughter and grand theft of a motor 

vehicle. Termination Entry 1. 

{¶ 12} Nevertheless, the consecutive service requirement in R.C. 2921.331(D) 
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applied only to Irwin-Debraux’s sentence for failure to comply with an order or a signal of 

a police officer. See State v. Johnson, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2018-CA-9, 2018-Ohio-4232, 

¶ 1. The statute did not invest the trial court with the authority to require consecutive 

service of Irwin-Debraux’s sentences for involuntary manslaughter and grand theft, and 

the court lacked the discretion to order as much because it did not comply with R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4). 

{¶ 13} Irwin-Debraux’s first assignment of error is sustained. The case is 

remanded to the trial court for resentencing consistent with this opinion. 

{¶ 14} For her second assignment of error, Irwin-Debraux contends that: 

 THE SENTENCE [sic] IMPOSED IS CONTRARY TO LAW[.] 

{¶ 15} Here, Irwin-Debraux argues that her sentences are contrary to law in two 

respects. See Appellant’s Brief 5-7. First, she claims that the trial court did not consider 

“the third principle of felony sentencing” under R.C. 2929.11(A), which is the 

“rehabilitat[ion] [of] the offender.” Id. at 6. Second, she faults the court for imposing 

sentences that are “excessively harsh to the point of being cruel and unusual 

punishment.” Id. at 11. These arguments lack merit. 

{¶ 16} A “trial court has full discretion to impose any sentence within the authorized 

statutory range, and [it] is not required to make any findings or [to] give its reasons for 

imposing maximum or more than minimum sentences.” State v. King, 2013-Ohio-2021, 

992 N.E.2d 491, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 

845 N.E.2d 470, paragraph seven of the syllabus. Even so, the “court must comply with 

all applicable rules and statutes, including R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12.” Id., citing 

State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54, 2006-Ohio-855, 846 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 37. 
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{¶ 17} Under R.C. 2929.11(A), a “court that sentences an offender for a felony 

shall be guided” by the “overriding purposes” of punishing the offender and “protect[ing] 

the public from future crime by the offender and others,” while using “the minimum 

sanctions that [it] determines [likely to] accomplish [these] purposes without * * * 

unnecessar[ily] burden[ing] * * * state or local government resources.” Accordingly, the 

court must “consider the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and 

others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution.” See id. 

R.C. 2929.11(B) adds that a felony sentence “shall be reasonably calculated to achieve 

the two overriding purposes of felony sentencing, * * * commensurate with and not 

demeaning to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and its impact upon [any] 

victim[s], and consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar 

offenders.” 

{¶ 18} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.12(A), in “exercising [its] discretion” to determine “the 

most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in 

[R.C.] 2929.11,” a court must consider, among other things, a list of nine factors 

“indicating that [an] offender’s conduct [was] more serious than conduct normally 

constituting” the offense or offenses for which the offender was convicted; a list of four 

factors “indicating that the offender’s conduct [was] less serious than conduct normally 

constituting the offense [or offenses]”; a list of five factors “indicating that the offender is 

likely to commit future crimes”; and another list of five factors “indicating that the offender 

is not likely to commit future crimes.” The court “may [also] consider any other factors 

that are relevant to [fulfilling the] purposes and principles of [felony] sentencing.” Id.; see 

also R.C. 2929.12(B)-(E). 
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{¶ 19} On review of a felony sentence, an appellate court may vacate or modify 

the sentence “only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does 

not support the trial court’s findings under the relevant statutes,” or that the sentence “is 

otherwise contrary to law.”1 See State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 

59 N.E.2d 1231, ¶ 1; see also R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). A sentence “is not contrary to law [if 

it falls] within the statutory range [and the trial court] expressly state[s] that it * * * 

considered the purposes and principles of sentencing [under] R.C. 2929.11 [and] 

2929.12.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Rodeffer, 2013-Ohio-5759, 5 N.E.3d 1069, ¶ 32 

(2d Dist.). 

{¶ 20} In the first part of her argument, Irwin-Debraux suggests that the “trial court 

failed to consider the third principle of felony sentencing” under R.C. 2929.11(A). The 

court, however, expressly stated in its termination entry that it had “considered the 

[sentencing] factors under [R.C.] 2929.11, 2929.12 and 2929.13, as well as all other 

relevant provisions” of the Revised Code. Termination Entry 1. Furthermore, although 

the court did not refer explicitly to the prospect of Irwin-Debraux’s rehabilitation in its 

remarks at her sentencing hearing, the court did state its reasons for imposing nearly the 

maximum aggregate sentence. See Transcript of Proceedings 8:10-11:17; see also

R.C. 2929.14(A)(1), (3) and (4). The court thus indicated with equal clarity, albeit by 

implication, why it determined that less stringent sanctions would have been 

 

1 Irwin-Debraux cites State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 

124, for her assertion that “the trial court’s [sentencing] decision [should] be reviewed 

under [the] abuse-of-discretion standard.” See Appellant’s Brief 3. The Kalish decision 

was abrogated nearly four years ago. State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 6-7. 
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inappropriate. 

{¶ 21} In the second part of her argument, Irwin-Debraux characterizes her 

aggregate sentence as “excessively harsh to the point of being cruel and unusual 

punishment.” Appellant’s Brief 11. Yet, she has not cited any evidence, let alone clear 

and convincing evidence, demonstrating that the record does not support the sentences 

imposed by the court, and the sentences themselves were within the ranges authorized 

by R.C. 2929.14(A)(1), (3) and (4). The essence of Irwin-Debraux’s argument is that the 

trial court “disregarded the mitigating evidence in an arbitrary way” and “did not 

appropriately consider all relevant statutory factors,” but a trial court may determine the 

relative weight to be accorded the various sentencing factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12(B)-

(E). See, e.g., State v. Bynum, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-18-20, 2019-Ohio-3139, ¶ 11; see

Appellant’s Brief 8-9. Regardless of whether the trial court could have sentenced IrwinDebraux less stringently, the sentences themselves were not contrary to law, and the 

court accurately cited to the record in support of its findings. 

{¶ 22} Additionally, Irwin-Debraux argues that the trial court erred by failing to 

conduct a proportionality review. Appellant’s Brief 7-8. She did not raise this argument 

before the trial court, and it consequently has been waived. State v. Forney, 2d Dist. 

Champaign No. 2012-CA-36, 2013-Ohio-3458, ¶ 20-22; State v. Howard, 7th Dist. 

Mahoning No. 15 MA 0031, 2016-Ohio-3246, ¶ 13-14. Irwin-Debraux’s second 

assignment of error is overruled. 

III. Conclusion 

{¶ 23} In the absence of the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), the trial court 

erred by ordering that Irwin-Debraux serve her term in prison for grand theft of a motor 
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vehicle consecutively to her term in prison for involuntary manslaughter. The record 

otherwise supports the trial court’s sentencing determinations, and the prison terms 

imposed by the court were within statutory limits. Therefore, the case is remanded to 

the trial court for resentencing consistent with this opinion; otherwise, Irwin-Debraux’s 

convictions are affirmed. 

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FROELICH, J. and HALL, J., concur. 

Copies sent to: 

Mathias H. Heck, Jr. 

Heather N. Jans 

Matthew M. Suellentrop 

Hon. Michael W. Krumholtz