Interim Decision #2624 

MATTER OF SOLOMON 

In Disbarment Proceedings 

A-17690345 

Decided by Board February 10, 1977 

(1) The standard of proof in suspension or disbarment proceedings under 8 C.F.R. 292.3 

requires that allegations of misconduct be established by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence. 

(2) Where a comprehensive witness list was made available to the respondent, and where 

respondent's request for discovery was granted and fulfilled, the Board of Immigration 

Appeals forind no prejudicial error or irnpropaiety in the immigration judge's denial of a 

continuance before and at the commencement of the disbarment hearing. 

(3) Where the interpreter in deportation proceedings is an employee of the Immigration 

and Naturalization Service, that person nee d not be sworn to interpret and translate 

accurately because he is acting under his oath. of office; however, in this disbarment case 

the Service interpreter was, in fact, sworn, avid counsel had an opportunity tv bring in 

an outside interpreter, and the Board of Immigration Appeals found no merit to 

respondent's objection to the use of the Sert.Tice interpreter. 

(4) Where the only evidence bearing on the charge under 8 C.F.R. 292.3(a)(3) was the 

alien's testimony that he received a "call-in letter" from the Service requesting an 

interview and that he gave that letter to the respondent who stated to him that he 

would represent the alien and told him to stay at home; and the "call-in letter" which 

contained the notation, "Mr. Solomon will bring in," the Board of Immigration Appeals 

concluded that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the charge that the respondent 

willfully misled, misinformed, or deceived any officer or employee of the Department of 

Justice concerning any fact, material and relevant or not, in connection with this case. 

(5) Where the respondent, an attorney, failed to take the necessary action to obtain an 

immigration visa for his alien client while informing him that he had done so; advised the 

alien to ignore "call-in letters" issued by the Immigration and Naturalization Service 

and failed to represent the alien in answer to the "call-in letters"; and these were 

contributing factors in the initiation of deportation proceedings and the existence of an 

outstanding order of deportation, the Attorney General and the Board of Immigration 

Appeals concluded that by dear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence the respondent 

had violated 8 C.F.R. 292.3(a)(4) (Charge #6) by willfully deceiving and misleading his 

client in a "matter relating to the case" and that such conduct warranted suspension 

from practice. 

(6) As to allegations of attorney misconduct charged under 8 C.F.R. 292.3(a)(3) and (4) 

(Charges #1-5, 7), the Attorney General and the Board of Immigration Appeals 

concluded that the Immigration and Naturalization Service had failed to meet its burden 

of proof by establishing the alleged acts of misconduct by clear, convincing, and un-

-equivocal evidence. 

388 
Interim Decision • #2624 

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: 

Esther M. Kaufman, Esquire 

Room 914, Woodward Building 

15th & II Streets, N. W. 

Washington, D. C. 20005 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

Franklin D. Kreutzer, Esquire 

Meyer M. Brilliant, Esquire 

Michael Reichman, Esquire 

3041 N. W. 7th Street, Suite 100 

Miami, Florida 33125 

ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: 

George Indelicato 

Appellate Trial Attorney 

BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Wilson and Torrington, Maud Members; Board Member Appleman, Concurring; Board Member Maniatis, Dissenting. 

This case is before us pursuant to the provisions of 8 C.F.R. 292.3(b) 

and Recommendation in Disbarment Prceeedings of the Regional Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. At the outset 

we feel constrained to comment on the state of the record in this case, 

which we find to be disappointingly deficient. First, the Immigration 

and Naturalization Service has sought to charge the respondent under 

specific numbered subsections of the regulations, yet in some instances 

the descriptive language of the charges Ads information totally irrelevant to the charge as stated in the regulation. Our deliberations are 

necessarily confined to the allegations of violations as expressed in 8 

C.F.R. 292.3(a)(3) and (4) under which the respondent is charged. We 

have not considered any other irrelevant accusations which may have 

been made against the respondent in the descriptive language of the 

complaint, at the hearing, or elsewhere. 

Secondly, we have been hindered by the failure of counsel for the 

Service and for the respondent to introduce into evidence affidavits and 

documents, some of which were referred to at the hearing, which might 

have been helpful to us in determining the facts and evaluating the 

credibility of the witnesses. 

Finally, we have been hampered by the lack of follow-through in the 

questioning of the witnesses, which resulted in gaps in the testimony 

and consequently in failure to resolve many crucial questions one way or 

the other. 

In disbarment proceedings under 8 C.F.R. 292, before discipline may 

be imposed, any allegations of miscondUct must be established by evidence which is clear, convincing, and unequivocal. Matter of Koden,: 

e The decision in Koden was not yet final at the time of the hearing. The case had been 

deuided by (lie Board end wee still before the Attorney General on certification pnrouaut 

to 8 C.F.R. 292.3(b). The final decision was rendered by theAttorney General on July 22, 

1976, and the case was then designated for publication. 

389 
Interim Decision #2624 

Interim Decision 2516 (BIA 1974; A.G. 1976; BIA 2516 August 16, 1976). 

This burden of proof is the key to this case. With regard to several of the 

charges, some evidence gave indications of wrongdoing, but because of 

failure to pursue a potentially enlightening line of questioning, or because 

of our doubts concerning the credibility of the witnesses—even, in some 

cases, where the respondent offered little or no defense other than a 

denial—we were simply unable to determine that the "clear, convincing, 

and unequivocal evidence" standard of proof had been satisfied. It was up 

to the Service tel resolve our doubts, and in those instances it failed to 

do so. As a result we have found the charges sustained only as to 

charge six. 

The respondent is an attorney who has been admitted to the bar of the 

State of Michigan and who has also been admitted to practice before the 

United States Courts of Appeals for the Third, Sixth, and Seventh 

Circuits and possibly for the Second Circuit as well. He has practiced 

immigration law almost exclusively since World War II, and began to 

practice immigration law in Dade County, Florida, in 1957, where he still 

practices. 

This disbarment proceeding was commenced on October 15, 1974, 

when the respondent was personally served both with a complaint, 

entitled Notice of Proposed Disbarment Proceedings, specifying the 

conduct which the hnmigration and Naturalization Service alleged constituted grounds for discipline, and with a Notice to Show Cause why a 

motion seeking his disbarment should not be made to the Board of 

Immigration Appeals. 

The respondent, through counsel, answered the complaint by stating 

that he was the subject of an investigation by the State Bar Grievance 

B oard of Michigan on the basis of allegations similar to those involved in 

this disbarment proceeding, and moved that this proceeding be held in 

abeyance pending completion of the Michigan investigation; in the alternative, he denied all of the allegations of misconduct and requested a 

Bearing on the charges. The motion to suspend proceedings was denied. 

The respondent's subsequent motion to take depositions was granted on 

February 25, 1975. 

A Request for Discovery and Motion to Take Depositions was made 

-by the Immigration and Naturalization Service on April 4, 1975. The 

Service requested a complete list, to be produced by the respondent, of 

all witnesses that were to testify in the respondent's behalf, statements 

made, by those witnesses to the respondent, and the right to take 

depositions of those witnesses. The Service also requested that the 

respondent produce his files relating to the persons named in the Notice 

of Proposed Disbarment Proceedings. The immigration judge granted 

the ex parte request and the motion by telephone on April 4, 1975 The 

-trial attorney for the Service also indicated, in a letter to the respon390 
Interim Decision #2624 

dent's counsel dated March 31, 1975, his intention to depose the respondent if the latter were going to testify at the hearing. 

Depositions were taken by the respondent's counsel on April 3, 4, 7, 

and 8, 1975. The Service also provided the respondent with scores of 

pages of documents. 

The hearing was scheduled to begin, and did begin, on April 15, 1975. 

Prior to the beginning of the hearing, and at its commencement, counsel 

requested a continuance so that he might have time to have the depositions transcribed and to study them and the great number of documents 

which the Service had produced. Otherwise, he argued, the grant of 

discovery was an empty right. Counsel objected to the fact that one 

Service witness would not be (and actually was not) available to he 

deposed until one day before the hearing. He further strenuously 

objected to the immigration judge's grant of the Service motion for 

discovery and depositions, declaring that it was a violation of the respondent's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Counsel 

moved that new counsel for the Service and a new trial judge be 

appointed and sought a continuance., These motions were all denied. 

Before the Board, counsel again raised the issue of sufficient time to 

take advantage of the grant of discovery. 

When the trial attorney provided a list of the witnesses the Service 

intended to call and offered documents relating to this case, he indicated 

(Exhibit 11) that this Board in Matter of Koden, supra, had held that in 

a disbarment proceeding there was no prejudicial error in the denial of 

the respondent's request for a list of Service witnesses and for discovery 

when, at the final hearing, ample opportunity was afforded the respondent to cross-examine all witnesses. 

As we stated in Matter of Koden, supra, "[title respondent, through 

his counsel, was afforded ample opportunity to cross-examine the available witnesses against him. The evidence against him was fully disclosed, and he was not denied a reasonable opportunity to defend on the 

charges levied in the complaint." ha Koden, we concluded that, although 

the respondent may have been inconvenienced by the denial of discovery and by lack of knowledge of the witnesses the Service intended 

to produce, there was no discernible prejudicial error in the denial. A 

fortiori, in this case, where a comprehensive witness list was made 

available to the respondent, and where his request for discovery was 

granted and fulfilled, we find no impropriety in the immigration judge's 

denial of a continuance before and at the commencement of the hearing. 

In any event, there was no prejudicial error. 

Concerning the Service's request for discovery, in view of the fact 

that the Service, perhaps persuaded by counsel's subsequent objections, 

did not insist that the immigration judge's order be obeyed, and since 

the respondent objected to the grant of the motion for discovery and 

391 
Interim Decision #2624 

was not deposed and did not produce a witness list or any documentary 

evidence in obedience to that order, we find that if there was error, it 

was not prejudicial to the respondent. 

Whenever the Service interpreter was asked to interpret for a witness, counsel for the respondent objected to the use of a Service employee for this purpose, stating that the Service should provide an 

impartial outsider to perform that function. The interpreter's qualifications were not called into question, nor would counsel formally accuse 

her of being biased. When the original objection was made, the trial 

attorney invited counsel to produce an additional outside interpreter at 

no expense to the Government. Counsel did not wish to do this. The 

immigration judge overruled the objection, stating that under similar 

circumstances in deportation cases Service interpreters are used as a 

matter of course. 

The regulations provide for the use of an interpreter in deportation 

proceedings. 8 C.F.R. 242.12. If the interpreter is not an employee of 

the Service, that person must be sworn to interpret and translate 

accurately. However, if the interpreter is an employee of the Service, 

no such oath need be taken, evidently because the employee is acting 

under his oath of office. Couto v. Shaughnessy, 218 F.2d 758 (2 Cir. 

1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). In the present case the interpreter, though a Service employee, was sworn. The record contains 

no allegations and no evidence of any lack of understanding between the 

interpreter and the witnesses. 

In view of the fact that the interpreter was sworn and that counsel did 

not avail himself of the opportunity to bring in an outside interpreter to 

cheek the Service interpreter, we find no merit in counsel's objection to 

the use of the Service interpreter in this proceeding. 

There are seven numbered charges of misconduct in the complaint 

(Exhibit 1). All are predicated upon the respondent's alleged violation of 

8 C.F.R. 292.3(a)(4), which provides, in pertinent part, for the suspension , or disbarment of an attorney or representative "[w]ho willfully 

deceives [or] misleads . . . any party to a ease concerning any matter 

relating to the case. . ." The fifth and sixth charges are also predicated 

upon the respondent's alleged additional violation of 8 C.F.R. 

2C2.8(a)(3), which provides for the suspension or disbarment of an 

attorney or representative "[w]ho willfully misleads, misinforms, or 

deceives an officer or employee of the Department of Justice concerning 

any material and relevant fact in connection with a case. . . ." 

CHARGE #1 

The first charge in the complaint, which alleges a violation of 8 C.F.R. 

252.3(a)(4), contains allegations that the respondent was retained by 

Dagoberto Castillo-Melo and Elbicia Grackle Moller de Castillo, natives 

392 
Interim Decision #2624 

and citizens of Chile who are husband and wife, to obtain lawful permanent resident status for them; that he accepted fees from them; and that 

he failed to represent them adequately both with regard to maintaining 

their nonimmigrant status, and in connection with any applications for 

immigrant visas. It is further alleged that the respondent repeatedly 

assured the Castillos that they had nothing to worry about and that they 

had applications pending before the American consul in Toronto, 

Canada, when no such applications had actually been accepted for processing in Toronto. Finally, the complaint characterizes this advice and 

information as misleading and deceiving, and states that the Castillos 

relied on it to their detriment. 

Mr. Castillo testified at the proceedings that he retained the respondent on June 19, 1972, in order to get legal extensions of his temporary 

stay and to obtain lawful permanent resident status. Before retaining 

the respondent, Mr. Castillo had applied for a labor certification. He 

stated that he had informed the respondent about this. Mr. and Mrs. 

Castillo became the parents of a United States citizen child on September 2, 1972, less than three months after they had originally retained the respondent to assist them. 

Mr. Castillo stated that he had agreed to pay the respondent $1,000 

for lawful permanent resident status for both himself and his wife. 

Canceled checks corroborate his testimony that he actually did pay 

$350. On cross-examination it was brought out that Mr. Castillo had 

agreed to pay the balance of the $1,000 in December 1972 but that he 

had not paid anything beyond the $350. 

Mr. Castillo testified that he had visited or spoken with the respondent approximately once a week concerning his ease, and that the 

respondent had told him that he had an open file in Toronto, that 

everything was ready for him to get his visa, and that it was just a 

matter of time. The respondent denies having made such statements or 

given such assurances. 

In June 1973 Mr. Castillo contacted the AMerican consulate in Toronto by telephone and was told that there was no file in his name. The 

absence of a file was corroborated by the American consul herself, Ms. 

Eleanor Ridge, who testified at the proceeding that she had performed a 

thorough search, which revealed that there was nothing there relating 

to the Castillos.z However, the absence of a record at the consulate 

does not necessarily mean that no application was ever submitted or 

that there has been no correspondence concerning a given case. It 

means only that the application did not meet the criteria for acceptance 

for processing. An incomplete or otherwise unacceptable application 

She also testifie d that her files contained nothing relating to Mr. & Mrs. Muniz (charge 

#2), Mr. Georges (charge #3), Mr. & Mrs. Zunino (charge #4), or Ms. Olivares (charge 

#7). There was an approved visa petition on file relating to Mr. Ilidalgo (charge #6). 

393 
Interim Decision #2624 

would be returned to the sender, and no record would be made for the 

applicant. 

At the time any application would have been made for the Castillos, 

Toronto was no longer accepting for processing applications made by 

alien parents of United States citizen children under the age of 21 if the 

parents were not former residents of Canada, with certain exceptions. 

If the alien parents had been from Chile and had claimed that they 

would suffer persecution if they had to return to Chile to make their visa 

applications, the consulate general would have made a determination 

as to whether or not the persecution claim was a valid one. If an asylum 

request had already been denied and this was known in Toronto, the 

visa application would not have been accepted. However, ordinarily it 

was not known in Toronto whether requests for asylum had been denied 

or not. 

Mrs. Castillo for the most part corroborated her husband's testimony 

as stated above. 

The record indicates that both Mr. and Mrs. Castillo were out of status 

when they retained the respondent. Mr. Castillo's 1-94, ArrivalDeparture Record, shows his admission as a R-2 visitor on December 

12, 1968, a change of status to that of an F-1 student on March 12, 1969, 

and several extensions of stay through February 2, 1972 (Exhibit 19). 

He stated that he was working when he retained the respondent. A 

call in letter (Exhibit 21) shows that Mr. Castillo was required to depart 

from the United States by May 6, 1972. Three extensions of voluntary 

departure were then authorized, the first obtained by Mr. Castillo 

himself, and the other two evidently by the respondent. 

A note dated November 3, 1972, and signed by the respondent describes Mrs. Castillo and contains a photocopy of the reverse side of her 

Form1-94 indicating extensions of stay at least through December 14, 

1971 (Exhibit 22). The note states that Mrs. (or perhaps Mr.—it is not 

clear which) Castillo was a Chilean refugee. Whether the term "refugee" described her official immigrant, status or merely her way of 

thinking of herself is not shown. The note also states that she is the 

mother of a newborn baby. 

The respondent denied telling the Castillos that they had nothing to 

worry about, though he concedes he may have said, after obtaining an 

extension of voluntary departure, that there was nothing to worry 

about for the time being, but that they should see him again before the 

p articular extension was to run out. He said that he felt he had fulfilled 

his obligation to them by obtaining extensions of voluntary departure; 

he told them there was no way they could stay in the United States 

p ermanently, but he kept them here lawfully as long as he could. At the 

hearing he did not recall that they had a United States citizen child, 

d ezpite the fact that Exhibit 22 indicates that he was aware of this. Still 

394 
Interim Decision #2624 

he stated that he had filed papers for them in Toronto, but he offered no 

copies of any such papers from his files. He may have filed a visa 

application or a Form FS-497A, Preliminary Questionnaire to Determine Immigrant Status3 , for Mr. Castillo, but, regrettably, that form is 

not included in the record.' 

Mr. Castillo's testimony contains some contradictions and evidence of 

hostility, which cast some doubt on his credibility. In an interview held 

on July 2, 1973, by a Service investigator, at which a statement was 

taken, Mr. Castillo was evidently asked whether he had ever signed any 

application for the respondent to send to Toronto and answered, "No, 

never." At the proceeding, before being confronted with this statement, 

he admitted having signed some papers for the respondent relating to a 

visa. After being shown his earlier statement, which, unfortunately, 

was not introduced into evidence, he affirmed the truth of what he had 

said in that statement. He explained the apparent discrepancy by saying 

that while he had signed a paper relating to his visa, he did not have any 

idea that it was going to be sent to Toronto. Therefore, he could not 

answer yes to a question as to whether he had ever signed any application for the respondent to send to Toronto. We are not convinced by this 

explanation. 

On the question of his extensions of stay, Mr. Castillo stated that he 

had obtained the first of three extensions for himself, and that after he 

had retained the respondent, the latter obtained one extension for him. 

It was only most reluctantly and under cross-examination that he admitted that the respondent had obtained two extensions of stay for him. 

In addition, on the subject of his asylum claim, Mr. Castillo testified at 

the hearing that he was a member of the National Party in Chile and 

denied being a member of the "Followers of O'Higgins," whereas the 

District Director stated in his letter to the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs of the Department of State, in connection with an earlier 

asylum claim, that Mr. Castillo had claimed to be a member of the 

"Followers of O'Higgins." (Exhibit 42) Mr. Castillo said that the statement in the District Director's letter was a mistake. 

On balance we question the credibility of Mr. Castillo's testimony. 

Accordingly, we find that the Service has failed to sustain its burden to 

3 There is A reference in the transcript (Part I, pp. 73-75) to a notice which Mr. Castillo 

received from the American Consul in Toronto indicating that a visa application or 

preliminary questionnaire had been filed. It appears to have been dated Jima 26, 19'T3 (Tr. 

Part I, p. 74), only three days before the respondent returned all of Mr. Castillo's papers 

to him and their attorney-client relationship was terminated. 

4At oral argument counsel stated that the form was returned to Mr. Castillo stamped 

TRT42A, see infra, and dated June 20, 1975 - However, as counsel below objected to the 

introduction of this document into evidence, with the result that it was not introduced, it is 

not before us, and we do not consider it. 

395 
Interim Decision #2624 

establish by evidence which is clear, convincing, and unequivocal that 

the respondent willfully deceived or misled the Castillos concerning any 

matter relating to their case. 

CHARGE #2 

The second charge in the complaint, which alleges a violation of 8 

C.F.R. 292.3(a)(4), contains allegations that the respondent was retained by Jose Ramon Muniz-Lyon and Maria Lucia Berguecio-Marin, 

husband and wife and natives and citizens of Chile, to obtain lawful 

permanent resident status; that he accepted fees from them; and that he 

failed to represent them adequately either with regard to their nonimmigrant status or in connection with any applications for immigrant 

visas. It is further alleged that the respondent repeatedly assured Mr. 

and Mrs Muniz that they had nothing to worry about and that they had 

applications pending before the American Consul in Toronto, Canada, 

when no such applications had actually been accepted for processing in 

Toronto. Finally, the complaint states that Mr. and Mrs. Muniz relied on 

this advice and this information, which are characterized as misleading 

and deceiving. 

Mr. Muniz testified at the hearing that he hired the respondent on 

January 27, 1972, in order to obtain lawful permanent resident status. 

He and his wife had a United States citizen child born on July 26, 1972. 

Mr. Muniz agreed to pay the respondent $500 for this service and 

actually did pay $250; he was to pay the rest upon receiving his lawful 

permanent resident status. He also paid an additional $125 for a "trip to 

Washington" concerning the visa application. According to Mr. Muniz, 

the respondent told him that it would take one-and-a-half to two years to 

obtain his residence. Sometime in 1973 the respondent allegedly told 

111r. Muniz that he would be able to get his lawful permanent resident 

status in Toronto the following August or October. 

After reading an article in a Miami newspaper which called into 

question the respondent's practices, Mr. Muniz asked the respondent 

for written assurance that he would get his lawful permanent resident 

status in August or October. At that time, according to Mr. Muniz, the 

respondent returned to him the Form FS-497A, Preliminary Questionnaire to Determine Immigrant Status, stamped April 5, 1973, and 

marked TRT42A, and told him the notation meant that the application 

Ilan already been approved. Mr. Muniz then went to the Immigration 

and Naturalization Service office, where Officer George E. Tarrant 

Informed him that the code meant that the application had not been 

approved. 

At the time when Mr. Muniz first retained the respondent, he was 

"-under the impression that he had been granted political asylum. As it 

was brought out at the hearing, what probably happened was that he 

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Interim Decision #2624 

applied for asylum at Service headquarters in April 1971 and was 

granted voluntary departure by April 12, 1972. He believed that this 

was a grant of political asylum until it was explained to him at the 

hearing that it was actually voluntary departure and not asylum. He 

stated that his wife had also been granted asylum when Salvador 

Allende was in power. 

In August 1973, with the assistance of Officer Tarrant, Mr. Muniz 

filled out an application for a visa and sent it to Chile, where he was put 

on a waiting list. By the time of the hearing in this ease he had still n ot 

procured a resident visa. Mrs. Muniz returned to Chile in December 

1974, after the fall of Allende. 

The respondent denied any wrongdoing in the Muniz case. He said 

that he had Mr. and Mrs. Muniz apply for visas in Toronto not because lie 

thought they would be successful but because they would not go anywhere else. He said that he had requested them to make their applications in Chile but they had refused to do so. The respondent denied 

having said the notation. TRT42A meant everything was all right. He 

said that he had given 1VIr. Muniz another paper (see Exhibit 42) along 

with the returned form, which explained that the form had not been 

approved. 5The respondent did not remember precisely about the "trip 

to Washington" for which Mr. Muniz had paid him $125, although it 

sounded familiar. He stated that obviously $125 would not cover the 

trip, and that it would have been to see someone in the State Department concerning an asylum claim. 

The core of the accusation concerning Mr. Muniz relates to the return 

of the Form GS-497A and the explanation given by the respondent. Mr. 

Muniz testified that the respondent told him it meant approval. However, Mr. Muniz was also quite sure that he had been granted political 

asylum when he had not been, and he was confused throughout his 

testimony about the dates on which various key events took place. 

We are not convinced by the testimony of Mr. Muniz that the respondent told him that the code TRT42A meant approval when it actually 

meant disapproval. Since it is so easy to check with the Service and fired 

out what that symbol actually means, as Mr. Muniz did, it seems highly 

unlikely that the respondent would have assured his client that it meant 

the opposite of what it actually meant. In addition, Mr. Muniz gave 

contradictory testimony concerning whether or not he had discussed 

political asylum with the respondent. At first he denied having discussed the matter (Tr. Part II, pp. 93, 97), but he later admitted that he 

had discussed asylum (Tr. Part H, p. 122). Moreover, because Mr. 

We note that there is no name, address, or signature on Exhibit 42. It is not clear, 

therefore, whether this is simply a sample, as it appears to be, or whether it was offered 

as the very piece of paper which the respondent allegedly gave to Mr. Muniz along with 

the returned Preliminary Questionnaire. 

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Interim Decision #2624 

Muniz was so certain that he had been granted asylum when he had not 

been, it seems to us that he could have been similarly mistaken regarding what the respondent told him about his application. People often 

hear only what they want to hear, and when they are disappointed they 

may turn against someone who is a convenient target even though he 

may not be the cause of their disappointment. 

Because we we are left with some unresolved doubts concerning the 

Muniz case, and because it is the burden of the Service to resolve those 

doubts, we find that charge #2 has not been established by clear, 

convincing, and unequivocal evidence. 

CHARGE #3 

The third charge in the complaint, which alleges a violation of 8 

C. F.R. 292.3(a)(4), contains allegations that the respondent was retained-by Antoine G. Georges, a native and citizen of Haiti, so that he 

might obtain lawful permanent resident status; and that the respondent 

failed to represent him adequately either as to his nonimmigrant status 

or in connection with any application for an immigrant visa. It further 

alleges that the respondent accepted important nationality, immigra 

ton, and other documents from Mr. Georges and thereafter refused to 

return them to him even when repeatedly asked to do so. It is further 

alleged that the respondent assured Mr. Georges that he had nothing to 

worry about, although he had taken little or no action in behalf of his 

client while regularly accepting fees from him. The complaint characterizes this conduct as misleading and deceiving, and states that Mr. 

Georges relied on it to his detriment until he retained new counsel in 

August 1974. 

Mr. Georges testified that he had last entered the United States as a 

nonimmigrant visitor on February 19, 1972. The record indicates that he 

has been in violation of his status since March 1972 (Exhibit41, p. 4). He 

monied a United States citizen on November 1, 1973, and retained the 

respondent on November 9 or 19, 1973, in order to obtain lawful permanent resident status. He agreed to pay the respondent $700 and 'actually 

paid him $510 in cash in several payments. 

Mr. Georges gave the respondent his passport, Form 1-94 (Arrivalrpparture Record), his marriage certificate, his -wife's divorce decree 

terminating a prior marriage, and her birth certificate. In August 1974, 

rime months later, Mr. Georges retained new counsel. He informed the 

Service of his change of counsel by letter and indicated on the letter that 

he had on several occasions asked the respondent to return his documents to him but that the respondent had refused to do so. 

The record contains a sworn statement signed by the respondent. It is 

a- question-answer interview before Officer Tarrant concerning a complaint by Mr. Georges that he had been unable to obtain his documents 

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Interim Decision #2624 

from the respondent and that he had paid the respondent for services 

which were not rendered. At the time of the interview, the respondent 

turned over to Officer Tarrant Mr. Georges' passport, I-94, and marriage certificate, Mrs. Georges' birth certificate with the name of the 

child omitted, an amendment to correct errors on Mrs. Georges' birth 

certificate, Mrs. Georges' divorce decree, and some other documents. 

The respondent said in the statement that he had prepared a visa 

petition in behalf of Mr. Georges but had never filed it. 

At the hearing the respondent indicated that he had tried on several 

occasions to contact Mrs. Georges because it was necessary to obtain a 

birth certificate which would be acceptable to the Service, and her birth 

certificate was defective in that her name was ommitted from it. He 

thought that she personally had to seek the correction. He said that 

Mrs. Georges was never home on these occasions and that lt.Er. Georges 

never knew where or how to reach her. Consequently, the respondent 

became suspicious that the marriage might be fraudulent. He said that 

he had prepared a visa petition, but because of his suspicions and his 

inability to contact Mrs. Georges, he did not in the nine months during 

which he represented Mr_ Georges submit the visa petition to the 

Service. 6No application for a visa was filed because the petition had not 

yet been approved. 

Having retained new counsel, Mr. Georges is now the beneficiary of a 

visa petition which was approved on December 27, 1974: 

On cross-examination Mr. Georges became angry when questioned 

about the validity of his marriage. He said that he was participating in 

this proceeding in order to get his money back, not to be a defendant. It 

is possible that the witness became defensive because he wanted to 

conceal a fraudulent marriage and did not expect to be questioned 

concerning his marriage at this proceeding. This could lend eredence to 

the respondent's testimony. On the other hand, Mr. Georges 'described 

his courtship of his wife without hesitation and emphatically denied that 

he paid her to marry him or that he married her only to obtain immigration benefits. He denied categorically that the respondent had ever 

mentioned to him that he thought the marriage might be fraudulent. -

The testimony and other evidence relating to this charge raise more 

questions than they answer, We must determine whether or not the 

respondent willfully misled or deceived Mr. Georges concerning his 

immigration case. The evidence shows that the respondent delayed the 

filing of a visa petition in Mr. George's behalf. The respondent says that 

The record does not contain a copy of the alleged visa petition, the amendment to 

correct errors on Mrs. Georges' birth certificate, or other documents relating to the 

Georges rose Hence, we cannot ascertain how much of the nine months was consumed in 

the preparation of the alleged visa petition or in attempting to procure a corrected birth 

certificate. 

299 
Interim Decision #2624 

he made several efforts to contact the petitioner, Mr. Georges' wife, 

without success and that he grew to suspect the bona fides of their 

marriage. There is very little in the record to indicate what the respondent promised he would do. 

Not having had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the 

witnesses to aid us in determining credibility, we find that the respondent's handling of this case was ineffectual, but we cannot find that the 

Service has proved by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence that 

he willfully misled his client. 

CHARGE #4 

The fourth charge, which alleges a violation of 8 C.F.R. 292.3 (a)(4), 

contains allegations that the respondent was retained and paid fees by 

Adolfo Bartolome Zunino-Riveros and Norma Estella Gomara-Caceres, 

husband and wife, so that they might obtain lawful permanent resident 

status; that they signed forms and gave the respondent their passports 

and immigration documents; and that the respondent assured them that 

there was nothing to worry about. It is further alleged that the respondent failed to represent them adequately either as to their nonimmigrant status or concerning any applications for immigrant visas; that he 

assured them that they had applications pending in Toronto, Canada, 

when no such applications were pending; and that this pattern continued 

until June 1973 when Mr. Zunino demanded the return of his docu 

ments. It is alleged that the respondent returned only the passport and 

asked for additional fees "for protection." The complaint characterizes 

this conduct as misleading and deceiving, and states that the Zuninos 

relied on it to their detriment. 

Mr. Zunino, a native and citizen of Chile, testified that the respondent 

told him that he was going to obtain his lawful permanent resident 

status for him. Mr. Zunino paid $250 at the outset. Receipts were given 

on the back of the respondent's business card. Another $250 was to be 

paid when Mr. Zunino obtained his residence. Mr. Zunino further testified that the respondent had told him that he had sent his immigration 

papers to Toronto—including his fingerprints and photograph. They 

had many meetings, and, according to Air. Zunino, at these meetings 

the respondent assured Mr. Zunino that his immigration papers were all 

in order. When Mrs. Zunino and their three children, all natives and 

citizens of Chile, arrived in the United States, their papers were also 

turned over to the respondent. Mr. Zunino stated that the respondent 

never asked for more money to arrange for the permanent residence of 

his wife and children. The only time he asked for more money was when 

Mr. Zunino requested the return of his papers. Then the respondent is 

alleged to have asked for an additional $100 "for protection" and to 

speed things up. 

400 
Imterim Decision #2624 

Before he sought the respondent's services, Dlr. Zunino evidently had 

obtained several extensions of stay or of voluntary departure for himself 

merely by requesting the extensions at Service headquarters. Mr. 

Zunino stated that he had never discussed political asylum with the 

respondent because he had never been involved in politics. 

Mrs. Zunino testified briefly. She said that while in this country she 

had worked in a factory as a sewing machine operator, in a laundry, and 

as a maid. She was asked about a recommendation from an employer in 

connection with the possibility of obtaining a labor certification. 

Mrs. Zunino testified that she had received a written recommendation 

from her employer which had been shown to the respondent who had 

read the letter and returned it to her. Mrs. Zunino testified that she did 

not remember whether or not the respondent had made any comment 

about the possibility of obtaining a labor certification for her. 

The respondent testified that he had not worked on a labor certification for either Mr. or Mrs. Zunino (Tr. Part VI, pp. 90-91). He also 

denied assuring them that they had pending applications in Toronto and 

that he had ever asked for additional money as "protection." 

The evidence of record does not indicate any %Nay in which the respondent could have obtained lawful permanent resident status for these 

aliens. No mention was made of any United States citizen or lawful 

permanent resident relatives; there was evidently no hope of obtaining - a 

labor certification; and they made no request for political asylum. The 

respondent testified that there was no basis on which to file a visa 

application for them (Tr. Part VI, p. 34). 

The respondent testified that none of the advice he had given to any of 

his clients was detrimental to them, because in every case he prolonged 

their stay in the United States, and it was to do that that they had 

retained him. He said that he used every tooL and technicality at his 

disposal within the law and the code of ethics to keep his clients in the 

United States as long as possible. 

In view a the fact that there was no discernible basis on which Mr. and 

Mrs. Zunino could seek lawful permanent resident status in the United 

States, we find it hard to believe that the respondent would have 

promised them that he would obtain that prize for them. The rejection of 

the employment letter would have been some indication to them that no 

such promise was made. We find it far likelier that he promised to do all 

he could to keep them in the United States as long as he could. 

Accordingly, we find that the Service has not sustained its burden to 

establish charge #4 by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence. 

CHARGE #5 

The fifth charge originally alleged a violation of 8 C.F.R. 292.3(a)(3) 

and (4). In its memorandum on appeal and at oral argument the Service 

401 
Interim Decision #264 

conceded that the alleged violation of 8 C.F.R. 292.3(a)(4) had not been 

established. Therefore, 'we shall not consider the evidence adduced 

under that portion of the charge. 

With reference to the portion of the charge relating to 8 C.F.R. 

292.3(a)(3), it is alleged that the respondent was retained and paid fees 

by Freddy Arnoldo Pradenas-Zurita, a native and citizen of Chile; that 

Mr. Pradenas was furnished certain forms by the Service which he 

gave, along with his passport, to the respondent to complete; that Mr. 

Pradenas married a United States citizen and subsequently called the 

respondent repeatedly and demanded the return of his passport, with no 

response; and that this pattern continued until NOvember 1973 when 

Mr. Pradenas and his wife went to the Service only to discover that 

little or nothing had been done on their behalf. It is concluded in the 

complaint that this "misleading and deceiving advice, information and 

inaction . . . worked to the detriment of officers of the Immigration and 

Naturalization Service who were obstructed in the performance of their 

duties." 

The regulation provides for suspension or disbarment of an attorney 

or representative who "willfully misleads, misinforms, or deceives an 

officer or employee of the Department of Justice concerning any material and relevant fact in connection with a case. . . . " 8 C.F.R. 

292.3(a)(3). The only evidence bearing on this charge in the record is 

testimony by Mr. Pradenas that he received a "call in letter" (Exhibit 

32) from the Service requesting an interview and that he gave the letter 

to the respondent, who said that he would represent Mr. Pradenas and 

told Mr. Pradenas to stay home. The call-in letter has a notation on it 

dated June 28, 1973, saying, "Mr. Solomon will bring in." 

On the basis of this scanty evidence, we do not find that the respondent willfully misled, misinformed, or deceived any officer or employee 

of the Department of Justice concerning any fact, material and relevant 

or not, in connection with this case. 

CHARGE #6 

The sixth charge, which alleges a violation of 8 C.F.R. 292.3(a)(3) and 

(4), contains allegations that the respondent was retained and paid fees 

by Mr_ [Everado] Efraira Hidalgo-Caicedo to represent him in deportation proceedings, which he did; that in September and November 1972 

IVIr. Hidalgo received letters from the Service requesting that he appear 

for interviews, and in March 1973 a notice ordering him to appear 

packed and ready for deportation; that Mr. Hidalgo, on the advice of his 

counsel, the respondent, did not appear on any of these occasions; and 

that the same thing happened twice in May 1973. It is alleged that on 

these occasions the respondent told Mr. Hidalgo that he need not worry 

It is further alleged that during this time the respondent assured Mr. 

402 
Interim Decision #2624 

Hidalgo that an immigrant visa was being actively processed at the 

American Consulate in Toronto, Canada, when this was not true. In 

conclusion it is alleged in this complaint that the respondent's actions 

were misleading and deceiving, and were detrimental to Mr. Hidalgo 

and to officers of the Immigration and NaturalizationService, who were 

hindered and obstructed in the performance of their duties. 

At this proceeding Mr. Hidalgo, a native and citizen of Colombia, 

testified that he had retained the respondent in January 1972, when he 

was detained by the Service and was faced with possible deportation. 

On that occasion he paid the respondent $250 to represent him at his 

deportation proceeding, which was held on January 28, 1972. Evidently 

Mr. Hidalgo was found deportable, released from custody, and granted 

six months voluntary departure, with an alternate order of deportation. 

Mr. Hidalgo further testified that he had spoken with the respondent 

about helping him to obtain lawful permanent resident status, as his 

wife was a United States citizen. The respondent allegedly told him n that 

his fee for that service would be $400, payable when Mr. Hidalgo 

received his resident visa. Mr. Hidalgo did not make any payments 

beyond the original $250. The record does not contain a visa petiliun 

filed on January 27, 1972, and approved on February 18, 1972, of which 

Mr. Hidalgo is the beneficiary. 

Exhibit 37 consists of three call-in letters which the Service sent to 

Mr. Hidalgo with copies to the respondent. They are dated September 

28, 1972, November 13, 1972, and March 12, 1973. The first two of the 

three ask Mr. Hidalgo to appear for an interview concerning his immigrant status, and the last one informs him that a final order of deportation has been entered and orders him to appear with baggage, ready for 

deportation. It is alleged that Mr. Hidalgo failed to appear on each of 

these occasions. 

Mr. Hidalgo testified that each time he had received a "call-in letter" 

from the Immigration and Naturalization Service, he had telephoned 

the respondent. On those occasions the respondent arranged to meet 

him in the waiting room at Service headquarters. Each time, according 

to Mr. Hidalgo, the respondent assured him that everything was all 

right. Mr. Hidalgo himself never appeared before an officer of the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service on any of these occasions. 

The respondent denied having told Mr. Hidalgo, to disregard the 

notices sent by the Service. He said that he had met Mr. Hidalgo many 

times at Service headquarters and that each time, he, the respondent, 

had met with someone in the building. The respondent said that if he did 

not appear for Mr. Hidalgo, such an omission was unintentional and 

h appencd by mistake. Moreover, he denied having implied to Mr. 

Hidalgo that everything was all right permanently, although he admitted that he might have said, after meeting with a Service officer and 

403 
Interim Decision #2624 

obtaining an extension of voluntary departure, that everything was all 

right for the time being. 

The record does not show that the respondent appeared in Mr. Hidalgo's place and obtained extensions of voluntary departure for him; the 

November 13, 1972, letter, however, has a handwritten notation dated 

March 2, 1973, saying "Atty [sic] Solomon will bring in Monday." It also 

says "FEted to appear," but that notation is not dated and it is not clear 

whether it relates to March 2, 1973, or some other date. 

Mr. Hidalgo testified that the respondent had told him that his papers 

had been sent to Canada and "were working," and that everything was 

all right; all he had to do was wait. Initially, according to Mr. Hidalgo, 

the respondent told him it would take 10 months to a year to get his visa. 

Then, when he received the last call-in letter, the respondent told him it 

would take about three or four weeks. Another witness , Mr. Jorge 

Sarmiento, corroborated Mr. Hidalgo's testimony, saying that he had 

heard the respondent tell Mr. Hidalgo that the papers "were working in 

Toronto and they were coming out fine." (Tr. Part IV, p. 80) 

The record contains two photocopies of a Form FS-499, Immigrant 

Visa Control Card, relating to Mr. Hidalgo (Exhibits 26 and 36). Both 

show that Mr. Hidalgo was represented by the respondent, and that his 

immediate relative visa petition was filed on January 27, 1972, and was 

approved on February 18, 1972. Both show a notation concerning "PKT 

3" dated March 8, 1972. The record does not, however, tell us what 

"PKT 3" is or what was done with it on March 8, 1972. Exhibit 26 is a 

copy of this card made at a later date. It shows the date July 17, 1973, in 

the box for "PKT 3," and also says "Sent US PKT 3 1018/T4 [sic]. . . ." 

This later version of the card also contains a notation dated Filly 25, 1973, 

indicating that Mr. Hidalgo was instructed to apply for permission to 

reapply for entry into the United States after deportation on Form 

1-212, and there is a later notation, dated January 8, 1974, which says 

"No need for permission. . . ." Unfortunately, these notations are not 

explained in the record. However, since Mr. Hidalgo allegedly went to 

the Immigration and Naturalization Service to inquire about his case in 

June 1973, it appears that Packet 3 was sent once when the respondent 

was still representing him, shortly after the visa petition was approved. 

It was sent to him twice more, and he was first instructefl about the 

need to seek permission to reapply for admission to the United States 

after deportation after his attorney-client relationship with_ the respondent had terminated. We are puzzled by the notation that p emission to 

reapply is no longer necessary, but are left with our pozvlement. 

It appears to us that the respondent did represent Air. Hidalgo 

adequately at his deportation hearing. Six months voluntary departure 

tirne is substantially greater than the average grant. More over, he did 

ale a visa petition for Mr. Hidalgo. However, Mr. Hidalgo 'was married 

404 
Interim Decision #2624 

to a United States citizen and was the beneficiary of an approved visa 

petition. In view of this fact, we find that the respondent's advice to Mr. 

Hidalgo that he not appear before the Service in response to several 

call-in letters, coupled with the respondent's failure to .appear himself in 

behalf of Mr. Hidalgo on those occasions, was misleading to Mr. Hidalgo 

and worked to his detriment; creating the conditions for a final order of 

deportation to be entered against him, with the possible consequence of 

his being denied entry into the United States at a later time, unless he 

could obtain the permission of the Attorney General to enter. 

Further, we find that the failure of the respondent to follow up the 

approval of the visa petition by complying with the instructions and 

completing the forms contained in Packed 3 7 , which were sent to him 

shortly after the visa petition was approved, and his failure to take any 

further action on the visa application for more than a year without 

explanation, as far as this record shows, while assuring his client that 

everything was in order for him to receive an immigrant visa, had the 

effect of misleading and deceiving Mr. Hidalgo. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the charge under 8 C.F.R. 292.3(a)(4) 

has been sustained.- However, we cannot determine from this record 

that any officer or employee of the Department of Justice was misled, 

misinformed, and deceived as to any material or relevant fact in connection with this case. Therefore, we hold that the charge under 8 C.F.R. 

292.3(a)(3) has not been sustained. 

CHARGE #7 

The seventh and last charge, which alleges a violation of 8 C.F.R. 

292.3(1)(4), contains allegations that the respondent was retained and 

paid fees by Aurora Olivares Oyarzun, a native and citizen of Chile, so 

that she might obtain lawful permanent resident status in the United 

States, and that he did not adequately represent her in that regard. It is 

further alleged that the respondent repeatedly assured Ms- Olivares 

that she had no problem, that her papers were in Washington, and that 

she would automatically acquire residence after two years iii the United 

States, all of which was untrue. It is also alleged that despite repeated 

requests that the respondent return Ms. Olivares' papers to her, he 

refused to do so. Lastly, it is alleged that when Ms. Olivares was 

granted voluntary departure on or before February 20, 1974, the respondent advised her to ignore the notice. The complaint characterized 

all of the above advice and conduct as misleading and deceiving, and 

states that Ms. Olivares relied upon it to her detriment. 

Ms. Olivares testified that she had retained the respondent to obtain 

lawful permanent resident status for her and that the agreed upon fee 

was $500, of which she had paid $420, twice by cheek and several times 

7 We infer that Packet 3 contains a visa application and other related forms. 

405 
Interim Decision #2624 

in cash. She said that she had requested a receipt, but that the respondent had said a receipt was not necessary because he would write what 

she had paid in her file. Ms. Olivares stated that the respondent told her 

that he had sent her papers to Washington and that she would get her 

visa automatically in two years; all she had to do was wait. When she 

was questioned concerning her application for political asylum, the 

denied the truth of several statements she had evidently made in an 

interview with a Service officer, saying that the respondent had instructed her how to answer. The earlier statement is not part of this 

record, 

Ms. Olivares received a notice from the Service ordering her to 

depart from the United States on or before February 20, 1974. When 

she informed the respondent about this, he told her that he would go 

with her to Service headquarters on that date. However, Ms. Olivares 

was alarmed by the notice because she did not have enough money to 

effect her departure by that date, so she went to the Service officer 

herself ahead of time and obtained a three-month extension. Ms. Olivares also stated that when she asked the respondent to return her 

passport and other papers, he told her that lup enuld do so, but that then 

it would be her responsibility to take further action. She said that he did 

not return the papers. 

The respondent denied that he had told Ms. Olivares that she would 

obtain her permanent residence automatically within two years. He said 

that there was no basis for her to apply for lawful permanent resident 

status. Concerning her asylum claim, he stated that she had provided 

him with all the information; clearly he could not have fabricated that 

story himself. He said that he had agreed to accompany her to the 

Service offices on the date specified in her notice from the Service, 

saying it was to her advantage to wait until the last moment. He denied 

refusing to return her papers and declared that indeed he had returned 

everything to her. 

In our opinion, Ms. Olivares was not a credible witness. At the 

hearing she herself discredited an earlier statement she had made to a 

Service officer. She admitted making false claims to entitlement to 

political asylum .6We therefore conclude that charge #7 has not been 

sustained. 

CONCLUSION 

Contrary to the opinion expressed by. the Service Appellate Trial 

Attorney at oral argument, we have found that the evidence in these 

eases has not been overwhelming. The burden of proof, of course, rests 

upon the Service. In this case the Serviceh as attempted to satisfy its 

burden through testimony and some documentary evidence. The re8Her request for political asylum was denied on December 12, 1973 (Exhibit 34). 

406 
Interim Decision #2624 

spondent, for the most part, has simply denied. the allegations against 

him, but has not offered any records to corroborate his testimony, such 

as copies of papers filed in behalf of his clients, or of letters to them 

describing actions taken, or confirming telephone conversations with 

them. However, some of his denials have been corroborated by the 

complaining witnesses themselves, and as noted, in other instances 

their testimony was neither credible nor convincing. It is within such a 

framework that we have arrived at our conclusions. 

We have concluded that the allegations involving a violation of 8 

C.F.R. 292.8(a)(4) in charge #6, involving ]Ii. Hidalgo, have been 

sustained. 

The respondent established an attorney-client relationship with Mr. 

Hidalgo, represented him creditably in deportation proceedings, and 

filed a visa petition for him which was subsequently approved. Having 

created a relationship of confidence and trust, the respondent thereafter 

failed to follow through on his client's visa application but at the same 

time assured him that everything was, in order for him to receive an 

immigrant visa. Moreover, he instructed his client not to appear in 

response to notices from the Immigration and Naturalization Service 

demanding his appearance, and by not appearing in his stead, the 

respondent created the conditions for a final order of deportation to be 

entered against Mr. Hidalgo, and thus jeopardized his chances to be 

readmitted to the United States to join his wife after deportation. 

Having reached these conclusions, we believe that a six-month suspension from practice before the Immigration and Naturalization Service and before this Board is warranted. 

ORDER: The respondent is suspended from the practice of law 

before the Immigration and Naturalization Service and before the 

Board of Immigration Appeals for a period of six months. 

FURTHER ORDER: The record is certified to the Attorney General 

for final disposition, and the foregoing order is stayed pending such 

disposition. 

CONCURRING OPINION: Irving A. Appletnan, Board Member 

This is not a case with which one can be comfortable. The Government's case is imprecise, despite 699 pages of testimony, and -44 

exhibits. The Service is not aided here by any statutory mandate, such 

as the Immigration and Nationality Act places on an alien to show the 

time, place, and manner of his entry into the United States. In this 

disbarment proceeding the Government must supply the missing witness, prove the nonperformance or establish the misfeasance, or run the 

risk its case will fall—and there was a persistent failure to recognize this 

burden of proof. 

Trial counsel for the respondent also bears a share of the blame. 

407 
Interim Decision #2624 

Despite numerous procedural objections, on occasion he too failed to ask 

the necessary further questions of the witnesses, and to pursue the facts 

to their ultimate, in behalf of his client. In this, perhaps he has some 

excuse in the lack of supporting documentation from his client to establish the "what" and "when" of events. Solomon's office is in his home. He 

is a sole practitioner with no secretary. His "files," such as they are, by 

his own definition consist only of copies of forms filed in various places. 

Not only do we not have the original complaints filed with the Service 

by the complainants, but we do not have the pretrial depositions which 

were taken from witnesses. Neither side sought to introduce these, for 

reasons not apparent in the record. Under the current procedure (happily now in process of change, see Federal Register, Volume 41, No. 

211, November 11, 1976) we are called upon to determine credibility on 

a cold record, without having observed demeanor ourselves and without 

the evaluation of anyone who did. It would have been helpful to have 

had the complaints and depositions;but as it is we must decide the case 

on the record before us, and it is frequently inadequate.' 

Some preliminary observations are needed. The procedural issues 

which have been raised are without merit In the words of one court! 

Such [disbarment] proceedings are not law suits between parties litigant but rather 

are in the nature of an inquest or inquiry as to the conduct of the respondent. They are 

not for the purpose of punishment, but rather seek to determine the fitness of an officer 

of the court to continue in that capacity and to protect the courts and the public from the 

official ministration of persons unfit to practice.. . The real question at issue in a 

disbarment proceeding is the public interest and an attorney's right to continue to 

practice aprofession imbued with public trust. In re Echeles, 430 F.2d 347, 7 Cir. 1970. 

While the respondent is entitled to procedural due process (Bogart v. 

Carter, 445 F.2d 321, 9 Cir. 1971; In re Bogart, Interim Decision 2465, 

A.G. 1976), and may even plead the Fifth Amendment (Spevak v. Klein, 

385 U.S. 511, 1967), I know of no authority which assures him the full 

panoply of pleadings available in a criminal trial, or, for that matter, in 

art ordinary civil proceeding. The hearing covered a period, in all, of four 

irl=ys. No prejudicial error has been shown. On the contrary, the Government fully informed the respondent of the charges against him, made 

fully available to him the evidence in its files, and has demonstrated 

every effort to insure a fair hearing. 

The homogeneous quality of the testimony of the Chilean complainaltts is disturbing. All were here in illegal status and were faced with 

deportation to Chile at the time they went to Solomon. The communist 

Government of Allende had come in power in Chile in 1970. He was not 

deposed until September 11, 1973. They came to Solomon during this 

period. Solomon seems to have deemed it his responsibility as an attorIt will be noted that the one charge sustained rests on documentary evidence, rather 

than the credibility of witnesses. 

408 
Interim Decision #2624 

ney to keep them here as long as possible consistent with the law, and he 

so testified. Without question this was the desire of his clients as well. 

An understandable reluctance to return to Chile could easily have 

influenced their conversations with Solomon, and could color their recollection of those conversations. Indeed, a refusal to admit unwillingness 

to return to Chile, as with the complainant Zunino, has to be viewed 

with some skepticism, and can reasonably be considered to reflect on the 

total credibility of the witness. The record indicates considerable tolerance on the part of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in not 

forcing these people to the point of actual deportation to Chile while 

Allende was in control. There is evidence that this policy changed after 

Allende was deposed. A natural, and perhaps inevitable, unhappiness 

over this change of position of the Immigration and Naturalization 

Service could account for some of the animus in the testimony of the 

complainants, directed at Solomon, and has to be weighed in evaluating 

their testimony. 

Apart from these general observations, there are specific instances of 

inconsistency in the testimony, and inadequacies in the record, as 

pointed out in the majority opinion, and as isupplemented below, which 

have led me to concur that the requisite clear, convincing, and unequivocal standard of proof has been met only as to Charge 6. 

Charge 1 

Castillo entered the United States in December 1968 as a tourist, 

before Allende came to power. He met and married his wife in the 

United States. She too was a nonimmigrant visitor. Long before he 

came to Solomon on June 19;1972, he was without status and illegally in 

the country. In fact he had already received a letter from the Immigration and Naturalization Service directing that he leave the United 

States on or before May 6, 1972. At least four months prior to coming to 

Solomon he had received some legal advice (Note Ex. 44 T. — Part I, 

pp. 85, 86) respecting his immigration status. His prior representative 

had made a telephone call to Toronto for him, apparently for information. Castillo had executed an application for a labor certification to 

assist in getting a visa and had also applied for political asylum. So far as 

known from the present record both of these applications were denied. 

He had been told by his prior counsel that it would take at least a year or 

14 months to get a visa through the consulate in Toronto. Clearly, he did 

not approach Solomon with the naive innocence in immigration matters 

the Government would perhaps have us believe. 

Apart from this, when Castillo Caine to Solomon he was faced with 

deportation to Chile at a time when the communists were still in control. 

H e was so unhappy with the thought of returning to Chile that he even 

explored the possibility of getting a visa to Australia. At the very least 

409 
Interim Decision #2624 

he was in a frame of mind where he could easily misunderstand, or 

misinterpret, anything told him with respect to his status in this country. 

When Castillo talked to Solomon there was a discussion about the 

need for a labor certification. At the time Mrs. Castillo was pregnant. 

The child was born in the United States on September 2, 1972, and on 

October 13, 1972, at the time he gave Solomon a second check for $100, 

Castillo furnished Solomon the documents for a visa application, including a birth certificate relating to the child. The United States citizen 

child made it unnecessary for the Castllos to secure a labor certification. 

In view of the requirement of a labor certification, or proven exemption, 

before any consideration could be given anywhere to an application for a 

visa, a delay in processing the application was not unreasonable. 

Castillo's admission that he filled out an application for an immigration visa at Solomon's direction, came most reluctantly and only under 

cross-examination. He had previously advised the Immigration Service, 

at the time he initiated his complaint, that no such application had been 

made. His unwillingness to admit that he had executed the application, 

reflects a possible disposition to "get" Solomon at all costs, even if it 

meant misleading the Service about work actually performed by 

Solomon. 

Solomon's testimony that the application was sent to Toronto without 

any real hope of acceptance, must be read with the testimony given by 

Ridge, the Vice Counsel at Toronto, that visa applications by some 

Chilean refugees could possibly be accepted in Toronto. With even a 

Mere possibility that Toronto might accept it, however unlikely, 

Solomon would have been remiss in not sending the application, particularly since his clients 'were unwilling to return to Chile for visas. The 

testimony of Ridge establishes that the application could have been sent 

and would have returned if unacceptable; that it was sometimes returned to the applicant, rather than to counsel; and that in either event 

there would have been no record whatsoever at the consulate. The 

absence of a record at the consulate in itself is not proof that no efforts 

were made in behalf of the Castillos. 

in addition to assisting the Castillos with respect to applications for 

visas and sending therm to Toronto, there is evidence that there were 

some 20 consultations with the clients, and that Solomon was also 

iinstrumental in securing two additional extensions of time within which 

to depart from the United States—without which, according to Tarrant, 

the Immigration and Naturalization Service investigator in the case, 

they would have been deported to Chile. Castillo showed the same 

e-nrinns reluctance to admit that Solomon had indeed secured the extensions for him. 

The extensions of time to depart should not be confused with exten410 
Interim Decision #2624 

sions of lawful nonimmigrant status. The Castillos' lawful status had 

expired before they came to Solomon. Any portion of Charge 1 which 

relates to Solomon not acting ethically with respect to lawful nonimmigrant status is not applicable. 

One is not impressed with the quality of proof on either side, but the 

burden is the Government's, and it is a substantial one. I am not satisfied 

that it has been met as to Charge 1. The Castillos not only got the 

extensions through Solomon, but had consultantions and visa application assistance, for which they paid, in all, $350. 

For these reasons, as well as those stated in the majority opinion, the 

charge falls for lack of adequate acceptable evidence to meet the required burden of proof. 

Charge 2 

'Muniz is a thoroughly confused, and confusing, witness. Initially, he 

showed a disorientation on dates, but after several contradictory statements, it was resolved that he is a native of Chile who last entered the 

United States on January 29, 1971, as a nonimmigrant visitor. His wife 

also entered the United States as a nonimmigrant and was granted 

political asylum. She subsequently returned Lu Chile and resides there 

now with their United States citizen child, born July 26, 1972. They 

retained Solomon on January 27, 1972, and consulted with him about ten 

times. During this time he gave Solomon both passports, his daughter's 

birth certificate, and his marriage certificate. 

Muniz denied that he told Solomon that he was interested in obtaining 

political asylum and testified at first that Solomon did not mention 

political asylum to him. He admitted that Solomon told him that he could 

not guarantee any success, that it would take between a year and a half 

and two years before he would be able to determine whether or not he 

would be able to stay. Ile stated with great firmness that he did not tell 

Solomon that he was afraid to go back to Chile, even though his family 

had lost five farms to the communists. 

He then testified that he believed he had already been granted political asylum. In actuality the record establishes he had been given extensions of voluntary departure time, a quite different matter. Finally, and 

only under cross-examination, did he admit that he told Solomon that it 

was important that he not be required to go back to Chile; that he had 

problems in Chile and his family was having a real hard time, and he did 

not want to go back to Chile. Ultimately, and most reluctantly, he 

admitted that he distinctly remembered discussing political asylum with 

Solomon. Solomon's testimony was that he attempted to get political 

asylum for Muniz, and even made a trip to the Office of Refugee and 

Migration Affairs in the Department of State in Washington, in the alien's 

behalf. 

Muniz also testified, again only under cross-examination, that 

411, 
Interim Decision #2624 

Solomon had shown him letters and all of the statements that he had 

sent to the consulate in Toronto, and told him at one time that it was 

hard to get "it" now and he was trying again; that he was told on one 

occasion that he was not being accepted; and that another application 

was filled out. 

In the face of this testimony we are asked to believe that Solomon told 

him that the symbol TRT-42—A appearing at the top of his rejected visa 

application form, meant that his application had been accepted in Toronto, and that Solomon gave him back the form without the accompanying specific rejection letter from the consulate (See Ex. 42). 

I have difficulty with this. Solomon testified that both forms were 

handed over to Muniz. It seems utterly incredible that, with the 

rejection of the form on its face, in symbols clearly understandable to 

Immigration and Naturalization Service officers, and to anyone else 

knowledgeable in immigration matters, Solomon would hand the form 

over saying that the application had been approved. If engaged in a 

fraud, as claimed, it seems far more logical that he would have retained 

this piece of evidence. That it was returned to Muniz, on the other hand, 

is consistent with Solomon's testimony that both forms were returned at 

the same time. 

With respect to the futility of filing a visa application in Toronto, 

again one must refer to the testimony of the vice consul. As noted, 

according to Ridge there was at least a possibility that, as a claimed 

fugitive from Chile, an application by Muniz might be considered in 

Toronto. The labor certification requirement had been overcome by the 

birth of a United States citizen child. I do not believe that the Service 

has satisfactorily established any obvious exercise of futility in sending 

the application to Toronto. On the contrary, in view of the insistence of 

Munk that the application go to Toronto, and not to Chile he would have 

been remiss in not sending it. 

The United States citizen child was born on July 26, 1972. The birth 

certificate and other documents were then submitted to Solomon. In 

November 1972 he communicated with the consulate and there was a 

response. Ultimately, the application was filled out and resubmitted. It 

is stamped "Received" at the consulate on April 5, 1973. The rejection 

occurred thereafter. It would appear that during the approximate year 

or so that Solomon was retained by Muniz, substantial, if unsuccessful, 

efforts were being made towards obtaining a visa in Toronto. 

In addition, as noted above, Solomon claimed to have made a trip to 

Washington to see someone at the Department of State with respect to 

Muniz's application for political asylum; he got an extension of stay for 

Mrs. Muniz; he appears to have secured extensions of time to remain in 

the United States for Mr. Muniz; and there were some ten consultations. For all of this he received the sum of $375. 

412 
Interim Decision #2624 

In the light of this evidence, I cannot find that the Government has 

established either a misrepresentation or a detriment by the requisite 

burden of proof with respect to Charge 2. 

As with Charge 1, it has not been shown that Muniz was in a bona fide 

nonimmigrant status at the time he was represented by Solomon or that 

there was any misrepresentation of any kind with respect to nonimmigrant status That portion of the charge must also fall. 

Charge 3 

Georges is a native and citizen of Haiti. It is impossible to realize the 

flavor of his testimony without reading it in full. He was abusive, and on 

occasion, even profane. He stated in unequivocal terms, more than once, 

that the only reason he was present was to get back the fee he paid 

Solomon. 

In view of the prevalence of immigration frauds, Solomon's stated 

reason for withholding the filing of a visa petition until his doubts about 

the bona fides of Georges' marriage were resolved, is credible. Solomon 

was an experienced immigration practitioner. Several unsuccessful efforts to contact the wife, and the lack of cooperation of his clients, could 

easily have triggered a reluctance to go ahead -until he was satisfied. 

Apparently, he had not yet resolved the question in his own mind by the 

time Georges went to the Service as the result of adverse newspaper 

publicity about Solomon. The overall period involved was not that 

great, and has not been shown to amount to a wilful deception as 

charged (c.f. Charge 6 below). That the petition was ultimately approved by the Service when Georges obtained other counsel is not 

determinative. The issue is Solomon's state of mind when he handled the 

petition. 

Georges is an unconvincing witness. His wife, who allegedly had 

personal knowledge of the facts, and who could.perhaps have tipped the 

scales, could have been put on the stand by the Government. 2She was 

not, on the apparent assumption, despite Solomon's contradiction of 

Georges' testimony, that the charge had been satisfactorily established, 

and that it was up to Solomon to call her as a witness. This was an 

erroneous assumption in my opinion, and a fatal one so far as this charge 

is concerned. I therefore concur that the clear, convincing, and unequivocal burden has not been met as to Georges. 

Charge 4 

Charge No. 4 relating to the Zuninos, is more troublesome. Solomon 

2She was not available at the time Georges testified, allegedly because of ill health_ 

Accordingto a statement made by the Government trial attorney she was available at a 

later stage of the proceedings. 

413 
Interim Decision #2624 

denied flatly that he assured them that they had pending applications 

for immigrant visa at the American Consulate in Toronto. His testimony was that there was no basis whatsoever on which to file such an 

application. They had no labor certifications, no possibility of getting 

any; and no exemption from the requirement. There was no United 

States citizen child or spouse, as in the other cases. It is clear that they 

had no chance whatsoever of achieving permanent residence. 

To an extent, Solomon's testimony was corroborated by Mrs. Zunino 

who stated that she showed Solomon a letter of recommendation from 

her employer to help her get a labor certification, that Solomon read it 

and returned it to her, apparently because the nature of her work was 

not in a category to warrant processing for the purpose of clearance. In 

itself this would appear to have been some notice to the Zuninos that 

there was a substantial impediment to obtaining permanent residence in 

this country. Moreover, I do .not believe Solomon would have rejected 

the letter, or given the advice he did, had he been bent on deliberate 

deceit as claimed. While Zunino testified that he turned over immigration documents to Solomon for processing a visa, his wife stated that she 

was not present when this happened, and hence she could not corroborate it. 

However, notwithstanding this manifest ineligibility for a visa, the 

record is uncontradicted that Solomon requested a fee of $500, and that 

a fee of $250 was actually paid in October 1970. While Solomon is not 

charged with receiving excessive fees, the amount of the fee is still 

significant in two respects, in my opinion. The first is with respect to 

credibility. The greater the legal service promised or performed, the 

larger the fee to be expected. If Solomon held out the promise of lawful 

permanent residence, one would normally expect him to charge more 

than if he agreed merely to consult, and to represent to some lesser 

extent, In a very general way, a larger fee would tend to corroborate 

Zunino's testimony; a lesser fee, that of Solomon. Second, the fee paid 

bears on the allegation of detriment to the alien—assuming a material 

misrepresentation. As to the Zuninos, so far as the record shows, the 

only detriment they could have suffered as a result of a misrepresentation by Solomon, would be in having paid a needless or irrational fee. In 

any opinion Solomon would be within the proscription of 8 C.F.R. 

292.3(a)(4) if he made misrepresentations to the Zuninos with respect to 

their immigration status, and thereby induced them to pay a fee in no 

'way commensurate with the services performed. 

This is a nebulous area. It should be approached only on the basis of a 

great deal more evidence than we have in this record, respecting the 

range of immigration fees generally, and the adequacy of services performed within that range. Five hundred dollars is consistent with the 

fee set by Solomon for obtaining permanent residence in other cases 

414 
Interim Decision #2624 

(See, for example, Olivares, T. Part IV, P. 8). On the other hand, in 

return for the $250 actually paid, the Zuninos consulted with Solomon 

several times over a two-year period, while faced with possible deportation. Mrs. Zunino appears to have received advice concerning a possible 

labor certification Zunino himself, when he received a call-in letter in 

May of 1972, arranged with Solomon to appear with him at the Immigration and Naturalization Service office to surrender. He did meet 

Solomon in the Miami office and at that time was fingerprinted and 

photographed. 3These were services performed, and in the complete 

absence of evidence to the contrary one cannot find they were so irrationally disproportionate to the fee paid, as to substantiate, by the 

requisite burden of proof, the allegations of deception and detriment as 

charged. For this reason, as well as the lack of overall credibility of the 

complaining witnesses, I concur that this charge has not been sustained. 

Charges 5 and 7 

For the reasons stated in the main opinion I concur in the finding that 

neither of these charges has been satisfactorily established. Even assuming that Solomon improperly kept a Form 1-94 in his own possession 

(Charge 5), while this might be the basis for a criminal charge under 8 

C.F.R. 1304(e) and 18 U.S.C. 2 in some circumstances, (United States 

v. Abrams. 427 F.2d 86, 2 Cir. 1970), it was not a misrepresentation to 

an officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service within the 

meaning of 8 C.F.R. 292.3(a)(4). 

Similarly, a direction to an alien not to report in response to an official 

communication, might well be reprehensible and improper conduct, but 

it, too, is not within the proscription of the specific charge. 

Charge 6 

Charge 6 is a different matter. Hidalgo is a native of Colombia who 

was married to a United States citizen. A visa petition was filed by 

Solomon and it was approved on February 18, 1972. It was forwarded to 

the consulate in Toronto and received February 28, 1972. Up to this 

point, Solomon, who had also represented Hidalgo at a deportation 

hearing, acted properly. 

Form F. S. 499—Hidalgo's control card at Toronto (see Ex. 26) is 

noted to show a consulate response to the application on March 8, 1972. 

The next notation appearing chronologically on the card is dated July 17, 

A.s of the date he terminated his relationship with Solomon—indeed as of the date of 

the hearing, he and his family were still in the United States and may even still be here, 

albeit at the sufferance of the Service. Under the recently enacted Western Hemisphere 

Act CPL. 94-571). as of January 1, 1977. Zunino and the other complainants might 

conceivably qualify for adjustment in the United States—a relief previously not available 

to them. 

415 
Interim Decision #2624 

1973, over 16 months later, and indicates that "PKT 3" was sent by the 

consulate. Hidalgo never did receive a visa as a result of this visa 

petition.' There is no explanation what, if anything, was done by Solomon between March 1972, and July 1973 or thereafter, to further the 

application. The record is silent as to exactly when his relationship with 

Hidalgo ceased, but there is no question that as of March 1973, a full 

year after the original submission, Solomon was still representing him. 

Solomon undertook to obtain permanent residence for Hidalgo with 

reasonable diligence_ No impediment to obtaining permanent residence 

is shown in the record. Most certainly Solomon has not shown any, 

despite the obvious burden thrown on him. There was no labor certification required. The petition had been approved for immediate relative 

status as the spouse of a citizen. The normal waiting period for Western 

Hemisphere applicants was not involved, since Hidalgo was married to 

a United States citizen. The Form F. S. 499 indicates that, at worst, 

Hidalgo might have needed permission to reapply for admission after a 

deportation order, in order to achieve the goal. Yet Solomon has not 

shown that he took any steps beyond the initial submission, to secure 

permanent residence for Hidalgo. 

It is not known if permission to reapply was needed—a further notation on the Form F. S. 499 would indicate it was not—but even if it 

were, Solomon should have taken action to secure that permission from 

the District Director. In March 1972 the consulate undoubtedly sent 

back additional forms to be executed. (See Ex. 29). If so, it was incumbent on Solomon to see to their execution and prompt submission. On 

the record before us, this was not done. 

Solomon did not obtain permanent residence for his client despite his 

representation that he would do so, and despite the absence of any 

impediment. If he had any explanation we must assume that, as an 

attorney faced with these charges, he would have offered it. It must be 

concluded that there is no explanation, and that his failure to act was 

either deliberate, or so grossly negligent on the part of a member of the 

bar as to amount to the same thing. Because of his nonfeasance his client 

suffered a serious and wholly unnecessary delay in obtaining permanent 

residence. 5I, therefore, concur that he wilfully failed to obtain permanent residence for Hidalgo and that Hidalgo thereby suffered a detriment. That he properly represented Hidalgo at the deportation hearing, 

securing a substantial grant of voluntary time, and did file a visa petition 

" He separated from the petitioner in April 1974 and on January 31, 1975, married 

another United States citizen. References to a second visa petition would indicate one was 

filed after that. 

The gravity of this delay is brought home when it is realized, apart from other 

considerations, that the residence period for naturalization begins only with the acquisition of lawful permanent residence (8 U.S.C. 1430). 

416 
Interim Decision #2624 

for him, are mitigating factors. I, therefore, concur in suspension for this 

violation for a six-month period. 

DISSENTING OPINION: Louis P. Maniatis, Board Member 

It appears that the determinations of both the majority and concurring opinions are based on the standard of proof that is clear, convincing, 

and unequivocal evidence as announced in Matter of Koden, Interim 

Decision 2516 (BIA 1974; A.G. 1976; BIA 1976). I take issue with the 

standard applied in this case. 

In my view, there is a marked difference between the facts in Koden, 

supra, and the facts in the instant case. Koden, supra, was acting as a 

representative of an accredited organization, which had been qualified 

by this Board pursuant to regulations, to appear in behalf of individuals 

who applied to such organization for legal assistance on immigration 

matters. There was no direct attorney-client relationship, as such, in 

Koden, supra, as there is in the instant case. In the present circumstances a different standard of evaluation is required, which, in my 

opinion, is the preponderance of the evidence. It is one that requires a 

higher degree of accountability and responsibility of an attorney to his 

client. Hence my dissent. I may add, however, that the Service has 

established its case by clear, convincing, and nnecroivocal evidence_ 

An attorney must not only exercise reasonable care and diligence and 

possess the legal skill and knowledge ordinarily possessed by members 

of the profession, but he is also bound to conduct himself as a fiduciary 

occupying a position of the highest trust and confidence. It is his duty to 

exercise the utmost honesty, good faith, fairness, integrity, and fidelity. 

To me, the main issue of this case is whether the respondent met this 

standard. 

Both the majority and concurring opinions refer to the seemingly 

contradictory testimony and evidence adduced during the hearing and 

conclude that seven complaining witnesses, who were clients of the 

respondent, appearing in behalf of the Service, did not overcome the 

blanket denials made by respondent. The respondent presented no 

corroboration of any sort, such as record files, memoranda as to actions 

taken, cash ledgers to indicate amount of fees received, copies of correspondence or even letters received or copies of forms. On the other 

hand, the record reflects that the Service had amply met its burden. 

In addition, much is made of the alleged discrepancies in the testimony of the Service witnesses, and as described in the concurring 

opinion, "the homogeneous quality of the testimony of the Chilean 

complainants is disturbing." What. is overlooked by the majority is that 

we have other than Chilean complainants whose testimony was of skilar, substantial, and probative nature. 

417 
Interim Decision #2624 

We are dealing with aliens seeking counsel, advice, and professional 

services of an attorney learned in immigration law. These aliens had a 

right to rely on respondent's competence and assurances "that everything was all right and not to worry," as admitted by respondent. I 

submit that they misplaced their trust and confidence in the respondent 

as an attorney. 

The concurring opinion apparently finds that the respondent is a sole 

practitioner, with no secretary (despite the record testimony that there 

was always one other person assisting respondent and acting as interpreter in all these cases), that his office is located in his home, and 

there is some excuse in the lack of supporting documentation, and that 

he only had copies of forms filed in various places. It seems to me that 

because of these circumstances he would be meticulous and orderly in 

his handling of cases. The various copies of forms or correspondence 

were not produced to substantiate his claim as proof of the type of 

services, together with the results of his professional services rendered 

on their behalf. 

Comment is also made in the concurring opinion that the fees charged 

were nominal, and at least the complainants gained time when they had 

no particular equities in their favor, and they suffered no detriment. I 

cannot accept such rationale as justification for respondent's conduct as 

a professional. Professional ethics requires that a lawyer should represent a client competently and his failure to handle a legal matte], without 

preparation adequate in the circumstances and to neglect a legal matter 

entrusted to him subjects him to disciplinary action. 

,An attorney has the duty to execute the matters entrusted to him 

with a high degree of care, skill, and dispatch. This, in my opinion, 

respondent failed to do. In my judgment there is sufficient and compelling evidence, which justifies suspension of the respondent for a 

minimum of at least two years. 

Before the Attorney General on Review 

November 10, 1977 . 

This matter is before me for review pursuant to § 292.3(b) of Title 8 of 

the Code of Federal Regulations relating to the suspension or disbarment of attorneys and representatives of accredited organizations from 

practice before the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the 

Board of Immigration Appeals. Respondent is an attorney who has been 

admitted to practice in several courts. His practice includes cases before 

the Service and the Board. 

The Service commenced a proceeding under 8 C.F.R. i292.3(a) seeking the disbarment of respondent on a number of grounds. Alter an 

evidentiary hearing before the Service, it recommended disbarment and 

418 
Interim Decision #2624 

forwarded the matter to the Board for decision as required by the 

regulation. The Board, with one member dissenting, sustained one of 

the charges and ordered respondent's suspension from practice for a 

period of six months.* The regulation further provides that a disciplinary order must be referred to the Attorney General for final determination. For the reasons set forth below, the Board's order is affirmed. 

I find that the Board correctly weighed the evidence adduced in 

support of the Service's allegations of misconduct against the standard 

articulated in Matter of Koden, (BIA 1974; A.G. 1970; BIA 1976). That 

case set forth the quantum of proof in disbarment proceedings under 8 

C. F. R. §292.3 to require that evidence supporting allegations of misconduct must be clear, convincing and unequivocal. I concur in the Board's 

decision that the Service only met its burden of proof with respect to one 

of the grounds alleged in charge six. 

The ground involved alleges a violation of 8 C.F.R. §292.3(a)(4). 

Section (a)(4) provides that disciplinary action is in the public interest 

against an attorney practicing before the Service or Board14) Who willfully deceives, misleads, or threatens any party to a case concerning any 

matter relating to the case." 

The evidence establishes that the respondent was retained byan alien 

named Hidalgo-Caicedo to represent him in deportation proceedings, 

which he did in January of 1972. The result of the proceeding was the 

entry of a deportation order with the condition that Mr. Hidalgo might, 

however, voluntarily depart from the United States within six months. 

Hidalgo, however, had a United States citizen wife living in the United 

States. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, §201(b), 8 U.S.C. 

§1151(b), he was entitled to apply for an immigration visa as an 'immediate relative" of a United States citizen. He then retained respondent for that purpose, and respondent filed the necessary petition with 

the Service, which petition was approved. The approved ,petition was 

then forwarded to the appropriate United States consul in Canada for 

processing. The respondent did not, however, take the needed steps 

with the consul for issuance of the immigration visa, although he told 

Hidalgo that he had done so. The outcome was the issuance of a final 

order of deportation against Hidalgo. As to this the Board states (Decision at 23) that respondent's "failure to take any further action on the 

I have been informed that subsequent to the date of the Board's order respondent was 

convicted in a Federal court of the felony of filing a false petition in an immigration 

proceeding. The conviction has peen appealed. Although 8 C.F.R. §292.3(a)(13)' provides 

that conviction of a felony Is a initSib fur disciplinary proceeding; the Service takes the 

position that the conviction must be final. The dissenting member believed that the Board 

had acted too leniently both as to other charges and the length of the suspension. 

419 
Interim Decision #2624 

visa application for more than a year without explanation . . ., while 

assuring his client that everything was in order for him to receive an 

immigrant visa, had the effect of misleading and deceiving Mr. 

Hidalgo." Accordingly, the Board concluded that the charge under 

§292.3(a)(4) has been sustained. 

For that charge to be sustained it had to be established that respondent had willfully misled and deceived Mr. Hidalgo as to "any matter 

relating to the case." The case here was the deportation proceeding 

against Mr. Hidalgo. There are two matters relating to the case; the 

application for an immigration visa and the respondent's advice to Mr. 

Hidalgo to ignore the Service's call-in letters. If respondent had not told 

Mr. Hidalgo to ignore the letters and then failed to represent him before 

the Service in answer to them, presumably, Mr. Hidalgo would not have 

been ordered to report for deportation in March of 1973. And if respondent had taken the necessary steps in connection with the application, 

presumably, Mr. Hidalo would have succeeded in obtaining an immigration visa and the deportation proceeding would have been terminated. 

Ordered that respondent be and he hereby is suspended from practice 

before the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Board of 

Immigration Appeals for the period of six months from the date of 

service on him by the Board of this decision. 

420