[Cite as State v. Tribble, 2011-Ohio-3618.]

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 MONTGOMERY COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO : 

: Appellate Case No. 24231 

Plaintiff-Appellee : 

: Trial Court Case No. 2010-CR-597 

v. : 

: 

BENNIE LEE TRIBBLE, JR. : (Criminal Appeal from 

: (Common Pleas Court) 

Defendant-Appellant : 

: 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

O P I N I O N

Rendered on the 22nd day of July, 2011. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by R. LYNN NOTHSTINE, Atty. Reg. #0061560, Montgomery 

County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, P.O. 

Box 972, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422 

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

DANIEL R. ALLNUTT, Atty. Reg. #0085452, Post Office Box 234, Alpha, Ohio 45301 

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 

RICE, J., sitting by assignment. 

{¶ 1} Appellant, Bennie Lee Tribble, Jr., appeals his conviction by the Montgomery 

County Court of Common Pleas, following a bench trial, of felonious assault. At issue is 

whether the court’s finding of guilt was against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm. 
2

{¶ 2} On March 23, 2010, appellant was indicted for felonious assault with a deadly 

weapon, to-wit: a boxcutter, a felony of the second degree, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2). 

 Appellant pled not guilty and waived his right to jury trial. The case proceeded to bench 

trial on June 28, 2010. 

{¶ 3} Matt Leaman testified he is employed as a bouncer at the Yellow Rose night 

club in West Carrollton, Ohio, and was on duty on Saturday night, February 27, 2010, near 

midnight. At that time he saw a male, later identified as appellant, and a female involved in 

an altercation. When Mr. Leaman saw appellant grab the female’s hair, Mr. Leaman started 

making his way toward them. However, before reaching them, the female’s husband 

intervened. The husband grabbed appellant by his shirt and was yelling at him. 

{¶ 4} Mr. Leaman testified that he and Shawn Parah, another bouncer, approached 

the three patrons involved in the altercation, and separated appellant from the couple. Mr. 

Leaman told the husband to calm down and walk away, and he complied. However, 

appellant remained combative and aggressive. Mr. Leaman told him he had to leave, but 

appellant refused. Mr. Parah then grabbed appellant by his arms and said, “Let’s go to the 

door.” Appellant started to struggle with him. As a result, Mr. Leaman and another bouncer 

each grabbed one of appellant’s arms and the three bouncers walked appellant to the door. 

{¶ 5} Mr. Leaman testified that, just outside the door, they released appellant. He 

then turned around and threw a punch at Mr. Leaman. However, he ducked and the punch 

struck Mr. Parah, who was behind him. 

{¶ 6} At that point a fourth bouncer, Ben Wentzel, arrived to provide assistance. 

The four bouncers then tackled appellant and took him to the ground a few feet past the 
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doorway in an effort to stop appellant from throwing any more punches. Mr. Leaman and the 

other bouncers then formed a human wall covering the front door to prevent appellant from 

re-entering the night club. 

{¶ 7} After appellant got up, Mr. Leaman said, “Leave. Just go. * * * This is 

over.” However, appellant refused and, instead, threw a few more punches at him. 

Appellant called Mr. Leaman a “soft-ass white boy,” and bragged that “he hangs with country, 

Georgian niggas.” 

{¶ 8} Mr. Leaman testified that appellant threw a few more punches at him without 

hitting him, and then he threw one jab at appellant, which made him more angry. When 

appellant was about 10 feet from the bouncers, he reached into his pocket and pulled out a 

metal object with his right hand that Mr. Leaman recognized as a boxcutter, which is a utility 

knife used to tear open boxes. Appellant passed it to his left hand and then extended the 

blade. Mr. Leaman took a few steps back, and appellant advanced toward him. Appellant 

slashed the boxcutter at Mr. Leaman three or four times with his left hand and then struck Mr. 

Leaman in the cheek with his right hand when he was about two feet from him. 

{¶ 9} Mr. Leaman testified that Mr. Parah reported the incident to the West 

Carrollton Police Department. Mr. Parah told the bouncers that the dispatcher had advised 

him to keep a safe distance from appellant, but to make sure he did not get away until the 

police arrived. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Leaman heard police sirens and appellant began to run 

across the parking lot. The bouncers followed appellant until the responding officer arrived 

and eventually arrested him. 
4

{¶ 10} Mr. Parah testified that when he saw a physical confrontation between 

appellant and another male, he approached appellant, put his hand on the back of his elbow, 

and said he needed to calm down. Appellant swatted his hand away, and said, “Get your 

fucking hands off me, white boy.” Mr. Parah then grabbed his arms, put them behind his 

back, and turned him around to lead him to the front door. However, appellant tried to pull 

his arms away, and Mr. Leaman and another bouncer approached and helped Mr. Parah escort 

appellant to the front door. 

{¶ 11} Just outside the front door, Mr. Parah released appellant and he swung and hit 

Mr. Parah in his face. Some of the bouncers pushed appellant to the ground. He then got up 

and, while clenching his fists, said, “That’s right, I got fast hands, bitch.” 

{¶ 12} The bouncers formed a straight line to keep appellant out of the bar. Appellant 

remained agitated and aggressive toward Mr. Leaman. The bouncers told appellant to leave, 

to get in his car and go home, but he refused. 

{¶ 13} Appellant confronted Mr. Leaman and threw a few punches at him. Appellant 

then produced a knife and, with its blade exposed, made cutting motions at Mr. Leaman’s face 

and threatened to slash his throat with it. Mr. Parah said that at the time, appellant was about 

four feet from Mr. Leaman. 

{¶ 14} Mr. Parah testified that while appellant was slashing his knife at Mr. Leaman, 

he called the police to report the incident. When the responding officer arrived, Mr. Parah 

told him that appellant still had the knife in his hand. 

{¶ 15} Another bouncer, Ben Wentzel, testified that once appellant was taken outside, 

he took a punch at one of the bouncers and was yelling he has quick hands. The bouncers 
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told appellant to leave many times, but he refused and kept coming back at them. Appellant 

took a few swings at Mr. Leaman, who then took one swing at appellant. Appellant backed 

up and pulled a knife out of his pocket. Mr. Wentzel said that appellant was three feet from 

Mr. Leaman when he was making slashing gestures at him. 

{¶ 16} Sergeant Kori Rolando of the West Carrollton Police Department testified that 

he was dispatched on a call of a male with a knife. As Sergeant Rolando pulled in the 

parking lot, he saw a male matching the suspect’s description with several bouncers and 

patrons following him. 

{¶ 17} Sergeant Rolando testified that after he exited his cruiser, appellant was 

walking toward him holding a boxcutter. The sergeant pointed his gun at him and told 

appellant to drop the knife and back up, but appellant refused and kept walking toward him 

holding the boxcutter. Sergeant Rolando was able to lead appellant to the back of his cruiser, 

but appellant refused to put down his knife. The sergeant placed appellant against the trunk 

of his cruiser, trying to control his wrist. Sergeant Rolando grabbed appellant’s left arm and 

struck his right forearm in order to get appellant to release his boxcutter, which he eventually 

did. 

{¶ 18} Sergeant Rolando testified that he tried to put appellant in handcuffs, but he 

resisted. The sergeant struggled with him to get his hands behind his back, and he eventually 

handcuffed him. Appellant was then transported to the police station. During an interview 

with police, when asked if he used the knife in an aggressive manner toward anyone, appellant 

said, “Hell, yes. I did. What would you do?” 

{¶ 19} After the state rested, Dan Levalley testified for the defense. He said that he 
6

went to the bar that night with appellant. He saw appellant arguing with a female in the bar 

and then saw the bouncers remove appellant from the bar. Later, he went outside and saw the 

bouncers surrounding appellant and the police arriving. Mr. Levalley said he did not see any 

of the bouncers hit appellant. Moreover, he saw no bruises, blood, or injuries on appellant. 

{¶ 20} Appellant testified that for no reason, four bouncers grabbed and choked him 

and dragged him outside. He denied taking a swing at or hitting Mr. Leaman, and denied 

calling him any names. He said the bouncers threw him to the ground. He said they 

punched and kicked him, but he got loose and walked away. He said ten bouncers then came 

after him and he pulled out his knife to back them off of him, but he said he never extended 

the blade and did not swing it at anyone. He said he never used the knife to try to harm any 

of the bouncers and never advanced toward them with it. He testified, “I didn’t use the knife 

in self-defense.” According to appellant, after he pulled out his knife, he merely said, “Hey, 

you all, I don’t respect you for the fact that - - how you all did me.” Appellant admitted that 

he did not comply with Sergeant Rolando’s initial instruction to back up. He said that after 

he threw his knife on the back of the cruiser, “the officer * * * started roughing [him] up, too” 

by picking him up and slamming him against the cruiser. 

{¶ 21} Following the trial, the court took the matter under advisement, and on July 2, 

2011, entered its verdict of guilty of felonious assault with a deadly weapon. The court 

entered a written verdict of guilt in which it found that appellant failed to meet his burden of 

proving self-defense. Specifically, the court found that, although appellant had an honest 

belief that he was in immediate danger of death or great bodily harm, appellant was not 

blameless in creating the situation giving rise to the incident. Further, the court found that, 
7

although appellant had a reasonable means of escape from the danger other than by the use of 

force, rather than retreat, appellant brandished a boxcutter with its blade extended and made 

swiping or cutting motions with the boxcutter, and advanced menacingly toward Mr. Leaman 

while displaying the boxcutter, thus knowingly attempting to cause physical harm to Mr. 

Leaman with it. The court also found that, while brandishing the boxcutter, appellant came 

close enough to Mr. Leaman to punch him with his free hand. 

{¶ 22} On July 29, 2010, the trial court sentenced appellant to community control 

sanctions not to exceed five years. 

{¶ 23} Appellant appeals his conviction, asserting two assignments of error. For his 

first assigned error, he contends: 

{¶ 24} “THE APPELLANT’S FELONIOUS ASSAULT CONVICTION IS AGAINST 

THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE APPELLANT’S SELF 

DEFENSE CLAIM WAS VALID.” 

{¶ 25} Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his 

conviction of felonious assault. Instead, he argues the court’s finding that he failed to prove 

self-defense was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶ 26} Although a conviction may be sustained as having been based on sufficient 

evidence, “a court of appeals may * * * nevertheless conclude that [the] judgment is against 

the weight of the evidence.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 1997-Ohio-52. 

{¶ 27} There is a fundamental distinction between a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence and a challenge to the weight of the evidence. The legal concepts of sufficiency of 

the evidence and weight of the evidence are quantitatively and qualitatively different from 
8

each other. Id. at 386. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

examines the evidence admitted at trial and determines whether, after viewing the evidence 

most favorably to the state, the jury could have found the essential elements of the crime 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273. 

{¶ 28} In contrast, the weight of the evidence concerns the inclination of the greater 

amount of credible evidence, offered at trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the 

other. Thompkins, supra, at 387. If, on weighing the evidence, the trier of fact finds the 

greater amount of credible evidence sustains the issue that a party seeks to establish, that party 

will be entitled to its verdict. Id. “Weight is not a question of mathematics, but depends on 

its effect in inducing belief.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id., quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (6 

Ed.Rev.1990), 1594. 

{¶ 29} In determining whether the judgment is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, the appellate court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences, and considers the credibility of the witnesses. The court determines 

whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence and deciding witness credibility, the trier of fact 

clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must 

be reversed and a new trial ordered. Thompkins, supra, at 387. “The discretionary power to 

grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence 

weighs heavily against the conviction.” Id. at 387, quoting State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio 

App.3d 172, 175; see, also, State v. Rowland, Montgomery App. No. 20625, 2005-Ohio-3756, 

at ¶5. 

{¶ 30} The role of the appellate court is to engage in a limited weighing of the 
9

evidence introduced at trial in order to determine whether the state appropriately carried its 

burden of persuasion. Thompkins, supra, at 390 (Cook, J., concurring). The reviewing court 

must defer to the factual findings of the trier of fact as to the weight to be given the evidence 

and the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, paragraph 

one of the syllabus. Because the trier of fact had the opportunity to see and hear the 

witnesses, the appellate court is required to give substantial deference to the factfinder’s 

determinations of credibility. Thus, the decision whether, and to what extent, to believe the 

testimony of each witness is within the province of the factfinder. State v. Key, Montgomery 

App. No. 22609, 2009-Ohio-422, at ¶25. “This court will not substitute its judgment for that 

of the trier of facts on the issue of witness credibility unless it is patently apparent that the trier 

of fact lost its way in arriving at its verdict.” Id. at ¶26. 

{¶ 31} Appellant was found guilty of felonious assault with a deadly weapon, in 

violation of R.C. 2903.11, which provides: 

{¶ 32} “(A) No person shall knowingly * * * 

{¶ 33} “* * * 

{¶ 34} “(2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another * * * by means of a 

deadly weapon * * *.” 

{¶ 35} Appellant argues the trial court erred in finding he failed to meet his burden to 

prove self-defense. Self-defense is an affirmative defense, which the defendant has the 

burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence. R.C. 2901.05(A); State v. Jackson

(1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 281, 283. 

{¶ 36} In order to establish self-defense through the use of deadly force, “a defendant 
10

must prove the following elements: (1) that the defendant was not at fault in creating the 

situation giving rise to the affray; (2) that the defendant had a bona fide belief that he was in 

imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his only means of escape from such 

danger was in the use of such force; and (3) that the defendant did not violate any duty to 

retreat or avoid the danger.” State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 24, 2002-Ohio-68, citing 

State v. Robbins (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 74. “[T]he elements of self-defense are cumulative. 

* * * If the defendant fails to prove any one of these elements by a preponderance of the 

evidence he has failed to demonstrate that he acted in self-defense.” (Emphasis omitted.) 

Jackson, supra, at 284. 

{¶ 37} This Court in State v. Kucharski, Montgomery App. No. 20815, 

2005-Ohio-6541, at ¶19-21, explained the duty to retreat, as follows: 

{¶ 38} “Deadly force may [be] used as a defense against a danger of death or great 

bodily harm, but when deadly force is used the defendant must * * * not have violated any 

duty to retreat in order to protect himself from that danger. Robbins[, supra]. Implicit in the 

retreat requirement is a value judgment that retreat is preferred to a loss of life resulting from 

the use of deadly force. 

{¶ 39} “The duty to retreat does not apply when one is attacked in one’s home or 

office. Jackson[, supra]. It otherwise generally does when deadly force is used, and to prove 

that the duty was not violated the defendant must show that no means of retreat or avoidance 

was available, that his only means of escape or avoidance was the deadly force he used. 

State v. Melchior (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 15. 

{¶ 40} “Because the use of nondeadly force, by definition, presents no risk of loss of 
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life, there is no duty to retreat when nondeadly force is used in self-defense. * * *” 

(Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 41} First, appellant argues the trial court’s finding that he violated his duty to 

retreat was not supported by the record. We do not agree. Citing isolated statements of Mr. 

Wentzel, one of the bouncers, appellant argues he attempted to retreat twice. However, the 

testimony of Mr. Leaman and Mr. Parah supports the trial court’s finding. 

{¶ 42} Mr. Leaman and Mr. Parah testified that once the bouncers took appellant 

outside, they released him. However, instead of retreating, appellant turned around and threw 

a punch at Mr. Leaman, missing him, but striking Mr. Parah in the face. Mr. Leaman and Mr. 

Parah also testified that after they told appellant to “[l]eave,” “[j]ust go,” “[t]his is over,” and 

to “get in your vehicle, go home,” instead of retreating, appellant threw more punches at Mr. 

Leaman, calling him a “soft-ass white boy” and bragging that he “hangs with country, 

Georgian niggas.” 

{¶ 43} Still failing to retreat, appellant threw more punches at Mr. Leaman, until he 

threw one jab at appellant, which made appellant more angry. At that point, appellant was at 

least ten feet away from the bouncers, and he therefore had another opportunity to retreat. 

Instead, he reached into his pocket and pulled out his knife. 

{¶ 44} Appellant argues that his witnesses testified that, while escorting appellant out 

of the bar, one of the bouncers put his arm around his neck in a chokehold. However, the 

bouncers denied ever doing so. In any event, the argument is irrelevant because that alleged 

incident occurred inside the bar prior to the bouncers escorting appellant outside and prior to 

giving him multiple opportunities to retreat. 
12

{¶ 45} Next, appellant argues the trial court erred in finding that he was at fault in 

creating the situation giving rise to the affray. Again, we do not agree. Both Mr. Leaman 

and Mr. Parah testified that after they removed appellant from the bar and released him 

outside, he threw the first punch attempting to strike Mr. Leaman, but hitting Mr. Parah 

instead. Further, despite the bouncers’ instructions to appellant to leave, he threw more 

punches at Mr. Leaman and taunted him by calling him derogatory names. Then, while 

threatening Mr. Leaman with his knife, he struck him in the cheek with his free hand. 

{¶ 46} Finally, appellant’s trial testimony defeated his argument that he acted in 

self-defense. The Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Poole (1973), 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19, 

characterized the defense of self-defense as a “justification for admitted conduct.” The court 

in Poole stated that this defense admits the facts claimed by the prosecution and then relies on 

independent facts or circumstances, which the defendant claims exempt him from liability. 

Id. Thus, self-defense seeks to relieve the defendant from culpability rather than to negate an 

element of the offense charged. However, appellant testified at trial, as follows: 

{¶ 47} “Q. * * * What was your point in displaying the knife? 

{¶ 48} “A. Just to back them off of me, to scare them away from me. * * * 

{¶ 49} “Q. * * * Did you ever use [the knife] in a manner where you attempted to 

cause physical harm? 

{¶ 50} “Q. No, sir. I didn’t. 

{¶ 51} “* * * 

{¶ 52} “Q. So at what point did you use the knife in self-defense? 

{¶ 53} “A. I didn’t use the knife in self-defense. I told you, they beat me. When 
13

they took me out of the club, they slammed me down on the ground. They punched and 

kicked on me. I got up. I don’t even know how I got up. I started walking away. I mean, I 

was walking away from them. 

{¶ 54} “And I looked back. * * * [I]t was about 10 guys in a circle coming towards 

me. I pulled my knife out. I said, ‘I don’t respect this way that you all did me.’ I never 

opened the blade or anything. * * *” 

{¶ 55} Thus, at trial, appellant denied extending the blade on his knife or using it to try 

to harm Mr. Leaman. However, on appeal, appellant argues there were independent facts or 

circumstances that exempted him from liability because the bouncers allegedly pursued him in 

the parking lot. Consequently, he cannot assert self-defense because that defense requires the 

admission by the defendant of the essential facts alleged by the prosecution. Poole, supra. 

To maintain both positions is “logically and legally inconsistent,” because “[a]ppellant cannot 

claim absolute innocence and simultaneously avail himself of an affirmative defense” of 

self-defense. State v. Powell (Sept. 29, 1997), 4th Dist. No. 96CA2257, 1997 Ohio App. 

LEXIS 4480, *11-*12. The court in Powell held: “It would be nonsensical to permit a 

criminal defendant to completely deny that he committed the act underlying the charge, yet 

also claim that his commission of the act was justified and that he should therefore be excused 

from criminal responsibility. Such a holding would allow a criminal defendant to have his 

cake and eat it too.” Id. at *5. Accord: Poole, supra; State v. Kajoshaj (Aug. 10, 2000), 8th 

Dist. No. 76857; State v. Perry, 5th Dist. No. 02-CA-77, 2003-Ohio-6097, at ¶27; State v. 

Wall (Aug. 21, 1973), 10th Dist. No. 73AP-115, 1973. 

{¶ 56} Because appellant denied committing the act alleged in the indictment, i.e., that 
14

he attempted to cause physical harm to Mr. Leaman by means of a boxcutter, he is precluded 

from arguing on appeal that the trial court should have found he acted in self-defense. 

{¶ 57} Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 58} For his second assignment of error, appellant alleges: 

{¶ 59} “THE APPELLANT’S CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED AS AGAINST 

THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, BECAUSE NO PHYSICAL HARM WAS 

SUSTAINED BY THE DEADLY WEAPON INVOLVED, AND THE RECORD DOES 

NOT SUPPORT A FINDING THAT HE KNOWINGLY ATTEMPTED TO CAUSE 

PHYSICAL HARM.” 

{¶ 60} Appellant concedes the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction of 

felonious assault pursuant to State v. Workman (1992), 84 Ohio App.3d 537, motion for leave 

to appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio overruled at (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 1507. Instead, he 

presents another manifest-weight challenge. First, he argues that the record as a whole does 

not support the trial court’s finding that he came close enough to Mr. Leaman with his knife to 

injure him with it. While appellant concedes that Mr. Leaman testified appellant struck him 

with his free hand while brandishing his knife with the other and therefore was close enough 

to stab him with it, he argues that Mr. Leaman’s testimony during his preliminary hearing 

contradicted that testimony. However, appellant failed to file the transcript of that hearing on 

appeal. Consequently, it is impossible for us to determine whether Mr. Leaman’s trial 

testimony contradicted his testimony at that earlier hearing. For this reason alone, the 

argument lacks merit. Riad v. Riad (June 2, 1987), Montgomery App. No. 10182, 1987 Ohio 

App. LEXIS 7346, *1-*2, citing Schick v. Cincinnati (1927), 116 Ohio St. 16, 25. In any 
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event, the alleged excerpt relied upon by appellant does not contradict Mr. Leaman’s 

testimony. He merely conceded at the earlier hearing that while appellant was holding his 

knife, he did not actually touch him with it. 

{¶ 61} Second, appellant argues that none of the bouncers testified he was within 

range to cause harm with his boxcutter. However, to the contrary, Mr. Leaman testified 

appellant was only two feet away from him when he pulled out his knife. Further, Mr. Parah 

testified that when appellant produced his knife and took a couple of swipes with it at Mr. 

Leaman’s face, appellant was about four feet from Mr. Leaman. Moreover, Mr. Wentzel 

testified that appellant was three feet from Mr. Leaman when he made slashing gestures 

toward him with his knife. 

{¶ 62} The trial court was in the best position to view the witnesses, determine their 

credibility, and resolve any conflicts in the testimony. In finding appellant guilty of felonious 

assault and finding he failed to prove self-defense, the trial court obviously chose to believe 

the state’s witnesses and to discredit appellant’s version of events. After thoroughly 

reviewing the record, we cannot say the trial court clearly lost its way and created such a 

manifest miscarriage of justice that appellant is entitled to a reversal of his conviction and a 

new trial. We therefore hold that appellant’s conviction was not against the manifest weight 

of the evidence. 

{¶ 63} For the reasons stated in this opinion, the assignments of error are not well 

taken. It is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the Montgomery 

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
16

FROELICH and HALL, JJ., concur. 

 (Hon. Cynthia Westcott Rice, Eleventh District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of 

the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio). 

Copies mailed to: 

Mathias H. Heck 

R. Lynn Nothstine 

Daniel R. Allnutt 

Hon. Mary L. Wiseman