alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Robie J. Drake, Appellant, v Richard C. Kloch, Sr., Acting Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Niagara County, et al., Respondents.

Submitted May 26, 2009;

decided September 1, 2009

Reported below, 2009 NY Slip Op 69151(U).

On the Court’s own motion, appeal dismissed, without costs, upon the ground that no substantial constitutional question is directly involved. Motion for leave to appeal denied.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-7876

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL ANTHONY HICKSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, Senior District Judge. 

(8:09-cr-00213-RWT-2; 8:13-cv-02790-RWT; 8:14-cv-00167-RWT)

Submitted: April 23, 2015 Decided: April 28, 2015

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael Anthony Hickson, Appellant Pro Se. Bryan E. Foreman, 

Christen Anne Sproule, Assistant United States Attorneys, Adam 

Kenneth Ake, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, 

Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Michael Anthony Hickson seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) 

motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or 

judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not 

issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the 

district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies 

this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would 

find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 

(2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural 

grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive 

procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a 

debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 

529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that 

Hickson has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we 

deny a certificate of appealability, deny Hickson’s motion for 

bail pending appeal, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 
3

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Exhibit 32

Certification of CEO and CFO Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

as Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of ZiLOG, Inc. (the "Company") for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), James M. Thorburn, as Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and Perry Grace, as Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of his knowledge, respectively, that:

	(1)	The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

	(2)	The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date:     August 13, 2003
/s/ James M. Thorburn
						

						Name:    James M. Thorburn

						Title:     Chairman and Chief Executive Officer

 

 

Date:     August 13, 2003
/s/ Perry J. Grace
						Name:   Perry J. Grace

						Title:     Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
#### State v. Hernandez-Madrid

Case below: 173 N.C. App. 234

No. 534P05

1. AG’s Motion for Temporary Stay (COA04-294)

2. AG’s Petition for Writ of Supersedeas

3. AG’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31

1. Allowed Pending Determination of State’s PDR 360 N.C. 71

2. Allowed 12/19/06

3. Allowed 12/19/06
THE STATE OF TEXAS

MANDATE

TO THE 123RD DISTRICT COURT OF PANOLA COUNTY, GREETINGS:

Before the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Court of Appeals District of Texas, on the 16th 

day of June, A.D. 2015, the cause upon appeal to revise or reverse your Judgment was determined; 

and therein our said Court made its order in these words:

William Robert Parker, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

No. 06-15-00058-CR

Trial Court No. 13,122

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find that the appeal should be dismissed 

for want of jurisdiction. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal.

We note that the appellant, William Robert Parker, has adequately indicated his inability 

to pay costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our said Court in this 

behalf, and in all things to have it duly recognized, obeyed, and executed.

WITNESS, the Hon. Josh R. Morriss, III, Chief Justice of our said Court of Appeals, with 

the seal thereof annexed, at the City of Texarkana, this the 14th day of October, A.D. 2015.

DEBRA K. AUTREY, Clerk
Exhibit 10.22


 


Amendment Agreement


 


This agreement (“Amendment
Agreement”) is made and entered into as of the date indicated on the signature
page below, by and between ebookers Limited whose registered office is located
at 25 Farringdon Street, London EC4A 4AB, (“ebookers”) and Galileo Nederland
BV, a company registered in the Netherlands with its registered address at
Neptunusstraat 35, 2132 JA Hoofddorp, the Netherlands (“Galileo”).


 


For good and valuable
consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the
parties agree as follows:


 


WHEREAS:


 


(A)                The parties
previously entered into a Global Incentive Agreement dated 8 August 2005 (“the
Incentive Agreement”);


 


(B)                  The parties have
agreed, to amend the agreement in order to change the definition of Effective
Date.


 


The parties agree to
amend the definition of Effective Date, located at page 1 of the Incentive
Agreement to read as follows:


 


“Effective
Date” means the 1 May 2005 and “Term” shall mean the period of 3 years from the Effective
Date or in the event all Subscriber Agreements terminate prior to the 3 years,
then this Agreement will terminate on the date the last Subscriber Agreement is
terminated.”


 


IN
WITNESS of which the parties or their authorised
representatives have signed this Amendment Agreement on the date set out below.


 


	
  Signed
  on behalf of Galileo Nederland BV

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Name: 

  	
  G A Wilson

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Signature: 

  	
  /s/ G A Wilson

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Position:

  	
  Managing Director

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Date:

  	
  17 August 2005

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  



 


	
  Signed
  on behalf of ebookers Limited

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Name: 

  	
  P A Searle

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Signature: 

  	
  /s/ P A Searle

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Position:

  	
  Director

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Date:

  	
  17 August 2005
#### Winfield PHILLIPS, Jeremy Collins, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FLORIDA FISH AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION COMMISSION, Alton Ranew, Officer, Defendants-Appel-lees.

No. 08-17084

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

May 6, 2009.

*865C. Edward McGee, Jr., McGee & Hus-key, P.A., Wilton Manors, FL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Cecilia Bradley, Attorney General’s Office Florida Capitol, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before BIRCH, HULL and HILL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Winfield Phillips and Jeremy Collins sued the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission and Officer Alton Ra-new under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages in connection with his alleged wrongful arrest of them for trespass. Phillips and Collins claim that Officer Ranew did not have probable cause to arrest them for trespass. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that probable cause for the arrest did exist, and, therefore, there was no unlawful deprivation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. We agree.

Probable cause is an absolute bar to a Section 1983 claim alleging false arrest. *Rankin v. Evans,*133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir.1998). To show the absence of probable cause, Phillips and Collins bear the burden of showing that no reasonably objective police officer would have perceived there to be probable cause for such an arrest. *Mitchell v. Forsyth,*472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985).

In this case, Phillips and Collins cannot meet this burden. Officer Ranew received information that shots had been fired from behind the complainant’s, Mrs. Hussey’s, home, and that she had seen a deer fall. Officer Ranew went to the scene and found Phillips and Collins with two dead deer, two rifles and blood on their clothes. The officer arrested the men for trespass and seized the rifles and deer. Collins admitted they had shot the deer in a cultivated peanut field and that they had followed the deer around a fence and through a gate. Neither man claimed to have permission to be hunting on the property.

Although Phillips and Collins now claim that they had no notice that they were trespassing, the trial court found that they had actual notice that they were trespassing because they admitted they knew they were hunting on property that did not belong to them, and that they had gone around the fence and gate to shoot the deer.

*866Furthermore, the trial court held that the men had constructive notice that they were trespassing because Collins admitted that they knew they were in Mrs. Hussey’s peanut field. Under the Florida trespass statute, planting a crop such as peanuts is considered “cultivation” of land, Fla. Stat. § 810.11(6), which satisfies the statute’s notice requirement. Fla. Stat. § 810.09.

Under these circumstances, the trial court correctly held that the officer had probable cause to believe that Phillips and Collins had violated the trespass statute. Since the officer had probable cause for the arrest, which is an absolute bar to the plaintiffs’ claim for false arrest, the trial court correctly entered summary judgment for the defendants.

AFFIRMED.
---

EXHIBIT 32.1

|CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO                     
|----------------------------------------------
|18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
|SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 

I, Shaun P. Davis, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

|(1) | the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Gurata Gold, Inc. for
      the year ended May 31, 2009 (the "Report") fully complies with the
      requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
      1934; and
|--- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
|(2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents,
      in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
      operations of Gurata Gold, Inc.                                                          

Dated: December ___, 2009

| |                                                                
| | ---------------------------------------------------------------
| | Shaun P. Davis                                                 
| | President, Chief Executive Officer, Chief
      Financial      
| | Officer, Treasurer, Secretary and director                     
| | (Principal Executive Officer, Principal
      Financial Officer
| | and Principal Accounting Officer)                              
| | Gurata Gold, Inc.                                              

A signed original of this written statement required by Section
906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the
signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this
written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Gurata Gold,
Inc. and will be retained by Gurata Gold, Inc. and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

---
`
 

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 

 

In connection with the Annual Report of Consolidation Services, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, John C. Francis, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify to my knowledge pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, following due inquiry, I believe that:

 

(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 
   
CONSOLIDATION SERVICES, INC.
  
March 27, 2008

 

By:
/s/ John C. Francis 
 
 
John C. Francis

Chief Financial Officer

 

 

 
`
EXHIBIT 32
 CERTIFICATION OF
THE TRUSTEE*
OF THE SAN JUAN BASIN ROYALTY TRUST
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 1350
  1.
    
    The Report fully complies in all material respects with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (as explained in Note 1
to the Trusts financial statements contained in the Report, in accordance with
Securities and Exchange Commission Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 47, released September
16, 1982, the Trust prepares its financial statements in a manner that differs from
generally accepted accounting principles; such presentation is customary to other
royalty trusts); and2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Trust.
 COMPASS BANK, AS TRUSTEE OF THESAN JUAN BASIN ROYALTY TRUSTBy:
    
    /s/ Lee Ann AndersonName:
    
    Lee Ann AndersonTitle:
    
    Vice President and Senior Trust OfficerDate: May 12, 2008
 
 *
    
    The Trust has no executive officers.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-7067

ERIC JOSEPH DEPAOLA,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

HAROLD CLARKE; A. DAVID ROBINSON; EARL BARKSDALE; AMEE 

DUNCAN; LT. CHRISTOPHER GILBERT; LT. KISER; B. WALLACE, Safety 

Officer; CRABTREE, Recreational Supervisor; SGT. LARGE; SGT. J. MESSER; 

SGT. J. HALL; SGT. J. DICKENSON; SGT. JASON SHEPHERD; D. TURNER, 

Unit Manager (C Building); HENRY PONTON; STEAVENS, Guard; R. 

STANLEY, Guard; J. T. FLEMING, Guard; LOVELL, Guard; HILL, Guard; 

VAUGHN, Guard; B. DODSON, Guard; GENTRY, Guard; L. MULLINS, 

Institutional Hearings Officer,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at 

Roanoke. James P. Jones, District Judge. (7:17-cv-00028-JPJ-RSB)

Submitted: December 21, 2017 Decided: January 11, 2018

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and KING and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Eric Joseph DePaola, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Eric DePaola seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 (2012) complaint without prejudice. Before addressing the merits of DePaola’s 

appeal, we first must be assured that we have jurisdiction. Porter v. Zook, 803 F.3d 694, 

696 (4th Cir. 2015). We may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 

(1949). The district court identified deficiencies in two of DePaola’s claims that DePaola 

may be able to remedy by filing an amended complaint. In ruling on DePaola’s Eighth 

Amendment recreation claim, the district court noted that DePaola failed to allege how 

often he was denied recreation entirely or if he was harmed by the conditions in the 

recreation cages. Additionally, the district court noted in ruling on the procedural due 

process claim alleged in Count 3 of the complaint that DePaola failed to allege that the 

hearing officer was biased or that the evidence the officer failed to consider would have 

been exculpatory. Because DePaola might be able to cure these defects by filing an 

amendment to the complaint, we conclude that the order DePaola seeks to appeal is 

neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory order. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal 

Aid Soc’y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 623-24 (4th Cir. 2015); Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar 

Workers Local Union 392, 10 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (4th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we 

dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remand the case to the district court with 

instructions to allow DePaola to amend his complaint. Goode, 807 F.3d at 630. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 
3

presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

DISMISSED AND REMANDED
[933 NE2d 208, 906 NYS2d 809]

#### Kristopher Kohl, Appellant, v American Transit Insurance Company, Respondent.

Argued June 3, 2010;

decided July 1, 2010

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*David Katz & Associates, LLP,*New York City *(Salvatore J. Sciangula*of counsel), for appellant.

*Marjorie E. Bornes,*New York City, for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed with costs.

*764Kristopher Kohl, a passenger in a taxicab, was sued by a bicyclist who claimed that he was injured when Kohl opened the taxi’s door. The Appellate Division correctly held that Kohl was not insured under the taxi owner’s policy of automobile liability insurance. The policy says that it “shall inure to the benefit of any person legally operating” the insured vehicle in the business of the insured. The word “operating” cannot be stretched to include a passenger’s riding in the car or opening the door.

Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.

Order affirmed, with costs, in a memorandum.
Order filed, December 21, 2017.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________ NO. 14

- 17

- 00821

- CR

____________ MARIA CORONA , Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 149th District Court Brazoria County, Texas Tria l Court Cause No. 66522



### ORDER

The reporter’s record in this case was due April 11, 2017

. See Tex. R. App. P. 35.1. On October 25, 2017, this court ordered the court reporter to file the record within 30 days. The record has not been filed with the co urt. Because the reporter’s record has not been filed timely, we issue the following order.

We order Robin Rios , the official court reporter, to file the record in this appeal within 30 days of the date of this order

. No further extension will beenterta ined absent exceptional circumstances. The trial and appellate courts are

jointly responsible for ensuring that the appellate record is timely filed. See Tex. R. App. P. 35.3(c). If Robin Rios does not timely file the record as ordered, we

may issue an order directing the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine the
reason for the failure to file the record.

PER CURIAM
**OFFICE OF**  **THE ATTORNEY**  **GENERAL OF**  **TEXAS AUSTIN** 

Honorable F. L. narrie countymditor Wilbager county V5rnon, rexas Dear Sira **09lnlOll uo.**  **o-66lS** Ret Whschar **Wllbargm** county"' is authorized to lsaue : bond8 for 

### mmorlal audiiiorlum. /' ---..,-.

'-._. 

### 1. **Your** 

### request**for opi~&has**  been‘keg+&d and 

### carefully**comidamd** by thi~,deparbment. Weq&ota$ fmrn your requa8t a8 follovsr~I~. .-' --~,\~

\ ' I:,
%ISO or 0~ ~iti~& 6 **9&90~ing** to petition the Co-t-tg tb,caU~.a boad election for the p;lrposyf ~eitrU+ng ga audltorlum.

Cauba, and others. The +kilable for any organaa~Vel1 as rhe city of

ita Permansia.t.,Improvement Fund for theywpose of erectinga monumant or &me form of memorial on rho courtihouse yard Fn honor of Clay County boys in the Armed Servicer. we quota from said opinion an iollova:Ron. F. L. nassio - Page 2

%* IrcVefallea to fInU. Bnycurhorlty thm pemiia ihe c%araih8ionors' court LOexpand COwty %ndS for LhEpUPpOf!ib hOIWtO~0~ I!I0At~OA@d. we do noi. tblnk ihaL a 'mmumeni or lamorInl* such 68 men;lonud A yaur letier ie a pc~‘~~imonr; **:mproveslsn;** BEcontumyls~ed by ;ne cxm8Litution OP~l;etuieu CP &.ia Scam.

“‘:hersfms, LA de sbsence of such auLhr)rity, It. ia cm ppuion of this depurc.mnc that Clay ,county has no 1ege.l authority io expend money 

### cut of tt3 pc~~~sxmx~L

1rapmveme.ntwncz or 6ny other cauniq -Au11for Lhe purpoaa of erecLl.xq a ~onumenc or some ~OPUI of memorial in hcnor of Lhe cLsieens cf i-ale; cv-iuhy vho are ti the Amed Sorv'rcea, alt:Lcu& 270popoeea expendSure of fzald Punda is a ~ar;rioti~ and coaendable irllo.’

Llkawiea, we havo bsm unable CofXnd any bt;aLUtory auihor1L.y fcm YAM Lstuirnca 3f bands by she County f'or the purpoeea sated in your lettsr.

rJUar the z’acts sLated ve ansver your queatlon Pn the negn-c;ivrJ. Yours very truly 

# ,/

G~PPRoVED OPlNlON 00unTmc 

# .&ii?

DY

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