Filed 9/20/13 P. v. Stiffler CA5

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JEFFREY RAY STIFFLER,

Defendant and Appellant.

F066071

(Super. Ct. No. BF143630B)

OPINION

THE COURT*

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Charles R. 

Brehmer, Judge.

Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, William K. Kim and Kathleen 

A. McKenna, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOoo-

 

* Before Cornell, Acting P.J., Gomes, J., and Kane, J.
2.

Defendant Jeffrey Ray Stiffler pleaded no contest to one count of possessing 

methamphetamine for sale. He had one prior strike within the meaning of the Three 

Strikes Law and was sentenced accordingly. He now argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion when it denied his motion pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) 

(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 to dismiss the prior strike. We affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORIES

The district attorney filed a complaint charging Stiffler with six counts: 

(1) maintaining a place for unlawfully selling methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 

§ 11366); (2) child endangerment (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)1); (3) possession of 

methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378); (4) manufacturing metal 

knuckles or offering them for sale (§ 21810); (5) being under the influence of a controlled 

substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a)); and (6) possession drug 

paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364.1). The complaint alleged that Stiffler had 

served three prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). An 

allegation of a prior strike—a first degree burglary from 1998—was added to the 

complaint later. 

The parties entered into a plea agreement. Stiffler pleaded no contest to count 3 

and admitted a prior prison term and the prior strike. The parties stipulated that a factual 

basis for the plea was contained in law enforcement reports, which are not included in the 

appellate record. In exchange for the plea, Stiffler received a lid of 44 months, consisting 

of the 16-month low term, doubled for the prior strike, plus one year for a prior prisonterm enhancement. The remaining counts were dismissed. Stiffler reserved his right to 

make a Romero motion at the sentencing hearing, arguing that the prior strike should be 

dismissed. 

 

1Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
3.

Stiffler made the Romero motion at sentencing and the court denied it. The court 

imposed the 44-month lid in accordance with the plea agreement. 

DISCUSSION

To establish that a trial court abused its discretion in denying a Romero motion, a 

defendant must show that “no reasonable person could agree” (People v. Carmony (2004) 

33 Cal.4th 367, 377) with the trial court’s determination that the defendant did not fall 

“outside the ... spirit” of the Three Strikes Law (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 

148, 161). Stiffler says he has shown that the court reached “a patently absurd result.” 

We disagree.

The appellate record does not contain Stiffler’s written Romero motion, the 

People’s written response to the motion, or a complete account of Stiffler’s criminal 

history.2 The primary source of information presented to us as a basis for determining 

whether a reasonable person could find that Stiffler fell within the spirit of the Three 

Strikes Law is the remarks of counsel and the court at the sentencing hearing:

“[Defense counsel]: [T]here are a number of reasons why it would 

be appropriate in this case to strike the strike. Mr. Stiffler’s conviction was 

14 years ago. He was 21 years old and he sustained that first degree 

burglary. It was not [a] violent felony. It was a serious felony. There was 

no violence as [far] as I’m aware involved in that particular offense. He 

doesn’t even have a history of violence. He has an ongoing drug problem. 

In spite of that, he has only two other felony convictions. They are both 

quite old. One is from the year 2000 and the other from 2004. He was off 

parole. He was not on probation or parole at the time that the offense was 

committed. He might have been on misdemeanor probation actually but not 

with search terms. He almost actually had finished his five-year washout 

[under section 667.5]. He was four years into a five-year washout to that 

prison prior which he now has in addition to that sentence.

 

2The probation officer submitted a “Short Report” containing only his statement of 

the sentencing options and his recommendation. It does not include Stiffler’s criminal 

history.
4.

“The actual facts of the case are not especially egregious. It wasn’t a 

large quantity of drugs. The total package weight was 8.5 grams. It was 

consistent certainly with personal use. He was under the influence at the 

time that he was detained by law enforcement and he cooperated with law 

enforcement. As a matter of fact, they asked permission—according to the 

officer [although] there might be a dispute of fact—but according to the 

officer Mr. Stiffler gave them permission to enter his residence and conduct 

a search. There were some—I think there was drugs found in the bathroom 

cabinet away from—high up, somewhere where minor kids could not get a 

hold of them.

“And, Judge, he did also enter a plea at an early stage in the 

proceedings. I think—you know, for all the reasons that I’ve enumerated, I 

think it would be appropriate in this case to strike the strike and sentence 

him to the 16 months plus the prison prior, which would be I think a total of 

28 months. In the alternative, if the court is not inclined to strike the strike 

then I would ask that you strike the prison prior and sentence him to the 32. 

But I would also ask to strike the strike.

“THE COURT: Thank you. [¶] Mr. [prosecutor].

“[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, I think Mr. Stiffler’s biggest problem is 

his ongoing criminal activity that’s been outlined in the probation summary 

that was provided at the pre-preliminary hearing. And in the past he’s done 

two years, three years, and I’m not positive but I believe once four years. 

So it’s really a matter of his overall record that the court should consider. 

And this was a possession for sales case in which there were children 

present in the home that although not especially for lack of a better word 

feloniously endangered in this case nonetheless were subject to a filthy 

house with apparent drug sales activity going on to which the co-defendant 

entered a plea as a misdemeanor. So I’m gonna submit on probation’s 

recommendation which would be—I don’t think they’re specifically 

addressing the Romero motion per se but their recommendation is to 

sentence according to the upper lid of 44 months.

“THE COURT: I did read and review the motion filed by Ms. 

[defense counsel]. I have listened carefully to her argument and the 

argument of Mr. [prosecutor]. The difficulty I have in granting the Romero 

motion is that Mr. Stiffler, although the strike is old, is that he continued to 

re-offend and had two more felony convictions since that date. The most 

recent I believe in 2004 which he was sentenced to prison. And although 

that was close as Ms. [defense counsel] does directly state, she has not 

incorrectly stated anything close to being washed out. What it does show is 
5.

that Mr. Stiffler continues to re-offend and it’s roughly around every four 

years or so with a significant offense. This is a very close call but I don’t 

believe it would be appropriate for me to strike the strike. And I don’t find 

it outside the intent of the Three Strikes Law so I’m going to respectfully 

decline to do that. [¶] In regard to the prison prior, it is still a valid prison 

prior and if that was the offer of the People to strike the prison prior that 

would be another issue. But I’m not gonna disturb the plea at this point.” 

In light of this exchange, a reasonable person could conclude that Stiffler fell 

within the spirit of the Three Strikes Law. Our Supreme Court has stated that the 

circumstances must be “‘extraordinary’” under which “‘a career criminal can be deemed 

to fall outside the spirit of the very scheme within which he squarely falls once he 

commits a strike as part of a long and continuous criminal record, the continuation of 

which the law was meant to attack ....’” (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at 

p. 378.) No such extraordinary circumstances have been shown in this case.

Stiffler contends that, in addition to the facts the court referred to, it should also 

have made clear that it was weighing others: that the current offense was not serious or 

violent, that the strike was 14 years old, and that without the strike he would still have 

received a significant prison term. He cites cases discussing various factors that have 

been held to be relevant to a trial court’s decision to avoid a Three Strikes sentence and 

says the court should have mentioned these. (See, e.g., People v. Superior Court 

(Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 978 [relevant factors include nature and circumstances 

of offense, defendant’s attitude toward offense, traits of defendant’s character, and 

sentencing objectives set forth in Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.410].)

We agree that the seriousness of the current offense, the age of the strike, and the 

sentence otherwise available are all relevant factors. These were all presented during oral 

argument at sentencing and the court said it had carefully considered the parties’

contentions. More was not required. There is no rule that in denying a Romero motion 

the court must expressly state on the record its view of the weight that should be given to 

every relevant factor. Instead, we apply the usual appellate presumption that, if the 
6.

record on some factor or issue is silent, the trial court has made all findings necessary to 

support its judgment. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) Our 

Supreme Court has expressly applied this presumption to Romero appeals. (People v. 

Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378 [“‘On a silent record in a post-Romero case, the 

presumption that a trial court ordinarily is presumed to have correctly applied the law 

should be applicable’”].) Stiffler must affirmatively show error to overcome this 

presumption, and he has not done so.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.