United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 17-1161 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 

v. 

LUIS DANIEL BENÍTEZ-BELTRÁN, 

Defendant, Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 

[Hon. Aida M. Delgado-Colón, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Torruella, Lipez, and Barron, 

Circuit Judges. 

Jessica E. Earl, Research and Writing Specialist, Eric 

Alexander Vos, Federal Public Defender, and Vivianne M. Marrero, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Supervisor, Appeals Section, on 

brief for appellant. 

John A. Mathews II, Assistant United States Attorney, Rosa 

Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, and Thomas F. 

Klumper, Assistant United States Attorney, Acting Chief, Appellate 

Division, on brief for appellee. 

June 13, 2018 
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BARRON, Circuit Judge. Luis Daniel Benítez-Beltrán 

("Benítez") appeals the 120-month prison sentence that he received 

after pleading guilty to being, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1), a prohibited person in possession of a firearm. 

Benítez contends that the District Court erred by classifying his 

prior conviction for attempted murder under Puerto Rico law as a 

"crime of violence" that triggers an increase in his base offense 

level pursuant to § 2K2.1(a)(4) of the United States Sentencing 

Guidelines. Benítez also contends that the District Court's upward 

variance from his advisory sentencing range under the Guidelines 

was procedurally unsound and that his sentence is substantively 

unreasonable. We affirm the sentence. 

I. 

During the execution of a search warrant at Benítez's 

residence in 2013, Puerto Rico police agents found a loaded 

revolver hidden behind the drawer of a nightstand. The following 

day, the federal government charged Benítez, who is a convicted 

felon, with one count of being a prohibited person in possession 

of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 

In November of 2014, Benítez pleaded guilty to this count 

pursuant to a plea agreement.1 Benítez, who was then serving a 

 1 The parties agreed to recommend a sentence of 180 months on 

the understanding that Benítez had three prior convictions for a 

"violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 
- 3 - 

ninety-year sentence for a 2014 conviction under Puerto Rico law 

for aggravated robbery and related weapons law violations,2 was 

sentenced for this federal conviction in January of 2017. 

A probation officer prepared a presentence report 

("PSR") based on the November 2016 edition of the Sentencing 

Guidelines. The PSR determined that § 2K2.1(a)(4) of the 

Guidelines applied. That guideline establishes the base offense 

level that applies to a defendant convicted of unlawful possession 

of a firearm if the defendant committed that offense after having 

been convicted of a felony that qualifies as a "crime of violence." 

Applying that guideline, the PSR determined that Benítez's base 

offense level was twenty, when, in the absence of that guideline's 

application, his base offense level would have been fourteen. See 

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(6) (2016). 

The PSR concluded that Benítez had a prior conviction 

that qualified as a "crime of violence" due to his 1998 conviction 

for attempted murder under Puerto Rico law. The PSR stated that 

 

§ 924(e)(1). But, after the Supreme Court's intervening decision 

in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 576 U.S. ___ (2015), 

invalidated part of the statutory definition of a "violent felony," 

both parties ultimately recommended a shorter sentence.

2 The parties' briefs generally refer to the sentence as 

having a ninety-year duration. We note, however, that Benítez's 

counsel said at the sentencing hearing that the "total sentence 

was 115 years, with somewhere between 60 to 65 years as a minimum," 

and that Benítez's appellate brief at one point also refers to a 

115-year sentence.
- 4 - 

this prior offense so qualified under what is known as the "force 

clause" of the Sentencing Guidelines' definition of a "crime of 

violence."3

The PSR also applied a four-level enhancement under 

§ 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) to Benítez's offense level because the firearm 

involved in Benítez's § 922(g) offense had an obliterated serial 

number. Finally, the PSR reduced Benítez's offense level by three 

levels pursuant to § 3E1.1 due to his acceptance of responsibility. 

In sum, the PSR calculated Benítez's total offense level 

to be twenty-one. Because the PSR assigned Benítez a criminal 

history category of V, the PSR determined that Benítez's advisory 

range for his term of imprisonment under the Guidelines was seventy 

to eighty-seven months. 

After hearing from the parties, the District Court 

adopted the PSR's Guidelines calculation. In doing so, the 

District Court concluded that Benítez had "only one prior 

conviction" for a "crime of violence," namely his 1998 attempted 

murder conviction under Puerto Rico law. The District Court then 

sentenced Benítez to the statutory maximum prison term of 120 

months, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(2), which was a term of imprisonment 

just under three years above the upper end of the advisory 

 3 The force clause provides that a "crime of violence" 

encompasses any felony that "has as an element the use, attempted 

use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of 

another." U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(a)(1) (2016). 
- 5 - 

sentencing range under the Guidelines. The District Court ruled 

that the sentence would run consecutively to any sentence that 

Benítez was then serving, which would include his ninety-year 

sentence for his Puerto Rico conviction for aggravated robbery. 

Benítez objected to the upward variance and then appealed the 

sentence. 

II. 

Benítez first challenges the District Court's conclusion 

that he had a prior conviction for a "crime of violence" under 

§ 2K2.1(a)(4). Our review of whether Benítez's prior conviction 

for attempted murder under Puerto Rico law qualifies as a "crime 

of violence" under the Guidelines is de novo. See United States 

v. Steed, 879 F.3d 440, 445 (1st Cir. 2018). 

A. 

The term "crime of violence" in § 2K2.1(a)(4) has the 

same meaning as it has in the § 4B1.2 career-offender guideline. 

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1, cmt. n.1 (2016). 

Section 4B1.2(a) defines a "crime of violence" to be any offense 

punishable by more than one year of imprisonment that either "has 

as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 

force against the person of another" (the so-called force clause) 

or is one of several enumerated crimes, including "murder." 

Benítez contends that his prior conviction for attempted 

murder under Puerto Rico law does not qualify as a "crime of 
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violence." He does so on the ground that this offense, as defined 

at the time of his conviction, neither falls within § 4B1.2(a)'s 

force clause nor matches one of the offenses enumerated in that 

guideline's definition of a "crime of violence." 

We need not address Benítez's argument concerning the 

force clause. As we explain, his attempted murder conviction is 

for an offense that matches one of the guideline definition's 

enumerated offenses. See United States v. Ball, 870 F.3d 1, 5 

(1st Cir. 2017) ("We may affirm the district court's sentence if 

any one of the . . . ways that an offense can constitute a crime 

of violence . . . applies here."). 

We use a "categorical approach" to determine whether the 

offense for which a defendant was previously convicted matches an 

expressly enumerated offense under § 4B1.2(a). United States v. 

Castro-Vazquez, 802 F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Descamps 

v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283, 570 U.S. ___ (2013)). 

Under that categorical approach, a prior conviction qualifies as 

one for a "crime of violence" so long as the elements of the prior 

offense encompass no more conduct than do the elements of the 

"generic" version of an offense that the guideline expressly 

enumerates. Id. (quoting Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283, 570 U.S. 

at ___). 

To begin our comparative analysis of the elements of 

Benítez's offense of attempted murder under Puerto Rico law and 
- 7 - 

the generic version of that offense, we set to one side the fact 

that his prior conviction was for attempted murder rather than 

simply "murder." That way, we may first focus on the way that 

Puerto Rico law defined the offense of "murder" at the time of his 

conviction, so that we may determine whether that definition makes 

that offense of "murder" a match with one of the enumerated 

offenses in § 4B1.2(a). 

B. 

As we have noted, § 4B1.2(a) does list "murder" among 

the expressly enumerated offenses that qualify as a "crime of 

violence." So, we must determine whether the generic version of 

that offense matches the way that Puerto Rico defined that offense 

when Benítez was convicted of attempting to commit that crime. If 

the generic version of "murder" is not such a match, then Benítez's 

conviction for attempted murder obviously does not match an 

enumerated offense. 

The parties agree that, at the time of Benítez's 

conviction for attempted murder, Puerto Rico defined "murder" as 

"the killing of a human being with malice aforethought." Pueblo 

v. Lucret Quiñones, 11 P.R. Offic. Trans. 904, 929 (P.R. 1981) 

(quoting P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 33, § 4001 (1974)). Benítez's sole 

argument that the Puerto Rico offense of "murder" at the time of 

his conviction encompassed more conduct than the generic version 

of that offense is the following. He asserts that the Puerto Rico 
- 8 - 

offense of "murder" required "purposeful or knowing conduct," 

whereas, he says, the generic version of "murder" requires "conduct 

evincing reckless or depraved indifference to dangers." And, 

Benítez goes on to contend, in consequence of that difference 

between the mens rea element of the way Puerto Rico defined 

"murder" and the mens rea element of the generic version of that 

offense, the Puerto Rico offense of "murder" criminalized conduct 

that the generic version of the offense did not.

We, however, do not agree. Benítez bases his assertion 

on the surprising contention that the mens rea of "purpose" and 

the mens rea of "knowledge" are less strict than the mens rea of 

"recklessness" and the mens rea of "depraved indifference." But 

Benítez offers no authority to support that contention, and there 

is good reason to think that the opposite would be the case. Cf. 

Model Penal Code § 2.02(5) ("When recklessness suffices to 

establish an element, such element also is established if a person 

acts purposely or knowingly."). 

Nor has Benítez persuasively identified any case in 

which Puerto Rico applied its "murder" statute to encompass more 

conduct than the generic version of the offense, even accepting 

his description of the mens rea for "murder" under Puerto Rico law 

at the time of his conviction and the mens rea for the generic 

version of the offense. Under the categorical approach, however, 

there must be a "realistic probability" that Puerto Rico would 
- 9 - 

have applied its "murder" statute at the relevant time to encompass 

conduct that the generic definition of "murder" does not 

criminalize in order for us to conclude that the Puerto Rico 

offense is broader. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1685, 

569 U.S. ___ (2013) (quoting Gonzales v. Duenas-Álvarez, 549 U.S. 

183, 193 (2007)), and the party that seeks "[t]o defeat the 

categorical comparison" bears the burden to demonstrate such a 

"realistic probability." Id. at 1693, 569 U.S. at ___; see also 

Duenas-Álvarez, 549 U.S. at 193. 

Accordingly, we reject Benítez's contention that the 

Puerto Rico definition of "murder" encompassed less conduct than 

the generic offense of "murder."4 And so we next turn to Benítez's 

alternative contention, which focuses on the way that "attempt" is 

defined under Puerto Rico law relative to the way that it is 

defined generically. 

C. 

In pressing this argument, Benítez contends that there 

is no match between the offense for which he was convicted and an 

 4 Benítez also points out that accomplices can be convicted 

of "murder" as principals in Puerto Rico. To the extent that he 

means to contend that for this reason the Puerto Rico offense of 

"murder" at the time of his conviction was broader than the generic 

crime, we note that the commentary to § 4B1.2(a) provides that the 

enumerated crimes of violence include aiding and abetting such 

offenses. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2, cmt. n.1 

(2016). And Benítez has not argued that Puerto Rico's definition 

of "aiding and abetting" encompassed more conduct than the generic 

definition of "aiding and abetting." 
- 10 - 

enumerated offense under the Guidelines' definition of a "crime of 

violence" because, at the time of his conviction, Puerto Rico law 

defined "attempt" to encompass more conduct than the generic 

definition of "attempt" does. There is no serious question that 

"attempting to commit" a "crime of violence" is itself a "crime of 

violence." U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2, cmt. n.1 

(2016); see also United States v. DeLuca, 17 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 

1994) (noting that the Guidelines are "transpicuous" on the point 

that the term "crime of violence" includes "attempting to commit" 

such an offense). Thus, so long as Puerto Rico defined "attempt" 

at the time of Benítez's conviction in a way that matches the 

generic definition of "attempt," then his conviction will qualify 

as one for a "crime of violence," given our conclusion about the 

match between Puerto Rico's definition of "murder" and what Benítez 

contends is the generic definition of "murder." 

The parties agree that, at the time of Benítez's 

conviction for attempted murder, Puerto Rico law provided that an 

"attempt" exists "when the person commits acts or makes omissions 

unequivocally directed to the execution of an offense, which is 

not consummated through circumstances extraneous to his will." 

Their dispute therefore concerns whether that Puerto Rico law 

definition of "attempt" matches the generic definition of 

"attempt." 
- 11 - 

Benítez contends that there is no such match. He relies 

on the way that "attempt" has been defined as a matter of federal 

criminal law to define the generic definition of "attempt." 

Specifically, Benítez contends that, under the federal definition 

of "attempt" -- and thus, in his view, under the generic definition 

-- the intent to commit both the underlying inchoate offense and 

the commission of "an overt act constituting a substantial step 

toward the commission of the offense" are required. Benítez then 

asserts that "attempt" under Puerto Rico law encompassed more 

conduct than this federal definition because it defined an 

"attempt" to encompass "any act or omission" -- as opposed to "a 

substantial step" -- including "mere preparation or slight acts." 

In making this assertion, however, Benítez fails to 

offer any explanation as to why an act or omission that is 

"unequivocally directed to the execution of an offense" would not 

be considered a "substantial step" under the generic version of 

"attempt." And Benítez's failure is conspicuous given that he 

concedes that Puerto Rico law made that element of unequivocalness 

an element of "attempt." Nor does such an explanation occur to 

us. As we mentioned, Benítez defines the generic version of 

"attempt" according to the law of federal "attempt." But, "[i]n 

this circuit, as in a number of others, the court has taken the 

Model Penal Code as its guide" in defining the federal law of 

"attempt." United States v. Doyon, 194 F.3d 207, 210 (1st Cir. 
- 12 - 

1999).5 And the Model Penal Code both defines "attempt" as "an 

act or omission constituting a substantial step," § 5.01(1)(c), 

and then goes on to define a "substantial step" as one that is 

"strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose." Doyon, 

194 F.3d at 211 (quoting Model Penal Code § 5.01(2)). Thus, it 

would appear that the definition of "attempt" that Benítez concedes 

Puerto Rico had adopted was no broader than the generic definition 

of "attempt," as it would appear that an act or omission that is 

"unequivocally directed to the execution of an offense" is also 

one that is "strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal 

purpose." 

Finally, we note, as we did in addressing his argument 

about "murder," that Benítez bears the burden of proving that there 

is a realistic probability that Puerto Rico's definition of his 

prior crime applies to more conduct than does the generic 

definition of that crime. But, as was the case with respect to 

Benítez's assertions about the relative breadth of conduct 

encompassed by Puerto Rico's definition of "murder," Benítez has 

not pointed to any Puerto Rico case (or even described a 

hypothetical case) that shows that Puerto Rico's definition of 

 5 In United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102 (2007), 

which Benítez invokes to define federal "attempt," the Supreme 

Court also relied in part on the Model Penal Code's definition of 

"attempt." See id. at 107. 
- 13 - 

"attempt" at the time of his conviction for attempted murder 

applied more broadly than does the generic definition of "attempt." 

Thus, for these reasons, we conclude that Benítez has 

not shown that the District Court erred in sentencing him by 

classifying his 1998 conviction for attempted murder under Puerto 

Rico law as an enumerated "crime of violence." Accordingly, we 

reject this first ground for challenging his sentence. 

III. 

Wholly apart from the "crime of violence" issue, Benítez 

also challenges his 120-month prison sentence as procedurally 

unsound and substantively unreasonable. "We review criminal 

sentences imposed under the advisory guidelines regime for abuse 

of discretion. Within this rubric, we assay the district court's 

factfinding for clear error and afford de novo consideration to 

its interpretation and application of the sentencing guidelines." 

United States v. Flores-Machicote, 706 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 2013) 

(internal citations omitted). 

We begin with Benítez's procedural challenges to his 

sentence. We then turn to his substantive challenge.

A. 

Benítez contends that the District Court committed 

procedural errors in sentencing him to the statutory maximum of 

120 months of imprisonment by (1) considering a prior sentence 

that he received for a separate Puerto Rico law conviction, (2) 
- 14 - 

considering charges that were then pending against him in a 

separate case under federal law, and (3) failing to explain the 

basis for the upward variance from his advisory sentencing range 

under the Guidelines. None of these contentions has merit. 

1.

Although Benítez asserts that the District Court 

impermissibly considered the sentence that he had recently 

received for aggravated robbery under Puerto Rico law in imposing 

his sentence for his federal conviction, Benítez does not show 

that the District Court actually did so. He instead merely points 

out that the government "highlighted Mr. Benítez's state court 

case and its lengthy sentence" and that the District Court "made 

mention" of that case at the sentencing hearing. Because Benítez 

neither explains how the District Court relied on the sentence 

that he received for aggravated robbery to justify the 120-month 

prison sentence nor develops an argument as to why any such 

reliance would have been impermissible, this aspect of his 

procedural challenge fails. See United States v. Zannino, 895 

F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (explaining that undeveloped arguments 

are deemed waived). 

2. 

Benítez also contends that, in sentencing him, the 

District Court impermissibly considered a separate federal 

criminal case that was then pending against him in which he was 
- 15 - 

charged with carjacking, robbery, and using a firearm in relation 

to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2119, 1951, 

and 924(c) respectively. Benítez contends that the District Court 

should not have considered those pending charges in setting his 

sentence in this case because he should have been "presumed 

innocent" of those charges. 

The District Court expressly stated at the sentencing 

hearing, however, that it would not consider those then-pending 

charges in its sentencing decision "in as much [as] he is presumed 

innocent and he is still facing trial and if convicted that will 

be for [the other judge] to determine and assess what is the 

punishment for that offense." Thus, the District Court did not 

purport to be basing his federal sentence on those pending charges. 

To be sure, Benítez does point out that the District 

Court later in the hearing went on to refer to his arrest for 

carjacking and related offenses while describing the overall 

pattern of arrests and convictions in Benítez's criminal history. 

But, while we have repeatedly expressed our concern about relying 

on a pattern of prior arrests in the absence of proof by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the alleged conduct underlying 

those arrests occurred, see United States v. Rondón-García, 886 

F.3d 14, 26 (1st Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. DelgadoSánchez, 849 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2017)), Benítez does not contend 

that it was impermissible for the District Court to rely on his 
- 16 - 

pattern of prior arrests in setting his sentence. See Zannino, 

895 F.2d at 17. Instead, he contends only that the District Court 

increased his sentence because of his pending charges, 

notwithstanding that the District Court expressly stated that it 

was not increasing his sentence due to those charges.

3. 

Benítez's final procedural challenge is that the 

District Court erred in sentencing him by failing to justify 

adequately its decision to vary upward from his advisory sentencing 

range. Benítez argues that, even though that range accounted for 

his criminal history, the District Court nevertheless relied on 

that very same history in varying upwards from the range, which he 

says was an error under United States v. Ofray-Campos, 534 F.3d 1, 

43 (1st Cir. 2008). 

But, Benítez's advisory sentencing range did not 

necessarily account for the fact that, as the District Court found, 

"the chances of recidivism are extremely high" here in light of 

the District Court's finding that Benítez was engaging in crimes 

involving "the continued use of weapons, the repeated engagement 

in violent actions against individuals" with little to no off time 

between convictions and sentences. In this regard, the District 

Court explained that the two prior lengthy prison sentences that 

Benítez had received -- a sentence of nine years of imprisonment 

for attempted murder and related weapons law violations in 1998 
- 17 - 

and a sentence of eighteen years of imprisonment for robbery and 

related weapons law violations in 2003 -- "did not serve the 

purpose of deterrence." See United States v. Thompson, 681 F. 

App'x 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2017) (finding no abuse of discretion in 

varying upward from the advisory sentencing range where the 

sentencing court "noted that [the defendant's] four convictions 

and sentences for 'drug involved' crimes over the course of nine 

years indicated that he was engaged in the drug trade essentially 

continuously, with no off time suggesting that he had reformed or 

was deterred by the law"). 

In addition, we have explained that "the incidence of 

particular crimes in the relevant community appropriately informs 

and contextualizes the relevant need for deterrence." FloresMachicote, 706 F.3d at 23. And, in this case, the District Court 

found that "the current increase in criminality rate and murder we 

experience here in Puerto Rico" supported the conclusion that there 

was a particular need for deterrence in this case. 

Benítez does assert that the District Court erred by not 

explicitly addressing some mitigating factors that Benítez had put 

forth, such as his young age when he committed his previous crimes, 

"the birth of his first grandchild, the death of his brother, or 

his relationship with his mother." But, "a sentencing court is 

not required to address frontally every argument advanced by the 

parties." United States v. Turbides-Leonardo, 468 F.3d 34, 40 
- 18 - 

(1st Cir. 2006). Moreover, a sentencing court acts "well within 

its discretion in giving greater weight to [a defendant's] criminal 

history than other factors." United States v. Arroyo-Maldonado, 

791 F.3d 193, 200 (1st Cir. 2015). Thus, as the District Court 

did address several mitigating factors that Benítez had identified 

-- such as his current age, his children, and a serious medical 

diagnosis -- we cannot say that the District Court abused its 

discretion in giving the mitigating factors the weight that it 

did, even though the District Court did not specifically mention 

the other mitigating factors that Benítez highlights on appeal.

Nor do we find persuasive Benítez's related contention 

that the District Court erred by impermissibly "turn[ing] some of 

the mitigation into a reason for a statutory maximum sentence." 

Benítez points to the District Court's comment that he "has not 

been able to refrain himself from engaging in illegal conduct" 

despite the fact that he has "good examples from brothers and 

family members" and is not "a drug user." But, we do not see how 

the District Court abused its discretion in reasoning that the 

likelihood of recidivism is high despite the presence of certain 

mitigating factors. See United States v. Sagendorf, 445 F.3d 515, 

518 n.2 (1st Cir. 2016) (per curiam) ("[T]he requirement that the 

sentencing judge consider a § 3553(a) factor that may cut in a 

defendant's favor does not bestow on the defendant an entitlement 
- 19 - 

to receive any particular 'credit' under that factor."). Thus, we 

reject this ground for Benítez's procedural challenge, too. 

B. 

We take up, then, Benítez's argument that his 120-month 

prison sentence is substantively unreasonable, given that it was 

the maximum allowed and was being imposed consecutively to a 

ninety-year sentence. We are not persuaded. 

"[T]he linchpin of a reasonable sentence is a plausible 

sentencing rationale and a defensible result." United States v. 

Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 96 (1st Cir. 2008). Here, "[i]n concluding 

that the statutory maximum sentence was justified because this 

incident . . . was just the latest in a pattern of serious crimes, 

the district court offered a plausible rationale for its variance." 

United States v. Concepción-Montijo, 875 F.3d 58, 60 (1st Cir. 

2017) (per curiam). And, Benítez does not challenge the District 

Court's decision to impose the federal sentence consecutively. 

See United States v. Ocasio-Cancel, 727 F.3d 85, 89-90 (1st Cir. 

2013) (describing a district court's "broad" discretion under 18 

U.S.C. § 3584(a) to decide "whether to impose a concurrent or 

consecutive sentence"). We thus fail to see what basis there is 

for concluding that the District Court erred in setting this 

federal sentence and then ordering it to run consecutively, given 

that the variance itself was justified and that Benítez does not 
- 20 - 

challenge the decision to impose the federal sentence 

consecutively. 

Benítez does reference our recent statement that 

"[c]ontext matters" in sentencing decisions in contending that 

imposing an upwardly variant sentence consecutively to an already 

lengthy one is substantively unreasonable. United States v. Matosde-Jesús, 856 F.3d 174, 180 (1st Cir. 2017). But, we explained in 

Matos-de-Jesús that the sentence there was substantively 

reasonable because, in context, it was "responsive to the nature 

and circumstances of the offense, the characteristics of the 

offender, the importance of deterrence, and the need for condign 

punishment." Id. And while Benítez asserts in conclusory fashion 

that this consecutive sentence is "an excessive punishment for a 

handgun tucked away in a bedroom drawer," he fails to develop any 

argument as to why these features of his offense -- when considered 

in context, and especially given the evident need for deterrence 

in light of his criminal history -- indicate that the District 

Court abused its discretion in determining his sentence. See 

Zannino, 895 F.2d at 17. 

IV. 

For these reasons, Benítez's sentence is affirmed.