Filed 2/28/23 P. v. Knox CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JACKIE LEE KNOX, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B322184

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA415456)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los

Angeles County, James R. Dabney, Judge. Affirmed.

Kevin D. Sheehy, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

I

An information charged defendant and appellant Jackie 

Lee Knox, Jr. with one count of attempted willful, deliberate, and 

premeditated murder (Pen. Code,2 §§ 187, subd. (a), 664), and one 

count of criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)). The prosecution 

alleged that, in 2013, Knox accosted his longtime girlfriend, 

accused her of cheating on him, told her, “[y]ou’re gonna make me 

kill you,” and “[y]ou’re gonna die today,” and stabbed her at least 

16 times, including once in the neck.

In 2017,3 Knox agreed to a plea bargain under which the 

prosecution struck the allegation that Knox acted with 

premeditation and deliberation in the attempted murder, and 

Knox pleaded no contest to the remaining charges and waived 

credit for time served. As part of his plea, Knox admitted that he 

personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. 

(b)(1)) in the commission of both offenses and personally inflicted 

great bodily injury on the victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)) in the 

attempted murder. Pursuant to the agreement, the court 

sentenced Knox to 16 years in prison.

1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion because it 

“is determined by a controlling statute which is not challenged for 

unconstitutionality and does not present any substantial question 

of interpretation or application.” (Cal. Rules of Court, Standard 

8.1(1).)

2 Unless otherwise specified, subsequent statutory 

references are to the Penal Code.

3 The case had been delayed after the trial court found 

Knox incompetent to stand trial.
3

In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 

(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), which “eliminated natural and probable 

consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and 

abetting, and limited the scope of the felony-murder rule.” 

(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957.) The legislation also 

enacted former section 1170.95 (subsequently renumbered as 

section 1172.6), which provides a mechanism for defendants 

previously convicted of murder, but who could not be convicted of 

murder under the law as amended, to petition for the court to 

vacate their convictions and resentence them. In 2021, the

Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), 

which, among other changes, extended the application of thensection 1170.95 to defendants convicted of attempted murder 

under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

On January 14, 2022, Knox filed a petition for resentencing 

under then-section 1170.95. The People opposed the petition on 

the ground that Knox “was the direct and only perpetrator of the 

crime of attempted murder” and that he could still be convicted of 

attempted murder under current law. Knox’s appointed counsel 

declined to file a reply brief and submitted on the basis of the 

pleadings. The trial court denied the petition, finding that Knox

had failed to make a prima facie case that he was entitled to 

relief.

We appointed counsel to represent Knox on appeal. Knox’s 

attorney filed a brief raising no issues and requesting that we

exercise our discretion to independently review the record for 

error pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216. In 

Delgadillo, the Supreme Court established procedures for cases 

in which counsel determines that an appeal from an order 

denying postconviction relief lacks merit. In such cases, 
4

“(1) counsel should file a brief informing the court of that 

determination, including a concise recitation of the facts bearing 

on the denial of the petition; and (2) the court should send, with a 

copy of counsel’s brief, notice to the defendant, informing the 

defendant of the right to file a supplemental letter or brief and 

that if no letter or brief is filed within 30 days, the court may 

dismiss the matter.” (Id. at pp. 231-232.) If the defendant does 

not file a supplemental brief, we “may dismiss the appeal as 

abandoned.” (Id. at p. 232.) If the defendant does file a 

supplemental brief or letter, we are “required to evaluate the 

specific arguments presented in that brief and to issue a written 

opinion. The filing of a supplemental brief or letter does not 

compel an independent review of the entire record to identify 

unraised issues.” (Ibid.)

We followed the procedure outlined above and, on 

January 13, 2023, sent Knox a letter notifying him of the nomerits brief and informing him that he had 30 days to file a 

supplemental brief. Four days later, his appellate attorney sent 

us a copy of a document from Knox titled “Petition for Rehearing” 

and asked us to treat it as a supplemental brief.

II

In his supplemental brief, Knox makes several contentions, 

only one of which relates to the denial of his petition for 

resentencing. Knox claims that he could not be found guilty of 

attempted murder under current law because “there is no 

element[ ] of malice in the plea agreement,” and that under 

current law, “[m]alice should not be imputed based on a person[’s] 

participation in a crime.” We assume Knox is referring to the 

fact that, as part of his plea bargain, the prosecution agreed to 

strike the allegation that Knox committed attempted murder 
5

with premeditation and deliberation.

We disagree with Knox’s assertion regarding the plea 

agreement. Express malice has long been an element of 

attempted murder, regardless of whether the defendant is alleged 

to have acted with premeditation and deliberation. (See People v. 

Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 740.) Prior to the enactment of 

Senate Bills Nos. 1437 and 775, however, the natural and

probable consequences doctrine provided an exception. Under 

that doctrine, a defendant “ ‘who knowingly aids and abets 

criminal conduct is guilty of not only the intended crime [target 

offense] but also of any other crime the perpetrator actually 

commits [nontarget offense] that is a natural and probable 

consequence of the intended crime.’ ” (People v. Medina (2009) 46 

Cal.4th 913, 920.) Thus, a defendant could be convicted of 

murder even if he did not intend or foresee that a killing would 

occur. (People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 165-166.) By 

barring the imputation of malice based on the defendant’s 

participation in another crime, the new homicide laws eliminated

the natural and probable consequences doctrine in cases of 

murder (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 846) and 

attempted murder (People v. Sanchez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 191, 

196).

In this case, Knox admitted that he personally used a 

weapon and caused great bodily injury in the commission of 

attempted murder, and there is no indication that Knox aided 

and abetted anyone else in the commission of any offense. Thus,

the record demonstrates that Knox was not convicted under the 

natural and probable consequences doctrine, but rather on the 

basis of his own action in attempting to kill the victim. Knox

cannot show that he “could not presently be convicted of murder 
6

or attempted murder because of” the recent changes in the law 

(§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3)), and the trial court did not err by denying 

his petition.

The remaining claims in Knox’s supplemental brief 

challenge aspects of his sentence unrelated to his section 1172.6 

petition. These claims fail because a defendant may not use an 

appeal of a postjudgment order to contest “matters that could 

have been reviewed on timely appeal from the judgment.” 

(People v. Howerton (1953) 40 Cal.2d 217, 220; accord, People v. 

Totari (2002) 28 Cal.4th 876, 882.) Furthermore, Knox agreed to 

the length of his sentence and the waiver of his presentence 

custody credits as part of his plea bargain. We have reviewed the 

transcript of the plea hearing, and we see nothing improper about 

Knox’s waiver of his trial rights nor the duration of his sentence.

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order denying Knox’s petition for 

resentencing is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

CHANEY, J.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.