This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restricti ons on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3 v. No. 33,663 4 WILLIAM JEROME HUNTER, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OTERO COUNTY 7 Angie K. Schneider, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender 12 Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender 13 Santa Fe, NM 14 for Appellant 15 MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 SUTIN, Judge. 172 {1} Defendant has appealed from a convi ction for trafficking a controlled 1 substance. We previously issued a notice of proposed summary disposition, 2 proposing to affirm. Defendant has filed a combinedmemorandum in opposition and 3 motion to amend the docketing statement. After due consideration, we remain 4 unpersuaded. We therefore affirm. 5
{2} Because the pertinent background information and applicable principles have 6 previously been set out, we will avoid unn ecessary repetition here and instead focus 7 on the content of the memorandum in opposition. 8
{3} First, Defendant renews hi s argument that he receive d ineffective assistance of 9 counsel. [MIO 9-13] Specifically, Defendant contends that trial counsel’s failure to 10 conduct an adequate pretrial investigati on, including conducting a pretrial interview 11 of the deputy who participated in the c ontrolled buy and subpoenaing the confidential 12 informant to testify at the trial, was obj ectively unreasonable and resulted in less than 13 a full and fair presentation of his defense. For the present purposes, we will assume 14 that counsel’s conduct was unreasonable. See generally State v. Sotelo , 2013- 15 NMCA-028, ¶ 31, 296 P.3d 1232 (describing the two prongs of the test for ineffective 16 assistance claims). However, Defendant has not demonstrated that the outcome of the 17 trial would have been different but for this failure. See generally id. Although 18 Defendant speculates that a more thorough pretrial investigation would have 193 strengthened the defense, this is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of 1 ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Martinez , 2007-NMCA-160, ¶¶ 20, 23, 2 143 N.M. 96, 173 P.3d 18 (rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based 3 in part upon failure to conduct pretrial interviews, where the defendant provided no 4 specifics how his defense would have b een strengthened by more preparation); State 5 v. Telles , 1999-NMCA-013, ¶ 25, 126 N.M. 593, 973 P.2d 845 (rejecting a claim of 6 ineffective assistance based on counsel’s alleged failure to investigate, where the 7 record was inadequate to support the claim) . We reject Defendant’s first argument. 8 However, we reach this conclusion without prejudice to Defendant’s pursuit of habeas 9 corpus proceedings on this issue and th e development of a factual record. See State 10 v. Gonzales , 2007-NMSC-059, ¶ 16, 143 N.M. 25, 172 P.3d 162. 11
{4} Second, Defendant continue s to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to 12 support his conviction. [MIO13-17] We remain unpersuaded. As we previously 13 observed, the State presented evidence th at Defendant transf erred Oxycodone to an 14 undercover police officer in the course of a controlled buy that was facilitated by a 15 confidential informant. [MIO 6-7] This evidence is sufficient to establish that 16 Defendant committed the offense. See State v. Rael , 1999-NMCA-068, ¶ 27, 127 17 N.M. 347, 981 P.2d 280 (holding that an undercover agent’s testimony that he 18 purchased heroin from the defendant provi ded sufficient support for a conviction for 194 trafficking) , rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Rael v. Blair , 2007-NMSC-006, 141 1 N.M. 232, 153 P.3d 657. Although Defendant continues to focus on informational 2 gaps, including the officer’s lack of comp lete knowledge of th e interaction between 3 the informant and Defendant, c ontending that the transaction could have been circular 4 [MIO 16], the jury reasonably concluded that the evidence was sufficiently 5 compelling to establish Defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court will 6 not second-guess the jury’s decision. See State v. Lucero , 1994-NMCA-129, ¶ 10, 7 118 N.M. 696, 884 P.2d 1175 (“[A] reviewing court will not second-guess the jury’s 8 decision concerning the credibility of witne sses, reweigh the evidence, or substitute 9 its judgment for that of the jury.”). 10
{5} Third, Defendant renews his argument that the district court erred in failing to 11 declare a mistrial. [MIO 17-21; RP 169] Relatedly, and by his motion to amend, 12 Defendant argues that the prosecutor’s comme nts effectively denied him due process 13 and a fair trial. [MIO 1, 17-21] Because this merely el aborates upon an issue already 14 raised, no amendment to the docketing statement is required. On the merits, however, 15 we remain unpersuaded by Defendant’s assertions of error. As we previously 16 observed in the notice of proposed summary disposition, the prosecutor appears to 17 have commented in closing upon defense couns el’s failure to challenge identity, rather 18 than Defendant’s failure to testify. [RP 169] In re sponse Defendant relies upon the 195 case of Gonzales v. State , 1980-NMSC-070, 94 N.M. 495, 612 P.2d 1306, in which 1 the Court reversed and remanded for a ne w trial based upon the prosecutor’s closing 2 references to the defendant’s failure to e ither deny the allegations or to offer any 3 justification for his acts. [MIO 19] Th e Court observed that although the prosecutor 4 probably “meant his comments to apply only to the arguments of defense counsel,” 5 his “choice of words” did “not exclude a reasonable interpretation that he was making 6 a direct comment on [the defendant’s] failure to testify.” Id. ¶ 3. Gonzalesis 7 distinguishable. In this case, while we l ack a precise description of the prosecutor’s 8 choice of words, the record indicates that the comment was ambiguous. Defense 9 counsel appears to have advanced no objection; instead, the district court raised the 10 matter sua sponte after closing arguments had concluded. [RP 169] After inviting 11 arguments and considering the comment in context, the district court ultimately 12 determined that the prosecuto r’s comment was responsive to defense counsel’s closing 13 argument. [RP 169] Although the districtcourt offered a curative instruction, 14 Defendant declined. [RP 169] Under th e circumstances, and based on the record 15 before us, we cannot say that the distri ct court abused its discretion in denying 16 Defendant’s motion for mistrial. See, e.g. , State v. Smith , 2001-NMSC-004, ¶¶ 34-40, 17 130 N.M. 117, 19 P.3d 254 (concluding that a mistrial was not required, where a 18 curative instruction was rejected relative to an improper question, and where the 196 prosecutor’s closing remarks, “[t]aken in context,” were responsive to the argument 1 of defense counsel, were based on evidence presented at trial, and did not amount to 2 direct comment upon [the d]efendant’s refusal to testify); State v. Dominguez , 3 2014-NMCA-064, ¶¶ 22, 25, 327 P.3d 1092 (“Trial judges are afforded broad 4 discretion in managing closing arguments because they are in the best position to 5 assess the impact of allege dly improper statements by counsel. We therefore review 6 for abuse of discretion and will only find re versible error in the most exceptional 7 circumstances.” (internal quotati on marks and citation omitted)). 8
{6} Fourth and finally, Defendant continues toassert that his constitutional right to 9 a speedy trial was violated. [MIO 22-27] As we observed in the notice of proposed 10 summary disposition, the first three factors weigh in Defendant’s favor, albeit slightly. 11 [MIO 23-25; CN 6-8] Ultimately, however , the absence of particularized prejudice 12 to the defense constitutes a fatal deficiency. The New Mexico Supreme Court has 13 explained that “generally a defendant mu st show particularized prejudice” to his 14 ability to defend himself and that it is only where “the length of delay and the reasons 15 for the delay weigh heavily in[the] defendant’s favor and [he] has asserted his right 16 and not acquiesced to the delay” that “thedefendant need not show [particularized] 17 prejudice” in order to prevail on a speedy trial claim. State v. Garza , 18 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 39, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387. In this case, Defendant does not 197 claim the loss of any exculpatory witnesses, the deterioration of exculpatory evidence, 1 or any other kind of particularized prejudice to his defense. See id. ¶ 36. Neither his 2 generalized assertions of anxiety and concern nor the travel limitations associated with 3 the conditions of his release are sufficient, particularly in light of Defendant’s failure 4 to request any modification. [MIO 27] See id. ¶ 37 (concluding that where the 5 defendant only demonstrated “prejudice in the form of restrictions imposed by 6 pre-trial conditions of release and stress[,] ” he failed to demonstrate particularized 7 prejudice as required). We therefore rej ect Defendant’s speedy trial claim. See id. 8 ¶ 40 (holding that because the “other factor s do not weigh heavily in [the d]efendant’s 9 favor” and “[b]ecause [the d] efendant failed to demonstrate particularized prejudice 10 . . . we cannot conclude that [the d]efendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated”). 11
{7} Accordingly, for the reasons stated in our notice of proposed summary 12 disposition and in this Opinion, we affirm. 13
{8} IT IS SO ORDERED. 14

__________________________________ 15 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 16 WE CONCUR: 17

_______________________________ 18 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge 198 _______________________________ 1 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 2