United States Court of App.eals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 97-1080

___________

Mamie Mullins, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

Helena Hospital Association, doing *

business as Helena Regional Medical *

Appeal from the United States

Center; Steve Reeder, Administrator, *

District Court for the 

as Agent on behalf of HRMC; Gerald *

Eastern District of Arkansas

Hicks, Director of Personnel, as *

Agent on behalf of HRMC; Ron * [UNPUBLISHED]

Vinson, Administrator of the *

Radiologist Department, as Agent on *

behalf of HRMC and other Agents on *

behalf of HRMC, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

 Submitted: December 15,

1997

 Filed: February

11, 1998

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Before McMILLIAN, BEAM, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD,

Circuit Judges.

___________

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.
The Honorable Elsijane Trimble Roy, United States District Judge for the

1

Eastern District of Arkansas.

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Mamie Mullins appeals pro se from the final judgment

entered in the United States District Court for the

1

Eastern District of Arkansas upon a jury verdict in favor

of her employer, Helena Hospital Association (Hospital),

and several supervisory employees. Mullins brought her

action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981,

alleging race discrimination in the terms of her

employment and discriminatory discharge. Mullins filed a

timely notice of appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), and we

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. For reversal,

Mullins argues the jury was required to return a verdict

against the Hospital for discriminatory discharge because

Hospital employees offered contradictory testimony as to

who decided to terminate Mullins, the basis for the

decision, and her exact termination date; she also claims

the district court erroneously admitted into evidence a

co-worker&s letter. For the reasons discussed below, we

affirm the judgment of the district court. 

Mullins, who is African-American, was an X-ray

technician at the Hospital. Mullins complained to her

supervisor, defendant Ron Vinson, and the human resources

director, defendant Gerald Hicks, about her employment

conditions, including unequal pay and other treatment she

considered racially discriminatory. Dissatisfied with

the response she received, in 1995 Mullins filed a

written grievance with the Hospital administrator,

defendant Steven Reeder. To the grievance, Mullins

attached a page from the personnel record of each of
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three white employees; each page included the employee&s

Social Security number and salary history. 

After receiving Mullins&s written grievance, Reeder

asked Hicks to investigate why Mullins possessed the

employee personnel records. Hicks contacted Vinson, who

discovered that copies of the personnel records were

missing from his files. Mullins told Hicks that coworker Susan Winston had given her the personnel records.

In a
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subsequent meeting, Vinson told Mullins he had talked with

Winston and she denied giving the personnel records to

Mullins, whereupon Mullins left the hospital, stating she

needed a lawyer. 

Mullins was suspended the next day, and Vinson and

Hicks subsequently recommended that Mullins be terminated

based on her possession of the personnel records, together

with “other problems” she had during her employment.

Reeder decided to discharge Mullins. Mullins&s termination

notice and final evaluation form states she was discharged

for taking personnel records from the manager&s office

without permission. 

Susan Winston did not testify at trial. Before trial,

the district court denied Mullins&s motion in limine to

exclude a letter written by Winston, without prejudice to

Mullins renewing her objection at trial. During trial,

Hicks testified without objection that the letter stated

“I, Susan Scott Winston, did not give Mamie Mullins any

personnel files or copies of any files. I had no personal

involvement with Mamie during my two years of employment

at [the Hospital].” Hicks added that the letter was

“used as part of the investigation” he conducted, and that

based on this letter and other evidence he recommended

Mullins be terminated. Defendants offered the letter into

evidence, and Mullins&s counsel objected on the basis of

hearsay and prejudice, noting the letter indicated it was

faxed three days after Mullins&s termination notice date.

Based on Hicks&s testimony, the district court admitted the

letter, ruling that Mullins could argue to the jury that

the Hospital did not actually rely on it in terminating

Mullins.
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This court will reverse the jury&s verdict only if all

of the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the

Hospital “points one way and is susceptible of no

reasonable inferences sustaining” the Hospital&s position.

See Stanton v. Arkansas Valley Elec. Coop. Corp., 49 F.3d

1317, 1319 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoted cases and internal

quotations omitted). Applying this deferential standard,

we find the evidence sufficiently
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supported the jury&s verdict. The Hospital presented

evidence--including witness testimony and Mullins&s

termination notice--that the Hospital terminated Mullins

for taking personnel records. Any minor evidentiary

discrepancies Mullins identifies did not require the jury

to find her discharge was racially motivated. See Texas

Dep&t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253

(1981) (“ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact

that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the

plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff”).

We hold the district court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting the Winston letter. See Wolff v.

Brown, 128 F.3d 682, 685 (8th Cir.1997) (standard of

review). In an employment discrimination case, internal

documents upon which the employer relies for an employment

decision are not hearsay--statements offered to prove the

truth of the matters asserted-- but are relevant and

admissible because they may help explain the employer's

actions. See id.; see also Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Hicks

explained the Hospital&s decision-making process and

testified unequivocally that he relied upon the Winston

letter in recommending Mullins&s termination.

Furthermore, even if we assume the letter was erroneously

admitted, Hicks read it to the jury without objection

before it was offered into evidence, and therefore its

admission would not support reversal. Cf. Boone v. Moore,

980 F.2d 539, 542 (8th Cir.1992) (where at trial expert

read audiologist&s report to the jury in open court without

objection, report itself was cumulative evidence, and

error in its admission as substantive evidence over

hearsay objection was harmless). 
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district

court.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.