97-151

 No. 97-151

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

 1997

BALYEAT LAW, P.C., as Trustee,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

 v.

LINDA JO HATCH,

 Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Ninth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Teton,

 The Honorable Marc G. Buyske, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 Regan Whitworth; Balyeat Law Offices, Missoula, Montana

 For Respondent:

 John M. Morrison; Meloy & Morrison, Helena, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: June 19, 1997

 Decided: July 23, 1997

Filed:

 __________________________________________

 Clerk

 Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.

 Appellant Balyeat Law (Balyeat) appeals from the order of the Ninth Judicial

District Court, Teton County, granting respondent Linda Jo Hatch (Hatch) summary

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-151%20Opinion.htm (1 of 4)4/16/2007 11:35:21 AM
97-151

judgment on the basis of res judicata. We affirm.

 We address the following issue on appeal:

 Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment on the basis of res

judicata and dismissing Balyeat's complaint for collection of a debt when Balyeat had

previously brought an action against Hatch for collection of a debt arising from the 

same

incident?

Factual and Procedural History

 Linda Jo Hatch and her son Carson Hatch were injured in a car accident and were

subsequently treated at Community Medical Center of Missoula (CMC) periodically

between November 10, 1992 and February 4, 1994. On June 13, 1994, Balyeat filed a

complaint as trustee for CMC in Missoula Justice Court against Hatch for a debt for

services rendered by CMC to Hatch and her son in the amount of $2,400. Default

judgment was entered and Hatch paid the debt in full.

 On July 28, 1995, Balyeat filed a second complaint against Hatch in Teton 

County. 

Balyeat asked for judgment in the amount of $3,612 for goods and services provided to

the Hatches by CMC during the same period of time in which CMC provided the services

which were the subject of the first debt collection action. The Justice Court 

granted

Hatch summary judgment and dismissed the complaint on the basis of res judicata. The

parties stipulated to a de novo review by the Ninth Judicial District Court which 

likewise

dismissed the complaint on the basis of res judicata. Balyeat appeals from that 

judgment.

Discussion 

 The standard of review of a summary judgment ruling is de novo. Motaire v.

Northern Montana Joint Refuse Disposal Dist. (1995), 274 Mont. 239, 242, 907 P.2d

154, 156; Mead v. M.S.B., Inc. (1994), 264 Mont. 465, 470, 872 P.2d 782, 785. When

we review a district court's grant of summary judgment, we apply the same standard as

applied by the district court based on Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P. Bruner v. Yellowstone

County (1995), 272 Mont. 261, 264, 900 P.2d 901, 903. In Bruner, we set forth our

inquiry:

 The movant must demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact exist. 

 Once this has been accomplished, the burden then shifts to the non-moving

 party to prove, by more than mere denial and speculation, that a genuine

 issue does exist. Having determined that genuine issues of material fact do

 not exist, the court must then determine whether the moving party is

 entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We review the legal determinations

 made by a district court as to whether the court erred.

Bruner, 900 P.2d at 903 (citations omitted). In the instant case, the parties do 

not

dispute any issues of material fact. Balyeat disputes only the District Court's 

legal

determination that the final judgment in the Missoula County Justice Court matter is 

res

judicata as to the second debt action.

 The doctrine of res judicata bars issues and claims litigated in a former 

action as

well as issues and claims which might have been litigated in the former action. 

Mills v.

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-151%20Opinion.htm (2 of 4)4/16/2007 11:35:21 AM
97-151

Lincoln County (1993), 262 Mont. 283, 864 P.2d 1265. This Court has established that

the doctrine of res judicata bars a party from relitigating a matter that the party 

has

already had the opportunity to litigate. " 'Once there has been a full opportunity 

to

present an issue for judicial decision in a given proceeding . . . the determination 

of the

court in that proceeding must be accorded finality as to all issues raised or which 

fairly

could have been raised . . . .' " Mills, 864 P.2d at 1267 (citing First Bank v. 

District

Court (1987), 226 Mont. 515, 519-20, 737 P.2d 1132, 1134-35).

 A resolved claim will be res judicata as to subsequent claims if: (1) the 

parties are

the same; (2) the subject matter is the same; (3) the issues are the same and relate 

to the

same subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons are the same in reference 

to the

subject matter and issues. Loney v. Milodragovich, Dale & Dye, P.C. (1995), 273

Mont. 506, 510, 905 P.2d 158, 161. 

 Balyeat argues that res judicata cannot bar its present debt collection action

because the subject matter is different from the initial debt collection action in 

the

Missoula County Justice Court. It claims that because the first debt covered medical

services and the second debt covers mostly expert testimony costs and the debts had

different account numbers, that the subject matter in the two actions is different.

 Balyeat relies on Berlin v. Boedecker (1994), 268 Mont. 444, 887 P.2d 1180, as

authority for the proposition that separate contracts do not present the same subject

matter. By analogy, Balyeat argues that debts with different account numbers do not

present the same subject matter. In Berlin, one lawsuit was brought by the Berlins

against Boedecker and his company for breach of contract, fraud and breach of 

fiduciary

duties in connection with a contract for acquisition of certain oil and gas leases. 

Berlin,

887 P.2d at 1184. Berlins brought a second lawsuit against Boedecker and his company

for breach of fiduciary duty for failing to reveal conflicts of interest in a 

different

investment transaction. This Court held that the subject matter of the two 

contracts was

not the same for the following reasons: 

 The contracts in the two actions were separate and the contracts' values

 differed. The locations of the oil and gas interests in the contracts also

 differed. Finally, the tortious conduct alleged by appellants in the present

 action differed from that in the [first action], involving a different

 fraudulent scheme. 

Berlin, 887 P.2d at 1185. 

 We agree with Hatch that Berlin is distinguishable. In contrast to Berlin, the 

first

and second actions brought by Balyeat both involve whether and to what extent Hatch 

is

liable to Balyeat for services provided by CMC. The services in question were 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-151%20Opinion.htm (3 of 4)4/16/2007 11:35:21 AM
97-151

provided

in connection with one car accident. The services giving rise to both debt 

collection

actions were rendered in the same time period and CMC was aware of the entire debt at

the time of the first action. For the above reasons, we hold that the subject 

matter of the

two actions is the same. 

 The remaining requirements for res judicata have also been met. The parties in

this action are the same as the parties in the Missoula County Justice Court 

action. The

issue in this matter, whether Hatch owes amounts claimed due, is the same as the 

issue

in the previous action and, as we have said, relates to the same subject matter. The

capacities of the persons in this action are the same as the capacities of the 

identical

persons in the previous action: Balyeat, as assignee\trustee for CMC, claims Hatch, 

as

an individual, is indebted to it for medical services provided by its assignor to 

Hatch.

 Furthermore, the doctrine of res judicata bars not only subsequent litigation of

previously litigated subject matter and issues, but also litigation of subject 

matters and

issues which could have been litigated in the prior proceeding. Loney, 905 P.2d at 

161. 

No evidence was presented showing that Balyeat lacked the opportunity to litigate 

all

claims incurred by CMC during the period from November 10, 1992 to February 4,

1994, for services provided to the Hatches when Balyeat commenced its Missoula County

Justice Court action in June, 1994.

 Accordingly, we conclude that Balyeat's second debt collection action is barred 

by

res judicata. Affirmed.

 /S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

We concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-151%20Opinion.htm (4 of 4)4/16/2007 11:35:21 AM