IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 09–1914

Filed April 13, 2012

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF

LOREN S. BOCKWOLDT, Deceased.

DALE RICHARD WILLOWS, Conservator

for Brandie Renee Bockwoldt, Minor Child

of the Decedent,

Appellant,

vs.

THE ESTATE OF LOREN S. BOCKWOLDT,

Appellee.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, 

James E. Kelley, Judge.

The conservator of a minor beneficiary of the estate of Loren S. 

Bockwoldt appeals the award of extraordinary fees and expenses to the 

attorney for the estate. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; 

DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN 

PART, AND CASE REMANDED.

Timothy L. Baumann, William B. Norton, and Christopher L. Surls 

of Norton, Baumann & Surls, PLLC, Lowden, for appellant.

Daniel P. Kresowik of Stanley, Lande & Hunter, P.C., Davenport, 

for appellee.
2

ZAGER, Justice.

This case comes before us on further review from the court of 

appeals. As part of an order approving the final report of the executor of 

the estate of Loren S. Bockwoldt, the district court approved 

extraordinary attorney fees of $15,845.50 for Pete Wessels and 

$17,957.91 in attorney fees for the law firm of Stanley, Lande and 

Hunter (SLH), attorneys for the estate. The district court also approved

expenses of $631.79. The district court found that these attorney fees 

and expenses were for necessary and extraordinary services to the estate

pursuant to Iowa Code section 633.199 (2005). Dale Richard Willows,

the conservator for the beneficiary of Loren’s estate, objected to the 

application. After a hearing and ruling by the district court, Willows

appealed. The court of appeals reversed the district court’s ruling, 

holding “attorney fees may not be awarded for litigating an application 

for attorney fees under chapter 633.” We granted further review. Upon 

our further review, we now vacate the decision of the court of appeals

and affirm the order of the district court in part and reverse in part. We 

hold extraordinary attorney fees may be awarded for defending a fee 

application in district court and on appeal. However, the case must be 

remanded for a hearing to determine the amount of fees to be awarded to

SLH.

I. Factual Background and Prior Proceedings.

The present case requires us to resolve a dispute over a request for 

fees for extraordinary services in connection with the estate of Loren S. 

Bockwoldt. The extraordinary services at issue in this appeal were 

provided to the estate by Wessels and SLH between February 1, 2007,

and June 8, 2009. This application was filed along with the final report 

and will be referred to as the 2009 application. The extraordinary 
3

services contained in the 2009 application were primarily for the defense 

of an application for fees for extraordinary services that Wessels provided 

to the estate between March 23, 2005, and January 31, 2007. This first 

application will be referred to as the 2007 application. Wessels and Eric 

Knoernschild of SLH defended the 2007 application before the district 

court, which granted the 2007 application. After Willows appealed, 

Wessels and SLH then defended the 2007 application on appeal. After 

remand by the court of appeals, Wessels filed a modified version of the 

2007 application. After the district court’s decision on remand from the 

court of appeals, Willows again appealed the award of extraordinary 

attorney fees. Wessels and SLH again defended the modified 2007 

application before the court of appeals. These are the extraordinary 

services for which Wessels and SLH now seek compensation in the 2009 

application.

A. The Background of the 2007 Application. Loren and Tammy 

Bockwoldt, husband and wife, died in an automobile accident in Arizona 

on March 12, 2005. Loren had two children: an adult son, Brock, and a 

minor child, Brandie. Brandie was Tammy’s only child. Brandie was a 

beneficiary of Loren and Tammy’s estates, while Brock was only a

beneficiary of Loren’s estate. Tammy’s brother, Willows, was appointed 

Brandie’s conservator. Neal Bockwoldt, Loren’s brother, was appointed 

as coexecutor of both Loren and Tammy’s estates, along with Willows 

and Brock. Wessels was designated as the attorney for both estates, but 

later withdrew from representation of Tammy’s estate due to a conflict of 

interest.

On February 16, 2007, the district court issued a ruling on several 

motions relating to Loren and Tammy’s estates, including the 2007 

application. The court awarded Wessels $67,045 in attorney fees from 
4

Loren’s estate and $5888.50 in attorney fees from Tammy’s estate. On 

Wessels’ motion, the court also removed Brock and Willows as 

coexecutors of both estates, citing conflicts of interest.1 The court 

appointed Central State Bank as the executor of Loren’s estate and First 

National Bank of Muscatine as the executor of Tammy’s estate. There

were significant assets in Brandie’s conservatorship, so the court 

required Willows to post a bond prior to removing any money from the 

conservatorship. A wrongful death action was pending in Arizona at the 

time, so the district court refused to close the estates. However, since 

the ultimate outcome of the litigation was unclear, the district court 

ordered that “for the time being” half of the recovery should be placed in 

Tammy’s estate and half should be placed in Loren’s estate, noting that 

the order might be amended in the future. Willows appealed each of 

these rulings, including the award of fees requested in the 2007 

application. The estates responded to the appeals.

On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s holding 

on all issues except the fee award. The court of appeals determined that 

the district court awarded fees without properly following code sections 

633.197–.199. The court of appeals noted that as part of the 2007 

application, Wessels had supplied a detailed, fifty-page statement 

itemizing exactly what services he had provided for the estate, as well as 

identifying seven “extraordinary issues” that had arisen during the 

management of the estate. These extraordinary issues included litigation 

as to Brandie’s guardianship, ownership of farmland interests and farmrelated business interests, income tax issues, obtaining information on 

fifteen different insurance policies between the two estates, and the 

 1Neal Bockwoldt subsequently withdrew as a coexecutor of both estates.
5

division of assets between the two estates.2 However, at the hearing, the 

district court did not require Wessels to go forward to prove his fees, nor 

did the district court make specific findings as to which of these services 

were ordinary and which were extraordinary. As a result, the court of 

appeals remanded the 2007 application to the “district court for a 

hearing requiring the applicant to meet his burden and for specific 

findings regarding the reasonableness of ordinary fees and extraordinary 

fees granted.”

On January 30, 2008, in response to the court of appeals ruling, 

Wessels filed another application for ordinary and extraordinary fees (the 

modified 2007 application). Like the initial 2007 application, the 

modified 2007 application sought fees for services provided from March 

23, 2005, to February 1, 2007. It included the list of seven matters that 

were extraordinary and an itemized list of services provided.3 Willows 

again objected. A hearing on the modified 2007 application commenced 

on February 25, 2008. Counsel for Wessels argued it would be “very 

difficult” to break out the “real estate, litigation, and taxation issues” 

involved in Loren’s estate. The district court agreed and refused to 

require Wessels to break out or itemize his bill. However, the hearing 

was continued to allow Wessels “an opportunity to amend his proofs”.

According to the itemized billing statement Wessels offered in 

support of the modified 2007 application, he had performed services for 

 2In later pleadings it is acknowledged that this case involves the conservatorship 

of Brandie.

3The remanded 2007 application initially sought fees for defending the district 

court’s original ruling, and reimbursement for litigation expenses in the form of fees 

Wessels paid to SLH in connection with defending that ruling. However, prior to a 

hearing on the fee request, Wessels withdrew these portions of the remanded 

application leaving the fees earned from March 23, 2005, to February 1, 2007 as the 

sole subject of the application filed on January 30, 2008.
6

Loren’s estate which totaled $76,375.50 in fees. This number was based

on the number of hours Wessels worked on the estate multiplied by his 

hourly rate and included the hourly rate of Wessels’ legal assistant. The 

modified 2007 application noted that, under section 633.197, the 

statutory cap on ordinary fees for Loren’s estate was $20,432.89. The 

modified 2007 application requested the court award extraordinary fees 

of $55,942.61, the difference between the amount Wessels billed to the 

estate and the maximum amount allowed as ordinary fees under section 

633.197.

At the resumed hearing on April 24, 2008, Willows admitted 

Wessels actually performed all the services listed in the itemized bill. 

Willows conceded Wessels was entitled to $20,432.89 in ordinary fees, 

$640.50 in necessary and extraordinary expenses, and $18,413 in fees 

for necessary and extraordinary services. Willows, however, disagreed 

that the remaining $37,529.61 in fees were for actual, necessary, and 

extraordinary services to Loren’s estate. The district court disagreed with 

Willows, stating,

It seems to this Court Willows has a larger obligation after 

Wessels specifically and extensively explained the unusual 

issues with which he had to come to grips . . . than to allege 

only in general terms without reference to specific services, 

some of the services Wessels provided were only “ordinary.” 

He did not do so.

The district court then awarded Wessels all $76,375.50 in fees for 

ordinary and extraordinary services, and Willows appealed.

In its April 8, 2009 ruling, the court of appeals modified the district 

court’s award. The court of appeals found the district court had once 

again improperly shifted the burden of proof under section 633.199 to 

Willows instead of placing it on the party requesting the fees. The court 

of appeals “disagree[d] with the district court that Wessels ‘specifically 
7

and extensively explained the unusual issues with which he had to come 

to grips.’ ” The court also took issue with how the amount of 

extraordinary fees was calculated, stating,

Wessels’s interpretation of the relevant code sections was 

that so long as he provided some extraordinary services, all 

his fees above the section 633.197 cap became 

presumptively compensable under section 633.199. This is 

not how the code sections operate.

Section 633.198 authorizes payment of reasonable 

attorney fees “as full compensation for all ordinary services.”

The fee schedule provided in section 633.197 provides the 

maximum any attorney can collect on fees for ordinary 

services, regardless of the amount of time spent to perform 

such services. However, if an attorney performs “actual 

necessary and extraordinary” services, compensation will be 

provided under section 633.199. Section 633.199 does not 

automatically allow payment of any fees requested by the 

attorney that exceed the cap set by section 633.197. Rather, 

section 633.199 provides for the payment of extraordinary 

fees, fees for non-ordinary services including but not limited 

to “services in connection with real estate, tax matters, and 

litigated matters.”

The court of appeals concluded that the district court did not make a 

finding that the services provided were “extraordinary” and that the 

district court did not “have an adequate basis to determine whether 

Wessels’ claimed extraordinary fees were ‘just and reasonable.’ ” The 

court of appeals modified the ruling, awarding $20,432.89 in ordinary 

fees, $640.50 for expenses that Willows conceded were necessary and 

extraordinary, and $18,413 in fees for services that Willows had 

conceded were extraordinary. An application for further review was 

denied by this court on June 5, 2009.

B. The 2009 Application: Wessels and SLH’s Extraordinary 

Fees for Defending the 2007 Application on Appeal and Remand. On 

August 24, 2009, Central State Bank filed its final report, which included 

an application for extraordinary fees (the 2009 application). While the 
8

2007 application was for services provided from March 23, 2005, to 

February 1, 2007, the 2009 application was for services provided from 

February 1, 2007, to June 8, 2009. The 2009 application included an 

itemized list of services Wessels provided to the estate, and indicated, 

line by line, which services Wessels asserted were extraordinary, as 

opposed to ordinary services, and only requested compensation for 

extraordinary services. It also included a “Statement of Extraordinary 

Fees” which detailed the necessity of the extraordinary services, the 

responsibilities assumed, and the importance of the services to the 

estate. Wessels’ fees for the extraordinary services contained in the 2009 

application totaled $15,845.50. The 2009 application also listed several 

“Outside Professional Fees” for SLH, totaling $17,952.91. The 2009 

application described these fees as “extraordinary fees in regard solely to 

representation relative to litigation and appeal matters.”

Willows resisted the 2009 application. He noted “nearly all” the 

services listed in the 2009 application were connected with the defense of 

the 2007 application, both on appeal and on remand. He also claimed 

SLH functioned as Wessels’ personal attorney, and not the attorney for 

the estate, and that the request for fees for extraordinary services 

provided by SLH was not supported by adequate documentation.

After a hearing, the district court found that the itemizations 

accompanying the 2009 application “show reasonable, ordinary, and 

required services that were not ordinary services, and were required by 

the appeal filed by [Willows]. Those extraordinary fees total $15,845.50.” 

The district court also found “the extraordinary fees of Pete Wessels of 

$15,845.50 and the attorney’s fees for [SLH] of $17,957.91 are 

reasonable, appropriate and required to protect the executors of the 

estate and the estate . . . .” The court rejected Willows’ argument that an 
9

executor and the executor’s attorneys cannot receive extraordinary fees 

for defending an appeal. Willows appealed, and we transferred the case 

to the court of appeals, which found that “attorney fees may not be 

awarded for litigating an application for attorney fees under chapter 

633.” Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the award “in its 

entirety.” The estate applied for further review, which we granted.

II. Standard of Review.

This dispute requires us to review the district court’s decision to 

award Wessels and SLH extraordinary fees in connection with Loren’s 

estate. Contests involving the costs of administration are tried in equity. 

In re Cory’s Estate, 184 N.W.2d 693, 696–98 (Iowa 1971) (noting that the 

decision in Cory’s Estate “nullifies many of our cases decided before 

adoption of the probate code holding probate cases were law actions and 

the decision of the judge in such action had the force and effect of a 

verdict on appeal”). “Attorney fees are included in the definition of costs 

of administration.” Id. at 696 (citing Iowa Code § 633.3(8)). Therefore, a 

proceeding to determine the award of attorney fees is tried in equity, and 

our review is de novo. In re Estate of Wulf, 526 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Iowa 

1994) (“It follows that hearings dealing with the costs of administration 

are equitable in nature and our review is therefore de novo.”); Bass v. 

Bass, 196 N.W.2d 433, 435 (Iowa 1972) (“[A] hearing on the allowance of 

attorneys’ fees stands in equity, being thus reviewable de novo.”).

Though our review on an action for the allowance of attorney’s fees 

is de novo, we review a district court’s decision that services were 

extraordinary under section 633.199 for abuse of discretion. See In re 

Estate of Brady, 308 N.W.2d 68, 74–75 (Iowa 1981) (“We do not believe 

the trial court abused its discretion in finding Mr. Heiserman’s litigation 

services were compensable as extraordinary services under this 
10

standard.”); see also Wulf, 526 N.W.2d at 156 (reviewing a district court’s 

application of section 633.199 and noting that “[w]e accord the trial court 

considerable discretion in taxing executor attorney fees to estates”). “An 

abuse of discretion occurs when the district court exercises its discretion 

on grounds or for reasons that are clearly untenable, or to an extent 

clearly unreasonable.” Quad City Bank & Trust v. Jim Kircher & Assocs., 

P.C., 804 N.W.2d 83, 92 (Iowa 2011); see also State v. Nelson, 791 

N.W.2d 414, 419 (Iowa 2010). “ ‘A ground or reason is untenable when it 

is not supported by substantial evidence or when it is based on an 

erroneous application of the law.’ ” Quad City Bank & Trust, 804 N.W.2d 

at 92 (citation omitted).

However, we review de novo a district court’s determinations 

regarding the sufficiency of the filing that supports the fees that are 

requested for those services. In re Estate of Mabie, 401 N.W.2d 29, 32 

(Iowa 1987) (finding, on de novo review, that an attorney had failed to 

meet “his burden of proving the necessity for the services for which he 

seeks extraordinary fees by the filing of a mere itemization of all services 

performed for the estate”). Accordingly, we will review the district court’s 

determination that the services Wessels and SLH seek compensation for 

in the 2009 application were in fact necessary and extraordinary services 

to the estate for an abuse of discretion. See Brady, 308 N.W.2d at 74–

75. We will review de novo the district court’s determination that 

Wessels and SLH provided sufficient documentation in the 2009 

application to justify the award of fees for those extraordinary services. 

Mabie, 401 N.W.2d at 32.

III. Discussion.

The 2009 application requested $15,845.50 in fees for 

extraordinary services and expenses for Wessels, reimbursement for 
11

actual and necessary extraordinary expenses consisting of $17,952.91 in 

legal fees for SLH, as well as $631.79 in expenses, all pursuant to section 

633.199. All of the fees requested in the 2009 application were for 

extraordinary services. Willows resisted, claiming that the only service 

provided was defending the prior applications for fees in the prior 

appeals and that section 633.199 does not allow an attorney to receive 

fees or reimbursement for defending a fee award. Alternatively, Willows 

claims that even if section 633.199 allows fees for defending fee awards, 

Wessels failed to adequately prove he was entitled to fees and expenses. 

Willows also claims the district court erred in awarding fees beyond the 

amount allowed in the court of appeals’ April 8, 2009 ruling. Finally, 

Willows claims that SLH was Wessels’ personal attorney, not the attorney 

for the estate, and therefore, it is not entitled to payment from the estate. 

Alternatively, if SLH was the estate’s attorney, Willows argues the firm 

failed to comply with Iowa Rule of Probate Procedure 7.2 and should 

therefore not be compensated.4 We will address each of these arguments 

in turn.

 4At this point, we note that the court of appeals decision and the parties’ further 

review materials make reference to section 633.315 and the “good faith and just cause” 

requirement contained therein. That section relates to will contests and has no bearing 

on the present dispute. We note that portions of In re Estate of Wulf, 526 N.W.2d 154 

(Iowa 1994) and In re Estate of Brady, 308 N.W.2d 68 (Iowa 1981) refer to sections 

633.315 and 633.199. See Wulf, 526 N.W.2d at 156; Brady, 308 N.W.2d at 71. In 

Wulf, we were reviewing a district court’s decision to award attorney fees to an executor 

for participating in a will contest. 526 N.W.2d at 156. Likewise, one of the issues in 

Brady was whether attorney fees could be awarded under section 633.199 for 

participating in a will contest under section 633.315. 308 N.W.2d at 71–72. In both of 

those cases, we discussed whether the executor acted with “good faith and just cause.” 

Wulf, 526 N.W.2d at 156; Brady, 308 N.W.2d at 71–72. This discussion was necessary 

because section 633.315 only allows for attorney fees if the executor “defends or 

prosecutes any proceedings in good faith and with just cause.” Section 633.199 

requires fees be “just and reasonable” but does not contain a good faith and just cause 

requirement, and we reject any implication to the contrary in our past cases.
12

A. The Scope of Section 633.199. This case requires us to 

interpret section 633.199 to determine under what circumstances, if any, 

the legislature intended defending an application for fees to be a 

necessary and extraordinary service to an estate. If the language of the 

statute is plain and unambiguous, we need not look to principles of 

statutory construction. Estate of Ryan v. Heritage Trails Assocs., Inc., 

745 N.W.2d 724, 730 (Iowa 2008). “If reasonable persons can disagree 

on a statute’s meaning, it is ambiguous.” Id. (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Section 633.199 reads:

Such further allowances as are just and reasonable 

may be made by the court to personal representatives and 

their attorneys for actual necessary and extraordinary

expenses or services. Necessary and extraordinary services 

shall be construed to also include services in connection 

with real estate, tax matters, and litigated matters.

Litigated matters may include defending fee awards, and defending fee 

awards may be a “necessary and extraordinary service” to an estate. 

However, the statute does not make clear in the plain language exactly 

what services are encompassed in “litigated matters.” It is possible 

litigated matters was meant to refer only to lawsuits where the estate is a 

party and not situations where the estate’s attorney’s fee is at issue. It is 

also not apparent from the plain language whether defending a fee that 

will ultimately go the estate’s own attorney is a “necessary and 

extraordinary service” to the estate. Because reasonable persons could 

disagree, the plain language of the statute is ambiguous, and we must 

turn to the principles of statutory construction. See Ryan, 745 N.W.2d 

at 730.

We have stated our principles of statutory construction as follows:

The purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine the 

legislature’s intent. We give words their ordinary and 

common meaning by considering the context within which 
13

they are used, absent a statutory definition or an established 

meaning in the law. We also consider the legislative history 

of a statute, including prior enactments, when ascertaining 

legislative intent. When we interpret a statute, we assess the 

statute in its entirety, not just isolated words or phrases. 

We may not extend, enlarge, or otherwise change the 

meaning of a statute under the guise of construction.

Doe v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 786 N.W.2d 853, 858 (Iowa 2010) 

(citations omitted).

Attorney fees for representing an estate are governed by statute, 

and “statutory authority is necessary for any fee award.” Brady, 308 

N.W.2d at 74. Section 633.198 allows an attorney for the personal 

representative to receive fees “not in excess of the schedule of fees herein 

provided for personal representatives.” Iowa Code § 633.198. Personal 

representatives are allowed reasonable fees for “ordinary” services 

rendered to the estate, and the maximum allowable fees for ordinary 

services depends on the size of the estate. Id. § 633.197. If personal 

representatives, or their attorneys, provide “actual necessary and

extraordinary expenses or services” to the estate, the attorney or 

personal representative can receive compensation beyond the amount 

allowed for in the fixed schedule listed in section 633.197. Id. § 633.199. 

Under section 633.199, “necessary and extraordinary services shall be 

construed to also include services in connection with real estate, tax 

matters, and litigated matters.” Id.5

 5In 2007, the legislature expanded the scope of necessary and extraordinary 

services covered by section 633.199. The relevant portion of the statute now reads as 

follows:

Necessary and extraordinary services shall be construed to include but 

not be limited to services in connection with real estate, tax issues, 

disputed matters, nonprobate assets, reopening the estate, location of 

unknown and lost heirs and beneficiaries, and management and 

disposition of unusual assets.

2007 Iowa Acts ch. 134, § 10. However, the new language applies only to the estates of 

decedents dying on or after July 1, 2007, and would therefore not apply to this case. 

See id. § 28(2).
14

We note that the legislature chose the word “include” as opposed to 

the word “means” when drafting the section at issue. See id. (stating 

extraordinary services “includes real estate, tax matters, and litigated 

matters” as opposed to stating extraordinary services “means real estate, 

tax matters, and litigated matters”). A statute that “declares what it 

‘includes’ is more susceptible to extension of meaning by construction 

than where the definition declares what a term ‘means.’ ” 2A Norman J. 

Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47:7, 

at 305 (7th ed. 2007) [hereinafter Singer]. This statute also contains a 

general term (“necessary and extraordinary services”) followed by specific 

terms that are examples of the general term (“real estate, tax matters, 

and litigated matters”). See Iowa Code § 633.199. Listing a general term 

and then supplying specific examples is a “common drafting technique 

designed to save the legislature from spelling out in advance every 

contingency in which the statute could apply.” 2A Singer, § 47:17, at 

370–73. Defining a term in this way “recognizes and gives effect to both 

the specific and general words by using the class indicated by the 

specific words to extend the scope of the statute with the general words 

to include additional terms or objects within the class.” Teamsters Local 

Union No. 421 v. City of Dubuque, 706 N.W.2d 709, 715 (Iowa 2005).

Just as the legislature has not defined the precise contours of what 

services are necessary and extraordinary under section 633.199, our 

cases have also refrained from making a “pronouncement of a precise 

test for the governance of this issue.” Wulf, 526 N.W.2d at 156. Instead, 

we have mirrored the legislature’s approach and have “defined 

extraordinary services as ‘those which “in character and amount [are] 

beyond those usually required.” ’ ” Mabie, 401 N.W.2d at 31 (quoting 

Brady, 308 N.W.2d at 74) (alternation in original). The determination of 
15

whether a service is beyond those usually required is a factual 

determination and is left to the district court’s broad discretion. See 

Wulf, 526 N.W.2d at 156–57; Brady, 308 N.W.2d at 74–75; Bass, 196 

N.W.2d at 435; Glynn v. Cascade State Bank of Cascade, 227 Iowa 932, 

939, 289 N.W. 722, 725 (1940).

We see nothing in section 633.199 that indicates the legislature 

intended to exclude defending an application for attorney fees from the 

definition of necessary and extraordinary services. The actions that are 

“necessary” will, of course, vary from case to case. “Extraordinary 

services” is also a broad term with a variety of meanings that change 

with context.6 In order to give effect to both the general and specific 

words used by the legislature, we will not treat the examples of necessary 

and extraordinary services provided in section 633.199 as exhaustive. 

See Teamsters Local Union No. 421, 706 N.W.2d at 715. It is possible 

that administrative tasks could be considered extraordinary services. 

For example, we have found that a district court did not abuse its 

discretion when it determined that defending a final report was an 

extraordinary service which entitled the attorney to fees. Brady, 308 

N.W.2d at 74–75. In that same case, we also held that defending a final 

report on appeal was an extraordinary service to the estate. See id. at 

75. By citing these examples, we are not stating that defending a final 

report in front of the district court or on appeal is always an 

 6According to the terms of the statute, necessary and extraordinary services 

“shall be construed to include services in connection with real estate, tax matters, and 

litigated matters.” Iowa Code § 633.199. Responding to a beneficiary’s appeal from a 

district court ruling could be considered a “litigated matter.” However, because the 

statute does not limit necessary and extraordinary services to the tasks listed in section 

633.199, it is not necessary to determine whether defending a ruling that, among other 

things, awards attorney fees, is a litigated matter. Our task is to determine whether 

Wessels’ actions constitute necessary and extraordinary services, not whether they are 

“a litigated matter.”
16

extraordinary service. To the contrary, we have held that it is not 

possible to define a precise test of what services are extraordinary as 

opposed to ordinary. See Wulf, 526 N.W.2d at 156. We reaffirm that 

principle today.

As part of his argument, Willows claims that allowing fees for 

defending a fee application is a minority viewpoint that has been properly 

rejected by a majority of jurisdictions. He cites several cases in support 

of this proposition. See In re Painter’s Estate, 628 P.2d 124, 126 (Colo. 

App. 1980); In re Andrews’ Appeal, 826 A.2d 1267, 1272–74 (Conn. App. 

Ct. 2003); In re Estate of Halas, 512 N.E.2d 1276, 1286 (Ill. App. Ct. 

1987); Inlow v. Estate of Inlow, 735 N.E.2d 240, 253–54 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2000); In re Sloan Estate, 538 N.W.2d 47, 49–50 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); In 

re Estate of Larson, 694 P.2d 1051, 1059–60 (Wash. 1985), abrogated by 

statute Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 11.96A.150(1) (West, Westlaw through 

March 26, 2012), abrogation recognized in In re Estate of McCuen, 137 

Wash. App. 1017, 2007 WL 512541, at *4 (Feb. 20, 2007). Wessels 

points to In re Estate of Trynin, 782 P.2d 232 (Cal. 1989), to support his 

claim that section 633.199 allows a district court to award fees for 

defending a fee claim. 782 P.2d at 239.

While the cases cited by Willows address the issue of fees for 

defending fees, only one of the cases cited by the parties addresses the 

precise issue presented to this court today. The California statute at 

issue in Trynin, like section 633.199, divides fees into those awarded for 

ordinary services and those awarded for extraordinary services. Id. at 

232–33. As the Indiana Court of Appeals noted in Inlow, the ordinary–

extraordinary dichotomy found in the California statute was not present 

in the Indiana statute that led to the categorical ban on so-called “fees 

for defending fees.” 735 N.E.2d at 252–53 & n.9. The court noted that 
17

the statutes at issue in Inlow, Larson, Sloan, and Halas did not have 

“extraordinary services” provisions and distinguished Trynin on that 

basis. See id. at 251–53 & n.9. The statutes at issue in Painter and 

Andrews also did not contain the ordinary–extraordinary dichotomy 

found in the Iowa and California statutes. See Painter, 628 P.2d at 124–

26 (discussing Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-12-721 (2009), repealed by 

2011 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 101, § 27); Andrews’ Appeal, 826 A.2d at 

1272–74. Because the statute at issue in Trynin is most similar to 

Iowa’s, we feel Trynin’s reasoning is the most helpful in deciding the case 

before us.

When asked to determine whether California’s statute might permit 

an attorney to receive fees for defending a fee request, the court stated,

We conclude . . . that extraordinary services 

compensable under [the statute] include work reasonably 

performed by the attorney to establish and defend the fee 

claim. This does not mean, however, that an additional 

award of fees for fee-related services is invariably required. 

Where the trial court reasonably concludes that the amounts 

previously awarded the attorney for both ordinary and 

extraordinary services are adequate, given the value of the 

estate and the nature of its assets, to fully compensate the 

attorney for all services, including fee-related services, denial 

of a request for fee-related fees would not be an abuse of 

discretion.

Trynin, 782 P.2d at 239. This conclusion mirrors our own. Under the 

statutory scheme enacted by the legislature, the district court is to 

determine whether a service is necessary and extraordinary, and the 

appellate courts must review that decision for an abuse of discretion. 

Therefore, like the Trynin court, we decline to create a categorical rule 

stating that the defense of an application for fees is never an 

extraordinary service under section 633.199, and instead leave that 
18

decision to the sound discretion of the district court, to be made based 

on the individual facts of each case.

B. The Services Provided by Wessels in the 2009 Application. 

Having determined that a court may award fees for defending an 

application for fees, we must determine whether Wessels has shown he is 

entitled to such fees in this case. Prior to awarding fees for extraordinary 

services, the district court must make a determination that the services 

rendered were both necessary and extraordinary. We review these 

determinations for abuse of discretion. See Brady, 308 N.W.2d at 74–75.

Wessels filed the 2007 application on behalf of the estate, seeking, 

among other things, fees for necessary and extraordinary services 

provided between March 23, 2005, and February 1, 2007.7 Willows 

objected. Wessels defended the application, as he was obliged to do, and 

it was granted in its entirety. Willows then appealed. On appeal, 

Wessels successfully defended the application on a majority of the issues 

presented, but the case was remanded to properly determine which of 

Wessels’ services were ordinary and which were extraordinary. Wessels 

filed a revised fee application, which was contested, granted by the 

district court, appealed, and subsequently modified by the court of 

appeals. At the conclusion of the litigation and appeals arising out of the

2007 application, Wessels filed the 2009 application, which sought fees 

for necessary and extraordinary services in connection with defending 

the 2007 application. The district court found the services Wessels listed 

in the 2009 application were “reasonable, ordinary, and required services 

 7Willows claims the court of appeals decision on the remanded 2007 application 

bars Wessels from receiving any of the fees requested in the 2009 application. The 

2009 application requests fees for services provided on or after February 1, 2007. 

Wessels has not received fees for services provided on or after February 1, 2007. 

Willows’ claim on this issue is therefore without merit.
19

that were not ordinary services, and were required by the appeal filed by 

the objector. . . . These fees were incurred and made necessary by the 

appeals filed by the objector.”8

Willows claims defending the 2007 application on appeal and 

handling the remand and the appeal of the remand were not “necessary 

for the protection of the estate,” and were therefore not necessary under 

section 633.199. The language used by Willows comes from In re 

Carmody’s Estate, 163 Iowa 463, 465–66, 145 N.W. 16, 17 (1914), where 

we stated, “To justify the allowance of anything in excess of the statutory 

commissions, the executor or administrator must have actually rendered 

services of an extraordinary character, and these must have been 

necessary for the protection of the estate.” More recently, however, we 

have considered those services that benefit the estate to be necessary, as 

opposed to only those services which protect the estate. See Brady, 308 

N.W.2d at 74 (noting section 633.199 “authorizes fees only for services 

which protect or benefit the estate”). We also note that a service does not 

have to directly benefit or protect an estate in order to be a “necessary” 

service. Accord Trynin, 782 P.2d at 235 (“Services that do not directly 

benefit the estate in the sense of increasing, protecting or preserving it 

are nonetheless compensable if the estate’s attorneys or representatives

in performing the services were ‘acting in consonance with the fiduciary 

duties imposed upon them.’ ” (citation omitted)).

Wessels contends that his services were necessary and benefitted 

the estate. The district court agreed, finding Wessels’ fees were “required 

 8The district court’s conclusion is somewhat contradictory. In the quoted 

sentence, the court calls the services ordinary, but then goes on to say that they are 

“not ordinary services.” However, when this sentence is viewed in the context of the 

district court’s ruling and the fact that it found Wessels was entitled to extraordinary 

fees, it becomes clear that the district court believed Wessels performed extraordinary 

services for the estate.
20

to protect the executors of the estate and the estate.” The first appeal of 

the 2007 application involved several issues other than Wessels fee 

request. As part of that appeal, Wessels defended removing Willows as 

an executor due to a conflict of interest. Removing an executor with a 

conflict of interest protects an estate, and therefore, even under the 

narrow definition found in Carmody, it was “necessary” for Wessels to 

defend the 2007 application on appeal.

Following remand, the only issue left to determine was whether the 

services Wessels provided were in fact extraordinary. However, this 

limited purpose does not mean Wessels’ actions were no longer 

“necessary.” Once Wessels defended the 2007 application on appeal, he 

was required to file a revised application in order to comply with the 

court of appeals instructions on remand. As a result, the district court 

found the application that Wessels filed on remand was “made 

necessary” by Willows’ appeals. The district court observed that if 

presenting reasonable arguments to an appellate court when an 

interested party objects to a fee request is not considered a necessary 

service, then any objector could force the attorney to work for no pay. 

This observation has merit. As the attorney for the estate, Wessels was 

obligated to defend the estate’s filing from Willows’ appeal and to file the 

required, revised application on remand. Because Wessels’ defense of 

the application benefitted the estate and was made necessary by Willows’

appeals, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion when it 

found Wessels’ services were necessary under section 633.199. This was 

not an erroneous application of the law.

To be compensable under section 633.199, the services provided 

by an attorney must not only be necessary, they must also be 

extraordinary. The district court found Wessels’ actions in defense of the
21

2007 application were extraordinary services. “We have defined 

extraordinary services as ‘those which “in character and amount [are]

beyond those usually required.” ’ ” Mabie, 401 N.W.2d at 31 (citation

omitted) (alteration in original). Most estates do not involve a dispute 

over fees for extraordinary services that requires numerous district court 

hearings and two court of appeals opinions. Thus it was not “clearly 

unreasonable” for the district court to determine Wessels provided 

necessary and extraordinary services to the estate. See In re Estate of

Roethler, 801 N.W.2d 833, 837 (Iowa 2011) (holding a court abuses its 

discretion when it exercises discretion on untenable or unreasonable 

grounds). The district court also did not abuse its discretion when it 

determined Wessels’ actions in defending the 2007 application were 

beyond those usually required and were a necessary and extraordinary

service.

Having established that Wessels provided necessary and 

extraordinary services to the estate when he defended the 2007 

application, we now turn to the 2009 application to determine whether it 

complies with the applicable probate rule. Iowa Rule of Probate 

Procedure 7.2(3) governs the procedure for requesting fees for 

extraordinary services. A request for payment for extraordinary services 

can be made in the final report or by separate application. Iowa Ct. R.

7.2(3). The attorney seeking fees bears the burden of proving that the 

fees should be paid. Id. The request for payment for extraordinary 

services 

shall include a written statement showing the necessity for 

such expenses or services, the responsibilities assumed, and 

the amount of extra time or expense involved. In appropriate 

cases, the statement shall also explain the importance of the 

matter to the estate and describe the results obtained.
22

Id. The statement required by the rule “allows the court to make an 

informed decision regarding the necessity and value of the attorney’s 

claimed extra services to the estate.” Mabie, 401 N.W.2d at 32. We have 

noted that “[i]t is not the role of this court or the district court to divine 

those services that are extraordinary from an attorney’s itemization of 

services. Rule [7.2(3)] clearly requires a written statement, to assist the 

court and make a better record, in addition to the itemization.” Id. An 

attorney is not entitled to extra compensation if he or she does not follow 

rule 7.2(3). Id. We review de novo whether an attorney has complied 

with rule 7.2. Id.

Wessels complied with rule 7.2(3) when he completed the 

application at issue today. He filed a written statement indicating the 

necessity of the services he provided and the responsibilities he 

assumed. Wessels pointed out that Willows appealed the estate’s fee 

application and various other matters and, that as the attorney for the 

estate, Wessels was obligated to defend the filings he had made on the 

estate’s behalf. Wessels’ itemized billing statement indicated the amount 

of extra time involved, a description of the service provided, and 

importantly, which itemized services he provided were ordinary and 

which were extraordinary. He has not asked us to “divine those services 

that are extraordinary from” the list of services he provided. Id. On our 

de novo review, we determine Wessels has complied with rule 7.2(3) and 

is therefore entitled to $15,845.50 in fees for extraordinary services.

C. The Services Provided by SLH. Willows raises two issues 

regarding the fees that the district court awarded to SLH. First, he 

claims SLH functioned as the attorney for Wessels personally and did not 

represent the estate. Second, he claims that even if SLH represented the 
23

estate, the fee request does not comply with applicable law and should 

therefore be denied.

Wessels claims that SLH represented the estate, as opposed to him 

personally. The first court of appeals decision, issued December 28, 

2007, which remanded the 2007 application to the district court, listed 

Eric M. Knoernschild of SLH as the attorney for Pete Wessels. Upon 

remand, the amended 2007 application initially requested fees for SLH. 

These fees were for services provided from February 2, 2007, to February 

16, 2007. The bill was addressed to Wessels but indicated it was for 

work done on the Bockwoldts’ estates. However, this request was 

withdrawn from the amended 2007 application on February 13, 2008. 

The transcripts of the February 25 and April 24, 2008 hearings on the 

amended 2007 application list Eric M. Knoernschild as the attorney for 

Pete Wessels. On August 4, 2008, in response to Willows’ appeal from 

the district court’s decision approving the amended 2007 application, 

Wessels filed a motion requesting the district court appoint Eric M. 

Knoernschild and Kenza B. Nelson of SLH as attorneys for the appeal. 

The district court “conclude[d] it ha[d] no authority to decide the motion 

presented.” Nelson signed the brief the estate filed in response to the 

appeal of the ruling on remand. The court of appeals decision on the 

remanded application listed attorneys Knoernschild and Nelson of SLH 

as the attorneys for the estates and did not list an attorney for Wessels 

personally.

Regarding the services SLH provided, the 2009 application asserts 

that Wessels and SLH “have acted for the Estate in regard to contested 

and litigation matters.” Wessels also claims, “The Estate’s executor hired 

[SLH] as its attorney to assist in the hearing on Wessels’ application for 

approval of extraordinary fees following remand from the first appeal to 
24

the Court of Appeals and in the second appeal to the Court of Appeals.” 

Wessels further claims that “Wessels’ and [SLH’s] actions defending those 

fee awards are a direct extension of the original beneficial services 

provided by Wessels to the Estate.” In addition to handling the second 

appeal, Wessels notes that SLH was hired after the first appeal because 

“Wessels was deposed and called as a witness to address the services he 

performed for the Estate. For this reason, the Estate hired [SLH] to 

assist in litigation matters related to Wessels’ application.” By assisting 

in the hearings on the amended 2007 application and handling the 

appeal of the remanded 2007 application, Wessels claims SLH was 

assisting the estate and not him personally. We agree.

We give a district court great deference when ruling on whether 

services benefit an estate. Brady is instructive on this point. There, we 

found the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to 

award a second law firm fees for assisting with litigation because the 

district court found “the employment was not reasonably necessary for 

protection of the estate’s interests.” Brady, 308 N.W.2d at 74. It was, 

however, appropriate to award the second firm fees for appellate work 

done on the same case. Id. at 75. The district court refused to order fees 

for defending a malfeasance action against the executor, finding those 

services did not benefit the estate in any way. Id. at 74. The district 

court similarly found that hiring an expert witness on attorney fees did 

not benefit the estate and accordingly denied the application for fees. Id. 

This finding was also not an abuse of discretion. Id. The district court

did find that litigation efforts defending the final report were 

extraordinary services that entitled the attorney to compensation. Id. 

We upheld this finding as being within the court’s discretion. Id. at 75.
25

In this case the district court found “the attorney’s fees for [SLH] of 

$17,957.91 are reasonable, appropriate and required to protect the 

executors of the estate and the estate” and approved the fees requested. 

SLH assisted with the preparation of the estate’s fee request and acted as 

counsel when Wessels was called on to be a witness and when the ruling 

was later appealed. These services may have benefited Wessels, but they 

also benefited the estate by ensuring the fees awarded for extraordinary 

services complied with the statute. Some of the documents in the file 

indicate that SLH was the attorney for Wessels as opposed to the estate. 

However, these inconsistencies are insufficient to lead us to conclude the 

district court abused its discretion when it determined the services 

provided by SLH benefited the estate and were therefore eligible for 

compensation under section 633.199. The only services SLH claims it 

provided to the estate were related to litigation and appellate services. It 

was not an abuse of discretion to determine these services were the type 

of services that are compensable under section 633.199.

Having determined that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in finding that SLH was acting as the estate’s attorney and 

that the litigation and appellate services provided by SLH could 

constitute necessary and extraordinary services, we now turn to Willows’

claim that SLH did not comply with applicable law when proving up its 

fee request.

All of the fees requested for SLH in the 2009 application are 

asserted to be for extraordinary services “in regard solely to 

representation relative to litigation and appeal matters.” In support of 

these fees, Wessels submitted a list of sixteen “Advances” in his itemized 

bill. The advances were labeled as “Outside professional fee STANLEY

LANDE & HUNTER” and totaled $17,952.91. The statement of 
26

extraordinary fees stated the necessity and importance of SLH’s services 

and claimed SLH spent a total of 101.7 hours working on the estate. In 

the reply to Willows’ resistance to the 2009 application, Wessels attached 

“a summary of services performed by [SLH] for the Estate.” He added, “If 

the Court needs additional information to determine whether the services 

provided by [SLH] were extraordinary, [SLH] is prepared to submit an 

itemized billing statement.”

The summary describes SLH’s services as follows:

Ordinary services rendered in connection with this case: 

reviewing, preparing, and drafting documents for hearings 

on applications for approval of fees and other matters, 

following remand from the Court of Appeals; representation 

at hearings; attending deposition of Attorney Wessels; office 

conferences with Attorney Wessels concerning the case; 

reviewing appeal documents and briefs submitted by 

Willows; drafting and filing Court of Appeals briefs; research 

regarding the case; drafting correspondence to all parties 

involved regarding status of the case.

The district court’s ruling found that the itemizations contained in 

Wessels’ bill were for “services that were not ordinary services.” The only 

finding the district court made that specifically referenced SLH’s services 

was, “The Court therefore FINDS, that the extraordinary fees of Pete 

Wessels of $15,845.50 and the attorney’s fees for [SLH] of $17,957.91 are 

reasonable, appropriate and required to protect the executors of the 

estate and the estate.”

While we give broad discretion to the district court’s 

determinations of whether an attorney’s services were necessary, 

extraordinary services to the estate, we review de novo whether an 

attorney has met his burden and proven his fee under section 633.199 

and rule 7.2. See Mabie, 401 N.W.2d at 32. In Mabie, we reviewed a

decision where an attorney had submitted an itemized application, but 

failed to indicate which items were ordinary and which were 
27

extraordinary. See id. We stated, “It is not the role of this court or the 

district court to divine those services that are extraordinary from an 

attorney’s itemization of services. Rule [7.2(3)] clearly requires a written 

statement, to assist the court and make a better record, in addition to 

the itemization.” Id. We then reversed the district court, finding there 

was an inadequate basis to support the award of extraordinary fees. Id.

This case presents a different problem. Wessels and SLH claimed 

all of the services SLH provided the estate were extraordinary but failed 

to present any itemization describing the time spent performing each of 

those services in greater detail. Willows claims the statement Wessels

provided is inadequate. The statement of extraordinary fees explains the 

necessity for the services, which we have already discussed. It also 

explains the responsibilities SLH assumed, notably preparing appeals 

and assisting Wessels with litigation surrounding the 2007 application

on remand. Finally, the application includes the amount of extra time 

involved, which was 101.7 hours. However, unlike Wessels’ application, 

the SLH application does not offer any sort of breakdown of how those 

hours were spent.

Section 633.199 only allows “just and reasonable” fees to be 

awarded for necessary and extraordinary services. The court of appeals 

has summarized our case law regarding what constitutes a reasonable 

fee as follows:

In endeavoring to ascertain a reasonable legal fee, 

relevant factors include the time necessarily spent by the 

attorney, the nature and extent of the service, the amount 

involved, the difficulty of handling and the importance of the 

issues, responsibility assumed, results obtained and the 

experience of the attorney.

In re Estate of Bolton, 403 N.W.2d 40, 44 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987); see also 

Boyle v. Alum-Line, Inc., 773 N.W.2d 829, 832–33 (Iowa 2009) (using the 
28

same factors to determine whether attorney fees were reasonable under 

the Iowa Civil Rights Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).9 

The applicant bears the burden of proving the fees should be awarded. 

Iowa Ct. R. 7.2(3); see also In re Metcalf’s Estate, 227 Iowa 985, 994, 289 

N.W. 739, 743 (1940).

In Metcalf, we addressed a similar situation where an attorney had 

requested fees for extraordinary services, but only documented his time 

in broad and approximate terms. See Metcalf, 227 Iowa at 988, 289 N.W. 

at 740. The district court found the attorney provided extraordinary 

services and that the reasonable value of the services was $3500. Id. at 

988–89, 289 N.W. at 740–41. Accordingly, the court granted the fee 

request. Id. at 989, 289 N.W. at 741. The beneficiaries objected, noting, 

among other things, “that services were not itemized” and the fees were 

unreasonable. Id. at 992, 289 N.W. at 742. We stated that “[i]t requires 

but a glance at the statement of the attorney . . . to apprise one that the 

same was too indefinite to furnish a proper legal basis for [a finding as to 

the extent of value of the alleged extraordinary services].” Id. at 993, 289 

N.W. at 743. The application for SLH’s fees poses a similar problem.

Willows resisted the application for fees for SLH, pointing out that 

other than the general statement of the type of duties performed, there 

was no “documentation or evidence showing the services performed by 

[SLH] from which the Court can determine whether the advances are 

reasonable or for the benefit of the estate.” Without an itemized 

statement from SLH, Willows argues that “there is no way for the Court 

 9We note that the legislature added these factors to Iowa Code section 633.199 

in 2007. 2007 Iowa Acts ch. 134, § 10. However, as noted earlier, the decedent in this 

case passed away prior to July 1, 2007, before the 2007 amendment took effect.
29

or interested parties to know whether the firm and Wessels double-billed 

for the work.”

We agree. Without a more detailed breakdown, such as the one 

Wessels provided to justify his own fees, it was impossible for the district 

court to determine whether the fees provided by SLH were “reasonable.” 

Specifically, it is impossible to determine whether SLH and Wessels 

duplicated each other’s efforts. In his reply brief in support of the fee 

application, Wessels offered to provide an itemized breakdown of SLH’s 

services to the estate, should the court require it. The district court 

should have insisted he do so. Without an itemized billing statement, it 

is not possible for the district court to evaluate Willows’ claims that SLH 

and Wessels may have duplicated their efforts and spent an excessive 

amount of time defending the appeal.

Since the application submitted does not support an award of fees 

for extraordinary services, it should not have been granted by the district 

court. See Mabie, 401 N.W.2d at 32. When a district court awards 

attorney fees without specifically addressing complaints raised by one of 

the parties, and the basis for the court’s decision is not clearly evident 

from the court’s ruling, we have found it appropriate to remand the case 

to the district court to review the application and make specific findings.

Boyle, 773 N.W.2d at 833–34. Accordingly, the $17,957.91 in fees 

awarded to SLH is set aside, and the case is remanded. The district 

court is to request an itemized statement of the services provided by SLH 

and make a determination as to the reasonableness of the fee request 

after reviewing the exact services SLH provided to the estate.

IV. Disposition.

We affirm the district court’s finding that Wessels and SLH 

provided necessary and extraordinary services to the estate of Loren 
30

Bockwoldt when they defended the estate’s application for fees. This

finding does not constitute an abuse of discretion on the part of the 

district court. On our de novo review, we find Wessels’ application was 

adequately supported, but SLH’s was not. Accordingly, we vacate the 

decision of the court of appeals and affirm the holding of the district 

court in part and reverse in part. On remand, the district court is to 

award Wessels extraordinary fees of $15,845.50 and $631.79 in 

expenses. Since there is an inadequate basis to conclude SLH’s fees 

were reasonable, the district court is to request an itemized statement of 

the extraordinary services provided by SLH and evaluate SLH’s fee 

request accordingly.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT 

COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND 

CASE REMANDED.

All justices concur except Mansfield, J., who takes no part.