UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

In Re: BOBBY G. PARKS, 

Debtor.

RANDALL PARSONS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,  No. 03-1072

v.

BOBBY G. PARKS,

Defendant-Appellee,

ROBERT E. WICK,

Trustee-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Virginia, at Big Stone Gap.

Glen M. Williams, Senior District Judge.

(CA-01-93, BK-00-1913-WSB, AP-00-155)

Submitted: November 26, 2003

Decided: December 19, 2003

Before WILLIAMS and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Timothy W. McAfee, MCAFEE LAW FIRM, P.C., Norton, Virginia,

for Appellant. Harold R. Montgomery, MONTGOMERY LAW
OFFICES, Jonesville, Virginia; Tony M. Hutchinson, WOLFE, WILLIAMS & RUTHERFORD, Bristol, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Randall Parsons appeals a district court order vacating the findings

of the bankruptcy court presiding over Bobby Parks’s bankruptcy.

The bankruptcy court found Parks liable for tortiously injuring Parsons, awarded Parsons compensatory and punitive damages, and held

that Parks’s debt was not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)

(2000). For the following reasons, we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand with instructions to reinstate the bankruptcy court’s

order. 

Early in the morning of October 6, 1999, Parsons entered Parks’s

store, the Crossroads Market at Stone Creek, and was shot in the face

by Parks. According to Parsons, he was a regular patron of the Crossroads Market and had been told by Parks that he had permission to

enter the store after normal business hours. He remembers nothing of

the shooting itself but testified that he parked his truck in front of the

store, entered the store through unlocked doors, and paid for gas and

a pack of cigarettes with a $20 bill. According to Parsons, Parks was

awake and with another unidentified individual when Parsons entered

the store. 

Parks’s version of the events differed from Parsons. According to

Parks, Parsons forced his way into the locked store and Parks shot

him, believing that he was an intruder. After a hearing at which both

parties testified, the bankruptcy court found Parsons’s story the more

credible. The bankruptcy court’s conclusions were based in part on

testimony from the investigating officer, Lieutenant Hammonds, who

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stated that he found no indications of a forced entry into the store.

Hammonds believed that the location of Parsons’s body further supported Parsons’s version of events. The bankruptcy court concluded

that: (1) Parks willfully, maliciously, and intentionally shot Parsons,

(2) Parks was liable to Parsons in the amount of $683,319.03 in actual

damages and $100,000 in punitive damages, and (3) the debt was

nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). 

Parks appealed to the district court, which reversed the bankruptcy

court’s decision. Specifically, the district court found that Parks’s

actions "were in self defense at best and negligent and reckless at

worst," and "in neither case can there be a finding of willful and malicious intent." (J.A. at 179.) Parsons now appeals. 

We review the judgment of the district court sitting in review of a

bankruptcy court de novo, applying the same standards of review

applied in the district court. In re Wilson, 149 F.3d 249, 251-52 (4th

Cir. 1998). The bankruptcy court’s findings of facts will not be set

aside unless clearly erroneous. In re Johnson, 960 F.2d 396, 399 (4th

Cir. 1992); Bankr. R. 8013. Our review of the bankruptcy court’s

application of the law is de novo. Id. 

Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a discharge

under § 727 does not discharge a debt arising from a "willful and

malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of

another entity." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). The Supreme Court has established guidelines for determining whether a debt arises from a willful

and malicious injury. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 59 (1998)

(holding that Section 523(a)(6) does not except from discharge debts

arising from negligently or recklessly inflicted injuries); see also St.

Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Vaughn, 779 F.2d 1003, 1009 (4th

Cir. 1985) (noting that in the context of § 523(a)(6), "willful" means

"deliberate or intentional"). In Kawaauhau, the Court concluded that

for a debt to be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6), the debtor must

have actually intended to cause injury, not merely an act that resulted

in an injury. The test, then, is whether the debtor acted with " substantial certainty [that] harm [would result] or a subjective motive to

cause harm." In re Miller, 156 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir. 1998). 

Our review of the record discloses that the bankruptcy court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous and that the bankruptcy court

IN RE: PARKS 3
applied the correct legal standard. Parks testified three times during

the trial that he "threw [his] gun up and shot [Parsons]." (J.A. at 101,

106, 112). Parks never claimed that the shooting was a mistake or an

accident. Parsons’s mother testified that her other son, Parsons’s

brother, had a hostile encounter with Parks sometime before the

shooting, suggesting a possible motive. The bankruptcy court concluded that "in the light of all other evidence in this case, [ ] the

Defendant shot the Plaintiff knowingly and for some reason which he

has yet to acknowledge." (J.A. at 143). Clearly, considering the evidence as a whole, one is not "left with the definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed" by the bankruptcy judge. See

Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 567 (1985). Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order reversing the bankruptcy

court’s decision and remand with instructions to reinstate the bankruptcy court’s order. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

VACATED AND REMANDED

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