IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Anthony Feliciano, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 588 M.D. 2019

: SUBMITTED: December 17, 2021

Pennsylvania Department of :

Corrections, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge1

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE CEISLER FILED: January 26, 2022

Petitioner Anthony Feliciano (Feliciano), an inmate currently incarcerated 

within the Commonwealth’s state prison system at the State Correctional Institution 

at Mahanoy (SCI-Mahanoy), has filed an amended petition for review (Amended 

Petition) in this Court’s original jurisdiction. Therein, Feliciano seeks a declaratory 

judgment establishing that Respondent Pennsylvania Department of Corrections 

(Department) violated his procedural due process rights during the course of 

administratively punishing him for a positive drug test. In response, the Department 

has filed preliminary objections, through which it demurs to the Amended Petition 

and challenges our jurisdiction to consider this matter. After thorough consideration, 

we sustain the Department’s preliminary objection to our jurisdiction and dismiss 

the Amended Petition with prejudice.

1 This matter was assigned to the panel before January 3, 2022, when President Judge 

Emerita Leavitt became a senior judge on the Court.
2

I. Background

This matter again comes to us for consideration, the better part of a year after 

we sustained the Department’s jurisdictional preliminary objection to Feliciano’s 

original Petition for Review (Petition) and dismissed that Petition without prejudice.

2

In sustaining the Department’s preliminary objection, we noted that “the 

Department’s decisions regarding inmate misconduct convictions generally fall 

outside the scope of our original jurisdiction, even where a prisoner’s constitutional 

rights have allegedly been violated.” Feliciano I, 250 A.3d at 1274. We also made 

clear, though, that “[t]here is a narrow exception [to this rule in instances where] an 

inmate can identify a personal or property interest not limited by [Department] 

regulations and affected by a final [Department] decision. . . . If one of these interests 

is involved, the inmate is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Id. at 

1275 (quoting Hill v. Dep’t of Corr., 64 A.3d 1159, 1167 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)). With

regard to procedural due process, we made clear that an inmate must be afforded this 

constitutional right in the context of prison disciplinary matters only where “the 

punishment imposed upon him as a result of his [misconduct] constituted an 

‘atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison 

life.’” Id. at 1279 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). Moving 

on, we stated that each case of this nature “requires a fact-specific inquiry” regarding 

whether the affected inmate has suffered such a hardship. Accordingly, we adopted3

the multifactor test created by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 

Columbia Circuit, which we concluded “articulates the proper method for 

2 The details of Feliciano’s situation and the particulars of his Petition are discussed at 

length in Feliciano v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 250 A.3d 1269 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2021) (Feliciano I), and, as such, we need not recount them here.

3 Feliciano I was a unanimous en banc published opinion and thus binding case law.
3

determining whether an inmate is entitled to procedural due process in the context 

of an administrative determination that affects his carceral housing situation[.]” Id.

Under this test, 

the proper methodology for evaluating [procedural due 

process] deprivation claims [of this type] . . . is to consider 

(i) the conditions of confinement relative to administrative 

segregation, (ii) the duration of that confinement 

generally, and (iii) the duration relative to length of 

administrative segregation routinely imposed on prisoners 

serving similar sentences.

Id. (quoting Aref v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 242, 255 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). We also stressed

“that a liberty interest can potentially arise under less-severe conditions when the 

deprivation is prolonged or indefinite.” Id. (quoting Aref, 833 F.3d at 255). 

Upon review of Feliciano’s Petition, we concluded that he had failed to make 

averments therein that satisfied the requirements of this test and consequently 

determined that we lacked jurisdiction to consider his action; however, we did so 

without prejudice, and gave Feliciano 30 days to submit an Amended Petition in 

which he had corrected the deficiencies contained in his original filing. Id. at 1279-

80. Feliciano availed himself of this opportunity through his aforementioned 

Amended Petition. In response, the Department submitted the preliminary objections 

that are currently before us for disposition.
4

II. Discussion4

Feliciano’s Amended Petition suffers from the same jurisdictional defects that 

plagued his original Petition and, as such, we lack jurisdiction to consider his action.

The Amended Petition is devoid of averments that would allow us to compare the 

conditions of Feliciano’s misconduct penalty to that experienced by inmates during 

normal carceral confinement. In addition, Feliciano’s Amended Petition is silent 

about whether the administrative punishment levied against him in this instance was 

more severe than the penalties imposed upon similarly situated inmates, or whether 

the length of that punishment is such that his liberty interests are implicated. See 

Am. Pet. ¶¶2-23. Therefore, Feliciano has failed to identify a personal or property 

interest that would obligate the Department to afford him adequate procedural due 

process in this situation. It follows, then, that we do not have original jurisdiction 

over Feliciano’s action and, in light of this, sustain the Department’s preliminary 

objection to that effect and dismiss the Amended Petition with prejudice.5

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

4

In ruling on preliminary objections, this Court accepts as true all 

well-pled allegations of material fact, as well as all inferences 

reasonably deducible from those facts. Key v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 

185 A.3d 421 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). However, this Court need not 

accept unwarranted inferences, conclusions of law, argumentative 

allegations, or expressions of opinion. Id. For preliminary objections 

to be sustained, it must appear with certainty that the law will permit

no recovery. Id. Any doubt must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. Id.

Dantzler v. Wetzel, 218 A.3d 519, 522 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019).

5 Given our disposition of this matter on jurisdictional grounds, it is unnecessary for us to 

address the Department’s remaining demurrer-based preliminary objection.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Anthony Feliciano, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 588 M.D. 2019

:

Pennsylvania Department of :

Corrections, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 26th day of January, 2022, it is hereby ORDERED that 

Respondent Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’ (Department) preliminary 

objection to our jurisdiction over Petitioner Anthony Feliciano’s (Feliciano) 

Amended Petition for Review is SUSTAINED. Feliciano’s Petition for Review is 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge