In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 09-2805

PATRICIA CLARETT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

STEVEN ROBERTS, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 07 C 5625—John F. Grady, Judge.

ARGUED OCTOBER 28, 2010—DECIDED SEPTEMBER 23, 2011

Before MANION, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. Police officers went to Patricia

Clarett’s home in Lansing, Illinois, early one morning

to question her sons about a burglary that had occurred

overnight in nearby Lynwood, Illinois. A confrontation

ensued and escalated quickly. One of the officers

Tasered Clarett three times, and the officers arrested her

for obstruction and resisting arrest. Those charges were

subsequently dropped, and Clarett sued the officers
2 No. 09-2805

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging use of excessive force and

false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and

various state-law claims. A jury returned a verdict for

the officers on all counts. Clarett appealed.

We affirm. Clarett waived her most plausible claim

of trial error—the court’s decision to admit two of her

criminal convictions—when she introduced evidence of

the convictions herself, before the officers could do so.

Her remaining evidentiary challenges are meritless. We

also reject Clarett’s claims of instructional error. Finally,

the district court properly denied Clarett’s motion for

judgment as a matter of law as well as her motion for

a new trial. The parties told dramatically different

stories about the confrontation inside Clarett’s home,

and the jury was entitled to believe the officers’ version

of events.

I. Background

Early in the morning on October 11, 2005, officers with

the Lynwood Police Department received a report that

a suspicious vehicle was making unusual, repeated

trips to and from a garage. Officers dispatched to the

neighborhood saw a vehicle in the area matching the

caller’s description. The officers stopped the vehicle and

in it found Clarett, her boyfriend, and her two sons

Patrick and Anthony Peters. The officers also noticed an

air compressor in the vehicle; none of the occupants of

the vehicle claimed to own the compressor, so the

officers confiscated it. Soon thereafter, Lynwood police

received a call reporting a garage burglary. Among the
No. 09-2805 3

items reported stolen was an air compressor whose

model number matched the one recovered from Clarett

and her sons. Lynwood officers went to Clarett’s home

in Lansing to try to talk with her sons, but they first

called the Lansing Police Department for backup.

At trial Clarett and the officers disagreed about what

occurred when the officers arrived at her home. Clarett

testified that when the officers asked to speak with her

sons, she asked them to remain at the door while she

woke them. Despite her request that they wait outside,

the officers—including several she claimed were hiding

out of her sight—entered her home immediately. When

she asked them again to wait outside, Lansing Officer

Steven Roberts used his Taser to immobilize her, causing

intense pain. Roberts was six feet away, and he used

the setting on the Taser that caused barbs to project

from the device and attach to Clarett. Clarett testified

that once she regained muscle control, she tried to run

from Roberts. The Taser barbs were still attached to her,

however, and Roberts shocked her a second time. The

second deployment caused Clarett to fall in the hallway.

Clarett testified that Roberts deployed the Taser a third

time, totally without provocation.

The officers’ description of the confrontation was very

different. They claimed that they entered Clarett’s home

only after she consented and that none of the officers

were hiding. They testified that Clarett also gave them

permission to enter her sons’ bedroom. Several did so,

and a dispute soon arose. Clarett ran past some of the

officers who were still in the living room and blocked
4 No. 09-2805

their entry into the bedroom. Officer Roberts testified

that he told Clarett a number of times to move away

from the door, but she refused. Fearing for the safety of

the officers in the small bedroom, Roberts warned

Clarett that he would deploy the Taser if she did not

move. When she did not move, he deployed the Taser, and

she fell to the ground. The Taser delivered an electrical

current for five seconds. Roberts said he waited five

seconds, then tried to assist Clarett in getting back on her

feet, but she began to kick at him. He warned her

several times to stop, and when she did not, he deployed

the Taser a second time. Because she continued to

resist, Roberts decided to arrest her for obstruction.

When he attempted to handcuff Clarett, however, she

started to yell and flail her arms. When she would not

stop, Roberts shocked Clarett a third time. The officers

were then successful in placing Clarett under arrest.

Though the parties radically disagreed about important

details, they agreed that Roberts deployed the Taser

three times. It was also undisputed that Clarett suffered

various injuries as a result of the deployments. A doctor

who examined her the day after the incident noted electrical burns from the Taser barbs, as well as multiple

bruises and sprains. She was prescribed Valium for stressinduced anxiety.

Clarett was charged with obstructing an officer and

resisting arrest, but those charges were eventually

dropped. Clarett then brought this action against four

officers from Lansing and three from Lynwood alleging

claims for excessive force and false arrest in violation of
No. 09-2805 5

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. She also

brought state-law claims for malicious prosecution and

failure to intervene. The case was tried to a jury, which

returned a verdict for the defendants on all counts.

Clarett moved for judgment as a matter of law under

Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or in

the alternative for a new trial under Rule 59. The district

court denied the motions, and Clarett timely appealed.

II. Discussion

Clarett’s appeal focuses primarily on claimed evidentiary

and instructional errors. She also argues that the jury’s

verdict was against the weight of the evidence and asks

us to remand for entry of judgment in her favor as a

matter of law, or alternatively, a new trial.

A. Evidentiary Challenges

Clarett challenges three evidentiary rulings made by

the district court. First, she challenges the court’s pretrial

decision to admit evidence of two of her criminal convictions, one for retail theft and one for obstructing

a police officer. Second, she claims that the court erroneously allowed Officer Roberts, a lay witness, to offer

expert testimony. Finally, she argues that the court erroneously excluded evidence that the police did not have

a warrant to enter or search her home. We review the

district court’s evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion and will reverse “only where no reasonable person
6 No. 09-2805

1 The judge excluded Clarett’s third conviction—for forgery—

because it was too old.

could take the view adopted by the trial court.” United

States v. L.E. Myers Co., 562 F.3d 845, 855 (7th Cir. 2009).

1. Admission of Clarett’s Convictions

The district court entered a ruling in limine that two

of Clarett’s criminal convictions—for misdemeanor

retail theft and obstructing a police officer—could be

admitted at trial. The judge held that her retail-theft 1

conviction was admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) of the

Federal Rules of Evidence as a crime involving an act

of dishonesty. The judge held that her obstruction conviction was also admissible, though he did not specify

the grounds. It appears that the judge admitted this

conviction—or perhaps both—for purposes of impeachment since Clarett had denied in her deposition that

she had ever been convicted of a crime.

These rulings may have been problematic. Admission

of a criminal conviction under Rule 609(a)(2) is limited

to crimes for which “it readily can be determined that

establishing the elements of the crime required proof

or admission of an act of dishonesty or false statement

by the witness.” FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2). The Advisory

Committee Notes explain that this rule is generally

limited to “perjury or subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, or false pretenses,”

and similar crimes. Retail theft lacks an element of an
No. 09-2805 7

Under Rule 609(a)(1) evidence of a conviction is admissible 2

for impeachment purposes if the crime is “punishable by

death or imprisonment in excess of one year.” Clarett’s retail

theft and obstruction convictions were both misdemeanors;

the defendants do not argue that they were admissible under

Rule 609(a)(1). As we have already explained, to be admissible

for impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a)(2), a conviction

must involve an act of dishonesty or false statement as proof

of an element of the offense; neither of Clarett’s convictions

qualifies.

act of dishonesty that is common to crimes of this type.

As such, “[t]his circuit generally does not count retail

theft as a crime of dishonesty” for purposes of

Rule 609(a)(2). Kunz v. DeFelice, 538 F.3d 667, 675 (7th

Cir. 2008).

The authority to admit evidence for impeachment

purposes is implicit in Rule 607 of the Federal Rules of

Evidence. See 27 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR

JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6096,

at 655 (2d ed. 2007). To the extent that the court gave

a green light to the introduction of either of Clarett’s

convictions to attack her truthfulness, their admission

was governed by Rule 608(b), which provides that

specific instances of conduct bearing on a witness’s character for truthfulness “other than conviction of crime

as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic

evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 608(b). Neither conviction was

admissible under Rule 609. So the defendants could 2

not make affirmative use of this evidence or prove it up

by way of extrinsic evidence. Moreover, it is generally
8 No. 09-2805

improper to rely on extrinsic evidence to impeach a

witness about a collateral matter. Young v. James Green

Mgmt., Inc., 327 F.3d 616, 627 (7th Cir. 2003); United

States v. Bonner, 302 F.3d 776, 785 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[O]ne

may not contradict for the sake of contradiction; the

evidence must have an independent purpose and an

independent ground for admission.” (quotation marks

omitted)). “A matter is collateral if it could not have

been introduced into evidence for any purpose other

than contradiction.” United States v. Williamson, 202

F.3d 974, 979 (7th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted).

The only remaining evidentiary option available to the

officers was inquiry on cross-examination. Under

Rule 608(b) specific instances of conduct bearing upon

truthfulness “may . . . be inquired into on cross-examination” in the discretion of the court. Perhaps this is what

the court and the officers had in mind. As things

unfolded at trial, however, and apparently based on the

court’s pretrial ruling, the first mention of the convictions came during Clarett’s case-in-chief, when her

counsel questioned her about them on direct examination.

By introducing the convictions herself, Clarett waived

the right to challenge their admission on appeal. The

Supreme Court has held that criminal defendants who

introduce evidence of their own prior convictions in an

effort to remove the “sting” forgo the right to appeal the

trial court’s decision to admit those convictions into

evidence. Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 758 (2000).

The Court held that by introducing the evidence first,

the defendant adopts a concerted trial strategy to
No. 09-2805 9

minimize the prejudicial effect of the evidence and in so

doing waives the right to appeal the court’s ruling that

the evidence may be admitted at trial. Id.; see also

United States v. Saunders, 359 F.3d 874, 877-78 (7th Cir.

2004).

We have never addressed whether the Ohler principle

applies in civil cases. Clarett argues against applying

Ohler in the civil context, noting that criminal defendants

have the right not to testify in their defense, while civil

plaintiffs generally must do so in order to prove their

claim. This distinction is immaterial in light of Ohler’s

reasoning. The Court noted that even after a criminal

defendant chooses to take the stand, she “has a further

choice to make . . . . The defendant must choose whether

to introduce the conviction on direct examination and

remove the sting or to take her chances with the prosecutor’s possible elicitation of the conviction on crossexamination.” Ohler, 529 U.S. at 757-58. The same choice

is present in civil cases. Similarly, in the criminal

context, the government must also make a tactical decision:

If the defendant testifies, [the government] must

choose whether or not to impeach her by use of her

prior conviction. Here the trial judge had indicated

he would allow its use, but the Government still had

to consider whether its use might be deemed

reversible error on appeal. This choice is often based

on the Government’s appraisal of the apparent effect

of the defendant’s testimony. If she has offered a

plausible, innocent explanation of the evidence

against her, it will be inclined to use the prior con-
10 No. 09-2805

viction; if not, it may decide not to risk possible reversal on appeal from its use.

Id. at 758 (footnote omitted). The Court noted in Ohler

that when the defendant decides to introduce the conviction evidence herself, she denies the government

“its usual right to decide, after she testifies, whether or

not to use her prior conviction against her.” Id.

The logic of Ohler applies with equal force in both

criminal and civil cases. The tactical nature of each

party’s decisions is the same; indeed, the stakes are

higher in a criminal case, and still the Supreme Court

found waiver. We note that every circuit to have

addressed the question has applied Ohler in civil cases.

See, e.g., Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1130

(9th Cir. 2010); Estate of Smith v. City of Wilmington, 317

F. App’x 237, 239 n.1 (3d Cir. 2009); Canny v. Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Bottling Grp., Inc., 439 F.3d 894, 904 (8th

Cir. 2006); Ludwig v. Norfolk So. Ry. Co., 50 F. App’x 743,

751 (6th Cir. 2002). In Canny the Eighth Circuit observed

that a civil litigant should not be allowed to “avoid the

consequence of its own trial tactic by arguing it was

forced to introduce the evidence . . . to diminish the

prejudice.” 439 F.3d at 904. We agree. Because Clarett

introduced the evidence of her retail theft and obstruction convictions herself, she is precluded from challenging their admissibility on appeal.

2. Admission of Expert Testimony by Lay Witness

Clarett next argues that the district court erred by

allowing Officer Roberts, a lay witness, to offer expert
No. 09-2805 11

testimony. Roberts was questioned about an inconsistency between the number of times he Tasered

Clarett and the digital register retained in the Taser’s

internal memory. The parties agreed that Roberts Tasered

Clarett three times and that each shock lasted for five

seconds. But the printout from the Taser’s digital memory

recorded six separate deployments of the Taser, some

just one second apart. When Clarett’s counsel asked

Roberts about the discrepancy, he disclaimed technical

knowledge about the mechanics of the Taser or the computer download that produced the printout. At one

point during this testimony, the judge instructed

Clarett’s attorney not to “ask this witness a great many

technical questions. He does not purport to be an expert,

and it would be unfair to put words in his mouth.”

Under questioning from his own counsel, however,

Roberts testified that based on his experience and

training, it would be physically impossible to discharge

the Taser multiple times just one second apart. He also

testified more generally about the Taser printout, which

registered 585 separate deployments occurring over the

span of more than a year. He also said that “[a]fter reviewing this printout, there does appear to be many

different malfunctions in the printout.” Clarett argues

that this was impermissible expert testimony by a lay

witness, offered without compliance with the requirements of Rule 702.

We disagree. Roberts did not give technical testimony

about how the Taser’s internal memory operated or how

data was uploaded from the Taser to the police depart-
12 No. 09-2805

ment’s central computer—subjects that no doubt would

have required some form of properly qualified expert

testimony under Rule 702. Rather, his testimony was

limited to his own experience in operating the Taser.

He explained the steps required to fire the Taser in order

to illustrate the incongruity of rapid, successive deployments only one second apart. Neither this testimony,

nor his discussion of the Taser printout, was couched in

terms of an expert opinion. See 29 CHARLES ALAN

WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 6253, at 119-20 (1997) (“[S]everal courts

have held that, in cases involving opinions based on

various types of extensive experience in a given

industry or on a specific subject, the opinions properly

could have been classified as either lay or expert.”).

Even if this testimony crossed the line into the domain

of expert opinion, its admission was harmless. FED. R.

EVID. 103(a) (“Error may not be predicated upon a

ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected . . . .”); Liu v. Price

Waterhouse LLP, 302 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2002)

(“[A]n error is harmless if it did not contribute to the

verdict in a meaningful manner.”). The parties agreed

that Roberts deployed the Taser three times for five

seconds each; had there been a dispute on this subject, the

evidence of the Taser printout discrepancy might

have been more important. As it was, in light of the

parties’ agreement, this discrepancy had little significance. See Aguirre v. Turner Constr. Co., 582 F.3d 808,

814 (7th Cir. 2009). Indeed, the judge might have excluded the evidence of the Taser printout on grounds of
No. 09-2805 13

irrelevancy; once the issue was raised, however, it was

not an abuse of discretion to permit Roberts to testify

about it to the limited extent that he did.

3. Exclusion of Evidence that the Officers Did Not

Have a Warrant

Clarett also challenges the district court’s decision

to exclude evidence that the officers did not have a

warrant to enter and search her home. The officers

moved before trial to exclude this evidence as well as

any testimony about whether Clarett consented to their

entry into her home. They argued that whether they had

a warrant or consent was irrelevant to the elements of

Clarett’s § 1983 claims. The district court granted the

motion in part, excluding all references to the absence

of a warrant. The court held, however, that whether

Clarett consented was potentially probative of what

happened once the officers were inside the house.

This was not an abuse of discretion. That the officers

did not have a warrant was irrelevant to whether they

used excessive force or falsely arrested Clarett for obstruction after they entered the house. Stated differently,

the fact that they did not have a warrant does not make

it any more or less likely that they subsequently

violated her federal rights by using excessive force or

falsely arresting her for obstruction. Even if there was

error, it was harmless. Despite the court’s pretrial

ruling, Clarett put the issue before the jury anyway. On

at least two occasions, Clarett testified that the officers

did not have a warrant to enter her home. Accordingly,
14 No. 09-2805

she can hardly claim to have been harmed by the

district court’s pretrial ruling.

B. Jury Instructions

Clarett raises three claims of instructional error. She

contends that the jury instructions on excessive force

and probable cause were erroneous, and also that the

district court should not have rejected her request for a

limiting instruction regarding the jury’s use of her

prior convictions. We review de novo whether the jury

instructions fairly and accurately summarized the law.

United States v. Quintero, 618 F.3d 746, 753 (7th Cir. 2010).

We review the district court’s decision whether to give

a particular jury instruction for abuse of discretion,

United States v. Tavarez, 626 F.3d 902, 904 (7th Cir.

2010), and will reverse only if the instructions in

their entirety so thoroughly misled the jury that they

prejudiced Clarett. Quintero, 618 F.3d at 753.

1. Excessive-Force Instruction

The district court’s excessive-force jury instruction

was based on the Seventh Circuit pattern jury instruction and was adapted to conform to the evidence in

the case. The court explained that excessive force “means

more force than is reasonably necessary under the circumstances shown by the evidence,” and instructed

the jury that “if [Clarett] did in fact interfere with the

arrest of her sons, then the defendant Roberts also had

the right to use the degree of force necessary to arrest
No. 09-2805 15

The pattern jury instruction leaves the harm element of 3

the excessive-force claim to the discretion of the trial judge

(continued...)

the plaintiff for that interference and for the offense of

resisting her own arrest.” The court also explained that

to recover against Roberts on her excessive-force claim,

Clarett had the burden of proving that he used excessive

force, that she suffered injury or harm, and that his use

of excessive force was the proximate cause of her injury

or harm.

Clarett argues that this approach to the excessiveforce instruction improperly conflated her excessiveforce claim with her false-arrest claim, making the

former contingent on the latter. Not so. The district

court simply explained that some degree of force may

have been appropriate to arrest Clarett if the jury

found she was actually obstructing the officers. The

jury’s consideration of the excessive-force claim was not

improperly linked to its determination of the falsearrest claim. Put differently, the jury was free to

conclude that Roberts used excessive force in subduing

and arresting Clarett even if it found that the arrest

itself was legal.

Clarett also argues that the excessive-force instruction

improperly required her to prove that injury or harm

occurred as a result of the excessive force. She cites

Briggs v. Marshall, 93 F.3d 355 (7th Cir. 1996), for the

proposition that injury need not be shown in order to

prevail on a claim of excessive force. But this was not a 3
16 No. 09-2805

(...continued) 3

because the law on this point is not settled. See 7TH CIR. PATTERN

CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION 7.08. Briggs says only that there is no

per se rule preventing a party from seeking nominal damages

in an excessive-force claim without a provable injury. Briggs

v. Marshall, 93 F.3d 355, 359-60 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Frizzell v.

Szabo, 647 F.3d 698, 701-02 (7th Cir. 2011).

“no injury” excessive-force case. Everyone agreed that

Clarett sustained injuries during the course of her confrontation with Roberts. In this situation, a nominaldamages instruction—perhaps appropriate in a true noinjury case—would have been inappropriate here.

2. Probable Cause

On the false-arrest claim, the court gave the jury the

following instruction on the meaning of probable cause:

“Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances

known to the officer are sufficient to warrant a

reasonable person in believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.” Clarett proposed

that the court substitute “a reasonable police officer” for

“a reasonable person” and now claims it was error for

the judge to decline to do so. For support she cites

Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc),

but that case is silent on this particular claim of instructional error. The issue in Llaguno was whether the

probable-cause instruction elucidated or confused the

issues before the jury based on the specific facts of

that case. Id. at 1569.
No. 09-2805 17

Here, the district court’s probable-cause instruction was

adapted from the pattern instruction, which defines

“probable cause” in terms of what a “prudent person”

would have believed at the time an arrest was made.

7TH CIR. PATTERN CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION 7.06. Although

some authority uses the more specific “objectively reasonable police officer” standard, see Ornelas v. United

States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996), probable cause is most

often assessed by reference to the “prudent person”

standard, see, e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991)

(per curiam); see also Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392,

398 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Police officers possess probable

cause to arrest when the facts and circumstances within

their knowledge and of which they have reasonably

trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a

prudent person in believing that the suspect had committed an offense.” (emphasis added) (quotation marks

omitted)). Clarett does not explain how her proposed

alternative instruction would have made any difference

here. The court’s probable-cause instruction was not

improper.

3. Limiting Instruction

Finally, Clarett challenges the district court’s failure

to provide a limiting instruction regarding the jury’s use

of the evidence of her criminal convictions. She

preserved this issue in the district court by submitting

proposed limiting instructions; the record does not

reflect why the court rejected her proposal. But on

appeal Clarett’s entire argument on this issue is limited
18 No. 09-2805

to two sentences in her opening brief: “Plaintiff offered

a curative instruction (153-1 p. 39) ‘you may not consider this evidence for any other purpose’ which was

rejected. (Tr. 873) These errors prejudiced Plaintiff

and were not harmless error.” She neither cited legal

authority nor made any meaningful argument in

support of this claim of error.

We have repeatedly held that undeveloped arguments

are considered waived. See Gross v. Town of Cicero, 619

F.3d 697, 704-05 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Tockes,

530 F.3d 628, 633 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Unsupported and

undeveloped arguments . . . are considered waived.”); APS

Sports Collectibles, Inc. v. Sports Time, Inc., 299 F.3d 624, 631

(7th Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is not this court’s responsibility

to research and construct the parties’ arguments, and

conclusory analysis will be construed as waiver.” (quotation marks omitted)). We see no reason not to find

waiver here.

C. Rule 50 and Rule 59 Motions

Finally, Clarett contends that the undisputed evidence

that Roberts deployed the Taser three times constitutes “overwhelming evidence” of excessive force and

required the district court to enter judgment in her favor

as a matter of law under Rule 50 or at least grant a new

trial under Rule 59. We review the district court’s denial

of Clarett’s motion for judgment as a matter of law de

novo, reviewing the record as a whole to “determine

whether the evidence presented, combined with all reasonable inferences permissibly drawn therefrom, is suffi-
No. 09-2805 19

cient to support the verdict when viewed in the light

most favorable to the party against whom the motion

is directed.” Erickson v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 469 F.3d 600,

601 (7th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted). We will

overturn the jury’s verdict only if no reasonable juror

could have found in the defendants’ favor. Id.; see also

Davis v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 445 F.3d 974, 975 (7th Cir. 2006).

On the other hand, we review the denial of Clarett’s

motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. Id. at 979.

“A new trial may be granted if the verdict is against the

clear weight of the evidence or the trial was unfair to

the moving party.” David v. Caterpillar, Inc., 324 F.3d 851,

863 (7th Cir. 2003). On review, however, “[a] new trial

should be granted ‘only when the record shows that

the jury’s verdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice or

where the verdict, on the record, cries out to be overturned or shocks our conscience.’” Davis, 445 F.3d at 979

(quoting Williamson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344,

1353 (3d Cir. 1991)).

The jury’s verdict finds ample support in the record.

Clarett’s telling of events differed sharply from that of

the officers, and it was entirely the jury’s province to

choose which version to believe. Roberts testified at

length regarding his reasons for deploying the Taser.

He testified that Clarett was blocking the doorway to

her sons’ bedroom after some officers had already entered. He heard a commotion in the bedroom and

believed that the officers may need help. He told Clarett

to move away from the doorway and she refused. He

used the Taser to temporarily immobilize and remove
20 No. 09-2805

her from the doorway. He said he considered using

other alternatives, such as physically moving Clarett out

of the way, but because the apartment was small

and crowded, a physical confrontation might escalate

quickly, risking serious injury. Under the circumstances,

he concluded that using the Taser was his best option.

Explaining the second and third Taser deployments, he

said that Clarett was kicking and flailing at him and

continued this assaultive behavior when he tried to

arrest her. The other officers testified similarly.

The jurors were entitled to believe the officers’ version

of events, and we will not disturb their credibility determination. On this record a reasonable juror could easily

find for the defendants; the verdict does not “cry out

to be overturned” or “shock the conscience.” Clarett’s

Rule 50 and Rule 59 motions were properly denied.

AFFIRMED.

9-23-11