NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 22-2369

_____________

JUSTIN PIERZNIK,

 Appellant

 

v.

COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY

______________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

of New Jersey 

(District Court No. 1:20-cv-12507)

District Court Judge: Honorable Christine P. O’Hearn

______________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on

March 24, 2023

Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and MCKEE Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: June 15, 2023)

_______________________

OPINION∗

_______________________

∗

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent. 
2

McKEE, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Justin Pierznik appeals the District Court’s decision affirming the Social 

Security Administration Acting Commissioner’s denial of his claim for social security

disability benefits.

1 For the following reasons, we will affirm.

I.2

The role of this Court, like that of the District Court, is to determine whether the 

Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.

3 Substantial evidence 

must be “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”4 We will uphold the 

Commissioner’s decision “if it is supported by substantial evidence, even if we would 

have decided the factual inquiry differently.”5

II. 

1 After the Acting Commissioner denied Appellant’s claims initially and on 

reconsideration, Appellant requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. The 

ALJ found that Appellant was not disabled. Appellant’s request for review by the 

Appeals Council was denied. Consequently, the ALJ’s decision became the 

Commissioner’s final decision on Appellant’s claim. See Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 

358, 359 (3d Cir. 1999).

2 The District Court had jurisdiction to review the final decision of the Commissioner 

under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1291. 3 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any 

fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”); see also Johnson v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008).

4 Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Smith v. Califano, 637 

F.2d 968, 970 (3d Cir. 1981)); see also Johnson, 529 F.3d at 200.

5 Hartranft, 181 F.3d at 360.
3

Appellant raises multiple issues on appeal. Most of his claims relate to his 

argument that the Administrative Law Judge erred by not giving controlling weight to the 

opinion of his treating physician, Dr. David P. Aita. Appellant contends that, had the ALJ 

properly weighed the opinion, he would have found Appellant to be disabled or, if not, at 

least arrived at a different Residual Functional Capacity determination. 

Although a treating physician’s opinion is often weighed more heavily than other 

evidence in the record, it is not automatically determinative. To be given controlling

weight, the opinion must be “well-supported by medically acceptable . . . techniques and . 

. . not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence.”6 The ALJ maintains authority to

weigh the medical opinions in the record and to “make the ultimate disability and RFC 

determinations.”7

We consider whether the ALJ’s disability and RFC determinations—and his 

underlying decision to adopt some of Dr. Aita’s opinions while rejecting others—were

supported by substantial evidence.8 We hold that they were. As the District Court rightly 

observed, the ALJ offered a detailed explanation of his decisions, in which he 

acknowledged and weighed the multiple opinions in the record. The ALJ explained that 

the Dr. Aita opinions he did not adopt were “vague” because they “failed to address 

specifically [Appellant’s] function-by-function abilities in vocational terms.”9 He also 

6 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.

7 Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011).

8 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any 

fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . .”); see also Johnson v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008).

9 App. 110.
4

noted that they were “inconsistent” with other evidence he considered.

10 This is 

supported by substantial evidence such that a “reasonable mind” would accept it as 

adequate to support his disability11 and RFC determinations.

12 Consequently, though we 

are not unsympathetic to Appellant, the law and our standard of review do not allow us to 

disturb the ALJ’s findings. 

Appellant also argues that the ALJ erred in relying upon testimony from the 

vocational expert. He contends that the expert was unreliable because he proposed two

jobs—Order Caller and Photocopy-Machine Operator—that include or may include 

responsibilities prohibited by Appellant’s RFC. He also argues that the ALJ erred by 

accepting an obsolete job and by relying on the expert’s calculations of the number of 

jobs available to Appellant in the national economy. Appellant, however, points to 

10 Id. The ALJ explained that Dr. Aita’s ambiguous conclusions “limited the probative 

value of his opinion” and that his conclusion that Appellant “would require additional 

supervision was unsupported and inconsistent with [Appellant’s] limited mental health 

treatment, limited positive examination findings, and reported functioning . . . which 

suggested that he did not require such a limitation.” Id. Appellant argues that the ALJ 

improperly relied on these three pieces of evidence (which he dubbed the “Three ALJ 

Reasons”) to find inconsistencies with Appellant’s limitations but offers scant evidence 

or legal analysis to support that assertion. 11 Appellant asserts that there was not substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding 

that he was not disabled under Listings 12.04 or 12.06. See 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P, 

app. 1, §§ 12.04(B), 12.06(B). He contends that the ALJ failed to “provid[e] detail

regarding claimant’s allegations.” Appellant’s Brief, 47. We disagree and adopt the 

District Court’s extensive analysis of the ALJ’s detailed examination of Appellant’s 

claims. See Justin P. v. Kijakazi, No. CV 20-12507 (CPO), 2022 WL 2965857, at *5-8 

(D.N.J. May 31, 2022).

12 Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Smith v. Califano, 637 

F.2d 968, 970 (3d Cir. 1981)); see also Johnson, 529 F.3d at 200.
5

nothing to support these arguments or to demonstrate that the ALJ’s conclusions were not 

based on substantial evidence. 

As to Appellant’s first argument, an examination of the jobs’ Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles entries reveals that neither requires significant interaction with 

people that would violate Appellant’s RFC.13 While we are sympathetic to Appellant’s 

second argument that the job of Addresser is likely obsolete, the ALJ need only establish 

that a claimant is capable of performing one job that exists in significant numbers in the 

national economy.

14 Finally, we reject Appellant’s arguments that there is a meaningful 

difference between “full time” and “full time equivalent” based simply on the definition 

of “equivalent.”15

III.

For the reasons described above, we therefore will affirm the District Court.

13 See DOT 209.667-014 and DOT 207.685-014. 

14 20 C.F.R. § 416.966(b); see also Penrose v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-00011, 2020 

WL 7640585, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2020). 

15 App. 19. As the District Court rightly noted, “Black’s Law Dictionary . . . defines

‘equivalent’ as ‘[e]qual in value, force, amount, effect, or significance[;] [c]orresponding 

in effect or function; nearly equal; virtually identical.’” Id. (alterations in original) (citing 

Black’s Law Dictionary, 682 (11th ed. 2019).