alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 92 (Thursday, May 14, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 22764]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-11292]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

[Disaster Declaration <greek-i> 11724 and <greek-i> 11725]


Georgia Disaster Number GA-00023

AGENCY: U.S. Small Business Administration.

ACTION: Amendment 2.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This is an amendment of the Presidential declaration of a 
major disaster for Public Assistance Only for the State of Georgia 
(FEMA-1833-DR), dated 04/23/2009.
    Incident: Severe Storms, Flooding, Tornadoes and Straight-line 
Winds.
    Incident Period: 03/26/2009 through 04/13/2009.

DATES: Effective Date: 04/13/2009.
    Physical Loan Application Deadline Date: 06/22/2009.
    Economic Injury (EIDL) Loan Application Deadline Date: 01/23/2010.

ADDRESSES: Submit completed loan applications to: U.S. Small Business 
Administration, Processing and Disbursement Center, 14925 Kingsport 
Road, Fort Worth , TX 76155.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: A. Escobar, Office of Disaster 
Assistance, U.S. Small Business Administration, 409 3rd Street, SW., 
Suite 6050, Washington, DC 20416.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The notice of the President's major disaster 
declaration for Private Non-Profit organizations in the State of 
Georgia, dated 04/23/2009, is hereby amended to establish the incident 
period for this disaster as beginning 03/26/2009 and continuing through 
04/13/2009.
    All other information in the original declaration remains 
unchanged.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers 59002 and 59008)

James E. Rivera,
Acting Associate Administrator for Disaster Assistance.
 [FR Doc. E9-11292 Filed 5-13-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8025-01-P
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

CESAR SAVIEL SALINAS

- TINOCO

,

Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

,

State

. '

'

'

'

'

' No. 08

- 1 3

- 00 310

- CR

Appeal from the

Criminal District Court No. 7

of Dallas County, Texas

(TC# F

- 1222231

- Y )

O R D E R

The Court GRANTS the Appellant ’ s third motion for extension of time to file the brief

until August 19 , 201 4

. NO FURTHER MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE

THE APPELLANT ’ S BRIEF WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT.

It is further ORDERED that the Hon. Rosalind A. Kelly

, the Appellant ’ s Attorney

,

prepare the Appellant ’ s brief and forward the same to this Court on or before August 19 , 201 4

.

IT IS SO ORDE RED this 2 2 nd day of July , 2014

.

PER CURIAM

Before McClure, C.J., Rivera and Rodriguez, JJ.
#### In the Matter of John D. Justice, Appellant, v Michael Hogan, as Commissioner of New York State Office of Mental Health, Respondent.

Decided June 30, 2009

Appeal dismissed, without costs, by the Court of Appeals, sua sponte, upon the ground that the order appealed from does not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lorenzo DORANTES-MENDOZA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 05-50742.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 16, 2006.*

Filed Oct. 23, 2006.

*766US Attorneys Office, USSD-Office of the U.S. Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Frank M. Murphy, III, Esq., San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Lorenzo Dorantes-Mendoza, San Diego, CA, pro se.

Before: LEAYY, W. FLETCHER, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Lorenzo Dorantes-Mendoza appeals from the 57-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for being a deported alien found in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Dorantes-Mendoza contends that his sentence is unreasonable because the district court failed to appropriately consider the need to avoid unwarranted disparity in sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly considered the advisory Guidelines and the § 3553 factors in imposing the sentence. The record reflects that the district court considered Do-rantes-Mendoza’s history and characteristics, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the kinds of sentences available, and Dorantes-Mendoza’s ties to the United States, and imposed a sentence that was sufficient but no greater than necessary to comply with § 3553(a). *See United States v. Plouffe,*445 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir.2006).

We reject Dorantes-Mendoza’s contention that disparity between his sentence and fast-track sentences imposed on other illegal reentry defendants rendered his sentence unreasonable. *See United States v.*Marcial-Santiago, 447 F.3d 715, 718-19 (9th Cir.2006) (concluding that the disparity between fast-track sentences and non-fast-track sentences is not unwarranted).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 70 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 70

     To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to remove the 
  restriction that a clinical psychologist or clinical social worker 
provide services in a comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation facility 
            to a patient only under the care of a physician.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            January 24, 2005

  Mr. Inouye introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
              referred to the Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
     To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to remove the 
  restriction that a clinical psychologist or clinical social worker 
provide services in a comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation facility 
            to a patient only under the care of a physician.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Autonomy for Psychologists and 
Social Workers Act of 2005''.

SEC. 2. REMOVAL OF RESTRICTION THAT A CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST OR CLINICAL 
              SOCIAL WORKER PROVIDE SERVICES IN A COMPREHENSIVE 
              OUTPATIENT REHABILITATION FACILITY TO A PATIENT ONLY 
              UNDER THE CARE OF A PHYSICIAN.

    (a) In General.--Section 1861(cc)(2)(E) of the Social Security Act 
(42 U.S.C. 1395x(cc)(2)(E)) is amended by striking ``physician'' and 
inserting ``physician, except that a patient receiving qualified 
psychologist services (as defined in subsection (ii)) may be under the 
care of a clinical psychologist with respect to such services to the 
extent permitted under State law and except that a patient receiving 
clinical social worker services (as defined in subsection (hh)(2)) may 
be under the care of a clinical social worker with respect to such 
services to the extent permitted under State law''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply to services provided on or after January 1, 2006.
                                 <all>
```
EX-33.19
(logo) WELLS FARGO

Wells Fargo Bank, NA
Document Custody
1015 - 10th Avenue SE
Minneapolis, MN 55014


ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE SERVICING CRITERIA


Corporate Trust Services division of Wells Fargo Bank, National Association
(the "Company") is responsible for assessing compliance with the servicing
criteria set forth in Item 1122(d) of Regulation AB promulgated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The Company has determined that the
servicing criteria are applicable in regards to the servicing platform as of
and for the period as follows:

Platform: Publicly-issued (i.e., transaction-level reporting required under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended) residential mortgage-backed
securities and commercial mortgage-backed securities issued on or after
January 1, 2006 for which the Company provides document custody services,
excluding any publicly issued transactions issued by any government sponsored
entity (the "Platform").

Applicable Servicing Criteria: The servicing criteria set forth in Item
1122(d)(1)(iv), 1122(d)(4)(i) and 1122(d)(4)(ii), in regard to the activities
performed by the Company with respect to the Platform (the "Applicable
Servicing Criteria"). Management of the Company has determined that all other
servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d) are not applicable to the
Platform.

Period: As of and for the twelve months ended December 31, 2007 (the "Period").

With respect to the Platform and the Period, the Company provides the following
assessment of compliance with respect to the Applicable Servicing Criteria:

1. The Company is responsible for assessing its compliance with the Applicable
Servicing Criteria.

2. The Company has assessed compliance with the Applicable Servicing Criteria.
In performing this assessment, the Company used the criteria set forth by the
Securities and Exchange Commission in paragraph (d) of Item 1122 of
Regulation AB.

3. Based on such assessment, as of and for the Period, the Company has
complied, in all material respects with the Applicable Servicing Criteria.

KPMG LLP, a registered public accounting firm, has issued an attestation report
with respect to the Company's assessment of compliance as of and for the
Period.


WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
By: /s/ Shari Gillund
Its: Senior Vice President

Dated: February 29, 2008
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-51045

Summary Calendar 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

ANDRES ORLANDO MAJANO-CHICA, 

Defendant-Appellant 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas 

USDC No. 4:16-CR-146-1 

Before BENAVIDES, DENNIS and PRADO, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Andres Orlando Majano-Chica pleaded guilty to illegal reentry and was 

sentenced within the advisory guidelines range to 41 months of imprisonment. 

On appeal he claims his sentence is substantively unreasonable. According to 

Majano-Chica, U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 lacks an empirical basis and results in the 

double-counting of a criminal record. As well, Majano-Chica maintains that 

his sentence is greater than necessary to fulfill the statutory sentencing goals 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 18, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 16-51045 Document: 00513997597 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/18/2017
No. 16-51045

2 

for his reentry offense and does not account for the fact that he reentered the 

country to escape danger and rejoin his wife.

We have rejected Majano-Chica’s theories that § 2L1.2’s lack of empirical 

foundation necessarily renders its application unreasonable, see MondragonSantiago, 564 F.3d at 366-67, that the Sentencing Guidelines “double count” 

prior convictions, see United States v. Duarte, 569 F.3d 528, 529-30 (5th Cir. 

2009), and that the Guidelines overstate the seriousness of illegal reentry, see 

United States v. Juarez-Duarte, 513 F.3d 204, 212 (5th Cir. 2008). 

Majano-Chica’s argument that within-guidelines sentences calculated 

under § 2L1.2 should not be presumed reasonable on appeal because § 2L1.2 

lacks an empirical basis is foreclosed, as he concedes. See Duarte, 569 F.3d at 

530-31; United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 366-67 (5th Cir. 

2009). Majano-Chica can rebut the presumption of reasonableness only by 

showing that the sentence fails to account for a factor that should receive 

significant weight, gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, 

or represents a clear error of judgment in balancing the factors. See United 

States v. Tuma, 738 F.3d 681, 695 (5th Cir. 2013).

The district court heard the parties’ positions, considered the 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) factors, and concluded that the sentence was appropriate. MajanoChica has not shown that his sentence failed to account for his fear of returning 

to El Salvavdor and sympathetic motive for reentry or that the court made a 

clear error judgment in weighing the factors. Because Majano-Chica has not 

rebutted the appellate presumption that his within-guidelines sentence was 

reasonable or demonstrated that his sentence is the result of an abuse of 

discretion, see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007), the judgment is 

AFFIRMED. 

 Case: 16-51045 Document: 00513997597 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/18/2017
S. 592

One Hundred Ninth Congress

of the

United States of America

AT THE SECOND SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday,

the third day of January, two thousand and six

An Act

To amend the Irrigation Project Contract Extension Act of 1998 to extend certain

contracts between the Bureau of Reclamation and certain irrigation water contractors in the States of Wyoming and Nebraska.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Glendo Unit of the Missouri

River Basin Project Contract Extension Act of 2005’’.

SEC. 2. GLENDO UNIT OF THE MISSOURI RIVER BASIN CONTRACT

EXTENSION.

Section 2 of the Irrigation Project Contract Extension Act of

1998 (112 Stat. 2816, 117 Stat. 1854) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by striking ‘‘December 31, 2005’’ and

inserting ‘‘December 31, 2007’’; and

(2) in subsection (b)—

(A) by striking ‘‘beyond December 31, 2005’’ and

inserting ‘‘beyond December 31, 2007’’; and

(B) by striking ‘‘before December 31, 2005’’ and

inserting ‘‘before December 31, 2007’’.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
#### Yuk Ping Cheng Chan, Respondent, v Young T. Lee & Son Realty Corp., Respondent-Appellant, and Great NY Noodletown, Inc., Appellant-Respondent.

[973 NYS2d 642]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Paul Wooten, J.), entered February 14, 2013, which denied defendants’ motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff alleges that she slipped and fell on a large patch of grease on the public sidewalk abutting the premises owned by Young T. Lee & Son Realty Corp. (Lee Realty) and subleased by Great NY Noodletown, Inc. (Noodletown), which operated a restaurant in the space.

Lee Realty, which has a nondelegable duty to maintain the sidewalk abutting its premises pursuant to Administrative Code of City of NY § 7-210, failed to meet its prima facie burden to eliminate the issue of constructive notice since it submitted no evidence establishing when the sidewalk was last cleaned or inspected prior to plaintiff’s fall *(see Sabalza v Salgado,*85 AD3d 436, 437-438 [1st Dept 2011]).

Noodletown also failed to establish its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The record presents triable issues as to whether Noodletown created the greasy condition on the sidewalk by disposing of waste from its restaurant on the *638sidewalk. There is evidence that Noodletown placed garbage bags on the sidewalk near the area where plaintiff fell *(see Kesselman v Lever House Rest.,*29 AD3d 302, 304-305 [1st Dept 2006]; *Healy v ARP Cable,*299 AD2d 152, 154 [1st Dept 2002]).

Defendants’ argument that plaintiff did not sufficiently identify the cause of her fall is unavailing. While she admitted to some uncertainty because she did not see when her foot slipped on the grease patch, plaintiff stated that following her fall, she found herself lying on top of the grease patch, her clothing and shoes had grease on them, and her shoe had left a groove in the patch. Moreover, photographs taken at the scene appear to match plaintiff’s description of the sidewalk condition. Such evidence establishes a sufficient nexus between the hazardous condition and the circumstances of the fall, so as to establish causation *(see Cherry v Daytop Vil., Inc.,*41 AD3d 130 [1st Dept 2007]).

We have considered defendants’ remaining arguments and find them unavailing. Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Renwick, DeGrasse, Feinman and Gische, JJ. [Prior Case History: 2013 NY Slip Op 30327CU).]
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. Section 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report ofFLM Minerals Inc.(the "Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended November 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date here of (the "report"), I,Jianxing Qian, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                
|-- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|  
|2. | The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|  

Dated this 27thday of February, 2008.

JIANXING QIANJianxing QianChief Financial Officer





















---
EXHIBIT 32.2

Officers Certification Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

(18 U.S.C 1350)

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Pioneer Drilling Company, a Texas corporation, (the Company) for the
quarter ended September 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, Lorne E. Phillips, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, hereby certifies,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that, to the best of his knowledge:

(1) The Report is in full compliance with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                        |  |  |  |  |  |                                                                       
|----------------------- |  |  |  |  |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------
|Dated: November 4, 2010 |  |  |  |  |  | /s/ Lorne E. Phillips                                                 
|                        |  |  |  |  |  | Lorne E. Phillips Executive
Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> BD
<MULTIPLIER> 1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                            8383
<RECEIVABLES>                                   619390
<SECURITIES-RESALE>                                  0
<SECURITIES-BORROWED>                           200208
<INSTRUMENTS-OWNED>                             131843
<PP&E>                                           14710
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  999267
<SHORT-TERM>                                     52292
<PAYABLES>                                      212387
<REPOS-SOLD>                                         0
<SECURITIES-LOANED>                             205800
<INSTRUMENTS-SOLD>                               44135
<LONG-TERM>                                      47134
<COMMON>                                           108
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                       99309
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    999267
<TRADING-REVENUE>                                11044
<INTEREST-DIVIDENDS>                             14778
<COMMISSIONS>                                    29659
<INVESTMENT-BANKING-REVENUES>                     9293
<FEE-REVENUE>                                     6457
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                8032
<COMPENSATION>                                   41086
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   5899
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                      3363
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .38
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .37
        

</TABLE>
#### East Forty-Fourth Street LLC, Respondent, v Yusuf Bildirici, Appellant.

[870 NYS2d 790]

Supreme Court, New York County (Louis B. York, J.), entered September 4, 2008, which, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s motion to disqualify plaintiffs attorney, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Disqualification for violation of Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-102 (22 NYCRR 1200.21), which requires withdrawal by counsel if it appears that he will be called as a witness, was properly denied in the absence of a showing that the testimony of plaintiffs attorney will be necessary to establish the claim or prejudicial in the event the attorney is called *(see Kirshon, Shron, Cornell & Teitelbaum v Savarese,*182 AD2d 911 [1992]). Concur—Tom, J.E, Andrias, Nardelli, Catterson and Moskowitz, JJ.
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D17-3557

_____________________________

TERRY DEWAYNE GIDEON,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.

Edward P. Nickinson, III, Judge.

August 17, 2018

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

B.L. THOMAS, C.J., and MAKAR and WINSOR, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________

Terry Dewayne Gideon, pro se, Appellant.
2

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Daniel Krumbholz,

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
### FOR PUBLICATION 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT



#  A RMANDO M ARMOLEJO -C AMPOS , aka Campos Ramos Armando, No. 04-76644 Petitioner, Agency No. v. 

#  A71-616-204 M ICHAEL B. M UKASEY , Attorney ORDER General, Respondent. 

# 

Filed March 14, 2008

ORDER
KOZINSKI , Chief Judge: Upon the vote of a majority of nonrecused active judges, it is ordered that this case be reheard en banc pursuant to Circuit Rule 35-3. The three-judge panel opinion shall not be cited as precedent by or to any court of the Ninth Circuit.

2591PRINTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE—U.S. COURTS BY THOMSON/WEST—SAN FRANCISCO The summary, which does not constitute a part of the opinion of the court, is copyrighted © 2008 Thomson/West.