[Cite as State v. Dapice , 2020-Ohio-4324.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CLARK COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee

v. ROBERT D. DAPICE, III Defendant-Appellant : : : : : : : : : : Appellate Case No. 2020-CA-2

Trial Court Case No. 2019-CR-642 (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court)

. . . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 4th day of September, 2020.

. . . . . . . . . . . JOHN M. LINTZ, Atty. Reg. No. 0097715, Assistant Prosecuting At torney, Clark County Prosecutor’s Office, 50 East Columbia Street, Suite 449, Spring field, Ohio 45502 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee GLENDA A. SMITH, Atty. Reg. No. 0070738, P.O. Box 15353, Wyomin g, Ohio 45215 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

WELBAUM, J.-2- {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Robert D. Dapice, III, appeals from his co nviction in the Clark County Court of Common Pleas after he pled guilty to one count of aggravated burglary. In support of his appeal, Dapice claims that the tri al court erred at sentencing because it failed to comply with the purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11. Dapice also claims that his trial counsel pro vided ineffective assistance during the plea and sentencing proceedings. For the reasons ou tlined below, Dapice’s

conviction will be affirmed.

Facts and Course of Proceedings {¶ 2} On October 1, 2019, a Clark County grand jury returned an indic tment charging Dapice with one count of aggravated burglary in violat ion of R.C. 2911.11(A)(1), a felony of the first degree. Following his indictment, Dapice entered into a plea agreement with the State whereby he agreed to plead guilty to t he indicted charge. The plea agreement also required Dapice to plead guilty to a fourth -degree-felony charge of failure to comply with the order or signal of a police officer in a separate case, Clark C.P.

No. 2019-CR-644. {¶ 3} At the plea hearing, the parties advised the trial court that i n exchange for Dapice’s guilty plea, they had agreed to jointly recommend a 3- to-6-year indefinite prison sentence for aggravated burglary and a 2-year definite prison s entence for failure to comply. It was further agreed that the 2-year sentence for fai lure to comply would run consecutively to the 3-to-6-year sentence for aggravated burgla ry. {¶ 4} Following the parties’ advisement, the trial court noted that u nder the new sentencing law, i.e. the Reagan Tokes Law, the maximum portion of the indefinite-3- sentence agreed to by the parties for aggravated burglary would be 4.5 years, not 6 years. The trial court explained that under the new law, the maximum p ortion of the indefinite sentence was supposed to be 50 percent greater than the selecte d minimum term. Given that the selected minimum term was 3 years, the trial cou rt determined that the proper maximum term was 4.5 years. {¶ 5} After the trial court’s remarks, both parties agreed that under the current state of the law, the jointly recommended sentence for the aggravated burglary charge should be 3 to 4.5 years in prison as opposed to 3 to 6 years. In lig ht of that correction, the trial court advised Dapice that the total agreed sentence for aggrava ted burglary and failure to comply would be 5 to 6.5 years in prison. Dapice confirmed his understanding of the corrected, agreed sentence and pled guilty to both charges. Af ter accepting Dapice’s guilty plea, the trial court imposed the parties’ jointly recom mended sentence. {¶ 6} Dapice now appeals from his aggravated burglary conviction, 1 raising two assignments of error for review.

First Assignment of Error {¶ 7} Under his first assignment of error, Dapice claims that the tri al court erred at sentencing because it failed to comply with the purposes and pr inciples of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11. However, in accordance w ith R.C. 2953.08(D)(1), we find that Dapice’s sentence is not reviewable on appeal.

1 Although Dapice’s plea agreement and agreed sentence involved t he failure to comply offense in Case No. 2019-CR-644, Dapice did not appeal from his conviction in that case. Dapice only appealed from his aggravated burglary conviction in Case No. 2019-CR-642. As a result, this court will onl y review Dapice’s aggravated bu rglary conviction.-4- {¶ 8} R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) provides that: “A sentence imposed upon a de fendant is not subject to review under this section if the sentence is aut horized by law, has been recommended jointly by the defendant and the prosecution in the case, and is imposed by a sentencing judge.” “If the requirements of R.C. 2953.08(D )(1) are met, an appellate court may not review a felony sentence.” State v. Shawhan , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27698, 2018-Ohio-2428, ¶ 11, citing State v. Connors , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26721, 2016-Ohio-3195; State v. Underwood , 124 Ohio St.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, 922 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 16. Therefore, when all the requirements of R.C. 2953.08(D)( 1) are satisfied, the statute bars “appeals that would otherwise challenge the court’ s discretion in imposing a sentence, such as whether the trial court complied with statuto ry provisions like R.C. 2929.11 (the overriding purposes of felony sentencing), 2929.12 (the seriousness and recidivism factors), and/or 2929.13(A) through (D) (the sanctio ns relevant to the felony degree).” Underwood at ¶ 22. {¶ 9} In this case, the record establishes that the parties jointly r ecommended a 3- to 4.5-year indefinite prison sentence for aggravated burglary. The record further establishes that the trial court imposed the jointly recommende d sentence and that the jointly recommended sentence is authorized by law. {¶ 10} A sentence is authorized by law “ ‘only if it comports with all mandatory sentencing provisions.’ ” State v. Contento , 2d Dist. Miami No. 2017-CA-1, 2018-Ohio111, ¶ 23, quoting Underwood at paragraph two of the syllabus. Effective March 22, 2019, the Reagan Tokes Law made substantive amendments to Ohio’ s felony sentencing statutes and enacted a new statutory provision, R.C. 2929.144, which calls for indefinite sentencing for “qualifying felonies,” i.e., first and second-de gree felonies committed on or-5- after the law’s effective date. R.C. 2929.144(A). Under this new law, Dapice was subject to an indefinite sentence for his aggravated burglary o ffense. In imposing the indefinite sentence, the trial court was required to select a m inimum term from the sentencing range for first-degree felonies in R.C. 2929.14(A)(1 )(a). The trial court was then required to calculate the maximum term of the indefinite s entence by adding 50 percent of the selected minimum term to the selected minimum te rm. R.C. 2929.144(B)(1). {¶ 11} As previously noted, after some discussion with the trial court , the parties jointly recommended an indefinite term of 3 to 4.5 years in pri son for the aggravated burglary offense. The 3-year-minimum term was within the appro priate sentencing range for first-degree felonies. SeeR.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a). Fifty percent of the 3-yearminimum term was 1.5 years. The maximum term was therefore 3 y ears plus 1.5 years, which equals 4.5 years. Based on these calculations, we find t hat the jointly recommended prison sentence of 3 to 4.5 years for Dapice’s aggr avated burglary offense is authorized by law. {¶ 12} Because Dapice’s sentence for aggravated burglary was authorize d by law, jointly recommended by the parties, and accepted by the trial c ourt, pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(D)(1), this court cannot review the sentence on appeal. {¶ 13} Although unrelated to his sentence, Dapice also argues that he was inappropriately charged with aggravated burglary because he did not forcibly enter the premises that he was convicted of burglarizing. Even if this w ere true, Dapice waived this argument for appeal when he pled guilty to the aggravated burglary charge. See

State v. Merrick , 2d Dist. Greene No. 2019-CA-29, 2020-Ohio-3744, ¶ 24, citing State v.-6- Kelley , 57 Ohio St.3d 127, 566 N.E.2d 658 (1991), paragraph two of th e syllabus (“a guilty plea generally waives all appealable errors that may have occur red in the trial court, unless such errors precluded the defendant from knowingly, inte lligently, and voluntarily entering his or her guilty plea”). Therefore, we are prevented from reviewing this claim on appeal. {¶ 14} For the foregoing reasons, Dapice’s first assignment of error i s overruled.

Second Assignment of Error {¶ 15} Under his second assignment of error, Dapice argues that his tr ial counsel provided ineffective assistance by advising him to plead guilty to aggravated burglary and by failing to advocate for a sentence that included drug rehabi litation. Dapice also suggests that his trial counsel w as ineffective for failing to realize that the initial 3-to-6- year sentence agreed to by the parties for aggravated burglary was longer than required by law. {¶ 16} A guilty plea, however, “waives the right to allege ineffective assistance of counsel, except to the extent that the errors caused the plea t o be less than knowing and voluntary.” State v. Hurtado , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26892, 2017-Ohio-1465, ¶ 11, citing State v. Spates , 64 Ohio St.3d 269, 595 N.E.2d 351 (1992). Dapice does not allege that his guilty plea to aggravated burglary was less tha n knowing and voluntary. Therefore, his ineffective assistance claims are waived for app eal. {¶ 17} Even if Dapice’s ineffective assistance claims were not waived, the record indicates that they lack merit. In order to succeed on an inef fective assistance claim, a defendant must establish: (1) his trial counsel’s performance w as deficient; and (2) the-7- deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), paragraph two of the syllabu s; State v. Bradley , 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), paragraph two of the syl labus. The failure to make a showing of either deficient performance or prejudice def eats a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel. Strickland at 697. To establish deficient performance, a defendant must show that his trial counsel’s performance fell b elow an objective standard of reasonable representation. Id. at 688; Bradley at 142. To establish prejudice, a defendant must show that there is “a reasonable probability tha t, but for counsel’s errors, the proceeding’s result would have been different.” State v. Hale , 119 Ohio St.3d 118, 2008-Ohio-3426, 892 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 204, citing Strickland at 687-688 and Bradley at paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 18} As previously noted, Dapice argues that his trial counsel provi ded ineffective assistance by advising him to plead guilty to aggra vated burglary. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel after pleading guilty, a defendant must show that: (1) counsel’s advice was not within the range of com petence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases; and (2) but for counsel’s errors, there was a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have pleaded guilty, b ut would have insisted on going to trial. (Citations omitted.) State v. Olsen , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28011, 2019-Ohio-568, ¶ 10. {¶ 19} In evaluating counsel’s performance, a reviewing court “must in dulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland at 689. “[A] debatable decision concerning trial strategy cannot form the basis of a finding of ineffective assi stance of counsel.” State v.-8- Woullard , 158 Ohio App.3d 31, 2004-Ohio-3395, 813 N.E.2d 964, ¶ 37 (2d Dist.), citing

Strickland at 689. (Other citation omitted.) Furthermore, “ ‘[a]n attorn ey’s advice to take a plea deal is not ineffective assistance of counsel.’ ” State v. Chatman , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25766, 2014-Ohio-134, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Shugart , 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 08 MA 238, 2009-Ohio-6807, ¶ 37. {¶ 20} Here, the advice of Dapice’s trial counsel to accept the State’ s offer to plead guilty to aggravated burglary in exchange for receiving the min imum possible sentence of 3 to 4.5 years in prison did not constitute deficient perfor mance because it shielded Dapice from the possibility of receiving a much longer prison t erm for that offense. If Dapice had been found guilty of aggravated burglary at trial, p ursuant to R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a) and R.C. 2929.144, Dapice could have received a sentence as long as 11 to 16.5 years in prison. “Hindsight is not permitted to dis tort the assessment of what was reasonable in light of counsel’s perspective at the time.” State v. Cook , 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 524-525, 605 N.E.2d 70 (1992), citing Strickland at 680. Therefore, regardless of how Dapice currently feels about his counsel’s ad vice to forego trial and plead guilty, the decision was sound trial strategy that cannot form the basis of an

ineffective assistance claim. {¶ 21} Dapice also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in fa iling to advocate for a sentence that included drug rehabilitation. The record, however, belies this claim, as Dapice’s trial counsel stated the following at s entencing: I promised [Dapice] that I would ask the Court to do him a favo r, if at all possible, and that is if there is anything you can do to help h im get into a drug program while in the institution. I understand the Depart ment of-9- Corrections is separate on its own, but [Dapice] does, in fact, need drug treatment. Every time he’s ever got in trouble and, in fact, h e was high as a kite, he admitted, at the burglary; and so anything the Court can do to get him in a treatment program is much appreciated. Trans. (Dec. 3, 2019), p. 11. {¶ 22} Dapice also suggests that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to realize that the initial 3-to-6-year sentence agreed to by the parties for aggravated burglary was longer than required by law. The trial court, how ever, caught the mistake prior to sentencing; therefore, no prejudice resulted from the mistake. {¶ 23} Because Dapice waived his ineffective assistance claims for app eal, and because none of the claims satisfy the Strickland test, Dapice’s second assignment of

error is overruled.

Conclusion {¶ 24} Having overruled both assignments of error raised by Dapice, th e judgment

of the trial court is affirmed.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

FROELICH, J. and HALL, J., concur.

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John M. Lintz Glenda A. Smith Hon. Douglas M. Rastatter