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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

No. 112,658

In the Matter of LOUIS M. CLOTHIER,

Respondent.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE

Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed March 6, 2015. Three-year probation.

Stanton A. Hazlett, Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause and was on the formal complaint 

for the petitioner.

John J. Ambrosio, of Ambrosio & Ambrosio, Chtd., of Topeka, argued the cause, and Louis M. 

Clothier, respondent, argued the cause pro se.

Per Curiam: This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the office of the 

Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent, Louis M. Clothier, of Leavenworth, an 

attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas in 1981.

On July 10, 2014, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal 

complaint against the respondent alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional 

Conduct (KRPC). The respondent filed an answer on July 17, 2014. The parties entered 

into written stipulations of facts. A hearing was held on the complaint before a panel of 

the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys on August 18, 2014, where the respondent 

was personally present and was represented by counsel. The hearing panel determined 

that respondent violated KRPC 1.1 (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 456) (competence); 1.3 

(2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 475) (diligence); 1.4(a) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 495) 

(communication with client); 3.5(c) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 626) (communication with 
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a judge without delivering copy in writing to adverse counsel); 3.5(d) (engaging in 

undignified or discourteous conduct degrading to a tribunal); 8.2(a) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. 

Annot. 677) (statements about judges and legal officials); 8.4(d) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. 

Annot. 680) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); and 8.4(g) 

(engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on lawyer's fitness to practice law).

Upon conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, together with its recommendation to this court:

"Findings of Fact

. . . .

"DA11768

"9. The respondent represented an active military service member in two 

cases: a protection from abuse action and a divorce action. Debra Snider represented the 

wife in the two cases.

"10. In January, 2013, outside a courtroom in the Leavenworth County 

District Courthouse, the respondent yelled at Ms. Snider. The respondent then explained 

that he was not upset with Ms. Snider, but was angry at another lawyer in a different case. 

The respondent explained to Ms. Snider that the moral of the story was 'don't fuck with 

me.'

"11. Also in January, 2013, the respondent and Ms. Snider negotiated 

language in a proposed order trying to resolve issues in the divorce case. Ms. Snider 

believed that an agreement had been reached, but the respondent refused to sign the 

order. Thereafter, Ms. Snider filed an accusation in contempt against the respondent's 

client.
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"12. On February 4, 2013, the court conducted a hearing in the divorce case. 

During the hearing, the respondent stated to the court that Ms. Snider had not been honest 

with the court and made the following statement, 'I never thought I would have to report a 

fellow member of the bar to the ethics committee for being dishonest with the court.' Ms. 

Snider told the respondent to make a report in writing to the proper authority if he had a 

valid complaint. The respondent did not file a complaint against Ms. Snider.

"13. On February 7, 2013, the court held a hearing on a motion filed by Ms. 

Snider. The respondent believed that he had not received proper notice of the hearing. 

The respondent went to Judge Wiley's chambers to complain about the notice. Ms. Snider 

arrived at Judge Wiley's chambers while the respondent was meeting with Judge Wiley.

"14. As the respondent left Judge Wiley's chambers, the respondent 

approached Ms. Snider near Judge Wiley's administrative assistant's desk. The 

respondent handed Ms. Snider a piece of paper with proposed dates for the retrieval of 

Ms. Snider's client's personal property. Ms. Snider asked the respondent why he was 

willing to provide dates when just a few days before he was not willing to do so.

"15. During the conversation, Ms. Snider 'rolled her eyes' at something the 

respondent said. The respondent became angry and called Ms. Snider a liar. The 

respondent stated that there was only one other lawyer in Leavenworth County that was 

more dishonest than Ms. Snider.

"16. The respondent told Ms. Snider that she was nothing but a histrionic 

woman. During the conversation, the respondent raised his voice, he was very close to 

Ms. Snider, and he was jabbing at her with his finger. The respondent called Ms. Snider a 

'newbie' as she has not been practicing very long in the Leavenworth area.

"17. Ms. Snider feared that the respondent might attack her. Judge Wiley's 

administrative assistant also feared that the respondent might attack Ms. Snider. As the 

incident progressed, the respondent leaned very close to Ms. Snider and stated, 'why don't 

you just grow a pair and punch me.' Ms. Snider told the respondent that he should 

consider self-reporting his behavior to the disciplinary administrator.
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"DA11795

"18. On May 15, 2012, K.B. retained the respondent to represent him in a 

divorce case and paid the respondent $2,500 for the representation. K.B. informed the 

respondent that he wanted to work out a property settlement agreement with his wife 

before the case was filed and his wife was served. K.B. and the respondent agreed that a 

settlement was not likely if the wife were served before the settlement was worked out.

"19. K.B. expected to be billed only for the initial consultation until K.B. 

instructed the respondent to proceed.

"20. Shortly after May 15, 2012, despite K.B.'s understanding, the respondent 

prepared divorce pleadings, including a petition and a request for temporary orders. K.B. 

had not authorized the respondent to prepare the pleadings.

"21. On October 15, 2012, K.B. went to the respondent's office without an 

appointment. At that time, he was ready to file his divorce. He advised the respondent of 

his new address and his desire to have to have the divorce completed before the holidays. 

Further, K.B. informed the respondent that he wanted to bring his wife to the respondent's 

office to pick up the pleadings rather than have her served.

"22. Despite K.B.'s instructions, on November 30, 2012, the respondent filed 

the divorce case in Leavenworth County District Court. The pleadings included a 

proposed stipulation and property settlement agreement. On December 6, 2012, the 

respondent sent a filed-stamped copy of the pleadings to K.B. and notified K.B. that a 

hearing had been scheduled for January 31, 2013.

"23. K.B. did not authorize the respondent to prepare the proposed stipulation 

and property settlement agreement. Further, K.B. did not agree with the contents of the 

property settlement agreement.
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"24. Despite K.B.'s express directions, the respondent made arrangements for 

K.B.'s wife to be served with the pleadings.

"25. On December 14, 2012, K.B.'s wife filed an answer, counterclaim, and 

motion to modify the temporary orders. The court scheduled a hearing on the motion to 

modify the temporary orders for January 3, 2013. The respondent failed to provide K.B. 

with a copy of the answer, counterclaim, and motion to modify.

"26. On December 19, 2012, the respondent sent K.B. a letter, enclosing 

copies of K.B.'s wife's discovery requests. Again, the respondent did not inform K.B. of 

the pending motion to modify or the hearing scheduled for January 3, 2013.

"27. On December 20, 2012, the respondent's staff sent an email to K.B. 

requesting that K.B. stop by the office to pick up the discovery requests filed by K.B.'s 

wife. The packet of materials did not include a copy of the answer, counterclaim, or 

motion to modify. On December 21, 2012, K.B. picked up the packet of materials.

"28. K.B. remained unaware that his wife had filed an answer, counterclaim, 

and motion to modify until December 31, 2012, when the respondent left a telephone 

message for K.B., informing K.B. of the hearing scheduled for January 3, 2013.

"29. On January 1, 2013, K.B. called the respondent on the telephone. K.B. 

was upset that he was just finding out about the hearing scheduled for January 3, 2013. 

During the telephone conversation, the respondent 'went off' on K.B. The respondent told 

K.B. that K.B. would do what the respondent told him to do. The respondent called K.B. 

a 'son-of-a-bitch' and a 'motherfucker.' K.B. hung up on the respondent.

"30. On January 2, 2013, at 12:16 a.m., the respondent sent K.B. a copy of the 

answer, counterclaim, and motion to modify as an attachment to an electronic mail 

message.

"31. On January 2, 2013, Amy Coppola contacted the respondent and 

informed him that she was taking over the representation of K.B.
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"DA11873

"32. On August 7, 2013, the Honorable Dan Wiley, district court judge for 

Leavenworth County, filed a complaint against the respondent. In the complaint, Judge 

Wiley complained of a number of incidents where the respondent engaged in erratic 

behavior. The incidents occurred over a period of 3 years.

"33. On one occasion, after Judge Wiley announced a decision from the bench 

which was adverse to the respondent's client, the respondent followed the judge to his 

chambers and stated, 'It's a good thing that you are still wearing that robe.' When Judge 

Wiley asked the respondent what he meant by that the respondent said, 'Why don't you 

take it off and step out here and I'll show you?' The respondent's tone was hostile and 

angry and Judge Wiley perceived these words as a threat.

"34. On another occasion, the respondent confronted Clinton Lee, an attorney, 

in front of Judge Wiley's administrative assistant's desk. The respondent and Mr. Lee had 

a heated exchange about a case. The exchange ended when the respondent threatened to 

'kick Mr. Lee's ass.' Judge Wiley's administrative assistant was frightened for her safety 

and the safety of Mr. Lee.

"35. At a pre-trial conference, the respondent told opposing counsel to 'go 

jump in a lake.'

"36. After receiving an adverse ruling in court, the respondent made the 

following statement to the judge, 'You are the poster child for judicial elections.' The 

statement was made at a time when there was a movement to alter the method by which 

judges are chosen in Leavenworth County.

"37. During a hearing, the respondent stated, 'Be quiet kid, I am talking,' to a 

pro se litigant.
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"38. The respondent referred to opposing counsel, from another jurisdiction, 

as 'Mr. Out-of-Town attorney.'

"39. On yet another occasion, the respondent admitted to Judge Wiley after a 

hearing at which he had lost his temper that he advised his client that 'he might go to jail 

but he was going to see how far he could push the judge.'

"40. On May 29, 2013, during a hearing on an order to appear and show cause 

the respondent accused Judge Wiley of colluding with opposing counsel.

'MR. CLOTHIER: . . . We have significant problems with the 

Court's interpretation of what the Court said. Question whether the 

Court's read or listened to the tape. Otherwise, there's just—there's just 

too many obvious differences between my notes and the Court's 

recollection. And—it appears to pretty much, in every case, favor the 

motion that's been filed so we would ask the Court to recuse itself at this 

point in time because we believe your actions and the apparent collusion 

indicates some animus towards my client at this point in time. You can't 

tell a client to build me a Empire State Building in 3 months, your 

Honor, and—then deny you said what you said, and then us—, entertain 

a motion and issue an order for—to show cause when the Empire State 

Building is not built. It can't be done and your apparent collusion with 

opposing counsel in the case or animus toward my client is to the ext—

is—to the extent that we think you should recuse yourself and allow 

someone with less emotional—apparently emotional—of feelings 

towards the case to resolve these issues.

. . . .

'MR. HALL: Your Honor, I'm—just dumbfounded to have 

counsel allege that the Court—

'MR. CLOTHIER: Objection, your Honor. The opinion—
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'MR. HALL: —and opposing counsel—

'MR. CLOTHIER: —of counsel—of—respondent's counsel is 

irrelevant with regard to my actions. He can—and I would object to 

his—

'THE COURT: All right. Well,—

'MR. CLOTHIER: I did not make any uh—, apparent indication 

or did not accuse him of collusion.

. . . .

'MR. CLOTHIER: Your Honor, I would just make a comment 

that uh, that uh, figuratively, Mr. Hall put his arm around you and said 

you're a good judge. You just do whatever you think—you know, that—

will help us. But go ahead, Judge, —

. . . .

'THE COURT: You're coming dangerously close to impugning 

the Court at this moment. I'm not going to tolerate that.

'MR. CLOTHIER: Your Honor, I've said what I've said. If you 

make—if you think that's the case, then you make the decision you got to 

make.

'THE COURT: Well, what you're asserting is that there's 

collusion between Mr. Hall and me and the last comment about putting 

his arm around me or I need to read whatever—

'MR. CLOTHIER: It's a figure of speech, your Honor.
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'THE COURT: —that you just state—

'MR. CLOTHIER: I didn't—

'THE COURT: And it's inappropriate.

'MR. CLOTHIER: —impugn you.

'THE COURT: Mr. Clothier, stop.

'MR. CLOTHIER: I impugned him.

'THE COURT: Stop. It's inappropriate. You're impugning 

everybody.

'MR. CLOTHIER: You may not like—

'THE COURT: Stop.

'MR. CLOTHIER: —what I say—

'THE COURT: Stop. I'm talking now. I've let you guys say what 

you wanted to say. I've listened to it. It is now my turn to talk. Stop. I 

don't want to hear another word at this moment. . . .'

"Conclusions of Law

"41. The parties stipulated that the respondent violated KRPC 1.1, KRPC 1.3, 

KRPC 1.4, KRPC 3.5(c), KRPC 3.5(d), KRPC 8.2(a), KRPC 8.4(d), and KRPC 8.4(g). 

Accordingly, based on the parties' stipulation and the findings of fact above, the hearing 

panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.1, KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.4, KRPC 

3.5(c), KRPC 3.5(d), KRPC 8.2(a), KRPC 8.4(d), and KRPC 8.4(g), as detailed below.
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"KRPC 1.1

"42. Lawyers must provide competent representation to their clients. KRPC 

1.1. 'Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 

preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.' The respondent violated KRPC 

1.1 by having K.B.'s wife served with divorce pleadings, despite his client's express 

directions. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the Respondent violated KRPC 

1.1.

"KRPC 1.3

"43. Attorneys must act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 

representing their clients. See KRPC 1.3. The Respondent failed to provide diligent 

representation to K.B. by failing to promptly notify K.B. that his estranged wife filed a 

motion to modify the temporary orders. Because the Respondent failed to act with 

reasonable diligence and promptness in representing his client, the hearing panel 

concludes that the Respondent (repeatedly) violated KRPC 1.3.

"KRPC 1.4

"44. KRPC 1.4(a) provides that '[a] lawyer shall keep a client reasonably 

informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for 

information.' In this case, for a 6-month period of time, the respondent failed to keep 

K.B. informed regarding the status of the divorce proceedings, in violation of KRPC 

1.4(a). Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the Respondent violated KRPC 

1.4(a).

"KRPC 3.5(c)

"45. Under KRPC 3.5(c), a lawyer shall not:
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'communicate or cause another to communicate as to the merits of a 

cause with a judge or official before whom an adversary proceeding is 

pending except:

(1) in the course of official proceedings in the 

cause; 

(2) in writing, if the lawyer promptly delivers a 

copy of the writing to opposing counsel or to the adverse 

party if unrepresented; 

(3) orally upon adequate notice to opposing counsel 

or the adverse party if unrepresented; 

(4) as otherwise authorized by law or court rule.'

In this case, the respondent violated KRPC 3.5(c) when he communicated with Judge 

Wiley without proper notice to opposing counsel, regarding the notice of a motion to 

compel return of personal property. Thus, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent 

violated KRPC 3.5(c).

"KRPC 3.5(d)

"46. 'A lawyer shall not . . . engage in undignified or discourteous conduct 

degrading to a tribunal.' KRPC 3.5(d). In this case, the respondent engaged in undignified 

or discourteous conduct. First, the respondent engaged in undignified or discourteous 

conduct degrading to a tribunal when he stated to Judge Wiley that 'It's a good thing that 

you are still wearing that robe' and 'Why don't you take it off and step outside and I'll 

show you?' Further, the respondent violated KRPC 3.5(d) when he told Judge Wiley that 

Judge Wiley was 'poster child' for judicial elections. As a result, the hearing panel 

concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 3.5(d).
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"KRPC 8.2(a)

"47. KRPC 8.2(a) provides:

'A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be 

false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the 

qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal 

officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal 

office.'

The respondent made a statement that he knew to be false when he stated that Judge 

Wiley was in collusion with opposing counsel. As such, the hearing panel concludes that 

the respondent violated KRPC 8.2(a).

"KRPC 8.4(d)

"48. 'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that 

is prejudicial to the administration of justice.' KRPC 8.4(d). In this case, the Respondent 

engaged in 'conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice' in relation to his 

conduct with Ms. Snider. The respondent accused Debra Snider of being dishonest. The 

respondent stated that Ms. Snider was 'nothing but a histrionic woman' and 'a newbie.'

And, while in Judge Wiley's office, the respondent jabbed his finger at Ms. Snider and 

stated in a loud voice that Ms. Snider should 'grow a pair and punch' him. Additionally, 

the respondent engaged in conduct which was prejudicial to the administration of justice 

when he engaged in threatening conduct in the presence of Judge Wiley's administrative 

assistant, including when he threatened to kick Mr. Lee's 'ass.' Finally, the respondent 

engaged in conduct which was prejudicial to the administration of justice when he called 

opposing counsel, 'Mr. Out-of-Town Attorney,' when he told opposing counsel to 'go 

jump in the lake,' and when he told a pro se litigant 'Be quiet kid, I am talking.' As such, 

the hearing panel concludes that the Respondent violated KRPC 8.4(d).
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"KRPC 8.4(g)

"49. 'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in any other 

conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.' KRPC 8.4(g). In 

this case, the respondent engaged in 'conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's 

fitness to practice law' when he called K.B. a 'son-of-a-bitch' and a 'motherfucker.'

Further, the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(g) when he told his client that 'he might go to 

jail, but he was going to see how far he could push the judge.' Accordingly, the hearing 

panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(g).

"American Bar Association

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

"50. In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel 

considered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for 

Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors 

to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual 

injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating 

factors.

"51. Duty Violated. The Respondent violated his duty to his client to provide 

competent and diligent representation. The respondent violated his duty to his client to 

provide reasonable communication. The respondent violated his duty to the public and 

the legal profession to maintain his personal integrity. Finally, the respondent violated his 

duty to the legal system to refrain from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the 

administration of justice.

"52. Mental State. The Respondent knowingly violated his duties.

"53. Injury. As a result of the Respondent's misconduct, the Respondent 

caused actual injury to his client, the legal profession, and the legal system.
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"54. Aggravating or Mitigating Factors. Aggravating circumstances are any 

considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be 

imposed. In reaching its recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, 

found the following aggravating factors present:

"55. Prior Disciplinary Offenses. The respondent has been disciplined on two 

previous occasions. First, in 1994, the disciplinary administrator informally admonished 

the respondent for violating KRPC 8.4(b) and KRPC 8.4(g). Then, in 2010, the 

disciplinary administrator informally admonished the respondent for having violated 

KRPC 1.9.

"56. A Pattern of Misconduct. The respondent engaged in a pattern of 

abusive behavior. The hearing panel concludes that the respondent's pattern of 

misconduct is an aggravating factor in this case.

"57. Multiple Offenses. The respondent violated eight violations of the 

Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. Thus, the hearing panel concludes that the 

respondent committed multiple offenses.

"58. Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law. The respondent has 

substantial experience in the practice of law. The Kansas Supreme Court admitted the 

respondent to the practice of law in 1981. At the time of the misconduct, the respondent 

had been practicing law for more than 30 years.

"59. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 

justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 

recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 

mitigating circumstances present:

"60. Absence of a Dishonest or Selfish Motive. The respondent's misconduct 

does not appear to have been motivated by dishonesty or selfishness.
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"61. Personal or Emotional Problems if Such Misfortunes Have Contributed 

to Violation of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. The respondent's mental 

health issues amount to emotional problems and the emotional problems contributed to a 

violation of the rules.

"62. The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by His or Her 

Cooperation During the Hearing and His or Her Full and Free Acknowledgment of the 

Transgressions. The respondent cooperated during the hearing and fully and freely 

acknowledged his misconduct.

"63. Previous Good Character and Reputation in the Community Including 

Any Letters from Clients, Friends and Lawyers in Support of the Character and General 

Reputation of the Attorney. The respondent has been an active and productive member of 

the bar of Leavenworth, Kansas. The respondent appears to enjoy the respect of his 

friends and peers and generally possesses a good character and reputation as evidenced 

by letters received by the hearing panel.

"64. Mental Disability or Chemical Dependency Including Alcoholism or 

Drug Abuse When (1) there is Medical Evidence that the Respondent is Affected by a 

Chemical Dependency or Mental Disability; (2) the Chemical Dependence or Mental 

Disability Caused the Misconduct; (3) the Respondent's Recovery from the Chemical 

Dependency or Mental Disability is Demonstrated by a Meaningful and Sustained Period 

of Successful Rehabilitation; and (4) the Recovery Arrested the Misconduct and 

Recurrence of that Misconduct is Unlikely. The respondent's mental disability is a 

mitigating factor in this case.

"65. In May and June, 2013, Christy Blanchard, Ph.D., evaluated the 

respondent. She concluded that the respondent suffered from generalized anxiety 

disorder, depressive disorder not otherwise specified, attention deficit hyperactivity 

disorder not otherwise specified, and narcissistic personality disorder with obsessive 

compulsive personality disorder traits. Dr. Blanchard stated that the respondent's 

'decision to seek inpatient treatment is an excellent first step toward effectively 

addressing his mental health issues.' Dr. Blanchard continued, '[c]onsistent with Dr. 
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Robertson's recommendations, individual therapy two to three times weekly is suggested 

upon his release to maintain his gains and further progress with his treatment goals.'

Finally, Dr. Blanchard set forth minimum treatment goals for the respondent:

'1. Identify and modify maladaptive thought patterns, especially 

those that encourage rigid, inflexible and unrealistic expectations 

of self and others.

'2. Develop insight into etiology of anger issues as well as the 

disproportionate magnitude of his responses.

'3. Increase self-awareness about how his behavior affects other 

people.

'4. Develop and implement effective stress management strategies 

so that he can create and maintain a better balance between work 

responsibilities and his personal life. Within this goal, Mr. 

Clothier should identify and incorporate pleasurable leisure 

activities into his personal life.

'5. Develop and implement effective emotional regulation skills, 

including but not limited to strategies that:

a. decrease anger and impulsivity;

b. manage anger appropriately when it emerges; 

c. decrease overall worry and anxiety; and

d. mitigate depressive symptoms.

'6. Given that Mr. Clothier's health appears to impact his mood and 

behavior, strategies should also be developed to help him 
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maintain his newly adopted healthy lifestyle that includes 

changes to diet, as recommended by his physician, and exercise.

'7. Receive a psychotropic medication evaluation by a board 

certified psychiatrist and adhere to prescribed medication 

regime.'

"66. In August, 2013, the respondent was admitted into an inpatient 

behavioral treatment facility, Pine Grove, in Mississippi, for a period of 90 days, for 

evaluation and treatment. Upon admission, the respondent was diagnosed with impulse 

control disorder, major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and narcissistic 

personality traits. At the time of discharge, the respondent was diagnosed with bipolar I 

disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, impulse control disorder, narcissistic personality 

disorder with obsessive-compulsive traits, and antisocial traits.

"67. While at Pine Grove and following his period of inpatient treatment, the 

respondent has made significant improvements in his behavior and his ability to control 

his anger.

"68. After leaving Pine Grove, the respondent has worked with John M. 

Robertson, Ph.D. According to Dr. Robertson's July 29, 2014, report:

'Summary Statement. Since his return from Mississippi, the 

behavior of Mr. Clothier has been monitored closely. The following 

observations can be made, based on my own observations in individual 

therapy sessions, statements to me from his other treaters, and reports 

from his family and his workplace.

'At this point in time, Mr. Clothier:

• Has a more thorough understanding of the forces 

that have driven his maladaptive behavior over 
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the course of his life—their sources, origins, and 

expressions

• Recognizes more fully the impact his angry 

behavior has had on others in the workplace, and 

he has offered apologies to those he believes he 

has offended

• Can communicate openly about problematic 

issues in non-defensive ways

• Has strengthened his stress management skills

• Has developed emotional distress tolerance 

skills

• Can identify risk patterns early in their 

development

• Has ceased using alcohol completely, and is 

attending AA meetings regularly

• Has reported numerous interactions in which he 

has "caught himself" in the "about to" moment, 

just before he previously would have lost control 

of his language in professional settings—and he 

has responded more reflectively and less 

reactively as a result.

'Since 2003, I have observed between 900 and 1,000 

professionals who were required to seek treatment because of their 

maladaptive behavior in the workplace (disruptive behavior, 
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unprofessional boundary crossings, inappropriate substance use, and 

behavior generated by various psychiatric conditions).

'Mr. Clothier is an example of how much difference a focused, 

intensive treatment program followed by a personalized aftercare plan 

can make in the life of a professional who is highly intelligent, 

motivated, and cooperative with his treaters.

'In the last 15 months, the "night and day" difference in his 

appearance, demeanor, and behavior is striking. He now listens. He 

accepts responsibility. He acknowledges risk. He is keen to observe the 

impact his behavior is having on others. Even his visage and mannerisms 

have changed, as he has become softer, more emotionally aware, more 

kindly, more empathic. Gone are the characteristic expressions of 

defiance, suspicion, dismissiveness, and accusatory anger.

'Mr. Clothier is a treatment success story, and the chances of his 

relapsing into behaviors like those that got him into difficulty appear to 

be minimal. With his aftercare supports in place, I believe he is fit to 

engage in the fulltime practice of law.'

"69. In addition to his mental health issues, the respondent is also an 

alcoholic. The respondent has undergone treatment for his alcoholism. The respondent is 

subject to a monitoring agreement with the Kansas Lawyers' Assistance Program. The 

respondent is compliant with the program.

"70. Based upon the evidence presented by the respondent, the hearing panel 

concludes that the respondent's mental disability is a mitigating factor. First, there is 

medical evidence that the respondent is affected by a mental disability. Next, the mental 

disability caused the misconduct. Third, the respondent's recovery from the mental 

disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful 

rehabilitation. Finally, the recovery arrested the misconduct and recurrence of that 

misconduct is unlikely.
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"71. Remorse. At the hearing on the formal complaint, the respondent 

expresses genuine remorse for his misconduct. At some point prior to the hearing, the 

respondent made heartfelt apologies to Ms. Snider and others affected by his misconduct.

"72. Remoteness of Prior Offenses. The 1994 informal admonition is remote 

in time to the misconduct in this case. The 2010 informal admonition is remote in 

character to the misconduct in this case.

"73. In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly 

examined and considered the following Standards:

'6.32 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in 

communication with an individual in the legal system when the 

lawyer knows that such communication is improper, and causes 

injury or potential injury to a party or causes interference or 

potential interference with the outcome of the legal proceeding.

'7.2 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly 

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a 

professional, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the 

public, or the legal system.'

"Recommendation

"74. The disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent be 

suspended for a period of 6 months. The disciplinary administrator also recommended 

that the respondent be required to undergo a hearing under Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 219 prior to 

consideration of reinstatement. The respondent recommended that his plan of probation 

be adopted and that he be allowed to continue to practice, subject to the terms and 

conditions of his proposed plan of probation.
21

"75. Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211(g) sets forth the procedure to follow when 

probation is requested:

'(1) If the Respondent intends to request that the Respondent be 

placed on probation for violating the Kansas Rules of Professional 

Conduct or the Kansas Supreme Court Rules, the Respondent shall 

provide each member of the Hearing Panel and the Disciplinary 

Administrator with a workable, substantial, and detailed plan of 

probation at least fourteen days prior to the hearing on the Formal 

Complaint. The plan of probation must contain adequate safeguards that 

will protect the public and ensure the Respondent's full compliance with 

the disciplinary rules and orders of the Supreme Court.

'(2) If the Respondent provides each member of the Hearing Panel 

and the Disciplinary Administrator with a plan of probation, the 

Respondent shall immediately and prior to the hearing on the Formal 

Complaint put the plan of probation into effect by complying with each 

of the terms and conditions of the probation plan.

'(3) The Hearing Panel shall not recommend that the Respondent be 

placed on probation unless:

(i) the Respondent develops a workable, 

substantial, and detailed plan of probation and 

provides a copy of the proposed plan of 

probation to the Disciplinary Administrator and 

each member of the Hearing Panel at least 

fourteen days prior to the hearing on the Formal 

Complaint;

(ii) the Respondent puts the proposed plan of 

probation into effect prior to the hearing on the 
22

Formal Complaint by complying with each of 

the terms and conditions of the probation plan;

(iii) the misconduct can be corrected by probation; 

and

(iv) placing the Respondent on probation is in the 

best interests of the legal profession and the 

citizens of the State of Kansas.'

"76. The respondent developed a workable, substantial, and detailed plan of 

probation. The respondent provided a copy of the proposed plan of probation to the 

disciplinary administrator and each member of the hearing panel at least 14 days prior to 

the hearing on the formal complaint. The respondent put the proposed plan of probation 

into effect prior to the hearing on the formal complaint by complying with each of the 

terms and conditions of the probation plan. It appears that the misconduct can be 

corrected by probation.

"77. The only remaining factor to consider is whether . . . probation is in the 

best interests of the legal profession and the citizens of the State of Kansas. The 

respondent has made remarkable progress in the past year. Dr. Robertson accurately 

characterized the respondent's change in his demeanor and in his interactions with others 

as 'night and day.'

"78. Further, two district court judges were called to comment on the 

respondent's request for probation. The following exchanges occurred during the hearing:

'Q. [By Chairman McInteer] . . . Do you—as a judge who has had 

Mr. Clothier appear before him since the treatment, do you 

believe that probation would be an appropriate arrangement that 

he could work under and still practice and it would work 

appropriate in his case?
23

'A. [By Judge Dan Wiley] Yes.

'Q. [By Mr. Ambrosio] . . . Do you think that [the respondent] can 

operate with a practice supervisor like Mr. Bates?

'A. [By Judge David J. King] Absolutely.

'Q. Why?

'A. I have no questions. Because [the respondent] is a different 

person. I think he's found some degree of peace, I think he's 

found some degree of insight in his own life. And I make that 

assumption because just the way he appears and the insight, the 

introspective qualities that I think that he has. I do know that 

Ron Bates would go to the last inch to help [the respondent]. I 

know that Tom Dawson I believe would go to the last inch to 

help [the respondent]. And I think that [the respondent] most 

importantly is in a position in his life now where it appears to me 

he will go to the last inch to help himself and that's the most 

important.'

"79. Because of the respondent's significant rehabilitation, the hearing panel 

unanimously recommends that the Kansas Supreme Court grant the respondent's request 

for probation, under the terms set forth below:

1. Duration of Probation. The respondent will remain on probation 

for 3 years from the date of the Supreme Court's opinion.

2. Supervision. G. Ronald Bates will supervise the respondent's 

practice. As the respondent's practice supervisor, Mr. Bates will be 

afforded all immunities granted by Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 223.
24

a. The respondent will allow the practice 

supervisor access to his client files, calendar, 

and trust account records.

b. The respondent will comply with any requests 

made by the practice supervisor.

c. The respondent will meet with the practice 

supervisor every week. During the regular 

meetings, the respondent and the practice 

supervisor will (1) discuss open cases, including 

cases which present any difficulties, (2) review 

the respondent's calendar for the upcoming two 

weeks for deadlines, court appearances, etc., and 

(3) review the respondent's trust account 

records.

d. If, after 18 months, the practice supervisor 

concludes that meeting every week is not 

necessary, the practice supervisor may meet with 

the respondent on less frequent basis for the 

remaining probation period.

e. The practice supervisor will provide written 

monthly reports to the disciplinary 

administrator. The monthly reports will detail 

the respondent's compliance with each of the 

terms and conditions of probation.

f. If the practice supervisor discovers that the 

respondent violated the Kansas Rules of 

Professional Conduct or any term or condition of 

probation, the practice supervisor will 
25

immediately report the violation to the 

disciplinary administrator.

3. Law Office Organization. The respondent will establish 

and utilize a diary and docketing system which includes a mechanism by 

which approaching court deadlines and statutes of limitations are noted. 

The respondent will review each of his cases at least every 2 weeks to 

determine what action needs to be taken. The respondent will update his 

calendar on a daily basis.

4. Audits. The practice supervisor will conduct audits of the 

respondent's files every 6 months, beginning November 1, 2014, and 

continuing throughout the time the respondent remains on probation. The 

practice supervisor will make a report of each audit. In conducting the 

audits, the practice supervisor will review each of the respondent's open 

case files. In the report of the audit, the practice supervisor will 

determine if deadlines were met, if the respondent maintained adequate 

communication, and if there were any irregularities in the cases. 

Additionally, the practice supervisor will note any matters which amount 

to a violation of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct or the Rules 

Relating to the Discipline of Attorneys. In the audit report, the practice 

supervisor will also provide the respondent with a list of changes to 

incorporate in his practice to improve the respondent's practice. The 

practice supervisor will provide a copy of the audit report to the 

respondent and the disciplinary administrator.

5. Court Deadlines. The respondent will meet all deadlines 

set by the courts or statutes. The respondent will appear in court for all 

hearings scheduled on cases in which he is counsel of record.

6. Communication. The respondent will return all 

telephone calls from current clients within two business dates of receipt. 
26

The respondent will respond to all written correspondence from current 

clients within one week.

7. KALAP Monitoring. Throughout the period of 

probation, the respondent will continue to be monitored through 

KALAP. The respondent will comply with all terms and conditions 

contained in the monitoring agreement. The respondent will keep his 

KALAP monitor informed of his treatment plan and the names of the 

treatment providers. Any deviation from the monitoring agreement shall 

be reported to the practice supervisor and the disciplinary administrator. 

The disciplinary administrator will exercise discretion in determining 

whether any deviation from the monitoring agreement amounts to a 

violation of the respondent's probation.

8. Log. The respondent shall maintain his log, referenced 

during the hearing on the formal complaint, current, throughout the 

period of probation. The respondent shall allow his KALAP monitor to 

review the log at any time during the period of probation.

9. Treatment. The respondent will continue to comply with 

the treatment plan established by his treatment professionals by 

participating in counseling and by taking prescribed medications. The 

respondent will not discontinue his participation in counseling or 

discontinue taking his medication unless the treatment providers 

determine that counseling or medication is no longer warranted. A 

treatment provider will provide the practice supervisor, the disciplinary 

administrator, and the KALAP monitor with quarterly updates. The 

quarterly updates will include the respondent's compliance with the 

treatment plan, the respondent's progress in treatment, and the 

respondent's prognosis.

10. Releases. The respondent will execute releases 

necessary to allow his practice supervisor, KALAP monitor, KALAP 
27

executive director, treatment professionals, and the disciplinary 

administrator, to freely discuss the respondent's status, progress, and 

cooperation with treatment and monitoring.

11. Cooperation. The respondent will attend any scheduled 

meetings with the disciplinary administrator. The respondent will 

provide information as requested by the disciplinary administrator.

12. Additional Violations. The respondent will comply with 

the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct and the Rules Relating to the 

Discipline of Attorneys. If the respondent violates the Kansas Rules of 

Professional Conduct, the Rules Relating to the Discipline of Attorneys, 

or any term or condition of probation, during the period of probation, the 

respondent will immediately report the violation to the disciplinary 

administrator.

13. Termination of Probation. Under Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 

211(g)(8), the respondent will remain on probation, even after 3 years' 

time, until the Supreme Court releases the respondent from probation.

"80. Costs are assessed against the Respondent in an amount to be certified by 

the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator."

DISCUSSION

In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence, the findings of the 

disciplinary panel, and the arguments of the parties and determines whether violations of 

KRPC exist and, if they do, what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct 

must be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945, 

258 P.3d 375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 363). 

Clear and convincing evidence is "'evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that "the 
28

truth of the facts asserted is highly probable."'" In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204 P.3d 

610 (2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188 P.3d 1 [2008]).

Respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint, to which he filed 

an answer, and adequate notice of the hearing before the panel and the hearing before this 

court. The respondent did not file exceptions to the hearing panel's final hearing reports.

As such, the findings of fact are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule 212(c) and (d) 

(2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 383).

The evidence before the hearing panel establishes by clear and convincing 

evidence the charged misconduct in violation of KRPC 1.1 (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 

456) (competence); 1.3 (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 475) (diligence); 1.4(a) (2014 Kan. Ct. 

R. Annot. 495) (communication with client); 3.5(c) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 626) 

(communication with a judge without delivering copy in writing to adverse counsel); 

3.5(d) (engaging in undignified or discourteous conduct degrading to a tribunal); 8.2(a) 

(2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 677) (statements about judges and legal officials); 8.4(d) (2014

Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 680) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); 

and 8.4(g) (engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on lawyer's fitness to practice law), 

and it supports the panel's conclusions of law. We adopt the panel's conclusions.

At the hearing before this court, at which the respondent appeared, the office of 

the Disciplinary Administrator modified its recommendation that the respondent be 

suspended for a period of 6 months and undergo a hearing pursuant to Supreme Court 

Rule 219 prior to consideration of reinstatement. Instead, the Disciplinary Administrator 

joined the respondent's and the hearing panel's request that the submitted plan of 

probation be adopted and that respondent be allowed to continue to practice law subject 

to the terms and conditions of his proposed plan of probation under the terms set forth in 

its final hearing report.
29

This court is not bound by the recommendations of the Disciplinary Administrator 

or the hearing panel. In re Mintz, 298 Kan. 897, 911-12, 317 P.3d 756 (2014). The court 

bases each disciplinary sanction on the specific facts and circumstances of the violations 

and aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented in the case. Mintz, 298 Kan. at 

912. This court has taken the position that, while prior cases may have some bearing on 

the sanctions that the court elects to impose, those prior cases must give way to 

consideration of the unique circumstances that each individual case presents. In re Busch, 

287 Kan. 80, 86-87, 194 P.3d 12 (2008). This court concerns itself less with the sanctions 

that were appropriate in other cases and more with which discipline is appropriate under 

the facts of the case before us. In re Dennis, 286 Kan. at 738.

In this case, the respondent developed a workable, substantial, and detailed plan of 

probation. The respondent put the proposed plan of probation into effect well in advance 

of the panel's hearing and has complied with its terms and conditions ever since. Further, 

the hearing panel concluded that the misconduct can be corrected by the proposed

probation and that it is in the best interests of the legal profession and the citizens of 

Kansas to place the respondent on probation subject to the plan's strict terms and 

conditions. Finally, the Disciplinary Administrator, at oral argument before this court, 

recognized the extraordinary efforts made by the respondent in his recovery and fulfilling 

the requirements of probation by submitting a plan that provides for considerably more 

and stricter conditions than is required.

We agree with the parties' and the hearing panel's recommendation, and we hold 

that respondent shall be placed on probation, per Paragraph 79 of the hearing panel's final

report. We find that the probation plan should be imposed with the modification that if 

the probation is revoked and a suspension invoked due to respondent's failure to comply 
30

with the terms and conditions of the probation plan, he must have a reinstatement hearing 

pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 219 (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 415).

A minority of the court would impose a greater sanction of suspension.

CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Louis M. Clothier be and is hereby disciplined by 

imposition of the proposed probation plan for a period of 3 years in accordance with 

Supreme Court Rule 203(a)(5) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 306).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to the 

respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports.

BILES J., not participating.

MICHAEL J. MALONE, Senior Judge, assigned.1

 

1

REPORTER'S NOTE: Senior Judge Malone was appointed to hear case No. 112,658 under 

the authority vested in the Supreme Court by K.S.A. 20-2616 to fill the vacancy on the court 

created by the appointment of Justice Nancy Moritz to the United States 10th Circuit Court of 

Appeals.