UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4060

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

PRETTY BOY COE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District 

Judge. (3:11-cr-00092-HEH-1)

Submitted: July 13, 2012 Decided: August 1, 2012

Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Robert J. 

Wagner, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Megan A. Kerwin, 

Research and Writing Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for 

Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Stephen W. 

Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Pretty Boy Coe appeals the district court’s denial of 

his motion to suppress prior to his guilty plea to possession of 

a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006), and possession of 

cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2006). We 

affirm.

This court reviews the factual findings underlying a 

district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for clear error 

and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Foster, 634 

F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011). When evaluating the denial of a 

suppression motion, this court construes the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the Government. Id. “We defer to the 

district court’s credibility findings, as it is the role of the 

district court to observe witnesses and weigh their credibility 

during a pre-trial motion to suppress.” United States v.

Griffin, 589 F.3d 148, 150 n.1 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Pursuant to a lawful 

stop, “an officer who has reasonable suspicion to believe that a 

vehicle contains illegal drugs may order its occupants out of 

the vehicle and pat them down for weapons.” United States v. 

Rooks, 596 F.3d 204, 210 (4th Cir. 2010).

Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than 

probable cause. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). 
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It must be evaluated using common sense and measured by a 

totality of the circumstances. United States v. Powell, 666 

F.3d 180, 186 (4th Cir. 2011). Courts are entitled to credit 

the practical experience of police officers who encounter 

criminal activity on a regular basis. United States v. Branch, 

537 F.3d 328, 336-37 (4th Cir. 2008). A “person’s possible 

involvement in prior criminal activity . . . can be relevant in 

establishing reasonable suspicion.” Powell, 666 F.3d at 188; 

United States v. Sprinkle, 106 F.3d 613, 617 (4th Cir. 1997). 

This information must be paired with other, concrete factors. 

Foster, 634 F.3d at 247. An area’s propensity for crime may 

also be considered. Branch, 537 F.3d at 338.

Coe does not contest the legitimacy of the traffic 

stop. He instead argues that the factors present at the time 

the officers conducted a pat-down do not support a finding of 

reasonable suspicion. We disagree. Our review of the record 

leads us to conclude that the facts known to the officers 

supported reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contained 

controlled substances, which allowed the officers to remove the 

occupants and conduct a pat-down of each for weapons.

Coe argues that even if reasonable suspicion existed, 

the officers’ actions indicated that they did not subjectively 

believe he was armed. Because the test is an objective one, we 

reject this argument. See, e.g., Rooks, 596 F.3d at 210 (“we 
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must uphold a police officer’s actions — regardless of the 

officer’s subjective intent — if sufficient objective evidence 

exists to validate the challenged conduct”); Powell, 666 F.3d at 

186 (the reasonable suspicion standard is an objective one). 

Coe lastly argues that the district court erred in not 

considering his race and that of the officers as a factor in its 

analysis of reasonable suspicion. Because race is not an 

appropriate factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis, we also 

reject this argument.

Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED