This opinion is subject to revision before final

publication in the Pacific Reporter.

2017 UT 15

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FRIENDS OF GREAT SALT LAKE, et al.,

1

Appellants,

v.

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, et al.,

2

Appellees,

and 

GREAT SALT LAKE MINERALS CORPORATION,

Intervenors/Appellees.

No. 20131050

Filed March 15, 2017

On Direct Appeal

Third District, Salt Lake

The Honorable Deno G. Himonas

No. 080902785

 

1 The other appellants are Utah Waterfowl Association, National 

Audubon Society, Audubon Society of Utah, including 

Bridgerland Audubon Society, Great Salt Lake Audubon Society, 

Red Cliffs Audubon Society, Wasatch Audubon Society, Utah 

Chapter of the Sierra Club, League of Women Voters of Salt Lake, 

League of Women Voters of Utah, Utah Airboat Association, and 

Utah Rivers Council.

2 The other appellees are the Executive Director of the Utah 

Department of Natural Resources, in his official capacity, Utah 

Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands, and the Director of the 

Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands, in his official capacity.
FRIENDS OF GREAT SALT LAKE v. UTAH DEP‘T OF NAT. RES.

Opinion of the Court

2

Attorneys:

Joro Walker, Charles R. Dubuc, Salt Lake City, for appellants

Sean D. Reyes, Att‘y Gen., Brent A. Burnett, Fredric J. Donaldson, 

Norman K. Johnson, Michael S. Johnson, Douglas J. Crapo, Assist. 

Att‘ys Gen., for appellees Utah Dep‘t of Nat. Res., et al.

Steven J. Christiansen, David C. Reymann, Cheylynn Hayman, 

Megan J. Houdeshel, Salt Lake City, for appellee Great Salt Lake 

Minerals Corp.

ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE authored the opinion of the Court, 

in which CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, JUSTICE DURHAM, JUDGE VOROS, 

and JUDGE CHRISTIANSEN joined.

Having recused themselves, JUSTICE HIMONAS and JUSTICE 

PEARCE do not participate herein; Court of Appeals Judges 

J. FREDERIC VOROS and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN sat. 

ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, opinion of the Court:

¶1 This case involves a series of legal challenges to the

decision of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands 

(Division) granting a mining lease covering a small portion of the 

Great Salt Lake. Plaintiffs-appellants, collectively known as 

Friends of Great Salt Lake (Friends), sought to halt the lease in

various requests and petitions submitted to the Division or to the 

Utah Department of Natural Resources (Department). The 

agencies rejected them all. Friends then challenged those

rejections in the district court. And in the district court 

proceedings Friends also sought leave to amend its complaint to 

raise additional constitutional and statutory arguments. 

¶2 The district court affirmed the rejection of Friends‘ requests 

and petitions, denied in part Friends‘ attempt to amend its3

 

3 ―Friends of Great Salt Lake‖ is singular in the sense that a legal 

entity is an ―it.‖ See BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE REDBOOK: A

MANUAL ON LEGAL STYLE 148 (2d ed. 2006) (in providing an 

(continued...)
2017 UT 15

Opinion of the Court

3

complaint, and later dismissed the remaining arguments on 

summary judgment. Friends filed this appeal. It alternatively 

sought extraordinary relief in this court. We affirm in large part.

And we deny Friends‘ request for extraordinary relief. Yet we 

reverse on one narrow question: We conclude that the Division 

was required to engage in ―site-specific planning‖ as a 

prerequisite to the issuance of the record of decision approving 

the lease application in question, see UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 652-90-

300(2) (2007), and remand to allow the Department to decide on 

the appropriate remedy for the failure to perform such planning. 

I

A

¶3 In 1996, the Division created a resource management plan 

for the Great Salt Lake. This ―Mineral Leasing Plan for the Great 

Salt Lake‖ divided the lake into four leasing zones, with lands in 

all zones foreclosed from leasing until nominated by outside 

parties. The first zone—and the only one relevant here—was 

labeled ―Open.‖ This designation meant that ―[n]o significant 

resource conflicts [were] identified.‖ It also indicated that the area 

would be ―[o]pen to hydrocarbon or mineral salt leasing with 

standard lease stipulations for Great Salt Lake environments.‖ 

¶4 One year later, the Division began the process of 

developing a comprehensive management plan for the Great Salt 

 

example of pronoun agreement, stating that a company is an ―it‖). 

We treat it as such in this opinion, while recognizing that the term 

may appear to be plural, particularly to the extent it has been used 

in this litigation as a collective shorthand encompassing not just 

Friends of Great Salt Lake, but other plaintiffs-appellants (Utah 

Waterfowl Association, National Audubon Society, Audubon 

Society of Utah, Bridgerland Audubon Society, Great Salt Lake 

Audubon Society, Red Cliffs Audubon Society, Wasatch Audubon 

Society, Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club, League of Women

Voters of Salt Lake, League of Women Voters of Utah, Utah 

Airboat Association, and Utah Rivers Council). 
FRIENDS OF GREAT SALT LAKE v. UTAH DEP‘T OF NAT. RES.

Opinion of the Court

4

Lake, a process that included re-examining the previous year‘s 

mineral leasing plan. From 1998 to 1999, the Division invited 

public participation in formulating the new comprehensive 

management plan and received comments from interested parties, 

including some members of Friends. In 2000, the Division enacted 

a comprehensive management plan, which also incorporated the 

1996 resource management plan. 

¶5 Seven years later, in February 2007, the Great Salt Lake 

Minerals Corporation (Corporation) nominated 23,000 acres for 

lease. This land fell under the ―Open‖ zone of the resource 

management plan. In April, the Division invited the public to 

comment on what stipulations and restrictions should be applied 

to the lease. Numerous comments were submitted, including from

Friends. In May, the Division opened up the nominated acreage to 

competitive bids. The Corporation‘s bid was accepted.

¶6 In early July 2007, the Division released a record of decision 

detailing the grounds for its decision to grant the Corporation the 

lease. And the Division concluded that granting the lease would 

not violate the comprehensive management or mineral leasing 

plans.

B

¶7 Friends made three parallel, simultaneous attempts to halt 

approval of the Corporation‘s mining lease on the Great Salt Lake: 

(1) it petitioned the Department for ―consistency review‖ of the 

Division‘s record of decision regarding the lease, asserting that 

the decision ran afoul of the state public trust doctrine and the 

Division‘s planning regulations; (2) it filed a request for agency 

action with the Division‘s director, asking the Division to ―redo‖

its analysis or ―undertake site-specific analysis‖ in furtherance of 

the Division‘s responsibilities to protect the public trust, and to 

determine how the leases should be changed and ―implement 

those changes,‖ Request for Agency Action at 3; and (3) it petitioned 

the Division for an agency declaratory order ―on the correct 
2017 UT 15

Opinion of the Court

5

applicability‖ of article XX, section 1 of the Utah Constitution,4

Utah Code section 65A-10-1(1),5 and the Division‘s Sovereign 

Land Management Planning regulation6 relating to the Division‘s 

record of decision.

¶8 In January 2008, the Division‘s Director and the 

Department‘s Executive Director consolidated the request and 

two petitions and issued a single agency order denying all three. 

The petition for consistency review and request for agency action 

were denied on the ground that Friends wasn‘t a party to the lease 

application; the order concluded that the Utah Administrative 

Procedures Act (UAPA) prevents non-parties from intervening in 

informal adjudications. The petition for a declaratory order was 

denied for three reasons: (1) granting it would substantially 

prejudice the Corporation‘s rights without its consent, (2) the 

petition improperly relied on disputed facts, and (3) the petition 

sought a declaratory order on what was not yet an executed 

contract. But the directors stayed the execution of the lease to give 

Friends a chance to request an amendment to the 2000 

comprehensive management plan.

¶9 Friends responded in three ways. First, Friends petitioned 

the Division to amend the comprehensive management plan 

based on the same arguments it had put forth in its previous 

 

4 ―All lands of the State . . . are declared to be the public lands of 

the State; and shall be held in trust for the people, to be disposed 

of as may be provided by law, for the respective purposes for 

which they have been or may be granted, donated, devised or 

otherwise acquired.‖ UTAH CONST. art. XX, § 1.

5 ―The division is the management authority for sovereign lands, 

and may exchange, sell, or lease sovereign lands but only in the 

quantities and for the purposes as serve the public interest and do 

not interfere with the public trust.‖ UTAH CODE § 65A-10-1(1).

6 UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 652-90 (entitled ―Sovereign Land 

Management Planning‖; ―set[ting] forth the planning procedures 

for natural and cultural resources on sovereign land as required 

by law,‖ id. r. 652-90-200).
FRIENDS OF GREAT SALT LAKE v. UTAH DEP‘T OF NAT. RES.

Opinion of the Court

6

petitions and request. Second, it appealed the directors‘ denial of 

the initial petitions and request to district court.7 Finally, Friends 

sought a stay of the issuance of the lease to the Corporation.

¶10 The Division‘s director denied the request to amend the 

comprehensive management plan amendment under Utah 

Administrative Code Rule 652-90-1000 (2007), a rule requiring

―unforeseen circumstances‖ to sustain an amendment to a 

comprehensive management plan. In the director‘s view, Friends 

had identified no ―unforeseen circumstances‖ that were not 

addressed in the original comprehensive management plan; 

instead Friends put forth only its disagreements with the plan. 

The director also noted that the 2000 comprehensive management 

plan would be reviewed in 2010 and invited Friends to participate 

in that process. 

¶11 The Division also denied Friends‘ stay request. It 

concluded that construction could not occur until the Corporation 

received a Clean Water Act permit authorizing development. 

¶12 The Division executed the lease with the Corporation a day 

later. And one month after that, the Department‘s Executive 

Director affirmed the Division director‘s denial of the plan 

amendment and lease stay requests.

¶13 Friends responded by amending its complaint in the

district court. The amended complaint sought judicial review of 

the denial of the petition to amend the comprehensive 

management plan. At that point the Corporation moved to

intervene in the district court proceedings. That motion was 

granted, and the Corporation thereafter filed a motion for partial 

summary judgment on the claims related to the two original 

petitions and the request (a motion echoed by the Division a few 

 

7 Friends also sought a direct appeal and petitioned this court 

for extraordinary relief. We dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and 

failure to exhaust avenues for judicial review in the district court. 

Friends of Great Salt Lake v. Utah Dep’t of Nat. Res. (Friends I), 2010 

UT 20, ¶ 25, 230 P.3d 1014.
2017 UT 15

Opinion of the Court

7

months later). Friends then filed a cross-motion for partial 

summary judgment.

¶14 The district court granted the partial summary judgment 

motions of the Corporation and the Division and denied the crossmotion filed by Friends. In so doing the court affirmed the 

directors‘ decision, rejecting Friends‘ original petitions and 

request on several grounds. First, the district court rejected 

Friends‘ argument that it was entitled to challenge the record of 

decision as an ―interested part[y]‖ commenting on a site-specific 

plan under Utah Code section 65A-2-4(1). In so doing, the court 

found that the record of decision proceeding was an adjudication,

not a proceeding involving a ―state land management plan[]‖ 

under section 65A-2-4(1).

8 And because Friends was not a party to

the Corporation‘s lease application to the Division, the court 

concluded that it lacked authority to file a petition for consistency 

review.9

¶15 The court also concluded that the Division‘s rules don‘t 

allow non-parties to a lease to collaterally challenge lease 

decisions. And it held that the request for agency action failed on 

 

8 The district court held that the record of decision ―proceedings 

concerned the lease application under the existing state 

management plans—the [Mineral Leasing Plan], a resource plan, 

and the . . . comprehensive management plan. . . . The [record of 

decision] was an adjudicatory and not [a] planning decision.‖ 

Memorandum Decision and Ruling, at 5 (Sept. 10, 2010).

9 Friends‘ petition for consistency review sought review of the 

record of decision ―for consistency with Utah‘s Public Trust 

Doctrine and with the Division‘s Sovereign Land Management 

Planning regulation.‖ Petition for Consistency Review, at 1 (July 23, 

2007). ―Consistency Review‖ involves a petition to review ―the 

division action for consistency with statutes, rules, and policy‖ 

filed by ―any party aggrieved by a division action directly 

determining the rights, obligations, or legal interests of specific 

persons outside of the division.‖ UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 652-9-100 

& -200(1).
FRIENDS OF GREAT SALT LAKE v. UTAH DEP‘T OF NAT. RES.

Opinion of the Court

8

that basis. Because intervention is not allowed in informal 

adjudications under Utah Code section 63G-4-203(g), moreover, 

the court rejected Friends‘ attempt at intervention in the informal 

adjudication. Finally, the court noted that UAPA prevents an 

agency from issuing a declaratory order if (1) the order is based 

on disputed facts; or (2) the order would substantially prejudice a 

party‘s rights without its consent. See UTAH CODE § 63G-4-503.

And the court dismissed the declaratory judgment claim because 

it found both disputed facts and a likelihood of substantial 

prejudice, especially given that the order sought by Friends

challenged existing leases the Corporation had held for years.

¶16 Friends responded by moving to amend its complaint a 

second time. In this proposed second amended complaint, Friends 

sought to challenge the Division‘s record of decision. It also 

sought to assert claims under the public trust doctrine, for breach 

of fiduciary duty, and for infringement of its alleged 

constitutional rights—under the federal Due Process Clause, the

Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution, and the Separation

of Powers Clause of the Utah Constitution. In addition, Friends

also sought declaratory judgments that (1) the comprehensive 

management plan didn‘t require the Division approve the 

Corporation‘s lease if it was in compliance; (2) Friends is entitled 

to direct judicial review of the record of decision; and (3) the 

record of decision violates the public trust doctrine.

¶17 The district court refused to allow the amended complaint 

to the extent it sought to assert constitutional claims (due process, 

open courts, separation of powers) or a declaratory judgment

claim recognizing a right to direct judicial review of the record of 

decision. It did so on the ground that those claims weren‘t 

preserved in the proceedings before the Division and because 

UAPA doesn‘t allow direct judicial review of a record of decision. 

For these reasons the district court found that the proposed
2017 UT 15

Opinion of the Court

9

amendments would be ―futile.‖ Memorandum Decision, at 6. (June 

9, 2011).

10

¶18 In addition, the district court found it ―axiomatic that 

 ̳[o]nly those issues that were brought to the factfinder‘s attention 

at the administrative level may be litigated in the de novo review 

in the district court.‘‖ Id. (quoting Taylor-West Weber Water 

Improvement Dist. v. Olds, 2009 UT 86, ¶ 12, 224 P.3d 709). Thus, 

the district court held that the constitutional claims are ―deemed 

waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal.‖ 

Memorandum Decision, at 6 (June 9, 2011).

11 It also reached a 

similar conclusion as to Friends‘ attempt to challenge the record of 

decision through a declaratory judgment claim. It held that it 

lacked jurisdiction to review the record of decision on a 

declaratory judgment claim. 

¶19 Initially, the court allowed Friends to amend its complaint 

to add the other claims (public trust, fiduciary duty, and 

declaratory judgments that the comprehensive management plan

isn‘t controlling and the record of decision violates the public 

 

10 See Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, ¶ 139, 82 P.3d 1076 

(holding that rule 15(a) of our rules of civil procedure ―does not 

require that leave be given  ̳if doing so would be futile‘‖ (citation 

omitted)).

11 The district court also considered the standards set forth in 

our caselaw for leave to amend under civil rule 15(a). See, e.g., 

Daniels v. Gamma W. Brachytherapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66, ¶ 58, 221 P.3d 

256 (holding that grounds for denying a motion to amend a 

complaint include a finding that the requested amendment is 

―untimely, unjustified, [or] prejudicial‖). Under these standards, 

the court noted its ―concern that Friends has not satisfied the 

justification and timeliness factors.‖ Memorandum Decision (June 9, 

2011), at 5. But because the Corporation had not addressed these 

factors in its opposition to the motion to amend, and because 

Friends didn‘t have ―the opportunity to respond to the concerns 

raised by the Court,‖ the court ultimately ―presume[d] that the . . . 

factors ha[d] been satisfied.‖ Id.
FRIENDS OF GREAT SALT LAKE v. UTAH DEP‘T OF NAT. RES.

Opinion of the Court

10

trust). But it ultimately reversed course. After further briefing and 

a motion to dismiss, the district court concluded that it lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction over these claims as well. Minute Entry 

Ruling, at 1 (April 10, 2012). 

¶20 The district court concluded that its jurisdiction in this 

proceeding was limited to review of the underlying informal 

adjudication. Because Friends sought a collateral attack on the 

underlying adjudication, the court concluded that it lacked 

jurisdiction. And it dismissed the remaining claims on that basis.

¶21 A period of inactivity ensued. This led the district court to 

issue an order to show cause demanding that the parties explain 

why the case shouldn‘t be dismissed for failure to prosecute. 

Friends then moved for partial summary judgment on its 

remaining claim—the challenge to the denial of its attempt to 

have the 2000 comprehensive management plan amended. Shortly 

thereafter the Division adopted new comprehensive management 

and mineral leasing plans. With that in mind, the district court 

dismissed Friends‘ final claim as moot since the new plans 

superseded the 2000 plan that Friends was petitioning the 

Division to alter. Friends then filed a timely appeal.

II

¶22 Friends‘ appeal presents three sets of issues: (1) whether

the district court erred in affirming the directors‘ order rejecting 

Friends‘ petition for consistency review, request for agency action, 

and petition for an agency declaratory order; (2) whether the 

district court erred in denying Friends‘ attempt to amend its

complaint and in dismissing its remaining claims on summary 

judgment; and (3) whether the district court erred in holding that 

Friends‘ appeal of the denial of its request to amend the 2000 

comprehensive management plan was moot.

¶23 We reverse the dismissal of the petition for consistency 

review (to a limited extent) but affirm on all other issues. We also 

deny Friends‘ collateral petition for extraordinary writ.
2017 UT 15

Opinion of the Court

11

A. Petition for Consistency Review, Request for Agency 

Action, and Petition for Declaratory Order

¶24 Friends asserted three challenges to the lease in late July 

2007. First, it filed a request for agency action with the Division‘s 

Director. Second, Friends filed a petition for a declaratory order 

with the Division‘s director. And third, it filed a petition for 

consistency review with the Executive Director of the Department.

The directors jointly denied all three, and the district court upheld 

the denial. We affirm with respect to Friends‘ request for agency 

action and petition for declaratory order, but we reverse (to a 

limited extent) the dismissal of the petition for consistency review.

1. Petition for Consistency Review

¶25 In its petition for ―consistency review‖ Friends alleged that 

the Division failed to engage in ―site-specific planning‖ as 

required under governing regulations. That petition was denied 

by both the Department and the district court on statutory 

standing grounds. Both the Department and the district court 

concluded that the record of decision amounted to only an 

informal adjudication, to which Friends was not a party, and thus 

that Friends lacked statutory standing to challenge it. See UTAH 

CODE § 65A-1-4(4)(a). In so concluding, the Department and the 

district court rejected Friends‘ assertion that the record of decision 

necessarily encompassed ―site-specific planning‖ by the Division 

under Utah Administrative Code Rule 652-90-300(2).

¶26 Friends challenges these determinations on this appeal. It 

asserts that the Division was required to engage in site-specific 

planning under the governing regulations. And it accordingly 

concludes that the district court erred in dismissing its petition for 

consistency review on statutory standing grounds. 

¶27 We agree and reverse—in part. First, we consider the 

threshold question whether the Division was required to engage 

in site-specific planning under the applicable provisions of the 

Utah Administrative Code. On this issue, we agree with Friends 

and reject the district court‘s (and the Department‘s) analysis. We 

hold that the applicable rules triggered an obligation of sitespecific planning by the Division under the circumstances of this 

case. Second, we assess Friends‘ standing under the governing 
FRIENDS OF GREAT SALT LAKE v. UTAH DEP‘T OF NAT. RES.

Opinion of the Court

12

rules as we interpret them. And we conclude that Friends has 

standing to pursue its petition for consistency review to a limited 

degree—to the extent its petition challenges the Division‘s refusal 

to engage in site-specific planning, but not to the extent it involves 

a decision to approve the lease sought by the Corporation.

a. The Governing Rules

¶28 The Division, the Department, and the district court 

concluded that governing regulations did not require site-specific 

planning in connection with the lease application. That 

determination presents a question of law—concerning the 

interpretation of governing regulations. We address that question 

de novo, yielding no deference to the agency‘s or district court‘s 

decision. See Ellis–Hall Consultants v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 2016 UT 

34, ¶¶ 29–33, 379 P.3d 1270 (identifying separation of powers 

concerns and other reasons for affording no deference to agency 

interpretations of regulations).

¶29 The governing provision of the Administrative Code states 

that ―[s]ite specific planning shall be initiated . . . by . . . an 

application for a sovereign land use, or . . . the identification by 

the division of an opportunity for commercial gain in a specific 

area.‖ Id. r. 652-90-300(2) (2007).12 The ―shall‖ formulation 

indicates mandatory action. Thus, this provision requires site-

 

12 All citations are to the 2007 version of the Administrative 

Code. That is the version that was in place at the time of the 

actions at issue on this appeal. And we find no basis for crediting 

subsequent amendments, such as the provision requiring that sitespecific planning be completed only ―[i]n the absence of a 

comprehensive management plan or a resource management 

plan. . . .‖ UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 652-90-300(3) (2016). The 

Corporation urges us to give this amendment retroactive effect on 

the ground that it merely clarifies the meaning of the original 

regulation. But we have repudiated that as a basis for rebutting 

the presumption against retroactivity. See Waddoups v. Noorda, 

2013 UT 64, ¶ 9, 321 P.3d 1108. And we reject the Corporation‘s 

argument on that basis.
2017 UT 15

Opinion of the Court

13

specific planning each time the Division identifies an opportunity 

for commercial gain or receives an application for a sovereign 

land use. And there is nothing in the rule that limits this 

requirement or provides exceptions to it.

¶30 That provision was implicated here. The Corporation 

submitted an application to the Division ―propos[ing] to lease . . . 

sovereign land located‖ in the Great Salt Lake in order ―to expand 

[its] mineral operations.‖ Corporation’s Brief Addendum G at 2. And 

upon receipt of the Corporation‘s application, the Division 

became aware of an opportunity for commercial gain. See UTAH 

ADMIN. CODE r. 652-30-400 (requiring the Division to ―receive at 

least fair market value for surface leases‖); id. r. 652-20-3200(3)

(requiring the Division to obtain a royalty of at least $10,000 for 

mineral leases within the Great Salt Lake). The application for the

lease was also an application for a sovereign land use. See id.

r. 652-3-300 (―Application for the . . . use of sovereign lands or 

resources, shall be on forms provided by the division.‖); id. r. 652-

3-400 (―Until a division executed . . . lease, permit, or right is 

delivered or mailed to the successful applicant, applications for 

the . . . use of sovereign lands or resources shall not convey or vest 

the applicant with any rights.‖). Thus, although either of the 

conditions identified in rule 652-90-300 is sufficient to trigger the 

Division‘s responsibility to conduct site-specific planning, both 

occurred in this case. And site-specific planning was accordingly 

required.

¶31 The Corporation points to two provisions of the 

administrative code in support of its contrary conclusion. But we 

find neither sufficient to undermine our view of rule 652-90-300.

The first provision cited by the Corporation provides that ―[o]ne 

or more of the following plans . . . shall be implemented‖ for 

sovereign land: ―(1) Comprehensive management plans; (2) SiteSpecific plans; (3) Resource plans.‖ Id. r. 652-90-200. In the 

Corporation‘s view the ―[o]ne or more of the following‖ 

formulation implies that the completion of one of these forms of 

planning obviates any need to engage in any other. And because 

the Division has already implemented a comprehensive 

management plan and a resource plan for the Great Salt Lake, the 

Corporation claims that any requirement of site-specific planning 
FRIENDS OF GREAT SALT LAKE v. UTAH DEP‘T OF NAT. RES.

Opinion of the Court

14

is obviated under rule 652-90-200. Yet we find no tension between 

this provision and rule 652-90-300. The latter, as noted, requires 

site-specific planning to be ―initiated . . . by . . . an application for 

a sovereign land use, or . . . the identification by the division of an 

opportunity for commercial gain in a specific area.‖ Id. r. 652-90-

300(2). And the former rule does not indicate that only one plan is 

required. It says that ―[o]ne or more‖ of the listed types of plans is 

required, and the ―or more‖ formulation leaves open the 

possibility that multiple plans may be required. 

¶32 The structure of the rules reinforces this conclusion. Rule 

652-90-200 is followed immediately by rule 65-90-300, and the 

latter sets forth circumstances in which each of the different types 

of plans must be initiated. Id. r. 652-90-300 (―[C]omprehensive 

planning process is initiated by the designation of a planning unit 

. . . . Site-specific planning shall be initiated either by (a) an 

application for a sovereign land use, or (b) the identification . . . of 

an opportunity for commercial gain in a specific area . . . . 

Resource management planning is initiated by identification . . . of 

a need for such a plan.‖). Thus, only one type of planning may 

well be required in certain circumstances. But in other 

circumstances more than one plan will be necessary. The number 

and type of plans required is dictated by the occurrence of

triggering events set forth in rule 652-90-300. Here there was an

event triggering the requirement of site-specific planning. And 

under the rules it is irrelevant that a comprehensive management

plan and a resource plan had already been implemented, as those

plans were triggered by other events.

¶33 The second provision cited by the Corporation provides 

that ―[a]ll requests for agency adjudications are initially 

designated as informal adjudications,‖ and that ―[r]equests for 

action include applications for leases, permits, easements . . . and 

any other disposition of resources.‖ Id. r. 652-8-200. The 

Corporation reads this rule to mean that a request for a lease 

requires only an informal adjudication. Under the Corporation‘s 

view, the lease in this case triggered only an informal adjudication 

and thus cannot require a site-specific plan. But this reading 

would effectively nullify the regulatory requirement that sitespecific planning ―shall be initiated‖ when ―an application for a 
2017 UT 15

Opinion of the Court

15

sovereign land use‖ is received by the Division. See id. r. 652-90-

300(2)(a).

¶34 If an ―application for leases, permits, easements‖ or ―other 

disposition of resources,‖ id. r. 652-8-200, never requires sitespecific planning, then the terms of rule 652-90-300(2) will never 

be implicated: An ―application for a sovereign land use,‖ id. 

r. 652-90-300(2)(a), would never trigger a site-specific planning 

obligation.13 That cannot be. Such an interpretation ―runs afoul of 

the settled canon of preserving independent meaning for all 

[regulatory] provisions.‖ VCS, Inc. v. Utah Cmty. Bank, 2012 UT 89, 

¶ 18, 293 P.3d 290. We reject the Corporation‘s argument on that 

basis.

b. Standing

¶35 Our interpretation of the governing rules forecloses the 

district court‘s basis for concluding that Friends lacks standing to 

pursue its petition for consistency review. Because the Division 

was required to engage in site-specific planning, we cannot 

endorse the district court‘s determination that the record of 

decision did not logically encompass a refusal to engage in such 

planning. Instead we must consider the record of decision on its 

face—to assess whether and to what extent it addressed matters 

that Friends has standing to challenge.

¶36 In so doing, we agree with Friends in part. On one hand, 

we do not view the record of decision as a reflection of a sitespecific planning decision by the Division. So we reject Friends‘ 

position that it had standing to challenge the record of decision in 

its entirety. And we note that there are aspects of the record of 

 

13 As a practical matter, it appears that every application for a 

sovereign land use would take the form of an application for a 

lease, an easement, or at least a permit. See BLACK‘S LAW 

DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining ―permit‖ as ―[a] certificate 

evidencing permission; a license‖ (emphasis added)). And the 

Corporation has not demonstrated any type of sovereign land use 

application that would take a different form.
FRIENDS OF GREAT SALT LAKE v. UTAH DEP‘T OF NAT. RES.

Opinion of the Court

16

decision that Friends lacks standing to challenge—in particular, 

the decision to grant the Corporation‘s lease application. On the 

other hand, we find in the record of decision a final agency action 

that Friends does have standing to challenge. To the extent 

Friends is challenging the agency‘s decision that no further 

planning was required, we hold that Friends has standing to 

pursue its petition for consistency review. And we reverse and 

remand to allow for further proceedings on that narrow question. 

¶37 The threshold question here concerns the proper 

interpretation of the record of decision. Friends claims that the 

record of decision ―represents the culmination of th[e] planning 

effort‖ required by the Administrative Code. Friends’ Brief at 26–

27. And because Friends views the Division‘s analysis of the 

Corporation‘s lease application as site-specific planning, it claims 

that it has standing to challenge the record of decision in its 

entirety in its petition for consistency review.

¶38 We view the matter differently. We concede that the 

Division‘s analysis of the question whether to grant the lease to the 

Corporation was to some degree site-specific.

14 The record of 

decision reflects the Division‘s public trust analysis, consultation 

with experts, tour of the site, interviews with local workers about 

how the area was used by wildlife, analysis of lake resources, and 

assessment of the degree of conformity with the Mineral Leasing 

Plan. And on each of those questions, the Division‘s analysis was 

to a large degree site-specific. But the question presented is not 

whether the Division engaged in site-specific analysis; it is 

whether it engaged in ―site-specific plan[ning].‖ UTAH ADMIN.

CODE r. 652-90-200(3). And we find no basis in the record or in 

governing law for the conclusion that the Division‘s actions 

amounted to site-specific planning.

 

14 For instance, Friends notes that ―the Division toured the site 

. . . [and conducted] informal interviews . . . with the workers [to] 

garner[] some information on wildlife use of the area.‖ Friends’ 

Reply Brief at 10.
2017 UT 15

Opinion of the Court

17

¶39 The record undermines Friends‘ assertion that the Division 

was engaged in site-specific planning. We find only two 

references to planning in the record. Both are to plans (expressly 

denominated as such) that predated the Division‘s record of 

decision—the comprehensive management plan and the mineral 

leasing plan. The record of decision, moreover, expressly 

disclaims that the Division is engaged in any site-specific 

planning. 

¶40 To a large extent, the record of decision is merely a 

reflection of an informal adjudication approving the Corporation‘s 

lease. And Friends lacks standing to challenge that informal 

adjudication. 

¶41 Only ―[a]n aggrieved party to a final action by the director 

[of the Division] may appeal that action to the executive director 

of the Department of Natural Resources.‖ UTAH CODE § 65A-1-

4(4)(a). And Friends lacks statutory standing to challenge the lease 

decision because it was not a party to the agency‘s informal 

adjudication. By statute, a ―party‖ to an adjudication includes 

only ―the agency or other person commencing an adjudicative 

proceeding, all respondents, all persons permitted by the 

presiding officer to intervene in the proceeding, and all persons 

authorized by statute or agency rule to participate as parties in an 

adjudicative proceeding.‖ Id. § 63G-4-103(1)(f). Friends cannot 

qualify as a party under this definition—it wasn‘t the ―agency or 

other person commencing an adjudicative proceeding,‖ it wasn‘t a 

respondent, it wasn‘t authorized by statute or rule to participate, 

and it didn‘t seek to convert the informal adjudication into a 

formal one and seek to intervene. See id. 63G-4-203(1)(g)

(prohibiting intervention in informal adjudications unless 

required by federal or state law).

¶42 But that conclusion is not the end of the road for Friends.

Because the Division was legally required to engage in sitespecific planning in these circumstances, the record of decision 

did render a final agency action beyond the decision to grant the 

lease (via an informal adjudication): The Division concluded 

(implicitly but erroneously) that it was not required to engage in 

any site-specific planning as a result of the Corporation‘s lease 
FRIENDS OF GREAT SALT LAKE v. UTAH DEP‘T OF NAT. RES.

Opinion of the Court

18

application. And Friends has standing to the limited extent that it 

is seeking to challenge that decision.

¶43 By rule ―any party aggrieved by . . . a division action‖ has 

standing to petition for consistency review of any final action that 

―directly determin[es] the rights, obligations, or legal interests of 

specific persons outside of the division.‖ UTAH ADMIN. CODE

r. 652-9-200(1). And a party is ―aggrieved‖ and thus has standing 

if it can show that it has suffered a particularized injury in fact 

that is traceable to the agency action and redressable by a decision 

in its favor. See Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality 

Bd., 2006 UT 74, ¶¶ 19–23, 148 P.3d 960.

¶44 Friends has established its standing to challenge the 

Division‘s conclusion that it was not required to conduct 

additional planning prior to adjudicating the Corporation‘s lease 

application under the above standards. That decision was a final 

one. And the decision to decline to engage in site-specific 

planning was a step that led to the determination of the legal 

interests of the Corporation. Friends, moreover, has adequately 

established that it was aggrieved by the Division‘s action. 

Throughout the proceedings, Friends has identified a 

particularized injury arising from the Division‘s failure to comply 

with its own planning obligations—namely the impact of the 

approved lease on its members‘ recreational and aesthetic 

interests in the leased land. 

¶45 To this limited extent we find that Friends has standing to 

pursue its petition for consistency review. Yet we underscore the 

limited nature of our decision. The record of decision 

encompasses two agency actions: (a) a final decision by the

Division that it had fulfilled its planning obligations under 

controlling regulations and (b) an informal adjudication of the 

Corporation‘s lease application. Friends has standing only to 

challenge the first of these two decisions. And we reverse and 

remand to allow it to pursue its petition on only that issue.

¶46 On remand the question for the Department will be the 

appropriate remedy for the failure to engage in the required sitespecific planning. Thus, we are not opening the door to a 

challenge by Friends of the merits of the decision to approve the 
2017 UT 15

Opinion of the Court

19

Corporation‘s lease application. We conclude only that the record 

of decision as it stands does not engage in site-specific planning as 

required by governing regulations. And we leave it to the 

Department in the first instance to decide on the appropriate 

remedy for that omission.15

2. Request for Agency Action

¶47 Next we consider the district court‘s affirmance of the 

Department‘s and Division‘s denial of Friends‘ request for agency 

action. Friends asked the Division to ―redo‖ its analysis or 

―undertake site-specific analysis‖ in light of the Division‘s 

responsibilities to protect the public trust, to determine how the 

leases should be changed, and to ―implement those changes.‖ 

Request for Agency Action at 3. The district court found no legal 

basis for Friends‘ request for agency action. It concluded that ―the 

filing of a Request for Agency Action does not confer on the 

Petitioners[] the status of party or interven[o]r in the [record of 

decision] proceedings.‖ Memorandum Decision and Ruling, at 7

(Sept. 10, 2010). On these bases the district court upheld the 

Department‘s and Division‘s denial of Friends‘ request for agency 

action. 

¶48 We affirm. Under state law ―persons other than the agency 

[may] initiate adjudicative proceedings‖ only ―[w]here the law 

applicable to the agency [so] permits.‖ UTAH CODE § 63G-4-

201(3)(a). And ―[r]equests for [agency] action‖ are limited to

―applications for leases, permits, easements, sale of sovereign 

 

15 At the risk of being over- or under-inclusive, and recognizing 

that the question is not presented to us on this appeal and is thus 

for the Department in the first instance, the possible remedies may 

include a new proceeding in which site-specific planning is 

performed anew or the issuance of an amended record of 

decision. But we offer these only as examples—illustrations of the 

scope of our remand—and without any intent to direct the 

outcome or the remedy to be adopted by the Department. Perhaps 

the Department will identify a different remedy; our opinion 

should not be deemed to foreclose such a course of action.
FRIENDS OF GREAT SALT LAKE v. UTAH DEP‘T OF NAT. RES.

Opinion of the Court

20

lands, exchange of sovereign lands, sale of forest products and 

any other disposition of resources under the authority of the 

agency or other matter where the law applicable to the agency 

permits parties to initiate adjudicative proceedings.‖ UTAH 

ADMIN. CODE r. 652-8-200(1).

¶49 Friends‘ agency action sought none of the above. It was 

essentially a request for an adjudication challenging someone 

else‘s adjudication. Friends‘ request for agency action, in other 

words, was a collateral attack on the approval of the 

Corporation‘s lease. And our law makes no provision for this sort 

of agency action.

¶50 It is true, as Friends notes, that UAPA allows ―persons 

other than the agency,‖ UTAH CODE § 63G-4-201(1)(b), to 

commence an adjudicative proceeding ―[w]here the law 

applicable to the agency permits persons other than the agency to 

initiate adjudicative proceedings.‖ Id. § 63G-4-201(3)(a). But the 

referenced ―law applicable to the agency‖ is not UAPA. It is the 

law governing the agency—here, the Division of Forestry, Fire, and 

State Lands. That law appears in Title 65A of the Code and in 

related provisions of the administrative code and governing 

caselaw. And nothing in that law authorizes the agency action 

filed by Friends.

¶51 A contrary conclusion would view UAPA as authorizing 

an end-run around the limitations on agency action appearing in 

Title 63G, Chapter 4 of the Code and in implementing regulations. 

Those provisions, as noted, prohibit intervention in informal 

adjudications, id. § 63G-4-203(1)(g), and place careful limitations 

on the sorts of agency actions that may be filed, UTAH ADMIN.

CODE r. 652-8-200(1). Friends‘ approach would eviscerate these 

limitations. We see no basis for that approach in the terms of the 

operative law.

3. Agency Declaratory Order

¶52 Friends also sought to block approval of the Corporation‘s 

mining lease by filing a request for a declaratory order. The 

requested order was one concluding that the Division had failed 

to comply ―with its statutory and regulatory Public Trust and 

planning obligations relative‖ to the lease under the Utah 
2017 UT 15

Opinion of the Court

21

Constitution, the Division‘s statutory authority to manage 

sovereign lands, and the Division‘s planning regulations. 

Petitioner’s Memorandum in Support at 40 (Apr. 27, 2009). In 

support of its request for such an order, Friends pointed to a

UAPA provision stating that ―[a]ny person may file a request . . . 

that the agency issue a declaratory order determining the 

applicability of a statute, rule, or order within the primary 

jurisdiction of the agency to specified circumstances.‖ UTAH CODE

§ 63G-4-503(1).

¶53 The district court affirmed the Division‘s and the 

Department‘s denial of the request for such an order. We likewise 

affirm. UAPA limits a party‘s ability to seek and receive a 

declaratory order in at least three ways. And any one of these 

three is fatal to Friends‘ request.

¶54 First, the Division ―may issue a declaratory order that 

would substantially prejudice the rights of a person who would 

be a necessary party, only if that person consents in writing to the 

determination of the matter by a declaratory proceeding.‖ Id. 63G4-503(3)(b) (emphasis added). As the district court found, the 

Corporation‘s rights would be substantially prejudiced if Friends 

prevailed—its lease has been granted, and it presumably has 

relied on that decision. And Friends is also challenging some of 

the Corporation‘s existing leases—leases it has held for two 

decades or longer. The Corporation would be a necessary party to 

an order that would potentially relinquish its rights. And since the 

Corporation did not consent in writing to a declaratory 

proceeding on the matter, Friends cannot request it. That alone 

defeats Friends‘ petition.

¶55 Second, as the district court noted, Utah Administrative 

Code Rule 652-7-500 requires that a petition for declaratory action 

―be denied if . . . the specified facts, issue situation, or 

circumstance is based on disputed facts.‖ UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 

652-7-500(1)(a). The district court found that Friends‘ petition 

―challenged numerous facts, findings and conclusion of the 

Division.‖ Memorandum Decision and Ruling, at 6 (Sept. 10, 2010). 

That also prevents the agency from issuing a declaratory order.
FRIENDS OF GREAT SALT LAKE v. UTAH DEP‘T OF NAT. RES.

Opinion of the Court

22

¶56 Finally, a petition for declaratory order must be denied 

when ―the petition requests a ruling on an order other than an 

executed contract.‖ UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 652-7-500(1)(c). The 

district court found that the Corporation‘s lease had not yet been 

executed at the time when Friends filed its petition. That is a final 

barrier to Friends‘ request for a declaratory order.

B. Amendments to Complaint

¶57 Friends filed a motion to add various constitutional and 

statutory claims in an amended complaint. The district court 

originally denied the motion as to some of the claims because they 

had not been raised before the agency. Initially, the court allowed 

other claims to be added. But it later determined that it lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction over the remaining claims as well, and 

thus dismissed them. 

¶58 We affirm. None of the claims that Friends sought to add in 

its motion for leave to amend were preserved in the underlying 

administrative proceedings. And that bars Friends from raising 

them here. See Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2001 UT 74, ¶ 20, 

34 P.3d 180 (holding that ―parties must raise constitutional claims 

in the first instance before the agency‖); Taylor-West Weber Water 

Improvement Dist. v. Olds, 2009 UT 86, ¶ 12, 224 P.3d 709 (―Only 

those issues that were brought to the factfinder‘s attention at the 

administrative level may be litigated in the de novo review in the 

district court.‖ (emphasis added)).

¶59 Friends filed a statutory proceeding for judicial review 

under UAPA, Utah Code section 63G-4-402(1)(a). In so doing it 

invoked the district court‘s jurisdiction under Utah Code section 

78A-5-102(7)(a). Friends‘ action was accordingly limited to review

of the administrative action. See UTAH CODE § 63G-4-402(1)(a) 

(authorizing action ―to review by trial de novo all final agency 

actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings‖); id.

§ 78A-5-102(7) (authorizing jurisdiction of district court ―to 

review[] agency adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Title 63G, 

Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act‖). And review implies 

an analysis of the claims and defenses raised in the proceeding 

under review. Friends‘ failure to preserve the claims in question is 
2017 UT 15

Opinion of the Court

23

accordingly preclusive of its attempt to assert them in an 

amended complaint. 

¶60 In so holding we need not and do not foreclose the 

possibility of a future filing by Friends invoking the district court‘s 

original jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-5-102.16 Our 

point is only that this action is not such a proceeding. This is an 

action for judicial review of final agency action, and in such a 

proceeding Friends‘ additional, unpreserved claims are 

foreclosed.

¶61 That conclusion also obviates the need for us to resolve the 

question whether the Public Trust Clause17 of the Utah 

Constitution is ―self-executing.‖ Friends asserts that it is. And it

contends that that conclusion sustains its right to assert its public 

trust claim in this proceeding. We reject Friends‘ position without 

rendering an opinion on the self-executing nature of the Public 

Trust Clause. 

¶62 To say that a constitutional provision is self-executing is to 

conclude only that it is judicially enforceable in the absence of 

statutory authority for a private claim. See Spackman v. Bd. of Educ. 

of Box Elder Cty. Sch. Dist., 2000 UT 87, ¶ 8, 16 P.3d 533. But 

judicial enforceability is only one piece of the puzzle. Friends 

must also establish the district court‘s jurisdiction to hear its 

claim. We affirm the denial of the motion for leave to add a public 

trust claim on that jurisdictional basis. We do so because Friends 

filed only a petition for review of an administrative proceeding 

under Utah Code section 63G-4-402(1)(a) and failed to assert an

 

16 Nor do we endorse such a future filing. The question whether 

such a filing would be precluded—under the doctrine of res 

judicata or otherwise—is not before us. So we simply flag the issue 

without rendering an opinion on it.

17 See UTAH CONST. art. XX, § 1 (―All . . . public lands of the State

. . . shall be held in trust for the people, to be disposed of as may 

be provided by law, for the respective purposes for which they 

have been or may be granted, donated, devised or otherwise 

acquired.‖).
FRIENDS OF GREAT SALT LAKE v. UTAH DEP‘T OF NAT. RES.

Opinion of the Court

24

independent public trust claim in the underlying administrative 

action, thus failing to preserve a right to litigate a public trust 

claim in the district court action for judicial review. We 

accordingly affirm without deciding whether the Public Trust 

Clause is self-executing.

C. Amendment to 2000 Comprehensive Management Plan

¶63 The Division‘s director denied Friends‘ petition for the 

Division to amend the 2000 comprehensive management plan 

based on a lack of ―unforeseen circumstances‖ as required by 

Utah Administrative Code Rule 652-90-1000. Friends challenged

that decision in the district court. And the court dismissed the 

challenge as moot, concluding that the 2000 plan had been 

superseded and replaced by a new plan adopted in 2013.

¶64 We affirm. The district court‘s mootness determination is 

not challenged in Friends‘ briefs—not in the opening brief and not 

in the reply brief. The opening brief mentions the mootness 

determination twice—once in the statement of the case and once 

in articulating an applicable standard of review. But there is no 

analysis of this issue in the argument section. And even after 

appellees noted this deficiency in their brief, Friends still failed to 

address it in the reply brief. That is fatal to Friends‘ position on 

appeal.

¶65 Friends cannot carry its burden of persuasion when it has 

failed to address an issue in its briefing. See State v. Roberts, 2015 

UT 24, ¶ 18, 345 P.3d 1226 (noting that the court‘s ―adequate 

briefing requirement is . . . a  ̳natural extension of an appellant‘s 

burden of persuasion‘‖ (citation omitted)). The district court‘s 

decision stands in the absence of any attempt by Friends to 

challenge it in the opening brief.

D. Extraordinary Relief

¶66 Friends seeks extraordinary relief as an alternative basis for 

the remedies it seeks on appeal. Its argument is based on language 

in our opinion in Friends I, Friends of Great Salt Lake v. Dep’t of Nat. 

Res., 2010 UT 20, 230 P.3d 1014. There we rejected a petition for 

extraordinary relief on the ground that Friends still had failed to 

―exhaust[] all available avenues of appeal‖—specifically, in 

further proceedings in the district court. Id. ¶ 23. Friends takes a 
2017 UT 15

Opinion of the Court

25

negative implication from our conclusion in Friends I. It asserts 

that it should be entitled to extraordinary relief because it now has

―no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy‖ available to it.

UTAH R. CIV. P. 65B(a).

¶67 We disagree for two reasons. First, Friends still has access 

to a traditional avenue of review given our decision to reverse and 

remand (to a limited degree) on the petition for consistency 

review. So to that extent, our conclusion in Friends I still stands. 

Second, to the extent Friends is seeking extraordinary relief as an 

end-run around barriers to traditional review of its claims, we 

decline to exercise our discretion to provide such relief.

¶68 The exhaustion of ―available avenues‖ of judicial relief is 

by no means the only prerequisite to the issuance of an 

extraordinary writ. Extraordinary relief is discretionary. 

Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 

Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, ¶ 24, 238 P.3d 1054. ―[A] petitioner seeking 

rule 65B(d) extraordinary relief has no right to receive a remedy 

that corrects a lower court‘s mishandling of a particular case.‖

Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Horne, 

2012 UT 66, ¶ 18, 289 P.3d 502 (citation omitted). Thus, we may 

elect not to issue an extraordinary writ even if we disagree with a 

lower court decision on its merits. Id. In deciding whether to issue 

such a writ ―we may consider a variety of factors such as  ̳the 

egregiousness of the alleged error, the significance of the legal 

issue presented by the petition, the severity of the consequences 

occasioned by the alleged error, and additional factors.‘‖ Snow, 

Christensen & Martineau v. Lindberg, 2013 UT 15, ¶ 22, 299 P.3d 

1058 (quoting State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ¶ 24, 127 P.3d 682).

Friends‘ principal gripe is that the district court failed to reach 

claims and issues not presented in the administrative case below. 

And, having now fulfilled the responsibility of exhausting its right

to litigate those issues in the district court, Friends invites us to 

consider them for the first time through our discretionary power 

to issue an extraordinary writ. This we decline to do. Friends had a

means of asserting each and every one of its claims in the ordinary 

course of litigation in the district court. Some of those claims were 

dismissed by the district court and affirmed in our decision on 

this appeal. Others are not properly before us because they were 
FRIENDS OF GREAT SALT LAKE v. UTAH DEP‘T OF NAT. RES.

Opinion of the Court

26

not preserved in the underlying administrative proceeding. But 

Friends could have sought to preserve those claims in the first 

instance. And it may not invoke our extraordinary relief 

jurisdiction by means of its own missteps in litigation. See 

Anderson v. Baker, 296 P.2d 283, 286 (Utah 1956) (―If there was once 

an adequate remedy by an appeal and the party permits it to 

lapse, he does so at his peril. Certainly to hold that extraordinary 

writs will issue . . . because there is error, would largely be 

destroying the rules requiring timely appeal.‖ (citation omitted)).

¶69 We deny Friends‘ request for extraordinary relief on these

grounds.