alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Shelton *v.*Holderness.

1. When husband and wife are sued jointly, but not as partners, there is no implied authority in the husband to employ counsel in behalf of the wife on her credit.

2. Where in employing an attorney in such ease the husband did not profess to be the agent of his wife or to have any authority from her, but stated that he himself was insolvent and did not desire to make any defence but his wife did, the attorney could not rightly infer that the defence was to be made on the joint credit of husband and wife, and no joint action is maintainable against them for his compensation, although the attorney entered a defence for the wife alone and prosecuted it successfully, and the defendants both knew that he rendered these services, and the wife was present at the trial, consulted with the attorney and testified as a witness, she saying nothing to him touching his employment or fee, and he saying nothing to her on the subject; and it affirmatively appearing, by the undisputed evidence of herself and her husband, that no authority to employ the attorney had *672been given by her, and the husband testifying that his understanding was that the employment was by himself alone and on his own credit, though for his wife’s benefit. *Judgment reversed.*

August 6, 1894.

*Certiorari.*Before Judge Harris. Carroll superior court. October term, 1898.

Cobb & Reese, for plaintiff in error.

Holderness sued Mi’, and Mrs. Shelton for the amount of a fee earned by him. Mrs. Shelton pleaded not indebted. Plaintiff obtained a verdict which was sustained on *certiorari.*He testified that Shelton asked him to go to court and represent a case in which he and his wife were defendants, saying that he was insolvent and did not want to make any defence, but his wife did. The case was a suit on a note. Plaintiff filed a plea of *non est factum*for Mrs. Shelton, and defeated any judgment against her.' He never saw her until he went to court; she never employed him nor agreed to pay him. He consulted with her about the case, introduced her as a witness, and made out her defence by her testimony. Shelton did not tell him he was employing him for Mrs. Shelton, or that he was her agent, or that she authorized him to employ counsel; but plaintiff represented the case entirely on her credit, and relied on her for pay. The second head-note shows the other facts.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-6193

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

THOMAS EDWARD FIELDS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. 

(1:08-cr-00241-CCB-2; 1:12-cv-00069-CCB)

Submitted: June 19, 2014 Decided: July 15, 2014

Before KING and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas Edward Fields, Appellant Pro Se. Christopher John 

Romano, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Thomas Edward Fields seeks to appeal the district 

court’s orders denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012)

motion and denying reconsideration. The orders are not 

appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). 

A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies 

relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by 

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is 

debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). 

When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the 

prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural 

ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable 

claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. 

at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude 

that Fields has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we 

deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 
3

presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Securities and Exchange Commission

          - [File No. 500-1]

      ( print page 22779)    
It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Fortel, Inc., now known as Envit Capital Group, Inc., because it has not filed any periodic reports since the period ended June 30, 2002.

The Commission is of the opinion that the public interest and the protection of investors require a suspension of trading in the securities of the above-listed company.

Therefore, it is ordered, pursuant to Section 12(k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, that trading in the securities of the above-listed company is suspended for the period from 9:30 a.m. EDT on May 12, 2009, through 11:59 p.m. EDT on May 26, 2009.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. E9-11393 Filed 5-12-09; 4:15 pm]

BILLING CODE 8010-01-P
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-8165

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM LEE JONES, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, 

Jr., District Judge. (2:02-cr-00019-1)

Submitted: March 29, 2010 Decided: April 7, 2010

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William Lee Jones, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. John J. Frail, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

William Lee Jones, Jr., appeals a district court order 

denying his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c) (2006). The district court found Jones was not 

eligible for a reduction because he was found responsible for 

more than 4.5 kilograms of crack cocaine. We affirm. We find 

the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Jones’s motion for a sentence reduction. See United States v. 

Stewart, 595 F.3d 197, 200 (4th Cir. 2010) (stating standard of 

review). A review of the sentencing transcript shows that the 

sentencing court noted Jones was responsible for more than 5.1 

kilograms of crack cocaine. Accordingly, we affirm the district 

court’s order finding Jones was not eligible for a sentence 

reduction. See United States v. Jones, No. 2:02-cr-00019-1 

(S.D. W. Va. Nov. 2, 2009) (citing United States Sentencing 

Guidelines §§ 1B1.10, 2D1.1(c)(1)). We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit 4.01
                                  ------------

                   INVESTMENT OFFER TO INTERCELL INTERNATIONAL
                            TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

I  and  Stanley  Richards  are  prepared  to  invest  $120,000  into  Intercell
International  Corporation to assure survival of the Registrant on the following
terms  and  conditions.

     1.   Paul  Metzinger is appointed as President and Chief Executive Officer,
          effective  immediately,  for  a  period of two years. I agree to serve
          without  salary  until sufficient funds are raised through our efforts
          to  justify  a  modest  salary.
     2.   Paul Metzinger is appointed as a Director of Intercell International.
     3.   The  $120,000  investment,  purchases  restricted  common  stock  of
          Intercell  International  at a 50% discount from the Closing Bid price
          of  the  stock  on  September  27,  2004.
     4.   I  am  granted  a  registered  stock option, fully vested, for 500,000
          shares  at  the  market  price  on  September  27,  2004.


September 21, 2004



/s/ Paul H. Metzinger
---------------------
Paul H. Metzinger


/s/ Stanley Richards
--------------------
Stanley Richards



<PAGE>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 20 - 0475 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. JOSEPH ALTON HAFLICH,

Defendant and Appellant.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including June 30 , 2021 , within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

May 25 2021

05/25/2021

Case Number: DA 20-0475
#### Waldrop *et al. v.*Almand *et al.*

An officer who levies an execution founded on a general judgment upon personal property in the custody of the defendant therein, with notice that her children are the owners and that the apparent possession of the mother is really their possession, is liable to the children in an action for damages; and the plaintiff in execution is also liable for causing the levy to be made, with like notice on his part. Jones v. *Lamon,*92 *Oa.*529, 18 8. E. Bep. 423.

July 16, 1894.

*Judgment reversed.*

Action for damages. Before Judge Richard H. Clark. Rockdale superior court. October term, 1893.

Almand had an execution against Mrs. Waldrop, and placed it in the hands of Boyd, a constable, with direction to levy on a mare, colt and buggy on Mrs. Waldrop’s place. Boyd did so, being informed at the time of levy that the property did not belong to her but to plaintiffs, her children, who would hold him and Almand to account for the trespass. He made the levy, and plaintiff's interposed claims and gave forthcoming and damage bonds. Before the ’ trial of the claim cases, Almand caused the levies to be dismissed. Plaintiffs brought their actions for damages against Almand and Boyd; both cases were tried together, and verdicts were rendered for defendants. Plaintiff's moved for a new trial, and the motions were overruled. It appeared, *624among other things, that plaintiffs, Mrs. Waldrop and her daughter all lived together on her land which plaintiffs had rented from her for the year in which the levy was made. One of plaintiffs was then a minor; the other had attained his majority. The court charged the jury, among other things, that the constable had the right, without incurring any damages, to levy on property in possession of the defendant in execution; and that if, under the facts, the constable was authorized to believe that whatever was on the place was in her possession, he would have the right to levy upon it without liability in damages.

J. N. Glenn and A. C. McCalla, for plaintiffs.

A. M. Helms and G. W. Gleaton, for defendants.
##### 



FORM 6-K
 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
 Washington, D.C. 20549
 Report of Foreign Private Issuer
 Pursuant to Rule 13a-16 or 15d-16
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
   BROOKFIELD PROPERTIES CORPORATION
  BCE Place
181 Bay Street
Suite 330
Toronto, Ontario
Canada M5J 2T3
(416) 369-2300
  o þ
 
 
  o þ




---



##### 



DOCUMENTS FILED AS PART OF THIS FORM 6-K
  SIGNATURES
   Brookfield Properties CorporationBy:

/s/   Craig J. LaurieName:
    Craig J. LaurieTitle:
    Senior Vice President &
Chief Financial Officer




---



##### 



EXHIBIT LIST
 Exhibit
    
    Description99.1
    
    Brookfield Properties Corporation Press Release dated November 29, 2005
<SEQUENCE>13

                                  EXHIBIT 32.a


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

                                 18 U.S.C. 1350,

                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Regent Technologies, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2001, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, David A. Nelson, in my capacity as Chief Executive Officer and Principal
Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

                  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

                  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.


                                        /S/ DAVID A. NELSON
                                        -------------------
Date: September 12, 2005
                                        David A. Nelson,
                                        Chief Executive Officer and Principal
                                        Accounting Officer
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. No. 96-4882 JAMES DEWAYNE DYE, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, Jr., District Judge. (CR-94-177) Submitted: August 12, 1997 Decided: September 8, 1997 Before HALL, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________ Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________ COUNSEL Gregory M. Courtright, COLLINS & COURTRIGHT, Charleston,West Virginia, for Appellant. Rebecca A. Betts, United States Attorney, Michael L. Keller, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________ Unpublished opinions are not binding pr ecedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).OPINION PER CURIAM: James Dewayne Dye appeals his conviction for escape from federal custody, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) (1994). He contends he was not in the custody of the Attorney General and her authorized representatives at the time of the escape, rendering his indictment andsubsequent conviction improper. We affirm his conviction and sentence. Dye pled guilty to aiding and abetting the interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle. As a part of his plea agreement, Dye agreed to enter a guilty plea in a pending state charge of battery prior to being sentenced on the federal offense. Although a federal prisoner, Dye was confined at South Central Regional Jail, a state facility. On November 9, 1994, in response to a state writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, Dye was released to a deputy of the Roane County Sheriff's Department to enter his plea on the battery charge. Dye appeared before the magistrate, entered his guilty plea, and received his sentence. Upon leaving the courthouse, Dye escaped from custody as he was entering a vehicle that was to be used to transport him back to the South Central Regional Jail. Dye remained at large until he was recaptured at his home on November 29, 1994, by local and federal law enforcement officials. Dye asserts that because he was in the custody of state officials at the time of his escape, the indictment charging him with escape from federal custody was defective and should have been dismissed. We rejected a similar challenge in United States v. Hall , 451 F.2d 347, 348 (4th Cir. 1971). Further, escape from federal custody, as defined in § 751(a), is a continuing offense; therefore, an escapee can be heldliable for his initial departure as well as his failure to return to custody. See United States v. Bailey , 444 U.S. 394, 413 (1980). Accordingly, Dye's conviction under § 751(a) was appropriate and we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
2
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<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999             DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999             JUL-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999             SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                           2,234                   2,234
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   18,865                  18,865
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0                       0
<INVENTORY>                                          0                       0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                22,509                  22,509
<PP&E>                                         339,975                 339,975
<DEPRECIATION>                               (218,406)               (218,406)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 148,683                 148,683
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           17,254                  17,254
<BONDS>                                        100,000                 100,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                           142                     142
<OTHER-SE>                                      13,187                  13,187
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   148,683                 148,683
<SALES>                                         43,840                  17,089
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                46,191                  17,696
<CGS>                                           32,907                  11,838
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   47,815                  18,159
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 6,188                   3,320
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               8,720                   3,001
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (1,624)                   (463)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     (465)                   (465)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (1,159)                       2
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (1,159)                       2
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.08)                       0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.08)                       0


</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 434 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 434

 To direct the Secretary of the Interior to study the suitability and 
    feasibility of designating the Wolf House, located in Norfolk, 
    Arkansas, as a unit of the National Park System, and for other 
                               purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           February 17, 2005

Mrs. Lincoln (for herself and Mr. Pryor) introduced the following bill; 
   which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and 
                           Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To direct the Secretary of the Interior to study the suitability and 
    feasibility of designating the Wolf House, located in Norfolk, 
    Arkansas, as a unit of the National Park System, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Wolf House Study Act of 2005''.

SEC. 2. FINDING.

    Congress finds that the Wolf House, located in Norfolk, Arkansas, 
is the oldest 2-story log structure and the oldest territorial 
courthouse west of the Mississippi River.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) House.--The term ``Wolf House'' means the structure 
        known by that name located on Highway 5 in Norfolk, Arkansas.
            (2) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
        of the Interior, acting through the Director of the National 
        Park Service.

SEC. 4. WOLF HOUSE STUDY.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary, in consultation with the State of 
Arkansas, shall--
            (1) carry out a study on the suitability and feasibility of 
        designating the Wolf House as a unit of the National Park 
        System; and
            (2) consider management alternatives for the Wolf House.
    (b) Applicable Law.--Except as provided by subsection (c), section 
8(c) of Public Law 91-383 (16 U.S.C. 1a-5(c)) shall apply to the 
conduct and completion of the study required by subsection (a).
    (c) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Resources 
of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources of the Senate a report describing the results of the study.
                                 <all>
```
#### In the Matter of Keith Bryant, Petitioner, v D. Venettazzi, Acting Director, Special Housing, Respondent.

[964 NYS2d 56]

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth *1438Judicial Department by order of the Supreme Court, Cayuga County [Thomas G. Leone, A.J.], entered October 15, 2012) to review a determination of respondent. The determination found after a tier III hearing that petitioner had violated various inmate rules.

It is hereby ordered that the determination is unanimously confirmed without costs and the petition is dismissed.

Present—Smith, J.P, Fahey, Peradotto, Lindley and Whalen, JJ.