NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

YOCHA DEHE WINTUN NATION ; et al.,

Plaintiffs

- Appellants,

v. GAVIN NEWSOM, Governor of the State of California; STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 19

- 16384
D.C. No. 2:19

- cv - 00025

- JAM

- AC

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted November 20, 2020 San Francisco, California Before: NGUYEN, HURWITZ, and BRESS, Circuit Judges. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq ., allows tribe s to offer gaming in Indian country. Class III gaming, consisting of the types of “ high

- stakes games usually associated with Nevada

- style gambling,” is permitted pursuant to a compact with the state encompassing the tribe’s territory

. In re Indian Gaming Related Cases , 331 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 2003) ; see 25 U.S.C.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3. 

# FILED

DEC 3 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

§ 2710(d)

. “ [ G ] eneral principles of contract interpretation” apply to compacts.
Idaho v. Shoshone

- Bannock Tribes , 465 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006) ; see also
Texas v. New Mexico , 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987) (stating that a compact, like a contract, is “construed and applied in accordance with its terms”). This action by t he Yocha Dehe Wintun Nation, the Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians, and the Sycuan Band of the Kumeyaay Nation (collectively, the “Tribes”) against the State of California alleges breaches of gaming compacts that purportedly grant the T ribes exclusive right s to operate b anked card games. 1 The Tribes a lleg e
the State has violated the compacts , its duty of good faith and fair dealing, and article IV, section 19(f) of the Cal ifornia Const itution (“Proposition 1A”), by failing to prevent non

- Indian cardrooms from also condu cting banked card games

. T he Tribes seek an injunction directing the State to enforce its laws and specific performance of
the purported compact obligations. The district court granted the State’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim

. Reviewin g de novo, see Nayab v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. , 942 F.3d 480, 487 (9th Cir. 2019), we affirm.
The S tate contends that the compacts merely recognize, but do not grant, the

1 “A card game is ‘banked’ if a gaming operator participates in the game

. . . and acts as a house bank, paying all winners and retaining all other players’ losses.” Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wint u n Indians v. Wilson , 64 F.3d 1250, 1255 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994), amended on denial of reh’g , 99 F.3d 321 (9th Cir. 1996). IGRA classifies b anked card games as Class III gaming. See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)( B )(i), (8).3

Tribes’ exclusive rights under Proposition 1A to operate legal banked card games.
See Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of Rincon Rsrv. v. Schwarzenegger , 602 F.3d 1019, 10 37 (9th Cir. 2010) ( noting that t ribal gaming exclusivity is a
“matter of state constitutional law” )

. The Tribes argue that through the comp acts’ preambles and purposes and objectives clauses, the State promise d to enforce the Tribes’ exclusivity

. We need not today decide whether exclusivity is a compact term. Even assuming that it is , the remedy the T ribes seek , an injunction requiring the State to
enforce its laws against non - Indian cardrooms that allegedly opera te illegal banked card games , cannot be granted

. Nothing in the compacts purports to impose on the
State the obligation to enforce its laws against non

- Ind ian cardrooms, and nothing
in the contract s suggests the Tribes may seek that remedy based on an alleged breach of any exclusivity guarantee. We would also be reluctant to read such a n extraordinary remedy into the compacts because California law does not permit the
S tate to “contract away its right to exercise the police power.” Summit Media LLC v. City of Los Angeles , 211 Cal. App. 4th 921, 934 (2012) ; see also Cotta v. City &
C ount y of San Francisco , 157 Cal. App. 4th 1550, 1564 ( 2007 ) (holding that a city
may not be “put to the choice between” exercising its police power and exposing itself to a breach of contract)

. Nothing in the compacts suggests we can order the State to turn its law enforcement priorities towards certain lawbreake rs, as individual4

law enforcement decisions are “particularly ill

- suited to judicial review

. ” Wayte v.
United States , 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)

. AFFIRMED. 2

2 The S tate’s request for judicial notice is denied

.