Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed April 13 , 2023.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 22

- 00271

- CR

JESSE CASTANEDA , Appellant

V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 412th District Court Brazoria County, Texas Trial Court Ca use No. 77579

- CR

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N A jury found Appellant Jesse Castan eda guilty on two counts of i ndecency
with a chil d by exposure and assessed punishment at four years ’ confinement. See
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(a)(2). On appeal, Ap pellant assert s t hat (1) the
evidenc e is legally insufficient to support the jury ’ s guilty finding s , and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in limiting the testimon y from Appellant ’ s expert. For
the reasons below, we affirm.2 BACKGROUND
Appellant was arrested in Oct ober 2015 and indicted o n two counts of indecency with a child by exposure . Appellant proceeded to a jury trial in M arch
2022. We summarize as follows the relevant witness testimony from trial. Complainant
Complainant was 12 years old at the time of t ria l. She t estified regarding an
incid ent that occurred with Appellant in Septem ber 2015 , whe n she was five years
old. According to Complainant, at that time she, her two bro thers, her mother ( “ Mother ” ) , and Appellant li ved together in th eir home. Compl ain ant said the family sh ared a bed in the bedroom. On the day in question, Complainant said she was sleeping a nd woke up to Appellant carrying her in to the living room. Complainant recalled that Appellant
laid her d own on the sofa and “ started like takin g [ her ] clothes of f
, ” inclu ding her
unde rwear. Complainant said Appellant also took his s hirt off

. Complainant said she was lying naked on her stomach when Appellant began “ sitting on [her] back

. ” According to Complainant, Appellant remained sitting on h er for “ a couple

m inutes ” b efore Mo ther came in the room

. Comp lainant said Mother “ started yelling at [Appellant] and then she grab bed me. ” Complainant recalled that Appellant and Mother were yelling at each other while Mother helped her put her
clothes ba c k on. C omplainant also remembered Appellant putting his clothes on
before “ walking out the door

. ”
Complai nant said she “ went to see the nurse ” later that same day

. C omplainant said Appellant did not spend the night at the family ’ s house after th e inci de n t.3

Off icer Hill
Officer Hill was the second witness to testify at trial. According to Officer Hill, he was dispatched to an early

- mo rning call at Mother ’ s house on September 26, 2015. Officer Hill said he made contact with Mother and Complainant at 9: 3 0

a.m. a nd learned that the incident with Appellant had occurred at approximately
7:00 a.m

. Officer H ill said Mother told him what had occurred and explained that Appellant was Complainant ’ s stepfather.
According to Officer Hill, Mother also gave him a clear Ziploc ba g

c ontaining the cl othes she put on Comp lainant after the incident with Appellant, specifically, a shirt and u nderwear. Officer Hill said Appel lant was not at the s cene when he arrived. According to Officer Hill, he was told Appellant had gone to work. Of ficer Hil l recalled that
Mother too k Complainant to Texas Children ’ s H o spital for a sexual assault
examination

. Officer Morrison

On S eptember 26, 2015, Officer Morrison was dispatched to the hospital to talk to Mother and Complainant a bou t the reported incident wit h A ppellant.
Officer Morrison also contacted the Children ’ s Ad visor y Center to schedule an interview for Complainant later that same day. Discussing Complainant ’ s interview, Officer Morrison recalled that Complainant was “ u n abl e to put into
words ” what h ad happe ned with Appellant. However, Comp lainant was able to

say that Appellant “ had picked her up out of her bed from her mom and taken her
to the couch. She talked about [how] her mom had come in screaming at him and
that mom had called the cop s. ” According to Offi cer Morri s on , Complainant also
used dolls to describe the incident and “ used them to show that the boy doll was on4

top of the girl doll. ”

Officer Morrison said the clothing Officer Hill collected from Mother was

sen t for DNA processing. Officer Morriso n also sa id that Appellant consented to

prov ide a DNA sample that also was sent for processing.

Amanda Domer

Amanda Do mer is a forensic scientist employ ed at th e Texas Department of Public Safety Crime Lab in Houst on. According to Domer, evid ence fro m Appella nt ’ s case was submitted for screening in 2016 and tested in November
2017.

With respect to Com p lainant ’s clothing, Domer “perform[ed] a chemical test that can identify possible semen. ” Domer said a “s tron g pos itive ” was identified on Comp lainant ’ s shirt a nd a “weak positive ” was identified on Complainant ’s
underwe ar

. Domer said these portions of Complainant ’s clothing were submitted
for f urther DNA testing.

Domer also tested the sample s collected du ring Comp lainant ’ s sexual assault

exam . Domer said sem en was not detected on Complainant ’ s vaginal or oral
swab s

. Jessica Ehmann
Jessica Ehmann is a supervisor in the DNA section of the Texas Department
of Public Safety Crime Lab in Houston. According to E hmann , he r work includes

“ comp ar[i ng] thos e DNA pro files from the eviden ce to DNA profiles from known
individual s in a case. ”
With respect to the seme n iden tified on Comp lainant ’ s underwear, Ehmann
testified that the “ D NA profile is interpreted as orig inat ing f rom a single
individual. ” Ac cording to E hmann , the probability of obtaining this profile if the5

DNA came from Appellant was 52.8 sextillion times more likely than the probability of obtaining the profi le if the DNA came from an unrelated, unk nown ind ividu al.

For the semen identifie d on Com plainant ’ s shirt, the DNA pr ofile a lso was attributed to a single individual. Ehmann stated that obtaining this DNA profile is 876 septillion times more likely if the DNA came from Appellant than if the DNA

ca me f rom a n unk nown, unrelated individu al. Of ficer Cox

Officer Cox testified regarding the data recovered from Appellant ’ s Apple
iP hone. O fficer Cox said Appellant voluntarily turned his phone over to law
enforc ement in October 2016, approximately one ye ar a fter the underlying
incident.

Offi cer Cox testified about two messages r eceived on Appel lant ’ s phone
from a number listed as a contact for Mother. In these messages, Mother purportedly admitted to setting Appel lant u p with respect to the charged offen se. 1

1 T he first message stated as follows:
It ’s me, [Mother], your soon to be ex

- wife. I have to tell you something. I ’m sorry fo r setti ng you up. I ha d to. I know you were probab ly going to try to take the kids from me. And you wer e right. I was going to l eave your sorry ass when you bough t that truck for me. I hate you so much and I want you to d ie. I haven ’t been happy in a long t im e. I have bee n thinking [ of ] ways to set you up so I ’ve been a lot searching [sic] . So I came up with this plan. And they bought it. When you were getting ready for work I text my dad and told him. I tricked [Complainant] to think that you pi cked he r up when I did. I took her u nderwear off. I made he r think that you were on top of her. It was hard to trick a 5

- year

- old but she believed everything I told her. I told her if she didn ’t do what I told her she wouldn ’t go to school no more. S o when y o u left for work at 7:30 I have

a lready told my aunt a nd uncle. They told me to call the c ops so I had to think fast so that ’s why [I] c alled them at 9 :30. I didn ’t know this would have been all day. But all that was worth it. You will never see these ki ds and you wil l go to prison and I will be out and l aughing at you. I have been talking to different guys. Also coming to [the ] house whil e you are at work. I hate you , [Appellant]. I6

The se messages were sent in Octo ber 2015 , shortly after the incident with Complainant occurred.

O fficer Cox te stified tha t these messages seemed inconsistent with other

mess ages from Mother that were found on Appell ant ’ s phone and did not have the

sa me “ tone. ” Ac cording to Officer Cox, other me ssages from Mother were not of the same length nor did they begin with Mother “ introduc [ ing] herself ” to Appellant. Officer Cox also stated that “ the grammatic al errors in these [two ]
messages are n ot consiste nt w ith o ther messages ” from Mother. Officer Cox not ed
that there was “ never any response ” to t hese messages and agreed that it was “ as if they were never acknowledged by anyone. ”

Co nt inuing on, Officer Cox testified about the possibility of manipulatin g

ce ll ph one data, including text me s sages : Q

. And is it

— in your experience do you even necessarily need access to some body ’ s physical phone to be able to manipulate data? A. No.
Q. Okay. And what are ways tha t you can do th at without physically havin g th e de v ice?

always have. And the only reason I am texting you this is becaus e I want to hurt [you] so bad. I can ’t believe you ca lled th e cops last year when I pushed you down the stairs. That ’s another reason I set you up. Because if you go to j ail they drop the warrant. Don ’t worry about showing this text message beca use by [ the] tim e you read you r message your phone will be reset and turned off. I just want you to know why I did it. I lost my first two kids. I won ’t lose t hese kids. So [Appellant], again, I set you r fucking ass up really good. Your very smart wif e, [ Mo t h er]. Yo u didn ’t think I could come up with this. I hope yo u die in prison be fore my uncle does. He want [s] to kill you. So does everyone else and [I] can ’t b elieve they let yo u out. But it ’s okay. You ’re going back because they will never be lieve you

. They don ’ t care how c le an you r background is. They are going to hang you. Just remember, I put you there, [Appellant]. The conte nt of the second text messag e is substantially similar to the first message.7

A. One option that com es to mi nd easily would be with Apple devices specifically. Apple has tried to get ever ything grouped together so with their iMessage utility you can have multi ple Apple devic es that can all receive the same text

messa ges and t hings like that. S o if I ha ve an iP ad or a Mac computer as well as an iPhone, all those devices can be

re gistered together and can receive and send text messages. Q. And with that said, can that ma ke it difficult to determine who is sending wh at a t tim es? A. Possibly, yes.

Acc ording t o Officer Cox, Appellant ’ s phone showed that it also had access to an
email account bel onging to Mother. With respect to the two messages purportedly
from Mother that took blame for setting up Appellant, Office r Co x agr eed that
ther e was “ no way t o tell ” who authored them.

Mother

Acco rding to Mother, she was married to Ap pellant for five years and they
have two children together. Mother said she and Appellant divorced in 2017. On the day in question, Mother r ecal led t hat she “ was sleeping and [] heard

m oaning. ” Mother said she “ thoug ht it was [Appellant] looking at porn ” because
he “ tended to do that a lot. ” Mother said she got out of the bed and “ walked towards where [she] was hearing the sounds from. ”

Moth er s aid s he walked into the living ro om and s aw Complainant o n t he sofa on her back, with Appellant on top of her “ between her legs. ” Mothe r said that both Comp lainant an d Appellant were naked and recalled that Complainant looked scared. When Appellant s aw M other , Mother said Appellant imme diately got off Complain ant and “ said that he was sorry and it wouldn ’ t happen again. ” According to Mother, Appellant al so “ begged [her] not to call th e po lice. ”
Mother said she helped Complainant put on her clothes, w hich were on the8

floor near the sofa . Mothe r also recalled that Appellant left the home. Mother said
she called the police and, when Officer Hill arrived, she gave him the clothe s she had put on Complainant after the i ncident

. When questioned further ab out C o mpl ainant ’ s clothes, Mother sa id she u sed her bare han ds to pick up the clothes and place them in a plastic bag. Mother said, after the incident
, she took Complainant to the hospital for a medical exam and to the C hildren ’ s Advisory
Center for an in terv iew

. Mother said she has not li v ed with Appellant since the incid ent occurred but acknowledged that she has stayed in contact with him about their sons. Mother
said she d id not send Appellant t he two text messages that admitted to setting him up with resp ect t o the charged offense.

Dr. Spence Appellant called Dr. Spenc e as an expert witness on forensic DNA a nalysis. During his testimony, Dr. Spence reiterated that Comp lainant ’ s clothing was collected by Mother after the incident occurred. According t o Dr . Spe nce, it was

“ concerning ” th at Mot her collected the evidence w ith her bare hands because

“ [y]ou ge t your own DNA onto the items or you could potentially transfer your
DNA or some body else ’ s DNA that ’ s on your hands onto those items. ”
Dr. Spence a lso was c oncerned that Mother placed Complainant ’ s cl othing
in a plas tic bag. Dr. Spen ce testified that m oisture in a plastic bag can cause the
DNA on clothing to break down.

On cross

- examination, Dr. Spence stated that he did not have any issues with
the DNA anal ys es done on the evid ence n or the “ results [a nd] i nte rpretations ” that they y ielded. Dr. Spence a lso testified that he had “ no way of k nowing ” if the
manner that the evidence was collected affected the results.9

A p pellant

At the time of the inc iden t, Ap pellant said he live d at the house with Mother,
their t wo sons, and Comp lainant. Appellant described the night before the incident

as “ no rmal

. ” Appellant said he got home from work afte r 6:00 p.m. and “ rela xed, took a shower, [and] watched a lit tle bit o f T V. ” Appellant said he and Mother

s tayed up after th e children
, went to bed
, and had sex. Appellant said he woke up the next morning at approximately 6:00 a.m., got ready for work, and left shortly afte r 7:00 a.m. Admitt ed into evidence was Appell ant ’ s time

- card showing that he arrived at work at 8:15 a.m. Appellant said
he worked the full d ay a nd went ho me at 5:00 p.m. Appellant recalled that Mother
and the children arrived home after he did an d described everything as “ normal. ”

Ac cordin g to App ell a nt, later in the week Mo ther started acting “ different ”
and Appellant suspected she was “ back on line dating again. ” Appellant said
Mother told him there was a warrant out for his arrest and she moved out of the home. Appellant sa id he “ had no i dea wh at was going on

. ” Several d ays later, Appel lant voluntarily tu rned himself in at the police departm ent. Appellant said Mother sent him the text messages in which she admitted to setting him up regarding the incident with Complainant . A ppellant ackn owledg ed
that it took him ov er a year from the date the message s were received to turn his phone over to law enforcement. Conclusion of Trial
After the close of evidence, the jury deliberated and returned a verdict finding Appellant guilty of two counts of indec enc y with a child by e xposure

. See
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(a)(2). The jury assessed punishment at four y ears ’ confinement. Appellant timely appealed.10 AN ALYSIS
Appellant raises two issues on appeal and asserts:

1. the evidence is legally insuffi cient to support the jury ’ s guilt y finding s ; and 2. the trial cour t erred by limiting Dr. Spence ’ s expert testimony

. We consider these issues separately, beginning with Appellant ’ s evidentiary sufficiency challenge.

I. Evidentiary Suffi ciency

A. Standard of Review and Go ver ning Law

When revie wing the legal sufficiency of the e vidence, we view all the evidence in the light most fa vorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational
factfinder could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
See G ear v. State , 340 S.W. 3d 743, 746 (Tex. Crim. App

. 2011) (citing Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 318

- 19 (197 9)). Although we con sider all the evidence presented at trial, we do not re

- evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence

o r substit ute ou r j udgment for that of the factfinder. Espino

- Cruz v. St ate , 586
S.W.3d 5 38 , 543 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist .] 2019, pet. ref ’ d). A f actfinder may accept one version of the facts and reject another, and the factfinder may accept or reject any par t of a wi tness ’ s testimony. F ebus v. State , 542 S.W.3d 568,
57 2 (Tex. Crim. App

. 2018). We defer to the factfinder ’ s r esolution of conflicts in the evidence, weighing of the testimony, and drawing of reasonable inferences
from basic facts to ultimate fac ts. I sas si v. State , 330 S. W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App

. 2010 ). A person commit s indecency with a child by ex posu re if, with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, he ( 1 ) exposes any part o f his11

genitals, knowing the child is pres ent, o r ( 2) causes the child to expose any part of
the child ’ s genitals. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11 (a)(2). Here, t he two counts
submitted in the charge asked the jury to make separate findings for each of these

two type s of exposure. Because t h e jury return ed a “ guilty ” finding on both
counts, w e consider the suf ficiency of the evidence with respect to each type of

exposure.
The term “ expose ” is not defined by s tatute, so we apply the term consistent with its general meaning. See Warner v. State , 2 57 S.W.3 d 2 43, 246 (Tex. Crim. App

. 2008) ( “ [A] term not defined by the legislature may be understood by its meaning in ordinary usage. ” ); see also Cantu v. State
, 604 S.W.3d 590, 593 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. ref ’ d). F or pu rposes of this s tatute , c ourts have defined exposure to mean “ ‘ [t]o deprive of concealment; to dis close or

unma sk something criminal, shameful, or the li ke. ’ ” Cantu , 604 S.W.3d at 593 ( quoting Balfour v. State , 9 93 S.W.2d 765, 769 (Tex. App.

— Austin 1999, pet.
ref ’ d)).

This s tat ute does not requir e the State to prove that the child complainant saw any part of the accused ’ s genitals; r ather, “ the offense of indecency with a child by exposure is complete o nce the defendant unlawfully exposes himself in the required circums tances

. ” Harris v. State , 3 59 S.W.3d 625, 631 (Tex. Crim. App

. 2011). The child need only be in the accused ’ s prese nce for the of fense to be
effectuated

— the child does not have to be aware of the exposure. Id

. B. Application
Here, legally suffi cient evidence su pports the jury ’ s finding s that Appellant,
with intent to arouse or grat ify th e sexual desire of any person, (1) exposed any part of hi s genitals, knowing Complainant was present, or (2) caused Complainant to expose any part of her genitals. See Tex. Pena l Code Ann. § 21.11 (a)(2).12

Complai nant and Mother offered substantiall y simi lar testimony regardin g the inc ident with Appellant. Acc ording to C o mplainant, she was sleeping when
she a woke to Appellant carrying her into the living roo m. Com plainant said Appell ant removed her clothes, removed his shirt, and sat on her back wh ile sh e was lying naked on t he sofa. Mother testified that she walked into the living room and saw both Appellant and Complainant naked, with Complainant on her back and Appellant on top of he r “ between her legs. ” Mother also said she heard Appellant “ mo aning ” before she walked in the living room and initially thought he

was “ looking at porn. ” Officer Morris on also said Comp lainant used dolls to
describe the incident and put “ th e boy doll [] on top of the girl doll. ”
Appel lant points out that Mot her ’ s and C o mplainant ’ s testimon y differe d on one point: whether Complainant was on her back or on her stomach when Mot he r walked into the living room. But it was within the jury ’ s provi nc e to resolv e this conflict in the testimony

. See Isassi , 330 S.W.3d at 638

. Moreover, regardless of
which version the jury believed , the remaining testimony is consistent on t he facts necessary to suppo rt the jury ’ s guilty findings.

Test ifyi n g abou t t h e DNA evidence collected in the case, Domer said semen
was ide ntified on Compla inant ’s shirt and underwear

— both of which were on the floor near the sofa during the incident with Appellant

. Wit h respect to the seme n iden tified on Comp lainant ’ s underwear
, Ehmann testified that the probability of obtaining this parti cular profile if the DNA came from Appellant was 52.8
sextillion times mor e likely than the probability of obtaining the profi le if t he DNA came from an unrelated, unk nown ind ividual. For the s emen identified on Complainant ’ s shirt, Ehmann stated that obt aining this DNA profile is 876 septillion times more likely if the DNA cam e from Appella nt than if the DNA
came from an unk nown, unre lated individual. This evidence , combined with the13

other te s timony (including Mother ’ s testimony that Appellant was naked and on top of Complainant)
, supports the inference that Appellant expos ed his genitals during the incident with Complainant.
Appellant testified that Mother set him up with respect to the c h ar ge d
of fen se and text messages were admitted into evidence to substant iate this allegation

. But this evidence was not undisp uted. Mother testified that she did not
send the m essage s and Officer Cox testified that ( 1) the me ssages were not consistent wi t h other messages from M other, and (2) it was possible to manipulate
cel l phone data, including text messages. Considering thi s evidence as a whole, the jury reasonably could have concluded that Mother did not set Appellant up with respect to the incident wi th Com p lainant. See F ebus , 542 S.W.3d at 572.
In sum, viewing all th e evidence in the light most fa vorable to the jury ’ s guilty f indings, we conclude a rational factfinder could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Gea r , 340 S. W.3d at 746 ; se e also Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11 (a)(2). We o verrule Appellant ’ s first issue.

II. Expert Testimony

In his seco nd issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in limiti ng the testimony of Dr. Spe n ce, his expert witness on foren s ic DNA a nalysis.

A. Standa rd of Review and Governing Law

Texas Rule of Evi d ence 702 provides that a witness who is qualified as an

expe rt by knowl edge , skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert ’ s scient ific, technical , or other specialized knowledge will help the t rier of fact to understand the evidence or
determine a fact i n issue. Tex. R. Evid. 702. Accordingly, before admitting expert testimony under Rule 702, the trial court must be satisf i ed that three condition s14

have be en met: (1) the witness qualifies as a n exp ert by reason of his knowledge, skill, experience, train ing, or education; (2) the subject matter of the testimony is an appropriate one for expert testimony; and (3) admitting th e e xpert testimony
will actually assist the fact finder in deciding the c ase. Rodgers v. Stat e , 205 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. Crim. App

. 200 6) ; D i xon v. State , 244 S.W.3d 472, 478 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref ’ d). “ The proponent of the expert

te stimon y bears the bur den of proving the expert ’ s qualifications. ” Di xon , 244
S.W.3d at 478. We employ an ab use of discretion st andard in reviewing both the trial

court ’ s determination of a witness ’ s qualifications as an expert and the trial court ’ s d e ci sion t o exclude exper t testimony. Ell ison v. State , 201 S.W.3d 714, 72 3 (Tex. Crim. App

. 2006); Jacob v. State , 587 S.W.3d 122, 1 32 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. ref ’ d). We will no t dis tur b the trial court ’ s ruling absent a
clear abuse of di screti on. Ellison , 2 01 S.W.3d at 723; Jacob , 587 S.W.3d at 132.

“ Un der this standard, we must uphold the trial court ’ s ruling if it falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement. ” Jacob , 587 S.W.3d at 132.

B. Evidence
Outside of the j ury ’ s presence, t he trial court permitte d counsel to question Dr. Spence. On direct exa m, Dr. Spence testified that he has a bachelor ’ s and

master ’ s degree in microbiology. Dr. Spence s a id he earned a PhD in molecular
b iology and focuse d his post

- doctoral work on DNA an a ly sis. Dr. Spence said he
inte nded to testify on issues related to the collection and handling of evidence, as
well as “ some issues with items that could have been collected and weren ’ t collected. ”

On cross

- examination, Dr. Spence agreed that his testi m on y “ wou ld revolve

arou nd how the crime scene or parties involved with thi s could have been15

processed differ ently ” by the police. S peci fically, Dr. Spence testified that police
should have collected Appellant ’ s underwear or a penile swab to test for e videnc e of Complainant ’ s DNA. In addition
, Dr. Spence said police sh ou ld have collect ed DNA samples from other places within the fa mily ’ s home. Dr. Spence said this
b iological evidence should have been collected “ very promptly ” after officers responded t o the s c ene. According to Dr. Spence, by failing to collect this
evide nce the police left “ a hole in the crime sc ene collection

. ”
The State also elicited testimony from Dr. Spence regarding h is qualifications to opine on the quality of evidence collect i on in th e case. Dr

. Sp ence testified that : (1) he has never been to o r worked a crime scene; ( 2) in the past decade, he has not “ c ommunicated directly with anybody in law enfor ce ment [on] how to process a crime sce ne ” ; (3) h e is not a police officer; an d (4) h e has not
taken a ny courses on crim e scene investigation

. Follo wing t his testimony, the trial court ruled that Dr. Spence co uld testify

on “ DNA, the items that were actually collected
, the DNA testings of those items,
and the results of those item s

. ” Th e trial court rul e d that Dr. Spence could not testify on “ what th e police could have collected, if something was collected wha t it would have shown, and anything of that nature. ” In sum, the trial court stated that Dr. Spence was not permitted to “ t estify a s to what the p olice should have done. ”

C. Application
On appea l, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discret ion in limiting Dr. Spence ’ s testimony. We disagree. As the testimony ou tlined above shows, Dr. Spence sought to testify on the

q uali ty of the e vidence collected in the case and wha t else police could have done
to secure additional b iological evidenc e. However, Dr. Spence did not have any16

experience, education, or trai n ing with respect to crime scene investigation or polic e proce du res for eviden ce collection. See Tex. R. Evid. 702

. Accord ingly, Appellant fai led to meet hi s burden to establish Dr. Spe nce ’ s qualifications with respect to the prof

fered testimony. See Dixon , 244 S.W.3d at 478. The trial court
did not abuse its dis cr etion in exclu ding Dr. Spence ’ s testimony on this po int. See
Ell ison , 201 S.W.3d at 72 3 ; Jacob , 587 S.W.3d at 132

. We over rule Appellant ’ s second issue.

CONCLUSIO N

We affirm the trial court ’ s judgment.

/s/ Mea ga n Hassan J u st ice

Panel consis t s of Just ices Bourliot, Hassan, and Poissant

. Do Not Publish

— Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).