IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 272A19

Filed 17 July 2020

IN THE MATTER OF: M.C., M.C., M.C.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from orders entered on 29 April 

2019 by Judge Joseph Moody Buckner in District Court, Orange County. This matter 

was calendared in the Supreme Court on 19 June 2020 but was determined on the 

record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North Carolina 

Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Stephenson & Fleming, LLP, by Deana K. Fleming, for petitioner-appellee 

Orange County Department of Social Services.

Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by Tiffany M. Burba and Spencer J. Guld, 

for appellee Guardian ad Litem.

Richard Croutharmel for respondent-appellant mother.

HUDSON, Justice.

Respondent appeals from the trial court’s orders terminating her parental 

rights to M.C. (Megan), M.C. (Miranda), and M.C. (Margot).1 We affirm.

Respondent and the children’s father, Walter, were married in September 

2010. Miranda was born in February 2012. Respondent and Walter divorced in April 

 

1 Pseudonyms have been used to protect the identity of the juveniles and for ease of 

reading.
IN RE M.C., M.C., M.C.

Opinion of the Court

-2-

2013, though they maintained an “on and off” relationship subsequent to the divorce. 

Megan was born in August 2016.

On 15 February 2017, Orange County Department of Social Services (DSS) 

received a report alleging neglect of Miranda and Megan due to their exposure to 

domestic violence. The report alleged Walter was verbally abusive, possessed a 

firearm, and that respondent was afraid for her life. Walter was arrested and charged 

for this incident. The report also alleged there had been an incident during the 

previous week where Walter pushed respondent against a wall and punched her in 

the face. When Miranda attempted to intervene, Walter threw her across the room. 

Law enforcement was not notified of that incident. 

As a result of the report, DSS conducted an assessment and decided to provide 

in-home services to the family. DSS determined there was a history of domestic 

violence. Respondent had obtained five previous domestic violence protective orders 

(DVPOs) against Walter, though each was subsequently violated, and she obtained a 

sixth following the February 2017 incidents. As part of a safety plan, DSS mandated 

respondent and Walter have no contact for three months. Services were recommended 

to address the domestic violence, respondent’s mental health, and Walter’s substance 

abuse. 

As with the previous DVPOs, Walter violated the sixth, and respondent

became pregnant with Margot during the mandated no-contact period. In June 2017, 

respondent informed her social worker that she had resumed her relationship with 
IN RE M.C., M.C., M.C.

Opinion of the Court

-3-

Walter and that services were no longer needed. Respondent and Walter moved back

in together on 19 June 2017.

On 21 June 2017, Walter became enraged because respondent lost her wallet, 

and he told her over the phone that he would put her “in the ground.” When he

subsequently showed up at her workplace, the police were called, and Walter was 

arrested for violating the DVPO. Respondent amended her DVPO to prevent Walter

from contacting her or the children. 

On 27 June 2017, DSS filed juvenile petitions alleging Miranda and Megan

were neglected but allowed the children to remain in respondent’s physical custody. 

On 12 July 2017, respondent entered into a consent order with DSS in which she 

agreed to have no contact with Walter. On 1 August 2017, respondent’s social worker

learned that respondent went to the emergency room on 21 July 2017, accompanied 

by Walter and the children. The social worker also learned that respondent was

staying at the apartment she had previously shared with Walter, though she claimed 

to be staying with her mother. DSS took Miranda and Megan into non-secure custody 

on 2 August 2017. They were placed in the home of their maternal grandmother. 

Following a hearing on 17 August 2017, Miranda and Megan were adjudicated 

to be neglected juveniles. The trial court concluded it was in the best interests of the 

children for DSS to maintain custody and allowed respondent one hour of visitation 

with the children per week. The court also ordered respondent to complete a mental 

health assessment and follow all recommendations, to sign a release for her 
IN RE M.C., M.C., M.C.

Opinion of the Court

-4-

treatment providers to release relevant information to DSS, and to abide by the 

DVPO against Walter. 

Walter was incarcerated for violating the DVPO from the end of July 2017 to 

November 2017. During that period, respondent was “highly engaged” and attended 

weekly visitations with the children, as well as a weekly domestic violence support 

group and monthly therapy sessions. 

Margot was born in January 2018. Because respondent was progressing with 

her case plan and “on track for reunification,” DSS did not remove Margot from her 

care. Respondent continued to make progress throughout the beginning of 2018. She 

continued therapy, started a parenting program, and claimed to be “done” with 

Walter. DSS expanded respondent’s visitation with Miranda and Megan, allowing 

respondent to be supervised by her mother instead of DSS and to visit the children in 

their grandmother’s home. 

On 22 March 2018, respondent was seen with Walter in the DSS parking lot. 

When confronted by her social worker the next day, respondent admitted having been 

in contact with Walter since December 2017. She also admitted she and Walter had 

argued in the car after leaving the DSS parking lot, and she had left Margot in the 

car with Walter following the argument. As a result of these admissions, DSS filed a 

petition alleging Margot was a neglected juvenile and obtained non-secure custody 

the same day. 
IN RE M.C., M.C., M.C.

Opinion of the Court

-5-

Following Margot’s removal, both parents appeared to make efforts toward

reunification. They agreed to not contact each other but indicated their ultimate goal 

was reunification as a family. Less than one month after Margot’s removal, however, 

respondent and Walter were seen at a funeral together. DSS was informed they 

arrived together and held hands during the ceremony. 

In the weeks that followed, Walter was repeatedly observed driving 

respondent’s car. DSS was aware respondent and Walter continued seeing each other 

during the summer of 2018 and advised respondent that her relationship with Walter

would prevent reunification with her daughters. Despite these warnings, the 

relationship continued. 

After a permanency planning hearing on 16 August 2018, the trial court 

changed the children’s primary permanent plan to adoption with a secondary plan of 

reunification. DSS moved the children from their placement with respondent’s 

mother into an adoptive foster home. 

After the permanency planning hearing, DSS lost contact with Walter, and he 

ceased all services with the agency. Respondent continued to report that she and 

Walter were still together. On 30 October 2018, respondent told her social worker 

that her relationship with Walter was stable and free of violence. At their next weekly 

meeting, the social worker learned that Walter had threatened to kill respondent on 

29 October 2018 and 30 October 2018 and had threatened to burn down her 

apartment on one of those occasions. Respondent sought another DVPO in November 
IN RE M.C., M.C., M.C.

Opinion of the Court

-6-

2018. Respondent again reported to DSS that she was not seeing Walter anymore and 

would not allow his presence to keep her from getting her children back.

Police saw Walter and respondent together in her car at her apartment 

complex on 13 November 2018. The officers spoke with her, but respondent and 

Walter left together in her car before the officers could serve Walter with the DVPO.

Two days later, the property manager at respondent’s apartment complex saw Walter

enter respondent’s apartment alone and called the police. Respondent later reported 

that she had given Walter a key. On 1 December 2018, two days after Walter was 

served with the DVPO, respondent called the police to report that Walter had taken 

her debit card and her car. Respondent later reported she had previously given him

the PIN for the debit card. Police were waiting for Walter when he arrived back at 

the apartment. He became aggressive toward the officers, was arrested, and charged 

with violating the DVPO and resisting arrest. 

On 16 November 2018, DSS filed motions to terminate respondent’s and 

Walter’s parental rights to each of the children. Following a hearing on 21 February 

2019, the trial court adjudicated grounds to terminate respondent’s and Walter’s 

parental rights to the children. The court further concluded that the termination of

respondent’s and Walter’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. 

Respondent appeals.

2

 

2 Walter did not appeal the trial court’s orders and is not a party to this appeal.
IN RE M.C., M.C., M.C.

Opinion of the Court

-7-

Termination of parental rights consists of a two-stage process: adjudication 

and disposition. N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, -1110 (2019). “At the adjudicatory stage, the 

petitioner bears the burden of proving by ‘clear, cogent, and convincing evidence’ the 

existence of one or more grounds for termination under section 7B-1111(a) of the 

General Statutes.” In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 5–6, 832 S.E.2d 698, 700 (2019) (quoting

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f)). 

On appeal, respondent argues the trial court erred in adjudicating the 

existence of grounds to terminate her parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), 

(2), and (6). As “an adjudication of any single ground in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) is 

sufficient to support a termination of parental rights,” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 

395, 831 S.E.2d 49, 53 (2019), we need only to address respondent’s arguments as to 

the ground of neglect under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1).

“We review a trial court’s adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111 ‘to determine 

whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the 

findings support the conclusions of law.’ ” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. at 392, 831 S.E.2d 

at 52 (quoting In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111, 316 S.E.2d 246, 253 (1984)).

“[A]ppellate courts are bound by the trial courts’ findings of fact where there is some 

evidence to support those findings, even though the evidence might sustain findings 

to the contrary.” In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 110–11, 316 S.E.2d at 252–53. 

Unchallenged findings are deemed binding on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 

93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991). “Moreover, we review only those [challenged] 
IN RE M.C., M.C., M.C.

Opinion of the Court

-8-

findings necessary to support the trial court’s determination that grounds existed to 

terminate respondent’s parental rights.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407, 831 S.E.2d 

54, 58–59 (2019). The trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. In re 

N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71, 74, 833 S.E.2d 768, 772 (2019).

A neglected juvenile is one “whose parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker;

does not provide proper care, supervision, or discipline; . . . or who lives in an 

environment injurious to the juvenile’s welfare[.]” N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2019).

Termination of parental rights for neglect “requires a showing of neglect at the time 

of the termination hearing or, if the child has been separated from the parent for a 

long period of time, there must be a showing of past neglect and a likelihood of future 

neglect by the parent.” In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 843, 788 S.E.2d at 167 (citing In re 

Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 713–15, 319 S.E.2d 227, 231–32 (1984)).

Respondent challenges several of the trial court’s findings of fact. She first 

contends there is no evidence to support the trial court’s finding of fact 35 and 373

that she and Walter had dinner together for his birthday. While there was no 

testimony at the termination hearing related to the dinner meeting, the social 

worker’s adjudicatory hearing report, admitted into evidence without objection, 

 

3 The trial court entered a separate termination order for each child, which resulted 

in differences between the numbering of the findings of fact in 17 JT 39 and 17 JT 40 with 

18 JT 19. As such, respondent’s challenges to a single finding of fact refer to two numbers, 

both of which we include. Because the orders contain findings of fact and conclusions of law 

which are essentially identical, any quotes are from a representative order entered in file 

number 17 JT 39. 
IN RE M.C., M.C., M.C.

Opinion of the Court

-9-

describes multiple meetings between respondent and Walter, including the birthday 

dinner, in violation of the no-contact orders and DVPOs. Respondent does not 

challenge the court’s findings concerning these additional meetings between 

respondent and Walter, including their appearance together at a funeral and a court 

hearing, as well as Walter’s ongoing use of respondent’s car and his presence in her 

apartment. 

Assuming, arguendo, the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s 

finding about the shared birthday dinner, the remaining unchallenged findings 

establish respondent’s continued engagement with Walter, notwithstanding the 

DVPOs and voluntary consent orders. Accordingly, the erroneous finding is not 

necessary to support the trial court’s legal determination that grounds existed for the 

termination of respondent’s parental rights. In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 407, 831 S.E.2d 

at 58–59.

Respondent next challenges the trial court’s finding of fact 47 and 49:

It is likely that the neglect experienced by the juvenile in 

the care of Respondent mother will repeat or continue if the 

juvenile is returned to Respondent mother’s care and 

custody. Specifically, this court finds the following facts:

. . . . 

b. Respondent mother minimizes the risk to herself, the 

juvenile, and her siblings.

c. Respondent mother has had contact with Respondent 

father despite DVPO’s she sought, agreements not to 

have contact, and orders of this court as set forth herein. 
IN RE M.C., M.C., M.C.

Opinion of the Court

-10-

d. Respondent mother has engaged in and completed 

several domestic violence education and support groups 

with the Compass Center, but she continued to 

maintain a relationship with Respondent father.

e. Respondent mother has engaged in individual therapy, 

but she continued to have contact with and maintain a 

relationship with Respondent father.

f. Respondent mother’s continued relationship with 

Respondent father despite engagement in services and 

no contact orders, and failure to maintain a safe home 

free from domestic violence subjects the juvenile to the 

likelihood of repetition of neglect if the juvenile were 

returned to her care and custody. 

Respondent argues her testimony at the termination hearing contradicts the 

finding that she minimizes the risk to herself or the children. At the hearing, she 

acknowledged it was a “terrible decision to get back together with [Walter] in March 

2018 and she was sorry for having done so.” She testified that she was no longer in a 

relationship with Walter, and she would not return to him again. 

Respondent also challenges the trial court’s finding that there would be a likely 

repetition of neglect if the children were returned to her care. She asserts her trial

testimony, as well as Walter’s possible incarceration for offenses with long prison

sentences, are evidence of changed circumstances at the time of the termination 

hearing, which the trial court failed to consider in its findings. 

Respondent cites In re A.B., 253 N.C. App. 29, 799 S.E.2d 445 (2017), to support 

her assertion that the trial court failed to make adequate findings related to the 
IN RE M.C., M.C., M.C.

Opinion of the Court

-11-

evidence of changed circumstances. In that matter, the Court of Appeals determined 

“the trial court’s findings and conclusions do not adequately account for respondentmother’s circumstances at the time of the termination hearing.” Id. at 38, 799 S.E.2d 

at 452. In that case both a social worker and the respondent “presented testimony 

that would support additional findings up to the time of the termination hearing,” 

and the Court “believe[d] the evidence would support different inferences and 

conclusions regarding the likelihood of a repetition of neglect based on evidence 

regarding respondent-mother’s circumstances at the time of the hearing.” Id. at 35, 

799 S.E.2d at 451. That testimony included evidence of the respondent’s (1) unbroken 

period of negative drug screens, (2) participation in therapy, (3) separation from the 

children’s father and her obtaining a DVPO against him, (4) full-time employment, 

(5) consistent and appropriate visitation with her children, and (6) her willingness 

and ability to meet minimal living standards for the children, all of which had been 

at issue at the adjudication hearing. Id. at 36–37, 799 S.E.2d at 451–52. 

At the time of the termination hearing in this matter, Walter was in jail on 

pending felony and misdemeanor charges. This, along with respondent’s testimony 

that she was no longer in a relationship with Walter and would not return to him, is 

the extent of the changed circumstances respondent presented. At the outset, the trial 

court heard respondent’s evidence of purported “changed circumstance,” but it “was 

not required to credit [respondent’s] testimonial evidence, particularly in light of 
IN RE M.C., M.C., M.C.

Opinion of the Court

-12-

other testimony admitted during the hearing.” In re Z.V.A., 373 N.C. 207, 212, 835 

S.E.2d 425, 430 (2019) (citing In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 843, 788 S.E.2d at 167–68).

Further, “[i]n predicting the probability of repetition of neglect, the court ‘must 

assess whether there is a substantial risk of future abuse or neglect of a child based 

on the historical facts of the case.’ ” In re M.P.M., 243 N.C. App. 41, 48, 776 S.E.2d 

687, 692 (2015) (quoting In re McLean, 135 N.C. App. 387, 396, 521 S.E.2d 121, 127 

(1999)), aff’d per curiam, 368 N.C. 704, 782 S.E.2d 510 (2016). 

In addition to the above challenged finding of fact, the trial court found 

numerous other unchallenged findings that show respondent repeatedly prioritized 

her relationship with Walter over the safety of Miranda, Megan, and Margot by 

continuing to allow Walter in her life and around the children; by violating court 

orders; and by lying to her social workers, doctors, and family members in the process. 

Walter has been confined for varying lengths of time during the course of the 

children’s lives, and each time he was released, respondent welcomed him back into 

the home. We conclude respondent’s evidence of changed circumstances does not 

“support different inferences and conclusions regarding the likelihood of a repetition 

of neglect based on evidence regarding [respondent’s] circumstances at the time of 

the hearing.” In re A.B., 253 N.C. App at 35, 799 S.E.2d at 451. Moreover, 

respondent’s refusal to acknowledge the effect of domestic violence on the children

and her inability to sever her relationship with Walter, even during or immediately 

following his periods of incarceration, supports the trial court’s determination that 
IN RE M.C., M.C., M.C.

Opinion of the Court

-13-

the neglect of the children would likely be repeated if they were returned to 

respondent’s care. See In re Z.V.A., 373 N.C. at 212, 835 S.E.2d at 430 (affirming a 

finding of neglect based on a respondent’s inability to sever a relationship with an 

unsafe parent).

Respondent also asserts that finding of fact 8 is actually a conclusion of law, 

and as such this Court “must assess it in the context of whether findings contained 

elsewhere in the TPR orders support it.” Finding of fact 8 states, in relevant part,

that DSS has proved “by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist to 

terminate [respondent’s] parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) 

. . . as set forth herein.” We agree that this finding is better labeled as a conclusion of 

law. Matter of Adoption of C.H.M., 371 N.C. 22, 28, 812 S.E.2d 804, 809 (2018) (“[A]ny

determination requiring the exercise of judgment or the application of legal principles 

is more properly classified a conclusion of law.” (citation omitted)); see also In re 

Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 510, 491 S.E.2d 672, 675–76 (1997) (“The determination 

of neglect requires the application of [statutory] legal principles . . . and is therefore 

a conclusion of law.” (citation omitted)). The trial court’s labels are not binding upon 

this Court, and we “may reclassify them as necessary before applying the appropriate 

standard of review.” N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cully’s Motorcross Park, Inc., 

366 N.C. 505, 512, 742 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2013) (citing In re Foreclosure of Gilbert, 211 

N.C. App. 483, 487–88, 711 S.E.2d 165, 169 (2011)).
IN RE M.C., M.C., M.C.

Opinion of the Court

-14-

Thus, having determined the challenged findings of fact are supported by clear, 

cogent, and convincing evidence, and having reviewed the findings as a whole, we 

conclude the findings of fact support the trial court’s conclusion that DSS proved “by 

clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist to terminate [respondent’s] parental 

rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) . . . .” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. at 392, 

831 S.E.2d at 52.

Finally, respondent argues that the trial court erred as its conclusions of law 

do not include the phrase “probability of future neglect.” She asserts this renders the 

orders reversible. However, the trial court did make findings regarding the 

probability of future neglect, stating, “It is likely that the neglect experienced by the 

juvenile in the care of Respondent mother will repeat or continue if the juvenile is 

returned to Respondent mother’s care and custody,” and that the juvenile was 

subjected to “the likelihood of repetition of neglect if the juvenile were returned to 

[respondent’s] care and custody.” Again, the trial court’s labels are not binding upon 

this Court, and we “may reclassify them as necessary before applying the appropriate 

standard of review.” N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. 366 N.C. at 512, 742 S.E.2d at

786. To the extent these determinations are more appropriately treated as 

conclusions of law, we will consider them as such, and we conclude there are sufficient 

findings of fact, supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, to support the 

trial court’s conclusion that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights 

for neglect under N.C.G.S. 7B-1111(a)(1).
IN RE M.C., M.C., M.C.

Opinion of the Court

-15-

For the foregoing reasons, none of respondent’s arguments demonstrate that 

the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights. Accordingly, we affirm the 

termination orders.

AFFIRMED.