_______________________________ 

 

Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

Chief Justice: Justices: 

Clifford W. Taylor Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver Opinion Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED DECEMBER 28, 2005 

DEBRA LEA MILLER, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v No. 127767 

JOHN THOMAS MILLER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

PER CURIAM. 

This case presents the question whether the domestic 

relations arbitration act (DRAA)1 requires a formal hearing 

during arbitration comparable to that which occurs in 

traditional trial proceedings. We conclude that it does 

not. 

Also at issue is whether a court order to which the 

parties have stipulated in writing can satisfy the act’s 

requirement of a written agreement to arbitrate. We 

conclude that it can. Therefore, we reverse the judgment 

of the Court of Appeals, which ruled to the contrary on 

1

 MCL 600.5070 et seq. 
both issues, and we reinstate the arbitration award and the 

judgment of divorce. 

THE FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Plaintiff filed for divorce in January 2001. After 

failed settlement conferences in the circuit court, on 

December 4, 2001, both parties stipulated in writing to 

entry of an order sending all issues in the case to binding 

arbitration. 

The arbitrator put the parties in separate rooms 

during the arbitration proceedings. He shuttled between 

them, gathering the necessary information and hearing the 

respective arguments. Both parties agreed to this 

procedure. 

At the end of the day, plaintiff asked the arbitrator 

for additional sessions. He denied the request, expressly 

noting in his written award that plaintiff had failed to 

raise anything new to justify further proceedings. When 

plaintiff made a second request, the arbitrator gave her 

three days to provide an outline of what she would present 

at the additional proceedings. She supplied, instead, 

voluminous material. Rather than schedule more hearings, 

the arbitrator reviewed plaintiff’s material, modified the 

award, and issued the final binding arbitration award. 

2
 
Plaintiff filed a motion in court to set aside the 

arbitration award on the basis that the arbitrator had 

failed to conduct a “hearing” as required by the DRAA. She 

also claimed that no arbitration agreement existed. The 

court rejected plaintiff’s claims and entered a judgment of 

divorce. In a split published decision, the Court of 

Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court and 

vacated the arbitration award. It held that the DRAA 

required a formal hearing and that none occurred during the 

arbitration. Miller v Miller, 264 Mich App 497; 691 NW2d 

788 (2004). 

THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The two issues on appeal are matters of statutory 

interpretation that we review de novo. People v Kimble, 

470 Mich 305, 308-309; 684 NW2d 669 (2004). When 

interpreting a statute, our goal is to give effect to the 

Legislature’s intent as determined from a review of the 

language of the statute. People v Koonce, 466 Mich 515, 

518; 648 NW2d 153 (2002). 

Defendant asks us to review the Court of Appeals 

decision not to enforce the arbitration award. We review 

such decisions de novo to determine whether the arbitrators 

exceeded their powers. See Gordon Sel-Way, Inc v Spence 

Bros, Inc, 438 Mich 488, 496-497; 475 NW2d 704 (1991). 

3
 
Arbitrators exceed their powers whenever they act beyond 

the material terms of the contract from which they draw 

their authority or in contravention of controlling law. 

DAIIE v Gavin, 416 Mich 407, 433-434; 331 NW2d 418 (1982). 

WHAT CONSTITUTES A HEARING UNDER THE DRAA 

MCL 600.5081 is the statutory provision that governs 

vacation and modification of arbitration awards under the 

DRAA. MCL 600.5081(2) provides: 

If a party applies under this section, the

court shall vacate an award under any of the

following circumstances: 

(a) The award was procured by corruption,

fraud, or other undue means. 

(b) There was evident partiality by an 

arbitrator appointed as a neutral, corruption of

an arbitrator, or misconduct prejudicing a 

party’s rights. 

(c) The arbitrator exceeded his or her 

powers. 

(d) The arbitrator refused to postpone the

hearing on a showing of sufficient cause, refused

to hear evidence material to the controversy, or

otherwise conducted the hearing to prejudice

substantially a party’s rights. 

The Court of Appeals concluded that the arbitrator 

violated MCL 600.5081(2)(d). It reasoned that the 

informality of the hearing prejudiced plaintiff’s rights. 

The question is whether, in proceedings under the DRAA, the 

statute precludes hearings being conducted as the hearing 

was conducted in this case. 

4
 
 

In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals 

majority relied primarily on MCL 600.5074(1), which 

provides: 

An arbitrator appointed under this chapter

shall hear and make an award on each issue 

submitted for arbitration under the arbitration 

agreement subject to the provisions of the 

agreement. [Emphasis added.] 

The DRAA does not define the term “hear” or “hearing.” 

Moreover, it sets no procedural requirements for 

arbitration. Rather, it specifically eschews them. For 

example, MCL 600.5077 requires, with certain exceptions, 

that the arbitrator not make an official record of most 

arbitration proceedings.2

 This purposeful requirement of 

little or no record shows that the Legislature intended not 

to require specific procedures in arbitration proceedings. 

2

 MCL 600.5077 provides: 

(1) Except as provided by this section,

court rule, or the arbitration agreement, a 

record shall not be made of an arbitration 

hearing under this chapter. If a record is not 

required, an arbitrator may make a record to be

used only by the arbitrator to aid in reaching

the decision. The parties may provide in the

arbitration agreement that a record be made of 

those portions of a hearing related to 1 or more

issues subject to arbitration. 

(2) A record shall be made of that portion

of a hearing that concerns child support,

custody, or parenting time in the same manner

required by the Michigan court rules for the

record of a witness’s testimony in a deposition. 

5
 
Without a record, reviewing courts cannot assess what 

procedures have been followed. 

The Legislature’s failure to provide specific 

arbitration procedures is consistent also with tradition. 

Historically, judicial review of arbitration awards is 

highly limited. Gavin, 416 Mich 433-434. This Court has 

characterized arbitration procedures as “informal and 

sometimes unorthodox . . . .” Id. at 429. Consequently, 

courts should not speculate why an arbitrator ruled in one 

particular manner. Id. 

Rather than employ the formality required in courts, 

parties in arbitration are able to shape the parameters and 

procedures of the proceeding. The DRAA requires that they 

first sign an agreement for binding arbitration delineating 

the powers and duties of the arbitrator. MCL 

600.5072(1)(e). 

The act also contemplates that the parties will 

discuss with the arbitrator the scope of the issues and how 

information necessary for their resolution will be 

produced. MCL 600.5076. The act contemplates that the 

parties will decide what is best for their case. Nowhere 

in the DRAA are procedural formalities imposed that 

restrict this freedom. 

6
 
 

This Court has consistently held that arbitration is a 

matter of contract. “It is the agreement that dictates the 

authority of the arbitrators[.]” Rowry v Univ of Michigan, 

441 Mich 1, 10; 490 NW2d 305 (1992). In this case, the 

Court of Appeals decision infringes on the parties’ 

recognized freedom to contract for binding arbitration. 

It restricts the parties’ freedom to decide how the 

arbitration hearing should be conducted.3 Plaintiff 

presents no convincing argument that the Legislature 

intended all DRAA hearings to approximate traditional court 

hearings. We know of none.4 It is inappropriate for a 

court to read into a statute something that was not 

3

 The language in US Const, art I, § 3, cl 6, stating 

that the Senate shall “try all Impeachments,” does not

constitute an “implied limitation on the method by which

the Senate might proceed in trying impeachments,” Nixon v 

United States, 506 US 224, 230; 113 S Ct 732; 122 L Ed 2d 1

(1993). Similarly, the language in MCL 600.5074(1),

stating that the arbitrator “shall hear and make an award 

on each issue submitted for arbitration,” does not 

constitute an implied limitation on the method by which the 

arbitrator might proceed in hearing the issues. (Emphasis

added.) 

4

 Court of Appeals Judge Kirsten Frank Kelly correctly

noted in her dissent: “[A]lthough the majority refers to

the process [used in this arbitration] as mediation, the

process was still binding; binding mediation is equivalent

to arbitration and subject to the same judicial limitations

on review. Frain v Frain, 213 Mich App 509, 511-513; 540

NW2d 741 (1995).” Miller, 264 Mich App 517-518. 

7
 
intended. AFSCME v Detroit, 468 Mich 388, 412; 662 NW2d 

695 (2003). 

Significantly, in this case, the parties specifically 

agreed to allow the arbitrator to conduct the hearing in 

two separate rooms. If the parties and the arbitrator 

thought that this was the best way to hold their hearing, 

they were at liberty to make that agreement. Because it is 

the agreement of the parties that dictates arbitration, the 

Court of Appeals should not have altered the agreement. 

Rowry, 441 Mich 10. 

THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE PARTIES’ WRITTEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT 

Plaintiff argued below that no written arbitration 

agreement existed in this case. Defendant disagreed. 

Although the Court of Appeals majority did not reach this 

issue directly, it listed as alternative grounds for 

possible relief that the stipulated order did not 

constitute a written arbitration agreement. Miller, 264 

Mich App 507 n 12. We disagree. 

As we noted earlier, the DRAA requires a written 

arbitration agreement setting out the subject of the 

arbitration and the arbitrator’s powers. MCL 600.5071 and 

MCL 600.5072(1)(e). Here, the parties entered into a 

written agreement satisfying these requirements when they 

8
 
 

stipulated to entry of the particularized order for binding 

arbitration that the court in due course entered. 

The order lists the issues for arbitration. It 

clearly delineates the arbitrator’s powers and duties. 

Accordingly, it is sufficient to satisfy the requirements 

of MCL 600.5071 and MCL 600.5072(1)(e).5 

Nothing in the DRAA mandates that there be an 

agreement separate from the stipulated order. This is 

consistent with the informal and sometimes unorthodox 

nature of arbitration. Gavin, 416 Mich 429. As long as 

the parties agree to some document that meets the minimal 

requirements of MCL 600.5071 and MCL 600.5072(1)(e), the 

agreement is sufficient. Therefore, we reverse the 

5

 In addition, but not relevant here, the parties must

satisfy MCL 600.5072(1)(a) to (d), which provide: 

The court shall not order a party to 

participate in arbitration unless each party to

the domestic relations matter acknowledges, in

writing or on the record, that he or she has been

informed in plain language of all of the 

following: 

(a) Arbitration is voluntary. 

(b) Arbitration is binding and the right of

appeal is limited. 

(c) Arbitration is not recommended for cases 

involving domestic violence. 

(d) Arbitration may not be appropriate in

all cases. 

9
 
 

decision of the Court of Appeals that reached the contrary 

conclusion. 

CONCLUSION 

We hold that the domestic relations arbitration act 

does not require that the formality of a hearing in 

arbitration proceedings approximate that of a hearing in 

court. Arbitration is by its nature informal. The 

appropriate structure for an arbitration hearing is best 

decided by the parties and the arbitrator. A procedure by 

which the arbitrator shuttles between the parties in 

separate rooms questioning and listening to them satisfies 

the act’s requirement of a hearing. 

We also hold that no written agreement beyond the 

order for binding arbitration is required (1) if the 

parties stipulate to entry of the order and the order meets 

the criteria of MCL 600.5071 and MCL 600.5072(1)(e), and 

(2) if the parties satisfy MCL 600.5072(1)(a) to (d) on the 

record. 

Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals and reinstate the arbitration award and the 

judgment of divorce. 

Clifford W. Taylor

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

 Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman 

10
 
_______________________________ 

v 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

DEBRA LEA MILLER, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

No. 127767 

JOHN THOMAS MILLER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

CAVANAGH, J. (concurring). 

I concur in the result reached by the majority for the 

reasons set forth in Renny v Port Huron Hosp, 427 Mich 415, 

437; 398 NW2d 327 (1986). 

Michael F. Cavanagh 
1