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2021 IL App (5th) 200037-U 

NO. 5-20-0037 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JOHN BUMPHUS, ) On petition for Direct

 ) Administrative Review of

Petitioner, ) an Order of the Illinois

 ) Human Rights Commission. 

 ) 

v. ) 

 ) 

ILLINOIS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, ) Charge No. 2016SR2090

ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN ) EEOC No. 440-2015-01744 

RIGHTS, and UNIQUE PERSONNEL ) ALS No. 16-0276 

CONSULTANTS, ) 

 ) 

 Respondents. . ) 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

 

JUSTICE BARBERIS delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Wharton and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.

 ORDER

¶ 1 Held: We affirm the decision of the Illinois Human Rights Commission that sustained the 

Illinois Department of Human Rights’ dismissal of petitioner’s discrimination 

charge for lack of jurisdiction. 

 

¶ 2 Petitioner, John Bumphus, filed a pro se petition for direct administrative review from a 

final decision of the Illinois Human Rights Commission (Commission), which sustained the 

decision of the Illinois Department of Human Rights (Department) dismissing Bumphus’s 

discrimination charge against respondent, Unique Personnel Consultants (Unique), for lack of 

jurisdiction. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).

NOTICE

Decision filed 02/26/21. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Petition for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.
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¶ 3 I. Background 

¶ 4 On August 6, 2015, Bumphus filed a pro se charge of discrimination with the United States 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that, on or about July 17, 2015, 

while working as a line production coordinator for Unique, he was denied a reasonable 

accommodation for his “disability related condition.” Bumphus further alleged that his 

employment was terminated after he provided Unique with a doctor’s note in support of his request 

for a reasonable accommodation, in violation of his civil rights under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) as amended (see 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (2012)). 

¶ 5 On December 21, 2015, while Bumphus’s discrimination charge remained pending before 

the EEOC, the Department purportedly sent Bumphus a letter advising that his charge of 

discrimination had been automatically filed with the Department. The letter further advised that 

Bumphus had 30 days from receipt of the EEOC’s findings to send a copy of the findings to the 

Department.

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¶ 6 On December 23, 2015, following an investigation, the EEOC sent Bumphus a letter of 

dismissal and notice of rights, advising that it had issued a determination on his charge of 

discrimination. In the letter, the EEOC explained that the information obtained during its 

investigation failed to establish violations of the statutes.2 

¶ 7 Several months later, on March 8, 2016, Bumphus sent the Department a request for 

investigation, along with a copy of the EEOC’s December 23, 2015, letter. Bumphus requested the 

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Neither the Department’s December 21, 2015, letter nor proof of service have been included in the record 

on appeal; however, the letter is described in other documents of record, including the Department’s investigation 

report, the Department’s response to Bumphus’s request for review, and the Commission’s order.

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Neither the EEOC’s December 23, 2015, letter of dismissal and notice of rights nor proof of service have 

been included in the record on appeal, but Bumphus acknowledges receipt of the letter in his opening brief. The letter

is also described in the Department’s response to Bumphus’s request for review and the Commission’s order. 
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Department to investigate the same charge of discrimination that had been dismissed by the 

EEOC.

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¶ 8 On March 22, 2016, prior to receiving a response from the Department, Bumphus filed a 

complaint against Unique, and other parties, in federal court. In the complaint, Bumphus alleged, 

inter alia, that Unique had discriminated against him in connection with their employment 

relationship by failing to accommodate his disability and by discharging him based on his 

disability.

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¶ 9 On April 12, 2016, the Department sent Bumphus a notice of dismissal for lack of 

jurisdiction. The Department also enclosed a copy of its investigation report, which provided as 

follows: 

“On August 6, 2015, Complainant [(Bumphus)] filed a charge with the [EEOC] 

alleging that a civil rights violation had been committed. On December 21, 2015, staff 

mailed Complainant a letter stating that Complainant’s charge was automatically filed with 

the Department and that Complainant had 30 days from receipt of [the] EEOC’s findings 

to send the Department a copy; the letter was not returned as undeliverable. On March 8, 

2016, Complainant submitted to the [Department] a copy of [the] EEOC’s findings. 

Section 7A-102(A-1)(1) of the Human Rights Act states that Complainant must 

submit to the Department a copy of the EEOC’s determination within 30 days after service 

on Complainant. Therefore, Complainant’s EEOC determination was not timely filed.” 

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A copy of Bumphus’s March 8, 2016, request for investigation is not included in the record but is mentioned 

in Bumphus’s July 14, 2016, request for review by the Commission of the Department’s dismissal and in the 

Department’s subsequent response to Bumphus’s request. 

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A copy of the Bumphus’s federal complaint has not been included in the record on appeal. A description of 

the lawsuit is contained in the parties’ briefs. Although Bumphus included a copy of the complaint in his “Appendix

A,” it does not appear that the parties have filed a stipulation, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 329 (eff. July 

1, 2017), or otherwise moved to supplement the record on appeal with the complaint. 

 
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The Department’s notice of dismissal further advised Bumphus that the filing deadline for review 

by the Commission was July 18, 2016. 

¶ 10 On July 14, 2016, Bumphus filed with the Commission a request for review of the 

Department’s dismissal. In the request for review, Bumphus admitted that he “submitted to the 

[Department] a copy of the EEOC Notice of Right to Sue” but failed to timely file a copy of the 

EEOC’s determination to the Department. Bumphus provided the following explanation: 

“On December 21, 2015, staff mailed the legally unrepresented pro se Complainant 

a letter stating that Complainant’s charge was automatically filed with the [Department] 

and that Complainant had 30 days from receipt of [the] EEOC’s findings to send the 

[Department] a copy; the legally unrepresented pro se Complainant, upon receipt of the 

[Department] letter, contacted the [Department] Pre-Investigations Coordinator by 

telephone, and erroneously misunderstood that the ‘EEOC findings’ was a reference to the 

EEOC case information file ***. On January 13, 2016, after having not yet received the 

aforementioned case information file, the unrepresented pro se Complainant contacted 

James F. Neely, Jr., Director of the St. Louis District Office of the EEOC, and formally

requested, under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 522, the full 

disclosure of all previously unreleased information and documents controlled by that office 

pertaining to the above-mentioned charge. On February 22, 2016, the St. Louis, Missouri, 

EEOC formally and electronically released the file *** to the unrepresented pro se

Complainant ***. The unrepresented pro se complainant was then, again, erroneously 

under the mistaken impression that he had 30 days from the February 22, 2016 date to 

download, print, and deliver the entire EEOC electronic release. Accordingly, while in the

process of trying to download, compile and coordinate for mailing the contents of his 
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EEOC case file for ‘timely’ forwarding to the [Department], he subsequently again 

contacted the [Department] Pre-Investigations Coordinator by telephone, to inquire as to 

whether, or not, the EEOC transmission could simply be forwarded, to meet the findings 

presentation requirement. It was then explained, to the unrepresented pro se Claimant’s 

embarrassed chagrin, that the EEOC Notice of Right to Sue, which he had already received 

on December 23, 2015, was the only required document for the [Department] investigation 

to commence. On March 8, 2016, the unrepresented pro se Claimant submitted to the 

[Department] a copy of the EEOC Notice of Right to Sue.” 

Additionally, after alleging several substantive reasons as to why his charge had merit, and, 

therefore, should not have been dismissed, Bumphus stated the following: 

“On March 22, 2016, the disabled unrepresented pro se Claimant filed Case No.: 

16-3 12-SMY-DGW, as a pro se Plaintiff in the East St. Louis, Illinois Office of United 

States Federal District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. Federal District Court 

Judge Staci M. Yandle has stated, in her April 14, 2016[,] Memorandum and Order, that a 

preliminary review of the pro se Plaintiff disabled unrepresented pro se Claimant’s 

Complaint found that it sets forth sufficient facts to state a plausible claim. The disabled 

unrepresented pro se Claimant is concerned that his applicable standing for claims against 

the Respondent, and their hired agency entities, under Illinois State Law might be at risk 

of being lost if his [Department] case is relinquished, withdrawn, or dismissed.”

¶ 11 On March 20, 2019, after receiving the Department’s response to Bumphus’s request for 

review and Bumphus’s reply to the Department’s response, the Commission entered an order 

sustaining the Department’s dismissal of Bumphus’s charge of discrimination for lack of 
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jurisdiction. Bumphus subsequently filed a petition for direct administrative review of the 

Commission’s order.5

¶ 12 II. Analysis 

¶ 13 Before turning to the merits, we note that Bumphus failed to comply with the briefing

requirements set forth in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. May 25, 2018). For instance, in

violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(6) (eff. May 25, 2018), Bumphus’s statement of 

facts fails to reference the appropriate pages of the record and contains improper argument and 

ardent comments. Also, in violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018), 

Bumphus refers to matters outside of the record. 

¶ 14 Although proceeding pro se on appeal, Bumphus is nonetheless required to comply with 

our supreme court rules. See Ammar v. Schiller, DuCanto & Fleck, LLP, 2017 IL App (1st) 

162931, ¶ 16. We may strike a brief and dismiss the appeal for failure to comply with the rules. 

Marzano v. Department of Employment Security, 339 Ill. App. 3d 858, 861 (2003). However, 

striking an appellate brief “is a harsh sanction and is appropriate only when the violations of 

procedural rules hinder our review.” Hall v. Naper Gold Hospitality LLC, 2012 IL App (2d) 

111151, ¶ 15. Because we have the benefit of a shorter, albeit incomplete, record on appeal, and 

we have cogent briefs with proper citations to the record from Unique and the State (the 

Commission and the Department), we choose to entertain the appeal. See Twardowski v. Holiday 

Hospitality Franchising, Inc., 321 Ill. App. 3d 509, 511 (2001) (despite insufficiency in appellant’s 

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Bumphus originally filed a petition for direct administrative review in the Second District Appellate Court

on April 24, 2019. On that court’s own motion, the appeal was transferred to the Fifth District Appellate Court because 

the alleged civil rights violations occurred in the Fifth District, and the venue provision of the Illinois Human Rights 

Act provides that “[p]roceedings for judicial review shall be commenced in the appellate court for the district wherein 

the civil rights violation which is the subject of the Commission’s order was allegedly committed.” 775 ILCS 5/8-

111(B)(3) (West 2018). 
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brief, the reviewing court entertained the appeal where the intended issues could be “readily 

ascertained from the record on appeal”). We now turn to the merits. 

¶ 15 We find it necessary to begin our analysis by clarifying the issue before this court. On 

direct administrative review, Bumphus challenges the Commission’s order sustaining the 

Department’s dismissal of his discrimination charge for lack of jurisdiction. Where, as here, the 

Department dismisses a charge as untimely filed, a petitioner may request review of that dismissal 

by the Commission. 775 ILCS 5/8-103(A)(1) (West 2018). A final decision by the Commission is 

subject to direct administrative review by this court. Id. § 8-111(B)(1). Our review in this matter 

is limited to the Commission’s decision; thus, we will not review the Department’s decision. 

Truger v. Department of Human Rights, 293 Ill. App. 3d 851, 858 (1997). In addition, we are 

limited to considering the evidence contained in the administrative record and may not hear 

additional evidence for or against the agency’s decision. Marconi v. Chicago Heights Police 

Pension Board, 225 Ill. 2d 497, 532 (2006). 

¶ 16 A charge of discrimination alleges a civil rights violation, as defined in section 6-101(A) 

of the Illinois Humans Right Act (Act). 775 ILCS 5/6-101(A) (West 2016). The Act is the 

“exclusive source for redress of civil rights violations.” Village of Maywood Board of Fire & 

Police Commissioners v. Department of Human Rights, 296 Ill. App. 3d 570, 581 (1998). Except 

for limited exceptions not relevant to the disposition of this case, the Commission is vested with 

exclusive jurisdiction over the subject of alleged civil rights violations. 775 ILCS 5/8-111(D) 

(West 2018). Moreover, because the Department is an administrative agency, any action it takes 

must be specifically authorized by statute. Ferrari v. Department of Human Rights, 351 Ill. App. 

3d 1099, 1103 (2004). An administrative body that acts outside its statutory authority does so 

without jurisdiction. Id.
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¶ 17 Section 7A-102(A-1)(1)(iv) of the Act provides that “the complainant must submit a copy 

of the EEOC’s determination within 30 days after service of the determination by the EEOC on 

complainant.” 775 ILCS 5/7A-102(A-1)(1)(iv) (West 2018). It is well settled that “compliance 

with [a] statutory time limit is a condition precedent to the right to seek a remedy” before an 

administrative body, and that it is a prerequisite to the acquisition of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Weatherly v. Human Rights Comm’n, 338 Ill. App. 3d 433, 437 (2003); see also Pickering v. 

Human Rights Comm’n, 146 Ill. App. 3d 340, 352 (1986) (an administrative agency, like a court 

of limited jurisdiction, can only act “pursuant to the authority conferred on it by statute”).

¶ 18 Here, Bumphus concedes, and the record confirms, that he sent a “late and untimely” copy 

of the EEOC’s December 23, 2015, determination to the Department on March 8, 2016, well past 

the 30-day deadline required by the Act. Because compliance with a statutory time limit is a 

prerequisite to the acquisition of subject matter jurisdiction, the Commission properly determined 

that the Department lacked jurisdiction to review the charge. 

¶ 19 Despite this, Bumphus requests that the Commission’s decision sustaining the 

Department’s dismissal be reversed and the matter remanded for an investigation of his 

discrimination charge. In support, Bumphus argues—for the first time on appeal—that, pursuant 

to section 7A-102(G)(4) of the Act (775 ILCS 5/7A-102(G)(4) (West 2016)), the Department’s 

administrative proceedings should have been stayed after he filed his federal lawsuit on March 22, 

2016. 

¶ 20 As noted, Bumphus relies on section 7A-102(G)(4) of the Act (id.), which was in effect 

at the time he filed his federal civil rights lawsuit against Unique and other parties.6 Section 7A102(G)(4) stated that “[t]he Department shall stay any administrative proceedings under this 

6

Section 7A-102(G)(4) of the Act was amended by Public Act 100-1066, § 5 (eff. Aug. 24, 2018). See 775 

ILCS 5/7A-102 (West 2018).
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Section after the filing of a civil action by or on behalf of the aggrieved party under any federal or 

State law seeking relief with respect to the alleged civil rights violation.” Id. 

¶ 21 Ordinarily, an administrative agency’s decision is entitled to deference; however, the 

amount of deference afforded to the administrative agency’s decision depends upon whether the 

question presented is a question of fact, a question of law, or a mixed question of law and fact.

Marconi, 225 Ill. 2d at 532. An agency’s rulings on questions of law are reviewed de novo. City 

of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 205 (1998). Similarly, the 

determinative issue before us presents a purely legal question for which our review is de novo. See 

Figueroa v. Deacon, 404 Ill. App. 3d 48, 52 (2010) (“Whether there is substantial compliance with 

a statutory provision is a question of law and our review is de novo.”). 

¶ 22 Here, the Commission properly sustained the Department’s dismissal for lack of 

jurisdiction without considering whether the administrative proceedings should have been stayed 

pursuant to section 7A-102(G)(4). We reiterate that, although Bumphus filed a federal civil rights 

lawsuit against Unique prior to the Department’s dismissal, Bumphus’s failure to timely send a 

copy of the EEOC’s determination to the Department was a necessary prerequisite to establishing 

the Department’s jurisdiction. Thus, the Department was not authorized from the outset to start its 

investigation of Bumphus’s charge, and there were no administrative proceedings that could 

arguably be stayed under section 7A-102(G)(4). Thus, Bumphus’s contention fails. 

¶ 23 Moreover, as the State correctly notes, Bumphus failed to raise this issue before the 

Commission. The record is devoid of any evidence that Bumphus notified the Department of the 

federal lawsuit or requested the Department to enter a stay. While Bumphus asserts in his reply 

brief that he notified the Commission of his general concern that his “applicable standing for 

claims against [r]espondent *** might be at risk of being lost if his [Department] case is 
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relinquished, withdrawn, or dismissed,” none of Bumphus’s filings with the Commission assert 

that the proceedings should have been stayed. Moreover, none of Bumphus’s filings with the 

Commission reference section 7A-102(G)(4) of the Act. Thus, we find Bumphus waived review

of the issue. See Smith v. Department of Professional Regulation, 202 Ill. App. 3d 279, 287 (1990) 

(“The waiver rule specifically requires first raising an issue before the administrative tribunal 

rendering a decision from which an appeal is taken to the courts.”); see also Texaco-Cities Service 

Pipeline Co. v. McGaw, 182 Ill. 2d 262, 278 (1998) (arguments not raised before the administrative 

agency will not be considered for the first time on administrative review). 

¶ 24 Lastly, we note that Unique asserts in its brief that, because Bumphus’s petition for direct 

administrative review is frivolous, this court should impose sanctions. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 

375(b) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) states, inter alia, that: “A reviewing court may impose a sanction upon 

a party or an attorney for a party upon the motion of another party or parties, or on the reviewing 

court’s own initiative where the court deems it appropriate.” Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 

137(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018), a court may grant sanctions under two different circumstances: 

“(1) when a pleading, motion, or other paper is not well grounded in fact or is not warranted by 

existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, 

or (2) when it is interposed for purposes such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 

increase in the cost of litigation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Stefanski, 377 Ill. 

App. 3d 548, 551 (2007). We note that Unique did not file a motion for sanctions in this matter. 

Additionally, after careful consideration of the briefs, the record, and the proceedings in this court,

we decline to sanction Bumphus on our own initiative. We simply do not view Bumphus’s request 

for direct administrative review, taken as a whole, as not warranted in a good-faith argument for 

extension of section 7A-102(G)(4) of the Act (775 ILCS 5/7A-102(G)(4) (West 2016)) or that his 
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primary purpose was to “delay, harass, or cause needless expense” (Ill. S. Ct. R. 375(b) (eff. Feb. 

1, 1994)).

¶ 25 III. Conclusion 

¶ 26 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Commission’s March 20, 2019, order sustaining 

the Department’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of Bumphus’s discrimination charge.

¶ 27 Affirmed.