COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Bumgardner 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

ROBERT C. LIGHTBURN 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2445-97-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 APRIL 14, 1998 

SHEILA JONES LIGHTBURN 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MADISON COUNTY 

Lloyd C. Sullenberger, Judge 

 D. Michael Atkins (McClure, Callaghan & 

Atkins, on briefs), for appellant. 

 J. Barrett Jones (Jones & Green, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 Robert C. Lightburn ("husband") appeals the trial court's 

awards of equitable distribution, spousal support, and attorney 

fees in his divorce from Sheila Jones Lightburn ("wife"). For 

the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

 I. 

 EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION 

 Husband contends that the trial court erred when it 

considered the factors of Code § 20-107.3(E) to determine its 

award of equitable distribution. He argues that the trial court 

misapplied Code § 20-107.3(E)(3) regarding the "duration of the 

marriage" and Code § 20-107.3(E)(6) regarding the manner in which 

the marital property was acquired. He also argues that the 

evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's factual 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
- 2 - 

finding regarding wife's non-monetary contributions to the 

well-being of the family. We disagree. 

 Following this Court's reversal of its initial decision to 

award wife one-half of the value of the marital residence, the 

trial court reconsidered the factors of Code § 20-107.3 and 

awarded wife approximately one-third of the property's value. 

 Code § 20-107.3, which governs awards of equitable 

distribution, "is intended to recognize a marriage as a 

partnership and to provide a means to divide equitably the wealth 

accumulated during and by that partnership based on the monetary 

and non-monetary contributions of each spouse." Williams v. 

Williams, 4 Va. App. 19, 24, 354 S.E.2d 64, 66 (1987). "Where an 

equitable distribution is appropriate, then all of the provisions 

of Code § 20-107.3 must be followed." Artis v. Artis, 4 Va. App. 

132, 136, 354 S.E.2d 812, 814 (1987). After classifying and 

valuing all of the property at issue, the court may order the 

division or transfer, or both, of jointly owned marital property 

or grant a monetary award to either party. See Code 

§ 20-107.3(A), (C), (D). The court must determine the amount of 

its award of any of these remedies "upon the factors listed in 

[Code § 20-107.3(E)]." Code § 20-107.3(C), (D). Subject to 

these enumerated statutory factors, "[t]his division or transfer 

of jointly owned marital property and the amount of any monetary 

award . . . is within the sound discretion of the trial court." 

Dietz v. Dietz, 17 Va. App. 203, 216, 436 S.E.2d 463, 471 (1993). 
- 3 - 

 Although, when making an equitable distribution decision, the 

trial court is not required to quantify the weight given to each 

factor or to weigh each factor equally, its considerations must 

be supported by the evidence. See Marion v. Marion, 11 Va. App. 

659, 664, 401 S.E.2d 432, 436 (1991). 

 First, we hold that the trial court's consideration of the 

duration of the marriage under Code § 20-107.3(E)(3) was not 

erroneous. The duration of the marriage is only one of numerous 

factors that a trial court is required to weigh when determining 

its award of equitable distribution. See Theismann v. Theismann, 

22 Va. App. 557, 565, 471 S.E.2d 809, 812, aff'd en banc, 23 Va. 

App. 697, 479 S.E.2d 534 (1996). In its opinion letter, the 

trial court did not expressly indicate how it weighed the short 

duration of the parties' marriage in its overall analysis. 

However, unlike its earlier award of equitable distribution, the 

trial court did not consider the relationship between the short 

duration of the marriage and wife's "hardships . . . from the 

divorce," such as "the expenses associated with relocating and 

the interruption of her private counseling practice," in 

determining the amount of its monetary award. Lightburn v. 

Lightburn, 22 Va. App. 612, 620, 472 S.E.2d 281, 285 (1996). 

Although the trial court considered wife's non-monetary 

contribution of joining the family in Madison County in 

determining its award of equitable distribution, it reserved its 

consideration of the negative effects of her quick return to 
- 4 - 

Blacksburg for the issue of spousal support. Based on our review 

of the record and the trial court's award, we cannot say that its 

consideration of Code § 20-107.3(E)(3) was flawed. Cf.

Theismann, 22 Va. App. at 565, 471 S.E.2d at 812-13. 

 Next, we hold that the trial court's consideration of "how 

and when" the marital residence was acquired under Code 

§ 20-107.3(E)(6) was not erroneous. The record indicates that, 

about ten months after the parties were married, husband arranged 

to have a 10.474-acre tract of his farm, which included the 

marital residence, parceled off and retitled to husband and wife 

as tenants by the entirety. Husband previously conceded that 

this transaction constituted a gift to wife and had the effect of 

transmuting the marital residence into "marital property" for the 

purposes of equitable distribution. See Lightburn, 22 Va. App. 

at 617, 472 S.E.2d at 283. The "gifted status" of specific items 

of marital property is relevant to the trial court's 

consideration of Code § 20-107.3(E)(6) and (10). See Theismann, 

22 Va. App. at 568-69, 471 S.E.2d at 814. Although, when 

warranted by the evidence, a trial court has discretion to award 

all or most of the gifted property's value to the donor spouse, 

Code § 20-107.3 does not compel such an award. See id. at 568, 

471 S.E.2d at 814. The trial court's opinion letter indicates 

that it carefully considered the gifted status of the marital 

residence in fashioning its award. The record does not indicate 

that this consideration was erroneous or that the decision to 
- 5 - 

award wife one-third of the value of this gifted property was an 

abuse of discretion. 

 Finally, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support 

the trial court's factual finding regarding wife's non-monetary 

contribution to the family. The evidence regarding the personal 

and professional concessions made by wife to join husband at the 

marital residence and the associated practical inconveniences was 

sufficient to support the trial court's finding that her 

relocation constituted a significant non-monetary contribution to 

the well-being of the family. 

 II. 

 SPOUSAL SUPPORT 

 Husband challenges the trial court's award of spousal 

support on two grounds. He contends that the trial court erred 

when it (1) concluded that wife was entitled to spousal support 

and (2) applied the factors of Code § 20-107.1 to determine the 

amount of its award. We disagree. 

 "The determination of whether a spouse is entitled to 

support and of the amount of that support is a matter committed 

to the sound discretion of the trial court." Theismann, 22 Va. 

App. at 572, 471 S.E.2d at 816. "'When the record discloses that 

the trial court considered all of the statutory factors, the 

court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal' absent a clear 

abuse of discretion." Id. (quoting Gamble v. Gamble, 14 Va. App. 

558, 574, 421 S.E.2d 635, 644 (1992)). 
- 6 - 

 We hold that the trial court did not err when it determined 

that wife was entitled to spousal support. 

 Where [a] wife has established her need for 

support and the husband's ability to provide 

it, and she was not shown to be guilty of 

misconduct entitling her husband to a 

divorce, the chancellor abuse[s] his 

discretion when he denie[s] the wife support 

and maintenance. 

Hodges v. Hodges, 2 Va. App. 508, 514, 347 S.E.2d 134, 137 (1986) 

(citing Rowand v. Rowand, 215 Va. 344, 346, 210 S.E.2d 149, 

150-51 (1974)). Husband, who had a net worth of well over three 

million dollars and substantial income from a multitude of 

investments, does not contend that the record failed to establish 

his ability to provide support. Regarding wife's needs, the 

trial court found that "wife had suffered substantial economic 

detriment" as a result of her move to Madison County and that her 

net worth was "practically nothing." Contrary to husband's 

assertion, the record contains ample support for both of these 

findings. Based on wife's lost opportunity to continue working 

as an employee of St. Albans Psychiatric Hospital, her reduced 

income and negative cash flow following the parties' separation, 

and her comparatively minuscule net worth, we cannot say that the 

trial court erred when it concluded that she was in need of 

spousal support. 

 We also hold that the trial court's determination of the 

amount of spousal support was not an abuse of discretion. "In 

fixing the amount of the spousal support award, a review of all 
- 7 - 

of the factors contained in Code § 20-107.1 is mandatory, and the 

amount awarded must be fair and just under all of the 

circumstances." Gamble, 14 Va. App. at 574, 421 S.E.2d at 644. 

"[W]hen the record discloses that the [trial] court has 

considered all of the statutory factors, its ruling will not be 

disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion." Lambert 

v. Lambert, 10 Va. App. 623, 628, 395 S.E.2d 207, 210 (1990). 

The trial court's opinion letter indicates that, following the 

hearing on remand, it carefully considered all of the factors of 

Code § 20-107.1, including the sharply contrasting financial 

conditions of the parties, the reduction in wife's award of 

equitable distribution, and her tax liability for any spousal 

support she received. 

 We disagree with husband that the trial court's 

consideration of the duration of the marriage was inappropriate 

or that it considered at all the "emotional difficulties" 

encountered by wife as a result of her successive relocations. 

In our previous consideration of this case, we held that wife's 

hardships from the divorce, which were "exacerbated" by the short 

duration of the parties' marriage, "were appropriate 

considerations for spousal support." Lightburn, 22 Va. App. at 

620, 472 S.E.2d at 285. In light of this directive and the 

evidence in the record regarding the financial ramifications of 

wife's departure from and then return to the Blacksburg area, we 

cannot say that the trial court's consideration of the duration 
- 8 - 

of the marriage was erroneous. Moreover, the trial court's 

finding does not indicate that it gave any consideration to the 

"emotional" difficulties associated with wife's relocations. 

Rather, when read in context with its statement regarding the 

"substantial economic detriment" encountered by wife, the trial 

court's finding indicates that it considered only the financial 

and practical problems that confronted wife because of her 

back-to-back moves. 

 III. 

 ATTORNEY FEES 

 We disagree with husband's contention that the trial court 

erred when it awarded attorney fees to wife and not to him. "An 

award of attorney fees is a matter submitted to the trial court's 

sound discretion and is reviewable on appeal only for an abuse of 

discretion." Graves v. Graves, 4 Va. App. 326, 333, 357 S.E.2d 

554, 558 (1987). The key to a proper award of attorney fees is 

"reasonableness under all of the circumstances." McGinnis v. 

McGinnis, 1 Va. App. 272, 277, 338 S.E.2d 159, 162 (1985). Based 

on the circumstances and equities of this case, including each 

parties' needs, abilities, resources, and the course and outcome 

of these lengthy proceedings, we cannot say that the trial 

court's award of $14,500 of wife's attorney fees was an abuse of 

discretion. Wife's request for additional attorney fees is 

denied. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's 
- 9 - 

awards of equitable distribution, spousal support, and attorney 

fees. 

 Affirmed.