SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-2706-22 

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

APPEAL OF THE DENIAL 

OF LOUIS J. LUCZU 

APPLICATION FOR FIREARMS 

PURCHASER ID CARD AND/OR 

HANDGUN PURCHASE PERMIT. 

_____________________________

Argued January 8, 2024 – Decided July 17, 2024 

Before Judges DeAlmeida and Berdote Byrne. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. 

GPA-0014-22.

Allan Marain argued the cause for appellant Louis J. 

Luczu. 

Nancy Hulett, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause 

for respondent State of New Jersey (Yolanda Ciccone, 

Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney; Nancy Hulett, 

of counsel and on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

Louis J. Luczu appeals from the trial court's order dated April 11, 2023, 

affirming the denial of his application for a Firearms Purchaser ID Card (FPIC) 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-2706-22

and Handgun Purchase Permit (HPP, together with the FPIC "the application"). 

Luczu claims the trial court erred because: (1) he presented "satisfactory proof" 

within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3) to show his alcoholism is not a 

disqualifying disability; (2) he does not meet the definition of an alcoholic as 

defined in subsection (c)(3); and (3) denial of his application violated his Second 

Amendment right as expressed in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 

U.S. 1 (2022). Having reviewed his arguments in light of applicable legal 

principles, we affirm. 

I.

On February 4, 2022, Luczu applied for an initial FPIC and a HPP with 

the East Brunswick Police Department. On his application, Luczu answered 

"yes" when asked if he was an alcoholic. There is also a handwritten "yes" and 

a typed "no" next to the following question which asked: "[h]ave you ever been 

confined or committed to a mental institution or hospital for treatment or 

observation of a mental or psychiatric condition on a temporary, interim, or 

permanent basis?" As part of standard procedure, Luczu was subjected to 

various background checks into his criminal, domestic-violence, and motor 

vehicle history. 
3 A-2706-22

The background checks revealed three investigation reports, all from an 

eight-day period in 1992. The first report documented a domestic incident that 

September involving terroristic threats. The second incident occurred two days 

later and was "another type of domestic violence harassment issue," which 

violated an existing restraining order. The third report documented a violation 

of a restraining order and occurred one week after the second incident. Of 

particular note to the Department were Luczu's suicidal threats and heavy 

drinking, which indicated he "would take action upon himself or others" if he 

drank heavily. This demonstrated to the Department that Luczu should not have 

a weapon because he posed a risk to the public health, safety and welfare. The 

Department denied Luczu's application pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5), 

finding issuance of the permit would be contrary to public health, safety and 

welfare. Luczu appealed to the Law Division. 

On March 23, 2023, the trial court heard Luczu's appeal of the 

Department's denial of his application. Detective Julia Lancos testified on 

behalf of the Department. 

Lancos stated, as part of the application process, Luczu needed to answer 

a series of questions, one of which inquired into whether he was an alcoholic. 

Because appellant answered in the affirmative, it was a factor the Department 
4 A-2706-22

considered in reviewing his application. Lancos testified as to the three 

investigation reports discovered during appellant's background check. Lancos 

noted the first report stated Luczu's then-girlfriend called the police because he 

was drinking, acting violently, and discussing suicide. He was taken to South 

Amboy Hospital and while there, he called his girlfriend and told her "she would 

pay for what she did to him[,] and he would make sure she rots in hell." The 

second report described how Luczu knocked on the door of his girlfriend's 

house, in violation of a restraining order. The third report detailed how Luczu 

sent a dozen roses to the victim a week after he violated the restraints. 

These incidents – involving heavy drinking, suicidal threats, and a stay at 

a mental health facility – formed the basis of the denial of the application as it 

relates to public health, safety and welfare. This concern was bolstered by 

Luczu's admission he was an alcoholic. 

Luczu testified on his own behalf. He stated he went to a clinic in 1992 

but has been sober for thirty-one years. Luczu joined and is still a member of 

Alcoholics Anonymous (AA). He testified he has a sponsor with whom he 

communicates once a month, although he admitted this was "not enough." 

Luczu testified he was unaware of any restraining orders entered against him. 

When asked if he was subject to a no-contact order rather than a restraining 
5 A-2706-22

order, he was equally uncertain. Despite his uncertainty, Luczu did not dispute 

the reports' accuracy. 

On cross-examination, Luczu acknowledged alcoholism was a lifelong 

disease that could not be cured but only controlled. He also testified he 

responded honestly when he described himself as an alcoholic on his 

application. 

At the conclusion of testimony, the court found Luczu did not contest the 

truthfulness of the investigative reports uncovered during his background check. 

It expressed concern that he did not recall the restraining order. It further found 

Luczu truthfully testified about his alcoholism and that, despite thirty-one years 

of sobriety, he acknowledged alcoholism was "a disease that will remain with 

him for the rest of his life." With that in mind, the court relied upon N.J.S.A. 

2C:58-3(c)(3) as it existed at that time, which precluded issuance of a gun permit 

to an alcoholic unless that person produces a certificate from a medical doctor, 

treatment provider, or psychiatrist licensed in New Jersey, or other satisfactory 

proof, that he is no longer suffering from that particular disability in a manner 

that would interfere with or handicap that person in the handling of firearms. 

 Based on N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3), the trial court found appellant had failed 

to demonstrate or present evidence he no longer suffered from alcoholism, and 
6 A-2706-22

although it appears he has been successful in recovery, the statute was clear that 

alcoholism is a disqualifier. The Law Division denied Luczu's appeal. This 

appeal followed. 

II. 

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(d) grants the "chief police officer of an organized fulltime police department of the municipality where the applicant resides" 

authority to issue a FPIC or HPP to any applicant deemed qualified after an 

informal investigation. In re M.U.'s Appeal of Denial of Application, 475 N.J. 

Super. 148, 172 (App. Div. 2023). A denied application may be appealed to the 

Superior Court, subject to a de novo hearing. Ibid. "Before the Law Division, 

'[t]he Chief has the burden of proving the existence of good cause for the denial 

by a preponderance of the evidence.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting In 

re Osworth, 365 N.J. Super. 72, 77 (App. Div. 2003)). 

 The Law Division applies a fact-sensitive analysis, and "should accept 

relevant testimonial and documentary evidence, including from the appellant 

and the police." Id. at 173. Hearsay may be considered and is admissible "if it 

is 'of a credible character— of the type which responsible persons are 

accustomed to rely upon in the conduct of their serious affairs.'" Ibid. (quoting 
7 A-2706-22

Weston v. State, 60 N.J. 36, 51 (1972)). Such evidence, however, is insufficient 

on its own to support the court's decision. Ibid. 

Our review of the trial court's denial of an application for a FPIC or HPP 

is limited. Id. at 171. We defer "to the trial court that heard the witnesses, sifted 

the competing evidence, and made reasoned conclusions." Ibid. (quoting 

Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015)). Legal interpretations 

and the consequences thereof are subject to de novo review. Ibid. (quoting Rowe 

v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019)). 

Initially we note, although Luczu focuses his arguments on the current 

definition of alcoholism in the statute, his application was initially denied on the 

basis of the Department's public health, safety and welfare concern, pursuant to 

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5), not N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3). And, although the trial 

court found Luczu disqualified on the basis of N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3), it 

correctly applied the language of the statute existing at that time. We recently 

observed that the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3 twice: the first 

amendment took effect on July 5, 2022, and the second amendment became 

effective on December 22, 2022. Id. at 194-195. The December 2022 

amendment "substantially changed the introductory paragraph" to section 

2C:58-3 and to section 3(c)(5) of the statute. Id. at 195. However, as we 
8 A-2706-22

concluded in M.U., "[t]he law favors prospective application" of laws. Ibid. 

(quoting James v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 216 N.J. 552, 556 (2014)). Applications 

submitted before the effective date of the amendments to the statute are 

evaluated using the prior version of the statute then in effect. Ibid. Thus, for 

purposes of reviewing Luczu's appeal before this court, the prior version of 

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3 (repealed by L. 2022, c. 131, §2, effective December 22, 2022) 

controls. This issue is critical because Luczu relies upon the current version of 

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3 to dispute the trial court's ruling. 

III. 

Luczu argues: (1) pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3), his thirty-one years 

of sobriety constitute "other satisfactory proof" he is no longer suffering from a 

disqualifying disability which would preclude him from obtaining a FPIC or 

HPP; (2) he does not meet the definition of an alcoholic as currently defined in 

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3); and (3) denial of his application violates his Second 

Amendment right to bear arms pursuant to Bruen. 

Luczu asserts there is no case law expounding upon what constitutes 

"other satisfactory proof" as used in N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3). However, Luczu 

did not produce evidence of consistent compliance with AA, such as sign-in 

sheets or testimony from his sponsor. He also stated he speaks with his sponsor 
9 A-2706-22

only once a month, which he admitted is not enough. It is undisputed Luczu 

failed to produce a certificate from a medical doctor or a psychiatrist. Thus, 

there is sufficient, credible evidence in the record that Luczu, having admitted 

to a statutory disqualifier, did not present sufficient "other satisfactory proof" 

he was no longer suffering from the disability. 

Luczu also argues he does not meet the definition of an alcoholic pursuant 

to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3) and thus his application cannot be denied on that basis. 

He directs us to the statutory definition of a "person with an alcohol use 

disorder," codified at N.J.S.A. 26:2B-8 and incorporated in N.J.S.A. 2C:58-

3(c)(3), which is 

any person who chronically, habitually, or periodically 

consumes alcoholic beverages to the extent that: a. 

such use substantially injures the person's health or 

substantially interferes with the person's social or 

economic functioning in the community on a 

continuing basis, or b. the person has lost the power of 

self-control with respect to the use of such beverages. 

[N.J.S.A. 26:2B-8.] 

Based upon that definition, he maintains he does not qualify as an alcoholic and,

hence, cannot be denied a FPIC or HPP pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3). 

Rather, he contends he is only an alcoholic "for AA purposes," because AA 
10 A-2706-22

requires him to admit to being an alcoholic. According to Luczu, "what he 

considers himself does not override" the statutory definition. 

Although the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3 several times, the 

substance of the law as it pertains to this appeal has not changed. The most 

recent alteration "replace[d] statutory terms regarding alcohol and substance 

use, alcoholism, addiction, drug addict, and similar terms with the terms 

'substance use disorder' and 'person with substance use disorder.'" S. Health, 

Human Servs. & Senior Citizens Comm. Statement to A. 5096 (June 15, 2023). 

Even applying this most recent version, Luczu is still prohibited from obtaining 

a FPIC or HPP unless he "produces a certificate of a medical doctor, treatment 

provider, or psychiatrist licensed in New Jersey, or other satisfactory proof," 

that his alcoholism would not interfere with or handicap his ability to handle 

firearms. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3). Luczu did not do this. The investigative 

reports detailed not only a history of alcoholism, but mental health treatment 

and suicidal ideation. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the 

requested credentials, given that Luczu did not present adequate medical 

evidence he no longer posed a threat to public health, safety and welfare. 

Secondly, Luczu attempts to minimize his own admission of being an 

alcoholic by relying upon arguments and evidence not considered by the trial
11 A-2706-22

court. He did not testify he considered himself an alcoholic solely for AA 

purposes, and did not testify his understanding of the term was predicated solely 

on AA's prerequisites.1

Simply because Luczu has maintained three decades of sobriety does not 

mean he could not be disqualified by N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3 after having admitted to 

a life-long, uncurable condition. Because he did not submit sufficient proof he 

no longer suffered from the condition to the extent public health, safety and 

welfare were impacted, we discern no error in the trial court's denial of the FPIC 

and HPP to him. 

With respect to Bruen, we "decline to consider questions or issues not 

properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation 

is available unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the 

trial court or concern matters of great public interest." Berardo v. City of Jersey 

City, 476 N.J. Super. 341, 354 (App. Div. 2023) (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)). 

Constitutional issues are not immune from this principle. State v. Garcia, 210 

1

 We do not consider the AA Frequently Asked Questions and Certificate of 

Eligibility to transfer ownership of a rifle or shotgun documents included in his 

appendix because it was not part of the record before the trial court. Bd. of 

Educ. of Clifton v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Clifton, 409 N.J. Super. 389, 

443 (App. Div. 2009). 
12 A-2706-22

N.J. 364, 383 (2012). Luczu failed to challenge the constitutionality of either 

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3) or (5) before the trial court and we decline to address it. 

Affirmed.