alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
##### 



UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
 Washington, D.C. 20549
 FORM 8-K
 CURRENT REPORT
 Pursuant to Section 13 OR 15(d) of The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
  INCO LIMITED
  CANADA
    
    1-1143
    
    98-0000676(Province or other jurisdiction of
    
    (Commission File Number)
    
    (I.R.S. Employer Identificationincorporation or organization)
    
    
    
    Number (if applicable))
 145 King Street West, Suite 1500,
Toronto, Ontario M5H 4B7
(416) 361-7511
 Form 8-K
 þ
    
    Written communications pursuant to Rule 425 under the Securities Act (17 CFR 230.425)o
    
    Soliciting material pursuant to Rule 14a-12 under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14a-12)o
    
    Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 14d-2(b) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR
240.14d-2(b))o
    
    Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 13e-4(c) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR
240.13e-4(c))




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##### 



Item 1.01 Entry into a Material Definitive Agreement.




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##### 



Important Legal Information




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##### 



INVESTORS AND SECURITYHOLDERS ARE URGED TO READ THE REGISTRATION STATEMENT AND ANY OTHER RELEVANT
DOCUMENTS FILED OR THAT WILL BE FILED WITH THE SEC WHEN THEY BECOME AVAILABLE BECAUSE THEY WILL
CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION. www.sec.gov
 Item 9.01. Financial Statements and Exhibits.
 2.1
    
    Support Agreement, dated as of October 10, 2005, between Inco Limited and Falconbridge
Limited.




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##### 



SIGNATURES
   INCO LIMITEDBy:
    Stuart F. FeinerStuart F. FeinerExecutive Vice-President,
General Counsel and Secretary




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##### 



EXHIBIT INDEX
 Exhibit
    
    Description2.1
    
    Support Agreement, dated as of October 10, 2005, between Inco
Limited and Falconbridge Limited
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-60701

Conference Calendar

 

EDDIE WHITE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

JAFER N. GHERAIBEH, Dr.,

Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 96-CV-182

- - - - - - - - - -

June 17, 1998

Before DAVIS, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Eddie White requests permission to proceed in forma pauperis

(IFP) on appeal so that he may appeal from the district court’s

denial of his request to proceed IFP. White’s motion for leave

to file brief in present form is GRANTED. 

To proceed IFP on appeal, White must demonstrate financial

eligibility and a nonfrivolous issue for appeal. Carson v.

Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 586 (5th Cir. 1982). An order denying IFP
No. 97-60701

-2-

is an appealable final decision. Flowers v. Turbine Support

Div., 507 F.2d 1242, 1244 (5th Cir. 1975). 

White’s complaint was subject to dismissal because there is

no subject-matter jurisdiction. White relies upon the “Privacy

Act of 1974". The Privacy Act of 1974, codified at 5 U.S.C.

§ 552a, requires agencies to keep accurate “systems of records”

on individuals. §§ 552a(a)(5), 552a(e). The Act does not apply

to White’s private physician.

White has not presented a nonfrivolous issue for appeal. 

His motion for leave to proceed IFP is DENIED, and the appeal is

DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS. See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20

(5th Cir. 1983); 5th Cir. R. 42.2. 

We caution White that any additional frivolous appeals filed

by him will invite the imposition of sanctions. To avoid

sanctions, White is further cautioned to review any pending

appeals to ensure that the appeals do not raise arguments that

are frivolous.

APPEAL DISMISSED. SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.
<PAGE>


                                 HOLLINGER INC.

                   COURT REMOVES PETER G. WHITE AS A DIRECTOR


TORONTO, ONTARIO, CANADA, JUNE 8, 2005 -- HOLLINGER INC. (TSX: HLG.C; HLG.PR.B)
announced that Mr. Justice Colin Campbell of the Ontario Superior Court of
Justice today ordered that Peter G. White be removed as a Director of Hollinger
effective immediately. The removal had been requested by the independent
Directors of Hollinger.

Hollinger's principal asset is its interest in Hollinger International Inc.
which is a newspaper publisher, the assets of which include the Chicago
Sun-Times, a large number of community newspapers in the Chicago area and a
portfolio of news media investments. Hollinger also owns a portfolio of
revenue-producing and other commercial real estate in Canada, including its head
office building located at 10 Toronto Street, Toronto, Ontario.



Media contact:
Larry Parnell
Hill & Knowlton
416-413-4623
larry.parnell@hillandknowlton.ca




                              www.hollingerinc.com
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          AUG-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAY-31-1998
<CASH>                                       3,130,845
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  535,242
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (10,000)
<INVENTORY>                                    595,185
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             4,264,365
<PP&E>                                         828,602
<DEPRECIATION>                               (771,842)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,398,204
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          367,343
<BONDS>                                         64,549
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       161,770
<OTHER-SE>                                   3,433,734
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,398,204
<SALES>                                      1,524,155
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,657,328
<CGS>                                          579,114
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,615,752
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               7,446
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              3,135,451
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          3,135,451
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 3,135,451
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .19
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .18
        

</TABLE>
* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 97-60262 Summary Calender

_______________

WILLIAM R. WILLIAMS

and ROBIN M. WILLIAMS,

Petitioners-Appellants,

VERSUS

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent-Appellee.

_________________________ Appeal from a Decision of the United States Tax Court

(20980-95)

_________________________
May 13, 1998

Before JONES, SMITH, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

William and Robin Wi lliams (“taxpayers”) appeal the Tax

Court's denial of their motion to vacate its decision. Finding no

abuse of discretion, we affirm.2 I.

The IRS notified taxpayers of a deficiency in the computation

of their income for tax years 1990 and 1991. The taxpayers filed

in the Tax Court a petition for a redetermination of the

deficiencies. Thereafter, the taxpayers and IRS entered into a

stipulation before the Tax Court, agreeing to the def iciencies

originally assessed; the Tax Court entered the stipulated decision.

About a month later, taxpayers retained new counsel, who

immediately filed a “motion for recons ideration and rehearing.”

The Tax Court, construing this as a motion to vacate under Tax

Court Rule 162, denied the motion.

II.

A.

We review the Tax Court's refusal to alter or amend its

judgment for an ab use of discretion. S ee Westbrook v.

Commissioner

, 68 F.3d 868, 874 (5th Cir. 1995). “This court on

review may reverse a discretionary denial by the Tax Court of postopinion motions only if there are shown to be 'extraordinary

circumstances' justifying reversal.” Wilson v. Commissioner , 500

F.2d 645, 648 (2d Cir. 1974) (citation omitted).

B.

Taxpayers' argume nt is based on the contention that their3

previous counsel misinformed them about the stipulation agreement

and that, in the stipulated judgment, they therefore were forced to

pay taxes on income they had not earned. For them, this constituted a per se “extraordi nary circumstance” that mandated

reopening the judgment.

We disagree. The taxpayers' first counsel's alleged,

unilateral error is not enough to grant relief from a stipulated

agreement. S ee Stamm Int'l Corp. v. Commissioner

, 90 T.C. 315,

321-22 (1988). “[T]he mistakes of counsel, who is the legal agent

of the client, are chargeable to the client.” P ryor v. Un ited

States Postal Serv.
, 769 F.2d 281, 288 (5th Cir. 1985) (citation

omitted). “Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent with our

system of representative litigation, in which each party is deemed

bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have

'notice of a ll facts, notice of which can be charged upon the

attorney.'” L ink v. Wabash R.R.
, 370 U.S. 626, 634 (1962) (quoting

Smith v. Ayer , 101 U.S. 320, 326 (1879)).

AFFIRMED.
#### In the Matter of Jayline R. and Another, Children Alleged to be Neglected. Jose M., Appellant; Administration for Children’s Services, Respondent.

[973 NYS2d 21]

Order, Family Court, Bronx County (Fernando H. Silva, J.), entered on or about October 18, 2012, which, upon a fact-finding determination that respondent neglected the subject children, inter alia, issued final orders of protection directing him to stay away from each of the children until their 18th birthdays, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

In light of respondent’s apparent refusal to accept the *420termination of his relationship with the children’s mother, as well as his obsessive and violent behavior in violation of the order of protection directing him to stay away from her, the court correctly concluded that its assistance, including the issuance of separate orders of protection for the children, was necessary to protect the children, and therefore correctly denied respondent’s motion to dismiss the neglect petition pursuant to Family Court Act § 1051 (c) *(see Matter of Sharnaza Q. [Clarence W.],*68 AD3d 436 [1st Dept 2009]; *compare Matter of Eustace B. [Shondella M.],*76 AD3d 428, 428 [1st Dept 2010]).

A preponderance of the evidence supports the court’s finding that respondent neglected the children by perpetrating acts of domestic violence against their mother in their presence *(see*Family Ct Act §§ 1012 [f] [i] [B]; 1046 [b] [i]; *Matter of Kelly*A. *[Ghyslaine G.],*95 AD3d 784 [1st Dept 2012]). The record shows that the children, particularly Jonel, observed respondent and the mother fighting on several occasions, and saw respondent strike the mother in the head and choke her, which caused the children to be frightened and upset. Respondent’s misconduct also extended to the children. The record shows that he forced Jonel to watch a pornographic movie, and threatened to shoot him in the head with a “fake” gun that looked real if he told his mother. There is also evidence of other instances of violence and inappropriate conduct toward the children. We see no reason to disturb the court’s evaluation of the evidence, including its credibility determinations *(see Matter of Ilene M.,*19 AD3d 106 [1st Dept 2005]).

The court’s finding that respondent was a person legally responsible for the children within the meaning of Family Court Act § 1012 (g) is supported by the evidence establishing that respondent, who had resided in the household as the mother’s boyfriend for a period of approximately nine months, picked the children up from school and cared for them during the day, while the mother worked. He described himself as a father figure to the children, and held himself out as the children’s babysitter or caregiver so as to be able to stay with them during the time when the family lived in a shelter after a fire destroyed the mother’s apartment *(see Matter of Yolanda D.,*88 NY2d 790, 796 [1996]; *Matter of Samantha M.,*56 AD3d 299 [1st Dept 2008], *lv denied*11 NY3d 716 [2009]). Concur — Friedman, J.P., Moskowitz, Richter, Manzanet-Daniels and Gische, JJ.
EXHIBIT 31.a

CERTIFICATE OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, David A. Nelson, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2008,
   of Regent Technologies, Inc. (the "Company");

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
   of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
   statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
   were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
   information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects
   the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Company
   as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. I, in my capacity as the Company's certifying officers, am responsible for
   establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
   in EXCHANGE ACT RULES 13a-15 and 15d-15) for the Company and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material
    information relating to the Company, including its consolidated subsidiary,
    is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the
    period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the Company's disclosure controls and
    procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this
    report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

(c) Presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
    disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation as of the
    Evaluation Date;

5. I, in my capacity as the Company's certifying officers, have disclosed,
   based on my most recent evaluation, to the Company's auditors and the audit
   committee of the Company's board of directors (or persons performing the
   equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal
    controls which could adversely affect the Company's ability to record,
    process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the
    Company's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
    employees who have a significant role in the Company's internal controls;
    and

6. I, in my capacity as the Company's certifying officers, have indicated
   in this report whether there were significant changes in internal controls
   or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls
   subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any
   corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material
   weaknesses.


Date: May 20, 2008                /S/ DAVID A. NELSON
                                      -------------------
                                      David A. Nelson, Chief Executive
                                      Officer and Principal Accounting Officer
(October 16, 2013)

#### Olatunde Bakare, Respondent, v Fontini Kakouras et al., Appellants.

[972 NYS2d 710]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the *839defendants appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Pineda-Kirwan, J.), entered February 6, 2013, as denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in accepting the plaintiff s untimely opposition papers, since the defendants were not prejudiced thereby *(see*CPLR 2004, 2214; *Lawrence v Celtic Holdings, LLC,*85 AD3d 874, 875 [2011]; *Vlassis v Corines,*254 AD2d 273, 273-274 [1998]).

The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident *(see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys.,*98 NY2d 345 [2002]; *Gaddy v Eyler,*79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff’s spine were not caused by the subject accident *(see Jilani v Palmer,*83 AD3d 786, 787 [2011]), and did not constitute serious injuries under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) *(see Staff v Yshua,*59 AD3d 614 [2009]).

In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he sustained serious injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of his spine that were caused by the accident (see *Perl v Meher,*18 NY3d 208, 215-218 [2011]). Therefore, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident. Mastro, J.P., Balkin, Sgroi and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 32.1





CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF
FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO EXCHANGE ACT RULE 13a-14(b) AND
18 U.S.C.  SECTION 1350



In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Lightning Gaming, Inc.
(the “Company”) for the year ended December 31, 2023, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”),
I certify as of the date hereof, solely for the purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code, to the
best of my respective knowledge, that:



(1)     the Report fully complies with
the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)     the information contained in
the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at the dates and
for the periods indicated.



A signed original of this written statement, or other document authenticating,
acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signatures that appear in typed form within the electronic versions of this written statement,
has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff
upon request.



This Certification has not been, and shall not be deemed, “filed”
with the Securities and Exchange Commission.



|Date: March 29, 2024 | By:    | /s/Brian Haveson       
|-------------------- | ------ | -----------------------
|                     | Name:  | Brian Haveson          
|                     | Title: | Chief Executive Officer





|Date: March 29, 2024 | By:    | /s/Brian Haveson       
|-------------------- | ------ | -----------------------
|                     | Name:  | Brian Haveson          
|                     | Title: | Chief Financial Officer
EX-35.1
(logo) Bank of America

Bank of America
475 CrossPoint Parkway
PO Box 9000
Getzville, NY 14068-9000


Annual Statement as to Compliance

Banc of America Funding 2007-3 Trust

I, H. Randall Chestnut, a Senior Vice President of Bank of America, National
Association (the "Servicer"), hereby certify pursuant to the Section 2.17 of
the Servicing Agreement, dated April 30, 2007 (the "Agreement"), between Banc
of America Funding Corporation, as Depositor, and the Servicer, that: (a) a
review of the Servicer's activities during calendar year 2007 and of the
Servicer's performance under the Agreement has been made under my supervision;
and (b) to the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has
fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects
throughout calendar year 2007.


March 26, 2008


Bank of America, N.A.
as Servicer

By: /s/ H. Randall Chestnut
Name: H. Randall Chestnut
Title: Senior Vice President
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose Juan SANDOVAL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 08-50697

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

May 27, 2009.

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Horatio R. Aldredge, IV, Federal Public Defender’s Office Western District of Texas, Austin, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before KING, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

*399PER CURIAM: *

Jose Juan Sandoval appeals from his conviction of illegal reentry following deportation. He contends that his sentence is not entitled to a presumption of reasonableness because it was calculated pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, which he argues is not supported by empirical evidence. He further contends that his sentence is unreasonable even if a presumption of reasonableness is applicable.

Sandoval’s contention that his sentence is not entitled to a presumption of reasonableness because the relevant guideline is not supported by empirical evidence is without merit. *See United States v. Mondragon-Santiago,*564 F.3d 357, 366-67 (5th Cir.2009). Sandoval’s sentence is presumptively reasonable. *See United States v. Alonzo,*435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir.2006). Moreover, the district court addressed the factors set out at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)— particularly the need to deter Sandoval from committing future offenses—when imposing the sentence. Sandoval has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness.

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

ALFONSO RAZZ,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D16-2400 

[February 7, 2018]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm 

Beach County; Glenn D. Kelley, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2014-CF-000570-

AXXX-MB.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Tatjana Ostapoff, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Georgina 

Jimenez-Orosa, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for 

appellee.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

PER CURIAM.

We deny appellant’s motion for rehearing and amended motion for 

rehearing, but withdraw our previously issued per curiam decision and 

substitute the following in its place. 

Affirmed. Taylor v. State, 114 So. 3d 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); contra

Lewars v. State, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D1098 (Fla. 2d DCA May 12, 2017), 

review granted, No. SC17-1002, 2017 WL 4022360 (Fla. Sept. 13, 2017).

GERBER, C.J., MAY and LEVINE, JJ., concur.