United States Court of App.eals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 97-1080

___________ Mamie Mullins, *
* Appellant, *
*
v. *
* Helena Hospital Association, doing * business as Helena Regional Medical * Appeal from the United States Center; Steve Reeder, Administrator, * District Court for the as Agent on behalf of HRMC; Gerald * Eastern District of Arkansas Hicks, Director of Personnel, as * Agent on behalf of HRMC; Ron * [UNPUBLISHED] Vinson, Administrator of the * Radiologist Department, as Agent on * behalf of HRMC and other Agents on * behalf of HRMC, *
* Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: December 15, 1997 Filed: February 11, 1998

___________ Bef ore McMILLIAN, BEAM, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD , Circuit Judges.

___________ McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.The Ho norable Elsijane Trimble Roy, United States District Judge for th e 1 Eastern District of Arkansas.

-2- Mamie Mullins appeal s pro se from the final judgment entered in the United States District Court for th e 1 Eastern District of Arkansas upon a jury verd ict in favor of her employer, Helena Hospital Association(Hospital), and several supervisory employees. Mullins brought he r actio n under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 , 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 , alle ging race discrimination in the terms of he r employment and discriminatory discharge. Mullins filed a timely not ice of appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), and we have juris diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. For reversal, Mullins ar gues the jury was required to return a verdict against the Hospital for discriminatory disch arge because Hospital e mployees offered contradictory testimony as to who d ecided to terminate Mullins, the basis for th e decision, and her exact termination date; she also claims the district court erroneously admitted into evidence a co-worker & s letter . For the reasons discussed below, w e affirm the judgment of the district court.

Mull ins, who is African-American, was an X-ra y tech nicianat the Hospital. Mullins complained to he r supervisor, defendant Ron Vinson, and the hum an resources director, defendant Gerald Hicks, about her employmen t conditions, including unequal pay and other t reatment she considered racially discriminatory. Dissatisfied wit h the response she received, in 1995 Mullins filed a written grievance with the Hospital administrator , defe ndant Steven Reeder. To the grievance, Mullin s atta ched a page from the personnel record of each o f-3-

th ree white employees; each page included the employee & s Social Security number and salary history.

Afte r receiving Mullins & s written grievance, Reede r aske d Hicks to investigate why Mullins possessed th e employee p ersonnel records. Hicks contacted Vinson, who disc overed that copies of the personnel records wer e miss ing from his files. Mullins told Hicks that co

worker Susan Winston had given her the person nel records. In a-4-

subsequent meeting, Vinson told Mullins he had tal ked with Wi nstonand she denied giving the personnel records t o Mullins, whereupon Mullins left the hospital, stating she needed a lawyer.

Mullins was suspended the next day, and Vinson an d Hicks subsequen tly recommended that Mullins be terminated based on her possession of the personnel records, together with “ other problems” she had during her employment

. Reeder decided to discharge Mullins. Mullins & s terminatio n notice and final evaluation form states she was di scharged fo r taking personnel records from the manager & s offic e without permission.

SusanWinston did not testify at trial. Before trial , th e district court denied Mullins & s motion in limine t o exclude a letter written by Winston, without prej udice to Mullins renewing her objection at trial. During trial , Hicks testified without objection that the letter state d “I, Susan Scott Winston, did not give Mamie Mullins an y personnel files or copies of any files. I had no personal invo lvement with Mamie during my two years of employmen t at [t he Hospital].” Hicks added that the letter wa s “used as part of the investigation” he conducted, and that ba sed on this letter and other evidence he recommende d Mullins be terminated. Defendants offered the let ter into evidenc e, and Mullins & s counsel objected on the basis o f hearsay and pre judice, noting the letter indicated it was faxed three days after Mullins & s termination notice date. Basedon Hicks & s testimony, the district court admitted th e le tter, ruling that Mullins could argue to the jury tha t the Hospital did not actually rely on it in terminatin g Mullins.-5-

This court will reverse the jury & s verdic t only if all of the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the Hospital “points one way and is susceptible of n o reasonable inferences sustainin g” the Hospital & s position. See Stanton v. Arkansas Valley Elec. Coop. Corp. , 49 F.3d 1317, 1319 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoted cases and interna l quotations omit ted). Applying this deferential standard, we find the evidence sufficiently-6-

supp orted the jury & s verdict. The Hospital presente d

ev idence--including witness testimony and Mullins & s terminationnotice--that the Hospital terminated Mullin s for ta king personnel records. Any minor evidentiar y discrepancies M ullins identifies did not require the jury to find her discharge was racially motivated. See Texa s Dep & t of Community Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 25 3 (198 1) (“ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fac t that the defendant intentionally discriminated aga inst the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff”).

We hold the district court did not abuse it s discretion in a dmitting the Winston letter. See Wolff v. Brown , 128 F.3d 682, 685 (8th Cir.1997) (standard o f review ). In an employment discrimination case, interna l documents upon which the employer relies for an em ployment decision are no t hearsay--statements offered to prove the truthof the matters asserted-- but are relevant an d admiss ible because they may help explain the employer' s actions. See id. ; see also Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Hick s expl ained the Hospital & s decision-making process an d testif ied unequivocally that he relied upon the Winsto n letter in recommending Mullins & s termination. Furthermore, ev en if we assume the letter was erroneously admit ted, Hicks read it to the jury without objectio n be fore it was offered into evidence, and therefore it s admission would not support reversal. Cf. Boone v . Moore , 980 F.2d 539, 542 (8th Cir.1992) (where at trial exper t readaudiologist & s report to the jury in open court withou t objec tion, report itself was cumulative evidence, an d
error in its admission as substantive evidence ove r hearsay objection was harmless).-7-

Acc ordingly, we affirm the judgment of the distric t court.
A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.