alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<SEQUENCE>13

                                  EXHIBIT 32.a


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

                                 18 U.S.C. 1350,

                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Regent Technologies, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2005, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, David A. Nelson, in my capacity as Chief Executive Officer and Principal
Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

                  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

                  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.


                                        /S/ DAVID A. NELSON
                                        -------------------
Date: September 14, 2005
                                        David A. Nelson,
                                        Chief Executive Officer and Principal
                                        Accounting Officer
#### The Georgia Pine Investment and Manufacturing Company *v.*Holton *et al.*

1. Although a deed may describe several lots of land as one tract, yet if in fact they do not lie adjacent so as to constitute one tract, actual possession of one of the lots will not be constructive possession of another of them which neither adjoins the former nor is connected with it by intervening lots covered by the deed.

2, On the facts in evidence there was no error in denying the injunction prayed for. *Judgment affirmed-.*

June 11, 1894.

Argued at the last term.

Petition for injunction. Before Judge Sweat. Appling county. February 6, 1894.

On January 20, 1894, the plaintiff corporation presented its petition to enjoin Holton and Hall from.boxing, cutting or working the timber on land lots 363 and 364 in the 5th district of Appling county. (See Acts 1885, p. 93 ; Acts 1887, p. 63; Acts 1889, p. 183.) Plaintiff' alleged that it was the true and lawful owner of the timber for turpentine purposes on said lots, to which *552privilege it had a perfect title; and that defendants had entered upon the lots and were engaged in boxing and working the timber for turpentine purposes, without any right to do so, to plaintiff’s damage, etc. The title relied on by plaintiff rested upon a claim of possession for seven or more years under color of title. There was no allegation of insolvency or that the damage would be irreparable. Defendants denied the allegations of the petition, and set up a *bona fide*claim of title to the lots under a chain of deeds. Plaintiff introduced a number of deeds and leases, among them a deed made in December, 1888, and recorded in April, 1884, conveying many lots in Appling and other counties, including the two lots in question. It did not appear that plaintiff' or those under whom it holds had held actual possession of either of these two lots. The extent of actual possession for as much as seven years had been over other lots covered by the deed, which did not adjoin these two, and were not connected with them by intervening lots covered by the deed. Plaintiff had actual possession of lots which do adjoin the two in question, for a few months and before defendants took actual possession of these two in November, 1893. Plaintiff had operated a railroad since 1886, which ran through the 5th district of Appling county; and had paid taxes on all the property covered by the deed since it was made. The injunction was denied. ' '

L. A. Wilson and J. C. McDonald, for plaintiff.

E. D. Graham, by Harrison & Peeples, *contra.*
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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
COMPANY'S FORM 10-Q FILED FOR THE PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 1996 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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</TABLE>
109TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 45

AN ACT

To amend the Controlled Substances Act to lift the patient

limitation on prescribing drug addiction treatments by

medical practitioners in group practices, and for other

purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
 †

2

S 45 ES

1 SECTION 1. MAINTENANCE OR DETOXIFICATION TREAT2 MENT WITH CERTAIN NARCOTIC DRUGS;

3 ELIMINATION OF 30-PATIENT LIMIT FOR

4 GROUP PRACTICES.

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 303(g)(2)(B) of the Con6 trolled Substance Act (21 U.S.C. 823(g)(2)(B)) is amend7 ed by striking clause (iv).

8 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section

9 303(g)(2)(B) of the Controlled Substance Act (21 U.S.C.

10 823(g)(2)(B)) is amended in clause (iii) by striking ‘‘In

11 any case’’ and all that follows through ‘‘the total’’ and

12 inserting ‘‘The total’’.

13 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section shall take effect

14 on the date of enactment of this Act.

Passed the Senate July 19, 2005.

Attest:

Secretary.
109TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 45

AN ACT

To amend the Controlled Substances Act to lift the

practices, and for other purposes.treatments by medical practitioners in grouppatient limitation on prescribing drug addiction
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Alejandro Gabriel ACEVES-LOPEZ, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 08-10317.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 13, 2009.*

Filed April 29, 2009.

*525Brent Landis, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Daniel L. Kaplan, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: GRABER, GOULD, and BEA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Alejandro Gabriel Aceves-Lopez appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea to illegal reentry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.

Aceves-Lopez contends that: the district court erred in not adjusting his sentence for time he served in state custody; and his sentencing violated his Sixth Amendment right to have a jury find all factors used to enhance his sentence.

As part of his written plea, Aceves-Lopez waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence. The district court’s plea colloquy confirms that Aceves-Lopez knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal. Accordingly, we enforce the appeal waiver. *See United States v. Bibler,*495 F.3d 621, 624 (9th Cir.2007). In addition, we reject Aceves-Lopez’s contention that the appellate waiver was not valid because he received an illegal, or unlawful, sentence where the “sentence was authorized by the judgment of conviction, and did not impose on [the defendant] a sentence in excess of the statutory penalty.” *United States v. Vences,*169 F.3d 611, 613 (9th Cir.1999).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Elizabeth SALAZAR-GALVAN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 08-40937

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

May 27, 2009.

James Lee Turner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Elizabeth Salazar, Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal, Public Defender Federal Public Defender’s Office Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, pro se.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BARKSDALE, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Elizabeth Salazar-Galvan (Salazar) pleaded guilty to one count of illegal reentry after deportation following a felony conviction in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b). She appeals her within-guidelines sentence of 37 months imprisonment, arguing that the sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to provide adequate reasons to explain its choice of sentence.

As Salazar failed to articulate her specific procedural objection at sentencing, this court reviews for plain error. *See United States v. Mondragon-Santiago,*564 F.3d 357, 361 (5th Cir.2009). To demonstrate plain error, Salazar must show a forfeited error that is clear or obvious and affects her substantial rights. *See id.*If these conditions are met, this court may exercise its discretion to correct the error if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” *Id.*

There is nothing in the record to indicate that Salazar’s sentence would have been different if the court had provided more explanation for its choice of sentence. Salazar has thus failed to demonstrate er*397ror affecting her substantial rights. *See id.*at 365.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

*

 Pursuant to Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
II 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 592 

To extend the contract for the Glendo Unit of the Missouri River Basin 

Project in the State of Wyoming. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 10, 2005 

Mr. THOMAS (for himself, Mr. HAGEL, Mr. ENZI, and Mr. NELSON of Nebraska) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To extend the contract for the Glendo Unit of the Missouri 

River Basin Project in the State of Wyoming. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Glendo Unit of the 

5 Missouri River Basin Project Contract Extension Act of 

6 2005’’. 
2 

•S 592 IS

1 SEC. 2. GLENDO UNIT OF THE MISSOURI RIVER BASIN CON2 TRACT EXTENSION. 

3 Section 2 of the Irrigation Project Contract Exten4 sion Act of 1998 (112 Stat. 2816, 117 Stat. 1854) is 

5 amended— 

6 (1) in subsection (a), by striking ‘‘December 

7 31, 2005’’ and inserting ‘‘December 31, 2007’’; and 

8 (2) in subsection (b)— 

9 (A) by striking ‘‘beyond December 31, 

10 2005’’ and inserting ‘‘beyond December 31, 

11 2007’’; and 

12 (B) by striking ‘‘before December 31, 

13 2005’’ and inserting ‘‘before December 31, 

14 2007’’. 

Æ
#### Bowling v. Margaret R. Pardee Mem’l Hosp.

Case below: 179 N.C. App. 815

No. 588P06

1. Pit’s NOA Based Upon a Constitutional Question (COA051497)

2. Def’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal

3. Pit’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31

1. _

2. Allowed 06/27/07

3. Denied 06/27/07
**
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

**Certification Required by Rule 13a-14(b) or**

**Rule 15d-14(b) and Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Permian Basin Royalty Trust (the “Trust”) on Form 10-Q for thequarterly period ended June 30, 2019, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, not in its individual capacity but solely as the trustee of the Trust, certifies pursuantto 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to its knowledge: 

(1) The Report fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and 

(2) The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Trust. 

 
  SIMMONS BANK, TRUSTEE FOR PERMIAN BASIN ROYALTY TRUSTDate:  August 8, 2019  By: /s/ RON E. HOOPER   
Ron E. Hooper,

SVP Royalty Trust Management

Simmons Bank

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Permian Basin Royalty Trust andwill be retained by Permian Basin Royalty Trust and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request. 
**
#### In the Matter of Cosimo Panetta, Appellant, v City of Rye et al., Respondents.

[963 NYS2d 274]

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, inter alia, to review a resolution of the Planning Commission of the City of Rye, the petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Colangelo, J.), dated September 12, 2011, which, upon severing the cause of action alleging a regulatory taking, denied the remaining portions of the petition and dismissed the remaining portions of the proceeding.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

The petitioner commenced this proceeding challenging Resolution 05-2010 of the City of Rye Planning Commission (hereinafter the Planning Commission), which denied his application to modify the standards for private streets to allow him to build a single-family residence on a vacant parcel of property he owned on Howard Place, a street in the City of Rye. The Planning Commission’s determination was based upon a resolution it adopted in 1968 (hereinafter the 1968 Resolution), which set forth minimum standards “for the purpose of determining whether a private street presently providing access for existing buildings is acceptably improved to permit the issuance of building permits for property having access therefrom.”

Initially, we reject the petitioner’s contentions that Howard Place is not a private street, but rather is a right of way to which the 1968 Resolution does not apply, or alternatively, that there is an ambiguity as to whether Howard Place is a private street which should be resolved in his favor. The 1968 Resolution includes a list of private streets which are not acceptably improved, and Howard Place is on that list.

*749A local planning board has broad discretion in deciding applications for site-plan approvals, and judicial review is limited to determining whether the board’s decision was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law, or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion *(see*CPLR 7803 [3]; *Matter of Fairway Manor, Inc. v Bertinelli,*81 AD3d 821, 822 [2011]). Here, the Planning Commission’s determination that Howard Place did not provide reasonable access from the proposed single-family dwelling to a street which was suitably improved had a rational basis and was not arbitrary and capricious *(cf. American Nassau Bldg. Sys. v Press,*143 AD2d 789 [1988]).

As the parties acknowledge, the petitioner’s cause of action alleging a regulatory taking was severed from this action and, thus, any issue raised with respect to that cause of action is not before us.

The petitioner’s remaining contention is without merit.

Angiolillo, J.P, Dickerson, Chambers and Lott, JJ., concur.
II 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 481 

To amend title 38, United States Code, to extend the period of eligibility 

for health care for combat service in the Persian Gulf War or future 

hostilities from two years to five years after discharge or release. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 1, 2005 

Mr. AKAKA introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

A BILL

To amend title 38, United States Code, to extend the period 

of eligibility for health care for combat service in the 

Persian Gulf War or future hostilities from two years 

to five years after discharge or release.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2

•S 481 IS

1 SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF PERIOD OF ELIGIBILITY FOR 

2 HEALTH CARE FOR COMBAT SERVICE IN THE 

3 PERSIAN GULF WAR OR FUTURE HOS4 TILITIES. 

5 Section 1710(e)(3)(C) of title 38, United States 

6 Code, is amended by striking ‘‘2 years’’ and inserting ‘‘5 

7 years’’.

Æ
#### In the Matter of Aron Lichtfeld, Petitioner, v N.A. Anderson et al., Respondents.

[973 NYS2d 80]

The above-named *509petitioner having presented an application to this Court praying for an order, pursuant to article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, now, upon reading and filing the papers in said proceeding, and due deliberation having been had thereon, it is unanimously ordered that the application be and the same hereby is denied and the petition dismissed, without costs or disbursements. Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Andrias, Freedman and Gische, JJ.
Order entered March 5 , 2021

In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 21

- 00050

- CV

MATTHEW MCKERLEY, D.O. , Appellant

V.

DANISHA JACKSON , ET AL. , Appellee s

On Appeal from th e 68th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC

- 19

- 10884

O RDER

Before the Court is appellant’s March 3, 2021 unopposed motion for an

extension of time to file his brief on the merits. We GRANT the motion and

extend the time to April 5, 2021

.

/s/ BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN JUSTICE
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Derrick Demond BRANCH, also known as Dedrick Demon Branch, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 08-60918

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

May 26, 2009.

Susan S. Bradley, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Mississippi, Oxford, MS, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Kevin J. Payne, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Mississippi, Oxford, MS, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before REAVLEY, WIENER, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Derrick Demond Branch appeals his 180-month sentence following his guilty *396plea conviction for carjacking. *See*18 U.S.C. § 2119. Branch argues that the district court erred by imposing a higher non-guidelines sentence based on factors already accounted for in the guidelines calculations.

The district court was not precluded from imposing a departure or variance based on factors that the Guidelines had already taken into account. *See United States v. Brantley,*537 F.3d 347, 350 (5th Cir.2008); *United States v. Williams,*517 F.3d 801, 810-11 (5th Cir.2008).

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under *396. the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
EX-31 Sarbanes-Oxley Certification.


  I, Diane Courtney, certify that:

  1.I have reviewed the report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D
    required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on
    Form 10-K of Merrill Lynch Mortgage Backed Securities Trust, Series
    2007-2 (the "Exchange Act periodic reports");

  2.Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a
    whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit
    to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
    light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
    misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

  3.Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other
    information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period
    covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

  4.I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the
    servicers and based on my knowledge and the compliance reviews
    conducted in preparing the servicer compliance statements required in
    this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed
    in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicers have fulfilled
    their obligations under the servicing agreements in all material
    respects; and

  5.All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria
    for ABS and their related attestation reports on assessment of
    compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required
    to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of
    Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been
    included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in
    this report.  Any material instances of noncompliance described in such
    reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

    Dated:   March 26, 2008


    /s/ Diane Courtney
    Signature

    Vice President
    (senior officer in charge of the servicing function of the master
    servicer)