IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

2022-NCSC-145

No. 339A21

Filed 16 December 2022

HANIA H. WILLIAMS as Executor and Administrator of the Estate of PATRICK 

WILLIAMS

v.

MARCHELLE ISYK ALLEN, P.A., NILES ANTHONY RAINS, M.D., BRONWYN 

LOUIS YOUNG, II, M.D., EMERGENCY MEDICINE PHYSICIANS OF 

MECKLENBURG COUNTY, PLLC d/b/a US ACUTE CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC., 

C. PETER CHANG, M.D., CHARLOTTE RADIOLOGY, P.A., and THE 

CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG HOSPITAL AUTHORITY d/b/a CAROLINAS 

HEALTHCARE SYSTEM or ATRIUM HEALTH

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of 

the Court of Appeals, 278 N.C. App. 790, 2021-NCCOA-410, remanding an order 

entered on 24 March 2020 by Judge Forrest Bridges in Superior Court, Mecklenburg

County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 10 May 2022.

Knott & Boyle, PLLC, by W. Ellis Boyle and Joe Thomas Knott III, for plaintiffappellant.

Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., by John T. Holden, for defendant-appellees

Marchelle Allen, P.A., and Emergency Medicine Physicians of Mecklenburg 

County, PLLC.

MORGAN, Justice.

¶ 1 In this appeal, we are called upon to determine whether a trial court erred in 

failing to make specific findings of fact as part of an order compelling discovery
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pursuant to Rule 37 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Based upon our 

determination that no party specifically requested that the trial court make findings 

of fact to support its ruling on this interlocutory motion, we conclude that the trial 

court was not required pursuant to Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to make 

such findings and thus the trial court’s order was proper and sufficient.

I. Factual background and procedural history

¶ 2 This matter arises from the death of Patrick Williams (Williams) following his 

visits to and encounters with various of the named defendants from which he sought 

medical care. On 6 May 2016, Williams experienced worsening pain in his back, 

stomach, and hip. Eventually, Williams’s wife, plaintiff Hania H. Williams, took 

Williams to Piedmont Urgent Care-Baxter in Fort Mill, South Carolina, but upon 

their arrival Williams was unable to get out of the car. Williams’s medical condition 

was not evaluated by any healthcare provider at Piedmont Urgent Care-Baxter, but 

staff of that facility called 911 for assistance for Williams. Emergency Medical 

Services personnel responded to the urgent care location and transported Williams 

by ambulance to the emergency department at Carolinas Medical Center Pineville 

(CMC-Pineville) hospital just before 4:00 p.m. 

¶ 3 In the emergency department of CMC-Pineville, defendant Dr. Bronwyn Louis 

Young II ordered 7.5 mg of oral hydrocodone and 600 mg of ibuprofen for Williams.

At about 4:50 p.m., defendant Marchelle Isyk Allen, a physician’s assistant affiliated 
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with defendant Emergency Medicine Physicians of Mecklenburg County, PLLC 

(EMP), evaluated Williams and reported that Williams was experiencing increasing 

lower back pain radiating down his left leg. Allen ordered 4 mg of morphine, 10 mg 

of Decadron, 10 mg of Flexeril, 4 mg of Zofran, and an x-ray of Williams’s spine.

Defendant Dr. C. Peter Chang read Williams’s x-ray and reported, “no acute osseous 

abnormality,” but he observed “unusual linear calcifications . . . to the right and left 

of the lumbar spine along the retroperitoneum likely vascular in nature.” Allen did 

not order further diagnostic tests for Williams but did prescribe Flexeril and 

hydrocodone. Williams was then discharged from CMC-Pineville with instructions to 

schedule an office visit with an orthopedic practice “within 2–4 days.” Dr. Niles 

Anthony Rains signed the record of the treatment provided by Allen to Williams on 7 

May 2016 at 6:36 a.m. 

¶ 4 Although Williams took the prescribed hydrocodone every six hours upon his 

return home, his previous pain persisted, and he additionally developed abdominal 

pains. Williams returned to the emergency department of CMC-Pineville on 7 May 

2016 at 9:56 p.m., presenting with low blood pressure as well as severe abdominal 

pain. Rains ordered a CT angiogram of Williams’s chest, abdomen, and pelvis, which 

revealed a ruptured abdominal aortic aneurism measuring 12 centimeters by 9.7 

centimeters. Rains contacted the emergency department of Carolinas Medical Center 

Main (CMC-Main) in Charlotte for immediate surgical repair of the ruptured 
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aneurism. Williams was transferred to CMC-Main by helicopter, but the surgery was 

unsuccessful in saving Williams’s life. Williams was pronounced dead at 3:24 a.m. on 

8 May 2016. On 9 May 2016, Rains informed Allen of Williams’s death and of 

plaintiff’s 7 May 2016 statement to emergency department staff at CMC-Pineville 

that if anything should happen to Williams, plaintiff would be filing a claim against 

the personnel who treated him during his 6 May 2016 visit. Rains then instructed 

Allen to memorialize her interactions with and treatment of Williams on an electronic 

form provided by her EMP group employer. This electronic report was later 

designated “Document B” during discovery in the lawsuit which ensued as a result of 

Williams’s death.

¶ 5 Plaintiff, Williams’s widow, as executor and administrator of Williams’s estate, 

brought this action for wrongful death on 2 May 2018, and plaintiff also asserted a 

claim for loss of consortium resulting from Williams’s death. During discovery,

plaintiff submitted interrogatories to defendants, including Allen, and sought the 

production of documents relating to any investigation by defendants related to 

Williams’s treatment and death and any information related to defendants’ 

interactions with and their care provided to Williams. In her responses to 

interrogatories 16, 19, 20, 21, and 22, and the corresponding requests for 

production—which concerned any written record Allen made about her treatment of 

Williams and any thoughts she had about the treatment she provided to him in May 
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2016—Allen raised no objection for privilege. Allen further claimed that she had 

never participated in any investigation or peer review process with EMP. Defendants 

did lodge a series of generic objections to interrogatories 4, 12, and 13, and the 

corresponding requests for production, referring to North Carolina’s statutorily

defined peer review privilege for certain medical care providers, N.C.G.S. § 90-21.22A 

(2021), as well as to attorney-client privilege and attorney work product doctrine. 

¶ 6 On 11 July 2019, a few days before her deposition was set to occur and more 

than four months after she submitted her written discovery responses, Allen 

produced a privilege log designating a four-page document identified as being written

on 10 May 2016 for which Allen claimed privilege based on: “Work Product; and 

Prepared by the Defendants in anticipation of litigation, peer review.” Upon learning 

of Allen’s privilege log identifying the document, plaintiff cancelled Allen’s scheduled 

deposition to pursue production of the document belatedly recognized as being 

withheld under a claim of privilege or protection. In a motion to compel pursuant to 

Rule 37(a) that was filed on 17 July 2019, plaintiff sought the production of the

document characterized as typed notes Allen had created on 10 May 2016, as 

identified in the privilege log produced on 11 July 2019. See N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 

37(a) (2021).

¶ 7 At a hearing on the motion to compel on 29 August 2019, plaintiff asserted that 

Allen had withheld the document at issue and failed to make any privilege assertion. 
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Defendants in turn argued that the document at issue was being withheld on the 

basis of the work product, attorney-client, and peer review privileges, noting that it 

was created by Allen at the direction of Rains and for the risk management 

department, with a copy retained by Allen on her computer. No argument was made 

asserting medical review committee privilege as set forth in N.C.G.S. § 90-21.22A in 

connection to the four-page document created by Allen. The trial court announced 

during the hearing that “Allen has failed to persuade the [c]ourt that the document 

is protected by the work product privilege such that the [c]ourt would allow the 

Motion to Compel for discovery of that document.”1

¶ 8 On 21 November 2019, plaintiff filed a second Rule 37 motion in which she

alleged, inter alia, the following: On 17 September 2019, defendants produced a threepage document created by Allen which was purportedly the document which was the 

subject of the 29 August 2019 hearing. However, during Allen’s deposition on 30 

October 2019, Allen explained that the document produced was actually a diary entry 

that she created for her own use and that she had never submitted the document to 

EMP or any other risk management department. For this reason, it was apparent to 

plaintiff that the document produced would never have been the proper subject of any 

type of privilege assertion. Allen further acknowledged that she had submitted an 

 

1 The trial court entered an order granting plaintiff’s Motion to Compel on 15 

November 2019.
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entirely separate report to EMP’s risk management department through the 

company’s website. The report to EMP’s risk management department—Document 

B—was never produced during discovery. Plaintiff asked the trial court to compel 

defendants to comply with the existing discovery order in addition to requesting that 

sanctions be ordered against defendants. In response, defendants filed a 

memorandum of law in opposition to plaintiff’s second motion to compel in which they 

acknowledged that Document B had not been produced in discovery, explained that 

counsel for defendants had been unaware of the existence of Document B at the time 

of the hearing on 29 August 2019, and asserted a claim of medical review committee 

privilege pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 90-21.22A.

¶ 9 A hearing on the second motion to compel was held on 31 January 2020. After 

hearing from the parties, reviewing the affidavits, and conducting an in-camera 

review of the disputed second document, the trial court granted the motion but 

ordered that the subject document be kept under seal pending appeal. The trial court 

denied plaintiff’s motion for sanctions and awarded no fees or sanctions. A written 

order was filed by the trial court on 24 March 2020. Defendants appealed to the North 

Carolina Court of Appeals.

II. The Court of Appeals proceeding

¶ 10 In the Court of Appeals, defendants argued that the trial court erred in 

granting plaintiff’s motion to compel because the trial court failed to make 
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appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law that would allow meaningful 

appellate review and that error occurred because Document B was shielded from

discovery by the medical review committee privilege. After observing that 

interlocutory orders compelling the discovery of documents over an assertion of

protection by the medical review committee privilege affect a substantial right and 

are immediately reviewable on appeal, Williams v. Marchelle Isyk Allen, P.A., 278 

N.C. App. 790, 2021-NCCOA-410, ¶ 17 (citing Hammond v. Saini, 229 N.C. App. 359, 

362 (2013), aff’d as modified, 367 N.C. 607 (2014)), the Court of Appeals addressed 

defendants’ argument that the trial court erred by granting plaintiff’s motion to 

enforce its previous motion to compel production in light of Allen’s invocation of the 

statutory privilege, Williams, ¶¶ 20–24. In order “to encourage candor and objectivity 

in the internal workings of medical review committees,” Shelton v. Morehead Mem’l 

Hosp., 318 N.C. 76, 83 (1986), the General Assembly has determined that 

[t]he proceedings of a medical review . . . committee, the 

records and materials it produces, and the materials it 

considers shall be confidential and not considered public 

records . . . and shall not be subject to discovery or 

introduction into evidence in any civil action against a 

provider of health care services who directly provides 

services and is licensed under this Chapter.

N.C.G.S. § 90-21.22A(c). The statute defines a “medical review committee” as “[a]

committee composed of health care providers licensed under this Chapter that is 

formed for the purpose of evaluating the quality of, cost of, or necessity for health care 
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services, including provider credentialing.” N.C.G.S. § 90-21.22A(a)(1) (emphases 

added). In their appeal, defendants—who, as the parties asserting the claimed 

privilege, bore the burden of establishing its applicability—argued that the trial court 

had failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, specifically regarding 

whether the committee in this matter was composed of “health care providers licensed 

under this Chapter” and was “formed for the purpose of evaluating the quality of, cost 

of, or necessity for health care services, including provider credentialing,” N.C.G.S. § 

90-21.22A(a)(1), (c).

¶ 11 In the view of the majority of the Court of Appeals panel, defendants had

appropriately requested, pursuant to Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,

additional specific findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the statutory 

elements set forth in N.C.G.S. § 90-21.22A, and the trial court erred when it failed to 

comply with defendants’ request. On that basis, the majority remanded this case to 

the trial court in order for it “to . . . enter factual findings and conclusions [of law]

consistent with the requirements of N.C.[G.S.] § 90-21.22A.” Williams, ¶ 25. Thus, 

the majority in the lower appellate court did not reach the merits of defendants’ 

privilege argument.

¶ 12 The dissenting judge in the lower appellate court first stated that he would 

have dismissed the appeal on the basis that the Court of Appeals was unable to 

meaningfully review the matter because defendants failed to include the disputed 
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document—the notes regarding Allen’s interactions with and treatment of Williams

that were prepared by Allen after her discussion with Rains—in the record on appeal,

even if under seal. Id. ¶ 26 (Murphy, J., dissenting); see N.C. R. App. P. 9(a)(1)(e), 

(a)(1)(j), (c)(4). Alternatively, the dissenting judge opined that, if the Court of Appeals 

elected to reach the merits of defendants’ appeal, he believed it should affirm the trial 

court’s order based on the dissenting judge’s belief that defendants (1) had not

satisfied their burden of production in asserting the medical review committee 

privilege provided by N.C.G.S. § 90-21.22A, and (2) did not make a clear request for 

the trial court to make findings of fact in accordance with Rule 52 at the hearing on 

31 January 2020, and accordingly, the trial court was under no obligation to make 

such factual findings. Id. ¶¶ 40, 45 (Murphy, J., dissenting). On 7 September 2021, 

plaintiff timely filed a notice of appeal in this Court based upon the dissent in the 

Court of Appeals pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2). 

III. Analysis

¶ 13 Oral argument before this Court took place on 10 May 2022. Plaintiff argued 

that the dissent in the Court of Appeals was correct on all three of the bases upon 

which that judge would have resolved the matter in plaintiff’s favor: first, that 

defendants failed to preserve any arguments for appeal by failing to include a copy of 

Document B in the record on appeal; second, that defendants failed to satisfy the 

strict statutory burden of proof for claiming medical review committee privilege 
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under N.C.G.S. § 90-21.22A; and third, that because defendants did not specifically 

request that the trial court make findings of fact pursuant to Rule 52, the trial court 

did not err in failing to do so. We consider only the third point raised by plaintiff and 

addressed by the dissenting judge—that the trial court failed to make the required 

findings of fact.

¶ 14 Upon our considerations of the arguments of the parties, along with a careful 

review of the transcript from the 31 January 2020 trial court hearing, we agree with 

the position of the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals that defendants did not 

specifically request findings of fact regarding the statutory elements set forth in 

N.C.G.S. § 90-21.22A and that in the absence of such a specific request by defendants, 

the trial court was not required to make any findings of fact in resolving plaintiff’s 

motion to compel. We reach this result through an examination of the clear provisions 

of Rule 52 as confirmed by well-established precedent.

¶ 15 In civil cases, whether a trial court must make findings of fact in a particular 

proceeding is always determined by statute or rule. In certain specific types of actions, 

a statute may explicitly require that a trial court make particular findings of fact. For 

example, “[i]n any case in which an award of child custody is made in a district court, 

the trial judge, prior to denying a parent the right of reasonable visitation, shall make 

a written finding of fact that the parent being denied visitation rights is an unfit 

person to visit the child or that such visitation rights are not in the best interest of the 
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child.” N.C.G.S. § 50-13.5(i) (2021) (emphasis added); see also N.C.G.S. § 45-21.16(d) 

(2021) (noting the specific findings which must be made by a clerk of court when a 

mortgagee or trustee wishes to exercise a power of sale); N.C.G.S. § 97-84 (2021) 

(providing that disputes under the Workers’ Compensation Act “shall be decided and 

findings of fact issued based upon the preponderance of the evidence in view of the 

entire record” (emphasis added)). In contrast, N.C.G.S. § 90-21.22A has no such 

requirement for any particular findings of fact to be made by a trial court, a 

circumstance which is unsurprising given that this statute is largely definitional, 

with provisions explaining what persons and materials are shielded from discovery. 

See N.C.G.S. § 90-21.22A. 

¶ 16 In other circumstances, a statute may give the parties the option of requesting 

findings of fact from the trial court. In an action for support of a minor child, for 

instance, “upon request of any party, the [trial c]ourt shall hear evidence, and from 

the evidence, find the facts relating to the reasonable needs of the child for support and 

the relative ability of each parent to provide support.” N.C.G.S. § 50-13.4(c) (2021)

(emphasis added). 

¶ 17 Here, the Court of Appeals majority and defendants focus on Rule 52 of the 

Rules of Civil Procedure as the applicable basis for concluding that the trial court 

erred in failing to make findings of fact. Certainly, a trial court acting as the finder 

of fact in a bench trial is required to “find the facts specially and state separately its 
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conclusions of law [before] direct[ing] the entry of the appropriate judgment.” N.C.G.S. 

§ 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(1) (emphasis added). The decision appealed by defendants in this 

matter is not a final judgment but rather an interlocutory order compelling discovery, 

as the Court of Appeals majority correctly observed in its opinion. Williams, ¶ 14. 

Pursuant to Rule 52, “[f]indings of fact and conclusions of law are necessary on 

decisions of any motion or order ex mero motu only when requested by a party and as 

provided by Rule 41(b).” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(2) (emphases added). The 

majority of the lower appellate court panel determined that “[d]efendants’ counsel 

correctly sought clarification of the ruling and requested the trial court to make 

specific findings and conclusions,” Williams, ¶ 23, but that nevertheless “the trial 

court declined to rule about whether the medical review committee privilege applied 

or not,” Williams, ¶ 22.

¶ 18 Our review of the 31 January 2020 hearing transcript leads us to disagree with 

the majority’s view on the former point: defendants did not specifically request 

findings of fact. After hearing from the parties on the various issues before it, the 

trial court announced its intended ruling regarding the motion to compel the 

production of the disputed document in open court: 

THE COURT: . . . I’m going to direct that that 

document be provided to . . . plaintiff. Now, at this time, I’ll 

retain it under seal (clears throat) in the file . . . .

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, Your Honor, that’s 

what I wanted to clarify because as you know the, uh, 
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legitimate and bona fide assertion of a privilege, even is —

is not an interlocutory appeal. So, I just need — if the 

[c]ourt can clarify and perhaps this can be worked out, 

whether you are ruling the privilege was waived, the 

privilege doesn’t apply, the privilege is — is somehow 

defeated so that we can establish the parameters of the 

argument for [the] Court of Appeals —

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: — if that should be the 

case.

The above-quoted language is specifically identified by defendants as evidence of 

defendants’ explicit request for factual findings on the trial court’s privilege ruling, 

but this request is unavailing to defendants’ position because the determination of 

whether the medical review committee privilege created by N.C.G.S. § 90-21.22A was 

“waived” or “defeated” or “doesn’t apply” is a legal conclusion which may be based 

upon findings of fact rather than themselves being findings of fact.

As a general rule, however, any determination requiring 

the exercise of judgment, see Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 74

. . . (1985), or the application of legal principles, see Quick 

v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446, 452 . . . (1982), is more properly 

classified a conclusion of law. Any determination reached 

through “logical reasoning from the evidentiary facts” is 

more properly classified a finding of fact. Quick, 305 N.C. 

at 452 . . . (quoting Woodard v. Mordecai, 234 N.C. 463, 472

. . . (1951)). 

In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 510 (1997); see also Finding of Fact, Black’s Law 

Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (defining “findings of fact” as “[d]eterminations from the 

evidence of a case . . . concerning facts averred by one party and denied by another”);
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Conclusion of Law, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (defining “conclusions of 

law” as “[f]inding[s] by [a] court as determined through [the] application of rules of 

law”). Whether a privilege such as that at issue in this matter applies or has been 

waived is a legal conclusion which is in turn based upon a trial court’s evaluation of 

the evidence presented by the parties.

¶ 19 Looking at the continuation of the exchange between counsel for the parties 

and the trial court buttresses our view that findings of fact were not requested by 

defendants:

[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, not to 

object, but it may help if the question is posed as, “Are you 

granting the [m]otion for 37(b) to enforce an existing 

order?”

THE COURT: Yes, yes.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So, you’ll — so, if that —

so, the [c]ourt’s order, as I understand it is that the 

[medical] review [committee] privilege that was identified

in the original privilege log was the subject of the or — of 

the argument before Judge Ervin [at the 29 August 2019 

hearing] is overruled and it is — the privilege is (inaudible) 

as to this document, that you have found?

. . . . [discussion about the “diary” entry created by 

Allen versus Document B]

THE COURT: I’m not saying it’s the same document. 

I’m saying that [Document B] was responsive to the 

request for discovery that were [sic] before Judge Ervin at 

that time. So, that in response to those discovery requests, 

this document should have been identified and if a 

privilege was claimed, it should’ve been asserted as to this 
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particular document.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. Because today we’ve 

had a lot of arguments about the nature — we’ve had 

arguments about the nature of the committee that reviewed 

it in the system and all that. I just want to know if that’s 

going to be part of the issue that’s going to be taken into —

that could be potentially taken up. I don’t know. I assume 

my client is going to want to . . . protect their — their 

medical review committee and that’s not casting 

(inaudible) on anyone in this room —

THE COURT: I know.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: — I’m just saying, I 

assume that’s going to be their position.

THE COURT: Sure.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So, it needs to be as — as 

clear as we can get it. So, you know, I don’t know if 

[plaintiff’s counsel] and I can go back and forth and find 

something that would — that would satisfy, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yeah. Why don’t — y’all work on the 

order and I’ll take a look at what you draft, and we’ll go 

from there. . . .

. . . .

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Is it your position it’s the 

same doc- because he was looking at a document and he 

ordered it to be produced and we produced it —

THE COURT: Yeah.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: — and now we’re being told 

that we didn’t comply with his order by producing a 

different document. So, that’s what I’m trying to figure out 

how to — how to craft this. I understand the [c]ourt’s 
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ruling, I just want to put it in a box where I can explain it.

THE COURT: Yeah, I don’t know that I can answer 

that question until I can see each version of the proposed 

orders.

. . . .

THE COURT: All right. Anything else we need to 

address?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No.

While defense counsel noted that “arguments about the nature of the committee” had 

been presented, he did not request findings of fact on that question but instead 

focused on properly framing the issue to potentially be presented upon an appeal and 

on how to explain the trial court’s ruling, either to defendants or to the Court of 

Appeals. Further, read in context, the primary confusion expressed by defense 

counsel appears to have concerned the ruling resulting from the 31 January 2020 

hearing on Document B as it might relate to the trial court’s previous ruling regarding 

the diary entry. Or, in the words of the dissenting judge on the Court of Appeals 

panel:

This exchange demonstrates that Defense Counsel 

sought clarification pertaining to the trial court’s ruling on 

the privilege to “establish the parameters of the argument”

for an appeal, and stated that he “[understood] the [c]ourt’s 

ruling,” but wanted “to put it in a box where [he could] 

explain it.” When the trial court declined to answer 

Defense Counsel’s questions at the time, and asked if 

anything else needed to be addressed, Defense Counsel 

replied “[n]o.” Based on this exchange, it is apparent that 
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[d]efendants only requested detailed conclusions of law, 

but made no specific request for the trial court to make 

findings of fact in accordance with Rule 52, and 

accordingly, the trial court was under no obligation to 

make such findings.

Williams, ¶ 45 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (first through fourth alterations in original). 

We agree, and accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, leaving 

the trial court’s order compelling discovery in effect, and remand to the Court of 

Appeals for further remand to the trial court.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Chief Justice NEWBY and Justice ERVIN did not participate in the 

consideration or decision of this case.