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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED In re SHEFFIELD, Minors. June 13, 2017

No. 335652 Bay Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 14-011708-NA

Before: O’B RIEN , P.J., and H OEKSTRA and B OONSTRA , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Respondent appeals by right the trial court’s order terminatin g her parental rights to her children KS, JS, and AS pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ) (the conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist), (c)( ii ) (other conditions exist tha t cause the children to come within the court’s jurisdiction), (g) (parent is unable to prov ide proper care and custody), and (j) (child is reasonably likely to be harmed if returned to the par ent’s home). We affirm. 1

I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner filed a petition seeking the removal of the childre n from the home based on improper supervision, neglect, and the condition of the home. At a preliminary hearing, Janice White, a Child Protective Services (CPS) worker, testified that she had received a call that the police needed assistance at respondent’s home, where children w ere present without adult supervision. The house lacked r unning water, electricity, and working plumbing, and had rotten food and medications scattered throughout the home. The childr en were dirty and had not eaten that day; JS required emergency medical attention. A police of ficer contacted respondent by telephone, and respondent hung up on him. White testified that she spoke with respondent, who admitted that she had spent the day drinking with family and fr iends. White placed the children with respondent’s cousin. The t rial court found probable cause to believe that the allegations of the petition were true, and authorized the petition. The trial court directed that the children be placed with a relative or in fos ter care, and that respondent b e granted supervised parenting time.

1 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the fat hers of the minor children. They have not appealed the trial court’s decision, and are not parti es to this appeal. Respondent is the mother of two other ch ildren who were place d with their fathers ; the disposition of those children is not at issue in this appeal.-2- Respondent pleaded to the allegations in the petition that the house had no electricity, running water, or func tioning plumbing, and th at medications, r otten food, and di rty diapers were strewn about the home. Respondent admitted that on August 3, 2 014, she had left the children alone, spent the day drinking, and hung up on a police officer. Petitioner’s representative indicated at the adjudication he aring that the children had bee n placed in foster homes.

The trial court held a dispositional hearing on October 13, 20 14. The trial court was informed that the children were in foster care, and that the ol der children were receiving counseling. Respondent was scheduled to undergo a substance ab use assessment and a psychological evaluation, was participating in parenting and bu dgeting classes, and was employed and attending college classes. Respondent had missed three parenting time sessions, and often did not bring necessary items, such as baby supplies, to the sessions. The trial court continued the children in fost er care and directed respondent t o comply with her treatment plan.

During the period from the adjudication in 2014 to the termina tion hearing in August of 2016, respondent had 13 different addresses and 3 different tel ephone numbers. Respondent did not attend counseling and superv ised parenting time on a consis tent basis. Respondent was dismissed from a parenting class for non-compliance and failed to complete a second parenting class. During parenting time, respondent had difficulty intera cting with all of the children at the same time and was not responsive to suggestions about parenting techniques. Respondent missed eight parenting time sessions in July 2015 because she w as incarcerated. Respondent was frequently late to parenting time sessions. In February 20 16, the trial court granted the children’s lawyer-guardian ad litem’s (LGAL) motion to suspend respondent’s parenting time because she had missed or canceled numerous visits and the miss ed visits caused the children to act out. Respondent was sporadically employed; at the time of termination she had obtained fulltime employment but had only been working for a week.

At the termination hearing, Tania Leachman, respondent’s case manager at Saginaw Psychological Services, testified that she worked with responde nt from September 2015 until April 2016. Leachman testified that respondent presented herse lf and acted appropriately, but seemed to gain only minimal benefit from the services offered. Christine Church, a clinical social worker, testified that she was a therapist for KS and JS . When Church started working with JS, he was so impulsive and aggressive that he needed to b e restrained at times. He had made progress, but his behavio r deteriorated around the times h e was scheduled to have a visit with respondent. Church testified that KS acted out violently when she started working with him, but that he had made significant progress.

Lorrie Foor, the foster mother for the children (who ultimatel y were all placed in the same foster home), testified that the children were doing relat ively well in their placement. Foor stated that JS and KS were very aggressive when they came into her care, and that this behavior escalated when they visited with respondent. The children did not ask to see respondent. Foor and her husband were willing to adopt the children.

Britney McInnis, the children’s foster care worker, testified that respondent’s current housing was not appropriate for the children because respondent ’s roommate had had her own parental rights terminated. M cInnis stated that respondent’s p arenting time sessions were-3- chaotic. McInnis stated that the children needed permanency an d a sense of stability, and opined that respondent’s parental ri ghts should be terminated.

Respondent testified that she ha d difficulty finding stable em ployment due to her criminal record, and had difficulty secu ring housing due to a lack of fu nds. Respondent stated that she had just obtained a job at a pickle plant. The job paid $11.25 an hour and offered health insurance. Respondent worked afternoons and evenings six to se ven days a week. Respondent acknowledged that she did not like to take parenting advice, an d preferred her own parenting methods. Respondent testified that she was currently participa ting in counseling. Respondent denied that she had told her children that they did not have to listen to their foster parents. Respondent stated that she knew of a 24-hour daycare facility w here the children could stay while she was working.

Valeria Sheffield, respondent’s aunt, testified that she and r espondent had a close relationship. Sheffield testified that respondent was a good p arent. Sheffield was willing to assist respondent in car ing for the children.

The trial court issued a written opinion and order terminating respondent’s parental rights. The trial court found th at at the time the children we re removed from respondent’s home, respondent had left the children alone and unsupervised, and th at the home was environmentally unsafe. The trial court noted that respondent had been offered numerous services, but that her participation in those services was inconsistent. Respondent o ften was late for parenting time sessions or missed sessions altogether, and the children acted out and were severely distressed after visits.

The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ) (conditions that led to adjudication still exist and there is n o reasonable likelihood the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the chil dren’s ages). The trial court noted that respondent’s home was unfit for the children at the time t hey were removed, and that respondent had had 13 different addresses during the pendency o f the case and showed no ability to maintain stable housing. The trial court also terminated re spondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( ii ) (other conditions exist that cause the children to come withi n the court’s jurisdiction). The tri al court stated that respondent had failed to engage in or benefit from services, and had not demonstrated an ability or willingne ss to do so in the future. The trial court also terminated respondent ’s parental rights under MCL 71 2A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care or custody). The trial court found that, responden t lacked parenting skills when the case began and that, although she had been given several opport unities to participate in parenting classes, her attendance was inc onsistent and she did not demons trate that she had benefitted from the classes. She was unable to advance beyond supervised visit s. Finally, the trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j ) (children at risk of harm if returned to parent’s home). The trial court noted that respond ent was unable to control the children during parenting time se ssions, and often ignored the children to concentrate on her phone.

The trial court also found that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children, noti ng that respondent had mental he alth issues that were not addressed on a consistent basis, and that she could not maintain stable h ousing or employment.-4- Additionally, the children’s foster parents provided the childr en with love, guidance, and the necessities of life, and the children were bonded to their fost er parents. The trial court stated that the children deserved stability and permanency.

This appeal followed.

II. STATUTORY GROUND S FOR TERMINATION

Respondent argues that the trial court erred by finding that t he statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree. We review for clear error the trial court’s f actual findings in order to term inate parental rights. MCR 3.977(K); In re Rood , 483 Mich 73, 90; 763 NW2d 587 (2009). “ ‘A finding is “clear ly erroneous” [if] although there is evidence to s upport it, the reviewing court o n the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’ ” Id . at 91, quoting In re Miller , 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). We must give due regard “t o the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who a ppeared before it.” In re Ellis , 294 Mich App 30, 33; 817 NW2d 111 (2011).

The trial court terminated res pondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ), (c)( ii ), (g), and (j), which permit te rmination under the following c ircumstances:

(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of aninitial dispositional order, and the c ourt, by clear and convincing evi dence, finds either of the following:

( i ) The conditions that led to the a djudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.

( ii ) Other conditions exist that cause the child to come within th e court’s jurisdiction, the parent has re ceived recommendations to rectif y those conditions, the conditions have not been rectif ied by the parent after the parent has received notice and a hearing and has be en given a reasonable opportunity to rectify the conditions, and there is no reas onable likelihood that the cond itions will be rectified within a reasonable ti me considering the child’s age.

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(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide pro per care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation th at the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable tim e considering the child’s age.-5- * * *

(j) There is a reasonable lik elihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.

The original barrier to respondent regaining custody of her ch ildren was the unfit condition of her home. Thereafter, respondent failed to mainta in stable housing and employment, failed to engage in counseling on a consistent basi s, and missed or was late to numerous parenting time sessions. The evidence showed that res pondent no longer lived in the home from which the children were removed. Indeed, respondent had 13 different addresses during the pendency of this case, and the home in which she was living at the time of the termination hearing was inappropriate for the children because respondent’s roommate had had her own parental rights terminat ed. The evidence that responde nt had not been able to secure appropriate housing for the child ren after two years constitute d clear and convincing evidence to terminate respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c) ( i ). In addition, respondent’s inability to maintain stable employment sufficient to support h erself and the children, her failure to engage in counseling on a consistent basis, and her failure to consistently attend parenting time sessions constituted clear and convincing evidence to term inate her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( ii ).

Compliance with a treatment plan is evidence of a parent’s abi lity to provide proper care and custody for a child. In re JK , 468 Mich 202, 214; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). A parent must not merely receive services, but mus t benefit from those services s o that the trial court can conclude that the parent can provide proper care for the child. In re Gazella , 264 Mich App 668, 676-677; 692 NW2d 708 (2005). In this case, the evidence shows that res pondent did not benefit from services. She did not attend counseling on a consistent basis. She missed numerous parenting sessions, which caused the children to become upset and act out . In addition, respondent did not have stable housing that was appr opriate for the children, and she had not demonstrated that she could maintain employment sufficient to support the children. At the time of the termination hearing, the children had been in foster care for two years, an d no evidence showed that respondent would be able to provide proper care and custody for the children within a reasonable time considering their ages. T herefore, clear and convincing e vidence supported the termination of respondent’s parental ri ghts under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g).

Actual physical abuse need not be established to terminate par ental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). The risk of emotional harm or neglect must be considered as well. In re Hudson , 294 Mich App 261, 268; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). The evidence sho wed that at the time of the termination hearing, respondent had not yet secured appr opriate housing for the children, and had obtained full-time employment only one week earlier. T he evidence also showed that respondent resisted taking advice regarding parenting technique s, and was unable during parenting time to provide each c hild with appropriate attention ; the parenting time sessions were described as “chaotic.” Clear a nd convincing evidence supporte d termination of respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).-6- IV. BEST-INTEREST DETERMINATION

Respondent also argues that the trial court erred by finding t hat termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests. We disag ree. We review for clear error the trial court’s factual findings in an order to terminate parenta l rights. See MCR 3.977(K); In re Rood , 483 Mich at 90. “[T]he prepondera nce of the evidence standar d applies to the best-interest determination.” In re Moss , 301 Mich App 76, 83; 836 NW2d 182 (2013).

“If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests , the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that a dditional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be made.” MCL 712A.19b(5). In determining a child’s best inte rests, the trial court may consider the child’s need for st ability and permanency and whether the child is progressing in his or her current placement. In re VanDalen , 293 Mich App 120, 141; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). In addition, the trial court may c onsider the children’s bond to t he parent, the parent’s parenting ability, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home. In re Olive/Metts , 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012).

At the time of the termination hearing, the children had been in foster care for two years, and were bonded to their foster parents, who were willing to ad opt them. The children did not ask about respondent, and their behaviors worsened both after p arenting time and after respondent missed scheduled visits. The evidence showed that r espondent lacked stable housing and employment, and had not made consistent efforts to engage i n counseling or to exercise parenting time. The children had needs, including continued co unseling, that respondent could not meet. The trial court found th at the children’s needs were being met by their foster parents, and that the children deserved permanence and stability, which respondent could not provide. The trial court did not clearly err by finding that the termina tion of respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. In re Rood , 483 Mich at 90.

Affirmed.

/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien /s/ Joel P. Hoekstra /s/ Mark T. Boonstra