alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit
      32.2**














**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**








In
      connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of AFP Imaging Corporation
      (the “Company”) for the quarter ended March 31, 2006 (the “Report”), I, Donald
      Rabinovitch, Co-Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
      18
      U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
      that:





(1)
            The
                Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13 (a) or
                15 (d) of
                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
                and





(2)
            The
                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
                Company.


























/s/
      Donald Rabinovitch


Donald
      Rabinovitch,


President


(Co-Principal
      Executive Officer)


May
      15,
      2006
955 A.2d 269

#### ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND, Petitioner, v. Aaron D. WEINRAUCH, Respondent.

Misc. Docket AG No. 5,

Sept. Term, 2008.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Aug. 27, 2008.

*ORDER*

This matter came before the Court on the Joint Petition of the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland and Respondent, Aaron D. Weinrauch, to disbar the Respondent by consent from the practice of law.

The Court having considered the Petition, it is this 27th day of August, 2008,

ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the Respondent, Aaron D. Weinrauch, be, and he is hereby, disbarred by consent from the practice of law in the State of Maryland; and it is further,

ORDERED, that a judgment in the amount of $209.50 be, and it is hereby entered against the Respondent and for the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, and it is further

ORDERED, that the Clerk of this Court shall remove the name of Aaron D. Weinrauch from the register of attorneys in the Court and shall certify that fact to the Client Protection Fund and Clerks of all judicial tribunals in this State in accordance with Maryland Rule 16-773(d).
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
UNAUDITED CONDENSED STATEMENTS OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND TRUST CORPUS OF SAN
JUAN BASIN ROYALTY TRUST AS OF JUNE 30, 1999, AND THE RELATED CONDENSED
STATEMENTS OF DISTRIBUTABLE INCOME AND CHANGES IN TRUST CORPUS FOR THE SIX-MONTH
PERIOD ENDED JUNE 30, 1999.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                       1,443,736
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,443,736
<PP&E>                                     133,275,528
<DEPRECIATION>                              84,934,900
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              49,784,364
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,443,736
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                  48,340,628
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                49,784,364
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            13,327,256
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               591,464
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             12,735,792
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         12,735,792
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                12,735,792
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
#### Hollin v. Johnston Cty. Council On Aging

Case below: 181 N.C. App. 77

No. 079P07

Defs’ Motion for Temporary Stay (COA06-310)

Allowed 02/08/07

Hudson, J., Recused
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Environmental Protection Agency

          - [FRL-8904-8] 

# AGENCY:

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 

# ACTION:

Notice. 

      ( print page 22742)    

# SUMMARY:

The Environmental Protection Agency has decided to terminate the National Environmental Performance Track Program. 

# DATES:

The Performance Track Program is terminated effective May 14, 2009. 

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

                        Chuck Kent, Office of Policy, Economics and Innovation, 202-566-2805 or by e-mail at                         *Kent.Chuck@epa.gov.*

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

                    On June 26, 2000, EPA announced the launch of the National Environmental Performance Track, “Performance Track”, which was initially designed to have two levels, the “Achievement Track,” and the “Stewardship Track.” On July 6, 2000, EPA published in the                     **Federal Register**                     (65 FR 41655) the design of the Achievement Track level of the Performance Track program. The Achievement Track was subsequently renamed the National Environmental Performance Track Program and the development of the Stewardship Track led instead to the creation of the Performance Track Corporate Leader designation.                 

On March 16, 2009, EPA Administrator Lisa P. Jackson issued a memorandum halting the Performance Track Program. The Administrator's memorandum was followed by a memorandum from Chuck Kent, Director, Office of Policy Economics, and Innovation, dated March 25, 2009, which provided more details about the termination, including that the low priority for routine inspections incentive is no longer in effect. This notice announces that EPA's decision to terminate the Performance Track Program is effective as of the date of this publication, and provides public notice that the low priority for routine inspections incentive for Performance Track facilities is hereby terminated. 

Dated: May 11, 2009. 

Marcia E. Mulkey, 

Acting Associate Administrator, Office of Policy, Economics and Innovation. 

 [FR Doc. E9-11272 Filed 5-13-09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6560-50-P
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KINNEY WAYNE COMPTON,

 Petitioner - Appellant,

 v.

KEVIN CHAPPELL, Warden,

 Respondent - Appellee.

No. 09-56946

D.C. No. 2:06-cv-02811-GW

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 6, 2013** 

Before: HUG, FARRIS, and LEAVY Circuit Judges.

Kinney Wayne Compton appeals from the district court’s judgment denying

his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253. We review de novo, Ybarra v. McDaniel, 656 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir.

2011), and we affirm. 

FILED

AUG 22 2013

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Compton contends that the trial court’s admission into evidence of the

deceased victim’s out-of-court statements to police violated Compton’s Sixth

Amendment right to confrontation. As to the crime scene and emergency room

statements, the state court did not unreasonably apply clearly established Supreme

Court law in denying Compton’s claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Crawford v.

Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), left ambiguous the scope and meaning of the

terms “testimonial” and “interrogation,” and there were material differences

between the circumstances in Crawford and those presented here. As to the

statements made by Compton five days after the shooting, admission of those

statements was harmless. See Brecht v. Abramson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993). 

AFFIRMED.
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 530 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 530

 To amend section 691 of title 10, United States Code, to increase the 
 end strengths of the Army and the Marine Corps for fiscal years after 
               fiscal year 2005, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 4, 2005

Mr. Reed (for himself, Mr. Hagel, Mr. McCain, Mr. Kerry, Mr. Biden, Ms. 
   Landrieu, Mrs. Clinton, and Mr. Nelson of Florida) introduced the 
 following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 
                             Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend section 691 of title 10, United States Code, to increase the 
 end strengths of the Army and the Marine Corps for fiscal years after 
               fiscal year 2005, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. INCREASE IN END STRENGTHS OF THE ARMY AND THE MARINE CORPS 
              FOR FISCAL YEARS AFTER FISCAL YEAR 2005.

    (a) Increase in End Strength of Army.--Paragraph (1) of section 
691(b) of title 10, United States Code is amended by striking 
``502,400'' and inserting ``532,400''.
    (b) Increase in End Strength of Marine Corps.--Paragraph (3) of 
such section is amended by striking ``178,000'' and inserting 
``183,000''.
    (c) Repeal of Superseded Additional Authority for Increase in End 
Strengths.--Section 403 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375; 118 Stat. 
1863; 10 U.S.C. 115 note) is repealed.
    (d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall take 
effect on October 1, 2005.
                                 <all>
```
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 96-CA-01005-SCT

ROBERT BUCKHALTER A/K/A ROBERT LEE

BUCKHALTER

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION AND MAY NOT BE CITED,

PURSUANT TO M.R.A.P. 35-A

MEMORANDUM/PER CURIAM AFFIRMANCE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 9/03/96

TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JERRY OWEN TERRY, SR.

COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: STONE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: PRO SE

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

BY: ROGER W. WILLIAMS

DISTRICT ATTORNEY: CONO CARANNA

NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST CONVICTION RELIEF

DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 10/23/97

MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

MANDATE ISSUED: 11/13/97

BEFORE PRATHER, P.J., BANKS AND McRAE, JJ.

PRATHER, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

Robert Lee Buckhalter pled guilty before the Stone County Circuit Court to armed robbery and

escape as an habitual offender. He was sentenced to eight years in prison on the armed robbery

charge and five years on the escape charge. The sentences were to run concurrently without eligibility

for parole, for a total of eight years in prison without parole. The appeal sub judice arises from the

trial court's subsequent denial of post-conviction relief to Buckhalter.

Buckhalter contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to

demur from the habitual offender portions of the indictments, which portions appeared after the

words "against the peace and dignity of the State." Section 169 of the Mississippi Constitution
requires that indictments "conclude" with the words "against the peace and dignity of the State."

However, such a defect in the indictment is curable by amendment and can be waived by a valid

guilty plea. Brandau v. State, 662 So. 2d 1051, 1054-55 (Miss. 1995). For this reason, the

performance of Buckhalter's attorney was neither deficient nor prejudicial. Therefore, Buckhalter's

argument that he received ineffective assistance of counsel fails. See Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

Buckhalter's appeal is without merit. The judgment of the trial court denying post-conviction relief is

affirmed, per curiam.

DENIAL OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AFFIRMED.

LEE, C.J., SULLIVAN, P.J., PITTMAN, BANKS, McRAE, ROBERTS, SMITH AND

MILLS, JJ., CONCUR.
**
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

**Certification Required by Rule 13a-14(b) or**

**Rule 15d-14(b) and Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Permian Basin Royalty Trust (the “Trust”) on Form 10-Q for thequarterly period ended September 30, 2020, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, not in its individual capacity but solely as the trustee of the Trust, certifiespursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to its knowledge: 

(1)    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of1934, as amended; and 

(2)    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Trust. 

 
  SIMMONS BANK, TRUSTEE FOR PERMIAN BASIN ROYALTY TRUSTDate: November 9, 2020  By: 
/s/ RON E. HOOPER
   Ron E. Hooper,   SVP Royalty Trust Management   Simmons Bank
A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Permian Basin Royalty Trust andwill be retained by Permian Basin Royalty Trust and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request. 
**
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

vs. FILED 

THE MARTIN CONDOMINIUM UNIT 

OWNERS' ASSOCIATION, DOMESTIC AUG 0 8 2022 

NON-PROFIT, 

Res s ondent. 

z 

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL 

This is a pro se appeal from a district court order dismissing a 

complaint. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Nancy L. Allf, 

Judge. 

Review of the notice of appeal and documents before this court 

reveals a jurisdictional defect. The notice of appeal was prematurely filed 

in the district court after the filing of a timely tolling motion for 

reconsideration but before that motion was resolved by the district court in 

a written order. See NRAP 4(a)(4) (regarding tolling motions); AA Primo 

Builders LLC v. Washington, 126 Nev. 578, 585, 245 P.3d 1190, 1195 (2010) 

(describing when a post-judgment motion carries tolling effect). To date, it 

appears that motion remains pending in the district court. This court lack 

jurisdiction over a premature notice of appeal. NRAP 4(a)(6). Accordingly, 

this court 

ORDERS this appeal DISMISSED. 

LIZ4a,L) J. 

Silver 

, J. 

Cadish Pickering 

WESLEY RUSCH, AN INDIVIDUAL, No. 85108 

Appellant, 

ELIZABETH A. BROWN 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

BY •\/ 

DEPUTY CLERK 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

I()) 1947A 44424c,

-e2g 
cc: Hon. Nancy L. Allf, District Judge 

Wesley Rusch 

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP/Las Vegas 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>     5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                       4,238,260
<SECURITIES>                                 2,514,213
<RECEIVABLES>                                  193,610
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             6,946,083
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               6,946,083
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           12,324
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         9,404
<OTHER-SE>                                   6,924,355
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 6,946,083
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                              (443,307)
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               368,471
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (74,836)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (40,016)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (114,852)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (114,852)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     (.37)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        


</TABLE>
#### Harvey *et al. v.*Allen.

An appeal bond duly executed under instructions from the ordinary and under like instructions transmitted- by mail to him from a distant county, and arriving at his post-office within four days from the rendition of the judgment of the court of ordinary appealed from, is sufficiently delivered, with reference to all duty in *455that respect incumbent upon the appellant, whether the ordinary actually takes the bond from the post-office, approves it and files it in his own office within the four days or not. If he afterwards does so and transmits the appeal, the accrued costs having been paid within the four days on his draft, the statute touching appeals is substantially complied with, and the appeal should be entertained by the superior court, if free from any imperfection except the imputed imperfection of not being entered in due time. This is so although the appellant knew that the ordinary intended to be absent from his county at the time when the bond by due course of mail would arrive at his 'post-office, the appellant not procuring or causing such absence. *Judgment reversed.*

April 2, 1894.

Argued at the last term.

Appeal. Before H. T. Lewis, judge *fro hac vice.*’Putnam superior court. March term, 1893.

The appellee moved to dismiss the appeal, on the ground that it was not entered and filed .with the ordinary within the time required.by law. The motion was sustained. The case was tried in the court of ordinary of Putnam county on November 7, 1892. Appellants’ counsel was told by the ordinary that he would draw on counsel for the cost, and that the ordinary would accept any appeal bond approved by the judge of Sumter county court. On November 8 the ordinary did draw on counsel for the cost, and the draft was paid on November 11. The ordinary left Putnam county for Atlanta on November 8, and did not return until the following Sunday, November 13. He had informed ■couusel of his intention to leave, but stated that counsel might send the appeal to him at Eatonton and he would have some one to receive it for him and file it. He did not mention that he had a clerk. On November 9 the appeal bond was executed, approved by the judge •of Sumter county court, and sent by mail (registered letter) to “ ordinary of Putnam county or his clerk,” and the receipt for the letter, and the entries of filing and approval of the appeal bond, all dated November 11, 1892, were signed by the name of the ordinary; but *456while the entry of approval and signature thereto written on the face of the bond were in his handwriting, the-entry of filing in office was not in his handwriting, and the signature thereto was in the handwriting of his daughter. He had a clerk, appointed March 7, 1892, for the special purpose of issuing marriage licenses. This clerk gave no bond. He did not get the letter sent by counsel. The ordinary’s family got his mail in his absence.

Butt & Lumpkin, for plaintiff in error.

W. B. & S. T. Wingfield and J. S. Turner, *contra.*
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Bradlee E. Burns, Appellant.

[974 NYS2d 820]

— Appeal from a judgment of the Wyoming County Court (Mark H. Dadd, J.), rendered August 17, 2012. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of attempted assault in the second degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of attempted assault in the second degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.05 [1]). Although “defendant’s challenge to the amount of restitution is not foreclosed by his waiver of the right to appeal because the amount of restitution was not included in the terms of the plea agreement” *(People v Tessitore,*101 AD3d 1621, 1622 [2012], *lv denied*20 NY3d 1104 [2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]; *see People v Miller,*87 AD3d 1303, 1304 [2011], *lv denied*18 NY3d 926 [2012]), that contention is unpreserved for our review inasmuch as defendant did not object during the restitution hearing or otherwise alert County Court of his objection *(see*CPL 470.05 [2]; *see also People v Horne,*97 NY2d 404, 414 n 3 [2002]). In any event, we conclude that the People established the amount of restitution by a preponderance of the evidence, and there is no basis to disturb the restitution award *(see People v Lucieer,*107 AD3d 1611, 1613 [2013]; *see generally*CPL 400.30 [4]; *People v Tzitzikalakis,*8 NY3d 217, 221 [2007]). Present — Scudder, EJ, Smith, Fahey, Sconiers and Valentino, JJ.