IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI N O. 2015-CP-01079-COA MARY J. ARCHER APPELLANT

v. MITCHELL J. CREEL APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/22/2015 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. L. BRELAND HILBURN COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: W A SHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: MARY J. ARCHER (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: KINNEY M. SW AIN NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - LEGAL MALPRACTICE TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: GRANTED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED: 09/13/2016 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES AND FAIR, JJ. GRIFFIS, P.J., FOR THE COURT : ¶1. Mary Archer f

iled this action against Mitchell Creel in the W ashington County Circuit Court. The trial c o u r t f

o u n d that the statutes of lim itation precluded Archer’s claim s and granted Creel’s m otion f

or sum m ary

judgm ent. W e f

ind no error and af

f irm

. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. On March 6, 2010, Archer signed an em ploy m ent contract to retain Creel to represent her brother with h i s post-conviction proceedings, including appearing at his s e ntencing h e a ring and f

iling his posttrial m otions. As part of t he agreem e n t, Archer p aid Cree l a $10,000 retainer. Creel appeared at the s entenci n g h e a r i n g . H o wever, h e ref erred thepreparation of t he m otions f o r a n e w t rial and a judgm ent notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) to another attorney , Julie Epps. According to the r ecord, Epps and Creel subm itted the m otions to the trial court on May 10, 2010. ¶3. On August 24, 2010, Archer sent a letter to Creel term inating his e m ploy m ent. Archer alleg e d t h at Creel breached his contract and did not render the services prom ised. On Septem ber 1 1 , 2 0 11, Archer f

iled a com

plaint a gainst Creel with the Mississippi Bar Association. The Mississippi Bar conducted an investigation and dism i ssed the com plaint in a letter dated April 13, 2012. ¶4. Af ter the Mississippi B ar ended its investigation, Archer f i led her com

p laint on April 21, 2014. The com

plaint alleged f

raud, breach of contract, a nd legal m alpractice. On May 29, 2 015, Creel f

iled a m otion f

o r sum m ary j udgm ent. Creel argued the statutes of lim itation f or each claim expired prior to the com m encem ent of A rcher’s suit. On J u ne 25, 2015, the trial court granted Creel’s m otion. Archer now appeals. S TANDARD OF REVIEW ¶5. “This Court applies de novo review to the grant of sum m ary judgm ent.” Bennett v. Hill-Boren P.C. , 52 So. 3 d 364, 368 (¶12) (Miss. 2 011) (quoting Fletcher v. L yles , 999 So. 2d 1271, 1 276 (¶20) (Miss. 2009)). “W hen reviewing the evidence on sum m a ry j udgm ent, the C ourt should view the evidence in t he light m ost f avorable t o t h e n o n m o v a nt.” Id.
F u r t her, “[ t]his Court applies a de novo standard of review to t he statute of lim itatio n s . ” Fletcher , 999 So. 2d at 1276 (¶21). ANALYSIS

2¶6. Archer contends that the trial court erred when it determi n e d t h a t the statutes of

lim itation began t o run o n he r claim s on August 24, 2010, when she term inated Creel’s

em ploy m ent. R ather, Archer argues the statutes of lim itation were tolle d u n til the Mis s i s s i p p i Bar dism issed her com plaint on April 13, 2012. Alternatively , A rcher asserts that Creel n ever obtained perm ission to withdraw f r om the case, which t o l l e d t he statutes of lim itation until Creel was rem oved f r o m the case. ¶7. A t hree-y ear statute of lim itations a p plies t o legal-m alpractice claim s. Bradley v. Jordan , 182 So. 3d 439, 440 (¶9) (Miss. 2016) ( citation om itted). The M ississippi Suprem e Cou r t has held that “the statute of lim itations in a legal m alpractice action p roperly begins

to run on the date the client learns or through the e xerci s e o f r easonable diligence should learn of the negligence of

his lawy er.” Champluvier v. Beck , 909 So. 2d 1061, 1063 (¶11) (Miss. 2004) (quoting Greenline Equip. Co. v. Covington Cty. Bank , 873 So. 2d 9 5 0 , 956 (¶17) (Miss. 2002)). This is known as the discovery r ule. B ennett , 52 So. 3d at 369 (¶15). “The discovery rule is applied when the f acts indicate that it is unrealistic to expect a lay m an to perceive the injury

at the tim e o f t he wrongf ul act.” Id. (citation and internal quotations

om itted). Theref

ore, this Court m

ust determ ine when A rcher f irst l earned of C reel’s alleged legal m a lpractice. ¶8. Archer sent a letter to Creel alleging a breach of contract and def icient perf

orm ance

o n A ugust 2 4, 2010. T he letter a lso s erved a s a n otice of term ination of C reel’s servi c e s . Creel a d mi t s that he received the letter and m ailed a r esponse on Septem ber 2, 2010. He contends t hat this letter d e m onstrated that Archer knew o f a potential legal-m alpractice claim

3as of

the date of

Archer’s letter. ¶9. Archer, however, disputes this date as the start of the statute-of -lim itations p e riod. Rather, Archer asserts that her c om plaint with the Mississippi Bar tolled the running of the

statute of lim itations u n til the Mississippi Bar investigation c oncluded. Archer r easons that the pending Mississippi B ar c om plaint constituted an agency actio n , which p recluded her f rom f iling a civil suit bef

ore e x hausting her adm inistrative rem edies. A s such, Archer contends that she could not f i le h e r l e g a l

- malpractice action bef ore dism i ssal of the Mississippi Bar com

plaint on April 13, 2012. This argum ent, however, f a ils. ¶10. “W hen prim ary jurisdiction is properly invoked, the agency and not a c o u r t s h ould

m ake the f

irst d e cision; the doctrine of exhaustion of rem edies requires that judicial review

occur o nly af

t er the adm inistrative agency h as m ade a com plete decision.” Jef

f rey Jackson, Encyclopedia of

Mississippi Law § 2:72 (2015). Thus, Archer’s argum ent f or the exhaustion of her adm inistrative rem edies only applies if the Mississippi Bar enjoy s prim a ry jurisdiction

over her legal-m alpractice action. The suprem e court, however, has “exclusive and inherent jurisdiction in m atters pertaining to attorney d iscipline.” Miss. Bar v. Robinson , 918 So. 2d 1264, 1265 (¶5) ( Miss. 2005) (citing R. Discipline Miss. State Bar 1). As such, Archer’s
argum ent f

ails, and the pendency of the Mississippi Bar com plaint did n ot r equire Archer to wait bef ore f iling suit. ¶11. Additionally , “[ c]auses of action f or breach of contract are subject to the three-y ear
statute of lim i tations[ .]” W allace v. Greenville Pub. Sch. Dist. , 1 42 S o. 3d 1104, 1106 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Re v . 2 0 1 5 ) )

. Likewise, f raud

4claim s have a three-y ear statute o f lim itations. S anderson F

arms Inc. v. Ballard , 917 So. 2d 783, 789 (¶29) ( Miss. 2005). Both statutes of lim itation arise under s e ction 15-1-49, which holds that these claim s arise “when it com es into existence as an enf orceab l e c l aim [ .]” Anderson v. LaVere , 136 So. 3d 404, 411 (¶¶32-33) (Miss. 2014). ¶12. Like the legal-m alpractice claim , Archer stated in the August 2 4, 2010 letter that she believed C reel breached the em ploy m ent contract. In f

act, A r c h e r t i t l ed the letter “Re Notif i cation of Breach of Contact [ sic].” Further, in her com plaint, Archer st a t e d t h a t she received a copy of the em ploy m ent contract that she alleged was alter e d b y Creel. Archer adm itted she r e ceived this copy on August 24, 2 010, and used this allegedly altered contract

as the basis of

her f raud claim

. Theref

ore, A rcher knew t hat e ach of h er claim s arose as of August 24, 2010. ¶13. Because the Mississippi Bar p roceeding s d i d n o t toll the statute of lim i tations, the August 24, 2010 l etter suf f iciently shows that Archer knew o f C r e e l ’s alleged legal

m alpractice as early as that date. Also on this d ate, Archer a dm itted t hat she received a copy of the em

ploy m ent contract t h a t she believed was a ltered and dem onstrated Creel’s “f raudulent activities” and that Creel b reached their em ploy m ent contract. Under the applicable statute of lim itations, Archer had until August 24, 2013, to f ile h er a ction. Based

on this evidence, A rcher f ailed to tim ely f

ile her suit. For these reasons, this Court af f i rm s the trial court’s decision to grant Creel’s m otion f or sum m ary

judgm ent. ¶14. THE JUDGMENT OF THE WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS AFFIRMED. A LL COSTS OF THIS A P PEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

5LEE, C.J., I RVING, P.J., BARNES, ISHEE, CARLTON, FAIR, WILSON AND

GREENLEE, JJ., CONCUR. JAMES, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

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